Armed forces and society: Sociological essays 9783111694757, 9783111306933

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ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS

Edited

by

JACQUES VAN DOORN

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1968 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER 68-22062

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

PREFACE

One of the first efforts at international exploration of the comparative sociology of military institutions took place at a Conference on Armed Forces and Society in Western Europe in London, July 1964. The Conference was sponsored jointly by the Committee on Political Sociology of the International Sociological Association and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, located at the University of Chicago. It brought together for the first time scholars from the United States and Western Europe and resulted in the publication of a special issue on the subject by the European Journal of Sociology (Archives Européennes de Sociologie, Tome VI, 1965, Numéro 2). Because of rapidly increasing interest and research on the sociological aspects of the professional military and peace-keeping institutions, a special working group was organized on "The Professional Military Man and Militarism" by the International Sociological Association for its Sixth World Congress which was held in Evian, France, in September, 1966. At these sessions over thirty five papers were presented and some seventy participants engaged in the discussions. This was the first time that scholars from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, including the U.S.S.R., the Middle East, the Far East and South America convened to evaluate the current state of the sociology of military institutions, war, revolution and international peace-keeping functions. An international group was established to prepare the publication of selected papers of the conference. It included Ludwig von Friedeberg, Federal Republic of Germany, John Jackson, Great Britain, Jacques van Doom, The Netherlands, and Jerzy J. Wiatr, Poland. Van Doom undertook to edit the papers and this volume is the result of his efforts. 5

Preface

At the initiative of the delegates from the U.S.S.R. it was agreed that the working group of the International Sociological Association on "The Professional Military Man and Militarism", should convene at a special international conference before the Seventh World Congress of Sociology. As chairman of this working group, I took steps to hold a research conference on the sociology of armed forces and peace-keeping in industrialized and developing countries in London, September, 1967. I wish to thank the officers and the Secretary-General of the International Sociological Association, Dr. Roger Girod, for their bold efforts which have made possible these intellectual developments on the international scene. I wish also to express my gratitude to Dr. van Doom for his initiative in making possible a rapid and efficient publication of this volume. These developments would not be possible without the assistance of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society which is supported by the Russell Sage Foundation, New York City. Bert Brim and Leonard Cottrell, Jr., officers of the Foundation, have once again shown extraordinary leadership, independence of mind and forethought underwriting this new phase of sociological endeavor. By means of this support, individual scholars throughout the world have been assisted in their research and enabled to participate in the work of the International Sociological Association. University of Chicago January 1, 1967

MORRIS JANOWITZ

E D I T O R ' S PREFACE

These collected essays are a selection out of a large number of papers presented to the Working Group on Armed Forces and Society at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Evian, September 1966. I am grateful to those who cooperated by contributing their papers to this edition. In particular I would like to thank Morris Janowitz for his advice and for his willingness to write an introductory chapter. Miss Marrigje de Maar offered indispensable administrative help, and took a leading part in the correction of the proofs and in the composition of the indexes. Netherlands School of Economics Rotterdam, February, 1967

JACQUES VAN DOORN

CONTENTS

Preface by Morris Janowitz

5

Editor's Preface by Jacques van Doom

7

I.

INTRODUCTION

Morris Janowitz, Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective

15

Jacques van Doom, Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends

39

n.

THE MILITARY PROFESSION

M. D. Feld, Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military

55

Bengt Abrahamsson, The Ideology of an Élite: Conservatism and National Insecurity: Some Notes on the Swedish Military

71

C. B. Otley, Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Élite

84 9

Contents J. A. Jackson, The Irish Army and the Development of the Constabulary Concept

109

S. Encel, The Study of Militarism in Australia

127

Roman Kolkowicz, The Impact of Modern Technology on the Soviet Officer Corps

148

III.

MILITARY AND SOCIETAL CHANGE

Ludwig von Friedeburg, Rearmament and Social Change: Observations on Civil-Military Relations in Western Germany .

171

Gerhard Brandt, Diverging Functions of Military Armament: The Case of the Federal Republic of Germany . . .185 Kurt Lang, The Military Putsch in a Developed Political Culture: Confrontations of Military and Civil Power in Germany and France

202

Jerzy J. Wiatr, Military Professionalism and Transformations of Class Structure in Poland

229

Raymond L. Garthoff, The Military in Russia, 1861-1965 .

240

.

IV. THE MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

M. J. V. Bell, The Military in the New States of Africa .

.

.259

Khalid B. Sayeed, The Role of the Military in Pakistan .

.

.274

C. I. Eugene Kim, The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961: Its Causes and the Social Characteristics of its Leaders . .298 Virgilio Rafael Beltran, The Army and Structural Changes in 20th Century Argentina: An Initial Approach 317 10

Contents V.

PEACE-KEEPING MILITARY FORCES

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans, United Nations Forces: On Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Military Operations

345

Subject Index

378

Name Index

381

11

I.

INTRODUCTION

Morris Janowitz

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY: A WORLD PERSPECTIVE

1. THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AS AN OBJECT OF SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION

In the last few years, there has been a marked increase in scholarly work on the sociology of military institutions and militarism. Despite the intrinsic intellectual interest of the field and its overriding substantive and policy importance, this aspect of sociology has lagged far behind other subjects in the discipline. During the first four World Congresses of Sociology, the topic was not directly discussed. At the Fifth Congress of Sociology in Washington, D.C., in 1962, a single paper was presented in the section on Political Sociology on the topic of "The Role of the Military in the Political Development of New Nations". However, the Sixth World Congress marks an important departure in that a complete working group was devoted to the topic "The Professional Military and Militarism". The communications presented to this working group include papers by sociologists and other scholars from a large number of countries and deal with issues such as the internal structure of the military, trends in the professionalization of the military, the relationships of armed forces to social structure, the socio-political institutions for controlling the military establishment and the role of the military as a peace-keeping agency in the world community. These papers represent the proliferation of research efforts on the military in both industrialized countries and in the developing nations. The sociological analysis of the military cannot be contained or restrained by arbitrary institutional categories. In a period of rapid 15

Morris Janowitz social and political change the focus of attention must of necessity include the full range of institutions which deal with force and violence. First, the impact of technology and new mass destructive weapons has changed the pattern of international relations and altered the threat of general war. The major nuclear powers, while pursuing a policy of mutual deterrence, have had to face the severe limitation which mass destruction instruments place on the conduct of traditional diplomacy and international relations. For the military profession, the implication has been not merely that new weapons have had to be incorporated but that there has been a fundamental crisis in the military profession. The military profession as it emerged in the nineteenth century had the overriding orientation that the outbreak of general war was inevitable. This inevitability, the profession assumed, was rooted in the nature of man, in the conduct of international relations and in the consequences of each new arms race. In the contemporary scene, the military profession must face the political imperative that the outbreak of general war is no longer seen inevitable nor in the national interest. General war continues to be a contingency and an undesirable one at that. It is recognized as such by a significant proportion of the military profession. Therefore, the study of the military profession involves its reaction to the actual and proposed international schemes of arms control and disarmament. The sociology of the military must also encompass the consequences of multilateral arrangements and United Nations peace keeping activities which are designed to contain or reduce limited wars, especially those limited wars which might increase the possibility of general war. Second, limited war is no longer 'traditional'. Since 1945, it has less often been a struggle between two legitimate governments, and more often a violent contest within a nation by some group against the existing regime. These wars are conflicts into which external national powers are drawn. These struggles involve use of non-professional forces and, therefore, the study of militarism and violence involves the analysis of various forms of armed revolts, police systems, insurrections, paramilitary formations and the other agencies of internal warfare. Despite the rapid development of sociological interest in the changing nature of military institutions, it is necessary to note the resistances to such research in order that these topics might be approached with the greatest amount of objectivity and thereby transcend national and personal prejudices. It would be a mistake to assume that current and contemporary literature has achieved the necessary levels of objectivity. 16

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective However, there is a growing body of literature, while based on existing national systems of sociological inquiry, which seeks to apply the canons of sociological scholarship. One. Sociologists have avoided the study of war - internal and external - because of political pressures and personal values. The management of violence involves the most fundamental values and most significant considerations in a society. Only under the conditions of the widest intellectual freedom is it possible to pursue sociological research on these topics. The field is still not pursued in a great many countries. Even where adequate political conditions exist, personal and academic considerations continue to define the study of the military as outside the central core of sociological endeavors. Second, the secrecy of military institutions, both official and professional, has been offered as a barrier to sociological analysis. There can be no doubt that this is an important reason with significant implications for the research sociologist. But it can hardly be offered as a fundamental explanation if only because the sheer amount of available material which is yet to be analyzed. This is particularly the case for historical materials and for the use of ex and retired military professionals as sources of more contemporary materials. It has also been the experience of numerous research workers that a direct contact with military professionals have produced more favorable conditions for research than they had anticipated. However, the central issue is that the recent growth, interest and fruitful work has not been the result of a fundamental change in military practices concerning secrecy, but rather, the orientation, diligence and persistence of sociological investigators. Third, and more important as a barrier than secrecy, has been the intellectual posture of sociology. The discipline has failed to develop a realistic understanding of social structure which would include the military establishment and the role of force. Classical writers of sociology such as Herbert Spencer, for example, could not be accused of such a failing. The growth of sociology as a specialized and technical discipline and as a diffuse form of social criticism seems to have been connected with this decline in such realism. Fourth, resistance to the growth of a sociology of the military can be stated in ideological terms. While there are many ideological sources at work in sociological thought, it appears that sociology has flourished in societies in which there is a strong liberal tradition. But the liberal tradition has served as a barrier to a sociology of the military, for the liberal tradition has in general sought to handle the problem of military institu17

Morris Janowitz tions by denial. In fact, in the liberal tradition some sociologists have even believed that to study and analyze military institutions would have the consequences of strengthening the role of military leaders and militaristic forces. Ideological opposition to the sociological study of military institutions has receded, but the field is still confronted by complex questions of 'values', in particular, the values of the sociologist. To the extent that progress has been made, it is because the study of military institutions has become a legitimate object of scientific analysis. The scholar worthy of any contribution must be judged by the same standards of intellectual progress as any other aspect of sociology. This assertion does not imply that sociologists in this field are not concerned with the responsible application of knowledge to social problems. The very importance of the issues of war and peace guarantee that the findings of sociologists will be subject to the closest scrutiny by political leaders, policy makers and the mass media. There is every reason to assert that the barriers to the research into the sociology of military profession and militarism are giving way to new pressures for sponsored scholarship by both public and private agencies. These pressures will in turn produce new problems and new distortions. In the past, the liberal tradition which was indifferent to the study of military institutions introduced a strong bias. When such social scientists approached the study of armed forces, they did so with an expression of a civilian ideology which tended to distort the differences between military and civilian organizations. They tended to overlook what is common to large scale organization in general, both civilian and military. In the current intellectual climate, the reverse distortion is the danger. The social scientist runs the risk of overemphasizing the special characteristics of the military establishment. The field of the sociology of war and peace has been and is likely to remain strikingly different from other fields in sociology. First, the rapid increase in interest and work still means that only a handful of specialists are at work. Even if the number were to double or even triple, we would still be dealing with a very small group. Second, it is a field in which there is more theoretical ideal type analysis and suggestive propositions than empirical substance. Nevertheless, even the limited available results have transformed the study of comparative sociology and societal change. It is no longer possible to deal with these problems - in either industrialized societies or in developing nations - without due emphasis to the sociology of military institutions in a world perspective. 18

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective From a worldwide perspective two fundamental questions require investigation: One, to what extent have the military in industrialized and developing nations modified their professional perspectives to take into account the consequences of new weapons of mass destruction and the emerging socio-political context of limited warfare? What factors condition or inhibit the transformation of professional military perspectives and forms of military organization? Two, why are military officers of the developing nations, as compared with those in industrialized societies, more influential in domestic politics? The answer must be found both in the internal structure of the military profession in different societies and in differences in social structure of nation states. 2.

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS: A WORLD PROFILE

The study of military institutions requires more adequate data and statistics on the forms, size and structure of military establishments throughout the world. It is not possible to point to a body of fundamental data organized on a world basis which would in particular include comprehensive trend data on costs and manpower allocations. Despite the problems of secrecy, and of reliable information, it is possible to develop a summary chart of available information. Chart No. 1 presents for the nation states of the world with over one million population, the size of the armed forces, total population size and the ratio of military manpower to the total population. Nations with less than one million were excluded since they present special cases and are often so small as not to have articulated military institutions. (Nevertheless, even the 320 man army of Togo was capable of political intervention by the use of force.) This chart is designed as preliminary statement in order to generate more careful attention to the problem of collecting basic data on the military profession. It should be pointed out that there are numerous countries which publish accurate data, and there are a variety of private sources which seek to produce relevant estimates. This chart is based on the author's evaluation and synthesis of all of the various types of available sources. An alternate array of data on military manpower has been presented by Bruce Russett et al.1 1

Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 72-80.

19

Morris Janowitz Aside from the basic question of the reliability of data, the definition of the term "armed forces" needs to be standardized. The figures presented are limited to the central government's formations of the army, the navy and the air force of the respective country. It includes only those personnel who are designated as being on full time active duty. These figures do not include the different types of reserve units, auxiliary reserves, civilian defense forces, or special frontier guards and national police units which are very large in some countries and may in selected cases be as large or larger than the central military establishment. In examining these data, it should be pointed out that among the leaders of the new nations which attained political independence since 1945, only Prime Minister Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika discussed the possibility of relying on an armed police force instead of a conventional army. Among the rest of the nations of the world, only in Costa Rica and Panama are there no central armed forces but they have a full time civil guard and national police force, respectively. National armed forces appear to be a "universal" institution and, in fact, in the present world, are defined as essential marks of national sovereignty. These data make possible gross analysis based on aggregate statistics. An analysis based on a world-wide array of data must be extremely crude because of the difficulties of developing an adequate set of concepts to handle the wide heterogeneity of the nations and of military establishments. For example, in the case of new nations, the Libyan army of 4,500 composed almost exclusively of infantry troops, is hardly the same type of administrative organization as the Indian defense forces of over 500,000 with first line jet planes and naval units. Again, in Western Europe, despite the similarities in societal setting and technology, for example, there are important differences between the military profession in Switzerland and Sweden which were able to be neutral during the last two wars and the military formations of Holland and Belgium which have been deeply influenced by their war-time experience. One effort at gross statistical analysis has been presented by Bruce Russett et al., which deals with a comparison of military expenditures and the size of the military manpower in a selection of heterogeneous countries. Military expenditures are standardized in the terms of the expenditures on defense as a percentage of Gross National Product, while military personnel is treated as a percentage of working age population. The conclusion of the analysis seems hardly profound, in 20

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective that the authors report "that the two ratios generally vary together (they correlated with a fairly high r = .68 around the regression line)". Deviations from the regression line are not errors in reporting since some countries have large but poorly equipped military establishments. An alternative approach is developed when a narrower and more homogeneous group of military establishments are examined in terms of a specific issue. Janowitz explored whether there is any relationship between economic development and limitations on the political role of the military in a sample of 51 developing nations.2 The empirical results are mainly negative or irrelative. Their findings are in contrast to some writings of students of comparative politics who offered the proposition that there is a positive association between economic development and democratic political competitiveness. They have argued that the more economically developed a new nation is, the less likely it is that the military could hinder the competitive process in domestic politics. S. M. Lipset made use of selected indices of economic development to compare Western European and Latin American democracies as a basis for testing this hypothesis concerning the positive association between economic development and political competitiveness. Statistical support for this proposition is hardly impressive and this type of analysis appears to have limited relevance for understanding, on a comparative basis, the dynamic relationship between economic development and political forms. Since there are only a limited number of cases in the analysis even a minor re-definition of the universe markedly alters the statistical conclusions. More important in order to avoid a mechanical test of the proposition one would expect that the changes in political competitiveness, since the original analysis would at least be congruent with the basic proposition. This means that those nations high on the economic development index should have moved toward more competitiveness. For Latin America, the trend has been toward less competitiveness and this trend cannot directly be related to the level of economic development; in some cases, it is inversely related. The same lack of support of this is presented by an examination of the countries of Africa and Asia. Some of the difficulties of this type of analysis rest within the crude nature of the political categories even when more refined categories of military involvement in politics are employed among the 51 new nations studied. However, there is no basis for asserting that, with higher levels Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 18-23.

2

of New Nations

21

Morris Janowitz of economic development, there is a movement toward restriction of the military's involvement with the domestic political system. In fact, among those new nations with the highest levels of economic development, the absence of democratic competitive systems is more noteworthy than their presence, since competitive systems are concentrated in the middle level of economic development. On the other hand, there is an apparent but not profoundly explanatory relation between the length of time that a new nation has been independent and the increased political role of the military. The chance of political involvement increases year by year after independence, while contraction of the military's political role remains a highly problematic issue. At this point, aggregate statistical analysis supplies at best a limited point of entrance for understanding differences in the political role of the military. Instead, a more systemic analysis of the military profession and social structure is required which rests on precise conceptual categories, and which could throw light on similarities and differences among relatively homogeneous groups of nations.

3.

MILITARISM AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION

The distinction offered by Alfred Vagts, the historian, between 'militarism' and 'the military way' is a useful approach for the study of the military profession undergoing change.3 "The military way is marked by a primary concentration of men and materials on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with the least expenditure of blood and treasure." "Militarism, on the other hand, presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes. Indeed militarism is so constituted that it may hamper and defeat the purposes of the military way." This distinction which requires refinement is a specific application to military organization of the classic problem of rationality in large scale organization, that is, the conditions promoting or handling the effective adjustment of means to ends. Internally, militarism implies the development and persistence of practices which block scientific and administrative procedures designed to produce greater 'professionalism'. Externally, militarism encompasses the social, economic and political power that the 3

22

Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (N.Y., Meridian Books, 1959), p. 13.

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective military generate and its consequences on domestic social structure and international politics. Militarism as it affects the external social structure can be either designed or unanticipated. Designed militarism flows from the strength and conscious effort of military officers to influence and modify certain social structures. Unanticipated militarism develops from a lack of effective traditions and practices for controlling the military establishment, as well as from a failure of certain political leaders to act relevantly and consistently. Under such circumstances a vacuum is created which not only encourages an extension of the tasks and power of the military but actually forces such trends. Both the internal and external aspects of militarism flow from the special characteristics of military organization. The similarities that exist between civilian and military bureaucracy are counterbalanced by the overriding consideration that its members are specialists in the 'management' of violence and mass destruction. Of course, military organizations have multiple goals and perform many non-military functions. Moreover, it is essential not to overlook the fundamental and repeated observation of both historians and sociologists that military institutions in peace time can quickly dissipate their special military character. But to the extent that the military officer is a professional, to that extent he must relate himself to the profound uncertainties in planning for and conducing military hostilities. Therefore, the ideal model of the military professional is not that of the scientist or the engineer or the business administrator. There is an irreducible component of an heroic posture in his professional self image for he must be prepared to face danger. The development of the military profession has been the outcome of a continuous struggle to be rational and scientific in the context of military requirements. Thus, it is possible to describe the history of the modern military establishment as a struggle between heroic leaders who embody traditionalism and glory, and military managers who are concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war. Internal militarism in the sense that military blocks technical progress has waned in most military establishments. As the military establishment becomes progressively dependent on more complex technology, the importance of the military manager increases. He does not displace the heroic leader, but he undermines the long standing traditionalism of the military establishment. As a result there is an intensification in the strain between the military managers and heroic leader. However, this is a professional crisis that can be controlled by organizational resources, by compromise and be23

Morris Janowitz cause the military manager acknowledges the worth and instrumental value of the heroic leader in the military profession. The crisis in the professional self image of the military man derives not primarily from this role differentiation, but from the crisis in military goals. At the upper end of the violence continuum, the development of nuclear weapons and strategic conceptions of deterrence means that the military officers, both military manager and heroic leader, is transformed into a teacher - that is - an instructor of men who will man and maintain a machine designed not to be employed. The past supplies little basis for organizing and maintaining a professional self image under such conditions. At the lower end of the violence, the scope of conventional warfare narrows. The tactics and techniques of limited war and internal warfare limit the authority of the military professional at the expense of civilian experts and civilian political leadership. It is almost possible to speak of civilian militarism as each military operation comes under the elaborate control of civilian leaders, democratic and authoritarian, and as the mechanics of warfare must be integrated into a political strategy in the absence of an opportunity of traditional type military 'victory'. The common elements which the military profession and military men display because of technology, organizational format and professional training have always been modified by the impact of the social and political structure in which they operate. In the contemporary period the linkages between armed forces and social structure are even more overriding and direct.

4.

MILITARISM AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A world wide perspective toward the sociology of military institutions requires a careful re-examination of the limitation of the model presented by historians concerning the development of the military profession from feudal forms of social structure. The aristocratic feudal model is a relevant base only if it is seen as describing the conditions of Western Europe, and not fully applicable to the historical emergence of the military in other parts of the world. The aristocratic-feudal model is a composite estimate of the armed forces and society among Western European powers before industrialism had its full impact. Under the feudal aristocratic model, civilian and military elites were socially and functionally integrated. A narrow base of recruitment for both elites and a relatively monolothic power structure pro24

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective vided the civilian elite with a comprehensive basis for political control of the military. There was a rigid hierarchy in the aristocratic model which delineated both the source of authority and the prestige of any member of the military elite. The low specialization of the military profession made it possible for the political elite to supply the bulk of the necessary leadership for the armed forces. Birth, family connections and common values insured that the military embodied the ideology of the dominant groups in society. Political control was civilian control because there was a unity of interests between aristocratic and military groups. The system was rooted in concepts of authority and land tenure which produced a relatively stable ruling stratum. In Western Europe the concept of armed forces and society began to have fuller meaning as the military developed a separate bureaucratic organization. Feudal military institutions had to be transformed - either by reformers from within or by the incorporation of new middle class elements - so that complex technology could be made part of the apparatus of war-making. In this long-term development, which became intensified in the first half of the nineteenth century, the various national armed forces became precursors of modern large-scale organizations and active elements of social change. However, the relatively common forms of military professions had diverse political impact and produced varying forms of socio-political balance in the nation states of Western Europe. Thus, for example, the emergence of a differentiated professional establishment in the nineteenth century was compatible with civilmilitary relations of parliamentary institutions in Great Britain and with a nationalistic oligarchy in Prussia. But in a world perspective the origins of the military in Western Europe and the United States derivatively represent one particular pattern of emergence and historical continuity. It was a pattern which generally linked the military to feudal institutions and to conservative traditions. The military emerged as a modern institution, in fact as one of the first modern institutions in Western Europe, but it was a modern institution in a western context. In the evolution of professional military forms throughout the world, Western concepts and practices had a profound effect. But there emerged different patterns of civil-military relations in other parts of the world, because of different historical settings and because often the military experienced sharp discontinuities or were grafted on by external forces. Frequently, the pattern of development was one that produced a more independent type establishment with fewer and weaker linkages to the 25

Morris Janowitz landed interest groups. Often the military evolved as one governmental bureaucratic service among others, but the most crucial one. In many parts of the world this was the result of European colonial practices which destroyed traditional military forces linked to feudal type ruling groups and which in turn created civil service type establishments under their control. Under the Ottoman Empire, the practices of recruitment and administration pushed early to 'separate' the military establishment and place it under centralized control. In this case, the land tenure system also served not to strengthen relations between the military and traditional landed groups. Elements of European feudalism were transplanted to South America, but in a manner which gave the military a much more independent political base than under classical European forms. Because of the experiences of Western Europe, when scholars analyze the development of modern military institutions it has been conventional to focus on the social origins of the officer corps. The differentiation of the military establishment in Western Europe can be carefully documented by a decline in the concentration of officers from aristocratic and landed gentry backgrounds and in the infusion of middle class patterns of recruitment. But even in the nineteenth century the difference, for example, between the socio-political balance in Great Britain and in Germany cannot be accounted for to any great extent by differences in social stratification, particularly social recruitment. The Prussian military was predominately recruited from landed higher and lower aristocratic groups, while the British armed forces were only slightly more differentiated from its aristocratic counterparts. By contrast, the German system of education for its officer recruits served to differentiate them more from civilian institutions than military education in Great Britain. What was important was that a political system emerged under the Prussian model in which the civilian political elites did not exercise control over the military through a set of formal rules. Instead, the polity was ruled by an oligarchy in which the military were active and key elements. In the contemporary period, social recruitment supplies only a partial index to patterns of armed forces and society in industrialized societies. Thus, for a variety of nations in Western Europe for which data are available - Great Britain, Germany, France, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands - there has been a basic social transformation in the pattern of officer recruitment which started in the nineteenth century and is even more marked since the turn of the century. The officer corps and 26

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective its elite members as well have been shifting their recruitment from a narrow, relatively high social status to a broader base more presentative of the population as a whole. The end of the feudal character of the armed forces is well documented, and with the elimination of colonial armies these vestiges are further displaced. But this is not to say that the broadening of the base has taken place at a uniform rate in the countries under investigation. Nor is it to infer that the consequences of this transformation have been similar in all of these countries. Thus for example, there is reason to believe that the long-term shift towards a 'middle class' profession has taken place at a slower rate in England than in other countries. The top elite in the military has a greater concentration of upper-middle class sons than some other industrialized nations as a result of the system of education and formal requirements for entrance. But this pattern of recruitment has not weakened civilian parliamentary controls. In the current period, one sociological issue in Western Europe is the extent to which the military profession, that is the officer class, is accessible to the sons of the working class. On this measure the findings support the observation of S. N. Miller that there are marked national differences in social mobility from the lower classes into other key professions.4 In England and the Netherlands, the amount of such mobility from the lower classes into the officer corps is negligible, while in France it is more pronounced. In Norway, the figure reached 18.7 percent of the cadets for the period 1950-1960, while for the United States in 1960 the percentage was over 30. The opening of the military to the working class represents general patterns of 'democratization' and the lower prestige of the profession in an industrial society. But the national differences derive in part from specific variations. In France, this is the result of self recruitment, especially recruitment of the sons of enlisted personnel into the officer ranks, and expresses a self segregation trend in the military. To the contrary, in Norway it represents the desire for social mobility among working class sons who are unable to enter upon a university career and thereby serves to integrate the military with the civilian population. In Western Europe or elsewhere there is, of course, no guarantee that 'democratization' of social origins produces 'democratization' of professional attitudes and a strengthening of the willingness to submit to civilian controls. In fact, there are clearcut cases where the reverse may 4

S. N. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility: A Trend Report and Bibliography", Current Sociology, vol. IX, no. 1 (1960).

27

Morris Janowitz be the case. What is significant is the process and content of professional socialization and the nature of the socio-political institutions for administering and controlling the military establishment, and the organizational task of the military. In industrialized societies, because the military has become a bureaucratized and professionalized institution in a complex division of labor, the significance of social origins in fashioning military orientaton declines. In a comparison of the military establishments of Western Europe with those of the new nations of Africa and Asia, social recruitment can still supply a more important index of social attitudes. In the new nations, the military establishment is recruited from the middle and lower middle classes, drawn mainly from rural areas or hinterlands. In comparison with Western European professional armies, there is a marked absence of a history of feudal domination. As a result, the military profession does not have strong allegiance to an integrated upper class which it accepts as its political leader nor does it have a pervasive conservative outlook. Militarism in the new nations of Africa and Asia is often reactive or unanticipated because of the weakness of civilian institutions and the breakdown of parliamentary forms of government. Military officers in these countries develop a sense of public service and national guardianship as a result of their military training and experience. Their politics is the politics of the 'suprapolitical' because they are suspicious of professional politicians and of the bargaining process. It is easier for them to seize power than to exercise power. Again, these forms of militarism must be distinguished from the intervention by the military in many South American countries. In the past, in many South American countries, military intervention was much more designed and premediated. In the past these military groups supplied political regimes because they were not primarily concerned with economic and social development although there were notable exceptions. In South America, the tasks of military leadership became complicated and their political limitations emerged in the face of contemporary popular demands for such progress. On a world perspective, the comparative analysis of armed forces and society leads to the identification of a range of typologies of civilmilitary relations which help explain the process of social change and political development. These typologies are designed to clarify the conditions under which militarism is restrained or developed. The power of the military in domestic politics and derivatively in 28

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective international relations can be limited by an authoritarian regime based on personal and traditional power, or it may be based on a newly developed personal autocracy. This is the (1) AUTHORITARIAN-PERSONAL SYSTEM of civil-military control and it is likely to be found in nations just beginning the process of modernization. The military can also be excluded from domestic political influence by the power of a civilian single mass political party. When political power is lodged in a one party state, under strong personal leadership, without parliamentary institutions, it is possible to reduce old fashioned militarism. This form of civil-military relations can be labeled ( 2 ) CIVILIAN MASS PARTY SYSTEM.

In these states, both the civilian police and paramilitary institutions, under the control of the mass party, operate as counterweights of the military. The militarism can be contained on the basis of (3) a DEMOCRATIC COMPETITIVE

SYSTEM o r a SEMI-DEMOCRATIC

SYSTEM.

Competitive

democratic systems have emerged mainly in industrialized societies where political power is exercised through a multiple party and election system. Civilian political elites exercise control over the military through a formal set or rules which specify the functions of the military and the conditions under which the military may exercise its power. In particular, these rules exclude the military from involvement in domestic partisan politics. Professional ethics, as well as democratic parliamentary institutions, guarantee civilian political supremacy. Semi-competitive democratic patterns can be found in a few of the new nations because of powerful personal leadership of the chief executive and in part because colonial traditions implanted a strong sense of self restraint on the military. In these countries, there are competing civilian institutions and power groups, as well as a mass political party which dominates politics but permits a measure of political competition. When the military expands its political activity and becomes a political bloc, the civilian leadership remains in power only because of active assistance by the military. The extent of political competition decreases and it is appropriate to describe such a system as a (4) CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION, because of the crucial role of the armed forces. Here the military serves as an active political bloc in its support of civilian parties and other bureaucratic power groups. The civilian group is in power because of the assistance of the military. The military may act as an informal, or even as explicit umpire between competing political parties and political groups. The military may, at this level, be forced to establish a caretaker government with a view to returning power to

29

Morris Janowitz civilian political groups. Such alliances and caretaker government can be unstable; they frequently lead to a wider level of involvement where the military set itself up as the political ruling group. The result is then a (5) MILITARY OLIGARCHY, because for a limited time, at least, the political initiative passes to the military. When an actual takeover occurs and the military becomes the ruling group, civilian political activity is transformed, constricted and repressed. But it is a basic observation that in the contemporary world the military operates at each level of political intervention, including the taekover of political power, as incomplete agents of political change. Thus, an additional type of civil-military relations, in part hypothetical, and to some degree actually emerging, must be postulated. After 'takeover', the military regime can begin to recognize the task of supplying national political leaders. At this level, the military recognizes the needs for a mass political base in order to achieve objective national development. It seeks to develop a broader political apparatus, either with its own personnel, under their direct supervision, or through a system of alliances with civilians.

5.

MILITARISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Militarism - internal and external, designed or unanticipated - complicates the tasks of international relations and the development of a world community. The opposite, the 'military way' - the efficient use of military resources, seems too limited a concept for analyzing the contemporary problems of the sociology of war and peace. To create a world community which is able to cope with the problems of nuclear confrontation and to contain limited warfare, a redefinition of the military profession is required. Two different models are possible in the intellectual and scientific tasks of conceptual reformulation. One model excludes the military from participation in the construction of a world community and from the specific tasks of United Nations peace keeping, regional security arrangements, the international relations of arms control and disarmament. This model focuses on the explicit negotiation of civilian political leaders who must search for the terms of reference to initiate treaties or agreements as the prime mechanisms for reducing international tensions. From this 'tensions' approach, the organizational and institutions aspects of the world community and of arms control are secondary and present few special problems beyond the 30

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective technical features of inspection and the like. The basic issues are the tensions between nations which need to be reduced in order to insure the success of the diplomatic and negotiating process. In this view, the threat of military professionals is seen in traditional terms as a pressure group and a coalition element in the political process likely to frustrate the development of a world community because of professional interests. This point of view has the advantage that it focuses on presumed basic issues of economic development and international communications and political arrangements which must be dealt with in order to contribute to the development of the world community. However, it is only a partial model for the students of the sociology of war and military institutions. It fails to incorporate a realistic understanding of the potentials and limitations of the military professional in constructive international relations. It fails to formulate an institutional role for the specialist in violence in creating the stable conditions required for a world community. The military must move in the direction of becoming a police type operation, in the sense that 'victory' against a specific enemy is no longer its major goal, but rather that of creating stable conditions for social and political change. The second model, the 'institutional' approach, does not exclude the military from a positive role in peace keeping arms control and disarmament. Movement toward a world community involves more than creating the political and social psychological preconditions for bargaining and negotiating at the diplomatic level. There is an organizational and institutional aspect. It is not enough to speak of policies without a concern for the organizations that must implement policy, since policy is not self enforcing. The reduction and elimination of the threat of war involves adaptation and changes in all of the institutions of foreign policy, political, economic and military. Over the long run, successful systems of accommodation and arms control would reduce the size of the military; but in the very short run, such schemes are likely to require a shift in the pattern of military activity. From this point of view each step and each type of international accommodation require new involvements and adaptations by the military if the accommodations of arms control are to be stable, relatively enduring and expanding in scope. Thus it becomes highly relevant to examine the actual and potential capacity of the armed forces to adjust and adapt to the problems of managing the instruments of violence so as to avoid general war and contain limited war. Obviously, this is a multifaceted problem, political, 31

Morris Janowitz strategic and organizational. The sociological analysis of the military must also deal with this problem. But for this purpose the sociologist must have a policy oriented conceptual standpoint if his research is to bear on these policy problems. The notion of the constabulary force is a sociological contribution to understanding the organizational problem. In The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, the constabulary concept is defined in the following way: "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective military posture." 5 The constabulary force concept encompasses the entire range of military power and organization, including the military contribution to arms control and disarmament. The constabulary concept is not tied to a specific strategic outlook, but rather is an expression of enlightened self interest. It is designed to facilitate creative innovations in military organization and doctrine so as to permit modification in national policy where necessary in order to reduce the risk of war. The peace-keeping operations of the United Nations can be viewed as an application of the constabulary concept at the level of the world community. In the early evolution of the United Nations, there was considerable discussion of the possibility of a world military unit, to enforce the political and legal decisions of the United Nations. This would be a force recruited and staffed directly under its jurisdiction, as a step toward 'world government'. The pressure of international relations plus the organizational defects of this approach rendered this concept inoperative from the very beginning. The actual pattern of military operations of the United Nations has in effect conformed to a constabulary pattern. Peace-keeping operations by the United Nations have been undertaken by conventional national forces which have been wielded into ad hoc organizations, and given political and administrative direction by United Nations organs. It is striking to note while there have been factual and operational reports of the United Nations peace-keeping operations, they have not been studied in depth from a sociological perspective. Such studies would be of considerable importance. However, there are still no resources or plans to study the impact and consequences of past or contemporary opera5

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 418.

32

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective tions, for example, United Nations Forces in Cyprus and on the IsraeliArab border. Clearly, international social science research units under the sponsorships of the International Sociological Association and U N E S C O to carry out such research and to be prepared on a stand-by basis to accompany future United Nations peace keeping operations are required. Equally significant is the analysis of the impact on United Nations military experiences on member nations and their constituent forces. A large number of nations have sent forces to participate in United Nations operations with discernible impact on the participants and in turn on the internal processes of the particular member nation involved. Only one such study is available on the Irish army, where the impact of United Nations peace keeping activity has been of considerable importance for political integration of the country and for broadening and deepening its international commitments. Participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities is not certain to have such consequences, since all experience has not been successful in this respect. In part, the outcome of the particular operations and the conduct of the troops are of significance. Victory in the traditional military sense is not relevant but success in the constabulary sense of making a contribution to the world community. (This was precisely the case for the Irish troops who were hardly 'victorious' in the field operations but succeeded in their organizational mission.) In recent years planning for United Nations military operations as a result of experience has undergone a radical change and the notion of a permanent United Nations force has receded. Obviously, this is a result of international politics and the burdens of existing United Nations military operations. It is also the result of creative thinking which is seeking to develop professional military forms appropriate to the political and administrative tasks of the United Nations. A s a result, thinking and planning has progressed in the constabulary direction; namely, to create that kind of force which satisfied the needs of the United Nations and which in its organizational format would contribute to the reduction of tensions per se rather than create new imbalances. The evolving format is that of national standby forces which are designated in advance as potential United Nations units. These units are housed in member nations and are part of their national defense forces but are available on a constabulary basis for United Nations emergencies. It is noteworthy that some small nations, namely Norway, Sweden and Denmark, have designated specific units for such activities. It is, of 33

Morris World profile Africa 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Nigeria UAR Ethiopia S. Africa Congo Sudan Morocco Algeria United Rep. of Tanzania Kenya Ghana Uganda Madagascar Cameroon Upper Volta Tunisia Mali S. Rhodesia Malawi (Nyassa Land) Ivory Coast Zambia Guinea Senegal Niger Rwanda Chad Burundi Somalia Dahoney Sierra Leone Togo Libya Cent. Af. Rep. Liberia

of armed forces personnel Population mid 1963 est. (1000 s)

- 1966

Janowitz

estimates

Military manpower

Military manpower ratio (a)

55,620 27,963 21,800 17,057 15,007 12,831 12,665 11,600

8,000 80,000-130,000 30,000 26,500 31,600 12,000 35,000 65,000

014 464 137 155 216 093 270 560

10,123 8,847 7,340 7,190 5,940 5,008 4,650 4,494 4,394 4,010

1,500 3,000 9,000 2,000 2,700-9,000 2,800 1,000 20,000 3,000 10,000

014 033 122 027 151 055 021 445 068 249

3,753 3,665 3,496 3,360 3,326 3,117 2,850 2,800 2,650 2,300 2,250 2,190 1,565 1,504 1,300 1,030

1,500 1,500-4,000 2,500 2,000-5,500 2,700-7,000 1,200-2,000 1,000 400 1,000 6,000 1,000 1,300 1,000 5,500 1,200 3,800

039 109 071 163 210 064 035 014 037 260 044 059 063 365 092 368

Asia 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

China (mainland) India Indonesia Pakistan Japan

750,000 460,490 100,045 98,612 95,899

2,614,000 550,000 350,000 103,000-260,000 221,000

(a) Ratio of military manpower over total population in percents.

34

348 119 349 263 230

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective World profile of armed forces personnel - 1966 Population mid 1963 est. (1000 s) 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Turkey Philipines Thailand Rep. Korea Burma Iran N. Viet Nam Rep. Viet Nam Afghanistan Taiwan N. Korea

30,256 30,241 28,835 26,868 23,735 22,182 17,800 15,317 14,900 11,696 10,700

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

Ceylon Nepal Malaya Iraq Saudi Arabia Cambodia Syria Yeman Israel Lebanon Laos

10,625 9,700 7,607 6,855 6,600 5,900 5,251 5,000 2,376 2,200 1,925

28. Jordan

1,827

estimates

Military manpower 428,000 28,500 81,000-134,000 575,000 149,000 150,000 250,000 225,000 90,000 542,000 280,000 Army 9,000 Navy 20,000 Air Force 8,800 20,000 8,000 60,000-70,000 30,000 32,000 45,000 10,000 75,000 10,800 60,000 Right 9,000 Neutral 25,000 Left 35,000

Military manpower ratio ( a ) 1.414 094 464 2.140 627 676 1.404 1.468 604 4.634 532 082 206 105 1.021 454 542 856 200 3.156 490 3.116 467 1.298 1.915

Europe 1. Fed. Ger. Dom. Rep. 2. U K 3. Italy 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

France Spain Poland Yugoslavia Rumania E. Germany (G.D.R.) Czechoslovakia Netherlands Hungary Belgium Portugal Greece

55,430 53,812 50,498 47,853 31,077 30,691 19,065 18,813 16,095 13,951 11,967 10,088 9,290 9,037 8,480

430,000 435,000 98,000 Army a. Navy 880,400 400,000 285,000 347,000 218,000 154,000 185,000 130,000 90,000 110,000 190,000 161,000

775 808 194 1.839 1.287 928 1.820 1.158 956 1.326 1.086 892 1.184 1.327 1.898

35

Morris World profile

of armed forces personnel Population mid 1963 est. (1000 s)

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Bulgaria Sweden Austria Switzerland Denmark Finland Norway Ireland Albania

- 1966

Military manpower

Janowitz

estimates Military manpower ratio (»)

8,078 7,604 7,172 5,770 4,684 4,543 3,667 2,841 1,762

149,500 23,000 14,000 12,000 42,500 41,900 35,000 13,000 28,000

1.850 302 195 207 907 922 954 457 1.589

189,417 38,416 18,928 7,203 4,448 4,144 3,334 2,721 2,024 1,541 1,177 1,344

2,702,000 62,200 119,700 43,000 5,000 8,000 19,000 4,000 2,500 5,000 NONE NONE

1.426 161 632 596 112 193 569 147 123 324

10,916 2,538

52,000 12,500

476 492

North America 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

U.S.A. Mexico Canada Cuba Haiti Guatamala Dom Rep. El Salvador Honduras Nicaraqua Costa Rica Panama Oceania

1. Australia 2. New Zealand U.S.S.R.

224,764

3,850,000

76,409 21,719 15,098 11,045 8,217 8,144 4,726 3,596 2,649 1,903

272,700 116,000 19,000-22,000 37,000 42,300 19,700 15,800 8,000-15,000 N.I. 9,600

1.713

South America 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

36

Brazil Argentina Columbia Peru Chile Venezuela Ecuador Bolivia Uruguay Paraguay

356 534 145 334 514 241 334 417 504

Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective course, such small nations that will be called on for United Nations constabulary duty. Canada has taken the lead and organized an international conference on these problems. As a result, the United Nations has the rudiments of a military force at its disposal without the political instabilities and administrative difficulties that would be generated if it had a centralized force in being. But it remains for sociologists to study and appraise these rudimentary efforts in order to help stimulate creative thinking on the development of appropriate military forms. Beyond peace-keeping operations is the arena of arms control and disarmament. It is possible to develop models of the world community under conditions of radical disarmament. Walter Millis and James Read in The Abolition of War are concerned with eliminating war as an instrument of national policy. Yet they conclude with an organizational concept which they label as national police forces. National police forces - and not a world police are argued as elements required to enforce the domestic conditions required for a world community. The idea of the national police force converges with the concept of the constabulary force. Not only are specialists in violence seen as operating in a protective military posture, but by whatever name they are seen as having a positive role in arms control and disarmament. On the level more specifically related to the mechanics of arms control, is the formulation of Thomas C. Schelling of a special surveillance force.8 The special surveillance force is seen as an instrument for implementing an arms control arrangement. It is an organizational device for making treaties and formal arrangements enforceable, effective and expanding. The special surveillance force is an example of institution building which would function "to observe the enemy's behavior, at the enemy's invitation, and to report home instantly through authentic channels. The purpose is to help tranquilize crises that threaten to erupt into general war, particularly crises aggravated by the instability of strategic deterrence.. . ." Thus, it is striking to note that Schelling sees arms control in part as a crash program in which new arrangements - formal and informal, unilateral and bilateral - can emerge in response to a sudden crisis. It is even more striking to note that the organizational characteristics he describes for his special surveillance force are military characteristics in part, and more specifically converge with the con» Thomas C. Schelling, "A Special Surveillance Force", Preventing World War III, edited by Irving Wright, William M. Evan, and Deutsch Morton (New York, Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1962), pp. 87-105.

37

Morris Janowitz stabulary concept; namely, "the attributes of the forces should be readiness, speed and reliability, self sufficiency, versatility and ability to improvise". It is of course, not sufficient for sociologists to speculate and develop alternative models of the institutional arrangements required for arms control and disarmament. It is essential to investigate in organizational and institutional terms the relevant national and international agencies in order to better understand the processes of their adaptation and decision-making. In projecting the research agenda for the sociology of military institutions, it is necessary to examine the full range of their non-military activities. A t a minimum national disasters are likely to persist whose consequences can be coped with in part by military forces. In addition to these national disasters, there are the continuous rescue missions and responses to the failure and breakdown of man-made systems of transportation, power, navigation and the like. In the process of economic and social development the military have roles to play in education and training that are compatible with the development of a world community. There is every reason to believe that such multiple goals, including cooperative exploration of the limits of man's environment supply important elements in containing and modifying professional militarism. U N I V E R S I T Y OF

38

CHICAGO

Jacques van Doom

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY: PATTERNS AND TRENDS

1.

ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY SOCIOLOGY

The studies collected in this book are characterized by a macroscopic approach. The main focus is not military morale, leadership behavior and small group cohesion, but the social structure and institutional change of the armed forces. The subject is not the 'human relations'approach,1 but the study of civil-military relations in the broad sense of the word. Thus, Armed Forces and Society is not an arbitrarily chosen title with some decorative value, but an effort to typify these collected essays. It is this macroscopic view, which is the main characteristic of the military sociology a la Janowitz. Without failing to appreciate the results of the research-tradition in the wake of The American Soldier, a second field of research developed mainly because of his initiative, which simultaneously encompassed the military profession and organization as well as the relation between the military and society. It is remarkable that these studies are more orientated towards the field of political science than towards the theories and techniques of social psychology. It is also remarkable that practically from the beginning military sociology covered the new nations as well as, though to a lesser degree, the communist countries. A world-wide approach seems to be no serious problem, as it does in some older and more settled branches of sociology.2 1

The term "human relations" school is somewhat restricted. Bigler presents a good comprehensive study from this school. R. R. Bigler, Der einsame Soldat. Eine soziologische Deutung der militärischen Organisation (Frauenfeld, Huber & Co., 1963). 2 S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Uni-

39

Jacques van Doom Those who are unconvinced by a statement like this should examine a comparative field such as industrial sociology, highly dominated by studies of work behavior, work satisfaction and informal organization, showing a strong social psychological orientation; besides that industrial sociology is exclusively directed at the modern industrial organization of Western countries. Very little attention is paid to the external relations of the enterprise, namely the market, and to the incorporation in the social and economic environment. The same applies to the aspects of the national characteristics and ideological affiliations of the industrial pattern, which phenomena are being explicitly examined in military sociology. The entrepreneurial function does not come into consideration at all; only the organizational role of management is being considered, but it is the worker who gets most attention. By contrast in military sociology it is the military elite - the officers which has already been studied thoroughly. One can say, that more is known about the social origin and social composition of the officer corps in many countries than about the managerial class in industrial societies. From a sociological point of view this striking accent is all the more important, since the relation of the military establishment to the societal and political system runs directly and almost exclusively via the professional elite. Studies of the professional soldier are, therefore, of primary importance for a better understanding of the relationship between armed forces and society. This applies even more, where this connection is subject to radical changes. One can even speak of a general crisis in civil-military relations. This crisis, already analyzed before in general terms,3 will be outlined in detail in most of the essays in this volume. In the first place there are a number of studies dealing with the relation of the military to the state or society, sometimes in abstract terms, e.g. Feld about the alienation of the military, mostly in more concrete analyses. The latter contributions are mainly concerned with the social role versity Press, 1957); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics (London and Dunmow, Pall Mall Press, 1962); M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1964); W. Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (London and Dunmow, Pall Mall Press, 1964). 3 S. P. Huntington, op. cit.; M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (The Free Press of Glencoe, 111., 1960f).

40

Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends of the armed forces in a particular country (Russia, Poland, Ireland, Germany, Pakistan, the African countries, Australia and Argentina). The tension between military and civilian institutions is brought to light in these studies, but is explicitly emphasized in the analysis of open conflicts, such as military putschism: comparatively examined in France and Germany, where the coups failed (Lang); separately analyzed in South Korea, Pakistan and Argentina, where the result was a direct or indirect military regime (Kim, Sayeed, Beltran). A second, more limited series of studies is discussing the military institution as such, and examines the social origin of the army elite, clearly showing its significance in respect of the political and social equilibrium: in Great Britain and Sweden, to a lesser extent also in Poland (Otley, Abrahamsson, Wiatr). Only a few contributions examine the internal military problems. The influence of modern technology on the attitudes and ideology of the Soviet officer (Kolkowicz), and the study of the functions of peacekeeping forces (Van Doorn and Mans) are two examples. However neither loses sight of the political power structure as a whole.

2. FOUR TYPES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In seeking a problem basic to the different contributions, one inevitably meets with the already mentioned tension between military professionalism on the one side, and social, political, ideological and technological development on the other. With the concept 'professionalism' as a point of departure, it is tempting to interpret this tension as a consequence of the professional autonomy, which the professional soldier enables to resist social influences, political pressure, ideological indoctrination and technical innovation. In doing so, a general contrast between military professionalism and social and cultural change is construed, which, however, at times is sustained, at times denied by the facts presented. By splitting the external relations of the military to the different subsystems of society, it seems possible to trace the various processes more exactly. The large number of subsystems, which would come into consideration for such an analysis may be limited by asking to which social phenomena the military establishment is related. Following this train of thought the most obvious institution is without any doubt the state. The armed forces can be considered the state's foremost instrument of violence. In the second place, the military are

41

Jacques van Doom affiliated to the people; the armed forces serve not only a government but are also the embodiment of a nation's conscience and a nation's will. Moreover, the officers are part of the social elite. Their weapon monopoly can be controlled easier by involving them in the vested interests of the legitimate social and political order, if possible by recruiting them from the establishment. In the fourth place there is the relationship between the military and the economic interests and pressure groups. This aspect is sadly neglected by sociologists, despite a long history of ideological discussions in the field of armament and politics. Those who examine the military profession along these four lines, stand at least some chance of arriving at more concrete and tenable conclusions. On all four subjects there is important material to be drawn from in these collected contributions. In the following analysis, this material is presented in a general outline, which offers the opportunity of paying attention to a number of phenomena partly or wholly omitted in the essays. In this way the studies may be connected by a common background. Successively to be discussed are: the relation of the state to the military, the armed forces as 'the nation in arms', the elitist commitments of the officer corps and finally the relation of the military to the economic system. In all four sections an examination is made to see whether these relations tend to a particular direction and what the relationship is between these developments and military professionalism.

3.

THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE

The relations of the military to the state are altogether correctly stated as a problem by Finer, in whose opinion the intervention of the armed forces in politics is more 'normal' than obedience to civil power. What, in Western nations, is to be considered as obvious, is not a 'natural' situation but the outcome of a long historical process which has to be safeguarded in order to be retained.4 In developed countries, one nevertheless can ascertain that the loyalty of the armed forces is, generally speaking, strongly assured. Recognition of the monarch as the only legitimate source of authority was founded 4

42

S. E. Finer, op. cit., p. 5.

Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends in the 18th century,5 carried over to the head of state in the 19th century and finally to the state as an institution. This transfer of legitimacy passed with unevitable friction but succeeded even in countries with differences in political orientation between officers and government. Both France 6 and Sweden contribute an example of this situation. Abrahamsson indicates a difference in ideological valueorientation between the Swedish officer and the Social Democratic government. This picture is confirmed in a negative sense by Kurt Lang in his studies concerning the abortive coups d'état in Germany in 1944, and in France in 1961. Both interventions, exceptional as such, were moreover doomed to fail by the incorporation of the principle of absolute subordination to the head of government. The situation in the communist world, in both developed and underdeveloped countries, is similar. Obedience to political authority, embodied in the party, is complete and firmly fixed. The position of the armed forces is often weaker than in the just-mentioned states. When Mao Tse-tung proclaims: "The Party commands the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party", 7 he is stating an approved fact in the communist world. This does not of course exclude the possibility of discussion on political indoctrination in the armed forces. The article by Kolkowicz on the Soviet Officer Corps gives an impressive insight into the prevailing discussion on this matter in the USSR. It is striking but in no way surprising, that the party loyalty is not in question: the discussion concerns only the balance between political-ideological and technicalprofessional elements in military training and task-fulfillment. The absence of independent political activity by the armed forces in both Western and communist countries is striking in comparison with the frequency, spread and intensity of military intervention in the political affairs of the new nations. Following the many studies already existing, such as those by Finer, Gutteridge and Janowitz,8 this book gives some analyses on the subject: Sayeed on Pakistan - especially the 5

M. Roberts, "The soldier became the king's man, for he wore the king's coat", The Military Revolution 1560-1660. Inaugural Lecture at Queen's University of Belfast, 1956 (Private Circulation), p. 20. » A. Juin, Trois siècles d'obéissance militaire 1650-1963 (Paris, Pion, 1964); J. S. Ambler, The French Army in Politics 1945-1962 (Ohio State University Press, 1966). 7 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 272. 8 See note 2.

43

Jacques van Doom situation before and after the revolution of October 1958 - and Eugene Kim on the coup in South Korea in May 1961; while Beltran offers a general outline of the stirring history of the civil-military relations in modern Argentina. The rising tide of military power in African politics, analyzed by Bell, has already extended to more countries in this area of the world. What is striking in many cases is the radical change in the relation of regime to power instrument: the instrument itself has become the regime. Generally speaking, however, there is no replacement of the political-ideological pattern; the armed forces come into action primarily to restore general order. Their intervention resembles their apparatus: pragmatic and technocratic, even a-political.9 The existence of divergent patterns of civil-military relations might suggest a connection between military professionalism and the extent of intervention in politics; that is to say, leads to a more general and theoretical approach of the political role of the military. Huntington pleads that maximizing military professionalism is the most safe basis for effective civilian control. "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state." 10 Finer disputes this. Not only on the grounds of varying observations, but mainly because he assumes Huntington to consider military professionalism and military non-intervention per definition as one and the same, thereby making it impossible to deduce from the degree of professionalism an explanation for political commitments. Finer poses instead the probability of political loyalty of the military to be dependent on the belief in the explicit principle of civil supremacy.11 However, in doing so, Finer introduces exactly what he reproaches Huntington, namely an essentialist argument. Thus the question still remains: where lies the base for the military attitudes? The facts does not bring us much further than this discussion. There are numerous highly professional armies, which seldom or never attempt to exercise political influence, e.g. the armed forces in Great Britain and many of the Commonwealth partners, in Scandinavia and in the Low Countries. There are also a number of armies in the new states, which " M. Janowitz, The Military ... cit., pp. 63-67. 10 S. P. Huntington, op. cit., p. 84. 11 S. E. Finer, op. cit., pp. 24 ff.

