Atomic Imperialism: The State, Monopoly, and the Bomb

Citation preview

.(

ON THE INTERNATIONAL ryoMrc

ENERGY AND SOCTETY

Allen

LIST

Atomic Imperiolism

Jameg S. Allen

An oppraisal of the social significance of afomic energy and tho conflicf over iis conirol. Clofh, $1.25; Poper, 50c

WORLD MONOPOLY AND PEACE James S. Allen A siimulaiing book about the main economic forces shaping tho world today.

-.1

Trade, $3.00; Pop., $2.50

C

RECONSTRUCTION. THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY James S. Allen

A

detailed and peneirating

analysis

CivilWar.

of the period following ihe Trade, $2.00; Pop., $ 1.50

H =

o

AMERICAN TRADE UNIONISM William Z. Fosfer Strafegy and tacfics, principles and organization. Thiriy years of frade union history in the making. Trade, $3.50; Pop., $2.85

H

K tu

MONOPOLY TODAY Labor Research Association An up-to-date sludy of fhe greaf financial combines and their influence on the American siandard of living. Cloth, $ 1.50; Paper, 90c

w H

duciivity, wages, ond surplus value in the U.S.

tr tH

Clo+h, $ I .50; Paper, 75c

Labor Research Association This latest volume in the biennial series includes informaiion on economic and social conditions, the irade union movemenf, and a special chapter on fhe fighf for peace. Trade, $2.50; Pop., $2.00

NEGRO

IO

LIBERATION

Govemment qnd the bomb business . Morgon, du Pont, cnd Rockefeller in the workl ccrtel ... . Urcnium rush . . . Science crnd wcn .'. . Forced lcrbor in Africc . . . Bcnuch Plcrn . . . People crgainst the bomb

UI

K

Harry Haywood

A fundamental sfudy of the Negro queslion in ihe

By JAMES S ALLEN

frj

TRENDS lN AMERICAN CAPITALISM Labor Research Association A basic analysis of the movement of profits, capital formaiion, pro-

LABOR FACT BOOK

The Stote, Monopoly, ond the Bomb

U.S.

Cloih, $2.75; Paper, $1.00 BRITAIN'S CRISIS OF EMPIRE R. Palme Dult Britain's crisis analyzed as part of the crisis of the imperialist system. $r.2s

s$t

z&

INTERN4TTONAL PUBLTSH ERS 38I FOURTH AVENIIE NEW YORK

"*|F

El

16,

Internqtioncl

N. Y.

Pr:blishers

{

ft

INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK

ATOMIC I MPERIALISM

BY THE SAME AUTHOR: Atomic EnergY aad Societlt

l7orld MonoPofu

The State,

and' Peace

Monopoly, and the Bomb

Tbe Econonic Ctisis and tbe Cold. Var (Editor)

Reconsrrurion, the Battle f or Dernoctacy

Tlte Neero Qaestion in the llnited

States

By JAMES S. ALLEN

ffi INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS, NE\T YORK

CONTEI{TS rutluclion I'AI( I' I 'T'HE STATE CARTEL

I

CoPYRTGHT,1952, sY TNTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS CO.' INC,

I

IN THE U.S.A.

'l'lte Neut Munitions

lnd,ustry

L,

Srrrtc Capitalism at the Peak, 16; The $Tartime Project, 18

', llltpcr Structure of Control,

25

l)ccision to IJse the Bomb,25; Setting the \7odd Control f irtrcrn, 30; A.E.C. as Civilian Ercnt, 33; The Lilienthal

le though less potent weapons. Korea was ,lr r,rrr.rrt'rl Lry the massed air power of the United States using con'nrun.rl lrornbs which produced the same total effect as might be r r;xr r.tl frorn fewer atomic missiles, but the result has been a long rrrrlrr,ry srllcrnate. Obvior.rsly, there are other factors, even more iml{,rr,rrr tlnn the tecirniques empioyed, sr-ich as the people's will to fight rr rr lu\r crrLrsc, which together decide the outcome. 1',,',lr;, srvt' c':rprcity cannor

I lrr nrost sobering influence upon the atomocracy is the certainry ,,1 rt.r.rlirrtion by the same rneans should the United States launch .rrr11i1i1 s111f1rc.

