Autocracy and Resistance in the Internet Age 2020024103, 9781626378995, 9781626379190

Citation preview

Autocracy and Resistance in the

Internet Age

Autocracy and Resistance in the

Internet Age Rachel Vanderhill

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2020 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB

© 2020 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Vanderhill, Rachel, author. Title: Autocracy and resistance in the internet age / Rachel Vanderhill. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Explores in detail how social media are both aiding and undermining autocratic regimes in the Middle East, North Africa, and the former Soviet republics” —Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2020024103 | ISBN 9781626378995 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781626379190 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Authoritarianism—Former Soviet republics. | Authoritarianism—Russia (Federation) | Authoritarianism—Middle East. | Internet—Political aspects—Former Soviet republics. | Internet—Political aspects—Russia (Federation) | Internet—Political aspects—Middle East. | Social media—Political aspects—Former Soviet republics. | Social media—Political aspects—Russia (Federation) | Social media—Political aspects—Middle East. Classification: LCC JC480 .V359 2020 | DDC 320.530947—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020024103

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

1 The Revolution Will Be Tweeted . . . Or Not? 2 Authoritarian Regimes and Information

vii

1

Communication Technology

21

The Cases of Iran and Russia

55

3 Censorship, Surveillance, and Propaganda: 4 Protest Without Change:

The Cases of Armenia and Moldova

109

The Cases of Kyrgyzstan and Egypt

155

5 Regime Overthrow Is Not Democratization: 6 From Protest to Democratization: The Case of Tunisia 7 Autocracy in the Internet Age

Bibliography Index About the Book

209

247

259 281 289

v

Acknowledgments

Many people have contributed to this project over the years. The idea arose while I was teaching about the Arab Spring. Therefore, my first thank you goes to students in my Revolution and Regime Change class at Wheaton College for helping spark the initial questions that led to this book. I am fortunate to have had the opportunity to travel to Tunisia in 2017, which provided invaluable insights. The trip was supported in part by Grant number P016A160042 from the International and Foreign Language Education Office of the US Department of Education and the Provost Office at Wofford College. Special thanks to Phil Dorroll, principal investigator on the grant, for making the trip to Tunisia happen. My host in Tunisia, Mounir Khelifa, and the School of International Training (SIT) faculty seminar provided an excellent and intellectually stimulating introduction to the politics of Tunisia. The chapter on Tunisia is far better than it would have been otherwise because of their knowledge and the remarkable opportunities they arranged for a group of visiting faculty members (including meeting President Beji Caid Essebsi!). Please note that this book does not necessarily represent the policy or views of the US Department of Education, the US government, or SIT. I deeply appreciate the many various rounds and forms of feedback that I received over the years, especially comments from two anonymous reviewers. Their thoughts and insights helped produce a clearer vii

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Acknowledgments

and, I hope, stronger argument. I am grateful to all the wonderful people at Lynne Rienner Publishers for their assistance and guidance, including patiently answering multiple questions about the process along the way. Over the course of this multiyear project, I was blessed with support from several wonderful colleagues at Wofford College: Laura Barbas-Rhoden, Christine Dinkins, Kimberly Hall, and Anne Rodrick. They all are remarkable scholars and teachers, and I am deeply honored to have them as colleagues and friends. My dear friend Sandra Joireman was an unfailing source of encouragement on the long, and often challenging, journey of writing and publishing this book. Della Huffines and Emily Witsell provided invaluable help with citations and references: they undertook the often thankless and tedious task of checking and formatting hundreds of citations, enabling me to finish the book on time. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my family for their unwavering faith in me and their enthusiastic encouragement. The shared articles, conversations about cases, and assistance with choosing a title all helped to produce a better book. Moreover, I am deeply grateful to my parents for instilling in me a love of learning that led me to become a scholar and teacher. I am thankful to my sisters, Sarah and Laura, for their friendship and support. This book is dedicated in loving memory to the Reverend George Dale Vanderhill, a wonderful friend, father, and grandfather.

1 The Revolution Will Be Tweeted . . . Or Not?

When I talk about technology and the internet, people normally pine for them and look forward to a future that will promote liberalization. But people neglect the fact that modern authoritarianism also rises with the development of technology, which makes wider and deeper control possible. —Sui Muqing1

In August 2018, Facebook publicly acknowledged what reporters and others had been documenting for months: that members of Myanmar’s military had used Facebook for years to incite hatred and violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority.2 This acknowledgment is just one example of many of how autocratic governments are using new technology, especially social media, to attack opponents and maintain legitimacy.3 In 2018, the New York Times reported on a number of stories regarding autocratic uses of the internet: the Saudi Arabian government paying people to post false information online to discredit opposition leaders (i.e., troll factories); the increased Chinese government censorship of the internet; and the role of Facebook in the Libyan civil war. The current negative perception of the influence of social media contrasts with the view in February 2011, when the world was captivated by the story of how Egyptians, such as Wael Ghonim, used Facebook and other technologies to organize antigovernment protests that led to the overthrow of Egypt’s president Hosni Mubarak. Commentators, 1

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government leaders, and scholars proclaimed the revolutionary prodemocratic power of new technologies, especially social media. This initial utopianism surrounding the idea of the internet as a revolutionary force for democratization has given way to more nuanced and conflicted debates about what role this technology has on democratization and authoritarianism. Autocratic governments, such as those in Iran, Russia, and China, have all developed sophisticated tools for monitoring, censoring, and manipulating information communication technology (ICT): the internet, social media, text messaging, and mobile technology.4 However, the events in Egypt and elsewhere suggest that ICT can also be a powerful tool to challenge governments. Therefore, the question arises: What influence does ICT have on authoritarian regimes? In this book, I investigate how governments and opponents use ICT in authoritarian regimes. How are autocratic governments able to use ICT to prevent democratic challenges and maintain their rule? How, when, and where are antigovernment activists able to utilize ICT to challenge autocratic leaders? Through examining these questions, I situate the debates about the influence of ICT within the broader literature on authoritarian persistence and democratization, something missing from most current analyses of ICT. Applying existing theories about authoritarianism and democratization to debates about ICT offers a more theoretical, rigorous, and comprehensive approach to these questions. I explore the role of ICT in authoritarian regimes through comparing cases from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and postSoviet regions. The unusual cross-regional comparison of cases allows me to explore the methods by which people use ICT both to further authoritarian rule and to challenge autocratic leaders. Through this cross-regional comparison, I seek to increase our understanding of the complex effects of ICT on autocratic regimes and how it can both undermine dictators and strengthen their rule.

The Complex World of Internet, Politics, and Society Studies

Examining how people and governments in autocratic states use ICT to influence regime outcomes intersects with a variety of different literatures and debates, including writings in the fields of communication studies, social movements, and democratization. Initially, there was debate about whether or not ICT had any influence on politics at all. For example, in an analysis of all authoritarian countries from 1993 to 2010, Espen G. Rød and Nils B. Weidmann found no statistical relationship

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3

between the level of internet penetration and changes in democratization scores.5 However, much of this research about the effects of the internet on regime change used data that predated the spread of social media applications like Facebook and Twitter, both of which facilitate communication among large numbers of people and aid organization of events in ways that previous forms of technology did not. Furthermore, the events of the 2016 US presidential election highlighted the growing influence of social media on political events. Writing the week after the surprising victory of Donald Trump, New York Times correspondent Farhad Manjoo argues that “with billions of people glued to Facebook, WhatsApp, WeChat, Instagram, Twitter, Weibo and other popular services, social media has become an increasingly powerful cultural and political force, to the point that its effects are now beginning to alter the course of global events” (emphasis added).6 In addition, as Clay Shirky writes, the “reason to think that social media can help bring political change is that both dissidents and governments think they can. All over the world, activists believe in the utility of these tools and take steps to use them accordingly. And the governments they contend with think social media tools are powerful, too, and are willing to harass, arrest, exile, or kill users in response.”7 Therefore, many would agree today that “the internet is an indispensable facet of contemporary politics.”8 However, what specific effects this technology has on democracy and authoritarianism is still debated.

Internet and Society Studies There is an existing rich, detailed discussion about the effects of new technology, especially the internet, on democracy and society. Aspects of this literature build off of the work of Jurgen Habermas on the idea of the public sphere or “publicness.” According to Habermas, the nineteenth century saw the development of newspapers, pamphlets, salons, and coffeehouses where people could debate issues, texts, and politics. Through these processes, the public sphere became a political space where rational, reasoned debate arose and was a potential source of opposition to the state.9 Jodi Dean, Diana Saco, and others have debated what impact, if any, cyberspace and the internet have had on the public sphere. Christian Fuchs argues that there was potential for the internet, because of the nature of many-to-many communication, to help “establish a more participatory democracy.”10 Manuel Castells states that ICTs may lead to the formation of a new type of civil society and that the “internet can contribute to enhance the autonomy of citizens to organize and mobilize.”11 Alternatively, Dean argues that the new technoculture involves a

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lure of secrecy, and that the drive to know more and more “sucks the life out of political action” and causes the continual delay of action.12 In other words, ICTs damage social capital, which Robert Putnam argues in Making Democracy Work is necessary for democracy. Habermas himself sees the internet as producing fragmentation and rejection of intellectuals.13 In other approaches, scholars propose that we need a whole new way of conceiving of democracy postinternet. In Reformatting Politics, Jodi Dean, Jon W. Anderson, and Geert Lovink introduce the idea of “postdemocratic governmentality,” arguing that networked societies cannot be “conceived within the democratic imaginary” and replace democratic ideas (i.e., representation) with a new set of values.14 They argue that reliance on the framework of the nation-state no longer works in the age of networked technologies.15 Recent developments of governments seeking to claim sovereignty over the internet suggest that their dismissal of the nation-state may have been premature. This interesting and complex conversation is not the focus of this book for three main reasons. First, I examine the influence of ICT in authoritarian societies, which I argue are different from democratic societies. Accessing Facebook is not an inherently risky or political act in democratic societies, but it can be in an authoritarian state. Vasileios Karagiannopoulos argues that, in highly repressive societies, the “mere possibility of being provided with the capacity to create a virtual space of personal expression, such as blogs or Facebook groups, is a dissenting, politicizing activity in itself.”16 Therefore, actions that would not be “political” in democratic societies, such as joining an online dating site, are political acts in places such as Iran. The distinctions between autocratic and democratic states means it is likely that the effects of ICT will be different, which justifies studying ICT in authoritarian states separately.17 Furthermore, this book is not focused on explaining protest movements, but instead its emphasis is on the effects of new technology on authoritarian regimes. Therefore, although this literature offers some insights about how ICT helps opponents of an authoritarian regime (which I discuss further in Chapter 2), it is engaged in a different debate about the quality of democracy. With a few notable exceptions, such as Emma C. Murphy, many of the scholars in this field are explicitly or implicitly discussing democratic societies and concerns about the impact of new technology on democracy. Although a valuable area of research, the effects of ICT on democracy are not the focus of this book. Second, this book focuses on how online activity transforms and influences “offline” efforts to challenge and maintain authoritarian regimes. I do not engage with the discussion about whether ICT erodes

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5

or improves the public sphere. The debates about the effect of the internet on the public sphere stem from a place where it is possible for people to engage in “a public sphere” separate from ICT. For example, Dean argues that the “new telecommunicational-informational capitalism” has little to do with Habermas’s idea of a rational public sphere defined by deliberation and knowledge.18 The public sphere in authoritarian regimes is different from that in democratic countries. It is not a question of whether or not ICT is the best avenue for political discourse to build a democratic society; the internet is often the only place, if that, where these conversations can occur in an authoritarian regime. Despite the problems associated with this telecommunicational-informational capitalism, it is the only option in many authoritarian regimes for people to express themselves, gain knowledge, and engage in discussions about politics. Again, this is a distinct and different question from what scholars examine when engaged in debates about Habermas, the internet, the public sphere, and democracy. Third, this is not a book of political theory or communication studies. It is a book rooted in comparative politics theory about authoritarianism and democratization. Furthermore, the major weakness of many debates within communication studies about the influence of ICT on regime type is that it does not engage with the comparative politics literature about how and why authoritarian regimes persist, and how and why they can be overthrown. In contrast, I apply theories of authoritarianism and democratization to questions about how activists and governments use ICT to challenge and support authoritarian regimes, and the effects of those efforts on the regime outcome.

Social Movement Theory One common form of challenge to authoritarian governments is mass mobilization, primarily in the form of street protests. Therefore, it is logical to consider the insights of the extensive social movement literature on the development, strengths, and weaknesses of recent digitally meditated protest movements. Over the past several decades, research by Doug McAdams, Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and others about contentious politics has demonstrated the importance of the political context and the strategic choices of movements for understanding collective action and the success or failure of various movements. One of the dominant approaches for studying social movements is the political process model, which focuses on the political opportunity structure (e.g., the institutional structure of government), the configuration of political actors (allies and adversaries), and the strategic interaction

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Autocracy and Resistance in the Internet Age

between social movements and authorities.19 Additional approaches to studying social movements focus on the role of diffusion, the importance of cultural frames, the value of social networks for recruitment of participants, and the repertoires of contention, among other topics. Although this book draws on some of the insights and theory of social movements—especially ideas about diffusion and how ICT is changing the nature of movements—it is primarily not about social movements. Social movement theory focuses on analyzing the leadership, strategies, and development of particular movements. In contrast, this book focuses on explaining how both opponents and supporters of the government use ICT to attempt to affect regime outcomes. Social movement theory, focused on analyzing and explaining the movement itself, is telling a different story. Furthermore, in at least several of the cases, it is questionable whether the protests meet the definition of a social movement. For example, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, the protests lasted only a few days, there was no institutionalization or organizational structure to the protests, and there was a lack of unity beyond the desire to see the president overthrown. Mario Diani defines social movements as “a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (emphasis added).20 It is difficult to label recent antigovernment activity in Russia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, or even Egypt as being defined by “a shared collective identity.” In their examination of collective action on the internet, Ulrich Dolata and Jan-Felix Schrape distinguish between “classical social movements,” characterized by “thematically focused protest actions” carried out by “established actors,” and “loosely networked movements,” characterized a “very general” shared identity and widespread use of web-based technology to communicate and organize protests.21 They categorize the 2011 protests in Egypt, one of the more sustained and institutionalized set of protests examined in this book, as being a “loosely networked movement,” not a social movement. In addition, Vincent Durac, discussing the Arab Spring, argues that “protest movements . . . are usually transitory and do not last long. Either they succeed or they are suppressed. . . . Unlike protest movements or insurrections, which only negate the prevailing order, social movements typically construct alternative institutions and value systems.”22 Some protest movements may institutionalize over time into social movements, but it is important to realize that not all protests are social movements. Interestingly, the fact that many of these cases are not social movements may explain some of their failures and weaknesses. Therefore, although I build on some elements of social

The Revolution Will Be Tweeted . . . Or Not?

7

movement theory in Chapter 2, overall this book is not about social movements, and is instead focused on explaining the influence and limits of ICT on regime outcomes in authoritarian contexts. I argue that ICT can both aid opposition movements in overthrowing the regime and help autocratic governments stay in power, especially through increased abilities to engage in surveillance and propaganda. To understand the effects of ICT on regime outcomes, we must turn our focus to the literature about democratization.

Democratization and ICT Initially, there were two major perspectives on ICT and its relationship to regime change: (1) ICT is a powerful tool for democratization; and (2) ICT helps authoritarian leaders. However, more recent research is seeking to move beyond this dichotomy to develop a more nuanced analysis of the role of ICT.23 Philip Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, some of the best-known advocates for the prodemocratization argument, found in their study of the Arab Spring that digital media is “a necessary and sometimes sufficient cause of democratization.”24 Other scholars have also found that social media, or “liberation technology,” plays an important role in mobilizing people and spreading protests.25 The second perspective on ICT believes that ICT is influential, but is often used by autocratic governments to suppress dissent and surveil its citizens. One of the best-known examples of this argument is Evgeny Morozov’s The Net Delusion. Morozov argues that “cyber-utopians” underestimate the ability of authoritarian governments to manipulate the internet for their own purposes. Ronald Deibert and the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto have extensively researched and documented the methods by which governments control cyberspace.26 In contrast to these perspectives, Nils Weidmann and Espen Geelmuyden Rød have taken a more focused and nuanced approach, seeking to examine the effects of the internet on the various stages of protest in autocratic regimes. Based on statistical analysis of thousands of cases of protest in autocracies, they argue that increased internet penetration actually reduces the occurrence of protest but, once protests begin, can help sustain and spread those protests.27 Although their analysis addresses only the frequency and size of protests, not regime outcomes, it does offer insight into the complex effects of ICT in autocratic regimes. Therefore, the debate within the literature raises multiple questions about the influence and limits of ICT on regime outcomes: How do authoritarian regimes utilize ICT to maintain power? How do activists use ICT to challenge the regime? What explains why sometimes the

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opposition succeeds in using ICT to overthrow the regime, and sometimes the regime is able to resist this challenge? What explains the regime outcome when “digitally networked protests” occur?28 The majority of the literature examining the role of ICT in relation to protests and democratization comes from communication studies and social movement theory. Few analyses or approaches to studying ICT incorporate insights from the vast literature about the causes of democratization and authoritarian persistence into their argument. Existing literature within the field of democratization studies argues that ICT does not determine regime outcomes and, therefore, brushes it aside.29 Although ICT by itself does not cause regime change or determine regime outcomes, it is powerful and should not be immediately dismissed. In addition, structural approaches to democratization, for example, Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds’ The Arab Spring, overall undercount the importance of action and agency for explaining regime outcomes. To explain why people choose to engage in antiregime activity in these cases requires considering how ICT influenced those decisions to challenge the regime. Furthermore, understanding the nature of digitally networked protests may be important for explaining the failures of democratization. Therefore, I incorporate existing theory about digitally networked protests with theories about democratization and authoritarian persistence to investigate how activists and governments use ICT in autocratic regimes, and how this affects regime outcomes. In this book, I examine how activists and governments use ICT and the effects of those actions on regime outcomes. Drawing on communication studies and theories about democratization, I hypothesize that new technology, especially the rise of social media platforms, has facilitated and enhanced four methods to challenge an autocratic regime: (1) ICT, especially the openness and interconnectivity of this new technology, can reduce the information monopoly of authoritarian governments. Compared to traditional media, such as television, the internet is harder for governments to control. Therefore, the internet offers people a new way to circumvent censorship and to disseminate information critical of the government. (2) The global nature of ICT can facilitate the diffusion of democracy. Being able to evade government censorship also enables people to hear about successful cases of democratization elsewhere (i.e., demonstration effects). (3) The ability to easily share information and

Argument Overview

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organize large numbers of people can aid the opposition in overcoming the collective action problem. The sharing of information online helps people realize that they have common grievances against the government, an important step in encouraging collective action. Social media platforms, like Facebook, also offer simple and effective ways to organize events such as protests against the government. (4) The combination of new technologies, such as Facebook, cell phone videos, and videosharing websites, can aid activists in spreading information about government abuses and prodemocracy protests around the world in an effort to shape global public opinion in their favor. When activists are able to effectively use all four of these mechanisms, ICT can be a powerful tool for mass mobilization and, in some cases, regime overthrow. However, authoritarian leaders have not been passive in response to the threats presented by this new technology, and have been actively adapting new technology to prevent challenges to their rule. In general, authoritarian leaders use three main mechanisms to maintain power: coercion, co-optation, and legitimacy. Building on this existing theory, I hypothesize that as new technology has developed, autocratic leaders have adapted ICT to aid with all three mechanisms, but especially coercion and legitimacy. Authoritarian leaders can engage in defensive actions— censorship and repression—to prevent activists from using ICT to challenge the regime. In addition, as authoritarian governments improve their technological capabilities, they can move from defensive actions to a proactive approach using technology for surveillance and propaganda. Both activists and autocratic governments have gained new tools and abilities with the development of ICT. The ability of each to successfully use ICT affects the power struggle between autocratic governments and their opponents, and possibly the regime outcome. Once new technology, such as social media, enters a country there are four possible effects on the regime outcome: (1) there are no major protests and no change (i.e., status quo ante); (2) technology aids the development and spread of antigovernment protests, but the regime survives; (3) digitally networked protests lead to regime overthrow (the removal of an autocratic leader through unconstitutional means); or (4) digitally networked protests lead to regime overthrow, and then democracy. What explains the different outcomes? The first, and most obvious, answer to this question is the degree of government control over ICT in a country. The greater the degree of repression, the harder it is for ICT to be a tool of digitally networked protests or regime overthrow. However, this is an incomplete answer as there are cases where ICT was not censored but there was no overthrow, and cases where ICT was censored but it

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was still used by an antiregime movement. Explaining the regime outcome requires moving beyond ICT to consider institutional and structural factors important for democracy and authoritarianism. Therefore, I argue that the regime outcome is dependent on factors other than just the degree of repression. Specifically, I hypothesize that the regime outcome is also dependent on: (1) the presence and strength of civil society in a country; (2) the nature of the international environment; (3) the strength of the authoritarian leader; and (4) the nature of the authoritarian regime. Civil society organizations provide important leadership and coordination to help maintain high levels of mobilization that may be necessary for regime overthrow. If digitally networked protests succeed in overthrowing the regime, a vibrant and diverse civil society also increases the possibility of democratization. An international environment supportive of democracy places additional pressure on authoritarian governments to not engage in violence and to make concessions, whereas having autocratic international allies helps bolster the regime against internal challenges. The strength of the leaders, or their coercive capacity and degree of legitimacy, will determine their ability to prevail against the protesters. In addition, authoritarian systems involving extensive networks of patronage and corruption or powerful, politically active security forces are problematic for regime overthrow and democratization. In places where there are existing civil society organizations to help sustain protests, where the international environment is supportive of democracy, and where the leader lacks coercive capacity or elite support, ICT is likely to be a powerful tool of mobilization and regime breakdown. ICT can aid mobilization and regime breakdown, but is unlikely to help the development of a new, democratic regime. The decentralized nature of digitally networked protests results in a lack of leadership that is often necessary for transitioning from regime breakdown to democratization. Moreover, although ICT may aid in the formation of shared grievances against the regime, it can also reinforce existing cleavages and increase tensions during a transition period. The existence of ICT can be a powerful and influential factor for regime breakdown, but may be either ineffective, or even detrimental, during a transition to democracy. In this argument, I combine agency-based approaches (explaining collective action and the strategic choice of activists) and structuralbased approaches (institutional legacy of authoritarian regimes). As Mark Lichbach states, “The structure-agent problem is at the root of the question of political protest and social order. The reason is that state structures and social movements are reciprocally constituted: Authority begets the resistance that transforms it.”30 The structure-agent problem

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is that individuals make history, society, government, and institutions. However, paraphrasing Karl Marx, people do not make history under circumstances of their own choosing. Structures confine people’s choices and opportunities. Structural arguments are strong at explaining the causes of revolt, but are weak at explaining how people challenge the regime.31 Conversely, action- or agency-based approaches, such as one finds in studies of digitally networked protests, are strong at explaining how people used new technology to rebel, but are weak at explaining the regime outcome. The agency-based approaches provide the mechanisms, and the structural aspects explain why. Both types of theories are necessary to explain how people use ICT to challenge the regime and the regime outcome. The significant challenge for social scientists, which I attempt in this book, is to successfully incorporate both dynamics—the macro and micro—into one theory.

A Note About Definitions Democracy I define democracy as having universal adult suffrage, competitive free and fair elections, and the protection of civil and political liberties, especially freedom of speech and freedom of the press. This definition builds off of Robert Dahl’s argument about the role of participation and contestation in democracy, and Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl’s idea that in a democracy, “rulers are held accountable.”32 Universal suffrage is necessary to achieve participation, and competitive elections are necessary to have contestation. To have free and fair elections and hold government accountable, you need the protection of civil and political liberties. Citizens and the press need to be able to publicly criticize the government without penalty for governments to be held accountable and elections to be fair. I chose this definition of democracy to be able to clearly distinguish between democratic states and hybrid regimes, those states that are neither fully democratic nor autocratic. Nondemocratic Regimes The wide range of different types of nondemocratic regimes, such as totalitarianism, military oligarchies, dictatorships, single-party regimes, neopatrimonial regimes, and “patronal presidentialism” cause definitional challenges for political scientists.33 In this book, the cases reflect several different types of nondemocratic regimes: dictatorship, competitive authoritarian, theocracy. I adapt Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s definition

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of authoritarianism—political systems with “limited political pluralism,” no “guiding ideology,” little to no political mobilization, and a degree of predictability—as a general term to refer to all of the nondemocratic regimes examined in this book.34 Furthermore, authoritarian regimes lack fair, competitive elections. The post-Soviet cases in this book, with the notable exception of Russia, are “competitive authoritarian” regimes, defined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.”35 A theocracy is an autocratic regime where political and religious power and institutions are intertwined. Iran, one of the cases in this book, is a rare example of a contemporary theocracy.

Information Communication Technology Why use the term information communication technology instead of just “the internet” or “social media?” Although a little unwieldy, ICT has two major benefits over using other terms. First, it refers to a broader and more comprehensive set of new technology. When referring to the internet and social media, we miss the influential dynamics of the ubiquity of mobile phone cameras and the importance of text messaging (or SMSing) for communication. Both of these technologies play a large role in the process of mobilization and are sometimes what people are discussing even when they use the term the internet. In addition, the terms internet and social media rarely incorporate the element of electronic surveillance into their definition or interpretation. Using information communication technology more accurately encompasses multiple new technologies. Second, the term is used by other scholars researching and writing about this new technology.36 Therefore, it is a term already present in the literature. I use qualitative comparative case study methodology in this book for several reasons. The comparative case study methodology involves “analytic narratives” or “causal process observations” to test whether there is empirical evidence supporting or challenging a theoretical argument.37 First, a comparative case study approach is an effective approach for building theory.38 Harry Eckstein argues that case studies are a valuable means of building theories, especially in regard to “macropolitical phenomena” involving “considerable magnitude or complexity.”39 I use

Methodological Approach

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“theory-building process tracing” and “explaining-outcome process tracing” to help discern the relationships between and the causal mechanisms linking ICT, protest movements, and regime outcomes.40 As we are at the early stages of theory development regarding ICT and its political, economic, and social consequences, it is appropriate to use a comparative case study approach and process tracing to aid theory development. Furthermore, given the recent nature of ICT, events involving ICT, democratization, or authoritarianism are rare and complex. Second, this approach, with its focus on exploring why “X affects Y,” facilitates the identification of different causal mechanisms and relationships, which is especially well suited for exploring the effects of ICT at this stage of theory development. Third, similar to comparative-historical analysis, this approach also allows for “configurational analysis,” the consideration of “how variables work together in combinations.”41 The effects of ICT are interactive, and studying them requires understanding the broader context. Therefore, comparative case study analysis and process tracing aid theory generation, help clarify the causal mechanisms, and enable the investigation of the interactive nature of the effects of ICT. The cases in this book are either crucial or heuristic cases, and they play an especially important role in theory generation and testing. Crucial cases are “critical” for a theory. John Gerring argues that there are two types of crucial cases: those that are seen as exemplifying a particular theory, and those that are either most likely or least likely cases.42 In other words, crucial cases are cases with results that challenge or confirm existing theory.43 I argue that the 2011 uprising in Egypt is a crucial case for considering the role of ICT because many accounts of this event see ICT as playing an essential role in the protests against Egyptian president Mubarak. Therefore, how could one study the influence of ICT on democratization in the Middle East and not study Egypt? Armenia and Tunisia are also crucial cases for analyzing the influence of ICT. Armenia is a most likely case for ICT to facilitate regime breakdown because there is little repression of the internet in Armenia. However, prior to 2018, repeated protest movements in Armenia failed to bring about regime change or political reform. Tunisia is a least likely case for ICT to contribute to regime breakdown because the authoritarian government of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali engaged in severe repression of the internet. But counter to what many would predict, democratization occurred in Tunisia. These crucial cases, especially because of the diverse range of regime outcomes, provide helpful insights into understanding the limits and sometimes surprising influence of ICT in relation to regime breakdown and democratization. The cases covered in the book are also what Eckstein

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labeled “heuristic case studies” and Arend Lijphart called “hypothesisgenerating cases.”44 Heuristic case studies allow for the development of theory because there is a focus on finding “potentially generalizable relations” among variables.45 Scholars rarely examine Middle Eastern and post-Soviet states together. Clearly, there are important cultural, religious, and historical differences between the two regions. Furthermore, unlike the Arab Spring, antiregime protests in post-Soviet states have generally occurred around elections and claims of electoral fraud. However, there are multiple similarities between the two regions in the use and in the restriction of ICT, and these similarities facilitate a cross-regional comparison that is particularly important in theory development. First, authoritarianism remains persistent in both regions. With the notable exception of the Baltic States, no post-Soviet states are democratic. Prior to the 2011 protests, outside of Israel there were no democratic states in the Middle East and North Africa region. Second, despite the persistence of authoritarianism in each region, both demonstrate important variation in the type, nature, and extent of authoritarianism. Post-Soviet states include illiberal democracies, such as Georgia, and one of the most repressive regimes in the world, Turkmenistan. In MENA, Lebanon is an illiberal democracy, and Saudi Arabia is as repressive as Turkmenistan. The regional differences in repression also apply to government control over the internet. For example, in the post-Soviet region, the Armenian and Moldovan governments allowed a free internet, Kyrgyzstan engaged in limited censorship, and the Russian government developed a sophisticated system of surveillance and propaganda. This variation enables cross-case comparisons within the region. The range of different autocratic regimes across the two regions, with the post-Soviet states being competitive authoritarian regimes, Iran a theocracy, and Tunisia a dictatorship prior to 2011, enables the analysis of the different approaches to ICT among autocratic regimes. Third, states in these two areas also generally have reasonably high levels of access to ICT, with a few exceptions in Central Asia (e.g., Turkmenistan). Fourth, although MENA states did not experience communism like in the Soviet Union (with the partial exception of Yemen), many of the states had predominantly state-directed and state-owned economies until the 1990s. Therefore, the MENA region and postcommunist states both experienced liberal economic reforms and upheaval

Introduction to the Cases

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during the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, there have been several cases of mass mobilization against autocratic regimes in post-Soviet states with some similarities to the revolts in MENA. In recent cases of antigovernment protests in both regions, activists have utilized some form of ICT to spread information, mobilize people, and organize activities. Therefore, this is a common dynamic across both regions. Cases from these two regions provide rich source material for investigating how people use ICT in authoritarian regimes to challenge or support the regime. I looked at all of the cases of significant antiregime protests in both regions between 2005 and 2018 that did not involve a foreign military intervention.46 Significant antiregime protests are those that involve 10,000 or more people, where protesters express goals to change the regime.47 Protestors may have other goals, but at least one of them must be a direct challenge to the regime. I restricted the scope of study to these types of protests because I was seeking to investigate how activists use ICT to challenge autocratic regimes, and the effects of these protests on regime outcomes. Therefore, protests such as those that occurred in Jordan in 2011 and in Turkey in 2013 are outside the scope of this project because they either involved under 10,000 people or the goal of the activists was reform, not overthrow.48 I chose this period because it covers the time since the development and spread of new technologies such as Facebook and YouTube. Although the countries of Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain all experienced significant antiregime protests during this period, they also experienced foreign military intervention of various degrees. While ICT can play a role in cases where there is foreign military intervention, such as has been documented in Ukraine and Syria, foreign intervention complicates the process tracing of the effects of ICT on regime outcomes.49 For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council and Saudi intervention in Bahrain make it impossible to know what would have happened without outside intervention. Furthermore, examining the effects of ICT on the civil wars in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, although important, is a different research project than the one detailed in this book. These cases warrant a separate, dedicated research project that investigates the role of ICT in situations where protests, foreign military intervention, and civil war all occurred. Therefore, to focus on the effects of ICT on authoritarian governments and their opponents, I narrowed the scope to exclude these cases. The range of twelve cases in this book cover three of the possible regime outcomes: protests that seek but fail to overthrow the regime, protests that successfully lead to the overthrow of the regime, and protests

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that lead to overthrow and democratization (see Table 1.1). Russia, Iran, Armenia (2008 and 2013), and Moldova all experienced digitally networked protests that failed to overthrow the regime. Armenia (2018), Kyrgyzstan, and Egypt had digitally networked protests that resulted in regime overthrow but not democratization. In Tunisia, digitally networked protests helped overthrow the regime and the country developed democracy. As I sought to understand the influence and limits of ICT on regime outcomes, I engaged in only limited comparisons with cases such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, where there have been no significant antigovernment protests between 2005 and 2018. When investigating causal mechanisms, cases where there is no change provide limited analytical assistance.50 To develop theory, I focused on the strongest possible cases for ICT—in other words, the cases where there actually were mobilization and attempts to challenge the autocratic regime. These are the cases where we would expect ICT to have had some effect. There are multiple cases within four countries: Armenia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova. These provide especially helpful explanatory value, as the repeated cases of protest within the same country offer insight into the changing nature and influence of ICT. For example, Armenia had antigovernment protests in 2008, 2013, and 2018. As Chapter 4 discusses, the level of internet penetration and usage of social media expanded significantly in Armenia over the decade between the first case and the most recent one. The within-country comparisons help control for other variables and enable stronger conclusions about the possible influence of ICT. Table 1.1 Cases and Regime Outcomes Regime Outcome

Regime survives

Regime is overthrown, but no democratization occurs Regime is overthrown and democracy is established

Cases

Armenia 2008 Iran 2009 Moldova 2009 Russia 2011–2012 Armenia 2013 Moldova 2015–2016 Iran 2017–2018 Kyrgyzstan 2005 Kyrgyzstan 2010 Egypt 2011 Armenia 2018 Tunisia 2011

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The combination of these twelve cases, reflecting a variety of different regime outcomes, allows for theory development and preliminary testing of hypotheses about the relationship of ICT to authoritarianism, mass mobilization, and democratization. In building the case studies, I drew on survey data, data on internet penetration and social media usage, firsthand accounts from activists, and newspaper reporting to investigate the role of ICT in the development of protest movements in each case. I used government reports, statistical data (e.g., information on trade relations), reports from nongovernment organizations, and the existing academic literature to examine the strength of civil society, the international environment, and the nature of the authoritarian regime. Chapter 2, the theoretical core of the book, begins by situating the ongoing debates about ICT within the broader literature about authoritarian persistence and democratization. In this chapter, I explore the main mechanisms by which ICT may have an effect on regime breakdown, hypothesize how authoritarian governments can successfully prevent ICT from aiding democratization, and then propose a theory explaining regime outcomes. The chapters that follow consist of case studies, most of which include cross-regional comparisons. In Chapter 3, I compare and contrast the cases of Iran and Russia, two countries where authoritarian regimes have survived antigovernment digitally networked protests. These two countries provide insights into how authoritarian governments are able to suppress, monitor, and censor ICT. The Russia case focuses on the 2011– 2012 protests against Vladimir Putin and the subsequent increased repression of the internet. The Iranian case discusses the 2009 Green Movement, where Iranians utilized ICT to help mobilize protests against alleged electoral fraud in the presidential elections. After that, I examine the 2017–2018 outbreak of antigovernment protests in Iran. The Iranian government violently suppressed both the 2009 and 2017–2018 protests. In Chapter 4, I look at the 2008, 2013, and 2018 protests in Armenia and the 2009 and 2015–2016 protests in Moldova. Armenia and Moldova are both crucial cases when considering ICT’s democratizing influence. At the time of the protests, Armenia and Moldova had an uncensored internet with unrestricted access to alternative news sites, Facebook, and foreign news sources. In addition, Armenian and Moldovan activists used ICT to organize protests. Armenia and Moldova are crucial cases because if, as some argue, the presence of ICT is necessary and

Plan of the Book

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sometimes sufficient for democratization, then it is highly likely that we would see activists using ICT to bring about democracy in both countries. However, despite some recent positive developments, the prospects of democratization in Armenia remain low, presenting a possible challenge to existing theory. An understudied case, Armenia’s unique situation of combining a competitive authoritarian regime with a free internet provides interesting insights into the role of ICT and the persistence of authoritarianism. In Moldova, the 2009 protests surrounding the parliamentary elections had only a limited and indirect impact on political reform. Furthermore, the president at the time remained in office for months after the protests. Although the 2015–2016 protests were larger and lasted longer, they also failed to overthrow the regime or bring about substantive political reform. In Chapter 5, I compare Kyrgyzstan and Egypt, which have each experienced digitally networked protests and regime overthrow. In these two cases, I was able to examine the role of digitally networked protests in regime overthrow and the postoverthrow period. The Kyrgyzstan case examines the protests leading to the overthrows of Presidents Askar Akayev in 2005 and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010.51 Activists in both Kyrgyzstan and Egypt used ICT to mobilize antigovernment protests that contributed to the downfall of autocratic leaders. However, neither country has developed democracy as an outcome of these protests, raising questions about the different roles of ICT in regime overthrow and democratization. The last case study, Chapter 6, focuses on Tunisia, which experienced both regime overthrow and democratization. In Tunisia, activists utilized ICT to help inform people of government abuses and to mobilize protests. With the regime outcome of democratization, Tunisia suggests that ICT may be a powerful tool to help mobilize antigovernment protests, but that democratization is a distinct process where ICT may have little positive effect. In the conclusion, Chapter 7, I review and tie together the arguments made in the preceding chapters and discuss the broader implications of ICT on regime outcomes. I close by discussing the prospects for democratization and authoritarian persistence in each region.

Notes

1. Sui Muqing, quoted in Mozur, “China Presses Its Internet Censorship Efforts.” 2. Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook.” 3. In this book, I use the terms authoritarian and autocratic interchangeably. 4. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright, “The Digital Dictators.”

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5. Rød and Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats?” 6. Manjoo, “Social Media’s Globe-Shaking Power.” 7. Shirky, “Political Power of Social Media,” p. 39. 8. Karagiannopoulos, “Role of the Internet in Political Struggles,” p. 171. 9. Murphy, “Theorizing ICTs in the Arab World,” p. 1132. 10. Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 133. 11. Castells, The Power of Identity, vol. 2, p. 417. 12. Dean, Publicity’s Secret, p. 163. 13. Cited in Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 244. 14. Dean, Anderson, and Lovink, “Introduction,” p. xvi. 15. Ibid., p. xxi. 16. Karagiannopoulos, “Role of the Internet in Political Struggles,” pp. 162–163. 17. Weidmann and Rød, The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies, p. 14. 18. Dean, Publicity’s Secret. 19. Kriesi, “Political Context and Opportunities.” 20. Diani, “The Concept of a Social Movement,” p. 9. 21. Dolata and Schrape, “Masses, Crowds, Communities, Movements,” p. 10. 22. Durac, “Social Movements, Protest Movements,” p. 245. 23. Weidmann and Rød, The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies. 24. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave?, p. 26. 25. Abbott, MacDonald, and Givens, “New Social Media and (Electronic) Democratization”; Rawal and Nixon, “Re-Tweet to Democracy?”; Kulikova and Perlmutter, “Blogging Down the Dictator?” The term liberation technology comes from Diamond, “Liberation Technology.” 26. There are multiple relevant articles by Ronald Deibert; one recent example is Deibert, “Cyberspace Under Siege.” 27. Weidmann and Rød, The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies, pp. 144–145. 28. I am using Zeynep Tufekci’s term “digitally networked protests” for describing protests organized by ICT, see Twitter and Tear Gas. 29. For example, see Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring. 30. Lichbach, “Contending Theories of Contentious Politics,” p. 403. 31. Ibid., p. 415. 32. Dahl, Polyarchy, pp. 4–5. Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,” p. 4. 33. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Bratton and van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”; Hale, Patronal Politics. 34. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, pp. 44–45. 35. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 5. 36. See, for example, Rød and Weidmann, “Empowering Activists or Autocrats?”; Fung, Gilman, and Shkabatur, “Six Models for the Internet + Politics”; Hussain and Howard, “What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades?” 37. Analytic narratives incorporate both narrative—stories and context—and theory. Bates et al, Analytic Narratives, pp. 3 and 10; Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, p. 22. 38. Alexander L. George argues comparative case studies can be used as the “building blocks for theory development.” George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” p. 54. 39. Eckstein, Regarding Politics, pp. 119–120.

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40. “Process tracing is a research method for tracing causal mechanisms using detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case.” Beach, “Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science.” 41. Thelen and Mahoney, “Comparative-Historical Analysis,” p. 7. 42. Gerring, Social Science Methodology, pp. 219–220. 43. Eckstein, Regarding Politics, p. 158. 44. Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” p. 691. 45. Eckstein, Regarding Politics, p. 143. 46. There also were major protests in Morocco in 2011, known as the February 20 Movement. Although there is some dispute over what the protestors were demanding (see Hoffman and Konig, “Scratching the Democratic Faҫade”), overall they focused on economic and political reform and did not call for the end of the monarchy. As Irene Fernandez Molina states, what set the protests in Morocco apart from the rest of the Arab Spring was the protestors did not “question the monarchical form of the state and the position of Mohamed VI as a monarch.” Molina, “The Monarchy vs. the 20 February Movement,” p. 437. 47. Studies of post–Cold War antiregime protests have found that protests involving 10,000 participants and lasting for more than a day present a moderate threat to an authoritarian regime. Therefore, I consider significant mobilization to involve protests greater than 10,000 and lasting more than a day. Brancati, Democracy Protests, p. 37. 48. Although Turkey had large and sustained protests in 2013, the main focus of those protests was about environmental issues, especially the status of Gezi Park, not the overthrow of the regime. The protesters generally did not call for the removal of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or a change in government. Therefore, this is not as relevant to the question of ICT and regime outcomes. 49. For an example of the research on Syria, see Lynch, Freelon, and Aday, “Blogs and Bullets III.” For example of the research on Ukraine, see Golovchenko, Hartmann, and Adler-Nissen, “State, Media and Civil Society in the Information Warfare.” 50. Beach, “Process-Tracing Methods in Social Science.” 51. Although the 2005 protests in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, involved less than 10,000 people, the combined number of protestors in other cities was more than 10,000. In addition, it is necessary to study the events of 2005 to understand the 2010 protests in Kyrgyzstan.

2 Authoritarian Regimes and Information Communication Technology In this chapter, I focus on applying what we know about authoritarian regimes and democratization to better explain the influence and limits of information communication technology (ICT) on regime outcomes in authoritarian contexts. The majority of the literature about ICT and its effects comes from other fields and disciplines and, therefore, does not incorporate many of the insights gained from decades of research in political science. For example, authors such as Evgeny Morozov, Manuel Castells, and Philip N. Howard, have all written influential and important works about the influence of ICT. However, these works either come from other disciplinary perspectives, such as communications, or do not significantly engage with the literature about authoritarian regimes.1 This book incorporates the changing dynamics of ICT into our understanding of authoritarian regimes, especially how authoritarian regimes survive. There are three main parts to my argument in this book. First, I discuss how ICT can be a powerful tool for challenging authoritarian governments. I hypothesize that there are four mechanisms by which ICT can aid mobilization: (1) ICT helps people challenge the autocratic government’s information monopoly; (2) ICT aids democratic diffusion and demonstration effects; (3) ICT facilitates mobilization by reducing the collective action problem; and (4) ICT enables people to increase the international pressure on elites by assisting the documentation and global dissemination of government atrocities. Then, I examine how autocratic 21

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governments have responded to these threats presented by ICT, and how they have adopted this new technology to help maintain their rule. Autocratic leaders use a combination of strategies to prevent challenges to their rule and have found ways to utilize ICT to improve several of those strategies. In some ways, ICT aids and abets the continuation of authoritarian rule. Clearly, governments and people can use ICT either as a tool of repression or one of liberation. Under what circumstances does ICT assist with overthrowing the regime? After that, I move from focusing on how people and governments use ICT in authoritarian systems to investigating the effects of ICT on the regime outcome. When does ICT aid in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime? When do authoritarian governments successfully survive challenges and remain in power? Once digitally networked protests begin, there are three possible outcomes: (1) the regime survives with no change in leadership; (2) the regime breaks down and the autocratic leader is overthrown; or (3) the regime breaks down and democracy is established. I hypothesize that the strength of civil society, the level of international support for democracy or authoritarianism, the coercive capacity and legitimacy of the autocratic leader, and the nature of the authoritarian regime all explain whether or not antigovernment digitally networked protests result in regime breakdown. I then apply existing information about democratization to explain regime persistence, regime breakdown, and democratization following digitally networked protests. Even when breakdown occurs, it is still rare for democratization to be the outcome of digitally networked protests. The breakdown of the authoritarian regime is a separate development from the formation of a democratic state. Although ICT can be utilized to bring down a regime, it has little effect on the development of a new democratic state because this technology is unable to change structural barriers to democratization. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of digitally networked protests is a weakness when it comes to constructing a new democratic regime postbreakdown. Proponents of the democratizing influence of ICT have an oversimplified view of democratic transitions; they are too focused on the role of specific individuals; and they fail to consider the role of structural factors, such as the legacy of military rule, on democratization. In addition, proponents often mistakenly equate mass mobilization and the popular overthrow of a dictator with democratization. Although these developments are often necessary, they are not sufficient for democratization. On the other hand, those who dismiss ICT as unimportant overlook how powerful a tool it is for facilitating communication, mobilization, and

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collective action against the state. The unique approach of this book is to incorporate both individual-level and structural-level theories to explain when and where ICT aids protests, and the effects it has on authoritarianism, regime breakdown, and democratization. Multiple cases and existing research argue that ICT can enhance the ability of people to mobilize by providing powerful tools of communication and organization. ICT clearly does not create people’s grievances and anger against the regime. The specific political context of state, including factors such as anger over electoral fraud, frustration with rampant corruption, and despair over persistent economic hardship, can determine the extent of grievances against a regime.2 However, people’s grievances do not automatically translate into protest and mass mobilization, especially because in authoritarian contexts it can be a challenge to know if your grievances are widely shared by other people. Therefore, ICT may provide a way to translate grievances into mass mobilization against an autocratic government. I hypothesize that ICT may facilitate the development, persistence, and spread of antigovernment protests through four mechanisms: challenging the information monopoly; aiding the diffusion of democracy; reducing the collective action problem; and gaining attention and swaying world opinion.

How People Use ICT to Challenge the Regime

Mechanism 1: Challenging the Information Monopoly It is harder for governments to censor and monitor information online than with traditional forms of media. The internet, because of its decentralized nature and the ability of users to bypass various forms of censorship, undermines “centralized control of public opinion” by authoritarian governments and offers alternative information.3 By accelerating and easing the flow of information, especially among many people, ICT lowers the costs of finding, sharing, and expressing different views.4 The technology involved with the internet also eases communication beyond the boundaries of the state.5 Blogs focused on politics and human rights, alternative online news sites, foreign news sites, cell phone videos disseminated via YouTube, and news on Facebook are the primary forms of ICT that people use to challenge the information monopoly of governments. These forms of technology enable the rise of the “citizen journalist,” where individual citizens report on events because the censored traditional media does not. “The power of the internet” comes from its “openness and interconnectivity,” which enables

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people to create their own content, hindering “authoritarian attempts at information control.”6 The synergy of various forms of technology (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) along with satellite television is especially powerful in providing alternative information and in disseminating that information to a large number of people. These developments, especially initially, challenge the government’s ability to control information.7 Why does this matter? Reducing the government’s information monopoly may erode the regime’s legitimacy as people can now share information about government atrocities, failures, and corruption. For example, digital technology provides new ways for activists to expose and publicize human rights abuses.8 The online documentation of atrocities fuels outrage against the regime. Manuel Castells posits that people can challenge authority only “by connecting with each other, by sharing outrage, [and] by feeling togetherness.”9 Furthermore, challenges to the government’s narrative may reduce people’s view of the invincibility of the government and lead them to believe change is possible. As Henry E. Hale argues, expectations about the future of the regime are powerful.10 Autocratic leaders need to maintain an impression of permanence, and undermining that sense of permanence and invincibility is essential for bringing about change.11 Public popularity, either real or a carefully crafted image of popularity, is a source of power for a dictator because it can appear pointless to “challenge the leadership in the name of democracy, since actual democracy would still result in the leadership’s victory.”12 Therefore, reducing the popularity of an autocratic leader through publishing stories about the regime’s faults may reduce the power of the regime. In other words, opposition movements that appear “out of nowhere” may actually be reflecting changing expectations about the viability of leaders and entire regimes.13 Moreover, ICT not only enables criticism of the authoritarian regime to circulate, but also enables opponents of the regime to frame and broadcast a narrative sympathetic to their cause. I argue that people’s use of social media may alter public opinion and expectations about the viability of the regime. Recent research provides evidence of the power of alternative narratives in changing perceptions of the government. In a study of the influence of alternative issue frames on the internet in China, a country where the internet is highly censored, Min Tang and Narisong Huhe found that people exposed to online comments, blogs, and discussions by dissident opinion leaders had more negative views of the government.14 In this study, user-generated discussions online allowed Chinese citizens to differ from the official government position on the interpre-

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tation of “safe facts.” For example, the government framing of the Chinese space program claims that the program demonstrated the success of government efforts to promote science and technology and, therefore, the righteousness of Chinese Communist Party rule.15 However, the online discussions viewed the space program as a political project used by the government to strengthen its legitimacy, and saw the investment in the costly program as a misuse of government funds needed to improve the lives of ordinary Chinese people.16 Alternative views of the government online may involve framing that redefines “existing circumstances as unequal, unjust and unfair” that may delegitimize the status quo.17 Challenging the information monopoly of the government can erode support for the regime. The internet and social media not only provide a way to circumvent government censorship, but they also can offer an opportunity in closed societies for people to engage in political discourse. Although many people may use the internet primarily for social and entertainment purposes, because of the nature of social media platforms such as Facebook, ICT provides opportunities for political conversations.18 This dynamic is different than access to foreign news sources. For example, although access to Al Jazeera helped Egyptians circumvent the government’s information monopoly, it did not provide the same opportunities for people to participate in political discourse as offered by social media. Online political discussions and debates can be a first step in gaining political awareness in societies where repression presents these discussions from occurring elsewhere. Political awareness may need to precede any mobilization. It is possible that the internet is a “potential civic space” where civil society can function and people can engage in political action.19 Therefore, the access to uncensored information may help shift the power balance between the regime and the opposition. The impact of the exposure to alternative, and often critical, information about the regime is not restricted to the person with the internet connection. In her research on the influence of the internet on the protests against the Indonesian dictator Suharto, Merlyna Lim found that activists took information found online about the corruption and abuses of his regime and made it available to a wide range of people not connected to the internet.20 They showed printed copies to friends and family members. In some cases, printed copies were sold from newsstands. Therefore, even in places with relatively low levels of internet penetration, this new technology can still be used to challenge the government’s information monopoly. As Castells argues, “networked social movements” exercise “counterpower” by developing autonomous avenues of communication.21

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Mechanism 2: Democratic Diffusion and Demonstration Effects Along with countering the government’s narrative, ICT may facilitate the introduction of new ideas and values such as democracy.22 ICT, especially the internet and social media, may make democratic diffusion via informal, undirected mechanisms or purposive collaboration between local and international actors easier.23 Exposure to democratic ideas may encourage people to demand democracy in their country. Multiple studies have shown that diffusion can influence democratization; therefore, enabling democratic diffusion is a potentially powerful effect.24 A form of diffusion is the demonstration effect, or what Eva Bellin calls “the power of precedent.”25 The successful overthrow of an authoritarian regime in one state can inspire people to challenge their own regime. As Mark Beissinger determined in his analysis of the color revolutions, people will emulate prior success.26 Demonstration effects involve the “power of positive example.”27 Beissinger argues that “each prior successful example raises the probability of further action in other contexts by raising expectations of the possibility for success. It does so by showing through analogy that the seemingly impossible is possible, by providing models for action that worked in other contexts, and by creating a sense of flow and direction of events that has an empowering effect.”28 Learning about other cases of regime overthrow abroad can help empower citizens and lead them to determine that if it was possible for Serbians, Tunisians, and others to remove a dictator, then it is possible in their country, or at least the probability of success is high enough to warrant taking some risks.29 Demonstration effects are likely to be the most powerful when there is a shared culture, language, or history.30 Social movement theory has found that movement success is partially dependent on “cultural resonance,” or the ability of the social movement to connect grievances to “mainstream beliefs and values.”31 Demonstration effects are also more likely to be effective when there is a cultural resonance between societies. These commonalities and shared identities can help connect people to the events in other countries and make analogies with their own circumstances. In closed media environments, ICT offers people a way to circumvent censorship and to witness revolutions and regime overthrows in other states. Furthermore, ICT, with its individual and personal accounts, is a powerful medium. People often participate in antiregime activities, especially protests, for emotional reasons (e.g., anger) and ICT can appeal to people’s emotions. The posting online of personal narratives and videos of successful protests can inspire others, especially in countries that share a common language and circumstances.

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ICT also may aid the deliberate transnational sharing of specific strategies for how to mobilize protests against an autocratic regime. ICT can facilitate communication and collaboration among global civil society organizations and link activists across the globe. People may use ICT to develop relationships, or a social network, among activists. Forming a social network is a direct, purposive form of diffusion where both the “transmitter” and the “adopter” are actively seeking connections and the sharing of strategies.32 Prior to the internet, activists did share information and strategies across borders. For example, in the late 1980s Polish dissidents shared information with dissidents in Czechoslovakia.33 However, this information sharing required written materials to be smuggled across the border. New technology has dramatically increased the ease of sharing strategies and techniques. ICT enables access not only to information, but also to conversations via Skype and Facebook with activists from other countries. For example, in Egypt, members of the April 6 Movement talked with former leaders of the Serbian organization Otpor, which had aided in the overthrow of dictator Slobodan Milošević.34 In other words, the dissemination of information via ICT facilitates the work and development of transnational advocacy networks. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink define transnational advocacy networks as actors working internationally on an issue, such as human rights and democracy, who share information, values, and discourses.35 Through Facebook and other forms of social media, activists can form transnational networks to help them gain training and information as well as provide them with avenues through which to disseminate information about the regime’s atrocities and the activists’ antigovernment activities. ICT, especially the internet and social media, makes collaboration between local and international actors easier and faster.36

Mechanism 3: Reducing the Collective Action Problem Collective action problems are situations where people would benefit from working together, but there is a lack of individual incentives to engage in the action to achieve the broader goal.37 In other words, to obtain the goal, multiple people need to participate and cooperate, but at the individual level everyone has an incentive to not participate. The logic of collective action is so strong that as Timur Kuran argues, when revolution does occur, “this presents a puzzle that the standard theory of rational choice cannot solve.” 38 The reasons for not taking action (high potential cost with low likelihood of success) are powerful and the benefits of having others bear the cost of protesting are high (no risk and all reward) so that it is hard to explain, based on rational calculations, why people will engage in revolution. The likelihood of

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overcoming a collective action problem depends on “the costs of participation, the benefits of the goal being sought, and beliefs about the likelihood that the goal can be achieved.”39 An additional part of the calculation about engaging in collective action is an assessment about how bad the current situation is, who is to blame for the current problems, and whether or not revolution will make things better. People can use ICT, especially social media, to help solve the collective action problem by sharing this information. Social media platforms can reinforce grievances and allow “people to realize that they are not alone in their opposition to the regime.”40 Forms of technology like Facebook focus on “socialability” and interpersonal relationships more than just seeking information. In other words, there is a distinction between searching the internet for information about government corruption and posting comments on a Facebook page expressing anger about government corruption. The latter demonstrates greater engagement with the issue and the development of shared grievances. Furthermore, the number of “likes” on Facebook is a signal to users about how broad the support is for their criticisms of the regime. For example, Zeynep Tufekci recounts the story of how social media enabled one Egyptian activist to find other Egyptians who were frustrated with the political, economic, and social situation in Egypt. The activist explained in an interview that “she had gone online to look for political conversations that were more open and more inclusive than any she had experienced in her offline personal life, and that this had led to her participation in the massive Tahrir protests.”41 Opinions posted on social media may help people realize that their grievances are widely shared, and that other people are committed to taking action against the government.42 The sharing of grievances online can be an important intermediate step between holding private views against the regime and engaging in public protest.43 New technology, especially interactive social media, can help overcome the collective action problem. The social movement literature discusses the importance of framing, or “discursive opportunity structure,” for social movement success. The government and opposition movements are in competition over the narrative and how people see them. Are they seen as victims fighting for a noble cause or as troublemakers that are threatening peace and stability? Who wins the fight over framing has an impact on the ability of any antigovernment movement to overcome the collective action problem. As William A. Gamson notes, “A successful framing strategy may increase . . . the movement’s mobilization potential by creating sympathy, support, and goodwill that may convert into useful, practical

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resources of various sorts.”44 The tactics, strategies, and narratives that activists choose are most effective when they connect with existing “beliefs, ideas, and cultural frames of meaning people use to make sense of their situation.”45 In other words, collective action is more successful when there is cultural resonance. Activists and organizers have to convince people that the collective action is legitimate. In authoritarian states where the government controls the media, various forms of ICT, especially the internet and satellite television, provide the main avenues for opposition movements to mobilize supporters through framing a favorable narrative that gives legitimacy to antigovernment action and protest. Grievances alone often are insufficient to mobilize people; emotions and the interpretative framework are also important for explaining cases of successful mass mobilization. Tools such as Short Messaging Service (SMS) and social media also offer practical, technical tools for organizing large numbers of people outside normal official communication channels. The development of Facebook, and to a lesser extent Twitter, increased the ease and flexibility of cooperating and communicating online. These forms of technology are “mediums of communication” that people can use to prepare for and coordinate protests.46 Castells argues that ICT provides “decisive tools for mobilizing, for organizing, for deliberating, for coordinating, and for deciding.”47 As Andrea Saveri, Howard Rheingold, and Kathi Vian noted even before the prevalence of social networking platforms like Facebook, “Social software is a set of tools that enable group-forming networks to emerge quickly. It includes numerous media, utilities, and applications that empower individual efforts, link individuals together into larger aggregates, interconnect groups, provide metadata about network dynamics, flows, and traffic, allowing social networks to form, clump, become visible, and be measured, tracked, and interconnected.”48 In their research on protests in autocracies, Nils B. Weidmann and Espen Geelmuyden Rød found that the internet facilitates the geographic spread of protests once they begin.49 Because many people use them for apolitical purposes, such as connecting with friends and family, applications like Facebook are popular and, therefore, harder for authoritarian governments to ban without consequences.50 Despite the often apolitical use, social media can be politically powerful because they can spread dissenting views to a larger audience and enable people to organize in places where it would have been difficult previously. Furthermore, social media platforms can reduce the risk of participation and increase the belief in the likelihood of success. People are much more likely to join antigovernment protests once there are large numbers

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of other participants because the perceived costs of participation are lower. However, the lack of information about other people’s preferences makes it difficult to organize and reach a critical mass of participants. People’s commitment on social media to show up for a protest may reduce each individual’s cost of showing up because they know that others are also likely to be present. In addition, information sharing about grievances via social media tells people that the size of the aggrieved population is large, which also increases the probability of successful action against the regime. Transitions are “tipping games”; once key actors shift support away from the regime or protests reach a certain size, the regime that seemed invincible now looks vulnerable.51 If the regime is seen as vulnerable, more people are likely to defect and protests can cascade. Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard found that digital media was critical to having street protests cascade into larger movements.52 Activists can use ICT to convince people that change is possible, an important aspect for overcoming the collective action problem. Social media can also reduce the transaction costs of organizing protests.53 One criticism made of the development of online communities and relationships is that they are only “virtual.” However, that is an oversimplification of the nature of online relationships as there are often interconnections between virtual relationships and face-to-face communities. One can lead to the other. As Christian Fuchs points out, relationships in the twenty-first century are “often a combination of online . . . and offline communication,” and political groups benefit from new technologies that “enable people to stay in touch, exchange opinions, create further contacts, and to plan meetings and activities.”54 These dynamics are even more important in authoritarian states where it is dangerous and difficult for opposition political groups to meet in person. Tufekci goes even further, rejecting the claim of “digital dualism” and that the internet is a “less ‘real’ world.”55 In his analysis of the recent protests in Iran and Egypt, Vasileios Karagiannopoulos also rejects this dichotomy, arguing that for activists internet-based contestation is interconnected to “real life actions” of protests.56

Mechanism 4: Gaining Attention and Swaying World Opinion Once protests begin, new technology, such as cell phone videos and YouTube, enable people to post videos online that can spread powerful, emotional first-person accounts of events around the world.57 As autocratic governments control the television media and often limit the access of foreign media, videos shot by activists and other citizens may

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be the only available footage of protests. One of the reasons that protesters post videos online is to bring attention to both their cause and the government repression. Attention, especially from international media and governments, can be an important resource for antigovernment movements in authoritarian states. New technology may help antigovernment movements gain international attention, and aid them in framing a narrative about their protests that is positive and appealing to Western audiences. A major challenge for “alternative sources of news and information is reaching a large audience because they lack resources and because of the segmented and fragmented nature of the internet.”58 Therefore, activists are most successful in disseminating information about the protests when they are able to have international media, including satellite television, broadcast videos recorded and uploaded by citizens. The combination of newer and older technology helps people to bypass government censorship and spread the message of the protesters around the world. The documentation and global dissemination of video footage of peaceful protesters being attacked by government security forces bring global attention to and, therefore, potential Western pressure on the authoritarian regime to avoid more violence. Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain found in their analysis that one way ICT influences democratization is through facilitating “international buy-in” by enabling information about government atrocities to be shared outside of the country.59 As Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way also argue, “Linkage heightens the international reverberation triggered by government abuse, thereby raising the cost of such abuse.”60 Levitsky and Way propose that one form of linkage with the West is information linkage—the flow of information across borders via, among other things, internet connections.61 Although this effect of linkage predates the development of the internet, cell phone videos, and YouTube, what is now different is that information linkage is no longer dependent on the presence of foreign journalists and international media.62 Given the limited physical presence of Western correspondents, stories of government abuse and prodemocracy protests often go unrecorded in lesscovered regions. For example, there was almost no information in Western media about the 2005 attack by Uzbek security forces on protesters in the Andijan region.63 Although the development and global spread of technology does not ensure Western attention or pressure, it is now easier to disseminate information to the West. The information linkage and pressure from Western governments may influence the decisions of elites in response to mass demonstrations. Elite decisions are a key factor for determining authoritarian

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breakdown or authoritarian persistence. Many scholars have recognized the importance of these strategic calculations for democratization and presented a variety for factors and theories about what determines these decisions.64 In their seminal work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter discuss the calculations of hard-liners (elites who seek the continuation of authoritarian rule), soft-liners (elites willing to consider political reform), and the military in moments of transition.65 Given the importance of coercive capacity for maintaining power in the face of widespread antigovernment protests, the decisions of the security forces are especially relevant to understanding regime breakdown.66 International pressure, stimulated by information linkage, can contribute to the decision by security forces and the ruling coalition to side with the protesters and end their support for a dictator. Although international pressure alone is rarely sufficient to end elite allegiance, in combination with domestic factors, outside pressure can tip the balance in favor of the opposition.67 Even if elite reaction to international pressure is unknown, people may believe that greater international attention provides some protection and, therefore, may be more willing to engage in protests. In summary, when there are grievances against the regime, the combination of these four mechanisms—challenging the monopoly of information, facilitating democratic diffusion, aiding mobilization by reducing the collective action problem, and international networking—can help start and spread antigovernment protests. Protests can be a powerful means of regime overthrow, as research has found that between 2000 and 2017, protests resulted in the overthrow of ten autocracies.68 New technology has provided people with new strategies and new forms of antigovernment activity, producing mass mobilization in some unexpected places. The development of ICT and the ability of people to use ICT to challenge the regime produced a new problem for autocratic leaders: How do they manage to gain the economic benefits arising from the internet and global connectivity without losing control over information and society?69 How do they respond to this new threat? The autocratic leaders who have managed to develop internet infrastructure and connectivity while preventing democratization have done so by adapting existing strategies for maintaining power. All nondemocratic rulers face threats from within the ruling elite and the broader population. Successful autocrats develop strategies to address both sources of threats.

How Authoritarian Governments Use ICT

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In the past decade, scholars have increased our understanding of how autocratic regimes stay in power. Scholars have used a variety of methodological approaches to develop a richer, more complex understanding of autocratic regimes.70 According to the current literature, autocratic leaders maintain power through using a combination of repression, co-optation, and legitimacy claims. In response to the rise of new technology, I argue that autocrats have adapted their existing tools to prevent ICT from becoming a tool of democratization, especially in response to events of the 2011 Arab uprisings. To successfully thwart the opposition from using ICT, autocratic leaders have prosecuted internet bloggers and launched attacks against opposition websites, blocked access to opposition websites and foreign news, and established elaborate and sophisticated nationalistic propaganda online to gain legitimacy. Although the development of new technology has presented some challenges to authoritarian leaders, it has also offered them significant new tools to maintain control over the population.

The Defensive Approach: Internet Control and Repression In terms of political survival, the ability to use violence, or what Michael Mann calls “despotic power,” is of great importance for authoritarian regimes.71 Repression is one of the key characteristics of authoritarian regimes, and an important part of regime durability.72 The traditional strategy of repression has been adopted to use against threats stemming from ICT. According to Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2015 report, in forty of the sixty-five states they examined, government authorities imprisoned people for discussing or sharing online information about politics, religion, or society that countered government interests. The case of Saudi Arabia is illustrative of authoritarian states that have a high level of internet penetration combined with government repression of ICT, especially any online activities that criticize the regime. For example, Saudi authorities charged Raif Badawi, the cofounder of the Saudi Arabia Liberals website, with “setting up a website that undermines general security.”73 Badawi is serving a lengthy jail sentence and has received public lashings.74 Along with jailing critics and political opponents, autocrats use repression to control information. There are three main purposes for controlling information: (1) to prevent the publication and spread of critical or negative information about the government; (2) to avoid the spread of democratic ideas and norms (democratic diffusion); and (3) to counter efforts by activists to organize antigovernment activities. It is harder for governments to suppress opposition when there is freedom of speech and

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the press.75 James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland found that as accurate public information about government performance becomes more widely available, there is an increased likelihood of protests, especially in an underperforming autocracy.76 According to James R. Hollyer, “Autocratic survival becomes more strongly conditioned on government behavior as the informational environment becomes increasingly rich. As more information becomes available, it becomes more likely that under-performing autocrats are revealed as such, and that these autocrats inspire protest by the public.”77 Since authoritarian states can underperform in multiple ways, they likely want to restrict negative or critical information. Concerned about the possibility of democratic diffusion, autocratic leaders seek to limit exposure to democracy through control over traditional media, especially television.78 Media capture occurs in a variety of ways. Many authoritarian governments ensure that either the regime or its close allies control the major television stations in their country. If there is no direct control, then autocratic governments may bribe or threaten journalists to guarantee positive coverage. Strict and vague defamation laws, where negative reports about leaders are jailable offenses, are another common tool to prevent criticism. Through a combination of actual censorship and self-censorship, television news is rarely critical of the government and usually follows government-mandated scripts. With the development of the internet and access to foreign news, governments have adopted new tools to prevent widespread access to information critical of the government. Autocratic leaders have successfully imposed electronic firewalls to restrict access to democratic ideas and to prevent the public from learning about successful cases of democratization.79 These are what Ronald Deibert calls “first-generation controls” and generally involve internet filtering to restrict the content users can access.80 The Great Firewall of China is the most well-known version of this strategy. Government legislation allowing the blocking of websites generally argues that it is done for “national security” or to maintain “peace” and “social stability.” Although authoritarian states care about all information critical of the government, Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts found that the Chinese government was more aggressive in its response to online efforts to organize than to blog posts critical of the government.81 Criticism of the local government or other complaints were unlikely to be censored but, once online discussion had the potential to produce collective action, government censors deleted the information.82 The Chinese government and other authoritarian states block Western social

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networking sites partially because of these sites’ ability to help people organize. Along with blocking specific programs, many governments also have the ability to shut down the internet or mobile phone service. Even where there are private companies offering internet and mobile phone service, the government still usually owns and runs the physical infrastructure. For example, in Kazakhstan the government telecommunications company, Kazakhtelecom, has a “de facto monopoly” on the connections to the global internet.83 When governments control the internet infrastructure, they can shut down internet access during times of protest or turmoil, as the Egyptian government did during the Arab Spring protests in 2011. The size of the internet makes controlling information more challenging than in earlier times, but authoritarian states are rapidly developing their capabilities to censor online content and maintain their information monopoly.

