Asymmetric Federalism in India: Ethnicity, Development and Governance 9783031237270, 3031237277

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FEDERALISM AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS SERIES EDITORS: SOEREN KEIL · EVA MARIA BELSER

Asymmetric Federalism in India Ethnicity, Development and Governance Harihar Bhattacharyya

Federalism and Internal Conflicts

Series Editors Soeren Keil, Institute of Federalism, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland Eva Maria Belser, University of Freiburg, Freiburg, Switzerland

This series engages in the discussions on federalism as a tool of internal conflict resolution. Building on a growing body of literature on the use of federalism and territorial autonomy to solve ethnic, cultural, linguistic and identity conflicts, both in the West and in non-Western countries, this global series assesses to what extent different forms of federalism and territorial autonomy are being used as tools of conflict resolution and how successful these approaches are. We welcome proposals on theoretical debates, single case studies and short comparative pieces covering topics such as: • Federalism and peace-making in contemporary intra-state conflicts • The link between federalism and democratization in countries facing intra-state conflict • Secessionism, separatism, self-determination and power-sharing • Inter-group violence and the potential of federalism to transform conflicts • Successes and failures of federalism and other forms of territorial autonomy in post-conflict countries • Federalism, decentralisation and resource conflicts • Peace treaties, interim constitutions and permanent power sharing arrangements • The role of international actors in the promotion of federalism (and other forms of territorial autonomy) as tools of internal conflict resolution • Federalism and state-building • Federalism, democracy and minority protection For further information on the series and to submit a proposal for consideration, please get in touch with Ambra Finotello ambra.finotello@ palgrave.com, or series editors Soeren Keil [email protected] and Eva Maria Belser [email protected].

Harihar Bhattacharyya

Asymmetric Federalism in India Ethnicity, Development and Governance

Harihar Bhattacharyya Department of Political Science The University of Burdwan Burdwan, West Bengal, India

Federalism and Internal Conflicts ISBN 978-3-031-23726-3 ISBN 978-3-031-23727-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Westend61/Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Saswati and Sahon for their love, care and affection

Preface and Acknowledgements

As a study in Indian federalism rather than of this book is centrally concerned with India’s federal asymmetry, comprehensively and examines its effectiveness in resolving ethnic conflicts, protecting ethnic identity and delivering development and governance. Asymmetric federalism in India like federalism generally has been facing challenges since the onset of India’s neo-liberal reforms from 1991 and, more particularly, from 2014 when the BJP-led NDA came to power at the Centre. Federal asymmetry got a jolt after the abolition of Article 370 in 2019 and demotion of the State of Jammu & Kashmir to a Union Territory status with lesser territory. This was of course a part of the NDA electoral pledge but a lone case in India’s post-1950s political history and the history of federalism in India in particular. The most powerful challenge to federalism and asymmetric federalism was the radical transformation of a command economy to a market-driven economy since the 1990s. And yet, most of the institutions of federalism and asymmetric federalism in India were crafted in the days of the ‘socialistic’ public sector dominated economy, and the various financial assistances to the asymmetric States were more intelligible within the framework of the said political economy. Although the process of institutional reforms was under way since the early 1990s, and during the UPA governments in Delhi (2004–2014), the NDA governments have been since taking it further more aggressively and with political radicalism of the Right brand. The Planning Commission was abolished, and

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the NITI Aayog was formed with a different role; the GST was introduced; the Concept of Special Category State was done away with in 2018; the States were re-defined to be competitive and collaborative in pursuing a capitalist path of development with their new found freedom, not by constitutional amendments, or legislatively speaking, but by the fiat of executive federalism. In short, India is indeed passing through radical changes. There are articles and book chapters on asymmetric federalism in India, but a single book, and that too, as a comprehensive treatment, on the subject, is terra incognito in the existing literature on Indian federalism. This book rectifies this neglect and fills the gap. It is centrally preoccupied with the nature and role of various asymmetric institutions and methods in India’s federation building, and the functioning, and effectiveness of the same as ethnic conflict mechanisms, and protecting and promoting ethnic identity, delivering better development and governance with two particular case materials. I have asked new questions about understanding institutions: what does an institution deliver? What does it do? Why do institutions work, sometimes, and when they do not do so? Conceived within a dynamic neo-institutional perspective it is argued here that the successful working of representative political institutions including asymmetric institutions is contingent upon a positive interactive role of three factors: actors, institutions and content which in positive combination work better the institutions and vice-versa. Taking a larger perspective, I have offered a new expansive ambit to understand asymmetry in Indian federalism and show that an asymmetric method was followed by the States Reorganization Commission in recommending statehood to different ethnic elites. This book also offers updated detailed survey and statistical data as records of performances of the asymmetric States. Finally, there is a detailed examination of two sub-State level tribal self-governments as cases of federal asymmetry in this book and the book also makes a strong plea to consider a tier beyond the conventional two-tier federalism concept as prevalent in the existing knowledge. In drafting this book I have incurred debt to some persons and institutions as well as those who volunteered knowledge during field works in Assam and Tripura. The local research assistants in both the States have helped in conducting field works and collecting other data. I wish to record my thanks to Abhisek for extending hands of support in preparing some tables. The Librarian and other staff members of the Burdwan

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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University Central Library, particularly Dr. Kanchan Kamilya, have also helped in locating books and journal articles. The International Leverhulme Trust, UK, funded a four-year-long inter-universities project on ‘Continuity and Change in Indian Federalism’ which was based in Edinburgh University and led by Dr. Willfried Swenden of the Department of Politics and International Relation and of which I was a Lead Researcher for the North-East. Dr. Jhumpa Mukherjee, Assistant Professor, St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata, was also part of the above project as a Research Co-coordinator for the North-East and deserves thanks. Subrata K. Mitra has always stood by me and has been very encouraging. I wish to thank him for his continuous encouragement. Ambra and Soeren have been very helpful in the penultimate stage in making the passage to Palgrave Macmillan possible. I sincerely thank them. The other expert reviewer deserves thanks too for spotting some infelicities and problems of citations. I wish to record my sincere thanks to Aishwarya and Mathrus for their support in the penultimate days of production. Prof. Apurba Ghosh, and his colleagues in the Environment Science Department of Burdwan University have helped prepare the map for which thanks are due. My son Sahon has offered considerable editorial support for which he deserves thanks. Saswati has endured yet another book project and must no doubt wonder at times whether the academic in me shall ever retire. Finally, the views expressed in the book are my sole responsibility. Burdwan, India

Harihar Bhattacharyya

Praise for Asymmetric Federalism in India

“This book by Harihar Bhattacharyya addresses the issue of asymmetrical federalism in the Indian context in a perspective which is extremely provocative and stimulating for researchers. He makes it abundantly clear that India has, for historical as well as political reasons, made a clear break with the traditional understanding of federalism over the years and with the emergence of new identities the question of recognition has come to the forefront. He has very ably shown how the Indian polity seeks to face the challenge of asymmetrical federalism at the institutional level by focusing on the problem of governance.” —Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Former SurendraNath Banerjee Professor of Political Science, University of Calcutta, India “Professor Harihar Bhattacharya’s book is the first full-length comprehensive study of various aspects of asymmetrical federalism to take into consideration sub-national levels and made critical examination of institutional performance and relative effectiveness so far generally neglected. It is innovative and thought-provoking.” —M.P. Singh, Former Professor of Political Science, an erstwhile Resident National Fellow of Indian Institute of Advanced Study, India “The scholarly contributions of Professor Harihar Bhattacharyya have provided a valuable counterpoint over the past many years to the skepticism about the strength and viability of Indian democracy voiced by xi

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the western liberal establishment and its Indian acolytes. In this new book – redolent of the analytical rigour and meticulous fieldwork that one has come to expect from him – Bhattacharyya has taken his core argument about the Indian state at the heart of which lies a dynamic neo-institutional model of state-society relations further, by the way of India’s asymmetric federalism. As he cogently argues, in a country of continental dimensions, this specific feature of the federal system has functioned as an institutional nexus to link regional and subregional units of vastly different size and institutional depth into a web of power-sharing, empowerment and accountability. This is how the post-colonial state successfully transformed subjects into citizens, rebels into stakeholders and pulled peripheral units into the national mainstream. This important book is destined to become a vital addition to the growing literature on federalism and democratisation in India.” —Subrata K. Mitra, Professor Emeritus, University of Heidelberg, Germany

Contents

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1

Introduction

2

Concept of Asymmetric Federalism and the Politics of Recognition

21

3

Founding Moment (1946–56)

39

4

Federal Asymmetry in India and Various Forms

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5

Politics of Fiscal Asymmetry in India

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6

Ethnic Cleavages and Federal Asymmetry

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7

The Making and Unmaking of the Special Category States in India

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8

Asymmetry Within Asymmetry in India

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9

The Working of Sub-State Federal Asymmerty in Tripura

115

Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts in Assam

141

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CONTENTS

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A Comparative Assessment of Asymmetric Federalism in India

163

Conclusion

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12

Bibliography

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Index

209

Abbreviations

AASU ABSS ABSU ADC AFSPA AGP AHDC AHDR BAC BLT BPF BSF BTAD BTC CA CAD CCP CEM CEO CH CPI CPI-M DGHC DoNER HDI INC

All Assam Students Union Obor Surokha Samity All Bodo Students Union Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council Armed Forces Special Powers Act Ahom Gana Parishad Autonomous Hill District Council Assam Human Development Report Bodoland Autonomous Council Bodoland Liberation Tigers Bodoland People’s Front Border Security Force Bodoland Territorial Districts Bodoland Territorial Council Constituent Assembly Constituent Assembly Debates Chief Commissioner Province Chief Executive Member Chief Executive Offer Conferatio Helvetica Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Department of the Development of North Easter Region Human Development Index (UNDP) Indian National Congress xv

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ABBREVIATIONS

J&K JVP LF MDNER MNGERGA NDA NDFB NEDA NGO NITI Aayog NLFT NSCM-IM PCTA PEI PIB SRC TMC TNV ToR TUJS ULFA UPA USSR

Jammu and Kashmir Jawaharlal Vallavbhai P. Sitaramiyya (committee of the CA) Left Front Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Act National Democratic Alliance Nationalist Democratic Front of Bodoland North-East Democratic Alliance Non-Government Organization National Institute for Transforming India Nationalist Liberation Front of Tripura Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Issac Muiva Plain Tribal Council of Assam Policy Effective Index Press Information Bureau (Government of India) States Reorganization Commission Trino Mool Congress Tripura National Volunteers Terms of Reference Tripura Upajati Youth Organization United Liberation Front of Assam United Progressive Alliance Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

List of Tables

Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 6.4 Table Table Table Table

7.1 7.2 7.3 9.1

Table 9.2 Table 9.3 Table 9.4 Table 9.5 Table 9.6 Table 9.7 Table Table Table Table

9.8 10.1 10.2 10.3

Army deployed in aid to civil order in the North-East, 1973–1983 Ethnic peace accords in India’s North-East Population and areas of states in NE and India, 2011 Tribes and their percentage to population in the North-East (2011) Gadgil-Mukherjee Formula Performance of the SCS in HDI (1990–2018) Policy Effectiveness Index Party performance in ADC (28-member + 2 nominated = 30-member) in 1982 and 1985 Performance of political parties in election to the ADC, 2010 (May 3) Party position in the ADC in 2021 (total seats 28) + 2 ADC’s field officers Land allotment to poor Jhumia Tribal Families (2006–07 to 2009–10) Public expenditure on tribal welfare (2011–12) (amount in INR @ 1 lakh (=100,000) Governmental Performances in Implementation of MNREGA (2006–07 to 2014–15) Sources of ADC Fund (ADC budget estimate 2012–13) Bodos in Bodoland areas Population of Scheduled Tribes in Assam Party-wise results of elections in 2020 (40-member)

81 83 84 84 101 102 103 119 121 122 124 126 128 129 133 150 151 154

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 10.4 Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 11.1 11.2

Seats won by political parties in the BTAD elections (2010 and 2015) Deprivation of basic amenities in BTC districts (2013) Deprivation in basic amenities: Rural–urban districts Human Development Index in Bodoland (2014) Dimensional and human development indices of districts Landlessness in Bodoland districts (Per cent HH) (2013) States and ethnic groups in the NE (2011) Presidential rule (under Article 356 of the Constitution) in the NE

154 157 157 158 158 159 172 179

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Federalism and more particularly asymmetric federalism in India seems to be passing through a challenge since the onset of India’s neo-liberal reforms, and more recently the abolition of Article 370 and the consequent loss of statehood of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019 by the current BJP-led NDA government in Delhi as part of the BJP’s electoral pledge1 and the making of two Union Territories of Jammu & Kashmir, and Ladakh, which remains an ethnically distinct territory but was part of the former State of J & K, and arguably not treated by the same with equanimity.2 The abolition of the Planning Commission in 2014 and with it of the Special Category States (11 States including J & K) in 2018 seems to be another blow to the above. To be sure, neither the Planning Commission nor the SCSs was part of the constitutional-legislative structure of federalism in India, but an extra-constitutional arrangement that devised a changing mechanism for special plan assistance to be offered to the SCSs. The Plan Assistance remains without the concept of the SCS. But that does not mean the end of asymmetric federalism in India and its importance. The States in North-East enjoy the special constitutional status, are entitled to various other grants from the Centre, and more money by way of the increased share of the States in Finance Commission allocation since 2014. The MDoNER, a separate ministry of the Union government (2004) has been financing a number of projects in the region with remarkable success. Fiscal equalization apart, many States especially with poorer resource bases and geo-strategic locations coupled with a © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_1

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significant presence of the deprived sections of society such as the Scheduled Tribes receive prioritized development and empowerment grants and schemes either fully and or partly financed by the Centre. The other structural asymmetry in respect of the composition of the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), and the absence of the equality principle of representation of the States to the Rajya Sabha remains. This strongly suggests that not all types of asymmetry are good for federalism. Indian federalism, to be sure, is not perfect (no federalism is), and it is still being made. In light of the above one would say that there cannot be a better time to critically reflect on India’s asymmetric federalism, its origin, forms, meaning and significance and effectiveness in furthering the cause of resolving ethnic conflicts, and federalism, i.e. unity and diversity of India, and in producing better development and governance. This book examines India’s experiments with asymmetric federalism and seeks to explain the institutional effectiveness in holding on the vast and complex multi-ethnic country together for many decades. For long, the term ‘federalism’ was a kind of taboo in discussions on politics and the state even in the West, as a recipe for disintegration and collapse. Although K. C. Wheare3 (1945/1953) wrote the classic book on federalism by being based in Oxford, the British scholarship neglected (Burgess 1985) to pay any attention to it, which was at variance with the British colonialism’s role as an exporter of the idea of federalism (like other concepts) to the colonies. In the latter, the concept of federalism underwent a metamorphosis in adapting to the local contexts so as to produce a hybrid character (Bhattacharyya 2016: 72–85). Harold Laski declared federalism as obsolete in 1938 on the basis of his observation of increasing state authoritarianism in the West in the wake of Fascism, Nazism and the War. The post-War (ll) interest in federalism was closely associated with the questions of nation and state-building in the post-colonial countries, and that too, in the midst of immense cultural diversity, mass poverty, underdevelopment and of the special problems of integration of disparate regions. It was particularly challenging to do so in great heterogeneity considered thus far inhospitable to nation-building. As we will see later in the book, India took a cautious but steady approach to federalism, a multi-staged process accompanied by democracy to answer many questions of diversity, identity, autonomy and power-sharing at multiple levels, not always successful in every case of accommodation of identity, however, but overall holding on a country of sub-continental proportions, comparable to Europe, or the former Soviet Union. I argue in this book

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that various asymmetric institutional arrangements in India, not simply limited to India’s peripheral regions, have worked through territorial autonomy and commensurate power-sharing in offering the cementing bonds at many levels of the polity as well as financial equalization. In the existing knowledge on Indian federalism, federal asymmetry remains neglected. This study seeks to rectify the neglect by examining the constitutional, political and fiscal aspects of federal asymmetry broadly within the macro framework with some micro-level empirically based materials. It pays special attention to the institutional effectiveness of federal asymmetry in delivering governance, and a sense of fulfilment of identity. The subject of accommodation of diversity today occupies a central place in federalism and asymmetric federalism; a theoretical chapter will deal with the current debates on the so-called ‘politics of identity and difference’ and of recognition—usually not brought in the discourse of federalism and asymmetric federalism, on the one hand, and in contemporary political theory, on the other. The book follows a modified dynamic neo-institutional approach that takes into consideration institutions and institutional design, actors who work or do not work the institutions, and the context which facilitates or hinders institutional working. A critical comparative analysis of the relation between ethnic identity and asymmetric federalism, and the special problems of why a territorial solution to ethnic identity often does not work in India is offered towards the end of the book. Asymmetry as such is not a desirable human value, but in federalism it has proved very functional and effective. Asymmetric federalism refers to a system of unequal status and powers of some federal units and subunits designed to meet some special socio-cultural, historical and economic needs of certain people living in peripheral areas of the federation. It refers also to special institutional arrangements for meeting problems that arise from asymmetric size, strength and resource bases of certain federal units, which may be de jure and de facto, and or de facto and then made de jure. Federal asymmetry, in other words, is a fact of life in most federations, and it has called for fiscal equalization at many levels through formal and or informal practices. The so-called federal success in a country like Switzerland, for example, has been made possible by many pragmatic measures to accommodate asymmetry of many kinds and at many levels (Dufflon 2007). Any understanding of asymmetric federalism would involve inevitably some prior understanding of what federalism is. After all, asymmetric federalism is unintelligible except for placing it

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within an overall federal framework. Asymmetric federalism does not and cannot have a separate existence apart from federalism per se. This has a special theoretical significance too in the sense that the special circumstances, or complex cultural diversity, that have called for asymmetric institutional arrangements within federations remain proof against the historical processes of homogenization undertaken in the days of building classical nation-states in the West and elsewhere too. As I have pointed out elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2001), when in neighbouring Germany, France and Italy nation-states were being built around the principle of homogeneity, and uniformity, the Swiss case for federalism was something of a great exception in having taken a more positive approach to cultural diversity in order to maintain and protect diversity. In Switzerland, diversity and federalism were, as if, two sides of the same coin. Apparently, the Swiss case might not be a good starting example: a very small country of some 8.7 million (2020) people having 26 Canton and half-Cantons (21 + 5) and about 2880 municipalities each with its distinctive identity, and provided with a government and autonomy would dismiss any grounds for asymmetry. But on a closer understanding (Dufflon 2007), Swiss federalism is very asymmetric in size and complexion, and the large scale equalization, financially speaking, has meant that this federation would not simply work without asymmetric institutions and practices. In the current discourse on comparative federalism, globally speaking, both federalism and asymmetric federalism have been conjoined to meeting the diverse needs, i.e. the needs for identity and territorial autonomy at many levels of the compound, federal polity.4 The central motive behind the formation of classical federations was ‘union’, as a kind of defensive alliance against external aggression. In the post-colonial federations, the motive has been ‘uniting’ (read ‘unity and integrity’ in the case of India) diverse people, ethno-regional, ethno-linguistic and tribal. However, lately, in the West the existing state institutions in unitary systems were revised in order to offer space for the accommodation of cultural diversity. Even in countries not formally federal, special arrangements have been made to offer territorial autonomy to ethnoregional communities. This has happened in 2018 in the Philippines (Bhattacharyya 2019b: 191).

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A Revised Template of Federation Long back Watts (1966: 353) wrote: Federal systems are no panacea, but in many developing countries they may be necessary as the only way of combining, through representative institutions, the benefits of both unity and diversity. Experience has shown that federations, both old and new, have been difficult to govern. But then, that is why they are federations.

The above passage sums up the basic message of why a diverse country needs a federal form of government, and also not lament that such governments are not easy. We may add from Wheare (1953) that federal governments are ‘so complicated and controversial’. Following Wheare again federation is to be seen as a political modernity of a special kind which means it is an ‘association of States’ (Wheare 1953: 51) that a deliberate construction by a compact agreed upon not by the individual citizens but by the pre-existing States. Here Wheare had in mind of course the classical federations; the post-colonial and post-Soviet federations have had different trajectories in which case a written Constitution or some other kinds of agreements and treaties are not necessarily valuable. In some cases, such as India, a federation has been built from above by disaggregating a once centralized colonial state, and also by a lot of adjustment and re-adjustment of territories by the political pressures from below. Such initial conceptual issues have been dealt with adequately in the existing knowledge. The terms ‘federalism’ and ‘federation’ are often used interchangeably. The Swiss still retain their original term ‘Conferatio Helvetica’ (CH for short) although they transformed their system into a federation in 1848. There are other species too (Watts 2008: 10–17). But there is a subtle but substantial difference between the two. On the basis of the classic statements on the subject (e.g. Wheare 1953; Watts 1966, 2008; Elazar 1987; Burgess 2006), the term ‘federalism’ is to be understood, as a normative category, a political principle that advocates for a combination of shared rule and self-rule—the former for the national purposes, and the latter for regional ones. The same is understood to be a compound polity thus constituted for unity and diversity, for ‘accommodating, preserving and promoting distinctive identities within a larger political union (Watts 2008: 8). The epithet ‘shared rule’ and ‘self-rule’ is associated with the

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name of Daniel Elazar (1987), and has since been much in use in federal discourse. There is a need for clarification of what they refer to. Watts (2008) argued that how this ‘combination’ of two types of rule is made and worked out depends on the particular context. He also forewarned that if this combination is not most appropriate, federalism then fails, often resulting in disintegration of the whole polity. There is also no one form of shared rule by meaning the regions’ participation in the national level policy making; nor is there one standard of regional participation in national level policymaking. This is precisely where the area of federal asymmetry, structurally speaking, comes in. In any case, a federal rule, or rather two or more types of rule, is rather complex, for federal governance is difficult, but an ethnically diverse country can hardly avoid it; if it does so it does it only at its own peril. A multi-tiered federalism is today accepted as a norm, sometimes expressed as ‘multi-level governance’, not there is still a subtle difference between the two. One could speak of multi-level governance in unitary systems of states too. The recognition of a third tier below the federal units, if constitutionally so guaranteed is certainly a part of the federal system of the countries concerned. The extent of participation of the regions in national level policymaking depends on how the federation is built—from below or from the top. In the case of the latter, the federal second chamber is not usually a house of the States with equal representation. Even in cases where a federation was a result of a compact among pre-existing states, the principle of equality of representation is not always followed. For example, in Switzerland, the half-Cantons have half the share of the full Cantons in the number of representatives sent to the federal second chamber. While the issue of equal or unequal representation in the federal second chamber remains unsettled, there is very little critical reflection on the nature and extent of self-rule. Is self-rule enough shared rule? Does it ensure the representation of different communities in a multi-ethnic context? I raised this issue elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2019a) with special reference to India’s North-East where achievement of statehood on the basis of tribal ethnicity has not been inclusive enough; on the contrary, this has produced exclusion of the newly created ethnic minorities. In many such cases, there is a provision for non-territorial representation by way of the nomination of the State Governor for sections not adequately represented. But that little assuages the feeling of being outnumbered in a parliamentary majoritarian model of democracy followed all over. Finally, federalism as a political principle informed the structural arrangements of

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shared and self-rule relative to specific contexts. If it is not adequately so done, the system remains defunct. The system of power-sharing that federalism defends among many tiers reflects the concerns for both shared rule and self-rule. Federation is a descriptive category, and a specific form of the broader category of ‘federal political systems’. Federalism is after all about governance and that too, of complex multi-ethnic countries, for which some kind of federation is a must if they want to survive and remain united. Students of Politics and Federalism often become confused by writings that seem to offer a long list of structural features for defining a federation. The great authority in our time late Watts (2008) has simplified our task by offering a 6-point template of the common structural features of a federation: • Two or more orders of government—one for the whole country (national level), and the other for the regions—each acting directly on citizens; • A constitutionally guaranteed distribution of legislative and executive powers, and allocation of revenue resources between two or more tiers of government; • Provision for a second chamber with designated representatives from the regions for regional participation in national-level policymaking; • A supreme written Constitution not amenable to unilateral amendment and requiring the consent of the federal units on significant matters; • An umpire (in the form of a Supreme Court or tribunal, referendum or an upper chamber with special powers) to guard the Constitution, resolve intergovernmental disputes; and • Institutions and practices for intergovernmental collaboration (Watts 2008: 9). The 6-points in the above template will require a lot of elaboration that is not taken up here. Watts (2008) himself has done that. Here I will stress that if a third tier is accepted in the tier structure of government in a federating, then the sub-state level governments require to be considered for federal asymmetry. In a multi-ethnic country like India, where many smaller ethnic identity, especially the tribal ones, are rooted in a little

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territory, and are considered as their own, this at once involves the question of recognition of identity and a local level government for the tribals, and an asymmetric solution to the question of identity. Such a government directly acts upon the local citizens; such governments’ autonomy is protected by the Constitution. However, it suggests that the existence of so many governments when government means more public expenditure, but the ethnically surcharged people when so mobilized act often on emotional grounds, and hardly like to see the cost of many governments. At least for the local populace or their leaders a government means control over public resources to spend, and enjoyment of the largesse of political power. But then that is the price one pays for choosing a federation, unavoidably, in culturally diverse countries. However, in a vast multiethnic country, this facilitates governance by following the principle of subsidiary i.e. by leaving the tasks to the level where it is most appropriate and creating a space for contestation for power among the stakeholders. It also decentralizes and thus helps localization of the problems and their solution possible. The above template needs to be revised, I would argue, to incorporate institutions of asymmetry, for Watts himself acknowledged above that federation today does not refer to only a two-tier system, but multitier. This was already acknowledged by Riker (1964) in his idea of the federation as a ‘constitutionally determined tiered structure’. The two-tier or orders of government do not tell us much about the relation between the tiers, or among the second tiers, or the second and the next tiers. The embedded core assumption at least in the case of classical federations was that of symmetry in powers and status among the federating units on the presumption that they were equal parties to the federal compact. However, in the course of time, all classical federations in the West experienced de facto asymmetry, which was to become de jure as a constitutional practice. In large multi-ethnic federations in the Global South, a mere two-tier structure was insufficient to accommodate manifold cultural diversity. Watts (2008: 125–30) paid important attention to the issue of symmetry and asymmetry in federations, and cautioned us, however, about the possibility of dysfunctionality, if asymmetry is too extreme. Watts (2008: 132–3) has paid attention to the sub-State level local governments in India and elsewhere as another tier in federalism. How can a federation with large cultural and ethnic differences manage to hold itself together without significant scope for asymmetry? It cannot do so without power-sharing at many levels of the polity. Consider the

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5 Russian

Federation (1993). It is territorially the world’s largest federation (with eleven time zones) of originally 89 constituent units—now reduced to 86—with differential status and powers, constitutionally as well as by treaties and bilateral agreements: 21 republics, 48 oblasts, 7 autonomous okrugs, 7 kranis and one autonomous oblast. Such examples today are galore. However, one factor that facilitates the running of the Russian federation is its ethnicity in that about 90% of the population speaks the Russian language and are Russian in ethnic stock. That the federation is multi-tiered is more so because of the geographical vastness of the territory than the ethnic factor. But the multilevel governments have necessitated also large space of asymmetry in power and status of the smaller units with ethnic minorities compared to the republics. No wonder, many post-conflict federations have incorporated asymmetry in their constitutional designs.

Federalism, Society and Ethnic Homeland Does society matter for federalism or vice-versa? It does so in both ways. Like democracy and liberty, federalism by origin is a Western notion associated with a compact or contract or a partnership, and the mutual trust in it is more closely connected with Christianity. But then like other concepts federalism has also been adapted to different contexts in the non-Western world not all professing Christianity. When the US federation was formed in 1789 there was a factor of political diversity in the contracting States to be maintained. In the case of Swiss federalism, sociocultural diversity and distinctive political traditions in the pre-existing States (now called Cantons) mattered a lot so much so that gradually diversity and Swiss federalism came to be known as two sides of the same coin. Since the early 1950s and 1960s some sociologically oriented studies of federalism pointed our attention to social divisions within the federal units with their potential for future politicization (Livingstone 1952 in place of 1956; Watts 1966, 2008; Friedrich 1968; Duchacek 1970). A society may be multi-cultural/ethnic but the polity may be unitary which means that the values upheld in society are not honoured in the passage of centralization and concentration of powers. On the other hand, a federation is more likely to give expression to societal values by recognition of difference, i.e. many identities. Unlike democracy federation, does not aim at equalization which is not possible where people’s identities are concerned. The value of diversity and hence the required sensitivity

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to plurality have a greater chance to be maintained in the institutional arrangements of federalism. This is not to be taken as an uncritical defence of traditions, or any differences. Federalism is capable of accommodating only those differences that have any territorial significance; other differences can be accommodated through the normal democratic process and procedures. Federalism per se faces at least two challenges. First, there is the question of cultivation and developing a federal loyalty from the citizens; this loyalty is of a civic character and occupies a higher place above all ethnic/regional/sub-regional level. Second, there is the question of regional loyalty i.e. loyalty to the region/State/Canton, etc.; this is not an ethnic loyalty in the exact sense of the term, but rather an ethnoterritorial. But one should exercise caution about the characterization of this loyalty. While in India, the States were created on the basis of some kind of ethnic markers, and or a combination of language, region, tribal ethnicity and so on, the American States do not represent any such ethnic considerations. The cross-cutting ethnic loyalties in the Swiss Cantons stand in the way of giving them any ethnic labels. But in Swiss federalism, citizens maintain three loyalties simultaneously: federal, Cantonal and Communal/Municipal. In post-colonial and post-Soviet federations, the mutual co-existence of these two loyalties has often been wanting. Even if loyalty to the regions/States is more easily available, and much asserted by the politicians, loyalty to the federation is in short supply. In India, for a variety of reasons the State level politicians cultivate a lot of anti-Centrism (‘Centre’s deprivation’; ‘stem-motherly attitude to the States’ and so on) (Bhattacharyya 2017: 197–211) which stands in the way of developing a healthy federal loyalty. In the cases of sub-State level territorial association based on tribal ethnicity, loyalty to the local level government qua the territory is often not easily achieved; in such cases, loyalty to the particular tribal pales into insignificance compared to the territorial loyalty of the District Council. This may not be the case in classical federations although there are other grounds for grievances against a particular regime. John Kincaid, an American political scientist and authority on US federalism, has pointed out that the federation has been coercive of late in implementing some health programmers through the NGOs by bypassing the States (Kincaid 2011: 37–53). This is a matter of cultivating and sustaining a federal culture, and remains an unexplored area of research, at least, in Indian federalism. This is more poignant in India where many loyalties (national, regional; sub-regional; tribal and

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sub-tribal and linguistic) co-exist not always in good harmony though. Of them all, national/federal is highly demanded but is in a relatively weaker position vis-à-vis the territorially rooted particular loyalties which are often emotive. From the perspective of asymmetric federalism, the demands for recognition and autonomy stem from a society in which some ethnic groups may feel discriminated under the rule of majority rule by a certain group. In most cases, if not all, such demands are for ethnic homeland. The homeland issue is not an easy one to explain let alone resolve. The available literature on Indian federalism has dealt with how such homeland demands in India have been met since the early 1950s which have resulted in statehood, for example, for the Tamils, the Telugus, Gujaratis, the Marathis and so on; creation of sub-State ethnic authority by way of the 6th Schedule in India’s North-East is also to be seen in this context. This has added more legitimacy to Indian federalism, and has been a major factor in its success. However, comparatively, the definition and boundaries of such homelands have remained a bone of contention. The fight over homeland demands has kept the ethnic leaders and the zealots preoccupied; they lead masses to enter into clashes and blood baths; it has led often to ethnic cleansing. People world over migrated from one area to another for a variety of reasons; they change their locale many a times over. Therefore, despite strong claims of antiquity over the proclaimed homeland as a very common feature of ethnic mobilizations, as Anthony D. Smith (1986: 154, 212)6 would have us believe, the matter has never been suitably resolved. Often a homeland is declared without precisely demarcating its boundaries. Smith (1986: 154) has noted how ethnic conflicts transform into nationhood7 : …more and more ethnie are trying to take on territorial components and adopt a civic model, as they seek to become nations. Of course not all ethnie are bent on attaining nationhood. Even if we refuse to adopt a linguistic criterion of ethnicity on the ground that an ethnie requires myths of descent, historical memories, a territorial association and a sense of solidarity, over and above any shared cultural attributes, there are still many more ethnie in the world which are potential nations….. (Smith 1986: 154)

For Smith, when an ethnie becomes politicized it does so when it claims a particular territory or a ‘territorial homeland’ (1986: 162), a ‘compact’

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space in which to control their destinies. We argue here that this space becomes ethnic/nationalist as a result of the political imagination of a community, or a nation, as Anderson (1983) would argue. The discursive community or nation’s space determines here the political space of contestation and struggles. On the basis of his global understanding of the phenomenon, Smith argues that this ‘territorialization of ethnicity’ (1986: 162) is but an attempt to culturally appropriate the sites and borders of homeland. This has many theoretical ramifications, which are not undertaken here.

Theory and Concepts Federal Asymmetry is one of the central concepts used in this book. Asymmetry is not such a desirable human value, but in federalism it has proved its remit. In the global discourse on federalism asymmetry has been well recognized as an indispensable element of federalism in nearly all existing federations (Burgess 2006; Watts 2008; Agranoff 1999; Bhattacharyya 2010, 2021). The symmetry of status and rights of the federal units is considered the basis of federalism, but in diverse contexts, the space for asymmetry has been expanded in order to accommodate diversity. In this study, we look at various special rights that certain States in India enjoy as per the Constitution, as well as by other means. We focus in our case study materials drawn from the North-East of India to understand federal asymmetry in a double sense: state and sub-State level governments with special autonomy, and its impact on identity as well as legitimacy. Ethnic identity, especially tribal identity, is another concept central to our investigation. It is a problematic phenomenon because it defies any precise definition; it is a contingent issue depending upon which part of an identity will become significant politically speaking, and when, cannot be ascertained a priori. Scholars have also argued that identity per se is plural (Sen 2006). Since it is a mobilization concept, the real nature of ethnic and tribal identity becomes obvious after many rounds of political mobilizations when it is found out that after all what was initially claimed as a single identity is in fact a case of many identities. In India, it has been found in the existing research that ethnic identity is to be understood as multi-layered and the politics over both remain central to the question raised in this book. Does identity matter? Can it be defined precisely especially when it comes to the question of tribal identity? This question is raised because an identity as such may not be as problematic as when a

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certain territory is demanded in its name when it is revealed that the claim is not well-based and territorial demarcation is difficult. Ethnic elites very often, ostensibly, mobilize a whole lot of tribals for homeland but once in the corridors of power they may exclude many others from the benefits of power. The other concept used in this book is territorial autonomy and its link with ethnic identity. India’s federation building—a process not, arguably, complete yet—has involved precisely the territorial recognition of ethnic identity since 1956. This autonomy has entailed a constitutionally guaranteed list of powers and authority. To accommodate smaller tribal ethnic identity, special provisions by way of the 5th and the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution have been made for the tribals in many parts of India, and the hill tribes in the North-East, respectively. But the latter has been amended from time to time to meet new situations though not always successfully. Connected to the above but having a unique value is the signing of ethnic peace accords which has since 1947 (Naga Peace Accord) is another concept which in the case of North-East has offered a novel instrument that has bound the stakeholders for a negotiable and peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts. This has worked at both the State and the sub-State levels. In most cases, it has entailed the question of territorial power. But in some cases, such accords have been signed to respond to non-territorial issues and accommodation of the insurgent rebels for their rehabilitation. All in all, power-sharing remains in this study the silver lining across many issues and factors. A theory of federalism per se is still an uncertainty. Federalism is, by origin, a compact between pre-existing States and Union (government) to be established, and hence the question of rights spoken about in federal discourse is that of the States vis-à-vis the Union/Federal government. Liberalism, as a theory or doctrine, concerns itself with the liberty of the individual, and (these days) of groups such as minorities. The rights of the territories are federal matters. In The Federalist (no 11), the founders of American federalism defended federalism even at the cost of some ‘natural rights’ of the people: Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable, whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers (Hamilton, Jay and Madison in Karmis and Norman, 2005: 105).

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However, federalism and asymmetric federalism are both linked to the liberty of the individual’s via the protection of diversity. Theoretically then, as Michael Burgess (2006, 208–24) has tried to maintain, there is a normative value in federalism. To my understanding federalism by the spirit is liberal, for it cannot sustain itself in authoritarian and undemocratic States. For example, the protection of rights of the ethnic minorities via asymmetric federalism is also a protection of the individual members of the same. Or better governance in an asymmetric federal unit means better living for all members of the community. There is another aspect of the theoretical issue in federalism. Long back K C Wheare highlighted the associational dimension in forming a federation. Explaining what the federal principle implies he says that it entails the art of associating (Wheare 1953: 1), the art, I argue, is very modern in nature. ‘Ethnicity, Development and Governance’—the sub-title of the book— requires some elucidation and explanation. Ethnicity refers to a group of people having some common characteristics such as language, region, religion, culture and a sense of identity (Smith 2003: 12–13). Smith believes that the territorial rootedness in that an ethnic group has a ‘homeland’ can also be considered as another common trait in defining ethnicity, but when that is the case the boundary between ethnicity and nationhood becomes blurred especially when Smith himself defines the nation as a ‘named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity at least among the elites’ (Smith 2003: 13). In India, an ethnic group which includes tribes too when politically conscious and demanded recognition to a homeland has most often presented their script of identity in the rhetoric of selfdetermination a la the classical notion of national self-determination. India officially never calls itself a multi-ethnic federation, but in actual political practices in the formation of the federation by state and sub-state creation, the ethnic identity has been recognized. Thus, in India, there are ethnically named States and sub-States as well as regionally named States. As the literature on the ‘politics of recognition’ makes us aware, recognition as such may not mean much if such recognition is not accompanied by powers and resources in a demarcated territory so that both development and governance take place. In other words, recognition without powers and powers without responsibilities do not carry much meaning. The reason why certain minority ethnic groups demand a separate territory in some form is because of the perceived feeling that they

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are deprived and excluded in the existing distribution of powers and resources. Serious attention will be paid in this book to measure development (human) and governance that has taken place in the States and sub-States under consideration. Governance today is measured not simply by the conventional yardstick of law and order and political violence, but also, more importantly, by the delivery aspects of governmental activities. In order words, we seek to show what the asymmetric States and sub-States have done in respect of the above; how much they have delivered the socio-economic public goods and services, etc. In this respect, I make use of the currently accepted yardsticks. While development and governance are dealt with in detail in Chapter 4, the ethnic dimensions remain central to both federalism and asymmetric federalism in several other chapters.

Methodology This research monograph has followed the methods of historical sociology, and made use of multiple research methods: apart from the archival sources (government records, newspapers and magazines), in several field visits by the author and his research assistants, elite interviews (15 from Tripura and 15 from Assam on a random basis) were taken in order to supplement the official records and versions. Interview centred the current challenges to State autonomy in the North-East, efficacy of the Special Category States and the role of sub-State Levels Autonomous Tribal District Councils in development and governance. Interviews were taken during 2011–2012 and then again in 2015–2017.8 Interview data have been used anecdotally to buttress a particular point, and to supplement if any, the official discourse. I have also made use of ethnographic methods. The primary sources used include Census Reports of India, and other official survey of the State government, and of the sub-State level governments too. Legislative proceedings of the ADC in Tripura were utilized. Relevant books, journal article and newspapers and magazines have also been used. Online sources have also been used. The perspective that informs the analysis is modified dynamic neoinstitutionalism. It stresses the role of institutions, actors and context in complex dynamic interaction. The institutions, however beautiful and well-designed they may be, do not work automatically on their own. They have to be worked, if at all, by actors. Actors are also not completely free to work or not the institutions, as they wish. For in many cases

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institutions are path dependent and context-bound. The optimal correlation of the above three variables is complex, and the institutional working is therefore conditioned by several factors. The inappropriately designed institutions may produce, not a good results, but disasters. Also, well-designed institutions may not produce anything if they are not worked by well-intentioned actors. Contexts may be permanently hostile to work institutions that are not appropriately designed, or it may facilitate institutional functioning.

Chapterisation Chapter 1 is Introduction which explains the subject matter, the existing literature, concepts used and methodology. Chapter 2 titled Concept of Asymmetric Federalism and the Politics of Recognition is theoretical and deals with the current concepts of asymmetric federalism, its various uses, comparatively speaking, and its problematic location in federal discourse, and discusses its implications for the so-called politics of recognition and difference. It also raises questions about the need for rethinking the appropriate institutions to respond adequately to the problems of diversity and the politics of recognition. Chapter 3 titled Founding Moment (1946–1956) deals with as its subject matter the formation of States and sub-States in India and the asymmetrical method as followed by the CA and the SRC in the making of the States. The data used are debates of the CA, reports of the SRC and other official sources and books. It also brings out the debates of the CA on the special provision with respect to the 5th and 6th Schedules of the Constitution in order to offer self-governance to the tribal in India’s North-East and other parts of India, and the special territorial arrangements for some areas. How did the mind of the founders work on this? How did they reconcile the need for asymmetry for the peripheral regions in particular within a uniting discourse overall? This chapter also seeks to answer that question. There are large-scale structural asymmetries in the Indian federation which is politically not very encouraging to the health of the federation, especially so when the political parties act as the operators. In Chapter 4 titled Federal Asymmetry in India and Various Forms an attempt is made to identify and critically discuss the various forms and levels of asymmetry in India federalism, constitutionally as well as politically speaking. This

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chapter also discusses the pros and cons of structural asymmetry in representation in Indian federalism and points outs out that such asymmetries are not unique to India. It also points out that such asymmetries are rooted in the very mode of formation of the Indian federation. Chapter 5 titled Politics of Fiscal Asymmetry in India examines the various aspects of fiscal federal asymmetry and the strategic implications of the same in nation-building. It shows how different types of fiscal asymmetry have been designed in order to respond to varied needs of diversity and special circumstances within the broad view of a multi-cultural nationbuilding. The subject brought in for critical discussion is the Finance Commission, and its method of distribution of money, Chapter 6 Ethnic Cleavages and Federal Asymmetry offers a critical exploration of the interface between ethnic cleavages and the making of the asymmetric States in India. It pays attention to India’s North-East as well as the other cases in the mainland. It shows how various markers of social and cultural cleavages have been used to demand statehood and sub-statehood that provided for the making of the interface between ethno-territorial cleavages and the politics of statehood and sub-statehood with special powers and status. This chapter also offers a profile of the institutional effectiveness of the States in India’s North-East following a set of parameters in comparison with the advanced States in India. Chapter 7 deals with the Special Category States as another form of federal asymmetry in India introduced way back in 1969 and extended to include more States (eleven till 2018). This formulaic system of fiscal disbursement was designed in the days of India’s planned economy as a system of offering financial plan assistance to the States in the peripheries which were economically backward with many geographical limitations. This chapter also shows that although the system as such was withdrawn in 2018, Central Plan assistance still remains, and points out with statistical data that the method of SCS status did indeed work in producing better policy effectiveness. Chapter 8 titled Asymmetry Within Asymmetry in India examines the making of the 6th Schedule and its differential application in India. It also makes a brief comparison with the 5th Schedule in order to show that the latter has not proved as effective as the former in guarding the rights of the tribal people outside the North-East compared to the tribals in other parts of India. Chapters 9 and 10 are two case study chapters dealing with the Tribal Autonomous District Council in Tripura and the Bodoland Territorial

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Council in Assam both governed by the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, respectively. Chapter 9 assesses the institutional effectiveness of the ADC in Tripura within the appropriate backdrop. It assesses its role in resolving ethnic conflicts and protecting tribal ethnic identity, delivering development and governance. Chapter 10 is the second case study of the BTC in Assam and assesses its effectiveness in resolving ethnic conflicts and protecting tribal (and non-tribal) identity, and delivery of law and order and governance. In both cases, an answer is offered as to why and when institutions succeed and or fail. Chapter 10 is about the second case study materials at the sub-State level federal asymmetry. It offers a brief historical trajectory of the ethnic movement for Bodoland in Assam, highlights the role of ethnic peace accords and their institutionalization, and the institutional functioning of the BTC in terms of power-sharing, development and governance. This chapter also shows the limits of ill-designed institutions, and the predictable effects of ethnic imbalance. Chapter 11 seeks to offer a comparative assessment of asymmetric federalism in India, and identifies the comparative best practices as well as pays attention to unresolved territory claims in various regions of India. Chapter 12 Conclusion summarizes the findings and evaluates their implications for the future prospects of federalism in India, and the status of the asymmetric States in India.

Notes 1. India’s Home Minister Amit Shah stated officially several times since 2020 that once the delimitations are completed and elections are held peacefully in J & K, statehood would be restore to J & K (The Times of India June 13, 2021). 2. There was and still is resent among the sub-regional political elites about the current status of the region as a Union Territory which appears to mean nothing but a rule by Delhi bureaucracy. No wonder, there is a demand placed by no less a person than an MP (sole) from Ladakh for extending the 6th Schedule status to the region for the sake of accommodation of their ethnic identity and autonomy. See for details on the current demand ‘Ladakh and the Sixth Schedule’ by Diptiman Tiwari, The Indian Express dated 17 December 2021, p. 9. Such a demand followed the statehood demand by the people of Ladakh. 3. K.C. Wheare was an Australian.

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4. I have termed these diversity-claims as distinguished from equality-claims. See Bhattacharyya (2015, 2021). 5. Formed in 1991 the Russian federation has turned out to be a problem of Centre-regional relations, and has not been working (Gribanova 2011: 86–129). It has seemed troublesome from the beginning, and ridden with power games, players in power politics and so on. 6. Anthony D. Smith. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 7. Smith uses the term ethnie in a specific sense as a ‘named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites’. Smith, A.D. 2003. Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge), p. 13. 8. Interview’s during 2015–2017 in Assam and Tripura were taken as part of the international collaborative research on ‘Continuity and change in India Federalism in the Age of Globalization’ based in the University of Edinburgh in which I was a Lead Researcher for the North-East.

References Agranoff, Robert, ed. 1999. Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Bhattacharyya, H. 2001. India as a Multicultural Federation in Comparison with Swiss Federalism. Fribourg: Hellbing and Lichetnhahn. ———. 2010. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia. London and New York: Routledge. ———. 2015. Indian Federalism and Democracy: The Growing Salience of Diversity-Claims Over Equality-Claims in Comparative and Indian Perspectives. Regional and Federal Studies, Regional and Federal Studies 25 (3). https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2015.1052965 ———. 2017. West Bengal Against the Centre: Continuity in Anti-Centrism in Indian Federal Politics. In Indian Federalism: Emerging Issues, ed. S.K. Jain, 91–115. New Delhi: Kalpaz. ———. 2016. Indian Federalism: A Hybrid Solution to the Problem of Diversity and Political Order. In Politics of the Other in India and China: Western Concepts in Non-Western Contents, ed. L. Kienig and B. Chaudhuri, 72–85. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ———. 2019a. Federalism in Asia: Beyond the Diversity-Problematic. In Federalism Studies (A Research Agenda), ed. J. Kincaid, 187–98. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar and Northampton, USA.