,lr

Io

1949 an atomic-type explosion

in the Soviet Union,

rrrrr.rl by instruments abroad and confirmed by an official Soviet

.ir,rr('nr('r)r, showed conclusively that the U.S.S.R. had the bomb. Another r' ,,r ()l rn (rtomic weapon in the Soviet Union and a press interview with ',r,rlrr on October 6, L9>I, indicated the U.S.S.R. was keeping pace

rirrlr rlrc Unircd States in the development of a vaiety of atomic \\,,rlr()ns. In his interview Staiin put the matter succinctly: "The belr,r'r'rs in the atomic bomb might consent to the prohibition of atomic \\'r',rlx)ns only when they see that they are no longer the monopolists." 'l'lrus, the American people can expect neither security nor easy vicr,ry 111;1n atomic weapons. On the contrary, the net effect of the armarr.nr nrce which the American governmeot is intent upon pursuing, 11 r() cxpose us to direct retaliation by the same terrible means which rlrr irromoclacy counts upon to terrorize the world. l,or the first time since the Civil V/ar the homeland would become ,r rlr('irter of war if the leaders of atomic imperiaiism have their way. t )rrr' 1'rcople have never really tasted modern war. \7e went through

it ffitr.-,*

10

INTRODUCI'ION

ATOMIC IMPERIALISM

*a*ly *ill 1'rovi,lc the major ground forces for the European bartlefield, relt:ving rlre Ilnircil States of rhe necessitl, of sending many divisions.

fwo wof!.[ vars pfscricaily unscathed, the native land secure, fr'ee from direct attack. To sense how the situation has changed, it is only necessary ta look at our exposed cities plastered with signs pointing to bomb shelters, and at the elaborate warning and drill systems. Guided missiles, transcontinental bombers, improved Schnorkels and other carriers of atomic explosives can come our way also' Global bases will no mofe scfeen our shores than the world-girdling military ourposrs of the British Empire saved London from a raifl of death during the last war. It is impossible to maintain an impenetrable defense along our thousands of miles of coastline or along ouf extensive land borders. Ve cannot disperse or move underground our gfear indusrrial centers and congested cities. The civilian defense progru* u...p,t the premise that in time of war the mass of people would be rnore or less where they are now, and it is not pretended that more than a tiny fraction of the urban population can be moved'

I lurf

fonction Japan is to assume u[der the separate ffeaty, and a role it has already played in the Korean war, although the policy on the Nofth Korean side of limiting the conflict saved them from retaliation' It is the assumption of the Atlantic Pacr that France and ltrest Gef-

itr tlrc irrsistcnr

demands

,f

of the American government and grants

l,illinrli of .lrlltrs, the expected mass armies are still not forthcoming, rlrr: "lirrrolrt.;rn rrmy" of over two score divisions is non-existent. In-

e*',r'|,

'r,l,litiorrll American rroops have been dispatched to Europe to ;,r"vl,lr tlrc gcnerals of the North Alantic Treaty Organization wirh

s'lre ",lrltcrrrlable" soldiers.

l'lre lrrrt rcrnains that the people are so fundamentally opposed to rlrc entitr t.ourse of policy that whatever forces are mustered, American rir liruolx'irn, find themselves in the midst of unfriendly reffitory. The ;rrargrlr of rhe Communist parties in western Europe bespeaks the great orgirtrizccl opposition to the contemplated war, especially among rlre workirrg people. Under powerful popular pressure for peace, even , lrrqrrvutive political circles edge toward neutraliry, especially since the valrre of the American alliance is so dubious and the sacrifice of narinrrrrt irrlrrrcst demanded by the United States is so great. ()lrvirxrsly, other nations are not ready to do the fighting and dying il rlre irrrcrcsts of United States imperialisrn. The Korean war revealed rn rlrr Arncrican people the deception inherent in the war program. Irr rrrrrrs of clirect military participation, the corrtribution of the Atlantic nllit,s in this criminal venture was negligible. Aside from the South |ioreurrs themselves, Americans have borne the brunt of the fighting, ,lrrrrng the fust year su$ering bamle casualties which exceeded the lrrrncr sustained by Americao armed forces in the first year of conflict

