Banning the Bomb: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons [1 ed.] 1626379246, 9781626379244

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Banning the Bomb

Banning the Bomb The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Jean Krasno & Elisabeth Szeli

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2021 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB www.eurospanbookstore.com/rienner

© 2021 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-1-62637-924-4 (hc)

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

The best weapon is to sit down and talk. —Nelson Mandela

Contents

Preface

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1

The Movement to Ban Nuclear Weapons Constructivism: A Theoretical Framework 2 The Humanitarian Response: Its Achievements and Strategies 7 Why This Book? 9 The Structure of This Volume 10

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Living on the Edge Accidents and Incidents 18 Thinking the Unthinkable: Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo 25 The Business of Mutually Assured Destruction The NPT Reaches a Midlife Crisis 32

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15 28

The Evolution of the Humanitarian Initiative The Humanitarian Conferences in Norway, Mexico, and Austria 43 The Open-Ended Working Group and the First Committee of the GA 46 Treaty or Convention: The Hard/Soft Law Debate

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Reframing the Nuclear Disarmament Discourse International Humanitarian Law as a Foundation 55 Countering Nuclear Deterrence Theory 58 Building on Experience from the Landmines and Cluster Munition Campaigns 64 vii

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Contents

Discourse Strategies: Stigmatization and Delegitimization 66 5

State and Society in Action The Central Role of Civil Society 77 State Supporters and the United Nations 81 States and Civil Society Join Hands: Collaboration as a Key to Success 86 Democratizing Nuclear Disarmament: Women Take a Stand 88

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The Negotiating Conference The March 2017 Negotiations 98 The June/July 2017 Negotiations 99

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Strong Treaty Obligations, Weak Enforcement Mechanisms Article 1: Prohibitions Under the Treaty 106 Articles 2–4: Leaving the Door Open for Nuclear-Armed States 108 Progressive Ideas and Open Questions 110

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Working Toward Entry into Force Signatures and Ratifications: Gaining State Support 116 Critics of the Treaty 119 Civil Society and State Advocacy 124 Challenges and Ideas for Treaty Implementation

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The Treaty Enters into Force Future Prospects for the Treaty 146 Conclusion 148

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book

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143 151 163 165 179 189

Preface

ON OCTOBER 24, 2020, THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION of Nuclear Weapons received its fiftieth state ratification, achieving the number necessary for the treaty to enter into force on January 22, 2021. October 24, 2020, also marked the seventy-fifth anniversary of the creation of the United Nations, when the original fifty-one members ratified the UN Charter, and came seventy-five years after two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in August 1945. In this book, we analyze the humanitarian disarmament initiative that culminated in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by 122 members of the UN General Assembly in July 2017. Through academic research and interviews with people directly involved in the process, we trace the initiative from its first conference in Oslo in 2013 to its ratification in 2020. To offer a comprehensive analysis of the humanitarian nuclear disarmament movement—its protagonists, its strategies, and its impact—we went beyond reports, working papers, UN documents, and academic publications. We immersed ourselves in the field by attending conferences, official UN meetings, side events, panel discussions, and book presentations. In addition, we conducted openended interviews with Allison Pytlak of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, one of the main nongovernmental organization partners of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons; Alexander Kmentt, one of the major architects of ix

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the humanitarian impact initiative at the interstate level; GeorgeWilhelm Gallhofer, counselor at the Austrian Mission to the UN, who attended the negotiating conferences and worked on the TPNW in the First Committee of the General Assembly; Alex Giacomelli da Silva, minister plenipotentiary at the Brazilian Mission to the UN; Tsutomu Kono, senior political affairs officer in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA); UNODA expert Michael Spies, who supported the Open-Ended Working Group and the negotiating conferences and assisted the president of the conference in drafting the treaty text; and Veronique Christory, weapons expert at the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation to the UN, who has been part of the humanitarian impact campaign from the outset. Due to the considerable political delicacy of the issue at hand and the professional obligations of the interviewees, the notes taken during the interviews are incorporated into the book without attributing them to a specific interviewee. We would like to thank the professionals who worked on the humanitarian initiative and the treaty process in various capacities— those already named and many others—for taking the time to engage with us and share their expertise. They granted us fascinating insights into their work, pointed us in new directions for our research, provided additional material, and shared with us their passion for a world free of nuclear weapons—a passion that has carried us through this project for the past three years.

1 The Movement to Ban Nuclear Weapons

NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSE A MASSIVE THREAT TO CIVIlization and to the planet, not simply due to their enormous destructive power, but also because of the poisonous radioactive contamination they perpetrate. It is not widely enough understood that this radioactivity takes millennia to degrade. Even the half-life of the radioisotopes found in nuclear weapons is measured in thousands of years. The 15 kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945 flattened a three-mile radius surrounding the city, killing and poisoning people and animals and contaminating water, soil, and air. Today, a nuclear bomb of this yield would be considered a small tactical nuclear weapon. Some say this catastrophic power means that nuclear weapons can never be used. But deterrence theory would have you believe that leaders could, and even would, decide to use them as a believable threat to prevent an enemy attack. To maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, the rhetoric practiced by leaders must convey a willingness to risk the consequences of nuclear weapon use, with Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the underlying argument of deterrence theory. Due to the East/West rivalry during the Cold War, the maintenance of a nuclear competitive advantage, a necessary condition of deterrence theory, led to the production of more weapons and greater explosive yields. The largest bomb was Tsar Bomba in the 1960s, with a 1

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yield of 57 megatons, 57 million tons of TNT, or approximately 1,500 times the power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although neither the United States nor Russia maintains bombs of that magnitude today, megaton bombs still remain in both arsenals. Currently, nuclear arsenal modernization is well under way in both countries. Modernization may seem reasonable, but the concern is that these upgrades may convince leaders that nuclear weapons are usable. The new B61-12, for example, may be the most dangerous weapon in the US arsenal. Its lower yield, which is limited to 50 kilotons and can be adapted electronically as needed, as well as its greater accuracy—within 30 meters of the target pinpoint—make it a possible field weapon, potentially causing thousands of deaths and lasting radioactive contamination.1 This type of modernization makes the use of a nuclear weapon more conceivable and, therefore, the world more dangerous, stimulating fears of nuclear war. With both modernization and the loose rhetoric espoused by today’s leaders, the threat posed by these weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is at its most acute now since the end of the Cold War. Adding to this uncertainty is the deterioration of international regimes to limit nuclear weapons, such as the deadlocked debate at the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) conferences over a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, the breakdown of talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and Russia. Over the past several years, as the alarm felt by members of civil society mounted, the urgent need for a renewed campaign for nuclear disarmament and abolition became paramount. The threat nuclear weapons pose to humanity and the environment served as the main impetus of this antinuclear movement. Framing the issue of nuclear weapons around their humanitarian impact became the magnetic pull needed to energize those who longed for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Constructivism: A Theoretical Framework The grounding theoretical framework for this study is constructivism. International political theory helps us understand the world around us, but it is only as useful as its explanatory power in describing and predicting outcomes. Realism and liberalism have

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been the two dominant theories in international relations, occupying opposing ends of the spectrum. Constructivists like Alexander Wendt would place constructivism as a third and more logical theoretical choice between realism and liberalism. Realism, which is fundamentally based on the notion that the political world is anarchic, places the state at the center, where the state is defined as a rational actor seeking power in a self-help, competitive environment. Powerful states dominate while weaker states are left to align with the more powerful or band together to form a balance of power in self-defense. Liberalism, however, recognizes that state leaders can also prefer to cooperate and organize and that human nature enjoys reliable and predictive structures. Cooperation is just as natural a state of affairs as competition, and the world is not anarchic but actually structured into international institutions and organizations that create a systemic regime of the rule of law. Liberalism is based on the notion that the social-political world is structured around intrinsic interdependence, both economic and political, and rational actors will act within that system under the belief that cooperation on a holistic level is in the state’s self-interest. Global problems create challenges that no country acting alone can resolve. Wendt argues that while these two theories seem contradictory, they both see the political world in terms of an intrinsic predetermined structure that cannot be altered, and policymakers as rational beings will react to this structure. He claims that, in fact, these structures should not be unquestioningly reified but are a product of social construction.2 State leaders are agents, and through their decisions and actions they can create structure in the image of their psycho-social identity. Wendt argues that “human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live.”3 Constructivists argue that we create our own security dilemmas and competitions through our interactions and signaling with one another in ways that appear inevitable. But if the quality of that interrelationship were to change or the perception of that relationship were altered, international outcomes might be quite different. Our identities, worldviews, interests, and how we see ourselves are socially constructed. Relationships among nations are contingent on how state actors think about one another—friend, foe, or uncertain. If policymakers are individual agents and not pawns in an unchangeable anarchic system, then they can construct systemic

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frameworks as they see fit, and therefore, change is possible. By choosing a particular sociopolitical narrative, leaders not only create a theoretical sense of the world but actually make the world, according to that narrative.4 Supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) have created a new narrative for structural change through the humanitarian initiative. This is not to say that power does not exist. Wendt explains that realists would argue that state leaders “should act on the basis of worst-case assumptions” as prudent. But he goes on to say, “Such a possibility always exists, even in civil society: however, society would be impossible if people made decisions purely on the basis of worst-case possibilities.” 5 People look at probabilities and patterns of behavior and actions. The fact that the world of power politics is socially constructed does not mean that those who believe in this worldview would be easily willing to change their perceptions. “Self-help systems, for example, tend to reward competition and punish altruism.”6 Challenges to that perceived system “are likely to create cognitive dissonance and even perceptions of threat,” which may in turn lead to resistance to social change as a pushback. 7 We see this demonstrated in the resistance and obstructionist tactics of the nuclear-weapon states and the resistance to change, or uncertainty, demonstrated by NATO allies. Social constructivism explains the dynamic relationship between agents (state leaders) and social structures and how ideas shape the behavior of these political actors. Ideas and belief systems play important roles. If leaders do not believe a type of state behavior is possible, they will not be able to see any actions or characteristics that do not fit into their preconceived notion of what a state will do. The phrase “I will believe it when I see it” is turned around to mean “I will see it when I believe it.” Norms and normative behavior are shared ideas accepted by a community, and to make a true paradigm shift in a belief system, that community would have to reach a critical mass. Although 122 states approved the TPNW in July 2017, we are still waiting for full ratification to create that critical mass. A tendency among constructivists is to emphasize morally desirable norms, but there is also the possibility that morally repugnant leaders can create an atmosphere of immoral behavior. Nevertheless, the humanitarian initiative that strengthened the idea to abolish nuclear weapons on moral grounds is the constructivist argument at the foundation of this study. Moral considerations in political exchange are

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controversial. Advocates of realism claim that morality cannot play a part in the dynamic global system because it is meaningless in the face of the overwhelming constraints on the struggle for power. Yet the massive movements for democracy, human rights, accountability, and the rule of law following the end of the Cold War bear witness to the power of the moral demand for participation and transparency. Demands to end global warming and climate change are examples of pressure on the international system for change. The creation of the International Criminal Court is another example of like-minded countries coming together to form a means of enforcement and accountability for those who commit heinous crimes against humanity. The Ottawa Convention and the outlawing of cluster munitions are other examples of commonality based on moral considerations. Moral norms are those that involve a sense of duty and responsibility to humankind, all life, health, and the wellbeing of planet earth. Moral norms include rules of conduct concerning human welfare—welfare in the sense of what is “good.” Goodness might be considered practical in the long run because we are social beings and working together toward a common goal supports survival. Yet, human beings traditionally have accepted that there is a moral compass beyond what is practical. That we cannot be sure there is not a selfish advantage behind behavior that seems moral does not negate that a common sense of morality exists. Immanuel Kant argues that human beings are able to sense the authority of moral compellence and have a duty to act on it.8 The constructivist argument proposed here, then, emerges from the transactional interaction between the agents, in this case state leaders, through a compelling belief in the moral repugnance of nuclear weapons and their exceptional capacity to destroy and pervert the genome. The theory supports the argument that agents of change can enact a dramatic shift in the paradigm of thought toward the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and that this prohibition enables a more secure world. To emphasize the importance of the consideration of nuclear weapons as a moral issue, an elite study conducted in Brazil in 1991, just as the Cold War was winding down, demonstrates the pivotal nature of moral concerns. Brazil had been conducting a secret nuclear weapons program since the 1970s.9 In this study of sixty elites (government officials, high-level military officers, business leaders, and nuclear scientists) in Brazil, when asked, “In pursuing national goals to what extent should leaders be guided by moral considerations?”

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57 percent answered “completely guided or nearly completely guided.” In correlation with two other questions that asked, “Can Brazil afford a nuclear weapon?” and “Should Brazil have a nuclear weapon?” those who believed that leaders should be guided by moral considerations did not think Brazil could afford or should have a nuclear weapon. Those who did not believe that leaders should be guided by moral considerations tended to support Brazil having a nuclear weapon.10 An additional question asked, “Is having nuclear weapons a moral issue or not a moral issue?” Here are a few narrative responses by those who considered nuclear weapons a moral issue: Nuclear policy is a moral question. We do not need an atomic bomb. We need food on the table. If not, our society will be a bomb.11 First, it is very dangerous. It is especially dangerous. It is dangerous in a way that is not just more dangerous than other things. It is dangerous in a way that can reach the very microscopic level of life, the genetic code. Radiation changes life in a way that is different than chemical or physical means. And I think we should be cautious about that.12

In conclusion, regarding a constructivist approach to social change, we can see from the 1991 study that shifting the narrative to whether having a nuclear weapon was a moral issue or not had a profound effect on supporting or not supporting nuclear weapons. Therefore, the agent—the policy maker—by promoting an idea—the moral factor—changed the outcome. Conducted near the end of the Cold War, when Brazil was facing decisions on its nuclear weapons program, the study captured a unique moment in time when these decisions were being considered by elite policymakers. By the end of 1991, Brazil had foregone its nuclear weapons program, signed an agreement with Argentina to mutually cooperate on abandoning their nuclear programs and to create an agency for verification,13 and invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct safeguard inspections at its nuclear enrichment facilities. In 1994, Brazil signed the protocol putting the Treaty of Tlatelolco into effect and by 1998 had joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.14 In this case study in Brazil, we see that agents and ideas changed the social structure. And the humanitarian initiative, according to constructivist theory, can also change the structural security system with enough political will in support of the TPNW.

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The Humanitarian Response: Its Achievements and Strategies The humanitarian impact initiative, which culminated in the adoption of the TPNW (the treaty), directly addresses the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons detonation. The Norwegian Nobel Committee confirmed the urgency and significance of the threat posed by nuclear weapons by awarding the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017. Previously, the international community relied on the initiative and cooperation of the nuclear-armed states to tackle nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The new treaty, however, was brought about by civil society in collaboration with non-nuclear-armed small and middle powers, without the support of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council recognized as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) in the NPT. Moreover, the TPNW prohibits any possession and use of nuclear weapons for all its signatories. On the premise that the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons affect all of humanity, the humanitarian initiative reframed the nuclear weapons discourse, steering it away from military security and toward ethics and human security. Similarly, supporters of the humanitarian initiative maintain that because nuclear weapons pose a danger to all states, all states should have a say in international norms regarding nuclear weapons. They therefore took their disarmament initiative to the UN General Assembly, where it could not be obstructed by the veto of a small number of states. This novel approach to nuclear disarmament, by defying great power politics and following an independent process outside traditional disarmament structures, marks a new precedent in nuclear security. Humanitarian disarmament is by no means an invention of the twenty-first century and has been around since long before the campaigns to ban antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, which are often cited as precursors of the humanitarian initiative to ban nuclear weapons. Since the late nineteenth century, various actors of civil society have pushed for disarmament on humanitarian grounds. They generally had a broader focus and were not limited to a specific type of weapon causing unacceptable harm. Although disarmament and arms control in the Cold War era were largely driven by concerns

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of strategic stability, humanitarian and existential threats became a central pillar of the Helsinki process and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (the precursor of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE]).15 Observers have raised questions about current humanitarian disarmament movements’ relationship to general and complete disarmament (GCD), a term coined at the first special session of the UN General Assembly to mean the “elimination of all WMDs and reduction and control of conventional weapons to the minimum level for national law enforcement purposes and a UN peace force.”16 The same session also marked the beginning of efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. After the end of the Cold War, the focus of humanitarian disarmament advocates shifted from arms reduction in a broader sense to focus more on specific types of weapons, such as cluster munitions and landmines. Nevertheless, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated in his 2018 disarmament agenda “Securing Our Common Future” that GCD “remains the ultimate objective of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.”17 GCD, with its humanitarian underpinning, remains an overarching goal to which the campaigns to eliminate certain types of particularly devastating weapons seek to contribute. Naturally, it is important that disarmament advocates at the state and civil society levels do not lose sight of the bigger picture while campaigning for the TPNW and nuclear disarmament. Arguably the most important achievement of the TPNW and the humanitarian initiative to date has been to refocus the attention of the international community on nuclear disarmament, creating a new momentum. The initiative demonstrated an alternative way forward in a previously deadlocked debate and built a campaign to shame nuclear-weapon states by drawing attention to their lack of concern for the dire humanitarian consequences caused by these weapons. This renewed energy led by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also brought on board elements of society that had previously been disengaged from the disarmament debate, such as financial institutions, parliamentarians, labor unions, and individual citizens. Our analysis shows that these strategies were key to the relative success of the humanitarian initiative compared to previous multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts. The humanitarian initiative and the treaty negotiations were successful because of their open, inclusive, and egalitarian nature and because of the close and effective collaboration between state actors and civil society. An egalitarian process

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was achieved by overcoming the double standards of the NPT regime (that allows five powerful nations to possess nuclear weapons while requiring everyone else to renounce them) and giving the non-nuclearweapon states (NNWS) the capacity to act through the majority-based voting system of the UN General Assembly. The openness of the process enabled close collaboration and coordination between civil society and likeminded states. Their initiatives complemented each other and reinforced their joint potential. The treaty’s impact on the nuclear regime demonstrates important lessons learned from bottom-up initiatives in international security that seek to confront the unyielding control of great-power politics in a multipolar world. By taking a closer look at the dynamics of the negotiations, the roles of the various actors, and the evolution of the treaty text, our analysis demonstrates that the effective collaboration and exchange between supportive states and civil society actors were critical to the success of the negotiations and to the initiative as a whole. Framing the issue in humanitarian terms, emphasizing the devastating impact of nuclear weapons and their testing on all forms of life, proved to be a motivating and compelling argument that drew individuals and policymakers into the process. Our realistic assessment of the future prospects of the treaty takes into consideration that, although its long-term aim is to eliminate nuclear weapons, in the short term its supporters hope to create a normative shift and raise the political and reputational costs for nuclear-armed states by stigmatizing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons. The implementation process is well under way, and ICAN partners and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are leading efforts to promote and accelerate ratification. The strategies undertaken by civil society to support the treaty are already impacting private-sector decisionmaking regarding nuclear financing.

Why This Book? The impetus for writing this book was to document and analyze the humanitarian impact initiative that culminated in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) by 122 members of the UN General Assembly in July 2017. The humanitarian initiative is of particular interest to international relations and international security because it constitutes a novel approach to nuclear

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disarmament based on the principles of international humanitarian law. It was spearheaded by civil society, small states, and middle powers, with overwhelming support from the Global South and in defiance of nuclear-armed states and major powers. With the help of supportive states and civil society actors such as ICAN, its NGO partners, and the ICRC, the humanitarian initiative succeeded in changing the discourse around nuclear weapons. It pointed out the flaws in nuclear deterrence theory and raised awareness of the unacceptable suffering caused by any use of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian initiative is therefore also a lesson in campaigning and organizing. It established a truly democratic process by adopting majority-based decisionmaking rules and inviting previously disenfranchised groups, such as NGOs, indigenous peoples, and victims of nuclear testing, to take an active part in the process.

The Structure of This Volume Here in Chapter 1, we lay out the context of the nuclear security environment, the new humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament, and why we undertook an analysis of the creation of the TPNW and its impact. Chapter 2, “Living on the Edge,” addresses the alarming number of accidents and incidents that have occurred over time involving nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and why we should care. The chapter lays out concerns over the recent withdrawals from major nuclear agreements and treaties that put us closer to the edge of miscommunication and miscalculation. It also describes the erosion of the nuclear “taboo” that once gave us the confidence that leaders and the public considered the use of these weapons as unthinkable. Particularly in the United States, the business interests of the armament industry fuel nuclear modernization and the maintenance of high numbers of warheads. The related costs, ranging in the trillions of dollars, have become a particular target for opponents of nuclear weapons and have sparked a divestment campaign. The chapter concludes by arguing that the breakdown of the recent NPT review conferences and the standstill in other established disarmament fora led to frustration among nonnuclear-weapon states and motivated them to seek alternative paths toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Chapter 3 describes the evolution of the humanitarian initiative, which sped up in 2010 after a speech by the president of the ICRC

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about the devastating consequences of nuclear war, building on the momentum created by president Barack Obama’s Prague speech, which envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons. Norway hosted the first of the so-called humanitarian conferences, where interested states came together with civil society to discuss the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons possession, testing, and use, as well as ways to revive the disarmament component of the NPT. A critical strategy evolved when supporters of the initiative created an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) within the UN, applying General Assembly rules based on majority voting and thus overcoming the de facto veto that nuclear-weapon states enjoyed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which requires all decisions to be made by consensus. Chapter 4 defines the strategy used to reframe the nuclear disarmament discourse by moving away from the ideology of national security to the emerging norm of human security. The humanitarian approach considers nuclear weapons from an apolitical perspective, with a focus on their effects on human beings and all life. This argument is grounded in international humanitarian law, claiming that nuclear weapons are illegal and calling for an international agreement banning the use, threat of use, or possession of nuclear weapons. We also describe in this chapter how the humanitarian initiative was built on previous experiences from the landmines and cluster munition campaigns and which arguments are used to counter nuclear deterrence theory. In Chapter 5 we describe the role of the principal actors, including states, international organizations, experts, NGOs, and other civil society groups. We take a critical look at inclusion and exclusion of actors from multilateral fora and the importance of equal representation and a diversity of ideas. The active participation of women was also key to the success of the humanitarian initiative. As previously mentioned, ICAN won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 for its instrumental work in raising awareness of the issue among politicians, business leaders, and citizens, spearheading the call for a nuclear weapons ban. The chapter also emphasizes the role of small and midlevel states and their courageous efforts in the face of fierce opposition by major powers. Collaboration among these actors was key to the success of launching the treaty, in particular the close coordination between state and civil society representatives at the humanitarian conferences as well as the negotiating conference for the TPNW.

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Civil society expertise helped smaller states compensate for their limited resources and nuclear know-how. Chapter 6 concentrates on the processes and strategies of the negotiating conferences, officially set in motion in December 2016 by General Assembly resolution 71/258, which states the intention to convene in 2017 a conference to put in place a binding agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons. Inevitably, the nuclear-weapon states pushed back against this initiative and declined to participate, but the negotiating conference was held regardless in March, June, and July 2017. The president of the conference, Ambassador Elaine Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica, drafted the treaty text from scratch during the negotiation phase, with input from states, civil society, and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. Despite major changes and revisions, the treaty could be finalized in less than four weeks of negotiations because the participating states (with perhaps one exception) shared the same intention of prohibiting nuclear weapons. Chapter 7 focuses on the language in the treaty, which lays out the catastrophic humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons, and states in precise and clear wording the strong obligations required under the treaty. However, many criticize the treaty for its weak language on enforcement, which leaves compliance verification up to a “competent international authority” to be created or designated in the future. Verification and enforcement are particularly relevant because the treaty leaves the door open for nuclear-weapon states to join either before or after eliminating their nuclear weapons. Chapter 8 addresses the current status of the treaty, the number of states that have signed and ratified, its entry into force, and the advocacy work of civil society and member states to encourage ratification. Criticism of the treaty by nuclear-weapon states and their allies and other challenges the treaty is facing on its path to implementation, such as disarmament verification and its compatibility with the NPT regime, are also discussed in detail. Finally, Chapter 9 describes the impact and achievements of the treaty. One of the most impactful initiatives has been the financial divestment campaign of ICAN partner organization PAX. They maintain a list of banks that do not include nuclear weapons-associated companies in their investment portfolios and put pressure on other banks to divest from nuclear weapons as well. The International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, commemorated by the UN each year on September 26, has become a rallying point for state

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support of the treaty, with side events on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and their prohibition as well as a treatysigning ceremony dedicated to the TPNW. The number of ratifications is expected to continue to increase now that the fifty states parties required for the treaty to enter into force have been reached, and a new norm against nuclear weapons is emerging in international law. The progress is encouraging. The humanitarian initiative has been pivotal in bringing together civil society, international organizations, and likeminded member states. The level of collaboration and democratic inclusion galvanized the process, which moved at an extraordinary pace compared to other multilateral disarmament negotiations. The challenges are serious, and pushback from the nuclear-armed states presents a huge obstacle, but the treaty welcomes all who seek to eliminate these weapons or renounce their nuclear arsenals. The TPNW is an important step on the path toward a nuclear-free world.

Notes 1. Zachary Keck, “Why the B-61-12 Bomb Is the Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon in America’s Arsenal,” The National Interest, October 9, 2018, https:// nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-b-61-12-bomb-most-dangerous-nuclear -weapon-americas-arsenal-32976. 2. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (2), Spring 1992, pp. 391–425. 3. Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41 (3), Summer 1987, pp. 337–338. 4. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Constructivist Approaches,” in Jennifer SterlingFolker, editor, Making Sense of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), pp. 128–132. 5. Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” p. 404. 6. Ibid, p. 411. 7. Ibid. 8. Jean Krasno, “Moral Considerations,” in The Role of Belief Systems in Shaping Nuclear Weapons Policy Preference and Thinking in Brazil, doctoral diss., Graduate Center, City University of New York, 1994, pp. 304–305. 9. Jean Krasno, “Non-Proliferation: Brazil’s Secret Nuclear Program,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 38 (3), Summer 1994, pp. 425–437. 10. Krasno, “Moral Considerations,” p. 319. 11. Ibid., p. 314. 12. Ibid., p. 315. 13. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the ABACC.

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14. Daphne Morrison, “Brazil’s Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), September 1, 2006, www.NTI.org/analysis/articles/brazils -nuclear-ambitions. 15. Dan Plesch and Kevin Miletic, “The Relationship Between Humanitarian Disarmament and General and Complete Disarmament,” in Matthew Breay Bolton, Sarah Njeri, and Taylor Benjamin-Britton, editors, Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 200–214. 16. Ibid., p. 201. 17. The United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), “Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament,” New York, 2018, https:// www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/sg-disarmament-agenda -pubs-page.pdf, p. 12.

2 Living on the Edge

THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (TPNW) comes at a critical moment in time when the global community faces serious challenges. Major power tensions are on the rise, and bellicose rhetoric permeates the news media. The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of complacency based on the idea that in the absence of the East/West rivalry, worries over the use of nuclear weapons were no longer a major concern. Yet the use, threat of use, and even the possession of nuclear weapons may present a more serious danger today than during the Cold War years. Due to the enormous consequences of their use, either by purposeful attack, accident, or miscalculation, nuclear weapons remain an existential threat. In addition to these tensions, adherence to, and respect for, international security regimes based on rule of law, transparency, and accountability is deteriorating. For example, in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate antiballistic missile systems, the means to shoot down incoming attack missiles, and created the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty). The two sides determined that competition over this type of weapon was leading to an escalation in the nuclear arms race that was getting out of control. However, in 2002, under the George W. Bush presidency, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty, an instrument that had contributed to international stability, claiming there was a need to test and deploy missile defense systems against threats by Iran and the Middle East.1 15

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Banning the Bomb

In 1987, the United States under Ronald Reagan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under Mikhail Gorbachev had agreed to eliminate an entire class of weapons, intermediate-range missiles, by agreeing to the creation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which helped reduce the arms race and calm anxieties arising from their deployment, particularly in Europe. However, in August 2019, US president Donald Trump formally announced the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty. 2 As the Elders— a group of prominent global leaders—stated in their press release on July 29, 2019, the “termination of the INF is only one element of destabilizing uncertainty around the future of arms control.”3 The Elders understood that withdrawing from the INF Treaty was just a symptom of the unraveling of the whole arms control security regime. Immediately after the United States officially withdrew, Defense Secretary Mark Esper announced a call for the rapid deployment into the field of US missiles formerly prohibited by the INF Treaty. And on August 18, the Department of Defense carried out a first test of a ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missile (capable of carrying a nuclear warhead), deployed by an MK-41 mobile launcher, that flew some 500 kilometers.4 In May 2018, the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which had been successfully negotiated with Iran under the Obama administration to eliminate their nuclear weapons program. The US withdrawal reduced the political cost for Iran to resume its uranium enrichment toward a weapons-grade level. The claim was that the JCPOA was not strong enough and did not include any pressure on Iran to end its support for terrorist groups. The Obama administration had separated these two issues to make it possible to reach an agreement in the interim on eliminating the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons, particularly against Israel. In May 2020, the Trump administration announced that it was withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) that had been signed in 1992 at the end of the Cold War. The Open Skies Treaty, with its thirty-four members, was created to establish an era of confidence and to allow its members to carry out unarmed monitoring flights over members’ territories to gather information on military deployments. The goal was to create transparency and openness and monitor compliance with agreements.5 On May 21, the US Department of Defense released this statement:

Living on the Edge

Tomorrow, the United States will formally submit its notification of its decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty. After careful consideration, including input from our Allies and key partners, it has become abundantly clear that it is no longer in the United States’ best interest to remain a party to this Treaty when Russia does not uphold its commitments. U.S. obligations under the Treaty will effectively end in six months.6

17

Withdrawing from this confidence-building arrangement further erodes accountability, transparency, and communication. The rationale as stated by Secretary Esper was that Russia was in noncompliance. So, instead of holding Russia accountable for alleged violations, the United States and Russia are now free to avoid any transparency. Also in May 2020, at a meeting of senior members of top-level security agencies, the Trump administration discussed the idea of resuming nuclear tests at the Nevada nuclear test site, claiming that Russia and China were conducting low-yield tests—a claim that has not been substantiated.7 The last nuclear test carried out by the United States was in September 1992. Adding to this list of threats to international order and the security regimes established over the years with the Soviet Union and now Russia and the international treaty system is President Trump’s creation of a US military space force. On December 22, 2019, Trump announced the official launch of the US Space Force as the sixth branch of the US military. However, the Outer Space Treaty (1967) outlaws weapons in outer space, posing the question of whether the US Space Force would violate the Outer Space Treaty. Formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, this international agreement prohibits the weaponization of space, including weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which cannot be stationed anywhere in outer space, and prohibits any kind of weapons testing. However, the treaty does not limit the placement of satellites, which are used by defense and intelligence-gathering bodies. The US Air Force maintains the Global Positioning System (GPS) used by the military and the general public. Although there do not seem to be any immediate US plans to deploy troops or weapons into space orbit, this is another example of thrusting uncertainty into the system of order that has promoted peaceful security, and it also invites other countries, such as Russia or China, to do the same to assure the United States does not gain a competitive edge.

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Banning the Bomb

It is also unclear whether Russia and the United States will renew their commitments to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) when it expires on February 5, 2021. Additionally, the major powers are currently undertaking the modernization of their nuclear forces and including them in military planning, creating a fear that there are intentions to use them. The growing nuclear arsenal and resumed testing of missiles in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, is another major concern. Adding to the litany of withdrawals noted above is the Trump administration’s lack of respect for international institutions and agreements, demonstrated by pulling out of the Paris Agreement on climate change. The agreement lays out an international plan for reducing fossil-fuel emissions that contribute to global warming. The Trump administration’s denial of the science of climate change is indicative of its support for the US fossil-fuel industrial base, particularly coal. By withdrawing from instruments of international order and accountability, the United States appears to be isolating itself, taking unilateral positions, and not seeking cooperation and support from friends and allies. Along with its dismissive attitude toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and rifts with its traditional allies, the United States contributes to a looming atmosphere of uncertainty regarding compliance with not only international law but also normative behavior, creating a destabilizing sense of living on the edge. This reinforces the argument that there are no safe hands when it comes to nuclear weapons, as advocates of the humanitarian initiative to ban nuclear weapons have repeatedly declared.8 As Angela Kane, former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, observes, “The Doomsday Clock remains at two minutes to midnight—and only once before was it set so close to midnight, in 1953, following the US decision to pursue the hydrogen bomb.”9

Accidents and Incidents Adding to this sense of uncertainty, although not well-known to the general public, is the frightening persistence of nuclear accidents. Weapons included in a country’s nuclear arsenal and strategic planning must be ready to launch within a few seconds and explode on target. However, the need for nuclear weapons to be safe and the

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need for them to be reliable are often at odds. Safety mechanisms that ensure that a bomb is less likely to explode during an accident could, during wartime, make it more likely to be a “dud.”10 Curtis LeMay, former head of the Strategic Air Command (SAC),11 which oversees the US nuclear bomber leg of the strategic triad, once stated, “Like any machine . . . they don’t always work.”12 Eric Schlosser, in his book Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, describes a litany of alarming accidents involving nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1958, “Walter Gregg and his son, Walter Junior, were in the toolshed outside their home in Mars Bluff, South Carolina, when a Mark 6 atomic bomb landed in their yard.”13 A B-47, en route from the United States to England, accidently released an atomic bomb, and while the nuclear trigger did not detonate, the high explosives created a blast that dug a crater thirty-five feet deep and fifty feet wide. The bomb that landed in Walter Gregg’s yard had dropped out of the bomb bay door by mistake.14 The locking pin that maintained the bomb in place did not seem to be working and a light on the instrument panel alerted the pilot that the pin was not engaged. The pilot told the navigator, Captain Bruce Kulka, to enter the bomb bay and insert the locking pin by hand. . . . Kulka spent about ten minutes in the bomb bay, looking for the pin without success. . . . The Mark 6 was a large weapon, about eleven feet long and five feet in diameter, and as Kulka tried to peak above it, he inadvertently grabbed the manual bomb release for support. The Mark 6 suddenly dropped onto the bomb bay doors. . . . A moment later the eight-thousand-pound bomb broke through the doors.15

In 1961, a B-52 bomber carrying two hydrogen bombs, four megatons each, disintegrated in the air and crashed. The two bombs landed near Faro, North Carolina. Although the hydrogen core did not detonate, one uranium trigger went so deep into the ground, it was never recovered.16 That day, “one simple, dynamo-technology, low-voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe!”17 Other accidents involving hydrogen bombs have occurred in Louisiana, Kentucky, Texas, and New Jersey.18 In 1957, a 42,000-pound hydrogen bomb (with an explosive yield of about ten megatons) accidentally fell out of a bomber near Albuquerque, New Mexico, taking the bomb bay door with it. Government documents released in 1986 reported the accident, which had been kept secret

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Banning the Bomb

for twenty-nine years. Although, fortunately, the bomb did not detonate, some radioactive contamination was detected in the crater left by the explosion.19 “Today, two hydrogen bombs and a uranium core lie in yet undetermined locations in the Wassaw Sound off Georgia, in the Puget Sound off Washington, and in swamplands near Goldsboro, North Carolina.”20 Other accidents have taken place outside the United States. In 1958, a B-47 bomber carrying a 10-megaton Mark 36 thermonuclear bomb caught on fire on the runway at an airfield in Morocco during a test run. The fire reached the bomb, which did not detonate but released radioactive material that was then buried next to the runway. The accident was kept secret for years.21 In 1966, a B-52 collided with a jet tanker over Spain, dropping three hydrogen bombs near the community of Palomares, a fishing and farming town. A fourth bomb, which fell into the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Spain, was recovered months later after being spotted by a submarine. The US military along with Spanish civil guards cleaned up the area and some 1,400 tons of radioactive material were sent back to the United States for disposal. The Spanish workers had not been provided with precautionary protection to prevent overexposure to the radiation and even US workers were not given adequate physical or respiratory protection. Air Force veterans involved in the cleanup, fifty years later, are complaining of illnesses caused by the exposure. They claim that they were told to eat the tomatoes grown on the farms to show that nothing was wrong, and they also claim that the records of the incident have been erased.22 While the aforementioned accidents involved air force bombers, other incidents have included stationary, land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) carrying nuclear warheads hidden in silos in locations around the United States.23 In 1965, in a complex outside Searcy, Arkansas, a silo containing a Titan II ICBM was under renovation when a fire broke out and killed fifty-three workers, who died from smoke asphyxiation. Although the nuclear warhead had been removed during the renovation, the accident revealed that ICBM silos were vulnerable to dangerous mishaps. Human error turned out to be the initial cause: “An Air Force Accident Investigation Board later concluded that a worker who’d been welding on the level 2 inadvertently struck a temporary hydraulics line. When the spray of hydraulic fluid hit the arc of the electrical welder, it caught fire.”24 In September 1980, another accident took place involving a

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Titan II missile site in the small town of Damascus, Arkansas. During a day of normal maintenance within the silo of the armed ICBM, a worker accidentally dropped a large wrench socket, which then ricocheted off several surfaces as it fell within the silo, eventually striking the stage one fuel tank, causing a major leak. A few hours later the facility exploded, throwing the warhead into a ditch. “The warhead lay there by itself, stripped of the electrical power source necessary for a nuclear detonation.”25 The silo also suffered major damage: “The blast had obliterated its upper levels and widened the hole in the ground. What had once been a deep, concrete cylinder now looked like a huge funnel.”26 While these accidents happened several years ago, there are more recent incidents involving nuclear weapons gone awry. In 2007, some five or six nuclear armed cruise missiles were mistakenly loaded and flown on a B-52H bomber from the Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota across the United States to the Barksdale base in Louisiana. Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists, states, “Beyond the safety issue of transporting nuclear weapons in the air, the most important implication of the Minot incident is the apparent break-down of nuclear command and control for the custody of the nuclear weapons.”27 Adding to this sense of anxiety is the potential accidental launch of a nuclear weapon. The United States and Russia maintain nuclear weapons ready to take off in minutes, increasing the risks of miscalculation or misinformation with potentially disastrous results. Those in charge have only a few minutes or even seconds to react. Nuclear alerts have been set off by moonlight or flocks of geese only to be discredited, fortunately in time. The US Department of Defense budget for 2021 of $28.9 billion for the modernization of nuclear weapons includes $7 billion “for modernizing the nation’s nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) infrastructure.”28 This electronic system informs leaders and the president of a possible attack, enabling the authorization of a defensive or retaliatory counterattack. Because the amount of time available to react is becoming shorter and shorter, sometimes measuring nanoseconds, there is an increasing drive to make improvements and build a highly automated command and control system, incorporating artificial intelligence (AI). While this would increase the capability to respond quickly in real time, it “will progressively diminish the role of human beings in making critical decisions over the use of nuclear weapons.” 29 If human judgment is