The Proactive Approach: Surveillance, Cyberattacks, and Propaganda Autocratic regimes have adopted the new technology to surveil and monitor any potential threats to the regime. ICT can enable governments to engage in “systematic massive surveillance.”84 In authoritarian societies, governments are suspicious of individuals and, therefore, seek to engage in mass surveillance to prevent threats to the regime. Autocratic governments across the world are now requiring manufacturers and service providers to include “backdoor” abilities to facilitate surveillance.85 In some ways, technology has made it easier to surveil people. Facial recognition software, the ability to search vast amounts of data for specific terms, the Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking capabilities on most mobile phones, and the technology that enables online tracking all help governments learn extensive amounts of information about people relatively cheaply and easily, especially compared to previous generations.86 In addition to monitoring opposition leaders, technology may also help autocrats prevent overthrows by their “allies.” Autocratic rulers can use repression to maintain power but it is costly and, as multiple cases demonstrate, not always effective. Therefore, autocratic rulers can seek to co-opt potential opposition. Co-opting may occur through patronage and the distribution of resources. In many dictatorships there is an ongoing power struggle between the dictator and the ruling coalition, which consists of powerful elites. As most authoritarian regimes are defined by secrecy and the lack of transparency, the dictator and the ruling coalition have imperfect information about the plans of each other.87 In analyzing

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303 cases of dictators losing power through unconstitutional means between 1945 and 2002, Milan W. Svolik found that in 205 cases government insiders, such as members of the dictator’s political party or security forces, removed the dictator, compared to only 32 cases where dictators lost power because of popular uprisings.88 Given that the threat of a coup d’état is real for many dictators, they have strong incentives to use new surveillance technology on members of the ruling coalition. In authoritarian systems defined by patronal politics—“politics in societies where individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments through chains of actual acquaintance”—the patron, or the leader, needs to be able to monitor the clients and know who deserves punishment or reward.89 ICT provides “the patron” with a powerful, efficient, and relatively cheap tool to monitor “clients.”90 In other words, ICT provides dictators with ways to repress threats not only from outside, but also from within the ruling coalition. The information technology revolution and globalization have enabled governments to expand their antidemocratic activities abroad. Several autocratic governments now engage in cyberespionage and denial of service attacks against human rights and opposition websites located outside of their country. China is known for its ability to launch intense cyberattacks on websites promoting human rights, prodemocracy, and Tibetan independence movements based outside of China.91 Governments less technologically developed than China can use a variety of available offthe-shelf software programs for overseas espionage and cyberattacks.92 Governments have adapted the tools of repression for the internet age. Legitimacy is an important component of authoritarian rule. Whereas co-opting primarily helps to manage threats from elites, legitimacy can be helpful for reducing threats from the population. A legitimate power can expect obedience without coercion from the majority of the population, which is a more effective way to rule, even for autocrats.93 Concerned about their citizens’ attitudes toward the regime, autocratic leaders seek to “convince their citizens that their regime is the right approach.”94 These authoritarian regimes hope to “persuade societies of the rectitude of [their] rule,” or their legitimacy, and therefore reduce the appeal of any democratic ideas.95 Elite legitimacy claims are attempts to frame the political debate in a country and interpret reality in a manner to facilitate their continued rule.96 Because government opponents can use ICT to challenge the government’s information monopoly, the technology is a threat to an authoritarian government’s strategy of controlling the narrative. How-

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ever, the same technology can help autocrats propagate a positive narrative of how they are great, legitimate rulers bringing about economic growth or protecting the nation from security threats. Therefore, as noted above, autocratic governments use repression and surveillance to censor any information that challenges their legitimizing narrative. However, autocratic governments have learned that ICT is also a tool by which they can influence public opinion and mobilize support. Moving beyond the traditional media, autocratic governments now utilize the internet to frame and disseminate a pro-regime narrative. As Tang and Huhe explain, “Framing works by either presenting logically equivalent content differently, casting it in a negative or positive light, or selecting some parts of a news item and making them salient, while ignoring or downplaying other parts.”97 Frames have significant influence on how people perceive an issue because they help people make sense of complex and confusing events.98 For example, during the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Chinese government ensured that the Chinese media emphasized only the disruptions, violence, and turmoil caused by the protests. There was no discussion or coverage of the euphoria of Tunisians and Egyptians when they overthrew their respective dictators.99 Developing influential frames is especially important in autocratic states with elections, as leaders would rather not be dependent on fraud to win; they would prefer to have real popular support. The most powerful mechanism for influencing people’s views about the government and their rule is through eliciting strong emotional impulses that cause fear or enthusiasm—motivating feelings of avoidance or approach. . . . This is aided if the messenger can get the audience to become actively involved and form a relationship, transforming them from a consumer to a prosumer. It adds a greater sense of perceived legitimacy and trust, because the interaction is based upon the freedom of choice, the interaction is symbolic (especially in terms of norms and values expressed), and it is a process of self-persuasion.100

The internet, especially social media, can be a powerful tool for moving people beyond passive recipients of issue framing to active participants in spreading the government’s interpretation of events. Two common themes for developing emotional responses and connectivity for leaders via ICT are to attack the Other and to appeal to nationalism. A common Other attacked is Western norms and values, especially support for democracy and human rights. Multiple authors have demonstrated a growing number of efforts by authoritarian states to prevent diffusion

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by condemning norms of liberal democracy and human rights as being un-Chinese, un-Russian, and so forth.101 Leaders claim that they are defending the country from immoral “Western” values and that opposition leaders are agents of foreign governments. Authoritarian governments, especially Russia, argue that Western support for democracy is actually a “new form of aggressive war” that the West is waging against them.102 Therefore, they argue that working with Western democracy promotion organizations, and even supporting democratization, is an attack against the nation. Governments use traditional media, digital media, and bloggers to spread their narrative. Technologically sophisticated governments now either directly or indirectly make use of trolling, where people are paid to develop a disinformation campaign against reporters, opposition leaders, and other critics online. Governments have also hired people to deliberately foster divisions within online opposition groups and to discredit the leadership.103 Along with discrediting critics, this practice helps to encourage self-censorship since the consequences of opposition even from outside the country have now increased.104 As discussed further in Chapter 3, Russia is particularly active with trolling. Autocratic leaders as diverse as Syrian president Bashir al-Assad, former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, and Russian president Vladimir Putin have all used social media to control their image and persuade people of their right to rule. A common source of their appeal to legitimacy is nationalism. Nationalism is the “ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity” of a nation.105 Appeals to nationalism or the nation to gain legitimacy are not new. Since the nineteenth century, governments have used claims to nationalism to obtain the loyalty of their citizens.106 Eric Hobsbawm writes about how nineteenth-century states used “increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants, above all the primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of the ‘nation’ and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to country and flag.”107 In the current era, technology offers autocratic leaders new ways to directly and emotionally connect with their citizens. Social media, because of its interactive component, is an effective way to spread nationalist ideas and to frame issues in nationalist terminology. Attacking the government or the leader can be framed online as attacking the “nation.” Nationalist language is a powerful emotional tool to gain support. In summary, autocratic leaders seek to use a combination of coercion, co-optation, and propaganda to maintain autocratic rule, resist democratic diffusion, and prevent dissent. All three methods intersect with and rein-

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force each other. Developing a legitimizing narrative (or propaganda) is easier when the leader controls the media and can repress anyone who tries to challenge that narrative. If there is some legitimacy to the government, then it is less necessary to engage in costly coercion. In response to the information technology revolution, autocratic leaders have begun to adopt these strategies to deal with any potential threat from ICT. Repressive tools of censorship, arrests, and monitoring are aggressively used to prevent activists from utilizing ICT to challenge the government. The increasing ability to electronically surveil and monitor people in some ways has made it easier for states to engage in repression. More recently, authoritarian states have moved beyond firstgeneration responses and adapted ICT to serve their purposes of discrediting opponents and developing citizen support. ICT can be a powerful tool in support of authoritarian rule. In the previous two sections, I outlined how both opponents and autocratic governments can use ICT to challenge or maintain the regime. However, what explains the regime outcome following digitally networked protests? Why do some regimes survive while others are overthrown? Why do some cases of regime breakdown result in democracy and others in a new authoritarian regime? The ability to use ICT against the regime is partially a reflection of the availability of the technology and the technical skills of the activists. If activists are able to use all four mechanisms through which ICT may facilitate the development, persistence, and spread of antigovernment protests, then it is possible they will have more success in overthrowing the regime. However, the degree and type of government repression also clearly affects the ability of activists to use ICT against the regime.108 Many autocratic governments own the telecommunications infrastructure for the internet, giving them ability to control, monitor, and restrict access to ICT and making it harder for activists to use ICT against the regime. High levels of coercive capacity in the area of technology prevent activists from using ICT to organize protests, provide alternative narratives, or challenge the regime.109 States vary in their coercive capacity in traditional terms and in relation to ICT. Therefore, where states have less capacity to repress ICT, there is a greater possibility for activists to adopt ICT as a tool of mobilization and liberation. The level of repression in a regime can change over time and is likely to increase following digitally networked protests that fail to change the regime. Authoritarian leaders

Explaining Regime Outcomes

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learn from their own experiences and from what happens in other countries, leading them to adopt new strategies to manage ICT in ways that prevent activists from using the technology to successfully challenge the regime in the future. However, repression is not a complete answer for explaining regime outcomes because there are cases (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt) where, despite repression, activists were able to utilize ICT to help organize mass mobilization and regime overthrow. Clearly, repression is not always successful. Moreover, there are cases where there is no repression of ICT and no regime overthrow. Explaining the ability of activists to successfully use ICT to overthrow the regime depends on more than just repression. Therefore, building on theories about ICT and the extensive literature on the causes of democratization, I hypothesize that the effect of digitally networked protests on the regime outcome is contingent on four major factors: (1) the strength of existing civil society; (2) the degree of international support for democratization or authoritarianism; (3) the coercive capacity and legitimacy of the leader; and (4) the nature of the authoritarian regime. Along with the level of repression, these four factors help to explain the regime outcome following digitally networked protests: regime survival, regime overthrow, or democratization. Regime breakdown and democratization are two separate regime outcomes, especially as regime breakdown does not always result in democratization. Moreover, democratization is often the result of different causal factors than what caused regime breakdown.110

The Role of Civil Society ICT is most likely to help facilitate regime overthrow when there are existing civil society organizations. As defined by Larry Diamond, “Civil society is the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating . . . [and] autonomous from the state. It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas . . . to hold state officials accountable.”111 Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman argue that “effective mobilization against the state” is a reflection of the nature of the authoritarian regime and the capacity for collective action of the opposition.112 What is especially relevant here is their discussion about what determines the capacity for collective action. In their analysis of third wave cases of democratization, Haggard and Kaufman found that although some protests emerge somewhat spontaneously, they are unlikely to be sustained without support from existing civil society organizations. These organizations “are pivotal actors in turning people

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out in the streets and mounting sustained threats to authoritarian rule.”113 For example, during the 2004 protests against electoral fraud in Ukraine, the student organization, Pora, helped facilitate the protests by arranging for tents and food on Maidan Square.114 Furthermore, in an analysis of all democratic protests since the end of the Cold War, Dawn Brancati found that political parties, candidates, or civic groups organized almost 75 percent of all protests.115 ICT and civil society organizations can work in synergy to bring about regime breakdown. ICT strengthens the ability of civil society organizations to challenge the authoritarian government’s monopoly of information, organize protests, and spread their message abroad. When protests develop “spontaneously” through social media, civil society organizations help to sustain and spread the protests. The more widespread and more long-lasting the protests are, the greater the pressure on the regime. Even governments with strong coercive capacity can struggle to repress widespread and large-scale protests. Furthermore, persistent, large, widespread protests can cause elites to reassess their support for the leader, possibly causing them to abandon the dictator. Digitally networked protests often begin in major cities because that is where internet connectivity is usually highest. However, these protests typically fail to spread beyond the capital city because of the limited reaches of technology and because of a lack of institutional structures in support of the movement. Sustaining antigovernment activity for weeks or months is a substantial effort that requires significant organizational capacity and persistent mobilization. A weak civil society can reduce the spread, size, and persistence of antigovernment activity. When the government engages in repression, existing civil society organizations can play an important role in helping to sustain mobilization in circumstances of violence and arrests. As Tufekci notes about social movements, the development of formal institutions and informal ties are “crucial” for surviving “severe repression and threats” as well as “legal and extralegal pressure and economic challenges.”116 Therefore, I hypothesize that where civil society is more active and robust, digitally networked protests are more likely to result in regime overthrow. Strong civil society organizations also play an important role in preventing countries from returning to authoritarian rule after regime overthrow and aiding in the consolidating of democracy (regimes where the possibility of authoritarian reversal is extremely unlikely).117 Although a dictator may fall, without an active role for civil society and “in the absence of formal organizations to engineer the transition, the [autocratic] regime may well survive.”118 Civic associations are also valuable

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for the development of stable democracy because they can “teach . . . skills of democratic citizenship” and “are great free schools of democracy.”119 As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue, “A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help transitions to get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages of the democratization process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society is invaluable.”120 “Traditional” civil society organizations are important for democratization because, although ICT may help people organize protests, the lack of organizational capacity reduces the ability of the digitally networked protests to achieve democratization. By their nature, many digitally networked protests have horizontal structures and are often leaderless. Because organizing protests is easier with ICT, movements need less organizational capacity to achieve large-scale protests. However, the lack of organizational capacity and clear leaders reduces the ability of the protesters to negotiate with the government to bring about democratization. Tufekci’s analysis of the US civil rights movement is illustrative. As Tufekci notes, the 1963 March on Washington by civil rights activists required significant organizational capacity as there was no other way to achieve an event of that size without it. The march contributed to bringing about major political reforms because it signaled to the government that the movement had significant organizational and political capacity, which could be translated into a real electoral threat.121 Tufekci argues that “digital infrastructure allows movements to carry out protests with the same size and energy as past protests but without similar organizational capacity. While this appears a shortcut for protests, it also engenders weaknesses, as these protests do not signal the same level of capacity as previous protests, and do not necessarily pose the same threat to governments and power.”122 The literature on social movements demonstrates how historically developing sustained, largescale collective action requires the development of extensive networks, decision-making structures, the ability to negotiate among multiple groups, and bonds of trust among the leadership. Tufekci calls these elements “network internalities.”123 Technology enables people to circumvent the massive amount of logistical and organization legwork previously required to organize large events. In authoritarian contexts it is dangerous and difficult to follow this traditional organizing approach and, therefore, technology is useful and powerful. However, skipping the years of building networks, developing organizational structures, and so forth result in movements that have no clear, widely

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accepted, and respected leaders and low levels of internal cohesion. Digitally networked protest movements also lack effective processes for resolving internal disputes about tactics and strategies.124 Civil society organizations can provide the organizational capacity lacking in protests organized via Facebook. Therefore, I argue that digitally networked protests need effective civil society partners to achieve regime overthrow and democratization. Not all civil society organizations are equal. Although civil society organizations are primarily supportive of democracy across the cases examined in this book, it is important to note that is not always true. Sheri Berman’s work on Weimar Germany proves that a vigorous civil society may weaken democracy.125 The type, nature, and purpose of civil society organizations can therefore determine their influence on democratization. As Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds argue, civil society is more likely to aid democratization if it is pluralistic and cuts across social cleavages.126 An important element of civil society for democratization is labor unions. In their class-based analysis of nineteenth- and twentieth-century democratization, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens argue that the urban working class was a major driver of democratization because of its strong interest in gaining political influence plus its “capacity to organize” (emphasis added).127 The ability to organize differentiated the urban working class from other socioeconomic classes such as the peasantry. The primary means by which the urban working class was able to organize was labor unions. The growth of the urban working class, fueled by capitalism, provided a force able to challenge the hegemony of elites and open up the political sphere to all classes, which is essential for democratization. As Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens state, dense civil society, of which labor unions often play an essential part, encourages democratization “because it creates favorable conditions for the classes previously excluded from the political arena to organize for collective action and to overcome the perennial ‘free rider’ problem obstructing effective political organization on a large scale.”128 Labor unions, if they are independent of the regime, can provide the opposition with helpful organizational capacity and the ability to sustain protests. In addition, labor protests, especially strikes, have effects that other forms of protest do not—they can seriously disrupt the economy. As Ruth Berins Collier found in her research on the role of the working class in democratization, in some cases the economic consequences of labor protests can help “provoke splits among” the elites and, therefore, contribute to the downfall of the authoritarian regime.129 Organized labor and

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the working class are not necessary for democratization, but they can help delegitimize the regime, sustain mass mobilization, and maintain pressure during the transition process to prevent a return to authoritarian rule.130 In summary, I hypothesize that digitally networked protests are more likely to result in regime overthrow when there are strong, diverse, prodemocracy civil society organizations to help sustain and mobilize the protests. In addition, civil society is important for the transition period postoverthrow. Democratization is a more likely outcome after regime overthrow when there are strong, diverse, prodemocracy civil society organizations to help establish the new system. Civil society organizations can help prevent the return to authoritarianism after the overthrow of a dictator.

The Role of the International Environment The extensive research on transitions in postcommunist Europe demonstrates that the international environment can effect democratization.131 Democratic states can aid the development of democracy in another state through spreading norms and ideas about democracy, giving financial assistance to civil society organizations, threatening sanctions, and providing diplomatic pressure to democratize. Conversely, authoritarian neighbors can provide economic and political support to prevent democratization.132 ICT is more likely to aid regime overthrow when the international environment is favorable because it increases the likelihood that the dissemination of information via ICT will result in pressure on authoritarian governments to not use repression. International pressure may help reduce censorship of the internet and prevent governments from using violence against protesters. International pressure may also shift the calculations of elites and lead them to determine that continuing to support the dictator is too costly. Conversely, if there is limited international support for democracy or other authoritarian states offer support for the regime, then it is less likely the digitally networked protests will lead to regime breakdown. If the autocratic regime can draw on international allies to provide diplomatic or even financial or military support, then it will have a higher probability of surviving the protests. Furthermore, limited international consequences for repressing protesters may make it more likely that regimes will resort to violence. It is possible that elites will take into account the international circumstances when deciding whether or not to abandon the dictator. What determines whether the international environment supports democracy or authoritarianism in a country? Levitsky and Way argue that the level of international support for democracy is a function of the

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extent of information, economic, intergovernmental, social, technocratic, and civil-society linkages between a country and the West along with the degree of leverage that Western, democratic states have over a country.133 Linkages with democratic states combined with leverage can encourage elites to side with democracy.134 The greater the degree of Western linkage and the higher the amount of Western leverage over a country, the greater the incentive for elites to democratize and the higher the costs for engaging in repression. Therefore, the higher the linkage and leverage, the more likely it is that the country will democratize. We also know that the number of democratic states in a region matters because it increases democratic diffusion. Statistical analysis has found that the more democratic neighbors a country has, the higher the likelihood the country will become democratic.135 The strongest example of this is European Union (EU) conditionality in Central and southeastern Europe. The dense linkages with Western Europe and the high leverage that EU potential membership offers encouraged democratization in illiberal postcommunist states such as Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria.136 Along with considering the linkages with the West, it is also necessary to examine the influence of authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian states, such as Russia, have used their economic leverage and historical ties with neighboring states to counteract any efforts to promote democracy.137 Oisin Tansey, Kevin Koehler, and Alexander Schmotz introduced the idea of “autocratic linkage,” connections between autocratic states. Investigating 250 autocratic regimes from 1949 to 2008, they found that the higher the level of autocratic linkage, the higher the likelihood of autocratic survival.138 In other words, authoritarian regimes with stronger economic and political linkages with other authoritarian regimes have a lower probability of democratizing. Authoritarian linkage can involve economic aid, financial assistance for progovernment political parties, security assistance, and technical assistance to aid other autocratic regimes.139 The technical assistance can include ideas about how to manipulate elections and ways to control the threat of social media. Therefore, an assessment of the international environment requires examining the degree of Western support for democracy, the amount of linkage with Western countries, the number of democratic states in the region, and the extent of countervailing authoritarian linkages and leverage. If the international environment is supportive of democracy, then digitally networked protests are more likely to result in regime breakdown. In contrast, weak international support for democracy or strong international support for the authoritarian regime lowers the probability that protests will lead to regime breakdown.

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Strength of the Leader: Coercive Capacity and Legitimacy The regime outcome also depends on the autocratic ruler; specifically, their level of coercive capacity and degree of legitimacy. The coercive capacity of a leader involves the size, strength, and capability of security forces and their degree of loyalty to the leader. Lucan Way argues that one source of autocratic stability is the “autocrat’s command over an extensive, cohesive, well-funded, and experienced coercive apparatus that can reliably harass regime opposition and put down protests.”140 Regimes with loyal and effective security forces are able to suppress civil society, mass protests, or other opponents of the regime. The strength and capabilities of security forces are relatively easy to measure. However, the loyalty is harder to assess as we often fail to accurately predict when they will or will not defect. Three factors increase the likelihood that the security forces will remain loyal to the leader: if it is a revolutionary regime; if the security forces have received economic patronage; and if their perception of the survivability of the leader is positive. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way define a revolutionary regime “as those which emerge out of sustained, ideological, and violent struggle from below, and whose establishment is accompanied by mass mobilization and significant efforts to transform state structures and the existing social order.”141 They argue that revolutionary regimes are especially durable and able to withstand multiple challenges because the experience of arising out of violent conflict results in a regime with powerful security forces under tight control of the leader and cohesive ruling elites.142 If the leader is tied to the revolutionary movement that established the regime, then the autocrat is more likely to retain the loyalty of the security forces in response to massive mobilization. When the security forces have received economic patronage from the leader, they have personal interest in maintaining the regime and are more likely to remain loyal. As I noted in previous sections of this chapter, both mass and elite support are important for authoritarian persistence. In other words, authoritarian leaders that have popular support and successfully co-opt elites are perceived as “stronger” and, therefore, less vulnerable to overthrow. However, being able to successfully co-opt elites and maintain popular support, or legitimacy, is at least partially dependent on people’s expectations about the stability and future of the regime. As Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz argue, “Before the dictatorship faces serious challenges, individuals, inside and outside the dictatorial elite expect it to survive.”143 But public protests can shift people’s perceptions about the viability of the regime. There are multiple cases of authoritarian regimes perceived by citizens and external experts as strong and stable that have been overthrown.144 The success or failure of a protest move-

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ment is partially dependent on who wins the perception game—can the protesters convince people that the leader is vulnerable, or will the leader be able to maintain an image of invincibility? As discussed above, social media can help both the activists and the government shape the narrative about the protests to favor their position. Therefore, I hypothesize that a leader who has both coercive capacity and legitimacy has a higher probability of surviving antigovernment protests. However, if a leader lacks coercive capacity or legitimacy, a protest movement is more likely to succeed in overthrowing the regime because of either the inability of the leader to suppress the protests or widespread defections to the opposition. When digitally networked antigovernment protests occur, the strength of the leader helps determine whether the regime survives or is overthrown.

Nature of the Autocratic Regime Whereas the strength of the autocratic ruler helps to explain regime survival, the nature of the authoritarian system is important for explaining the outcome after regime breakdown. As the recent cases from the Arab Spring demonstrate, the development of democracy once regime breakdown occurs often is dependent on structural conditions.145 Multiple scholars of democratization argue that the institutional structures of the previous authoritarian regime influence the likelihood of democratization and consolidation because the overthrow of a dictator often involves the overthrow of only one individual, not the destruction of the entire autocratic system. In their influential article, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle argue that authoritarian regime type determines the nature of transition process.146 In a sophisticated analysis, Milan Svolik found that countries that were military dictatorships have a low probability of consolidating democracy.147 Often a major source of coercive power, the military “matters more to a state’s survival” than almost any other institution and a revolution is unlikely to succeed “without the support or at least the acquiescence of its armed forces.”148 In addition, Henry E. Hale found that presidential systems are less favorable for democratization in post-Soviet states because they allow for the consolidation of power behind one family or group. Furthermore, these systems of patronal presidentialism—systems with a directly elected president with significant constitutional powers and control over important networks of clients—are difficult to change as long as society remains patronalistic and based on a presidential system.149 Svolik also concludes that presidential systems are problematic for democratic consolidation, arguing that the “negative effect [of a presidential system] on consolidation is remarkable.”150

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Along with specific types of authoritarian regimes causing problems for democratization, as Dankwart A. Rustow argued decades ago, a vital prerequisite for democracy is national unity and territorial control by the state.151 Countries where state authority is challenged by armed conflict or where the state lacks control over its territory are unable to develop democracy.152 Weak states—those which struggle to collect taxes and provide basic public goods—and states with internal conflicts struggle to develop any stable political system, including democracy. Lucan Way argues that countries experiencing state weakness, political party weakness, and divided national identities are unable to consolidate democracy or authoritarianism.153 Therefore, I hypothesize that states with an institutional legacy of state weakness, military rule, or communism are unlikely to develop democracy, even after regime overthrow. Weak states or a legacy of Soviet rule explain the persistence of competitive authoritarian regimes in the post-Soviet states where they experienced regime breakdown: Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The powerful political role of the military explains the persistence of authoritarianism in Egypt after the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. In contrast, I argue that a state without these negative legacies is more likely to transition to democracy after regime breakdown, such as we see in postbreakdown Tunisia. Table 2.1 provides a brief overview of the twelve cases examined in this book and highlights the range of regime outcomes and the presence of each of the four variables: strength of civil society, the international environment, the strength of the leader, and the nature of the autocratic regime. Although ICT can aid in the development of antiregime protests, its effects on the regime outcome depend on how it interacts with other factors, such as civil society, and structural dynamics like the nature of the international environment. As a tool, ICT is ill suited to address structural issues. There is no evidence so far of ICT being able to change major structural factors such as territorial integrity of the state or the legacy of authoritarian rule. Furthermore, some of the aspects that make ICT a powerful tool of regime overthrow may produce problems for establishing democracy, including a lack of leaders and increasing political polarization. The postoverthrow period often involves negotiations about the structure of the new system. The lack of clear leaders of digitally networked protests means that there can be no one with the authority and legitimacy to speak for the protesters, complicating the negotiation process and possibly allowing space for the authoritarian system to seize power. As I argued earlier in the chapter, ICT can help mobilization against the regime by developing a sense of shared grievances against the

Authoritarian Regimes and Information Communication Technology

Table 2.1 Explaining Regime Outcomes

Kyrgyzstan 2005 Armenia 2008 Iran 2009

Moldova 2009 Kyrgyzstan 2010 Tunisia 2010–2011

Strength of Civil Society

International Environment Supportive of Democracy

Strength of the Leader

Weak

No

Strong

Weak

Partially

Moderate

Active and strong

No

Moderate

Partially

Moderate

No

Strong

Weak

Weak

Weak

Egypt Moderate 2011 Russia Weak 2011–2012 Armenia 2013 Weak

Moldova 2015–2016 Iran 2017–2018 Armenia 2018

Weak

Weak

Weak

Partially No

No

No

Weak

Strong Weak

Strong

No

Moderate

No

Strong

No

Strong

Nature of Autocratic Rule Prior to Protests

Competitive authoritarianism Competitive authoritarianism Theocracy

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Regime Outcome

Regime breakdown Regime survives Regime survives Competitive Regime authoritarianism survives Competitive Regime authoritarianism breakdown Authoritarian Regime breakdown and democracy Authoritarian Regime with military rule breakdown Competitive Regime authoritarianism survives Competitive Regime authoritarianism survives Competitive Regime authoritarianism survives Theocracy Regime survives Competitive Regime authoritarianism breakdown

regime. During the postoverthrow transition period, the ability of social media to mobilize and intensify public opinion may cause problems for democratization. There is growing research on how social media may increase political polarization in democratic states by creating “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles” where social media “promote[s] opinion similarity” and filters out opposing views.154 Recent research has found that social media use interacts with an individual’s political ideology and can lead people to hold stronger and, sometimes, even extremist views.155 Although the majority of this research has been done on democratic states, it does suggest that, during a transition period, the technology that aided regime overthrow may make democratization harder as increased political polarization reduces the likelihood of political compromise.

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ICT can enhance the ability of activists to challenge the authoritarian regime, mobilize mass protests, and bring down a dictator. On the other hand, authoritarian governments have been able to adapt existing strategies to limit the democratizing effect of ICT and to take advantage of the new technology to help suppress dissent. The coercive capacity and the strength of the leader partially explain why authoritarian states sometimes are able to prevent digitally networked protests from overthrowing the regime. However, mass mobilization can erode the strength of the regime and convince security forces to defect. Therefore, the likelihood of regime breakdown is dependent not only on the status of the authoritarian regime, but also on the capabilities of the opposition and its ability to use ICT to challenge the regime. Activists are most likely to be able to use ICT to successfully produce regime breakdown when there are existing civil society organizations to help sustain and spread protests, when the international environment is supportive of democratization, and when the leader is weak. However, regime breakdown does not equal democratization. ICT has an influence on regime breakdown, but has little impact on the next stage: the development of democracy. Structural barriers to democratization can be influential and difficult to overcome. The following chapters test this multipart theory through examining case studies from the Middle East and North Africa region and the postSoviet region. In the next chapter, I examine how the Iranian and Russian governments have been able to successfully prevent regime breakdown and have adapted ICT for their purposes.

Conclusion

1. Morozov, Net Delusion; Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope; Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 2. Brancati, Democracy Protests. 3. Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 133. 4. Fung, Gilman, and Shkabatur, “Six Models for the Internet + Politics,” p. 33. 5. Lim, “Lost in Translation?” p. 94. 6. Karagiannopoulos, “The Role of the Internet in Political Struggles,” pp. 162–163. 7. Abbott, MacDonald, and Givens, “New Social Media and (Electronic) Democratization,” p. 107. 8. Diamond, “Liberation Technology,” p. 10. 9. Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, p. 229. 10. Hale, Patronal Politics. 11. Robertson, “Managing Society,” p. 530. 12. Hale, Patronal Politics, pp. 74–75, 91.

Notes

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13. Ibid., p. 14. 14. Tang and Huhe, “Alternative Framing.” 15. Ibid., p. 565. 16. Ibid. 17. Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, p. 69. 18. Although Nils B. Weidmann and Espen Geelmuyden Rød argue that the internet may be a new “opiate” of the people and reduce actual mobilization, it still can be a valuable avenue for political conversations, especially on platforms like Facebook where apolitical people may be exposed to political issues through friends’ posts and comments. Weidmann and Rød, The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies, p. 20. 19. Lim, “Lost in Translation?” p. 88. 20. Ibid., pp. 98–99. 21. Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, pp. 3, 5. 22. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 142. 23. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 287. 24. For examples of research on diffusion, see Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions”; Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena”; Brinks and Coppedge, “Diffusion Is No Illusion”; Givan, Roberts, and Soule, “Introduction.” 25. Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism,” p. 140. 26. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena,” p. 264. 27. Ibid., p. 265. 28. Ibid. 29. Tucker, “Enough!” p. 541. 30. Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism,” p. 141. 31. Taylor and Van Dyke, “Get Up, Stand Up,” p. 282. 32. Soule, “Diffusion Processes Within and Across Movements,” p. 297. 33. Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution. 34. “Revolution in Cairo.” 35. Keck and Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks,” p. 89. 36. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” p. 287. 37. Tucker, “Enough!” p. 540. 38. Kuran, “Now Out of Never,” p. 14. 39. Tucker, “Enough!” p. 540. 40. Jumet, Contesting the Repressive State, p. 54. 41. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 9. 42. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? 43. Jumet, Contesting the Repressive State, p. 73. 44. Gamson, “Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media,” p. 249. 45. Taylor and Van Dyke, “Get Up, Stand Up,” p. 276. 46. Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 280. 47. Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, p. 229. 48. Andrea Saveri, Howard Rheingold, and Kathi Vian, quoted in Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 130. 49. Weidmann and Rød, The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies, p. 36. 50. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, pp. 20–21. 51. van de Walle, “Tipping Games.”

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52. Hussain and Howard, “What Best Explains Successful Protest Cascades?” p. 57. 53. Lynch, “Media, Old and New,” p. 93. 54. Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 243. 55. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 17. 56. Karagiannopoulos, “The Role of the Internet in Political Struggles,” p. 164. 57. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? 58. Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 282. 59. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? p. 26. 60. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 45. 61. Ibid., p. 44. 62. Joseph, “Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights,” p. 153. 63. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 45. 64. For one example, Henry E. Hale reasons that, in presidential systems defined by “widespread patron-client relationships,” elites may stop supporting a president if they believe he or she is a “lame-duck” and unable to maintain patronage networks. Hale, “Regime Cycles,” p. 138. 65. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 16. 66. Albrecht and Ohl, “Exit, Resistance, and Loyalty.” 67. Vanderhill, “Promoting Democracy and Promoting Authoritarianism.” 68. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright, “The Digital Dictators.” 69. Howard, Pax Technica. 70. For just a few examples, see Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, How Dictatorships Work; Svolik, “Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics”; Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism; Hale, Patronal Politics; Reuter, “Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest”; Gandhi and LustOkar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism”; Brown, “Dictatorship and Democracy Through the Prism”; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” 71. Michael Mann, quoted in Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring, p. 44. 72. Wintrobe, The Political Economy of Dictatorship, p. 34; Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars of Stability,” p. 21. 73. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Saudi Arabia, 2015, https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/saudi-arabia. 74. Ibid. 75. de Mesquita et al., Logic of Political Survival, p. 544. 76. Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland, “Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability.” 77. Hollyer, “Information, Disclosure and Regime Stability,” p. 5. 78. Vanderhill, “Active Resistance to Democratic Diffusion.” 79. Solingen, “Of Dominoes and Firewalls,” p. 633. 80. Deibert, “Cyberspace Under Siege,” p. 65. 81. King, Pan, and Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism.” 82. Ibid. 83. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Kazakhstan, 2015, https:/// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/kazakhstan. 84. Fuchs, Internet and Society, p. 250. 85. Deibert, “Cyberspace Under Siege,” p. 67. 86. Morozov, Net Delusion; Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope.

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87. Svolik, “Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics.” 88. Ibid., p. 478. 89. Hale, Patronal Politics, pp. 9–10. 90. Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright argue that new forms of digital surveillance, such as China’s new social credit system, provide governments with the ability to award pro-regime behavior with things such as discounted energy bills; in other words, co-opting the public. Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright, “The Digital Dictators.” 91. Deibert, “Cyberspace Under Siege,” p. 68. 92. Ibid., p. 69. 93. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, p. 26. 94. Elkink, “The International Diffusion of Democracy,” p. 1656. 95. Schatz and Maltseva, “Kazakhstan’s Authoritarian ‘Persuasion,’” p. 47. 96. Schatz, “Access by Accident.” 97. Tang and Huhe, “Alternative Framing,” p. 562. 98. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, “Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict.” 99. Vanderhill, “Active Resistance to Democratic Diffusion.” 100. Simons, “Euromaidan and the Geopolitical Struggle for Influence,” p. 289. 101. Bunce and Hozič, “Diffusion-Proofing and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”; Cooley, “Countering Democratic Norms”; Vanderhill, “Active Resistance to Democratic Diffusion.” 102. Bunce and Hozič, “Diffusion-Proofing and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” p. 444. 103. Morozov, Net Delusion, p. 67. 104. An example is the attacks done by Russian trolls on Finnish journalist Jessikka Aro after she requested information from people about their own experiences with being attacked online by Russians. Higgins, “Efforts to Expose Russia’s ‘Troll Army.’” 105. A. D. Smith, “Nations in Decline?” p. 19. 106. Eric Hobsbawm discusses the historic relationship between the government and nationalism in Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. 107. Ibid., p. 91. 108. Weidmann and Rød, The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies, p. 30. 109. Soldatov and Borogan, The Red Web; Deibert, “Cyberspace Under Siege;” King, Pan, and Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism.” 110. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring. 111. Diamond, Developing Democracy, p. 221. 112. Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, p. 62. 113. Ibid., p. 16. 114. Demes and Forbrig, “Pora.” 115. Brancati, Democracy Protests, p. 19. 116. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 64. 117. Bratton and van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”; Putnam, Making Democracy Work; O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 118. Bratton and van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” p. 488. 119. Hahrie, How Organizations Develop Activists, p. 2. 120. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 9. 121. Tufekci, “Social Movements and Governments in the Digital Age,” p. 15. 122. Ibid.

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123. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 75. 124. Vanderhill, “The Internet, Regime Breakdown, and Democratization.” 125. Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic.” 126. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring. 127. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, Capitalist Development & Democracy, p. 6. 128. Ibid, p. 50. 129. Collier, Paths Toward Democracy, p. 112. 130. There are many critiques of a class-based explanation of democratization (see Haggard and Kaufman, Dictators and Democrats, for one of the most recent, and O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, for a broader critique of all structural accounts), and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens themselves argue that the working class was less important in the Latin America cases. I am not claiming here that the class-based approach is always right but, rather, that previous research on the role of organized labor does tell us that it can be an influential part of civil society for democratization. 131. Way, “Resistance to Contagion.” 132. Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad. 133. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism. 134. Levitsky and Way, “Linkage Versus Leverage.” 135. Kopstein and Reilly, “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation.” 136. There is extensive research on the influence of EU conditionality; see works by Geoffrey Pridham, Milada Vachudova, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, among others. 137. Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad. 138. Tansey, Koehler, and Schmotz, “Ties to the Rest,” p. 1222. 139. Vanderhill, Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad. 140. Way, “Resistance to Contagion,” p. 232. 141. Levitsky and Way, “The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes,” p. 5. 142. Ibid., p. 7. 143. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, How Dictatorships Work, p. 185. 144. For one example, dissidents in Czechoslovakia in October 1989 did not think the Communists would fall anytime soon. 145. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring. 146. Bratton and van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa.” 147. Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation,” p. 162. 148. Barany, “The Role of the Military,” p. 28. 149. Hale, Patronal Politics, p. 427. 150. Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation,” p. 162. 151. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy.” 152. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development & Democracy, p. 67. 153. Way, Pluralism by Default. 154. Asker and Dinas, “Thinking Fast and Furious,” p. 488; Hong and Kim, “Political Polarization on Twitter”; Deibert, “Three Painful Truths about Social Media,” p. 32. 155. Ingrams, “Connective Action and the Echo Chamber of Ideology,” p. 10.

3 Censorship, Surveillance, and Propaganda: The Cases of Iran and Russia The two cases in this chapter, Iran and Russia, share some important similarities. They are states where the digitally networked protests were the largest antigovernment protests in decades. Although the protests did present a challenge to each regime, the Russian and Iranian governments were able to survive without even engaging in political reforms. Therefore, these two cases offer important insights about the limits of information communication technology (ICT) as a tool of regime overthrow. Iran and Russia are also similar because the primary reason why the protests failed and the regime maintained power was that the government had a high level of coercive power, and the elite support to enable it, to suppress or disregard the protests. Both of these countries also demonstrate the extensive and effective methods by which authoritarian states can use ICT to prevent opposition and gain support. However, there are important differences in the methods used by Iran and Russia. Iran focused more on censorship and restricting access, whereas Russia emphasized spreading its own narrative and discrediting opponents online. Leaders in each state have successfully resisted pressure to democratize and have adapted ICT to help them maintain power. Following the overthrow of Shah Pehlavi, Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, a leader of the Iranian Revolution, established the Islamic Republic of

An Introduction to Iran and Russia

55

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Iran. Under Khomeini’s leadership, Iran became an authoritarian regime. Iran is an unusual authoritarian state as it is a theocracy and a revolutionary regime. Iran has a political system that grants political power to Islamic institutions, such as the Council of Guardians, which has the power to approve or disapprove all candidates for the parliament or presidency. Although Iran has republican institutions, the Islamic institutions have the most political power. “For example, the Supreme Leader, an appointed religious and political position, is the commander-in-chief and controls the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Therefore, the Supreme Leader is more powerful than the president, because the president has no control over coercive power.”1 The powerful role of the Islamic institutions is one of the reasons why Iran is not a democracy. Freedom House’s 2009 Freedom in the World report rated the country as not free with a score of 6 on civil liberties and political rights (out of a 1 to 7 scale where 7 is the least free).2 Much of Russia’s postcommunist political history has been dominated by one man, Vladimir Putin. Since Putin stepped in to replace an ailing Boris Yeltsin as president in 1999, he has either been president (1999–2008, 2012–present) or prime minister (2008–2012) of Russia. During Putin’s first two terms as president, Russia returned to positive economic growth after a decade of turmoil, negative economic growth, high inflation, and increasing unemployment. Although high global oil prices were the main reason for Russia’s economic growth, Putin often received the credit. The greater economic stability and his victory in the war in Chechnya contributed to high levels of popularity for Putin throughout much of his first two terms as president. Putin’s popularity is also partially a reflection of the increased control over the media during his presidency. Putin and his advisers utilized that media control to construct a positive narrative about Putin and his leadership. The increased restrictions on the freedom of the press corresponded with growing authoritarianism and centralization of power in Russia. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit democracy score for Russia has fallen from 4.96 in 2003 to 6.61 in 2018 (scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the least democratic). Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way argue that Russia was an authoritarian regime by 2008.3 In this chapter, I first discuss the causes of the postelection protests in Iran and Russia and the role of ICT in helping to organize the largest antigovernment Russian and Iranian protests in decades. Because the protests failed in both Iran and Russia, these two cases are examples of the limitations of ICT as a tool of regime overthrow. Then, I investigate how both regimes have increased controls on ICT to prevent a recur-

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rence of protests and adapted new technology to improve surveillance and propaganda. Iran has emphasized repression and surveillance in its approach to ICT, barring access to many websites and social media platforms. In contrast, the Russian government allows relatively open access to the internet. Instead of strictly controlling access, the Russian government has instead focused on proactive strategies. The Russian government directly or indirectly supports online trolls—governmentpaid commentators, usually specially recruited—to promote the government’s message and to discredit opponents. The Russian government also actively seeks to frame a pro-Putin, Russian nationalist narrative online. Overall, these efforts have succeeded, as Putin’s popularity remains high and all opponents are weak. These cases demonstrate not only the limitations of ICT as a tool of regime overthrow, but also the different ways that authoritarian regimes can manipulate ICT to help them remain in power.

Digitally Networked Antiregime Protests in Iran and Russia The Iranian Green Movement and the 2009 Presidential Elections The Green Movement refers to the large-scale protests that erupted in June 2009 after the Iranian presidential elections. In the presidential elections, incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was running against opposition candidates Mehdi Karrubi and Mir Hosein Mousavi. Karrubi, former speaker of the parliament, was a known reformist politician in Iran. Mousavi had been prime minister during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s but, since that time, had not been as politically active. Because Ahmadinejad was unpopular with many Iranians, there were hopes prior to the election that Mousavi would win. The official, and suspected fraudulent, election results declared that Ahmadinejad had won the election with 63 percent of the vote compared to 34 percent for Mousavi.4 The apparent blatant nature of the electoral fraud, especially the unbelievably high level of support for Ahmadinejad, angered many reformers and supporters of Mousavi. Unexpectedly, hundreds of thousands of Iranians engaged in protests against the perceived fraudulent election results. Mousavi’s campaign color was green, so protesters often wore green to demonstrate their solidarity, giving the name “Green Movement,” at least in the West, to the protesters. One of the largest protests was a rally led by Mousavi in Tehran on June 15, 2009. Some estimates

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suggest that there were 2 million people in attendance. The June 2009 protests were the largest and most widespread since the Iranian Revolution thirty years earlier. Surprised by the size of the protests, the Iranian security forces, despite engaging in repeated violence, were unable to stop the protests. However, the dynamic changed after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speech during Friday prayers on June 19. Khamenei expressed a hardline position by condemning the protesters, supporting Ahmadinejad’s victory, and threatening increased violence. In his speech, Khamenei dismissed all claims of electoral fraud, arguing that “supporters of some of the candidates should have faith that the Islamic republic does not betray people’s votes. The country’s legal structure does not allow for fraud to take place.”5 He also blamed the protesters for any bloodshed, and called on the security forces to enforce the ban on all public protests.6 The government security forces, especially the paramilitary Basij units, repeatedly attacked the protesters, resulting in at least seventy-two deaths and thousands of arrests over the weeks of protest.7 After the violent government response and Khamenei’s speech, the protests ended, with the exception of a few demonstrations later in the year on major holidays. As a result of the intense repression, by 2010 the Green Movement had dwindled. Although suspected electoral fraud was the spark that ignited the protests, there were three main longer-term causes for Iranian dissatisfaction with the political situation and Ahmadinejad. One, the protests reflected an ongoing struggle between conservatives and reformers about the fundamental nature of the Islamic republic. Ahmadinejad represented the more conservative perspective and his hard-line approach angered the reformers. Second, the overall poor economic situation had deteriorated under Ahmadinejad’s presidency, which contributed to dissatisfaction and frustration among Iranians. Third, Ahmadinejad’s provocative, and often inflammatory rhetoric, had eroded his public support, especially among middle-class and educated Iranians. Since the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there have been disputes among political elites over what constitutes the appropriate vision for the republic, especially the relationship between Islam and the state. Although the Islamic institutional structures dominate in Iran, at different times the reformist political elites have been able to gain some influence and increase the level of openness in society. The presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) was a period when the reformist faction had greater political power, as Khatami supported a political approach that emphasized rule of law and greater pluralism. 8 The reformist faction, like Khatami, is not radical and does not call for regime change; they are part of the political system and are dependent

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on approval from the authoritarian Council of Guardians to run for office. Furthermore, the continued powerful influence of the conservative faction limited the reforms Khatami could pursue during his presidency. Despite the limited liberalization that occurred under Khatami, conservatives saw his actions as a threat because they could lead to “more liberal interpretations of the role of Islam in society and politics” and encourage Iranians to demand greater political change.9 Ahmadinejad’s election was a return of the conservatives to the presidency, and began a period of increased repression and social restrictions. The ongoing conflict between the reformists and conservatives played an important role in the outbreak of protests in 2009 and their subsequent repression by the government. The intensification of the enforcement of social and moral rules, such as forbidding unmarried men and women from meeting in public, along with the increased restrictions on the media under Ahmadinejad frustrated many Iranians. For example, the paramilitary Basij carried out thousands of raids on private gatherings in 2007 under the pretense of “countering immoral behavior,” and forced over 150,000 people to sign statements “promising to observe official dress codes and adhere to moral standards.”10 The continued discrimination against women, including that they need the permission of their husband to leave the country, also angered Iranian women.11 Some Iranian women saw the 2009 elections as an opportunity to improve their circumstances and gain greater rights.12 Although Mousavi, approved by the Council of Guardians and a former prime minister, was not calling for regime change or even major political reforms, the conservatives still saw his victory as a threat. Ali Reza Abootalebi argues that “Ahmadinejad’s first term [had] . . . pleased Iran’s social conservatives and his reelection would have meant a consolidation of their power. On the other hand, a Mousavi victory would have meant a return to the Khatami years, when social conservatives felt under pressure to concede to social and political reforms and thus a weakening of the Islamic nature of the Republic.”13 Therefore, the election of Mousavi would have challenged the conservatives’ position of power and their religious perspective on Islam and the state. In addition to the conflict between reformists and conservatives, the poor economic situation increased Iranian grievances against President Ahmadinejad. The combination of poor economic policies by Ahmadinejad and a dramatic fall in global oil prices contributed to economic problems in Iran. In 2008, the year before the election, the economic growth rate was only 0.6 percent, which was a dramatic fall from the 2007 growth rate of 6.4 percent.14 Inflation doubled to almost 30 percent in 2008 and the central bank’s response to high inflation, the restriction of

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credit, damaged Iranian businesses and increased unemployment (12 percent in 2008).15 Unemployment rates were particularly bad for Iranians younger than age thirty (20 percent for men and 40 percent for women), contributing to anger against the Iranian government.16 Because the government of Iran is dependent on oil revenue, the low oil prices added to a budget deficit of approximately $50 billion. The increasing budget deficit led President Ahmadinejad and the Majlis (the parliament) to impose the first sales tax and to discuss the end of gasoline, electricity, and water subsidies. The 3 percent sales tax combined with the high inflation provoked jewelers and other shopkeepers in bazaars to protest by closing their shops in October 2008.17 The shopkeepers’ unusual action highlights Iranian anger about the economic situation. Moreover, Ahmadinejad had won the election in 2005 partially because of his claims that he would improve the economy and redistribute wealth in Iran to reduce inequality. However, there was no significant reduction in the Gini coefficient between 2005 and 2009, and the income of the richest 20 percent increased at a rate four times faster than the poorest Iranians.18 Furthermore, the government allowance given each month to the poorest Iranians had fallen from $70 per person to only $20 per person by 2008.19 As Abootalebi notes, during the 2009 electoral campaign, “Ahmadinejad’s opponents contended . . . that his populist efforts to redistribute wealth among Iran’s 70 million people had caused high inflation, slower economic growth, and a steep rise in unemployment.”20 Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory rhetoric and provocative foreign policy also turned Iranians against him. During his first term in office, Ahmadinejad made repeated outlandish claims such as Iran had achieved the status of a superpower.21 Opponents of Ahmadinejad considered his foreign policy, especially the repeated Holocaust denials and support for the nuclear program, as “overly aggressive and even unnecessarily bellicose, rhetorical, and misdirected.”22 Ahmadinejad’s performance during the televised debates against Mousavi and Karroubi reinforced this perception of him among Iranians. The most surprising statements were his claims that the Iranian economy was doing very well.23 As these statements directly contradicted most Iranians’ personal experience, it was a particular problematic claim for Ahmadinejad to make. The desire to no longer have Ahmadinejad as president was one of the main unifying components of the postelection protests.

The 2017–2018 Protests in Iran Major antigovernment protests broke out in the Iranian city of Mashhad on December 28, 2017. The protests were primarily because of anger

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about the poor economic situation. The high inflation, high unemployment (60 percent in some parts of the country, and 26.7 percent for fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds), and increased levels of poverty all contributed to economic grievances in Iran.24 The situation was so dire that Iranian households had decreased their consumption of food items such as bread, milk, and red meat by 30–50 percent over the past ten years.25 Unlike the protests in 2009, these antigovernment demonstrations occurred in multiple towns and cities across Iran. However, fewer people participated overall in the protests and, unlike in 2009, the demonstrators were mainly young men. The demonstrations, lacking any clear leaders, were mainly organized via ICT, especially the messaging application Telegram that had 40 million users in Iran by 2017.26 Similar to in 2009, the Iranian government responded with repression, killing 21 protesters and imprisoning over 1,000. The protests again failed to achieve any political or economic reforms.

The 2011–2012 Antigovernment Protests in Russia There were two main short-term triggers for the Russian protests that began in December 2011. The first was the September 24, 2011, announcement that President Dmitri Medvedev would not run for a second term and, instead, Putin would run again as president. This announcement angered some Russians, as it appeared to take away any choice about who rules the country. Educated, urban, middle-class Russians, especially those in their twenties and thirties, wanted a competitive political system and better governance. The poor electoral results of the ruling party, United Russia, in the December 2011 Duma elections demonstrated the anger and frustration of some Russians with the political situation.27 The second short-term cause of the protests was the report of widespread electoral fraud in the December elections for the Duma. According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) official report on the elections, “The contest was also slanted in favour of the ruling party. This was evidenced by the lack of independence of the election administration, the partiality of most media, and the undue interference of state authorities at different levels. This did not provide the necessary conditions for fair electoral competition.”28 The independent Russian election monitoring nongovernmental organization (NGO), GOLOS, also noted problems with the election and cases of electoral fraud. Protests in Moscow began almost immediately after the election commission announced the results. However, it was not until December 10, 2011, that it became apparent that these protests were different

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from previous attempts to challenge unfair elections. Possibly as many as 60,000 people joined the protest on December 10, making it the largest since the end of the Soviet Union. The main demands made by the demonstrators were investigations of electoral fraud, new parliamentary elections, the dismissal of the head of the Election Commission, and the release of people arrested in earlier protests.29 In addition, protesters chanted “Putin is a thief” and “Russia without Putin.”30 The protesters were generally middle-class Russians and young professionals, who had experienced economic success during Putin’s presidency. Two weeks later, on December 24, there was another large protest in Moscow. Police estimated 30,000 people participated; the opposition said there were 120,000 protesters.31 A third large-scale antigovernment demonstration, with 36,000–120,000 protesters, occurred on February 4, 2012. The last major demonstration was on March 5, after the announcement of Putin’s victory in the presidential election. Although the reports of electoral fraud and Putin’s return to the presidency were triggering events for the protests, several longer-term grievances contributed to the outbreak of protests. One major grievance was the high level of corruption and the overall poor quality of public services. Public opinion surveys from 2012 highlight the concern about corruption, as 51 percent of Russians surveyed believed that corruption was worse than in 2000, when Putin gained power. Furthermore, this result was substantially higher (13 percentage points) than in 2008.32 Corruption is pervasive in Russia. According to Georgiy Satarov, an expert on Russian corruption, “the total sum of bribes annually meted out by Russians has reached $30 billion” and at least $3 billion of those bribes are paid by average Russians to gain access to regular services in the areas of public health, education, universities, childcare centers, and so forth.33 Frustrations with corruption connected to the overall poor quality of governance in Russia. Forty-one percent of Russians surveyed believed that the government “had not become more responsive to the needs of the population since 2000” and 22 percent believed it was less responsive than in 2000.34 Given that in the 1990s the Russian government defaulted, failed to pay salaries for months at a time, and almost all social services stopped functioning, this is a striking assessment. Despite having more doctors per capita than the United States, Russia’s infant mortality rate is 40 percent higher.35 Less than one-third of Russians think that their children are receiving a good public education.36 The poor quality of government services, such as education and health care, contributed to a lack of economic opportunities for Russians, especially young, educated professionals. Experts estimate 100,000–150,000 Rus-

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sians immigrate each year, seeking professional employment not available in Russia.37 Despite Putin’s promises to improve the government and reduce corruption, the situation was the same or worse by 2011. The failure to improve the quality of government and the persistent high levels of corruption may partially explain why a 2012 survey documented the first decline in the percentage of Russians who believed that Putin was honest and “really cared about people.”38 The “sparks” for the protests—the fraudulent Duma election results and the announcement of Putin returning to the presidency—reflect, at least among the protesters, a broader dissatisfaction with politics and the growing authoritarianism of the country. A survey of Russians participating in the December 24 protest found that 73 percent of the protesters were there to express “outrage” over the falsification of election results and 52 percent were dissatisfied with the undemocratic nature of policymaking in Russia.39 It is important to note that these views are not necessarily universal in Russia, but rather reflect those supporting the protests. The protesters rebranded the United Russia political party as the “party of swindlers and thieves,” demonstrating their anger with the lack of democratic process in Russia.40 Protesters also repeatedly stated that they were seeking “fair elections,” not a revolution.41 The statements of opposition blogger Aleksei Navalny represent some of the stronger antiPutin positions among protesters. In December 2011, Navalny stated that Putin “won’t be a legitimate president” and, if Putin was reelected in March, that it “will be an illegal succession to the throne.”42 In Chapter 2, I theorized that ICT can help overthrow a regime through four mechanisms: (1) providing an alternative source of information; (2) aiding democratic diffusion; (3) helping activists to organize and mobilize protests; and (4) spreading information globally about the demonstrations and government repression, which in turn may increase international pressure on the government to compromise. Even before the protests, ICT was an important source of information in Iran and Russia, and an avenue for Iranians and Russians to debate and share grievances. There is no evidence that Iranian activists relied on ICT to organize protests in 2009; however, social media played an important role in organizing the 2017–2018 Iranian demonstrations. Taking advantage of the freer internet and limited censorship, Russians extensively used ICT to organize protests. ICT was more important for Iranian activists to gain international attention than for Russian protesters because

The Role of ICT in the Iranian and Russian Protests

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Russia was more open to foreign media. However, international attention on the protests did not translate into changes in government policies in either Iran or Russia because of the weak Western leverage and linkage with both countries.

Mechanism 1: Alternative Source of Information

Iran. There is some dispute regarding the actual number of Iranians who had internet access by 2009. The most reliable numbers are that the internet penetration rate was at approximately 11 percent, with 30 percent of all internet users based in Tehran.43 A major reason for the relatively low level of internet penetration, especially outside of Tehran, was the high cost of computers and internet service. There were also an estimated 54 million mobile phone subscriptions in Iran by 2010.44 Despite government censorship (discussed in detail below), there were various social media platforms in Iran prior to the 2009 presidential elections, including Orkut, Yahoo 360, and Facebook, which first appeared in Iran in 2007. The majority of social media users were young single women.45 Surveys of Iranian social media users found that most of them joined for social and cultural reasons, primarily to make friends.46 One area in which Iranians were active on the internet was blogging, as there were an estimated 60,000–100,000 Iranian blogs. A measure of the popularity of blogging was that the Persian language was among the top five languages of the global blogosphere.47 Blogging appealed to Iranians, especially the youth, not only because of the technical ease of launching a blog, but also because it provided an opportunity for those dissatisfied with the high levels of authoritarian control and repression to discuss and debate economic, social, and political issues. As Gholam Khiabany and Annabelle Sreberny argue, through blogging, Iranians “are developing powerful and poetic political voices, analyzing national and international issues and public and private concerns.”48 Similar to internet usage elsewhere, the majority of blogs are not about politics or news. However, Iran is different from any of the other cases in this book because the Iranian government, a theocracy, also tries to control many areas of life beyond politics, including people’s dress, relations between the sexes, and much of social life. Therefore, actions that would not be political in Tunisia, Russia, or Armenia, such as visiting websites or blogs that address issues of sex or gender relations, “are often seen by Internet users as small acts of defiance against the state” and political acts.49 Based on an in-depth 2008 content analysis of Iranian blogs and their networks, John Kelly and Bruce Etling “found that the Iranian blogosphere supports a political discourse

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that is rich, contentious, and varied. A wide range of opinion is represented, on a large number of specific issues of concern to Iranians.”50 The virtual space of the internet, through blogs and various social media platforms, provided an important source of alternative information and ability to connect with other Iranians dissatisfied with the situation in Iran. Despite the government’s censorship and attacks on bloggers (see below), Kelly and Etling found in 2008 that the vast majority of blogs, including those that expressed views against the government, were visible in Iran. Therefore, they conclude that “the Iranian blogosphere remains a viable arena of political contestation and forum for viewpoints challenging the ruling ideology of the Islamic Republic. In this sense, it remains a robust platform for democratic discourse for a society with severely curtailed modes of practical political participation.”51 During the 2009 election campaign, all of the major candidates, including Ahmadinejad, had websites and Facebook pages. The websites and Facebook pages were especially helpful for the reformist candidates as they had limited access to other forms of media because of the government’s control over newspapers, radio, and television. By the June 12 election, there were over 40,000 members on Mousavi’s Facebook page and the email listserv 88camp, used to support Mousavi, had nearly 400,000 subscribers.52 Once the postelection protests began, social media continued to play an important role in spreading information about events, especially as the government-controlled media provided little coverage of the protests. Without the coverage of protests on social media platforms, there would have been “a near total media blackout in Iran.”53 The combination of “citizen journalists” posting videos and photos online and major international media organizations using that information in their broadcasts provided information for Iranians about the demonstrations. Various oppositionconnected websites became venues for spreading information, and some groups emailed out news to subscribers.54 Other activists posted short videos on YouTube to provide updates and analysis about the protests and the government response.55 Because of the more interactive nature of the internet, and especially social media, it was also a place for collective discourse and shared grievances. Facebook users in Iran demonstrated their solidarity with the demonstrations by changing their profile pictures to a green square with the text, “where is my vote?”56 Again in 2017–2018, other forms of Iranian media did not report on the outbreak of protests. Therefore, ICT was the primary way that people shared information about the protests, especially as they began in locations outside of the capital. People shared videos and photos via Telegram and Instagram. The use of social media to publicize the protests

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helped them spread from the initial location in Mashhad to other cities throughout Iran.

Russia. At the time of the protests, Russia had the second-highest internet penetration rate of any of the cases in this book, 49 percent.57 The highest rate of access was in the urban areas, where on average 71 percent of Russians had internet access.58 Russian youth are particularly well connected with 96 percent of twelve- to thirty-four-year-olds having access to the internet.59 Furthermore, many Russians were actively involved in blogging and using social media, with the Russian equivalent of Facebook, VKontakte, being especially popular. Studies of Russian internet users found that 51 percent of users read the news online and 50 percent utilized social networking platforms, with 18.3 million Russians using VKontakte every day.60 At the time of the 2011 protests, there were approximately 190 million registered VKontakte accounts, making it the most popular social networking site in Russia.61 Moreover, Twitter was growing in popularity throughout this period and, by March 2012, there were 2.3 million Twitter users in Russia.62 A Berkman Center analysis of Russian Twitter in 2011 found that a significant percentage of tweets were engaged with politics and public issues such as corruption.63 Russia had a diverse, relatively open, and active blogosphere. Analysts estimate that Russia had over 1 million active blogs in 2011.64 LiveJournal is a major Russian blogging platform. An analysis of 2,000 blogs on LiveJournal in 2011–2012 found that, although there were progovernment blogs, opposition voices dominated the Russian blogosphere.65 In an in-depth analysis and mapping of the Russian blogosphere, Bruce Etling, Hal Roberts, and Robert Faris concluded that there were distinct differences in the topics discussed in blogs compared to Russian mainstream media, and that blogs provided an “alternative public sphere.”66 Compared to traditional forms of media, the Russian government rarely engaged in censorship of the blogosphere, enabling the blogosphere to be an alternative source of information. Bloggers do not have the reach and influence of television media; however, it is possible for bloggers to “change the parameters of political debate in small ways at first,” providing the “potential for more widespread influence over time.”67 A good example of this type of influence is the work of Alexei Navalny, one of the most popular bloggers on LiveJournal prior to the protests. Navalny’s blog and his website rospil.ru documented government corruption in Russia, including how members of United Russia engaged in corruption. Navalny’s blog grew in popularity and, by the 2011 Duma elections, his labeling of United Russia as a political party

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of “crooks and thieves” and calls to vote for any other party contributed to United Russia’s relatively poor performance in the election. The work of bloggers influenced the election and changed the nature of the political discourse in at least parts of Russia.68 According to Etling, Roberts, and Faris, “Given Russia’s limited and continually shrinking opportunities for meaningful participation in political and civic life, the blogosphere represents one of the few public spaces where Russians can decide what issues are of public concern and how to organize to act on them, in a bottom-up, organic manner.”69 During the 2011–2012 protests, activists used the existing dynamic of social media, blogs, and news websites to create an alternative negative narrative about Putin’s regime, to spread information about electoral fraud, and to mobilize supporters. For example, some bloggers expressed discontent with the Dmitry Medvedev–Vladimir Putin switcheroo that enabled Putin to run for president again. One blogger, Marina Litvinovich, documented government abuse and corruption. Her blog, along with others, spread information about official wrongdoing, challenging the Russian government’s monopoly over information and urging people to take action. In an interview with Washington Post correspondent Kathy Lally, Litvinovich argued that the internet “gave people the opportunity to get united, and [referring to the December protests] people did it with pleasure.”70 At the time of the elections, Russians employed ICT to document fraud. People uploaded videos of suspected electoral fraud and the Russian NGO and independent election monitor, GOLOS, collected reports of electoral violations on a designated website.71 As Sarah Oates notes, GOLOS was able to use crowdsourcing to document and map election violations, providing compelling evidence of widespread fraud.72 The YouTube channel that documented electoral fraud received millions of hits.73 Given that the traditional media was reluctant to discuss possible electoral fraud, the internet was essential for organizers to spread information about the fraud. In a regression analysis, Stephen White and Ian McAllister found that the more a person used the internet, the more likely they were to see the Duma elections as unfair, demonstrating the possible influence of the internet on public attitudes about the election.74

Mechanism 2: Democratic Diffusion

Iran. Overall, democratic diffusion to Iran is low. Iran has no democratic neighbors and Iran’s main allies are all authoritarian states. In addition, in the period leading up to 2009 Iran was a relatively isolated country,

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as few Iranians had any interactions with foreigners, especially those from democratic states.75 Democracy promotion agencies from the United States and Europe were unable to operate in Iran. The Iranian media, heavily state controlled, was unlikely to broadcast positive information about Western, democratic countries. By 2009, the internet was beginning to be an avenue through which Iranians could gain access to the rest of the world. For example, the new forms of communication available with the internet provided a way for the Iranian diaspora to provide solidarity and support for the opposition.76 However, the relatively low levels of internet penetration at that time, combined with heavy government censorship, reduced the influence of ICT as an enabler of democratic diffusion. More recently, the Iranian government has supported the development of high-speed internet infrastructure. The better connectivity, combined with the enormous increase in the number of smartphones (from 1 million in 2009 to 48 million in 2018), has increased Iranians’ exposure to the West and “modernity.”77 Therefore, ICT may help democratic diffusion moving forward, but there was little evidence of this in 2009 or 2017–2018.

Russia. Although there is also no direct evidence of ICT facilitating democratic diffusion in Russia, the internet does enable Russians to access foreign news and gain exposure to democratic ideas. In contrast to Iran, the Russian government did not block access to international news sites or restrict the ability of Russians to interact with foreigners. Furthermore, as the Russian government increased its restrictions on the work of foreign NGOs working on democracy or human rights and its control over television news, the internet became one of the few remaining places to encounter democratic ideas and engage in public debate. Despite the various forms of linkage and the relative freedom of the internet, there is little evidence of either democratic diffusion or promotion succeeding in Russia. Most analyses of democratic promotion efforts in Russia find that they had limited impact.78 Moreover, the level of democracy in Russia has deteriorated compared to where it was in the 1990s. The lack of European or US leverage over Russia is one reason for the minimal impact.79 In addition, following the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the Russian government has actively worked to resist democratic diffusion and challenge US and European democracy promotion efforts.80 For example, Russia helped establish the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) election observation organization as a nondemocratic alternative to the election monitoring of the

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OSCE.81 Overall, it appears that democratic diffusion has been limited and ICT’s role in facilitating it, at least so far, has also been limited.