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———. 2019b. States Reorganization and the Accommodation of EthnoRegional Cleavages in India. In Territory and Power in Constitutional Transition, ed. G. Anderson and S. Chaudhry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2021. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistna, Malysia, Nepal and Myanmar. London and New York: Routledge. Burgess, M. 1985. Comparative Federalism Theory and Practice. London and New York: Routledge. Burgess. 2006. Comparative Federalism Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. Duchaceck, Ivor. D. 1970. Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimensions of Power. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. Dufflon, B. 2007. Accommodating Asymmetry Through Pragmatism: An Overview of Swiss Fiscal Federalism. In Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries, Chapter 5, ed. Richard M. Bird and Robert D. Ebel. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://ideas.repec.org/b/elg/eebook/3864.html. Sighted on 24 March 2022. Elazar, D. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Albama: The University of Albama. Friedrich, C. 1968. Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice. London: Pall Mall Press. Groibanova, G. 2011. Russian Federalism: Does It Work? In Varieties of Federal Governance Major Contemporary Models, ed. R. Saxena, 86–129. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press. Karmis, D., and D. Norman, eds. 2005. Theories of Federalism: A Reader. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kincaid, J. 2011. Political Coercison and Administrative Cooperation in US Intergovernemntal Relations. In Varieties of Federal Governance, ed. R. Saxena, 37–54. New Delhi: Foundations Book. Livintgstone, W.S. 1952. A Note on the Nature of Federalism. Political Science Quarterly 67 (March): 81–95. Riker, W. 1964. Federalism, Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little Brown. Sen, A. 2006. Identity and Violence the Illusion of Destiny. London: Penguin. Smith, A.D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ———. 2003. Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Watts, R.L. 1966. New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth. Oxford: Clarendon. ———. 2008/1999. Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd edn. Ontario: Queens McGill University Press. Wheare, K.C. 1953. Federal Government. Oxford: Clarendon

CHAPTER 2

Concept of Asymmetric Federalism and the Politics of Recognition

Introduction Federalism especially in today’s context is considered as an institutional solution to the politics of identity and recognition. Federals asymmetry also responds to varied issues of ethnic/regional identity. Classical federalism was more geared to the territorial distribution of powers with very little to do with ethnic identity fulfilment. The close connection between federalism and ethnic identity is a post-Second World War development. Spawned by the Swiss in the late nineteenth century, federalism came to be increasingly conceived as an institutional space for nation-building but not by suppressing but integrating multiple identities within a single federal polity. The Swiss experience, as Anderson (1991) pointed out, offered the lesson for the post-colonial states that cultural diversity was no longer to be considered as a problem, but an asset and resource to build on. This identity turn in federalism became far removed from the old impulse of federalism as a defensive alliance of the pre-existing states. It has been increasingly seen that if appropriately designed, federalism could be the only option to accommodate difference not only territorially but also as ‘corporate federalism’ (i.e. non-territorially). However, as we will see soon, constitutional recognition is not enough by itself; it has to be accompanied by redistribution so that territorial self-rule does not degenerate into rule by the ethnic zealots. The redistributive orientation of such self-rule may provide for the much-needed check on the concentration of powers in the hands of a few ethnic leaders. There is © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_2

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also a relatively unexplored issue: the existing knowledge of federalism as a combination of shared rule (national purposes) and self-rule (regional purposes) (Elazar 1987; Watts 2008) calls for some revision. We ought to consider if self-rule is also enough shared rule ethnically speaking. The examination of the effectiveness of federalism often stops at regional selfrule, and does not go into the nature of self-rule, or the shared nature, if any, of self-rule. But that is a question dealt with in detail elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2021). The so-called ‘politicos of recognition’ has, however, acquired a place of their own in contemporary debates in Western liberal theory especially multiculturalism, communitarianism, and citizenship (Taylor 1994; Tamir 1998; Glazer 1998; Calhoun 1999; Kymlicka 2007; Young 1999; Kakathas 2002; Markell 2006; Owen and Tully 2006). The issue at once intersects with the question of ‘difference’ and its recognition in liberal theory; the women’s rights; the question of reconciliation between individual and groups rights in typically liberal democratic states in the West. The issue has been considered to refer to such aspects as minority rights, group rights, and their most appropriate recognition in the existing institutional arrangements of the nation-states, or in reformed institutions. The question of appropriate recognition of minority identity and its rights have remained since the 1980s as a lively debate among liberal scholars in the West and the East centring around the ‘politics of recognition’. Sen (2006) and Markell (2006) have raised, however, the question of how to ensure redistribution via recognition, or if recognition does not lead to equity, or redistribution it loses all significance. Markell has in particular drawn our attention to various issues connected with the ‘politics of recognition’ such as ‘official language policy’, aboriginal rights; and land claims (Markell 2008: 450). Sen argues that if recognition (of difference) is not accompanied by equity, the real effects of such recognition do not mean much (Sen 2005, 2006). Charles Taylor in his classic essay ‘Politics of Recognition’ (1994) has pointed out the limits of ‘difference-blind’ liberalism to accommodate difference, and ethnic minority rights. Nancy Fraser (1995: 69) has identified two approaches to the politics of recognition: affirmative and transformative. The former entails affirmative action within mainstream multiculturalism (in the Indian case it would include ‘reservation’ or quota for the socially and economically underprivileged) while the latter involves redistribution of resources and income. The above brief reference to the debates suggests that the issue of especially territorial recognition of identity/difference within the existing

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liberal democratic systems remains far from resolved. The burning question of why most liberal democracies in the West find it difficult to accommodate ethnic identity claims of sorts is that the existing political arrangements there are not appropriately federal. In the cases of the predominantly unitary state structures, and their concomitant practices the space is limited for accommodating what I have termed ‘diversityclaims’ (Bhattacharyya 2015). Added to that are the interests of some dominant groups who have been the beneficiaries of such structures and practices and who seek to vehemently oppose such moves at ideological and conceptual levels. Interestingly enough, Switzerland does not confront such a problem about its varied ethnic minorities because the existing political arrangements are designed in such a way as to recognize and accommodate them. By contrast, as Moreno has pointed out in the case of Spain, although different ethno-regional identity such as the Basque Country, the Catalon, Valencia, Galicia and Andalsia surfaced again and again clamouring for recognition from the late nineteenth century, the Spanish state authorities have always looked down upon them and repressed them (Moreno 2001: 207). Such repression took extreme forms in Franco’s dictatorship which was anti-communist and anti-separatist and bent on ‘to extirpate all forms of home rule’, regionalism and ‘sub-state nationalism’ within a paradigm of national unity that ‘brooked no cultural or ethnic diversity’ (Moreno 2001: 207). Today the ethno-regional identity in Spain has had a better deal because the state is more federalized in practice by accommodating the ‘ideology of autonomism’, and by providing for more financial and political space for such identity.1 This served to pave the way for more political stability and provide better political public sphere at the regional level—which is a must for what is nowadays, termed ‘deepening democracy’. However, globally speaking, Spain was not alone. Watts (2008: 1) says that there are twenty-one countries in the world (about 40% of the global population) that are governed by practices that have a federal character. This has happened in the wake of worldwide decentralization since the 1980s which has encouraged the connecting process of regional devolution whether in federal countries or unitary ones in the U.K. Belgium, Canada, Spain and India (Gagnon and Tully 2001; Bhattacharyya 2001). Although Great Britain is still formally a unitary country, in practice, particularly since 1992 it has allowed devolution to the regions to a significant extent (Burgess 1995, 2006). In Asia, there are many examples to show how federal practices are adopted in conceding

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autonomy to minority groups even within an otherwise centralized system of government. In the Philippines in 2018 the government approved the Bangsamoro Organic Law giving more autonomy to the Muslim regions in the South (Bhattacharyya 2019a: 191). For a long time, federalism as a word was taboo even in the land of its origin, i.e. Europe. In the whole nineteenth century, Switzerland was the lone country to go federal drawing largely from the US federation. The larger debate on state formation and nation-building would suggest that in the face of the homogenizing nation-state building project all over Europe (Hobsbawm 1992), the ancient Swiss diversity was a powerful check and federalism was the only option available to them (Bhattacharyya 2001). Therefore, the term federalism had to wait for another half a century or so, till the beginning of the process of decolonization in the non-Western world, for its renewal with a completely different thrust (Watts 1966; Bhattacharyya 2010). In other words, federalism came to be associated with the politics of recognition, accommodation of diversity, protection and maintenance of ethnic identity for nation-building of a different order from that of the classical Mazzinian model (Hobsbawm 1992). The global acceptability and its indispensability, as it were, as a tool of accommodation of diversity for maintaining territorial integrity today is beyond doubt. Even post-Soviet Russia, the only one among the postSoviet States, had to refederalize although it is beset by a series of problems including the relative absence of political will to fully recognize differences. Smith (2001) has offered a detailed examination of the problems that undercut at once the demands of liberalism, nationalism (especially of the minorities) and the citizenship rights (Smith 2001: 364– 65). Smith expresses doubt about the sustainability of Russian federation in the absence of many constitutionally guaranteed territorial rights to the territorial minorities and in the presence of ‘the distinctive executive functions of the federation, as secured by the president’ (Smith 2001: 347). The above global level evidence are used to suggest that federalism is always better placed to accommodate differences, heterogeneity, ethnonational and regional identities and manage diversity for the sake of unity and legitimacy. The most relevant question here is of course the appropriate institutional arrangements designed for the purpose. Late Watts (1966, 2008) has repeatedly forewarned us about this ‘appropriateness’

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in designing federations or responding to particular problems. The experiences have shown that inappropriate institutional arrangements have failed both the federation so designed as well as the diversity concerns. The existing literature on federalism squarely suggests that federalism as a political principle that defends both unities for shared, national purposes and autonomy for protecting social-cultural diversity, and federation as a political system—which offers the institutional arrangements for the same—is best suited as an institutional design for multicultural contexts provided the institutional arrangements so designed that they respond to the needs for both unity and diversity (Elazar 1987; Watts 2008). This should not, however, give the impression that the federal solutions are easy, and federal governance is simple. On the contrary, federations are typically difficult to govern (Watts 1966, 2008), and the federal solutions are never simple. But then, for complex and multinational, multicultural and multi-ethnic countries with mostly territorially rooted social and cultural communities, the federal devices are unavoidable. Also, it must be borne in mind that federal solutions, if not appropriately designed, could be quite risky, paving the way for secession and eventual disintegration. The example at hand is the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 giving birth to Bangladesh.2 The distant examples are former USSR and Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Watts (1966) recorded many such failures in the post-colonial federations in Asia and Central America. Today, however, ethnically diverse countries in Asia are seriously considering the federal option as a tool of the resolution of problems stemming from diversity and minorities within the states (Bhattacharyya 2010, 2019a: 187–98). There is another important development in the global discourse on federalism which should merit some discussion. This is with reference to the tiers of federalism. Conventionally, more or less, following the US model, a two-tiered structure was the consensus for a considerable period of time. The current global literature on federalism, however, rejects the two-tiered model of federalism and the US federation as an ideal one (Watts 2008; Stepan 2005: 255–69). Watts declared emphatically: There is no single pure model of federalism that is applicable everywhere. Rather the basic notion of involving the combination of shared rule for some purposes and regional self-rule for other purposes within a single political system so that neither is subordinate to the other has been applied in different ways to fit different circumstances. (Watts 1996: 1)

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In the third revised edition of his book (Watts 2008: 7), Watts argued that the current popularity of federalism, globally speaking, owes to the fact that federalism can take ‘a variety of forms’. Globally speaking, then he concedes: Thus, there has been emerging trend towards three or even four (not just two) levels of federal organization to reconcile supranational, national, regional and local impulses and thereby to maximize the realization of citizen preferences.

The above basic idea of federalism has revolutionized thinking in federalism world over, and rescued, as it were, the concept of federalism from the straight-jacketed notion of a merely two-tiered structure. Writing a little earlier in 1996, William Riker, another international authority on federalism (Riker 1996: 10) defined federalism as ‘a constitutionally determined tiered structure’, a form of government which implies arrangements of tiers of government ‘in a permanent agreement’. However, the two-tier model still remained in Riker’s definition, but there is a novelty in his understanding which acknowledges arrangements of tiers, as well as their being ‘constitutionally determined.’ Daniel Elazar (Elazar 1987: 7, 35) long time back while introducing the federal political system as a combination of ‘self and shared rule’ in a single polity indicated also the possibility of a matrix structure. He pointed out also the possibility of a ‘power pyramid’, a ‘pyramid of governments with gradations of power flowing down from the top’. Those who are familiar with the structural arrangements of Swiss federalism know that in this organically evolved federalism, the municipalities or the Communes, which themselves are quite old, are the constitutionally recognized lowest tier of the three-tier Swiss federalism (Bhattacharyya 2001: 10–11). The reasons why I threw some light on the increasing acceptability of federalism are two. First, we wanted to familiarize us with the overarching institutional canvass of federalism and highlight its importance in multiethnic societies. Second, since asymmetric federalism is part of the federal lexicon, it required some discussion on the underlying issues involved. The issues are both large and small but interconnected. The very recent studies of comparative federalism (Burgess and Pinder 2007; Burgess 2006; Bhattacharyya 2019a, b, 2021; Watts 1999, 2008; Adeney 2007; Keil and Kropp 2022) have recognized that there has been

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an organic link between federalism and identity, particularly in ethnonational/regional. Watts (1999) even went to the extent of claiming that behind the formation of the US federation, the force distinct regional political cultures were quite powerful (Watts 1999: 21). The more global level theoretical literature on federalism emphasizes upon the fact that plurality and diversity of political identity are in fact inherent in the ‘language of federalism’ (Karmis and Norman 2005: 9). Karmis and Norman (2005) also argue that federalism has been quite attractive to the multifaceted processes of globalization, in particularly appearing as an alternative to secession (Karmis and Norman 2005: 4). The argument of Karmis and Norman (2005) in respect of the relation between identity issues and federalism is quite original and requires some further elaboration. They argue that for a long time since the days of the Enlightenment, a monistic conception has predominated our understanding of the world including identity, and the classical theorists of federalism could not break away from such a notion. As a result, the monistic language of identity tended to imply the required identification of people (irrespective of their differences otherwise) with either one group, or one standardized (by the State) notion of citizenship.3 Many leading theorists of the nineteenth century such as John Calhoun, Proudhon and J. S. Mill were monistic of sorts too. Recall Mill’s famous quote: [f]ree institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities (Quoted in Karmis and Norman 2005: 11). Proudhon’s socalled notion of ‘integral federalism’ (Karmis and Norman 2005: 11–12), when judged in the specific context of the Jacobinistic homogenizing drives in France, was nevertheless more akin to confederation than federation in nature and implications. In much of the last century, a pluralistic notion of federalism was something of an anathema to political thinkers and politicians alike. One may recall that the dominant idea for the reconstruction of Europe after the First World War was the Wilsonian notion of national self-determination, and the breaking up of multinational European empires which were anti-pluralist in nature. The embedded prejudice in the above notion was that ‘ethno-national identities would soon disappear in the institutionally complete nation-state’, and hence there was little ground for supporting a case for federalism, as it were. The proponents of modernization and political development schools thought so in regard to the prospects of modernization in the post-colonial countries, with unexpected results. Modernization of sorts has taken place in such countries, but the traditional markers of identity have not only not

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been dissolved, or weakened, but rather been reinforced (Rudolph and Rudolph 2008). Today, in the wake of the disintegration of the former USSR, the end of the Cold War and the multifaceted processes of globalization, a remarkable shift of attention away from such deep-rooted monism to what Watts terms ‘diminished state sovereignty’ (Watts 2008: 8), and to recognition of ‘the plurality of allegiances that must be accommodated in a viable multinational federation’ is unmistakable. Given the multi-ethnic and national social and cultural complexion of much of the countries of the world today,4 this provides the most congenial atmosphere for rethinking identity issues and their federal solutions.5

Theoretical Framework of Asymmetric Federalism Since this book is premised on the effectiveness of asymmetric federalism as a tool of governance and legitimacy for accommodation of diversity and ensuing unity and relative political stability, some theoretical discussion is called for. Although Watts (2008) above has cleared the deck, to some extent, for us by accepting the premise of multi-tiered federalism, in the standard theoretical literature on the subject though the interest in the subject is intermittent only (Tarlton 1965; McGarry 2007; Swenden 2012; Agranoff 1999) and more or less has remained confined to the twotiered structure of federalism in discussing asymmetric federalism. That is most often at variance with the very complex social and cultural diversity at many layers of society which may require multiple levels of institutional arrangements for accommodating diversity, and power-sharing. In other words, we ought to go beyond the simple and often unclear idea of ‘self-rule’ because self-rule often empowers one dominant ethnic identity to the exclusion of the others. That is to say, for responding to multiple identities, self-rule should need to reflect elements of ‘shared rule’ (so far conceived only for the national/federal level) so that the micro-minorities within the self-rule structure do not fall victim to majoritarianism. In defending a case for sustainable federalism for Russia, Smith has also drawn our attention to what needs to be done. In order to avoid the danger of secession (in the case of Russian federation), he asserted: ‘it is important to ensure, first, that federal subunits are not defined as the possession of one ethnic group, but rather as belonging to all residents; secondly, that a civic identity is developed which can be a source of allegiance and identity for non-dominant groups…’ (Smith 2000: 365).

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The observations of Smith above are profound and contain original insights not only about the method of recasting federal subunits but also the units below, i.e. the sub-State level units which, ethnically distinct, demands also political recognition, which is not otherwise met by the designing of the federal subunits. His second suggestion takes one to a greater theoretical debate on nationhood. In a multi-ethnic country in which ethnic identities are thick, and where such groups find little in common to share with other ethnic groups, what then holds them together? In my other writings (Bhattacharyya 2008, 2015), I resorted to a conceptual distinction between ethnic and civic nationhood, and argued that in multi-ethnic countries, it is not ethnic identity/identities which provides for the cementing glue to hold them together but a thin layer of civic nationhood which implies, inter alia, sharing in certain civic values deriving mostly from the constitution but on which as societal consensus has been built. The construction of ethnic identity is always and everywhere exclusivist; the ethnie define them always in terms of having the other; in such a construction, there is always the ethnic other to which it is opposed and from which it is different. This ethnic other is the enemy to be fought out. Smith (1986) has brought out the various manners of construction of such ethnic-self-identity the world over. The term ‘asymmetry’ does not suggest a desirable value to be upheld, not particularly in the Left radical thinking. The term ‘asymmetric federalism’ may appear on the face of it to be sacrilegious. This is so perceived because while symmetry implies a balance of elements, asymmetry implies just its opposite. That, at least, is the dictionary connotation of the terms. But then, if we take the view that the basic objective of federal governance, however difficult it is, is to obtain and maintain a dynamic political equilibrium among constituent parts, or elements, premised on the protection and maintenance of diversity for identity of sorts, then asymmetric federalism serves to play a supplementary role for the same objective. It is so argued because not all identity demands could be responded to, and met at ‘sub-national’ levels. This is particularly so in complex multi-ethnic countries. This is, however, not to argue that the tool of asymmetric federalism, or the practice of it, is something unique and discovered recently. The fact of the matter is that all federations starting with the US have had some space for asymmetric federalism, theoretically and practically speaking, since their beginning. What then is asymmetric federalism? Why is it provided for and how? What is the motive behind asymmetric federal demands? Given

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the growing global interest in federal as the mode of governance for multi-ethnic countries, it is time perhaps to alert the scholars of comparative federalism to the need to pay more serious attention to federal asymmetries across federal states because a symmetric approach, as it is constitutionally and conventionally assumed so far in the most standard literature on federalism, does not answer all the questions why federations have succeeded in cases, and where they failed. Following Riker (1975), Rao and Singh (2005: 4–5) argued that the ‘differences in bargaining strength’ provides for a ‘source of asymmetry’—bargaining for economic gain, greater freedom of action, and political representation (Rao and Singh 2005: 5). About half a century back, Charles D. Tarlton’s seminal essay titled ‘Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation’ (1965) pointed our attention to this direction when he argued that even in the US federation known for its symmetry of relations between the States and the federation (although the US federation had had peripheral asymmetric structural elements from quite early on) (Watts 1999 in Agranoff), in actual practice, there had been significant areas of asymmetry in respect of the relations between the States and the Federal government. Defined very simply, asymmetric federalism refers to institutional arrangements for different statuses and rights of the units of the federation premised on the political recognition of diversity ‘while deflecting the secessionist potential of certain forces’ (Agranoff 1999: 9). Taking a broader perspective, one would also go beyond to examine not only the structures as designed in the institutional arrangements but also the processes and outcomes to assess the effectiveness of such techniques. In fact, the above is the main thrust of the collection of some ten long chapters edited by Agranoff (1999). If Tarlton (1965) found out different relationships of the States with the Central government, the scholars found out that Tarlton was stating almost a universal fact about federalism across the globe. Sociologically oriented scholars on federalism (Livintgstone 1952; Duchacek 1970; Watts 1966, 1999) point out the inadequacies of a symmetric approach in federalism to adequately respond to the federal qualities of society marked by differences of kinds. Agranoff (1999: 17–23) has identified a 9-point ‘guiding principles’ of asymmetric federalism: de jure and de facto; conditions and outcomes; levels of asymmetry; normative dimension; analytic dimension; asymmetry and political stability; relational symmetry and asymmetry; neutrality of asymmetry and

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asymmetry as a social reality. De jure and de facto asymmetry refer to the constitutional/legal status and rights of units, and the actual practices either following from the de jure position/or not. Also, the de jure asymmetry may vary enormously relative to social and cultural contexts, and the compulsions in federation building. It may affect variously the principles of representation and other institutional principles of federalism and democracy. Differentiated federal structures, as Watts argues (1999: 16) are examples of de jure asymmetric federal arrangements. ‘Conditions and outcomes’ refer to the social basis of federalism and the effect on the ‘politics of recognition’ that is embedded in asymmetric arrangements respectively. The levels of asymmetry refer to the mostly vertical relationship of the units, especially special units with the Centre suggesting more diffuse centres of power within the federation. It is argued, for example, that Quebec’s current relationship with the federal government in Canada ‘reflects the possibility of greater vertical asymmetry’ (Agranoff 1999: 18). What is the normative implication of asymmetry? This principle takes one down to the issues of ethnic and democratic rights of groups and their self-rule because only through that the ethnic groups can resist rule over them by other groups. The analytical dimensions of asymmetry entail institutional designing, that is, the recognition of the nature of society at stake, the details of regional or local autonomy and so on (Agranoff 1999: 19). The remaining principles suggest the cardinal issue of political stability and recognition in favour of increasing devolution. From the developing literature on asymmetric pressures on the federations, it also found out that such pressures act upon the actual operation of the political systems, federal or unitary (McGarry 2007), including that of coalition-building, as Swenden (2012) has pointed out. In this context, it is worth considering a little more of the views of Watts (1999, 2008: 125–30) Asserting like others before him on the subject that all federations contain some asymmetric elements, he pointed, for example, the case of US federation in which beyond the 50 symmetric states (constituent units), there are what he terms ‘peripheral unit’ (two federacies, three associated states, three home rule territories, three unincorporated territories and some 130 Native American Nations (de facto federacies). He pointed out that they exist ‘in an asymmetric federal relationship to the federation’ (Watts in Agranoff 1999: 25). According to Watts again (1999: 25), the current Russian Federation of 89 constituent units of varying sizes and powers and jurisdiction provides the ‘most complex’ de jure and de facto asymmetry. In his subsequent writing

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on the subject (Watts 2008: 125–30), Watts has distinguished between political asymmetry—a function of social, economic, cultural and political factors—and constitutional asymmetry, which is constitutional and legal allowing a variety of units within the federations with differential powers and jurisdiction, and influences within the federation (Watts 2008: 25– 27). The movements for more powers to the units, or to increase regional autonomy and so on fall, Watts believes, within this category. Watts’ conclusion which is not to be ignored is that more and more asymmetric pressures within the federation also induce counter-movements for more symmetry. Second, extreme asymmetry may prove to be dysfunctional in the end (Watts 2008: 30). But, as we have already indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the predominant thrust of asymmetric federalism so far has been in relation to federal units and their relations with the federation. Watts (1999, 2008) is perhaps alone in specifically focusing on the other what he calls ‘peripheral units’ to be considered in the purview of the discussion on asymmetric federalism. My point of departure in this connection is that we need to rethink the cases of asymmetry within asymmetry given the very complex diversity to be accommodated. If federalism is to accommodate diversity, if it is to recognize difference, it ought to recognize not just one, dominant difference, but many. This leads us to consider the cases of sub-state level units as cases of asymmetry both de jure and de facto. Our two case study materials from India’s North-East, with particular focus on two experiments—in Tripura and Assam—governed by the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India are illustrative in this respect in the sense that both the States (like other state in the region) have enjoyed until 2014 asymmetric status as Special Category States within the Indian federation and yet had to concede self-governance for the aboriginal people of Tripura comprising some one-third of the total population of the State, but majority in the ADC areas; the State government is constitutionally obliged to delegate jurisdiction and powers to the ADC. In the case of Bodoland in Assam, also under the amended Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, the same constitutional stipulations apply, and yet the latter experiment, as we shall in the relevant chapter below, is fraught with a host of problems. The whole experiment has produced incessant inter-ethnic violence and deaths. Finally, we ought to consider the cases of de facto federal asymmetry in the land of the classic federalism. John Kincaid (2011, 38–53) has forcefully argued that ‘contemporary American federalism’ has assumed

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a ‘coercive’ functioning so that since the 1960s there have been federal dictates on states and local governments (Kincaid 2011: 37). He said: The era of coercive federalism has been marked by a shift of federal policymaking from the interest of places (i.e. state and local governments) to the interests of persons (i.e. voters and interest groups). (Kincaid 2011: 37)6

Evidently, this has undermined federal symmetry in the US. The point that is being made here is that federal asymmetry is not to be taken out of proportion at the cost of federal symmetry without which federalism, symmetric and asymmetric, cannot work. The lesson that can be drawn from the above theoretical landscape is that as a tool of governance in multi-ethnic contexts, federal asymmetry serves to add values and strength in the process of inclusive governance, which otherwise is considered as a very difficult proposition, and quite daunting for the politicians and statesman alike. Asymmetric federal arrangements are part and parcel of all federations for addressing some special cases especially in peripheral regions. As Burgess (2006: 209–25) argues, while federal asymmetry is not a threat to the state or national integration, it is also not a panacea; beneficiaries of such institutional arrangements must find other ways of securing their interests and protecting their identity. If federalism is to result, desirably, in dynamic political equilibrium, federal asymmetry for special cases serves to enhance it rather than becoming a negative force. There is a final point to be noted here. There are asymmetries in federal design especially when the federations are made from the top rather than bottom up. In the cases of federation being built from below with the compacting parties equal in power and status, the structural asymmetry does not have any space. But in the other cases, especially when federal units are the result of federation building from above, federal units remain quite asymmetric in respect of their share in shared rule and thus serve to cause large areas of discontent in the federal dynamics. As the case of India will testify, the principle of equality of representation in the second chamber is not followed here so many small States send one or two MPs to the Raja Sabha (Council of States) which contrast sharply with some States sending as many as 31 (Uttar Pradesh) MPs to the second chamber. The successive territorial reorganization and right-sizing of the States are yet to balance this huge imbalance, which adversely affects the role of the Second Chamber to do justice to the states smaller in size.

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Exclusion/Inclusion in Federalism Does federalism exclude? Is federalism inclusive? Federalism could result in exclusion of minorities who find themselves dominated by the majority group in power at the level of federal units. Although federalism is a combination of shared rule and self-rule, exclusion may occur at both levels especially when one or two dominant and majority groups take power at the national as well as sub-national levels. This can particularly so happen at the sub-national level where the regional self-rule is not enough shared rule. In other words, one ethnic group by being the majority may exclude the minorities from sharing the powers as well as reaping the benefits of governance and development. Territorial power-sharing in this case may not be of any help, for the smaller size and dispersed habitation of the minorities may not have enough territorial significance. A territorial solution, if any, for the smaller minorities would be an asymmetric solution. But non-territorial solution as ‘corporate federalism’ would be another of its kind. Thus the tool of asymmetric federalism here addresses the problem of exclusion that result from federation building by territorial resizing.

Conclusion The final point I would draw attention to is that in a complex multiethnic/cultural country a federal solution to the problem of accommodation, power-sharing, autonomy and development will necessarily be complex in nature: two or more tiers of government each with its own constitutionally guaranteed share of powers, an autonomous government, and the appropriate measures to have the space of corporate federalism so that non-territorial minorities are also included. A snag remains though: to concede many layers of government based on localism, subregionalism, regionalism and ethnicity may appear to be an exercise in multiculturism. But this potentially cuts into the very basis of interregional/sub-regional, ethnic and tribal terms of existence which can offer the cementing glue to unite a diverse culture. That is to say, if all ethnic groups are keen on having a government of their own in a tiny territory, this tends to add to further ghettoization—costs of government itself apart. Over optimism in the so-called ‘right-sizing’ does not answer the question as to when it is the ‘right’ time to stop ‘right-resizing’. The rest of the book will seek an answer to this question too.

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Notes 1. Spain’s state structure is today more decentralized, and the regional and local level governments are responsible for spending significant amounts of public expenditure: in 1999, for instance, Central government expenditure was 54%; regional government (33%) and local government (13%), which is a major departure from the days of hard dictatorship over the last four decades or so (Moreno 2001: 201–22). 2. It took, awfully, some half a century for Pakistan to realize the value of decentralization and power-sharing, and thus to curb the omnipotence of one ethnic community, namely, the Punjabis, for the sake of better working of its federalism. The 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010 abolishes the North-West Frontier Province and renamed it Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and provides for more representation of minorities in the Senate (upper chamber), and devolution of powers to the provinces. The critical account of this institutional move still finds the federation to be ‘majoritarian with an ethnic core and small number of units’. See for further details, Adeney, K. 2012. A Step Toward Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics of 18th Amendment. The Publius 42 (4) (Fall): 1–27. 3. Even the authors of the Federalist and Tocqueville, the famous French author of American democracy are not spared. It is argued that even in the formation of the US federation, the embedded monism was undeniable in that there was only one conception of ‘one nation’, or ‘one united people’, and not as a multinational, multiethnic federation (Karmis and Norman 2005: 10). 4. For further details on the above, see Karmis and Norman (2005: 12–13). 5. See H. Bhattacharyya (2019a: 187–98) for the current interest in federalism in South East Asia. 6. However, Kincaid does assure us that while the above has been taking place in matters of certain grants-in-aid, especially health care, the cooperative functioning of the three layers of governments remain, for cooperation rather than obstruction has proved to be more beneficial for the state and local government officials, as it concerns policy implementation, which means spending and the scope for gaining in more popularity. See for more details, Kincaid (2011: 37–52).

References Adeney, K. 2007. Federalism and the Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan. New York: Palgrave McMillan. Agranoff, Robert, ed. 1999. Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

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Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Bhattacharyya, H. 2001. India as a Multicultural Federation in Comparison with Swiss Federalism (In Comparison with Swiss Federalism). Fribourg: Institute of Federalism. ———. 2008. Ethnic and Civic Nationhood in India: Concept, History, Institutional Innovation and Contemporary Challenges. In Ethnicity and SocioPolitical Change in Africa and Other Developing Countries, ed. S.C. Saha, 169–95. Lanham, US: Lexington Books. ———. 2010. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia. London and New York: Routledge. ———. 2015. Indian Federalism and Democracy: The Growing Salience of Diversity-Claims Over Equality-Claims in Comparative and Indian Perspectives. Regional and Federal Studies, Regional and Federal Studies 25 (3). https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2015.1052965 ———. 2019a. Federalism in Asia: Beyond the Diversity-Problematic. In Federalism Studies (A Research Agenda), ed. J. Kincaid, 187–98. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar and Northampton, USA. ———. 2019b. States Reorganization and the Accommodation of EthnoRegional Cleavages in India. In Territory and Power in Constitutional Transition, ed. G. Anderson and S. Chaudhry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2021. enlarged rev edn. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nepal and Myanmar. London and New York: Routledge. Burgess, M. 1995. The British Tradition of Federalism. London: Leicester University Press. ———. 2006. Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice. London and New York: Routledge. Burgess, M., and J. Pinder, eds. 2007. Multinational Federations. London and New York: Routledge. Calhoun, Craig J. 1999. On Minority Representation. In Democracy Difference and Social Justice, ed. G. Mahajan, 117–28. Delhi: OUP. Duchacek, Ivor D. 1970. Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimensions of Power. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. Elazar, D. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Reno, USA: University of Nevada Press. Fraser, N. 1995. From Redistribution to Recogntion? Dillemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist Age. New Left Review 212: 68–93. Gagnon, A-.G. and Tully, J. eds. 2001. Multinational Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Glazer, N. 1998. Individual Rights Against Group Right. In Democracy Difference and Social Justice, ed. G. Mahajan, 416–34. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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Smith, G. 2000. Sustainable Federalism, Democratization and Distributive Justice. In Citizebnship in Diverse Societies, ed. W. Norman and W. Kymlicka, 345–365. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stepan, A. 2005. Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model. In Theories of Federalism, ed. D. Karmis and W. Norman, 255–269. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Swenden, W. 2012. Asymmetrical Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32 (3): 67–87. Tamir, Y. 1998. The Minority Cultures and the Nation-State. In Democracy, Difference and Social Justice, ed. G. Mahajan, 100-004. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Tarlton, Ch.D. 1965. Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Thematic Speculation. Journal of Politics 27: 861–74. Taylor, Charles. 1994. The Politics of Recognition. In Multiculturalism and the Problem of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman, 25–73. Princeton University Press: Princeton. Watts, R.L. 1966. New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1996. Comparting Federal Systems in the 1990s. Ontario: Queens’ University Press. ———. 1999. Comparing Federal Systems. Ontario: McGill Queens’ University Press. ———. 2008/1999. Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed. Ontario: Queens McGill University Press. Young, I.M. 1999. The Politics of Difference. In G. Mahajan, ed. Democracy, Difference and Social Justice, 434–451. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 3

Founding Moment (1946–56)

Introduction The founding moment of India’s constitution-making and federation building involved resorting to many asymmetric methods and was very critical. In the aftermath of the communal riots between the Hindus and the Muslims in 1946 followed by the Partition of the sub-continent into Pakistan and India in 1947, the ground situation was really very grim. The Indian nationalist, the INC in particular, made it their pledge to the people during the freedom movements that in free India a Constituent Assembly would be formed on the basis of universal adult suffrage or by method closer to it to draft India’s Constitution. This did not happen, for a Constituent Assembly was formed before India’s independence. Although the Constituent Assembly (CA) was formed in 1946 the voters were not the citizens and the members of the future CA would be elected by members of the Provincial Legislatures constituted by elections in 1945 by the people on the basis of a limited franchise. Also, the initial functioning of the CA was disrupted and slowed down. And yet the task of drafting a Constitution for the vast and complex multi-ethnic country was not easy. Harder still was determining the most appropriate basis of accommodation of ethnic, most importantly the tribal ethnic identity across India, more particularly in the peripheral North-East of India. The State-making as the making of the federal units with lots of special provisions was very vexing ethno-linguistic and tribal cleavages in the country did not correspond with territories. Above all, there was the question © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_3

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of the princely States numbering some 562 interspersed between the Provinces, and with great demographic mix; in many cases, there were Muslim princes with the predominant Hindu subjects; in other cases, it was the reverse. The initial round of simplifying the picture was different types of States with differential statuses and powers which remained between 1950 and 1956. The entire exercise of providing for three types of States was asymmetric. The lots of the princely States were grouped under Unions of States , which suggested a confederal type of system. But the question of accommodating the tribals living in different parts of India including those in the princely States was most vexing. How to accommodate them, especially those in the peripheral areas with the appropriate degree of autonomy was quite puzzling. The ‘founding moment’ in India’s constitution-making and federation building was to be extended to 1956 when the first major reorganization of territories in India took place. If the Constitution inaugurated on 26 January 1950 came up with as many as 27 units (States) (Basu 1997: 71), the arrangements were asymmetric with States with differential status and powers. In 1956, the picture was simplified to a large extent, but the reorganization was still asymmetric, as the States Reorganization Commission (1953–56) grappled with the very complex ethno-territorial situation at the ground level up to the taluka, and failed to suggest one criterion as the basis of State-making. The so-called ‘balanced approach’ of language, economic viability and administrative efficiency was not and could not be exact. The Commission in following a ‘balanced approach’ took note of 50% or more speakers of the language as a basis of State creation. This left out of consideration speakers of other languages from gaining statehood. This aspect has received critical analysis by Schwartzberg (1985: 155–82).1 Despite successive reorganizations, the large linguistic minorities remain without any territorial benefits but had to be content with the so-called (non-territorial) safeguards for the linguistic minorities. The various Reports of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities in India are far from satisfactory on the protection of minority languages at the school level. This chapter deals with three main issues pertaining to the above. First, it examines how the princely States were made members of the Union of India. Second, it seeks to understand the concept of the States (to be made) that the CA, the Constitution of India, and the States Reorganization Commission (1953–56) came up with. Third, it seeks to bring out the debates on the 5th and the 6th Schedules for meeting the needs

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of accommodation and autonomy for the tribals of India who comprise today some 100 million in population.

Princely States: Asymmetric Integration The princely States numbering some 562 and comprised of some twothirds of the territory of India till 1947, of different sizes and complexion, and interspersed between British-created provinces, offered the most formidable challenges in the making of the Union. They were not directly ruled by the British; these were under ‘indirect rule’ of the British. The so-called ‘indirect rule’ was an imperialist strategy, and designed to use them as the bulwark of colonial rule in India. There were such large and rich States as the Nizam of Hyderabad consisting of a few million inhabitants, on the one hand, and Lawa in Northern India, with a few hundred inhabitants, on the other hand. The princely rulers entered into the so-called ‘subsidiary alliance’ with the Company Raj and became dependent for their security on the latter in exchange for their loyalty to the Company, and at the cost of paying annual revenues, and bearing all costs of maintaining the British Residents in their domains as well as providing for some territories for the military forces and their upkeep. In return, the princes were assured of protection against external aggression and internal rebellion, once and for all (Menon 1956: 5). While doses of constitutional reforms, and limited participation of the subject in the provinces were being introduced gradually on a limited scale eventuating in the Government of India Act 1935 (which provided for much progress towards self-government), a medieval autocracy was maintained in the princedom till 1947. The Indian National Congress (born in 1885) also did not allow any political activities for reforms in the princely States until 1938 under its name. The INC rejected the colonial offer of a federation between the princely States and the rest of India in its Cabinet Mission Plan on the ground that a federation could not be built between autocracy and democracy (Bhattacharyya 2021: 55–85). The Government of India Act 1935 had proposed a federation of the princes and British India but made the latter’s joining the federation voluntary; the princely States were very reluctant to cede their ‘sovereignty’ and autonomy in such an eventuality. With the impending transfer of power from the British Crown to India (and also Pakistan) in the late 1940s and the resultant lapse of paramount, there were a lot of political activities by the princes and their representatives on the issue of taking part in the Constituent Assembly

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and joining the Union of India. Ultimately a carrot and stick policy of the INC worked in favour of their accession to the Union of India. The classic book The Integration of the Indian States (1956) by V. P. Menon who served as secretary to the Indian States Ministry headed by Sardar V. Patel is a minefield of first-hand data on the whole drama of integration of the princely States. But the most interesting point for our purpose here is that the integration of the princely States into the Union of India was asymmetric. In the late 1940s, the princes themselves were busy making several Unions, which looked like a regional federation. But those efforts dissipated soon, and they were taken into the Union by following different routes. Austin (1966) said that the princely States were ‘loosely attached to the Union in a relationship resembling a confederation than a federation’ (Austin 1966: 241). When the Constitution was inaugurated on 26 January 1950 the princely States were actually several Unions of States rather than just States, and did not have equal status and powers. The three categories of States as per the Constitution (1950) were highly asymmetric; most of the Princely States were grouped under ‘B States’, and ten were categorized as part ‘C States’. The picture was simplified and a better Union of States came out after the reorganization of the States in 1956. Nonetheless, the scope of asymmetry remained especially with regard to Jammu and Kashmir (Article 370), and Nagaland (371). Sardar Patel’s ‘Unionization of the States’ was more complicated than meets the eye. The SRC’s task was not easy either; it had to do a lot of cutting and pasting; transfer of districts and taluks from one to the other, to make States out of the British Provinces and the Princely States. But in all cases, the most important criterion was language although the SRC harped on the ‘balanced approach’ in tune with its Terms of Reference. The SRC tried as far as possible to recreate States following a ‘balanced approach’, in the sense indicated above; it could not concede to the demands for statehood that were voiced by many ethnic groups. Also, it kept Uttar Pradesh as it is which is to overlook the asymmetric implications of such a big-sized State. Its recommendation for a bi-lingual State of Bombay was only a halfway approach for two States to appear in 1960 out of Bombay, namely, Gujarat and Maharashtra. Punjab was right-sized even with one-third of its territory of the pre-independence period only in 1966. It also left half-done the case of the State of Hyderabad.

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SRC’s Asymmetric Approach to State-Making The States Reorganization Commission (1953–56) played a very instrumental role giving the Union of India a federal turn. Indian federation has since the days of the CA been the result of federalization of two types of territories inherited from the Raj: provinces directly governed by the British, and the princely States which were under the indirect rule of the Raj. The federation building in India has been a multi-staged process (Bhattacharyya 2019b: 80–118) yet to be completed. If we consider India relatively successful as a federation, the key to that lies in resorting to various asymmetric routes in the making of the States: full States; halfStates; sub-States; and so on in finally turning the whole territory into a federation of States with symmetric powers and those with asymmetric powers. The CA and the interim government, particularly the States Ministry headed by Sardar V. B. Patel, was successful in reorganizing the princely States into Unions of States (B) and ten out of them into the Chief Commissioner’s Provinces (C). While that was a splendid job, the real push to ‘Unionization’ came from the SRC, which was confronted with a Herculean task, but which it performed by resorting to various routes of asymmetric re-territorialization. The large, in millions, number of linguistic minority remained in many States after 1956 (Schwartzberg 1985: 165). The work of the SC has been documented in the reports; its activities and recommendations have been critically assessed in some existing literature (Schwartzberg 1985; Bhattacharyya 2010, 2019b, 2021). The unresolved issues left behind by the SRC have of late been taken up for critical scrutiny (Sarangi and Pai 2011). What I propose to highlight here, briefly, is to point out that despite the considerable political momentum generated by the campaigns for linguistic States after Andhra was created in 1953, the terms of the SRC were limited and cautious. Second, Congress’ nationalist pledge to reorganize India after independence into a federation based on linguistic provinces reiterated from 1920 onwards was not based on any detailed understanding of the ground situation— the main reason why the JVP report (1948) of the Congress sought to limit the scope of linguistic provinces by downplaying the Dar Commission report (1948) of the CA formed in order to advise it on the issue. For a variety of reasons Nehru was rather reluctant to grant statehood on the basis of language sensing the lurking dominant caste/class interests that would be served in the event of such statehood being granted

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(King 1997).2 In 1948 the Dar Commission was quite sensitive to the force of nationalism being rooted in the provinces: ‘Indian nationalism is deeply wedded to its regional languages; Indian patriotism is aggressively attached to its provincial frontiers’ (Bhattacharyya 2001: 256). The Commission did recommend for a federation with happy provinces, but its prescription was largely ignored by Congress’s JVP Committee. The Terms of Reference of the SRC clearly showed the mind of the power that be. It was stated: ‘The Government expect that the Commission would, in the first instance, not go into the details but make recommendations in regard to the broad principle which should govern the solution of the problem, and if they, so choose, the broad lines on which particular States should be recognized…’ (SRC 1955: 01) [emphasis added]. This in a way tied the hands of the Commission, which recommended, nonetheless, the formation of States primarily on the basis of language (50% and above!). The Commission’s recommendations for State-making were both symmetric and asymmetric. The States that the SRC recommended to be recognized and formed were to be treated equally in terms of status and powers. The SRC recommended for centrally administered territories of Delhi, Manipur (pending its merger with Assam) and Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Of the 16 States recognized by the SRC, little reorganization was involved: Assam, Odisha (formerly Orrisa), West Bengal, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh; Kerala is the lone case of linguistically most homogeneous State in India today, and its border did not change after 1956. The other recommendations of the SRC with regard to the creation of Vidarbha, and Hyderabad (pending till 1961), or the merger of Tripura with Assam were not conceded to by the government. The other States such as Bombay (bi-lingual), Madras (later Tamil Nadu), Andhra (later Andhra Pradesh), Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab underwent major changes in boundaries; the Bombay State was abolished in 1960. The States reorganization went on, however. Beyond what the SRC recommended minor adjustments of transfer of some territories from one State to the other went from 1959 onwards. Interestingly, a portion of the Purnea district and the district of Purulia minus the Chas thana of Bihar were transferred to West Bengal; it was so done mostly on the basis of language.

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CA and the Making of Asymmetric Provisions for Tribal Self-governance India’s tribal people are today around 100 million (100.3 million) scattered all over India with significant concentrations in some States and in India’s North-East where there are three tribal dominated States, namely Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya (They are also predominantly Christians.). The has provided for two asymmetric provisions for the tribal—5th Schedule for Tribal Advisory Council for ‘tribal welfare and advancement’ under the caption ‘Administration and control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes’, which is far removed from providing for self-government for the vast majority of tribals in India while providing for the Sixth Schedule for Autonomous Tribal District Council for the smaller hill tribes of India’s North-East. Debates took place in the CA on both, but in the case of the former there was no question raised about the absence of tribal self-governance via the 5th Schedule, not surely achievable by an Advisory Council. While the CA has provided for the 5th Schedule for the tribals India except the North-East (where only a minority of tribals live). For the hill tribes in the NorthEast, a more empowering 6th Schedule has been provided that includes the formation by election of the Autonomous Tribal District/Regional Councils for their self-governance via territorial power and autonomy. Historically, while the INC was aware of India’s diversity, and committed itself to reorganizing India after independence as a federation based on linguistic provinces, the tribals of India were not recognized in a like manner. As discussed below, where most tribals live in the rest of India, no territorial provisions were made for tribal self-governance. For most tribals, a 5th Schedule that provides for a Tribal Advisory Council was made while a territorial authority with autonomy and powers for tribal self-governance was provided by way of the 6th Schedule for the hill tribals in India’s North-East who comprise about 8.1 million (26% of the total population of the region) which is about 6% of the total tribal population of India. One reason especially for the tribals of today’s North-East was that the colonial rulers kept the tribal inhabited areas either ‘excluded’ or ‘partially excluded’ for any access from outside. In many cases, the tribals were subjects of the princely States which were kept outside the purview of Congress politics well until 1938 (Haripura Congress).3 Our founding fathers did not visualize the tribal States as the federal units of the Union would ever have to be formed although there were debates

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about the kind of territorial autonomy to be extended to the tribals by way of autonomy and self-governance with powers and authority which would be an example of asymmetric power sharing, and in todays’ lexicon, a level of governance in India’s multi-level governance. As far as the CA debates were concerned, the members expressed concern about real ambit of the 5th Schedule, and the real efficacy of the Tribal Advisory Council to be appointed/nominated for the purpose of ‘administration and control of Scheduled Areas and Tribes’, and its functioning under the State Governor (read State government). On 5 September 1949, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution, introduced the 5th Schedule above purpose. He added that among others ‘the executive powers of a State shall extend to the Scheduled areas therein’ (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 967). As the name suggests, the main ‘duty’ of the Council would be to advise the State on matters pertaining to the welfare and advancement of the tribes in the State. It was also not designed as a territorial animus body unlike the 6th Schedule. The State Governor (read the State government) is given powers of appointment to the Council and its meetings. The advice relates to important areas such as land transfer from the tribals, land allotment among them, and control of illegal money lending among the scheduled areas. Nonetheless, members of the CA were particularly concerned about the fate of the Scheduled Tribes under the 5th Schedule. Jaipal Singh (from Bihar) raised many issues concerning the real efficacy of the Council: Here again, I want that the Advisory Council should be effective and have a real say in what is being done. I would not for one moment, deny the Governor or the ruler his powers in initial things, but, at the same time I do feel that the word ‘consultation’ is not the right word there… (CAD 2014, Vol. 1X: 978). Jaipal Singh further argued: As I have already stated, there are only two principles in my five amendments: first that the Scheduled Tribes should be benefited by the powers of the Fifth Schedule, and secondly, that the Tribal Advisory Council should be a reality and not a farce Let us not give it a big name, without any powers to do things (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 978). Singh got the problem right, but not the solutions. The Tribal Advisory Council is not a territorial body armed with the requisite powers; its advisory capacity, which is not binding in any way, makes it in practice superfluous. Many other members of the CA who took part in the debates and spoke a lot were minor matters of semantics without much substance when seen from the perspective of the self-governance of

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the Scheduled Tribes, more numerous than that of the North-East who would get, as we shall see soon blow, a much better treatment from the CA by way of the 6th Schedule. Going by the mode of formation and formation of the Council it can be said that it is representative of the tribals though indirectly in that three-fourths of 30 members are to be the MLAs belonging to the tribals in the concerned State. Each State shall have one such Council if the provisions for Scheduled Areas and Tribes apply.