44

Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends recently have created a military regime, however typically professional in composition and outlook.12 The concept of professionalism therefore does seem to be unsuitable for determining the extent of political involvement. French experience in civil-military relations lends some support to the thesis of Huntington, who considers professionalism to be the surest guarantee of civilian control. This is confirmed, amongst others, by Lang.13 Kolkowicz, by contrast, considers the growing criticism of political indoctrination in the Soviet officer corps a step towards the creation of a more professional group than before, though without any doubt this reduces the grip of the regime on the military. Feld's weighted argument supports the conclusion, that not professionalism but other factors are decisive in the relation of the military towards the state and the political system. Military intervention might be better explained by reason of the political and social situation than by reason of military orientation. It is not clear, whether one may indicate a general trend in civilmilitary relations. In all probability no such trend exists, and one has to take into consideration, in each particular case, the "level of political culture" (Finer) and the ideological content of the political system. 4.

THE MILITARY AND THE MASSES

One can also approach the role of the military in society and politics from an altogether different angle by questioning the relation to the people. The modern army, which took form in the 19th century, was not only an instrument of the state, but as a national army gave expression to the will of the people and their collective loyalty. This aspect of military history is symbolized in the "levée en masse" of the French Revolution. For the first time in modern history the doctrine of the popular army was put into practice,14 later to appear elsewhere: "das Volk in Waffen", "the nation in arms". This concept has a certain nationalist, expansionist tendency. It is connected with the great European wars, and with the imperialistic dreams of the great European nations. The real bond between army and nation, however, can be much stronger felt in the citizen army of some small nations - in the first place Switzerland and Israel15 - and 12

M. Janowitz, The Military ... cit., pp. 49-67. See also J. S. Ambler, op. cit., pp. 370 ff. 14 R. D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms 1866-1939 (New York, Russell & Russell, 1965). 14 M. R. D. Foot, Men in Uniform. Military Manpower in Modern Industrial Societies (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), pp. 60 ff. 13

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Jacques van Doom was experienced in the idea of a popular militia of the opposing social classes in the 19th century states.18 Indeed, in these countries it is not the professional army but the mobilized mass of civilians which guarantees the integrity of the state. The concept of "the nation in arms" expresses here a strongly selfassertive civil society, and is not an ideology for making acceptable the conscript system. Concerning this citizen tradition Encel gives ample information in his study on Australia. Characteristic for this country is the small size of the professional army, the low rate of professional self-recruitment, and the penetration of militia-officers in the highest ranks. Whereas the soldier and his virtues are highly respected, the professional military is unpopular: one may speak of militantism, not of militarism. Related to this is an explicit egalitarianism, an aversion to feudal attitudes and values, and a high degree of individualism, showing itself even in military tactics. It is tempting not only to compare the Australian army with the Israeli army, but moreover to bring it in connection with a general category, namely the pioneer communities of the frontier areas: Israel, pioneering Australia, Canada and USA, South Africa during the Boer period. In all these territories white settlers penetrated and colonized the hinterland from the coastal areas, thereafter either expelling or pacifying the native population. The military style and organization following out of this situation, typifies the early settlements with their frontier problems, and their ensuing frontier tradition. Nowhere else is a finer citizen tradition to be formed. Every settlement constitutes a strategic military post, with the requirement of each individual settler to safeguard life and property.17 Besides the modern national army and the militia, a third type of popular army is the guerrilla force. Here also the relation of the military to the masses is very clearly accentuated. The function however is 18 In France the ideas of the socialist leader Jean Jaurès on "l'armée nouvelle" prevailed; in Germany both liberals and socialists opposed the aristocratic army in favour of a people's militia. Cf. R. Hôhn, Die Armee als Erziehungsschule der Nation (Bad Harzberg, Verlag für Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft und Technik, 1963), pp. 36 ff, 105 ff, 177 ff, 128 ff. 17 W. Millis, Arms and Men. A Study of American Military History (New York, Mentor Books, 1958), p. 20: "In the early days every settlement had been virtually a military colony; long after the necessity had passed, the enrolled militia companies and regiments had continued to play a role in local politics and community affairs."

46

Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends different: the guerrilla army is fighting a domestic war, characteristic for the late and post-colonial period. In some cases guerrilla warfare is associated with social reform movements (China, Cuba).18 The guerrilla is not nourished by a mere section of the population, but is in need of the support of the whole population; to quote Mao, the guerrilla fighter needs the people as a fish needs water. The guerrilla army, like the militia, has a strong individualistic mentality, is anti-professional and anti-hierarchic, and thrives in combat, where it develops its experience and tactics. The classics on guerrilla warfare have been written by guerrilla leaders: Mao, Nasution, Guevara, Giap, Grivas.19 They describe a modern and evidently effective variant of the concept of the "nation in arms". The modern guerrilla army is, for the time being, to be considered the last important embodiment of the concept of the "nation in arms". Encel shows in his article that the militia is a vanguard in military development; the guerrilla force however has grown into a universal phenomenon, successful both in the military and the political field (China, Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam). None the less, the fate of the popular army seems decided. Even in countries like Communist China with its recent successful people's uprising, the professionalization of the military continues.20 Professionalization having taken a strong foothold, it seems very difficult to return to a people's militia, as Beltran shows for some Peronist experiments. Von Friedeburg mentions that the post-war idea of the "citizen in uniform" realized by the Bundeswehr also was not successful. The general tendency appears to be a progressive professionalization of the military, coupled with alienation from the people. Both tendencies were stimulated on the one hand by the continuous technical development of warfare, and on the other hand by the process of internationalization of the military. Political alliances, like NATO and 18 Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York, Praeger, 1961), p. 30: "The individual guerrilla: a social reformer." 19 Guevara, op. cit.; Mao Tse-tung, op. cit.; A. H. Nasution, Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (Djakarta: Indonesian Army Information Service, 1960); V o Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York, Praeger, 1962). (Facsimile Edition-Hanoi 1961); G. Grivas-Dighenis, Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle (London, Longmans, 1964). 20 E. Joffe, Party and Army. Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps 1949-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965).

47

Jacques van Doom Warsaw-pact, with their supranational strategic conceptions, coalition commands, and joint training programmes, at least demand a dual loyalty of the professional soldier. The constabulary concept, applied to the U.N. peace-keeping forces, stresses the international task instead of the national commitments. Van Doom and Mans analyse the probability of a renaissance of military professionalism as a consequence of peace-keeping operations. It stands to reason why the nations without pretentious nationalism such as the Scandinavian countries, Ireland, the Netherlands and Canada - therefore seem to be the most fervent advocates of an international constabulary force. Jackson's study on the enthusiastic adoption of the constabulary concept in Ireland gives a fascinating insight into this preference. The pragmatic view of these countries on the political role of the military offers a stronger basis for international activity than the exaggerated nationalism of the old and new superpowers with their tendency towards political missionarism. 5.

THE OFFICER CORPS AND THE ELITE

The sociologist will feel obliged to judge both points of view as partial. An army is rarely a mere instrument of the state, especially not in a world where mass democracy guarantees broad political influence. Nor will an army function as the armed nation, being technically underdeveloped and ineffective, and politically a permanent danger to political authority. In fact the social and political control of the military is considerably more complicated and differentiated. Gaetano Mosca has stated earlier that the political loyalty of the English and American armed forces primarily is to be explained by the recruiting of their officers from the social elite.21 The reversed hypothesis states that recruitment from the lower strata rouses high ambitions and enforces the tendency towards military intervention in politics. On first sight it seems a paradox, since an aristocratic officer corps would guarantee a more stable political order - even a democratic order - than an officer corps with a broad, 'democratic' social base.22 This supposition is further discussed by Lang and is partially confirmed by Otley as far as the British army elite is concerned. It throws " G. Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York and London, McGraw-Hill Book Cy., 1939), p. 233; St. Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 106 f. 22 M. Janowitz, Professional Soldier ... cit., p. 254. 48

Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends indeed a new light on the general tendency of the democratization of the officer. It draws attention to the question of the functional alternatives of the aristocratic attitude of non-intervention in politics, especially in those political systems without a countervailing power in the sense of a broad political participation of the people. In many new nations one can observe the outcome of such a situation. The new officer corps, recruited from the lower and middle class, aims at far-reaching intervention in political affairs in spite of its professionalism. To prevent a similar development the fascist and communist countries have searched consciously and systematically for an alternative formula. It is the performance of the party that the social and political integration of the armed forces and especially of the military elite has here succeeded: Mosca redivivus. In some cases a new elitism came into existence, such as in the political militia of SA and SS of National Socialism. The communist countries have followed the way of a more gradual, but irrevocable ideological indoctrination of the officer corps recruited from the working class. By this policy both social continuity and discontinuity are guaranteed: the political indoctrination replaces the earlier elitist commitments, the party affiliation is substituted for the aristocratic origin. What Garthoff states on the Russian development, is pictured by Wiatr of this process in Poland. The striking resemblance between the old and the new elitism also can be indicated in a negative way: much as the aristocratic officer e.g. in pre-war Poland and Great Britain - received little professional education but was politically reliable, so the officer of the young communist countries; only thereafter military expertise was sought for and developed in due course of time.23 The discussion on the relation between professionalization and politicization comes into focus when the regime maintains itself over a longer period. According to Wiatr, figures concerning the low percentage of party members among officers and cadets in Poland show that this problem does not exist at all; whereas in People's China it is a highly 23

In 1956 only 0.2% of all officers in the German Democratic Republic had attended a military college. In 1965, 77% of all regimental and divisional commanders had completed a degree course. E. Stuber and K. H. Schulze, "The Problem of Militarism and the Armies of the Two German States", Paper presented to the 6th World Congress of Sociology, Evian, Sept., 1966, p. 33. For China, see Joffe, op. cit., p. 14 ff.

49

Jacques van Doom actual matter; and Kolkowicz's article shows for the Soviet Union the opposite direction since the necessity of political indoctrination in the army is considered past question. Evidently there is not a general tendency in one direction. There is in some countries a virtually completed demolition of aristocratic amateurism in favour of military professionalism; in other countries the already achieved professional autonomy is a point of discussion, leading in some cases to direct political indoctrination.

6.

THE ARMED FORCES A N D ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Brandt and Von Friedeburg, in their contributions on the German Bundeswehr, point to a subject which receives only scant attention among sociologists: the relation between the military establishment and the economic system. There are many popular opinions on this subject. A number of American authors, amongst others Wright Mills, has suggested the existence of a powerful pressure group by placing the interests of the military apparatus in a supreme 'power elite' consisting of small groups of politicians, businessmen and generals.24 Their views are a re-formulation of the marxist-leninist theory of militarism as an instrument of capitalist and imperialist interests. Brandt sees parallel interests for army and industry in the event of a continuous arm's race, but he and Von Friedeburg also recognize contrasting interests. Von Friedeburg in particular poses that the German post-war rearmament did not completely correspond with the interests of private business. Would it not be probable, as Von Friedeburg asks, that the other 19th century theory, on the incompatibility of the developed industrial society and the military establishment, becomes valid again? Spencer redivivusl As it appears, the relation of the military to the economic system is a multiple one. The arm's race is an undeniable stimulus for technical development, while on the other hand military technology depends on a highly developed industrial production system. Interests diverge however on the level of labor force and manpower planning. On a limited scale attempts have been made to link-up a 24

C. W. Mills, The Power Elite (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956); J. M. Swonley, Jr., The Military Establishment (Boston, Beacon Press, 1964).

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Armed Forces and Society: Patterns and Trends military career with a second career in civilian life, but these attempts may have limited possibilities judging by recent results. Finally there may be a contradiction in ideology, since the valuepatterns of the private enterprise only partially coincide with the values of the professional soldier. Being formulated at the height of the capitalist era, Spencer's thesis on the incompatibility of the 'militant' and the 'industrial' type of society 25 is better applicable in countries where this economic system dominates. In the communist world and in the new nations the situation may be different. Neither on this subject a general tendency is evident. Political and societal differences have their influence on the relation of the military to the economic system. If in this synopsis is to emerge a general conclusion, it must be a modest one: almost every tendency shows its counterpart. Highly divergent patterns exist alongside one another and often the existing civil-military relations in the various countries are on different levels of development. It will be clear that this situation also creates problems of professional orientation for the individual military. The crisis of the military institution is equally a crisis of the military mind. This collection of essays does not probe further in detail on this aspect of the matter. It deserves the attention of the various branches of the behavioral sciences. NETHERLANDS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, ROTTERDAM ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, BREDA, THE NETHERLANDS

25

H . S p e n c e r , The Principles of Sociology, I I ( N e w Y o r k , A p p l e t o n & C o m p . ,

1883), eh. XVII and XVIII.

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II. THE MILITARY P R O F E S S I O N

M. D. Feld

PROFESSIONALISM, NATIONALISM, AND T H E A L I E N A T I O N OF T H E M I L I T A R Y

1. The sociology of the military profession is, in essence, the study of an elite group. It is a political elite, moreover, functioning as such by virtue of the roles it plays within the society of nations and within its own social structure: that of being a key instrument of international conflict and that of being the ultimate arbiter upon occasions of extreme internal disorder. This is not to assert that the soldier is a purely political animal, devoid of social and economic motivations. The rewards of his calling - in this paper I am dealing exclusively with members of the officer class - include wealth and status as well as power. The authoritative position of the officer is, however, based on the political utility of the organization he directs. Before everything else, he is a public servant. As in all other walks of life, wealth and status may facilitate entrance into and success throughout a chosen career. High rank, in return, normally results in a notable increment in status and wealth. But such considerations apply only to individuals. For the officer corps as a whole, what really determines prestige is the role played within the political life of the nation. Everything else, desirability as a profession, attractiveness of rewards follows from that. This narrow attachment to the factor of political power has its price. The range of rewards and inducements of a military career are limited by the fact that military service is a public monopoly. Within his social system, the organization he belongs to is the only one to which the soldier can legitimately sell his skills. His bargaining position is a limited one. Unlike most other professionals he is not confronted by a variety of economic institutions and particular communities competing for his 55

M. D. Feld special talent. He can take advantage of other opportunities, but only by shedding his professional status, resigning his commission and adopting a civilian career. Another way of putting this is to assert that the military officer represents a case of purely ASCRIPTIVE PROFESSIONALISM. His particular role is the direct result of his active membership and assigned position in a special organization. His professional status is subject to a continual process of review and reassessment. While terminal limits do exist, there is really no guaranteed age of retirement. He is liable to dismissal back into the civilian world whenever the organization considers his usefulness to have come to an end. ASCRIPTIVE PROFESSIONALISM means that career decisions are entirely in the hands of the organization and that tenure-like considerations play virtually no role. Background and training may be pertinent data in the process of role selection, but it is the official act of selection and designation itself which confers the label of professionalism on the individual soldier. It is not enough to be a member of a particular social class or to have graduated from a special school. The status opportunities inherent in the latter situations may be conferred or withheld, depending upon the usefulness to the organization of the individual in question. The ability to fill some organizational requirement may, of itself, be enough to lead to the granting of promotions and commissions to individuals otherwise academically untrained and socially unqualified. Officer status is a result of organizational fiat, and may be withdrawn as arbitrarily as it is conferred. ASCRIPTIVE PROFESSIONALISM accordingly guarantees an exceptional degree of dependence upon and therefore of loyalty to the organization by its individual members. But this loyalty and dependence are not, however, undivided. The relationship of the officer to the armed forces is balanced by an analogous relationship between the armed forces and the state. Here again the relationship is one of status dependency. Just as the individual soldier depends upon the organization for the legitimization of his rank, armed aggregates are dependent upon political sponsorship for their recognition in conventional armed forces. According to rules of international law, an armed force is as professional as its government is legitimate.1 In other professions the status of already accredited or of candidate members depends more or less on the manner 1

L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. II; Disputes, War and edited by H. Lauterpacht, 7th edition (London, 1955), pp. 248-268.

56

Neutrality,

Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military in which they perform their particular roles and not on or for whom. In the military business, the authority of a particular armed force to confer professional status is directly dependent upon the degree of international acceptance its government enjoys. Without such acceptance, its members are no more than disturbers of the peace. Experience or reputation, no matter how extensive, cannot give professional status to an armed band lacking a recognized political sponsor. Military success does, of course, lead to political authority, and political authority generally results in international recognition. The victorious rebels become the legitimate state. But the claim of legitimacy and the right to possess and employ instruments of violence resides in the political sponsor and not in its armed forces. The leader of the army becomes the head of the state and appoints his own military successor and subordinate. The political and international influence of armed forces can thus normally be described as an expression of SURROGATE AUTHORITY.

These two concepts of ascriptive professionalism and surrogate authority can be treated as the defining terms of military careerism. They fix both the limits and sources of power. The latter concept is as significant as the first, for the soldier has not only a profession but also a career. His possibilities of advancement are dependent not merely upon his own efforts but also upon the scope of opportunities his organization offers. This in turn depends upon the strength and stability of the state and upon the posture the latter is willing and able to take in domestic and international affairs. For all this formal dependence, the state-armed forces relationship might appear to be a one-sided one. With their near monopoly of the instruments of violence and with their control of a highly disciplined organization designed to employ them, the officer corps would appear to possess an almost limitless capacity to force the state and its policies into the forms they consider most favorable to their own interests. Surrogate authority might, paradoxically, be said to encourage an active military role in political life. But this possibility is, with equal paradox, balanced, at least theoretically, by the concept of ascriptive professionalism. The extreme dependence upon his organization of the individual officer enables the former to impose upon its members its own standards as to professional attitudes and professional behavior. Armed forces are enmeshed in a tangle of rules and traditions defining both what is proper for them as soldiers and moral for them as servants of the state. Central to this control mechanism

57

M. D. Feld is the assertion that the management of violence is to be used only for politically approved purposes.2 But what 'politically approved purposes' are is not always easily determined. Within the framework of the state, authority may be incoherently divided, policies inadequately or not at all formulated and the process of succession inoperative or ambiguous. The open defiance of the government by groups other than the armed forces may put in question not only the ability of the former to maintain order but also its right to direct a society which its very existence seems to divide. There are, of course, general rules. It is usually considered both proper and moral for an armed force to wage war following the wishes of the government in power, and improper and immoral for it to engage in such hostilities upon its own initiative. Within the more complicated domestic arena, it is usually proper and moral for an armed force to aid the established government in the suppression of disorders which seem to threaten the stability of society, but improper and immoral in such a situation to take, without explicit authorization, the side of either government or opposition. When applied to actual cases, however, these criteria appear to be inadequate guides. Even external war, which in appearance is simpler, offers many cases of conflict. The verdict of contemporary history is that de Gaulle and Kemal Ataturk 3 were justified, one in continuing and the other in starting a war, when in both cases the regime in power had ordered the reverse. But in analogous cases, the French generals in Algeria in 1961 and the Japanese officers in Manchuria in 1931 have been judged to have behaved both improperly and immorally. Nevertheless strong moral grounds have been attributed to the former 4 and cogent professional reasons to the latter.5 Similarly the German officer corps has been condemned for not offering greater resistance to Hitler's aggressive plans, though their professional obligations were in this case quite clearly fulfilled. Domestic intervention also has its complications. In Egypt and Pakistan the armed forces ousted the constitutional regime and in doing so appear to have created a more stable and popular government. On 2

S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 14-16. ® Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961), pp. 237249. 4 George A. Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 5 Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden (New Haven, 1963).

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Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military the other hand, the military coup of 1943 in Argentina, though ousting an already discredited regime, subjected that nation to a cycle of ineffective government and military intervention from which it has yet to emerge; and the Venezuelan military coup of 1948 resulted in ten politically and socially disastrous years. The examples cited, moreover, have reasonably clear consequences. But the problem is made more complicated if we take into account the large number of cases of countries where the verdict has yet to come in. This article, however, will not deal with the grounds for either justifying or condemning such military acts. The cases mentioned above have been used solely to indicate the sort of tensions to which the combination of ascriptive professionalism and surrogate authority subjects the military officer. What is to be analyzed is the relationship of such tensions to the general political culture. To be more specific, what will be examined is the relationship between professional military standards and political activism. Does the existence of a self-regulating military system guarantee or jeopardize the stability of the state? My answers will, of course, be hypothetical and framed in terms of the light mature societies case upon the problems of emergent ones. 2. An unstable relationship between the professional soldier and his government has been described as a characteristic of 'new nations'.6 The process of rapid change, it has been noted, creates an extreme degree of social instability and strain. Granting the validity of this hypothesis, one can nevertheless make the paradoxical observation that one of the salient features of new nations is that in a relative sense their recent history has been characterized by stagnation rather than transformation. Compared to so-called industrial societies, their social and economic structure has for the last hundred years exhibited a rather modest degree of transformation. If they do seem at present to be in a stage of radical development, it is perhaps because the events of recent years furnish such a sharp contrast with the stagnation of their immediate history. Nevertheless, taking examples from 'advanced' societies, there is an apparent validity to the contention that civil-military tension and rapid social change are related. Consider the evidence of the recent past. Over the period 1860-1960, there were six major world powers: France,

Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by J. J. Johnson (Princeton, 1962), pp. 7-68.

8

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M. D. Feld Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Russia, and the United States. All six were also in the forefront of industrialization. In terms of our two variables, they present the following pattern (see Table 1). TABLE 1

1860-1960 Civil-military tension France Germany Great Britain Japan Russia USA

high high low high ? low

Social change low high high high high high

The determinations in this table are obviously impressionistic, but they do fit in with general historical conventions. One of the examples, that of Russia, will be excluded from consideration for reasons of its rather unique political history. The remainder provide us with the following pattern: two nations, Germany and Japan, with a high degree of civilmilitary tension and a high degree of social change; two nations, Great Britain and the United States, with a low degree of civil-military tension and a high degree of social change; one nation, France, with a high degree of civil-military tension and a low degree of social change. To simplify our analysis, the discussion will be largely restricted to the three cases where analytical material is most abundant: 7 France, Germany, and the United States. Using their histories as evidence, several broad hypotheses will be sketched as to the relationship between surrogate authority, ascriptive professionalism, civil-military relations and social change. Let us begin with the problem of civil-military relations. Was there any particular attitude towards society shared by the members of the three professional groups in question? The works of Demeter, Girardet and Huntington, our most authoritative historical surveys, strike the 7 The following books have been used as background material for the statements made in the subsequent pages: F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918-1933 (Oxford, 1966); K. Demeter, The German Officer Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945 (New York, 1965); R. Girardet, La Société Militaire dans la France Contemporaine (1815-1939) (Paris, 1953); La Crise Militaire Française 1945-1962, edited by R. Girardet (Paris, 1964); S. P. Huntington, op. cit.-, Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); G. A. Kelly, op. cit.

60

Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military reader with their continual evocation of a military sense of social alienation. In the period between 1815 and the Second World War, members of the officer class were dominated by the consciousness of an estrangement between their own way of life and the dominant social trends of their respective nations. In their eyes the major threat to the armed forces lay not in some hostile power but in the materialistic and leveling values of their own society. The reaction to this threat was in each case unique. The conflict between officer and civil society was for the German officer corps a matter of their own deliberate choice. From the days of its Prussian eminence this group had pursued a policy of maintaining itself as a privileged and exclusive group, the embodiment of a unique and ultrapure set of social and political values. The organization's capacity for ascriptive professionalism was refined to a degree never attained before or since. Even though industrialization and national development had progressively reduced the aristocratic background of its membership, it continued to indoctrinate its new recruits in a tradition of anachronistic Junkerism and virulent anti-civilianism. The German officer corps, even under the Nazis, regarded itself as a society above society and a state within the state. The primary loyalty of its members was not simply to the organization but more significantly to a kind of transcendental notion of personal honor and national mission. Society and government were, insofar as they failed to satisfy these nebulous terms, rejected as transitory and un-German. In the case of France, civil-military tension was also considerable and deliberate, but here the initiative can be said to have come more from the state than from its armed forces. Mindful of the national revolutionary tradition, successive governments attempted to keep the armed forces isolated and in a state of political and social inertia. The concept of surrogate authority was systematically imposed. The recruitment and promotion of officers was strongly influenced by the complexion of regimes. The soldier was assumed to be an instrument of order and of empire, indispensable for such purposes. His political and social beliefs were expected to be those of the class into which he had been born or with which he identified himself, not those of the profession he practiced. Whatever ideological bias the officer class displayed was focused upon the supranational issues of the threat of Germany and the preservation of the overseas empire. The United States presents an interesting case in that the alienation of its military class cannot be described as being the result of ascriptive 61

M. D. Feld professionalism or of surrogate authority, or either autonomous intention or of imposed design. It just simply appears to have happened. Up until World War II there was not much attention given to either the social or the political significance of the professional officer. Historical factors may have played a part in this. Unlike France whose modern history was generally felt to have begun with the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, or Germany whose unity was popularly held to have been forged with 'blood and iron', the history of the United States was essentially a civilian one. Its Revolutionary War had been a militia operation. The plantation South, the one society with a military tradition, had been effectively crushed in the Civil War. Subsequent armed conflicts had been neither professional in nature nor inspirational in effect. The accepted role of its armed forces was somewhat sanitary in nature, that of cleaning up infected areas. They were something in the way of unsuccessful private enterprises, publicly subsidized. Without either a supranational mission or a national role, the armed forces were relegated to passive obscurity. These distinctions in the nature and degree of their social affiliation were accompanied by exhibited differences in the level of professional attainment. The consensus of informed opinion seems to be that the German officer corps, 1860-1940, was the most efficient of the major military establishments. The French officer corps was rated considerably lower, and the American military establishment considered to have scarcely been in the running. It is perhaps significant to note that in terms of ascriptive professionalism and surrogate authority the German officer corps can be rated as strong in the first and weak in the second, the French the other way around, and the American rather neutral in both. Moreover, an examination of the list of major powers of the first half of the twentieth century - France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Russia and the United States yields one serious rival to the German claims of professional military eminence, Japan. Here again, we find an officer corps strong in its professional identity and insubordinate to its civilian superiors. I am not arguing that any army is better prepared for fighting a war through the fact of its being actively committed to some independent political position. The combination of professionalism and nationalism may result in a form of political surrealism that defeats its own ends. The cases here discussed are, anyhow, too limited in number and nature for the drawing of any definite conclusions. They all refer to events prior to 1940 and to societies exceptionally high on the scale of industrialization. 62

Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military What is being presented is the hypothesis that, in highly industrialized nations prior to 1940, the professional level of particular military establishments was directly related to their conscious pursuit of an independent national role. This, after all, is no more than some of the more prominent and sympathetic contemporary analyses of the political sociology of the military have claimed. Huntington has described the painful forging of an American professional military class through the gradual emergence of a sense of national mission; Demeter credits the eminence of the German officer corps to this factor and attributes its decline to the relinquishing of that role to the Nazi party. More significantly because it is more contemporary, Girardet has credited the Algerian conflict with the creation of a French army far superior in professional effectiveness and political commitment to any in recent history and finds a bitter irony in the doubly foredoomed nature of that achievement.8 All three authors have found military effectiveness to reside in a sense of distinctiveness not only as to professional identity but also in the possession of a unique social role. The particular relevance of this to present-day problems lies in the fact that it has become customary to regard the armed forces as an especially effective instrument in programs of social and economic modernization. Much more frequently than in the case of mature societies, the problems of emergent nationhood are held to justify the active intervention of military leaders in the domestic political process. The armed forces regard themselves and are broadly supported as the unique embodiment of national unity. But are there reasonable historical grounds for regarding them as effective agents of national unification? Among the armed forces of 'advanced' nations where the concept of a unique national mission was both strong and explicit, the professional soldier seems to have been equally conscious of his membership in an unrepresentative, 'alienated' group.9 3. Ascriptive professionalism and militant nationalism

10

are not neces-

8

Girardet (editor), op. cit., pp. 173-185; 221-229. The question is too complicated for discussion in this limited article. But there appear to be cogent grounds for arguing that the military exacted an exorbitant price for their role in the unification of Germany. See L. B. Namier, 1848: The Revolt of the Intellectuals (Oxford, 1946). 10 Being too significant a phenomenon to be described in negative terms, a weak degree of surrogate authority will henceforth be referred to as 'militant nationalism'. 9

63

M. D. Feld sarily inseparable. There are a large number of examples of states where the military forces were highly professional in composition but nationally uncommitted, where officer corps were made up of international careerists, bound solely to the sovereign, and there by a contractual relationship.11 On the other hand, there are cases of forces of a definitely unprofessional nature but with a strong sense of national mission, militia bands led by local worthies and destined to spontaneous dissolution upon the attainment of their objectives. But in the western world these two kinds vanished by the mid-nineteenth century, disappearing with the emergence of the notion of the secular society. Henceforth in the nations under consideration, we find armed forces whose degree of professionalization marches hand-in-hand with the self-conscious assumption of a national role. Is this relationship an accidental one? It can perhaps be explained by treating the process of modernization as one in which accepted political goals are transformed from ABSOLUTIST into SECULAR ones. "In a secular society the essential purpose of political action is the improvement of the level of living of the citizens." 12 In an absolutist society the essential purpose of political action is that of increasing the internal control and external influence of the sovereign authority.13 According to the secular ideology, public servants are participants in a commonly shared enterprise. Following the logic of absolutism, public servants are instruments of the particular goals of the sovereign. Given a general consensus on secularization, the professional soldier finds himself in an anomalous position. His is perhaps the only prominent group excluded both by tradition and by design from making a positive welfare contribution. His professional affiliation commits him to the absolutist concept of the state. By tradition the officer corps is anti-commercial, nonentrepreneurial. In function it is non-productive.14 11 Consider the career of the Prussian military hero, Marshall Bliicher. Born in Rostock in 1742, he entered Swedish service in 1756, was taken prisoner by the Prussians in 1760 and was persuaded to enter their service. 12 J. Fourastie, The Causes of Wealth (Glencoe, 111., 1960), p. 21. 13 F. Meinecke, Machiavellianism (New Haven, 1957), pp. 1-3. 14 "What, then, is the use of the shi, or samurai, class? Its only business is to preserve, or maintain, giri (right, honor, duty). The people of the other classes deal with visible things, while sumarai deal with invisible, colorless, and insubstantial things . . . If there were no sumarai, right (giri) would disappear from human society, the sense of shame would be lost, and wrong and injustice would prevail." - Tokugawa Mitsukini (1628-1700) to his samurai. Quoted from an article by Ernest W. Clement in the Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society (London, 1898); by R. W. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion (Glencoe, 111., 1957), p. 90.

64

Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military On the other hand, the armed forces participate in the general expansion of industrial technology. The competitive experience of warfare forces even the most traditionally-minded armies to take a more modern view of their responsibilities. The social and economic activities surrounding them cannot be ignored. Secularism and industrialism have created a new technology which emphasizes expertise at the expense of tradition. 15 The military have been modernized in spite of themselves. The criteria of military professionalism are now measured against the standards employed in secular enterprises. My first hypothesis then is that the secularization of society has intensified both the professionalism and the alienation of the military. It has obliged the armed forces to adopt more rigid criteria for the selection and training of its officers. Ascriptive professionalism has thereby been emphasized. At the same time, the social basis for military privilege, i.e., the distinction between noblemen and commoners has been progressively eliminated. The differentiation of soldiers and civilians has increasingly become a function of the armed forces themselves and not of society in general. But as secularization and industrialization spread, as expertise replaces tradition, the ascriptive processes discard absolutistic standards in favor of secular ones. The officer corps is forced to adapt itself to the criteria and practices of other professions. The soldier becomes more subject to the control of his organization and is at the same time informed that the honorific traditions of this organization no longer carry much weight. The expectation emerges that military policy should in some significant sense be a rational extension of social policy. At the same time, it is dogmatically denied that the armed forces have any particular social contribution to make. As a result the officer comes to consider himself as exploited by a society from which he is debarred. My second hypothesis is that the military process of mutually reinforcing professionalization and alienation inclines the officer corps towards doctrines of militant nationalism. Wherever circumstances permit, military officers deny the existence of any special commitment to society on their part. They assert themselves to be bound by a unique allegiance to the state, to a constitution or to a national tradition rather than to any particular regime; to concepts, in other words, which because they are permanent and unchanging have a stronger claim to loyalty than the secular procession of designedly transient and evolutionary regimes. This doctrine has the additional virtue of providing a traditionalist content to the otherwise increasingly secularized process of ascriptive professional15 Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 21-31.

65

M. D. Feld ism. It offers the organization a basis for indoctrinating and assessing its members in terms which are purely its own. The uses of militant nationalism serve as a partial explanation for the sympathetic approach to fascism displayed by significant numbers of professional soldiers during the period between the two world wars.18 Fascism offered a vision of a modern society in which secular welfare and sovereign authority would be reconciled. The consciousness of a unique national mission would promote internal harmony, eliminate social conflict and promote economic efficiency. The resultant increase in material wealth would enable the state to pursue more vigorously its rightful international role. Successful international adventures would provide the resources for raising the internal standard of living to a yet higher level. Moreover, the authoritarian, one-party state would put an end to the domestic interplay of political factions and particular interest groups. In doing this, it would eliminate the condition of military alienation. With every form of political activity forbidden, the apolitical soldier would simply participate in a common national fate. With society organized in parà-military terms, his special gifts would be particularly appreciated. His apolitical discipline would be a model for all. The major drawback to this solution was that it was a purely imaginary one. It was guided by the old absolutist concept. By the twentieth century the absolutist concept of the state had ceased to play a significant role in the western world. In totalitarianism, the military saw a reemergence of the traditional supremacy of political authority over social conflict. But here they misread the evidence. The new authority did not intend to take a position above society. They sought to pervade it and to fuse the political and social structures into one system. The military offered their loyal services. But it was commitment, not service that was demanded. There were to be no special cases. The totalitarian party and its leaders saw no justification for the existence of any independent professional groups. The military imagined that their profession's unique degree of professional expertise and national committment would make them an exception. All it achieved was to make them particularly suspect. In the context of the totalitarian state, ascriptive professionalism and surrogate authority were more than anachronisms. They were heresies, positions vis-à-vis the established order which one side or the other was bound to find impossible to maintain. Under any circumstances there were bound to be difficulties. There is 16

66

Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (N.Y., Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 410 ff.

Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military a definite ambiguity to both the concept of ascriptive professionalism and that of surrogate authority. Both soldiers and civilians accept them as valid descriptions of the military outlook and of its conditions of service. But for the two parties the terms do not have the same meaning. For the soldier, ascriptive professionalism means that the armed forces remain above politics. To the civilian, secularist or totalitarian, ascriptive professionalism means that the political loyalty of the military is guaranteed. Both regard ascriptive professionalism as a guarantee of objectivity. But for the soldier this means that military decisions are to be made in a purely military setting, while to the civilian it implies that the soldier simply obeys orders. For the soldier the concept of surrogate authority means that the armed forces are to be free to follow their own unique set of values and that the civilian and military spheres should be sharply delimited. For the civilian it represents the precautionary isolation of a potentially unreliable group, and this implies that military activities be kept in a condition where they can be constantly and closely observed. This conflict of interpretations finds its most clear-cut expression in the question of the relationship between the professional soldier and the nation-state. Soldiers and civilians agree that ascriptive professionalism and surrogate authority are the premises of the modern military condition. They differ as to how the attitudes in question can be resolved into a valid social role.17 For the officers, militant nationalism represents the logical solution. For the civilian, depolitization is the obvious answer. Each side believes itself to possess an obvious and easy answer. But what is satisfactory to one group violates all the principles of the other. In nations such as Great Britain and the United States where the secular persuasion is dominant, the armed forces are, by and large, inert and apolitical. In states such as Japan and Germany where the absolutist tradition had a strong hold, the pursuit of doctrinaire nationalist programs committed the armed forces to an active political life and at the same time undermined and eventually destroyed the secular order. In France which for a century and a half lay stranded between the two ideologies, the officer corps was divided within itself in the intermittent practice of these two roles and contributed in significant part to the torpor and inertia which characterized the political life of that nation. In all three cases the solutions finally arrived at accurately reflect the 17

A distinction should at this point be made between secularist and totalitarian attitudes with regard to the military. Secularism tends to further the military process of ascriptive professionalism; totalitarianism tends to politicize and prescribe the qualifications of military officers.

67

M. D. Feld internal politics of the nations involved. An apolitical officer corps is a direct consequence of a stable political order. An actively nationalist professional military body is a symptom of deteriorating or ineffective civilian rule. Militant nationalism is, in its way, the objective correlative of military alienation, the practical analogue of a psychological state. Its programmatic ends correspond to its inner sense of unbridgeable social divisions. The aim of militant nationalism is political stability. But it is the stability of a vacuum, a state undisturbed by the erratic movements of partisan bodies. My third hypothesis, therefore, can be expressed in the following form: Since the military policy of a secular society has as its objective the creation of an apolitical armed force and the social policy of the professional soldier has as its objective the creation of an apolitical society, sustained and equal partnership between the two is impossible. 4. For the moment let us accept the assertion that in modernizing societies civil-military relations actually do fall into the pattern described above. Is this inevitably so? Must other nations following the path of modernization suffer the same experience? Most new nations have adopted the secularist goals of improving the general level of living. Many of them regard their armed forces as an important instrument in the achievement of this end. Is commitment to a secularist political approach without a resultant alienated officer corps possible? There is considerable evidence for the contention that the incidence of alienation is a peculiar condition, that in much of recorded history and in many contemporary nations this is not the case. Indeed, it can be argued that in most cases the military occupy or have occupied a secure and honored position. The decline in military status exists only in a comparative sense. In most cases the professional soldier is still a member of an acknowledged elite. Is military alienation then a necessary consequence of rapid social change? Modern society has been described as a condition where the conflict of social groups is assumed to be mutually beneficial in both material and moral terms.18 The armed forces suffer because there is a strain in them which represents a notable exception to this statement. Somewhere the belief persists that 'there is really no substitute for victory'. They can and do compete, of course, but at the price of adapting themselves to civilian modes and rules. As a result they are the one 18

Lewis Coser, The Functions pp. 70-81.

68

of Social Conflict

(Glencoe, III., 1956), esp.

Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military major political group suspicious of the going rules of the game and suspected by the other participants. Their successful participation seems somehow to imply a radical transformation, the substitution of discipline for discussion and of hierarchy for compromise. In a way then, the military condition in a secular society is a tautological one. As a class they are alienated because they cannot compete. And they cannot compete because in code and structure they are too different from the rest of society. Conflict which in other instances is assumed to reinforce social integration does in their case become an act too radical to be safely managed. The historical conditions of their successful integration presuppose a society in which leadership in the armed forces is either synonymous with membership in the political and social elite or else one in which the structure of authority is so monolithic as to reduce internal competition to an exceptionally low level.19 It is not entirely the case that the professional soldier is incapable of competing in the politics of modern state. The price, however, demanded of such behavior seems to be somewhat too high to be openly discussed. The professional soldier is most liable to enter into politics under the banner of a nationalistic program which proclaims the need for suspending much or most of secular competitive activity and for uniting the nation in the face of some extraordinary internal or external threat. Riding into power upon such a program, he faces the grave problem of knowing how and when to dismount, or of being able to establish some operational criteria for conclusively resolving the crises which led to his assumption of power. In either case, abdication is an extremely difficult and rare occurrence. If it is an external threat which has justified political action, then military victory may end the emergency and permit the resumption of normal political life. If, however, the threat is conceived to be internal, the possibilities of a return to secular politics are greatly diminished. The aspects of military alienation described above are liable to intensify rather than diminish the internal divisions which initially justified the seizure of power. The military themselves may become more secular-minded, but their regime is not likely to develop into a broader form of political consensus. The secularization of their own authority is likely to take place at the expense of civilian groups with whom they would 'normally' have to compete. At best it may result in a solidification of civilian opposition and a resolution by non-military groups that this crisis once over they will never again allow their 19

M. D. Feld, "A Typology of Military Organization", Public Policy bridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 3-40.

(Cam-

69

M. D. Feld differences to go so far as to create an opportunity for armed intervention. But this itself represents an inhibition of the secular process. Given the current tendency towards the secularization of politics, the problem of military alienation may, in fact, be an insoluble one. Except for the extremity of total war and for the two or three states for whom this macabre condition represents a political alternative, the professional soldier has been reduced to a role which the value structure of his society categorizes as being both marginal and dysfunctional. In an incrementally-minded situation he does not appear to have any positive contribution to make. Among many of the 'new nations' this fact has been recognized, and efforts have been made to reconstruct the professional military along the lines of a new image. The manipulation of violence has been deemphasized, and a special stress has been placed on the discipline and rational structure of military organization. The armed forces have been cast in a new light as an official instrument particularly well suited for the mobilization of national energies towards the attainment of high priority social and economic goals. The military in these cases has been treated as a substitute, temporary or otherwise, for a high level career civil service. It is noteworthy that the states in which this process is supposed to be taking place are by most indices just entering upon the processes of secularization. They have assumed programs of development and are guided by models which have little direct relationship to their own social structure, programs and models which have been adopted precisely because their sponsoring societies have up to now made so little progress in the direction of secularization. In these states the professional military are being called upon to undertake the direction of a process which would have as one of its ultimate results the creation of a social structure in which the political guidance would be entirely civil in origin. It is rather farfetched to imagine a high status social class rationally and willingly directing the process of its superannuation. But this, if it should ever turn out to be the case, would be the highest possible tribute to the professionalism of the armed forces. HARVARD

70

UNIVERSITY

Bengt Abrahamsson

THE I D E O L O G Y OF AN ÉLITE: CONSERVATISM AND NATIONAL INSECURITY Some Notes on the Swedish Military

The purpose of this paper is to consider some elements in the military ideology. Some theoretical considerations from Morris Janowitz 1 and Samuel P. Huntington 2 will be applied to the Swedish military. The main body of findings to be mentioned below is from a survey among Swedish military personnel which I conducted in 1962 for the Institute of Military Psychology, Stockholm.3

1.

THE THEORY OF RISKS

In his book on civil-military relations, Huntington has discussed the military mind. Technical evolution causes deep-reaching changes in the military sector. Ideology, however, is influenced only to a small extent by this evolution. Developments in weapons technology, Huntington claims, do not alter the character of the military ethic "any more than the discovery of penicillin altered medical ethics". Military ideology is, to a great extent, a nationalistic ideology. Mili1

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1960). 2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964). * I wish to express my thanks to Docent Jan Agrell, Director of the Institute, for placing research and office facilities at my disposal. My friends and colleagues Olof Fr£nden, Sten Johansson (University of Uppsala), and Sam Kaplan (University of California, Berkeley) have contributed comments and criticisms which have been of great value to me. Sam Kaplan also checked the English. My wife, Ulla B. Abrahamsson, has read the manuscript and suggested useful improvements and corrections.

71

Bengt Abrahamsson tary men have a professional responsibility for the security of the state. This responsibility leads the military (1) to view the state as the basic unit of political organization; (2) to stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war; (3) to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats; (4) to favor the maintenance of strong, diverse, and ready military forces.4 Nationalism functions as a motive for a concern with war and war preparations. One element of nationalism, that the nation is sacred, provides a rationale for a national defense system - it establishes, in other words, the object which is threatened or may become threatened. Without such an object, there would be no reason for defense. It is easy to find statements made by the Swedish military which exemplify Huntington's points. The statements occur in newspaper interviews with military leaders, in manuals, and in reports of military investigations like the OB 65 (which is a study and prognosis made by the Swedish Commander-in-Chief on the future development of the national defense. OB is short for Overbefalhavare, which means Commander-in-Chief). In a series of interviews in the daily newspaper Stockholms-Tidningen in the spring of 1965 some members of the Army High Command commented upon international politics. The Commander-in-Chief said the danger of war was the same as in 1962 (when the former defense study was conducted) and that the need for a strong defense had not changed. The Chief of Staff did not see any evident changes in the dangers of armed conflict, and the Assistant Chief of Staff thought that world tensions would last. An overview in the OB 65 of the military political situation up to May 1, 1965, ends with some conclusions: The trends in military politics thus are characterized by that world tension remains on a varying but high level; that dangers of various wars will continue to exist; that wars and causes of conflict - even in remote parts of the world where the interests of the Great Powers are affected - may affect us; 5 These are evident examples of the general risk theory which Hunting4 5

72

Huntington, op. cit., pp. 64-65. OB 65, p. 13.

The Ideology of an Elite ton discusses. As it is expressed in the formulations above the theory has, however, certain shortcomings which renders it useless as a prognosis about the future. It cannot be used for predictions concerning (a) whether Sweden will become involved in a war, (b) with whom Sweden will in that case be in war, (c) what type of war it will be (conventional or nuclear), or (d) approximately when it will start. (The report clearly has the ambition to make predictions. It speaks of "developmental tendencies" which show that "political antagonisms and suspicions between the Great Power blocks continue to exist"; on the subject of disarmament it says that there are not to be expected "any agreements of essential importance in the reasonably near future". The report also maintains that "even in the future we will have to count with a high level of tension which involves considerable dangers of war".) What is said in the theory is so elastic that at any point in time it may be used ex post facto to explain (a) why a war has started (world tension is said to be on a high level; war is, therefore, a natural consequence), or (b) why a war has not started (world tension is said to be varying, and it has not at the moment the temperature which is required to cause the outbreak of armed action). On the other hand, if the theory specified when a possible war will start or how long a period of peace may be expected, it would be testable. Such clarifications are avoided in the OB 65; thus, the theory is safe for any attack on the military ability to prophesy about the future. The theory is also applied to domestic security policy. The Swedish defense has published a manual called Masked Front, where the permanent and immediate threats to each citizen are stressed. The front with the sharp bullets, the bombs, and the shells - that is the 'outer front'. What you have read about here is the "second front" - with the silent

weapons - "the masked one". On that front we are all attacked - soldier or not soldier. On that front there is never peace - there we fight at this very moment - even you. Against you stand the soldiers of the masked front - the subversives to be - THE ENEMIES OF YOUR COUNTRY [illustrated by a spider, a mole, and a megaphone]. 6

A list of some "dark sides of the temper and dispositions of the Swedes" is presented and commented: 6

Maskerad Front, Handbok i sakerhetstjanst (HSak), p. 5.

73

Bengt Abrahamsson - To this rather dismal list we might... add some extra Swedish 'weaknesses': - we have a certain disposition to believe that people are good, a credulity which in a critical situation may lead to serious situations.7 It would certainly be absurd to deny that such disturbing factors as international crises, espionage, and subversion do exist. But it is at the same time evident that the military institution is more prone than many other judges to stress threats and violence. This "pessimism" - I use the word as a term for the military view of international politics, although it has some deficiencies as a descriptive concept — is functional to the interests of the profession. The military risk theory, clothed in cold, analytical - but, as we have seen, not very precise - terms becomes a rationalization for the motive to maximize one's own resources. (This, of course, holds true for other professions as well.8 It is, however, clear that since the risk theory is applied to international politics, it is a body of thought which may have consequences not associated with most other professional ideologies.) One passage from Huntington summarizing the basis of the military view of threats against national security, provides a hypothesis about the relation between professionalization and the sense of danger. The goal of professional competence requires the military man to estimate the threat as accurately as possible. But the military man also has a professional interest and a professional duty to stress the dangers to military security. Consequently the objective realities of international politics only partially determine the military estimate of the situation. The military man's views also reflect a subjective professional bias, the strength of which depends upon his general level of professionalism. This professional bias, or sense of professional responsibility, leads him to feel that if he errs in his estimate, it should be on the side of overstating the threat. Consequently, at times he will see threats to the security of the state where actually no threats exist.® The higher their level of professionalization, the more likely officers are to believe that there is a great risk of war. Since rank may be taken as a rough index of professionalization, we would expect officers of high rank to judge the international situation 'pessimistically' more often than lower rank officers. 7 8

Ibid., p. 61.

Compare Lord Salisbury's remark: "If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe." 9 Huntington, op. cit., p. 66.

74

The Ideology of an Elite In the survey which I conducted in the autumn of 1962 among military personnel on active duty in the Swedish forces the following question was included: According to your opinion, how great is the risk that there will be a great war in Europe within the next 5 years? (Response alternatives: very small, rather small, rather great, very great, don't know.)10 Before discussing the results, it is worth noting that the questionnaires were sent out in the beginning of November, 1962, shortly after the culmination of the Cuban missile crisis. For this reason, the percentages below should not be taken as representative of the current opinion among the Swedish military. However, what is primarily interesting in this context is the variation in the percentages by rank. It may be assumed that these relations are still the same. As can be seen from table 1, the hypothesis of a more widespread 'pessimism' in higher ranks is confirmed. The table lists figures for Army officers only, but the tendencies in the Air Force and the Navy are the same, though slightly less pronounced.

TABLE 1

Opinions on risks of war11 (By rank and Army branch) Considers the risk of war in Europe within 5 years to be very or rather great. Per cent. Rank Ensign Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant-colonel

Infantry 37 44 54 60 —

(16) (64) (80) (20) (5)

Other Army branches —

36 51 53 58

(7) (88) (139) (37) (14)

10

Bengt Abrahamsson, Anpassning och avg&ngsbenagenhet bland militart befdl, MPI rapport nr 37, maj 1965, Halmstad: 1965. The survey was conducted among all military personnel on active duty within the Swedish defense, except full colonels and higher ranks, which were inaccessible. A nonproportionate stratified sample was used. The data in the table are previously unpublished results from the survey. Estimates computed by Erikson's inversion test (an extension of Kendall's tau; see R. Erikson, Yrkesval och officersrekrytering, MPI report no. 31, June 1964, appendix 8) for both branch categories give statistically significant results (p, HI 3% The corresponding figures for the 1956-58 class were: Social class I 26% „ II 52% „ III 22% (Source: Armens befal. SOU 1959:23.) According to the preliminary results of a later survey this trend may have stopped. The percentages for War Academy candidates in 1962 were: Social class I 34% „ II 54% „ III 12% (Source: a study on the military occupational role conducted by O. Franden, Institute of Military Psychology, Stockholm.) On the whole, though, these figures seem to parallel Janowitz's findings among American Army military leaders showing a pattern of infusion of persons from lower middle-class backgrounds during the period 1910-1950 (op. cit., p. 90). 29 Riksdagsmannavalen &ren 1961-1964: II (Stockholm, Statistiska CentralbyrSn, 1965), p. 95.

81

Bengt Abrahamsson Thus, the main impression of this examination of military political preferences is the great difference between the officer corps and the total population as to modal political opinion. Needless to say, this also reflects a difference in ideological value-orientation between officers and the Social Democratic government which in turn may involve some problems of cooperation and understanding between military experts and politicians. Against this background it is interesting to note that conflicts between Social Democratic politicians and military leaders very seldom occur in Sweden or, at least, are not publicly disclosed. The prerequisites for ideological collisions are present, but it is rare to find politicians openly opposing military views. One reason for this may be the way in which decisions relating to the defense are reached. A congressional committee - composed of representatives of the Social Democratic, Liberal, Agrarian, and Conservative parties - prepares the defense proposition, the main features of which are to be presented to the Riksdag. (The committee as its main material uses the report from the Commander-in-Chief.) Thus many details relating to the defense are not brought to common attention. In addition, defense problems seem to be of little concern to the electorate, one reason for this being the absence of political controversies on the matter. Consequently, politicians tend to concentrate on issues of greater interest as, for instance, questions of social welfare. As a prominent official in the Department of Defense once said: "It is very difficult to get politicians interested in the defense and the security policy. Nobody becomes elected on that. It is not useful, like pensions and schools." 27

3.

SUMMARY

The paper has discussed two elements in military ideology with applications to the Swedish officer corps. A great majority of officers have been found to have a conservative outlook, the homogeneity increasing with higher ranks. These results parallel some of Janowitz's findings among American military leaders. Increasing professionalization also correlates with judgments on war risks, higher rank officers being more 'pessimistic' than personnel 27

Dieter Strand, Politiker - Forsvar - Tystnad [Politicians - Defence - Silence], manuscript to be published, autumn, 1966.

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The Ideology of an Élite in lower ranks. This might be taken as a support of Huntington's proposition that the strength of the subjective professional bias depends upon the military man's general level of professionalism. UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM

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C. B. Otley

MILITARISM A N D THE S O C I A L A F F I L I A T I O N S OF THE BRITISH A R M Y ÉLITE*

1.

INTRODUCTION

Militarism has been defined as "the compound of militancy, preponderance of the army in the state, adulation of military virtues, and militarization".1 Put in another way militarism is that condition in which military institutions, values and forms of behaviour predominate over civilian institutions, values and forms of behaviour. Militarism is not the same as bellicosity though the two conditions are often associated. The opposite of militarism, as Vagts points out, is not pacifism but 'civilianism'.2 It is true that war or the threat of war is often a cause of the development of militarism and that in turn militarism often encourages war or the threat of war.3 Nonetheless the term militarism refers primarily to the predominance of military over civilian factors in the internal and external relations of a society, rather than to the propensity for war-making. Normally 'civilianistic' societies can display great ferocity and aggressiveness under appropriate conditions; conversely, normally 'militaristic' societies can show caution and restraint in their use of violence. * This is a completely revised and re-written version of the paper of the same name presented at the Sixth International Congress of Sociology held at Evian in September, 1966. 1 S. Andreski, "Militarism", A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, edited by J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (London, Tavistock, 1964), p. 429. 2 A. Vagts, A History of Militarism, revd. ed. (London, Hollis and Carter, 1959), p. 17. 5 See S. Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 92; S. E. Finer, Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London, Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 72-74.