Mechanism 3: Source of Mobilization and Tool of Organization

Iran. Despite being labeled “Iran’s Twitter Revolution” by US observers of the 2009 protests, there is little actual evidence that Facebook or Twitter played an important role in helping to organize and mobilize protests.82 There are a few reports of supporters of the opposition candidate Mousavi using Facebook, text messaging, and email to organize pro-Mousavi rallies, such as a 19-kilometer human chain in Tehran a few days before the election.83 In terms of Twitter, despite the large number of tweets related to the elections in Iran during the June 12–19 period, the majority of the activity was taking place outside of Iran. The data on Twitter in Iran suggests that there were only approximately 10,000 Twitter accounts in Iran at the time of the election, and fewer than 100 of those showed high levels of activity during the postelection protests.84 Furthermore, in 2009 Twitter did not support the language Farsi, limiting its reach in Iran to English speakers.85 There are also multiple reports of progovernment entities spreading false information about protests and government repression on Twitter.86 Along with limited usage in Iran, the Iranian government was successful and extensive in its repression of ICT during the protests. The government blocked access to blogging sites and frequently shut off mobile service.87 Mousavi’s supporters primarily used traditional forms of communication, such as sharing information by word of mouth, to organize protests because of the extensive repression of ICT by the Iranian government. The low usage of ICT to organize the 2009 protests contrasts with the 2017–2018 protests, where Iranians extensively used the messaging application Telegram to organize demonstrations. Reports say that the first protest in Mashhad was organized via the public channels of Telegram.88 This change partially reflects the increased access to the internet in Iran by 2017, where internet penetration rates were then 44 percent.89 It also reflects the continued government control over all other forms of media, making social media applications one of the few ways to organize antigovernment activity quickly and broadly.

Russia. In contrast to Iran in 2009, ICT provided helpful tools for organizing the protests in Russia. VKontakte event groups were one tool employed by activists to organize protests. Another tool used by

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organizers was Twitter. A detailed study of tweets around the presidential elections found that Twitter also helped to spread details about the protests and mobilize people.90 For example, before the December 10 protest, there was extensive tweeting about the protest under the hashtag #Dec10 and its Russian language equivalent (Twitter was available in Russian).91 Social media and opposition websites were also essential for the organization of the December 10 protest. When the city government required the organizers to move the protest location from the original site, Revolution Square, to Bolotnaya Square, the internet was the only way to disseminate information about the change of venue to demonstrators.92 Activists also used Facebook to organize the December 24 protest and the protests in February 2012. A survey of people at the December 24 demonstration found that 89 percent had heard about the protests from an internet source.93 In interviews with participants in the demonstrations, it was clear that Facebook, more so than other forms of social media, was a main source of information about the protests.94 In surveys of protesters, 42.6 percent said they were active on Facebook and 32.9 percent said they used Twitter.95 The Facebook pages not only provided logistical details, but also helped to overcome the collective action problem as people were able to indicate that they planned to attend. The information that others are attending may encourage more people to participate since larger protests are often seen as being safer from repression (i.e., safety in numbers).

Mechanism 4: Spreading the Word

Iran. Activists used ICT during the 2009 Iranian protests to spread information about the protests outside of Iran. The growing number of tweets, blogs, and social media posts about events in Iran triggered greater coverage of the protests by the international media, which had originally given little attention to the situation.96 For example, thousands of Twitter users outside of Iran followed events via tweets from Iranian activists within and outside of Iran. One of the most active hashtags on Twitter during the peak period of protests was #IranElection.97 Greater international coverage provoked the Iranian government and, during the protests, major international broadcast media, including BBC, Al Jazeera, NBC News, and others, reported that their journalists in Iran faced harassment and in some cases were forced to leave the country.98 Therefore, citizen journalists often became the only observers of the protests and provided the majority of the video footage of events.99 Despite the government efforts to block all forms of interna-

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tional communication, “some protesters somehow managed to circumvent the restrictions, which caused floods of cell phone video clips and news about the brutal crackdown in Tehran’s streets being broadcast over the Web, triggering an international solidarity movement.”100 However, the activists still depended on satellite international television news to broadcast videos and information about the protests back into Iran, as more Iranians followed information about the protests via satellite television than social media. Some involved in the protests even went so far as to argue that, without BBC Persian (satellite television station and website launched in 2009) reporting about the protests, they would have ended earlier.101 The case of Neda Agha-Soltan and her untimely death is illustrative of the interplay between ICT and traditional media that contributed to the development of international solidarity with the protesters. The cell phone video of twenty-seven-year-old Neda being shot and dying in the street on June 20, 2009 became the major international symbol of the demonstration. Posted by witnesses on YouTube, the video became one of the most searched videos on YouTube.102 The online and media portrayal of Neda’s death connected to Iranian views of martyrdom.103 Neda’s death became an iconic image and expression of the strength and determination of the opposition.104 As Samira Rajabi argues, Iranians and others saw Neda’s death as an act of sacrifice that would lead to freedom and salvation for the young protesters in Iran, their voice, their Neda would lead them to freedom. Freedom would, in turn, lead to salvation. The power of what had been witnessed was almost immediately articulated and understood. A woman participating in a protest for her political freedoms and human rights could now be a symbol evoking prayer, faith, and hope. She became an angel, a voice, and a potent symbol of a movement that used the digital.105

CNN was the first to feature the forty-second video of Neda’s death on its broadcast after an Iranian American journalist saw it online.106 Other media sources soon followed CNN with their coverage of the video and the events surrounding her death. The interconnectivity between traditional media and new technology continued as the media broadcast of the video attracted even more online commentary, and on Twitter, Neda’s story became one of the main trending topics. 107 For some Iranians and Western observers of the protests, the image of Neda’s death epitomized both the brutality of the state and the “courage, agency and self-determination” of the protesters, especially the Iranian women participants.108

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Because the Iranian government still severely restricted foreign media access to the country, social media was again important for spreading information about the 2017–2018 protests to the rest of the world. The international media coverage was highly dependent on citizen journalist videos and photos for reporting on the protests. Overall, the protests in 2017–2018, not being as large or connected to a major election, received less international media coverage.

Russia. There is little evidence that ICT played a unique role in disseminating information about the 2011–2012 protests abroad. Although the protests were discussed outside Russia on social media, the demonstrations were extensively covered in the international media from the start. Unlike Iran, where foreign journalists either have their movements restricted or are deported, major international media organizations had a strong presence in Moscow and there were no restrictions on their reporting in 2011–2012. Furthermore, since Facebook, Twitter, and VKontakte were all available in the Russian language and Russians generally used their local language, the linguistic barrier likely limited the global spread of YouTube videos, tweets, and so forth. In summary, the Iranian and Russian governments both controlled television and radio news, ensuring persistent positive coverage of their respective governments. Therefore, a common dynamic in all three cases of protest (Iran 2009, Iran 2017–2018, and Russia 2011–2012) was the importance of the internet and social media as alternative forms of information and challenges to the government’s narrative. Both countries also had an active blogosphere in the years prior to the protests, providing a valuable avenue for people to share grievances and information. The Berkman Center research on the Russian internet concluded that Russia had an “open, vibrant and diverse online media space that discusses and debates a wide range of political and social issues and that constitutes an independent alternative to broadcast and print media.”109 The exposure to a wider range of ideas may also help to shape different attitudes in Iran and Russia about the appropriate relationship between government and society. Interestingly, correlation analysis found “that regular internet users are more positive about respect for human rights, freedom of speech, the ability to join organizations, and the chance to participate in public life in Russia.”110 The spread of new technology contributed to the outbreak of the largest protests in Iran and Russia in decades, a noteworthy development. The two cases differ the most on Mechanisms 3 and 4. In Russia, activists heavily relied on social media to organize the protests in 2011–

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2012. In contrast, there is little evidence of Iranians using ICT to organize the 2009 protests. However, demonstrating the increased availability of technology, Iranians did use Telegram and other social media platforms to organize protests in 2017–2018. Mechanism 4, ICT being used to spread information around the world, was the main way for Iranians to share their account of the protests and disseminate evidence of the government’s violent response to the world. Given Russia’s greater openness to international media in 2011–2012, ICT was significantly less important for spreading news of the protests. These differences may be due partly to the differences between a revolutionary theocracy and an authoritarian regime. The success or failure of attempted regime change depends on the strength and capabilities of both the opposition and the government. Despite the differences between Iran and Russia, the reasons for the failure of the protests are similar. Both countries, partially because of deliberate, sustained government attacks on civil society, have a weak civil society, reducing the ability to sustain mobilization against the government. Furthermore, the protest movements never managed to diversify their support beyond urban, middle-class, educated Iranians and Russians. A broader, more diverse opposition movement would have been more difficult for each government to efficiently weaken and disband. In addition, both protest movements had little international support because democratic states lack leverage over each country, and in the case of Iran, also have low levels of linkage. The protests in Iran and Russia also failed to bring about political reform because each leader retained sufficient elite support and coercive capacity. Unlike in the cases of Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, or Tunisia (discussed in the following chapters), the Iranian security forces remained loyal to the supreme leader and were willing to engage in violence against civilians to maintain the current political system. The nature of the Iranian regime, being both a theocracy and a revolutionary regime, makes regime change more difficult as the government has strong ideological legitimacy. In the case of Russia, Putin did not have to resort to widespread violence, but rather the existing presidential system of patronal politics and his popularity limited the reach of the opposition movement. Moreover, the weakness of the opposition is directly connected to the efforts of the Russian government over the previous decade to prevent the development of any alternative to Putin.

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Weakness of Civil Society

Iran. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, civil society organizations worked in synergy with digitally networked movements to mobilize and sustain protests (see Chapters 5 and 6). Although civil society organizations did play a role in mobilizing support for Mousavi and in the postelection protests, they had less of an influence in Iran than other cases. The main civil society organizations that were active were women’s rights NGOs, student organizations, and human rights activists. During the election campaign, women’s rights activists formed the Iranian Women’s Movement Coalition, which included more than forty organizations. Focused on repealing elements of the Iranian constitution that discriminated against women, the coalition did not endorse any candidate during the electoral campaign.111 Student organizations, historically playing an important role in Iranian social movements, also participated in the presidential election campaign. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the combination of restrictions on political parties, the urban location of major universities, and the “lack of upward mobility among a relatively young population” all contributed to the relatively high levels of activism among Iranians younger than age thirty.112 Similar to the women’s coalition, the student unions focused less on advocating for a particular candidate during the campaign and more on a series of core issues. The student union, the Office for Consolidating Unity, issued a statement in May 2009 calling for a general restoration of civil and political liberties and academic freedom.113 Despite the involvement of these civil society organizations during the electoral campaign, in general, civil society organizations did not organize or lead the postelection protests, although many members, especially students, were active participants.114 Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, there is no nationwide, well-organized, and independent organization able to mobilize vast numbers of people. The Iranian government engages in regular repression of civil society organizations, restricting their ability to organize and to challenge the government. For example, although nongovernmental organizations are not required by law to have permits, the NGO Human Rights Defenders Center was forcibly closed by government officials “in December 2008 for allegedly operating without a license.”115 As the Iranian government has strict control over religion, there are no powerful independent religious organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Furthermore, labor unions are illegal in Iran, eliminating a major source of organizational capacity. The lack of labor unions reduces the likelihood of labor strikes, which

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can be a powerful form of pressure on governments. For example, in the 1979 revolution, strikes by the oil workers contributed to the Shah’s overthrow by threatening the economic stability of the country and, thereby, eroding support for the Shah. The protests in Iran had limited regional and cross-class appeal. The demonstrators were predominantly urban, mainly in the capital Tehran, and most participants were educated, middle-class Iranians. The dominance of urban, educated professionals in digitally networked protests is common, especially because these are the people most likely to have access to the internet. Although the protests were in connection with the electoral loss of Mousavi, he was not the main organizer of the protests. Similar to other digitally networked protests, the movement also lacked clear leaders. The lack of cross-regional, cross-class support made the protests easier for the government to suppress. After the 2005 election of Ahmadinejad, the government increased its monitoring and repression of civil society, further weakening its ability to operate in Iran. In a 2008 interview, an Iranian NGO employee stated that “we are under much closer scrutiny: our budgets and our personal opinions are deeply scrutinized; we’re under perpetual stress. Many people have passed the last few years trying to convince the government that they are not American or Israeli spies.”116 US organizations that fund civil society development in other countries are not able to work in Iran. For example, because the United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), a major foreign funder of civil society organizations, cannot work in Iran. Overall, civil society organizations were (and are) weak in Iran, reducing the likelihood that mass mobilization will be sustainable and place enough pressure on the government to force change.

Russia. Russian civil society is also weak. Similar to Iran, deliberate strategies by the Russian government have reduced the influence of civil society organizations and led to a more repressive environment for them. However, some of the weakness of civil society in Russia is unique to being a postcommunist state, especially the high level of political apathy. Along with these existing challenges facing civil society, the 2011–2012 protest movement struggled because, similar to the 2009 protests in Iran, it lacked broader appeal and had limited support outside of the major cities. A significant challenge for Russian civil society organizations is obtaining resources. Fund-raising within Russia is difficult “because a large majority, 64 percent [of Russians], suspect that charities will not

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use their money for the declared purpose.”117 Furthermore, the Russian government has continually eroded access to foreign funding for civil society, especially after the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. One of the best examples of this is the 2006 On Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation law, also known as the 2006 NGO Law. The 2006 law increased the reporting requirements and scrutiny over all foreign NGOs and foreign funding for Russian NGOs, making it harder for Russian NGOs to obtain foreign funds. In interviews with Russian NGOs, researchers found that after the NGO Law was passed, the funding situation was “difficult,” and that there was “an unspoken agreement that good organizations should not accept funding from specific organizations such as USAID.”118 Organizations like USAID were important sources of financing for Russian NGOs, especially those involved in advocating for human rights, rule of law, and democracy. Between 2001 and 2011, Russian NGOs received more than $3 billion in assistance from USAID.119 Although there are well-documented problems with NGOs being dependent on foreign funding, in the case of Russia there was no replacement source of funding. 120 Therefore, restricting foreign money curtailed NGO activity and the influence of civil society on government policy. In an interview, one Russian NGO worker stated that “civil society is systematically being destroyed from above. Administrative and financial pressure are being systematically used to destroy civil society in Russia.”121 In addition to a lack of resources, civil society is weak in Russia because of the lack of public engagement and support. Public surveys have found low levels of political efficacy among Russians. Political efficacy refers to people’s beliefs about their ability to understand and influence government policy. Generally, low levels of political efficacy translate to low levels of participation. A Levada Center poll found that “in an answer to a question about whether people thought they could influence the political processes in Russia, in 2011 only 14% believed they could while 82% believed they could not.” 122 A variety of reasons account for the lack of collective action, low levels of political participation, and overall political apathy in Russia. The legacy of required volunteering under Soviet rule contributes to a general rejection of volunteering, including in civic organizations. As Alexander Smolar notes, “Flight from the public to the private sphere may be regarded as a natural reaction to years of forced participation and mobilization. Everyday life under socialism taught people to survive as individuals and to fear any association with independent col-

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lective action.”123 Surviving communism, especially in a state defined by surveillance and chronic shortages, required developing informal networks of trusted friends and families. After the fall of communism, citizens of postcommunist states continued to trust these informal networks more than organizations, political parties, or legal norms. 124 Furthermore, attempts to develop a postcommunist civil society occurred under difficult conditions of economic recession, political turmoil, collapse of public services, lack of legal norms, and rampant corruption. It is hard to overemphasize the trauma of the 1990s in Russia and its effects on people’s perceptions of government, politics, society, and the economy. Russia, like all postcommunist states, struggles with weak civil society because of the legacy of totalitarian rule and the trauma of the 1990s. The systemic weakness of civil society in Russia meant that, unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, there were no strong partners available to help sustain and spread the 2011–2012 protest movement. The movement itself also had several challenges. First, despite being the largest protests since the downfall of the Soviet Union, the protests were still relatively small. The most generous interpretation of the protests states that there were 120,000 protesters at its peak, significantly smaller than the protests in Tehran in 2009. In a city of 9 million and a country of 141.8 million, that is a small number. Second, the protests were not widely supported. A poll by the Levada Center in March 2012 found that 52 percent of Russians opposed the protests and only 8 percent said they were willing to participate.125 Furthermore, the majority of Russians (59 percent) accepted the results of the December parliamentary elections and only 21 percent supported the protesters’ demand for the government to call for new elections.126 The protest movement struggled to gain support outside of Moscow or to develop an influential antiPutin narrative. In the city of Lyubertsy, people interviewed by a New York Times reporter “had little good to say about” the protests and one person said that the protests were for “people who have free time and don’t have to work for a living.”127 Third, the protest movement, like other digitally networked protests, lacked clear leaders and failed to form into a cohesive movement. The 2011–2012 protest movement failed to achieve either of its major goals—a new parliamentary election or the defeat of Putin—partially because of the inherent weakness of civil society and Russian political opposition. NGOs in Russia lack resources and broad support within society. The opposition was disunified, ideologically diverse, and lacked popular leaders in 2011.

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Weak International Support for Democracy The main international prodemocratic actors, the United States and the EU, have limited leverage and linkage with Iran, reducing international support for the protest movements. Since the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, the United States has not had diplomatic relations with Iran. Furthermore, in 2009 the United States had a range of economic sanctions on Iran, which made economic linkage almost nonexistent. In contrast, the EU imported 9.3 billion euros of goods (primarily oil) from Iran in 2009.128 However, the EU did not end its imports of oil or increase sanctions on Iran because of government repression. In addition, the Iranian government’s repeated claims that the protests were a British and US plot made it difficult for the United States or the EU to effectively aid the protesters. In just one of many statements blaming the British, Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottatki said that there had been “an in-flooding of British intelligence officials ahead of the election,” a claim denied by the British government.129 Furthermore, Iran’s ongoing nuclear program was a higher priority for both the United States and European states than promoting democratization in Iran. An example of this was the EU’s suspension of all oil imports from Iran in January 2012 because of Iran’s nuclear program, not because of government violations of human rights. The nuclear program and Iran’s violation of UN Security Council resolutions drove the increased US, European, and UN sanctions on Iran, not its violations of human rights. Russia has stronger linkages with democratic states than with Iran. Unlike Iran, Russia has democratic neighbors (the Baltic States). In addition, Russia has extensive economic linkages with the EU because the EU is Russia’s largest trading partner. Russia’s total trade with the EU in 2011 was 309 billion euros.130 The EU is also Russia’s largest foreign direct investor.131 In contrast to Iran, the main US democracy promotion agencies were active in Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s. They supported political party and civil society development, and engaged in election observation. Despite the multiple linkages, Europe and the United States lack leverage over Russia, limiting any democracy promotion efforts.132 Russia is a large state with significant military capacity and nuclear weapons, all of which reduces US and European leverage. The response to Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 is a good example of the limited US and European leverage over Russia. When Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine, it violated international law on state sovereignty and the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine, in which Russia promised to respect the territorial borders of Ukraine. Despite the egregious violation of international law, the United

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States and the EU have been unable to change Russia’s behavior. Furthermore, because Russia is an important supplier of natural gas to Europe (approximately 26 percent as of 2018), the Europeans agreed to only limited sanctions on Russia.133 Therefore, even in a situation that has significant negative international implications, the United States and the EU have had limited leverage over Russia.

Strength of the Leader and the Nature of the Autocratic Regime

Iran. The supreme leader in Iran is able to survive multiple rounds of protests for several reasons. First, as a theocracy, the Iranian regime combines religious and political authority in the position of the supreme leader, currently Ayatollah Khamenei, providing stronger ideological support for the regime than a typical dictatorship such as that of Zine alAbidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. Second, the Iranian security forces are well funded, loyal, and effective. In other words, the government has high coercive capacity. Third, major oil reserves provide an independent source of government revenue and a way to fund a large security force. The presence of oil makes repression easier for the supreme leader. When Ayatollah Khamenei came out publicly in support of Ahmadinejad as the next president and rejected any claims of electoral fraud, the political dynamic of the situation in 2009 changed. It meant that the protest movement was no longer just against Ahmadinejad, but also was challenging the authority of the supreme leader and the identity of the Islamic regime. The position of the protesters was more revolutionary than that of Mousavi or the other reformist political elite. Mousavi himself wrote to supporters that he was not seeking to overturn the Islamic constitution or system of government in Iran. Instead, Mousavi and other reformist political elites in Iran wanted gradual and moderate changes, not a revolution. Jason Brownlee argues that during Khatami’s presidency the reformist political elites in Iran were unwilling to force a direct confrontation with the conservative factions as they feared risking internal conflict.134 This dynamic was also true in 2009 when the political elites remained cautious in their public statements. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad won an unfair, but relatively free, election in 2005, and even in 2009 the polling suggested significant levels of popular support for his candidacy. Given the constraints on accurately obtaining public opinion data in an authoritarian state, it is not possible to know the true extent of Iranian support for Ahmadinejad versus the Green Movement. However, polling information from before the election does

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show between 40 percent and 50 percent of Iranians supporting Ahmadinejad, and one poll had 43 percent of the population of Tehran saying that they were planning on voting for Ahmadinejad.135 As discussed in Chapter 2, public opinion does matter in authoritarian regimes as it reduces incentives for elites to defect. A reasonably high level of public support signals to the elite that the president is likely to remain in power and it is too risky to come out against the president. In the case of Iran, because of its unique political structure, public support for Ahmadinejad is only one factor; the other is loyalty and support for the supreme leader. The fact that Mousavi and his allies never directly challenged Ayatollah Khamenei or called for his removal suggests that elites believed that there remained significant public support for Khamenei. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that, between the ideological legitimacy of Khamenei and the popular support for Ahmadinejad, the regime had at least tacit support from many Iranians, strengthening its position relative to the protesters. Along with at least some degree of public support, the Iranian government had high levels of coercive capacity in 2009. The Iranian security forces remained loyal to Khamenei and Ahmadinejad for ideological and economic reasons. Furthermore, unlike in Tunisia, the Iranian security forces have had a long history of engaging in politics. Ayatollah Khamenei has two different security forces beyond the police and regular military that he can use to help maintain his rule and to counter protests: the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, a militia. The IRGC is an elite military organization of approximately 120,000 soldiers under the direct control of the Ayatollah. The IRGC, reflecting the theocratic and revolutionary nature of the regime, has a political mandate within Iran to ensure the continuation of the Islamic Republic and to actively support Shiite groups in the region, especially in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.136 Along with the political mandate, at least some members of the IRGC have a nondemocratic ideological and religious interpretation of the appropriate relationship between Islam, the state, and society. Ayatollah Khomeini in his political writings and thoughts outlined the idea of the velayat-e faqih (the Guardian of the jurist). The supreme leader is, according to Khomeini, the faqih (top jurist). The idea of the velayat-e faqih for Khomeini and Khamenei is interpreted as playing the role of the guardian of the people, who are seen as subjects, not citizens, and “the divine right of the clergy to rule.”137 Not only does this ideology eliminate the people as a source of legitimacy and therefore is inherently undemocratic, but it also provides the justification for the IRGC to violently suppress dissent for “as executors of the Faqih’s

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(and by extension God’s) will, the [IRGC] see themselves as empowered to do whatever necessary” to maintain the regime.138 The IRGC also oversees the all-volunteer Basij. The Basij are a militia, a social organization, and a quasi-police force. There is no accurate data on the size of the Basij, but the best guess is that there are approximately 4 million members, with the majority being “regular” members that have minimal training.139 There are also likely around 200,000 IRGC members assigned to the Basij, demonstrating the interconnectivity between the two organizations.140 The Basij has two main functions: helping to enforce social and morality laws and developing loyalty to the regime among the youth. From the time of its formation immediately after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the “Basij was designed to be an ideologically and religiously-driven armed force geared toward the defense of Iran’s revolutionary regime and its theocratic system (velayat-e faqih).”141 As part of spreading the values and ideals of the Islamic Revolution, members of the Basij also monitor friends, neighbors, classmates, and coworkers and report any violations of rules or dissent.142 The Basij are most known by Iranians for their enforcement of the dress code and strict public separation of the sexes. When demonstrations occur, such as the student protests in 1999 or the Green Movement in 2009, the Basij also help suppress protests. For all of these reasons, the Basij are an important part of the security apparatus of the Iranian government. The members of the Basij also receive economic benefits. Membership in the Basij is an important way to achieve mobility, especially for poorer Iranians, as Basij Iranians have access to subsidized government housing, subsidized food, and preferential admission into university.143 Members of the Basij profited from the Iranian regime. Therefore, they had little incentive to abandon Ahmadinejad and, given their emphasis on religious and ideological training, the Basij were likely supportive of Ayatollah Khamenei. Economically, the IRGC had already benefited from a government policy to support veterans of the Iran-Iraq War and from privatization that had occurred over the previous decade. However, it increased its economic influence and wealth during the first administration of Ahmadinejad. According to Roozbeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet, “The Khatim al-Anbiya’ Headquarters, the IRGC’s most visible economic arm, in the last four years has gone from being a major government contractor to being the single largest recipient of government contracts, often bypassing the bidding process completely.”144 The leadership of the IRGC, because of their political connections, has advanced information about privatization and has used that to obtain companies at

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below market prices or even before the sale is publicly announced.145 The IRGC is a “vast social-political-economic-security complex that today permeates every aspect of Iranian society.”146 The unity and coercive capacity of the Iranian government is clear in the extensive and effective repression utilized by the security forces since the protests in June 2009. There is significant debate about how many people the Iranian security forces killed in response to the protests. Iranian opposition figures have 72 documented deaths, and research by international media suggests 200 deaths in Tehran alone with another 173 in other cities.147 Along with killing demonstrators, the security forces arrested over 4,000 people. Although Iranian security forces engaged in violence against the demonstrators during the first week, the situation deteriorated after Ayatollah Khamenei’s speech at Friday prayers on June 19. He signaled in that speech that the police, IRGC, and Basij were authorized to end the demonstrations by any means necessary. A December 2009 report by Amnesty International documents in detail the Iranian government’s arrest and harassment of opposition leaders, human rights activists, journalists, foreign correspondents, and students. The report also includes details about how detainees suffered torture and rape in detention centers, along with being denied access to a lawyer or communication with their families. In scenes reminiscent of the Soviet Union, the government held show trials where defendants were coerced into confessing crimes against the state.148 The Iranian government adopted similar tactics in response to the 2017–2018 antigovernment protests. Freedom House reports that at least 21 people were killed during the protests and approximately 4,900 people were detained.149 The government also subsequently banned the messaging application Telegram. Again, the contrast with Russia is noticeable, as the Russian government managed to end protests with few arrests and no deaths. Another reason why the Iranian government has high coercive capacity is its oil reserves. Oil revenues are approximately 45 percent of the government budget and provide resources to spend on police, IRGC, Basij, and the military.150 Current research finds that countries with major oil rents will have higher levels of coercive power.151 Although international sanctions eventually restricted government oil revenue, this was not true in 2009 as Iran was still able to sell its oil at that time. Ironically, the protests in 2009 helped to increase the global price of oil and, thereby, the Iranian government’s revenue.152 The 2009 Green Movement failed to prevent the reelection of Ahmadinejad because of the weakness of the movement and the strength

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of the supreme leader. The 2017–2018 protests also failed for the same reasons. Partially due to years of repression, civil society in Iran is weak and lacks the capability to organize sustained, cross-national protests against the regime. The combination of religious-ideological support for the supreme leader and highly effective security forces under his direct control ensures the persistence of his rule.

Russia. Despite the weaknesses with Russian civil society noted above, similar to Iran, the failure of the protest movement is primarily because of the strength and effectiveness of Putin’s rule. Putin had developed a system where there were no major sources of elite opposition and where there was widespread popular support for his rule. Putin’s popularity made resorting to violence unnecessary. Furthermore, when Putin’s popularity was challenged by the protest movement, the government pursued a successful strategy to restore his popularity and discredit the opposition. The opposition was not able to convince most Russians that Putin was vulnerable nor was it able to fundamentally challenge the government’s framing of Putin as an effective, legitimate, and popular leader. Unlike all of the other cases of mass demonstrations discussed in this book, the Russian government did not have to engage in widespread violence (there were several hundred arrests) to suppress the movement. That it was unnecessary to resort to violence demonstrates the true strength of Putin, as violence is a costly and problematic method for autocrats to use to stay in power. Resorting to violence always risks the possibility of domestic and international backlash, which may eventually cause the downfall of the regime. Putin successfully survived the protests because he retained both elite and popular support. Putin’s elite support is the result of over a decade of developing a presidential pyramid–type system where both political and economic elites are dependent on him to maintain their wealth, power, and influence. Multiple excellent books have documented Putin’s remarkable rise from a KGB official to president of Russia, and it is not the purpose of this book to repeat that material.153 Therefore, I only briefly discuss the nature of the system and why digitally networked protests were unable to bring about any change. Once he became president, Putin and his allies worked to prevent economic and political elites from challenging his rule. In terms of the economic elite (generally the oligarchs), many of them benefited from Putin’s rule since they gained increased wealth as the economy improved. It is estimated that 110 Russian billionaires control 35 percent of the country’s wealth.154 Putin moved early on to ensure that the oligarchs

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realized they could keep and even increase their wealth so long as they did not challenge him and played by his rules. Because almost all Russian oligarchs gained wealth through legally questionable means, Putin had leverage over most of them. According to Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, Putin’s relationship with the oligarchs is in many ways a form of a protection racket. The property rights and wealth of the oligarchs are dependent on the goodwill of the Kremlin.155 As long as they are loyal and support Putin, they can avoid arrest and keep their companies. Most Russian oligarchs gained their wealth through connections with the state and, therefore, are vulnerable. The system developed by Putin also sought to limit the power and influence of other political offices. Putin worked to increase the control of the federal government over local prosecutors, ministries, and courts. As Henry E. Hale argues, one of the best examples of Putin eliminating rival centers of power is his actions taken to reduce the power of the governors. Putin removed the governors from the Federation Council (the upper house of the federal legislature), decreasing their influence over federal politics and their ability to coordinate. The final development that eliminated the governors as political rivals was when Putin was able to end all direct elections of governors and make them presidential appointees.156 The maneuvers against the governors helped to centralize power under Putin and eliminated a possible avenue for an opposition politician to gain experience, influence, and name recognition. It was an important step in the formation of the pyramid structure of power developed by Putin. Furthermore, by the end of Putin’s second term, almost all political elites were dependent on him and his favor for continued power and access to economic gain. As Hale argues, by 2007–2008, “Putin had effectively combined virtually all major networks into a single patronal pyramid that was so tightly bound that few even thought a serious challenge was possible.”157 Therefore, when protests began in December 2011, few political or economic elites had incentives to defect and join the opposition. Another reason for Putin’s continued support among the elites was because, as noted above, he retained majority popular support and the opposition was never able to alter the pro-Putin narrative. The popular support for Putin is a signal to elites of the difficulty in replacing Putin and further reduces their incentives to challenge the system. Russians supported Putin because of a combination of fear of a return to the instability of the 1990s or because of their improved living conditions under his rule. Putin won the March 2012 election with 64 percent of the vote, and even his opponents acknowledged that he would have won

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the election without any electoral fraud. Mikhail Dmitriev, an economist at the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, notes that their research found that Russians who disliked Putin still voted for him because people feared the possibility of “the complete disorganization of their country” and saw Putin’s rule as a source of stability.158 Interviews at the time of the election with various Russians support these results. For example, one woman stated that she did not “see any other option” and that Putin was the “most reliable” and the source of their “stability.”159 When asked what would happen if Putin was not elected, one pensioner stated that life in Russia would either not improve or that they would “return to the old, terrifying days of the 1990s.”160 The Russian Election Studies 2012 Survey found that Russian voters overwhelming considered Putin the most competent to handle major issues, as 61 percent of those polled saw him as best qualified to improve the economy and 70 percent saw him as the best presidential candidate to promote the international interests of Russia.161 There are a variety of reasons why Putin was popular. His presidency coincided with the first economic growth in over a decade and much greater stability than most Russians had seen since the mid-1980s. An additional reason for his popularity was the government’s control over most forms of media, but especially television news. Freedom House’s 2012 Freedom of the Press report ranked the media in Russia as not free with a score of 80 (scale of 1 to 100 with 100 the least free). The report also states that in 2011, “most state and privately owned mass media engaged in blatant propaganda that glorified the country’s national leaders and fostered an image of political pluralism, as the government maintained control over key television outlets.”162 The Russian government exerts direct editorial control over the news on all three national networks.163 Given that 83 percent of Russians cited television “as their primary source of political information,” control over television news was an important method for framing a favorable narrative of Putin and his rule.164 One reason why the protest movement failed to spread was that television news either did not cover the protests or provided negative coverage. Although there has been growth in viewership of online sources of news, this is primarily only among young Russians, especially those between the ages of twelve and seventeen years old.165 Moreover, just because people obtain their news over the internet does not mean they are watching or reading independent sources of news, as a Berkman Center study found that there was a high similarity between the official government statements and Russian mainstream media’s online coverage of politics.166

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In response to the threat presented by the low election results for United Russia and the protests, the Russian government adopted a variety of strategies to increase support for Putin and to discredit the protest movement. The government made some modest concessions, such as installing web cameras in all polling stations, claiming that the cameras would help prevent electoral fraud. It is not clear how much difference the web cameras made in the presidential election, but unlike in the Duma elections, there were few YouTube videos of ballot box stuffing in March 2012. Despite this concession, the government refused to hold new parliamentary elections. Putin and Medvedev also both refused to meet or negotiate with the protesters, denying them that degree of legitimacy. In an attempt to gain votes, the government increased pensions, military salaries, and government spending. Putin held campaign rallies, which the mainstream media made sure to report had higher turnout than the antigovernment protests. For example, just before the election the police officially reported that 138,000 people attended a progovernment rally in Moscow, compared to reports of 120,000 people at the December 24 protest.167 Although the Russian police arrested some protesters, such as opposition blogger Navalny, in general the government allowed the protests to occur and used limited violence against the protesters. Instead of primarily using repression, the Russian government engaged a variety of other tools to demobilize the population and discourage people from participating. For example, the Department of Education in Moscow required all students in secondary school to attend a “mandatory” exam on December 10, the day of the protests, to prevent youth from attending.168 As part of his campaign to discredit the protest movement, Putin categorized the movement as being driven from abroad and as threatening stability. In a February campaign rally, Putin, referencing Russia’s history of fighting off invaders, stated that “we will never allow anyone to interfere in our internal affairs. We will not allow someone to impose their will on us, because we have our own will! It has helped us to conquer! We are a victorious people!”169 Putin’s rhetoric indirectly connected support for the protest movement with being anti-Russia. Pro-Putin supporters at campaign rallies adopted these aspects of the government’s message, condemning the antigovernment protesters as “traitors” and stating they did not need an “Arab Spring” in Russia.170 Russian government officials claimed the protesters were following orders of the United States. As noted above, some Russians voted for Putin because of concerns about a return to the massive political, economic, and social instability

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of the 1990s. Putin deliberately used those concerns in his electoral campaign. Putin wrote an opinion piece in February reminding Russians of how difficult life was in Russia before he became president and then prime minister. He also connected “democracy” with the turmoil of that time, writing, “under the flag of democracy, in the 1990s we received not a modern government, but an opaque fight among clans and numerous semifeudal fiefdoms. We received not a new quality of life, but huge social costs; not a just and free society, but the highhandedness of a selfappointed elite, who openly neglected the interests of simple people.”171 He also repeatedly warned during the campaign that the current stable situation in Russia was fragile and that “it is enough to take two or three incorrect steps” for chaos and turmoil to return.172 Pro-Putin government actors and other groups also launched direct electronic attacks on the protest movement, trying to limit its ability to use ICT. For example, the only independent election monitor, GOLOS, had its website disabled by a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack during the Duma elections.173 Other opposition websites and LiveJournal also experienced cyberattacks. Along with trying to disable opposition sites, progovernment groups tried to dominate Twitter with pro-Putin comments. On YouTube, a progovernment video depicted the protesters as long-fanged orcs from The Lord of Rings movie.174 The 2011–2012 protests failed to prevent Putin’s reelection or to bring any real political reform. The weakness of the political opposition and Russian civil society, partially due to the legacy of communism, meant there were few partners available to help sustain and disseminate the protest movement. Although new technology helped spread information and mobilize protesters, it was not sufficient to maintain a long-term social movement. The protests also failed because of the existing strength of Putin. Putin and his supporters had systematically worked for years to eliminate any true opposition. In addition, memories of the turmoil of the 1990s, combined with the increased prosperity that occurred during Putin’s first two terms as president, resulted in majority public support for Putin, even during the protests. In summary, the Iranian and Russian regimes survived antigovernment protests because of the combination of the weakness of civil society and the strength of the leaders, both of which are partially the result of the nature of the autocratic system in each country. The Iranian regime, as a theocracy, has allowed little pluralism. Moreover, the combination of political and religious authority in the government gives the Iranian regime powerful claims to be the legitimate rulers of Iran. Iran is also a revolutionary regime, which as Levitsky and Way’s

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theory would predict, results in a regime with powerful security forces under the direct control of the supreme leader. Therefore, authoritarianism in Iran may be more durable and harder to overthrow than other types of autocratic regimes. In Russia, the combination of the negative legacy of communism with a patronal presidential system partially explains the persistent weakness of civil society and Putin’s position of strength. However, there is no equivalent ideological foundation for authoritarianism in Russia. The Russian regime is more clearly focused around one individual—Putin. As long as Putin remains popular, regime change appears unlikely. However, if Putin loses popularity, becomes ill, or dies, the regime may be vulnerable to overthrow.

Internet Control, Repression, and Propaganda in Iran and Russia

Prior to the outbreak of protests, Iran and Russia had taken different approaches to the internet. Iran had, and still has, some of the highest levels of restrictions on the internet in the world. In contrast, Russia had a relatively open internet with little government censorship. The varying levels of internet repression highlight how the level of repression is insufficient for examining the impact of ICT on politics in authoritarian contexts. After the outbreak of protests, both governments increased their repression of the freedom of speech on the internet and their overall control. In Iran, the government blocks access to thousands of websites and bans many social media programs. The Iranian government has also announced plans to develop a separate Iranian internet that would reflect Islamic values as opposed to Western ideas. Since 2011, the Russian government has increased its repression of civil society, opposition leaders, and journalists. Unlike Iran, Russia does not block access to social media applications such as Facebook. However, the government has increased censorship over the internet and has extensive surveillance capabilities. Both governments have also adapted this technology to spread their propaganda and surveil any opposition. The Russian government has been especially aggressive in using cyberattacks against the opposition and in engaging in trolling—the practice of paying people to post negative or false information—to discredit opponents at home and abroad. In this section, I first discuss the “defensive approaches” of restricting access to information. Then, I examine the proactive use of new technology to help the Iranian and Russian regimes remain in power. Iran’s and Russia’s uses of ICT demonstrate the ability of authoritarian governments to adapt ICT for their own purposes.

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Iran. Although the Iranian government blocked websites and censored the internet prior to 2009, after the protests it intensified its efforts to control the new technology. The Iranian government has significant ability to block and monitor internet traffic because all internet traffic connecting with the internet outside of Iran goes through the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI), which the IRGC has had a majority stake in since September 2009. To maintain its strict control over internet traffic, the government prohibits anyone from directly accessing the internet via satellite for personal use.175 Iran is working to develop domestic tools and technical capabilities to filter the internet to reduce its dependence on imported technology.176 Comparing OpenNet Initiative’s investigation of internet filtering in Iran in 2009 versus 2011 demonstrates the increased level of government repression.177 Prior to June 2009 the government only periodically blocked Facebook and YouTube, and rarely restricted access to English-language foreign media. After 2009, the government consistently blocked access to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and English-language foreign media websites including the BBC, CBS News, and The Guardian newspaper. Moreover, before June 2009, the government targeted only specific blogs; after 2009, the government prevented all access to major blog sites such as wordpress.com or blogspot.com. The government continued to deny access to women’s rights websites and prevented web searches that included the keyword “women.”178 Reflecting the cultural and social dynamic to Iran’s censorship, the government also blocked all dating websites and stated that they are illegal.179 Some estimate that the government filters more than 5 million websites in Iran.180 The government used a variety of methods to filter the internet. One of the less sophisticated methods is what is known as shallow inspection, which is where the http address and domain name are checked to see if it is on a list of forbidden websites or if the website name includes a blacklisted keyword such as “women.” A more sophisticated form of filtering is random packet dropping. Random packet dropping is a technology where the government is able to stop “packets” of data from reaching their destination. Through this method, the government slows down the internet and prevents Iranians from uploading content, especially videos.181 If content that violates the government rules or challenges the government appears on a website, the government has the ability to block it within a few hours.182

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Along with specific technologies to filter the internet, the Iranian Majlis have adopted several laws that authorize government filtering and restrict access and content. For example, the amended Press Law requires all “internet publications,” broadly and vaguely defined, to obtain a license from the government.183 The police and court systems have utilized the Press Law to prosecute bloggers and journalists writing online. The newer 2009 Cyber Crime Law is what gives the government the authority to filter the internet. The Cyber Crime Law also makes internet service providers (ISPs) legally responsible for any content that appears on their sites, leading ISPs to engage in censorship for the government by removing any blogs and news websites that the government may find objectionable.184 The Iranian government also seeks to filter or block other forms of communication. Government agencies regularly jam satellites to prevent access to foreign news and programming. For example, during the 2013 presidential elections, the government jammed the BBC Persian, Voice of America Persian TV, and Manoto (Persian language station broadcast from London) satellite channels.185 The government also either directly, or indirectly through proxy companies, owns all of the major cell phone carriers in Iran, allowing it to monitor and filter content. There are multiple reports of text messages related to sex or politics being blocked. The government-connected carriers also prevent Iranians from making any video calls on their mobile phones to further restrict communication.186 Iran announced in 2011 that it was working on developing a national information network, SHOMA, which would increase the government’s ability to control content and to monitor internet usage. After the Stuxnet computer virus, likely engineered by the Americans and Israelis, disrupted Iran’s nuclear facilities, the government is driven by security concerns to develop a separate internet. According to the OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, the goal of the “National Information Network” of Iran “is to create a system that no longer requires Iranian Internet traffic to be routed through external (often US based) servers that expose data to interception.”187 Iran had one of the slowest connection speeds in the world; however, in the past few years there have been increased internet speeds, from 1.2 megabits per second (Mbps) in 2013 to 4.7 Mbps in 2017.188 The development of SHOMA is leading to a two-tiered system where there is a highly filtered, monitored, and slow global internet and a faster, easier to access national internet. As part of this effort, the government ordered ISPs to give a 50 percent discount for traffic on approved domestic websites.189 Partially as a result of

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these cost changes, Iran has claimed that domestic traffic now accounts for 40 percent of all internet usage.190 Despite the government’s actions, Iranians use virtual private network (VPN) services or other methods to circumvent government filtering. According to Iranian authorities, in 2012, 20 to 30 percent of Iranians on the internet used a VPN, or approximately 7 million people.191 However, the majority of Iranians use VPNs for social, not political, reasons, especially as the Iranian government blocks dating websites and anything related to sex. In addition, despite being blocked, more than 17 million Iranians have Facebook pages, including major political leaders.192 Instagram and Telegram have both become popular social media and messaging apps in Iran. President Hassan Rouhani’s 2017 electoral campaign actively used Instagram, including livestreaming rallies.193 However, after the outbreak of antigovernment protests in December 2017, the government blocked access to Telegram and Instagram. The blockage of Telegram led more Iranians to resort to VPNs. According to a report by BBC, the Iranian government’s official blocking of Telegram had limited effect on usage as “the volume of content published on more than 600,000 Farsi public channels showed no marked fall” after the government instituted the ban, suggesting widespread use of VPNs to circumvent the block.194 Although many Iranians use VPNs to circumvent censorship like this, the Iranian government also attempts to prevent the use of VPNs by periodically blocking all VPN technologies. The government of Iran not only filters content, but also arrests and harasses internet bloggers, journalists connected to foreign news websites, and anyone challenging their filtering system.195 Iran’s 2009 Cyber Crimes Law criminalizes access to banned websites. Although the Cyber Crimes Law is ambiguous regarding the legality of VPNs, there are reports of authorities arresting people involved in the dissemination of technical tools used to circumvent filtering.196 Since 2009, the Iranian government has targeted Iranians living overseas who work for foreign media organizations, especially BBC’s Persian language news service. Mark Thompson, director general of BBC, noted in 2012 that some “BBC Persian staff [based outside of Iran] have had their Facebook and email accounts hacked and others have faced a ‘stream of false and slanderous accusations . . . in the official Iranian media, ranging from allegations of serious sexual assault, drug trafficking, and criminal financial behaviour.’”197 The government has also arrested family members of BBC Persian staff living in Iran, and other family members have been prevented from leaving the country.

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The result of these combined methods of censorship is that Iran has one of the lowest levels of internet freedom in the world. As noted in Chapter 2, Ronald Deibert has categorized restrictions on internet access into three generations.198 First-generation controls involve restricting access to specific websites through filtering. Second-generation controls include creating a legal environment authorizing control over content and requiring ISPs to provide governments with access to users’ records. The Iranian government effectively employs first- and second-generation controls over the internet. Since 2009, Iran has also been developing what Deibert refers to as third-generation controls—surveillance, espionage, and propaganda. These offensive or proactive strategies are discussed in the next section.

Russia. The downgrade from partly free status in the 2012 Freedom on the Net report to not free in the 2016 report highlights how the Russian government has increased its censorship and control over the internet.199 One example of the growing restrictions on the internet is that the founder of VKontakte, Pavol Durov, was forced to flee Russia and give up control over the popular social networking site. It is now owned by oligarchs loyal to Putin.200 The government also began requiring in 2015 that multinational companies, such as Google, store data about Russians within Russia. Although government officials claimed the law was to secure the online data of Russian citizens, most believe it was to increase the government’s surveillance of Russians and to help facilitate increased filtering. The Russian Ministry of Telecommunications and Mass Communications announced in 2016 that it is seeking to have 99 percent of Russian internet traffic geographically located within Russia by 2020. This plan, similar to Iran’s desire to build the SHOMA network, would, if successful, “increase the authorities’ ability to block international traffic and potentially cut Russia’s network off from the rest of the world.”201 As of 2014, Roskomnadzor (Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media) is the primary government agency involved in blocking and filtering information on the internet.202 In 2012, the Duma passed a law that requires ISPs to block a list of websites.203 Failure to block a website will result in a fine for the ISP. The law allowed for the creation of the Unified Register of Prohibited Information, a list of websites with extremist content that ISPs must block. There is no independent oversight of the list and it has been used to block legitimate content, including websites labeled as extremist because they criticized the government.204 Navalny’s blog is

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one of the sites regularly on the list and blocked by Roskomnadzor. The government has also blocked the website of opposition leader Garry Kasparov. It is known that the Roskomnadzor has censored websites discussing possible strikes or speaking out against the 2015 Duma elections.205 After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014, these topics are especially sensitive and websites challenging the government’s narrative about both topics are often blocked. Websites considered mass media are subject to additional oversight. Roskomnadzor can issue warnings about “abuse of freedom of mass media,” which is arbitrarily defined and assessed by Roskomnadzor.206 “If a media outlet receives two warnings within a year, Roskomnadzor has the right to apply for a court order to shut down the media outlet.”207 According to Andrei Soldatov, the increased control over the internet since the protests has created a “feeling of constant threat,” and under pressure internet businesses have to be cautious and “engage in selfcensorship” leading to an erosion of internet freedom.208 The government has also increased its arrests and prosecutions of bloggers and online journalists since 2011. As noted above, posts critical of Russia’s actions in Ukraine are especially likely to result in government action. For example, in May 2016 Andrei Bubeev, a resident of Tver (a city north of Moscow), received a two-year prison sentence for reposting on VKontakte information against Russia’s annexation of Crimea because the post was “public incitement of extremism.”209 Bubeev’s case is not unique. Another example is the five-year sentence issued for Vadim Tyumentsev, a blogger, for posting videos calling on people to demonstrate against high bus fares and for criticizing Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.210 Although Russia has not engaged in mass arrests and detention of bloggers, the limited prosecutions and harsh sentences of a few bloggers has contributed to a growth in self-censorship and reduced freedom of expression online.

The Proactive Approach: Surveillance, Propaganda, and Cyberattacks

Iran. The Iranian government engages in widespread surveillance to prevent dissent, actively propagates an antidemocratic narrative, and uses cyberattacks against perceived threats. The Iranian government has adapted social media and other new technologies to help it identify and track dissidents. Social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, are a valuable way for Iran’s intelligence services to gather information about people and possible relationships with known activists. There are

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even reports that passport control officers at the airport question Iranians living abroad about their Facebook accounts, and then “write down any suspicious-looking online friends a traveler might have.”211 In addition to using social media to surveil Iranians, the government strictly monitors internet usage. Starting in 2012, the Iranian government required internet cafés to record the name, national identification number, telephone number, and other identifying information of every customer. Furthermore, the police also stated that the internet café owners had to keep records for at least six months of every IP address and website visited by each customer.212 There are reports that Iran has purchased technology from Western companies to increase the government’s ability to monitor phone calls, read emails, and intercept internet data.213 As noted in Chapter 1, the Iranian government has engaged in crowdsourcing to help identify people in photos who had engaged in protests. According to the Iranian police (an admittedly questionable source), the crowdsourcing helped to identify at least forty people in December 2009 alone.214 During the 2017–2018 protests, supporters of the government, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Tasnim news agency, enlarged the faces of protesters in videos and pictures to enable the Iranian security forces to arrest them.215 Control over the media and the development of the SHOMA national internet not only help the Iranian government prevent democratic diffusion and criticism of the regime, but also aid in the development of alternative narratives to maintain legitimacy. One example of this is the development of the soft war rhetoric by the Iranian government. The term soft war reflects an Iranian government belief that they are under a US and European information attack. The Islamic Development Organization (IDO), which controls multiple forms of media in Iran, has referred to the actions of the US and European states as part of a “cultural NATO” attack that seeks to encourage opposition within Iran.216 According to an official IDO document, “The plan of ‘Cultural NATO’ which has been underlined and noted by the Supreme Leader, consists of the offensive line of the enemy [the United States, Europe, NATO] and their effort in order to enter into the cultural, artistic and media arenas so that they deal a black picture against Iran. The main purpose of cultural NATO is to destroy the unity and inseparable connection of the nation.”217 Iranian officials only began using the term soft war after the June 2009 protests. The government said that the relationship between protesters, internet users, and international media was a part of this “soft war.”218 “The Social and Cultural Deputy of the IRGC has claimed that, ‘today, the weapons of war are not tanks, bombs and missiles’—rather, warfare

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against the Islamic Republic takes place in the field of cyberspace, Internet, and satellite TV.”219 The soft war narrative is a way for the Iranian government to discredit foreign negative reporting on Iran and frame criticisms of the regime as treason. Discrediting internal opposition by labeling them as tools of the United States or the United Kingdom has been a strategy since the 1979 revolution. However, the reframing of dissent this way has shifted to include new forms of media, including satellite stations such as BBC Persian. The Iranian government argues that the BBC Persian station was to blame for the unrest in 2009, and that it is part of a British propaganda campaign designed to delegitimize the Iranian regime. Along with using rhetoric, the government also allegedly budgeted $500 million in 2010–2011 to combat this soft war.220 In addition to reframing negative international coverage of Iran, the government has also gone on the offensive by establishing its own media outlets, establishing pro-regime social media sites, and hacking dissident websites. The Iranian government supports at least 400 news websites that publish progovernment information and editorials.221 When digitally networked protests began in December 2017, the government quickly responded online, using Twitter bots to discourage people from joining protests and calling posted videos of demonstrations fake.222 Supporters of the government developed their own hashtag, #nationwide_riots, tweeting against the demonstrations and in favor of the government. The government has also supported the formation of a student group, Officers of the Soft War, that seeks to build a virtual community with the mission to mobilize Iranians against perceived online foreign attacks on Iran.223 Reports further suggest that the IRGC has trained thousands of “cybersoldiers” to monitor online activity and make progovernment posts on blogs and other discussion sites.224 Leaders are also encouraging members of the Basij to engage in progovernment blogging.225 Arzeshi, who are conservatives active online, ironically now use banned social media platforms, such as Twitter, to generate support for the supreme leader.226 Along with surveillance and propaganda, the Iranian government has used cyberattacks against perceived opponents of the regime. The Iranian Cyber Army, a hacker and intelligence unit, has hacked opposition websites to disrupt service and to collect information about those who log on or visit those sites. The Cyber Army creates mirror sites that look like the legitimate site, but are actually controlled by them and use this to obtain users’ information such as names and email addresses.227 The Cyber Army has also targeted Iranians living abroad, posting messages on their Facebook pages saying they should not support opposition movements.228

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In summary, Iran effectively uses all three generations of internet control to prevent opposition to the regime. The Iranian government has learned from the experience of 2009, and the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, that ICT can be an effective tool for challenging an authoritarian regime. Therefore, the Iranian government has developed multiple strategies to prevent ICT from being used by the opposition and activists to challenge the regime again. Although we have no way to currently assess the effectiveness of these pro-regime social media actions, their existence demonstrates the desire of the Iranian regime to frame the online narrative in support of its rule and against democratization. However, the recent antigovernment protests demonstrate how there is an ongoing battle between the ability of Iranians to circumvent government control over ICT and the government’s ability to restrict access. Even in a country with low levels of internet freedom, people still have used ICT to challenge the regime.

Russia. Prior to the 2011–2012 protests, the Russian government was able to surveil most electronic communications. Since the protests, this ability has only increased. Building off of the work of the KGB during the Soviet years, the System of Operative Investigative Measures (SORM) enables the Russian government to monitor mobile phones and all internet content. Russian ISPs are required by law to install equipment (at their own cost) that allows the Federal Security Service (FSB) and other Russian security agencies to monitor, without warrants or independent supervision, all internet content. Failure to install the equipment will first result in a fine and, if an ISP continues to fail to comply, it will lose its license to operate. At the time of the Sochi Olympics, the US State Department warned that SORM “permits the monitoring, retention and analysis of all data that traverses Russian communication networks.”229 Oates reinforces this assessment, arguing that with SORM, “any type of electronic information in the territory of the Russian Federation can be accessed, recorded, and used in investigations by civil or military security services.”230 The current version of SORM (SORM-3) uses deep packet inspection, which provides the government with the technical ability to block specific websites and monitor content. A 2016 law requires ISPs to keep all online content from users for six months, expanding the amount of information available to the government. This system enables an extensive level of surveillance. Along with restricting access to opposition voices online, government agencies or allies have undertaken a significant and sustained campaign to discredit opponents at home and abroad through propaganda and

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trolling. This approach seeks to erode support for opponents and to build legitimacy for the regime. Putin and his supporters have been successful with this strategy. Part of the reason for the success is that they have strategically adapted powerful narratives of nationalism and threats to national security to gain legitimacy for the regime. The nationalist aspects of the government’s narrative intensified after the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine. In 2012, 54 percent of Russians approved of Putin’s leadership. However, in June 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, 83 percent of Russians said they approved of his leadership.231 Putin was able to use the annexation of Crimea, a popular move in much of Russia, as a way to increase his popularity. As Lilia Shevtsova notes, the Russian government has turned the Russia media, especially television, “into war-propaganda outlets.”232 Russian media and official government statements have depicted the “United States as Russia’s major enemy, [branded] the Ukrainian government a ‘military junta,’ and [labeled] Kremlin critics as ‘traitors.”233 In a speech celebrating the annexation of Crimea, Putin rebuked the United States and portrayed himself as a great protector of the Russian people and state. Referring to the United States and Europe, Putin said, “They cheated us again and again, made decisions behind our back, presenting us with completed facts,” and decried the expansion of NATO.234 As part of an “information war,” the Russian government has promoted a narrative of the “West waging war against Russia, and Putin as trying to keep Russia out of the bloody chaos.”235 Putin and allies have adopted new technology to help spread their multipart message that the West is maligning Russia, the opposition is treasonous, and Russians should glorify the state. Progovernment voices are active on Twitter, the blogging platform LiveJournal, and on VKontakte. At the time of the protests, progovernment comments flooded Twitter feeds related to the protests. According to internet security experts, it is likely that the messages were from a botnet, a network of hijacked computers, suggesting deliberate action by a governmentrelated group.236 More recently, in March 2015, an investigation by the independent Russian newspapers Novaya Gazeta and Moy Rayon found that there were pro-Kremlin paid commentators active online, including more than 500 accounts on LiveJournal.237 These accounts both express progovernment views and attack opposition activists. Ludmila Savchuk, a journalist for Moy Rayon, went undercover at one of the known troll factories in St. Petersburg. She reported on how there were individual departments for each form of social media (VKontakte, LiveJournal, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and that employees were paid to develop

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“appealing online characters” to promote Russian government propaganda.238 For example, after Boris Nemtsov, a longtime Russian opposition leader, was murdered, she and others in her department placed comments on Russian news outlet websites suggesting that the opposition had arranged the murder.239 There are reports of thousands of people working for the Russian government as trolls. There are also reports of pro-Putin youth movements, such as Nashi, engaged in progovernment blogging and postings on social media. Ilya Klishin, TV Dohzd editor, reported in May 2014 that Vyacheslav Volodin, deputy chief of the presidential administration, was overseeing a “systematic manipulation of public opinion through social media.”240 One of the effects of these government efforts is that it is reducing the helpfulness of the internet for the opposition. Some Russian activists have declared “that the Internet is no longer a natural medium for political opposition.”241 Therefore, the Russian government strategy of weakening or eliminating the democratic threat presented by new technology may be working. After the 2014 attack on Ukraine, the government expanded its disinformation social media campaign outside of Russia, especially in Ukraine. The shared language and history between Ukraine and Russia helped to facilitate an extensive campaign to undermine the Ukrainian government’s legitimacy and spread conspiracy theories. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan document how Russian propaganda, including fake reports about the conflict, dominated Ukrainian social media.242 The following is just one example of this form of propaganda: There was a heart-wrenching photograph of a grieving young girl, sitting by the body of a dead woman sprawled on the ground and carrying the caption, “This democracy, baby, Ukrainian army is killing Donbass people.” It went viral on social networks under the hashtag #SaveDonbassPeople. In fact, however, the photo was borrowed from a famous Russian film, Brest Fortress, released in 2010, about the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.243

Although this propaganda was primarily directed at Ukrainians, it helped to reinforce the government’s narrative about the conflict at home and sought to further deride “democracy” in Russia. Russian trolls also attacked US and European media and journalists critical of Putin. The British newspaper The Guardian reported high levels of anti-Western and pro-Putin comments on any article related to Russia or Ukraine.244 One documented case of attacks on non-Russian journalists is the story of Jessikka Aro, a Finnish journalist writing on

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Russia. In response to Russian reporting on the troll factory in St. Petersburg, Aro decided to investigate the influence of Russian trolls on public online debate in Finland. As Aro recounts, Pro-Kremlin propagandists operating in the international information sphere immediately mobilized against my work. They created their own falsified narrative of me and my article, and spread lies on fake news sites about me “persecuting Russians living in Finland and putting together an illegal database of Putin’s supporters.” I was named as a “famous assistant of foreign security services” and said to “cooperate with NATO.” . . . Facebook and Twitter trolls . . . questioned my investigations and mental health.245

Online, via email, text, and voicemail, Russian trolls harassed and threatened Aro. Despite the harassment, Aro continued with her investigation and found that the strategy of attacking opponents and publishing false information was successful in influencing public debate in Finland. Because of the attacks, fewer Finns commented about Russia online, eroding freedom of speech. Even more problematic was that Aro found multiple cases of Finns believing Russian propaganda and false information about the events in Ukraine.246 The Russian government is one of the best in the world at cyberattacks.247 These efforts predate the protests, but have intensified over the past few years, especially since the 2014 conflict in Ukraine began. As noted above, during the 2011 Duma elections the election monitoring NGO, GOLOS, came under a cyberattack. Although it is not possible to prove with certainty who was behind this cyberattack, most observers suspect it was either government agencies or people associated with the government. The Freedom on the Net 2016 report notes that the Russian human rights organization Agora documented at least thirty websites, email accounts, or social media accounts of journalists, activists, and opposition groups that were hacked. Multiple independent media or prodemocracy websites have suffered DDoS attacks.248 In October 2016, Google notified several Russian activists and journalists that “government-backed” hackers were attempting to access their email accounts.249 There are also reports of people’s mobile phones being hacked via SIM cards issued by Russian mobile phone companies, leading to questions about possible collusion between the companies and the government. These likely government-sponsored hacks and DDoS attacks are another way to restrict free speech and expression online. The inability to attribute these attacks to a particular entity gives the

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government deniability that it does not have when blocking a website. It is therefore a way to censor without having to acknowledge that the government is engaged in censorship. The government has also manipulated the public to attack online media. One of the best examples of this is the case of TV Dohzd (or TV Rain), an independent television station initially located only online, but which eventually moved into Russian cable television. TV Dohzd was particularly popular with young, urban professionals, such as those who participated in the 2011–2012 protests. Despite its relatively low viewership (far behind the over 80 percent viewership for three national networks), its editorial independence and investigations of government abuse provoked the Kremlin. As Maria Lipman accounts, “In January 2014, TV Rain came under an orchestrated public attack after an online vote question it had posted on its website was deemed ‘unpatriotic.’ Almost instantly nearly every cable provider terminated its contract with TV Rain.”250 The Russian government’s strategy of limited censorship, but intense online propaganda and attacks against opponents, is unusual compared to the other cases in this book. Currently, this strategy appears to be successful as Putin remains popular among Russians and there are no serious challengers to him. Furthermore, the vast majority of Russians are able to use the internet and social media as they wish, preventing the development of widespread dissatisfaction with censorship that arose in cases like Tunisia. This strategy requires significant resources, especially the ability to pay a large number of people to engage in trolling. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, or Armenia, the Russian government had the technical and financial resources to undertake this strategy. The government also likely learned from the Arab Spring cases that censorship is insufficient to prevent the internet from being a tool of regime overthrow. Therefore, its strategy has been to go on the offensive and use the internet to maintain the regime. Examining these two cases leads to some tentative conclusions. First, ICT helped organize the largest antigovernment protests in decades in Russia and Iran. Therefore, the degree of internet penetration and repression may not determine the likelihood of digitally networked protests against the government. Although Iran had significantly higher levels of internet censorship than Russia, it still experienced two rounds of antigovernment protests in less than a decade. In both Russia and

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Iran, ICT was an important source of alternative information. However, the usage of ICT as a tool of mobilization varied between the cases, primarily because of the Iranian government’s ability and willingness to censor or shut off technology. In contrast, the Russian government never suspended or censored social media during the protests, allowing activists to effectively utilize these tools to organize protests. Second, the antigovernment protests in all three cases failed to overthrow the regime, or even bring about limited political reform. Although the development of new technology aided Iranian and Russian opposition movements, it was insufficient to overthrow the regime. Overall, both cases demonstrate the ability of authoritarian regimes to survive antigovernment digitally networked protests if it maintains elite or public support. The ideological legitimacy of the Iranian revolutionary regime and the view of Putin as the safe and stable choice were barriers that the protest movements were unable to overcome. Public opinion and the legitimacy of the regime may be important factors in explaining why some states survive antigovernment protests. Furthermore, in both cases, the loyalty of the security forces was never even a question. The government maintained full control over coercive power. However, one of the major differences between the cases was that the Russian government did not have to resort to using coercive power to end the protests and discredit the opposition. One of the most remarkable elements of the Russian case is how the government has used ICT for its own purposes. Not only does the government have extensive surveillance capabilities, but it also has the ability to construct its own narrative online. The sheer volume of misinformation and propaganda released by trolls and progovernment Russians produces a Russian internet where distinguishing between fact and fiction is challenging. Furthermore, the offensive campaign discredits journalists, opposition leaders, and any potential opponents. Russia’s offensive approach to eliminating ICT as a tool of democratization demonstrates a possible effective alternative to widespread censorship. One of the benefits of Russia’s strategy is that it avoids the potential economic costs that come from Iran’s approach of extensive censorship. As part of this process of adaptation and authoritarian learning, the Russian and Iranian governments have established effective strategies to prevent ICT from being a tool of regime overthrow and democratization in their countries. In the next chapter, I examine digitally networked antigovernment protests in two post-Soviet states, Armenia and Moldova. Unlike the Iranian government, the Armenian and Moldovan governments do not

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censor the internet. Therefore, although the cases of Iran and Russia highlight how autocratic governments use ICT to serve their interests, the cases of Armenia and Moldova demonstrate how even when the internet is “free,” ICT can have limited influence on the regime’s outcome.

Notes

1. Vanderhill, “Iran and Its Neighbors,” forthcoming. 2. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: Iran, 2009, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-world/2009/iran. 3. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 371. 4. As there was no independent observation of the election it is not possible to prove electoral fraud. However, the much higher than expected vote for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad strongly suggests the government engaged in electoral fraud. 5. Black, “Iran,” p. 4. 6. Tait and MacAskill, “Iran in Turmoil.” 7. Jeffrey, “Iran Election Protests.” 8. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: Iran. 9. Abootalebi, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Elections,” p. 7. 10. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: Iran. 11. Monshipouri and Assareh, “The Islamic Republic and the ‘Green Movement,’” p. 35. 12. Ibid., p. 37. 13. Abootalebi, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Elections,” p. 7. 14. World Bank, “World Bank Data, Iran,” n.d. http://data.worldbank.org/country /iran-islamic-rep?view=chart. 15. Salehi-Isfahani, “Trouble in Tehran,” p. 85. 16. Abootalebi, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Elections,” p. 5. 17. Fathi, “Iran Vendors Protest Move to Collect a Sales Tax.” 18. Salehi-Isfahani, “Trouble in Tehran,” p. 85. 19. Fathi, “Iranian President Proposes Ending Energy Subsidies.” 20. Abootalebi, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Elections,” p. 12. 21. Ansari, “Iran Under Ahmadinejad,” p. 698. 22. Abootalebi, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Elections,” p. 6. 23. Afshari and Underwood, “The Green Wave,” p. 7. 24. “Six Charts that Explain the Iran Protests,” BBC News, January 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42553516. 25. Ibid. 26. “Iran Protests: Social Media Messaging Battle Rages,” BBC News, January 7, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42566083. 27. United Russia barely received 50 percent of the vote, dramatically less than its 64 percent of the vote in 2007. 28. “Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma 4 December 2011, OSCE/ ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), January 12, 2012, https://www.osce.org/odihr/86959. 29. E. Barry, “Tens of Thousands Protest Against Putin in Moscow.” 30. Ibid. 31. E. Barry and Schwirtz, “Putin Opponents Hold Vast Rally.”

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32. Colton and Hale, “Putin’s Uneasy Return and Hybrid Regime Stability,” p. 9. 33. M. P. Barry, “Corruption in Russia,” p. 393. 34. Colton and Hale, “Putin’s Uneasy Return and Hybrid Regime Stability,” p. 10. 35. Dmitriev and Treisman, “The Other Russia.” 36. Ibid. 37. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2012: Russia, 2012, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2012/russia. 38. Colton and Hale, “Putin’s Uneasy Return and Hybrid Regime Stability,” p. 10. 39. Oates, Revolution Stalled, p. 176. 40. Herszenhorn, “Freed Blogger Puts Protest in Overdrive in Russia.” 41. Kramer and Herszenhorn, “Lifted by Putin, Middle Class Turns on Him.” 42. Herszenhorn, “Freed Blogger Puts Protest in Overdrive in Russia.” 43. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Iran, 2011, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2011/iran. 44. Ibid. 45. Eloranta, Kermani, and Rahimi, “Facebook Iran,” pp. 28–29. 46. Ibid., p. 29. 47. Khiabany and Sreberny, “The Politics of/in Blogging in Iran,” p. 563. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid., p. 570. 50. Kelly and Etling, “Mapping Iran’s Online Public,” p. 5. 51. Ibid., p. 21. 52. Esfahlani, “The Politics and Anti-politics of Facebook,” p. 149; Afshari and Underwood, “The Green Wave,” p. 7. 53. Mueller and van Huellen, “A Revolution in 140 Characters?” p. 200. 54. Honari, “From Virtual to Tangible Social Movements in Iran,” p. 153. 55. Ibid. 56. Sreberny and Khiabany, Blogistan, p. 173. 57. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012: Russia, 2012, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2012/russia. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Oates, Revolution Stalled, pp. 58, 65. 61. White and McAllister, “Did Russia (Nearly) Have a Facebook Revolution in 2011?” p. 77. 62. Kelly et al., “Mapping Russian Twitter.” 63. Ibid. 64. Etling, Roberts, and Faris, “Blogs as an Alternative Public Sphere.” 65. Koltsova and Shcherbak, “LiveJournal Libra!” p. 1724. 66. Etling, Roberts, and Faris, “Blogs as an Alternative Public Sphere.” 67. Oates, Revolution Stalled, p. 67. 68. Koltsova and Shcherbak, “LiveJournal Libra!,” pp. 1728–1729. 69. Etling, Roberts, and Faris, “Blogs as an Alternative Public Sphere.” 70. Lally, “Russia’s Internet Generation Fuels Protests.” 71. Oates, Revolution Stalled, p. 170. 72. Ibid., p. 171. 73. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012: Russia. 74. White and McAllister, “Did Russia (Nearly) Have a Facebook Revolution in 2011?” p. 79. 75. Erdbrink, “Our Man in Tehran.” 76. Khiabany and Sreberny, “The Politics of/in Blogging in Iran,” p. 577.

