Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates: The Complex Legacy of Saint Augustine and Peter Lombard 0739174150, 9780739174159

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Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates

Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates The Complex Legacy of Saint Augustine and Peter Lombard Severin Valentinov Kitanov

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books A wholly owned subsidiary of Rowman & Littlefield 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com 10 Thornbury Road, Plymouth PL6 7PP, United Kingdom Copyright © 2014 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kitanov, Severin. Beatific enjoyment in medieval scholastic debates : the complex legacy of Saint Augustine and Peter Lombard / Severin Kitanov. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7391-7415-9 (cloth : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-7391-7416-6 (electronic) 1. Happiness--History. 2. Philosophy, Medieval. 3. Pleasure--Religious aspects--Christianity--History of doctrines--Middle Ages, 600-1500. 4. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. 5. Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, approximately 1100-1160. Sententiarum libri IV. I. Title. B738.H3K58 2014 171'.4--dc23 2013050245 TM The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Abbreviations of English and Latin Words Acknowledgments The Concept of Beatific Enjoyment Notes 1

2

Aurelius Augustine and Peter Lombard on Beatific Enjoyment—The Starting Point of the Debate St Augustine on Things to Enjoy and Things to Use St Augustine on the Passions, Will, and Enjoyment The Importance of Peter Lombard Lombard on Enjoyment and Use Conclusion Notes The Thirteenth Century—Setting Up the Key Issues in the Debate The Object of Enjoyment Alexander of Hales Albert the Great St Bonaventure St Thomas Aquinas Peter of Tarantaise Robert Kilwardby Richard of Middleton The Eternal Res of Enjoyment The Proper Faculty of Enjoyment Alexander of Hales Albert the Great St Bonaventure St Thomas Aquinas Peter of Tarantaise Robert Kilwardby William de la Mare Giles of Rome Richard of Middleton Enjoyment and Volitional Quiescence The Enjoyment of Animals v

ix xi xiii xviii

1 2 7 13 16 18 18 29 30 30 32 33 35 38 38 40 41 43 43 44 46 48 50 51 53 55 57 58 58

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3

4

Contents

Conclusion Notes The Early Fourteenth Century—The High Point of the Debate Regarding the Object and Psychology of Beatific Enjoyment Voluntarist Psychology and the Condemnation of 1277 Duns Scotus on Enjoyment and Use The Liber propugnatorius of Thomas Anglicus—an Early Thomistic Critique of Scotus Peter Auriol on Enjoyment and Use Francis of Marchia on the Different Acts and Passions of the Will William of Ockham on Enjoyment and Use Walter Chatton on Enjoyment and the Love of God Robert Holcot on Enjoyment and Use Adam Wodeham on Enjoyment, Cognition and Volition Beatific Enjoyment in the Sentences Commentaries of Some Less-Known Fourteenth-Century Theologians: Robert Graystones O.S.B. and the Secular Richard FitzRalph at Oxford, and John Baconthorpe O. Carm. & Gerard of Siena O.E.S.A. at Paris Enjoyment and Pleasure Durandus of Saint Pourçain on the Object of Beatific Enjoyment Conclusion Notes Early Fourteenth-Century Views of the Enjoyment of the Holy Trinity The Trinity, Logic and the Limits of Theological Explanation Duns Scotus’s Exploration of Diverse Enjoyment Standpoints Peter Auriol on Enjoying the Trinity as a Numerically Indistinguishable and Complete Unity Gerard of Siena on the Objective Unity of Beatific Enjoyment John Baconthorpe on Essential and Notional Acts of Cognition and the Challenge of Differentiated Enjoyments William of Ockham’s Ars obligatoria Elimination Strategy Walter Chatton’s Way with Trinitarian Syllogisms Richard FitzRalph on the Possibility of Differentiated Enjoyments in this Life and the Life to Come Robert Holcot’s Logic of Faith Adam Wodeham on Possible and Impossible Enjoyments Conclusion Notes

60 60

73 74 75 78 80 82 85 90 93 95

100 107 114 119 121 143 143 145 148 151 153 156 158 161 162 163 165 166

Contents

5

Early Fourteenth-Century Views of the Contingency of Beatific Enjoyment Contingency, Obligation, Covenant and Divine Power Duns Scotus on the Contingency of Enjoying the Ultimate End in via and in patria, with and without Charity’s Assistance The Liber propugnatorius on Scotus’s Destruction of Moral Philosophy Peter Auriol on the Psychological Irresistibility of the Ultimate End and the Voluntariness of Beatific Enjoyment Francis of Marchia on Kinds of Freedom, Volitional Suspension, Kinds of Volitional Necessitation and the Contingency of Beatific Enjoyment William of Ockham on Volitional Indifference, Rejecting Beatitude and the Passivity of the Will of the Blessed Walter Chatton on Vision-Based and Abstraction-Based Enjoyment, and on Hating God and Beatitude Richard FitzRalph on Freedom per se, Freedom per accidens and the Security of the Blessed Robert Holcot on the Contingency, Causation and Security of Enjoyment, and on Volitional Suspension and Necessitation Adam Wodeham on Apprehension-Based and Deliberation-Based Beatific Enjoyment Robert Graystones on the Compatibility of Freedom and Necessity and the Contingency of Enjoyment through Personal Experience Conclusion Notes

Beatific Enjoyment in the Late Middle Ages and Beyond: Conclusion and Summary Notes Bibliography Primary sources Secondary Sources Index

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175 177 178 192 194

196 201 210 214 216 223

225 229 230

253 260 263 263 266 279

Abbreviations of English and Latin Words

A.

Article

a.

articulus

Ch.

Chapter

c.

capitulum

D.

Distinction

d.

distinctio

dub.

dubium

lin.

linea or line

MS.

manuscript

n.

numerus

OPh

Opera Philosophica. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae

OTh

Opera Theologica. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica. Cura Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S. Bonaventurae

p.

pagina

par.

paragraphus

Q.

Question

q.

quaestio

Quodl.

quodlibet

sect.

sectio

subart.

subarticulus

suppl.

supplementum ix

x

Abbreviations of English and Latin Words

Tom.

tomus

tract.

tractatus

vol.

volumen or volume

Acknowledgments

The accomplishment of the present work was made possible with the assistance of many people—family, friends, and colleagues. I thank my wife, Michele, for supporting me and giving me confidence to continue working on my book when times were hard and I lacked inspiration. I thank my wonderful children, Emily and Luke, for bringing joy and love to my life, and I ask forgiveness for not always being a good and attentive father. I thank my father, Captain Val, for having faith in me, for supporting my choice of education, and for devoting so much of his life to me. In many ways, this book is a testimony to my father’s love of learning. I thank my mother, Siika, for loving me unconditionally, and I hope that she forgives me for living thousands of miles away. I thank my little brother, Martin, for translating German scholarly literature for my research, and for always finding the time to help me when I needed it. I also thank my wife’s family and friends for making my life in the United States enjoyable and worthwhile; I would not have been as productive and effective in my work without their love, support and appreciation. I express my deepest gratitude to Reijo Työrinoja for inspiring me to study medieval scholastic theology and philosophy. I am also grateful to him for his continuous and unwavering support as well as for his valuable criticism in the course of my work. I thank Simo Knuuttila for challenging me to think hard about the philosophical dimensions of medieval scholastic theological reflection as well as for his immense patience and countless insightful comments on the many drafts of my work. I thank my dear Finnish friends and colleagues Olli and Jaana Hallamaa, Heikki Kirjavainen, Taneli Kukkonen, Pekka Kärkkäinen, Ville Päivänsalo, Ritva Palmén, Taina and Toivo Holopainen, Vesa Hirvonen, Risto Saarinen, Marja Suhonen, and Hilkka Ranki for their warm welcome at the former Department of Systematic Theology at the University of Helsinki, and for helping me launch the long research project which led to the present book. I thank Margot Whiting and Mariealana Salamone for improving my English. I thank Dennis Carlson and Philip and Sue Reynolds for opening their hearts and home to me in Decatur, GA, and for helping me to adjust to American culture after my arrival in the United States a week before September 11, 2001. Philip Reynolds’ generous support during my stay at Emory University as a visiting scholar made my study of medieval theology and philosophy especially rewarding. I also thank Ghitta-Holmström-Hintikka and Jaakko Hintikka for xi

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Acknowledgments

their kindness and friendship, and for opening my eyes to the wonders of the philosophical life. I thank Stephen F. Brown for training me in the craft of Latin paleography and for teaching me the value of rigorous source investigation for appreciating the complexity of medieval scholastic theology. I thank Girard J. Etzkorn for generously sharing with me his work on the critical edition of Walter Chatton’s Sentences commentaries as well as Mark Henninger, Robert Andrews and Jennifer Ottman for allowing me to use their forthcoming critical edition of Robert Graystones’ Questions on the Human Will. I am also grateful to Russell L. Friedman and Christopher Schabel for always finding the time to answer questions related to my own work and for providing me with rare sources and various opportunities for research collaboration. I thank Patricia Johnston, Keja Valens and Elizabeth Duclos-Orsello for helping me write my book proposal for Lexington Books. I also thank William Cornwell for helping me obtain a much needed course release from Salem State University in order to complete my book. Lastly, I thank my editor, Jana Hodges-Kluck, for making a dream come true with her confidence, patience, kindness and wholehearted support throughout the entire process. Wilmington, Mass. Severin Valentinov Kitanov November 3, 2013

The Concept of Beatific Enjoyment

It has been said that part of what makes a book great is that book’s enduring influence, and that what explains a book’s influence is the ability of the stories or ideas contained in it to provoke interest over and over again through the generations and to still be found relevant by readers centuries after the stories were told and the ideas explored. 1 As far as philosophical stories and ideas are concerned, one will hardly find a story of more enduring influence than Plato’s Parable of the Cave and an idea of more potent and awe-inspiring character than the idea behind the Parable of the Cave, namely, that the knowledge of ultimate reality is blissful and liberating. A story parallel in depth and importance is part of the historical narrative and self-definition of Christian theology. It is the story of salvation through the resurrected Christ, the Son of God and second person of the Holy Trinity. The idea behind this story is not much different from the lesson of Plato’s Cave Parable. In essence, the idea is that the knowledge of what is ultimately real is blissful and liberating. The significant difference, of course, is that the ultimate reality in Christian theology is the reality of the triune God, not the impersonal and abstract reality of Plato’s forms, and that we come to know and become one with ultimate reality through Christ alone, not by being tutored by a Philosopher King. According to Christian theology, the best prospect to hope for and anticipate in this life is the experience of the face-to-face vision of the triune God in the next life. Christian theology teaches us that this vision will be accompanied with unprecedented and wholly consuming joy. The concept of beatific enjoyment is a theological, not a philosophical concept; it is the concept of religious, not secular enjoyment. Based on New Testament allusions to the indescribable experience of heavenly bliss in the presence of God, the concept of beatific enjoyment became a staple of Christian systematic theology thanks to Church Father and Saint Aurelius Augustine. St Augustine developed the concept both as a way of giving a teleological orientation to Christian learning and as a way of distinguishing the Christian ideal of heavenly beatitude from rival philosophical—Neo-Platonic and Stoic—conceptions of human flourishing. St Augustine’s concept and treatment of enjoyment were passed on to medieval scholastic theologians as a result of the systematizing effort of Peter Lombard. Once incorporated into scholastic theological discussions in the medieval university, the concept was articulated dialectically and with xiii

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great philosophical rigor and sophistication. How can we be sure that such joy is possible for us to have? Is this joy associated primarily with intellectual contemplation of the divine nature and attributes or with volitional quiescence? Is it experienced freely or forced upon us as a result of a fundamental alteration of our ontological status in heaven? These questions shape the contours of the medieval debate regarding the nature of beatific or heavenly enjoyment (fruitio beatifica). The debate occurred in the context of lecturing on Peter Lombard’s Sentences—the chief form of training in systematic theology for students seeking a degree in theology in the medieval university. The historical record of this debate is preserved in the hundreds of written commentaries on Lombard’s Sentences. 2 Many of these commentaries are found in manuscript form alone. These manuscripts are housed in different European and English libraries and their content is comprehensible only to specialists (historians, theologians and philosophers among others) trained in Latin paleography. The most popular and influential of these Sentences commentaries were printed during the Italian Renaissance and the early modern era. Only a small fraction of these commentaries is available in modern critical editions. My aim in this book is to engage a select portion of the Sentences commentary tradition in order to divulge the complexity of the debate regarding beatific enjoyment, articulate the key features of the concept of enjoyment, and give an account of the challenges scholastic theologians faced in their attempts to clarify what the experience of God in heaven might be like. Understanding the concept of beatific enjoyment is important not only for the sake of an adequate understanding of the nature of medieval scholastic theology—its aims, subject-matter and methodology—but also for the sake of comprehending the difference between a religious kind of enjoyment and various categories of secular enjoyment encountered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The latter rationale for the study of the medieval scholastic concept of beatific enjoyment is especially relevant given the fact that enjoyment plays a prominent role in John Kekes’s recent work in moral philosophy 3 and that a sexual kind of enjoyment (commonly referred to under the French term “jouissance”) occupies a central place in Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic ethics. 4 Interest in the nature of beatific enjoyment in contemporary philosophy begins with the work of Hannah Arendt. Arendt drew attention to the Augustinian concepts of enjoyment and use in her 1929 Heidelberg dissertation, Augustine’s Concept of Love (Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin). Written under the supervision of one of the rising stars of German philosophy at the time—Karl Jaspers—Arendt’s dissertation was an attempt to apply key insights of Jaspers’s Existenz philosophy to St Augustine’s Christian worldview. 5 Interestingly, in September of the very same year during which Arendt wrote her dissertation, a German Franciscan schol-

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ar—Ludger Meier—highlighted in a conference presentation the foundational significance of St Augustine’s concepts of enjoyment and use for underscoring the unity and truly orthodox character of Franciscan theology in the Middle Ages. 6 Meier’s conference article, in particular, can be viewed as the first systematic attempt to trace the development of the concept of beatific enjoyment in medieval scholastic theology, especially Franciscan theology. Although Meier was not the first modern scholar to have highlighted the importance of the Augustinian concept of enjoyment for understanding the framework of Catholic theology, 7 Meier was the first to chart the general doctrinal trends in the medieval scholastic debate about enjoyment. Several significant contributions to the study of the concept of beatific enjoyment as understood by medieval scholastic theologians have appeared since Arendt’s dissertation and Meier’s conference article. One should mention the major contributions of Arthur Stephen McGrade, 8 William J. Courtenay 9 and Kimberly Georgedes. 10 The mentioned scholars focused their treatments on the development of the discussion of enjoyment in the Sentences commentary tradition in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Most recently, however, the debate about beatific enjoyment has been revisited by Jessica Rosenfeld 11 in light of the reflection of this debate in late medieval poetry and vernacular literature as well as in connection with emerging secular conceptions of the happy life under the influence of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The adequate understanding of the concept of beatific enjoyment requires the realization that beatific enjoyment is first and foremost a theological concept. The concept was developed by St Augustine as a particularly Christian way of perceiving our place and purpose in a divinely instituted cosmic order of things. Even though secular enjoyment was not foreign to Augustine the man, Augustine the theologian emphasized in most eloquent terms the importance of the right ordering of one’s will and the redirecting of one’s love to God. For St Augustine, only the Holy Trinity is to be enjoyed. This is indeed how St Augustine was interpreted by Peter Lombard in the twelfth century and by the many medieval scholastic authors who commented extensively on Lombard’s Sentences. Georgedes draws attention to the fact that the term “enjoyment” was understood very differently in medieval scholastic theology than it is actually understood today in contemporary lay culture and secular society. We now associate the idea of enjoyment with just about any imaginable human activity and lifestyle. We tend to think of enjoyment especially in connection with entertainment and the experience of sensual pleasure, and we also appear to have entirely lost the ability to distinguish between honorable and shameful sources of enjoyment. Georgedes is certainly right in pointing out that enjoyment, for medieval theologians, had everything to do with the idea of right order in relation to God, neighbor and the world as a whole. 12 Yet Georgedes’s analysis of the medieval

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scholastic discussion of enjoyment focuses on a relatively minor issue— the conceptual possibility of differentiating a “neutral” or “middle” act of the will; an act that is neither enjoyment nor use, that is directed at something other than God and that can be viewed as a weaker or lesser type of enjoyment. In Georgedes’s eyes, the idea of the “neutral” or “middle” act of the will foreshadows humanist developments in ethics and paves the way for articulating a purely philosophical and secular concept of enjoyment. 13 According to Georgedes, the “neutral” or “middle” act of the will is “[a] crack in the Augustinian edifice,” 14 hence the title of Georgedes’s doctoral dissertation—The Serpent in the Tree of Knowledge: Enjoyment and Use in Fourteenth-Century Theology. Georgedes gives the impression that medieval theologians—such as John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol and, above all, William of Ockham—were deeply interested in weaker or lesser types of enjoyment. Considered in the whole context of the actual treatments, some of which encompass dozens of questions, the problem of weaker enjoyments appears to be of only marginal concern. In fact, the treatments show much more interest in whether the enjoyment of God in heaven is a matter of intellectual contemplation or volitional quiescence, whether enjoyment is cognition or volition, whether enjoyment is the same or not the same as pleasure, whether differentiated enjoyments with respect to the Trinity are possible, and whether the enjoyment of God in heaven is a free act or not. Similar in its ambition to comprehend the historical transformation from medieval Christian to early modern secular ethics is Rosenfeld’s exploration of the development of the concept of enjoyment and love in late medieval poetry. The extraordinary value of Rosenfeld’s contribution is in showing that the clash between the Aristotelian ideal of happiness in this life and the Christian ideal of beatitude in the next did not characterize only the high culture of medieval university intellectuals and ecclesiastical personae. A profound sense of this clash is also present in medieval vernacular love poetry. 15 Furthermore, Rosenfeld shows convincingly how, under the combined impact of Aristotelian moral philosophy and Christian theology, the medieval poetic imagination contributed to the emergence of what Rosenfeld calls “an earthly ethics of the love between subjects at the mercy of fortune,” 16 an ethics very much akin to that of Jacques Lacan. In my book, I explore the various dimensions of beatific enjoyment as a theological concept. I argue that the medieval scholastic debate about the nature and possibility of beatific enjoyment gave rise to a very rich and complex understanding of the state of the human being in heaven. I also claim that by relying on the tools of Aristotelian ethics, logic and metaphysics and by engaging the contents of Christian doctrine dialectically, medieval scholastics achieved a deeper understanding of the intellectual foundations of the Christian worldview, on the one hand, and the limitations of philosophical reason, on the other. Scholastic theologians

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asked many different questions about the nature of ultimate states of consciousness and answered these questions differently depending on how they understood theology as a scientific discipline, the method of theological analysis and argumentation, the structure and functioning of human cognition, volition and motivation. The questions medieval theologians asked would still be asked today, if we shared their faith and if we were intellectually curious about that faith and courageous enough to ask difficult questions about it. In what follows, I discuss the concept of beatific enjoyment in light of its origin in the theological works of St Augustine and in the setting of the tradition of commenting on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. More precisely, I discuss beatific enjoyment as an act of the will, the relationship between enjoyment, pleasure and cognition, the possibility of differentiated enjoyments with respect to the Trinity, and the contingency and necessity of enjoyment in heaven. My book consists of five chapters. The first chapter deals with St Augustine’s view of enjoyment. My objective is to show what things ought to be enjoyed and used, and to explain what enjoyment is and how it relates to St Augustine’s view of the human passions and will. I also survey Peter Lombard’s adaptation and interpretation of St Augustine’s distinction between enjoyment and use. In the second chapter, I examine different thirteenth-century views about the objects and psychology of enjoyment. I also inspect enjoyment in connection with volitional quiescence, and I address the problem of animal enjoyment. My analysis focuses on the views of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St Bonaventure and St Thomas Aquinas among others. In the third chapter, I look at early fourteenth-century conceptions about the objects and psychology of enjoyment. The central themes in this chapter cover the division of the acts of the will, the problem of the relationship between enjoyment and cognition, on the one hand, and between enjoyment and pleasure, on the other. The key figures in this chapter are major early fourteenth-century theologians such as John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, Walter Chatton, William of Ockham, Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham among others. I also provide an account of the controversial view of Durandus of Saint Pourçain regarding the adequate object of beatific enjoyment, and I discuss Durandus’s view in terms of its critical reception at the time. In chapter four, I review the early fourteenth-century discussion of the enjoyment of the Trinity. The main question in chapter four is whether there can be differentiated enjoyments with respect to the divine essence and persons. In chapter five, I give an overview of early fourteenth-century positions regarding the contingency of beatific enjoyment. Here, as in the preceding two chapters, I pay close attention to the positions of Scotus, Auriol, Ockham, Chatton, Holcot, and Wodeham among others. I conclude with a brief overview of the state of the debate about beatific enjoyment in the late Middle Ages and the early modern era and I summarize my findings.

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NOTES 1. See Philipp W. Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book Peter Lombard’s Sentences (Broadview Press, 2007), 13. 2. In order to appreciate the richness, magnitude and complexity of the Sentences commentary tradition, it is sufficient to peruse Stegmüller’s 2-volume repertory of Sentences literature. Although it needs to be updated in light of the most recent scholarly work, the repertory is still an excellent starting point and useful tool for anyone interested in studying the Sentences commentary tradition. See Friedrich Stegmüller, Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi, 2 vols. (Würzburg, 1947). 3. John Kekes, Enjoyment: The Moral Significance of Styles of Life, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008). 4. See Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 57, 91–92. See also Jessica Rosenfeld, Ethics and Enjoyment in Late Medieval Poetry: Love after Aristotle (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 7, 18, 58. 5. See Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark, Hannah Arendt: Love and Saint Augustine (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 198–205. 6. See Ludger Meier “Zwei Grundbegriffe augustinischer Theologie in der mittelalterlichen Franziskanerschule,” in Fünfte Lektorenkonferenz der deutschen Franziskaner für Philosophie und Theologie, Schwarz in Tirol, 3–7 September 1929, (Werl i. Westfalen, 1930), 74. See also Kimberly Georgedes, “The Serpent in the Tree of Knowledge: Enjoyment and Use in the Fourteenth-Century Theology” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995), 7–8. 7. According to Georgedes, the first scholar was Heinrich Scholz. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 4–7. 8. See Arthur Stephen McGrade, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham: Philosophy, Psychology, and the Love of God,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, 63–88 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); idem, “Ockham and Valla on Enjoyment and Pleasure,” Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Sanctandreani. Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies (St. Andrews, 24 August to 1 September 1982.), ed. I.D. McFarlane, 153–58 (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Text Studies, 1986); and idem, “Ockham on Enjoyment—Towards an Understanding of Fourteenth Century Philosophy and Psychology,” The Review of Metaphysics 33 (1981): 706–28. 9. See William J. Courtenay “Between Despair and Love. Some Late Modifications of Augustine’s Teaching on Fruition and Psychic States,” in Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology (1300–1650). Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of His Sixtieth Birthday, ed. Kenneth Hagen, 5–20 (Leiden, New York, København, and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1990); idem, Scholars and Schools in Fourteenth Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987). 10. See Georgedes, “The Serpent.” More recent treatments of beatific enjoyment are found in Severin V. Kitanov, “Is It Better for the King of England to Be a King of England Than a Duke of Aquitaine? Richard FitzRalph and Adam Wodeham on Whether Beatific Enjoyment is an Act of the Intellect or an Act of the Will,” in Richard FitzRalph: His Life, Times and Thought, ed. Michael Dunne and Simon Nolan O Carm., (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2013), 56–78; idem, “Displeasure in Heaven, Pleasure in Hell: Four Franciscan Masters on the Relationship between Love and Pleasure, and Hatred and Displeasure,” Traditio 58 (2003): 287–340; and idem, “Bonaventure’s Understanding of Fruitio,” Picenum Seraphicum 20 (2001): 137–91. Beatific enjoyment is also partly addressed in Christian Trottmann, La vision béatifique: des disputes scolastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1995) and in Vesa Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004). 11. See Rosenfeld, Ethics and Enjoyment. 12. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 1–3.

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13. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 296–98. 14. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 1. 15. See Rosenfeld, Ethics and Enjoyment, 1–13. 16. See Rosenfeld, Ethics and Enjoyment, 161. See Glending Olson, review of Ethics and Enjoyment in Late Medieval Poetry: Love after Aristotle, by Jessica Rosenfeld, Speculum 87, no. 4 (2012): 1244–46.

ONE Aurelius Augustine and Peter Lombard on Beatific Enjoyment—The Starting Point of the Debate

Most of the great philosophical debates—viz., the debate about the freedom of the human will, about the existence of innate knowledge or about the moral justification of state authority, among others—have a very long history. The same is true of great theological debates—viz., the debate about the natures and personhood of Christ, about God’s knowledge of the future or about divine predestination. In order to gain a basic understanding of what exactly drives a debate forward, regardless of whether the debate is a philosophical or theological one, it is necessary to first find out how the debate started. The medieval scholastic debate about beatific enjoyment gathered momentum soon after the Sentences of the Italian theologian Peter Lombard were accepted as the standard textbook in systematic theology at the universities of Paris and Oxford. The very concept of beatific enjoyment, however, originates in the writings of Church Father Aurelius Augustine. To see why St Augustine introduced the concept of beatific enjoyment in theology, why this concept became pivotal in medieval systematic theology and why it gave rise to an enduring conversation and debate, I turn toward St Augustine and Lombard. In the first and second sections of this chapter, I provide a brief treatment of St Augustine’s concept of enjoyment. I concentrate upon St Augustine’s distinction between enjoyment and use and their corresponding objects as well as upon the place of enjoyment in St Augustine’s philosophical psychology. In the third and fourth sections, I show the significance of Peter Lombard’s Sentences as the point of departure of the great scholastic debate of the nature of beatific enjoyment, and I explore the

1

2

Chapter 1

originality of Lombard’s own treatment of the Augustinian concepts of enjoyment and use. ST AUGUSTINE ON THINGS TO ENJOY AND THINGS TO USE St Augustine’s most important treatment of enjoyment and use is found in the treatise On Christian Doctrine (De doctrina Christiana), Book I. Augustine 1 started writing this work after his consecration as Bishop of Hippo in 395 and completed it in 426. 2 The treatise represents a major effort to incorporate the pagan model of learning into the study of Scripture. 3 At the beginning of Book I, St Augustine introduces two fundamental distinctions—the distinction between things (res) and signs (signa) and the distinction between enjoying (frui) and using (uti). St Augustine explains the first distinction as follows. He says that all human teaching (doctrina) is about things or signs, but that signs, in particular, are the means through which we come to know things. Strictly speaking, a thing is something that is not used to signify something else. There are certain things, however, that are sometimes used to signify something else—e.g., things mentioned in the Old Testament that can be employed in reference to Christ. The sole purpose of signs, on the other hand, is to signify something beyond signs; they point to a transcendent reality. This does not mean that signs are not also things in some sense because, if signs were not things, then they would have no reality whatsoever. St Augustine does not talk about signs any more in Book I. He says that he will discuss things. 4 Immediately after announcing his intention to consider things, St Augustine differentiates between things to be enjoyed (quibus fruendum), things to be used (quibus utendum), and things that enjoy and use (quae fruuntur et utuntur). The things for enjoyment make us blessed. The things for use help us attain the things that make us blessed. Human beings have a share in both realms—the realm of things that must be enjoyed and the realm of things that must be used (inter utrasque constituti). Human beings, however, are not merely objects. They are also subjects of enjoyment and use (fruimur et utimur). St Augustine maintains that by enjoying the things that we only ought to use, we are deflected and even wholly prevented from attaining the things that make us blessed, and we are thus fettered by a love of inferior things. 5 It must be stressed that St Augustine’s distinction between different categories of things is a succinct expression of St Augustine’s Neo-Platonist ontology. According to this ontology, there is an objective, hierarchically structured order of things. From the point of view of this ontology, there is also an objective order of love. This ontology, however, is supplemented by what the Finnish scholar Miikka Ruokanen has termed a “psychological or positive love (finem ponere, which includes the element

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of [human] choice).” 6 St Augustine launches the distinction between enjoyment and use precisely because he seeks to show how humans relate subjectively to the objective order of love. In other words, the frui/uti distinction is the connection between St Augustine’s Neo-Platonist ontology of goods and his inner-life ethics. 7 To enjoy, St Augustine states, is to cling or adhere to something with love for its own sake. 8 St Augustine’s definition of enjoyment is usually taken to mean that enjoyment is a form of love. This interpretation can be supported on the basis of a well-known passage from the Confessions, Book XIII, where St Augustine characterizes love as a weight (pondus) that carries us upward toward the heavenly Jerusalem, toward the house of the Lord. Enjoyment, then, can be understood as the ultimate realization or consummation of our love of God. It is a psychological state of eternal rest (requies) and dwelling in heaven. 9 It has also been pointed out that enjoyment for St Augustine is a theological, not a philosophical concept, insofar as it incorporates the biblical idea of attachment to God. 10 According to Arendt, the very expression “for its own sake” (propter se ipsum) suggests that “‘enjoyment’ stands outside all human-temporal categories and hence can only be hinted at via negativa.” “Enjoyment,” Arendt states, “is the existential state that is unrelated to anything except to itself.” 11 Arendt is certainly right that beatific enjoyment, as conceived by St Augustine, is a transmundane reality, and that any attempt to fully describe that reality from the vantage point of the present life is bound to be unsuccessful and incomplete. Nevertheless, a lot can be said about the formal features of enjoyment even though the actual experience surpasses our limited understanding. And as we shall see in the following chapters, scholastic theologians never tired of discussing beatific enjoyment with growing precision and rigor. According to St Augustine, we ought to enjoy only God. More precisely, we ought to enjoy the one supreme thing (summa res)—the Holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 12 To use, according to St Augustine, is to employ something in obtaining that which is worthy of love and which constitutes a higher end. St Augustine also says that there is illicit or bad use (abusus, abusio). St Augustine’s illustration of bad use is quite effective. One can imagine the human being’s path to his/her final destination as a sort of a journey or wayfarerage (peregrinatio), and the human being as a wayfarer or traveler (peregrinus). The wayfarer wants to reach the end of the path and return to his/her homeland (patria), the place wherein joy awaits him/her. But he/she does not want to accomplish the journey too fast. He/she takes delight in the journey and is gradually alienated from his/her homeland. The wayfarer enjoys his/her mortal life and the lures of the created world, ignores the value of spiritual and eternal reality, and forgets his/her ultimate divine destiny. Seeking to enjoy what is intended for use alone, the wayfarer becomes an abuser. 13 We can say, therefore, that the object of use is the created world (utendum est hoc

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mundo), and that if we seek to enjoy this world rather than use it, then we are making bad use of it. 14 St Augustine states that not all things for use should be loved. We should love only those things that are related to God, such as human beings and angels, or those things that pertain to us, such as the human body. 15 St Augustine asks whether human beings should enjoy one another, or use one another, or both. This is indeed a “great question” (magna quaestio) because our ontological status is somewhat ambiguous; we are bodily creatures yet we are made in the image and likeness of God. 16 Reflecting upon the evangelical commandment to love one another, St Augustine speculates whether we are required to love our neighbor for his/her own sake or for the sake of another. According to St Augustine, we ought to love our neighbor on account of that which is loved for its own sake and which can make us blessed. 17 In anticipation of the objection that the commandment to love your neighbor specifies that you should love your neighbor “as yourself” (sicut teipsum), St Augustine clarifies that the expression “as yourself” should not be understood to mean “on account of oneself” (propter se ipsum). 18 Self-enjoyment is not totally wrong, but it is imperfect and hopeless if it is wholly detached from the immutable and eternal good. St Augustine then continues and says “if, therefore, you ought to love yourself not on your own account but on account of the one who is the most adequate object of your love, let not another man be angry at you for loving him on account of God.” 19 We are indeed commanded to love our neighbor as ourselves, but this love should be inseparable from loving God toto corde, tota anima, tota mente. Anything that appears lovable to the soul must be channeled into the love of God. The love of God is like a flowing river which does not allow any stream to be deflected away from its course and to diminish its strength. 20 Moreover, St Augustine does not think that a special commandment is needed for self-love and for the love of our bodies. 21 He, instead, maintains that no one hates himself/herself, and that even he/she who says he/she hates his/her body, does not actually hate his/her body but rather its weakness and heaviness. 22 It is also the case that true self-love is just another form of the love of God, and in learning to love God properly we likewise learn to love ourselves properly. 23 But proper self-love is not exactly isomorphous with natural self-love, which is why natural self-love does not require learning whereas proper self-love does. Even though it foreshadows proper self-love, natural self-love is nothing more than narrowly conceived egoism and self-idolatry. St Augustine will in fact go as far as to call natural self-love hatred. 24 It is important to emphasize that St Augustine does not want to separate self-enjoyment and the enjoyment of others from the enjoyment and love of God. This clearly shows that human beings should not be regarded as an ultimate object or end of enjoyment. Rational creatures do not seem to be even relative ends of enjoyment. 25 Commenting upon

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Saint Paul’s words to Philemon—”So, brother, I shall enjoy you in the Lord” (Phil 1:20)—St Augustine notes that, if Paul had omitted the words “in the Lord” (in Domino), then he would have placed the hope of his beatitude upon a mortal man. 26 Georgedes states that enjoying one’s fellowman “in God” is understood by St Augustine as a form of use, or at least as a form of weaker enjoyment. 27 St Augustine does indeed assert in the same context that enjoyment is very close in meaning to using with delight (cum delectatione uti). He explains that to take delight in the proximity of a loved object is to enjoy in the loose or improper sense of the word (abusive, non proprie), insofar as the pleasure is not enjoyed for its own sake but is related to something higher. By placing a higher value upon the experienced pleasure, we are said to enjoy that pleasure in the proper sense of the word (proprie). Doing so, however, would be wrong because we should never place a higher value on anything other than the Trinity, which is the supreme and unalterable good. 28 The point St Augustine seems to make is that there is nothing wrong with enjoying the pleasure supervening upon use as long as this pleasure is not ultimately sought. 29 Thus, the person who lives justly is one who has a rightly ordered love (dilectio ordinata), that is, who loves everything proportionately. 30 Finally, St Augustine declares that the fulfillment and the end of the law and the Scriptures is to love the one thing that we ought to enjoy as well as the being that can share that enjoyment with us. 31 This seems different from the claim that fellowmen must be used. 32 Nevertheless, St Augustine adds that we ought to use the whole temporal dispensation which divine providence has arranged for our salvation with a transitory love and delight. 33 Thus, in St Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, the love of other human beings must be understood as a form of use. 34 It has been argued, however, that St Augustine’s thinking of the relation between the love and enjoyment of God and the love and enjoyment of the neighbor evolved from asserting the primacy of the love and enjoyment of God to emphasizing the inseparability of the two loves and affirming the love of one’s neighbor as the necessary condition for the love of God. 35 But that St Augustine considered the love of neighbor to be a very demanding and extraordinary kind of love is also clear. It is the kind of love that requires self-sacrifice and complete renunciation of mundane attachments. 36 St Augustine ends his discussion of religious enjoyment and the love of God in On Christian Doctrine with a short treatment of the theological virtues of faith (fides), hope (spes), and charity (caritas). St Augustine had said earlier that beatific enjoyment can be achieved through the purification (purgatio) of the mind. This purification can be understood as a voyage home accomplished through good effort and good habits (bono studio bonisque moribus). 37 St Augustine adds that the preparation of the soul for eternal enjoyment happens through faith, hope, and charity. Faith and

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hope are necessary in the present life only. Eventually, faith will be replaced with vision (species), and hope with bliss (beatitudo). Charity, however, will continue in heaven and will increase in intensity (augebitur). The increase of beatific love is caused by the eternal nature of the beatific object. St Augustine explains that something eternal is more passionately loved when possessed than when merely desired. This is so because the eternal is found to be even more valuable after it is attained. Something temporal, on the other hand, is loved more before it is obtained. Once obtained, it does not satisfy (non satiat) the soul because it is no longer found attractive. 38 St Augustine also states that the influence of the theological virtues is so great that a person who has those virtues can be instructed about and carried toward the eternal life even without the mediation of books. The greatest of the virtues, however, is charity, which will become stronger (auctior) and more secure (certior) in heaven. 39 Hannah Arendt has argued convincingly, I think, that St Augustine has two different concepts of love—love defined as charity and love defined as craving or desire (cupiditas, appetitus). Desire-based love requires fulfillment, and once the desire has been fulfilled the love ceases to exist. “An everlasting desire,” Arendt observes astutely, “could only be either a contradiction in terms or a description of hell.” 40 Thus, when St Augustine talks about the continuation and intensification of charity in heaven, charity is not understood as desire-based love. We can draw two conclusions from St Augustine’s treatment of enjoyment and use in De doctrina Christiana, Book I. First, the basis of St Augustine’s distinction between enjoyment and use is teleological. Enjoyment and use are two different dynamic attitudes with respect to ends and means. St Augustine’s definition of enjoyment as clinging or adhering to something with love (amore inhaerere) accentuates the aspect of perseverance or determination with respect to the object of love. We ought to enjoy God above all because only God can bring total satisfaction to our souls. To enjoy orderly is thus to actualize the teleological tendency of one’s being. It is to find one’s proper place in the cosmic order of things. To use, on the other hand, is to treat all created goods, including other human beings, as means to the achievement of our ultimate end—the enjoyment of the Holy Trinity. Other human beings must be loved as participants or co-sharers in our enjoyment of God. It is not wrong to have enjoyment supervening upon the use of the neighbor, but it is wrong to seek that enjoyment as an end in itself. It should also be stressed that the attitude of use toward created things must not be confused with pure utilitarian exploitation. St Augustine is simply advising us not to be overly attached to the created world. 41 It can even be said that St Augustine’s view of use is predicated upon the perfect coincidence of the useful good (bonum utile) and the right (bonum honeste) of classical Greco-Roman ethics. 42

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Second, enjoyment and use are distinct from pleasure (delectatio). 43 Pleasure is something that one undergoes or experiences passively. In contrast to pleasure, enjoyment and use manifest a certain activity. By employing the verbs “going beyond something” (transire), “relating something to another” (referre), “holding fast to something” (inhaerere) and “remaining permanently related to something” (permansere), St Augustine seems to indicate a certain kind of activity, which could be interpreted as an activity of willing. Holding fast to something can be considered an act of frui, providing that the thing is taken as a final end in itself; or it can be thought of as an act of uti, if the thing is related to a higher end. Although St Augustine does not employ the term “will” (voluntas) in this context, it is clear that both frui and uti demand voluntary effort on the part of the human being, an act of a free motor faculty. ST AUGUSTINE ON THE PASSIONS, WILL, AND ENJOYMENT The next step is to expound the concept of enjoyment from the perspective of St Augustine’s discussion of the passions and his notion of the will. St Augustine’s most developed views of the passions are found in Books IX and XIV of The City of God (De civitate Dei), which was written between 413 and 427. 44 These views were influenced by the writings of the Roman orator Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.). 45 The treatment contained in Book IX appears in a longer discussion of the pagan worship of demons. St Augustine argues that it is foolish to worship demons because the rational minds of demons are slaves to vicious passions. 46 St Augustine points out that certain philosophers, such as the Platonists and the Aristotelians, believe that the passions (passiones, perturbationes, affectiones, affectus) can assail the mind of the wise man, but that he controls the passions through reason by imposing laws upon them and keeping them in check. 47 The Stoics, on the other hand, claim that the wise man cannot be disturbed by passions. Using Cicero’s observation that the Stoic view of bodily and external things differs from the position of the Platonists and the Aristotelians only verbally, St Augustine argues that the same applies to the controversy regarding whether the wise man can be affected by the passions. The Stoic view, St Augustine holds, is not substantially different from that of the other philosophers. 48 To prove that even the mind of the Stoic sage is not immune to passions, St Augustine relates an anecdote from Aulus Gellius’s Attic Nights about a certain distinguished Stoic philosopher who grew pale with fear (vi timoris expalluit) at the impending danger of shipwreck during a sea storm. According to the story, Gellius, who was a passenger on the ship, asked the philosopher, after the storm had passed, to explain the reason for his reaction. The philosopher opened a book from the Stoic teacher Epictetus (ca. A.D. 55–ca. 135) and let Gellius read some of the doctrines

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of the founders of Stoicism—Zeno and Chrysippus. In that book, Gellius read that, according to the Stoics, there are certain sensations or mental images (phantasiae) caused by terrifying things, which affect the mind of the wise man and which even he cannot prevent from arising. Both the wise man and the fool are thus necessarily subject to passions with the only difference that the fool surrenders to these passions, whereas the wise man retains his mind unshaken. 49 On the basis of Gellius’s anecdote, St Augustine concludes that there is no significant disagreement between the Stoics and the other philosophers regarding the passions and that the Stoic philosopher mentioned in the anecdote experienced fear. The essential point about the passions, according to St Augustine, is that though they assail the lower parts of the soul (accidunt inferioribus animi partibus), the higher part of the mind can control them by withholding assent from them and by resisting them. 50 In The City of God, Book XIV, St Augustine talks about the difference between living according to God and living according to man. In this context, St Augustine systematizes his treatment of the passions with the help of the concept of will. 51 He introduces a slightly modified version of the Stoic classification of the passions, 52 and he calls the passions movements of the will (motus, voluntates) based upon consent (consensio) and dissent (dissensio). Desire (cupiditas) is thus an agreement to chase after what we wish for. Delight or pleasure (laetitia) is consent to enjoy (fruendo) what we wish for. Fear (metus) is a dissent from an impending evil. Sadness or grief (tristitia) is a dissent from something that happens against our will. Accordingly, the human will can be transformed into different kinds of volition depending upon the presence, absence, and quality of the objects of volition. 53 St Augustine also links the treatment of the passions and volitions with the notion of love. He associates desire, pleasure, fear, and grief with various forms of love. He maintains that the Bible does not use special terms for good love and bad love but employs the words amor, dilectio, and caritas as synonymous, and it sometimes uses them in a good sense and at other times in a bad sense. 54 St Augustine describes love as a volitional direction, which gives rise to four dynamic states or affective attitudes. He says that striving to possess a loved object is desire, possessing (habens) and enjoying (fruens) a loved object is delight (laetitia), fleeing what is adverse to love is fear, and undergoing an adversity is grief. These experiences, St Augustine says, can be good or bad depending on whether one’s love is good or bad. 55 In other words, the basic orientation of the will transforms the quality of one’s experiences or emotions. A righteous will makes one’s emotions good whereas a perverse will makes them evil. In essence, the direction of a person’s will represents that person’s commitment to a set of moral values. Thus, if the chosen values are good, then his/her emotions are good and praiseworthy, but if they are evil, then his/her emotions are evil and blameworthy. 56 Those who live

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according to God (secundum Deum) have a good love and experience desire, fear, pain, and joy (gaudentque) in the right way. 57 Contrary to Stoic theory, Augustine did not consider the emotions to be inherently negative phenomena. Their negative or positive value depends on one’s morally significant choices and preferences. 58 It is important to note that St Augustine employs the concept of enjoyment in his treatment of the will and the various dynamic states brought about by the will. He first describes laetitia as the consent or will to enjoy (fruendo) what we wish for. He then defines love (amor) as being in the position to have (habens) and enjoy (fruens) what one cherishes and calls it laetitia. These remarks tend to stress mostly the volitional character of enjoyment. However, St Augustine also links the term “fruitio” with joy or bliss (gaudium). He does this in his treatise On the Trinity (De Trinitate), Book I, where we read that the fruition of God is the fullness of our joy (gaudium). 59 We shall see later that Duns Scotus interprets this text to mean that fruitio is a certain attribute of an elicited act and he calls this attribute delight (delectatio). 60 Delight can be understood as the feeling aspect of enjoyment. 61 Scotus also points out that, sometimes, St Augustine applies the term “fruitio” to the combination of volition and delight. Thus, in De Trinitate, Book X, St Augustine says that to enjoy is to achieve calm (quies) and delight (delectatio) with respect to the objects of cognition which are contained in the memory and the intelligence. 62 It is useful to mention that consent plays an important role in St Augustine’s view of sin. In the first book of his exegetical commentary on Christ’s Sermon on the Mount (De sermone Domini in monte), St Augustine points out that sinning includes three distinct elements—enticement (suggestio), pleasure (delectatio), and consent (consensio, consensus). St Augustine says that suggestions arise from the memory or through bodily sensations and cause pleasure in the sensitive appetite. Consent to a sinful suggestion constitutes a full-fledged sin (plenum peccatum). 63 St Augustine traces the model of sinning to the biblical story of the fall of Adam and Eve. He interprets the fall allegorically in terms of the subjugation of reason to the carnal (or animal) appetite. He writes that the serpent in the story represents the original source or cause of temptation, the pleasure of Eve corresponds to the animal appetite, and the consent of Adam symbolizes the higher part of the soul. St Augustine’s point is that sin deflects the mind from the contemplation of higher realities. 64 St Augustine explains the psychological mechanism of sinning more thoroughly in De Trinitate, Book XII. The phases of the psychological mechanism depicted by St Augustine are as follows—(1) the carnal (or animal) sense entices the mind to enjoy itself (fruendi se) as a private and suitable good, (2) there is a consent to the mere pleasure of thinking or fantasizing about the sinful suggestion (3) finally, there is a decision on the part of the “superior counsels” (or the mind) to carry out the sinful thought physically (through an exterior act). 65 The consent to a sinful thought is not

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necessarily actualized through a deed. One can merely fantasize about the sinful suggestion. However, it is still a sin, although a lesser one, to retain (tenere) and willingly think over (libenter volvere) sinful thoughts without putting them into actions. Sinful thoughts should be defeated or cast away (respuere) as soon as they touch (attingere) the soul. 66 There are two relevant points associated with St Augustine’s interpretation of original sin. The first is that, through the fall of Adam and Eve, the human being is alienated from his/her true end in God insofar as he/ she loves himself/herself more than God. Perverse self-love is implied in St Augustine’s characterization of the beginning of sin as the desire to enjoy oneself (fruendi se) as a private and proper good. 67 To rejoice in private goods is a form of pride or self-love, which destroys the unity of mankind. 68 The second point is that, as a result of the fall, the emergence of sinful thoughts cannot be controlled. The corruption of the soul makes us prone to spontaneous evil desires, which can be transformed into fullfledged sins if not immediately rejected by the controlling power of the human mind. 69 Furthermore, consenting to the enjoyment of sinful thoughts can become a habit and lead to vice if it is not regulated by the mind. 70 Vices are difficult to eradicate because we derive more intense pleasure from their enjoyment. 71 Vicious habits thus hinder the pursuit and enjoyment of our true end. For instance, in De doctrina Christiana, Book I, St Augustine speaks about the conflict between the spirit (spiritus) and the habits of the flesh (consuetudo carnis) with its unruly impulses (inordinati motus). He says that after the Resurrection, the body will live immortally in peaceful subjugation to the spirit (cum quiete summa). The task of the spirit in the present life is to subdue or tame (domare) the flesh by breaking (solvere) the perverse contracts (pacta perversa) imposed on it by evil habits (malae consuetudines). The spirit must establish peace through good habits (bonae consuetudines). The spirit does not fight back out of hatred (per odium), but in order to regain its authority; nor does the flesh fight back out of hatred, but because it is constrained by the bond of the habits (per consuetudinis vinculum) ingrained in the stock of our ancestors. 72 St Augustine views the persistence of evil habits as a source of the bondage and weakness of the will. In the Confessions, Book VIII, he gives an account of his own internal struggle with such habits. St Augustine tells us that he admired the well-known Roman orator Marius Victorinus who had abandoned his career and profession in old age only to be faithful to Christ. St Augustine wanted to have the same kind of determination but he felt bound by an old habit that had gained full control over him. St Augustine saw this habit (consuetudo) as a full-fledged manifestation of lust (libido). 73 The sinful habit had become a necessity, a fleshbound will which makes one a slave to sin. St Augustine experienced an intense internal struggle which he describes as a conflict of wills—the will of the flesh and the will of the spirit. Through his new spiritual will,

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St Augustine wanted to enjoy (frui) and worship God freely but he was held back by his old carnal will. 74 With his own self at the center of this conflict of wills, St Augustine could understand the meaning of the words “flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh.” At that stage of his spiritual journey, St Augustine had attained a clear perception of the truth, yet he kept postponing the renunciation of his evil habits. His new self had gradually emerged from the darkness of conceit and false beliefs, yet he was still a servant of his old, earthbound and sinful self. His identity was thus split into two halves. Although he knew exactly who or what he wanted to be, he could do no more than become a “reluctant victim” (patiebar inuitus) of his old, inferior self. 75 St Augustine’s description of the dramatic division of his soul contains the idea that the fundamental orientation of the human will can be reluctant. The human being can be fully aware of the benefit of choosing eternal life, yet he or she can fail to will this life effectively. St Augustine wanted to change his sinful ways, but his will was incomplete and imperfect. His new will was a mere wish, not an effective and perfect volition. 76 However, it has also been argued that, for Augustine, weakness of will, or what Aristotle calls akrasia, is not just a rare and episodic phenomenon, as it was originally understood by Aristotle, but a condition affecting all of us, in one way or another and at all times in the present life. 77 According to St Augustine, the internal conflict of the soul can be resolved only by supernatural means. The only remedy for the deplorable state of the divided or ineffective human will is the grace of God. 78 More precisely, our interior reformation happens through the influence of the Holy Spirit, who pours into our hearts the love of charity (caritas). It is through this love that we are firmly established upon the path of salvation and united with God. In De Trinitate, Book XV, St Augustine says clearly that a man has no capacity for loving God unless God infuses in him/her the love of charity through the mediation of the Holy Spirit. 79 St Augustine makes the same point in the Confessions, Book XIII, where he embarks upon an exegetical analysis of the first chapter of Genesis. In his interpretation of Genesis 1:2, St Augustine observes that only the Spirit 80 is mentioned to hover over the waters and not the Father and the Son. He says that the reason why the text mentions only the Holy Spirit is that the Spirit is the gift (donum) in which we attain rest (requiescimus) and enjoy (fruimur) God. This gift enkindles love (amor), which lifts us up toward the heavenly Jerusalem. Love is the weight (pondus) which pulls us toward our proper station (locus). Under the influence of the Holy Spirit, we acquire a good will (uoluntas bona), which places us where we belong. 81 Thus, according to St Augustine, both the orientation of our will toward God and our enjoyment of God are supernaturally caused. 82 Through the Holy Spirit we are not only inspired to love God but we are also endowed with the ability to recognize the goodness of the entire creation. 83

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An important characteristic of the state of beatific enjoyment is also stillness or tranquility. Tranquility can be described more as a general condition of the state of blessedness and not so much as a feature of fruition itself. St Augustine criticizes the Stoics for devaluating the entire spectrum of human emotions and believing in the possibility of attaining complete tranquility or quietude (apatheia) in the present life. It has been pointed out that confusion regarding the meaning and feasibility of Stoic apatheia existed already in antiquity, 84 and this confusion is also reflected in the work of St Augustine. In the De civitate Dei XIV.9, for instance, St Augustine says that if apatheia is understood as the absence of irrational affections then it is a good and desirable state. If, on the other hand, it is defined as emotional insensitivity or absence of affection (stupor), then it should be regarded as the worst of all vices. 85 Furthermore, if apatheia is equated with the absence of sin, then one can hope to attain such a condition only in the future life of blessedness. Finally, if apatheia is understood as the absence of fear (timor) and sadness (tristitia), but not of love (amor) and joy (gaudium), then it can be viewed as a desirable state. Such a state, however, can only be achieved in heaven. 86 St Augustine condemns the vanity of those among the citizens of the earthly city who have no affections whatsoever. He firmly maintains that this kind of condition is characterized by a loss of humanity rather than a true tranquility (vera tranquillitas). Only the inhabitants of the city of God can attain the state of true tranquility. Those are the people who live according to the spirit and not according to the flesh, according to God and not according to man. In this life, the citizens of the city of God are subject to the influence of human emotions. It is good for human beings to experience emotions. Having emotions is also an essential part of human nature, and those who have a righteous life experience the emotions in a good way. In the future, however, the inhabitants of the city of God will inherit an immortal life characterized by love and gladness and unclouded by fear and distress. 87 In De diversis quaestionibus, a work that he began writing in 388, several years before De doctrina Christiana, 88 St Augustine reflects on the cause of fear and explains that there is a correlation between fear and the desire (cupiditas) for transient things. A person who has nothing to fear is also one who has no desire. 89 St Augustine argues that if having no fear is a vice (vitium), then we should not love this vice. However, since the most blessed person (beatissimus) does not fear anything, and since he/she is not tainted by vice, then it follows that having no fear should not be considered a vice. But what accounts for the absence of fear in the blessed? It is the tranquility of mind (tranquilitas animi). In this respect, the blessed is utterly unlike the audacious person (audax), who has no fear due to stupidity (temeritas), and utterly unlike a corpse, which feels no fear because it does not sense anything. 90 Thus, the blessed is comparable to the Stoic sage. The emotional experiences of both can be aptly

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described by means of the oxymoron “dispassionate passions,” an oxymoron coined by Peter King in the effort to capture the philosophically problematic character of the Stoic ideal of total emotional equilibrium. 91 We can close the examination of St Augustine’s psychology of the passions and the will with the following remarks. First, enjoyment can be described as an act of the will or a volitional attitude which contributes to the generation of certain affective states. Enjoyment can also be said to involve a certain feeling aspect—spiritual joy or bliss (gaudium). Second, genuine enjoyment requires the right disposition of the human will with respect to God. The effective redirection of the will toward God can occur only through divine grace. Our ultimate enjoyment of God in heaven is also caused by God who binds us to his being through the fire of the Holy Spirit. Enjoyment can also be viewed as the final actualization of the love of God. This aspect of enjoyment is signified by the weight-metaphor. Finally, beatific enjoyment can also be linked with tranquility—essentially Stoic apatheia re-conceived and translated in the terms of Christian eschatology. THE IMPORTANCE OF PETER LOMBARD St Augustine’s distinction of enjoyment and use became the focus of lively discussion in Latin scholasticism thanks to the Italian theologian Peter Lombard (1095/1100–1160). 92 Early twelfth-century scholastic theologians were certainly familiar with the frui/uti distinction, but it was Peter Lombard who popularized the distinction when he made it the opening theme of professional theological reflection. 93 Peter composed the Book of Sentences (Sententiae in quatuor libris distinctae), which was accepted as the basic textbook of systematic theology in medieval universities before the middle of the thirteenth century. Peter’s Sentences belong to the genre of scholastic sentence collections. The genre was an original contribution of twelfth-century theologians. Sentence collections were written and designed with the intention to fulfill the educational and pedagogical needs of the twelfth-century schools. The purpose of these collections was to provide a methodological arrangement and a full-scale systematic treatment of the material of Christian theology. 94 The ultimate practical goal was to teach students to appreciate and explore the legacy of the Christian tradition and to train them how to think about various— ancient and contemporary—theological problems. 95 Peter Lombard was an expert in the genre of biblical commentary known as Glossa. 96 He was, however, dissatisfied with the genre of biblical exegesis because it imposed certain limitations upon the exercise of theological speculation. 97 Since Peter studied in France, he was very familiar with the theological trends of his day, and he knew that celebrated scholars and theologians, such as Hugh of Saint Victor (1090–1141) and

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Peter Abelard (1079–1142), had developed their own models of theological systematization. Hugh of St Victor was a representative of the tradition of monastic learning. In the spirit of this tradition, he had tried to arrange the material of theology along the chronology of salvation history and he stayed closer to the narrative of the sacred page. The outcome of Hugh’s work was the major system of dogmatic theology called De sacramentis fidei christianae (completed in 1137). Hugh’s De sacramentis was divided into two books and was organized along the rationale of the distinction between God’s work of institution and God’s work of restitution. 98 Abelard, on the other hand, had spent his life as an itinerant scholar and served as the mouthpiece of the more secular tradition of the urban cathedral schools. In his effort to divide and systematize the content of Christian doctrine, Abelard had employed a rational or conceptual approach and had brushed aside the order of the biblical narrative. Abelard left three unfinished treatises of systematic theology—Theologia summi boni, Theologia Christiana and Theologia scholarium. Taken together, these treatises give a clear idea of Abelard’s theological agenda. Abelard wanted to divide the material of theology into three parts—faith, charity, and sacraments. 99 Abelard’s treatise Sic et non was also influential. This work served as a model of theological methodology insofar as it juxtaposed dialectically authoritative statements and opinions on a number of theological topics. 100 Abelard left the contradictions among the quoted passages unresolved. Nevertheless, Abelard’s dialectical art was, in principle, intended not only to expose the conflicts among theological authorities but also to provide ways of interpreting and reconciling those authorities. 101 Other prominent sentence collections were the Sentences of Gilbert of Poitiers (compiled around 1140), the anonymous Summa sententiarum (written shortly after Hugh’s De sacramentis), the Sentences of Roland of Bologna (written around 1150), the Sentences of Robert Pullen (written in the period 1142–44), and the Sentences of Robert of Melun (composed between 1150 and 1160). 102 Among these collections, Robert of Melun’s Sentences presented the most appealing alternative version after the systematic theology of Peter Lombard. 103 Lombard’s Sentences turned out more successful than those of his older and immediate contemporaries. 104 This has to do partly with Peter’s structuring of his Sentences—an ingenious combination of a historicobiblical narrative plan with a rational schema. 105 Peter adopted the rational schema from the first book of St Augustine’s treatise On Christian Doctrine, where St Augustine had divided the study of theology into the examination of things (res) and signs (signa). 106 In the beginning of the first book of the Sentences, Peter says that, after a careful inquiry into the contents of the Old and New Law, the grace of God had revealed to him that the treatment of the sacred page comes down principally to things and signs. Peter then refers to the authority of St Augustine—the “illustrious doctor”—who taught that every doctrine is about things or signs, and

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that signs are used for signifying whereas things are not. 107 Peter continues and explains, with the help of St Augustine, that signs are also things in the sense that they are not nothing. Signs are things used for signifying. There are two kinds of signs—(1) signs which merely signify grace without justifying, such as the sacraments of the Old Law, and (2) signs which confer grace, such as the sacraments of the Gospel. However, not all things are signs. 108 For example, divine realities (res divina) are not signs and should therefore be treated first. 109 Following St Augustine’s lead, Peter tells us that there are three categories of things—things that ought to be enjoyed, things that ought to be used, and things that enjoy and use. The things to be enjoyed make us blessed, whereas the things to be used assist us in attaining and adhering to the things that make us blessed. Human beings and angels fall into the category of things destined to enjoy and use. 110 Peter concludes the general treatment of the objects of enjoying and use with an epilogue containing the plan for the Book of Sentences—the treatment of the things to be enjoyed (the Trinity), the treatment of the things to be used (the created world), the treatment of the things destined for both enjoyment and use (the virtues and the powers of the soul), and the treatment of signs (the sacraments). 111 In agreement with this plan, Peter Lombard opens a detailed discussion of the mystery of the Holy Trinity which covers the entire body of Book I. In Book II, Peter treats the creation of things and the formation of spiritual and corporeal entities. Book III contains a treatment of the Incarnation of the Word. Peter’s systematic exposition of theology ends with Book IV, which focuses upon the sacraments. 112 In line with the newly embraced—by twelfth-century authors—tendency to organize a book according to a table of contents with chapters and headings, each of the four books of Lombard’s Sentences is divided into chapters, and each chapter is furnished with a title summarizing its content. To facilitate the selective reading of the Sentences even more, Lombard differentiated the paragraphs of each chapter by means of rubrics. Evidently, the very structure of Lombard’s Sentences served as a major stepping stone in the process of professionalization of theology, which involved a gradual distancing from the contemplative style of monastic theological reflection and a drive toward more dialectical and systematic mode of theological investigation. 113 The reception of Lombard’s Sentences as the principal systematic theology textbook in the medieval university was expedited in great part by the tradition of early abbreviations and glosses. 114 Initially a mere tool of theological instruction used primarily in connection with scriptural exegesis, Lombard’s Sentences acquired a life of their own. As Rosemann points out, in the early phase of the reception of Lombard’s Sentences “[t]he theologian’s task was certainly not to study the Sentences, but Scripture itself—or rather, Scripture within the bounds of meaning established by the Fathers.” 115 Once the Sentences themselves became the theo-

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logian’s proper object of study, the topics and problems addressed in them became the theologian’s main concern. The topic of beatific enjoyment, in particular, since it was one of the first topics of examination in Lombard’s Sentences and was closely related with the question of the status of theology as an academic and scientific discipline, became the focus of vigorous dialectical investigation and the source of one of the greatest and most enduring debates in medieval scholastic theology. LOMBARD ON ENJOYMENT AND USE On first sight, Peter’s literal exposition of St Augustine gives us very little of Peter’s own interpretation to work with. For the most part, Peter is simply assembling passages from Augustine’s writings with the intention of providing navigation rubrics for the readers of the Sentences. Following St Augustine closely, Peter states that the category of things that ought to be enjoyed includes the Holy Trinity. 116 The category of things that ought to be used comprises the world and the things created by God. 117 The category of things that both enjoy and use contains the subjects of enjoyment and use—human beings and angels. 118 A closer look at Peter’s rubrics reveals that he had a very good sense of the dynamics and complexity of St Augustine’s treatment of enjoyment and use. Peter tries to resolve some of the contradictions found among various Augustinian statements regarding enjoyment and use. For instance, in D. 1, Ch. 3, Peter examines whether there is an intermediate state between enjoyment and use. Focusing upon St Augustine’s words “to enjoy is to use with an actual, not merely anticipated joy,” Peter explains that, according to St Augustine’s view, only those who experience actual enjoyment can be said to truly enjoy. In the present life, we can be said to have only a form of use, which involves an anticipated joy. 119 Peter, however, disagrees with St Augustine and states that we can experience enjoyment not only in the future life but also in this life. According to Peter, we are capable of experiencing enjoyment in the present life although this kind of enjoyment is much less fulfilling than heavenly enjoyment. Peter even finds certain Augustinian passages that support the claim that we can enjoy God during our temporal existence in this world. Furthermore, Peter says that we can enjoy God in actuality, not only in hope. This is so because we can be said to take delight in what we love, which means that we possess the object of love—i.e., the Trinity—to some extent although not fully. 120 Peter promptly adds that we ought to enjoy and not use God. He points out that, according to St Augustine, we enjoy the thing the makes us blessed. St Augustine also says that we ought to enjoy the thing that we love propter se and use everything else. Finally, Peter presents St Augustine’s definition of enjoyment as “use with delight.” He does not comment upon this definition but he gives the

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full text of St Augustine’s words, which makes it clear that the delight derived from the love of the present object should not be treated as an end in itself. One ought to enjoy only the Trinity, which is the highest and enduring good. 121 Another example of Peter Lombard’s hermeneutic skills concerns St Augustine’s pronouncements regarding the question whether human beings ought to be used or enjoyed. Peter quotes St Augustine as saying that human beings should be used rather than enjoyed because the person who puts his hope for blessedness in another human being is accursed. 122 Peter, however, notes immediately that St Augustine’s claim seems to conflict with St Paul’s words to Philemon: “Thus, brother, I will enjoy you in the Lord.” Peter then cites St Augustine’s exegesis of the Apostle’s words. In his comment to this particular New Testament verse, St Augustine explains that the addition of the expression “in the Lord” indicates that the ultimate end of enjoyment is God Himself, and that God should be enjoyed more than human beings. 123 A significant part of Lombard’s exposition is devoted to the question whether the virtues ought to be used or enjoyed. Some of the statements that Peter puts forward support the view that the virtues ought only to be used, whereas other statements defend the opposite view, namely, that the virtues ought to be enjoyed. Certain Augustinian passages suggest that the virtues ought only to be used. According to St Augustine, the Trinity ought to be the sole object of enjoyment. The virtues, on the other hand, ought to be loved on account of eternal beatitude. St Augustine points out that we would love the virtues even less than we ought to if we did not love them on account of beatitude. 124 The view that the virtues ought to be enjoyed and not used is confirmed by Ambrose’s gloss to a verse from St Paul’s Epistle to Galatians. The verse states that charity, joy, peace, and patience are among the fruits of the Holy Spirit. The glossator notes that charity, joy, peace and patience are called fruits and not deeds (opera) because a fruit is something sought for its own sake. Peter comments that if the fruits are things sought for their own sake, then they are also loved for their own sake. 125 Peter adopts an intermediate position between the two extreme views. One could say, according to him, that the virtues are sought and loved on their own account as well as on account of beatitude. The virtues ought to be loved for their own sake because they bring genuine delight and spiritual joy to those who have them. Nevertheless, Peter claims, the love of the virtues should not terminate in the virtues but should be directed to the supreme end. To justify his own position, Peter insists that St Augustine does not so much contest the claim that we ought to love the virtues for their own sake as he rejects the thesis that we ought to value the virtues more than the ultimate end. 126 Peter also specifies that to love the virtues on their own account is not so much to enjoy them but to use them for the enjoyment of the eternal good. We actually enjoy through or

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by means of the virtues (per virtutes fruimur), just as we enjoy through or by means of the faculty of our will. 127 In the epilogue of his exposition Lombard contends that the powers of the soul and the virtues are natural goods which we use and through which we at the same time enjoy. 128 Thus, essentially Lombard’s view is the same as St Augustine’s—everything other than God, including human beings, must be used. 129 CONCLUSION The aim of this chapter was to clarify Aurelius Augustine’s concept of enjoyment and to see how this concept was popularized in Latin scholasticism by becoming the cornerstone of Peter Lombard’s outline of the most successful systematic theology course. The aim was also to inspect Lombard’s adoption and articulation of the various aspects of St Augustine’s treatment of enjoyment and use. Our examination of the views of St Augustine and Lombard leads to the following observations. According to St Augustine, beatific enjoyment is a form of love characterized by the firm attraction of the human will to God. The adequate object of beatific love is the Holy Trinity alone. The attainment of the Trinity demands the right ordering or disposition of our volitions. We ought to love God propter se and we ought to love and treat everything other than God as a means to the attainment of God. St Augustine also associates enjoyment with delight (or pleasure) and rest. He seems to think that beatific bliss involves spiritual delight (or pleasure) and the universal appeasement or tranquility of our will. We have also seen that St Augustine conceives of the state of the blessed in heaven alongside the Stoic ideal of apatheia. St Augustine’s main ideas were later used by Peter Lombard to give a more coherent structure to the material of systematic theology. We find that Lombard is not merely collecting and organizing St Augustine’s views but that he is also critically engaging certain aspects of these views. For instance, Lombard thinks that it is possible to have enjoyment in this life and not only in heaven. He notes, of course, that this would be an imperfect or less gratifying form of enjoyment. Lombard devotes a major portion of his treatment to the enjoyment of the virtues. According to him, the virtues should be loved for their own sake as well as for the sake of God. NOTES 1. Aurelius Augustine was among the most influential patristic authorities for theologians in the Middle Ages. He was born in the North African town of Thagaste (now in the territory of Algeria) in A.D. 354. His mother Monica, who is mentioned so often in the Confessions, was a devout Christian whose magnetic personality exerted a major influence upon the development of Augustine’s character and spirituality. Augustine’s father Patricius was a modest man, a small landowner and town official. In

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Confessions, Book II, Augustine says that he was a new catechumen. It seems that Augustine did not appreciate his father very much, although it was he who funded Augustine’s education and sent him to Carthage to study rhetoric. At Carthage (371–4), Augustine discovered his passion for philosophy after reading Cicero’s Hortensius. There he also took a mistress with whom he had a son called Adeodatus. Augustine does not mention the name of his mistress in the Confessions, but he loved her very much and he suffered deeply when he had to send her away while waiting to get legally married. Augustine also joined the Manichean sect. He was a Manichean for quite a while but he abandoned the sect once he saw through the unstable intellectual foundations of its doctrines. He worked in the meantime as a teacher of rhetoric at Thagaste (375) and Carthage (376–83). He sailed for Rome (383) to pursue his teaching career and he was appointed a professor of rhetoric in Milan (384). In Milan, he became a follower of Neoplatonism and at the same time came under the influence of the local Christian community and their leader, Bishop Ambrose. Soon after he settled in Milan, Augustine converted to Christianity (386) and was baptized together with his son (387). He returned to Africa (388) with the intention of establishing a monastic community. He was ordained a priest (391) and was later consecrated as successor to Bishop Valerius in Hippo (395). After the death of Valerius (396), Augustine took the office of Bishop of Hippo and held it until the end of his life in 430. See Scott Macdonald “Augustine,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 154–55; Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 3, 64–67, 178–81, 280–83, 380–81. 2. See Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 178. 3. See Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 1036: “In that work Augustine transformed the Graeco-Roman goals for logic, grammar, and rhetoric: he placed these three disciplines, the ‘trivium,’ and all pagan learning, at the service of Christian truth.” 4. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana, ed. Joseph Martin, CCSL 32 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1962) I.2, 2, lin. 22, p. 7–lin. 20, p. 8. See also Stephen F. Brown, “Sign Conceptions in Logic in the Latin Middle Ages,” in Semiotics: A Handbook on the SignTheoretic Foundations of Nature and Culture, vol. 1, ed. Roland Posner, Klaus Robering and Thomas A. Sebeok (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 1036: “In Augustine’s Christian vision the words of the Scriptures and the created things of the universe are signs pointing to their ultimate source. For Augustine, as he was explained by the authors of the Latin Middle Ages, all realities can be divided into things and signs. Yet, when he speaks of things, he indicates that all created things can also be signs, for they have the essential characteristic of a sign: it is that which leads us to knowledge of something other than itself. Although created things are things, they also point beyond themselves to the God who made them.” It should be pointed out that the frui/uti distinction is analogous to the res/signa distinction. The object of enjoyment is intransitive in character insofar as it is taken as the final end of human action. Analogously, the entity signified by a sign is intransitive in the sense that it can be considered the ultimate point of reference. The object of use, on the other hand, is transitive in character insofar as it provides a means to the attainment of something else. Similarly, a sign serves as an instrument through which something else is designated. See Giovanni Manetti, Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity, trans. Christine Richardson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 165. 5. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.3, 3, lin. 1–10, p. 8. O’Donovan notes that the definitions introduced by St Augustine in the present section express his ontological intent to discern an objective structure of reality in which the human being participates. See Oliver O’Donovan “Usus and Fruitio in Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana I,” Journal of Theological Studies 33 (1982): 384. Georgedes considers two different translations of the expression “quae fruuntur et utuntur,” one which allows reference to a special category comprising objects of weaker enjoyment, and one which permits reference to subjects (humans) rather than objects of enjoyment and use. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 33–36. It can be said that the two translations are

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compatible because human beings are both subjects and objects of enjoyment and use. We can choose what things to enjoy and use and we can also be the passive objects of other subjects’ enjoyment and use. 6. See Miikka Ruokanen, Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s De civitate Dei (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 50. 7. See William E. Mann, “Inner-Life Ethics,” in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1999), 147. An account of a range of modern interpretations of the frui/uti distinction is found in O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio,” 361–73. 8. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.4, 4, lin. 1–2, p. 8. See Mann, “Inner-Life Ethics,” 147; Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 5–6; O’Donovan “Usus and Fruitio,” 361; Courtenay, “Between Despair and Love,” 13. 9. My explanation agrees with Georgedes who points out that love and enjoyment are not synonymous although they are conceptually linked. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 38. In the De diversis quaestionibus, Q. XXXV, St Augustine says that love is a movement (motus). He explains that when we ask what ought to be loved, we are thus asking in what direction we ought to be going. The idea of love as a movement explains also how enjoyment and love are related. Enjoyment is the final station of the movement of love. See Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, CCSL 44A (Turnholt: Brepols, 1975), XXXV.1, lin. 12–15, p. 50. 10. See Ruokanen, Theology of Social Life, 53. 11. See Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, 33. 12. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.5, 5, lin. 1–4, p. 9. In the Diversis quaestionibus, q. XXXV, St Augustine calls the love through which we love the things that ought to be loved “charity” (caritas, dilectio). Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, XXXV.2, lin. 61, p. 52–lin. 67, p. 53. 13. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.4, 4, lin. 2–18, p. 8. The theme of the wayfaring soul (peregrinatio animae) is constantly recurring in St Augustine’s writings. For a textual analysis of the works where the theme of peregrinatio animae appears and for an interpretation of its various imaginative modifications See Robert J. O’Connell, Soundings in St. Augustine’s Imagination (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), 67–94, 143–284. 14. Mann explains that abuse is the first limitation that St Augustine imposes on the concept of use. To use x to obtain y, if y is unworthy of love, qualifies as a case of abuse. The second limitation is that use presupposes a rational faculty and knowledge of means and ends. Thus, the desire to use God—who alone should be enjoyed—is an incoherent desire insofar as it requires that God is known as an object of use and is regarded as an inferior means to obtain a superior end. See Mann, “Inner-Life Ethics,” 148–49. 15. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.23, 22, lin. 1–4, p. 18. O’Donovan notes that St Augustine delineates four objects of love: God as an object of enjoyment, and ourselves, our neighbors and our bodies as objects of use. All other temporal things should only be used, not loved. See O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio,” 386–87. 16. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.22, 20, lin. 1, p. 16–lin. 11, p. 17. 17. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.22, 20, lin. 11–16, p. 17. St Augustine makes a similar point in his Confessions, Book IV. Recalling his grief and devastation over the death of a close friend, St Augustine says it is madness to love a human being too much. It is better to love a human being in God, and an enemy for the sake of God. To love a person in God or for the sake of God is better because God can never be lost unless one refuses to love Him. See Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones, ed. Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1981), IV.6, 12, lin. 27–28, p. 46. Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones IV.6, 12, lin. 6–13, p. 47. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 69. 18. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.22, 21, lin. 17–25, p. 17. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 51–52.

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19. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.22, 21, lin. 26–28, p. 17. O’Donovan remarks that, in this paragraph, St Augustine superimposes a threefold distinction on the twofold distinction between eternal things for enjoyment and temporal things for use. Thus, to the equations usus = diligere propter aliud and fruitio = diligere propter se, St Augustine adds the formula usus = diligere propter Deum. The later formula, O’Donovan maintains, “has formed the bridge between the twofold love-command and the twofold distinction between the use of temporal things and the enjoyment of eternal things.” See O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio,” 386. 20. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.22, 21, lin. 28, p. 17–lin. 42, p. 18. 21. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.23, 22, lin. 6–13, p. 18. 22. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.24, 24, p. 19, lin. 1–6. Both self-love and the love of our bodies are conceptually included in the evangelical command to love our neighbor. See O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio,” 387. 23. See Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 37–41. 24. See O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love, 43–48. 25. Georgedes stresses this point. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 55–56. 26. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.33, 37, lin. 15–20, p. 27. See also Phil 1:20a: “Yes, brother, let me have this benefit from you in the Lord!” [All biblical quotations are from The New Oxford Annotated Bible, ed. Michael D. Coogan (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 3rd ed.).] According to Canning, there is a certain disagreement among interpreters as to whether St Augustine understood St Paul’s words to refer to the ultimate frui in the beatific vision of God or to the frui in a future meeting between Paul and Philemon in this life. See Raymond Canning, The Unity of Love for God and Neighbour in St. Augustine (Leuven: Augustinian Historical Institute, 1993), 111–12. 27. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 57, 70. 28. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.33, 37, lin. 20–27, p. 27. In his De Trinitate, Book X, St Augustine talks about enjoyment as a form of using with joy (uti cum gaudio). St Augustine explains that talent (ingenium) is found in the use that the will makes of the things stored in the memory and understanding. He then defines use as putting something at the will’s disposal and enjoyment as using with an actual joy. Enjoyment includes use insofar as a person who enjoys puts something at the disposal of his/her will with the purpose of pleasure (delectatio). However, not everyone who uses is said to enjoy if what is put at the disposal of the will is wanted for the sake of something else. Georgedes points out that, through Lombard, this passage becomes the major vehicle for discussing enjoyment in the Middle Ages. The passage clearly indicates that enjoyment is an act of the will, not of the intellect, and that it is not something passive received in the will. Aurelius Augustinus, De Trinitate, ed. W. J. Mountain and Fr. Glorie, CCSL 50–50A (Turnholt: Brepols, 1968), X.10, 17, p. 330. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 41–42. 29. See Mann, “Inner-Life Ethics,” 149: “There is nothing wrong with finding oneself enjoying what one is using, or with enjoyment supervening on use, but there is something wrong with one’s seeking to enjoy a good instead of seeking to use it. Augustine illustrates the distinction repeatedly: here are two examples. Pleasure generally accompanies the nourishment necessary to sustain one’s body, but desiring to eat and drink solely for gustatory relish rather than sustenance is sinful (Confessions 10.31.44). When it brings us closer to God, we use sacred music properly; when we delight more in the singing than in what is being sung about, we do not (Confessions 10.33.49–50).” 30. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.27, 28, lin. 1–7, p. 22. 31. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.35, 39, lin. 1, p. 28–lin. 5, p. 29. See also Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.32, 35, lin. 17–19, p. 26. 32. O’Donovan notes that St Augustine is here saying that the neighbor is included in the end of enjoyment. See O’Donovan, “Usus and Fruitio,” 390: “The ‘end’ and ‘fulfilment’ of the command is the two-fold love, love of the object-of-enjoyment and

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love of the fellow subject (dilectio rei qua fruendum est et rei quae nobiscum ea re potest frui). The term ‘use’ has not lost its significance with which it originally entered Augustine’s thought, expressing the relation to things of this world of one who seeks the things of the next. But the neighbour does not belong simply among the things of this world; he belongs at the ‘end’ and ‘fulfilment’ of the command, beyond the limits of the temporal dispensation.” 33. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.35, 39, lin. 5–12, p. 29. 34. This is also the view of Georgedes. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 54, 60–61, 70–71. Georgedes notes that St Augustine sometimes talks about goods that are sought in themselves, e.g., health, wisdom, one’s personal safety, and friendship. He states, however, that St Augustine does not regard these goods as legitimate objects of religious enjoyment. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 66–69. 35. Scanlon credits the Augustinian scholar, Johannes van Bavel, for making Augustinian spirituality compatible with the contemporary emphasis on the identity between the love of God and the love of neighbor in Karl Rahner’s theology by demonstrating convincingly that St Augustine’s mature understanding stresses the inseparability of the love of God from the love of neighbor. See Michael J. Scanlon, “Arendt’s Augustine,” in Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession, ed. John Caputo D. and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 167–68. 36. The radical nature of the love of neighbor in St Augustine has in fact prompted Arendt to argue that the neighbor is merely an occasion for the exercise of the love of God. See Arendt 1929, 98–97. 37. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.10, 10, lin. 1–8, p. 12. 38. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.38, 42, lin. 1, p. 30–lin. 14, p. 31. 39. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.39, 43, lin. 1–14, p. 31. 40. See Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, 32. 41. See Edmund Hill, The Trinity. Saint Augustine, introduction, translation, and notes by Edmund Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1991), 284: “By any interpretation this is an austere morality, utterly unhedonistic; so much so that in the hands of persons of narrow intelligence and determined will it can—and often has—become frighteningly inhuman. But we have to remember that Augustine carefully defines what he means by enjoying and using. What he means by the former is something much more precise, deliberate, intellectual and spiritual than what we ordinarily mean by enjoying. So he is not in fact forbidding us to enjoy our food, our sleep, our work, our play, good weather, good company, good entertainment, and so forth. What he is telling us to do is to use the pleasure we take in such things by referring it, in one way or another, to the only wholly satisfying object of enjoyment, namely God; and to avoid making these things ends in themselves. The same is true for the idea of using; he is not telling us to take a purely exploitative utilitarian attitude to the created world, because he had never heard of Jeremy Bentham; he is merely warning us against idolizing the world.” 42. See O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love, 40–41. 43. Georgedes also states that St Augustine differentiates clearly between pleasure and enjoyment. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 49. 44. See Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 280, 380. According to Peter Brown, St Augustine started writing his monumental work The City of God when faced with the threat of an emerging “literary and philosophical neo-paganism” among Roman aristocrats. See Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 300. 45. See Simo Knuuttila, “The Emergence of the Logic of Will in Medieval Thought,” in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), 208. 46. See Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2004), 153. 47. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei, ed. Bernard Dombart and Alphonse Kalb, 2 vols., CCSL 47–48 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1955), IX.4, lin. 1–10, p. 251.

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48. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei IX.4, lin. 11, p. 251–lin. 28, p. 252. 49. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei IX.4, lin. 29, p. 252–lin. 71, p. 253. Sorabji has noted that there are some significant discrepancies between Gellius’s and St Augustine’s reports. By replacing Gellius’s words “getting the jitters” (pavescere) with the expressions “to get the jitters with fear” (pavescere metu) and “to shrink with distress” (tristitia contrahi), St Augustine misrepresents the Stoic view according to which mere mental images do not count as genuine passions. See Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 375–84. Gellius’s anecdote is discussed also in Knuuttila, Emotions, 154–55; Knuuttila, “The Emergence of the Logic of Will,” 208; Johannes Brachtendorf , “Cicero and Augustine on the Passions,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 43 (1997): 296–300; O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 48–49. 50. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei IX.4, lin. 72–104, p. 253. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 144–45; Knuuttila, “The Emergence of the Logic of Will,” 208. Knuuttila explains that the Stoics would not have approved of St Augustine’s adjustment of their terminology because they did not accept the Platonic model of the divided soul and maintained that the first movements of the soul do not contain any evaluative component and cannot be regarded as emotions. Unlike the Stoics, St Augustine regarded a spontaneous first movement (pre-passion) as the initial stage of an emotion. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 155; Knuuttila, “The Emergence of the Logic of Will,” 211; for the Stoic view of the soul, see Knuuttila, Emotions, 47–48; for Plato’s tripartite model of the soul, see Knuuttila, Emotions, 7–13. According to the Stoics, emotions are mistaken judgments based on the human being’s tendency to consider his/her own self as the center of all things. The only way to achieve harmony with nature is to make an effort to change this puerile attitude toward life by means of a cognitive re-evaluation of established habits, extirpation of spontaneous emotions, and cultivation of rational habits or affections (eupatheiai). See Simo Knuuttila, “Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul,” in Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 51. Brachtendorf argues that St Augustine’s modification of Stoic terminology can be explained by his intention to justify second-order passions, i.e., praiseworthy passions directed at real goods and evils. Second-order passions must be distinguished from first-order passions which are always sinful insofar as they make men strive for apparent and wrong goods. See Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the Passions,” 301–3. 51. Knuuttila points out that St Augustine has a narrow concept of will as a controlling faculty in the higher rational part of the soul, and a broad concept of will which comprises all kinds of dynamic acts of the soul. These two concepts account for the fact that the higher power of the soul can control the impulses emerging in the lower emotional part of the soul. See Knuuttila, “Emotions,” 159, 168; Knuuttila, “The Emergence of the Logic of Will,” 209–10. 52. St Augustine adopts the Stoic taxonomy of the passions from Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations with the following alterations: he uses tristitia instead of Cicero’s aegritudo, and cupiditas instead of libido. See O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 46. For the Stoic classification of the passions, see Peter King, “Dispassionate Passions,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 11; Knuuttila, Emotions, 51–52. 53. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei XIV.6, lin. 1–15, p. 421. 54. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei XIV.7, lin. 21–40, p. 422. 55. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei XIV.7, lin. 40–45, p. 422. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 159; Petri Järveläinen, A Study on Religious Emotions (ThD diss., Helsinki University: Luther-Agricola-Society, 2000), 90; O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 49–50; John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1991), 95. 56. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 160. See also Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the Passions,” 300–301.