The 6th Schedule: Asymmetry Within Asymmetry The 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution like any other Schedule and Articles are mere texts which do not give us the context and the concerns behind their drafting; the reason that lay behind them, and the apprehensions that many drafters had had in the event of these being passed and so on. Since the Tribal Autonomous District Councils in the North-East (some ten are working) of India are governed by the provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution (as amended from time to time as per needs), we are required to familiarize ourselves with the making of the particular Schedule during the time of the making of the Indian Constitution, the debates surrounding its making on the floor of the Constituent Assembly of India (1946– 1949, dated 5–7 September 1947) (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1003–1084) and the detailed provisions of this Schedule (discussed in this book later) in order to understand the rationale behind the incorporation of this Schedule in the Constitution of India, the extent of autonomy available as per provisions of the Schedule, their efficacy in protecting tribal identity, and finally the role of the Schedule via the Autonomous Tribal District Council itself in the process of ‘national’ integration in India, if any. Or did they promote separatism and disintegration? Before we proceed any further we must remember that this is not the only Schedule, i.e. the special provisions, for catering to the special needs of diversity within the social and cultural morphology of India. Students of the Indian Constitution are aware that the 6th Schedule4 apart, there are such other special provisions as the 5th Schedule and Article 370, the latter designed to concede special autonomy to the State of Jammu and Kashmir,5 as well as Article 371 which offer asymmetric status to all the States in the North-East. The reasons that those provisions and Schedules were debated and finally made into the Constitution of India strongly suggest

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among others the sensitivity of the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution to India’s diversity and the pledge that the Indian nationalists made during the freedom struggle to respond to the needs for protecting diversity after independence as well as maintaining national unity and territorial integrity. In the Constituent Assembly (CA), though over-dominated by the members of the Indian National Congress,6 the rationale of incorporating the 6th Schedule was debated. The debate centred on, on the one hand, the issue of self-government for the tribals (aboriginal people in India’s North-East), the need for accommodation of diversity, and on the other, the problems that might occur in the way of national integration, for nationhood because such little self-government bodies further isolate such people from the ‘mainstream’ and thence hamper national integrity, on the other. Those in favour of the latter argument were in favour of assimilation of the tribal people. Mr Rohini Kumar Choudhuri, a member of the CA, had this to say on the floor of the Assembly: We want to assimilate the tribal people. We are not given that opportunity so far. The tribal people, however much they liked, had not the opportunity of assimilation. So much as that, I living in Shillong, cannot purchase property from any Khasi except with the permission of the Chief of the State or with the permission of the Deputy Commissioner. I have no right to purchase property in any tribal areas. An Indian has no right to purchase property in those areas without the permission of the Deputy Commissioner, or the Chief of the State. If this Constitution is adopted those disabilities will continue. I am not allowed to associate with the tribal people; the tribal people are allowed to associate with me…...Why do you want to dissociate them from us by creating these autonomous districts which remain autonomous? Do you want an assimilation of tribal and non-tribal people, or want to keep them separate? (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1017)

Mr Lakshinarayan Sahu from Orissa held the opposite view and countered Mr Choudhuri by stressing that ‘we wish none should be able to take away land from the aboriginals since they do not understand their own economic interest’ (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1019). Mr Jaipal Singh, another proponent of the 6th Schedule, highlighted in particular the angle of accommodation through the Schedule. The Rev JJM Nichols Roy from Assam and the most powerful and cogent defender of the 6th Schedule refuted the cultural argument made by some members that the

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tribal people (backward) were to be assimilated and brought up to the ‘mainstream’, etc. Defending the culture of the hill men, Rev Nicols Roy argued that the culture of the former was in some respect even superior to that of the plainsmen. He said: Among the tribesmen, there is no difference between class and class. Even the Rajas and Chiefs work in the field together with their laborers. They eat together. Is that practiced in the plains? The whole of India has not reached that level of equality. (p. 1023)

He added: The social organization is that of the village, the clan and the tribes, and the outlook and structure are generally strongly democratic. There is no system of caste or purdah and the child marriage is not practiced. (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1023)

Stressing the better culture of equality among the hill men and women, he opined: Even the Rajs and Chiefs work in the filed together with the laborers. They eat together. Is that practiced in the plains. (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1023)

The Rev Roy’s conclusive statement is well-argued and forceful: This Schedule gives a certain measure of self-government to these hill areas but the laws and regulations to be made by the District Council are subject to the control and assent of the Governor of Assam. What is more unifying than that? (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1024). In short, the Bordoloi Committee of the Constituent Assembly formed for the purpose was confronted with three points of view regarding the issue of autonomy to be conceded to the tribes under the Constitution of India. The first view was in favour of complete assimilation of the tribes with the political set up of India. The second one rejected any power of the State Governor in the matter of the 6th Schedule. The third view combined the first two in favour of giving autonomy to the tribes to be guaranteed under the Indian Constitution but within the overall control by the State Governor.7 The provisions for the 6th Schedule for autonomous tribal District Council for the hill tribes in India’s North-East are more empowering for the tribals, and the District Councils under this Schedule are like a

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State within a State, asymmetry within asymmetry. While I shall deal with the details of the Schedule and its applications to cases otherwise not befitting, this section seeks, in brief, to bring out the tenor of the debate in the CA over it. Opinions in the CA on the desirability of the 6th Schedule that while none was so provided for the vast majority of tribals living elsewhere in India was questioned by many including some members of the CA’s Bordoloi Committee. It further stressed the risk and dangers in offering autonomy to the hill tribes in the frontier regions of India. Brajeswar Prasad raised the above issue (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1005–06) which was not the lone voice. But Dr Ambedkar’s defense was two-pronged and very powerful. First, he said: Although we have constituted autonomous districts for the purpose of the satisfaction of the tribal people living in those areas that they will have, at any rate for the first ten years, autonomy in the matter of the government of their areas we have nowhere provided that autonomous districts shall not constitute part of the province of Assam. That being so, it is very difficult to leave part of the Province to be governed by the Governor of the province and part of the province be administered as a centrally administered area (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1001). The second point in his defence was: It has been provided in this Schedule that so far as the frontier areas of Assam are concerned the Governor would be acting under the President. Consequently, whatever strategic importance the frontier areas may have, the Centre would certainly have jurisdiction to see that none of the disturbing factors to which he has made reference will find any place there. I therefore think that all the amendments are unnecessary and out of place. (CAD 2014, Vol. IX: 1007)

What divided the CA about the 6th Schedule and the District Council was two: the question of integration of the frontier region with the Union of India, and the right method to do so. Second, granting territorial autonomy to the hill tribes in the frontier regions would encourage separatism or not. Some members such as Brajeswar Prasad (Bihari) and Kuladhar Chaliha (Assam) opined that granting such autonomy would be tantamount to Tribalistan (p. 1010). He was equally vociferous against placing the Sixth Schedule above the act of Parliament (p. 1010). The first question pertains to the manner of integrating the tribals into the mainstream by force and or local self-government—either by assimilation with the Assamese or by forcing them to do so. Brajeswar Prasad was opposed

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to the idea of self-determination as a justification of tribal self-rule via the 6th Schedule (p. 1011). Gopinath Bordoli (Assam), the Chairman of the Tribal Subcommittee of the CA was sympathetic to the cause of the tribal and their self-government, the latter’s integration peacefully rather than forcefully assimilates. He appreciated the local tribal customs and rules of self-governance by panchayats and other practices which he argued should be honored. He said: In other words, they are exercising a certain amount of autonomy, which, I thought, and the members of the Tribal SubCommittee thought, should be preserved rather than destroyed. What is necessary for good government is already there (p. 1013). While Rajeswar Prasad, Rohini Kumar Chaudhury and other opposed the very idea of the tribal self-governance and autonomy, and were in favour of assimilation, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, Jaipal Singh, Bordoloi and J. J. M. Nichols Roy8 were in favour of offering the hill tribes autonomy as a method of integration. Sardar Patel is quoted to have approved the proposal of the Tribal Sub-Committee (p. 1019).

Conclusion It is thus seen from the above debates that members of the CA were divided over the introduction of the autonomy via the 6th Schedule for the hill tribes of North-East India. Some members even went to the extent of accusing Dr B. R. Ambedkar of indulging in separatism like the departing British. Others who supported Dr Ambedkar and the 6th Schedule defended it on grounds of culture and identity, and accommodation (Jaipal Singh), and Rev Nicols Roy (some measure of self-government for the tribals) and others defended it provided there is control of the Governor over the Council. Those who were opposed to it were worried about the unity of India after the Partition let separate self-government was granted to the hill people on the frontiers. As the following chapters will show, the supporters of the 6th Schedule have been proven right, the various Autonomous Tribal District Councils have been working for decades, with some upgraded to Union Territories, and then Statehood such as Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh.

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Notes 1. As Schwartzberg showed, a very few States are linguistically ‘homogeneous’ which suggests that even with States created with symmetric status and powers, they are hardly representative of the all the linguistic groups in the State. 2. Nehru vacillated between two poles: linguistic domination vis-à-vis socioeconomic domination. Democracy here was like a double-edged sword. 3. Even at Haripura the INC resolved to allow individual Congressmen to engage in political mobilization in the Princely States but not the party as a whole. 4. This provides for State autonomy and also contains powers and functions of the State governments in India in respect of the State and the Concurrent Lists. 5. Abolished in 2019 by the current Union Government. 6. Granville Austin (1999/1966: 8–18) reported that after the creation of Pakistan and with the Muslim League members deserted, the Congress dominance was about 82% of the total members. (Austin, G. The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation. Delhi: OUP.) 7. Roy Burman, B.K. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. In Gassah. L. S. (ed.) 1997, op. cit., p. 24 (for details, pp. 15–39). 8. Roy referred to Jawaharlal Nehru’s approach to the tribal in the region and defended that the tribal should be allowed some measure of autonomy. For further details, see Nehru’s Letters to Chief Minister Vol. 4, 1988, Delhi, p. 558 and see also Elwin, V. 1957. A Philosophy for NEFA. Government of Assam, Shillong.

References Austin, G. 1999/1966. The Indian Constitution: The Cornerstone of a Nation. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Basu, D.D. 1997. The Constitution of India. New Delhi: Prentice Hall. Bhattacharyya, H. 2001. India as a Multicultural Federation in Comparison with Swiss Federalism. Fribourg: Hellbing and Lichetnhahn. ———. 2010. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia. London and New York: Routledge. ———. 2019a. Federalism in Asia: Beyond the Diversity-Problematic. In Federalism Studies (A Research Agenda), ed. J. Kincaid, 187–98. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar and Northampton, USA. ———. 2019b. States Reorganization and the Accommodation of EthnoRegional Cleavages in India. In Territory and Power in Constitutional

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Transition, ed. G. Anderson and S. Chaudhry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2021. enlarged rev edn. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nepal and Myanmar. London and New York: Routledge. Constituent Assembly Debates. 2014. Vol. IX, 5th September 1949: 967. New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat. King, R. 1997. Nehru’s Language Policies. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Menon, V.P. 1956. The Integration of the Indian States. Hyderabad: Orinet Longman. Sarangi, A., and S. Pai, eds. 2011. Interrogating States Reorganization: Culture, Ethnicity and Politics in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Schwartzberg, J. 1985. Factors in the Linguistic Reorganizations of Indian States. In Region and Nation, ed. P. Wallace, 155–82. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Official Sources Reports of the States Reorganization Commission (vols. 1–4) (Ministry of Home Affair: Government of India) (1955).

CHAPTER 4

Federal Asymmetry in India and Various Forms

Introduction Conventionally, federal symmetry is the core assumption on which federalism is based. It refers to equality of status and powers among the federal units. This is particularly true in cases where federation was the result of a compact among pre-existing states. Federal asymmetry is generally understood as special cases such as for peripheries and federacies but beyond the main structure of the two-tiered federal system. Asymmetry is also found in relatively different sizes and political weights of the federal units. But in any case, it is understood in relation to the federal units, but not extended down to the subunits or sub-states which may be distinct ethnoterritorial units with constitutional guarantees, and which enjoy powers and authority for local regional or sub-regional affairs. We seek to argue that there are two grounds on which a case of asymmetric federalism in federations in post-colonial countries can be made. First, since federation building in such countries has followed a different route, by disaggregation of a once centralized colonial state (but not ethnically homogenous), and also by incorporation of new territories, even at the level of states, the scope for different degrees of asymmetries had to be provided for meeting special, particularly diversity needs of regions. Elsewhere I (Bhattacharyya 2021) have discussed this aspect. Second, in post-colonial federation, given the very complex ethnic diversity at the base of the states, especially those concerning the tribals, sub-state level asymmetric institutional arrangements were unavoidable. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_4

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This chapter seeks to offer a critical examination of the concept of asymmetric federalism, de jure and de facto within federations in conventional federations. Second, we offer a critical outline of the various institutional arrangements in India at the state and sub-state levels. In the final part of the chapter, we point out the limits of such asymmetric arrangements. The predominant thrust of asymmetric federalism so far has been in relation to federal units and their relations with the federation. Watts (1999, 2008) is perhaps alone in specifically focusing on the other what he calls ‘peripheral units’ to be considered in the purview of the discussion on asymmetric federalism. My point of departure in this connection is that we need to rethink the cases of asymmetry within asymmetry given the very complex diversity to be accommodated. If federalism is to accommodate diversity, if it is to recognize difference, it ought to recognize not just one, dominant difference, but many. This leads us to consider the cases of sub-state level units as cases of asymmetry both de jure and de facto. Our case study materials from India’s North-East, with particular focus on two experiments—one each in Tripura and Assam—governed by the 6th Schedule of the Constitution of India are illustrative in this respect in the sense that both the States (like other state in the region) have enjoyed until 2014 asymmetric status as Special Category States (Bhattacharjee 2016)1 within the Indian federation and yet had to concede self-government for the aboriginal people of Tripura comprising some one-third of the total population of the State, but the majority in the ADC areas; the State government is constitutionally obliged to delegate jurisdiction and powers to the ADC. In the case of Bodoland in Assam, also under the amended Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, the same constitutional stipulations apply, and yet the latter experiment, as we shall discuss in the relevant chapter below, is fraught with a host of problems. The whole experiment has produced incessant inter-ethnic violence and deaths. We seek to argue that the tool of governance in multiethnic contexts, federal asymmetry serves to add strength to the process of inclusive governance, and generate some legitimacy in difficult terrains, which otherwise is considered as a very difficult proposition but quite daunting for the politicians and statesmen alike.

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State Level Asymmetry Asymmetries in Indian federalism are very complex indeed born of historical compulsions, the particular mode of formation of the federation, special geo-strategic considerations of some regions, formally centralized nature of the federation, certain political considerations and so on (Arora 1995; Rao and Singh 2005; Saxena 2011; Tillin 2007) Rao and Sen (2011) have mostly focused on the economic aspects of the phenomenon although the identity, or cultural aspects have not escaped their attention. The subject of asymmetric federalism and its role in holding the federation together has received some attention. There are gross misconceptions too. Tillin (2007) has almost denied any role of India’s federal asymmetry as India’s ‘national minorities’ (one does not know where in the Indian Constitution there is such a recognition!) and the cultural rights of others are not recognized. The students of Indian Constitution and politics would recognize easily that there are no such things as ‘national minorities’ in India, and the asymmetric arrangements made in the Indian federation were designed to protect the cultural rights of ethnic minorities, especially in the North-East. On the contrary, a la Riker (1975), that since federalism involves much of bargaining for ‘enhancing freedom and representation’ by some groups, the sources of asymmetry are precisely the differences utilized for the above purpose. However, they have also pointed out that de facto asymmetry can contribute to nation-building (Rao and Sen 2011: 5). De facto asymmetry assumes special significance in India because of the centralized nature of the federation (Rao and Singh 2011: 5). In their account, the ‘Special Category States’ (SCS) in India enjoying special status and powers relative to the general or nonspecial category states, for a variety of reasons, part path dependency and part contingent, has drawn their detailed attention. Until 2019 India had 11 SCS (comprising all 8 States in the North-East), Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. Such States again do not enjoy the same kinds of power and privileges. For example, Sikkim, a very small State, is a lone case that can levy income taxes. Nagaland is another lone case in another respect.2 One central fact is common to all SCS: they are heavily dependent on the Central government fiscal transfers for they have limited revenue-raising capacity compared to the non-special category, or general category state. Rao and Singh (2011: 20) inform us that the total population of the SCS is only some small per cent of the total population, but they receive 90% plan assistance as grant,3 and the rest is loans. Apart from the grounds for

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equity, the other strategic reasons may be at work because many of these states are located on India’s international borders, and hence the issue of foreign investment in such areas is not always easily, if at all, allowed by the central government (Rao and Singh 2011: 2–21).4 Be that as it may, the paradigm of discussion of Rao and Singh (2011), as above, like other scholars mentioned before, is asymmetric position of the constituent units of the federation in relation to the Central government and other units of the federation. In their estimate, and by the provisions of the Indian Constitution (Article 371), for example, Tripura is a ‘special category state’. But what is neglected in such analyses is asymmetry within asymmetry, that is, the sub-state level institutional arrangements for self-government for the accommodation of diversity and protection of identity. The reference here is made to Autonomous Tribal District Councils in the North-East as well as various other district-level self-governing bodies, and regional councils/development councils elsewhere in the country that tape part in power-sharing, and enjoy relative autonomy. Balveer Arora (1995) is alone in pointing our attention to this direction by referring to what he calls ‘sub-state political structures’ (Arora 1995: 84). This relates to relations between the State and the district-level governing structures, and involves the issue of decentralization. Arora (1995) has rightly pointed out that the Fifth and the Sixth Schedules of the Constitution of India are the most important examples providing for such arrangements although the latter is more empowering than the former in respect of self-government of tribal (aboriginal peoples), and protection of their identity (Arora 1995: 85). On the basis of the experience of Autonomous District Councils in India, he seemed apprehensive of the real content of autonomy to be enjoyed by such structures cast as they are in the same unitary mould of state–district relations, as the centre–state relations (Arora 1995: 85). In other words, the reference here is made to some inherent limitations of such provisions which make the district level government structures dependent upon the State government for devolution of powers and functions. Constitutional provisions apart one very important consideration in respect of the extent of autonomy to be enjoyed by such autonomous district councils is ethnicity or the ethnic content of both the State government and of the district council. Very often, the State government dominated by one or two ethnic groups may perceive the existence of such councils as a potential threat to their authority because the very fact

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that such an institutional structure had to be worked out by carving up territorial jurisdiction of the existing State government itself may be taken as a defeat on the part of the State government run by a different political party from that of the district councils. Ethnic deprivation is otherwise ethnic States have triggered demands for further territorial division of the existing States for recognition and accommodation of still smaller ethnic minority. The history of the formation of all the district councils in the North-East except Sikkim are a testimony to this. While all the States in the North-East were until very recently Special Category States, (We discuss it later in the book.) some States remain very special. Nagaland of course leads others (after the abolition of Article 370) and is somewhat unique enjoying, as it were, semi-sovereign authority. Article 371A ensures that. It says: Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution --No act of Parliament in respect of --a. Religious or social practices of the Nagas, b. Naga customary laws and procedure, c. Administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to customary laws, d. Ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides. (Bakshi 2014: 391)

Beyond Nagaland, other States in the NE as well as the States in the mainland enjoy some special provisions in respects of financial support to the tribal communities not covered under the District Councils. Article 371B provides for financial support to a Committee of the Assam State Assembly in order to extend some benefits of the 6th Schedule to them, and the State Governor has been specifically empowered to secure the proper functioning of the committee Bakshi 2017: 394). Article 371C provides for similar provisions. Article 371D has provided for the purposes of ‘equitable opportunities and facilities belong to different parts of the State’ (of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana) and determining the local areas that needs such support; for such local areas direct recruitment to local cadres under the State and admission to any university under the State control (Bakshi 2017: 394–95). There is a provision (under Article 371 J) for setting up a Development Board in the State of Karnataka for

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Hyderabad-Karnataka region for the purpose of equitable allocation of development expenditure for the region (Bakshi 2017: 400–01). Although constitutionally speaking a ‘temporary and special provision’ Nagaland is a powerful case of asymmetry in Indian federalism which no other States have enjoyed. The Naga politicians, however, believe that the autonomy was not sufficient for the Nagas, as they are yet to achieve Nagalim, a Naga federation to be constituted by incorporating the Naga inhabited areas in Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh (Interviews quoted in Bhattacharyya 2018: 45). Whether Nagalim is to be achieved or not is a different question altogether, and its implications for India’s multicultural social and political fabric of India in the event of its being so achieved, the Nagas in power since 1963 have proven their ability to develop and govern the State. The available records of which are competitive. Its records of political participation in Lok Sabha elections over the years show that starting with 53.77% in 1957, the voter turnout has gone up as high as 91.77% in 2004, 90% in 2009, and 87% in 2014 (Bhattacharyya 2018: 61). Its records of the rule of law has been quite high too (Malhotra, 2014: 159). Going by Malhotra’s (2014) analysis, Nagaland’s score in 2011 in terms of the rule of law—a composite index of such sub-indexes as police personnel per 10,000 people, rate of crime (IPC and State Laws), crime against women, etc.—was highest of all the States in India. We will provide a comparative account of governance, and development in the asymmetric States/Special Category States later in a separate chapter. The case of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 was another case of asymmetry and its special autonomy was protected by Article 370 due to the reason that the J & K acceded to the Union under very special circumstance the politics of which is not acceptable to all observers of Indian politics (Anderson 2014). It was deleted in 2019 by the current Union government and the State was bifurcated into two Union Territories, namely, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladhak. However, J & K never really enjoyed autonomy under Article 370 due to persistent Central control over its powers and autonomy since 1954. Until 2014, Indian federation contained eleven ‘special category states’ ( Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and all the seven (now eight including Sikkim (since 2012) states in India’s North-east), an arrangement connected with the complex processes and other strategic considerations connected with the formation of the Indian federation

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(Rao and Singh 2005: 65, 68, 70).5 The special attraction of ‘special category states’ is that the financial transfers from the Union/Centre to such states are weighted (Rao and Singh 2005: 68). Rao and Singh (2005) have given some indication of the considerations on which such provisions are made into the Constitution of India: They include language designed to protect, or customary laws and religious practices, restrictions on the ownership and transfer of land, and restriction on immigration (Rao and Singh, 2005: 68). Rao and Singh (2005) also argue that it is not true that in all cases the spirit of ‘special category states’ is maintained by the Centre which has had overruled the special autonomy enjoined in such provisions by its centralization drives. This has so happened in the case of Nagaland in respect of its ‘natural resources’ (Rao and Singh 2005: 69).6 Two interesting features of the provisions for ‘special category states’ (SCS) in India stand out. First, they are heavily dependent on the Centre for financial transfer; to the extent of 80% of their public expenditure is financed by the Centre. This makes them depend heavily on the Centre. Second, yet, it does not cost the Centre much in terms of per capita transfer because of the small size of populations of such states (the entire population of all the SCSs amounts to only about 5.4% of the total population of India (Rao and Singh 2005: 75). From the data given in Table 4.2 of Rao and Singh (2005: 76–77) it is seen that the per capita central transfers to the SCSs do not compare at all with the general category states. Nonetheless the percentage share of own resources to finance public expenditure is much higher in the general category states than in the SCSs. The average for the general category states as a whole in this regard is 52.3% while for the SCSs as a whole is only 20.2% (Rao and Singh 2005: 77). There is another type of territorial power-sharing within the States and Union Territories too. Ladhak, now a Union Territory, was part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and has since 1995 been governed by two Autonomous Hill Development Councils of Kargil and Leh, which are elected bodies: (26 out of 30 are elected, four being appointed for representing women and minorities). These autonomous bodies are governed under the State law and their autonomy is limited. The Council has an Executive Council as the top body. The Hill Council maintain liaison with the sub-district level panchayats for ensuing equitable development down to the grassroots. These Councils have powers relating to economic development, healthcare, education, land use, taxation, and local governance which are further reviewed at the block headquarters in the presence of the Chief Executive Councilor. The Darjeeling Gorkha Territorial

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Council in West Bengal is another similar example of a territorial body elected and operating under State laws. Such territorial/regional/subregional as well as non-territorial arrangements are to be seen from a broader perspective of asymmetric federalism in India. Beyond those special provisions, there is structural asymmetry in the making of States by the SRC. As we have seen in Chapter 2 above, the State-making in the Indian federation is not complete yet, but in the first major reorganization of the States in 1956, India’s most populous State, i.e. Uttar Pradesh was kept unchanged. As a result, UP sends 80 representatives to Lok Sabha (popular chamber), and 31 to Rajya Sabha (second chamber) while many States (smaller in population) send only one or two. UP’s share of the above remains even after the bifurcation of the State in 2000 and the carving up of Uttarakhand, The latter sends only 5 representatives to Lok Sabha, and three to Rajya Sabha. Unlike many federations, India’s second chamber is composed of members decided according to the size of the population. The larger population has other advantages too in financial disbursement by the Finance Commission.

Conclusion The last point to be addressed here is that even after the reorganization of the States in 1956, most of the States remain multi-lingual and -cultural in conditions when the States are known for the linguistic identity of the dominant groups. Because the SRC went by the criterion of 50% or more speakers of the language to qualify for statehood, the large linguistic minorities came out as the after-effects. Such linguistic minorities have been provided with ‘constitutional safeguards’,7 but they do not have any territorial representation. For example, there are more than 10 million Bengali speakers out of West Bengal and Tripura, but they do not benefit from what is called ‘corporate federalism’. This raises the issue of representation at the level of decision-making bodies. A formal state structure as such is important for the dominant ethno-regional groups, but not sufficient to incorporate the minorities. To look at it from the perspective of so-called ‘politics of recognition’, this is clearly asymmetric. One would suggest that the above be considered as a part of the discourse of federal asymmetry for a more comprehensive understanding.

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Notes 1. Bhattacharjee (2016) is the first ever comprehensive book on the Special Category States. However, his perspective that the system of SCS was a ‘flawed mechanism’ does not appear to take SCS as part of the overall political economy of India. In other words, his otherwise very detailed account does not place the SCS in then political economy of India. 2. Consider the following provision under Article 371A of the Indian Constitution with respect to the state of Nagaland: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, (a) No act of Parliament in respect of (i) the religious or social practices of the Nagas; (ii) Naga customary law and procedure; (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according Naga customary law, and; (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resource, shall apply to the state of Nagaland unless the Legislative assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides’ (Bakshi, P.M. 2009. The Constitution of India [New Delhi: Universal law Publishing House Pvt. Ltd], p. 308). This, beyond doubt, compromises with the sovereignty of Indian parliament, but then that was an instance of the extent of asymmetry allowed for the sake of accommodating diversity in India’s often very difficult circumstances. 3. It is not surprising that there is among some States of India a competition for being considered as ‘Special Category States’. It was in the news that Bihar went all its way to get it by collecting a few hundred thousand signatures of the people, and citation in some 1800 books in defence of its claim in order to woo the investors. But the plea was turned down by the Central government (The Statesman, Kolkata dated 2.4.12). 4. Of late though, in the wake of India’s reforms and opening up, the control regime has been slackened to some extent. Added to that is the end of oneparty rule at the Centre and the growing importance of regional parties in the coalition governments at the Centre, which means more bargaining power in favour the regions for trade, commerce and investment. 5. Rao and Singh (2005) however argue that the so-called strategic geographic considerations used to justify special category states are often exaggerated because such states as created exercise bargaining power greater than their political importance in terms of their size. (p. 71). 6. The government of Nagaland brought the issue to the attention of the Sarkaria Commission but the latter did little except leaving it to the practice of bargaining and negation, something which can only take place among equals. (Rao and Singh 2005: 69). 7. The successive reports of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities have pointed out the lack of adequate safeguards for the linguistic minorities at the primary level of schooling.

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References Arora, B. 1995. Adapting Federalism to India: Multilevel and Asymmetric Innovations. In Multiple Identities in a Single State Indian Federalism in Comparative Perspective, ed. B. Arora and D. Verney. New Delhi: Konarak Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Chapter 3. Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 14th ed. New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing. Bhattacharjee, G. 2016. Special Category States of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bhattacharyya, G. 2018. Radical Politics and Governance in India’s North East: The Case of Tripura. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Bhattacharyya, H. 2021. enlarged rev edn. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nepal and Myanmar. London and New York: Routledge. Malhotra, R. 2014. India Public Policy Report. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Rao, M.G., and Taps Sen. 2011. Federalism and Fiscal Reform in India. Working Paper No. 2011-84. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. https://www.nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2013/04/wp_ 2011_84.pdf. Sighted on 12 March 2011. Rao, G., and N. Singh. 2005. The Political Economy of Federalism in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Riker, W. 1975. Federalism. In Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 5, ed. F. Green and N. Polsbyeds, 95–112. Boston: Little Brown Company. Tillin, L. 2007. United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 37 (1): 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/ pjl017. Sighted on 20 March 2022. Watts, R.L. 1999. Comparing Federal Systems. Ontario: McGill Queens’ University Press. ———. 2008/1999. Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed. Ontario: Queens McGill University Press.

CHAPTER 5

Politics of Fiscal Asymmetry in India

Introduction The political economy of fiscal federalism is a distinct area of study in federalism in its own right. It deals with tax assignment, collection and distribution among many tiers of government. Federations vary a lot about how this is done, and the practices followed. The term ‘fiscal federalism’ was introduced way back in the late 1950s by Musgrave to suggest measures for the distribution of governmental public finance functions and fiscal relations between governments. The theoretical understanding of fiscal federalism is based on the assumption that a ‘federal system of government can be effective and efficient at solving problems of governments’ (https://www.britannica.com/topic/ fiscal-federalism). (sighted on 27/3/22) Richard Bird (2000), Richard Bird, an authority on fiscal federalism (2000: 1–13) argued that fiscal federalism entails a decentralization, and seeks to answer the following questions: ‘who decentralises what revenues? Who is responsible for what expenditure? How do inter-governmental transfer work? What degree of freedom sub-national governments have with respect to borrowing?’ (p. 5). However, this is part of a discourse on public finance and fiscal federalism, generally, none of which is the subject of our discussion here. In this chapter, our objective is to critically examine asymmetric fiscal arrangements in India as a political strategy designed to meet various needs of diversity in the country in the light of the broad vision of nationbuilding.1 This vision entails plurality, multiplicity and recognition of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_5

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diversity, and the required space for them to negotiate and bargain often going beyond the constitutional provisions. Long back Jawaharlal Nehru defined the contours of a liberal multicultural approach to be followed for autonomy and self-governance for the tribal peoples of North-East. In his five-point template of the approach to be followed in respect of the tribal peoples of the region, he highlighted that the tribal ‘people should develop along the lines of their genius’, ‘their rights to land and forest should be respected’, they should not be over-administered’ and so on (Nehru 1957).2 We seek to identify the ways in how Indian federalism has conjoined finance to diversity so that the various critical regions in the country and their peoples find a better reason to stay together and differently. What value does asymmetric fiscal federalism add to the overall health of a federation, and cohesion, particularly in a culturally diverse country? Does it imply wasting public resources, and encouraging ‘dole-out politics’? Or does it encourage political secessionism? The last question becomes particularly relevant in the sense that once a territorial concession is granted by way of statehood, or sub-Statehood in the Indian federation to the ethnic rebels, such governments are entitled to receive the money from the Union/State governments as grants and also by way of implementing development and empowerment programmes and project in their domain which with which come funds. This is a good incentive to avoid secession, and to stay within the democratic Union for the latter offers better space for bargaining and negotiation. The Indian experience suggests that asymmetric fiscal arrangements of various kinds have not encouraged political secessionism, or territorial disintegration, for the regions which benefit from such institutional arrangements have very poor, if not, none at all, resource bases to rely upon. Among other reasons, this has ensured in most cases that ethnic elites, many of whom were rebels in the near past, have exercised the voice option rather than exit, to use a phrase from Hirschman (1970), developed stakes in the system and offered to guard the frontiers.

Democracy and Federal Asymmetry Added to the above is the close link between democracy and federalism in India, the former providing the space for contestation and bargaining. India’s democracy and the recognition of ethno-regional and ethnolinguistic identity in the form of federalism do not provide the full answer

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to why India holds itself together, and that too, democratically. Democracy in conditions of multi-ethnicity often leads to disintegration and collapse. Also, federalism, if not accompanied by democracy, may be the recipe for the same fate. The important question is what federalism does. Does it redistribute, and if so, in what manner? The simple political and constitutional recognition may not be enough to offer the cementing bond across ethnic identities. Indian federalism is often considered as the answer to why such a vast multi-ethnic country stays together. But, as I have argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2015), it is India’s federalism and democracy that offers the answer although federalism has here always been privileged over democracy so that democracy has played the second fiddle. While India has, in general, recognized its cultural diversity in the making of federalism—a process not complete yet—the key lies in India’s specific mode of fiscal federalism, in a manner that links finance to diversity, is taken into consideration in distributing the tax money that responds positively to diversity at many tiers of the polity. This diversity may be of many kinds: social and cultural; regional and sub-regional; geographic location, etc. The comparative theoretical literature on federalism suggests that while there are certain patterns in taxing, its collection and redistribution, there are a lot of variations among federations in this regard (e.g., Watts, 1999/2008; Bird, 2000: 1–13). Watts says that the need for fiscal equalization occurs in every federation in order to respond to varied special needs of the federal units. But the mode of doing so varies among federations, classical, post-colonial and post-Soviet. In the case of India, as I argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya, 2001: 247–305), a pluralist and multicultural approach to nation-building lay behind the mode of financial transfer to the States by way of the Finance Commission (under Article 280 of the Constitution), and by other means, an approach that is accommodative and inclusive especially for the weaker members of the federation and those in the peripheral and strategically sensitive regions.

General Category and Special Cater States for Fiscal Distribution Asymmetries in Indian federalism are very complex indeed born of historical compulsions, the particular mode of formation of the federation, special geo-strategic considerations of some regions, formally centralized nature of the federation, certain political considerations and so on (Arora

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1995; Ra and Sen 2011; Saxena 2011; Tulin 2011). Rao and Singh (2011) have mostly focused on the economic aspects of the phenomenon although the identity, or cultural aspects have not escaped their attention. Since federalism involves much of bargaining for ‘enhancing freedom and representation’ by some groups, the sources of asymmetry are precisely the differences utilized for the above purpose. However, Rao and Singh (2005: 5) have also pointed out de facto asymmetry can contribute to nation-building. De facto asymmetry assumes special significance in India because of the centralized nature of the federation, legislatively speaking. In their account, the ‘Special Category States’ (SCS) in India enjoying special status and powers relative to the general or non-special category states, for a variety of reasons, part path dependency and part contingent, has drawn their detailed attention. Until very recently (2018) there were 11 SCS (comprising of all 8 States in the North-East), Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and Uttarakhand. With the abolition of Article 370 the number of SCS States was brought down to ten. Such States again do not enjoy the same kinds of power and privileges. For example, while Jammu & Kashmir (now demoted to Union Territory in 2019) (under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution) enjoyed unique powers not enjoyed by any other units of the Indian federation, Sikkim, a very small State, is a lone case which can levy income taxes. Nagaland is another lone case in another respect3 (Ra and Sen 2011: 13). One central fact is common to all SCS: they are heavily dependent on the Central government for fiscal transfers. The revenue-raising capacity of these States is also limited compared to a non-special category, or general category states. The total population of the SCS is only 5.32% of the total population of India, but they receive 90% of plan assistance as grant,4 and 10% as loans. Apart from the grounds for equity, the other strategic reasons may be at work because many of these states are located on India’s international borders, and hence the issue of foreign investment in such areas is not always easily, if at all, allowed by the central government (Rao and Singh 2011: 2–21). Be that as it may, the paradigm of discussion of Rao and Singh (2011), as above, like other scholars mentioned before, is the asymmetric position of the constituent units of the federation in relation to the Central government and other units of the federation. In their estimate, and by the provisions of the Indian Constitution (Article 371), the States in the North-East are Special Category States well until 2018. But what is neglected in such analyses is asymmetry within asymmetry, that is,

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the sub-state level institutional arrangements for self-government for the accommodation of diversity and protection of identity. There are as many 10 Tribal Autonomous District Councils operating in the region except Sikkim. Since such sub-State level governments are constitutionally guaranteed, and received grants from the Finance Commission, there is no reason why we should not consider them as an instance of asymmetry in the Indian federation too. There is in the writings of the late Watts (2008) of considering such levels in his definition of federalism primarily a two or more tiers of government among others. Balveer Arora (1995) was alone in pointing our attention to this direction by referring to what he calls ‘sub-state political structures’ (Arora 1995: 84). This relates to relations between the State and the district level governing structures, and involves the issue of decentralization. Arora (1995) has rightly pointed out that the Fifth and the Sixth Schedules of the Constitution of India are the most important examples providing for such arrangements although the latter is more empowering than the former in respect of self-government of tribal (aboriginal peoples), and protection of their identity (Arora 1995: 85). On the basis of the experience of Autonomous District Councils in India, he seemed apprehensive of the real content of autonomy to be enjoyed by such structures cast as they are in the same unitary mould of state–district relations, as the Centre–state relations (Arora 1995: 85). Such apprehension is a little farfetched, as the two case studies made in this book do suggest. However, one should not ignore the inherent structural limitations in the institutional designs of such bodies, more particularly the 5th Schedule. In the cases of the rural local self-governing bodies and the Municipalities, the major limitation is their over-dependence on the State government which empowers them the way and the extent it desires. Financially both the Tribal District Councils (under 6th Sch.) and the Gram Panchayats have very few resources of their own and collect very few taxes. Until 2014, the Indian federation contained eleven ‘special category states’ (Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and all the seven states in India’s North-east), an arrangement connected with the complex processes and other strategic considerations connected with the formation of the Indian federation.5 The special attraction of ‘special category states’ was that the very liberal financial transfers from the Union/Centre to such States are weighted. Rao and Singh (2005) have given some indication of the considerations on which such provisions are made into the Constitution of India: They include language designed

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to protect, or customary laws and religious practices, restrictions on the ownership and transfer of land, and restriction on immigration. Rao and Singh (2005) also argue that it is not true that in all cases the spirit of ‘special category states’ is maintained by the Centre which has had overruled the special autonomy enjoined in such provisions by its centralization drives. This has so happened in the case of Nagaland in respect of its ‘natural resources’ (Rao and Singh 2005: 69).6 Rao and Singh (2005) have also brought out two interesting features of the provisions for ‘special category states’ (SCS) in India. First, they are heavily dependent on the Centre for financial transfer; to the extent of 80% of their public expenditure is financed by the Centre. This makes them depend heavily on the Centre. Second, yet, it does not cost the Centre much in terms of per capita transfer because of the small size of populations of such states (the entire population of all the SCSs amounts to only about 5.4% of the total population of India (Rao and Singh, 2005: 75). From the data given in Table 4.2 of Rao and Singh (2005: 76–77) it is seen that the per capita central transfers to the SCSs do not compare at all with the general category states. Nonetheless, the total transfer amount is smaller in case of the SCSs, but the percentage share of own resources to finance public expenditure is much higher in the general category states than in the SCSs. The average for the general category states as a whole in this regard is 52.3% while for the SCSs as a whole is only 20.2% (Rao and Singh, 2005: 77). In India, federal fiscal asymmetry consists of both the Constitutional and the extra-constitutional methods of transfer of funds from the Centre to the States, in general, and the Special Category States, in particular (ceased to exist since 2018). Beyond the above two, there are other ways of funds transfer (ministerial) discretionary and various special financial packages to the States. Thus, the space of fiscal federal asymmetry in India is quite large. As far as the North East is concerned, the DoNER has other development and empowerment schemes/projects which are to be considered within the ambit of the asymmetric fiscal federalism in India. Beyond the above, the Union government very often has shown flexibility in treating thus far general Category State for a ‘Special package’ for a few years. For example, on 01 March 2014, the Union Cabinet decided to offer a ‘special package’ to Andhra Pradesh for five years to compensate for the adverse effects of the bifurcation of the State to carve up Telangana (Reddy and Reddy 2019: 176). But the devolution of tax money from the Centre (Union) to the States on the basis of a set of criteria (which has

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been changing) in order to offer more equity and balance to the whole economy remains the most determining factors in India’s federal cohesion.

Finance Commission and Fiscal Asymmetry: Varying Needs of Diversity The Finance Commission is the stabilizer of Indian federalism. The Finance Commission of India (Article 280 of the Constitution) has since 1952 been the most important constitutional body that distributes the divisible pool of Union taxes and excise duty every five years between the Union and the States, decides the principles of grants-in-aid to State, and any other matter. The Finance Commission and its distribution have received a lot of academic attention (Reddy and Reddy 2019; Rao and Singh 2005). But what is missing in the current understanding is the asymmetry embedded in the Finance Commission’s disbursement that follows from the differential criteria adopted by the Commission in calculating who gets what. The Constitutional provisions under Article 280 of the Constitution states: The President shall, within two years after the commencement of the Constitution, and thereafter, at the expiry of every fifth year or so or as such earlier time as the President considers necessary, by order, constitute a Finance Commission which shall consists of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the President. (Bakshi, 2017: 316–17)

The duty of the Commission is to recommend to the President the following: • Distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds of taxes, and allocation between the States of the respective shares of such proceeds; • The principle that should govern the grant-in-aid of the revenues of the States out of the Consolidated Fund of India; • Measures needed to augment the Consolidated Fund of a States to supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities7 in the States on the basis of the recommendation made by the Finance Commission of the State; and • Any other matter referred to the Commission by the President in the interest of sound finance (Bakshi, 2017: 316).

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The last point ‘any other matter referred to’ often has assumed significance especially in the last Finance Commission (15th 2019–24. We will come back to it a little later. What is of general significance from the broader perspective of federalism here is the regularity of formation and functioning of the Commission, and the regular transfer of money from the Finance Commission to the States on a regular basis without which the holding the vast country of immense diversity could not have been possible. Second, the formula-based transfer by the Commission, and the changes therein from time to time have helped to address the newer needs arising out of the experience of the previous commissions. The qualifications of the Chairman and other members of the Commission (Under Article 280 of the Constitution) have been left to Parliament. This aspect has attracted some serious critical scholarly attention (Rao and Singh, 2005: 312–15) for the administrative inefficiency of the staff and other members who work usually on a deputation basis from the Union Finance Ministry, and other political biases. This has not, however, affected the tenor of the transfer system in a major way. Rao and Singh (2005) have also admitted, however, that the importance of such a rule-based, formula-based system has not been able to offset the possibilities of ‘implicit’ and ‘invisible’ ways of powerful States to manage to get more resources in their favour. Since 1952, as desired by the Constitution, Finance Commissions have been formed on a regular basis and formula-based transfers to the States have taken place. Even during the heyday of late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Emergency regime (1975–77), the Finance Commission did its job of distributing money from the Centre to the States (Brass 1989). Another area of special attention is that the ‘core functions’ of the Terms of Reference of the Commission have been expanded in keeping up with the new requirements of the economy and the macro-economic stability. The needs arose from natural calamity and the individual States’ inability, financially speaking, to face it has been another factor to have been considered by the Commission. As a result of the increasing demands of the States, the royalty from offshore exploration of mineral resources like natural gas (Reddy and Reddy 2019: 32–3), not usually shareable, is also brought under the remit of the Commission for determining the method and quantum to be transferred to the State. Over the last three decades, the debt burden of the States has been increasing; this has been brought under the remit of the Commission too. The Commission has since 1992 been devolving money for the rural and urban local government bodies to

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augment the resources of the States on the basis of the recommendations of the State Finance Commission.8 Since 1952 the following criteria have been used by different Commissions at different times: population and its changing weightage; area, the contributions of the States in income tax collections; income distance (backward States benefited from this being too far from Delhi); inverse per capita income; backwardness; index of infrastructure; poverty; tax efforts; fiscal discipline, and self-reliance; fiscal capacity distance; and forest cover (Reddy and Reddy 2019: 93–95). It is not true that all the Commissions have adopted them all, or that one or two has been repeated by all the Commissions. What is of special significance here is that population even with differential weightage has remained a constant variable. It is natural that ultimately the public money is to go to the people who are the sources of the same. Thus, the population received the greatest weightage in the early period of the Commission. Until 1979–80, weightage for population was 80–90% and 100% for union excise duty. The picture began to change drastically from the 8th Finance Commission (1984–89) when the weightage to population was reduced to 22.50% of the income tax, and 25% of the Union Excise duty @25%; this has further shrunken. But until the 14th Finance Commission (2019–24), the weightage went up and down but remained overall in the 20s. In the 14th Finance Commission, population’s weightage to all taxes was 27.5%. In the 14th Finance Commission, the following were the criteria and weightage: population (25.5%); income distance (50%); areas adjusted infrastructure was 15%; and forest cover 7.5% (Reddy and Reddy 2019: 97–98). Transfer of resources from the Union to the States on a five-yearly basis has thus been regular, and increasing, the long jump in this regard took place in the 14th Finance Commission when the overall percentage of transfer was raised from the existing 32–42%. The 15th Finance Commission (2021–2026) provided for 41% as vertical transfer to the States—1% less in order to adjust the situation in the wake of the demotion of J & K from statehood to Union Territory. With grants, the States’ share of the divisible pool of taxes now is 50% plus, which surpasses all previous commissions. This Commission followed a modified formula as follows: area (15%); population (1971) 17.5%) and population (2011) 10%; fiscal capacity/income distance9 (50%);

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and forest cover 7.5%) (https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/budget20152016/es2014-15/echapvol1-10.pdf (15th FC chapter10, vol.1) sighted on 11/3/22). The Special Category States (now 10 in number) continue to receive favourably discriminatory per capita transfers which are far above the General Category States. Within the Special Category States, those which are hilly and have a sizable number of Scheduled Tribe population get even better per capita transfers.

Notes 1. Bird has in fact discussed in a paper with Valliancourt (2000) how Canada’s linguistic and cultural diversity impact fiscal federalism there. For details see their chapter ‘The role of Intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in maintaining an effective state in Canada’ (pp 189.229). 2. See Nehru’s Preface to V. Elwin’s A Philosophy for NEFA. Shillong: Government of Assam, 1957/1959). 3. The last two were inserted after 1992 in the wake of the passage of 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments Acts for Panchayats and Municipalities respectively when the rural and urban local self-governments in the States were made constitutionally obligatory. Previously such provisions were there in the Constitution under Article 40 (in chapter Directive Principles of State Policy) which was and still is under States’ competence but not obligatory. 2. Consider the following provision under Article 371A of the Indian Constitution with respect to the state of Nagaland: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, (a) No act of Parliament in respect of (i) the religious or social practices of the Nagas; (ii) Naga customary law and procedure; (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according Naga customary law, and; (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resource, shall apply to the state of Nagaland unless the Legislative assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides.’ (Bakshi, P. M. (2009) The Constitution of India (New Delhi: Universal law Publishing House Pvt. Ltd), p. 308. This, beyond doubt, compromises with the sovereignty of Indian parliament, but then that was an instance of the extent of asymmetry allowed for the sake of accommodating diversity in India’s often very difficult circumstances. 4. It is not surprising that there is among some States of India a competition for being considered as ‘Special Category States’. It was in the news that Bihar went all its way to get it by collecting a few hundred thousand signatures of the people, and citation in some 1800 books in defence of its claim in order to woo the investors. But the plea was turned down by the Central government (The Statesman, Kolkata dated 2.4.12).

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5. Rao and Singh (2005: 71) however argue that the so-called strategic geographic considerations used to justify special category states are often exaggerated because such states as created exercise bargaining power greater than their political importance in terms of their size. 6. The government of Nagaland brought the issue to the attention of the Sarkaria Commission but the latter did little except leaving it to the practice of bargaining and negation, something which can only take place among equals (Rao and Singh 2005: 69). 7. This was so Inserted by the 73rd Constitutional Amendments 1992 (effective from 1993). 8. Provided for under Article 243-l of the Constitution after the passage of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992 with the same functions as the central Finance Commission but in this its duty is limited to financial transfer from the States to the local self-government bodies, and to recommend for the sum required for the next five years to the central Finance Commission. However, the all-India scenarios in this regard is not very optimistic, for many States have not formed such Commissions. 9. It is a very complex criterion but ultimately it benefits the backward States. For details, see Reddy and Reddy (2019: 95).

References Arora, B. 1995. Adapting Federalism to India: Multilevel and Asymmetric Innovations. In Multiple Identities in a Single State Indian Federalism in Comparative Perspective, ed. B. Arora and D. Verney. New Delhi: Konarak Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Chapter 3. Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 14th ed. New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing. Bhattacharyya, H. 2001. India as a Multicultueral Federation: Asian Values, Democracy and Decentralization (In Comparison with Swiss Federalism). Fribourg: Institute of Federalism. Bhattacharyya, H. 2015. Indian Democracy and Federalism: The Growing Salience of Diversity-claims over Equality-claims in comparative and Indian Perspective. Regional and Federal Studies 25 (3). https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13597566.2915,1052965. Bird, R. 2000. Rationale and Form of Decentralization. In Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Fragmented Societies, ed. R. Bird and T. Stauffer, 1–11. Fribourg: Institute of Federalism. Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nehru, J. 1957. Preface to V. Elwin’s book The Philosophyfor NEFA. Shillong: Government of Assam.