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77. Erdbrink, “Our Man in Tehran”; Frenkel, “Iranian Authorities Block Access to Social Media Tools.” 78. Gerrits, “Exploring Democracy in the Russian Federation,” p. 43. 79. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 187. 80. Bunce and Hozić, “Diffusion-Proofing and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” pp. 435–445. 81. Saari, “European Democracy Promotion in Russia.” 82. For example, Andrew Sullivan blogging about the events for The Atlantic discussed Twitter as a “critical tool” for organizing protests in Iran. Commented on in Morozov, “Iran,” p. 10. 83. Esfahlani, “The Politics and Anti-politics of Facebook,” p. 148. 84. Mueller and van Huellen, “A Revolution in 140 Characters?” p. 193. 85. Baldino and Goold, “Iran and the Emergence of Information and Communications Technology,” p. 22. 86. It is not known whether or not the incorrect information was deliberate or just a mistake. Ibid., p. 21. 87. Mueller and van Huellen, “A Revolution in 140 Characters?” p. 190. 88. Khodabakhshi, “Why Ordinary Iranians Are Turning to Internet Backdoors.” 89. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2017: Iran, 2017, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2017/iran. 90. Oates, Revolution Stalled, p. 181. 91. Englund, “In Russia, Internet Getting Word Out on Big Elections Protest.” 92. Ibid. 93. Oates, Revolution Stalled, p. 176. 94. Bodrunova and Litvinenko, “New Media and Political Protest,” p. 39. 95. Smyth and Oates, “Mind the Gaps,” p. 299. 96. Mueller and van Huellen, “A Revolution in 140 Characters?” p. 190. 97. Ibid., p. 193. 98. Duranti, “The Green Screen.” 99. Ibid. 100. Mueller and van Huellen, “A Revolution in 140 Characters?” p. 191. 101. Nejad, “Transpatial Public Action,” p. 171. 102. Rajabi, “Political Memory and Social Media,” p. 232. 103. See Rajabi, “Political Memory and Social Media,” and Duranti, “The Green Screen,” for detailed discussions of this dynamic. 104. Duranti, “The Green Screen.” 105. Rajabi, “Political Memory and Social Media,” p. 234. 106. Duranti, “The Green Screen.” 107. Ibid. 108. Tahmasebi-Birgani, “Green Women of Iran,” p. 78. 109. Alexanyan, “Exploring Russian Cyberspace.” 110. Oates, Revolution Stalled, p. 74. 111. Boroumand, “Civil Society’s Choice,” p. 18. 112. Kerman and Wood, “The Failure of Democracy Building in Modern Iran,” p. 35. 113. Boroumand, “Civil Society’s Choice,” p. 18. 114. Ibid., p. 20. 115. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010: Iran, 2010, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-world/2010/iran. 116. Rivetti, “Co-opting Civil Society Activism in Iran,” p. 197.

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117. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2012: Russia, 2012, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2012/russia. 118. Crotty, Hall, and Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation,” p. 1260. 119. Ibid., p. 1257. 120. For just a small example of the literature on this topic, see Henderson, “Selling Civil Society”; Mendelson, “Unfinished Business”; Richter, “Promoting Civil Society.” 121. Crotty, Hall, and Ljubownikow, “Post-Soviet Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation,” p. 1263. 122. Levada Center poll, quoted in Gill, “The Stabilization of Authoritarian Rule in Russia,” p. 72. 123. Smolar, “From Opposition to Atomization,” p. 33. 124. Ibid. 125. Dmitriev and Treisman, “The Other Russia,” n.p. 126. Ibid. 127. Schwirtz, “For Struggling Russians, Fear of Return to Hardship.” 128. “European Union, Trade in Goods with Iran,” European Commission, June 3, 2019, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_iran_en.pdf. 129. Tait and MacAskill, “Iran in Turmoil.” 130. “European Union, Trade in goods with Russia,” European Commission, June 3, 2019, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_russia _en.pdf. 131. “Trade with Russia,” European Commission, November 13, 2019, http://ec .europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/. 132. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 187. 133. Kottasová, “Europe Is Still Addicted to Russian Gas.” 134. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. 135. Abootalebi, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Elections,” pp. 7–8. 136. Hourcade, “The Rise to Power of Iran’s ‘Guardians of the Revolution,’” p. 60. 137. Milani, “Iran’s Paradoxical Regime,” pp. 53–54. 138. Safshekan and Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians,” p. 551. 139. Ostovar, “Iran’s Basij,” p. 345. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid., p. 348. 142. Safshekan and Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians,” p. 549, footnote 21. 143. Ostovar, “Iran’s Basij,” p. 353. 144. Safshekan and Sabet, “The Ayatollah’s Praetorians,” p. 555. 145. Ibid. 146. Ibid, p. 549. 147. Amnesty International, “Iran: Election Contested, Repression Compounded,” December 10, 2009, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE13/123/2009/en/. 148. Ibid. 149. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2019: Iran, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/iran. 150. Cross, “Why Iran’s Green Movement Faltered,” p. 185. 151. Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds provide a good discussion of the current literature on the resource curse and conclude that the majority of the evidence supports the conclusion that oil rents help autocratic regimes. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring, pp. 51–55.

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152. Cross, “Why Iran’s Green Movement Faltered,” pp. 183–185. 153. For example, see Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin; Hale, Patronal Politics. 154. Dawisha, “The Putin Principle,” p. 15. 155. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy detail how when Vladimir Putin was working in the St. Petersburg government, he and Viktor Zubkov gained access to damning information about businesses, especially mispayment of taxes, and used that information to force (aka blackmail) businesses to accept business deals with the mayor’s office that were on terms favorable to the city government. Putin brought this approach with him to Moscow and the presidency. Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, p. 188. 156. Hale, Patronal Politics, p. 271. 157. Ibid., p. 274. 158. Mikhail Dmitriev, quoted in Herszenhorn and Barry, “Russian Voters Send a Message to Putin’s Party.” 159. Herszenhorn, “Putin Wins Vote, but Opposition Keeps Pressing.” 160. Schwirtz, “For Struggling Russians, Fear of Return to Hardship.” 161. Colton and Hale, “Putin’s Uneasy Return and Hybrid Regime Stability,” p. 7. 162. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2012: Russia, 2012, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/russia. 163. Etling, Roberts, and Faris, “Blogs as an Alternative Public Sphere.” 164. Colton and Hale, “Putin’s Uneasy Return and Hybrid Regime Stability,” p. 6. 165. Oates, Revolution Stalled, pp. 63–64. 166. Etling, Roberts, and Faris, “Blogs as an Alternative Public Sphere.” 167. E. Barry and Kramer, “In Biting Cold Protesters Pack the Center of Moscow.” 168. Schwirtz, “Russia Allows Protest, but Tries to Discourage Attendance.” 169. E. Barry, “Familiar Candidate Rallies His Supporters in Moscow.” 170. E. Barry and Kramer, “In Biting Cold Protesters Pack the Center of Moscow.” 171. Schwirtz, “For Struggling Russians, Fear of Return to Hardship.” 172. Ibid. 173. Herszenhorn and Barry, “Russian Voters Send a Message to Putin’s Party.” 174. Schwirtz, “Russia Allows Protest, but Tries to Discourage Attendance.” 175. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran, 2015, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2015/iran. 176. OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in Iran,” June 16, 2009, https://opennet .net/research/profiles/iran. 177. OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, “After the Green Movement: Internet Controls in Iran 2009–2012,” February 2013, http://www.opennet.net/iranreport2013. 178. OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in Iran.” 179. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran. 180. Dehghan, “Iran Clamps Down on Internet Use.” 181. All information on filtering is from OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, “After the Green Movement” and “Internet Filtering in Iran.” 182. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran. 183. OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, “After the Green Movement,” p. 19. 184. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran. 185. Rahimi, “Censorship and the Islamic Republic,” p. 369. 186. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran. 187. OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, “After the Green Movement.” 188. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2017: Iran. 189. Ibid. 190. Ibid.

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191. Burleigh, “Iran to Crack Down on Web Censor-Beating Software.” 192. Dehghan, “Iran Clamps Down on Internet Use.” 193. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2017: Iran. 194. Khodabakhshi, “Why Ordinary Iranians Are Turning to Internet Backdoors.” 195. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran. 196. Amnesty International, “We Are Ordered to Crush You: Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran,” February 28, 2012, https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports /we-are-ordered-to-crush-you-expanding-repression-of-dissent-in-iran/. 197. Ibid. 198. Deibert, “Cyberspace Under Seige.” 199. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012: Russia; Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016: Russia, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2016 /russia. 200. Soldatov and Borogan, The Red Web, pp. 293–294. 201. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016: Russia. 202. Ibid. 203. Soldatov and Borogan, The Red Web, p. 166. 204. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013: Russia, 2013, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2013/russia. 205. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016: Russia. 206. Ibid. 207. Ibid. 208. Soldatov, “The Taming of the Internet,” p. 68. 209. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016: Russia. 210. Ibid. 211. Morozov, “Why the World’s Secret Police Want You to Join Facebook.” 212. Dehghan, “Iran Clamps Down on Internet Use.” 213. OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, “After the Green Movement,” p. 30. 214. Morozov, “Why the World’s Secret Police Want You to Join Facebook.” 215. “Iran Protests.” 216. Monroe Price, “Iran and the Soft War,” p. 2401. 217. Islamic Development Organization document, quoted in Ibid. 218. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Iran. 219. IRGC social and cultural deputy, quoted in OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, “After the Green Movement,” p. 37. 220. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Iran. 221. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran, p. 9. 222. “Iran Protests.” 223. Rahimi, “Censorship and the Islamic Republic,” p. 376. 224. OpenNet Initiative and Citizen Lab, “After the Green Movement.” 225. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2015: Iran. 226. Khodabakhshi, “Why Ordinary Iranians Are Turning to Internet Backdoors.” 227. Price, “Iran and the Soft War,” p. 2409. 228. Morozov, “Why the World’s Secret Police Want You to Join Facebook.” 229. Soldatov and Borogan, The Red Web, p. 244. 230. Oates, Revolution Stalled, p. 98. 231. Ray and Esipova, “Russian Approval of Putin Soars.” 232. Shevtsova, “The Authoritarian Resurgence,” p. 31. 233. Ibid. 234. Myers and Barry, “Putin Reclaims Crimea for Russia and Bitterly Denounces the West.”

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235. Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin, p. 381. 236. Schwirtz, “Russia Allows Protest, but Tries to Discourage Attendance.” 237. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016: Russia. 238. Chen, “The Agency.” 239. Ibid. 240. Soldatov and Borogan, The Red Web, p. 282. 241. Chen, “The Agency.” 242. Soldatov and Borogan, The Red Web, pp. 280–281. 243. Ibid., p. 284. 244. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016: Russia. 245. Aro, “The Cyberspace War: Propaganda and Trolling as Warfare Tools,” p. 123. 246. Ibid., p. 124. 247. Segal, The Hacked World Order, p. 40. 248. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016: Russia. 249. Murdock, “Russian Activists and Journalists Receive Google Warnings.” 250. Lipman, “Russia’s Nongovernmental Media Under Assault,” p. 188.

4 Protest Without Change: The Cases of Armenia and Moldova Armenia and Moldova are competitive authoritarian regimes where there is little government censorship of the internet. There have been repeated digitally networked antigovernment protests in each country. However, popular protests in Armenia and Moldova, those that utilized information communication technology (ICT) and those that did not, repeatedly failed to remove leaders or change the country’s political system. This pattern unexpectedly changed in 2018 when mass mobilization in Armenia resulted in a new prime minister. In Moldova, antigovernment protests in 2009 and 2015–2016 did not lead to the overthrow of the government. Although there eventually was a change in president after the 2009 protests, it happened following another election and months later. In 2015–2016, despite the largest protests in Moldova since independence, there was limited reform as the protesters’ demands for the resignation of the president and new parliamentary elections went unfulfilled. Therefore, these protests, at best, had a limited influence on political reform in Moldova. Moreover, Moldova has not made substantial progress toward democratization and continues to struggle with political instability. Although things look more positive in Armenia, it is too soon to say what the prospects are for democratization. These two cases highlight how even when ICT is “free,” there are significant limits to the effectiveness of ICT as a tool of regime breakdown or democratization.

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The success of digitally networked protests depends on more than just the lack of repression. Similar to Iran and Russia, the weakness of civil society is an important reason why the protest movements failed. Armenia is an especially important case because the 2018 successful protests contrast significantly with failed protests in 2008 and 2013, enabling cross-case comparisons within the same country. These comparisons demonstrate the role of contingency in explaining the success or failure of protest movements, and the increasingly important role of social media in Armenian protests. War with Azerbaijan accompanied Armenia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Even prior to the declaration of independence, Azerbaijan and Armenia had clashed over the status of the NagornoKarabakh region, which was majority Armenian but technically located within the Soviet state of Azerbaijan. The war continued until a 1994 cease-fire. Armenia had greater military success than Azerbaijan, as the Armenians managed not only to gain control over the enclave but also to seize approximately 9 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. This territory provided a vital link between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Despite a cease-fire, the conflict remains unresolved and continues to have political and economic consequences. As recently as April 2016, there was fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces. Armenia is a competitive authoritarian regime. Despite repeated antigovernment protests, until 2018 there was little systemic progress toward democratization in Armenia. Although opposition parties can compete in elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the 2013 and 2017 parliamentary elections as involving vote-buying, “pressure on public servants,” and “intimidation of voters,” which “contributed to an overall lack of public confidence in the electoral process.”1 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit democracy score for Armenia since 2008 has ranged from 5.21 to 5.43, out of a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 being the least democratic.2 In contrast, the OSCE observers were generally positive about the 2018 parliamentary elections, stating that the elections “were held with respect for fundamental freedoms and enjoyed broad public trust . . . open political debate, including in the media, contributed to a vibrant campaign.”3 Unlike other cases, Armenia has an uncensored and open internet. Although broadcast media experienced editorial interference from government officials and journalists engaged in self-censorship, there were “no

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restrictions on online news sources, contributing to increased pluralism in the media.”4 According to the 2013 Freedom on the Net report, “Armenian internet users enjoy access to internet resources without limitation, including peer-to-peer networks, voice and instant messaging services such as Skype and Google Talk, and popular social networks such as Facebook, YouTube, and LiveJournal.”5 Moldova shares several similarities with Armenia. Like Armenia, Moldova became an independent state in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moldova also has an unresolved “frozen” conflict. During the period leading up to independence, the region of Transnistria tried to secede from the rest of Moldova. The ethnic Ukrainians and Russians that make up the majority of the population of Transnistria feared growing Moldovan nationalism, especially the decision to declare Moldovan the official language. The dispute over the control of Transnistria resulted in a brief military conflict in 1992. Since 1992 Transnistria has remained outside of Moldovan control, but is not recognized as an independent state. Repeated efforts by the OSCE to negotiate an end to the dispute have failed. Also similar to Armenia, Moldova is a competitive authoritarian regime. Over the past decade, Freedom House’s Nation in Transit measures of democracy in Moldova, such as judicial independence, electoral process, and independent media, have ranged from 4 to 5.75.6 Again, although the opposition political parties could compete in elections, the elections were not fair. For example, the 2016 OSCE election report found that “the process was marred by widespread abuse of administrative resources, lack of campaign finance transparency, and unbalanced media coverage.”7 Overall, there is significant political interference in the media in Moldova and pressure on independent or opposition media sources. However, similar to Armenia, at the time of the 2009 and the 2015–2016 protests, there was little government censorship or repression of the internet in Moldova.

Antigovernment Protests in Armenia and Moldova The 2008 Armenian Electoral Protests The day after the February 19, 2008, presidential election in Armenia people began to protest, claiming that the results were fraudulent.8 Serzh Sargsyan, the current prime minster and member of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun), and Levon Ter-Petrossian, former president of Armenia (1991 to 1998), were the two

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main candidates. According to the official election results, Sargsyan won the election with 52.8 percent of the vote compared to Ter-Petrossian, who received only 21.5 percent of the vote. Rejecting these results, supporters of Ter-Petrossian engaged in twelve days of protests in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia. As many as 20,000 people demonstrated in Yerevan’s Freedom Square against the alleged electoral fraud. The protests ended on March 1, 2008, when the police attacked the protesters, resulting in 10 deaths and over 200 injured. The security forces also arrested hundreds of supporters of Ter-Petrossian. President Robert Kocharyan declared a state of emergency for twenty days, restricting gatherings, strikes, and the freedom of movement of people.9 The state of emergency also imposed strict limits on the press. The protests failed to produce new elections or prevent Sargsyan from becoming president. Although reports of electoral fraud were the immediate trigger of the protests, there were also several longer-term causes. Overall, many Armenians did not trust the electoral process because they perceived the elections as a means by which the political elite focused only on increasing their own power and wealth instead of addressing problems or improving the economy. For example, some Armenians “believe that the ruling party decides how to transfer power long before elections and that opposition parties are no more than a ‘second column’ assembled by the Republican Party [ruling party] from its own ranks before elections to simulate competition for the benefit of the Armenian people and the world community.”10 A Human Rights Watch investigation of the 2008 protests found that there was “low public confidence” in the electoral process and “widespread cynicism about their outcome.”11 A December 2007 survey found that 67 percent of Armenians surveyed did not believe that the 2007 parliamentary elections were free and fair, and 58 percent did not believe that the upcoming February 2008 elections would be better.12 Reports from independent monitors documented problems with fraud and intimidation in all elections until 2018. In addition to the lack of trust in the electoral process, Armenians were frustrated with the high levels of corruption and continued economic hardship. Ninety-seven percent of Armenians surveyed in 2007 saw corruption as a serious and pervasive problem.13 Armenians believed the police, health care, education, the president, and the prime minster to be the most corrupt aspects of society. The Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) issued a report in 2006 that expressed serious concerns about how people escaped prosecution for corruption and that there was limited protection for witnesses or whistleblowers.14

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An important issue for many Armenians in 2008 was persistent economic inequality and high levels of poverty. Despite economic growth between 2001 and 2008 and a growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) of 6.9 percent in 2008, 27.6 percent of the population still lived below the national poverty line.15 In a January 2008 survey of Armenians by the US International Republican Institute, 40 percent of respondents believed unemployment was one of the main problems in Armenia, and 41 percent said that the overall socioeconomic situation was one of the three most important problems for their household.16 The unresolved war with Azerbaijan is a major economic problem because Armenia has no economic or political relations with either Turkey or Azerbaijan, two of its four neighbors. Also, the population is shrinking with net emigration. Remittances were a major source of income for many and, by 2010, remittances were equivalent to 18 percent of GDP.17 The 2008 protests reflected anger at the possibly fraudulent election results and longer-term dissatisfaction with the lack of political and economic progress in Armenia.

The 2013 Armenian Electoral Protests President Sargsyan ran for reelection in February 2013. The main opposition opponent was Raffi Hovhannisian, a relative newcomer to Armenian politics and leader of the Heritage Party. According to the electoral commission, Sargsyan won with 58.6 percent of the vote and Hovhannisian received 37.0 percent, which at that time was one of the best performances ever for an opposition candidate. Alleging electoral fraud, Hovhannisian refused to accept the results and organized protests in Yerevan and around the country. Hovhannisian called for the government to hold a second round of voting or to hold early parliamentary elections.18 The OSCE election observation report noted that, although there were improvements in the electoral process, the “lack of impartiality of the public administration and abuse of administrative resources” was troubling.19 The preliminary report reflected a mixed assessment on the election stating that it “was generally well-administered and was characterized by a respect for fundamental freedoms. . . . While election day was calm and orderly, it was marked by undue interference in the process, mainly by proxies representing the incumbent, and some serious violations were observed.”20 Despite Hovhannisian’s efforts, the protests were significantly smaller than in 2008 and they quickly lost momentum. The protests did not result in violence or any deaths in 2013. They also did not produce any changes to the election results or reforms to the electoral process. The failure of the opposition movement to bring about

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change was especially evident when Hovhannisian’s political party, Heritage, received only 8.5 percent of the vote in Yerevan local elections three months later.21 The dramatic decline from Hovhannisian’s 43 percent of the vote in Yerevan in February highlighted the overall weakness of the opposition movement.22

The 2018 Armenian Protests The 2018 Armenian protests were different from any of the previous rounds of antigovernment demonstrations because they resulted in regime overthrow. The protests connect back to a 2015 decision to switch the government from a presidential system to a parliamentary system. There were concerns that the current president, Sargsyan, who because of term limits was unable to run again for president, was supporting the switch to a parliamentary system to remain in power as prime minister. Sargsyan repeatedly promised that he would not become prime minister in response to these concerns. However, when his term as president ended on April 9, 2018, his political party, the dominant Republican Party, immediately voted him in as prime minister. Realizing that Sargsyan was likely to remain in power, opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan began a protest march going from the city of Gyumri to the capital Yerevan on March 31. Upon arriving in Yerevan on April 13, Pashinyan and his supporters organized multiple demonstrations. Over the next several days, the protests continued to grow in size and they eventually forced Sargsyan to resign on April 23. However, the political turmoil continued because the protesters demanded that Pashinyan be elected prime minister but the majority Republican Party refused. After the failed vote for prime minister on May 1, Pashinyan called for a nationwide strike and demonstrations occurred throughout the country, including widespread blockage of major roads, subways, and train stations. Under intense public pressure, members of the Republican Party voted to elect Pashinyan prime minister on May 8. The protests arose out of similar sources of anger and frustration as in the previous rounds of demonstrations. Grievances included the persistence of oligarchic and authoritarian rule by Sargsyan, the high levels of corruption, and the continued poor economic situation. The autocratic nature of rule, corruption, and high economic inequality were all related, as many Armenians saw Sargsyan and his supporters using their political power to enrich themselves. Varazdat Mkrtchian, an Armenian soldier, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that “Sargsyan wasn’t running Armenia like a country, he was running it like his own personal fiefdom. His people were doing fine, while the rest of us were being stretched more and more each year.”23 According

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to Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2018 report, “Corruption is rampant through the government and remains a significant point of tension with the Armenian public.” Furthermore, in a 2017 survey Armenians said that they “fully distrusted” the president, the National Assembly, the judicial system, and the political parties.24 The persistent economic problems intensified Armenians’ anger at the corrupt practices of Sargsyan. Since Sargsyan came to power in 2008, nearly 10 percent of the population had emigrated because of the lack of economic opportunity, and unemployment was at almost 20 percent.25 Moreover, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line had not decreased in the ten years of Sargsyan’s rule.26 The decision for Sargsyan to remain in power as prime minister, despite his earlier promise not to do so, was the spark that lit the fuel of long-running political and economic grievances.

The 2009 Moldova Protests Violent protests broke out in Moldova following the April 5, 2009, parliamentary elections. These protests were one of the first digitally networked antigovernment protests in an authoritarian state in either the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or post-Soviet region. The Moldovan protests in April 2009 predate Iran’s Green Movement, the Arab Spring, and the Russian protests. Although election observers overall gave a positive assessment to the elections, they did express concerns about reported incidents of intimidation of opposition candidates, biased media coverage, and flaws with voter lists.27 The official election results show that the Party of Communists (PCRM) obtained a majority in parliament with sixty seats. The PCRM had been in power since 2001. Believing that the elections were fraudulent, some opposition leaders and other Moldovans, mainly youth, began protesting in Chisinau, the capital city, the day after the election. By the second day, there were 10,000–30,000 protesters. The protests unexpectedly turned violent when demonstrators besieged, and then forced their way into, the parliamentary building. The protesters set fire to the building and used office equipment to start a bonfire outside.28 The peak of the protests was the violence on April 7; however, protests continued until April 12. According to the OSCE report, the police arrested several hundred people in relation to the protests and there were reliable reports about their mistreatment.29 The number of deaths is disputed, with the government acknowledging one death and independent sources stating three people died in relation to the protests.30 The protests failed to change the election outcome or force a new election, at least directly. However, partially because of the protests, the

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forty-one opposition members in parliament managed to vote together against the PCRM’s candidate for the presidency. Under the Moldovan constitution a new president needs to receive at least sixty-one votes in the parliament to be elected; since the PCRM held only sixty seats, they were unable to vote in a new president on their own. The failure to elect a new president triggered new parliamentary elections in July 2009. The PCRM lost their majority in these elections and a new coalition, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE), came to power in August 2009 promising reform. However, they also failed to obtain enough votes to elect a president, forcing new elections again in November 2010. Given the repeated political turmoil and elections, it is difficult to say that the April 2009 protests had any direct effect on political reform or leadership change. They may have helped incentivize the opposition politicians to vote together against the PCRM’s presidential candidate, but the consequences of the protests were clearly delayed and indirect. Although anger at the election results was the spark for the 2009 protests, there were also several longer-term causes. Similar to Armenia, there was widespread frustration at the growing authoritarian nature of the PCRM-led government under President Vladimir Voronin, anger at high levels of corruption, and despair about persistent economic hardship. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2009 report provides evidence that, despite constitutional separation of powers, Voronin controlled all state institutions and that the government regularly harassed opposition party leaders. Among other actions, judicial and security institutions pressured opposition party leaders with “fabricated” criminal cases such as Chisinau’s mayor being charged with hooliganism.31 The lack of independent media was another sign of the growing authoritarianism of the Moldovan government. Television coverage was biased toward Voronin and the PCRM. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) repeatedly ruled against the Moldovan government, charging it with lacking fair trials, violating freedom of expression, and engaging in widespread torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners.32 An International Republican Institute public opinion survey in November 2008 found that 62 percent of Moldovans were dissatisfied with the state of democracy in the country.33 Again, similar to Armenia, corruption was also a persistent and major problem in Moldova. In 2007, Transparency International ranked Moldova 111 out of 179 countries on its Corruption Perceptions Index (the lower the rank, the worse the level of corruption).34 The Moldovan Ministry of Economy and Trade acknowledged that corruption was “pervasive in law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, the health and

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education systems, the fiscal system, customs, and local public administration.”35 In public opinion surveys, 89 percent of Moldovans said that corruption was a major or big problem in the country.36 The high levels of corruption contributed to the poor economic situation. Similar to most other post-Soviet states, for Moldova the decade of the 1990s was economically traumatic, with high inflation, high unemployment, and a dramatic fall in living standards. Overall, Moldova has little industry that survived the economic transition, especially as most of its industrial base was located in the breakaway region of Transnistria. The economy is still predominantly agricultural. For example, in 2007, wine exports were 25 percent of Moldova’s GDP.37 The poor economic situation resulted in high levels of migration, and remittances from Moldovan migrants made up 30–35 percent of GDP by 2007, far surpassing foreign direct investment. 38 In 2009 the gross national income (GNI) per capita in Moldova was only $1,570, making it the poorest country in Europe.39 According to 2008 public opinion polls, the two top problems in Moldova were the lack of jobs and low incomes.40 Therefore, although the economy had stabilized following the turmoil of the 1990s, the economic situation remained poor in 2009.

The 2015–2016 Moldova Protests Anger about corruption was again a major cause of the protests in Moldova in 2015 and 2016. The immediate source of the protests was the public announcement that over $1 billion had disappeared from three banks, including the state-owned Banca de Economii. Although it was not clear where the money had gone, corrupt practices involving various government agencies, politicians, and the banks were all suspected of contributing to the crisis. The theft, equivalent to one-eighth of Moldova’s GDP, worsened economic conditions because it led to a currency depreciation and a 37 percent increase in the price of electricity.41 There were protests throughout 2015 demanding investigations and prosecutions of those responsible. The protesters were especially angry about the role of Vladimir Plahotniuc, a billionaire oligarch and powerful political player, who was suspected of being involved in highlevel corruption. In addition to anger about corruption, various protests also involved disputes about the national identity of Moldova, with competing pro-Romanian and pro-Russian protests occurring at various times. The Dignity and Truth civic movement, formed in February 2015, helped to organize antigovernment protests.42 Formed by a coalition of anticorruption activists and politicians, the Dignity and Truth

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civic movement called for a shift to direct presidential elections, the resignation of President Nicolae Timofti, and early parliamentary elections.43 The largest protests occurred in early September 2015, with over 50,000 people demonstrating against the government in Chisinau.44 The protests occurred during a period of political turmoil as there were three different prime ministers in less than a year. Protests peaked again in January 2016 with the announcement that Pavel Filip, a close ally of Plahotniuc, became prime minister under questionable circumstances. Despite repeated, large-scale protests, activists were unable to obtain the resignation of the president or new parliamentary elections. Although the country moved back to direct presidential elections, one of the demands of the protesters, this change was the result of a controversial and legally problematic ruling by the Constitutional Court and does not appear to be connected to the protest movement.45 Moreover, Ryhor Nizhnikau argues that Plahotniuc used the political turmoil as an opportunity to increase his control over the Moldovan government, furthering his capture of the state.46 In summary, these five cases of antigovernment protests (Armenia 2008, 2013, 2018, and Moldova 2009, 2015–2016) share common causes. Armenians and Moldovans were unhappy about antidemocratic rule, high levels of corruption, and persistent economic problems. As I discuss in the next section, the 2013 and 2018 protests in Armenia and the protests in Moldova all involved ICT. In Armenia and Moldova, the generally uncensored internet provided an important source of alternative news and information, especially as the government heavily influenced the television news in each country. ICT was also an essential mechanism by which Armenians organized the 2018 protests and Moldovans organized the 2009 protests. Mechanism 4, disseminating information abroad, was more prevalent in the 2009 Moldovan protests than in Armenia, possibly because it was harder for foreign media sources to access Moldova. Overall, there is limited evidence that Mechanism 2, aid for democratic diffusion, occurred in either country. Although manipulation of elections and anger about corruption were the main triggers for protests, the existence of new technology increased the speed by which protests developed and enhanced the ability of activists to organize against the regime. ICT does not “cause” grievances, but it can change the nature, size, and distribution of protests.

The Role of ICT in the Protests

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Armenia. As noted in Chapter 2, one way ICT can aid antigovernment activists is by giving people access to news outside of government control. However, there is little evidence ICT played a role in the 2008 Armenian election or the postelection demonstrations, primarily because the number of internet users was around only 6 percent of the population, a percentage too low to enable ICT to have major influence.47 Furthermore, only 5 percent of those surveyed in 2008 obtained political information via the internet, whereas 100 percent received political information from television news programs.48 The OSCE noted in its report on the 2008 election that the television media’s coverage was generally biased in favor of Sargsyan and negative about Ter-Petrossian. Television news shows often engaged in self-censorship as the government pressured Armenian businesses to not advertise on stations critical of the government.49 Therefore, it was problematic for Ter-Petrossian’s campaign that almost all Armenians obtained their news via television. Once protests began, the television media generally ignored the demonstrations. An additional sign of the limited role of ICT during the 2008 protests was that most protesters said the only way for them to obtain information was to attend the demonstrations.50 The surprising thing about the internet and the 2008 elections was how the government responded when the postelection violence occurred. Despite the limited reach and usage of the internet for news, during the state of emergency the government blocked access to the websites of Radio Liberty in Armenian, www.azatuyun.am, the pro-opposition television company A1+, www.a1plus.am, and YouTube.51 The National Security Service also blocked access to most Armenian internet sites. When Armenians tried to access the blocked sites, they received a message saying, “Warning! As ordered by a state decree, some informational Web sites will not be accessible.”52 This censorship was the only time the Armenian government directly and widely blocked the internet. By 2013, the internet situation in Armenia had changed significantly. Whereas there was little usage of the internet during the 2008 campaign and protests, by 2013, with the internet penetration rate at 39 percent, online news sources now played an important role as an alternative source of information.53 According to surveys, by 2013 30 percent of Armenians obtained political information from the internet.54 A variety of online websites provide Armenians with “politically nonbiased, neutral, or oppositional opinions.”55 Two of the most popular online news sites were “A1+ news editorial (A1plus.am) and Lragir

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Daily (Lragir.am),” both of which were regularly critical of the government.56 Overall, online news sources received more than 20,000 daily visitors, significantly more than the subscription rate for independent print media.57 Surveys of Armenian journalists found that the majority believed that online media was more independent and provided opportunities for journalists to report on sensitive political issues.58 Compared to television news, where self-censorship was widespread, there were no reports of self-censorship among online journalists.59 Furthermore, in a 2013 survey by the OSCE, the majority of those surveyed said that Facebook, the most popular social media platform in Armenia, became their exclusive source of information during tense times.60 Online media sources reported on Hovhannisian’s protests against the election results and demands for them to be annulled.61 Overall, the freedom of expression online helped to enable an alternative source of information about political and economic developments in Armenia. The blog culture had also developed by 2013. Similar to other cases, blogs were a place for political debate and critiques of the government. Activists also adopted the new technology in attempt to help counter electoral fraud. In the 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections, an election monitoring project, the iDitord project, allowed people to report online information about electoral fraud at polling places around the country.62 During the 2013 presidential elections, the project received over 400 reports of problems with the election such as cases of bribes, problems with electoral lists, and violations of advertising rules.63 The internet was an alternative source of information before and during the 2013 presidential election. The greater media freedom online may have contributed to Hovhannisian’s relatively strong electoral result of 37 percent of the vote. The situation changed even more by 2018, with the internet penetration rate reaching 62 percent, mobile phone penetration at 119 percent, and Wi-Fi widespread throughout the capital city of Yerevan.64 According to the OSCE, there were “more than 200 online news portals operating in” Armenia in 2018.65 Although television remained the main source of news, since 2008 online media and social networks, especially Facebook, had become major sources of political news and information.66 In 2018 approximately 1.2 million Armenians were using Facebook, which is about 42 percent of the population.67 This was almost double of the number of users of Facebook in 2013.68 Unlike traditional media, according to Freedom House, “Online publishers and individual bloggers strongly resist self-censorship. Indeed, there is a wide diversity of opinion on social media, and virtual battles between supporters and opponents of the government are often observed. A variety of independent

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and opposition web resources provide Armenian audiences with politically neutral or oppositional opinions.”69 In addition, as in 2013 the Armenian government did not restrict access, censor websites, or ban any social media platforms. The movement’s leader in 2018, Pashinyan, relied on Facebook to communicate his message and to connect with followers. He used Facebook daily not only to organize protests (see below for more information on this), but also to receive feedback from protesters, often responding directly to them.70 Pashinyan especially took advantage of the ability to livestream events and videos on Facebook to share information about the protests. One way to assess the importance of the internet as a source of information during the protests is to measure internet usage. The internet service provider Ucom reported an almost “300 percent increase in demand for internet traffic during the protests.”71 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Armenian service had significant coverage of the protests, and its YouTube and Facebook Live pages received over 100 million views in April 2018 which, given that Armenia has only 2.9 million people, suggests high levels of repeated traffic to their sites.72 The lack of censorship plus the widespread use of online news sources and Facebook eroded the ability of the Armenian government to control the narrative as the 2018 crisis unfolded.

Moldova. Similar to Armenia, the Moldovan government heavily influenced the television news, but generally allowed for alternative and independent news online. The European Union “repeatedly expressed concern” that the state television station, Teleradio-Moldova (TRM), lacked editorial independence and generally provided positive coverage for President Voronin and his Communist Party while not covering opposition political parties at all.73 The nature of the reporting on TRM is especially important because it is the only broadcaster to have national reach.74 In addition, the Moldovan government used more indirect methods to control the media. For example, the government would direct advertising to only the media sources that did not critique the government.75 During the April 2009 protests, TRM failed to provide any coverage of the demonstrations. Later, in response to criticism for failing to report on the protests, the president of TRM, Valentin Todercan, “wrote a letter to the European Parliament (EP) claiming that reporters were unable to connect their equipment to a power source during the protests,” a questionable excuse.76 The harassment of journalists also increased during the April protests, as the government prevented foreign reporters from the Associated Press, BBC, Reuters, and other international news sources from entering the country.77

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In contrast to its control over television, according to the OpenNet Initiative, Moldovans generally “enjoy unfettered access” to content on the internet and the government rarely engaged in censorship.78 Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and the Russian Odnoklassniki, along with international news sources, were all available to internet users. In the years prior to the protests, several news websites established livestreaming capabilities. For example, Unimedia, an independent news website, began in 2007 and Romanian Television stations also had livestreaming news coverage of Moldova on their websites. Blogs and internet forums were additional avenues for people to spread information about the regime’s abuses. For example, the Moldovan human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Hyde Park Association, under harassment from authorities, moved primarily online and posted about regime abuses on the public blog Curaj.Net.79 Although by 2008, the OpenNet Initiative reported that 37 percent of the Moldovan population were internet users, the majority of these users were in the cities, with significantly less internet access in the rural areas.80 Furthermore, according to a November 2008 International Republican Institute poll, only 9 percent of Moldovans obtained political information via the internet.81 During the April 2009 protests, the government took the unprecedented step of temporarily blocking access to the internet in the capital city, Chisinau, where the majority of the protests occurred. Moldovans in Chisinau were unable to access social media platforms, like Facebook, starting on April 7 and continuing for the next several days. The government was able to relatively easily restrict access to the internet because the main national internet service provider (ISP), Moldtelecom, was under state control. Government officials also “disconnected cell phone coverage in the main square” on April 7.82 This strategy was similar to the Armenian government’s actions in 2008, where they also blocked access for a period of time. The Moldovan government did quickly restore internet and cell service, with the exception of internet news sites and social media, because of the problems it caused for government communications to have internet and cell phone service blocked.83 During the 2015–2016 protests, the internet continued to be a source of alternative information, especially because the Moldovan government did not engage in online censorship. Furthermore, the internet penetration rate had increased to almost 50 percent.84 The access to diverse perspectives online was important as Moldovan television was predominantly controlled by politically connected oligarchs, with Plahotniuc owning four of the five national television outlets and the state-owned public television presenting “mostly positive news on the incumbent par-

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ties.”85 Once the protests began, the stations owned by Plahotniuc and state television provided minimal coverage of the events and focused on discrediting the Dignity and Truth civic movement.86 In contrast, the protests received significant attention online and on Jurnal TV, one of the stations associated with the Dignity and Truth civic movement.87 Highlighting the continued role of blogs was the fact that Alexandru Cozer, a well-known political blogger, was one of the founders of the Dignity and Truth civic movement. The generally uncensored internet in both Armenia and Moldova enabled it to become an important avenue for critical information about the government. As the Armenia case involves over a decade of protests, we can also see that increased levels of internet penetration did translate into more Armenians using it as a source of news. The greater availability of the internet weakened the ability of the Armenian government in 2018 to control the narrative about the antigovernment protests and, thereby, possibly contributed to Sargsyan’s defeat. In contrast, the continued dominance of television news in 2009 likely reduced the ability of Moldovan activists to spread their message outside of the capital city.

Mechanism 2: Aid for Democratic Diffusion

Armenia. ICT, especially Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Armenianlanguage social media presence and website, may have helped to spread democratic ideas in Armenia. Radio Azatutyun, its Armenian-language service, has a website, Facebook page, YouTube page, and active Twitter and Instagram feeds. Radio Azatutyun has a large presence in Armenia because it combines a traditional news medium, radio, with new technology, internet and social media. In 2018 alone, they had 32.2 million visits to their website, 567.2 million views of their videos on Facebook, and 7 million views of their Instagram videos.88 As Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s mission “is to promote democratic values and institutions by reporting the news in countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established,” it is likely that they help to spread democratic ideas in Armenia.89 However, the data about Facebook usage and public opinion about foreign relations raise some questions about the degree of democratic diffusion, especially via ICT, that has occurred in Armenia. According to an OSCE Armenia survey of Facebook users in 2013, a large number had only Armenians on their friends list and, in general, the survey found that Facebook in Armenia is “mainly an intra-Armenian phenomenon.”90 Armenians are also generally more focused toward Russia.

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For example, an International Republican Institute public opinion survey in 2008 found that 95 percent of Armenians saw Russia as the most important partner for the country, compared to the only 19 percent who said the United States was an important partner.91 A further sign of the limited influence of democratic diffusion is that the 2009 Civil Society Index found that only 1–2 percent of all NGOs actively engaged in regional or international networking.92 An alternative mechanism by which democratic diffusion could occur would be through contact with the Armenian diaspora. According the 2010 United States Census, there were approximately 480,000 people in the United States claiming Armenian ancestry.93 Organizations such as Birthright Armenia, the Armenian Volunteers Corps, and others have been active in facilitating connections between members of the Armenian diaspora and Armenia. For example, between 2001 and 2010, more than 850 volunteers of Armenian descendent went to Armenia from Western countries, predominantly the United States.94 These personal interactions could be an avenue of democratic diffusion. However, there is little data on whether or not Armenian Americans use ICT to remain in contact with the Armenians they meet on these trips. Furthermore, promoting democratization in Armenia is generally not a top priority for Armenian diaspora organizations. For example, the Armenian National Committee of America focuses on advocating for Armenian Americans in US legislatures and ensuring that people remember the Armenian genocide, not on democracy in Armenia.95 In terms of demonstration effects, because international and online news is not usually censored, Armenians would have had exposure to the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2005 and 2010 protests in Kyrgyzstan, and the wave of protests across the Middle East in 2010– 2011. However, the timing of major Armenian protests (2008, 2013, 2018) suggests limited evidence of a demonstration effect. Therefore, outside of the influence of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Radio Azatutyun, there is little evidence of ICT being used as a mechanism to aid democratic diffusion in Armenia.

Moldova. Similar to Armenia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty may have played a role in facilitating democratic diffusion in Moldova. As noted above, its mission is to support democracy through independent reporting. It also has a local Moldovan service, Radio Europa Libera, that provides news in both Romanian and Russian via its radio station and website. However, there is no specific evidence that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s website or social media were influential in 2009 or 2015–2016.

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There is a possibility that, because of the uncensored internet and shared language with a European Union (EU) Member State, Romania, democratic diffusion occurred in Moldova via ICT. However, there is no direct evidence that ICT was important for democratic diffusion in Moldova. Moreover, there is no direct evidence of a demonstration effect contributing to the outbreak of protests in April 2009. Although there had been a “colored revolution” in neighboring Ukraine, it had occurred four-and-a-half years earlier, so there was no immediate effect. There is also no evidence of a demonstration effect in 2015–2016. In neighboring Ukraine, President Yanukovych had been overthrown in a violent confrontation the year before. However, the overthrow of Yanukovych contributed to the outbreak of civil war in Ukraine, so it is unlikely that situation would be seen as a positive demonstration effect. In addition, the causes of the 2015 protest appear to be rooted in the domestic circumstances of the banking scandal and political corruption. In both Armenia and Moldova, there is limited evidence that ICT aids democratic diffusion. Language barriers in the two countries may restrict democratic diffusion via ICT. Furthermore, unlike Russia and Iran, both countries allow the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and EU to operate democracy promotion programs, enabling a more direct form of democratic diffusion to occur. However, as discussed below, USAID and EU programs focused on supporting democracy have had minimal success despite decades of effort. Therefore, the evidence of any form of successful democratic diffusion is limited.

Mechanism 3: A Tool of Mobilization and Organization

Armenia. As noted above, there is little evidence that in 2008 supporters of Ter-Petrossian used the internet to organize demonstrations. However, five years later in 2013, with increased access and use of social media platforms, activists had started to use Facebook to organize demonstrations and civic action. Despite this, there are no examples of Hovhannisian himself using the internet to organize protests against electoral fraud in 2013. In contrast, in the years leading up to the 2018 protests, social media platforms became popular tools for organization and mobilization around environmental and economic issues. All of these “civic initiatives” shared common characteristics of being grassroots movements organized via social media and disconnected from existing civil society and political parties. For example, Armenians used Facebook to advocate for saving the Trchkan waterfall from environmentally destructive construction (2011) and to prevent the Mashtots

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Park in Yerevan (2012) from being cemented over.96 Both of these civic initiatives were successful in achieving their immediate aims, demonstrating the ability of digitally networked protests to bring about a change in policy. The largest digitally networked protest movement between 2013 and 2017 was the protests against the planned increase in electricity prices in the summer of 2015. The 17 percent increase in electricity prices provoked widespread anger because of the economic hardship it would cause many Armenians and because of allegations of corruption in the Russian-owned electricity company.97 These protests had no clear leaders or structure. They developed out of a “No to Robbery” community on Facebook, which used the page to organize protests.98 Again, these protests were successful, as the government decided to, at least temporarily, cover the costs of the rate hike. The 2018 protests built on the previous experiences of digitally networked protests. As the most recent case of digitally networked protests in this book and the one where there is the highest level of internet penetration, the protests online and off demonstrate how the presence of social media fundamentally altered the structure and nature of the protest movement. In 2018, activists depended on social media to mobilize and organize. It was also the primary way Pashinyan communicated the plans for demonstrations, road blockages, and strikes. The protesters themselves used messaging applications, like Telegram, to communicate and to share information about demonstrations.99 The demonstrations were highly creative and mobile. The high level of mobility was possible only with the availability of messaging applications and social media tools that were able to instantly inform thousands of people where the next protest or road blockage would occur. As Levon Abrahamian and Gayane Shagoyan recount, Pashinyan changed tactics from previous rounds of demonstrations by moving the protests out of Freedom Square to throughout Yerevan. “Every morning, Pashinyan would send a message indicating the quarter where street blocking would take place, but concrete actions were improvised by activists.”100 Activists used a variety of techniques to block streets, including trash cans, cars, and even protesters constantly crossing the street back and forth at crosswalks.101 There rarely were enough protesters to block all of the streets; therefore, the protesters took advantage of ICT to be highly mobile, and once the police unblocked a street they would move to block another street. Along with using ICT to organize the daily protest activity, Armenians also went online to mobilize people. One method Armenians used to gain support and recruit participants was to design creative images and slogans online and offline. Eduard Kankanyan, a graphic designer,

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posted images, designs, and slogans on his Facebook page. His image of the word “revolution” “was posted to more than 20,000 Facebook profile pictures” and then moved offline to be printed on T-shirts, posters, and so forth.102 The protests often had a carnival element to them, especially online, as people posted the most interesting and appealing videos and pictures. Abrahamian and Shagoyan argue that this dynamic “made the ‘protest space’ more attractive” and helped to mobilize people.103 Abrahamian and Shagoyan argue that the protest movement in 2018 resembled the nature of communication within social networks: Just as each user of a social network can quickly and independently react to the actions of numerous strangers (comments, statuses, or memes), a protester could make a “post” by blocking a street or “comment” by standing with a fellow protester, even if only for a short time. It became like a social media newsfeed: if somebody reacted, an action happened; if they didn’t, protesters moved on, “scrolling down” to the next action. This principle of Facebook communication given form in the non-digital space seemed to guarantee that the dispersed struggle worked—it was literally a “network” principle.104

The higher level of internet penetration translated into it having a greater role in mobilizing and organizing protests in 2018. Moreover, the nature of the protests changed as social media had altered people’s behavior and enabled a more mobile, individualistic form of protest to occur.

Moldova. Moldovan activists primarily used ICT to help organize and mobilize protesters in 2009. More so than in the Armenian protests, the April 2009 protest resembled a flash mob as it arose quickly, was completely organized via technology, and was disconnected from existing civil society organizations. Six Moldovan activists, including Natalya Morar, a journalist and organizer of the internet forum ThinkMoldova, organized the first protest on April 6 in only several hours. On her blog, Morar recounted that “Six people. Ten minutes for creativity and action. A few hours of information on networks, Facebook, blogs, SMS [Short Messaging Service] to friends, and an e-mail newsletter. All of the organization through the Internet. On the street came out 15,000 young people!”105 Oleg Berga, one of the activists involved in organizing the protests, said that SMS text messages were one of the primary ways the organizers spread information about the protest.106 Their original text read: “If you did not vote for the communists, come at 6 pm to the Stephen the Great’s monument and bring a candle. If you received this message, send it to all your friends.”107 In addition, Berga noted they used internet messaging, such as

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Skype and Yahoo Messenger, to spread information. He stated that, “My list of friends on Yahoo Messenger, for example, has at least 500 addresses, and I used it to send in one minute short information with a link to the message about the demonstrations. It was spread instantly by my friends to other thousands of addresses.”108 The success of the April 6 demonstration helped to spread information about the second protest on April 7, which the opposition political parties had been planning since before the election.109 Along with using SMS text messaging, Facebook, emails, and other forms of social media, people also began to use Twitter to disseminate information about the protest. There was an increase in Moldovans joining Twitter, as the OpenNet Initiative report remarked that “more than 10,000 Moldovans joined in on Twitter to share their opinions and spread the news of Chisinau’s political protests.”110 Tweets about the protests generally had the hashtag #pman, shorthand for Piata Marii Adunari Nationale, the Romanian name of Chisinau’s largest square.111 One of the protesters, Alexei Ghertescu, recounted how the information about the April 7 demonstration spread: “I heard that you can get some fresh information from Twitter. And then I decided to join Twitter only yesterday evening. . . . There was information about a meeting on the central square. And this information appeared on one or two Internet sites—the opposition sites. And then it was spread around [with Twitter and text messages].”112 In the end there were over 30,000 tweets with the hashtag #pman.113 Despite the surge of Twitter usage, reports from those involved with the protests suggest that text messaging remained the main way that people organized the protests. The government’s decision to shut down cellular service in the area of the protests along with blocking internet access further illustrates the importance of ICT for organizing the protests. The protests quickly faded out after the violence on April 7. The government’s repression likely also contributed to the end of protests, as they placed Natalya Morar, one of the main organizers, under house arrest and beat up other protesters. Delegates from a European Parliament fact-finding mission determined that protesters arrested by the government “were brutally beaten and forced to walk through ‘corridors of death,’ two rows of police officers who beat them with their fists, feet, and truncheons.”114 On April 9, Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii said that if protests occurred again the “police will use all means necessary to protect the constitutionality of Moldova, including the use of arms,” and that “human sacrifices will be very hard to avoid.”115 The government did agree to a recount of the April 5 vote. The combination

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of threats, arrests, and minor concessions may explain why the protests ended after only a few days. Social media was again used to organize protests in 2015 and 2016.116 However, unlike in 2009, civil society organizations also played a role in organizing and participating in the protests, and multiple members of the Dignity and Truth civic movement had connections to Moldovan NGOs. The protests, especially in January 2016, more directly involved political leaders than in 2009. Igor Dodon and Renato Usatii, pro-Russian leaders of the Socialist and Our Party political parties, along with the newly formed political party Platform for Dignity and Truth, played a leadership role in the January 2016 protests.117 Therefore, the available evidence is mixed about how important ICT was for mobilizing and organizing protests in 2015–2016.118 ICT was an essential tool of protest organization and mobilization for the 2018 protests in Armenia and the 2009 Moldovan protests. In both cases, the organizers depended on various forms of social media and text messaging to communicate and organize protests. There is no way prior to the arrival of ICT that a limited number of Moldovans could have arranged a protest with thousands of participants in a few hours. These two cases demonstrate the potential power of ICT and “few-to-many” communication to organize antigovernment protests in authoritarian contexts, as well as how new technology can alter the nature and dynamics of protest. In contrast, there is less evidence about the role of ICT in the 2015–2016 protests. The political maneuvering and complexity surrounding the 2015–2016 protests suggest that, although social media likely played a role, civil society organizations and political leaders may have been equally, if not more, important.

Mechanism 4: Spreading the Word Around the World

Armenia. When the government limits access to foreign journalists and controls the media, ICT can provide an important avenue for activists to spread their message around the world and gain international attention. International attention can increase pressure on the government to negotiate and raise the cost of repression. However, unlike other cases, the international press can freely operate in Armenia. Therefore, ICT is less essential for spreading the word about antigovernment protests and government repression. The larger issue is that Armenia is not seen as a strategic priority for the United States or European states, resulting in less attention to political developments. However, both the 2008 and 2018 protests did receive international

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coverage and expressions of concern by US and European officials. The 2013 protests received little international attention, partially because the protests were shorter and involved no government violence.119 In 2008, the US chargé d’affaires, Joseph Pennington, called on the Armenian government to not arrest opposition leader Ter-Petrossian, arguing that the United States “strongly discourages” such action and that it “would not contribute to stability and reduction in tensions.”120 The EU’s special representative for the South Caucasus came to Armenia to mediate the political crisis.121 After the end of the protests, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza called on all parties involved to engage in talks to “restore democratic momentum” in Armenia.122 Bryza also criticized the restriction of the media, including the censorship of the internet, stating that it was “essential . . . that these media freedoms be restored.”123 In 2018, the US embassy in Armenia issued a statement expressing concern “over reports of violence against journalists and demonstrators; we emphasize the need for those responsible for violence . . . to be held accountable under the law.”124 The spokeswoman for EU Foreign Policy High Representative Federica Mogherini issued a similar statement calling everyone to “show restraint and act responsibly” and that there needed to be a “peaceful resolution” of the crisis.125 Given the low level of usage of ICT in Armenia in 2008, it is unlikely that it was an important tool to disseminate information. As noted above, by 2018 usage had expanded dramatically. Pashinyan used livestreaming broadcasts to spread his message and to possibly gain some degree of protection from government repression. For example, Pashinyan livestreamed his meeting with Sargsyan on April 22, where the prime minister dismissed Pashinyan and then walked out of the meeting after only three minutes.126 Pashinyan’s decision to livestream the meeting with Sargsyan may have been his attempt to be protected from retaliation. It is more difficult to violently attack an opposition leader on live television streaming around the world than it is to beat someone in private. However, the fact that the majority of the Facebook and social media discussion of the protests were in Armenian or Russian likely limited the importance of ICT as a source of global dissemination. Unlike the 2009 Green Movement in Iran, there were no videos of the protests that went viral and gained high levels of attention around the world. It is also possible this mechanism was less important here because of the lower level of attention Armenia receives in the United States compared to other cases such as Russia or Egypt. For example, according to Google, Armenia was not in the top ten searches or news items in the United States

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in 2018, but in 2011 Egypt was the eighth most common news-related search on Google in the United States.127 Moreover, Armenian activists may have been less focused on reaching an international audience because the Armenian government had never been as violent toward protesters as the Egyptian, Tunisian, and Iranian governments. Although several protesters were killed in 2008, since then the government had been limited in its use of repression, possibly reducing the strategic need to gain international attention for protection from repression.

Moldova. Unlike in Armenia, the existence of ICT helped people spread news about the 2009 Moldovan protests. Because approximately 1 million Moldovan citizens are migrant workers in either Europe or Russia, various forms of ICT are important ways for Moldovans outside of the country to stay connected and informed.128 An analysis of the use of Twitter during the protests by Ethan Zuckerman found that Moldovans outside of the country were active on Twitter over this period.129 As this tweet, “The west is hungry for more detail, post as much as you can, let them see what is happening, Moldova don’t give up and don’t give in!!!” demonstrates, Moldovans were deliberately using Twitter to spread information outside of the country.130 Additional analysis of the use of Twitter by Evgeny Morozov found that one of the primary uses of Twitter in Moldova was to increase international awareness of the protests.131 Given the efforts of the government to keep foreign journalists out of the country, the internet was an important means for Moldovans to share information about events. Noting the challenge of reporting on the developments in Moldova, Deutsche Welle commented that “Twitter and Facebook posts, though often not verified by independent sources, are proving to be a major source of information about developing events in Chisinau.”132 The protests in Moldova likely received more international attention because they were one of the earlier examples of people in an authoritarian country using Twitter, Facebook, and other forms of social media to organize protests. Although social media helped to disseminate information about the protests outside of Moldova, they resulted in limited international pressure on the government. The European Union did express concerns about the violence, but applied little direct pressure on the government. On April 8, the EU presidency issued a statement calling on Moldovan authorities and the opposition to each “refrain from any action that could lead to further escalation of the tensions,” and that any solution requires “peaceful dialogue and respect for the rule of law.”133 Javier Solana, EU high representative for common foreign and security policy, issued a similar statement

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calling “on all sides to refrain from violence and provocation. Violence against government buildings is unacceptable. Equally important is the respect for the inalienable right of assembly of peaceful demonstrators.”134 The US State Department issued a similar statement urging “the government to act in accordance with Moldovan law and its international obligations” and stressing “that there is no excuse for violence, such as took place on April 7 [by the protesters].”135 As the EU and US statements demonstrate, one reason for the muted European response was that the protesters themselves turned violent. Another reason is that the protests lasted for only a brief amount of time, reducing the level of international attention. Despite the EU’s own reports of violence against protesters, the Council of Europe argued in April 2009 that Moldova should not be subject to sanctions and that government response to the protests did not signal Moldova was moving backward on democracy.136 Overall, there is little evidence that the Moldovan government came under pressure to democratize because of international attention driven by social media. Although the protests lasted longer and were larger in 2015–2016, there again was minimal international pressure to democratize and little evidence that social media helped to increase international pressure on Moldovan politicians. As the political and economic crisis in Moldova unfolded throughout 2015 and into 2016, the EU and the United States did repeatedly express concern. However, the Europeans and Americans prioritized stability in Moldova over promoting democracy. For example, US assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasian affairs, Victoria Nuland, publicly expressed support for the government of Prime Minister Filip, despite his connections to Plahotniuc and the controversial process by which he became prime minister.137 The Moldovan press interpreted this action as US support for Plahotniuc, a man distrusted by over 90 percent of Moldovans.138 In addition, following the Russian seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine the previous year, the Europeans and Americans feared possible Russian interference in Moldova.139 The increasing public support for pro-Russian politicians, such as Igor Dogon, contributed to these fears. Therefore, by prioritizing stability and geopolitics, the Americans and Europeans provided little pressure to democratize. Of the five cases examined, this mechanism was most evident in Moldova in 2009, when ICT helped people spread information about the protests abroad after the government prevented foreign journalists from entering the country. However, in all of the cases, the level of international attention and pressure on the Armenian and Moldovan governments was minimal.

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Why the Armenian (2008 and 2013) and Moldovan Protests Failed

The 2008 and 2013 Armenian protests and the Moldovan protests all failed for similar reasons—weak civil society, weak to moderate international support for democracy, and the relatively strong leaders. The weakness of Armenian and Moldovan civil society limited the size, duration, and distribution of the protests. All of these protest movements also lacked effective leadership, further illustrating the weakness of civil society and opposition leaders. On the international side, Armenia and Moldova both had important economic relations with the EU and Russia. However, Moldova is in a more favorable international environment as it borders the EU and is less dependent on Russia for its national security than Armenia. The unusual circumstances of unresolved territorial conflicts gave the Armenian and Moldovan leaders additional mechanisms by which to maintain power and counter protests. In Armenia, the persistent threat from Azerbaijan resulted in Presidents Kocharyan and Sargsyan having sufficient coercive capacity to repress protests, and they were able to draw on national security concerns to maintain the loyalty of the security forces. Moldovan president Voronin was able to maintain some legitimacy through appealing to nationalism and enflaming existing disputes about national identity. In 2015–2016, Plahotniuc was strong enough to survive the political turmoil and consolidate his political power in Moldova because of systemic corruption that enabled oligarchs and politicians to use the government to serve their own interests (i.e., state capture).

Weak Civil Society in Armenia and Moldova Armenian and Moldovan civil society organizations are able to operate more freely than their counterparts in Russia, Iran, or Egypt. Freedom House’s 2008 Nations in Transit annual report reflects the higher degree of pluralism in each country as it evaluated Armenia’s civil society as 3.5 and Moldova’s as 3.75 on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 as the least free.140 In contrast, it evaluated Russia’s civil society as 5.5.141 Despite this positive dynamic, Armenian and Moldovan civil society have little influence on policymaking, lack financial resources, and are generally distrusted by their respective populations.142 After analyzing civil society development in post-Soviet Armenia, Armine Ishkanian concluded that although NGOs have done some helpful projects, overall they have not affected the Armenian political context, influenced political debate, or improved political participation.143 As noted above, the Armenian government generally did not repress civil

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society; instead, the government’s strategy was to ignore civil society organizations. According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index Armenia Country Report, Armenian civil society’s influence is limited by “the state’s failure to engage it in constructive dialogue or to grant it a role in public debate or the formulation of policy.”144 The Armenian people also see civil society as having little impact. A 2014 survey of Armenians found that 54 percent believed that civil society “has either limited or no impact in addressing social issues in Armenia. People are even more skeptical about civil society’s impact on policy making: 58% believe that civil society as a whole has limited or no impact on policy making.”145 At the time of the 2009 and 2015 protests, Moldovan NGOs also had minimal influence on public debate or government policy. Romanian scholar Petru Negură argued in 2016 that Moldovan civil society “is hardly perceivable in the public space.”146 Only in 2010 was the National Participation Council, an institution designed to facilitate civil society’s engagement with government legislation, established.147 In addition, prior to 2009, government officials rarely met with NGO representatives.148 By 2015, the government had failed to renew the mandate of the National Participation Council, illustrating the government’s continued dismissal of civil society.149 Foreign donors are the main source of funding for civil society organizations in Armenia and Moldova. Over 40 percent of financing for Armenian NGOs comes from foreign political donors, many of which are members of the Armenian diaspora.150 In Moldova, the 2010 NGO Sustainability Index stated that the financial viability of NGOs is their “most critical challenge” and that NGOs still receive 80–95 percent of their funding from US and European sources.151 One of the problems with the high dependency on foreign donors is that NGOs serve the interests of donors and can be disconnected from the needs of their society. In her critique of civil society development in the region, Orysia Lutsevych gave the following example: “Following the 2009 electoral revolution in Moldova, NGO leaders met with foreign embassies and donors to consult over priorities but no major public forum or debate was launched to discuss a national reform agenda.” 152 The focus on foreign donors over engaging with the local population on a political agenda reduces the influence of Moldovan NGOs on developing civic culture and support for democracy. In addition, the agendas of the foreign donors may not always be about building democracy, as surveys of Armenian civil society organizations found that “the general perception of the examined NGOs was that the EU was prepared to compromise their democracy and human rights policies in favor for their more salient economic and strategic policies.”153

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There is also widespread distrust of and a lack of engagement with NGOs in Armenia and Moldova. According to Ishkanian’s research, Armenian “NGOs lack strong connections to local grassroots groups and the wider public” and, therefore, they are often “perceived with skepticism and suspicion of being externally oriented grant-eaters who are driven by the interests and concerns of Western donors.”154 The USAID NGO Sustainability Index made similar observations, stating that the Armenian local “business community’s perception of NGOs remained relatively negative. Most businesses are not interested to support NGO activities as they see NGOs as nontransparent and ineffective.”155 Polling in Moldova found that 51.9 percent of respondents do not trust civil society organizations.156 Along with generally distrusting civil society organizations or NGOs, most Armenians and Moldovans have little engagement with them or participate in volunteer activities. For example, in Moldova only 4 percent of those surveyed volunteer their time or donate money to NGOs.157 The self-reported rates of volunteering are higher for Armenia; according to the Caucasus Barometer survey, 23 percent of Armenians said they engaged in volunteer activity in 2012.158 However, over half of those respondents reported volunteering activity is informal and not connected to an organization.159 Therefore, in terms of supporting and developing civil society, the rate of volunteerism is more likely around 11–12 percent, which is higher than Moldova but still low. As discussed previously about Russia in Chapter 3, one reason for the low level of support for civil society is the negative legacy of communism. The communist system not only repressed all forms of civil society, but it also required people to rely on informal networks of trusted friends and family to survive. The economic turmoil of the 1990s, combined with the partial collapse of the state, reinforced the need to rely on informal networks. As Huseyn Aliyev describes in detail in his book, PostCommunist Civil Society and the Soviet Legacy, informal networks still dominate in Armenia, especially kinship networks. These informal networks “often perform functions of a formal civil society.”160 However, unlike a vibrant civil society, informal networks are “exclusivist, hierarchical, [and] corrupt” and not supportive of democratization.161 The perceived ineffectiveness of civil society organizations and the lack of trust in them contributed to the rise of digitally networked protest movements independent from civil society organizations, especially in Armenia. An Armenian activist involved in the digitally networked protests expressed her deliberate choice to not even use the term civil society because of its negative connotations: “If we [the civic initiatives] were to describe ourselves as ‘civil society’, then the Government would immediately say, ‘Oh they are grant-eaters’ [negative term

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for NGOs] . . . the words NGO or civil society are so compromised so that they are immediately associated, in the minds of many people in Armenia, with grant-eaters. For that reason, we must use a different word.”162 However, there are also structural weaknesses with digitally networked protests. As discussed in Chapter 2, they often lack coherence, institutional capacity, and clear leadership. All of these issues can reduce their impact, especially when the situation requires negotiating with the government. Furthermore, as Orysia Lutsevych argues, digitally networked protests struggle to “confront socially entrenched norms and practices—something that is needed to develop a stronger civil society— as this requires thorough planning and a hierarchy. Many groups spread political commentary or start virtual initiatives without any follow-up to develop ties between members.”163 Repeated protests in Armenia and Moldova were unable to change the political system or increase the influence of civil society on government.

A Mixed International Environment Armenia and Moldova both have important political and economic relations with Russia and the EU, resulting in international support for democratization and authoritarianism in each country. However, Moldova, being on the border of the EU, has stronger linkages with the EU than Armenia. In contrast, Armenia views Russia’s military assistance as vital to its national security, given its hostile neighborhood and the unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan.