84

Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite Militarism is thus a term with meanings on a variety of levels. It implies a certain orientation in foreign policy, a certain balance of power within a society, the predominance of certain values in society, an elevated status for certain occupational groups, a widespread distribution of a certain style of life, and so on. Various indices of militarism can be used. In the case of nations whose foreign policy is normally subordinated to military priorities and military goals we may speak of militarism. Wars almost always signify outbursts of militarism especially if the countries involved are warring for essentially expansionist reasons.4 The internal politics of a society need also to be scrutinized for signs of militarism. According to Finer this means examining the military's normal mode of intervention in politics, the level to which this intervention is normally pressed and the resultant type of regime.5 Militarism is obviously high in countries in which the military go beyond the normal legal and constitutional channels in exerting political influence or in which the military play a decisive role in actual government. At the institutional level whenever civilian organisations are subordinated to military objectives and partially or wholly integrated into military organisations, then we may speak of militarism. Where public interest and involvement in military or para-military activities is high then militaristic sentiments are likely to be widely diffused through the society concerned. Finally it is also necessary to ascertain the degree to which military conceptions of discipline, honour and obedience are reflected in the lore and everday folkways of a particular community. Employing any of these measures we are bound to reach the conclusion that Britain has been singularly free of militarism.6 It is true, of course, that Britain has not been slow to employ violence against other nations and cultures (especially in the colonies), and her imperial record at times can truly be called militaristic.7 Internally, however, Britain has 4

Vagts, op. cit., pp. 14 f. Finer, op. cit., Ch. 10. On the political role of the military in Britain, see R. Blake, "Great Britain. The Crimean War to the First World War", Soldiers and Government, edited by M. Howard (London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957), pp. 27-50; B. Bond, "Military Power in Modern British History", Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. CVIII (Aug. 1963), pp. 236-242; M. Howard, "Civil-Military Relations in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1958", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXV (March 1960), pp. 35-46. 7 British troops were almost continuously involved in colonial campaigns in the nineteenth century. Using a variety of sources, I estimate that British forces (including colonial auxiliaries, etc.) were involved in no less than 49 major colonial campaigns between 1803 and 1901. The burden of day-to-day 'police' action can be gauged from the fact, noted by Brian Bond (in his "The Introduc5 6

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C. B. Otley been mercifully free of the intrusion of military institutions and military values on civil life - at least in recent times.8 To a great extent this is because of the complexity, depth and authority of civilian institutions in this country. For the past three centuries the economic and political institutions have decisively outranked the military institution. Over that period civilian supremacy has not been seriously challenged by the military, and the military has, on the whole, eschewed a role in politics. Except on one or two occasions the military establishment has confined itself to the officially approved channels in exerting political influence. The British Army, except in time of war, has been small and compact, largely deployed abroad and isolated from the great mass of the civilian population. Except during periods of jingoism or war fervour the British public seems to have been un-interested in the status claims and value orientations of the military. Britain has been, in short, a civil society par excellence. Britain's relative freedom from militarism has been grounded in the facts of strategy and history. Probably the most important single factor has been the country's island position. This has posed great problems for Britain's foes, effectively minimising the threat of invasion and permitting Britain's rulers to pursue an isolationist policy. The burden of defence has fallen on the Navy rather than on the Army and so effective has this defence been that no invader has set foot in England since 1066. Under normal conditions the country has not needed a large standing army, and military priorities have rarely reached the forefront in policy-making. Relative immunity from invasion has permitted civilian institutions and procedures to grow without major interruption. The specially early and prolonged development of parliamentary forms of government have given Britain's representative and civil institutions a great authority and 'density'. Since the Cromwellian era the political élite has shown a great awareness of the possibility of military intervention in politics and has deliberately asserted the sovereignty of parliament over the armed forces.® Parliament regulated the discipline and tion and Operation of Short Service and Localisation in the British Army, 186892", unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1962, p. 240n), that between 1869 and 1879 troops were used to repress civil disturbances in nine provinces of India and Burma on no less than 44 occasions. 8 However mob violence, civil disturbance and even attempts at insurrection are frequent enough in Britain's history over the past 150 years. On this, see B. Crick, "The Peaceable Kingdom", Twentieth Century, Vol. CLXXIII (Winter 1964/65), pp. 51-60. ' On relations between parliament and the army, see C. M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, 2 vols. (London, John Murray, 1869), esp. Vol. I, Chs. V,

86

Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite finance of the army, demanded property qualifications of officers and set up militia forces to counterbalance the standing army. The energies of the armed forces have been dissipated in colonial campaigning and - after the establishment of the police - have rarely been directed into domestic conflicts.10 The British regular army, usually small, active mainly in the colonies, hedged around by constitutional limitations, set in a context of fully legitimized civilian authority and stable political succession, has, in Finer's terms, lacked both the disposition and the opportunity to intervene.11 One other explanation has been offered for the continuously effective political subordination of the Army in Britain. It has been said that there has been a relationship of particular closeness between the army officer corps and the ruling class in Britain. In consequence, it has been claimed, the officer corps and the politico-economic élite have shared a common interest in the preservation of the status quo.12 The clearest expression of this view is to be found in Mosca's writings. Mosca asserted that in Britain (and in America) by virtue of family connections and education, " . . . army officers retain close ties with the minority which by birth, culture and wealth stand at the peak of the social pyramid".13 Unfortunately this connection between the ruling order and the army has been assumed rather than proved. There is in fact very little published data concerning the social origins and connections of British army officers.14 It is my basic purpose in this paper to add to the meagre body VI, v m & IX and Vol. II, Chs. XVI & XXVI, and J. S. Omond, Parliament and the Army, 1642-1904 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1933). The importance which was attributed to the question of the Army's role in politics is vividly illustrated in I. M. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). 10 The authorities were not slow to employ soldiery in domestic disturbances in the early nineteenth century. Thus in 1812 - the year which saw the highpoint of Luddism - there were more soldiers in arms in England than Wellington had under his command in the Peninsula (E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, Victor Gollanz, 1963), p. 564). 11 Finer, op. cit., Chs. 4-6. 12 See e.g. Andrzejewski, op. cit., pp. 107, 142; G. Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. H. D. Kahn, ed. & revd. A. Livingston (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 233. But see Finer, op. cit., p. 40, for the argument that social origins have little to do with an officer corps' political loyalties. 13 Mosca, op. cit., p. 233. 14 There are precisely two studies: P. Abrams, "Democracy, Technology and the Retired British Officer", Changing Patterns of Military Politics, edited by S. P. Huntington (New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Ch. VI; P. E. Razzell, "Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army", British Journal of Sociology, Vol. XIV (Sept. 1963), pp. 248-260.

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C. B. Otley

of information on the social affiliations of the British army officer corps and then to review Mosca's hypothesis in the light of this further evidence. The data presented in this paper covers the social origins, schooling and family connections of members of the British army élite over the past ninety years.16 The sample selected for study consists of all the Lieutenant-Generals, Generals and Field-Marshals on the army Active List at certain dates between 1870 and 1959. Although this sample of TABLE 1

The basic sample Year 1870 1897 1913 1926 1939 1959 Totals

Lieutenantgenerals

Generals

Fieldmarshals

Total

No. 0(a) 38 33 27 24 18

No. 76 19 16 14 13 9

No. 4 6 9 7 8 9

No. 80 63 58 48 45 36

140

147

43

330

(a) Note there were nearly ISO Lieutenant-generals in 1870 and in order to have a sample which was manageable in size, Lieutenant-generals had to be excluded.

330 officers is a largish one it has certain peculiar features.19 First of all its coverage of the period under study is somewhat irregular - the intervals between the sample dates varying from as much as 27 years to as little as 13 years. Secondly the sample contains quite a large number of 'nominal' officers, i.e. officers without effective military employment or position. As most of these are Field-Marshals, and as Field-Marshals remain on the Active List until they die (and Field-Marshals seem to have been prodigiously long-living) it follows that each élite sample contains a number of officers who are, in a sense, 'unrepresentative'. And as the later élite samples are the smallest ones such 'dormant' officers form a particularly large component of the more modern élites sample under study. Thirdly, and most seriously, officers of the rank of MajorGeneral have not been included in the sample. This is unfortunate 15

Drawn from my unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "The Origins and Recruitment of the British Army Élite, 1870-1959" (University of Hull, 1965). 19 See ibid., pp. 165-169, for a more detailed discusion of the merits and demerits of this sample.

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Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite because Major-Generals are usually regarded as part of the army élite and because they make up two-thirds of it at any one time. There is, too, some evidence that the origins of Major-Generals have been more representative than those of higher ranks.17 It follows from these remarks that the results of this study apply only to the highest echelons of the officer corps and that they can in no way be taken to be a guide to the social composition of the broader élite of army commanders let alone to the officer corps as a whole. To set against this point, however, it should be noted that a much wider range of information on the social character of at least a portion of the officer corps than has hitherto been available, is presented here. Further, the data itself has been most rigorously checked so that what it lacks in applicability it gains in reliability.

2.

ORIGINS

The social exclusiveness of the army élite is strikingly high. Nearly 90% of élite officers were drawn from the propertied or higher professional strata. Over 40% of all generals were identified as sons of propertyowners and of these three-quarters were landowners - the old ruling class (Table 2). Seventeen percent of army leaders were sons of great landowners, 13% were sons of members of the military élite, an indefinite but significant percentage were sons of members of the political administrative and professional élites (Tables 4 and 5). Amongst the occupations of fathers of members of the élite, army and navy officers, civilian professionals, gentlemen of leisure and business men were overwhelmingly preponderant (Table 3). Barely 3 % of senior officers could claim lower middle class origins. Not one single officer with a definitely working-class background was identified in the sample. And there were but slight signs of any process of 'démocratisation' of recruitment to the élite. There was a fairly consistent decline in the contribution of landed families, but the contribution of 'non-traditional' families grew significantly only in the 1959 sample. On the whole the picture is one of continuing privilege in the recruitment of army generals. However the pattern of recruitment was by no means static. In particular the figures show a marked decline in the contribution of landed families - thus between 1870 and 1939 the landed contribution to the élite was nearly halved (Table 2). This is also reflected in a steep decline in the incidence of occupationless fathers; landowners were, of 17

See Abrams, loc. cit., p. 181; Razzell, loc. cit., p. 253.

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C. B. TABLE 2 Socio-economic position of fathers of members the British army élite, 1870-1959 Property owners (») Year

ComLanded mercial

Higher professionals ) 360.0W

(a) Actual expenditures (until 1966). (b) Estimates. (c) Projected estimates.

ground support' has been transferred to the Fiat G-91, which, however, has been procured in much smaller numbers. In the light of pronouncements put forth by Airforce leaders there is no doubt, moreover, that the Starfighter will be able to execute these missions effectively only when using nuclear weapons. Thus the 'dominant weapon' not only of the German Airforce but of the Bundeswehr as a whole is constituted by a nuclear weapons-carrier included in the so-called strike forces of NATO's European Command.12 On this evidence it seems to be legitimate to characterize the changes in the structure of the German defence contribution as a substitution, first, of mechanical power for manpower, and, second, of nuclear for conventional firepower. This applies not only for the shift of emphasis in the rearmament programme from the Army to the Airforce, but also to the structural changes within the Army itself. For the Army was forced to make up in a similar way for the weaknesses resulting from reduced manpower and loss of combat assistance from the Airforce. Thus the artillery equipment of Army corps and Army divisions already 11

Source: Bundeshaushaltspläne für die Rechnungsjahre 1958-1968, Einzelplan 14 für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Kapitel 1415,

1418, 1419. For the concept of the 'dominant weapon' see J. F. C. Fuller, Armament and History (New York, 1945), p. 7 f. 12

193

Gerhard Brandt include nuclear weapons-carriers of the Sergeant and Honest John type, while armoured howitzers and guns of the M-109, M-107, and M-110 types, all of them double purpose systems, are being introduced into the artillery units of divisions and brigades.13 As revealed particularly by American investigations, the substitution of conventional by nuclear firepower was a prevailing tendency of military armament throughout the large and medium-sized memberstates of the Western Alliance during the 1950's. In compensating for deficiencies in conventional forces by adopting nuclear weapons an attempt was made to find a solution to the dilemma occasioned by the economic consequences of military armament today. This very attempt appears to be the more remarkable since the nuclear weapons monopoly of the United States was in dissolution, and the relative superiority of the Soviet Bloc in the field of the conventional forces became increasingly effective.14 Wherever such changes in the forces' structure following this model materialized, they appear to have been associated with a reorientation in strategy as well as with structural changes of the war potential. Thus the substitution of conventional by nuclear firepower was accompanied by the ascent of an extreme strategy of nuclear deterrence as well as the forced growth of so-called new arms industries. As corroborated by the present study this observation applies to the Federal Republic just as well, though somewhat modified because of the conditions peculiar to the German case. The Federal Republic evolved its own version of the deterrence strategy: the concept of the low nuclear threshhold, which has been maintained up to the present. According to this concept, only border incidences of negligible magnitude can be settled by conventional forces, while any conflicts transcending these dimensions require the immediate use of nuclear weapons, even if the enemy forces should only be armed with conventional weapons. As the formula goes, the Army divisions and the Airforce squadrons of the Bundeswehr have to be regarded as the trigger of nuclear war. For it is argued that it is only 13 According to A. Weinstein, the military correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Federal Republic is, because of its tactical nuclear capabilities, considered by the Pentagon the "third-strongest atomic power". See "Von der glaubwürdigen Abschreckung", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 19, 1966. 14 See S. P. Huntington, The Common Defense, Strategie Program in National Politics (New York and London, 1961); R. E. Osgood, NATO - The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 1962); W. R. Schilling, P. Y. Hammond, G. H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York and London, 1962).

194

Diverging Functions of Military Armament by convincing the enemy of automatic nuclear responses to aggressions of any kind that the professed intention of military armament to prevent general war is to be fulfilled, and in this the strategic concept governing the thinking of the Bundeswehr leadership claims to be in line with the meaning of a rational security policy.15 As far as arms production is concerned, again, it was the Airforce programme which moved into the centre after rearmament had begun. While the Army had to depend for a considerable time for its hardware on imports from allied countries, predominantly the United States, the Airforce has been able to rely on domestic aircraft production. This is all the more peculiar as the German aircraft industry, after having been dismantled at the end of the war, had to be reconstructed from scratch. As a matter of fact, it is to government subsidies and to the Defence Ministry's procurement orders, particularly to the licensed production of the F-104 G and the G-91, that the new German aircraft industry owes its existence. By the same token, it appears that the aircraft industry in the Federal Republic will remain dependent on the demand of the armed forces for its future employment. The reconstruction of the aircraft industry was parallelled by the inauguration of a research and development programme in the field of defence. The emphasis again lay on Airforce requirements with VTOL projects enjoying high priorities; also worth mentioning is the development of small naval vessels and armoured cars. Indeed, it appears that new centres of arms production, particularly in the ship-building and in the automobile industries, have come into existence as a result of the armed forces' programme of research and development. According to official pronouncements, the share of research and development outlays in the total of the defence budget was intended to amount to about 5 per cent, though actual figures proved to lag behind this goal as yet. Nevertheless, the considerable importance of research and development for defence is evidenced by the fact that in 1963 outlays for this purpose accounted for 33.8 per cent of all Federal expenditures devoted to science and research.16 Economic considerations seem to have played an important role both 15

For an account of strategic concepts prevalent in Europe generally and in the Federal Republic in particular, also for a critique of them see A. Buchan and Ph. Windsor, Arms and Stability in Europe (London, 1963); N . Brown, Nuclear War: The Impending Strategic Deadlock (London, 1964); H. Schmidt, Verteidigung oder Vergeltung (Stuttgart, 1965). 19 See Der Bundesminister fur wissenschaftliche Forschung, Bundesbericht Forschung I, Bundestagsdrucksache IV/2963, S. 61.

195

Gerhard Brandt in the revision of the military programme and in the decision to build up a new domestic aircraft industry as the core of the Federal Republic's war potential. This is evidenced by the arguments which the former Minister for Defence put forth in the Starfighter-debate of the Bundestag. For these reasons we have carried out the licensed production of the F-104 and the Fiat G-91 in the Federal Republic and, along with this, the development of a German VTOL project, certain components of which, such as a Rolls-Royce-engine, are imported from foreign countries. It has been done because without this activity, the reconstruction of the German aircraft industry and the return of our people to a leading scientific and technological position in the modern industrial world would, regrettably, not have been possible. I have considered this investment of the money much more sensible than using it for the accumulation of conventional weapons and the huge quantities of munitions which they require; those who call it wasteful expenditure are people with a very narrow horizon indeed.17 Again, it appears to be indicated by evidence available from American investigations that this line of argument is in correspondence with general tendencies of military armament in capitalist countries. In order to ascertain its significance an analytical distinction proposed by S. P. Huntington seems very appropriate. Arms races, according to Huntington, are to be distinguished as being either quantitative or qualitative in kind. A state may increase its military power quantitatively, by expanding the numerical strength of its existing military forces, or qualitatively, by replacing its existing forms of military force (normally weapons systems) with new and more effective forms of force. 18 Though scarcely ever displayed in pure form in the reality of military 17 Deputy Strauss, Deutscher Bundestag, Official Record, March 24, 1966, p. 1572. - In the original the statement reads as follows: "Aus diesen Gründen haben wir den Lizenzbau der F 104 und Fiat G 91 in der Bundesrepublik und nebenher die Entwicklung eines deutschen Senkrechtstarters mit zum Teil ausländischen Komponenten - wie Rolls-Royce-Motor - durchgeführt. Es geschah, weil ohne diese Tätigkeit der Aufbau einer deutschen Luftfahrtindustrie und die Rückkehr unseres Volkes zu einer wissenschaftlich-technischen Spitzenstellung in der modernen Industriewelt leider nicht mehr möglich ist. Ich habe dieses Geld - seine Ausgabe ist oft als Verschwendung bezeichnet worden, allerdings von jenen, die einen sehr kleinen Horizont hatten - für sinnvoller angelegt gehalten, als wenn man damit konventionelle Waffen und riesige Munitionsmengen, die dazu gehören, angehäuft hätte." 18 S. P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results", Public Policy, A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, edited by C. J. Friedrich and S. E . Harris (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University, 1958), pp. 41-86.

196

Diverging Functions of Military Armament history, these categories are useful for defining decisive characteristics of military armament today. It appears to be the characteristic, then, of the quantitative arms race that the overall size of the armed forces is extended, on the basis of a given state of weapons technology. Qualitative arms races, on the other hand, distinguish themselves in that existing weapons and weapons systems are continually displaced by ever more effective ones and that the overall size of the forces in terms of personnel and financial expenditures remains fairly constant. Whether an arms race is primarily quantitative or qualitative in kind has to be considered one of the main determinants of its historical form as well as of its outcome. Quantitative arms races will tend to extend over a comparatively long stretch of time with the result, however, of one of the antagonists eventually achieving a clear lead over the other, since the main determinants are the size of available resources and the prerequisites, both institutional and moral, available for their exploitation. Where on the other hand the arms race is primarily qualitative it can be expected to dissolve into a series of single competitions without either of the parties involved achieving a decisive lead once for all. Quantitative and qualitative arms races, moreover, differ with respect to the economic consequences entailed by them, and it is this difference that furnishes one of the decisive explanations for general tendencies of modern military policy. While a quantitative arms race will demand the mobilization of an ever increasing part of both the labour force and material resources, which can only result in some kind of war economy, only a rather limited sector of the economy with specifically new industries in the centre will be activated by a qualitative arms race. Still more important, qualitative armament with research end development at its core tends to promise a maximum of by-products which will act as stimulants to civilian production. Thus military research and development in the missile field as well as in the aircraft industry and shipbuilding are localized in crucial areas at the frontiers of technological development with a range of interests sufficiently wide to ensure the spill-over of technical innovation to civilian fields of production. Given a qualitative arms race, it seems that the relationship of production for military and production for civilian use, far from being incompatible with one another, are essentially complementary. Owing to a latent function adherent to it, modern weapons technology appears to provide a means for overcoming the intrinsic contradiction of security in modern capitalist society. The very fact that civilian production is stimulated by the by-products 197

Gerhard Brandi of weapons research and development is not of merely accidental significance but has to be considered, at least according to certain commentators, as one of the characteristics of the present phase of industrial development.19 Thus it is supposed that the relationship between the processes of industrialization and the development of weapons technology has in a sense been reversed. While until 1914 and again between the two World Wars technical innovation originated in the sphere of civilian production and the military organization, both technical and social, was affected only secondarily and after a certain time lag, weapons technology has taken the lead during the last two decades. There is a good case for the statement that it is the productive organization of civilian society, instead of the technical organization of the military, that has become dependent on second-hand technical innovation. With respect to the economic implications of military armament today it can be stated, then, that the integration of the military establishment into modern capitalist society, where it has been successful, has been rendered feasible by the limitation of overall force goals and by making use of the latent economic function implied by qualitative armament. All the same, it remains an open question whether, in being informed by latent functions, security policy meets the desiderata and requirements of its professed aims. 3. As is the case with all military armament today the Federal Republic's defence contribution is to be legitimized only by the professed purpose of the prevention or, at least, the limitation of the use of force. Measured against this purpose and the criteria implied by it, the German defence contribution gives ample occasion for criticism, though no more, it ought to be emphasized, than e.g. those of Britain and France do.20 In consequence of the forced build-up of a tactical nuclear weapons armoury, conventional armament was seriously neglected; while it must be noted no considerable increase in the capability of nuclear deterrence was attained. Thus, not only the Airforce but also the Bundeswehr's Army divisions appear to be based on tactical nuclear weapons and to depend on using them early in any likely contingencies. Insofar as it is fought 18

See E. Benoit, Economic Impact of Disarmament (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), January 1962; J. G. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (London, 1958); J. U. Nef, War and Human Progress, An Essay on the Rise of Industrial Civilization (Cambridge, Mass., 1950); F. Sternberg, Die militärische und die industrielle Revolution (Berlin and Frankfurt/Main, 1957). 20 See the works of Buchan and Windsor, Brown, and Schmidt, op. cit.

198

Diverging Functions of Military

Armament

with nuclear weapons, however, a conflict initially limited in scale threatens to extend very soon into a general nuclear war, by virtue of escalation. In turn, this very prospect is apt to weaken the political and military leadership's sense of purpose, with the consequence of making them yield eventually to the opponent's blackmail. Under these circumstances and in view of the relative superiority of the Warsaw Pact powers in the field of conventional armament, with the nuclear balance prevailing, the perpetuation of the present instability has to be expected. At the same time the speeding-up of nuclear armament runs counter to the desiderata of arms control and controlled disarmament which constitute the medium and long-term goals of a rational security policy. In the first place, any strategy dependent on using nuclear weapons at a very early moment will be understood as a provocation by the East European states, with much greater justification than conventional armaments for fighting limited conflicts would be. Moreover, with new nuclear capabilities springing into existence the military situation will tend increasingly to evade responsible control, even though in the alliances the keys to the nuclear arsenals will stay with the superpowers for the time being. Still more important, it can be expected that in the course of the nuclear arms race the latent economic function of qualitative armament will become firmly entrenched as one of the determinants of the policy-making process. It could be argued that qualitative armament was the ideal solution of the security problem as long as it appeared to ensure credible deterrence and, at the same time, not only enabled the avoidance of conflicting demands on economic resources, but on the contrary stimulated economic development. However, for the sake of these economic advantages derived from modern weapons technology, the transformation of the war potential in the direction of qualitative armament was carried far beyond the extent justifiable from the standpoint of security. The by-products accrueing from qualitative armament and the desire to use industrial capacities once created have hindered a re-evaluation of strategy. In the sense, as it were, of a feed-back, secondary consequences of military armament entered into the process of military policy-making so as to become one of its determinants. It appears to be this reversal in the relation of manifest and latent functions of military armament that provides one of the main explanations for the perpetuation of the arms race. The complex relationship between manifest and latent functions of military armament gives rise to a number of grave problems for policymaking as well as for social and political theory. For one thing, there is 199

Gerhard Brandt the question to what extent the economic development of capitalism and the functioning of this economic system has become dependent on the economic and technological consequences of military armament. Hypothetical answers put forth with respect to this question range from assertions of complete dependence to the negation of any structural connections. Only if economists, political scientists, and sociologists would take a co-operative approach to this problem dependable evidence can be expected.21 Beyond that, solutions are required to the problem of what kind of projects might be suited to take the place of defence procurement and of weapons research and development - in other words, what kind of functional alternatives appear to be available. In this respect the crucial point is whether it would be possible to ensure technological progress by a programme financed out of public funds, but exclusively devoted to civilian purposes. Even if it proved possible to formulate a programme of this kind the question would remain of whether it had a chance of being put into practice. Based on the evidence available, it seems a legitimate proposition that great difficulties stand in the way of an adequate science and research programme for exclusively civilian purposes. This is the case for essentially political reasons. The political process in advanced capitalist countries appears to follow the model of bargaining among competing oligopolistic groups.22 Transcending the prevailing particular interests, a public programme of sizeable magnitude could hardly be expected to find political consent, the less so since the appeal to the common interest in preserving the existing social and economic system would not prove as effective as in the case of defence. Thus it is the transformation of the existing political system securing the introduction of economic planning to overcome the existing dominance of sectional interests, without injuring the general interest of the public which legitimates any responsible political action, which must be regarded as the necessary precondition for implementing a functional alternative to qualitative armament. 21

Reference is due in this respect to the pioneering studies published by E. Benoit and K. E. Boulding, Disarmament and the Economy (New York, Evanston, London, 1963), as well as to surveys undertaken by the Canadian Peace Research Institute and published by J. Paul and J. Laulicht, In Your Opinion (Clarkson, Ontario, 1963). 22 A certain preference for qualitative, as compared with quantitative armament is to be observed also in the Soviet bloc and can be accounted for, at least partiallly, by economic considerations. For an evaluation of the relative weight of political and economic factors making for the perpetuation of military armament under different political systems comparative studies are needed.

200

Diverging

Functions

of Military

Armament

APPENDIX TABLE 3 Defence

expenditures

1958 % Fed. Rep. 2.6 5.7 France United Kingdom 6.4 10.2 United States

as percentage 1959 % 3.1 5.9 6.2 9.5

1960 % 3.2 5.6 6.1 9.0

of gross national 1961 % 3.5 5.5 6.1 9.3

1962 % 4.2 5.1 6.3 9.3

1963 % 4.6 4.7 6.1 8.8

producta 1964 % 3.9 4.4 5.9 8.1

TABLE 4 Total armed forces as percentage 1958 % 1.1 Fed. Rep. France 6.6 United Kingdom 3.6 United States 5.3

1959 %

1960

1.4 6.4 3.3 5.1

1.8 6.5 3.0 5.0

%

of male labour force 1961 % 2.0 6.4 2.7 5.1

1962

%

2.4 6.0 2.5 5.6

1963 % 2.5 5.1 2.4 5.4

a

1964 % 2.6 4.5 2.4 5.3

(a) Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, National Accounts Statistics 1955-1964, Paris 1966. (b) Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Manpower Statistics 1954-1964, Paris 1965. UNIVERSITÄT FRANKFURT AM M A I N

201

Kurt Lang

THE M I L I T A R Y PUTSCH I N A DEVELOPED POLITICAL CULTURE* Confrontations of Military a n d Civil Power in G e r m a n y a n d France

Coercive intervention by the military in the politics of nations only just freed from colonial domination has been commonplace, with the low level of political culture characteristic of many new nations being regarded as conducive to such intervention.1 Indicative of a 'low level of political culture' are such things as: the sustained political participation by only a small segment of the population; the precarious legitimacy of a government which, though based on a 'mandate' given to a party, remains unresponsive to popular grievances, whether because of administrative inefficiency or corruption; a poorly developed associational infrastructure for channeling political demands, which in some instances may be so rudimentary that there is no provision for an orderly succession of governments. Where these conditions prevail, the armed forces often constitute the only effective nation-oriented force within the society, and military intervention when it takes place usually is of a 'reactive' character: a response to the weakness of civil institutions.2 It is not so much motivated by a desire for military domination as an effort to maintain internal order and to counteract sectional and other divisive influences. Governmental succession has frequently been secured by a coup d'état in European areas like the Balkans or in countries of Latin * Revised version of a paper presented to the Working Group on Armed Forces and Society, Sixth World Congress of Sociology held at Evian in September, 1966. 1 S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London and Dunmow, Pall Mall Press, 1962). 2 M. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1964).

202

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture America where European traditions have held sway. Here military intervention has been of a somewhat different character. Usually it was designed to ensure the political hegemony of a class, of a ruling dynasty, or of an ethnic group to which the officer-class had particularly close links. Yet the establishment of a new government with the backing of armed force could and did at times serve more directly the military's own interest, securing for it the spoils and offices that went with a successful seizure of power. With the new focus in comparative studies on the rash of military coups in developing nations, such attempts in nations with a developed political culture and a tradition of civil supremacy have received only marginal attention. In the relatively small area of Northern, Western, and Central Europe, where parliamentary institutions evolved out of an indigenous tradition and rested on a highly developed industrial base, attempts by the military to overthrow civil governments have been rare and, when they occurred, not too difficult to quash. Thus the most recent military challenge to civil power in Great Britain was in 1914, when British officers staged an 'insurrection' against their government's policy toward Ireland. There was no clash of arms; the issue was quickly resolved by a mass resignation of officers.3 By contrast, in both Germany and France, long years of troubled civil-military relations led to abortive attempts by members of the officer corps to stage a coup d'état and thereby to reverse their government's policy. The putsch of German officers against Hitler (1944) and the putsch of French officers in Algiers against de Gaulle (1961) provide the clearest exceptions to the empirical generalization that coercive intervention by the military in internal politics is associated with a low level of political culture. It seems important to look closely at these two cases since the civil institutions in the two countries were highly developed by any of the usual criteria, no matter how unstable and drawn-out had been the political situation that led in each to the establishment of a strong government. Both were major landbased powers, and the need to maintain a large army drew its major justification from considerations of foreign policy, not from domestic considerations. To be sure, acceptance by the officer corps of the principle of military subordination to civil power occurred earlier in France than in Germany, and the curtailment of its social dominance was also more complete in the former. Yet German officers also had been guided for some time before the abortive putsch of 1944 by a tradition that equated the soldierly ethos with a full 3

A. P. Ryan, The Curraugh Mutiny (London, 1956).

203

Kurt Lang acceptance of civil supremacy. In fact, this tradition was an important factor accounting for the ineffectiveness of their opposition to Hitler's disastrous policies. The kind of comparative analysis attempted in this paper aims at a higher level of abstraction than is usually found in case studies by historians and political scientists, whose interest has usually centered on the particular motives and conflicts and on the unique circumstances that led in each country to the open challenge of civil authority.4 Historical data on Germany and France are used to identify the more general sociological elements underlying the development of civilmilitary conflict in each and to illustrate and elaborate some general propositions. In one sense especially, these two countries are uniquely suited to provide us with an opportunity for testing general trends. In France, civil-military relations at the time of the first major clash approximated the democratic model, whereas in Germany under the Nazis, the Wehrmacht had been progressively subjected to various kinds of totalitarian controls. If any similarity is found in the emerging pattern of civil-military relations that culminated in attempts at coercive intervention by the armed forces in both countries, the significance of this similarity would be enhanced by the difference noted above. The following three propositions shall serve us as general guidelines for an analysis of the military coup in a developed political culture: (1) External factors. — The area of potential civil military conflict expands as technological, social, and political developments become more relevant for military policy. Both Germany and France had passed through a period in which circumstances had compelled their armed forces to act autonomously of the civil government. When subsequent governments used their popular mandate to impose their own military policy, regardless of the opposition in the officer corps, they were clearly headed in the direction of a showdown. (2) Internal factors. - Social origins and career experiences tend to aggravate conflicts from any source to the extent that they promote a social and political atmosphere within the officer corps at variance with that of the mainstream of society. Cleavages within the military, if they 4

See especially, on Germany, J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, 2nd ed. (New York, 1965); G. A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 16401945 (New York, 1956); W. Goerlitz, Der deutsche Generalstab (Frankfurt am Main, 1950); and for France, R. Girardet, "Pouvoir Civil and Pouvoir Militaire dans la France Contemporaine", Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. X (March, 1960), pp. 5-38; J. M. de la Gorce, History of the French Army (New York, 1963); G. A. Kelly, Lost Soldiers (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).

204

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture bring together a politically-minded group, are most likely to form the network within which conspiratorial activity flourishes. However, for a conspiracy to develop into a coup links with influential anti-government civilians are probably a prerequisite. (3) Transactions. - Because the coercive use of armed force against their civil government encounters an obstacle in the tradition to which military men explicitly subscribe, its prime movers are officers who develop broad political perspectives. Traditionalism promotes retreatist reactions. Career politics and the normal disputes over doctrines and strategies can easily be absorbed within the given civil-military system. The many divisions along these lines provide, in fact, a means of controlling the military. Some support can invariably be found for even the most unpopular policy a civil government may be pursuing.

1.

EXTERNAL CONDITIONS LEADING TO CONFLICT

For the last century civil-military relations in the major industrial powers have been undergoing a secular change of an apparently irreversible nature. The traditionally sharp line of distinction between policy and strategy has been blurred as a consequence of the increasing technological know-how required to assess the capabilities of modern weapons. Policy had been the acknowledged domain of civil government; strategy the expert professional competence of the military. But from about the middle of the Nineteenth Century, military men have been assuming ever more important roles as technical advisors to their governments in foreign affairs. Similarly, with the greater involvement of civilian populations in mobilization and in the economic, political, and psychological effects of war, it has also become increasingly difficult for the military to offer advice on such things as military budgets, manpower policies, military pay and allowances, and so forth as if they were strictly internal matters without broader implications. These implications had to be included among their concerns when giving advice. This new dimension to military politics was not unique to either Germany or France. It was nevertheless an important development in the decades preceding the specific events with which we are dealing, particularly because the crisis in civil-military relations had its roots in events about a generation before. Thus one cannot overlook the significance of the shattering military defeat suffered by the German army in 1918 and by the French army in 1940. The surrender of the German 205

Kurt Lang government to the Allied powers coincided with the dissolution of the Imperial Army. As a result the officer corps lost its privileged position, long enjoyed through direct access to the sovereign, that had enabled it, on many occasions, to escape the scrutiny of parliament. Though the change in the relations between the armed forces 5 and the state in France was nowhere near as traumatic, there too the army, following its collapse before the invading German columns, had to accommodate itself to a number of successive regimes and constitutional changes. Defeat posed a number of dilemmas for both armies and certain guidelines for socially sanctioned responses to these gradually developed. The impact was probably greatest on relatively junior officers who, during this period, were just moving into positions of responsibility. Reactions to subsequent developments were no doubt influenced by perspectives developed at a time when the entire army was riding out a major crisis. First, even after the armistice, which in each instance formally terminated the war, some officers of considerable renown insisted on continuing resistance until the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country were guaranteed. Their unauthorized action entailed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the government that had signed the peace and had thereby committed itself to the fulfillment of armistice provisions. The refusal of men like General von der Goltz to withdraw from territories they took to be inalienably German, plus the behavior of other Freikorps commanders, led to the threat of a complete Allied occupation, which the army was not strong enough to resist. For that reason, the high command had committed itself to a policy that gave at least the appearance of cooperation. Officers in open dissidence jeopardized the unity of command on which the success of this policy naturally depended. Gaullist appeals for continued resistance, especially those directed at the Navy and the colonial forces, created dilemmas that were in certain respects similar. Most officers in both countries were naturally inclined toward sympathy with those continuing the struggle. Second, the immediate response by the military leadership was to rely on the formal authority structure to cement the unity of the army and to rid itself of the 'cancer' of political dissension. In doing so, the onus for the defeat the armed forces had suffered was displaced insofar 5

In France, the l'armée includes ground, sea, and air forces, so that army and armed forces are synonymous terms. In Germany, the services still enjoyed a more or less separate existence, with the ground forces [.Heer] and its general staff assuming a dominant role. Resistance to Hitler was centered in the OKH, i.e., the ground forces.

206

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture as possible to the political disunity of the home front. Legends of betrayal were deliberately disseminated in both countries; the primary objective of these stories was to exonerate the army but they also weakened the already tenuous loyalty of many officers to the kind of party government that, in Germany, had accepted the defeat and, in France, was seen as the cause of it. These legends were to be revived in modified form during subsequent clashes with the civil government over policies. Third, both the Reichswehr under the Republic and the armistice army under Vichy embarked, in open collusion with some members of their government, on a program of clandestine circumvention of the armistice clauses limiting rearmament, clauses the government was officially committed to uphold and enforce. Sponsorship by some officers of the 'Black Reichswehr' (which consisted of labor battalions) and of the chantiers de jeunesse was designed to get around restrictions on the number of men receiving military training. Both armies also had access to an area beyond the possible control of their victorious conquerors. Secret collaboration with the Soviet Union enabled the Germans to test some equipment disallowed them by the armistice they had signed. Similarly, the French during the German occupation were able to maintain an excess of military strength within their colonial possessions, particularly in North Africa.6 While none of these activities were critical for the outcome of World War II, they nevertheless habituated officers to playing an independent role outside normal governmental channels. Finally, the political fragmentation that beset both the Weimar Republic and Fourth Republic of France prevented the formation of stable parliamentary majorities and so created situations that gave a new meaning to the military tradition of apolitical neutrality. Through the old motto of the general staff officer — "mehr sein als scheinen" — and through the symbol of la grande muette, the military leadership in each instance managed to secure once again the unity of the army, which had been threatened so seriously during the crisis brought on by defeat and which, in the case of France, had been put to an acid test when North Africa was invaded in 1942 with the participation of Gaullist contingents. The point needs to be made, however, that an army whose loyalty was to a concept of service to the nation independent of obedience to any particular government or regime was also a potent political 8

On the Vichy army, see especially G. O. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966).

207

Kurt Lang instrument in the hands of a commander-in-chief prepared to use it for this purpose. The growing influence of the 'politically neutral' administrative organs of government (the military, the civil service, etc.) has generally played a significant role in the dissolution of parliamentary democracy. This role has received the fullest documentation in Bracher's monumental work on the Weimar Republic.7 The potential and actual capability of the military leadership to influence events was undoubtedly at its peak in the period immediately preceding the accession of Hitler and of de Gaulle to a position of formal power, which - in both instances - took place behind the benevolent shield of the army's avowed neutrality. For a brief interval, the army leadership appears to have held the balance of power between the various parliamentary fractions deadlocked in a struggle over who was to dominate the government. General von Schleicher, the Minister of the Army under the short-lived von Papen government of 1932 and the driving force in the behind-the-scenes machinations, was able to bring about the fall of the legally constituted government of Prussia. Troops acting under his command prevented the Landtag from meeting. Likewise, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of France, General Ely, helped seal the fate of the Pflimlim government. His refusal during the critical days of May 1958, when dissident forces took control in Algiers, to pledge the military to support the government, which he dramatized by resigning, made it impossible for the government to deal with this situation. The particular form intervention took depended on the personality of each leader as well as on unique elements in the situation. In exerting his influence, von Schleicher had relied heavily on his friendship with the son of the Reichspraesident and the direct access to von Hindenburg this gave him. Ely, who enjoyed great prestige throughout the French army, played a more passive role. He was in no sense a prime mover behind the events in Algeria but allowed them more or less to take their course. Nevertheless, the immense difference in the actual political role each assumed should not obscure the underlying similarity in the objective guiding their actions. Both had as their avowed aim the formation of a government of 'national unity' that would give full backing to the army and to a policy most officers believed to be in the national interest. Equally significant was the inability of the army in both Germany and France to control developments after it had successfully acted as the arbiter among deadlocked political forces. Military intervention had 7

K. Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (1957).

208

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture been encouraged by an existing power vacuum, but the politically active officers, as in most countries, showed themselves unable to wield effective political power by military force alone.8 They lacked the capacity to mobilize the support of the population. Therefore what power they briefly enjoyed quickly slipped through their hands. To be sure, the military had achieved some of its objectives insofar as the regimes of Hitler and of de Gaulle were clearly preferred to the ones each had displaced. Yet most members of the military elite regarded both Hitler and de Gaulle with considerable distrust, with active proNazi and Gaullist sentiments confined to a fairly small minority of officers. This distrust proved, in the long run, to be altogether justified. The new heads of government, once they had consolidated their political power, imposed their own military and political policies on the army and, through the effective use of forced transfers and normal retirements of senior officers whose loyalty they doubted, prevented the crystallization of an effective opposition. Hence, the military interventions in 1932 and in 1958, though successful in bringing about a change of government, did not regain for army officers an autonomous role in policy formation. Military intervention that helped bring about the replacement of parliamentary government by the Third Reich and the Fifth Republic lacked most of the characteristics of a conventional coup d'état. In Germany, the army had exercised influence largely through its own representatives within the civil government, and desperate last-minute plans to forestall by a show of military force the formation of a government under Hitler remained still-born. The power of the Nazis had become too great. By contrast, the uprising in Algiers was never of the French army's own making. Given the lack of alternatives, de Gaulle's return to power had become almost a matter of logical necessity. The troops deployed for a mainland coup did not have to be used. Military politics took a new turn with the establishment of these regimes. Though the idea of using a coup d'état as a political instrument, as we have seen, antedates this period, it was the clear exclusion of the army viewpoint that led to the focalization on armed intervention as the only possible means of reversing policy. The anti-Hitler putsch of 1944 and the Algerian putsch of 1961 differ from these earlier clashes in two important respects: (1) Military force, which had been considered as only one of several levers to be employed in forcing a change, now came 8

M. Janowitz, op. cit.

209

Kurt Lang to be viewed as the only possible means of military politics; and (2) by and large officers who became prime movers in the events of 1944 and 1961, had been or were more centrally placed with regard to the military leadership nucleus than those who joined in the earlier conspiracies. This shift was somewhat less evident in France, since events there moved with greater rapidity, than in Germany. In either case, the intransigency of the political regime, whose leaders felt firmly entrenched and could appeal directly to the people for support, meant that the putsch, when it came, was motivated by a feeling among officers that basic military considerations were not being heeded in the formulation of national policy. They responded in terms of the military's conception of a more permanent national interest. 2. INTERNAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE INTENSIFICATION OF CONFLICT

The military milieu differs from that of the civilian society in at least one fundamental aspect: its dominant orientation is toward violence rather than political negotiations and compromise. The degree of actual contrast can be enhanced or softened depending on how selective recruitment is and on how much the army is isolated from the main currents of political life. Historically the trend has been toward a broadening of the officer recruitment base. During this same period, technological developments have increased the importance of administrative, technical, and support functions as opposed to strictly military functions, so that the distinctions between the two milieus have been blurred somewhat, though not obliterated. The armed forces of neither Germany nor France were exempt from the effects of these developments. Within the limits of the broader sociological and historical context, both the level within the society from which officers are predominantly recruited and the criteria that facilitate a successful military career are important factors that influence the political behavior of the military. They influence in particular the social and political atmosphere within the officer corps and the connections members of the military elite are apt to form with members of civilian elite groups. Scholars such as de Tocqueville and Mosca discerned long ago that an officer corps recruited from among the lower strata of society might be a greater danger to civil government than an officer corps predominantly recruited from the upper levels, mostly because the former would be consumed by ambi210

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture tion, whereas the latter, whatever its ideology, would be more closely tied to the existing order and have a stake in its stability. The officer corps in neither Germany or France was recruited from a broadly representative segment of the population. Nevertheless, the social origins of the German officer corps were higher than those of the French by any of the usual measures. By restricting eligibility, the Imperial German army had reserved almost all commissions for sons of the titled aristocracy and of socially qualified and well-to-do bourgeois families. By contrast, French statute had long specified that one third of the new officer intake consist of promotions from the ranks of noncommissioned officers on active service. To be sure, the number of officers commissioned from the ranks had lagged for a long time behind the number specified, and these men were no doubt at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the socially more prominent St. Cyrians when it came to subsequent advancement. Still, they were a more important component, numerically, within the French officer corps than in Germany, where the officer commissioned from the ranks was practically nonexistent until shortage caused by wartime needs forced some modification of policy. Comparison of father's occupation likewise suggests that in France the officers coming from a middle class background represented a broader spectrum of occupations than was the case in Germany.9 Whatever the manner and degree in which the officer corps was selectively recruited, no abrupt change in its social composition accompanied the major social and political changes that followed defeat - of the German army in World War I and of the French army in the opening phase of World War II. Reduction of the standing force and the low prestige a military career had in the post-war world seems, if anything, to have strengthened what social homogeneity already existed. Thus there was more social continuity within the ranks of the military than within the rest of society. Let us see how this happened. Taken over from the provisional Reichswehr, which was formed from the remnants of the Imperial army, into the permanent 100,000-man army was a disproportionately large number of officers who had previously served on the General Staff. Furthermore, the sharp decline in the social status of officers usually implied that a new applicant would have strong career motivations, while the small number of vacancies 8

On social composition, see K. Demeter, Das deutsche Offizierkorps in Gesellschaft und Staat 1650-1945 (Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe, sec. ed. 1962), and R. Girardet and J. P. H. Thomas, "Problèmes de recruitement", in La Crise Militaire Française 1945-1962 (Paris, Armand Colin, 1964), pp. 11-72.

211

Kurt Lang left a wider area of discretion to officer selection boards. It has been estimated that persons who once would have been automatically disqualified from becoming officers made up no more than about five per cent of total recruits throughout the years of restriction.10 The situation began to change significantly only in the mid-thirties, when the rapid rate of expansion offered new opportunities not only within the army as inherited by Hitler but also in the new military formations he set up outside the jurisdiction of the traditionally-minded army leadership. The armistice terms imposed by the Germans on the French in 1940 likewise forced a drastic reduction in the number of men under arms. It had an effect similar to the one in Germany, namely of strengthening by the separation of marginal officers the solid professional core of professionals. In addition, the military leadership, bent on ultimately shaking off the German yoke, was impelled to rely more heavily on colonial units, whose ties to French social and political life were much more tenuous.11 After the victory of 1945, little was done to redress the balance, even though during the liberation of France F.F.I, elements had been integrated and fought side by side with the regular and colonial units. Those separated during the inevitable retrenchment in the two years after victory consisted mainly of those taken over from the F.F.I., while all through the post-war period, officer recruitment exhibited a sharp increase of candidates with a military family background.12 The social composition of the officer corps is judged to have at least two significant implications for the intensification of civil-military conflict to a point where the two confront one another in an attempted coup. In the first place, a strong sense of common identity that cuts across the various specialized functions is more easily developed and maintained in a homogeneously recruited officer corps. This same sense of identity also provides a milieu in which conspiracy is more readily tolerated. Even officers themselves opposed to a conspiracy, when approached or apprised of its existence, were loathe to turn informer. For the same reason, officers who stage a successful coup usually count on gaining acceptance from many others not privy to their plans. In the second place, the failure to infuse the military leadership with new social elements representative of a changing society is apt to increase the disarticulation of the ideological point of view predominant within the armed forces with that of the society at large. As a result, 10 11

12

Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit.; see also Demeter, op. cit. Paxton, op. cit.

Girardet, op. cit.

212

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture the military becomes less responsive to outside political and social developments; their capacity for collective adaptation is adversely affected. Indirectly, through the social and political atmosphere it promotes within the officer corps, the pattern of recruitment has a discernible influence. A modern army is a complex organization; it contains too many diverse elements for the entire officer corps to develop a monolithic ideological and doctrinal outlook of the kind typical of a conspiratorial group. Inevitably embedded within its social structure are certain cleavages: between officers of different generations and seniority, of different branches, arms, functions, and theatres of operation, and between the advocates of various policies, doctrines, and strategies. This variety of perspectives and viewpoints makes it unlikely that consensus necessary for unified political opposition will be found within the officer corps in its entirety. These considerations lead us to the further hypothesis that decisive political intervention by armed force depends upon the prior crystallization of intent among a limited circle of officers, usually rising young stars (such as those in the German OKH or in the more informal club de colonels of the French army), men who often were nearly as critical of their military superiors as of civilian policy-makers. These conflicts within the military played an important part in the coalescence of the conspiratorial group in several ways. On the one hand, they mark the lines along which personal allegiances developed that later formed the basis for conspiratorial networks. On the other hand, a civilian leadership intent on bending the army to its will can always, by playing on cleavage within the military, find officers willing to carry out its policies. Hence, the degree of unity necessary to openly thwart a particular policy to which a firm commitment has been made will rarely be forthcoming. However, where personal frustrations coincide with the lines of conflicts over ideology, doctrine, strategy, and other issues, they are easily channeled into any existent military antagonism to civil authority. That both putsches drew their main support from officers in the ground forces - the Heer and l'armée de terre - is no accident. The primary mission of the ground forces is to occupy and secure a territory. Hence their units are more likely than air and naval forces to come into contact with the population being occupied and pacified. They share in the tasks of civil administration and therefore are more apt to have to deal with local political factors. Only two naval officers and not a single 213

Kurt Lang officer of the Luftwaffe were implicated in the 20th of July putsch against Hitler. The French navy likewise remained loyal during the events in April 1961 in Algiers, but two air force generals, Challe and Jouhaud, played key roles. In their case, special factors, like past assignments and Jouhaud's having been born in Algeria, help account for their participation. The involvement in political activity by military men is generally associated with what Janowitz called an 'adaptive', as opposed to a 'prescribed', career.13 Whether pro or anti-Hitler, whether Gaullist or O.A.S., politically active officers were more likely than other officers to have participated in the development of new weapons, new tactics, and new forms of internal management; more of them had also had the chance to broaden their perspective by serving, at some time or other, on quasi-political assignments, as attachés to foreign armies or to civilian officials. Indeed, some early supporters of Hitler, i.e. officers who had seen in the Nazi 'revolution' a way of revitalizing flagging patriotic sentiment, ultimately moved toward the anti-Nazi conspiracy. Similarly with de Gaulle: disillusionment converted some early supporters to the clandestine opposition when the Algerian policy he was charting did not meet with their favor. The case of Admiral Canaris, who as head of the intelligence service of the German combined forces command (OKW) was among those most active in the anti-Hitler conspiracy, illustrates the strategic part officers with intelligence, propaganda, and psychological warfare functions played in its development. These assignments required an officer to concern himself with the military implications of a broad range of economic, political, and psychological developments and with the possibility that they can be manipulated. Perhaps the activities of the intelligence services (the Abwehr and the deuxième bureau) were especially adapted to the spinning of a web of intrigue, but perspectives that encompassed political and economic effects of the use of force were probably necessary to extend these intrigues to a level where the open defiance of governmental policy by a military coup d'état could be seriously entertained. One finds, indeed, among the prime movers behind the two putsches an especially large number of psychological warfare enthusiasts. The iconoclastic activities of General Chassin, the first to draw attention to the posible applicability of Maoist doctrines to French military policy, 13

M. Janowitz, The Professional Glencoe, 1960), p. 168.

214

Soldier

(New York, The Free Press of

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture and the involvement in Algiers of the colonels associated with action psychologique are well known.14 Less well known is the fact that most of the circle of German officers to speak out for a policy by which the loyalties of the population in the conquered territories of the East could be won for Germany became prominent later on in the assassination attempt of 1944.15 This circle had included at one time Colonels von Stauffenberg, von Roenne, and (later General) von Tresckow. Their attempt to chart a new course represents something analogous to the colonial experience of the French army, many of whose officers became deeply committed never to abandon members of the native population who had been loyal to France. Certain kinds of career experiences are conducive to an active political stance. They indicate some of the sociological determinants of likely involvement in the conspiracy. But whether a politically-minded officer was in fact drawn into the conspiracy depended less on his experiences within the military than on the contacts he enjoyed with influential civilians. In Germany, the conspiracy was essentially a civilian-military alliance. The civilians it attracted were predominantly conservative and nationalistic on the political spectrum. Among them were found highly placed civil servants, industrialists, and clergy. This opposition could only operate underground; its size and the scope of its activities were limited by the effectiveness of the controls imposed by Nazi police state. Lacking a political base from which to launch action, the civilian opposition looked to their contacts within the military to provide the physical force to topple the regime when the timely moment to press their demands arose. Opposition to French governmental policy could be and was expressed much more openly than in Germany. It furthermore had an important regional base among the Algerian ultras, with whom many French officers maintained close connections. Demands that France not abandon its colonial empire were also backed by associations of veterans of oversea combat. In these associations, many retired officers of high rank, Salan among them, held important honorary posts. Also officers affiliated with la cité catholique had apparently formed cells within the army and thereby helped perpetuate the heritage of right-wing catholic thought. These and other contacts with various right-wing extremists had some influence on those who ultimately collaborated with the O.A.S. Others, like Challe, who had been an active participant in the resistance 14 15

P. Paret, The French Doctrine of Revolutionary War (New York, 1964). A. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945 (New York, 1957).

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Kurt Lang under the Nazi occupation and had held responsible commands in the combined French forces and the Allied high command in Europe, clearly drew the line between themselves and going over into total illegality.