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Banning the Bomb

removed from decisions to activate a nuclear weapons response to a computer-perceived attack based on a computer-generated algorithm, the world could face a disastrous, unpreventable nuclear calamity. The irony here is that if the international community eliminates all nuclear weapons, we do not even have to create, build, pay for, or generate these automated systems. There will be no nuclear weapons. On January 13, 2018, during a period of high tensions between the United States and the DPRK, an alert went out throughout Hawaii, “BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER, THIS IS NOT A DRILL.”30 It took about thirty minutes before officials realized the mistake and the alert was withdrawn. Yet, people were left in a panic. Just a few days later, Japan experienced a similar false missile alert. These incidents revealed that there was really no safety plan in place and communications would have been wiped out in a real attack. So far, such catastrophes have been averted, but the chance of such an incident going awry remains.31 The safety of nuclear weapons is highly dependent on the expert training and skills of those in charge of their handling. Yet, “in 2003, half of the Air Force units responsible for nuclear weapons failed their safety inspections—despite the threeday advanced warning.”32 Other concerns are emerging. Further modernization by the United States of its nuclear arsenal could enhance safety or might actually create new dangers. The renewed interest by the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the Department of Energy in building increased numbers of plutonium pits is a case in point.33 Plutonium pits are spherical shells of plutonium about the size of a bowling ball and are used as triggers, a key element in initiating the chain reaction needed to detonate nuclear material in warheads for modern thermonuclear weapons.34 The replacement of newly manufactured plutonium pits in older warheads is seen as necessary to assure reliability. However, studies have shown that a credible lifetime of plutonium pits is somewhere between 100 and 150 years, which would mean that they would age out in about 2090.35 Pit manufacturing stopped in the 1990s because the pit production facility located at Rocky Flats near Denver, Colorado, was closed in 1989, following an investigation by the FBI that revealed widespread environmental contamination and negligence.36 The United States plans to build two pit manufacturing facilities, one at Los Alamos and a second one at the Savannah River Site in

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South Carolina. The budget request from the Department of Energy for 2021 was about $1.4 billion; the plan includes making eighty pits per year by 2030. This would include thirty pits per year at Los Alamos and the remaining fifty pits at the Savannah River site. However, the plutonium facility at Los Alamos, designed in the 1970s, “lacks important safety features.”37 In 2013, the facility had to shut down for three years after the Defense Nuclear Safety Board found problems with the safe storage of plutonium. According to safety experts, Los Alamos lacked enough personnel “who knew how to handle plutonium so it didn’t accidentally go ‘critical’ and start an uncontrolled chain reaction.”38 The site has also been criticized for its lack of plans to address risks presented by forest fires and seismic activity. All this suggests that accidents will continue to be a problem. These concerns, presented by the Defense Nuclear Safety Board, continued into 2019 as stated in a letter to Secretary of Energy James Perry.39 Underlying motivations to advance the plutonium pit program as one of NNSA’s highest priorities beyond those of modernization may also be institutional selfinterests to hold onto budgets and turf and secure jobs for future missions. Graham Allison’s theories of bureaucratic decisionmaking would help to explain these institutional motives.40 Russia has not been exempt from nuclear accidents. On August 8, 2019, a nuclear explosion took place near the city of Severodvinsk in Russia’s northern coastal region on the White Sea, below the Arctic Circle. Clare Corkhill, research fellow in nuclear waste disposal at the University of Sheffield, speculates that the explosion was the result of the failure of a nuclear-powered missile (code-named Skyfall by NATO), using a small nuclear reactor contained within the missile to provide thrust for a missile potentially loaded with a nuclear warhead, such as a cruise missile. Two servicemen and five nuclear engineers died in the incident, and six others were injured. Russian authorities have not been forthcoming with information, but “the state weather monitoring agency, Roshydromet, reported a spike in radiation 40 km away.”41 Mysteriously, “several Russian radiation monitoring stations went silent shortly after the explosion.”42 Fears of radioactive contamination were high. Those injured in the explosion were taken to hospitals nearby, where doctors were not warned of radiation exposure. The doctors realized that three of the injured “had received a very high radiation dose.”43 “The emergency room at the hospital continued to receive other patients for around an hour. . . . A military team later carried out decontamination work in the Arkhangelsk hospital.”44

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Banning the Bomb

Later reports indicated that the radioactive material included “rapidly decaying radioactive isotopes—strontium-91, barium-139, barium140, and lanthanum-140” which are “products of nuclear fission involving uranium” and are highly dangerous.45 Russian nuclear-powered submarines have also suffered a number of deadly accidents. On July 1, 2019, a fire broke out in the nuclear submarine Losharik—whose purpose and capabilities are clouded in mystery—killing fourteen of the estimated crew of twenty-five.46 The Losharik was reported to be of the highly secret AS-31 type, containing a nuclear reactor and primarily used on espionage missions. It is not clear if it was nuclear-armed, but at the funeral for the fourteen people who died, a high-ranking military officer stated, “With their lives, (the fourteen sailors) saved their comrades, saved the ship, and averted a catastrophe of planetary scale.”47 Other highlights of the most serious Russian nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarine accidents include: the Kursk nuclear submarine on August 12, 2000, killing 118; Soviet nuclear submarine K-278 Komsomolets in 1989, killing 42; Soviet nuclear submarine K-8 on April 12, 1970, killing 52; Soviet submarine K-129 on March 8, 1968, killing 98; Soviet submarine B-37 on January 11, 1962, killing 122; and Soviet submarine S-80 on January 27, 1961, killing 68.48 The “Komsomolets’s nuclear reactor and its two nuclear warheads remain onboard the stricken hull under 5,500ft of water in the Barents Sea—a disaster waiting to happen.”49 Highlighting further tensions, on June 7, 2019, in the Philippine Sea, a Russian destroyer vessel almost collided with a US cruiser, the USS Chancellorville, which may have been carrying nuclear-tipped guided missiles. The USS Chancellorville is part of Carrier Strike Group Five, which was deployed in 1993 with the Nimitz Battle Group and launched nine conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles at the Baghdad Intelligence Center after an attempt on the life of President George H. W. Bush.50 Another serious concern is the challenge posed by the threat of terrorists obtaining a nuclear weapon or nuclear material that could be weaponized. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases an annual report called the “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database,” which addresses incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material that has been reported missing and out of regulatory control. The conceptual framework of the data reporting includes: “Group I: incidents that are, or likely to be, connected with trafficking or malicious use; Group II: incidents of undetermined intent; and Group III: incidents

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that are not, or are unlikely to be, connected with trafficking or malicious use.”51 Between 1993—when the IAEA began reporting this data—and the end of 2018, participating states reported a total of 3,497 confirmed incidents, of which 285 involved “a confirmed or likely act of trafficking or malicious use (Group I).”52 Included in this group are twelve incidents involving highly enriched uranium, two cases involving plutonium, and four instances involving plutonium beryllium.53 Although most of these incidents were small amounts measured in grams, others included seizures of kilogram amounts of “potentially weapons usable nuclear material.”54 The report indicates that there is a demand for nuclear and radioactive material. However, it is difficult to estimate the extent of an “illicit nuclear market.”55 The report indicates that, more recently, there is a growing number of incidents of manufactured goods that are contaminated by radioactive material. “This indicates a persistent problem for some countries in securing and detecting unauthorized disposal of radioactive sources.”56 The accidents and incidents reported here, while not a comprehensive list, give a snapshot of the risks confronting the global community today. They primarily focus on the risks posed by nuclear weapons or missing nuclear material, but accidents involving nuclear energy for power production cannot be ignored. These accidents expose the dangers of radioactive contamination and their humanitarian impact that also accompany the use of nuclear weapons. We are well aware of the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United States, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine, and the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011. Benjamin Sovacool, researcher at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, warned only a few months before Fukushima that “there has been at least one nuclear incident and US$332 million awarded in damages every year for the past three decades.”57 If you are scared, you should be; but for a thin film of luck, we are teetering on the brink of disaster.

Thinking the Unthinkable: Erosion of the Nuclear Taboo In 1945, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at the culmination of World War II in the Pacific. Since that time, no country has used a nuclear weapon, even

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Banning the Bomb

though opportunities may have arisen during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War, or more recently during the 1991 or 2003 Iraq wars or in Afghanistan. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union and the United States appeared to be on the brink of a nuclear conflagration but stepped back from the edge through diplomatic channels. Nina Tannenwald claims that this aversion to the use of nuclear weapons amounts to a normative inhibition, also referred to as the “nuclear taboo.”58 But that taboo might be eroding, and the launch of a nuclear attack might become more thinkable. “President Trump’s threats in August 2017 to rain ‘fire and fury like the world has never seen’ on North Korea . . . alarmed leaders and citizens around the world.”59 Although the president did not use the word “nuclear,” his message was clear. The United States has also stepped back from agreements that have in the past offered stability and a means for communication. The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review contains a “claim that an enemy cyberattack on U.S. nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) facilities would constitute a ‘non-nuclear strategic attack’ of sufficient magnitude to justify the use of nuclear weapons in response.”60 In conclusion, arms control strategies, policies, and negotiations previously intended to lower nuclear tensions and stabilize a kind of nuclear order seem to be disappearing. Tannenwald expresses her alarm at this development: “In short, the global nuclear normative order is unraveling. The nuclear taboo is at the core of this normative order.”61 A study conducted by Daryl Press, Scott Sagan, and Benjamin Valentino supports the argument that the nuclear taboo is eroding. Among the general American public, the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are fading, along with any images of the devastation and radioactive contamination suffered as a result of the blasts. After carrying out a survey to examine the opinions of Americans on the potential use of nuclear weapons, the researchers concluded: “We find that the public has only a weak aversion to using nuclear weapons and this aversion has few characteristics of an ‘unthinkable’ behavior or taboo.”62 The characteristics of a taboo include a revulsion or abhorrence of even thinking about a certain behavior as acceptable, such as cannibalism or incest.63 The traditional view has been that nuclear weapons are not just more powerful conventional weapons but are a different category of weapon altogether. The consequences of their use can leave immeasurable damage for generations.

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The study conducted by Press, Sagan, and Valentino classifies certain types of responses by the participants in which they indicate that nuclear weapons would be considered a poor option, but not a taboo. These could be the threat of retaliation, Mutually Assured Destruction, harm imposed on US soldiers through nuclear weapons use in the field, or the contamination of regions that an attacker might wish to occupy or rebuild. But these are decisions based on logical outcomes, not on abhorrence or an appreciation for the qualitative difference of a nuclear strike. In the opinion survey, the subjects were given a scenario in which it was discovered that al-Qaeda had a secret nuclear weapons lab in Syria and that the United States had attacked the site with two nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. “More than two-thirds of subjects approved of the nuclear strike, and more than half viewed a US nuclear strike as ethical.”64 The study also shows, however, that when elites state that nuclear weapons should never be used, public approval diminishes. This indicates the importance of leadership over the use of nuclear weapons. US presidents in the past have supported the non-use of these weapons, but the Trump administration’s leadership demonstrates an unsettling uncertainty and even hints at the possibility of their use. The authors of the study conclude by stating, “Far from being unthinkable or repulsive, the experiments suggest that US nuclear use is something that a substantial majority of the American public is prepared to support, at least in high-stakes situations.”65 Other evidence of the erosion of the nuclear taboo appears in the Pentagon’s new updated war plan, according to which tactical nuclear weapons could be used on the battlefield.66 The new doctrine allows field commanders to make recommendations. “In other words, commanders in the field would not only execute orders from the national command authority, but they would also participate in battle planning. This tends to normalize the possibility of nuclear war fighting.”67 When plans are in place to use nuclear weapons under certain scenarios on the battlefield and field commanders are a part of that decisionmaking process, there can be a greater tendency to operationalize such a plan. At a meeting of the Arms Control Association on July 29, 2019, Lara Seligman, Pentagon correspondent at Foreign Policy, stated in a discussion about the Trump administration’s nuclear weapons policy, “The most interesting and controversial piece to me is the introduction of two new low-yield or tactical nukes to the US arsenal. Opponents say this addition is unnecessary

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Banning the Bomb

and increases the risk of nuclear war.”68 An example of this fieldready modernization is, as mentioned in the introduction, the new B61-12, which has a lower yield of up to 50 kilotons and greater accuracy within 30 meters of a designated target. This type of modernization may lead decisionmakers to deploy and use a nuclear weapon, making these new weapons more dangerous despite their comparatively lower yield.69 All the while, Russia is attempting to do the same thing, increasing the risks even more. The erosion of the nuclear taboo and plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield further emphasize the need for a total prohibition of nuclear weapons before their use becomes inevitable or the mere possession of nuclear arsenals leads to a horrific accident. Instead of the policy of nuclear restraint pursued in the past, the very countries that possess nuclear weapons today appear to be those who are eroding the nuclear taboo, with precarious effects. Leadership is key. Nina Tannenwald suggests that, “Presidents Trump and Putin should be able to say the same thing that President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev said in 1985: ‘that nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.’”70 Speaking at the high-level plenary meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on September 26, 2019, UN Secretary-General António Guterres echoed that view, stating that nuclear weapons are an “existential threat” and that “the only real way to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons is to eliminate nuclear weapons.”71 This premise has long been a central argument of the humanitarian initiative to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The Business of Mutually Assured Destruction Aside from the technical risks and dangerous political developments mentioned previously, disarmament advocates are deeply concerned by the sheer number of nuclear arms still in existence a quarter-century after the end of the Cold War. Nine states are presently in possession of nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the DPRK), and each of them is making significant investments into the modernization of their nuclear arsenals.72 The United States alone is currently investing $1.7 trillion into its nuclear build-up and modernization.73 Although the number of nuclear warheads has been reduced significantly since its

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peak in 1986, from a technological perspective, they could be dismantled much faster.74 However, the modernization of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new ones are taking resources away from the dismantlement of retired warheads, which often relies on the same facilities.75 According to estimates, there are currently 14,465 nuclear warheads in existence worldwide, 76 of which approximately 9,300 are stockpiled for potential use and 3,600 are deployed (on or nearby operational delivery systems). The United States and Russia are currently deploying 1,750 and 1,600 strategic nuclear warheads, respectively.77 Even defense experts who support nuclear deterrence (a theory that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) agree that 300 strategic nuclear warheads are more than enough to discourage an attack.78 That is also the approximate number of nuclear weapons the United Kingdom, France, and China currently possess, respectively.79 Anything beyond that number can be considered overkill, quite literally, since we have only one planet to annihilate. This begs the question of what, if not deterrence, is behind the excessive stockpiles held by the United States and Russia, as well as the costly modernization of nuclear arsenals worldwide—for example, the sudden need to manufacture eighty plutonium pits per year by 2030, as discussed previously. The short answer is money and a profit motive, and the slightly longer answer leads us to the so-called military-industrial complex. First invoked by US president Dwight D. Eisenhower in his 1961 farewell address,80 the military-industrial complex commonly refers to “policy and monetary relationships between legislators, national armed forces and the so-called ‘defence’ industry.”81 Although World War II brought an unprecedented buildup of the defense industry in the United States and elsewhere, the advent of the nuclear age made this build-up permanent. A large-scale nuclear attack can destroy an entire country or region in minutes, leaving the other side no time to shore up its defenses and mobilize for war. Consequently, US military strategists determined that the country had to be ready for war at all times, maintaining a permanent arms industry at a scale that had previously been reserved for times of active conflict.82 During the Cold War, a combination of fear, hyped intelligence, and special interest lobbying worked to keep military spending, including investment in nuclear weapons, extremely high. Spending came down when the Cold War ended, although not by as much as it could have, only to increase to its highest level since 1945

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after September 11, 2001. The arms industry in the United States seized on that moment to increase its economic interests by using various avenues of influence, including targeted campaign contributions to members of Congress on key committees, its role as an employer in select states, an army of lobbyists, funding for think tanks that support hard-power worldviews, and the revolving door between high military ranks and high positions in the defense industry.83 The redoubled investment in defense after 9/11 also extended to nuclear weapons, in particular shorter-range, nonstrategic nuclear weapons intended for deployment in a battlefield setting alongside conventional weapons. The previously mentioned number of deployed nuclear warheads—approximately 1,750—includes only long-range, strategic nuclear weapons. Nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced drastically at the end of the Cold War, but have recently made a comeback, with Russia holding about 1,830 and the United States holding 230.84 They should not be disregarded for two reasons. Firstly, tactical nuclear weapons have shorter range, but not necessarily lower destructive capacity. The yield of nuclear warheads overall has increased sharply since the beginning of the nuclear age, and some nuclear weapons considered tactical today actually have the destructive power of a Hiroshima bomb.85 Secondly, current modernization programs in some nuclear-weapon states (NWS), as already mentioned, are aimed at making tactical nuclear warheads more “usable” for battles on the ground by improving their target accuracy and enabling military planners to customize nuclear weapons. Therefore, tactical nuclear weapons make a breach of the nuclear taboo more likely. While the United States and Russia are modernizing their existing strategic nuclear weapons, China, India, and Pakistan are increasing their stockpiles of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. According to estimates, Pakistan has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world, which includes ultrashort-range missiles specially designed to respond to a conventional attack from India in a tactical fashion.86 Although the moral and security concerns of this development are undeniable, some antinuclear activists have made the sheer cost of current nuclear modernization and build-up campaigns their particular target. On the one hand, that money, about $66,000 per minute in the case of the United States,87 largely comes from taxpayers. Therefore, campaigns like “Don’t Bank on the Bomb” by the NGO PAX are working to rally citizens against the use of their tax contri-

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butions for nuclear armament. On the other hand, the companies involved in the nuclear-weapon supply chain cannot do business without investments from the private sector. Don’t Bank on the Bomb found that between 2013 and 2016, “390 banks, pension funds, and asset managers in twenty-six countries made more than $498 billion available . . . to twenty-seven companies that produce, maintain and modernize nuclear arsenals in France, India, the United Kingdom and the United States.”88 In Russia, China, Pakistan, and the DPRK, the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons is chiefly carried out by government agencies, with only marginal involvement of private companies.89 The twenty-seven companies holding large contracts for nuclear weapons manufacturing, modernization, and/or maintenance include several prominent names. Airbus is involved in the production of French nuclear missiles. Boeing holds contracts with the US military for at least $700 million for the Minuteman III ICBMs and for the development of their replacement. General Dynamics supplies key components for the UK and US Trident II, as well as the Columbia class ballistic missile submarines. Its combined nuclearweapons-related contracts also amount to almost $700 million. Honeywell International manages and operates “the facility responsible for producing an estimated 85 percent of the non-nuclear components for US nuclear weapons,”90 and co-owns Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, which has a $9 billion contract for the nuclear warhead deployed on the Trident II. Lockheed Martin also holds a contract related to Trident II worth around $6.6 billion. In addition, the company participates in research and design for new long-range missiles for the US Air Force. Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor for the Minuteman III ICBM system and also contributes to the Trident II, holding nuclear-weapons-related contracts for about $4 billion in total.91 The enormous amounts of money flowing into nuclear armament are highly problematic, not only because they could be spent on sustainable development, environmental remediation, infrastructure, education, or healthcare instead, but also because they create a strong economic and financial interest in the long-term continuation of nuclear weapons programs. These powerful special interests work to inhibit disarmament and justify deterrence-based security concepts. Therefore, NGOs such as PAX are employing naming and shaming tactics against nuclear weapons producers and the banks and other

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entities who invest in them. The aim is to make nuclear weapons a less-attractive investment and thus limit financial flows into the nuclear sector. The previously mentioned nuclear weapons manufacturers have numerous other business interests and fields of activity, with nuclear weapons making up only a part of their company portfolio. This makes them potentially vulnerable to stigmatization. If the stigma against nuclear weapons becomes strong enough to hurt their brand and their non-military revenue—if, for instance, consumers stopped buying Honeywell appliances because of the company’s association with nuclear weapons—this can create an incentive for companies to withdraw from the nuclear sector. The same is true for banks and insurance companies who invest in the nuclear sector. Nuclear divestment campaigns and their impact are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9.

The NPT Reaches a Midlife Crisis With a growing sense of urgency building as a result of the mounting concerns described previously, civil society and the non-nuclearweapon states (NNWS) realized they needed to break the status quo. Stagnation within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) process added to the frustration. We argue here that the impasse at NPT conferences, as well as the repeated nonfulfillment of disarmament plans agreed to at these conferences, led civil society and the NNWS to take matters into their own hands. They were determined to move ahead with a new process, even without the participation of the NWS and their allies. Thus, the motivations and interests behind the humanitarian impact initiative can best be understood by taking a closer look at the status of multilateral nuclear disarmament frameworks at the time the humanitarian initiative emerged. We have already discussed the nine current NWS and the magnitude of their arsenals. Among them, the United States is the only one who also deploys its nuclear weapons on foreign soil, “at six air bases in five NATO countries— Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey,”92 and extends its nuclear weapons as protection to other allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These extended security guarantees, also known as the “nuclear umbrella,”93 significantly increase the actual area of proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the possessor states.

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In concrete terms, the United States currently has about 180 B61 nuclear gravity bombs deployed to its airbases in the aforementioned NATO countries.94 Since the end of World War II, there have been numerous attempts to tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons at the regional and international levels, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Existing nuclear disarmament and control frameworks include the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has not entered into force,95 the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and other bilateral agreements between the United States, Russia, and other former Soviet states,96 as well as regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). One hundred states and over 50 percent of the globe are covered by NWFZ, including all of Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Central Asia, and the South Pacific.97 The fact that NWFZ encompass the entire southern hemisphere makes it easier to understand the strong support the humanitarian initiative enjoys in the Global South. The NPT has been the main instrument of the international nuclear regime since its entry into force in 1970. Sometimes called the “grand bargain”98 between the NWS and the NNWS, it rests on three pillars: Nuclear nonproliferation (Articles I, II, and III), nuclear disarmament (Article VI), and, as an incentive for the NNWS to join the treaty, peaceful nuclear cooperation (Articles IV and V) by which the NWS assist the NNWS in developing nuclear technologies for research, power generation, and other peaceful purposes.99 Under the NPT, a clear distinction is made between the NNWS and NWS. The NNWS pledge to renounce nuclear weapons and subject their civilian nuclear programs to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify compliance. The five recognized NWS, coinciding with the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council, are allowed to maintain their arsenals and are not subject to inspections.100 Initially, the NWS, notably the United States and the USSR, had no intention of halting their ongoing nuclear arms race. Only as a result of substantial pressure from nonaligned states did they finally agree to Article VI of the NPT,101 in which the NWS pledge to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”102 Article VI does not specify concrete steps or timelines for disarmament. Nucleararmed states are simply required to demonstrate that they are pursuing

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disarmament negotiations “in good faith.” Even at the time, the NNWS were aware of the vagueness of this commitment, and their doubts were proven correct over subsequent decades. Despite the NPT’s impressive record concerning nonproliferation,103 not a single nuclear warhead has ever been eliminated under the NPT regime.104 (Any nuclear disarmament at the end of the Cold War was the result of bilateral efforts between Russia and the United States.) In return for the international community’s consent to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, three additional disarmament provisions were included in the relevant decision of the Conference of the Parties, titled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.”105 The first objective was the conclusion of the CTBT and a fissile materials cut-off treaty; the second was the review of the implementation of the states parties’ commitments by the preparatory committee; and the third was to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.106 Similar assurances were given at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties in the form of thirteen “practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI,” as well as the 1995 principles and objectives.107 Whereas the 2005 conference failed to produce any results, the 2010 conference took place in a generally positive international climate. President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech calling for a world free of nuclear weapons, along with the conclusion of the New START between the United States and Russia, had reinvigorated the disarmament community.108 The Arab Spring and the annexation of Crimea had not yet soured relations between East and West, and after the failure of the 2005 conference, the international community had high hopes for reaching a substantial agreement on disarmament this time around. Indeed, the 2010 conference was widely hailed as a success since it produced a concrete action plan designed to make disarmament efforts more measurable, thus increasing accountability.109 Disarmament activists, however, argued that the final document hid the continued resistance of the nuclear-armed states parties to any concrete disarmament commitments.110 For instance, France, Russia, and the United States would not commit to cease the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.111 The failure of the NWS to uphold their end of the bargain led to growing frustration among the NNWS and made them reluctant to agree to any concrete nonproliferation measures. This dynamic virtually halted progress in both areas and was beginning to undermine the

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decades-old NPT regime. A debate emerged around the double standards set by the treaty, sometimes referred to as “nuclear apartheid,”112 which allows the nuclear-armed states to control the NPT regime and use it to maintain their strategic military advantage over other states.113 Another factor contributing to the gradual erosion of the NPT regime is the fact that three NWS—India, Israel, and Pakistan—are not parties to the treaty and therefore not bound by its provisions.114 The DPRK can arguably be added to the list of unauthorized NWS, rendering the NPT ineffective in combating one of the most immediate nuclear threats of our time. The Conference on Disarmament (CD), a UN body that brings together sixty member states at yearly meetings in Geneva, has been paralyzed ever since the conclusion of the negotiations for the CTBT in 1996.115 Since all its decisions must be taken by consensus, the Conference has not succeeded in adopting a program of work in several years. Much the same can be said for the New York–based UN Disarmament Commission. In these two fora, as well as the NPT conferences, the NWS effectively control the institutional procedures and have the power to impede any disarmament initiatives that do not suit their military interests.116 For Ray Acheson, this standstill of the nuclear disarmament process is partly owed to the fact that the negotiations in these fora are conducted by elites. Civil society has been excluded from the process almost entirely, denying ordinary citizens who would suffer the most severe consequences of a nuclear war a voice in the matter.117 In sum, the alarming list of nuclear accidents, the withdrawal from disarmament agreements, the missing nuclear material, the unraveling of the nuclear taboo, and the entrenched positions within the NPT regime and other existing nuclear disarmament and control frameworks were undoubtedly an important impetus for civil society, countries of the Global South, and other like-minded states to embrace the humanitarian initiative and devote their political influence and resources to creating the TPNW. The series of humanitarian conferences that followed were significantly more inclusive, dynamic, and open-minded as supporters galvanized around a new paradigm focused on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.118 Humanity, perhaps unwittingly, has been living on the edge while the dangers of these massive weapons threaten life itself. The confluence of factors enumerated previously drove those concerned about the state of the world’s security to take bold steps to prohibit nuclear weapons. We believe it is important to tell their story.

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1. Wade Boese, “U.S. Withdraws from ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2002, https://www.armscontrol.org/act /2002-07/news/us-withdraws-abm-treaty-global-response-muted. 2. For the INF Treaty text, see https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm. 3. The Elders, “The Elders Warn of Escalating Nuclear Tensions Following Termination of INF Treaty,” Press Release, London, July 29, 2019, https://www.theelders .org/news/elders-warn-escalating-nuclear-tensions-following-termination-inf-treaty. 4. Kingston Reif, “Treaty Withdrawal Accelerates Missile Debate,” Arms Control Today, September 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news /treaty-withdrawal-accelerates-missile-debate. 5. James J. Cameron, “The U.S. Plans to Withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty. That’s a Miscalculation,” Washington Post, May 24, 2020, www .washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/24/us-plans-withdrawal. 6. US Department of Defense, “Statement on Open Skies Treaty Withdrawal,” May 21, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release /Article/2195239/dod-statement-on-open-skies-treaty-withdrawal/. 7. John Hudson and Paul Sonne, “Trump Administration Discussed Conducting First U.S. Nuclear Test in Decades,” Washington Post, May 22, 2020, www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration. 8. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) UK, “Arguments for Nuclear Abolition: The Humanitarian Case,” http://uk.icanw.org/why -a-ban/arguments-for-a-ban/, accessed on July 6, 2020. 9. Angela Kane, Between Aspiration and Reality: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2019), p. 1. 10. Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin, 2013), p. 173. 11. Now renamed the Strategic Command. 12. Schlosser, Command and Control, p. 220. 13. Ibid., p. 185. 14. Ibid., p. 186. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., pp. 245–246. 17. Ibid., p. 247. 18. Ibid., p. 248. 19. Associated Press, “Accident Revealed After 29 Years: H-Bomb Fell Near Albuquerque in 1957,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1986, https://www.latimes .com/archives/la-xpm-1986-08-27-mn-14421-story.html. 20. History.com, “H-Bomb lost in Spain,” History, February 9, 2010, www .history.com/this-day-in-history/h-bomb-lost-in-spain. 21. Schlosser, Command and Control, pp. 184–185. 22. Dave Phillips, “U.S., Decades Later, Sickness Among Airmen After Hydrogen Bomb Accident,” New York Times, January 19, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016 /06/20/us/decades-later-sickness-among-airmen-after-a-hydrogen-bomb-accident.html. 23. There are currently some 400 active ICBM silos around the United States located in Montana, North Dakota, Colorado, and Wyoming. ICBMs have included Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Peacekeeper types, however the Minuteman III is the most commonly used today. National Park Service, “Minuteman Missiles on the Great Plains,” April 6, 2017, http://www.nps.gov/articles/minuteman-missiles. 24. Schlosser, Command and Control, pp. 23–25.

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25. Ibid., p. 426. 26. Ibid., p. 428. 27. Hans M. Kristensen, “Flying Nuclear Bombs,” Federation of American Scientists, September 5, 2007, https://fas.org/blogs.security/2007/09/flying-nuclear-bombs. 28. Michael T. Klare, “‘Skynet’ Revisited: The Dangerous Allure of Nuclear Command Automation,” Arms Control Today 50 (3), April 2020, https://www.armscontrol .org/act/2020-04/features/skynet-revisited-dangerous-allure-nuclear-command-automation. 29. Ibid, p. 11. 30. Kristyn Karl and Ashley Lytle, “This Is Not a Drill: Lessons from the False Hawaiian Missile Alert,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 10, 2019, http:// thebulletin.org/2019/01/this-is-not-a-drill-lessons-from-the-false-hawaiian-missile-alert. 31. Union of Concerned Scientists, “Close Calls with Nuclear Weapons,” April 2015, www.ucsusa.org/weaponsincidents, accessed on August 20, 2019. 32. Schlosser, Command and Control, p. 472. 33. Sharon K. Weiner, “Reconsidering U.S. Plutonium Pit Production Plans,” Arms Control Today 50 (5), June 2020, pp. 6–13. 34. Nuclear Watch, “U.S. Plutonium Pit Manufacturing,” Nuclear Watch, March 1, 2008, www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/pits.html. 35. Weiner, p. 9. 36. Nuclear Watch, “U.S. Plutonium Pit Manufacturing”; Weiner, p. 6. 37. Weiner, p. 7. 38. Ibid. See also Jeffrey Smith and Patrick Malone, “Safety Problems as Los Alamos Laboratory Delay U.S. Nuclear Warhead Testing and Production,” Science, June 30, 2017, www.sciencemag.otg/news/2017/06/safety-problems -los-alamos-laboratory-delay-us-nuclear-warhead-testing-and-production. 39. Defense Nuclear Safety Board, Letter to Secretary of Energy James Perry, November 15, 2019, https://ehss.energy.gov/deprep/2019/FB19N15B.PDF. 40. Graham T. Allison with Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson, 1991). 41. Claire Corkhill, “‘Nuclear-Powered’ Missile Accident in Russia—What Really Happened?” The Conversation, August 16, 2019, http://theconversation .com/nuclear-powered-missile-accident-in-russia-what-really-happened-121966. 42. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian Doctor Has Trace of Radiation After Explosion,” Associated Press, August 23, 2019, https://www.apnews.com /5a3874bbae7d47c18bfd6199a24a1aa9. 43. BBC, “Russian Nuclear Accident: Medics Fear ‘Radioactive Patients,’” BBC News, August 23, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49432681. 44. Ibid. 45. Ryan Pickrell, “New Details on Russia’s Mysterious Missile Disaster Suggest a Nuclear Reactor Blew Up,” Business Insider, August 26, 2019, https:// www.businessinsider.com/russian-missile-disaster-shows-signs-nuke-reactor -blew-up-experts-2019-8. 46. Sam LaGrone and Ben Werner, “14 Sailors Die on Secretive Russian Nuclear Submarine; Putin Calls Incident ‘Great Loss,’” USNI News, July 2, 2019, https:// news.usni.org/2019/07/02/14-sailors-die-on-secretive-russian-nuclear-submarine. 47. Jamie Seidel, “‘Catastrophic’ Risk Run by Doomed Russian Nuclear Submarine,” Technology, Innovation, Military, July 10, 2019, https://www.news .com.au/technology/innovation/military.mysterious-mission. 48. Moscow Times, “The Five Deadliest Submarine Accidents in Soviet and Russian History,” Moscow Times, July 3, 2019, www.moscowtimes.com/2019 /07/03/the-deadliest-submarine-accidents.

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49. Dave Majumdar, “Dead Submarines: 5 Worst Sub Disasters of all Time,” The National Interest, August 9, 2019, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/dead -submarines-5-worst-sub-disasters. 50. Stephen Smith, “Russian Destroyer Nearly Collides with U.S. Warship,” CBS News, June 7, 2019, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-destroyer-admiral -vinogradov-nearly-collides-uss-chancellorsville-warship-today-2019-06-07/. 51. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) 2019,” https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/04/itdbfactsheet-2019.pdf. 52. Ibid., p. 2. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid., p. 3. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., p. 4. 57. Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Second Thoughts About Nuclear Power. A Policy Brief—Challenges Facing Asia,” National University of Singapore, January 2011, p. 2. 58. Nina Tannewald, “How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?” Washington Quarterly 41 (3), Fall 2018, p. 89. 59. Ibid., p. 90. 60. Michael T. Klare, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” Arms Control Today 49 (9), November 2019, p. 6. 61. Tannewald, “How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?” p. 91. 62. Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino, “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” American Political Science Review 107 (1), February 2013, p. 1. 63. Ibid., p. 3. 64. Ibid., p. 10. 65. Press et al., Atomic Aversion, p. 11. 66. Todd South, Stephen Losey, and Kristine Froeba, “Blast from the Past: The Pentagon’s Updated War Plan for Tactical Nukes,” Military Times, July 10, 2019, www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/07/10. 67. Ibid. 68. Arms Control Association, “A Critical Evaluation of the Trump Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Policies,” transcript of a meeting held by the Arms Control Association at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 29, 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/events/2019-07/critical-evaluation-trump -administrations-nuclear-weapons-policies. 69. Zachary Keck, “Why the B-61-12 Bomb Is the Most Dangerous Nuclear Weapon in America’s Arsenal,” National Interest, October 9, 2018, https:// nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-b-61-12-bomb-most-dangerous-nuclear -weapon-americas-arsenal-32976. 70. Tannewald, “How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?” p. 104. 71. António Guterres, “Secretary-General’s Message on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” September 26, 2019, https:// www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-09-26/secretary-generals-message -the-international-day-for-the-total-elimination-of-nuclear-weapons. 72. Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew G. McKinzie, “Nuclear Arsenals: Current Developments, Trends and Capabilities,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 564.

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73. William D. Hartung, “Massive Overkill: The Threat of Nuclear Annihilation. Brought to You by the Nuclear-Industrial Complex,” Global Research, November 17, 2017, https://www.globalresearch.ca/massive-overkill-the-threat -of-nuclear-annihilation/5618720. 74. Tom Sauer and Joelien Pretorius, “Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach,” Global Change, Peace & Security 26 (3), 2014, p. 244. 75. Oleg Bukharin, “A Breakdown of Breakout: U.S. and Russian Warhead Production Capabilities,” Arms Control Today, October 2002, https://www .armscontrol.org/act/2002-10/features/breakdown-breakout-us-russian-warhead -production-capabilities. 76. Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Hiroshima Report 2019: Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2018 (Hiroshima, March 2019), https://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/346733.pdf, p. 10. 77. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status -world-nuclear-forces (last updated in May 2019); in relation to the numbers, the authors remark: “Numbers may not add up due to rounding and uncertainty about the operational status of the four lesser nuclear weapons states and the uncertainty about the size of the total inventories of three of the five initial nuclear powers.” 78. Hartung, “Massive Overkill.” 79. ICAN, “How Many Nuclear Weapons Are There in the World?” https:// www.icanw.org/the-facts/nuclear-arsenals/, accessed on March 1, 2019. 80. William D. Hartung, “Nuclear Politics,” Sleepwalking to Armageddon: The Threat of Nuclear Annihilation, edited by Helen Caldicott (New York: The New Press, 2017), p. 56. 81. Reaching Critical Will, “Military-Industrial Complex,” http://www .reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Resources/Factsheets/mic.pdf (accessed November 20, 2019). 82. Hartung, “Nuclear Policies,” p. 56. 83. Ibid., p. 57f. 84. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75 (5), 2019, p. 253. 85. Ibid., p. 258. 86. Hans M. Kristensen, “Modernization of Nuclear Weaponry,” Sleepwalking to Armageddon: The Threat of Nuclear Annihilation, edited by Helen Caldicott (New York: The New Press, 2017), p. 22. 87. Susi Snyder, “Don’t Bank on the Bomb,” Sleepwalking to Armageddon: The Threat of Nuclear Annihilation, edited by Helen Caldicott (New York: The New Press, 2017), p. 76. 88. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90. Susi Snyder, “Producing Mass Destruction: Private Companies and the Nuclear Weapon Industry,” report for ICAN and PAX, May 2019, https://www .dontbankonthebomb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019_Producers-Report -FINAL.pdf, p. 7. 91. Ibid., p. 6f. 92. Ray Acheson, “Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66 (6), 2010, p. 80.