Relations with Russia. Russia is an important trading partner and investor for both Armenia and Moldova. In 2010, 20.8 percent of Armenia’s total trade was with Russia.164 Following Armenia’s decision to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, trade with Russia increased to 26 percent of its total trade by 2018.165 Moldova’s trade with Russia is less, about 12 percent in 2010. The lower level of volume of trade may partially be the result of Russia’s decision to impose economic sanctions on Moldovan agricultural exports, especially wine, its largest agricultural export to Russia, in 2005.166 Russian state-owned and private companies are major investors in Armenia, controlling Armenia’s transportation, mining, finance, telecommunications, and insurance sectors.167 Despite the economic sanctions, Russia was the largest investor in Moldova. For example, in 2012 foreign direct investment stock inflows from Russia had reached over $200 million.168 Russia has economic leverage over each country through its control over energy supplies. In Armenia, Russia manages and supplies the fuel

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for the Metsamor nuclear power plant, which produces 40 percent of the country’s electricity.169 Since 2014, the Russian natural gas company Gazprom has had a monopoly over the import and distribution of natural gas in Armenia.170 Russia has control over most of Moldova’s energy supply. Almost all of Moldova’s gas comes from Russia and most of its electricity comes from a power plant in Transnistria run on Russian gas.171 Gazprom engaged in a series of gas wars with Moldova, which involved disputes over the gas price and Moldovan debt to Gazprom. Gazprom repeatedly reduced the supply of gas, and occasionally completely shut off supply. Russian energy companies, including Gazprom, used Moldova’s debt as a way to gain ownership of the gas pipelines and the main power plant in Moldova. Russia is an important market for Armenian and Moldovan migrant labor. Because of the persistent economic problems in Armenia, over 2 million Armenians have moved to work in Russia. Approximately 500,000 Moldovans have also left to work in Russia because of economic problems.172 However, unlike Armenians, over 500,000 Moldovans have been able to claim Romanian citizenship, giving them the right to visa-free travel to Europe which, combined with the geographic proximity of the EU, has resulted in 100,000s of Moldovan migrants working in Europe.173 Russia also has leverage over Armenia and Moldova because of its role as a guarantor of Armenian security and its involvement in the Transnistria conflict. Russia’s support for Armenia’s position in NagornoKarabakh has long been seen by Armenians as essential for the continued autonomy of the territory.174 In other words, if Russia decided to side with Azerbaijan against Armenia in this conflict, it could have devastating consequences for Nagorno-Karabakh and, therefore, Armenia. Russia has also been Armenia’s main weapons supplier and has sold the weapons to Armenia at a discounted price.175 Russia’s only military base in the Caucasus region is in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city, and its presence is seen as a deterrent against Turkey, who is allied with Azerbaijan.176 As discussed above, Russia, with over a thousand troops stationed in Transnistria, is a major player in the conflict. As Elena Korosteleva writes, Russia’s preponderance in the region is unquestionable. It deploys hard power—from military, economic and nationalist to electoral and political tools—to fully exert and extend its influence over the country. . . . Russia is also a key player, and more importantly, is perceived as such by the Moldovan elite, in the process of conflict resolution in Transnistria, the success of which came to be seen as almost entirely dependent on Russia’s political will.177

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Clearly, Russia has leverage over Moldova and, given its antidemocratic position, this is not supportive of democracy in Moldova.

Relations with the EU and the United States. Although Russia has important linkages with and leverage over Armenia and Moldova, both countries also have valuable economic ties with the EU. The EU has also sought to support democratization in both countries, but especially in the case of Moldova. The EU has long been a major trading partner for Armenia; for example, 26 percent of Armenia’s total exports in 2016 went to the EU, and overall the two entities engaged in approximately 300 million euros of trade.178 Despite the economic value of trade with the EU, the Armenian government, under pressure from Russia, decided in 2014 to not ratify a negotiated association agreement with the EU and instead join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. However, the recent ratification of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU reflects the continued importance of the EU as an economic partner for Armenia. Along with strong trade relations, the EU has provided 120 million euros since 2014 in financial assistance to Armenia, focusing on economic development, improving the business environment, and strengthening the rule of law.179 However, the EU has been criticized as being a weak promoter of democracy. The EU’s limited involvement with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue resulted in a perception in Armenia that the EU was “a reluctant partner,” which weakened its normative power and its political influence in Armenia because the status of Nagorno-Karabakh remains a high priority for Armenians.180 There also are concerns that the EU may favor Azerbaijan in any settlement because of the importance of Azerbaijan’s energy supplies.181 In a 2012 assessment of the EU’s efforts to promote democracy, Licínia Simão argues that the “outcome has been an ‘imitation of democracy’, aimed at maintaining external assistance, crucial to the survival of the regime, but unable to assure more freedoms and equity within society.”182 Armenia’s linkages with the United States are less than with the EU as the United States is not even in the top fifteen trading partners for Armenia.183 Furthermore, Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik found that the United States has placed little pressure on Armenia to democratize.184 Although Armenia has important economic linkages with the EU and moderate linkages with the United States, these linkages are significantly less than Armenia’s multiple linkages with Russia. In addition, being geographically distant from the EU, Armenia has no possibility of joining the EU, limiting the EU’s most powerful form of leverage. Armenia is not a

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foreign policy priority for the United States, limiting its engagement in the region. Russia has more leverage over Armenia than the EU because of its influence over Armenian security and its high level of investment in major parts of the Armenian economy. The dependency on Russia reduces international support for democratization in Armenia, contributing to the failure of the protests and its struggles to democratize. In contrast, Moldova has closer economic and political ties with the EU. In 2010, trade with the EU was 52.3 percent of all of Moldova’s trade, more than double Moldova’s trade with Russia.185 Since 1999, Moldova has officially sought European integration. At the time of the 2009 protests, Moldova was following an Action Plan as part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Under the ENP, the EU had significantly increased its financial assistance to Moldova, including programs focused on democracy and good governance.186 During the fiscal years 2007–2010, the EU allocated over 50 million euros to support for democratic development and good governance.187 As Ecaterina McDonagh documents in her research, after 2001 the EU applied more direct pressure on Moldova to democratize, leading to government policy changes regarding opposition political parties and the media.188 By 2015 Moldova had signed an association agreement with the EU, increasing their political and economic ties. As a result, trade between Moldova and the EU grew, confirming the EU’s role as Moldova’s most important trading partner. The United States also promoted democracy in Moldova before and after the 2009 elections and protests. USAID began its work in Moldova in 1992 and funded programs such as Strengthening Democratic Political Activism, the Moldova Civil Society Strengthening Program, and the Moldova Citizen Participation Program.189 In fiscal year 2008, USAID spent approximately $6.7 million on democracy- and governance-related programs.190 However, Moldova’s lack of democracy and continued struggles with corruption suggest these programs have had a limited impact.191 Linkages with the EU, along with the possibility of some future membership, did provide international support for democratization in Moldova. However, the EU itself has not committed to possible membership for Moldova, which limits its leverage. Public opinion surveys have found that although a majority of Moldovans (70 percent in 2008) favored integration with the EU, 53 percent in 2008 also said Moldova should remain in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).192 Polling suggests that many Moldovans would prefer to have close, positive relations with both the EU and Russia, which reflects how important the linkages are with each entity. Overall, Moldova is in a position where the international environment provides support for democratization and

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authoritarianism. This mixed international environment may explain why international pressure played a relatively small role in the 2009 and 2015–2016 protests.

Strength of the Leader and the Nature of Autocratic Rule One reason why the leadership of Armenia was able to survive repeated waves of protests (prior to 2018) was because the coercive capacity of the state enabled them to suppress demonstrations. The unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the threat from Azerbaijan justified high levels of government expenditures on security forces. The continued militarization, along with the legacy of the military victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, resulted in the army becoming one of the “most powerful institutions in Armenia.”193 From the beginning of the modern, independent state of Armenia, the military has been actively engaged in politics. The war with Azerbaijan was primarily fought by volunteers, resulting in a military lead by “passionately political men,” many of whom became actively involved in politics in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.194 Therefore, veterans of the war and political leaders from Nagorno-Karabakh have had powerful influence on Armenian politics. For example, both President Kocharyan and Sargsyan were from Karabakh and had the loyalty of the security forces. In addition, the Yerkrapah organization of veterans of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh was politically powerful throughout the 1990s and 2000s.195 It is alleged that members of the organization suppressed protests following the disputed presidential elections in 1996. Parliamentary members of the organization also played a pivotal role in forcing the resignation of President Ter-Petrossian in 1998.196 The coercive capacity of the state, combined with the strong political influence of former military leaders, helps explain how Kocharyan and Sargsyan, unlike Kyrgyzstani presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev (discussed in Chapter 5), were able to survive multiple rounds of antigovernment protests. Voronin did not have the same coercive capacity as Kocharyan and Sargsyan. When Moldova became an independent state, it did not inherit sufficient military or police resources from the Soviet Union. Military and police forces initially lacked equipment, suffered from low morale, and were underpaid. The situation was so dire in the 1990s that police had to share equipment with each other.197 Although the overall condition of the security forces had improved by 2009, Moldovan security experts Valeriu Mija and Diana Molodilo noted that the security forces failed to respond effectively to the 2009 protests and were unable to resolve the crisis.198 The security forces had “no contingency plans to deal with such

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a situation,” especially as the protests became violent, and “left the scene when the fires were raging.”199 Even after the events, “the law enforcement and internal intelligence agencies failed to provide Moldova’s political leadership with adequate information and analysis.”200 Therefore, having limited coercive capacity, Voronin drew on disputes over national identity to discredit the protest movement and strengthen his claims for legitimacy. Immediately after the April 7 protests Voronin said, “The neighboring state, Romania, has been involved in all these events. We have proof of that. Romania’s ambassador will be declared persona non grata today. This is a political step meant to make the Romanians understand that we have our own independent state, Moldova. They shouldn’t stick their noses in our boiling pot, as we Moldovans say.”201 As noted above, the demands to make Moldovan the official language and calls for unification with Romania contributed to the 1992 outbreak of conflict in Transnistria, a region dominated by Russian speakers concerned about being marginalized in Moldova.202 The protests and Voronin’s response enflamed the existing divisions between the proRomanian and pro-Russian factions in Moldova. In the short term, this helped Voronin stay in power and justify his arrest of activists. However, over the longer term, it contributed to failure of the PCRM to elect a new president, as the intensification of the national identity debate led to the decision of the disparate opposition political parties to remain unified against the PCRM candidate.203 Overall, the unresolved conflict over Transnistria and lingering debates about Moldovan national identity, including the idea of unification with Romania, have made democratization difficult. As Theodor Tudoroiu writes, “The war in Transnistria and the de facto independence of this region affected seriously and durably Moldova’s politics and democratization.”204 Disputes over national identity helped to prevent regime overthrow and democratization in Moldova. The situation in 2015–2016 is more complex than in 2009 because the protests were not specifically against the president or prime minister per se, but rather against the whole corrupt political system, a corrupt political system personified by Plahotniuc. The corrupt system and Plahotniuc were powerful enough to survive widespread public anger and outrage. According to Armand Goşu, through “various blackmail or corruption schemes,” Plahotniuc had gained control over the judicial system in Moldova, which was a major source of his power and influence.205 Through his control of the courts, Plahotniuc was able “to secure his assets, to increase his wealth by hijacking businesses and legalizing the operations in courts, and to secure veritable networks

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which, using the banks and courts in Moldova, managed to launder for the Russian mafia over 20 billion dollars in only a few years.”206 Plahotniuc managed to seize more power during the political turmoil of 2015–2016, as his ally, Filip, became prime minister and his political party, the Democratic Party, ended up with a parliamentary majority despite winning only 19 seats out of 101 in the 2014 elections.207 Therefore, Plahotniuc dominated the media, economy, judiciary, and parliament. Plahotniuc is an example of the broader dynamic of state capture in Moldova. The persistence of widespread corruption and state capture is a negative legacy of the communist political system and the turmoil of the 1990s when criminal organizations thrived and became intertwined with political networks.208 The protest movements in Moldova have been unable to reform this deeply ingrained system. In summary, the 2008 and 2013 Armenian protests and the Moldovan protests all failed to overthrow the leader and bring about political reform for three main reasons: weak civil society, limited international support for democratization, and leaders or systems strong enough to survive the protests. In both Armenia and Moldova, the legacy of communism and Soviet rule helps explain the weakness of civil society and, at least partially, the existence of unresolved territorial disputes. Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and Voronin were able to manipulate these unresolved territorial disputes to justify their continued rule and to discredit opposition movements. The communist system, with its lack of rule of law and dependency on informal institutions, also contributed to the rise of a corrupt postcommunist system.209 This corrupt political system, defined by state capture, was strong enough in Moldova to resist public demands for reform. The combination of the structural factors of a legacy of communism and unresolved territorial disputes may also, at least partially, explain why both states have struggled to develop democracy because a weak civil society, an unfavorable international environment, high levels of corruption, and no territorial integrity are all problematic for democratization. The previous failed protests are a helpful set of cases to compare to the 2018 protests. Because the protests all occurred in the same country over a relatively short time period, we are able to engage in comparative analysis and use the comparative method of difference to help explain what was different about the 2018 protests that enabled their success. As noted above, the causes of the 2008, 2013, and 2018 protests are

Why Did the 2018 Armenian Protests Succeed?

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quite similar (economic distress, anger at high levels of corruption, and frustrations with the lack of democracy); therefore, they cannot explain the different results of the protests. The 2018 protests differed from the earlier protests in three main ways: (1) Pashinyan was a strong, creative, and legitimate opposition leader; (2) the more widespread availability and usage of social media enabled activists to more effectively organize different forms of protest; (3) the timing, size, and nature of the protests made repression harder. There were two important differences between Pashinyan and the leaders of the 2008 and 2013 protests: Pashinyan had a solid reputation as an opposition leader and he was innovative in his approach to protest. The Armenian government had arrested Pashinyan, an independent journalist, because of his alleged engagement in violence during the 2008 protests. Although sentenced to seven years in prison, the government gave him amnesty in 2011. Once out of jail, Pashinyan successfully ran for parliament. Therefore, Pashinyan had strong credentials as an opposition member and was clearly not part of the corrupt political network of President Sargsyan. Pashinyan’s prior experience also led him to develop creative and new tactics, realizing that repeating the previous strategies were unlikely to be successful. One example of Pashinyan’s new tactics was his idea, inspired by “Gandhi’s famous 1930 walk across India to protest British taxation,” to walk from Gyumri, the second-largest city, to Yerevan.210 Another element of his innovative approach was not to hold protests in Freedom Square, the traditional site of protests, but instead to block streets throughout the city.211 In addition, when the protesters gathered in a square, he chose Republic Square, which unlike Freedom Square, opens up to six streets, resulting in a significant negative impact on traffic.212 These tactics made the protests more visible throughout the city and made them harder for the security forces to suppress. The more widespread availability and usage of social media made these innovative tactics possible. As noted above, Facebook and other forms of social media were the primary way by which Pashinyan communicated with Armenians and the main way that the protests were organized. They also enabled a highly flexible, mobile, and creative approach to demonstrations. Moreover, people were able to build on the previous digitally networked protests about electricity rates and environmental issues. Earlier experience helped activists develop the networks and relationships that were helpful for organizing events in 2018 and showed that mass movements could change government policy, giving people some hope of success in 2018. The more widespread usage

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of social media is one of the main differences between 2018 and 2008. Therefore, it is clear that the power and nature of social media made it an important contributing factor to the success of these protests. The size, disbursement, and highly mobile nature of the protests made them harder to repress. However, as noted above, the Armenian government had sufficient coercive capacity and in all likelihood was capable of using violence to end the demonstrations. Therefore, the question arises as to why Sargsyan did not choose violence. Why Sargsyan decided against using violence to disperse the protesters has been debated among Armenians.213 One explanation is that the timing of the protests hampered Sargsyan’s options for how to respond. April 24 is the day that Armenians commemorate the 1915 Armenian genocide. As Alexander Iskandaryan notes, on April 24 it is common for half a million people to visit the genocide memorial in Yerevan, a ritual that involves slowly walking up the hill on which the memorial is situated. The date and the place are considered sacred; a regime that attempted repressive action on Genocide Day would be doomed. With hundreds of thousands walking together, anything could have turned the commemoration march into a gigantic antigovernment rally. It is no surprise that Sargsyan announced his resignation on April 23.214

The fact that the protests were deliberately nonviolent may also have raised the costs of repression. Research by Sharon Erickson Nepstad and others have shown that nonviolent protests are more likely to encourage the defection of security forces.215 We do not know if Sargsyan still had support from the security forces and Republican Party officials. It is possible that he was losing elite support because of questions about his ability to stay in power and provide patronage. As Henry E. Hale argues, future expectations about the strength of a ruler are an important factor in determining elite support.216 Why Sargsyan chose to step down instead of using force is a question to which we may never have the true answer. The decision of security forces to engage or not engage in violence is hard to predict in advance and may be contingent on a multitude of factors.

ICT in the Postoverthrow Context: Prospects for Democratization in Armenia?

Despite the surprising success of Pashinyan and the Merzhir Serzhin (“Reject Serzh”) movement in ending the rule of Sargsyan and the

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Republican Party, the development of democratization in Armenia remains uncertain. On a positive note, Pashinyan’s multiparty alliance, My Step, won 70 percent of the vote in December 2018 parliamentary elections, giving him a clear majority in parliament. However, theories about democratization and authoritarianism in postcommunist states suggests that democratization is more likely when the international environment is favorable, there are no disputes about the state’s territorial boundaries, corruption is limited, and civil society is active and vibrant. Furthermore, extensive research on the relationship between democratization and economics has found that democratization is more likely in states with higher levels of economic development and economic stability during the period of transition to democracy.217 Unfortunately for Armenians, none of these conditions apply to their current circumstances. Instead, Armenia is in an unfavorable international environment for democracy, has an unresolved territorial dispute with Azerbaijan, corruption is widespread, civil society is relatively weak, and the economic conditions are poor. The combination of all of these factors suggests that democratization, although more possible now than before 2018, remains unlikely. Although ICT, especially social media, played an important role in the success of the 2018 protests, it has been unable to ameliorate these challenges for democratization. Furthermore, the OSCE report on the December 2018 parliamentary elections repeatedly noted that there was “inflammatory rhetoric” online and that women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender groups, and religious minorities were all subject to repeated personal attacks and abusive language online.218 This OSCE report suggests that not only will ICT be unhelpful in addressing structural barriers to democratization, it may also cause problems for democratization. The current debate in the United States, Europe, and other consolidated democracies about the potential threats that social media presents to democracy suggests this is a valid concern, especially in a fragile state with weak democratic institutions. The cases of Armenia and Moldova provide an interesting contrast to the Iranian case in Chapter 3. Iran has some of the strongest controls over the internet in the world. Armenia and Moldova generally had an uncensored internet. However, in all the cases (with the exception of Armenia in 2018), protest movements failed to bring about a change in regime, or even a more limited outcome, political reform. Therefore, the

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comparison of these cases supports my argument that the level of internet repression is not the only explanation for the success or failure of digitally networked protests. Both Armenia and Moldova are post-Soviet, competitive authoritarian regimes. The institutional legacy of Soviet rule is clear in the weakness of civil society, the continued influence of Russia, the persistence of corruption, and the unresolved territorial conflicts. All of these factors are problematic for regime change and democratization. As competitive authoritarian regimes, Armenia and Moldova are not as repressive as Iran, as having a generally uncensored internet illustrates. The lower levels of repression suggest that the Armenian and Moldovan regimes may be weaker and more vulnerable to overthrow than Iran, with its impressive coercive power and ideological legitimacy. The role of repression and the coercive capacity is also apparent when briefly comparing Armenia and Moldova to neighboring postSoviet states such as Azerbaijan. Unlike Armenia and Moldova, Azerbaijan is a consolidated authoritarian regime where the government has control over the internet. Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom on the Net report rates the internet in Azerbaijan as not free and notes that the government follows the dictator’s tool kit of blocking websites critical of the government, arresting online activists, and using bots to generate propaganda online.219 The Azerbaijan government has also been able to use its oil resources to fund the security forces, extensive political patronage, and social benefits, giving President Ilham Aliyev coercive capacity, elite support, and public acquiescence.220 Azerbaijan has not experienced significant, repeated antigovernment mass mobilization and, when the rare protest does occur, the government responds with violence. Despite sharing many similarities—legacy of Soviet rule, weak civil society, legacy of the unresolved conflict—Armenia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan have had different regime outcomes and experiences with mass mobilization. Higher levels of coercive capacity and strong economic growth (the official poverty rate fell 43 percent in twelve years) in Azerbaijan may partially explain these differences, especially compared to Moldova’s low levels of coercive capacity.221 However, agency factors also may be influential here, as Armenian and Moldovan leaders have generally engaged in less repression than President Aliyev in Azerbaijan. As noted above, why Sargsyan did not engage in widespread violence against protesters is hard to discern, but is an important factor in the regime breakdown. Another tentative conclusion from comparing all four countries studied so far (Russia, Iran, Moldova, and Armenia) is the importance

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of “traditional” civil society organizations even in the age of the internet. In all the countries, the weakness of civil society contributed to the failure of the protests. However, the success of the 2018 protests in Armenia, which occurred without strong civil society support, offers an interesting and complicated counterpoint to this conclusion. Because this is only one case, there are inherent limitations to generalization, especially as Armenia is unusual in having an autocratic regime with an uncensored internet. However, it does raise some interesting questions about the potential power of digitally networked protests when access to the internet and social media is widely available. In Chapter 5, I shift my focus to cases of successful regime overthrow: Kyrgyzstan and Egypt. Similar to the 2018 Armenian protests, these two cases highlight how ICT can aid mass mobilization and regime breakdown.

Notes

1. “Legal and Technical Reforms Bring Improvements in Well Administered Armenian Elections,” press release, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), April 3, 2017, http://www.osce.org/office-for-democratic-institutions -and-human-rights/elections/309161; “Republic of Armenia, Presidential Elections 18 February 2013 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), May 8, 2013, http://www.osce.org/odihr/98629. 2. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2017: Armenia, 2017, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2017/armenia. 3. “Republic of Armenia: Early Parliamentary Elections 9 December 2018, Election Observation Mission Final Report,” OSCE/ODIHR, March 7, 2019, https:// www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/401984. 4. “Legal and Technical Reforms Bring Improvements.” 5. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013: Armenia, 2013, http://www .freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/armenia#. 6. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2017: Moldova, 2017, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2018/moldova. 7. “Republic of Moldova Presidential Election, October and November 2016,” OSCE/ODIHR, February 15, 2017, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova /257956. 8. The OSCE election report did note fraudulent practices. However, whether or not they were enough to determine the election outcome is not clear. “Armenia, Presidential Election, 19 February 2008: Final Report,” OSCE, May 30, 2008, http:// www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/32115. 9. “Armenia: Self-Censorship, Propaganda ‘Widespread,’—IWPR.” 10. Iskandaryan, “Armenia Between Autocracy and Polyarchy,” p. 33. 11. “Democracy on Rocky Ground: Armenia’s Disputed 2008 Presidential Election, Post-Election Violence, and the One-Sided Pursuit of Accountability,” Human Rights Watch, February 2009, https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/02/25/democracy -rocky-ground/armenias-disputed-2008-presidential-election-post-election.

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12. International Republican Institute, “Armenian National Study, January 13– 20, 2008,” 2008, https://www.iri.org/resource/iri-releases-survey-armenian-public -opinion-0. 13. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2008: Armenia, 2008, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2008/armenia. 14. Ibid. 15. “Armenia: World Bank Data,” World Bank, n.d., https://data.worldbank.org /country/armenia?view=chart. 16. International Republican Institute, “Armenian National Study.” 17. “Armenia: World Bank Data.” 18. “Republic of Armenia Presidential Election 18 February 2013.” 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2014: Armenia, 2014, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2014/armenia. 22. Ibid. 23. Crosby and Chapple, “Armenians Want What They Need, After Getting What They Wanted.” 24. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Armenia, 2018, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2018/armenia. 25. Grigoryan, “Protesters in Armenia Demand Snap Parliamentary Elections.” 26. Ibid. 27. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010: Moldova, 2010, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2010/moldova; Socor, “Moldova Tense After Post-election Violence in Chisinau.” 28. Socor, “Violent Riots Devastate Moldovan Presidential and Parliament Buildings.” 29. “OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Republic of Moldova Parliamentary Elections 5 April 2009,” OSCE/ODIHR, June 16, 2009, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/37568. 30. Ibid. 31. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009: Moldova, 2009, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2009/moldova. 32. Ibid. 33. International Republican Institute, “Moldova National Study, November 10– 25, 2008,” 2009, https://www.iri.org/resource/iri-releases-survey-moldovan-public -opinion. 34. “EU/Moldova: EU Puts Conditional Trust in Moldova.” 35. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2008: Moldova, 2008, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2008/moldova. 36. International Republican Institute, “Moldova National Study.” 37. “EU/Moldova: EU Puts Conditional Trust in Moldova.” 38. Negură, “The Republic of Moldova’s Transition,” p. 559. 39. “Moldova: World Bank Data,” World Bank, n.d., https://data.worldbank.org /country/moldova?view=chart; Barry, “As East and West Pull on Moldova, Loyalties and Divisions Run Deep.” 40. International Republican Institute, “Moldova National Study.” 41. Daniel Brett, Ellie Knott, and Mihai Popșoi, “The ‘Billion Dollar Protests’ in Moldova Are Threatening the Survival of the Country’s Political Elite,” London School of Economics and Political Science blog, September 21, 2015, http://bit.ly /1MjcNVR.

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42. The Dignity and Truth civic movement was also called the Justice and Truth Civic Dignity Platform. 43. “Explainer: Why Moldovans Are Protesting,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 9, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/why-moldovans-are-protesting/27235036 .html. 44. Goşu, “Republic of Moldova,” p. 23. 45. Popşoi, “Controversial Ruling by Moldova’s Constitutional Court.” 46. Nizhnikau, “Guiding Voice to Exit.” 47. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009: Armenia, 2009, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2009/armenia. 48. International Republican Institute, “Armenian National Study.” 49. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009: Armenia. 50. Tavernise, “Armenia Clamps Down After a Deadly Protest.” 51. “Armenia: Self-Censorship, Propaganda ‘Widespread,’—IWPR.” 52. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Armenia: Restrictions Imposed as President Declares Emergency,” news release, March 3, 2008. 53. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2013: Armenia, 2013, http://www .freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2013#.UyIMCIVssm. 54. Ibid. 55. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013: Armenia, 2013, https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/armenia. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Sargsyan, “Online Media in Armenia,” p. 293. 59. Sargsyan, “Online Media in Armenia.” 60. “Facebook in Armenia: Users and Using: Results of Surveys Among Facebook Users in Armenia,” OSCE, Office in Yerevan, 2013, https://www.osce.org /yerevan/108535?download=true. 61. “Defeated Armenian Presidential Candidate Slams ‘Intimidation’ Against Opposition.” 62. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2014: Armenia, 2014, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2014/armenia. 63. Ibid. 64. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2018: Armenia, 2018, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2018/armenia. 65. “Republic of Armenia: Early Parliamentary Elections 9 December 2018.” 66. Ibid. 67. “Facebook Users in Armenia,” NapoleonCat, 2018, https://napoleoncat.com /stats/facebook-users-in-armenia/2018/11. 68. “Facebook in Armenia: Users and Using.” 69. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2018: Armenia. 70. Abrahamian and Shagoyan, “Velvet Revolution, Armenian Style,” p. 525. 71. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2018: Armenia. 72. Ibid. 73. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009: Moldova, 2009, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2009/moldova. 74. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2010: Moldova, 2010, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-press/2010/moldova. 75. Ibid. 76. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010: Moldova, 2010, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2010/moldova.

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77. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010: Moldova. 78. OpenNet Initiative, “Moldova,” December 19, 2010, https://opennet.net /research/profiles/moldova. 79. Twitter Against Tyrants: New Media in Authoritarian Regimes, Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, United States House of Representatives, 111th Cong. (2009) (material submitted for the record by Oleg Berga, filmmaker, journalist, civil society activist from the Republic of Moldova). 80. OpenNet Initiative, “Moldova.” 81. International Republican Institute, “Moldova National Study.” 82. OpenNet Initiative, “Moldova.” 83. Lysenko and Desouza, “Moldova’s Internet Revolution,” p. 350. 84. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016: Moldova, 2016, https://freedom house.org/report/freedom-world/2016/moldova. 85. Ibid.; Quoted in Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2016: Moldova, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2016/moldova. 86. Brett, Knott, and Popșoi, “The ‘Billion Dollar Protests’ in Moldova.” 87. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2016: Moldova. 88. “RFE/RL’s Armenian Service: Radio Azatutyun,” Radio Free Europe, 2019, https://pressroom.rferl.org/rferl-armenian-service-radio-azatutyun. 89. “RFE/RL Mission Statement,” Radio Free Europe, n.d., https://pressroom .rferl.org/mission-statement-principles-of-ethical-journalism. 90. “Facebook in Armenia: Users and Using.” 91. International Republican Institute, “Armenian National Study.” 92. Aliyev, Post-Communist Civil Society and the Soviet Legacy, p. 96. 93. United States Census Bureau, “U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2010,” n.d. https://archive.org/details/2011AmericanCommunitySurvey Ancestry. 94. Darieva, “‘Journey to the Future,’” p. 429. 95. The Armenian National Committee of America website lists several priorities, none of which are democracy in Armenia. See https://anca.org/issue/. 96. Ishkanian, “Self-Determined Citizens?” 97. Demourian, “In Armenia, Rate Hikes for Electricity Suspended.” 98. “Russian, Armenian Experts Look at Yerevan Protests.” 99. Mezzofiore, “Armenia’s Capital Brought to Standstill as Protesters Take to Streets.” 100. Abrahamian and Shagoyan, “Velvet Revolution, Armenian Style,” p. 522. 101. Ibid., p. 523. 102. Ayres, “The Agents of Change in Armenia’s Revolution,” p. 2. 103. Abrahamian and Shagoyan, “Velvet Revolution, Armenian Style,” p. 527. 104. Ibid., p. 525. 105. Natalya Morar, recounted in Deasy, “Moldova’s Twitter Activist Under House Arrest.” 106. Synovitz, “The Revolution Will Be Tweeted.” 107. Lysenko and Desouza, “Moldova’s Internet Revolution,” p. 345. 108. Twitter Against Tyrants. 109. See Hale, “Did the Internet Break the Political Machine?” for a detailed discussion of the role of political parties in the 2009 events. 110. OpenNet Initiative, “Moldova.” 111. Synovitz, “The Revolution Will Be Tweeted.” 112. Lysenko and Desouza, “Moldova’s Internet Revolution,” p. 348. 113. Ibid.

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114. “European Fact-Finders Cite ‘Horrible Violence’ Against Moldova Protesters,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 30, 2009, https://www.rferl.org/a/European _FactFinders_Cite_Horrible_Violence_Against_Moldova_Protesters/1619000.html. 115. Tomiuc, “No Protest in Moldovan Capital as President Calls for Recount.” 116. Goşu, “Republic of Moldova,” p. 22. 117. Socor, “Moldovan Anti-government Protests Unify.” 118. Unlike the 2009 protests, there is little discussion of the role of social media in the 2015–2016 protests. The complexity of the political situation, combined with the nature of the banking scandal, may explain why the majority of the discussion about the crisis focuses on the political maneuvering of various politicians and oligarchs. 119. My media search for news from 2008 found dozens of results from major US and European news publications, whereas there were only a few for 2013. 120. “Armenia: Self-Censorship, Propaganda ‘Widespread,’—IWPR.” 121. Sasse, “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy,” p. 575. 122. Tully, “Armenia.” 123. Ibid. 124. “Tens of Thousands Fill Yerevan Square as Protest Leader Pashinian Detained,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 22, 2018, https://www.rferl .org/a/armenia-pm-walks-out-of-meeting-with-protest-leader/29184802.html. 125. Ibid. 126. “Armenian Prime Minister Walks Out of Meeting with Protest Leader,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 22, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/Sargsyan -pashinian-protest-meeting/29184858.html. 127. “Google Trends 2018,” Google, n.d., https://trends.google.com/trends/yis /2018/US/; “Google Trends 2011,” Google, n.d., https://trends.google.com/trends /yis/2011/US/. 128. Rumer, “Moldova Between Russia and the West.” 129. Lysenko and Desouza, “Moldova’s Internet Revolution,” p. 348. 130. Synovitz, “The Revolution Will Be Tweeted.” 131. Lysenko and Desouza, “Moldova’s Internet Revolution,” p. 348. 132. “Facebook, Twitter Help Moldova Protesters Organize Demonstrations,” Deutsche Welle, April 9, 2009, https://www.dw.com/en/facebook-twitter-help-moldova -protesters-organize-demonstrations/a-4166896. 133. “Moldova Crisis Can Only Be Solved Through Talks: EU.” 134. “EU ‘Very Concerned’, Calls for End to Moldova Poll Violence.” 135. “Daily Press Briefing: Moldova: Aftermath of Protests,” NewsBank: Access World News, Research Collection, April 17, 2009, https://infoweb.newsbank.com /apps/news/document-view?p=AWNB&docref=news/1277B549748EB258. 136. “European Fact-Finders Cite ‘Horrible Violence.’” 137. Goşu, “Republic of Moldova,” p. 46. 138. Ibid.; Nizhnikau, “Guiding Voice to Exit,” p. 372. 139. Vladimir Socor, “Russia Watches and Puts Own Spin on Moldova’s Crisis (Part One).” As Vladimir Socor discusses, there is limited evidence that Russia actually did seek to exploit the political turmoil in Moldova. 140. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2008: Armenia, 2008, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2008. 141. Ibid. 142. N. R. Smith, “Europeanization Through Socialization?” p. 392; Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Armenia. 143. Ishkanian, Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia, p. 107.

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144. Bertelsmann Transformation Index Armenia Country Report, quoted in Paturyan and Gevorgyan, “Armenian Civil Society After Twenty Years of Transition,” p. 28. 145. Ibid., pp. 62–63. 146. Negură, “The Republic of Moldova’s Transition,” p. 563. 147. US Agency for International Development (USAID), “2010 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 14th Ed,” 2010, https:// www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/2010complete_document.pdf. 148. Ibid. 149. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2016: Moldova. 150. Aliyev, Post-Communist Civil Society and the Soviet Legacy, p. 99. 151. USAID, “2010 NGO Sustainability Index.” 152. Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution.” 153. N. R. Smith, “Europeanization Through Socialization?” p. 396. 154. Ishkanian, “Self-Determined Citizens?” p. 1211. 155. USAID, “2010 NGO Sustainability,” p. 33. 156. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2009: Moldova; Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution.” 157. Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution.” 158. Paturyan and Gevorgyan, “Armenian Civil Society After Twenty Years of Transition,” p. 57. 159. Ibid., p. 66. 160. Aliyev, Post-Communist Civil Society and the Soviet Legacy, p. 110. 161. Ibid., p. 114. 162. Armenian activist, quoted in Ishkanian, Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia, p. 1217. 163. Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution.” 164. Sasse, “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy,” Appendix 1. 165. Baumgartner, “Moscow Watches Anxiously.” 166. Sasse, “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy,” p. 565. 167. Vasilyan, “Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and with the European Union,” p. 36. 168. UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “UNCTAD Investment Policy Review: Republic of Moldova,” 2013, https://unctad.org/en/Publications Library/diaepcb2013d5_en.pdf. 169. Vasilyan, “Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and with the European Union,” p. 37. 170. Markarov and Davtyan, “Post–Velvet Revolution Armenia’s Foreign Policy Challenges,” p. 539. 171. Bruce, “Power Resources,” p. 29. 172. Rumer, “Moldova Between Russia and the West.” 173. Ibid. 174. Vasilyan, “Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and with the European Union.” 175. Ibid. 176. Baumgartner, “Moscow Watches Anxiously.” 177. Korosteleva, “Moldova’s European Choice” p. 1279. 178. “Fact Sheet on EU-Armenia Relations,” European Union External Action, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/education/4080/fact-sheet-eu-armenia-relations_en. 179. Ibid.

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180. Simão, “The Problematic Role of EU Democracy Promotion,” p. 194. 181. Vasilyan, “Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and with the European Union.” 182. Simão, “The Problematic Role of EU Democracy Promotion,” p. 197. 183. Vasilyan, “Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union and with the European Union.” 184. Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries, p. 196. 185. Sasse, “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy,” Appendix 1. 186. McDonagh, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective in Moldova?” 187. Sasse, “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy,” p. 590. 188. McDonagh, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective in Moldova?” 189. USAID, “U.S. Foreign Aid by Country: Moldova,” n.d., https://explorer .usaid.gov/cd/MDA?implementing_agency_id=1&measure=Obligations&fiscal _year=2009. 190. USAID, “USAID Data, Moldova,” n.d., https://explorer.usaid.gov/query ?country_name=Moldova&fiscal_year=2009&transaction_type_name=Disbursements &implementing_agency_name=U.S.%20Agency%20for%20International%20 Development/. 191. One example of the continued problems in Moldova is that Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2018 report evaluated Moldova’s level of democracy as 4.93 on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 the least democratic, a score that has barely changed since 2009. Furthermore, the level of corruption has not improved at all since 2009. See Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Moldova, 2018, https://freedomhouse .org/report/nations-transit/2018/moldova. 192. International Republican Institute, “Moldova National Study.” 193. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 208. 194. Grigoryan, “The Karabakh Conflict and Armenia’s Failed Transition,” p. 855. 195. Fuller, “Armenia.” 196. Ibid. 197. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 229. 198. Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on CivilMilitary Relations,” p. 335. 199. Socor, “Moldovan Authorities Caught Unprepared by Violent Riots.” 200. Ibid. 201. Coalson, “Chisinau Unrest Exposes Moldova’s Fault Lines.” 202. Way, Pluralism by Default, pp. 98–99. 203. Ibid., p. 110. 204. Tudoroiu, “Structural Factors vs. Regime Change,” p. 244. 205. Goşu, “Republic of Moldova,” p. 32. 206. Ibid. 207. Nizhnikau, “Guiding Voice to Exit,” p. 368. 208. Nizhnikau, “Guiding Voice to Exit.” 209. Ibid. 210. MacFarquhar, “He Was a Protester a Month Ago.” 211. Abrahamian and Shagoyan, “Velvet Revolution, Armenian Style,” p. 523. 212. Ibid., p. 524. 213. Abrahamian and Shagoyan, “Velvet Revolution, Armenian Style.” 214. Iskandaryan, “The Velvet Revolution in Armenia,” pp. 479–480. 215. Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions; Chenoweth, Why Civil Resistance Works.

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216. Hale, Patronal Politics. 217. Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered”; Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation”; Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy.” 218. “Republic of Armenia: Early Parliamentary Elections 9 December 2018.” 219. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2019: Azerbaijan, 2019, https://freedomhouse .org/country/azerbaijan/freedom-net/2019. 220. Langerak, “Regime Stability in Azerbaijan.” 221. Ibid.

5 Regime Overthrow Is Not Democratization: The Cases of Kyrgyzstan and Egypt At first look, Kyrgyzstan and Egypt appear to have little in common. One is a relatively new, postcommunist Central Asian state; the other is an Arab state with an ancient history. However, Kyrgyzstan and Egypt have each experienced the overthrow of their leader in the past decade, and Kyrgyzstanis and Egyptians used information communication technology (ICT) to challenge their regimes. Furthermore, they share the similar outcome of regime overthrow, but no democratization. Kyrgyzstan was a competitive authoritarian regime before the overthrow of Presidents Askar Akayev in 2005 and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2010, and it remains a competitive authoritarian regime today. Egypt was an authoritarian state before the 2011 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, and it is an authoritarian regime today. These cases demonstrate the usefulness of ICT for activists challenging an authoritarian regime and the limits of ICT as a tool for democratization. The leaderless and decentralized nature of digitally networked protests can not only aid mobilization in repressive societies but also produce weaknesses when it comes to developing democracy. In this chapter, I investigate how Kyrgyzstanis and Egyptians used ICT to challenge the information monopoly of their respective governments, organize protests, and spread news about the protests around the world. I also explain how two Kyrgyzstani presidents and an Egyptian president lost power. Finally, I examine why, despite the overthrow of the president, authoritarianism remains persistent in Kyrgyzstan and 155

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Egypt. Although their authoritarian systems of government were different, what is similar in both cases is that the removal of the leader did not fundamentally change the power structures within each country, which enabled the continuation of authoritarian rule. In contrast to the relative lack of coverage of Kyrgyzstan, especially in relation to ICT, Egypt is one of the most discussed and analyzed cases involving ICT and regime change. Numerous articles, book chapters, and books debate how much influence, if any, ICT had on the overthrow of Egyptian president Mubarak in February 2011.1 Therefore, this chapter includes only a brief overview of the events leading to Mubarak’s downfall and, instead, focuses on the role of ICT and the events after the end of Mubarak’s rule. Furthermore, unlike the accounts written in the immediate aftermath of the protests, we now have a better ability to understand the remarkable role ICT played in the protests and the limits of its influence. Kyrgyzstan is a relatively new state, as it first came into existence with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Compared to its Central Asian neighbors of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, all of which quickly became stable, consolidated authoritarian regimes, Kyrgyzstan has had a contentious political history. Two of Kyrgyzstan’s five presidents have been forced out of office by unconstitutional means. President Akayev stepped down after peaceful protests in 2005, and President Bakiyev fled to Belarus in 2010 after violent clashes between security forces and protesters. Kyrgyzstan has the most active civil society in Central Asia and greater freedom of speech than any of its neighbors. Outside election monitors noted that the 2015 parliamentary elections had real contestation, including televised debates between members of the ruling party, the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), and opposition candidates. The country is also the only Central Asian state to have a parliamentary, as opposed to presidential, system of government. In a region where presidents overturn constitutional term limits and serve until death (e.g., Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov and Turkmenistan’s Sparmurat Niyazov), Kyrgyzstan’s president is currently constitutionally limited to only one six-year term. Despite these positive developments, Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2018 report evaluated Kyrgyzstan’s electoral process as only 5.75, its civil society 5.00, and the independence of its media at 6.25 on a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 is the least democratic.2 Kyrgyzstan is a competitive authoritarian regime and has

An Introduction to Kyrgyzstan and Egypt

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not managed to turn the overthrow of Akayev or Bakiyev into real, sustained progress toward democracy. Compared to Kyrgyzstan, only an independent country for twentynine years, the authoritarian system in Egypt has been long-lasting and relatively stable. By 2011, Freedom House ranked Egypt as not free with a civil liberties score of 5 and political rights score of 6 (on a scale of 1 to 7 with 7 as the least free).3 Mubarak gained power in 1981 when a member of the terrorist organization Egyptian Islamic Jihad assassinated President Anwar Sadat. Therefore, by 2011 Mubarak had been in power for thirty years, compared to Akayev’s fourteen years and Bakiyev’s five years in office. Egypt has never been a democracy and, at the time of the 2011 protests, had been ruled over the past sixty years by a succession of three military rulers: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. The regime stayed in power through a combination of repression, co-opting elites and opposition leaders, and using concerns about security as justification for their rule. As Jason Brownlee argues, Egyptian leaders since Nasser successfully consolidated authoritarianism by developing a system that used ruling political parties to maintain coalitions of support, defuse intraelite conflicts, and prevent challenges from elites.4 An example of the government’s repressive authority is the emergency law, which allowed the government to intercept mail, tap phones, and indefinitely hold people without charge. The emergency law was in place the entire time Mubarak was president. People tried under the emergency law lacked constitutional protections, due process, or the right of appeal.5 In addition, the police and security personnel “often tortured and abused prisoners and detainees.”6 Whereas Kyrgyzstan has been an unconsolidated competitive authoritarian regime for most of its short history, Egypt was a consolidated authoritarian regime at the time of the 2011 protests. Kyrgyzstan has a weak security apparatus; in contrast, Egypt’s military has ruled Egypt for decades. However, both governments had significant control over traditional media, and the expansion of the internet into each country enabled this new technology to become a form of alternative information about government, politics, and society.

Regime Overthrow in Kyrgyzstan and Egypt The 2005 and 2010 Protests in Kyrgyzstan The events of 2005 and 2010 in Kyrgyzstan had some common characteristics. In both circumstances, protests began outside of the capital

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city Bishkek and a major grievance was persistent, widespread corruption. However, a major difference is that in 2010 government security forces responded with greater violence, resulting in over eighty deaths. The repeated overthrow of the president in Kyrgyzstan illustrates how Kyrgyzstan is a weaker state than Egypt, where Mubarak is the only Egyptian leader overthrown in decades. The size of the protests was also always smaller in Kyrgyzstan than in Egypt. Beginning in the south of the country, especially the cities of Osh and Jalalabad, protests against a fraudulent parliamentary election unexpectedly resulted in the overthrow of President Akayev on March 24, 2005. Although the main catalyst for the outbreak of protests was electoral fraud, there also were several other important and influential factors: anger at Akayev’s growing authoritarianism, evidence of rampant corruption by the Akayev family, and a loss of elite support for Akayev. A series of events contributed to Akayev’s unpopularity by 2005. In 2002, government security forces shot and killed five unarmed protesters in the Aksy region. Outrage over the killings contributed to an erosion of public support for Akayev.7 The corrupt practices of Akayev and his family also provoked anger. The publication of photographs in the opposition newspaper, Moya Stolitsa Novosti (MSN), of the president’s new luxurious home under construction publicly verified rumors about Akayev’s corruption. Along with losing popular support, Akayev had lost many important political allies by 2005. The possibility that Akayev would leave office at the end of his term in October 2005 meant that his future as a supplier of patronage was in question, thereby eroding elite support.8 The decision by people like Bakiyev, Akayev’s former prime minister, to side with the opposition demonstrated the reduction in elite support for Akayev. Therefore, by the February 27, 2005, parliamentary elections, Akayev was unpopular. Then, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported that the elections failed to meet international standards and that “the competitive dynamic was undermined throughout the country by deregistration of candidates, interfering with independent media, vote buying, and a low level of confidence in electoral and judicial institutions on the part of candidates and voters.”9 The reports of electoral fraud contributed to an outbreak of protests in the south of the country. The protesters demanded the parliamentary elections be rerun and that President Akayev resign. After weeks of protests and continued occupation of government buildings in southern cities, Akayev sent in security forces to violently seize control. This decision backfired as the violence outraged people and the protesters managed to retake the government buildings from the security forces. Protests did not start in the capital Bishkek until Akayev had essentially lost control of major cities in

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the south, including Osh and Jalalabad. Surprisingly, on only the second day of protests in Bishkek, demonstrators were able to seize the White House (the president’s headquarters) because “police officers and Interior Ministry troops fled in panic, leaving helmets, shields, and batons behind them.”10 As Akayev and his family fled the country, opposition leaders Bakiyev and Felix Kulov (just released from prison) established a new government, with Bakiyev becoming president. Only five years later, President Bakiyev was overthrown. Similar to 2005, the protests did not begin in the capital city of Bishkek. However, in this case the protests began in the northern cities of Talas and Naryn, partially because of the north-south division in the country. Bakiyev, from the south, was more unpopular in the north than in his home region. The government’s violent response to the protests in Talas and Naryn contributed to the turnout on the first day of protests on April 7, 2010, in Bishkek. The security forces again responded with violence, but the protesters were eventually able to seize the White House and force Bakiyev to flee to his home city of Jalalabad (in the south). Over the next week, Bakiyev refused to resign, and there were concerns within Kyrgyzstan and abroad about continued instability and violence. After days of negotiations, Bakiyev agreed to leave the country and went into exile in Belarus. Opposition leader Roza Otunbaeva became the interim president until presidential elections were held in October 2011. Overall, approximately eighty people were killed in the protests, making it noticeably more violent than the overthrow of Akayev in 2005.11 Kyrgyzstanis were angry with Bakiyev because of his corrupt, authoritarian rule. Shortly after coming to power in 2005, Bakiyev began to retreat from his promises of establishing democracy. International and domestic observers considered both the 2007 parliamentary and the 2009 presidential elections to be fraudulent.12 However, a major source of anger was the blatant corruption and nepotism. Bakiyev appointed his son Maksim as chief of the Agency for Investment and Economic Development, which managed most of the foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev appointed other relatives to powerful government posts, including the head of presidential security. According to Kathleen Collins, It is widely believed that Bakiyev’s seven brothers and two sons all got large shares of the state’s wealth through political appointments or insider business deals. . . . Bakiyev’s allies reportedly demanded massive kickbacks and extortion from two state joint ventures in the gold industry. Family connections allegedly pocketed about half the annual profits of the Toktogul hydroelectric power plant and profited from multimillion-dollar contracts to supply fuel to the U.S. military transport center at Manas.13

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A 2010 survey found that “89.7 percent of respondents felt that corruption was either a ‘serious’ or ‘very serious problem’” in Kyrgyzstan.14 Bakiyev’s corruption made the 2009 government announcement of a price hike for electricity, heating, and water even more irritating for Kyrgyzstanis.15 Along with his increased unpopularity, Bakiyev, like Akayev, had lost elite support by 2010. Bakiyev had weakened his position by favoring his family over developing networks of support among other powerful elites and clans in Kyrgyzstan.16 In the years prior to 2010, Bakiyev had forced many elites out of the government, leading them to join the opposition. Therefore, by 2010, Bakiyev faced threats from both the mass public and elites.

Days of Rage: Overthrow of Mubarak In contrast to the overthrows of Akayev and Bakiyev, significantly more protesters and greater violence were involved in the downfall of Egyptian president Mubarak. Partially inspired by the successful overthrow of Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011 (see Chapter 6), Egyptian activists began organizing a protest in Cairo on January 25. At the time, there were modest expectations about the size and impact of the protests in Egypt. As many noted, “Egypt is not Tunisia and Tunisia is not Egypt.”17 To the surprise of the organizers of the protest and the Egyptian government, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians turned out to protest on January 25 and called for President Mubarak to resign. The Egyptian security forces repeatedly responded to the protests with violence, resulting in over 800 deaths. There were also reports of Egyptians attacking police stations, expressing their anger and frustration with years of poor treatment by the police.18 After eighteen days of protests, concessions, and political maneuvering, Mubarak left office on February 11, 2011, and turned power over to the Egyptian military Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). Several long-term issues and grievances contributed to the outbreak of protests. By 2011 Mubarak was eighty-four years old, which raised questions about succession. Mubarak was clearly trying to have his son, Gamal, become the next president.19 Many Egyptians were opposed to the idea of establishing hereditary rule in Egypt. The fraudulent November 2010 elections, where the party of Mubarak won over 90 percent of the vote, appeared to be at least partially designed to help ensure that Gamal would become president in the future. However, the blatant electoral fraud, combined with the increased repression of independent media, demonstrated to Egyptians that reform through elections and parliament was not a viable option.20 Furthermore, the fraudulent and

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repressive approach to the 2010 elections encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood to join the protests since they had lost any opportunity to gain power through parliament.21 Another source of anger, similar to in Kyrgyzstan, was the widespread corruption in Egypt. Government officials themselves noted the extent of the corruption. After leaving Egypt, a member of the Egyptian Ministry of Interior said that “the Mubarak era will be known . . . as the era of thieves. His official business is the looting of public money, and we find that the super-corrupt, ultra-delinquents have attained state posts.”22 In 2010, Global Integrity assessed Egypt’s anticorruption efforts as very weak, with significant problems in the area of conflicts of interest and asset disclosure by government officials.23 The high levels of corruption especially angered many Egyptians because of the generally poor economic situation in the country. At the time of the protests, Egypt had high rates of poverty, low economic growth, a lack of economic opportunity, and rising prices for basic items. Egypt was one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of only $2,270 in 2009.24 Egypt also struggled with high youth unemployment; almost two-thirds of Egyptians between the ages of eighteen to twenty-nine years old, who had the equivalent of a high school degree, were unemployed.25 By 2011, the combination of anger about the attempt to establish hereditary rule, the increased repression and electoral fraud, the high levels of corruption, and the overall lack of economic opportunity combined to produce significant grievances against the Mubarak government. It is into this context, hoping to seize the moment provided by the international demonstration effect of Tunisia, that activists used ICT to organize a large demonstration on January 25. Although ICT did not create the grievances many Egyptians and Kyrgyzstanis had against their governments, it did contribute to the outbreak of protests and regime overthrow in both states. In Egypt, people used ICT in all four ways discussed in Chapter 2: Egyptians utilized ICT to provide an alternative source of information about the regime; ICT facilitated demonstration effects from Tunisia; activists employed ICT to help overcome the collective action problem and organize protests; and ICT enabled Egyptians to spread information about their protests around the world. In contrast, in Kyrgyzstan ICT primarily helped spread information and had

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limited influence on mobilization because powerful new forms of technology, such as social media, either did not exist at the time of protests or had limited usage because of relatively low levels of internet penetration.

Mechanism 1: Value of Alternative Sources of Information

Kyrgyzstan. To understand how ICT challenged the government monopoly over information and helped to enable an antigovernment movement, it is necessary to first understand the media context in which this new technology entered. All the governments of Kyrgyzstan have influenced television news and intimidated journalists, but they have rarely censored the internet. Government officials harassed independent newspapers, such as Res Publika and MSN, with repeated criminal libel charges.26 When MSN lost one of the cases, the imposed fines were so high that the newspaper went out of business and had to be reformulated as a new company.27 Television media, dominated by either governmentowned stations or stations owned by associates of Akayev, gave a disproportionate amount of time to Akayev and little coverage to opposition leaders. For example, in the 2000 presidential election Akayev had approximately 600 hours of mostly positive coverage, whereas the top opposition candidate received less than five hours of coverage, most of which was negative.28 In contrast to the repression of print and television news, the government of Akayev did not engage in any censorship or monitoring of the internet. There were no restrictions on citizens accessing foreign media. The main restriction on the influence of the internet at this time was the lack of access outside of the major cities and its high cost. Kyrgyzstani internet providers reported approximately 500,000 users of the internet by 2004, which was about 10 percent of the population.29 Despite the initial rhetoric in support of independent media and democracy, the new Bakiyev government, which gained power when Akayev was deposed, was more repressive than the Akayev regime. The 2010 Freedom of the Press report ranked Kyrgyzstan as not free.30 The practices of intimidating journalists and restricting media freedom intensified.31 The government also ended its transmission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Kyrgyz language service (Radio Azattyk) on the government radio stations, the only ones that reached the whole country.32 Radio Azattyk was one of the few sources of radio news not controlled by the government in the country and, therefore, an important alternative source of information. However, similar to under President Akayev, the government of Bakiyev did not engage in censorship of the

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internet. Although still primarily in the cities, according to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) internet, usage grew during this time and, by 2010, reached a penetration rate of 16 percent.33 One way that ICT contributed to the 2005 and 2010 protests was by providing Kyrgyzstanis with an alternative, non-government-controlled source of information. Prior to the outbreak of the 2005 protests, the websites of opposition newspapers, MSN and Res Publica, along with the online newspaper Gazeta.kg, were all sources of alternative information about the government, and much of the content was negative.34 The news website kyrgyz.us was also popular, especially with Kyrgyzstanis living outside of the country. However, just prior to the 2005 elections, the government took action to restrict existing independent media by turning off the power at the printers for opposition newspapers, partially ending the broadcast of Radio Azattyk, and trying to discredit Gazeta.kg and kyrgyz.us.35 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that internet users “received spam e-mail messages allegedly sent by gazeta.kg and kyrgyz.us. The first message contained an appeal to register on the website kyrgyz.us with a promise to obtain child pornography. The second e-mail message, allegedly sent by gazeta.kg, contained a message about erotic DVDs.”36 During the 2005 parliamentary elections, the government launched a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on the websites of opposition newspapers.37 The DDoS attacks were so “debilitating” that the sites were “unable to communicate during the critical period leading up to and during the Kyrgyz election.”38 In response to the government’s actions, activists created the blog Akaevu.net as a way to share information. The site had over 11,500 hits on March 24, 2005, the day Akayev lost power, and was one of the few ways for people to learn what was happening.39 Independent media, because of its coverage of Akayev’s corruption and the protests in the southern cities, influenced the development of protests and helped the protests spread to the capital city of Bishkek. However, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Kyrgyz radio service and the independent newspapers, which were printing 150,000 to 200,000 copies of each issue, were likely more influential than the internet because of the country’s limited internet access and the government’s ability to disrupt opposition websites. Although websites based outside of Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyzstani blogs were able to continue to function, government repression prevented the normally popular online news sites from providing information. In 2010, ICT was a more important source of alternative information about the regime, especially as Bakiyev continued to repress traditional

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forms of media. The greater usage of ICT in 2010 demonstrates the larger spread of the technology among the population and the development of new technologies such as Twitter. Given the high level of repression of independent newspapers and government control over television news, the internet was one of the few places left for people to find out critical information about Bakiyev. The reports of Bakiyev’s corruption especially intensified people’s grievances against the government. Two weeks prior to the April 7 protests, “online news sites posted a series of hard-hitting exposés accusing the family of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of skimming money from the public coffers, an allegation that touched a nerve in this poor country and galvanized opposition to his government.”40 Blogs were an important source of information and debate about the Bakiyev government. Since 2005, there had been a growth not only in internet usage, but also in work by citizen journalists reporting on events via blogs. For example, in 2006, Edil Baisalov, dedicated blogger and president of the NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, used his blog to counter the antiopposition view presented by the state media and to inform people of upcoming protests.41 In 2010, information about corruption scandals involving Bakiyev’s family appeared on Diesel Forum, an online news and discussion forum with approximately 40,000 users, which was the most visited and commented on site in Kyrgyzstan in 2010.42 With the development of protests, the government engaged in censorship, blocked websites, and pressured sites like Diesel Forum to delete threads, but people continued to find other blogs and websites to share information.43 Despite government efforts, “during March, Twitter, Moi Mir (a Russian-language social networking site created by the Russian-based company mail.ru), social networks and online forums became key places to get information about anti-Bakiyev protests happening in the country.”44 As protests started to break out in late March 2010, Twitter became one of the primary ways in which information was shared about the protests in Naryn and Talas.45 Throughout March and into April, protests continued and spread to other cities. By April 4–5, the main topic on Diesel Forum was the protests across the country. When protesters seized the Talas regional administration building and took the governor hostage, they communicated their success via mobile phones and internet users live tweeted coverage of the protest.46 Blogs, social media, and Twitter were the also the only sources of information about the arrests of opposition leaders on April 6, an event that enraged the opposition and increased the fervor and size of the protests on April 7.47 Mobile phones, online forums, blogs, and Twitter, combined with reporting by Radio Azattyk, were the primary forms of reporting on

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the protests and the main way people obtained information as events unfolded in March and April 2010.

Egypt. At the time of the 2011 protests, the Egyptian government, like Kyrgyzstan, engaged in regular and systematic repression of the media and limited freedom of speech. The Egyptian government owned and operated all domestic radio and television stations.48 However, Al Jazeera, outside of government control, was widely available in Egypt. Along with direct control of television and radio stations, the government also used the libel laws to intimidate journalists. If convicted of criticizing President Mubarak, journalists could be fined up to $3,426 and be sentenced up to five years in prison.49 Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press report ranked Egypt’s press status as not free for the year 2010. The Committee to Protect Journalists issued multiple press releases expressing concern at further deterioration of press freedom in Egypt in 2010.50 In contrast to the Egyptian government’s control of television and radio, the government’s repression of the internet was moderate. According to the OpenNet Initiative, the Egyptian government did not engage in online censorship or regular filtering of websites.51 The government rarely blocked access to websites, and social media programs such as Facebook and Twitter were available along with video-sharing platforms like YouTube. By 2010 31 percent of Egyptians were internet users, and there were more mobile phone subscriptions than there were people in Egypt.52 There were also 4.5 million Egyptians on Facebook.53 Prior to 2011, the most significant government action against internet freedom was the arrest of bloggers. For example, in 2010 the government arrested and tried Ahmad Mostafa, a member of the April 6 Movement and the owner of the blog Maza Asabuki Ya Watan (What Is Ailing You, My Country?), for posting a report about a scandal at the Military Academy.54 The Committee to Protect Journalists considered Egypt one of the ten worst countries in the world in which to be a blogger because of the government’s arrest and harassment of bloggers.55 Although some Egyptians suspected that the government engaged in online surveillance, there was little actual evidence of surveillance. It was well known that the government required people purchasing a modem to submit a copy of their national identification card and that most internet cafés recorded users’ names and identification numbers.56 Despite these efforts, there was still widespread use of the internet for political discussions and critiques of the government prior to the 2011 protests. Years before the outbreak of protests, the internet, combined with the arrival of satellite television like Al Jazeera, had been a source of critical information about corruption, human rights abuses, and other

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problems in Egypt. Internet blogs were one source of this critical information. Despite the government repression, among Arab states Egypt had some of the most active political bloggers: “Bloggers who are actively engaged in political movements.”57 Bruce Etling and colleagues found in their research on blogging in Arab states that “Egyptian bloggers comprise of the largest structural cluster in the Arabic blogosphere . . . [and] is also one of the most politically active.”58 Bloggers such as Wael Abbas, Nawara Negm, Maikel Nabil, and the Sandmonkey were highly critical of the Mubarak regime and regularly posted information about human rights violations and corruption. The posting of videos of violations of the human rights of prisoners and torture of suspects in police stations by bloggers was one method of documenting and spreading critical information. It became common for people to send bloggers “videos of torture, abuse, and corruption . . . to post on their blogs.”59 The development of an Egyptian blogosphere contributed to the growth of activist networks among bloggers, and facilitated the development of transnational relationships with foreign journalists and bloggers.60 Once Facebook became available in Arabic in 2009, this site also became a popular avenue for people to share information about the abuses of the Mubarak regime. One of the prominent examples of this was the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said,” which was administrated by Wael Ghonim. The site was named after an Egyptian blogger who was tortured and killed by Egyptian police. There were regular posts about police abuses, human rights abuses, and democracy on the page. The arrival of new media, like blogs, coexisted with satellite television, especially the Qatar-based Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera was especially influential because it covered news, such as reports of government corruption, that state-run, national news media would not.61 The wider access to information facilitated the comparison between Egyptians’ own difficult economic situations with the privileged elites. These comparisons magnified “their unfortunate lot and give impetus to rising demands for a piece of the pie and for the end of oppression, discrimination, government corruption, and misinformation.”62 Along with helping to develop awareness of the government’s failures and corruption, Al Jazeera also played a role once protests began by concentrating its coverage on the protests. Al Jazeera had a “transformative impact” not only because it challenged the government’s monopoly over television news, but also because it was able to focus the whole Arab region on a particular topic or country.63 As Marc Lynch argues, the combination of the new social media and satellite television was a challenge to the regime’s information monopoly and a powerful tool for activists.64

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In both Kyrgyzstan and Egypt, activists were able to use ICT to challenge the government’s information monopoly. The ability to share critical information about the regime via blogs, online forums, and social media was important for helping people realize they had shared grievances against the regime. Although not sufficient for regime overthrow, the ability to circumvent the government’s control over information can be an important step for mass mobilization against an authoritarian regime.

Mechanism 2: Aid for Democratic Diffusion

Kyrgyzstan. ICT can facilitate democratic diffusion through demonstration effects and through assisting the sharing of strategies between democratic activists in multiple countries. Democratic diffusion was more influential in the 2005 protest movement than in 2010. In 2010, Kyrgyzstanis had the demonstration effect of their own successful overthrow of Akayev in 2005 and, therefore, it is likely they were more influenced by that experience than any international events. There were antigovernment protests in Moldova in 2009, but there is no evidence of that providing a demonstration effect to Kyrgyzstanis. However, in 2005 there was the powerful demonstration effect of the successful protests against electoral fraud in Ukraine (aka the Orange Revolution), which had occurred only four months earlier in December 2004. In addition, in 2003 protests against electoral fraud had forced the ouster of Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze. As Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik discuss, Kyrgyzstan adopted the “electoral model” of regime overthrow, especially the aspect of protests against electoral fraud. The events in Ukraine and Georgia resonated with Kyrgyzstanis because of the similarities of all being post-Soviet states.65 Along with the general demonstration effect of successful protests against electoral fraud in another post-Soviet state, there also were direct contacts between Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani organizations. Kyrgyzstanis, who as election observers had witnessed the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, formed Kelkel, a youth movement, when they returned to Kyrgyzstan.66 Kelkel was modeled on Otpor—the Serbian group that had helped overthrow Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević—and received training from the Ukrainian youth organization, Pora, which had been active in the Orange Revolution.67 Although demonstration effects and purposive diffusion occurred in 2005, there is no evidence that ICT was important in facilitating diffusion. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, with its Kyrgyzlanguage service and strong coverage across post-Soviet states, had a

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larger audience than any online sources in 2005, making it a more likely source for sharing information about Ukraine’s and Georgia’s electoral revolutions. As noted in Chapter 4, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has a clear democratic mission; therefore, it possibly played a role in democratic diffusion. By 2010 Kyrgyz television, and to a lesser extent, the internet were dominated by Russian mass media and Russian news. According to Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report, Russian media organizations had a “near monopoly” in Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstanis could “view Moscow’s foreign and domestic news reports as well as a wide range of entertainment programs.”68 The main new challenger to Russian media’s dominance was China, as it tried to move into the market with Russianlanguage programming from China Central Television in Bishkek. Russian websites and social networking sites, such as Moi Mir, were also popular in Kyrgyzstan. Since neither Russia nor China supported democratization, the dominance of Russia in the media market and online reduced the likelihood that democratic diffusion was occurring. The increased repression of civil society under Bakiyev (discussed further below) meant that there also were fewer organizations for international democratic activists to work with, reducing the likelihood of purposive democratic diffusion. Overall, there is little evidence that democratic diffusion was an influential factor in 2010, or that ICT aided diffusion.

Egypt. The case of Egypt provides a strong contrast to Kyrgyzstan as ICT helped to facilitate a powerful demonstration effect and aided the spreading of specific strategies for how to challenge an authoritarian regime. The example of Tunisia was a powerful international demonstration effect, especially because of the ability of Egyptians to follow events in Tunisia either through Al Jazeera satellite television or on the internet. In an interview, Marc Lynch argues that “it’s not actually obvious that what happens in Tunisia should be relevant to a Jordanian or to a Yemeni, yet the way Al-Jazeera frames it, it naturally fits. This is a common struggle of Arab peoples against oppressive regimes.”69 The Egyptian government saw Al Jazeera as having fueled the antigovernment protests in 2011 because of its broadcast of the successful Tunisia uprising. The decision of the government to attempt to block access to Al Jazeera and the statement of Egyptian prime minister Omar Suleiman for Egyptians to stop watching satellite television illustrate the influence of Al Jazeera.70 Al Jazeera’s coverage was dependent on new technology, especially cell phone videos and video-sharing sites, because they were unable to send journalists to Tunisia when the protests began in Decem-

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ber 2010. Therefore, Al Jazeera relied on citizen journalists posting videos online during the first weeks of protest. The combination of older technology (satellite television) and new technology (cell phone video) provided a powerful mechanism for documenting the events in Tunisia and spreading the story throughout the Arab world. Although Al Jazeera’s coverage played a major role, information about the protests did spread via social media such as on Facebook and Twitter.71 The protests in Egypt, occurring only eleven days after the successful overthrow of the Tunisian dictator, were clearly inspired by those events. Because Al Jazeera had extensively covered the events in Tunisia, Egyptians were aware of what had occurred.72 We also know that the events in Tunisia encouraged the April 6 Movement, one of the groups organizing the anti-Mubarak protests. They “saw an opportunity to turn its little-noticed annual protest on Police Day—the Jan. 25 holiday that celebrates a police revolt that was suppressed by the British— into a much bigger event.”73 The April 6 Movement succeeded beyond their expectations when hundreds of thousands of Egyptians turned out to protest. An important element of overcoming the collective action problem is for people to believe protests have a possibility of achieving the goal. The international demonstration effect of Tunisia showed Egyptians that it was possible for protests to bring down a long-serving, repressive Arab dictator.74 New technology, especially social media, helped to facilitate personto-person sharing of specific strategies for how to organize antiregime activity. Unlike other forms of diffusion, this type is purposive. Prodemocracy organizations and activists from other countries specifically and deliberately sought to share information with people in Egypt on how to organize protests, survive confrontations with police, and improve their communication. Sharing a common language and situation of living under a long-serving dictator, Tunisian and Egyptian activists made connections online. The Egyptian April 6 Movement formed on Facebook in the spring of 2008 to support workers in Mahalla al-Kobra planning a strike for April 6. Although initially formed to assist workers, over time members of the April 6 Movement expanded their focus to include a range of political and economic issues, including free speech, government corruption, and the lack of economic opportunity. A few months after the failed Egyptian labor strike, activists in Tunisia followed a similar model of using Facebook to establish the Progressive Youth of Tunisia organization. According to Ahmed Maher, one of the founders of the April 6 Movement, shortly after these events the two organizations began exchanging information and sharing strategies. 75

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“Young Egyptian and Tunisian activists brainstormed on the use of technology to evade surveillance, commiserated about torture and traded practical tips on how to stand up to rubber bullets and organize barricades.”76 Therefore, by the time of the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia, there already were online connections between Tunisian and Egyptian activists, which facilitated the sharing of strategies. After protests began in Egypt, Tunisian activists shared information on Facebook about how to use vinegar, lemon, and milk to counter teargas and suggested ideas for how to construct makeshift armor to protect from rubber bullets.77 ICT, especially social media, combined with Al Jazeera, influenced the anti-Mubarak protests in Egypt by showing Egyptians it was possible to overthrow a long-serving dictator. Although the demonstration effect of Tunisia does not fully explain why protests occurred in Egypt, it does explain why protests occurred in January 2011. ICT also facilitated the grassroots sharing of information, strategies, and methods between youth activists in Tunisia and Egypt. The combination of new technology and a shared language made the developing connections faster and easier than ever before in history.