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57. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei XIV.9, lin. 1, p. 425–lin. 8, p. 426. 58. See King, “Dispassionate Passions,” 18. 59. Aurelius Augustinus, De Trinitate, I.8, 18, lin. 130–32, p. 52. It seems to me that St Augustine is using the term “gaudium” in a much broader sense than he uses it in Book X, where he defines enjoyment as using with joy (gaudium). In the broader sense, “gaudium” could mean a state of bliss or satisfaction, not merely a feeling of pleasure or delight. 60. See chapter 3, section 11. 61. Knuuttila explains that there are feelings immediately associated with volitional attitudes of the highest part of the soul. These feelings differ from passions on account of their location and causal history which includes the influence of the Holy Spirit. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 161. It should also be mentioned that feelings are forms of awareness with respect to bodily conditions or spiritual states of affairs. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 158. 62. Aurelius Augustinus, De Trinitate, X.10, 13, lin. 20–25, p. 327. 63. Aurelius Augustinus, De sermone Domini in monte (ed. Mutzenbecher, 1967) I.12, 34, lin. 781, p. 36–lin. 790, p. 37. Knuuttila explains that enticement refers to the cause of an actual desire, pleasure refers to the initial state of the desire, and consent to the acceptance of thinking about the deed with pleasure or of the inclination to act. See Knuuttila, “The Emergence of the Logic of Will,” 211. 64. Aurelius Augustinus, De sermone Domini in monte libros dvos, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher, CCSL 35 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1967), I.12, 34, lin. 790–809, p. 37. 65. Aurelius Augustinus, De Trinitate XII.12, lin. 17, p. 371–lin. 36, p. 372. 66. Aurelius Augustinus, De Trinitate XII.12, lin. 37–45, p. 372. See also Mann, “Inner-Life Ethics,” 149–152; Knuuttila, “The Emergence of the Logic of Will,” 211. 67. Rist points out that the second aspect of St Augustine’s concept of concupiscence is “the lust for bodies and in general the desire to ‘enjoy’ oneself physically and idolatrously, that is, without reference to the superior claims and implications of the love of God.” See John Rist, “Augustine of Hippo,” The Medieval Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Medieval Period, ed. G.R. Evans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 16. 68. See Rist, “Augustine of Hippo,” 17. 69. Knuuttila notes that, for St Augustine, sinful thoughts are equivalent to Stoic first movements or pre-passions. See Knuuttila, “Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul,” 53–54. 70. St Augustine calls vice the desire to enjoy what should be used and use what should be enjoyed. See Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus XXX, lin. 12–14, p. 38. 71. Mann states that, for St Augustine, vice is “the desire for the heightened pleasure that supervenes on repeatedly enjoying what should be used.” See Mann, “InnerLife Ethics,” 150. See also Aurelius Augustinus, De sermone Domini in monte, I.12, 34, lin. 810, p. 37–lin. 821, p. 38. 72. Aurelius Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana I.24, 25, lin. 17, p. 19–lin. 35, p. 20. 73. It has been suggested that the habit St Augustine talks about in this context is of a sexual kind. See James Wetzel “Body Double: Augustine and the Sexualized Will,” Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 64–65. 74. Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones VIII.5, 10, lin. 1, p. 119–lin. 19, p. 120. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 167–68. 75. Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones VIII.5, 11, lin. 20–32, p. 120. 76. Knuuttila says that, for St Augustine, the basic orientation of the human will can be reluctant and remarks that St Augustine’s description of actions done reluctantly (invitus) resembles Aristotle’s characterization of “mixed acts” in Nicomachean Ethics III.1. “Mixed acts” are those that a person would not choose to do in ordinary circumstances although such acts can sometimes be willed as means to an end; e.g., the crew of a ship can throw cargo overboard during a storm in order to avoid shipwreck. In

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this particular case, the act of throwing the goods is done unwillingly or reluctantly. Knuuttila notes that one of the specific features of St Augustine’s theory of will is that not only the choice of the means to the end, but also the basic tendency of the will toward the end can be reluctant. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 171–72. Harry Frankfurt calls the internal disunity of the will “ambivalence” and he characterizes it in the following manner, Harry G. Frankfurt, Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 99: “Ambivalence is constituted by conflicting volitional movements or tendencies, either conscious or unconscious, that meet two conditions. First, they are inherently and hence unavoidably opposed; that is, they do not just happen to conflict on account of contingent circumstances. Second, they are both wholly internal to a person’s will rather than alien to him; that is, he is not passive with respect to them. An example of ambivalence might be provided by someone who is moved to commit himself to a certain career, or to a certain person, and also moved to refrain from doing so.” 77. See John Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 184–85, 135–40; Wetzel “Body Double,” 63–65. 78. Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones VIII.5, 12, lin. 47, p. 120–lin. 54, p. 121. 79. Aurelius Augustinus, De Trinitate XV.18, 31, lin. 128, p. 506–lin. 134, p. 507. 80. See Gen. 1:1–2: “In the beginning when God created the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of the deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of the waters.” 81. Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones XIII.9, 10, lin. 1, p. 246–lin. 23, p. 247. St Augustine’s notion of the weight (pondus) of the soul may derive from the Neoplatonist Iamblichus. See O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 10. O’Connell notes that St Augustine uses the weight imagery to convey the idea of the return of the soul to its proper place in heaven. See Robert J. O’Connell, Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969), 161. See also Burnaby, Amor Dei, 93–94. 82. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 161; Järveläinen, A Study on Religious Emotions, 92–93. 83. Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones XIII.31, 46, lin. 17, p. 269–lin. 27, p. 270. 84. See King, “Dispassionate Passions,” 14. 85. Sheridan has argued that the condemnation of the notion of apatheia by Jerome and St Augustine was damaging to the central teaching of the Christian monastic tradition from Philo of Alexandria to Evagrius of Pontus. This condemnation created a disastrous situation that Cassian tried to resolve by explaining the notion of apatheia as “purity of heart,” which is the goal of the ascetic endeavor. See Mark Sheridan, “The Controversy over ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ: Cassian’s Sources and His Use of Them,” Studia Monastica 39 (1997): 299–303. 86. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei XIV.9, lin. 92–114, p. 428. 87. Aurelius Augustinus, De civitate Dei XIV.9, lin. 141, p. 429–lin. 163, p. 430. 88. See Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 64. 89. Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus XXXIII, lin. 2–4, p. 47. Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus XXXIII, lin. 25–35, p. 48. 90. Aurelius Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, XXXIV, lin. 2–12, p. 49. 91. For St Augustine’s reformulation of the Stoic ideal of apatheia and the philosophical problems this reformulation presents, see King, “Dispassionate Passions,” 20–22. 92. Peter was from the district of Novara, in Lombardy (northern Italy). He was born between 1095 and 1110. Nothing certain is known about Peter’s social background and early life. The first reference to Peter is found in a letter of Bernard of Clairvaux addressed to Gilduin, Prior of St. Victor in Paris. In this letter (written some time during 1134–36), Bernard recommends Peter to Gilduin and asks Gilduin to support Peter’s studies at Paris. Peter arrived in Paris in 1136, and it is possible that he received instruction as an extern from Hugh of St Victor. Peter had a very successful ecclesiastical career. He became a canon of Notre Dame in 1145, a subdeacon in 1147, a

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deacon and archdeacon by 1156, and Bishop of Paris in 1159. Peter died in 1160, soon after his elevation to the bishopric. See Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, vol. 1 (Leiden, New York, and Cologne: E.J. Brill, 1994), 15–23. See also Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 23–24; Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 34–39; and idem, “Peter Lombard,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 514. 93. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 22–24; Courtenay “Between Despair and Love,” 15. One can find a discussion of enjoyment and related terms in Peter Abelard’s Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a Christian. See Rosenfeld, Ethics and Enjoyment, 33–36. 94. The method of systematic organization of the theological material was in fact something that twelfth-century theologians learned from cannon lawyers. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 22. 95. See Colish, Peter Lombard, 33–35. 96. Swanson gives the following account of the term, see Jenny Swanson, “The Glossa Ordinaria,” in The Medieval Theologians, ed. G.R. Evans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 156: “The term glossa is an ancient one, which dates back to the time of the Greek grammarians. These scholars, commenting on Greek texts, used glossa to mean both a word which required particular explanation, and also the explanation itself. This second meaning is the one which was carried forward into the Middle Ages, and indeed into modern times. It is important, nowadays, to distinguish between firstly a gloss (glossa) or individual comment, secondly the Gloss or Glossa, meaning the ever-growing body of comment which became attached to the Bible from patristic times, and thirdly the Glossa Ordinaria, that particular sequence of explanatory material which became standard apparatus to the Bible in the mid-twelfth century. The term Glossa Ordinaria is in fact a modern one: twelfth- and thirteenth-century scholars simply used the term Glossa.” For Peter’s expertise and skills as a glossator, see Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 43–48, 50–53. 97. See Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 54. 98. See Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 27–28, 57; Colish, Peter Lombard, 57–63; Emero Stiegman, “Bernard of Clairvaux, William of St. Thierry, the Victorines,” in The Medieval Theologians, ed. G.R. Evans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 142–44. 99. See Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 29–30, 57–58; Colish, Peter Lombard, 47–52. Nielsen notes that Abelard’s Theologia Christiana and Theologia scholarium are actually later redactions of Theologia summi boni. See Lauge O. Nielsen, “Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers,” in The Medieval Theologians, ed. G.R. Evans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 106. 100. The method of opposing—with the aim of reconciling—conflicting statements from authoritative sources was also something that twelfth-century theologians, Abelard notwithstanding, learned from cannon lawyers. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 22. 101. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 23–24; Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 28–29; Nielsen, “Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers,” 106–7; and Colish, Peter Lombard, 44–47. 102. See Colish, Peter Lombard, 52–57, 63–77. 103. See Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 30–33; Colish, Peter Lombard, 72–77. 104. The plausible reasons why Lombard’s Sentences became valued as the best version of systematic theology are discussed in Colish, Peter Lombard, 77–90. 105. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 24. 106. Colish explains that Peter extracted St Augustine’s distinction between things and signs, enjoyment and use, from its original context—biblical hermeneutics—and applied it in the form of a conceptual division of the topics of a course of systematic theology. See Colish, Peter Lombard, 78–79.

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107. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae (Grottaferrata (Rome): Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971), liber I, d. 1, cap. 1, lin. 5–12, p. 55. 108. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 1, lin. 13–20, p. 55. 109. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 1, lin. 24–26, p. 55. 110. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 2, lin. 2–9, p. 56. 111. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 3–9, p. 61. 112. Rosemann says that the structure of Peter Lombard’s Sentences does not exactly correspond to the initial plan contained in the epilogue. In Book III, which deals with the Incarnation of the Word, Peter offers a different explanation of the structure of the Sentences, an explanation based upon the order of reason (ordo rationis), and Rosemann suggests that Peter may have abandoned St Augustine’s distinctions in favor of Abelard’s rational way of structuring theology. See Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 61–62. 113. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 25–26. 114. For the history of early Sentences abbreviations and glosses, see Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 27–52. 115. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 52. 116. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 2, lin. 14–19, p. 56. 117. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 2, lin. 20, p. 56–lin. 3, p. 57. 118. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 2, lin. 8–10, p. 56. 119. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 5–16, p. 57. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 41–44. 120. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 17–28, p. 57. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 44–46. 121. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 1–12, p. 58. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 46–49. 122. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 13–22, p. 58. 123. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 23–29, p. 58. Georgedes points out that Peter Lombard adopts St Augustine’s position that not even human beings are to be enjoyed for their own sake, but only on account of God. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 53. 124. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 20–35, p. 59. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 1995, 61–62. 125. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 1–6, p. 60. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 62–63. 126. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 7–20, p. 60. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 63–64. 127. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 21, p. 60–lin. 2, p. 6. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 65. 128. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 3, lin. 3–7, p. 61. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 65–66. 129. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 66.

TWO The Thirteenth Century—Setting Up the Key Issues in the Debate

The key issues in the medieval scholastic debate about beatific enjoyment began to take definitive shape in the thirteenth century, as soon as Lombard’s Sentences were accepted as the main systematic theology instruction manual in the medieval university. The theologians generally credited with prompting the adoption of Lombard’s Sentences as a university textbook are the Franciscan Alexander of Hales (1185–1245) at Paris and the Dominican Richard Fishacre (1205–48) at Oxford. As previously mentioned, however, commentaries on the Sentences appeared already in the second half of the twelfth century and in the first decades of the thirteenth century. 1 Chief among these early Sentences commentaries are the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss (existing in four separate versions composed between 1160 and 1230) 2 and the commentary of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton (composed between 1196 and 1206/1207). 3 Langton’s commentary, in particular, although emerging from the gloss tradition, can be viewed as the originator of the Sentences commentary as a distinct literary genre in the vast literature on Lombard’s Sentences. 4 One should also add to these early commentaries the Materia super libros Sententiarum attributed to Langton’s teacher at Paris, Peter Comestor (ca. 1100–ca. 1180). Comestor’s own Historia Scholastica became part of the theological curriculum alongside Lombard’s Sentences. Even though Comestor’s own method of theological study differed from that of Peter Lombard, Comestor composed an introduction (introitus) to Lombard’s Sentences that helped clarify the relationship between Lombard’s work and the content of sacra pagina. Comestor’s Introitus was used by readers of the Sentences up until the 1240s. 5 The actual practice of lecturing and, henceforth, commenting on Lombard’s Sentences was initiated by Alexander of Hales, who dedicated his morning “ordinary” 6 lectures at the Pari29

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sian theology faculty to Lombard rather than to Scripture. Alexander’s precedent of lecturing on Lombard was soon followed by Richard Fishacre at Oxford, even though the reception of the practice at Oxford provoked the dissatisfaction of Bishop Robert Grosseteste. Grosseteste wrote a letter to the regent masters of the university and urged them not to allow lecturing ordinarie on Scripture to be ousted in favor of lecturing on the Sentences. 7 By the middle of the thirteenth century the practice of lecturing and commenting on the Sentences of Peter Lombard had been firmly established in the medieval university curriculum, and the scholastic debate about beatific enjoyment, as we shall see, had started to unfold with full force. Our investigation of treatments of beatific enjoyment found in thirteenth-century commentaries on Lombard’s Sentences will take us through the pivotal issues theologians in this stage of the debate were interested in, such as: What is the adequate object of beatific enjoyment, and how does the Trinity function as an object of enjoyment? To what faculty of the soul is enjoyment typically attributed? How does enjoyment relate to volitional rest or quiescence? Are animals capable of enjoyment? In articulating the key issues pertaining to the debate about beatific enjoyment in the thirteenth century, we consult a number of Sentences commentaries between the years 1240 and 1280. We focus in particular upon the commentaries of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St Bonaventure, St Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise, Robert Kilwardby, William de la Mare, Giles of Rome, and Richard of Middleton. THE OBJECT OF ENJOYMENT The question of the object of enjoyment occupies a central place in scholastic treatments of enjoyment. A typical formulation of the question is whether only God ought to be enjoyed or whether enjoyment is only of the ultimate end. The universal position of thirteenth-century scholastics is that only God ought to be enjoyed. However, there is also a great interest in the question whether there are types of weaker or limited enjoyment with respect to objects other than God, e.g., another human being, the virtues, the faculties of the soul. In this section, I deal with discussions of the objects of enjoyment in the commentaries of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St Bonaventure, St Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise, Robert Kilwardby and Richard of Middleton. ALEXANDER OF HALES Alexander of Hales was one of the most highly esteemed and influential theologians of the thirteenth century. 8 He was born in Hales Owen in Shropshire, England, and studied and taught at the University of Paris

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(both at the Arts Faculty and the Faculty of Theology). His teaching at Paris was interrupted by a brief exile in 1229–31 as a result of a conflict between the Bishop of Paris and the university. Alexander entered the Franciscan Order in 1236 or 1237 and became Regent of the first Franciscan school at Paris. Before his sudden death in 1245, Alexander was involved in the Parisian ban on the study of Aristotle’s philosophical works and participated in the First Council of Lyons. 9 Apart from inaugurating the practice of lecturing on Lombard’s Sentences “ordinarily,” Alexander is also known for a second important innovation, viz., the restructuring of the text of the Sentences into distinctions. As Rosemann points out, the importance of this rearrangement can be seen in the resulting shift from a narrative, chapter-based order of exposition to a logical order based on units of meaning. 10 From this moment on, commenting on Lombard’s Sentences would follow the order of distinctions introduced by Alexander, and the debate regarding beatific enjoyment would unfold within the confines of the first distinction of Book I. Alexander’s Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi is based on a student report (reportatio) of Alexander’s actual university lectures delivered at Paris in 1220–27 almost a decade before Alexander entered the Franciscan Order. 11 As Rosemann notes, the title—“Glossa”—of Alexander’s commentary is somewhat misleading because, by its method, the commentary represents only loosely a literal interpretation of Lombard’s text. 12 This is exactly what we find in Alexander’s large treatment of enjoyment. The treatment follows closely the text of Lombard’s Sentences, yet it contains numerous insightful comments on the objects and psychology of enjoyment. With respect to the question of the objects of enjoyment, for instance, Alexander discusses whether we ought to enjoy created beatitude and the virtues. According to Alexander, enjoyment can be considered in multiple ways in relation to its objects. In a formal sense, we can be said to enjoy even enjoyment itself. In a material sense, we can be said to enjoy the virtues insofar as they represent the material disposition through which we enjoy beatitude. Created beatitude is an object of enjoyment in a limited sense whereas uncreated beatitude is an object of enjoyment in the sense of being the true final end of enjoyment. Alexander specifies that created beatitude is an object of use insofar as it is not taken as an end on its own but is related to uncreated beatitude. 13 The virtues, on the other hand, are very valuable goods which serve as the ontological link between the enjoying subject and the objects of enjoyment. The virtues, however, belong in the category of goods that do not have subsistence per se and fall outside St Augustine’s classification of things for enjoyment, things for use, and things for both enjoyment and use. 14 Should we enjoy virtues for their own sake (propter se)? Alexander says that, insofar as the virtues are considered perfections of the soul and are included in the genus of the honest good, they are to be enjoyed propter se. However, insofar as the virtues elevate our souls

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and connect us ultimately with uncreated beatitude, they can be said to be enjoyed on account of God (propter Deum) and not for their own sake. 15 ALBERT THE GREAT The German theologian Albert the Great (1200–1280) produced some of the earliest systematic treatments of the concept of enjoyment. Albert studied law at Padua and theology at Paris. He joined the Dominicans in 1223 or 1229. He received his doctorate of theology from Paris and worked as a Regent Master until 1248 when he was sent to Cologne to establish a Dominican study house (studium generale). 16 We have two treatments of enjoyment in Albert’s works—the first one from his commentary on the Sentences (1246–49) 17 and the second one from his Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei (1268–74). 18 According to Albert the Great, the supreme good or God should be taken as the adequate object of enjoying if we are thinking about enjoyment in a simple or perfect sense. This kind of enjoyment should be understood as a full-fledged pleasure or delight (delectatio non impedita), which is experienced in relationship to the most worthy operation of the intellect. If enjoyment is taken in a broad sense (communiter), then we are rather thinking about using accompanied by gladness (cum gaudio uti). In this latter sense, there are many things other than God that can be said to be enjoyed. 19 Commenting upon St Augustine’s reading of St Paul’s words to Philemon—“Brother, I will enjoy you in the Lord.”—Albert states that by loving another human being, one can also advance toward loving God because God resides in us through grace. The enjoyment of another human being is a sort of use accompanied by gladness, whereas the enjoyment of God is true enjoyment (fruitio vera). 20 In his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, Albert provides a grammatical analysis of Paul’s phrase. He explains that the construction of the verb frui together with the personal pronoun te indicates the matter or occasion of the act of enjoyment, namely, the person Philemon. The construction “in Domino” designates the end in which the act of enjoying terminates, i.e., God. 21 One can say therefore that St Paul’s words combine both the immediate object and ultimate end of enjoyment. Philemon is the immediate object of enjoyment and God is the final end to which the enjoyment of Philemon is subordinated. Moreover, Albert notes that we can derive joy from the virtues because, by doing so, we also enjoy God in them. Thus, we can be said to enjoy the virtues and God through one and the same act of enjoyment just as we can be said to love our neighbor and God through one and the same act of love. 22 One should not draw the erroneous conclusion, however, that by simply loving and treating one’s neighbor com-

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passionately one simultaneously loves and enjoys God. This is so because one may indeed have a natural affection with respect to one’s neighbor, not the supernatural virtue of infused charity. It has indeed been argued—convincingly in my opinion—that Albert’s moral theory allows us to make a legitimate and clear-cut distinction between the philosophical and theological ideals of human happiness. In Albert’s mind, we can achieve happiness within the natural moral order through the exercise of civil virtue or philosophical contemplation. 23 In a theological work such as Albert’s commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, on the other hand, love and enjoyment are construed within the parameters of St Augustine’s Christian ethics and the framework of grace and the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity. As far as the objects of use are concerned, Albert insists that every creature in the world can be considered an object of use as long as the being of this creature is not defiled or corrupted by sin. Furthermore, love should never terminate in created things because, as the Bible teaches, all created things are subject to vanity. Nevertheless, it is occasionally permissible for a person to adopt an attitude of use toward sin or the devil. For instance, the memory of past sins can be useful to the extent to which it can sharpen the feeling of remorse. On the other hand, the pain inflicted by the devil can be used to test the perseverance of the faithful and can help to increase the merit of repentance. 24 ST BONAVENTURE One of the major Franciscan thinkers of the thirteenth century was the Italian theologian Bonaventure (1217–74). St Bonaventure was St Thomas Aquinas’s slightly older contemporary. He entered the order of the Friars Minor in 1243 and studied theology at Paris under Alexander of Hales, John of la Rochelle, Eudes Rigaud and William of Melitona. He became a Regent Master in 1252 and functioned in this capacity until 1257 when he was elected a Minister General of the Franciscans. On November 11 or 12, 1273 Bonaventure was consecrated a Cardinal Bishop of Albano. His life ended seven months later during the council of Lyons. 25 St Bonaventure lectured upon the Sentences in 1250–52. The official edition (ordinatio) of his lectures dates from the years 1253–57, when he served as a Regent Master at Paris. 26 Rosemann makes two important observations regarding St Bonaventure’s achievement as a commentator on Lombard’s Sentences. The first is that the commentary itself is the result of the author’s ingenious synthesis of two rival traditions—the symbolism of traditional Christian theology, on the one hand, and the language of the liberal arts influenced by the rediscovered works of Aristotle, on the other. 27 We shall see below how in treating beatific enjoyment St Bonaventure in fact filters the Christian symbolism of heavenly

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beatitude, the vision and love of God through the Aristotelian scientific terminology of “motus,” “quies,” “delectatio,” “summum bonum,” etc. The second observation concerns the structure of St Bonaventure’s commentary. The structure is modeled after the division of distinctions introduced by Alexander of Hales, but each distinction follows an articulate three-prong pattern of internal division—(1) a divisio textus containing an account of the plan of Lombard’s argument; (2) a section of advanced questions organized into articles; the subject-matter of these questions is no longer directly related to the issued raised by Lombard himself; and (3) a concluding section consisting of doubts (dubia circa litteram) emerging from Lombard’s actual text. The advanced questions are organized dialectically. Each question represents a query (utrum) and consists of arguments pro et contra, a response to the principal query, and an assessment of the initial arguments presented in favor of the affirmative or negative answer to the query. 28 It is precisely these queries that begin to shape the boundaries of the debate regarding beatific enjoyment in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and have in fact served as thematic markers in our investigation. In his discussion of the objects of enjoyment, St Bonaventure talks about two different types of enjoyment. He defines enjoyment in the strict sense as a movement accompanied with delight and repose (motum cum delectatione et quietatione) and he claims that only God ought to be enjoyed in this sense. There is, however, an entire range of spiritual goods and things related to the ultimate end, such as fruits, gifts, and beatitudes, which constitute the objects of a different type of enjoyment. This is enjoyment taken in a general sense (communiter) as a kind of movement with delight only. St Bonaventure explains that it is not illegitimate for humans to have this kind of enjoyment. 29 Georgedes points out that the enjoyment of spiritual goods should be understood as a type of weaker enjoyment. He also notes that St Bonaventure does not want to separate this enjoyment from the enjoyment of God. 30 St Bonaventure insists that only God ought to be enjoyed. St Bonaventure argues that the soul is naturally capable of knowing all cognoscible objects because its cognitive power is unlimited. Thus, the soul’s power of cognition cannot be complete unless it knows the object which encompasses all other knowable things. Similarly, the soul through its affective power or will (affectio, affectus) is capable of loving (diligere) every good. But only an infinite good can bring ultimate fulfillment to the will. A finite good cannot bring volitional fulfillment to the soul because the human mind can always conceive of something greater than that good and the will can extend itself beyond that good. Accordingly, nothing less than an infinite good can satisfy the will. Since only God is the supreme and infinite good, therefore only God ought to be enjoyed. 31

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ST THOMAS AQUINAS We have three separate treatments of enjoyment in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–74). 32 The first is from his lectures on Peter Lombard’s Sentences delivered at Paris in 1252–56, 33 the second is from the so-called Lectura romana dating from the time of St Thomas’s teaching at the newly founded Dominican provincial studium of Santa Sabina in Rome (1265–66), 34 and the third is from his Summa theologiae IaIIae. Perhaps dissatisfied with Lombard’s approach to theology as a systematic discipline, St Thomas abandoned his second commentary on the Sentences—the Lectura romana—and began working on what would become St Thomas’s monumental synthesis of systematic theology—the Summa theologiae. 35 The project was carried out in the period 1265–73 but left unfinished. St Thomas stopped writing the third part of his Summa on December 6, 1273, in Naples, where he served as a Regent Master. The Summa was completed by his disciples. 36 I focus primarily on St Thomas’s Paris Sentences commentary, which is longer and more detailed than the Lectura romana, although I will occasionally refer the reader to some relevant passages, as well as on the treatment of enjoyment found in St Thomas’s Summa theologiae. In his Paris Sentences commentary, St Thomas gives the following explanation in response to the question whether only God ought to be enjoyed. He says that the expression “to enjoy of” (frui aliquo) can be understood in three different ways: (1) “to enjoy of God,” (2) “to enjoy of/through a habit” and (3) to enjoy of/through a faculty. 37 Georgedes notes that, on the basis of the different significations of the term “enjoyment,” it can be inferred that St Thomas allows weaker types of enjoyment with respect to things other than God. 38 In order to get a fuller picture of St Thomas’s understanding of the object of enjoying it will be helpful to see how he deals with some of the objections against the thesis that only God is to be enjoyed. I will consider only the first, third, and fourth objections. 39 According to the first objection, we ought to enjoy the things that make us blessed. We should thus enjoy created beatitude and not only God. 40 In response to this objection, St Thomas distinguishes between two senses in which we can be said to become blessed. In the effective sense (effective), only God can make us blessed. In the formal sense (formaliter), we are made blessed through the form of created beatitude, just as the form of “whiteness” can make something white. 41 In the former sense, then, we can be said to have God as an object of enjoying, whereas in the latter sense we can be said to enjoy created beatitude. 42 The third objection is based on the authority of Cicero who claims that the honest good can attract and charm us with its power and dignity. Whenever the intrinsic value of something allures us, we also love that same thing for its own sake. Therefore, the honest good and the virtues

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ought also to be enjoyed and not only God. 43 St Thomas handles this objection with another distinction. He now speaks about two different ways of understanding the expression “propter se.” In one sense, the expression “propter se” can be taken as the opposite of “propter aliud,” which means “on account of another” or “for the sake of another.” The virtues, then, should not be loved propter se because they are related to something else. There is, however, a sense in which “propter se” is opposed to “per accidens,” which means “accidentally” or “by accident.” Thus, to say that something is loved propter se means that the thing in question contains a certain intrinsic feature or indelible characteristic on account of which it is loved. This particular feature or characteristic of such objects does not prevent us from loving them also on account of something else which is believed to be worthier. There are other things, however, that we seek not because of what they contain but because of what we can achieve through them. For example, we take a bitter potion not because we love it as such but because we believe it will cure us. On the other hand, the expression “propter se” can be taken to refer to something as a formal or final cause. The virtues can be said to function as the formal cause of enjoyment whereas God can be said to be its final cause. 44 The fourth objection asserts that St Paul’s words to Philemon lend support to the view that we ought to enjoy both the human being as an image of God as well as creatures containing a vestige of God. 45 St Thomas points out that we ought to enjoy a just and saintly person not absolutely (simpliciter) but in God, insofar as God is the ultimate object of enjoyment whereas the holy person contains and represents merely an expressed likeness of the divine goodness. The sinner, on the other hand, should not be enjoyed because he lacks grace, and it is grace alone that makes possible God’s dwelling in a human being and prepares the path for the enjoyment of the supreme goodness of God. 46 St Thomas’s later treatment of enjoyment is found in Q. 11 of the First Part of the Second Part of the Summa theologiae. In the Summa, St Thomas discusses enjoyment in relation to the broader framework of the structure of human action. 47 He deals with the object of enjoyment in Q. 11, A. 3. In response to the question whether only the ultimate end can function as the object of enjoyment, St Thomas maintains that something can be taken as ultimate in two different senses: (1) either absolutely (simpliciter) or (2) relatively (secundum quid). Something is understood to be ultimate in the absolute sense if it is not related to something else but is taken as an end on its own. Something is taken as an ultimate end in the relative sense when it is the last in a particular order of ends. St Thomas does not give an example of the second type of ultimate end but he distinguishes it clearly from things that are taken as means and says that it contains a certain amount of delight (delectatio) and can be called a fruit (fructus) in some sense. Nevertheless, an end taken as ultimate in the relative sense is

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not a fully satisfying end because as long as there is more to expect, the will remains in suspense. 48 St Thomas deals with various categories of enjoyable objects in his replies to the objections of the third article. He examines whether we should enjoy other human beings, the fruits of the Spirit, and enjoyment itself. Georgedes notes that although St Thomas does not make the threefold distinction regarding the types of enjoyment found in the Scriptum, he nevertheless allows the possibility of enjoying something other than God. 49 St Thomas’s analysis of St Paul’s words to Philemon does not include the distinction between enjoying a just man and enjoying a sinner. St Thomas refers to St Augustine’s interpretation of the text in De doctrina Christiana, Book I and states only that man must be considered the intermediate object of enjoyment and not its terminus. 50 St Thomas says that the fruits of the Spirit can be understood as effects caused by God. With respect to the subject of enjoyment, on the other hand, the fruits can be viewed as something delightful and ultimately desirable or hoped for. Using the authority of St Ambrose, St Thomas points out that the fruits are sought for their own sake because they contain qualities that please us. This does not mean, however, that the fruits are not related to the ultimate end. 51 St Thomas’s remark on enjoying one’s enjoyment is quite interesting. The objection states that since enjoyment is an act of the will and since we enjoy through the faculty of the will, then it is possible to enjoy one’s enjoyment. However, our true ultimate end is not the act of enjoying itself but the uncreated good alone, i.e., God. 52 St Thomas distinguishes between two kinds of ends: (1) the thing itself (res) and (2) the attainment of the thing (adeptio rei). God is thus the thing or end with which enjoyment is concerned and the act of enjoying is the attainment of God. St Thomas explains that God and the enjoyment of God are not two distinct ends but one and the same end instead (unus finis). This is so because the formal character (ratio) by means of which we enjoy God is the same character through which we enjoy the divine enjoyment. St Thomas claims that this comment also applies to created beatitude which consists in the act of enjoyment. 53 Given that God is the ultimately satisfying object of enjoyment we can ask whether it is possible to experience an enjoyment of God in the present life. St Thomas’s answer to this question in both his Sentences commentary and the Summa is unequivocal. It is indeed possible to enjoy God in this life, but a perfect and totally fulfilling enjoyment can be attained only in heaven. Thus, in his Scriptum, St Thomas writes that a just man can have only an imperfect enjoyment. True and perfect enjoyment is available only to the blessed (beati) in heaven. 54 In the Lectura romana, St Thomas states that St Augustine defines two different kinds or degrees of enjoyment—enjoyment of anticipation (in mente) and consumate enjoyment of the real thing (in re). 55 In the Summa, St Thomas says that one can distinguish between perfect and imperfect enjoyment de-

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pending upon the mode of attainment of the end. Enjoyment is perfect if the end is possessed in reality (in re). Enjoyment is imperfect if the end is not attained actually but only in intention (in intentione). 56 St Thomas’s distinction between imperfect and perfect enjoyment suggests that there can be degrees of enjoyment. Thus, the better an end seems and the more firmly grasped, the greater the enjoyment. The idea that enjoyment has degrees is also what distinguishes an act of enjoyment from an act of simple volition. 57 It must be stressed, however, that enjoyment of anything other or less than the ultimate end should not be considered enjoyment in the proper sense of the term. 58 PETER OF TARANTAISE It has been stated that St Bonaventure’s and St Thomas’s Sentences commentaries have played a major formative role in the development of the theological and philosophical thought in the period between 1256 and 1285. 59 As we shall see below, the features of St Bonaventure’s and St Thomas’s conceptual elucidations of enjoyment are more or less present in subsequent commentaries. One of the earliest treatments of enjoyment from the period following the Parisian lectureships of St Bonaventure and St Thomas is found in the Sentences commentary of the Parisian Dominican Peter of Tarantaise. Peter lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1257–59, and became Pope Innocent V shortly before his death in 1276. 60 Peter’s election as pope—the first Dominican to become pope—was most probably the reason why his Sentences commentary was abridged several times. But it has been said that Peter’s commentary was not entirely lacking in originality insofar as it demonstrated an attempt to reconcile the positions of St Bonaventure and Aquinas. 61 Along with St Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise talks about different ways of understanding the expression “frui aliquo.” In a productive sense (effective), the expression refers to the faculty of enjoying. In a dispositional sense (dispositive), the expression refers to the habit of charity through which we prepare ourselves for the enjoyment of God. In a formal sense (formaliter), “frui aliquo” concerns the very act of enjoying and repose. We are thus said to enjoy created beatitude. In a material (materialiter) or final sense (finaliter), “frui aliquo” represents the object that we ought to enjoy as a supreme good and ultimate source of repose. 62 ROBERT KILWARDBY A major Oxford treatment of the concept of fruitio from the period 1255–60 is found in the Sentences commentary of the English theologian Robert Kilwardby (1215–79). Born in Leicestershire, England, around 1215, Kilwardby studied the liberal arts at Paris, where he received his

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Master of Arts degree in 1237 and occupied the position of a regent master until 1245. He joined the Dominicans in 1245 and moved to Oxford to study theology. He served as a regent master in theology from 1256 to 1261. On October 11, 1272 Pope Gregory X appointed Kilwardby Archbishop of Canterbury. In 1278, Kilwardby became Cardinal Bishop of Porto in Italy. He died in Viterbo on September 10, 1279. 63 Kilwardby is known for issuing a doctrinal condemnation similar to that of Bishop Tempier. The condemnation was announced on March 18, 1277 and covered thirty propositions—fourteen concerning grammar and logic, and sixteen concerning natural philosophy. 64 Kilwardby’s Sentences commentary, however, is said to contain no trace of the Paris and Oxford controversies or of any doctrines attributable to Dominican education in particular. 65 Kilwardby is also known for his indexing and tabulating skills. The aids he developed for use in connection with the study of the Sentences, especially, were very popular in the Middle Ages. 66 Kilwardby’s commentary covers all four books of Lombard’s Sentences, but, unlike the commentaries we have considered so far, it is organized according to a question-format, not distinctions. The latest research indicates that Kilwardby’s commentary was composed around 1255. 67 In terms of the large number of references to the works of St Augustine, Kilwardby’s commentary has been described as deeply Augustinian in character. The commentary also bears evidence of the influence of Kilwardby’s contemporaries—Alexander of Hales, St Bonaventure, Richard Fishacre, Richard Rufus and William of Melitona. 68 Kilwardby discriminates between the various senses of enjoying. According to him, we can talk about enjoying an object or an end as well as enjoying through or by means of that which attunes our being with respect to the end. There are two things that can attune our being with respect to the end: (1) the natural faculty through which we are directed toward and adhere to the end and (2) the divine power (virtus) or grace (gratia) through which we are disposed habitually and become actually united with the end. We can be said to enjoy something as an object or end when we enjoy God, because God is the highest end. 69 A noteworthy aspect of Kilwardby’s treatment is the rejection of the distinction of the twofold end of enjoying. Kilwardby mentions that some thinkers differentiate between created beatitude, which is the interior end of enjoying (finis intra), and uncreated beatitude, which is the exterior end of enjoying (finis extra). 70 To Kilwardby’s mind, this distinction is superfluous because created beatitude is not an additional intermediary bond between God and the soul. Created beatitude is not distinct from the perfect and complete degree of virtue, which the soul acquires in the state of glory. 71 The rejection of the distinction between created and uncreated beatitude is in fact evidence of the Augustinian foundations of Kilwardby’s virtue ethics. For Kilwardby, all virtues—even the cardinal virtues— are caused by God. Admitting the existence of created beatitude, even if

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we granted its existence only in heaven, may have suggested to Kilwardby that beatitude can be acquired through human effort alone. For Kilwardby, beatitude can only be a divine gift. Accordingly, a life of virtue not permeated by concern with the ultimate end of human life—viz., union with God—is not a truly virtuous life, or, at least, is not virtuous in the relevant sense of being salvific. 72 RICHARD OF MIDDLETON A major treatment of the concept of enjoyment from a Franciscan author from the period before 1280 is found in the Sentences commentary of Richard of Middleton (1249–1302). Richard’s origin was either French or English. He studied at Paris, served as a Regent Master of the Franciscan study house in Paris during 1284–87, and became a Franciscan Master of the French province. Richard’s commentary on the Sentences dates from 1278 to 1280. 73 Richard of Middleton claims that God alone is the legitimate (debitum) object of enjoyment. He specifies that the enjoyment of God is an act of the free will. This enjoyment has degrees of perfection and should not be confused with the enjoyment of animals. 74 Following the authority of St Augustine, Richard argues that the will is not allowed to seek ultimate rest in anything other than a supremely excellent object. Since only God is supremely excellent and since the will has the capacity to attain Him, therefore the will should not enjoy anything other than God. 75 Furthermore, the will is not allowed to enjoy anything less than an object capable of bringing total rest to the will. Since only God can satisfy the will, therefore only God ought to be enjoyed. In support of the assertion that only God can satisfy the will, Richard recalls the opening paragraph of St Augustine’s Confessions, where we read that our vocation is to praise God and that our hearts cannot find peace until they rest in Him. Richard also appeals to the testimony of the writer of the treatise De spiritu et anima who states that the human appetite is never fully satisfied by partial goods but always seeks better and more complete goods until it reaches the supreme good. 76 Richard maintains that the truth of the claim that only God can bring rest to the will can be demonstrated by a rational proof as well. Interestingly enough, the proof is partly based upon the authority of the Neo-Platonic work Book of Causes (Liber de Causis). A body in motion tends toward the cause of its motion through the influence which it receives from that cause. The causal influence of the prime mover is much more powerful than the causal influence of any secondary mover. Therefore, the movable body has a stronger tendency in respect to the prime mover than in respect to the secondary movers. Similarly, since God moves the will in the capacity of a prime mover, the will, therefore, cannot attain full rest unless it is united with God. 77

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THE ETERNAL RES OF ENJOYMENT A question which addresses some essential aspects of Trinitarian theology and which does not appear in Lombard’s account of enjoyment is whether the blessed have a single act of enjoyment with respect to the Trinity. Can the blessed in heaven enjoy the divine essence separately from the divine persons or a single divine person separately from the others? This particular question received a great amount of attention in the yearly fourteenth century but it was also discussed by some thirteenth century theologians, e.g., Alexander of Hales, St Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome and Richard of Middleton among others. The initial problem at the root of the question of the enjoyment of the Trinity stems from St Augustine’s characterization of the divine persons as enjoyable things (res), which implies that the persons are three distinct divine beings and leads to polytheism. The concern to understand the term “res” correctly when applied to the divine persons is evident already in Stephen Langton’s Sentences commentary. Langton remarks that labeling the persons “res” does not imply polytheism because the substantive “res” can change its meaning depending on the context in which it is used. In some propositions “res” stands for the divine persons whereas in other propositions it stands for the divine essence. What “res” stands for in one proposition (a function of names called in medieval scholastic linguistic theory a supposition), however, is not interchangeable with what “res” stands for in another proposition. Thus, safeguarding Trinitarian orthodoxy in connection with the application of the term “res” to the Trinity requires an elaborate account of the way in which the term functions in different Trinitarian propositions. 78 One of the first treatments of the question of the enjoyment of the Trinity is contained in the Glossa of Alexander of Hales. Alexander’s comments on the enjoyment of the Trinity show a concern to explain the meaning of the term “res” when applied to the divine persons. Alexander says that a divine person should be understood as a median between notions and essence. The essence is a thing or reality, the notions are distinguishing aspects or properties of the persons (rationes distinguentes), and the persons are things or realities with respect to the notions and aspects with respect to the essence. Thus, it is only with respect to the differentiating personal properties that the persons can be said to be res. 79 Alexander also rejects the idea that there are three simultaneous affective movements with respect to the Trinity. 80 He claims that there is numerically one affective movement which can be accounted for in terms of the unity of the divine essence. 81 St Thomas Aquinas maintains that the blessed enjoy the persons of the Trinity in a single act. This act can be considered in two ways: (1) on account of the divine essence and (2) on account of the divine properties. On account of the essence, the object of enjoyment receives its unity from

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the supreme goodness of the divinity. Since the goodness of the persons is numerically one, therefore the enjoyment of the Trinity is also numerically one. On account of the properties, enjoyment is still one act, yet it can be viewed as a complex act because it is differentiated in respect to the divine relations. For St Thomas, the persons of the Trinity are differentiated by the relations. St Thomas points out that, according to Aristotle, a pair of related terms is known as soon as one of the terms is known. Thus, the enjoyment of one of the persons entails the enjoyment of the other two persons. Consequently, one and the same act of enjoyment corresponds to the three persons. In conclusion, St Thomas notes that the first account—that is, the account of the essence—is a better one because it captures that particular aspect of the beatific object which brings unity to the act of enjoying. 82 The problem whether the blessed enjoy the Trinity through a single act is also discussed by Giles of Rome (1243/7–1316). Giles was the first member of the Order of Augustinian Hermits to become a doctor of theology at Paris (sometime in 1285–87). Giles may have studied theology at Paris under St Thomas Aquinas during 1269–72, which was the period of St Thomas’s second Parisian regency. Shortly after the Condemnation of 1277, Bishop Tempier started a separate doctrinal investigation of Giles’ writings. Giles was summoned to recant 51 articles drawn from book I of his Sentences commentary. Giles refused to recant the condemned articles and his academic career came to a halt until his final rehabilitation in 1285. 83 Giles lectured on the Sentences before 1271 and his ordinatio-commentary on the first book of the Sentences dates from 1271–73. 84 Giles concurs with the opinion of St Thomas and states that we should be said to enjoy the persons of the Trinity through a single act. He also adds that there are three ways of understanding this single act of enjoyment: (1) from the point of view of its formal character or aspect, (2) from the point of view of its end, (3) from the point of view of its subject. Since enjoyment receives its character from goodness, and since the goodness of the Trinity is formally integrated in a single object, therefore the act of enjoying is numerically one. Furthermore, since human beings have a single objective end, and since the persons of the Trinity cannot be viewed as separate ends, therefore there is one enjoyment. Finally, Giles explains that there can be only one enjoyment from the standpoint of the enjoying subject. The act of enjoying cannot receive its formal specification from something which is by nature double or multiple. 85 Richard of Middleton’s solution to the problem of the enjoyment of the Trinity is very similar to that of St Thomas and Giles. Richard claims that the blessed have a single act of enjoyment in respect to the persons of the Trinity. In support of his view, Richard argues that the formal object of enjoyment in respect to the divine persons is the supreme goodness (summa bonitas), which the persons share in common. Since the three

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persons are equal in terms of their divine goodness, they ought to be adored equally. Consequently, the blessed enjoy the Holy Trinity through a single act. 86 THE PROPER FACULTY OF ENJOYMENT In this section, I discuss beatific enjoyment from the point of view of the thirteenth-century interest in classifying the faculties of the human being. 87 I focus mainly upon the definitions of enjoyment in order to find out to which human faculty enjoyment is most strictly attributed and what are its essential psychological aspects or characteristics. It should be said that the notion of enjoyment was also discussed to some extent in medieval commentaries on the soul. 88 For instance, the Franciscan thinker John of la Rochelle (1190/1200–1245) 89 includes the terms “enjoyment” and “use” in his taxonomy of the acts of the concupiscible power in his Summa de anima (ca. 1235). 90 According to John, enjoyment (fruicio) and use (usus) can be viewed as attitudes which bring about the experience of delight (letari). 91 John mentions use specifically in the classification of the acts of the rational motive faculty (voluntas). Use is the last step in the process of volition involving deliberation (consilium), judgment (iudicium), disposition (sentencia), choice (electio), and motion or impulse (impetus). 92 However, John of la Rochelle makes no effort to explain how the act of use should be understood. I discuss the views of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St Bonaventure, St Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise, Robert Kilwardby, William de la Mare, Giles of Rome, and Richard of Middleton. ALEXANDER OF HALES Alexander explains that the three definitions of enjoyment which Lombard extracts from St Augustine’s writings spell out three distinct aspects of the subject and object of enjoyment. With respect to the subject, the expression “to cling with love” refers to the soul, the saying “to use with joy” relates to the power or ability of the soul (potentia), and the phrase “we enjoy things known” corresponds to the faculty of the will (voluntas). With respect to the object, on the other hand, the phrase “to cling with love” stands for God, “to use with joy” refers to created beatitude, and “we enjoy things known” refers to the uncreated divine persons. Alexander also notes that Lombard interprets the expressions differently. Lombard takes the phrase “to cling with love” to signify earthly enjoyment and the statement “we enjoy things known” to refer to the enjoyment of the eternal good. 93 It must be said that, for Alexander, to enjoy, simply speaking (simpliciter), is to cling to or inhere in the object with love. In the present life (in

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via), we can be said to enjoy only in an imperfect or conditional sense (secundum quid) because we only approach and have not yet arrived at the ultimate station of our love. To inhere in something with love is to have reached the last station of one’s desire. 94 Alexander even calls this state of ultimate fulfillment a kind of “vision” of the motor faculty (vis motiva), which should be distinguished from the vision of the intellect (vis cogitativa). Alexander explains that the term “vision,” when applied to the motive faculty, means “cleaving with love.” He then asserts that our beatific reward consists in that cleaving. This last remark is very significant because it shows the tendency of Franciscan theologians to emphasize the pre-eminence of love and the will in the state of the beatific vision. 95 ALBERT THE GREAT In his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, Albert defines enjoyment as an actus affectus 96 consequent upon the act of the intellect. Unlike speculation, which does not require cleaving to the object and can take place from a distance, enjoyment involves an intimate union with and a tasting (gustus) of the delightful nature of the object. The union with the object is accomplished through the faculty of the will. The will is the highest power of the soul capable of perfecting joyfulness and bringing to a halt the longing of the soul. 97 The remark that enjoyment involves tasting (gustus) of the object is quite interesting because of the association with the doctrine of grace-based spiritual senses which Albert evidently acknowledges. 98 According to Albert, beatific enjoyment is the result of the immediate conjunction of the intellect of the blessed with the divine substance. 99 Nevertheless, enjoyment will not only affect the intellectual level of the human soul but it will also influence the lower powers of the soul—the imagination and common sense—and the body. Albert beautifully describes the future experience of beatific enjoyment. He talks about an overflow of divine sweetness (redundantia dulcedinis divinae) flooding the intellect and descending all the way down to the bodily senses. 100 The senses of the blessed will take delight in the humanity of Christ whereas the intellect will contemplate the divinity of Christ. 101 In the first part of his Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, Albert offers a thorough systematic examination of the concept of enjoyment. The form of this second examination differs from that contained in Albert’s Sentences commentary insofar as it is based on Aristotle’s method of classification into genus, species, and specific difference. In the generic sense of the term, enjoyment is a passion (passio), which follows upon the operation of the intellect in respect to the ultimate good. Albert explains that when the intellectual nature is elevated to the supreme good through grace and glory it appropriates that good internally and is subsequently

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refreshed and nourished. This interior replenishing of the intellect gives rise to enjoyment. 102 According to species, enjoyment is a passion of the will prompted by the operation of the intellect. Enjoyment is caused through the operation of the intellect by announcing (intellectus nuntiat) what ought to be pursued and by activating the will. Once the will is determined by the intellect, the will initiates the movement (voluntas impetum facit) of the living organism. 103 We can discern, therefore, two relevant aspects of enjoyment: (1) the causal determination of the intellect and (2) the motivational influence of the will. Having defined enjoyment according to genus and species, Albert gives two strict definitions of enjoyment: (1) a proper and simple definition and (2) an improper and relative definition. Properly (proprie) and simply speaking (simpliciter), enjoyment is an unhindered and absolute (per se) adherence to a thing with love and delight. The first definition pertains only to beatific enjoyment (fruitio patriae). Improperly (improprie) and relatively speaking (secundum quid), enjoyment is an accidental (per accidens), instrumental (propter aliud) or incomplete (imperfect) adherence to a thing. In this second sense, enjoyment is understood as the natural pleasure (delectatio naturalis) which animals and human beings derive from food and other fleeting goods. 104 Why does Albert classify enjoyment in the category of passions? Surely, the placing of enjoyment in the passion-category conflicts with Albert’s earlier view of enjoyment as an act of the will. We can solve the conflict by explaining Albert’s use of the term “passion.” According to Albert, passions are qualities generated by movements. 105 Albert says that enjoyment is a passion in relationship to the intellect. It is indeed the operation of the intellect which generates the enjoyment. This operation is called happiness (felicitas) and is distinct from enjoyment (fruitio). Considered on its own, enjoyment is called delight or pleasure (delectatio). 106 Appealing to the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius, Albert explains that pleasure must be understood as the reception of something agreeable to the subject. Albert combines this characterization with the account of Aristotle’s commentator Michael of Ephesius who describes pleasure as an expanding (dilatatio), diffusing (diffusio) or blooming (refloritio) caused by the conjunction of nature with what is agreeable to it or perfects it. 107 It can be said then that enjoyment is an appetitive state which is caused by an intellectual apprehension. The successful actualization of that state is hinted at by the words “dilating,” “diffusing,” and “blooming,” which seem to suggest that certain spiritual and bodily changes have taken place. 108 Interestingly enough, Albert places use in the category of action. What is his rationale for doing that? He explains that use is an elicited act of a faculty through which the faculty becomes related to something useful or delectable that can be considered the terminus of the act. 109 According to

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scholastic terminology, an elicited act is an act drawn out or proceeding directly from a faculty, and it should be distinguished from the act commanded by that faculty (actus imperatus), which is basically an act of faculties subordinate to the commanding faculty. 110 Albert maintains that use proceeds from reason and not from the will. More specifically, use is an act of prudence. Albert thinks that St Augustine’s definition of use—”to take something within the faculty of the will”—contains the fallacy of amphiboly. The meaning of the term “facultas” is rather different from that of the term “voluntas.” Facultas refers to the facility with which reason selects and chooses means to obtain certain ends whereas voluntas captures the volitional impulsion and tendency toward ends in general. Appealing to the authority of Aristotle, Albert argues that choice is a function of prudence and not of will. The moral power (virtus moralis) does not make choices but is simply inclined or tends toward the end. 111 St Thomas’s view of use is radically different from that of Albert. According to St Thomas, use can mean the operation of using a thing well or poorly or it can mean a frequently or habitually performed operation. Strictly speaking, the operation of using consists in taking something as a means to a certain end. The relation of means to ends includes three distinct operations: (1) the purely rational operation of prescribing an end and of directing toward the end, (2) the operation of the commanding will and (3) the operation of the executive motor power. The act of use belongs to the operation of the commanding will, which moves the subordinate powers according to the ordinance of reason. 112 ST BONAVENTURE In his Sentences commentary, St Bonaventure claims that enjoyment is an act of the will and suggests that this act can be viewed in a threefold manner (tripliciter). Generally speaking (communiter), enjoyment can be considered as a movement (motus) associated with or attended by delight (delectatio), which corresponds to St Augustine’s definition of enjoyment as “use with delight.” Properly speaking (proprie), enjoyment can be regarded as a movement culminating in repose or a relaxing effect (quies). This description matches St Augustine’s definition of enjoyment as cleaving to something with love for the sake of the thing. Strictly speaking (propriissime), enjoyment can be viewed as a movement involving both delight and repose. This does not seem to be a distinct type of enjoyment but is simply a combination of the previous two definitions. St Bonaventure draws the strict definition of enjoyment from St Augustine’s words “to enjoy is to take repose in things known, in which the will is delighted propter se.” 113

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St Bonaventure seems to take the term “motus” in the sense of volitional activity or impulse, which in turn makes “quies” and “delectatio” specific aspects of volition—volitional appeasement and a feeling associated with this appeasement. 114 He thus says that the term “frui” is understood to mean pleasure or rest or the combination of the two. Since both pleasure and rest have the character of the good (ratio boni) and since the good is the object of the will, it follows that enjoyment is an act of the will. 115 Furthermore, St Bonaventure insists that enjoyment should not be regarded as pertaining to any of the other powers of the human being except only in a dispositional sense (dispositive), i.e., insofar as these powers prepare or dispose the human being for the exercise of enjoying. One should keep in mind, however, that under each of the three aforementioned descriptions, enjoyment is first and foremost (loquendo essentialiter) an act of the will. 116 Thus, although delight and rest can be applied to all other human powers when united with their corresponding object, it is primarily from the will that these powers receive delight and rest. 117 It is also important to see how St Bonaventure stresses the role of love (amor) in relationship to beatific enjoyment. He maintains that the vision and possession of the beatific object are not by themselves sufficient to produce enjoyment and delight. A person is never delighted unless he/ she also loves the object. St Bonaventure describes love in mystical terms. He says that love is like a sharp edge (quasi acumen penetrans) capable of achieving perfect union with the object. The union with the object gives rise to pleasure and tranquility. 118 One can thus consider the relationship between vision and enjoyment from the point of view of two distinct aspects of volition—desire (appetitus) and satisfaction (complacentia). From the point of view of desire, the act of the will can precede the actual vision of the beatific object whereas from the point of view of satisfaction, it follows it in the form of enjoyment. 119 Nevertheless, one should not overstate the importance of vision at the expense of satisfaction or the importance of satisfaction at the expense of vision because vision and satisfaction are inseparable from one another. 120 It is interesting to note that St Bonaventure also uses the term “fruitio” in the broader sense of blessedness. Taken in this sense, fruitio embraces vision (visio), love (dilectio), and attainment (comprehensio), which St Bonaventure calls enjoyment through appropriation. According to St Bonaventure, vision, love, and attainment are three gifts (dotes) through which the grace of God perfects the faculties of the soul. Vision perfects the rational faculty of the soul. Love and attainment perfect the will. St Bonaventure divides the will into the concupiscible and irascible faculties by analogy with the sensitive appetite. He consequently suggests that love perfects the concupiscible faculty, whereas attainment perfects the irascible faculty. Through the irascible faculty, the will is capable of holding fast to the ultimate end. 121 St Bonaventure also maintains that vision, love and attainment are inextricably linked and united. The only reason for

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stressing the importance of the act of vision is that the clear vision of the beatific object differentiates the state of glory (status patriae) from the state of earthly pilgrimage (status viae). 122 ST THOMAS AQUINAS In his early discussion of enjoyment—Book I of the Paris commentary on Lombard’s Sentences—St Thomas gives two accounts of the term “fruitio.” The first account is found in the first article of the first question. The second is contained in a separate section based on the literal exposition and interpretation of Lombard’s text. 123 In the first account, St Thomas distinguishes two senses of the term “fruitio.” Fruition, taken in the sense of happiness (felicitas), can be described as an intellectual act. St Thomas explains that, since fruition is the highest felicity possible for us, consequently it must pertain to the ultimate operation of the worthiest human faculty. The highest human faculty is the intellect and the ultimate operation of the intellect is the vision of God, which is the noblest object. Therefore, the whole substance of blessedness (beatitudo) consists in the vision of God. 124 St Thomas says that God is seen through His essence and not through a likeness. This vision is then described as an actual grasping (comprehensio) and as a kind of mutual penetration through love of the seen and the one seeing. 125 St Thomas explains that the union with the most fitting object entails supreme delight (delectatio summa). This kind of delight is what makes our happiness most perfect and is what the term “fruitio” designates from the point of view of the fullness or culmination of enjoyment. Enjoyment—thus understood—is an act of the will in accordance with the habit of charity although only in relation to preceding powers and habits. 126 The two senses of the term “fruitio” are then the following: In terms of its origin or foundation (ex parte principii), fruitio is an intellectual act. In terms of its culmination or perfection (ex parte sui complementi), however, fruitio is an act of the will. 127 It is interesting that St Thomas connects fruitio with summa delectatio. Pasnau points out how St Thomas reserves the term “fruitio” for the supreme delight which, unlike any other familiar kinds of delight, can be experienced only as the result of the successful attainment of the ultimate end or God. 128 Knuuttila claims that St Thomas treats pleasure as an appetitive act responsible for behavioral modifications. Pleasure is also linked with an awareness of the presence of something delightful. 129 It is important to point out that the pleasure of the rational appetite—i.e., the will—differs from the pleasure of the sensitive appetite. Robert Miner explains the key difference between the two kinds of pleasure in terms of whether the delight is or is not accompanied by a certain corporeal transmutation. The pleasure of the rational appetite, in particular, can be characterized as a “pseudopassion,” and the

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more appropriate term for this kind of mental state is “gaudium.” 130 Thus, it is conceivable that one may feel bodily pleasure and yet be deeply saddened or that one may experience a state of overwhelming joy or gladness while being simultaneously in pain. 131 In the second account of fruitio, St Thomas notes that there could be multiple definitions of a thing derived from the causes or properties of the being of the thing (esse rei). 132 St Thomas then extracts the following technical descriptions from the three Augustinian definitions of enjoyment found in Lombard’s Sentences. 133 He contends that by defining enjoyment as “to inhere in a thing with love for the sake of the thing,” St Augustine is describing the act of enjoyment in relation to the object as a thing worthy on its own account, and to the habit of love which generates the enjoying. St Thomas insists that, by stating that “we enjoy things known, in which the will finds repose and delight propter se,” St Augustine makes a connection between the will and the intellect. Finally, St Thomas explains that by calling enjoyment a “delightful use of what is actually possessed,” St Augustine defines the act of enjoyment in terms of the property which follows it, namely, the delight or gladness which accompanies the obtainment of the desired object and perfects the act of enjoyment. 134 The last definition shows clearly that delight is a property of enjoyment which follows the attainment of the end. It is what makes enjoyment perfect. In the Lectura romana, which contains a more literal interpretation of St Augustine’s frui/uti distinction, St Thomas defines enjoyment as a form of love whereby the will clings to God. Love, St Thomas claims, is prior to all other affections insofar as it gives rise to desire, joy and grief. The concept of love is also the more encompassing one because it includes the love of what is not yet possessed as well as the love of what is actually possessed. 135 In his Summa, St Thomas discusses whether enjoyment is an act of the appetitive power (potentia appetitiva). His response to the question is based mostly on some grammatical remarks. He says that the abstract name “enjoyment” (fruitio) is derived from “fruit” (fructus), which is a concrete name standing for sensible things. As a sensible thing, the fruit is the last thing which we expect a tree to produce and which we perceive with certain sweetness. Enjoyment then can be said to be related to the love (amor) or pleasure (delectatio) that we experience as an effect of the attainment of a longed for object or end. Accordingly, since the end is the object of the appetite, enjoyment must be an act of the appetitive faculty. 136 It should be noted that St Thomas uses the word fructus in the proper sense to describe the object of the appetite in general. In a transferred sense, however, the word can signify the object of the intellectual appetite, Fructus, then, represents the universal good as an object and ultimate end of the will. Accordingly, to have fruitio means to have one’s will in a state of full repose and delight through the attainment of the

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end. 137 St Thomas explains that the vision of God, which is essentially an act of the intellect, can also function as an object of the will. As an object of the will, the beatific vision produces enjoyment. 138 What is the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure? Are they identical or are they distinct? St Thomas explains that pleasure has two aspects: (1) the perception of something agreeable, which pertains to the apprehensive power and (2) the satisfaction of delight (complacentia) derived from the pleasant object, which belongs to the appetitive power. 139 St Thomas also treats pleasure in his discussion of beatitude in the Summa. Pleasure is said to be a consequence or inseparable property (quasi per se accidens) of beatitude and is attributed to the will. Beatitude is an act of the intellect. The reason why volition is not included in the essence of beatitude is that the attainment (consecutio) of the beatific object can only occur through the intellect. The will initiates a pursuit of the beatific object but it cannot attain the object simply by desiring it. St Thomas gives an example to show that the will cannot grasp the object through mere desire. A person cannot obtain money simply by desiring it but ought to seize it by hand or by some other means. 140 Thus, delight, which is not included in the essence of beatitude but follows from it, is understood to belong to the will. 141 But how is that distinct from enjoyment which is also an act of the will? Georgedes states that St Thomas never says explicitly that enjoyment and pleasure are identical. 142 Richard Cross argues for a clear distinction between the two. Cross explains that the difference between fruitio and delectatio is essentially that between an appetitive act (i.e., willing) and an affective response or an emotion in the will. Cross also points out that the meaning of delectatio is equivocal. Delectatio can be taken to mean the passion of pleasure in the sensitive appetite but it can also be understood to refer to the emotion of delight or elation in the will. 143 Other commentators, however, do not see a very clear-cut distinction between simple acts of the will and corresponding volitional passions even though they do concur that St Thomas distinguishes between affections of the intellectual appetite (or the will)—call them “pseudopassions” or “dispassionate passions”—and passions proper. 144 Still, even if St Thomas did differentiate clearly between acts and affections (or passions) of the will, a more rigorous analysis of the relationship between volitional acts and passions, in general, and between enjoyment and delight, in particular, would be undertaken by later scholastics such as Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol. PETER OF TARANTAISE In his treatment of enjoyment, Peter of Tarantaise agrees with the main lines of the work of St Bonaventure and St Thomas. 145 Peter views enjoyment as an act of the will, which is elicited through the habit of charity. It

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is noteworthy however, that Peter’s characterization of enjoyment rests upon the preeminence of the will and charity. In order to be considered a perfect act, Peter claims, enjoyment must belong to the most perfect human faculty, which is the will, and to the most perfect virtue, which is the virtue of charity. It is especially pertinent to our examination to point out that Peter characterizes the will as the sole mistress of her own acts (sola Domina sui actus). This emphasis on the will’s self-mastery is quite remarkable because it foreshadows fourteenth-century Franciscan voluntarism and is less characteristic of Thomistic intellectualism. 146 Nevertheless, one could also say that enjoyment pertains to the other faculties of the soul in a dispositional sense. 147 Peter identifies three aspects or conditions of enjoyment: (1) joining or union, (2) pleasure or delight and (3) repose or respite. All of these aspects are included in St Augustine’s definition of enjoyment as “to inhere with love in a thing for the sake of the thing.” According to Peter, the mind (mens) cannot inhere in a thing without being somehow united with that same thing. Furthermore, without love there can be no pleasure or delight in the union with the thing. Finally, without rest or repose, one cannot be said to love the object for its own sake. 148 ROBERT KILWARDBY Robert Kilwardby’s treatment of enjoyment is highly sophisticated and very systematic. A peculiarity of Kilwardby’s treatment is the inclusion of the terms “affectus” and “aspectus” in the definition of the concept of enjoyment. The terms “affectus” and “aspectus” were used by the English theologian Robert Grosseteste (1168–1253). Under the influence of St Augustine, Grosseteste wanted to distinguish between the will and intelligence of the human soul, on the one hand, and between affection and reason, on the other. 149 For Kilwardby, affectus signifies the volitional character of enjoyment whereas aspectus expresses the contemplative and intellectual character of enjoyment. In essence, enjoyment can be called affectus because it involves a delightful and restful cleaving of the will to something that is cherished and loved for its own sake. Secondarily and accidentally, enjoyment can be also called aspectus because vision and cognition are required as supporting grounds for enjoyment. 150 Kilwardby divides the concept of enjoyment into general and special modes of enjoyment in rational subjects. The general mode of enjoyment includes all rational and delightful actions whereas the special mode includes only volitional rational and delightful actions. The general mode applies to the various intellectual acts of the mind. In the performance of these acts, the mind functions under the aspect of nature (natura) and not under the aspect of will (voluntas). The mind can thus be said to enjoy in the delightful speculation of the truth. According to Kilwardby, this con-

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templative or intellectual sense of enjoyment was not intended by St Augustine when he tried to capture the essential character of enjoyment. By analogy with the enjoyment of animals, who seek pleasure in food and drink by means of a natural drive or instinct, the acts of intellectual enjoyment can be viewed as fully natural and spontaneous acts of delight that do not involve a voluntary element. Thus, one can say that human beings take delight in paintings and songs just as animals take pleasure in food and drink. 151 The special mode of enjoyment comprises delightful actions of reason accomplished through the application of a voluntary principle. There are two such actions: (1) enjoyment in the proper sense of the term (proprie) and (2) enjoyment in the improper sense of the term (improprie). The former enjoyment should be understood as an action which does not tend toward another whereas the latter should be understood as an action which tends toward another. According to Kilwardby, the latter kind of enjoyment is also defined by St Augustine as “use with delight” (usus cum delectatione). Kilwardby contends, however, that use with delight concerns more the act of use than the act of enjoyment. 152 Once again, it is important to note that Kilwardby allows a certain kind of enjoyment to be attributed to the intellect. In response to the objection that enjoyment belongs to the intelligence because the vision of God is our highest reward, 153 Kilwardby distinguishes two kinds of vision—speculative and affective. The speculative vision should be taken to apply to enjoyment in general whereas the affective vision should be understood to pertain to enjoyment in the special mode. The beatific vision of God is primarily an affective vision because the act of intellectual contemplation extends to the act of volition and is transformed into love and delight. The sole reason why the significance of the act of vision has been emphasized is that the complete vision of God adds a significant component, which is missing from the love of and delight in God in the present life. 154 As far as speculative vision is concerned, one can perhaps say that the mere exercise of acts of thinking and speculation involves a kind of cold and detached enjoyment, which differs radically from the warm volitional attachment or clinging to a loved object. An interesting feature of Robert Kilwardby’s treatment of enjoyment is the effort to analyze the concept of enjoyment in connection with the division of the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Kilwardby asks whether enjoyment pertains to the irascible or concupiscible aspects of desire. 155 His answer is that enjoyment pertains primarily and per se to the concupiscible and secondarily to the irascible faculty. The irascible faculty serves in the capacity of an auxiliary function in relationship to the concupiscible faculty. The irascible faculty removes the obstacles hindering the effective satisfaction of desire. As soon as the concupiscible faculty is appeased by the attainment of the loved object, the irascible faculty surrenders as well. 156

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Kilwardby concludes his analysis of enjoyment with a brief summary of the established points. Enjoyment is divided into general and special modes. The general mode corresponds to the activity of natural agents (rational as well as irrational), whereas the special mode applies to the activity of voluntary agents. In the proper sense of the term, enjoyment is distinguished from use. In the improper sense of the term, enjoyment is understood as “use with delight,” which is equivalent with use. Enjoyment is defined primarily and per se as belonging to the appetitive faculty, and secondarily and per accidens as pertaining to the other powers of the soul, e.g., to the intellect. 157 In sum, Kilwardby understands enjoyment as an act of the appetitive power. The status of pleasure in relation to enjoyment is not systematically analyzed and remains unclear. The more noticeable feature of Kilwardby’s concept of enjoyment is the application of the term “fruitio” to acts of apprehension. WILLIAM DE LA MARE A significant treatment of enjoyment from a Franciscan writer dating from the period before 1270 is contained in the Sentences commentary of the Parisian Master William de la Mare (b. in 1230 or shortly after and d. around or shortly after 1285). 158 William was mostly known for his Correctorium fratris Thomae (the first version was composed probably in 1278 and the second, expanded version was produced before 1285), which represented a revision of a number of controversial opinions and doctrines found in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas. In 1282, the Franciscan Chapter General of Strasbourg announced that St Thomas’s Summa should be used only by the more intellectually capable lectors, and only in conjunction with the revisions of William de la Mare. The order of the Chapter General declared that William’s corrections were to be inserted in the text and not in the margins of the Summa, and that seculars were not to be allowed to copy the corrections. 159 William’s Correctorium gave rise to a number of counter-correctoria penned by Dominican and even secular theologians in an attempt to defend St Thomas’s teachings. 160 William’s Sentences commentary dates from 1268–70. 161 According to Kraml, the commentary is most strongly influenced by the works of St Bonaventure and Aquinas, although it very frequently refers to and quotes texts from John Peckham. 162 Books I & II appear to be a commentary in its final stage of revision—i.e., a scriptum—whereas books III & IV seem to be a reportatio. 163 In dealing with the question whether enjoyment is an act of the will, William begins his treatment by offering arguments in favor of three distinct possibilities: (1) that enjoyment is an act of the will, (2) that enjoyment is an act of reason and (3) that enjoyment pertains neither to the will nor to reason. 164 William defends the view that enjoyment, insofar as it characterizes the experience of the blessed in heaven, is

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essentially and properly an act of the intellect. Ironically, even though William criticized Aquinas’s concept of beatitude on several counts, William ended up characterizing beatific enjoyment as an act of intellectual contemplation rather than volitional attachment. William presents three competing opinions regarding the character of enjoyment. According to the opinion of some (secundum quosdam), enjoyment is neither cognition nor love but a delight or pleasure (delectatio) experienced in embracing the object of love. William does not offer a detailed systematic critique of this opinion. He thinks that by identifying enjoyment with delight, one fails to provide a satisfactory elucidation of enjoyment. If enjoyment is the same as delight, and if, as St Augustine suggests, enjoyment can also be understood as “use with delight,” then one fallaciously defines the thing through itself (i.e., one defines enjoyment—as equivalent with delight—through delight); in other words, one has given a circular definition. The second opinion holds that enjoyment is an act of the will. William approves of this opinion. 165 We shall see, however, that he accepts the view that enjoyment is an act of the will in a somewhat qualified and restricted sense, only insofar as enjoyment is taken generally. According to the third opinion, enjoyment is a general act (actus generalis) in respect to something loved for its own sake. This general act pertains to various faculties depending on the diversity of the objects loved. For instance, one can say that those who love women in a carnal manner enjoy doing shameful things with them. Enjoyment can then be said to characterize certain shameful and promiscuous behavior. One can also say that gluttons enjoy food for the sake of gluttony. In that case, enjoyment can be applied to the act of gluttony. Therefore, enjoyment in general can be understood to be an unhindered operation in respect to the object loved, regardless of the kind of faculty to which this operation is ascribed. William adds, however, that every such unimpeded operation is initiated and carried through under the command of the will. In this commanding sense (imperative), enjoyment can be attributed to the faculty of the will. 166 We can shed some light upon William’s general act of enjoyment if we examine William’s critique of St Thomas’s view of beatitude in the Correctorium. This critique shows that William disagrees with St Thomas on three counts: (1) that pleasure is not essential to beatitude, (2) that the act of the will does not pertain to the essence of beatitude and (3) that the delight concomitant to the vision of the divine essence is an act of the will. 167 In his third charge against St Thomas’s concept of beatitude, William denies that the pleasure concomitant to the clear vision of the divine essence is an act of the will. According to the psychological theory defended by William, pleasure is a sign of the effective (or unhindered) operation of a faculty and is included in the same faculty. The theory is corroborated by the testimony of Scripture and supported by evidence

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extracted from the writings of the Islamic philosophers Avicenna and Algazel. Consequently, William argues that one can talk about two separate kinds of pleasure involved in the experience of beatitude: (1) the pleasure concomitant to the act of vision, which is an act of the intellect, and (2) the pleasure concomitant to the love of God, which is found in the will. 168 Note, however, that the distinction between vision-associated and will-associated pleasure is still not very helpful for understanding the relationship between pleasure and enjoyment. As far as the enjoyment of God in heaven is concerned, William asserts that this enjoyment should be located in the intellect (vis intellectiva), not in the will. In support of his view, William argues that to enjoy God is to see Him as a friend through an act of intelligible or incorporeal vision. Furthermore, he maintains that an increase of love never takes place unless there is also an improvement in the quality of the vision. If the beloved person is seen more clearly, then one has a greater enjoyment. In other words, a greater enjoyment can be produced only through an increase of vision and not through an augmentation of love. In conclusion, it must be admitted that enjoyment is essentially an act of vision and not an act of love. Nevertheless, as William points out, love should not be altogether excluded from the act of enjoyment. There cannot be an enjoyment of God without love. 169 William completes his response to the question whether enjoyment is an act of the will with a brief remark which captures the essence of his position. He notes that the act of enjoyment is directed toward the thing seen, i.e., God alone, and not toward the act of vision. Thus, the reason why enjoyment should be regarded essentially as an act of the intellect is that vision has a single object. Love, on the other hand, has two distinct objects because it is directed both at God and at the vision of God. 170 Further along in William’s examination of the arguments corroborating the opinion that enjoyment is an act of the will we find utterances indicating that enjoyment could also be viewed as a complex or composite act. For instance, in response to the argument defending the volitional character of enjoyment on the ground of the nobility of the will, 171 William says that fruitio can be regarded as a twofold act—an act of clear vision and an act of absolute love (which seems consistent with William’s view of the two distinct acts of pleasure in the Correctorium). He adds, however, that the character of enjoyment (ratio fruitionis) is defined by the act of vision whereas the act of love is merely a disposition or tendency toward the object (quasi dispositio obiecti). 172 GILES OF ROME Agreeing with the chief lines of Aquinas’s analysis of enjoyment Giles of Rome states that enjoyment requires three things: (1) cognition (cognitio),

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(2) delight (delectatio) and (3) repose (quies, quietatio). Enjoyment consists of delight, and delight requires intellective or sensory cognition. Following closely Aristotle’s understanding of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, Giles argues that perfect delight should be viewed as a complete whole or a state of replenishment, which does not require time, and which, consequently, does not involve movement. In sum, enjoyment should be considered to be a state of supreme delight and absence of movement. 173 The emphasis on quiescence is a characteristic feature of Giles’ understanding of enjoyment. Like St Thomas, Giles links enjoyment with pleasure. However, in contrast to St Thomas, Giles wants to emphasize that ultimate pleasure is a total absence of movement. This has to do with Giles’ view that pleasures and distresses are states following movement and not movement per se. 174 Giles maintains that enjoyment—since it implies absence of movement—belongs solely to the faculty of the will. His argument runs thus. Relying on the authority of Aristotle and John of Damascus, Giles says that there are two classes of faculties: (1) the class of irrational faculties and (2) the class of rational faculties. The class of irrational faculties can be further subdivided into faculties which are disobedient to reason, such as the natural (or vital) faculty, and to faculties which are obedient to reason, such as the irascible and concupiscible faculties. In sum, one can distinguish five faculties: (1) the natural faculty, (2) the faculty of sensory cognition (or sensory perception), (3) the faculty of sensory appetite, (4) the faculty of rational cognition (or the intellect) and (5) the faculty of rational appetite (or the will). 175 According to Giles, enjoyment cannot be attributed to the natural faculty because no natural faculty by itself has any cognition, and without cognition there can be no pleasure and enjoyment. Furthermore, enjoyment cannot be ascribed to the faculties of sensory cognition and appetite because the objects of these faculties are movable corporeal things. In contrast, the object of enjoyment is the immovable good. Enjoyment cannot be attributed to the intellect because the intellect cannot be said to attain restfulness in its own acts and operations. The process of intellective cognition could be described as a movement of exterior things toward the soul which in turn causes activation in the intellect. The activation of the intellect by the apprehension of an exterior thing is only an initial impetus on the part of the soul. The movement of the soul terminates in the object of the will. Consequently, enjoyment belongs exclusively to the faculty of the will. 176 It can be concluded, therefore, that Giles’ view of fruitio is not much different from that of St Thomas. Giles seems to equate fruitio with ultimate delight just as St Thomas does. The only relevant dissimilarity is found in Giles’ characterization of pleasure. For Giles, pleasure is not really a movement but a state after movement.

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RICHARD OF MIDDLETON Richard of Middleton’s discussion of enjoyment resembles St Thomas’s treatment in the Summa. In the same way as St Thomas, Richard bases his definition of enjoyment upon the conceptual clarification of the term “fructus.” A fruit is anticipated and perceived with certain sweetness on the part of the subject. Fruitio means the actual attainment of fruit and is described as a state of quiescence. Pleasure is said to be concomitant to the act of enjoyment. 177 Richard presents three reasons why the act of enjoyment should be considered a volitional rather than a cognitive act. The first reason is that the act of the cognitive faculty cannot be regarded as an ultimate act. Since cognitive acts precede the acts of appetite, therefore cognitive acts cannot be viewed as ultimate acts. The second reason is that cognitive acts cannot be characterized by repose or stillness because they tend toward the appetitive acts. The third reason is that the quality of delight does not pertain to cognitive acts except through the mediation of the appetitive faculty. Along with St Bonaventure, Richard argues that we do not take delight in the object unless we already love the object. As a consequence of the three aforementioned considerations, enjoyment should be said to belong strictly to the appetitive faculty and in a dispositional sense to the cognitive faculty. Furthermore, enjoyment does not belong to just any appetitive faculty, but to appetitive faculties which operate through cognition. Richard makes this stipulation because irrational things, such as physical elements, minerals and plants also have a natural appetitive faculty which can be described as a certain natural tendency or inclination. Regardless of their natural inclination, however, such things cannot be said to enjoy because they lack the faculty of cognition. 178 Richard also distinguishes three categories of enjoyment on the basis of the objects, agents and the way in which the agents seek to attain repose. Good persons seek repose in the ultimate good through the rational control of the appetite. Evil persons seek satisfaction in the created good through the free exercise of lustful desire. Animals pursue food through the faculty of the sensory appetite. 179 Although Richard does not say so explicitly, the enjoyment of the good could be called ordinate, the enjoyment of the evil could be called inordinate, and the enjoyment of animals could be called enjoyment in the imprecise sense of the term. Richard specifies that ordinate enjoyment can be further subdivided into three types depending on the character of the repose: (1) repose based on real identity, (2) repose achieved through glory and (3) repose attained through grace. The first type of repose applies to God alone who is the ultimate good and who enjoys Himself without the need to seek any other good beyond Himself. The second type of repose characterizes the state of the blessed in heaven whereas the third type of repose applies to the willing of the saintly wayfarer. The difference between the state of the

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blessed and that of the wayfarer is that the blessed enjoy the full possession of the good whereas the wayfarer enjoys only an incomplete or partial possession of the good. 180 ENJOYMENT AND VOLITIONAL QUIESCENCE An interesting question to ask is whether the property of rest associated with beatific enjoyment means that the blessed no longer have any particular acts of volition. According to St Augustine, rest means finding one’s place in the overall plan of God’s creation. It also means that one has finally reached the summum bonum and seeks nothing else. This view can be translated into the idea of rest as an inflexible state of fulfillment and ultimate satisfaction. 181 It should be stated, however, that rest is not necessarily a total volitional capitulation or acquiescence. The blessed continue to have particular (non-deliberative) acts of volition. For instance, St Thomas Aquinas states that certain acts of use shall remain in heaven. The blessed will use the natural perfections of the body and the gifts of the Spirit. The blessed, however, will not use expiation penalties and acts of faith and hope; neither will they use food or drink. 182 Robert Kilwardby notes that the blessed will continue to have acts of enjoyment and use with respect to the virtues. However, these beatific acts will have a much better quality than those preceding the state of glory. 183 It is instructive to note that a similar problem with volition arises in Buddhist thought. It is believed that Buddha urges us to give up desire altogether, both in its selfish and unselfish form. It is asked then whether something positive will remain. One of the answers given by Buddhist philosophy is that desire is replaced by a good feeling involving a fundamental transformation in one’s attitude to time. It is also revealing to note that Buddhist texts talk about enlightenment as a state of silent joy or bliss. 184 One may say that regardless of the significantly different metaphysical commitments of Christian and Buddhist religious thought, there are some features that the experience of beatific enjoyment, as conceived by St Augustine and St Augustine’s medieval scholastic interpreters, shares with the experience of enlightenment or nirvana as understood in Buddhism. THE ENJOYMENT OF ANIMALS One of the questions pertaining to the psychology of enjoyment concerns the problem whether the capacity to enjoy can be attributed to subjects such as animals and inanimate things. 185 According to the preceding section, enjoyment is the fulfillment of the rational appetite (or will), which requires a manifest cognition of God and involves delight or pleasure. Consequently, one can say that subjects devoid of reason and sensibility

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cannot have acts of enjoyment. In his brief discussion of the question, Alexander of Hales says that enjoyment can be applied in an extended or less accurate sense (minus proprie) to creatures with vegetative and sensory faculties. Since irrational creatures have appetite, and since appetite involves pleasure, then they can be said to have acts of enjoyment. Nevertheless, enjoyment in the precise sense of the term should only be ascribed to rational creatures. 186 St Bonaventure’s view is the same as that of Alexander. Use and enjoyment are essentially free acts and cannot be attributed to animals. Animals cannot have acts of use because use involves a free mental exercise of setting up priorities. Since animals can feel pleasure, they can have acts of enjoyment. Animal enjoyment, however, must not be taken to be enjoyment in the strict sense of the term. Strictly speaking, enjoyment requires both pleasure and free mental exercise. 187 In a similar vein, St Thomas Aquinas explains that enjoyment entails pleasure (delectatio), and that since pleasure is a sensible change in nature which requires cognition creatures incapable of sensation and rudimentary cognition have no acts of enjoyment. 188 According to St Thomas, the reason why animals do not have acts of enjoyment in the strict sense of the term is that they have no apprehension of the final end and cannot prioritize ends in the way rational agents do by subordinating certain proximate ends to final ends. 189 In his Summa, St Thomas explains that non-rational animals lack a commanding faculty (potentia imperans). Animals have only an executive faculty but they do not possess a power which can control the achievement of the end. According to St Thomas, animals are drawn to the end in the same way in which heavy bodies tend in a downward direction and light bodies tend in an upward direction. Unlike animals, human beings have dominion (imperium) over their own nature and they can freely direct themselves toward an end. 190 Furthermore, human beings are capable of attaining universal knowledge of the end and the good whereas animals cognize the end and the good only in particular. Animals do not pursue an end freely but are moved to the end by the force of natural instinct. 191 St Thomas’s inspection of the enjoyment of non-rational animals is based on the following two explanations of animal behavior. First, St Thomas thinks that animals lack the cognitive level that allows a conceptualization of the universal character of things and that makes possible the relationship between ends and means. Nevertheless, animals are not fully blind agents although their rationality and freedom are very limited. Animals do indeed make judgments about things but they can neither form universal concepts 192 of things nor deliberate regarding ends and means. Second, animals recognize ends on the basis of natural instinct. Thus, sheep sense danger and necessarily flee when they see a wolf, and dogs bark when irritated. 193 In general, the element of passivity in animal behavior is the main reason why animals cannot be said to enjoy in the

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strict sense of the term. Animals grasp the pleasant or harmful features (what Avicenna calls intentions and Dominik Perler terms “normative” properties 194) of objects in their perceptual field and react to these features automatically, as if programmed to do so by some kind of an inbuilt schema that coordinates a variety of sensory inputs with corresponding passions and behavioral output. 195 CONCLUSION The examination of thirteenth-century scholastic discussions of enjoyment can be reduced to the following concluding remarks. From the discussion of the objects of enjoyment, we can draw the conclusion that God is the sole legitimate object of beatific enjoyment. Anything other than God (fellow humans, the virtues, or the human faculties) is either not a legitimate object of enjoyment at all or is an object of use or of a weaker type of enjoyment. The enjoyment of God in heaven should be understood as a single act in terms of the divinity and goodness shared by the persons of the Trinity. On the basis of the above discussion of the psychology of enjoyment, we can conclude that the term “fruitio” is most often applied to the faculty of the will. Nevertheless, the term is sometimes understood as signifying both an intellectual and a volitional act or state. An example of a purely intellectual sense of “fruitio” is found in William de la Mare. We have also observed that the definitions of fruitio linked fruitio with pleasure and rest. It should be said that the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure is not discussed systematically. Although the association of pleasure with fruitio is a constantly recurring theme in the writings of the studied thinkers, the status of pleasure with respect to fruitio remains ambiguous insofar as it is not always clear whether fruition-related pleasure is an affective response of the will itself or a volitional passion distinct from pleasure in the sensitive appetite. Rest, on the other hand, is understood as the climax of the will’s desire for God, which leads to a psychic relaxation and gives a sense of fulfillment. Lastly, only rational subjects are capable of having an act of enjoyment. Animals can be said to enjoy only to the extent to which they can have simple cognitive and evaluative acts and feel pleasure. Even so, the volitional sense of enjoyment excludes animals from participation in true enjoyment. NOTES 1. These commentaries fall in the genre of glosses on the Sentences. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 38–40. See also Artur Michael Landgraf, Introduction a l’histoire de la littérature théologique de la scolastique naissante, (Édition française par les soins de Albert-M. Landry. Traduction de l’allemand par Louis-B. Geiger) (Montréal: Institut D’Études Médiévales; Paris: J. Vrin, 1973), 136–37.