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93. Terence Roehrig, “The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella Over South Korea: Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence,” Political Science Quarterly 132 (4), December 2017, p. 651. 94. Snyder, “Producing Mass Destruction,” p. 5. 95. Richard D. Burns and Philip E. Coyle, The Challenges of Nuclear NonProliferation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), p. 69. 96. Ibid., p. 133f. 97. Ibid. 98. Ban Ki-moon, “Recalling Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty’s ‘Grand Bargain,’ Secretary-General Urges Leaders at Review Conference to ‘Abandon Short-Sighted Posturing,’” United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2015 NPT Review Conference, (DC/3551), https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/dc3551.doc.htm. 99. Toby Dalton et al., “Toward a Nuclear Firewall: Bridging the NPT’s Three Pillars,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 20, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/toward-nuclear-firewall-bridging-npt -s-three-pillars-pub-68300; for the complete text of the NPT, see endnote 102. 100. Burns and Coyle, The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, p. 45. 101. Ibid., p. 50. 102. United Nations, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Treaty Series 729, (10485), July 1968, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication /UNTS/Volume%20729/volume-729-I-10485-English.pdf. 103. Burns and Coyle, The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, p. 45. 104. Kjølv Egeland, “Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?” Global Governance 24 (1), August 2018, p. 12. 105. NPT, “Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Final Document,” UN document symbol NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), 1995, p. 9 (all official UN documents can be accessed by entering their document symbol at https://documents.un.org). 106. Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament” Washington Quarterly 40 (4), 2017, p. 73. 107. NPT, “Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Final Document,” NPT/CONF.2000/28, 2000, p. 14 (art. 6, par. 15). 108. Declan Butler, “Obama’s Nuclear-Weapons-Free Vision,” Nature 458 (7239), April 2009, p. 684. 109. Alexander Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons Debate,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 684f. 110. Acheson, “Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” p. 77f. 111. John Zarocostas, “The UN Adopts Treaty to Ban the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Lancet 390 (10092), July 2017, p. 349. 112. Jonathan Granoff, “The Process of Zero,” World Policy Journal 26 (4), Winter 2009/10, p. 92. 113. Acheson, “Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” p. 79. 114. Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 72. 115. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Conference on Disarmament (CD),” last updated on April 29, 2019, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/conference-on -disarmament/. 116. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 705. 117. Acheson, “Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” p. 85. 118. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 705.

3 The Evolution of the Humanitarian Initiative

THE HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE TOOK SHAPE AT A MOment when there appeared to be a new dynamism in the disarmament community. US president Barack Obama signaled his support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and his administration took up bilateral disarmament negotiations with Russia for the New START. The action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference contained what many hailed as long-awaited concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament. 1 In September 2010, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon convened a high-level conference on “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.”2 Although the conference did not meet its objective of initiating multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations within the framework of the CD, it inspired several UN member states to push for nuclear disarmament within the UN General Assembly. The ICRC chose this moment to reinsert itself more actively into nuclear disarmament advocacy and published various studies on the devastating impact of nuclear weapons. Then-president of the ICRC Jakob Kellenberger gave a speech before the diplomatic corps in Geneva on April 20, 2010, recounting the testimony of an ICRC delegate who was the first foreign doctor present in the immediate aftermath of the 1945 bombing in Hiroshima. Kellenberger pointed out that even today, the international community 41

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does not have the capacities to adequately address a humanitarian emergency of such magnitude. He went on to state that the ICRC found it difficult to envision a scenario when the use of nuclear weapons might be compatible with international humanitarian law.3 Coming from the organization that considers itself the guardian of international humanitarian law, this statement became an important input for the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 and was taken up by the Austrian and Swiss delegations at the meetings. 4 Thus, the humanitarian dimension of nuclear war was addressed in an NPT consensus document for the first time, with a passage in the 2010 action plan that read: The Conference expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.5

In combination with action I of the action plan, in which states commit to policies compatible with the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, the previous statement can be interpreted as a mandate for states to pursue the humanitarian initiative in their implementation of the NPT. This interpretation became an important argument to counter one of the main critiques the NWS aimed at the humanitarian initiative, namely that it distracts from the implementation of the NPT.6 In the timeline of the humanitarian initiative, the next step within the NPT framework was the first preparatory committee meeting (held in 2012) for the 2015 Review Conference in Vienna. During this meeting, Switzerland presented the first cross-regional statement on the humanitarian initiative on behalf of sixteen states, which became known as the “Group of 16.”7 Norway announced that it would host a conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in 2013. In the same year, the first OEWG was established through a GA resolution called “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations,”8 sponsored by Austria, Mexico, and Norway, among others. The OEWG met in Geneva for fifteen working days. Although it produced no groundbreaking final report, the OEWG ushered in a new kind of meeting that was previously unheard of in nuclear arms control: a meeting not dominated by the P5, where civil society was invited to actively participate, and where speakers

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brought forward constructive ideas instead of lamenting the status quo and the inaction of other parties.9 These OEWG meetings can therefore be considered the first official meetings that carried the spirit of the humanitarian initiative. By 2012, the NWS, which had likely attributed little importance to the mention of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons when they first subscribed to the 2010 action plan, began to realize that the humanitarian initiative was gaining traction. According to Alexander Kmentt, this development took them by surprise.10 Although the United States considered disarmament a bilateral affair, the Obama administration was, at least in the beginning, open to dialogue with the humanitarian initiative. Without decisive US leadership, other NATO members and allies were unable to slow the momentum of the humanitarian initiative effectively.11

The Humanitarian Conferences in Norway, Mexico, and Austria The first of the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons took place in Oslo in March 2013. It consisted mainly of expert presentations on the humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences of any detonation of nuclear weapons and on preparedness and response to nuclear emergencies. The conference thus set the stage for the disarmament push by laying down the facts about the devastating impact of nuclear weapons. The Norwegian hosts kept the focus on facts and evidence, purposefully avoiding a more political discussion or the premature adoption of conclusions. Before the conference, ICAN hosted a civil society forum that brought together hundreds of activists and contributed to the dynamic atmosphere of the subsequent conference.12 Among the participants of the conference were delegations from 127 countries, several UN organizations such as UNHCR, OCHA, UNDP, and WFP, as well as a variety of civil society representatives. The ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) both sent large delegations, and ICAN was represented with numerous partner organizations from different countries.13 The NWS collectively boycotted the conference in a rare demonstration of P5 solidarity. According to Kmentt, their assumption was that any discussion about nuclear weapons would be an exercise in futility without their

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participation. To the supporters of the humanitarian initiative, this dismissive attitude served as further proof that the NWS had no interest in changing the status quo and no serious intention to pursue complete nuclear disarmament as envisioned in the NPT.14 Perhaps because Norway is a member of NATO, or perhaps because the humanitarian initiative was in its early stages, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s summary was succinct and limited to facts about nuclear weapons, avoiding any political statements. Its three main points were that the international community cannot adequately address the humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation; that the immediate and long-term effects of such a detonation are well-known; and that these effects will transcend national borders.15 At the closing meeting, Mexico announced its intention to host a follow-up conference,16 thus guaranteeing the continuity of the humanitarian initiative. The second conference took place in Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014 and brought together 146 states. One of its most salient features was the testimony of the hibakusha, the survivors of the atomic bomb detonations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Their stories helped to shift the focus of the disarmament discourse away from technicalities and toward the lives of real human beings. Moreover, the Nayarit conference addressed the element of risk associated with the existence of nuclear arsenals and the deployment of nuclear weapons. It exposed the vulnerabilities of the nuclear command and control infrastructure by citing sixteen historical cases of so-called near misses—nuclear catastrophes that almost happened due to human or technical error, as described in Chapter 2. Naturally, the security of nuclear arsenals is not only threatened by accidents but also by cyberattacks and terrorist activities. The Nayarit conference had a more political dimension than the one in Oslo and featured a general debate with contributions by almost eighty state delegations.17 This time, the chair’s summary did not avoid politically charged statements. It declared the mere existence of nuclear weapons to be absurd on account of the cost, both material and human, associated with them, and openly called for a legally binding instrument to outlaw nuclear weapons.18 This direct language gave rise to significant controversy. Several participating states, including Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey, did not feel that the summary adequately reflected their views and criticized it as going too far.19 This controversy significantly complicated the work of the organizers of the next conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear

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weapons, to be held in Vienna in December of the same year. They were faced not only with the delicate task of appeasing European NATO states in order to assure their participation but also with the ambitious expectations of NGOs and other proponents of the legal instrument that Mexico had put on the agenda. In the lead-up to the conference, the NWS and nuclear umbrella states launched numerous diplomatic appeals to the Austrian hosts, seeking reassurance that the conference would not produce a political outcome contrary to their interests. This was a clear sign that the NWS and their allies were growing increasingly concerned that the humanitarian impact conferences would indeed turn into a slippery slope toward a treaty banning nuclear weapons.20 In an effort to reconcile these expectations, Austrian diplomats immediately began outreach efforts and sought to avert confrontation by reaffirming that the humanitarian initiative was in line with the objectives of the NPT and that the views of all participants would be reflected in the chair’s summary. Most importantly, they reached out to US Department of State officials, who seemed to be looking for a way to insert themselves into the humanitarian initiative. Having encountered substantial difficulties in the realization of President Obama’s Prague speech, they sought to retain their credibility on nuclear disarmament and preferred to leave the obstructionist role to France and Russia. This gave rise to solid working relationships with the Department of State and several US-based think tanks. Since the Ukraine crisis had driven a wedge between Russia and the remaining P5 members, the conference organizers saw an opportunity to soften the NWS’s united front of categorical opposition. In the end, the United States did indeed join the conference, and the United Kingdom quickly followed suit, generating a significant surge in international news coverage and heightened interest among US think tanks such as the Arms Control Association.21 Although the number of participating states increased to 158,22 France, Russia, and China continued to boycott the humanitarian initiative.23 Among the salient elements of the Vienna conference were the health, environmental, and social impacts of nuclear weapons testing, illustrated by testimonies from victims from Utah, Australia, and the Marshall Islands, as well as the gender dimension of radiation exposure, which affects women more severely than men. Radiation causes irreversible damage to the female reproductive system and leads to miscarriages and stillbirths.24 The strong support the humanitarian

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initiative and the TPNW have received from Pacific Island countries can be traced directly to the adverse effects of nuclear testing. As the representative of Fiji stated on the 2019 International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, “More than 2,000 nuclear tests have been carried out around the world, out of those 300 in the Pacific, in the air, at sea and underground.” 25 Pacific Islanders were directly exposed to radioactive fallout from these tests, and their descendants continue to suffer terrible health consequences.26 At the Vienna conference, moral aspects and the legality of nuclear weapons under international law were also discussed. The last day of the conference featured a general debate, 27 during which an increasing number of delegations explicitly called for a prohibition of nuclear weapons. In the chair’s summary, the hosts fulfilled their promise that the views of both sides would be reflected.28 Since the Austrian delegation did not consider the resulting document assertive enough, they simultaneously issued their own national statement, the Austrian Pledge.29 The Austrian government pledged, among other things, to take the findings of the humanitarian conferences to the next NPT Review Conference and to cooperate with all relevant stakeholders “in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.”30 The document called for the legal gap regarding nuclear weapons to be filled, but did not explicitly mention a ban treaty. After the conference, Austria invited other states to endorse the pledge, and ICAN actively promoted it at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The pledge gained significant momentum, and by the end of the conference 114 states had subscribed to it.31 In the light of widespread and growing support, it was renamed the Humanitarian Pledge.

The Open-Ended Working Group and the First Committee of the GA The 2015 NPT Review Conference is mostly remembered for its failure to produce a consensus, due to the breakdown of negotiations in a closed group addressing the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the conference resulted in some noteworthy developments. Building on the aforementioned Humanitarian Pledge, Austria issued a statement on the humanitarian initiative on behalf of 159 states. Australia presented another, less

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ambitious statement on the same issue on behalf of twenty-six states. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC), consisting of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa, 32 submitted a working paper that expressed support of the humanitarian initiative and “[rejected] attempts to assert a right to indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states or to justify the continued retention of nuclear weapons on security grounds.” 33 In an attempt to reach consensus on nuclear disarmament, the president of the conference convened a focus group of nineteen states, consisting of the P5, the six members of the NAC, as well as Austria, Australia, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It was in this group that the idea of creating a new OEWG was first brought forward. 34 It is interesting to note that in Kmentt’s opinion, the humanitarian initiative gained traction not in spite of the previously mentioned lack of consensus at the NPT Review Conference but because of that lack of consensus.35 When it came to creating another OEWG, there was a fundamental disagreement on whether it was necessary or desirable for the NWS to participate and whether decisions within the OEWG should be made by consensus or by majority vote.36 The struggle to obtain a mandate for an OEWG based on GA rules of procedure (which do not require consensus) has been described as the most difficult phase of the entire multilateral process.37 The proponents of this type of OEWG had the advantage of building on the existing resolution, titled “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations,” which already had a solid base of supporters in the GA. Austria and Mexico, among other sponsors, introduced this amended resolution in the First Committee of the GA, arguing that under GA rules of procedure (majority voting), the OEWG could not be held hostage by individual states. Meanwhile, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and others were in favor of creating an OEWG under the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which requires consensus, and Iran drafted a competing resolution for a consensus-based OEWG. The First Committee consultations on these two draft resolutions have been described as a battle of words that led to curious situations, such as the P5 (including the United States) lauding Iran for its resolution while disparaging Austria and Mexico.38 Under consensusbased rules, as proposed by Iran, the NWS and their allies would effectively have been able to prevent any developments in the OEWG that went against their interests. In the end, however, Iran

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(the chair of the NAM) withdrew its draft resolution because it could not harness the full support of the NAM or the United States after all. Consequently, the Austrian/Mexican draft was adopted, and an OEWG based on GA rules of procedure was created. William C. Potter’s impression as a participant in the OEWG sessions was that the most ardent supporters of the humanitarian initiative actually preferred to move forward without the NWS. 39 This observation is in line with the assertions of several of our interviewees, who agreed that the negotiations became noticeably smoother from the 2016 OEWG onwards due to a basic understanding among the participants about the way forward. Along the same lines, Ken Berry and colleagues argue that negotiations with fewer players who share a higher common interest produce more concrete agreements—a departure from traditional arms control frameworks, in which the lowest common denominator is the order of the day because decisions must be made unanimously.40 Indeed, Rebecca Johnson claims that the use of integrative diplomacy allowed the humanitarian initiative to succeed in producing a substantive nuclear ban treaty— integrative diplomacy being a positive-sum process of expanding options, finding zones of possible agreement, and building support along the way. 41 Evidence for this form of consensus-building can be found throughout the humanitarian initiative, which went through remarkable stages of transformation from an initiative to strengthen Article VI of the NPT all the way to the creation of a separate treaty. The primary mandate of the OEWG, established pursuant to GA resolution 70/33, was to “address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.”42 During the OEWG meetings, representatives from Latin America and the Caribbean were particularly active, and civil society organizations participated in all meetings except the last. Several NATO states, along with Australia, South Korea, and Japan, formed their own group of so-called “progressive states,” promoting a pragmatic step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament. The majority of the 103 participating states, however, supported the launch of negotiations on a legally binding instrument for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, which was reflected in the OEWG report. 43 Due to opposition by the “progressive states,” the report was not adopted by consensus, but rather by a vote,44 which can be interpreted as a sign of considerable contro-

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versy, given that the text of such a report is negotiated and already contains the language of compromise. The OEWG’s report recommended negotiating, in 2017, a legally binding instrument that contained “general prohibitions and obligations as well as a political commitment to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world.”45 A simple ban treaty was considered the most viable option for the immediate future because it could be achieved relatively quickly, would not entail lengthy technical language, and would not require the support of the NWS or their supporters. Because a significant number of states continued to favor the idea of a nuclear weapons convention—the NAM prominent among them—the report recommended that this idea be reconsidered at a high-level conference in 2018.46 The difference between the two approaches will be discussed shortly. In the end, many members of the NAM, including Brazil, Thailand, and Indonesia, decided to support the negotiations for a ban treaty, recognizing it as the best available option to put pressure on the NWS.47 Upon the OEWG’s recommendation, provisions to convene a negotiating conference for a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty were included in the 2016 draft of the resolution, titled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.”48 The resolution was adopted with 123 votes in favor, 38 against, and 16 abstentions.49 The mandated negotiations would take place in New York from March 27–31 and from June 15 through July 7, 2017, under the rules of procedure of the GA. The negotiating mandate explicitly encouraged the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives.

Treaty or Convention: The Hard/Soft Law Debate As mentioned previously, during the OEWG meetings, two main options were put forward, namely a nuclear weapons convention and a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty. Although the terms convention and treaty are legally synonymous,50 in nuclear disarmament discourse the concept of a nuclear weapons convention precedes the humanitarian initiative and generally refers to a legal instrument similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In 1997, a group of lawyers, scientists, disarmament experts, and activists drafted a model nuclear weapons convention, containing provisions to:

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outlaw the use, possession, development, testing, deployment, and transfer of nuclear weapons, as well as mandate internationally verifiable dismantlement of nuclear arsenals.51

The model convention was updated in 2007, following the examples of the conventions against chemical and biological weapons, as well as the Ottawa Convention against antipersonnel landmines. Costa Rica and Malaysia submitted the updated model convention as a working paper to the 2007 NPT preparatory committee meeting in Vienna.52 Similar to the CWC or the Ottawa Convention, a nuclear weapons convention would regulate the technical aspects of the elimination of nuclear weapons in detail and contain concrete provisions for compliance verification. A prohibition treaty would outlaw the use of nuclear weapons as well as other related activities, such as nuclear testing and the development, acquisition, and possession of nuclear weapons, but refrain from going into technical detail. Therefore, a ban treaty and a convention are not mutually exclusive. Rather, a ban could be a first step on the way to a more comprehensive legal instrument dealing with the actual elimination and verification processes.53 In some cases, the two sides of this debate may have applied the terms convention or treaty simply to distinguish the two approaches. The concept put forward for a convention would have given the agreement more hard-law characteristics, while the conceptual base of a treaty is situated closer to the soft-law end of the scale. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal lay out a framework for analyzing agreements on a continuum of hard to soft law. Hard law features strong, precise, and unambiguous language that confirms obligation and contains clear mechanisms for accountability and enforcement.54 The TPNW in its final adopted form creates a strong obligation to forego nuclear weapons, but it contains less precise language in other areas and does not include a clearly stated mechanism for accountability or enforcement. Abbott and Snidal point out that soft law characteristics can bring advantages in areas affecting state sovereignty and national security because they enable more states to join, avoid lengthy quibbling over technical issues, facilitate compromise between actors with different interests and degrees of power, and provide flexibility to adapt an agreement to future developments.55 It was with a similar rationale that the majority of states participating in the 2016 OEWG finally opted to negotiate a “simple” nuclear ban treaty that focused on normative rather than technical aspects.

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Notes 1. NPT, “Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Final Document,” 2010, UN document symbol NPT/CONF.2010/50, vol. I, p. 19 (all official UN documents can be accessed by entering their document symbol at https://documents .un.org). 2. United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), “Revitalizing Multilateral Disarmament: A Partnership to Overcome Global Challenges,” 2010, https://www .unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/FF973F4D04706075C125788500369E8C /$file/In+Focus+Revitalizing...pdf. 3. Jakob Kellenberger, “Bringing the Era of Nuclear Weapons to an End,” Statement by the President of the ICRC to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, April 20, 2010, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons -statement-200410.htm. 4. John Borrie, Michael Spies, and Wilfred Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), 2018, p. 6. 5. NPT, “Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Final Document,” UN document symbol NPT/CONF.2010/50, vol. I, p. 19. 6. Alexander Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons Debate,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 684. 7. Ibid., p. 685. 8. General Assembly, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” UN document symbol A/RES/67/56, December 2017. 9. Beatrice Fihn, “The Open-Ended Working Group Concludes,” Reaching Critical Will of WILPF, September 6, 2013, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org /disarmament-fora/oewg/2013/reports/8004-the-open-ended-working-group-concludes. 10. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 688. 11. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 12. 12. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 689f. 13. For a full list of participants see https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/hum/hum_participants.pdf. 14. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 690. 15. Espen Barth Eide, “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,” Norwegian Foreign Ministry, March 5, 2013, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt /nuclear_summary/id716343/. 16. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 691. 17. Ibid., p. 691f. 18. Government of Mexico, “Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons—Chair’s Summary,” February 2014, http://www .mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000027687.pdf. 19. Andrea Berger, “A Mexican Stand-Off: The P5 and the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative,” European Leadership Network, policy brief, April 2014, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads /2017/11/2014-04-A-Berger-Policy-Brief-ELN.pdf, p. 5. 20. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 694f; Richard Slade, Robert Tickner, and Phoebe Wynn-Pope, “Protecting Humanity

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from the Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: Reframing the Debate Toward the Humanitarian Impact,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 749. 21. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 696f; interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 22. Slade et al., “Protecting Humanity from the Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 749. 23. William C. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (4), 2017, p. 83. 24. Lisa Carson, “Why Youth and Feminist Activism Matters: Insights from Anti-Nuclear Campaigns in Practice,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), p. 262. 25. ICAN, “Live Blog: International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 2019,” September 26, 2019, http://www.icanw.org/action/live -blog-international-day-for-the-total-elimination-of-nuclear-weapons-2019/. 26. Ibid. 27. For the conference program see https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user _upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14vienna-Program.pdf 28. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 697f. 29. NPT, “The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (8 and 9 December 2014) and the Austrian Pledge: Input for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Working paper submitted by Austria, April 21, 2015, UN document symbol NPT/CONF.2015/WP.29, Annex. 30. Ibid. 31. Slade et al., “Protecting Humanity from the Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 750. 32. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) was formed during negotiations regarding the indefinite extension of the NPT during the 1995 Review Conference. “New Agenda Coalition,” last updated on May 31, 2018, http://www.nti .org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/new-agenda-coalition/. 33. NPT, “Taking Forward Nuclear Disarmament,” Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, March 9, 2015, UN document symbol NPT/CONF.2015/WP.8. 34. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 84f. 35. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative,” p. 704. 36. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 92. 37. Interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 38. Ibid. 39. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 89. 40. Ken Berry et al., “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence,” Monterrey Institute of International Studies, May 2010: https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/dam/eda/de/documents/aussenpolitik/sicherheitspolitik /Delegitimizing_Nuclear_Weapons_May_2010.pdf. 41. Rebecca Johnson, “Arms Control and Disarmament Diplomacy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 602. 42. General Assembly, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” Resolution 70/33, December 7, 2015, UN document symbol A/RES /70/33, para. 2.

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43. General Assembly, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” Note by the Secretary-General, September 1, 2016, UN document symbol A/71/371, para. 67. 44. Jenny Nielsen, “2016 Open Ended Working Group: Towards 2017 Nuclear Weapon Ban Negotiations?” Arms Control Wonk, September 13, 2016, https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201937/2016-open-ended-working -group-toward-2017-nuclear-weapon-ban-negotiations/. 45. UN document symbol A/71/371, para. 34. 46. Ibid., paras. 36 and 37. 47. Interview conducted by the authors on October 16, 2018. 48. General Assembly, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” First Committee draft resolution, October 14, 2016, UN document symbol A/C.1/71/L.41. 49. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 92f. 50. Malcolm Shaw, “Treaty,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last updated on August 27, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/treaty. 51. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC),” last updated on November 27, 2018, http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties -and-regimes/proposed-nuclear-weapons-convention-nwc/. 52. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 5; for the text of the model nuclear weapons convention see UN document symbol NPT/CONF .2010/PC.I/WP.17. 53. Tom Sauer and Joelien Pretorius, “Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach,” Global Change, Peace & Security 26 (3), October 2014, p. 249f. 54. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” in International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 3rd ed., edited by Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010), pp. 21–48. 55. Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization 54 (3), 2000, p. 423.

4 Reframing the Nuclear Disarmament Discourse

IN THIS CHAPTER, WE TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT OPPOSING ideological viewpoints, nuclear deterrence policies, and the arguments and discourse strategies that proponents of the humanitarian initiative employ.

International Humanitarian Law as a Foundation The humanitarian approach to disarmament considers weapons from an apolitical perspective, focusing not on their real or perceived military utility but on their effects on human beings. The legitimacy of a weapon is determined according to whether or not it causes unacceptable harm.1 Following this line of argument, the humanitarian approach assumes that any use of nuclear weapons is likely to be in breach of international humanitarian law, that on this basis states should logically agree that the use of these weapons is illegal, and that this approach can and should lead to international agreements banning, and then possibly abolishing, nuclear weapons.2

This assumption is based on the principles of humanitarian law that govern warfare, including the principle of discrimination, the

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principle of proportionality, the principle of non-damage to the environment, and the principle of avoidance of unnecessary suffering.3 Discrimination refers to the obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians as well as military and civilian targets.4 The principle of proportionality prohibits an attack that causes loss of life and property disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage.5 The relationship between nuclear weapons and international humanitarian law was addressed in the advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 at the request of the UN Secretary-General. Although the ICJ “could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense,”6 it did find that such an act would generally be contrary to international humanitarian law. The US defense of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons before the court was based on lowyield nuclear weapons, whose effects can supposedly be better controlled.7 This argument is becoming ever more relevant as the United States and other NWS modernize their arsenals and create smaller, more “usable” tactical nuclear weapons for the battlefield. Charles J. Moxley Jr., John Burroughs, and Jonathan Granoff state in the Fordham International Law Journal that the US argument lacks substantial merit, not only because the US arsenal is mostly comprised of higheryield nuclear weapons, but also because “the rules of necessity and proportionality prohibit the use of nuclear weapons if the military objective could be achieved through conventional weapons,”8 which would be the case for a small tactical nuclear weapon. Furthermore, the US argument is based on a theoretical scenario in which the use of a nuclear weapon does not lead to a counter-strike and an escalation with devastating consequences. The question of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons has not been revisited again by the ICJ. When the Republic of the Marshall Islands filed applications against India,9 Pakistan,10 and the United Kingdom11 (those NWS that accept compulsory jurisdiction by the ICJ) in 2014 for failing to meet their disarmament obligations, the court found that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction and it could not proceed. Once the TPNW enters into force, the resulting normative shift will make it possible for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to recognize that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a crime against humanity and a war crime; the use of chemical and biological weapons is already considered as such under the Rome Statute. 12 The

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ICC charges not states but individuals. Therefore, the recognition of nuclear weapons use as a crime against humanity and a war crime could reinforce the nuclear taboo and create a stronger psychological barrier for leaders of nuclear-armed countries. In the case of nuclear weapons use, even those involved in their production and maintenance could be charged with preparing to commit a crime—a possibility that risk-averse actors, such as the CEO of a company producing nuclear weapons components, would certainly take into account in their decisionmaking. Addressing both the principle of not damaging the environment and the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War released a climate impact study in 2012. This study paints a dramatic picture, describing the humanitarian and environmental consequences of a concrete scenario of limited, regional nuclear war, namely between India and Pakistan.13 Recent tensions in the border region of Kashmir have turned such a scenario from a remote possibility into an acute threat. During his speech before the UN General Assembly in September 2019, the Pakistani prime minister ominously declared, “Supposing a country seven times smaller than its neighbour is faced with the choice: either you surrender, or you fight for your freedom till death. . . . What will we do? I ask myself these questions. We will fight and when a nucleararmed country fights to the end, it will have consequences far beyond the borders.”14 Together, India and Pakistan account for around one percent of the world’s nuclear arsenals. If each of them uses only half of their nuclear weapons, or around fifty Hiroshima-sized bombs, against the other, 20 million people will die within a week from the blasts, the resulting fires, and the acute radiation exposure. The effects will not end there. The black soot from the fires will rise into the atmosphere and block sunlight, causing global temperatures to drop by 1.3 degrees centigrade for about a decade. This dramatic disruption of the global climate will shorten the crop growing season and lessen rainfalls, leading to a 12 to 30 percent decline in agricultural production. The subsequent food shortages and price increases will first claim the lives of 870 million already malnourished people, but another 300 million people living in countries that rely heavily on food imports will also be severely affected.15 This study clearly demonstrates that the consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation go far beyond the borders of individual countries and cannot be contained in space or time.16 In addition, the environmental footprint of

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nuclear weapons is not limited to their testing and use, but begins with uranium mining, includes the radioactive waste produced during uranium enrichment and conversion, and ends with the environmental risks associated with their eventual destruction.17 In its 1996 advisory opinion, the ICJ referenced environmental damage but also stated that nuclear weapons “have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet,” and that ionizing radiation is a “serious danger to future generations.” 18 Radioactive fallout is paired with extreme heat and sheer explosive force to create the ultimate humanitarian disaster. While the most powerful conventional weapons have a yield of 14 tons of TNT, today’s strategic nuclear weapons have a yield of several kilotons and up to 5 megatons of TNT.19 These scientific facts demonstrate that the use of nuclear weapons violates each of the principles of international humanitarian law. The sheer destructive capacity of a nuclear weapon makes it practically impossible to avoid extensive civilian harm and unnecessary suffering. Furthermore, the farreaching and long-term consequences for the environment and the socioeconomic development of the entire planet far outweigh any real or perceived military advantage of nuclear weapons use. These observations and recent scientific evidence lead to a conclusion that goes far beyond the one the ICJ reached two decades ago, namely that nuclear weapons use is contrary to international humanitarian law under any circumstances.

Countering Nuclear Deterrence Theory For proponents of the humanitarian initiative, the aforementioned dramatic consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation illustrate the deep flaws of nuclear deterrence theory. A relic from the Cold War, the theory is based on the assumption that any nuclear attack would cause such devastation that an adversary with second-strike capability would certainly strike back, leading to “mutually assured destruction.”20 Since this is not a desirable outcome for either side, the theory concludes that nuclear weapons in the hands of rational actors introduce higher levels of caution into international relations, deter nuclear weapons use, and make conflict less likely.21 Even after the adoption of the TPNW, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom have stated that nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of their security policy.22

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Relating the history of US nuclear deterrence policy, and nuclear deterrence policy in general, is important because it describes a longheld tradition that leaders are resistant to abandon. The movement to abolish nuclear weapons altogether is a major challenge to this entrenched tradition. The concept of using nuclear deterrence as a preventive policy can be traced back to US president Harry Truman and his decision to drop the two atomic bombs on Japan in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ostensibly, the decision made by Truman and his advisers, including secretary of war Henry Stimson, to deploy the two bombs was to seek an immediate end to the war with Japan in the Pacific. However, although it may have saved the lives of some US soldiers, the war in Europe had already ended, and the war against Japan was also coming to a close. The United States had already been fire-bombing Tokyo, causing massive devastation. The result of the nuclear attacks, with their massive destructive capabilities, was that the United States and Truman could dictate the conditions of Japan’s complete surrender. Nevertheless, perhaps Truman’s primary reason for dropping the bombs was to send to the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin a very visible and symbolic message meant to deter the USSR from holding any notions of Soviet expansion against the interests of the United States following the end of the war. Some have conjectured that Japan’s real reason for surrender was the Soviet Union’s announcement on August 8, 1945, that it would enter the war against Japan.23 However, the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, two days before Stalin’s announcement, making the Soviet pronouncement rather hollow. The second bomb at Nagasaki took place on August 9, 1945. Whatever pushed Japan to capitulate does not alter Truman’s motivation for using the bombs and their devastating results as a message of deterrence against future Soviet ambitions. Scientists from the Manhattan Project had been seriously thinking about the postwar world, and in 1944 they wrote to Henry Stimson warning of a nuclear arms race and the prediction that the Soviet Union was fully capable of attaining a nuclear capability within a few years.24 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had died in April 1945, months before Hiroshima. Harry Truman, now president, was informed for the first time by Stimson and his colleagues of the Manhattan Project; knowledge of the project had been held by only a small group of

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advisers. Churchill and Truman met with Stalin in Potsdam to discuss arrangements in Europe at the end of the conflict, just one day after the Trinity test—the first nuclear detonation in Alamogordo, New Mexico—which gave Truman the confidence that the bomb worked. “Truman was advised to speak to Stalin about a powerful new weapon without describing what it was. He did so on July 24.”25 The United States was not sure if Stalin understood that this powerful new weapon was an atomic bomb, but in hindsight, with gathered intelligence, we now know that Stalin knew full well what Truman was talking about.26 By the time the USSR had successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in 1949, the message of nuclear deterrence and the threat of nuclear retaliation had already been conveyed. Truman’s policies and actions set certain precedents in US nuclear policy, including deterrence. Although the Manhattan Project had been under military control, Truman determined that the atomic energy program would fall under civilian control following the end of World War II, and the United States Atomic Energy Commission was created. “One precedent that Truman was loathe to establish was the deployment of nuclear weapons with units of the military.”27 Truman never deployed nuclear weapons with US troops and made sure that policy decisions about their use were under the control of the president.28 The policy of not deploying nuclear weapons in the field under field commander control is now being reconsidered by the Trump administration. Truman was still president in the early 1950s during the Korean War, when 37,000 US soldiers lost their lives. He could have authorized the use of nuclear weapons to end the war, but he did not, despite appeals to do so. One explanation was that there were no reasonable targets in Korea, a small country, that would not affect our South Korean allies. But also, the use of nuclear weapons could have encouraged Soviet retaliation on behalf of its client, North Korea. Thus, Truman utilized nuclear restraint, a policy precedent that so far has been continued through subsequent US administrations. Truman also advocated for a strong conventional defense force, particularly in Europe, rather than the utilization of a nuclear threat to contain Soviet ambitions. However, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who followed Truman as president, altered that policy. Eisenhower did not believe that a nuclear war should be fought— the results for both sides would be catastrophic—but he did believe that the United States had to retain

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a policy of first use of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower’s strategy, approved in December 1953, overturned Truman’s plan to increase conventional military capabilities to be able to respond to any Soviet build-up, both in Europe and in the developing world. Eisenhower viewed that policy as too expensive. Instead, he put in place a nuclearoriented policy with a first-use option to counter the Soviet Union’s greater conventional capacity. With just a few nuclear weapons on both sides at the time, it may have been seen as a cheaper alternative.29 But today, with the budgetary costs of maintaining large arsenals of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, that argument does not make sense. Nevertheless, the same first-use policy is still in place today as a deterrent toward Russian aggression. Extended nuclear deterrence is intrinsically linked to NATO. Eisenhower, as the first NATO commander (before he became president), instituted the same allied cooperation he had led during World War II. That cooperation involved an extended nuclear deterrent, which included NATO and a firm implantation of a United States nuclear umbrella.30 Extended nuclear deterrence, the first-use option, and the US nuclear umbrella are all policies that have survived multiple administrations and are still in place. Those who support the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the abolition of a nuclear deterrence policy are up against this instituted and firmly ingrained policy tradition. Disarmament is contradictory to deterrence because the massive, destructive power of nuclear weapons constitutes the threat on which the effectiveness of deterrence depends.31 Nevertheless, NATO defends this nuclear deterrence strategy as a Western policy that is considered restrained, responsible, and safe.32 Therefore, although there is a threat, the assumption is that the use of nuclear weapons is under the control of rational, prudent state leaders. With leaders such as Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un, and nonstate actors, that trust may be eroding. Deterrence can be viewed from varying perspectives. 33 The first perspective is maximum deterrence, in which the paradigm of logic is that more and bigger weapons win, maintain an advantage, and must prevail, thus projecting a kind of nuclear terror in its essence. A second-strike capability is built into this strategy. Its intent would be to prevent a nuclear conflagration through the projection of terror. 34 The second perspective is minimum nuclear deterrence, as advocated by Bernard Brody, a strategy of possessing an arsenal of nuclear

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weapons to the extent that an attack on the United States or its allies would be too risky.35 The third perspective is non-nuclear deterrence, which considers that nuclear weapons are too dangerous and conventional weapons are perfectly capable of deterring aggression. The fourth perspective is antideterrence, which utilizes a nonprovocative, confidence-building approach that claims deterrence policy is based on the assumption of hostility. Maximum deterrence based on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was growing out of control in the 1970s and 1980s as the Soviet Union and the United States were amassing huge nuclear arsenals, which created a sense of crisis. US president Ronald Reagan and his counterpart in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, agreed to establish crisis stability, and a policy of détente emerged. A number of arms-control agreements were initiated during détente, including the INF Treaty, which eliminated a whole class of intermediate range nuclear missiles, START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), and other agreements,36 reducing MAD to less MAD. Today, that sense of international cooperation and adherence to the rule of law is unraveling. In conclusion, nuclear deterrence is premised on MAD and the projection of terror. Nuclear restraint is credible only if policymakers are rational and aware of all incoming information in a timely manner, which requires a fully capable command, control, and communication system. Therefore, for nuclear deterrence to be believable, policy leaders have to appear irrational and willing to take risks, thus increasing the sense of instability. Nuclear deterrence may be the defense strategy of the United States, NATO, and the NWS, but for the NNWS, it projects a specter of Armageddon. The Humanitarian Challenge to Nuclear Deterrence

The humanitarian initiative challenges this security concept based on mass destruction with the following arguments: For deterrence to work, the NWS must be credibly committed to a suicidal course of action. This stands in direct contradiction to the claim that deterrence and the balance of power cause states to behave more rationally. A rational actor would be aware that a nuclear war cannot be won.37 Not only is deterrence theory based on a circular argument, its credibility is weakened by the nuclear taboo—the norm of nonuse of nuclear weapons that has been observed by all states since 1945.38 Some might argue that the recent erosion of the nuclear taboo, as dis-

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cussed in Chapter 2, strengthens the deterring effect of nuclear weapons. Supporters of the humanitarian initiative counter that the heightened risk of a nuclear strike cannot possibly create human security. Indeed, an important argument employed to counter deterrence theory is that when nuclear weapons are kept in a constant state of readiness for deterrence purposes, the likelihood of a human or technical error resulting in a global catastrophe increases.39 The frequent claim by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France that an adverse international security environment requires them to retain their nuclear weapons is equally inconsistent—if an adverse security environment justified the possession of nuclear weapons, then surely a beleaguered state like the DPRK would also be entitled to them. 40 This observation goes hand in hand with another argument employed by the NNWS: that nuclear deterrence serves only to reinforce the myth of nuclear weapons as instruments of power and makes them more desirable to other states, heightening the risk of proliferation. 41 Therefore, the humanitarian initiative needed to address the prestige and authority associated with nuclear weapons and to examine the commonly held beliefs about nuclear weapons in order to deconstruct them, if possible. Advocates of the humanitarian initiative use these arguments to demonstrate that the existence of nuclear weapons makes the world less secure and to shift the debate from the legality of nuclear weapons toward their legitimacy. If nuclear weapons are eliminated, however, former NWS and their allies will require alternative security concepts. Although general and complete disarmament remains the ultimate goal, Rebecca Johnson, among others, brings forward the denuclearization of deterrence as an intermediate step.42 This is a reference to the concept of non-nuclear deterrence mentioned previously, which acknowledges states’ desire for strategic stability in the form of military deterrence, but maintains that deterrence can be achieved without nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament advocates would also include the security benefit of removing nuclear weapons— a volatile element prone to accidents and escalation—from the international system. Security guarantees through non-nuclear deterrence may become a viable alternative particularly for nuclear-dependent states facing a delicate security situation, such as NATO members in Eastern Europe, who have not been receptive to the humanitarian nuclear disarmament initiative so far.