3. DILEMMAS AND THEIR RESOLUTION

A modern army incorporates in its structure many different types of roles and an even larger number of concrete relationships among the incumbents of the various statuses with which these roles are associated. The elements of military social structure are important determinants of the transactions that take place among members of the military. They likewise influence the transactions that take place between military men and other members of the society. Because the relations between the military elite and representatives of civil authority are the special concern in this paper, we examined the impact of certain general social trends to which the armed forces had to accommodate themselves. We also examined the implication of some specific positional elements - particularly an officer's career experience, his current assignment, and the way these affected his participation in certain military and civilian networks - for the likelihood of his participation in an attempted coup d'état. An analysis of the events that culminated in the 20th of July putsch in Germany and of the Algerian putsch of April 1961 solely in these terms would obviously be incomplete. The decision on the part of a high-ranking officer to join in a conspiracy against the recognized civil authority could hardly have been simple or easy. Nor was it in any sense an 'automatic' reaction either to the altered position of the army in society or to the officer's position within the armed forces social network. To conspire the overthrow of the civil government went not only against military tradition but also against the whole system of bureaucratic authority within which military men were accustomed to operate. Therefore most officers had first to overcome some deep inner reservations before they could commit themselves to a conspiratorial plan of action. The sociological analysis of 'motives' takes as its point of departure the postulate that transactions are oriented toward some general value orientation implicit in specific role prescriptions. Only on relatively rare occasions are these value orientations explicitly invoked to justify behavior, but the likelihood that this will happen is increased in situations 216

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture of conflict or ambiguity about which standard applies. Thus the rhetoric by which individual officers sought to legitimate various courses of action provides important clues about the principles toward which they were oriented. It gives a clear indication that the dilemmas officers faced arose from their concurrent involvement in several transactional (behavior) systems, each of which incorporated a different principle. Four general principles can be abstracted from such data: (1) the conception of the officer corps as an internally regulated guild, whose corporate reputation it is the responsibility of each individual member to uphold; (2) the principle of absolute loyalty and obedience to the commanderin-chief; (3) the image of the army as the bearer of the national ethos; and (4) the principle of technical expertise. Each of these principles was a dominant image for the officer corps in a distinct historical phase of its existence. The present-day armies had their origin in the feudal era, when the officer corps had many of the features of an autonomous estate (a closed guild). Much of this social exclusiveness carried over into absolutism but with the principle of loyal service to the sovereign head of the state added to it. Constitutional government, justly suspicious of any semblance of privileges retained by the officer class, tended to transform the army into the 'school of the nation'. Finally, with the growth of military expertise, being an officer indicated membership in a skill group functionally specialized in the management of violence. Tempting as it may be to reflect on the historical continuity of these images, the way each principle corresponds to an aspect of contemporary reality is more relevant. Each officer, in short, is expected to be responsive to the demands of status honor, to accept discipline and obey orders, to be moved by patriotic concern for the well-being of his country, and to apply his independent professional judgment to military problems. As long as these principles are properly articulated with one another and the limits of each recognized, no conflict ensues; but when they become disjointed and overlap, officers are confronted with the need to make choices. An army in whose tradition the principle of obedience to civil authority has been raised to an absolute principle cannot at the same time include an equally compelling structural imperative to engage in a coup d'état. The hold this tradition had on most officers made them hesitant, and even those who ultimately became the prime movers for a coup went through long soul-searching to find a justification. The 217

Kurt Lang significance of the various principles for whether or not an officer committed himself to participate will now be explored, first on the basis of some German and then of some French data available. The 20th of July putsch. - In the years preceding the putsch, relations between the army leadership and Hitler, who as head of the state was nominally, and later actually, the commander-in-chief, became strained by new policies and practices that clashed with these principles. In the first place, the caste consciousness of the old officer corps and the guild spirit of its general staff, which had survived the dissolution of the Empire, became translated in the new Reichswehr into a constant apprehensiveness over the 'unity of the army'. Also, commanding officers were enjoined to inculcate in their subordinates, by personal example, certain traditional military values, such as a voluntaristic concept of soldierly honor, outranking in importance any conceptions of civic responsibility. But Hitler's direct intervention into the internal affairs of the army threatened the autonomous existence of these values and therefore, expectedly, evoked a hostile response. In the same vein, many officers viewed with disfavor the influx, under the impetus of mobilization, of socially and politically alien elements into the ranks of the officer corps. Relations were further strained as Hitler narrowed the army's traditional sphere of military responsibility, both by his sponsorship of military units (like the SS) not under army jurisdiction and by his insistence that the army, in serving as his advisor, confine its activity to planning the logistic aspects of campaigns he devised. By the creation, in 1938, of a planning staff directly subordinate to himself and, in 1941, by his personal assumption of operational command of the army, Hitler weakened the effectiveness of normal bureaucratic channels and opened the army to the most uninhibited career politics. Prevented by the bureaucratic tradition of obedience from making an open break, the army leaders found it increasingly difficult to press collectively for a point of view different from Hitler's. Yet Hitler, by constant interference, brought about numerous specific conflicts within the system of expertise. Now that he held the operational command, his scorn for the timidity of his military planners and field commanders, bound as they were by their professional judgments, led him repeatedly to ignore their advice and to intervene increasingly, as the war neared its disastrous end, into the tactical details of an operation. Protests, often originating with the highest-ranking and most prestigious officers, were abruptly rejected, but very few protests were 218

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture followed by resignations designed to give force to these complaints. By dismissing a few of his disobedient generals, Hitler, it seemed, was able to beat the rest into submission, and always found new officers willing to take over the vacated posts. As long as Hitter's diplomatic and military ventures continued to yield visible successes, most officers were in fact content to avoid open conflict by retreating into a narrower conception of responsibility than that which their view of the long-term national interest seemed to enjoin upon them. Even after all prospects of a German victory had faded and there could be no longer any rational justification for further risk of lives and cities, generals, as one of them testified, who were putting in 16 to 18 hours a day in support of their troops, could not possibly entertain thoughts of a coup or even of resigning. It becomes clear therefore that a notion of duty that transcended the imperatives of bureaucratic discipline was a prerequisite for military action to overthrow the regime. Such action had to be seen as consonant with the more permanent national interest its leaders were pledged to serve. An analysis of the roles played by 84 officers in the German military leadership nucleus - of their specific acts of opposition and of the issue over which each act arose - points to an underlying unidimensionality in the various sources of conflict.16 The first point to note is that opposition to Hitler's proclaimed strategy and his conduct of military operations was quite pervasive. Those who at one time or another voiced their differences with Hitler on these matters included even some proNazi generals; such action on the part of the latter might even have been encouraged by a belief that in a context where their basic loyalty was taken for granted their views on professional military matters would therefore carry greater weight. Because of its pervasiveness, conflict arising within the system of military expertise could evidently not have been a sufficient cause of why an officer was moved to support the conspiracy. However, it did happen in some cases that an officer fell from favor following an argument with Hitler. If the officer himself became sufficiently disenchanted, this could soften him up for an approach by the conspirators. Perspectives rooted in the different functions, theatres, arms, and doctrinal commitments of officers always contain a potential for conflict, which the acceptance of a work-oriented military discipline as a 18

K. Lang, "Bureaucracy in Crisis: A Role-Analysis of German Generals under Hitler", unpublished M.A. thesis, Sociology Department, Univ. of Chicago, 1952.

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Kurt Lang guide for action cannot completely suppress. Yet the number of possible divisions is too vast, and the judgments on these matters too imprecise and too much left to conjecture, for the various alignments to coalesce into the kind of commitment sufficient to carry a conspiracy against a regime. Also, the notion of work-oriented discipline was by itself perhaps the main impediment to the evolvement of a putsch, and any notions of duty that diverged from it would certainly bring an officer up against the vast apparatus of formal institutional prescriptions, at the peak of which stood the oath of personal fealty Hitler had been able to exact in exchange for his promise to rebuild German military power. By this oath each officer bound himself personally to Hitler, thereby reviving, as far as its form was concerned, the old relationship of the officer corps to the Emperor. Hitler himself, however, did not see himself as bound to respect army tradition. On the contrary, he intervened more and more in what the traditionalistically oriented army leadership considered to be purely internal matters over which it alone had jurisdiction. The conflict came to a head particularly over the conduct of the war in the East. Hitler's intervention had especially aggravated the military, insofar as many commanding generals saw in his directives transgressions against the traditional military code. Two points are noted about the opposition by the military that centered on these issues. The first point concerns the cumulative character of opposition. Almost all officers who actively opposed the subversion of traditional military values had also at one time or another come into conflict with Hitler over strategic issues. However, not all officers who had been involved in disputes over strategic points - and there were many such officers - extended their opposition to other than 'technical' matters within their sphere of expertise. The second point has to do with the characteristics of officers most troubled about the threat to military values and the form in which their opposition was expressed. The group includes an unusually large proportion of officers most senior in age and rank, who already had attained posts within the military elite nucleus by the time World War II broke out. This rise to eminence was usually the crowning achievement of what may be called a 'prescribed' career. Instead of innovating perspectives these officers had strongly traditionalistic orientations, which were most appropriate to an era where the autonomy of the armed forces was unchallenged. In the present situation, these officers were faced with a clear dilemma. They could follow the dictates of loyalty and obedience 220

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture while overlooking the challenge to the military code of directives they were duty-bound to transmit and implement. Or, on the assumption that these codes were still binding, they could follow a course of actively protesting the practices they considered in violation of the Geneva convention or of other tenets in their code. Most officers were content simply to avoid active involvement in the implementation of these directives. Only when these attempts failed, did they tender their resignation or, in some instances, begin to court open conflict with Hitler that led to the dismissal of several. Neither their opposition nor their resignations were motivated primarily by a concern for the political implications these practices might have either for developments in Germany or in the post-war world. Though they sympathized with its goals, these officers did not join the conspiracy. Most were unable to visualize any course of action beyond a retreatist response; their quiet resignations were hardly an effective protest, and their declamations through military channels could only hasten their forced retirement. What set the opposition of the conspirators apart from that of others, i.e. led them to plot actively to get rid of Hitler, was their deep concern not only that the military policies of which the army was the principal instrument were clearly headed for disaster but that they had a responsibility for changing these policies. The conspirators shared with many other officers who did not enter the plot the view that Hitler was courting a military disaster by his strategy; most were also outraged by the policies in the occupied countries and by Hitler's intervention into the internal affairs of the army, acts that could only blemish the reputation of the military. But conspirators were at least equally apprehensive about Germany's place in the post-war world and about which ideology would dominate Europe if Germany were to suffer a total defeat. It was the last concern that induced them to justify the use of illegal means to reverse Hitler's policies. The specific content of their ideology and the kind of post-war world they envisaged are not at issue here; it is important to point out that the motives underlying participation in the conspiracy grew out of a disarticulation among the various principles to which officers were supposedly committed. It became increasingly difficult to uphold all these principles as equally binding. The system of military (bureaucratic) discipline helped confine policy disagreements within narrow limits; responsibility for the resolution of problems could always be passed upwards to where the final authority lay. Among officers with strongly

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Kurt Lang traditionalistic orientations concerned over status honor, conflicts were less easily resolved, but a retreatist reaction, the typical response of the traditionalist, enabled them to extricate themselves. By contrast, officers whose careers had provided them with 'adaptive' experiences found refuge behind traditional codes far less comforting. Ultimately they arrived at the conclusion that the only way to reestablish concordance among disparate elements of the various transactional systems was through a forcible overthrow of the government and its replacement by one with whose ideological objectives and policies they would be able to identify. To maintain the unity of the army and to avoid civil war, military intervention had to be limited both in its scope and in its goals. It had to deal with reservations rooted in the system of status honor and of military discipline to which most officers subscribed. Hitler's death therefore became the principal condition for the success of any military revolt, because (so the conspirators reasoned) only in this way would officers be released from their oath. An uprising of foreign workers was to be simulated and serve as a cover for Operation Valkyrie, whereby the reserve army, to be headed by a field marshal reactivated from retirement, would assure internal order. Counting on the sympathies of several commanding generals, who were aware of Germany's strategically hopeless situation, and on the apolitical neutrality of the rest, the conspirators aimed to paralyze the policy-making apparatus only long enough for a new government to be established. Many reasons together account for the failure of the putsch, the most immediate of which was Hitler's unexpected escape from the fatal effects of the bomb blast. As long as Hitler remained alive, many generals and their subordinates refused to do anything that appeared as collaboration with the coup, especially after his direct appeal to army commanders, to their troops, and to the civil population over the German radio. Thus the system of impersonal discipline, on which the conspirators had counted for their success, was effectively used to crush them. Most officers' political instincts warned them not to court civil war. Whether the coup could have succeeded even under the most favorable tactical circumstances is nevertheless dubious. As Malaparte has pointed out, without a semblance of legitimacy and active cells to control and immediately take over the major services, a strictly military revolt under modern conditions does not stand much chance of success.17 There were too many loyal followers of Hitler among officers and their troops, and the civil population could hardly have been expected to remain passive. 17

C. Malaparte, The Coup d'état (New York, (1932).

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The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture The 1961 putsch in Algiers. - The political and military circumstances in which French officers began to conspire were, in several important respects, the clear obverse of those in Germany during the early 1940s. Where German officers had hoped by their intervention to salvage what they could from inexorable defeat, the French conspirators came from among the champions of a more aggressive policy to 'pacify' and retain possession of Algeria, which the civil government appeared all too ready to cede. The commander-in-chief in Algeria, unlike his German counterparts in the high command of the German ground forces (OKH), enjoyed considerable autonomy over the conduct of operations within his zone. There had even been occasions where the military had forced the acquiescence of the government by confronting it with a fait accompli (as with the diversion of an international flight to arrest the F.L.N. leaders or with the aerial attack on Sakhiet across the border in Tunisia). Furthermore, in France the drive toward new and unconventional forms or warfare, including the exercise of police functions by the army and the organization of territorial units as auxiliaries to the regular force, came largely from within the military. There is record of only one general's public protest against the use of torture in Algeria (he was confined to 30 days of house arrest). Conflict over specifically military issues and over traditional military values was much less important among the French officers. The conflict there had focused from the very beginning on broader policy and political issues, the main one of which concerned the priority of the Algerian theatre vis-à-vis participation in the defense of Europe. These differences between Germany and France notwithstanding, one can nevertheless analyze the emerging civil-military conflict in terms of the same, or at least a similar, progressive disarticulation among the four principles that served the military as guides to conduct in a variety of situations. To begin with, the inadequacies in the traditional concept of work-oriented discipline (bureaucratic obedience) had already become evident in the many dilemmas of the liberation struggle. In 1942, during the first Allied landings in North Africa, some officers stationed there had received completely contradictory orders from superiors at different echelons of command. They were thus compelled to make their own political decisions. During the post-war prosecutions, officers saw themselves (or their fellow officers) brought to trial for having carried out the orders of the legally constituted civil government. Both the legal and the moral issue centered explicitly on the principle of unquestioning 223

Kurt Lang obedience. In Algeria, a new dimension was added to this dilemma, which grew out of the past. The political judgment of military commanders was severely tested, particularly in areas where, following the collapse of the normal machinery of government, an officer had to assume the responsibility for civil affairs as well. The political commitments of officers gave rise to new dilemmas for yet another reason. The experiences during frequent and often protracted tours of duty outside of mainland France, shared by many officers,18 left them with little sympathy for the major social and political developments in the nation. In part, this estrangement reflected merely the natural suspicion that combat soldiers anywhere have for the home front. A political motive was added by their general distaste for a civil society enjoying considerable affluence but apparently lacking in any unified national purpose. Among officers who felt they had borne the brunt of the sacrifices, there was a revival of the guild spirit that viewed the military as incorporating the highest civic virtues. The old spirit had a new content, however. Officers felt that they had to find ways to make their influence felt and to change the government's policies. Third, neither the links between regular officers still on active duty and militant associations of combat veterans of the overseas struggle nor the increasing number of draftees who served on brief tours of duty in Algeria, often in the same units with regular troops, could narrow the developing schism. On the other hand, identifications and ties regular officers formed in Algeria with the French settlers and with some members of the native population did give officers an 'indigenous' base. It pointed a way for the army to become once again the 'school of the nation'. Hence the pacification of Algeria was for many officers more than a strictly military mission. They saw themselves as having entered into a solemn compact, in the name of France, never to abandon a civil population, whose loyalty, they felt, they had done so much to win. A campaign there, brought to a successful conclusion with popular support, would have re-established their belief in the symbolic unity of army and nation. Finally, the history of past defeats moved many officers to serious study of the reasons behind them. Their study convinced some that prevailing military doctrines were inappropriate to the present situation, and they became professionally committed to a new doctrine of revolutionary warfare. The Algerian pacification campaign afforded a unique 18

P. M. Bouju et J. P. Thomas, "Problèmes de structure et de mode vie", La crise, ... cit., pp. 73-150.

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The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture opportunity to test the validity of this doctrine, which they would have had to forgo with de Gaulle's reversal of policy. As a result, the possibility that the application of these new concepts could have brought the Algerian conflict to a successful termination was never demonstrated, but neither was it disproved. Obviously, French officers were strongly motivated to create conditions under which the esoteric military knowledge, which was the monopoly of their profession, could be exercised in the public interest without restraint. This applies even to General Challe, who was in no way an advocate of revolutionary warfare but who believed that the quadrillage system of defense he had developed would, if given a chance, be crowned with success. The system of expertise thus aggravated civil-military opposition and so gave an added impetus to the putsch. The stance taken by the de Gaulle government in 1958 suggested that it was committed to a policy of 'integration' and so would untie the hands of the army, leaving it to find the best means of pursuing this goal. This had the effect of reducing, temporarily, the disarticulation among the principal orientations embodied in the several behavior systems of the military. Corporate solidarity, harmony between soldiers and the head of the state, a sense of national mission, and its freedom of action within the military sphere seemed once more restored. Hence the coup some officers had been ready to unleash never came off, despite the fact that in 1958 the conditions for a successful revolt with the participation of officers had been unusually favorable. The Pflimlin government with its precarious parliamentary mandate was paralyzed before events in Algiers, and for a brief period the army had evidently held the balance of power. Yet the top military leadership did not wish to be caught between the contending political factions. It was therefore content to join the call for the formation of a government headed by de Gaulle. Such a course enabled them to preserve at least the appearance that their conduct during the demonstrations in Algiers involved no disloyalty and to avoid, above all, jeopardizing the unity of the army by what might have turned into a civil war. During 1959 and 1960 it became progressively clearer that de Gaulle was abandoning the goal of integration with France. All the issues around which civil-military conflict had arisen in the past were once more revived. This time, however, officers in opposition knew they were facing a popular regime that was most unlikely to yield to the ordinary forms of pressure. The political aspects of the conflict thus came to dominate all the others. Giving priority to the Algerian theatre, at the 225

Kurt Lang expense of the common defense of Europe, was essentially the course of the extreme right-wing with whom the conspirators now were forced into a clear alliance. They believed that the pacification of Algeria had the highest priority in the struggle of the West against the Communist menace, because he F.L.N, campaign represented the enemy's strike against the weakly defended backdoor, a course he preferred to a frontal assault. The civil-military impasse, once it developed over this issue, could only be resolved either by complete acceptance on the part of the military of the dominant civilian policy role or by resort to force of arms in order to reverse the policy of their government. Events in France moved more rapidly than in Germany, especially as the dissident military were in a better position to make a bid for open political support. One nevertheless discerns in both countries the same fundamental weakness in the position of the military opposition. In France, as in Germany, the forced transfer and retirement of officers whose loyalty and obedience were in doubt effectively precluded the possibility of a unified resistance. The homogeneity of elite units, whose unquestioning obedience the conspirators had once been able to take for granted, had been greatly diluted by an influx of short-term draftees. Challe nevertheless expected most commanders to accept his orders once he had restored himself to command. He had wanted the uprising to remain a strictly military venture, without the participation of armed civilians. His plan was to confront the government in Paris with a fait accompli, to which it would have no alternative but to accede. That the plan had miscarried was evident after the first few hours. Too many among both officers and troops heeded the direct appeals of de Gaulle over the radio. The spectre of an unavoidable civil war was not relished by the military conspirators, many of whom were still driven by strong feelings of loyalty to a concept of an apolitical army serving the broader national interest. This doomed from the very start any revolt against a strongly entrenched civil government. To be sure, neither Salan and other officers who later jointed the O.A.S. had accepted in advance these restrictions on the scope of the uprising, but just what could have been achieved by acts of terrorism without the support of a large political movement on mainland France is difficult to surmise. The point here is that even if the attempt to force a change in the Algerian command had succeeded, the conspirators would not have been able to carry out, solely in cooperation with the French Algerians and without the support of the mainland, the pacification strategy by 226

The Military Putsch in a Developed Culture which Challe had hoped to achieve a victory. The pursuit of their objectives would have culminated in a major clash with most of the rest of France. The passive acquiescence of the French population would have been every bit as dubious as that of the draftees and loyal officers who helped foil the Algerian uprising. 4.

CONCLUSIONS

Sometimes the view is advanced that the cause of a military coup are proper sociological concerns but that its success or failure are not. Our view is the contrary. It holds that the means available to ensure success in a coup d'état have sociological determinants. An examination of these means in relation to the obstacles to be overcome can clarify what military conspirators have to consider when committing themselves to an armed uprising. That both the German and French coups, hatched by military men of recognized expertise, miscarried is hardly accidental. The failures point rather to a fundamental incapacity of the military, the only group to possess the means of violence necessary for a forcible overthrow of the government, to give their revolt an effective political underpinning. Under conditions of a developed political culture, the predominance of traditionalist orientations probably aggravates any existing civilmilitary conflict but, at the same time, inhibits the coup d'état. Whoever may ultimately emerge as the senior spokesman and nominal head of a putsch, the nucleus of those actively urging the use of military force to overthrow the regime tends to crystallize around younger men, just rising to positions of influence, particularly those whose career experiences have helped school them in the reality of politics. The traditionalists capitulate not so much because of their stake in the dominant order as because of their distaste for politics, as a result of which they tend to lose touch. The social groups behind whose protective shield generals in many European countries once wielded considerable political influence were always in the minority; what power they held at the time of the coup represented only a shadow of their former pre-eminence. One would specifically note that the open resort to violence did not occur while an army was at the height of its power and prestige but only after it had suffered a serious blow to both. Hence the two military putsches can be viewed as acts of political desperation, a last resort after other means of influence had failed. 227

Kurt Lang To the extent that these two putsches are at all typical, they point to certain conditions likely to promote a military coup in countries with a developed political culture and, at the same time, limit the chances of its success: (1) a disruption of the normal channels by which the military exercises its political influence, culminating in a civil-military impasse; (2) a past history of illegal (conspiratorial) activities - provided by organized efforts to circumvent certain restrictions on the armed forces; (3) increasing internal homogeneity in the face of rapid social and political change; and (4) contacts with anti-government groups to provide political support and legitimation. The obstacles with which a military coup has to reckon may be the main reason for its rare occurrence, even where these four conditions seem to favor such action. The precondition for success lies in the conspirators' disposition over a sufficiently large number of disciplined troops. Yet impersonal discipline and responsiveness to duty presuppose a politically neutral military establishment. Therefore the means on which the possible success of a strictly military coup would hinge would contradict the likelihood that the armed forces will develop the kind of common political orientation that is the prerequisite for winning enough officers for such a plan. The officer corps of modern armed forces is usually of too heterogeneous an origin, the division of labor too complex, the number of functions performed by military men too diverse, and technocratic and careerist orientations too prevalent for the development of a unified point of view on the basis of either expertise or tradition without the development of a common political viewpoint. Where such a viewpoint exists, however, it is usually because the military mirrors the consensus and cleavages within the rest of the society. A military coup is hardly necessary when the viewpoint of the military is the dominant one in the society and its leading strata. Where, on the other hand, the military is a faction within a more general anti-government opposition, military force is much less important and military leaders are much less likely to play a predominant role in it. STATE UNIVERSITY OF N E W YORK AT STONE BROOK

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Jerzy J. Wiatr

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND T R A N S F O R M A T I O N S OF CLASS S T R U C T U R E IN P O L A N D

This paper is concerned with a specific case of changes in the social position of professional soldier, which are conditioned simultaneously by three basic factors: 1. historical process of national integration, struggles for independence and the state-building; 2. Socialist transformations in economic and political structure of the country, resulting from the seizure of power by the working class and the process of Socialist revolution; 3. industrialization of the once basically rural society and rapid economic growth during the post-war period. Each of these three factors can be observed in some other societies. However, the peculiar combination of all of them does not seem to appear in many other societies. Even more, the lack of comparable data makes it impossible to undertake any systematic cross-national comparisons between the role of the military in Poland and other countries. This, however, does not preclude a possibility of treating an analysis of the Polish case as a point of departure for future study of the transformations of the military professionalism under Socialism. Whether the Polish case is mostly determined by nation specific historical conditions (or, alternatively, whether it reflects general rules of the Socialist transformations in this domain) has yet to be tested. The early history of military profession in Poland reflects the country's underdevelopment which began to be visible during the XVIIth and early XVTIIth century. When in the majority of other European powers a new trend toward crystallization of the military profession began, Poland - plagued by prolonged wars and political anarchy - witnessed a gradual diminution of her military strengths. At the end of XVIIIth century, when military professionalism became a recognized pattern in 229

Jerzy J. Wiatr

other European armies, the Polish armed forces disappeared along with the independent Polish state, partitioned between Prussia, Russia and Austria in 1772, 1793 and 1795. The same period opened also another chapter in the history of Polish soldier: that of national uprisings, liberation struggles, conspirations and emigrations. The last period before the partitions of Poland - the so-called Stanislas epoch (from the name of the last king, Stanislas August Poniatowski, who ruled between 1764 and 1794) - saw desperate attempts to reform the country, both politically and militarily. In 1765 the 'Knights' School' (called also 'cadet corps') was established in Warsaw, being the first military school in the country's history. Among its graduates one finds those, who like Tadeusz Kosciuszko, Jakub Jasinski, Karol Kniaziewicz became later the best commanders of Polish troops in the Polish-Russian war of 1792, national insurrection of 1794, and, subsequently, during the Napoleonic wars. On the other hand the same epoch witnessed some further signs of stagnation. The 1786 Sejm (Parliament) passed a law which, for the first time, restricted the access to commissioned-officers ranks only to noblemen; the artillery was then a sole exception, where qualifications and experience counted more than social background. On the balance then, it is only fair to say, that the modernization of the army, and the professionalization of its officer corps were never completed before the final collapse of independent Poland. Almost on the next day after the collapse of independent Poland a new chapter in the country's military history was opened: a group of officers, led by Jan D^browski, organized Polish 'legions' fighting in Italy on the French side. The 'legions', deeply influenced both by the French revolutionary atmosphere and by the spirit of national-liberation movements, formed a modern school of the Polish military. New kinds of officers - radical in socio-political orientation and innovative in the art of war - were formed and educated in these units; after 1806 they constituted the bulk of the officer corps of short-living Warsaw Princedom (1806-1813). The tradition of the officer corps from the Napoleon wars was then continued in the professional officership of the Russiancontroled Polish Kingdom created by the Vienna Treaty (1815-1830). The national insurrection of 1830 initiated by a group of ensigns from the officer school in Warsaw and the defeat in the war with Russia which followed ended this chapter in the history of the Polish military. The new defeat did not, however, end the attempts to regain the national independence through armed struggle: it only changed the 230

Military Professionalism in Poland forms of this struggle. Conspiration was substituted for the national army, no longer existing in any part of the partitioned country. Guerilla warfare was praised and practised, long before it became a revolutionary weapon of the XXth century. A new myth was formed: that of a soldier without uniform, fighting against overwhelming power of the regular armies, strong by his own courage and by the support of the nation. Shortly, this period produced an unprofessional stereotyp of the soldier, as well as a militarily oriented stereotyp of a Pole. The armed struggle became a virtue and duty of all patriotically minded Poles, not restricted in any sense to a professional.1 All this took place when the rest of European armies were undergoing the process of transformation leading to the mass (citizens) army with professionalized officer corps. Professionalism of military officers is believed to have originated at the turn of the 18th century. It is true, that even before some officers treated the military service as the sole, or main, source of their revenue. They, however, were not professional specialists (experts) in the military field, and were not supposed to be. With the exception of the mercenaries, aristocrats and noblemen in uniforms performed their military functions in a close connection with their political duties. There were endeavours, and even fairly stable forms, of separating the duties of a politician from the functions of a soldier but nevertheless any citizen could become an army leader, and the concept of expert was for a long time not applicable to military issues. The fall of feudalism and the birth of a bourgeois society in Europe, combined with progress in military art and military technique, created new conditions under which the previously unknown type of officer as expert could emerge.2 The recognition of the status and professional competences of officers was slow and difficult. In France, it were only the Acts of April 14, 1832, and of May 19, 1834 (Sould Acts), which regulated and stabilized from the legal point of view, the 1 This, however, is in a sense a simplification. After the abortive 1863-65 insurrection, a positivistic tendency became strong and outspoken among some parts of the population: it advocated 'realism' as well as the 'organic work* to build the nation's material well-being and cultural achievements, rather than to repeat unsuccessfully 'romantic' struggles for independence. Even then, however, the true spirit of the nation was best expressed by Stefan Zeromski's Dream about Sword, where he says: "Polish poetry alone shall never betray, never defame thou, Soldier. She alone will never be afraid of thy dreams and deeds. . . ." 2 In addition to the usually quoted literature, I should like to mention here an excellent study of these problems by Jules Leverrier, La naissance de l'armée nationale, Paris: 1939. "Jules Leverrier" was a pen-name of late Julian BrunBronowicz, one of the leading Polish Marxists.

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Jerzy J. Wiatr

professional status of officers. In the United States the army fighting against Britain in 1812 was commanded by amateurs, and the situation was not considered extraordinary. Still later, in the middle of the 19th century, Edwin von Manteuffel not without success opposed the system of compulsory examinations for candidates applying for officers' posts in the Prussian army. Finally however, the new profession took its place among the earlier established ones. Professional ethos of the officers became one of the powerful forces shaping the image of the army, and the esprit du corps of the military began to play an essential role both in everyday life and in politics. The concept of military expertness changed the social position of the professional military and contributed to the new traditions of the profession. When Poland regained her national independence in 1918, the new army was built out of heterogeneous elements inherited from three powers, under which the country had to live for more than a century. Officers from Russian, Austrian, and, to a minor extent, German army constituted the bulk of the new officer corps and were particularly numerous among the higher ranks. The fourth element in the army consisted of the officers from the Polish 'legions', formed on the Austrian side during the first world war; the commander of the 'legions', Joseph Pilsudski, became the nation's first Chief of State (provisional) and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The composition of the general-officer corps in December 1922 is presented below: 3 Military career exclusively or mostly in: Rank Marshall of Poland Army-Generals Lieutenant-Generals Major-Generals Totals (a)

Polish legions

Austrian army

1 1 3 7

2 10 33

12

45

Russian army

German army

— —

—

5 32

1 1

37

2

(a) No data available about the military background of one major-general; making the grand total 97. 3

Data calculated from biographical informations about Polish generals published in Mieczyslaw Cieplewicz, "Polish Generals in J. Pilsudski's Opinion", Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny, no. 1 (1966), pp. 316-337.

232

Military Professionalism in Poland This distribution of the general-officer corps calls for few words of interpretation. Before 1914, military career was widely open for Poles in the Austrian army, while in the Russian one it was possible but subject to certain limitations; also the attitude of the Polish public opinion differentiated among the professional military career in the Austrian army and in the Russian one. The first was fully approved (due to a considerable local autonomy and toleration shown by Vienna toward Polish national culture), the latter was not. In the case of the military career in the German army it was both made extremely difficult by the existing national restrictions and disapproved by the Poles. Officers from the three foreign armies represented a type of true professionals, with almost complete lack of political interests and, at least in some cases, strong feelings of alienation from the rest of the nation. The officers from the 'legions' differed from the others in their education (mostly or exclusively a civilian one), political background (most of them actively participated in moderately left-wing parties and groupings), strong feeling of mission (they were former 'conspirators', who inherited the romantic tradition of uprisings, illegal activity etc.). Furthermore, they were strongly united by their particular esprit du corps and their loyalty to Marshall Pilsudski. After the military coup of 1926, a considerable part of the old professionals from the foreign armies was dismissed and the 'legionists' moved to more important positions both in the armed forces and in the civilian administration.4 The social position of the military officer in 1918-1939 Poland resulted from the country's economic backwardness and from the high esteem in which the national army was being kept by the majority of the population. The military officer became a member of the privileged stratum of society not because of his economic position,5 but mostly because of the tradition: he was perceived as the heir of the nation's military tradition, which ultimately led to the national renaissance. In the pre-war social structure of Poland the group of professional officers constituted a separated, elitist stratum. It was composed by 18-19.000 officers on the active list (24.722 in 1921, 17.822 in 1926, 4

The extent to which the military officers penetrated the civilian administration after the 1926 coup d'état has been well documented by P. Stawecki, "Military Dominance in the Civil State Apparatus, 1926-1939", Wojskowy Przeglad Historyczny, no. 3 (1965). 5 Economically however, the officer, as well as other state functionaries was much better-of than the rest of the working population. This was partly due to the fact that the economic crisis did not touch those who were employed in the high and medium levels of state apparatus, while it impoverished the rest of the people.

233

Jerzy J. Wiatr 18.376 in 1937/38) 6 and a number of officers delegated to the civil administration. They were considered the members of higher stratum of the intelligentsia in spite of their moderate level of general education: in 1931 only 688 officers on the active list were graduates of military colleges.7 The elitist character of the officer corps was strengthened by provisions regulating the selection of spouses: the officer was not supposed to marry a woman of a lower status and President's Order No. 20 (March 18th, 1937) stated that he might be dismissed from the service for disobeying this regulation. When, after the Second World War, Poland entered the path of Socialist transformations, both the general class structure and the position of the military were deeply changed. Equality became a goal of the social transformations. "Modern Poland's system of institutions Szczepanski writes - is egalitarian. There are no class based institutions, i.e., no institutions acting as barriers between classes and strata or preserving class privileges. They are founded on the principle of uniformly satisfying the needs of all citizens and they regulate the behaviour and activity of all so that they may devote maximum energy to the basic aims of the state: economic growth and the strengthening of the political system." 8 This change in the class structure is reflected in the distribution of the national income which became much more egalitarian, than ever before. While he ratio of the real earnings of nonmanual workers to those of the manual workers in 1937 was 2.2:1, it declined by 1960 to 1.1:1, respectively. The officers were subject to the same trend of changes: the study of family budgets in the military community conducted in 1964 showed that the average income did not exceed that of lower officials or semiskilled and skilled workers, while it was considerably lower than the income of better educated and higher placed groups of the intelligentsia, and even lower than the income of very highly skilled workers.9 Egalitarianism of the officer corps is reinforced by the pattern of spouse selection. Not only the pre-war status-based restrictions have been abolished, but officers were (especially in early 'fifties) encouraged 6

Janusz Zarnowski, Struktura spoleczna inteligencji w latach 1918-1939 [Social Structure of Intelligentsia in Poland, 1918-1939] (Warsaw, 1964), p. 266. 7 Ibid., p. 267. 8 Jan Szczepanski, "Some Characteristics of Contemporary Polish Society", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 2 / 1 0 (1964), p. 10. 9 The study has been conducted by Eugeniusz Stefaniak; results were published in Z badan nad zawodem oficera [Studies on the Military Profession], edited by Jerzy J. Wiatr (Wroclaw-Warszawa-Krak6w, 1966), pp. 91-92; in print.

234

Military Professionalism in Poland to marry within the workers and poor peasants classes; after 1956 official restrictions to this effect were abolished and the officer's family started to be more heterogeneous socially. Nevertheless, the majority of officers' wifes come from the peasant and worker strata.10 Furthermore, this egalitarianism results from the mass upward social mobility in and through the army which characterized the post war decades. The military profession, which ever before had been perceived as an elitist one, became one of those in which the social advancement of workers and peasant was the strongest. The majority of commissioned officers of the Polish Armed Forces comes from workers' or peasants' families. In 1963 for example 48.6% of them were the sons of workers, 33.3% - sons of peasants, 11.3% - sons of white collar workers ('intelligentsia'), 5.2% - sons of craftsmen, and only 1.6% - people with other social background.11 This corresponded closely with the general pattern of social transformations in the country. The changes in political and economic relations, rapid economic growth, and to some extent heavy losses in the ranks of Polish intelligentsia during the war made it imperative to promote various forms of social advancement of the lower classes. Both the educational system and the system of promotions worked in the direction of allowing workers and peasants to occupy higher positions in the social structure. "Characteristic for that period (1950-1960) were the high share in the national income of accumulation and capital investment as well as the important role of the productive utilisation of the excess of capacity of labour force, particularly of disguised unemployment in agriculture, in the commencement of the process of growth. The latter phenomenon was synonymous with the stormy upsurge of the vertical social mobility, particularly of the lower social strata." 12 The same author commented also on "the weakening of advancement resulting from the interaction of vertical mobility of individuals and groups." 13 In respect to the civilian clerical workers this phenomenon 10

Three monographical studies of the family life of the professional officer show that the by-effect of this phenomenon is a discrepancy between the husband's education and cultural level and that of the wife, as well as serious complications in the family life resulting from this discrepancy. Cf. Wiatr (ed.), op. cit., pp. 92, 115-122. 11 Wojciech Jaruzelski, "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie", XX lat Polski Ludowej [Twenty Years of People's Poland] (Warszawa, 1964), p. 205. 12 Michal Pohoski, "Interrelation Between Social Mobility of Individuals and Groups in the Process of Economic Growth in Poland", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 2 / 1 0 (1964), p. 33. 13 Ibid., p. 33.

235

Jerzy J. Wiatr has been documented by Krystyna Lutynska.14 A study conducted by Budny in a military unit did not show a similiar phenomenon among the officers - at least not to the same extent. However, officers with the medium longevity of military service (7-12 years), belonging mostly to those who rapidly advanced to the officer corps from factories and farms, show lower satisfaction with the profession and attribute to it lower prestige than do both the older officers with the war-time military background and the youngest generation of officers, graduates from the military academies and colleges.15 This phenomenon can be best explained in terms of a relative decrease of the attractiveness of the individual upward social mobility when taking place within the mass process of reshaping the social structure. The position of the officer (and to a higher extent the position of clerical workers) was lowered in the process of expansion of the national economy, when other - industrial - professions became the most popular. Even more, the easy access to these professions made them less prestigious and, therefore, less attractive to get the post of a military officer or civilian functionary. The above mentioned diminution of the economic privileges worked in the same direction. All this produced a relatively low feeling of personal achievement. On the other hand, however, it contributes also to the lack of elitist tendencies among the military officers (as well as among the civilian administrators). Junior officer's perception of his own social position puts him close to skilled or white collar workers. The senior officer, on the other hand, usually sees his own position as close to that of professionals and other intelligentsia groups. The disappearance of the elitist position of the military is reflected also in the changes which take place in social consciousness. The way in which the population perceives the social 'hierarchy' is, in a sense, an indicator of the actual relations between the social strata. Obviously, we would not identify the subjective perception of social structure with the social structure itself, but we can interpret the perception of class relations and social stratification as reflection of objective changes in this field. In this sense, Polish researches on public opinion concerning social stratification and mobility,16 appreciation of various professions and 14 Krystyna Lutynska, "Office Workers' Views on their Social Position", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 1/9 (1964). 15 Teodor Roman Budny, "Z badan nad pozycja spoleczna zawodu wojskowego" [From the Studies on the Social Position of the Professional Military], Wiatr (ed.), op. cit. 18 Cf. Adam Sarapata and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "The Evaluation of Oc-

236

Military Professionalism in Poland attitudes towards differentiation of earnings,17 attractiveness of various professions 18 show clearly the extent and the direction of changes in the evaluation of the social position of professional soldiers. This is how the trends of these changes are described by one of Poland's leading students of social stratification: In three synthetic hierarchies, which together were supposed to show the position of military officer in our society - that of prestige, just payment and attractiveness - the military profession, or to put it more precisely, the profession of professional officer in the rank of captain, occupies medium and slightly higher than medium place. The military profession belongs to the category of controversial professions; the most favorable opinions concerning this profession come from the rural population and from unskilled workers, the less favorable ones from some groups of intelligentsia.19 The author - as well as almost all Polish scholars dealing with this problem - attributes the changes in the social position of the military, and especially a decrease in his social prestige, attractiveness of his profession etc., to the consequences of socialist transformations in the class structure, broad upward mobility and economic growth, which weakens the traditional basis of the once elitist position of the military. However, this change does not undermine the emotional attachments of the population to the national army and to military traditions. Public opinion surveys conducted in 1961 and 1965 20 clearly showed very high evaluation of the military traditions (especially traditions of the World War II, and generally all traditions of the anti-German struggles for national independence), strong attachment to the army and national defense, favorable stereotypes of the contemporary Polish army and its officer corps etc. The results of these polls in a sense falsify the hypothesis, that the decrease in the social prestige and attractiveness of the military profession reflects a basic crisis in public opinion's attitudes toward the army and military efforts. With this hypothesis falsified, we cupations by Warsaw Inhabitants", The American Journal of Sociology, vol. LXVI, 6 (May 1961). 17 Adam Sarapata, "Iustum Pretium", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 1/7 (1963). 18 Tadeusz Gesek, "Zaw6d oficera w oczech mlodziezy" (The Occupation of the Officer in the Eyes of the Youth), Studia Socjologiczne, No. 1/4 (1962). 19 Adam Sarapata, "Pozycja wojskowego we w sp61czesnych spoleczenstwie polskim" [The Miliary's Position in Contemporary Polish Society], Wiatr, Z badan nad zawodem oficera, op. cit., p. 34. 20 Till now only the results of the first survey have been published. Cf. T. Gesek, S. Szostkiewicz, J. Wiatr, "Z badan opinii spoleczenstwa o wojsku" [From the Study on Public Opinion on the Army], Studia Socjologiczno-Polityczne, No. 13 (1962). (With Russian and English summaries.)

237

Jerzy J. Wiatr propose interpretation of the existing data: the army and the professional military are accepted and positively evaluated as parts of an egalitarian society, judged on the basis of their merits and achievements and rationally compared with other institutions, as well as social groups of the society. Since egalitarianism of the Polish society is hardly absolute, there exist still differences between the social position of the professional officer and other, especially less educated strata (as they exist generally between the social position of various strata of the society), but their objective character, as well as their perception by the people, show the extent to which Polish society has been transformed under the impact of Socialism. This change in the social position of the military has important consequences in political life. One of the factors disfunctionally affecting civil-military relations in many societies is the social isolation and elitist position of the military. With their disappearance, the prospects for the harmonious functioning of the relations between civilian power and the military are much better. Moreover, in the Socialist societies the integration of military forces with the whole life of a nation is strengthened by the politicization of the professional soldier, who no longer is treated as an expert only, but acts also as a member of the Communist Party and through the Party participates in the political decision-making not as a soldier but as a politically active citizen.21 Moreover, it should be kept in mind that in the Socialist armies there existed two basic periods. In the first, which lasted several, and in some cases even over a dozen of years, the army was headed on the one hand by politicians, revolutionaries who had been assigned military tasks, and on the other by military professionals from the old army, who were used mostly (and sometimes only) as experts. In Poland for example in 1949 18% of all military officers consisted of pre-war professionals; another 8% came from the non-Communist war-time Resistance. In this period several leading politicians served on key posts in the army, forming a pattern of interchange between the civilian apparatus and the military one. In the second period, when the new political and social system is sufficiently stabilized, the whole corps of officers consists of professional soldiers, who, however, are treated not only as experts in purely military matters, but also as politicians. The political training of professional soldiers, » Members of the Polish United Workers' Party constitute almost 100% of the top military commanders, 72.7% of all officers, 36.8% of all professional N.C.O.'s and 28.6% of all students in the officer schools (figures for 1963). Source: W. Jaruzelski, op. cit., p. 205.

238

Military Professionalism in Poland marked by the dominant role of the socialist ideology, emphasizes the integration of the army with the society and the subordination of the military to the civilian authorities. The Communist Party as the leader of such a society constitutes also a forum for the participation of the military in public life. Thus the rejection of the concept of an army man as an apolitical expert only becomes, in Poland as in the other Socialist countries, one of the elements of integration of the army with society and of strengthening of the prestige of the civil state authorities. It is also an additional factor working for liquidation of the military isolationism or elitarism and determining the new position of the professional soldier in the new society. POLISH A C A D E M Y

OF SCIENCES,

WARSAW

239

Raymond L. Garthoff

THE M I L I T A R Y I N R U S S I A , 1861-1965

Russian society over the past century has mirrored both change and continuity. The pattern of change and continuity has been the product of two complexes of determining factors: those common to the Imperial and Soviet eras, and others specifically distinguished by the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution. It seems warranted and useful, even though in oversimplification, to identify the former on the whole with basically economic factors - above all industrialization, with the many attendant social effects of urbanization. Similarly, the latter are most directly the political factors, though of course the origins of the Revolution reflected the weakening of the social underpinnings of the political structure, and the consequences of the revolution were manifested in all aspects of life and society. In other words, the degree and direction of change in Russian society would have proceeded very much along certain of the lines which it has followed whether or not the revolution had occurred, while certain other lines have been given peculiar direction or impetus in consequence of the historical turns of Russian political developments. The evolution of the military as a social group, and as a political force, in Russian society markedly reflects both the elements of historical continuity, and those of disruption. The present period prompts comparison with the late nineteenth century in Russia. Now, as then, a technological revolution is deeply affecting military affairs, and in turn the professional military man. Now, as then, a new type of professional officer is coming into being. And now, as then, a new military caste is being born in Russia. But the differences, too, are significant. Then, military professionalization meant a contribution to the breakdown of a traditional, established social and 240

The Military in Russia,

1861-1965

political order; now, increasing military professionalism is part of a broad build-up of a new society. Now, as then, the military is largely apolitical - but for different reasons, against a different political trend in other classes of society, and with possibly different consequences. The half century preceding World War I was marked by important changes in the composition both of the Russian officer corps and of the enlisted ranks. The Crimean War, and later the Russian-Turkish War and Russian-Japanese War, exposed severe shortcomings in the preparation of the personnel of the Russian Army, as well as in its system of supply and the level of weaponry. From 1861 to 1881, War Minister Dmitri Milyutin (brother of the great reformer Nikolai Milyutin) instituted a series of reforms that were of great significance for the Army in its subsequent social evolution.1 In 1861, the term of service of the enlisted man was reduced from twentyfive to sixteen years. It was followed in 1874 by an unbonding of these virtual serf-soldiers, and compulsory universal military service was introduced. The term of active duty was again reduced, to a period varying from a half year for the university-educated to six years for those without complete primary education. In the 1860's and 1870's the soldiers' training was broadened so that many who had not had sufficient schooling could learn to read and write. Generous exemptions were granted (essentially on economic grounds) for 'only sons' and other breadwinners. Finally, conditions of service and discipline became less harsh, and corporal punishment was abolished. Equality of all classes before the law was established. Equally great changes were made in the system of selecting and preparing officers. From the 1860's on, officers had to have experience as regimental commanders before coming eligible for general's rank. In the mid-1860's, Milyutin converted most of the military schools into gymnasia, and established certain higher junker schools for technical specialties. After Milyutin's departure, in the 1880's, caste distinctions in the officer corps were revived, with encouragement from the government. Officers were exempt from the laws prohibiting duels. The military gymnasia were changed into 'Cadet Corps' schools. And the 1885 1 The most complete account of these reforms, though not objective in its interpretation, is P. A. Zaionchkovsky, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii [The Military Reforms of the 1860's and 1870's in Russia] (Moscow, Moscow University Press, 1952), which includes a useful bibliographic essay. For a good brief account in English, see Alexander Kornilov, Modern Russian History (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), pp. 157-162.

241

Raymond L. Garthoff Manifesto creating the Bank of the Nobility expressed the wish that "the Russian nobles preserve a dominant place in the military leadership".2 However, the basic line of development of the new officer corps was not affected. From 1861 to 1914, the officer corps developed from what had been a segment of the nobility who served part-time, to a group of professionally and technically qualified men drawn from all classes. This trend was a reflection of the general social change taking place as a byproduct of growing industrialization, urbanization, educational progress, and other developments. But it was also a response to the definite needs of a modern army. As war and armaments became more technologically advanced, it was necessary to have officers with corresponding technical qualifications. In the war years 1812-13, some 14 per cent of the military budget had been spent on military ordnance and technology; in 1904-05, this share had risen to 25 per cent; and in 1914-15, it jumped to 60 per cent. (The increase was also notable in absolute terms - from 80 million gold rubles in 1812-13 to 12 billion gold rubles in 1914-15.) 3 Measures taken to overcome the technical backwardness revealed in the wars affected some branches more than others - the navy, engineers, and artillery more than the infantry and cavalry. But it pervaded all to some degree. The rise of technically qualified officers, regardless of their birth, was opposed by many traditionalist line officers, but necessarily it continued. Especially in the navy, the line officer corps preserved an aristocratic character by reluctantly admitting the growth of a separate corps of naval engineers and technical officers, most of whom were not from the nobility. The men of this corps, products of special naval engineering and shipbuilding schools, were for a long time denied naval ranks (i.e., they became colonels or generals of the navy, rather than captains and admirals), and when they were finally given epaulettes, the shoulder boards were narrower. Differentiation in rank remains today in the Soviet Navy, though it was long ago discarded by such other modern navies as once used it. What about the non-technical officer corps? The Guards, navy officers of the line, and much of the cavalry maintained with determination their aristocratic character and composition. Indeed, even noble birth was insufficient, since the expected standard of living required much heavier expenditure than was provided by the salary. The 2

Cited in Kornilov, op. cit., p. 262. Col. (now Major General) A. Lagovsky, Strategiya i ekonomika and Economics] (Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1957), p. 9. 3

242

[Strategy

The Military in Russia,

1861-1965

Guards officers were drawn from certain select preparatory Cadet Corps schools which, by tradition, were restricted to the nobility and associated with specific Guards regiments. Even there, only about 60 per cent of the Guards officers were of the hereditary nobility; another 28 per cent were sons of 'personal nobles' - that is, individuals granted nonhereditary status in the nobility; all officers were automatically granted such status.4 Not until 1913 were all schools opened to all qualified applicants. In the army as a whole, in contrast to the Guards, change occurred more rapidly. In a typical military school in Moscow during the late 1860's, 81 per cent of the men were of the hereditary nobility, and 9 per cent were sons of personal nobles; in the late 1870's, some 43 per cent were of the nobility, 33 per cent were sons of personal nobles, 13 per cent were of bourgeois origin, and 11 per cent were from the clergy. By the late 1880's, only 12 per cent were nobles, 57 per cent were personal nobles, 16 per cent were from the bourgeoisie, and 5 per cent were from the peasantry. Finally, by the beginning of World War I, 9 per cent were nobles, only 30 per cent were personal nobles, 28 per cent were bourgeoisie, and 19 per cent were peasants.5 In fact, by 1912 even in the Academy of the General Staff only 48 per cent were hereditary nobles.6 General Alekseyev, last Commander in Chief under the Czar and later a leader in the anti-Bolshevik White Armies, was not born of the nobility. General Denikin, Alekseyev's successor as Commander in Chief of the White Army, was the grandson of a serf. Both were graduates of ordinary junker military schools open to all. The officer corps of the Russian Army continued to be composed of 'nobles' only because, as noted earlier, Russian law provided that on reaching officer status any man automatically acquired 'personal' nobility. And those reaching the rank of colonel were granted 'hereditary' nobility. We are accustomed to thinking of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the era of the decline of old pre-Napoleonic professional armies, and the rise of mass citizen armies. But this is only one aspect of a complex phenomenon. While in one sense the illiterate Russian soldier of 1860 who was handed over by his master for twenty-five years' service was unquestionably 'professional', the soldier of a few decades later was more in tune with the professional requirements of 4

Nikolaus Basseches, The Unknown Army (New York, Viking, 1943), p. 59. Colonel Sventsitsky, cited by Dimitri D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton, New Jersey, 1944), pp. 43-44. 6 General A. I. Denikin, Staraya armiya [The Old Army] (Paris, 1929), p. 59.

5

243

Raymond L. Garthojf contemporary warfare. In the officer corps this was even more true. It was not so many decades earlier that military service had been a parttime duty levied on all nobles in Russia. In the early and middle nineteenth century, many of the aristocracy served only a few years of active duty and then retired to full-time social life. The average length of duty for officers rose from ten years under Nicholas I to eighteen years by the first decade of the 1900's. In the long run, the professionalization of the officer corps occurring in the period 1861 to 1914 would have created a new, vertical stratum of society. Initially, however, the once homogenous aristocratic military caste disintegrated into a heterogenous compound. Moreover, the emerging group tended to become increasingly isolated from the lateral strata of civil society. Nationality, too, was a complicating factor. During much of the nineteenth century, a 'see-saw' controversy existed over discipline and military doctrine, involving the ethnic Great Russians versus the BalticGerman nobility. The 1885 Manifesto, earlier cited, favored the preservation of 'a dominant place in the military leadership' by 'the Russian nobles'. But the regular army had come to include a large number of officers and generals from the various nationalities of Russia (including the Baltic Germans); in contrast, the Guards schools and units at the turn of the century had about 90 per cent Russian officers (the balance being chiefly Baltic Germans and from princely Georgian families).7 Before the Revolution, most officers were staunchly conservative, and, of course, loyal, but essentially apolitical. The echoes of the Decembrists were faint by the latter part of the nineteenth century, for no longer were the intelligentsia and officer class intimate - another effect of the growing isolation of the military class from the rest of society. True, the social mores and traditions of service to the Czar were reinforced by conceptions of military discipline that inhibited active political interest. Moreover, the training of the officer, though by no means inferior, was simply not a liberal education. While the social composition of the officer corps became more varied, the regular officers continued to be drawn from the military school systems, which remained apart from the ardently political and frequently radical universities. The apolitical stance of the officer corps was reflected in the fact that, after the proclamation of the Provisional Government, there were no attempts at a royalist counterrevolution. The Kornilov affair, the sole apparent exception, was inspired more by a combination of a mis7

Basseches, op. cit., p. 59.