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Ra, G., and T. Sen. 2011. ‘Federalism and Fiscal Reforms in India’ Working Paper. National Intitute of Public Finance and Policy, 211–84. New Delhi. Rao, G., and N. Singh. 2005. The Political Economy of Federalism in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Reddy, Y.V., and Reddy, G.R. 2019. Indian Fiscal Federalism. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Watts, R.L. 2008/1999. Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed. Ontario: Queens McGill University Press.

CHAPTER 6

Ethnic Cleavages and Federal Asymmetry

Introduction Ethnic cleavages in India have paved the basis for federal asymmetry in most cases. If one takes into account the majority of States in India, most of them were created and carved up ethnically so that India’s States can be said to be ethnic States. As we have seen in Chapter 3 above, some kind of ethnic consideration was at play in demanding Statehood in the Indian federation although it took many round to right-size them (Bhattacharyya 2019a: 81–99) However, there remained cases in which special provisions had to be made to address special issues of geography and strategic locations, poor-resourced bases, and the presence of ethnic tribal peoples. The formal-legalistic understanding usually does not take the content, that is, the social and cultural basis of why federal asymmetry is demanded and positively conceded to. While in the rest of India, ethnic diversity and the resultant conflicts have since the early 1950s (in staged processes) (Bhattacharyya 2019b: 81–99) been accommodated and managed by a set of territorial institutional strategies, this has not so happened in the North-East of India which has perhaps most difficult cultural diversity relative to territory, and whose territorial trajectories were more complex. Formerly Jammu & Kashmir (It was a very special case), Himachal Pradesh and Uttrakhand are very hilly and shared international borders, and resource-poor so they were made special category States. If we consider the ethnic cleavages, Jammu & Kashmir, although India’s lone Muslim majority © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_6

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State, it was actually three regions with three distinct ethno-religious peoples: Muslim majority in Kashmir, the Hindu majority Jammu and the Buddhist majority Ladhak. The asymmetric status of the former J & K guaranteed under Article 370 that provided for a large area of autonomy which no other States in India enjoyed. But its asymmetric status had little to do with the internal ethnic cleavages than the circumstances in which it ‘acceded’ to the Indian Union (Menon 1956; Anderson 2014). But the case of Himachal Pradesh, ethnically rather quite homogeneous with about 95% of the 8 million (about) people being Hindus and Hindi speakers, and a small (about 5%) belonging to nine tribes, was made a Special Category State’ since 1971, the year it was formally recognized as a State in the federation. The story of its integration with the Indian Union was very complex, and the State’s (comprising some 30 princely States) political identity dwindled a lot Bhattacharjee, 2016: 316–21). The State had little or no internal ethnic conflicts but there were economic conflicts for the princely ruler maintained a kind of feudalism and slavery. It was known for long as a very peaceful country. Unlike Himachal Pradesh, the achievement of a Special Cattery Status by Uttarakhand was not easy, for despite its distinct ‘pahari identity’ born of as an inclusive all ethnic identity, the making of the State out of Uttar Pradesh in 2000 and the SCS status in 2001 when the NDA government led by the BJP leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee was ruling at the Union level. The movement for a separate statehood for the hilly regions of Garwal and Kumauni regions was very old, but successive government at the Centre and of the State of Uttar Pradesh maintained a niggardly attitude to the plight of the hill peoples, and consequently Statehood was denied to them. The unfoldment of the process of statehood for the regions was chequered with its ups and downs, and the dirty political games played out by various national level and regional and caste-based party politics (Bhattacharjee, 2016: 340–352). The State was very backward in development terms for many decades since 1947 surviving on remittances (nicked named ‘money order’ economy) sent by the youths who were working elsewhere in India. Beyond those three above, most of the asymmetric States were found in India’s North-East—a region (except Sikkim) in which there were significant cases of sub-State federal asymmetry too, (I have termed them ‘asymmetry within asymmetry’.) and also where all eight States were until very recently Special Category States (Bhattacharjee 2016).

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This is India’s most strategic and security region with long international borders, and where the demands for identity, autonomy and power have invited more frequently state violence resulting in an unending war like situation between the security forces of India, on the one hand, and those on the other side of the fence, the ethnic rebels, on the other hand. In other words, ethnic diversity of the region has provided for a fertile ground for ethnic radicalism and violence. In post-statehood situation in the rest of India, radical ethno-nationalism—whether of the Tamils, the Telegus, the Marathas, the Gujaratis, or the Sikh (post-1966)—subsided. In those cases, the territorial solution in the form of statehood has worked. In the late 1950s and 1960s, territorial strategies for statehood with autonomous powers accompanying the non-territorial but symbolic recognition of identity turned the Tamil secessionists into the defenders of Indian sovereignty and law and order. (Hardgrave jr. 1965: 399–407) In the case of Punjab, the radical Sikh ethno-nationalists were accommodated within even a truncated and shorter Punjab (post-1966) (Nayar 1968; Singh 1994). By contrast, in India’s North-East, the same strategies have not worked to ensure durable ethnic peace and political stability. Unlike other regions of India, ethnicity and territory do not match with each other neatly in the North-East. In the more improved political situation in the region since the 1990s, the militants surrendering arms to join the ‘mainstream’ looks like a routine affairs.1 The Bodo Peace Accord signed on 27/1/2020, the third of its kind, is a very recent case in point. Sikkim’s route to be considered as a SCS and its inclusion in 2012 in the North-East was simply a decision from the Centre to consolidate the entire region under the overall direction and control of the ministry of MDoNER of the Union government. In the North-East the territorial solutions to ethnic conflicts have worked out sometimes, but have often resulted in more conflicts. The complex ethno-territorial trajectories of the region vis-à-vis ethnic diversity and identity are explored to show the objective imperatives for designing multi-layered asymmetric solutions, as well as to show why the same stands in the way of durable solutions to ethnic conflicts in the region.

Demographics: Ethnicity and Diversity India’s North-East comprising today eight States of the federation— Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim (added in 2012) and Tripura—remains very diverse, ethnically

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speaking, strategically significant and the hotbed of varieties of ethnic radical politics. Das (2010: 45–47) offered an inventory of 77 armed militant ethnic outfits still operative in the region (except Sikkim). The number of such organizations has of course dwindled over the decades since the 1950s in consonance with the changes in the outer political environment. This region shares India’s international borders with Bangladesh, on the west, (and south and east too for Tripura) and Myanmar, China, and Bhutan, on the east and North-East. The socalled ‘North-East’ was not known as such before 1947 but a creation of the Indian state in 1972 by way of the North-Eastern States Reorganization Act in Indian Parliament in 1972. During the British colonial rule in India, the region comprised of four territorial units: Assam (as a directly governed province), NEFA (today’s Arunachal Pradesh), Manipur and Tripura as two princely kingdoms (with ‘indirect’ British control), and Sikkim as a British ‘Protectorate’. Today’s Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland were the Hill Districts (predominantly tribal inhabited) within Assam. During colonialism, the Hill Districts were ‘excluded’ and ‘partially excluded’ (Chaube 1999) so that people from other parts of India could not access those regions. After India’s independence (1947) the Nagas rebelled and declared independence—pioneering the tradition of ethnic radicalism in the region—but eventually after a long period of rebellion and war with the Indian armed forces, settled down for a separate State (1963) with special rights.2 Political insurgency, ethnic conflicts and violence vis-à-vis the heavy hand of the Indian security forces have most often served to mark the region out as ‘not normal’, and added a blot on the process of democracy, participation and development in the region. Given the special territorial trajectory of Sikkim which was added to the region as late 2012, Sikkim would not fit with the rest of the region in matters of the common problems afflicting it. No wonder, a kind of insurgency framework of understanding has dominated the discourse on the region (Kumar 1996; Bhaumik 2009; Baruah 2005, 2009; Chaube 1989). Baruah (2005) made an interesting point when he argues that some States such as Arunachal Pradesh may not have ethnic militias but nonetheless are not immune from them. He adds that since there are Nagas inhabited areas in Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Assam, the Naga militancy has spread over to these States (Baruah 2005: 5). The Naga insurgent groups, most notably the Naga Socialist Council (NSC) (Issac-Muiva) demand inclusion of such areas in their proposed Nagalim, the greater Nagaland.

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The deployment of military and para-military forces in the region, only second after Kashmir (Bhaumik 1999), was more frequent as an aid to civil order (Table 6.1). Civil order was difficult to obtain despite the introduction of democracy based on adult suffrage in the region since 1952. No wonder, various repressive laws of the Indian state, most notably, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958), have been imposed on the States on various occasions.3 While the security forces of India have been deployed to restore civil order in the region for decades (Table 6.1), things improved a lot since. The better performance records of the States in the region, discussed below, particularly from the 1990s are a proof of an atmosphere of development and governance. Table 6.1 Army deployed in aid to civil order in the North-East, 1973–1983

Year

Place

Reason

Duration

1973

Assam

Language riots

1973

Tribal violence

1980

Arunachal Pradesh Imphal, Manipur Assam

13 April–17 May 13–18 June

1980

Tripura

Anti-foreigner’s stir Tribal violence

1980

Meghalaya

Tribal Unrest

1980

Nagaland

Tribal violence

1981

Assam

1982 1982

As above Arunachal Pradesh Northeast

Anti-foreigner’s stir As above Tribal unrest

1973

1983

Riots

Anti-insurgency

13–21 September February (continuously) 7 June–14 November 17 April–17 May 23–30 July/15 November* Continuously for 1 year As above 17 July–21 August Continuously

Note The data in chapter 4 above has shown remarkable improvement in law and order in the region as well as in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Source Cohen, S. P (1988) in Kohli A ed. pp. 121–22 * It refers to a Naga federation, or gretaer Nagaland that inlcudes the Naga-inhabitated areas in the neighbouring States

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The data in Table 6.2 show that the signing of ethnic accords (Memorandum of Settlement, or Agreement) remained a frequently used instrument for the transformation of the ‘rebels into stake holders’ in the region and the basis of some territorial concessions to the militants who found joining the Indian political process as a better option (voice) than secession (exit option). Usually following the bipartite or tripartite peace accords, the legislation has followed for institutionalization of the accords and for participation which served the basis on which the insurgents of yester years became the rulers by becoming either the Chief Ministers and other ministers in the case of statehood, or some other incentives within the system. In some other cases, ethnic peace accords were the instrument for the rehabilitation of the militant who surrendered arms. However, the same methods were not followed in the creation of the other asymmetric States including the former J & K. Sharing the country’s international border with Bhutan, Nepal, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, the region is marked by the extreme diversity of social structures, languages, religions, and ethnic groupings, a large presence of immigrants, the single largest concentration of tribals, the lack of development (until about the 1980s), and relative deprivation, on the one hand, and the persistent sub nationalism and political extremism, on the other. The region’s population is estimated to be 45,587,982 (2011) which was around 3.76% of the total population of India. As evident from Table 6.3 below, the region is still sparsely populated; of them, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram are still more sparsely populated compared to India as a whole. The region’s current level of decadal growth of population is rather stable but historically that was not the case. Due to India’s Partition (1947), the region, particularly Assam and Tripura, received millions of refugees from across the border from East Bengal (pre-1947), which became East Pakistan (1947–1971) and now Bangladesh. In the wake of the Bangladesh war of independence further migration took place disturbing and upsetting the demographic balance in the region. In Assam, the rate of decadal growth of population during 1951–1961 and 1961–1971 was very high—35 and 34.7% respectively compared to all India average of 21.6 and 24.6% respectively (Weiner 1978, 82). Weiner (1978, 75–143) shows, in greater detail, how this huge demographic transformation became the roots of ethnic conflicts in the State subsequently. In Tripura, the migration of Bengalis from East Bengal and later East Pakistan reduced the local population (aboriginal peoples) during 1941–1951, and later in 1951–1961 to a small minority

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Table 6.2 Ethnic peace accords in India’s North-East Name of Accord

Date

Nature

Place

Issue

Naga-Hydari Accord 16-Point Agreement (Naga) Shillong Accord (Naga) Suppl. Shillong Accord (Naga) Assam Accord Mizo Accord

26–28 July 1947

Bipartite

Kohima

Naga Rights

27–28 July 1960

Bipartite

Shillong

Naga Statehood

10–11 November 1975 5 January 1976

Bipartite

Shillong

Surrender of arms

Bipartite

Shillong

15 August 1985 30 January 1986

Tripartite Tripartite

New Delhi New Delhi

TNV Accord (Tripura) 1.1.1.1.ATTE Accord (Tripura) Hmar Accord (Mizoram) Bodo Peace Accord (Assam) Bodo Peace Accord Framework** Agreement

4 May 1988

Tripartite

New Delhi

Surrender of arms and rehabilitation Foreigners’ Statehood to Mizoram Tribal causes

23 August 1993

Bipartite

Agartala

Tribal causes

29 September 1993 20 February 1993

Bipartite

Aizawl

Tripartite

Guwahati

10 February 2003 3 August 2015

Tripartite Bipartite

New Delhi Nagaland

Hmar tribal causes Bodo tribal causes Bodo autonomy Nagalim*

Source Bhattacharyya 2018, p. 56 * It refers to a Naga federation, or gretaer Nagaland that inlcudes the Naga-inhabitated areas in the neighbouring States ** It refers to a Naga federation, or gretaer Nagaland that inlcudes the Naga-inhabitated areas in the neighbouring States

in their own state. The result was the loss of habitat to the settler Bengalis in Tripura who came to dominate the state politics. This region is reported to have as many as 215 Scheduled (constitutionally recognized) Tribes (said to be the aboriginal peoples) and many more which are not yet recognized as such to be entitled to constitutional special protection and privileges. Of the eight States of the region, four are predominantly tribal (aboriginal) inhabited (of them three are predominantly Christian4 ) and there are significant proportions of them in the rest (Table 6.4). The data offered in columns second and third in Table 6.4 merits some explanation for an adequate understanding of the depth of ethnic diversity in each State in the region. The percentage figure in the third column is very broad which is to be qualified by the data in column first. For example, while it is true that 68.8% of the population in Arunachal

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Table 6.3 Population and areas of states in NE and India, 2011 State

Area (sq. km)

Population 1,383,727

Density (per sq. km) 17

Growth Rate* (%) 26

Arunachal Pradesh Assam Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Sikkim Tripura NE total All India

83,743 78,438 22,327 22,429 21,081 16, 579 7,096 10, 486 255,083 3,287,263

31,205,576 2,570,390 2,966,889 1,097,206 1, 978,502 610,577 3,673,917 45,587,982 1,210,193,422

398 115 132 52 119 86 350 174 382

17.1 18.6 27.9 23.5 −0.6 12.9 14.8 – 17.64

*indicates the decennial growth rate during 2001–2011. Source Basic Statistics of North Eastern Region 2015, North Eastern Council Secretariat, Shillong, pp. 1–4

Table 6.4 Tribes and their percentage to population in the North-East (2011)

States Arunachal Pradesh Assam Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Sikkim Tripura

Number of tribes

Percentage to population

101

68.8

23 28 14 5 20 6 18

12.4 35.1 86.1 94.4 86.5 33.8 31.8

Source Basic Statistics of North-East India (2015), p. 7

Pradesh are tribal but then they are 101 tribal groups and sub-groups— each having their own identity and culture (perhaps inhabiting a little territory of their own) and speaking a dialect. In Tripura, 31.8% tribal refers to as many 18 tribal groups and sub-groups; in this case too each of them has its own dialect although Kok-Borok is the lingua franca. The intricacies of such diversity are to be read in conjunction with the linguistic diversity in each State. The 50th Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities, Government of India (2014) contains detailed information of the linguistic diversity in each State.5

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In Arunachal Pradesh, there is no majority language group, and hence there is no dominant ethnic group. There are significant speakers of three 8th Schedule languages (i.e. Bengali, Hindi and Nepali). The majority speak different tribal dialects lacking in scripts so that the official language of the State is English. The State was created in 1987 without any distinct identity basis, and movement for the same. However, after India’s independence the erstwhile NEFA evolved into a Union Territory in 1971, and finally a State in 1987 (Mukherjee 2014: 90–92).6 In Assam, the major State in the region with 68.45% of the region’s total population in 2011, the Assamese speakers are found to have lost their majority for the first time. In 1971, the Assamese speakers were some 60.89% of the total population so this loss of majority is likely to create ethnic tensions among the Assamese in days to come. The linguistic diversity in the State is immense because apart from the Assamese, Bengali, and Bodo/Boro, the major language speakers, there are a plethora of languages spoken, not all of which are officially recognized. The recent decline in the percentage of Assamese is due to the relative decline of Assamese speakers and the increase of Bengali speakers in seven districts in the Brahmaputra Valley during 1991–2001 (The Hindu 9 October 2016). Assam has experienced territorial contraction since preindependence days, and more particularly since the 1960s when its Hill Districts were separated; Nagaland was conceded as a State in 1963; and in 1972 Mizoram and Meghalaya were conceded statehood. This added to a greater percentage of Assamese to the total population but a diverse ethnic situation remained. The dwindling demographic numbers of the Assamese gave birth to ethnic militancy arising from the majority community (i.e. the Assamese) in the form of the ULFA and the AGP among others. Ethnic minorities have mobilized themselves in militant forms for the protection of their identity. Various Bodo organizations have cropped up for a State of Bodoland in the northern banks of the river Brahmaputra. A Bodoland Territorial Authority has been conceded in 2003 but it has created more problems than resolved (Bhattacharyya, Hausing and Mukherjee 2017). Beyond them, there are demands for further territorial separation out of Assam by different ethnic minorities group such as the Karbi, Dimasa and the Nagas. Assam and Nagaland share a long 434 km border, east of Assam, and there is a long drawn dispute (border) between the two States over some territories on the border areas. The Nagalim (greater Nagaland) demand of the Naga rebels (NSCN-IM) includes parts of Assam’s territory.7

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In Manipur, the erstwhile princely State like Tripura, although the Manipuri is spoken by the majority this majority is not high. There are a lot of speakers of other tongues which are not all recognized officially. Manipuri is the official language of the State but English is adopted as an additional official language. There is still controversy about the script to be used for Manipuri. The people in Manipur are diverse living in the hills (41.1%) and the valley (58.9%). The people living in the plains are also ethnically divided and profess different faiths. There are Kuki and the Naga settlement in the valley—the Nags comprising the second largest after the Meitei (Manipuri). There are some 29 tribes living in the hills generically grouped into the Naga, the Kuki and the Zo. There are many sub-groups among them too. The Nagalim demand of the Naga rebels includes parts of Manipur inhabited by the Nagas. When the State of Meghalaya was conceded in 1972 it was understood to be the State of the whole people of Meghalaya, and that the ethnic rebels fighting for Statehood were the representatives of the whole people. But it turned out to be otherwise. It turned out that the Khasis, the dominant tribe, got the State, and hence the second largest ethno-linguistic group, i.e. the Garos, were unhappy and began demanding a State of their own, which is yet to be fulfilled. The Khasis and the Gaors are the two major linguistic groups, but then there is immense ethno-linguistic diversity in the State (Table 6.4). It was created as an autonomous state within the state of Assam on April 2, 1969. It comprises of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District. It became a fully fledged State in 1972. And yet, statehood has not been able to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts in Manipur. Mizoram is the lone tribal State in the region whose dominant Mizo community speaking Mizo/Lushai constitutes 73.21% of the total population. This has served to ensure enduring ethnic peace in the State although the Hmar tribe has been demanding some territorial autonomy and protection of their identity for long; the Brus are the others. However, the greater ethnic homogeneity in the State has produced better governance results. Contrary to all claims for a coherent Naga nationhood and solidarity, Nagaland contains very diverse linguistic groups so that there is no single Naga group as a majority in population. The two largest linguistic groups—Ao and Konyak—constitute respectively 12.94 and 12.46% of the total population. The various other groups have a population which

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is significant in number in a State with a small population. This ethnolinguistic diversity undercuts the demand for a homogenous Naga identity has given birth to numerous ethnic rebels. However, the State of Nagaland was offered a unique asymmetric federal status under Article 371A. It says: ‘Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, —a. No Act of Parliament in respect of— i. Religious or social practices of the Nagas, ii. The Naga customary laws and procedure, iii. Administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary laws, iv. Ownership and transfer of land of the Naga unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides……’ (Bakshi, 2017: 391). The Naga case is an example of a kind of semi-sovereignty that no other States in the Indian federation enjoys. Sikkim is diverse too although its majority Nepali community has majority (62.61%). The other language groups are smaller in number and proportions. But the State has had a different trajectory, and shared very little with the North-East. For a long period, it was a ‘feudal’ dynasty which the British protected with its indirect control. After 1947 India extended the protection but incorporated it into the Union of India in 1974 and made a State in 1975. In the 1960s and 1970s there were attempts to construct a common Sikkimese (national) identity though it turned out to be fraught with a host of problems stemming from a multicultural social mosaic (Hiltz 2003). But the State has a distinct regional identity, which again is multicultural, which sets it apart from similar identity in the North-East. Tripura’s linguistic diversity is not as complex, for the Bengalis and the Tripuri/Kok-Borok languages cover more than 92% of the population. But there is persistent and long drawn ethnic conflict in the State. The roots of the conflicts lie in the fact that the tribals (Tripuri/Kok-Borok) plus others such as the Mogh, Manipuri, Halam, and Garo speaking (together about 31.8%) who were the original inhabitants of the princely State were reduced in the wake of long drawn migration of Bengalis to a minority. This entailed loss of land and habitats to the settlers on the

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part of the tribals. This has complicated the sense of identity both among the tribals and the settlers Bengalis whose territorial loyalty is more to the State, and the areas of East Bengal (East Pakistan) from where they migrated respectively. In a detailed empirical survey, Mitra (2012: 59– 61) explained why a quarter of the people had reported (in a national survey) themselves as not citizens of India with reference to the regions and localities of their origin. The above analysis suggests that a common identity in each State, let alone in the region, remains a far cry. Each unit of the federation is ethnically heterogeneous, and most often territorially rooted, and provided for fertile grounds for political mobilizations for identity and autonomy. Often one dominant group has claimed power and autonomy for the whole lot of people but once in the corridors of power, it has discriminated against the other groups; or the minorities newly created have expressed grievances against the dominant group in power. The latter has followed suit for further territorial division for the protection of their identity through the application of the principle of federal asymmetry. Whether demanded by the minority tribals or not, there are some ten Autonomous Tribal District Councils in the region since 1951, which are yet to be taken up for a separate detailed d study.

Limits to Territorial Solution: Demands for More (Survey Data) Statehood and sub-state territorial status conceded to the ethnic groups in the North-East have not been able to resolve all territorial issues and hence ethnic conflicts. Territorial solutions in the region have given rise to the demands for further territorial divisions in nearly all States in the region excerpt Sikkim, where the extent is very limited. Such demands are unavoidably linked to complex ethno-linguistic diversity we have examined above. In this section I will present evidences from elite interviews conducted on the States during 2015–2016. 10 elites (politicians, MLA and Ministers including former Chief Minister, senior civil servant, senior journalists and academics) from each were selected on the random basis to provide the answer to our question: Are there demands for territorial restructuring in your State? If so, please give some examples? We take up Arunachal Pradesh, an unlikely case for consideration of further territorial divisions, first. This State was created in 1987 by upgrading it from

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the status of Union Territory (directly governed by the Central government) (1962) and without there being any strong political movement for statehood. This small State (1.38 million people) is ethnically extremely diverse, as we have seen above. 59 of 60 Legislative Assembly seats are reserved for the tribes (101 in number) and the State is very sparsely populated. And yet, in answer to our question above, 9 out of 10 elites responded, and of them, 8 reported positive. The elites confirmed that there was no demand for a separate statehood out of the State, but there were demands for smaller territorial units such as Union Territory and Autonomous District Councils. One well-informed respondent, the sub-editor of the Arunachal Pradesh Times, said that there were demands for Autonomous District Councils in Mon, Patkai, and Ziro, and a UT demand for Siang belt (Dated 20/9/16 at Itanagar). In the case of Meghalaya, 9 out of 10 respondents reported positive. In most cases, the demand for a separate State of Garoland for the Garos, the second largest tribes in the State, the demand which was supported by the legendary Garo leader late P N Sangma, the former Speaker of the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha). Some respondents did mention also the demands for a separate state for the Khasi-Jaintia where an Autonomous District Council is established. On the basis of the experiences of statehood in the region it has been found out that the Union Territory status and the Autonomous District Councils have been the stepping stone for demanding statehood. Assam remains almost perennially the fertile ground for demands for territorial divisions in a State which has borne the brunt of state contraction most. In the case of Assam, all respondents reported positive and mentioned various cases of territorial restructuring. Mr Prafulla K Mohanta, the former Chief Minister, a founder of the AGP and powerful student leader in the late 1970s and 1980s,8 opined: ‘Yes, almost all ethnic communities in Assam are demanding statehood— Boros, Rabhas, Mishing Rajbansis….’. (Dated 22/6/15 Guwahati). The Vice President of the Assam State unit of the BJP Mr Chandrakant Das was cynical: ‘Bodoland, Kamptapuri, Rajbansi….Not in every 50 sq km area in Assam is composed of just one ethnic group’. (Dated 21/6/15 Guwahati). One top civil servant of Assam opined: ‘Yes, the Bodos, the Mishings, Rabhas, all are demanding separate territory for them’. (30/6/15). The President of the Hind Majdoor Sabha, Mr Ajay Dutta saw the tree in the woods:

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Whatever movements are taking place they are benefiting the elites among the ethnic groups. The identities are not asking; it’s their leaders who are demanding.” (Dated 22/6/15). Mizoram in the North-East is considered the most successful tribal ethnic State whose records of enduring peace after statehood remain remarkable. It is also the most consolidated tribal state in the sense that the Mizos comprise the overwhelming majority in population. Therefore, on the face of it, Mizoram is an unlikely case of witnessing demands for territorial restructuring. However, there are three Autonomous Tribal District Councils in force in Mizoram, namely, Chakma, Lai, Hmar and Maro. But there are demands for the Bru Tribal Autonomous District Council in the State as well as by the Hmar. The Bru tribes, said to be displaced by the Mizos, are sheltered in refugee camps in Tripura for a long time. Of the many small tribal communities, the demand of the Hmar tribal for more powers to their District Council was recognized in a bilateral agreement (Ethnic Peace Accord) between the Hmar People’s Convention and the Government of Mizoram in 1993 for more powers and autonomy to the Hmar Autonomous Tribal District Council including their demand for recognizing their language as an official language in the State and a medium of instruction at the primary school level.9 The case of Nagaland is set apart from the rest. Out of 10 respondents, 8 reported positive on one point: unification of all Nagas living in the North-East under Nagaland. Consider the representative response offered by Mr. Z. Lohe, Treasurer, Nagaland Congress Party, 4 times MLAs in Nagaland Legislative Assembly and former Speaker of the Assembly: No 13 of the 16-Point Agreement10 is that ‘the other Naga tribes inhabited in the areas contiguous to Nagaland will be allowed to join, if they so desire, Nagaland’.11 This is to be implemented. The Naga Legislative Assembly passed four Resolutions on Naga integration (Dated 2/7/16). There was, however, a lone exception. One respondent mentioned that there were demands for ‘Eastern Nags of Mon, Tuensang, Lenglon and Kiphike districts for a separate state’ (A civil servant dated 27/6/16). The unresolved Naga problems today is confined to their demand for Nagalim12 a greater Nagaland by incorporating the Nagainhabited areas in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur—which is a difficult demand to fulfil because the affected States would not be willing to concede their territory. Such a demand if conceded to, will have far

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reaching consequences for India’s multiculturalism, and may pave the way for the country’s ‘balkanization’.

Conclusion From the above account it is clear why statehood and sub-Statehood in the North-East have been rooted in complex ethnic cleavages in the region, and do apparently not work in favour of some enduring ethnic peace. But there are records of relative peace, and for some States longterm peace. Most of the States and some District Councils have worked and shown competitive records of governance, development and better identity fulfilment (This has been discussed in Chapter 7 and will be further discussed in Chapters 9 & 10, and Conclusion). States in the region are small in size and the minority tribal ethnic communities except perhaps the Garos in Meghalaya are still smaller with pockets of territorial concentration. It is also clear from the interviews and the exiting texts on the politics of the region that however small the tribal communities are in size and importance they (i.e. the elites) routinely form militias, articulate their demands in the rhetoric of ethnic self-determination, of which the region, as shown in Baruah (2010), can boast of producing many, and demand some territory following the provisions of the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, or otherwise. As Baruah (2005: 5) has observed: The sheer number of militias in North-East is extraordinary. Indeed it might appear that any determined young man of the numerous ethnic groups of the region can proclaim the birth of a new militia, raise funds to buy weapons or procure them by aligning with another militia and become an important political player. Demographically, the region is home to 8.6% of the tribal population of India; four States are predominantly tribal: Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. Of the four, three are Christian dominated. The other States also contain significant numbers of tribals. The total tribal population in the region is approximately 26% of the region. In terms of religion, Hindus are 54. 23%, Muslims, as the second largest group, are 25.15% and Christians are 17.31%. Buddhists are not dominant in any States (although they are 11.78% of the population of Arunachal Pradesh). Ethnic militancy in the region has been found among the tribals as well as non-tribal, Hindus as well as Muslims and Christians, hill people as well as plains people. Unlike religion, language and tribal

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ethnicity have (and still do) played a powerful determining role inthepolitical processes in this region. Such loyalties and identities have remained very active in political mobilizations for political recognition of identities within Indian federalism. This has called for both the territorial and non-territorial solutions to the categorical problems. Territorially, this had involved different degrees of statehood (from tribal, district, and regional councils, often through associate statehood, to finally statehood as a federal unit with autonomous powers). The non-territorial accommodation, through official recognition of language and its eventual placement in the 8th Schedule of Indian Constitution, which entitles the particular linguistic community to certain rights in matters of official communication and instruction etc., symbolic satisfaction of linguistic identity has worked well. As I have argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2008), the ethnic elements of nationhood in the region are very thick, and their civic ties of nationhood are thin comparatively speaking. When the ethnic ‘nations’ in the region share little with the others in their own State, they hardly share their identity concerns with the others in the other States in the region. The question of common sharing of identity and values with the others in the rest of India thus simply does not arise. Oddly, their incessant demands for identity, (territorial) autonomy and power are at variance with the very poor resources available, given that the region is heavily dependent on the Centre for funding, and then there is the cost of government itself. Emotions born of ethnicity most often does not take care of the practicality in governance. An important factor that has more easily turned the ethnic groups to take up arms is the deployment of security forces in the region. To the outside world the region has generally been known as India’s ‘insurgent country’ (Bhaumik 1999: 322). The region’s ethnic movements and politics, persistent political militancy, ethnic genocides13 and geographic isolation have made it a ‘problem area’ of India. The States in the region share India’s international borders, particularly with China and Myanmar and hence have witnessed, unavoidably, deployment of security forces on a regular basis. For Indian rulers since independence, the region has remained a major security concern, and many of the policies for ‘national integration’ have been adopted through a security paradigm. A large number of India’s security forces have been deployed in the region, only second to the numbers deployed in Kashmir (Bhaumik 1999: 326)14 , and the AFSPA has regularly been in force except in Tripura. This securitization of the region has failed to quell the large number of ethnic militant

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and political outfits15 fighting for autonomy and/or secession. Beyond doubt, this securitization of the region has increased dissatisfaction and the support for movements challenging the writ of the state (although it is important to stress that the intensity of conflict varies markedly across the different States for reasons very specific to the states concerned). In economic terms, the region’s resource bases are meagre. Historically, about 80% of the region’s revenue has come from the Centre. Because of their backwardness, isolation and strategic location, until 2014 all the States of the region were Special Category States (SCS) that received (favourable) asymmetric financial treatment from the Centre.16 The abolition of the Planning Commission in August 2014 raises now questions about the future financing of the region. There is much resentment among the elites of the region against this decision. Finally, contrary to what Baruah (2005, 2010) would have us believe, the formation of militias in the region is not the entire story. Since the day of the famous Naga-Akbar Hydari Ethnic Peace Accord (26–27 June 1947) with the Naga rebels followed by the ‘16-Point Agreement’ (1960), institutionalization of ethnic radicalism has also taken place in which the ethnic rebels have decided to give up arms in favour of joining the democratic political process, taking part in elections and finally forming the government by them. This has happened in most States, and served to pave the basis for democratic power-sharing and taking part in governance. The ethnic radicals in the region have also learnt that the simply rebellious action does not pay, and for long, and leaves them with little space. The other side of ethnic rebellion in the region since the days of the Nagas in 1947 and then from the 1960s remains negotiation for peace (read power and autonomy) and a share in power. The governments of the days at the State and Central levels have also sought a negotiated settlement, and bipartite and tripartite peace agreements (Datta 1995) that have most often worked. This has transformed yesterday’s rebels into tomorrow’s stake holders (Mitra and Singh 2009). The past militant AGP in Assam of the Assamese (majority), not of the tribals, took part in Ethnic Peace negotiation in 1985, took part in elections, got into state power in 1985, and 1991, and ruled Assam for the next ten years.17 The other case is the Mizo National Front, one time formidable ethnic rebel organization, entered into the bipartite (The MNF and the Government of India) ethnic agreement known as the Mizo Accord (Memorandum of Agreement) in 1960, (Datta 1995: 146–151) transformed itself into a political party,18 took part in elections which returned them to power in 1989 and

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in 1993 as the dominant party (in coalition) and governed the State till on its own from 1998 to 2008 winning successive elections. As a result of this process of institutionalization of ethnic radicalism in North-East in and through a democratization process, the space for ethnic rebellion has been minimized, and that the region has a better record of the management of ethnic conflict and peace since the 1990s has to be explained with reference to the politics of institutionalization of ethnic radicalism and the resultant governance, treated elsewhere with detailed statistical data (Bhattacharyya 2018).

Notes 1. In Tripura, 4 militants (ethnic radicals) belonging to the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) surrendered before the Border Security Forces (BSF) yesterday at eastern border at Rajbari under Rashiyabari police station in Dhalai district. According to Border Security Force officials, the militants surrendered without arms, as they confessed that the NLFT had been facing shortage of arms and other resources that compelled them to surrender. The surrenders were identified as Milan Mohan Tripura (38), Niranjoy Tripura (20), Danto Mohan Tripura (24) and Raiya Tripura (37) of the same district. (https://thenortheasttoday.com/4-national-liberation-front-of-tri pura-militants-surrender-in-tripura/ (sighted on 27 August 2017). 2. Article 371-A of the Indian Constitution says: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution—a. No Act of Parliament in respect of: (i) religious or social practices of the Nagas; (ii) Naga customary law and procedure; (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to the Naga customary law; and (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides.’ (Bakshi 2017: 391–92). 3. On 3 August 2017 the entire State of Assam has been declared as ‘disturbed areas’ under the above law. Areas near Meghalaya’s border areas adjoining Assam and three districts in Arunachal Pradesh have also been declared as ‘disturbed’ under the AFSPA for two more months with effect from August 3. (The Hindustan Times 7 August 2017). 4. These are Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. 5. See 50th Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities in India (July 2012–June 2013) (www.nclm.in) accessed on 20/2/22). 6. See Mukherjee (2014: 90–107) for more details on state formation in the region.

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7. The map of Nagalim, released by the NSCN-IM, includes the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills District of Assam as well as parts of the districts of Golaghat, Sibasagar, Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, and Jorhat. The unresolved dispute is deeply rooted in the history of British colonialism in the region since the late ninetieth century. 8. He was in the forefront of the campaign against foreigners and the illegal immigrants in the late 1970s and early 1980s. His party the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) was returned to power in 1985 and again in 1991 and ruled the State for 10 years before conceding defeat to Congress. This party was out of power for a long time since the 19990 s but has joined the BJP led state level coalition government in Assam in 2016 with its 14 Assembly seats. 9. For more details, see Datta ed. 1995 Ethnic Peace Accords in India (New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd), p. 152. 10. This was signed between the Naga People’s Convention and the Government of India in July 1960 (see Datta ed. 1995, pp. 156–61). 11. This statement was under Point 13 was not true. In the actual Agreement, the Government of India did not so commit. (Datta 1995, pp. 159–60). 12. There many such Naga groups, based in the neighbouring countries, especially Myanmar, but six of them are of any significance, and the Government of India is keen on negotiation with them. https://thenortheasttoday.com/naga-accord-nagaland-gov ernor-urges-nscn-k-to-join-peace-talks/ (sighted on 28/10/17). 13. Tripura in 1981 (Mandai ethnic riots) see Bhattacharyya, H. (1999). Communism in Tripura. Delhi, Ajanta Book International for details, Assam before 1985 and now in the Bodoland areas. 14. These include the BSF and several para-military forces like the Assam Rifles, the Gurkha Regiment and the CRPF. 15. Das (2010: 45–47) reported that there were some 76 such organizations in the region. 16. These states have traditionally received 90% of India’s Planning Commission’s disbursement of funds as grants and 10% as loans. In comparison, the general category ‘mainstream’ states received 70% of central funds as loans and 30% as grants. In addition to the seven states of the NorthEast, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim also enjoyed Special Category Status. 17. It is reported that sixty-eight militants (ethnic rebels) along with a huge cache of assorted weapons such as AK series assault rifles, surrendered on Monday 14 August 2017 in Manipur before Manipur Chief Minister N Birendra Singh at the parade ground of the 1st Battalion Manipur Rifles. The ethnic radical groups they represented were as follows: 23 from Kangleipak In Tripura, 4 militants (ethnic radicals)

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belonging to the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) surrendered before the Border Security Forces (BSF) yesterday at eastern border at Rajbari under Rashiyabari police station in Dhalai district. According to Border Security Force officials, the militants surrendered without arms, as they confessed that the NLFT had been facing shortage of arms and other resources that compelled them to surrender. The surrenders were identified as Milan Mohan Tripura (38), Niranjoy Tripura (20), Danto Mohan Tripura (24) and Raiya Tripura (37) of the same district. (https://thenortheasttoday.com/4-national-liberation-front-of-tri pura-militants-surrender-in-tripura/ (sighted on 27 August 2017). The AGP today is a junior partner in the coalition government in Assam led by the BJY (since 1026). The Bodo People’s Front, another ethnic radical party, has also followed suit. Although AGP has joined the BJP led coalition government in Assam in 2016 it has not given up its regionalism and localism for development, employment and empowerment in government and non-government sectors. The Bodo People’s Front came out of the erstwhile militant outfit (Boland Tigers Force) in 2001. 18. The specialized knowledge on Mizo politics suggests that much credit is due to the MNF as a political party and its leadership for far better ethnic peace in Mizoram than elsewhere in the region. (See for details, Hassan, M. S. 2010 ‘The Mizo Exception: State-Society Cohesion and Institutional Capacity’ in Baruah, S ed. Beyond Counter-Insurgency Breaking the Impasse in North-East India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 207–31.

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Bhattacharyya, H. 2018. Radical Politics and Governance in India’s North East: The Case of Tripura. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. ———. 2019a. Federalism in Asia: Beyond the Diversity-Problematic. In Federalism Studies (A Research Agenda), ed. J. Kincaid, 187–98. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar and Northampton, USA. ———. 2019b. States Reorganization and the Accommodation of EthnoRegional Cleavages in India. In Territory and Power in Constitutional Transition, ed. G. Anderson and S. Chaudhry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bhaumik, S. 1999. North East India: The Evolution of a Post-Colonial Region. In Wages of Freedom: Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-State, ed. Partha Chatterjee, 327–36. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bhaumik, S. 2009. Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India’s North East. New Delhi: Sage. Chaube, S.K. 1999. Ethnicity, Regionalism and the Problem of National Identity in India. In The State, Identity and the Political Process, ed. Z. Hasan, et al., 297–312. New Delhi: Sage. Datta, P.S., ed. 1995. Ethnic Peace Accords. New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. Hiltz, J. 2003. Construction of Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s. Bulletin of Tibetology 67 . https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bit stream/handle/1810/243140/bot_2003_02_04.pdf?sequence=1. Sighted on 20 May 2018. Kumar, B.B. 1996. Reorganization of North-East India. New Delhi: Omsons. Mitra, Subrata K. 2012. Measuring the Mosaic: Caste, Class and Sentiment in Making the Citizen of India. In The Politics of Citizenship, Identity and the State in South Asia. Heidelberg Series in South Asian and Comparative Politics, ed. H. Bhattacharyya, A. Kluge, and L. Koenig, 23–42. New Delhi: Sanskriti. Mitra, Subrata K., and V.B. Singh. 2009. When Rebels Becomes Stakeholders Democracy, Agency and Social Change in India. New Delhi: Sage. Mukherjee, J. 2014. Conflict Resolution in Multicultural Societies: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Sage. Nayar, B.R. 1968. The Minority Politics in the Punjab. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Singh, Gurharpal. 1994. Communism in Punjab. Delhi: Ajanta Books International. Weiner, M. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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Newspapers The Hindu.

Official Sources Basic Statistics of North Eastern Region 2015, North Eastern Council Secretariat, Shillong. Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities Commission (2014) 50th report (on-line). http://14.139.60.153/handle/123456789/10182. Sighted on 25 March 2022.

CHAPTER 7

The Making and Unmaking of the Special Category States in India

Introduction The concept of Special Category States (SCS) in India (discontinued in 2018) was associated with India’s asymmetric federalism from 1969, and also a part of India’s Planning process. It was not constitutionally so provided, but there are references in the Constitution for providing grants to the States as well as for treating some States with special rights and privileges. Therefore, the notion of SCS was not anti-constitutional. But it must be said that the notion was associated with a political economy of India dominated by the public sector and command economy. As was true with the abolition of the Planning Commission (2014), which was a misfit for a free market economy, the notion of SCS was also a part of the same political economy. Today, the notion is no longer there, but its spirits remain in a modified form in the provision for Normal Plan Assistance. The criteria followed in considering an SCS were many: hilly and difficult terrain; low population density; sizeable presence of the Scheduled Tribes population; strategic geographical location on international borders; backward infrastructure; and non-viable state finance (Bhattacharjee, 2016: 3). Beginning in 1969 with three Special Category States such as Nagaland, Jammu & Kashmir and Assam, other States have been added to the list in different times. During 1974–1975, five States were added: Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya and Sikkim. In 1990,

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Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram received the status; and in 2001, it was Uttarakhand’s turn. Until 2018, 11 States (all eight States in the North-East, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand) were Special Category States. The concept of SCS was introduced in 1969 by a Cabinet decision when the 5th Finance Commission wanted to extend preferential treatment to certain States by providing them financial assistance and tax breaks. But it was not until 1974–1975 that the category came to be known as such. The factors are taken into consideration in deciding the SCS were hilly and difficult geographical terrains; low density of population; sizeable share of tribal peoples; locations at the international borders; and economic and infrastructural backwardness (Bhattacharjee, 2016: 2– 3). In 1969 only three States received such status, namely, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam and Nagaland. SCS was granted by the NDC on the basis of the recommendations of the Planning Commission (abolished on 15 August 2014, the NITI Aayog taking its place). But it remains an extraconstitutional arrangement. The Fifth Finance Commission is said to have recommended a ‘liberal dose of central assistance’ to those States (Bhattacharjee 2016: 4). All the SCS were located in the periphery of India. For our specific purposes, the SCS status was an important example of asymmetric federalism in India, something linked to diversity and identity needs. For the SCS it was enjoying double status: asymmetric and SCS. As we will soon below, these States’ performance records in development and governance over the last thirty years have been commendable, and often above the all-India average. There is some confusion, however, whether after the abolition of the Planning Commission, and the introduction of the market economy, the SCS still exist or not. Reddy and Reddy (2019: 180–82) argue that they exist in a much diluted form as those States still receive Normal Plan Assistance from the Centre on the basis of the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula. On the basis of the data provided in Table 1.6 in Bhattacharjee (2016: 33), it is seen that the quantum and per cent of transfers to the SCS has since 1969–1974 (fifth Finance Commission) have increased from 9.80 to 12.48% in 2010–2015. The Statutory transfers have also increased: 35.9% in the same year to 68% in 2005–2010. From the records of the Home Ministry dated 11 December 2018 it is learnt that the Special Category State status had ceased to have existed although Normal Plan Assistance was given to those States.

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Table 7.1 Gadgil-Mukherjee Formula Criteria

Weightage in per cent

Population Per capita GSDP

60 25 (20% for States below the national average; 5% for all States in distance method) 7.5 7.5*

Performance Special problem

*It is a function of some other factors. Source Reddy and Reddy 2019: 197

Since its inception in 1969, the SCS have been offered Plan assistance by then Planning Commission, now by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, by following a formula—long known as the Gadgil formula, later modified as Gadgil-Mukherjee formula. D R Gadgil was an economics and Vice-Chairperson of the Planning Commission. The socalled Gadgil formula prescribed that of the total Plan Assistance 30% should be earmarked for the SCS; of the sum 90% is to be given as grants and 10% as loans. This is in contrast with the general category States which receive 70% as loan and 30% as grants (Reddy and Reddy, 2019: 14–15). The distribution of the assistance money, population is the predominant factor; other factors are backwardness, fiscal performance, special problem, etc. (Reddy and Reddy, 2019: 15). In the beginning (Table 7.1), population weightage was not very high (60%). Third, there were ministerial transfers to the States though of a small per cent. Beyond those there are other special funds for the Backward Districts Development Grant Fund and the fund for Border Development etc. Of late Centre’s/Prime Minister’s special financial packages to some States have also meant some asymmetric transfers. The Finance Commissions since 1993 have been earmarking grants for the Panchayats and Municipalities and the Autonomous Tribal District Councils through the concerned States governments.