Nor can we expect other nations to absorb the shocks of q/ar for us' The elaborate srfucrufe of alliances which atomic diplomacy is busy tr:ying to erect is flimsy, unstable, and undependable. It is built on the quicksand of aggressive imperiaiist ambitions and has no feal or lasting support among the peoples. These "defense alliances" require orher nations to submit to the policies of the united states, which is

already thoroughly hated by broad sectors of their populations. The burden of national armament demanded of each North Atlantic bloc ally is becoming unbearable, necessitating severe cuts in the standatd of living and increasing inner strains to a critical point. The mustering of neo-Nazis and former collaborators with the Axis in support of the American progfam places the united srates on the sarne level a.s their late enerny in the minds of the people. Above all, the people are alarmed at the danger to which their homelands are exposed. The British do not relish the role their land has been assigned by the Atlantic Pact generals, as a stationary catfiet for American air armadas, in this fixed position inevitably subject to attack from relativeiy neafby bases. Nor can the Japanese accept with composufe a similar role as the ofishore base for American forces, the

11

'

trr rhe Pacific during \fodd \Var II. This may well prove the pattern lnr irrry war, big or small, instigated by the atomocracy. lrulracient with the uncettain and unstable allies of the Atlantic bloc, rr rrr()ng trend within the warmaking oligarchy would drastically cut Irrrrrrrciul and arms aid to these countries and concentrate entirely upon rlre totiil armament of the United States. General Douglas MacArthur r rlr outstanding representative of the go-it-alone trend. The general rr,rrtcncled that nothing short of an atomic attack upon China would qlllicc to finish the war in Korea, even at the admitted risk of war with the Soviet Union, which has a mutual assistance treaty with China. Alrhough MacArthur was dismissed from his command in the Far llrnt, no cause for relief could be found in the reply of the Chiefs of Srrrfl ro his arguments. They rurned down the proposal to atom-bomb

72

China on the ground that atomic missiles should not be squandered on a secondary objective when all such weapons s,'ould be needed to strike at the Sovier Union. As for other issues raised in the dispute, the Administration, oriented toward Europe as the main theater of war, felt it importanr to build up aliies, and wanrecl more time to mounr a majot war. By and large, the extended discussions around the dismissal of MacArthur revealed that the difierences exisring at the top, while sharp, were mainly of tactical and partisan narure. Both sides argued within the framework ^ of a war program, whether the go-it-alone immediate war advocated by MacArthur or the coalition war of aggression sought by the dominant policy-makers. Neither side assessed correctly the great power of the peoples now resisting the war provocation and the power of additional millions who will be arrayed against the United States should it come to war. SZar preparations are proving detrimental ro the American people. The massive arms budget burdens them with taxes and sends the cost

of living saaring. \far-inspired inflarion is already playiag havoc with

the economy, and unemployment is growing in civilian indusuy. Fearful of increasing internal stress and economic decline despite the high arms budget, some monopoly circles show signs of leaning toward a slower pace of war preparations. Among orhefs, this tendency q/as expressed by Phiiip D. Reed, chairman of General Electric Co., which plays the leading role in both the central mobilization agency of the government and in the atomic enterprise. In a speech before a gathering of American and European industrialists in New york on December 5, I95I, he calied for some reducrion in arms spending and urged allowing more time, another rwo or four years, to complete the armament program. Fointing to the dangers threatening from inflation throughout the Atlantic bloc countries, he also advocated small reductions in their arms programs. Contrary to everything that has been said in justification of the war hysteria, Reed declared that all evidence indicated "Russia will not deiiberateiy precipitate another world war within the foreseeable future." Despite this rend, the Adminiscation conrinues to expand military production. The new budget submitted by the president in January 1952, and the arms proglam projected for the yeaq would impose addi tional and onerous burdens upon the people. There is to be more guns, less butter.