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The Military in Russia, 1861-1965 understanding and a fear of the rise of Bolshevism; it was not the spearhead of a monarchist movement.8 Former Imperial Army and Guards officers have frankly acknowledged their political ignorance prior to the revolution, which reflected simple lack of interest in political affairs. In the crisis of 1905, many officers proved politically unsure, and in the face of widespread passive opposition in the army to dispelling the rebels, the Guards proved the regime's most reliable support. To correct the political immaturity of officers, courses in political science and current political events were instituted in the military schools in 1907.9 Three years later, however, these courses were abandoned, as they proved more provocative than palliative. During World War I, the officer corps underwent further rapid change. The heavy losses of the first year, especially among the Guards, seriously diluted both the officer corps and the regular troops. The 50,000 regular officers, plus 35,000 reservists who were added upon mobilization in 1914, totalled less than the number of officer casualties in 1914-1916 alone!10 While, of course, the casualties included many of the new wartime officers, the depletion of the regular pre-war cadre officer corps was tremendous. It was necessary, therefore, to commission several hundred thousand new officers during the war - generally men with very little military training except, in some cases, for noncommissioned service.11 By 1917, the officer corps was of a very different nature from what it had been in 1914. The new officers were drawn from the largely peasant non-commissioned officer staff, and from the young intelligentsia; both groups, for varying reasons, had been imbued with patriotism in the 8

In the late summer of 1917, differences arose between Prime Minister Alexander F. Kerensky of the Provisional Government and General L. G. Kornilov, Commander in Chief of the Army, over means of enforcing discipline in the army and the leftward trend of the Petrograd Soviet. In September, General Kornilov ordered an army unit to march on Petrograd, disperse the Soviet, and, if necessary, depose Kerensky, too. Kornilov, however, did not attempt to restore the monarchy. The unit he sent refused to fire on other troops loyal to the Provisional Government; its commander, General Krymov, committed suicide, and General Kornilov was arrested. 9 For some background to this measure, see Denikin, op. cit., pp. 147-148. 10 General N. Golovin, Voennye usiliya Rossii v mirovoi voine [The Russian Military Effort in the World War] (Paris, 1939), Vol. I, p. 160, provides the figures for casualties - totalling 92,500 by the end of 1916 (including 15,000 held prisoner by the enemy). The estimates of officer active duty and reservist strengths in 1914 are based on the careful study of Col. N. Piatnitsky, Krasnaya armiya SSSR [The Red Army of the USSR] (Paris, 1932), Vol. 2, p. 14. 11 Piatnitsky, op. cit., p. 14.

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Raymond L. Garthoff early years of the war, but by 1917 and 1918 they were not inclined to continue the war. The 'Guards Regiments', which defected to the Revolution in 1917, were not the authentic Guards Regiments, whose remnants were at the front; they were the regimental training battalions in the capital, which by 1917 had little chance for selection or training of personnel in accord with traditional standards. The Imperial Russian officer corps underwent substantial changes of social composition and attitude during the fifty years preceding World War I. Like Russian society as a whole, it was adjusting to the changed economic conditions of the country and of the world. Political evolution, however, while moving reluctantly in the same direction, had failed to keep pace with the times. The Bolshevik Revolution violently ruptured the trend of development of the officer corps. During the Civil War, between 50,000 and 100,000 officers of the old army were taken into the new Red Army (while some 200,000 entered the White Armies). 12 Perhaps as important, more than 10,000 civil servants of the Ministry of War were absorbed, as were the major part of the General Staff and military academies of the old army. 13 By August, 1920, over 48,000 former officers of the Imperial Army had been taken into the Red Army 14 - though, of course, many of these were wartime promoted officers. At the end of the Civil War, in 1921, however, a large number of these officers were dismissed.15 Even more important than the numbers was their influence. A number of former career General Staff colonels and lieutenant colonels exerted considerable influence - men like S. S. Kamenev, Vatsetis, Shaposhnikov, Kork, Uborevich, Primakov, and Lebedev. The professional officers - some representing the new pre-war technical experts, others the career military drawn from the nobility - played a very important role, though they were not as politically influential as the new breed of military chiefs who arose from the Bolshevik Party (Frunze, Podvoisky, Voroshilov) and from the very process of the revolution itself (Budenny, 12 The official Soviet figures show a total of 314,180 former officers, noncommissioned officers, and rated medical personnel from the pre-revolutionary army had entered the Red Army by August, 1920; in Grazhdanskaya voina [The Civil War], edited by A. S. Bubnov, et al. (Moscow, 1928), Vol. II, p. 95. The estimate for the White Armies is from Erich Wollenberg, The Red Army (London, Seeker and Warburg, 1938), p. 73. 13 Ibid., p. 95. The exact figure is 10,339. 14 Ibid., p. 95. This figure (48,409) is line commissioned officers only. 15 Ibid., pp. 97-98. During 1921, 37,954 officers were dismissed, including 14,390 who had been officers in the White Armies at one time.

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Blucher). These revolutionaries and guerrilla fighters often were more hostile to the specialists on military science and on modern weapons than the old line officers had been thirty years earlier. Thus, for a decade or more following the Civil War, a conflict raged between the 'proletarians' and the 'military specialists'. Beginning about 1931, the professionalization of the army was renewed in earnest. The old officers continued to dominate military thinking, even though by this time they were only a small minority of the total officer strength.16 In 1929, a survey of military writers showed that over 80 per cent were former Imperial Army officers, over onethird of them former colonels or generals. And of the hundred authors of the 1929 Field Regulations, seventy-nine had been officers in the old army.17 The turning point came in 1931, when Mikhail Tukhachevsky nobleman, ex-lieutenant of the Guards, future Marshal of the Red Army — rose to de facto control of the army. The Red Army moved toward modernization, and the officer corps toward a distinctive place in Soviet society. From the Revolution on, the Bolshevik Party felt hard pressed to ensure the control and assimilation of the new officers. As late as 1924, only 32 per cent of the officers were affiliated with the Communist Party; by 1928, an estimated 65 per cent were members.18 But in 1928, still only 32 per cent of the influential category of military writers were Party members.19 Moreover, although Party membership increased, the data on social (class) origins show that the Red Army continued to depend on 'alien' elements. In 1923, the officer corps was composed of 13.6 per cent workers, 52.7 per cent peasants, and 33.7 per cent 'others' By 1927, the comparable figures were 22.4 per cent workers, 56 per cent peasants, and only 21.6 per cent others. As late as 1926, 'higher officers' (generals) were 7.3 per cent workers, 31.2 per cent peasants, and the remaining 61.5 per cent 'others'. Similarly, 'senior officers' (colonels) were 44.7 per cent from the other classes, and even 'middle 16

Piatnitsky, op. cit., p. 116, states that the percentage of former Imperial officers declined from 76 per cent in 1918 to 10 per cent in 1930. N. Yefimov, Grazhdanskaya voina, Vol. II (1928), p. 106, notes that officers with prerevolutionary military education declined from 30 per cent in 1928 to 15 per cent in 1926. 17 S. Nikitin-Zubrovsky, Voina i revoliutsiya [War and Revolution], Moscow, No. 9 (September, 1929), pp. 111-114. 18 N. Yefimov, Grazhdankaya voina, Vol. II (1928), p. 108, cites official 1924 figure; Wollenberg, op. cit., pp. 72-73, gives the later one. 19 Nikitin-Zubrovsky, op. cit., p. 101.

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Raymond L. Garthoff rank officers' (lieutenant colonels and majors) were 20.6 per cent in this category. 20 The same picture was to be found in the technically specialized arms. In the Zhukovsky Air Academy in 1922, only 40 per cent were 'workers and peasants' and 35 per cent Party members; and in 1927, while over 77 per cent were by then Party members, still only 50 per cent were 'workers and peasants'. 2 1 The Soviet regime does not rely only upon increased Party membership among the officers to provide Party control. 'Military commissars' had been introduced in 1918 to control the 'military specialists', as former Imperial Army officers were termed, and the institution of political officers in the armed forces has remained ever since. A stabilization of the new officer corps came about during Marshal Tukhachevsky's ascendancy, from 1931 to 1937. Again, as in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the driving motive was the establishment of a professional group comprising specialists in the military art and in military technology. But this generated certain social aspects that were not in keeping with the official ideology. The new officer class wanted a return of traditional and hierarchical personal ranks, insignia, and privileges, and the opportunity to give these same advantages to their sons. Beginning with the mid-1930's, some of these demands were met. In 1935, ranks were restored, except for general officer grades, which were not given until 1940; moreover, the creation of the rank of marshal was an 'imperial' addition that had not even been found in the prerevolutionary army. New salary scales not only favored the military, but also reflected the growing gap between officers and enlisted men, and between junior and senior officers. Hundreds of special stores, theaters, and clubs were established for military officers and their families. The emerging new caste of officers was given lessons in French, in polo, in dancing, and in the social graces. Many of the newly 'cultured' Civil War heroes divorced their too-proletarian wives and married young ladies with more appropriate social savoir-faire. It again became necessary, as before the Revolution, for junior officers to have their commanding officers' approval before they could marry. Count Ignatyev, the Imperial Army Attaché in Paris before the Revolution, returned to the Soviet Union in the 1930's and became a consultant on precisely such matters of cultural forms. Thus in respect All data above are taken f r o m the official reports cited in Grazhdanskaya voina, Vol. II (1928), pp. 105-109. 21 These figures were compiled by the author f r o m official data given in the Soviet Air F o r c e Journal Vestnik vozdushnogo flota [Herald of the Air Fleet] during the 1920's. 20

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to custom and deportment, as well as in military art and tactics, 'specialists' from the old regime were found indispensable. As a new military tradition - and caste - was evolving, the political development of Stalin's dictatorship burst into the Great Purge. The purges wiped almost clean the slate of senior officers in the Red Army. Three of the five marshals, 13 of the 15 Army Commanders, 57 of the 85 Corps Commanders, and 110 of the 195 Division Commanders were purged.22 Up to half of the members of the officer corps were adversely affected. Nonetheless, even this severe jolt to the new military caste in the long run contributed to the emergence of a more homogenous group. Those hardest hit by the Purge were the Old Bolsheviks who took to military affairs in the Civil War, and the former Imperial officers. In this sense, the Purge was instrumental in the advancement of the new officers. Indeed, the rapidity with which some individuals rose was astonishing: for example, Rychagov, a senior lieutenant in 1937, had become a lieutenant general three years later, and by 1941, at the age of 35, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces (for a few months tenure). The proportion of Party members continued to grow, though irregularly, as the purges hit Party members heavily, and led to increase in numbers of non-Party officers both in 1934 and in 1937-38. Similarly, in the armed forces as a whole, Party membership in 1939 was what it had been in 1931, about fifty per cent, some ten per cent below its high point in 1933.23 During this period before the war, the army finally became entirely a regular army, and the last of the territorial troops were integrated by 1939.24 Many of the new officers had become competent specialists in the mechanized and technical arms - the air forces, armored forces, and others. A professional military leadership was being developed to meet the new military technology. World War II, like the Purge, decimated the ranks of the pre-war professional officer class - but also contributed to raising its standing. 22

See Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe, 111., The Free Press, 1953), p. 220. 28 Piatnitsky, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 21, gives the 1931 and 1933 figures (and other data showing the rise during the 1920's and early 1930's). The 1939 figure was given by Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov at the 18th Party Congress, Rech' na XVIII s'yezde VKP(b) [Speech to the 18th Congress of the CPSU(B)] (Moscow, 1939), p. 12. Other official figures for the years 1933, 1934, and 1935 are given by Voroshilov, Stati i rechi [Articles and Speeches] (Moscow, 1963), pp. 574, 611, et passim. 24 Voroshilov, Rech' na XVIII s'yezde VK(b), p. 32.

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Raymond L. Garthoff Under the impact of the preliminary campaigns in Poland and Finland, generals' ranks were restored, and firm discipline was established in 1940. Saluting was now required, including even that of noncommissioned officers by privates. The political officer (military commissar) had been again raised to a coequal position in 1937, but after 1940 (except for a year in 1941-42) he was again subordinate to the commanding officer. In 1942 the pogony, the once-hated golden epaulettes, returned to adorn the new military elite. Guards units were formed, and given extra pay and privileges. Finally, the officers were granted the opportunity to cultivate a 'hereditary' line, by sending their sons to new exclusive cadet schools, established in 1943. These schools, like the new Orders for valor and achievement, were named for distinguished Imperial military heroes — the Suvorov and Nakhimov (naval) schools. Young boys were accepted at the ages of eight or nine (now at eleven), so that they grow up in an atmosphere of military caste. The Soviet officer today is the only military representative of a modern world power to sport epaulettes and velvet lapels, leather boots and a dress dirk at his side. Marshals (several grades), generals, field grade officers, and junior officers are rigidly separated categories, with segregated messes and recreational facilities. A field grade officer and a company grade officer are not social equals. Personal orderlies are assigned to field grade, as well as to general, officers. A strong sense of social solidarity has come to pervade the military. In present-day Russia, to an extent greater than in any other major power, garrison life still exists. It, too, accentuates the solidarity among fellow officers. Caste intermarriage and inbreeding is not uncommon, though available statistical data are insufficient to reach a firm conclusion or comparison with other armies. It is clear from accounts of career Soviet officers that the regular professional officers and their families tend to be drawn to one another. After the early 1930's, they usually draw a line short of association with the political officers - and almost always avoid the secret police counterintelligence officers in the armed forces. Opportunities to observe and talk with Soviet officers make it clear that they - and their wives - are quite content with their security and high standard of living (relative to the rest of the population). Young officers - and to a lesser extent even enlisted men - show less of the skeptical criticism of the regime so widespread among students. The pride of young air force lieutenants in their sharp uniforms, the superior air of smartly elegant colonels at Sochi, the deference shown a general 250

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entering a Moscow hotel - all, though not unique, are signs of the pronounced caste complexion of the Soviet Army.25 How does the emergence of a privileged military caste affect the social structure at large? The military tend to associate with their fellow officers more than do the other privileged groups - artists, writers, scientists, and managers. But while there may be more contact among some other groups, all Soviet society seems to be moving toward increased class stratification. The evolution of a separate military caste within the privileged social stratum does not, therefore, contradict the broader trend. The recent development of a military caste is thus different in its import from the growth of a new military class in the late nineteenth century, for then it was at the cost of contributing to the disintegration of long-established, rigidly stratified classes based on birth. However, the new trend does widen the gulf between officers and enlisted men, which provokes some resentment from the latter. Thus, since about 1931, a new traditionalism and a new military caste have grown, in many ways reminiscent of the military institution as it was developing from 1861 to 1914. But while in many ways present-day social status has much in common with the older period, owing both to circumstances and to conscious efforts to revive past tradition, the political effect of this sociological phenomenon is quite different. As it developed into a distinct social stratum, the military could not fail to become, to some degree, a political entity. As an institution, it could not fail to be affected by the shifting political weight of other institutions. And particularly in the early post-Stalin period, important changes in the political balance of Soviet institutions greatly altered and increased the potential political role of the military. The death of Stalin was a key development. All other Soviet institutions automatically became more important as the institution of the allpowerful autocrat disappeared. In the ensuing political readjustment, first the secret police and later the governmental and managerial bureaucracies were weakened. While the Communist Party machine gained most in political power, the military - almost by default - also rose in stature. As a consequence of the unavoidable involvement of the military in issues weighted with strategic decisions, but also contested between 25

These illustrations and comments are based primarily on the author's experience in meeting and talking with Soviet officers while traveling in the USSR in 1957, 1959 and 1963.

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Raymond L. Garthoff factions of Party rivals, the senior military chiefs came to play a significant political role. There is no evidence that the military have been driven by political ambition. Rather, the nature of the issues forced their political involvement. Marshal Zhukov was removed after he became a political figure and sought to pursue certain policies. Although some of these policies directly concerned the role of the professional military, Zhukov's fall from power did not remove the military from their institutional involvement or basically reduce their status. It did, however, mark an abrupt decline in active representation of the military in national policymaking. The actual locus of decision-making power in the U.S.S.R. is the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Communist Party. Apart from Marshal Zhukov's brief tenure as a candidate member of the Politburo (then called the Presidium) from 1955 to 1957, and as a full member from June to October 1957, no professional military man has ever been accorded membership in those bodies. The Minister of Defense is, of course, a member of the Council of Ministers of the Government, and in general he serves as the senior expert on defense affairs to the policymakers. The highest level of political authority in which military leaders are represented is the Central Committee of the Party, in which they usually hold about ten per cent of the membership. The present Central Committee, elected by the Twenty-third Party Congress in April, 1966, has 195 full members, of whom 15 are military men, and 165 candidates, of whom 18 are military. (Of the military representatives, three are officers of the Political Administration in the armed forces, and ten are retired or semi-retired marshals.) The military has shown no inclination toward political opposition - nor has it displayed much positive political interest. The Party's constant harping on increased political indoctrination, and the intensity of the reaction a decade ago to Marshal Zhukov's desire to insure that such nonsense didn't interfere with raising the professional qualifications of the military, bear eloquent witness to the awareness by the Soviet leaders of the essentially apolitical posture of the military as a whole. True, over ninety per cent of the officers are affiliated with the Party, but the Soviet leaders realize that Party membership is ordinarily more a formality than a reflection of zeal. Intensive efforts to indoctrinate all military personnel in Marxism-Leninism continue. Thus, about twenty per cent of the soldiers' training time is devoted to political instruction - about 240 hours per year. Today, as in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a new techno252

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logical revolution deeply affects the military. In the mid-twentieth century technological reorientation of the army, just as in the last century, new specialists are needed - new men conversant with the military application of nuclear energy, rocket power, and space flight. The social disruption of the introduction of such men is much less severe now than eighty years ago, due both to the different pattern of society, and to the tendency to train career military men in these specialities. Indeed there is a strong tendency to advance these very scientific and technological fields substantially through the medium of research in military institutions. But the cultivation of an apolitical attitude is furthered by this trend. A few of the new military scientific-technical men have not even deigned to join the Communist Party, although all unit commanders and staff officers of the rank of major and above must be Party members, and gradually all officers are becoming Party men as a simple career requirement. At present, some 93 per cent of the officers in the Soviet armed forces are members of the Communist Party or its youth adjunct, the Komsomol. This marks the gradual normalization of Party membership as a prerequisite for a military career. From the late Stalin period in 1952 to 1958, the percentage was apparently unchanged; authoritative Soviet sources gave the figure of 86 per cent Party affiliation for officers. From 1960 through mid-1965 the figure cited was about 90 per cent; at the Twenty-third Party Congress in April, 1966, Marshal Malinovsky reported that 93 per cent of officers were Party affiliates. He also reported that 80 per cent of the total personnel of the Soviet armed forces are now Party or (mainly) Komsomol members. 26 ' 27 The renewed professional concentration on military technical development has accompanied the rejuvenated approach to questions of military science and the military art, and the increasing modernization of equipment, over the past decade. The level of technical competence required 28 Marshal A. Vasilevsky stated in 1952 that 86.4 per cent of officers were members of the Communist Party and Komsomol (Pravda, October 10, 1952). Marshal Malinovsky repeated the figure "over 86 per cent" six years later (.Pravda, February 23, 1958). Various Soviet sources in the early and mid-1960's gave the figure 90 per cent, including Marshal Malinovsky (Pravda, February 23, 1965), and Leonid Brezhnev (Radio Moscow, July 3, 1965). For the new figures of 93 and 80 per cent, see Marshal R. Malinovsky (Krasnaya zvezda, April 2, 1966). 27 The percentages of Party affiliation of officers in the other Communist states of Eastern Europe may be of comparative interest. Various published Communist sources provide these figures for 1965: East Germany - 96 per cent; Bulgaria - 83 per cent; Rumania - 76 per cent; Czechoslovakia - 75 per cent; Poland - 73 per cent; (data on Hungary are not available).

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Raymond L. Garthojj of military personnel is, of course, rising. For example, at present nearly 50 per cent of all Soviet officers are qualified 'engineers and technicians', and 75 per cent of the officers in the Strategic Rocket Forces are so identified. More broadly, 90 per cent of all officers have secondary or higher education, including 25 per cent with higher military or specialized education.28 And over 90 per cent of the total armed forces personnel have at least incomplete secondary education (a figure for 1966, which had risen from 83 per cent in 1964, and from 35.5 per cent in 1940). Moreover, 70 per cent of conscriptees are said to have 'some technical specialty', though this term has been stretched beyond anything meaningful.29 What does this mean for the future? In another decade or two, a new generation of officers will have risen, men who have a new outlook. Gone will be the durable marshals who, like Konev and Timoshenko, earned their spurs in the Civil War; the horse-drawn tachanka sporting a heavy machine gun will be as outmoded as the bow and arrow. And the outlook of the new men will almost surely be less, rather than more, political. Thus the military has acquired outstanding social status, material rewards, and prestige; it has, however, neither sought, nor been given, commensurate political power. It seems useful to review, in conclusion, two key aspects of change and continuity in the role of the military as a social force during the last century: (1) social status and stratification, the privileged place of the military in society and the social structure; and (2) political prestige and power, the apparent and actual extent to which the military share in national decision-making. The social status of a given group does not always reflect its role in society. But such status is usually related to either past or present functional importance - or, at the least, to the image of the functional importance. Russian society in the latter part of the nineteenth century was in process of gradual but reluctant adaptation to new conditions of life. The Russian nobility, unlike, for example, the English aristocracy at a parallel stage of development, did not adjust to the new economic 28

Again, for comparison, the proportion of officers with higher education is 25 per cent in Poland, 18 per cent in Czechoslovakia, and 15 per cent in Bulgaria. (In East Germany, 33 per cent have attended 'technical colleges", and 12 per cent of the officers are said to come from 'the intelligentsia'.) 29 Data taken from Marshal R. Malinovsky, Krasnaya zvezda, April 2, 1966; Malinovsky, V yedinom stroiu (In One Rank), Moscow: 1965, p. 132; Col. I. Prusanov, Kommunist vooruzhennykh shil [Communist of the Armed Forces], No. 3 (March, 1966), p. 14; and Marshal A. Grechko, Krasnaya zvezda, February 23, 1966.

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system by merging with the class of mercantile and industrial entrepreneurs. In the army, in the Petrine period, feudal primacy of rank and command based solely on aristocratic hierarchy was ended. The reforms of Milyutin in the 1860's and 1870's established a basis for merging men from various classes with the military-career segment of the nobility. So the military institution, unlike the Russian autocracy and nobility as a whole, did come to terms with the changing needs of the times. By 1914, the evolution of a new military class was well advanced, and though there was friction, it was overcome. The result was that the new military class, with its heterogeneous origin, rose to the social sphere of the hereditary nobility. This viable solution to the problem of adjustment of the new military class in the social structure was accompanied by a corresponding political accommodation (although under the circumstances of political autocracy, this did not mean any real sharing in politial power). There were no shortcomings in the relationship of the military class, as such, to the regime. The basic shortcomings were in the fundamental relationship of the regime to society as a whole. After the abdication of the Czar, the military served the new Provisional Government without question. And later, a surprising proportion voluntarily served the radical Bolshevik regime. A fundamentally apolitical attitude enabled the military to accommodate a shift of patriotism from Russian Czar to Russian Commissar. In fact, that stretch was sometimes more easily bridged than that between strong liberal opposition to the old regime and acceptance of the new Bolshevik autocracy. In a positive way, the superprofessionalism of the military indeed had a certain influence on the new regime. This was foreseen by the Old Bolshevik Mekhonoshin, who, in evaluating the inherited bureaucracy of the Ministry of War, told Lenin: "This machine cannot be remodelled. It is more likely to change us than be changed by us." 30 The new Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was no more a continuation of the old Imperial Army than the new regime was of the old one. The early social egalitarianism of the society was mirrored in the army. But the army appears also to have fully kept in step with the subsequent rebirth of the new, and in some respects even more highly stratified, social structure that has evolved in the Soviet state. The present social standing of the military in the Soviet Union - with its material rewards, 30

Cited by Wollenberg, op. cit., p. 74; and by Col. J. D . Hittle, The Staff (Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Co., 1949), p. 242.

Military

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Raymond L. Garthoff hierarchical system, and prestige - is unsurpassed among contemporary world powers. The political role of any social class is an integral and important part of its being. It is neither logically inherent nor historically established that the social function of any class and its importance to society as a whole should determine its political power. Armies and police forces, as the armed guardians of society, have a unique potential for influencing political decision. But their actual political power depends upon the structure and stability of society as a whole, and the accepted locus of decision-making. The Soviet Army, like the Russian Army of fifty and more years ago, is today essentially apolitical. Nonetheless, its potential political role, in the light of changes in the internal Soviet political balance over the years since Stalin's death, is peculiarly great. The sensitivity of the ruling Party machine to this high potential was evident in the preemptive ouster of Marshal Zhukov, the first - and to date, the last - spokesman for the military to have been admitted (briefly) to policy-making councils. The privileged military caste in mid-twentieth century Russia is one component in an increasingly stratified society. In this respect it is responsive to the general trend of development of contemporary Soviet society as well as to the requirements of a modern army. And the military continues to develop as a technically-oriented, highly professional, and essentially apolitical instrument of the state. US

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D E P A R T M E N T OF

STATE

THE MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPING N A T I O N S

M. J. V. Bell

T H E M I L I T A R Y IN T H E N E W S T A T E S OF A F R I C A

In the years after the Gold Coast became independent in 1957, colonial rule, once paramount from the Sahara to the Zambesi, was swept away and replaced by the triumphant African politicians who had agitated for independence. This independence was achieved by political struggle, its battlefields the platform and the constitutional conference and its weapon the ballot box. The transition was in most cases easy, even amicable, and bloodshed was small. But this easy transition had its disadvantages. The successful leaders had not been tested by the fierce process of natural selection which weeds out the less competent during a prolonged war of national liberation; and however competent they may have been, their talents of negotiation and party organization did not fit them for the task of ruling an independent country in the same way as guerrilla leaders who had administered both armies and populations for years at a stretch. In particular, the armed forces remained outside the struggle almost throughout. The party politicians who became Africa's new leaders laboured as a result under the grave disadvantage of profound ignorance not simply of the function of the armed forces, but even in the vaguest terms of their equipment, structure and capabilities.1 What then were these forces and how have they developed since independence?

1

As Major Gen. H. T. Alexander, the last British commander of the Ghanaian army, put it, "No civilian Ghanaian . . . really understands the difference between a division and a company." African Tightrope (London, Pall Mall, 1965), p. 13.

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M. J. V. Bell 1. The prejudices of British colonial recruiting officers in favour of the 'warrior tribes' and against the semi-educated in the more developed areas of their possessions led to a strong tribal imbalance in the armies of newly independent states. Thus in Kenya, despite the dominant position of the Kikuyu, shown by the success of the predominantly Kikuyu party, the Kenya African National Union, there were virtually no Kikuyu in the army and few in the police. In 1962, the tribal composition of the army was: Kamba 34%, Kalenjin 34%, other tribes (Somali, Rendille, Samburu, Turkana, Masai, Luo, etc.) 32%. The police being a predominantly local force were more diversely recruited but the Kamba still provided the largest proportion of recruits (18%) and the Kikuyu only 9-7%. 2 Again in Ghana, 62% of the other ranks came from the far north, and even in Tanganyika, where the plethora of small tribes is a considerable national asset, one quarter of the new recruits of 1963 were Kuria and one quarter Hehe. The same tendency was apparent in French recruiting, since army service was less popular among the peaceful coastal tribes. There was in theory universal military conscription in all the French African territories after 1919, but this made little difference, since the contingent (draft) took only 10,000 young men a year on average. It was a relatively simple matter to avoid it - many fled across the border into British territories. Tribalism and tribal feeling have played a large part in events since independence, yet its significance in the behaviour of African armies seems to have been small. It is true that the mutiny of southern troops in the Sudanese army against their northern officers in 1955 was an obvious case, yet in most countries (including subsequently the Sudan) the custom of mixing up soldiers of different tribal origin down to the lowest unit level forestalled any difficulties. In most cases, one can only see the influence of tribal antipathies among the soldiery when, as in the Congo, discipline had begun to deteriorate for other reasons. Since independence, other rank recruiting has usually been brought more into line with the political realities of the country concerned. After the army mutinies in East Africa, new recruitment was largely from the mass party youth organisations, while in Kenya, the new National Youth Wing is specifically intended to act as the main source of recruitment for the army. In most countries it appears that a tacit tribal balance is maintained, although statistics of this touchy subject are never published; 2

Daily Telegraph,

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8.1.62.

The Military in the New States of Africa in Nigeria, however, it was under the civilian regime explicitly laid down that recruitment should be 50% from the northern region and 25% from each of the others (in the same ratio as population). Recruitment is certainly no problem in Africa, where an army career offers good pay, security and, as has recently become apparent, power. 2. A disciplined army obeys its officers. This was strikingly demonstrated during the Nigerian military coup when Hausa troops from the North followed an Ibo officer, Major Nzeogwu, against the ruler of the North, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and killed him without protest. In any army, the attitude of the officer corps will be decisive. The Africanisation of the army presented formidable problems. The first of these was the number of qualified and educated Africans required. As early as 1943, Lieutenant-General (now Lord) Slim, a veteran of the Indian army, on observing African troops for the first time, was critical of the excessive number of white officers and N.C.O.'s (50 or 60 to a battalion, compared with 7 or 8 in an Indian battalion), which he felt led to a lowering of the quality of the Whites and a stifling of initiative among the Africans.3 Yet the army was competing for a very limited number of qualified men, to most of whom at that time the army was an unattractive option. Because of the poor quality and small numbers of those offering themselves for direct commission, the gaps had to be filled by promotions from the ranks. The first African officers (all former N.C.O.'s) were appointed at the most a decade before independence in West Africa; the first Tanganyikan officer was commissioned only the year before Tanganyika became independent. In no British territory did Africans fill more than a quarter of the officer posts at independence. Although Africanisation started late, the inevitable pressures after independence meant that it was carried through very quickly. The last British officer was replaced in 1961 in Ghana, in 1965 in Nigeria and in 1964 in Uganda and Tanzania (i.e. 4 years after the first Tanzanian was commissioned). Although some African leaders might well have been willing to slow down the process, the soldiers showed, by such actions as the East African mutinies of 1964, that they were not prepared to tolerate a delay greater than that imposed on their fellows in civilian life. The practice in English-speaking Africa fell somewhere between that 3

W. J. Slim, Defeat into Victory (London, Cassels, 1956), pp. 166, 353.

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M. J. V. Bell in the Belgian Congo and that in former French Africa. The Congo's troubles stemmed from the mutiny of the Force Publique, and this mutiny stemmed from the exasperation of the Congolese soldiers at the failure of the Belgians to make any provision for the replacement of their European officers and warrant officers. 4 The French territories were more fortunate. In 1955 there were only sixty-five African officers in the French forces. In the following year, however, a crash officer-training programme was started, not, it may be said, because of the forthcoming requirements of independence, which was not at that time contemplated, but in accordance with an ephemeral plan to make better use of the manpower reserves of Afrique Noire for the French army. But as a result nearly 500 officers were either commissioned or under training by the time the majority of Francophone states achieved independence in 1960 - two-thirds of the requirement. The process of Africanisation is almost entirely complete, and it is now possible to observe its consequences. First, whereas the men have tended to come from the more primitive tribes, the officers are overwhelmingly from the more advanced areas. In Ghana, whereas at independence 62% of the men were from up country, 92% of the Ghanaian officers were from the coast. Of the 81 Nigerian officers in 1961, 60 were Ibos from the East. This dominance has been characteristic as much of officers commissioned from the ranks as of officers commissioned directly through Officer Cadet Schools. In the pre-independence army, although few from the more educated tribes enlisted, mostly doing clerical duties, they were usually the only ones with the education to fit them for promotion. Thus both General Ankrah, Ghanaian head of state from Accra, and General Ironsi, first Nigerian military head of state, an Ibo, spent the war doing clerical jobs and were commissioned some years after. Secondly, there is a split between officers promoted from the ranks and those directly commissioned both in years and in education and ability. Contrast two of Nigeria's present regional military governors, Lt. Col. Fajuyi, who, although only 39, enlisted as a private in 1943 and was commissioned in 1954, and Col. Ojukwu, now 32, son of one of Nigeria's richest business men, a graduate of Oxford who became a

4

See C. Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence (Oxford, OUP, 1965), pp. 87 ff.

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The Military in the New States of Africa District Officer in the Administrative Service and transferred to the army because it offered better prospects.4» Thirdly, since almost all of the officers in Africa's armies are young, there is almost certain to be growing impatience in the lower ranks at the existence of a massive promotion blockage. The young officers are the most important single group in African politics today. Often commanded by former N.C.O.'s of limited ability and little interest in politics, they themselves are likely to want to intervene in politics not through tribal feeling but largely through the impatience of the young and capable at incompetence and corruption. 3. As soon as independence became certain, the colonial powers lost interest in equipping their African armies with modern armaments. By contrast, the new leaders were in most cases anxious to modernise and expand their armies, and establish air wings and sometimes navies. However, with one or two exceptions, such as Ethiopia, equipped on a fairly lavish scale with aircraft and tanks by the United States, African armies are small and lightly equipped. Characteristically, they consist of a battalion or two of infantry, armed with basic infantry weapons, and a squadron of armoured cars, with supporting engineer units. They are usually without artillery. Air forces under formation consist mainly of a few transport and reconnaissance aircraft, navies of patrol boats. Military manpower usually comprises 1% or less of the population, military budgets between 10 and 20% of total government expenditure and between 2 and 6% of the GNP.5 The capacity of these forces to act outside their own countries is negligible, but they are adequate for internal security and to defend their own frontiers. In addition, of course, they may provide useful facilities in national development, and many African leaders are anxious to employ them in this role. In countries where the armed forces have inherited the British tradition that it is the army's business to fight in war and to train to fight in peace, these efforts have proved largely abortive. Yet, in view of the general unpopularity of technical training and education in Africa, soldiers trained even in the unsophisticated techniques of an African army - drivers, plant operators, seamen, aircraft mechanics - will be useful additions to the civilian

4a

Although it is doubtful whether even he foresaw the prospect of his present (1967) position as president of secessionist Biafra. 5 See David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (= Adelphi Paper No. 27, Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1966), pp. 28, 29.

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M. /. V. Bell labour force. Furthermore, small though they are, these armies provide for their senior officers as considerable a management charge as any to be found in civilian life. Especially in those countries under military rule, officers may well play an important part in business management or government administration. The French colonial army always had a tradition of involvement in administration and social development, and this tradition has been inherited both by those countries that have broken with France - Guinea and Mali - and those which retain close ties with her. In these states, the army is expected to use its skills in economic development: "Enfin nous tenons à ce que l'Armée participe directement et activement au développement du pays, en nous fournissant non pas des travailleurs sans spécialités, de simples terrassiers", said President Senghor of Senegal, "mais en mettant au travail des unitées composées de techniciens instruits, bien encadrés et disposant des engins les plus modernes du Génie. L'aviation assure les transports les plus difficiles et les evacuations sanitaires d'urgence. La marine est chargée de la surveillance des côtes et des fleuves, contrôle les pêches." 6 The francophone states have also inherited from the French a tradition of compulsory military service and a belief in its social virtues. This is seen as a means of providing an impulse towards national unity -"expression de la nation, elle est le creuset où se force l'Unité Nationale par le brassage de groupes ethniques, par les contacts profonds avec les populations".7 It is also seen as a means of providing simple technical training, particularly in agriculture. Perhaps the best known example was the Ivory Coast, whose army's badge is a rifle and hoe. Here the contingent, after one year of military training, went to an army school for civic action run by an Israeli mission and thence to six large cooperative farms elsewhere. The Israeli example is clearly admired, and there has been a good deal of Israeli assistance in setting up these schemes. It is unfortunate that they have not been very successful: the Ivory Coast scheme has indeed had to be abandoned. There were special reasons for the Ivory Coast failure but there is good cause for doubting the possibilities of general success. The French had a form of compulsory civic service, the military labour corps or deuxième contingent but it was a constant target of African politicians, being 6

Frères d'Armes, June 1963. General Ramanantsoa, Chief of Staff of the Malagasy Armed Forces, Frères d'Armes, December 1963. 7

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The Military in the New States of Africa finally abolished in 1950. It is less easy for the young to see the point of conscription than it is in Israel, where the possession of the largest possible reserve of trained manpower is a matter of national survival. In modern African states, furthermore, conscription is too easy to avoid; there is not the bureaucratic structure needed to make it fair, and so those who are called up tend to be the unlucky or incapable. Conscription may even be counter-productive since the army is anxious to keep the most able instead of allowing them to go back to civilian life. It is frequently pointed out that the armed forces are a modern influence in national society. This may be so, but they do not always show much interest in modernising. Even if they do, their contribution is hardly in proportion to their cost. This fact has been recognised by some of the most able of the intelligentsia, who would like to see decreases in military spending; in this they find themselves in opposition to large numbers of the educated and semi-educated.8 4. The continuation of military assistance in some form or other after independence was vital. Despite some much publicised diversification of aid sources, military aid still comes overwhelmingly from the former metropoles, France, Britain and Belgium (and in the case of Liberia and Ethiopia, the United States). France signed formal agreements with most of her former dependencies guaranteeing their external defence. She still maintains bases in francophone countries, and, despite a drastic run-down, her forces there number over 6,000.® France also signed military aid agreements, under which over 2,000 French officers and N.C.O.'s are attached to francophone armies and over 2,000 Africans are training in France. There has been some minor diversification, mainly in the field of civic action training and equipment, to the United States and Israel. Britain made no formal arrangements with her former territories, but there are still more than 550 British officers and N.C.O.'s in Africa, on secondment or in training teams. There are others on contract, that is, former officers in the British army employed on limited contracts by the 8

An informal poll conducted by Harvey Glickman in 1963 "among incoming civil servants, extra-mural students and technical students" in Tanganyika, "showed that about two-thirds of the respondents favoured a larger army for Tanganyika". Impressions of Military Policy in Tanganyika (The Rand Corporation, Nov. 1963), p. 7. 9 This excludes over 8,000 young Frenchmen who have elected to do their national service as teachers or technicians in Africa.

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M. J. V. Bell country concerned to whom their position may appear less equivocal than that of British officers on secondment. Some hold quite important positions, e.g. the Commander of the Zambian army is a European officer on contract. In addition there are nearly 300 Africans training in Britain. There has been a good deal of diversification, but almost entirely to Commonwealth states, particularly Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel. The Soviet Union has been the major provider of military aid only to Guinea and Somalia - Chinese military assistance has been negligible. In all, there are more than 3,000 Western officers and N.C.O.'s in subSaharan Africa against probably less than 200 Communists. 10 It is improbable that there will be much more diversification of military aid in Africa. The military governments have no interest in diversification for its own sake, since it leads to loss of efficiency, while surviving civilian regimes are anxious to avoid the creation of potentially dangerous cliques in the armed forces. The practice in Africa, with those who were the first to reject Western military aid in the van, is the establishment of indigenous training facilities staffed at first by officers from Western or non-aligned nations on contract, and later by nationals of the country concerned. What effect this pattern of military assistance has had on the attitudes of the army and particularly of the officer corps, it is exceedingly hard to say. Victor le Vine of Washington University in a trip to francophone Africa in 1965 noted mixed feelings among political leaders about the impending French run-down of troops. On the one hand, they had a feeling of greater freedom of action when liberated from the stifling French presence; on the other, they were nervous that possible opponents too might feel freer to act. On the whole, it appears that the presence of large numbers of European military personnel has been a stabilising influence - not least by maintaining standards of discipline and conduct. But the presence of French officers in the armed forces of Congo (Brazzaville) did not help President Youlou, nor the presence of a large British training team Dr. Nkrumah. What of the African officers themselves? They have learnt the techniques of their trade in Western military academies, but there is nothing in the syllabus of Sandhurst or St. Cyr about staying out of politics. 10 For details and discussion see M. J. V. Bell, Military Assistance to Independent African States (= Adelphi Paper No. 15, Dec. 1964). More recent figures in D. Wood, op. cit.

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The Military in the New States of Africa Instead of political guidance, they have heard the idle talk of messes, which in any Western army is almost universally derogatory to politicians. 5. There is no doubt that African political leaders had the option of abandoning their armed forces on independence. All colonial police forces possessed mobile gendarmerie or General Service Units equipped with light infantry weapons and able to carry out the internal security and frontier defence roles. There would have been problems of resettlement of the discharged soldiers, but nothing approaching those of the massive demobilisation after the Second World War. A fundamental motive for retention was clearly that the armed forces were a symbol of national independence. Some leaders even admitted this. President Hamani Diori of Niger told his troops, "Dorénavant, aux yeux du monde comme à ceux de notre peuple tout entier, vous êtes le signe visible de notre indépendence politique et de notre volonté proclamée de le défendre contre toute aggression." 11 Or, as M. Sylvanus Olympio put it, when explaining the reversal of his decision that Togo should not have an army, "we cannot be an independent nation without an army of some sort". It is ironic that so many of the political leaders of new Africa should have been overthrown by elements in the state established for essentially frivolous reasons. How has this occurred? Apart from the mutiny of the Force Publique and the attempted coup in Ethiopia in 1960, there have been two waves of military interventions in politics. In the first, which covered a period of 14 months from December 1962, President Olympio of Togo was assassinated, Presidents Youlou of Congo (Brazzaville) and Maga of Dahomey were overthrown, British troops crushed army mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, and French troops crushed an army revolt against President Mba of Gabon, to mention only the major events. In the second, from November 1965 to February 1966, civilians were overthrown and replaced by military regimes in Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria and Ghana. Some of the earlier troubles were caused by discontent over pay and status. President Olympio died for his failure to employ in the Togolese army 300 discharged veterans of the French army, (whose leader, Bodjollé, subsequently became Chief of Staff) thus demonstrating what 11

At the inauguration of the Army of Niger, 3 Aug. 1961. Quoted in Frères d'Armes, April 1963.

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M. J. V. Bell the revolutionary junta called his "profound contempt for the military". In the Congo, as I have suggested earlier, the soldiers were exasperated by the obvious intention of the Belgians that they were not to share in the independence bonanza.12 The East African mutinies were, as President Kenyatta put it, a strike - largely provoked by the slowness of Africanisation in the armed forces compared with that in civilian life. Those mutinies have been comparatively few in number and the product of rather special circumstances. For the most part the intervention of the military in politics has been for reasons suggested by James Coleman and Belmont Brice before any of these events had taken place: "In Africa's new states the national goals of the civilian policy-makers (the politicians), the bureaucracy and the army are substantially the same: stability and order, national unity, and rapid modernisation. These are the goals of the educated African nationalist. Under such circumstances experience elsewhere indicates that if the civilian regime becomes stalemated in its pursuit of these goals there is a high probability that the military will intervene." 13 In nearly every case, the military have intervened when the failure of politicians to live up to expectations has touched the military directly. This failure has been in every field, administrative, economic and political, each reacting on the other, but the fundamental and decisive failure has been political. Thus the decline in administrative standards caused by rapid Africanisation has been assisted by nepotism and the contemptuous treatment of what able civil servants there are - "the belief once held by many CPP leaders in Ghana about civil servants, that they were no more than superior clerks, whose job it was to keep the files and produce evidence in favour of what the politicians wanted to carry out".14 Every African country faces mountainous economic problems: the difficulty of increasing agricultural efficiency, growing urban unemployment, one-crop economies dependent on erratic world markets. But again these have been complicated by allocation of resources on 'pork barrel' lines and by wanton extravagance on prestige projects. 12 At the first sign of trouble, the Commander of the Force Publique, General Janssens, held a parade at which he wrote on the blackboard "Before Independence = After Independence". 13 "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa", The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by J. J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 402. 14 Dennis Austin, The Ghana Coup d'État (Survival, May 1966), reprinted from New Society, 3 and 10 March 1966.

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The Military in the New States of Africa The passing of time after independence saw in the political sphere the systematic exclusion of the people from the conduct of affairs, by the setting up of one-party states, the rigging of elections and by intimidation. "Thus, the ballot box was emptied of meaning, and the hapless electorate was offered instead the mythology of Nkrumahism. The CPP provided a sorry spectacle of a nationalist party bereft of its earlier mass membership and popularity. It had become a closed society, lacking the appeal of a coherent dogma, offending by its extravagant displays of personal wealth at a time of severe shortages in the economy, rent periodically by intrigue between one or other of its numerous factions, and held together only by the power and graft it was able to bestow on its followers." 15 Therefore, while the politicians had lost the confidence of the people, there was no way of removing them democratically. The army could not remain isolated as the regime systematically antagonised all the educated parts of the population first outside then inside the governing party itself and devoted its energies more and more to destructive factional squabble and the fruits of corruption. Sometimes this spectacle alone has been enough to provoke the military. In the Congo for instance, it was the irrelevant quarrel between the Prime Minister, Mr. Tshombe and President Kasavubu; in the Central African Republic, Col. Bokassa, the commander of the army, acted to resolve a situation he described thus: "Le président Dacko s'était entouré d'une équipe dont la plupart des membres étaient des incapables. Au surplus, il ne parvenait pas à se séparer de ces gens aux intentions douteuses. Il vivait dans la hantise d'être lui même victime de leur machinations. Les Centrafricains s'en rendaient compte. Dacko ne se conduisait plus en chef d'Etat. Devant la menace d'une catastrophe, prenant toutes mes responsabilities, je l'ai mis en demeure d'opérer des transformations au sein de l'équipe gouvernementale. Se sentant déborde, il a préféré se démettre de ses fonctions." 16 If this was not enough, since the only means of protest was by rioting in the towns and terrorism in the country, the armed forces were directly involved in the restoration of order. "The rampaging bands of election thugs had caused so much unrest and dislocation that our young Army officers seized the opportunity to take over." 17 In Congo (Brazzaville), 15

Austin, loc. cit. Jeune Afrique, 30.1.66. 17 Chinua Achebe, A Man of the People (London, Heinemann, 1966), p. 165. Besides being a funny and accurate satire on a corrupt civilian regime in an unnamed African country very like Nigeria, this book, which ends with a 16

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Bell

in Dahomey and in Upper Volta, the military commanders were faced with the choice of firing on rioting crowds in the capital or overthrowing the regime. In each case, they chose to overthrow the regime. In Nigeria too, the young officers felt not only a general dislike of the northern based coalition in power - Major Nzeogwu, one of the leaders of the revolt, claimed: "We wanted to get rid of the rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, Trades Unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of the Federal system"; 18 but they were also incensed at having to restore order in the Western region which elections rigged by the government had reduced to a state of virtual anarchy. In some cases, actions of the government have impinged directly on the interests of the officer corps. In Volta and CAR, austerity budgets, including pay cuts for those on the government payroll had caused discontent among the military. In Nigeria, the insistence of the government that officer recruitment should be on the same basis as other rank recruitment (i.e. 50% from the North and 50% from the Southern regions) in effect discriminated against the better educated Ibos. In Ghana, General Katoka admitted that the coup was caused by discontent in the Army, in particular because they suspected that Nkrumah wanted to create a private army (the Palace Guard), and because Nkrumah wanted to send the army to fight in Rhodesia. In addition Nkrumah had finally lost the confidence of the armed forces by abruptly sacking the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Gen. Otu, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Ankrah (the present Head of State), the previous year, after the overthrow of President Ben Bella of Algeria, presumably in the fear that his own generals might be plotting similarly against him. 6. "For I do honestly believe that in the fat-dripping, gummy, eat-andlet-eat regime just ended—a regime which inspired the common saying that a man could only be sure of what he had put away safely in his gut. . .; a regime in which you saw a fellow cursed in the morning for stealing a blind man's stick and later in the evening saw him again mounting the altar of the new shrine in the presence of all the people to whisper in the ear of the chief celebrant - in such a regime, I say, you died a good death if your life had inspired someone to come forward and shoot your murderer in the chest - without asking to be paid." 19 So universal and military coup, is also a remarkable piece of prediction, since it was published only a day or two after the Nigerian coup. 18 West Africa, 21.1.66. 19 Achebe, op. cit., p. 167.

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The Military in the New States of Africa deep-seated has been the dislike of the old regimes that the new military governments have a big reservoir of popularity on which to draw. And there is no question that these new governments have scored gains of considerable importance. They have put an end to disorders that were tearing their countries apart; they have dislodged brutal and tyrannical governments that could have been removed in no other way; they have stopped showy extravagance in the economic sphere. But what of their future conduct of affairs and in particular the possibility of a return to civilian rule? Some of the military are clearly not interested in an early hand-over of power. Colonel Bokassa of the C A R , in reply to the question "Quel délai vous accordez-vous pour aboutir à la normalisation de la situation?" answered "Je suis plutôt optimiste. Je dis que tout ira très bien. Peut-être pas totalement avec moi, mais avec un future président de la République qui trouvera, grâce à nos efforts présents, un R C A où régneront la justice, la liberté et la paix." 20 Most of the generals however are genuinely eager to 'normalise the situation' and return to their professional concerns of running efficient armed services, but there are clearly problems. A return to civilian rule requires two conditions. The first is the existence of a disciplined, united officers corps, willing to obey the orders of its leaders. A disunited army, riven into quarreling factions, is much less likely to be successfully disengaged from politics. The second condition is of course the existence of suitable civilians to hand over to. Most of the military coups in Africa have been carried out by united forces under control from the top. In Ghana, indeed, the police leadership also was closely involved in instigating and planning the coup. Nigeria was a disturbing exception. Gen. Ironsi, the Commander in Chief, was totally ignorant of the plot, which was planned and carried out at the cost of considerable bloodshed among the officers corps by a group of junior officers. In any case, unity may not long survive the breaking of the spell which keeps soldiers from even contemplating involvement in politics - the Sudan suffered no less than four further military plots in the year after the coup of 1958. A fruitful source of trouble may lie in the split between the young and able junior officers and their seniors, whom they may regard as not only less capable but also as obstacles to promotion. The second problem, that of who to hand over to, is perhaps even more difficult. A permanent government of technicians on the old colonial pattern is not seriously contemplated, yet the only existing 20

Jeune Afrique,

30.1.66.

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politicians are the discredited 'old gang'. The lack of an effective public opinion is a most serious shortcoming - Chinua Achebe did not exaggerate when he wrote: "Overnight everyone began to shake their heads at the excesses of the last regime, at its graft, oppression and corrupt government: newspapers, the radio, the hitherto silent intellectuals and civil servants - everybody said what a terrible lot and it became public opinion the next morning." 21 Indeed the growing contempt of the military for civilian rule is shown by the fact that in all of the first wave of coups, civilian politicians were placed in control, but in the second, every coup was succeeded by a military regime. In Dahomey, General Soglo, a man with no political ambitions, removed each of the three leading Dahomeyan politicians from the Presidency in turn when they had clearly lost control of events and finally took it over himself. These events lend point to Colonel Lamizana of Volta's remark: "To those who are in a hurry for the Army to cede power we say that we are in a hurry to return to the barracks. However, the Army does not want to leave precipitously and thereby be obliged to come back once more and for a longer time." Yet since an effective public opinion is likely to cut its teeth by attacking authoritarian military rule, it is more likely to be opposed than encouraged. Thus it is likely that there will be long periods of military rule, during which laborious attempts will be made - unsuccessfully - to build up basic democracy. Such military rule will itself not be immune from risks - both for the army and the country. The politicians are no more entirely responsible for Africa's problems than the colonialists, and Africa's problems will not be solved simply by removing the politicians. The building up of viable states will be a slow process demanding unpopular acts. It will be a great temptation for military governments to bask in the glory of having over-thrown hated regimes and avoid taking the hard economic and political decisions that the situation demands. One can see ways in which military rule may be actually harmful. The effect on the discipline and morale of the armed forces of the absence of many officers running the country, not to mention periodic purges, is likely to be damaging. In the long term, the predominance of the armed forces in national life is likely to encourage the most able young men to enlist, thus depriving the country of the full use of their talents in development and further debilitating the civilian alternative. Then, even under civilian regimes it was hard enough to achieve cuts in a principal source of government extravagance - military 21

Achebe, op. cit., p. 166.

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The Military in the New States of Africa budgets themselves. It will be still harder under military rule. Indeed, as opposition to military rule grows inside the country, the regime may be tempted to increase military spending in order to cope with disaffection. Equally no civilian government in Africa can be considered immune to military take-over. The ones which appear most likely to survive are those like Tanzania and Guinea where the civilian rulers have not fallen victim to the temptation to transform the regime into a self-perpetuating oligarchy, where there has been an effort to involve the people in the running of the country (in Guinea through the Congress of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée; in Tanzania through genuine elections within the framework of the Tanzania African National Union) and where attempts have been made to associate the army closely both with the aspirations and with the machinery of the mass party. With these possible exceptions, civilian governments are entirely dependent on the loyalty of the armed forces and will continue to survive only by the skilful manipulation of military opinion and the cultivation of inter-and-intraservice rivalry. Africa is full of surprises and it may be that a period of military rule will so strengthen the administration that resources will be efficiently allocated and efficiently employed, while the brooding presence of the armed forces will enforce on politicians a respect for democratic forms that no amount of colonial constitution-making was able to do. It is more likely, however, that at best military rule in Africa will be remembered less for what it achieved than for what it prevented, and at worst for aping the vices of preceding regimes without the compensating virtue of vulnerability. INSTITUTE FOR S T R A T E G I C STUDIES, LONDON

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Khalid B. Sayeed

T H E ROLE OF T H E M I L I T A R Y IN P A K I S T A N *

It is well known that defense expenditure in Pakistan, because of the country's strategic location and its fear of a hostile India, has invariably been kept between 55 to 60 per cent of the country's total revenue.1 This expenditure has been exclusive of military aid from the United States. It is obvious that this defense expenditure has strained economic resources. Even after the United States started giving military aid in 1954, defense expenditure by the Pakistan government has continued to increase instead of going down. This suggests that the military establishment in Pakistan has played a very influential role in shaping both the domestic and foreign policy of the country. The recruitment policy of the Pakistan army owes its origins to British recruitment practices in the subcontinent. Disturbed by the revolt of the local forces in the mutiny of 1857, the British deliberately excluded certain groups from the northern and eastern parts of India from the Indian army. "No more Brahmins, no more Musalmans of Hindustan * The author is grateful to the Arts Research Committee of Queen's University for the financial support provided to pursue his research relating to the role of the military in Pakistan. He wishes to express his thanks to Mr. Harold S. Lisson, his student at Queen's University, for the invaluable help that he rendered in compiling biographical data and information regarding Majors-General of the Pakistan Army. 1 This expenditure has been rated as 4.5 per cent of national income in 196465. Defense estimates have been steadily going up from Rs. 1,290 million (196465), Rs. 1,360 million (1965-66), Rs. 2,710 million (revised estimate 1965-66), Rs. 2,250 million (estimate 1966-67). Published defense expenditures seldom tell the whole story because in a number of countries, both developed and developing, some of the defense expenditures are concealed in items like communications, roads, transport, etc.