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2. See Marcia L. Colish, “The Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers Gloss,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 1. For a concise account of the features of the Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss, see Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 41–51. 3. See Riccardo Quinto, “Stephan Langton,” Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 49. 4. For an account of the elements which set Langton’s commentary apart from the gloss tradition, see Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 55–60. 5. See Riccardo Saccenti, “The Materia super libros Sententiarum Attributed to Peter Comestor: Study of the Text and Critical Edition,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 54 (2012): 202–4. 6. The medieval university system distinguished between two different kinds of lectures—ordinary lectures and cursory lectures. Ordinary lecturing (ordinarie) took place in the morning and was carried out under the leadership of a master. Cursory lecturing (cursorie) occurred later in the day and was guided by a graduate student (or so-called “bachelor”). See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 60. 7. See James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 160–65. Fishacre’s commentary dates from 1241–45. See James R. Long, “Richard Fishacre,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 563. 8. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 60–61. 9. See Hubert Philipp Weber, “The Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 83; Christopher M. Cullen, “Alexander of Hales,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 104–5; Walter H. Principe, Alexander of Hales’ Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1967), 13–14. 10. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 62–64. See also Rosemann, Peter Lombard, 65; Ignatius Brady, “The Distinctions of Lombard’s Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales,” Franciscan Studies 25 (1965): 95–96, 115. 11. See Weber, “The Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales,” 88–90. 12. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 67–68. Weber argues that Alexander’s commentary is in fact a transitional form between the gloss, as a type of commentary focused narrowly on literal exegesis, and the later medieval questionformat commentary. See Weber, “The Glossa in IV libros Sententiarum by Alexander of Hales,” 91. 13. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, tom. XII (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1951), liber I, d. 1, par. 4, lin. 12–23, p. 8. 14. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, par. 5, lin. 24, p. 8–lin. 16, p. 9. 15. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, par. 41e, lin. 20, p. 25–lin. 18, p. 26. 16. See Mechthild Dreyer, “Albertus Magnus,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 92; H. Anzulewicz, De forma resultante in speculo des Albertus Magnus. Handschriftliche Überlieferung, literargeschichtliche und textkritische Untersuchungen, Textedition, Übersetzung und Kommentar, Teil I (Münster: Aschendorff, 1999), 4–6. 17. According to Anzulewicz, Albert composed Book II of his Sentences commentary during or after 1246, and Book IV during 1249. See Anzulewicz, De forma resultante in speculo, 14. 18. See Anzulewicz, De forma resultante in speculo, 17.

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19. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, vol. 34, pars 1, ed. Dionysius Siedler (Münster: Aschendorff, 1978), liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 9, lin. 58–70, p. 31. 20. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 9, ad 3.4, lin. 3–13, p. 32. 21. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in I Sententiarum (Dist. I–XXV), opera omnia, vol. 25, cura ac labore Augusti Borgnet (Paris, 1893), d. 1, E, a. 18, p. 43. 22. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in I Sententiarum, d. 1, H, a. 21, p. 49. 23. The case for the presence of a theory of natural morality in Albert’s moral treatises De bono and Super Ethica has been made in Stanley B. Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), esp. 79–84, 254–69. 24. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 11, lin. 10–35, p. 34. 25. See Michael Robson, “Saint Bonaventure,” in The Medieval Theologians, ed. G.R. Evans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 187. 26. See Russell L. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 1250–1320 General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Case of Predestination,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Current Research, vol. 1, ed. G.R. Evans (Leiden, Boston, Köln: E.J. Brill, 2002), 44. 27. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 74. 28. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 78–80. 29. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, tom. I, ed. PP. Gollegii a S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1882), liber I, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, p. 40. It should be said that in St Bonaventure’s moral theory the term “fruits” comprises the three theological and four cardinal virtues, the term “gifts” stands for the qualities or habits corresponding to the group of theological and cardinal virtues and the term “beatitudes” refers to the various perfective acts and states of the blessed in heaven. See Kitanov, “Bonaventure’s Understanding of Fruitio,” 184–86; Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 85–86. 30. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 83–85, 86–87, 91–94. Georgedes also notes that St Bonaventure’s stance on the enjoyment of other human beings is Augustinian. Since God does not enjoy man but rather enjoys Himself in man and therefore uses man, it follows that we ought to use man for the sake of God. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 90–91. 31. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 3, q. 2, pp. 40–41. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 87–90. 32. The main facts of St Thomas’s life and academic career are relatively well known. Thomas was born in the castle of Roccasecca in the region of Naples. His mother and father were of noble origin. Around 1230, Thomas was sent as an oblate to the Benedictine Abbey of Monte Casino. He studied the liberal arts at Naples in the period 1239–44. Thomas’s decision to join the Dominicans was not approved by his family, and he was held captive at Roccasecca during 1244–45. He returned to the Dominicans in 1245 and was sent to Paris to study theology. Thomas studied under Albert the Great (1245–1248), and he later followed Albert to Cologne where he stayed until 1252. Thomas taught at Paris twice—the first time as a Bachelor of the Sentences (1252–56) and a Regent Master (1256–59), and the second time as a Regent Master again (1268–72). Thomas also taught in Italy—at Naples (1259–61), Orvieto (1261–65), Rome (1265–68), and Naples again (1272–73). On December 6, 1273, Thomas had a mystical experience and his theological work came to a halt. He died a year later in Fossanova on his way to the Council of Lyons. Thomas was canonized as a saint by Pope John XXII on July 18, 1323, and proclaimed a “Doctor of the Church” by Pope Pius V on April 15, 1567. See Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work, vol. 1, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 327–29; Fergus Kerr, “Thomas Aquinas,” The Medieval Theologians, ed. G.R. Evans (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 201–6.

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33. St Thomas became a master of theology in the spring of 1256. Father Torrell notes that it took St Thomas a “little more than four academic years” to write his Sentences commentary. St Thomas continued working on his commentary after the spring of 1256 when he became a Master of Theology. See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 45, 54, 328, 332. 34. St Thomas’s Lectura Romana comprises only Book I, dd. 1–17 and 23–24, and is found in the margins and the front and back guard folios of a single manuscript—MS. Lincoln College, Lat. 95—presently at Oxford, containing St Thomas’s Parisian commentary. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 80–81. For a detailed account of the features of this second Sentences commentary, see John F. Boyle, “Thomas Aquinas and his Lectura Romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 149–73. 35. Rosemann describes St Thomas’s Summa as a “failed coup” insofar as the Summa failed to replace Lombard’s Sentences as the basic textbook of systematic theology in the medieval university. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 80–83. 36. See Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 328, 333–34. 37. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, tom. I (Parma: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1856), liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, sol., p. 13. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 105–6. 38. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 106–7. 39. The second objection deals with enjoying the enjoyment and is discussed briefly in Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 108–9. 40. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, 1, p. 13. 41. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1, p. 13. 42. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 107–8. 43. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, 3, p. 13. 44. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3, p. 13. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 109–11. In the fruitio-treatment of Giles of Rome we stumble upon a similar analysis of the expression “diligi propter se.” See Egidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum (Venice, 1521), d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, p. 13ra. 45. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, 4, p. 13. 46. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4, pp. 13–14. Georgedes notes that St Thomas does not call one’s enjoyment of a just man in God a form of use. The kind of enjoyment should be viewed as enjoyment in the broad sense of the term. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 111–12. 47. Westberg maintains that St Thomas’s sequence of human action involves four major steps, each subdivided into two—cognitive and affective—components: (1) intention (apprehensio–intentio); (2) deliberation (consilium–consensus); (3) decision (judicium–electio); and (4) execution (imperium–usus). See Daniel Westberg, “Aquinas and the Process of Human Action,” in Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge, vol. 2, ed. C. Bazán, E. Andújar and L.G. Sbrocchi I, (New York, Ottawa, and Toronto: Legas, 1995), 820–21. Westberg explains that the reason why St Thomas does not treat fruitio within the sequence of human action is that enjoyment does not simply follow usus as a consequence of action. See Westberg, “Aquinas and the Process of Human Action,” 822: “When specific actions are in a series towards a long-term goal, enjoyment of the end is delayed.” 48. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, cura et studio Sac. Petri Caramello, cum textu et recensione Leonina (Taurini, Rome: Marietti, 1952; reprint New York: Musur-

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gia Publishers, 1948), IaIIae, q. 11, a. 3, p. 62. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 127–29. 49. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 127, 130. 50. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 3, ad 1, p. 62. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 130–31. 51. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 3, ad 2, p. 62. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 131–32. 52. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 3, ad 3, p. 62. 53. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 3, ad 3, p. 62. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 132–33. 54. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, p. 15. 55. Thomas de Aquino, Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed. Leonard E. Boyle OP and John F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2006), d. 1, q. 1, ad 1, p. 84. 56. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 4, p. 63. 57. See Donagan, “Thomas Aquinas on Human Action,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 646; Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 140–41. 58. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 4, ad 2, p. 63. Georgedes points out that Donagan fails to note the significance of this text for adequately understanding St Thomas’s concept of enjoyment. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 141. 59. See Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 45, 47. 60. See Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 47–48. 61. See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 91. 62. Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV libros Sententiarum commentaria, tom. I (Toulouse, 1652), liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, p. 14. 63. See Gerhard Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 175. 64. See A. Broadie, “Robert Kilwardby,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 611; Kerr, “Thomas Aquinas,” 208. 65. See Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary,” 184. 66. In an illuminating discussion of Kilwardby’s tables on the Sentences, Rosemann describes the shift from the logical/cosmological to the alphabetical ordering of the contents of a book as a Copernican turn of enormous epistemological significance. The alphabetical order, which was new in the thirteenth century, contributed to the transformation of the world of signs into a world of signifiers. The consequence of this transformation, Rosemann explains, is that the human being is no longer merely a reader decoding signs that point to the Thing. The human being is now predominantly a writer, who “faced with a jumble of words arranged in no intrinsic, natural pattern, he himself has to create a ‘cosmos,’ an ordering scheme, that will make sense of it all.” See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 85–90, esp. 90. 67. See Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary,” 184–85. 68. See Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary,” 184. 69. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, ed. Johannes Schneider (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1986), q. 30, lin. 32–47, p. 66. 70. The editor of Kilwardby’s Sentences commentary finds the source of the view of the twofold end of enjoying in the writings of Alexander of Hales and St Bonaventure. See Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 30, n. 9, p. 66. 71. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 30, lin. 48, p. 66–lin. 67, p. 67. 72. See Leibold “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary,” 213–21, esp. 221.

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73. See Richard Cross “Richard of Middleton,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 573; Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 53–54; A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 1253–55. 74. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, vol. 1 (Brescia, 1591), liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, p. 23. 75. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, p. 23. 76. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, pp. 23–24. The Cistercian treatise De spiritu et anima was very influential until the time of Albert the Great. Its authorship was mistakenly attributed to St Augustine, but the work was probably composed by Alcher of Clairvaux around 1160. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 199. 77. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 3, p. 24. The Book of Causes was translated into Latin in Toledo by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) and became very popular from the beginning of the thirteenth century. The treatise was listed in the syllabus of the Parisian Faculty of Arts among the works of Aristotle. Aristotle’s authorship was questioned by both Albert the Great and St Thomas Aquinas. St Thomas claimed that the Book of Causes was translated from an Arabic work based on Proclus’ Elements of Theology. See Dennis J. Brand, The Book of Causes (Liber de Causis), trans. with an introduction by Dennis J. Brand (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1984), 4–5; see also idem, The Book of Causes, 19: “1. Every primary cause exercises more influence upon its effect than [does] the universal second cause.” 78. Stephanus Langton, Commentarius in Sententias (Der Sentenzenkommentar des Kardinals Stephan Langton), ed. Artur Michael Landgraf, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Band 37, Heft 1 (Münster Westf.: Aschendorff, 1952), liber I, d. 1, p. 3. I rely here on Riccardo Quinto’s clear and detailed account of Langton’s distinction of the semantic elements of terms and rules for regulating Trinitarian discourse. See Quinto, “Stephan Langton,” 54–66, at 60. 79. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, 14f, lin. 13–21, p. 13. Principe notes that, for Alexander, the Latin term “persona” means a “being distinct by property or properties” or a “hypostasis that is distinct by means of a property.” The term “hypostasis” refers specifically to the subsistence (subsistentia) of the person’s substance in abstraction from the properties constituting the person. With respect to their distinguishing properties, the divine persons must be considered tres res. This is so because a thing (res) does exist by itself, whereas a property does not exist by itself but on account of the thing of which it is a property. See Principe, Alexander of Hales’ Theology, 53–54, 71. 80. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, 14c, lin. 25, p. 12–lin. 2, p. 13. 81. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, 14k, lin. 20–22, p. 14. 82. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, p. 14. 83. In 1285, Pope Honorius IV requested an official re-examination of Giles’ views from the Bishop of Paris, Ranulphe de la Houblonnière. See Silvia Donati, “Giles of Rome,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 266; Kent Bonnie Dorrick Kent, Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 79–80. Thijssen argues that, since there is no record of Giles’ recantation in any of the collections of condemned university articles, the case against Giles must have been dropped. See J.M.M.H. Thijssen “1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigation of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome,” Vivarium 35, no. 1 (1997): 97–99.

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84. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 55–56. 85. Egidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, p. 13GH. 86. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 4, p. 24. As it can be seen, Richard’s response is also in firm agreement with St Bonaventure’s view. St Bonaventure indeed claims that beatific enjoyment is numerically one in terms of the unity of the divine essence, goodness, and affection. See Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, dub. 7, p. 43. 87. Thirteenth-century scholastics relied widely and elaborated upon Avicenna’s classification of the human faculties. According to Avicenna, human beings possess, in addition to the faculties characteristic of the vegetable soul, such as nutrition, growth, reproduction, and the faculties of the animal (or sensitive) soul, such as apprehension and locomotion, also the faculties of theoretical and practical reason, and rational choice. The sensitive soul of the human being is divided into apprehensive and motor powers. The motive power is of two kinds: commanding and executive (the faculty operating through the nervous system and the muscles). The apprehensive powers include the five external bodily senses and the five internal apprehensive faculties: the common sense, the imagination, the cogitative power, the estimative power and the memory. There are also apprehensive and motor powers in the intellectual soul. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 219–21. 88. Thirteenth-century discussions of philosophical faculty psychology were influenced mostly by the Latin translations of the sixth book of Avicenna’s encyclopedic treatise al-Shifā’ and by Aristotle’s De anima. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 218–19. 89. John of la Rochelle was a master of arts and a master of theology. He is known as one of the redactors of the influential Summa fratris Alexandri. See Gérard Sondag, “Jean de la Rochelle,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 334; Jacques Guy Bougerol, introduction to Ioannes de Rupella. Summa de anima, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), 9–13. John probably introduced the analysis of human action into Latin scholasticism. See Westberg, “Aquinas and the Process of Human Action,” 820. 90. John of la Rochelle’s Summa de anima is based on the pseudo-Augustinian treatise On the Spirit and the Soul. See Sondag 2003, 334. 91. Ioannes de Rupella, Summa de anima, ed. Jacques Guy Bougerol (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), cap. 107, lin. 3, p. 256–lin. 19, p. 257. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 234. 92. Ioannes de Rupella, Summa de anima, cap. 79, lin. 26, p. 213– lin. 45, p. 214. John of la Rochelle’s systematization relies upon John of Damascus’ De fide orthodoxa, which in turn depends upon the work of Maximus the Confessor. See Westberg, “Aquinas and the Process of Human Action,” 819–820. 93. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, par. 16, lin. 10–23, p. 15. 94. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, par. 9, lin. 1–9, p. 11. Alexander also talks about two acts of the love of charity: (1) the desire to see the object of love, which is the earthly form of charity, and (2) the desire to continue the vision of the object of love, which is the form of charity in heaven. See Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, lib. I, d. 1, par. 34, lin. 11–18, p. 22. 95. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, par. 32, lin. 16, p. 21–lin. 4, p. 21. 96. It should be noted that the term affectus can be used to refer to feelings as well as to dynamic functions of the soul. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 196, 210, 265. 97. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in I Sententiarum, d. 1, B, a. 12, p. 29. 98. The theory of the five spiritual senses was developed by the Alexandrian theologian Origen. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 126; Järveläinen, A Study on Religious Emotions, 78–84. 99. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in I Sententiarum, d. 1, B, a. 15, p. 36.

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100. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in I Sententiarum, d. 1, I, a. 23, p. 51. 101. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in I Sententiarum, d. 1, I, a. 23, ad 1, p. 51. 102. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 7, cap. 1, lin. 8–19, p. 25. 103. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 7, cap. 2, lin. 10–36, p. 26. 104. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 7, cap. 3, lin. 63–82, p. 27. 105. Knuuttila notes that this is Albert’s official view. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 238. 106. Cunningham states correctly that, for Albert, happiness is in effect the greatest pleasure (maxima delectatio). See Cunningham, Reclaiming Moral Agency, 261. 107. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 7, cap. 1, lin. 45–71, p. 25. 108. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 238: “an evaluation of a present object as good causes a passion of joy, which in its turn intensifies the dilation of the heart and the diffusion of the spirit and initiates enjoying.” 109. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 8, cap. 1, lin. 27–33, p. 28. 110. See Robert Edward Brennan, Thomistic Psychology. A Philosophic Analysis of the Nature of Man (New York: Macmillan Company, 1941), 216. The difference between actus elicitus and actus imperatus in the case of the will can be illustrated with the example of willing to raise my arm. I may want to raise my arm, but if my hands are handcuffed behind my back then I am not able to actualize my desire. Nevertheless, being incapable of actualizing one’s will-act does not mean that one has no such willact. Thus, my desire to raise my arm is the actus elicitus, whereas the desire actualized in and through my body is the actus imperatus. 111. Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei, liber I, pars 1, tract. 2, q. 8, cap. 2, lin. 63, p. 29–lin. 4, p. 30. 112. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, sol., p. 13. See also Thomas de Aquino, Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 2, ad 4, p. 86. 113. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, p. 36. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 74–76. 114. I do think that, for St Bonaventure, delectatio connotes a certain feeling attached to the act of enjoyment which is not identical with the enjoying. See Kitanov, “Bonaventure’s Understanding of Fruitio,” 140. The same point is made by the editors of St Bonaventure’s Sentences commentary in the scholion. According to the editors, St Bonaventure’s view is that enjoyment is an act of the will followed by and inseparable from the passion of delight. See Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, scholion I, p. 37. 115. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, p. 36. 116. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, pp. 36–37. 117. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, ad 1, p. 37. 118. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, ad 2, p. 37. 119. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, ad 2, p. 37. Georgedes translates the term “complacentia” as satisfaction and explains that it means a state of tranquil pleasure. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 80–81. I agree with the translation given by Georgedes. Complacentia can indeed be understood as the feeling aspect of volition. See Kitanov, “Bonaventure’s Understanding of Fruitio,” 146–49. It should be noted, however, that the terms “placentia” and its opposite “displicentia” were used by John of la Rochelle in the sense of dispositions associated with motor acts. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 234.

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120. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, ad 3, p. 37. The editors trace to the present discussion of beatific reward the origin of the notorious controversy among the followers of St Thomas and the followers of Duns Scotus regarding whether beatitude is an act of the intellect or an act of the will. See Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, scholion I, p. 37. 121. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi (Quaracchi, 1889), liber IV, d. 49, pars 1, a. unicus, q. 5, p. 1009. 122. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, tom. IV, ed. PP. Gollegii a S. Bonaventura (Quaracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1889), liber IV, d. 49, pars 1, a. unicus, q. 5, ad 1.2.3, p. 1009. 123. The early commentaries on Lombard’s Sentences usually contain separate sections including short comments or glosses on Lombard’s original text. Later, however, these sections were abandoned and replaced by the more systematic quaestio-parts of the Sentences commentaries. 124. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 12. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 97–98. 125. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 12. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 98. 126. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 12. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 98–99. 127. Georgedes explains that the reason why St Thomas says that fruitio is an act of the intellect and then an act of the will is that all volitions are initiated by the intellect. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 99–101. 128. See Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 242: “As everyone discovers, we can love what we do not possess. But—perverse cases aside—the will does not stop loving what it succeeds in possessing. And when the will is fully at rest in the good that it loves, it does not cease to function; on the contrary, it then experiences pleasure (delectatio). Aquinas has a special term, fruitio, to talk about the will’s enjoyment of what it has achieved. We enjoy only ultimate ends, not the means to such ends. The more ultimate the end, the greater our enjoyment. Strictly, fruitio comes only when we attain God; nothing else is all that enjoyable. This may seem rather grim, but Aquinas goes on to explain how we can imperfectly enjoy what we have not yet attained. We refer to this as anticipation.” The editors of St Bonaventure’s Sentences commentary remark that followers of Thomas treat enjoyment as formally equivalent with pleasure. See Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. unica, scholion I, p. 37. 129. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 252–53. 130. See Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae Ia2ae 22–48 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 164–65. See also King, “Dispassionate Passions,” 25. 131. See Nicholas E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 235. 132. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, expositio textus, p. 17. 133. Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, liber I, d. 1, cap. 2, lin. 10–11, p. 56. 134. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, expositio textus, p. 17. 135. Thomas de Aquino, Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 1, ad 3, p. 85. 136. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 1, p. 61. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 121–22. 137. For the various meanings and uses of fructus and fruitio in St Thomas, see Roy J. Deferrari and M. Inviolata Barry, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC:

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Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 448–49. For a summary of St Thomas’s division of will-acts, see Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 234–35. 138. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 1, ad 1, p. 61. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 122–23. 139. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3, p. 61. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 123–24. 140. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 3, a. 4. 141. When St Thomas calls delight a per se accident of beatitude, he means interconvertible or coextensive properties. Interconvertible properties are non-essential properties, yet they can be said to “follow” or “flow from” their subjects. Delight can thus be said to follow from beatitude in the sense that it is caused by beatitude. See Philip Lyndon Reynolds, “Per se Accidents, Accidental Being and the Theology of the Eucharist in Thomas Aquinas,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 13 (2002): 198; idem, “Properties, Causality and Epistemological Optimism in Thomas Aquinas,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 68, no. 2 (2001): 279. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 124–25. 142. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 126. 143. See Richard Cross “Thomas Aquinas,” in The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity, ed. Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 176. 144. See Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 75–93. Even though King’s careful analysis suggests that one might differentiate between volitional “directives” and “responses,” King is mostly concerned with whether volitional affections in general can be viewed as passions at all. See King, “Dispassionate Passions,” 24–28. 145. Peter’s work has been viewed as an effort to synchronize the positions of St Bonaventure and St Thomas. See Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 49. 146. According to Rosemann, the fact that Peter of Tarantaise sided more often with St Bonaventure rather than with St Thomas shows that “toward the end of the thirteenth century, there existed no ‘fixed party lines’ yet between the Franciscans and the Dominicans.” See Rosemann, The Story of a Great Medieval Book, 91. 147. Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV libros Sententiarum commentaria, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, p. 13. 148. Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV libros Sententiarum commentaria, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, p. 14. 149. See McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, 78, 84, 136. For a concise account of how the aspectus/affectus distinction is used and understood in Kilwardby’s theological virtue ethics, see Leibold, “Robert Kilwardby’s Commentary,” 218–20. 150. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 21, lin. 48, p. 49–lin. 62, p. 50. 151. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 21, lin. 29–39, p. 49. 152. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 21, lin. 39–47, p. 49. 153. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 21, lin. 12–15, p. 48. 154. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 21, lin. 76–87, p. 50. 155. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 22, lin. 1–3, p. 52. 156. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 22, lin. 7–21, p. 52. 157. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 22, lin. 22, p. 52–lin. 30, p. 53. 158. See Hans Kraml, “William de la Mare,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 234.

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159. See Kent, Virtues of the Will, 81; Trottmann, La vision béatifique, 338–40. 160. See Kraml, “William de la Mare,” 227. 161. See Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 52. 162. See Kraml, “William de la Mare,” 237–38. 163. See Kraml, “William de la Mare,” 240. 164. Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1989), q. 3, lin. 5–20, p. 54. 165. Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, q. 3, lin. 21–26, p. 54. 166. Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, q. 3, lin. 27, p. 54–lin. 36, p. 55. 167. Guillelmus de la Mare, Correctorium corruptorii Thomae (ed. Glorieux, 1927), in Iam Iae, a. 1, p. 209. See also Kent, Virtues of the Will, 82–83. 168. Guillelmus de la Mare, Correctorium corruptorii Thomae, in Iam Iae, a. 1, pp. 210–211. 169. Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, q. 3, lin. 36–43, p. 55. 170. Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, q. 3, lin. 44–49, p. 55. 171. Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, q. 3, lin. 11, p. 54. 172. Guillelmus de la Mare, Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum, q. 3, lin. 70–79, p. 56. 173. Egidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, p. 11K–M. 174. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 254–55. 175. Egidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, p. 11M. 176. Egidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, p. 11M–O. 177. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, p. 21. 178. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 1, pp. 21–22. Hocedez points out that Richard of Middleton tends to accentuate the primacy of the will in relation to the intellect. The intellect is subordinate to the will and serves only to illuminate and dispose the will with respect to the end. Furthermore, according to Richard, beatitude consists principally in an act of the will. Hocedez also notes that Richard anticipates Scotus by claiming that the intellectual aspect of beatitude is related more with the practical than the speculative intellect. See Edgar Hocedez, Richard de Middleton: sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1925), 213, 379. 179. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, p. 22. A similar text is also found in Peter of Tarantaise. See Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV libros Sententiarum commentaria, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, p. 14. 180. Richardus de Mediavilla, Super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae, liber I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, p. 22. See also Petrus de Tarantasia, In IV libros Sententiarum commentaria, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, p. 14. 181. Hoye has argued that St Thomas Aquinas’s conception of beatitude includes not only the satisfaction of the human desire to be united with God but also the satisfaction of every particular human desire for things or objects other than God. See William J. Hoye, Actualitas Omnium Actuum: Man’s Beatific Vision of God as Apprehended by Thomas Aquinas (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975), 161: “Since every being is present in the divine essence, the beatific vision will satisfy every human desire. In seeing God, man will experience directly and concretely all things, all people, all hopes, all loves, all pleasures, all operations, in short, all modes of being, to the extent that a desire for such goods has at some time been awakened in him. When St. Thomas taught that the vision of God is to fulfill all human desires, he meant this

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teaching to be taken with complete seriousness, though it may present tremendous difficulties to the conceptions of the average Christian.” See also Hoye, Actualitas Omnium Actuum, 163–64: “St. Thomas readily seconded Boethius’ contention that man could not find perfect happiness in voluptas, divitiae, famae celebritas, honoris sublimitas, potestas and conservatio sui; but he never denied that these modes of happiness would have a place in perfect happiness. In fact, he went to pains to show how the vision of God’s essence would result not in their depreciation or annihilation but in the realization of their total satisfaction.” Hoye has even tried to show that St Thomas’s notion of love permits the existence of an elevated or spiritual aspect of sex in heaven, which would fit well with the claim that all wishes will be fulfilled in the afterlife. See Hoye, Actualitas Omnium Actuum, 221–32. 182. See Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, sol., p. 16. 183. Robertus Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum, q. 25, lin. 1–7, p. 56. 184. See Joel J. Kupperman, Classic Asian Philosophy: A Guide to Essential Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 34–39. 185. It should be mentioned that scholastic discussions regarding animal psychology took their point of departure from Avicenna’s discussion of animal passions in De Anima, Book IV. See Dominik Perler, “Why Is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf? Medieval Debates on Animal Passions,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 34–39. 186. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, par. 10, lin. 10–21, p. 11. 187. Bonaventura, Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, dub. 8, p. 43. 188. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, p. 15. According to St Thomas, even inanimate things can be said to have appetitive acts, such as love, desire, and hope, but they cannot have acts of pleasure and pain because pleasure and pain require an awareness of the presence of something agreeable or disagreeable. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 251–52. 189. Thomas de Aquino, Commentum in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, p. 15. 190. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 2, p. 61. 191. Thomas de Aquino, Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 11, a. 2, p. 61. 192. Paul Hoffman suggests that it is not so much animals’ inability to form concepts that distinguishes them from humans as it is their inability to grasp universals apart from their particular instantiations. See Paul Hoffman, “Reasons, Causes, and Inclinations,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro, 156–75 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 164. 193. See Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 47–48; Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 209–14. 194. See Perler, “Why Is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf?”, 34–39. 195. See Perler, “Why Is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf?”, 39–44, esp. 42 and 44.

THREE The Early Fourteenth Century—The High Point of the Debate Regarding the Object and Psychology of Beatific Enjoyment

The medieval scholastic debate about beatific enjoyment continued unabated throughout the entire fourteenth century and well into the early fifteenth century. Surveying the development of the debate in this long historical period would be a very tedious and onerous task insofar as it will inevitably involve repetition as well as prolonged and painstaking examination of sources many of which exist in a manuscript form only. It suffices to examine the development of the debate in the first three decades of the fourteenth century because, in fact, this is exactly the time when the debate reaches its peak in terms of depth, complexity, and diversity. In the following three chapters, therefore, I shall trace the development of the debate in the Sentences commentaries of early fourteenth-century theologians, and I shall focus on three separate issues in particular—(1) the problem of the adequate object and psychology of beatific enjoyment; (2) the problem of differentiated enjoyment with respect to the Trinity; and (3) the problem of the contingency of beatific enjoyment. I shall also confine my analysis to the views of more prominent and better known authors in this period, e.g., John Duns Scotus, Thomas Anglicus, Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, Walter Chatton, William of Ockham, Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham. I shall, nevertheless, discuss some less well-known and partially studied figures as well. In this chapter, I engage early fourteenth-century developments in the discussions of the adequate object and psychology of beatific enjoyment. I first mention some of the historical factors that influenced the scholastic psychological analyses of enjoyment. I then examine the views 73

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of Scotus, Auriol, Marchia, Ockham, Chatton, Holcot and Wodeham. Consequently, I discuss the views of the less-known authors Robert Graystones, Richard FitzRalph, John Baconthorpe and Gerard of Siena. Further, I examine in some detail the problem of the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure. Lastly, I discuss Durandus of Saint Pourçain’s controversial view regarding the adequate object of beatific enjoyment in light of the criticism of his contemporaries. Two very significant late thirteenth-century authors—the secular theologians Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines—have not been included in this survey because they have not left us Sentences commentaries, and the issue of beatific enjoyment is primarily discussed in such commentaries. However, Henry and Godfrey did examine various issues related to enjoyment in their Quodlibetal Questions, and I do address the views of these two authors in connection with Duns Scotus’s account of the contingency of beatific enjoyment in the last chapter of the book. VOLUNTARIST PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277 At the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century, the concept of beatific enjoyment received more and more attention. One of the noteworthy aspects of the treatments of enjoyment—especially in the commentaries of Franciscan thinkers—is the accent on free volition. The tendency to emphasize the importance of the will as a crucial explanatory factor of human action has been called ethical voluntarism. 1 One can even talk about the rise of a certain voluntarist psychology. 2 This type of psychology was very much encouraged by the famous Condemnation of 1277. The Condemnation was provoked by the zealous assimilation of Aristotle’s philosophy by some thirteenth-century masters of the liberal arts—often referred to in contemporary scholarship as radical or heterodox Aristotelians. 3 At the request of Pope John XXI (Peter of Spain), Bishop Stephen Tempier had to inquire and find out the origin of certain grave doctrinal errors and the persons responsible for the dissemination of those errors. Bishop Tempier asked a commission of 16 theologians, including Henry of Ghent, 4 to examine the suspect philosophical literature used in the Arts Faculty and extract from it the heterodox doctrines that had been brought to the attention of the Roman pontiff. The Commission concluded its search in less than a month and compiled a list of 219 (or 220) heretical articles of a philosophical and theological nature. 5 On March 7, 1277 the Bishop of Paris Stephen Tempier condemned these propositions as opposed to Christian faith. 6 Bishop Tempier did not in fact name the individuals responsible for the diffusion of the condemned propositions. A certain number of articles have been traced to the writings of Siger of Brabant, Boethius of Dacia, and to three anonymous tracts from the Arts Faculty. Some articles may have been taken

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from the writings of theologians such as St Thomas Aquinas. 7 The Condemnation of 1277 had important implications for the development of theology, and it also influenced the discussions of beatific enjoyment in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Some of the censured articles were thought to undermine the foundations of Christian doctrine and morality because they asserted the passivity of the will. The will was thought to be passive in the sense that it could not move by itself but required activation from other forces—the heavenly bodies, the sensitive appetite, the intellect, or the object as presented to the will by the intellect. 8 It has been pointed out that the early fourteenth-century discussions of volition, love, and enjoyment have stimulated the treatment of various other questions, such as the question of the finite or infinite capacity of the soul for grace and beatitude and the problem of conflicting judgments and conflicting cognitions. 9 There was also a cluster of related debates that influenced—directly or indirectly—the intensive discussion of enjoyment in the early fourteenth century. We can mention here at least three such debates: (1) the debate about divine grace, acceptation and predestination, 10 (2) the debate regarding the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, and especially regarding the possibility of intuitive cognition of an absent object, 11 (3) the controversy over the beatific vision provoked by the sermons of Pope John XXII. 12 DUNS SCOTUS ON ENJOYMENT AND USE John Duns Scotus, also called the Subtle Doctor (Doctor Subtilis), was born in 1265 or 1266 in the Scottish village of Duns, near the English border. One of the definite dates for Scotus’s life is his ordination to the priesthood in the Franciscan Order, which took place at Saint Andrew’s Priory, Northampton, on March 17, 1291. Scotus began studying theology at Oxford in 1288. In 1300, Scotus became a Full Bachelor (baccalaureus formatus), after having served as a Sententiary Bachelor (1298–99) and a Biblical Bachelor (1299–1300). In 1301–2, he was sent to the University of Paris to go on with his education. His studies at Paris were interrupted in 1303 when he and eighty other friars were expelled from France for supporting Pope Boniface VIII in a conflict with King Philip IV. Scotus returned to Paris in 1304 and continued lecturing on the Sentences. On November 18, 1304, the Minister General of the Franciscans, Gonsalvus of Spain recommended that Duns Scotus should become the next theology bachelor to incept as a Regent Master. Scotus incepted in 1305. He served as a Regent Master in the Franciscan chair until 1307 when he was transferred again. This time, he departed for Cologne where he was a lector at the Franciscan studium. Scotus died on November 8, 1308, soon after his arrival in Cologne. 13 Scotus lectured on the Sentences several times—at Ox-

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ford (1298–1299), Paris (1302–3, 1304–5), and perhaps Cambridge (1301–2, or 1303–4). Among other things, Scotus’s theological production includes three major commentaries on the Sentences—a Lectura, an Ordinatio, and several reportatio versions, of which I use the recently edited Reportatio IA. 14 Scotus also wrote several small logical tracts, a treatise on Aristotle’s On the Soul (Quaestiones super libros De anima) and on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis). 15 Duns Scotus says that we can distinguish four things in the will: (1) an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of another called use, (2) a perfect act of willing a good for its own sake called “frui,” (3) a neutral act (actus neuter) and (4) pleasure (delectatio). 16 I shall discuss what Scotus says about pleasure below. I focus here on Scotus’s treatment of “frui,” use and the neutral act of the will. Scotus discusses the division of the acts of the will in connection to the intellectual acts of affirmation or assent in respect to propositions. He maintains that one ought to distinguish two acts of intellectual assent to a proposition (duo actus assentiendi alicui complexo), which in turn parallel two acts of volitional adhesion to an object (duplex prosecutio vel adhaesio). In the intellect, there is an act of assent to something for its own sake (propter se) as well as an act of assent to something for the sake of another (propter aliud). The act of assent to something for its own sake concerns intellectual first principles, with which the process of scientific demonstration begins. In a certain sense, the intellectual principles correspond to the premises of a categorical syllogism. The act of assent to something for the sake of another pertains to the conclusion of the syllogism. The conclusion follows from the combination of premises in the syllogistic argument. Thus, in agreement with Scotus’s reasoning, there are two intellectual paths or directions of assent: (1) a simple assent to a first principle or premise and (2) an assent to a conclusion mediated through the evidence of the principles or premises from which the conclusion is deduced. Similarly, there are two acts of assent in the will: (1) an act by means of which the will assents to a good for its own sake and (2) an act by means of which the will assents to a good for the sake of another. 17 Scotus notes that there are significant differences between the acts of intellectual and volitional assent. According to Scotus, intellectual assent is differentiated and caused by distinct objects. Volitional assent is differentiated not by the objects but by the very acts of the faculty of the will. The faculty of the will can be shown anything attractive or desirable (quodcumque bonum volibile) without being determined to elicit an act of enjoyment or use in respect to this object. The will can thus have an act of use with respect to an object that ought to be sought for its own sake or an act of enjoyment with respect to an object that ought to be sought for the sake of another. 18 Furthermore, the acts of intellectual assent are differentiated decisively (sufficienter) into two kinds of affirmation: (1) an affirmation of the truth of the principles and (2) an affirmation of the

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truth of the conclusion. Unlike the intellect, however, the will can have an act of intermediate assent (assensus medius). What is this act of intermediate assent? Scotus explains that the will can be offered a good which is apprehended absolutely, neither as an end nor as a means to an end. The will can have an act with respect to this kind of object and this act is not necessarily inordinate. The will can then command the intellect to find out what kind of good has been presented to it and how is this good to be willed (quale bonum illud sit et qualiter volendum). Once the intellect has accomplished the inspection, the will can assent to that good in the form of enjoyment or use. 19 There are two things to point out with respect to Scotus’s analysis of the acts of enjoyment, use, and the act of “middle assent.” The first concerns Scotus’s transposition of the term “assensus” to volition. Scotus thinks that the will can assent to an object of desire just as the intellect can assent to the truths of propositions. In other words, the will can function intelligently. The difference, of course, is that the will can assent to its object freely. This fundamental difference between the intellect and the will seems to be the point of Scotus’s act of “middle assent.” 20 Scotus’s description of this act suggests that there can be more or less advanced levels of volitional assent with respect to an object. The more advanced level of assent can be viewed as a full-fledged act of acceptance or approval in the form of enjoyment or use. The act of “middle assent” (assensus medius) is a less advanced phase or level of acceptance. The object is willed neither as an end on its own nor as a means to another. The object is simply desired as something interesting in itself prior to any significant moral evaluation. 21 The act of “middle assent” resembles the act of liking or favoring (complacentia). Scotus says that complacentia is a simple volition but he then explains that this is not an efficacious volition and must be distinguished from election. 22 Just like the act of “middle assent,” complacentia seems to be a free volition which is not a full-fledged election. 23 It is interesting to see that the Franciscan John of Bassol (d. 1333) 24 — known as a close disciple of Scotus—shows some hesitancy as to whether it is licit to talk about an act that is neither enjoyment nor use. 25 John reports Scotus’s view on the intermediate act of the will somewhat differently. John says that when the will wants an apprehended good absolutely, it can suspend the act of intellectual inspection. Thus, by postponing indefinitely the inquiry into the character of the desired object, the will reveals its independence in relationship to the intellect. 26 John objects, however, that the volition of postponing may be viewed not as a separate act of intermediate assent but simply as an act of enjoyment or use. 27 On the other hand, John argues that the intellect—just like the will—could also have an act of intermediate assent. For instance, the intellect can give assent to a conclusion of a syllogism without necessarily deducing the conclusion from the premises. John explains that this kind of assent is not

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a full-fledged assent because it is not based on a complete deductive proof. 28 In conclusion, John notes that some thinkers admit the possibility of an act of intermediate volition. 29 Enjoyment, as Scotus said, is a perfect act of the will. The qualification “perfect” indicates that the object of the act is sought for its own sake (propter se) and not for the sake of another (propter aliud). The term “fruitio” can be taken in a broad sense (fruitio in communi) or it could be taken in the sense of orderly or ordinate enjoyment (fruitio ordinata). Enjoyment in the broad sense of the term is a more generic or universal type of enjoyment, which may or may not be accompanied by appropriate circumstances (debitas circumstantias). 30 Overall, the object of general enjoyment is an end that is pursued or willed as ultimate regardless of whether it is ordinate or inordinate. The end of general enjoyment can thus be a true end, or an apparent end, or simply an end that the will has freely prescribed or appointed to itself (finis praestitutus, bonum praefixum). 31 Enjoyment is an ordinate act if it is in harmony with right reason and is surrounded by circumstances consonant with one’s ultimate end, which, as Scotus argues, can only be God. 32 Can it be proved that God is the adequate object of ordinate enjoyment? Scotus seems to believe that it can. He argues that the object of ordinate enjoyment can only be something ultimately good and infinite. He rejects the theory that enjoyment can have as an object something that is less than absolutely good and infinite. 33 We always experience a pull toward more and more excellent goods; and we are certainly capable of conceiving the existence of an infinite good that we can prefer to all other finite goods. 34 Furthermore, since the will is concerned with every good or with the good in general, it cannot be satisfied except in that which has the character of an ultimate end. Since only God has the character of the ultimate end, therefore only He can be the proportionate object of ordinate enjoyment. 35 THE LIBER PROPUGNATORIUS OF THOMAS ANGLICUS—AN EARLY THOMISTIC CRITIQUE OF SCOTUS An early Thomistic critique of Scotus is found in the so-called Book of Defense on [Book] I of the Sentences against John [Duns] Scotus (Liber propugnatorius super primum sententiarum contra Johannem Scotum). The authorship of the book is uncertain. It has been attributed to a certain Thomas Anglicus, although it is no longer believed that this “Anglicus” is the same person as Thomas of Sutton. 36 It is probable that the “Anglicus” in question is the Dominican Thomas Wylton. 37 The method of Anglicus’s Book of Defense represents a sustained critical appraisal of Scotus’s positions, definitions and arguments. Anglicus follows the order of Lombardian distinctions treated in Scotus’s Sentences

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commentary, provides a verbatim report of the contents of each Scotistic distinction and appends a section with critical remarks to specific questions whenever he deems it necessary to correct Scotus. Anglicus’s overview of the first distinction, for instance, covers four separate questions discussed by Scotus. The first question concerns whether the ultimate end is the per se object of enjoyment. Anglicus narrates Scotus’s entire question—the principal arguments pro and in oppositum, Scotus’s subdivision of the question, the contents of each sub-division, and Scotus’s responses to the principal arguments. Apparently finding no fault in the subject-matter of Scotus’s first question, Anglicus says at the very end of the report that there is nothing to be said and moves on to the next question. Anglicus follows the same reporting protocol for the second question, but this time the report ends with the statement that even though Scotus’s proposal rings true the proposal has not been sufficiently demonstrated. Anglicus then embarks upon an elaborate refurbishing of Scotus’s arguments. 38 Anglicus’s remarks on Scotus’s third question, which asks whether enjoyment is an act or a passion of the will, reveal a much higher level of dissatisfaction with Scotus’s work. “In this question,” Anglicus says, Scotus “is deficient in many ways” (multipliciter deficit). 39 Anglicus’s critical tenor becomes even more poignant in the section appended to Scotus’s fourth question, i.e., the question about the necessity of enjoying the ultimate end. Anglicus states that Scotus’s teaching on this issue destroys moral philosophy. 40 I shall first examine some elements of Anglicus’s critique of Scotus’s division of the acts of the will. We shall revisit Anglicus’s critique later in this chapter in connection with the problem of the relation between enjoyment and pleasure. In chapter 5, we shall see why in Anglicus’s eyes Scotus’s account of heavenly enjoyment undermined the foundations of moral philosophy. The first element of Anglicus’s criticism of Scotus’s division of the acts of the will concerns the comparison between the acts of the intellect and the acts of the will. Anglicus points out that Scotus is guilty of terminological confusion. The will’s inclination toward the good should properly be termed “consent,” not “assent.” Anglicus’s criticism, however, goes beyond a mere terminological purism. Anglicus explains that the intellect’s assent does not differ significantly from the will’s assent. Just as it is within the will’s capacity to consent or not consent to a given good so also it is within the intellect’s capacity to assent or dissent with respect to a given truth. In other words, the intellect is not necessarily bound by the perceived truth of a statement. This is especially evident with respect to the articles of faith, according to Anglicus, since we are free to believe or not believe the truth of these articles. Furthermore, it is not the case that we always give our assent to some particular truth on account of the evidence for that truth. If the assent to propositions was always dependent on evidence, then the process of truth-seeking would be a never

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ending one (esset procedendum in infinitum). We must grant, therefore, that we do not always assent to propositions on account of the evidence provided by further propositions but that we accept some propositions on the basis of belief. It also is not true that only the will is capable of relating to a good without accepting it as a good propter se or as a good propter aliud. The intellect is capable of doing the same with respect to truths, i.e., the intellect can apprehend some truth absolutely, without considering it as a truth proper se or as a truth propter aliud. Lastly, Anglicus disagrees with Scotus that will can have an intermediate act with respect to enjoyment and use. Any such intermediate act would already be a morally blameworthy act because it would either amount to using what is—objectively speaking—meant to be enjoyed or enjoying what is meant to be used. 41 Putting aside Anglicus’s rejection of Scotus’s actus medius, one wonders whether Anglicus really understood Scotus’s account of the nature and functioning of the human will. Anglicus in essence claims that the intellect is capable of free assent just as the will is capable of free consent. But how can the intellect assent to a non-evident truth unless it does so through the mediation of the will? And is the acceptance of the articles of faith based on a purely intellectual confidence in the truth of those articles? The belief in the truth of those articles must be a voluntary, not coerced belief, which is exactly Scotus’s point. If it were up to the intellect alone to determine whether an article of faith is to be believed or not, then the intellect must be a free faculty after all; the intellect will appear to have its own innate voluntariness. Thus, Scotus’s account is much more plausible than Anglicus’s. Whenever the intellect is confronted with selfevidently true propositions, the intellect inevitably assents to them. Whenever the intellect is confronted with propositions that are not selfevidently true, the intellect does not accept them to be true unless evidence extraneous to those propositions shows clearly that they are true or unless the will prompts the intellect to accept them as true without any evidence. The latter must be the case with respect to the articles of faith, which the intellect accepts as true because the will wants them to be true even without incontrovertible evidence. PETER AURIOL ON ENJOYMENT AND USE Peter Auriol was born in 1280 near Cahors in southern France. He entered the Franciscan Order at an early age. After the completion of his preparatory studies, Auriol was appointed a lector in the study houses of the order in Bologna and Toulouse. In 1316, Auriol was sent to Paris to lecture on Lombard’s Sentences. He served as a Regent Master during 1318–20. In 1321, Auriol was elected a provincial minister of Aquitaine, and was consequently consecrated as Archbishop of Aix-en-Provence.

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Auriol died soon after his consecration in 1322. Peter Auriol lectured on the Sentences at the Franciscan study houses in Bologna (1312) and Toulouse (1314), and at the University of Paris (1316–18). 42 His lectures comprise two commentaries—the monumental Scriptum super primum Sententiarum (finished in Paris in late 1316 or early 1317 and dedicated to Pope John XXII) and reportationes on all four books of the Sentences. 43 I use only Auriol’s Scriptum. According to Auriol, the definition of enjoyment states that enjoyment is an act of the will. However, enjoyment is really (secundum rem) not an act but a state of rest of the will. This state of rest is nothing else than pleasure (delectatio, complacentia). Pleasure in the broad sense of the word (largo nomine) is understood as a partial rest of the will in the cognized being of the object (in esse cognito). This kind of pleasure is only an imperfect foretaste of the object prior to the object’s real presence (esse reale). We can talk about perfect enjoyment when the real presence of the object causes the total fulfillment of desire and brings ultimate peace to the will. 44 However, the distinguishing feature of beatific pleasure is not so much the factor of fulfillment or rest as it is the direction of the pleasure. Beatific pleasure is always God-centered. The direction of using is different from that of enjoying. Using is always oriented toward the self or toward something created. Using is thus a self-centered desire or a selfcentered pleasure. One can say therefore that we do not desire God for our own sake. We desire the vision of God because that vision contributes to our individual perfection. 45 Consequently, one can talk about two kinds of beatific delight or pleasure: (1) God-directed and (2) vision- or possession-directed. Beatitude consists essentially in the God-directed delight, and actually or experientially (actualiter) in the vision-directed delight. Auriol claims that only the God-directed pleasure should be viewed as a true enjoyment (fruitio vera) and ultimate good (summum bonum). The second type of delight is an additional or supervenient perfection. 46 The distinction between God-centered and self-centered enjoyment is based on Auriol’s more general division of the affirmative act of the will (velle) into love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae). 47 Both types of love share three modes: (1) anticipatory pleasure, (2) desire for a future good and (3) pleasure at the attainment of the good. 48 Auriol explains that the difference between the two types of love is based on the way in which the object is viewed by the lover. The object of the love of friendship is the good insofar as it is a good in itself (quatenus obiectum est bonum in se). The object of the love of concupiscence is the good insofar as it is a good for the lover (quatenus obiectum est bonum amanti). Furthermore, in contrast to the love of friendship, the love of concupiscence is focused mainly upon the attainment or possession of the thing loved and not upon the thing as such. Thus, we

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can say that when we love something with a love of concupiscence, we treat that thing as useful to us or as a source of our personal perfection and well-being. In the love of friendship, on the other hand, we treat the object—say our friend—as a good in itself. We favor or accept someone as a friend or we experience delight at the thought of a friend’s visit. We wish our friend to acquire some useful good, or wish the friend to be better off in life. We experience a full-fledged enjoyment when our friend attains the good that we hoped for him/her or when he/she is actually present in our company. However, none of these modes of love expresses the desire to enjoy our friend in a selfish or self-fulfilling manner. 49 Auriol seems to allow an act that is partially enjoyment and partially use. He says that when certain created goods—say the virtues or understanding—are willed for their own sake (propter se) without adherence to God, then such an act is neither sinful nor meritorious. The delight in created goods propter se cannot be called enjoyment in the fullest sense of the term because these goods are not regarded by the intellect as absolute ends and the will is not fixated upon them through a strong act of adherence. Neither is this delight an act of use in the fullest sense of the term because the objects of the delight are not related to the enjoyment of God in actuality. 50 FRANCIS OF MARCHIA ON THE DIFFERENT ACTS AND PASSIONS OF THE WILL The Franciscan theologian Francis of Marchia (b. ca. 1290–d. after 1344), also known as Francis of Esculo, lectured on Lombard’s Sentences at Paris in 1319–20, soon after Peter Auriol. Marchia started teaching at the Franciscan house of study around 1324. Marchia did not stay at Avignon very long, however, because as a member of the Franciscan opposition to Pope John XXII on the issue of poverty he had to flee Avignon in 1328 in the company of Michael of Cesena and William of Ockham to avoid persecution. Marchia found temporary refuge in the court of Emperor Louis of Bavaria until he was captured by ecclesiastical authorities and forced to recant his views. 51 Francis of Marchia is known primarily for his work in natural philosophy and especially for his explanation of projectile motion in terms of a residual force (virtus derelicta)—a force that keeps an object moving after it has been thrown. Marchia’s virtus derelicta theory was in fact the precursor of the well-known “impetus” theory developed by the Parisian natural philosophers John Buridan and Nicole Oresme. Marchia’s chief work in systematic theology is a massive commentary on Lombard’s Sentences surviving in several redactions. 52 Marchia’s commentary on Book I of the Sentences exists as a reportatio (dd. 1–10 of which have already appeared in Nazareno Mariani’s critical edition) and a scriptum (in pro-

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cess of being critically edited under the leadership of Russell L. Friedman and Christopher Schabel). Insofar as it is based on the critically edited reportatio version of Marchia’s Sentences commentary on Book I, my account of Marchia’s treatment of enjoyment ought to be considered provisional and in need of further emendation in light of the forthcoming critical edition of Marchia’s scriptum. Marchia’s treatment of the first distinction of Book I contains a series of questions on the nature of the will. I focus here on Marchia’s discussion of the division of the acts of the will contained in questions 3–5 of the reportatio of Marchia’s Sentences commentary. Question 3 asks whether the end and the means to the end are willed in one and the same instant. The question is divided into two articles—the first containing Marchia’s differentiation of the acts of the will and the second representing Marchia’s response to the question. In the first article of the question, Marchia says that the will has three distinct acts which parallel the three acts of the intellect with respect to a complex object. The intellect, according to Marchia, has an act of division and composition through which the complex cognitive object—e.g., man and stone (hominem cum lapide)—is put together (in esse constituitur). The intellect then has an act of apprehension through which the already constituted object is grasped, and this is the intellect’s second act. Lastly, the intellect has an act through which the apprehended object is judged positively or negatively. Truth and falsity are said to characterize only this, last third act of the intellect, which can also be described as an act of assent or dissent—e.g. when the intellect affirms or denies the truth of the statement “a man holds a stone.” The parallel acts of the will are respectively (1) the act of relating one object to another (actum referendi obiectum ad obiectum), (2) the act of merely inclining toward an object (actus tendendi in ipsum obiectum relatum), and (3) the act of accepting or rejecting an object (actus acceptandi vel respuendi). According to Marchia, only the third act of the will can be characterized as having moral goodness or badness (malicia moralis et bonitas). The first and the second act of the will are morally indifferent. Marchia does not simply assume that the will must have an act corresponding to intellectual division and composition and an act corresponding to intellectual conceptualization. He argues that the will has these two acts on the ground that the will as an active power must also be capable of functioning in a regulative and directive manner. What Marchia means is that the will itself is responsible for bringing the intellect to an act of composition and division (iste ordo constituendi obiecta conplexa per intellectum actu conponendi et dividendi est per inperium voluntatis). Moreover, just as the intellect is capable of apprehending an object without making any judgments about it so also the will must be capable of simply tending or inclining toward an object without any kind of approval or disapproval. 53 Thus, Marchia’s first division of the acts of the intellect and the will appears in table 3.1 as follows:

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Composition and division Relating an object to another

2nd act

Complex apprehension

Tending toward an object related to another

3rd act

Affirmative or negative judgment

Willing or willing-against

Marchia’s response to question four adds a further dimension to his account of the acts of the will. This question is whether the act of willing (velle) and willing-against (nolle) differ according to species. In his response to the question, Marchia explains that there is a twofold genus of contrary acts in the intellect paralleled by a twofold genus of contrary acts in the will. There is a twofold genus of acts in the sense that some of these acts are understood as operations (per modum operacionum) and others as passions (per modum passionum). Thus, the intellect’s acts of affirmation or negation are in essence operations that must be differentiated from the intellect’s acts of assent or dissent, which are passions. Similarly, the will’s simple acts of velle and nolle can be described as operations and must be distinguished from the acts of complaisance (complacencia) and displeasure (displicencia) because the latter are more accurately defined as passions. 54 In sum, Marchia’s second division of the acts of the intellect and the will is as presented in table 3.2: Table 3.2.

Second division of the acts of the intellect and the will

Order of operations

Affirmation or denial

Willing or willing-against

Order of passions

Assent or dissent

Complaisance or displeasure

Marchia proposes a third classification of the parallel acts of the intellect and the will in question five. Question five asks whether the will has a third act that differs from the acts of velle and nolle. Marchia concludes that there is indeed such a third act. This third act corresponds to the intellect’s act of simple apprehension and can be termed an act of simple volitional inclination or propensity (simplex inclinatio et tendencia voluntatis). In sum, Marchia distinguishes between two orders of intellectual and volitional acts—the first comprised of simple acts and the second comprised of complex acts. The simple acts are those that have no contrary acts, whereas the complex acts come in pairs of contrary acts. Thus, the intellect’s act of simple apprehension and the will’s act of simple inclina-

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tion have no contraries. On the other hand, the intellect’s act of affirmation is distinguished from its corresponding contrary act of denial, and the will’s act of velle is distinguished from its own corresponding contrary act of nolle. 55 In conclusion, the third division of the acts of the intellect and the will looks in table 3.3 as follows: Table 3.3. Third division of the acts of the intellect and the will Order of simple acts

Simple apprehension

Order of complex acts

Composition and division Willing Affirmation and denial

Simple inclination or propensity

Willing-against

How do the above three divisions relate to each other? In other words, do we have a case of a thoroughgoing isomorphism between the acts of the intellect and the acts of the will? That the isomorphism is not complete is in fact suggested in the form of the following objection: While the intellect’s acts can be divided into simple and complex depending on the nature of the object—i.e., whether the object is simply grasped as a thing outside of the intellect (in re extra) or constituted as a complex by the intellect—the will’s acts cannot be so divided because the will always regards the object as a whole, regardless of whether the object is something simple or complex. Thus, all acts of the will tend to coalesce in relation to a simple intellectual act (assimilatur actui simplici intellectus) with respect to an already presupposed object. 56 Marchia insists that the twofold order of the acts of the will is based on the distinction between acts that have no contraries and acts that do have contraries. The act of simple inclination, for instance, has no contrary. The acts of willing and willing-against, however, are contrary acts. Thus, just like the intellect, the will also has both simple and complex acts. 57 The isomorphism between the acts of the intellect and the acts of the will is indeed a thoroughgoing one. WILLIAM OF OCKHAM ON ENJOYMENT AND USE William Ockham was born in 1285 in the village of Ockham near London. He became an oblate at the age of seven or eight, and he probably received his elementary education through a local parish priest. He obtained the prerequisite training in grammar and philosophy at a Franciscan convent in London. His official acceptance into the Franciscan Order took place when he was fourteen or fifteen years old. It is certain that Ockham was ordained as a subdeacon on February 26, 1306, at Southwark Cathedral, in the Diocese of Winchester, and that he received a

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license to hear confessions in 1318. He began his theological studies at Oxford in 1309 but he never received a final degree as a Master of Theology. In 1321, Ockham left Oxford to become a philosophy lecturer at the Franciscan study house in London. While in London, Ockham composed his major philosophical works (the monumental Summa logicae, expositions on Porphyry’s Isagoge and on Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, and Sophistical Refutations, a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics). In 1322, Ockham began writing his last theological work, the Quodlibets, which he finished at Avignon around 1325. In 1324, Ockham was summoned to Avignon to answer charges of unorthodoxy brought to the papal court by the former Chancellor of Oxford, John Lutterel. Pope John XXII appointed a commission to examine Ockham’s theological writings. The commission (which included Durandus of Saint Pourçain) extracted 51 passages from Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences that had to be censured. However, these passages were never formally condemned. During his stay at Avignon, Ockham became involved in the controversy over the poverty of Christ and his apostles. Ockham took the side of the Minister General of the Franciscans, Michael of Cesena, and fled Avignon in 1328 to avoid persecution. As a consequence of his support of Cesena’s view on poverty, Ockham was excommunicated. Eventually, Ockham joined the court of Emperor Louis of Bavaria in Munich. He spent the last years of his life writing polemical treatises on ecclesiastical polity. Ockham died in 1347, perhaps falling victim to the devastating Black Death. Subsequent generations of scholastic thinkers coined for Ockham the memorable title Venerabilis Inceptor, probably because he never became a regent master in theology or because he initiated a novel way of thought (via moderna)—known as nominalism (or more precisely conceptualism)—which became a powerful alternative to Thomistic realism. 58 Ockham lectured on the Sentences in the period 1317–19. The Oxford lectureship was the basis for Ockham’s Reportatio on Books II–IV. Ockham also prepared an Ordinatio on Book I during 1319–24. 59 According to Ockham, the distinction between enjoyment and use can be presented as a distinction between an intransitive or non-referring act (actus non referens) and a transitive or referring act of the will (actus referens voluntatis). Intransitive (or non-referring) and transitive (or referring) acts are basically two different modes of willing (velle). The intransitive mode of the will consists in the pursuit of something for its own sake (propter se). Ockham explains that this kind of mode takes place when something is assumed or taken within the will even if nothing else has been shown or presented to the will by the intellect. Ockham notes that the intransitive or non-referring mode would occur if God were shown to a person without anything else being shown to him/her; the person, then, would desire only one thing—that is, God. The transitive mode of the will, on the other hand, consists in the pursuit of something for the sake of another (propter aliud). In this case, something—say x—is taken within

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the will, while another thing—say y—has been presented and taken within the will first. The relationship between x and y is such that, if y were not presented to the will, x would not be presented to the will either. The act (or mode) so-described can be called use (usus), and Ockham’s illustration of this act is the example of a person who would not take a bitter potion unless he desires health. The intransitive act of the will can be of two kinds: (1) an act of enjoyment (actus fruendi), when the will accepts an end as the highest possible good (summum bonum) and as an object loved beyond all other goods and (2) an act that is neither enjoyment nor use (non est proprie frui nec proprie uti), when the will accepts some good absolutely, regardless of whether it truly is the highest good or not. 60 The act that is neither enjoyment nor use can be viewed as an intermediate act of the will (actus medius). 61 Ockham makes it very clear that the intermediate act is a positive volition. But he also states that the object of this volition should not be taken as an ultimate end although it may be loved propter se. 62 Ockham’s support for the thesis that there can be such intermediate volition is a well-known text from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, where we read that there are certain things, e.g., honor, pleasure, understanding and the virtues, that we pursue and choose in their own right and not only on account of happiness. On the basis of Aristotle’s words, Ockham argues that something can be willed and chosen in its own right when nothing else (ultimate) is presented to the will. The implication is that if something else is being presented to the will as an ultimate end, then the will ought to choose its other ends on account of that final end. 63 Ockham declares that the “middle act” of the will is not necessarily a morally evil act because if there is no apprehension of the ultimate end as such, then there is no obstacle to taking something as valuable or worthy of pursuit for its own sake. 64 Furthermore, according to Ockham, one is not obligated to will something—say virtue—for the sake of the ultimate end. An evil act or sin would be committed if one prescribes or chooses a relative end as an end higher than all other ends. 65 Ockham also talks about ordinate and inordinate enjoyment. Needless to say, the object of an act of ordinate enjoyment (fruitio ordinata) is God, Who alone ought to be loved supremely whereas the object of an act of inordinate enjoyment (fruitio inordinata) is something other than God that is loved supremely and just as much as God. Ordinate enjoyment, in turn, can be of two kinds: (1) enjoyment that brings rest to the will, which is the enjoyment of the blessed in heaven (fruitio perfecta seu comprehensoris, fruitio patriae) and (2) enjoyment that allows anxiety or sadness, which is the enjoyment of God in this life (fruitio imperfecta seu fruitio viae). 66 Thus, the distinctive feature of beatific enjoyment seems to be the state of satiation (satietas), which, as Ockham explains elsewhere, means the exclusion of all distress and anxiety. Nothing except God can satiate the will in this sense. 67 It should be added, however, that the total exclusion

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of distress and anxiety is only one sense of the term “satiation.” Ockham also talks about satiation in the sense of exclusion of all potency or appetite in respect to objects other than the object of satiation. In this sense, nothing—not God or something created, not something finite or infinite—can satisfy the will and intellect of the blessed. This is so because the intellect of the blessed can see and love something created while it contemplates God. 68 Broadly speaking (large), Ockham says, the term “frui” applies to any act of willing something for its own sake, regardless of whether that thing is present or absent, possessed or not possessed. This is precisely the kind of act by means of which the wayfarer loves God above all else and for His own sake. Strictly speaking (stricte), “frui” applies to the ultimate beatific act through which the blessed enjoy God in heaven. 69 Ockham denies that natural reason alone is capable of demonstrating the possibility of enjoying the divine essence. The possibility of beatific enjoyment is mostly a matter of belief. 70 Moreover, one cannot prove decisively that enjoyment is solely an act of the will. Here one should simply look into the established conventions to find out how different authors define the term “frui.” 71 Ockham derives the meaning of the term “frui” from “fructus,” which means “something ultimate” or “the ultimate.” One can say, therefore, that enjoyment is an ultimate act. If enjoyment is an ultimate act, then it must be an act that brings ultimate rest to the will (maxime quietativus voluntatis). Ockham argues that an ultimately satiating act must be either pleasure or the immediate cause of pleasure. But such an act must be an act of the will because, if pleasure is found in another power (e.g., the intellect), or if it occurs without an act of the will, then—given an equal act of the other power—there would be equal pleasure, or some pleasure. Experience shows, however, that when someone thinks about something intensely, he/she does not take pleasure in the object of thought unless he/she also loves that object; or if, on the contrary, he/she hates the object, then there is sadness (tristitia). Sadness is said to belong to the will according to the authority of St Augustine, who claims that sadness arises from things that happen against our will. Thus, since pleasure is a quality opposite to sadness, and since sadness is in the will, therefore pleasure must be in the will as well. 72 Ockham further notes that although he takes enjoyment to be an act of the will, he does not want to deny that enjoying could also be an act of the intellect. He maintains that intellect and will are one and the same thing (sunt omnino idem) and that whatever is in the intellect is also in the will and vice versa. Thus, the act of enjoyment can be attributed both to the intellect and to the will. Nevertheless, enjoyment is said to be an act of the will because it differs from cognitive acts, such as thinking or knowing. 73

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How do volitional acts differ from cognitive ones? Ockham examines this problem in his commentary on Book II, Q. 20. 74 He tries to show that, from the point of view of the primary significatum of the terms “intellect” and “will,” the distinction between the intellect and the will can be neither conceptual (ratione) nor real (ex natura rei). The distinction between the two faculties cannot be conceptual because a conceptual distinction can be caused only by an act of the intellect and the faculties precede every such act. If, on the other hand, the distinction were real, then this distinction would be established either on the basis of the diversity of the acts (propter diversitatem actuum) or on the basis of the different operative modes of the faculties (propter diversum modum principiendi). The first cannot be accepted because then one would have to accept that there are as many faculties as there are acts. The second cannot be accepted either because, although in principle the acts of the intellect are ruled by necessity whereas the acts of the will are not, the will can sometimes act by necessity as well. 75 The intellect and the will can be further compared in a qualitative sense. One can say the will is nobler than the intellect because the act of love connoted by the definition of the term “will” is nobler than the act of understanding connoted by the definition of the term “intellect.” On the other hand, the intellect can be viewed as more primary than the will because the act of understanding connoted by the definition of the term “intellect” is the efficient partial cause of the act of the will and can naturally exist without the act of the will. Nevertheless, the primacy of the act of the intellect does not imply that the will is less perfect than the intellect. Ockham asserts that such qualitative contrasts disappear as soon as one brushes aside the connotations of the terms “intellect” and “will” and takes the terms to signify the intellective soul. Thus, from the perspective of the primary signification of the terms “intellect” and “will” one can say neither that the will is nobler than the intellect nor that the intellect is nobler than the will. 76 Ultimately, Ockham’s view amounts to saying that the intellect and the will are not faculties at all. Ockham’s “identity thesis”—as Claude Panaccio has termed it—leads to an outright rejection of faculty psychology in relation to the intellective soul. Ontologically speaking, Ockham is committed only to positing a variety of mental acts. 77 What then makes intellectual acts different from volitional ones? It has been suggested that the crucial factor that distinguishes intellectual from volitional acts is the latter’s freedom (regardless of Ockham’s remark that the will sometimes acts by necessity). According to Ockham, intellectual acts have a purely informative function whereas volitions have an elective and motivational function, 78 although it must be stressed that we are talking about volitions caused by an agent, not by a series of antecedent volitions. 79 Another way of phrasing the difference between intellectual and volitional acts is in terms of the notion of moral responsibility and accountability

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for sin. It is precisely because we are capable of volitional conformity or non-conformity to the dictates of right reason—in essence intellectual acts—and also because intellectual acts of adjudication cannot force volitions upon us that we are held responsible for our volitions. 80 Panaccio identifies other differences as well—e.g., that volitions, as was mentioned earlier, are nobler than intellectual acts, that volitions in general presuppose at least one intellectual act whereas some intellectual acts can occur without a prior volition, and that volitions can sometimes cause or direct intellectual acts. 81 In view of Ockham’s analysis of the difference between the acts of the intellect and the acts of the will, we can conclude that enjoyment differs from cognition insofar as it is a free act. Furthermore, enjoyment—especially a beatific one—is an act of amicable love, which Ockham regards as the most perfect act of the rational soul. 82 WALTER CHATTON ON ENJOYMENT AND THE LOVE OF GOD Walter Chatton was born in 1285 in the town of Chatton in Northumbria. He was a Franciscan theologian and a contemporary of William of Ockham. Chatton was one of Ockham’s first opponents and he frequently defended the views of Scotus. Chatton was ordained a subdeacon in 1307, and he became a Regent Master at Oxford in 1330. Between 1333 and 1343, Chatton was present at Avignon, acting as an examiner of the writings of Thomas Waleys and Durandus of Saint Pourçain. In 1343, Pope Clement VI appointed Chatton to the Welsh See of St Asaph, thinking mistakenly that the see had become vacant. Chatton died soon after his appointment in 1343. 83 Chatton commented upon the Sentences three times—twice in London (1321–23 and 1323–24) and once at Oxford (1328–1330). His first commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences is a Reportatio on Books I–IV written during the years 1321–23. Chatton’s second commentary is a Lectura on Book I, DD. 1–17. 84 I use both Chatton’s Reportatio and Lectura. Walter Chatton distinguishes three kinds of love (dilectio) in respect to God: (1) loving God above all things on account of the recognition that He is God (per hoc solum quod scio eum esse Deum), (2) loving God because it is so decreed (quia praeceptum est) and (3) loving God because I desire to obtain beatitude (quia desidero beatitudinem). According to Chatton, only the first kind of love—loving-God-because-He-is-God—can be called an act of enjoyment in the proper sense of the word (proprie). Chatton explains that this love involves honoring God and desiring that God’s will be fulfilled and His commands obeyed. He also points out that the love of God in this case precedes and motivates the desire to fulfill the divine precept to love God (est talis actus virtute cuius volo implere praeceptum). 85

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The second act of love can perhaps be called an imperfect or less perfect act of enjoyment because, as Chatton maintains, it is less perfect to love God because it is so commanded by the divine law than to love Him because He is God. The precept-based or command-based love of God can be called love of desire somewhat strictly or most properly (aliquantulum strictius, magis proprie) because, by obeying the precept to love God above all things one also wants to give God the honor that He deserves. 86 Chatton argues that there are two different orders of relationship between the first two acts of love. According to the order of perfection (secundum ordinem perfectionis), the love-of-God-because-He-is-God takes precedence over the command-based love of God. According to the order of origin (secundum ordinem originis), the command-based love comes before the love-of-God-because-He-is-God. From the point of view of the order of origin, it is possible to say that one is first taught that God ought to be loved. One learns that God ought to be loved through divine revelation and commandment. But the more one understands the true nature of God, the more one loves God for what He is. 87 The third act of love is based on the desire for beatitude. This type of love is not an enjoyment and it should be named wanting love or love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) because, through this kind of love, one wants something useful to or important for oneself. 88 Chatton maintains that the supreme love of God is an act of the will. He surmises that even if intellect and will were really distinct per impossibile, the act of love (dilectio)—which for him is identical with the act of enjoyment—would still be received within the will and not within the intellect. Chatton explains that the soul is the direct subject of both intentions and volitions. However, each set of acts has a different indirect subject. The indirect subject of intentions is the phantasma whereas the indirect subject of love is the heart (subiectum mediatum dilectionis sit cor). Chatton thus maintains that the heart is the seat of love insofar as any somatic experience of love involves or is brought about by means of cardiac transmutation or change. He adds that since love is also a psychic phenomenon, we are capable of experiencing it even when our souls are separated from our bodies. 89 Chatton offers a careful examination of the question whether natural reason can prove that the love of God is a praiseworthy and virtuous act. 90 Chatton clarifies that the expression “diligere Deum super omnia” can have two different meanings. The expression can mean an act performed under the obligation of the divine precept and in the presence of supernatural circumstances (e.g., charity infused in the soul). The expression can also signify an act performed ex puris naturalibus and under natural conditions. This would be an act of supreme loving in respect to something (aliquid), in respect to oneself (se ipsum), or in respect to the first being (primum ens). If the expression is understood in the first sense, then the proof that God ought to be loved supremely belongs entirely to the

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domain of revelation and cannot be derived from natural reason alone. One can appeal to the testimony of natural reason only if the expression is understood in the second sense. 91 Chatton suggests that one can differentiate three types of arguments which can be convincing for natural reason. In the Reportatio, Chatton discriminates between (1) arguments evident to any person whatsoever apart from the influence of laws, factions, and authorities (2) arguments signifying the true nature of the thing and (3) arguments consonant with the sayings of Aristotle and other philosophers. 92 In the Lectura, Chatton distinguishes between (1) arguments containing evident premises, (2) arguments which would convince even a totally impartial person and (3) arguments signifying in a truthful way and consonant with the thing itself and the philosophers’ mode of argumentation. 93 In the Reportatio, Chatton states that the first type of natural reasoning cannot show that God ought to be loved supremely. In order to demonstrate the truth of the conclusion that God ought to be loved above all, one must show that we are obligated to love God in that way. It is impossible to prove that we are obligated to love God unless we rely upon positive law (ex lege positiva), which is ruled out by the very nature of the proof, or derive the evidence from the excellence of something metaphysically prior, by which we can only prove that we ought to love an angel more than we are obligated to love ourselves. 94 In the Lectura, Chatton adds that natural reason cannot demonstrate that we ought to love God above all unless it can show that we ought to hold fast to the first being insofar as that being is the first universal cause. However, if it were true that we ought to love more the beings that have a higher causal power, it follows that we ought to love things such as the sun and the stars more than we ought to love our own friends. 95 Also in the Lectura Chatton argues that if we put aside the positive law and listen to natural reason alone, then we arrive at a series of striking conclusions. For instance, the laws of nature reveal that the part of a whole seeks its own preservation rather than the preservation of the integrity of the whole. If this is so, then individuals are more inclined to promote their own well-being rather than the well-being of the community in which they live. 96 Furthermore, right reason alone cannot dictate to me to face the danger of death for the sake of merit unless I am promised a future life as an ultimate reward. Reason, however, cannot prove that there is a future life. Moreover, reason could dictate that it is better to outlive the danger of death than die for the sake of limited merit. 97 The second type of natural proof—that is, proof based on knowledge of the nature of the thing or on impartial adjudication—seems more promising. Chatton maintains that a person would very likely accept that the love of God is a virtuous act if he/she hears the testimony of the Bible and witnesses a miraculous event that supports what is said in the Bible. 98 The third type of natural reasoning—that is, reasoning consonant

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with the philosophy of Aristotle or with the thing itself and the philosophers’ mode of argumentation—can also yield assent to the conclusion that God ought to be loved. In the Reportatio, Chatton says that the Philosopher approved of the view that one must prefer one’s community and the highest good to one’s self-love. 99 In the Lectura, Chatton also attributes to Aristotle the belief that a person should be friendly toward gods and masters and the belief that a person should be willing to sacrifice his or her own well-being for the sake of the common good. Chatton claims, however, that even though Aristotle had said such things, he could not have proved them through reason alone without taking into consideration the actual law of the city-state or the authority of his predecessors. 100 An original feature of Chatton’s concept of beatific enjoyment is the introduction of abstractive knowledge in the state of ultimate blessedness. According to Chatton, it is possible to distinguish between the intuitive knowledge or vision of God and the specific abstractive cognition through which the blessed can deliberate, reason and compose judgments. These two types of knowledge in heaven cause two different types of enjoyment: (1) the beatific enjoyment proportionate to the vision infused by God and (2) the enjoyment produced in the process of abstractive deliberation and judging. 101 As we shall see in the fifth chapter, Chatton uses this distinction to account for the passivity and activity of the beatified will. ROBERT HOLCOT ON ENJOYMENT AND USE Robert Holcot was born in 1290. He got his name from the village of Holcot, Northamptonshire. He studied and taught at Oxford and he started lecturing upon Lombard’s Sentences in 1331. He received his Doctorate in Theology probably in 1335 and served as a Regent Master at Oxford between 1336 and 1338. Holcot may also have spent some time as a lector at Cambridge after the completion of his Oxford regency. Holcot’s reputation of a man of great learning had most likely won him the patronage of Richard de Bury, Bishop of Durham. Holcot is believed to have contributed to the preparation of Richard de Bury’s Philobiblon. From 1343 until his death, Holcot was active as a confessor in Northampton. He succumbed to the plague in 1349. Holcot composed his commentary on the Sentences in the period 1331–33. 102 Apart from his commentary on the Sentences and Quodlibets, Holcot was also well known for his biblical commentaries. 103 In Beryl Smalley’s more than half a century old study of Holcot’s sources and method of biblical exegesis, Holcot’s world and mind come alive through many stories, anecdotes, moralizing exempla and pictures. Holcot, Smalley says, “took the whole world as his library.” 104

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Holcot adopts Ockham’s division of the acts of the will. There are, however, some noticeable differences and innovations. Holcot distinguishes three volitional modes: (1) willing something for its own sake (propter se), (2) willing something for the sake of another (propter aliud) and (3) willing something both for its own sake and for the sake of another (voluntas diligit aliquid propter se et propter aliud). Holcot’s account of the first two modes of volition is taken almost verbatim from Ockham. 105 The first volitional mode can be understood in a twofold way: (1) when something is loved propter se absolutely and (2) when something is loved propter se as an ultimate end. Strictly and properly speaking (stricte et proprie), only this second type of propter se-love is called enjoyment. 106 Holcot specifies that the second and third volitional modes are types of use. His illustration of the third volitional mode is as follows: A winelover finds wine desirable on account of its sweetness or good taste. One day, however, he learns that wine purifies the blood and is good for the health. Once he has acquired this new knowledge, the wine-lover will drink wine not only because of its delightful taste but also because he thinks that it will make him healthier. 107 Holcot also adds that using in general can be viewed in a twofold way. One way of using is when both the means and the end are willed actually. Another way is when the means are willed actually and the end is willed habitually or implicitly. Holcot gives two examples of the latter type of using. The first example is when a doctor employs his medical skills without at the same time thinking about his profession or about the ultimate goal of his profession, i.e., health. The second example is about people who do good things by routine. Holcot says that many people give alms to the poor and perform deeds of compassion for the sake of God without at the same thinking about God. 108 Holcot’s remarks on the “middle act” of the will are very brief yet they provide a rather interesting interpretation of Ockham’s “middle act.” Holcot at first acknowledges the possibility of postulating a third act in the will, which is neither enjoyment nor use. He then concedes an objection based on the authority of St Augustine. According to St Augustine, God’s love toward us could be either enjoyment or use, and it is inconceivable that there could be any other type of love. Holcot suggests that the intermediate act of the will could be inspected through the model of habitual or implicit using. It is possible, he says, to love an object for its own sake without actually relating that object to something else ultimately loved (non requiritur ad usum actualis relatio in aliud magis dilectum). This kind of love can be called use in a qualified sense by specifying that the ultimate term of the relationship is willed habitually or implicitly. 109 Holcot states that natural reason alone cannot demonstrate the categorical proposition “God ought to be loved above all.” However, natural reason is capable of demonstrating the hypothetical or conditional proposition “If God exists, God is to be loved by man above all things.” 110 The

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proposition “God ought to be loved above all” cannot be naturally demonstrated because its subject implies something that is believed (implicativum crediti), such as that God exists or that God is the supreme good or that God is an infinite being and prime mover, etc. 111 If the proposition “God is to be loved above all” is transformed into the consequent of a hypothetical proposition, then that hypothetical proposition could be proved by natural reason. Thus, given the signification of the term “God” and granted the concept corresponding to this term in the mind of the religious believer, one can prove that God is to be loved by humanity above everything. 112 Holcot’s conclusions are in fact consonant with his overall view of the relationship between faith and reason, theology and philosophy. According to Holcot, the truths of the Christian faith are not evident and do not constitute a body of scientific knowledge. This is so because the notion of God on which these truths are based is acquired through supernatural means. It can be said, therefore, that, for Holcot, the role of theology is not strictly demonstrative. In other words, if the human intellect grants certain basic truths about God, e.g., that God exists or that God is the creator of all things, then it can prove other truths, such as that God ought to be loved and enjoyed above everything. 113 Holcot may have thought that it is not enough to grant the validity of the articles of faith on the basis that one simply wants them to be true. Assent requires evidence independent from volition otherwise one can believe anything whatsoever to be true. 114 Holcot’s skeptical attitude with respect to what human reason can achieve without divine support is also reflected in Holcot’s Wisdom commentary, where Holcot wrote that not even Christian theologians can provide indubitable evidence for God’s existence. Yet, one should not draw the hasty conclusion that Holcot considered human reason to be entirely incapable of knowing God because Holcot did say that God would grant knowledge of Himself to those who exercise their reason with innocence and are sincere in their pursuit of God. 115 ADAM WODEHAM ON ENJOYMENT, COGNITION AND VOLITION Adam Wodeham (1298–1358) was one of the most distinguished scholastic theologians and philosophers of the fourteenth century. He was a Franciscan thinker, a faithful follower of William of Ockham and a trustworthy exponent of his theology. Wodeham taught theology in London, Norwich and Oxford. 116 Wodeham lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard three times—in London (before 1329 or 30), Norwich (1329–32), and Oxford (1332–34). 117 I rely upon the last two commentaries. 118 Wodeham’s Oxford lectures contain an interesting terminological classification. Wodeham differentiates two kinds of enjoyment: (1) an absolute love of something for its own sake and (2) a love of something

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that is accepted as an ultimate end in itself, which should be called enjoyment in the strict sense of the term (proprie). Absolute love branches out into sensitive and intellectual love. Intellectual love can be further subdivided into love following the act of simple apprehension and love following the acts of composition and division in the intellect. 119 The Augustinian theologian Gregory of Rimini (1300–1358), who knew Oxford theology very well and who commented upon Lombard’s Sentences at Paris in the period 1343–44, 120 reports Wodeham’s classification almost verbatim and criticizes Wodeham’s views. 121 Gregory attacks Wodeham primarily for allowing weaker types of enjoyment and for admitting that things other than God—such as honor, pleasure, understanding and the virtues—are also worthy of enjoyment. Gregory accuses Wodeham of expanding St Augustine’s concept of enjoyment. He claims that St Augustine did not intend to introduce an act that is neither enjoyment nor use. 122 He also blames Wodeham for taking too much from Aristotle. It is true, Gregory admits, that Aristotle talked about seeking things such as virtues, honor, pleasure, and understanding for their own sake. A true Catholic, however, would not say that, in addition to the virtues, one also ought to enjoy honor, pleasure and understanding as such. 123 Wodeham’s classification of enjoyment deserves some elucidation. What is meant by “absolute love”? Wodeham mentions absolute love in the context of his discussion of animal cognition. The main point of this discussion is that, unlike humans, animals do not have complex objective adjudicative acts. Animal behavior can be explained on the basis of acts of simple apprehension and the force of instinct (ex instinctu naturae). Different animal species function automatically. Ants collect grain for the winter, spiders spin webs to catch flies, and there is no special cognition, memory, experience or any factor other than instinct that can account for this purposeful behavior. Even if two members of the same animal species exhibit opposite reactions with respect to one and the same external stimulus, these reactions can be explained on the grounds of the different memory or imagination trace produced by the object at an earlier time and associated at present with the act of simple apprehension. Thus, the patterns of animal behavior do not manifest even the most primitive form of rationality. Animal behavior is rather analogous to impulsive human reactions such as scratching one’s head or rubbing one’s beard. 124 Immediately after these explanations of animal conduct, Wodeham makes a distinction between virtuous and absolute love. Virtuous love presupposes judgment or deliberation, whereas absolute love requires frequently only an act of simple apprehension. Wodeham applies the model of absolute love to the analysis of the appetitive acts of animals. Animals are attracted toward an object unless there is an external obstacle preventing the attraction or a negative memory associated with the object. Animals, however, do not form complex judgments. 125 It appears, then, that Wode-