INTRODUCTION

AToMIC IMPERIALISM

13

I lrher rkrrrre$tic preparations for war indicate the heavy price in l.=c rrf rlrrru)crntic liberties to be exacted from the American people, ll*.rurr ro rcirction is sharp. As the state becomes increasingly miliru*r*.,1, rlre cstablished constirutional guarantees of civil liberties ate +er.rely rrntlcrrnined, the rights of rade unions are drastically circum+tlrrl I'y urrti-labor laws, and the Negro people are subjr;cted to more =. =rrFrF lrnrccution. The most drastic step, involving thCl nullification ,'l rhe llill of ltights, is the imprisonment of Communi* leaders for rlr nrrc utlvocacy of ideas, rendering their party practically illegal, afll 1rlxl ittg under the threat of persecudon anyone opposd to ttre war ;rrlh y, ro tlrc resulting cuts in living standards, and to tlrn flagrant disreH*rrl of thc Constirution. llre wur danger is very serious. But war itself is not inevitable. The Errvlct llniou offers to negotiate at every important point, and also ir+lr a cornprehensive sefilement of all major questioru at issug on rlrr lrnrlc prcmise that both social systems can coexist in pace. Neither il tlre itrtcrnal situation nor in the foreign requirements of the Soviet

lllutr ir there anything that impels it toward war. It is engaged in great projects at hom€, designed to obliterate the last traces of 'teye'Lrlrrnctrc tlre telrnt devastating conflict, and to increase the well-being of the 'l'he United States is threatened by no one. lr€111116, I

hrr nursr pressing difficuldes at home and abroad are caused by the l*lllgrrenr and aggressive program of the leaders of atomic imperialism. l}o grcnt opposition these policies encounter throughout the world rlxnrld bc welcomed by the American peoplg for we are thus granted lr ntltlitional opporrunity to halt the mad rush toward war. Let the l,arplc exert their will for peace, and national poliry will be influenced Irr the tlirecrion of negotiations with the Soviet Union for a mutually uthfuctory solution of outstanding difrerences. 'llris book is essentially a study of the atomic enterprise in its ecotlonric and political aspects. By throwing some light on the source of l*cicnt war policies it is hoped the work may contribute to the rtnrggle for peace. Certain social phases of atomic €nergt, especially In great constructive potential, were treated by the author in his l'rxtk, Atomic Eneryy and, Society, and this ground is not covered again (

ln the present work. lsnuary, 1952

J.S.A.

PART

!.

I THE STATB CARTEL

The New Munitions Industry

'l'llll ATOMIC \TEAPONS industry is big. In the words of lt' W Waymnck, for a time an Atomic Energy Commissionet, "A new lrur suddenly appeared, of huge staftrre when fust unveiled, €l'r*lng irr overall dimensions by the hour, already by conventional l*1.1s111;t

r*rF*rurrnents the biggest single industry we have. It ramifies throughi,rr rlre.(ntnrry and in no negligible sense throughout the economy."t I lrtr lrirherto secrer enterprise was announced to the world when rlre errrl lrrrxlrrcr was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Havi*g rlrr! tlemonstrated the success of its commodity, the new industry, ,;ntll llren largely experimental, turned with confidence to the manuf+;nrre of more and "better" weapons. l'lrp wnr's end made no difference. The industry boomed. Peace *r un'lcr'nt(x)d by the real managers of the enterprise required more l*rnrlrr. ln live posrwar years, while American diplomats v/ere prolerrirrg thc highest humanitarian aims, more capital was invested in crl"ruion of weapons production than had been expended during the *'rr irr thc establishment of the nuclear project. Ity rhc end of 1950 almost $5 billion had been appropriated by r|1e ;4overnment for nuclear weapons, and a supplementaly appropriariuu of over $1 billion was before Congress. When the Atomic Energy (iommission took over from the Army in January 1947, the in,lrrrtry represented a total capital outlay of $Z.Z bitlion during a lrcrlrxl of seven years, but mostly since t943. In the following four ye'rru the known appropriations for atomic munitions reached $2.6 lrillion. Including the supplementary appropriation, total grants for rlrr fiscal year 191O-1951 alone would reach $2.3 billion, or more tharr the entire cost of the wartime prol'ect.* On a very liberal interpre-

rntion possibly eight to ten per cent of the total may have been devn(r(l to exploring the constructive uses of atomic energy, although

.lkrr the 6scal year 7951-52, the A.E.C. requested another 91.2 billion, and rLF Ectual appropriations are likely to be higher than that, bringing the total lrrrr ussigned for atomic weapons to about $B billion by mid-1952. 15