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The Role of the Military in Pakistan proper to be entertained in the regular native force." 2 Recruitment to the British Indian army was largely confined to the northwestern parts of India. This policy was also influenced by the fact that the British thought that a future attack on India would probably be launched by the Russians through the passes that lay in the North-Western Frontier. In this way also was the theory of martial races developed. These martial races were the Pathans, the Punjabi Muslims, the Sikhs, the Rajputs, the Dogras, the Garhwalis, and the Mahrattas. All these races lived in the northern and northwestern part of India with the exception of the Mahrattas. The Simon Commission reported that, "Bengal with a population of 45 millions, provided 7,000 combatant recruits; the Punjab with a population of 20 millions provided 349,000 such recruits." 3 The great bulk of the Hindu population was characterized by some of the British generals as 'unmanly classes'.4 The increasing importance of technical and engineering services in modern warfare modified this approach so that during the Second World War out of a total recruitment of 2.5 million, Hindus, including some of their martial classes, contributed 1.06 million. Non-martial groups like the Madrasis of south India contributed as many as 302,732. The Muslim share was 617,353.5 However, despite these developments, the distinction between the martial and non-martial races in the Indo-Pakistan context should not be underestimated. It could be argued that soldiers belonging to the martial races were 'voluntary mercenaries' in the sense that they joined the army not only for monetary reasons but also because in adopting the military profession, they were carrying out the traditions of their ancestors.

1.

COMPOSITION OF THE PAKISTAN ARMED FORCES

The army constitutes about 87.5 per cent of the armed forces in Pakistan. During 1964-65, the army had eight divisions consisting of 2

Peel Commission Report cited in Report of the Indian Military College Committee Dated 15th July 1931 (London, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1931), p. 111. 3 Report of the Statutory Commission, Vol. I: Survey (London, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1930), Cmd. 3568, p. 97. 4 Lieutenant-General Sir George MacMunn, The Martial Races of India (London, Sampson Low, n.d.), pp. 2, 4, 359. s Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, Vol. IV, edited by Nandan Prasad (Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1956). See Appendix 13.

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B.

Sayeed

about 230,000 men. The respective strength of the navy and the air force was estimated at 7,700 and 17,000-25,000.« In Pakistan the preponderant bulk of the army has been drawn from four districts of the northern Punjab, namely, Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, Jhelum and Gujarat, and two districts of the former Frontier Province, Peshawar and Kohat.7 Sixty per cent of the army consists of Punjabis, 35 per cent are Pathans, and others constitute the remaining five per cent. The Pathan tribes which have contributed men to the Pakistan army in the descending order of importance are the Yusufzais, Khattaks, Afridi, and Bangash. It is said that Punjabis are solid, disciplined and long-suffering. The Pathans are inclined to be volatile and more religious. East Pakistan has only three battalions with approximately 3,000 soldiers. East Pakistanis constitute no more than five per cent of the officers in the Pakistan army. In the navy, East Pakistanis constitute 19 per cent of the technical officers and nine per cent of the non-technical officers. Their proportion in the naval ranks on the technical side is 28.4 per cent and 28.5 on the non-technical side. Among air force officers, East Pakistanis constitute 11 per cent of pilots, 27 per cent of navigators, 17 per cent of the technical officers, 31 per cent of administrative officers, and 13 per cent of education officers.8 It is said that this is largely because of two factors - lack of martial spirit among the Bengalis and their inability to meet the physical standards or requirements of the army. Thus, the Pakistan army is not as representative of the various regions of the country as the Indian or the Nigerian army. It has its advantages in the sense that the army has so far been able to function as a fairly cohesive unit in striking contrast to the Nigerian army with its deep and bitter tribal and regional conflicts. However, army authorities have been trying to lower the standards so that it may become possible for an increasing number of East Pakistanis to join the army. The height of 5'6" has been reduced to 5'4" and for officers for short service commission, the height has been further lowered to 5'2".9 It is very difficult to obtain information regarding the number of • These figures have been derived from Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1964-65 (London, n.d.). 7 The district of Campbellpur seems to have the largest share in the armed forces. Dawn (Karachi), May 18, 1966. 8 National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, Vol. I, No. 1,March 8, 1963, pp. 29-31. Information regarding other positions in the army, navy and air force may also be obtained from the some source. • See The Pakistan Observer, November 5, 1965; Dawn, November 16, 1965; and The Pakistan Times, April 15, 1966 (advertisements).

276

The Role of the Military in Pakistan officers that exist in Pakistan's armed forces. The British used to publish what were known as the Indian Army Lists from which one could get such information but these have been discontinued both by the Indian and Pakistani governments. Information regarding the number of officers is treated as classified information. According to fairly accurate estimates, the number of military officers in Pakistan is about 8,000 (6,000 army; 1,200 air force; 800 navy). Among the 6,000 army officers, there are 100 Brigadiers; 400 to 500 Colonels; Majors, 2,500; Captains and Lieutenants, 3,000. In addition, there are about 6,000 junior noncommission officers. There are accurate figures available for senior naval officers of ranks of Commanders and above. There were in all 60 such senior officers (including 10 surgeons) in the Pakistan navy in 1965.10 Similarly, it is difficult to get biographical and career information regarding senior military officers. The author has been able to gather the following information from newspapers, sources like biographical encyclopedias or Who's Who, and interviews. In 1959, out of 23 officers in the army who had attained the rank of Major-General and above, their age composition was as follows: Age Between Between Between Between

Number of Officers 58-59 50-55 46-49 41-44

2 7 8 6

In 1965, out of 18 Majors-General and above, the age composition was as follows: Age

Number of Officers

Between 55-57 Between 50-54 Between 45-49

3 6 9

In all the author has been able to compile information regarding 48-50 senior army officers who have attained the rank of Major-General and above since the establishment of a separate Pakistan army in 1947. Under the British, very few of them had even attained the rank of a Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel. Out of these 48, ten have attained the 10

The Navy List Autumn 1965), p. 425.

1965 (London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office,

277

Khalid B. Sayeed rank of Lieutenant-General, one that of General, and one that of FieldMarshal. The remaining 36 are Majors-General. In terms of regional origin, type of commission, place of training, branch of service, these 50 senior officers may be classified as follows: Type of commission

Regional origin Punjab Frontier (Pathan) India Refugee Bengal Not known Total

17 19 11 1 2 50

Regular Emergency (a) Not known

Total

41 6 3

50

(a) Emergency commission officers are those who were recruited on a temporary basis during the Second World War, but because of shortage of officers were retained after the establishment of Pakistan.

Place of training Sandhurst Dehra Dun (India) Direct Not known

Total

Branch of service 11 20 5 14

50

Infantry Armor Artillery Service Technical (medical and engineering) Not known Total

32 4 2 1 7 4 50

It was only after the First World War in 1918 that the British offered regular commissions in the Indian army to Indian officers. Before that, Indians were eligible only for lower positions and were given Viceroy's Commission under which they functioned below the British officers enjoying regular King's Commission. The first two Pakistani Commandersin-Chief of the Pakistan army, Ayub and Musa, are sons of Viceroy's Commission officers. 11 In their recruitment policy of Indian officers after 1918, the British often took men whose fathers had served in the army or men of aristocratic antecedents. In other words, these officers had to be politically safe. Perhaps officers who came from areas which constitute India today did become aware of political agitation and opposition to the British in their provinces.12 But Pakistani officers who 11 Prior to 1950, the Commanders-in-Chief officers - Generals Messervy and Gracey. 12 General Thimayya of the Indian army leaders like Motilal Nehru. Humphrey Evans, (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company,

278

of the Pakistan army were British refers to his contacts with Indian Thimayya of India. A Soldier's Life 1960), pp. 107-125.

The Role of the Military in Pakistan came from the politically quiescent Muslim martial areas like the Punjab were not as politically conscious. It is said that the decision to transfer power to India and Pakistan in 1947 came as a surprise to most of the senior officers of the British Indian army.13 Some of the Muslim officers who were trained at Sandhurst and who rose to high positions were often described as professionally competent, though not brilliant, and usually fun-loving and polo-playing. But the officers who were commissioned between 1941 and 1946 were of a different breed for they were from urban areas and had been to universities. In 1958, it was said that they constituted a third of the army officers,14 and now that a number of the senior officers have retired, their proportion among the senior influential officers in the Pakistan army is even higher. British traditions of mess life with its dinners and social gatherings are very much on the wane and it is said that Pakistani officers are more nationalistic and less anglicized than their predecessors. They take greater pride in being professionally competent than in being socially correct. The Pakistan air force, which is about one-tenth the size of the army, has drawn most of its men from urban areas. Everyone in the ranks, with the exception of those who play in the band, are high school graduates. Thus, the air force on the whole tends to be more progressive in its outlook than the army where the ranks, besides being drawn from rural areas, are not as well educated. The air force in advanced countries as well (for example, in the United States) with its emphasis on technical skills tends to be more democratic and progressive in outlook than other services.

2.

TRAINING AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Though the Pakistan army enjoys high prestige in the country, yet it does not seem to attract men from the upper middle class to its officer ranks. In fact, there is a tendency among sons of Generals and other senior officers to leave the army and seek employment either in business houses or in the Civil Service of Pakistan. From his interviews the author has noted that the great bulk of the cadets at the Pakistan Military Academy come from either the lower middle class groups or pre13

General Auchinleck in an interview with the author suggested this. This is also borne out by the fact that some of the British officers were naive enough to believe that somehow the British Indian Army would not be partitioned even though the country itself was being partitioned into two states. 14 The Economist, October 18, 1958, pp. 247-248.

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Khalid B. Sayeed dominantly rural classes in West Pakistan. The rural origin of the officer class seems to be a universal phenomenon in the army profession. Janowitz has noted that in 1950 almost 70 per cent of the army leaders in the U.S. were of rural origin.15 In the Pakistan Military Academy, 12 out of the 14 persons who were interviewed said that politics was never discussed at home. The two who said that it was discussed at home were sons of refugees who came from India. Some of those who said that politics was never discussed emphasized that since their family had served the army, they never discussed politics. One of them said that his parents were both well educated, but stressed that "father and other relatives have nothing to do with politics. They hate politics." It may also be noted that the Pakistan army, like any other army, is highly security conscious and before a young man is selected for admission into the Pakistan Military Academy, an elaborate and thorough investigation is made into his background. Thus, it is ensured that men who get into the army are non-political and they and their families have not been connected with what the government may regard as subversive activities. In November 1964, 108 candidates for regular commission in the army were selected for admission to the Pakistan Military Academy. Out of these 108 candidates, 13 were from East Pakistan, 6 were from colleges in Sind and Karachi, and the remaining 89 were from colleges in the Punjab and the former Frontier Province and Quetta.16 Most of these candidates before entering the Pakistan Military Academy, obtained their earlier education from schools and cadet colleges established by the government on English public school lines (American private schools). A Pakistan military officer has observed that "education in these institutions tends to isolate the students from the mass of the common people". It also makes them "soft, smooth and comfortloving".17 The cadets undergo in all a training of two and a half years at the Pakistan Military Academy. Military history forms an important part of their academic instruction and from the syllabus and books prescribed at the Military Academy, it seems that they study with considerable care American Civil War campaigns, campaigns during the Second World War and those of the Korean War. They also study the lives and strategy 15

Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 82 and 86. 16 The Pakistan Times, November 16, 1964. 17 Lieutenant Colonel Ihsanul Haq, "System of Recruitment and Initial Training of Officers in the Pakistan Army", Pakistan Army Journal, Vol. VI, No. 2 (December 1964), p. 35.

280

The Role of the Military

in Pakistan

of famous military leaders like Liddell Hart, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton, and Rommel. In addition to military leaders like Napoleon, they also admire and study the campaigns of Asian or Muslim leaders like Babur and Chengiz Khan.18 It has often been pointed out that the senior and field grade commanders of the Indian and Pakistani armies have been far too much influenced by the British school of tactics and methods of fighting. Thus, in the recent Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965, both sides were following the same textbooks with the result that they could predict and counter each other's orthodox moves. "Hence, there was no decision reached by either side." 19 However, Pakistan's military tacticians maintain that the Indian army, which greatly outnumbered the Pakistany army, by launching its attack first, came so close to the Pakistan army and defenses that the Pakistanis could not take advantage of their superior weapons which could only be used to their full advantage for long-range firing and attack. The result was that the Patton tanks, instead of using their superior long-range fire power, collided with Indian tanks which came right on them. Pakistan was also handicapped in its strategy because it could not let Lahore fall to Indian attacks. The strategy that Pakistan might have liked to pursue was to let a city like Lahore fall so that Indian troops might be drawn inside for a pincer attack. But the fall of Lahore would have resulted in political and psychological demoralization in Pakistan. One does get the impression from reading some of the articles written by Pakistan's military officers that they seem to think that certain clear lessons can be drawn from military battles and campaigns and that if an army applies these lessons when it is engaged in a battle, victory is certain. "The fate of battles is often decided by the initial manoeuvres, long before they are actually fought by placing troops at the right place and at the right time." 20 There is a tendency in all armies to simplify a problem to its bare essentials and to avoid lengthy or complicated processes of thought or analysis. A number of Generals have stressed on the supreme virtue of clear thinking and ability to take firm and quick decisions. Field-Marshal Ayub Khan, addressing the army cadets in the Pakistan Military Academy, said: "A saying that I frequently like to remember is 'I may be right, I may be wrong but I have no doubts.' 18

Military Training Syllabus The Pakistan Military Academy (March 1962), pp. 33-35. 19 Leo Heiman, "Lessons From the War in Kashmir", Military Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (February 1966), p. 23. 20 The Owl. Command and Staff College (Quetta, 1964), p. 58.

281

Khalid B. Sayeed When in a difficult situation let boldness and daring be your counsel." 21 The syllabus of the Pakistan Military Academy is also designed to instill in the minds of the cadets the concepts and principles of military leadership and considerable importance is attached to the subject of manmanagement. Ayub has often derided bookish knowledge that lawyers, intellectuals, and sometimes even civil servants take pride in. A Pakistani General told the author that the Pakistan Military Academy was very much like a university except that it did not produce skeptics. An Air Vice-Marshal of the Pakistan air force told the author that an ideal air force officer is "daring not studious. He should not be a worrying type. If he is, we take him off flying." Lord Ismay, who started his career in the British Indian army, referring to military intervention in politics, told the author: "All our training is wrong for politics. . . . Very few soldiers have time for intensive reading. They are not directed how to read. . . . Soldiers cannot even run a modern war. They can win a campaign but not a war." Lord Ismay pointed out that were it not for the political decision of Churchill to land troops in Greece in 1944, Greece would not have been saved because the army said that divisions could not be spared. President Nasser has pointed out: I know soldiers. They don't read books. They don't read newspapers. Yes, I am a military man. But I was a politician first — I was arrested as one in the secondary schools. Being both was the strength that helped. We planned for ten years before our coup and our study carried us through. Without this, the coup does not last, - bad economics, bad agriculture, and the people expect something better. So there is another coup - the results go from bad to worse.22 Pakistan's military leaders would assert that Pakistan's military officers are not handicapped by such deficiencies. They would claim that there is a considerable reservoir of high professional competence and administrative ability even for non-military assignments among Pakistan's military officers. Career records of the 50 senior officers who have attained the rank of Major-General and above that the author has studied indicate that 35 of these 50 officers have completed staff college courses. This means that they have not only studied modern methods of warfare but also problems like current affairs, psychological warfare, civil defense, internal security, etc. In addition, ten of these 50 senior officers have attended the Imperial Defence College in Britain where they, in concert with senior officers from civil and military services of 21

Dawn, October 13, 1963.

22

Special Report Egypt, "Nasser Speaks Out", Life, March 11, 1966, p. 70.

282

The Role of the Military in Pakistan the Commonwealth, have been exposed to a study and analysis of defense policy in its wider context. They have studied how the machinery of a modern state works both in times of war and peace. Six air force and two naval officers have also attended the Imperial Defence College. Pakistani military leaders would claim, and, as we shall see later, that some of Pakistan's miliatry officers have been called upon from time to time to serve as ministers of the government, chairmen or managing directors of government-sponsored corporations concerned with industrial development, mining, press, shipping, agriculture, etc. The great bulk of the Pakistani ranks are from the rural areas of the Punjab and the Frontier and are noted for their devotion to religion. It is said that this devotion, particularly in the case of the Pathans, is so fanatical that some of the senior military officers have to hide their laxity in matters religious. It is well known that even during the British period some of the Muslim soldiers refused to fight against the Turks in the First World War because Turks were Muslims.23 During the Second World War, Muslim soldiers of the Eighth Indian Division fighting in Italy charged with their age-old war cry, "Mara Nara Haidri Ya Ali".24 In the Pakistan Military Academy, the form of oath that a cadet recites is: To To To To

the the the the

service of Allah love and service of our State preservation of law, order and good government greater glory of Islam.28

The author found considerable ambivalence in religious attitudes and outlook among the cadets at the Pakistan Military Academy. They were aware that the orthodox mullahs (preachers) and the ulama (the learned authorities on Islam) were liable to give a rigid interpretation of Islamic principles and thus use Islam to block progress and modernization in the country. Therefore, the great majority were of the view that these orthodox elements were not competent to steer the ship of the Islamic state. When asked whether Islam and modern science and industrialization could co-exist, the answer was an emphatic affirmative. But when 23

Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan The Formative Phase (Karachi, Pakistan Publishing House, 1960), p. 46. 24 This is a slogan raised in the name of Caliph Ali who was noted for his military prowess. One More River, The Story of the Eighth Indian Division (Bombay, W. H. Smith, n.d.), p. 9. 25 The Rising Crescent, Vol. 2, No. 1, Journal of the Pakistan Military Academy (Kakul, August 1950).

283

Khalid B. Sayeed pressed further as to how they could reconcile Islamic injunctions regarding purdah (veiling of women) with modernity, their first reaction was to suggest that the modernity of the West was nothing more than moral decay and sexual depravity that one came across in Las Vegas in the United States or Paris and Monte Carlo in Europe. The institution of purdah, if properly understood, was designed merely to regulate relations between the two sexes along moral and proper lines. The cadets, following the line of reasoning of some of the modern Muslim writers, suggested that Islam had merely recommended that women should appear decent in their attire and should not expose themselves too much. Islam did not recommend the covering of the female face, etc. It was also significant that the religious attitudes of the cadets were interlaced with superstition. They had come from low middle class or rural homes. They suggested that mere repetition of prayers or observance of rituals was not enough. They asked, "Why was it that East Pakistan was being battered by cyclones and floods? Why was it that we never had these catastrophes before partition? It was all because we do not mean anything by our prayers and we are fast deteriorating and degenerating in our moral standards." One may ask that the Pakistan army gets most of its recruits out of the country but can it get the country out of these recruits? The Pakistan army has often succeeded in transforming the social outlook of its cadet officers. As they move up the hierarchy, they tend to become more and more pragmatic and rational. One comes across basically three kinds of religious attitudes among the senior officers. These attitudes are best personified in the three Commanders-in-Chief that the Pakistan army has had. Musa (1958September 1966) is extremely religious and punctilious in the performance of prayers and rituals. Ayub (1950-1958) stands midway between those who are religious and those who are indifferent. His social outlook is fairly modern. He lives in two worlds. In the world of statecraft and public functions, he behaves like the dignified and efficient head of the state with a marked Sandhurst veneer. But he also visits the shrines of saints and pirs and his wife and children do not appear to be too western in their ways of life. Yahya (September, 1966-) is known to be modern in his outlook and quite western in his way of life. Air force officers, on the other hand, have resolved this ambivalence in favor of modernity. Their senior officers are younger than their counterparts in the army. Their wives mix freely in social functions. The former C-in-C, Asghar Khan, made it quite clear that since fasting during the month of Ramadan impairs one's flying capacity, those pilots 284

The Role of the Military in Pakistan and flying officers who insist on fasting would be grounded. The C-in-C was careful enough to obtain a fatwa (religious decree) in support of these orders. The October revolution that took place in October 1958 in Pakistan was not so much to usher into Pakistan a revolutionary change but its object was to clean the augean stables. The Generals who dominated the new cabinet and all martial law administrators were a conservative breed whose basic ideas had already been formed during the years they served the British raj in the thirties and forties of this century. Referring to the fact that his land reforms had provided for adequate compensation and had been eminently fair, Ayub observed: "A large number of these landowners are personal friends of mine. They are people I went to school with, people I was associated with in the army and elsewhere. . . . " 26 For economic development, the new regime relied mostly on private enterprise, disinvestment of some of the state-controlled or state-sponsored industries with the public sector confining itself only to those areas where capital was shy or private entrepreneurial initiative was lacking. Ayub made it clear that, "There have been no grand experiments in nationalization, no fancy slogans about socialism, no undue intervention in the private sector." 27 General Habibullah, a former Chief of Staff of the Pakistan army, together with his son-in-law who was Ayub's son, emerged as the moving spirit behind Gandhara Industries, the successor of General Motors in Pakistan. Rear-Admiral Choudhri, a former C-in-C of the Pakistan navy, joined the directorate of Batala Industries, a leading industrial firm in Pakistan. However, as one moved downwards in the military hierarchy, one found that some Brigadiers, Colonels, and Majors felt that the martial law administration should have been more ruthless in eliminating injustices and reducing economic inequalities. A Brigadier, narrating his experiences of the martial law, said that a proprietor of an oil firm complained to him that he was making only Rs. 2,500 a day instead of Rs. 6,000 a day, but was totally unconcerned about the workers in his firm with six or seven children making only Rs. 75 a month. A Colonel said, "We need a dictator who is quite ruthless in executing his program. The lot of the common man is not improved. We should develop industries under state control." When one considers attitudes toward the West, one finds that the 26

Congressional Record-House, July 12, 1961, p. 12394. Foreword to The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, Government of Pakistan, June 1965, p. IV. 27

285

Khalid B. Sayeed Generals by and large have usually been highly pro-Western. Ayub has often taken pride in describing himself as the architect of the U.S.Pakistan alliances. In July 1958 he went so far as to suggest that Pakistanis were prepared to fight on behalf of the West and put forward the idea of 'lend-lease' which he defined as, "we provide the manpower and you provide us with the means to do the fighting".28 Adressing the U.S. Congress in 1961, he declared, "The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan." The United States through its military aid had by September 1965, when military aid was suspended, trained in all 25 per cent of about 8,000 military officers in Pakistan. The United States has also (even after the suspension of military aid) maintained their military assistance advisory group in Pakistan of 110 military personnel. But ever since the American decision to extend military aid to India in 1962 following the Chinese attack on that country not only public opinion but also military officers in Pakistan have become extremely bitter against the United States. Even before 1962, Pakistan's military officers resented the fact that the United States kept such a tight control over the flow of military aid so that Pakistan's miliary units were never kept in a state of full operation for more than a month or so. This control was exercised through the regulations of the flow of supplies and spare parts. Rifles without scabbards and bayonets would be provided. Planes with fuel for no more than thirty days were made available. The officers complained that they were being constantly and painfully made aware of the fact that they were 'beggars', completely dependent on the generosity of the United States. Particularly after the suspension of military aid in September 1965, Pakistan's military officers have established contacts with the Chinese and the Russians. Chinese tanks and planes have been provided and some of Pakistan's air force and army officers have visited China. In July 1966, the C-in-C of Pakistan's air force led a military mission to the U.S.S.R. the main object of which was to explore ways and means of obtaining Soviet military assistance or purchasing Soviet arms. Pakistan's military policy-makers are aware that the unique strategical position that Pakistan occupies both in the Near East and Southeast Asia is bound to improve their bargaining position with the three big powers of the world - the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Communist China.

28

General Muhammed Ayub Khan, "Strategic Problems of the Middle East", The Islamic Review, July-August 1958, p. 12.

286

The Role of the Military in Pakistan 3.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS - MARTIAL LAW

Army intervention in 1958 and the imposition of martial law was not merely an act of sudden seizure of power. Ever since the early 50's the army, led by the Commander-in-Chief, had been gaining increasing influence. The army acquired increasing power and influence partly by design, partly through default and partly through external factors like the threat from India and U.S. military aid. To begin with, the army perhaps did not plan and conspire to seize power. Weakness, indecisiveness, and inability on the part of politicians to mobilize political support through well organized and integrated political parties, their propensity for internecine intrigues and squabbling, and the resulting failure to create national consensus for a constitution and political stability, and finally the proven incapacity of political leaders to maintain law and order created a political vacuum. All these factors we would characterize as default on the part of politicians. The army, when called upon to suppress lawlessness arising out of religious or industrial riots, soon realized how fragile and prone to constant breakdown was the civilian power. Therefore, one could say that more defaulting on the part of politicians might have led to more designing on the part of the army. From the very beginning it seems that the idea that soldiers were superior to civilians in terms of character, discipline, and loyalty to their country had taken root among the army officers.29 In March 1951, the Rawalpindi conspiracy was unearthed and suppressed. This conspiracy to seize all power in Pakistan was led by Major-General Akbar Khan, Chief of the General Staff. The army was to play the crucial role, but amongst the conspirators were a few Communists. The main source of discontent was the fact that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had not capitalized on the advantageous position and initiative that the Pakistan army had vis-à-vis the Indian army in the Kashmir war and had agreed upon a cease-fire. It is said that the Prime Minister chose General Ayub as the first Pakistani C-in-C because he was a Pathan from Hazara who was not likely to have much support among the Punjabi officers. Furthermore, a large number of Pathans might not regard him as a fullfledged Pathan for he came from Hazara which was outside the main Pathan areas and also because he was not a proper Pushtu-speaking Pathan. 29

See speeches of Major-General Muhammad Akbar Khan, Mujahid (Malir Cantonment, October 1, 1948) and General N. A. M. Raza, Mujahid, October 15, 1948.

287

Khalid B. Sayeed In addition to default and design, there were external factors. The most persistent has been the threat from India. Soon after becoming Commander-in-Chief in 1950, General Ayub decided that in view of the Indian threat and also because of the strategic location of the country with powers like the Soviet Union and China being interested in extending their sphere of influence to Pakistan, it was imperative that Pakistan should have a well organized army. However, he was aware that Pakistan could not affort to build a strong army without external aid. All this meant that the Commander-in-Chief in order to pursue his objectives should have a government readily responsive to his needs and demands. The Pakistan army found in Iskander Mirza, the Defense Secretary, who himself had started his career as a military officer, a forceful and powerful advocate of their demands. The Defense Secretary was close to the Prime Minister in his capacity as the Minister of Defense. In addition, Ayub had during the early fifties his own brother in the Pakistan cabinet. But the most important factor was the fact that the mutual hostilities between Pakistan and India were frequently at a boiling point with the result that politicians, who often used this factor for their political purposes, could not resist any pressure from the army for increase in defense expenditure. During 1953-55, the prestige of the civilian government reached its lowest ebb whereas public estimation of the role of the army reached its high watermark. During early 1953, in the former province of West Punjab, religious disturbances were staged by a coalition of the ulama and several political groups and punitive measures against the minority sect of Qadianis were demanded. Politicians, both for political and genuine religious reasons, were incapacitated from taking any decisive action. Some of the political leaders and even police officers would have liked to take strong measures for maintaining law and order but they were genuinely disturbed in their consciences wondering whether the demonstrators were not justified in their demands. At this crucial moment, faced with a situation when mobs led by their leaders were resorting to open lawlessness and destruction of public property, military officers, when called upon to take action, did not hesitate to open fire to restore law and order. To the army mind, no religious issue worthy of its name could degenerate into lawlessness. The martial law that was introduced in the city of Lahore ushered in a clean and efficient administration with prices under control, with goods available in the shops and with the streets and roads looking clean. For the first time the army became aware of what it could accomplish for the public and 288

The Role of the Military in Pakistan how much harm a divided or misguided civilian government could cause to the country. During the spring of 1954, some of the industrial areas in East Pakistan were faced with riots between Bengali and non-Bengali Muslims in which several hundred Urdu-speaking refugees from outside Bengal fell victim to the bitter hostility of Bengali Muslims. Again the civil administration stood paralyzed and the army was called in to restore law and order. In October 1954, the Constituent Assembly was dissolved by the Governor-General. The Governor-General "with a General to the right of him and a General to the left of him" packed off the rump Parliament and set up a regime in which Ayub, the C-in-C, became the Defense Minister. In October 1958, Ayub revealed that the Governor-General had asked him several times (presumably during 1954-55) to take over the country on behalf of the army, but he had refused. Obviously, the C-in-C being a cautious man was not quite sure whether the army was sufficiently united behind him to extend its full loyalty. In addition, having been brought up on the British tradition of a non-political army, he was reluctant to intervene. It is difficult to say whether Ayub actually started planning for seizing political power. However, those who knew him intimately detected certain straws in the wind. He often subjected some of the civil servants and political leaders he met to searching questions regarding government policy and administration and when told that the government had no clear policy or was bungling, would often say that eventually things would be set right. His biographer has written that in October 1954, when a serious political crisis was brewing in Pakistan, he formulated an elaborate plan in which details regarding the integration of West Pakistan, the role of East Pakistan, the desirability of indirect elections, etc. were spelled out with great precision and clarity.30 This meant that the scheme of integration of the various provinces and areas of West Pakistan into the province of West Pakistan, which was brought about by the government in 1955, was first worked out in most of its salient details by Ayub Khan. In March 1957, Ayub persuaded President Mirza that there should be a Chief of Staff in the Pakistan army so that he might be relieved of administrative and routine matters and thus be able to establish close contacts with army units throughout the country. His biographer records that his average annual mileage by road for touring and inspection used 80

Colonel Mohammed Ahmed, My Chief (Lahore, Longmans Green, 1960), pp. 86-93.

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Khalid B. Sayeed to be as high as 30,000.31 In addition, the system of military security intelligence was elaborate and thorough. This involved a monthly report sent by battalion commander to the General Headquarters and to his own brigade and divisional headquarters. The battalion commander obtains his information from company commanders. Information regarding civilian morale, relations between military personnel and civilians, public reaction to national and international issues, etc. is communicated. There is also the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence which gathers intelligence from all services as well as from military attachés abroad. It is well known that very often the intelligence that is available to the military is superior to the kind of intelligence that is gathered by civilian agencies. It may be noted that in addition military officers posted in various districts are in touch with civilian officials. The author saw a 'Handing-over Note' 32 of a Deputy Commisioner of Sialkot which stated: "Major General Umrao Khan - a very straight forward and upright man and my relations with him were just like a brother. Discussed the problem of the District practically every day." Another factor which increased the confidence of a military leader like Ayub to take on the civilian administration was the fact that the Pakistan army had become very much like a large-scale organization. The army had launched a number of profitable industrial units like textile mills, a cereal manufacturing factory and sugar mills for the welfare and employment of retired or released soldiers. In addition, army cadet colleges on English public school lines had been established both in East and West Pakistan. Above all, as C-in-C, Ayub had practised with superb skill the art of political management whereby he had kept units and officers belonging to several regions in West Pakistan in considerable harmony. Professor Janowitz has referred to the tendency of the military elite becoming 'civilianized' to a greater extent than the civilian elite becoming militarized.38 Pakistan during 1956-58, with the exception of Suhrawardy's Prime Ministership (1956-57), did not achieve political stability or national consensus of a higher order than it had attained during the years 195356. In fact, during 1957 and 1958, bureaucrats and military leaders were alarmed by increasing bitterness and hostility among political factions. The legislature in West Pakistan could not normally transact 31

Ibid., p. 48. A 'Handing-over Note' contains notes and experiences of a Deputy Commissioner which he leaves for the benefit of his successor. 33 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 117. 32

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The Role of the Military in Pakistan any business because neither of the two factions would let any government function in the house. In September 1958, the Speaker of the East Pakistan Assembly had to flee from the House and the Deputy Speaker was assaulted and later died. A Major-General of the Pakistan army has disclosed that Pakistan's army leaders were thinking of military intervention ever since the early part of 1957. Plans for the military seizure of power sometime in the middle of October 1958 had been finalized, but the army decided to impose martial law on the night of October 7 because the situation was fast deteriorating as a big Muslim League demonstration in Karachi had to be dispersed by the police on October 6.34 The United States decided to give military aid to Pakistan in 1954 so that the country, along with the other countries of the Northern Tier - Turkey, Iran and Iraq - should be able to resist Communist aggression, and particularly the North Korean type of Communist attack. Pakistan's military leaders could argue that if political instability were allowed to degenerate into civil strife and lawlessness, the situation would become soon ripe for eventual Communist takeover. In such a situation only the army with its monolithic unity could intervene to save the country. Indeed, a U.S. President's Committee had approved of such military intervention. It argued that the existing system of political parties in the developing areas were incapable of producing such a counter force as to match the quasi-military organization of Communist parties. Therefore, it concluded "that the military officer corps is a major rallying point of the defense against Communist expansion and penetration".35 We have already referred to the universal tendency among army officers to simplify problems to their bare essentials. Army leaders, including General Ayub, who were the principal decision-makers during the early stages of the martial law administration, not only produced a simple and straightforward diagnosis of the basic problems that Pakistan was plagued with, but also put forward equally simple remedial measures. The economy of the country should be set right by curbing tax evasion, on the one hand, and reducing government expenditure and abandoning the policy of deficit financing on the other. Smuggling should be eliminated, exports should expand and private enterprise 34

Major-General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1963), see pp. 190-194. 35 Supplement to the Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol. II (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 79.

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Khalid B. Sayeed should be given maximum encouragement. An army minister like Lieutenant-General Azam Khan displayed tremendous drive and dynamism in the resettlement of about 100,000 refugees within a period of three years. The martial law administration also introduced land reforms, but their approach was again more pragmatic and conservative than doctrinaire. All this was, as we have said before, mostly cleansing of the augean stables and not a social revolution. We have detected a certain amount of design and planning on the part of the army before it staged the coup in October 1958. But the army had not produced a comprehensive blueprint of social and economic reforms. However, certain officers like Brigadier F. R. Khan found that the army was given a tremendous opportunity to transform and revolutionalize the entire social fabric of the country. They asked fundamental questions, but the maladies they detected and the remedies they suggested were along hackneyed lines and expressed in familiar cliches. Provincialism, they said, was the cancer which was eating into the moral and social fibre of the country. A Bureau of National Reconstruction was set up. The thinking behind it had a fascist flavor. The Bureau was established to explain to the people that the policies of the government were in their own interest. Another objective was "to develop a pattern of character which is necessary for the creation of a national outlook".36 The Brigadier soon found that he had taken on too much and that the bureaucratic machinery was far too strong and set in its ways to be transformed or circumvented. Martial law administrators were motivated by a high degree of concern for public welfare but had very little expertise to translate such noble intentions into practice. They tried to fix prices and profits only to find that the goods were disappearing. They introduced land reforms, but soon found that they had to rely on the experience and expertise of civil servants. The martial law administrator in East Pakistan, addressing the civil servants, said, "Whenever something crops up you think it over and put to the test whether it is in the interest of the country or not. If it is in the interest of the country do it otherwise not." 37 They were not only naive in their thinking but the author found that they, having led sheltered lives in military cantonments, did not know the daily degradation and injustices that afflicted the lives of their fellow countrymen. The author, while going around the Military Complaint 36

The Challenge and the Response p. 19. 37

(Bureau of National Reconstruction, n.d.),

The Pakistan Observer, August 1, 1959.

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The Role of the Military in Pakistan Offices in Lahore that the martial law authorities had set up was told by a non-commission officer that he had never realized that the people of Pakistan had become morally so depraved. He referred to cases of women being kidnapped and living with their captors and the husband pursuing his complaint for years on end without obtaining any redress. Within a matter of six weeks after the imposition of martial law, most of the army had been withdrawn. The fighting capacity of the army was not to be impaired. Only two days after martial law was declared, General Musa, at that time Deputy Commander-in-Chief, issued instructions to the whole army for winter collective training. Martial law administrators and military courts continued to function, but civil servants soon recovered their former positions of influence and power. Indeed, it was very much like the former British viceregal system. The present Viceroy was the Supreme Martial Law Administrator, General Ayub, armed with enormous power, but mostly dependent for his dayto-day administration of the country on the civil servants. Unlike the pre-martial law political regimes, the civil servants could depend upon the coercive sanctions of the martial law and were not hamstrung by political demands and pressures.

4. POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Under the present Constitution (1962), the military in Pakistan enjoy an entrenched position. President Ayub under the Constitution is the Supreme Commander of the Defense Services. The present Minister of Defense is the former Commander-in-Chief of the navy. The Minister of Defense is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Committee. Under the existing set-up the Commanders-in-Chief of the three services exercise a considerable degree of autonomy with regard to the supervision and administration of their respective services. The entrenched position of the military is perhaps even more clearly reflected in Article 238 of the Constitution which lays down that for a period of 20 years after the commencement of the present Constitution, the Ministry of Defense shall be held by a person who has held a rank not lower than that of Lieutenant-General in the Pakistan army or an equivalent rank in other services. The Pakistan army, like other armies, takes great pride in its concept of man-management. The essence of military organization is that the officer from dawn to dusk is in constant contact with his men. Whether 293

Khalid B. Sayeed it is the morning parade or weapon training, digging of trenches or other fatigue jobs, or games and sports in the afternoon, the officer is expected to supervise, to lead, and, in fact, is supposed to perform better than his men. His men have been placed in his charge. He is concerned about their meals. He advises them even about their domestic problems. And when the day is over, an ideal officers is one who retires last. By working with his men, the officer is trying to mold them into a team. He gets to know their capabilities and is also aware of their shortcomings. Many military officers have told the author that the civil servant knows his files but not his men. The Civil Service of Pakistan is often regarded, and rightly, as a great instrument of national unity. But to an army officer it is not as cohesive as the Pakistan army because it suffers from the quota system under which 80 per cent of the officers are recruited on the basis of quotas assigned to the provinces and units of Pakistan. Entry into the Pakistan army is not based on such considerations. Therefore, in the eyes of the officers, the army is the supreme symbol and unholder of national unity. In the words of General Von Seeckt: "The army serves the state and the state alone, for it is the state." It is these ideas which have shaped the thinking of military men regarding the affairs of state. The officers think that since they can lead and manage their men, they can provide leadership to others as well. Since the army is so united, so can the country be. Similarly, military men are often used to reducing difficult problems to their bare essentials and simple solutions. Some of the military officers in Pakistan have been led into thinking that the affairs of state also lend themselves to simple and straightforward solutions. While campaigning during his first Basic Democracy elections, President Ayub said: "It was his desire to see the country as organized as her army." 38 One may ask that when a General, having seized power, is unable to eliminate corruption altogether and discipline the civilians in an army fashion, are the officers likely to become restless? But it would be extremely difficult to challenge President Ayub's position because he enjoys several advantages. First of all, the Pakistan army, like any other army, has a 'hegemonic' organization. It would be difficult for a Colonel to seize power in an army as large as the Pakistan army. Promotions after the rank of Major are by careful selection only and the average promotion of a Major is made after a period of nearly 18 years of service. A t the time of promotion, the entire career of the officer is scrutinized in terms of his Annual Confidential Reports. Not only his 38

Dawn, December 20, 1959.

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The Role of the Military in Pakistan professional capabilities but also factors like how he gets along with other people are taken into account. As he moves up the hierarchy from the rank of Brigadier upwards, promotions are made not only by a selection committee of Generals but they are placed before the Cabinet and the Supreme Commander for final approval. Promotion of an officer to the rank of the Commander-in-Chief not only involves military efficiency but also how he fits into the broader framework of civilian and military organization. Thus, one can say that through such rigorous and careful promotion procedures, officers have been de-politicized. An additional safeguard is the British tradition that the army is strictly nonpolitical in its orientation. President Ayub has been careful in stressing the fact that he had to intervene only because everything else had failed. In addition to these built-in advantages, it may be said to the credit of President Ayub that he has been extremely skillful in the political management of the army.89 Both General Musa, the former C-in-C, and General Yahya, the present C-in-C, are Pathans in an army with a Punjabi majority, but do not belong to any of the major Pathan tribes. In addition, both come from a minority religious sect. It would not be fair to say that these officers have been promoted because they are safe men. It may be argued that because such officers do not have influential connections, in order to gain promotions, they have to be more efficient and loyal than their competitors. Matters of promotion, particularly at the higher levels, require both skill and resources on the part of the Supreme Commander. In promoting some of his senior officers in the army, navy or air force, President Ayub may have to overlook considerations of seniority. This means that a senior officer who has been superseded often resigns from the military in which case he may have to be provided with a post in a government or business organization. However, keeping the military high command technically efficient and politically safe through a policy of careful promotions and screening is not enough. Given the strategic location of Pakistan and its continuing confrontation with India, the military cannot remain altogether free from political influences. After the recent war with India (September 1965), military officers are bound to raise uncomfortable questions. If Pakistan emerged victorious, where are the political benefits in the form of the settlement of the Kashmir dispute? To some extent the President 3I>

For President Ayub's political skills in dealing with regional and other forms of political opposition, see Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967), Chapters 8 and 9.

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Khalid B. Sayeed can argue that Pakistan could not continue its war with India because of its dependence for spare parts and supplies on U.S. military aid which was suspended soon after the outbreak of hostilities. The military officers in their turn may suggest that Pakistan should increase the domestic capacity to manufacture arms and also diversify its dependence by obtaining arms from sources like China and the Soviet Union. Such pressures from the military to improve the imbalance with India (the imbalance is usually estimated as four to one or five to one) will strain Pakistan's economic resources and arrest the increasing pace of economic development. In addition to striking a balance between defense expenditure and economic development, the President has to use his skills in the management of the military in such a way that disgruntled officers are shifted from operational commands to non-operational commands like those of military schools and academies. The Pakistan air force, which takes pride for its performance during the war with India, is bound to have some officers who are bitter that the suspension of military aid from the United States is likely to impair the efficiency of the air force. The military leaders in Pakistan may also argue that the overall efficiency of the military organization has been kept relatively intact. All that has happened since the martial law of 1958 is that the government has been able to draw upon the administrative and organizational talents of senior military officers in filling some of the key positions in the ministries and government-sponsored corporations. They would also argue that the administration in the government of Pakistan would improve as a result of the infusion of qualities like military dynamism and man-management into the civilian sector. How increasingly powerful the military officers have emerged in the power structure of Pakistan is indicated by the kind of offices they have held in the government of Pakistan and in the government-sponsored and private corporations since the imposition of martial law. In addition to President Ayub, three Generals from the army held ministerial positions during the martial law period (1958-62). One of them also became Governor of East Pakistan. The present Governor of West Pakistan is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, General Musa. The present Defense Minister is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan navy. Four Generals from the army have been Ambassadors in ten countries. In addition, an Air Commodore from the air force has been an Ambassador to two countries. Army officers have been chairmen of the following government-sponsored corporations: the Pakistan Oil and Gas Corporation, Pakistan Press Trust, West Pakistan Industrial 296

The Role of the Military in Pakistan Development Corporation, West Pakistan Agriculture Corporation, Small Industries Corporation, and the Karachi Development Authority. Navy officers have been placed in charge of corporations like National Shipping Corporation, Karachi Port Trust, and East Pakistan Inland Water Authority. The Chairmanship of Pakistan International Airlines has gone to Air Marshals of the Pakistan air force. We have already seen that a former Chief of Staff of the Pakistan army has become the Managing Director of Gandhara Industries, the successor of General Motors in Pakistan. In addition, army officers have been given high positions in firms like National Oils, Burma Shell, Sui Northern Gas, etc. A Rear Admiral of the Pakistan navy occupies a senior position in Batala Industries, an iron and steel firm in West Pakistan. Military officers also occupy several important positions in the civil service hierarchy. An example is that a former Director of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate is in charge of the Research Division in the Ministry of External Affairs. Junior military officers like Lieutenants •and Captains were also admitted into the highly prestigious Civil Service of Pakistan during the years 1960-63. It may be noted that most of these military officers have accepted these positions after retirement or have had to resign their military commissions after joining government or private agencies. Thus, it may be said that the army had the striking power in 1958. Today its officers, along with naval and air force officers, occupy a number of commanding positions in the government and commercial sectors of Pakistan. QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON (ONTARIO)

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C. I. Eugene Kim

THE S O U T H K O R E A N M I L I T A R Y C O U P OF M A Y , 1961 Its Causes and the Social Characteristics of its Leaders*

This article tries to answer three critical questions concerning the May 1961 military coup in South Korea. First, what was the nature of the general political, economic, and social dysfunction of Korean political system which made the coup such an easy success? Second, why was there a general ambivalance toward the military assumption of political power at the time of the coup? 1 Related to this is the third and the last question. The coup was executed by a small group of young military officers who seem to differ from the other officers of the huge South Korean Army in their disposition to intervene in civilian politics.2 Who were these young military officers and what made this group of officers different from the rest in their perception of revolutionary possibilities? The approach of this analysis is microcosmic, but it is hoped that this study will promote understanding of comparable problems in other * Western Michigan University has supported this project with a faculty research grant and allowing the time for the author to complete it. Thanks are also due to Professor Morris Janowitz of the University of Chicago for his moral support and encouragement. 1 This ambivalence seems still prevalent particularly among the Korean intellectuals. See Sin, Sang-ch'o, "Ch'oego Hoeui T'ongch'i Sidae" [The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction Period], Sasangge Monthly, May, 1964, pp. 62-75; Robert A. Scalapino, "Korea: The Politics of Change", Asian Survey, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (January, 1903), pp. 31-40. 1 According to an official version of the coup: "At 3 O'clock before the dawn of May 16, 1961, the revolutionary army comprising the 1st Marine Brigade, the Army Airborne Unit, the 30th and 31st Reserve Divisions, and the Sixth Corps Artillery Units crossed the Han River and, although there was a negligible exchange of fire, seized in an instant the entire city of Seoul." See Korea (Republic), The Secretariat, Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, Military Revolution in Korea (Seoul, 1961), Appenlix 2, p. 202.

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The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961 places and at other times.3 As matter of fact, one may find Korean developmental experiences rich in source materials for macrocosmic theorizing, particularly on one of the dominant features in the developing areas, the seizure of power by indigenous military.4 1.

THE EXTENT OF SYSTEM DYSFUNCTION PRIOR TO THE COUP

Since her liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, Korea, a little peninsular country of 85,000 square miles, has been forced into the midst of cold war conflicts.5 She was divided north and south, when liberated, and, for three years before two Koreas were created, North Korea was under a military rule of the Red Army of the Soviet Union and South Korea under the United States Armed Forces. This was an artificial division, and much of the traumatic birth experiences for the Republic of Korea in the south were caused by this division. To make things worse, the Korean peninsula went through one of the most tragic wars in history. This war was not merely about a terrible winter, about the frustrating experience of a limited war, about 'Chinese hordes', and about hills and rice paddies; but there were also stories about premature death and suffering of innocent people without any promise of restitution. This war was fought for three years and left the casuality toll on both sides in excess of 3,000,000 among which were included 144,173 U.S. soldiers and 17,260 soldiers from the rest of the U.N. allies. Civilian casualities were estimated at 1,000,000 and the havoc of the war further included the destruction of more than 75 per cent of all physical facilities in Korea, leaving 10,000,000 as refugees and innumerable others orphaned and homeless.8 A significant aftermath of the war is psychological. What the war was 3

John P. Lovell, "The Military in Relation to Political Change: Micro and Macro Analyses", a paper presented at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists which was held in Chicago between April 28 and 30, 1966. See also Lyle N. McAlister, "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 360 (July, 1965), pp. 85-98. 4 For a significant contribution in macrocosmic theorizing in this regard, see Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York, Praeger, 1962). 5 Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and was annexed formally to Japan in 1910. 6 The figures are compiled from Korea (Republic), Statistics Bureau, Office of Public Information, Statistical Tabulation Explaining the Overall Status of Damages suffered during the Course of the War of June 25, 1950 (Seoul, 1952).

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C. I. Eugene Kim like in human suffering and degradation only those who went through it know, and those who went through it are left with bitterness towards life, towards themselves, and towards everything else. Still, Koreans are living under the precarious condition of cease-fire. Korea was one time called the most virtuous nation of the East. Economically, the country has been on very precarious footing ever since the liberation. Aside from the devastation incurred as a result of the recent war, Korea has had longer-standing and more basic handicaps. Under Japanese colonial status, the country could not develop any integrated economy of its own; it was an adjunct to the economic system of Japan and was exploited accordingly. In 1945, such natural balance as existed in the geographical unity of the 'agricultural south' and the 'industrial north' was torn apart by the division of the country. North and south are so complementary in the nation's economy that one sector alone cannot hope to provide successfully the economic basis of national independence.7 Since the liberation, furthermore, South Koreans have been exposed to Western tastes, yet their personal and individual wants and aspirations have been incessant and far from satisfied. The country has been in perpetual depression, and according to one estimate, about 2,000,000 people out of 9,000,000 employable workers between the ages of 16 and 60 were jobless as of May, 1961. The flight of more than 3,000,000 refugees from Communist North Korea to the South since 1945 was no help. Worse still, the already over-populated 37,450 square miles of land in the southern half of the Korean peninsula has been adding to its population of 24,000,000 at a 'conservative' rate of 2.95 per cent a year.8 As critical as the situation for national survival has been in Korea, the country has not had a political leader who could focus the diversified and divisive efforts of the people on a general purpose that would mobilize their loyalty and dedication. This might have been a liability of the liberation in 1945, which was gained but had not been fought for. The experiences of both The First and Second Republics of Korea were frustrating. 7

Yoon T. Kuark, "Economic Development Contrasts between South and North Korea", Patterns of Economic Development, edited by Joseph S. Chung (Kalamazoo, Mich., The Korea Research and Publication, Inc., 1966), pp. 121176. 8 The New York Times, May 10, 1961. See also Lee, Chang-yul, "The Problem of Over-population in Korea", The Journal of Asiatic Studies (Seoul), March, 1958, pp. 83-103.

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The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961 True, Japan invested heavily in Korean education during her rule of thirty-six years in Korea,9 but this education was meant to achieve unification of Japan and Korea and make Korea an integral part of Japan's expansionism on the Asian mainland. This meant also an economic modernization of the peninsula under Japanese management. Indeed, to move from the last Korean Yi dynasty of the Confucian past to an integrated part of Japan was a big stride for such a short period of time, but if Koreans were affected by these changes, they were not active participants in them. What is significant is that, despite general mobilization of Korean society under Japanese rule and heavy investment in Korean education by the Japanese authorities, Koreans were more and more excluded from positions of responsibility in their government and from the process of governing themselves. Furthermore, Koreans were not trained in self-expression and political articulation. When Korea was liberated in 1945, Koreans were highly mobilized, but their mobilization was differential in nature.10 The political culture of Korea at the time was subjective, and Korea since 1948 has lacked any general consensus concerning the national purpose.11 To attest this lack of general political consensus: The First Republican constitution (1948-1960) was drawn up in less than a month in July 1948 to meet the deadline of August 15, 1948, the date set for proclamation of the Republic of Korea. Almost each session of the National Assembly thereafter concentrated on fighting over the constitution - a presidential system or a cabinet system; an American type of presidential system or a Fourth French Republican type. What basic framework of government was to be instituted became the most crucial issue of party politics in Korea. The Democratic Party, which had been unable to replace Syngman Rhee as president, tried to make his office merely titular and to obtain a majority in the National Assembly and thus primiership by its party head in a cabinet form of government.12 For the • See C. I. Eugene Kim, "Japan's Colonial Education and Korea's Nationbuilding", in the book edited by him, A Pattern of Political Development (Kalamazoo, Mich,, The Korea Research and Publication, Inc., 1964), pp. 1-16. 10 Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1953). 11 See Yoon, Ch'ung-joo, 'The Authoritarian Power Manipulation and the Party Formation in Korea", The Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Seoul, December, 1961), pp. 51-100. 12 For a further analysis of South Korean constitutional development, see the author's "South Korean Constitutional Development: The Meaning of the Third Republican Constitution", Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, Vol. XLIX (1964), pp. 301-312. 301

C. /. Eugene Kim general public, the point of all this dispute was immaterial. According to a survey conducted in November, 1960 among a national sample of about 3,000 respondents, 23.0 per cent favored a cabinet system and 13.1 per cent a presidential system. However, those who responded "Don't matter which system" and "Don't know" amounted to 13.1 per cent and 55.9 per cent respectively.13 Syngman Rhee got what he wanted,14 but the negative evaluation of his regime did continue until the April 1960 Student Movement which toppled the regime.15 A study made on the motivating factors of the April, 1960 student movement classified the student participants in the movement as 'action crowds or mobs' - disorganized gatherings excited and angered and activated into terrors inadvertantly.18 The movement was not in the least in support of one regime as against another. It was not Chang's group which deposed Syngman Rhee, but they succeeded to power after Rhee as the logical successor because of their role of opposition to the Rhee government and because a genuine political motive was lacking among the student uprisers. Rhee was left to resign his office and the so-called caretaker government was instituted by men who were so designated by Rhee before his resignation. Another incident that undermined the revolutionary nature of the fall of Rhee was a generous gesture of the caretaker government that saw Rhee sent off safely to the United States. Thus, Rhee, who cut-maneuvered, out-lasted, and out-lived all of his power rivals, terminated his political career in Korea. All of his power rivals and Korean political notables met death, some natural and some unnatural. During this interim period, a new constitution was set up. The 13

Yi, Kuk-ch'an, "Chongch'ijok Mugwansim kwa Minju Chongch'i ui Wigi" [Political Indifference and Peril to Democratic Politics], Sasangge Monthly, April, 1961, pp. 60-69. 14 For a vivid description of crude power manipulation of Syngman Rhee, see Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland and Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1960). 15 A military coup could have taken place earlier, if the plan was not interrupted by the Student Uprising in April 1960. See Chung Hee Park (Chong-hi Pak), "What has made the Military Revolution successful", The Koreana Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Summer, 1961), p. 26. 16 Kim, Sung-tai, "A Study on the Motivating Factors of the April-19th Student Upheaval in Seoul", Sunggyungwan Taihakkyo Nonmun Chip [Songgyungwan University Collected Essays], 1960, pp. 80-106. A similar conclusion was also reached by a study conducted by Kim Ke-soo and the author on the April 19, 1960 Student Movement. See C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "The April 1960 Korean Student Movement", Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (March, 1964), pp. 83-92. This article is also carried in A Pattern of Political Development: Korea, op. cit., pp. 48-60.