Mechanism 3: A Tool of Mobilization and Organization

Kyrgyzstan. There is no evidence of widespread use of ICT by Kyrgyzstanis to organize the protests in 2005 because of the limits of technology at that time. Social media platforms, such as Facebook and VKontatke, were not in existence yet. As discussed in Chapter 2, social media platforms are especially helpful for organizing. Although these platforms existed in 2010, they were not as widespread in Kyrgyzstan as in other regions at that time. However, in 2010 mobile phones with internet access were an essential tool for organizing the opposition protests.78 Ordinary citizens used the internet and text messaging to organize protests in Talas and elsewhere. By April 6, the opposition political parties had also adopted social media as a tool of organization. Edil Baisalov, a member of the opposition political party, the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), used the hashtag #freekg to help spread information and organize protests.79 Political leaders managed to combine traditional methods and new technology to coordinate and organize protests outside government buildings throughout Kyrgyzstan and to spread news of these events across the country. After the protests, people also turned to social media and the internet to arrange volunteers to provide security and prevent looting. According to Neil

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Melvin and Tolkun Umaraliev, “On the evening of 7 April . . . Diesel Forum, Facebook and Twitter were used to help organize citizens’ protection groups. Organizers of the group’s [sic] report that the social media sites helped bring together more than 1000 volunteers to join patrols in the city, with mobile phones serving as the principal means to organize and coordinate the groups.”80 Although new technology was not the only tool used to mobilize and organize protesters in 2010, it helped coordinate and facilitate antigovernment action. The greater use of technology to organize protests in 2010 versus 2005 highlights the rapidly changing nature of technology. In only five years, entirely new technological tools (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) were now available for activists to use to challenge the regime. Although the presence of social media was not necessary for protests in Kyrgyzstan, it was a helpful tool for communication and coordination.

Egypt. ICT was a much more important tool for activists for mobilizing people (overcoming the collective action problem) and organizing protests for activists in Egypt. Social media platforms, especially Facebook, helped develop a sense of shared grievances against the Egyptian government and were the primary means by which people shared information about the first day of protest. Egyptian activists had prior experience with using technology to help organize mass mobilization. The earliest example is the Kefaya (“Enough”) movement’s use of the internet during the 2004 elections. According to a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, Kefaya’s actions were “the first political initiative in Egypt to truly explore and capitalize on new social media and digital technology as its main means of communication and mobilization.”81 Kefaya utilized text messaging to communicate with members, published information on its own website, and gathered photos and videos of abuse by police.82 The April 6 Movement also had employed cell phones, blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to organize protests, labor strikes, and document human rights abuses.83 Therefore, by 2011 activists had experience in using ICT to organize protests. Compared to the Kyrgyzstani cases, there is significant evidence of Egyptians utilizing Facebook to mobilize protesters and overcome the collective action problem. Prior to the protests, social media was already a way Egyptians connected and shared grievances. Surveys from 2012 found that 85 percent of Egyptian users of social media said it helped connect them more to their communities, suggesting that social media was playing a role in developing a sense of solidarity. 84

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Multiple Facebook pages with large numbers of followers encouraged people to join protests on January 25, a national holiday in Egypt. For example, the “April 6 Movement” page, with 53,000 members, and the “ElBaradei President of Egypt 2011” page (created by opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed El-Baradei), with 244,000 members, each posted the invitation.85 However, one of the most influential was the call to action by Wael Ghonim on the “We Are All Khaled Said” page, which had 804,000 members. More than 50,000 people responded to the invitation on the “We Are All Khaled Said” page, saying that they planned to attend the protest, a remarkable level of commitment given the relatively small scale of previous attempted protests.86 Ghonim’s posts on the Facebook page called on his followers to spread the word of the protests to people not on Facebook.87 An on-the-ground survey of people engaged in anti-Mubarak protests found widespread use of social media. Approximately 50 percent of the protesters had a Facebook profile, and almost all of them with a profile had used Facebook to communicate about the protests.88 The surveys found that blogs, Facebook, Twitter, and email were especially influential for the initial participation in the first protest on January 25.89 First-person accounts of January 25 protesters support the survey data. As Maha Hindawy, a participant in the January 25 protest, recounts: On one night, long before January 25, I saw pictures of Khaled Said on Facebook—I could not sleep at all that night. I joined his support group “We Are All Khaled Said” on Facebook. . . . the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page started promoting the march, which was very well planned in terms of where to meet, what to chant, what to carry and what not to carry, and acceptable types of shoes. . . . Before the morning of January 25, I had never voted in any elections or taken part in any protests, because I always thought both were dangerous in Egypt. I always associated protests with harassment and very violent police reactions . . . —and yet I trusted the Facebook page.90

Surveys show that Facebook was the second most cited method of learning about the protests, partially because, at the time of the protests, approximately 5 million Egyptians had Facebook accounts.91 The availability of Facebook meant that organizers could quickly and efficiently spread information about protests to tens of thousands of people, who could then share that information with others. Along with spreading news about the protests, Facebook was also a source for strategic information on how to effectively engage in protest and how to counter police action. Sahar Khamis and Katherine Vaughn argue that “the Egyptian revolution

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witnessed the first incident of the politicization of Facebook on a grand scale to orchestrate major reform and drastic change.”92 Twitter was another social media tool that aided the protesters. The hashtag #Jan25 focused on the January 25, 2011 protests and the hashtag #egypt more generally covered ongoing events in Egypt. In an extensive analysis of Twitter usage during January–February 2011, Axel Bruns, Tim Highfield, and Jean Burgess found significant Arabic language usage in Tweets, demonstrating local and regional usage of Twitter. Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess also argue that Twitter played a role in organizing protests and spreading information about events. Twitter, easier to use on mobile phones than other forms of social media, was especially helpful for coordinating action while people were on the streets. People could use Twitter to spread information about marching to a specific location or to share news about protests in other parts of the city.93 Once the protests began, Twitter was also used by activists to help organize other aspects related to the protest movement. For example, Zeynep Tufekci recounts how four activists utilized Twitter to organize medical supplies for the protesters injured in confrontations with the Egyptian security forces. Establishing the Twitter handle @TahrirSupplies, these four activists accessed high-follower users of Twitter and quickly developed a system for collecting and distributing medical supplies via Twitter, text messaging, and applications such as Viber.94 One of the remarkable aspects of this story is that two of the activists were not located in Egypt, yet because of technology they played a vital role in helping to sustain the protests through the days of violent clashes with the government. Analysts have noted that approximately 75 percent of the tweets related to the protests in Egypt came from outside the Middle East region.95 Some people use data like this to discount social media’s role in the protests. However, these arguments misunderstand the different ways in which people utilize ICT; even though the tweets by the London-based founder of @TahrirSupplies would be counted as outside the region, he played an important role in the protests. Therefore, the geographic location of the tweets or Facebook posts is not a clear measure of their relevance to the protests.

Mechanism 4: Spreading the Word Around the World

Kyrgyzstan. International attention and pressure can help protect protesters from government retaliation and provide additional pressure on the government. As governments have incentives to not allow negative coverage, ICT assists protesters in bypassing the censors and spreading

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information around the world about government brutality. In 2010, ICT assisted Kyrgyzstanis in sharing news about the protests against Bakiyev and the violent government response with the rest of the world. Kyrgyzstan, like most Central Asian states, is rarely covered in the major international media. Therefore, foreign media had a limited presence in Bishkek and was generally nonexistent outside of the capital. ICT enabled a wider dissemination of news about events and may have increased international attention on the government and its response. Twitter, primarily in English and outside of government control, was especially important for sharing information with international audiences. Twitter and blogs “were efficiently used by the opposition attracting the attention of international community and shifting public opinion to the side of the protesters.”96 Blogs, such as the KyrgyzReport (English language) and the Journal of the Wandering Cat (Russian language), sought to attract international attention to the protests by posting photos and information about events. The online posting of pictures of repression and violence help erode Bakiyev’s international legitimacy. Once protests broke out, ICT helped to spread information about events.97 As the protests continued, and then especially after the government responded with violence, there was international pressure on Kyrgyzstani leaders. For example, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for restraint, and the US embassy expressed concern.98 The UN SecretaryGeneral also condemned the Kyrgyzstani government’s attempts to shut down access to Diesel Forum, a major online source of critical information, and block international websites. The limited presence of international media made the internet an important avenue for antigovernment protesters to reach an international audience and construct their own narrative about the protests.

Egypt. Although there has been significant attention on the influence of social media on the 2011 uprising in Egypt, other forms of ICT, especially mobile phones, citizen videos, and YouTube were important. In a survey of participants in protests, interviewers found that 48.2 percent of protesters had made and shared videos or pictures from the protests.99 The widespread availability of mobile phones with cameras provided the opportunity for protesters to circumvent official media coverage of events and share their experiences globally. In their detailed analysis of videos of the protests, Mohamed Nanabhay and Roxane Farmanfarmaian found that on January 25, the beginning of the protests, citizens produced and distributed the majority of the videos about events. Initially, mainstream media, even Al Jazeera, had little coverage of the

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protests in Egypt. Of the videos made on January 25 and posted on YouTube, over three-quarters were produced by citizens, not journalists.100 Overall, there were almost 20 million views of citizen videos of the protests over the eighteen days of protests.101 On January 28, the mainstream media began providing live 24-7 coverage of events in Cairo. After this, there were more mainstream videos produced and viewed than citizen videos.102 However, the mainstream media, especially Al Jazeera, often used citizen videos in their coverage of events. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube all helped to globalize and popularize the demonstrations and assisted Egyptian activists in framing an international narrative in support of their actions. The speed by which news was able to travel through ICT was different from earlier cases of mass mobilization. Citizen videos offered an especially powerful method to frame grievances in a way that would resonate with international audiences.103 Using relationships developed earlier with foreign journalists, activists deliberately worked to connect videos and reports from demonstrators with the international media and human rights organizations.104 For example, back in 2010 activists formed an English-language version of the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said” to communicate with an international audience. According to Khamis and Vaughn, this Facebook page “empowered activists to associate and share ideas with others globally, enabling collaboration between activists in Egypt and in the diaspora, democracy activists in other countries, and Internet activists. Thus, it not only energized political activism, it also created a ‘virtual global public sphere.’”105 In Egypt, pictures and videos from mobile phones, “which in earlier days would have never been taken, let alone see the light of day,” combined with television, was one of the more effective uses of ICT by people challenging the regime.106 Nadia Idle and Alex Nunns also found that Egyptians worked hard to ensure that their tweets reached an international audience, even after the Egyptian government blocked the majority of the internet. For example, they used landlines to contact friends living overseas to have them post their tweets, and they also offered to give interviews with international news organizations in exchange for satellite internet access.107 These tweets were clearly meant for an international audience, as during the five-day internet blockage in Egypt most Egyptians would not have been able to access Twitter. Reaching an international audience was valued by protesters because they hoped that the attention would prevent government repression. Demonstrators called Al Jazeera and begged them to not turn off their cameras because they believed the international audience was the only reason the government had not “slaughtered” them.108

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Analysis of Role of ICT in Kyrgyzstan and Egypt The most visible and important mechanism involving ICT in Kyrgyzstan was its role as an alternative source of information. ICT enabled activists, prior to the outbreak of protests, to spread critical information about the corruption of Akayev and Bakiyev. Once protests began, new technology was one of the primary ways through which people could obtain information about what was happening with the protests since the government controlled the television coverage. Because of the advances of technology, especially the development of platforms like Twitter and the more widespread availability of mobile phones, technology played a larger role in organizing protests in 2010 than in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan. However, overall ICT played only a modest role in the 2005 and 2010 protests, especially compared to how helpful it was for Egyptian activists. In Egypt, ICT helped people challenge the information monopoly, spread information about the events in Tunisia, overcome the collective action problem, organize the first days of protest, and influence international coverage of events. Why was ICT more influential in Egypt than in Kyrgyzstan? One initial answer is that ICT had limited influence in Kyrgyzstan because the internet penetration rate was only 16 percent. The problem with this argument is that the national internet penetration rate distorts the situation. Although the rate of internet usage was low nationwide, it was relatively high in Bishkek, as almost 70 percent of the city had internet access.109 In addition, surveys showed that approximately a third of all Kyrgyz youth obtained political views via the internet.110 Although Egypt had a higher level of internet penetration and more widespread use of social media, the lack of access is not a sufficient, or complete, explanation for why ICT had less influence on regime breakdown in Kyrgyzstan than in Egypt. A second possible explanation is that the Kyrgyzstani government’s repression of the internet at the time of protests reduced its usefulness. However, it is not clear that blocking websites really had an impact in Kyrgyzstan, as people still found ways to access websites and to communicate online. In addition, until the days immediately preceding the protests, the government had not censored the internet, enabling the spread of information about the regime for years. Comparing the repression in Kyrgyzstan with the repression in Egypt raises further questions about how important the level of repression is for explaining regime outcomes. The Egyptian government engaged in greater repression than the Kyrgyzstani government as it blocked Short Messaging Service (SMS) and shut down almost all internet service for several days during the protests. Despite these actions, ICT clearly played a more important role

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in the 2011 Egyptian protests than in Kyrgyzstan. Part of the reason for this is that, by the time the Egyptian government blocked SMS and the internet, it was too late as people had already taken advantage of the technology to organize against the regime. In addition, blocking the internet increased dissatisfaction with the government and was economically costly, as according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the short shutdown cost Egypt at least $90 million.111 Although the degree of repression is important in explaining the influence of ICT on protests and regime overthrow, it is not sufficient. An important reason why ICT had a larger role in Egypt than Kyrgyzstan was because overthrowing the Mubarak regime was much harder and took more effort. As discussed below, the protests succeeded in Kyrgyzstan because of the significant weakness of the state. In both 2005 and 2010, a few thousand protesters managed to bring down the government. Therefore, a reason why ICT was not as influential was because the opposition played only a moderate role in the overthrow of the Akayev and Bakiyev regimes. If the opposition plays only a modest role in the breakdown of a regime, then ICT is unlikely to be an important tool of regime overthrow. The Egyptian state was stronger than the Kyrgyzstani state, and Mubarak was in a stronger position than either Akayev or Bakiyev. Therefore, the Egyptian opposition needed to be stronger and sustain antigovernment protests for longer to overthrow Mubarak, meaning there was more of a need for information sharing, organizing, and mobilizing via ICT in Egypt than in Kyrgyzstan.

Why Regime Overthrow? Kyrgyzstan As noted above, ICT played a limited role in the regime breakdown in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the protest movements were not large, so by most predictions the government should have been able to maintain power and successfully respond to the protests. Kyrgyzstan has a more vibrant civil society than its neighbors, and the United States and the European Union (EU) have supported democratization in Kyrgyzstan. However, civil society organizations and international pressure had only a minimal role in the 2005 and 2010 regime overthrows. The fact that Akayev and Bakiyev each lost power only five years apart suggests a pattern which, in turn, points to larger structural issues. Akayev and Bakiyev primarily lost power because of their weak positions as leaders, lacking coercive capacity and legitimacy.

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Weak civil society. Despite having the most active civil society in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstani civil society organizations had little impact on the 2005 or 2010 protests. In the case of the 2005 elections, Scott Radnitz found that NGO leaders “played no part in mobilizing people in Jalalabad or Osh, and only an ancillary role in Bishkek.”112 Furthermore, under Bakiyev, civil society organizations came under increased government repression, reducing their influence in the country. For example, almost no NGOs openly contested the “results of the highly flawed presidential election in July” 2009.113 Because many NGOs had retreated from public life, there is little evidence of NGOs playing an important role in the 2010 overthrow of Bakiyev. Therefore, both the 2005 and 2010 Kyrgyzstan cases raise questions about the role of civil society organizations in regime breakdown.

Limited international support for democratization. I hypothesized in Chapter 2 that the international support for democracy is important for explaining the success or failure of digitally networked protests. In 2005, there were two main ways through which the international community supported democratization in Kyrgyzstan. First, the election monitoring mission of OSCE and international support for the Kyrgyzstani election monitoring organization, The Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, provided evidence of electoral fraud in the February parliamentary elections, which contributed to people’s anger with the Akayev regime. Second, US NGOs and the US government provided direct assistance to help the independent press. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Kyrgyz-language radio service, funded by the US government, was an important source of news throughout much of the country. In addition, independent newspapers, such as MSN, had difficulty printing their editions because the government controlled all of the printing presses. Freedom House, a US democracy promotion organization, opened up its own printing press in Bishkek for independent newspapers to use, which allowed publications like MSN to keep publishing.114 Furthermore, when the power went out at the printing house in early March 2005, the US Embassy sent two generators, which enabled MSN to print a special edition documenting the corruption of the Akayev regime. Overall, by 2005 USAID had been active in Kyrgyzstan for more than a decade, providing millions of dollars in assistance for civil society, election monitoring, and the development of independent media.115 The situation was different in 2010. Although the OSCE continued to monitor elections, the protests in 2010 were not around electoral fraud, so that was not as directly relevant. In addition, the United States,

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trying to negotiate a renewal of its lease on the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan (valuable for supplying the war in Afghanistan), did not actively condemn the Bakiyev government. However, Russia played an unexpected and important role in undermining Bakiyev. Angered at Bakiyev’s decision to agree to a large loan from Russia, but to then not evict the Americans from the Manas Air Base, the Russian government dropped its support of Bakiyev.116 Russian state television, available in much of northern Kyrgyzstan, ran stories critical of the Bakiyev government.117 More importantly, Russia increased the tariff on petroleum products exported to Kyrgyzstan, raising gasoline prices only five days before protests broke out.118 The Russian government, whether intentionally or not, helped to erode public support for Bakiyev. Despite the direct financial assistance from the United States, Kyrgyzstan’s low levels of linkage and leverage with Western states reduced the international support for democracy in 2005 and 2010. One sign of the limited linkage and leverage is that Kyrgyzstan currently has only minimal economic relations with the EU and the United States. Approximately 80 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s trade is with China, Russia, and Central Asian neighbors.119 Less than 1 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s trade is with the United States and only 3.8 percent is with the EU.120 Aid from the EU has focused on economic development and poverty reduction, with only 17 percent of EU funding going to human rights organizations.121 Although Russia’s criticism of Bakiyev may have contributed to public anger in Kyrgyzstan, Russia was not seeking to develop democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Russia’s engagement with Bakiyev’s successor, Almazbek Atambayev, demonstrates its emphasis on economic ties and reducing US influence in the region. Russia convinced Atambayev to have Kyrgyzstan join the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union, partially by providing $500 million in financial assistance.122 Under significant pressure from Russia, Atambayev refused to extend the US lease on the military base in Manas, but did give Russia a fifteen-year lease for a military air base in Kant. Russian financial assistance and joining the Eurasian Economic Union reduce Kyrgyzstan’s dependency on US and European assistance and, thereby, reduces their leverage to encourage democratic reforms. Along with strong economic and political linkages with authoritarian Russia, Kyrgyzstan has no democratic neighbors, resulting in an unfavorable international environment for democracy. Although ICT, civil society organizations, and the international environment all had some influence in either 2005, 2010, or both, none of these factors appears strong enough to explain why Akayev and Bakiyev were forced to leave office. Both Akayev and Bakiyev lost

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power not because the opposition was strong and resilient, but rather because they lacked legitimacy and had weak coercive capacity.

Weak leaders: Lack of coercive capacity and legitimacy. Compared to Egypt, the Kyrgyz government “has weak coercive capacity as the police are underpaid and regularly have to purchase their own uniforms and fuel. During the protests in 2005 the Kyrgyz police agreed to stand aside and allowed protesters to take control of the regional government in Jalalabad.”123 There are also reports that Akayev did not order security forces to fire on protesters in Bishkek in March 2005 because there were real concerns that the armed forces had defected and could no longer be counted on to support him.124 Scott Radnitz argues that the overthrow of Akayev “would more appropriately be labeled a coup that led to the replacement by one set of elites by another” than a “democratic breakthrough.”125 The overthrow of Bakiyev was different as it did not involve an election and the security forces did engage in violence. However, the inability of the security forces to prevent protesters from seizing control of the Kyrgyz White House on April 7 demonstrates either a lack of coercive capacity or an unwillingness to protect Bakiyev.126 By 2005 and 2010, Akayev and Bakiyev were unpopular and had failed to develop legitimacy. Akayev tried to use the “Epic of Manas, the world’s longest oral narration and a poetic jewel of the Kyrgyz cultural tradition,” to gain nationalist support, especially just before the 1995 presidential election.127 Despite these efforts, by 2005 Akayev was unpopular and lacked legitimacy. There is little evidence Bakiyev tried to develop a national ideology.128 Bakiyev, instead, emphasized security concerns as a reason why it was important to support him as a leader. For example, in 2006 Bakiyev, trying to make the case that Kyrgyzstan faced serious security threats, stated that Central Asia had “become a key target of international terrorists and religious extremists.”129 Overall, these efforts to gain public support failed as, by 2010, Bakiyev was deeply unpopular. In a 2009 public opinion poll, Kyrgyzstanis said Bakiyev’s two biggest mistakes were regular electrical cuts and corruption.130 Just after Bakiyev lost power in 2010, another public opinion poll found that 47 percent of Kyrgyzstanis believed that Bakiyev’s largest mistake was his practice of placing family members in positions of power.131 These public opinion surveys suggest that Bakiyev’s efforts to gain public support failed because Kyrgyzstanis were clearly angry about corruption. Akayev’s and Bakiyev’s unpopularity and overall weak position contributed to their loss of elite support. As noted above, in 2005 Bakiyev, who had been prime minister under Akayev, defected and became one of the leaders of the opposition movement against Akayev. In 2010, the

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inability of Bakiyev, even in his regional stronghold of Jalalabad, to rally sufficient support to prevent his forced exile again demonstrates significant elite defections. The weakness of the Akayev and the Bakiyev regimes were the primary reasons why each lost power.

Egypt Why were the anti-Mubarak protests successful in forcing him out of office? As documented in the previous section, ICT played an influential and important role in spreading information, mobilizing supporters, and gaining international attention. However, the use of ICT is not sufficient by itself to explain the successful overthrow. Along with the organizational power of ICT, existing civil society organizations with prior protest experience helped to mobilize and sustain protests over eighteen days. In addition, the erosion of international support, including US president Barack Obama’s statement for Mubarak to step down, may have factored into the Egyptian military’s decision to no longer support him. The large-scale protests, which activists used ICT to help mobilize, were necessary for the overthrow of Mubarak. Without the protests, there would have been no change as there would have been no pressure on the military or elites to abandon Mubarak. Unlike Akayev and Bakiyev, Mubarak had coercive capacity as long as the military continued to support his rule. Therefore, the decisionmaking of the military is important for explaining regime overthrow. The development of widespread antigovernment protests, combined with the erosion of international support for Mubarak, contributed to the military’s decision to no longer defend him, thereby ending his presidency.

Role of civil society. Part of the reason the 2011 demonstrators were able to sustain high levels of mobilization over multiple days, occupy Tahrir Square, and eventually cause Mubarak to step down is because of the role of existing movements such as the April 6 Movement, and civil society organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, although not that influential on the first day of protest, did participate later and provided valuable assistance in conflicts with pro-Mubarak supporters. The 2011 protests did not spontaneously develop, but instead were the result of several years of prior activism and earlier experiences with mobilization. Kefaya, formed around the time of the 2005 Egyptian parliamentary elections, provided a foundation for the 2011 protests by providing a rare example of protests against Mubarak. The message of Kefaya’s demonstrations, “No to a fifth term [for Mubarak] and no to hereditary rule,” was echoed in 2011.132 Three years before the overthrow of

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Mubarak, a RAND Corporation report on Kefaya noted that “Kefaya’s greatest significance was in serving as a catalyst for all those wishing to protest the current situation. Kefaya planted the seeds of protest, an act that had been taboo previously.”133 The example of Kefaya helped activists overcome the collective action problem in 2011, as protesting against Mubarak was no longer a new idea. The April 6 Movement, developed partially out of the experience of Kefaya, formed in the spring of 2008. Ahmed Maher, a leader of the April 6 Movement, had been engaged with the Youth for Change branch of Kefaya. One of the organizers of the April 6 Movement, Abdel Fattah Ahmed Rashid, noted that the membership of their Facebook page quickly grew to over 70,000.134 Until 2011, most of the events the April 6 Movement organized had few attendees and often attracted government repression.135 However, the April 6 Movement’s prior experience with organizing demonstrations helped the 2011 protests succeed. Along with Ghonim’s “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page, the April 6 Movement was one of the main organizers of the January 2011 protests. Although Facebook is a powerful and influential tool for organizing protests, it still requires that there be organizers. For example, the April 6 Movement provided information for people about routes they should take to reach Tahrir Square, and lists of churches and mosques where people could meet for the Friday, January 28, “Day of Rage” protests.136 The April 6 Movement built on the international demonstration effect of successful protests in Tunisia to help Egyptians mobilize against the Mubarak government. Whereas the existence of the April 6 Movement helps explain the development of anti-Mubarak protests, the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation explains how Egyptians managed to sustain protests for eighteen days. The Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928, believed that Egypt should be governed by Islamic law and advocated for the Islamization of society. However, beginning in the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood officially adopted a policy of supporting a democratic Egypt and began to run candidates in parliamentary elections. The Brotherhood also expanded its social and economic services to Egyptians starting in the 1980s, operating medical clinics, educational centers, and Islamic schools, and providing economic assistance. These efforts enhanced its profile and influence among Egyptians.137 In the 1990s, the Brotherhood came under intense pressure by the Mubarak government and faced severe repression, with much of its leadership ending up in prison. Partially because of its history of being a target of repression, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership initially did not support the protests and

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instructed its members to not participate. However, members of the Muslim Brotherhood Youth participated in the early days of protests anyway.138 Concerned about growing internal generational divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood and seeing how the protests had momentum, the leadership decided to shift their position and support the protests on January 28, 2011.139 Once they committed to the protests, the Brotherhood was helpful in sustaining the protests. As a decades-old organization, the Brotherhood had extensive experience in confrontations with the government and also operated in “a disciplined hierarchy,” important in times of crisis.140 Muslim Brotherhood members were particularly helpful in the violent confrontations with the police and pro-Mubarak supporters. For example, during the February 2 battle for control of Tahrir Square, the Muslim Brotherhood Youth “brought homemade firebombs into the square and organized its defense. Barricades were erected with pedestrian guardrails torn out of the pavement.”141 One of the leaders of the April 6 Movement acknowledged that “the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood played a really big role.”142 In contrast to Tunisia (see Chapter 6), the Egyptian labor unions leadership did not aid in the protests. The only legal labor union, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), was state controlled and actively worked against the demonstrations. A later investigation found that ETUF’s president, Hussein Megawer, “received orders from highranking [government] leaders . . . to gather a large number of progovernment workers and NDP [National Democratic Party] supporters and to pay them to attack” demonstrators in Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011.143 However, individual workers did participate in the demonstrations. Furthermore, some workers went on strike during the last four days of the protests, and the newly formed Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions called for a general strike on February 9.144 Estimates say that strikes involved approximately 300,000 workers.145 Although the strikes were a late development, they may have helped to influence the military’s decision to no longer support Mubarak. In addition, the years of worker activity prior to 2011, when there were hundreds of strikes, repeatedly challenged the government and demonstrated the possibility of collective action to Egyptians. As Joel Beinin notes, “In the 2000s, persistent workers’ collective action was one of the several protest movements eroding the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime and a major component of the emergent culture of protest.”146 ICT offered activists new ways to coordinate activities and mobilize supporters by 2011. However, as a tool, ICT would have been less effective without the existence of civil society organizations. The prior

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protests and strikes played a role leading up to the events of 2011 because they provided people with experience in organizing demonstrations. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood, with its loyal, mobilized membership, helped to sustain the pressure on the Mubarak government. New technology and skills worked in synergy with traditional methods of protests to explain the development of a sustained movement against Mubarak in January and February 2011.

The international environment. Once the Egyptian protests began, unlike protests in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, or even Tunisia, there was widespread and intense media attention. Along with Al Jazeera, US media companies such as CNN had extensive live coverage. The intense international media attention meant that any government repression was likely to be seen around the world, including in the United States. The high level of media attention required the US government to respond to the protests. The decades-long relationship between the US government and Egypt made the United States one of the more important international actors in 2011.147 The United States had been a significant provider of financial assistance to the Egyptian government over the three previous decades. In 2010 alone, the US government gave $1.56 billion in aid to Egypt. The vast majority of this assistance was security related. For example, in 2010 only $24.7 million of the $1.56 billion went toward funding for civil society development, rule of law programs, and improving governance. In contrast, $1.31 billion was given for “peace and security.”148 Historically, the United States had focused on issues of fighting terrorism, maintaining peace with Israel, and other national security issues and had not pressured Mubarak on democracy or human rights. The US government had linkage and leverage with Egypt, but rarely used either to support democratization. Moreover, as a “coalitional partner of Sadat, Mubarak, and the SCAF,” the United States directly defended authoritarianism in Egypt.149 Given the close and long-term relationship between the United States and Egypt, as the protests unfolded multiple members of the US government repeatedly engaged with Egyptian officials. However, it was not until February 2, 2011, that US officials called for an “orderly transition” to begin “now.”150 After the first day of protests, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly said that the government of Egypt is stable and interested in the “needs of Egyptians.”151 Initially, President Obama also only encouraged Mubarak to adopt reforms and did not talk about him resigning. The Obama administration was reluctant to advocate for a

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long-time ally to resign and wanted an “orderly transition.”152 Although the Obama administration was cautious about advocating for Mubarak to leave, they did repeatedly, both publicly and privately, urge Egyptian officials not to engage in violence. For example, US military officials spoke with contacts within the Egyptian military and encouraged them to avoid violence. US defense secretary Robert M. Gates called Egypt’s field marshal Mohammad Tantawi multiple times with similar statements.153 The Obama administration not only took advantage of their linkages with the Egyptian military, but also used their leverage by threatening to freeze military aid if there was no plan to move forward with democratic elections.154 The international pressure, especially from the United States, clearly raised the cost of engaging in repression for the Egyptian military.

The strength of the leader. As noted above, Egyptians had multiple grievances against Mubarak and his regime. It was difficult to conduct public opinion polling and survey research under the Mubarak regime, so there is limited information about his popularity prior to his overthrow. However, an International Republican Institute survey in April 2011, a few months after his overthrow, found that 94 percent of Egyptians approved of Mubarak’s resignation, suggesting that he lacked legitimacy as a ruler.155 However, unlike Akayev and Bakiyev, Mubarak had significant coercive power available. At the time of the 2011 protests, Mubarak had a million police officers and was spending over $3 billion on internal security forces.156 In addition, Egypt had a large, wellresourced military. Therefore, as long as the security forces remained loyal, Mubarak had the ability to suppress the demonstrations. However, the military eventually decided to defect and remove Mubarak from office. This decision was especially surprising because Mubarak, a former commander of the air force, had prioritized maintaining good relations with the Egyptian military. Preventing a coup d’état is a major concern for all authoritarian rulers, but it is especially an issue in the Middle East, where from 1949 to 1980 there were fifty-five coup attempts, thirty-one of which succeeded.157 Mubarak had successfully managed relations with the military for three decades by co-opting the military generals through access to economic rewards, resulting in the military controlling between 20 and 40 percent of the Egyptian economy.158 Given the close connection that the Egyptian military had with Mubarak, why did they eventually decide to pressure Mubarak to step down? The military disliked some elements of the privatization that occurred under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, as the government was

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selling state-owned enterprises to friends of Mubarak’s son Gamal.159 US State Department cables leaked by WikiLeaks include reports by US ambassador Margaret Scobey that the Egyptian military viewed the privatization approach of Prime Minister Nazif “as a threat to [the military’s] economic position.”160 Furthermore, the military was not supportive of Mubarak’s efforts to have Gamal be his successor. Mubarak’s policy of increasing the importance, size, and resources of the police and internal security forces also upset the Egyptian military because they were seen as competitors for state resources.161 Therefore, by 2011, the military had some grievances against the Mubarak regime. However, the most significant likely factor was concerns about their ability to actually successfully suppress the protests. It is important to note that the military waited eighteen days before making the decision to pressure Mubarak to resign and, during that time, did not intervene to protect demonstrators or to prevent the loss of over 800 lives. Neil Ketchley’s detailed accounts of interactions between the military and protesters documents how there was a high degree of ambiguity about what the soldiers would do once the military appeared on the streets of Cairo.162 The military shifted its position only after it realized that, given the size and persistence of the demonstrations, ending the protests would require high levels of repression and significant casualties. A major factor in the military leadership’s decision was the concern that mid-level officers would not follow the orders to kill unarmed civilians. Although the military generals had benefited from the system of patronage, mid- and low-level officers had not and they were unhappy. Leaked US diplomatic cables included multiple reports noting that “mid-level officers do not necessarily share their superiors’ fealty to the regime” and that they were “generally disgruntled.”163 Furthermore, protesters actively tried to sway Egyptian soldiers to support them with a deliberate strategy of fraternization. Protesters would offer flowers, chant “the army and the people are one hand,” and hug soldiers.164 A retired Egyptian major general summarizes the military leadership’s decision this way: [Field Marshall Mohammad] Tantawi was personally loyal to Mubarak. He tried to save him. But he understood that upholding the status quo required a large slaughter which the officer corps would not hear of. Had SCAF ordered the mid-ranking and junior officers to shoot on civilians, they would have turned their weapons against SCAF. The officer corps would have splintered along generational lines. Tantawi refrained from opening fire on the protesters not to protect the revolution, but to safeguard the unity of the armed forces.165

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At the center of the protests, Tahrir Square, it was clear by February 10, 2011, that there had been a breakdown of military discipline and there were serious questions about the likelihood soldiers would follow orders to kill protesters.166 Furthermore, the SCAF took over when Mubarak stepped down, so by deciding to abandon Mubarak the military gained popular support and remained in power. In summary, the reasons for the downfall of Akayev and Bakiyev and that of Mubarak are quite distinct. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, Akayev and Bakiyev each lacked coercive power and legitimacy. Mubarak, having significantly more coercive power, was in a stronger position at the start of protests. Therefore, the size, scale, and persistence of the protests in Egypt were a much more important factor in the downfall of Mubarak. Because ICT played an essential role in organizing and sustaining those protests, it aided regime breakdown in Egypt. Digitally networked protests working with existing civil society organizations, combined with international pressure, resulted in the Egyptian military deciding to no longer support Mubarak, which caused the end of the Mubarak regime. The strength of the opposition movement explains regime breakdown in Egypt because, without widespread mass mobilization against Mubarak, the military was unlikely to defect. In contrast, regime breakdown in Kyrgyzstan occurred because of the weaknesses of Akayev and Bakiyev, not the strength of the opposition.

ICT in Postoverthrow Contexts: Ineffective Aid for Democratization

ICT was a helpful tool for overthrowing the Egyptian and, to a lesser extent, the Kyrgyzstani regimes. However, it was ineffectual, or even detrimental, for the development of democracy in both countries. The development of democracy involves the negotiation, compromise, and agreement on the “new rules of the game.” Instead of facilitating compromise, social media appeared to intensify divisions in each country. Overall, the existence of new technology did not help Egyptian or Kyrgyzstani activists manage a transition to democracy.

Kyrgyzstan Despite two cases of overthrowing a nondemocratic leader, Kyrgyzstan has not democratized. As Table 5.1 shows, other than having a slightly better electoral process, there is no real change in the level of democracy from 2009 (Bakiyev) to 2018 (Sooronbai Jeenbekov). The weakness of the state is why Akayev and Bakiyev were overthrown,

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and why the country remains a competitive authoritarian regime. Kyrgyzstan, with its democratic institutions but illiberal system, remains a competitive authoritarian regime. ICT is not an effective tool to overcome Kyrgyzstan’s structural challenges for democratization: the legacy of communism and the persistence of a regime defined by patronage and corruption.

Legacy of communism. The previous cases of Russia, Armenia, and Moldova all documented how the legacy of communism contributes to the weakness of civil society in post-Soviet states. This is also true in Kyrgyzstan, where Table 5.1 shows there has been little overall improvement in the strength of civil society in Kyrgyzstan over the past decade. Kyrgyzstani civil society is relatively weak because of limited financial resources and low public distrust. According to the NGO Sustainability Index, 80–90 percent of all NGO funding comes from international organizations and “financial vulnerability remains the most acute and serious issue for NGO development in Kyrgyzstan.”167 A 2010 poll found that only 18 percent of Kyrgyzstanis believed that NGOs did “good” work and 55 percent were either neutral or did not know about the work of NGOs—hardly a statement of public support.168 Although some Kyrgyzstanis see NGOs as providing helpful social services, others believe that NGOs are grant-eaters and cause trouble.169 In addition, in the past few years there have been increased political attacks against NGOs, leading to a reduction in civic activism. One example of this negative political rhetoric is a 2017 statement from President Atambayev, who called for the people to protect the country against those who “under the guise of human rights defenders, opposition, NGO representatives” are “working off foreign money and imposing foreign values.”170 The persistent weakness of civil society makes democratization harder, as civil society plays an important role in all stages of democratization from regime overthrow to consolidation. Table 5.1 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit Scores Electoral process Independent media Civil society Judicial framework and independence

2009 6.00 6.25 4.75 6.00

Note: On a scale of 1–7, with 7 the least democratic.

2018 5.75 6.25 5.00 6.50

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The lack of national unity and repeated violence among ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan is another negative legacy of the Soviet Union because the region of Central Asia is a postcolonial space where state borders were drawn without the input of the local people.171 When the Soviets drew the borders of the states in Central Asia, they intentionally divided the best agricultural land among the republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, resulting in states that did not reflect the territorial distribution of ethnic groups.172 The two largest minority groups in Kyrgyzstan are Uzbeks (14.5 percent of the population) and Russians (9.0 percent of the population). After the overthrow of President Bakiyev in April 2010, violence broke out between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in Osh and Jalalabad. The conflict resulted in 470 deaths, the majority of whom were Uzbek.173 The legacy of the Soviet Union, the postindependence efforts to develop Kyrgyz nationalism, and the chaos caused by Bakiyev’s ouster all contributed to the outbreak of violence. Bakiyev was seen by some southern Kyrgyz as their defender against perceived Uzbek “aggression” and, once he was gone, there was significant (unwarranted) fear of attacks by Uzbeks.174 Social media contributed to an outbreak of violence in June 2010. Following the events of April, there was an increase of nationalistic posts on online forums and Twitter, with “ethnic Kyrgyz accusing ethnic Uzbeks of wrongdoings and setting fire to Bakiyev’s family house, and ethnic Uzbeks accusing ethnic Kyrgyz of hatred towards Uzbeks and of attacking private property.”175 Once violence began in Osh, videos posted of the violence inflamed tensions further between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Similar to elsewhere, social media also contributed to disinformation campaigns such as the false reports of ethnic Tajiks being involved in the violence.176 Social media not only failed to help promote national unity, but it also contributed to increased interethnic polarization and violence. Reuel R. Hanks argues that the divisions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks will continue until there are “profound changes in the fundamental manner in which political power is distributed, amassed and expressed there.”177

Nature of the autocratic regime: Patronage and corruption. The nature of the political system, defined by patronage and corruption, presents further serious challenges for democratization. Kyrgyzstani politicians are rarely guided by principles or ideology; therefore, the system of vlast’ (patronage) is often effective in convincing opposition figures to join the government. As one leader of the opposition told researchers, “Only rarely do people go into government for the sake of

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principles, to implement their vision for the country.”178 Observers reported that gaining a place on one of the political party’s candidate lists required a bribe of $300,000 to $500,000.179 Akayev and Bakiyev both used government positions as a way to co-opt opposition figures. A Kyrgyzstani official noted that “everyone knows much a post costs, and how much an official can generate from that position in a year . . . [in some cases] it’s millions of dollars.”180 Scott Radnitz argues that the lack of change between Akayev and Bakiyev was because localism and clientelism remain the central characteristics of Kyrgyzstani life and prevent reform.181 In other words, the change in leader produced no fundamental changes in the authoritarian system. Henry E. Hale also contends that in systems like Kyrgyzstan, defined by personalized networks of rewards and punishment (patronal politics), the ousting of a leader is a normal part of the cycle of political life: Revolutions in patronal presidential systems, therefore, should not generally be mistaken for a change in regime. In fact, even if an opposition network captures the presidency in a patronal presidential system after winning support through democratic rhetoric and mobilizing prodemocracy masses on the streets, and even if the opposition leaders actually do genuinely intend to democratize, the reappearance of single-pyramid politics [a system of political patronage focused on the president] is still quite likely . . . so long as the patronalistic nature of society and the presidentialist constitution have not changed.182

Digitally networked protests are unable to change the basic structure of a political system based on patronage, corruption, and localism. It is important to note that Bakiyev and Atambayev, the postprotest leaders, were each part of the existing system and had little incentive to change it. Therefore, as the International Crisis Group notes, “The system remains remarkably unchanged despite elections and upheaval.”183 Kyrgyzstan’s weak civil society, lack of national unity, and persistent corruption are barriers for democratization. The lack of state capacity helps explain why relatively small-scale protests were able to overthrow two different presidents. However, these factors also explain why regime breakdown did not result in democratization. Although ICT was a powerful way to challenge the government’s information monopoly and mobilize protests, it was not effective in supporting democratization in Kyrgyzstan because it has been unable to help people overcome the structural challenges for democracy. Furthermore, social media is a double-edged sword in Kyrgyzstan as it is both a means to spread democratic ideas and a way

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to intensify existing divisions. Therefore, ICT has been of limited help in establishing a democratic state in Kyrgyzstan, and may also be detrimental to democracy by worsening ethnic and regional tensions.

Egypt In many ways Egypt was a more likely case for successful democratization than Kyrgyzstan. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, there is a strong sense of national identity among Egyptians and there are no ethnic divisions. Despite some of these positive conditions, democracy did not develop in Egypt. The existence of at least 40,000 political prisoners in Egypt demonstrates the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian government.184 Why did democracy not develop in Egypt? What role did ICT play in post-Mubarak Egypt? How did the joy of February 2011 turn into the repressive dictatorship of today? Egypt remains an authoritarian regime, despite the overthrow of Mubarak, because of the weakness of the digitally networked protests and the persistent strength of the authoritarian institutions. The events in Egypt between when Mubarak stepped down and the military coup d’état in July 2013 that overthrew the democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, demonstrate the limits of ICT as a tool of democratization in Egypt. Furthermore, the developments in Egypt illustrate a potential weakness with digitally networked protests— the lack of leadership and a cohesive agenda. Although the lack of centralized leadership can be a benefit in the antigovernment protest movement as it reduces the effectiveness of government repression—there are no leaders to target—it is a problem when trying to establish a new regime because there are no leaders to represent the interests of the protesters during negotiations.

Weakness of digitally networked protests. After Mubarak resigned, protesters and activists remained engaged and continued to use social media to spread their message and organize protests against the SCAF. For example, in November 2011, the April 6 Movement and the Coalition of Revolution Youth called for protests in Tahrir Square to force the resignation of the government, still dominated by Mubarak-era politicians, and to demand presidential elections by April 2012.185 Large-scale protests did bring about change in SCAF’s policies, as they led to the scheduling of parliamentary elections and the arrest of Mubarak.186 Politicians, realizing the value of social media, established an online presence, especially for the 2012 elections. The Muslim Brotherhood was also active online; for example, posting election night results from polling stations across the country on Twitter and Facebook.187

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Despite the continued political activity, the activists who had successfully used social media to challenge the Mubarak regime struggled to have an influence during the transitional period between February 2011 and July 2013. It is difficult to sustain a movement for months, and the SCAF’s resistance “exhausted the revolutionary movement and strained its camaraderie.”188 However, the digitally networked protests in Egypt had several internal weaknesses, reducing their impact on democratization. As Wael Ghonim noted in a later interview, there was a lack of leadership and no master plan during the anti-Mubarak protests.189 An analysis of the experiences of the April 6 Movement since January 2011 highlights some potential challenges with digitally networked protests and democratization. As early as March 2011, the lack of cohesion and leadership was a problem for the April 6 Movement. During a meeting to discuss the group’s future, there were angry debates about the identity of the movement itself: “‘Who are we?’ one member demands. ‘A resistance group? Civil rights organization? Lobbying and pressure group?’ ‘Should we even exist anymore?’ another asks. ‘We accomplished our mission. Mubarak is gone.’”190 There were also major debates about policy: Do they negotiate with SCAF or boycott? How often should they protest? Should they become a political party or not? In April 2011, Maher announced that the April 6 Movement would now be a political civic organization and not become a political party. However, members of the April 6 Movement immediately objected to this decision, saying they had not been consulted and arguing that the revolution was not over so the April 6 Movement needed to stay a “resistance movement.”191 By May 2011 internal divisions had led to the formation of a splinter group, the 6 April Democratic Front. Reflecting on this several years later, members of the April 6 Movement acknowledged that “we didn’t have a vision. . . . We didn’t have an answer for what comes next.”192 Furthermore, “Maher struggled to articulate an ideology, vaguely describing the group’s leanings as ‘social democratic, social liberal’—somewhere between unfettered capitalism and Soviet-style communism.”193 The origins and nature of the April 6 Movement contributed to its leadership crisis. The structure and philosophy of the organization, influenced by the nature of social media, was that “everyone-gets-a-voice.”194 This leadership philosophy was not unique to the April 6 Movement, but widespread among the youth participants in the protests. For example, several youth groups formed the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution, to help coordinate activities. However, “the coalition—which . . . played a large role in negotiating with the Egyptian military [in 2011– 2012] . . . avoided anointing any leaders.”195 This lack of organizational

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structure and leadership resulted in a lack of cohesion, which weakened the movement and reduced its influence. Because social media facilitates and reduces barriers for organizing antigovernment activity, it is possible to have large-scale protests without leaders or organizational capacity. However, this leaderless dynamic produces challenges for the development of democracy after a dictator is overthrown. Other attempts to translate the success of the protest movement into political power postoverthrow also had difficulties. Young Egyptian liberals and activists struggled to decide on a platform and a name, raise money, and reach people beyond the internet. One political consultant described the situation in 2011 as “every five people are forming a party.”196 Given that only some Egyptians were on Facebook and that 40 percent of Egyptians lived below the poverty line, the youth activists, mainly educated, urban, and middle class, also struggled to connect with Egyptians. Efforts such as “Tweet the Street,” which sought to encourage people to interact with people offline and reach out to poorer neighborhoods, generally had little influence.197 The lack of connection with the majority of Egyptians hampered the influence of the activists on the parliamentary and presidential elections where the Muslim Brotherhood, with its extensive, countrywide network, had the greatest success. All of the political parties connected to the anti-Mubarak movement, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, did poorly in the 2012 parliamentary elections. As Adel Iskander argues, “It is easy to oust a dictator from power, but it is harder to decide what to do next. Here lies the real challenge. Now there is more division of opinion among the various political groups as to how the country should be managed and how its affairs should be run. It is, therefore, harder to see the type of consensus that was reflected on some online pages during the revolution.”198 In addition to internal struggles, the April 6 Movement and its leaders were repeatedly attacked by the SCAF as being foreign agents seeking to “drive the wedge between the army and the Egyptian people in order to implement the goals of foreign powers.”199 The government also attacked other leading activists such as Ghonim. Activist Mohamed Mostafa argued that the negative campaign labeling Ghonim as atheist and antireligious might have influenced his decision to stay away from the public domain and to keep a low profile.200 Therefore, the SCAF deliberately prevented people, like Ghonim, from becoming leaders. As the best-organized political movement in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, dominated the first parliamentary elections, and their candidate, Morsi, won the presidential election. Egyptian political parties divided along religioussecular lines during the campaign. The Democratic Alliance, a coalition

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of several parties, including the Freedom and Justice Party, and a coalition of Salafi political parties (the Islamist Bloc), represented the religious political parties. The liberal, secular side included several different political parties, including the New Wafd Party and the Egyptian Bloc. The year before the parliamentary elections saw repeated defections from coalitions, the splitting of political parties, and the shifting of alliances among political parties. The greater organizational strength of the Muslim Brotherhood and the internal divisions of the liberal parties contributed to the decisive victory of the Islamist coalitions, including the Democratic Alliance and the Islamist Bloc. This victory reinforced existing concerns and cleavages. As Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds argue, the “Islamist electoral dominance is thought to have given Islamists the delusions of a mandate and sent non-Islamists in search of extra-institutional means of redress.”201 The non-Islamist political parties and civil society saw the Muslim Brotherhood as the main threat to their interests. Activity on social media postbreakdown reflected and reinforced the tensions between the religious and secular political groups in Egypt. For example, Muslim Brotherhood members active on Twitter and Facebook singled out critics of Morsi and argued that anti-Morsi voices should be “cleansed.”202 A study of Egyptian Tweets and Facebook posts between 2011 and 2013 found evidence of increased polarization and division into “Islamist” or “activist” clusters.203 Based on this study, Deen Freelon, Marc Lynch, and Sean Aday argue that social media makes democratization harder as it intensifies “polarization, fear and dehumanization of rivals . . . because of its ability to spread violent images and frightening rumors extremely quickly and intensely through relatively closed communities of the like-minded.”204 The protests leading to the ouster of President Morsi in July 2013 caused further divisions and disputes among activists. A grassroots movement begun in 2012 (Tamarod) organized multiple days of largescale demonstrations and a petition calling for new elections and for President Morsi to resign. The protests attracted over a million people. Initially, the April 6 Movement gave its support to Tamarod. However, after the military coup d’état, the movement criticized the government’s human rights abuses and the lack of democracy. In contrast to January 2011, the April 6 Movement had no popular support for its challenges to the military government. Ama Sharaf, a spokesperson for the movement, recalls that “at that time, there was not one person in the street who was against Sisi [the military general who seized power] . . . we tried to make protests, and we got beaten. People with hammers and knives were chasing us. There was a lot of ugliness.”205 How to respond

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to the military coup d’état also divided the administrators of the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page. Ghonim initially praised the military’s decision to oust Morsi, but the administrator of the Englishlanguage version criticized the coup d’état. 206 However, the decision to criticize the coup d’état provoked an angry response from Khaled Said’s sister, Zahraa Said, who argued that the Facebook page should no longer use her brother’s name and that it “no longer represent[s] what is happening in the street.”207 After the coup d’état, resistance to the military’s takeover was often organized online, especially through closed social media groups. As the repression intensified, anticoup activists used innocuous names for the groups to help prevent the police from successfully finding the groups on their phones when arrested.208 The Revolutionary Front, a coalition of activists, similar to during the Mubarak period, used social media to spread information about government abuses and violations of human rights. However, they have had limited impact on politics in Egypt because of high levels of repression. Furthermore, as Nadine Abdalla argues in her analysis of Egyptian youth movements, the decentralized organizational structure of the Revolutionary Front “hindered its ability to formulate a coherent strategy for inducing change.”209 Since July 2013, the Egyptian government has engaged in a brutal crackdown on any form of dissent. Government forces killed over 800 anticoup demonstrators, mostly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, in Cairo’s Raba’a Square in August 2013. Almost all of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, including Morsi, remain in prison, and the government labeled the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December 2013. According to a Human Rights Watch report, “Between August 2015 and August 2016, the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, an independent group, documented 912 victims of enforced disappearance by the police, 52 of whom had not reappeared by the time the group issued its report.”210 Ahmed Maher, one of the leaders of the April 6 Movement, was convicted in late 2013 for illegal demonstrating, rioting, and “thuggery.” He spent over three years in jail, mostly in solitary confinement. Despite extensive repression, the Egyptian government still fears the power of social media. “As it was explained to Maher, ‘tweets can lead to demonstrations, and demonstrations can lead to revolution, and that will bring down the regime and create martyrs,’ he said. ‘So if you are tweeting, you are like a terrorist.’”211

The continued power of authoritarian institutions. As discussed in Chapter 2, the nature of the authoritarian regime has significant consequences for the likelihood of democratization. In the case of Egypt, the

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almost sixty years of either direct or indirect military rule was a challenge for democratization, especially because the Egyptian military had become influential in the government bureaucracy. For example, Mubarak often appointed retired military officers to high-level government positions. According to research by Hicham Bou Nassif, 63 of the 156 governors appointed by Mubarak were retired members of the armed forces.212 Furthermore, “173 major generals and 30 brigadier generals and colonels were found to occupy undersecretary, general director, and other leadership positions in the Egyptian bureaucracy.”213 During Mubarak’s rule, the Egyptian military also gained economic power. The Egyptian government classifies as a state secret the military’s business ventures and property holdings, so we do not know precisely what the military owns. However, there is enough evidence to suggest that its holdings are diverse and broad. The Arab Industrial Organization, Ministry of Military Production, and the National Service Projects Organization are the main organizations managing the military’s commercial interests. Overall, analysts believe that these organizations run thirty-five factories and farms.214 Much of what is produced by these organizations are nonmilitary products, as the military is known to “manufacture everything from olive oil and shoe polish to the voting booths.”215 The military also has extensive land holdings, including parts of the valuable tourism industry.216 In addition, the military has partial ownership or joint ventures with foreign investors in a wide range of enterprises such as the Alexandria Shipyard, a computer manufacturing company, an oil and gas manufacturing company, and a company making smart cards.217 The Egyptian military had both political and economic interests to defend, giving it strong motivation to resist political reform. Similar to Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010, the overthrow of the dictator did not result in democracy in Egypt because the removal of an autocratic leader did not change the fundamental structure of the system. In Kyrgyzstan, one set of elites was exchanged for another in 2005 and 2010, but the system of patronal politics remained the same. In Egypt, the end of Mubarak did not significantly change the role of the military in the Egyptian government. The military never gave up political, economic, or coercive power in Egypt, as the SCAF replaced Mubarak in February 2011. The SCAF remained in charge for more than a year because presidential elections did not occur until May–June 2012. Nathan J. Brown argues that Egyptians did not have much hope of establishing democracy “when they allowed the military to seize control of the transition process in February 2011 and to start making all the rules on its own.” 218 The SCAF continued to suppress freedom of speech, engage in torture, and arrest bloggers for criticizing the government.219

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Furthermore, in 2011 alone nearly 12,000 civilians were tried in military court, including for “offensive writings” on social media.220 The SCAF dismissed protests as the work of foreign spies and believed that they had the right to, quoting Egyptian general Mamdouh Shaheen, decide “what’s best for the country” without consulting other groups.221 Moreover, the Egyptian military maintained its self-perception as the “messianic” leaders of Egypt, distrusting nonmilitary leaders and believing that they had built the modern state of Egypt.222 Although there were multiple elections or referendums (five between 2011 and 2013), the elections never restricted or reduced the power of the military. After the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, according to Brown, the “Islamists discovered that their parliamentary majority meant little because the military had taken care in the constitutional declaration to ensure that the new parliament would have no power to oversee the cabinet or pass legislation without the generals’ approval.”223 In addition, during the voting for president in 2012, the Egyptian military issued a constitutional declaration that removed powers from the presidency and guaranteed military influence over the writing of a new constitution. 224 With the election of Morsi as president in 2012, the Egyptian military no longer had direct control over the daily running of government, but the military never accepted civilian oversight.225 Given the military’s deep integration into Egyptian politics and economics, military leaders were going to defend their political interests. As Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle argue, “An institutional legacy of military involvement in politics seemed to predispose security forces to intervene during transitions and to incline subsequent transition outcomes to fall short of democracy.”226 Moreover, Cherine Chams El-Dine notes that, after the 2011 overthrow of Mubarak, various civilian political actors, instead of seeking to reduce the power of the military, sought the military as allies so that they would support them against other civilian groups they distrusted.227 The lack of common vision of what the new regime should look like contributed to internal turmoil that provided the military with a justification for remaining involved in politics and for seizing power through a coup d’état. The Muslim Brotherhood was both too strong and too weak in the 2011–2013 period. It was too strong in the sense that it dominated electoral politics, raising fears among secular Egyptians, and it was too weak to effectively challenge the military’s power. The internal divisions within Egypt, along with the legacy of decades of military rule, resulted in the Egyptian military being a powerful antidemocratic force. The military was not the only institutional holdover from Mubarak’s rule; the courts also presented repeated problems for the development of

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democracy. On the eve of the June 2012 election for president, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the law under which parliament had been elected only a few months earlier was unconstitutional and that the lower house had to be disbanded. The removal of democratically elected institutions hampered the transition from the beginning. There also was little effort to remove supporters of Mubarak from within the state bureaucracy; although President Morsi did not reform the bureaucracy, reduce the military’s economic privileges, overhaul the police, or support independent labor unions.228 These failures were the result of more than poor decisions by Morsi. The failure to adopt reforms was also because Morsi lacked the power to bring about real change. The military maintained a “decisive advantage in terms of its resources, organization and, above all, monopoly of legitimate armed forces.”229 Moreover, the tools that were able to bring down Mubarak, ICT and mass mobilization, were ineffective in countering the problems of the military and authoritarian institutions. The comparison with Tunisia suggests that a successful transition to democracy requires an apolitical military and a diverse civil society able to work together. Two other possible explanations for the failure of democratization are the economic crisis in Egypt and an unfavorable international situation. The Egyptian economy grew at only 1.8 percent in 2011 and 2.2 percent in 2012, and more than a fifth of the population lived below the poverty line.230 Furthermore, the political turmoil severely damaged the economically important tourist trade. The economic problems existing prior to the 2011 protests—high youth unemployment, stagnant economic growth, economic inequality, and inflation—were the same or worse after the overthrow of Mubarak. The international environment was also unfavorable, as Tunisia is the only democratic state in the entire MENA region.231 In addition, although the United States and the EU provided financial assistance supporting democracy, overall this was a small amount compared to Saudi Arabia’s financial support. After the 2013 coup d’état, Saudi Arabia announced $12 billion in assistance to Egypt, far surpassing the US assistance of $1.5 billion.232 As an authoritarian neighbor, the Saudi government likely saw a democratic Egypt as a threat to its stability. Moreover, the civil war in Libya and Syria contributed to overall regional instability and increased concerns about terrorism. Although the economic and international situation was problematic for democracy, neither of these factors can adequately explain the failure of democratization in Egypt because Tunisia faced similar circumstances (discussed in Chapter 6), but has managed to develop democracy. Therefore, the cross-case comparison demonstrates the importance of an apolitical military and a strong civil society for democratization. Furthermore, the case of Egypt

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highlights some of the internal weaknesses of digitally networked protests and how, by their nature, these movements struggle to move from regime breakdown to democracy. Comparing the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Egypt offers some interesting insights about the role of ICT and democratization. There are several significant differences, the most relevant being the use of ICT in Kyrgyzstan versus Egypt. Egyptians employed ICT more, and with greater success, than Kyrgyzstanis did. The eighteen days of protests in Egypt were much larger and more sustained than the protests in Kyrgyzstan. The intensity of the protests placed greater pressure on the Egyptian government and elites than the protests in Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, the elites took advantage of the unpopularity of the leader to seize power for themselves. In contrast, the Egyptian protests forced the Egyptian military leadership to either abandon Mubarak or attempt widespread, brutal repression. The Egyptian protests were more important for the downfall of Mubarak than protests were for the downfall of Akayev and Bakiyev. Activists effectively used ICT in both states to challenge the government. ICT helped people in Kyrgyzstan and Egypt counter the government’s information monopoly. In Egypt, ICT facilitated the demonstration effect of Tunisia’s successful overthrow and aided cross-national sharing of effective protest strategies. ICT was also an important tool of mobilization and dissemination of information to international audiences during the anti-Mubarak protests. A comparison of the two cases suggests that it was not just the availability of the internet, but rather the introduction of new programs, especially Facebook and cell phone video, that made technology so helpful for mass mobilization. In Kyrgyzstan, where these tools either did not exist yet (2005) or were less widespread (2010), technology had less of an impact on regime breakdown. A difference between Egypt and Kyrgyzstan is that the events in Egypt received significantly more international attention, and Egyptians themselves are more globally connected than Kyrgyzstanis. There are a variety of reasons for the more extensive coverage by international media. Central Asia is geographically isolated, and Egypt is not. Egypt is seen as strategically more important than Kyrgyzstan by Western policymakers. The commonality of the Arabic language helped Egyptians spread information about events throughout the Middle East. In addition, the protests within Egypt occurred within the midst of the outbreak of antigovernment protests across the region, provoking intense international interest.

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The higher degree of global engagement and attention resulted in more pressure on the Egyptian government than on the Kyrgyzstani government to avoid violence. Despite this, the Kyrgyzstani government did not engage in widespread, massive repression against protesters, reinforcing the idea that the state lacked coercive capacity. A brief comparison with Kazakhstan, a neighboring Central Asian state, highlights the role of state weakness in explaining why Kyrgyzstan has experienced regime overthrow twice. Unlike its neighbor, Kazakhstan has been a stable authoritarian regime since independence in 1991. Moreover, Kazakhstan had the same autocratic leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, from independence until 2019. In addition, Nazarbayev’s 2019 resignation was his decision and he was able to handpick his successor. During Nazarbayev’s rule, Kazakhstan did not experience any major antigovernment mass mobilization. What explains the different regime dynamics? Kazakhstan is a stronger state than Kyrgyzstan. One reason why Nazarbayev has had greater coercive capacity and legitimacy is that Kazakhstan has had much more economic success over the past thirty years, primarily because of its oil and natural gas resources. For example, in 2018, Kazakhstan’s gross national income (GNI) per capita was $8,070 and Kyrgyzstan’s GNI per capita was only $1,220.233 Kazakhstan’s greater economic success meant that Nazarbayev was able to effectively use Kazakhstan’s economic performance as a source of legitimacy, and he had the money to pay and equip his security forces.234 Persistent state weakness explains why Kyrgyzstan has experienced repeated regime breakdown. A similarity between Kyrgyzstan and Egypt is that, in both states, the government did not effectively suppress or use ICT to further its own regime. Although the Egyptian government arrested some bloggers, until the actual outbreak of protests neither government censored the internet or blocked social media platforms. In contrast to Russia, both governments did not use ICT for propaganda. When reading the account of the 2011 events, it appears that the Egyptian government was surprised by how effective ICT was in mobilizing protests. As discussed more in Chapter 3, there is evidence that authoritarian governments learned from the experience of the Egyptian government, and one reason why there have been increased efforts by authoritarian governments to control and manipulate ICT is because of the success of digitally networked protests in overthrowing the regime in Egypt. Kyrgyzstan and Egypt each experienced the overthrow of a leader and the failure to develop democracy. In comparing the two cases, there are several preliminary conclusions about why the democratic transi-

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tions failed. First, in Kyrgyzstan and Egypt the removal of the leader did not really change the authoritarian system. Although there were changes to laws and constitutions, in reality the power structures did not change. Kyrgyzstan remained a competitive authoritarian regime based on patronage and regionalism. The removal of Akayev and Bakiyev, in fact, involved shifting one set of elites for another. It did not incorporate new voices in the political process nor an expansion of political power beyond the existing elite. In Egypt, the military retained its political, economic, and coercive power. The Egyptian courts and bureaucracy from the Mubarak era also remained unreformed and powerful. In both cases, the removal of the leader did not change the overall system. Second, internal divisions about the nature and future of the state provided opportunities for authoritarian factions to seize power. Although the sources of the divisions are different in the two cases—Kyrgyzstan has regional and ethnic divisions and Egypt has religious versus secular divisions—the results are similar. In each case, the inability of political parties and organizations to unify, or at least compromise, prevents civil society and political parties from being a powerful voice for democracy. The negative consequences of these divisions was especially evident in Egypt, where the disagreements between the Muslim Brotherhood and liberal, secular political groups gave the Egyptian military a justification for seizing power in 2013. The failure to develop democracy in Kyrgyzstan and Egypt illustrates how ICT provides limited help for establishing democracy when digitally networked protests succeed in overthrowing a leader. People have not been able to use ICT to overcome any of the barriers for democratization in Kyrgyzstan and Egypt. Activists continued to use ICT during the transitional period of 2011–2013. Civil society organizations developed websites and used social media to educate voters about the elections, political parties and organizations increased their online presence, and Egyptians continued to debate politics and policy on Facebook and blogs. However, none of these activities were particularly helpful for the difficult process of negotiating new electoral laws, writing a new constitution, or determining how to dismantle the Mubarakera authoritarian institutions. Moreover, the Egyptian digitally networked protests had internal weaknesses that hampered the ability of activists to influence the establishment of democracy. Digitally networked protests are usually decentralized, lack cohesion, and do not have strong leaders. Therefore, they can struggle to negotiate terms of elections, new constitutions, and so forth. Furthermore, it is not clear how ICT could have been used to challenge the political, economic, and

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coercive powers of the military. ICT was a powerful and effective tool of regime breakdown in Egypt but, so far at least, it has not had a positive influence on democratization. In the next chapter, I examine Tunisia, another Arab Spring case. However, in contrast to Egypt, Tunisia developed a democracy after regime breakdown. Because protests in Egypt and Tunisia share similarities, but their regime outcomes are different, the comparison of these two cases aids theory development. 1. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave?; Brym et al., “Social Media in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising”; Khamis and Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution”; Lynch, “Media, Old and New,” pp. 93–109; Tufekci and Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest”; Aman and Jayroe, “ICT, Social Media, and the Arab Transition to Democracy”; Mabon, “Aiding Revolution?”; Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess, “The Arab Spring and Social Media Audiences”; el-Nawawy and Khamis, Egyptian Revolution 2.0. 2. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Kyrgyzstan, 2018, https://freedomhouse .org/nations-transit/2018/kyrgyzstan. 3. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011: Egypt, 2011, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-world/2011/egypt. 4. Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. 5. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011: Egypt. 6. “Egypt: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practice,” US Department of State, April 2011, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154460.htm. 7. Kulov, “March 2005,” p. 345. 8. Hale, Patronal Politics, p. 194. 9. Saidazimova, “Kyrgyzstan.” 10. Peuch, “Kyrgyzstan.” 11. Various reports at the time document different numbers of deaths—seventysix, seventy-nine, eighty-one, eighty-six. 12. “Kyrgyz Republic: Pre-term Parliamentary Elections, December 16, 2007,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections /kyrgyzstan/31607; “Kyrgyz Presidential Election Failed to Meet Key OSCE Commitments, Despite Some Positive Elements,” OSCE, July 24, 2009, http://www.osce .org/node/51201. 13. Collins, “Kyrgyzstan’s Latest Revolution,” p. 154. 14. Ibid., p. 162. 15. Djumataeva, “The Roots of Kyrgyzstan’s Uprising.” 16. Collins, “Kyrgyzstan’s Latest Revolution,” p. 154. 17. Hany, “It Is Just . . . the Beginning,” p. 67. 18. Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution, pp. 29–30. 19. Back in 2006, President Hosni Mubarak made his son, Gamal, one of the three deputy secretary generals in the ruling National Democratic Party and began to have Gamal accompany him on diplomatic trips. Lesch, “Egypt’s Spring,” p. 39. 20. In the weeks prior to the November 28 elections, the government restricted public campaigning, intimidated opposition candidates, and arrested over 1,300 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including five candidates for the National

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Assembly. On election day, there were multiple reports of security forces denying people the right to vote, vote-buying, and ballot stuffing. The ruling political party, the National Democratic Party, won 420 seats out of 444 seats. “Egypt: Systematic Crackdown Days Before Elections,” Human Rights Watch, November 24, 2010, https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/24/egypt-systematic-crackdown-days-elections; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011: Egypt. 21. Lust, “Elections,” p. 227. 22. Member of Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, quoted in Lesch, “Egypt’s Spring,” p. 42. 23. Global Integrity, “Global Integrity Report 2010 – Qualitative Report – Egypt, 2010,” https://www.globalintegrity.org/resource/gir2010-report-egypt/. 24. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening, Appendix. Only Yemen and Morocco had lower GDP per capita in 2009. 25. Sullivan, “Youth Power and the Revolution,” p. 69. 26. Pannier, “Central Asia.” 27. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2005: Kyrgyzstan, 2005, https://freedom house.org/report/nations-transit/2005/kyrgyzstan. 28. Ibid. 29. Kulikova and Perlmutter, “Blogging Down the Dictator?” p. 37. 30. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2010: Kyrgyzstan, 2010, https://freedom house.org/report/freedom-press/2010/kyrgyzstan. 31. “Kyrgyzstan: 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practice,” US Department of State, 2010, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136089.htm. 32. Ibid. 33. “Individuals Using the Internet, 2005–2019,” International Telecommunication Union, ICT Statistics, n.d., http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat /default.aspx. 34. Kulikova and Perlmutter, “Blogging Down the Dictator?” p. 30. 35. Saidazimova, “Kyrgyzstan.” 36. Ibid. 37. Deibert and Ronozinski, “Beyond Denial,” p. 8. 38. Ibid., p. 8. 39. Kulikova and Perlmutter, “Blogging Down the Dictator?” 40. Kramer, “In a Change of Tactics, Russia Threw Its Support Behind Kyrgyz Uprising.” 41. “Analysis: Kyrgyz Blogs Play Key Role in Reporting Protests.” 42. Melvin and Umaraliev, “New Social Media and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 5. 43. “Kyrgyzstan: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practice,” US Department of State, 2011, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154460.htm. 44. Melvin and Umaraliev, “New Social Media and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 7. 45. Ibid., p. 7. 46. Ibid., p. 9. 47. Ibid.; Hale, Patronal Politics, p. 233. 48. “Egypt: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practice,” US Department of State, 2011, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154460.htm. 49. Ibid. 50. “Press Freedom Deteriorates in Pre-election Egypt,” Committee to Protect Journalists, October 7, 2010, https://cpj.org/2010/10/press-freedom-deteriorates-in -pre-election-egypt.php. 51. OpenNet Initiative, “Egypt,” August 2009, https://opennet.net/research /profiles/egypt. 52. Ayish and Mellor, Reporting in the MENA Region, pp. 37, 39.