16

.I'IIII NEW MUNITIONS INDUSTAY

AToMrc IMpBnIALTSM

of the activities in this

sphere indirectly serve the weapons program.' For all practical pruposes, atomics is totally militatized. The supreme munitions industry comprises an integrated system of production plants, laboratories, and testing facilities which is probabiy the most complex economic and scientific enterprise in the Unitecl States. The multiple operations connected with the production of nuclear explosives are carried on in some two score separat€ installations in at least 24 states and include the weapons proving ground at the Enivretok Atoll ia the Pacific. The land area occupied by these undertakings totals about 3,000 square miles (larger than the states of Rhode Island and Delaware combined). Scores of industries provide

many

equipment and materials. The largest industrial corporations

are

among the managers and conffacrors of the enterprise, while practically every major research and engineering institute has been drawn into its development. In the industry proper over 100,000 people are employed, 19 out of 20 by the private corporations which manage the undertaking for the government. New consffuction of nuclear fa-

cilities after the war was the largest single operation in rhe

counmy.

The combine reaches into a dozen counries for uranium ores and other raw materials, while the frantic search for new sources extends into many mofe, Immediately or potentially the atomic technology affects the estab-

lished economic interests

in

such diverse fields as electric power, drugs, transportation, explosives, fertilizer, oil, coal, medicine, steel, food, servo-mechanisms. It impinges upon the nerwork of corporate relations at the most important points. Vith the expansions under way in I95L, the atomic bomb enterprise will have a larger investment in plant and equipment than U.S. Steel and General Motors combined.

State Capitalism at tbe Peak Atomics is not only big industry, it is also big business. It is big to the apex of state monopoly, and from that pinnacle commanding the vast new technology and its far-flung economic and political offshoots. State ownership with corpof,are control is the central characteristic of the organization of the new rnunitions industry. It is state enterprise under the control of big business, the merger of the state and corporate structures at the zenith. It rypifies state monopoly capitalism at maturity. business raised

L7

l*r rlrlr llrrrerl stare-corpofate undertaking the structure of cootrol .r .,.r'l,ler ( iovcrnment agencies and privare corpofations intef.. i,:clF lr ,rll yrlrtses, ranging from the formulation of poliry and i i..€r+rrr rl tlrc adlninistration and management of opefatioos' Pef. ..,,'l ,i|r,l lrrttction are closely intetwoven, with a certain division of

i'!,'.r l,rtwn'rr tltc government

apparatus and the private corpofations' l ..F nrer'rr rcllccts the complexiry of the monopoly stlucture and also .r,€ il{rirnrc futtctioning of the state as an instrumeot for the trusti-

ri,d.r,lr ,,1 tlre cconomy. There is nothing static ailout this systern, .. l';,lr rFd( rs scnsitively to rivalries ajnong monopoly grollps ancl to ,r.. ,'il{ilr rwists of domestic and foreign poliry. But the funda-.:,.rrrrl lr',rlutc remains unchanged-the fusion of the state with the ',l.r,r{re 3lnrctufe at a level never before reached in this countfy. l lrir,lrvtkrptnent serves as the base of reaction, tending in the direc'ir:q*

rrf lirrr isrrr, unless the people are able to meet this threat effectively.

rr,, ,t,lv,rr(r',1 coalescence of state and monopoly is the central material ...,,.liri,n lor the open and aggressive dictatorship of big capital, which r: rlrr r,i\cllcc of the fascist forrn of state. No strict parallel can be r!'E.rr llrtwccu the development of reaction in the United States and !!:, [,r,,(r'.s by which the Nazis came to power in Germany, where '!.i rr,r5r lirrrltical party of fascism, the uncetemonious overthrow of the ,l'l rlrntirution, and the appearance of the personal dictator were !,,,ir, trtililiti. I l, rrrrrrts and trends along these lines can be found in the United r,rr, I ,rlso, but reaction continues to oPerate within a fmmework *ll, lr retrrins many of the outer forms of democracy. However, the .i,f lilrrt.trrre of the state is increasingly affected by its militarization As events them=rr,l l,I grcat centralization under monopoly control. u, lvrr,lt.rnonstrare, rhe content and result of this development in the I !lrtr.,l Stares can be no less perilous than the fascist form of reaction .i \1,r' lincw it in Getmany. How fat the Process will proceed toward , f,rr isr-(ype state in our country depends primarily upon the people's