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The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961 presidency had been changed from a popular elective office with broad executive powers to a more formal office with election by the National Assembly. Elections were again held on July 29, 1960 and the Democratic Party, as against the former Liberal Party of Syngman Rhee, won an absolute majority of 175 out of 235 seats in the National Assembly. With this absolute majority in the National Assembly, however, the Democratic Party failed to exert a concerted effort to execute its policies as it was split into two factions - a progressive and an old guard faction. The compromise between the two gave John M. Chang, head of the progressives, the position of Prime Minister, and Yun Po-son, head of the old guard, become President. It was a victory for the progressive elements within the Democratic Party. The truth of the matter, however, was that John M. Chang, or the Democratic Party itself for that matter, was led into power by windfall and there seem to have been many reservations as to the capability of the Democratic Party's leadership 17 - so much so that Chang's Second Republic was lacking in both dynamism and policy innovation, and his government, as a reaction against the strong-hand rule of Rhee, was necessarily weak in substance as well as appearance. Chang's mediocrity in leadership was an asset, yet, it also was a liability. His fall was not only precipitated by his lack of leadership ability in this critical period of Korean history, but also by the paradoxical demands that Chang shouldered. The people were too proud of their achievement in bringing down the Rhee regime and they asked that all the ills of the country be solved before their thin patience ran out.18 "Ever since the April Revolution", reports the junta's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, "a total of 1,835 demonstrations of various types took place with the participation of 969,630 individuals". To oppose these demonstrations, "There occurred every day 7.3 demonstrations with 3,876 individuals participating." 19 At one time on October 11, 1960, demonstrating students rushed into the National Assembly building and threatened the members of the Assembly in session with a demand for stricter measures for cleaning up traitors and 17

See Oh, Byung-hun, "Political Attitudes of Korean Voters", The Journal of Asiatic Studies (Seoul), December, 1960, pp. 29-80; Han, Tae-yon, "Hanguk ui Chisik Kyegup" [Korean Intellectuals], Sasangge Monthly, May, 1959, pp. 3441. 18 E. O. Reishauer, Kim, Chung-yop and Yi, Nab-gap, "Innae mani Minjujuui rul chikkinda" [Patience alone makes a Democracy work], ibid., December, 1960, p. 213. 18 Korea (Republic), The Secretariat, Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 15.

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C. I. Eugene Kim corruption in general. The government acceded to the demonstrators' demand and ordered retrial of those already acquitted. So frequent were the demonstrations that the ordinary citizens developed immunity to them.20 The Second Republic has further discredited a civilian government.

2.

THE MILITARY DISPOSITION TO INTERVENUE

Considering all the resources which the modern military organization of the South Korean Armed Forces had and all the political advantages which the military had over debilitating civilian organizations, the sooner it would seem that a military coup could have come in South Korea. Indeed, such a shrewd observation was made.21 The logic of the situation should have dictated a 'radical reform coup'.22 Recent studies show that the military in the developing areas is more exposed to Western influences than other groups in the society and it is more Western in its organizational concepts and structures; it is capable of unified, effective, and disciplined action; its officers are highly nationalistic and keenly aware of civilian inadequacies. A high proportion of them are able, energetic and upwardly mobile.23 At the time of the coup, however, the military's rise to power in South Korea was acquiesced in but not consented to by the general populace. Writing in the New York Times, Bernard Kalb stated: "The mood of South Korea today was reflected in the intense expression on the faces of the people reading the bulletin board." "Theirs was a mood of anxiousness, doubt, uncertainty - all stemming from the same question: 'What will the all powerful junta do next?' " He continued: "The uncertainty in South Korea is reflected in the soul-searching among 20 See A. M. Rosenthal, "Again Korea is being tested", The New York Times Magazine, November 12, 1961, pp. 24 ff. 21 Conlon Associates, Ltd., United States Foreign Policy - Asia: A Study Produced at The Request of The Committee In Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, November, 1959 (Washington, 1960). 22 Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence In World Politics", in Changing Patterns of Military Politics (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 32 ff. 23 Huntington, ibid., pp. 33-34. See also Janowitz, op. cit.; Finer, op. cit.; Dankwart A. Rustow, Politics and Westernization in the Near East (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956); Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (The Little Brown series in Comparative Politics, 1966), pp. 179 ff; John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin American (Stanford University Press, 1958); Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, Praeger, 1960).

304

The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961 students, professors, business men and other non-military Koreans." "These people whisper worriedly among themselves." "They wonder whether there will be a new coup by one or another of the factions of the Armed Forces. . . ." 24 This reservation existed despite the high popular esteem of the military. At the time of the April 1960 student movement, the soldiers who were enforcing a martial law in the country were heroes too.25 They sided with the students and their permissive attitude toward the student demonstrators against Rhee's government was instrumental in the success of the student movement. One can explain in the main this ambivalence of the populace in terms of Korean Confucian cultural heritage. The last Korean dynasty of Yi governed the peninsula for about five hundred years (1392-1910) on neo-Confucian precepts and smartly perpetuated the ruling oligarchs who were recruited from the ruling class called Yangban (two orders of civilian and military officials). The Yi society was highly structured. The government was an absolute monarchy and the system of political power was unipolar from top to bottom and all the government positions were appointive. In this unipolar system of balancing power in the country, the monarch's government was extremely jealous of any source of power other than its own. No centrally appointed officials were assigned to the place of their origin; no appointment was for more than 900 days and for only 360 days for the provincial governor; and all of them were under surveillance of the monarch's secret agents.28 Emphasis was also on civilian supremacy.27 Any military hero was naturally suspect. The military was given a lower ranking in the Yi government. No military commander was given the highest government rank. Very often the Department of War was headed by a scholarofficial. The provincial governor was a scholar-official. Furthermore, 24

The New York Times, May 28, 1961. See also A. M. Rosenthal's review of one year rule of the junta in ibid., May 28, 1962; Mun Ch'ang-sik, "Chang, Toyong Panhyongmyong Ummo Sagon" [Chang, To-yong Anti-revolutionary Plot Incidence], Taesagon [Historical Events] (Seoul, Inmulgue, March, 1962), p. 275; Kiyomiya Ryou, "Chang Chusio to sono Nakama" [Lt. General Chang and his Compatriots], Bungei-Shunju, July, 1961, p. 92. 25 C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, op. cit. 29 Keijo Teikoku Daigaku Hobun Gakkai, ed., Chosen Shakai Keizai Shi Kenkyu [Korean Socio-Economic Research], No. 6 (Tokyo, 1933), pp. 17-18; W. H. Wilkinson, The Corean Government (Shanghai, 1897), Part I; Yi, Pyong-do, Kuksa Taegam [A general Survey of Ko Korean history] (Seoul, 1960), passim. 27 Aso Takeki, "Gunseishi: fu, Keisatsu Seidoshi" [History of the Military and Police Organizations], Chosenshi Koza [Lectures on Korean History], series no. 1.

305

C. I. Eugene Kim a long dynastic history of seclusion (Korea was often called 'Hermit Nation') further weakened the role of the military in traditional Korea. The end result of all these left Korea with no group, either civilian or military, strong enough to bring about a radical reform even though the existing government was clearly incapable of meeting internal and external demands made upon it during its last years of existence. When Korea became a protectorate of Japan in 1905, the Korean armed forces altogether numbered only about 9,000 men with 311 officers.28 The officers were recruited from the Yangban class. The rest were variously recruited from the landless peasants, from the men in the peddlers' guilds, and from the mountain tiger hunters skilled in the use of fire arms. At the time, the American Counsul General in Seoul observed that Korean troops were "an uncertain quality, unreliable, and apt to join with a mob in a crisis".29 In 1907, all of them were disbanded in toto by the Japanese. Thus disbanded, some of them were inducted into Japanese gendarmery and police forces; some returned to their villages and became school drill masters. Some joined guerrilla band which fought the Japanese intermittently. To subjugate the guerrillas the Japanese forces used a search and destroy method. Furthermore, under the assumption that the Koreans were sympathetically disposed to the guerrilla fighters, if not actively participating in the fight, the Japanese authorities also punished whole villages in reprisal for any aid given to the Korean fighters. Between July, 1907 and December, 1908, approximately 6,880 houses were burned by the Japanese forces.80 The Koreans regarded the Japanese military and police forces as awesome and arrogant. Even public school teachers, both Japanese and Koreans alike, dressed themselves like police officers and wore swords even in the classroom until 1920. All the Japanese Governor-Generals were military men. It was this kind of military dictatorship with which Japan governed Korea in her effort to transform the old-established country of Korea into an integral part of Japan. 28

See C. I. Eugene Kim, "Japanese Rule in Korea (1905-1910): A Case Study", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. CVI, No. 1 (February, 1962), pp. 53-59. 29 Sammons to Assistant Secretary of State, August 1, 1907, U. S. Department of State, Diplomatic Dispatches, Japan, No. 145, Case 1166. Cited in ibid., p. 58. 30 For a detailed study of this period, see Korea and the Politics of Imperialism 1876-1910 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press 1967) by C. I. Eugene Kim and Han Kyo Kim, chapter 12. See also Chosen Chusatsugun Shireibu, Chosen Boto Tobatsu Shi [Records on the Subjugation of Korean Rebels] (Riusan, 1913).

306

The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961

This negative Korean image of the Japanese military did change somewhat over the years, coincidental with the glorification of military virtues in Japanese daily life. The soldiers were national heroes. With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 in particular, there were frequent victory celebrations. The military career was adored. The school children were taught military bravery and self-sacrifice. Indeed, the Korean children in the 1930's were brought up with more affectionate orientation toward the Japanese military or the military career in general than their older generations were. Koreans were recruited for Japanese military service from 1938. In that year there were 2,946 applicants. Those who passed the qualifying examinations numbered 1,381, but only 480 were finally recommended for a special training school for them. Each province was assigned a quota and the final recommendation came from the provincial governor. The number of Korean applicants for voluntary Japanese military service increased significantly thereafter. In 1939, the number of applicants were 12,348. Those who passed the qualifying examinations numbered 6,247 and the final recommendations were made for 780.S1 Meantime, Korean college students were inducted into the military service on a selective basis. Some middle school (American junior high school level) students were selected by the school and sent to the cadet school. Korean conscription was enforced in 1944. Korean ambivalence toward the military profession did continue after the liberation along the generational lines. The following table seems to indicate, that the leaders of the military coup represent a new, upwardly mobile middle class of Korea.32 As will be pointed out later, they are not only younger than the previous decision-makers in the Korean government, but also their fathers had more and better education than the fathers of their predecessors.83 3.

SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUP LEADERS

After 1945, when the Korean military forces were organized, there were three types of initial recruits. The first recruits were selected largely from 31 Chosen Sotokufu, Chosen Shitsusei Sanjunen Shi [A History of 30 Years of Administration of Korea] (Keijo, 1940), pp. 806-807. 82 A large number of the military coup leaders ran successfully for the National Assembly elections which were held in November, 1963. See C. I. Eugene Kim, "Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections", Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 3 (March, 1964), pp. 765-773. 33 See also Lee, loung-sik, "The Social Origin of Members of the Sixth National Assembly", Korean Affairs (Seoul), Vol. m (April, 1964), pp. 1-19.

307

C. I. Eugene Kim TABLE 1

Father's education of sixth (1963-1967) assembly men

Education

All

Liberal party period 1948-60

Democratic party period 1960-61

Military period 1963-

(Per cent) N o education Chinese classics Primary school Middle & High school Former College (Senmon) University Graduate school Doctor's degree Unknown Total

15.8 35.7 10.7

18.9 36.5 6.8

16.3 41.8 11.6

8.5 17.0 19.1

15.8

16.2

12.8

23.4

8.2 7.3 0.6 0.3 5.4

8.8 6.8 0.7 0.7 4.7

5.8 2.3

8.5 19.1 2.1

100

100

— —

9.3 100

—

2.1 loo

Source: Adapted from Hahn, Bae-ho and Kim, Kyu-taik, Korean Political Leaders (1952-1963); Their Social Origins and Skills, Monograph (Seoul, 1963). A revised version of this monograph appeared in Asian Survey, Vol. Ill, No. 7 (July, 1963), pp. 305-323.

the candidates who were nominated by the leading private armies at the time. Their selections reflected a strong anti-Japanese Korean revolutionary forces once stationed in Manchuria and China. The veterans of the Japanese armies were then recruited in the second wave. The third wave came after the founding of the Republic of Korea when there was a big expansion program of the ROK military forces and the officers' ranks were quickly filled to lead eventually some 600,000 men in the armed forces. It was in this third wave that the first contingent of those with no prior military experience entered the Academy in December, 1948. They graduated in six months as part of the '8th Graduating Class', (about 3,000 men), the largest class in the history of the Academy. This graduating class became subsequently famous because of a high incidence of participation by its members in the military revolution of 1961. All the nine original coup planners led by Kim Chong-p'il were of this class.34 This short-term military academy was discontinued when 34

See Tsuboe Senji, Nan-sen no Kaiho Junen [South Korea in Ten Years Since Liberation] (Tokyo, 1957); U.S. Department of Army, Military Advisers in Korea - KM AG in Peace and War, edited by Walter G. Hermes (Washington, D. C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962); Kang, In-sop, "Yuksa Palki Saeng" [The Class 8 of the Military Academy], Sin Dong-a, September, 1964, pp. 170-198.

308

The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961 the four-year military academies of the Army, Navy and Air Force modeled on those in the United States were established. This class is unusual in the history of the Academy. As earlier stated, the leadership of the coup came from this class. They were born around 1930. They had had some college training before volunteering for military careers. They represented a new generational orientation to the military as a career and left college life which was at the time in a sorry state. Most of the colleges in Korea at that time were torn by strikes, and classes were held intermittently. At the time of the Korean War, they provided leadership at the company level and the majority of the class were killed in battle. Those who survived the war were quickly promoted and they could also point with pride to the fact that so many of their classmates died in the defense of the nation. They neither had any patience with political bickering nor bear their politically minded generals. They became the most vocal group for reform in the government, including the military itself. Any reduction in the military forces could have affected them greatly.35 They were against any rapport with the North Korean regime as had been frequently advocated by various social and student organizations since the Student Movement.36 Korea furthermore has the tradition of what the Japanese call gakubatsu 35

"Interview (of Finance Minister Kim)", Far Eastern Economic Review, October 27, 1960, p. 166. During the Rhee Administration the armed forces were about 700,000 - the fourth largest in the world - and later the opposition Democratic Party in power in 1960 advocated a reduction to 500,000. Then Finance Minister Yung Seung Kim, in an interview, disclosed that the new government would reduce the force to 300,000, reallocating the defense budget of $165 million for 1961. 'Aide Memoire' indicated that an ultimate reduction to 50,000 was considered by the Chang government as a part of 'new reform measures'. "Aide Memoire on Economic Reform Measures in Korea" to Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter from Prime Minister John Myon Chang, published in Monthly Reconstruction Survey and Statistics, October and September, 1960, p. 22. 36 The New York Times, May 20, 1961. See also "5.16 Kunsahyongmyong ui Kyongui wa Pihwa: Kukka Chaegon Ch'oego Hoeui Chungang Chongbo Pujang, Kim Chong-p'il Chungnyong Hoegyondam" [A Hidden Story of the Success of the 5.16 Military coup: An Interview with Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction, Col. Kim Chongp'il], Naemak [The Inside Stories] (Seoul, Sintaeyangsa, June, 1961), pp. 47-49; Robert A. Scalapino, "Which Route for Korea?", Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 9 (September, 1962), p. 12, "The Young Korean officers are deeply patriotic". Pak, Chong-hui, Kukka wa Hyongmyong kwa Na [Korea, The Revolution, and I] (Seoul, 1963). An English translation available. Hanguk Hyongmyong Chaepan Sa P'yonch'an Wiwonhoe, Hanguk Hyongmyong Chaep'ansa [Trial of political Crimes] (Seoul, 1962); Minju Hanguk Hyongmyong Ch'ongsa P'yonch'an Wiwonhoe, Minju Hanguk Hyongmyong Ch'ongsa [History of Democratic Korean Revolution] (Seoul, 1962).

309

C. I. Eugene Kim (school and class faction). The same educational experiences are a unifying element among those who went to school together. Other socio-economic characteristics of the leaders of the coup and the subsequent military government are shown in the following analysis of the available biographical data for the 142 participants. Furthermore, the known characteristics of these leaders are compared with those of the leading military officers who neither participated in the coup nor the subsequent junta government. This latter group of 75 officers is taken from the Gendai Chosen Jinmei Jiten [Modern Korean Biographical Dictionary] which was compiled by the Japanese government from the Korean newspapers and other mass media and included all the leading officers and those who had distinguished careers.37 Table 1 is a breakdown of the sample. The author is aware of a skewed nature of the non-participant sample. The non-participants in the sample are highly a select group who have had distinguished careers in the military service and they would tend to undermine the real differences between the participants and the non-participants in the coup and the subsequent junta government. What is interesting, however, both groups of the military officers still show some significant differences. A Chi square test is applied, where possible in terms of theoretical frequency, to show significant differences between them. TABLE 2

Sample distribution

37

Participant

Non-participant

Total

142

75

217

The Gendai Chosen Jinmei Jiten was originally compiled in 1960 by the Foreign Ministry of the Japanese Government and its second edition was issued in 1962. Attempts were made in the dictionary to include "all the individuals listed in the biographical publications in North and South Korea and all those who had their biographical data published in the newspapers and magazines". This information in response to an inquiry was given to the author by the World Journal [Sekai-Journal-sha] (Tokyo, Japan). The following sources were further checked: United States, Department of the State, Principle Government Officials of the Republic of Korea, edited by American Embassy in Korea, No. 2 0 (July 1, 1962); United Nations, Reports of the U.N. Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, Supplement, No. 13, a/4900, pp. 17-19; United Nations, Statistical Office and Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Demographic Yearbook: 1961; Asia Who's Who: 1960 (Hong Kong, Pan Asian Newspaper Alliance, 1960); Segge Yongam: 1961 [World Yearbook] (Seoul, Segge Yongam Chulpan Sa, 1960); Hanguk Yongam: 1961 [Yearbook of Korea] (Seoul, Hanguk Yongam Ch'ulp'an Sa, 1961); Dongo-a llbo [Asian Newspaper] May 16, 1961-August 31, 1962 (Seoul, Korea).

310

The South Korean Military Coup of May, 1961 Participant sample

distribution

Types of participation (a) Original coup member SCNR member Cabinet member Non-Cabinet central government agency member Provincial governor Total

Participant 7 41 21 56 17 142

(9)0» (52) (36) (72) (21) (190)

(a) Mutually exclusive category. (b) For instance, there were actually reported nine original coup members, but the sample includes seven of the nine members.

The military elite officers who participated in the coup and the junta regime were younger than those who did not. Their median ages were respectively 37.8 and 42.1. Furthermore, 6 per cent of the participants served in the Chinese Army and 12 per cent in the Japanese Army as against 5 per cent and 23 per cent respectively among the nonparticipants. A high percentage of the officers who served in the former Japanese Army were found among the non-participants. As a matter of fact, a majority of the participants were the graduates of the Korean Military Academy and had no prior military experiences. More of the participants than the non-participants, however, received a further military training in the United States as officers with 21 per cent of the participants having received such an additional training whereas only 13 per cent of the non-participants had a similar experience. As to their civilian educational backgrounds, the participants had more college or university education (48.1%) than the non-participants had (42.1%). Significantly, the more participants received their college and university education in Seoul than the non-participants, despite the fact that they were predominantly born in the rural areas in the country. Tables 3 through 10 indicate the success story of a coup leader. He was born in a rural area in Korea of a family well-to-do enough to send a son to the city for college education. He did well in the college, but chose a military career.38 Understandably, he also did well in his military career. As explained earlier, more of the participants were chosen 38

In this connection, it is interesting to find in a recent study by professor Lee, Joung-sik that Koreans rank politics high as a possible career choice. In the scale of 28, 'Politicians' ranked fourth following in the order of preference 'Professors', 'Medical Doctors', and 'Lawyers'. See Lee, Joung-sik, "The Social Origin of Members of the Sixth National Assembly", The Korean Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 3, April, 1964, p. 4.

311

C. I. Eugene Kim for further military training in the United States. Furthermore, more of them also received further staff college education (Table 10). TABLE 3

Social backgrounds of Korean political leaders and Korean population

Occupation of father

Total Korea (1930)

All leaders

Liberal gov't.

Democratic gov't.

Military gov't.

(Per cent) Landlord

3

36

37

41

26

Government official, professional or business executive

5

25

25

21

28

Owner-small business, shop; and clerk

8

10

12

4

14

78

24

22

31

24

Small farmer owner, or tenant farmer Laborer

6

1

1

0

2

Other occupation

0

2

1

2

4

Unknown

0

2

2

1

2

100

100

(86)

(47)

Total Number

100

100

100

—

(316)

(148)

Source: Adapted from Hahn, Bae-ho and Kim, Kyu-taik, op. cil., Table III.

To summarize our findings: among many others, Edward Shils candidly pointed out earlier that "military rule is one of several practicable and apparently stable alternatives when parliamentary, democratic regimes falter".39 This proposition has a definite theoretical validity and many cases can be cited to attest to it. For one, the military coup in Korea in May, 1961 followed such a course. A successful military coup, however, needs more than failure of a civilian government to sustain itself. Like a good Aristotelian drama, it has to accommodate many other elements. It takes good actors. It has within it the elements of time and place. Furthermore, the failure of a coup in many instances means loss of life for the planners. It takes suicidal dedication for the participants. It seems, therefore, the failure of a civilian government to sustain itself is one thing. To wage a success38

Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States", The Role of The Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by John J. Johnson, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962).

312

The South Korean Military

Coup of May,

1961

ful coup is another. The military has within it those who are capable of waging a coup and those who are not. Indeed, we need to know more about their differences. One would easily hypothesize that the participants in the coup in a developing nation have been greatly exposed to and keenly aware of the process of politics. They seem to maintain high indices of political socialization. As pointed out by Morris Janowitz, they are furthermore in extensive daily contact with civilians in their familial cultural context - particularly with their families and their old school-mates - and they show definite political orientations.40 In addition, they are strongly success-minded. Their perception of the military profession is non-traditional. They could have chosen a military career from many other occupational alternatives and have done well. They also show their contempt for civilian politicians.41 It was this group of the young military offices in Korea then who successfully waged the coup in May, 1961 and accelerated the downfall of the Second Republic of Korea. After the three years of direct rule by the junta, they have been also successful in transforming themselves into a civilian government, head of the junta government as president, in a close election for presidency and for the national assembly which was held respectively in October and November, 1963. These officers are still in control of political decision-making in Korea, and they have been able to overcome several political crises. TABLE 4 Place of birth Place of birth Seoul City over 100,000 excluding Seoul City of 20,000-100,000 Rural (all other places in Korea) Foreign born Total Unknown 40 41

Participants

Non-participants (Per cent)

16.0

( 8)

47.4

( 9)

2.0 8.0

( 1) ( 4)

15.8

( 3) ( 0)

72.0 2.0

(36)

36.8

( 7) ( 0)

100.0

(50)

; 0(1.0

(19)

—

( 1) (92)

(56)

Janowitz, op. cit., p. 70. C. I. Eugene Kim, "South Korean Constitutional Development", op. cit. 313

C. I. Eugene TABLE 5 Level of civil education

Kim

attained

Participant

Non-participant (Per cent)

Middle school (or junior high school) Senmon gakko (or senior high school) Some college or university College or university graduate Post graduate education

4.8

4)

13.3

( 6)

30.1 15.7

( 25) ( 13)

33.3 11.2

(15)

44.6 4.8

( 37) ( 4)

37.8 4.4

100

Total known

(

( 83)

( 5) (17) ( 2) (45)

100

Unknown

( 59)

(30)

Total

(142)

(75)

TABLE 6 Place of college or university

education

Participant

a

Non-participant (Per cent)

No college or university

51.9

( 54)

57.9

(33)

Total college or university education

48.1

( 50)

42.1

(24)

2

X = -959 .30 < P < .50

The .05 level of significance was used for all the chi square tests hereafter.

College or university in Seoul College or university in other places in Korea College or university in Japan College or university in China or Manchuria College or university in the United States Total Unknown

23.1 1.9 15.4

10.5

( 6)

2)

1.8

( 1)

( 16)

17.6

(10)

( 24) (

5.8

(

6)

8.7

( 5)

1.9

(

2)

3.5

( 2)

(104)

100.0

(57)

100.0

( 38)

(18)

(a) Most of those in the sample not having college or university education had had education equivalent to Junior or Senior high school education. More in detail they number 50 (39.1%) out of the total of 128 cases whose educational backgrounds were listed in the biographical data.

314

The South Korean Military

Coup of May,

1961

TABLE 7 Source of military commission Participant

Non-participant (Per cent)

Graduate of Korean military academy Commissioned at formation of constabulary in 1946 Direct commission because of prior experience or education Battlefield promotion

51.6

5.4

33.3 9.7 100

Total known

( 48)

19.1

( 9)

(

5)

12.8

( 6)

( 31) ( 9)

61.7 6.3

( 3)

( 93)

(29)

100

(47)

Unknown

( 49)

(28)

Total

(142)

(75)

x 2 = 16.5766

.05 < P < 10 TABLE 8 Service incidence

in Chinese or Japanese Participant

army

Non-participant (Per cent)

Served in: Chinese army Japanese army

6.3 12.0

( 9) ( 17)

5.3 22.7

( 4) (17)

Total

18.3

( 26)

28.0

(21)

81.7

(116)

72.0

(54)

No service Total

100

= 12.852

(142)

100

(75)

.05 < P < .10 TABLE 9

Incidence

of military

training in the United

States

Non-participant

Participant

(Per cent) Yes No

21.1 78.9

Total X2 = 1.982

100

( 30) (112) (142)

13.3 86.7 100

(10) (65) (75)

.10 < P < .20 315

C. / . Eugene

Kim

TABLE 10 Additional

military school

training

Participants

Non-participants (Per cent)

Additional military school training in Korea: Army college, defense research institute No additional military school training in Korea Total

41.5

( 59)

58.5 100.0

18.7

(14)

( 83)

81.3

(61)

(142)

100.0

(75)

X2 = 11.5116 P < .005 W E S T E R N MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

316

Virgilio Rafael Beltrân

THE A R M Y A N D S T R U C T U R A L C H A N G E S IN 20TH C E N T U R Y A R G E N T I N A A n Initial Approach

1.

INTRODUCTION

This work only claims to be an initial, descriptive approach to the responses of the Argentine military institutions vis-à-vis structural changes within Argentine society in the 20th century, while bearing in mind the fact that the army is itself a part of those phenomena of social transformation to which it reacts.1 The presentation will be based upon an historical sequence divided into time periods according to their internal coherence in which over-all variables of a qualitative nature will be employed. The points of reference used in determining these periods are the dates of the most obvious military interventions. As a consequence, any resulting hypotheses will be on a very general and theoretical level, merely serving as guidelines for a more exact and quantified study. A brief summary of structural and political elements will be given for each historical period in order to correlate the corresponding military actions.2 I must also mention the great practical difficulties that the social investigator studying the armed forces in Latin America must face.3 1

The correlation has been noted by D. C. Rapoport in "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types", Changing Patterns of Military Politics, edited by S. P. Huntington (New York, The Free Press, 1962). 2 I wish to express my enormous debt to the work of Germani and his associates, as well as to Imaz, for their work on a general theoretical reference point and the emperical evidence supporting it. 3 See J. J. Johnson, "Some Social Characteristics of the Military in Latin America", paper presented in the Seminar on Elite Formation in Latin America, Montevideo, June, 1965.

317

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán Their organization and purpose make those in authority very reticent in making available such data as might be necessary for a better understanding of the military sector of the society. This, I think, is principally due to a lack of clear understanding about the scientific nature of sociological knowledge. To this must be added the barriers imposed by the secrecy and reserve surrounding military affairs and preventions against civilian (and even military) scientist interference. Traditional attitudes of distrust with respect to the scientific, empirical, and objective approach of human relations also create an unfavorable atmosphere. All of this within the Manichean framework of the Cold War, makes the area of investigation one of maximum sensitivity. Lastly, the existence of certain projects of investigation sponsored by United States governmental agencies, such as 'Plan Camelot', and 'Operation Simpático' are well known and are seen as friction-causing elements not in accordance with the concept of national sovereignty currently held in Latin American nations.4

2.

THE 1880-1930 PERIOD

This is the period of consolidation, adjustment and expansion of the liberal system and the period of military professionalization. Here, the structural bases of modern Argentina are formed, initiated by the politico-economic program of the so-called 'generation of the 80's'. This group, made up of a progressive, dynamic elite, undertakes the necessary measures in order to: (1) Concentrate the wealth and basic commands of the national economy in the federal capital and Buenos Aires province. (2) Promote the economic development and modernization of Argentine society in accordance with the contemporary Liberal European model of democracy, integrating Argentine economy in the world market as an exporter of primary goods. (3) In order to obtain the former, mass immigration is promoted as a means to bring large quantities of moderately qualified labor (cultural change was seen as a human transmigration of more industrious 'races'), and the importation of large quantities of foreign capital attracted by the concessions offered. (4) To implement the process, institutional modernization and 4

See G. Selser, Espionaje en América Latina: el Pentágono y las Técnicas Sociológicas (Buenos Aires, Iguazú, 1966). 318

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina secularization is undertaken by means of legislation covering land, civil marriage, secular education, equalitarian and obligatory military service, etc. During the period under consideration, the balance of immigrants acquires an extraordinary magnitude in relation to the native population of the country.5 The immigrants are concentrated in Buenos Aires and along the Argentine coastline (Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, Santa Fé provinces). Half are Italian, one third are Spaniards. Denied ownership of fertile lands, currently concentrated in the hands of large landowners, those immigrants who do not accept positions as tenant farmers either return to their country of origin or concentrate in the cities, principally Buenos Aires. Somewhat more skilled than the native population, they devote themselves to minor occupations, become artisans or urban workers, or start small businesses and workshops. The exchange of primary goods for manufactured articles and capital investments is spectacularly increased. The principal pole of the economy is Great Britain. As a fundamental consumer of Argentine products within the framework of the international division of labor, England accounts for 81% of foreign investment, which is directed toward the formation of basic capital: railroads, ports, transportation, public services, etc. As a correlary of this phenomenon, industries of a lesser importance appear, weak because of their marginality, lack of investment and their subsidiary position in the mainstream of exportation. Immigration provides labor and opens a domestic market which is stimulated in turn by state support, centralization of communications and urban development. Industrial establishments increase from 22,204 in 1895 to 48,779 in 1914." 5

The figures are as follows: Immigration Total Population 1881-1890 638,000 1869 1,737,076 1891-1900 320,000 1895 3,954,911 1901-1910 1,120,000 1914 7,885,237 1911-1920 269,000 1921-1930 878,000 Source: A. Bunge "Ochenta Y Cinco" [Eighty Five], Revista de Economía Argentina, 1944 [Argentine Economic Review, 1944], Quoted by G. Germani, Política y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición [Politics and society in a period of transition] (Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1962), p. 182. 6 National Census.

319

Virgilio Rafael

Beltràn

In business ownership as well as labor there are twice as many foreigners represented as Argentines. In 1914, due to the upset in the international system caused by World War I, industrial activity increases by substitution of exportations, foreign investment wanes and the economy enters into a period of decline ending in the crash of 1930. The combined politico-social phenomena of this period have been schematized by Germani 7 as the transition from a "Representative Democracy with Limited Participation" to a "Representative Democracy with Enlarged Participation". The stratification system becomes more open and penetrable, showing characteristics of definite modernization. Despite the continued preeminence of the upper sectors, the middle class - tripled in number during this period - gives the overall structure a totally different outline. It is important to note that this process is a comparatively rapid one, reinforced by the impact of immigration. Political parties appear in Argentina at the end of the 19th century. 8 The ideology or political formula of the system is that of European liberalism, a liberalism lacking the capitalistic and class bases necessary for its development. The middle sectors," product of the economic development process, and first generation Argentines mobilize 10 in the urban areas demanding political participation. The party which brings them together is the Radical Civic Union (Union Civica Radical) which comes to power after various frustrated subversive attempts as a result of institutionalized channels of access provided by the electoral reform of 1912. Its main objective is to incorporate the interests of the middle sector into the governmental apparatus, always within the current liberal political 7

G. Germani and K. Silvert, "Hacia una Democracia de Masas" [Toward a Mass Democracy], and "Estructura Social e Intervención Militar en América Latina" [Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America], Di Telia et al., Argentina, Sociedad de Masas [Argentina, A Mass Society] (Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1965). 8 A. Galletti, La Realidad Argentina en el Siglo XX: La Politica y los Partidos [Argentine Reality in the 20th Century: Politics and Parties] (Mexico, 1961). 9 See J. J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America. The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford, 1958). 10 Concept put into circulation by Germani, taken from K. W. Deutsch. See G. Germani, Los Procesos de Movilización e lntegración y el Cambio Social en América Latina [Mobilization and Integration Processes and Social Change in Latin America] ( = Publication no. 51, Department of Sociology, National University of Buenos Aires, note 2).

320

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina system. Once in power, it makes no attempt to change either the economic or power structures. Disintegration of its governmental machinery and pressure from traditional groups, whose economic and social bases of power have remained intact, among other factors, leading to the first military intervention in 20th century Argentina. The process of professionalization implies the acquisition by the military institution of traits which define it as a specific and distinct social order within society. The following are among the characteristics attributed to the military institution by sociological literature: 11 Full-time activity Bureaucratization Norms of its own (operative, and those based on honor) Permanent budgetary provisions for salaries and equipment Differential social status 'Esprit de Corps' Technical specialization Corporativeness Professional responsibility Training curriculum Certain alienation from the rest of society. Our task will be to describe the process by which the above patterns have been acquired by the Argentine army. A necessary starting point is a brief description of the TRADITIONAL ARMY at the end of the 19th century. This is the army of the Paraguayan War (1865-1870), of the Desert Campaign, and of national unification against the last of the provincial 'caudillos'. It was an army of a low level of organization - as compared to later models - indiscriminately recruited, mainly by force, whose discipline

11

S. Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Rote of the Military in Politics (London, Pall Mall Press, 1962); S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of the Harvard U.P., 1957); M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, 111., The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); E. Lieuwen, Armas y Política en América Latina [Arms and Politics in Latin America] (Buenos Aires, Sur, 1960); B. Rattenbach, Sociología Militar [Military Sociology] (Círculo Militar Argentino, Buenos Aires, 1964).

321

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán was maintained by terror by its officers, the majority of whom were not career officers.12 The Paraguayan War resulted in some organizational efforts which were under French doctrinaire influence. Heir to the great tradition of the Independence, the army had suffered the disturbances of civil wars, the influence of 'caudillos', the precariousness of their equipment and the low quality of personnel, especially among the troops. The beginnings of professionalization can be spotted by the creation of the National Military School (Colegio Militar de la Nación) in 1869. Its influence is somewhat slow to be felt. In 1873 13 Second Lieutenants (Subtenientes) are graduated, in 1880 there are 15, in 1888 there are 29, in 1890 there are 54 and 122 in 1896.13 Around that time the first laws regulating the military profession are passed, dealing with promotions, retirement, etc., strengthening the process of professionalization, as well as the law of obligatory military service improve the quality of the troops. The leader of the enlightened elite and a decisive factor in the professionalization of the military is General Julio A. Roca (President between 1880-1886 and 1898-1904). The Chilean example and boundary problems with this country between 1896 and 1900 result in the arrival of a German military mission and German armaments (mauser rifles and Krupp cannons), the law of obligatory military service (1901), and the creation of the War College (1900). The army adopts Prussian doctrine in form and spirit, which is maintained until the Second World War. Although often exaggerated, this Prussian influence leaves its professional mark on the ground forces. Thus it is that the army functions in strictly professional fashion when stifling subversive Union Civica Radical coup attempts such as the one in 1905, in spite of the presence of some officers politized by this party. While the political system seeks a solution to its problems by means of the electoral reform of 1912, which gives the middle sectors, represented 12 A. A. Maligne, Historia Militar de la República Argentina [Military History of the Argentine Republic] (Buenos Aires, 1960); A. G. Rodríguez, Reseña Histórica del Ejército Argentino 1862-1930 [Historical Description of the Argentine Army] (Buenos Aires, Dirección de Estudios Históricos de la Secretaría de Guerra, 1964), Year I, no. 1. 13 Anón, Reseña Histórica del Colegio Militar de la Nación [Historical Description of the National Military School], available in the library of the Secretaría de Guerra.

322

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina by radicalism, an access to the government, the professional attitude of the army is maintained. This moment is cited by some as the high point of the political parties functioning within constitutional norms.14 Hipólito Irigoyen, the first Radical President (1916-1922 and 19281930) grants pensions and promotions, acknowledges seniority and violates regulations of the military profession in order to reward those who had supported him in 1893 and 1905, and political motives lead him to upset institutional hierarchical order.15 To strengthen military professionalism against political interference, the Lodge 'General San Martin' is formed within the army.16 It successfully defends certain key institutional positions and is able to impose certain political conditions upon the second Radical President, Marcelo T. de Alvear (1922-28).17 Irigoyen's second presidential term was very ineffective and suffered pressure from conservative opposition, lastly is easily overthrown by the military movement of September 6, 1930. A decisive role is played in this process by the Lodge 'General San Martin' and its key man, General Agustín P. Justo. Although most of the army and navy do not become involved, the revolutionary fraction demonstrates the organizational efficiency of the army. The activist sector of the military presents the army as a moderating and corrective factor within a tottering political system. It takes over a governmental aparatus facing administrative collapse, lack of authority, the pressure of public opinion intensified by mass media and the threat of populist riots. It desires to restore an order seemingly destroyed. To synthesize the process of professionalization, the schema proposed by Janowitz will be employed.18 14

G. Andújar, "Estructura Política y Realidad Social" [Political Structure and Social Reality], Reconstruir, no. 19 (July-August, 1962). 15 J. A. Ramos, Historia Política del Ejército Argentino [Political History of the Argentine Army] (Buenos Aires, Peña Lillo, 1959). 16 J. V. Orona, La Logia Militar que Enfrentó a Hipólito Irigoyen [The Military Lodge that Confronted Hipolito Irigoyen] (Buenos Aires, 1965). 17 The conditions were: (1) that the Irigoyenist Grl. Dellepiane not be nominated Minister of War, and (2) that the President no delegate the power at any time to Vice-President Elpidio González. Grl. Dellepiane, Minister of War under President Irigoyen, stifled a serious coup attempt in 1919 that had characteristics of a social revolution in the manner of the Russian Revolution of 1917. He acted over the head of the undecisive chief executive. Although he controlled the power in a situation conductive to a coup, his professional formation and loyalty to the President result in his handing over power as soon as the danger had been eliminated. 18 Janowitz, op. cit. and The Military in the Development of New Nations (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964), appendix.

323

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán The ORGANIZATIONAL FORMAT of the period under analysis evolves in the direction of the World War I army model based upon infantry and cavalry units. Professionalization - giving the military institution total superiority over other institutionalized groups within society - can be considered a completed process in the Argentine army by 1930. The SKILL STRUCTURE is becoming more complex. Technical services are incorporated organically. The Advanced Technical School (Escuela Superior Técnica) is created in 1931. The process of industrialization and its implications for national defense is clearly perceived by such figures as Generals Mosconi, Baldrich and Savio, who are driving forces behind the exploitation of petroleum resources and heavy industry. CAREER LINES acquire regular patterns as the laws regulating the military profession are perfected (laws no. 4031 of 1901, 4707 of 1905, etc.), and professional competence becomes the fundamental criteria for promotions. Officers are recruited principally from Buenos Aires and developed coastal areas. The middle sectors have become the main source of recruitment as opposed to a previous predominance of the upper class in the 19th century. The sons, and later the grandchildren of immigrants enroll in large numbers in the Military School. There, they receive a Prussian style of EDUCATION which instills values of patriotism and efficiency as a professional ideology in a socialization process resulting in the respective status mentality. They share the values and social attitudes currently held by the society as a whole, which are none other than those held by the upper class (the oligarquía) accordant with his authoritarian and traditionalistic formation.19 Established as a social mobilization channel, the military career gives a high status, based on comparatively good salaries and a quite social prestige. The INTERNAL COHESION created by professional sentiment is high, although there are no indicators showing that this cohesion produced an institutional interest group.20 Any interference by radicalism is rejected as detrimental to the profession. If were to place the situation within the typology proposed by Janowitz, we would have to lean toward the DEMOCRATIC MODEL of civilian-military relations, prior to the intervention of 1930. 19

J. J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, 1964). G. Almond & Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960), Introduction. 20

324

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina In summary, we have seen the Argentine army evolve as a variable which is interdependent upon changes within Argentine society. As this latter became modernized, its army became professionalized. Here is where the first question arises: rather than agreement and system consolidation, modernization and military professionalization lead to a rupture of the regime by means of a military coup. Attempts to explain this must be sought within the peculiarities of Argentine politico-social development.

3.

1930-1943 PERIOD

Immigration changes. From 1930 on, the influx from abroad is checked and regulated in such a way as to reduce the previous balance.21 In its place is substituted another form of human transfer: internal migration. The period from 1930 to 1935 in particular produces a mass exodus of inhabitants, mainly adults of employment age, from the provinces to the Federal Capital and large urban centers.22 Although comparatively speaking, this phenomenon is of a lower intensity and speed, it influences important politico-social events to be described in the following pages. Foreign investments gradually diminish after the First World War, and those still existing are directed toward secondary sector of economy. Around 1930, foreign investment practically disappears.23 As a consequence, development based upon foreign investment is paralysed. Countries producing raw materials such as Argentina are those most 21

The figures are these: 1931-1940 73,000 1941-1950 386,000 Source: same as footnote 5. 22 Immigration to the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires Year

Total Population (Thousands)

Foreign Immigrants: % of total

Domestic Immigrants: % of total

1869 1895 1914 1936 1947

230 783 2035 3430 4720

47 50 49 36 26

3 8 11 12 29

Domestic Immigrants: Average 8,000 —

83,000 96,000

Source: Germani, Política y Sociedad ..., loe. cit. G. di Telia & M. Zymelman, "Etapas del Desarrollo Económico Argentino" [Stages of Argentine Economie Development], Argentina, Sociedad de Masas, loe. cit.

23

325

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán severely shaken by the world economic crisis. The fields are deserted by workers seeking employment in urban industries, which experienced an initial leap forward during the First World War due to substitution of imports and became consolidated around 1933, date marking the 'takeoff period of the national economy. The definitive push in the industrial sector (light industry) is provided by the Second World War, creating an entrepreneurial group with its own interests that will seek its place within the system. Internal immigration and the new industrialization create a pyramid of stratification with modern outlines. The urban working class sector rapidly grows and is added to the thick layer of middle stratas whose incorporation was attempted in the previous period. The impact of internal mobilized immigrants with traditional culture patterns is added to that of first and second generation Argentines descendents of foreign immigrants. Middle class participation in the liberal system seems to be failed, and recently mobilized working class sectors find themselves without institutionalized channels of political participation. In the political situation of about 1930, there appear to be two possible solutions of the problem facing the government of General Uriburu: the Fascist CORPORATIVE STATE, as personified by Grl. Uriburu himself influenced by contemporary fascism and certain nucleii of clerical nationalism; or some kind of restoration propounded by the 'oligarchy', in the person of General Justo.24 The neo-liberal restoration would mean the conservation of constitutional forms as long as participation of the majority of the middle sectors (Irigoyenism) would be limited by proscription and electoral fraud. The possibilities of a corporate state versus restoration are aired within the army. The Lodge 'General San Martin' takes immediate control, giving orders to purge Radical elements from the army in the name of professionalism.25 Through his own skillfulness, General Justo is able to impose both restoration and his own presidential nomination. He is elected for the 1932-1938 term. His Minister of War, General Manuel A. Rodriguez is the champion of professionalism and he maintains the army on a plane above the unfortunate political process being experienced by the nation. 24

Germani, Política y Sociedad .. ., loe. cit. See J. V. Orona, La Revolución del 6 de Septiembre September 6th] (Buenos Aires, 1966); Ramos, op. cit.

25

326

[The Revolution of

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina The army limits itself to consolidation of the restoration government through indirect or limited action only.26 It is necessary at this point to attempt a few hypotheses that might explain why a professionalized army, consisting primarily of middle class officers, would create a movement resulting in a conservative restoration. Confirmation of the following propositions may provide an answer: (1) A 'german' type of authoritarian formation made the officers' corps more vulnerable to Fascist or traditionalist ideas.27 (2) The concept of efficiency and order must have been deeply affected by the calamity, corruption and lack of authority of Irigoyen's second term. (3) The antiprofessional intrusions of the president must have wounded its sense of hierarchy, seniority and professional efficiency - all subjected to political interferences from 'outside'. (4) Although middle class in background, it must be remembered that the army aped the 'oligarchy' in their values, national objectives and way of thinking, the 'oligarchy' was the positive reference group of the entire Argentine society. This may be related to the ideological sterility of Radicalism whose political objectives are exhausted once electoral participation has been attained.28 (5) Governmental inaction during the revolutionary strike of 1916 and the eventuality of populist overflows presented a potential threat. (6) The influence of conservative forces via mass communications — dominated by the opposition — and on a person-to-person level. These forces had complete control over the means of economic and social power. (7) The personal attitudes of some superior officers, many still having strong ties with traditional families and circles. General Uriburu is the most notable example. The role of the army became a dynamic one in 1943 due to a combination of factors some of which are given below: 28

Between December, 1930 and December, 1933 there were seven radical attempted coups, all easily stifled. See A. Ciña, Partidos y Poder en la Argentina Moderna, 1930-1946 [Parties and Power in Modern Argentina, 1930-1946] (Buenos Aires, J. Alvarez, 1964), a work that contains an important documentary summary of the period. 27 Johnson, The Military and Society ..., loc. cit., p. 73. 28 See Galletti, op. cit.; E. Gallo and S. Sigal, "La Formación de los Partidos Políticos Contemporáneos: la U.C.R. (1890-1916)" [The Formation of Contemporary Political Parties: The U.C.R. (Radical Civic Union) 1890-1916], Argentina, Sociedad de Masas, loc. cit.

327

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán (1) The erosion caused by a system based on fraud. The restoration of the 1930's had run its course despite negotiations with certain Radical groups (The 'Concordancia') who agree to electoral participation in certain areas only, having obtained the presidency for Roberto M. Ortiz (1939-1942). The military see themselves identified with a completely discredited regime. (2) The presence of available masses, the result of internal migration, industrialization and urbanization. (3) The existence of marginal industrial sectors which prospered from the decline in imports caused by World War II, in need of a state support not available under the Conservative government which favored free exchange. (4) The neofascist tendencies of a group of army officers whose professional formation made them admirers of German efficiency. Some of them nationalists and industrialists,29 who dreamed of an Argentine sphere of influence in South America. Until this time, such tendencies had been limited to the G.O.U.30 a Lodge to which Colonel Perón belonged. (5) The World War situation, which in 1943 appeared favorable to the axis. Many felt that a German victory would mean a new order, in which Argentina should participate as fully as possible. (6) The nationalist 'intelligentia'. Small groups of influential intellectuals who had good connections among the military, who were influenced by their ideological schema. 4.

1943-1946 PERIOD

With the revolution as accomplished fact, the measures satisfactory to the objectives of the above-mentioned groups could be carried out. An experimental period begins for state capitalism and support of national industrial groups.31 The armed forces receive good budgetary allotments and their personnel increases.32 29

Military concern in technological and heavy industrial development is not new. General Mosconi's interest in the petroleum industry and General Savio's in metallurgy and the creation of Military Manufactures are only the best examples of a current of thought whose greatest impact is felt after 1943. The Advanced Technical School [Escula Superior Técnica] for military engineering, began in 1931. 30 J. V. Orona, La Logia Militar que derrocó a Castilla [The Military Lodge that Overthrowed Castillo] (Buenos Aires, 1966). 31 The lecture given by J. D. Perón on June 10, 1944 in the National University of La Plata is the most genuine explanation of Perón's promises on this

328

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina In general terms, the new system is authoritarian, based upon militarist and nationalist values. Political parties are dissolved. With the outcome of the war, however, neofascist tendencies cool off 33 One figure in particular begins to show prominence in governmental decisions, especially during the presidency of General Edelmiro J. Farrel (9-3-'44 to l-5-'46), and this is Colonel Juan D. Perón. As VicePresident, Minister of War, and Secretary of Labor, Perón steadily builds toward his own future. A series of measures favoring the working class, such as state-protected unions, appear, replacing the first motto 'order and work'. By 1945, the military budget begins to feel a 'deflationary' effect, and a reduction in the overall volume of the armed forces was decided. Between October 8th and 17th, 1945, a group within the army led by General Avalos demands, together with the navy, that Perón be slowed down. Although Perón is arrested, he is released because of pressure from industrial working classes in Buenos Aires who are supported in their effort by members of the army loyal to Perón. After this 'pueblada' (uprising) in his favor, the road ahead was smooth. Traditional political parties, united in the Democratic Union, lose in the free, armed forces protected elections of 1946.34 In synthesis: (1) The militarist objectives of the 1943 revolution fade away in the course of two years. (2) Perón has a talent for using support from the military and recently mobilized masses to his own advantage and prestige, generating a point. Important parts can be found in J. L. Romero, Las Ideas Políticas en la Argentina [Political Ideas in Argentina] (Mexico, F.C.E., 1955), pp. 250-253. Also see J. L. Imaz, Los Que Mandan [Those in Command] (Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 1965), p. 79. 32 The number of officers graduated from the National Military School increases thusly: 1942 119 1943 123 1944 342 1945 197 1946 195 1947 477 and hundreds of reserve officers are also called into service. 33 See Imaz, op. cit., p. 79. 34 This period is covered in more detail in Galletti, op. cit.; Ciria, op. cit.; Romero, op. cit.; Various authors, Argentina 1930-1960, Buenos Aires; Sur, 1960; and a version with a marxist slant is J. J. Real, SO Años de Historia Argentina (30 Years of Argentine History), Buenos Aires, Actualidad, 1962.

329

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán heterogeneous movement which enables him to obtain the presidency by means of elections. (3) The army has had wide participation in government through the hundreds of important public jobs entrusted to the military, which sees its corporative objectives assured with the continuity of the 1943 movement. (4) Perón proposes to the military a nationalist,35 anti-communist plan for a peaceful society based on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, and a share for themselves in the nation's management.

5.

1946-1955 PERIOD

This contemplates the Peronist experiment.36 The internal migration process continues. An annual average of 96,000 persons move to the urban area of 'Big Buenos Aires' between 1947 and 1957. The economy of the period is continuation of generalized steps toward state controlled capitalism. Nationalization of public services and industries and a growth of state bureaucracy are apparent signs of this phenomenon. The growth of light industry is expanded during the first five years as production increases for a constantly expanding market. The formation of basic social capital and heavy industry is neglected, however. The percentage of income distribution recieved by labor increases from 45% to 55%. This boom ceases around 1951-52 due to both serious errors in investment distribution and an agricultural crisis. In stratification, the modern pyramid with its broad base of middle and lower classes can be perceived. The latter begins to participate in political decision-making, within the limitations imposed by the regime. In accordance with the Germani typology, a transition has taken place from a Representative Democracy with Enlarged Participation to a regime of Total Participation by of what Germani calls a Popular National Revolution uniting the social elements mentioned above. The masses are committed to unions and partizan organizations, both 35

Johnson, The Military and Society ..., loc. cit., pp. 135-144. For sociological approaches to the phenomenon see Germani, Política y Sociedad ..., loc. cit., chapters 8 and 9; Germani & Silvert "Estructura Social e Intervención . . . " , loc. cit.; T. di Telia, "Populismo y Reforma en América Latina" [Populism and Reform in Latin America], Revista de Desarrollo Económico [Review of Economic Development], Vol. IV, no. 16 (January-March, 1965); S. M. Lipset, Political Man (New York, Doubleday, 1960). 36

330

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina controlled vertically. Perón applies the unipersonal military leadership principle. His party organs are called 'Commands' and 'Basic Units'. His political movement differs from classical Fascism in that the rank and file consists mainly of lower and lower middle class individuals. Perón's leadership is authoritarian, supported by his own charisma and later reinforced by the political activation of his wife, Eva Duarte. Within a predominantly authoritarian party system he has an almost total control over the formal governmental aparatus, and a tight control over mass communications media. His system can be roughly described as a DUAL LEADERSHIP. On the one hand, there is the leadership of the armed forces, concretely the army - now purged of his enemies - a leadership both personal and constitutional. On the other hand, there is his leadership among his supporters who make up his political party and the labor unions.37 He plays the appropriate role with each and maintains an equilibrium between both. He utilizes the military elite and the catholic 'intelligentia' to form ruling elite groups. He promotes elite groups of secondary level and technicians on a massive scale, delegating jobs on a basis of personal loyalty. The original Fascist clique within the army is rapidly overtaken and diluted by the Peronist movement. Army loyalty is maintained because of his support of the armed forces, his nationalist and industrialist preachings and his personal magnetism. The navy, with its strong positive psychological references with respect to the upper class, is reticent in its support. Many military men are placed in state-controlled jobs through bureaucratic expansion and nationalization of industries. Some of his most loyal supporters become governors, intendents, congressmen, etc.38 The irritating presence of Eva Perón, the possibility of her becoming a vice-presidential candidate for the 1952-58 period, plus early symptoms of system deterioration result in an unsuccessful military revolt in September 1951. It emphasizes the fact that a good number of subofficials (enlisted men) openly support Perón. The government attempts to make the admissions policy of the 37

See Finer, op. cit., pp. 173-174. See K. Silvert, "Liderazgo Político y Debilidad Institucional en la Argentina" [Political Leadership and Institutional Weakness in Argentina], Revista de Desarrollo Económico [Review of Economic Development], Vol. I, no. 3 (OctoberDecember, 1961). In 1947 22% of all key positions in the Argentine political system were occupied by military.