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ham’s position on the possible enjoyment of animals would not differ significantly from that of St Thomas Aquinas. Just as St Thomas, Wodeham refuses to attribute any sort of complex form of rationality or a process of deliberation to animals. 126 Interestingly, Gregory of Rimini disagreed with both Wodeham and St Thomas and argued that animals are also capable of having acts of complex apprehension that allow them to relate differently to one and the same object. 127 What then qualifies as an act of enjoyment in the strict sense of the term? This is an act of love of an object that is accepted as the ultimate end in itself. Wodeham specifies that enjoyment, in the strict sense of the term, includes acts of love based on composition and division. In general, virtuous love presupposes complex cognitive acts, such as judgment and deliberation, and if enjoyment is to be considered an instance of virtuous love, it must include such complex acts. 128 Irrational animals are incapable of judgment and deliberation because they have no practical reason and are not free moral agents. 129 Therefore, enjoyment in the strict sense of the term applies only to volitions caused through complex adjudicative acts. Nevertheless, Wodeham maintains that the plain vision of God in heaven can cause an act of enjoyment that is not under the control of the will. The will, according to Wodeham, elicits its acts in respect to God or any other object grasped through simple apprehension in a purely natural way (mere naturaliter). This particular passive aspect of volition does not undermine the freedom of the will insofar as the free exercise of the will requires deliberation and judgment. 130 Enjoyment in heaven could be a free act if God relinquishes the will of the blessed to the will’s own power. 131 Wodeham’s notion of enjoyment can be examined in the context of his peculiar theory of volitions. 132 Modern commentators have proposed two somewhat different accounts of Wodeham’s theory. According to the “compositional” account of Wodeham’s theory proposed by Knuuttila, appetitive acts such as desire and hatred not only presuppose cognition as their partial cause but also in some way incorporate or include the preceding cognitive cause. 133 According to the “cognitivist” account proposed by Martin Pickavé, the occurring appetitive acts can be said to copy the antecedent cognitions. 134 We are consequently faced with three separate questions. First, if enjoyment requires cognition for its occurrence, then what kind of cognition can cause enjoyment? Second, why describe enjoyment itself as having cognitive character or content? Third, if an occurring enjoyment can be said to have an inherent cognitive character or content, what exactly is this character or content? What kind of cognition can cause enjoyment? According to Wodeham, this could be an act of intuitive or abstractive cognition. Wodeham explains that enjoyment cannot cause itself and requires an act of cognition as a partial efficient cause. 135 As Knuuttila explains, Wodeham simply follows the accepted Franciscan account according to which cognition

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is necessary insofar as it provides the will with an intentional object. 136 However, cognition is by itself not a sufficient causal factor with respect to enjoyment. Wodeham says, for instance, that people often have an apprehension of an object without experiencing any hatred or love toward that object. Furthermore, given the same act of apprehension, the will can freely produce an act of love or an act of hatred, or it can remain indifferent. 137 For the purposes of our investigation, the fact that enjoyment requires cognition and yet is not necessitated by it is essential. However, in the case of the sensitive appetite, enjoyment would be caused automatically. 138 Why think of enjoyment itself as having a cognitive character or content? It has been suggested that part of what motivated Wodeham to call appetitive acts cognitions is his concern with preserving their intentionality. 139 For Wodeham, appetitive acts are basically acts of a living thing— i.e., a spiritual substance or mind—and all such acts are experiences of something (omnis actus vitalis est quaedam experientia). This experience is an immediate awareness or apprehension of the object and not of some species representing the object to the mind (species praevia omni actui). 140 Thus, enjoyment is not simply based upon a conceptualization of things. It is also itself a way of conceptualizing things. The will, Perler explains, “is to be understood as a capacity that makes use of the concepts supplied by the intellect and produces conceptualized passions.” 141 Furthermore, the term “experientia” indicates that enjoyment is not simply a thought of something but it is likewise a thought which exists in a mind and by or through which a mind apprehends something. 142 Lastly, the cognitive component (on Knuuttila’s “compositional” account) or aspect (on Pickavé’s “copy” account) of enjoyment is not some kind of sensible or intelligible species but an immediate or direct acquaintance of the mind with the object. 143 Wodeham presents a number of difficulties that follow from the thesis that enjoyment is really distinct from all cognition. 144 For instance, if cognition and love were really distinct, then the soul could love something unknown or obscure, which, according to St Augustine, is impossible. The consequence of the hypothetical syllogism is established on the basis that, if cognition and love were strictly distinct, then God could create an act of beatific love without cognition and vice versa. 145 It also follows that the will would be blind with respect to the discrimination of the intellect, 146 that an individual can be blessed without beholding or knowing God, 147 or that an unknown object can be pleasing (placere) to the will, 148 etc. Moreover, if love were strictly distinct from all instances of cognition, then—by the same token—the fear of pain would be strictly distinct from cognition. If so, then a person who believes he/she deserves eternal punishment could experience grief of infinite intensity. 149 Some of the aforementioned difficulties suggest that Wodeham also has serious theological reasons to insist upon the cognitive character of appetitive

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acts. Pickavé suggests that Wodeham’s main theological reason for maintaining that appetitive acts are cognitions stems from the nature of the beatific vision. 150 Perhaps what worries Wodeham also is that by denying that volitions have a cognitive character one is at the same time denying that the love of God can itself be a kind of knowledge or that it can add something extra (new or different) to our previous knowledge. Theological concerns aside, it is debatable whether Wodeham gains anything by treating volitions as cognitions. Gregory of Rimini, for instance, believed that it is redundant to characterize appetitive acts as cognitions and argued that volitions do not in any way expand or improve our preexisting knowledge. 151 If volitions are certain types of cognition, then one can ask how volition differs from other types of cognition such as scientific knowledge or demonstration. Wodeham offers detailed comments on the structural and qualitative similarities and dissimilarities between volitional and epistemic acts. According to Wodeham, volitions can be said to have propositional structure only to the extent to which they are caused by epistemic acts of assent or dissent. However, not all volitions can have a propositional structure. 152 Some types of volition are caused by non-complex objects and can take the form of simple expressions, such as “I love this.” Other volitions are caused by complex objects and can be translated into propositions, such as “I hope that you will become a bishop.” Wodeham notes, however, that the latter type of volition is propositional in signification but simple in nature. 153 As it was already mentioned, certain volitions involve assent or dissent. Thus, the gladness that someone experiences over the adversity of an enemy includes a belief or knowledge that the enemy is dead or that the enemy is in a state of anguish. 154 Wodeham asks whether volitions can be true or false. One may object that truth and falsity are properties of propositions. 155 In response to this objection, Wodeham maintains that only volitions that have indicative propositional structure can be called veridical. In this sense, the gladness of being a Christian or a Franciscan can be said to be a true apprehension (apprehensio vera). The cognitive content of other volitions, however, may be expressed in optative, imperative or infinitive modes, in which case the volition cannot be called veridical. Nevertheless, Wodeham claims that, in principle, non-indicative expressions can always have an equivalent indicative form. For instance, the infinitive Latin expression “hunc esse episcopum” can always be transformed into the indicative expression “ille est episcopus.” 156 One can add that, for Wodeham, there is also a certain parallelism between judgments and volitions. Wodeham portrays the notion of judgment (iudicium) as a mental accepting (adnuitio, concessio), rejecting (negatio) or doubting the significate of a proposition. It is as though the mind “nods” and says “Yes” or it says “No” or it hesitates. Likewise, one can say that volitions involve acts of accepting, rejecting or doubting. 157

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However, such mental acts are not necessarily veridical. They can be viewed as evaluations of the desirable or undesirable aspects of the apprehended objects. 158 There is, however, a key qualitative difference between volitions and cognitions. Wodeham points out that the nobility and perfection of the intellectual nature become manifest through the meritorious acts of the will and not so much through the acts of cognition. On the grounds that there is no habit nobler than charity, he argues that the human soul’s volitional capacity is nobler than its cognitive capacity. 159 Nonetheless, Wodeham insists that the qualitative difference between volitions and cognitions should not be overstated. He holds that a primacy of nobility cannot be attributed to the intellect or to the will because the intellect and the will are ontologically speaking identical. The intellect and the will are identical in the sense that they are blended with the substance of the rational soul. Accordingly, the intellect and the will should be viewed not so much as separate faculties but as different capacities or applications of one and the same spiritual substance. 160 In conclusion, enjoyment should be understood as a quality inhering in the very substance of the rational soul and not in some faculty or power which is really distinct from the soul. 161 BEATIFIC ENJOYMENT IN THE SENTENCES COMMENTARIES OF SOME LESS-KNOWN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY THEOLOGIANS: ROBERT GRAYSTONES O.S.B. AND THE SECULAR RICHARD FITZRALPH AT OXFORD, AND JOHN BACONTHORPE O. CARM. & GERARD OF SIENA O.E.S.A. AT PARIS Detailed and exciting discussions of beatific enjoyment are also found in the Sentences commentaries of a significant number of less-known Oxford and Parisian theologians. In order to showcase the extraordinary abundance of theological reflection and because our analysis has mostly been concerned with the work of Franciscan authors and to some extent also with Dominicans, I now turn to the contribution of thinkers outside of the Franciscan and Dominican orders, at Oxford and at Paris in the third decade of the fourteenth century. The treatment of beatific enjoyment of a rather obscure Oxford theologian—the Benedictine monk Robert Graystones, also known as Greystone, Grayston, Graystans and Graystanes (d. in 1336)—is currently in the process of being critically edited and made available for scholarly study. 162 Graystones was a scholar at Durham College, Oxford, in 1321 or 1325. In 1333, Graystones was appointed and consecrated Bishop of Durham, but surrendered his post to Richard of Bury, who himself was a candidate supported by King Edward III and approved by Pope John XXII. 163 Graystones’ commentary on all four books of the Sentences is

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found in a single manuscript (Westminster Abbey, MS. 13). Beatific enjoyment is discussed in the commentary on Book I, questions 1–3. The first question concerns whether God alone is the object of enjoyment. The second question asks whether enjoyment is an act of the will. The third question examines whether the will enjoys the ultimate end of necessity. Especially interesting is Graystones’ second question. The question is divided into six articles each one addressing a specific enjoyment-related topic. Although Graystones accepts the thesis that enjoyment is essentially an act of the will, he is—as we shall see below—fully aware of the different senses of the term “fruitio.” A thesis that stands out in particular is that—strictly speaking—every act of use is simultaneously an act of enjoyment (omnis utitio sit fruitio) whereas not every act of enjoyment is an act of use. This is so because the object of volition becomes an object of use as a result of the will’s intentional subordination of that object to a higher end. But the use of the object vis-à-vis the object of ultimate concern is really the same act through which the object of ultimate concern is loved and enjoyed. Graystones finds support for his thesis in a lesson found in Anselm’s dialogue De casu diaboli. The teacher in Anselm’s dialogue asks his student: “When someone wants something for the sake of something else, what precisely is to be determined that he wants, the thing he actually wants or the thing for the sake of which he wants it?” The student responds: “The thing for the sake of which he is said to want this.” Anselm thus concludes that when someone wants something for the sake of beatitude it is beatitude that he truly wants. 164 The contribution of the Irish theologian Richard FitzRalph (also known to his contemporaries as “Hibernicus” and “Armacanus”) to medieval scholastic theology has only recently been revisited. 165 FitzRalph received his doctorate in theology in 1331 and became Chancellor of Oxford University in 1332. Evidence that FitzRalph was counted among the leading early fourteenth century theologians is the fact that while FitzRalph was at Avignon on his first visit Pope Benedict XII sought FitzRalph’s advice in correcting Pope John XXII’s controversial views on the beatific vision. FitzRalph is mostly known, however, for opposing the mendicant orders on the question of evangelical poverty and for protecting the rights of the secular clergy. 166 FitzRalph finished lecturing on Lombard’s Sentences before October, 1329. He was a pivotal figure in the period between Ockham and Wodeham. Judging by the frequency of Wodeham’s references to FitzRalph, FitzRalph was one of Wodeham’s most important discussion partners. He was also one of the most frequently cited authors in the works of fourteenth-century English theologians. 167 In light of the most recent scholarship, it has become clear that FitzRalph played a key role in the development of early Oxford theology and that FitzRalph’s contribution to scholastic thought merits more attention and consideration, even though later in his career FitzRalph characterized his scholastic training as a vain pursuit. 168

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FitzRalph’s treatment of beatific enjoyment is found in Q. 1 of FitzRalph’s Lectura on Book I of Lombard’s Sentences. 169 The question is titled “Whether only the immutable Trinity is to be enjoyed” and consists of four articles: (1) Whether the enjoyment of God is possible for man; (2) Whether it is possible for someone to enjoy one person without enjoying another or the divine essence without the person; (3) Whether the will enjoys the ultimate end freely through liberty of contradiction; and (4) Response to the main question. 170 Interestingly, FitzRalph discusses two related questions immediately after completing the treatment of enjoyment. The title of Q. 2 is “Whether beatitude is an act of the will or the intellect” and Q. 3 is titled “Whether the single act of the intellect or the will is differentiated with respect to diverse objects.” I focus briefly on FitzRalph’s response to the first question and on the first, third and fourth articles of FitzRalph’s second question. 171 As we shall see, FitzRalph positions the discussion of beatific enjoyment in the broader scholastic discussion of the nature of beatitude and the axiological hierarchy of the human faculties. FitzRalph stands firmly on Augustinian grounds when he maintains that the Trinity is indeed the sole adequate object of enjoyment if enjoyment is understood in the sense of loving God for God’s sake, in this life or in heaven. Surprisingly, FitzRalph attributes enjoyment to irrational creatures (bruta), although he swiftly notes that the object of such enjoyment is corporeal pleasure, which animals, since they lack reason, enjoy licitly. This view entails that a human being’s indulgence in bodily pleasure is indeed enjoyment, albeit a sinful one. 172 But is enjoyment an act of the will or of the intellect? From FitzRalph’s formulation of the third article of question 1—”Whether the will can freely enjoy the ultimate end with freedom of contradiction”—it is clear that enjoyment is strictly speaking an act of the will. Furthermore, on the basis of the third article of question 2 and FitzRalph’s response to the question, it can be inferred that enjoyment is included in beatitude if beatitude is understood in a very broad sense as a collection of qualities. 173 If, on the other hand, beatitude is taken in a narrow sense, then beatitude must be attributed to the will, and, more precisely, to the act of love or the concomitant passion of pleasure or delight. 174 Most rewarding, however, are FitzRalph’s comments on the axiological hierarchy of the human faculties. In the first article of the second question, FitzRalph inquires whether the will is a faculty nobler than the intellect. FitzRalph answers that the opinion according to which the intellect is the nobler faculty is indeed very probable (valde probabilis), but that he himself is more prone to agree with those authorities who state the opposite—viz., that the will is the nobler of the two human faculties. FitzRalph then takes Aquinas to task for being inconsistent on this issue. When in his Commentary on the Sentences, Book I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 Aquinas had characterized the intellect as the “highest potency” (potentia altissima)

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in us, FitzRalph asks, did he mean “highest” in the axiological sense (secundum perfectionem) or in the sense of “prior according to origin” (secundum originem)? If Aquinas had meant “highest” in the axiological sense, then he had certainly contradicted himself, FitzRalph observes, because immediately after the response to the main article, in the reply to the first objection, Aquinas had stated the exact opposite—viz., that the will is axiologically higher than the intellect. 175 But FitzRalph offers more than a mere criticism of Aquinas’s position. FitzRalph also argues that what makes the will axiologically more valuable than the intellect is the fact that without it the intellect would be completely useless. Moreover, the intellect is naturally subordinate to the will insofar as its whole purpose is to enable the will’s functioning by presenting it with the information necessary to make a choice. Thus, FitzRalph suggests that the Aristotelian argument that felicity is the noblest human activity because all human actions aim at its achievement can be reformulated in such a way as to support the axiological primacy of the activity of the will. However, the axiological priority of the will over the intellect does not entail that the intellect and the will are ontologically distinct because they are very much the same thing (sint eadem res). 176 This last point, as we saw at the end of our discussion of Adam Wodeham’s treatment of enjoyment in the Oxford Ordinatio, is something that both FitzRalph and Wodeham insist should not be forgotten in making claims about the axiological hierarchy of the human faculties. The English theologian John Baconthorpe (1290–ca. 1345/48), also called the Unyielding Doctor (Doctor Resolutus) and “Prince of the Averroists,” is among the best known Carmelite authors of the early fourteenth century. Baconthorpe lectured on Lombard’s Sentences at Paris some time before 1318 and became a regent master of theology by 1323. He held the administrative post of Provincial of the Carmelite Order in England in 1323–33, and taught in Cambridge and, possibly, Oxford. Baconthorpe is known for his Sentences Commentary (edited ca. 1325) and three Quodlibetal Questions, and was long after his time considered being the official teacher of the Carmelites. It has also been said that Baconthorpe was an independent thinker in the sense that he did not position himself strictly within the doctrinal confines of the Thomist, Scotist or Ockhamist schools. 177 Baconthorpe’s lengthy treatment of enjoyment consists of two questions: (1) “Whether enjoyment is of the ultimate end under the aspect of the final cause?” and (2) “Whether the Father can enjoy the essence without enjoying the persons, or one person without the other?” The first question consists of five articles. The reader is instantly struck by the surrounding principal arguments. The principal argument pro states that the object of enjoyment is the ultimate end, and that this end is of the nature of the final cause. The principal argument con declares that enjoyment consists in a reflexive act whereby one perceives oneself as holding

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on to God. 178 The principal arguments exhibit a clear concern with an issue which becomes prominent in scholastic discussions of enjoyment emerging in response to Durandus’s unusual view of the adequate object of beatific enjoyment. Obviously, Baconthorpe’s enjoyment account is partly intended as a rejoinder to Durandus’s view. Later, in our discussion of Durandus’s view in the last section of this chapter, we shall also articulate some of the notable features of Baconthorpe’s own take on this issue. The second question of Baconthorpe’s treatment, on the other hand, is evidently concerned with the problem of the differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity, and we shall pursue Baconthorpe’s substantial contribution to this particular trinitarian scholastic discussion in the following chapter of the book. I shall limit myself here only to the following two remarks: (1) Baconthorpe equates enjoyment in the broad sense of the term with beatitude. This is how Baconthorpe wants us to think of enjoyment while reading his account of the object of enjoyment and the differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity. He even explicitly states in the body of the division of the second question that “frui” is to be understood not in the strict Augustinian sense of an act of the will, but in the broader Augustinian sense of beatitude as a whole (tota beatitudo), which includes both intellect and will. 179 (2) The object of beatific enjoyment, on the other hand, is God under the aspect of Aristotle’s final cause. That God is the final cause of all things is also clear from Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics. The precise meaning in which God serves as the final cause of all things is that God is the extrinsic good to which all things are ontologically oriented. It is clear, then, that philosophical reason, for Baconthorpe, can licitly speak about God as the summum bonum toward which all things tend. 180 From a purely theological standpoint, however, the summum bonum coincides with the essence of the triune God. In this sense, it is truly the divine essence that serves as final cause with respect to our beatitude. 181 A major treatment of beatific enjoyment in Parisian Sentences commentaries of Augustinian Hermits from our period of interest comes from Gerard of Siena. Gerard lectured on the Sentences at Paris around 1325 and became a master of theology by 1330. 182 According to the twentieth-century Augustinian Friar and scholar, Damasus Trapp, Gerard was a devotee of Giles of Rome and an avid critic of Peter Auriol. 183 Gerard’s treatment comprises five questions and discusses the object and psychology of enjoyment in great detail. Similar to many of the already examined authors, Gerard deals with the question whether enjoyment is an act of the intellect or the will. He answers that if it is considered in its own right (secundum se) enjoyment is an act of the will. Considered from the vantage point of the disposition necessarily required for its occurrence, however, enjoyment incorporates an act of the intellect. 184 It is very clear from Gerard’s response that, considered as a whole, enjoyment is simultaneously an exercise of cognition and volition since without preceding cog-

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nition enjoyment cannot occur. In addition to discussing whether enjoyment is an act of the intellect or the will, Gerard talks about the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure (Q. 1, A. 3), the adequate object of enjoyment and the problem of the differentiated enjoyment of the Trinity (Q. 2), the distinction between enjoyment and use (Q. 5). We shall review some of Gerard’s contributions to the scholastic discussion of these issues in the proper context. What stands out in Gerard’s analysis of enjoyment, however, is the fact that enjoyment is discussed within the broader account of the differences between the human faculties of the intellect and the will and in terms of their causal interaction. In the first article of the third question, for instance, Gerard asks how the intellect and the will differ in the understanding, and whether they are equally immaterial. In the first article of the fourth question, on the other hand, Gerard explores whether the imaginative faculty (phantasia) relates to the intellect in the same way as the intellect relates to the will, and in the third article of the same question Gerard discusses whether the enjoyable object in patria can activate one human faculty without activating another faculty at the same time. According to Gerard, the intellect and the will are equally immaterial potencies, and this means that they are not tied to any particular bodily organ. Even though they are both immaterial they are not equally disconnected from the material realm. Unlike the intellect, the will is absorbed in material things. The proper object of the intellect is being in general (ens universaliter sumptum) whereas the proper object of the will is what is desirable in general. The will is related to the intellect just as the natural appetite is related to its corresponding natural form. More precisely, just as the natural appetite is drawn toward what is convenient and repulsed by what is inconvenient so also the will is attracted by what the intellect perceives as good and repulsed by what the intellect regards as bad. In the case of the natural appetite, however, the convenient and inconvenient are determined by one and the same form. Gerard does not give an example in this context, but one can imagine him talking about the natural movement of rocks; thus, the form that accounts for the natural downward movement of rocks is also the same form that prevents rocks from naturally floating in midair or moving upward. An intellectual nature, on the other hand, is not strictly disposed with respect to a single form. Such a nature is capable of self-determination with respect to opposites. “Someone might inquire,” Gerard says, “Why couldn’t such determination or inclination come about by means of the intellect just as in the case of natural things by means of the natural form?” Gerard responds that the intellect has no inclining force (intellectus ex sui natura non habet vim inclinativam). All inclination comes from within and terminates at something external. On the contrary, the act of the intellect is initiated outside the intellect and terminates within the intellect. The inclining force is to be attributed to the will alone. 185

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After a lengthy discussion of the generic and specific distinction between acts, Gerard asks whether the enjoyable object presents itself to the will and the intellect under one and the same aspect. Having concluded earlier that two acts differ from each other specifically partly on account of their corresponding potencies and principally on the basis of their corresponding objects, Gerard claims that there must be two distinct terminating grounds (rationes terminandi actus) in potentiality in the very nature of the enjoyable object which account for the different mode of appropriation of the object through the act of the intellect and through the act of the will. These grounds, however, are not ontologically prior to the acts, but emerge in conjunction with the acts. They also do not bring about anything additional really distinct from the object although in their accomplished being vis-à-vis the acts of the soul they follow upon the object as passions and can be viewed as something absolute (quid absolutum). 186 One wonders what truly motivates Gerard’s meticulous discussion of the way in which the object of enjoyment relates to the acts of the intellect and the will. The motivation transpires in the formulation of question 4 of Gerard’s treatment of enjoyment—“Can the enjoyable object move the will toward an act of enjoyment without moving the intellect toward an act of vision?” In other words, Gerard asks whether an act of enjoyment, which is an act of the will, is in essence separable from the act of vision, which is an act of the intellect. To answer this question satisfactorily, one must examine the nature of the causal interaction between the intellect and the will. In the first article of question 4, Gerard compares the order whereby the intellect and the will relate to each other to the order whereby the intellect relates to the imagination (phantasia). The will and the intellect are related essentially whereas the intellect and the imagination are related accidentally. This is so because the activation of the will cannot occur without the intellect’s assistance whereas the intellect considered on its own (secundum se) and in separation from the body does not require the imagination’s assistance. 187 According to Gerard, the will is neither purely passive nor purely active with respect to the intellect. This becomes evident in the second article of question four, where Gerard rejects both the Thomistic opinion that the will is inevitably moved by the intellect’s apprehension of the enjoyable object and the voluntaristic position of Henry of Ghent according to which the cognition of the object is merely a necessary but not a sufficient condition (causa sine qua non) for the activation of the will. It is rather the case that the intellect and the will contribute in equal measure to the experience of enjoyment—the intellect through its own act of vision and the will through its own act of enjoyment. 188 After arguing that an act of the will always presupposes an act of the intellect, Gerard leads the discussion toward an examination of the question whether the beatif-

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ic vision can occur without enjoyment or whether beatific enjoyment can occur without vision. Another interesting aspect of Gerard’s treatment of enjoyment surfaces in the context of Gerard’s discussion of the differences between enjoyment and use. According to Gerard, one noticeable difference between enjoyment and use is that enjoyment is an elicited act whereas use appears to be a commanded act (actus imperatus). 189 This is a distinction we have not previously encountered. The use of any given thing, Gerard explains, involves an action commanded by the will and executed by potencies or faculties subordinate to the will. As to whether all things other than God are to be used, Gerard defends the already well-known Augustinian stance that all things other than God are to be used on account of God or for the sake of God. 190 ENJOYMENT AND PLEASURE Duns Scotus was among the first scholastics who discussed the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure in some detail. In his Lectura and Ordinatio, Scotus offers mainly some terminological remarks indicating that pleasure is a passion 191 of the will following upon the obtainment of the object of enjoyment. We find a more theoretical analysis of enjoyment and pleasure in the Reportatio examinata of Scotus’s Paris lectures. This analysis shows that Scotus understood pleasure to be indirectly voluntary. 192 In his Ordinatio, Scotus tells us that there is a debate (altercatio) among authorities regarding whether the word “frui” should be used only for the perfect act of pursuing something for its own sake, or for the pleasure resulting from the act, or for both. Some authorities think that “frui” signifies only the perfect act of willing something for its own sake. Others claim that the signification of “frui” applies to the pleasure subsequent upon the act. A third group of authorities insists that the word “frui” signifies a composite act or aggregate including both enjoyment and pleasure. According to Scotus, it is not unfitting for a word to signify many things. 193 Scotus shows that the various significations of the word “frui” can in fact be derived from the different statements and words of St Augustine. For instance, the statement—“every perversity, which is called vice, is to use what ought to be enjoyed and to enjoy what ought to be used”—can be understood as referring implicitly to the act of the will and not to the pleasure associated with the act. To Scotus’s mind, wickedness is formally in the act of will and not in the pleasure (delectatio) resulting from the act. Pleasure is wicked only if the act that causes it is wicked. According to Scotus, one can discover a clear indication that St Augustine takes the term “frui” in the sense of an act of the will in the treatise On Christian

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Doctrine, Book I, where St Augustine says that “enjoyment is to inhere with love in something for its own sake.” Scotus explains that the word “inhaesio” in St Augustine’s statement refers to the will as a motor power or faculty (potentia motiva). 194 Scotus also notes that sometimes St Augustine uses “frui” as synonymous with delight (gaudium) and pleasure (delectatio, voluptas). For example, St Augustine seems to equate enjoyment and pleasure in two places. The first place is a passage contained in St Augustine’s theological masterpiece On the Trinity, Book I, where St Augustine mentions that “there is full delight in enjoying the Trinity.” The second place is a passage located in the Eighty-Three Questions, where St Augustine says that “we enjoy that thing from which we derive pleasure.” 195 Scotus remarks that, occasionally, St Augustine takes the term “frui” as signifying an aggregate of an act of the will and pleasure. For instance, in the treatise On the Trinity, Book X, St Augustine gives the following definition of enjoyment: “We enjoy the things we know, wherein the will rests by being delighted propter se.” Scotus observes that, in this definition, St Augustine does not seem to consider pleasure as something merely incidental with respect to “frui.” Otherwise, St Augustine would not have included pleasure in the definition of “frui.” 196 Scotus claims that the latter compositional definition of enjoyment can be defended by saying that ultimate enjoyment means essentially beatitude. If enjoyment is understood to mean beatitude and if beatitude is our ultimate and final reward, then enjoyment must include both the act of the will and the pleasure achieved through the act. 197 In conclusion, Scotus maintains that one should not get involved in a dispute regarding the significatum of the term “frui” because, regardless of what signification has been attached to the term, the reality (res) signified by it remains unchanged. Thus, from the point of view of the signified reality, the will can be said to have four states, three of which are properly speaking acts, and one of which is a passion subsequent upon an act. Two of the three acts of the will—viz., the intermediate act of assent and the act of use—are not enjoyment and the word “frui” does not apply to them. It can be said that the word “frui” can be applied equivocally, in which case it can have two distinct significations. In its primary signification, “frui” can mean the act of inhering in God propter se. In its secondary signification, “frui” can refer to the passion of pleasure. If one takes “frui” univocally, then one ought to clarify whether one is speaking in a causal sense (causaliter), as if purporting to say that the act of inhering causes the passion of pleasure, or in an associative sense (concomitanter), as if intending to say that pleasure is simultaneously attendant with respect to the act of inhering. 198 In the Paris lectures, Scotus explains that the reason why there is a confusion regarding the signification of the word “fruitio” is that enjoyment (fruitio), love (dilectio) and delight (delectatio) are considered goods,

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which makes them conceptually inseparable. 199 He also maintains that authorities define the term “fruitio” differently depending upon how they gloss St Augustine. Sometimes St Augustine seems to indicate that enjoyment is an elicited act of love separate from pleasure. 200 Every so often, he regards enjoyment as identical with pleasure and delight. 201 Occasionally he also views enjoyment as an aggregate. 202 Therefore, Scotus asserts that if one wants to say that enjoyment is one thing or that it is an elicited act, then one should interpret the statements indicating that enjoyment is two things by saying that enjoyment is the sum total of distinct qualities or that there is some other attribute which accompanies enjoyment or is associated with it. If one does not want to gloss the mentioned passages from St Augustine’s writings, then one should say that “fruitio” is an equivocal term which can mean or signify different things. 203 Scotus’s Paris lectures also contain an examination of the theory of an unknown master regarding the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure. According to the theory, enjoyment and pleasure are identical in reality yet they differ conceptually (secundum rationem). 204 Scotus’s disciple and follower, Peter of Aquila 205 (also known as Scotellus, i.e., “little Scotus”) calls this theory opinio Thomistarum. 206 The theory is supported by six arguments—four arguments in favor of the real identity of enjoyment and pleasure and two arguments in favor of their conceptual distinction. I shall mention only the first and third arguments for the real identity of enjoyment and pleasure and the first argument for the conceptual distinction. According to the first argument, two distinct acts presuppose two distinct faculties or two separate objects. Since, in the case of enjoying and pleasure, there is a single faculty and a single object, consequently enjoyment and pleasure are really the same. 207 The third argument maintains that two things are the same if their opposites are the same. Thus, the opposites of love (dilectio) and pleasure are respectively hatred (odium) and sadness or sorrow (tristitia). Hatred is the same as sadness in the sense that it entails uneasiness or unrest (inquietatio). Therefore, love and pleasure are also identical. 208 The first proof for the conceptual distinction between enjoyment and pleasure asserts that love is understood as a movement from the faculty to the object whereas pleasure is conceived as a movement from the object to the faculty. Hence love and pleasure can be described as two distinct—active and passive—aspects of a single act. 209 Scotus does not find the arguments in support of the real identity of enjoyment and pleasure very convincing. He takes the major premise of the third argument and gives a proof demonstrating that the opposites of enjoyment and pleasure are not the same. Hatred, which is the opposite of enjoyment or love, is a certain willing-against (nolle) that does not require the existence of the object. A person hates something in the sense that he or she does not want something to happen. Sadness, which is the

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opposite of pleasure, is also a type of willing-against. Unlike hatred, however, sadness requires an apprehension of the object’s existence. A person is sad because something has happened that he/she had hoped not to happen. Consequently, sadness is not the same as hatred and pleasure is not the same as enjoyment. 210 Furthermore, Scotus argues that when the will elicits an act of willing (velle) or willing-against (nolle), the will does so voluntarily (voluntarie), which can be shown upon reflection to be “pleasant” or “acceptable” to the will. The will, however, does not elicit sadness voluntarily. According to Scotus, no one is pleased by sadness. Sadness is a kind of passive dislike or displeasure that the will cannot prevent from happening. 211 In some situations, there can be an actual separation of enjoyment from pleasure and of hatred from displeasure. Scotus gives the following examples: (1) God and the blessed can have acts of hatred without experiencing grief, 212 (2) fallen angels have great self-love yet cannot feel delight because this delight would be overcome by the greater degree of distress, 213 (3) some pious believers love God fervently and yet they experience no delight at all or feel only minimal delight. 214 One of Scotus’s more interesting arguments against the real identity of love and pleasure runs as follows: When the will desires an object, it also anticipates the delight that it can derive from that object. Thus, delight can be an object of desire, but the desire itself is not an object in the same immediate way. The act of desire or love can become an object only upon reflection, which requires a second act. Consequently, love and delight are not really the same because delight can be the per se object of the act of love whereas love itself cannot be the per se object of the same act. 215 Scotus rejects the argument in support of the conceptual distinction of enjoyment and pleasure. He explains that love does not signify merely the direction or manner of proceeding from the faculty to the object. Love should be understood as an elicited act, and the will should be considered the real cause (causa realis) of this act. Pleasure, on the other hand, should be grasped as a state of the will immediately dependent upon the object (delectatio est ab obiecto delectabili realiter), and, more precisely, upon the representation of the object in the sensory or intellectual appetite. 216 According to Scotus’s view, pleasure should be strictly separated from love because pleasure is not a free act. Pleasure can be said to be under the control of the will only indirectly, insofar as the will is capable of abnegating its act of love. 217 Why did Scotus emphasize the passive character of pleasure and distress? According to Knuuttila, Scotus’s primary motivation for doing so was his concern with proper moral education. Scotus believed that psychic pleasure and distress can hinder the acquisition of virtue unless one learns to control and experience them in a proper manner by means of establishing certain volitional habits. 218 Knuuttila also states that, for Scotus, enjoyment in heaven can be understood as partly love and partly a pleasure or delight. Eternal bliss can thus be said

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to comprise two elements—love as an active element and pleasure as a passive element. 219 Such a distinction between the passive and active dimensions of heavenly enjoyment would also fit perfectly with the broader notion of bliss as encompassing both an act of will and the mental state of joy. The relationship between enjoyment and pleasure became the center of lively debate after Scotus’s death. This debate revolved mostly around Peter Auriol’s basic model of concupiscible acts. 220 Auriol postulated two positive acts of love (amor)—desire (velle desiderii) and pleasure (velle delectationis)—and two negative or privative acts of hatred (odium)—avoidance or aversion (nolle fugae) and distress or sadness (nolle displicentiae). According to Auriol, desire can be understood as a motion toward an object and pleasure as the satisfaction of desire or the attainment of a goal. Hatred can be viewed as an aversion from an impending evil and sadness as a reaction to a present evil or danger. 221 Auriol also thought that there is love distinct from satisfaction. This love gives rise to desire and could be called an anticipatory or antecedent pleasure (delectatio obiecti apprehensi desiderium praeveniens). 222 According to Auriol, the terms “delectatio,” “complacentia,” “laetitia,” and “gaudium” signify one and the same act of love. However, these terms can have different impositions. For instance, the term “complacentia” can be taken to mean the experiential pleasantness and sweetness of love. The term “laetitia” can be understood as representing the enlarging of the heart, which is one of the characteristic somatic aspects of love. 223 Auriol describes love as a certain spiritual transportation or ecstatic progression toward the beloved (latio amantis in amatum). In the love of concupiscence or desire (amor concupiscentiae) the lover mentally pulls the beloved toward himself or herself. In the love of friendship (amor honestae amicitiae), the lover departs from his or her own self and is transported toward the beloved (egrediatur amans ad amatum spiritualiter). This process of spiritual transportation is characterized by contentment (complacentia) and peacefulness (quies). 224 In Auriol’s psychology, favoring or liking (complacentia) and pleasure (delectatio) are free acts of the will. The freedom of these acts can be illustrated with a simple example from experience. If we ask a person to tell us why she does what she does, she would respond: “Because I like it.” If we inquire further and ask her the reason for her liking, she would say that there is no reason. 225 Furthermore, even acts such as sadness (tristitia) and distress (dolor) can be called free in the sense that they can be derived from love and pleasure. 226 It should be said, however, that Auriol does seem to think that the will can behave in a compulsory manner. This can happen under the influence of violent sensory passions. For instance, Auriol says that sometimes people experience overwhelming feelings of distress and obsessive love that can bind or immobilize the

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will temporarily. Violent distress and dislike are also experienced by the damned in hell. 227 Auriol’s thesis that psychic pleasure and distress are free acts was criticized by William of Ockham. 228 In Ockham’s psychology, the pleasure and distress of the will are passions, not free acts. 229 In his second Quodlibet, Ockham makes a distinction between acts and passions in the will. He says that love (amor), hope (spes), fear (timor), and joy (gaudium) can be called acts of the will because they are immediately elicited by the will or by habits of the will. Pleasure and distress are passions of the will. This is so for two reasons: (1) acts—such as love and hatred—can occur without concomitant pleasure and distress whereas pleasure and distress cannot occur without love and hatred (e.g., an evil angel loves itself without experiencing pleasure and a guardian angel hates the actual sinning of its protégé without experiencing distress) and (2) the passions of the will can only be caused and preserved by preceding acts of the will. 230 Ockham understands psychic pleasure and distress not so differently from Scotus. If there is dissimilarity at all, it is that, for Ockham, the immediate cause of psychic pleasure is the act of the will, not the object. Ockham proves this thesis by arguing that given an equal act of love, there will be an equal pleasure regardless of whether the object of the love exists or not. 231 If the act of love is destroyed, then no pleasure will follow. 232 Perler notes quite rightly in this connection that, unlike in the case of sensory pleasure which requires sensory cognition for its production, “there is no simple causal mechanism that makes the will come up with a certain passion whenever the intellect delivers a particular cognition.” 233 Ockham’s other reason for disagreement with Auriol concerns Auriol’s notion of beatific enjoyment. According to Auriol, beatific enjoyment is essentially pleasure. 234 Ockham did not accept Auriol’s equation of beatific enjoyment with pleasure. He thought that beatific enjoyment is fundamentally an act of amicable love toward God. Ockham saw beatific love as an operation of the human will and pleasure as a concomitant side effect of this operation, and he argued that love is nobler than pleasure. 235 Love is worthier than pleasure because love is a free volition that can be experienced only by rational creatures. Pleasure, on the other hand, is common to both rational and irrational creatures. 236 An act of amicable love (amor amicitiae) is worthier than pleasure because it is ultimately acceptable to God. 237 Moreover, according to Michael Ephesius’s comment on Book X of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, operations are sought for their own sake whereas pleasure is sought on account of operations. 238 By accentuating the distinction between pleasure and beatific love, Ockham attempts to eliminate any eudaimonist considerations from the motivation of moral action. As Bonnie Kent points out, the experience of pleasure is not what causes love. It is love that causes pleasure. 239

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Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham rejected Ockham’s distinction between love and pleasure in heaven and approved of Auriol’s thesis that ultimate enjoyment is essentially pleasure. Both Chatton and Wodeham argue against Ockham that if beatific enjoyment were really distinct from pleasure, then an individual could enjoy God without pleasure and could therefore be unhappy, which is absurd. 240 Wodeham also claims that if an individual were asked to choose between beatific enjoyment and ultimate pleasure, he or she would inevitably prefer pleasure. Thus, given that enjoyment and pleasure are really distinct, it will follow that pleasure is a worthier alternative than enjoyment. 241 Along with Auriol, Chatton and Wodeham postulate a secondary reflexive pleasure in the experience of beatific enjoyment. The object of this derivative pleasure is the operation of beatific delight, not God. 242 According to Wodeham, the multiple wonders of philosophy can also be included in the object of reflexive pleasure. 243 In Holcot, we find a concise treatment of the question whether pleasure is something distinct from the will. On the basis of the authority of Aristotle, Holcot maintains that pleasure is a separate quality which supervenes upon volition just as beauty supervenes upon youth. 244 Unlike Ockham, however, Holcot seems to think that pleasure causes volition and not vice versa. Holcot is sympathetic toward the view that the awareness of a pleasant object— say, the clear vision of God—causes pleasure, which in turn causes love. 245 He also notes that the will can be regarded as the indirect cause of pleasure in the sense that it can sustain the thought of the delightful object and attach to it a sensible image. Similarly, the will can cause and augment distress in itself (in se) by focusing continuously upon the cause of the distress. 246 It should be said that there is the tendency in Dominican treatments of enjoyment to equate enjoyment with pleasure. The early fourteenth-century Dominican John of Naples, 247 who is known as one of the first defenders of Aquinas’s doctrines, while observing that the idea of enjoyment (fruitio) is derived from that of the fruit (fructus) we expect to attain, points out that enjoyment is to be defined by genus as pleasure and by specific difference as quiescence. 248 In concurring with St Thomas Aquinas, John adds that there are three acts of the will with respect to the end—(1) volition, (2) intention and (3) fruition or pleasure. 249 Evidently, for John of Naples, enjoyment is the same thing as pleasure. Evidence that the Dominican account of the relation between enjoyment and pleasure differs significantly from the Franciscan is also found in Thomas of Anglicus, whom we met earlier in this chapter. According to Anglicus, Scotus is mistaken in thinking that pleasure differs from enjoyment strictly speaking insofar as enjoyment is an elicited act whereas pleasure is a passion consequent upon the act. Pleasure is also an elicited act (delectatio est actus); it just is a second act (actus secundus). Apparently, the love of the will (dilectio) is the will’s first elicited act (actus

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primus). In Anglicus’s mind, enjoyment is—broadly speaking—an equivocal term because it can be taken to mean the love of God in this life or the fulfilled love of God in heaven. Both kinds of love are actually enjoyment, but the difference between the two is merely one of degree—earthly enjoyment is a much less intense and fulfilling form of enjoyment than heavenly enjoyment. In the final analysis, beatific enjoyment is simply the perfection of the loving will, a perfection which is in essence the same thing as pleasure. 250 I would like to conclude the examination of the relation between enjoyment and pleasure by drawing attention to the Benedictine Robert Graystones’ account of the causation of pleasure and distress. Graystones concurs with Duns Scotus’s thesis about the indirect voluntariness of pleasure and distress, but the account Graystones offers is, I think, a bit more articulate. According to Graystones, pleasure and distress are caused partially by the act of the will and partially by the cognition of an object as present or absent, as fit or unfit for assimilation (coniungi vel nonconiungi sibi). These two acts are integrated into a single total cause of pleasure or distress. Thus, if the will loves a given object and if that object is apprehended as present and fit for assimilation, then the will is necessarily pleased. If, on the other hand, the object is apprehended as present but the will does not love it, then the will is distressed. The will is also distressed if the object it loves is apprehended as absent. Now, absent one of the two acts—an act of velle or nolle or an act of apprehension—there follows neither pleasure nor distress. It is the case, then, that the two acts are jointly necessary and sufficient to cause pleasure or distress. 251 Graystones adds an important proviso. According to him, only the pleasure and distress of the intellectual appetite require a prior act of the will. Somatic pleasure and distress—i.e., pleasure and distressed experienced in the sensory power (vis sensitiva)—require cognition and mere sensory or somatic complaisance or dislike. It is necessary to draw this distinction between intellectual and somatic pleasure and distress because sometimes one’s intellectual appetite is in conflict with one’s spontaneous somatic reaction to pleasant or unpleasant sensory stimuli. 252 DURANDUS OF SAINT POURÇAIN ON THE OBJECT OF BEATIFIC ENJOYMENT One of the widely debated views of beatific enjoyment in the early fourteenth century is found in the Sentences commentary of Durandus of Saint Pourçain (1270/5–1334). Durandus was a Dominican theologian known mostly for having taught opinions contrary to those of St Thomas Aquinas. Durandus served as a Regent Master at Paris in 1312–13. He had a distinguished ecclesiastical career. In 1313, Pope Clement V appointed Durandus a lector at the school of the Papal Curia at Avignon. In the

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period 1317–27, Durandus served as a bishop—first of Limoux, next of Le Puy-en-Velay, and last of Meaux. 253 Durandus lectured on the Sentences several times and wrote three commentary-redactions (1st redaction 1304–07/08, 2nd redaction 1310–11, and 3rd redaction [1317–27]). 254 I rely upon the final, third redaction of Durandus’s Sentences commentary, which is regarded as the definitive text for understanding the thought of Durandus. Durandus counts three conditions for the experience of enjoying: (1) cognition, (2) pleasure and (3) rest. He specifies that cognition is not included in the essence of enjoying but rather precedes it (antecedit). This is so because there can be a cognition in the absence of delight whereas there cannot be enjoyment without delight. 255 Just like St Thomas Aquinas, Durandus seems to regard enjoyment as a special type of pleasure. The specific feature of this type of pleasure is rest. Since both pleasure and rest pertain to the faculty of the will, therefore enjoyment, which includes both pleasure and rest, is an act of the will. 256 Durandus was attacked mostly for his view regarding the object of beatific pleasure. According to Durandus, beatific enjoyment or pleasure can have two distinct objects—an immediate and a remote one. The immediate object of beatific pleasure is the vision of God. The remote object of beatific pleasure is God Himself. 257 Durandus, with the help of two well-known distinctions, explicates the thesis that the immediate object of beatific pleasure is the vision of God. 258 First, he says that an end can be considered in a twofold way: (1) in respect to the attained object or thing (res assecuta) and (2) in respect to the possession of the object or thing (assecutio rei). On the basis of this distinction, one can say that God is the objective end of the rational creature, whereas the vision of God is its formal end. 259 Second, Durandus mentions that one can distinguish between a concupiscent love (amor concupiscentiae) and a benevolent love (amor benevolentiae). Concupiscent love is directed at the good or perfection that we want for ourselves or others. Benevolent love is directed at the object for which a good or perfection is wanted. 260 Durandus explains that the immediate object of concupiscent love is inseparable from the person who experiences this love. Since beatific enjoyment is a certain kind of concupiscent love, therefore the immediate object of enjoyment is not God but the act through which God is attained. God cannot be the immediate object of enjoyment because He is separate from the person who experiences the enjoyment (sit res a nobis subiecto distincta). 261 The claim that God is not the immediate object of desire can be illustrated by means of the following example: No one ever desires wine simply or directly. We desire wine so that we can make use of it or taste it. 262 Furthermore, something separate from and external to us—say, wine or food—cannot be considered our proper good (bonum nostrum) unless it is assimilated through a certain physiological act or operation. Similarly, God cannot be regarded as our proper good unless He be-

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comes associated with us through a certain act of the soul. This act is the vision of God. The desire to see God face-to-face cannot be an act of benevolent love because this desire can only be directed at something that we want for ourselves (we cannot want something to be added to God’s perfection). 263 What is the act through which an external object can become our proper good and be internalized, so to speak? In the same way as St Thomas Aquinas, Durandus thought that pleasure requires two things— attaining something good and being aware of the attainment. Durandus interprets this idea as follows. Granted that it is something separate from us, the good that we seek can never become an object of desire unless we think it is important for us. It is therefore this awareness of the object’s importance to oneself that gives rise to pleasure. 264 Another way of expressing Durandus’s point is by saying that enjoyment is essentially a reflexive act, i.e., an act of being aware of seeing God face-to-face and knowing God. But is this reflexive act separate from the act of the beatific vision? Durandus believed that the awareness of seeing God was inseparable from the vision of God. In other words, the act of vision and the act of awareness are one and the same act. 265 Furthermore, one cannot say that animals are not aware of their own acts; they cognize external objects and are aware that they do so either through the act of vision itself or through an act of common sense. 266 As Russell L. Friedman explains, Durandus’s view of the reflexive character of beatific enjoyment was partially an outcome of Durandus’s view that two acts cannot exist in the same subject at one and the same time. 267 This view became the object of heated debate right around 1312–13, the time when Durandus was writing his Questions on Free Choice (Quaestiones de libero arbitrio). A number of theologians—such as the Augustinian Hermit Prosper of Reggio Emilia, the secular John of Pouilly, the Carmelite Guy Terrena, the Dominican Peter of Palude and the Carmelite John Baconthorpe—reflected upon this issue, all agreeing with Durandus that there cannot be two acts in the same subject simultaneously but maintaining, nevertheless, that the act of vision and the act of awareness must be two distinct and separate acts. 268 Unlike the aforementioned authors, the secular English theologian Thomas Wylton argued that the intellect can indeed have two or more acts simultaneously. Wylton, in fact, attempted to show that if Durandus was right and the intellect cannot have two or more acts simultaneously, then scientific knowledge, which involves a number of acts such as the apprehension of terms, the composition and division of propositions, etc. would be impossible. 269 According to Friedman, the Wyltonian kind of defense of the simultaneous compossibility of multiple acts—intellectual and volitional—was later on undertaken by Francis of Marchia and Gregory of Rimini. 270 At the end of this section, we shall see how Baconthorpe, in particular, criticizes Durandus’s view of the reflexive character of enjoyment.

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According to Durandus, the remote object of beatific enjoyment is God. This is so because God is the direct object of the act of vision whereas the vision is the direct object of pleasure. In defense of this thesis, one can say that the direct object of the act of drinking or tasting is wine as such, and that, consequently, wine is the remote object of the pleasure derived from the drinking or tasting. 271 It can be added that, for Durandus, heavenly beatitude is an act of the intellect, not of the will. This is so because the operation of the will is subordinate to the operation of the intellect, which is the ultimate and most perfect operation of a human being. 272 Basing himself on the authority of Aristotle, Durandus argues that happiness consists essentially in intellectual contemplation rather than pleasure. Moreover, the immediate object of beatitude is God whereas the immediate object of beatific pleasure is the vision of God. 273 Trottmann thinks that Durandus’s idea of beatitude exemplifies “un intellectualisme sans concession,” and says that Durandus remains faithful to the Dominican tradition in this sense. 274 However, Durandus’s notion of enjoyment was criticized by fellow Dominicans as well. Durandus was primarily criticized for distancing himself from St Thomas’s original stance regarding the object of enjoyment. 275 The critics argued, for instance, that God and the vision of God constitute one indivisible object of enjoyment. If God and the vision of God had strictly separable enjoyable aspects, then the will could enjoy the vision of God without God and vice versa. The common enjoyable aspect of God and the vision of God is the deity (deitas). It follows, therefore, that the immediate object of the will cannot be the vision of God more so than God Himself and vice versa. The thesis that God and the vision of God compose a single object of enjoyment can also be corroborated by the authority of St Thomas Aquinas. For St Thomas, the end and the act through which the end is attained amount to one object (sunt unum obiectum nobis applicatum). 276 Critics also argued that Durandus’s concept of enjoyment is more suitable to ends other than God. Ends which occupy the lower places in the axiological hierarchy of being could indeed be pursued by us for the sake of our own well-being or perfection. However, we ought never to desire and love God simply for the sake of our personal welfare. To do so would be to abuse our ultimate end. God ought to be loved charitably and because of His glorification rather than our own. 277 Durandus’s view of the object of beatific enjoyment was regarded as very controversial because it stressed the subjectivity of the experience of beatific enjoyment and undermined the unconditional character of the love of God. Peter Auriol, for instance, argues that the blessed in heaven enjoy the felicity of God more than the felicity derived from the vision of God. 278 The blessed participate in the bliss of God just as a virtuous person enjoys and shares in the happiness of his/her friend. 279 Walter Chatton simply states that Durandus’s position contains a contradiction

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in terms. If the vision of God and not God is the object of beatific love, then this love cannot be called a love of God above all things. 280 Disagreeing with Durandus, William of Ockham insists that it is possible to love God directly just as it is possible to love another person directly through an act of friendship. The act of loving God directly in Himself (in se)—which is an act of amicable love—is worthier than the love of the beatific vision. 281 Ockham also claims that if the enjoyment of God were inseparable from the desire to see God, then everyone who desires the vision of God would inevitably enjoy God. This cannot be true because mortal sinners and the damned in hell desire the vision of God and yet do not enjoy and love God. Moreover, a person who loves God ex puris naturalibus without the support of revealed faith could be ignorant as to whether it is possible to see God, and could consequently fail to desire the vision of God. 282 Durandus’s view of beatific enjoyment is also discussed in the Sentences commentary of John Baconthorpe. A closer look at the first question of Baconthorpe’s treatment of enjoyment reveals, however, that Durandus was hardly the sole object of Baconthorpe’s criticism. Baconthorpe also engages the views of a certain James of Perugia, who argued that beatitude consists in a reflexive act of intellectual awareness with respect to the act of the will through which one holds firmly (imperdibiliter) to God. Apparently, James believed that it is not enough for one to see God face-to-face and grasp God through one’s will. One must also be aware of having an unfaltering bond with God. Reasoning by analogy, James argued that we enjoy a friend fully only to the extent to which we are aware of being permanently united with our friend. 283 Baconthorpe rejects this view and maintains that the genuine object of enjoyment, or beatitude broadly understood, is God himself as seen and as grasped by the will (Deus ipse, ut est tentus, et habitus), not the act of vision or the act of grasping, which is something created. 284 Baconthorpe also considers the view of the Parisian secular theologian John of Pouilly (d. ca. 1328), 285 who held that the direct act (actus rectus) and the reflexive act are numerically one, but that beatitude consists in this single act when conceived as a direct act rather than as a reflexive act. Another way of stating Pouilly’s position is by saying that the direct and reflexive acts are the same only accidentally in the sense in which an accident is said to inhere in a subject. For instance, “white Socrates” is numerically the same with “Socrates.” This is so only accidentally, however, because the subject “Socrates” does not have to support the accident of “whiteness” and can well enough exist without it. Baconthorpe in fact interprets John of Pouilly’s position as an attempt to respond to Durandus’s view that the cognition of something and the awareness of this cognition are numerically identical. According to Pouilly, this numerical identity must be understood as an accidental identity, not as an essential one. 286

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This is how Durandus understood the relation between the direct and reflexive acts, according to Baconthorpe: The perception of a stone causes an intellection of the stone, first, and an intellection of the intellection of the stone, second. This second intellection—i.e., the act of reflexive awareness—is in effect caused by the perception of the stone just as much as the first intellection. Thus, both intellections have the same object, viz., the stone. Now, if the reflexive act came temporally after the direct act, then at the very instant the intellect says “I think that I think a stone” (dico me intelligere lapidem) the intellect must be thinking something false, since, after all, by the very fact that the reflexive act came temporally after the direct act, the reflexive act must be about a no longer existing situation. Furthermore, since the two acts cannot occur simultaneously or in the very same instant, they must be numerically the same act. 287 Baconthorpe insists that the direct and reflexive act must be two separate acts. In response to Durandus’s stone argument, Baconthorpe explains that one ought to distinguish between the real (existentia realis) and objective presence (in esse obiectivo) of the direct act. Thus, the proper object of the reflexive act is not the direct act in its actual occurrence but the direct act as it is found objectively in the memory. 288 The principal object of both acts, however, is the same—viz., the stone. This fact, according to Baconthorpe, exempts Durandus from the charge that beatific enjoyment—as understood by Durandus—is not really about God but about one’s subjective experience of God. 289 CONCLUSION The focal theme of this chapter was the progress of the discussion of the object and psychology of enjoyment around the beginning of the fourteenth century. Our examination has revealed an astonishing wealth of positions and accounts of beatific enjoyment in light of the various acts and passions of the will as well as in connection with acts of cognition. A novelty in the treatment of enjoyment is the introduction of the “middle” or “neutral” act of the will. Scotus, Ockham and Auriol admit that there is such an act, but this does not seem to be an act of enjoyment at all. Marchia posits a simple act of the will, a morally indifferent volitional inclination or propensity. Chatton does not discuss the “middle” or “neutral” act of the will whereas Holcot is hesitant as to whether there can be any such act. Wodeham does not mention a “middle” or “neutral” act, but he distinguishes an act of absolute love which seems to be a type of weaker enjoyment. Especially noteworthy is Marchia’s rigorous systematization of the acts of the intellect and the will in relation to each other. An original account of the relationship between cognition and volition is found in Wodeham who defends the thesis that volitions are essentially a kind of cognition. According to this theory, volition requires cognition as

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its partial cause, but the volition itself can also be said to have a cognitive character in the form of an evaluation. Thus, enjoyment, which is an act of the will, must be caused by a certain type of cognition which is strictly separate from it and precedes it. The actual enjoyment, however, can reflect this same cognition in the form of an evaluation. Early fourteenth-century scholastics were also interested in the question whether natural reason can demonstrate that God ought to be loved and enjoyed. According to Scotus, and, to some extent, Chatton, it is possible to demonstrate that God is the object of ultimate enjoyment. Ockham and Holcot, on the other hand, deny that natural reason can show that God is the true object of enjoyment without appeal to divine revelation. A very ingenious treatment of enjoyment and the love of God is found in the Sentences commentaries of Walter Chatton. Chatton differentiates between loving God on account of acknowledging God’s true character, loving God because He commands us to love Him and loving God for the sake of the pleasure we shall obtain. He claims that only the first type of love should be regarded as a true enjoyment. Chatton also distinguishes between a vision-based and abstraction- or discursionbased enjoyment in heaven. These two types of enjoyment will be discussed in the next chapter. A topic of major interest is the relationship between enjoyment and pleasure. This relationship is examined carefully by Scotus and Ockham who point out that pleasure is a passion of the will not to be confused with enjoyment. Among the teachings that aroused particular interest were the views of Peter Auriol and Durandus of Saint Pourçain. Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham criticize Auriol for identifying pleasure with love. On the other hand, Chatton and Wodeham agree with Auriol that beatific enjoyment is essentially pleasure. For Ockham, however, beatific enjoyment and pleasure are separate. According to Durandus, the adequate object of beatific enjoyment is the vision of God, not God as such. This opinion did not receive the approval of Durandus’s contemporaries and Durandus was even accused by some of his Dominican confreres of distorting the views of St Thomas Aquinas. We also find that less known early fourteenth century scholastic authors such as Graystones, FitzRalph, Gerard of Siena and John Baconthorpe have contributed significantly to the debate about the object and psychology of beatific enjoyment by asking slightly different questions, by suggesting alternative interpretations of the meaning of fruitio, by embracing a different approach to the treatment of enjoyment, or by shedding light on the positions or arguments of other participants in the debate about enjoyment. Graystones, for instance, provides elegant explanations of the mechanism of causation of volitional pleasure and distress. FitzRalph discusses beatific enjoyment in terms of the axiological hierarchy of the human faculties. Both FitzRalph and Baconthorpe equate fruition—broadly understood—with beatitude. Baconthorpe, in particu-

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lar, tends to think of beatific enjoyment as including both the intellect and the will. Gerard of Siena discusses the causal contribution of both intellect and will to the production of enjoyment, the nature of the intellect and the will as immaterial human faculties, and the distinction between enjoyment and use in terms of the distinction between elicited and commanded acts of the will. Lastly, we see ample evidence that even the views and positions of the most towering and influential theological authorities such as Duns Scotus were always received with criticism, and that sometimes this criticism was very unforgiving, as is the case with the author of the Liber propugnatorius. NOTES 1. Bonnie Kent says that one can talk about three different senses of the term “voluntarism” in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries: (1) a general emphasis on the affective and volitional aspects of human nature, (2) a strong emphasis on the active character of the will and (3) a strong emphasis on God’s freedom or absolute power. See Kent, Virtues of the Will, 94–95. According to Kent, the distinguishing marks of ethical voluntarism are the views that the will is nobler or superior to the intellect, that happiness is found more in the activity of the will than in the activity of the intellect, that the will and not rationality is the source of the freedom of the human being, that the will is free to act against the dictates of the intellect, and that the will and not the intellect commands or moves the other powers of the soul. See Kent, Virtues of the Will, 95–96. Colleen McCluskey has argued that some of the roots of ethical voluntarism can be traced all the way back to the first decades of the thirteenth century, to the Summa de bono of Philip the Chancellor. See Colleen McCluskey, “The Roots of Ethical Voluntarism,” Vivarium 39, no. 2 (2001): 190–201. 2. The special feature of this voluntarist psychology is the analysis of reflexive acts, free volitions, virtues and passions of the will. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 256–65. 3. See Kent, Virtues of the Will, 40–46; Fernand Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism, trans. Leonard Johnston (Louvain: Nauwelaerts Publishing House, 1970, 2nd ed.), 198–229. 4. Henry of Ghent was known as the leading representative of the conservative reaction against the alleged radical Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas and the group of Arts Faculty teachers. Henry was a secular priest from Flanders. He served as Archdeacon of Bruges (1277) and Tournai (1279/80). He was active as a Regent Master in theology at the University of Paris from about 1275/76 until his death in 1293. See R. Wielockx, “Henry of Ghent,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 296; Steven P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century, vol. 2. (Leiden, Boston, and Köln: E.J. Brill, 2001), 264–65; Roland J. Teske, introduction to Henry of Ghent: Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1993), 1–2. 5. See John F. Wippel, “The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 65. Piché adds one more article to Hissette’s list. See David Piché, La Condamnation Parisienne de 1277: Nouvelle édition du texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999), 146–47. 6. See Wippel, “The Parisian Condemnations,” 67–68; Piché, La Condamnation Parisienne, 152. A detailed discussion of the events leading up to the condemnation is found in J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “What Really Happened on 7 March 1277? Bishop Tempier’s Condemnation and its Institutional Context,” in Texts and Contexts in Ancient and

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Medieval Science: Studies on the Occasion of John E. Murdoch’s Seventieth Birthday, ed. Edith Sylla and Michael McVaugh (Leiden, New York, and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1997), 91–99. See also Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, 230–38. 7. See Thijssen, “What Really Happened on 7 March 1277?,” 99–101. The effort to identify the targets of the condemnation has provoked intense research, and the problem of attribution of the condemned theses has not been resolved satisfactorily. The general trend has been to implicate masters of the Parisian Arts Faculty for their involvement in teaching the censured articles. Among the most clearly identifiable addressees of the condemnation are Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. See Thijssen, “What Really Happened on 7 March 1277?,” 101: “Only a limited number of the 219 propositions represent erroneous teaching that was authored by artistae. Among the authors were Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia—but they were crearly not the only members of the arts faculty who were criticized for propagating false views, or whose own views were condemned on 7 March 1277. Siger and Boethius, however, appear to have been the most prominent targets, or, in any case, among the most easily identifiable for modern historians. They may have been the ‘heresiarchs,’ so to speak, of the crisis over the encounter between faith and reason that became manifest in Tempier’s condemnation. Yet, their names appear nowhere in the syllabus.” The view that Parisian masters were the primary target of Tempier’s Condemnation has been questioned. It has been suggested, for instance, that the Condemnation was aimed chiefly at the inexperienced students in the Arts Faculty. See Malcolm De Mowbray, “1277 and All That—Students and Disputations,” Traditio 57 (2002): 218–23. 8. See Wippel, “The Parisian Condemnations,” 70; Kent, Virtues of the Will, 76–79. For the list of erroneous articles regarding the will, see Piché, La Condamnation Parisienne, 302–4. For a detailed and illuminating discussion of the articles concerned with the functioning of the human will, see Roland Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 Mars 1277 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1977), 230–63. Especially relevant to the discussion of enjoyment among those propositions asserting or implying internal or psychological determinism are propositions 151, 157, 158, 161, 163, 164 and 165. See Hissette, Enquête, 231, 241, 250, 253, 255–57. 9. For a useful survey of these problems, see Courtenay, Scholars and Schools, 289–94. 10. The predestination debate concerns the relationship between the human and divine will and covers issues such as the efficaciousness of human moral initiative (facere quod in se est), God’s knowledge of future events, and others. The treatment of such problems culminated in the polemical treatise De causa Dei contra Pelagium by the Oxford theologian Thomas Bradwardine (1290–1349). The aim of Bradwardine’s De causa Dei (published in 1344) was to refute the various biases of early fourteenthcentury Pelagianism and to defend the power and primacy of God’s grace over the created world. See Stephen E. Lahey, “Thomas Bradwardine,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 660–61; Edith Wilks Dolnikowski, Thomas Bradwardine: A View of Time and a Vision of Eternity in Fourteenth-Century Thought (Leiden, Boston, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995), 5–7; Courtenay, Scholars and Schools, 321–23; Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A Study of His ‘De Causa Dei’ and its Opponents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 11–16. 11. Trottmann has claimed that the treatment of the problem of intuitive cognition of absent or non-existent objects contributed to early fourteenth-century discussions of the psychology of the beatific vision. See Trottmann, La vision béatifique, 527–29; idem, “Vision béatifique et intuition d’un object absent: des sources franciscaines du nominalisme aux défenseurs scotistes de l’opinion de Jean XXII sur la vision différée,” Studi Medievali 34, no. 2 (1993): 714–15. 12. See Courtenay, Scholars and Schools, 282–83. Walter Chatton, who is one of the central characters in this study, was present at Avignon from 1333 to 1343, where he served on the commission appointed to examine the writings of the Dominicans Thomas Waleys and Durandus of Saint Pourçain under Popes Benedict XII and Clem-

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ent VI. Chatton was therefore very much in the middle of the debate caused by the radical views of Pope John XXII, who declared that the blessed will not see the essence of God until after the Last Judgment, when the soul of the human being is finally reunited with the resurrected body. Chatton even contributed to the debate with a sermon preached on February 22, 1333, at the Franciscan church in Avignon. See Girard J. Etzkorn “Walter Chatton,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 674; Trottmann, La vision béatifique, 544; M. Dykmans, “Les frères mineurs d’Avignon au début de 1333 et le sermon de Gautier de Chatton sur la vision béatifique,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 38 (1972): 122–25, 133. 13. The latest and most detailed treatment of Duns Scotus’s life and its medieval context is found in A. Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 17–102. See also Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Aldershot, UK, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 1–2; Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus: An Introduction (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 9–12; Thomas Williams “Introduction: The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–6; Stephen D. Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 353; Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 66; Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3–4; Allan B. Wolter, introduction to John Duns Scotus. Philosophical Writings. A Selection, trans., with introduction and notes, by Allan Wolter (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), xiii–xxiii. 14. Scotus’s earliest commentary is the Lectura on Books I and II of the Sentences which he gave at Oxford as a Bachelor before his departure for Paris. There also exists a Lectura completa on Book III which was probably given at Oxford during Scotus’s exile from France in 1303–04. There is no Lectura on Book IV. Scotus’s more mature commentary is the Ordinatio, which contained a revision of Book I and parts of Book II (until distinction 15) of the Oxford Lectura. The Lectura on Books I, II and III and the Ordinatio on Books I and II have been made available in the Vatican critical edition. There are also several student reports (reportationes) of lectures given by Scotus at Paris. One of these reports—the Reportatio on Book I—was called Reportatio examinata because Scotus had examined it personally. Reportatio I-A was published by the Franciscan Institute in 2004. In addition to the Vatican edition of Scotus’s Lectura and Ordinatio, and the recently published Reportatio I-A, I have also used some texts from the Opus Oxoniense (Wadding, vols. 5–9) and Reportatio Parisiensis (Wadding, vol. 11). It should be said that the Opus Oxoniense on Books I–IV was composed by a team of scholars guided by William of Alnwick. 15. A detailed treatment of the corpus of Scotus’s philosophical and theological writings is found in Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 103–47. See also Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov, introduction to John Duns Scotus. Reportatio I-A, ed. Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2004), xix–xxi; Williams “Introduction: The Life and Works of John Duns Scotus,” 6–13; Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 353–54; Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 65–66; Cross, Duns Scotus, 4, 6; Wolter, introduction to John Duns Scotus, xxiii–xxx. 16. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Opera omnia, vol. 2, ed. C. Balić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 68, lin. 13–16, p. 51. 17. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opera omnia, vol. 16, ed. C. Balić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1960), liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 72, lin. 2–9, p. 86. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 66, lin. 4, p. 49–lin. 2, p. 50. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 172–73. 18. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 74, lin. 10–25, p. 86. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 67, lin. 3–13, p. 50. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 173–74.

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19. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 74, lin. 26, p. 86–lin. 10, p. 87. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 67, lin. 14, p. 50–lin. 9, p. 51. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 174–76. 20. Georgedes explains that the main point about the act of “middle assent” is not so much the object as the freedom of the will with respect to the recommendation of the intellect. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 176–77. 21. Georgedes argues that it is possible to equate Scotus’s “middle act” with freely elicited morally indifferent acts. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 178–80. 22. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, Opera Omnia, vol. 7.2, ed. Luke Wadding (Lyons, 1639), liber III, d. 33, p. 704. Scotus also mentions the term “complacentia” in his Lectura, liber II, d. 25, where he discusses a debate about whether the will is activated by a certain affection or passion caused by the object. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, Opera omnia, vol. 19, ed. Luca Modrić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1993), liber II, d. 2, q. 1, n. 53, p. 245. 23. According to the Parisian philosopher John Buridan (1295/1300–1358), favoring (complacentia) and disfavoring (displicentia) are passive aspects or parts of volition caused by apprehensions or mental judgments about the good or bad, suitable or unsuitable characteristics of the objects. See Henrik Lagerlund, “Buridan’s Theory of Free Choice and its Influence,” in Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 180. Knuuttila says that, unlike Buridan, both Scotus and Ockham regard complacentia and displicentia as free acts. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 273–74. According to Knuuttila, complacentia and displicentia are the first acts through which the will reacts to possible or impossible objects. These acts presuppose cognition and have the will as their efficient cause. Knuuttila also observes that complacentia and displicentia resemble emotional phenomena and can be construed as unpremeditated reactions to things. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 268–69. According to Drummond, the difference between a simple act of the will and an efficacious act of the will in Scotus is that the former is an act of willing the end itself whereas the latter is an act of choice made possible by a prior deliberation on the part of the practical intellect. However, both of these acts are—in Drummond’s view—free acts of the will, and this interpretation, I think, clashes with Knuuttila’s view that simple acts of the will are more like spontaneous and uncontrollable reactions on the part of the will rather than free acts. See Drummond, “John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will,” 71–72, n. 62. 24. John of Bassol lectured on the Sentences at Reims around 1313, and seems to have had some influence on later scholastics. See Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 78–79. 25. Ioannes de Bassolis, Super sententias (Paris, 1516–17), liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, fol. 41vb. 26. Ioannes de Bassolis, Super sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, fol. 41vb. 27. Ioannes de Bassolis, Super sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, fol. 42ra. 28. Ioannes de Bassolis, Super sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, fol. 41vb–42ra. 29. Ioannes de Bassolis, Super sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, fol. 42ra. 30. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, n. 8, lin. 15–23, p. 64. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, a. 1, n. 8, lin. 8–18, p. 4. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, ed. Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2004), d. 1, pars 1, q. unica, a. 1, n. 7, p. 90. 31. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, n. 20, lin. 14–23, p. 67. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, a. 3, n. 16, lin. 3–13, p. 10. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 1, q. unica, a. 3, n. 10, p. 91–n. 11, p. 92. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 151–54, 161–62. 32. For Scotus, a morally human good act can have a generic and specific or circumstantial goodness. The generic goodness of an act is constituted by the appropriate object of the act. The specific or circumstantial goodness includes elements such as an appropriate end, form, time, and place. See Thomas Williams “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus: A Pseudo-Problem Dissolved,” The Modern Schoolman 74

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(1997): 79–81; Mary Beth Ingham, “Scotus and the Moral Order,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 1 (1993): 135. Enjoyment, which can be understood as a love of God propter se, is fully good in virtue of its object and under any circumstances. See Williams, “Reason, Morality, and Voluntarism in Duns Scotus,” 83; Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 154. Furthermore, the obligation to love God can be established on the necessary basis that God is the best possible being and that God cannot command us to hate Him. See A. Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love. Texts and Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans (Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 57 33. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, n. 9, lin. 1–11, p. 65. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, a. 2, n. 9, lin. 1–10, p. 5. 34. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, n. 12, lin. 1–9, p. 66. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, a. 2, n. 12, lin. 4, p. 6–lin. 9, p. 7. 35. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, n. 10, lin. 12–n. 11, lin. 19, p. 65. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 1, a. 2, n. 10, lin. 11–15, p. 5. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 1, q. unica, a. 2, n. 8, pp. 90–91. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 155–60. 36. The Dominican friar Thomas of Sutton (ca. 1250–ca. 1315), also known as Thomas Anglicus, was among the earliest critics of Scotus’s views. We know that Sutton was ordained deacon at Blithe on September 20, 1274, that he was a fellow of Merton College at Oxford, and that he served as a theology master at Oxford between 1290 and 1300. Sutton was regarded as one of the first defenders of Aquinas’s teachings. Aquinas’s strong influence on Sutton’s thought is in fact the reason why some of Sutton’s works were believed to have been written by Aquinas. See Gyula Klima, “Thomas of Sutton,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 664; Stephen F. Brown and Juan Carlos Flores, Historical Dictionary of Medieval Philosophy and Theology (Lanham, MD, Toronto, and Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 279–80. 37. See Russell L. Friedman “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260–1330,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2007), 423; Christopher Schabel, Theology at Paris, 1326–1345: Peter Auriol and the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents (Aldershot, Burlington, VT, Singapore, and Sydney: Ashgate, 2000), 52–54. 38. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius super primum sententiarum contra Johannem Scotum (Venice, 1523; reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), d. 1, q. 2, fol. 14a. 39. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 3, fol. 15b. 40. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 4, fol. 17a. 41. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 3, fol. 15rb–va. 42. See Lauge O. Nielsen, “Peter Auriol,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 494; idem, “Peter Auriol’s Way with Words: The Genesis of Peter Auriol’s Commentaries on Peter Lombard’s First and Fourth Books of the Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Current Research, vol. 1, ed. G.R. Evans (Leiden, Boston, Köln: E.J. Brill, 2002), 149; Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 82–83; Schabel, Theology at Paris, 68–70; Stephen F. Brown, “Petrus Aureoli: De unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in I Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3 et p. 2, qq. 1–2),” Traditio 50 (1995): 199; Eligius M. Buytaert, introduction to Peter Aureoli. Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, vol. 1, prologue and distinction 1, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1952), vii–xvi. 43. The relationship between the redactions of Auriol’s commentaries on the Sentences has posed many problems for scholars. For the attempts to solve these problem, see Nielsen, “Peter Auriol’s Way with Words,” 151–215; Brown, “Petrus Aureoli: De unitate conceptus entis,” 200–207.

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44. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1952), d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 4a, n. 89, lin. 4–28, p. 410. 45. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 4b, n. 92, lin. 2–n. 93, lin. 27, p. 412. 46. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 1e, propositio tertia, n. 66, lin. 59–68, p. 401. 47. The distinction between the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and the love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) became the focus of lively debates in England during 1280–90. A discussion of the distinction is found in the Disputed Questions on the Love of God of the Franciscan friar Nicholas of Ockham (1242–1320). Following partly Henry of Ghent and partly Thomas Aquinas, Nicholas distinguishes three types of natural love: (1) well-pleasing or agreeable love (dilectio beneplacentiae vel complacentiae), (2) love of friendship or benevolence (amor amicitiae seu benevolentiae) and (3) love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae). Well-pleasing or agreeable love is directed at the object as a good in itself. Amicable or benevolent love is directed at the object for which something good is willed. Love of concupiscence is directed at the object which is willed for someone (oneself or another). See Nicholas de Ockham, Quaestiones disputatae de dilectione Dei, ed. Caesar Saco Alarcón (Grottaferrata (Rome): Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1981), q. 1, I-B, lin. 36–45, p. 18. In general, the difference between love of friendship and love of concupiscence boils down to the difference between seeking the best for the object of love (whether ourselves or others) and seeking to possess the object. See Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, introduction to Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 16–17. 48. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7, a. 1e, n. 57, lin. 12, p. 397–lin. 20, p. 398. 49. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7, a. 1e, n. 58, lin. 21–44, p. 398. 50. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 1c, n. 64, lin. 49, p. 434–lin. 62, p. 435. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 241–42. 51. See Christopher Schabel, “Francis of Marchia,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/ francis-marchia/ (accessed October 28, 2013); Russell L. Friedman and Christopher Schabel, introduction to Francis of Marchia Theologian and Philosopher: A Franciscan at the University of Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Russell L. Friedman and Christopher Schabel (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2006), 1–20; Russell L. Friedman, “Francis of Marchia,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 254; Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 111; Schabel, Theology at Paris, 189–90. 52. See Schabel, “Francis of Marchia”; Friedmam and Schabel, Francis of Marchia Theologian and Philosopher, 1–20; Friedman, “Francis of Marchia,” 254; Schabel, Theology at Paris, 191–92. 53. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, tom. II, ed. Nazareno Mariani (Grottaferrata (Rome): Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 2006), d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, lin. 5, p. 70–lin. 66, p. 72. 54. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, lin. 4–13, p. 79. 55. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 5, a. 1, lin. 4, p. 83–lin. 127, p. 88. 56. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 5, a. 1, lin. 71–83, p. 86. 57. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 5, a. 1, lin. 105, p. 87–lin. 115, p. 88.

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58. See Timothy B. Noone, “William of Ockham,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 696; Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 83; Armand Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999), 1–3; William J. Courtenay, “The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 17–30; Paul Vincent Spade, introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3–4; Rega Wood, Ockham on the Virtues (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1997), 3–6; Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, vol. 1 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), xv–xvii; Auguste Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 18 (1922): 240–48. 59. See Noone, “William of Ockham,” 696; Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary,” 83; Wood, Ockham on the Virtues, 3. 60. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, OTh, vol. 1, edited by Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1967), d. 1, q. 1, lin. 4, p. 374–lin. 7, p. 375. See also Vesa Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 162–63; Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 250–54; McGrade, “Ockham on Enjoyment,” 709–10. 61. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, lin. 23–25, p. 376. 62. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, lin. 1–5, p. 377. 63. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, lin. 15, p. 377–lin. 10, p. 378. The “middle act” of the will is discussed in detail by Georgedes who argues that Ockham goes a step further than Aquinas by stating that the “middle act,” which is basically a type of weaker enjoyment, does not necessarily have to be ordered to the enjoyment of God. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 254–61. Hirvonen hesitates as to whether Ockham’s “middle act” can be called a kind of enjoyment at all. He stresses the point that, morally or theologically speaking, there can be only two kinds of enjoyment—orderly and disorderly. See Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, 163–64. 64. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, lin. 11–15, p. 378. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 262. 65. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, lin. 16, p. 378–lin. 3, p. 379. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 262–63. 66. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 13–20, p. 431. See Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, 164; Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 265–66. Ockham also distinguishes the acts of ordinate and disordinate use (i.e., abuse). See Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, 166–67. 67. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones variae, vol. 8, ed. Girard J. Etzkorn, Francis E. Kelley and Joseph C. Wey (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), q. 4, lin. 430, p. 118–lin. 439, p. 119. 68. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones variae, q. 4, lin. 404, p. 117–lin. 413, p. 118. See also Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, 160–62. 69. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 4, lin. 22, p. 396–lin. 6, p. 397. See also Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 264–65. 70. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, lin. 21, p. 433–lin. 2, p. 434. Georgedes points out that Ockham is faithful to tradition insofar as he states that the object of ordinate enjoyment is God alone but that he departs from tradition by denying that reason can demonstrate that God is the ultimately satisfying object. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 266–67. See also McGrade, “Ockham on Enjoyment,” 719–21.

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71. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 2, lin. 8–10, p. 395. It should be noted that Ockham distinguishes between mental and conventional language. Mental language encompasses natural acts of the soul such as understanding, judgment, and reasoning, whereas conventional language includes spoken and written signs. The distinction is based on the opening chapter of Aristotle’s treatise On Interpretation (De interpretatione), where the philosopher says that inscriptions and sounds signify passions of the soul. Spoken and written signs are conventional and vary from one community to another, whereas the passions of the soul, which correspond to extra-mental things, are universal in character. Aristotle’s statements in De interpretatione were the source of a major debate in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century concerning whether words signify concepts or things. Evidence of this debate is found in John Duns Scotus’s two commentaries on De interpretatione. William of Ockham entered the debate at a time when the treatment of the issues involved in it had reached a level of extreme complexity. See Brown, “Sign Conceptions in Logic in the Latin Middle Ages,” 1039–44. Gabriel Nuchelmans defines the late fourteenth-century scholastic understanding of the distinction between natural and conventional signification with the following general remarks: (1) Something is said to signify naturally (significare naturaliter) when it derives its signification from its own nature and does not need an imposition of meaning from the outside. This type of signification is common to all mankind and is universal in character. There are three categories of natural signifiers: (i) signs that acquire their meaning from an innate drive (ex instinctu naturae), such as groans, sighs and cries (ii) all things are said to signify naturally and commonly (significare naturaliter communiter seu obiective) to the extent that they can cause the knowing power to form a concept of them (iii) concepts or formal signs are said to signify naturally in the proper sense (significare naturaliter proprie) to the extent that they represent through themselves and not by means of anything else. (2) Conventional or arbitrary signification (significare ad placitum) is characteristic of spoken and written signs. Conventional signification is established by usage and it is limited to a distinct speech community. The official promulgation of linguistic usage occurs through imposition. See Gabriel Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam, Oxford, and New York: North Holland Publishing Company, 1980), 15. 72. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 2, lin. 11, p. 395–lin. 4, p. 396. 73. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 2, lin. 10–20, p. 396. 74. For a detailed account of Ockham’s examination of the distinction between the intellect and the will, see Claude Panaccio, “Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 76–80; Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham, 460–70; Taina M. Holopainen, William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics, (ThD diss., University of Helsinki: LutherAgricola-Society, 1991), 24–26. 75. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, OTh, vol. 5, ed. Gedeon Gál and Rega Wood (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1981), q. 20, lin. 19, p. 436–lin. 21, p. 437. 76. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, q. 20, lin. 6, p. 441–lin. 3, p. 442. 77. See Panaccio, “Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism,” 76–80, esp. 80; Dominik Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions: Fourteenth-Century Discussions on the Passions of the Soul,” Vivarium 43, 2 (2005): 263, n. 35. 78. See Holopainen, “William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics,” 26. 79. See Panaccio, “Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism,” 84–85. 80. See Panaccio, “Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism,” 88–90. 81. See Panaccio, “Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism,” 82–86.

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82. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 4, lin. 7–9, p. 426. 83. See Etzkorn, “Walter Chatton,” 674; Schabel, Theology at Paris, 231; Courtenay, Scholars and Schools, 265–67; idem, Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 66–74; A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 395–96. 84. See Joseph C. Wey and Girard J. Etzkorn, introduction to Walter Chatton. Reportatio super Sententias. Liber I, distinctiones 1–9, ed. Joseph C. Wey and Girard J. Etzkorn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), vii; Christopher Schabel, “Oxford Franciscans after Ockham: Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 1, ed. G.R. Evans (Leiden, Boston, Köln: E.J. Brill, 2002), 360–61. 85. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, ed. Joseph C. Wey and Girard J. Etzkorn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002), liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 99, lin. 18, p. 48–lin. 5, p. 49. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, ed. Joseph C. Wey and Girard J. Etzkorn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007), liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 231, lin. 13–19, p. 90. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 100, lin. 7–11, p. 49. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 234, lin. 28, p. 90–lin. 3, p. 91. 86. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 99, lin. 23, p. 48–lin. 1, p. 49. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 232, lin. 20–24, p. 90. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 101, lin. 12–14, p. 49. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 234, lin. 3–17, p. 91. 87. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 103, lin. 20, p. 49–lin. 3, p. 50. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 235, lin. 12–n. 236, lin. 27, p. 91. 88. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 99, lin. 1–5, p. 49. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 233, lin. 25–27, p. 90. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 102, lin. 15–18, p. 49. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 234, lin. 7–11, p. 91. 89. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 26, lin. 22, p. 28–lin. 12, p. 29. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, dubium 4, n. 70, lin. 6–18, p. 45. Adam Wodeham says that, according to Chatton, intellections are experienced in the brain whereas love is experienced in the heart. See Adam de Wodeham, Lectura secunda, ed. Rega Wood (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 3, lin. 30–32, p. 277. 90. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 76, lin. 5–7, p. 43. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 190, lin. 10–12, p. 79. 91. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 82, lin. 10–13, p. 44. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 206, lin. 30, p. 82–lin. 12, p. 83. 92. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 81, lin. 3–9, p. 44. 93. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 199, lin. 22, p. 80–lin. 2, p. 81. 94. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 83–84, lin. 15, p. 44–lin. 3, p. 45. 95. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 200, lin. 4–12, p. 81. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 207, lin. 13–23, p. 83. 96. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 202, lin. 20, p. 81–lin. 3, p. 82. See also Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 86, lin. 11–14, p. 45.