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Building on Experience from the Landmines and Cluster Munition Campaigns The process that led to the TPNW can be viewed as the next step in a gradual shift from security mainly defined in military terms toward the more holistic concept of human security, taking into account the root causes of conflict as well as the factors that drive fatalities and lasting damage. This shift became evident in the disarmament community in the 1990s and led to the campaigns to abolish landmines and cluster munitions. By 2010, the humanitarian argument was rapidly gaining traction. States called for nuclear disarmament, as many of the NNWS and civil society groups were frustrated with the existing nuclear regime centered around the NPT and the CD, which strongly motivated them to seek new avenues. To understand why the humanitarian approach became their chosen path, we take a closer look at the campaigns for the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction—typically referred to as the Ottawa Convention— and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). In 2010, the Norwegian foreign minister explicitly stated before the Norwegian Atlantic Committee that the experience gained in humanitarian disarmament initiatives on antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions could be applied to nuclear weapons. 43 This statement, made by a representative of the state who would go on to organize the first humanitarian impact conference three years later, demonstrates that the similarities between the campaigns are not coincidental, but rather part of a deliberate strategy. Each campaign applied the same basic approach: to change the way we as agents think about an issue and reframe it to overcome an unproductive policy environment, in keeping with Wendt’s constructivist theory. In each case, the new discursive framework was centered around international humanitarian law.44 Moreover, ICAN’s organizational structure is a replica of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), established in 1992. Like ICAN (which will be discussed in detail in the following chapter), ICBL was led by a steering committee of six organizations and worked with hundreds of partner organizations in different countries.45 The lines of argument used in these campaigns are also worth comparing. In the 1990s, antipersonnel landmines had become a wide-

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spread hazard and were causing large numbers of civilian and combatant casualties worldwide. It was therefore easy for the proponents of the Ottawa Convention to argue that these weapons violate international humanitarian law because they cause unnecessary suffering. The threat of cluster munitions, by comparison, never became as pervasive. Therefore, advocates of the CCM had to adapt their argument to focus on precaution and prevention.46 This successful refocusing of the humanitarian argument is highly significant for the initiative to ban nuclear weapons, as the record of nuclear detonations is also very limited. Nuclear ban advocates therefore had to focus their argument on the prevention of future suffering as well. Another parallel between present and past humanitarian initiatives is that many states in possession of landmines and cluster munitions did not initially participate in the respective processes—a previously unthinkable approach in the realm of arms control.47 Despite initial difficulties in creating a process outside traditional diplomatic channels, there was a shared belief among the proponents of the Ottawa Convention that pursuing an alternative process was the right thing to do because it was the only way a ban could be achieved. 48 At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the set of states still possessing antipersonnel landmines49 or cluster munitions50 differs from the NWS. Even more importantly, the degree to which those states rely on nuclear weapons for their national security is significantly higher. Although several NWS also possess antipersonnel landmines or cluster munitions, these weapons do not play any major part in their defense policy, and the bulk of landmine and cluster munition possessors is made up of developing countries and minor players on the international stage. Last but not least, the previous humanitarian disarmament campaigns built networks of trust between representatives of governments, international organizations, and NGOs.51 Many of these professionals, who had ample experience collaborating on disarmament, came together again in Oslo in 2013 for the first conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, bringing their prior expertise, strategies, and connections to the table. Despite ICAN’s dominance, these networks of veteran disarmament experts played decisive roles in the nuclear ban initiative,52 and the concept pioneered by the landmines and cluster munition campaigns provided fertile ground on which ICAN could rally support.53 In terms of state support for the TPNW process, however, Sweden, Canada, and other

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Western democracies that had led the previous humanitarian campaigns were conspicuously absent.54 The humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament facilitated the shift from arms management—dominated by the nuclear-armed states and centered around the CD and bilateral initiatives—to the call for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Discourse Strategies: Stigmatization and Delegitimization Like the campaigns to prohibit landmines and cluster munitions, the humanitarian initiative to ban nuclear weapons applies the strategy of stigmatization. By effecting a normative shift, advocates of the humanitarian initiative seek to accelerate the elimination of nuclear weapons.55 To this end, they support measures toward disarmament on two parallel tracks that reinforce and complement each other. The first track includes concrete measures, such as the reduction of nuclear stockpiles, de-alerting nuclear weapons, no first use-policies, and lessening the role of nuclear weapons in national defense strategies. These measures closely resemble the step-by-step approach advocated by some NWS. The second track is a more abstract, longterm campaign to stigmatize nuclear weapons by presenting them as a threat to human security and survival. The stigmatization and delegitimization of nuclear weapons is meant to incentivize and facilitate the implementation of the concrete disarmament measures.56 The TPNW forms part of the second track and is declaratory rather than operational, stating that nuclear weapons are illegal without defining a concrete roadmap for their elimination. The assumption behind this approach is that even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms, states are reluctant to violate taboos. As perceptions change, the burden of proof will shift to the NWS and they will have to justify why they insist on maintaining their nuclear weapons.57 Once the use and even the possession of nuclear weapons have become morally unacceptable on an international level, the assumption goes, the NWS will fall in line.58 As Kjølv Egeland phrases it, TPNW proponents hope that “over time, the ban treaty will nudge the nuclear armed states to pursue disarmament . . . with greater intensity.”59 Taylor Benjamin-Britton sees change in disarmament behavior as a path that states can be persuaded to take through a combination of reputational

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and material pressure. Material pressure mainly targets the weapons producers, while reputational pressure seeks to influence state behavior through normative suasion—domestic and transnational campaigns employing persuasive arguments and tools of stigmatization. Once domestic political actors begin to pay lip service to the new norms to appease civil society, they can become rhetorically entrapped.60 One example of this phenomenon is the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference endorsed by all states parties, which expressed deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. To apply reputational pressure on governments, civil society campaigns need to generate issue salience, i.e., a feeling of urgency around the issue that will incentivize news organizations to report on it and ideally call on civil society representatives as experts. Current events, such as the testing of nuclear weapons by the DPRK, can also create issue salience. However, advocates of the humanitarian initiative have so far had little success in using this platform to disseminate their ideas in the mainstream media, which, at least in the NWS, remains dominated by a national security perspective on nuclear weapons. Similarly, the level of participation of the wider public in ICAN’s campaign and other civil society campaigns related to the TPNW has been low, especially when compared to the large-scale antinuclear demonstrations of the 1980s Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. Instead, the humanitarian initiative has had to contend with what Benjamin-Britton calls “lowstrength activities”61—letter-writing, petitions, and parliamentary initiatives at the regional and local levels. To better understand how exactly stigmatization may produce changes in state behavior, the ICBL once again provides valuable insight. A 2003 study found “empirical evidence to demonstrate the success of the ICBL and the Ottawa Convention in changing the behavior of state parties,” 62 and showed how “a treaty can assist in the enforcement of an international norm.” A stigma is created when “the actor’s actual attributes [. . .] do not coincide with the attributes society expects him or her to possess.”63 For the stigma to produce change in behavior, however, the actors must share the beliefs underlying the stigma.64 Tom Sauer and Mathias Reveraert argue that nuclear weapons are perceived as objects of privilege and superiority in many countries and that, compared to landmines, they are incomparably harder to stigmatize. Furthermore, stigmatization has only been proven to work on actors, such as individuals or states, whereas

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so far TPNW advocates have concentrated on stigmatizing the weapons themselves rather than the states deploying them.65 The NWS have been using various methods to deflect stigma, including avoidance (by staying away from the humanitarian conferences), rejection (redoubling their defense of nuclear deterrence), and evasion (blaming the dangerous security environment for lack of progress in disarmament).66 In relation to cluster munitions, BenjaminBritton identifies a range of successive state responses to new disarmament norms.67 First, states opposing the new norm react with silence. This reaction could be observed with the NWS at the beginning of the humanitarian initiative, when the NWS and their allies simply chose to ignore it, hoping that it would die down if they did not give it relevance by engaging with it. Second, the states justify their disregard for the emerging norm and aim to offset the reputational cost of doing so by creating a counter-narrative. This stage could be observed once the humanitarian initiative moved toward a treaty, when the NWS and their allies warned of the dangers of creating a nuclear ban treaty and reemphasized why they consider nuclear deterrence essential for international security. The next stage, yet to be observed with respect to the TPNW, is the granting of concessions. BenjaminBritton already observed this stage in the United States’ engagement with the CCM. Although the United States has not joined the convention or eliminated its arsenal of cluster munitions, it has nonetheless ceased producing or employing them and has begun to call out other countries on their use of cluster munitions. There are also past examples of top-down norm recognition, for example, when South African political leaders decided to conform to the NPT regime and give up the country’s nuclear weapons program. Although this is unlikely in most current NWS, normative change can also take place bottom-up. If civil society campaigns successfully persuade the public to accept the stigma of nuclear weapons, the public can in turn put pressure on the pronuclear elite. This was the case in the Netherlands, where NGO activism led to a parliamentary motion that obliged the government to participate in the TPNW negotiating conferences.68 Another elite group even more receptive to stigmatization is the banking sector, in which divestment from nuclear weapons has accelerated in recent years, as discussed in Chapter 8. In their efforts to stigmatize nuclear weapons and their possessors, states of the Global South have been employing the antiquated term civilized nations, which appears in the statute of the ICJ69 and in

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the past was used by the great powers to brand nations of the Global South as “uncivilized” and inferior within the international system. Nations of the Global South have long perceived a colonial undertone in international humanitarian law all the way to the Geneva Conventions, which branded certain methods of warfare employed by native peoples in the fight against colonial occupation as uncivilized. The same colonial aftertaste can, to a degree, be found in the campaigns to ban what Matthew Bolton and Elizabeth Minor call “marginal weapons systems,” such as landmines.70 Observers from the Global South argue that the Ottawa process and other humanitarian disarmament initiatives originated from Northern and Western states (Canada, Norway, etc.), which considered themselves defenders of international humanitarian law in the Global South and sought to ban weapons that did not play any part in their own national security or affect their own population. Exactly the opposite is the case for the TPNW and the humanitarian process that led to its creation. The TPNW seeks to ban the ultimate “great power weapon” that plays a major military role in the Northern hemisphere, while the Southern one is almost entirely covered by NWFZ. The TPNW process was owned by middle powers and states of the Global South, if not from the very beginning, then at least from the moment it moved toward the creation of a treaty. In terms of discourse strategies, the Global South turned the colonial concept “standard of civilization” on its creators. They claimed the role of civilized nations for themselves by reframing the term to mean nations that rejected the devastating humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons,71 thereby holding the creators of international humanitarian law to their own standards.72 This reframing is also meant to provide incentives for the NWS and their allies to join the TPNW by offering moral and political benefits to states that choose to align their military strategies with contemporary humanitarian standards.73 Therefore, the more the NWS dismiss humanitarian concerns, the more they reinforce the argument that the NPT regime does not effectively address the risks posed by nuclear weapons.74 In their efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons, campaigners have also called their utility into question. Realist disarmament theory suggests that states will abandon a type of weapon only once it is no longer materially useful.75 Whereas nuclear weapons were once conceived as instruments of strategic stability, they are fast becoming

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“legacy problems,”76 as Rebecca Johnson puts it, wholly inadequate to address current asymmetric threats like terrorism, ethnic conflict, cyberattacks, and climate change. Instead, nuclear weapons heighten the stakes in international tensions and create an illusion of security for their possessors that may camouflage a lack of preparedness for the aforementioned threats. Nuclear weapons are not only harder to stigmatize than landmines or cluster munitions but also have a higher level of perceived utility for their possessors because they play a more significant role in national security strategies. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that cluster munitions are not a marginal weapon employed only by less powerful states or states openly dismissing international humanitarian law. When the Oslo process to ban cluster munitions began, the United States was in fact the world’s leading producer, exporter, and user of cluster munitions. The United States clearly ascribed significant military utility to cluster munitions and defended their record of civilian casualties, claiming that they were relatively safe if they were of good quality and used responsibly, and made a significant effort to derail the Oslo process from outside.77 Despite all this, the United States has since fallen in line with the normative shift around cluster munitions and ceased employing or even producing them, demonstrating that the reputation of a weapon does influence its perceived utility. While the leftist and pacifist discourse of previous generations of antinuclear activists was considered too radical to gain traction, the humanitarian approach has proven far more relatable. The “affective strategy”78 employed by ICAN and other proponents of the nuclear ban is subtle rather than confrontational. It seeks to point out the inconsistencies between policymakers’ moral beliefs and their political actions by confronting them with hard facts and personal victims’ testimonies. The purpose of these testimonies is to make the discourse on nuclear weapons less technocratic and more emotional. Although ICAN activists have promoted ideas that are more than a little revolutionary, they have always taken great care to deliver their statements in the measured language of the diplomatic arena. Another important component of the humanitarian initiative was the effort to “democratize” the disarmament discourse by giving a voice to people and actors who had previously been silenced or simply uninvolved. Countries of the Global South as well as civil society organizations in Europe and North America figure prominently among these actors,79 and so do women. The role of women and the

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diversification of actors and viewpoints that the humanitarian initiative has brought to the disarmament field will be discussed in Chapter 5. In the meantime, not only the actors but also the target groups had to be diversified in order to truly democratize nuclear disarmament. The general public is a key constituency for the humanitarian initiative because it makes up the taxpayers who finance nuclear programs, the voters who influence policy decisions in the NWS, and the potential victims of a nuclear weapons detonation. Supporters of the nuclear ban therefore need to connect even more strongly with advocacy groups unrelated to nuclear disarmament, such as unions, environmentalists, or human rights activists, and convince them that they have a stake in the matter. Effectively framing nuclear disarmament as a global public good allows its supporters to build alliances across all sectors of society, including the business community. Although human security and stability are clearly in the best interest of the business community in general, the industries involved in the financing, development, and manufacture of nuclear weapons must also be taken into account. Only when all these constituencies are effectively mobilized will nuclear disarmament be achieved.80 Despite proactive campaigning on the part of ICAN, the ICRC, and others, media coverage has remained weak on the humanitarian initiative. Back in 2015, Elizabeth Minor already remarked that news stories on nuclear weapons almost exclusively focused on the DPRK and used national security as a frame of analysis.81 Even the day after the adoption of the TPNW by the UN General Assembly, the topic was absent from the front pages of major news outlets such as the Washington Post in the United States or Le Monde in France. The New York Times did cover the story in detail, but almost exclusively from a US/UK perspective. They focused on the rejection of the treaty by NATO members and neglected to mention the amount of support it received from states of the Global South.82 One of our interviewees heartily agreed with this perception and lamented the lack of coverage of the humanitarian campaign in the French media, labeling it “deliberate disinformation.”83 ICAN’s struggle to reach mainstream media outlets with their message made the Nobel Peace Prize even more significant for the humanitarian initiative as a whole. Briefly, at least, international media were compelled to report on ICAN and its mission, although some did not bother to hide their reluctance, such as the newspaper USA Today, which introduced ICAN as “a little-known organization that campaigns to abolish nuclear weapons.”84

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1. Elizabeth Minor, “Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Initiative,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 722. 2. Tom Sauer and Joelien Pretorius, “Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach,” Global Change, Peace & Security 26 (3), October 2014, p. 234. 3. Ibid., p. 236. 4. Daniel Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context (The Hague: Brill, 2011), p. 88f. 5. Ibid., p. 67. 6. International Court of Justice (ICJ), “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Summary of the advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, http:// www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/7497.pdf. 7. Charles J. Moxley, Jr., John Burroughs, and Jonathan Granoff, “Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Fordham International Law Journal 34 (4), 2011, p. 660. 8. Ibid. 9. ICJ, “Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India),” https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/158, accessed on May 1, 2019. 10. ICJ, “Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. Pakistan),” https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/159, accessed on May 1, 2019. 11. ICJ, “Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom),” https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/160, accessed on May 1, 2019. 12. Rebecca Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, edited by Bård Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njølstad (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 88. 13. Ira Helfand, “Nuclear Famine,” Peace Review 25 (4), 2013, pp. 541ff. 14. Dhaka Tribune, “Imran Khan Warns of Nuclear War Over Indian Kashmir,” September 27, 2019, https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/2019 /09/27/imran-khan-warns-of-nuclear-war-over-indian-kashmir. 15. Helfand, “Nuclear Famine,” pp. 541ff. 16. Richard Slade, Robert Tickner, and Phoebe Wynn-Pope, “Protecting Humanity from the Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: Reframing the Debate Toward the Humanitarian Impact,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 752. 17. Doug Weir, “How the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Helped Expose Disarmament’s Weakness on the Environment,” International Disarmament Institute, Pace University, July 2017, https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/blogs.pace.edu /dist/0/195/files/2017/07/Nuclear-Weapons-Ban-and-Environment-1rieiz2.pdf. 18. ICJ, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.” 19. Sauer and Pretorius, “Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach,” p. 234f. 20. Alexander Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and Its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons Debate,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 682.

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21. Minor, “Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons,” p. 712. 22. Permanent Mission of France, “Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” July 7, 2017, https://onu.delegfrance.org/Adoption-of-a-treaty-banning -nuclear-weapons. 23. Ken Berry et al., “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence,” Monterrey Institute of International Studies, May 2010, https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/dam/eda/de/documents/aussenpolitik /sicherheitspolitik/Delegitimizing_Nuclear_Weapons_May_2010.pdf, p. 15. 24. James E. Goodby, At the Borderline of Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), p. 7. 25. Ibid., p. 10. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid., p. 11. 28. Ibid., p. 12. 29. Ibid., pp. 23–25. 30. Ibid. 31. Barry Buzan, ed., The International Politics of Deterrence (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), p. xv. 32. Ibid., p. xvii. 33. Ibid., pp. xix–xx. 34. Robert E. Osgood, “Chapter 4,” in The International Politics of Deterrence, edited by Barry Buzan (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), pp. 49–52. 35. Steven Kull, Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers (New York: Basic Books, 1988), pp. 5–6. 36. Goodby, At the Borderline of Armageddon, pp. 132–134. 37. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and Its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons Debate,” p. 706f. 38. Sauer and Pretorius, “Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach,” p. 235. 39. Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and Its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons Debate,” p. 682f. 40. Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament,” Washington Quarterly 40 (4), 2017, p. 88. 41. Ray Acheson, “Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s Next for Nuclear Disarmament?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66 (6), 2010, p. 79. 42. Rebecca Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, edited by Bård Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njølstad (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 75. 43. Jonas Gahr Støre, “Disarmament—Reframing the Challenge,” Speech before the 45th annual conference of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, February 1, 2010, www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/disarmament/id592550/. 44. Minor, “Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons,” p. 722. 45. Nicola Short, “The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines,” International Negotiation 4 (3), 1999, p. 484. 46. John Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban,” International Affairs 90 (3), 2014, p. 632f. 47. Sauer and Pretorius, “Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach,” p. 246.

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48. Patrick Cottrell, “Legitimacy and Institutional Replacement: The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Emergence of the Mine Ban Treaty,” International Organization 63 (2), 2009, p. 241. 49. The following states stockpile antipersonnel mines and are not party to the Ottawa Convention: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, North Korea, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. CBL-CMC, “Landmine Monitor 2017,” December 2017, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2615219 /Landmine-Monitor-2017_final.pdf, p. 18. 50. The list of states not party to the CCM that stockpile cluster munitions is similarly composed, although their possession is generally more widespread, even among states party to the convention. CBL-CMC, “Cluster Munition Monitor 2017,” August 2017, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2582190/Cluster -Munition-Monitor-2017_web4.pdf, p. 26. 51. Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban,” p. 637. 52. John Borrie, Michael Spies, and Wilfred Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 2018, p. 3. 53. Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban,” p. 638. 54. Kjølv Egeland, “Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?” Global Governance 24 (1), August 2018, p. 16. 55. Ibid., p. 15f. 56. Mitsuru Kurosawa, “Stigmatizing and Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (1), January 2018, p. 46. 57. Minor, “Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons,” p. 723. 58. Matthew Bolton and Elizabeth Minor, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories,” Global Policy 7 (3), 2016, p. 387f. 59. Egeland, “Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?” p. 12. 60. Taylor Benjamin-Britton, “US Arms Control Dynamics in the Era of Humanitarian Disarmament: A Case Study of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” in Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament, edited by Matthew Breay Bolton, Sarah Njeri, and Taylor Benjamin-Britton (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 146. 61. Ibid., p. 148. 62. Lesley Wexler, “The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 20 (3), 2003, p. 561. 63. Tom Sauer and Mathias Reveraert, “The Potential Stigmatizing Effect of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25 (5–6), December 2018, p. 438. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid., p. 440f. 66. Ibid., p. 446ff.

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67. Benjamin-Britton, “US Arms Control Dynamics in the Era of Humanitarian Disarmament,” p. 149. 68. Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience,” Survival—Global Politics and Strategy 60 (2), 2018, p. 68. 69. ICJ, “Statute of the ICJ, Article 38,” http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute. 70. Matthew Breay Bolton and Elizabeth Minor, “The Agency of International Humanitarian Disarmament Law: The Case of Advocacy for Positive Obligations in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” in Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament, edited by Matthew Breay Bolton, Sarah Njeri, and Taylor Benjamin-Britton, (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 67. 71. Egeland, “Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?” p. 15. 72. Bolton and Minor, “The Agency of International Humanitarian Disarmament Law,” p. 68. 73. Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban,” p. 640. 74. Ibid., p. 643. 75. Benjamin-Britton, “US Arms Control Dynamics in the Era of Humanitarian Disarmament,” p. 144. 76. Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” p. 78. 77. Benjamin-Britton, “US Arms Control Dynamics in the Era of Humanitarian Disarmament,” p. 151. 78. Bolton and Minor, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay,” p. 391. 79. Ibid., p. 387f. 80. Randy Rydell, “A Strategic Plan for Nuclear Disarmament: Engineering a Perfect Political Storm,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1 (1), December 2017, pp. 58ff. 81. Minor, “Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons,” p. 725. 82. Hugh Gusterson, “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty (Not) In the News?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 14, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/nuclear -weapons-ban-treaty-not-news10952. 83. Interview conducted by the authors on March 22, 2018. 84. Kim Hjelmgaard, “ICAN Just Won the Nobel Peace Prize: What is ICAN?” USA Today, October 6, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news /world/2017/10/06/ican-just-won-nobel-peace-prize-what-ican/738744001/.

5 State and Society in Action

HERE WE TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT THE MAIN ACTORS— states, international organizations, experts, NGOs, and other civil society groups—and how they collaborated to create and advance the humanitarian impact initiative. This reinforces our argument that the initiative owes a large part of its success to the close and constructive collaboration between state actors and civil society, and that this set a precedent for smaller states and states of the Global South to assume active roles in nuclear disarmament. William C. Potter highlights the two tracks of the humanitarian impact initiative, which was spearheaded by NGOs on the one hand and a number of interested states, notably Norway, Switzerland, and Austria, on the other. These states contributed funds to the movement and advocated for it in various diplomatic fora, such as the NPT conferences and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The participating NGOs complemented these efforts with their own civil society and outreach initiatives. Representatives of both tracks remained in contact throughout, and although their interests did not always coincide perfectly, their activities were sufficiently aligned to be mutually reinforcing.1

The Central Role of Civil Society The civil society group most commonly associated with the TPNW is the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 77

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due in no small part to ICAN’s 2017 Nobel Peace Prize “for its work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons.”2 ICAN is a global coalition of 468 NGOs from over 100 countries, which work together to establish a strong and effective treaty banning nuclear weapons.3 ICAN was launched at the 2007 NPT preparatory committee meeting in Vienna, at the initiative of the NGO International Physicians against Nuclear War,4 originally in connection with the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. The humanitarian underpinning was adopted by ICAN around 2011, when the CCM had been completed, and NGOs involved in the cluster munitions campaign were looking for a new focus, joining the nuclear disarmament cause and bringing their humanitarian strategies along.5 ICAN is headquartered in Geneva and is currently organized around a team of six international staff, including executive director Beatrice Fihn and an international steering group in which ten organizations are represented (Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, African Council of Religious Leaders—Religions for Peace, Article 36, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Latin America Human Security Network, Norwegian People’s Aid, PAX, Peace Boat, Swedish Physicians against Nuclear Weapons, and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom).6 Although much of its initial funding came from the Norwegian government, ICAN is now supported by Ireland, Sweden, New Zealand, the Ploughshares Fund, as well as political foundations and private donors.7 Foundations and organizations contribute 42 percent, and government grants contribute 33 percent of ICAN’s budget, with the rest coming from private donors. Its total budget in 2019 was 1.2 million Swiss francs. 8 ICAN also received prize money for the Nobel Peace Prize and allocated some of it to the 1000 Day Fund, which is dedicated to projects that support the TPNW entering into force.9 Each of ICAN’s partner NGOs across the world has its own funding structure and projects. ICAN served as civil society coordinator for each of the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and it lobbied for the establishment of the OEWG in Geneva, as well as for the adoption of the negotiating mandate for the TPNW.10 Through its partners, ICAN contributed essential expertise by organizing several informal workshops for diplomats, activists, staff of international

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Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony, December 10, 2017. Atomic bomb survivor Setsuko Thurlow (center) and ICAN Executive Director Beatrice Fihn (right) accept the prize on behalf of ICAN.

organizations, and researchers. The workshops fostered exchange and dialogue between these actors.11 ICAN followed a highly data-driven approach and meticulously documented the medical, economic, political, and environmental impacts of nuclear weapon detonations. In order to ensure coherence, ICAN distributed campaigners’ kits to its activists and developed detailed guidelines for interactions with the media, parliamentarians, and other key constituencies. ICAN activists delivered statements at international fora and parliamentary hearings, lobbied diplomats, and reached out to citizens via social media.12 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) played a less public, but no less important role in the humanitarian initiative, and has been invested in nuclear disarmament from the advent of the nuclear age. The ICRC is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, along with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the 191 National Societies.13 The ICRC is neither an NGO nor an international organization,

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ICAN UK protest on November 29, 2017.

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but a private association under the Swiss Civil Code. Its functions and activities (centered around assistance to victims of conflict) are founded in international law (the Geneva Conventions) and mandated by the international community.14 In 2009, shortly before the humanitarian initiative began to take shape, the ICRC published extensive research on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and on countries’ nuclear disaster preparedness.15 As described in Chapter 3, it was a speech by the then-president of the ICRC in Geneva in 2010 that brought the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to the attention of the diplomatic community. The ICRC was present at each of the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. During the treaty negotiations, the ICRC particularly advocated for the mention of international humanitarian law and the inclusion of victim assistance provisions.16 Due to its observer status at the UN General Assembly, the ICRC delegation had access to all meetings and documents, enabling it to play the role of both expert and convener. Members of the ICRC delegation organized meetings with like-minded

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states and provided input for the treaty text. Although they collaborated with ICAN and occasionally shared information from meetings to which NGOs did not have access, the ICRC did not engage in any joint action with ICAN and instead endeavored to occupy the middle ground between states and NGOs to act as a mediator between them.17 During its Council of Delegates in November 2017, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted a four-year action plan to promote adherence to the TPNW.18 One hundred National Societies were mobilized to support treaty ratification in their respective countries, including National Societies in nucleardependent states like Japan.19 The lingering colonial undertone of humanitarian disarmament movements discussed in the previous chapter also extends to NGOs. As Carpenter points out, the salience of an issue in civil society and its resonance on the global stage depends strongly on “the endorsement of powerful advocacy gatekeepers.” These organizations are often headquartered in Western and Northern Europe or North America and staffed by highly educated professionals educated in those same regions and fluent in English.20 Data from thirteen disarmament fora between 2010 and 2014 showed that of the 541 civil society organizations represented at these fora, 379 were headquartered in high-income countries, and 351 were headquartered in countries belonging to the Western European and Others Group at the UN. Furthermore, 90 percent of registered individual civil society representatives were from high-income countries. This creates a power dynamic that needs to be addressed to create a more equal pattern of representation. The humanitarian initiative to ban nuclear weapons was partially successful in addressing this issue and featured more equal participation and ownership, both at the civil society level and at the state level.21

State Supporters and the United Nations Of all thirteen disarmament fora mentioned above, the three humanitarian conferences in Norway, Mexico, and Austria were the most equally attended across income categories on the state level. Choosing the First Committee of the UN General Assembly as a forum also fostered more equal participation, as the First Committee is the only forum observed in the study in which lower and middle-income

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countries took the floor more frequently than high-income countries. The Humanitarian Pledge formulated after the Vienna conference was endorsed by more than 70 percent of low-income and middle-income countries but only by less than a third of highincome countries. The GA vote that adopted the TPNW on July 7, 2017, showed a similar pattern, with low-income countries voting in favor at almost twice the rate of high-income countries. In this respect, the humanitarian initiative to ban nuclear weapons clearly broke with the discriminatory dynamics of other disarmament fora, in which the highly technical discourse favors the nuclear-armed states and long-standing politics determine who is considered qualified to speak on nuclear issues.22 The humanitarian initiative and the TPNW process upended these expectations because they draw the majority of their support from small states and states of the Global South. At the same time, they lack the support of the great powers. One author goes so far as to call the adoption of the TPNW “the first time an instrument of international humanitarian law has been forced into existence against the fierce opposition of the major powers and the majority of European states.”23 States of the Global South do have a history of advocating for disarmament because, particularly during the colonial and decolonialization period, they were frequently at the receiving end of the Northern military might and understood the devastation of war all too well. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), for instance, stressed the importance of disarmament from the 1960s onwards. 24 India and Pakistan attended all three humanitarian conferences, perhaps in an attempt to be seen as responsible nuclear powers committed to disarmament.25 Needless to say, neither of them attended the negotiating conference or has shown any inclination to join the TPNW so far. With the P5 as well as Germany and Japan in firm opposition, the closest the TPNW has come to gaining the support of a major power is Brazil. 26 Aside from its membership in the BRICS group and its considerable influence in the region, Brazil’s support for the TPNW has strong symbolic value—an aspiring great power with ambitions for a UN Security Council seat that has actively given up its nuclear ambitions and now officially rejected nuclear weapons by signing and supporting the TPNW.27 Brazil is also among the six states whose delegations were honored with the 2018 Arms Control Person of the Year Award for their extraordinary engagement in

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bringing about the TPNW. The other award recipients were Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica, the president of the 2017 negotiating conference.28 This distinction by the Arms Control Association can be considered the insider’s view of who played the most important roles in the process. Among the main advocates of the humanitarian initiative, there are several smaller states that frequently find themselves at a disadvantage in multilateral negotiations. Aside from their modest political and economic weight, they have fewer resources at their disposal on the diplomatic stage, as well. Their delegations tend to be smaller, and their governmental institutions employ fewer experts in a given field. Their diplomatic impact therefore depends strongly on the individual negotiators, who have to shoulder a greater workload.29 This assessment was corroborated during our interviews. In the case of Austria, only six officials shared the task of supporting the humanitarian initiative and negotiating the TPNW: three in the disarmament department of the Foreign Ministry in Vienna, one at the Permanent Mission in New York, and two at the Permanent Mission in Geneva. This exemplifies how much a small group of people with few resources can achieve in a multilateral forum if they are competent, motivated, and well-connected. Also due to their limited resources, smaller states are forced to prioritize and focus their diplomatic efforts on select issues. Austria, Ireland, and, to a degree, Norway and Switzerland are examples of small states that chose to focus their energy on the issue of nuclear disarmament. And yet, Norway is also the best example for John Borrie, Michael Spies, and Wilfred Wan’s assertion that “[in] politics, nothing happens in a vacuum,” and that the influence of external circumstances on the humanitarian initiative must be taken into account. Norway’s left-wing government, which was in office until 2013, generously supported nuclear disarmament research and activism with an annual budget of around 175 million Norwegian Crowns (around $22.5 million) and was the main donor for ICAN and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. When a conservative government came into power, and as the humanitarian initiative began to move in the direction of a treaty, the country gradually withdrew its support for the humanitarian initiative, both politically, through abstentions on relevant votes in the UN General Assembly, and financially, through the suspension of funding

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for the aforementioned NGOs from 2015 onwards. As this example shows, the future of the TPNW depends as much on domestic political developments in different countries as it does on the engagement of its advocates. Austria has a long-standing history of supporting nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and despite the recent changes of government, it continues to be one of the main supporters of the humanitarian initiative on the diplomatic stage and contributes funding to NGOs and research centers, such as ICAN Austria and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. The Holy See played an important role in the humanitarian initiative as well, both through the active participation of its Observer Mission and through the video messages Pope Francis sent to the Vienna conference and to the first round of treaty negotiations in March 2017. The strategies available to smaller states in the international arena include collaboration with specialized agencies and NGOs, as well as coalition-building.30 The states spearheading the humanitarian initiative began to build their base of support in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly as early as 2012, when the draft resolution etitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” was first introduced.31 Nevertheless, the coalition was not as clearly defined as it had been for the Ottawa Convention. Even for those working directly on the issue, it was at times difficult to determine which states actually formed part of the core group.32 Ray Acheson, who was actively involved in the treaty process as an NGO representative, names Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa as members of the cross-regional core group,33 whereas the Arms Control Association names New Zealand instead of Nigeria.34 A closer look at the states who sponsored the aforementioned draft resolution from the 67th through the 72nd sessions of the General Assembly reveals the shifting composition of the coalition supporting the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW. The number of sponsors increased from thirteen in 2012 (mandating the first OEWG) to twenty-three in 2015 (mandating the second OEWG), to thirty-four in 2016 (mandating the treaty negotiations), and to forty in 2017. Eight states sponsored the draft resolution at every session: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Nigeria, and the Philippines. New Zealand and Peru sponsored all drafts but one. It is also worth noting that several European states involved in previous humanitarian disarmament initiatives sponsored the resolution initially but withdrew their support when the idea of a treaty began to take shape. These states

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include Iceland, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland. Several African and Latin American states took over instead and joined the list of sponsors from the 70th session of the GA onwards. Among them were Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Guatemala, Kenya, Namibia, Panama, South Africa, Venezuela, and Uruguay.35 In light of the existing NWFZ in Africa and Latin America, the support of states from these regions is hardly surprising. Yet smaller states, particularly in the Global South, have been facing considerable pressure from their nuclear-armed allies not to support the humanitarian initiative.36 For instance, the United States reportedly threatened a leastdeveloped country with the withdrawal of funding for a landmines removal program if the country voted in favor of a GA resolution calling for the prohibition of nuclear weapons.37 Although the conferences in Norway, Mexico, and Austria were held as stand-alone events on the initiative of the respective governments and outside a larger institutional framework, the UN came to play an important part in the latter stages of the humanitarian initiative. The process was advanced by several GA resolutions and the debates in the First Committee that preceded them, as described earlier. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly, where consensus is not required and each state has one vote regardless of its political power, worked to the advantage of the humanitarian initiative. The GA’s institutional framework was chosen for this very reason, according to Dunworth38 and several of our interviewees. This practical choice goes hand in hand with the theory that multilateralism and the framework of international institutions with majority-based decisionmaking rules empower small states and give them an opportunity to advance their agenda by building coalitions.39 In defiance of the common perception that institutions like the UN were created by and for the major powers,40 small and medium-sized states effectively instrumentalized the institutional framework of the UN to progress the humanitarian initiative. Furthermore, institutional expertise can serve to compensate for small states’ lack of resources or technical competency. 41 In the case of the TPNW negotiations, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) provided essential technical support, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has done considerable policy research related to the treaty.42 Nonetheless, UNODA staff members need to tread carefully, as they are also mandated to uphold the NPT. If UNODA is seen to be invested in

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the humanitarian initiative beyond its concrete General Assembly mandate, the department and/or its staff members may face a backlash from the NWS.43 Therefore, the substantial work they and staff members from other departments have contributed behind the scenes as organizers, experts, assistants, and advisers tends to remain unrecognized, especially compared to the public and widely communicated efforts of NGOs.