,. it'ir;ilI(c to the war pfogfam. lire irtom bomb business is the furrhest advance of the orgaoic t,,r, i,,r trcnd in the United States. It may be considered a protorype ,,1 lrrsrisrn within a country which as a whole is beginning to trose its ,,,,,lrrionirl democratic forrn' This "mixed" enterprise was rhe first r', l)crfcct the system of thought control, loyaity tests, dossiers, F.B.I' .,[veillance, and othef pfactices of the police srate which have ra-

18

AToMrc

TMPERTALTSM

I

diated out to affect the country in general. The most thorough co ordination of labor prevails throughout the enterprise, in tle form ol a glorified company unionism. Basic science and the institutions ol higher learning are subverted to the military program by the hierarchy of corporate magnates, professional militarists, and military scientists ruling the indusuy. The complete militarization of atomics fort: shadowed the permanent militarization of the country which is now

.-,,=

.r,i,

In its general

The atom bomb has become a symbol of the policy of might. It gavc rise to a new school of "blitz" war, dazzled by dreams of instantaneous victory resulting from atomic dosing of cities, regions, and entirc countries. If in more realistic circles the fantasy of total victory in a "preventive" war was nor so readily accepted, the threat of mass atomic annihilation remained a cornerstone of national policy. Dollar diplomacy characterized the previous wave of expansion after the 6rst \7orld \Var. Atomic diplomacy is rhe earmark of rhe presenr dtive for world hegemony. Not thar dollar diplomacy is now absent. It plays a central role, but this time in conjunction with all the appurtenances of imperialist power at the peak, especially in its strategic and milirary aspects.

MUNITIONS INDUSTRY

19

attack l,rrxluction facilities were well advanced. The

I -.

, r

sritlt{)ilS.

r,'

,rr rlris clrly stage the features which came to characerize the r'r,lurrry wcre already apParent. Politically the most important .tt,,r w,rr to keep the project a top Anglo-American secret' As far

r

i t *r {lrtrrlrcr Il, L94l-before the United States entered the war I,.i,lr'rrr l{oosevelt suggested to Churchill that the British and

rllorts be co-ordinated or even iointly conducted.s By June rr,,rr,litrg to Churchill, there was an understanding berween the lr,,iirl1 1'rrrnc rninister and Roosevelt that the results of the project - r.t r,, l,e frrlly shared by the two countries as equal partners.4 This r,rrr rir rrrr

r

,l'

,,''l-rrr,rnrlrrg apparently was confumed and formalized at the Quebec r ...t,'r.'rr r of August 1943, wher- Roosevelt and Churchill, with the | {lir rlt'rti()n of Prime Minister MacKenzie King of Canada, arranged l,,r rlr tr,rnsfer of the British nuclear scientists to the American unI',rdlrrll, rrttd the co-ordination of the Canadian effort (principally

:nlr rrrl)ect to raw material but also including the experimental -,,r! rr Monueal) with the major enterprise in the United States.

The l{/artime Proiect The groundwork for the presenr atomic cartel was prepared during the war. By the end of the world conflict the basic structure of the industry was already in being, and the framework of the state cartel erected. Therefore, before examining the consolidation and expansion of the atom bomb business after the war, with which the rest of this book is concerned, it is necessary to outline briefly the principal characteristics of the wartime ptoiect. The establishment of the industry may be divided into rwo stages: the period of incubation, from I94O to 1942; and the construction

of the industry,1943 to

1945. During the initial period, organized research in both Britain and the United States came to rhe conclusion that an atom bomb was feasible. By the end of 1942 it was demonstrated that large-scale production of

the nuclear componenrs of the bomb was immediately possible,

rlr

NUID(/

t.=,1 ll,rrl,,rr in December l94L md the direct involvement of the ' '. | ',s'111 '. irr rhc global cooflict accelerated the entire Proiect' i i .',r.,rr r,,.s of this country from theaters of warr the peripheral ' .,1 rl' llrritcd States in the conflict as a whole, and cornmand t !:,:!,r r.qr )ilr(cs, only part of which were committed, enabled the i .:r; l',rrrt.'t ro undertake the "all-out" and massive effort to produce

proceeding.