SCS: Development and Governance Although SCS has been withdrawn, the performance records of such States in terms of development and governance have remained stellar often above the national average. Data in Table 7.2 show how since 1990 all the SCSs improved their lot in terms of the Human Development

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Index. Except Assam all the SCSs in 2018 have performed in HDI above the national average. Assam has also registered development and its record in 2018 of 0.614 is only a few point lower than that of the all-India average of 0.645. The Special Category States including those with asymmetric status and powers have been jealous about their ethnic identity and territory. However, language as part of ethnic identity remains problematic for some States in the North-East. For example, Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya language has never been an issue; their statehood demand was based on tribal identity. These States are Christian dominated, and the movements for statehood on the basis of Christianity was initially launched, but very soon, realizing that in India religion-based territory would not be conceded, switched over to tribal ethnicity (Weiner 1978). A detailed statistical study by Malhotra (2014) on the records of their development and social well-being during the period of 1981–2011 shows various performance levels, but also their competitive records in governance, development and the protection of their ethnic identity. As the data in Table 7.3 below shows all the SCSs have made progress in terms of Policy Effective Index (PEI) from 1981, and their records are even higher than the all-India average. The PEI is a composite index of some variables such as the rule of law, attacks on women, livelihood opportunity, households without safe drinking water, sanitation and Table 7.2 Performance of the SCS in HDI (1990–2018) States

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2018

Assam Arunachal Pradesh Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Sikkim Tripura Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Uttarakhand All India

0.411 0.437 0.495 0.456 0.525 0.531 0.541 0.447 0.479 0.493 0.629 0.431

0.447 0.471 0.526 0.469 0.547 0.533 0.548 0.448 0.530 0.511 0.635 0.463

0.488 0.502 0.559 0.477 0.547 0.557 0.548 0.531 0.589 0.528 0.630 0.498

0.531 0.535 0.598 0.533 0.630 0.621 0.590 0.561 0.644 0.587 0.656 0.539

0.567 0.641 0.681 0.620 0.686 0.661 0.633 0.608 0.667 0.640 0.641 0.582

0.567 0.641 0.681 0.620 0.699 0.679 0.631 0.608 0.667 0.640 0.641 0.527

0.614 0.661 0.698 0.656 0.705 0.679 0.691 0.643 0.701 0.674 0.684 0.645

Source https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_states_and_union_territories_by_Human_Develo pment_Index (sighted on 22/2/21)

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electricity etc. Those sub-variable are also composite (Malhotra, 2014: 148–156). Assam, the largest State in terms of population is of course a slow mover, and the case of Sikkim is not to be comparable with the rest. The former State of Jammu & Kashmir was a slow mover till 1991 but afterwards it made it up. Himachal Pradesh has been a fast mover. The records of Mizoram are the highest of all the States which is due to relatively enduring ethnic peace, and more homogenous population than the rest. The Nagas have kept the home front well, and its record is higher than the all-India average. It seen from Table 7.3 above, the States have since the 1980s consistently progressed with some notable records such as Mizoram and Nagaland. Uttarakhand since its formation in 2000 has not fell behind. Jammu & Kashmir has made considerable improvement since the late 1990s. In terms of Human Development Index of the UNDP (Table 7.2)— income, health and education—all the States have held on to their rate of progress, in all cases keeping their records above the all-India averages. Contrary to popular perception, the records of Jammu & Kashmir have consistently outperformed all-India average. The political scientific conclusion that one may arrive at here is that the SCS status and other asymmetric arrangements have well responded to the questions of backwardness and under development that such States have often been Table 7.3 Policy Effectiveness Index State/UT

1981

1991

2001

2011

Arunachal Pradesh Assam Himachal Pradesh Jammu & Kashmir Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Sikkim Tripura Uttarakhand INDIA

0.188 0.177 0.239 0.188 0.275 0.248 0.229 0.261 0.237 0.193 – 0.205

0.243 0.193 0.268 0.258 0.280 0.327 0.335 0.372 0.388 0.257 – 0.228

0.303 0.220 0.290 0.308 0.330 0.374 0.424 0.341 0.503 0.262 0.255 0.246

0.345 0.232 0.359 0.347 0.328 0.383 0.493 0.371 0.566 0.302 0.311 0.285

Source Malhotra Rajeev, India Public Policy Report, (2014), p. 148

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accused of. It is also seen from the available data that in some cases the records of these States in 2018 were comparable to those of the socalled advanced States of India: for example, the development index of Jammu & Kashmir in 2019 (0.688) is above that of Karnata (0.683); Gujarat (0.672) and Telangana (0.669), and comparable, internationally, to that of Morocco. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_ states_and_union_territories_by_Human_Development_Index (sighted on 22/2/21). The SCS status has been withdrawn but special funding for the NorthEast has not decreased, but increased a lot, in fact. From 1996, the Union government announced ‘New Initiatives for North Eastern Region, one of which was the policy to earmark at least 10% of the Plan budget of the Union ministries for the development of the region’ (Annual Report of the MDoNER 2021–2022) (https://mdoner.gov.in/contentimages/ files/Annual_Report_2021-22.pdf) (sighted on 14/3/22). According to 10% of the Plan Budget of the Union Ministries has since been named as Plan Gross Budgetary Support (GBS). The formation of a separate Department for the Development of North Eastern Region in 2001 in the Union government, and later a separate Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region (MDoNER) in 2004 was a continuity in public policy on regional development added with several other funded projects by the international and national agencies. This was a unique institutional arrangement focused on infrastructural development, empowerment, communication and social and economic development in the region—connected to the implementation of India’s Look East Policy (1992)/Act East Policy (2014–). This Ministry is a nodal agency that acts by pooling resources from several other ministries. Under the aegis of the Ministry a plethora of projects for multifarious activities have been under taken, and a massive amount of funds have been earmarked and released under such projects as the Central Pool of Resources for the region, Hill Areas Development programmes, North Eastern Livelihood Projects, Special Development Package for the BTC and other Autonomous Tribal District Councils. Many of those projects are associated with the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Railway Ministry, Civil Aviation and so on, and some of them have a grants portion. In the financial year 2022–2023, a huge sum of Rupees 76,040.07 crores was the total budgetary allocation for the Ministry (Annual Report of MDoNER 2021–2022). Several development projects of the Central government have been carried out in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand for better connectivity, and

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the records of both the governments are exemplary. Like other exSCSs, these two States also receive Central Assistance as per the Gadgil formula provided a certain number of projects were implemented on time (https://www.constructionweekonline.in/projects-tenders/15334himachal-pradesh-implements-32-amrut-projects) (sighted on 14/3/22). The above institutional arrangements and funding for the ex-SCSs are to be seen as further examples of asymmetry in financial disbursement in Indian federalism thus far neglected in the existing studies. True, the formation of a Union Ministry of the MDoNER and its nodal role appears to be a kind of centralization, but then the Ministry functions in association with the State governments, which have to provide for the administration of the tasks. Many of the projects are implemented by the sub-State levels local governments, urban and rural as well as Autonomous Tribal District Councils. The MDoNER’s Annual Report of 2021–22 offers detailed statistical data on the implementation of various projects and its effects in the region. Substantial reduction in poverty level has also taken place in the region. There is in the MDoNER list of project of the special funding for the Scheduled Tribes in the region. The evidence offered above on indices of HDI as well as governance in the region and Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand seem to testify to the relative success of many programmes and projects undertaken by the MDoNER and its predecessor DoNER.

Conclusion The concept of SPC was withdrawn in 2018 although the practice of giving plan assistance (Central Plan Assistance) remains for the erstwhile SCSs. However, an element of ‘condition’ has been added. Those States still received the assistance on the basis of the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula. To be sure, the SCS system was a part of the planned economy which no longer exists nationally. As part of the major institutional reforms being carried on since the early 1990s, most of the institutions of the bygone days have been abolished, and some of them have been replaced by new institutions. Bhattacharjee (2016) argued that the reason the SCS were introduced way back in the early 1963 was partly political, and the mode of such disbursement was entailed an element of ‘discretion’ that was beyond the statutory allocation by the Finance Commission. The Gadgil formula in grants allocation to the SCS was designed to remove

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any element of discretion and discrimination. Given the records of development and governance given above it is not easy to explain away the effectiveness of such system of financial assistance to the hilly and border States. In the shifting political economy of neo-liberalism sweeping the country, the erstwhile SCSs are placed in a dilemma: they are unable to attract private investment, foreign or national, and yet, they have to be competitive. The choice is hard.

Bibliography Bhattacharjee, Govind. 2016. Special Category States of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Malhotra, R. 2014. India Public Policy Report. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Weiner, M. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Official Sources Annual Report of DoNER (various years).

CHAPTER 8

Asymmetry Within Asymmetry in India

Introduction Indian federalism is perhaps a lone case of having asymmetric within asymmetry in constitutionally guaranteed institutional arrangements. This means that India’s asymmetric States have within them sub-State level asymmetry and respective political institutions under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution that provides for tribal self-governance for the hill tribes of North-East India and offers autonomous powers to govern and develop. For non-asymmetric States in the rest of India, the tribals in millions were not as lucky for them the 5th Schedule for a Tribal Advisory Council was provided, an asymmetric structure of sorts, but not as empowering as the 6th Schedule. Unlike the 6th Schedule, the Tribal Advisory Councils are subject to control of the State government; and it is also not a democratic body like the Autonomous Tribal District Councils under the 6th Schedule. In Chapters 2 and 3 above there is a more detailed analyses of different forms of asymmetry throughout India with different degrees of powers and autonomy. In Chapter 3, I have discussed in detail the various forms federal asymmetry at the state and sub-State levels. Chapter 2 contains a detailed discussion of the debates that took place in the CA on tribal self-governance. Here my focus would be on the 5th and 6th Schedules as per Constitution and the application by amendments of the latter to respond to a unique situation.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_8

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5th Schedule (Under Art 244(1)) This Schedule was designed for ‘administration and control’ of Scheduled Areas and Schedule Tribes in the States except those of the North-East. There is a Provision for a Tribal Advisory Council (TAC) in each State having Scheduled Areas consisting of nor more than twenty members of whom three-fourths shall be representatives of the Scheduled Tribes in the concerned State Legislative Assembly. If the said number of MLAs are not found, then the remaining seats shall be filled by other members of those tribes. Thus the MLAs are members of the TAC, and the job of the Council is to advise on matters pertaining to welfare and advancement of the Scheduled Tribes as may be referred to them by the State Governor (Bakshi 2017: 421). The State Governor has been empowered by the Schedule to make regulations of the areas as well as to make exceptions to the laws of the State Legislature or Parliament if they are found to be appropriate for the areas. As it has been made more clear by the verdict in the case of Sudhakar B Kadu vs the State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 2014 MP 69 (DB) (Bakshi 2017: 421) that the Governor is competent to enact provisions restricting transfer of land located in the Scheduled Areas between tribals and non-tribals. Tribal Advisory Council has been formed in many States including Himachal Pradesh which has a smallper cent of tribals (about 4 lakh) but belong to several tribes and sub-tribes. The TACs have not yet attracted scholarly attention, but the many court cases in several States regarding the vital issues of land transfer, forest resources and mining operations are an indication that the relative lack of adequate protection to the tribals living in the Scheduled Areas the TACs having been formed notwithstanding. The Government of India Tribal Affairs Ministry’s own document have highlighted the vital issues and also used the judgement of many court verdicts (Land and Governance under the Fifth Schedule).

6th Schedule The 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution provides for the formation of Autonomous Tribal District Councils for the hill tribes of NorthEast India. This is more empowering than the 5th Schedule applicable

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to Scheduled Areas and Tribes in the rest of India; but the latter offers the Tribal Advisory Council only advisory capacity. By contrast, the 6th Schedule has autonomous powers over many matters affecting the hill tribes of the district so formed. For our purpose, such Councils that are formed at the sub-State level are examples of asymmetric federalism, and to be more precise, asymmetry within asymmetry. The above Articles of the Indian Constitution provide for the constitution of an autonomous tribal district within a state by the Governor of that State, and the formation by elections, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, of an Autonomous Tribal District Council consisting of 30 members out of which 26 are to be elected and not more than four shall be nominated by the Governor of the State concerned. The term of office of this Council is five years like any such body corporate in the Indian polity. The District Council has been provided with a range of legislative, executive and some quasi-judicial powers. The fact that it is provided with powers to make laws makes it more autonomous than the 5th Schedule, and semi-sovereign , so to say. Its legislative powers pertain to: allotment, occupation, or use, or the settlement of land, other than reserved forest, for the purpose of agriculture or grazing or for residential or other nonagricultural purposes, or for any other purpose that promotes the interests of a village or town within its jurisdiction; the management of any forest, not considered as ‘reserved forest’; use of any canal or water course for the purpose of agriculture; the regulation of the practice of jhum or any other forms of shifting cultivation; the establishment of a village or town committee or council; village or town police, public health and sanitation; the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen; the inheritance of property; marriage and divorce; and social customs. The Council has also the power to levy taxes and collect the same on lands and buildings, and tolls on persons residing within the area; professions, trade, calling and employment; animals, vehicles and boats; the entry of goods into a market for sale; and for maintenance of schools, dispensaries or roads, and so on. The Council has also the power to make regulations for the control of moneylending and trading by non-tribals within its jurisdiction. All laws made by the Council take effect only upon having received the assent of the Governor of the State concerned. It is also to be pointed out here that just as in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the Council has executive powers on laws made by it. Beyond that, the Council has powers to establish primary schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle pounds, ferries, fisheries, roads and

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road transport and waterways. There has been a provision of a District Fund for the administration of the district under the overall control of the Governor in respect of payment into the District Fund, or the withdrawal of money from it. There is also a provision for royalty sharing in respect of mineral within the Council areas between the Council and the State government. The Council has been provided with some quasi-judicial powers in respect of administration of justice in the autonomous districts, and that too, for the tribes, and for this the Council is empowered to create village councils or courts. The latter shall exercise the powers of appeal in respect of all suits and cases triable by a village courts or council. The quasi-sovereign character of the Council under the 6th Schedule is further evident in the provision (Clause 12AA) which states that ‘notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no Act of the Legislature of the State of in respect of the District Council, may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State shall apply to the Council areas in respect of prohibiting or restricting of any non-distilled alcohol liquor (Bakshi 2017: 423–41). Currently the following Autonomous Tribal District Councils are in operation in the North-Eats: the North Kachar Hill District, the Karbi Along District, the Khasi Hill District, The Jaintia Hill District, the Garo Hill District, the Tripura Tribal Autonomous District, the Chakma District, the Mara District, the Lai District, the Bru Autonomous District Council and the Bodoland Territorial Council. Of them, the Bodoland Territorial Council is an odd man out. This was major deviation made in respect of extending the 6th Schedule to Plain tribes on the Northern Bank of the river Brahmaputra, and that too, to the Bodo whoa are a minority in the areas. There is another deviation involved here: the majority of 46-member Council has been reserved for the Bodo minority seats in the Council have been reserved, ostensibly, to make the minority Bodos a political majority. The extension of the 6ht Schedule was done by an amendment of the 6th Schedule by the parliament in 2003 (w.e.f 7/9/2003) (Bakshi, 2017: 424) Out of 46 seats, 30 are reserved for the Bodos; 5 reserved or non-tribal communities; 5 open to all; and 6 to be nominated by the State Governor from the unrepresented communities. The Bodos thus have been given an in-build and structural majority. This arrangement has made the non-Bodos of many communities and tribes too vehemently opposed, and they began to organize themselves against the Bodos (discussed at some length later in the book on the chapter on

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the BTC) which has seen persistent ethnic violence in the areas, and thousands from the Bodos and non-Bodos in relief camps. This has seriously affected the functional effectiveness of the Bodoland Territorial Council.

Ethnic Cleavages and Tribal Autonomous Districts: How Far to Go The Autonomous District Councils were predicated upon the ethnic cleavages and the special needs for self-government for the minority tribes. The underlying principle is self-determination. The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution were divided between the two opposed methods of integration by way of decentralization through the Councils, on the one hand, and assimilation but no separate governmental authority especially in the frontier areas to encourage further separation. A separate serious scientific study of all the District Councils is yet to be undertaken. So demanded, District Council defeats all rationale of government and public finance, for any governmental institution involves cost. Second, if this defeats also the purpose of building a multicultural society and any bid for ensuring any inter-community amity. Autonomy by way of the provisions of the 6th Schedule is not to be misunderstood. It is not absolute, but relative. The Councils have to work under the overall control of the State Governor, and the State administration. The funds for the Council comes from the Finance Commission as well as the State government apart from the Council’s own revenues, which very limited. There are criticism of the Schedule for, a top officer, known as the CEO, of the 30-member District Council is a top civil servant of the rank of I. A. S who is an all-India recruit by the Union Public Service Commission, New Delhi a Constitutionally autonomous body, posted in a particular State, and sent out on deputation by the concerned State government. The critics point out that this hampers autonomy (Gassah, 1997) of the elected body. This is a wrong way of looking at the issue: in an elected body dominated by the party that has a majority may be partisan when the CEO may strike the balance. Already in the same decade the Councils were introduced for the Garos in Meghalaya, strong reservations were expressed by former CEM (Chief Executive Member) of the Garo Hill Autonomous District Mr Williamson A. Sangma:

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By experience, the tribal leaders have found that the provisions of the Sixth Schedule do not give the hills adequate power to safeguard their interests— social, economic and political—and that on the contrary there are ample loopholes for interference from outside in matters relating to day-to-day administration of the districts. (Quoted in Gassah 1997: 7–8)

Sangma has not supplied though any examples to substantiate his claim for under the 6th Schedule there is no such scope. In his Introduction to the study referred to above, Gassah also pointed out that the arrangement of the 6th Schedule was a ‘fragile’ one: Lacking in statutory support, the Autonomous District Councils therefore had to depend on the changing political relation with the state leadership. The developmental activities of the Autonomous District Councils therefore depend very much on the political party or parties that run the state administration. (Gassah 1997: 9)

This is unavoidable, for who can guarantee that the same party will rule in both the State government and the Council. B K Roy Burman, raised the issue which grappled the CA members drafting the 6th Schedule: autonomy to statehood, or secessionism. He remarks ‘[I] Inadequacy of the Sixth Schedule to satisfy the self-management urge has stimulated two types of responses from the communities concerned (Roy Burman, 1997: 23). First, it has encouraged the tribals to seek alternative political arrangement within India in the form of statehood on which the tribal could dominate. Second, this had led to secessionist demand for a separate state outside of India, and such demands are often articulated rather violently (Roy Burman, 1997: 23). Stanley Nichols Roy, the son of the Rev. Nichols Roy, one of the architects of the 6th Schedule in the Constituent Assembly, engaged in the hill people’s movement since the 1950s, expressed doubt about the economic authority of the Council to control trade and commerce conducted by the non-tribals because the Supreme Court order in 1987 in a case had presumably diluted the authority of the Council in the matter (Roy 1997: 325–26). And yet, the 6th Schedule has acquired an enduring legitimacy in Indian among the tribes and even the non-tribals who demand this to be extend to their territory. There are many such ethno-tribal movements for autonomy or self-government in the North-East and even beyond (e.g. Gorkhaland movement in West Bengal) have been fighting for the Sixth Schedule status to be extended as a means of political recognition

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of their identity. In many cases, the tribal District Councils have been the stepping stone to higher political status such the Union Territory, and then finally statehood. Very few have demanded secession outside of India basing themselves on the District Council. The case of Bodoland in this book shows that although the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) was conceded to the Bodos in 1993 with a long list of subjects to be under the control of the BAC, since it was governed under the State law, and hence very much dependent on the sweet will of the State government, the Bodoland movement turned even more violent, and demanded doggedly the Sixth Schedule status to their territorial authority. Since the Bodos are Plain Tribesmen, the Sixth Schedule did not originally apply to them. The Schedule was designed to protect tribal identity in the hills. But then, in this case, the Constitution was amended as per provision of the Tripartite Ethnic Peace Accord with the Bodo militants in 2003, and the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTADs) was incorporated in the Constitution. In other words, the instrument of the Sixth Schedule has added legitimacy to India’s constitutional engineering in respect of the aboriginal tribes in India’s North-East but with a heavy price for the Bodos and non-Bodos, and the records of persistent violence. Therefore, the limits to autonomy are mostly political in character i.e. something unavoidable in culturally and politically diverse India. The institutional ill-designing as the Bodo case will testifies is expected to produce undesirable effects on governance and development.

Conclusion Evidently the institutional arrangements for the 5th Schedule raise question about the effectiveness of the TAC. The many judicial interventions in several States testify to it. Unlike the provisions of the 6th Schedule, the 5th Schedule does not provide a democratic self-governing body for the tribals in the Scheduled Areas especially when those areas have proven records of land alienation, extraction of mineral resources and forest resources. In so far as the 6th Schedule is concerned, every time a new autonomous tribal district council in the North-East has been conceded, the said Schedule has been amended. But when in 2003 the Bodoland Territorial Council was conceded the application of the said Schedule deviated for the first time from the democratic norms so that an autonomous tribal district council was conceded to the Bodos who are a minority within its jurisdiction. It deviated from the Constitution

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in another matter: the founding fathers of the Constitution designed the 6th Schedule for self-governance of the Hill Tribes of North-East India. In this case, it was applied to the Plain Tribesmen. Such measures set, no doubt, undesirable precedent in the façade of India’s constitutional democracy.

References Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 423–41. New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing. Gassah, L.S., ed. 1997. The Autonomous District Councils. New Delhi: Omsons. Land and Governance under the Firth Schedule (Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India and the UNDP) online. Roy Burman, B.K. 1997. Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. In The Autonomous District Councils, ed. L.S. Gassah, 15–39. New Delhi: Omsons.

CHAPTER 9

The Working of Sub-State Federal Asymmerty in Tripura

Introduction Institutional designs even if appropriately so formulated to fit the context do not always work. In a democracy in complex cultural diversity such as India, representative institutions have not always worked up to the satisfaction of the citizens. Their effective working depends on a judicious combination of actor, institutions and context. Political secessionists often tend to ignore that a political separation does not always work, for formation and running a government has costs, which the poor resource bases do not offer. The Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council (TTADC)—at work since 1982—is a case of sub-state asymmetry and government which offers an example, in comparative politics and federalism, of when institutions sometimes work. Institutional effectiveness for us is to be measured in terms of continuity in political participation, political stability within and outside, and finally the delivery of what it was pledged: law and order, and other goods and services. In the case of multi-ethnic body, inter-tribal amity and equality is a factor that facilitate institutional functioning. As Blondel (2006: 717) wrote, institutions do not work on their own, but are to be worked, and so worked by the political actors. A neo-institutional (dynamic) approach recognizes context, institutions and actors in explaining why institutions sometimes work, and or not. Blondel’s approach above indicates his acceptance of such thinking in the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_9

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broad neo-institutional perspective. I have followed the same in this book including the two case studies.

A Brief History If an ethnic identity provided the initial impulse to demand a territorial solution via the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, it was a Tripuri ethno-nationalist identity which was born in a militant armed struggle against both the fledgling tribal princely regime in Tripura as well as the military clampdown of the nascent Indian state in the later 1940s. The main agency that spearheaded this movement was the Gana Mukti Parishad (GMP), which resisted the state repression, and articulated a powerful tribal identity (Bhattacharyya, 2018: 117–40). However, the cutting edge of this identity was somewhat blunted in the aftermath of India’s independence which turned this otherwise tribal State into Bengali (refugee) dominated one, with the tribals reduced to a minority. The refugee influx and their eventual settlement in Tripura entailed large-scale alienation of tribals’ lands to the Bengalis by means fair and foul. This served to strike a severe blow to the very existence of the tribals in their own State. As the history of the communist movement to which the GMP was subjugated from around the early 1950s1 shows, the GMP found itself increasingly cornered and desperate to stop any further erosion and damages to tribal identity in Tripura by voicing its resentment at different fora, and by advocating for the introduction of available institutional resources available within the Indian Constitution for the protection of tribal identity.2 From the detaild accounts of the GMP-communist movement in Tripura (Bhattacharyya 1999; 2018) it is learnt that the GMP backed by the Communist Party of India/CPI-M was in the forefront of the movement for the introduction of the ADC in Tripura. As the following will show, the ADC whether under the 7th Schedule (1982–85), or under the 6th Schedule (since 1985) was not designed to be anti-Bengali, but pro-tribal in the tribal compact areas in order to protect the distinct identity, culture, tradition, customs and ways of life of the tribals. That was the original intention of the making of the 6th Schedule. In the specific context of Tripura, the protection of the tribal identity assumed special significance because no other State in India’s North-East experienced such a huge demographic revolution that had overturned an originally

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tribal dominated State into a Bengali dominated one. No other State in India’s North-East, or for that matter, any state in the world, had faced such a situation of large-scale alienation of land of the tribes to the Bengali settlers in mostly dubious ways. In no other State in India or the world, has had witnessed the original inhabitants been reduced to a small minority in a State which was once their own. The Tripura Legislative Assembly for the purpose of introducing the ADC under the 7th Schedule of the Indian Constitution (under the control of the State) in 1979, and an elected ADC was proposed to be formed by elections. This triggered a lot of apprehensions among the Bengalis less than the tribal that perhaps now the Bengalis would be unsettled and driven out of Tripura. The tenor of the controversy was the possible effect of the ADC: would it mean the eviction of the Bengalis out of Tripura? Would it mean that all lands held by the Bengalis were to be transferred back to the Tribals? This speculation led to major ethnic riots between the Bengalis and the tribals in 1980 in Mandai in which more tribals were killed than the Bengali; this happened when late Nripen Chakrabarti, a Bengali, and member of the CPI-M Polit Bureau, was the Chief Minister of Tripura. On the question of the link between the introduction of the ADC and the riots in Tripura in 1980, late Nripen Chakrabarti, ex-Chief Minister of Tripura of the first Left Front government denied any link whatsoever by pointing out the cases of riots taking places elsewhere in India on many grounds; he also denied that the charge that the ADC would meant eviction of Bengalis, or its adverse effects on the Bengalis on the grounds that (a) only the money-lenders among the Bengalis who grabbed tribal land by fraudulent means would be affected; and (b) a major portion of territory under the ADC was hills which were under the control of the Forest Department as ‘Reserved Forest’. He also pointed out that most fertile areas of the State, namely, the western part of the State adjoining Bangladesh, where most Bengalis lived, where most trade, commerce, cultivation etc. take place; he also made another very strategic point: in the Tripura Legislative Assembly of 60 members, the tribal M L As were only 19; but the Bill for the ADC Act was supported also by 38 Bengali M L As (CPI-M, 1981: 3). On the vital question of the role of the ADC in protecting tribal identity, Chakrabariy’s defence was very cogent, historically grounded and couched in the tribal nationalist moorings:

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Tripura was predominantly a tribal state. By historical compulsions, the Bengali refugees have entered Tripura. Although the tribals are weaker they have a distinct identity, language, culture and way of life. Compared to them, the Bengalis are more advanced, if not the most advanced in India. They constitute today some 70% of the population. Quite naturally, there is a fear among the tribesmen in Tripura if they will be able to protect their identity. There is a fear among them that if they will be able to develop their national identity. They are not that educated enough; they are not businessmen; neither are they peasants. They today possess any good piece of land to cultivate. In the face of a secessionist demand for an independent Tripura out of India by a section of the disgruntled Tribal youths, the proposed ADC will promote national integration, provides the space within which the tribal themselves will protect their national identity, protect their own language (Kok-borok) and spend the money allocated to them. (CPI-M, 1981: 3–4)

Late Dasarath Devbarma, former Chief Minister of Tripura, and a legendary Tribal leader (of the GMP and later CPI/CPI-M) on the question of how could the ADC protect tribal interests, sounded very realistic when he said that the ADC alone could not do all welfare for the tribal people because, first of all, the full protection of interests was connected with the end of exploitation in India as a whole and the establishment of socialism. Secondly, the ADC nonetheless, given the time and space, could play a fruitful role as an agency of tribal welfare. However, he forewarned, the ADC was not going to be a separate state; it was the State government which would make the laws, which the ADC would only implement. Even if the ADC wanted to make a law for the tribals it would have to inform the State government beforehand. Finally, he said that the State was also responsible for the protection of tribal interests (CPI-M 1981: 8–9). But he also made it a point that in the post-independence period: the tribal areas have been neglected. Even the minimum efforts for the development of the tribal areas have not been taken. There has been gross neglect in respect of developing their culture, language, identity and economic basis (CPI-M, 1981: 10). The materials contained in the section serve to suggest that the State’s communist movement has ‘increasingly recognized tribal nationalism as a distinct force in the State and not merely as a second-order derivative of capitalism reducible in the last instance to the economic distortions of true class consciousness’s’ (Bhattacharyya and Nossiter, 1988: 152).3

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Formation of the ADC The first elections to form the ADC (under the 7th Schedule meaning thereby under the State laws) (Table 9.1) was held on 03 January 1982 which were swept by the Left Front under the leadership of the CPIM which alone got 19 out of 28 seats on the basis of 56 per of the popular votes cast. The TUJS (b. 1967), an indigenous tribal youth front, recognized as such as a political party, got significant number of seats (7) and 37.5 per popular votes polled. The TUJS managed to increase its share of seats to 10 in the next elections held in 1985 (under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution) although its share of popular votes shrank by 4%. Two other noticeable features of the party performance in the two elections held within a short span of three years only are quite significant increase of votes for the Congress (INC): 3 seats with 14.3%% popular votes, and second, the relative loss of strength for the Left Front, particularly the CPI-M: its share of seats dropped to 15, and share of popular votes shrank by about 14%. One would argue that the activities of the ADC with the backing of the friendly State government in Agartala, particularly in respect of restoration of lands illegally alienated from the tribals by the Bengali landed interests and money-lenders to their original owners must have antagonized the Bengali vested interests which formed part of INC’s vote-bank in Tripura. Except 1990 and 2000, the two elections that the Left Front lost to Congress-TUJS-TNV alliance (1990) and IPFT backed by the extremist organization NLFT respectively and that too, in the background Table 9.1 Party performance in ADC (28-member + 2 nominated = 30-member) in 1982 and 1985

1982 CPI CPI-M INC RSP FB TUJS Independents THPP

Seats &% of votes polled 1 (3.3%) 19 (56.5%) – 0 (1.2%) 1 (1.3%) 7 (37.5% 0 (0.1%) –

Source Bhattacharyya and Nossiter, 1988: 152

1985 (Seats & % of votes polled) 0 (1.4%) 15 (42.3%) 3 (14.3%) – – 10 (33.5%) 0 (1.8%) (7.2%)

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of considerable pre-poll violence, and charges of rigging and boothcapturing.4 In the 1990 elections, the magnitude of violence went to such a passé that out of 864 booths, as many as 724 booths had to be declared ‘sensitive’ where (Central) para-military forces were deployed.5 Nonetheless the Left Front won in 10 seats (CPI-M = 9 and THPP = 1) and the Congress-TUJS alliance got 18 (Congress = 6 and TUJS = 12). The elections were held when the Congress-TUJS alliance was in State government, and is alleged to have facilitated the emergence of the dubious electoral process leading up to massive exercise of violence and insurgency. The 2000 elections took place when the Left Front headed by the CPI-M was in power at the State level since 1993 and 1998, but then the NLFT led insurgency and added violence, and other secessionist activities were at its nadir in the period up to the elections in 2000. The Oriental Times reported as much: The newly floated IPFT, a tribal party, came into existence just before the elections and registered victory over the Left Front by unleashing a reign of terror during the run up to the elections. (OT , May 22, 2000)

In this elections the IPFT got 18 seats leaving 10 to the Left Front (CPIM = 8; CPI = 1; and FB = 1) Oriental Times (May 22, 2000) gave more evidence of NLFT violence: it holds the views that all non-tribals should leave Tripura; it engaged in massive offensive against the nontribals with massacre, abductions, arsons and rapes; it abducted many candidates and their relatives who stood up against the IPFT; barring Congress, all other opposition parties such as the BJP, TMC, Janata Dal (U), TUJS boycotted the elections. The tribal extremists thus won the battle of ballot by bullet, but is said to have missed. Tripura Darpan in its ‘Tathy Panji’ (2011: 117) reported that during 2000–05, the Executive Committee of the ADC changed hands five times because of intra-party squabbles. Hence, one could expect very little developmental activities during this period. The Left Front regained its hold over the ADC since 2005 with overwhelming majority. In the elections held in 2010, all 28 seats were won by the parties of the Left Front in which many other political parties took part but drew only a blank. However, the Congress party and the INPT together retains more than 30% popular vote support. The fact that they could not win a single seat was because at the constituency level, the margin of support for the Left Parties was too high (Table 9.2).

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Table 9.2 Performance of political parties in election to the ADC, 2010 (May 3)

Political parties CPI-M AIFB RSP CPI INC BJP AITC INPT Independents

Seats won 25 01 01 01 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

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Percentage of votes polled (%) 60 1.79 0.05 0.91 21.09 0.55 0.28 11.52 2.51

Total seats = 30 (28 elected and 02 nominated by the Governor) Source State (Tripura) Election Commission Notes Left Front (CPI-M, AIFB, RSP and CPI) together got all 28 seats

In 2015 (4 March) elections to the ADC the Left Front swept the poll winning all 28 States: the CPI-Ms tally was 25, and its partner CPI, RSP and AIFB each winning one. But the Front all out defeat in the next elections in 2021 is not intelligible except one major factor that since 2018 the State has been governed by the BJP in alliance with a party of the tribals (and arguably secessionist) INLFT. In (6 April) 2021 elections, of 28 seats, there are only two Bengalis representing the SC category. Also, of the 26 seats won by the tribals, there is a fair representation of different tribes in Tripura: 16 Tripuris (61.53%)6 ; 3 Reangs; 3 Jamatias; 02 Mogs, and 01 each for the still smaller tribal communities. The Chairman of the Chief Executive Committee is a Mog (Mongsajai Mog) who represents one of the smallest tribal communities in Tripura. In the 9-member CEC, only four members are from the majority tribal community (Tripuri/Devbarma), and the portfolios are distributed among others: Jamatia, Chakma, Reang, and Bengali. It is therefore difficult to argue a case of Tripuris’ over dominance in the ADC. On the contrary, other communities have been taken on board. In the elections to the ADC on 4 May 2015, the Left swept the poll wining all 28 seats. But in the last elections held on 6 April 2021, with the BJP-INLT alliance in State government since 2018, the Left drew a blank: the TIPRA, a newly launched party by a surviving member of the dynasty Kirit Prodyot Devbarma, in alliance with the INPT, swept the poll by winning 16 and 9 seats respectively leaving one

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Table 9.3 Party position in the ADC in 2021 (total seats 28) + 2

Political Parties TIPRA INPT BJP Independents CPI-M INC Total

Vote share

Seats won

37.43 9.3 18.72 6.49 12.46 2.24

16 2 9 1 0 0 28

Source The Indian Express 25 February 2022 Notes TIPRA and INPT were in an alliance. The BJP ruling over the State won 9 seats from 0 in the last time

seat for an Independent candidate. The poll was peaceful and the turnout was very high (85.74%). The results of this election are very significant and a turning points in the politics of Tripura, and more particularly the ADC functioning. It clearly shows that the Left has lost the loyalties of the tribals. But then the ADC administration under the new alliance will have to work with their adversary in the State capital, i.e. BJP whose political ideology does not accord at all with that the new regional party of TIPRA which went to the polls with the issue of separation of the tribals in Tripura territorially into a State outside of Tripura (Table 9.3). However, the question is if working under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution and the overall control of the State Governor, that is a realizable objective or not.

Activities of the ADC: Institutionalization, Devolution and Delivery7 Since the experiment with the TTADC in now about four decades old it was not easy to access data of the past periods. Thus my assessment of the performance records of the ADC is limited to the last ten years or so. But we can assume that the regularity of elections to form the ADC and its continuity, multi-party competition, and with high popular participation in most cases is a proof of some efficacy. One important point to consider is its institutionalization in Tripura and visibility beyond the State. In other words, any assessment of the ADC as a tribal local selfgovernment body within the State of Tripura must prima facie take into considerations a few issues. First, the success of an institution of this kind

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requires continuous institutionalization in terms of differentiation in its structures and functions, and the concomitant legislative empowerment. Second, such an institution requires undertaking realistic objectives for fulfilment rather than some unrealizable absolute objectives. Third, since the ADC was designed for protection of tribal interests in Tripura and for ensuring their self-government, and that they are mostly poor and underdeveloped, a pro-poor public policy orientations were also required to be implemented. Fourth, although the ADC receives grants from the Finance Commission, and also that it can legislate, it is nonetheless dependent on the State government for a variety of purposes: legislation; revenues; projects; and administrative staff. The ADC-State government relation is thus a serious matter of concern especially when governments in our times are all-party governments. Fifth, it is a matter of considerable success of the ADC in respect of differentiation of structures that it has successfully undertaken to devolve powers down to Village level by instituting elected Village Committees, as per provisions of the 6th Schedule, since 2006. Since its formation in 1982, and more importantly since 1985 (6th Schedule) the ADC has continuously differentiated its structures in order to develop a more decentralized administrative machinery but with the democratic participation of the people at each level. Accordingly, it passed laws and made amendments to existing Acts for the purpose. A bureaucratic structure has taken shape in the ADC development purpose, not in large number to supervise village level development in which the Village Committees (elected) played the most crucial role (Table 9.4). The Zonal and Sub-Zonal Officers supervise in particular the activities of the Village Committee numbering 527, each assisted by a Village Committee Secretary. In the Village Committees, the election for which was held in 2011, the Left Front won 472 out of 527 Committees leaving only 55 to Congress-INPT alliance. Block level performance of the parties shows that the Left Front, especially the CPI-M’s, margins of victory in popular vote share ranged between 60 and 75% (State Election Commission, Tripura, 2011). Seats were reserved @33% for women (in the total members as well as position of Chairpersons), and also in adequate number for the ST and SC. As a result, as many as 1662 women members out of 3652 belong to the STs and 20 members belong to SCs. Similarly, 120 women chairpersons, 494 ST Chairpersons and 13 SC chairpersons were also elected. The formation of democratically elected

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Table 9.4 ADC’s field officers

Institution Zonal Development Office Sub-Zonal Development Office Engineering Divisions Office Engineering Sub-Division Office School Inspectorate Office Circle Office of Education Education Sector Offices Village Councils

Number 4 32 4 17 17 65 34 527

Source Hamkraini Yakhlii (in Kokborok) (Development Initiatives of the TTAADC) (2005–06 to 2009–10) (Khumlung: TTAADC, 2011), p. 27

Village Committees under the ADC since 2006 is a remarkable democratic achievement of the ADC in decentralization and devolution of powers and responsibilities for tribal development. This is also an achievement, democratically speaking, because these Committees replaced the previous nominated Committees. The relevant Act for the formation of such Committees was passed way back in 1994 by the TTAADC.8 As of 2012, in the Village Committees (total number being 4165), there are 210 women chairpersons, 317 male chairpersons, 19 SC chairpersons, 494 tribal chairpersons, 1662 women members altogether, and 3652 tribal members. Beyond that, there are 494 Village secretaries posted in the villages. That is quite an achievement of empowerment of the weaker sections of society, institutionally speaking. As per provisions of the Village Committee Act (1994) of the TTAADC, the following are the functions of the Village Committee: The Village Committee shall initiate the development schemes for the Village areas on the control and guidance of the Executive Committee.

The Village Committee may exercise all or any of the following Functions: a. Sanitation and conservancy of the Village areas; b. Cleaning and maintaining of Village roads and paths; c. Construction and maintenance of Rest house in the Village; d. Maintenance of children, adult and women education9 ; The Left’s overwhelming electoral victory and the retention of strong support bases in the villages in the ADC areas as well as over the ADC

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itself over the were a testimony to positive activities undertaken by the ADC for the tribals over the last few years.10 Simultaneously, the very poor show of the Congress-INPT alliance (with 55 VCs out of 527) is also an indictment on what they did for the tribals during 2000–05 when the latter (with the backing of the former) was in power in the ADC.

Governmental Performance of the ADC Governmental performance of the ADC means the delivery aspects of the ADC as administrative and democratic governmental machinery. An assessment of the ADC’s governmental performance must include the objectives and goals formulated as defined by the ADC, their realistic character relative to the surrounding context within which they have to be implemented. Second, we need also to consider the powers and functions available at hand because the former is contingent upon the State government that transfers Department (s) to the ADC as per provisions of the 6th schedule or not. To take up the second issue first, the State government has transferred not all subjects, as per the 6th Schedule, but primary school, social education, market, rural industries, village roads etc. In other areas of development activities, many State government offices have been transferred and staff (3256) of many categories deputed to the ADC administration. Thus, such departments as agriculture, horticulture, fisheries, forest, cooperation, industries, school and social education, language promotion, health, information, culture and tourism, tribal youth programme, tribal welfare programme rural development land record and settlement, and finance are under the over control and supervision of both the ADC and the State government. The ADC administration, it appears, is to work in tandem with the State administration. With the above-mentioned combined governmental-administrative set up, many developmental and promotional activities have been under taken successfully by the ADC over the years. Some records of its achievements are outlined below (Table 9.5). As per information provided in the Tripura Human Development report (2007), during 1997–2005 around 34, 349 tribal families have received land amounting to 34, 598 acres redistributed out of the Government khas land; in 2005, 7147 acres of land were distributed among 9000 tribal families. (p. 16) While the report does not make it clear if the second category of land distributed among the tribal families

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Table 9.5 Land allotment to poor Jhumia Tribal Families (2006–07 to 2009–10)

Year 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10

Cases approved 162 271 451 364

Areas involved in Hect. 28, 30, 68, 47,

768 396 700 964

Source Hamkraini Yakhili (Development Initiative of the TTAADC, 2010, p. 73. (Henceforth HY 2010)

was those alienated from them by the Bengali or not. But it is gratifying to note that the process of land redistribution among the poor tribal families has remained recurrent activity of the ADC. Although the Land and Revenue Settlement Department of the TTAADC is to sanction the proposal for allotment, the power of making the actual allotment lies with the Revenue Department of the State government. However, the State government carries out such operation with the assistance of Sub-Divisional Land Allotment Committees that select the eligible poor jhumias for the purpose. The official report of the ADC, the HY 2010 records many achievements of the ADC in respect of rural development and tribal youth self-employment programme and their skill development such as motor driving, computer training, Diesel mechanic, short hand training, black smith, wool knitting, electrical wiring, carpentry, tailings and beautician and so on. (HY 2010: 69) There is evidence of success in sustainable tribal development initiative in respect of rubber plantation and rubber nursery. During 2006—07, for instance, 2073 hectares of rubber plantations have been raised benefiting some 2073 tribals, involving a cost of Rupees 1059.34 lakh (1 lakh = 100,000). It is to be noted here that the multiple sources of fund were utilized for the purpose: Special Central Assistance, NREGA and the ADC’s Plan Fund. (HY 2010, 67). The Tripura Human Development Report (2018) recorded that till March 2014 some 8146 acres of lands had been restored to the tribals (THRP 2018, 46). In the same report it has been mentioned that 231, 757.375 acres of khas land (government land) had been distributed among 199,356 families out of which 42% are tribals, and 17% are dalits (THDR 2018, 47). This has to be read in conjunction with a pro-tribal and pro-poor State government of the LF led by the CPI-M. Though a separate human development report on

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the ADC areas is not available, but from the Tripura Human Development Report 2018 it is seems clear in the field of education (primary and secondary) in the districts under the ADC much improvement has taken place. Language is the most essential part of one identity. Kok-borok has long been recognized as the second official language in Tripura. But there is no one tribal language in Tripura. Tripura’s tribals speak many languages and dialects. The ADC has therefore has taken various steps to promote, protect and improve the languages by means encouragement of many sorts: translation of good books in literature; compilation of books in Kok-borok; setting up of Kok-borok Book Museum; provision for awards for writers in the languages; fairs organized for the purposes; orientation training for teachers in Kok-borok and so on (HY 2010, 57–59). Remarkable achievements have also taken place in the areas of primary education among the tribal people in the ADC areas. From the unofficial sources, it is found out that while the tribal student enrolment in primary section in 1972 was 34, 088, the figure grew to 2, 02, 615 in 2006. There has also been a change in student enrolment in class 9 and 10: 1517 in 1972 to 25, 240 in 2006, which is 16 times the figure of 1972.11 It has increased since manifold (THDR 2019). Many primary schools (462) have been set up and the existing ones have been upgraded (237) to upper primary in the school less tribal areas. Hostels for the tribal students and the youths have also been constructed. There has also been improvement in providing for safe drinking water by sinking mini deep tube wells as well as by Masonry Wells. From the report of Malhotra (2014) it is seen that the ST households without access to electricity, safe drinking water and sanitation between 1991 and 2011 has decreased: 52.3% (1991) to 34.2% in 2001 and 22.9% in 2011 (Malhotra, 2014: 235). Irrigation facilities have also been much improved. During 2008–09, some 140 hectares of paddy lands were brought under this improved irrigation project of 2 Horse Power Mini Deep Well. Tribal youths have been befitted by the various self-employment schemes. It is to be noted here again that in carrying out the developmental schemes of the ADC, various State and Central government sponsored schemes have been harnessed. There are today as many as 11, 750 Self-Help Groups among the tribal women in the ADC areas (Economic Survey, 2009–10, Govt. of Tripura, 28) as a proof that tribal women are forthcoming in selfemployment endeavour. Literacy rate among the tribes has improved since 1981 (23.07%) to 56.5% in 2010 (Economic Survey, 2009–10, Govt. of

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Tripura, 28) Of this, 68% are tribal male and 44.6% are tribal women. It is found out that during the last five years or so, the more tribal jhumias families have befitted out of the improved method of cultivation: 2000 families in 2005–06 to 18, 026 families in 10,090–10 (HY 2010, 36–37). The figures on the above are much higher in the lasts THDR 2018. Most remarkable aspect of the achievement of the ADC has decentralized community participation in decision making at the village level through the institution of Village Committees since 2006 where a women reservation of seats @33% is followed and in which with the formation of Sub-Zonal and Zonal Development Committees, the village administration has been strengthened. Those bodies have served to build capacity among the villagers, and to impart training for undertaking various activities themselves. Above all, 40% women out of the total of 4165 Village Committees seats seems a most remarkable achievement in community empowerment. The ADC has been empowered to make laws with respect to the allotment, occupation or use of land (excluding the reserved forest), regulation of shifting cultivation, water uses for agricultural purposes, inheritance of property, marriage and divorce, social customs etc. The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution empowers the ADC to establish, construct or manage primary schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle pounds, ferries, fisheries, village roads, waterways etc. The ADC has also financial powers to taxation. In short, it is seen as a governmental institution to deal with multifarious activities relating to the development and welfare of the tribals (Table 9.6). By performing multifarious activities particularly related to the welfare and development of the tribals, the ADC has been found to be heavily Table 9.6 Public expenditure on tribal welfare (2011–12) (amount in INR @ 1 lakh (=100,000)

Name of schemes

Approved ADC budget

Physical target

Rubber plantation Nucleus budget Tribal rest house Composite welfare and Relief Scheme Total

140.00 30.00 25.00 19.50

1094 Hectares 125 Fa 04 Nos 1000 F

214.50

Source Annual Plan 2011–12 (ADC, Khumulwng, Tripura, p. 26)

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engaged in various developmental and empowerment programmes in its jurisdiction. Of the jobs received under the MNREGA (Table 6.8), a high proportion constitutes the tribal families because the tribals are mostly poor and landless. Under various welfare and empowerment schemes including MNREGA till 31 December 2014, the tribal families benefitted were 93,183 and the sum spent for the purpose was INR 1332.8 million (Ray, 2015: 191). Tripura’s records in implementation of the MNREGA (100 days rural employment guarantee) place it at the very top scorer in the country. The literacy rate among the Scheduled Tribes in Tripura has increased manifold (from only 23.07% in 1981 to 56.50% in 2011) although this is far behind the high level of general literacy in the State (87.75%, all India being 74.03%). (Economic Survey, Government of Tripura 2013–14). The tribal population in the State began to increase from 1981. The decadal growth was 8–53% in 1991 over 1981, 9.93% in 2001 over 1991 and 11.66% in 2011 over 2001 (Economic Survey 2013–14, 307, Government of Tripura) (Table 9.7). The ADC has appeared to be an effective institutional safeguard to the identity of the tribals. What the state government of Tripura could not do, the ADC did it. Within the first rather shorter term of its existence, the ADC restored some 2, 946 acres of tribal land to some 3,006 tribal families. The other kinds of benefit the tribals received included scholarship to tribal students in hotels (number was 230,585); pre-Madhyamik scholarship; Madhyamaik and post-Madhyamik scholarship; provisions for special coaching to tribal girl students; coaching for drop-out tribal students (26,059); supply of books free of costs to the tribal students (1,321,745); Table 9.7 Governmental Performances in Implementation of MNREGA (2006–07 to 2014–15)

Year 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–03 2013–14 2014–15

Job seekers

Job received

Percentage

75,067 425,299 549,145 577,540 557,413 567,129 597,437 605,187 595,862

75,067 423,724 549,022 576,487 557,055 566,793 596,530 599,531 571,111

100 99.63 99.82 99.82 99.94 99.94 99.85 99.00 97.48

Source Ray 2015: 289

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support to form Self-Help Groups among the tribals (1502 formed till 2014); 34 Tribal Rest House constructed; 17,320 tribal families have been trained and helped to engage in rubber plantation; and so on. (Ray 2015: 188–89) The Government of Tripura recognized Kok-Borok as the second official language of the State way back on 19 January 1979, and 19 January is observed every year as the Koko-Borokday.The ADC’s Language Cell (for all round cultivation of Kok-Borok language) had INR 22 lakh as its annual plan budget for 2011–12. (ADC 2010–11: 18).