States and Civil Society Join Hands: Collaboration as a Key to Success The individual actions of the aforementioned stakeholders are only part of the story. Ultimately, it was collaboration that made the humanitarian initiative successful, by relying on the networks of trust between diplomats, scholars, experts, activists, and international civil servants that previously existed in the disarmament community and that were strengthened throughout the humanitarian impact movement. ICAN itself was founded at the margins of an NPT conference and for many years drew the majority of its funding from the Norwegian government. While the ICRC and NGOs were the first to bring attention to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the simultaneously growing frustration with the NPT regime among the NNWS provided fertile ground for this novel approach to nuclear disarmament. States took the initiative to organize the humanitarian conferences, inviting civil society actors to contribute actively and substantively to the discussion. It was not only ideas that flowed between states and NGOs but also human capital. For instance, most of ICAN’s staff in Vienna previously worked as interns at the Austrian Foreign Ministry during the organization of the Vienna conference.44 During the intergovernmental process, NGOs offered their expertise to diplomats and generated media attention. At the same time, bilateral contacts with delegations allowed NGOs to stay informed of the goings-on in closed meetings and consultations.45 Diplomats who worked on the treaty negotiations have lauded ICAN and its partners as mature and well-informed NGOs who pursue realistic goals and have a clear strategy.46 In the ongoing implementation phase of the treaty, state advocates and NGOs strategize together on how best to reach out to potential signatories. While a diplomatic outreach carries more weight on an intergovernmental level, NGOs

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Civil society representatives Tim Wright (ICAN, left) and Ray Acheson (WILPF, right) at the United Nations negotiating conference for the TPNW, July 5, 2017.

are more effective in leading media campaigns and fostering grassroots movements in support of the TPNW. The close working relationship between like-minded states and NGOs also became evident at the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony, when ICAN passed on some of its 50 tickets to state representatives who had played a major role in the humanitarian initiative.47 The humanitarian initiative bears some characteristics of a transnational advocacy network, as evoked by John Borrie, Michael Spies, and Wilfred Wan.48 The range of actors involved (NGOs, government officials, the UN) is reminiscent of a network, and so are the exchanges between the actors, the common goal, the reframing of the issue of nuclear disarmament, the use of information policies, and the normative approach.49 Other aspects, however, are less typical of an advocacy network. Our observations have shown that the distinction between the members of the network and their target group (the states they seek to influence) is blurred and has changed over time. Some states (like Norway) started out as network advocates but have now become the object of lobbying from the same network. More generally, states are found on both sides of the aisle: some are advocates for

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the humanitarian initiative, others are targets for network advocacy. This further demonstrates that the humanitarian initiative defies existing theoretical frameworks, differs from previous initiatives in the same field, and does indeed constitute a novel approach.

Democratizing Nuclear Disarmament: Women Take a Stand At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Costa Rica declared, in reference to the humanitarian initiative, that “democracy has come to nuclear disarmament.”50 This statement rings true in three ways. First, the TPNW was elaborated under majority-based rules of procedure, giving every state the same voice and successfully avoiding the hijacking of the agenda by a few powerful actors. Second, NGOs played a decisive role throughout the humanitarian initiative and, compared to other disarmament fora (such as the CD), NGOs were granted better access even during the intergovernmental stage. And third, the treaty text itself sets a precedent by expressly recognizing the role of NGOs and the role of women in disarmament.51 The recognition of women’s contribution, their vested interest in disarmament, and the potential they represent for a nuclear-free world sets the TPNW apart from the rest of the nuclear disarmament field, in which women are chronically underrepresented and their views undervalued. According to the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), “at any given intergovernmental meeting on disarmament, only about one quarter of participants are likely to be women.”52 Although the ratio of women at the conferences to negotiate the TPNW still left much to be desired (one third of the delegations were composed entirely of men), women nevertheless took on a more active role in the humanitarian initiative than in other disarmament fora. At the TPNW negotiating conferences, 31 percent of registered state delegates were women (compared to 24 percent in disarmament fora overall), although only 15 percent of state delegations were led by women. Women were more strongly represented in civil society groups, making up almost half of civil society representatives. Civil society delegations were twice as likely as state delegations to be headed by a woman, and women civil society representatives gave more than twice the proportion of interventions compared to women state representatives. 53 WILPF has been

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perhaps the most significant NGO supporter of the treaty process at the multilateral level. Even among member states, forty-five delegations at the negotiating conferences counted more women than men, and four delegations were entirely female. Last but not least, the negotiations were presided over by a woman, ambassador Elaine Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica.54 According to recent research, when women take substantial roles in government delegations or as civil society representatives, the negotiated outcomes in the realm of peace and security are more sustainable and effective.55 The TPNW can be seen as a recent example to this effect. While past humanitarian impact campaigns targeting cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines also counted strong female participation, the nuclear field, with its emphasis on national security, has always been considered more “insulated, male-dominated and unwelcoming,” rendering the progress the TPNW process made on women’s participation even more significant.56 The representation of women in member-state delegations differs widely across regions, however. Renata Dwan finds a strong correlation between national income levels and gender-balanced delegations, suggesting that women’s representation goes hand-in-hand with wider socioeconomic development. Almost 40 percent of delegates from Latin America and the Caribbean are women, but African delegations have the lowest proportion of women, even though they often take the floor to promote gender perspectives. When we look at women in leadership positions, the picture is even more bleak in traditional disarmament fora: Across the First Committee, the CD, and the NPT conferences, 76 percent of delegations were headed by a man, exceeding the overall proportion of 66 percent male delegates.57 This datum shows that even when women do enter the field of disarmament, they are often relegated to the second row and their voices are less likely to be heard. Dwan suggests a range of measures to facilitate women’s ascension through the ranks of multilateral disarmament, including improved work-life balance with less travel and fewer late-night negotiations, mentorship networks, and the reduction of cultural and structural biases.58 In this respect, the humanitarian disarmament initiative has made an important contribution by breaking nuclear disarmament out of its strict military and national security framing. The participation of women in disarmament is not just a game of numbers, however. A woman in the room does not automatically bring

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gender-awareness to the discussion. It is paramount that the women in attendance are not taken hostage by existing structural inequalities and the established rhetoric of weapons as masculine instruments of power. 59 The association of weapons with traditional ideas of masculinity goes beyond words and creates an expectation for professionals in the field to be tough, dispassionate, and dauntless. 60 Ray Acheson sees patriarchic thought patterns reflected in the dismissal and criticism that the NWS and their allies have aimed at the TPNW. Those in power denounce and belittle views they do not agree with, calling them unrealistic, radical, delusional, or naïve. Instead of making an argument on substance, defenders of the nuclear status quo take aim at the credibility, motives, and expertise of TPNW supporters. They seek to discredit arguments based on the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons by labeling them as emotional—a trait they consider feminine and weak. 61 Nicola Sturgeon, First Minister of Scotland—home to the UK’s nuclear weapons and a long tradition of antinuclear activism—offers an excellent example of these patriarchic dynamics in circles of power. Sturgeon denounces UK media for asking politicians whether they would be prepared to press the nuclear button “as some kind of virility test,”62 and declares that as prime minister, she would never authorize the use of a nuclear weapon. In a similar manner, the humanitarian initiative challenged the framing of nuclear weapons as instruments of power and deliberately introduced an emotional aspect by portraying the human suffering they cause. It actively embraced feminist perspectives in nuclear disarmament and gave a platform to the voices of women, indigenous communities, and other overlooked people whose concerns the nuclear powers have routinely dismissed. Dwan confirms that mainstreaming gender into disarmament means “offering a feminist perspective of the root causes of conflict and redefining security away from military strength.”63 The feminist perspective is therefore part of a larger normative reorientation promoted by the humanitarian disarmament initiatives. It benefits not only women but humanity as a whole by making our world safer, reducing the number of devastating weapons, and freeing up resources for socioeconomic development. Overall, women participants and feminist perspectives have been central to the democratization of nuclear disarmament under the TPNW process. Offering a fresh view of safety and security decoupled from military thinking, they made vital contributions to the

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reorientation of the discourse around human beings, their survival, health, and wellbeing. Women not only participated but took on leading roles and propelled the process ahead with their professional competency, passion, and determination, as exemplified by ambassador Elaine Whyte Gómez as president of the negotiating conference, and Beatrice Fihn as president of ICAN. In return, the humanitarian initiative gave women experts, diplomats, and activists an opportunity to insert themselves into the disarmament field. Even more importantly, they were not required to don the mantle of martial, dispassionate rhetoric common to the arms control sector in order to get a seat at the table. The TPNW process offered a platform for feminist conceptions of security that have long been promoted by civil society groups such as WILPF. Via the TPNW, these conceptions have found their way into the mainstream disarmament discourse, as evidenced by countless speeches from both male and female delegates at the First Committee or the high-level meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, referencing human security, the environmental impact, and the socioeconomic cost of nuclear armament. Irrespective of the future fate of the TPNW, these subjects are here to stay, and women and advocates of feminist perspectives have made a lasting impact on nuclear disarmament by bringing them to the table.

Notes

1. William C. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (4), 2017, p. 78. 2. Nobel Foundation, “The Nobel Peace Prize 2017,” https://www.nobelprize .org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2017/, accessed on April 20, 2018. 3. ICAN, “About ICAN,” http://www.icanw.org/campaign/, accessed on April 20, 2019. 4. John Borrie, Michael Spies, and Wilfred Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 2018, p. 5. 5. Motoko Mekata, “How Transnational Civil Society Realized the Ban Treaty: An Interview with Beatrice Fihn,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (1), March 2018, p. 83. 6. ICAN, “Structure and People,” http://www.icanw.org/campaign/structure -and-people/, accessed on April 20, 2018. 7. Mekata, “How Transnational Civil Society Realized the Ban Treaty,” p. 92. 8. ICAN, “ICAN Annual Report 2019,” https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront .net/ican/pages/131/attachments/original/1579878473/ICAN_Annual_Report_2019 .pdf?1579878473, accessed on July 5, 2020.

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9. ICAN, “1000 Day Fund: Four New Projects Launched!” https://www.icanw .org/1000_day_fund_four_new_projects_launched, accessed on June 22, 2020. 10. ICAN, “Campaign Overview,” http://www.icanw.org/campaign/campaign -overview/, accessed on April 20, 2018. 11. Borrie, Spies, and Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 14. 12. For a collection of ICAN’s campaigning resources see: http://www.icanw .org/resources/publications/. 13. ICRC, “Who We Are,” https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are/movement, accessed on April 20, 2018. 14. Rona Gabor, “The ICRC’s Status: In a Class of its Own,” ICRC Resource Center, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm, accessed on April 20, 2018. 15. Linh Schroeder, “The ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Working Towards a Nuclear-Free World Since 1945,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1 (1), March 27, 2018, p. 73. 16. Ibid., p. 74. 17. Interview conducted by the authors on March 22, 2018. 18. Schroeder, “The ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,” p. 76. 19. Interview conducted by the authors on March 22, 2018. 20. Charli Carpenter, “The Politics of Advocacy: Setting and Vetting the Global Agenda,” World Politics Review, September 9, 2014, https://www .worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14047/the-politics-of-advocacy-setting-and -vetting-the-global-agenda. 21. Elizabeth Minor, “Addressing the Political Impact of Inclusion and Exclusion in Multilateral Disarmament Forums,” in Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament, edited by Matthew Breay Bolton, Sarah Njeri, and Taylor BenjaminBritton (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 225–251. 22. Ibid., p. 243ff. 23. Kjølv Egeland, “Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?” Global Governance 24 (1), August 19, 2018, p. 17. 24. Dan Plesch and Kevin Miletic, “The Relationship Between Humanitarian Disarmament and General and Complete Disarmament,” in Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament, edited by Matthew Breay Bolton, Sarah Njeri, and Taylor Benjamin-Britton (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 212. 25. Elizabeth Minor, “Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Initiative,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 717. 26. Egeland, “Banning the Bomb,” p. 18. 27. Mekata, “How Transnational Civil Society Realized the Ban Treaty,” p. 85. 28. Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at 50: Strengthening and Reinforcing the Regime,” meeting program, transcript, audio, and video, April 19, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/ArmsControl2018. 29. Diana Panke, “Small States in Multilateral Negotiations: What Have We Learned?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25 (3), 2012, p. 387. 30. Ibid., p. 390. 31. General Assembly, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” First Committee draft resolution, October 19, 2012, UN document symbol: A/C.1/67/L.46 (all official UN documents can be accessed by entering their document symbol at https://documents.un.org).

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32. Interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 33. Ray Acheson, “Impacts of the Nuclear Ban: How Outlawing Nuclear Weapons Is Changing the World,” Global Change, Peace and Security 30 (2), May 3, 2018, p. 247. 34. Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at 50.” 35. This data was obtained from the draft resolutions titled “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations” submitted to the First Committee at its 67th to 72nd sessions, respectively. 36. Interview conducted by the authors on November 12, 2017. 37. Tilman Ruff, “Negotiating the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Role of ICAN,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 30, 2018, p. 235. 38. Treasa Dunworth, “Pursuing ‘Effective Measures’ Relating to Nuclear Disarmament: Ways of Making a Legal Obligation a Reality,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 612. 39. Panke, “Small States in Multilateral Negotiations,” p. 387ff. 40. Egeland, “Banning the Bomb,” p. 17. 41. Panke, “Small States in Multilateral Negotiations,” p. 387ff. 42. For a list of recent UNIDIR publications visit http://www.unidir.org /Publications/listerPublications. 43. Interview conducted by the authors on February 7, 2018. 44. Interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 45. Ibid. 46. Interview conducted by the authors on October 16, 2018. 47. Interview conducted by the authors on November 12, 2017. 48. Borrie, Spies, and Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” 49. For an introduction to Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1999). 50. Juan Carlos Mendoza, “Statement at the 2015 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations, April 29, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/CR_en.pdf. 51. See Annex for the full text of the TPNW, preamble. 52. Reaching Critical Will, “Gender and Disarmament,” http://www .reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/research-projects /10637-gender-and-disarmament (accessed on October 10, 2019). 53. Minor, “Addressing the Political Impact of Inclusion and Exclusion in Multilateral Disarmament Forums,” p. 235ff. 54. Elizabeth Minor, “Missing Voices: The Continuing Underrepresentation of Women in Multilateral Forums on Weapons and Disarmament,” Arms Control Today, December 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-12/features/missing -voices-continuing-underrepresentation-women-multilateral-forums-weapons. 55. Rebecca Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, edited by Bård Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njølstad (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 82. 56. Renata Dwan, “Women in Arms Control: Time for a Gender Turn?” Arms Control Today, October 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/features /women-arms-control-time-gender-turn.

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57. Ibid., p. 3. 58. Ibid., p. 5f. 59. Ray Acheson, “The Nuclear Ban and the Patriarchy: A Feminist Analysis of Opposition to Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons,” Critical Studies on Security 7 (1), April 30, 2018, p. 79. 60. Lisa Carson, “Why youth and feminist activism matters: insights from antinuclear campaigns in practice,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), p. 263. 61. Acheson, “The Nuclear Ban and the Patriarchy,” p. 79. 62. Nicola Sturgeon, “Why I’d Never Press the Nuclear Button,” The Guardian, November 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/24 /nuclear-weapon-kill-millions-cold-war-mentality-nicola-sturgeon?CMP=share _btn_tw. 63. Dwan, “Women in Arms Control,” p. 7.

6 The Negotiating Conference

THE NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR THE TPNW WAS OFFIcially granted by the UN General Assembly in December 2016 with the adoption of its resolution 71/258, in which it decided to “convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading toward their total elimination,”1 and encouraged “all member states to participate in the conference.”2 Unsurprisingly, there was an immediate pushback from the NWS. A Russian diplomat in the First Committee bluntly stated that under the NPT, Russia was entitled to possess nuclear weapons, and called the mandated negotiations destructive and catastrophic while at the same time ridiculing any attempt to tackle disarmament in the absence of the P5.3 The same sense of entitlement to nuclear weapons was professed by the United Kingdom4 and France,5 which closely associate their status as permanent members of the Security Council with their possession of nuclear weapons. A document circulated by the United States among NATO members discouraged any participation in the treaty negotiations. The same document also listed the potential negative political and military consequences of a nuclear weapons ban for the alliance. These concerns included “delegitimizing the concept of nuclear deterrence, undermining the longstanding strategic stability,” and the prospect that it may become “impossible to undertake nuclear planning or training [. . .] or 95

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nuclear-related transit through territorial airspace or seas.”6 These reactions reflect the growing concern among the NWS that the humanitarian initiative, which they had previously chosen to ignore or dismiss, might impact them if it produced a concrete legal instrument, after all. They made their choice early on to confront the humanitarian initiative by discrediting it and refusing to engage with it, in the hope that without major power support, the initiative would lead to nothing. When the opposite happened, it was seemingly too late for them to change course without losing face, and they missed their opportunity to influence the treaty process from within. This dilemma also becomes apparent in one of the inherent contradictions found in public statements by representatives of the NWS both before and after the negotiations; the treaty can hardly be both irrelevant and dangerous at the same time. There were 135 states officially represented at the negotiating conferences, including two-thirds of NPT states parties. The size of their respective delegations gave an indication of their level of dedication to the treaty process, with Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ghana, the Holy See, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand sending especially large delegations.7 The NWS and most of their allies were conspicuously absent. The only NATO member to break rank was the Netherlands, where the NGO PAX had launched a petition affecting a debate in parliament. The Dutch Parliament then obliged the government to participate in the negotiations despite enormous pressure from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.8 The Dutch delegation was thus the sole defender of the NATO viewpoint at the negotiations and found itself in an increasingly isolated position. 9 The complete boycott by the NWS and the rest of their allies was unprecedented—never before had a group of states downright refused to attend treaty negotiations mandated by the UN General Assembly.10 Ramesh Thakur even went so far as to claim that the boycott placed the NWS and their allies in noncompliance with Article VI of the NPT.11 Others observed that having fewer parties and especially fewer contradicting interests at the table raised the common denominator and led to a more substantial agreement.12 In retrospect, the boycott may well have worked to the disadvantage of the NWS and their allies—had they shown up in numbers at the conference and strived to influence the drafting process, they might have been able to secure a final text more palatable to them.13

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UN Photo/Rick Bajornas, Photo # 718786

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, permanent representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations office in Geneva, was chosen as president of the conference, with the representatives from Austria, Chile, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, New Zealand, and South Africa serving as vice presidents. The main facilitators of the treaty process wanted a Geneva-based ambassador who would be well-versed in disarmament issues as president of the conference. Costa Rica had a credible track record of supporting not only the humanitarian initiative but also previous nuclear disarmament initiatives, such as the 1997 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention.14 Other core advocates, such as Mexico and Austria, preferred not to chair the conference because they believed they could better serve the humanitarian agenda by investing their full diplomatic capacities into negotiating as states parties.15 During the conference, NGOs were invited to submit statements, display their material at a designated table, set up exhibits, and organize side events in a separate conference room.16 They also used their access to the conference to directly lobby government representatives.

Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez (right) chairs a meeting during the negotiating conference on March 30, 2017.

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They published articles expressing their views, as well as reports on the progress of the negotiations, on their own platforms.17 A 15minute time slot was officially set aside for NGO statements at the end of each day, but the meetings frequently ran behind schedule, causing NGOs to get knocked off the agenda when time ran out. Thus, there is still room for improvement where NGO participation is concerned. The organizational setting of intergovernmental negotiations generally leaves little room for NGOs, and the final days of the conference were dominated by closed negotiations. But even during the closed meetings, NGO representatives managed to play their part by passing on suggested language for treaty provisions to diplomats via text messages. Such exchanges of information require discretion, however, as a passage would lose credibility among other states if it was perceived to originate from an NGO.18

The March 2017 Negotiations The United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, held its first substantive session at UN headquarters in New York from March 27 to March 31, 2017. The high-level segment with a general debate took up the first two days of the conference. The subsequent discussions were structured around three topics: principles and objectives, core prohibitions, and institutional arrangements. Delegations were invited to comment on each of the topics, and before moving on to the next topic, a number of civil society representatives were accorded speaking time.19 In the absence of a formal preparatory process for the negotiations, many governments had not yet fully formed their positions. On the one hand, this left accredited NGOs with more room to promote their ideas and gave the president greater independence in the formulation of the first draft. 20 On the other hand, the important question of the scope of the proposed legal instrument was reopened and took up a substantial amount of time during the March negotiations. Some of the main advocates of the humanitarian initiative, including Mexico, Austria, and Brazil, favored a narrow treaty—a political statement that could be negotiated rapidly rather than a fundamental altering of international legal norms. Iran and Egypt were among those who called for a comprehensive and ambitious legal

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instrument, even if or perhaps because such an endeavor would require lengthy and complex negotiations.21 The general discussions were exhausted after three days due to the aforementioned lack of clear negotiating positions among the delegations. Therefore, the two informal question-and-answer sessions led by civil society and ICRC experts on the fourth day were perhaps the most defining elements of the March session. They helped governments clarify a number of complex technical and legal issues and shape their national positions.22 Ambassador Whyte Gómez prepared a first draft of the TPNW based on the views and preferences expressed by member states at the first round of negotiations, with substantive support from UNODA. She did not circulate the text until after the conclusion of the NPT preparatory committee meeting in Vienna in May 2017 in order to avoid any interference between the two processes.23 The first draft was finally issued in Geneva on May 22, 2017.24

The June/July 2017 Negotiations The second session of the negotiating conference took place in New York from June 15 to July 7, 2017. An open reading of the draft took up the first five days, allowing delegations to express their views on the text and propose revisions. Delegations had the opportunity to comment on each paragraph and many took the floor repeatedly. When the reading of the preamble was concluded, civil society representatives were invited to speak, and representatives of ICAN and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, as well as seven other speakers, took the floor. At the end of the intergovernmental discussions on the crucial first paragraph (containing the prohibitions), there were six more interventions by civil society representatives (ICAN, WILPF, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, PAX, Unfold Zero, and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations).25 This alternation between state and civil society speakers was an attempt by the president of the conference to strike a balance between the open and unconventional nature of the process so far (i.e., the high level of civil society participation and leadership in the humanitarian initiative) and the expectations of state representatives accustomed to more private settings for intergovernmental negotiations.26 The same pattern continued for each

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paragraph or set of paragraphs. The delegations most active during the plenary discussions at both sessions include Brazil (23 interventions), Cuba (22), Austria (20), Ireland (20), Nigeria (19), Ecuador (19), Iran (18), Egypt (18), Mexico (17), Indonesia (17), Sweden (17), and New Zealand (16).27 Both supporters and skeptics of the treaty process can be found among the frequent speakers, and even the advocates of the treaty occasionally expressed divergent views on certain provisions.28 Among the more contentious points were the possible prohibition on transit, the scope of the prohibition on nuclear testing, 29 and how the responsibilities for victim assistance would be shared.30 Nonetheless, several of our interviewees noted that, due to a basic consensus among the participating states on the desired outcome, the negotiations for the TPNW were uncharacteristically harmonious in comparison to other disarmament negotiations they had attended.31 Even civil society representatives in attendance found the atmosphere “constructive and dynamic.”32 On June 22, the first reading was complete. Ambassador Whyte Gómez then produced a revised preamble, and, on June 27, the first revision of the entire draft.33 The most significant changes from the original draft to the first revision concerned Article 4 on the accession of the NWS to the treaty.34 (The treaty text will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.) The conference then entered into full negotiating mode with numerous informal discussions and closed meetings. No verbatim records were kept of those meetings, making it harder to reconstruct the negotiating history.35 Among the informal meetings were two panel discussions spontaneously arranged by the president. They allowed delegates to seek the advice of independent experts on verifying the elimination of nuclear weapons and on transit through national territory.36 To expedite the negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion by July 7, the president divided the text into four clusters and appointed facilitators to lead parallel consultations on each cluster. The president herself led the consultations on Article 1 (general obligations), Ireland led Articles 2 through 5 (declarations; safeguards; elimination; additional measures), Chile led Articles 6 to 8 (national implementation; victim assistance and environmental remediation; international cooperation), and Indonesia (later replaced by Thailand) led Articles 9 to 21 (meeting of states parties; costs; amendments; settlement of disputes; universality; signature; ratification; entry into force, reservations; duration and withdrawal; relations with other agreements; depositary; authentic texts).

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United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, July 5, 2017.

All of these meetings were closed, and NGOs had no part in the consultations on the core provisions in the first two clusters. For victim assistance, environmental remediation, etc., limited indirect input from NGOs was possible. Even among states, only twenty to thirty delegations took an active part in this crucial phase of the redrafting process.37 The parallel meetings posed a challenge for smaller delegations, which did not have enough diplomats in their ranks to be represented at each of the clusters.38 They had to prioritize some clusters over others and practice burden-sharing, whereby coalitions of states covered all clusters among them.39 Based on these consultations, the facilitators each submitted a revised draft of their respective articles to the president, who then incorporated them into the second revision of the draft, circulated on July 3, 2017.40 At this point, the conference was already operating on a tight schedule, as the delegations required time to obtain feedback from their capitals, and the translators required time to produce true copies in the six official languages. A final review of the text was held on July 5, 2017, allowing all delegations to state their official positions regarding the latest draft. The text remained almost unchanged, with

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the only contentious points being the right to withdraw from the treaty, and the provision of victim assistance and environmental remediation by states that had used or tested nuclear weapons.41 On July 7, 2017, the conference adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with a vote of 122 in favor, one against (the Netherlands), and one abstention (Singapore).42 There had been hope of adopting the treaty by acclamation until the Netherlands presented an objection, and a formal vote had to be called. It is worth noting, however, that other delegations, such as Iran and Egypt, which had been critical during the negotiations ultimately did vote in favor of the final draft. In their official statement following the vote, the Netherlands explained that the treaty was incompatible with their commitments under NATO and further lamented the absence of concrete verification mechanisms. Singapore declared having abstained on account of legal uncertainty in relation to existing nuclear disarmament instruments. A large number of states pronounced congratulatory statements, some in their national capacity, others on behalf of regional groups. The meeting ended with interventions by the ICRC, ICAN, and a survivor of the Hiroshima bombing.43

Notes 1. General Assembly, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations,” Resolution 71/258, January 11, 2017, UN document symbol: A /RES/71/258, para. 8 (all official UN documents can be accessed by entering their document symbol at https://documents.un.org). 2. Ibid., para. 9. 3. William C. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (4), 2017, p. 93. 4. As cited in Marianne Hanson, “Normalizing Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Road to the Prohibition Treaty,” Contemporary Security Policy 39 (3), 2018, p. 474. 5. Nick Ritchie, “Nuclear Disarmament and a Nuclear Ban Treaty,” The NPT and the Prohibition Negotiation: Scope for Bridge Building, 2017, http:// unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-npt-and-the-prohibition-negotiation-en -682.pdf, p. 15. 6. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 94. 7. Sweden and the Netherlands also accredited sizable delegations, although they were not among the advocates of the humanitarian initiative. For a full list of participants see: https://www.un.org/disarmament/tpnw/participants.html. 8. Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience,” Survival—Global Politics and Strategy 60 (2), 2018, p. 68. 9. Interview conducted by the authors on October 16, 2018.

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10. Meyer and Sauer, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 61. 11. Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament,” Washington Quarterly 40 (4), 2017, p. 80. 12. Tom Sauer and Joelien Pretorius, “Nuclear Weapons and the Humanitarian Approach,” Global Change, Peace & Security 26 (3), 2014, p. 247. 13. Interview conducted by the authors on October 16, 2018. 14. Interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 15. Ibid. 16. General Assembly, “Information for Civil Society Representatives,” United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, February 22, 2017, UN document symbols A/CONF.229/2017/INF/2 and A/CONF.229/2017/INF/2/Add.1. 17. John Borrie, Michael Spies, and Wilfred Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 2018, p. 19. 18. Interview conducted by the authors on October 2, 2018. 19. For a list of all statements see: Reaching Critical Will, “Statements from the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Negotiations,” 2017, http://www.reachingcriticalwill .org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements. 20. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 15. 21. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 95f. 22. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 15. 23. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 97. 24. United Nations, “Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear WeaponsRevised Preamble-20 June 2017-Submitted by the President,” United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, UN document symbol A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.1. 25. For a list of all statements see: Reaching Critical Will, “Statements from the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Negotiations.” 26. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 16. 27. For a list of all statements see: Reaching Critical Will, “Statements from the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Negotiations.” 28. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 17. 29. Ray Acheson, “What Do We Want from a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons?” Nuclear Ban Daily 2 (3), June 19, 2017, http://www.reachingcriticalwill .org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/11775-nuclear-ban-daily-vol -2-no-3. 30. Ray Acheson, “Dealing with the Realities of Nuclear Violence,” Nuclear Ban Daily 2 (5), June 21, 2017, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament -fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/11777-nuclear-ban-daily-vol-2-no-5. 31. Interviews conducted by the authors on November 12, 2017 and February 28, 2018. 32. Acheson, “What Do We Want from a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons?” 33. UN document symbol A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.1/Rev.1. 34. Yasmin Afina, John Borrie, Tim Caughley, Nick Ritchie, and Wilfred Wan, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Nuts and Bolts of

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the Ban - The New Treaty: Taking Stock,” UNIDIR resources, 2017, http://www .unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/-en-687.pdf, p. 4. 35. Interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 36. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 17. 37. Interview conducted by the authors on December 4, 2018. 38. Afina et al., “Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty,” p. 4. 39. Interview conducted by the authors on December 4, 2018 40. General Assembly, “Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Submitted by the President of the Conference,” United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, July 3, 2017, UN document symbol: A/CONF .229/2017/L.3. 41. For the changes made see: United Nations, “Substantive Revisions to A/CONF.229/2017/L.X. Submitted by the President of the Conference,” United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, July 6, 2017, UN document symbol A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.3; and Afina et al., “Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty,” p. 5. 42. Not all states represented at the negotiating conference were present for the final vote. For the voting results see: General Assembly, “Vote Name: Item 9, A/CONF.229/2017/L.3/Rev.1. Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” July 7, 2017, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads /2017/07/A.Conf_.229.2017.L.3.Rev_.1.pdf. 43. United Nations, “Conference to Negotiate Legally Binding Instrument Banning Nuclear Weapons Adopts Treaty by 122 Votes in Favour, 1 Against, 1 Abstention,” Meetings Coverage, DC/3723, July 7, 2017: https://www.un.org /press/en/2017/dc3723.doc.htm.

7 Strong Treaty Obligations, Weak Enforcement Mechanisms

THIS CHAPTER DOCUMENTS THE EVOLUTION OF THE treaty text from the first draft to the final adopted text.1 It also highlights some of the key provisions and discusses their significance for the impact of the treaty on the multilateral nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime. When Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez drafted the treaty text with the assistance of UNODA experts, she borrowed the wording of many technical aspects of NWFZ treaties, the NPT, the CTBT, and the Ottawa Convention.2 As already mentioned, the tenor of the text and the selection of included provisions were based on the president’s notes, the statements made by delegations at the first negotiating session, and the working papers submitted by states, the ICRC, and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).3 The result was a relatively concise draft text of eight pages, comprising a fifteen-paragraph preamble, twenty-one articles, and an annex concerning safeguards.4 (Safeguard provisions were later included in Article 3.) The president intended for this first draft to be a basis for consensus that the June/July negotiations could build on, and she deliberately left open more contentious issues that required further discussion.5 The extensive changes made to the first draft are a testament to the amount of substantive and technical work that took place during the June/July negotiations. The largest number of changes is apparent between the initial draft and the first revision circulated on June 20 (preamble) and June 27 (operative paragraphs). 105

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The following analysis of the provisions of the adopted treaty text, as well as, to the extent possible, the evolution of the text during the June/July session, takes into account the amendments submitted in writing by member states until June 20,6 the comments submitted by the ICRC,7 and the response published online by Reaching Critical Will, the nuclear disarmament program of the NGO WILPF.8 As expected, the preamble of the TPNW starts with an expression of concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and later recalls the unacceptable suffering caused to victims. In reference to the beginnings of the humanitarian initiative, the preamble laments the “slow pace of nuclear disarmament” and declares that “any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to [. . .] international humanitarian law” and “abhorrent to the principles of humanity.” This last passage reflects the intention of the treaty’s architects to stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons. The preamble was considerably expanded during the drafting phase to include several additional references, such as to human rights law, to the danger posed by “detonation by accident, miscalculation or design,” as well as the fact that “the consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend borders [and] pose grave implications for human survival.” The principles of international humanitarian law were spelled out in detail, and several other paragraphs were reformulated for clarity. A paragraph recalling the prohibition of the threat or use of force under the UN charter was added, and upon the request of several states, the “inalienable right” to the “use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” is explicitly mentioned in the final text. One of our interviewees noted that the treaty makes no mention of delivery mechanisms for nuclear weapons.9 Means of delivery were referenced in preambular paragraph 8 of the first draft, but deleted from later versions. Reaching Critical Will, the Swedish delegation, and others sought to strengthen the mention of women. The disproportionate impact of radiation on women and girls, as well as women’s important role in achieving nuclear disarmament, both made it into the final text, setting the TPNW apart for its inclusiveness.

Article 1: Prohibitions Under the Treaty Article 1 of the treaty was originally titled “General obligations,” but changed to “Prohibitions” in the July 3 version (second revision). It

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contains the core provision of the treaty, namely that states parties shall never “develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The first article also prohibits the transfer and the stationing of nuclear weapons, a provision particularly relevant to NATO members that currently host US nuclear bases on their territory (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey). Although the use of nuclear weapons is, of course, prohibited under Article 1, the threat of use was not included in the first draft and was added only after intense discussion. Prohibiting the threat of use of nuclear weapons was controversial among state delegations and even some civil society groups because it directly attacked the concept of nuclear deterrence, making it harder for NATO member states and others under the nuclear umbrella to join the treaty.10 This provision has also been a frequent point of criticism by the NWS, who claim that in attacking the deterrence doctrine, the treaty weakens international security and stability.11 The question of transit of nuclear weapons through national territory or territorial waters was discussed at length during the conference, but no agreement was reached.12 Many called for a mention of transit in Article 1, but others doubted the practicability of such a provision, given that a nuclear-armed submarine or aircraft may cross territorial waters or airspace without the sovereign state’s knowledge. Would this place the state in violation of the TPNW?13 To avoid this ambiguity, it was agreed that transit could be considered a part of assistance, which is prohibited pursuant to paragraph 1(e). The same argument was used to dismiss calls for a prohibition on financing, designing, and researching nuclear weapons, although NGOs advocated strongly for an explicit prohibition of nuclear financing.14 It was argued that in other WMD treaties, “assistance” is interpreted to include financing. Explicitly naming financing in the TPNW would therefore raise the question of whether its prohibition could still be considered implicit in previous treaties. Another controversial question was whether a prohibition on financing would be limited to public investments or include private financial entities operating in a state party to the treaty.15 Concerning nuclear testing, the TPNW reflects the prohibitions contained in the CTBT. This was agreed upon in order to avoid creating parallel regimes, despite some states parties (notably Mexico) calling for more comprehensive prohibitions, including computer-simulated tests and subcritical tests.16

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Articles 2–4: Leaving the Door Open for Nuclear-Armed States The discussions on Articles 2 through 4 all revolved around one issue: how to deal with the NWS in the context of the treaty. These provisions presented a particular challenge to negotiators because they had to be drafted without any input from the NWS, which had chosen to remain absent. According to one of our interviewees, the negotiating parties made a genuine effort to “negotiate on behalf of the NWS” and create the best possible platform for them to join the treaty.17 The initial draft would have required the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals completely before joining the treaty. Some deemed it unnecessary to include a possibility for the NWS to disarm after joining, believing that, for national security reasons, the NWS were unlikely to allow the (future) treaty body to regulate their disarmament process. Others argued that an NWS such as the DPRK may indeed have a strong interest in disarming as publicly and verifiably as possible.18 The ICRC was among those advocating for the second option, maintaining that the goal of having nuclear weapons removed from operational status and systematically destroyed could best be served by bringing the NWS into the treaty regime and holding them to strict, time-bound elimination commitments. 19 The second option won out, and the negotiators elaborated different pathways for the NWS to join the treaty. In this respect, South Africa played a key role. Due to its experience as a former NWS, South Africa was able to compensate, at least partially, for the fact that these provisions had to be drafted without any input from current NWS.20 For Article 2 (Declarations), South Africa proposed language requiring that each state party declare its status in relation to nuclear weapons. This language effectively divides states into four categories: (1) those who have not owned or housed nuclear weapons or explosive devices since the treaty’s adoption on July 7, 2017; (2) those who possessed nuclear weapons as of July 7, 2017, but eliminated them prior to joining the treaty; (3) those who continue to own nuclear weapons even as they join the treaty; and (4) those who have foreign-owned nuclear weapons stationed on their territory even as they join the treaty. It is worth noting that according to Article 2, states like South Africa, which eliminated its nuclear arsenals and nuclear programs prior to the adoption of the treaty, fall under the first category and are not distinguished from states who never owned or developed nuclear weapons at all. Similarly, the new treaty

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eliminates any distinction between the five NPT-sanctioned NWS and the four NWS outside the NPT.21 Under the premise that there are no safe hands for nuclear weapons, the TPNW treats all states the same, irrespective of their status within the international system. The architects of the TPNW thus addressed one of the main credibility and effectiveness deficits of the NPT, namely that four NWS currently exist outside its legal scope. Some believe that the TPNW could present a palatable option for these four NWS to disarm and return under the mantle of international law without giving the impression of having succumbed to great power pressure. For each category of states, Article 4 sets out adequate procedures for joining the treaty, as well as corresponding obligations. According to this article, titled “Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” states in category 2 must conclude a special safeguards agreement with the IAEA and submit to verification by a “competent international authority” (Art. 4, para. 1). This authority was not further specified during the treaty negotiations, and its nature is left to be determined at future meetings of the states parties. States in category 3 must “immediately remove [their nuclear weapons] from operational status” and submit a legally binding, time-bound plan for the “verified and irreversible elimination” of their nuclear weapons program within 150 days after ratifying the treaty (Art. 4, para. 2). Once the elimination is complete, the states in question must negotiate a special safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States in category 4 are simply required to “ensure the prompt removal” of all nuclear weapons from their territory (Art. 4, para. 4). Article 4 draws on the precedent of the Chemical Weapons Convention,22 which also allows states to join while still in possession of chemical weapons and subsequently proceed to eliminate them under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. These provisions make the treaty more inclusive and more open to future ratification by the NWS or their allies, one of the declared aims of ICAN and other treaty advocates. Even so, the requirement to immediately remove nuclear weapons from operational status could prove hard for the NWS to fulfill, both from a technical and a political perspective, as Thomas Shea points out.23 We also see potential challenges related to the implementation of Article 4 from a disarmament point of view. First and foremost, the treaty does not specify fixed timelines for the elimination of the nuclear arsenals of states joining under Art. 4, para. 2. Nor is there a specified deadline for the removal of nuclear weapons or any mention of a dedicated safeguards

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agreement for states joining under Art. 4, para. 4. One could argue that the NNWS will hold the majority of votes at the meetings of states parties, where further details will be determined, and that this will ensure the purpose of the treaty is upheld and the weapons in question are rapidly eliminated. At the same time, it is worth remembering that the NNWS also hold the majority of votes at the NPT Review Conferences, and yet progress under Article VI of the NPT has been negligible. Consequently, we see a potential danger of the NWS joining the TPNW with the aim of deliberately holding its agenda hostage by delaying the implementation of Art. 4, para. 2. Small states and states of the Global South, who make up the majority of current TPNW signatories, could be susceptible to diplomatic and political pressure by the NWS, and the TPNW could eventually suffer the same fate as the NPT. Such a scenario appears unlikely at the moment due to the categorical opposition of the NWS to the TPNW, but as the new treaty gains traction, the NWS may yet change their tactics. In a broader context, however, it can be argued that if an NWS joins, there will at least be engagement and negotiations toward disarmament, which is in itself an improvement from the status quo. According to this line of argument, the NNWS had nothing to lose by making accession to the treaty more feasible for the NWS.