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97. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 204, lin. 14–n. 205, lin. 28, p. 82. See also Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 87, lin. 15–20, p. 45. 98. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 88, lin. 22, p. 45–lin. 5, p. 46. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 211, lin. 14–26, p. 84. 99. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 89, lin. 6–14, p. 46. 100. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, n. 212, lin. 27, p. 84–n. 213, lin. 14, p. 85. 101. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 34, lin. 10–12, p. 60. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 34, lin. 1–11, p. 107. It can also be said that, for Chatton, knowledge of God in general (cognitio propria Dei) can include various kinds of cognitive acts in respect to God only: simple, complex and descriptive cognitions, cognitions based on discursion (discursus) and cognitions based on a precept (dictamen) through which something is commanded or derived syllogistically in respect to God in this life or in heaven. See Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 4, lin. 30, p. 92–lin. 2, p. 93. 102. Georgedes notes that Holcot completed the revision of his commentary around 1336. See Georgedes, “Robert Holcot,” 609. 103. See Hester Goodenough Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2004), 92–98, 102; Kimberly Georgedes, “Robert Holcot,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 609; Leonard A. Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, FourteenthCentury Skeptic (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1993), 3; Courtenay, Scholars and Schools, 268–69; Beryl Smalley, “Robert Holcot O. P,” in Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 26 (1956): 7–9. 104. See Smalley, “Robert Holcot,” 65. 105. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones (Lyons, 1518; reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), liber I, q. 4, a. 1C. 106. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4, a. 1C. 107. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4, a. 1C. 108. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4, a. 1C. 109. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4, a. 2D. 110. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4, a. 2M. 111. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4, a. 2M. 112. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4, a. 2L. According to McGrade, this passage reveals a certain tendency toward egoism in relation to the love and enjoyment of God. See McGrade, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham,” 74. 113. See Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 14–15. 114. See Reijo Työrinoja, “Faith and the Will to Believe. Thomas Aquinas and Robert Holcot on the Voluntary Nature of Religious Belief,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 12 (2001): 485–89. 115. See Smalley, “Robert Holcot,” 82–85; Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 238–43; Severin V. Kitanov, “The Problem of the Relationship between Philosophical and Theological Wisdom in the Scholasticism of the thirteenth and Early fourteenth-Centuries,” Analytic Teaching and Philosophical Praxis 31, no. 1 (2011): 92–94. 116. See Rega Wood, “Adam of Wodeham,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 77; idem, introduction to Adam de Wodeham. Lectura secunda in librum primum Sententiarum, tom. I, prologus et distinctio prima, ed. Rega Wood (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1990), 5*–8*; William J. Courtenay, Adam

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Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writings (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 160–82; A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 2082. According to the testimony of the seventeenthcentury Irish Franciscan historian Luke Wadding, Wodeham was a man of “blameless life, great prestige, acute ingenuity, and profound judgment.” See Ludovicus Wadding, Annales Minorum (Quaracchi, 1931), tomus VI, pp. 388–89. 117. See Schabel, “Oxford Franciscans after Ockham,” 361. For a tabular chronology of the Oxford lectureship of Wodeham and other contemporary theologians, see P. Streveler and K. Tachau, Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1995), 27. 118. Wodeham’s London lectures are no longer extant. According to Rega Wood, Wodeham’s Norwich lectures—the so-called Lectura secunda—are a reportatio; Wodeham’s Ordinatio on all four books is found in manuscript form and in John Mair’s 1512 edition of Henricus Totting de Oyta’s Abbreviation. See Wood, “Adam of Wodeham,” 77; Wood, introduction, 7*–10*. 119. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, ed. John Mair (Paris, 1512), liber I, d. 1, q. 11, a. 1, fol. 37ra. 120. See Jack Zupko, “Gregory of Rimini,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 283; Trapp and Venicio Marcolino, “Einleitung,” in Gregorius Ariminensis. Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, tom. I, prologus et distinctiones 1–6, ed. Damasus Trapp et Venicio Marcolino (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), xiii. 121. Gregorius Arminensis, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, tom. I, prologus et distinctiones 1–6, ed. A. Damasus Trapp and Venicio Marcolino (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, lin. 23, p. 247–lin. 6, p. 248. 122. Gregorius Arminensis, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, lin. 34, p. 251–lin. 5, p. 252. Georgedes shows that the idea of a “middle act” of the will was criticized not only at Paris by Gregory of Rimini, but also at Oxford by Robert of Halifax. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 286–96. In the conclusion of her dissertation, Georgedes speculates whether there might be a connection between the fourteenthcentury Franciscan discussion of the “middle act” of the will and the Italian humanists. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 296–97. There may indeed be such a connection. The Franciscan theologian Peter of Candia (Pope Alexander V), who was also a wellknown humanist, discusses the “middle act” in his Sentences commentary. See Petrus de Candia, Super Sententias, liber I, q. 2, a. 1 (MS. Vatican City, Bibl. Apost., 1081, fol. 20vb). 123. Gregorius Arminensis, Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, lin. 31–35, p. 254. 124. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, prologus, q. 4, par. 8, lin. 35, p. 99–lin. 58, p. 100. See also Maria Elena Reina, “Un Abozzo di Polemica sulla Psicologia Animale: Gregorio da Rimini contro Adamo Wodeham,” in L’homme et son univers au moyen âge. Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie medieval, ed. Christian Wenin (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1986), 603–4. 125. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, prologus, q. 4, par. 8, lin. 59–69, p. 100. Reina argues that Wodeham’s reluctance to attribute even the most primitive form of discursiveness to animals can be explained by his rejection of multiple souls in the human person and by the blending of the sensitive and intellective potencies. See Reina, “Un Abozzo di Polemica sulla Psicologia Animale,” 604–8. 126. See Perler, “Why Is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf?,” 45. 127. See Perler, “Why Is the Sheep Afraid of the Wolf?,” 45–49. 128. The thesis that free and virtuous acts demand acts of composition and division seems to be an original feature of Wodeham’s philosophical psychology. See Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 6, a. 2, dubium 12, fol. 20vb. Reina states that, for Wodeham, all acts of desire and hatred

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require no more than a single cognition or apprehension, whereas conflicting motivations with respect to pleasure and distress demand acts of division and composition. See Reina, “Un Abozzo di Polemica sulla Psicologia Animale,” 608. 129. The absence of complex objective adjudicative acts in animals explains why a dog when offered a morsel of bread on the edge of a knife, with which it was previously stabbed, stays fixed in one place and is equally incapable of moving toward the bread or running away from it. See Reina, “Un Abozzo di Polemica sulla Psicologia Animale,” 608–9. 130. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33vb. 131. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33vb–34ra. 132. Knuuttila notes that one of the distinctive features of Wodeham’s treatment of enjoyment is the view that the discussion of volitions provides the proper and sufficient framework for the analysis of emotions. He also explains that the rationale for equating the analysis of emotions with the analysis of volitions is based on Wodeham’s rejection of any distinction between the sensitive and intellective souls. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 281. That Wodeham’s theory of appetitive acts (volitions and emotions included) was uncommon yet, perhaps, not original has been suggested by Pickavé. See Martin Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy: The Case of Adam Wodeham,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 100–101. 133. According to Knuuttila, the compositional analysis of emotions was brought into the context of the treatment of volitions thanks to the idea that the acts of the will can be accompanied by positive and negative feelings. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 274. For a detailed discussion of Wodeham’s compositional theory of emotions, see Knuuttila, Emotions, 276–79; Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 264–70. 134. See Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy,” 101–2. 135. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 4, lin. 4–14, p. 277. 136. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 277. 137. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 4, lin. 21–25, p. 278. 138. See Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy,” 101, n. 23. 139. See Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy,” 107–8. 140. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 4, lin. 27–34, p. 278. 141. See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 265–66. Perler also points out that the distinctive element about conceptualized passions is an evaluation. See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 266: “The important point is that in the very act of conceptualizing your friend as your friend you feel joy. Joy is not a basic form of cognition. Otherwise, everyone conceptualizing your friend as, say, the neighbor living next door or a six-foot tall person, would feel joy. You need to conceptualize your friend as your friend or as a good person in order to feel joy.” See also Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 268–69. 142. Karger observes that, for Wodeham, cognition—which is only one type of thought—has the property of being a cognition of something extrinsically, i.e., by being related to a mind. If intentionality were an intrinsic property of cognition, or, in other words, if cognition had the property of being a cognition of something by itself, then God could insert a cognition of something in a stone, which would make the stone a cognizer. Furthermore, according to Karger, the intentionality of cognitions can be known only by the person in whose mind the cognitions occur. In other words, the intentionality of cognitions can be observed only through introspection. Karger also notes that cognitions have an aptitudinal intentionality, which means that cognitions are naturally apt to become cognitions of something providing that there is a mind to actualize them. Once cognition exists in a mind, it necessarily becomes the cognition of a given thing or of a given sort and of no other. See Elizabeth Karger, “Adam Wodeham on the Intentionality of Cognitions,” in Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentional-

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ity, ed. Dominik Perler (Leiden, Boston, Köln: E.J. Brill, 2001), 288–99, esp. 289, 294–95, and 299 (n. 48 and n. 49). Karger’s remarks can also apply to volitions. Volitions have an extrinsic intentionality, which means that volitions have the property of being volitions of something only insofar as they exist in a mind. More precisely, volitions have aptitudinal intentionality, which is to say that volitions are naturally apt to become volitions of something providing that there is a mind to actualize them. As soon as volition exists in a mind, it becomes the volition of a given thing or of a given sort and of no other. One can further speculate that if beatific enjoyment or love is volition, then this particular volition has the natural aptitude to become the volition of God insofar as it exists in the mind of the blessed. 143. According to Wodeham, one does not need to postulate more than two relata in the act of apprehending, namely, the apprehended thing (whether external or internal) and the mind doing the apprehending. See Karger, “Adam Wodeham on the Intentionality of Cognitions,” 286–87. 144. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy,” 105–9. 145. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 2, lin. 15, p. 273–lin. 22, p. 274. 146. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 2, lin. 23, p. 274. 147. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 2, lin. 24–25, p. 274. 148. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 2, lin. 26–27, p. 274. 149. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 2, lin. 55–63, p. 275. Knuuttila says that the example about the infinite increase of grief was well-known among English scholastics. He also explains that, for Wodeham, the different way of analyzing propositions about increase and decrease involving the term “infinite” sets apart the fear of infinite punishment as a special and more intense form of fear. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 292–93. 150. See Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy,” 109, n. 34. 151. See Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy,” 109–12. 152. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 5, lin. 18–22, p. 281. Perler warns us not to interpret Wodeham’s cognitivist stance on passions as implying that passions are judgments. According to Wodeham, passions are not always judgments. See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 266. 153. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 5, lin. 23–38, p. 281. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 279; Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 266–67. 154. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 5, lin. 40–52, p. 282. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 279; Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 267–68. 155. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 7, lin. 3–5, p. 284. 156. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 5, par. 7, lin. 6, p. 284–lin. 30, p. 285. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 279. Wodeham’s theory of volition as a blend of volitional approval and optative content was also defended by Holcot. See Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 5G. For an assessment of Holcot’s position in comparison with that of Wodeham, see Pickavé, “Emotion and Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy,” 103–4. 157. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, prologus, q. 6, par. 18, lin. 13–22, p. 173. See also Knuuttila, Emotions, 278. 158. Perler presents the following picture of the hierarchy of acts involved in the formation of cognitive passions: (1) sensory cognition: seeing or imagining x (pre-conceptual), (2) intellectual cognition: apprehending x as being F (conceptual and descriptive) and (3) volitional cognition: (a) apprehending x as being good/bad (conceptual and evaluative) and (b) judging that x is F and taking this fact to be good/bad (conceptual and evaluative). See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 268–69. Perler also points out that Wodeham’s cognitive theory contains an affective component which surfaces clearly in the context of Wodeham’s analysis of beatific enjoyment. See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 269–70.

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159. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 14, a. 1, fol. 47va. 160. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 14, a. 1, fol. 46vb. For a more thorough account of Wodeham’s discussion of the axiological hierarchy of the human faculties in the context of beatific enjoyment, see Severin V. Kitanov, “Is It Better for the King of England to Be a King of England than a Duke of Aquitaine? Richard FitzRalph and Adam Wodeham on Whether Beatific Enjoyment is an Act of the Intellect or an Act of the Will,” in Richard FitzRalph: His Life, Times and Thought, ed. Michael Dunne and Simon Nolan O. Carm. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2013), 70–76. 161. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 14, a. 1, fol. 47rb. See also Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, par. 3, lin. 4–5, p. 253. The thesis that enjoyment is a quality inhering in the soul has its theoretical foundation in the belief that there are only two categories of things in the world—substances (material and spiritual) and qualities inhering in them. See Karger, “Adam Wodeham on the Intentionality of Cognitions,” 285. 162. See Mark G. Henninger, Robert Andrews, and Jennifer Ottman, introduction to Robert Graystones, Questions on the Human Will, edited and translated by Mark G. Henninger, Robert Andrews and Jennifer Ottman, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming.) 163. See Steven J. Livesey, “Robert Graystanes O.S.B. on the Subalternation of Sciences,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 61 (1994): 139; Leonard A. Kennedy, “Robert Graystanes O.S.B. on Essence and Existence,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 56 (1989): 102; idem, “Robert Graystanes Commentary on the Sentences,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 53 (1986): 185. 164. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias in Robert Graystones, Questions on the Human Will, lib. I, d. 1, q. 2, par. 75–76. 165. See Michael Dunne and Simon Nolan O. Carm., Richard FitzRalph: His life, times and thought (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2013). 166. See Dunne “Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 405. 167. See Dunne, “Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences,” 406. 168. See Dunne’s fascinating discussion of the motives for FitzRalph’s rejection of scholasticism in Dunne, “Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences,” 436–37. 169. For the list of manuscripts and table of questions of FitzRalph’s Lectura, see Dunne “Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences,” 407–14. 170. For a helpful survey of the main points of FitzRalph’s theology in the Lectura, see Dunne, “Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences,” 422–35. 171. For a more detailed discussion of q. 2, see Kitanov, “Is It Better for the King of England to Be a king of England than a Duke of Aquitaine?”, 64–69. 172. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 1, a. 4 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 11va). 173. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 2, a. 3 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 16rb). For a more detailed discussion of FitzRalph’s remarks on beatitude, see Kitanov, “Is It Better for the King of England to be a King of England than a Duke of Aquitaine?,” 66–69. 174. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 2, a. 4 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. 15853, fol. 16va–b). See also Kitanov, “Is It Better for the King of England to be a King of England than a Duke of Aquitaine?”, 69. 175. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 2, a. 1 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 13rb). See also Kitanov, “Is It Better for the King of England to be a King of England than a Duke of Aquitaine?”, 65. 176. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 2, a. 1 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 13rb–va). See also Kitanov, “Is It Better for the King of England to be a King of England than a Duke of Aquitaine?”, 64–65.

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177. See Richard Cross, “John Baconthorpe,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 338–9; Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 156–7; Schabel, Theology at Paris, 176. 178. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, tom. I (Madrid, 1754), d. 1, q. 1, p. 63a. 179. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, p. 77a. 180. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, par. 93–95, p. 76a–b. 181. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, par. 96, p. 76b. 182. See Christopher Schabel and William J. Courtenay, “Augustinian Quodlibeta after Giles of Rome,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2007), 557; Schabel, Theology at Paris, 184. 183. See Damasus Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the fourteenth Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore,” Augustiniana 6 (1956): 160–63. See also Schabel, Theology at Paris, 184–85. 184. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones (Padua, 1598), q. 1, a. 2, p. 81. 185. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 3, a. 1, pp. 97–98. 186. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 3, a. 3, pp. 104–105. 187. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 4, a. 1, pp. 106–107. 188. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 4, a. 2, pp. 107–108. 189. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 5, a. 2, p. 115. 190. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 5, a. 3, pp. 116–117. 191. Perreiah states that, for Scotus, a passion or emotion is a “semipermanent quality in the rational or sensible appetite.” He also explains that emotions arise from actions but are not actions. They are passive potencies that accompany faculties such as knowing, willing, doing, and making. Emotions are also not states but contribute to an individual’s being in a certain state. See Alan R. Perreiah, “Scotus on Human Emotions,” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998), 329. Scotus’s taxonomy of the emotions is treated in Knuuttila, Emotions, 265–68 and Perreiah, “Scotus on Human Emotions,” 329–31. 192. The indirect voluntariness of pleasure and distress is discussed in Ian Drummond, “John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 65–67; Simo Knuuttila, “Sixteenth-Century Discussions of the Passions of the Will,” in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 117–18; Knuuttila, Emotions, 269–70, and O. Boulnois, “Duns Scot: Existet-il des passions de la volonté,” in Les passions antiques et médiévales, ed. Bernard Besnier, Pierre-François Moreau and Laurence Renault (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003), 286–88. 193. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 69, lin. 17, p. 51–lin. 9, p. 52. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 76, lin. 20–23, p. 87. 194. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 70, lin. 10, p. 52–lin. 6, p. 53. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 77, lin. 24, p. 87–n. 78, lin. 5, p. 88.

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195. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 71, lin. 7, p. 53–lin. 6, p. 54. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 79, lin. 6–8, p. 88. 196. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 72, lin. 7–13, p. 54. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 80, lin. 9–14, p. 88. 197. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 72, lin. 14, p. 54–lin. 4, p. 55. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 81, lin. 15–18, p. 88. 198. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 73, lin. 5, p. 55–lin. 6, p. 56. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 80, lin. 19, p. 88–n. 82, lin. 6, p. 89. 199. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 79, p. 109. 200. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 80, p. 109. 201. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 81, p. 109. 202. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 81, p. 109. 203. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 2, n. 82, p. 109. Scotus’s remarks regarding the various significations of the term “frui” must have had some impact in the discussion of enjoyment. We see the same remarks repeated in Robert Graystones’ Sentences commentary. See Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3, nn. 44–48. 204. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 62, p. 105. 205. Peter of Aquila (†1361) was a Franciscan theologian. He lectured on Lombard’s Sentences at Paris after 1337. See Schabel, Theology at Paris, 262. 206. Petrus de Aquila, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, tom. I, In primum Sententiarum Librum (Levanto, 1906), d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, pp. 41–42. 207. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 63, p. 105. 208. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 65, p. 105. 209. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 67, p. 105. 210. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 69, p. 106. 211. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 71, pp. 106–7. Knuuttila notes that distress as a passion of the will can be caused by several things. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 269–70: “These are the apprehension that something takes place (1) contrary to one’s actual will against something, (2) contrary to one’s prima facie will against something which is actually accepted with the conditional will of the opposite, (3) contrary to one’s natural inclination to happiness, when no particular act of will is actual, and (4) contrary to one’s sensitive appetitive dispositions, provided that the will is not habituated to ignoring these. Of these (1) is the basic kind of distress which is caused by the fact that something takes place contrary to one’s actual will; (2) refers to a reluctant choice which is associated with the conditional will (velleitas) of the opposite. Such conditional will is sufficient to evoke distress, as is the natural inclination to happiness (affectio commodi) when something takes place contrary to it (3), while (4) involves the same idea with respect to the inconveniences in the sensitive appetites.” 212. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 72, p. 107. 213. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 74, pp. 107–8. 214. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 75, p. 108. 215. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 73, p. 107. 216. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, a. 1, n. 76, p. 108. For an excellent and concise account of the way in which power and object relate to each other in the process of causing pleasure in the sensitive appetite or delight in the will, see Drummond, “John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will,” 60–65. 217. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 270. See also Boulnois, “Duns Scot: Existe-t-il des passions de la volonté,” 286–87. 218. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 270–271 and Knuuttila, “Sixteenth-Century Discussions of the Passions of the Will,” 117–19. Drummond corroborates Knuuttila’s point that one of Scotus’s reasons to attribute passions to the will comes from Scotus’s attempt to explain what role the moral virtues play in the moderation of the passions. See Drummond, “John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will,” 57–58.

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219. Knuuttila, Emotions, 271. See also Boulnois “Duns Scot: Existe-t-il des passions de la volonté,” 289. Perreiah writes briefly that beatitude is not a passion but an act of steadfast love of the Trinity whereas joy (gaudium), peace (pax), and repose (quiescentia) are emotions associated with the attainment of God. See also Perreiah, “Scotus on Human Emotions,” 343. The claim that beatific enjoyment is understood by both Scotus and Ockham as a passive phenomenon is also presented by Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri. See Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri, introduction to Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, 19. 220. Knuuttila claims that Auriol’s notion of concupiscible acts is a variation of Aquinas’s treatment of concupiscible emotions transferred to volitions. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 273. Auriol’s model of concupiscible acts is also discussed in Severin V. Kitanov, “Displeasure in Heaven, Pleasure in Hell: Four Franciscan Masters on the Relationship between Love and Pleasure, and Hatred and Displeasure,” Traditio 58 (2003), 292–95 and Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 192–98. 221. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7e, a. 1, n. 50, lin. 6–13, p. 394. Petrus Auriol, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 1e, n. 56, p. 397. 222. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 1e, n. 52, p. 395. 223. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 1e, n. 68, lin. 24, p. 402–lin. 29, p. 403. For the corporeal effects associated with love, fear, and anger, see Petrus Aureoli, Commentarium in primum librum Sententiarum (Rome, 1596), d. 10, a. 3, p. 343. 224. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, vol. 2, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1956), d. 3, sect. 14C, a. 3a, n. 58, lin. 94, p. 714–n. 59, lin. 119, p. 715. See also Anne A. Davenport, “Esse Egressus and Esse Apparens in Peter Auriol’s Theory of Intentional Being,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 35, no. 1 (2006): 77: “There are two ways, Auriol explains, that union with the beloved can be carried out: either the beloved exerts a force of attraction on the lover, or the lover himself departs and goes forth to reach the beloved. In the first case, the case of lust, the lover is drawn to the beloved by an external force. In other words, the lover who lusts is not the autonomous agent of his own motion of transfer, which is to say that his experience of acting is not the critical cause of his uniting with (x). The lustful lover does not by loving make the union happen. In the case of ‘honest love,’ on the other hand, the lover genuinely acts, by which we mean that he causes himself to proceed and unite with the beloved, precisely by loving.” 225. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3a, n. 144, lin. 6, p. 449–lin. 20, p. 450. 226. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3a, n. 120, lin. 59–61, p. 451. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3a, n. 120, lin. 79, p. 451–lin. 93, p. 452. 227. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3b, n. 126, lin. 95–107, p. 455. 228. Ockham’s critique of Auriol’s division of the acts of the will has been discussed in Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, 141–48 and Kitanov, “Displeasure in Heaven, Pleasure in Hell,” 305–11. For a discussion of Auriol’s thesis that psychic pleasure is a free act, see Knuuttila, “Sixteenth-Century Discussions of the Passions of the Will,” 121–22. 229. Ockham’s theory of the acts and passions of the will has been discussed extensively in Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, 107–70. See also Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 260–64; Kitanov, “Displeasure in Heaven, Pleasure in Hell,” 313–20. 230. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibet II, vol. 9, ed. Joseph C. Wey (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1980), q. 17, a. 2, lin. 27, p. 187–lin. 45, p. 188. Perler states that psychic pleasure and distress can be understood as acts with a certain phenomenal quality, i.e., a feeling-like aspect. Enjoyment and hatred, on the other

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hand, are intentional acts that may or may not be accompanied by phenomenal qualities. Furthermore, the intentional content of enjoyment can be propositional or nonpropositional in character. The devil’s act of love can have a complex intentional content, e.g., “that this human being should sin.” The act of enjoyment of the blessed in heaven, on the other hand, can have a simple non-propositional content, e.g., “God.” See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 263–64. 231. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, lin. 17–22, p. 415. See also McGrade, “Ockham on Enjoyment,” 715, 718, n. 7. 232. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, lin. 25, p. 414–lin. 4, p. 415. 233. See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 262. Perler also explains that, with respect to sensory pleasure, the will cannot function as the immediate cause. See Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 257: “Were I exposed to rotten flowers, I could not command myself: feel pleasure! No matter how much I want a sensory passion, I cannot have it unless I have previously had the necessary sensory cognition.” See also Arthur Stephen McGrade, “Ockham and Valla on Enjoyment and Pleasure,” in Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Sanctandreani. Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies (St. Andrews 24 August to 1 September 1982.), ed. I.D. McFarlane (Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Text Studies, 1986), 153–54; McGrade, “Ockham on Enjoyment,” 715, n. 6, 718, n. 7. 234. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 1e, n. 63, lin. 29–32, p. 400. 235. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 4, lin. 16–17, p. 425. 236. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 4, lin. 1–6, p. 426. 237. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 4, lin. 7–9, p. 426. 238. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 3, a. 4, lin. 13, p. 426–lin. 6, p. 427. 239. See Bonnie D. Kent, “The Moral Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 241–42. 240. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, n. 69, lin. 13–12, p. 41. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 6, par. 2, lin. 3–12, p. 295. See also Perler, “Emotions and Cognitions,” 270. 241. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 6, par. 3, lin. 36, p. 299–lin. 42, p. 300. 242. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, n. 181, lin. 25, p. 76–lin. 1, p. 77. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, n. 67, lin. 22–28, p. 40. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 6, par. 4, lin. 21–27, p. 302. 243. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 6, par. 4, lin. 10–15, p. 301. Adam Wodeham, Lectura secunda, liber I, d. 1, q. 6, par. 7, lin. 3–8, p. 307. 244. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 6H. 245. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 8, dubium 5, Ad secundum principale huius dubii. See McGrade, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham,” 69: “In his brief direct treatment of the question, Holkot argues that pleasure is indeed really distinct from the volition on which it follows, and so he would at first glance seem to be on Ockham’s side in the dispute. In other passages, however, he seems to favor a third view: love and pleasure are really distinct and causally related, but it is the pleasure which causes the love, not the love which causes the pleasure. The whole causal sequence on this view is as follows. The awareness of God (at least the direct awareness of the beatific vision) causes pleasure, and this pleasure causes love of God as the source of the pleasure.” 246. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 8, dubium 5, Ad secundum principale huius dubii.

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247. John of Naples (ca. 1280–ca. 1350) was a regent master in theology at Paris from 1315–17. He also taught at the Dominican studium in Naples. Together with Peter of Palude, John of Naples was burdened with the task of examining the teachings of Durandus of Saint Pourçain. See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 160; Arthur Stephen McGrade, John Kilcullen and Matthew Kempshall, eds., The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 326. 248. Ioannes de Napoli, Quaestiones variae Parisiis disputatae (Naples, 1618), q. 2, punctum 1, p. 12C. 249. Ioannes de Napoli, Quaestiones variae Parisiis disputatae, q. 2, punctum 1, p. 12D. 250. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 3, fol. 15rb–va. 251. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, nn. 26–27. 252. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, n. 32. 253. See Russell L. Friedman, “Durand of Saint Pourçain,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 249; idem, “The Sentences Commentary,” 71; M.T. Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli, Durando di S. Porziano. Elementi filosofici della terza redazione del ‘Commento alle Sentenze’ (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1969), ix–xiv. 254. See Friedman, “Durand of Saint Pourçain,” 249; idem, “The Sentences Commentary,” 71; Fumagalli, Durando di S. Porziano, ix–xii. 255. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII (Venice, 1571; reprint Ridgewood, NJ: The Gregg Press Inc., 1964), liber I, d. 1, q. 1, n. 6, fol. 13vb. 256. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 1, n. 7, fol. 14ra. 257. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 4, fol. 14ra. 258. The distinctions can be found in Thomas Aquinas. See Summa theologiae, IaIIae, q. 3, a. 4; q. 26, a. 4. 259. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 5, fol. 14ra. 260. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 6, fol. 14rb. 261. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 7, fol. 14rb. 262. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 7, fol. 14rb. 263. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 8, fol. 14rb. 264. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber IV, d. 49, q. 5, n. 6, fol. 418rb. 265. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 21, fol. 15ra–b. 266. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 22, fol. 15rb. 267. See Russell L. Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate: Durandus of St.-Pourçain vs. Thomas Wylton on Simultaneous Acts in the Intellect,” in Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender and Theo Kobusch (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2009), 434–35. According to Scotus and Ockham, the intellect knows its first-order acts through a separate act of awareness. For Ockham, this separate act is an act of intuitive cognition. Chatton, on the other hand, thought that all mental acts are known immediately without a separate reflexive act. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 261–62. 268. See Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate,” 448–51. The debate surrounding Durandus’s view of the reflexive character of beatitude has in fact been

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studied meticulously and reconstructed with critical editions of the texts of all the authors involved in this debate by Thomas Jeschke. See Thomas Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2011). 269. See Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate,” 433–38. 270. See Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate,” 452–57. 271. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, n. 18–19, fol. 15ra. 272. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber IV, d. 49, q. 4, n. 14, fol. 416vb. See also Trottmann, “Vision béatifique et intuition d’un object absent,” 665. 273. Durandus de Sancto Porciano, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII, liber IV, d. 49, q. 4, n. 15, fol. 417ra. See also Trottmann, “Vision béatifique et intuition d’un object absent,” 665–66. 274. Trottmann, “Vision béatifique et intuition d’un object absent,” 664. 275. Nicolaus Medensis (Durandellus), Evidentiae contra Durandum, pars prior, ed. Prosper T. Stella (Tübingen and Basel: A. Francke Verlag, 2003), liber I, I.3, lin. 3, p. 32–lin. 14, p. 34. 276. Nicolaus Medensis (Durandellus), Evidentiae contra Durandum, liber I, I.3, lin. 99, p. 41–lin. 123, p. 42. 277. Nicolaus Medensis (Durandellus), Evidentiae contra Durandum, liber I, I.3, lin. 151, p. 44–lin. 171, p. 46. 278. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 1a, n. 37, lin. 56–63, p. 391. 279. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 7C, a. 1e, n. 65, lin. 50–58, p. 401. 280. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, n. 95, lin. 21–24, p. 47. See also McGrade, “Ockham on Enjoyment,” 721. 281. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 4, a. 3, lin. 15, p. 441–lin. 4, p. 442. Hirvonen explains that, for Ockham, amicable love is “an act of the will by which something is loved (diligere) in itself (in se) and because of itself (propter se).” Amicable love includes acts such as loving God, loving one’s own life, and loving other people. See Hirvonen, Passions in William Ockham’s Philosophical Psychology, 151. 282. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 4, a. 3, lin. 9–21, p. 443. 283. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 63b–p. 64a; Iohannes Baco, In primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1. ed. Thomas Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus: Die Debatte um die Seligkeit im reflexiven Akt (ca. 1293–1320) (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2011), lin. 23, p. 595–lin. 54, p. 596. 284. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, p. 64b; Iohannes Baco, In primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, lin. 55, p. 596–lin. 70, p. 597. 285. John of Pouilly occupied one of the secular chairs of theology at Paris in the period 1307–12. He is mostly known for being summoned to and tried at the Papal Court in Avignon (1318–21) for his views on the limits of papal authority. He was also a student of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines, and he himself claimed to also have been taught by Albert the Great and St Thomas Aquinas. See Ludwig Hödl, “The Quodlibeta of John of Pouilly († ca. 1328) and the Philosophical and Theological Debates at Paris 1307–1312,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel, 199–229 (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2007), 199. 286. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, pp. 68b–69a; Iohannes Baco, In primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, lin. 342, p. 606–lin. 351, p. 607. For a detailed discussion of Pouilly’s accidental identity, see Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus, 86–92.

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287. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.1, p. 67a–b. Iohannes Baco, In primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, lin. 206–219, p. 602. 288. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.4, par. 55, p. 70b. Iohannes Baco, In primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, lin. 427, p. 609–lin. 443, p. 610. See also Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus, 92–102. 289. I am grateful to Friedman for drawing my attention to this significant exculpatory caveat in Baconthorpe’s text. See Friedman, “On the Trail of a Philosophical Debate,” 447.

FOUR Early Fourteenth-Century Views of the Enjoyment of the Holy Trinity

The principal question discussed in this chapter is whether the will of the blessed could have differentiated acts of enjoyment—enjoyment of the divine essence alone or enjoyment of one divine person separate from the others or separate from the essence. 1 This question represents an integral part of early fourteenth-century trinitarian theology and was discussed in light of two broader concerns—whether Aristotelian logic can be applied to the Trinity and whether it is possible to provide sound theological explanation of the nature of the Trinity without compromising the absolute simplicity of God. THE TRINITY, LOGIC AND THE LIMITS OF THEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION The writings of early fourteenth-century theologians reveal a staggering sophistication and complexity in the realm of trinitarian theology. Theologians in the period between 1300 and 1335 were deeply interested in the tension between trinitarian statements and the traditional Aristotelian rules of syllogistic discourse. 2 One of the central problems was how to account for the distinctness of the divine persons in relation to the essence without undermining the simplicity of God. 3 This problem was by no means a new one. In fact, the theological project of formulating a coherent and scripturally sound concept of the Trinity was given birth in late antiquity, during the age of the Church Fathers (ca. 200–ca. 900 A.D.) and the great ecumenical Church Councils (especially the Council of Nicea in 325 A.D. and the Council of Constantinople in 381 A.D.). Many late thirteenth-century scholastic theologians made an effort to make the 143

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Christian doctrine of the Trinity more adaptable to rational understanding. This effort did not mean to deny the mysteriousness and ineffability of God. It simply meant to show the rational plausibility of a triune God for the sake of corroborating the faith of the ordinary believer, on the one hand, and for the sake of countering the criticism of Muslim philosophers who accused Christian theologians of establishing the existence of three gods, on the other. 4 Gelber explains that late thirteenth-century theologians were mostly concerned with the “epistemological issues raised by the fact that man perceives God through diverse conceptions when God is most simple.” 5 The logical issues involved in the attempt to avoid contradiction in trinitarian discourse were treated as subordinate to the epistemological issues. In the first decades of the fourteenth century, however, the preoccupation with avoiding logical contradiction and paradox in the definition of God became a priority. 6 There were two views on the relationship between Aristotelian logic and trinitarian doctrine. According to the radical view, Aristotelian logic is valid only within the natural order. The realm of faith requires a higher level, supernatural logic with exceptional rules applicable to rational argumentation involving revealed truths. According to the moderate position, there is no need to develop a special logic of faith. In principle, syllogisms containing trinitarian terms are fallacious but this only means that theological inferences have a nonstandard character. One can circumvent the logical difficulties presented by trinitarian syllogisms by employing various ad hoc theological solutions. 7 As we shall see below, the debate about the viability of the two rival views on the relationship between Aristotelian logic and trinitarian discourse influenced discussions of the question whether the blessed can enjoy the divine essence without the persons or one divine person without the others. The worry about the viability of trinitarian logical discourse is also intimately linked with the concern about the cash value and limits of theological explanation in the face of the mysterious character of God— utterly simple in essence and yet consisting of three distinct persons. Our investigation will show how these two concerns bleed into each other in the texts of early fourteenth-century theologians. It can be said, perhaps, that the question of the logical malleability of the doctrine of the Trinity is merely one side of the same coin, the other side being the explicability and intelligibility of the essential unity and personal distinctions in God. We begin our journey with John Duns Scotus—the medieval scholastic thinker whose trinitarian theology has been described in Russell L. Friedman’s profoundly insightful and remarkably clear study of thirteenthand early fourteenth-century scholastic trinitarian theology as “explanatorily dense” on account of its explanatory zeal and pursuit of completeness. 8 We then turn to familiar authors, some of whom endeavor to balance explanatory completeness with emphasis on the absolute simplicity

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of God and some of whom epitomize the fideistic tendency of accentuating the supreme authority of revelation and the skeptical penchant for asserting the limits of human reason. 9 DUNS SCOTUS’S EXPLORATION OF DIVERSE ENJOYMENT STANDPOINTS Duns Scotus’s treatment of enjoyment contains an entire question devoted to the problem of whether one can enjoy a certain aspect (ratio fruibilis) of the ultimate end without enjoying another. He says that the problem presents a fourfold difficulty in connection to four distinctions in the divinity: (1) a distinction between the essence and the persons, (2) a distinction between the persons, (3) a distinction between the essence and its attributes and (4) a distinction between the essence and the divine ideas. Scotus, however, discusses only the aporiae associated with the first and second distinction. 10 Scotus explains that the question whether one can enjoy the essence apart from the persons or one person apart from the others can be examined from four separate standpoints: (1) from the standpoint of the enjoyment possible to the wayfarer, (2) from the standpoint of the enjoyment of the blessed de potentia absoluta divina, (3) from the standpoint of the enjoyment of the blessed in terms of the capacity of the created will and (4) from a de facto standpoint regarding the enjoyment of the wayfarer and the blessed. 11 In the Lectura, Scotus says that the question can be inspected from two standpoints: (1) from the standpoint of imperfect enjoyment and (2) from the standpoint of perfect enjoyment. 12 However, the Lectura-text also contains a brief response regarding the enjoyment of the wayfarer and the blessed from a de facto 13 standpoint as well as an examination of the enjoyment of the wayfarer in terms of God’s absolute power and in terms of the capacity of the created will. Scotus maintains that—speaking de facto—the blessed shall have one beatific vision (una visio) and one beatific enjoyment (una fruitio) of the Trinity. Scotus states that this claim can be confirmed on the basis of Christ’s response to Philip who wished to see the Father without the Son. Christ says that whoever has seen Him has also seen the Father. Scotus notes, however, that these words should be understood de potentia ordinata. 14 Similarly, the habitual ordinate enjoyment of the wayfarer terminates de facto at all three divine persons simultaneously. 15 According to Scotus, it is in principle possible for the wayfarer to orderly enjoy the essence of God without enjoying the persons. This is so because the divine essence can be conceived absolutely without relation to another object. Thus, the wayfarer can grasp the essence under the aspect of the supreme or infinite good. Furthermore, an individual ex puris naturalibus can conclude that there is one supreme good and enjoy

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that good without thinking about it in trinitarian terms. To imagine God as the highest good does not necessarily imply a rejection or denial of the Trinity. An individual can simply lack knowledge about the Trinity, as in the case of the pagan philosophers. An individual can also not actually think about the Trinity. For instance, many Christians praise God in their prayers under the aspect of His divinity without actually thinking about the Trinity. Scotus points out, though, that the wayfarer cannot orderly enjoy one of the persons apart from the essence because the essence is conceptually included in the person. 16 Nevertheless, the wayfarer can enjoy orderly one person apart from another. Scotus defends this claim on the ground that the creed of the Catholic Church contains distinct articles of faith and that Catholic worship includes special prayers composed for each divine person. He also maintains that, although the intellection of one person necessarily involves the intellection of its correlative, this does not entail the enjoyment of the correlative person. One is perfectly capable of thinking about two persons and enjoying primarily only one of them. 17 From the standpoint of God’s absolute power, it is not contradictory to think that the blessed could see and enjoy the divine essence apart from the persons or one person apart from another. 18 Scotus’s argument in defense of this claim is as follows. An act of vision or enjoyment can have two objects—one primary and one secondary. The primary object is such that the act depends upon it in an essential way. The secondary object is such that the act does not depend upon it in an essential way but tends toward it insofar as it is included in the primary object. Consequently, the sameness of the vision or enjoyment can be preserved even if there is no indispensable relation to the secondary object. One can apply this twofold-object model to the divine essence and the things or items contained in it. The divine essence can be thought of as the primary object of the beatific vision and enjoyment, and the things or items contained in the essence can be thought of as the secondary object. Scotus maintains that it is not inconceivable that God could assist the blessed in seeing and enjoying the divine essence and at the same time withhold His assistance in respect to the seeing and enjoying of the things or items included in the essence. God could indeed reveal His essence to the blessed without revealing the persons, and, by parity of reasoning, He could also reveal one person without revealing another. 19 In his Lectura, Scotus explains that the divine essence serves as the primary object of the beatific vision by virtue of its “this-ness” (in quantum haec). Everything else which is distinct from the essence is excluded from the primary formality of the vision. Consequently, God is capable of causing a vision of the essence without causing a vision of the persons. Similarly, God is capable of influencing the vision of one person apart from the vision of another. 20 Why does Scotus hold that it is possible to have an enjoyment of the essence apart from the persons? This question requires an account of

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Scotus’s view of the relationship between the divine essence and the persons. Cross explains that, for Scotus, the essence is prior to the persons (in a weak sense, as Cross notes) because it is infinite whereas the personal properties are not, it serves as the foundation of the relations, and it has per se formally existence in itself. 21 The priority of the divine essence with respect to the persons is articulated by means of instants of nature. In the first instant of nature, the essence has per se existence and infinite perfection. The infinite perfection of the divine essence is communicated to the individual subjects (supposita) only in the second instant of nature. 22 According to my understanding, instants of nature must be distinguished from instants of time. The idea is to differentiate temporal from logical succession. 23 Thus, the thought that the divine essence is somehow prior to the persons, as its instantiations, might explain why Scotus says that the blessed can, although only de potentia absoluta, enjoy the essence separately from the persons. How is it possible to enjoy one divine person separately from another? The key here is Scotus’s view of what constitutes a person. In his opinion, each person is distinguished from the others on the ground of a certain non-repeatable or incommunicable formal property. According to the standard version of the scholastic relation theory, the divine persons are differentiated on the basis of their relations to each other—paternity, filiation or sonship, and passive spiration. 24 Cross believes that Scotus seems to have favored an alternative absolute-property theory in his early career. According to this theory, the relational properties are not sufficient to distinguish the persons because relations are repeatable. The persons must be distinguished from one another on the basis of some absolute property, the kind of special feature, i.e., “this-ness” (haecceitas) that renders an individual exceptional or unique. 25 From the standpoint of the capacity of the created intellect and will, the blessed cannot see or enjoy the essence without the persons or one person without the others. This is so in the case of the intellect of the blessed because the intellect is a natural and not a free faculty. Thus, if the object of itself represents three persons to the intellect, the intellect cannot fail to grasp what the object represents. 26 The will, unlike the intellect, is a free faculty. Nevertheless, the will of the blessed does not have the power to orderly enjoy one aspect of the beatific object without enjoying the other aspects as well. If the will could do so, then it would enjoy disorderly and sinfully. 27 In sum, Scotus holds that, from the standpoint of God’s absolute power, it is not impossible to see or enjoy the essence without the persons or one person apart from the others. He stipulates, however, that—speaking de facto—the blessed shall have only one beatific vision and enjoyment. The wayfarer, on the other hand, can orderly enjoy the divine essence apart from the persons but not vice versa. The wayfarer can also enjoy one divine person in distinction from the other two. Lastly, it is impossible for

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the blessed to see or enjoy the essence without the persons or one person without the others on account of the capacity of the created intellect and will. Even if it were possible to have a differentiated enjoyment with respect to the Trinity, this kind of enjoyment would automatically lose its orderly character. PETER AURIOL ON ENJOYING THE TRINITY AS A NUMERICALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE AND COMPLETE UNITY In his Scriptum, Auriol discusses Scotus’s opinion on the question whether the blessed can enjoy the divine essence without the persons. He notes that—speaking from the point of view of God’s absolute power—the act of vision and the act of enjoyment can have the divine essence and not the persons as their terminus. Auriol explains that, regardless of the mention of God’s absolute power, Scotus insists that of itself the created intellect cannot see the essence without the persons because the intellect passively registers the features revealed by the object. Furthermore, the will—even though it is a free power—cannot break the conditions which the beatific object imposes upon its elicited act of enjoyment without falling into sin. 28 Auriol rejects Scotus’s distinction between primary and secondary objects of the beatific act. Scotus suggests that the persons can be treated as a secondary object of the beatific vision in the same way in which the items (creatures) contained in the essence can be taken as a secondary object with respect to the vision of the essence. Auriol claims that Scotus reduces the persons to the level of mere accidents by employing the essence–creatures model. 29 Auriol also mentions the opinion of Gerard of Bologna 30 and an anonymous opinion. According to Gerard, the intellect of the blessed cannot abstract the divine essence from the persons, yet the essence and the personal property can be distinguished conceptually and through reason alone, although they are really, formally, quidditatively, and totally identical prior to the act of the intellect. 31 Auriol points out that Gerard’s opinion seems to involve a contradiction. If the essence and the person differ on the basis of reason, then they have distinct objectival concepts. Consequently, two distinct acts of intellection and two distinct formal concepts correspond to the essence and the person. Thus, God can conserve one intellection without the other and sustain in the intellect of the blessed the intellection of the essence without sustaining the intellection of the person. 32 According to the anonymous opinion, it is possible to form a distinct concept of the divine essence which does not include the persons. However, such a concept would not be fully beatific. 33 Against this opinion, Auriol argues that the strict cognition (notitia) of the essence and the cognition of the essence in the persons are equally beatific. 34 Furthermore, the three divine persons constitute one ultimate end, not

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three distinct ultimate ends. Since the divine essence has the character of an ultimate end, consequently a strictly distinct, intuitive vision of the essence—if such were indeed possible—would be truly beatific. 35 Auriol claims that it is impossible to have either intuitive or abstractive vision of the divine essence separately from the persons. The origin of this impossibility is that the essence cannot be said to have a proper unity in either a real or a conceptual sense. It is rather the case that the essence and the paternity constitute a numerically indistinguishable and complete unity (fundant eandem indistinctionem et omnimodam unitatem). The same applies to the relationship of the essence to sonship and spiration. Thus, no intellect, not even the divine one, can conceive the essence in total disconnection from the persons. 36 According to Auriol, the impossibility of conceiving the essence without the persons is expressly stated by St Augustine. In his De Trinitate, Book I, St Augustine maintains that it is impossible to see the essence apart from the persons or one person apart from the others. Auriol shows that St Augustine accepts the following consequence: “Whoever sees the Father, sees the divine essence; whoever sees the essence, sees the Son; therefore, whoever sees the Father, also sees the Son.” Auriol points out that St Augustine would not have endorsed the consequence unless it were true to say that conceiving the essence entails conceiving the Son and that conceiving the Father entails conceiving the essence. 37 Thus, since the essence cannot be conceived separately from the persons, it follows that the essence alone cannot be the per se object of beatific enjoyment. 38 Auriol makes a notable effort to clarify what he means by the indistinguishableness (indistinctio) of essence and persons. He introduces two kinds of identity: (1) identity of repetition and (2) identity of mutual indistinguishableness. He presents three models of identity of repetition: (i) repetition of the same thing through identical vocal terms, as in “Socrates, Socrates,” (ii) repetition of the same thing through a different vocal term and under the same concept, as in “Marcus, Tullius” and (iii) repetition of the same thing through different vocal expressions and under different concepts, as in “Socrates, human being, animal.” 39 An identity of mutual indistinguishableness is present when two items, which are equally things (res), coexist inseparably and indistinguishably from one another. An example of mutual indistinguishableness is the relationship between surface (superficies) and surface-qualities, such as tenderness and sharpness. According to Auriol, the intellect cannot conceive of tenderness (lenitas) without conceiving surface. 40 Auriol mentions that in the case of identity of repetition under different concepts, it is necessary that one or more of the designated things is an ens rationis. For instance, in the expression “Socrates, human being,” the term human being (homo) stands not for something external, but for an entity of reason. In the case of unity of indistinguishableness, on the other hand, each of the identical items is an external thing (res extra) and neither is an ens rationis. 41

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According to Auriol, it is possible to differentiate various degrees of identity of mutual indistinguishableness. There are entities that are indistinguishable in act and distinguishable in potency, such as surface and surface-qualities, or form and matter. There are also certain entities that are indistinguishable in act and potency yet can be differentiated mentally (intellectus distinguere potest). Auriol says that an arithmetician can contemplate the number “three” without contemplating its oddity. Nature, however, is incapable of making such a distinction. Two entities can be related in such a way that the first can be separated from the second but not vice versa. For instance, it is impossible to mentally separate a certain property of a triangle—e.g., the sum of the angles—from the triangle whereas the triangle can be mentally separated from that particular property. Finally, certain entities allow no mental separation whatsoever. Auriol says that it is difficult to find an example of such entities in the realm of created things, and he certainly believes that this kind of strict mutual indistinguishableness is found in God. 42 An example of strict mutual indistinguishableness from the realm of creatures is the reflection in a mirror. Auriol explains that the reflection exists in the mirror intentionally (intentionalier) and as something illusory (in esse apparenti). The image combines both the thing (res) that appears in the mirror as well as the very apparition through which the thing appears (apparitio qua apparet). However, the thing and the apparition of the thing are mutually indistinguishable. The intellect does not dissolve the image into what is contained in it as such (de re) and into what is superimposed upon the thing. It grasps the image as something simple. But that there is something over and above the thing (ultra rem) is clear from the fact that the apparition of the thing can be multiplied whereas the thing itself cannot. 43 Auriol’s final distinction concerns unity. He says that unity contains two negations—indistinguishableness in itself (in se) and distinguishableness from another (ab alio). According to Auriol, no natural entity can lack proper unity (propria unitas) in the sense of indistinguishableness in itself. However, not all natural entities have proper unity in the sense of distinguishableness from another. Some entities are mutually indivisible yet distinguishable through the intellect. 44 With the help of the distinctions of identity and unity, Auriol establishes four conclusions with respect to the Trinity. The first conclusion states that none of the proposed three models of identity of repetition apply to the case of the divine essence and paternity. Auriol notes, in particular, that the identity of the essence and the Father is not such that the term “essence” stands for the thing while the term “Father” stands for a concept or a formality, even if the formality were ex natura rei. If this were so, then the Father would have no real being, but would be an ens rationis, which would result in the Sabellian heresy. 45 The second conclusion asserts that both the essence and paternity are things (res) which are mutually indistinguishable and indivisible in reality (secundum rem). The

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specification “secundum rem” is imperative, because otherwise there would be a quaternity in the deity. 46 The third conclusion maintains that the formal objective cognoscible grounds of the essence and the paternity are indistinguishable from the realities of the essence and the paternity. Thus, since the realities of the essence and the paternity are mutually indistinguishable and properly united, it follows that the formal objective cognoscible grounds of the essence and the paternity are also mutually indistinguishable and properly united. 47 Auriol’s fourth distinction is quite imaginative. According to Auriol, the infinite actuality of the deity requires that the realities of the divine persons be indistinguishable from the essence. The divine persons should not be thought of as something additional to the essence. The addition of parts applies to the case of potential infinity, not actual infinity. The infinite actuality of the deity is the very foundation of the strict indistinguishableness and perfect unity of the essence and the persons. 48 In conclusion, Auriol’s position is that there cannot be an enjoyment of the essence apart from the persons. This position is based on a particular understanding of the relationship of the divine essence and the persons. The essence and the persons constitute a numerically indistinguishable and complete unity which does not allow any intellect, not even the divine one, to have a clear conception of the essence in separation from the persons. 49 It can also be said that Auriol’s position on the problem of differentiated enjoyments of the Holy Trinity is fully consonant with the tendency of early fourteenth-century theologians to stress the absolute simplicity of God. 50 GERARD OF SIENA ON THE OBJECTIVE UNITY OF BEATIFIC ENJOYMENT The problem of differentiated enjoyments with respect to the Trinity is examined in the third article of the second question of Gerard of Siena’s treatment of enjoyment in distinction 1. The main object of Gerard’s criticism is Duns Scotus. Gerard presents Scotus’s view in detail and rejects every single one of Scotus’s claims about the enjoyment of the wayfarer and the blessed. According to Gerard, Scotus is mistaken in thinking that the wayfarer can enjoy the essence without the persons or one divine person without the others. Sure enough, our intellect can abstract the essence from the persons in the same way in which it can abstract the essence of a thing from its individuating spatio-temporal conditions. However, abstractions cannot function as achievable aims in action. Whenever we do something, we do it for the sake of or in relation to something concrete and singular. Furthermore, if the enjoyment of the wayfarer is a legitimate one (fruitio ordinata), then it must terminate at both essence and persons. Furthermore, Gerard rejects the claim that the

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blessed can have differentiated enjoyments from the standpoint of God’s absolute power. Gerard argues that it is simply impossible to have an intuitive cognition of the divine essence without the persons. This is so because an intuitive cognition involves cognition of a thing according to its actual mode of being (secundum suam actualem existentiam). Neither can the blessed cognize intuitively one divine person without the other two because the persons are inseparable from one another even in abstractive cognition. Lastly, Gerard rejects Scotus’s twofold-object distinction. Gerard argues that if the act of enjoyment acquires its specification on the basis of the divine essence as a primary object, then it follows that the Trinity of divine persons does not belong to the truth or essential integrity of enjoyment. Insofar as it is an infinite good, the primary object of enjoyment—viz., the divine essence—must include the Trinity of persons. Otherwise, the infinite good would not be truly infinite and the integrity of enjoyment would be compromised. Moreover, if the Trinity of persons is to be regarded as the secondary object of enjoyment, then, since the distinction between objects is based in extra-mental reality (sit ordo realis inter realiter distincta), there must be a numerical distinction between the essence and the persons resulting in a quaternity. Gerard’s overall assessment of Scotus’s view is thus quite negative. “This mode of speaking is indeed subtle and ingenious,” states Gerard about Scotus’s approach, “yet it appears to me that it cannot stand.” 51 Gerard’s own view on the issue of differentiated enjoyments is that there is no basis for such enjoyments in God. There is only one simple and individual enjoyable ground in God. Therefore, there can only be a single kind of enjoyment through which the will of the blessed enjoy individually the one divine essence or goodness in the three persons or, vice versa, the three persons in the one single divine goodness. The essence and persons stand in a relation of mutual inclusiveness with respect to each other (mutuo se includunt essentia et personae). Thus, it is impossible to enjoy the essence without the persons or one person apart from the others. Additionally, the blessed not only have a single enjoyment of the Trinity. Their enjoyment is also uninterrupted. Gerard reasons that only the wayfarer can have multiple acts of enjoyment, presumably because the experience of enjoyment in this life is sporadic and short-lived; one may experience beatific enjoyment of various intensity and duration, at different times and places. It appears as if there are many acts of enjoyment simply because the ultimate state of consciousness has been episodic (plurificatur actus propter interruptionem). This is not the case in heaven, however, because the beatific state of consciousness is one of incessant vision and joy. 52

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JOHN BACONTHORPE ON ESSENTIAL AND NOTIONAL ACTS OF COGNITION AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIFFERENTIATED ENJOYMENTS The second principal question of Baconthorpe’s treatment of enjoyment is devoted entirely to the problem of differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity. In its exact formulation the question asks whether the Father can have an essential act of intellection prior to having a notional act of intellection or whether He can have one notional act prior to another. In the preamble of the question, Baconthorpe adds two caveats. The first is that enjoyment is taken in the broader sense of beatitude which includes both intellect and will. The second is that the notional act is understood in two different ways. In the first way, the notional act is commonly understood by all doctors to refer to the act through which a person is produced in the divine nature, and it is in this strict sense of production that one can distinguish it from the essential act understood as operation. In the second way, the notional act is understood to imply the act through which the Father intuits everything that is proper to the Father and to the other persons, and this act differs from the essential act through which the Father is said to understand each and every perfection that pertain to the divine essence. Baconthorpe stipulates that the principal question must be understood according to the second meaning of the distinction between the notional and essential act. 53 Baconthorpe’s second question has three separate articles. Article 1 asks whether God the Father has an essential cognitive act with respect to the essence and all essential perfections which precedes the notional cognitive act with respect to the divine persons. Article 2 examines whether the notional act through which God the Father cognizes what is proper to Him alone precedes the notional act through which He knows what is proper to the other two divine persons. Article 3 concerns whether given such prior acts in God the Father it is also possible to enjoy the essence without the persons or one person without the others. 54 Baconthorpe’s response to the first article is an effort to reconcile two contrary opinions—the opinion of Duns Scotus, who maintains that the Father can indeed have an essential act prior to having a notional act, and the opinion of an anonymous author, who says the opposite, namely, that there cannot be such a prior act in the divine nature. Especially interesting is the first argument used in support of the anonymous opinion. According to the argument, if an essential act is granted to exist in God, then this act would have to be a type of simple and less perfect knowledge (notitia simplex) which God must have prior to having a perfect, fullfledged or complete knowledge (notitia declarativa). But this cannot be the case because there is no transition from a less perfect to a more perfect degree of knowledge in God’s intellect. God’s knowledge, in other words, is always perfect and complete. This is confirmed on the basis of

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the Aristotelian principle that definitional knowledge proceeds from what is prior by nature (diffinitio est ex prioribus natura). Thus, since definitional knowledge is in essence complete knowledge, then the definitional knowledge of God’s intellect must always be complete knowledge. 55 In his response to the first article, Baconthorpe states that the existence of an essential cognitive act in God must be either granted or denied depending on the sense in which the essential act is understood. In one sense, an essential act with respect to the divine essence can be said to be specifically distinct (distinctus specie) from a notional act with respect to the persons. In another sense, the essential act is included in the notional act in the same way in which the confused cognition of the animality of a human being is included in the express and full-fledged definitional cognition of a human being. According to Baconthorpe, an essential act with respect to the divine essence can be granted to exist in God only if such an act is understood in the second sense. Baconthorpe also points out that the order of cognitive acts corresponds to the very nature of the object (ex natura rei in obiecto) or, in other words, has a basis in extramental reality. This is an important caveat precisely because if such a basis was unavailable no distinction whatsoever between cognitive acts in God’s intellect would be possible. 56 Now, the order of transition from confused to express knowledge is an order which characterizes an imperfect intellect. Since God’s intellect is perfect, a transition from confused to express knowledge cannot take place in it at all. The perfectly comprehending divine intellect grasps the divine nature as it is in itself—viz., as the origin or foundation (fundamentum) of the divine persons—in which case it comprehends the essence as ontologically prior to the persons. But this is not an altogether separate and isolated cognition. Rather, it is included or, to use Friedman’s term, “nested” in the essence of the cognition of the persons. 57 How should one understand the precise nature of the priority of the essential act with regard to the notional act of cognition? According to Baconthorpe, the divine intellect elicits the notional act by means of the essential act (elicit notionalem mediante essentialem), and there is nothing in this process such as transition from confused to express knowledge, composition or graduated cognitive intensification that implies imperfection. 58 In a remarkable explanatory tour de force, Baconthorpe states that the essential and notional act contain each other and are contained by each other mutually but dissimilarly. The notional act contains the essential act as an intrinsic degree similar to the way in which a definition contains a confused cognition. Baconthorpe calls this a virtual and graduated containment. On the other hand, the essential act contains the notional act as an originating principle similar to the way in which a confused cognition contains an express or definitive cognition. Baconthorpe calls this just a virtual containment. 59 In response to the question regarding the possibility of differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity Baconthorpe maintains that such enjoyments

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can be granted only from the standpoint of the priority of derivation (praecessio in aliquo priori a quo, posterioritas originis) of the divine essence with respect to the persons, or of the Father with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit. 60 Baconthorpe’s chief argument in defense of this position is based on the distinction between two different kinds of object— viz., an originating object (obiectus principians) and a terminating object (obiectus terminans). Baconthorpe explains what he means through the following analogy: “When we are convinced of God through God’s creation, the creation serves as the origin, not the terminus of our conviction.” 61 Clearly, God is the terminus of the conviction. Finally, it is worth mentioning Baconthorpe’s criticism of the views of Peter Auriol and Duns Scotus. Baconthorpe’s main objection to Auriol is that even though Auriol reaches the same conclusion as Baconthorpe, Auriol nevertheless fails to address the real difficulty posed by Scotus’s account of differentiated beatific enjoyments. “I wonder how it is possible that he [Auriol] does not touch upon the difficulty of the question,” says Baconthorpe. According to Baconthorpe, Scotus is not merely talking about whether the divine relations differ from the divine essence in extra-mental reality (ex natura rei). Scotus is also exploring the possibility of differentiated enjoyments from the vantage point of the notion of opposition of relations as the basis for personal constitution. Thus, the more difficult question is whether one can enjoy the divine essence without at the same time enjoying the persons according to what belongs to each through opposition of relations. 62 Baconthorpe’s assessment of Scotus’s account is negative. Essentially, Scotus has failed to show convincingly that differentiated beatific enjoyments with respect to the Trinity are possible in this life or the next. Baconthorpe sums up Scotus’s position in the following four claims: (1) A wayfarer can ordinately enjoy the divine essence apart from the persons. (2) A wayfarer can ordinately enjoy one divine person apart from another. (3) The blessed (comprehensor) can ordinately enjoy the essence alone or one person apart the others. (4) God the Father can enjoy the essence in something prior (in aliquo priori) without enjoying the persons. 63 The key point in Baconthorpe’s criticism is that a differentiated enjoyment—if such is indeed possible—is not a truly beatific or ordinate enjoyment (fruitio ordinata). Thus, even if Scotus is correct in assuming that God can cause a concept of the divine essence as a primary object without at the same time causing a concept of the persons as a secondary object, the corresponding enjoyment, according to Baconthorpe, is not beatific. Baconthorpe grants that in seeing the divine essence without the persons our intellect is prompted to love the essence as if by a noble inclination for the highest good. However, the capaciousness of the intellect is not thus entirely satisfied, and, consequently, the enjoyment is not enjoyment in the fullest sense of the term. 64 Furthermore, it is simply not within the power of the blessed to alter the nature of the beatific object by

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abstracting the essence from the persons, especially given the effect of the light of glory upon them. Lastly, all doctors concur, Baconthorpe states, that although the divine essence reveals the creatures contained in it at will, it nevertheless represents the three persons of necessity. 65 WILLIAM OF OCKHAM’S ARS OBLIGATORIA ELIMINATION STRATEGY According to Ockham, it is quite meaningless to ask whether the created will can enjoy the divine essence apart from the persons. Ockham claims that we should not concede logically contradictory statements unless they are contained in the sacred Scripture or unless the Church has determined that they are true or unless they follow evidently and formally from the determinations of the Church. 66 Ockham reasons that we ought to abandon all contradictory statements that the basic Christian belief does not compel us to accept. Everything that belongs to the realm of faith is either found in sacred Scripture or in the determinations of the Church or it can be inferred evidently and formally from the determinations of the Church. Since the proposition “an individual can enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the persons” belongs to none of the mentioned portions of faith, it should consequently be eliminated. 67 Writing at the closure of the fourteenth century, the Greek Franciscan Peter of Candia (1340–1410) 68 presents the rules that govern Ockham’s elimination strategy. He reports that, according to Ockham, we should not grant any evidently impossible propositions unless they follow evidently from statements which we are obligated to believe for the sake of our salvation. Since propositions such as “the blessed can enjoy the essence apart from the persons,” or “the blessed can enjoy one person in separation from another” seem impossible and do not follow from statements that ought to be accepted on faith alone, then they should be negated. In matters of faith, we ought to proceed in agreement with the three rules of the obligational art (ars obligatoria): (1) everything that follows from the positum must be granted, (2) everything that is incompatible with the positum must be negated and (3) everything that is irrelevant must be examined according to its own quality. Since, from the perspective of central Christian beliefs, the aforementioned propositions seem irrelevant, it follows that they should be examined according to their own quality. However, since according to their own quality these propositions turn out to be improbable, it follows that they should be simply negated. 69 Ockham intended his elimination strategy to cut off anything that faith does not force us to accept and to reduce the number of believed propositions to a bare minimum. This strategy can also be explained by Ockham’s firm commitment to the rules of the Aristotelian syllogistic art.

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For Ockham, there is no special logical theory dealing with the Trinity. Natural logic has no means of accommodating exceptional theological rules for syllogistic reasoning with trinitarian terms. A case in point is the formal non-identity between the essence and the persons which Duns Scotus posited in the Trinity. The Christian faith instructs us that the persons of the Trinity are really distinct and yet they are identical with the divine essence. Scotus taught that the persons are at least formally non-identical with the essence. Ockham insisted that the principle of formal non-identity should be postulated only if we believe that the Trinity exists. He denied, however, that this principle could help us understand how the Trinity is possible. 70 Ockham’s response to the question whether the will can enjoy the essence without enjoying the persons states that no such enjoyment is possible. One cannot have an act of enjoyment with respect to something that is really God without having an act of enjoyment with respect to something else that is equally God due to the real identity between the essence and the persons. 71 Ockham does not deny that it is possible to have a special concept (conceptus proprius) through which one grasps the essence as such. He states, however, that this concept must connote or signify a person in some way. 72 Therefore, it can be accepted in one sense that it is possible to grasp the essence without the persons. Nonetheless, it does not follow that there can also be an act of enjoyment of the essence apart from the persons. This is so because, unlike the intellect, the will is incapable of abstracting the essence from the persons. 73 We can conclude that Ockham rejects the view that it is possible to enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the persons of the Trinity. 74 He admits that it is in some sense possible to have an intellection of the essence as such which does not include the persons. In general, Ockham does not think that the question of the enjoyment of the essence apart from the persons is very relevant from the point of view of Christian faith. We are not obligated to believe that the blessed can enjoy the essence without the persons, and we can consequently expose the flawed logical foundation of this belief and dismiss it as improbable. Ockham’s peculiar faith-based (sola fide) approach to the problem of the differentiated enjoyments of the Holy Trinity can also be explained in light of Ockham’s search for simplicity. Differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity presuppose some sort of real or conceptual distinction in God. Yet no such distinction is to be acknowledged unless faith explicitly requires it, and even though faith explicitly differentiates between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, it does not explicitly say anything about differentiated enjoyments with respect to the divine essence and persons. 75

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WALTER CHATTON’S WAY WITH TRINITARIAN SYLLOGISMS In his discussion of the enjoyment of the Trinity, Walter Chatton is mainly interested in the question whether there is a contradiction involved in enjoying the divine essence apart from the persons. Chatton explains that the question can be understood in at least three different senses. If one understands the statement—“to see the divine essence without seeing the person”—in the sense that the essence is seen and that the person is not really identical with the essence, then there is a contradiction involved. 76 Similarly, if one understands the statement—“to enjoy the essence without enjoying the person”—to mean that the person is really distinct from the essence, then there is certainly a contradiction. 77 However, one can simply say that there is a certain vision which represents God alone without representing God as a Trinity; or one can say that there is such a vision which is per se and primarily directed at the divine essence and which is not so directed at the divine persons. This kind of discourse does not entail a contradiction. 78 Likewise, it is not contradictory for God to be able to cause an act of enjoyment of the essence separately from the persons. 79 Chatton’s chief point is that—psychologically speaking—it is not inconceivable that there could be a vision representative of the essence and not of the persons. Having a vision of the divine essence apart from the persons is just as probable as having a vision of an animal without seeing clearly and distinctly that it is also a man. 80 Furthermore, in the Reportatio Chatton argues that nothing ought to be ruled out from God’s absolute power unless it can be shown through faith and Scripture to contain a contradiction. But nothing deduced from faith and Scripture can demonstrate that having a vision of the Father without seeing the Son is logically contradictory. 81 Chatton discusses two opinions maintaining that the discourse regarding the enjoyment of the essence apart from the persons entails a contradiction. The first opinion is that of William of Ockham. 82 Chatton criticizes Ockham’s elimination strategy with respect to credibilia that Christians are not compelled to accept. According to Chatton, the official tenets of the Christian faith should be treated on an equal basis with statements that are not evidently or immediately derivable from such tenets. 83 Chatton also claims that it is inconsistent to hold that some contradictory statements are true because we are forced to believe them whereas others are false because we are not compelled to believe them. Contradictory statements should never be granted, and if scripture and faith insist that we ought to accept such statements, then we are accepting false things. Moreover, it ought to be demonstrated that statements such as “being seen and not being seen through one and the same vision” entail a logical contradiction when applied to the Trinity. If it cannot be shown that there is a contradiction, then one can say that God—de poten-

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tia absoluta—is capable of causing a vision of the essence which is not at the same time a vision of the persons. 84 Chatton argues that in order to concede that two statements are compossible from the standpoint of God’s absolute power, it is sufficient to relate them to two other statements that are held as compossible on the basis of faith. Otherwise, the rationality of the Christian faith would be undermined. 85 The second opinion examined by Chatton is attributed to the English theologian Richard of Campsall. 86 According to Campsall, it is contradictory to hold that one can enjoy the essence without the persons or one person without the others. Campsall maintains that the only norm that can guarantee the certainty of trinitarian discourse is Anselm’s rule, which states that “where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way, what is conceded of one person ought to be conceded about the other, but where the opposition of relation does stand in the way, one should not concede about every person what was conceded about any given one.” 87 Campsall constructs one expository syllogism and one syllogism based on the principle dictum de omni vel nullo: 1. (P1) This essence is understood (or seen) by you. (P2) This essence is the Son. (C) Therefore, this Son is understood (or seen) by you. 2. (P1) Every divine essence is understood (or seen) by you (P2) No divine Father is understood (or seen) by you. (C) Therefore, no divine Father is divine essence.

Campsall claims that both (A) and (B) fall under the rules of ordinary logic. The conclusions follow logically from the premises and must be granted. Anselm’s rule is the sole theological rule that we can use if we want to obstruct a given syllogistic discourse. Anselm’s rule, however, cannot be applied in either case because an opposition of relations does not stand in the way of the discourse. Syllogism (B) is problematic because a theologian knows that the conclusion is false. 88 In the Reportatio, Chatton argues that if the opposition of relations can be used to distinguish the Father from the Son, then it can also be used to differentiate the cognition of one person from the cognition of another. 89 Chatton asks: “On what basis does the opposition of relations maintain that the essence is the Son and that the Father is not the Son?” One could seek such basis either in the order of concepts or in the special nature of the thing which is described by the statements. The basis cannot be found in the order of concepts because this order is uniform. Therefore, the basis can only be found in the special nature of the thing, which allows the verification of the affirmative as well as of the negative statement. 90 In the Lectura, Chatton argues that if the opposition of relations stands in the way of the identity between the Father and the Holy Spirit, then it is possible to grasp the Father without grasping the Holy Spirit. Thus, one

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can either say that grasping the Father without the Holy Spirit does not involve a contradiction, in which case God can—de potentia absoluta— bring it about that the Father is grasped without the Holy Spirit, or one can say that the Father and the Holy Spirit are really distinct, in which case there are two distinct intelligible objects. 91 The main point of Chatton’s criticism of Campsall, however, lies in Chatton’s belief that the application of Anselm’s rule is not a sufficient way of solving trinitarian paralogisms. Chatton presents the following expository syllogism: 1. (P1) This essence is not relatively opposed to the Son. (P2) This Father is relatively opposed to the Son. Therefore, this Father is not this essence.

Chatton points out that, in this case, the opposition of relations cannot be used to block the syllogistic discourse. Therefore, one should admit that there may be another device for dealing with syllogistic difficulties apart from Anselm’s rule. Thus, the negative proposition “the Father is not the Son” should be interpreted to mean that the subject term is the cognition of that of which the predicate term is not a cognition. 92 Gelber explains that Chatton proposed four means of resolving syllogistic difficulties based on expounding the premises of trinitarian syllogisms through the application of different verbal formulae. According to Chatton, one can resolve syllogistic problems by distinguishing between the signification and the supposition of the trinitarian terms, by distinguishing the logical determinations of trinitarian propositions, by distinguishing between the universality and particularity of trinitarian propositions, and by differentiating the premises and conclusion according to essential identity and personal distinction. 93 In the Lectura, Chatton states that trinitarian paralogisms involving the terms “videtur” or “videtur per istam visionem” 94 can be analyzed in the same way as syllogisms about generation, spiration or personal identity. For example, one can consider the following syllogism: (P1) This essence is the Holy Spirit (P2) This essence is the Father. (C) Therefore, the Father is the Holy Spirit.

One can deny the conclusion of the syllogism either by appealing to Anselm’s rule, or by rejecting the validity of Aristotelian logic in this exceptional case, or by pointing out that the middle term—“essence”— does not have the sufficient unity required for the connection of the extremes “Father” and “Holy Spirit,” which leads to the fallacy of accident. 95 Furthermore, if these three means seem insufficient in the eyes of the infidel, 96 then one can employ other means. For instance, one can use circumlocutions. Thus, the proposition “this essence is the Holy Spirit” can be reformulated in two different ways. One can say “anything what-

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ever (quilibet) which is this essence is the Holy Spirit” or “something (aliquid) which is this essence is the Holy Spirit.” The first proposition is false, whereas the second proposition is true. The second proposition can be used to form the following syllogism: (P1) Something which is this essence is the Holy Spirit. (P2) Something which is this essence is the Father. (C) Therefore, something which is the Father is the Holy Spirit.

According to Chatton, it is, in principle, possible to reformulate syllogisms featuring the term “videtur” with the help of circumlocutions such as “quilibet” and “aliquid.” 97 To summarize, Chatton claims that there can exist a special vision of the divine essence which does not at the same time represent the persons. One can indeed talk about mental qualities corresponding to diverse descriptions of God. These mental qualities can be understood as different experiences or visions of God—visions of the essence alone or of the essence and persons or of the persons. Such differentiated experiences or visions, however, should not be taken to mean that there is an actual distinction between essence and persons. What is remarkable about Chatton is that he makes a great effort to show how one can avoid contradiction in trinitarian discourse. He opposes Ockham’s elimination strategy and criticizes Campsall’s narrow approach to trinitarian paralogisms. He blames Ockham for undermining the intellectual foundations of Christian faith and he rejects Campsall’s view that the only tool available for resolving trinitarian syllogisms is Anselm’s rule. But even if we have recourse to several different strategies and ad hoc solutions for avoiding contradiction in trinitarian discourse, the fact remains that the very nature of the Trinity is such as to allow contradiction to surface repeatedly in trinitarian discourse. Thus, even if it is contradictory to think that there could be an enjoyment of the essence without the persons or of one person without the others, this is no more contradictory than saying that the three divine persons are at the same time really distinct yet essentially identical; and if faith teaches us that the latter is the case, why couldn’t the former be the case as well. But if we cannot at all explain how the Trinity is possible and must merely grant that it is, neither can we hope to explain how there can be differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity. 98 RICHARD FITZRALPH ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENTIATED ENJOYMENTS IN THIS LIFE AND THE LIFE TO COME FitzRalph discusses the problem of differentiated enjoyments with respect to the Trinity in the second article of the first question of his treatment of enjoyment. The target of FitzRalph’s criticism is Duns Scotus. According to FitzRalph, Scotus maintains that enjoying the essence with-

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out the persons or one person without the others does not involve a contradiction. FitzRalph strongly disagrees with Scotus regarding the possibility of differentiated enjoyments with respect to the persons. One either sees the person as included in the divine essence, in which case everything else is seen clearly and enjoyed equally, or one sees the person in light of its correlative since relation is the only mark that makes one person distinguishable from another. However, FitzRalph grants that it is very probable (magis probabile) that someone might enjoy the essence without the persons. Yet, because the human intellect is incapable of grasping anything more simple and indivisible than the divine essence and persons, which represent the simplest thing (sunt una res simplicissima), it must be the case that the clear beatific vision of the divine essence involves the vision of everything and anything contained in that essence. In the circumstances of the present life, however, differentiated enjoyments are certainly possible because the abstractive cognition of the Trinity which we can have in this life is never perfect and complete, and if such abstractive cognition remains in the life to come (in proxima), then it is possible to enjoy the essence without the persons or one person without the others. 99 One is struck by FitzRalph’s indecision and caution regarding the possibility of differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity in heaven. How can it be probable that one can enjoy the essence without the persons in the state of the clear beatific vision if, after all, the human intellect is incapable of grasping anything more simple than the absolutely one and indivisible divine nature? In fact, this kind of vacillation is not atypical for FitzRalph. FitzRalph can often be seen as advancing probable opinions and positions. For instance, he uses phrases such as “it seems to me” (mihi videtur), “I do not assert anything” (nihil asserendo) and “I hold this side [of the answer] although the opposite is very probable” (teneo hanc partem, quamvis opposita pars sit valde probabilis). Given the fact of FitzRalph’s late age conversion and renunciation of the scholastic “cunning of reason”—to use an appropriate Hegelian expression—it is not all that surprising to see in FitzRalph’s air of scholarly uncertainty a foreshadowing of his eventual withdrawal into the safe embrace of a divine illumination experienced through prayer and Scripture-based meditation. 100 ROBERT HOLCOT’S LOGIC OF FAITH Holcot was deeply interested in the effect of trinitarian problems on the relationship between faith and reason. In his Sentences, he even talked about a special logic of faith (logica fidei) associated with supernatural truths. 101 In his Quodlibets, however, Holcot held the view that only inferences officially accepted by the Church must be granted and inferences condemned by the Church must be denied. A Catholic can do what he/

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she pleases with respect to inferences that are neither accepted nor condemned by the Church. 102 A Catholic should not apply any human logic in matters of belief except what the Church has determined. 103 Holcot thinks that a wayfarer cannot enjoy one divine person apart from the others. He argues that enjoying one divine person apart from the others is as impossible as loving Marcus without loving Tullius given that “Marcus Tullius” is the name of one and the same person. Thus, the proposition “I love God” cannot be true without the propositions “I love the Trinity” and “I love the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit” being true. Similarly, the proposition “I love the Son” cannot be true without the proposition “I love God” being true. The statement “I love God” is always understood as implied by the statement “I love the Son” although it is not verbally expressed. Holcot explains that a wayfarer can love the Trinity although it is possible that he is not aware of loving the Trinity. Thus, one can say that the proposition “I love the Trinity” is compossible with the proposition “I do not know that the Trinity is loved by me.” 104 One of the objections against Holcot’s view states that if an individual has only a single cognition with respect to the divine persons, then he will not be able to differentiate the persons from one another. However, if the individual has two distinct cognitions, then one of those cognitions can be destroyed while the other is kept intact. In this case, it is possible to cognize one divine person without the other, and, consequently, to love one person without the other. 105 Holcot maintains that the divine persons are seen through a single vision but he rejects the assumption that this same vision cannot grasp the persons distinctly. He claims that we can distinguish between two things—e.g., one human being from another, or black from white—by means of a single cognition. 106 Holcot does not discuss the enjoyment of the blessed, 107 but it is worth asking whether he would have allowed an enjoyment of the essence apart from the persons or of one person apart from the others. It does seem possible to say that the blessed can enjoy one person separately from the others because Holcot grants that there is a real distinction among the persons of the Trinity. 108 However, Holcot’s fideistic approach to trinitarian theology, inspired in essence by the concern to shield God’s absolute simplicity, would have prevented Holcot from granting any claims not explicitly warranted by the creed of the Catholic Church. 109 ADAM WODEHAM ON POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE ENJOYMENTS In his Oxford lectures, Adam Wodeham proposes nine conclusions with respect to the question whether it is possible to enjoy one divine person apart from the others. He maintains that it is impossible to cognize the divinity without also cognizing the persons or to cognize one divine person without cognizing the others. Wodeham specifies, of course, that

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the divinity must be the per se object of the cognitive act. In defense of this claim, Wodeham reports Jesus Christ’s reply when the apostle Philip asked him to show the Father to his disciples. Jesus said to Philip that whoever has seen the Son has also seen the Father, and that the Father dwells in the Son and the Son is in the Father. 110 According to Wodeham, the words of Jesus cannot be taken to stand only de potentia Dei ordinata. If it were logically possible to separate the Father and the Son, then it would be useless for Jesus to try to convince his disciples that the Father and the Son share in the same divine being. 111 Furthermore, there cannot be an abstractive individual or specific cognition of the deity or of one divine person without cognition of the other persons as well. This is so because any abstractive individual or specific cognition is based on an intuitive cognition and has the same object as that intuitive cognition. But an intuitive cognition of one divine person inevitably includes the cognition of the other persons. 112 Consequently, Wodeham argues that it is impossible to acquire any general or transcendental cognition with respect to one divine person without knowing the other persons through that same cognition. 113 Finally, Wodeham states that it is possible to have multiple concepts that stand for (supponere) the divine substance without signifying the persons or concepts that stand for one person without signifying another. Nevertheless, it is impossible in the present life or in heaven to have concepts that signify one divine person without signifying the others. 114 Thus, on the basis of the distinction between signification and supposition, a distinction to some extent similar to the contemporary distinction between meaning and reference, Wodham argues that a concept can mean the Trinity as a whole and yet refer to the divine essence alone. Wodeham allows that a sole divine person can be cognized and loved per accidens. Cognizing a thing per accidens means to have a limited or vague cognition of the thing. The cognition of Christ in his body and the knowledge of Christ’s humanity can be adduced as examples of knowing one divine person per accidens without knowing the others. Wodeham also says that the person of the Son can be grasped through the concepts “man” and “animal.” Similarly, it can be said that if an individual has a specific concept of a human being, he can thus elicit an act of love with respect to all human beings—including Christ—without loving the Father and the Holy Ghost. 115 Wodeham insists that it is impossible to enjoy or love one person in her divine character (secundum divinitatem) without enjoying or loving the others. 116 I have selected three of the arguments that Wodeham uses in defense of this conclusion. The first argument states that the work of creation is ascribed to the three divine persons equally. This is so because the proximate and immediate principle of creation is the divine volition which is common to all persons. By a parity of reason, one can say that the first and immediate object of beatific enjoyment is the divinity or the

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essential goodness which all three persons share in common. 117 The second argument asserts that it is impossible for an individual to enjoy a thing unless he is attracted by that thing as an end (per modum finis). But one divine person cannot exert a pull on an individual without the other two persons being involved. This is so because the Trinity’s activity ad extra is indivisible. One divine person can neither function as a final cause nor as an efficient cause without the participation of the other two persons. 118 The third argument declares that if it were possible for an individual to enjoy one divine person without the others, then that particular divine person would have the character of a final end and ultimate beatitude, which is theologically inappropriate. 119 In some circumstances, it is possible to know or enjoy the divine essence without the persons. This is possible when an individual believes that something is God without knowing that it is also three persons. 120 Furthermore, it is possible that an individual wills through an act of approval and liking (volitio acceptationis et complacentiae) that something is the divine essence without willing that same essence to be three persons. In this particular case, the individual believes that something is God without at the same time believing that God is a Trinity. Thus, if his reason dictates that the object is good and pleasing to the will, consequently he can conform to the dictate of reason. 121 In conclusion, Wodeham thinks that it is impossible to have an act of cognition or an act of love with respect to the divine essence which does not terminate at the persons. It is also impossible to enjoy or love one person according to her divine character without enjoying or loving the other two persons. 122 It is possible to cognize or to love one divine person in distinction from the others only per accidens, e.g., when an individual knows and loves only the humanity of Christ, or when an individual believes that something is God without knowing or willing that God is also three persons. CONCLUSION The focal question of this chapter was whether an individual can enjoy the essence of God without the three persons or one divine person without the others. It does not seem impossible for a wayfarer (viator) to have differentiated enjoyments with respect to the Trinity. It is, however, difficult to say whether the blessed in heaven (beati) or those who grasp God clearly (comprehensores) can experience such special enjoyments. Only Duns Scotus and, to some extent, Walter Chatton think it is plausible that God can—de potentia absoluta—reveal to the blessed His essence without the persons or show them one person without the others. We also encountered two very different styles of trinitarian reflection. Thinkers such as Scotus, Auriol and Baconthorpe are profoundly interested in exploring

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the metaphysical dimension of trinitarian theology. Thinkers such as Chatton, Ockham, Holcot and Wodeham seem to care more about analyzing the compossibility of trinitarian statements. Especially remarkable in this respect is Chatton, who is oftentimes engrossed in the analysis of trinitarian syllogisms. NOTES 1. The question whether an individual could enjoy the divine essence separate from the persons parallels the question whether an individual could see the essence apart from the persons. Trottmann mentions a number of thinkers who were interested in the differentiation of the vision of God at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. See Trottmann, La vision béatifique, 364–65. 2. See Hester Goodenough Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1974), 5–6; Olli Hallamaa, “Defending Common Rationality: Roger Roseth on Trinitarian Syllogisms,” Vivarium 41, no. 1 (2003): 86. 3. See Michael H. Shank, “Unless you Believe, You Shall not Understand.” Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 61. Friedman points out that there were two theological traditions or “styles” explaining the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity—the relation account and the emanation account. Within the relation account, the distinctions of the persons were understood in terms of Aristotle’s notion of relation. Within the emanation account, the distinctions were explained on the basis of the special manner of origination of each divine person in God. The relation account was adopted predominantly by the Dominicans, and the emanation account was used mostly by the Franciscans. Both traditions were developed in the period 1250–1350. See Russell L. Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5–30; idem, “Divergent Traditions in Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology: Relations, Emanations, and the Use of Philosophical Psychology, 1250–1325,” Studia Theologica 53 (1999): 14–17. 4. See Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity,” 8; Hallamaa, “Defending Common Rationality,” 85–86. 5. See Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity,” 9. A good example of the late thirteenthcentury discussions of the epistemological issues involved in trinitarian theology is Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibet II, Q. 7. In this text, Henry asks whether the blessed see the three divine persons as distinct through a single intuition (unico intuitu). He says that he/she who sees one divine person, cannot fail to see the others simultaneously and through the same intuition. See Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet II, Opera omnia, vol. 6, ed. R. Wielockx (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), q. 7, lin. 11, p. 34–lin. 31, p. 35. 6. See Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity,” 9–11; Shank, “Unless you Believe, You Shall not Understand,” 59–60. 7. See Hallamaa, “Defending Common Rationality,” 86–87. 8. See Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 112. 9. One of the great merits of Friedman’s investigation of early fourteenth-century trinitarian theology is in showing that the fideism and skepticism which the French scholar Étienne Gilson believed to be the defining symptom of the decline of Latin scholasticism was in fact an expression of the search for simplicity in trinitarian explanation. See Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 98–101, 164–70. 10. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 32, lin. 2–6, p. 71. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 30, lin. 2–8, p. 20. 11. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 30, lin. 9–14, p. 20. 12. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 32, lin. 6–9, p. 71.