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53. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Egypt, 2011, https://freedomhouse .org/report/freedom-net/2011/egypt. 54. “Egypt: Free Blogger in Military Court Trial,” Human Rights Watch, March 1, 2010, https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/01/egypt-free-blogger-military-court-trial. 55. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Egypt. 56. Ibid. 57. Etling et al., “Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere,” p. 1232. 58. Ibid. 59. el-Nawawy and Khamis, Egyptian Revolution 2.0, p. 80. 60. Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess, “The Arab Spring and Social Media Audiences,” p. 874. 61. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? p. 91. 62. Aman and Jayroe, “ICT, Social Media, and the Arab Transition to Democracy,” p. 319. 63. Tufekci and Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest,” p. 365. 64. Lynch, “Media, Old and New.” 65. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions.” 66. Page, “From West to East.” 67. Saidazimova, “Kyrgyzstan.” 68. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010: Kyrgyzstan, 2010, https://freedom house.org/report/nations-transit/2010/kyrgyzstan. 69. Lynch, “Tunisia’s Twitter Revolution?” 70. Tawil-Souri, “Egypt’s Uprising and the Shifting Spatialities of Politics,” p. 162. 71. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? p. 54. 72. Mona Price, “Funny Beginnings and Happy Endings,” p. 61. 73. Kirkpatrick and Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link that Shook Arab History.” 74. Lynch, “America and Egypt After the Uprisings,” p. 34. 75. Kirkpatrick and Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link that Shook Arab History.” 76. Ibid. 77. Khamis and Vaughn, “‘We Are All Khaled Said.’” 78. Melvin and Umaraliev, “New Social Media and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 7. 79. Ibid, p. 10. 80. Ibid, p. 11. 81. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, quoted in Aman and Jayroe, “ICT, Social Media, and the Arab Transition to Democracy,” p. 325. 82. Oweidat et al, “The Kefaya Movement,” p. 21. 83. Khamis and Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution.” 84. Ayish and Mellor, Reporting in the MENA Region, p. 43. 85. Aman and Jayroe, “ICT, Social Media, and the Arab Transition to Democracy,” p. 326. 86. Khamis and Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution.” 87. Ibid. 88. Tufekci and Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest,” p. 369. 89. Ibid., p. 373. 90. Hindawy, “My Egyptian Revolution,” p. 75. 91. Tufekci and Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate,” p. 373. 92. Khamis and Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution.” 93. Ibid. 94. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, pp. 53–60.

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95. Brym et al., “Social Media in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising,” p. 270. 96. “Kyrgyzstan: The ‘Archived’ Revolution,” Global Voices, April 10, 2010, https://globalvoices.org/2010/04/09/kyrgyzstan-archived-revolution/. 97. Melvin and Umaraliev, “New Social Media and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 12. 98. “Further Demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 7, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/a/Kyrgyz_Protesters_Occupy_Regional_Government _Office/2003769.html. 99. Tufekci and Wilson, “Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest,” p. 373. 100. Nanabhay and Farmanfarmaian, “From Spectacle to Spectacular,” p. 585. 101. Ibid., p. 584. 102. Ibid. 103. Pis, “#ArabSpring,” p. 116. 104. Khamis and Vaughn, “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution.” 105. Khamis and Vaughn, “‘We Are All Khaled Said,’” p. 157. 106. Hardaker, Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle, p. 7. 107. Idle and Nunns, Tweets from Tahrir, pp. 20–21. 108. Nanabhay and Farmanfarmaian, “From Spectacle to Spectacular,” p. 589. 109. Melvin and Umaraliev, “New Social Media and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 3. Seventy-seven percent of the country’s 760,664 internet users are in Bishkek, which calculates out to approximately 70 percent of the citizens of the city. 110. Nikolayenko, “Youth Media Consumption and Perceptions of Electoral Integrity,” p. 269. The data are from 2011, shortly after the 2010 events, but close enough that the numbers are likely to be similar. 111. “The Economic Impact of Shutting Down Internet and Mobile Phone Services in Egypt,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), February 4, 2011, http://www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/theeconomicimpactofshutting downinternetandmobilephoneservicesinegypt.htm. 112. Radnitz, “A Horse of a Different Color,” p. 320. 113. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010: Kyrgyzstan, 2010, https://www .freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2010/kyrgyzstan. 114. C. S. Smith, “U.S. Helped to Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstan’s Uprising.” 115. “U.S. Official Development Assistance Database,” US Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014, http://usoda.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do. 116. Collins, “Kyrgyzstan’s Latest Revolution,” p. 156. 117. Kramer, “Before Kyrgyz Uprising, a Dose of Russian Soft Power.” 118. Ibid. 119. “European Union, Trade in Goods with Kyrgyz Republic,” European Commission, 2015, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113409.pdf. 120. Ibid. 121. “Delegation of the European Union to the Kyrgyz Republic, Civil Society Dialogue,” European Commission, May 26, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations /kyrgyzstan/eu_kyrgyzstan/civil_society_dialogue/index_en.htm. 122. Ott, “Russia Tightens Control over Kyrgyzstan.” 123. Way, “Resistance to Contagion,” pp. 244–245; Vanderhill, “Limits on the Democratizing Influence of the Internet,” p. 51. 124. Hale, Patronal Politics, p. 198. 125. Radnitz, “A Horse of a Different Color,” p. 301. 126. It is almost impossible to imagine a few thousand protesters being able to seize control of the Kremlin, 10 Downing Street, or the US White House. 127. Marat, “Imagined Past, Uncertain Future,” p. 15. 128. Marat, “Nation-Branding in Central Asia,” p. 1132.

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129. “Bakiyev Emphasizes Preventive Role of CSTO.” 130. International Republican Institute, “Kyrgyzstan National Public Opinion Poll April 22–May 9, 2009,” 2009, https://www.iri.org/resource/iri-releases-survey -kyrgyzstani-public-opinion. 131. International Republican Institute, “Kyrgyzstan National Public Opinion Poll May 11–25, 2010,” 2010, https://www.iri.org/resource/iri-releases-survey-kyrgyzstan -public-opinion-0. 132. Oweidat et al., The Kefaya Movement, p. 17. 133. Ibid., p. 25. 134. Shapiro, “Can Social Networking Turn?” 135. Ibid. 136. Jones, “Seeds of Change.” 137. al-Anani, “Upended Path,” p. 530. 138. ElGhatit, “Revolution Without Islamists?” p. 113. 139. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership also chose to support the protests because of “the realization that it would be the first target of the regime’s wrath if the uprising failed. As one Brotherhood leader put it, ‘our only card is the mobilization in Tahrir Square. It has been our life insurance against the swing of the pendulum if the regime gets back on its feet.’” Wickham, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Democratic Transition in Egypt,” p. 213. 140. Kirkpatrick and Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link that Shook Arab History,” p. 1. 141. ElGhatit, “Revolution Without Islamists?” p. 112. 142. Kirkpatrick and Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link that Shook Arab History,” p. 1. 143. Hussein Megawer, quoted in Langohr, “Labor Movements and Organizations,” p. 184. 144. Allinson, “Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings,” p. 305. 145. Alexander and Bassiouny, Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice, p. 200. 146. Beinin, “Egyptian Workers and January 25th,” p. 328. 147. Although the EU provided financial assistance to Egypt, it was minor compared to the United States. From 2007 to 2013, the EU gave 1 billion euros (approximately $1.3 billion) total in assistance, compared to the over $1 billion per year the United States gave. “European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Egypt,” European Commission, n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement /neighbourhood/countries/egypt_en. In addition, throughout its engagement with Egypt, the EU has generally had security concerns take priority over promoting democracy. During the crisis itself, European leaders differed significantly in their response with British prime minister David Cameron speaking against the use of violence by the Egyptian government and Italian leader Silvio Berlusconi saying Hosni Mubarak should stay in office and that the protests were relatively small. Traynor, “Egypt Needs Reform Not Repression, Say EU Leaders.” Therefore, overall the EU was not a major actor in the downfall of Mubarak. 148. Foreignassistance.gov, “Foreign Assistance in Egypt,” n.d., https://foreign assistance.gov/explore/country/Egypt. 149. Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, p. 4. 150. Sanger, “Obama Urges Quick Transition in Egypt.” 151. Brownlee, Democracy Prevention, p. 143. 152. Ibid., p. 144. 153. Lynch, “America and Egypt After the Uprisings,” p. 37. 154. Cooper and Landler, “Ally Balks as White House Is Said to Press for His Rapid Exit.”

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155. International Republican Institute, “Egyptian Public Opinion Survey, April 14–27, 2011,” June 5, 2011, https://www.iri.org/resource/iri-releases-egypt-poll. 156. Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats,” p. 261. 157. Ibid., p. 259. 158. Bassiouni, “Egypt’s Unfinished Revolution,” p. 74. 159. Marroushi, “US Expert.” 160. Marshall and Stacher, “Egypt’s Generals & Transnational Capital,” p. 13. 161. Barany, “The Role of the Military,” p. 32. 162. Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution. 163. Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats,” p. 264. 164. Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution, pp. 64–65. 165. Interview with a retired Egyptian major general, recounted in Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats,” p. 266. 166. Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution, p. 76. 167. “2010 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, 14th Ed.,” USAID, November 2011, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files /documents/1863/2010complete_document.pdf. 168. International Republican Institute, “Kyrgyzstan National Public Opinion Poll May 11–25, 2010.” 169. “2010 NGO Sustainability Index.” 170. President Almazbek Atambayev, quoted in Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Kyrgyzstan, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/kyrgyzstan/. 171. Hanks, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 178. 172. Ibid., p. 185, footnote 36. 173. “Kyrgyzstan: An Uncertain Trajectory,” International Crisis Group, Europe and Central Asia, Briefing No. 76, September 30, 2015, https://www.crisisgroup .org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/kyrgyzstan/kyrgyzstan-uncertain-trajectory. 174. Hanks, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan,” pp. 184–185. 175. Melvin and Umaraliev, “New Social Media and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 14. 176. Ibid., p. 15. 177. Hanks, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan,” p. 186. 178. Huskey and Iskakova, “The Barriers to Intra-opposition Cooperation,” p. 242. 179. Tynan, “Tracing Political Circles in Kyrgyzstan.” 180. Huskey and Iskakova, “The Barriers to Intra-opposition Cooperation,” p. 239. 181. Radnitz, “A Horse of a Different Color,” p. 316. 182. Hale, Patronal Politics, pp. 426–427. 183. Tynan, “Tracing Political Circles in Kyrgyzstan.” 184. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016: Egypt, 2016, https://freedom house.org/report/freedom-world/2016/egypt. 185. Zayan, “Egypt Set for Mass Rally Against Military Rule.” 186. Cambanis, “Now What?” 187. Lutz, “The Role of Social Media in Egypt’s 2012 Presidential Election.” 188. Cambanis, “Now What?” 189. Campbell, “I Tapped, Mubarak Toppled.” 190. Wan, “In Egypt, One Vision Splinters into Many.” 191. “April 6’s Future in Question on Its Third Anniversary,” Daily News Egypt, April 7, 2011, https://ww.dailynewssegypt.com/2011/04/07/april-6s-future-in-question -on-its-third-anniversary/. 192. Hammer, “How Egypt’s Activists Became ‘Generation Jail.’” 193. Ibid. 194. Wan, “In Egypt, One Vision Splinters into Many.” 195. Ibid.

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196. MacFarquhar, “After Revolt, Egyptians Try to Shape New Politics.” 197. Bohn, “Egyptian Activists Try to Bridge Digital Divide.” 198. Quoted in Khamis and Vaughn, “‘We Are All Khaled Said,’” p. 155. 199. “A Declining Force.” 200. Khamis and Vaughn, “‘We Are All Khaled Said,’” p. 155. 201. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring, p. 190. 202. Trager, Arab Fall, p. 178. 203. Freelon, Lynch, and Aday, “How Social Media Undermined Egypt’s Democratic Transition.” 204. Ibid. 205. Quoted in Hammer, “How Egypt’s Activists Became ‘Generation Jail.’” 206. Quoted in Van Langendonck, “In Egypt, Lonely Voices Warn of Too Much Love for the Military.” 207. Ibid. 208. Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution, p. 143, footnote 21. 209. Abdalla, “Youth Movements in the Egyptian Transformation,” p. 50. 210. “Egypt: Consolidating Repression Under Sisi,” Human Rights Watch, January 12, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/egypt-consolidating-repression-under -al-sisi. 211. Hammer, “How Egypt’s Activists Became ‘Generation Jail.’” 212. Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak,” p. 516. 213. Ibid., p. 524. 214. Ibid., p. 526. 215. Marshall and Stacher, “Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital,” p. 12. 216. Marroushi, “US Expert.” 217. Marshall and Stacher, “Egypt’s Generals & Transnational Capital,” p. 14. 218. Brown, “Tracking Down the ‘Arab Spring,’” p. 46. 219. “HRW Accuses Egypt Military of Silencing Critics,” Daily News Egypt, August 18, 2011, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20110817/ARTICLE/308179818/1016. 220. Chams El-Dine, “Egypt,” pp. 195–196. 221. Cambanis, “Now What?” 222. Bou Nassif, “Patterns of Civil-Military Relations,” pp. 139–140. 223. Brown, “Tracking Down the ‘Arab Spring,’” p. 47. 224. Ibid., p. 48. 225. Ibid., p. 52. 226. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratization in Africa, p. 215. 227. Chams El-Dine, “Egypt,” p. 199. 228. Alexander and Bassiouny, Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice, p. 206. 229. Ibid., p. 207. 230. “Egypt: World Bank Data,” World Bank, n.d., http://data.worldbank.org /country/egypt-arab-rep?view=chart. 231. Israel is a democratic state but, given the regional tensions, is unlikely to be seen as a positive democratic example. 232. Freyburg and Richter, “Local Actors in the Driver’s Seat,” p. 503. 233. “Kyrgyzstan: World Bank Data,” World Bank, n.d., http://data.worldbank .org/country. 234. One sign of Nazarbayev’s success is his persistent high levels of support among Kazakhstanis. For example, in 2011, 75 percent of those polled supported his reelection bid. International Republican Institute, “Kazakhstan National Opinion Poll,” February 2011, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Full%20English%20Version %20Kazakhstan%20IRI%20Poll%20Feb%202011.pdf.

6 From Protest to Democratization: The Case of Tunisia After gaining independence from France in 1956, Tunisia was ruled by dictators, first Habib Bourguiba and then Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. In 2010, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report ranked Tunisia as 7 on political rights, where 7 is the most repressive. Human rights organizations estimated that the Tunisian government had imprisoned more than 2,000 political prisoners, many of them charged with little or no evidence of engaging in terrorist acts.1 Bourguiba and Ben Ali both followed programs of economic modernization and secularization in Tunisia. There were some macroeconomic improvements under Ben Ali, as growth averaged approximately 5 percent between 1996 and 2005, poverty rates fell, and literacy rates rose by 30 percent.2 However, these macroeconomic indicators miss some major economic problems such as unemployment rates of 20–30 percent for university graduates, government neglect of rural areas, and high rates of corruption.3 Frustration with the lack of economic opportunity and the corrupt practices of Ben Ali and his family contributed to the outbreak of protests against the government in December 2010. The protests forced President Ben Ali to flee to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011. Despite significant challenges, Tunisia has been the most successful case of democratic transition among the Arab uprising cases. It is the only case that avoided civil war and saw its measures of freedom significantly improve, as Freedom House now rates Tunisia as free. As theorized, information communication technology (ICT) helped Tunisian 209

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activists mobilize and organize protests against the authoritarian government of Ben Ali. This new technology worked in synergy with “traditional” civil society organizations, especially the labor unions, to spread and sustain the protests. ICT played a valuable role in helping to mobilize Tunisians and overthrow Ben Ali, but the transition to democracy was the result of other factors. Tunisia’s diverse and influential civil society organizations, including the main labor union and bar association, provided an essential role in pressuring the transitional government to remove remnants of the Ben Ali regime and in helping the country survive serious political crises. In addition, a history of civilian control over the military and a military culture supportive of republicanism prevented a return to authoritarian rule. The case of Tunisia demonstrates how activists can use ICT to overthrow dictators, and how ICT has a limited effect on democratization. I begin the chapter by providing an overview of the overthrow of Ben Ali, focusing on the role of ICT in challenging the government’s monopoly of information and aiding the mobilization of mass protests. Next, I demonstrate how the combined use of ICT and the active support of civil society explains why the protests succeeded in overthrowing the regime of Ben Ali. Then, I explain why ICT had a limited role in the development of democracy postoverthrow and how, in contrast, existing civil society organizations were essential. In the conclusion, I discuss in greater detail how Tunisia compares with the other Arab Spring case in this book, Egypt, and the lessons that the events in Tunisia can teach us about the role of ICT in regime overthrow and democratization. A series of remarkable and unexpected events led to the downfall of Ben Ali. On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated in the interior city of Sidi Bouzid. Although there are some disputes about why Bouazizi committed suicide, a common narrative is that his suicide was an act of desperation rooted in the lack of economic opportunity, especially outside of the major coastal cities. After Bouazizi’s self-immolation, protests began in Sidi Bouzid. The protesters called for social justice and dignity, by which they meant the equal distribution of wealth and honorable employment.4 Local police responded to the protests with violence, injuring and killing protesters. By the end of December, protests had spread to multiple cities around Tunisia. As the demonstrations continued, the protesters also began to advocate for “democracy” and “liberty.”5 The situation further escalated in early Jan-

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uary 2011, when the Tunisian Bar Association (Ordre national des avocats) announced a general strike on January 6. A major turning point came during January 9–12, when the police killed dozens of protesters in the cities of Kasserine and Thala. The violence in Kasserine and Thala angered many Tunisians and led more people to participate in the protests. Overall, the post–Ben Ali government estimated that over 300 people were killed and more than 700 wounded during the weeks of protest.6 In an attempt to control the situation, on January 13 Ben Ali promised major reforms and investigations into the deaths of protesters. He also announced that he would not seek reelection in 2014. However, the concessions failed to end the protests as tens of thousands of Tunisians filled Avenue Bourguiba, the main street in the capital city of Tunis, on January 14. By the evening of January 14, Ben Ali and his family had fled Tunisia, eventually ending up in exile in Saudi Arabia.7 Despite the initial appearance that protests against Ben Ali developed overnight, there are two main longer-term causes for the protests. First, the lack of economic opportunity contributed to widespread grievances against the regime. Second, there was intense anger about the blatant corruption of Ben Ali and his family. These causes are similar to the reasons for protests in Russia, Armenia, Moldova, Egypt, and Kyrgyzstan, suggesting that economic hardship and anger about corruption are common sources of grievances against autocratic governments in both the post-Soviet and Middle East and North Africa regions. In addition, a series of earlier protests in the three years prior to Ben Ali’s downfall laid the groundwork for the larger protests of 2010–2011. In 2010, the macroeconomic data on Tunisia was generally positive. The growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) was 3.5 percent, the gross national income per capita was $4,130, foreign direct investment (FDI) was $1.3 billion, and inflation was low.8 However, the good macroeconomic statistics hid the growing economic problems, especially the high youth unemployment and the economic distress outside the coastal cities. The official unemployment rate was 14.7 percent, but this did not account for the significant levels of underemployment and the much higher levels of unemployment in the rural areas.9 In the central regions of Kasserine and Gafsa, where the protests against Ben Ali began, the unemployment rate averaged 22 percent, with some areas over 30 percent.10 The unemployment especially affected the youth as unemployment rates for even university graduates was over 20 percent.11 The government’s poverty statistics also underreported the levels of poverty. A survey by the World Food Programme three months after Ben Ali lost power found much higher levels of food insecurity than expected, with

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most Tunisians unable to afford fish or red meat.12 The failure of the Ben Ali regime to address the economic problems, especially the marginalization of the central and southern regions, eroded its legitimacy for many Tunisians.13 Therefore, regional economic disparity, high levels of unemployment, and widespread poverty contributed to growing frustration and anger against Ben Ali. The increased economic hardship of many Tunisians coincided with a growing awareness of the extensive corruption of the Ben Ali family. The privatization of state-owned enterprises, begun in the 1990s, offered multiple opportunities for corruption. For example, Ben Ali’s son-in-law, Marouane Mabrouk, was able to purchase the company controlling all of the distribution of Mercedes and Fiat cars in Tunisia far below market value.14 The leak of US State Department cables (WikiLeaks) from US ambassador Robert Godec provided independent verification of the widespread corruption. In a July 2009 cable, Ambassador Godec documented the luxurious and lavish lifestyle of members of the Ben Ali family through his experience of having dinner at the home of Ben Ali’s daughter and son-in-law.15 The ambassador’s cable concludes with the following assessment: “The opulence with which El Materi and Nesrine live and their behavior make clear why they and other members of Ben Ali’s family are disliked and even hated by some Tunisians. The excesses of the Ben Ali family are growing.”16 Another US State Department cable noted that Tunisians believed Tunisia had become a “state run by the mafia [Ben Ali’s family].”17 Although there were rumors of the corruption of the Ben Ali family prior to the release of the WikiLeaks documents, the official US government cables provided independent verification. As Middle East and North Africa (MENA) expert Mary-Jane Deeb commented at the time, “The WikiLeaks revelations confirmed that people surrounding President Ben Ali were corrupt and spent a lot of money . . . It was happening at a time when ordinary Tunisians were struggling to find jobs and feed their families. It’s a bit of Marie Antoinette-like disconnect between the people and the top.”18 The release of the documents occurred just weeks before protests began in Sidi Bouzid, suggesting they may have influenced Tunisians’ decisions to protest. Overall, by 2010 there was a sense that corruption had worsened in Tunisia, which influenced the decisions of many middle-class Tunisians to no longer support the regime.19 The WikiLeaks information, disseminated by a combination of old and new media, contributed to Ben Ali’s loss of legitimacy. The growing anger and frustration with the political and economic situation in Tunisia was visible in a series of protests prior to the 2010–2011 overthrow of Ben Ali. Although these protests received little attention out-

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side of Tunisia, they did provide prior experience with planning and organizing protests. The most significant protest was in Gafsa in 2008. The main employer in the region was the Gafsa Phosphate Company (Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa, CPG). In January 2008 CPG announced a list of new hires, which clearly showed that people had obtained employment based on their connections, not merit. Because of years of mismanagement and economic struggles, by 2008 the Gafsa region had over 30 percent unemployment and deteriorating public services. The combination of persistent high unemployment and corrupt hiring practices triggered five months of protest in Gafsa and nearby Redayef. Although the uprising remained local, it was sustained and supported by a wide range of people as wives of miners, local merchants, the unemployed, workers, civil servants, and students all participated in the protests.20 The government blocked media coverage of the protests; especially, the police’s violent response. The protests ended in June when government security forces killed two protesters and arrested hundreds of demonstrators.21 The 2010–2011 protests that led to Ben Ali’s downfall combined the protests driven by economic frustration in the interior (e.g., Gafsa) with anger at the continued authoritarianism of the Ben Ali regime. As Ayeb Habib argues, “While the marginalized classes protested with demands for employment, food and an end to marginalization and exclusion, the middle classes fought tooth and nail for individual liberties, for political rights of expression, organization and participation, for the consolidation or affirmation of their new rights, especially for women, and for an improvement in incomes and standards of living.”22 This cross-class coalition and overall broad base of support for the protests in 2010–2011 distinguished them from the earlier movements. In addition, the spread of new technology, especially Facebook and cell phone video, increased the ability of Tunisians to challenge the regime. ICT helped Tunisians spread critical information about the Ben Ali regime, facilitated the dissemination of information once the protests began, and assisted activists in organizing protests throughout the country. The use of ICT by activists in 2010–2011 built on a decade of growing internet use and cyberactivism.

The Role of ICT in the Government Overthrow

Mechanism 1: Value of Alternative Sources of Information ICT contributed to efforts to undermine the government’s information monopoly and disseminate information critical of Ben Ali and his family. In 2010 Freedom House noted that “Tunisia has one of the worst media

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environments in the Arab world,” and Reporters Without Borders included Ben Ali on its list of the world’s worst press freedom predators.23 The repeated attacks on independent journalists and the government efforts to censor the media justify Freedom House’s and Reporters Without Borders’s negative evaluations. Under Tunisian law, offensive statements about the president could result in a five-year prison sentence, and anything ruled defamation of government institutions or members of parliament could end in a three-year prison sentence.24 Freedom House noted in 2010 that “Tunisian journalists are detained, physically assaulted, fired from their jobs, prevented from leaving the country, and subjected to seemingly arbitrary police surveillance.”25 Along with direct attacks on journalists, the government engaged in high levels of censorship. Multiple sources document how government officials called editors to censor material and to directly control news coverage.26 Overall, journalists, editors, news directors, and publishers were under regular and intense pressure to not publish anything critical of Ben Ali or the government. The development of the internet and its increased usage provided opportunities for Tunisians to find alternative information about the government. By 2009 Tunisia had an internet penetration rate of 34 percent, and approximately 20 percent of Tunisians were on Facebook.27 Many Tunisians without internet service at home were able to access the internet through public cafés (Publinet), of which there were 240 by 2010, or at universities and schools.28 There also were over 10.7 million mobile phone subscriptions, out of a population of 10.5 million, by 2010.29 However, because of the high cost, most did not have access to the internet on their mobile phones. Mohamed Zayani documents the development of cyberactivism in Tunisia. As Zayani notes, over a decade before Ben Ali’s overthrow, websites such as TUNeZINE were places for online discussions about sociopolitical issues in Tunisia, including criticism of Ben Ali’s government.30 Although TUNeZINE ended after the death of its founder, other websites and blogs followed. Started in 2004, Nawaat, a collective blog, posted information critical about the Tunisian government, including copies of the leaked US State Department documents about the corruption of the Ben Ali family. Many Tunisians learned about the documents either through Nawaat’s posts or the Al Jazeera television special about the documents. Nawaat was also the site of the first “international Web campaign against Ben Ali,” which occurred around the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) conference in Tunis in 2005. Activists used the hosting of the conference to draw international attention to the high level of internet censorship in Tunisia. The gov-

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ernment blocked access to Nawaat in Tunisia, but the internet campaign—involving video clips about the lack of freedom of speech, photos of people holding signs saying “yezzi fock” (“enough is enough”), and support from other bloggers—gained international media attention.31 Nawaat’s campaign did not reduce censorship in Tunisia, but it was an important first attempt to internationally publicize the regime’s abuses. The rise of blogging provided new opportunities for Tunisians to engage in discussions and learn about different viewpoints. The majority of blogs did not engage in dissident behavior. However, even blogs that did not address controversial subjects helped to empower Tunisian bloggers because, for the first time in authoritarian Tunisia, their views mattered and gained attention.32 Despite growing access to the internet, the level of internet freedom in Tunisia prior to 2011 was low. The Tunisian government engaged in a variety of strategies to control the internet, primarily filtering and censoring of content. The government required internet service providers to prevent access to “undesirable” content, including criticism of the government, discussions about human rights, and any tools that could be used to circumvent government filters.33 Security officials monitored internet cafés and all visitors to the cafés had to show their identification cards to use a computer. The government also had the legal right to examine the content of any email message.34 In terms of censorship, the government deleted blog entries critical of the government or blogs that discussed sensitive issues such as political corruption. A Tunisian cyberactivist recounted how “everything was censored. Any website having the words human or rights in it would be blocked . . . all video sharing platforms were shut down. If you had more than 20 visitors on your blog, no matter what the subject—even if you were blogging on cooking recipes—it would be blocked automatically.”35 In addition to filtering and censoring content, the government arrested and tortured bloggers, making Tunisia one of the worst places in the world to be a blogger.36 For example, the editor of the online news site Kalima repeatedly suffered physical intimidation, “smear campaigns,” and government censorship of the website.37 Along with attacking bloggers and online journalists, the government also launched technical attacks on specific websites such as the 2008 attack on Kalima that deleted all content on the site.38 Partially in response to increased government censorship of the internet, Tunisian bloggers and others began to be more deliberately engaged in anticensorship actions and other forms of resistance by early 2010. The case of blogger Fatima Arabicca is a well-known example of bloggers

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forcing a change in government behavior. On November 2, 2009, the government wrongly arrested Fatima, believing that she was associated with a critical cartoonist known as -Z-. The arrest of a nondissident blogger mobilized other bloggers, who launched an internet campaign for her release. The campaign involved a Facebook page, logos, spreading the word via other blogs, and outreach to the international media. Al Jazeera, and even the Los Angeles Times, covered the story. Under pressure from a variety of sources, the government released Fatima five days later. The story of Fatima both frightened other bloggers and empowered them. On the one hand, it demonstrated that the government continued repressive power; however, it also illustrated how, through collective action and international connections, they could enact change.39 In addition to the attacks on bloggers, starting in 2010 Tunisians saw with greater frequency the “Error 404 not found” message, signaling that the Tunisian Agency of the Internet had blocked the website. The visible internet censorship annoyed and frustrated younger Tunisians, especially in the cities where access to the internet was more common.40 As the government censored and arrested bloggers, activity moved to Facebook, which was harder for the government to restrict as the government was unable to block specific pages and did not have access to closed groups.41 For example, two Facebook pages, “Sayyib Saleh” and “Nhar ‘Ala ‘Ammar,” formed to organize online activities and street demonstrations against censorship. The Sayyib Saleh Facebook group asked Tunisians to post photographs protesting against censorship.42 Once the protests began in December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, activists were able to use social media and cell phones to spread information about the protests and mobilize the population. Almost immediately after protests started, “activists from Sidi Bouzid created a closed Facebook group to share videos and information about events happening in their region. Two large Facebook pages with over 300,000 members (‘Ma Tunisie’ and ‘Tunisia_Tunisie’) developed relations with activists in Sidi Bouzid and became an important avenue for sharing information.”43 By 2010, cell phones and internet access had spread to more Tunisians outside of the large cities. The launch in early 2010 of the cell phone company Elissa, which offered cheap SIM cards, helped 100,000s of young Tunisians obtain a cell phone.44 The widespread presence of cell phones enabled ordinary Tunisians to film protests and record police brutality. Furthermore, the availability of cell phone cameras corresponded with the development of new technology that made it easy to post videos on Facebook and YouTube. Therefore, spreading information about events did not require special technical knowledge or capabilities.45

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Tunisian accounts from that period discuss how the Tunisian television news showed only “propaganda and perpetual lies” and that it did not discuss the government’s killing of peaceful protesters.46 The censored media ignored the protests in Sidi Bouzid; therefore, social media and YouTube were important sources of information about the protests.47 Bloggers such as Slim Amamou and “A Tunisian Girl” helped to spread news of the protests and police brutality. Of the Tunisians with internet access, 94 percent of them told pollsters that they used social media to learn about the protests.48 As the protests moved to Tunis and other cities, people found social media helpful for sharing information. In the month prior to Ben Ali stepping down, 60.5 percent of surveyed Tunisian users of Facebook reported discussing the political situation online, and 60.8 percent reported searching online for information about protests.49 The greater availability of cell phones and internet access helped to differentiate the 2008 Gafsa protests from the 2010 protests. In 2008, there was little information about the protests online; 2010 was radically different. As a Tunisian blogger notes, “The difference between Gafsa 2008 and Sidi Bouzid 2010 is as simple as everyone had a smartphone. So it was impossible . . . I mean you can block journalists, that’s very easy to do, even in Sidi Bouzid the regime managed to do so. But the difference is that everyone can shoot a video from his smartphone, and upload it directly to the Internet, and then the information is public.”50 According to Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle, “Everyone with a cellphone and, even better, any 3G subscriber could become an activist or citizen journalist.”51 Furthermore, the availability of cell phones and cheap SMSing meant that Tunisians could spread information about events to friends and relatives across the country.52 The combination of new forms of ICT (social media, internet access, cell phone cameras) with satellite television, especially Al Jazeera, was essential for spreading news of the protests in Sidi Bouzid and other regional cities. During the first ten days of protests, the main source of information was the internet, especially Facebook and Al Jazeera, which often used videos filmed by protesters. Despite lacking a local correspondent in Tunisia, Al Jazeera regularly covered the protests in Tunisia on its primetime show. Unable to send journalists, Al Jazeera relied on citizen journalists posting videos online during the first weeks of protest. This coverage, which many Tunisians had access to via satellite television, also helped to increase awareness of the antigovernment movement. The continued censorship and silence by the state media contrasted significantly with the information available online and on Al Jazeera, and this deliberate silence contributed to growing anger at the regime.53

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Mechanism 2: Aid for Democratic Diffusion The protests in Tunisia were the first of the Arab Spring; therefore, there was no demonstration effect for the Tunisians. In addition, promoting democracy in North Africa had not been a priority for either the United States or the European Union (EU). Western governments generally gave priority to maintaining stable energy supplies and countering Islamist radicalism over promoting democracy and human rights in the region.54 Unlike the situation of postcommunist states, where the United States and the EU strongly supported democratization, the United States continued to support Arab authoritarian leaders even after the end of the Cold War.55 However, Tunisian activists did use new technology to help build relationships with other democracy activists around the world. Nawaat was connected with Global Voices, the “grassroots citizen journalism network that spans the globe.”56 Through Global Voices, Nawaat’s founders and contributors were able to develop relationships with journalists and activists from around the world. In interviews, members of Nawaat said that the relationship with Global Voices was what kept them going when struggling against the repression of the Ben Ali regime.57 ICT was helpful for building international networks of support for prodemocracy activists in Tunisia. Furthermore, given the high levels of government censorship of traditional media, ICT was also one of the few areas in which Tunisians had exposure to ideas about democracy and human rights. Mechanism 3: A Tool of Mobilization and Organization Activists used ICT to help mobilize people and organize antigovernment activity. Prior to December 2010–January 2011, activists had first tried to use Facebook and Twitter to organize the Tunisia in White protest of May 22, 2010. The planned protest involved a “white-clad flash mob sipping coffee in one of the many cafes on Avenue Habib Bourguiba” in Tunis and a more “traditional” peaceful protest in front of the Ministry of Technology.58 Security forces prevented the protest from occurring by arresting two of the organizers and dispersing anyone who was dressed in white from the cafés.59 Despite its failure, using social media to organize the Tunisia in White event provided important practice for organizing antigovernment actions. The combination of videos, photos, and Facebook was also a powerful way to motivate people to take action. Bouazizi’s self-immolation in the town of Sidi Bouzid was the not the first self-immolation in Tunisia, and it is unlikely that it would have triggered any further protests without the combination of new and old technology. As a Tunisian youth activist said, images of police brutality on Facebook forced apolitical peo-

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ple to see the horrible acts that the government was taking against fellow citizens: “You watch on Facebook, people, ordinary people, and thanks to cell phones, people would film . . . and share easily. They would say ‘look at police brutality,’ look you are living under dictatorship,’ and ‘Look you are living in a police state!’”60 Activists believed that social media helped Tunisians realize their shared grievances and to overcome the collective action problem. According to Mohamed A. El-Khawas, “Bouazizi’s act of self-immolation united people in his hometown and gave them the courage to protest against widespread unemployment.”61 Nada Maalmi, a Tunisian student, argued that the videos, photos, and information shared on Facebook and other social networking sites “showed Tunisian individuals that they were not alone—that other people cared about their revolution and supported it. These postings included people criticizing the government and its policies. . . . The impression of unity given by this virtual space strengthened the unity in the streets.”62 The value of Facebook as a mobilization tool in Tunisia, as opposed to other aspects of the internet, was that it was more popular than blogs or Twitter and Tunisians would “unintentionally” be exposed to the protests through posts on the Facebook pages of their friends. Many began their activism against Ben Ali with sharing videos and messages opposing government repression on Facebook, especially after the police killed protesters in Kasserine and Thala.63 The use of social media by Tunisians helped to erode Ben Ali’s legitimacy and mobilize people. Activists also used the internet, especially Facebook, to organize protests. One protester noted that “the Internet, especially the social networks, made it possible for activists to organize and mobilize with surprising speed. The activists were calling for general mobilization, a show of strength and defiance.”64 Analysis by Anita Breuer and Jacob Groshek determined that, in Tunisia, social media was a “central resource for the mobilization of protest.”65 For example, on January 14 there were two demonstrations in Tunis, one organized by the main labor union and the other one organized via Facebook.66 Social media also encouraged people to protest by showing examples of other Tunisians asserting their rights and speaking out against the regime. As Zayani notes, “The most empowering implication of the increase in the use of social media by ordinary people was not simply the ability to contribute and share user-generated content during critical times but the proclivity to turn witnesses into activists.”67

Mechanism 4: Spreading the Word Around the World ICT helped Tunisians to spread information about the protests not only within the country, but also throughout the world. As noted above, the

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majority of Al Jazeera coverage about the protests depended on citizen journalists’ cell phone videos and photos. The Tunisians running the blog Nawaat played an important role in collecting and disseminating the videos and information being posted by Tunisians.68 One of the activists writing for Nawaat stated how “during the revolution we had set up a team of six and I was the only one inside Tunisia. This Sidi Bouzid section on the blog was aggregating all the photos, videos and pieces of articles.”69 Tunisians living abroad aided activists in Tunisia by posting videos about the protests to YouTube and other online platforms hoping to gain attention from the international media. A member of a team running a Facebook page during the protests recounted how their team of ten to fifteen people, who had connections all across Tunisia, collected videos sent privately via Facebook and disseminated them to journalists, often also translating posts and tweets into English and French.70 France24 news and Al Jazeera’s coverage of the protests helped to spread information in Tunisia and also throughout the region, contributing to the outbreak of protests in Egypt a few weeks later. Despite the efforts to gain international attention, Western governments were slow to respond and applied little pressure on Ben Ali to resign. Also, little media attention was given to the protests in the United States until the second week of January, weeks after the protests had started. Furthermore, the government of France publicly and actively supported Ben Ali. French foreign minister Michele AlliotMarie vacationed in Tunisia over the Christmas holiday and ignored the ongoing protests. Furthermore, in January, she offered to send French police to help Ben Ali’s government restore calm.71 Although US president Barack Obama mentioned Tunisia in his State of Union address, this was after Ben Ali had already fled into exile. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is unlikely that international factors influenced the decisionmaking of elites or the military in Tunisia. The December 2010–January 2011 protests succeeded in overthrowing the regime because of the combined role of ICT and civil society organizations in spreading, organizing, and sustaining antigovernment protests. In addition, by January 2011, Ben Ali had lost popular and elite support, including the essential support of the military. With limited coercive capacity and legitimacy, Ben Ali was forced to step down. As noted above, the international environment had little influence on events in Tunisia. Moreover, it is well documented that there is an unfa-

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vorable international environment for democratization in the Middle East and North Africa.72 Tunisia had (and has) no immediate democratic neighbors (see Table 6.1). Tunisia did have economic and cultural linkages with France, which may have provided exposure to democratic ideas and norms. Although this may have helped encourage democracy among the population, there is no evidence it had any influence on Ben Ali or his allies. Tunisians overcame an unfavorable international and regional environment to establish democracy.

The Role of Civil Society The combination of the new role of social media and traditional methods of mobilization by civil society organizations was a significant reason why the protests spread in size and location. Although the Ben Ali regime had severely restricted civil society, two organizations had remained at least partially independent from the regime and played an important role in helping to mobilize protests: the Tunisian General Labor Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, UGTT), a federation of multiple trade unions, and the Tunisian Bar Association. The UGTT, founded in 1946, had a complicated relationship with the government. At times the UGTT cooperated with the regime, and at other times it was a major source of resistance. From its founding the UGTT has been political, as it played a “decisive role in the national struggle” for independence.73 Initially, the UGTT worked closely with Bourguiba and his Neo-Destour nationalist political party. However, by the mid1970s the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions led to increased numbers of strikes and confrontations with the regime. The UGTT’s general strike on January 26, 1978, was violently suppressed by the government, killing hundreds of protesters.74 This event weakened the UGTT for years, but it also helped to erode the legitimacy of the Bourguiba regime.75 Under more cooperative and progovernment leadership, the UGTT generally avoided strikes and protests after this incident. Table 6.1 Tunisia’s Neighbors Country

Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco

Freedom in the World 2010 Civil Liberties Score 5 5 7 4

Freedom in the World 2010 Political Rights Score 6 6 7 5

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The official position of cooperation with the Ben Ali regime hid the more complex dynamics within the UGTT. There were significant differences among the local and regional branches of the UGTT along with differences among the various unions that were members of the UGTT. Therefore, when protests began in December 2010, the national leadership remained quiet, but the local and regional UGTT members actively supported the protests. As Abdellatif Hamrouni, a member of the UGTT General Assembly noted, “The union activists on the ground were not awaiting orders from above. No one met in union halls to decide whether to support the revolution or not. The solidarity of the unionists with the revolution was spontaneous.”76 Various local branches of the UGTT unions in Sidi Bouzid (e.g., health workers union, postal workers union) helped organize days and weeks of protests against the government.77 The teachers’ union organized a special Committee of the Marginalized to help coordinate protests. The trade unionists were strategic in their approach to demonstrations. For example, in an interview, Sami al-Tahiri, secretary-general of the National Secondary School Teachers’ Union, stated that the trade unionists used their networks at the regional level to spread the protests “to relieve pressure. When we saw that the crackdown was focused on Sidi Bouzid and that many of the security forces were coming from Tunis to reinforce them, we decided to diversify locations and organise protests in other regions.”78 The union also was important for framing Bouazizi’s actions not as suicide, but “rather to consider it a political assassination. Bouazizi should be seen as a victim of the regime.”79 While the local and regional offices of UGTT organized protests and mobilized their members, the national leadership of UGTT remained ambivalent. However, as the protests spread and strengthened, the leadership’s “wait and see” approach became increasingly problematic.80 Realizing that the UGTT’s lack of involvement, at least at the national level, in the 2008 protests in Gafsa was a mistake that caused them to lose significant legitimacy in the eyes of many of its rank and file, the leadership eventually decided to support the 2011 protests.81 On January 11, the National Administrative Council of the UGTT officially announced that regional trade unions had the right to participate in the protests, and that all citizens have the right “to express their active solidarity through peaceful protests, and in coordination with the National Executive Office.”82 The UGTT organized a large strike and protest in Sfax, Tunisia’s second-largest city, on January 12. The strike had strong support among workers and the local business community because of widespread anger about the corruption of Ben Ali’s family, which had contributed to

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the economic marginalization of Sfax.83 Two days later the UGTT called for a general strike in Tunis, demonstrating the cross-regional, cross-class support for the downfall of the regime. By the end of that day, Ben Ali had fled the country. The UGTT’s support in 2010–2011 was important for the success of the protests. The other major civil society organization that helped to mobilize protests against Ben Ali was the Tunisian Bar Association. Despite efforts by the government to suppress the independence of the association, it continued to be a source of protest and resistance.84 After protests began in December 2010, the Tunisian Bar Association played an important role in helping to spread the protests beyond the labor unions. Among other actions, lawyers in the city of Kasserine were the first to engage in protests in support of the Sidi Bouzid demonstrators. The bar association also played a pivotal role in expanding the demonstrations by organizing protests on December 31 in Tunis, Sousse, Monastir, and Gafsa.85 On January 6, 2011, 95 percent of the lawyers went on strike. “The participation of the lawyers along with the labor unions demonstrated the cross-class and cross-regional support for the demonstrations, making it clear to Tunisian elites and the government of Ben Ali that there was widespread support for the downfall of the regime.”86 As Michelle Penner Angrist argues, “The nationwide geographical extension of dissent was strategically crucial to the revolution, as it prevented the regime’s coercive forces from containing the protests in a small area. Instead, the regime’s security forces were obliged to react to multiple widespread disturbances which surpassed their ability to repress the movement.”87 The reason why the 2010–2011 protests were widespread and longlasting was because of the combination of civil society activity and the availability of new technology such as cell phone videos and social media. The UGTT’s active participation, especially at the local and regional levels, helped to sustain and mobilize support for protests. UGTT’s regional and national networks combined with the use of social media to publicize the protests, and the government’s violent response enabled the protests to spread beyond the central interior region—an essential difference from the 2008 Gafsa demonstrations. As Angrist argues, the support of the Tunisian Bar Association and the internet bloggers broadened the movement “from ‘just’ a labor movement to include young members of the middle class and the elite, bringing citizens out in such numbers as to raise internal doubts within the regime as to its ability to counter the mobilization.”88 The participation of civil society organizations like the UGTT and Tunisian Bar Association worked in synergy with new methods of organizing protests via social media.

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The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Ben Ali Regime Compared to Akayev and Bakiyev in Kyrgyzstan, Ben Ali had significant coercive capacity. Ben Ali had successfully relied on 80,000 internal security forces to repress opposition for decades. However, the geographic disbursement, size, and duration of the protests stretched the capacity of the security forces and, by January 2011, Ben Ali needed the military’s assistance to help quell the protests. Unfortunately for Ben Ali, the military chose to not support him. In addition, as noted above, the widespread corruption of Ben Ali and his family had eroded his legitimacy as a ruler. Unlike Vladimir Putin, Ben Ali was not popular and, unlike Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ben Ali had no ideology to draw on as justification for his continued rule. Therefore, by 2011 Ben Ali was dependent on coercion to stay in power and, when that failed, he had nothing left to maintain his rule. The peaceful nature, large size, and widespread popular support for the protests all contributed to the military’s decision to not support Ben Ali. However, the decision of the Tunisian military to no longer support Ben Ali in mid-January 2011 was also a result of the nature of civilmilitary relations in Tunisia. Unlike the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military was underfunded, small, and had no personal connections with the regime. In their study of military responses to mass protest, Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer found that the military is more likely to side with the demonstrators if the dictator has failed to stack the military with loyalists.89 Both the first leader of independent Tunisia, Bourguiba, and Ben Ali did not have strong personal connections to the military and did not pursue a strategy of ensuring that the military leaders were personally loyal to them, such as by appointing family members as generals. In addition, concerned about possible military coup d’états, both leaders kept the military out of politics. For example, Bourguiba banned members of the military from joining NeoDestour, the ruling political party.90 Moreover, in an interview, ColonelMajor (ret.) Abdullah Ben Abdullah stated how “the military elite never played a political role and are not politically influential.”91 In contrast to Egypt, current and former military officers did not have positions of power or influence within the civilian government of Ben Ali.92 The Tunisian military also had no involvement in the Tunisian economy or benefits from corruption, a significant difference from the Egyptian military’s widespread business interests.93 The military was also relatively small in size, as it had only approximately 35,000 personnel. Because Ben Ali generally relied on the security forces for repression, the Tunisian military had little involvement in the

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regime’s human rights abuses. The lack of involvement in the repression meant that the military had less to fear from regime change as its leaders would be unlikely to face prosecution or punishment in a new democratic Tunisia.94 In addition, the Tunisian army was a conscript army mostly drawn from the economically depressed regions of Tunisia and they likely shared the grievances of the protesters.95 If the Tunisian military leadership had ordered soldiers to fire on peaceful Tunisian demonstrators, it is possible those orders would not have been followed. Therefore, the military leadership, unhappy with the corruption of Ben Ali, had no incentive to save him and no strong reasons to shoot peaceful demonstrators, especially as the protests clearly had significant support among the population. In his interviews with the Tunisian military, Hicham Bou Nassif noted that Tunisian military personnel “expressed pride in la spécificité tunisieene, the tradition of a republican military respectful of civilian rule in a region plagued with military interventionism.”96 Reflecting this view, the military generally remained bystanders throughout the crisis and did not intervene to protect protesters or to support Ben Ali. On January 10, 2011, Ali Seriati, head of the Presidential Guard, summoned various security officials to the presidential palace to coordinate a response to the protests. According to reports, it was at this meeting that the generals refused to participate.97 Army Chief of Staff General Rachid Ammar also ordered his soldiers not to fire on demonstrators “unless otherwise commanded.”98 On January 14, there also were multiple reports of members of different branches of the internal security forces defecting. For example, Colonel Samir Tarhouni of the Brigade Anti-Terrorisme (BAT), decided to arrest several members of the family of Ben Ali’s wife at the airport.99 Members of other security agencies, including the National Guard elite unit and the rapid intervention unit, soon joined Tarhouni at the airport. The rebellion of these elite units may have contributed to the decision of Ben Ali to leave the country with his family on January 14, as it increasingly became clear that the security of the president was no longer guaranteed.100 By January 14, it was apparent that the internal security forces had failed to repress the anti– Ben Ali movement, demonstrating the size, persistence, strength, and geographic diversity of the protesters. Initial reports about the events in Tunisia emphasized the role of the military. However, there is now some debate about whether or not the military “defected.” Alejandro Pachon argues that the Tunisian military generally remained loyal to the regime and followed civilian orders. Although there are conflicts within the empirical record and it is not clear how much the military supported the protesters, it is known that the Tunisian military did not fire on the protesters or act to prevent Ben Ali’s

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exile. Furthermore, once Ben Ali fled into exile, the military actively worked to restore law and order and prevented forces loyal to Ben Ali from overturning the new civilian government.101 Along with losing the support of the military, members of Ben Ali’s ruling party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique, RCD), also defected. The increased corruption of Ben Ali’s family had eroded his support among the elite, especially as “The Family’s” actions left many elites without access to power or patronage. “Mohamed Jegham, a former defense minister and ambassador to Italy, commented regarding Ben Ali’s treatment of the party, ‘RCD cadres no longer existed. We were treated at best like peons, at worst like lepers.’”102 Along with these developments, Ben Ali’s advanced age had raised concerns about succession and the future of the regime. As Henry E. Hale argues, patronal presidential systems, which Tunisia had some elements of, are more likely to experience elite defection when there are questions about the future rule of the president.103 The increased dissatisfaction within the RCD, and questions about the future, contributed to the failure of the RCD to successfully mobilize a single demonstration in support of Ben Ali. Moreover, on January 14, when the RCD attempted to organize a pro–Ben Ali rally in Tunis, the demonstrators defected and joined the UGTT anti–Ben Ali rally chanting that Ben Ali dégage (get out).104 In summary, the 2010–2011 demonstrations were successful in overthrowing Ben Ali because of the use of new technology to spread and organize protests, the ability of civil society organizations such as the UGTT to mobilize supporters, and the decision of the security forces and other elites to abandon Ben Ali. Although the decisions of the security forces were important and helped to reduce the amount of bloodshed, the action by tens of thousands of Tunisians was the most important causal factor. Without the persistent, widespread demonstrations, Ben Ali would have remained in power. Similar to Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, and Armenia, mass demonstrations resulted in regime breakdown in Tunisia. However, Tunisia is the only case in this book where both regime breakdown and democratization occurred. The democratic nature of Tunisia is evident in the fact that international observers viewed the October 2011 elections for the National Constituent Assembly (NCA)—tasked with writing a new constitution— and the October 2014 elections for the new parliament and president as fair and free. The new Tunisian constitution outlines support for political

Why Did Tunisia Democratize?

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and civil liberties, including the right to conscience which allows people to choose their own religion, an unusual legal protection of religious freedom in the MENA region. The government no longer restricts the internet and allows for freedom of speech. There is also a National Truth and Dignity Commission that is holding public hearings on the abuses of the Ben Ali regime. For all of these reasons, Freedom House ranks Tunisia as free.105 Tunisia still faces several serious challenges, especially continued corruption, security threats from terrorism, and economic distress (discussed further below). However, in contrast to every other case from the Arab Spring, it has established a democratic government. Why was Tunisia able to successfully establish democracy? Regime breakdown and democratization are two separate events and the causes of democratization may be different than those of regime breakdown. ICT had a more mixed effect on the establishment of democracy than on regime overthrow. Although activists continued to use ICT to help organize protests during the transition period, ICT was also a source of antidemocratic rhetoric and activity. Several factors that helped explain the overthrow of Ben Ali are also relevant here—especially the civilian control of the military and the continued involvement of civil society organizations in the political process. Compared to Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, and Armenia, Tunisia had a more favorable institutional legacy, as the country had not experienced military rule and had no legacy of communism. The lack of political intervention by the military contrasts significantly with the Egyptian military’s coup d’état in 2013. Tunisia also meets the preconditions of national unity, state control over the territory, and no unresolved conflicts. Moreover, Tunisia has the most vibrant and diverse civil society sector of all of the cases. The events between January 2011 and October 2014 highlight the valuable role of civil society organizations in preventing a return to authoritarianism in Tunisia. Unlike most digitally networked movements, existing Tunisian civil society organizations were able to make collective decisions and were led by clearly identified leaders.106 Therefore, they had the ability to negotiate with the political parties, which digitally networked movements failed to do in the other cases in this book. In addition, at several key moments, political elites made the decision to compromise instead of choosing more autocratic options. Both agency and structural-level variables are important for explaining Tunisia’s democratic outcome.

The Role of ICT in the Post-2011 Events and Political Process After the overthrow of Ben Ali, activists continued to use social media in a variety of ways, attempting to encourage political reform. For example, throughout February and March 2011, Tunisians used Facebook to

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organize protests demanding the removal of Ben Ali–era officials from the government. People also utilized social media to convey information, such as live tweeting the NCA’s meetings.107 Civil society organizations adopted digital technologies to continue to report on corruption post–Ben Ali, and women’s organizations used Facebook to organize protests in support of women’s rights. Despite a dramatic reduction in repression and censorship, the continuation of the Ben Ali laws and court system still resulted in several disturbing cases of bloggers and others being arrested and convicted for libel and criminal defamation in 2011 and 2012. After a strike by journalists in October 2012, the government enacted a new law that recognized “web journalists” as professional journalists with the same legal protections and ended prison sentences for defamation cases.108 All of the major political parties adopted the new technology as part of their election campaign strategies in 2011 and 2014. For example, the campaign for 2014 presidential candidate Moncef Marzouki was very active on social media, and he had many dedicated support pages on Facebook.109 A survey of Tunisian voters who were internet users found that social media was second to traditional media as the main source of information about the candidates and the election.110 The internet and social media, especially Facebook, helped voters learn about political party platforms and influenced voting decisions. However, since internet access was still limited in Tunisia, especially outside of the major cities, door-to-door campaigning and traditional media were the primary forms of outreach to voters.111 For example, the League of Tunisian Women Voters’ voter education campaigns and voter registration drives were primarily done by going door-to-door.112 Several influential cyberactivists and bloggers ran for office in the 2011 elections for the National Constituent Assembly, including one of the founders of Nawaat.113 However, the majority of these candidates did not win seats since the preexisting opposition parties, such as the Islamist party Ennahda, were the most successful in the elections. Online activists generally lacked the networks and organizational support to successfully compete in elections, especially in places where 56 percent of the population still had no internet access. Although ICT had a positive role in the overthrow of Ben Ali, people also have used social media to intensify the political divisions within Tunisia, worsening the political crises. During the 2011 election campaign, online defamation of female candidates for the NCA was a significant problem and contributed to some of their electoral defeats.114 Extremists, both Islamists and secularists, used social media to threaten

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opponents and to increase hatred. For example, the terrorist group Ansar al Sharia had a Facebook page through which it sought to recruit new members and communicated with its followers. A radical Salafist leader had over 100,000 followers on his Facebook page.115 After the February 6, 2013, assassination of Chokri Belaid, a leader of a secular-leftist opposition party, social media helped to fuel conspiracy theories and increase divisions. Many of those online blamed Ennahda for the assassination, despite the fact there was no evidence connecting the political party to the crime and Ennahda quickly condemned the attack. The following is an example of the type of dialogue found on Twitter and Facebook: “Bring out the Kalashnikovs, my brothers, Ennahdha has declared war.”

“Why accuse Ennahdha alone? And what about [Moncef] Marzouki (the Tunisian president), who meets with terrorists, isn’t he guilty?” “Ennahdha has opened the door of hell on Tunisia.”

“Undoubtedly it’s Ennahdha that assassinated him; gang of terrorists, gang of criminals, that’s why Tunisia can still not stand up.”116

On the other side of the political spectrum, an extremist Facebook page published a list of activists, journalists, bloggers, and politicians that were to be “slaughtered” because of their “secular” viewpoints.117 During this tumultuous period, social media helped fuel violent clashes between secular and religious groups.118 Moreover, the security situation in Tunisia is probably worse today because of ICT, as the internet and social media are prime recruitment tools for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Experts estimate at least 3,000 Tunisians have gone to fight in Syria, so ISIS recruitment is a security concern. Although ICT remained a helpful tool for political organization and mobilization, its influence on the development of democracy after the overthrow of Ben Ali was moderate, at best, and sometimes was negative. Similar to the protest period before the downfall of Ben Ali, Facebook remained a helpful tool for organizing protests and as a source of information. However, the resolution of the political crisis of 2013 (discussed below) required the involvement of civil society leaders and political elites willing to compromise, not just mass mobilization. Digitally networked protests lack the leadership and institutional

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capacity necessary for negotiating with other stakeholders about the nature of the new regime.

The Role of Civil Society After the removal of Ben Ali, persistent activity by Tunisian civil society organizations helped ensure three essential developments: (1) that members of the “old regime” did not have sole control over the transition; (2) that an independent commission oversaw the first elections; and (3) that the country survived the political crisis of 2013. Not only the strength of the civil society in Tunisia, but also its diversity, was important for democratization as it prevented any one faction of society from being able to dominate the transition. Tunisia had influential religious organizations, secular human rights organizations, labor unions, and employer’s associations involved in its transition. Tunisia’s relatively high level of economic development and large educated middle class partially explain its pluralistic civil society.119 Tunisia had a higher level of urbanization, GDP per capita, and industrialization than Egypt or Kyrgyzstan, all factors that help support the development of civil society, especially the strength of the labor unions, which played a valuable role in the transition process.120 The diversity of interests and the secular-religious divide in Tunisia contributed to the political turmoil between 2011 and 2014 but, because no one group had veto power, the major players eventually agreed to compromise and produce a new, democratic constitution and government. The period between when Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia and the October 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections was complicated and involved many important events. For clarity, in this subsection, I focus on only a few critical moments that illustrate the important role of civil society in the development of democracy in Tunisia. The first important development was that civil society, combined with sustained mobilization, forced the remaining members of the Ben Ali government to resign from the transitional government. When Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, following the requirements of the existing constitution, the parliamentary speaker Fouad Mebazza became president, and prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi formed a new government of national unity. However, Ben Ali ministers and RCD party members retained fifteen cabinet-level positions, including powerful positions such as the interior and defense ministers. The continued role of RCD officials and politicians who served in Ben Ali’s government provoked renewed protests and objections from civil society organizations such as the UGTT. Within days, opposition politicians appointed to ministerial

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positions resigned. As Mustapha ben Jaafar, secretary general of the opposition political party the Democratic Front for Labor and Freedom, stated on January 18, 2011: The procedure for announcing the new government functioned the same as it had under the old regime. The former Ben Ali government officials had not yet recognised by this time the realities of the revolution. They discussed the transition as if there was total continuity. An example of authoritarian manner of the prime minister, and the manner in which his cabinet was formed: it was his former government team who made all ministerial assignments, even who would serve as which minister. There were no negotiations on the distribution of appointments [among the parties] at any time.121

The subsequent government reshuffle by Prime Minster Ghannouchi failed to reduce concerns that the old regime would prevent the formation of a democratic system. Various civil society organizations and protesters came together to form the Front of January 14th to demand elections for an assembly to write a new constitution and the dissolution of Ben Ali institutions, including the RCD political party. Throughout the next month, there continued to be disputes on how to manage the transition. Frustrated with the continued influence of the RCD, civil society organizations formed a new coalition on February 11. The National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (Conseil National de protection de la revolution, CNPR) included the Front of January 14th, UGTT, Ennahda, Tunisian Bar Association, and human rights organizations. Activists and members of the National Council believed that the concessions offered by Prime Minister Ghannouchi, such as promising elections in July, were insufficient. Moncef Marzouki, a long-time opposition leader and founder of the Congress for the Republic (CPR), stated in February that “a president who is a product of the former regime, a prime minister had that job before the fall of Ben Ali, and some technocrats cannot be considered a national unity government.”122 While civil society organizations and leaders negotiated with the government, protests in the street continued. The police violently removed students protesting in Kasbah Square, located by government offices, on January 27. There also were protests in early February in Gafsa, Kef, and Kebili, where the police killed five people. The continued police violence intensified anger against the Ghannouchi government. Under pressure, Ghannouchi dissolved the RCD on February 21. However, for many Tunisians who had demonstrated for the removal of Ben Ali, this was seen as insufficient. Over 100,000 Tunisians protested

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in Kasbah Square on February 25. Similar to the protests against Ben Ali, the participants in the demonstration came from different regions and socioeconomic classes, including youth from Sidi Bouzid, trade union activists, and students. The demonstrators called for the resignation of the Ghannouchi government and the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution.123 “According to one of the protesters, ‘Even if Mohammed Ghannouchi is not the worst of the former regime, it is unacceptable that he be in the government. He was a minister for Ben Ali for fourteen years. We don’t understand why he’s still there.’”124 The protests, organized by activists on Facebook, the CNPR, and the UGTT forced Prime Minister Ghannouchi and the rest of his government to resign. Beji Caid Essebsi, who had been in government under Bourguiba but not Ben Ali, became prime minister. In response to the change in government, the UGTT canceled planned strikes and demonstrations. Highlighting its political engagement, the UGTT leadership stated that “the priority of the next steps is to participate . . . in the development of the new electoral law that guarantees the elections and their transparency in order to break once and for all with the sinister practices of the past.”125 Continued mass mobilization and civil society activism forced the removal of members of the old regime from government, a significant difference from Egypt where the military controlled the transition government. Persistent pressure from civil society organizations, such as the UGTT and the National Council, contributed to Prime Minister Essebsi’s decision to create a new, independent authority to organize the elections for the National Constituent Assembly.126 The new institution, the High Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, for Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition (Haute Instance pour la réalisation des objectifs de la revolution, des réformes politiques et de le transition démocratique), was the combination of the Committee for Political Reform created earlier by Prime Minister Ghannouchi and the CNPR. The inclusion of opposition leaders, civil society organizations, and human rights activists on the High Authority guaranteed that the new elections would not favor the old regime. The High Authority quickly agreed to the formation of an independent election commission, moving oversight of the elections away from the Ministry of the Interior, widely believed to have been involved in election rigging under Ben Ali. Partially due to the work of the independent election commission, international observers saw the October 2011 elections for the National Constituent Assembly as free and fair. According to the US National Democratic Institute’s election report, the “newly-created High

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Independent Authority for Elections (Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Elections or ISIE) overcame numerous obstacles to create a transparent electoral environment and encourage broad public participation in a free and fair process,” and that the creation of the ISIE “encouraged inclusivity, impartiality and citizen oversight of the election process.”127 The newly elected NCA, dominated by political parties that had been in opposition or illegal under Ben Ali, demonstrated the eroding influence of Ben Ali politicians. Furthermore, a former political prisoner, Hamadi Jebali of the Ennahda party, became prime minister, and Moncef Marzouki of the CPR, who had been in exile during Ben Ali’s regime, became president. The third critical moment, or series of events, that demonstrates the important role of civil society in the formation of Tunisian democracy is the work of the National Dialogue Quartet. Throughout 2012, the NCA worked on drafting a new constitution. Originally designed to be completed by October 2012, the NCA was unable to come to agreement on several core issues and by mid-2013 there was growing frustration with the political deadlock. Adding to the problem, there continued to be significant political turmoil and multiple incidents of political violence, including an attack on the US embassy in September 2012. The situation worsened in 2013, when there were two high-profile political assassinations. The February 6, 2013, assassination of Chokri Belaid provoked widespread protests. Over a million people attended his funeral and the UGTT called for a general strike to force a dismissal of the government.128 In response to the uproar, Prime Minister Jebali resigned and there was a cabinet reshuffle. The proposed strike demonstrates how during this time the UGTT, as a leading civil society organization, was actively engaged on political issues, not just economic policy. Deputy Secretary General Sami Tahri stated that, after the assassination, the UGTT’s first obligation was “drafting a constitution with consensus.”129 The country reached a crisis point when the Islamist terrorist group Ansar al Sharia assassinated Mohamed Brahmi, a member of the NCA and opposition political leader, on July 25, 2013. The political assassinations sparked a larger political crisis because secular Tunisians blamed the Ennahda political party for failing to prevent the violence and failing to criticize the more radical Islamist groups. Ennahda, having won 40 percent of the seats in the NCA, was the largest political party and controlled the office of prime minister. Although Ennahda repeatedly disavowed violence and condemned the assassinations, members of the opposition and secular Tunisians held the party responsible. In the aftermath of Brahmi’s assassination, rival demonstrations developed, with

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some calling for the dissolution of the government and others in support of Ennahda. The UGTT called a two-day nationwide strike and groups opposing the government began a sit-in outside where the NCA met.130 There were attacks on Ennahda’s offices and high levels of political turmoil and violence. Over fifty members of the NCA withdrew and the head of the NCA, ben Jaafar, issued an order on August 6 to temporarily suspend the work of the NCA. At this point, ben Jaafar considered the outbreak of civil war a real possibility.131 It is under these circumstances that four major civil society organizations formed the National Dialogue Quartet to provide a parallel process outside of the NCA and political parties to reach a solution to the political crisis. New UGTT leader Houcine Abbassi met with leader of the Tunisian Bar Association Fadhel Mahfoudh, Tunisian Human Rights League president Abdessattar Ben Moussa, and Wided Bouchamaoui, president of the employers’ association, the Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA). These four organizations and their leaders worked publicly and privately to negotiate a solution with the major political parties. As Bouchamaoui stated, “The quartet, as an organisation, didn’t have a legitimacy to say to the government, ‘You have to do that.’ The hard job was how to convince them.”132 The National Dialogue Quartet wanted all major political parties to agree to a road map that included approving the new constitution, selecting a date for new elections, and replacing the Ennahda-led government with a technocratic government until the elections.133 Agreement on a solution took months of negotiating. The National Dialogue Quartet, leading the negotiations, focused on saving democracy in Tunisia.134 Ennahda accepted the road map agreement in October, but it was not until January that the NCA passed the new constitution and established the technocratic government. The ability of Abbassi, Bouchamaoui, Ben Moussa, and Mahfoudh, as leaders of important and legitimate civil society organizations, to negotiate with politicians and help obtain a compromise was essential for the development of democracy in Tunisia. The decision of the Nobel Prize committee to award the members of the National Dialogue Quartet the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 demonstrates the valuable role these organizations played in helping to resolve the political crisis, ensuring the passage of a new democratic constitution, and the holding of democratic elections for a new parliament and president. The continued mass mobilization applied pressure to the political parties, but the National Dialogue Quartet was able to provide a solution. The digitally networked protests that had contributed to the downfall of Ben Ali lacked the leaders, organizational

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capacity, and influence to have helped negotiate an end to the crisis. Deeply rooted, long-standing civil society organizations representing a variety of interests within Tunisia had the legitimacy, connections, and influence to negotiate with the political parties.