Progressive Ideas and Open Questions Among the most progressive aspects of the TPNW are the victim assistance and environmental remediation provisions in Article 6. They oblige states parties to provide assistance to any individuals under their jurisdiction who have been affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons. Similar obligations can also be found in the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Article 5) and, to a lesser degree, in the Ottawa Convention (with the qualifier “states in a position to do so”). A new addition is the obligation for states that have used or tested nuclear weapons to provide assistance to affected states parties under Article 7 of the TPNW. This provision was not included in early drafts and is likely a result of determined advocacy by the ICRC, other civil society organizations, and several states, including Brazil, in favor of strengthening the victim assistance provisions. Although it only seems fair to expect states that used or tested nuclear weapons to take responsibility for the human and environmental consequences, such a potentially costly obligation might also deter the NWS from joining the treaty.

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Pursuant to Article 8, a meeting of the states parties will be convened by the UN Secretary-General within one year of the treaty’s entry into force, and on a biennial basis thereafter. The rules of procedure for these meetings are not determined by the treaty but will be adopted at the first session. The first review conference is scheduled to take place five years after entry into force, and further review conferences every six years thereafter, perhaps to avoid coinciding with NPT Review Conferences on a regular basis. The ICRC, the IFRC, NGOs, relevant entities of the UN system, other international organizations, regional organizations, as well as states not party to the treaty are expressly invited to attend the meetings and conferences as observers, continuing the tradition of inclusiveness and openness that characterized the humanitarian initiative. The costs for these meetings and conferences, as well as the related costs incurred by the UN Secretariat, are to be covered by the states parties and any participating observer states. In the case of the TPNW, this common practice could imply budget issues and place financial constraints on a future treaty body, as neither the traditional major donors nor the states paying high-assessed contributions to the UN are among the current signatories.24 Provisions for the costs of verification and disarmament (to be borne by the states parties to which they apply) were included only in the draft on July 3—an indication that agreement on this issue was not reached until the very end of the negotiations. This arrangement means that states in categories 1 and 4 will not incur any additional costs for verification, provided they already have a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The NWS, however, would have to pay for their own disarmament and its verification, which could be an issue, as Shea validly points out. By withholding or delaying funding to the inspecting authority, these states could hinder verification and the authority’s ability to detect cheating. As an alternative, Shea proposes a nuclear warhead tax to fund verification operations while simultaneously providing an incentive for swift disarmament.25 Article 3 requires that states in category 1 either maintain their existing IAEA safeguards obligations or conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA if they have not already done so. The TPNW thus effectively maintains the standard of safeguards established by the NPT’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) in 1972 and makes no attempt to strengthen it.26 This may be considered a missed opportunity, as during the negotiations, many states were strongly in favor of making the Additional Protocol to the CSA with the IAEA a requirement for TPNW states parties.27 The Additional Protocol is a legally

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binding agreement between the IAEA and a state party that grants the agency more extensive access to civilian nuclear facilities for verification purposes, as well as the right to monitor radiation levels, to apply seals to nuclear material, and to review the export of nuclearrelated technologies.28 Currently, 136 states have an Additional Protocol in force with the IAEA, and 15 other states have signed but not ratified it.29 Indeed, the large majority of current TPNW signatories and states parties already have an Additional Protocol in place, with the exception of Brazil, Venezuela, Palestine, and several small island states. It may be safe to assume that the objections to the Additional Protocol that made its inclusion in the treaty text too controversial came from some of those states. Brazil, in particular, has been an important advocate of the treaty in South America and would have had to be kept on board. The technicalities of the verification of disarmament obligations, which will become necessary if a state falling under categories 2 or 3 joins the treaty, were largely left open. The treaty text merely delegates this task to a “competent international authority,” which will need to be defined, agreed upon, founded, staffed, and financed before it can begin its work. The treaty is of unlimited duration. States parties have the right to withdraw from the treaty in the event that “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests” of the state in question (Art. 17, para. 2). The timelines and modalities for withdrawal were subject to intense discussions during the negotiations and were updated in the July 3 draft, changing the period required for a withdrawal to take effect from 3 to 12 months. Upon initiative of the ICRC, among others, the additional condition—whereby a withdrawal can only take effect if the state in question is not party to an armed conflict—was strengthened to apply to intrastate as well as interstate conflicts. The TPNW was completed in less than seven months from the adoption of its negotiating mandate and with less than four weeks of actual negotiations,30 a remarkably short period of time for a multilateral treaty and especially for a disarmament instrument. According to Ambassador Whyte Gómez, the negotiators were able to keep the timeframe due to a shared sense of purpose that allowed them to quickly resolve procedural questions that had paralyzed past disarmament negotiations and to move on to the substance of the treaty almost immediately. The engagement of civil society organizations and academia helped create a sense of ownership and confidence in the outcome of the negotiations.31 Tilman Ruff affirms that in three

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decades of working in nuclear disarmament fora, he had never witnessed “such a level of commitment of governments,” noting that each successive version of the draft strengthened the treaty’s provisions instead of watering them down.32 The present analysis of the negotiating conferences and the treaty text has reinforced the impression of an open, participatory drafting process that welcomed input by civil society and a wide range of national delegations. To the extent documented, particular engagement was demonstrated by the treaty’s main facilitators (including Austria, Brazil, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa), as well as by several states of the Global South (including Cuba, Argentina, and Ecuador, who submitted detailed amendments).

Notes

1. For the final adopted text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (UN document symbol A/CONF.229/2017/8), see annex. 2. William C. Potter, “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 59 (4), 2017, p. 98. 3. OPANAL (Spanish acronym for the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) verifies compliance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco (http://www.opanal.org/en/about-us/); for the working papers see: United Nations, “Working Papers,” United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, 2017, https://www.un.org/disarmament/tpnw/working-papers.html. 4. United Nations, “Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Submitted by the President of the Conference. REVISED PREAMBLE–20 JUNE 2017,” United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, UN document symbol A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.1 (all official UN documents can be accessed by entering their document symbol at https://documents.un.org). 5. John Borrie, Michael Spies, and Wilfred Wan, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 2018, p. 16. 6. Reaching Critical Will, “Compilation of Amendments Received from States on the Preamble,” June 20, 2017, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents /Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/documents/compilation_20June.pdf. 7. United Nations, “Comments of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Key Provisions of the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross,” United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, June 14, 2017, UN document symbol A/CONF.229/2017/CRP.2. 8. Reaching Critical Will is a program run by WILPF, a major ICAN partner. Among several NGO responses, we chose theirs due to its comprehensive nature and the active participation of WILPF activists in the conference. It largely coincides with the comments published by the ICAN office in Geneva and

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other principal ICAN members on the same occasion. See: Reaching Critical Will, “Response to the First Draft Text of the Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” 2017, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents /Publications/response-to-22-May-draft-text.pdf. 9. Interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 10. Interview conducted by the authors on October 2, 2018. 11. Permanent Mission of France, “Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” July 7, 2017, https://onu.delegfrance.org/Adoption-of-a-treaty-banning -nuclear-weapons. 12. Borrie et al., “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 17. 13. Interview conducted by the authors on December 4, 2018. 14. Interviews conducted by the authors on February 7, 2018, and October 2, 2018. 15. Interview conducted by the authors on December 4, 2018. 16. Interview conducted by the authors on February 7, 2018. 17. Interview conducted by the authors on October 16, 2018. 18. Interview conducted by the authors on December 4, 2018. 19. Linh Schroeder, “The ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Working Towards a Nuclear-Free World Since 1945,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (1), March 27, 2018, p. 73. 20. Interview conducted by the authors on November 12, 2017. 21. Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament,” Washington Quarterly 40 (4), December 13, 2017, p. 89. 22. OPCW, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,” Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2005, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CWC/CWC_en.pdf. 23. Thomas Shea, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament (New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 5. 24. Interview conducted by the authors on November 12, 2017. 25. Shea, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament, p. 6. 26. Yasmin Afina, John Borrie, Tim Caughley, Nick Ritchie, and Wilfred Wan, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Nuts and Bolts of the Ban - The New Treaty: Taking Stock” UNIDIR Resources, 2017, http://www .unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/-en-687.pdf, p. 8. 27. Rebecca Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, edited by Bård Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njølstad (New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 93. 28. Norwegian People’s Aid, “Safeguards and Verification Under the TPNW,” Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, https://banmonitor.org/the-history-of-the-tpnw /safeguards-and-verification-under-the-tpnw (accessed on July 7, 2020). 29. IAEA, “Status List. Conclusion of Additional Protocols,” https://www.iaea .org/sites/default/files/20/01/sg-ap-status.pdf (last updated on February 20, 2020). 30. Borrie, “Obstacles to Understanding the Emergence and Significance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 14. 31. Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at 50: Strengthening and Reinforcing the Regime,” meeting program, transcript, audio and video, April 19, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/ArmsControl2018. 32. Tilman Ruff, “Negotiating the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Role of ICAN,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 30, 2018, p. 235.

8 Working Toward Entry into Force

Darren Ornitz/ICAN

THE TPNW WAS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE DURING THE high-level segment of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly on September 20, 2017, following an opening ceremony presided over by Secretary-General António Guterres, the depositary of the treaty.1 Fifty states signed the treaty that day.2

Signing ceremony for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons at UN headquarters in New York on September 20, 2017.

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Signatures and Ratifications: Gaining State Support The treaty is now well into its ratification phase, during which signatory states set in motion the required domestic procedures for ratification according to their constitutions, such as parliamentary approval or an executive order. This process can take months or years to complete. The TPNW took slightly over three years to reach the required fifty ratifications. Although this threshold is higher than the one set for the NPT (forty plus three depositary states), it is not unreasonably high and allows the treaty to enter into force on January 22, 2021, pursuant to its Article 15, ninety days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification was deposited. This increases the normative and political weight of the treaty and strengthens the incentive for other states to join. Just like the NPT, the TPNW will have to build credibility and work toward universality over time.3 As of October 2020, the treaty counts a total of eighty-four signatories and fifty states parties that have both signed and ratified.4 During the annual high-level plenary meetings to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons held at UN headquarters on September 26, the Austrian mission was hosting treaty signing events to encourage accession to the TPNW, in collaboration with UNODA, ICAN, the ICRC, and other state and civil society supporters. The 2019 high-level plenary meeting represented an important step toward the TPNW’s entry into force. Advocacy work, activism, diplomatic, and political efforts of the previous years bore fruit with nine new signatories and five additional states depositing their instruments of ratification. In addition, several representatives of signatory states announced in their speeches that their legislative bodies were in the process of ratifying the TPNW. These included Cambodia, Ghana, and Nepal.5 Signatories who have on previous occasions announced their intention to ratify include Brazil, Comoros, Guatemala, and Sudan. Several additional states parties can therefore be expected in the near future as the treaty’s entry into force increases its legitimacy and generates media coverage, giving new confidence to hesitant supporters. In addition, many state supporters are reportedly eager to be represented at the first meeting of the states parties, which is due to be held within a year of the treaty’s entry into force. This prompted a wave of new ratifications as the number approached fifty.6

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A comparison with other disarmament treaties shows that the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Convention on Cluster Munitions each took about three years to reach fifty ratifications. Only the Ottawa Convention started out with 57 ratifications in its first year and achieved over 100 by its third.7 Some consider 100 ratifications a psychological threshold that, once overcome, lends additional authority to a treaty, perhaps because 100 states parties constitute a clear majority of the 193 UN member states.8 The experience of the CWC further demonstrates that it can take two decades or more to actually eliminate an entire category of weapons.9 Long-term thinking is therefore required when judging the impact of the TPNW. It is perhaps useful to remember that even the NPT—today’s landmark nuclear treaty—did not achieve near-universality overnight. In fact, it entered into force after two years with only forty-six states parties; France and China, both recognized as NWS under the NPT, joined the treaty only in 1992.10 Table 8.1 shows the regional distribution of support for the TPNW. The second column shows how many states in each UN regional group voted in favor of the treaty’s adoption on July 7, 2017. Although 135 UN member states attended the negotiating conference, only 124 were present for the final vote; of those, 122 voted in favor, 1 voted against, and 1 abstained. Disaggregating the voting data in this manner illustrates the concentration of support for the TPNW in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. The treaty enjoys nearuniversal support in Latin America, and states in that region have been the most reliable in following up their favorable vote with a signature and ratification. Although many African states supported the TPNW at the negotiating conference, the region lags behind on signatures and ratifications. Nonetheless, there are four African states that have signed the treaty despite not participating in the vote on July 7, 2017. The Western European and Others group and the Eastern European group stand out with extremely low support for the treaty—the only TPNW states parties from these two groups are Austria, Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, and San Marino, three of them having been main architects of the treaty. The regional disaggregation of support reinforces the image of a treaty carried by smaller, less-influential states against the traditional centers of power.11 On the South American continent, Argentina stands out as a nonsignatory of the TPNW. Although Argentina is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco NWFZ, its nuclear policy is more

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Table 8.1 Support for the TPNW Disaggregated by UN Regional Groups UN Regional Groupsa

Adoption of the TPNW on July 7, 2017 (votes in favor)

African 42 of 54 (78%) Asia-Pacific 38 of 55 (69%) Eastern European 2 of 23 (9%) Latin-American and Caribbean 30 of 33 (91%) Western European and Others 8 of 28 (29%)

Signatory States

TPNW States Parties

28 (85%)

22 (67%)

26 (48%) 21 (38%) 0 6 (21%)

6 (11%) 14 (25%) 0 5 (18%)

Source: Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, “United Nations Regional Groups of Member States,” https://www.un.org/depts /DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml, accessed on July 11, 2020. Note: a. Those like the Holy See and the State of Palestine that voted in favor, signed, and ratified the TPNW, but are not members of any regional group, are not represented in this table.

favorable to NATO doctrine than that of its neighbors. The country also put forward a candidate for the presidency of the 2020 NPT Review Conference12 and needed P5 support to make this bid successful. Growing support for the treaty among smaller and lowerincome states worldwide is especially remarkable considering that some of them have been threatened with retaliation by the NWS. The ambassador of South Africa was the only one to publicly call out the “incredible pressure” placed on African states, which is reflected in the high number of African states that remained absent from the General Assembly vote on July 7, 2017, despite being members of the African NWFZ.13 In the interviews we conducted, diplomats as well as NGO representatives acknowledged pushback by the NWS against potential treaty supporters and simultaneously considered it a sign that the treaty is showing effect, or else the NWS would not feel the need to resort to such measures. France, for instance, has allegedly threatened to cut development aid to states in francophone Africa if they join the treaty.14 Pressure by France, the United States, and Russia is especially aimed at states where ratification procedures are underway—firstly, because these lengthy procedures are easier to influence, and secondly, because ratifications are more significant than signatures.15 On October 21, 2020, as it became clear that the

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TPNW was about to reach the threshold of fifty ratifications, the Associated Press obtained a letter by the US government sent to TPNW states parties. In this letter, the United States affirms that the P5 and “America’s NATO allies ‘stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions’ of the treaty” and “‘believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.’”16 As Ray Acheson of WILPF points out, this constitutes a nearly unprecedented disregard for domestic legislative processes and is offensive to both state sovereignty and international law.17 It also indicates the increased nervousness among the NWS that the new treaty they had so far largely ignored or ridiculed would have a tangible impact after all.

Critics of the Treaty Most of Europe, North America, and the Middle East remain outside the treaty, with the notable exceptions of Austria, Ireland, and Malta. In Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Italy, and Switzerland, parliamentary reviews have been initiated, despite government opposition, to examine the legal and political implications of joining the treaty.18 In Switzerland—one of the earliest supporters of the humanitarian initiative—the relevant parliamentary working group recommended the country not join the treaty at this time, due to objections to the stigmatization agenda and fears that the prohibition of military cooperation with nuclear forces would weaken Switzerland’s self-defense capabilities, despite admitting that the treaty’s objective is “in line with the Swiss disarmament policy.”19 NATO member states, many of which have supported nuclear disarmament initiatives in the past, now find themselves performing a balancing act. On the one hand, NATO urges them to defend the nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, they have to justify their support of nuclear weapons, as well as their rejection of the TPNW, to their citizens and civil societies.20 In Belgium, for instance, polling indicates that almost 65 percent of citizens support joining the TPNW, but until recently, the country’s disarmament policy remained firmly in line with NATO positions. In 2020, the newly formed government declared that Belgium “will explore how to strengthen the multilateral non-proliferation framework and how the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can give new impetus to multilateral nuclear

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disarmament.” 21 This development indicates that advocates of the TPNW are slowly making an inroad into NATO countries. Given that US nuclear weapons are stationed in Belgium, the country joining the TPNW would have not only symbolic but real-life significance for the proliferation of nuclear weapons on European soil. Even some non-members of NATO in Europe face a delicate situation, as reflected in Sweden’s inquiry into a possible accession to the TPNW. The inquiry concluded that although Sweden supports the further development of the treaty (and voted in favor of the text in the UN General Assembly), it should not sign on, as to do so “would be perceived as a fundamental criticism of the strategic concept within NATO.”22 In several countries that officially support the nuclear deterrence doctrine, a large number of parliamentarians has nevertheless subscribed to ICAN’s parliamentary pledge, agreeing to promote the signature and ratification of the TPNW at the national level. These countries include Australia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.23 In the United States, the California state senate recently passed a resolution urging the federal government “to embrace the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”24 In Norway and the Netherlands, NGOs supporting the treaty are highly active, and the respective National Red Cross Societies participated in the negotiating conferences. These two National Societies also cosponsored a conference on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons that took place in Nagasaki in April 2017, together with the National Societies of Japan, Australia, and Austria.25 These initiatives demonstrate that there are cracks in the wall of opposition to the TPNW formed by the United States and its allies. Japan is an intriguing case because of the apparent contradiction between the government’s rejection of the treaty and the high level of support for the elimination of nuclear weapons among the Japanese population. Although hibakusha, the Japanese survivors of the atomic bombings, publicly and actively support the treaty, the Japanese government did not send a delegation to the negotiating conference and even voted against the draft resolution that established the negotiating mandate, 26 supposedly in response to diplomatic pressure from the United States (Japan remains under the US nuclear umbrella). 27 A domestic discussion is currently underway about whether Japan’s dependence on US extended nuclear deterrence actually disqualifies the country from joining the treaty. Under its Three Non-Nuclear

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Principles, Japan does not allow stationing, landing, or passing foreign nuclear weapons through its territory, but nonetheless accommodates infrastructure that is part of the US nuclear forces, such as reconnaissance and intelligence.28 Australia is in a similarly ambivalent situation, at the same time part of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty and under the US nuclear umbrella.29 Although the Australian government opposes the TPNW, there is strong civil society support for humanitarian disarmament led by ICAN, a movement first conceived in Australia. This strong support is partly due to the lasting effects of nuclear weapons testing conducted by the United Kingdom in Southern and Western Australia in the 1950s, felt particularly among the Aboriginal population.30 Germany has also shown some degree of engagement with the humanitarian initiative.31 In the 2017 election, Germany’s Social Democratic Party endorsed the removal of US nuclear weapons from German territory.32 Support for nuclear disarmament is also strong among the general population. In a YouGov poll commissioned by ICAN, 68 percent of Germans stated that they supported their country signing the TPNW, and 67 percent wanted US nuclear weapons removed.33 Acheson maintains that countries are wrestling with their complicity in the nuclear deterrence system as a direct result of the effective stigmatization of nuclear weapons through the humanitarian initiative.34 Meanwhile, support for nuclear deterrence remains strong in Eastern Europe. NATO members in close proximity to Russia are unlikely to endorse the new treaty unless their allies offer them a credible alternative security guarantee.35 Chief among the treaty’s critics are, of course, the NWS. In a joint press statement after the adoption of the treaty, the P3 (United States, United Kingdom, and France) declared that they did “not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it” and did not accept the notion that it contributed in any way to the development of customary international law, on the grounds that an accession to the treaty would be “incompatible with the policy of nuclear deterrence.”36 In October 2018, all five NPT-sanctioned NWS issued a joint statement declaring that “the TPNW fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT. It ignores the international security context and regional challenges, and does nothing to increase trust and transparency between States. It will not result in the elimination of a single weapon.”37

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The statement also calls on other states that are considering signing or ratifying the TPNW to reconsider. In response to the treaty and the humanitarian initiative more generally, the NWS have come up with new arguments in favor of nuclear weapons, reflected in the most recent US Nuclear Posture Review, which discusses the use of nuclear weapons in response to significant non-nuclear strategic attacks and calls for the development of new lower-yield warheads.38 US government officials have even gone so far as to deny the interrelationship between the three pillars of the NPT (nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy) and to argue that disarmament is up for discussion only once an environment has been created where “weapons possessors feel that such a movement is feasible, safe, verifiable and sustainable.”39 This approach clearly attempts to shift disarmament responsibility away from the NWS and toward other actors in the international system who supposedly create insecurity and necessitate the retention of nuclear weapons. The argument conveniently ignores the insecurity that the nuclear weapons themselves, as well as their possessors, introduce into the international system. This development raises concerns that the pushback against the TPNW might ultimately hurt the nuclear disarmament agenda, as the NWS stop paying lip service to the NPT’s goal of full and complete disarmament and instead openly defend the indefinite retention of their nuclear weapons. Even within the firm front of opposition presented by the NWS, there are nuances to be considered. Out of the P3, the United Kingdom has been identified as the most amenable to the TPNW for two reasons. First, disarmament activism flourishes in the United Kingdom, and popular opposition to nuclear weapons has already formed around the costly renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent. Antinuclear sentiments are particularly strong in Scotland, where the UK’s nuclear forces are stationed. Second, Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour Party, is a longstanding supporter of nuclear disarmament. The official party line is still in favor of the Trident but may be challenged by Corbyn’s supporters before the next elections. Like in Norway and the Netherlands, much depends on domestic political developments.40 This reinforces the constructivist view of states as heterogenous entities subject to change—more precisely, changes in government.41 Despite the tendency in international relations to think of states in more abstract terms and to refer to the position of the United Kingdom or the position of the Netherlands, the current gov-

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ernment and/or the legislative body in its current composition have far-reaching powers to shape national security positions and to decide whether or not to join a treaty regime or fund a weapons program. However, as Beatrice Fihn stated in an interview, there is much advocacy work left to be done as long as support for the elimination of nuclear weapons is dependent on election results. ICAN’s aim needs to be for humanitarian disarmament and the rejection of mutually assured destruction to become a cross-party issue.42 In France, disarmament activism is much less prominent than in the United Kingdom, and nuclear weapons are perceived more in terms of national prestige than military deterrence. According to one of our interviewees, these circumstances will make it considerably more difficult for humanitarian arguments to gain a foothold in France.43 When the TPNW reached its fiftieth ratification, it nonetheless received substantive and surprisingly positive mainstream media coverage in France for the first time. The major French newspaper Le Monde even published an opinion piece by Beatrice Fihn, executive director of ICAN, declaring that, in 2021, we will enter a new decade in which nuclear arms will be illegal under international law.44 This development is a strong testament to the additional legitimacy the TPNW will attain with its entry into force and demonstrates that the NWS and their allies, despite refusing to engage with the treaty, will not remain completely unaffected by the new international norm prohibiting nuclear weapons. The TPNW holds a certain appeal for all states wishing to publicly reaffirm their commitment to humanitarian principles and their reputation as civilized and responsible members of the international community,45 even if it does not reflect their current nuclear policy. This appeal is particularly strong in democratic states (where civil society holds considerable sway), in emerging states (not to be confused with emerging economies) wishing to raise their profile on the international stage, and in states with a strong tradition of supporting humanitarian causes and initiatives. This has caused advocates of nuclear deterrence in the United States and Europe to complain that the stigmatization campaign puts unequal pressure on the democratic NWS where leaders are accountable to their citizens.46 In the view of TPNW supporters, however, this argument merely demonstrates how out of touch political and military elites in democratic NWS are with the opinions and priorities of their respective civil societies47 and also makes for a rather antidemocratic argument.

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In illiberal states like Russia and China, the lack of political accountability and the weakness of civil society do, indeed, make generating support for nuclear disarmament far more challenging.48 The Russian government considers nuclear weapons crucial for its security and its standing in the international system. In the public eye, countervailing opinions are almost completely absent at all levels of Russian society.49 China has been considerably less vocal than other NWS in its opposition to the treaty. It is also the only NWS that has a firm no-first-use policy in place and has declared an unconditional negative security assurance for all NNWS (other NWS have provided legally-binding negative security assurances for certain NNWS under protocols to NWFZ treaties).50 Despite having no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons, the Chinese government considers that the treaty may serve the country’s interests in some respects, such as by strengthening the nuclear taboo.51

Civil Society and State Advocacy One of the most important tasks for disarmament activists and state advocates at the moment is keeping the debate alive, as well as sustaining the attention that the treaty signing and Nobel Peace Prize ceremony generated in the international community. Now that the treaty is a fait accompli and resistance to its creation is no longer an issue, treaty advocates have the opportunity to refocus the discussion on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The highlevel plenary meetings to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons held at UN Headquarters during the high-level week of the General Assembly in 2018 and 2019 provided an opportunity in this regard. The meetings were each followed by a treaty signing ceremony that generated a wave of new signatures and ratifications. Among the member states most heavily invested in promoting treaty ratification are Austria, Brazil, Ireland, and Mexico. The Austrian mission and ICAN, for instance, have jointly organized lunches with fifteen states that were close to signing or ratifying the treaty in order to encourage them and to offer advice. At the May 2018 NPT preparatory committee meeting, the Humanitarian Group (including Austria, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa and many others) submitted a

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working paper on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, recommending that states acknowledge the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and recognize that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is an objective shared by the NPT and the TPNW.52 Austria submitted another working paper titled “Nuclear Weapons and Security: A Humanitarian Perspective,” which explicitly emphasizes that the TPNW complements and strengthens the NPT, countervailing claims to the contrary brought forward by the NWS.53 Over twenty states welcomed the adoption of the TPNW, while France and Russia denounced it decisively. Widespread concern that discord over the TPNW would prevent a successful preperatory committee proved largely unfounded, as the meeting covers a wide range of topics, and disagreements were equally evident on other topics, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (concerning the Iranian nuclear program), the extension of New START (between the United States and Russia), and the proposed WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Meanwhile, ICAN has been monitoring the developments in various states with the aim of understanding state positions and levels of support. ICAN worked to identify those states most likely to be won over and the pressure points that could tip the scale. Funds from the Nobel Peace Prize award were put toward grants to partner organizations in key countries. In signatory states, ICAN partners assist national lawmakers with drafting legislation to speed up the ratification process. Since the foremost priority was for the treaty to enter into force as quickly as possible, ICAN initially focused its efforts on countries that were close to signing and/or ratifying it. Now that the threshold of fifty states parties has been reached, ICAN is initiating phase two of its treaty implementation strategy and turning its attention to select NATO members and other countries with latent support for disarmament. An important achievement in this regard was the “Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”54 issued in September 2020 and coordinated by ICAN, in which 56 former leaders from countries that do not currently support the TPNW, including 20 NATO members as well as Japan and South Korea, speak out in favor of nuclear abolition and call upon their countries to join the TPNW. Among them are such prominent figures as former secretaries-general of NATO, Javier Solana and Willy Claes, and former secretary-general of the United Nations, Ban Kimoon. The letter prompted balanced, judgment-free coverage of the

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TPNW in the New York Times,55 something rarely seen before in a major US newspaper. The imminent entry into force of the treaty was also reported by major US news organizations such as the Washington Post and ABC News.56 These recent articles differ greatly from previous coverage in that they did not condemn the new treaty and went beyond official US government and NATO statements (conspicuously absent on the day the treaty reached fifty ratifications) to quote Beatrice Fihn and other civil society representatives. Where national governments are not open to nuclear disarmament, ICAN and its partners engage at the municipal and regional levels. The ICAN Cities Appeal has gathered particularly strong support in Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. Prominent cities that joined the Cities Appeal, expressing support for the TPNW and pledging to lobby their national governments to sign it, include Paris, Sydney, Melbourne, Toronto, Berlin, Munich, Oslo, Zurich, Geneva, Edinburgh, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC.57 At the regional level, ICAN is working to assist states of the Global South that are interested in signing or ratifying the TPNW but have limited administrative and technical capacities to get the process underway. In June 2019, for instance, ICAN organized a meeting of representatives of ten states of the Caribbean Community with disarmament experts, legal advisers, and local civil society groups to clarify legal and technical aspects of ratification and implementation and to create momentum in favor of the treaty.58 During the 2019 NPT preparatory committee meeting in New York, civil society organizations and state delegations supporting the TPNW organized a range of side events destined to raise awareness of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and to promote their prohibition. The Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy sponsored a panel on “Human Rights, Democracy, and Nuclear Weapons.”59 The Mexican and Austrian missions, along with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (a foundation associated with the German Social Democratic Party), organized a panel aimed at bridging the gap between the TPNW and the NPT ahead of the 2020 NPT Review Conference. The panel, titled “The Nuclear Ban Treaty between Aspiration and Reality,” featured former UN high representative for disarmament affairs Angela Kane, ambassador Alexander Kmentt (one of the main architects of the humanitarian initiative), and Jon Wolfsthal of Global Zero, former senior director for arms control and nonproliferation at the US National Security Council.60 NGOs were strongly represented

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at the preparatory committee venue, and the latest disarmament research was distributed among attendees, such as the 2019 Hiroshima Report, which was presented at an event called “Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament.”61 The First Committee meetings at the UN in fall 2019 proved less encouraging for disarmament advocates. Hardened fronts between the United States and Russia led to lengthy interchanges and open displays of hostility on procedural matters that took time away from substantive work, resulting in negligible progress on disarmament. Some observers even saw setbacks; submitted draft resolutions set less ambitious goals than in previous years, and member states attempted to relativize their obligations under the NPT.62 Despite divisive statements and a rather unconstructive atmosphere at official meetings, civil society and state advocates of the TPNW managed to make an impact through various side events, such as the workshop to promote the early entry-into-force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, hosted by ICAN and the mission of Bolivia to the UN.63 The tenor at these events was to advocate disarmament but also to diffuse tensions between the hardening fronts of disarmament advocates, on the one hand, and the refusal of the NWS to make concessions on their nuclear arsenals, on the other. TPNW advocates are strongly aware that it is in their interest to make the 2020 NPT Review Conference a success, both to avoid blame for failed negotiations falling on the TPNW and to reengage the NWS and their allies in the disarmament discourse. For this purpose, the core group of ten states supporting the TPNW has been discussing and coordinating diplomatic strategies on a regular basis as the Review Conference (now postponed to 2021) draws near.