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13. Acting de facto can be understood as doing something without qualification, i.e., absolutely speaking. Scotus points out that the expression “acting de facto” comes from a juridical context where it is contrasted with the expression “acting de jure”—that is, acting according to the laws or acting without violating the laws. Thus, to act de facto means to act from absolute power, whereas to act de jure means to act from ordained power, i.e., within the limits of the established law. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 312–13; Mary Beth Ingham and Mechthild Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus: An Introduction (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 137, n. 32; Simo Knuuttila and Taina Holopainen. “Conditional Will and Conditional Norms in Medieval Thought,” Synthese 96 (1993): 119. Through His absolute power, God can replace an existing order with another, provided that His action does not violate the principle of contradiction. See Hannes Möhle, “Scotus’s Theory of Natural Law,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 318. 14. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 62, lin. 9–16, p. 81. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 54, lin. 2, p. 38–lin. 4, p. 39. See also John 14:8–14: “Philip said to him, ‘Lord, show us the Father, and we will be satisfied.’ Jesus said to him, ‘Have I been with you all this time, Philip, and you still do not know me? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me? The words that I say to you I do not speak on my own; but the Father who dwells in me does his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me; but if you do not, then believe me because of the works themselves. Very truly, I tell you, the one who believes in me will also do the works that I do and, in fact, will do greater works than these, because I am going to the Father. I will do whatever you ask in my name, so that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If in my name you ask me for anything, I will do it.” 15. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 55, lin. 5–12, p. 39. 16. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 33, lin. 11, p. 71–n. 36, lin. 15, p. 72. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 31, lin. 16, p. 20–n. 32, lin. 17, p. 21. 17. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 37, lin. 16, p. 72–n. 38, lin. 7, p. 73. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 33, lin. 1–17, p. 22. 18. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 48, lin. 10–14, p. 76. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 42, lin. 13, p. 26–lin. 4, p. 27. 19. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 43, lin. 5, p. 27–lin. 11, p. 30. 20. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 50, lin. 4–18, p. 77. 21. See Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God (Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 176–77. See also Richard, Duns Scotus on God, 181: “The divine essence, as the causal power in virtue of which Son and Spirit are produced is prior to the persons, and is somehow determined to its existence in exactly the three supposita that exist in God. Scotus believes, however, that this essence, although not a person or suppositum, is a subsistent in itself. As we have seen, he believes it to be a substantial individual: substantiality is what the claim to per se existence amounts to, and individuality is entailed by numerical singularity.” 22. See Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 178. Scotus also applies the distinction of instants of nature in the context of the divine psychology of creation and God’s knowledge of future contingents. See Christopher Schabel, Theology at Paris, 1326–1345: Peter Auriol and the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents (Aldershot, Burlington, VT, Singapore, and Sydney: Ashgate, 2000), 43–46; Steven P. Marrone, “Revisiting Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent on Modality,” in John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood and Mechthild Dreyer (Leiden, New York, and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1996), 181–82; Calvin G. Normore, “Scotus, Modality, Instants of Nature and the Contingency of the Present,” in John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics,

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ed. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood and Mechthild Dreyer, 167–68; Knuuttila, Modalities, 139–40; idem, “Being Qua Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus,” in The Logic of Being, ed. S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Tokyo: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), 209–10; Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 130–31. 23. According to Normore’s account, two instants of nature differ “just in case something indexed to n1 is naturally prior to or naturally posterior to something indexed to n2.” See Normore, “Scotus, Modality, Instants of Nature and the Contingency of the Present,” 169. 24. For a very clear and detailed statement of the relation account of the divine persons, see Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 6–15. 25. See Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 65–67. See also Cross, Duns Scotus, 69: “A divine person includes both the divine essence and the person’s non-repeatable constitutive property. Scotus appeals to the formal distinction between each divine person and the divine essence to block potentially damaging anti-Trinitarian arguments. For example, the identity of the Father with God, and of the Son with God, prima facie entails that the Father is identical with the Son. But Scotus believes that both Father and Son are formally distinct from the divine essence. And this allows him to conclude that the Father and Son are not formally identical—they are not in every respect the same. Scotus claims that they have essential identity, but not formal or hypostatic identity— they are not the same person.” See also Cross, Duns Scotus, 66–67: “A created person— indeed any independent substance—properly exhibits three features: existence per se, individual unity, and non-repeatability (incommunicability). It gets these three features not from its essence but from its ‘ultimate actuality’—its haecceity. A divine person likewise exhibits these three features. But the first two features belong properly to the divine essence, and are had by a divine person merely in virtue of its having the divine essence. The third feature, however, belongs to a divine person in virtue of its personal property.” For a discussion of Scotus’s notion of the incommunicability of the persons, see Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 158–63. 26. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 58, lin. 5–n. 59, lin. 19, p. 80. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 51, lin. 5–11, p. 35. 27. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 60, lin, 20, p. 80–n. 61, lin. 5, p. 81. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 1, q. 2, n. 52, lin. 1–7, p. 36. 28. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 1c, par. 37, lin. 4, p. 341–lin. 26, p. 342. 29. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 1c, par. 42, lin. 87, p. 343–lin. 111, p. 344. 30. Gerard of Bologna (ca. 1245–1347) was the first Carmelite Master of Theology at Paris. He left Quodlibeta, Quaestiones ordinariae, and an incomplete Summa theologiae. Gerard’s Quodlibeta reveal his doctrinal disagreement with Duns Scotus and the Dominican Hervaeus Natalis. See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 118–19. 31. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 1a, par. 26, lin. 3–8, p. 337. 32. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 1a, par. 27, lin. 11, p. 337–lin. 27, p. 338. 33. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 1b, par. 32, lin. 3–6, p. 340. 34. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 1b, par. 35, lin. 27, p. 340–lin. 34, p. 341. 35. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 1b, par. 36, lin. 35–41, p. 341. 36. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 2, par. 46, lin. 2–14, p. 346. 37. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 2e, par. 76, lin. 2, p. 358–lin. 22, p. 359.

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38. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 2e, par. 78, lin. 35, p. 359–lin. 51, p. 360. 39. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4a, par. 99, lin. 4–13, p. 364. 40. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4a, par. 99, lin. 13–24, p. 364. 41. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4a, par. 99, lin. 24, p. 364–lin. 41, p. 365. 42. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4a, par. 100, lin. 42, p. 365–lin. 69, p. 366. 43. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4a, par. 102, lin. 95, p. 366–lin. 115, p. 367. According to Auriol, a mirror image of a thing is not an impressed species or a representation. The mirror image is the original thing itself (ipsamet res) as it is placed in apparent being (esse apparens). The thing and the image are numerically identical. See Anne A. Davenport, “Esse Egressus and Esse Apparens in Peter Auriol’s Theory of Intentional Being,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 35, no. 1 (2006): 63–65. 44. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4a, par. 103, lin. 116–124, p. 367. 45. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4c, par. 109, lin. 2, p. 369–lin. 13, p. 370. This particular conclusion seems to aim in part at Scotus’s opinion that there is a non-identity ex natura rei between the essence and the persons. See Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity,” 133–34. 46. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4c, par. 110, lin. 14–19, p. 370. 47. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4c, par. 111, lin. 20–37, p. 370. 48. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 6, a. 4c, par. 112, lin. 38, p. 370–lin. 57, p. 371. Gelber notes that Auriol rejects the view of Gerard of Bologna and Hervaeus Natalis that “the essence is inconvertibly and inadequately the same as the three relations because it is infinite.” The inconvertibility of the divine essence entails that the essence as such exceeds the relations. Gelber explains that, for Auriol, the essence cannot exceed the paternity in re. Paternity is infinite in the same mode and in virtue of the same kind of infinity as the essence. See Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity,” 131–33. 49. Nielsen states that, for Auriol, the adequate object of the beatific vision is God in all His immensity. This means that this vision embraces not only the divine essence and the divine persons, but also the realm of divine ideas and creation in its full actuality. Nielsen says that this is the basic instance of the beatific vision, but he also notes that there must be multiple other beatific acts derived from the fundamental beatific vision. These acts are engendered by God’s continuing self-revelation. The blessed always perceive God in both His absolute and relative aspect as well as the totality of possibility and actuality, but they do not have an immediate access to every single detail included in this vision. Seeing and exploring the details of the divine essence requires multiple acts of intellection. See Lauge O. Nielsen, “Parisian Discussions of the Beatific Vision After the Council of Vienne: Thomas Wylton, Sibert of Beka, Peter Auriol, and Raymundus Bequini,” in Philosophical Debates at the University of Paris in the First Quarter of the Fourteenth Century, ed. T. Kobusch, S.F. Brown and T. Dewender (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2009), 204–5. 50. For a detailed account of Auriol’s original, but problematic attempt to reconcile the absolute simplicity of God with the personal distinctions, see Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 113–20. 51. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 2, a. 3, pp. 91–94. 52. Gerardus Senensis, In primum librum Sententiarum doctissimae quaestiones, q. 2, a. 3, pp. 96–97.

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53. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, p. 77a–b. 54. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, p. 77b. 55. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1.1, par. 107–108, p. 78b. 56. Baconthorpe in fact criticizes Auriol for rejecting extramental distinctions in the triune God. See Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 118–20. 57. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1.2, par. 113–15, p. 79a–b. 58. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1.3, par. 124, p. 81a. 59. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.2, par. 199, p. 90a. 60. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.1, par. 190, pp. 88b–89a. 61. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.1, par. 192, p. 89b. 62. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.1, par. 147, p. 84b. 63. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2.1, par. 163, p. 86a. 64. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2.1, par. 171, p. 86b. 65. Joannes Bachonis, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, et Quodlibetales, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2.1, par. 172–73, p. 86a. 66. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 5, lin. 5–13, p. 455. 67. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 5, lin. 15, p. 455–lin. 2, p. 456. 68. Peter of Candia (also Petrus Philaretus or Petros Philargis) was born on Venetian Crete. He was left an orphan and cared for by the Franciscans. He entered the Franciscan Order in 1357, and moved from Crete to the University of Padua. He studied theology at Norwich and Oxford, and lectured upon the Sentences at Paris in 1378–80. Peter received his Doctorate in Theology in 1381. Peter had a remarkable ecclesiastical career which culminated with his election as Pope Alexander V in 1409. See Stephen F. Brown, “Peter of Candia’s Hundred-Year “History” of the Theologian’s Role,” Medieval Philosophy & Theology 1 (1991): 156–57; Christopher Schabel “Peter of Candia,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 506. 69. Petrus de Candia, Super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, a. 2 (MS. Vatican City, Bibl. Apost. 1081, fol. 28vb). 70. See Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa logicae, OPh, vol. 1, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1974), pars III–1, c. 1, lin. 30–34, p. 360. Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa logicae, pars II, c. 2, lin. 124, p. 253–lin. 138, p. 254. See also Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 255–56, 257–59; Hallamaa, “Defending Common Rationality,” 111–13; Simo Knuuttila “Luther’s View of Logic and the Revelation,” Medioevo 24 (1998), 226; idem, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 151–52; Armand Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999), 76–77; Philotheus Boehner, “Crisis of Logic and the Centiloquium,” in Collected Articles on Ockham, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1992, 2nd ed.), 361; Shank, “Unless you Believe, You Shall not Understand,” 65–71. 71. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 5, lin. 2–6, p. 482.

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72. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 5, lin. 7, p. 482–lin. 4, p. 483. 73. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 5, lin. 6–20, p. 483. 74. McGrade explains Ockham’s position as an effort to bring home the point that one’s conception of an object must correspond with the object’s own nature if one is said to have a genuine act of enjoyment with respect to that object. Since God is three persons in a single divine essence, a person who sees and loves God must necessarily enjoy God just as He is and not as she conceives Him to be. See McGrade, “Ockham on Enjoyment,” 722–23. 75. For Ockham’s fideistic approach to trinitarian discourse, see Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 124–31. 76. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 5, n. 155, lin. 11–15, p. 182. 77. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 5, n. 156, lin. 2–5, p. 183. 78. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 5, n. 155, lin. 19, p. 182–lin. 1, p. 183. 79. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 5, n. 156, lin. 6–10, p. 183. 80. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 4, n. 70, lin. 10–20, p. 87. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 4, subart. 1, n. 122, lin. 29, p. 170–lin. 7, p. 171. 81. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 22, lin. 12, p. 72–lin. 5, p. 73. 82. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 4, lin. 3–10, p. 68. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 5, lin. 21–32, p. 129. 83. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 10, lin. 10–15, p. 69. 84. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 27, lin. 7–20, p. 74. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 49, lin. 7–30, p. 144. 85. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 28, lin. 21–225, p. 74. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, n. 50, lin. 31, p. 144–lin. 11, p. 145. 86. Richard of Campsall (1280–1350) was a secular theologian active at the University of Oxford. Campsall lectured on Lombard’s Sentences in 1316–17, and served as a Regent Master from 1322 to 1324. Campsall’s commentary on the Sentences is not extant. Campsall’s views on trinitarian syllogisms were influential. According to him, the application of “Anselm’s rule” to trinitarian syllogisms leads to the fallacy of accident. This view was also adopted by William of Ockham. See Kimberly Georgedes, “Richard of Campsall,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 561. 87. See Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity,” 224. Hallamaa points out that trinitarian paralogisms were most frequently solved by means of Anselm’s rule. See Hallamaa, “Defending Common Rationality,” 87. See also Anselmus Cantuariensis, De processione Spiritus Sancti, Opera omnia, vol. 2, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt (Rome, 1940), cap. 1, lin. 19, p. 180–lin. 4, p. 181. 88. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, n. 47, lin. 18, p. 80–n. 49, lin. 14, p. 81. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, n. 65, lin. 1–n. 66, lin. 27, p. 151. 89. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, n. 52, lin. 26, p. 81–lin. 5, p. 82.

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90. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, n. 53, lin. 6–11, p. 82. 91. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, n. 73, lin. 27–33, p. 153. 92. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2, n. 54, lin. 12, p. 82–n. 55, lin. 11, p. 83. 93. See Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity,” 195–97. 94. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 4, subart. 3, n. 147, lin. 20–30, p. 178. 95. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 4, subart. 3, n. 148, lin. 32, p. 189–lin. 12, p. 179. 96. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 4, subart. 3, n. 149, lin. 13–22, p. 179. 97. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 4, subart. 3, n. 150, lin. 23–34, p. 179. 98. After all is said and done, Chatton’s trinitarian theology amounts to no more than a sophisticated version of Prepositinianism—viz., the view of the twelfth-century theologian Prepositinus according to which the Trinity is utterly inexplicable. See Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 152–53. 99. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 1, a. 2 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 6va). 100. See Michael Dunne, “Richard FitzRalph’s Lectura on the Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 436–37. 101. Gelber says that Holcot changed his mind about the logic of faith in his Quodlibets and moved closer to Ockham’s view of the universal applicability of Aristotle’s syllogistic rules and the exceptional character of trinitarian terms. See Hester Goodenough Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason. Three Questions on the Nature of God by Robert Holcot, OP (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), 26–28. Knuuttila notes that Holcot’s view was probably never very different from Ockham’s. He writes that Holcot “only separated the revealed doctrines from the syllogistics more radically.” See Knuuttila, “Luther’s View of Logic and the Revelation,” 227. See also Knuuttila, Modalities, 152–53. 102. Robertus Holkot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason. Three Questions on the Nature of God, ed. Hester Goodenough Gelber (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1983), Quodl. I, q. 2 (ed. Gelber, 1983), lin. 89–101, p. 35. 103. Robertus Holkot, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, Quodl. I, q. 2, lin. 102, p. 35–lin. 106, p. 36. 104. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4P, quarta difficultas. 105. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4P, quarto. 106. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4U, ad quartum. 107. Holcot promises to treat this question but I was not able to find the text containing that treatment. See Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 4X, a. 3. 108. See Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason, 25: “Holcot stated that all distinctions are real distinctions and that the only real distinctions permissible in God are those between the three persons of the Trinity.” 109. Friedman shows convincingly that the search for simplicity is the driving motivation behind the fideistic character of Holcot’s trinitarian theology. See Friedman, Medieval Trinitarian Thought, 155–58. 110. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 40vb. 111. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 40vb.

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112. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 40vb–41ra. 113. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41ra. 114. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41ra. 115. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 40vb. 116. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41ra. 117. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41ra–b. 118. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41rb. 119. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41rb. 120. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41va. 121. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 12, a. 1, fol. 41va. 122. Wodeham’s response may be explained with his rejection of the formal distinction in the case of the Trinity. For Wodeham’s view of the formal distinction and nonidentity, see Hallamaa, “Defending Common Rationality,” 114.

FIVE Early Fourteenth-Century Views of the Contingency of Beatific Enjoyment

One of the most intriguing questions related to the medieval scholastic theological concept of beatific enjoyment is whether enjoyment is a free or un-free act of the will. The question—expressed in less scholastic terminology—is whether there will be free will in heaven. In essence, the question is entailed by the perplexing problem of the compatibility between freedom and impeccability, i.e., the inability to sin. Early Christians believed that those members of the Christian community who gain access to heaven will be free from sin for the rest of eternity. This belief was later on articulated by Aurelius Augustine and crystalized into the notion of the impeccability of the blessed. St Augustine also realized that impeccability and freedom are closely related, and, according to Father Simon Francis Gaines, was the first theologian to have explicitly addressed the issue of the relationship between impeccability and freedom. 1 St Augustine’s solution of the problem involved a distinction between the different historical stages of human freedom—the stage of Adam and Eve prior to the fall, commonly referred to in scholastic literature as the pre-lapsarian stage of mankind, and the stage of the perfect fulfillment of the rational creature in the state of heavenly glory or beatific vision. In the pre-lapsarian stage both angels and human beings have the freedom to sin or not sin. In the state of glory, on the other hand, both angels and human beings are unable to sin. 2 However, the inability to sin is understood by St Augustine to be the distinguishing mark of a greater and more powerful type of freedom—freedom from delight in sinning and freedom for delight in not sinning. The blessed cannot possibly turn away from the delight of not sinning. Their will is permanently steadfast or resolute (indeclinabilem); hence the notion of impeccability. 3 Similar understanding of the nature of perfect free choice (liberum arbitrium) is 175

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found in the view of the well-known medieval scholastic theologian Anselm of Canterbury. In a treatise titled On Free Choice (De libero arbitrio), Anselm argues that true freedom rests in the will’s power to preserve volitional rectitude for its own sake. The blessed in heaven have this higher form of freedom and can never lose it. In some sense, those who see God face-to-face are freer than they could ever be apart from God. 4 Interest in the problem of the compatibility between freedom and impeccability in heaven was rekindled at the turn of the thirteenth century partly as a result of the Parisian Condemnation of 1277 and partly because of a paradigm shift in the method of theological analysis. The Parisian Condemnation of 1277 stimulated vigorous discussions of the nature of human freedom in the present life and the life to come precisely because some of the theses censured by Bishop Tempier undermined the voluntary and meritorious basis of Christian soteriology (i.e., salvation doctrine) by espousing a form of necessitarianism in the explanation of human action. 5 The paradigm shift I talk about involved the realization that the emphasis on God’s absolute power and freedom with respect to the created world leads to redescribing both the natural and moral order of the actual world as radically contingent. This realization in turn provoked a reexamination of foundational Christian beliefs about human agency, salvation history and heavenly beatitude in terms of possible worlds and an ethics of norms or rules. In this chapter, I trace the development of the early fourteenth-century debate regarding the state of the human will in heaven. More precisely, I ask the following questions: Is beatific enjoyment contingent or necessitated? Does the created human will want beatitude of necessity? Is the created will capable of hating God and rejecting heavenly beatitude altogether? 6 Can the blessed have certainty with respect to the continuation and preservation of their beatitude? My chief aim is to showcase the wealth and complexity of the early fourteenth-century discussion of the state of the will in heaven by articulating a variety of alternative models of thinking about the freedom and impeccability of the blessed developed in response to the voluntarism of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. According to Father Servais Pinckaers, one can distinguish two very different systems of moral thought in Catholic theology based on two entirely different concepts of freedom. The more ancient moral system is the one associated with the views of the Church Fathers and St Thomas Aquinas in particular and is based on virtue ethics and the concept of freedom as “freedom for excellence.” The more modern moral system is associated primarily with William of Ockham and is based on divine command ethics and the concept of freedom as “freedom of indifference.” In my view, Father Pinckaers is certainly correct in distinguishing between these two major alternative moral systems in Catholic theology. 7 I also concur with Father Gaines that the two moral systems and concepts of freedom identified by Pinckaers may give rise to two completely dif-

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ferent eschatologies (i.e., theological doctrines of last things). 8 The distinction between the two concepts of freedom, especially, is undeniably warranted by the writings of Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. The distinction also has enormous classificatory value insofar as it helps us categorize a particular scholastic view of freedom as more indebted to the tradition of “freedom for excellence” or more strongly influenced by the tradition of “freedom of indifference.” What interests me the most, however, is the astonishing richness of explanatory nuance found in the texts of early fourteenth-century theologians. We do not find only two rival accounts of freedom and impeccability in heaven. We find many and diverse accounts of the state of the will of the blessed. Some of these accounts are surely more original than others, yet all of them taken together speak in favor of the extraordinary resourcefulness of early fourteenth-century scholastic authors. CONTINGENCY, OBLIGATION, COVENANT AND DIVINE POWER Early fourteenth-century discussions of enjoyment reflected some of the novel conceptual and theoretical changes in the method of theological analysis. The growing interest in the nature of modal notions led to the emergence of obligational theology. 9 Gelber explains that obligational theology “begins with the assumption that the world is radically contingent.” 10 It was thought that both the laws of the physical universe and the sacramental order of salvation depend upon the divine will. God envisions all logically possible world systems and chooses to actualize one world system, which, however, does not mean that God could not have chosen a different system if He so wished. God could manifest His freedom by replacing the existing physical and spiritual order with an entirely different one. 11 Through the techniques of the obligatorial art (ars obligatoria), theologians analyzed the relationship between God and the created world. This relationship was now viewed as a kind of contract or covenant (pactum). 12 In this model, human salvation depends upon the voluntary acceptance of the divine precepts, which function in the created order as the proposals of an obligation game. 13 Duns Scotus is the main figure responsible for influencing the fourteenth-century developments in modal theory and obligational theology. 14 Applied in the context of the psychology of human action, Scotus’s notion of synchronic contingency had important implications for ethics. The idea that at the very instant a person begins to will something, there is also a real possibility of willing otherwise contributed to a shift from Aristotelian virtue ethics to normative ethics. 15 Early fourteenth-century discussions of the relationship between God and the created world also revolve around the problem of the limits of divine omnipotence. These limits were examined with the help of the

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distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power (potentia Dei absoluta/potentia Dei ordinata). 16 The application of the distinction was prompted by the Condemnation of 1277 which censured statements restricting certain aspects of the power of God or describing God’s actions in creation as necessary. 17 Gelber points out that, regardless of the differences between Scotus’s and Ockham’s use of the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power, they both think that God’s absolute power is never separate from God’s ordained power. Through his absolute power, God is capable of substituting one system of divine ordination for another. The immediate theological context for understanding the nature of the divine absolute power is the shift from the law of the Old Testament to the law of the New Testament. In relationship to the Old Law, the New Law is simply another legislative system which God actualizes through his absolute power. 18 However, the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power was not meant to suggest that God operates in the actual world outside of the confines of His ordained power. In other words, the term “potentia absoluta” is not so much a label for some special kind of power in God as it is an expression indicating that God could have done something—viz., the physical universe as a whole and/or the existing order of moral values—in a different way. It is, therefore, more accurate to say that the idea of God’s absolute power relates to the world of what is logically possible, not to the actual world we inhabit. DUNS SCOTUS ON THE CONTINGENCY OF ENJOYING THE ULTIMATE END IN VIA AND IN PATRIA, WITH AND WITHOUT CHARITY’S ASSISTANCE Duns Scotus presents several distinct approaches to the question of the contingency of enjoyment. These approaches are based on different conceptions of the ultimate end. In his Lectura, Scotus says that, according to some authorities (secundum quidam), the ultimate end can be grasped by means of two modes: (1) through the mode of the obscurely cognized and seen end as well as (2) through the mode of the clearly seen end. From the standpoint of the first mode, one could conceive the end either universally or in particular. 19 In the Ordinatio, Scotus explains that the mode of obscure and universal apprehension of the end resembles our way of conceiving of beatitude in general whereas the mode of obscure and particular apprehension of the end resembles our grasping of beatitude in relation to God as triune. He also states that the mode of the clear vision of the end can be spelled out in two ways: (1) in relationship to the will elevated supernaturally through charity and (2) in a purely natural way, that is, without the assistance of charity. 20

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It should be pointed out that Scotus adopts the aforesaid distinctions from Henry of Ghent. 21 Thanks to Scotus, Henry’s specific methodological approach to the question of the freedom of enjoyment became the typical one. 22 Henry’s opinion regarding the enjoyment of the ultimate end seems to be the chief target of Scotus’s critique. 23 Scotus’s critique is addressed primarily toward Henry’s thesis that the will enjoys the ultimate end because it is necessitated to do so from the standpoint of the obscurely and universally apprehended end. 24 There are three arguments in defense of this thesis. I shall present only the first and third arguments. The first argument runs as follows. According to Aristotle, the end in human actions is analogous to the point of departure of speculation; consequently, just as the intellect necessarily assents to the first principles of speculation, so does the will necessarily assent to the ultimate end. 25 The third argument states that the will cannot have an act of not-willing (non velle) with respect to an object unless that object contains a certain defect of goodness (defectus boni) or a certain character of evil (ratio mali). Since the ultimate end includes neither a defect of goodness nor any degree of evil, therefore the will wants the ultimate end of necessity. 26 Scotus’s overall thesis is that beatific enjoyment is a free and contingent act, and that no object—not even the beatific one—can determine the exercise of the human will. 27 According to Scotus, the will enjoys the ultimate end contingently under the aspect of the obscurely and universally apprehended end. 28 Against the first argument, Scotus claims that the parallel between intellectual and volitional assent is not entirely adequate. It is true, Scotus says, that there is a certain similarity between speculative principles and practical ends. There is a twofold similarity: (1) similarity between the order of truths on the one hand and the order of goods on the other and (2) similarity in respect to the ends as they are attained by the two distinct faculties in an orderly way. However, there is also a great dissimilarity between the faculties because, while the intellect always acts in an ordinate way in respect to the first principles (i.e., the intellect assents necessarily to the truth derived from the principles), the will can fail to do so in respect to the ultimate end. 29 In response to the third argument, Scotus states that the will cannot reject or shun (nolle) an object perfect in all respects. Nonetheless, the will can refuse to choose (non velle) such an object. 30 The ability of the will to refrain from choosing the ultimate end is a very significant aspect of Scotus’s view of enjoyment. The point is that the will is fundamentally free with respect to the object of intellection. The relationship between an act of positive volition (velle) and an act of refraining (non velle) 31 is based on the idea of reflexivity which distinguishes the will from mere appetite. 32 Scotus maintains that the will is not necessitated to enjoy beatitude in general. He explains that the power (potestas) of the will does not extend over the very nature of the appetitive faculty. Only God has mastery over the nature of the will in the sense that only He can control whether the

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will exists such as it is or not. Nevertheless, the will can control its own elicited acts. This is true because the will can direct even the acts of the intellect. For instance, the will can prevent or dissuade the intellect from considering an end. Consequently, if the will is capable of performing this kind of prevention or dissuasion, then it is also capable of controlling itself directly. Therefore, the will can choose to ignore and refrain from willing the ultimate end. 33 Cross says that Scotus’s argument is based on a commonly accepted thesis. The thesis states that if the will can control itself through the intellect, consequently it can control itself directly. According to Cross, the thesis seems false because a person can do certain things using a tool that he/she cannot do without it. 34 Scotus argues that if the will is moved toward the ultimate end by necessity, then it should remove any obstacle preventing its course of action by necessity, including the intellect’s inattention to the end (nonconsideratio finis). But if the will by necessity commands the intellect to think about the end, then the intellect should constantly think about the end just as a heavy body tends toward the center of the earth. 35 Furthermore, if the will by necessity tends toward the ultimate end, then it does so with a consistent intensity (uniformiter), which is false. 36 Finally, one can call the faculty of sight free by participation insofar as it is under the control of the will. Thus, if sight is not determined in respect to minimally or maximally visible objects, neither is the will determined in respect to more or less perfect objects. 37 Scotus’s statement that the will cannot be necessitated to seek beatitude in general disagrees with St Thomas’s account of human action. St Thomas thinks that we are free to the extent to which we are faced with a multiplicity of relatively good ends. Once we have decided what the best life is for us, we would inevitably make an effort to actualize the kind of life that we have chosen. What is more, if the intellect presents an object perfect in all respects to the will, the will is automatically inclined to pursue it. Thus, if we know that ultimate happiness is found in the vision of God, then we cannot fail to act morally well in order to achieve that goal. Scotus rejects this account of moral action because it undermines human freedom and turns the will into a merely natural power. 38 It must be said, however, that despite his defense of the thesis that the will does not necessarily seek beatitude in general or in particular, Scotus does think that in actuality the will—in most cases—wants both general and specific happiness. 39 This is so because the will frequently follows the inclination of the natural appetite. 40 But that does not mean that the will is intrinsically programmed in such a way that it cannot fail to seek beatitude. Scotus declares that the will can function contingently even when elevated by charity in the actual vision of God. 41 This is so because necessity is not an intrinsic characteristic of volition and because nothing extrinsic—such as the supernatural habit of charity—can introduce neces-

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sity into it. Furthermore, since a wayfarer who has charity elicits enjoyment contingently, therefore the blessed that see God clearly should also enjoy contingently. 42 Additionally, according to Scotus, the contact of the will with the end does not alter the mode of operation of the will. The presence of the end merely intensifies the enjoyment. 43 Scotus’s thesis that the will remains active even under the influence of charity is consonant with his view that every act worthy of divine acceptance involves a twofold causality—free will and charity. Etzkorn explains that charity should be regarded as a partial cause in the factual order of things in order to avoid Pelagianism. The activity of the will, on the other hand, is required in order to avoid fatalism. 44 Lastly, Scotus maintains that the will is capable of enjoying the ultimate end even though it is not elevated supernaturally. 45 One can object that enjoyment requires supernatural assistance, and if such assistance is lacking and one still has enjoyment, then one could become beatified by one’s bare will. Scotus contends that if the will enjoys the end through charity, then charity is either a part of the faculty of the will or is that very faculty, which is false. Furthermore, if the will is naturally capable of eliciting an act of enjoyment toward an obscurely apprehended object, then it is also capable of eliciting such an act toward a clearly apprehended object. As for the objection that the will could make itself blessed without divine help, Scotus says that the enjoyment of the bare will does not necessarily imply blessedness. Thus, a person could want to receive charity so that he/she could experience a more perfect enjoyment. However, if he/she wants charity and does not have it, consequently his/her will is not blessed. Conversely, if he/she does not want to be given charity, then his/her will is evil. 46 Scotus thinks that a person could love God above all ex puris naturalibus, at least insofar as the original state of human nature is concerned. 47 In the actual order of things, however, the habit of charity is necessary. Charity, more so than the act of the will itself, is required for divine acceptance. In turn, God’s acceptance is what makes an act truly meritorious. 48 Furthermore, the difference that the presence of charity makes is enormous because even a stronger will without the assistance of charity would always be less perfect and less blessed than a weaker will informed by charity. 49 What are the psychological conditions required for the occurrence of a volition? Scotus discusses this question in his Lectura, Book II, D. 25. Dumont notes that the question is “designed to resolve the debates between the intellectualists and voluntarists of the previous two decades.” 50 On the one side are St Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines who hold that the total cause of an actual volition is the object of the intellect. The only difference between St Thomas and Godfrey concerns the object that moves the will. According to St Thomas, it is the object of the appetite as apprehended by the intellect. According to Godfrey, it is the object as existing in the imagination (phantasma), not in the

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intellect. 51 On the other side of the debate is the opinion of Henry of Ghent. Henry maintains that the total cause of an actual volition is the will itself. By presenting the object to the will, the intellect operates merely as a causa sine qua non, i.e. as a necessary and accidental cause. 52 Since there cannot be a blind volition, the object known is required so that the will could exercise its function. 53 Scotus, however, maintains that an actual volition requires the concurrent causality of the intellect and the will. Volition arises from the partial co-causality of the intellect and the will as a total efficient cause (ut a causa effectiva). Scotus labels his own opinion a middle way (via media). 54 For Henry of Ghent, on the other hand, an account of the will’s functioning in terms of the concurrent partial causality of the will and the intellect would still compromise the will’s freedom. 55 Before we examine Scotus’s view, we must see why Scotus rejects the aforementioned opinions. For Scotus, the view that cognition is the total cause of an actual volition reduces the will to a passive recipient, which in turn undermines the freedom of the will and threatens the foundations of moral responsibility. 56 The defenders of the view that the object known is the total cause of volition explain that the will is passive only in its first act, i.e., insofar as it needs an object to be moved to act. Once it has been activated (in operando), the will is free to attend to or not attend to the object of the intellect. 57 The freedom of the will to attend to or not attend to the cognitive object is known in scholastic terms as “freedom of specification.” 58 The problem with this type of freedom, as Scotus understands it, is that the power of the will to attend to or not attend to the object of the intellect is undermined by presuming, in the first place, that the will moves only when moved by another. According to Scotus, the will either controls the fixation of an object of consciousness or not. If it controls the awareness of the object, then it also controls whether this object is attended to or not. If, on the other hand, it does not control this awareness, neither does it matter whether the object is attended to or not. 59 It should also be added that the distinction between “freedom of exercise” and “freedom of specification” was to some extent aimed at clarifying the nature of the relationship between the intellect and the will in the process of free decisionmaking. It can be said, however, that for Scotus, just as for Henry of Ghent, this kind of distinction fails to provide an adequate account of the will’s freedom. 60 Scotus also rejects the view of Godfrey of Fontaines 61 according to which an actual volition is caused by a phantasm, or the object as it exists in the imagination. According to this view, the principle of the motion of the will cannot be intrinsic to the will, otherwise the mover and the moved would be in the same subject and Aristotle’s prohibition against self-motion would be violated. Therefore, an actual volition can take place only if its cause is extrinsic to it and belongs to a different subject. 62

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For Scotus, this view denigrates the spirituality of human nature and reduces the human soul to the level of the beasts. Scotus refutes the view by means of a thought-experiment involving angels. 63 If it is true that the mover and the moved should be distinct in subject, then an angel would not have any new volitions or intellections. God would have to intervene miraculously by creating the angel’s new volitions. It follows that God is responsible for the act through which an angel has sinned or it follows that an angel has no power whatsoever. 64 It is interesting to mention that, in addition to the impossibility of self-motion, Scotus also rejects the view that self-change in the physical world is impossible and that all apparent cases of self-change must be the result of interaction between an agent and a patient that are strictly distinct. Scotus maintains that there is a wide variety of cases in the physical world—e.g., growth, locomotion, and alteration—that can be described as instances of self-change in one and the same subject. 65 Scotus presents several arguments against Henry’s view that the intellect is only a causa sine qua non in respect to volition. 66 I will mention only three of them. First, if the will has a sufficient causal power to bring about an actual volition, then the will could always will through itself (semper de se potest velle). If this were true, then the will would be like a combustible substance which could ignite spontaneously without the influence of any proximate agent. 67 Second, it would seem that volitions are not formally distinct in respect to their objects because the sole distinguishing feature of volitions is their origin in the will as an active cause. But if the acts of the will were not differentiated according to the greater or lesser perfection of their respective objects, then one could obtain beatitude simply by loving a fly. 68 Third, if the will were the sole cause of its own acts, then it would be capable of making those acts perfect. Thus, it would follow that the will can cause equal love with respect to an absent object as well as with respect to a present one. Consequently, the wayfarer could become blessed simply by making a greater effort to love God. 69 Scotus explains his own position as follows. He maintains that the intellect and the will are related in such a way that each contributes to the production of a single effect. The concurrent action of the intellect and the will is not the same as the concurrent action of accidental causes, such as, e.g., several people pulling a boat. The concurrent causality of the intellect and the will is a causality of an essential order, which, according to Scotus, means that the intellect and the will presuppose one another and cannot produce an effect separately. 70 Furthermore, the intellect and the will are not related in such a way that one derives its causal power from the other, as in the case with the elements and celestial bodies. Instead, the causal efficacy of the intellect and the causal efficacy of the will are distinct and independent of one another. 71 Finally, the causal power of the intellect and the causal power of the will—when combined—function simultaneously as a single total cause in respect to the exercise of the will.

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The will, however, is the more principal cause (causa principalior) whereas the intellect is the less principal cause. This is so because the will concurs with the intellect freely and contingently, while the intellect acts deterministically in the manner of a natural cause. Scotus’s analogy with vision is quite helpful. The will can direct the intellect toward various objects in the intelligible realm just as it can direct the power of sight toward various things in the visual field. 72 According to Dumont, Scotus held the view of the partial co-causality of the intellect and the will during his early academic career while at Oxford. At Paris, however, Scotus altered his early position and defended the sine qua non causality of the intellect. 73 In his Reportatio Parisienis, Book II, D. 25, Scotus is mainly attacking Godfrey’s position and defending Henry of Ghent’s sine qua non causality against Godfrey’s arguments. 74 Scotus does not mention his theory of the partial causality of the will. He concludes instead that the will is the total cause of volition. 75 Thus, Scotus must explain how volition depends upon cognition without cognition being the prior essential cause of volition. 76 According to Scotus’s account, when two effects are related to one another as prior to posterior, and neither is the cause of the other, the posterior effect depends upon its own cause and upon the prior effect as a cause sine qua non. Scotus illustrates his explanation as follows. The sun is the immediate cause of a whole ray of light. However, the more distant part of the ray cannot be caused unless the part closer to the sun precedes it naturally as a prior effect. 77 What made Scotus change his mind on the causality of the will? Dumont argues that this change of mind was probably occasioned by Scotus’s involvement in Gonsalvus of Spain’s defense of Henry’s voluntarism against the criticism of Godfrey of Fontaines. Gonsalvus was Scotus’s Master at Paris and it was he who had recommended Scotus as the next candidate for a Doctorate in Theology. 78 Dumont also states that the more voluntaristic understanding of the will’s causality presents an obstacle to the distinction between enjoyment in patria and enjoyment in via. If the essential cause of enjoyment is the will, and if the beatific object is merely a causa sine qua non, it follows that the will could already attain beatitude in the present life. 79 According to Dumont, Scotus’s solution of the aforesaid difficulty in the Lectura, Book II, D. 26 and Ordinatio, Book II, D. 26 is based on the partial co-causality of the intellect and the will. These two texts deal with the question whether the habit of grace is found per se in the essence of the rational soul or in its faculty or power. 80 Scotus examines and rejects Henry of Ghent’s view that the form endowing the soul with supernatural being is found in the essence of the soul. 81 According to Dumont, in both of his Lectura, Book II, D. 26 and Ordinatio, Book II, D. 26, Scotus argues that the specific difference between enjoyment in via and enjoyment in patria can be explicated in terms of the variation of the knowl-

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edge of the object which causes the enjoyment. 82 In the Reportatio Parisiensis, Book II, D. 26, however, Scotus adds a somewhat different explanation. Even if the object is understood not as a definite cause of beatitude but merely as a sine qua non–condition, the two states of enjoyment would still differ specifically. This is so because the will can produce different effects even though the various conditions required for the production of those effects are taken as necessary. 83 Scotus’s understanding of the activity of the will can further be viewed from a metaphysical and moral perspective. From a metaphysical point of view, the activity of the will can be compared to the activity of the intellect. Scotus compares the will and the intellect in his Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book IX, Q. 15, where he investigates the adequacy of Aristotle’s distinction between rational and irrational potencies. 84 Scotus maintains that the primary distinction of active potencies is based on the diverse mode of production or performance of their respective operations. In this sense, the distinction of potencies on the basis of the differentiation of their respective objects is less immediate and less fundamental. 85 As far as the potency’s operation is concerned, Scotus claims that there are only two generic ways in which an operation is produced or performed: (1) the potency is determined in such a way that, in the absence of an external obstacle, it cannot fail to produce its own operation and (2) the potency can determine itself in such a way that it can perform either this act or its opposite, or it can either act or not act at all. According to Scotus, the first kind of potency is called “nature” (natura), whereas the second kind is called “will” (voluntas). 86 The division of nature and will is the primary division of the active principles. This division, Scotus says, is found in the second book of Aristotle’s Physics, where Aristotle reckons two incidental causes—spontaneity (casus) in the realm of natural action, and chance (fortuna) in the realm of voluntary and purposive action. 87 In response to the question why nature is determined of itself (ex se) to produce just this or those effects whereas the will is not, Scotus answers that there is no further reason why. One can give no further reason why the will is not intrinsically determined to this action or its opposite, or to acting or not-acting, except that it is just this sort of cause (quia est talis causa). 88 The indeterminacy of the will can be demonstrated only a posteriori, on the basis of a person’s experience, because a person who wills somehow knows that he/she could have willed otherwise or not willed at all. 89 According to Scotus, the indeterminacy of the will can be elucidated by differentiating two kinds of indeterminacy: (1) indeterminacy of insufficiency (indeterminatio insufficientiae) and (2) indeterminacy of superabundant sufficiency (indeterminatio superabundantis sufficientiae). The first kind of indeterminacy involves an imperfection and a privation of actual-

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ity. For example, one can say that formally indeterminate matter is imperfect and deficient. The second kind of indeterminacy is the indeterminacy of an unlimited actuality. 90 Scotus explains that the first sort of indeterminacy applies to agents which can be induced to act only by something else. The second sort of indeterminacy applies to agents which can be induced to act on their own. Scotus infers that if the latter sort of indeterminacy could occur where there is limited actuality, it could even occur to a greater extent where there is unlimited actuality, e.g., in God. 91 Although the created will’s actuality is limited, the will can be said to have an indeterminacy of surpassing perfection and power (indeterminatio excellentis perfectionis et potestativae) because the will is not bound to a specific action. 92 How should one understand the indeterminacy of the will? Scotus’s notion of indeterminacy includes three types of freedom of the will (libertas voluntatis): (1) the freedom for opposite acts, e.g., willing or willingagainst, loving or hating, (2) the freedom to tend toward opposite objects by means of opposite acts of the will and (3) the freedom for opposite effects. The first type of freedom is not really a perfection of the will because it involves mutability. The other two powers, however, constitute a perfection of the will. 93 According to Scotus, a twofold contingency or a twofold possibility (duplex contingentia, duplex possibilitas) flow from the freedom of the will: (1) the power to tend toward opposite objects over time and (2) the power to tend toward opposite objects without succession. Scotus calls the second power of the will a logical power (potentia logica). 94 The introduction of this power is the essence of Scotus’s theory of synchronic contingency. A free agent, according to Scotus, is not only capable of making a free choice in exactly the same circumstances. A free agent can do so in an instant as well. In other words, in the same instant in which I choose to bring about e, I can also choose to bring about not-e. 95 It can be said that, for Scotus, genuine freedom presupposes the contingency of our volitions in terms of synchronic alternatives. 96 Scotus analyzes the willing involved in the case of a single extension-less moment of time in terms of logical moments or instants of nature. 97 Scotus’s account of freedom can also be viewed from the perspective of the contrast between the intellect and the will. Scotus suggests that there are two ways in which one can compare the intellect and the will: (1) by comparing their elicited acts and (2) by comparing the acts of the intellect (showing and directing) and the acts of the will (inclining and commanding) with the acts of subordinate faculties. Scotus claims that the first kind of comparison is more essential, and he states that Aristotle says nothing about it. From the standpoint of this comparison, the intellect always operates in a determinate manner. The intellect does not have the capacity to both understand and not understand the meaning of simple terms, but it either understands or does not understand. Furthermore,

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the intellect does not have the capacity to both assent and dissent to the value of propositions, but it either assents or dissents. Thus, the intellect is always determined in respect to acts of simple apprehension as well as in respect to acts of intellection. The intellect cannot determine itself in opposite ways. Unlike the intellect, the will is capable of eliciting its own acts in opposite ways. 98 Aristotle, however, seems to be speaking of the second comparison between the intellect and the will when he says that opposite effects require knowledge (notitia). Scotus argues that the knowledge of opposites is insufficient to cause an extrinsic effect (ad aliquid causandum extra) because then it would cause opposites simultaneously, which, as Aristotle stipulates, is impossible. This impossibility, however, would not follow unless the intellect—in view of its causality over external things—is determined of itself in respect to what it directs. If the intellect is so determined, then it should not be regarded as rational either in respect to its own acts or in respect to the extrinsic acts that it directs. Considered in itself and in respect to its own acts, Scotus states, the intellect is irrational. The intellect can be called rational only in the sense that it is required for the operation of a rational potency, such as the will. 99 Scotus explains that the will follows the intellect, but is not determined of itself in respect to one alternative only, otherwise the intellect and the will together can be said to produce one effect. The will determines the intellect through its own elicited acts insofar as the intellect is capable of causing an extrinsic effect. 100 According to Scotus, Aristotle calls the determination of the intellect by the will choice (electio), although he does not call it “will,” i.e., potency (potentia). But only the will can be called potency because—as far as opposites are concerned—it is able to determine itself (potest se determinare) both in respect to its own acts and in respect to the acts of inferior faculties. Therefore, only the will can be called truly rational (proprie rationalis). The intellect, on the other hand, is unable to determine itself in respect to opposites and is unable to do anything outside itself unless determined by the will. 101 Scotus’s notion of the will’s superabundant sufficiency and rationality can be linked with what Cross calls the “‘moral psychology’ of choicemaking.” 102 The will’s activity of choice-making can be examined in the light of the will’s two intrinsic inclinations—the affection for the advantageous (affectio commodi) and the affection for justice (affectio iustitiae). 103 The distinction between affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae is the cornerstone of Scotus’s moral psychology and is what significantly distinguishes Scotus’s account of the human pursuit of happiness from the account of St Thomas Aquinas. According to St Thomas, all agents and substances in the universe have a natural tendency toward self-fulfillment. Scotus does not reject St Thomas’s teleological view of the created order. He insists, however, that the actions of free agents ought to be moderated by the affection for justice since otherwise the created will

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would automatically seek its own happiness even at the expense of justice. 104 Referring to Anselm’s treatise De casu diaboli, Scotus asks us to imagine a sole angel endowed with the capacity to think and the ability to seek what is advantageous (affectio commodi) but without the ability to seek justice (affectio iusti). Even if this angel can pursue spiritual goals (intelligibilia), he would do so in agreement with nature (per modum naturae), and he would be like a beast seeking satisfaction of the senses. Therefore, the very possibility of moral autonomy requires the presence of both affections in the created will. 105 What is more, the presence of the inclination for justice is also a precondition for the possibility of enjoying God. Scotus responds to an argument drawn from St Augustine’s treatise De Trinitate, Book XIII. The argument is based on the acknowledgement of the universality of the desire for happiness. If all people desire to be happy, then the will must necessarily enjoy the ultimate end. Scotus explains that the statement “all people desire to be happy” is true only with respect to habitual, not actual desire. The will has a natural inclination or promptitude toward beatitude. This inclination or promptitude should not be regarded as necessity. 106 Moreover, the desire for happiness does not count as genuine enjoyment because this desire is a manifestation of the love of concupiscence and is shared by both rightly ordered and disordered wills. 107 It can be said that an individual whose will is rightly ordered must desire happiness moderately, i.e., he/she must desire it less than he/she wishes God well. Scotus makes this point obvious when he explains how the created will can fail to moderate the affection for the advantageous: (1) by loving happiness more passionately than it deserves to be loved, (2) by wanting it sooner than it is permitted, (3) by wanting to receive it without merit or in some other improper way. 108 Scotus also notes that the good angels did not dislike nor were capable of disliking the attainment of happiness. Yet, unlike the evil angels, they did not want happiness more than they wished God well. 109 Thus, the affection for justice is essential to beatific enjoyment. One should not seek enjoyment for the sake of one’s happiness alone. 110 To love something for its own sake is to be freer and capable of sharing. Therefore, enjoying within the scope of the affection for justice is nobler than enjoying within the limits of the affection for the advantageous. 111 Scotus also links the affection for justice with the virtue of charity and the affection for the advantageous with the virtue of hope. Thus, charity perfects the affection for justice, and hope perfects the affection for the advantageous. 112 Lastly, we can ask how Scotus envisions the state of the blessed in heaven. Scotus’s understanding of the enjoyment of the blessed is found in the discussion of the subjects of enjoyment, which is largely borrowed from the commentary of Giles of Rome. 113 In addition to the blessed in heaven, the class of the subjects of enjoyment also includes God, the wayfarers, and the sinners. Scotus proposes to examine the enjoyment of

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these subjects with examples of diverse grades of repose (quies) in the realm of natural bodies (corpora). The ultimate place for the rest of heavy bodies is the center. (1) A certain body can be said to rest in the center of gravity primarily (primo) and per se without adhering to another body. An example of this kind of repose is the stability of the earth. 114 (2) Another body adheres to the center statically (immobiliter) and per se, but not primarily. This kind of rest is found in stones, metals, and minerals, which occupy the innermost parts of the earth. These elements partake of the stability of the earth and are drawn toward the center of gravity firmly and immovably and by means of their intrinsic form. 115 (3) Another body adheres to the center in a periodic (ad tempum) and fluctuating manner (non firmiter). This type of mobility is present in bodies located on the surface of the earth. 116 (4) Lastly, a body is at rest with respect to something else, just as a passenger is at rest in a moving ship. One can say that the passenger is at rest in a qualified sense (secundum quid). 117 Scotus applies the aforesaid physical examples to the will in its relationship to the ultimate end. The first example illustrates the relationship between the uncreated divine will and the final end. The divine will, according to Scotus, loves the ultimate end (summum bonum) primarily and per se, which means that it does not partake of anything else beyond itself. The divine will also adheres to the ultimate end steadfastly and necessarily, which, according to Scotus, means that it is attracted toward the end of itself (per essentiam) without the mediation or influence of any distinct habit, act, or superior cause. 118 The second grade of repose pertains to the relationship of the created beatified will to the ultimate end. Thanks to God’s benevolence, the wills of the blessed are permanently embedded in the end (sunt quasi incorporati) just as a rock is permanently implanted in the womb of the earth. Furthermore, the blessed are fastened to God through the habit of glory. 119 It has been pointed out that in St Thomas Aquinas’s account of human action, the saints in heaven will not be free. 120 This is not so for Scotus. Cross explains that, for Scotus, a “change in the circumstances of the will (e.g., the presence of God) cannot alter the way the will acts.” 121 The impeccability or steadfastness 122 of the blessed does not take away their fundamental freedom to refrain from eliciting the act of beatific enjoyment. The will in general cannot hate (odire, detestare) or reject (nolle) beatitude, but it can suspend its volition with respect to it. According to Scotus, experience shows that a person can turn away from a good even if the good offered is something that ought to be considered and willed. 123 It has been pointed out as well that the contingency of beatific enjoyment is grounded in the finite ontological status of the created being which receives its worth from God alone. 124 Can the blessed ever suspend their love of God? Scotus does not think that this is possible. God, as a superior metaphysical agent, can prevent the will of the blessed from not loving

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Him. 125 According to Cross, this kind of prevention should not be understood to imply coercion. He notes that a “coerced action does not spring from the causal powers of the coerced agent.” Beatific enjoyment, however, springs from the causal powers of the agent in the sense that the agent contributes actively to its being elicited. 126 Scotus actually thinks that if there is any sort of necessitation with respect to the beatified will, this necessitation must be understood as something that is introduced into the will as if from outside. He thus says that the characteristics of “holding fast to” (tentio) and security (securitas) of the will of the blessed come from God and not from the will. 127 The third grade of rest involves the will of the righteous wayfarer, who seeks the divine good through charitable love (caritas). The will of the wayfarer, however, is not permanently and firmly drawn toward the end as is the will of the blessed. Sometimes the wayfarer adheres to the good and sometimes turns away from it. One has to be careful, Scotus remarks, not to identify the will’s formal acquiescence with the formal acquiescence of a physical body. Physical bodies tend toward their natural place through an invariable pull. The will, on the other hand, sometimes acquiesces through charity and sometimes does not. 128 According to Scotus, the will tends toward ultimate happiness naturally, and thus it pursues whatever it pursues for the sake of happiness. However, as far as the elicited act of the will is concerned, the will can fail to seek happiness, and it can fail to do so both in a negative sense (negative) and contrary sense (contrarie). The will can fail to pursue happiness in a negative sense when a person wants something particular and is not thinking about ultimate happiness at that same moment, or when a person seeks something without relating that thing to happiness. The will can fail to seek happiness in a contrary sense when a person wants something opposed to happiness. Thus, someone can simultaneously conceive of happiness in the Trinity and contemplate fornication. 129 The fourth grade of repose applies to the disordered love of the mortal sinner (peccans mortaliter). The will of the sinner inheres in something other than God, and since it does not seek God—who is the ultimately satisfying object in the universe—consequently it cannot acquiesce simply on the part of the object (ex parte obiecti non potest simpliciter quietari). Thus, the fluctuating movement of the sinful will resembles the motion of a passenger lifted up and down by a ship at sea. 130 Scotus states that, as far as the will is concerned, the sinner can be said to enjoy and attain rest in the object as something loved propter se. As far as the object is concerned, however, the sinner cannot be said to be at rest and his/her enjoyment should be regarded as an inordinate act (fruitio inordinata). 131 In connection to this response, Scotus raises the following doubt. He asks: What is it that the sinner enjoys—his/her own act or the object of this act? According to Scotus, the sinner loves his/her own act

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with a love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae), and he/she loves himself/herself with a love of friendship (amor amicitiae). 132 For Scotus, the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) is the love of a person, whereas the love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) is the love of the object that one wills for a person (for oneself or for another). 133 Love of desire can be corrupt only if it is subordinated to a corrupt love of friendship. Corrupt love of friendship is the love of oneself above God and above the rest of humankind. For Scotus, the fall of Lucifer was caused by an act of benevolent self-love. The first inordinate act of the will can never be an act of hatred or willing-against (nolle) because willing-against presupposes love or willing (velle). Thus, Lucifer fell not because he hated God, but because he loved himself more than God. 134 Lastly, enjoyment cannot be ascribed to animals except in an extended or improper sense (abusive). Animals can be said to inhere in an object propter se. Nevertheless, animals can neither calculate a means to an end nor evaluate an object as an absolute end in itself. The animal appetite is simply pulled toward the object (quasi infigitur vi obiecti). 135 Furthermore, since enjoyment requires cognition, corporeal objects devoid of cognitive capacities and driven by natural appetite cannot be said to have acts of enjoyment. 136 In Scotus’s account, the reason why enjoyment ought to be regarded as an act of the rational appetite is that enjoyment is a freely elicited act (although the delight produced by it is not freely elicited and is not an act). One of the principal arguments against the contingency of enjoyment states that the end is necessarily suitable to the will because, as Avicenna says, “delight is the conjunction of something suitable with that for which it is suited.” 137 Scotus argues in response that nothing is suitable to the rational appetite unless it is accepted or preferred by that appetite. In the case of the sensitive and natural appetites, on the other hand, whatever is naturally (aptitudinaliter) suitable is also actually (actualiter) suitable because those appetites have no control over whether something is suitable to them or not. 138 We can say, in conclusion, that Scotus presents a strong case for the contingent character of beatific enjoyment. Scotus borrows the distinction between types of cognition (clear/confused) and planes of volitional altitude (natural/supernatural) from Henry of Ghent and argues that the ultimate end does not induce enjoyment necessarily in the will. Scotus’s thesis of the contingency of beatific enjoyment is also confirmed by his remarks on the nature of the will, especially by the metaphysical notion of superabundant sufficiency and the rationality of the will. The notion of superabundant sufficiency is based on the model of synchronic contingency and the belief in the rationality of the will rests on the idea that the will is capable of self-determination. Scotus’s understanding of the rationality of the will is also linked with the moral theory of the two affections of the will. Scotus goes beyond Aristotelian–Thomistic eudemonism

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by arguing that the natural desire for self-fulfillment must be moderated by the affection for justice. The affection for justice makes it possible to seek and love God above all and is thus indispensable with respect to beatific enjoyment. THE LIBER PROPUGNATORIUS ON SCOTUS’S DESTRUCTION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Duns Scotus’s view of the contingency of beatific enjoyment is the outcome of a critique of Aristotelian-Thomistic eudemonism, on the one hand, and a redefinition of the will as a power capable of rational selfdetermination, on the other. It can even be said that Scotus set the stage for further exploration of the notion of contingency and for the application of this notion to the analysis of volition and the associated Christian concepts of merit and demerit. Scotus’s view, however, did not go unchallenged. One of the gravest criticisms of Scotus comes from the author of the Liber propugnatorius. The author—the presumed Thomas Anglicus—blames Scotus for undermining the very foundation of moral philosophy (videtur destrui morali philosophia). The moral philosophy Anglicus refers to is the philosophical account of human intellectual and moral excellence found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. As is well known, Aristotle’s account of excellence presupposes the belief that all human beings seek happiness, even though they may have a very different understanding of the essence of the happy life. How could moral philosophy be possible, asks Anglicus, if the human will does not want the universally apprehended ultimate end of necessity? If the will can fail to enjoy the ultimate end, this must be either because the end is apprehended as unsuitable or because one wants the opposite of that end, or something very different from that end, or because one wants nothing. The end cannot possibly be apprehended as unsuitable because it is in the very nature of the end to be suitable, otherwise it would not be the end at all. Furthermore, it makes no sense to say that one can want the opposite of the ultimate end because if the ultimate end is happiness, then one would want misery. But it is absurd to want to be miserable, and if the aim is to be miserable, then moral philosophy is indeed pointless. Could someone perhaps want something other or something very different than the ultimate end? If the answer to this question is “yes,” then it is possible to prefer something else to happiness, which is also absurd. 139 Is it possible for the will to want nothing at all? Anglicus understands the expression “to want nothing” to mean that the will can suspend every act of willing with respect to the ultimate end (suspendere omnem actum). Anglicus thinks that such volitional suspension with respect to the ultimate end is less improbable; he argues against it, however. In order to illustrate the distinctive Aristotelian-Thomistic flavor of the critique, I

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summarize all six arguments given by Anglicus. The first argument is based on the claim that the only way to explain volitional suspension with respect to the ultimate end is in terms of the will’s choice of a greater good. But this involves contradiction because there cannot be—by definition and objectively speaking—a greater good than the ultimate end. In practice, the will always chooses an end under the aspect of the good, even if the intellect is mistaken about the good as such. Thus, the greater the good appears, the more is the will inclined to seek it. The second argument points out that it is in fact an imperfection for the will to abstain from wanting the ultimate end. Every other animal seeks its proper good by way of instinct or natural necessity. Thus, if we, human beings, who are rational animals, abstain from what is proper to a rational animal, it follows that we are even less perfect than irrational animals. The third argument maintains that the volition of the ultimate end is a merely natural one (mere naturalis). Since merely natural acts—such as the acts of the vegetative or sensory faculty—are beyond the direct control of the will, it follows that the desire for the ultimate end is also beyond the control of the will. The fourth argument rests on the claim that the ultimate end provides the basis for the strongest possible connection between the intellect and the will. The connection in this case is strong to the point where volition follows inevitably upon cognition. This is especially clear with respect to the virtue of prudence, which, according to Anglicus, is necessarily connected with the acts of the will. To say otherwise—viz., that prudence and volition are disconnected—would imply that one can acquire prudence without at the same time acquiring moral virtue or virtue of character. Implicit in this argument is Aristotle’s, as well as Aquinas’s, conviction that prudence—broadly understood—is positioned midway between the intellectual and the moral virtues. In other words, prudence partakes of each kind of virtue—virtue of intellect and virtue of character. So, to say that the will can abstain from wanting the ultimate end is in effect to say that one can be both prudent and morally at fault; and this is an unacceptable consequence of Scotus’s view, according to Anglicus. The fifth argument articulates Aristotle’s claim that one does not deliberate about the ultimate end. One deliberates only concerning the means to the end. The ability of the will to suspend its act with respect to the end presupposes deliberation with respect to the end as such or, at least, with respect to the act of wanting the end. Hence, the possibility to deliberate about the end or about wanting that end contradicts Aristotle’s well-known dictum. The last argument appeals to the extreme case of volitional enslavement brought about as a result of unrestrained concupiscence. Anglicus argues that if—as both saints and philosophers maintain—the will can be necessitated as a result of habitual exposure to strong concupiscence, the will can also be necessitated through the apprehension of the ultimate end. 140

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If Anglicus is right in saying that the human will wants the universally apprehended ultimate end of necessity, it follows—a fortiori—that the will must want the ultimate end of necessity when this end is apprehended in particular detail, since, after all, to apprehend the end in particular is to grasp it in the plenitude of its perfection. Anglicus makes exactly this logical move. A further logical move would require of Anglicus to reject Scotus’s third thesis—namely, that the will enjoys the ultimate end contingently even if elevated by the supernatural habit of charity. Anglicus makes this further move as well. 141 However, Anglicus partly concurs with Scotus’s fourth thesis—namely, that the will is capable of enjoying the clearly seen ultimate end in the absence of charity. I say partly because Anglicus thinks that—in this life and given that one’s intellect is perfected through faith—one can certainly enjoy God through a natural kind of enjoyment. If, on the other hand, a different, supernatural kind of enjoyment is meant, then such enjoyment is impossible without the presence of charity. 142 Anglicus’s formidable critique of Scotus notwithstanding, Anglicus holds that—as far as the will itself is concerned—it is necessary for the will to enjoy the ultimate end, whether this end is apprehended in general or in particular, obscurely or clearly. Yet it is possible for God—on account of God’s absolute power—to suspend the act of beatific enjoyment. 143 We can conclude, therefore, that God’s absolute power is, for Anglicus, the sole venue of possibility of contingency with respect to wanting the ultimate end. One wonders, à propos, how Anglicus can reconcile the integrity of Aristotelian moral philosophy with the actual exercise of God’s absolute power, given that it falls within God’s absolute power to suspend an individual’s necessary volition of the ultimate end. PETER AURIOL ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IRRESISTIBILITY OF THE ULTIMATE END AND THE VOLUNTARINESS OF BEATIFIC ENJOYMENT For the most part, Peter Auriol accepts Scotus’s account of the contingency of enjoyment. Auriol, for example, agrees with Scotus that the will does not enjoy necessarily when the ultimate end is grasped confusedly and in general in the present life. Auriol, however, defends this thesis on quite different grounds. He argues that knowledge that is less than clear and intuitive cannot satiate the will completely. The universal and obscure knowledge of the end contains a certain amount of potentiality and imperfection and it cannot therefore necessitate the will. According to Auriol, the mode of apprehension of the end has a significant bearing upon whether the end moves the will or not. Thus, an imperfect apprehension of the ultimate end would not suffice to necessitate the will. 144

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Auriol also argues that the volition of the final end can be obstructed in different ways—causally or deliberately. The psychological factors contributing to a causal obstruction of the volition of the end are unawareness (inadvertentia) or lack of attention (inattentio), as in the case of participants in disputations and students who are not continuously thinking about the end. There can be many ways of deliberately obstructing the volition of the end. One could perceive the desire for the end as a hindrance to the attainment of a greater good. One could also bring oneself to believe that having a desire for the ultimate end is worthless. 145 In sharp contrast to Scotus, Auriol thinks that in the circumstances of the beatific vision, the will loses its innate liberty and becomes necessarily static. Auriol discusses in some detail how the wills of the blessed could be fastened in the state of beatific love and made perpetually impeccable. The resoluteness of the will can come about either by means of the specific intrinsic conditions of the will with respect to the beatific object, or through a distinct habit that binds the will, or through divine conservation and maintenance. God cannot conserve the resoluteness of the will while the will retains its power to abnegate the act of love because then He would be coercing the will. If, on the other hand, God takes away from the will the power to resist the divine influence, then the will would be less perfect in heaven than it is in the present life. The will cannot be made steadfast by the habit of charity because a wayfarer can have as much charity as the blessed. A wayfarer could have even more charity than the blessed, as in the case of the Virgin Mary who had more charity than many who abide in heaven. It follows, therefore, that the immutability of the will should be explained in terms of the presence of the object. 146 How is it possible for the will to become immobilized by the beatific object? Auriol contends that the pull (ratio motiva) of an object of volition can have various degrees of intensity. A greater pull on the side of the object requires a greater resistance on the part of the will. If the intensity of the pull is infinite, then the will cannot resist the object. This is so because the will has a resistance threshold (conatus voluntatis finitus est). Even if the resistance of the will were infinitely powerful, it must exceed the infinite intensity of the pull in order to overcome it, which is impossible. Thus, an infinitely greater good can attract and ultimately immobilize the will. 147 Auriol maintains that the static character of beatific enjoyment does not undermine the freedom and dignity of the will. Beatific enjoyment is formally a voluntary state. This so because, by definition, voluntariness excludes compulsion (violentia) and its corresponding dislike (displicentia). In the state of beatific vision, one experiences ultimate satisfaction (summa complacentia), which, according to Auriol, indicates a total absence of involuntariness. Furthermore, it is pointless to attribute to the saints the capacity for acting contingently because contingency is only a

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relative perfection. Necessity, on the other hand, is a perfection simpliciter. Lastly, it would be absurd to ascribe to the saints the privilege of suspending the act of loving God for the sake of preserving the potentiality of fallibility and sinfulness of the will. If the blessed were capable of sin, then they would not be able to receive and enjoy perpetual felicity. 148 To sum up, Auriol thinks that the enjoyment of the blessed in heaven should be viewed as necessary, not as contingent. The determination of the will, however, does not destroy the voluntary basis of the enjoyment. God does not exercise compulsion upon the will, and the very experience of supreme delight indicates that the blessed enjoy voluntarily. FRANCIS OF MARCHIA ON KINDS OF FREEDOM, VOLITIONAL SUSPENSION, KINDS OF VOLITIONAL NECESSITATION AND THE CONTINGENCY OF BEATIFIC ENJOYMENT Marchia’s examination of the nature of the enjoyment of the wayfarer and the blessed is prefaced by an important account of different kinds of freedom and the nature of volitional suspension. The distinction between kinds of freedom is found in Book I, D. 1, Q. 6 of Marchia’s Reportatio. Marchia differentiates two kinds of freedom—simple and absolute freedom, on the one hand, and freedom of contradiction, on the other. The first kind of freedom characterizes the state of the will prior to any act of willing or willing-against. According to Marchia, this freedom can also be described as perfect in comparison with the freedom of contradiction. By definition, the freedom of contradiction involves imperfection because “contradiction” implies that the will can fail to elicit an act (potest non elici), which in turn implies the imperfection of non-existence (posse non esse) with respect to the act itself. Furthermore, the freedom of contradiction is reducible to and is derived from the simple and absolute freedom of the will. The important consequence that can be drawn from the distinction between the aforementioned two kinds of freedom, according to Marchia, is that one can be free through simple and absolute freedom without at the same time having the freedom of contradiction. 149 Marchia formulates two conclusions regarding simple and absolute freedom and freedom of contradiction. The first conclusion states that simple and absolute liberty consists in the simple act of the will (actus simplex) that precedes both acts of willing and willing-against. 150 It is worth reminding ourselves at this point that the simple act of will is not an act of complaisance (complacentia), since complaisance is a volitional passion. Marchia has earlier described the simple act of the will as a propensity or inclination. 151 The second conclusion asserts that the liberty of contradiction can be called liberty of contingency (libertas contingentiae) and is expressed through the acts of willing and willing-against. Marchia adds that—considered essentially and by itself—the simple act is

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not contingent because its very existence (quantum ad suum esse) or inexistence through suspension presupposes an intellectual act of simple apprehension. 152 Is volitional suspension possible, and if so, how does it work? Marchia addresses the possibility and mechanics of volitional suspension in Book I, D. 1, Q. 7 of the Reportatio. Marchia examines and refutes an opinion according to which the will cannot suspend an act unless it does so by means of another act. This opinion entails the conclusion that the will can never suspend the acts of willing and willing-against altogether because such suspension is itself an act of willing or willing-against. 153 Marchia criticizes the opinion on the ground that it introduces infinite regress in the acts of the will. According to Marchia, volitional suspension is not all that different from the eliciting of volition. Thus, if the will is capable of eliciting an act directly, viz., without the mediation of another act, it follows that the will can also suspend an act directly. 154 Marchia then argues against the conclusion that the will can never suspend the acts of willing and willing-against altogether. His argument is that prior to having any act at all the created will is like a blank slate (tabula rasa). “The will,” Marchia says, “was not created as having a certain act (sub aliquo actu), but as a blank slate, and yet it immediately makes itself have a certain act.” Marchia thus reasons that if the will is already in act—presumably an act of willing or willing-against—the will can easily deprive itself from acting altogether, assuming, of course, that the initial state of the will at the moment of its creation by God is one of blank slate. That such is indeed the initial state of the will at creation is clear, according to Marchia, if we consider the will of the good and evil angels in the first instant of their creation. 155 If volitional suspension is possible, how does it work exactly? Marchia explains the mechanism of suspension on the basis of the distinction between virtual and formal freedom. Prior to an act (ante actum) the will is free virtually, but not formally. When in act (in actu) the will is free formally, but not virtually. Marchia explains the distinction by analogy with sun and its heat. The sun is virtually cold before it produces heat. At the very instant the sun produces heat, however, the sun is formally hot because heat and cold are formally incompatible (calidus calor sibi repugnat). Marchia actually says that the will uses its formal freedom every time it is in act. When the will uses its virtual freedom, the will has no act other than itself. The will is continuously in act, and if the will suspended all of its freely elicited acts, the will can do so only through its virtual freedom. 156 We can thus conclude that volitional suspension presupposes an altogether different and deeper dimension of freedom through which the will can control its surface freedom of willing one way or another. The contingency of the wayfarer’s enjoyment of the ultimate end is discussed in Book 1, D. 1, Q. 8 of Marchia’s Reportatio. The question is divided into two articles—the first one including the presentation and

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refutation of a view attributed by the editor of the Reportatio to St Thomas Aquinas, and the second one containing Marchia’s response to the principal question. According to the opinion presented by Marchia, one can speak of two different kinds of contingency—intellectual and volitional. Intellectual contingency is the contingency with which the intellect assents to what is only probably true or, more precisely, what is not of necessity drawn from self-evidently true principles. Volitional contingency is the contingency with which the will wants the good that is not related to the ultimate good of necessity. However, just as the intellect assents of necessity to first speculative principles, so also the will desires of necessity first practical principles, which is to say that the will desires the ultimate end of necessity. 157 Marchia rejects the aforementioned view on several grounds. The first is that the intellect does not assent to first speculative principles of necessity. According to Marchia, any sign of doubt on the part of the intellect with respect to first principles suggests that the intellect does not firmly (immobiliter) assent to these principles. In Marchia’s view, the fact that the intellect can entertain doubt with respect to first speculative principles is something we learn from the history of philosophy. Ancient philosophers have indeed doubted and argued about the first speculative principles and their intellect, according to Marchia, is no different than ours. 158 Furthermore, Marchia claims that there are sane and corrupt intellects. A sane intellect is an intellect incapable of dissenting to self-evident first principles through a contrary act, although it can dissent in a negative way, by not actually thinking about those principles in the process of syllogistic discourse through an elicited act but, rather, through habit. A corrupt intellect, on the other hand, is one which can straightforwardly dissent to self-evident first principles. 159 Marchia also remarks that the opinion fails in the way in which it juxtaposes and compares the intellect in relation to first principles and the will in relation to the ultimate end. If by “first principles” is meant “practical principles,” then since the intellect can fail to assent to first practical principles so also the will can fail to want the ultimate end. But can the intellect fail to assent to first practical principles? Marchia believes that it certainly can and refers to St Augustine’s account of the ancient Cynics in The City of God, Book XIV, Chapter 10. Marchia states that St Augustine called these ancient philosophers “dogs” (caninos) because they believed that having sex with one’s spouse in public was perfectly natural. In Marchia’s mind, the Cynic philosopher represents a clear-cut example of an intellect rejecting a self-evident practical first principle, in this case the principle that one ought to be modest in public. 160 Lastly, the presented opinion is mistaken because it leads to the false conclusion that the will wants and adheres to the ultimate end of necessity at all times. If the will does indeed want and adhere to the end at all times, it would follow that the will is absolutely immobile. Howev-

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er, the will does move from end to means, and in this very process the will ceases from wanting and adhering to the end. 161 In response to the principal query of Q. 8, Marchia says that the will in this life does not want or tend to the end of necessity in any way (nullo modo vult finem necessario). The will can want the ultimate end in two ways—in relation to the will itself (sibi) or simply and absolutely as an end in its own right (in se). However, whether the will wants the end in the former manner or in the latter, the will is not necessitated in doing so. 162 Marchia defends the contingency-thesis on the basis of the already familiar claim that the will cannot possibly be drawn of necessity by a good which is not wholly perfect either formally or eminently. Since neither the good in general (bonum in communi) nor the ultimate end as seen in this life (in via) is absolutely perfect, it follows that the will wants neither the good in general nor the ultimate end of necessity. 163 Moreover, the will can be necessitated in one of three ways: (1) by the object in the way of an agent (per modum agentis) impressing some quality upon it; (2) by way of attraction on the part of the end (per modum finis allicientis); and (3) through itself (ex se ipsa). According to Marchia, the object cannot possibly take away the freedom of the will. The end, on the other hand, cannot attract the will because the end must always be found to be in some way insufficient or deficient in this life. Neither can the will necessitate itself (ex se) with respect to an end that is found to be insufficient or deficient. 164 Lastly, the will does not want the ultimate end of necessity in relation to the will itself (sibi) because, again, the will cannot be necessitated to want for itself an insufficiently satisfying end. 165 Marchia uses the distinction between modes of necessitation also in connection with his discussion of the state of the will in heaven. The discussion is found in Q. 9 of Marchia’s treatment of enjoyment in the Reportatio. Marchia states at the outset that the question is not whether God can necessitate the will, but whether the will on its own (sibi derelicta) can suspend the act of enjoyment with respect to God when seen face-toface or whether the will elicits this enjoyment of necessity. 166 Marchia pursues a painstaking analysis of each of the three modes of volitional necessitation when applied to the will in the state of the beatific vision. Especially interesting is Marchia’s discussion of the second mode of necessitation—viz., necessitation by way of attraction on the part of the end. The discussion involves Marchia’s presentation and appraisal of Peter Auriol’s argument for volitional necessitation in terms of the will’s resistibility threshold, although the editor of Marchia’s Reportatio has attributed the argument to the Dominican author Hervaeus Natalis. 167 According to Natalis, there is a significant difference between agent-type necessitation and end-type necessitation. Agent-type necessitation involves compulsion and takes away the freedom of the will. End-type necessitation, however, only inclines and pulls the will. The infinite divine essence exercises end-type necessitation with respect to the created will, by pull-

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ing the will for the rest of eternity with greater and greater intensity to the point where the will can no longer resist the appeal of the essence and is decisively overpowered. The definitive surrender of the will to God, however, must be thought of not as the eradication but, rather, as the perfection of the freedom of the will (non tollit, sed magis perficit, libertatem). 168 Marchia’s response to the volitional resistance threshold argument involves an ingenious distinction between two different modes of grasping the divine essence—(1) the essence as it is in itself, according to its proper mode of being (secundum suum esse proprium) and (2) the essence as subsumed under the act of creaturely vision (sub actu visionis creatae). Marchia thinks that it makes perfect sense to say that the divine essence attracts the created will under the aspect of creaturely vision because, since the act of vision is finite, the essence does not pull the will through all of its infinite might. Rather, the essence pulls the created will in a finite manner (finite allicit) and, consequently, the will is not necessitated by the essence. 169 In examining the third mode of volitional necessitation—viz., necessitation of the will through itself (a se ipsa)—Marchia considers as very probable the view (this time attributed to Duns Scotus) that the will cannot be necessitated by an extrinsic principle because it is intrinsically contingent. Marchia also rehearses the two chief arguments developed by Scotus in defense of this view. The first argument relies on the premise that an alteration in the state of the will cannot possibly alter its proper modus agendi. Thus, if the will behaves contingently in this life, it must also be capable of behaving contingently in heaven. The second argument rests on the principle that the different degrees of proximity to the agent can only make the act of the will more or less intense, but cannot transform the proper act of the will from contingent to necessary. 170 Marchia proposes a different way of answering the principal question and formulates his answer by means of two propositions—the first asserting the contingency of the will and the second asserting the necessitation of the will. The first proposition states that the created will is free to suspend or elicit an act with respect to any object whatsoever other than the clearly seen beatific object. 171 The second proposition states that the created will is of necessity drawn or inclined toward the clearly seen beatific object. Thus, the created will elicits its act of enjoyment with respect to the beatific object of necessity, not contingently. 172 The key insight in Marchia’s arguments in support of the aforementioned propositions is that the created will is poised between two slightly disproportionate or misaligned contrary inclinations or propensities. The disproportion or misalignment is two-directional in the sense that the will is either in a state of being more non-inclined than inclined (magis non inclinata quam inclinata) or in a state of being more inclined than non-inclined (magis inclinata quam non inclinata). In this life, the will is in a state of being more

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non-inclined than inclined with respect to its objects. Hence it can freely suspend and elicit its own acts. In heaven, however, the will is in a state of being more inclined than non-inclined. The latter state makes it impossible for the will to tip in the opposite direction and reach its previous state of being more non-inclined than inclined. The will in heaven is like scale that has lost its balance and has been decisively tilted in one direction only. One may call this the “tipping point” argument. The will in the present life is like a perfectly balanced scale, “partly inclined and partly non-inclined,” as Marchia puts it, which is really to say that it has no decisive tilt. 173 WILLIAM OF OCKHAM ON VOLITIONAL INDIFFERENCE, REJECTING BEATITUDE AND THE PASSIVITY OF THE WILL OF THE BLESSED William of Ockham’s discussion of the freedom of beatific enjoyment is contained in two Sentences texts—in Book I, D. 1, Q. 6, and in Book IV, Q. 16. In the first text, Ockham asks whether the human will enjoys the ultimate end contingently and freely. 174 At first, Ockham criticizes some of Scotus’s arguments in support of the contingency of enjoyment. Scotus maintains that the will is essentially a free cause and it cannot be determined toward the final end through natural necessity. 175 Ockham thinks that this is false. Sometimes a will can act both contingently and necessarily. Ockham points out that even Scotus himself admits this when he teaches that the same divine will is the necessary productive principle of the Holy Spirit and the contingent productive principle of all creation. 176 Furthermore, Scotus argues that insofar as the will can exercise direct control over the acts of the intellect, it can also exercise direct control over its own acts. 177 The will’s ability to control the acts of the intellect can be confirmed on the grounds that the will can deflect the intellect from considering the final end. If, on the other hand, the will were drawn toward the final end of necessity, then it would necessarily remove any obstacle preventing the volition of the end, including the intellect’s nonconsideration of the end. 178 Ockham objects, saying that certain volitions are not directly controllable by the will. Ockham illustrates this with a well-known practical principle. Knuuttila formulates this principle as follows: [I]f the antecedent expresses an end and the consequent expresses a means and a person believes that it is a good consequence, then willing the antecedent implies willing the consequent. 179

Ockham’s point is that the will cannot discontinue the volition of the consequent unless it stops willing the antecedent or unless the consequent is not believed to follow from the antecedent. 180 For example, if a

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sick individual wants to be well and is not aware of the fact that he/she can be cured only by taking a bitter potion, then he/she can either choose or not choose to take the bitter potion. If, on the other hand, the individual believes that he/she can be cured only by means of a bitter potion, then—given his/her genuine desire to be well—he/she will choose the potion necessarily. 181 Now, Panaccio stresses that the process whereby the volition of the means (the bitter potion) is brought about by a combination of an antecedent volition of the end (becoming healthy) and an intellectual act (the belief that taking the potion makes one healthy) is a strictly causal process, and he warns us to avoid two possible misinterpretations of Ockham’s view—(1) that the acts cannot occur independently of one another, which is what Panaccio means by saying that “the principle must not be taken to be analytical,” and (2) that the process instantiates an inferential or argumentative sequence. The second misinterpretation is especially serious, Panaccio thinks, because it would suggest that the agent’s antecedent volition and belief about how to attain the intended end justify or constitute the reason why the agent must pursue the end. According to Panaccio, the situation Ockham envisions is much more similar to a natural process whereby certain causes related in a particular way give rise to a particular effect. 182 Ockham also objects to Scotus’s claim that the variation in the knowledge of the beatific object does not alter the mode of enjoying from contingent to necessary. According to Scotus, the actual presence of the beatific object can alter only the intensity of the occurring enjoyment. 183 Ockham maintains that the influence of the beatific object can be construed in two ways: the object either functions as a partial cause, in which case the will elicits the act of enjoyment necessarily, or it functions as a sufficient cause without the active involvement of the will, which is similar to the case in which an agent has a genuine desire (volitio efficax) to attain a goal and believes that certain means are necessarily required for attaining that goal. 184 How does Ockham respond to the question whether the will enjoys the ultimate end contingently and freely? We ought to consider first how Ockham paves the way for his response. He presents four preliminary distinctions and deduces five conclusions. First, he explains the sense in which he takes the term “contingently.” In the first sense the term means that an agent simply can produce or not produce an effect. The point is that whenever an agent produces a certain effect, God can make it so that the agent does not produce that effect. In the second sense, the term “contingently” means that an agent has the power (potestas) to produce or not produce a given effect. More precisely, an agent is of itself determined indifferently (ad neutrum determinatur) in respect to the production or non-production of an effect. According to Ockham, the contingency of enjoyment should be interpreted in the second sense of the term. 185