impact upon American thought the atom boml.r business inspired only decadence, and brutalized the human spirit.

l.,r

IIIJ

and

l

lrr sovier Union was completely excluded. Irr Volume IV of his war memoirs, Churchill tells of his trip to Mos-

August 1942to inform Stalin that the Second Front would not l,r' l,rrrrrthcd that year. This was the first of a series of Postponements rlrrt lrlnced the major burden of the v/af, uPon the Soviet Union. N'vrrlrclcss, according to the Prime minister, Stalin offered to provide rlr,, tlritish with all information about the new Russian rocket mortars, *n,l rrrggested an agreement among the allies to exchaoge information invcntions. Churchill teplied that he was leady to give every-

rrrlv

i11

"l*,rrr

rlrlrrg wichout bargaining except for such devices as may be carried in *lrgrlrrrrcs and if shot down by the eoemy would make the British l,orrrbing of Germany more difficult. This understanding was acceptd lry lxrth sides.u Not a word did Churchill say about the preparatory wlrk on the atom bomb, by then well advanced io Britain and Amert r, which were beginning to co-ordinate their seltarlte efforts. If by

20

ATOMIC IMPERIALISM

IIIN NE\'7 MUNITIONS INDUSTRY

his exception Churchill meanr to exclude the then still theoreti,,,l atornic bomb, which is not merely anorher "device" bo, iouolt"t 'r,, entirely new technology of paramount military and indusuial valrr, he kept this hidden from Stalin.

It is obvious, therefore, that from the very inception the atontr, project was kept strictly an Anglo-American affair, foreshadowirrl tire postwar diplomacy rhar was to split the anti-Hitler alliance. $Tithil the framework of the warrime coalition, the Anglo-American birx was preparing a supreme weapon which, it was hoped, would endou' this combination with overwhelming military might ais 2 als the Sovicr Union. I-he post-war speeches of Churchill confirm that this concepr iater formalized in the Atlantic Alliance, played a decisive role in tlrt'

,

war policy of the western powers.

\X/ith respect to the or.ganization and control of the new industry the most important step was to concentrate the effoft in the Uniterl States. In view of their own exposed and precarious position, an(l the superior material advantages of the United States, the Britislr came along with this plan. Thus, from the very beginning, the patteln was established for the American monopoly of the new weapon. \fith the Soviet Union excluded and the United States assured complete control of the projected weapon, the organization of thc new industry was undertaken with vigor.

An outstanding feature of the initial phase q/as the rnobilization of science fot war. As matters stood in l)40, according to Henry D. Smyth, the official chronicler of the atomic prol'ect, "Americanborn nuclear physicists were so uoaccustomed to the idea of using their science for military purposes that they hardly realized what to be clone,"6 although the necessary scientific knowledge for making the bomb v/as at hand. The initiative was taken by leading European scientists, who had sought refuge from fascism in the United States. Recognizing the weapons potential of atomic fission and fearing that Hitler might be the fust to develop the terrible weapon, they urged the American authorities seriously to explore its possibilities. President Roosevelt was prevailed upon to grant government support to preliminary research, which proceeded on a relatively rninor scale, fu'st under the Advisory Committee on Uranium and then under the National Defense Research Council, when ir was needed

organized

in June 1940.

Research dragged along

at a more or less leisurely pace until De-

2L

: 'e, | 'll, tt'lretr tlte clecision was made to mohilize the necessary .. ,,, tlrtr lromb. 'fhis step was deeided by a group which 'r,rl'r . r, !n,)\\'n ;rs tlre'fop PolicT Committee, consisting of Presi' ii ..-, ri lr. Vicc-l)r'esi.lent $(allace, Secretary of lVar Stimson' t .! ',! rll N4;rrsltLll, and two science administrators prominently . :t. ! tr rlr tlrt' srrbscquent military mobilization of research: Vas. l!,,rlr ,,1 rlr