Challenges and Ideas for Treaty Implementation Even though the treaty has achieved the needed fifty ratifications to enter into force, it will be essential to grow that number in order to acquire the political weight necessary for the treaty to truly represent the will of the peoples of the world. When assessing the effectiveness and soundness of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in its adopted form, it is necessary to keep in mind that any treaty text is always a result of the circumstances under which it was created. Not only the national interests of the negotiating parties play

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into that but also their considerations of what is feasible and what will find majority support. Some of the main drivers of the treaty process, such as Austria and Ireland, favored keeping the treaty text as narrowly focused as possible, with a simple prohibition of nuclear weapons and little else.64 They believed that negotiating detailed provisions on disarmament verification would be too time-consuming— the General Assembly had only mandated slightly over three weeks of negotiations, and there was a general sentiment that failing to reach an agreement within this timeframe would significantly derail the entire process—and that strong provisions for victim assistance and environmental remediation may turn away state supporters. During the negotiating conference, a group of civil society advocates calling themselves the “PosObs team” fought hard to remind the negotiating parties of the humanitarian consideration that had inspired the whole treaty process and to include positive obligations for victim assistance and environmental remediation in the treaty.65 Positive obligations made their first appearance in a multilateral disarmament agreement with the Ottawa Convention, which requires states parties to clear minefields and assist landmine victims. The Convention on Cluster Munitions followed suit, and advocates were successful in achieving a solid humanitarian framing for the TPNW, including positive obligations for victim assistance and environmental remediation. Verifying Nuclear Disarmament

Once the TPNW enters into force, it will have to confront the challenges of verification and enforcement, as the effectiveness of international regimes largely depends on their ability to detect cheating and to induce compliance. Its provisions in this regard, or lack thereof, have been frequent points of criticism. The architects of the treaty, meanwhile, chose a slim text without technical detail, not just to avoid protracted negotiations, but also because detailed provisions can be “more vulnerable to legalistic arguments, loopholes and compliance challenges.”66 Some challenges related to the verification of disarmament obligations under Article 4 of the TPNW were already explained in the previous chapter, such as the fact that the “competent international authority” tasked with verification was left to be designated or created at future meetings of the states parties. This could be a cause for

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delays in treaty implementation and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Alternatively, the IAEA could assume the role of competent international authority. However, there has not been any official cooperation or exchange between the TPNW negotiating conference and the IAEA. Ambassador Whyte Gómez sent a letter to the directorgeneral of the IAEA requesting the agency’s participation in the negotiating conference. The matter was discussed at a meeting of the IAEA board of governors, but the agency did not send any representatives or experts.67 This development is a reminder that, although the IAEA predates the NPT by over a decade,68 it became closely connected to the NPT regime and thus under the influence of the P5, which exercised pressure on the agency not to engage with the TPNW process. Any verification of disarmament obligations under the TPNW would require approval by the IAEA board of governors. The architects of the treaty are well aware of these challenges and, in fact, have not one but several alternative plans concerning verification, depending on which (if any) NWS join the treaty. For instance, the IAEA would be much more likely to support disarmament verification in the DPRK than in a P5 state.69 In the meantime, the negotiating parties considered it wiser not to settle on the IAEA for verification, and instead they retained the option of creating a new entity. A concrete proposal for a new “competent international authority” has been brought forward by former IAEA inspector-general Thomas Shea. He calls it the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency and assigns it five missions: encouraging the NWS to disarm; verifying arms reductions and fissile material controls; eliminating mission-critical facilities; verifying nonexplosive military use of fissile materials; and estimating the volume of existing weapons-usable fissile material and disposing of it safely.70 In light of previous experience building nuclear weapons, timely detection of any rearmament attempts will become particularly important in the case of former NWS. Shea assigns the IAEA the task of preventing rearmament as an extension of its current safeguards procedures.71 Tamara Patton, Sébastien Philippe, and Zia Mian suggest a two-part organizational structure for the implementation of the TPNW, with an implementation support unit to handle engagement with states parties and information management, and a scientific and technical advisory board to develop guidelines and standards for disarmament. When an NWS joins the treaty, an adhoc inspectorate can be formed out of these existing structures to be

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later scaled up into a treaty organization.72 This approach takes likely financial constraints into account and offers flexibility in the event an NWS decides to join the treaty. States parties could even decide to follow the example of the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty Organization preparatory commission and move ahead with the creation of an institution ahead of time. Although a comprehensive disarmament verification regime would be expensive, Tytti Erästö, Ugnė Komžaitė, and Petr Topychkanov estimate that it would still cost considerably less than the maintenance and modernization of current nuclear arsenals.73 Despite its complexity, verification is one of the less contentious subjects surrounding the TPNW. It is a technical matter being discussed among disarmament experts, and it brings together both supporters of the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament and supporters of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.74 Experts can rely on a wealth of experience and best practices from previous verification regimes, such as the verification regime for the INF Treaty between the United States and Russia, which “involved an extensive exchange of data on all declared facilities” as well as “an inspection protocol, which entailed on-site inspections of selected missile assembly facilities and all storage facilities; deployment zones; and repair, test and elimination facilities for a period of 13 years.”75 After this period, on-site inspections ended, and verification was limited to national technical means. Before long, a dispute over alleged noncompliance broke out and the INF regime fell apart. The experience of the INF Treaty clearly demonstrates that intrusive inspections are indispensable in order to build and maintain the level of confidence and trust necessary to reconcile disarmament measures with national security interests. The question of how to dispose of weapons-grade nuclear material has also been addressed before. In the 1990s, highly enriched uranium from USSR stockpiles equivalent to 20,000 nuclear warheads was down-blended and sold to the United States for use in nuclear power stations, and excess plutonium was turned into fuel in Russian fast-neutron reactors.76 The Megatons to Megawatts Program also demonstrated that the conversion of weapons-grade nuclear material into reactor fuel can be made profitable.77 Between 1996 and 2002, the United States and Russia even explored the possibility of extending IAEA safeguards to weapon-origin fissile materials in the framework of the US-Russia-IAEA trilateral initiative.78 Although the

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official stance of the IAEA is that it does not have a mandate to verify nuclear disarmament, the agency did in fact retroactively verify the dismantlement of South Africa’s nuclear weapon program and also played a part in verifying the absence of nuclear weapons in Iraq between 1991 and 2003 and in Libya in 2004.79 In general, however, the IAEA’s verification process is geared toward the civilian nuclear fuel cycle and accounting for fissile materials. To verify disarmament obligations under the TPNW, the IAEA safeguards would have to “cover a considerably higher amount of material and a larger amount of facilities”80 than they do today. Military nuclear facilities in the NWS are not currently covered by IAEA safeguards. Although military facilities have been subject to inspections in bilateral disarmament efforts between the United States and Russia, these verifications were limited to delivery vehicles. Nevertheless, methodologies and technologies for the verification of warhead dismantlement have already been explored. In 2000, a joint project between the United States and the United Kingdom simulated a mutual verification exercise between two nuclear-armed states. From 2007 onwards, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership explored the role the NNWS could play in verification, addressing challenges such as how to allow for verification without exposing sensitive information. “Quad” refers to the four participating countries: Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.81 The Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership also engaged in a simulation exercise to evaluate monitoring technologies and model verification strategies.82 In 2014, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the US Department of State jointly established the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, in which more than twenty-five countries participate. The partnership identified fourteen key steps83 in the nuclear weapons dismantlement lifecycle, with a particular focus on warhead dismantlement, and discussed how other states could assure themselves of the effective dismantlement of a warhead and the adequate disposition of its components.84 This work is particularly relevant because verifying warhead dismantlement is technically challenging and can therefore slow or hinder disarmament efforts, even when the political will is there.85 In the framework of the UN, a “Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament” was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution

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71/67, consisting of twenty-five member states selected by the secretary-general, including all NWS except Israel and the DPRK. In 2018 and 2019, the group met in three five-day sessions. 86 Among other things, the group discussed the various disarmament verification methods that have been used in the past, including “declarations and material accountancy, containment and surveillance, non-destructive and destructive analysis methods, on-site inspections, environment sampling, information analysis and national technical means.”87 It is important to note that although the group includes several TPNW supporters (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, South Africa), the existence of the TPNW is not acknowledged in the group’s final report, which even laments “the impracticability of setting out prescriptions for a nuclear disarmament verification regime in the absence of treaty negotiations.”88 This is just one of many examples of how the TPNW continues to be sidelined and ignored in disarmament fora, sometimes under the pretext of avoiding controversy. The report of the Group of Governmental Experts observes that disarmament verification can be especially difficult if carried out post facto because it depends strongly on the recordkeeping of the disarming state.89 A possible tool to overcome these difficulties is nuclear archeology, or “the ability to independently reconstruct past military fissile material production history.”90 Patton et al. estimate that nuclear archeology will play a key role in reducing uncertainties about the fissile material inventory of disarming states.91 While the TPNW gives current NWS the option of disarming before or after they join the treaty, this observation suggests that, from a verification point of view, it would be preferable for an NWS to disarm after joining. As we can see, the verification challenges facing the TPNW are nothing nuclear experts haven’t dealt with before—the key will be to get the NWS and their experts on board with the multilateral disarmament process. The flexibility afforded by the open-ended verification provisions in the TPNW may even present an advantage in the future, as Johnson points out. Traditional arms control treaties “often embedded prevailing political and technical conditions in legal concrete,”92 restricting their effectiveness as circumstances change over time. With the TPNW, however, the states parties will be able to create and adapt the verification regime as needed, keeping the treaty relevant and responsive to new circumstances. Erästö et al. suggest bringing civil society on board for treaty verification,93 which would

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be in keeping with the crucial role civil society played in all previous stages of the TPNW. If a current NWS joins the treaty, comprehensive verification will be required to ensure full and complete disarmament, including verification of nuclear capabilities, such as warheads and delivery vehicles, nuclear materials, and all relevant facilities. As mentioned above, the duration of disarmament, which could span years or even decades for large nuclear arsenals, could become a major challenge.94 Surmounting this challenge will require sustained political commitment beyond the tenure of individual governments. Here, civil society can play an important role in holding governments accountable and raising awareness among the general public about the need for continuous progress on disarmament. The next logical step after verification is enforcement. If a treaty’s verification mechanism detects violations, the violating parties need to be brought back into compliance for the treaty regime to remain credible and effective. This is especially true for a treaty that contains concrete prohibitions and obligations, as discussed in Chapter 3 under hard/soft law. Bilateral disarmament agreements between the United States and the USSR/Russia generally relied on the balance of power and a shared interest in mutual compliance. In relation to the Ottawa Convention, shaming was cited as an alternative mechanism for norm enforcement, enabling the norm entrepreneurs— states as well as civil society—to fill the enforcement gap in a treaty.95 Michael Rühle, writing for NATO, stresses the crucial role of enforcement and points out that, ultimately, there will always be states that are indifferent to “naming and shaming” strategies, and only the threat of “serious military reprisals”96 will keep such states from breaking their obligations. Although this statement leans toward the extreme, the TPNW does show evidence of a lack of provisions regarding violations. Generally, norms related to international peace and security are enforced by the UN Security Council, as illustrated by the Council’s recent actions in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Regarding the TPNW, however, the P5 as opponents of the treaty can hardly be relied on to enforce its provisions in the event that a state party violates the terms of the treaty after its entry into force. 97 Even less can the P5 be expected to enforce the elimination of nuclear weapons should one of their own ranks join the treaty. Therefore, enforcement is definitely an issue the states parties to the treaty will have to address in the future, with a view to finding viable alternatives to the Security Council.

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Interaction with the NPT

Also with regards to treaty implementation, UNODA experts underscore the importance of the 2020 NPT Review Conference (now scheduled to take place in 2021) and warn that opponents of the new treaty will attempt to frame it as the cause for any dissent or lack of progress within the NPT.98 It is therefore vital that the treaty’s advocates find a constructive way of engaging with the NPT regime in order to strengthen the disarmament pledge while preventing forumshopping by potential proliferators. The TPNW arguably creates momentum for disarmament under the NPT by putting pressure on the NWS to deliver results through their preferred method, the stepby-step approach, to prevent any further erosion of the authority of the NPT.99 Looking back to the beginning of the humanitarian initiative, the original intention of its advocates was to engender progress in nuclear disarmament within the NPT. Only when the 2015 NPT Review Conference failed to produce the desired results did they contemplate creating a new legal instrument. As Dunworth pointed out back in 2014, the NPT does not require the “effective measures” related to its Article VI to be carried out under its own regime. Consequently, an overlap between the NPT and other instruments prohibiting nuclear weapons does not undermine but rather strengthens states’ legal obligations.100 This has long been the case for regional NWFZ, where members are also party to the NPT and thus under a double obligation to forego nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Article VI of the NPT explicitly calls for negotiations “on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Nuclear-armed states parties to the NPT claim that such a treaty should only be created when the world has already come close to the goal of zero nuclear weapons. The same procedure was not followed for other WMD, notably biological and chemical weapons, which were banned long before they approached total elimination.101 At the 2019 preparatory committee, Austria, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, San Marino, and Thailand submitted a working paper that directly addresses the relationship between the NPT and the TPNW. They point out that New START as well as START and SALT, all treaties between two nuclear-armed states, explicitly refer to Article VI of the NPT in their preamble, “confirming that nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements serve the implementation of article VI.”102 Therefore, they conclude that there can be no doubt the TPNW

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also serves the implementation of the NPT, and any claims to the contrary are based on double standards. The authors of the paper further argue that the TPNW also serves the nonproliferation agenda of the NPT—prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons limits their actual geographical proliferation.103 Advocates of the TPNW have every intention to continue to emphasize this point during upcoming NPT conferences to ensure that the two treaties reinforce each other and create a joint momentum for nuclear disarmament. The postponement of the 2020 NPT Review Conference due to COVID-19 has indeed worked in favor of TPNW supporters because it will allow the treaty to enter into force before the NPT states parties next meet, presenting the prohibition of nuclear weapons as a fait accompli and making it harder for nucleararmed states to ignore the new treaty and the message it sends. Another decisive factor in the treaty’s future is how NATO and its members choose to engage with it. On the one hand, the prohibition against threatening the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the prohibition to assist, encourage, or induce activities prohibited under the treaty, could be interpreted as incompatible with extended nuclear deterrence and prevent non-nuclear-armed NATO members from joining the TPNW. While nuclear weapons sharing as practiced by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey is clearly prohibited under Article 4 (4) of the TPNW, the status of other NATO members, as well as countries under the US nuclear umbrella, is less clear. On the other hand, NATO members have always had different national views and practices in relation to nuclear weapons. In the past, the organization has accommodated these differences and adapted its operations accordingly. Since there is no mention of nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty itself, the organization could accommodate members wishing to join the TPNW if the new treaty is interpreted as compatible with NATO membership.104 So far, however, the alliance has been firm in its opposition to the treaty, accusing its facilitators of undermining the NPT and even suggesting that nuclear abolition may be immoral if it makes major war more likely. Disarmament demands directed at the P3 have been deflected by claims that the real danger does not come from their extensive arsenals but rather from “those of some smaller countries.”105 Ultimately, the alliance’s future attitude toward the treaty may be defined by the choices made by NATO’s nonnuclear members and by their ability and willingness to withstand diplomatic pressure from the P3.106

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1. United Nations, “Arrangements for the High-Level Signature Ceremony for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Convened by the UN Secretary-General,” September 20, 2017, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda -web/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Information-Note-on-the-Signing-Ceremony -for-the-Treaty-on-the-Prohibition-of-Nuclear-Weapons_24-August-2017.pdf. 2. UNODA, “List of Countries Which Signed Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on Opening Day, 20 September 2017,” https://www.un.org /disarmament/list-of-countries-which-signed-tpnw-on-opening-day-20-september -2017. 3. Rebecca Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, edited by Bård Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njølstad (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 90f. 4. The full list of signatories includes Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, State of Palestine, Sudan, Thailand, TimorLeste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Vietnam, Zambia; the full list of states parties includes Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Panama, State of Palestine, Paraguay, Samoa, San Marino, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), and Vietnam; United Nations, “Treaty Collection XXVI-9. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” https://treaties.un.org/pages /ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-9&chapter=26&clang=_en (last updated on October 28, 2020). 5. ICAN, “Live Blog: International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 2019,” September 26, 2019, http://www.icanw.org/action/live -blog-international-day-for-the-total-elimination-of-nuclear-weapons-2019/. 6. ICAN, “Entry into Force: Recording of Global ICAN Partner Organisations Call,” September 17, 2020, https://www.icanw.org/entry_into_force _recording_global_ican_partner_organisations_call_zoom. 7. Yasmin Afina, John Borrie, Tim Caughley, Nick Ritchie, and Wilfred Wan, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: Nuts and Bolts of

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the Ban - The New Treaty: Taking Stock” UNIDIR Resources, 2017, http://www .unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/-en-687.pdf, p. 6. 8. Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament,” Washington Quarterly 40 (4), December 13, 2017, p. 86. 9. Ibid., p. 83. 10. Daryl Kimball and Kingston Reif, “Timeline of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),” Arms Control Association Fact Sheets & Briefs, updated February 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-the-Treaty -on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT. 11. Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Legislatures Act on Ban Treaty,” Arms Control Association, May 1, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-05/news/legislatures -act-ban-treaty. 12. Permanent Mission of Austria to the UN in Vienna, “Workshop on Promoting a Successful Outcome of the 2018 NPT Prep Com,” April 4, 2018, https:// onu-vienne.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/vienna_workshop_agenda_attendees _4april2018_final-2.pdf?3560/ed8e9753c32bc031687779f927a06ea5245241b0. 13. Tilman Ruff, “Negotiating the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Role of ICAN,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 30, 2018, p. 235. 14. Interviews conducted by the authors on October 2 and October 16, 2018; Ray Acheson, “General Assembly: High-Level Plenary Meeting on Nuclear Weapons, 73rd session — Part 2,” September 26, 2018, http://webtv.un.org /search/general-assembly-high-level-plenary-meeting-on-nuclear-weapons-73rd -session-%E2%80%94-part-2-/5840671449001/?term=nuclear&lan=English &sort=date (video, starting at 2:11). 15. Interview conducted by the authors on December 4, 2018. 16. Edith M. Lederer, “US Urges Countries to Withdraw from UN Nuke Ban Treaty,” Associated Press, October 21, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/nuclear -weapons-disarmament-latin-america-united-nations-gun-politics-4f109626a1 cdd6db10560550aa1bb491. 17. Ray Acheson, “Editorial: Nuclear Ban Treaty Reaches 50!” Reaching Critical Will, First Committee Monitor, 18 (3), October 25, 2020, https://reachingcriticalwill .org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/FCM20/FCM-2020-No3.pdf. 18. Ray Acheson, “Impacts of the Nuclear Ban: How Outlawing Nuclear Weapons Is Changing the World,” Global Change, Peace and Security 30 (2), May 3, 2018, p. 245; Alicia Sanders-Zakre, “Legislatures Act on Ban Treaty,” Arms Control Association, May 1, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018 -05/news/legislatures-act-ban-treaty. 19. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Report of the Working Group to analyse the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” June 30, 2018, https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/sicherheitspolitik /2018-bericht-arbeitsgruppe-uno-TPNW_en.pdf. 20. Angela Kane, “Between Aspiration and Reality: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Perspective Peace and Security (New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2019), p. 2. 21. ICAN, “Belgian Government Shifts Stance on TPNW,” https://www .icanw.org/belgium_tpnw_shift, accessed on October 17, 2020. 22. Kane, “Between Aspiration and Reality,” p. 3.

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23. ICAN, “Parliamentary Pledge,” http://www.icanw.org/projects/pledge, accessed on October 17, 2018. 24. California Legislative Information, “Assembly Joint Resolution No. 33” September 5, 2018, https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml ?bill_id=201720180AJR33. 25. ICRC Council of Delegates, “Working Toward the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons—Four-Year Action Plan,” September 2017, http://rcrcconference .org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CD-17-8-NW-Progress-Report-final_EN.pdf. 26. United Nations Digital Library, “Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations: Resolution / Adopted by the General Assembly,” voting records for A/C.1/71/L.41, December 23, 2016, https://digitallibrary.un .org/record/855229. 27. Thu-An Pham, “Reading G20 Reactions to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 17, 2018, http:// carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/17/reading-g20-reactions-to-nuclear-weapons -ban-treaty-pub-75279. 28. Nobuyasu Abe, “Ban Treaty: Will it Abolish Nuclear Weapons? A Japanese Perspective,” Global Change, Peace and Security 30 (2), April 27, 2018, p. 274. 29. ICAN, “Choosing Humanity: Why Australia Must Join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” July 2019, https://icanw.org.au/wp-content /uploads/Choosing-Humanity-ICAN-Report.pdf, p. 18f. 30. Ibid., p. 37ff. 31. Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 83. 32. Social Democratic Party, “Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland,” legislative program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany 2017-2021, https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Bundesparteitag _2017/Es_ist_Zeit_fuer_mehr_Gerechtigkeit-Unser_Regierungsprogramm.pdf, p. 104. 33. ICAN, “Polls: Public Opinion in EU Host States Firmly Opposes Nuclear Weapons,” https://www.icanw.org/polls_public_opinion_in_eu_host_states_firmly _opposes_nuclear_weapons, accessed on October 26, 2020. 34. Acheson, “Impacts of the Nuclear Ban,” p. 245 35. Tom Sauer, “How Will NATO’s Non-Nuclear Members Handle the UN’s Ban on Nuclear Weapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73 (3), 2017, p. 180. 36. Permanent Mission of France, “Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” Quai d’Orsay French official statement and joint press statement from the permanent representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, July 7, 2017, https://onu.delegfrance.org/Adoption -of-a-treaty-banning-nuclear-weapons. 37. Permanent Mission of the UK, “P5 Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” October 24, 2018, https://www.gov.uk /government/news/p5-joint-statement-on-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of -nuclear-weapons. 38. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR -POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 39. Kane, “Between Aspiration and Reality,” p. 2. 40. Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience,” Survival—Global Politics and Strategy 60 (2), 2018, p. 68f. 41. Rebecca Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment,

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edited by Bård Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njølstad (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 79. 42. Motoko Mekata, “How Transnational Civil Society Realized the Ban Treaty: An Interview with Beatrice Fihn,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (1), March 2018, p. 84. 43. Interviews conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 44. Beatrice Fihn, “Beatrice Fihn : Le 22 janvier 2021, nous entamerons une nouvelle décennie où les armes nucléaires seront illégales au regard du droit international,” Le Monde, October 26, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article /2020/10/26/beatrice-fihn-le-22-janvier-2021-nous-entamerons-une-nouvelle -decennie-ou-les-armes-nucleaires-seront-illegales-au-regard-du-droit-international _6057439_3232.html. 45. Marianne Hanson, “Normalizing Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Road to the Prohibition Treaty,” Contemporary Security Policy 39 (3), February 1, 2018, p. 480. 46. Brad Roberts, “Ban the Bomb? Or Bomb the Ban? Next Steps on the Ban Treaty,” European Leadership Network, Global Security policy brief, March 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180322 -Brad-Roberts-Ban-Treaty.pdf. 47. Interview conducted by the authors on December 4, 2018. 48. Mitsuru Kurosawa, “Stigmatizing and Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (1), January 3, 2018, p. 47. 49. Nikolai Sokov, “Breakthrough or Breakpoint? Global Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” European Leadership Network, December 2017, https:// www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ELN-Global -Perspectives-on-the-Nuclear-Ban-Treaty-December-2017.pdf, p. 13ff. 50. Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Hiroshima Report: Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, NonProliferation and Nuclear Security in 2018 (Hiroshima, March 2019), https:// www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/346733.pdf, p. 55. 51. Raymond Wang and Tong Zhao, “China and the Nuclear Ban Treaty,” European Leadership Network, Breakthrough or Breakpoint? Global Perspectives on the Nuclear Ban Treaty, December 2017, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork .org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ELN-Global-Perspectives-on-the-Nuclear-Ban -Treaty-December-2017.pdf, p. 28. 52. NPT, “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” Working paper submitted to the preparatory committee for the 2020 Review Conference, March 9, 2018, UN document symbol NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.9 (all official UN documents can be accessed by entering their document symbol at https://documents .un.org). 53. NPT, “Nuclear Weapons and Security: A Humanitarian Perspective,” Working paper submitted to the preparatory committee for the 2020 Review Conference, March 12, 2018, UN document symbol NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II /WP.10. 54. Lloyd Axworthy et al., “Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” September 21, 2020, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx .cloudfront.net/ican/pages/1712/attachments/original/1600645499/TPNW_Open _Letter_-_English.pdf. 55. Rick Gladstone, “Former World Leaders Urge Ratification of Nuclear Arms Ban Treaty,” The New York Times, September 20, 2020, https://www

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.nytimes.com/2020/09/20/world/treaty-nuclear-arms-united-nations.html?referrer =masthead. 56. Edith M. Lederer, “UN: Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty to Enter into Force,” ABC News (Associated Press), October 25, 2020, https://abcnews.go .com/US/wireStory/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-enter-force-73810802; and Washington Post, September 24, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia _pacific/un-nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-to-enter-into-force/2020/10/24/aa696ce2 -1653-11eb-a258-614acf2b906d_story.html. 57. ICAN, “I Can Save My City,” http://nuclearban.org/cities/getinvolved #cities-list, accessed on November 30, 2019. 58. ICAN, “This Is How We Get a State to Join the Treaty,” campaign newsletter, December 18, 2019. 59. Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, “Human Rights, Democracy, and Nuclear Weapons,” May 1, 2019, http://lcnp.org/LCNPMay12019sideevent.pdf. 60. Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, “Angela Kane, the Ban Treaty and the 2019 PrepCom,” May 7, 2019, https://vcdnp.org/angela -kane-the-ban-treaty-and-the-2019-prepcom/. 61. Hiroshima Prefecture, “Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament,” April 29, 2019, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt /prepcom19/documents/Hiroshima_Prefecture_Side_event.pdf. 62. Ray Acheson, “The Unbearable Heaviness of Hypocrisy,” First Committee Monitor 17 (6), November 9, 2019, http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images /documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/FCM19/FCM-2019-No6.pdf. 63. UNODA, “Opening Remarks at the ICAN/Mission of Bolivia Workshop to Promote the Early Entry-Into-Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” October 18, 2019, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp -content/uploads/2019/10/Opening-remarks-at-TPNW-workshop-by-High -Representative-Ms.-Nakamitsu-.pdf. 64. Matthew Breay Bolton and Elizabeth Minor, “The Agency of International Humanitarian Disarmament Law: The Case of Advocacy for Positive Obligations in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” in Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament, edited by Matthew Breay Bolton, Sarah Njeri, and Taylor Benjamin-Britton (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 67. 65. Ibid., p. 60. 66. Rebecca Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, edited by Bård Nikolas Vik Steen and Olav Njølstad (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 90. 67. Interview conducted by the authors on February 28, 2018. 68. International Atomic Energy Agency, “History,” https://www.iaea.org /about/overview/history, accessed on October 10, 2019. 69. Interviews conducted by the authors on October 16, 2018, and December 4, 2018. 70. Thomas Shea, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament (New York: Routledge, 2018), p. 9f. 71. Ibid, p. 4. 72. Tamara Patton, Sébastien Philippe, and Zia Mian, “Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, September 24, 2019, p. 8.

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73. Tytti Erästö, Ugnė Komžaitė, and Petr Topychkanov, “Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament Verification,” SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2019/3, April 2019, p. 19. 74. Ibid., p. 1. 75. Ibid., p. 3f. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid., p. 19. 78. Patton et al., “Fit for Purpose,” p. 4. 79. Erästö et al., “Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament Verification,” p. 9. 80. Jürgen Scheffran, “Verification and Security of Transformation to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Framework of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), 2018, pp. 143–162. 81. US National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA Leads U.S. Participation in International Nuclear Verification Initiative,” November 16, 2017, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-leads-us-participation-international -nuclear-verification-initiative. 82. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Consider the Role of Verification in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament,” May 15, 2019, UN document symbol A/74/90, Annex I, para. 8. 83. For a diagram depicting each of the fourteen steps see: International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, “Monitoring and Verification Activities, as Identified by the IPNDV, for Key Steps in the Process of Dismantling Nuclear Weapons,” https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11 /IPNDV_14-steps-diagram-Final.pdf, accessed on September 14, 2019. 84. International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, “Project Phases,” https://www.ipndv.org/about/project-phases. 85. Erästö et al., “Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament Verification,” p. 12. 86. United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), “Group of Governmental Experts to Consider the Role of Verification in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament,” https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/794372F61323EA8EC125 80ED0053B8D5?OpenDocument, accessed on September 15, 2019. 87. United Nations, “Final Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Consider the Role of Verification in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament,” A/74/90, para. 16. 88. Ibid., para. 28. 89. Ibid., Annex I, para. 1. 90. Patton et al., “Fit for Purpose,” p. 5. 91. Ibid. 92. Johnson, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and Humanitarian Strategies to Eliminate Nuclear Threats,” p. 83. 93. Erästö et al., “Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament Verification,” p. 19. 94. Ibid., p. 17. 95. Lesley Wexler, “The International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 20 (3), 2003, p. 563. 96. Michael Rühle, “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Reasons for Skepticism,” NATO Review, May 19, 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017 /also-in-2017/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-scepticism-abolition/en/index.htm. 97. Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament,” Washington Quarterly 40 (4), December 13, 2017, p. 89.

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98. Afina et al., “Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty,” p. 7. 99. Meyer and Sauer, “A Sign of Global Impatience,” p. 70. 100. Treasa Dunworth, “Pursuing ‘Effective Measures’ Relating to Nuclear Disarmament: Ways of Making a Legal Obligation a Reality,” International Review of the Red Cross 97 (899), 2015, p. 606. 101. Thomas Hajnoczi, “The Relationship Between the NPT and the TPNW,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 3 (1), March 2020, p. 90. 102. NPT, “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the Cornerstone of the Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime and its Relationship to Other Relevant Treaties,” Working paper submitted to the preparatory committee for the 2020 Review Conference, May 1, 2019, UN document symbol NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.46, para 15. 103. Ibid., para 23. 104. Afina et al., “Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty,” p. 9. 105. Rühle, “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.” 106. Tom Sauer, “How Will NATO’s Non-Nuclear Members Handle the UN’s Ban on Nuclear Weapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73 (3), 2017, p. 180.

9 The Treaty Enters into Force

WITH THE HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE AND THE TPNW, the NNWS found a way to reclaim agency in nuclear disarmament. After decades of inertia and empty promises under the NPT, the NNWS chose an alternative approach and did what lay within their power—they initiated a normative shift in order to gradually diminish the political utility of nuclear weapons and raise the reputational cost of their possession and use. Angela Kane, former UN high representative for disarmament affairs, even considers that this normative shift has already occurred.1 With the treaty’s entry into force, the normative shift is growing and gaining traction. This milestone also engendered positive mainstream media coverage, making the public more aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons and perhaps more supportive of the effort to eliminate them. The treaty may no longer be perceived as a pacifist utopian pipedream, but a concrete possibility for change. In addition, countries that have been supportive but hesitant to take the final step toward ratification may now be emboldened to become states parties. Although the treaty does not prohibit nonstate parties from possessing and using nuclear weapons, its normative nature and deliberate humanitarian underpinning will eventually affect the behavior of those states by creating a compliance pull.2 According to realist IR theory, states will always act in their own self-interest. Indeed, the treaty’s advocates do not expect the NWS to renounce their nuclear weapons 143

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for idealistic or ethical reasons. The compliance pull is intended to work in a more roundabout way, changing the incentive structures to the point where nuclear weapons carry such a strong stigma that it will be in states’ self-interest to abandon them. While the NWS hold a great deal of power within the international system, Hedley Bull’s muchcited definition of great powers demonstrates that power does not exist in a vacuum and is a psychological as well as a physical construct: “Great powers are powers recognised by others to have . . . certain special rights and duties.”3 The P5 choose to interpret the NPT as supposedly recognizing their special right to possess nuclear weapons. As Kjølv Egeland observes, however, with the TPNW this “once special ‘right’ to possess nuclear weapons . . . has been withdrawn by the international community.”4 Therefore, the TPNW can be credited for creating new incentives for nuclear disarmament and reenergizing a process that had previously reached an impasse. Another major achievement of the humanitarian initiative is that it has democratized nuclear disarmament by bringing previously disenfranchised groups into the process. This democratization took place on several levels. At the interstate level, the NNWS assumed agency and refused to play by the unequal rules of the NPT any longer. At the level of disarmament fora, NGOs were invited to participate and indeed played a leading role in the humanitarian initiative. At the national level, activists mobilized civil society and prompted citizens to take an interest in their countries’ nuclear policy. Previously, the NWS effectively shielded nuclear decisionmaking from public oversight by labeling it a national security issue. Reframing nuclear weapons as an issue of human security and human survival is meant to break this taboo and make citizens increasingly aware that nuclear disarmament is a global public good.5 The TPNW has further democratized nuclear disarmament by placing all states on an equal footing. Majority-based voting systems were applied throughout the treaty process, giving each participating state the same voting power, and the same conditions were set for all states—no nuclear weapons, no reservations, no exceptions. These principles of inclusiveness and sovereign equality pose a special incentive for smaller and less influential states to join the treaty. Even though a clear prohibition on financing nuclear weapons was not achieved, the prohibition to “assist, encourage or induce . . . anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty,”6 which, during the negotiations, was interpreted to encompass financing, requires states parties to withdraw government money

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from companies producing nuclear weapons. This provision has already proven effective even beyond the legal scope of the treaty. The Norwegian government and the largest Dutch pension fund, for instance, announced that they will cease investment in a number of companies involved in nuclear weapons production.7 At a time when business ethics are gaining importance, and private banks and investors are increasingly concerned about their reputations, they may also be deterred from investing in the nuclear weapons industry as the stigma attached to nuclear weapons grows.8 Therefore, the treaty’s advocates are engaging the private sector and especially the financial sector with regards to their investment in nuclear weapons modernization programs. This type of divestment campaign successfully curbed the production of cluster munitions and could also have a significant impact on nuclear weapons modernization.9 A recent example regarding cluster munitions is that of US cluster munitions producer Textron, whose munitions were employed by Saudi Arabia in civilianpopulated areas in the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Humanitarian disarmament campaigners called attention to the issue and gained coverage in major US media outlets such as the New York Times, which led Textron to cease cluster munitions production.10 Stigmatizing media attention, loss of investors, or loss of revenue from other products due to a consumer boycott can be costly for companies involved in weapons production, which makes this type of advocacy geared toward the private sector highly effective. Don’t Bank on the Bomb, an initiative by ICAN partner organization PAX, campaigns for divestment from nuclear weapons and maintains a list of financial institutions that exclude all nuclear weaponsassociated companies from their operations.11 Deutsche Bank, for instance, announced in May 2018 that it will no longer invest in companies involved in the manufacture, distribution, or maintenance of nuclear weapons.12 One month later, KBC Bank in Ireland announced its decision to divest completely from nuclear-weapons-related firms, explicitly citing the TPNW.13 On the same day that the UN held its high-level meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on September 26, 2018, PAX activists visited the headquarters of BNP Paribas, calling on the bank to divest from companies producing nuclear weapons.14 All this serves to put pressure on the nuclear-military-industrial complex, which has played a major role in slowing down past disarmament efforts.15 The entry into force of the TPNW is expected to trigger a new

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wave of divestment from nuclear weapons, as financial institutions often choose not to invest in weapons prohibited by international law. In addition, states parties to the treaty may direct financial institutions under their jurisdiction to divest from companies producing nuclear weapons in third countries to comply with the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance.16 During the 2019 high-level meeting to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, numerous state representatives stressed that the enormous financial resources being spent on nuclear weapons are urgently needed in other areas, such as the fight against climate change, poverty, and inequality—measures that address the root causes of today’s conflicts and therefore make a much greater contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security than nuclear deterrence.17 Pope Francis echoed this sentiment during his 2019 visit to Nagasaki, stating that “in a world where millions of children and families live in inhumane conditions, the money that is squandered and the fortunes made through the manufacture, upgrading, maintenance and sale of ever more destructive weapons, are an affront crying out to heaven.”18

Future Prospects for the Treaty In this book, we examined the humanitarian impact initiative for nuclear disarmament, relying on a combination of official documents and records, academic literature, civil society publications, and interviews. We went beyond a simple recounting of events to take a closer look at the strategies that made the initiative successful and the actors that drove it forward. The humanitarian initiative and the resulting treaty broke new ground in several areas. Its architects created renewed momentum in nuclear disarmament by moving the discussion into fora more conducive to dialogue and progress—independent international conferences and the UN General Assembly. This opened up the field of nuclear disarmament to the participation of a wider range of actors, notably states of the Global South, women, NGOs, and other civil society organizations. Another important component was reframing nuclear disarmament as a humanitarian concern, based on welldesigned discourse and advocacy strategies. The analysis in Chapters 3 through 8 reveals that the active and constructive collaboration and exchange between state and civil society actors was a crucial factor in the humanitarian initiative’s success. The resulting network of small states, states of the Global South, and civil society organiza-

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tions achieved what would have been unthinkable a decade ago—a multilateral treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. A closer look at the negotiating conference revealed an open and participatory drafting process and an unusually swift conclusion of the negotiations. Although the treaty, which is currently in its ratification phase, faces a number of challenges, notably the continuing opposition of the NWS and their allies, its achievements cannot be overlooked and will shape the future debate on nuclear disarmament as well as the cost/benefit calculations of states and private investors. The treaty and the humanitarian initiative can also be viewed in a larger context of power and accountability. Recent years have seen increasingly successful efforts to hold the powerful accountable, be it for government corruption, sexual misconduct, or, in the case of the nuclear-armed states, the continued nonfulfillment of international obligations. States and citizens that had previously been excluded from the nuclear weapons debate became crucial actors and called entrenched great-power privileges into question. Nick Ritchie refers to this phenomenon as “diplomacy of resistance” and describes the humanitarian initiative as an anticolonial social movement.19 By basing their arguments on the principles of international humanitarian law, the treaty’s advocates made it difficult for countries wishing to be perceived as civilized and responsible members of the international community to dismiss them. In the past, it was the United States and Western European states who frequently instrumentalized their moral authority for political ends. With the humanitarian initiative, states of the Global South effectively claimed the moral high ground for themselves and called out the NWS on their unfulfilled NPT obligations. With its entry into force, the treaty is gaining momentum, reinforcing the global norm against nuclear weapons and allowing for implementation efforts to begin in earnest.20 From January 22, 2021, states parties will be obligated to offer assistance to victims of nuclear testing under their own jurisdiction as well as to help other countries in their victim assistance and environmental remediation efforts. They will also be required to actively promote the TPNW in their diplomatic relations with non-states parties, urging them to sign and ratify. According to Article 8 of the treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the first meeting of the states parties of the TPNW within a year of its entry into force. At this meeting, important decisions will be taken regarding the institutional structure of the treaty regime, and the rules of procedure for future meetings will be adopted. The treaty is silent regarding UN secretariat support, so the states parties may

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decide to establish a secretariat or committee outside the UN, particularly if the NWS and their allies remain hostile to the treaty. With such major decisions on the agenda of the first meeting of the states parties, current signatories may wish to become states parties in time to have a vote at this first meeting. Furthermore, it will be interesting to see which non-states parties decide to attend as observers. For instance, NWS and nuclear umbrella states with strong civil society support for nuclear disarmament, such as Japan or the UK, will have to determine whether it is still in their best interest to disregard the TPNW. The engagement of previously critical or hesitant states with the institutional process of the new TPNW regime will be an important indicator of its perceived legitimacy and the normative pressure it generates. The meetings of the states parties of the TPNW will also offer an important platform for civil society to advocate for progress on nuclear disarmament. The ICRC and NGOs are explicitly invited to participate in the meetings as observers, continuing the tradition of the open and collaborative humanitarian initiative that brought the treaty into existance. Even before the first official meeting, ICAN and its partner organizations are planning major campaigning events, actions, and stunts to mark the entry into force of the treaty on January 22, 2021.21

Conclusion In summary, our intent for writing this book was to create a historical account of the process leading to the completion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and of the magnetic pull of the humanitarian initiative that offered a common ground for action. We wanted to draw attention to the urgency of eliminating nuclear weapons and creating a nuclear-free world. As long as this class of devastating and poisonous weapons exists, the world will be under constant threat, if not by a purposeful detonation against an enemy then by a catastrophic accident or weapons-grade material falling into the hands of terrorists. The chance of this happening is not zero. We are, in fact, living on the edge. The ongoing modernization of nuclear arsenals adds to the threat that nuclear weapons could be used on the battlefield, and the US Nuclear Posture Review actually lays out scenarios in which their use is contemplated. In addition, the previous taboo on the use of nuclear weapons is deteriorating, and the memory of the atrocities at Hiroshima and Nagasaki is fading. As long as nations are allowed to build and maintain nuclear weapons, the nuclear industrial complex will push for

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more and newer weapons to drive up profits. The withdrawal from international agreements like the ABM and INF treaties, which not only limited these categories of weapons but also provided a means of communication, dialogue, and oversight, only adds to a global sense of uncertainty. Traditional nuclear control regimes like the NPT have proven inadequate at addressing current nuclear threats and advancing disarmament. Therefore, networks of civil society organizations like ICAN, the ICRC, and WILPF, working with like-minded states and taking advantage of UN General Assembly majority voting, filled the void by creating the humanitarian initiative, which ultimately culminated in the adoption of this momentous legal instrument, the TPNW. Through their initiative, they created a counter-narrative to the increasingly bellicose tenor of international relations, showing a way forward for nuclear disarmament and giving a voice to non-nuclear-armed states and ordinary citizens that overwhelmingly wish for a world free of nuclear weapons. Perhaps most importantly, the TPNW process has raised awareness of the devastating humanitarian consequences of any nuclear explosion, let alone a nuclear war, and of the staggering cost of nuclear armament that takes away government resources from public goods such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated at the high-level plenary meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons held at the UN on September 26, 2019, nuclear weapons are an “existential threat,” and “the only real way to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons is to eliminate nuclear weapons.”22 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons offers a framework to eliminate this threat and draws a roadmap that can lead to a nuclear-free world.

Notes

1. Angela Kane, “Between Aspiration and Reality: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” Perspective Peace and Security (New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2019), p. 4. 2. Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament,” Washington Quarterly 40 (4), December 13, 2017, p. 84. 3. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 202. 4. Kjølv Egeland, “Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?” Global Governance 24 (1), August 19, 2018, p. 18. 5. Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty,” p. 89; Marianne Hanson, “Normalizing Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Humanitarian Road to the Prohibition Treaty,” Contemporary Security Policy 39 (3), February 1, 2018, p. 472.