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Second, Ockham clarifies the term “freely.” He says that this term can be understood in three distinct senses: (1) as distinct from compulsion or coercion (coactio), (2) as opposed to the subjection (servitium) of the rational creature, which can be understood in turn as subjection to guilt (culpa) and punishment (poena) and (3) as opposed to necessity (necessitas). In the first sense, the freedom of enjoyment is grasped improperly because freedom, as distinct from coercion, can also be ascribed to the intellect. In the second sense, one can say that the blessed are endowed with a higher degree of freedom than the wayfarer because—unlike the wayfarer—the blessed are not subject to guilt and punishment. In the third sense, the freedom of enjoyment is understood as a kind of indifference (indifferentia) and contingency (contingentia), and is strictly distinguished from the necessary mode of operation of natural agents. 186 It is very important to emphasize the term “indifference” in Ockham’s third definition of freedom. Marilyn McCord Adams notes that Ockham’s freedom of indifference represents a reformulation of Scotus’s notion of “superabundant sufficiency.” 187 Calvin Normore has pointed out that Ockham’s view of freedom goes even beyond the radical voluntarism of thinkers such as Peter John Olivi insofar as Ockham makes the will “explanatorily prior to its final cause.” 188 For Ockham, we are free simply because we can cause or not cause the same effect even though there is no difference in the external conditions. 189 Whereas for Olivi, the will is an active power which requires an object as a terminating cause (causa terminativa), Ockham believes the will can move itself from potency to act without any triggering cause. 190 Ockham’s third distinction is parallel to Anselm’s distinction between the affection for the advantageous (affectio commodi) and the affection for justice (affectio iusti). Ockham does not say that there are these two affections in the will. He rather says that just as Anselm discriminates between an affection for the advantageous and an affection for justice, so can one distinguish between a volitional rejection of something inconvenient or disagreeable (nolle incommodi) and a volitional rejection of something unjust (nolle iniusti). The latter distinction holds when the acts of willing (velle) and willing-against (nolle) are elicited in accordance with the dictate of reason. 191 Lastly, Ockham makes a distinction between acts of willing and willing-against with respect to simple objects and acts of willing and willingagainst with respect to complex objects. Love (amor) and hatred (odium) or contempt (detestatio) can be regarded as volitions directed toward simple objects. The desire to obtain beatitude, the desire not to exist, or the desire not to obtain wealth or honors are volitions directed toward complex objects. 192 After the preliminary distinctions Ockham advances five conclusions. The conclusions run as follows:

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1. Accordingly, the first conclusion is that the will enjoys contingently and freely—in the described manner—the ultimate end insofar as it is seen universally, because it can love beatitude or not love beatitude, and it can desire beatitude for itself or not desire beatitude. 193 2. The second conclusion is that an individual can reject (nolle) beatitude in particular. 194 3. The third conclusion is that an individual can reject (nolle) beatitude in particular which he/she believes possible to obtain, so that he/she can refuse to accept beatitude. 195 4. The fourth conclusion is that an individual having a vision of the divine essence and lacking beatific enjoyment can reject (nolle) that enjoyment. 196 5. The fifth conclusion is that such an individual having a vision of the divine essence and lacking love of God through the divine absolute power—which will become manifest in the fourth [book of the Sentences]—can reject (nolle) God. 197 Ockham defends the aforesaid conclusions not so much with the help of strictly demonstrative arguments but on the basis of persuasive grounds. He supports the first conclusion on the ground that the will can have a willing-against (nolle) with respect to something that the intellect dictates must be rejected. For instance, the intellect can believe that it is impossible to attain any other state than the one that we see as actual (de facto). Thus, the will can reject anything that is seen as repugnant to that actual state of affairs. 198 How can the will reject something that is viewed as repugnant or impossible? Ockham explains that the will can have an act of willing-against with respect to anything that is believed to be possible and not entirely satiating. Furthermore, he thinks that the will can also have an act of willing-against with respect to anything impossible. 199 Furthermore, an individual can genuinely (efficaciter) want his/her non-being and realize that this implies absence of beatitude. Consequently, this individual can want his/her personal non-existence and reject beatitude. Can an individual want non-existence? Ockham thinks that this can be illustrated on the basis of experience. According to Ockham, many rational people—believers as well as unbelievers—kill themselves and expose themselves to death, and this shows that they want not to exist. 200 On the other hand, there are faithful who believe that they can attain beatitude on the condition that they refrain from sinning. However, they choose to sin although they realize or believe that they will be punished for their sins in eternity. In this particular situation (tunc), the faithful reject beatitude not only in general but also in particular. 201 Ockham provides the following grounds in defense of the third conclusion. He states the principle that the will can apply itself to anything that can be dictated by right reason. On the basis of this principle, Ock-

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ham claims that if right reason dictates that an individual can be forever devoid of beatitude, then this individual can will to be forever devoid of beatitude. Therefore, the will can reject beatitude altogether. 202 Ockham gives the following confirmation. A damned individual could—if relinquished to his/her own power—conform (conformare se) to what he/she knows and believes that God wants him/her to suffer. Since God wants the damned to be forever devoid of beatitude, therefore the damned can also will this. The same remark also applies to the will of the wayfarer. 203 In what situation could an ordinary believer fail to will beatitude? This happens when the faithful refuses to lead a good and holy life although he/she believes that it is impossible to attain beatitude without willing to have such a life. 204 Ockham proclaims that the fourth conclusion follows from the principle that the created will can subordinate itself (conformare se) to what God wills. Thus, if God wills that an individual ought to be devoid of beatific enjoyment forever (pro semper), then that individual can will so. 205 Furthermore, if an individual can reject beatitude for a single moment of time (pro uno tempore), he/she can also reject beatitude for eternity (pro semper). An individual can reject the possession of beatitude for a specified amount of time as long as God wants him/her to do so. Consequently, he/she can reject beatitude simply (simpliciter). 206 The proof of the last conclusion runs as follows. Everything that is truly or seemingly disagreeable (incommodum) can be an object of rejection (nolitio). Similarly, everything that is truly or seemingly agreeable can be an object of desire (volitio). Since God can be assumed to be something disagreeable, therefore God can be an object of rejection. But can God have the character of something disagreeable? Ockham asserts that this is possible insofar as God is thought to punish an individual by the suffering of pain and damnation. 207 Furthermore, even Christ—in spite of the fact that he was blessed—was punished and endured corporeal pain. Accordingly, since every punishment and affliction can be viewed as a source of anxiety, therefore God can have the aspect of something unsuitable or disagreeable. 208 It should be noted that the last, fifth conclusion along with its supporting proofs is listed as Article 46 in the Report of the Commission charged by Pope John XXII with the inspection of Ockham’s theological writings. 209 According to the opinion of the Commission, Ockham’s proof can pass as arguably true providing that one specifies the sense in which it is possible to reject God, and insofar as it is true to assume that an individual who sees the divine essence clearly can be deprived of the love and delight of God. 210 In response to the principal question, namely, whether the will enjoys the ultimate end freely and contingently, Ockham maintains that the ultimate end can be understood in two ways: (1) from the perspective of created and possible beatitude and (2) from the standpoint of the object of

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that beatitude, which is God Himself. Created beatitude can be taken as the ultimate end in the strict sense of enjoyment (i.e., in the sense of ordinate enjoyment) or in the broad sense of enjoyment (i.e., as an act of desire in general). In the strict sense of enjoyment, it is illicit to enjoy created beatitude as the ultimate end although the will can, in principle, enjoy such an end freely and contingently. In the broad sense of enjoyment, the will can absolutely choose, reject or abstain from choosing the ultimate end regardless of whether the end is shown in general, in particular, in the present life (in via) or in heaven (in patria). 211 From the point of view of the object of beatitude, Ockham claims that, in the present life, the end can be an object of acceptance as well as an object of rejection. Ockham presents two possibilities regarding the clear and bare vision of God. The first possibility is that God suspends the activity of the will with respect to its act of positive willing (volitio). In this case, God can be an object of rejection (nolitio). The second possibility is that God does not suspend the activity of the will but instead relinquishes the will to its own power. Ockham does not elaborate any further on this second case although he says that it is highly doubtful whether the will can reject God in this situation. 212 Ockham continues his treatment of the freedom of enjoyment in Book IV, Q. 16. He presents six theses along with corroborating proofs. Some of the theses are similar to the conclusions advanced in Book I, D. 1, Q. 6. The first thesis states that the will in the present state (pro statu isto) can reject beatitude under both its general and special aspects. 213 There are two proofs for this thesis. The first proof is that the intellect can believe that there is no ultimate end and no beatitude and it can thus dictate the will to reject beatitude. The second is an abridged version of the proof offered in support of the first conclusion in Book I, D. 1, Q. 6. It maintains that an individual can wish not to exist and reject beatitude as a result. 214 The second thesis claims that the will can reject an end even though the intellect judges that this end is the ultimate end. 215 I shall mention only the second and the third of Ockham’s proofs. The second proof is based on the fundamental indeterminacy of the created will. Since the will is a potency that can act in an indeterminate way (potentia obliquabilis), the will can choose the opposite of what right reason dictates. The will’s ability to choose contrary to the dictate of right reason is evident from experience in the present life (in via). Thus, even when the intellect judges that a given end is the final end, the will can still reject this end. 216 The third proof states that an individual can have a willing-against (nolle) with respect to his/her own beatitude. This is so because an individual can have a willing-against with respect to the beatitude of another individual. In other words, since I can will that Peter be deprived of beatitude, I can also wish myself to be deprived of my personal beatitude. 217 The third thesis is that it is not necessary for the will to seek the ultimate good when grasped in general or through a common concept (in

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aliquo conceptu communi). This is true because the good in general can be believed to be not entirely fulfilling or satiating. If so, then the will can reject that good. 218 The fourth thesis asserts that the beatific vision can occur without enjoyment. Ockham’s proof is fairly simple. It is based on the philosophical principle that two things that are related to one another as prior to posterior can be separated from each other. 219 The fifth thesis is included under Articles 5 and 6 in the Report of the Avignon Commission. It claims that even a will elevated through charity or some other habit can wish not to have beatitude in itself. In support of this thesis, Ockham argues, as he did earlier in Book I, by saying that if the will can reject beatitude temporarily—e.g., during the committing of mortal sin—it can also reject beatitude for the totality of time both in via and in patria. 220 The authors of the Avignon Report censure Ockham’s fifth thesis as false, heretical and contrary to many sayings found in Scripture. They deem it heretical to think that charity could possibly coexist along with mortal sin. Furthermore, they claim that the situation described by Ockham would engender a multiplication of sinful acts insofar as the rejection of beatitude is also a mortal sin. 221 The second, rather radical proof adduced in defense of thesis 5 is based on the dictum that every will can conform to the divine precept. But God can command that the created will should hate Him (odiat eum). 222 Moreover, God can command that the act of hating God (odire Deum) could become a righteous act in via as well as in patria. Consequently, the will can hate God if God so commands. 223 The Avignon theologians reject the aforesaid statements as false and erroneous. They contend that the hatred of God implies a total disorder of the rational creature in relationship to God. The hatred of God is an intrinsically (de se) evil act just as the love of God is an intrinsically (per se) good act. God cannot possibly make hatred of Himself a legitimate act because He would then compromise His own goodness. 224 In Quodlibet III, Q. 14, Ockham states that God can command without contradiction that He be not loved. Ockham says this in response to an objection against the claim that an act by which God is loved above all things and for His own sake is a necessarily virtuous act and cannot be a vicious act. 225 The objection declares that God can command that He should not be loved for a given period of time. God can command instead that one should focus upon one’s studies and not think about Him at the same time. If, in that particular situation, the will elicits an act of loving God above all things, then this act would not be virtuous because it will be contrary to the divine precept to concentrate upon studying. 226 Ockham’s reply to the example is that the will would not be able to elicit an act of loving God above all things in that hypothetical case. Ockham thinks that to love God above all means to love whatever God wants to be

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loved. Thus, if God commands that He not be loved, and if the will obeys that command on account of loving God above all, consequently the will would love and not love God, obey and disobey the divine precept. 227 Nevertheless, Ockham says that the will could have a simple and natural love (amor) toward God in the given case. This natural love, however, is not a love of God above all (dilectio). 228 Ockham’s comments on the question whether God can command that He should be hated or that He should not to be loved have been understood to mean that the divine will is the absolute foundation of any dependable moral system. God can render the moral system irrational if He so wills. He can make it impossible for a human being to act consistently by imposing two contradictory norms on the same level. 229 In the interest of historical accuracy, however, it is important to say that Ockham was not the first scholastic to have said that the created will can hate God. The secular English theologian Henry of Harclay (ca. 1270–1317) 230 seems to be the first to have argued that the will can hate God. Harclay argues that the created will can hate God by either wanting something to be taken away from God, by wanting God not to exist at all or by wanting that another God exists instead. An individual can also hate God on account of being punished by God. 231 Ockham’s sixth thesis states that an individual who sees God clearly cannot have an act of willing-against (nolle) or hatred (actus odiendi) with respect to God if the beatific act is totally caused by God. This is so because it is logically contradictory to experience love and hatred with respect to the same object simultaneously. 232 Ockham believes that both the act of beatific vision and the act of beatific enjoyment are totally caused by God. He states that it is rational to think so because both vision and enjoyment are God-given rewards (praemia) for prior meritorious acts. Creatures have neither total nor partial causal capability with respect to such meritorious acts. One can say, therefore, that both the intellect and the will are passive with respect to uncreated beatitude. 233 Certainly, Ockham thinks that meritorious acts cannot compel God to reward beatitude. God can be constrained only insofar as He has obligated Himself by the decrees that He has preordained. The divine decrees, however, are installed freely and contingently. In principle, God can alter or replace these decrees. 234 From the perspective of logical possibility, it is not inconceivable that God could forbid us to love Him or command us to hate Him or command the opposite of the dictates of right reason. If God were to act outside the bonds of His ordained power, then the very foundation of moral life and the sacramental system of merits and rewards would collapse. De facto, however, such a collapse will never occur. In the actual world, God commands us to follow the dictates of right reason and He rewards our moral commitments, efforts and piety with eternal life. 235 If the factual arrangement of the moral order and the system of salvation cannot fail, why then does Ockham talk about what God

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can or cannot command absolutely? Marilyn McCord Adams has tried to answer this question with the help of the notion of “self-transcendent aseity,” which she explains as “God’s choice among nondecisive reasons to will something besides his own infinite goodness, to create and to benefit something else . . . a manifestation of divine ‘liberality,’ ‘sheer grace.’” 236 It should be said that, for Ockham, God can be regarded as the sole cause (causa totalis) not only of the confirmation of the blessed but also of the obstinacy of the damned. 237 Thus, Ockham claims that neither the blessed in heaven nor the damned in hell should be considered free with respect to those acts that are caused and conserved by God alone. Furthermore, the law of contradiction makes it impossible for the blessed to elicit a hatred of God along with their love of God or for the damned to elicit a love of God simultaneously with their hatred of God. 238 Ockham claims that insofar as God is the total cause of the beatific acts, He is likewise the total cause of the act through which the blessed experience security (securitas) regarding the everlasting continuation of beatitude. Ockham explains that security is an act of evident knowledge through which the blessed are assured that God wants them to maintain their state of uninterrupted beatitude. This act is neither an act of vision nor an act of enjoyment. It is rather a reflexive act whose total object is the proposition (complexum) “God desires that both the beatific vision and enjoyment shall be conserved perpetually.” 239 Ockham notes, however, that an individual can be blessed completely even without an act of security. 240 Ockham also considers the case where God is not the sole cause of the beatific act. He envisions two possible scenarios in that situation. On the one hand, if God relinquishes the created will to its own resources, and if He suspends the act of beatific enjoyment de potentia absoluta, then the will can desire God freely. However, this volition would not be beatific because it is under the control of the will. Consequently, given that the act of vision is beatific, the blessed can make themselves miserable or blissful at will (sicut placet sibi). 241 On the other hand, if God deactivates the positive act of the will (volitio), then the will can have an act of willing-against (nolle) with respect to God. 242 Let us now review the main points of Ockham’s treatment of enjoyment. Ockham aims at establishing the contingency of enjoyment through a set of distinctions and conclusions. Part of Ockham’s account of the contingency of enjoyment is based on the very nature of the will, namely, its freedom of indifference. Another part of the account rests upon an examination of what God can command. According to Ockham, one can reject beatitude in general and in particular. One can also wish to be damned and deprived of enjoyment if God so wills. God can even make one see Him without experiencing enjoyment. What is more, Ockham maintains that God can command that He be hated or not loved. As

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far as the enjoyment of the blessed is concerned, Ockham is inclined to think that the will of the blessed is totally passive with respect to those acts that are caused and conserved by God alone. God is not only the total cause of the beatific vision and enjoyment but also of the security of the blessed. If, on the other hand, God does not cause the beatific acts, then the will can freely want or reject God although it would not be able to beatify itself. WALTER CHATTON ON VISION-BASED AND ABSTRACTIONBASED ENJOYMENT, AND ON HATING GOD AND BEATITUDE Walter Chatton’s treatment of the contingency of enjoyment revolves around the question whether the human soul is capable of not enjoying God given that God is known adequately. 243 Chatton’s response to the question is based upon a distinction between two types of knowledge in heaven. On the one hand, there is the beatific vision which only God can impart to the blessed as a reward for meritorious action. On the other hand, there is the specific abstractive cognition of God through which the blessed can deliberate, reason and make judgments. Accordingly, there are two parallel types of enjoyment: (1) an enjoyment proportionate to the infused vision of God, which is a truly beatific act and (2) an enjoyment produced by means of an abstractive deliberation or a dictate commanding that God ought to be loved. 244 Chatton maintains that no creature can possibly cause the first kind of enjoyment. If a creature could effectively produce such enjoyment, then a person of a better nature (qui haberet meliora naturalia) could make himself/herself blessed more so than a person of a weaker nature. Therefore, only God can cause beatific enjoyment. 245 The second kind of enjoyment, which is also a kind of love of God, can be produced freely by the blessed. Given the static character of the beatific act, the blessed in heaven can love God or not love God, love God more or love God less. 246 It should be mentioned that in the Reportatio, Book IV, Chatton gives a more developed view on the relationship between the state of the blessed soul and the enjoyment which is directly caused by God. He maintains that the soul of the blessed is passive only with respect to the creation of the beatific act and active with respect to its continuation or conservation. The soul is incapable of bringing the beatific act into existence. Thus, the first instant of the existence of beatitude can be caused by God alone. 247 However, after the first instant of the existence of beatitude, the soul is capable of maintaining and safeguarding beatitude on its own and without divine intervention. 248 If, on the other hand, God does not cause the act of beatific enjoyment in the very first instant of the existence of beatitude, then the soul could actively cause an act of enjoyment proportionate to the vision of God that is distinct from the act directly imparted to

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the soul by God. According to Chatton, the souls of the blessed cannot presently cause any such acts of enjoyment because they are preoccupied with the conservation of their God-given beatific acts. Nevertheless, the souls of the blessed could presently cause volitions proportionate to their abstractive cognitions of God. 249 Chatton deduces three conclusions from the distinction between vision-based and abstraction-based enjoyment. The first conclusion states that—given an adequate cognition of God in the present life (in via)—the soul can contingently enjoy and not enjoy God, and it can equally contingently love and not love God. According to Chatton, the conclusion can be demonstrated on the basis of common human experience. An individual can sin by acting against the conscience’s dictate that God be loved. An individual can also sin by acting against the conscience’s dictate that God’s creatures be loved. The whole foundation of meritorious action would be destroyed if the conscience could coerce us to act morally. 250 In his Lectura, Chatton points out that the opinion that the intellect can necessitate the act of volition was condemned at Paris. He explains that this opinion denies the need for grace and turns sin into an error of the intellect. If love were a necessary consequence of the knowledge of God, then the act of loving God would not be a virtuous act. 251 Furthermore, if love were necessitated by cognition, it would be superfluous to have a special obligation to love God in addition to the obligation to know or believe in God. It would be enough to have a sole precept demanding that we ought to know God or believe in God. 252 The second conclusion declares that the soul in heaven enjoys God necessarily with respect to the beatific vision and freely with respect to the abstractive and discursive cognition of God and His creatures. 253 The expanded version of the Lectura adds that the blessed can enjoy freely through the dictate of the practical intellect. This is so because the blessed are allowed contemplating or loving one creature rather than another. Sometimes they neither reflect upon nor love a given creature, and sometimes they only think about a creature without loving it at the same time. One can say, therefore, that—given that there is an abstractive or discursive cognition of God—the intellect of the blessed can dictate that God be loved or not dictate that God be loved or even dictate that God be not loved. 254 According to Chatton, the blessed have the freedom to carry out logical discourses, make deductions and inferences, and construct philosophical demonstrations. Consequently, they can also have free volitions. 255 Chatton confirms the claim that the blessed can experience free acts of enjoyment by pointing out that we pray to the saints hoping that they will intercede on our behalf. For Chatton, this practice clearly indicates that the blessed have renewed and free acts of supplication. 256 Chatton also maintains that both Christ and the angels can freely contemplate things in themselves (in genere proprio) alongside or apart from the vision

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of those same things in the divine Word. 257 Lastly, Chatton explains that, although the intuitive vision of a beautiful thing may automatically trigger a sensory passion, the soul can still refuse to love the object providing that the intellect retains the capacity to deliberate. Consequently, since the will in the present life acts contingently in respect to the love of God and His creatures, it follows that it can also act contingently through the abstractive vision of God in heaven. 258 The third conclusion maintains that the soul cannot possibly cause from its own nature (ex puris naturalibus) an efficacious hatred of God in the present life or in heaven. 259 In the Reportatio, Chatton also says that the soul cannot cause a hatred of beatitude in general, which consists of living virtuously in conformity with right reason. 260 The will could elicit an act of hatred toward God propter se only if the intellect could assent that God is evil propter se. The intellect, according to Chatton, can so never assent, because this kind of assent would inevitably contradict the first principle of right action (principium practicum) in the mind of the person who understands the signification of the term “God.” 261 The intellect can also not assent to propositions such as “no good ought to be desired,” “every evil ought to be desired,” “living virtuously is not a good thing,” or “it is not good to want to do what right reason dictates.” Since the intellect cannot assent to propositions conflicting with the principles of right action, therefore the will cannot hate the good universally or love evil universally. Consequently, the will cannot hate God propter se. 262 Some of the elements in the third conclusion concern Chatton’s understanding of the character of practical knowledge and the foundation of moral science. According to Chatton, both speculative and practical sciences operate with syllogistic middle terms. However, speculative middle terms are based on cognitions of the essence or natural causes of things whereas practical middle terms rest upon the consideration of the moral end of human action. 263 The basis of a genuine moral action is love of the moral end as such. 264 Chatton denies that the will can hate the end in general, which can be understood as living virtuously, or living in agreement with the dictate of reason, or living according to divine law. The intellect cannot conclude evidently that the life of virtue is evil on the basis of the consideration of the nature of this same life (ex natura vitae virtuosae) because to conclude so would be to contradict its own first principles. The intellect can assent that the virtuous life is evil only on the basis of some extrinsic condition, by recognizing, for instance, that to be virtuous is difficult. 265 Similarly, since the soul can never have cognitive experiences by means of which to ascertain that God as such is evil, the intellect is incapable of discovering any evil and displeasing characteristic inherent in God. Consequently, the will cannot cause hatred of God propter se. Thus, if one says that a soul which has an adequate cognition of God enjoys God necessarily, one

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could be understood to mean that, in those circumstances, the will can produce only an act of love (dilectio) and never an act of hatred (odium). Nevertheless, hatred of God is possible when a person is displeased by a given effect caused by God. 266 It is also possible that a person hates God because of the desire to experience the limits of his/her freedom, or because he/she wants to be equal to God and recognizes that it is impossible, or because he/she regards God as evil and unjust for depriving him/ her of beatitude and bestowing upon him/her eternal punishment, or lastly, because he/she feels that it is better if God never existed. 267 Therefore, even the damned in hell cannot naturally hate God propter se. The reason for their hatred is God’s decision to damn and punish them or the envy caused by the impossibility of being equal to God. 268 Chatton criticizes Ockham’s opinion that the created will can reject and hate the beatific act 269 and that the will can hate (odire) God propter se in the present life as well as in heaven. 270 According to Chatton, the will can never hate or reject beatitude simply (simpliciter) because the intellect can never assent that it is evil to acquire beatitude. One could reject beatitude only in a conditional sense (condicionaliter), provided that God does not want one to have beatitude. In this case, one would have a mixed volition (volitio involuntaria mixta) with respect to beatitude. 271 For Aristotle, a mixed volition contains two elements—voluntariness and involuntariness. One of Aristotle’s examples of a mixed act is throwing cargo overboard during a storm at sea. The act can be described as voluntary in one sense and as involuntary in another. It is voluntary in the sense that it is done willingly on that specific occasion. It could also be called involuntary because one would never do such a thing under normal circumstances. 272 Chatton observes that the intellect can never absolutely assent to the proposition “it is evil to obtain beatitude.” If the intellect could assent to this proposition, then it would contradict the first principle of moral action. This principle directs the movement of the appetite by dictating that beatitude is good per se and ought to be pursued propter se. 273 Furthermore, one cannot say that the intellect can be mistaken with respect to its own regulative practical principles. To say that the intellect can err with respect to its practical principles is to undermine the certainty of moral science. 274 Against the view that the will can hate God, Chatton firmly states that no person who understands the meaning of the term “God” can give credence to the proposition “God as such is evil.” The intellect in general is incapable of assenting to logically contradictory propositions, such as “God as an infinite good is something evil,” or “not every whole is bigger than its part,” or “something is evil because it is good,” etc. Accordingly, since the intellect cannot possibly assent that God is evil, therefore the will cannot possibly elicit hatred toward God. 275

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One could object, however, that just as the intellect can have conceptions of impossible things—e.g., chimeras—so the will can have impossible desires—e.g., acts of hatred with respect to things which cannot be hated. 276 Chatton responds to the challenge and says that to think about impossible objects or to give assent to impossible propositions resembles an act of imagination (actus imaginativus). In other words, the intellect can perhaps imagine that God is evil propter se, but it can never form the firm assent required for the causation of an efficacious hatred of God. 277 In conclusion, the essence of Chatton’s position consists in the distinction between vision-based and abstraction- or discursion-based enjoyment. Vision-based enjoyment is caused by God alone and is not a free act whereas abstraction- or discursion-based enjoyment is a free and not fully beatific act. Chatton’s remarks on the nature of discursion-based enjoyment show that the blessed in heaven can have free volitions to the extent to which they retain their rational faculties. They can think about different things at different times and they can even deliberate. Chatton maintains that the blessed are active with respect to the continuation and conservation of the beatific act but not with respect to its initial causation. Chatton is also interested in demonstrating that the human will cannot reject beatitude in general. The will can reject beatitude only in a conditional sense—that is, if God wants one to reject beatitude. Even in this particular case, however, one can have at best a mixed volition because the intellect can never absolutely assent to the proposition “it is evil to obtain beatitude.” Furthermore, the will cannot hate God propter se. God could be hated only to the extent to which He is believed to cause our suffering. RICHARD FITZRALPH ON FREEDOM PER SE, FREEDOM PER ACCIDENS AND THE SECURITY OF THE BLESSED FitzRalph discusses the problem of the contingency of beatific enjoyment in the third article of the first question of his treatment of enjoyment. The question of the article is whether the will can freely enjoy the ultimate end through freedom of contradiction (libertate contradictionis). FitzRalph juxtaposes the positions of Scotus and St Thomas. As we now know, Scotus maintains that the blessed can refrain from willing (non velle) the clearly apprehended ultimate end. We also know that, for St Thomas, the will cannot possibly fail to want the clearly apprehended ultimate end. According to FitzRalph’s understanding, however, one major difference between the two positions boils down to whether the vision and enjoyment of God are to be considered two separate and absolute things (duae res absolutae). If they are, then Scotus is right in saying that the vision of God can take place without the enjoyment of God. Thus, whether enjoyment is caused directly by God (a Deo immediate) or indirectly by the

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vision of God (mediate visione), enjoyment can nevertheless fail to occur, either because God did not cause it in the will of the blessed or because God prevented the will from experiencing what is natural to it in the same way in which God prevented Daniel and his companions from being consumed by fire and St Hippolytus from suffering the effect of burning coal. 278 In response to the question of the third article, FitzRalph distinguishes between two different kinds of freedom of contradiction—freedom in itself (per se) and freedom by accident or accidental freedom (per accidens). What exactly is the difference between these two kinds of freedom of contradiction? Freedom per se is the ability to will or not will, given that nothing is lacking with respect to both intellect and will. Freedom per accidens is the ability to will or not will, given that something is lacking— viz., on account of some flaw or omission—with respect to either intellect or will. The second kind of freedom can be exercised as a result of cognitive diversion, e.g., when someone fails to desire something because of some distraction, although this freedom can be had even where such a diversion is impossible, as in the case of the angels prior to the fall. FitzRalph maintains that if one talks about freedom per se, then the will wants the clearly apprehended ultimate end in an un-free manner, and this is the case whether or not the will has been confirmed. However, if one talks about freedom per accidens, then it is possible for the will not to want the ultimate end, especially if the will is not confirmed. One can even imagine a case such that an individual is actually punished rather than pleased by the beatific vision, and since love inevitably follows pleasure, it is not entirely impossible for an individual to fail to love God if the painfulness of the punishment outweighs the pleasure of seeing God. 279 FitzRalph addresses the problem of the security of beatitude in the first question of the first article. The actual question of the article is whether the enjoyment of God or beatitude is possible for the human being. FitzRalph’s answer is short and definitive—yes, it can be maintained without ambiguity that is possible for us to attain beatitude because the Catholic faith, the Gospels and every canonical letter say so. 280 The antithesis—viz., that beatitude is impossible to attain—is supported by a series of eleven arguments, most of which deal with difficulties associated with thinking about beatitude in terms of proportions and degrees. The first two arguments, however, deal with the problem of the security of the blessed in heaven. The arguments are quite ingenious and we can also get a sense of FitzRalph’s own position on the issue of the security of the blessed by seeing how FitzRalph responds to them. The first argument states that if the blessed have security with respect to their eternal beatitude, then that security would make them as powerful as God because God would forever be unable to annihilate them if He so wished. Suppose, FitzRalph says, that Peter has this kind of security

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and that Peter experiences joy in that security. Suppose furthermore that God decides to annihilate Peter now or in the future. Well, if God can do this, it follows that God can make it so that Peter lacks the security and corresponding joy that Peter has now or has had in the past. How can God do this? By giving Peter another security and another joy. But this means that God can make it so that the first security and joy never existed in the first place, or, in other words, God can make it so that the past never took place (potest facere aliquod praeteritum non fuisse), which is false. 281 The second argument states that if the same Peter is certain about his eternal beatitude and if God can annihilate Peter now or in the future, it follows that Peter is deceived. If Peter is deceived about his own perpetual happiness, it is God who allows him to be deceived, which, in turn, entails that God is a deceiver. 282 In response to the aforementioned arguments, FitzRalph maintains that Peter, just like all the blessed in heaven, has security with respect to the eternity of his own beatitude. FitzRalph adds, however, that God can indeed annihilate Peter if only because God is equally free to annihilate Peter as He is free to create him. FitzRalph thus argues that the proposition “God will annihilate Peter” is a contingent and possible proposition. But if this is so, whence do the blessed derive their unshaken security? FitzRalph seems to think that their security is grounded in the fact that they know about that security through the Word, which means that they know their beatitude is eternal because God has already foreseen it as eternal (Deus ipse aestimavit beatitudinem Petri fore aeternam). As a matter of principle, however, God could also not have foreseen the eternal beatitude of the blessed without any error involved (potest non aestimasse illam fore aeternam absque errore). 283 ROBERT HOLCOT ON THE CONTINGENCY, CAUSATION AND SECURITY OF ENJOYMENT, AND ON VOLITIONAL SUSPENSION AND NECESSITATION Robert Holcot’s discussion of the contingency of beatific enjoyment is centered upon two specific questions: (1) Is it possible for a rational creature to simultaneously behold God and not enjoy Him? And (2) Can the created will absolutely suspend its act and not enjoy God given that same clear vision? 284 Holcot establishes two conclusions in connection to the first question. The first conclusion states that it is possible for the rational creature to see God clearly and not enjoy Him at the same time. The second conclusion declares that it is possible for the created will to have charity, the light of glory (lumen gloriae), and a clear vision of God without an enjoyment of God. 285 Holcot offers several arguments in defense of the first conclusion. He argues, for instance, that since the vision and enjoyment of God are dis-

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tinct things, therefore God could separate one from the other. Furthermore, it could be said that vision and enjoyment are two strictly distinct operations. Thus, in the state of clear vision, the created being is capable of eliciting two distinct operations—one prior which is cognition and one posterior which is love caused through cognition. Consequently, God could co-cause the first operation without causing the second, or He could co-cause the first operation and suspend the second. Lastly, Holcot claims that God could do anything that does not involve a contradiction. Since the idea of seeing God clearly and failing to love God does not involve contradiction, therefore God could make such a thing happen. 286 Holcot notes, however, that it is impossible to enjoy God without seeing God. This is so because an enjoyment of God cannot occur in a rational creature unless it is preceded or accompanied by a vision of God. 287 According to Holcot, it is possible for a person not to enjoy God even though he/she is endowed with infused charity and is elevated to the state of clear vision through the light of glory. How is this possible? Holcot explains that enjoyment is causally posterior to and strictly distinct from the habit of charity and the light of glory. Thus, God could sustain charity and the vision of God in the mind of the blessed and at the same time suspend the act of enjoyment. 288 Holcot considers five objections against the second conclusion. I shall mention only the second, third and fifth. The second objection recalls the well-known thesis that eternal beatitude is essentially an act of contemplation. 289 The third objection states that a person who beholds God and judges that God is supremely amiable cannot fail to love Him unless he/ she omits the judgment of reason. Furthermore, if he/she omits the judgment of reason, he/she is committing a sin and departing from charity. 290 The fifth objection declares that if it were possible to suspend the act of enjoyment with respect to God in the presence of charity, then it would also be possible for the will to elicit hatred of God. But it is impossible for hatred of God and charity to exist simultaneously. 291 Holcot’s reply to the second objection states that beatitude should be understood as a collection of goods, and that neither vision alone nor love alone constitutes full beatitude. Thus, God can communicate a vision of the divine essence to an individual without an enjoyment of the same. Holcot says, however, that—de facto—the different parts of beatitude are not separated in the blessed. Therefore, it is possible to say that whoever sees God clearly is blessed, and that whoever enjoys God is blessed. 292 Against the third objection, Holcot argues as follows. He states that the intuitive vision of God has the character of an incomplex cognition (notitia incomplexa). A judgment, on the other hand, is a complex cognition (notitia complexa). Thus, God can conserve the intuitive vision of God in the mind of blessed without allowing the blessed to form the judgment that God is indeed supremely amiable. Furthermore, it is invalid to infer that—given the judgment of reason—a person who fails to love God is

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committing a sin since it is God Himself who obstructs the act of love. Lastly, it is not true that one who sins thereby departs from charity. Holcot maintains that God could—if He so wills—give charity to the damned in hell. 293 Against the fifth objection, Holcot retorts that it does not seem contradictory to suppose that charity, the light of glory, and the clear vision of God could coexist with hatred of God in one and the same created will. Of course, something of this kind is possible from the standpoint of God’s power. Furthermore, there is no formal repugnancy between charity and mortal sin, or between charity and hatred of God. Moreover, it is not absolutely necessary for hatred of God to be something sinful. According to Holcot, God could accept an act of hatred toward Him as something good or view it as morally indifferent. Lastly, it is not totally inconceivable to imagine that God could conserve in one and the same soul two contrary and strictly distinct qualities, such as hatred and love. An example of this kind of occurrence is the soul of Christ which experienced ultimate joy and was simultaneously troubled by intense pain. 294 Holcot devotes an extensive analysis to the question whether the created will can suspend the act of loving God in the state of clear vision. He says, at first, that this question is frequently discussed among scholars, and he explains that the problem is not so much whether God could obstruct the act of love but what the created will could do given the influence and clear vision of God—that is, could the will love God or fail to love God, or could the will hate God? 295 Holcot then notes that the question about the power of the will to suspend its act of love or to elicit hatred of God can be treated in a twofold way. The question could be formulated: (1) in terms of the bare will (voluntas nuda) or (2) in terms of a will informed by charity and the light of glory. As far as the bare will is concerned, Holcot admits that it is not contradictory for the will to suspend its act of love. 296 Holcot proposes three cases about an informed will based on various cognitions. God can communicate to an individual a vision such that he/she can freely abstain from loving Him. God can also communicate to an individual a vision by means of which to inspire natural love toward Himself and which makes it impossible for that individual to hate God. Finally, God can communicate a vision such that the individual can hate God freely. All three cases, Holcot tells us, are based on the assumption that the will does not have the power to reduce or lessen the intensity of the vision of God. Otherwise, it would be easy for the will not to love God. 297 There are two arguments for the first conclusion. I shall present only the second. The second argument begins with the premise that not all angels are equally free and that one angel is freer than another. It can be imagined that a is the least free angel, b is freer than a, and c is the freest of them all. It can be supposed that a receives the least amount of clear beatific vision (remississima dei visio clara) that it is possible to obtain. One

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can then ask: Does the small amount necessitate the will of a to love God or not? If it does not, then one must grant the truth of the first conclusion. If, however, the least amount of beatific vision necessitates the will of a, then one can argue as follows: It can be presumed that the vision of a is equal to the vision of c. Since c is freer than a, therefore not every vision that necessitates the will of a can necessitate the will of c. Thus, c can freely choose not to love God. 298 Holcot considers an objection to this argument. The objection states that the object, not the vision, necessitates the will to love God. Holcot replies that an object seen does not necessitate the will unless it does so through an act of vision. But it is possible to freely cause various degrees of remission and intensity in an act of vision; or a vision can cause a greater remission in one spectator than in another. Thus, c can possibly have a lesser degree of vision, on the one hand, and a greater degree of freedom, on the other. Therefore, c can choose to love or not to love God. 299 Holcot remarks that the arguments that he has produced could be indeed easily contested. He contends, however, that the conclusion that he is defending appears to him to be true even without the support of these arguments. 300 Is it possible for the will to be naturally necessitated to love God? Holcot thinks that it is. He offers a proof resembling the “volitional resistance threshold” argument used by Peter Auriol in justification of the necessity of beatific enjoyment. Holcot reasons as follows. It is possible that there is a certain special good which—after being presented to the will—makes it difficult for the will to reject it, i.e., to hate it, or to neglect it, or to choose not to love it. Otherwise, the power of the will would be unlimited, and the will would be capable of rejecting an object twice as good, or three times as good, and so on in infinitum, without any difficulty. Since the power of the will is not unlimited, therefore the will cannot possibly reject an infinitely good object such as God. 301 The same argument is found in a more developed form in Holcot’s Sentences, D. 1, Q. 3, A. 3, where Holcot discusses whether the will can be naturally necessitated in general. 302 The first part of the argument states that the greater the good presented to the will, the greater the effort it takes for the will to reject it. Thus, an infinitely great good cannot be rejected by the will because the rejecting power of the will is limited. 303 The second part of the argument concerns the conduct of the will with respect to temptations (illecebrae). Holcot suggests that the will can have a maximum or minimum level of resistibility. In any case, the will must be given a certain limit of resistibility beyond which the will can be necessitated. 304 Are there any situations in which the will can be naturally necessitated? Holcot allows at least four such situations. 305 For instance, the will could be necessitated to elicit an act of avoidance by the intense apprehension of an extremely distressing object. 306 Furthermore, the will could

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be placed in an act of desire or a state of pleasure by the intense apprehension of an extremely delightful object. 307 The third example of necessitation articulates a standard case of conditional willing, e.g., when a person wills an end and knows that he/she cannot attain the end unless he/she also wants the means to the end. 308 Lastly, the will can be necessitated to elicit an act of volition by an intense habit ingrained in the will and given the requisite circumstances. 309 Holcot’s examples of necessitation (especially the first and the second) attracted the attention of later critics, such as, e.g., Thomas Bradwardine. 310 According to McGrade, Bradwardine ventured to refute the argument that a pleasurable or distressing object can affect the will if the resistance of the will is less than the force of the object. Bradwardine maintains that there is a maximum degree of suitability or a most suitable natural proportion of an object to a psychological power. He then contends that, if the power is capable of resisting the force of the object in any degree below its maximum suitability or proportion, then regardless of how much the force of the object is augmented, the power can resist it more easily than before. McGrade explains that the point of Bradwardine’s argument is that any increase in the force of the object beyond the degree of maximum suitability is less pleasant and even displeasing to the power “because of the dissolution of the most suitable proportion.” 311 As was said earlier, Holcot maintains that—given the plain vision of God—the created will could hate God. Holcot argues that this is possible if God is apprehended under the aspect of something exceedingly harmful. God could thus reveal to a person who sees Him plainly that he/she will be annihilated or damned. 312 Moreover, God could reveal to a person that He wants him/her to hate Him temporarily under the threat of eternal misery. The will could consequently accept what God wants. 313 An opponent may object that it is impossible to hate God per se. Hatred is directed not toward God but toward the suffering that God inflicts. Holcot, however, believes that if a person hates his/her impending punishment and knows that God wants to inflict it, then he/she actually hates God for punishing him/her. 314 Holcot also discusses whether beatific enjoyment is produced effectively by the will. This discussion forms an integral part of the curious question whether enjoyment could remain in the will without being an enjoyment. 315 It will be helpful to look at Holcot’s answer to this specific question before focusing upon his understanding of the mode of production of enjoyment. In his reply to the question whether enjoyment could remain in the will without being an enjoyment, Holcot formulates four propositions: (1) enjoyment is an immanent mental operation in the intellectual creature, 316 (2) an intellectual operation is a quality distinct from the nature or substance of which it is an operation, 317 (3) a quality must be caused by the operating substance in order to be considered a proper quality of that substance, 318 (4) God can bring about or conserve any

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effect whatsoever without the co-causality or co-agency of any creature. 319 On the basis of these four propositions, Holcot argues that: (i) enjoyment is an operation of an enjoying substance or subject, (ii) enjoyment is a quality strictly distinct from the operation of enjoyment, (iii) enjoyment should not be considered an operation unless it is caused effectively by the operating substance or subject and (iv) one and the same quality can be caused partly by the operating creature and totally by God in such a way that it is first an operation proper to the creature and afterwards it is an operation not proper to the creature. Holcot concludes that enjoyment can exist in the created mind without being an enjoyment of God. Similarly, the vision of God can exist in the soul of Christ or Saint Peter without being a vision of God. 320 The point of these distinctions seems to be that in order for enjoyment to be experienced as an enjoyment of God, it must be partially caused by the subject. God could indeed cause an enjoyment of Himself in the mind of an individual, but this enjoyment would be an abstract quality and not a true operation if the individual had nothing to contribute to its production. 321 With this in mind, we can now return to the problem whether beatific enjoyment is produced effectively by the will. Holcot presents two opposing views. The first view—which seems to be the view of Ockham—states that, due to its perfection, beatific enjoyment is caused by God alone. 322 The contrary view maintains that beatific enjoyment is caused effectively by the will. This view is corroborated with a number of arguments. Probably the most important argument is that, in order to have a meritorious quality, volition must be elicited effectively by the will. 323 Holcot maintains that beatific enjoyment is caused partially by the soul, and he identifies three distinct factors each of which contributes partially to the causation of enjoyment—the object, the act of cognition and the will. Holcot argues that if these factors are not involved in the causation of enjoyment, then enjoyment cannot be considered an immanent action. Consequently, one can say that the soul is in some way active both with respect to its act of cognition and its volition. Holcot thinks, however, that the activity of the soul is insufficient to produce an act of beatific enjoyment. Otherwise, it would be futile to hold—as the Church does—that the soul must be assisted and fortified by the light of glory in order to be able to enjoy God. 324 It should be stressed that Holcot does not favor the idea that one could distinguish two different kinds of enjoyment—an enjoyment elicited actively by the soul which is not strictly beatific and a supernatural enjoyment infused directly by God and received passively by the soul. Holcot argues that if the blessed enjoy God equally intensely through both acts, then one of these enjoyments would be superfluous. If, on the other hand, the elicited enjoyment were less intense than the infused one, then the

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blessed would be dissatisfied with this less intense enjoyment, and, consequently, that enjoyment would be elicited in vain. 325 Instead of positing two distinct kinds of enjoyment, Holcot thinks that one could talk about a single enjoyment that is partially natural and partially supernatural. Beatific enjoyment is supernatural in the sense that only God can bring it about. It is also supernatural in the sense that charity, the light of glory, and the manifest vision of God endow the soul with the strength to love God by itself. Analogically, God could miraculously confer the power of sight to a wholly blind person. Thus, insofar as God alone is responsible for making a blind person see, the power of sight should be considered supernatural. However, the actual exercise or application of this power should be considered natural. 326 Can the blessed in heaven have security regarding the eternal duration of the beatific acts? Holcot differentiates two types of security (securitas): (1) one can believe that one will always be blessed and will never fall from beatitude, or (2) one can believe that one will always be blessed and cannot fall from beatitude. Only the first type of security can be attributed to those in heaven. 327 God can—if He so wishes—deceive or mislead a beatified person. 328 Holcot’s treatment of the contingency of beatific enjoyment can be reduced to the following key points. According to Holcot, an individual can behold God without experiencing enjoyment. Beatific vision and beatific enjoyment must be regarded as strictly distinct operations. Thus, God can co-cause beatific vision without co-causing enjoyment, or He could reveal Himself and suspend the operation of enjoyment. By the same token, God can reveal Himself to an individual, infuse the mind of that individual with charity and the habit of glory and yet suspend his/ her enjoyment. Furthermore, the clear vision of God, charity, and the habit of glory can be accompanied by hatred of God. This kind of situation is possible from the vantage point of God’s absolute power. It is also not impossible for God to conserve two contrary and strictly distinct qualities—hatred and love—within one and the same soul. Holcot also maintains that the bare human will is capable of suspending its act of enjoyment. In the case of an informed will, Holcot envisions various scenarios based on different types of beatific cognitions. Some of these cognitions are such that an individual can hate or fail to love God. On the subject of the necessitation of the will, Holcot states that the will can be naturally necessitated to love God. On the subject of hatred toward God, Holcot claims that an individual can hate God if God discloses Himself and at the same time informs him/her of his/her future damnation or if God obligates him/her to hate Him temporarily under the threat of eternal punishment. Holcot also thinks that an individual can hate God per se on account of God being the cause of his/her perpetual suffering. Holcot argues that the will must be involved in the effective production of enjoyment. Unquestionably, enjoyment can be caused totally by God. If such is

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the case, then enjoyment would not be regarded as an operation of the enjoying subject. In order to be considered an immanent operation, enjoyment should include three factors: (1) object, (2) cognition and (3) volition. These three factors contribute as partial causes to the production of beatific enjoyment and constitute the natural aspect of beatific enjoyment. The supernatural aspect of enjoyment comes from God’s self-disclosure, charity, grace and the light of glory. Finally, Holcot believes that the blessed in heaven do not have absolute security regarding the continuation of the beatific acts. In principle, God could always deceive the blessed. ADAM WODEHAM ON APPREHENSION-BASED AND DELIBERATION-BASED BEATIFIC ENJOYMENT Adam Wodeham treats the problem of the freedom of beatific enjoyment in his Oxford lectures. Wodeham’s discussion contains twelve conclusions, but I will focus only upon the more essential and original conclusions. According to Wodeham, the will of the wayfarer can actively cause in itself love (dilectio) toward God without an enjoyment—given that the wayfarer has acquired universal or particular knowledge of God. This is so because the will can conform to the right dictate of the intellect when the intellect commands that God ought to be loved above all. 329 A critic may object that, by allowing the will the power to conform to the dictate of the intellect, Wodeham in fact brings upon himself the charge of Pelagianism. Given a sufficient knowledge of God, an individual could love God naturally, and consequently want to fulfill all of God’s commandments and avoid sin altogether. 330 Wodeham admits that an individual in the present life could love God above all without supernatural assistance. He specifies, however, that this natural love could not be as perfect as the kind of love caused by the supernatural habit of charity. 331 Wodeham acknowledges that in the conditions of the present life, it is impossible to fulfill all of God’s commandments and avoid sin completely. Nevertheless, he argues that the divine precepts would be irrational if they bind humankind to impossible things. God could rationally command that He be loved above all even without charity, and we could fulfill such a commandment ex puris naturalibus. We could indeed avoid many mortal and venial sins but we cannot avoid sin altogether. Furthermore, we could perform many generically good acts ex puris naturalibus but we cannot acquire merit because merit ultimately depends upon God’s acceptance and not upon human effort. 332 Furthermore, Wodeham states that the various—particular and universal—modes of knowledge of God in the present life do not necessitate the will to enjoy God. If this were not so, then human beings would love God necessarily and would not act meritoriously. 333 If the will can active-

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ly initiate love with respect to God in the present life, then—a fortiori—the will can also actively initiate an enjoyment of God when God is seen clearly in heaven. 334 According to Wodeham, as we can see, the will of the blessed in heaven is in some sense free. More importantly, however, only God loves Himself necessarily. 335 The thesis that—given the vision of God—the will can actively initiate a corresponding enjoyment of God is open to a well-known objection: if the thesis were true, then the soul could make itself blessed. 336 Wodeham stipulates that the vision of God cannot be actively caused by the soul and that consequently, the soul’s enjoyment depends upon that vision as an essential part of beatitude. Wodeham explains that the objection could be met in a different way. One could say, for instance, that there are two acts of enjoyment—one caused by God alone and another caused by the soul. The enjoyment caused by God is much worthier than that caused by the soul. 337 The question naturally arises how could the volition of the blessed remain perpetually impeccable if it is freely elicited? Is it not possible to imagine that the will could cease to act after some process of deliberation takes place? 338 Wodeham replies that there are at least three ways of understanding the impeccability of the blessed. One could adopt the solution of Peter Auriol and others who follow him and admit that the will is necessitated to enjoy God. Another option is to agree with Scotus that once the blessed have elicited an act of enjoyment, God sustains that act perpetually. The last option is to allow two different types of enjoyment in respect to God—one caused by God alone and indestructible and another caused by the will and capable of being suspended. Wodeham thinks that Scotus’s solution seems most probable. He adds, however, that one ought to allow for the act of beatific enjoyment to be conserved by God alone or by God and the will jointly or in some other way. 339 In synchrony with his cognitivist theory of volitions, Wodeham speculates that if there is a certain beatific vision which is not strictly distinct from love, then it would be impossible for an individual to behold God without loving Him. 340 In the absence of any other type of vision, however, the clear vision of God which is entirely separate from all forms of love must cause an act of love that is not immediately in the control of the will. Wodeham defends this conclusion on the ground that the reaction of the rational appetite based on the simple apprehension of a pleasant object—whether God or something other than God—is automatic, not voluntary. 341 It does not follow, however, that the will of the blessed in heaven is totally determined. The will could, in principle, suspend its act of beatific love on condition that God relinquishes the will to its own resources; and if God does so, then the blessed could suspend their volition through an act of deliberation. 342 According to Wodeham, God can also give a temporary enjoyment to a person and assure him/her that he/ she will lose it later. In this case, a person could accept what God wants

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and suspend his/her love of God when the time comes. 343 God could even allow a temporary enjoyment to a dying person who has committed venial sins and show that person that his/her felicity will be interrupted during his/her stay in purgatory. In this situation, a person could consent to be deprived of God’s presence for a certain period of time. 344 Is there a sense in which the will of the blessed is necessitated to love God? Wodeham thinks that there is. The will of an individual who beholds God is necessitated through an act of non-elective love (dilectio non electiva). Non-elective love is a natural, unpremeditated automatic reaction of the appetite based upon simple apprehension. This non-elective love is not immediately in the control of the will and must be distinguished from elective love (dilectio electiva), which is based upon consent or dissent with respect to the dictate of practical reason. Wodeham says that elective love is always within the dominion of the will unless the will is bound to the supreme good by God. 345 In sum, Wodeham claims that the will can love God above all as well as actively initiate an enjoyment of God in the present life and in heaven. The central and innovative ingredient of Wodeham’s view of beatific enjoyment is the distinction between non-elective and elective love and enjoyment. Apparently, Wodeham thinks that one can differentiate two cognitive aspects of beatific enjoyment—apprehension-based and deliberation-based. Since, according to Wodeham’s understanding, the blessed never totally lose the power of reason, the fundamental freedom of their will is never totally destroyed or taken away. Because of this, God must sustain their enjoyment supernaturally. ROBERT GRAYSTONES ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF FREEDOM AND NECESSITY AND THE CONTINGENCY OF ENJOYMENT THROUGH PERSONAL EXPERIENCE The Benedictine monk Robert Graystones discusses the problem of the contingency of beatific enjoyment in the third question of distinction one of his commentary on Book I of Lombard’s Sentences. The treatment of the problem is interesting partly because it is very extensive—it consists of dozens of pro et con arguments and covers almost 10 two-column folio pages in the manuscript containing the question—and partly because it features an examination of the views of several different authors, e.g., St Thomas, Henry of Ghent, Gerard of Bologna, William of Alnwick, Robert Cowton 346 and a certain Lucas of Ely. Additionally, Graystones’ entire approach to the question is quite unusual insofar as Graystones asks whether necessity and freedom are compatible or not with respect to the same act and the same object (an libertas et necessitas stent simul respectu eiusdem actus et objecti). Graystones presupposes right from the very beginning of the question that enjoyment is strictly speaking an act of the

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will and that rightly-ordered enjoyment (fruitio ordinata) is the enjoyment of the ultimate end alone. 347 After a set of preliminary arguments for and against the thesis that the enjoyment of the end is necessary, Graystones divides his principal question in two articles—the first one dealing with the compatibility between freedom and necessity, and the second one focusing more narrowly on the contingency of enjoyment. 348 The first article of Graystones’ treatment deserves close attention because prior to responding to the question about the compatibility of freedom and necessity Graystones distinguishes different kinds of necessity and different kinds of freedom. Although these distinctions are not original—they replicate distinctions found in Ockham, Durandus, Scotus, Peter Lombard—Graystones weaves them together ingeniously in the effort to clarify the different contexts and senses of compatibility and incompatibility between freedom and necessity. According to Graystones, there are three kinds of necessity: (1) necessity of coercion (necessitas coactionis), (2) necessity of immutability, and (3) conditional necessity (necessitas suppositionis sive ex conditione). One may also distinguish a fourth kind of necessity—viz., (4) necessity of inevitability—although this is really the same as necessity of immutability if immutability is understood in a broad sense. 349 Graystones explains the first kind of necessity as involving the violence or force applied against the inclination of a thing from an external source or principle. 350 One can easily imagine being dragged by a henchman against one’s will as an example of this kind of necessity. The second kind of necessity must be understood not only in terms of the way in which something is in itself (in se), as, for instance, God is absolutely immutable qua God, but also in terms of the way something relates immutably to something else (a parte sui respectu alterius). The latter kind of immutability can be further subdivided into various modes of necessity depending on the strength of the necessity. For instance, the necessity with which God understands and wills is much stronger than the necessity with which man is a rational animal because man can fail to be a rational animal if man fails to exist. However, the necessity with which God understands and wills cannot possibly be taken away from God. Furthermore, the necessity with which man is a rational animal is stronger than the necessity with which fire burns flammable things because God is capable of thwarting the necessity with which fire burns while fire exists. 351 The last, third kind of necessity is the necessity characteristic of future contingent states of affairs. For instance, the consequences of the compound propositions “If the Antichrist will exist, then God must know that the Antichrist will exist,” or “If I run, then I move” are true in virtue of conditional necessity. Neither the antecedent nor the consequent in the above propositions need to be true. However, if both antecedents happen to be true, then the consequents must be true. 352 Graystones also differentiates four kinds of freedom: (1) freedom for itself or oneself (libertas sui gratia), (2) freedom as opposed to servitude,

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(3) freedom as opposed to coercion, and (4) freedom as voluntariness or, more precisely, as the ability for self-determination with respect to alternatives (posse flecti ad utrumlibet). The first kind of freedom is of two modes—(i) when something or someone is free for its own or his own sake alone, and (ii) when something or someone is free for the sake of nothing other than the ultimate end. According to Graystones, the first mode applies to God alone because only God enjoys freedom for His own sake. The second mode applies solely to human beings and angels because only they enjoy freedom on account of the ultimate end and everything else in the created world has been made for their sake. 353 The second kind of liberty also takes different forms insofar as there are various types of servitude. Only God is absolutely free from servitude altogether. The blessed in heaven are free from the servitude of sin and misery in particular. 354 The third kind of freedom characterizes the behavior of things such as heavy bodies, which fall in a downward direction by natural inclination unless they are prevented from doing so by some obstacle. 355 The fourth kind of freedom involves a distinction between the voluntary and the natural. Graystones also explains that the voluntary is not the same as the wanted (volitum) because it is possible to want something without wanting it freely. If the mere fact of wanting and tending naturally toward something was sufficient to guarantee voluntariness, then one would have to attribute voluntariness to rocks and cows. Rather, the voluntary is opposed to what is necessary; it also implies the ability to choose (arbitrium) from among a range of alternatives. 356 Graystones says that this last kind of freedom is the greatest of all four because it includes the other three kinds of freedom (omnes alias libertates includit). 357 On the basis of the aforementioned distinctions between different kinds of necessity and freedom, Graystones draws several conclusions regarding compatibility. His first conclusion is that conditional necessity is compatible with freedom of voluntariness, and he illustrates the compatibility at hand by means of the statement “If I run, then I move.” “It is necessary,” he states, “that if I run, then I move of necessity, through necessity of consequence, and yet because I run freely, I move freely.” 358 The fourth kind of freedom, however, is incompatible with necessity of immutability (except in the case of God, whose will is both free and immutable) and with necessity of coercion. The necessity of coercion, in particular, eliminates voluntariness altogether; a voluntary agent cannot possibly choose freely if he or she has been coerced to choose a certain way. In fact, coercion obviates choice entirely. 359 Immediately after having said that coercion eliminates freedom of voluntariness Graystones addresses the problem of compatibility between freedom and impeccability in the case of the blessed in heaven. This problem is at the heart of the arguments (eleven in total) presented by Graystones in support of the thesis that freedom and necessity are

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indeed compatible. The cash value of these arguments, several of which are borrowed from St Augustine and St Anselm, is that it is a mark of a greater and more perfect freedom if the will is incapable of making wrong choices. Such is the state of the will of those who are firmly rooted upon the path of virtue as well as of the will of the blessed in heaven who are no longer capable of sinning. 360 Graystones rises to the challenge by saying that the freedom of the will is nothing other than the will itself. Thus, it is impossible to take away the freedom of the will unless the will itself is taken away. However, since the freedom of the will always manifests itself through an act, God can suspend one act of the will without suspending another. Thus, God suspends the will’s freedom to sin in the case of the blessed in heaven and the will’s freedom to repent in the case of the damned in hell. 361 The blessed cannot sin, but that does not mean that they lack free choice (liberum arbitrium) in general, especially if “free choice” means having a certain power (potentia) or connotes having many acts that the blessed can elicit through freedom of contradiction. In other words, even though the blessed can no longer choose sin or make evil choices, they can make many other (good) choices in heaven. 362 Clearly, Graystones endorses the Augustinian-Anselmian conviction that perfect freedom is the freedom not to sin. The second article of Graystones’ third question asks whether the will enjoys the ultimate end of necessity when presented to it by the intellect. Graystones responds that if enjoyment is understood in the proper sense, then the answer to the question must be negative because the wayfarer is also capable of using God, and one cannot both use and enjoy God in this life. Furthermore, if enjoyment was necessary, then enjoyment would also be a meritorious act. A meritorious act, however, requires grace and one does not always have grace in this life. 363 Graystones notes that the real difficulty posed by the question emerges when enjoyment is understood broadly as an act of love (dilectio), and he lists a number of authorities (St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, Gerard of Bologna, William of Alwick, Robert Cowton) who hold that the will cannot fail to love the ultimate end when presented to it by the intellect. Graystones presents and examines twenty five arguments for the necessity and thirteen arguments for the contingency of loving the end. Most of the arguments for the necessity-thesis stem from Gerard of Bologna, although one also finds familiar arguments from St Thomas and Henry of Ghent. 364 Graystones’ own position is that the will wants both the ultimate end as well as the means to the end contingently. It is fascinating to see, however, that Graystones appeals to his own personal experience as a way of demonstrating the truth of the position: I have thus experienced it in myself that I often think about God when I have neither an act of desire nor an act of willing with respect to Him, and I know that whenever I desire [something], I can also not desire

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[it]; and I say this about the present life, because I have no heavenrelated experience whatsoever. 365

In sum, Graystones rejects the necessity-thesis and argues—partly basing himself on the authority of Duns Scotus and partly on the internal evidence provided by his own personal experience, that the orientation of the will with respect to the ultimate end is contingent. CONCLUSION In this chapter, I discussed the problem of the contingency of beatific enjoyment. With the exception of Thomas Anglicus, Peter Auriol and Francis of Marchia, all of the authors examined allow a certain aspect of contingency with respect to the experience of beatific enjoyment. Anglicus blames Scotus’s account of the inherent contingency of the will with respect to the ultimate end for undermining the foundations of moral philosophy. Anglicus, however, is alone in his conviction that the will of the wayfarer desires the ultimate end of necessity. Neither Auriol nor Marchia allow contingency in heaven, and both offer clever arguments in support of the necessitation of the will with respect to God—Auriol gives us the “volitional resistance threshold” argument and Marchia offers us the “tipping point” argument. According to Duns Scotus, necessity is not an intrinsic characteristic of the will and therefore God must sustain the will of the blessed in the act of enjoyment once it is elicited. Ockham’s view is that the will can reject beatitude and turn away from the beatific vision. The will can even hate God if God makes hatred a righteous act. (Henry of Harclay was actually the first scholastic to have said that an individual can hate God.) Nevertheless, Ockham says that the will of the blessed is totally passive with respect to the acts caused and conserved by God. Chatton claims that vision-based enjoyment is not a free act, but he also allows a free discursion- or abstraction-based enjoyment. According to Chatton, the blessed cannot cause the truly beatific acts although they can actively maintain and prolong them. Holcot is deeply interested in the problem of the contingency of enjoyment. He presents various scenarios which allow for the suspension of beatific enjoyment or for the coexistence of hatred and love of God. Holcot also holds that beatific enjoyment must be partially natural and partially supernatural. His most radical statements with respect to the topic of beatific enjoyment are that the blessed can never have absolute certainty regarding the perpetual duration of their bliss and that God can, in principle, always deceive the blessed. FitzRalph cautiously distinguishes between freedom per se and per accidens, just in case we might worry about the blessed losing their freedom in heaven. He also explores the problem of the certainty or security of the beatitude of the blessed, but his answer to the problem wavers between a definitive “yes”

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and a definitive “no.” Wodeham, on the other hand, believes that the will can love and enjoy God actively in the present life as well as in heaven. He further claims that the will can love God necessarily through an act of non-elective love. Nonetheless, the will has an act of elective love which is always within its control. In order for the blessed to remain everlastingly fastened to God, it is necessary that their wills are strengthened by God. 366 Lastly, we saw Graystones engaging the problem of the compatibility between freedom and necessitation. Even though the distinctions he makes between the various senses of necessitation and freedom are derivative, Graystones weaves these different senses together in an attempt to explain to what extent freedom can coexist with necessity in heaven. He answers that the saints are incapable of sinning, but that they still have freedom to choose or do something other than sin. In this life, however, we are not determined to want or think about God. This is clear from experience, Graystones says. NOTES 1. See Simon Francis Gaines,“Will There Be Free Will in Heaven?” Freedom, Impeccability and Beatitude (London and New York: T&T Clark, a Continuum Imprint, 2003), 7–8. 2. See Gaines, “Will There Be Free Will in Heaven?”, 9–10; 22–25. 3. See Gaines, “Will There Be Free Will in Heaven?”, 22–23. 4. See Gaines, “Will There Be Free Will in Heaven?”, 25–26. 5. See chapter 3, section 1 above. 6. There were also two other popular questions regarding divine and human psychology: (1) is it possible for an individual to fulfill God’s command to be hated, or is it possible for God to command that He should be hated? And (2) can two contrary volitions—e.g., love and hatred—exist simultaneously in the same subject? See Courtenay, Scholars and Schools, 298–99. 7. See Gaines, “Will There Be Free Will in Heaven?”, 87–102. 8. See Gaines, ‘Will There Be Free Will in Heaven?’, 103–18. 9. The latest statement on obligational theology and the obligatorial art is Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 151–90. 10. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 190. 11. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 190. 12. See Työrinoja, “Faith and the Will to Believe,” 485: “According to the nominalistic view, God has freely chosen the means by which he wants us to know him. In principle, they could be anything. For Ockham, God’s promise (promissio) is the only guarantee that x-beliefs are true and adequate means to reach him. Ockham and his successors replace the older metaphysical model of God-human relationship with the non-metaphysical contract model (pactum, conventio). The relationship between God and humans is analogous to making a contract or entering into alliance. The whole system of beliefs concerning God is a part of this arrangement of the contract by which one is to reach God. There is no epistemic justification for them known to us other than God’s election. The revealed truths as the means are based only on the properties of the one who has given a promise. But this does not justify them in an epistemic sense because the existence of such a promise-giver is not naturally known.” See also Reijo Työrinoja, “Regularity of Will and the Problem of Egoism,” in Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge, vol. 2, ed. C. Bazán, E. Andújar and L.G. Sbrocchi. (New York, Ottawa, and Toronto: Legas, 1995), 956–57.

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13. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 190. 14. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 150: “The fourteenth-century history of modal theory begins with Scotus. His views gave direction and impetus to the development of modal theory during the years that followed, and he pioneered in the application of obligational counterfactual analysis to theology. Armed with the ars obligatoria later theologians might assess the realm of possibilities for consistency and establish which sets of possibilities were truly compatible and subject to God’s will.” 15. See Simo Knuuttila and Taina Holopainen, “Conditional Will and Conditional Norms in Medieval Thought,” Synthese 96 (1993): 115–32, 115–17; Simo Knuuttila, “The Emergence of Deontic Logic in the Fourteenth Century,” New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions, and the Foundations of Ethics, ed. Risto Hilpinen (Dordrecht, Boston, London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), 234–35. 16. See Courtenay, Scholars and Schools, 211–14. The distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power was developed in the thirteenth century in the effort to solve a problem posed by Peter Abelard. The problem was whether God could have created the world differently than He did. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 348; Maurer, The Philosophy of William of Ockham, 254; William J. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power (Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, 1990), 132. 17. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 317. 18. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 314–16, 324. 19. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 89, pp. 90–91. 20. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 82, lin. 2–10, p. 62. Scotus’s Reportatio I-A contains a different description of the particular and universal modes of apprehension of the obscurely grasped end. The particular mode of apprehension grasps the end as a term whereas the universal mode of apprehension grasps the end under one aspect. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 23, pp. 94–95. See also Guido Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica nello Sviluppo del Pensiero di Duns Scoto,” in Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti. Atti del Congresso Scotistico Internazionale Roma 9–11 marzo 1993, vol. 2, ed. Leonardo Sileo (Rome: Edizioni Antonianum, 1995), 634–35. 21. The distinction between obscure and clear apprehension is parallel to the distinction between obscure and distinct knowledge, which was used systematically by Scotus throughout his commentaries. The different forms of the distinction between obscure and distinct knowledge in Scotus is explained by Marrone. See Steven P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century, vol. 2 (Leiden, Boston, and Köln: E.J. Brill, 2001), 440–41: “Here he also employed Henry’s distinction between confused and distinct knowledge, another maneuver rejected by Vital du Four. Developed by Duns to a far greater degree than by Henry, the division became a virtual leitmotif for his thought. His views are laid out most fully in parallel passages in the Lectura and the Ordinatio, and though the latter exposition is somewhat more refined, both present the same basic scheme. Each carefully differentiates one disjunctive pair: knowing a confused object (confusum intelligere) and knowing a distinct object (distinctum intelligere), from another: knowing confusedly (confuse intelligere) and knowing distinctly (distincte intelligere). A confused object was one with sufficient integrity to be seized by the mind in a simple act corresponding to a simple concept but still itself divisible into what might be called simpler logical constituents, either ‘the essential parts’ of a complete essence—such as the matter and form of a composite—like the various species of a genus. A distinct object was one that could not be so divided, such as an ultimate species or an individual. The distinction in this case was thus effectively between more or less general, or universal, levels of apprehension. Knowing confusedly, on the other hand, entailed knowing an object, as by name alone, without resolving it into definitive elements or formal parts. Knowing distinctly demanded making that resolution—that is, finding the definition. One might know either confusedly or distinctly at the same level of generality.”

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22. The approach is characteristic especially of followers of Scotus. See Guillelmus de Alnwick, In Primum Sententiarum (ed. Cova, 1993), d. 1, a. 1, n. 8. See Ioannes de Bassolis, Super Sententias (Paris, 1516–17), liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, fol. 42vb. 23. See Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 634. In addition to the passages from Henry of Ghent’s works, the editors of Scotus’s Lectura and Ordinatio have included in the footnotes some passages from the writings of St Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines. The editors of Scotus’s Reportatio I–A identify the opinion discussed by Scotus as “The Opinion of Henry of Ghent” (Opinio Henrici Gandavensis). See Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, p. 95. 24. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 90, lin. 3–4, p. 91. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 83, lin. 12–14, p. 62. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 24, p. 95. Scotus concurs with the second thesis of his opponent, i.e., that the will does not enjoy the ultimate end when apprehended obscurely and in particular. Scotus notes, however, that by negating the necessity of enjoying the end as apprehended in particular, the opponent contradicts his own principles and undermines the arguments in support of the first thesis. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 112, lin. 21–23, p. 97. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 144, lin. 1–8, p. 97. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 134, lin. 3–10, p. 90. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 41, p. 99. In his Quodlibet, q. 16, Scotus states that it can be said with probability that not every created will is necessitated in its volition of the end. See Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quodlibetum, q. 16, Timothy B. Noone and H. Francie Roberts (eds.), “John Duns Scotus’ Quodlibet. A Brief Study of the Manuscripts and an Edition of Question 16,” in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel, 131–98 (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2007), a. 1, n. 30, lin. 15, p. 174–lin. 4, p. 175. 25. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 90, lin. 5–8, p. 91. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 83, lin. 16, p. 62–lin. 3, p. 63. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 24, p. 95. 26. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 92, lin. 1–5, p. 92. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 85, lin. 12–15, p. 63. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 26, p. 95. 27. See Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 634. 28. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 143, lin. 16–18, p. 96. 29. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 116, lin. 22, p. 98–lin. 14, p. 99. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 147, lin. 14, p. 97–lin. 15, p. 98. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, nn. 37–38, p. 98. See also Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 638−39. 30. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 118, lin. 6–16, p. 100. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 149, lin. 1–10, p. 100. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 40, p. 99. See also Möhle, “Scotus’s Theory of Natural Law,” 325–26; Ingham and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus, 150; Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 639. 31. To will (velle) and to not-will (nolle) can be called positive volitions. They are two contrary acts of the will with respect to the same object and their relationship resembles the relationship between love and hatred. The situation of not having an act of the will is referred to as “non velle.” See A. Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love. Texts and Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans (Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 184–85. 32. See Möhle, “Scotus’s Theory of Natural Law,” 326: “On Scotus’s view the will has a reflexive act (actus reflexus), as Scotus calls it, bearing on its own willing. The first-order willing that is directed at a particular object becomes, at the second-order level, itself an object of the will, which can determine itself either to will or to refrain from willing this object. This twotiered character and reflexivity are what make the will, as Scotus understands it, a free, self-determining power.”

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33. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 96, lin. 10–19, p. 93. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 91, lin. 2, p. 66–n. 92, lin. 2, p. 67. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 35, p. 97. See Möhle, “Scotus’s Theory of Natural Law,” 326–27. 34. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 86. 35. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 97, lin. 1–10, p. 94. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 93, lin. 7, p. 67–lin. 6, p. 68. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 27, pp. 95–96. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 30, p. 96. See also Cross, Duns Scotus, 87; Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 636. 36. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 98, lin. 11–15, p. 94. 37. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 99, lin. 16–21, p. 94. See also Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 636. 38. See Möhle, “Scotus’s Theory of Natural Law,” 324–26; Bonnie D. Kent, “The Moral Life,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 237–41; Cross, Duns Scotus, 84–85; Thomas Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” The Thomist 62 (1998): 197–207; Knuuttila, “The Emergence of Deontic Logic,” 234. 39. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, selected and translated with an introduction by Allan B. Wolter (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), Ordinatio, liber IV, suppl. d. 49, qq. 9–10, a. 2, pp. 188–90. 40. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber IV, suppl. d. 49, qq. 9–10, a. 2, p. 190. 41. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 145, lin. 9–10, p. 97. 42. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 113, lin. 24, p. 97–lin. 5, p. 98. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 136, lin. 5–15, p. 91. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, nn. 43–44, p. 100. See also Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 637. 43. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 138, lin. 5–14, p. 93. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 45, p. 100. 44. See Girard J. Etzkorn, “Walter Chatton and the Controversy on the Absolute Necessity of Grace,” Franciscan Studies 37 (1977): 35. See also Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love, 112–13. 45. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 146, lin. 11–12, p. 97. 46. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 114, lin. 6–n. 115, lin. 20, p. 98. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 141, lin. 1–n. 142, lin. 14, p. 96. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 49, p. 101–n. 52, p. 102. See also Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 637–38. 47. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber III, suppl. d. 27, a. 3, p. 438. See also Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love, 121–-23; Allan B. Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 40. 48. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, Opera omnia, vol. 17, ed. C. Balić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966), liber I, d. 17, pars 1, q. unica, n. 89, lin. 22, p. 209–n. 90, lin. 6, p. 210. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber III, suppl. d. 27, a. 3, p. 442. See also Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love, 112–13. 49. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 17, pars 1, q. unica, n. 80, lin. 27, p. 206–lin. 11, p. 207. See also Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love, 121–23. 50. See Stephen D. Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?”, in Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 28, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr. und Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 744–45. Dumont also explains that the chief issue upon which the debate between intellectualists and voluntarists centered was not so much whether the will can act contrary to the dictate of right reason but on the way in which the will is able to elicit opposite acts. See Stephen D. Dumont,

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“John Duns Scotus,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 366. 51. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, Opera omnia, vol. 19, ed. Luca Modrić et al. Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1993), liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 22, lin. 13–15, p. 234. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 25, lin. 7–15, p. 235. See also Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 744–45. 52. Teske explains that the intellect acts as “an accidental cause and a necessary condition (sine qua non).” See Teske, introduction to Henry of Ghent, 14. Dumont notes that the sine qua non causality was used already by Peter Lombard to account for God’s knowledge of future contingents. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 773–74. Henry’s voluntarism is also discussed in Teske, introduction to Henry of Ghent, 4–22; Mary Beth Ingham, “Did Scotus Modify His Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?”, Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 69, no. 1 (2002): 112–14; Kent, Virtues of the Will, 137–43; Ilkka Kantola, “Probability and Moral Uncertainty in Late Medieval and Early Modern Times” (ThD diss., University of Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society 1994), 85–94. For an excellent account of Henry’s voluntarism in connection with the notion of weakness of will, see Tobias Hoffmann, “Henry of Ghent’s Voluntarist Account of Weakness of Will,” in Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 115–37. 53. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 54, lin. 3–10, p. 246. See also Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 745. 54. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 69, lin. 2–n. 70, lin. 17, p. 253. See also Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 745–46; Ingham and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus, 163–64. 55. See Hoffmann, “Henry of Ghent’s Voluntarist Account,” 125–26. Ironically, by treating the known object as a necessary yet accidental condition with respect to the will’s act, Henry is also jeopardizing the necessity with which the blessed love God in heaven. Thomas Osborne has shown that this particular weakness of Henry’s position had become the object of Godfrey’s criticism. According to Godfrey’s criticism, the beatific vision cannot have any positive influence on the will of the blessed if it is only a sine qua non cause. See T. M. Osborne, Jr., “Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines on Whether to See God is to Love Him,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 80, no. 1 (2013): 69–70. 56. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 28, lin. 16–24, p. 236. 57. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 30, lin. 6–18, p. 237. 58. See Mark Pestana, “The Three Species of Freedom and the Six Species of Will Acts,” The Modern Schoolman 74 (1996): 20–21: “Exercises of will in the first mode of freedom pertain to fixing an object in consciousness. With regard to any mental content, however simple (e.g., remembering one’s phone number) or complex (e.g., imagining the consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons), an individual can either attend to that content or not attend to that content. If one attends to the object then it is fixed in one’s awareness. If one does not attend to this possible object of consciousness then some other intentional object will ‘present’ itself for consideration. That ‘next’ object will come either from the environment ‘outside’ of oneself or from the further workings of one’s own mind. It may even be the object just ‘non-attended to’ or ‘turned away from’ that represents itself for consideration. In scholastic terminology, this capacity is referred to as ‘freedom of specification,’ the content of consciousness being specified, from among a field of possibilities, by an exercise of will. This is the primordial way in which one can ‘do otherwise’ since in order to do anything (other than simply focus attention) one must first attend to what one is doing or contemplating doing.” 59. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 31, lin. 1–n. 32, lin. 14, p. 238. Pestana notes that the difference between St Thomas and Scotus “turns on a difference in their construal of freedom of exercise.” See Pestana, “The Three Species of Freedom,” 21. Regarding St Thomas’s and Scotus’s conception of the freedom of exercise,

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see Pestana, “The Three Species of Freedom,” 21–22: “According to Thomas, one is able to ‘not-will x’ (and therefore the exercise of willing x is free), but only in so far as one is able to will y instead (where y either is the original object in so far as it is bad or is something completely different). The exercise of willing x can be suspended, but not in its own right. Furthermore, one is able to will y instead of x (thereby, being able to not-will x) only because one is able to attend to y instead of x. In other words, for Thomas, freedom of exercise is always contained virtually in either freedom of contrariety or specification. However, to Scotus, since being able to will y instead of x presupposes that one is able to not will x, the essence of freedom in willing x lies in being able to not will x simpliciter. He takes this as meaning that one is able to suspend willing x in its own right, i.e., without thereby to will y. In short, for Scotus, the freedom of exercise is not virtually contained within the freedoms of contrariety and specification, it is a type of free willing that stands on its own.” 60. See Hoffmann, “Henry of Ghent’s Voluntarist Account,” 124–26. 61. Godfrey of Fontaines (b. before 1250–d. 1306/9) was a secular priest from Belgium. He was born into a noble family in the principality of Liège. He studied in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the early 1270s. He entered the Faculty of Theology in 1274, where he studied and taught as a Regent Master until 1303 or 1304. See John F. Wippel, “Godfrey of Fontaines,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 272; idem, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A Study in Late ThirteenthCentury Philosophy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), xv–xxi. 62. Wippel notes that Godfrey’s entire epistemology and all his philosophical thought is governed by the Aristotelian principle that nothing can reduce itself from potency to act. See John F. Wippel, “The Role of Phantasm in Godfrey of Fontaines’ Theory of Intellection,” in L’homme et son univers au moyen âge (Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale), ed Christian Wenin (Louvain-laNeuve: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1986), 574. Interestingly enough, however, in Quodlibet VI, Godfrey states that the will can be said to move the intellect with respect to the exercise of its act (ad exercitium actum) insofar as it commands the organic potencies of the soul to form adequate phantasms which are subsequently illuminated by the agent intellect and made suitable for intellection. See Godefridus de Fontibus, Quodlibeta, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, Les Philosophes Belges, Textes et Études, vol. 3 (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1914), VI, q. 7, pp. 170–71. 63. According to Dominik Perler, one of the main reasons for the vitality of angelology, i.e., the study of angels, in the late Middle Ages is that angels had acquired the status of thought experiments. In these thought experiments, scholastic authors raised and attempted to answer questions about cognition, volition, mental language from the standpoint of idealized conditions. See Dominik Perler, “Thought Experiments: The Methodological Function of Angels in Late Medieval Epistemology,” in Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance, ed. Isabel Iribarren and Martin Lenz (Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), 144. 64. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 40, lin. 19, p. 241–n. 43, lin. 12, p. 242. Wippel points out that Scotus also criticized Godfrey’s application of the actpotency axiom in the account of the cause of intellection. See Wippel, “The Role of Phantasm in Godfrey of Fontaines’ Theory of Intellection,” 581. 65. See Peter King, “Duns Scotus on the Reality of Self-Change,” in Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton, ed. Mary Louise Gill and James G. Lennox, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 227−28, 244; Calvin G. Normore, “Ockham, Self-Motion, and the Will,” in Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton, 296. 66. Dumont mentions that Scotus actually uses Godfrey’s own arguments against Henry. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 775. 67. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 55, lin. 3–16, p. 247. The objection is taken from Godfrey of Fontaines. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change

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His Mind on the Will?,” 750: “Godfrey reasons from the Aristotelian principle that whenever an agent is proximate to a patient, and the patient is suitably disposed, activity ensues. Given this principle, if the will were the cause of its own act, so that it was active with respect to itself, then it would always be in act, just as Aristotle says that the senses, if active, would always be sensing . . . Godfrey’s argument is that given the will must be passive to serve as the subject of its own acts, it cannot also be admitted, with Henry, that the will is active, for then the active and passive principles of volition would always be proximate to one another within the will. Volition would thus be continuous, contrary to the evident fact that we will after not having previously willed.” See further Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 751. 68. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 61, lin. 21, p. 249–n. 62, lin. 11, p. 250. Scotus offers a similar argument in his Ordinatio, Book I, D. 3, where he discusses the cause of knowledge (notitia). Scotus argues that if the rational soul is the total cause of intellection, then the soul could produce more perfect intellection in respect to a less valuable object simply by applying itself to the intellection of that object with a greater effort. Consequently, the “intellection of God” would not be more perfect than the “intellection of a fly.” Thus, Scotus maintains that the cause of knowledge is neither the soul alone nor the object alone but the integrated effort of the soul and the object. See Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Opera omnia, vol. 3, ed. C. Balić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1954), liber I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 491, lin. 8–16, p. 290. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 494, lin. 1–4, p. 292. 69. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 67, lin. 3–18, p. 252. 70. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 71, lin. 18–25, p. 253. See also Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 746. 71. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 72, lin. 1–7, p. 254. See also Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 746. 72. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 25, q. 1, n. 73, lin. 8, p. 254–n. 74, lin. 8, p. 255. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 746–47. 73. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 749, 756–58, 776, 780–81, 783–84, 793. The change of Scotus’s position is treated also in Ingham- and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus, 162–72; Ingham, “Did Scotus Modify His Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?,” 104–12; Tobias Hoffmann, “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,” Archives D’Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire au Moyen Âge 66 (1999): 204. A summary of Scotus’s discussion of the relationship of the intellect and the will is found in Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 365–66. 74. A thorough analysis of Scotus’s critique of Godfrey and defense of Henry in the Reportatio is found in Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 749–57. 75. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis, vol. 11.1, ed. Luke Wadding (Lyons, 1639), liber II, d. 25, q. unica., n. 20, p. 371. See also Ingham and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus, 168. 76. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 755: “To claim, with Henry, that volition cannot occur unless the object is present to the will in the intellect is simply to make volition dependent upon the object. But the production of any effect is dependent only upon its essential causes, for otherwise all essential causes together would not be sufficient to bring about their effect, which is a contradiction. As Scotus puts the difficulty in his related question concerning the object’s role in cognition, appeal to a sine qua non cause involves the following dilemma: either sine qua non cause is a class of essential cause beyond the recognized four of Aristotle, which is false, or an effect essentially depends upon something other than its causes, which is absurd.” 77. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis, liber II, d. 25, q. unica, n. 20, p. 371. See also Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 756.