The Legacy of Authoritarianism and Elite Decisions When the Tunisian government was under pressure from sit-ins and mass demonstrations, political elites had the choice to continue to support democracy and work toward a solution or to respond with violence and repression. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood government refused to compromise, and President Mohamed Morsi declared in November 2012 that the Egyptian constitution did not apply to him. When protests against Morsi grew substantial, the military used the civil unrest as an excuse to seize power through a coup d’état. In contrast, when there was a serious political crisis in Tunisia in 2013, the military did not seize power, and eventually Ennahda agreed to a technocratic government and a more progressive constitution than it had advocated for in the NCA. Tunisian political elites compromised when the Egyptians did not. The outcome of the 2013 political crisis determined the direction of the country. As discussed above, clearly the National Dialogue Quartet played an important role in supporting negotiations and pressuring political elites to compromise. Furthermore, the Tunisian military continued its position as an apolitical force and never intervened or threatened to intervene. In other words, the Tunisian military was not a veto player in the transition period. The role of civil society and the military helped to prevent a return to authoritarian government or civil war. However, the decision of political elites, especially the leadership of the major political parties, also mattered as they could have refused to compromise. Political elites agreed to compromise for three main reasons: (1) no faction or political party was strong enough to govern on its own; (2) the Tunisian crisis intensified just after the Egyptian military coup d’état, providing everyone with a vision of what could happen if the political stalemate was not resolved; and (3) the political leaders, especially the influential politicians Rached Ghannouchi (the leader of Ennahda) and Essebsi, did not want Tunisia to return to autocratic rule. The election results for the NCA demonstrate how no one political faction was strong enough to dominate politics or the writing of the constitution. The moderate Islamist party Ennahda received eighty-nine seats, or 41 percent of the vote. The secular parties CPR and Ettakatol received the next highest number of votes, with twenty-nine seats (13 percent of the total) and twenty seats (9 percent of the total), respectively.

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The remaining seats went to various other secular political parties and independent candidates. Although Ennahda received the largest number of seats, it did not have enough to form a government on its own or to pass a new constitution. Therefore, Ennahda formed a coalition government with CPR and Ettakatol, two secular, leftist political parties. The need to form a coalition helped to “counterbalance[d] the power of Ennahda” and resulted in a “more open and inclusive transition.”135 As Eva Bellin notes, “The fact that no party enjoyed a majority provided an incentive for coalition building and accommodation.”136 Overall, the NCA represented significant diversity in political positions as there were not only parties representing the secular and religious factions but also factions representing everything from traditional conservative economic views to the leftist Communist Party. The diversity of views, combined with the need to govern in coalition, meant that any political progress required negotiation and compromise. The distribution of power in Tunisia contrasts with Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood controlled both the parliament and the presidency. The dominant position of the Muslim Brotherhood contributed to a constitutional process and governing approach that was exclusive and a factor in Egypt’s failed democratization.137 In Tunisia, the power distribution encouraged negotiation, deals, and compromise. When the political crisis in Tunisia intensified in July 2013, it was just after the Egyptian military had overthrown President Morsi. As the crisis continued in Tunisia, the Egyptian military was violently repressing the Muslim Brotherhood, causing hundreds of deaths. These events provided a sobering example to Tunisian political elites about what could happen if they failed to reach a compromise. Meherzia Maïza Labidi, Ennahda party member and vice president of the NCA, noted that Ennahda learned from the events in Egypt and what had happened with President Morsi.138 In October 2013, Rached Ghannouchi noted in an interview with the newspaper Al-Hayet that whatever the circumstances might be, the results of the Egyptian situation prove that the Egyptian elite have failed to reach a consensus. Some people have tried to promote the Egyptian model in Tunisia, and thought that this is possible. This explains that sectors of the opposition have welcomed the putsch in Egypt and considered it a revolution. Some people have hoped to transfer it to Tunisia; however, after the emergence of the results of the Egyptian situation, the people have started to find the scene atrocious, and have revised their stance towards it, opted for the peaceful means to change the government, and the opposition was compelled to dissociate itself from it.139

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Ben Jaafar also noted how the example of what happened in Egypt influenced his decision to temporarily suspend the work of the NCA and to support the efforts of the National Dialogue Quartet.140 The international demonstration effect of Egypt may have helped to convince Tunisian elites to compromise and negotiate. It is important to acknowledge there were (and are) strong political divisions in Tunisia that reflect social, economic, and religious cleavages within society. By 2013, the political cleavages in post–Ben Ali Tunisia were along a religious-secular divide. Political identity became associated with each person’s view on the role of Islam in public life. There were strong divisions among society on what the new constitution should say about women’s rights and the role of Islam in relationship to the state. Formed in 1981, Ennahda originally advocated for the formation of an Islamic state where sharia would be a source of law for the country. However, before 2011, Ennahda, and its founder Rached Ghannouchi, had publicly moderated their perspective on the role of Islam in the modern state. Ennahda member Habib Ellouz noted that the “party had learned from the Algerian, Sudanese, and its own experiences that going too far with the objective of taking power was a fundamental mistake made by Islamist movements. Ellouz indicated that Islamist movements needed instead to signal to the international community that they advocate democracy as a definitive choice.”141 Before the revolution, there were contacts between Ennahda and other opposition parties. Almost a decade earlier in 2003, Ennahda, CPR, Progressive Democrats, and Ettakatol all signed the document “Call from Tunis,” which outlined support for a democratic state, “equality of women and men,” and “the guarantee of liberty of beliefs to all.”142 These prior contacts enabled the formation of the governmental coalition between Ennahda, the CPR, and Ettakatol.143 In addition to Ennahda’s public support for democracy, the leadership also expressed support for the idea of a civil, as opposed to Islamic, state.144 This development was essential for the passage of the constitution, as the secular political parties and groups refused to accept a constitution that included references to sharia. The divisions between religious and secular Tunisians were especially strong during the 2013 crisis. There were competing demonstrations in Tunis with some supporting Ennahda and others advocating for the Islamist political party to step down. The protests continued for three months while Ennahda resisted demands to step down from the government. However, on October 5, 2013, it publicly accepted the road map. The intense combination of religious and political identity makes the willingness of political elites across the religious-secular divide to

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compromise remarkable. Months of protest and negotiations were necessary to bring about the compromise, but it did occur. During the height of the crisis in 2013, Rached Ghannouchi and Essebsi, now leader of the new secular political coalition Nidaa Tounes, began a series of secret one-on-one meetings in Paris. Although the relationship between the two men is complex, they were able to move from a situation of conflict to one of dialogue. The willingness to compromise and negotiate was politically risky for both leaders, as members of each party were against it and vocally expressed their criticism of the meetings.145 Labidi recounted how Ghannouchi advocated for negotiations with Essebsi against objections from some Ennahda party members.146 However, Ennahda agreed to give up power and allow the formation of a technocratic government. Rached Ghannouchi argued that, during the crisis of 2013, he sought to “forge a compromise” and that Ennahda’s priority was to “ensure that the NCA . . . could complete the work of drafting a constitution that would establish the political foundations of a democratic Tunisia.”147 Moreover, Ghannouchi argued that legitimacy and protecting the life of the people was more important than staying in power. Labidi also stated that Ennahda stepped down from power “to gain democracy.”148 Overall, despite the intense divisions within society, the political elite had a commitment to the “principle and practice of inclusiveness” and to dialogue.149 Reflecting on Tunisia’s process of democratic consolidation in 2018, Rached Ghannouchi commented that democracy required that “we all . . . learn the art of governing by compromise, negotiation, and consensus.”150 The constitutional process in the NCA demonstrates the inclusive and dialogue-focused approach. All of the major political factions had a seat in each of the six constitutional subcommittees working on the constitution, and members were “encouraged to deliberate” until they reached consensus.151 Furthermore, the consensus committee, designed to resolve the differences on controversial core issues, had a majority of seats for the opposition, not the government.152 As discussed above, elite compromise was, to some extent, forced on elites as civil society placed high levels of pressure on the political parties to resolve the crisis. In addition, the fact that no one political party or faction had a majority, plus the military’s unwillingness to intervene, meant there were strong incentives to compromise. Although these conditions were important, Tunisian political elites still had choices, and they chose to negotiate and compromise. Therefore, contingent factors, such as Ghannouchi’s decision to compromise, are also important for explaining the development of democracy in Tunisia. Similar to the decision of Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan to not

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engage in repression in 2018, elite decisions during a transition process may be hard to predict and may be the result of unique factors.

The Continued Challenges for Democracy Tunisia has several serious challenges for continued democratic consolidation. The two most significant are the lack of economic growth and the security situation. A major motivating factor for the protests in 2010 was the lack of economic opportunity and high unemployment. Unfortunately, the economic situation has not substantially improved since then, fueling people’s dissatisfaction. Unemployment levels remain high, with youth unemployment around 35 percent.153 Corruption also remains a problem as the anticorruption commission just began its work in 2017, six years after the overthrow of Ben Ali. According to a 2016 report by Transparency International, 64 percent of Tunisians think corruption is becoming worse. However, the perception may not reflect reality as only 9 percent of Tunisians reported having to pay a bribe to a public official, the second-lowest rate in the MENA region.154 Tunisia has also suffered several terrorist attacks; most devastating were the attacks on the Bardo Museum and the beach in Sousse in 2015. The double terrorist attacks decimated the economically important tourism industry, contributing to the continued economic problems in Tunisia. Both the Ennahda-led government and the Nidaa Tounes government struggled to improve the security situation. In July 2015, the government announced it had arrested 1,000 terrorists and prevented 15,000 Tunisians from leaving to join extremist radical groups abroad.155 More recently, with EU and US assistance, the Tunisian government has made some progress on improving the security situation, but it remains a concern. A November 2015 poll by the International Republican Institute found that 83 percent of Tunisians thought the country was going in the wrong direction and 86 percent thought the economic situation was either somewhat bad or very bad.156 Additional research by the International Republican Institute also found growing political apathy, expressions of hopelessness in economically distressed regions, and support for extremist groups.157 Overall, Tunisia confronts an unfavorable regional environment. The security situation is difficult because of the chaos in neighboring Libya, which has repeatedly threatened the security situation in Tunisia. In addition, Tunisia stands alone in a region of autocratic states. Both President Essebsi and the leadership of Ennahda commented on how regional countries are not happy with a democratic Tunisia because it demonstrates that there is an alternative to authoritarian rule.158 The tension in

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Tunisia between secularists and Islamists is partially fueled by the regional disputes, as Saudi Arabia supports Nidaa Tounes and Qatar supports Ennahda.159 The foreign involvement in Tunisia has increased tensions and overall has not been supportive of democracy. Although the United States and the EU have provided assistance, especially funding for improving the security situation, the assistance has not been sufficient to help overcome the economic problems. The events in Tunisia demonstrate both the power and the limits of ICT to aid democratization. New technology, such as cell phone video and social media, enabled activists to spread protests from Sidi Bouzid to all of Tunisia. Videos, photos, and personal accounts posted online helped to further erode Ben Ali’s legitimacy, develop a strong sense of shared grievances among Tunisians, and mobilize tens of thousands of Tunisians to engage in protest. However, the successful overthrow of Ben Ali also depended on the organizational capacity and strength of Tunisian civil society, especially the labor union UGTT and the Tunisian Bar Association. Both organizations played an essential role in mobilizing and sustaining protests. The combination of new technology plus existing civil society organizations helped bring down a dictator. Tunisia is an especially interesting case because it experienced regime breakdown and democratization. Four countries in this book underwent regime breakdown—Armenia, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, and Tunisia. However, Egypt and Kyrgyzstan have each replaced one authoritarian regime with another. In Egypt, a more repressive autocracy has developed since the overthrow of President Mubarak. Although Armenia looks more promising, as Chapter 4 discussed, there remain multiple barriers to democratization. Tunisia’s exceptionalism demonstrates how overthrowing a dictator is difficult and rare, but that establishing a new democratic regime may be even harder and rarer. Tunisia has succeeded (at least so far) in transitioning to democracy because of the continued role of civil society in demanding the removal of Ben Ali politicians from the transition government and in resolving the 2013 political crisis. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan has a weak civil society, with no organizations capable of organizing sustained mobilization against the government. Tunisia’s structural circumstances of a power balance between competing factions also aided its democratization as no one faction (religious, secular, liberal, conservative) was strong enough to dominate, which forced negotiation and compromise. In contrast, in Egypt, the Muslim

Conclusion

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Brotherhood dominated the government, provoking a strong backlash that contributed to the military’s decision to seize power. Furthermore, the power structures of the Mubarak regime remained in place after his resignation because the Egyptian military controlled the transition. The political role of the military in Egypt versus the clear civilian control and generally apolitical nature of the Tunisian military is also an important distinction between the two cases. Tunisia’s transition to democracy did not end on January 15, 2011, but rather was the result of three more years of political conflict, turmoil, and negotiation. During this period, activists and organizations continued to use ICT to spread information and mobilize protests. However, because traditional media was freer and society more open, political parties, activists, and nongovernmental organizations were also able to use traditional methods to organize and share information, such as door-to-door campaigning. ICT was less important during this stage of the democratization process because the successful outcome depended on elite-level negotiations among politicians and civil society leaders. Digitally networked protests in Tunisia lacked the leaders and institutional capacity to engage in the sustained negotiations required for writing a new constitution and designing a democratic state. Furthermore, social media played a role in intensifying political cleavages and conflict because extremists on both sides used Facebook and other platforms to demonize each other. Even more disturbing, the internet has been a powerful tool of recruitment for ISIS, increasing problems with terrorism in Tunisia. Therefore, although ICT was a powerful and positive tool of regime overthrow, since then ICT has had more limited, and sometimes negative, effects on democratization.

Notes

1. “Tunisia: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” US Department of State, 2011, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/154474.htm. 2. Cavartorta and Haugbølle, “The End of Authoritarian Rule.” 3. Ibid. 4. Presentation by Mounir Khelifa, School of International Training (SIT) director, to SIT Faculty Seminar, Sidi Bou Said, Tunisia, May 21, 2017. 5. Ibid. 6. Schraeder and Redissi, “The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia,” p. 11. 7. “Timeline: Tunisia’s Uprising,” Al Jazeera, June 23, 2011, http://www.aljazeera .com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html. 8. “Tunisia: World Bank Data,” World Bank, n.d., http://data.worldbank.org /country/tunisia?view=chart. 9. Ibid; Political Risk Services, Country Conditions: Tunisia, p. 6.

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10. El-Khawas, “Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution,” p. 7; Murphy, “Under the Emperor’s Neoliberal Clothes!” p. 44. 11. El-Khawas, “Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution,” p. 7. 12. Murphy, “Under the Emperor’s Neoliberal Clothes!” pp. 41–42. 13. Thomas O’Brien makes this argument in detail. See O’Brien, “The Primacy of Political Security.” 14. Murphy, “Under the Emperor’s Neoliberal Clothes!” p. 46. 15. “Monday, 27 July 2009 US Embassy Cables: The ‘OTT’ Lifestyle of Tunisian President’s Son-in-Law, Including Pet Tiger,” The Guardian, July 27, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/218324. 16. Ibid. 17. WikiLeaks, “Corruption in Tunisia: What’s Yours in Mine.” Classified cable from Ambassador Robert F. Godec to Secretary of State Washington, DC, Reference ID 08TUNIS679, EO 12958, June 23, 2008, www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06 /08TUNIS679.html. 18. Mary-Jane Deeb, quoted in Sanina, “WikiLeaks Cables Help Uncover What Made Tunisians Revolt.” 19. Cavatorta and Haugbølle, “The End of Authoritarian Rule,” p. 185. 20. Zemni, “From Socio-economic Protest to National Revolt,” p. 129. 21. Chomiak and Entelis, “The Making of North Africa’s Intifadas,” p. 14. 22. Ayeb, “Social and Political Geography of the Tunisian Revolution,” p. 476. 23. “Tunisia: RSF Criticizes President for 20 Years of Press Censorship.” 24. “Tunisia: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” 25. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011: Tunisia, 2011, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/tunisia. 26. “Tunisia: 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.” 27. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Tunisia, 2011, https://freedom house.org/report/freedom-net/2011/tunisia; Lowrance, “Was the Revolution Tweeted?” 28. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Tunisia. 29. Ibid. 30. Zayani, Networked Publics and Digital Contention, pp. 88–93. 31. Ibid., pp. 102–103. 32. Ibid., p. 110. 33. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Tunisia. 34. “Tunisia: RSF Criticizes President for 20 Years of Press Censorship.” 35. Tunisian cyberactivist, quoted in Breuer and Groshek, “Online Media and Offline Empowerment in Post-Rebellion Tunisia,” p. 31. 36. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010: Tunisia, 2010, https://freedom house.org/report/freedom-world/2010/tunisia. 37. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2011: Tunisia. 38. Ibid. 39. Zayani, Networked Publics and Digital Contention, pp. 128–129. 40. Hermassi, “The Torments of the Revolution,” p. 38. 41. Kahlaoui, “The Powers of Social Media,” p. 153. 42. Ibid., p. 151. 43. Quote from Vanderhill, “The Internet, Regime Breakdown, and Democratization”; Kahlaoui, “The Powers of Social Media,” p. 153. 44. Haugbølle, “Rethinking the Role of the Media in the Tunisian Uprising,” pp. 167–168. 45. Zayani, Networked Publics and Digital Contention, p. 178.

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46. Jemili, “Tunisians Breaking the Silence,” p. 31. 47. Lowrance, “Was the Revolution Tweeted?” 48. Huang, “Facebook and Twitter Key to Arab Uprisings.” 49. Breuer and Groshek, “Online Media and Offline Empowerment in PostRebellion Tunisia,” p. 35. 50. Tunisian blogger, quoted in Lowrance, “Was the Revolution Tweeted?” p. 162. 51. Haugbølle, “Rethinking the Role of the Media in the Tunisian Uprising,” p. 170. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid., p. 171. 54. Way, “Comparing the Arab Revolts.” 55. Brownlee, “The Transnational Challenge to Arab Freedom.” 56. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 15. 57. Ibid. 58. Chomiak and Entelis, “The Making of North Africa’s Intifadas,” p. 15. 59. Ibid. 60. Tunisian youth activist, quoted in Lowrance, “Was the Revolution Tweeted?” p. 165. 61. El-Khawas, “Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution,” p. 9. 62. Maalmi, “The Smell of Jasmine,” p. 49. 63. Lecomte, “Tunisian Revolution and the Internet.” 64. Yazidi, “The Death of My Cousin and the Birth of a New Tunisia,” p. 29. 65. Breuer and Groshek, “Online Media and Offline Empowerment in PostRebellion Tunisia,” p. 40. 66. Haugbølle, “Rethinking the Role of the Media in the Tunisian Uprising,” p. 173. 67. Zayani, Networked Publics and Digital Contention, p. 179. 68. Lecomte, “Tunisian Revolution and the Internet.” 69. Faris, “Beyond ‘Social Media Revolutions,’” p. 11. 70. Lecomte, “Tunisian Revolution and the Internet.” 71. Schraeder and Redissi, “The Upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia.” 72. Way, “Comparing the Arab Revolts”; Brownlee, “The Transnational Challenge to Arab Freedom.” 73. Zemni, “From Socio-economic Protest to National Revolt,” p. 133. 74. Ibid., p. 136. 75. Netterstrøm, “The Tunisian General Labor Union and the Advent of Democracy,” p. 387. 76. “Tunisian Labor Leaders Reflect upon Revolt,” p. 32. 77. International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way,” Middle East/North Africa Report No. 106, April 2011, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/popular -protests-north-africa-and-middle-east-iv-tunisia-s-way. 78. Ibid., p. 4. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid., p. 6. 81. Ottaway, “Democratic Transitions and the Problem of Power.” 82. International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV).” 83. Ibid. 84. Gobe, “The Tunisian Bar to the Test of Authoritarianism,” p. 340.

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85. International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV),” p. 5. 86. Vanderhill, “The Internet, Regime Breakdown, and Democratization.” 87. Angrist, “Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia,” p. 561. 88. Ibid. 89. Croissant, Kuehn, and Eschenauer, “Mass Protests and the Military.” 90. Barany, “The Role of the Military,” p. 31. 91. Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats,” p. 273. 92. Ibid., p. 272. 93. Ibid. 94. Croissant, Kuehn, and Eschenauer, “Mass Protests and the Military,” pp. 152–153. 95. Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations,” p. 35. 96. Bou Nassif, “Patterns of Civil-Military Relations,” p. 134. 97. International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV),” p. 11. 98. Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations,” p. 35; Pachon, “Loyalty and Defection,” p. 516. 99. Pachon, “Loyalty and Defection,” pp. 518–519. 100. Ibid., p. 519. 101. Ibid., p. 521. 102. Angrist, “Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia,” p. 553. 103. Hale, Patronal Politics. 104. Ibid. 105. Tunisia’s political rights score is 1 out of a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 as the most democratic. Civil liberties are 3 out of a scale of 1 to 7. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017: Tunisia, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world /2017/tunisia. 106. Tufekci, Twitter and Tear Gas, p. 71. 107. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013: Tunisia, 2013, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2013/tunisia. 108. Ibid. 109. “Legislative and Presidential Elections in Tunisia: Final Report,” Carter Center, 2014, p. 43, footnote 93, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs /news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia-final-rpt-2014-elections.pdf. 110. Ben M’Barek, Jeddi, and Achouri, “Impact of Social Media on the Behavior of Tunisian Voters.” 111. Anna Mysliwiec, National Democratic Institute, interviewed by the author, Washington, DC, June 10, 2016. 112. Nalja Abbess, League of Tunisian Women Voters, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar, Sidi Bou Sid, Tunisia, May 21, 2017. 113. Chrisafis, “Tunisia’s Most Influential Bloggers Prepare for Historic Elections.” 114. Abbess, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar. 115. Breuer and Groshek, “Online Media and Offline Empowerment in PostRebellion Tunisia,” pp. 40–41, endnote 3. 116. Oufella, “Algerians Worried About Seeing Tunisia Sink into Terrorism.” 117. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013: Tunisia. 118. Breuer and Groshek, “Online Media and Offline Empowerment in PostRebellion Tunisia,” p. 33.

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119. Chomiak and Entelis, “Contesting Order in Tunisia.” 120. Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, The Arab Spring, p. 204. 121. International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (IV),” p. 15. 122. Ibid., p. 17. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid., p. 18. 126. Zemni, “From Socio-economic Protest to National Revolt,” p. 6. 127. “Final Report on the Tunisian Constituent Assembly Elections,” National Democratic Institute, 2012, https://www.ndi.org/node/23420. 128. Hartshorn, “Organized Interests in Constitutional Assemblies,” p. 414. 129. Ibid. 130. Ibid. 131. Mustapha ben Jaafar, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar, Sidi Bou Sidi, Tunisia, May 24, 2017. 132. Stephen, “The Tunisia Quartet.” 133. Ibid. 134. Wided Bouchamaoui, Meeting with SIT Faculty Seminar, UTICA headquarters, May 23, 2017. 135. Szmolka, “Exclusionary and Non-consensual Transitions,” p. 82. 136. Bellin, “Drivers of Democracy,” p. 4. 137. Szmolka, “Exclusionary and Non-consensual Transitions,” p. 88. 138. Ennahda leadership, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar, Tunis, Tunisia, May 24, 2017. 139. “Tunisian Ennahda Leader Ghannouchi on Flexibility, Islamic Rule, Terrorism.” 140. ben Jaafar, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar. 141. Angrist, “Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia,” p. 556. 142. Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations,” p. 96. 143. Szmolka, “Exclusionary and Non-consensual Transitions,” p. 83. 144. Cavatorta and Merone, “Moderation Through Exclusion?” p. 861. 145. Robert Worth has a detailed account of the meetings and changing relationship between Rached Ghannouchi and Beji Caid Essebsi in his book. Worth, A Rage for Order. 146. Ennahda leadership, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar. 147. Ghannouchi, “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy,” p. 63. 148. Ennahda leadership, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar. 149. Bellin, “Drivers of Democracy,” p. 3. 150. Ghannouchi, “Islam and Democracy in Tunisia,” p. 6. 151. Bellin, “Drivers of Democracy,” p. 3. 152. ben Jaafar, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar. 153. Ottaway, The Arab World Upended, p. 225. 154. “People and Corruption: Middle East and North Africa Survey 2016,” Transparency International, 2016, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication /people_and_corruption_mena_survey_2016. In contrast to 9 percent in Tunisia, 48 percent of Moroccans reported having to pay a bribe in the past year. The only country with a lower number was Jordan, where only 4 percent reported having to pay a bribe. 155. Ottaway, The Arab World Upended, p. 224.

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156. “Public Opinion Survey of Tunisians,” Center for Insights in Survey Research, November 2015, http://www.iri.org/resource/iri-center-insights-poll-tunisians-believe -country-headed-wrong-direction-pessimistic. 157. Macdonald and Waggoner, “Dashed Hopes and Extremism in Tunisia.” 158. Ennahda leadership, Presentation to SIT Faculty Seminar; SIT Faculty Seminar Meeting with President Beji Caid Essebsi, Presidential Palace, Carthage, Tunisia, May 24, 2017. 159. Lynch, The New Arab Wars.

7 Autocracy in the Internet Age

Over the past decade the rhetoric, in the press and among many scholars, has swung from viewing social media as the new source of democratization (“the revolution will be tweeted”) to seeing social media as a tool of authoritarian power (“digital dictators”). Through the course of this book, I sought to show that those narratives are too simplistic and fail to consider the complex dynamics of social media in authoritarian contexts. Both narratives also fail to engage with decades of research by political scientists about the causes of democratization and authoritarian persistence. I tried to correct this oversight by examining the role of information communication technology (ICT) in authoritarian regimes through the prism of existing knowledge and theories about democratization and authoritarianism. Democratic activists and autocratic governments seek to adapt ICT to serve their own goals. In the cases in this book, who wins the struggle between these competing goals is the result of factors beyond technology—factors that determined regime outcomes long before the development of social media. The twelve cases discussed in the previous chapters offer several preliminary conclusions about the relationships in authoritarian states between ICT, regime survival, regime breakdown, and democratization. As I discuss below, activists can effectively use ICT to challenge the government’s information monopoly and to mobilize antigovernment protests. However, the nonhierarchical and fluid nature of digitally networked protests,

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combined with existing structural barriers to democratization, mean that few cases of regime breakdown will likely result in democratization. In this chapter, I analyze the results from the twelve cases and, based on those results, assess the original hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2. I begin by evaluating the four proposed mechanisms by which activists can use ICT to challenge authoritarian regimes. Next, I discuss how authoritarian regimes have responded to the threats and the opportunities that new technology provides them. I then evaluate the proposed theory for explaining regime outcomes following digitally networked protests. Finally, I examine the prospects for democratization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and post-Soviet regions, and propose further research questions. I hypothesized in Chapter 2 that there are four mechanisms by which activists utilize ICT to challenge the government and overthrow the leader (see Table 7.1 for an overview). Mechanism 1, using ICT to challenge the government’s information monopoly, was prevalent in all of the cases except Armenia in 2008, which was primarily due to the limited availability of the technology. This mechanism was the most widespread, which makes sense as the nature of the technology lends itself to spreading alternative views and circumventing censorship. In addition, if this mechanism does not occur, it is unlikely that activists will be able to pursue the strategies in any of the three other mechanisms. It is difficult, if not impossible, for ICT to be used for democratic diffusion, organizing against the government, and spreading a message around the world without blogs, websites, and social media platforms where people are able to share information outside of the government’s control. In other words, this mechanism occurs first and the three other mechanisms may build on this dynamic. Activists used ICT to spread critical information about the government and to develop a positive, pro-opposition narrative. In almost all of the cases, the critical blogs, online news sources, and antigovernment Facebook pages arose months or years before protests began. The online criticism likely eroded support for the authoritarian governments. Once protests began, ICT continued to be an important source of information as authoritarian governments used their control over television media to try to discredit protest movements; for example, calling protestors against Vladimir Putin traitors. Various forms of ICT were used by protesters to construct a pro-opposition narrative, seeking

Evaluating the Four Mechanisms for Using ICT

Table 7.1 ICT and Breakdown: Which Mechanisms Occurred Where?

Case

Armenia 2008 Iran 2009 Moldova 2009 Russia 2011–2012 Armenia 2013 Moldova 2015–2016 Iran 2017–2018 Kyrgyzstan 2005 Kyrgyzstan 2010

Egypt 2011

Armenia 2018

Tunisia 2010–2011

Mechanism 1: Challenging the Information Monopoly

Mechanism 2: Diffusion and Demonstration Effects

Mechanism 3: Reducing the Collective Action Problem

Mechanism 4: Dissemination Abroad

Yes

No

Limited role

Limited role

No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes

Yes

No No No Limited role No No No No Yes

Limited role

Limited role

Note: ICT, information communication technology.

No Limited role Yes Yes Limited role Limited role Yes No Yes

Yes

Yes

No Yes Yes Limited role No No Yes Limited role Yes

Limited role Yes

Outcome

Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime breakdown Regime breakdown Regime breakdown Regime breakdown Regime breakdown and democratization

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to gain public support. In cases where protesters failed to successfully challenge the government’s negative portrayal of the protests, like in Russia, the protests were less likely to succeed. As authoritarian governments have become more sophisticated with manipulating social media, the battle over the framing of the protest movement has moved online. Who is able to control the narrative about the government and the opposition may have important implications for regime breakdown and democratization. In contrast to the importance of ICT for challenging the government’s information monopoly, ICT appears to have only a minor impact on democratic diffusion in these cases. There was little evidence in any of the cases, except Egypt, that ICT was important for Mechanism 2, democratic diffusion. This outcome initially presents a puzzle because logically, ICT, especially social media, should be a powerful tool for spreading democratic ideas when by design the technology is meant to connect people and spread information. Why was the impact limited in these cases? One possible reason is that democratic diffusion, regardless of the method of diffusion, had a limited impact on all of the cases except Egypt. As discussed below, all of the cases have limited international support for democracy; therefore, unlike in other regions and cases, democratic diffusion may have little effect on these cases. Second, although social media facilitates connections between people, it cannot overcome linguistic barriers. Egypt, the one case where ICT clearly facilitated a demonstration effect from Tunisia, was also the only case where there was a shared language. A third reason may be that, following the color revolutions (Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, and Kyrgyzstan 2005), authoritarian governments have become much more active in resisting democratic diffusion. Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Iran, and others have all developed narratives characterizing democracy as a Western and foreign concept being imposed by the United States.1 Therefore, it is possible that democratic diffusion may be less effective than in previous circumstances.2 Mechanism 3 focuses on how ICT is a powerful tool to mobilize people and organize antigovernment activities. Through looking at Table 7.1, it is evident that there is a change over time in the prevalence of this mechanism. Social media platforms, such as Facebook, were not widely available in the earliest cases. However, by 2009–2010, as these platforms had spread to both regions, activists were able to harness the power of the few-to-many technology of social media to effectively mobilize and organize protests. The rise of social media has helped move ICT from being only a source of alternative news to now being a

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method of mobilization. In the most recent case I discuss, Armenia’s 2018 protests, the spread of technology changed the nature of the protests themselves. As Chapter 4 showed, strategies, such as having protests in different locations every day and constantly moving street blockades, made it harder for security forces to prevent protest activity. The highly flexible and adaptable approach of Nikol Pashinyan and his supporters was dependent on technology such as smartphones, Facebook, and Twitter. Therefore, ICT not only made mobilization and organization easier and faster, it also enabled greater creativity, flexibility, and spontaneity in the antigovernment activities. Journalists note similar dynamics in the protests in Hong Kong in 2019. The Hong Kong protests had no discernable leaders and the protesters pursued flexible, creative, and adaptable tactics—an approach dependent on social media applications such as Telegram and Instagram.3 Protesters recount being notified only an hour in advance about a particular antigovernment activity—a fluid approach to protests.4 In other words, ICT is not just a tool; it may be having transformative effects on the characteristics of antigovernment protest in authoritarian regimes. ICT did help activists spread their message about the regime’s abuses and atrocities globally, Mechanism 4, in most cases. The main exceptions to this are Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. It is likely that language barriers and the limited strategic importance of Kyrgyzstan and Armenia reduced global attention of the protests in these countries. In other cases, ICT helped activists challenge the government’s narrative about the protests and present a pro-opposition narrative to a global audience. Unfortunately, in cases like Iran, the increased global attention did not prevent the government from engaging in violent repression. Although ICT helped increase global attention, in these cases that attention rarely translated into effective international pressure because of low levels of democratic linkage or leverage. If we look at the five cases where digitally networked protests resulted in regime breakdown (see Table 7.1), we can see that Mechanism 1 was prevalent in all of the cases and Mechanism 3 was prevalent in all of the cases except Kyrgyzstan 2005. Although the grievances and initial causes of the protests were different in these cases, ranging from anger over electoral fraud in Kyrgyzstan to frustration about the lack of economic opportunity in Tunisia, ICT helped the antigovernment movements in similar ways across the cases. Therefore, I argue ICT had the greatest effect on regime breakdown when it helped activists share information about the government’s abuses and when people were able to use it to organize antigovernment activities.

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The cases of Iran, Russia, Tunisia, and Egypt demonstrate the variety of ways by which authoritarian governments have responded to the potential threat of ICT. In all four countries, the governments engaged in online censorship and harassed people who used social media to critique the government. The cases of Russia and Iran also highlight how some autocratic governments have moved from focusing on defensive actions, such as censorship, to adapting this technology to discredit opponents and construct a pro-regime narrative. Table 7.2 shows the differences among the cases and how authoritarian governments have changed their approach to ICT over time. The best example of that change in this book is Iran. During the 2009 protests, the Iranian government did not use technology like social media to advocate a pro-government perspective. However, by 2017, the government responded to the outbreak of protests by using Twitter to criticize the demonstrations and to support the government. As Chapter 3 discusses, both Iran and Russia pay people to make progovernment posts on social media. Multiple other authoritarian governments have adopted similar strategies toward social media. For example, in August 2019, Facebook announced that it had removed several hundred accounts and pages linked to the Saudi Arabian government that were being used to spread progovernment propaganda.5 Although it is challenging to measure the influence of progovernment activity online, studies from democratic states that document how difficult it is for people to discern what is true and what is fake online suggest that these efforts of authoritarian governments may have influence. It is possible to document how authoritarian governments have adopted the new technology to increase their surveillance of members of the opposition and society in general. The Iranian and Russian governments each have hacked into opposition websites. The Iranian security forces also have taken advantage of facial recognition software and crowdsourcing to help identify Iranians participating in protests. Because the technology for electronic surveillance is widely available and relatively cheap for governments, it has become easier for governments to monitor potential opponents. Among the cases, the degree of repression, surveillance, and propaganda varied depending on the type of autocratic regime. The competitive authoritarian regimes of Moldova, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan had the least amount of repression, surveillance, and propaganda of all of the cases. Since competitive authoritarian regimes still have some elements of democracy and allow opposition political parties to exist, it is not surprising that these regime types would also have lower levels of internet repression and surveillance than other autocratic regimes. The

Authoritarian Governments and ICT

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Table 7.2 Authoritarian Governments’ Approaches to ICT Case

Armenia 2008 Iran 2009 Moldova 2009 Russia 2011–2012 Armenia 2013 Moldova 2015–2016 Iran 2017–2018 Kyrgyzstan 2005 Kyrgyzstan 2010 Tunisia 2010–2011 Egypt 2011 Armenia 2018

Repression/ Censorship

Surveillance

Manipulation of Narratives

Yes No

Possibly No

No No

No Yes No Limited No No Yes No No Yes

No Yes No Yes No No Yes No No Possibly

Note: ICT, information communication technology.

No No No Yes No No Yes No No No

Regime Outcome

Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime survives Regime breakdown Regime breakdown Regime breakdown and democratization Regime breakdown Regime breakdown

three authoritarian regimes, Russia, Tunisia, and Egypt, differed significantly in their levels of repression, surveillance, and propaganda. Russia, with its lower level of repression, but active online propaganda, contrasts with Tunisia and Egypt, where the autocratic governments primarily engaged in repression, not propaganda, at the time of protests. One possible explanation for why Russia’s approach is different is because of Putin’s popularity. The high levels of popular support for Putin may mean that he does not need to control the internet to the same extent to eliminate challenges to his rule. As a theocracy and a revolutionary regime, Iran is a unique case. The need for the Iranian government not only to eliminate political challenges but also to dictate social interactions, such as relations between men and women, may partially explain why the government has sought to control the internet. The range of approaches to ICT in these autocratic states illustrates how autocratic states have a variety of strategies to choose from when seeking to reduce its threat to their regime. Despite the importance of defensive and proactive approaches to ICT for understanding the role of ICT in authoritarian regimes, I found no clear relationship between the level of ICT censorship and regime breakdown. As Table 7.2 shows, there are cases where there was no repression and no regime breakdown (e.g., Moldova), and cases where there was repression and regime breakdown (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt). It is important to note

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that, although the governments of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak censored the internet and repressed bloggers, various forms of social media and Al Jazeera were still available in each country. If an authoritarian government removes all access to the internet, then digitally networked protests will not occur. However, cutting off access to the internet, as the Egyptian government did in 2011, comes with significant economic and international costs. More recent cases outside the scope of this book also illustrate the potential consequences of blocking access to the internet for a region or the whole country. For example, during the 2019 antigovernment protests in Sudan, the Sudanese government shut down the internet for weeks. The internet shutdown increased international criticism of the government, caused economic disruptions, and did not end the opposition’s pressure on the regime to negotiate a transition.6 Repressing the internet may be insufficient to prevent regime overthrow. If repression is insufficient to explain the success or failure of digitally networked protests, then what does explain regime outcomes? I sought to explain three different outcomes in this book: (1) a regime survives digitally networked protests; (2) digitally networked protests help to overthrow the regime; and (3) digitally networked protests lead to regime breakdown and democratization. As Table 7.3 illustrates, there were seven cases where the regime survived digitally networked protests, four cases of regime breakdown, and one case of regime breakdown and democratization. The diversity of outcomes aids the testing of the proposed theory. I hypothesized in Chapter 2 that regime breakdown is more likely to occur when existing civil society organization is strong, the international environment is supportive of democracy, and the leader is weak. Through examining these cases, we can draw some tentative conclusions about the causes of each regime outcome. First, there appears to be no clear correlation between the level of international support for democracy and regime breakdown across the cases. In addition, although autocratic linkage and support can be helpful in preventing regime breakdown, it was not sufficient in four of these cases.7 The two regions studied, MENA and the post-Soviet region, each have few democratic neighbors and strong autocratic regional powers. In addition, geopolitical strategic interests are often the primary concern of the United States and the European Union (EU) in the MENA region and post-Soviet space, reducing international pressure to democratize. Therefore, it is unsurprising that none of the cases had strong international support for democratization. What is interesting is that, despite the generally unfavorable international context,

Explaining Regime Outcomes

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there were still five cases of regime breakdown. Regime breakdown occurred despite the international context, not because of it. There appears to be an interactive dynamic regarding the other two variables in these cases: strength of civil society and strength of the leader. When civil society was weak, regime breakdown occurred only if the leader lacked coercive capacity and elite support to defeat the protests. For example, the protests succeeded in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010 because of the weakness of Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. However, if there was coercive capacity and, at least initially, elite support, then civil society needed to be stronger for protests to obtain the necessary size and strength to cause the security forces and elites to defect and no longer support the leader. In Tunisia and Egypt, the digitally networked protests were able to apply high levels of pressure on each government because of the added support of existing civil society organizations. Without the assistance of those existing civil society organizations, such as the Tunisian labor unions and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely that activists would have been able to sustain protests in the face of increasing regime repression. In addition, the widespread nature of the protests in Tunisia overwhelmed the coercive capacity of the police, forcing Ben Ali to turn to the military, which decided against helping to maintain his rule in the face of strong, widespread popular opposition. The unity and Table 7.3 Regime Outcomes

Case

Armenia 2008 Iran 2009 Moldova 2009 Russia 2011–2012 Armenia 2013 Moldova 2015–2016 Iran 2017–2018 Kyrgyzstan 2005 Kyrgyzstan 2010 Egypt 2011 Armenia 2018 Tunisia 2010–2011

Civil Society

Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Weak Moderate Weak Strong

International Environment Supportive of Democracy? No No Partially No No Partially No Partially No Partially No No

Strength of the Leader

Strong Strong Moderate Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Moderate Strong Moderate

Regime Outcome

No change No change No change No change No change No change No change Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown Breakdown and democratization

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strength of the opposition and the unity and strength of the regime were both important for explaining the success or failure of the antigovernment protests. The one case that does not clearly fit this model is Armenia in 2018. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are several possible explanations for why, despite having a weak civil society and strong autocratic leader, the digitally networked protest movement succeeded. Although civil society was weak, the opposition movement did have a clear, accepted, and supported leader, Pashinyan, who was able to negotiate with the government. In addition, Armenia in 2018 was the only digitally networked protest movement that occurred in a country with no censorship of the internet and high levels of internet penetration rates. Under those unusual conditions, it may be possible for ICT to empower opposition movements to such an extent that they are an unexpected challenge to the coercive capacity of the state and the legitimacy of the leader. As discussed in Chapter 2, although regime breakdown is a necessary first step for democratization, it is not sufficient. The regime outcomes across the cases reinforce this as there is only one case of democratization, despite there being five cases of regime breakdown. The strength of civil society and the nature of the previous authoritarian regime explained democratization postbreakdown in Tunisia. Tunisia had the most active, diverse civil society of all of the cases. As previous research has demonstrated, having a history of military rule makes transitioning to democracy difficult, which was true in Egypt but not in Tunisia.8 It is also evident that the legacy of communism caused challenges for democratization in Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Moldova. ICT has powerful, even revolutionary, effects but was unable, at least in the short term, to affect these challenges for democracy. Furthermore, in Tunisia, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, social media caused problems during the period of transition by increasing tensions and inflaming existing cleavages. These dynamics made negotiations about the nature and structure of a new political system more difficult. Therefore, ICT can shift from being a powerful aid for regime breakdown to being an additional problem for democratization. Digitally networked protests were able to bring about regime breakdown, but were unable to overcome structural barriers to democratization in the MENA and post-Soviet regions.

Prospects for Democratization in the MENA and Post-Soviet Regions?

The outcome of only one case of democratization out of twelve cases of mass mobilization illustrates the difficulties of developing democracy in

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either region. These results do not include the multiple cases where there were not even any significant antigovernment protests during this period, such as in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. When those cases are taken into consideration, the overall prospects for democratization in the MENA or post-Soviet region are low. As all of the cases demonstrated, there are multiple barriers to democratization in both regions: low levels of international support for democracy, weak civil society, negative legacies of authoritarian rule, and in some cases unresolved territorial disputes. Moreover, globally, we are witnessing a resurgence of authoritarianism and growing threats to democracy.9 It does not appear to be an auspicious era for democratization. On the other hand, the causes of protest in many of the cases— economic dissatisfaction, high levels of political corruption, and frustration with autocratic governance—have not been resolved or fixed. Therefore, the problems and potential threats to the dictator’s rule remain in all the cases, suggesting the possibility of future protests. In 2019, there were protests for related reasons in Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, and Hong Kong. Furthermore, protests in Algeria and Sudan did result in the overthrow of long-serving dictators. As the Egyptian and Tunisian cases also demonstrated, dictators may be weaker than they appear. Accurately assessing the strength of authoritarian regimes and how they will respond to mass mobilization is still a struggle because of the secretive nature of these political systems and our continued lack of knowledge of how they function. In addition, there is an element of indeterminacy and uncertainty once protests begin, making predictions about government responses difficult. The Economist reported that, in 2018, twenty-five governments chose to shut off access to the internet during times of unrest or crisis.10 Clearly, authoritarian governments are willing to suffer the economic costs of an internet blackout if they view the internet as a threat. However, despite the repressive power of authoritarian states, the outbreak of digitally networked protests in places as diverse as Sudan, Algeria, and Hong Kong in 2019 demonstrate the continued influence of the internet, especially social media, on antigovernment protests and regime overthrow. Moreover, as social media has become more widespread, we see evidence of it transforming how people engage in protest against authoritarian governments. Because of the rapid rate of technological change, the implications of ICT for authoritarian rule will also continue to change.

What’s Next?

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In this book, I used comparative case study analysis to investigate how autocratic governments and their opponents use ICT to influence the regime outcome. This case study analysis facilitated an in-depth analysis of how, why, and when ICT affected regime outcomes in twelve different cases. However, there are inherent limitations with a case study approach, especially in terms of generalizability. Therefore, looking forward, there is a need for further research on how new technology is influencing the strategies of autocratic governments and opposition activists. Do the mechanisms and variables analyzed in these cases apply beyond the MENA and post-Soviet regions? Moreover, there are multiple additional research questions that require investigation: How do social media and smartphones continue to alter the nature of protest in authoritarian contexts? How does technology affect the balance of power between the opposition and the government? Will technological developments be able to affect structural factors such as weak civil society? The combination of the speed of technological innovation and the repressive, secretive nature of authoritarian governments makes studying these questions challenging and dependent on developing new methods and approaches. However, the persistence of authoritarianism and the growing influence of autocratic regimes in global politics means that we need to better understand autocratic regimes, including the role of ICT in maintaining and in challenging these regimes.

Notes

1. Vanderhill, “Active Resistance to Democratic Diffusion.” 2. Diamond, “Breaking Out of the Democratic Slump.” 3. Pomfret et al., “Inside the Hong Kong Protester’s Anarchic Campaign Against China.” 4. Ibid. 5. “Facebook Bans ‘Saudi Arabia-Linked Propaganda Accounts,’” BBC News, August 1, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49197576. 6. “Sudan: UN Experts Denounce Internet Shutdown”; “In Sudan, Internet Users Find Ways to Beat.” 7. Tansey, Koehler, and Schmotz, “Ties to the Rest.” 8. Svolik, “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation”; Bratton and van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa.” 9. Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2018 report has the headline: “Democracy in Crisis.” Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, 2018, https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 10. “The New Censors.”

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Index

Abbassi, Houcine, 234 Agha–Soltan, Neda, 71–72 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 57–60, 65, 75, 79–81 Akayev, Askar, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 167, 180 Al Jazeera, 25, 70, 165, 166, 168–169, 175, 214, 217, 220, 254 Algeria, 257 Aliyev, Illham, 146 Alliance for European Integration (AIE), 116 Ansar al Sharia, 229, 233 April 6 Movement, 27, 165, 169, 171, 181, 182, 191, 193, 194 Arab Spring, 6, 35, 47, 218, 227. See also Egypt, Tunisia Armenia, 13, 14, 16, 48, 110–111, 145– 147, 256; 2008 protests, 111–113, 119; 2013 protests, 113–114, 119– 120, 125, 130; 2018 protests, 109, 114–115, 120–121, 125–127, 142– 144; blogging, 120; censorship, 119–121, 130; civil society, 133–136, 145; coercive capacity, 140, 144; corruption, 112, 114–115, 145; democratic diffusion, 123–124; demonstration effect, 124; economic conditions, 113, 114, 115, 126, 136–

138, 145; election fraud, 111–113, 120, 140; Facebook, 120–121, 123, 125–127, 130; ICT blockage, 119; Instagram, 123; internet penetration, 119–120; legacy of Soviet rule, 110, 135, 142, 146; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 124, 133, 134–136; relationship with EU, 138; relationship with Russia, 136–138; relationship with US, 124, 129–130, 138–139; security forces, 140; Telegram (messaging application), 126; violence, 119, 130–131, 144; YouTube, 119, 121, 123 Armenian diaspora, 115, 124, 134 Aro, Jessikka, 98–99 Argument overview, 8–11 Atambayev, Almazbek, 179, 188 Authoritarianism: 2, 5, 14, 253, defined, 11; authoritarian persistence, 2, 8, 17, 46, 247 Autocratic linkage, 45, 254 Azerbaijan, 16, 110, 113, 133, 136–138, 140, 146

Bahrain, 15 Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162–164, 180 Bakiyev, Maksim, 159

281

282

Index

Basij, 58, 59, 80–82, 95 BBC Persian, 71, 90, 91, 95 Belaid, Chokri, 229, 233 Ben Ali, Zine El al–Abidine, 13, 79, 209–210, 226; overthrow of, 210– 213, 240 Ben Jaafar, Mustapha, 234, 237 Berga, Oleg, 127 Blogging, 4, 23, 33, 38, 248. See also specific countries Bouazizi, Mohamed, 210, 218 Bouchamaoui, Wided, 234 Bourguiba, Habib, 209, 221, 224 Brahmi, Mohamed, 233 Bulgaria, 45

Censorship, 8, 9, 23, 39, 248, 256; government censorship, 8, 252; self– censorship, 34, 38. See also specific countries Central Asia, 156, 180, 189, 199 China, 1, 24–25, 34, 36–37 Citizen journalists, 23, 65, 70, 169, 217, 220 Citizen Lab, 7 Civil society, 3, 10, 25, 40–44, 255–256; defined, 40; role in democratization, 10, 22, 41–43; role in regime overthrow, 10, 22, 41. See also specific countries Civil war, 1, 15, 125; possibility in Tunisia, 209, 234, 235 CNPR. See National Council for the Protection of the Revolution Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, 164, 178 Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution, 191–192 Coercive capacity, 10, 22, 32, 39, 46–47, 255 Collective action problem, 9, 21, 27–30, 70, 169; defined, 27 Comparative case study methodology, 12–13, 258 Competitive authoritarianism, 109, 110, 111, 155, 252; defined, 11 Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), 234 Congress for the Republic (CPR), 235, 236, 237 Co–optation, 9, 35, 46

Corruption, 10, 23, 25, 28. See also specific countries Council of Europe, 132 Council of Guardians (Iran), 59 Crimea, 78, 93, 97, 132 Cyberattacks, 35–39, 87. See also specific countries Czechoslovakia, 27

Deep packet inspection, 96 Democracy: defined, 11 Democratic Constitutional Rally (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique, RCD), 226, 230, 231 Democratic diffusion, 21, 26–27, 33–34, 45, 248, 250. See also specific countries Demonstration effect, 26. See also specific countries Diesel Forum, 164, 171, 174 Dignity and Truth civic movement, 117– 118, 123, 129 Disinformation campaigns, 38, 189, 252 Distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, 36, 87, 99, 163. See also cyberattacks Duma (Russia), 61, 66, 86, 92, 93

Echo chambers, 49 Economic conditions, 23. See also specific countries Economic sanctions, 44; on Iran, 78, 82; on Moldova, 132, 136; on Russia, 79 Egypt, 6, 13, 16, 27, 28, 48, 155–157; 2011 protests, 165, 171–175, 181– 187; 2013 coup d’état, 191, 194–195, 197; blogging, 165, 166, 171; censorship, 165; civil society, 181– 184; coercive power, 185; corruption, 161, 165; democratic diffusion, 168– 170; demonstration effect, 168; economic conditions, 161, 198; election fraud, 160; Facebook, 165, 166, 169, 170, 171–173, 175, 191, 193, 194; ICT blockages, 175, 177; internet penetration, 165, 176; January 25 protests, 160–161, 172– 173, 175; legitimacy, 185; media control, 165; mobile phones, 171, 173, 174; press freedom, 165; relationship with EU, 198, 206n147;

Index relationship with US, 184–185, 198; satellite television, 166, 168; security forces, 157, 160, 185–187, 196; Supreme Constitutional Court, 198; Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), 160, 184, 187, 191–193, 196–197; surveillance, 165; text messaging, 171, 173, Twitter, 165, 169, 172, 173, 175, 191, 194; violence, 160, 186, 195; YouTube, 165, 171, 174, 175 Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), 183 Elections, 11, 12, 14; election fraud, 14, 22, 41. See also specific countries Ennahda, 228, 229, 231, 233–238 Essebsi, Beji Caid, 232, 235, 238 Ettakatol, 235, 236, 237 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), 136, 138, 179 European Union: democracy promotion, 45, 254. See also specific countries

Facebook, 1, 3, 4, 9, 17, 23, 25, 27–29, 43, 248, 250, 252. See also specific countries Filip, Pavel, 118, 132, 142 Flash mobs, 127, 218 Freedom and Justice Party, 193–194

Gazprom, 137 Georgia (former Soviet Republic), 14, 124, 167, 250 Ghannouchi, Mohamed, 230, 231, 232 Ghannouchi, Rached, 235, 236, 238 Ghonim, Wael, 1, 166, 172, 182, 193, 195 GOLOS, 61, 67, 87, 99 Google, 92, 99 Green Movement, 57–60

Habermas, Jurgen, 3–4 Heuristic case studies, 13–14 Heritage Party, 113, 114 High Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, for Political Reform, and Democratic Transition, 232 Hong Kong, 251, 257 Hovhannisian, Raffi, 113, 114, 120, 125 Hyde Park Association, 122

283

ICT. See information communication technology. iDitord project, 120 Information communication technology (ICT): defined, 2, 12; service blockages, 33–35, 69, 70–71, 254, 257. See also specific countries Information linkage, 31–32 Information monopoly, 21, 23–25, 248 Instagram, 251. See also specific countries International environment, 10, 44–45, 254. See also specific countries International linkages, 45 International Republican Institute, 185 Internet penetration, 25, 33, 100, 256. See also specific countries Iran, 12, 14, 16, 55–61, 100–102, 145– 147; 2009 protests, 252; 2017–2018 protests, 60–61, 63, 69, 72, 82–83, 95, 252; blogging, 64–65; censorship, 55, 68, 88–92; civil society, 73–75; coercive capacity, 80, 82; cyberattacks, 95; Cyber Crimes law, 90, 91; democratic diffusion, 68–69; economic conditions, 58–61, 75; election fraud, 57–58, 102n4; electronic surveillance, 57; Facebook, 65, 69, 89–91, 93–95; Green Movement protests, 57–60, 63, 69, 70–71, 81–82; ICT blockage, 69, 70– 71, 88, 91; Instagram, 65, 91; internet penetration, 64, 68, 69; legitimacy, 73, 94, 101; media control, 69; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 74; relationship with EU, 78; relationship with US, 78; security forces, 73, 79–82; strength of leader, 79–83; surveillance, 93–96; Telegram (messaging application), 61, 65, 69, 73, 82, 91; Twitter, 69, 70, 93, 95; virtual private networks (VPNs), 91 Iranian Cyber Army, 95 Iranian Revolution, 55–56, 75, 81, 95 Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), 56, 80–82, 89, 95 Iraq, 257 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 229, 241

Jebali, Hamadi, 233

284

Index

Jordan, 15

Kazakhstan, 16, 35, 200 Kefaya, 171, 181–182 Kelkel, 167 Khatami, Mohammad, 58–59, 79 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 58, 79–82 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 55–56, 80 Kocharyan, Robert, 112, 133, 140 Kulov, Felix, 159 Kyrgyzstan, 6, 14, 16, 20n51, 48, 124, 155–157; 2005 protests, 157–159, 162–163, 167, 170, 177–181, 250; 2010 protests, 157–160, 164, 167, 170–171, 177–181; blogs, 163, 164, 174; censorship, 162, 164; civil society, 156, 168, 178, 188; coercive capacity, 180; corruption, 158, 160, 180, 189–191; cyberattacks, 163; democratic diffusion, 167–168; demonstration effect, 167; disinformation campaigns, 189; economic conditions, 160; elections, 156, 158, 159, 167, 178; Facebook, 170, 171; ICT blockages, 163, 164, 176; independent media, 162–164; internet penetration, 162–163, 176; legacy of Soviet rule, 156, 167, 188– 189; legitimacy, 174, 177, 180; media control, 162–164; mobile phones, 170, 171; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 178, 188; patronage, 158, 189–191; press freedom, 162; relationship with EU, 179; relationship with Russia, 168, 179; relationship with UN, 174; relationship with US, 178–179; security forces, 158, 159, 180; Twitter, 164, 171, 174, 176; violence, 158, 159, 174, 189; VKontakte, 170

Labidi, Meherzia Maïza, 236 Lebanon, 14, 257 Legitimacy, 9, 24, 33, 36–39, 46–47. See also specific countries Libya, 15, 198, 239 Linkages, 78; defined, 45; with EU, 136, 138, 139; with France, 221; with Russia, 138, 179; with US, 138, 185

Maher, Ahmed, 182

Majlis (Iran), 60, 90 Manas military base, 159, 179 Marzouki, Moncef, 228, 233 Medvedev, Dmitri, 61, 67, 86 Military. See security forces Moldova, 6, 14, 16, 111, 145–147, 167; 2009 protests, 109, 115–117, 121– 122, 124–125, 127, 131–132, 140–141; 2015–2016 protests, 109, 117–118, 122–125, 129, 132, 141; blogging, 122, 127; censorship, 122; civil society, 129, 133–136; coercive capacity, 140; corruption, 116–117, 141–142; democratic diffusion, 124– 125; demonstration effect, 125; economic conditions, 116–117, 136– 138; election fraud, 115; Facebook, 122, 127, 128, 131; ICT blockage, 122, 128; internet penetration, 122; legacy of Soviet rule, 111, 117, 142; legitimacy, 133, 141; media control, 122; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 122, 129, 134–136; relationship with EU, 125, 131–132, 137, 139; relationship with Russia, 136–138; relationship with US, 139; security forces, 140–141; Skype, 128; SMS messaging, 127, 128; Twitter, 122, 128, 131; violence, 115, 128, 131, 132; Yahoo Messenger, 128 Morar, Natalya, 127, 128 Morsi, Mohamed, 191, 193, 194, 195, 197, 236 Mousavi, Mir Hosein, 57, 59, 65, 69, 74, 75 Moya Stolitsa Novosti (MSN), 158, 162, 163, 178 Mubarak, Hosni, 1, 13, 157, 185–187, 200n19; overthrow of, 1, 155, 160– 161 Mubarak, Gamal, 160, 200n19 Muslim Brotherhood, 161, 181, 182–184, 191, 193–195, 197, 203n20, 206n139, 236, 241 Myanmar, 1 My Step party, 145

Nagorno-Karabakh, 110, 137, 138, 140 Nashi, 98 National Constituent Assembly (NCA), 226, 228, 232, 233–237

Index National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (Conseil National de protection de la revolution, CNPR), 231, 232 National Democratic Party (NDP), 183 National Dialogue Quartet, 233–237 National Truth and Dignity Commission, 227 Nationalism, 37–38 NATO, 94, 97 Navalny, Alexei, 63, 66–67, 86, 92–93 Nawaat, 214–215, 218, 220, 228 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 200 Nidaa Tounes, 238–240 Nobel Peace Prize, 234 NGO Law (On Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation), 76 Novaya Gazeta, 97

Obama, Barack, 184–185, 220 Oil, 105n151; Azerbaijani, 146; Iranian, 59, 60, 75, 78, 79, 82; Kazakhstani, 200; Russian, 56 Organization for Security and Co– operation in Europe (OSCE), 61, 68–69, 110, 113, 178 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe Osh, 189 Otpor, 27, 167 Otunbaeva, Roza, 159

Party of Communists (PCRM), 115–116, 141 Pashinyan, Nikol, 114, 121, 126, 130, 143, 145 Patronal politics, 11, 36, 47. See also specific countries Patronal presidentialism, 11 Piata Marii Adunari Nationale (#pman), 128 Plahotniuc, Vladimir, 117–118, 122, 132, 133, 141–142 Platform for Dignity and Truth (political party), 129 Poland, 27 Political efficacy, 76 Political process model, 5 Pora, 41, 167 Postdemocratic governmentality, 4

285

Process tracing, 13 Propaganda, 9, 14, 35–39, 252 Public sphere, 3, 5, 40, 66, 175 Putin, Vladimir, 56, 61–63, 67, 83–87

Qatar, 240

Radio Azattyk, 162, 163, 164 Radio Azatutyun, 123 Radio Europa Libera, 124 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 121, 123, 124, 162, 163, 167–168, 178 Random packet dropping, 89 RCD. See Democratic Constitutional Rally Regime durability, 33 Regime outcomes, 7–11, 15–16, 39–40, 48, 49, 254–256, 258 Republican Party of Armenia (HHK), 111, 112, 114, 144 Revolutionary Front, 195 Revolutionary regime, 46, 56, 73, 253 Romania, 45, 125, 141 Roskomnadzor ((Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media), 92–93 Russia, 6, 14, 16, 38, 55–57; 61–63, 66– 67, 100–102; 2011–2012 protests, 61–63, 66–67, 69–70, 72–73, 86, 87; blogging, 66–67, 93; censorship, 88, 92–93, 100; civil society, 73, 75–77, 87; coercive capacity, 83–87; corruption, 62; cyberattacks, 99–100; democratic diffusion, 69–70; disinformation campaigns, 98; economic conditions, 56, 62, 85; electoral fraud, 61–63, 67, 86; Facebook, 70; ICT blockage, 92–93, 96; internet penetration, 66; legacy of Soviet Union, 76, 96; legitimacy, 97, 101; LiveJournal, 66, 97; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 61, 68, 76, 77; patronal politics, 73, 88; political efficacy, 76; press freedom, 56, 85; propaganda, 85, 96–98; relationship with EU, 78– 79; relationship with US, 78; surveillance, 92, 96–99; System of Operative Investigative Measures (SORM), 96; SORM–3, 96; trolling,

286

Index

97–99; Twitter, 66, 70, 87, 97; VKontakte, 66, 69, 92, 97

Sadat, Anwar, 157 Sargsyan, Serzh, 111–114, 119, 123, 130, 133, 140, 144, 239 Saudi Arabia, 1, 14, 33, 198, 240, 252 Security forces, 10, 31, 32, 46, 47. See also specific countries Serbia, 27, 167 Shallow inspection, 89 Shiite, 80 SHOMA, 90, 94 Sidi Bouzid, 210, 222 Short Messaging Service (SMS), 12, 29. See also specific countries Slovakia, 45 Social movement theory, 5–7, 26 Soft war, 94–95 Sudan, 257 Supreme Leader, 56, 73, 79 Surveillance, 9, 12, 14, 35–39, 53n90, 252. See also specific countries Syria, 15, 198, 229

Tahrir Square, 28, 181, 182, 183, 187, 191 Tajikistan, 189 Tamarod, 194 Technocratic government, 234, 235, 238 Telecommunicational–Informational capitalism, 5 Telegram (messaging app), 251. See also specific countries Teleradio–Moldova (TRM), 121 Ter–Petrossian, Levon, 111–112, 119, 130, 140 Theocracy, 56, 64, 73, 79, 253; defined, 12 ThinkMoldova, 127 Totalitarianism, 11, 77 Transnational advocacy networks, 27 Transnistra, 111, 117, 137, 141 Trolling, 38, 53n104, 57; troll factories, 1, 97–99 TUNeZINE, 214 Tunisia, 13, 14, 16, 48, 168–170; 2008 Gafsa protests, 213, 217, 222, 223; 2010–2011 protests, 209–213, 216– 220, 222–223, 240; 2103 protests, 231–232, 237; blogging, 214–217, 219, 223, 228; censorship, 214–216,

218, 228; civil society, 210, 221–223, 227, 230–235; coercive capacity, 220, 224; corruption, 209, 211, 212, 227, 239; cyberactivism, 214; demonstration effect, 218; economic conditions, 209, 210, 211, 213, 221, 225, 230, 239; elections, 226, 232; Facebook, 213, 216–220, 227–229, 232; ICT blockages, 215–216; internet penetration, 214; legitimacy, 212, 220, 221, 224; mobile phones, 214, 216; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 241; press freedom, 214; relationship with EU, 218; relationship with France, 209, 220, 221; relationship with autocratic states, 239–240; relationship with US, 218, 220; satellite television, 217; security forces, 210, 211–212, 218, 222–227, 231, 235; SMS service, 217; terrorism, 239; Tunisia in White protest, 218; Twitter, 218, 219, 228; violence, 210, 211, 213, 219, 221, 231, 233; YouTube, 216, 217, 220 Tunisian Bar Association, 210, 211, 221, 223, 240 Tunisian General Labor Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, UGTT), 221–223, 230, 232, 233–234, 240 Tunisian Human Rights League, 234 Turkey, 15, 20n48, 113, 137 Turkmenistan, 14, 156, 257 TV Dohzd, 100 Twitter, 3, 29, 251. See also specific countries

UGTT. See Tunisian General Labor Union Ukraine, 15, 41, 78, 93, 97–99, 125, 167168, 250 United Russia, 61, 63, 66–67, 86 United States, 62, 25, 254. See also specific countries USAID. See US Agency for International Development US Agency for International Development (USAID), 75, 76, 125, 139, 178 UTICA. See Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts

Index Uzbekistan, 31, 189, 257; Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, 189

Velayat-e faqih, 80 Vkontakte, 66, 69, 92, 97, 170 Virtual private network (VPN), 91 Voronin, Vladimir, 116, 121, 133, 140– 141

We Are All Khaled Said, 166, 172, 175, 182, 195

WikiLeaks, 186, 212 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) conference, 214

287

Yemen, 14, 15 “Yezzi fock” (“enough is enough”), 215 YouTube, 30, 71. See also specific countries

-Z- (cartoonist), 216

About the Book

How do autocratic governments exploit communication technology in their efforts to maintain power? Can prodemocracy activists successfully use that same technology to support the overthrow of autocratic rulers? Rachel Vanderhill addresses these two questions, exploring in detail how social media are both aiding and undermining autocratic regimes in the Middle East, North Africa, and the former Soviet republics. Rachel Vanderhill is associate professor in the Department of Govern-

ment and International Affairs at Wofford College.

289