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6. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (UN document symbol A/CONF.229/2017/8) Art. 1, para. 1 (e) (see annex). 7. Ray Acheson, “Impacts of the Nuclear Ban: How Outlawing Nuclear Weapons Is Changing the World,” Global Change, Peace and Security 30 (2), May 3, 2018, p. 246. 8. Paul Meyer and Tom Sauer, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: A Sign of Global Impatience,” Survival—Global Politics and Strategy 60 (2), 2018, p. 67. 9. Acheson, “Impacts of the Nuclear Ban,” p. 246. 10. Taylor Benjamin-Britton, “US Arms Control Dynamics in the Era of Humanitarian Disarmament: A Case Study of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” in Global Activism and Humanitarian Disarmament, edited by Matthew Breay Bolton, Sarah Njeri, and Taylor Benjamin-Britton (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), p. 142. 11. PAX, “Hall of Fame,” Don’t Bank on the Bomb, https://www.dontbank onthebomb.com/2018-hof/, accessed on February 8, 2019. 12. Maaike Beenes, “New Deutsche Bank Policy Expands Exclusion Nuclear Weapons Producers,” Don’t Bank on the Bomb, May 23, 2018, https://www .dontbankonthebomb.com/new-deutsche-bank-policy-expands-exclusion-nuclear -weapons-producers/. 13. Tom Sauer and Mathias Reveraert, “The Potential Stigmatizing Effect of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review 25 (5–6), December 2018, p. 17. 14. Susi Snyder, “Calling on BNP Paribas: End Support for Nuclear Weapons Production!” Don’t Bank on the Bomb, September 26, 2018, https://www.dontbankonthe bomb.com/calling-on-bnp-paribas-end-support-for-nuclear-weapons-production/. 15. Sauer and Reveraert, “The Potential Stigmatizing Effect of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 17. 16. ICAN, “The Significance of the Entry Into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” briefing paper for partner organizations, September 2020, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ican/pages/1718/attachments /original/1601295290/Briefing_Paper_on_the_Significance_of_TPNW_EIF_FINAL _September_2020.pdf?1601295290. 17. ICAN, “Live Blog: International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 2019,” September 26, 2019, http://www.icanw.org/action/live-blog -international-day-for-the-total-elimination-of-nuclear-weapons-2019/. 18. Justin McCurry, “Pope Francis Calls for a ‘World Without Nuclear Weapons’ During Nagasaki Visit,” The Guardian, November 24, 2019, https://www .theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/24/pope-francis-calls-for-a-world-without -nuclear-weapons-during-nagasaki-visit. 19. Nick Ritchie, “The Diplomacy of Resistance: Power, Hegemony, and Nuclear Disarmament,” Global Change, Peace & Security 30 (2), April 27, 2018, p. 121. 20. ICAN, “Live Blog.” 21. ICAN, “Entry into Force: Recording of Global ICAN Partner Organisations Call,” September 17, 2020, https://www.icanw.org/entry_into_force_recording _global_ican_partner_organisations_call_zoom. 22. António Guterres, “Secretary-General’s Message on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” September 26, 2019, https:// www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2019-09-26/secretary-generals-message -the-international-day-for-the-total-elimination-of-nuclear-weapons.

United Nations

General Assembly

A/CONF.229/2017/8

Distr.: General 7 July 2017

Original: English

United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination New York, 27–31 March and 15 June–7 July 2017 Agenda item 9 Negotiations, pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 71/258 of 23 December 2016, on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination

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The States Parties to this Treaty, Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances, Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation, Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free 151

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world, which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests, Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons, Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples, Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment, Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, Recalling also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons, Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achieve-

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ment and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determined to act towards that end, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security, Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament, Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament, Recognizing also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty, Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end

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undertaken by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha, Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 Prohibitions

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly; (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 2 Declarations

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall: (a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclearweapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party; (b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or

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in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State. 2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

Article 3 Safeguards

1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. 2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

Article 4 Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons

1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this

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Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. 2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weaponsrelated facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure. 3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article. 4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon

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the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article. 5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled. 6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.

Article 5 National implementation

1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. 2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 6 Victim assistance and environmental remediation

1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. 2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

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shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated. 3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

Article 7 International cooperation and assistance

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty. 2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties. 3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty. 4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis. 6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Article 8 Meeting of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including: (a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;

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(b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty; (c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty. 2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply. 3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties. 4. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. 5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.

Article 9 Costs

1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

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2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately. 3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

Article 10 Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first. 2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties. 3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.

Article 11 Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the par-

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ties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. 2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 12 Universality

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

Article 13 Signature

This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

Article 14 Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.

Article 15 Entry into force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. 2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

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Article 16 Reservations

The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 17 Duration and withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.

Article 18 Relationship with other agreements

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

Article 19 Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 20 Authentic texts

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic. DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and seventeen.

Acronyms

ABM Treaty AI CCM CD CSA CTBT CWC DPRK GA GCD GPS IAEA ICAN ICBL ICBM ICC ICJ ICRC IFRC

INF INF Treaty JCPOA

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty artificial intelligence Convention on Cluster Munitions Conference on Disarmament Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Chemical Weapons Convention Democratic People’s Republic of Korea General Assembly General and Complete Disarmament Global Positioning System International Atomic Energy Agency International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons International Campaign to Ban Landmines Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles International Criminal Court International Court of Justice International Committee of the Red Cross International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 163

164

Acronyms

MAD NAC NAM NATO NC3 New START NGO NNSA NNWS NPT NWFZ NWS OEWG OPANAL OPCW OSCE OST P5 SAC START TPNW

UN UNGA UNIDIR UNODA USSR WILPF WMD

Mutually Assured Destruction New Agenda Coalition Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear command, control, and communications Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty nongovernmental organization National Nuclear Security Administration non-nuclear-weapon states Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nuclear-weapon-free zones nuclear-weapon states Open-Ended Working Group The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Open Skies Treaty five permanent members Strategic Air Command Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (interchangeable with “the treaty”) United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Weapon of Mass Destruction

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Index

ABM Treaty. See Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Abolition, nuclear weapons, 4, 41, 66, 125 Accidents, nuclear weapons, 4, 18–19, 25, 44, 106; false alerts as, 21–22; human error and, 20–21; Russian, 23–24 Acheson, Ray, 35, 84, 87, 90, 119, 121 Activists, nuclear disarmament, 30, 113n8, 122–123, 124, 144–145 African states, 117–118 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), 105, 113n3 Agents, nuclear policy, 3–6 AI. See Artificial Intelligence Air Force, US, 17–22, 31 Airbus, 31 Allison, Graham, 23 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), 15, 149 Antideterrence, nuclear policy, 62 Archaeology, nuclear, 132 Argentina, 6, 13n13, 117–118 Arkansas, 20, 21 Armament industry, US, 10, 29–31. See also Private sector Arms control, international security, 16, 48 Arms Control Association (think tank), 27, 45, 84; Person of the Year Award, 82–83 Arms race, nuclear, 15–16, 33, 59

Article 1, TPNW, 106–107, 154 Article 2, TPNW, 108–110, 154–155 Article 3, TPNW, 108–110, 155 Article 4, TPNW, 100, 108–110, 128, 155–157 Article 5, TPNW, 157 Article 6, TPNW, 110, 157–158 Article 7, TPNW, 110, 158 Article 8, TPNW, 111, 158–159 Article 9, TPNW, 159–160 Article 10, TPNW, 160 Article 11, TPNW, 160–161 Article 12, TPNW, 161 Article 13, TPNW, 161 Article 14, TPNW, 161 Article 15, TPNW, 116, 161 Article 16, TPNW, 162 Article 17, TPNW, 162 Article 18, TPNW, 162 Article 19, TPNW, 162 Article 20, TPNW, 162 Article VI, NPT, 33–34, 48, 96, 110, 134 Artificial Intelligence (AI), 21–22 Assistance for victims, nuclear weapons, 100, 102, 110, 147, 158 Associated Press, 119 Atomic bombs, 19, 26; for Hiroshima, 1– 2, 30, 41, 44, 59; for Nagasaki, 1–2, 25, 44, 59, 146. See also Hibakusha; specific atomic bombs

179

180

Index

Atomic Energy Commission, US, 60 Austria, 43–46, 81–86, 121, 125 Austrian Pledge. See Humanitarian Pledge Avoidance of unnecessary suffering, international humanitarian law on, 55– 56, 57 B-47 (bomber), 19, 20 B-52 (bomber), 19, 20 B-52H (bomber), 21 B61-12 (nuclear bomb), 2, 28 Baghdad Intelligence Center, Iraq, 24 Ban Ki-moon, 41, 125 Ban treaties, 46, 49, 50, 66. See also Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Banks, nuclear divestment by, 12, 31–32, 68, 145–146 Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, 21 Belgium, 119–120 Benjamin-Britton, Taylor, 66–67, 68 Berry, Ken, 48 Bilateral negotiations, nuclear disarmament, 33–34, 41, 131, 133 Biological weapons, 50, 56 Biological Weapons Convention, 117 BNP Paribas (bank), 145 Bolton, Matthew, 69 Borrie, John, 83, 87 Brazil, 5–6, 13n13; TPNW supported by, 82–83, 110, 112 Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), 13n13 Brody, Bernard, 61–62 Budget, 61; Department of Defense, 21; Department of Energy, 23; ICAN, 78, 83, 86. See also Cost Bull, Hedley, 144 Burroughs, John, 56 Bush, George W., 15, 24

Carpenter, Charli, 81 CCM. See Convention on Cluster Munitions CD. See Conference on Disarmament Chancellorville, USS, 16 Chemical weapons, 56, 133, 134 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 49, 50, 109, 117 China, 17, 45, 124; nuclear arsenal of, 29, 30 Churchill, Winston, 60 Cities Appeal (campaign); ICAN, 126

Civil society, 9, 32, 35, 87; OEWG involving, 42–43; states working with, 77, 86–88, 146–149; TPNW supported by, 7, 11–12, 77–81, 99, 124–127, 132–133. See also Nongovernmental organizations Civilized nations, ICJ, 68–69 Claes, Willy, 125 Climate change, 5, 18, 57–58 Cluster munitions, 5, 7, 11, 64–66, 74n50, 145; stigmatization and, 68, 70. See also Convention on Cluster Munitions Cold War, 1–2, 5–8, 15–16; military spending during, 29–30 Colonialism, 68–69, 81–82 Colorado, 22 Command and Control (Schlosser), 19 Complex, military-industrial, 29, 145, 148–149 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 33, 34–35, 107, 130, 153 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), NPT, 111 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 8 Conference of the Parties, 34 Conference on Disarmament (CD), UN, 11, 35, 41, 47 Conferences; NPT, 32, 34, 35, 41. See also specific conferences Consensus-building. See Decisionmaking Constructivism, international relations, 2– 6, 64, 122 Contamination, radioactive, 1, 2, 19–20, 23–25, 46. See also Nuclear radiation exposure Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), 64–65, 68, 74n50, 78, 110, 117 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. See Ottawa Convention Conventional weapons, 56; nuclear weapons compared to, 26, 58, 67 Conventions, 49–50. See also specific conventions Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 33 Corbyn, Jeremy, 122 Corkhill, Clare, 23 Costa Rica, 12, 50, 97 Costs; of nuclear disarmament, 111, 130, 160; of nuclear weapons, 10, 12, 28–

Index 29, 30–31, 61, 146. See also Divestment campaign Council of Delegates, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 81 COVID-19, 135 Crimes against humanity, 5, 56–57; war, 56–57 Critics, TPNW, 119–124 CSA. See Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements CTBT. See Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty Cuban Missile Crisis, 26 CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention

Decisionmaking, 10, 21–23, 27, 88, 144; for CD, 11, 35, 47; for OWEG, 11, 47–49; for UNGA, 8, 85 Defense industry. See Armament industry Defense Nuclear Safety Board, US, 23 Delegations, states, 96, 98–102, 102n7 Delegitimization, nuclear weapons, 66–71 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 2, 18, 22, 26, 35, 108; nuclear testing by, 67 Democratization, of nuclear disarmament, 70–71, 88–91, 144 Department of Defense, US, 16–17, 19, 21, 27 Department of Energy, US, 22–23 Department of State, US, 45, 131 Deterrence theory, nuclear, 2, 10, 11, 29, 58–63 Deutsche Bank, 145 Disarmament, humanitarian, 7, 64–65, 69, 81, 145. See also Nuclear disarmament Disarmament Commission, UN, 35 Discrimination, international humanitarian law on, 55–56 Divestment campaign, nuclear weapons, 10; for banks, 12, 31–32, 68, 145– 146; PAX, 12, 30–32 Don’t Bank on the Bomb (campaign), 30– 31, 145 Doomsday Clock, 18 Double standards, NPT, 8–9, 35 DPRK. See Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Dunworth, Treasa, 85, 134 Dwan, Renata, 89, 90

181

Egeland, Kjølv, 66, 144 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 29, 60–61 Elite states, 27, 81 Enrichment, Uranium, 16, 130 Environmental remediation, TPNW, 101– 102, 110, 128, 158 Erästö, Tytti, 130, 132–133 Esper, Mark, 16, 17 European states, 82, 84–85, 117, 147 Exposure, nuclear radiation, 20; women and, 45, 106, 151 Extended nuclear deterrence, NATO, 61, 135

False alerts, nuclear accidents, 21–22 FBI, 22 Feminist perspective, nuclear disarmament, 90–91 Fihn, Beatrice, 78, 79, 91, 123 First Committee, UNGA, 47–48, 77, 81– 82, 84, 91, 127 First-use, nuclear policy, 61, 124 Five permanent members (P5), UN Security Council, 7, 42–45, 47; NPT for, 33, 144; TPNW opposed by, 82, 95, 119, 121, 133 Fordham International Law Journal, 56 Foreign Policy (magazine), 27 France, 29, 34, 45, 118, 123 Francis (Pope), 84, 146 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (foundation), 126 Funding, 77; for nuclear weapons, 9, 30, 70–71, 107, 144–145

GA. See General Assembly, UN GCD. See General and complete disarmament Gender, 45, 89–90, 106; humanitarian initiative and, 11, 88 General and complete disarmament (GCD), 8 General Assembly (GA), UN, 12, 38, 57, 152; decisionmaking in, 8, 85; First Committee of, 47–48, 77, 81–82, 84, 91, 127; ICRC as observer for, 80; negotiating mandate for TPNW, 49, 78, 95–98, 112; TPNW adoption by, 9, 71, 82, 102 General Dynamics, 31 Geneva, Switzerland, 35, 41; OWEG in, 42–43, 78 Geneva Conventions, 69

182

Index

Germany, 82, 121 Global Positioning System (GPS), 17 Global South, 35, 147; colonialism and, 68–69, 82; as NWFZ, 33, 69; TPNW supported by, 10, 71, 82, 117 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 16, 28, 62 GPS. See Global Positioning System Granoff, Jonathan, 56 Gregg, Walter, 19 Group of Governmental Experts, 132 Guterres, António, 8, 28, 115, 149

Hard-law, conventions as, 49–50 Hawaii, 22 Helsinki process, 8 Hibakusha (atomic bomb survivors), 44, 120, 152, 154. See also Survivors; Victims Hiroshima, Japan, 1–2, 30, 41, 44, 59 the Holy See, 84 Honeywell International, 31–32 Human error, nuclear accidents, 20–21 Human security, 5, 11, 63, 64, 144 Humanitarian conferences, 35, 64, 82; Austria hosting, 44–46; ICAN and, 78–79; language at, 44, 46; Mexico hosting, 44–45; Norway hosting, 11, 42–44, 65; NWS and, 43–44, 45 Humanitarian disarmament, 7–8, 64–65, 69, 81, 145 Humanitarian impact, nuclear weapons, 2, 12, 41–42, 46, 80, 124–125; climate change and, 57–58 Humanitarian initiative, nuclear disarmament, 5–6, 48, 62–63, 102n7; gender and, 11, 88; ICAN and, 77–81; ICRC and, 79–81; media coverage on, 71, 125–126; multilateral negotiations and, 32; NAC supporting, 47; NGOs and, 77, 86–87, 88; NPT and, 42, 45, 86; NWS and, 43, 85–86, 96; TPNW and, 4, 7, 8–10, 35; transnational advocacy network compared, 87–88; UN role in, 85–86; women in, 11, 71 Humanitarian Pledge, 46, 82 Humanity, crimes against, 5, 56–57 Hydrogen bombs, nuclear weapons, 1–2, 18–20

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency ICAN. See International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

ICBL. See International Campaign to Ban Landmines ICBM silos, US, 20–21, 36n23 ICBMs. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles ICC. See International Criminal Court ICJ. See International Court of Justice ICRC. See International Committee of the Red Cross IFRC. See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Implementation, TPNW, 86, 125, 127– 135, 157, 158–159 Income disparity, States, 81–82, 89 India, 30, 35, 57, 82 INF. See Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Integrative diplomacy, humanitarian initiative, 48 Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 20–21, 31, 36n23. See also specific missiles Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 2, 15–16, 62, 130, 149 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 6, 24–25, 33, 129; safeguards agreement with, 109, 111–112, 130– 131, 155–157 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 9–10, 43, 46, 64, 70, 80; budget for, 78, 83, 86; Cities Appeal, 126; humanitarian conferences and, 78–79; humanitarian initiative and, 77–81; Nobel Peace Prize for, 7, 11, 71, 77–78, 79, 87; 1000 Day Fund, 78; TPNW supported by, 116, 121, 124–127; workshops by, 78–79, 127 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), 64 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 9, 10, 41–43, 99, 148; humanitarian initiative and, 79–81; as UNGA observer, 80 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 56, 68–89 International Criminal Court (ICC), 5, 56–57 International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, UN, 12–13, 28, 46, 91, 124, 145–146, 149; TPNW ratification and, 116 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 43, 79–80

Index International humanitarian law, 55–58, 68, 82, 152; nuclear disarmament and, 9–10, 11, 42; Ottawa Convention and, 64–65, 69 International laws, 18, 109, 146, 152 International Nuclear Disarmament Agency, 129 International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, 131 International Physicians against Nuclear War, NGO, 78, 83 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 57 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 79, 81 International relations, 16, 18, 123; constructivism of, 2–6, 64, 122; realism for, 2–5, 69, 143 International security, 9, 15, 68; arms control and, 16, 48 Investments, nuclear modernization, 28–29, 30–31, 130, 145 Iran, 15–16, 47–48 Iraq, 24 Israel, 16, 35 Issue salience, nuclear weapons and, 67, 81

Japan, 22, 25–26, 82; hibakusha of, 44, 120, 152, 154; Hiroshima, 1–2, 30, 41, 44, 59; Nagasaki, 1–2, 25, 44, 59, 146; Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 121 JCPOA. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Johnson, Rebecca, 48, 63, 69–70, 132 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 16, 125 Kane, Angela, 18, 126, 143 Kant, Immanuel, 5 KBC Bank, 145 Kellenberger, Jakob, 41 Kim Jong-un, 61 Kmentt, Alexander, 43–44, 47, 126 Komsomolets (nuclear submarine), 24 Komžaitė, Ugnė, 130 Korean War, 60 Kristensen, Hans M., 21 Kulka, Bruce, 19 Landmines, antipersonnel, 7, 11, 66; Ottawa Convention on, 50, 64–65, 74n49

183

Language, nuclear disarmament, 34, 49, 68–69; at humanitarian conferences, 44, 46; of TPNW, 12, 50, 66, 88, 98, 151–162 Latin America. See Global South Laws, 49–50; international, 18, 109, 146, 152. See also International humanitarian law; specific laws Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, 126 Legality, nuclear weapons, 55–56, 66. See also International humanitarian law LeMay, Curtis, 19 Liberalism, international relations, 2–3 Lockheed Martin, 31 Los Alamos, New Mexico, 22–23 Losharik (nuclear submarine), 24 Louisiana, 21 Low-yield nuclear weapons, 17, 27–28, 56. See also Tactical nuclear weapons

MAD. See Mutually Assured Destruction Manhattan Project, US, 59–60 Mark 6 (atomic bomb), 19 Mark 36 (thermonuclear bomb), 20 Maximum nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, 61–62 Media coverage, humanitarian initiative, 71, 125–126 Megatons to Megawatts Program, 130 Mexico, 44–45 Mian, Zia, 129 Middle East, 15; WMD-free zone in, 2, 32, 46, 125 Military, US, 20; Cold War spending by, 29–30; Manhattan Project, 59–60; Space Force, 17 Military-industrial complex, 29, 145, 148–149 Minimum nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, 61–62 Minor, Elizabeth, 69, 71 Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, 21 Minuteman III (ICBM), 31, 36n23 MK-41 (mobile launcher), 16 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, 49– 50, 78, 97 Le Monde (newspaper), 71, 123 Moral norms, constructivism, 4–6 Morocco, 20 Moxley, Charles J., Jr., 56 Multilateral negotiations, nuclear disarmament, 8, 11, 47, 128;

184

Index

humanitarian initiative and, 32; small states and, 83–86 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 1, 27–32, 58, 62

NAC. See New Agenda Coalition Nagasaki, Japan, 1–2, 25, 44, 59, 146 NAM. See Non-Aligned Movement National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), US, 22–23 National security, 11, 69, 71, 89, 144. See also International security NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization NC3. See Nuclear command, control, and communications Negotiating conferences, TPNW, 12, 49, 87, 95–96, 104n42; June/July 2017, 99–102, 101, 105–106; March 2017, 98–99; NGOs participating in, 97–98, 101; Whyte Gómez heading, 89, 91, 97, 97, 100 Negotiating mandate, TPNW, 49, 78, 95– 98, 112 Netherlands, 68, 96, 102, 102n7 Nevada, 17 New Agenda Coalition (NAC), 47, 52n32 New Mexico, 19, 22–23, 60 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), 18, 34, 41, 125 New York, 35, 49, 98, 99 New York Times, 71, 126, 145 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations NNSA. See National Nuclear Security Administration NNWS. See Non-nuclear-weapon states Nobel Peace Prize, 124; ICAN awarded, 7, 11, 71, 77–78, 79, 87 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 47–49, 82 Non-damage to the environment, international humanitarian law on, 55– 56, 57–58. See also Environmental remediation Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 31–32, 81, 148, 159–160; humanitarian initiative and, 77, 86–87, 88; nuclear disarmament supported by, 8, 10; participating in TPNW negotiation, 97– 98, 101. See also specific NGOs Non-nuclear deterrence, 62, 63, nuclear policy

Non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), 9, 110, 124, 131, 149; NWS and, 32–35 Nonproliferation, of nuclear weapons, 33–34, 105, 122, 135, 153 Nonstrategic nuclear weapons. See Tactical nuclear weapons North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 43–44, 48, 96, 102, 119; extended nuclear deterrence of, 61, 135; US and, 18, 32–33, 107 North Carolina, 19–20 North Dakota, 21 North Korea. See Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Northrop Grumman, 31 Norway, 11, 42–44, 65, 83–84, 145 Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 64 Norwegian Nobel Committee, 7 NPT. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear apartheid. See Double standards, NPT Nuclear archaeology, 132 Nuclear arms race, 15–16, 33, 59 Nuclear arsenals, 18, 44, 108; of China, 29, 30; US, 2, 30, 32, 56 Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) infrastructure, 21, 26 Nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, 59– 62, 68, 107, 123, 135 Nuclear deterrence theory, 2, 10, 11, 58–63 Nuclear disarmament, 2, 41–42, 48, 66; activists for, 30, 113n8, 124, 144– 145; bilateral negotiations for, 33–34, 41, 131, 133; costs of, 111, 130, 160; democratization of, 70–71, 88–91, 144; feminist perspective on, 90–91; international humanitarian law and, 9–10, 11, 42; multilateral negotiations for, 8, 11, 32, 47, 83–86, 128; NGOs supporting, 8, 10; nuclear deterrence compared to, 61; NWFZ and, 33, 69; verification of, 12, 50, 102, 109, 111–122, 127–133, 156; women’s role in, 88–91, 153. See also Humanitarian initiative; specific programs Nuclear disarmament language; at humanitarian conferences, 44, 46; of TPNW, 12, 50, 66, 88, 98, 151–162; Nuclear material, trafficked, 24–25

Index Nuclear modernization, 10, 18, 148; investments in, 28–29, 30–31, 130, 145; in NWS, 30, 56; US, 21, 22–23, 28, 56 Nuclear policy, 3–6; deterrence as, 59–62, 68, 107, 123, 135; first-use, 61, 124; second-strike capability as, 58, 61 Nuclear Posture Review, US, 26, 122, 148 Nuclear radiation exposure, 20, 45, 106, 151 Nuclear taboo, 10, 25, 28, 30, 57, 62–63; US and, 26–27. See also Stigmatization Nuclear testing, 17, 45–46, 100, 102, 107; by DPRK, 67; Trinity, 60 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 131 Nuclear umbrella, US, 32–33, 61, 107, 121 Nuclear war, 10–11, 27–28, 57–58 Nuclear waste, 23, 25, 57–58, 130 Nuclear weapons; abolition of, 4, 41, 66, 125; accidents involving, 4, 18–25, 44, 106; conventional weapons compared to, 26, 58, 67; cost of, 10, 12, 28–29, 30–31, 61, 146; delegitimization, 66– 71; funding for, 9, 30, 70–71, 107, 144–145; humanitarian impact of, 2, 12, 41–42, 46, 57–58, 124–125; hydrogen bomb as, 1–2, 18–20; issue salience around, 67, 81; legality of, 55– 56, 66; low-yield, 17, 27–28, 56; nonproliferation of, 33–34, 105, 122, 135, 153; perceived utility of, 55, 69– 70; power of, 1–2, 30, 57; private sector and, 9, 30–32, 57, 145; prohibition of, 5, 7, 28, 46, 48; radioactive fallout from, 46, 58; stigmatization of, 31–32, 66–71, 121, 123, 143–144; strategic, 58; survivors of, 44, 79, 102, 120; tactical, 1, 27–28, 30, 56; terrorists obtaining, 16, 24, 27, 44; thermonuclear bombs as, 20, 22; threat of, 15, 16, 28, 56, 107, 151; transit of, 95–96, 100, 107, 154; victims of, 45, 100, 102, 110, 147, 158; warheads as, 20, 29, 30, 39n77. See also Atomic bombs; specific topics; specific weapons Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, 67 Nuclear-weapon states (NWS), 4, 68; humanitarian conferences and, 45; humanitarian initiative and, 43, 85–86, 96; NNWS and, 32–35; NPT and, 35, 44, 108–109; nuclear modernization in, 30, 56; OEWG and, 47–49; power dynamics of, 11, 35, 144; TPNW and,

185

12, 95–96, 108–110, 121–122, 147. See also Five permanent members Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), 118, 134, 153; Global South as, 33, 69 NWFZ. See Nuclear-weapon-free zones NWS. See Nuclear-weapon states

Obama, Barack, 16, 41; Prague speech by, 11, 34, 45 OEWG. See Open-Ended Working Group; 1000 Day Fund, ICAN, 78 OPANAL. See Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean Open Skies Treaty (OST), 16–17 Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), UN, 46; civil society involved in, 42– 43; decisionmaking for, 11, 47–49; Geneva meeting of, 42–43, 78; NWS and, 47–49 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 109 OST. See Open Skies Treaty Ottawa Convention, 50, 67, 74n49, 84, 110, 117, 133; International humanitarian law and, 5, 64–65, 69 Outer space, weaponization of, 17 Outer Space Treaty, 17

P3, UN, 121–122, 135 Pacific Island countries, 45–46 Pakistan, 30, 35, 57, 82 Paris Agreement, 18 Patriarchic, power dynamics, 90 Patton, Tamara, 129, 132 PAX, NGO, 12, 32, 96; Don’t Bank on the Bomb, 30–31, 145 Perceived utility, nuclear weapons, 55, 69–70 Perry, James, 23 Philippe, Sébastien, 129 Plutonium pits, 22–23, 29 Policymakers. See Agents Potter, William C., 48, 77 Power, of nuclear weapons, 1–2, 30, 57 Power dynamics, 3–4, 81, 90, 147; of NWS, 11, 35, 144. See also Gender Prague speech, Obama, 11, 34, 45 Press, Daryl, 26–27 Private sector, nuclear weapons, 9, 30–32, 57, 145. See also specific companies Progressive states, 48–49

186

Index

Prohibition, nuclear weapons, 5, 7, 28, 46, 48. See also Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Proportionality, international humanitarian law on, 55–56 Putin, Vladimir, 28

Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership, 131

Radioactive contamination, 1, 2, 19–20, 23–25, 46 Radioactive fallout, nuclear weapons, 46, 58 Ratification, TPNW, 4, 12–13, 115–119, 118tab, 123–127, 136n4, 162 Reaching Critical Will, WILPF, 106, 113n8 Reagan, Ronald, 16, 28, 62 Realism, international relations, 2–5, 69, 143 Republic of the Marshall Islands, 45, 56 Reputational pressure. See Stigmatization Reveraert, Mathias, 67 Review Conference of the Parties, 34 Review conferences; NPT, 10, 41–42, 45– 47, 52n32, 67, 88, 135; TPNW, 111, 127, 134, 159, 161 Risk. See Threat, of nuclear weapons Ritchie, Nick, 147 Rome Statute, ICC, 56 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 59 Roshydromet, Russia, 23 Ruff, Tilman, 112–113 Rühle, Michael, 133 Rules of procedure. See Decisionmaking Russia, 30, 45, 124; nuclear weapons accidents in, 23–24; US and, 2, 17, 24, 34, 127, 130–131. See also Soviet Union SAC. See Strategic Air Command Safeguards agreement, IAEA, 109, 111– 112, 130–131, 155–157 Sagan, Scott, 26–27 Saudi Arabia, 145 Sauer, Tom, 67 Savannah River Site, South Carolina, 22– 23, 31 Schlosser, Eric, 19 Second-strike capability, nuclear policy, 58, 61 Secretary General, UN, 111, 147, 154– 155, 159, 160, 162 Security, 7, 10, 44; human, 5, 11, 63, 64, 144; international, 9, 15, 48, 68; national, 11, 69, 71, 89, 144

Security Council, UN, 18; P3 of, 121–122, 135. See also Five permanent members Seligman, Lara, 27; 9/11, 29–30 Shea, Thomas, 109, 111, 129 Singapore, 102 Small states; multilateral negotiations and, 83–86; TPNW supported by, 81–86 Snidal, Duncan, 50 Soft-law, treaties as, 49–50 Solana, Javier, 125 South Africa, 68, 108, 118, 131 South Carolina, 19, 22–23 South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, 121 Sovacool, Benjamin, 25 Soviet Union (USSR), 16; US and, 15, 26, 59–60 Space Force, US, 17 Spain, 20 Spies, Michael, 83, 87 Stagnation, of NPT, 32–35, 149 Stalin, Joseph, 59–60 START. See Strategic Arms Reduction Talks State leaders. See agents States, 3–6, 9; African, 117–118; civil society working with, 77, 86–88, 146– 149; delegations of, 96, 98–102, 102n7; elite, 27, 81; European, 82, 84– 85, 117, 147; income disparity across, 81–82, 89; NC3 infrastructure for, 21, 26; progressive, 48–49; small, 81–86; TPNW ratification by, 124–127, 136n4, 162. See also specific States Stigmatization, 64, 119; cluster munitions and, 68, 70; of nuclear weapons, 31– 32, 66–71, 121, 123, 143–144 Stimson, Henry, 59–60 Strategic Air Command (SAC), US, 19 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 62 Strategic nuclear weapons, 58 Structural inequality, gender bias and, 89– 90 Sturgeon, Nicola, 90 Survivors, nuclear weapons, 44, 79, 102, 120. See also Victims Sweden, 102n7, 120 Switzerland, 35, 119 Syria, 27, 133

Tactical nuclear weapons, 1, 27–28, 30, 56 Tannenwald, Nina, 26, 28

Index Taxpayers, funding nuclear weapons, 30, 70–71 Terrorism, nuclear weapons and, 16, 24, 27, 44 Textron, 145 Thakur, Ramesh, 96 Thermonuclear bomb, nuclear weapons, 20, 22 Threat, of nuclear weapons, 15, 16, 28, 56, 107, 151 Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan, 121 Thurlow, Setsuko, 79 Titan II (ICBM), 20–21 Tomahawk (cruise missile), 16 Topychkanov, Petr, 130 TPNW. See Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons TPNW Negotiating conferences, 12, 49, 87, 95–96, 104n42; June/July 2017, 99–102, 101, 105–106; March 2017, 98–99; NGOs participating in, 97–98, 101; Whyte Gómez heading, 89, 91, 97, 100 Trafficking, nuclear material, 24–25 Transit, of nuclear weapons, 95–96, 100, 107, 154 Transnational advocacy network, 87–88 Treaties, 2, 133; ban, 46, 49, 50, 66; conventions compared to, 49–50; withdrawals from, 10, 15–17, 101–102, 112, 149, 162. See also specific treaties Treaty of Tlatelolco, 6, 113n3, 118 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. See Outer Space Treaty Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 2, 6–7, 68; Article VI, 33–34, 48, 96, 110, 134; conferences, 32, 34, 35, 41; CSA, 111; double standards of, 8–9, 35; humanitarian initiative and, 42, 45, 86; NWS and, 35, 44, 108–109; P5 under, 33, 144; stagnation of, 32–35, 149; TPNW and, 12, 116–117, 122, 134–135. See also Review Conferences, NPT Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), 15–18, 115, 120; Brazil supporting, 82–83, 110, 112; civil society role in, 7, 11–12, 77–81, 99, 124–127, 132–133; critics of, 119–

187

124; disarmament verification under, 12, 50, 102, 109, 111–112, 127–133, 156; drafting of, 98–102, 105–113; environmental remediation under, 101– 102, 110, 128, 158; Global South supporting, 10, 71, 82, 117; humanitarian initiative and, 4, 7, 8–10, 35; ICAN supporting, 116, 121, 124– 127; implementation of, 86, 125, 127–135, 157, 158–159; language of, 12, 50, 66, 88, 98, 151–162; negotiating mandate for, 49, 78, 95–98, 112; NPT and, 12, 116–117, 122, 134–136; NWS and, 12, 95–96, 108–110, 121–122, 147; P5 opposing, 82, 95, 119, 121, 133; ratification of, 4, 12–13, 115–119, 118tab, 123–127, 136n4, 162; review conferences for, 111, 127, 134, 159, 161; right to withdraw from, 101–102, 112, 162; small states supporting, 81– 86; UNGA adoption of, 9, 71, 82, 102. See also TPNW Negotiating conferences; specific articles Trident II (ballistic missile), 31 Trinity nuclear test, 60 Truman, Harry, 59–60 Trump, Donald, 16–17, 18, 26, 28, 61 Trump administration, US, 16–17, 18, 27–28, 60; Nuclear Posture Review by, 26, 122, 148 Tsar Bomba (hydrogen bomb), 1–2

Ukraine, 25, 34, 45 UNIDIR. See United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research United Kingdom (UK), 19, 29, 122 United Nations (UN), 115, 118tab, 152; CD, 11, 35, 41, 47; Disarmament Commission, 35; humanitarian initiative role of, 85–86; Office for Disarmament Affairs, 12, 85–86, 99, 105, 134; Secretary General, 111, 147, 154–155, 159, 160, 162. See also General Assembly; International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; Open-Ended Working Group; Security Council United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 85 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), 12, 85–86, 99, 105, 134

188

Index

United States (US), 85, 95–96, 120; armament industry of, 10, 29–31; atomic bombs used by, 25–26; Atomic Energy Commission, 60; cluster munitions and, 68, 70, 145; ICBM silos in, 20–21, 36n23; INF Treaty and, 2, 15–16; NATO and, 18, 32–33, 107; NC3 infrastructure for, 26; nuclear arsenal of, 2, 30, 32, 56; nuclear deterrence policy of, 59–62; nuclear modernization by, 21, 22–23, 28, 56; nuclear taboo in, 26–27; nuclear umbrella of, 32–33, 61, 107, 121; Russia and, 2, 17, 24, 34, 127, 130–131; treaty withdrawals by, 15– 17; Trump administration, 16–17, 18, 26, 27–28, 60, 122, 148; USSR and, 15, 26, 59–60. See also specific departments; specific states UNODA. See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Uranium enrichment, 16, 57–58, 130 USA Today, 71 US-Russia-IAEA trilateral initiate, 130–131 USSR. See Soviet Union

Valentino, Benjamin, 26–27 Verification, nuclear disarmament, 50; TPNW on, 12, 50, 102, 109, 111–112, 127–133, 156 Victims, of nuclear weapons, 45; assistance for, 100, 102, 110, 147, 158 Vienna Center for Disarmament and NonProliferation, 84 Wan, Wilfred, 83, 87 War, 55; crimes of, 56–57; nuclear, 10– 11, 27–28, 57. See also specific wars

Warheads, nuclear, 20, 29, 30, 39n77 The Washington Post, 71 Waste, nuclear, 23, 25, 57–58, 130 Weaponization, outer space, 17 Weapons, 15–16; antipersonnel landmines as, 7, 11, 50, 64–66, 74n49; biological, 50, 56; chemical, 56, 133, 134; cluster munitions as, 5, 7, 11, 64–66, 68, 70, 74n50, 145; conventional, 26, 56, 58, 67. See also nuclear weapons Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 2, 8, 17, 134 Wendt, Alexander, 3–4, 64 Whyte Gómez, Elaine, 12, 83, 105, 129; TPNW negotiations headed by, 89, 91, 97, 97, 100 WILPF. See Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Withdrawals, treaty, 10, 17, 149; INF, 15– 16; JCPOA, 16; TPNW right to, 101–102, 112, 162 WMD-free zone in the Middle East, 2, 32, 46, 125 WMDs. See Weapons of mass destruction Wolfsthal, Jon, 126 Women in the humanitarian initiative, 11, 71; in nuclear disarmament, 88–91, 153; nuclear radiation exposure for, 45, 106, 151. See also Gender Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), 88–89, 91; Reaching Critical Will, 106m, 113n8 Workshops, ICAN, 78–79, 127 World War II, 25–26, 29 Wright, Tim, 87 Yemen, 145

About the Book

FRUSTRATED BY THE ABROGATION OF PROMISES BY nuclear weapons states to disarm, countries that have foregone nuclear weapons joined forces with key members of civil society in efforts that culminated in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). How did this initiative succeed—in defiance of the major powers—in changing the discourse around nuclear weapons? What roles did the various actors play, and how did the language of the treaty evolve? Answering these questions, Jean Krasno and Elisabeth Szeli provide a deeply researched account of the TPNW campaign, the negotiations, and the ongoing challenges of ratification and implementation.

Jean Krasno is tenured lecturer and director of the MA Program in International Affairs at the Colin Powell School for Civic and Global Leadership, City College of New York. Elisabeth Szeli is on the staff of the United Nations Department for General Assembly and Conference Management.

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