Implications for Governance To the State’s Marxists’ rulers (till 2018), the ADC symbolized a reconciliation of class and tribal ethnicity, a fulfilment of a long standing aim of the democratic movement in the State. The ADC in Tripura is a sign that the force of tribal nationalism is recognized in the state, and ‘not merely a second-order derivation of capitalism reducible in the last instance to economic distortion of true class consciousness. ‘ For our purpose, the ADC represents a case of sub-State federal asymmetry, a major territorial institutional innovation and measure for the accommodation of identity, and the management of ethnic conflicts. The tribal elites (elected officials at the ADC) as well non-elected GMP leaders interviewed in May-December 2015 recognized in interviews the (developmental) role of the ADC plus the determined political intervention by the GMP and the CPI-M to politically neutralize insurgency in the State. To be sure, the ADC was not an elite imposed device on the tribals, but a result of the institutional resource at the above combined with the popular political pressures from below for the establishment of such a decentralized political unit of tribal self-governance. The Tripura State government had had to delegate and part with a lot of powers with the ADC (08 Department were transferred), but then that helped in containing secessionism in Tripura, to a great extent. The State government has also shared the revenues with the ADC to a large extent. The ADC’s own taxes bases are very limited so it is heavily dependent on funding by the State government as well as the Union Finance Commission which makes the resources available through State Plans to the ADC. One must not, however, come to the conclusion that the ADC offered all the answers to the tribals’ overriding need for protecting their identity and their well-being in Tripura. The ADC had problems, both structural and operational, to ensure what was termed ‘meaningful

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autonomy‘. As an institutional measure to supplement the ADC in its drive for ‘meaningful autonomy‘, the Tripura State Assembly passed the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District (TTAAD) (Establishment of Village Committee) Act, 1994 that provide for the formation of the Village Committees (VC) in the ADC areas as a step towards real, meaningful decentralization of power. The survey report by the author (2013 & 2014–15) on the ADC showed that all tribal communities have been represented in the ADC; there is satisfaction over the role of the ADC in regard to the protection of tribal identity.12 Despite the fact the ADC is a success story in Tripura, sub-state level power-sharing and identity accommodation; there are areas of dissatisfaction, negative assessment, and the evident lack of knowledge of the actual work done by the ADC for the last five years (2005–10, and 2010–15). However, the negative side of the story must not be blown out of proportions. The regularity of holding elections at the interval of five years in a free multi-party competition has meant that institutionalization of the self-governing body in the tribal-dominated areas of the state has taken place. The democratization even within ADC decisional process is not doubted by the INPT, the arch enemy of the CPI-M/GMP:’…apparently all decision are taken on the floor of the ADC, the implementation of such decision depends ultimately on the will of the state government….’. (An INPT leader Interviewed in Agartala on 10.9.11) Given the fact that the ADC funds from the Centre come via the state government, the latter naturally has a hand. But what is intriguing is the relatively higher cost of financing such government (the ADC establishment). Of the knowledge and awareness of the Schedule that governed the ADC, 12 out of 15 leaders/elected official of the ADC responded positive, only 03 negative. No less the persons than the civil servants associated with the ADC admitted at the rate of 89% (9 out of 10 interviewed) that more than 80% of ADC money goes to pay for the establishment—the cost of running the government at the ADC—leaving little for actual development works. But then, as Max Weber reminded us long back, more democracy results in more bureaucracy, inevitability and irony in a democracy. 9 out of 15 leaders/elected official of the ADC was found to be aware of the ongoing activities of the ADC. 6 had negative response. How effective was the ADC in protecting tribal identity? 14 out of 15 responded ‘positive’. 11 out of 15 could identify some concrete activities of the ADC over the last five years.

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Be that as it may, the ADC experiment in Tripura has not failed unlike its neighbours; it has enabled the tribal folks of Tripura in the art of governance, to take part in debates in their own language (Kok-Borok) on the floor of the Council, and thrash out the vital issue such as land, rubber plantation, and schooling for the tribal children and so on. There is no doubt that the idea of self-government has been implemented in Tripura in the tribal inhabited areas under the jurisdiction of the ADC. The ADC in Tripura has proved that democracy can also be self-government. The next chapter will consider all the three States together and move in the direction of distilling the specific findings into more general conjectures.

Limitations And yet, the ADC’s achievements, despite the best intention of the State government and the ADC administration, are overshadowed by the limitations that are often beyond their control. Over the years since the formation of the ADC, one does not hear of the misuse, or under-utilization of funds and the audit reports have mostly been above many remarks. The ADC’s limitations are party environmental (difficult geographical terrain and limited resources available) and partly structural, which are detailed below. The ADC’s financial sources are diverse but they are nearly 100% external. The territorial jurisdiction of the ADC being 68% of the total geographical terrain of the State falls mostly on the eastern half of the State covering four districts of Tripura and is hilly with limited land available for settle cultivation.13 The area is inhabited mostly by the tribes, which are otherwise 31% of the total population of the State. The 18 tribes that constitute the tribal population of the State mostly survive on jhum cultivation, and more backward in terms of HDI. As the ADC in its Memorandum to the 13th Finance Commission itself admitted: The percentage of people living below the poverty line in Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) is much higher than that of the State average of approximately 55%. The economic condition of the people living in the ADC areas (primarily tribal population) is quite poor and most of the people are dependent upon subsistence agriculture based on jhuming. Majority of the villages in the ADC areas suffer on account of poor communication network resulting in poor education and health infrastructure. Since the areas included in the Council is very backward and

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underdeveloped, it requires the mobilization of large resources to promote the economic upliftment of the people residing in the area. (Memorandum, p. 2) (http://www.ttaadc.nic.in/13thfinane.pdf) (accessed on 29. 12. 20).

From the Memorandum submitted by the ADC administration to the 14th Finance Commission it is seen that during 2012–13 the ADC’s own resource of the total money accounted for only 0.60%: Annual Plan grants 90 crores; Share of taxes 35 crores; Other receipts 25.8 crores; Transfer fund 154.2 crores out of the total sum of 307.8 crores (THDR 2018, Table 9.5). Resource mobilizations from such area and from such peoples are inherently limited in nature. From the various official sources it is found that the (Union) Finance Commission is an important source of finance of the ADC. For example, the 13th Union Finance Commission (2010– 15) recommended a sum of Rupees 12.67 crores for the TTADC for the construction of four Zonal Offices (INR 5 crores), development of Kokborok language and culture (INR 2.5 crores) and provision of drinking water facility (as a special grant) of INR 5.17 crores. (http://www.tta adc.nic.in/13thfinane.pdf (accessed on 29. 12. 19). However, the same Commission recommended for transfer of a sum of INR 369.80 crores to Tripura under ‘local bodies’, which include items overlapping with the activities of the ADC. (http://11planningcommision.nic.in/plans/ fnres/grants12th13th.xls (accessed on 29. 12. 20)14 The following table gives details of the diverse sources of the ADC fund (Table 9.8). Table 9.8 Sources of ADC Fund (ADC budget estimate 2012–13) Sources a. Plan Fund b. Share of Taxes c. Transferred Fund d. 13th Union Finance Commission Award* e. Market licences and other revenue receipts f. Miscellaneous Total =

Sum in Rs in ‘000 thousands

Percentage of the total

14,260.61 4870.25 12,811.40 1267.00

43 0.15 38.26 3.79

228.55

0.68

45 33,482.81

0.0013

Source ADC Budget 2012–13, p. 2. * The 13th Union Finance Commission award during 2011–12 was Rs. 1396.00 (INR/lakh) (ADC Budget 2012–13), p. 4)

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In the more recent times, (2020–21), the following are the sources of the ADC funds: 12% from the Finance Commission; Transfer fund = 31% (from the Consolidated Fund of the State); Excluded Areas grant (from the Centre) 13%; Plan grant 28%; shared taxes revenues = 15%; and revenue money (ADC’s own) = 1%. Of the above sources of fund of the ADC, the ADC’s own fund, that is, ‘share of taxes’ (non-plan) is only a meagre sum of Rupees 4870.25 lakh, which is about 0 0.15% of the total budget of the ADC. The sum under heading e (Rs. 228.55 lakh) (I lakh = 100, 000) may also be considered as the ADC’s resources. But that comes down to only 0 0.68%. This is somewhat inevitable because one does not know how and from what sources can the ADC mobilize resources in the areas in which there is, in the words of the ADC itself, ‘high incidence of poverty’. (Memorandum, p. 5) In short, the ADC is over-dependent upon the State government on finances without whose support the selfgovernment for the tribes in the ADC becomes superfluous. The latter pools resources from various Departments and Ministries such as Tribal Welfare, Fisheries, and Animal Husbandry and juxtaposes that with the resources of the ADC for carrying out various developmental activities in the ADC areas. It is also admitted in the ADC document (Memorandum to the 13th Finance Commission) that the Government of Tripura had transferred the following subject, as per 6th Schedule of the Constitution, to the ADC: primary education, social education, Markets, Rural Industries, Village Roads, 527 Village Committees, Minor Irrigation and Agriculture. However, from the different portfolio allocation among the 8-member Executive Council of the Council it is seen that such departments as science and technology, cooperation, sports and youth welfare, finance, general administration, Public Works, tribal welfare, land records and settlement, tourism and culture are now under the purview of the ADC [Tathyapanji o nirdenshika (in Bengali) (Facts and Directory), 2011 (Agartala: Tripura Darpan, 2011, 113)]. It is found out further from the ADC’s Annual Account of Expenditure submitted to the Auditor-General, Government of Tripura for the year 2020–21 that 59% its money is spend on ‘direction and administration’; 3% on pension, and 38% on development. The ADC is not only dependent upon the Union government for funding, but substantially on the State government too. Of the total transfer from the State, the following is the break up: land revenue = 40%; professional tax = 25%; Agricultural income tax = 50%; forest revenue = 75%; gas royalty = 30%

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and motor vehicle tax = 25% (http://ttaadc.gov.in/sites/default/files/ Budget_estimates_2020-21.PDF) (accessed on 29. 10. 21).

Governmental Cost of Self-Government: ADC in Tripura It is a perennial dilemma for the advocates of self-government, and that too, identity-based ones, that while a new governmental set up is demanded at a lower tier, the same also eats up significantly the resources in terms of the establishment cost, or the cost titled ‘direction and administration’. One might call it bureaucratic cost, which, following Max Weber is unavoidable in a mass democracy. Weber would in fact argue that more democracy we have, more bureaucracy we have too because democratization inevitably results in further bureaucratization. They are, as it were, intertwined with each other. Keeping those conceptual issues in mind, we will now look at the cost of administering self-government by way of the ADC. As per the statistics offered by the ADC authorities in its Memorandum to the 13th Finance Commission, mentioned above, the ADC has appointed some 635 officers of different categories (p. 3). The ADC’s own staff including those officers are 5494 out of which 3292 (60%) are tribal and the rest (2202) are non-tribal (40%) (Source: Samiran Roy, Editor, Tripura Darpan, Agartala dated 4.1. 13 over telephone) are of General and SC categories, the proportion being fair given that the tribal do not constitute cent% of the population in the ADC areas, but about 80%. Their educational attainment of the tribals, particularly with respect to the post of officers is also to be considered relative to other communities. However, as per the proposal of the ADC to the 13th Union Finance Commission, some 11, 178 posts are lying vacant to be filled up for the overall development of the tribal areas. (Memorandum, p. 6) If those posts are filled up, it will means of course some employment for the tribals too, but also add to the bureaucratic expenditure for the ADC. Added to that are some 325 staff members deputed from the State Government whose salaries etc. are paid out of the transferred fund in the ADC budget. Even if the vacant posts are not filled up, for the moment, the ADC then has already got a huge bureaucratic apparatus, which has entailed a large budgetary sum to meet up their salary and other benefits. In sum, some 62% money is to be spent for ensuring development at the rate of 38%. As per the 15th

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Finance Commission recommendations, it is seen that while the Commission provided for 12% of the resources for the ADC, the other sources of money are as follows: transferred fund from the State government of 13%; excluded areas grants 28%; share tax revenues 15% and its own revenue is only 1%. However, in terms of district wise ranking in HDI, Dhalai, which contains most of the population in the ADC areas, achieved the composite lowest rank of 8 while West Tripura district has got 1 (THDR 2018, 206). West Tripura district is a fertile land with alluvial soil adjacent to Bangladesh, and where the (settler) Bengalis live.

Conclusion The ADC is a relative success story in federal asymmetry in India—the sub-State level institutional arrangements for the Hill Tribes in India’s North-East that over the years since 1985 has continuously differentiated and institutionalized with the regularity of elections and further decentralization within the ADC in respect of forming by elections the Village Committees. As a result, a relatively large administrative structure has evolved in response to various activities to be undertaken. Multifarious empowerment and developmental works have paved the basis of more education, health care, road and communication and so on. The THDR 2018 has recorded much of this. Crores (10 million) of Indian rupees have been allocated to the ADC by the Finance Commission, the Central government (under various schemes) and the State government for infrastructural development as well as empowerment. The ADC’s own resource is very negible. The ADC has come out as an effective agency to carry out works for the State and Central governments as well as for itself. The most important point is that the tribals in the ADC have to self-govern, theoretically speaking. In practice though there is already much of a bureaucratic administrative structure so that 62% of its money is spent on administration, and 39% for development. In fine, tribal self-government in this respect comes with a huge price tag. Since the ADC has to work in association with the State government on which it is dependent, financially, and the Finance Commission and the Union government, latter for development and empowerment projects, it is closely linked up with them, and has to function as the lowest tier in India’s federal governance. For long, the tribals’ identity issue was organically linked with the land question—restoration of illegally transferred land to the tribals—but in the course of time, with the growing grip of

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the settlers Bengalis over administration and the political parties, the tribal identity issue, at least for the State’s Marxists, has been delinked from the land question, and linked mostly to offering them state welfare benefits from development and empowerment schemes mostly of the Union government.

Notes 1. The growth of the GMP as a tribal nationalist movement and its subsequent subjugation to the authority of the Communist party since the early 1950s has been dealt with at greater length in Bhattacharyya, Harihar 1999, especially pp. 90–126. There it is examined in greater detail how the GMP first articulated the tribal identity issues in a militant mass mobilization against the state power. 2. There is evidence, however, to suggest that the now defunct TUJS (b. 1967) (re-christened NLPT, also demanded such a Council under the 6th Schedule from its birth on although it sought a much more radical solution, with strong elements of secessionism. 3. For further details, see Bhattacharyya (2018); and Mitra and Bhattacharyya (2018). 4. Oriental Times, Vol.2, No. 4, 47–48, 200 (http://www.nenanews. com/ot%20may%2022-%20june6,%2000/oh3.htm (accessed on 5.1.13); See, also ‘Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 30, July 28, 1990, 1627–29. 5. ‘Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 30 (July 28, 1990), p. 1627. 6. In the total tribal population of Tripura, they are about 55% (2001), followed by the Reangs (16.6%); Jamatias (7.5%); Chakmas (6.5%); Halams (4.5%); Mog (3.1%); Munda (1.2%), Any Kukti (1.2%); and Garo (1.1%)––these together comprise about 97% of the tribes in Tripyra. For details on the interviews, see Miutra and Bhattacharyya 2018: 266–67. 7. Chakrabarty, S. 2000 ‘Identity, Autonomy and Development: A Study of Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (Calcutta: Ekushe) made an assessment of the ADC up to 2000. 8. The Village Committee Act 1994 passed by the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council, which has received the assent of the Governor on 28–04-94. This Act has been enacted with the objective to Establish and develop Local Self Government and to make better provisions for administration of Village into well –developed and sufficient unit. The Village Committee means a Committee constituted Accordance with the provision of paragraph 3(1)(e) of the Sixth Schedule to the constitution of India and this Act. The relevant Rules were made in 2006. The

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9. 10.

11. 12.

13.

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Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Village Committee (Election of office bearers) Rules 2006. See note 5 above. However, it must be pointed out that although the Left Front won 3 more seats in 2010 over 2005 election in the ADC itself, and the INC and the NPT drew a blank in 2010, the Left Front’s share of popular votes shrank by about 8% over its performance in 2005. Significantly, there was also a huge rise in popular voting percentage from 2005: 67.19% in 2005 to 81.84% in 2010. While the votes for the tribal party (INPT) remained more or less stable around 12%, the Left Front’s loss of this 8% votes went over to INC (The State Election Commission, Tripura). Sarkar, M. 2010 ‘ADC jati-upajati maitri bandhan’ Tripura Darpan, February 2010. (in Bengali). The two surveys were conducted by the authors and his assistants under funding from two agencies: Indian Council for Social Science Research, New Delhi and the International Leverhulme Trust, UK during 201-1417. Harinath Devbarma, a former member of the TTAADC, brought to our attention another constraint to resource mobilization by the ADC. He says that the ADC areas comprise mostly hills and forests in Tripura, the forests are declining by the day and also that the ADC does not have any authority over the Reserved Forests, the ADC’s capacity to raise more resources is further limited. For further details, see his ‘Amendment of the Sixth Schedule in the light of the Problems faced by the Autonomous District Councils’ in Gassah, L. S. ed. The Autonomous District Councils (New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1997), pp. 338–39. As per recommendations of the 13th Finance Commission of India (2010– 15), the grants under ‘local bodies’ are also to be treated under Article 275 of the Constitution.

References Bhattacharyya, H., and T.J. Nossiter. 1988. Communism in a Micro-State: Tripura and the Nationalities Question. In Marxist State Governments in India, ed. T.J. Nossiter. London: Pinters. Bhattacharyya, H. 1999. Communism in Tripura. Delhi: Ajanta Books International. ———. 2018. Radical Politics and Governance in India’s North East: The Case of Tripura. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. Blondel, J. 2006. About Institutions, Mainly, But Not Exclusively, Political. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, ed. R.A.W. Rhodes, et al., 716– 31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Hamkraini Yakhili (Indicatives of the ADC) (Khumulwng: TTAADC) 2010. Malhotra, R. 2014. India Public Policy Report. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Orinetal Times, Agartala 22 May 2000. Tripura Human Development Report 2007. https://planning.tripura.gov.in/ hdr. Sighted on 12 March 2022. Tripura Human Development Report 2018. https://planning.tripura.gov. in/sites/default/files/Draft%20Tripura%20Human%20Development%20R eport%20%28THDR%29%20-%20II%2010%20April%202018.compressed.pdf. Sighted on 22 March 2022. Tripura Human Development Report 2019. Tripura Darpan (Mirror of Tripura) in Bengali. 2011. Published by Tripura Darpan Press, Agartala (Tripura). Ray, S. ed. 2015 & 2011. Tathya Panji (in Bengali), Agartala: Tripura Darpan.

CHAPTER 10

Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts in Assam

Introduction As I have been arguing in this book, institutions grow out of social and cultural cleavages and also operate in the context, if so done by the political actors. The cleavage-based social surrounding may not facilitate institutional functioning if there is a misfit between the institutional design, on the one hand, and social and cultural cleavages. In the case of Tripura, as we have seen the extent of cleavages within the jurisdiction of the TTADC is minimal that about 97% belongs to the tribes. The BTC has not been as lucky. Unlike Tripura, the political recognition of the plain tribes in Assam in the form of a territorial authority for ‘homeland’ remains very complex and plagued by many factors, which are apparently beyond the control of the Bodos and those on the other side of the fence. The decision to form the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) in 1993 under the State government, and then the Bodoland Territorial Council in 2003 under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution was preceded by large scale and persistent violence by different groups of the Bodo militants, such as the Bodoland Liberation Tigers, the Bodo Volunteers Force, Bodo Security Force, the National Democratic Force of Bodoland and the counter-violence by a plethora of organizations of the non-Bodos. This aspect has received some scholarly attention (Baruah 2005; Bhaumik 2009; Mishra 2012; Pathak 2012; Mohanta 2013; Talukdar 2020; Swargiary 2020; Sharma 2017; Chakladar 2004; Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_10

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2017, 2019). The reason the Bodoland issue has attracted so much attention is because of the ethnic political violence which apparently does not see any end. The BTC was formed in 2003 but spiraling political violence has remained a hurdle to normal governmental functioning. With the relative loss of political space of the BLF in the electoral competition within the BTC, and a rival group taking most of its space under a coalition led by the BJP (which is actually a small partner) in 2020, the grounds for further conflicts seem inevitable. In this chapter, I seek to make three arguments. First, political stability or governmental stability is a major factor why representative institutions work sometimes in matters of maintaining law and order and delivering social and economic goods. Second, persistent violence of one ethnic community over the others fails any government to be effective, especially when it is a conflict between a ruling minority and the vast majority that is ruled. Third, defective institutional design is foreordained to fail.

A Short Trajectory of Bodoland Movement The Bodos are a minority in the population of Assam, and the so-called plain tribesmen with a concentration in four districts of Assam on the Northern bank of the river Brahmaputra. Beyond those four districts, the Bodos are spread over the State. Very significantly, the Bodos in the four districts, namely Kokrajhar, Chirang, Udalguri and Baksa, are also a minority in population (in each district) of about 30%, the rest of the population being the non-Bodos such as the Bengali and Assamese Hindus, the Bengali Muslims, the Santhals and Sarnias. The Santhals elsewhere in India are categories as Scheduled Tribes, but not in Assam. The political recognition of the Bodos first in 1993 and then 2003 was a radical departure in Indian state and nation-building and asymmetric federalism too. This was for three reasons. First, this was for the first time that the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution was extended to the Plain Tribes, which was contrary to the original intention of the Schedule. Second, self-government was conceded to the Bodos in areas where they are a minority in population. Third, as connected to the above: a demographic minority was made a political majority in reserving 30 out of 46 seats in the Council, which was very discriminatory to the majority of non-Bodos in the same areas, and anti-democratic. No wonder, the BAC/BTC resolved few problems but created more for the Bodos as well as the non-Bodos. A separate State of Bodoland outside Assam has

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not been conceded to, but the experience of the BAC/BTC is a proof of when ethnic self-rule exacerbates exclusion and persistent violence. The Bodoland movement1 has received much scholarly attention, as we have mentioned above. Although the aspiration of the Bodos for recognition goes back to the days of the Simon Commission (1928) when the Kachari Yubak Sammelon submitted in 1927 a memorandum to the Commission for ‘independent identity’, and separate Kachari Regiment (Majumdar and Singh 1997: 179) the real beginning of the movement was made in the 1950s. In early 1947, the Assam Tribal League submitted a memorandum to the Constituent Assembly to include the plain tribals under the 5th Schedule of the Constitution for their self-government for socio-economic development, but of no avail (Chakladar 2004: 53). Very broadly, the Bodo movement in Assam could be said to have passed through three phases: cultural (1947–1967); cultural–political (1967–1990); and political and violent from the late 1980s. We are aware that when an aggrieved ethnic community fights for its identity, language and culture, and against manifold discrimination, its movement is political by nature. But in the very specific sense the Bodos’ demand in the first phase was not associated with the territory demand or self-rule demand. The Bodos had long been suffering due to large scale and persistent land alienation (see Chapter 6), attempts of assimilation and deprivation particularly due to the neglect of their language, and imposition of the Assamese on them. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha as a counter to the Ahom Sahitya Sabha was formed in 1952 in order to harp on the above, and therefore to share in political power. The Ahom Sahitya Sabha urged upon the government to declare Assamese as the official language in the State which was so done in 1960 under the Official Language Act 1960 (23 October). This was taken by the Bodos as an attempt to assimilate them and synonymous with the death of their language. For long, their movement was peaceful and followed the constitutional methods of protest, demonstration and submission of memoranda to different authorities in Assam. Historically speaking, the Bodo question, the question of their protection in land, language and culture was not taken up seriously by the Constituent Assembly (of India) which preferred to leave the matter to the State Government’s minority affairs department or committee. Their question was neglected by the States Reorganization Commission (1953– 1955) too. The PTCA (formed on 27 February 1967) as the political organization of the plain tribes demanded the creation of Udayachal, a Union Territory and homeland of plains tribal in the north bank of

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the river Brahmaputra. This demand was made in the wake of the news of the States Reorganization in the North-East, which would take place in 1972 as per the North Eastern States Reorganization Act 1971. It also demanded an extension of the provisions of Sixth Schedule in the northern bank of Brahmaputra. One of the PCTA’s memorandums highlighted the following demands: political self-government or autonomy; control over land and other resources; preservation of their language, culture, stop assimilation, ethnocide etc. (Singh Committee 1991)2 . It also pointed out the ‘ineffectiveness of the so-called Tribal Advisory Council and the Assam Tribal Development Authority’ (Singh Committee 1991). In the wake of reorganization of Assam and the subsequent creation of tribal States of Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya, the erstwhile cultural demand gave way to the demand for the creation of an Autonomous Region and the formation of Udayachal by the Plains Tribal Council of Assam. It was during this period that the Bodo movement witnessed a change of guards with the leadership passing off to the dynamic All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) which shed off the earlier democratic tactics and adopted a militant strategy to pursue the goal of a separate state of Bodoland and conferment of the Sixth Schedule status on the BodoKacharis of Karbi Anglong. The subsequent years saw Assam rocked in bandhs, roads and rail blockades, assassinations, kidnapping, abduction and inhuman violence including ethnic cleansing. In May 1996 about 100 people died in ethnic clashes between the Bodos and the Santhal; 30 persons were killed in August 1996 (Chakladar 2004: 63). Till the 1990s the Bodo organizations resorted to selective violence to get their due share of power in the political process. After many informal talks with the government authorizes (State and Union), the Bodos were brought to the table to sign an ethnic peace accord in 1993 (details below) to form an autonomous council to be called Bodoland Autonomous Council. Such a council was formed by elections. However, the 1993 accord failed to satisfy them and the next couple of years saw a militant bloodbath by the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Bodoland Liberation Tigers (BLT) which saw the failure of conventional associations and groups to wrest power exclusively for the Bodos and the changing demography of the region wherein the ethnic rulers (Bodos) were being transformed into a minority group in relation to the Adivasis, Mishings, Rabhas and the immigrant Muslims. The

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new leadership believing in only militant methods restarted the movement for an exclusive Bodo ‘homeland’3 and resorted to ethnic cleansing. Because of the region’s changing demography, persistent Bodo homeland demand and organized discrimination against the non-Bodos, a number of non-Bodo organizations have started agitational programmers. Mention may be made of the Sanmilita Janagoshthiyo Oikya Mancha, a united forum of 21 organizations, who are demanding a Scheduled Tribes status for the Koch-Rajbongshis and the Adivasis which the Bodo leadership was in no mood to relent. While demanding a White paper on the situation created by the Bodo movement, the organization was pressurizing the Union Government to review the BTC accord and to apply an amended Sixth Schedule to the Constitution to them. This was so done following the Second Bodo Accord in 2003 (details below) by the minority NDA Union government then headed by the BJP. This was highly resented by the non-Bodos who became apprehensive about their constitutional rights and feared exclusion by the Bodos from their habitat in the Bodoland areas (Interview 9 August 2014, Editor, Muslim Mirror). The non-Bodos have also mobilized themselves and intensified their struggle by launching another organization Oboro Suraksha Samiti (ABSS: Non-Bodo Protection Forum). The main demand of the Oboro Suraksha Samiti was the decision to exclude 64 non-Bodo-dominated villages from Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD). The Samiti has actively contested the BTC elections (April 2015) and drawn up the poll manifesto comprising 17 points, which includes steps to foil any bid for further extension of BTAD areas; curtailing of non-Bodo majority villages from BTAD through review of BTC Accord; to oppose and check the transfer of Home and Finance departments to the BTAD; to accord recognition of ST status to the Koch-Rajbongshis, Adivasis, TaiAhoms, Morans, Motoks etc.; seizure of illegal arms in BTAD; to keep the surrendered NDFB cadres in the designated camps under the vigilance of the Army; stringent steps against corruption, extortion, violence and killing; Government employment to educated unemployed youths; to make provision of constituency reservation on the basis of ethnic population pattern; to resolve the problem of issuing caste certificate to the Sarania community; to resolve the problem of teachers in BTAD, appointed in 1999, and to foil the conspiracy of further division of Assam etc. It can, thus, hardly be denied that the electoral fray is no longer confined to the Bodo political parties but non-Bodo organizations are equally competing to represent themselves in the Territorial Council.

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And yet, such cases of success or failure are not as significant as the larger and deeper issues involved: representation, redistribution, political discrimination by the majority over the minority, or of the ruling minority over the majority. Second, the majoritarian principle of representation (via the electoral system of first past the post) and rule as the only institutional arrangement available in Indian democracy hardly match the multicultural mosaic of the country at all levels.4 There is also the fundamental question of what defines the ‘homeland’. Are homelands, as demanded by an ethnic majority or minority as distinct and clear with their clear-cut geographical boundary as proclaimed by the ethnic rebels? Baruah (2005, 2009) has raised new questions about the basis of this homeland demand, historically speaking. Third, is the ethnic identity at stake as homogenous as claimed by the ethnic rebels? The fact of the matter is that in the Indian context, no ethnic identity is homogeneously divided as they are by caste and class, religion, community, tribes and sub-tribes. Often such sub-divisions have given birth to rival political agencies to articulate demands contrary to those of the dominant group. This creates a lot of anxiety and desperation on the part of the dominant group which engages itself in violent action as a means of achieving some territorial authority as the authentic representative of the ethnic group (s).

The Case of Bodoland: Whose Homeland? What is Bodoland? Whose land is it? Who are the Bodos/Boros? Today the Bodos are the Plain Tribes of Assam comprising 13.73% of the total population of Assam (2001) and about 32% (2001) in the BTC area. The Bodos are not a homogeneous community linguistically speaking; there were as many as 18 branches of the language such as Kachari, Meech, Dimasa, Koch, Garo, Tripuris, Reangs, Jamatia and Rabha (Chakladar 2004: 34–35).5 No wonder, Gait (1905: 3) considered the Bodos as a ‘complex tribes’.6 But as it happens in ethnic self-definition, those sub-groups are not recognized as the Bodo today by the leaders of the Bodoland. Their self-definition of the community is exclusive. In their Memorandum to the Government of Assam in 1987, the Bodo leaders were found to be defensive. In the Memorandum it was stated: ‘Boro includes only the purely Boro speaking people …but the term Bodo refers to all Kachari or Bodo groups of people’.7 That is to say, the Bodos are claimed as an ethnic group rooted in Assam. It has been observed that the Bodos are known in different parts of North-East India and

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West Bengal (northern districts) by different names. They are the original autochthonous tribe in Assam, and their racial stock is of the ‘Great Mongoloid’, and their language belongs to Assam-Burmese (a sub-family of the Tibeto-Burman. There are historical references of their antiquity, as recorded in books on the history of Assam (e.g. Gait 1905) which suggest that the Bodo had once established kingdoms in large parts of what is Assam today and even in Northern Bengal. They had what then was known as the Kachari (Bodo) kingdom on the south bank of the river Brahmaputra; the Ahom (Assamese) had come to the region only in the thirteenth century. No wonder, this got reflected in the rhetoric of national self-determination in the passages of the Memorandum (1987): The Bodos established a big kingdom covering the entire Assam and North Bengal (now part of West Bengal). They subjected many tribes and imposed their language and culture upon them. The accultured tribes retained their original group names (quoted in Chakladar 2004: 35). The Bdos also got it recorded in the ethnic peace accords signed with the governments (Assam and India) in 1993 and 2003 as well as in the Acts passed subsequently and published in the Gazettes.8 The 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution was amended in 2003 by the Indian Parliament (w.e.f. 7.9.2003) in order to insert provision for the Bodoland Territorial Council in the text of the Constitution itself.9

Bodo Ethnic Peace Accords for Power-Sharing and Legitimacy The Nagas set the trend way back in 1947 when the Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord was signed on 26–28 June 1947 at Kohima between the Government of India and the 10 Naga groups. In the wake of Naga’s resistance to join the Indian Union in view of the impending transfer of power from the British to India, this accord was path-breaking in negotiating for ethnic peace and accommodation of ethnic diversity. This accord asserts the right of the Nagas to develop themselves according to their customs and laws; the Naga autonomy is preserved at all costs and all the Nagainhabited areas in other areas in the region to be transferred back to the Nagas etc. (Datta 1995: 153–54). More such accords with the Nagas have since been signed although it remains a big question if the so-called Nagalim demand can be met without disturbing India’s commitment to multiculturalism.

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Such ethnic peace accords have since been signed, bipartite or tripartite, for the Bodos, the Mizos, TNVs (Tripur) as well as for the majority Assamese (represented by the All Assam Students’ Union later converted into the AGP in 1985 as a political party and took part in elections and formed the first AGP government in the State) that did not involve always the issue of territorial power-sharing (Datta 1995). So far three Bodo Peace Accords have been signed. The first two were signed one each in 1993 and 2003 to define the terms of power-sharing and the institutional arrangements to do so. The second one in particular was more important in that the tribal self-rule here was placed under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution that is more empowering than that of the former (1993) that provided for self-rule under the State government. In the first accord which was signed on 20 February 1993 between the Government of Assam (the Union Home Minister was present) and Bodo leaders (All Bodo Students’ Union and Bodo People’s Action Committee) provided for constituting a 40-member Bodoland Autonomous Council with detailed provisions for power-sharing for the sake of autonomy and ethnic self-determination and ‘homeland’; the BAC was conceived as territorial authority under the State government which meant among other things that it will be governed by State laws. The proposed BAC to be elected shall have 40 members out which 30 shall be reserved for the Bodos, and the rest for the non-Bodos (5 for the non-Bodos and 5 to be nominated by the State Governor). The special provisions were also made for the BAC to protect the religious and social practices of the Bodos; the Bodo customary laws and procedures; and ownership and transfer of land within the BAC areas (Datta 1995: 43). However, it was also mentioned that the BAC would govern the areas keeping in mind the ‘demographic complexion of the areas within its jurisdiction’ (Datta 1995: 43) in which a reference is made to the question of the majority non-Bodos living in the BAC areas. The second Bodo Ethnic Accord was signed on 10 February 2003 (after many rounds of negotiations, cease-fires and violence)10 in New Delhi between the Government of India, the Government of Assam and the Bodo militant group called BLT. This accord replaced the BAC by the BTC and provided for a two-tier governance structure: General Council of 46 members out of which 30 are reserved for the (Scheduled Tribes) (read Bodos), 5 for the non-Bodos, 5 are open to all to compete and 6 are to be nominated (including 2 women) by the State Governor. There shall be an Executive Council consisting of 12 members one of which will

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be the Chief and one the Deputy Chief. The Council shall have legislative, administrative and financial powers on as per provisions of the 6th Schedule. The Bodo language was also declared to be the official language of the BTC (Chakladar 2004: 72–73). The third accord called the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 27 January 2020 with different factions of the NDFB, and the ABSU centred on ‘increasing the powers of the BTC; to promote and to streamline its functioning; resolved issues relating to Bodo people outside the BTADs’. The agreement also promised ‘to promote and protect Bodo’s social, cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities; provide legislative protection for the land rights of tribals; ensure quick development of tribal areas and rehabilitate members of NDFB factions’. More vitally, the accord also committed itself to resolve the pending issues of the inclusion of villages with Bodo majority, but contiguous to the BTADs and exclusion of villages without Bodo majority from the BTADs. Among others, the Bodo language was declared to be considered as an associate language in Assam, and a fund of some 1599 crores was earmarked for the development of the language, and the schools to be set up for the Bodo medium etc. (PIB, Government of India 2021). The above promises are to be understood in conjunction with the fact that the BJP is now in government not only at the State level but also in the BTC in the last elections held on 7 and 10 December-—the first time since 2005 that the Bodo People’s Front lost control over the BTC.

From BAC to BTC: Half-Hearted Institutionalization An ethnic peace accord followed by a legislation and formation by a free multi-party competitive election a designated body has more or less worked in most cases in North-East India. This, however, did not happen in the case of the BAC. After the first ethnic peace accord (1993), the State government passed the required Act in May 1993, but elections to constitute the BAC did not take place. The State government handed over authority to the Interim Council on 10 June 1993 headed by S K Bwiswmuthiary elections being scheduled for November 1993 (George 1994: 887–88). The Chairman, however, resigned on the grounds of differences with the State government on the unresolved issue of delimitation of the BAC areas. With the BAC being left defunct, the militant leaders of the movement began their violent activities over the issue of

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territory (the villages contiguous to the BAC but to be incorporated in the BAC’s jurisdiction). From September 1993 onwards, the Bodo militants engaged in ethnic cleansing in 515 villages in Kokrajahr and Bongaigaon district in which 19 persons most of them being members of the minority settled community and over 30 thousand fled their homes to take shelter in relief camps (George 1994: 890). This was followed by further violence and more loss of life (George 1994: 890). In George’s estimates, by early 1994, some 70,000 people were displaced and took shelter in relief camps (George 1994: 890).11 This included both the Bodos and non-Bodos. The Bodo violence rocked the State for the whole of the 1990s involving road blocks, blowing off train and railways tracks, ethnic cleansing, inter-ethnic riots and so on. Following the second Bodo accord, the Indian Constitution was amended in 2003 (44 of 2003) (w.e.f. 2.7.2003) with additional powers to make laws with regard to the matters in the Schedule (Bakshi 2017: 425–26). The major structural limitations of the Bodos is their numerical minority in the Bodo areas (Table 10.1). The point is that the Bodos constitute around 31% of the total population in the BTC area and are not in majority in any of the four newly created Bodoland Autonomous Districts (Table 10.1). The rest of the population are non-Bodos, which includes the Asomiya Hindus, Koch-Rajbanshis, Muslims, Bengali Hindus, Adivasis, Nepalis etc. This creates the problem of legitimacy basis for claiming a homeland with 30% plus population in the BTC areas. Thirty out of 46 seats of the Council were reserved for the Bodos—a bizarre norms—which seems very discriminatory and defies any democratic logic. In Assam, the Bodos are 40% of tribes. There are other tribes who are substantial in number (Table 10.2). While the Bodos/Boros claim that the area under the BAC as per Ethnic Peace Accord (1993)12 with the Table 10.1 Bodos in Bodoland areas

Districts

Bodo population

Kokrajhor Baksa Chirag Udaguri

278665 331007 178688 267372

Source Assam Statistical Handbook (2020)

Per cent 31.41 34.84 37.06 32.15

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Government of Assam is their homeland, or for that matter the jurisdiction of the subsequent BTC (2003) under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution as their homeland, the other communities living within the same jurisdiction also claim it as their homeland. The latter together constitute more than 70% of the population in the area. The non-Bodos leaders opined that such a territorial authority with the minority Bodos ruling over the majority non-Bodos should not have been created at all. Consider the following opinion of a leader of Adivasi People’s Army (in ceasefire since 2012) (unattributable): Even after identifying ourselves as a part and parcel of the greater Assamese society, we are seen today as outsiders. This has paved the way for resentment and bitterness in our community…. The simple problem with Bodoland is that the Bodos are a minority in the region. The only way to become majority in a multi-ethnic region like Assam is to systematically carry out ethnic cleansing which the Bodo Militant have been doing for years now. It is sad that ‘there has to be such exclusive demand where so many people have been living peacefully for years…. The demand for Bodoland has alienated all communities in the region. All of us are suffering due to it. We were made to take up arms to counter this demand. We have been living here for so long yet are denied the ST status. We were evicted from our lands in the name of forest acts. Most of the schemes are denied to us. Our social indicators are worst. In such a Table 10.2 Population of Scheduled Tribes in Assam Name of the Scheduled Tribe All STs Boro Miri Mikir (now recognized as Karbi) Rabha Kachari Lalung Dimasa Deori Source Assam Statistical Handbook (2020)

Total population 3,308,570 1,352,771 587,310 353,513 277,517 235,881 170,622 110,976 41,161

Proportion to the total ST population (%) 100 40.9 17.8 10.7 8.4 7.1 5.2 3.4 1.2

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situation we were left to ourselves to defend our rights. (Interview on 12 September 2015 at Dekhiajuli)

Nearly similar resentment has been expressed by the former Tea Tribes (as they are called). Sanjiv Mirdha, former President of Guwahati City Committee and currently a member of the Tea Tribe Welfare Board, believed that the BAC as a compromise short of a separate state of Bodoland has affected inter-community relations ‘very badly’: BAC was formed to end violence. But this never happened. It became a constitutional tool in the hands of Bodo elites to oppress others. Today, the minority Bodo people in the BAC are receiving all benefits, and the nonBodos are living as second-class citizens. It is clear that the BAC has done more harm than good (Interview on 2.9.15 at Guwahati). There are 18 non-Bodo organizations for their rights within the BTC. Arun Jyoti Das, representing the Koch-Rajbansis (founder President of Koch-Rajbansi Research and Development Centre, Guwahati), opined that his tribesmen were ancient and like the Bodos they had also encountered problems of protecting their identity in the face of the dominant Assamese community. In answer to the question ‘How has your community reacted to the demands for Bodoland?’, his answer was very candid: ‘Our community forms a substantial population of the BTAD; therefore, it is quite obvious to be apprehensive about any kind of autonomy to a rival group. At the same time, the demand for a separate state of Bodoland takes areas which fall under the proposed state of Kamtapuri demanded by the Koch-Rajbansi community’ (Interview at Guwahati on 07 September 2015). Sharply commenting on the outcome of Bodoland, he said: ‘All groups are now demanding separate state’. He pointed the direction to ‘continuous killing and rioting’ because, for him, the Bodos can transform themselves into a majority only by ‘ethnic cleansing’. However, quite predictably, the Bodo leaders would defend their case. For instance, Mr. Tridip Daimary (aged about 40) of the Bodo People’s Front (BPF) considered the institutional arrangement of the BTC/BTAD as a means of ‘self-realization’ (read self-determination) of the Bodos. That 30 seats out of 46 are reserved for the minority Bodos does not seem to be undemocratic; it is a case of what he terms ‘preferential right’ for the Bodos which is legitimate for him: ‘Bodoland was carved out to safeguard the rights of the indigenous population of this part of the state’ (Interview dated 9 September 2015, Guwahati).

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The Bodo People’s Front (BPF), the main representative of the Bodo interests, has been controlling the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) since the first election held in 2005 and has also emerged as the largest party in the elections in April 2015, with only one seat short of a simple majority. While elections were held for 40 seats, the BPF won 20 in comparison to 33 it had won in 2010, and the non-Bodo organizations got 18 seats (All-India United Democratic Front = 4, Jangustio Aikyo Mancha=4, People’s Co-ordination for Democratic Right= 7, A-Bodo Surakha Samiti = 3), thus highlighting the emergent dominance of the non-Bodo organizations and a potential threat to Bodo identity (Indian Express 13 April 2015). A comparative study of the 2010 and 2015 BTC elections shows that though the BPF still remains a potent force yet the non-Bodo organizations are gradually gaining strength thus bringing to the fore the declining power of the Bodos in their own homeland. The BPF is an offshoot of the earlier Bodo Liberation Tigers, a ruthless militant outfit which was a party to the Memorandum signed in 2003. While the BPF won without any opposition in the first BTAD elections in 2005 and even in the 2010 BTAD elections, however, in 2015 their dominance stands seriously contended by both non-Bodo and independent candidates who if seen reflects the rising power of a strong non-Bodo opposition, a reality which the BPF can hardly afford to ignore. One of the reasons may be the deeply divisive nature of Bodo organizations and the Bodo electorate is itself divided among the BPF and PCDR. Though the BPF won 20 seats, it polled only 28.5% vote share in these elections. In most seats, the party faced stiff competition from the nonBodo candidates and also from the Peoples Coordination for Democratic Rights (PCDR). PCDR, formed by the All Bodoland Student Union (ABSU), and Bodoland Peoples Progressive Front (BPPF)—in collaboration with the Pro-Talk National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), contested the elections as an independent party. PCDR came out of the Bodo community, as a response to the widespread corruption by the BPF party, and its dictatorship in the governing process. The margin between the winners of the BPF, and the runners-up candidates were very less, the lowest being only 13 votes. The PCDR, which contested as an independent, had snatched seven seats from the BPF.13 The BPF lost further ground in the elections in 2020 (Table 10.1) merging as the single largest party with 17 seats—04 short of a single majority mark—but formed the Council in alliance with the BJP which got 9 seats. But the non-Bodos are more organized and bagged 12 seats in total in 2020 (Tables 10.3).

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Table 10.3 Party-wise results of elections in 2020 (40-member) Parties

Seats contested

Seats won

37 40 13 35 1 2

17 12 9 1 0 1

Bodoland Peoples’ Front United People’s Party (Liberal) Bharatiya Janata Party Gana Surakha Party Asom Gana Parishad Congress

±/ −7 +3 +1 +1

Source: The Hindu dated 13 December 2020

From 2010 (Table 10.4) the Bodos have increasingly lost their bases of support from 31 seats in 2010 to 17 in 2020. The increasing loss of ground of the Bodos was evinced in 2014 Lok Sabha elections when the sole seats from Korajhar so far held by a Bodo candidate were won by a non-Bodo candidate put up by the SJA, a political platform of 20 nonBodos by a high margin of 355778 votes. Naba Sarania won the elections. This was a political possibility that in the unique demographic situation, since the vast majority are the non-Bodos, the latter may get together to defeat and stop the Bodos by following the very democratic norms.

Table 10.4 Seats won by political parties in the BTAD elections (2010 and 2015) Political parties

Seats contested in 2010

Seats won in 2010

BPF INC AIUDF BJP IND CPI(M) AGP

40 23 – 08 40 05 09

31 03 – – 06 0 0

Source Assam State Election Commission 2015

Seats contested in 2015

Seats won in 2015

40 40 08 40 40 07 06

20 0 04 01 15 0 0

Gain/loss since 2010 −11 −3 +4 +1 +9 Nil Nil

10

Map 10.1

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155

Map of Bodoland Territorial Territorial Districts

Performance of the BTC Citizens judge the efficacy of the government, at any level, by what it does, that is, what it delivers by way of law and order, and other goods and services. Violence, and that too, persistent, is a bad companion to development. Development defined in any terms requires peaceful environment for its working14 that entails the rule of law, delivery of services and goods and so on. Violence and killing including large-scale displacement are the grossest anti-thesis to governance. Since the 1990s ethnic violence and cleansing in Bodoland never stopped. Elsewhere Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee (2018) offered reports of spiraling violence in the region which resulted in killing in hundreds and displacements of thousands (of both the Bodos and the non-Bodos) (Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee 2018). The Assam Tribune dated 28 December 2014 terms it a ‘killing field of Assam’ and reported that in 1993 more than 20,000 people were displaced and about 1000 killed; in 1994, 400 people were killed; in 1996, ‘NDFB massacred over 250 Adivasis mostly in Kokrajhar district and burnt down scores of villages’; in retaliation, the Adivasis organized themselves and fought back which resulted resulting in some

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200,000 people being displaced and took refuge in government shelters; in 1998, some 50 people were killed, 500 houses burnt down and 75,000 displaced. In 2008, some 100 people were killed and one and a half lakh were displaced. There are reports of continuing violence in the region since. As must be obvious by now, institutional ill-designing in an inappropriate environment in institutionalizing the BTC since 2005 has not been the answer to the complex identity question in Bodoland whose impact on development governance was somewhat predictable. Nonetheless, some records as available from the Assam Human Development Report (2014) (in association with the UNDP) and other sources such as the MDoNER report show a level of development in the BTC areas to have taken place. The BTC’s own sources of revenues are very limited being basically an agricultural economy, but it receives funds from multiple sources: the Assam government grant (no. 78) provided for 2021 a sum of Rs. 787131.39 (lakh) as revenue grant and Rs. 46480.69 (lakh) as capital grant up to 31st March 2022. (Assam Budget). The DoNER has multiple routes to grant for the region and has its ‘special package’ for the BTC. It has agreed to offer Rs. 500.00 crores (100crores per year) for five years for socio-economic development of the areas under the BTC over and above the normal Plan assistance as per the MoU singed on 10/2/2003. In 2008, the then Prime Minister in his visit to Assam announced an ‘additional package’ of Rs. 250.00 crores for the same purpose (PIB, New Delhi 11/8/21) (online). However, the funds are not directly released to the BTC but to the Government of Assam under ‘special package’ for various development projects (PIB. Government of India, New Delhi 11/1821) (online) in the BTC areas. The BTC also benefits from seven other projects under the MDoNER such as North-East Special Infrastructural Development Schemes, Non-Lapsable Central Pool of Resources-State and North-East Road Sector Development Scheme.15 The BTC16 like many other Autonomous Tribal District Councils in North-East India is, financially, dependent upon the State and Union governments.