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78. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 774–77. Ingham defends the thesis that Scotus’s novel position on the will in the Reportatio differs from the extreme voluntarism of Henry of Ghent. See Ingham, “Did Scotus Modify his Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?,” 112: “the expression causa sine qua non in the context of the rational will that Scotus articulates in Reportatio II, 25 does not mean what it meant in Henry’s teaching. This is because Henry does not identify the will’s freedom with its rationality, nor does he see the Anselmian affections as Scotus does.” See also Ingham “Did Scotus Modify His Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?,” 112–16. Overall, Ingham’s view is that Scotus’s later treatment accentuates the will’s superiority in terms of its rationality, which includes an account of the difference between rational and natural potencies and the two Anselmian affections. Scotus’s position in Reportatio, Book II, D. 25 is indeed more voluntarist in the sense that it calls the will the total cause of its act. That does not mean, however, that the will is totally independent of reason. Scotus highlights the intrinsic rationality of the will. See Ingham and Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus, 166–72. 79. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?”, 777–78. 80. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, Opera omnia, vol. 19, ed. Luca Modrić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1993), liber II, d. 26, q. unica, n. 1, lin. 5–7, p. 265. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Opera omnia, vol. 8, ed. B. Hechich et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 2001), liber II, d. 26, q. unica, n. 1, lin. 4–5, p. 271. 81. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 26, q. unica, n. 7, lin. 8–n. 8, lin. 13, p. 266. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber II, d. 26, q. unica, n. 11, lin. 43, p. 273–n. 13, lin. 51, p. 274. 82. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 778. See also Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber II, d. 26, q. unica, n. 15, lin. 12–n. 17, lin. 25, p. 268. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber II, d. 26, q. unica, n. 18, lin. 66, p. 276–n. 20, lin. 86, p. 277. 83. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis, liber II, d. 26, q. unica, p. 373. See also Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?,” 778–80 and Knuuttila, Emotions, 264. The other texts where Scotus discusses the distinction between enjoyment in via and enjoyment in patria are contained in Reportatio Parisiensis, Book II, D. 40, which is about whether the goodness of the act is derived from its end, and Ordinatio, Book IV, D. 49, Q. 5, which represents Scotus’s treatment of beatitude. In the first text, Scotus maintains that the distinction between the two kinds of enjoyment can be explained even if the will is the total cause of the enjoyment. In the second text, Scotus asserts that the distinction can be explained in terms of how the will is united with God. More precisely, the will can produce different effects depending on its distance from and proximity to the beatific object. See Dumont, “Did Duns Scotus Change His Mind on the Will?”, 781–83. 84. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (ed. Andrews et alii, 1997), IX, q. 15, lin. 5–7, p. 675. The distinction between rational and irrational potencies in Scotus is discussed in Ingham Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of Duns Scotus, 153–56; Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 367; Hoffmann, “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,” 199–203; Allan B. Wolter, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 163–80; Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 640–42. 85. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Opera philosophica, vol. 4, ed. R. Andrews et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1997), IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 21, p. 680. 86. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 22, pp. 680–681. 87. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 23, p. 681. 88. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 24, p. 681.

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89. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 27, lin. 4–5, p. 682. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 30, lin. 20, p. 682–lin. 1, p. 683. Cross states that Scotus’s a posteriori-argument in support of the will’s freedom is circular. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 86: “we can only know that, when we did a, we could have done not-a, or refrained from acting altogether, if we know that we are free.” 90. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 31, p. 683. 91. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 32, p. 683. 92. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 34, pp. 683–84. Williams claims that, for Scotus, the activity of free creatures resembles the activity of God in the sense that there is no ultimate explanation of their free actions. See Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” 210: “For Scotus, free actions are valuable because in them we express our likeness to the Creator, whose ‘superabundant sufficiency’ is mirrored, though imperfectly, in our own freedom. The paradigmatic instance of freedom is God’s creating the universe. As every medieval Christian philosopher agreed, there was nothing about this universe that constrained God to create it. And as Scotus takes pains to emphasize, there can be no finally adequate explanation of why God willed to create as he did. Freedom thus conceived is a pure perfection, and like every other pure perfection it can, for Scotus, be predicated univocally of God and creatures. So for Scotus free creatures (that is, creatures who have wills) are free in exactly the same sense in which God is free. It is their likeness to God’s unconditioned creative activity that makes free actions valuable and noble. And for those free actions, as for God’s, there can be no fully adequate explanation.” 93. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, Opera omnia, vol. 17, ed. C. Balić et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1966), liber I, d. 39, q. 5, n. 45, lin. 12, p. 493–n. 46, lin. 2, p. 494. Vos calls Scotus’s three types of freedom active, objective, and effective freedom. See Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 427–28. See also Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 366; Cross, Duns Scotus, 57–58; Douglas C. Langston, God’s Willing Knowledge: The Influence of Scotus’ Analysis of Omniscience (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), 27–28; Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 642–43. 94. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 39, q. 5, n. 47, lin. 3–n. 49, lin. 28, p. 494. 95. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 39, q. 5, n. 50, lin. 1–14, p. 495. See also Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 366–67; Cross, Duns Scotus, 58. 96. Knuuttila notes that one does not find in St Thomas Aquinas the idea of an alternative volition with respect to one and the same temporal moment. See Knuuttila, “The Emergence of Deontic Logic,” 234. According to Cross, the synchronic power for opposites had important implications for theology and metaphysics. In theology, it allowed Scotus to “give an account of God’s power as ranging over sets of compossible (i.e., compatible) states of affairs.” In metaphysics, it helped Scotus distinguish logical possibility from the possible exercise of real causal powers. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 58–60. 97. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 128–30; Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 139–40; idem, “Being Qua Being in Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus,” in The Logic of Being, ed. S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Tokyo: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), 209–10; Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” 196–97; Normore, “Ockham, Self-Motion, and the Will,” 298–99. According to Normore, Scotus adopted the device of instants of nature from Henry of Ghent. See Normore, “Ockham, Self-Motion, and the Will,” 296, 299, n. 19. 98. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, nn. 35–36, pp. 684–685.

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99. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 38, p. 685. 100. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, n. 39, p. 686. 101. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis IX, q. 15, a. 2, nn. 40–41, p. 686. See also Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 367. 102. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 86: “There is another objection to Scotus’s account of free agency. We often think of reasons as explaining actions. If we think that reasons for actions are always overwhelming, Scotus’s sort of account cannot allow for explanatory reasons lying behind actions. There is a further component of Scotus’s theory, however, which allows him to overcome this objection. Scotus’s account of the superabundant sufficiency of the human will ties in with a theory of what we might call the ‘moral psychology’ of choice-making.” According to Boler, suberabundant sufficiency characterizes any moral or immoral human action, whereas affectio iustitiae is a more specialized feature of moral autonomy. See John Boler, “Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will,” in Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 138. 103. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 87: “The precise nature of the affection for justice is a subject of some debate. Perhaps the most plausible is the view that the affection for justice inclines the will to act in accordance with the moral law irrespective of its connection with our own happiness. The idea is that these two inclinations explain the fact that the will has two different modes of operation: one in which it seeks selffulfillment or happiness, and one in which it seeks justice.” The distinction between affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae is discussed also in Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 423–24; Ingham and Dreyer 2004, 156–62; Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 367–68; Kent, “The Moral Life,” 236–37, 240–41; Thomas Williams, “From Metaethics to Action Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 345–49; idem, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” 197–200; Boler, “Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will,” 136–38, 142–43; idem, “Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 1 (1993): 116–25; Ingham “Did Scotus Modify His Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?,” 90–103; idem, “Scotus and the Moral Order,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 1 (1993): 129, 137–43; Hoffmann, “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,” 209–12; Lee Sukjae, “Scotus on the Will: The Rational Power and the Dual Affections,” Vivarium 34, no. 1 (1998): 43–44, 51–54; Perreiah, “Scotus on Human Emotions,” 331–32; Douglas C. Langston, “Did Scotus Embrace Anselm’s Notion of Freedom?,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5, no. 2 (1996): 157–58; Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, 39–41. 104. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 86–87. Dumont notes that by denying that the rational desire for happiness is a free appetite, Scotus contributed to the separation of morality from eudemonism. See Dumont, “John Duns Scotus,” 368. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 252: “[…] morality and virtue require that an agent reach beyond its own (individual or species) perfection, to love goods for their own intrinsic worth quite apart from whether they are (really or apparently) good for the agent or its kind.” 105. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis, vol. 11.1, ed. Luke Wadding (Lyons, 1639), liber II, q. 25, n. 20, p. 372. Anselm’s De casu diaboli is composed in the form of a dialogue between a master and a student and the subject-matter of the discussion is what caused the fall of the evil angels. In chapter 14, Anselm argues that in order for an intelligent being to be considered a moral agent, God must implant in that being not only the will for happiness, but also the will for rectitude which can discipline the will for happiness. Without the will for justice, an intelligent being will desire only happiness, and without the will for happiness an intelligent being will desire only

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what is just. Either way that being would not have the power to act otherwise than it does. Consequently, its will can be called neither just nor unjust. See Anselmus Cantuariensis, De casu diaboli (ed. Schmitt, 1946), cap. 14, lin. 18–30, p. 258. See also Calvin G. Normore, “Goodness and Rational Choice in the Early Middle Ages,” in Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2002), 36, 40; idem, “Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice,” Vivarium 36, no. 1 (1998): 27–28; Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri, introduction to Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, 10; Ingham “Did Scotus Modify His Position on the Relationship of Intellect and Will?”, 108–10; Langston, “Did Scotus Embrace Anselm’s Notion of Freedom?,” 146–47; John Boler, “Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67, no. 1 (1993): 114--15; Ingham, “Scotus and the Moral Order,” 129. There is some debate as to whether Scotus has two totally separate—metaphysical and moral—conceptions of freedom or a single notion of freedom that can be articulated under two distinct yet inseparable conceptual descriptions. Boler defends the thesis that the dual affections are neither necessary nor sufficient for the freedom of the will. The theory of the dual affections merely presupposes but does not explain the metaphysical account of freedom. See Boler, “Transcending the Natural,” 115–16, 125. Lee, on the other hand, argues that Scotus’s notion of superabundant sufficiency and the dual affections of the will are tightly connected. See Lee, “Scotus on the Will,” 40–41, 44–54. Adams argues that superabundant sufficiency and the affection for justice are linked teleologically. See Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 253: “Although conceptually distinct and logically independent, ‘the superabundant sufficiency’ and the affection for justice go together when considered teleologically. If imputability is in service of morals and merit, then a self-determining power for opposites would be otiose without the affection for justice that makes self-transcendent aim possible.” Williams maintains that Scotus “simply never thought through the connection between moral and metaphysical freedom.” See Williams, “From Metaethics to Action Theory,” 349. 106. This is almost like a catch 22 insofar as our will’s most important and deeply ingrained inclination—viz., the inclination for happiness—seems to be itself a matter of free choice. See Drummond 2012, “John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will,” 71–72. 107. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 120, lin. 23, p. 100–n. 121, lin. 8, p. 101. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 152, lin. 13, p. 103–n. 153, lin. 2, p. 105. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 55, p. 103. 108. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber II, d. 6, q. 2, pp. 470–472. 109. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber II, d. 6, q. 2, p. 474. 110. Georgedes stresses this point. See Georgedes, “The Serpent,” 163–64. See also Burnaby, Amor Dei, 272–73. 111. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber III, suppl. d. 26, p. 178. The idea that loving something for its own sake involves sharing is very significant because Scotus believes that, in virtue of its open character, the love of God above all necessarily entails loving our neighbor. See Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 442–46; Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love, 66–71. 112. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber III, suppl. d. 26, pp. 178–80. 113. See Egidius Romanus, Primus Sententiarum, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1, p. 14CDE. 114. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 137, lin. 14–21, p. 105. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 170, lin. 1–7, p. 113. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 93, p. 111.

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115. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 137, lin. 21–23, p. 105. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 171, lin. 8–15, p. 113. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 93, pp. 111–12. 116. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 137, lin. 23, p. 105–lin. 3, p. 106. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 172, lin. 16–20, p. 113. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 93, p. 112. 117. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 137, lin. 3–6, p. 106. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 173, lin. 21, p. 113–lin. 8, p. 114. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 93, p. 112. 118. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 138, lin. 7–20, p. 106. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 174, lin. 9, p. 114–lin. 3, p. 115. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 94, p. 112. Hoffmann claims that, for Scotus, God’s love of His own goodness is both necessary and free, and that there is a compatibility between the necessity and the freedom of the divine volition. An example of compatibility between freedom and necessity in the Trinity is the production of the Holy Spirit. Scotus’s example of compatibility between freedom and natural necessity is the case in which a person voluntarily throws himself/herself off a cliff and continues to will suicide while falling. See Hoffmann, “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,” 206–8, 220–22. Alliney explains that the absolute necessity of God’s self-love follows from the infinite actuality of the divine volition and the infinite character of the object willed. See Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 644. See also Vos et al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love,” 212–13. 119. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 139, lin. 21–25, p. 106. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 175, lin. 4–8, p. 115. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 94, p. 112. 120. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 150. 121. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 150. 122. Perreiah comments that steadfastness (firmitas) is a “quality of constancy in a will committed out of an affection for justice to the love of God.” See Perreiah, “Scotus on Human Emotions,” 338. Langston maintains that, for Scotus, steadfastness is merely a perfection of freedom and is not an essential part of the univocal notion of freedom. Thus, one should not identify steadfastness with freedom. See Langston, “Did Scotus Embrace Anselm’s Notion of Freedom?,” 154–56. See also Cross, Duns Scotus, 151. 123. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber IV, suppl. d. 49, qq. 9–10, a. 2, pp. 192–94. 124. See Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 645, 655. 125. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 150–151; Langston, God’s Willing Knowledge, 40–42; Hoffmann, “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,” 204–5. Williams argues that, regardless of the strong emphasis on the will’s fundamental metaphysical freedom, Scotus adopts the view that the will is free sometimes, but not always. Williams, “From Metaethics to Action Theory,” 348–49. 126. See Cross, Duns Scotus, 151. 127. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 48, p. 101. According to Bonansea, the blessed in heaven love God by a “moral necessity or necessity secundum quid.” This necessity becomes second nature and resembles the tendency of stones and metals to be drawn toward their natural place. See Bernardine M. Bonansea, “Duns Scotus’s Voluntarism,” in John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, ed. John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1965), 95. 128. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 140, lin. 26–31, p. 106. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 176, lin. 9, p. 115–lin. 3, p. 116. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 96, p. 112. Perreiah notes that the willing of the devout (devoti) is accompanied by a certain feeling of sweetness (dulcedo). See Perreiah, “Scotus on Human Emotions,” 338. 129. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber IV, suppl. d. 49, qq. 9–10, a. 2, pp. 194–96.

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130. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 141, lin. 1–9, p. 107. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 177, lin. 4–14, p. 116. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–3, n. 97, p. 113. 131. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 178, lin. 8–13, p. 117. 132. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 144, lin. 17–25, p. 107. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 179, lin. 14, p. 117–lin. 11, p. 118. 133. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber II, d. 6, q. 2, p. 462. See also Perreiah, “Scotus on Human Emotions,” 340–41. 134. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality, Ordinatio, liber II, d. 6, q. 2, pp. 462–64. 135. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 142, lin. 10–13, p. 142. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 180, lin. 12, p. 118–lin. 13, p. 119. 136. Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 143, lin. 14–16, p. 107. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars 3, q. 1–5, n. 181, lin. 14, p. 119–lin. 6, p. 120. 137. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars. 2, q. 2, n. 78, lin. 10–12, p. 59. 138. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Lectura, liber I, d. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 123, lin. 16, p. 101–lin. 2, p. 102. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, liber I, d. 1, pars. 2, q. 2, n. 156, lin. 7–18, p. 106. Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A, d. 1, pars 2, q. 1, n. 56, p. 103. Scotus’s argument is also discussed in Williams, “The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus’s Moral Philosophy,” 211–12. 139. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 4, fol. 17ra. 140. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 4, fol. 17ra–va. 141. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 4, fol. 17va. 142. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 4, fol. 17va. 143. Thomas Anglicus, Liber propugnatorius, d. 1, q. 4, fol. 17vb. 144. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3c, n. 130, lin. 3, p. 457–lin. 29, p. 458. 145. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3c, n. 131, lin. 30–45, p. 458. 146. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3b, n. 122, lin. 3, p. 452–lin. 32, p. 453. Alliney points out that Auriol ignores the ontological aspect of Scotus’s analysis of beatific enjoyment, which is based on the distinction between natural and free causes. For Auriol, the will behaves like a natural cause. The presence of the object is sufficient to necessitate its act of enjoyment. See Alliney, “La Contingenza della Fruizione Beatifica,” 654, n. 77. 147. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3b, n. 123, lin. 33, p. 453–lin. 65, p. 454. See also Davenport, “Esse Egressus and Esse Apparens,” 81–82. 148. Petrus Aureoli, Scriptum super primum Sententiarum, d. 1, sect. 8C, a. 3b, n. 129, lin. 133, p. 456–lin. 164, p. 457. 149. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, vol. 2, d. 1, q. 6, a. 1, lin. 4–20, p. 91. 150. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 6, a. 2, lin. 6–17, p. 92. 151. See chapter 3, section 5 above. 152. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 6, a. 2, lin. 30, p. 93–lin. 70, p. 94. 153. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 7, a. 1, lin. 3–21, p. 97. 154. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 7, a. 1, lin. 30, p. 98–lin. 45, p. 99. 155. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 7, a. 1, lin. 46, p. 99–lin. 70, p. 100.

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156. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 7, a. 2, lin. 3, p. 101–lin. 3, p. 102. 157. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 1, lin. 2, p. 104–lin. 53, p. 106. 158. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 1, lin. 58, p. 106–lin. 68, p. 107. 159. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 1, lin. 121–133, p. 109. 160. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 1, lin. 135, p. 110–lin. 159, p. 111. 161. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 1, lin. 174, p. 112–lin. 189, p. 113. 162. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 2, lin. 3–15, p. 114. 163. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 2, lin. 16, p. 114–lin. 27, p. 115. 164. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 2, lin. 28–46, p. 115. 165. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 8, a. 2, lin. 51–60, p. 116. 166. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 9, lin. 16–20, p. 120. 167. Hervaeus Natalis (ca. 1250–1323) was a French Dominican theologian. He lectured on the Sentences in 1301–1302 or shortly after, served as regent master of the Dominicans from 1307 to 1309, was elected provincial in 1309 and minister general in 1318. Hervaeus is known for insisting that Thomas Aquinas be canonized and for writing a treatise of defense of Aquinas’s views (Defensio doctrinae fratris Thomas). Hervaeus was also very critical of the views of Henry of Ghent, Peter Auriol and Durandus of Saint Pourçain. See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 140–41. 168. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 9, a. 2, lin. 64, p. 124–lin. 104, p. 126. 169. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 9, a. 2, lin. 160–80, p. 180. 170. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 9, a. 2, lin. 295, p. 135–lin. 317, p. 136. 171. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 9, a. 2, lin. 320–31, p. 136. 172. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 9, a. 2, lin. 355, p. 137–lin. 361, p. 138. 173. Franciscus de Marchia (sive de Esculo), Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, d. 1, q. 9, a. 2, lin. 340–54, p. 137; lin. 362, p. 138–lin. 403, p. 139. 174. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 3–4, p. 486. 175. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 1–11, p. 487. 176. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 21, p. 490–lin. 6, p. 491. See Ioannes Duns Scotus, Quodlibetum, q. 16, a. 2, n. 36, lin. 5, p. 178–lin. 4, p. 179. See also Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 256; Marino Damiata, Il Contenzioso fra Duns Scoto e Ockham (Firenze: Studi Francescani, 1993), 92–93. 177. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 12–19, p. 487. 178. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 20, p. 487–lin. 10, p. 488. 179. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 263. See also Knuuttila and Holopainen, “Conditional Will and Conditional Norms in Medieval Thought,” 118–19.

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180. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 17, p. 493–lin. 1, p. 494. 181. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 14–25, p. 494. Knuuttila says that scholastic thinkers developed three models explaining how an individual can fail to choose the consequent. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 263: “If the agent does not choose the consequent, then (1) the antecedent is not willed effectively but only conditionally (in the sense of velleitas) or (2) the antecedent is genuinely willed but the knowledge of the consequent is temporarily overshadowed by an occurrent emotion or (3) the will does not will the consequent since it no longer attaches itself to the antecedent.” See also Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 256: “if neither the intellectual apprehensions, the will’s inclinations or habits, nor their combination can determine the will, the will’s own acts in the form of efficacious generic volitions can combine with beliefs and virtuous habits, or the native inclination, to will objects whose sensory apprehension is pleasure-producing to determine its later acts. For example, the efficacious generic volition to do whatever right reason dictates, or to eat all available sweets, combines with the belief that right reason dictates this, or that this food is sweet, to determine a volition to do this act commanded by right reason, or a volition to consume this particular sweet.” See also Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 256–57. 182. See Panaccio, “Intellections and Volitions in Ockham’s Nominalism,” 86–88. 183. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 5–17, p. 490. 184. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 19–21, p. 498. See also Damiata, Il Contenzioso fra Duns Scoto e Ockham, 93. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 10–17, p. 500. See also Damiata, Il Contenzioso fra Duns Scoto e Ockham, 94. 185. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 2–12, p. 501. 186. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 13–22, p. 501. 187. See Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 255. 188. See Normore, “Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice,” 33. 189. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibet I, (OTh, vol. 9, ed. Wey), q. 16, p. 87. See also Normore, “Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice,” 34. 190. See Normore, “Ockham, Self-Motion, and the Will,” 294–98. 191. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 16–19, p. 502. See Normore, “Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice,” 34–35: “Ockham’s position gives the will a very special place. Alone among agents either corporeal or spiritual, the will is able to move from potency to act without a ‘triggering’ cause. This aspect of the structure of the will is crucial to Ockham’s account.” Adams claims that Ockham recognizes that certain inclinations “pertain to the human will in and of itself” but denies that these inclinations define the scope of the will or causally determine its acts. See Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 255. 192. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 20, p. 502–lin. 5, p. 503, lin. 5. 193. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 7–10, p. 503. 194. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6 lin. 15–16, p. 504. 195. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 18–20, p. 504. 196. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 11–12, p. 505. 197. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 21–23, p. 505.

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198. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 11–19, p. 503. 199. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 11–20, p. 503. 200. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 1–9, p. 504. 201. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 10–14, p. 504. 202. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 20–24, p. 504. 203. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 25, p. 504–lin. 4, p. 505. The notion of conformity with God’s will is an essential part of Ockham’s ethics. Conformity with the divine will means to will whatever God wants to be willed. But this also means to love God above all. See Työrinoja, “Regularity of Will and the Problem of Egoism,” 956–97; Holopainen, “William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics,” 142. Thus, if a damned individual can will to be devoid of beatitude because God wants him/her to will so, then he/she inevitably loves God. But it is surely quite odd to say that a damned individual can love God and yet remain damned for all of eternity. Ockham specifies, however, that a situation like this can occur only if the damned were left to his/her own resources (si sibi relinqueretur). 204. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 5–10, p. 505. 205. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 12–15, p. 505. Ockham differentiates three ways in which a will can conform itself to another will: (1) by willing what the other will has willed, (2) by willing what the other will wants it to will and (3) by willing something in a manner similar to that of the other will. See Peter King, “Ockham’s Ethical Theory,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, edited by Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 237. 206. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 16–20, p. 505. 207. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 23, p. 505–lin. 5, p. 506. 208. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 6–10, p. 506. 209. See Auguste Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 18 (1922): 268–69. 210. See Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” 269. 211. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 14, p. 506–lin. 1, p. 507. 212. Guillelmus de Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 6, lin. 1–7, p. 507. 213. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, OTh, vol. 7, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), q. 16, lin. 5–7, p. 350. 214. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 7–14, p. 350. 215. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 15–16, p. 350. 216. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 22, p. 350–lin. 5, p. 351. 217. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 6–9, p. 351. 218. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 10–14, p. 351.

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219. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 19–20, p. 351. 220. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 21, p. 351–lin. 4, p. 352. See Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” 254. 221. See Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” 254. 222. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 5–7, p. 352. 223. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 8–10, p. 352. See Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” 254. 224. See Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” 254. 225. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibet III, OTh, vol. 9, ed. Joseph C. Wey (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1980), q. 14, lin. 60, p. 255–lin. 72, p. 256. 226. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibet III, q. 14, lin. 74–81, p. 256. 227. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibet III, q. 14, lin. 83, p. 256–lin. 91, p. 257. See also Holopainen, “William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics,” 140–42. 228. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quodlibet III, q. 14, lin. 91–94, p. 257. See also Holopainen, “William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics,” p. 140. 229. See Holopainen, “William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics,” 142. See also Knuuttila, “The Emergence of Deontic Logic,” 236–37: “In the fourteenth century the most discussed problem pertaining to the logic of norms was that presented by William Ockham as the question whether God can command men to hate Him. The question was theoretically interesting because it offered an extreme case for considering the rationality of a system of norms. According to Ockham, God can add into the divine law an obligation to the effect that all obligations must be violated. Such a rule, if it is given at the same level as the others, makes the system of norms irrational, because then no rule can be fulfilled, without violating the others. God can make it impossible for man to act meritoriously by making the divine law irrational.” Oberman states that the question whether God can command someone to hate Him is a standard test case for whether it is possible to divorce God’s wisdom from His will. Oberman notes that, for Ockham, a man commanded to hate God would be psychologically perplexed and it would be impossible for him to obey God’s command. Oberman also points out that the real problem is whether God would not contradict Himself if He were to command to be hated. See Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 92–93. It should be stressed, however, that Ockham says that if God commands that He be hated, the created will can do so (potest hoc facere). The impossibility of doing what God commands concerns the case in which God commands that He should not be loved for a given time. Holopainen notes this difference as well. See Holopainen, “William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics,” 143. The case of God commanding not to be loved or to be hated is also discussed in King, “Ockham’s Ethical Theory,” 232 and Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 261. 230. Henry of Harclay began his theological studies at Paris in 1299–1300 and lectured on Lombard’s Sentences a year or two after Scotus had finished his Paris lectures. Harclay eventually returned to Oxford, became a Master of Theology some time before 1312 and eventually took the post of Chancellor of Oxford University. Harclay has left us with a commentary on Book I of the Sentences and a set of Ordinary Questions. See G. Mark Henninger, introduction to Henry of Harclay, Ordinary Questions, I–XIV, vol. 1, ed. Mark G. Henninger, xvii–lviii, trans. Raymond Edwards and Mark G. Henninger (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), xvii–xxx. 231. See Henry of Harclay, Ordinary Questions, vol. 1, ed. Mark G. Henninger, trans. Raymond Edwards and Mark G. Henninger (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), Q. VII, a. 1, n. 14, p. 290–n. 23, 295. 232. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 11–13, p. 352. See also Courtenay, Capacity and Volition, 120–21. 233. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 15, lin. 21, p. 331–lin. 6, p. 332. Normore surmises that Ockham departs in two ways from Scotus’s position on the contingency of beatific enjoyment by claiming that the blessed (1)

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can actively reject the beatific vision and (2) turn toward any other object instead. See Normore, “Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice,” 35. It is clear, however, that this does not apply in the case in which God is thought to be the total cause of the beatific acts. 234. It is also useful to mention in this connection that Ockham criticized Peter Auriol for the claim that infused grace necessarily pleases God. According to Ockham, God can—de potentia absoluta—accept an individual for salvation and eternal life without the mediation of infused grace. Ockham’s position on the non-necessity of grace de potentia Dei absoluta was condemned as heretical by the members of the Avignon Commission. It was thought that Ockham’s view on the relationship between grace and divine acceptance leads to Pelagianism even without the qualification “de potentia Dei absoluta.” See Rega Wood, “Ockham’s Repudiation of Pelagianism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 355–56; Courtenay, Capacity and Volition, 123–26; Etzkorn, “Walter Chatton and the Controversy on the Absolute Necessity of Grace,” 36–37. See also Pelzer, “Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam,” 250–52. 235. See Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 265–67. See also Työrinoja, “Regularity of Will and the Problem of Egoism,” 954–55; Holopainen, “William Ockham’s Theory of the Foundations of Ethics,” 135. 236. See Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” 267. 237. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, OTh, vol. 5, ed. Gedeon Gál and Rega Wood (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1981), q. 15, lin. 7, p. 341–lin. 7, p. 342. See also Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, q. 20, lin. 10–17, p. 443. 238. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum secundum Sententiarum, q. 15, lin. 16–22, p. 344. 239. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones variae, OTh, vol. 8, ed. Girard J. Etzkorn, Francis E. Kelley and Joseph C. Wey (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1984), q. 6, a. 11, dub. 6, lin. 562–75, p. 312. 240. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones variae, q. 6, a. 11, dub. 6, lin. 576–84, p. 313. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 15, lin. 3–18, p. 330. 241. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 13–19, p. 352. 242. Guillelmus de Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum, q. 16, lin. 19–21, p. 352. 243. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, lin. 5–6, p. 51. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, lin. 5–6, p. 92. 244. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 34, lin. 10–12, p. 60. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 34, lin. 1–11, p. 107. 245. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 34, lin. 12–17, p. 60. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 35, lin. 12–20, p. 107. 246. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 35, lin. 18–22, p. 60. 247. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, ed. Joseph C. Wey and Girard J. Etzkorn (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2005), liber IV, q. 10, dub. 1, n. 11, lin. 1–8, p. 338. 248. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber IV, q. 10, dub. 1, n. 15, lin. 17–24, p. 338. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber IV, q. 10, dub. 1, n. 19, lin. 9–11, p. 339. 249. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber IV, q. 10, dub. 1, n. 20, lin. 12–20, p. 339.

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250. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 36, lin. 25, p. 60–lin. 5, p. 61. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 38, lin. 12–23, p. 108. 251. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 39, lin. 24, p. 108–lin. 8, p. 109. 252. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 40, lin. 9–14, p. 109. 253. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 37, lin. 7–11, p. 61. 254. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 41, lin. 16, p. 109–lin. 1, p. 110. 255. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 22, lin. 12, p. 101–n. 23, lin. 6, p. 102. 256. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 42, lin. 2–4, p. 110. 257. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 43, lin. 5–7, p. 110. 258. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 44, lin. 8–16, p. 110. 259. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 46, lin. 27–29, p. 110. 260. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 38, lin. 13–17, p. 61. 261. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 46, lin. 29, p. 110–lin. 3, p. 111. 262. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 47, lin. 4–12, p. 111. 263. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias, ed. Joseph C. Wey (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1989), prologus, q. 7, a. 1, lin. 45–55, p. 358. 264. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias, prologus, q. 7, a. 3, lin. 77–84, p. 380. 265. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 49, lin. 28, p. 111–lin. 8, p. 112. 266. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 48, lin. 14–27, p. 111. 267. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 30, lin. 10–18, p. 59. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 32, lin. 6–16, p. 106. 268. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 3, n. 100, lin. 13–19, p. 126. 269. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 9, lin. 23, p. 52–lin. 4, p. 53. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 9, lin. 11–24, p. 94. 270. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 10, lin. 6–9, p. 53. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 10, lin. 25, p. 94–lin. 5, p. 95. 271. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 29, lin. 5–24, p. 104. 272. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 171; Knuuttila and Holopainen, “Conditional Will and Conditional Norms in Medieval Thought,” 1993, 122. 273. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 27, lin. 9–16, p. 58.Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 29, lin. 18–24, p. 104.

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274. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 28, lin. 17–25, p. 58. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 30, lin. 25, p. 104–lin. 6, p. 105. 275. Gualterus Chatton, Reportatio super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 29, lin. 27, p. 58–lin. 9, p. 59. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 31, lin. 7, p. 105–lin. 5, p. 106. 276. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 3, n. 63, lin. 22–25, p. 115. 277. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 33, lin. 17–30, p. 106. Gualterus Chatton, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 3, n. 97, lin. 17–23, p. 125. 278. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 1, a. 3 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 9va–b). 279. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 1, a. 3 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 9vb). 280. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 1, a. 3 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 2vb). 281. In his detailed study of the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, Schabel points out that no medieval theologian held that God can undo a past event and make it so that the event never happened. See Schabel, Theology at Paris, 229. 282. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 1, a. 3 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 1va–b). 283. Riccardus Filius Radulphi, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, q. 1, a. 3 (MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat., 15853, fol. 2vb). 284. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes (Lyons, 1518), q. 9, Decisio questionis, B. 285. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1. 286. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1C. See also Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 95–96: “Now, it was Robert’s contention that God can separate any two things which are really distinct, and that if one of these things is prior to another it can be made to exist by itself, whereas the posterior cannot be made to exist by itself. And with these principles Robert analyzed what God can do, by His absolute power in the case of the blessed.” 287. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1C. See also Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 96–97. 288. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1D. 289. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1D. 290. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1D. 291. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1D. 292. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1F. See also Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 96. Courtenay notes that, for Holcot, the expression “de facto” means how things actually occur. See Courtenay, Capacity and Volition, 131. 293. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1G. 294. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 1J. See also Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 98. For Holcot, God could conserve in the same subject two contrary physical qualities—e.g., heat and cold—and prevent their mutual destruction by suspending their activity. See Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 39. 295. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2K. 296. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2K. 297. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2L. 298. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2M. 299. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2L. 300. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2L. 301. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2N. 302. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones (Lyons, 1518), liber I, q. 3, a. 3. 303. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 3.

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304. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 3. McGrade also points out that, for Holcot, we are obligated to resist temptation only up to the point at which we are overcome by it. See McGrade, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham,” 75–76. For the complete argument, see Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 3, A, Secundum; P, Ad secundum. 305. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 3. 306. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 3. 307. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 3. 308. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 3. 309. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber I, q. 3, a. 3. 310. McGrade lists a number of Holcotian-type objections against the freedom of the will cited and examined in Thomas Bradwardine’s De causa dei. See McGrade, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham,” 82. 311. See McGrade, “Enjoyment at Oxford after Ockham,” 83–85. See also Thomas Bradwardinus, De causa Dei, contra Pelagivm, et de virtute cavsarvm, ad suos Mertonenses, libri tres (London, 1618; reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1964), liber II, c. 3, p. 454B–E. 312. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2O. 313. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2O. 314. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 9, a. 2O. 315. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8A. 316. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 2K. 317. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 2L. 318. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 2M. 319. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 2N. 320. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 2P. See Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 36. 321. Kennedy points out that, for Holcot, God can produce a meritorious will-act without the will’s co-causality, or even refuse to cooperate with a person’s act of loving God. Moreover, Holcot seems to think that we can never know with absolute certainty whether the effects that we observe are caused by created beings or by God alone. This is so because all things that God normally does together with the creature’s co-causality can also be done by God without that co-causality. See Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 36–37. 322. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 1L. 323. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 1D. Holcot denied that there is a necessary relationship between merit and divine reward. In the present system of the world, good deeds are always rewarded and bad deeds are always punished, but God can—de potentia absoluta—abolish the present order of merits and demerits. See Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 89. 324. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 1E. 325. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 1E. 326. Robertus Holkot, Determinationes, q. 8, a. 1F. 327. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber IV, q. 8, a. 2P. See also Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, 99. 328. Robertus Holkot, In quatuor libros Sententiarum quaestiones, liber IV, q. 8, a. 2P. Gelber points out that Holcot acknowledged not only that God could deceive someone but that He had also done so in the actual world according to the testimony of Scripture. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 215–16. The effect of admitting that God might and did, in fact, deceive amounts to eliminating any absolute certainty in God’s promises. See Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise, 217–21. 329. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, ed. John Mair (Paris, 1512), liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 30vb. See also Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians, 246–47. 330. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 31ra.

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331. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 30rb–va. 332. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 31va. See also Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians, 247. 333. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 32ra. 334. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 32va. 335. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33vb. 336. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 32va. 337. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33ra. 338. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 32va–b. 339. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33ra. 340. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33vb. 341. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33vb. 342. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 33vb–34ra. 343. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 34ra. 344. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 34ra. 345. Henricus Totting de Oyta, Adam goddam super quattuor libros sententiarum, liber I, d. 1, q. 10, a. 1, fol. 34rb. 346. Robert Cowton (ca. 1274–ca. 1315) was a Franciscan theologian. He was ordained in 1300 and composed a Sentences commentary in 1309–1311. Cowton criticized Scotus on many counts. See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 245. 347. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, (in Robert Graystones, Questions on the Human Will) lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 1. 348. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, nn. 10–12. 349. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, nn. 27–28. 350. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 29. 351. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 30. 352. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 31. 353. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 32. 354. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 33. 355. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 34. 356. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 35. 357. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 39. 358. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 40. 359. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, nn. 41–43. 360. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, nn. 13–26. 361. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 44. 362. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 1, n. 45. 363. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, nn. 84–86.

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364. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 87, nn. 88–122, nn. 155–214. 365. Robertus Graystones, Commentarius super Sententias, lib. I, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, nn. 220–21. 366. The question of the passivity of the will of the blessed was also well known during the Reformation. A short treatment of the question is found in the Annotatiunculae on the first book of the Sentences of the Catholic theologian Johann Eck of Ingolstadt. Eck was instrumental in the preparation of the bull Exsurge Domine (June 15, 1520), which condemned Luther’s teaching. Eck points out that the will is passive with respect to the beatific acts. The saints cannot fail to love and enjoy God. Nevertheless, the will of the saints is not coerced. It is simply made immutable. Ioannes Eckius, In primum librum Sententiarum annotatiunculae, ed. Walter J. Moore, Jr. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), d. 1, lin. 20–37, p. 20. On Eck’s relationship with Luther, see Carter Lindberg, The European Reformations (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 84–88.

Beatific Enjoyment in the Late Middle Ages and Beyond Conclusion and Summary

Interest in the concept of beatific enjoyment persisted throughout the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, although the treatments of the concept become more and more perfunctory and repetitive the closer we get to the sixteenth century, Martin Luther’s Reformation movement and the dawn of the modern era. The tendency of late medieval discussions of enjoyment to become more and more routine can be briefly illustrated on the basis of the work of Erfurt University theologians. As is well-known, Erfurt University was Martin Luther’s alma mater. Luther (1483–1546) earned the Master of Arts degree at Erfurt University (1505) and, consequently, entered the Augustinian monastery in Erfurt to study theology. At the monastery, Luther served as a sententiary bachelor (1509–1511) and wrote his own marginal notes on Lombard’s Sentences. 1 By Luther’s time, the theological training at Erfurt had a very firm reputation based on a long tradition stretching back to religious houses of study founded almost a century prior to the official inauguration of Erfurt University in 1392. 2 One of the earliest treatments of enjoyment from an Erfurt theologian is found in the Sentences commentary of the Augustinian Angelus Dobelinus. Dobelinus (or the “Angel of Döbeln”) was Erfurt University’s first theology professor and dean. Since he received his theological training at Prague, where he studied under John Klenkok, and at Paris, where he earned his theology doctorate, Dobelinus can be seen as the founding father of Erfurt theology, especially the theology of Erfurt Augustinians. Dobelinus’s Sentences commentary (Lectura in Sententias) is preserved in a single manuscript owned by the Jena University Library and dates probably from the period when Dobelinus lectured on the Sentences at Paris (1373–75). 3 The commentary covers all four books of Lombard’s Sentences and the treatment of enjoyment it contains is among the most extensive treatments in the commentary. Dobelinus’s treatment of enjoyment abounds in references to the views of early fourteenth-century theological authorities, such as Duns Scotus, Gregory of Rimini, Adam Wodeham, Richard Kilvington (ca. 1302–61), 4 Robert Holcot, Roger Roseth and Richard FitzRalph. We also find mention of more contemporary authors 253

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such as John Klenkok, Richard Brinkley (ca. 1325–73) 5 and Hugolin of Orvieto (†1375) as well as the fairly unknown figures Bonsemblant (1327–69) 6 and Facinus of Asti (theology bachelor at Paris during 1361–63 and theology doctor before 1373). 7 Dobelinus’s treatment of enjoyment contains two principal questions—the first focusing on whether the enjoyment of the highest good is solely an operation and pleasure of the created will and the second examining whether something other than the highest good can satisfy the will. 8 A closer look at Dobelinus’s discussion of enjoyment reveals Dobelinus’s profound familiarity with the various issues examined by early fourteenth-century Sentences commentators in the context of the first distinction of book I. Dobelinus discusses problems such as whether enjoyment is an incomplex or complex volition, whether there is a third thing or middle act (res media, actus medius) between enjoyment and use, whether enjoyment itself requires cognition as a partial efficient cause or whether it actually is a certain kind of cognition, etc. How original is Dobelinus in general? Perhaps Dobelinus is not very original, according to Damasus Trapp’s verdict, 9 even though he is often critical with respect to his most cherished authorities, according to Zumkeller. 10 The fact remains, however, that Dobelinus’s treatment of enjoyment, in particular, is astoundingly rich and complex. One cannot read this treatment without at the same time acknowledging the highest degree of rigor and sophistication that the debate about the nature and possibility of beatific enjoyment had achieved by the middle of the fourteenth century. On the other hand, one is hard pressed to find novel positions and problems. What we see, instead, is the rehearsal of already familiar views and arguments to the point of saturation. Decades after Dobelinus, as we move closer to the turn of the fourteenth century and enter the fifteenth century, we tend to discover trimmed down treatments of enjoyment. Most of the surviving Sentences commentaries from Erfurt theologians stem from the Franciscan tradition. A representative example of the state of the debate about beatific enjoyment from early fifteenth-century Erfurt is found in the Sentences commentary of Matthias Döring (ca. 1393–1469), also known as Doctor Armatus (i.e. “The Armed Doctor”). Döring was a talented preacher and was regarded as a highly competent interpreter and defender of Catholic doctrine. Prior to receiving theological training at Erfurt, Döring had actually studied in England for five years. 11 Döring’s Sentences commentary has survived in a single manuscript owned by the Münich State Library. Ludger Meier has discovered that Duns Scotus is the most often cited theological authority in Döring’s Sentences commentary. Besides being a faithful follower of the Subtle Doctor, Döring is likewise a reliable interpreter of Scotus’s views. 12 One can therefore see significant value in Döring’s work insofar as reading Döring can help one understand Scotus better. Döring’s treatment of enjoyment is in fact a perfect illustration of Döring’s hermeneutic abilities.

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Döring’s treatment of enjoyment is to a substantial degree representative of the tendency of late Erfurt Sentences commentators to remain closer to the letter of Lombard’s text, but the treatment also contains an examination of the problem of differentiated enjoyments. The problem is not itself formulated as a question to be discussed. Rather, the problem emerges as a counter-argument to the part of Döring’s conclusion which states that only the immutable Trinity is the genuine object of ordinate enjoyment. One immediately realizes that the counter-argument is in the text for the sake of exercise. According to this counter-argument, the Trinity functions as an adequate object of enjoyment either under a single aspect (sub unica ratione) or under several aspects (sub pluribus rationibus). But the Trinity cannot be subsumed under a single aspect because the aspect proper to the Father differs from that proper to the Son. Neither can the Trinity be subsumed under several aspects because then one could—without contradiction—enjoy God under one aspect but not enjoy God under a separate aspect, which is impossible. 13 Döring responds to this argument by means of a “Scotist solution” (ratio Scotica). This solution is then itself subjected to dialectical examination in terms of objections raised by John of Ripa (fl. 1357–1368). 14 In his assessment of Ripa’s objections, Döring points out that “[m]any who have attempted to ensnare this [Scotus’s] position have only managed to trap their own feet.” 15 Clearly, Döring did not think much of Ripa’s criticism of Scotus. What is especially rewarding about Döring’s text is the effort itself to clarify what Scotus had meant and whether or not Scotus had been understood correctly by critics such as John of Ripa. Döring explains that Scotus’s position, as criticized by Ripa, amounts to the following: “the act of the enjoyable vision has the divine essence as a primary object, but the divine persons as a secondary object; however, God can by means of a special outpouring assist man with respect to the evidence of the primary object and not of the secondary [one]” 16 What we see happening in late medieval discussions of beatific enjoyment—and Döring’s discussion is in my view a textbook example—is an attempt to come to full terms with what has already been done by past masters by revisiting, elucidating and consolidating their positions and arguments. Interest in the concept of beatific enjoyment in the sixteenth century gradually disappears, and this happens in great part as a result of lack of interest in commenting on Lombard’s Sentences. 17 One of the last extensive and rich treatments of the concept of beatific enjoyment is found in the Sentences commentaries of the renowned Scottish theologian and philosopher John Mair (1467–1550). Mair studied and taught theology and logic at Paris, where he met influential historical figures such as Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (1469–1536), Jean Calvin (1509–1564) and St Ignatius Loyola (1491–1556). 18 Mair’s commentaries are not only an encyclopedia of medieval scholastic systematic theology, but an important witness in connection with the influence of humanism on scholastic au-

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thors. One can still find surprises in Mair’s lengthy and tedious treatments of the already sorely familiar questions and problems pertaining to the object and psychology of enjoyment, the differentiated enjoyments of the Trinity, the contingency and impeccability of the saints in heaven. 19 Yet, it is difficult to dispel the feeling that the passion that once propelled the debate forward has long been gone as the snows of yesteryear. At the dawn of the modern era, one can hardly find a more pronounced rejection of the entire scholastic exploration of transcendent states of consciousness than in Thomas Hobbes’s masterpiece of political philosophy, the Leviathan (1651) In his discussion of the human passions in Leviathan, Book I, Ch. 6, Hobbes defines felicity as the uninterrupted success in the satisfaction of desire. The satisfaction of one desire leads inevitably to another. The series of desire is endless, at least in this life, for, as Hobbes states, “there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquility of mind, while we life here.” What about supernatural felicity? If such is possible for those of us who honor God, then we “shall no sooner know, than enjoy.” However, such supernatural joys are now as incomprehensible “as the word of Schoole-men Beatificall Vision is unintelligible.” 20 Hobbes’s injunction against theological discourse about transcendent states of consciousness—beatific vision and enjoyment—may have a perfectly legitimate explanation in terms of Hobbes’s understanding of the scope of philosophical investigation. 21 His injunction in effect anticipates a famous twentieth century ban on pseudo-philosophical questions and discourses—viz., the ending of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) of the Austrian Philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein: “What we cannot speak off we must pass over in silence.” 22 Is the term “beatific enjoyment” a misnomer? It certainly was not treated as a misnomer by medieval scholastic theologians. Is it permissible and legitimate to talk about beatific enjoyment today without being accused of engaging in a meaningless intellectual exercise and vain curiosity? I believe that it is, at least pragmatically speaking, insofar as something like what scholastic theologians meant by the term “fruitio” may still be relevant to individuals who have embraced a religious way of life. Furthermore, the very idea of what contemporary moral philosopher John Kekes calls “the rightful enjoyment of our being” comes close to the medieval scholastic understanding of fruitio ordinata. A genuinely good and enjoyable human lifestyle, according to Kekes, affirms human dignity and involves integrity of character, reflectivity and autonomy. 23 Medieval scholastic theologians would agree with most details of Kekes’s account of rightful enjoyment. They would only add that the object of genuine enjoyment cannot possibly be our own being alone, since we are not alone in this universe, and that enjoyment is not to be sought in this life only, since there is hope for life everlasting.

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My aim in this book has been to examine the theological concept of beatific enjoyment (fruitio) in light of its origin in the work of St Augustine and in the context of commenting on Peter Lombard’s Sentences in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In the first chapter of the study, I demonstrated that, for St Augustine, enjoyment and use are volitional attitudes with respect to ends and means. St Augustine maintained that only the Holy Trinity ought to be enjoyed, and that everything else in the world, including fellow humans, must be enjoyed in the Holy Trinity. It became clear that St Augustine treats enjoyment as a volitional attitude, but that he also links enjoyment with the notions of delight (laetitia) and bliss or joy (gaudium). The enjoyment of God requires redirecting the human will and coordinating the whole affective life of the believer. The influence of divine grace proved essential for the effective turning of the will toward God. It was further shown that the enjoyment of God in heaven can be understood as the ultimate realization and fulfillment of our love of God. The state of beatific enjoyment and life in heaven is also characterized by a sense of deep volitional calmness. After having dealt with St Augustine’s concept of enjoyment, I discussed the significance of Peter Lombard’s Sentences for the transmission of St Augustine’s views and as the point of departure for the scholastic conversation and debate about enjoyment. St Augustine’s distinction between enjoyment and use became the basis of the outline of Lombard’s Sentences. Lombard did not merely assemble St Augustine’s views, but provided a critical assessment of certain aspects of those views. Unlike St Augustine, Lombard stressed the possibility of having an experience of enjoyment already in the present life. In addition to the traditional Augustinian themes, Lombard was interested in the question whether the virtues ought to be enjoyed. He claimed that we should love or enjoy the virtues both for their own sake and for the sake of God. In the second chapter, I turned toward the state of the debate about beatific enjoyment in the thirteenth century, and I surveyed the main topics and questions in the debate on the basis of the writings (primarily Sentences commentaries) of Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarantaise, Robert Kilwardby, William de la Mare, Giles of Rome and Richard of Middleton. I treated the objects of enjoyment and concluded that only God is the legitimate object of enjoyment. Anything other than God—our fellow humans, the virtues, the faculties of the human being—must be regarded as an object of use or as an object of a weaker type of enjoyment. A question which received partial attention was whether the blessed have a single act of enjoyment with respect to the Trinity. The standard answer was that beatific enjoyment must be a unique act due to the common divine character and goodness of the persons of the Trinity. I also demonstrated that the term “fruitio” was usually understood to signify an act of the will. Sometimes, however, the term was also taken in the sense of both some-

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thing intellectual and something volitional. A strong emphasis on the intellectual character of fruitio was found in the writings of William de la Mare. According to de la Mare, beatific enjoyment should be called an act of the intellect. Another remarkable aspect of William’s view of enjoyment was the idea of two distinct types of pleasure—a pleasure concomitant with the act of vision and a pleasure concomitant with the act of love of God. The analysis of different thirteenth-century scholastic definitions of “fruitio” revealed two other key aspects of enjoyment—pleasure and rest. It was believed that beatific enjoyment involves pleasure, but a clear distinction between enjoyment and pleasure was not visibly drawn and systematically examined. Rest was understood as a quality of volitional satisfaction and fulfillment. Nevertheless, rest did not imply total volitional capitulation or absence of any volitional activity. Robert Kilwardby, for instance, suggested that the blessed can have multiple acts of enjoyment or use with respect to things other than God, e.g., the virtues. At the end of the chapter, I also discussed briefly the enjoyment of animals. The official view was that animals can be said to enjoy only in a very broad or imprecise sense of the term. Genuine enjoyment can be experienced only by rational agents, such as human beings and angels. In the following three chapters, I focused upon the Sentences commentaries of major theologians such as John Duns Scotus, Peter Auriol, Francis of Marchia, Walter Chatton, William of Ockham, Robert Holcot, and Adam Wodeham, and less-known theologians, such as Robert Graystones, Richard FitzRalph, John Baconthorpe and Gerard of Siena. In the third chapter, I concentrated upon some of the more prominent early fourteenth-century views of the object and psychology of beatific enjoyment. The examined texts confirm the rise of a certain voluntarist psychology oriented toward the analysis of reflexive acts, free volitions, virtues, and passions of the will. Interest in this type of psychology was prompted by the Condemnation of 1277. The general consensus of the discussed authors is that enjoyment is strictly speaking an act of the will, and there is great interest in the nature of the relation between enjoyment and other acts or passions of the will. The relationship between enjoyment and pleasure was also thoroughly explored. Duns Scotus distinguished between the act of the will and the pleasure accompanying or consequent upon the act. According to Scotus’s view, pleasure is a passion of the will caused by the object. Scotus’s analysis of enjoyment and pleasure was imitated and deepened by Auriol, Ockham, Chatton, and Wodeham, among others. Auriol’s views became the focal point of heated debate as well, partly because Auriol confused love with various forms of pleasure and partly because he believed that complaisance and pleasure are free acts. However, Auriol’s equation of beatific love with pleasure or bliss was approved by both Chatton and Wodeham. Ockham, on the other hand, insisted that one should dissociate the love of God from the pleasure or happiness derived from the beatific vision. In the

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last section of chapter three, I also engaged Durandus’s view of the object of beatific enjoyment and discussed this view in light of the criticism of Durandus’s contemporaries. Durandus was criticized for maintaining that the act of beatific vision, not God, is the fitting object of enjoyment. According to the view of Durandus’s opponents, Durandus had inappropriately accentuated the subjectivity of beatific enjoyment. I discussed the problem of the possibility of differentiated enjoyments of the Holy Trinity in the fourth chapter of the book. The main question was whether an individual can enjoy the essence of God without the three persons or one divine person without the others. This question became very popular probably because it offered the opportunity to test the applicability of ordinary Aristotelian logic to the doctrine of the Trinity. The question also proved challenging from the standpoint of the very possibility of providing satisfactory theological explanation of the mystery of the Trinity. We saw that Scotus and, to some extent, Chatton allow the possibility of having a vision or an enjoyment of the divine essence alone or of one divine person apart from the others. Scotus and Chatton, however, are exceptional in this respect because everyone else discussed in this chapter disagrees about the possibility of enjoying the essence of God without the persons or one person apart from the others. Especially interesting is Ockham’s fideistic approach to the problem of differentiated enjoyments. He argued that since we are not explicitly asked to believe that there are differentiated visions or enjoyments with respect to the Trinity, we should simply eliminate the question as irrelevant. We also observed different styles of trinitarian explanation or investigation— one based on metaphysics, in the case of Scotus, Auriol and Baconthorpe, and another based on syllogistic analysis, in the case of Chatton, Ockham and Wodeham. In the last chapter of the study, I focused upon the question of the contingency of beatific enjoyment. At the beginning of the chapter, I related the discussion of the contingency of fruitio with the novel conceptual changes in the method of theological analysis. The treatment of enjoyment was mainly influenced by the non-metaphysical contractual model (pactum) of the relationship between God and the religious believer. God’s decrees were viewed as the terms of a contract which can, in principle, be replaced by a wholly different system of divine ordination. It became evident that Scotus, Ockham, Chatton, Holcot, Wodeham and even FitzRalph admit a certain level of contingency in the experience of beatific enjoyment. For Scotus, the will is always free in itself even though God must sustain its enjoyment perpetually. Ockham thinks that the will can reject beatitude, turn away from the beatific vision, and even hate God if hatred becomes a righteous act. He does state, however, that the will of the blessed is totally passive with respect to the beatific acts insofar as they are caused and conserved by God. Chatton differentiates between a vision-based and a discursion- or abstraction-based enjoyment

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and claims that the will is entirely passive only with respect to the visionbased enjoyment. He also believes that the blessed can sustain and prolong the beatific acts once they have been caused by God. Holcot considers various scenarios allowing the suspension of enjoyment as well as the co-presence of love and hatred of God in one and the same subject. He maintains that beatific enjoyment is partially natural and partially supernatural. He also thinks that the blessed cannot have absolute certainty regarding the continuation of their beatitude. God can deceive the blessed. Wodeham argues that the will can love and enjoy God actively, both in the present life and in heaven. In heaven, the will loves God necessarily through an act of non-elective love. Nevertheless, the will retains a certain amount of independence insofar as it is always capable of eliciting an act of elective love. Thus, to keep the blessed continually fastened to Him, God must fortify their wills. From the group of early fourteenth-century thinkers whose views were examined, only Thomas Anglicus (Scotus’s harsh critic), Peter Auriol and Francis of Marchia maintain that the will in heaven operates by necessity. According to Auriol’s position, the will cannot resist the pull of the beatific object once it is seen clearly and it becomes immobilized. Marchia concurs with Auriol, even though Marchia argues the point differently. I finished my discussion of the contingency of beatific enjoyment by exploring Robert Graystones’s extensive account of the compatibility between freedom and necessity. I concluded that the blessed, according to Graystones, are free to choose or do anything other than what is or involves a sin. In essence, the blessed are absolutely impeccable. In this life, however, our personal experience teaches us that we do not desire God of necessity. NOTES 1. See Pekka Kärkkäinen, “Martin Luther,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 471. 2. For the history of the establishment of the University of Erfurt, see Erich Kleineidam, Universitas studii Erffordensis, Teil I: 1392–1460 (Leipzig, 1964), 1–14. 3. See Adolar Zumkeller Adolar, Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters (Würzburg, 1984), 136–39; Damasus Trapp, “Angelus de Dobelin, Doctor Parisiensis, and His Lectura,” Augustinianum 3, no. 2 (1963), 389–90. 4. Richard Kilvington was a fellow of Oriel College at Oxford. He received his degree in the arts in 1333 and became a regent master in theology in 1338. He wrote commentaries on Aristotle’s Ethics and Physics, Sophismata and Sentences commentary. See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 240–41. 5. Richard Brinkley was an Oxford Franciscan. He is known primarily as a logician, although he also left some theological writings. See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 240. 6. This is most likely the Augustinian theologian Bonsemblantes Baduario de Peraga (de Patavio). See Stegmüller, Repertorium, vol. 1, n. 162, p. 68. See also Damasus

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Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore,” Augustiniana 6 (1956), 268. 7. See Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the fourteenth Century,” 240; Stegmüller, Repertorium, vol. 1, n. 215, p. 96. 8. Angelus de Dobelin, Lectura super Sententias, liber I, d. 1, qq. 1–2 (MS. Jena, El. Fol. 47, fols. 21va, 25vb). 9. See Trapp, “Angelus de Dobelin, Doctor Parisiensis, and His Lectura,” 390 10. See Zumkeller, Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst, 211–12. 11. See Ludger Meier, “De Schola Franciscana Erfordiensi Saeculi XV,” Antonianum 5 (1930): 60–61; idem, “Der Sentenzenkommentar des Matthias Doering,” Franziskanische Studien 17 (1930): 88; idem, Dei Barfüsserschule zu Erfurt (Münster, 1959), 20–21. 12. See Meier, “De Schola Franciscana Erfordiensi Saeculi XV,” 63–65. 13. Matthias Döring, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, d. 1 (MS. München, Staatsbibliothek, Clm., 8997, fol. 15v). 14. The Franciscan John of Ripa taught at Paris. He was also called Doctor Difficilis (“The Difficult Doctor”) and Doctor Supersubtilis (“The Extra-Subtle Doctor”) as a way of alluding to the fact that Ripa was a follower of Scotus, but also because he surpassed Scotus with the difficulty of content or structure of his Sentences commentary. See Brown and Flores, Historical Dictionary, 161. 15. Matthias Döring, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, d. 1 (MS. München, Staatsbibliothek, Clm., 8997, fol. 15v). 16. Matthias Döring, Lectura in Sententias, liber I, d. 1 (MS. München, Staatsbibliothek, Clm., 8997, fols. 15v–16r). 17. According to Rosemann, in Protestant universities Lombard’s Sentences were no longer used as a systematic theology textbook, whereas in Catholic universities the Sentences were eventually replaced by St Thomas’s Summa theologiae. See Philipp W. Rosemann, “Conclusion: The Tradition of the Sentences,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 2, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2010), 523. 18. See J. K. Farge . K. Biographical Register of Paris Doctors of Theology, 1500–1536 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), 304–9; Severin V. Kitanov, John T. Slotemaker and Jeffrey C. Witt, “John Major’s (Mair’s) Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: Scholastic Philosophy and Theology in the Early Sixteenth Century,” in Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, vol. 3, ed. Philipp W. Rosemann (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, forthcoming). 19. Mair studied early fourteenth century Sentences commentaries and he knew and understood well the many positions and arguments that had shaped the debate about beatific enjoyment in the Middle Ages. See Kitanov, Slotemaker and Witt, “John Major’s (Mair’s) Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,” forthcoming. 20. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan I.6, vol. 2, ed. G.A.J. Rogers and Karl Schuhmann (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), lin. 33, p. 51–lin. 8, p. 52. 21. See Severin V. Kitanov, “Happiness in a Mechanistic Universe: Thomas Hobbes on the Nature and Attainability of Happiness,” Hobbes Studies 24 (2011): 134–35. 22. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden, with an introduction by Bertrand Russell (London and New York: Routledge, 1974), 89. 23. See Kekes, Enjoyment, 234–51.

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Index

Adams, Marilyn McCord, 203, 209, 239n105 Adam Wodeham (Adam de Wodeham), xvii, 73, 95–100, 101, 103, 113, 119, 120, 129n89, 130n116, 131n117, 131n118, 131n125, 131n128, 132n132, 132n133, 132n142, 133n143, 133n149, 133n152, 133n156, 133n158, 134n160, 163–165, 173n122, 223–225, 229, 253, 258–259 affection for the advantageous (affectio commodi), 187–188, 203 affection for justice (affectio iustitiae), 187–188, 192, 203, 239n103, 239n105, 241n122 Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus), xvii, 30, 32–33, 43, 44–46, 61n17, 62n23, 62n32, 65n76, 65n77, 67n105, 67n106, 140n285, 257 Alexander of Hales (Alexander de Hales), xvii, 29–30, 30–31, 33, 34, 39, 41, 43–44, 59, 61n12, 64n70, 65n79, 66n94, 257 Algazel, 55 St Ambrose (of Milan) 17, 18n1, 37 Angelus Dobelinus (Angelus de Dobelin), 253–254 St Anselm of Canterbury (Anselmus Cantuariensis), 101, 176, 188, 203, 228, 239n105 Anselmian affections, 203, 237n78 Anselm’s rule, 159, 160, 161, 171n86, 171n87 Arendt, Hannah, xiv–xv, 3, 6, 22n36 Aristotle, xv, 11, 24n76, 31, 33, 42, 44, 45, 46, 56, 65n77, 66n88, 74, 76, 86, 87, 92, 93, 96, 104, 112, 113, 117, 128n71, 166n3, 172n101, 179, 182, 185, 186–187, 192, 213, 235n67,

236n76, 260n4 St Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus), xiii, xiv–xv, xvii, 1–13, 14–15, 16–17, 17–18, 18n1, 19n3, 19n4, 19n5, 20n12, 20n13, 20n14, 20n15, 20n17, 20n9, 21n19, 21n26, 21n28, 21n29, 21n32, 22n34, 22n35, 22n36, 22n41, 22n43, 22n44, 23n49, 23n50, 23n51, 23n52, 24n59, 24n67, 24n69, 24n70, 24n71, 24n73, 24n76, 25n81, 25n85, 25n91, 26n106, 27n112, 27n123, 31, 32–33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43, 46, 49, 51, 52, 54, 58, 65n76, 88, 94, 96, 98, 107–108, 108–109, 149, 175, 188, 198, 227, 257 Aulus Gellius, 7–8 Avicenna, 55, 60, 66n87, 66n88, 71n185, 191 Boethius of Dacia 74, 122n7 St Bonaventure (Bonaventura), xvii, 30, 33–34, 38, 39, 43, 46–47, 50, 53, 57, 59, 62n29, 62n30, 64n70, 66n86, 67n114, 68n128, 69n145, 69n146, 257 Bonsemblant, 254, 260n6 cognition: abstractive, 75, 93, 97, 152, 162, 210; intuitive, 75, 122n11, 139n267, 152, 164; intellective or intellectual, 56, 133n158; sensory, 56, 112, 133n158, 138n233; as sine qua non cause, 106, 182, 183, 184, 185, 234n52, 234n55, 236n76 Condemnation of 1277, 42, 74–75, 176, 178, 258 Contingency: synchronic, 177, 186, 191, 238n96. See also freedom and will contract (pactum), 177, 230n12, 259 Cross, Richard, 50, 147, 180, 187, 189–190, 238n89, 238n96 279

280

Index

Courtenay, William J., xv, 249n292 Damasus Trapp, 104 Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, 255 Donagan, Alan, 64n58 Drummond, Ian, 124n23, 136n218 Dumont, Stephen D., 181, 184, 233n50, 234n52, 235n66, 239n104 Durandus of Saint Pourçain (Durandus a Sancto Porciano), xvii, 74, 86, 90, 104, 114–119, 120, 122n12, 139n247, 139n268, 226, 243n167, 259 end (finis): relative, 4, 87; ultimate or final, 6, 7, 17, 19n4, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36–37, 38, 40, 47, 48, 49, 59, 68n128, 78, 79, 87, 94, 95, 97, 101, 102, 103–104, 117, 145, 148–149, 165, 178–179, 180, 181, 188, 189, 191, 192–195, 197–199, 201, 202, 204, 205–206, 214–215, 226, 228, 229, 232n24 enjoyment (fruitio): abstraction- or discursion-based vs. vision-based, 120, 210–214, 229, 260; apprehension- vs. deliberationbased, 223–225; beatific or heavenly, xiii–xv, xvi–xvii, xviiin10, 1, 3, 5, 12, 13, 16, 18, 29–30, 31, 33–34, 43, 44, 45, 47, 54, 58, 60, 66n86, 73–75, 79, 88, 93, 100–101, 102, 104, 107, 111, 112–113, 114, 115, 116–117, 117, 118, 119, 120–121, 132n142, 133n158, 134n160, 137n219, 145, 149, 152, 155, 164, 175, 176, 179, 188, 189–190, 191–192, 194, 195, 201, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210, 214, 216, 219, 220, 221, 222, 222–223, 224, 225, 229, 242n146, 246n233, 253–255, 256–260, 261n19; God-centered vs. self-centered, 36; inordinate (fruitio inordinata), 57, 87; in this life (in via) and the next (in patria) 178, 184, 211, 237n83; ordinate or rightly-ordered (fruitio ordinata), 57, 78, 87, 127n70, 145, 151, 155, 206, 226, 255, 256; perfect vs. imperfect, 37–38, 81, 145, 181; weaker or lesser type, xvi, 5, 19n5, 30, 34, 35, 60, 96, 119, 127n63, 257;

and beatitude, xiii, xvi, 5, 17, 31–32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39–40, 43, 50, 54, 54–55, 62n29, 68n120, 69n141, 70n178, 70n181, 75, 81, 90, 91, 101, 102, 104, 108, 117, 118, 121, 134n173, 137n219, 139n268, 153, 165, 176, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 201, 203, 204, 205, 205–206, 207, 208, 209, 209–210, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215–216, 217, 222, 224, 229–230, 237n83, 245n203, 259–260; and charitable love (caritas), 5–6, 11, 14, 17, 20n12, 33, 38, 48, 50, 51, 66n94, 91, 100, 178, 180–181, 188, 190, 194, 195, 207, 216, 217, 218, 222–223; and cognition, xvi, xvii, 9, 34, 51, 54, 55–56, 57, 58–59, 75, 90, 93, 95, 96, 97–99, 100, 104, 106, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119–120, 122n11, 124n23, 130n101, 131n128, 132n141, 132n142, 133n158, 138n233, 139n267, 148, 152, 153, 154, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 182, 184, 191, 210, 211, 212, 217, 218, 221, 222–223, 235n63, 236n76, 254; and elective vs. non-elective love, 225, 229, 260; and hatred (odium), 97, 109, 110, 111, 112, 131n128, 137n230, 191, 203, 207, 208–209, 212, 212–213, 213–214, 217, 218, 220, 222, 229, 230n6, 232n31, 259–260; and pleasure or delight, xv–xvi, xvii, 5, 7, 8, 9–10, 18, 21n28, 21n29, 22n41, 22n43, 24n59, 24n63, 32, 45, 47, 48–49, 49–50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 54–55, 56, 57, 58–59, 60, 67n106, 67n119, 68n128, 70n181, 71n188, 74, 76, 79, 81, 87, 88, 96, 102, 105, 107–114, 115, 116–117, 120, 131n128, 135n192, 136n216, 137n228, 137n230, 138n233, 138n245, 215, 220, 244n181, 254, 258–259; and rest or tranquility, 58; and security, 190, 209, 210, 214, 215–216, 222, 223, 230; and virtue, 15, 17–18, 30, 31, 32, 35–36, 51, 58, 60, 82, 87, 96, 257–258; of animals, xvii, 40, 52, 57, 58–60, 97, 258; of God (as an object of the divine will), 189; of the blessed, 87, 137n230, 145, 151, 163, 188, 196, 210; of the

Index damned, 118, 209; of the sinner, 118, 188, 190; of the wayfarer, 145, 151, 196 eschatology (theological doctrine of last things), 13, 177 Eudes Rigaud, 33 Facinus of Asti, 254 Francis of Marchia (Franciscus de Marchia sive de Esculo), xvii, 73, 82–85, 116, 119, 196–201, 229, 258, 260 Frankfurt, Harry G., 24n76 freedom: and voluntariness, 195, 226–227; for excellence, 176–177; for opposite acts, 186; for opposite effects, 186; of contradiction (libertas contradictionis), 102, 196, 214, 215, 228; of exercise, 182, 234n59; of indifference (libertas indifferentiae), 176–177, 203, 209; of specification, 182, 234n58; per se and per accidens, 215, 229 Friedman, Russell L., 83, 116, 141n289, 144, 154, 166n3, 166n9, 172n109 Gaines, Simon Francis, 175, 176 Gelber, Hester Goodenough, 144, 160, 169n48, 172n101, 177, 178, 250n328 Georgedes, Kimberly, xv–xvi, xviiin7, 5, 9, 19n5, 20n9, 21n28, 22n34, 22n43, 27n123, 34, 37, 50, 62n30, 63n46, 64n58, 67n119, 68n127, 124n20, 124n21, 127n63, 127n70, 130n102, 131n122 Gerard of Bologna, 148, 168n30, 169n48, 225, 228 Gerard of Siena (Gerardus Senensis), 74, 100, 104–107, 120–121, 151–152, 258 Giles of Rome (Egidius Romanus), 30, 41, 42, 43, 55–56, 63n44, 65n83, 104, 188, 257 Glossa (Ordinaria), 13 Godfrey of Fontaines (Godefridus de Fontibus), 74, 140n285, 181, 182, 184, 232n23, 234n55, 235n61, 235n62, 235n64, 235n66, 235n67, 236n74 Gonsalvus of Spain, 75, 184

281

Gregory of Rimini (Gregorius Ariminensis), 96, 97, 99, 116, 131n122, 253 Guy Terrena, 116 Henry of Ghent (Henricus de Gandavo), 74, 106, 121n4, 126n47, 140n285, 166n5, 179, 182, 184, 191, 225, 228, 232n23, 234n55, 237n78, 238n97 Henricus Totting de Oyta’s Abbreviation, 131n118 Henry of Harclay, 208, 229, 246n230 Hervaeus Natalis, 168n30, 169n48, 199, 243n167 Hobbes, Thomas, 256 Hocedez, Edgar, 70n178 Hoffman, Paul, 71n192 Hoffmann, Tobias, 241n118 Hoye, William J., 70n181 Hugh of St Victor, 13–14, 25n92 Hugolin of Orvieto, 254 James of Perugia, 118 Jean Calvin, 255 Jeschke, Thomas, 139n268 Johann Eck of Ingolstadt (Ioannes Eckius), 252n366 Johannes van Bavel, 22n35 John Baconthorpe (Ioannes Baco/ Bachonis), 74, 100, 103–104, 116–117, 118–121, 141n289, 153–156, 165, 170n56, 258–259 John Buridan, 82, 124n23 John Duns Scotus (Ioannes Duns Scotus), xvi, xvii, 9, 50, 68n120, 70n178, 73–74, 75–80, 90, 107–109, 109–111, 112, 113, 114, 119–120, 121, 123n13, 123n14, 123n15, 124n21, 124n22, 124n23, 124n32, 125n36, 128n71, 135n191, 136n203, 136n218, 137n219, 139n267, 144–148, 151–152, 153, 155, 157, 161–162, 165, 167n13, 167n21, 167n22, 168n25, 168n30, 169n45, 176–177, 178–194, 194, 195, 200, 201, 202, 203, 214, 224, 226, 228, 229, 231n14, 231n20, 231n21, 232n22, 232n23, 232n24, 232n32, 234n59, 235n64, 235n66, 236n68, 236n73,

282

Index

236n76, 237n78, 237n83, 237n84, 238n92, 238n96, 239n102, 239n104, 239n105, 240n111, 241n118, 241n125, 246n230, 246n233, 251n346, 253–255, 258–260, 261n14 John Mair, 131n118, 255–256, 261n19 John of Bassol (Ioannes de Bassolis), 77, 124n24 John of Damascus, 56, 66n92 John of Naples (Ioannes de Napoli), 113, 139n247 John of la Rochelle (Ioannes Rupella), 33, 43, 66n89, 66n90, 66n92, 67n119 John of Pouilly, 116, 118, 140n285, 140n286 John of Ripa, 255, 261n14 Karger, Elizabeth, 132n142 Kekes, John, xiv, 256 Kennedy, Leonard A., 250n321 Kent, Bonnie Dorrick, 112, 121n1 Knuuttila, Simo, 23n50, 23n51, 24n61, 24n63, 24n69, 24n76, 48, 97–98, 110–111, 124n23, 132n132, 132n133, 133n149, 136n211, 136n218, 137n220, 172n101, 201, 238n96, 244n181 Lacan, Jacques, xiv, xvi Lacanian psychoanalysis, xiv logical power, 186 love: absolute, 55, 95, 96–97, 119; precept- or command-based, 91; as a weight (pondus), 3, 11; of benevolence (amor benevolentiae), 115, 116, 126n47; of charity (caritas). See enjoyment and charitable love; of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae), 81–82, 91, 111, 126n47, 188; of desire, 6, 91, 191; of friendship (amor amicitiae), 81–82, 111, 126n47, 191; of God-becauseHe-is-God, 90, 91; of neighbor, 5, 22n35, 22n36 Lucas of Ely, 225 Luke Wadding (Ludovicus Wadding), 130n116 Luther, Martin, 252n366, 253

Marcus Tullius Cicero, 7, 18n1, 23n52, 35 Mariani, Nazareno, 82 Matthias Döring, 254–255 McGrade, Arthur Stephen, xv, 130n112, 171n74, 220, 250n304, 250n310 Meier, Ludger, xv, 254 Michael Ephesius, 45, 112 Michael of Cesena, 82, 86 moral philosophy: Anglo-American, xiv; Aristotelian, xvi, 79, 192, 194, 229 moral psychology of choice-making, 187, 239n102 necessity: conditional, 226, 227; of coercion, 226; of immutability, 226; of inevitability, 226 Neo-Platonic xiii, 40 Neo-Platonist ontology 2–3 Nicholas of Ockham (Nicolaus de Ockham), 126n47 Nicole Oresme, 82 Nielsen, Lauge Olaf, 26n99, 169n49 Normore, Calvin G., 168n23, 203, 238n97, 246n233 O’Donovan, Oliver, 19n5, 20n15, 20n7, 21n19, 21n32 Oberman, Heiko Augustinus, 246n229 Obligation, 177; obligational or obligatorial art (ars obligatoria), 156, 177, 230n9; obligational theology, 177, 230n9; obligational counterfactual analysis, 231n14 Ockham’s “identity thesis”, 89 Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., 234n55 Panaccio, Claude, 89–90, 202 Pasnau, Robert, 48 St Paul 5, 17, 21n26, 32, 36–37 Perler, Dominik, 60, 98, 112, 132n141, 133n152, 133n158, 137n230, 138n233, 235n63 Pestana, Mark, 234n58, 234n59 Peter Abelard, 14, 26n100, 26n93, 26n99, 27n112, 231n16

Index Peter Auriol (Petrus Aureoli), xvi, xvii, 50, 73, 80–82, 104, 111–113, 117, 119, 120, 125n43, 137n220, 137n224, 137n228, 148–151, 155, 165, 169n43, 169n48, 169n49, 169n50, 170n56, 194–196, 199, 219, 224, 229, 242n146, 247n234, 258–260 Peter Comestor, 29 Peter Lombard (Petrus Lombardus), xiii–xiv, xv, xvii, 1–2, 13–18, 21n28, 25n92, 26n106, 27n112, 27n123, 29–30, 31, 32–33, 33–34, 35, 39, 41, 43, 44, 48, 49, 63n35, 68n123, 79, 80, 82, 90, 93, 95, 96, 101–102, 103, 136n205, 171n86, 225–226, 234n52, 246n230, 253, 255, 257, 261n17 Peter of Aquila (Petrus de Aquila = Scotellus), 109, 136n205 Peter of Candia (Petrus de Candia), 131n122, 156, 170n68 Philosopher King, xiii Prosper of Reggio Emilia, 116 Pelagianism, 122n10, 181, 223, 247n234 Peter John Olivi, 203 Peter of Palude, 116, 139n247 Peter of Tarantaise (Petrus de Tarantasia), 30, 38, 43, 50–51, 69n146, 257 Philemon 5, 17, 21n26, 32, 36–37 Pickavé, Martin, 97, 98–99, 132n132 Pinckaers, Servais, 176 Plato, xiii; Plato’s Parable of the Cave, xiii; Plato’s model of the divided soul, 23n50 Pope Alexander V. See Peter of Candia Pope Benedict XII, 101, 122n12 Pope Clement V, 114 Pope Clement VI, 90, 122n12 Pope Honorius IV, 65n83 Pope Innocent V. See Peter of Tarantaise Pope John XXI (Peter of Spain), 74 Pope John XXII, 62n32, 81, 86, 100–101, 205; and the controversy over the beatific vision, 75; and the controversy over the poverty of Christ and the apostles, 82 Prepositinianism, 172n98 Pseudo-Dionysius, 45

283

Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers gloss 29, 61n2 Quinto, Riccardo 65n78 reflexive act (actus reflexus), 104, 116, 118–119, 121n2, 139n267, 209, 232n32, 258 “resistance threshold” argument, 195, 200, 219, 229 Richard de Bury (Bishop of Durham), 93, 100 Richard Kilvington, 253, 260n4 Richard Brinkley, 254, 260n5 Richard Fishacre, 29–30, 39, 61n7 Richard FitzRalph (Riccardus Filius Radulphi), 74, 100, 101–103, 120–121, 134n168, 134n169, 134n170, 134n173, 161–162, 214–216, 229, 253, 258, 259 Richard of Campsall, 159–160, 171n86 Richard of Middleton (Ricardus de Mediavilla), 30, 40–43, 57, 70n178, 257 Richard Rufus of Cornwall, 39 Robert Cowton, 225, 228, 251n346 Robert Graystones (Robertus Graystones), 100–101, 114, 120, 136n203, 225–229, 230, 258, 260 Robert Grosseteste, 30, 51 Robert Holcot (Robertus Holkot), xvii, 73–74, 93–95, 113, 119–120, 130n102, 133n156, 162–163, 166, 172n101, 172n107, 172n108, 172n109, 216–223, 229, 249n286, 249n292, 249n294, 250n304, 250n310, 250n321, 250n323, 250n328, 253, 258, 259–260 Robert Kilwardby (Robertus Kilwardby), 30, 38–40, 43, 51–53, 58, 64n66, 64n70, 69n149, 257–258 Robert of Halifax, 131n122 Robert of Melun, 14 Roger Roseth, 253 Rosenfeld, Jessica, xv, xvi Rosemann, Philipp W., 31, 33, 63n35, 64n66, 69n146, 261n17 Scanlon, Michael J., 22n35 Scholz, Heinrich, xviiin7 self-transcendent aseity, 209

284

Index

Siger of Brabant 74, 122n7 Smalley, Beryl, 93 Sorabji, Richard, 23n49 soteriology (salvation doctrine), 176 soul: intellective, 89, 132n132; rational, 90, 100, 184, 236n68; sensitive, 66n87; faculties of, 30, 47, 51; powers of, 15, 18, 44, 53, 121n1; weight of, 25n81 Stephen Langton (Stephanus Langton), 29, 41, 61n4, 65n78 Stephen Tempier (Bishop of Paris), 39, 42, 74, 122n7, 176. See also Condemnation of 1277, Thijssen, J.M.M.H. 65n83 Thomas Anglicus, 73, 78–80, 113–114, 125n36, 192–194, 229, 260 Trinity, xiii, xv–xvi, xvii, 3, 5, 6, 15, 16–17, 18, 30, 41–43, 60, 73, 102, 104–105, 108, 137n219, 143–165, 166n3, 172n108, 172n98, 173n122, 190, 241n118, 255, 256, 257, 259 Trottmann, Christian, xviiin10, 117, 122n11, 166n1 St Thomas Aquinas (Thomas de Aquino), xvii, 30, 33, 35–38, 41, 41–42, 43, 48–50, 53, 54, 55–57, 58, 59, 62n32, 63n33, 63n34, 63n35, 63n46, 63n47, 64n58, 65n77, 68n120, 68n127, 68n137, 69n141, 69n145, 69n146, 70n181, 71n188, 75, 97, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 140n285, 176, 180, 181, 187, 189, 197, 214, 225, 228, 232n23, 234n59, 238n96, 257, 261n17 Thomas Bradwardine (Thomas Bradwardinus), 122n10, 220 Thomas Waleys, 90 Thomas Wylton, 78, 116 “tipping point” argument, 201, 229 use (usus), xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, 1–5, 6–7, 13, 15, 16–18, 18, 19n4, 19n5, 20n15, 21n19, 21n28, 21n29, 21n32, 22n41, 24n70, 24n71, 26n106, 31, 32–33, 43, 45–46, 46, 49, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62n30, 63n46, 75–76, 76–77, 80, 82, 85, 86–87, 93, 94, 96, 101, 105, 107, 108, 115, 121, 228, 254, 257–258; bad

use or abuse (abusus, abusio), 3–4, 20n14, 117, 127n66; ordinate vs. disordinate, 127n66 virtue ethics vs. ethics of norms, 177 vision: beatific, 21n26, 44, 50, 52, 70n181, 75, 99, 101, 107, 116, 118, 122n11, 138n245, 145, 146, 147, 148, 162, 169n49, 175, 195, 199, 207, 208, 209, 210–216, 211, 215, 218–219, 222, 224, 229, 234n55, 246n233, 256, 259; clear, 48, 54, 55, 113, 178, 216–217, 218, 222, 224; intuitive, 149, 212, 217 voluntarism. See also will, 51, 74, 121n1, 176, 184, 203, 234n52, 237n78 Walter Chatton (Gualterus Chatton), xvii, 73–74, 90–93, 113, 119–120, 122n12, 129n89, 130n101, 139n267, 158–161, 165–166, 172n98, 210–214, 229, 258–259 Westberg, Daniel, 63n47 will (voluntas): conditional, 136n211, 220, 244n181; and acts of willing (velle) and willing-against (nolle), 81, 84–85, 86, 110, 111, 114, 179, 191, 196–197, 203, 204, 206, 208, 209, 232n31; and indirect voluntariness of pleasure and distress, 114, 135n192; and intellect, 21n28, 32, 44–45, 45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 68n120, 68n127, 70n178, 75, 76–77, 79–80, 82, 83–85, 86, 88, 88–90, 91, 95, 98, 100, 102–103, 104, 105–107, 112, 116, 117, 119, 121, 121n1, 124n20, 124n23, 128n74, 134n160, 139n267, 147–150, 151, 153, 155, 157, 162, 179, 180, 181–182, 183–184, 184–185, 186–187, 192–194, 198, 201, 203, 204, 206, 208, 211, 212, 213–214, 215, 223, 228, 234n52, 235n62, 236n73, 236n76; and volitional suspension or not-willing (non velle), 179, 189, 192, 196, 197, 199, 200–201, 206, 214, 216, 217, 218, 222, 224–225, 229, 232n31, 234n59, 260; compulsion or coercion of, 190, 203, 226–227; necessitation of, 190, 196, 199, 200, 216, 220, 222, 229, 230;

Index neutral or middle act of, xvi, 87, 94, 124n21, 127n63, 131n122, 254; passions of, 50, 112, 119, 121n2, 137n229, 258; superabundant sufficiency of, 185, 187, 191, 203, 238n92, 239n102, 239n105; weakness of (akrasia), 11 William de la Mare (Guillelmus de la Mare), 30, 43, 53–55, 60, 257–258 William of Alnwick (Guillelmus de Alnwick), 123n14, 225 William of Melitona, 33, 39 William of Ockham (Guillelmus de Ockham), xvi, xvii, 73–74, 82, 85–90, 90, 94, 95, 101, 112–113, 118,

285

119–120, 124n23, 127n63, 127n66, 127n70, 128n71, 128n74, 137n219, 137n228, 137n229, 138n245, 139n267, 156–157, 158, 161, 165, 171n74, 171n75, 172n101, 176–177, 178, 201–210, 213, 221, 226, 229, 230n12, 244n191, 245n203, 245n205, 246n229, 246n233, 247n234, 258–259 Williams, Thomas, 238n92, 239n105, 241n125 Wippel, John, 235n62, 235n64 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 256 Zumkeller, Adolar, 254