Status of Development Any ‘report card’ on development in the BTC is not available. To begin with, in 2013 in the four Bodoland districts, there was large-scale deprivation of the households of the basic amenities (Table 10.5). The district

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of Udalguri was well ahead in terms of access to electricity compared to the other three districts, but in terms of sanitation all four districts had a dismal picture. As many as 84.4% of all households, for example, in Chirag, were without any sanitation. In terms of safe drinking water, Chirag and Udalguri performed much better than the other two. To be sure, these are to be seen as both development and empowerment. The data in Tables 10.6 and 10.7 are to be read together in order to read the wide rural–urban disparity and also the fact that it was the rural people who are mostly deprived of those basic amenities. The overall performance indexes for each district are 0.310, 0.516, 0.412 and 0.391 respectively. In comparison, Assam’s overall performance even as a backward State in India was 0.557 in 2014 which was an improvement from 2001 (0.386). However, the level of development in Bodoland is still much below the State average. Table 10.5 Deprivation of basic amenities in BTC districts (2013) Districts

Households without electricity (%)

Baksa Chirag Kokrajhar Udalguri

34 26.4 44.0 0.6

Households without toilet (%)

Households without safe drinking water (%)

71.1 84.4 72.2 78.1

23.2 0.8 14.8 7.4

Source Swargiary, P. http://www.ijstr.org/final-print/apr2020/A-Study-Of-Human-Development-InBodoland-Territorial-Area-Districts-btad-Assam.pdf (sighted on 1/3/22)

Table 10.6 Deprivation in basic amenities: Rural–urban districts District

Baksa Chirang Kokrajhar Udalguri ASSAM

HH without electricity

HH without toilet

HH without drinking water

Rural

Urban

Total

Rural

Urban

Total

Rural

Urban

Total

34.7 28.7 46.0 0.0 36.2

13.3 0.0 15.8 11.3 7.3

34.4 26.4 44.0 0.6 31.7

72.8 85.9 75.3 79.8 77.3

13.3 66.7 29.0 47.2 29.7

72.1 84.4 72.2 78.1 69.8

23.3 0.9 14.4 7.6 14.2

13.3 0.0 21.1 1.9 5.7

23.2 0.8 14.8 7.4 12.9

Source Assam Human Development Report (2014) (Based on the survey conducted in 2013), p. 217

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Table 10.7 Human Development Index in Bodoland (2014)

District

Health

Education

Income

Baksa Chirag Kokrajhar Udalguri

0.216 0.614 0.427 0.325

0.367 0.644 0.570 0.558

0.255 0.347 0. 287 0.268

Source Assam Human Development Report (2014)

In the UNDP’s measurement criteria of human development in terms of access to health care, education and living standard, the Bodoland district’s performance varies but only Chirag district has been found to be well ahead of others: its rank is 7 while the rest are far below: 26, 20 and 18 (Table 10.8). The question of development is very closely related to the level people in general are, economically speaking. Available statistical survey data, as mentioned below, shows that landlessness (homestead as well as cultivable land) among the households in four Bodoland districts is very high (Table 10.9). While the people have in most cases some homestead land, a high percentage have limited cultivable land especially when a very per cent cultivable land has not irrigation facilities. This is a major hurdle to the development and empowerment of the people. When this is the condition of the people (all communities) in Bodoland is so precarious, this raises many further questions about the prospects of identity in the region. Comparatively, the performance records for composite development index of Assam and the Bodoland districts, in the assessment of the NITI Table 10.8 Dimensional and human development indices of districts District

Health

Education

Living Standard

Human Development Index

Dimensional Rank Dimensional Rank Dimensional Rank Dimensional Rank Index Index Index Index Baksa Chirang Kokrajhar Udalguri

0.340 0.746 0.539 0.538

26 4 14 15

0.606 0.677 0.645 0.602

23 12 18 25

0.404 0.457 0.402 0.441

Source Assam Human Development Report (2014: 192–93)

21 17 22 18

0.437 0.614 0.519 0.523

26 7 20 18

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Table 10.9 Landlessness in Bodoland districts (Per cent HH) (2013)

District

Baksa Chirang Kokrajhar Udalguri ASSAM

159

No homestead land

No cultivatable land

No irrigated land

0.6 0.0 0.5 1.2 0.8

54.5 45.3 42.7 54.7 48.5

75.8 75.7 83.7 94.2 89.5

Source Assam Human Development Report (Based on a survey conducted in 2013), p. 212

Aayog, are behind that of Tripura and the areas within the TTADC during 2020–21 (data period 2019–2020). During the said period, Tripura’s record was 71.9 to 75.5, and the Dhalai district and part of North Tripura were above 72 and 75% respectively. Assam’s record for the same period was 62.77–71.75%, and the four districts of Bodoland were as follows: Baksa (62. 65%); Chirag (27 to 69%); Kokrajhar (59.69%) and Udalguri (53 to 73%) ((niti.gov.in/sights/default) dated 4.4.21) (sighted on 11.11.21).

Conclusion The various experiments of the Autonomous District Councils in the North-East are based on the premise of a certain ethnic minority who have demanded an Autonomous District Councils in the States, but who are a majority in the areas inhabited by them. This has facilitated through institutional functioning but produced at the same time exclusion. But the BTC has remained a glaring exception to the rule, an undesirable experience at that, in which seats are over-reserved for the Bodo minority confronted with a majority of 70% non-Bodos of different communities, tribals and others, the Hindus and the Muslims. It could otherwise have been a good case of experimenting with real multiculturalism so that all communities take part in power-sharing as none of them is a majority, and hence all could collectively take up the development and better protection of human rights—a solid sure guarantee for peaceful method of resolving conflicts. But that was not to be. The fact that the Bodos are living in other areas of Assam outside the BTC areas would have added further reasons for such power-sharing. Like elsewhere in India and at many levels

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of the polity, the majoritarian principle of democracy (the Winners take all!) has been infectious for the counter-ethnic elites who have indulged in mobilizing the ethnic brethren, sentimentally and emotionally, of the story of their deprivation, loss of their identity and so on. One may call it the politics of identity and recognition, but when a territory is conceded for a government, this often becomes self-defeating because the government itself means more public expenditure to be borne by the people in a democracy leaving most often very little for ‘development’. For the BTC, it has been fortuitous that the BPF is a partner of the NDA and NEDA which has meant ‘Special financial package’ for the Bodos. But the intra-tribal and community strife in the BTC and beyond will remain.

Notes 1. See George (1994) for a succinct account of the movement till 1993. 2. A three-member Committee was formed by the Union government under the Chairmanship of Bhipinder Singh in 1991 to study the Bodoland situation. 3. Baruach has pointed out the unreason of the proliferation of ethnic homeland discourse in the region (Baruah 2010). 4. Globally, as Smith (2003: 17) informs us, nearly ‘90 per cent of the states are polyethnic, and about half of them are seriously divided by ethnic cleavages’. 5. Chakladar, S. 2004 Sub-Regional Movement in India (Kolkata: K. P. Bachi & Co), Chapter 2 ‘Bodoland a Sub-region in Assam), 34–73. 6. Gait, Sir E. A. 1905. A History of Assam (Guwahati) quoted in Chakladar (2004: 34). 7. Quoted in Chakladar (2004: 35). 8. In the Accord in 1993, the objective was stated to be: ‘to provide maximum autonomy within the framework of the Constitution to the Bodos for social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural development’ (Datta 1995: 41). In the Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993 (Assam Act No. Xl of 1993) (Datta 1995: 41–49). 9. The Constitution of India (introduced (2014, 12th edn.) by P M Bakshi) (New Delhi: Universal Law publishing hose Pvt. Ltd.), p. 363. 10. See South Asia Terrorism portal for the day to day reports on the issue. 11. See Chaudhruy, K. 1994. ‘Outrage in Assam: Bodos on the Rampage”, Frontline 11 (17), 13–26, 28–30. 12. Datta, P. S. ed. 1995. Ethnic Peace Accords in India (New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.).

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13. Nazimuddin Siddique, Bodoland Area District Elections 2015—A Discussion, in EPW , Vol. L, No.31, August 01, 2015 in http://www.epw.in/rep orts-states/bodoland-territorial-area-district-elections-2015.html (sighted on 2/3/22). 14. See, for example, Goswami, N. 2014 ‘Bodoland Violence: Contest for Power and Authority’; https://idsa.in/idsacomments/Bodoviolence_ngo swami_090514 (sighted on 2/3/22); Pathak, S. 2012. Ethnic violence in Bodoland’, EPW, Vol. 47, 34, August 25, 10–23; Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee 2018. ‘Bodo ethnic self-rule and persistent violence in Assam: A failed case of multinational federalism in India’ Regional and Federal Studies. 15. How much and in what manner such money has been utilized for the purposes require a separate study and field visit. This is left to the future researchers. 16. The BTC is placed under the Government of Assam Department of Welfare of Plain Tribes and Backward Classes for the purpose of making money available to the former.

References Bakshi, P.M. 2017. The Constitution of India, 14th ed. New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing. Baruah, S. 2005. Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. ———, ed. 2009. Beyond Counter-Insurgency Breaking the Impasse in North-east India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. ———, ed. 2010. Ethno-Nationalism in India: A Reader. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bhaumik, S. 2009. Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India’s North East. New Delhi: Sage. Bhattacharyya, H., and J. Mukherjee. 2018. Bodo Ethnic Self-Rule and Persistent Violence. Regional and Federal Studies 28 (4). https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13597566.2018.1478293 Chakladar, S. 2004. Sub-Regional Movements in India. Kolkta: K P Bagchi & Co. Datta, P.S., ed. 1995. Ethnic Peace Accords. New Delhi: Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. George, J. 1994. ‘Bodoland Violence-Victoims All’. Economic and Political Weekly 29 (24) (June 11). Majumdar, A.K., and B. Singh. 1997. Regionalism in Indian Politics. New Delhi: Radha.

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Mishra, U. 2012. The Burden of History. Economic and Political Weekly 47 (37) (September 15): 36–42. Mohanta, N.G. 2013. ‘Politics of Space and Violence in Bodoland’. Economic and Political Weekly 45 (23) (June): 49–57. Pathak, S. Ethnic Violence in Bodoland. Economic and Political Weekly 47 (34) (August 25): 19023. Sharma, S. 2017. ‘The Bodoland Demand: Genesis of an Ethnic Conflict’. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. (online) Smith, A.D. 2003. Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Swargiary, P. 2020. A Study of Human Development in Bodoland Territorial District Assam. International Journal of Science and Technology Research 9 (4) (April): 1546–48. Talukdar, S. 2020. The Role of Badland People’s Front in Bodoland Territorial Council and Assam. International Journal of Political Science 6 (1): 1–6.

Official Sources Assam Human Development Report 2014.

CHAPTER 11

A Comparative Assessment of Asymmetric Federalism in India

Introduction Does asymmetric federalism add any value to the discourse of India’s unity and integrity? What do asymmetric federal institutions stand for? Do asymmetric institutions staying as they are in the periphery of the country perform any job worthy of our attention? There is some scholarly reservation about this (e.g. Tillin 2007). Such reservations are largely misplaced. India’s federal asymmetry has proved to be an effective instrument to accommodate ethnic diversity not manageable otherwise. Although territory claims have most often been the main object in state creation, the territory is not an undifferentiated entity in that not all territories are as resourceful and many are often quite barren. And yet, tribes and subtribes as well as other ethnic groups have articulated demands for official recognition of their territory in favour of self-government. When such territories are in India’s international border regions, they have deserved special treatment. Some ethnic claims for self-deamination with the story of deprivation, exclusion and discrimination have served to offer the basis of self-government and development. At the levels below the asymmetric States the same objective informed the institutional design for tribal selfgovernance for the hill and Plain Tribals in North-East India. Therefore

Some materials in this chapter are derived from Bhattacharyya, H. 2019 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_11

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at the base of this vast multi-ethnic country such asymmetric and subasymmetric institutions add value to India national unity and integrity, political order and stability. As the Indian experience from the North-East has specifically shown, such sub-asymmetric institutional arrangements for power-sharing have helped to resolve ethnic conflicts at the base levels, very often by offering the space to be utilized by the militants and insurgents of yester years to transform themselves from rebels to stake holders in the system, and with constitutionally guaranteed powers and authority to act the guardians of law and order and defend the border. Asymmetric federalism entails the issues of identity, territory and selfdetermination in a particular territory. While identity recognition is easily done, recognition of territory-based identity is never easy, especially if it entails tribes who are not always too deeply attached to a territory. In the age of India’s neo-liberal reforms, governing itself is challenging in the sense that the governments have to show results; to develop and improve the living standard measured by HDI and other yardsticks. For the asymmetric States with very limited resource bases of their own, and which are financially very dependent Central transfers, it is even more challenging when the aspirations of the people are fast growing. Before we proceed further, we ought to pay some attention to the following three considerations here. First, nearly all federations have either de jure or de facto asymmetry. This suggests that asymmetries are unavoidable in order to respond to certain issues that require special attention and some asymmetric institutional arrangements. Second, asymmetry conceptually is not intelligible apart from federalism per se, or to be more precise, federal symmetry. Third, in practical politics, de facto asymmetry creeps even in a condition of federal symmetry so that the federal symmetrical units suffer a temporary setback. Kincaid has shown how in the US the federal government has bypassed the States and handed over health programme grants to the NGOs (Kincaid, 2011: 37–54). Consider what Kincaid said about this: Contemporary American federalism can be described as an era of coercive or regulated federalism in which the predominant political, fiscal, statutory regulatory and judicial trends have entailed imposition of federal dictates on state and local government (Kincaid, 2011: 37).

This is, for him, a major shift in the federal balance from the interest of places to the interests of persons and interest groups.

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India, by contrast, has done quite well for there are few murmurs among the ruling parties in the asymmetric States in India of the Centre’s neglect or they being bypassed at least financially speaking. Politically though, as we have seen above in Chapter 5, there are complaints of the Centre not taking into confidence of the Chief Ministers of the States in India’s North-East into matters of Act East policy. The asymmetric States in India have not resented for not getting enough funding from the Centre. As it applied generally, the Centre is dependent on the States to implement its various legislations concerning empowerment, poverty alleviation and development. This very often encroaches upon the rights of the States for the latter have to allow their administrative machinery to be used as well as for sharing a portion of the funds especially when the States are allegedly not consulted in the policy-making process. However, asymmetric federalism in India is to be understood in the particular context of Indian federalism, its mode of formation and social and cultural cleavages around it. The relative success of Indian federalism in managing ethno-regional conflicts in the mainland of India thus can be safely extended to include the asymmetric States for no States, symmetric or asymmetric, in India is mon-ethnic, or cultural. Neither Himachal Pradesh nor Uttarakhand is mono-ethnic, but multi-ethnic. Erstwhile J&K was distinctively multi-ethnic: Muslims, Hindus and Buddhist. That Ladhak, now Union Territory, had had a Regional Development Council whose performance records remain a gold standard. India’s North-East contains most of the asymmetric States, and the SCS until recently has offered a picture of both success and failure. Assam, for instance, has always been a difficult State to govern due mostly to its complex ethnic mosaic and the long-drawn history of ethnic insurgency and political violence. Until the 1990s, the region witnessed high level of insurgency and political violence and Central rule (under Article 356 of the Constitution). With a lot of state contraction in many phases, Assam still remains ethnically very diverse and politically volatile. On the success side, many ethnic issues have seen their resolution in the region by State and subState creation, but the success is relative because there are claims by some ethnic groups as being deprived and so demand a state of their own. Many of such issues are the consequences of resolution of some ethnic conflicts in a certain way that has failed to satisfy the ethnic others. The ethno-territorial model of ethnic conflict management in India followed since 1956 has confronted two types of problems: the ethnic minorities, and their lack of adequate representation in decision-making, and the

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tribals in other parts of India where the 6th Schedule is not applicable. One wonders if the 6th Schedule could be amended to accommodate the Bodos who are not hill tribes and a minority in their proclaimed homeland—a wrong application though—why cannot it be applied to the tribes in other parts of India who are in millions and occupy vast territory. Such unresolved issues are the fall outs of the model generally. Many distinct ethnic communities territorially rooted are demanding a state of their own, or in some cases, extension of the 6th Schedule benefits to them. The demand for Vidarbha State out of Maharashtra, or some tribes in the region demanding the 6th Schedule are cases in point. Despite the relative success of Indian federalism in the mainland, to a large extent, what Indian federalism so far has not been able to resolve is the relation between ethnicity and territory. What is the optimal level of correspondence between ethnicity and territory? What is the optimal size of the population to be provided with territorial concession? More tribal peoples live in the mainland of India than that in North-East India, but comparatively very little special protection and safeguards are available to them than that of the tribals of North-East which are smaller in per cent. I cite the example of the State of Jharkhand created in 2000 as a State for the tribals, for the Jharkhand movements were one of the oldest of such movements; but when the State was created, the tribals were found to be in a minority who can influence public policy only to a limited extent, and the jobs in public sectors (shrinking in any way) that could be reserved for them are mostly in lower category in offices and administration. In the case of the North-East, for example, the federal experiment has scored some limited success, but the relation between tribal ethnicity and territory here remains precarious. In this region, the size of the population of the States except Assam is a very small. And yet, many sub-State level asymmetric arrangements had to be provided for to accommodate ethnic diversity. But there are demands for more, one reason responsible for the above is India’s majoritarian mode of democracy that is exclusionary in nature particularly among the tribals whose internal divisions and sub-divisions are manifold and often puzzling to the anthropologists. Although India officially proclaims to be a multicultural state, this is less reflected in its democratic institutional practices.

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Theoretical Considerations Theoretically, the scholars of ethnicity and nationhood are grapple with a question: Why and when ethnicity gets attracted to territory, or how ethnicity becomes territorialized? This has been debated in the theoretical discourse on the subject. (e.g. Smith, 1986: 161–77) Smith argues that many often territorialization is an ethnic group’s transformation into nationhood via the civic association of statehood. Ethnic heterogeneity and territory claims have remained, however, contested in the courtiers of Asia and Africa where ethnic diversity is very complex and often baffling. Why territorial option does not work in sub-Saharan plural Africa has been well-argued in recent research. Coakley in a comparative study of territorial management of ethnic conflict management has shown that different societies have different meanings of ethnicity, and second, the boundaries of ethnic groups are blurred so that ethnicity and territory do not go well. He rightly says: ‘Ethnic affiliation is in realty much more complex’. Thus the current theoretical knowledge on the subject suggests that given the very complex nature of ethnicity and overlapping loyalties that it entails, it is not easy to disentangle them for any territorial solution. And yet, ethnicity, if it is associated with languages, could arouse serious emotions and sentiments among its adherents for hasty, often over-simplified solution in territorial autonomy and relative power, if not, in eking out a separate nation-state. Elite instrumentalities in such cases are more likely to succeed because people are easy prey to being mobilized when the issue is their sentiments and emotions. The point that is being made here is that when ethnicity is of tribal affiliations, as we shall see shortly below, any attempts at the territorial solution is bound to create more problems of exclusion and further ethnic discontent.

A Brief Macro Picture In India, the world’s most diverse country, ethnically speaking, ethnolinguistic identity’s ‘natural’ claims to territory were a consensus, as it were, since the days of anti-colonial liberation movements led by the Indian National Congress, which endorsed it way back in its Nagpur session in 1920. With the leadership over Congress by M K Gandhi in the early 1920s the claim began to receive greater legitimacy. It became eventually an official pledge of Congress to many linguistic groups that after independence (1947) India would be a federation based on linguistic

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provinces (Bhattacharyya, 2008: 193–219). Even the Congress organization itself was reorganized to fit the linguistic identity. It was so done for better political communication between the party and the masses in a linguistically very diverse country. But what was little understood then and perhaps also later was the fact that linguistic identity and territory were never a neat-fit in India, nationally, and more particularly at the sub-national levels (and also below them); there was thus more to the so-called ethno-territorial linguistic identity than met the naked eye. The internal diversity of the so-called ethno-territorial linguistic identity in India was overwhelming but overshadowed by the nationalist zeal, short-sightedness and political expediency. In the post-independence period particularly after 1956, a multi-staged process of recasting the territory of India has been in place to recreate new federal units called ‘States’ around linguistic and other ethnic identity (the process is far from complete) in order to regulate ethnic conflicts. The method has been relatively successful in the mainland India. This is more or less adequately examined in the existing knowledge ; Adeney 2007 ; Bhattacharyya 2001, 2010, 2017, 2018; Tillin 2013; Sarangi and Pai 2011), although there are differences in assessment. What such macro-level analyses neglect to consider is that although secessionist conflicts in the mainland have dissipated to a large extent, the dominant ethnic group(s) which spearheaded the movement for new States and received power as a result have established their own hegemony over the States because they were economically dominant castes and classes in their respective regions. Thus, Kammas and Reddys were the real beneficiaries of Andhra Pradesh state; Lingayats and Vokkaligas in the case of Karnataka; the Jat Sikhs in the case of Punjab and so on. This has been detailed in Bhattacharyya (2019b). To add some credence to Singh (2000)’s thesis of ‘ethnic democracy’ operating at the State level which has resulted in the marginalization of new minorities so created. Since the base-line of consideration of the SRC (1955) was 50% and above language speakers deserving a State it had left out millions of other language speakers out of its consideration. Thus the new States so created were multi-lingual and multicultural. In subsequent States reorganization in the 1960s many of such limitations were taken care of by creating more States, most States today (except Kerala) have large linguistic minorities without territorial concentration and or district-level concentration. Indian federalism and democracy as such do not have any solution to their

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problems; even a non-territorial solution, or what Lijphar calls, ‘corporate federalism’ is not yet considered. It is argued here that while ethno-federal conflict management resulting in new State creation out of the existing Indian territory served to ensure better political order and legitimacy in the mainland of India, the problem remains unresolved, and in the North-East, this remains problematic. In the case of Punjab, as Singh and Kim (2017: 427–44) have argued, the experience of federalism remains very limited as the state has witnessed large-scale deployment of the Indian security forces, which culminated in 1984 in the Indian Army’s crackdown, nick-named ‘Operation Bluestar’, on the Golden Temple, the most sacred place of worship of the Sikhs. Interestingly, in the Punjab case, where statehood was finally conceded in 1966, ethnicity and territory threw out a bitter lesson: to create a Sikh majority (only about 52%) state in the Punjab, the territory was so much slashed that what came out as Punjab in 1966 was actually the one-third areas of the original state. In the case of North-East, the method followed in territorialization of ethnicity and creation of small ‘ethnic homelands’ did not result in sustaining ethnic peace but the newer bases of ethnic conflict.

Comparative Practices Federal asymmetry remains a part of most federations. In the Asian federations, India and Malaysia can be said to have achieved some success. In Malaysia, there are two asymmetric States on the Borneo islands: Sabah and Sarawak who joined the federations in 1963 but enjoy constitutionally speaking special rights with regard to their non-Malaya interests, and identity. Of late though there is resentment among the indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak about the lack of protection of their languages and increasing attempts by the Centre in extraction and logging-taking activities in the regions (Bhattacharyya, 2019b: 193). In India, similar resentments are heard of the mining activities in the Northeastern States by the private players leaving the areas hugely damaged, environmentally speaking. The erstwhile State of J&K was assured of autonomy (under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution); it was also a Special Category States. But in reality, many Union government orders, Ordinances and the frequent use of Article 356 of the Constitution backed up by the huge deployment of the Indian security forces meant

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that the State’s so-called autonomy was merely on paper. Of all the asymmetric States in India, J&K, and those in the North-East for long were infested with insurgencies and political violence, but in the latter, things began to subside from the 1990s. Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, though hilly and sharing international borders, remain exceptions.

Contentious Territory Claims Unlike the former J&K, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, the States in the North-East have witnessed on a regular basis the newer claims for territory however small they might be. The region as such is very diverse though but the diversity particularly relating to the tribes is puzzling for a clear-cut territorial solution. No wonder, the region has remained until recently volatile and the hotbed of varieties of ethnic radical politics and political extremism. This has been well-covered in the existing writings on the region. (Baruah 2005, 2009 and 2010; Bhaumik 2009; Lacina 2009; Mitra and Bhattacharyya 2000; Hausing 2014; Bhattacharyya 2017, 2018) Das (2010, 45–47) offered an inventory of 77 armed militant ethnic outfits still operative in the region (except Sikkim). The number of such organizations has of course dwindled over the decades since the 1950s in consonance with the changes in the outer political environment. But each State has many ethnic militant groups working underground and many working over the ground. True, all militants have not demanded territorial concession; in many cases, they have demanded expulsion of the migrants from the States and engaged themselves in political violence: arson; kidnapping; killing the migrants and so on. The objectives of various Ethnic Peace Accords signed (see Chapter 5) are evidence enough of the various demands of the various ethnic militants. The AGP’s campaign in Assam in the 1980s was for the identification of foreigners and then their expulsion. But the campaign paralyzed Assam for many years. This region shares India’s international borders with Bangladesh, on the west (and south and east too for Tripura) and Myanmar, China and Bhutan, on the east and North-East. Demographically, the region is still sparsely populated; of them, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram are still more sparsely populated compared to India as a whole. The region’s current level of decadal growth of population is rather stable but historically that was not the case. Due to India’s Partition (1947) and the birth of Bangladesh (1971), the region, particularly Assam and Tripura, received millions of refugees

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from across the border from East Bengal (pre-1947), which became East Pakistan (1947–71) and now Bangladesh. In the wake of the Bangladesh war of independence further migration took place disturbing and upsetting the demographic balance in the region. In Assam, the rate of decadal growth of population during 1951–61 and 1961–71 was very high—35 and 34.7% respectively compared to all-India average of 21.6 and 24.6% respectively. (Weiner, 1978: 82) Weiner (1978: 75–143) had shown in greater detail how this huge demographic transformation became the root of ethnic conflicts in the State subsequently. By the 2011 Census Reports of India, the Assamese have lost the majority in population (now 48.81%). In Tripura, the migration of Bengalis from East Bengal and later East Pakistan reduced the local population (aboriginal peoples) during 1941–51 and later in 1951–61 to a small minority in their own state. The resultant loss of land and habitat to the settler Bengalis in Tripura was to become the roots of persisting radical ethnic politics in the State (Bhattacharyya 2018). The tribal people constitute about 8.6% (some 104 million) (2011) of the total population of India and are spread over the country with the North-East as one of the areas of their concentration. The term ‘tribe’ used since the British colonial days is a loose category that covers tribes, sub-tribes as well as assimilated ones. This region is reported to have as many as 215 Scheduled (constitutionally recognized as such) Tribes (Table 11.1) and many more which are not yet recognized as such to be entitled to constitutional special protection and privileges. The lists of Scheduled Tribes vary across the States in India. Of the eight States of the region, four are predominantly ‘tribal’ inhabited (of them three are predominantly Christian) and there are significant proportions of them in the rest. When the percentage figure of the tribals is offered in statistical presentation, it is not always made clear that such tribals are not a homogeneous category. For example, while it is true that 68.8% of the population in Arunachal Pradesh are tribal but then they are 101 tribal groups and subgroups—each having their own identity and culture Table 11.1) (perhaps inhabiting a little territory of their own) and speaking a dialect. In Tripura, 31.8% tribal refers to as many as 18 tribal groups and sub-groups; in this case too each of them has its own dialect although Kok-Borok is the lingua franca. The intricacies of such diversity are to be read in conjunction with the linguistic diversity in each State. The 50th Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities, Government of India (2013)

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Table 11.1 States and ethnic groups in the NE (2011) States

Major linguistic ethnic groups

Majority/minority

Arunachal Pradesh

*Nissi/Dafla, Adi, Bengali, Nepali Assamese, Bengali, Hindi, Bodo** Manipuri, Thada, Thankhul and 11 others Khasi, Garo, Bengali and 4 others

No majority group: Daflas are 18.97%; Adi 17.61% No majority group; Assamese as dominant group (48.81%) Manipuri (58.43%)

Assam Manipur Meghalaya

Mizoram Nagaland Sikkim Tripura

Lushai/Mizo, Bengali and six others, Ao, Konyak, Lotha and Angami and 18 others Nepali, Bhutia, Hindi, Lepcha, Limbo and three others Bengali, Tripuri***

No majority group; Khasis are dominant group (47.05%) Lushai/Mizo (73.25%) No majority (AO = 12.94% as the largest group) Nepali (62.61%) Bengali**** (67.14%)

Source 50th Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities in India (July 2012 to June 2013) (New Delhi: Government of India) Notes * Nissi/Dafla and Adi are divided into 101 sub-groups; ** Bodos are plains tribes but there are many tribal groups speaking their own dialect and have their terrestrial concentration in the hills such as the Nagas and the Dimasas. *** Tripuris are sub-divided into 18 groups. **** Bengalis are settlers in the state. No territorial changes took place after 2011

contains detailed information on the linguistic diversity in each State and the state of protection of minority languages at the grassroots. In Arunachal Pradesh, there is no majority language group and hence there is no dominant ethnic group. There are significant speakers of three 8th Schedule languages (i.e. Bengali, Hindi and Nepali). The majority speak different tribal dialects lacking in scripts so that the official language of the State is English. The State was created in 1987 without any distinct identity basis. In Assam, the major State in the region with 68.45% of the region’s total population in 2011, the Assamese speakers are found to have lost their majority for the first time in 2001. In 1971, the Assamese speakers were some 60.89% of the total population so this loss of majority is likely to create ethnic tensions among the Assamese in days to come. The linguistic diversity in the State is immense because apart from the Assamese, Bengali and Bodo/Boro, the major language speakers, there are a plethora of languages spoken, not all of which are officially recognized. The recent decline in the percentage of Assamese is due to

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the relative decline of Assamese speakers and the increase of Bengali speakers in seven districts in the Brahmaputra Valley during 1991–2001 (The Hindu Kolkata 9 October 2016). Assam has experienced territorial contraction since pre-independence days and more particularly since the 1960s when its Hill Districts were separated; Nagaland was conceded as a State in 1963; and in 1972 when Mizoram and Meghalaya were conceded statehood. This added to greater percentage of Assamese to the total population but a diverse ethnic situation has remained. The dwindling demographic numbers of the Assamese gave birth to ethnic militancy arising from the majority community (i.e. the Assamese) in the form of the ULFA and the AGP among others. Ethnic minorities have mobilized themselves in militant forms for the protection of their identity. Various Bodo organizations have cropped up for a State of Bodoland in the northern banks of the river Brahmaputra. A Bodoland Territorial Authority was conceded in 2003 but it has created more problems than resolved any (Bhattacharyya and Mukherjee 2018) because ethnicity and territory here have been on a black burner: a territorial government has been conceded to an ethnic minority (30% Bodos) in an area inhabited by some 70% non-Bodos! Beyond them, there are demands for further territorial separation out of Assam by different ethnic minorities groups such as the Karbi, Dimasa and Nagas. Assam and Nagaland share a long 434 km border, east of Assam, and there is a long-drawn dispute (border) between the two States over some territories on the border areas. The Nagalim (greater Nagaland) demand of the Naga rebels (NSCN-IM) includes parts of Assam’s territory. In Manipur, the erstwhile princely State like Tripura, although Manipuri is spoken by the majority, this majority is not large. There are a lot of speakers of other tongues which are not all recognized officially. Manipuri is the official language of the State but English is adopted as an additional official language. There is still controversy about the script to be used for Manipuri. The people in Manipur are diverse living in the hills (41.1%) and the valley (58.9%). The people living in the plains are also ethnically divided and profess different faiths. There are Kuki and the Naga settlement in the valley—the Nags comprising the second largest after the Meitei (Manipuri). There are some 29 tribes living in the hills generically grouped into the Naga, the Kuki and Zo. There are many sub-groups among them too. The Nagalim demand of the Naga rebels includes parts of Manipur inhabited by the Nagas.

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When the State of Meghalaya was conceded in 1972 it was understood to be the State of the whole people of Meghalaya, and that the ethnic rebels fighting for Statehood were the representatives of the whole people. But it turned out to be otherwise. It turned out that the Khasis, the dominant tribe, got the State, and hence the second-largest ethnolinguistic group, i.e. the Garos, were unhappy and began demanding a State of their own, which is yet to be fulfilled. The Khasis and the Gaors are the two major linguistic groups but then there is immense ethnolinguistic diversity in the State. It was created as an autonomous state within the state of Assam on 2 April 1969. It comprises the United KhasiJaintia Hills District and the Garo Hills District. It became a fully-fledged state in 1972. And yet, statehood has not been able to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts in Manipur. Mizoram is the lone tribal State in the region whose dominant Mizo community speaking Mizo/Lushai constitutes 73.21% of the total population. This has served to ensure enduring ethnic peace in the State although the Hmar tribe has been demanding some territorial autonomy and protection of their identity for a long. So is the Brus many of whom are living in refugee camps in Tripura. However, the greater ethnic homogeneity in the State has produced better governance results (Bhattacharyya 2018). Contrary to all claims for a coherent Naga nationhood and solidarity, Nagaland contains very diverse linguistic groups so that there is no single Naga group as a majority in population. The two largest linguistic groups—Ao and Konyak—constitute respectively 12.94 and 12.46% of the total population. The various other groups have populations which are significant in number in a State with a small population. This ethnolinguistic diversity undercuts the demand for a homogenous Naga identity and has given birth to numerous ethnic rebel groups. Sikkim is diverse too although its majority Nepali community is 62.61% of the population. The other language groups are smaller in number and proportions. But the State has had a different trajectory and shared very little with the North-East, let alone India, generally. For a long period, it was a feudal dynasty which the British protected with its indirect control. After 1947 India extended the protection but incorporated it into the Union of India in 1974 and made a State in 1975. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts to construct a common Sikkimese (national) identity though it turned out to be fraught with a host of problems stemming from a multicultural social mosaic (Hiltz 2003). But the State has

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a distinct regional identity, which again is multicultural, that sets it apart from similar identity in the North-East. Tripura’s linguistic diversity is not as complex for the Bengalis and the Tripuri/Kok-Borok languages cover more than 92% of the population. But there is persistent and long-drawn ethnic conflict in the State. The roots of the conflicts lie in the demographic upheaval due to the influx of Hindu refugees from across the border adjacent to the princely State were reduced in the wake of long-drawn migration of Bengalis to a minority. This entailed loss of land and habitats to the settlers on the part of the tribals. This has complicated the sense of identity both among the tribals and the settlers Bengalis whose territorial loyalty is more to the State and the areas of East Bengal (East Pakistan) from where they had originated and migrated respectively. In a detailed empirical survey, Mitra (2012: 59–61) explained why a quarter of the people had reported (in a national survey) themselves as not citizens of India with reference to the regions and localities of their origin. In light of the above, three issues need to be considered. First, a common North Eastern regional identity has not emerged and is unlikely to do so. A common identity in each State, let alone in the region, remains still a far cry. Each unit of the federation is ethnically heterogeneous and most often territorially rooted and has provided fertile grounds for political mobilizations for identity, autonomy and power. Second, ethnic heterogeneity within the States is not conducive to development and governance, for the ruling parties of some ethnic groups may discriminate against the minority others. Often one dominant group has claimed power and autonomy for the whole people but once in the corridors of power, it has discriminated against the other groups, or the minorities newly created have expressed grievances against the dominant group in power. Third, ethnic heterogeneity means there is little correspondence between ethnic identity and ethnic territory, and hence the potentials for persistent conflicts is embedded in the social fabric. As a result, the ‘other’ ethnic minorities have come out to demand a territory of their own. The latter has followed suit for further territorial division and sub-divisions for the protection of their identity. Baruah (2010) has rightly pointed out that the region witnessed a proliferation of ethnic homeland discourse and the demands for more. In terms of religion too, this region is especially very diverse but the Hindus are overall in majority (54.23%). In the North-East, Hindus are the majority in population in only three States—Assam, Sikkim

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and Tripura. In Manipur, the Hindus are the single largest group (43.21%). The Christians here have a significant presence in the population. Muslims are sizeable proportions of the population in Assam, Manipur and Tripura. Nonetheless, religion did not play a determining role in redefining ethnic identity in the North-East, a role played rather effectively by other factors such as language and tribal ethnicity. Weiner and Katzenstein reported that in the 1960s, some of the Khasi, Garo and Naga tribesmen had begun to assert their identity as Christians in demanding separate territories, but then realizing the political unacceptability of a religion-based territory claim, switched to tribal loyalties and identities and were successful carving out three tribal States. It must, however, be acknowledged that Christianity has played nonetheless a critical role in redefining tribal ethnic identity in Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram. Three States in the region—Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland—are predominantly Christian, and there are a large number of Christians in Assam and Manipur (3.7% and 30.28% respectively). However, the Christians overall in the region are only 17.31%. Arunachal Pradesh is the only State with a significant Buddhist population (11.7%). Many militant ethnic organizations such as the AGP (until 1985) and the ULFA are dominated by the caste Hindu Assamese. The Muslims in Assam have mobilized themselves separately as well as within the Congress party. In Tripura because of the impact of Left politics over the decades, communal polarization along religious lines did not take place. On the contrary, the fact that most tribals here are Hindus has added to inter-community amity. In Tripura again, the Muslims have traditionally been the support bases of the Left. Since 2014 the BJP’s Hindutva politics has made some headways in the region so that the party obtained a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly (36 out of 60) in Tripura in alliance with the local tribal outfit though. In Tripura, the whole hog of the Congress and TMC joined the BJP just before the elections. In Assam in 2016 the party itself got 60 seats (04 short of majority) out of 126 but with the allies another 27 seats. With the AGP, an ethnic Assamese party, leaving the government in 2019, the coalition has now 73 seats. The BJP has been returned in 2021. In other States such as Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur the BJP remains a junior partner with a very few seats. Its alliance (North-East Democratic Alliance) partners are

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not all parties of the Hindus—most of them are Christian dominated in Mizoram, Meghalaya and Nagaland. Since the States in the region are resource-starved, the region was dependent heavily on rather liberal Central grants by way of various arrangements. Until 2014 a system of Special Category Status (SCS) ensured that there was a provision for 90% as grants from the Centre and 10% as loan out of the total plan outlay by the then Planning Commission, which for the general category States was 30:70 (Bhattacharjee 2016). The purpose of such a device by the National Development Council (of the Planning Commission) was to help the region overcome its economic backwardness with rather liberal access to the central funds. However, the SCS status was criteria-based (Bhattacharjee, 2016: 3) which served to balance between finance and diversity. The formation of the North Eastern Council (NEC) in 1972 by an Act of Parliament (1971) was the first major institutional step by the Centre to recognize the region’s political identity. Located in Shillong, the capital of Meghalaya, the Council is thought only as an Advisory Body consisting of members including all the Chief Ministers and the Governors of the States in the region for planning, development and supervision. It can fund projects of common of interests such as production of electricity and roads but most of its funds come from the Centre; the State governments share part of the funding. Apparently designed to serve as a zonal body like the other Zonal Councils for other regions, the NEC does not as yet have any power to resolve inter-state conflicts let alone to participate in policy matters beyond the region with neighboring countries even though such policies have larger ramifications for the region. India’s Look/Act East Policy (1992–)is an instance in which the North-East is a land bridge to Southeast Asia for development, trade and investment. The Council’s role in planning was also overshadowed by the Planning Commission, now defunct (2014)—replaced by the NITI Aayog. The ineffectiveness of the Council has been pointed out by Bhattacharjee (2016) in his detailed study of the SCS. In the official website, the NEC is stated as an organ of the Government of India. The other major institutional measure that recognizes the NE as a region was a Department of Development of the North Eastern Region in 2001 (DoNER)—then a Department first within the Union Ministry— which became a fully-fledged ministry of the Union government in 2004 (MDoNER). The idea was mooted during the rule of the first NDA government at the Centre during 1999–2004. This is a Central ministry

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housed in Delhi and headed first by a Minister of State Dr. Jitendra Singh (now headed by a Cabinet Minister Mr. G. Kishan Reddy (Hyderabad) who was elected to Lok Sabha (Popular chamber of Indian Parliament) from Jammu, not the North-East. In 2017–18, the Ministry had a sumptuous budget of INR 3000 crores (US $ 70 million). The Ministry was set up to facilitate between the Central ministries and the State governments of the region in economic development, including the removal of institutional bottlenecks and provision of basic minimum services in the region. The other important objective of the Ministry is to create an ‘environment of private investment’, and to remove all impediments to lasting peace and security in the region. But what is of special importance to us here is that the MDoNER has brought the NEC under its control! The formation of a separate Ministry for the region’s development is significant but then this is an instance of centralization.

Limited Federalism in the North-East The eight States of India’s North-East (Sikkim was added in 2002) did not experience the federal treatment from the Centre. On the contrary, the States in the region except Sikkim had had rather bitter experiences of central rule via the President’s rule under Article 356 and or semi-military rule under the draconian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958) (AFSPA). The ambit of the Act is said to be minimized in the States where it is clamped. The territorial evolution of the region’s units into statehood was chequered; there took place state contraction in the case of Assam, which had to concede to territorial divisions that gave birth to the states of Nagaland (1963), Mizoram (1987) and Meghalaya (1972). The erstwhile North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)—a construct of the imperial ruler—was made into a State too in 1987. But some of the units were Union Territories and had their elected governments. Therefore, when the central rule under Article 356 was imposed the Union Territories were not spared. The available records show that Assam, Manipur and Nagaland are the worst sufferers (Table 11.2) where there is no normal democratic governance for a prolonged period. Such rule was clamped on Assam when the government was run by the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) had a majority in the State Assembly in 1990–91. Likewise, Arunachal Pradesh was under the President’s rule in 1979 for 76 days, and also later in 2015–16. The rest of the units except Tripura underwent similar experiences. We learn from the data provided by Cohen

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Table 11.2 Presidential rule (under Article 356 of the Constitution) in the NE

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States Assam Manipur Meghalaya Sikkim Nagaland

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Since 1950 (days) 1117 1327 172 347 1545

Source Compiled from various media reports. Note The figures are not final

that during 1973–83 the army was regularly deployed as an ‘aid to civil order’. Except Jammu and Kashmir, the States in the North-East are the other areas in which the draconian AFSPA (1958) was in force routinely. When the areas or the States are placed under this act, democracy and federalism take a back seat. Even in a State such as Tripura (under the Left rule over the last 25 years at a stretch and during 1978–88), the Act was withdrawn only on 29 May 2015 after long 18 years. Nagaland which was placed under this Act for several decades is placed again under this Act on 01 January 2018. Ironically, Nagaland has remained the highest scorer over the three decades from 1981 to 2011 in terms of the maintenance of the rule of law (Malhotra, 2014) whose link with the force of the APSPA is arguably not strong enough. But AFSPA has been clamped over the state again on 31 December by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India for six months. This Act gives the troops and the paramilitaries nearly the license to kill with guaranteed immunity anyone suspected in the eyes of a Commissioned Officer or a non-Commissioned officer not below the rank of Havildars of the troops in the interest of public order. Awfully, this Act had its origins in the repressive Bengal Jail Code/Regulation (1818) of the East India Company. The frequency with which this Act has been in place and the consequences it had had on human rights of the citizens in the region predictably produced only an ugly face of the Centre. No wonder, anti-Centre sentiments are rampant among the people at large and the elites in the region.

Conclusion We argue here that the North-East of India continues to experience political centralization and encroachment on the special States’ rights when the overall political climate in India over the last three decades or so is

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characterized by more autonomy and freedom of action for the States. In the North-East, as we have seen above, the inter-State institutions of the region have all been brought under the control of the Centre. Rather than empowering the regional bodies such as the NEC via legislative federalism, the Centre has chosen the path of further centralization through the method of what I have termed ministerialization. A separate ministry is created under the Union government called the Ministry of Development of the North Eastern Region (MDoNER) in 2004 headed by a Minister who was elected from Jammu, not from the region. The Centre’s encroachment on the special States’ rights in the region has taken place in mining operations carried on by the private players as well as by the Central government agencies. In other matters so vital to the region such as the Look/Act East Policy, all policy decisions are taken by the Centre in total neglect of the State governments when the North-East is regarded in the policy as the land bridge to the Southeast as well as the nodal point of development. With only 25 Members of Parliament (Lok Sabha, the popular chamber), the region does not perhaps count as much in the making or unmaking of the government at the Centre, let alone in policy decisions including those affecting the region. But the strategic importance of the region goes beyond the numbers. The abolition of the Planning Commission (2014) and along with the Special Category Status of the States (2018) has created legitimately a deep sense of anxiety and uncertainty among the region’s elites to which the socalled (Centre’s) ‘Special Economic Packages’—not above the charge of political discrimination—is hardly an alternative. In short, the apparent anti-federal approach of the Centre to the region goes against the socalled ‘competitive cooperative federalism’ that the Prime Minister Modi has been highlighting so much in his public postures. Political centralization and neglect of the region by the Centre is a bad omen for the region long known for its political insurgency and violence. Second, despite many rounds of reorganization, the relationship between ethnicity and territory remains very uncertain in the region. The experience suggests that perhaps territorialization of ethnicity in the region has not been a rational political decision with very small, economically unviable states afflicted with further ethnic conflicts for territory. Territorialization of tribal ethnicity in the North-East via many ‘micropartitions’ has produced only many small economically unviable States, and sub-States in the shape of the territorial District Councils, which are a testimony to the final limits, as it were, of the so-called ‘unity in

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diversity’ model of nation-building in India in which diversity is recognized, most often politically too, to create the basis of unity grounded in the recognition of multiple ethnic identity. Given the intra-tribal and inter-tribal identity claims compounded by rival claims to territory, any further territorialization of tribal ethnic identity may be a bad omen for legitimacy and governance in the region, especially when the existing territorial boundaries are contested. How, for example, the Nagalim demand of the Naga organizations can be fulfilled which would mean that Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur will have to part with their Naga-inhabited territories? Finally, the reasons why ethno-federal model of management of subnational movements in the mainland happens to be the lesser real risk of secessionism and greater ethnic homogeneity in the movements although, as we have indicated, there are significant ethnic minorities with many territorially rooted in the same areas. Except Kerala and Gujarat, most of the new States so created are multi-ethnic and multi-lingual. In the peripheries, and that too, with international borders the risks for secessionism are real; management of long borders for cross-border insurgent activities, smuggling of arms and drug etc. is a serious challenge and the complexity of tribal ethnicity that defies any clear correspondence with territory has meant that the strategy of territorialization of ethnic conflicts may not work.

References Adeney, K. 2007. Federalism and the Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan. New York: Palgrave McMillan. Bhattacharyya, H. 2001. India as a Multicultural Federation in Comparison with Swiss Federalism. Fribourg: Hellbing and Lichetnhahn. ———. 2008. Ethnic and Civic Nationhood in India: Concept, History, Institutional Innovation and Contemporary Challenges. In Ethnicity and SocioPolitical Change in Africa and Other Developing Countries, ed. S.C. Saha, 169–95. Lanham, US: Lexington Books. ———. 2010. Federalism in Asia: India, Pakistan and Malaysia. London and New York: Routledge. ———. 2017. West Bengal Against the Centre: Continuity in Anti-Centrism in Indian Federal Politics. In Indian Federalism: Emerging Issues, ed. S.K. Jain, 91–115. New Delhi: Kalpaz. ———. 2018. Radical Politics and Governance in India’s North East: The Case of Tripura. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

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———. 2019b. States Reorganization and the Accommodation of EthnoRegional Cleavages in India. In Territory and Power in Constitutional Transition, ed. G. Anderson and S. Chaudhry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2000. Federalism, Decentralization and State-Building in India: Aspects of Centre-State Fiscal Relations. In Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Fragmented Societies, ed. R. Bird and T. Stauffer, 247–305. Fribourg: Institute of Federalism. Bhattacharyya, H., and J. Mukherjee. 2018. Bodo Ethnic Self-Rule and Persistent Violence. Regional and Federal Studies 28 (4). https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13597566.2018.1478293 Bhattacharjee, G. 2016. Special Category States of India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Bhaumik, S. 1999. North East India: The Evolution of a Post-Colonial Region. In Wages of Freedom: Fifty Years of the Indian Nation-State, ed. Partha Chatterjee, 327–36. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Baruah, S. 2005. Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Baruah, S., ed. 2009. Beyond Counter-Insurgency Breaking the Impasse in Northeast India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. ———, ed. 2010. Ethno-Nationalism in India: A Reader. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Hiltz, J. 2003. Construction of Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s. Bulletin of Tibetology 67. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bit stream/handle/1810/243140/bot_2003_02_04.pdf?sequence=1. Sighted on 20 May 2018. Hausing, KK Suan. 2014. Asymmetric Federalism and the Question of Redistributive Justice India’s Northeast. India Review 13 (2): 87–111. Kincaid, J. 2011. Political Coercion and Administrative Cooperation in US. In Varieties of Federal Governance, ed. R. Saxena, 37–54. New Delhi: Cambridge Univerity Press. Malhotra, R. 2014. India Public Policy Report. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Mitra, Subrata K. 2012. Measuring the Mosaic: Caste, Class and Sentiment in Making the Citizen of India. In The Politics of Citizenship, Identity and the State in South Asia. Heidelberg Series in South Asian and Comparative Politics, ed. H. Bhattacharyya, A. Kluge, and L. Koenig, 23–42. New Delhi: Sanskriti. Mukherjee, J. 2014. Conflict Resolution in Multicultural Societies: The Indian Experience. New Delhi: Sage. Smith, A.D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

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Sarangi, A., and S. Pai, eds. 2011. Interrogating States Reorganization: Culture, Ethnicity and Politics in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Tillin, L. 2007. United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 37 (1): 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/ pjl017. Sighted on 20 March 2022. Weiner, M. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

The various chapters in this book above have been centrally preoccupied with the question of India’s asymmetric federal institutional arrangements and their efficacy in identity protection, development and governance. In this book I have adopted an extended conception of asymmetry in Indian federalism since the inauguration of the Constitution, if not before—something missing in the existing literature. I show how the very federation-building process in India has followed an asymmetric method. The book throughout has attempted to answer what India’s federal and asymmetric federal institutions have done in respect of identity, development and governance at both the State and sub-State levels. A larger perspective is offered here in understanding India’s varied forms of federal asymmetry and their effectiveness from the days of the making of the Constitution up to today when India’s political economy has made a major and radical shift since the early 1990s in the wake of India’s adoption of the policy of neo-liberal reforms. I have pursued the inquiry down to the sub-State level asymmetry too in order to offer a comprehensive account of federal asymmetry thus far not studied as well as detailed case materials on how such institutions actually work in promoting and protecting identity, producing better development and governance. Two case study materials from India’s North-East— not seen usually as an exemplar of development and governance, and always treated, condescendingly, as a test case of militancy and political

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0_12

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violence—of sub-State asymmetric institutions, and their actual functioning; in the latter, I sought to explain when representative institutions in India work, sometimes, and when they do not do so. A dynamic neoinstitutional approach, as distinguished from static neo-institutionalism (e.g. Singh 2022) followed in this study has sought to highlight the role of institutions, actors and context, and to show how the appropriate combination of them, if any, can produce better results in producing protection of ethnic identity, development and governance; and when ill-designed institutions fail and produce an unusual and disastrous results. The larger perspective within which the materials in this book have been critically treated needs some re-emphasis. This is the question of what is called ‘the politics of recognition’ in the current liberal discourse. India’s experience in this regard since the 1950s, if not before, has worked. It has been a multi-staged and very cautious approach (Bhattacharyya 2019b). The success in those cases meant, by and large, lessening the level of ethnic conflicts and mobilizations, and violence in favour of more enduring ethnic peace and political stability, which has produced better development and governance. Today the yardsticks of measuring any success or failure of governments are different from the olden days when the sole criterion was governmental stability (Mitra 1978). Myron Weiner (1968) in identifying the methods of studying state politics in India was also puzzled by how to measure governmental performance in the absence of statistical evidence, and that too, consistent, Weiner had to settle down for governmental stability as the marker of governance. Things have since improved, and so has the expansion of the notion of governance. Today not only governmental stability, law and order and political violence are considered as important variables of measuring governance, but also the socio-economic variables more particularly relating to the delivery of services and goods are considered very important (Mitra and Bhattacharyya, 2018: 276–307). Officially since the inauguration of the Indian Constitution, if not before, any ethnic ‘homeland’ demand has, however, been ruled out. Indians are thought to have only one homeland, that is, India. But in practice, the various ‘ethnic homelands’ have been recognized. India’s federation building through ‘states reorganization’ has entailed almost an unending process of recasting its territory in order to right-size the political map. Various States and sub-States that have resulted from this process are all based on some kind of rhetoric of ethnic self-determination in a homeland, whether based on language, region, religion (in part),

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tribal affiliations, or a combination thereof. But the so-called successes of some dominant ethnic groups in having eked out a State for them within the federation with relatively autonomous powers have not been unblemished: ethnic minorities, or the so-called ‘micro-minorities’ produced as a result of the process have faced exclusion on many counts; their language rights as fundamental rights fared very badly at the grassroots (Report of the Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities, Government of India, 2011: 76). No wonder, they began demanding a State, or a sub-State for them as a redress. Added to that are the various brands of ‘nativist’ movements that defended, not always unjustly, the principle of ‘sons of the soil’ (Weiner 1978) and or what is called the ‘ethnic homeland’. Baruah (2010) has informed us of the proliferation of such discourse in India’s North-East, which often results in a tiny-sized territorial concession to some ethnic group who formed a Tribal District Council (under the 6th Schedule of the Indian Constitution) that is not economically viable. And yet, economic viability was one of the criteria that the SRC (1955) adopted in recommended in state creation, but the governments of the day since have much deviated from such principle for often short-term political goals. In Chapter 1 we have introduced the subject, defined the problems, considered a revised template of federalism, discussed the cocneptual framework of asymmetric federalism, and the issues of exclusion and inclusion, issue of ethnic homeland in federalism. We have discussed also our methodology. In Chapter 2 we have analyzed the conceptual issues of asymmetric federalism and examined the current debates on the concept. We have highlighted the special importance of the concept in multi-ethnic, diverse countries, and made with reference to India a plea for considering the sub-State level autonomous institutions into the conceptual framework of asymmetric federalism. The subject matter of Chapter 3 is rather novel. Here I have explored critically the state-making process in India since 1950 as asymmetric and pointed out as how the idea of the States have evolved with differential powers and status. The Making of the Six Schedule providing for self-government for the hill tribes in India’s North-East is also offered here utilizing the debates in the Constituent Assembly. We pointed out the special sign finance of the 6th Schedule. I have used the expression ‘asymmetry within asymmetry’ for the ten such Councils in operation in the region that fall within the States which are asymmetric. The States

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in the North-East have also undergone a similar process. Such asymmetric approach in the making and unmaking of the States in India has proved very effective for the often cautious and steady nature. The asymmetric States in the North-East were not created in one go. Except Assam which a directly governed Province under British rule, the rest underwent territorial evolution with asymmetric status—District Councils to Union Territory to finally statehood. In Chapter 4 we have identified various forms of federal asymmetries in India various forms of the States, sub-States and other agencies with special powers to meet the special situations all over India. It has dealt with de jure and de facto asymmetry, and various other forms of powersharing, and argued that the gamut of asymmetry in India’s federalism is quite complex and large indeed, but this has proved functional for the internal cohesion and unity in this vast multicultural country. The various levels of power-sharing down to the sub-State levels (e.g. tribal district councils) have paved the basis of the insurgents and the militates to transform themselves into stakeholders at various levels of the Indian polity. Chapter 5 has as its subject matter fiscal asymmetry in Indian federalism starting with the Finance Commission, the Special Category States and other financial transfers to the States and sub-State level local selfgovernments. In this chapter, we have noted the recent changes in Indian federalism with particular reference to the 14th and 15th Finance Commissions (2021–22), scrapping of the SCSs in 2018 but retention of the Annual Plan Assistance; and various other transfers by way of projects of development, infrastructure and empowerment in the hilly border States and the North-East, and the formation of the DoNER as a separate and intendent ministry for the North-East. The most important aspect covered in this chapter is the comparative performance records in development and governance in the ex-SCS particularly since the 1990s. I argued there that the olden image of the North-East, in particular, as the home of militancy and political violence may no longer hold true, and tried to make a plea to abjure the so-called ‘insurgency approach’ (e.g. Baruah, 2005 and 2010) in understanding the region. India’s asymmetric States were rooted in ethnic cleavages. In Chapter 6 we provided a critical account of the interface between social and cultural cleavages, on the one hand, and the rise of the States with asymmetric powers and status, on the other. I have argued there that most of India’s States carry some ethnic content and character in the sense that some kind

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of ethnic factor was responsible for their creation. We have offered a broad overview of all the Special Category States and make pointed reference to identity-based sub-State level asymmetry. However, we have argued that there should be an end in what is called ‘micro-partitioning’ India with too many little governments especially with regard to the tribals in the North-East who go on demanding a territory of their own while not believing in territorial boundaries as such! I have pointed out that after all governments mean public expenditure, and more governments means more public expenditure. This of course raises the tricky question of where to stop, and what is the optimal level (Bhattacharyya 2019a). Chapter 7 discusses the Special Category States in India, their origins and development, and governmental performance in terms of development, governance and identity protection. It shows that despite the withdrawal of the system in formal terms, the subject of Central Plan Assistance to the States in the peripheries remain. It finally, examines the implications of India’s neo-liberal reforms for the future prospects of the States in the peripheral areas of India. The subject matter of Chapter 8 was ‘asymmetry within asymmetry’ in India federalism. It sought to bring out the constitutional debates on the institutional forms of self-governance for the tribes of India in the North-East and those in the mainland. It shows that the provisions of the 5th Schedule for tribal self-governance in the mainland of India where most tribes live are inadequate and less empowering than that of the 6th Schedule meant for the hill tribes of North-East India. The former has provided only for a Tribal Advisory Council which has been of little effects in protecting the rights of the tribes while the latter has provided for tribal self-governing bodies. It has paid attention to the working of ten Tribal Autonomous Districts Councils in the North-East. It has shown the seriousness of the Bordoli Committee of the CA, and highlighted the quality of debates on the 6th Schedule compared to the 5th Schedule which received only perfunctory attention of the founding fathers. Chapters 9 and 10 are case study chapters that offered critical accounts of the formation, composition and performance of the two district council—Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council and the Bodoland Territorial Council respectively. In a way, these are cases in contrast. In the case of the ADC (Tripura), it has been a case of relative success story by being one of the longest serving Council with more homogeneous and concentrated tribal groups in the eastern areas of Tripura. In Tripura, the tribal ethnic identity question and their protection were initially related

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to their loss of land to the settler Bengalis who are now over 70% of the population. The tribal pro-nationalist organization the TRUGMP (GMP for short) in association with the CPI/CPI-M defended tribal interests and tried to restore lands illegally transferred, but subsequently settled down for a new definition of protection of tribal identity by de-linking it from the land questions and re-linking it to enjoyment of government welfare programmes, and making maximum use of them (Bhattacharyya 2023: 273–86). However, the ADC’s fate dwindled when it is governed by a different political party that was in power at the State level. With the LFG led by the CPI-M in power at the State level and the same Left coalition in power at the ADC, it was a royal combination that produced better results for the tribals in Tripura. In fine, the most important reason why the ADC has been a success story is its institutionalization for over three decades. The BTC formed in 2003, by contrast, is another story. It is ill-fated in the sense that the Bodos are a minority (about 30%) in the region confronted with a huge majority of multiple communities. What has added further fuel to the fury is that 30 seats in the 40-member Council have been reserved for the Bodos to make them a political majority—a clear defiance of the democratic principle in a situation where multiple ethnic communities reside for ages. The ill-designed institutional framework has paved the basis for persistent inter-conflict and violence. This has also cleared the deck for the non-Bodos (about 70%) to countermobilize against the BPF, the main party of the Bodos, and appeared as a formidable challenge to the Bodos who are losing grounds, politically speaking. The results have been ethnic cleansing, and riots which sent thousands of the Bodos and non-Bodos to government relief camps apart from hundreds of death and many thousands injured. The detailed account in Chapter 10 shows that the counter-mobilization has taken place and the Bodo People’s Front, the party of the Bodos has been increasingly lost ground so that in the last elections in 2021 it formed a coalition with its erstwhile adversary, the BJP. With the BJP-led coalition in the State in which the BPF is a partner, a large sum has been earmarked in the MDoNER for the ‘Special packages for Bodoland’. Some limited development and improvement in human development has taken place but here most of the people are landless and above 70% rural household in some districts under the BTC are without basic amenities. I have explained in Chapter 10 the problematic concept of ‘homeland’ for the Bodos. In the survey (elite interviews) we have seen that the other

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communities (Hindus, Muslims, Assamese, Santhals and others) also call the region their ‘homeland’ too. Therefore, the institutional working in this case remains mired in ethnic claims and counter-claims, and conflicts, and those in power often are bent on converting the minority into a majority by means, fair and foul. To be precise, the failure of Bodoland Territorial Council lies in its institutional ill-design. Even if the BTC has relatively failed, or some other Councils elsewhere in India have failed to deliver, that does not lead to political instability in the country because of two reasons: first, such conflicts are localized with little spillover effects; and second, where such experiments have been successful that have meant territorialization of conflicts, and some value addition to the overall political stability and order in the country. Chapter 11 has dealt with the comparative aspects of asymmetric federalism in India, and highlighted the best practices in institutional working in resolving ethnic conflicts, delivering better development and governance. It has also how in the wake of India’s neo-liberal reforms the asymmetric States especially in the North-East have suffered in matters of their special rights and autonomy. It has shown that while the region has been considered as the land bridge to South-East Asia in India’s new foreign policy initiative titled ‘Look/Act East Policy’ the stakeholders in the region have not been adequately involved in policy taking . With the establishment of a new Union Ministry called Ministry of Development of the North-Eastern region (MDoNER) more ministrialisation has taken place especially when so far not a single member of Parliament from the region has been appointed the Minister in charge of the above ministry. Finally, this chapter has shown that while territorial autonomy has proved quite effective in resolving ethnic conflicts, there are incessant demands for more, which does not appear to be a viable option. Given the very complex ethnic situation relative to territory in the region, some ethnic conflicts will remain unresolved, and suggested that territorial solutions have limits, and there is a need for considering consociation measures to supplant the territorial representation. From the foregoing it is clear that the reasons why India has stayed united amidst diversity and democracy, despite many odds, lie in her ability to adapt ideas and institutions, which had their origins in the Western political theory and discourses and federalism, to suit local circumstances and needs. India’s innovation in institutions and ideas in the applied pool of federalism in this regard can hardly be underestimated. True, a majoritarian model of democracy at any level of the polity excludes

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others from power-sharing. This has created problems of representation and redistribution especially for the tribals in India’s North-East. For example, the creation of the State of Meghalaya did not resolve the problems of all the tribals, but seemed to empower one dominant group of the Khasis. The Garos, the second-largest tribal community in the State resented. A Garo Tribal District Council under the 6th Schedule was formed to address their problems of self-government. There are provisions in the 6th Schedule that the State Governor can nominate up to 4 persons from communities which are not otherwise represented in the decision-making body. This addresses the issue of non-territorial representation, a kind of consociationalism a la Lijphart (1969 & 1977). When it is so done it is a case of both self-rule and shared rule writ small, the most essential conditions of federalism. In the days of India’s ongoing neo-liberal reforms Indian federalism and asymmetric federal institutions are facing challenges. Some old structures have been abolished and replaced by new ones. The abolition of the Planning Commission in 2014, abolition of Article 370 and conversion of the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir into a Union Territory (under Central control), abolition of the concept of Special Category States in 2014 are some examples of the old structures being abolished. The new institutions and structures are as follows: the introduction of the GST and the formation of the GST Council in 2016; formation of the NITI Aayog and the MDoNER (2004) etc. When the Plan Assistance (now called Normal Central Assistance) with the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula remains, a diluted form of SCS is said to be existing (Reddy and Reddy 2019). But this may not be as simple. It is found out, for example, that in the case of Himachal Pradesh, such assistance based on the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula is said to be available provided the State complete certain projects in time. While the SCS has been withdrawn, the asymmetric status of some States, most notably in the North-East remains (Article 371). The funding for the erstwhile SCSs has in fact increased manifold via the MDoNER and several other projects of the Union government for the hill States in India. The most significant area of change in the post-1991 period has been the shift of the command economy to a market economy, and the retuning of India’s political institutions to the new task. In so far as the States in general are concerned, it has been a change for their greater autonomy of policy taking and action in matters of investment (foreign and indigenous), and trade and commerce in their domain which has set

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in motion a competition among the States. This newfound autonomy of the States for the first time ever since 1950 has been so possible by the fiat of executive federalism rather than by constitutional change or amendments. As I have shown elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 1999, 2012), this new definition of the States’ rights has resulted in new regional disparity in development so that in human development terms, there are in India broadly two types of States: forward and backward. Rao and Singh (2005: 382) have identified wide disparity among the States in terms of FDI in the States. The States in the North-East have received little or nothing FDI. Reddy and Reddy (2019) have observed that the role of the governments (Union and States) in matters of public expenditure has decreased, but there is ‘more competition between the Centre and States to provide private goods, or subsidized private goods, than for public goods such as road and law and order’ (p. 262). The study made by Bhattacharyya (2018: 63–66) on the North-East shows that a precarious situation has arisen in India’s advanced States where high growth and low level of the rule of law co-exist. As Mitra and Bhattacharyya (2018) have argued, this called for revision of the existing understanding of governance in India as advanced by Atul Kohli (1990). While the States in India are enjoying more rights in India’s ‘market federalism’, the same cannot be said to be true for all the States, as we have already indicated above. There is resentment though expressed by the weaker States—formerly SCSs—that there is more centralization and increased encroachment by the Centre in the domain of the States (Elite interviews in Chapter 5). Many political elites in the North-East complained about the Centre’s one-size-fit-all policy that does not apply to the specific situation in the North-East. There is also scholarly reservation corroborating the above. As Reddy and Reddy (2019: 262) wrote: The concern of the States is that their administrative machinery and funds are used to implement the Centre’s programmes. The institutional framework needs to be revised in order to address, even if partially, these complex issues.

This is mostly relating to the Centrally sponsored Schemes and Central Sector programmes; 100 days rural employment programmes (MNREGA 2005) which was adopted in 2005 and there is a policy continuity from the then UPA-1 and 11 to the NDA regimes since 2014. Although BJP,

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and PM Modi, in particular, was not very enthusiastic about its continuation, electoral compulsions and the popular sentiments around it were not easy to overcome. So the programmes continue with larger funding. However, there is an unmistakable trend in centralization so far as the Act East Policy was concerned. In the policy, the North-East is supposed to be bridge to the Far East, the Chief Ministers of the States in the regions were not taken into confidence although in implementing several projects the administrative cooperation has been much sought after. Certainly, the abolition of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution that assured the ‘special status’ of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (it was also a SCS) appears a blow to India’s asymmetric federalism. The issue of revocation of the action is still far from resolved but there is a promise made by no less a public functionary than Mr. Amit Shah, the Home Minister of the Union government (https://www.hindustantimes.com/ india-news/what-amit-shah-said-on-jammu-and-kashmir-in-parliament10-points-101613207499312.html) (The Hindustan Times 18 March 2020). If development is a concern for the State, then its performance since the 1990s, (Chapter 7) has been quite satisfactory. So underdevelopment could no longer be held against the State. Constitutionally though, Articles 370 and 371 were not only ‘special provisions’ but ‘temporary’ too. Technically one has had very little to argue against its abolition since it was part of the electoral Manifesto of the NDA led by the BJP and with huge popular mandate in 2014 and 2019 the electoral promise was materialized. Finally, India’s neo-liberal reforms have impacted both federalism and asymmetric federalism in India. The States’ strategic importance in carrying out those reforms has been clear to the Centre. The items in the State list, in particular, land, its reforms, use and acquit ion, public health, law and order and water supply etc. are much needed to implement reforms, but the same cannot be so done without the States concerned being willing and consider themselves partners in globalization. While this has opened up opportunities for some States, others have responded negatively. There are also records of the Centre cajoling and coercing the States to swallow the sweet-bitter pill of globalization (Bhattacharyya 2009) in respect of reforms in many sectors. Certainly with a sway of globalization over the last three decades or so, the Centre–State relations can hardly be understood in term of existing constitutional provisions. No wonder, a Second Centre–State Relations Commission known as the Punchi Commission after its Chairman Justice (former Chief Justice of the

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Supreme Court) M. M. Punchi was set up in 2007 following a government notification dated 30 September 2005 to review the existing Union and States relations in the light of the changes in India following neoliberal reforms. The Commission has submitted its seven-volume reports to the Government of India. The tenor of the Terms of Reference of the Commission is quote-worthy: Are the existing arrangements governing Centre–State relations—legislative, executive and financial—envisaged in the Constitution, as they have evolved over the years, working in a manner that can meet the aspirations of the Indian society as also the requirements of an increasingly globalized world? If not, what are the impediments, and how can they be remedied without violating the basic structure of the Constitution? (Vol 1, p. xxii, Commission on Centre–State Relation, March 2010)

The space here does not permit any further discussion on the reports and the recommendations, but a close look at the summary and conclusions suggests that in the Commission’s concept of ‘collaborative federalism’ there is a vision of a federalism of strong Centre with strong States, focus on the backward regions, and the North-East for development and investment, and stopping of the ‘one-size-fit-all’ public policy in order to respect diversity. The Commission has also highlighted the importance of local governments, and urged that the money to the latter should not bypass the State governments. However, a detailed critical study of the report of the Commission in seven volumes from the perspective of federalism and asymmetric federalism is left to the future researchers.1 What is clear though is that the Commission defended more space for private players (‘increasing the space for private participation in governance’), civil society involvement in policy taking and implementation, Centre suo motto intervention in times of communal riots and caste conflicts, need for ‘public hearing’ in the Panchayats and the Municipalities etc. are at once redolent of the basic urges of globalization as well as transparent and responsible government at all layers of the government.2 Be that as it may, when asymmetric institutional measures (special regional autonomy) are being introduced in some parts of the world to respond to the special needs of that region (e.g. the Muslim regions in the south of the Philippines in 2018) (Bhattacharyya 2019a: 191), even though the county itself is not federal, sustenance of asymmetry in Indian federalism

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is a must if India wants to keep its ethnically diverse peripheries stable and peaceful.

Notes 1. The Economic Times dated 25 May 2018 reported that the Inter-State Council deliberated on the reports of the Commission and decided to take a close look at the 272 recommendations in due course. (https:// economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/deliberationson-punchhi-commission-report-completed/articleshow/64320379.cms?fro m=mdr) sighted on 18/3/22. 2. See volume 7 of the Reports on the Punchhi Commission 8.(http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/ Chapter 06/volume7.pdf) sighted on 20/3/22.

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Index

A Aboriginal rights, 22 Accommodation of diversity, 3, 24, 28, 48, 58, 69 Act East Policy, 104, 165, 177, 180, 192 ADC, 15, 18, 32, 56, 116–136, 189 ADC performance, 119, 122, 125 ADC’s expenditure, 134, 135 ADC’s Plan Fund, 126, 134 Additional package, 156 Adeney, K., 26, 168 Adi, 172 Advisory Body, 177 Africa, 167 AFSPA (1958), 178, 179 AGP’s campaign, 170 Agranoff, R., 12, 28, 30–32 Ahom Sahitya Sabha, 143 AIFB, 121 All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), 144, 149, 153 American States, 10 Andalsia, 23 Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 44

Anderson, B., 21 Andhra Pradesh, 44, 59, 70, 168 Annual Account of Expenditure, 134 Anti-Centrism, 10 Ao, 86, 172, 174 Arora, B., 57, 58, 67, 69 Article 370 (J & K), 1, 42, 47, 60, 68, 78, 169, 191, 193 Article 371A, 59, 87 Art of associating, 14 Arunachal Pradesh, 51, 60, 79, 80, 83, 84, 88, 90, 91, 100, 170–172, 176, 178, 181 Asia, 23, 25, 167, 177 Asian federation, 169 Assam, 15, 18, 19, 32, 44, 48–50, 52, 56, 59, 60, 74, 79, 83, 85, 86, 89, 90, 93–96, 99, 100, 102, 103, 141–146, 148–151, 154, 156–161, 165, 166, 170, 172, 174–176, 178, 181, 187 Assam Budget, 156 Assamese Hindus, 142 Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), 85, 89, 93, 148, 173, 176, 178

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Bhattacharyya, Asymmetric Federalism in India, Federalism and Internal Conflicts, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23727-0

209

210

INDEX

Assam Rifles, 95 Assam Tribal League, 143 Assimilation, 48–51, 111, 143, 144 Associate States, 92 Association of States, 5 Asymmetry within asymmetry, 32, 49, 56, 58, 68, 78, 109, 187 Auditor-General, 134 Austin, G., 42, 52 Autonomism, 23 Autonomous powers, 79, 92, 107, 108, 187 Autonomous Tribal District/Regional Council, 15, 45, 49, 51, 58, 88, 90, 101, 105, 107–110, 113, 114, 156 Autonomy, 2–4, 8, 11–13, 15, 24, 25, 31, 32, 34, 40, 41, 45–47, 49–51, 58, 60, 61, 66, 69, 70, 78, 86, 88, 90, 92, 107, 111–113, 131, 144, 147, 148, 152, 167, 169, 170, 174, 175, 180, 191, 194 Autonomy to minority groups, 24 B Backward Districts Development Grant Fund, 101 Bakshi, P.M., 59, 60, 63, 71, 74, 94, 108, 110, 150, 160 Balanced approach, 40, 42 Balkanization, 90 Bangladesh, 25, 80, 82, 83, 117, 136, 170, 171 Bordoloi Committee, 49 Baruah, S., 80, 91, 93, 96, 141, 146, 160, 170, 175, 187, 188 Basis of State making (India), 40 Basque Country, 23 Bengal, 83, 88, 147, 171, 175, 179 Bengali landed interests, 119 Bengali Muslims, 142

Bezbaruah, M.P., 170 Bhattacharyya, H., 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 22–26, 29, 41, 43, 44, 55, 60, 67, 77, 85, 92, 94, 116, 118, 141, 155, 168–171, 173, 174, 186, 189, 191–194 Bhaumik, S., 80, 81, 92, 141, 170 Bhutan, 80, 82, 170 Bihar, 44, 46 Bird, R., 65, 67 BJP, 1, 78, 120–122, 142, 145, 149, 153, 154, 176, 190, 192, 193 BJP-INLT Alliance, 121 Blondel, J., 115 Bodo ‘homeland’, 145 Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC), 113, 141, 144, 148 Bodoland in Assam, 32, 56 Bodoland Liberation Tigers, 141, 144 Bodoland Territorial Authority, 85, 173 Bodoland Territorial Council, 18, 110, 111, 113, 141, 147, 153, 189 Bodo People’s Committee, 148 Bodo People’s Front, 149, 152, 153, 190 Bodos, 89, 110, 111, 113, 114, 141–148, 150–154, 159, 160, 166, 172, 189, 190 Bodo Volunteers Force, 141 Bombay, 42, 44 Border Security Forces (BSF), 94, 95 Brahmaputra Valley, 85, 173 Brass, P.R., 72 British Crown, 41 Bru Tribal District Council, 90 Bureaucratic cost, 135 Burgess, M., 2, 5, 12, 14, 23, 26, 33 Bwiswmuthiary, S.K., 149

INDEX

C Canada, 23, 31 Canton and half-Cantons, 4, 6 Central America, 25 Central control, 60, 191 Central plan assistance, 17, 105 Central pool resources, 104 Central Rule (Article 356), 165, 178 Chakladar, S., 143, 146, 147, 149 Chakma, 90, 121 Chakrabarti, Nripen, 117 Chaube, S.K., 80 Chief Commissioners’ Provinces, 43 Chief Executive Committee, 121 China, 80, 82, 92, 170 Choudhuri, Rohini Kumar, 48 Christian, 45, 83, 91, 171, 176, 177 Christianity, 9, 102, 176 Citizenship, 22, 24, 27 Civic identity, 28 Civic Loyalty, 10 Civic values, 29 Civil and criminal justice, 59, 87 Civil order, 81 Classical federalism, 21 Coakley, J., 167 Collaborative federalism, 194 Commissioner of Linguistic Minorities, 50th report, 84, 94, 171 Common identity in each State, 88, 175 Communes, 26 Communism, 116, 118 Communitarianism, 22 Compact space, 11 Competitive records of governance, 91 Complex tribes, 146 Congress (INC), 119 Congress-TUJS-TNV alliance, 119 Consociationalism, 191

211

Constituent Assembly, 39, 41, 47–49, 112, 143, 187 Constitutional Amendments, 73rd and 74th (India), 74, 75 Constitutional recognition, 21, 67 Constitutional safeguards, 62 ‘Corporate federalism’, 21, 34, 62, 169 Corridors of power, 13, 88, 175 CPI, 118, 119, 121, 189 CPI-M, 116–123, 127, 130, 131, 189 Cross-border, 181 CRPF, 95 Customary laws and procedures, 59, 87, 148 Czechoslovakia, 25

D Daimary, T., 152 Dar Commission, 43 Datta, P.S., 93, 147, 148 Decentralization within the ADC, 136 Defence of traditions, 10 Defensive alliance, 4, 21 Delhi, 1, 44, 73, 178 Demands for identity, 78, 92 Demands for recognition, 11 Demographic transformation, 83, 171 Deployment of security forces, 92 Deprivation, 10, 59, 83, 143, 156, 157, 160, 163 Descriptive category, 7 Devbarma, Dasarath, 118 Development and better identity, 91 Development index of J and K, 104 Dhalai district (Tripura), 159 Difference, 5, 6, 8–10, 16, 21, 22, 24, 30, 32, 49, 56, 57, 68, 149, 168 Differentiated its structures, 123 Dimasas, 172

212

INDEX

Diminished state sovereignty, 28 Discrimination, 106, 143, 145, 146, 163, 180 Disintegration, 2, 6, 25, 28, 47, 66, 67 Distinct regional identity, 87, 175 Diversity and power sharing, 13 Diversity and Swiss federalism, 9 Diversity-claims compare (equality-claims), 23 Dominant Mizo Community, 86, 174 Dominant tribe, 86, 174 Duchacek, I., 9, 30 Dufflon, B., 3, 4 Dynamic neo-institutional approach, 3, 186 E East Pakistan, 83, 88, 171, 175 Economic Survey, 128 Elazar, D., 6, 22, 25, 26 Elite instrumentalities, 167 English, 85, 86, 172, 173 Enlightenment, 27 Environmental, 132 Equality-claims, 23 Equal representation, 6 Equity, 22, 58, 68, 71 Establishment of Village Committee, 131 Ethnic, 2, 3, 6, 8–15, 17, 18, 21–24, 28–31, 33–35, 39, 42, 55, 57–59, 66, 67, 77–89, 91–94, 102, 103, 111, 116, 117, 142–152, 155, 159, 160, 163–176, 180, 181, 186–190 Ethnic and tribal identity, 12 Ethnic cleansing, 11, 144, 145, 150–152, 189 Ethnic cleavages, 17, 77, 78, 91, 111, 188 Ethnic conflict management, 167

Ethnic conflicts, 2, 11, 13, 18, 78–80, 83, 86–88, 94, 130, 164, 165, 168, 169, 171, 175, 180, 181, 186 Ethnic diversity, 23, 55, 77, 79, 83, 147, 163, 166, 167 Ethnic elements, 92 Ethnic elites, 13, 66, 160 Ethnic heterogeneity, 167, 175 Ethnicity and territory, 79, 166, 167, 169, 173, 180 Ethnic militancy, 85, 91, 173 Ethnic movements, 18, 92 Ethnic Origins of Nations Oxford, 19 Ethnic peace accords, 13, 18, 82, 144, 147–150, 170 Ethnic self-rule, 143 Ethno-linguistic, 4, 39, 66, 86, 88, 167, 174 Ethno-regional, 4, 23, 62, 66, 165 Ethno-territorial model, 165 Eviction of Bengalis out of Tripura, 117 Exclusion, 6, 28, 34, 143, 145, 149, 159, 163, 167, 187

F Fascism, 2 FDI in the States, 192 Federal governance, 6, 25, 29, 136 Federalism, 1–16, 18, 21, 22, 24–34, 55–57, 60, 62, 65–67, 69–72, 91, 99, 100, 105, 107, 109, 115, 142, 163–166, 169, 179, 180, 185, 187, 188, 190–194 Federalism and identity, 27 Federal loyalty, 10 Federal practices, 23 Federal second chamber, 6 Federation, 3–10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 24, 25, 27–30, 32–34, 39–45,

INDEX

55–58, 60, 62, 65–69, 77, 79, 87, 88, 168, 169, 185–187 Finance Commission, 1, 17, 62, 67, 69, 71–73, 75, 100, 106, 111, 123, 130, 133–136, 138, 188 Finance linked to diversity, 66, 67 Financial transfer, 61, 67, 69, 70, 188 Fiscal equalization, 1, 3, 67 Fiscal federalism (Indian model of), 67 Formula-based system, 72 Fraser, N., 22 Free market economy, 99 Friedrich, C., 9 Full states, 43 Funds transfer, 70

G Gadgil formula, 101, 105, 106 Gadgil-Mukherjee formula, 100, 101, 105, 191 Gagnon, A., 23 Gait, E.A., 146, 147 Galicia, 23 Gana Mukti Parishad (GMP), 116 Garo Hills District, 86, 174 Garos, 86, 89, 91, 111, 174, 190 Gassabh, L.S., 111 Geographical vastness, 9 George, S.J., 149, 150, 160 Ghettoization, 35 Golden Temple, 169 Governance, 2, 3, 6–8, 14, 15, 18, 28, 30, 32–34, 45, 46, 56, 60, 61, 66, 81, 86, 92–94, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 113, 130, 132, 148, 155, 156, 174, 175, 178, 181, 185, 186, 188, 192 Governance (measuring), 186 Government of India Act 1935, 41 Grants-in-aid, 35, 71

213

GST, 191 Gujaratis, 11, 79 Gurkha regiment, 95 Guwahati City Committee, 152

H Half-states, 43 Hamkraini Yakhili, 126 Hausing, S., 85, 170, 173 Hill areas development programmes, 104 Hill councils, 61 Hill districts, 80, 85, 173 Hill Tribes of North-East, 13, 45, 49, 51, 107, 108, 114, 136, 187 Himachal Pradesh, 57, 60, 68, 69, 77, 81, 95, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108, 165, 170, 191 Hindu subjects, 40 Hirschman, A., 66 Hmar tribe, 86, 174 Hobsbawm, E., 24 Homeland, 11, 13, 14, 141, 143, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 175, 186, 190 Homeland demand, 11, 145, 146 Homeland of Plain Tribal, 143 Home rule, 23, 31 Hostels for the tribal students, 127 Human Development Index (HDI), 102, 103, 105, 132, 136, 158, 164

I Identity, 2–4, 8, 12–14, 18, 21–24, 27–29, 33, 39, 51, 57, 58, 62, 66, 68, 69, 78, 79, 83, 85–88, 92, 100, 102, 103, 113, 116, 118, 127, 129–131, 136, 137, 143, 146, 152, 153, 156, 158,

214

INDEX

160, 164, 168, 169, 171–177, 181, 185, 186, 188, 189 Identity turn in federalism, 79 Immigrants, 82 Incessant violence, 33, 56 Inclusive governance, 33, 56 India’s majoritarian mode of democracy, 166 India’s North-East, 6, 17, 48, 60, 69, 113, 116, 117 Indian National Congress (INC), 39, 41, 42, 45, 48, 119, 167 Indian Union, 78, 147 Individual and group rights, 22 Innovative instrument, 82 INPT, 120–123, 125, 131 Institutional designs, 69, 115 Institutional ill-designing, 113, 156 Institutional innovation, 130 Institutionalization of ethnic radicalism, 93, 94 Institutional reform, 105 Insurgent activities, 181 Inter-ethnic conflicts, 86, 174 Inter-tribal amity and equality, 115 Intra-tribal and community, 160 IPFT, 119, 120 J Jamatia, 121, 146 Janata Dal (U), 120 Jangustio Aikyo Mancha, 153 Jhumias , 126, 128 JVP report, 43 Jyoti Das, Arun, 152 K Kachari, 146, 147, 151 Kammas, 168 Karbi Anglong, 94, 144 Karnataka, 59, 168

Katzenstein, M., 176 Kerala, 44, 168, 181 Khasis, 86, 172, 174, 190 Kim, H., 169 Kincaid, J., 10, 33, 164 King, R., 44 Kirit Prodyot Devbarma, 121 Koch, 146 Kok-Borok, 84, 87, 118, 127, 130, 132, 133, 171, 175 Konyak, 86, 172, 174 Kuki, 86, 173 Kumar, B.B., 80

L Lacina, B., 170 Ladakh, 1, 18 Lai, 90, 110 Land alienation, 113, 143 Land and habitats, 87, 175 Landlessness, 158, 159 Language of federalism, 27 Language rights, 187 Language(s), 9, 10, 14, 27, 40, 42–44, 61, 62, 69, 84–87, 90–92, 102, 118, 125, 127, 130, 132, 133, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 168, 172–174, 176, 186, 187 Large scale displacement, 155 Laski, H., 2 Left Front (LF), 117, 119–121, 123, 138 Left parties, 120 Liberalism, 13, 22, 24 Liberty of individuals, 13 Limited resources, 132 Lingayats, 168 Linguistic diversity, 84–87, 171, 172, 174, 175 Linguistic minority, 43

INDEX

Linguistic States, 43 Livingstone, W.S., 9, 30 Lok Sabha elections, 60, 154 Look East Policy, 104 Loyalties in federalism, 10 M Macro-economic stability, 72 Madhya Pradesh, 44 Madras, 44 Mahanta, Prafulla Kumar, 89 Maharashtra, 42, 166 Majoritarian model, 6, 190 Major security concern, 92 Majumdar, A.K., 143 Malaysia, 169 Malhotra, R., 60, 102, 103, 127 Management of ethnic conflicts and peace, 130 Manipur, 44, 60, 79, 85, 86, 90, 99, 173, 174, 176, 178, 181 Manipuri, 85–87, 173 Marathis, 11 Markell, P., 22 Maro, 90 Maximum autonomy, 160 McGarry, J., 28, 31 MDoNER, 1, 79, 104, 105, 156, 177, 180, 190, 191 Measuring development and governance, 186 Meech, 146 Meitei, 86, 173 Memorandum, 133–135, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 153 Memorandum to the Government of Assam, 146 Menon, V.P., 41, 42, 78 Militancy in North-East, 80 Minority rights, 22 Mitra, S.K., 88, 93, 137, 170, 175, 186, 192

215

Mizo accord, 93 MNF, 93 MNREGA, 129, 192 Modernization, 27 Money-lenders, 117, 119 Moreno, L., 23, 35 Mukherjee, J., 85, 141, 155, 173 Multi-cultural, 9, 17, 111, 168 Multiculturalism, 22, 90, 147, 159 Multi-ethnic body, 115 Multi-lingual, 62, 168, 181 Multiple research methods, 15 Multi-tiered federalism, 6, 28 Municipalities, 4, 26, 69, 71, 101, 194 Muslim majority, 77 Muslim Mirror, 145 Muslim princes, 40 Myanmar, 80, 82, 92, 170

N Naga identity, 86, 174 Nagalim, 60, 80, 85, 86, 90, 147, 173, 181 Naga nationhood, 86, 174 Naga peace convention, 13 Nagas are not coherent group, 86, 174 Naga settlements, 86, 173 Naga Socialist Council, 80 Naga’s resistance, 147 Nation, 2, 12, 14 National Democratic Force of Bodoland, 141 Nationalism, 24, 44, 83, 118, 130 National self-determinism, 14, 27, 147 Nation building, 2, 142 Nationhood, 11, 14, 29, 48, 92, 167 Nation-states, 4, 22, 24, 27, 167 Natural calamity, 72

216

INDEX

Natural gas, 72 Natural resources, 61, 70 Nazism, 2 NDA, 1, 78, 160, 177, 192, 193 NEDA, 160 NEFA, 80, 85, 178 Negotiation for peace (read power and autonomy), 93 Nehru, J., 43, 66 Neo-liberalism, 106 Neo liberal reforms, 1, 164, 185, 191, 193 Nepali community, 87, 174 Nissi/Dafla, 172 NITI Aayog, 100, 159, 177, 191 NLFT, 119, 120 Non-territorial representation, 6 Normal Plan Assistance, 99–101, 156 Normative category, 5 Normative value in federalism, 14 North Cachar hills district, 94 North-East, 1, 15, 17, 68, 79, 102, 144 North Eastern Council, 177 North Eastern Livelihood Projects, 104 Nossiter, T.J., 118 O Odisha, 44 Official language policy, 22 One-size fit all, 192, 194 P Pakistan, 25, 39 Pali, S., 43, 168 Panchayats, 51, 61, 69, 71, 101, 194 Participation, 6, 41, 60, 80, 82, 115, 122, 123, 128 Partition (of India), 83, 170 Patel, S.V., 42, 43, 51

People living below poverty, 132 People’s Co-ordination for Democratic Right, 153 Peripheral areas of the federation, 3 Persistent violence, 113, 141–143 Philippines, The, 4, 24, 194 PIB, Government of India 2021, 149 Plain Tribesmen, 113, 114, 142 Plan Assistance, 1, 101, 105, 191 Plan Gross Budgetary System (GBS), 104 Planning Commission, 1, 93, 99–101, 177, 180, 191 Plurality, 9, 27, 65 Plurality of allegiances, 28 Policy Effective Index (PEI), 103 Political discrimination, 146, 180 Political imagination, 12 Political modernity, 5 Political principle, 5, 6, 25 Political recognition of plain tribes, 141 Political secessionism, 66 Post-Soviet states, 24 Power sharing, 3, 7, 8, 13, 18, 34, 46, 58, 148, 159 Primary schools, 90, 109, 125, 127, 128 Prime Minister Modi, 180, 192 Princely States, 40–43, 45 Protecting tribal identity, 47, 117, 131 PTCA, 143 Punchi Commission, 193 Punjab, 42, 44, 79, 168, 169

Q Quasi-judicial powers, 109, 110 Quebec, 31 Question of identity, 8

INDEX

R Rabha, 144, 146, 151 Rajya Sabha, 2, 62 Rao, M.G., 30, 57, 58, 61, 68–70, 72, 191 Reangs, 121, 146 Recognition of difference, 9 Reddys, 168 Redistribution, 21, 22, 67, 126, 146, 190 Regional and local governments, 105 Regional Development Council, 165 Relative power, 167 Religion, 14, 82, 91, 146, 175, 176, 186 Religious practices, 61, 70 Representation, 2, 6, 17, 30, 31, 33, 57, 62, 68, 121, 146, 165, 190, 191 Reservation or quota, 22 Resource mobilization, 133 Restoration of illegally transferred, 136 Right-sizing, 34, 35 Riker, W., 8, 26, 30, 57 Riots, 39, 117, 150, 189, 194 Roy Burman, B.K., 112 Roy, ReV. JJM Nichols, 48, 51, 112 Roy, Samiran, 135 RSP, 119, 121 Russian Federation, 9, 24, 28, 32

S Sabah, 169 Sangma, P.N., 89 Santhals, 142, 144 Sarangi, A., 43, 168 Sarania community, 145 Sarania, Naba, 154 Sarawak, 169 Sarkaria Commission (India), 63, 75

217

Sarnias, 142 Saxena, R., 57, 68 Schedule, 5th, 13, 16, 17, 40, 45–47, 69, 107–109, 113, 143 Schedule, 6th, 11, 13, 16–18, 32, 40, 45–51, 56, 59, 91, 107, 108, 110–114, 116, 122, 123, 125, 134, 141, 142, 147–149, 166, 190 Scheduled Tribes, 2, 46, 47, 99, 105, 108, 129, 142, 145, 151, 171 Schwartzberg, J., 43 Secessionist, 30, 79, 112, 115, 118, 120, 168 Second Bodo Accord, 145, 150 Second Bodo Ethnic Accord, 148 Second official language of the State, 130 Security region, 78 Self-definition, 146 Self-governance for the hill tribes, 45, 107, 114 Self-rule, 5–7, 21, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 50, 143, 148, 191 Semi-sovereign, 109 Semi sovereign status (Nagaland), 87 Sen, A., 12, 22 Sen, T., 22, 57 Separate statehood, 78, 89 Settler Bengalis in Tripura, 83, 171 Shared memories, 14 Shared-rule, 5, 7, 191 Sikhs, 169 Sikkim, 57, 59, 60, 68, 69, 78–80, 84, 87, 88, 99, 102, 103, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179 Sikkimese identity, 87, 174 Simon Commission, 143 Singh, B., 143 Singh Committee, 144 Singh, G., 169 Singh, J., 46, 48, 51, 178

218

INDEX

Singh, M.P., 186 Singh, N., 30, 57, 58, 61, 68–70, 72, 191 Singh, V.B., 93 Six-point template, 7 Sixteenth-Point Naga agreement, 82, 90, 93 Smaller ethnic identity, 7 Smaller tribal ethnic identity, 13 Smith, A.D., 11, 12, 14, 24, 28, 29, 167 Social divisions, 9 Societal values, 9 South Asia, 160 South East Asia, 177 Spain, 23 Special arrangements, 4 Special Category States, 1, 15, 17, 32, 56, 57, 59–61, 68–70, 74, 77, 78, 93, 99, 100, 102, 169, 188, 191 Special Central Assistance, 126 Special Development Package, 104 Special package, 70, 156 Special provisions, 13, 16, 39, 47, 59, 62, 77, 148, 193 Spillover effects, 190 SRC’s terms of reference, 44 State Administration, 111, 112, 125 State Finance Commission, 73 State Governor, 6, 46, 49, 59, 108, 110, 111, 122, 148, 190 Statehood, 1, 6, 11, 17, 40, 42, 43, 51, 62, 66, 73, 77–79, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 102, 112, 113, 167, 169, 173, 174, 178, 188 State of Garoland, 89 State plans to the ADC, 130 State politics, 83, 186 State welfare benefits, 137 Stepan, A., 25

Structural asymmetry, 2, 17, 33, 62 Structural limitation, 69, 150 Sub-asymmetric for power-sharing, 164 Sub-State ethnic authority, 11 Sub-state level, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 29, 32, 55, 56, 58, 69, 105, 107, 109, 131, 136, 166, 185, 187, 188 Sub-state nationalism, 23 Sub-States, 14–16, 43, 55, 180, 186, 188 Sub-Zonal Councils, 128 Sudhakar B Kadu vs State of Madya Pradesh (AIR 2014 MP 69), 108 Sweden, W., 28 Swiss diversity, 24 Swiss experience, 21 Swiss federalism, 4, 9, 10, 26 Switzerland, 3, 4, 6, 23, 24 Symmetry in powers and status, 8

T Tamil Nadu, 44 Tamils, 11, 79 Tarlton, C.D., 28, 30 Taylor, C., 22 Tea Tribes, 152 Tea Tribe Welfare Board, 152 Telugus, 11 Terms of power-sharing, 148 Territorial autonomy, 3, 4, 13, 46, 50, 86, 167, 174 Territorial contraction, 85, 173 Territorial homeland, 11 Territorially loyalties, 10, 87, 175 Territorial power and autonomy, 45 Territorial recognition (liberal), 22 Territorial resizing, 34 Territorial self-rule, 21 Territorial strategies, 79

INDEX

Territory-based identity, 164 Territory claims, 18, 163, 167, 170, 176 THDR (Tripura Human Development Report), 126–128, 133, 136 The Assam Tribune, 155 The Catalon, 23 The Federalist , 13 The Hindu, 39, 78, 159, 175–177 The Indian Express , 18 The Tripura Tribal Autonomous District Council (TTADC), 115, 122, 133, 141, 159 Third tier, 6, 7 Three categories of States, 42 Three phases of Bodoland movements, 143 Tillin, L., 57, 163, 168 TIPRA, 121, 122 TMC, 120, 176 TNVs, 148 Tocqueville, Alex De., 35 Tribal, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 34, 39, 45, 48–51, 58, 59, 66, 69, 77, 80, 83, 85, 86, 89–92, 100, 102, 107, 109, 110, 112–114, 116–132, 134–137, 144, 148, 149, 166, 167, 171, 172, 174, 176, 180, 181, 187, 189, 190 Tribal Advisory Council (TAC), 45, 46, 107, 108, 113, 144 Tribal cleavages, 39 Tribal ethnicity, 6, 10, 91, 102, 130, 166, 176, 180, 181 Tribal identity, 12, 47, 102, 113, 116, 131, 137, 189 Tribal nationalism, 118 Tribal people, 17, 45, 48, 50, 118, 127, 171 Tribal self-governance for the hill and the plain tribes, 16, 45, 46, 66, 107, 114, 163

219

Tribal sub-state, 10, 15, 188 Tripura Darpan, 120, 134, 135 Tripura Human Development report (2007), 125–128, 133, 136 Tripura Legislative Assembly, 117 Tripura State Assembly, 131 Tripuris, 121, 146, 172 TUJS, 119, 120 Tully, J., 23

U Udayachal, 143, 144 ULFA, 85, 173, 176 UNDP’s measurement, 158 Unions of States (India), 40, 42, 43 Union territory, 61, 68, 73, 85, 88, 89, 113, 143, 165, 188, 191 Unitary state structures, 23 United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District, 86, 174 US federalism, 10 US model, 25 USSR, 25, 28 Uttarakhand, 57, 60, 62, 68, 69, 78, 81, 100, 103, 105, 170 Uttar Pradesh, 34, 42, 44, 62, 78

V Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 78 Value of decentralization, 35 Vidarbha, 44, 166 Vidarbha State, 166 Villages Committees (VC), 123, 124, 128, 131, 134, 136 Violence, 15, 79, 80, 111, 120, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 150, 152, 155, 156, 161, 165, 170, 180, 186, 188, 189 Vokkaligas, 168

220

INDEX

W Watts, R.L., 5–9, 12, 22–28, 30–32, 56, 67, 69 Weber, Max, 131, 135 Weiner, M., 83, 102, 171, 176, 186, 187 West Bengal, 44, 62, 113, 147 Western liberal theory, 22 Wheare, K.C., 2, 5, 14 Women’s rights, 22

Y Yugoslavia, 25

Z Zo, 86, 173 Zonal Council, 177 Zonal Development Committees, 128