38

331

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán National Military School as democratic as possible through a generous scholarship plan. Scholarships are also created by special law, enabling children of both the working and white collar classes to attend Liceos Militares,39 The death of Eva Perón is not enough to prevent further military reaction. The economic crisis of 1951-52 is prolonged by economic disorder, causing Perón to lose much of the support of the middle sectors and industrialists. Furthermore, the general state of corruption and obsequiousness slowly weakens Perón's image before his peers. Other factors contributing to this are his personal eccentricities, his open attack upon the Catholic Church - with which he openly breaks in mid-1954, and his plans to exploit the petroleum resources by granting concessions to foreign firms. Finally, secret attempts to form working class militias become public knowledge. This would have facilitated almost uncontrollable uprisings, not to mention a breakdown of the established equilibrium within the armed forces. The following explanations can be formulated concerning the military rebellion against the Peronist government: (1) Officers come increasingly from middle class backgrounds,40 with all the psychological consequences that this implies such as fear of a populist takeover, values related to the upper class which is felt to be the scapegoat of peronism, etc. (2) Professional formation made them inclined to reject violent irruptions within the social order. The possibility of militias represented a real threat. (3) Loyalty to Perón and the general state of corruption had broken down professional regulations regarding promotions, assignment of commands, etc. (4) Disintegration of Perón's image as a military leader and the consequent revulsion against being identified with a discredited individual and his regime. (5) Feelings of insecurity inspired by the economic crisis and the threat of a disequilibrium in the stratification system where the middle classes occupied a relatively privileged position. (6) Pressures from the Church and catholic 'intelligentia', whose 39

Secondary schools run by the military establishment having both a military regime and training. 40 Imaz, op. cit., Chapters 3 and 4. A fundamental book on Argentine military elite. I have had the pleasure of discussing the subject of this chapter with the author.

332

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina support had been withdrawn in the face of Peronist attacks upon them. (7) Activities of political and pressure groups which Peron had harassed but not eliminated. In summary: the Popular National Revolution failed to institutionalize elements it derived from the 1943 neofascist movement through its inability to create a system of organic political participation, either in competitive democratic form or a more authoritarian annihilation of opposing groups. This still appears to be one of the basic problems of Argentina's political modernization.

6.

1955-1958 PERIOD

This covers the SECOND distinct subperiods:

RESTORATION,

and can be divided into two

a. The Lonardi subperiod (September 21,1955 to November 22, 1955) President Lonardi's policy in dealing with peronism is one of continuity and pacification. He permits the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and the Peronist party to continue, proposing to chastize only the delinquents. He creates an Advisory Junta, which has been referred to as 'a pocket parliament', made up of two representatives from each of the traditional parties, and two catholics from the recently created Federal Union. Excluded are only the Peronists and Communists. His general objective appears to have been to maintain these changes and displacements of power that occurred from Peron more or less intact. The navy, emerging 'immaculate' from the Peronist experience, becomes very powerful under the new government. Naval influence and other groups that suffered under Peron demand sweeping retaliation. This kind of pressure, plus declining health 41 hasten General Lonardi's removal from power. In the meantime, members of the armed forces previously purged for anti-Peronist activities or attempting to overthrow his regime are reinstated en masse. In parallel fashion, those officers and even subofficers (enlisted men) most committed to peronism are immediately purged.

He was suffering from a chronic illness from which he died few months later.

333

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán b. The Aramburu subperiod (23 November 1955 to 1 May 1958) This new change in government brings more radical anti-Peronist measures. Institutions inherited from peronism are gradually dismantled. The General Confederation of Labor (CGT) is intervened and the Peronist Party dissolved. Traditional interests are indemnified and reestablished, while the percentage of income distribution received by labor is cut back to 45%. Catholic nationalists are removed from government along with Lonardi. The new government declares itself purely transitional.42 To this effect, a second attempt at restoration is made, aiming toward Liberal traditionalisms (the so-called Mayo-Caseros Une). The army suffers from a genuine guilt complex and overcompensates by hotly anti-Peronist displays, exponents of which are to be known as 'gorillas'. At the same time, some military have a great restlessness for a possible Peronist reaction, a state of mind to have its long lasting effects in what was later designated the 'red' fraction of the army.43 At about that time, armed forces instruction comes under the influence of French counter-insurgency doctrine and its emphasis on psychological warfare, which will have great importance in the posterior period. Stronger ties are forged with USA doctrine and its continental sphere of influence within the framework of the Cold War, what had been begun during the final stages of Peronism.44 There is an unsuccessful counterrevolutionary attempt on the part of retired Peronist military in June, 1956. Finally, political parties - considered the proper channels for expressing the political will of the people - are called upon to present candidates for the coming elections with the exception of peronism, proscribed from participation as a party.

7.

1958-1962 PERIOD

Arturo Frondizi pacts with the Peronists to obtain its support for his candidacy, organized around a fraction of the traditional Radical Civic Union (Intransigencia), some sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, some nationalists and others of diverse origin. 42 43 44

See Germani & Silvert, "Estructura Social e Intervención" . . . , loe. cit. See Finer, op. cit., pp. 118-120. See Imaz, op. cit., pp. 80, 81.

334

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina Despite the Provisional government's support of the other sector of the Radical Civic Union and its leader Ricardo Balbin, the victory goes to the Frondizi coalition nurished by Peronist votes. The military permit Frondizi to take power. From that moment on, Frondizi finds himself in a squeeze between peronism which soon becomes his opposition and the 'gorilla' elements of the armed forces which weild a 'tutelary' influence over political decisions with crude pressures and vetoes,45 within an atmosphere of psychological warfare developed from their intelligence and security services.46 Although Frondizi seriously attempts a capitalist development of the economy based on foreign investment, he lacks the political power necessary to carry it through. Harrassed by political pressures and lack of support, he is overthrown in March, 1962 after the threatening Peronist victories in an important provincial elections. On this occasion the 'blue' or 'legalistic' fraction of the army was overtaken by events. Victory for those responsible for the coup, the 'reds', is nevertheless overshadowed by the rapid maneuvering of Jose M. Guido, Frondizi's constitutional successor. He sees to it that he is sworn in as President before the Supreme Court of Justice.

8.

MARCH 1962 TO OCTOBER 1963 PERIOD

From this point on, the center of political power and decision-making is displaced and supreme authority lies with the armed forces. All the tensions play within the armed forces and only in minimal proportion within the other institutional sectors. Tensions burst in September 1962. The 'blue' fraction of the army successfully triumphs over the 'reds' in an armed uprising, and the latter are purged from its ranks. An important coup attempt in April 1963 planned by the navy and retired 'gorilla' groups is quickly smothered. The April, 1963 movement causes the original governmental orientation, as exercized indirectly from the army, to move toward a harder line with respect to peronism. A political front, including the Peronists, 45 A description of the period from a pro-Frondizi point of view can be seen in C. A. Florit, Las Fuerzas Armadas y la Guerra Psicoldgica [The Armed Forces and Psychological Warfare] (Buenos Aires, Arayu, 1963); Also see, by a qualified observer, J. W. Rowe, Argentina's Restless Military, American University Field Staff, Reports Service (JWR-2-'64). 48 See Imaz, op. cit.; Florit, op. cit.

335

Virgilio Rafael Beltrân is outlawed. The only political organization with possibilities that reaches elections day is the Radical Civic Union (the fraction now called U.C.R. 'of the People') following an electoral campaign fought with disorganization, improvisation and public indifference. Attempts to persuade the 'blue' military 'leader' General Juan C. Ongania to nominate himself as candidate are completely rejected. The doctrine now affirmed within the army is a new professionalism with characteristics of its own. In sum: the army attempts a NEW RESTORATION by delivering the government into the hands of a traditional middle class party. This may be the last experiment of this kind.

9.

OCTOBER 1963 TO JUNE 27-28, 1966 PERIOD

The government of Arturo U. Illia represents the final attempt to restore the political system as normatively defined in the 1853 constitution. As an important political observer has said: "the armed forces, by handing over the government (to Illia) retained the power for themselves".47 Power that they gave up under the strong professionalist leadership of General Ongania. Nevertheless he publically expounds a doctrine of responsibility to the nation rather than to individual governments.48 The performance of the new president is shadowy, paralyzed in political schemes that would have been more appropriate in the 1920's. He drags himself through almost three years without finding visible solutions to any of the political or economic problems facing the country, mainly those concerning economic growth and a way to make incorporation of peronism into an acceptable equilibrium within the political system. The army, meanwhile, establishes itself once more as a monolithic and coherent force. Determined to remain on a purely professional plane, it is overly cautious in its avoidance of situations that might provoke an exertion of pressure upon the government. It successfully keeps within its legal sphere of influence until the end of 1965.49

47

M. Grondona, Primera Plana, issue of June 30, 1966. The so-called "West Point Doctrine" presented by Grl. Ongania on a visit to the USA. 49 According to Finer, op. cit., pp. 86-89. 48

336

The Army in the 20 th Century Argentina 10.

NOTE CONCERNING THE ARGENTINE REVOLUTION OF 27-28 JUNE, 1966

This date marks the end of military self-restraint. A 'clean' coup occurs, with no resistance from the government. The country itself is not disturbed, work continues as usual, school children continue going to classes. Nobody defends the government. There is no state of siege, there are no political prisoners, no one is exiled. Once removed from their desks and offices, the overthrown president, the cabinet ministers and government functionaries are at complete liberty. The armed forces, more concretely the army, take back the power that inevitably had come in their hands since 1962. The deposed government is not accused of corruption or repression, merely of an overwhelming inefficiency. The armed forces intervene 'against their will'. They depose the executive powers, dissolve legislative bodies and political parties. All members of the Supreme Court of Justice are replaced. The classical junta of Commanders-in-Chief is dissolved as soon as General Ongania assumes the presidency. Rather than being a de facto or 'caretaker' government this time, the new government considers itself to have revolutionary powers of a constitutional nature.50 It would appear that a new kind of military intervention with a new problematic has appeared on the Argentine scene, although at this writing there are not, nor can there be clear indices of the new government's orientation aside from its own statements on the subject. Public offices have been filled with civilians and retired military of different political tendency. Express statements say that military intervention was necessary in order to defend essential national values, to modernize state machinery and Argentine society and make them more efficient, as both suffered from a paralysis caused by political and economical anachronistic rigidities. The armed forces have filled the power vacuum themselves in response to popular demand only after all other political and institutional resources have been exhausted. 11.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) Argentina has its own particular characteristic as a developing country.51 The most notorious are caused by institutional imbalance. 50 51

The Brazilian example has made a new contribution to this point. Finer, op. cit., pp. 55, 111. 337

Virgilio Rafael Beltrán Despite many developed infrastructural traits, it has not been able to find an efficient, legitimate and widely accepted political formula that would permit adequate regulation of political functions. This basic imbalance may partly explain the frequent military interventions in the 20th century. Until an institutional channel is found to incorporate masses no longer 'just recently mobilized', and institutions organizing public opinion are coordinated - both factors permitting coexistence within a tolerable margin of conflict - moderating or 'restorative' military interventions will continue to be an ever present probability.52 (2) The phenomenon of asynchronic modernization, with special characteristics in the case of Argentina, forces the same constitutional definition to cover two societies as different in composition and structure as those of 1890 and 1966. This normative framework functioned adequately between 1890 and 1930, after being broadened in 1912, but became inappropriate after that time. Although for a time the middle sectors could be assimilated, the process deteriorated because of their own inability to consolidate sufficiently their political strength. The panorama became even more complicated when urban working sectors and lower classes acquired a personality and an awareness of their interests, and were trying to penetrate into the political system. The political parties were in a state of crisis, since the onset of the Peronist phenomenon and perhaps since 1930. Inefficient as power structures, they cease to be functional. Their mission of articulation and incorporation of interests is then fulfilled by other groups, such as the armed forces and labor unions. Even the Peronist Party recognizes itself as a MOVEMENT, that is - a monolithic, non-pluralistic type of ideology whose backbone is not the party itself but the labor unions. It should be mentioned here that the Argentine working class was mobilized under the banner of nationalism, and is deeply reformist and far from the antimilitaristic attitudes that certain ideological schema would like it to see. (3) As far as military interventions are concerned, the country has experimented with almost every possibility, except a permanent and direct military government in the manner of Nasserism. Using the catagories elaborated by Finer (Table 1). (4) All of the military interventions have been, perhaps obviously, in response to critical political situations mainly created by tensions arising from the transfer of power - actual or potential - because of 52

Imaz, op. cit., pp. 77 ff; Germani & Silvert, "Estructura Social e Intervención", loe. cit.

338

Violence Intimidation Violence Constitutional channels Violence

Supplantaient

Supplantive Pressure Displacement Influence Supplantaient

Latent crisis

Overt crisis

Latent crisis Power vacuum Latent crisis Power vacuum

National interest Manifest destiny Self esteem

National interest (moderating force) Corporative defense

National interest (moderating force) Corporative defense

National interest Manifest destiny

1943

1955

1962

1966

Violence

Violence

Supplantaient

Latent crisis

National interest (moderating force) Manifest destiny

1930

Method

Level

Opportunity

Motive

Year

1

1. Military 2. (?)

1. Indirect complet 2. Civilian ('63—'65)

1. Direct military 2. Limited indirect ('58-'62)

1. Direct military 2. Dual ('46-55)

1. Direct military 2. Limited indirect Quasi civilianized

Resulting regime

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina

Virgilio Rafael Beltràn structural change and incorporation of new groups into the political system. With the exceptions of the interventions of 1943, and may be 1966, the objective has always been to restore the liberal constitutional system or what was considered as such. (5) In terms of Vagts' definition, 'militarism' does not exist in Argentina 53 in the sense of an empire of ideas and values where military establishment is predominant over civilian society.64 The only period in which the existence of a minority group having this ideology might be suspected would be between 1943 and 1945, although there is no direct evidence of this.55 The military has no ideology of its own, created by the military or for military consumption.56 On the contrary, the military has frequently been used 57 by civilian groups who wish to further their own ideological or material interests by promoting military intervention.58 This has been accomplished by means of personal contacts or publications which exploit the attitudinal disposition of the military. (6) The professionalization process developed as Argentine society developed. Modern Argentina had a professional army but not the political structures to regulate the process of change at an appropriate speed to the functions of input and output.59 (7) 20th century army officers were increasingly recruited from the middle sectors60 and their political attitudes can be analysed accordingly. This in itself does not completely explain their behavior in 1930, 1955 or 1962. Tendencies influenced by professional formation and corporative objectives should also be examined. (8) Professionalization not only increased the army's aptitude for political participation,61 but also provided a concrete argument in favor of intervention in 1930 and was a necessary factor in the intervention of 1943. Professionalization steadily developed as an institutional defense and reconditioner of organizational strength from 1962-1965, permitting the existence of a completely civilian government with the armed forces limiting their influence according to constitutional procedures. 33

A. Vagts, A History of Militarism (London, Hollis and Carter, 1959). W. C. Mills, The Power Elite (New York, Oxford U.P., 1956). Imaz, op. cit., 58 Imaz, op. cit., pp. 77 ff. 57 Florit, op. cit. 58 Imaz, op. cit., pp. 83-84; Johnson, The Military, loc. cit., pp. 123-124. 59 Almond & Coleman, op. cit. so Imaz, op. cit.\ Johnson, op. cit. 81 Finer, op. cit., pp. 6-13, 24-25. 54

35

340

The Army in the 20th Century Argentina (9) The functional alternative theory suggested by Imaz 62 may provide a fertile line of analysis in that until now, almost all military interventions have presumed to restore the old constitutional system, but this theory cannot be applied without difficulty - a feature of functionalism itself - should a military intervention openly and consciously promote social change. (10) In line with this last supposition - and the derivations of the recent military uprising cannot be guessed at - the following subjects should be considered: (a) how to bring about, or orient the process of change including method of operation, objectives and instrumentation? (b) how to create institutionalized channels for total political participation without insurmountable conflicts? (c) how to resolve the problems of economic growth, as indispensable requirement for modern society? (11) Despite opinions of some observers, possibilities of a 'Nasserist' way, in the correct sociological sense, appear highly improbably in Argentina. In my opinion, it seems unlikely that a country having good institutional development, a developed entrepreneurial class and a conscious, organized workers' movement, where political development has permitted the participation of one kind or another of the majority of the population, would adopt a system whereby the army constitutes the backbone of the entire development process. (12) Finally, to ratify statements made at the beginning, the need for objectivity in dealing with the problem at hand must be appreciated in order to avoid presenting a drama in which military intervention is always the villain and civilian government the suffering hero who deserves to triumph in the end. Both should be seen as parts of a historical-social process involving the whole society. CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, BUENOS

62

AIRES

Imaz, op. cit., pp. 77 ff.

341

V. PEACE-KEEPING MILITARY FORCES

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans

UNITED N A T I O N S FORCES On Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Military Operations"

1.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A NEW PROBLEM

The United Nations Forces 1 are a new phenomenon in the field of international relations. True, there had been some modest military activity by the League of Nations,2 but a comparison of those actions with the military intervention in the Suez campaign (1956), the Congo (1960), Cyprus (1964) and some other countries make it clear beyond all doubt that a new period in the history of international peace-keeping has begun. Both in scope and in scale, the UNF surpass all former efforts in international military operations. The UNF are unique in that they combine three elements which formerly were found only separately: (a) they are a coalition of national military units (b) they serve a peace-keeping function (c) they are supervised by a world-wide, in fact nearly universal organization of nations. Alliances of states and of national armies have always existed. Those alliances do in fact impose constraints and obligations upon their * Revised version of a paper presented to the Working Group on Armed Forces and Society, Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Evian, France. 1 United Nations Forces are military forces, but in some cases they also include policemen and civilian experts. 2 Experiences with international military forces, prior to the establishment of the UN, are summarized by D. W. Bowett, United Nations Forces. A Legal Study of United Nations Practice (London, Stevens and Sons, 1964), pp. 3-11; G. Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 207-217.

345

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans participants, as can be seen by analyzing the war performance of alliance signatories.8 Alliances, however, were always directed against other states; their international character is by definition a partial one, or even the expression of fundamental political contradictions or conflicts. Secondly, allied forces had not been known to function as a peacekeeping apparatus (with few exceptions, e.g. the intervention of seven nations in China in 1900, after the Boxer rebellion). An important exception, nevertheless, is the cooperation of national military units by some regional organizations.4 The most remarkable action of this kind was the intervention of forces under supervision of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the Dominican Republic in recent years, a mixture of pacific settlement of internal conflict and enforcement by foreign powers. The peace-keeping function of the great empires, from the centuries of PaxRomana and Pax Sinica to the Pax Britannica in the 19th century, was always much more impressive. Colonialism and military conquest, designed first and foremost to serve political and economic interests, have often been benign in their latent function by ending the constant bloodshed of the native tribes and widening the areas of peace.5 This 'pacification', however, was an activity of the colonial army of one state, not the work of an international force.6 The ideal of Universal Peace and proposals to organize a World Government have been known for centuries. The League of Nations can be regarded as the first concrete realization of the old ideas. But the instruments to enforce or to safeguard peaceful relations had always been lacking. The League was a body without a hand. The establishment of the UNF, a military force acting in the name of a global organization of states, is a step forward. The combination of the peace-keeping function, joint command and international responsibility of the UNF is the expression of a general » J. D. Singer and M. Small, "Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: a Quantitative Description", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. Ill (1966), p. 19. 4 A. Eide, "Peace-Keeping and Enforcement by Regional Organizations: its Place in the United Nations System", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. Ill (1966), pp. 125-145. 5 In the Congo the U N F took over the pacification task from the Belgian forces. W. F. Gutteridge, "The United Nations Force in the Congo", British Army Review, Oct. 1962, p. 16: "in fact, the independence celebrations had ended with tribal fighting". ' Colonial armies were often composed of ethnically highly mixed personnel. But as a whole these armies were managed by one government.

346

United Nations Forces post-war development toward really world-wide commitments. And, in much the same way, there is a fundamental difference between the economic aid from rich to poor countries before and after World War II, between the transmittance of Western culture in that time and now, and between the pre-war European 'cordon sanitaire' and the present-day World Health Organization. All these differences reflect the transition from a colonial to a post-colonial world; in other words, from a world regarded from the viewpoint of Western interests to a world looked on as a growing community of autonomous partners. In the last decade, many experts have undertaken the task of examining the experiences gained in the exercise of military force in international peace-keeping. The legal and military problems have been analysed again and again; politicians and civil servants have studied ways of improving the use of UNF in emergency cases; strategic, logistic, organizational and financial problems have been critically examined. The sociological aspects, although of definite importance, have not been analysed up till now. Yet it is most interesting to know how international military activities are able to find support and legitimation in a world of sovereign states founded on the assumption that military force is the most important guarantee of independence; in a world divided into two ideological camps and filled with controversies in the international field. From this point of view the success or failure of UN peace-keeping operations may be seen as a test-case for the development of peaceful international relations. The second question concerns the military rather than the political aspect of the problem. One may ask whether it is realistic to expect that professional soldiers of very different countries - members of a nationalistic institution par excellence - can be brought together in an ad hoccreated force, one without tradition or flag, and be motivated to operate in the service of international peace. Though both questions have aspects other than just the sociological ones, it will be clear that sociology, with its capacity to compare systematically the functioning of social institutions, can contribute something to their clarification.

2.

THE UN AS A COALITION: THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMATION

To understand UNF operations it is essential to understand the structure of the UN, the authority that controls the military forces. 347

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans Defined as an organization, the UN is an example of a well-established coalition. It is composed of nation-states whose commitments do not affect their autonomy. Often the participants will have only one interest in common: a concern for their survival as independent units. Their participation in the whole is restricted by their particular interests. The basic characteristics of coalitions may be derived from the functional autonomy of the parts: 7 (1) the entry and in any case the secession of members is practically always possible, which weakens the integration and power of the organization as a whole; (2) the effectiveness of their performances is limited because of the necessity to accept formal and informal bargaining between the members; (3) sectional interests and bloc solidarities often cause strain in the coalition. Being a coalition of nations, the UN is confronted with what is formally the perfect type of functional autonomy: sovereignty — 'the state's right to be unpredictable'.8 There is of course a common interest, but avoiding war is often too abstract and too vague for the formulation of a common policy. The major powers rely on their own strength or, like many small ones, on alliances and regional arrangements for their protection.9 Regionalism in international relations is a fundamental challenge to the UN, one which is sometimes dangerously related to controversies inside the organization. The exclusion of special interest groups is, however, outside its sphere of control. In addition, regional alliances are formally recognized by the UN Charter (art. 51). The danger of immobilism is even more serious. Emergency situations cannot be dealt with by a coalition of a hundred or more independent nations. Moreover, it is unavoidable that majority and minority groupings can be formed at any moment, and that serious discussion arises, thus destroying the obtained consensus. Obviously the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary challenge of the coalition structure of the UN. The provisions of the Charter make it clear that the dangers of immobilism and im7

J. A. A. van D o o m , "Conflict in Formal Organizations", Conflict in Society, edited by A. de Reuck and J. Knight (London, Churchill Ltd., 1966), pp. 18 ff. 8 S. Hoffmann, "Erewhon or Lilliput? A Critical View of the Problem", International Organization, Vol. XVII (1963), p. 413. 9 Robert W. MacDonald, The League of Arab States. A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 3 ff, 289 ff.

348

United Nations Forces potence were fully understood. The answer was the creation of a built-in 'oligarchic' agency, the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintenance of the international equilibrium. The authors of the Charter went even further, offering the great powers a permanent seat in the Council and, moreover, ensuring that no collective measures could be taken against a permanent member without his consent. Furthermore, they provided for the Security Council's being assisted in military affairs by a military Staff Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members. This delegation of authority, power and machinery, formally outlined in the Charter, indicates the intention of the founders of the UN to provide the new organization 'with teeth' and to emphasize the role of the major powers in peace-keeping activities. The provisions have either never been used or have in practice been of little importance.10 The controversies of the Cold War destroyed the possibility of cooperation between East and West, symbolized in the frequent exercise of the 'veto' by the Soviet Union. The Military Staff Committee met regularly for some years, but the military arrangements provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter never became a reality. What was to have been the supreme authority in the post-war world turned out to be a vacuum in which the great powers and their supporters tended to be increasingly immobilized by rivalry and fear. UN action in the Korean War resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution on November 3, 1950, which provides for the Assembly to move quickly in emergency situations if the Security Council is paralyzed by the veto. But for the next five years the success of the new provisions, including military plans, was very limited.11 During the last decade, however, a number of UN military operations have been carried out: in Suez, in the Congo, in Cyprus, besides less spectacular ones in different parts of the world. Those actions require an explanation. The UN is in fact still the sort of coalition that it was in the beginning, characterized as it is by controversies and strains, by shifting international equilibrium, regionalism, and the absence of a power centre. Even the intended role of the Security Council has lost most of its value since the 'Uniting for Peace' 10

L. M. Goodrich, "The Maintenance of International Peace and Security", The United Nations in the Balance, edited by N. J. Padelford and L. M. Goodrich (New York, Praeger, 1965), pp. 65 ff. 11 K. S. Petersen, "The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950", International Organization, Vol. XIII (1959), pp. 219-232.

349

Jacques van Doom and, Jan H. Mans resolution supplanted much of its conflict-management function by the decisions of the General Assembly. The tremendous growth of the UN as a consequence of decolonization has brought a great number of powerless new nations to the fore. That explains why the UN, contrary to all expectation regarding political coalitions and to past experience with them, has not progressed toward increasing unification around a 'core' unit,12 but has become even more of a 'typical' coalition structure. Established in a period of hope and idealism, the UN changed into a more pragmatic and improvisational system.18 How could an organization like this have succeeded in gaining the capacity to legitimate collective military operations? What special conditions are needed to make decisions in this field politically acceptable to the participating nations? It can be hypothesized that the process of legitimation in coalitions is determined by two sets of factors: (1) the degree of institutionalization of the political system, as well as the extent to which a common political culture has come into existence in the system; (2) the support of the majority of the participants and of the major groupings. Both hypotheses will now be tested with regard to the UNF. (a) Institutionalization and a Common Political Culture. - Unlike an established political order, a coalition like the UN has a low rate of institutional integration. Nevertheless, some functions of the organization are highly institutionalized in a number of specialized agencies, such as UNESCO, FAO, ECOSOC and WHO. The core function of securing peace in international relations by use of military force, however, lacks permanent organs and arrangements of similar importance. The allocation of authority in military operations is possible only by separate resolutions of the Council or the Assembly. There is no mandate given to the Secretary-General. Even very dangerous situations and urgent requests can only be dealt with in special sessions of the main organs of the UN. 12

A. Etzioni, "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXVIII (1963), p. 409 f. 15 B. E. Urquhart, "United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: an Institutional Perspective", International Organization, Vol. XVII (1963), pp. 351-354.

350

United Nations

Forces

Suez.u During the night of 29 October, 1956 Israeli armed forces entered the territory of Egypt. On 31 October military action against Egypt was also undertaken by the United Kingdom and France. Egypt referred the matter to the Security Council, but the inability of the Council to act led to the convening of the Assembly for an emergency session. On 2 November a resolution calling upon the parties to cease fire was passed. A Canadian proposal to institute a U N F was accepted on 4 November. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General, as a matter of priority, 'to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international UNF.'" On 7 November the Secretary-General was authorized to issue all regulations required for the effective functioning of the Forces, and to take all other necessary action. The first members of the U N Emergency Force, a number of officers, arrived in Egypt on 12 November, followed by troop units on 15 November. By early February 1957 there were 6,000 men in Egypt, which was the strength needed to perform the tasks assigned to the U N E F by the Assembly.1« On 12 July, 1960 the president of the new Republic of the The Congo." Congo requested the Secretary-General the urgent dispatch of military assistance. The Security Council met in the evening of 13 July. Early in the morning of 14 July the Council decided to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to provide the government of the Congo with military assistance. Four days later the U N F in the Congo (ONUC) numbered 3,500 troops made up of contingents from Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco and Tunesia, while a Swedish battalion was being airlifted in from Gaza. By 31 July the ONUC numbered 11,155 troops.1» Not only the authorization, but also the obligation of frequent renewal of the Secretary-General's mandate expresses the reluctance of the member-states to part with even a small fragment of their sovereignty. The Assembly members always agree on the principle that U N F shall not be used without a new mandate for any purpose other than the one envisaged when the Forces were created. The absence of an institutionalized loyalty on the part of the members can explain their resistance to the establishment of a body of qualified executives and their tendency to exercise close supervision. Tensions between government and military leaders are as old as the "

Bowett, op. cit., pp. 90 ff; Rosner, op. cit., pp. 21 ff. Bowett, op. cit., p. 92. 16 Rosner, op. cit., pp. 121 f. 17 Bowett, op. cit., pp. 153 ff; K. Gordon, The United Nations in the Congo. A Quest for Peace (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), pp. 15 f. 18 Gordon, op. cit., pp. 25, 31. 15

351

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans military institution itself, but in the UN the problem is more serious as a consequence of the coalition structure of the political authority. The failure of the Military Staff Committee has already been mentioned. The peace-keeping operations during the past decade have not stimulated new forms of continuous top level coordination. All problems of the military missions are handled within the office of the Secretary-General.19 "The situation could be likened to that of a large corporation which has a board of directors, some department heads (like the head of the Field Operations Service, the Commander-in-Chief of UNEF, the political officer of ONUC), but no president and vice-presidents. The high-level administrative element is missing." 20 Most experts believe that many difficulties in the UNF operations could have been avoided if the Secretary-General had been provided with a permanent military staff.21 A distinction should be made between legitimating and managing military operations. "Only the Council and the Assembly are capable of authorizing a United Nations force, but if the history of Suez and the Congo demonstrates anything, it is that they are utterly incapable of running it." 22 This situation having been accepted for a long period, there can be no serious discussion about the establishment of a permanent force. The same experts who advocate a permanent military staff reject the idea of a standing army for either political or financial reasons, or both.23 If the reliability of an international force is, as Hans Morgenthau says, "a function of the legal order and the political status quo it is called upon " "In fact, apart from the military adviser's small staff and a very small civilian affairs unit . . . in New York, there is no U N military or special organization outside the actual areas of operation to backstop the U N forces." Urquhart, op. cit., p. 350. 20 E. H. Bowman and J. E. Fanning, "The Logistics Problems of a U N Military Force", International Organization, Vol. XVII (1963), p. 370. 21 Peace-Keeping Experience and Evaluation; the Oslo Papers, edited by P. Frydenberg (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), pp. 14 f; Bowman and Fanning, op. cit., pp. 370 ff; I. Rikhye, "Preparation and Training of U N Peace-Keeping Forces", Peace-Keeping Experience and Evaluation; the Oslo Papers, edited by P. Frydenberg (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), p. 185; Urquhart, op. cit., p. 350. As a consequence the General Services Branch of the U N was able to control military commanders. See also Carl von Horn, Soldiering for Peace (London, Cassell, 1966), p. 62: "I had had the rather disturbing suspicion that in New York the quartermaster dictated to the generals. This struck me as strange. I had imagined this principle had been settled for all time in the post-mortem which had followed the Crimean War." 22 H. Nicholas, "UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe", International Organization, Vol. XVII (1963), p. 337; cf. von Horn, op. cit., p. VII and many other pages. 2S Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 415; Bowett, op. cit., pp. 323 ff.

352

United Nations Forces to uphold, a reliable and effective permanent force in a world of sovereign nations is a contradiction in terms". 24 Institutionalized legitimation of political action presupposes a certain degree of consent with respect to the basic values in the political community. In a global organization, the existence of such a common political organization is most unlikely.25 The only way out, then, is the exclusion of elements which are contradictory to a number of basic political ideas. In a coalition including a great number of small nations and new states, some degree of suspicion attaches to all members who (a) express strong national feelings and expansionist aspirations; (b) are playing a colonial or imperial role, or have been doing so in the recent past; (c) are politically or ideologically directly committed; (d) show a lack of involvement in the common interests of the coalition as a whole. Applying this to UNF policy, we can expect that only a restricted number of nations will be accepted as reliable enough to exercise military functions in the name of the UN. It is indeed remarkable that the whole series of UNF operational and observational functions have primarily been fulfilled by a group of historically, politically and ideologically 'unsuspected' nations: Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, India and, less frequently, by other Asian, African and American states.26 Canada and the Scandinavian states were responsive to UN plans for collective peace-keeping right from the beginning. The first attempt of the UN to stimulate the members to contribute military units for any collective action necessary - undertaken in 1950 after passing the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution - was no more than a modest success. Only 4 of the countries invited offered military forces, viz. Denmark, Norway, Greece and Thailand.27 H. J. Morgenthau, "The Political Conditions for an International Police Force", International Organization, Vol. XVII (1963), pp. 399, 402. 25 F. O. Wilcox, "Regionalism and the United Nations", The United Nations in the Balance, edited by N. J. Padelford and L. M. Goodrich (New York, Praeger, 1965), p. 443: "NATO, SEATO, CENTO and even OAS, with their curious mélange of members offer ample proof for this observation." 28 A. B. Fox, "The Small States of Western Europe in the United Nations", The United Nations in the Balance, edited by N. J. Padelford and L. M. Goodrich (New York, Praeger, 1965), pp. 410-422; H. Kotani, "Peace-Keeping: Problems for Smaller Countries", International Journal, Vol. XXVIII (1963/64), pp. 308-325. 27 W. R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (London, Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1957), p. 59. 24

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Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans Sweden has a relatively long tradition in international military activity. The number of Swedish troops who have so far served in UN Forces is about 7000.28 Canadian forces in the Korean War were provided not for Korea alone, but "for general United Nations service".29 Lester Pearson has strongly supported collective activities for peace-keeping functions ever since. Ireland is a most impressive example of military help to the UN. Her extremely small army sent a total of 5,300 troops to the Congo,30 which meant that one-sixth of the entire Irish army, including a high proportion of specialists, was serving in the ONUC.31 The participation of the smaller countries was a later development in the history of the UN. In 1945 it was assumed that peace would be secured by the 'Big Five'; since 1956, however, the tendency has been to keep the major powers out and ask the smaller states to provide the UNF. "No 'neutral' country would welcome embroilment in a cold-war issue; no 'uncommitted' nation would receive with cordiality soldiers from the super-powers on its terrain. And thus the small or 'middle-powers' themselves came to the rescue." 82 May it be concluded that legitimation of the exercise of military force has nothing to do with the existence of a basic political culture? Such a conclusion would be wrong. Several of the smaller European countries have, like the new states of Africa and Asia, a pattern of 'non-commitment' in the struggle between East and West, and a tradition of 'neutralism' and 'internationalism' (Sweden, Ireland 33 ). Like the less developed states, they are highly dependent upon peaceful international relations and foreign trade. In short, there is a basic political culture which is typical of most of the countries entrusted with a mandate for UN military operations. This common value-pattern explains the fact that even an outsider like 28

Kotani, op. cit., pp. 309 f. G. Spry, "Canada, the United Nations Emergency Force and the Commonwealth", International Affairs, Vol. XXXIII (1957), p. 296. 30 J. A. Jackson, The Irish Army: Institutional Identity in an Emerging Neutral Nation, Paper Conference on Armed Forces and Society in Western Europe (London, July 1964), p. 4. 31 H. E. D. Harris, "Operation Sarsfield: the Irish Army in the Congo", Military Review, Vol. XLII (May 1962), p. 71. 32 Rosner, op, cit., p. 119. 33 Fox, op. cit., pp. 412 ff. Even their short period of independence is used as an argument for easy cooperation with the new states. "In U N debates Irish delegates with their experiences of a people emerging into independence are in a good position to acquire the trust and respect of Africans and Asians"; Harris, op. cit., p. 72. 29

354

United Nations Forces Switzerland went so far as to make a financial contribution to the peace-keeping forces in Cyprus in 1964.34 In the last few years both the number of smaller nations and their influence in UN affairs have increased tremendously. It can thus be said that the UN has developed from a victors' alliance, with its elitist claims, to a more pure coalition of states which shows a tendency to equalitarianism in the fulfilling of its pacification task. (b) The Support of the Participants. - The degree of legitimacy of the political decisions and institutions of a coalition depends on bargaining processes between its members and on the voting outcome of its sessions. Legitimate decisions are, from this point of view, a function of majority and minority relations. Legitimating UNF operations has always been a matter of voting on proposed resolutions. Measured by this standard, remarkable differences in consensus with respect to the UNF operations may be observed (Table 1). TABLE 1

Voting for UN military intervention Host country Greece Indonesia Kashmir Palestine Korea Suez Libanon The Congo New Guinea Yemen Cyprus

Percentage of U N members 100

90

80

70

60

50-0

35

Abstention

X X X X X

Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union S. Union absent

X

x

Soviet Union X X

X

Soviet Union

X

The prescribed renewal of the mandate sometimes shows some unstability of the opinion as time progresses (Table 2). Political developments evidently exercise a certain influence on the consensus of the participating states. Apart from this, the nations involved are holding different opinions 34

Fox, op. cit., p. 411. Source: B. G. Lall, "Le maintien de la paix depuis 1946", March 1965, p. 12.

35

Désarmement,

355

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans about the UN-operations. These differences are the expression of the political interests and ideological orientation of each country, clearly to observe in the Congo.36 In the field the military operations were endangered by the attitudes of national units with a direct interest in their host country's internal affairs.37 TABLE 2

Votes concerning continued activity UNTSO (Palestine) 38 Date voting

15- 4—47 29-11-47 2 3 - 4-48 14- 5-48 11-12-48 11- 8-49

Security council

General assembly Pro

Con

Abstention

45 33

7 13

1 10

31 35

7 15

16 8

Pro

Con

Abstention

9

0

2

9

0

2

The withdrawal of contingents in the course of operations is another symptom of the low degree of cohesion in a coalition like the UN, even in emergency situations. Sometimes difficulties at home make such a withdrawal necessary, but sometimes political manoeuvring or lack of confidence have also led to the withdrawal of troops. Kashmir.™ In March 1954, Nehru, criticizing the UN decision to extend military assistance to Pakistan, requested the withdrawal of the American members from the UN Military Observer Group in Kashmir. The gradual disappearance of the Americans from the UNMOG was the consequence of this request. Suez-40 In the second half of 1957 the Indonesian and the Finnish contingents of UNEF were withdrawn, and other units were reduced in strength, even though the Commander feared "loss in effectiveness through inability to cover the long lines involved and lack of the necessary reserves". The Congo.*1 After declaring at the Casablanca meeting early in 1961 38

Kotani, op. cii., pp. 313-315. Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 173, 197, 217-218. 38 Source: Lall, op. cit., p. 12. 39 S. Louri6, "The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan", International Organization, Vol. IX (1955), p. 22. 40 Rosner, op. cit., pp. 122 f. 41 B. Egge, "Regional Command of U N Security Forces", Peace-Keeping Experience and Evaluation; the Oslo Papers, edited by P. Frydenberg (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1964), p. 139; Gordon, op. cit., pp. 103 ff. 37

356

United Nations Forces that they were in disagreement with UN policy, a number of African countries immediately withdrew their troops from the Congo. A large zone which the UN had guaranteed neutral was thereupon invaded by one of the belligerents, resulting in a lessening of confidence in the UN. One of the main problems in seeking a consensus is the financing of the UNF operations. Juridical standpoints and opinions are important,42 but not essential. The difficulty is, in fact, that it is the political evaluation of peace-keeping that determines readiness to support the operations both morally and financially. The UN has no regular budget sufficient to finance its very costly military operations,43 so that special peace-keeping funds are needed. It is obvious that this arrangement offers opportunities for the introduction of political arguments into the dispute. If nations refuse to vote for action, they are not willing to pay for it. Sometimes they are afraid that the operations may threaten their interests; in other cases they are unable to assume indeterminate burdens and rising costs.44 A crucial point is the allocation of costs. The proposed sharing of UNF costs gave rise to heated debate, and has split the Assembly ever since.45 It is probably true that the crisis can be solved by diplomatic negotations rather than by voting. A coalition in crisis can only be controlled by recognition of the bargaining power of its members.46 The number of votes pro and con does not provide full information on the members' support of and resistance to UNF operations. The 'formal oligarchy' of the major states as permanent members of the Security Council is only the institutionalization of the key power position of those states in the Organization as a whole and in international relations in general. UN operations directed immediately and exclusively against the interests of a major power are politically unacceptable and practically impossible. The case of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 can be men42

L. Gross, "Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping Operations: the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice", International Organization, Vol. X V n (1963), pp. 1 ff. 43 Maintaining the U N E F cost the U N on the average $20 million a year from 1957 to 1963. The expenses for the Congo operation averaged $100 million a year. The United Nations in the Balance, edited by N. J. Padelford and L. M. Goodrich (New York, Preager, 1965), p. 80. 44 Padelford and Goodrich, op. cit., pp. 91 ff. 45 Rosner, op. cit., pp. 163 ff. 46 Gross, op. cit., p. 35: "The United Nations needs not to be reminded that its Members are sovereign states which will not be commanded if they cannot be persuaded." 47 There is a very striking difference between the degree of support by the USA and the Soviet Union, as can be seen from Table 1, p. 355.

357

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans tioned as a classic example of both moral indignation and military impotence on the part of most UN members.47 The case of Korea (1950) was an exception in the history of the UN and even as such was only formally a UN operation, for the Organization had in fact given the USA a mandate 'to run the campaign'.48 The setting up of the UNF in Korea and its command structure is a typical instance of the merging of parts to form a new corporate body along 'elitist' lines.49 The scope of the political objectives is also of importance. Most of the UNF operations have taken place in areas which, from a global point of view, may be characterized as marginal. There is now a concentration of activity in the Middle East (Suez, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Cyprus), whereas conflicts between East and West are handled by the opponents themselves and their supporting powers (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Berlin, Hungary, Poland). This restriction in objectives is normal for a coalition without much power or authority. Consent can only be reached if the major participants are sure that the protection of their own interests remains in their own hands. A further consequence of the coalition situation is the need to deal with regionalism (sub-coalitions) among its members, especially if such regional blocs are older and more cohesive than the all-embracing union. Some international crises have been solved by regional organizations, e.g. the OAS sanctions against the Dominican Republic in I960. 50 The pragmatic approach adopted in UNF affairs is evident from the tendency to use regional solidarity rather than frustrate it. All important collective military actions of the UN have some connection with sectional interests and organizations Suez. The attack of the UK and France on Egypt raised grave issues for the members of the UN and the Commonwealth. First of all, the action provoked the most powerful possible collective disapproval in the UN. The cease-fire resolution of 2 November, 1956 was carried by 64 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions. The groups of nations in opposition to the aggressors included the Western hemisphere; Europe except the UK, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal; Asia except Laos and Israel; and Africa except South Africa.51 48

General MacArthur: "my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. . . . I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatsoever." Bowett, op. cit., p. 42. 49 Etzioni, op. cit., pp. 409 f. 50 Wilcox, op. cit., pp. 435 ff. 51 Spry, op. cit., p. 291.

358

United Nations

Forces

Secondly, the response of the Commonwealth governments, however varied, was generally disapproving. The UK's policy in Suez was in contravention of the principle of concert, and this failure was sanctioned by most of the Commonwealth members. The only sub-coalition, however, which was strong enough to face the international crisis, despite these internal controversies, was precisely the Commonwealth. It was Canada which successfully proposed the intervention of a UNF in Suez. The commander of the UNEF was a Canadian; the personnel of the services, transport, signal and ordnance units were largely Canadian. From a third to a half of the Force were from Canada and India, and the HQ staff was also substantially Indian and Canadian. In the Advisory Committee of seven governments the majority were Commonwealth members (India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Canada).82 Obviously the Suez crisis was solved with the assistance of a United Nations Force, but it was strongly supported by sub-coalition initiatives and means. The Congo. The intervention in the Congo, four years later, was regarded by Hammarskjold, as well as by the African states, as being first and foremost a test case of African solidarity.6® The general plan for ONUC was worked out in cooperation with the representatives of nine African nations. If the Canadian Prime Minister Pearson was the key statesman in the Suez crisis, it was the Tunisian representative, Mongi Slim, who played the same role with regard to the Congo. The first contingents for ONUC came from African countries, and the hard core of troops was always African. Only two nations outside Africa participated in the ONUC, both fully acceptable to the African sub-coalition: Ireland and Sweden. During the following years, however, African enthusiasm decreased. African solidarity 'in the framework of the UN' broke down as a consequence of differences of views in the sub-coalition.54 Cyprus. The UNF in Cyprus (UNFICYP) followed two unsuccessful attempts by the UK to restore peace with the assistance of a sub-coalition operation, first by a NATO force and then by a Commonwealth force.55 The composition of UNFICYP demonstrates the same principle as in the Congo: regional solidarity first. The contingents were drawn from UK and Canada (Commonwealth), Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and Austria (Europe).58 (c) Conclusions. - First, the degree of institutionalization of UN peacekeeping activities is very low. The decisions on collective military actions 52

Spry, op. cit., p. 300. Gordon, op. cit., pp. 21 f, 26 f; Kotani, op. cit., pp. 312 ff; J. Karefa-Smart, "Africa and the United Nations", N. J. Padelford and J. M. Goodrich (eds.), op. cit., p. 403. 54 Kotani, op. cit., pp. 317 ff; Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 155, 187, 217-218. 55 Bowett, op. cit., p. 552. 56 Bowett, op. cit., p. 554. 53

359

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans and on the formation and allocation of military personnel can only be made in actual emergency situations. The members are free to withdraw their contingents and to refuse financial support. A standing military planning committee is non-existent; a permanent security force is considered to be out of the question. Secondly, there is a basic political culture among the smaller and non-committed members of the UN which support collective security activities. The major powers are free from threatening actions; regional blocs are recognized as interested groups in relevant UNF operations. The support of peace-keeping operations by the members is a function of bargaining processes which often lead to uncertainties in the decisionmaking processes as well as to financial difficulties. The total picture suggests that legitimating peace-keeping activities is a most delicate affair. The conditions for playing safe are complicated and tend to aggravate the functioning of the military forces. It must be hypothesized that the effectiveness of the UNF is low as a consequence of the conscientious search for legitimation of political decisions. 3.

THE UNF AS AD HOC INTERNATIONAL FORCES: THE PROBLEM OF EFFECTIVENESS

Organizations are orientated to the attainment of a specific goal.57 As a mechanism established for 'getting things done', an organization can be evaluated in terms of success or failure. The yardsticks may be quantitative (productivity of industry) or qualitative (perfection of musical performance), easy to define (winning a war) or very complicated (a government's success), but they are always there. But achievement or goal-attainment cannot be analysed without knowledge of the available resources of the organization (input), even if an input-output ratio is not appropriate. Moreover the network of relations between the parts of the system, as well as the solidarity of the members, is of direct importance for the evaluation of the organization's effectiveness. In other words: effectiveness in a plural concept and can only be measured by using a number of yardsticks. The relevant question is what kind of effectiveness can be expected from an ad hoc international military force charged with an emergency 57 The conceptual frame used here is largely borrowed from Caplow's approach to organizational effectiveness. Th. Caplow, Principles of Organization (New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964), pp. 119 ff. 68 The allocation of cost is a different problem, mainly of political interest.

360

United Nations Forces task? This question can only be formulated by selecting the essential functional problems confronting UNF as a social system: (1) UNF requires a sufficient allocation of resources to function as a system or to maintain itself as such; (2) UNF can only survive if there is a certain degree of cohesion between its constituent parts (organization); (3) UNF needs the ability to bring about some consent among its members (morale); (4) UNF has to 'produce' some net result as the achievement of the system (output). (a) The Allocation of Resources. - Above all, three kinds of resources are necessary for military operations: qualified personnel, logistics support and adequate information.58 The difficulties in the mobilization of manpower are fully admitted, even by the Secretary-General himself.59 Recruiting personnel in a very short time from a number of different countries and operating units without experience in oversea actions can only be considered as a dangerous venture. The frequent rotation of personnel is another undesirable aspect. Yet some continuity can be found in the UNTSO (Palestine) "in acting in effect as a training area, replacement depot, and stockpile of key personnel for other UN operations".60 The chief of staff of UNTSO, Major-General Burns, a man with considerable experience of UN affairs in the Middle East, was appointed Commanderin-Chief of UNEF in 1956; he recruited a limited number of UNTSO officers for UNEF.« In 1960, the first step in establishing the ONUC was to send ten officers recruited from the ranks of UNTSO to the Congo. Brigadier Rikhye, former Chief of Staff of the UNEF, was appointed Hammarskjold's military adviser, and Major-General Carl von Horn, Chief of Staff of the UNTSO, was appointed Commander of the ONUC.82 His headquarters core was formed by a team drawn from UNTSO, including officers from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Italy and New Zealand.68 59

U Thant in his address delivered to the Harvard Alumni Association on June 13, 1963. International Military Forces: the Question of Peace-Keeping in an Armed and Disarming World, edited by L. P. Bloomfield (Canada, Little, Brown and Company Ltd., 1964), pp. 264 f. 80 Bloomfield (ed.), op. cit., p. 94. 61 Rosner, op. cit., pp. 117 f. 62 Rosner, op. cit., p. 139. 63 Gutteridge, "The United Nations Force . . . " , cit., p. 17; Von Horn, op. cit., p. 31.

361

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans UNOGIL in Lebanon, the UN force in New Guinea and the Yemen Observer Group also drew their commanders, initial staff and observers from UNTSO.64 It may be concluded that the gradual creation of a standing peacekeeping cadre had begun, despite formal recruitment procedures. Logistics problems are difficult too.65 The necessity to act immediately and to provide forces oversea with whatever supplies and equipment they required placed a too-heavy burden on the UNF. Airlifting troops and supplies from all over the world proved a task which could only be handled by the air force of a major power. UNEF was mainly supported by the Canadian Air Force, and ONUC by the US Military Air transport Service. The Congo airlift was activated on July 8, 1960, by the US Air Force in Europe. During the first three months this airlift accomplished the transport of 20,000 men and 7 million pounds of cargo from 21 countries. 110 aircraft took part, and 52 airfields in 33 countries were used. This was achieved without any prior planning.®6 "All too often, the only notice we had of incoming troops was when their aircraft contacted the control tower ten minutes ahead of touching down."67 Some countries were poorly prepared for military operations overseas. The Irish troops in the Congo arrived in heavy serge uniforms - and without steel helmets.68 In the early stages only the Ghanian contingent was administratively self-sufficient. The Guinean contingent had no signal equipment of any kind, although long-range radio was badly needed.69 The information on what was to be expected in the field was not much better. The troops were armed for infantry service, while often police functions were required. Tear gas and smoke grenades-"as tranquilizers in the art of peace-keeping" - were urgently needed, but only the Ghanian battallionwas adequately prepared for dealing with mobs.70 The 64

Bloomfield (ed.), International Military Forces . . c i t . , p. 94; Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 90 f. 65 Important contributions are found in E. H. Bowman and J. E. Fanning, op. cit.; L. P. Bloomfield, "Headquarters-Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and End of ONUC", International Organization, Vol. XVII (1963); Frydenberg (ed.), op. cit., pp. 163 ff. 66 T. H. Watkins, "Operation New Tape: the Congo Airlift", Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 19, 22. 67 Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 153, 148. 88 Harris, op. cit., p. 66; Jackson, op. cit., p. 4. 69 Gutteridge, "The United Nations Force . . . " , cit., p. 19. 70 Bloomfield, "Headquarters . . . " , cit., p. 383.

362

United Nations Forces UN had practically no information on the Congo. The first maps of the territory, in fact, were obtained from a Belgian shipping company on Wall Street.71 Comments of military experts are very critical: "working under nightmare conditions"; "this tempo and this improvisation were precarious and hazardous"; "inefficient and expensive"; "the management of resources in the Gaza and Congo operations measured up far short of present-day notions of military efficiency".72 (b) The Integration of the Units. - Since goal-attainment is impossible without an established cohesion among the constituent parts of the system, the integrative problem is of essential importance for a military group. The focus here is on the hierarchy, on the division of labor, the coordination of the contributions, the degree of standardization, and the lines of communication. The integrative problems become more complicated in proportion to the number of units and the heterogeneity among the units. Under such circumstances it takes a long time for a reasonable degree of integration to be achieved. An ad hoc formation like a military emergency force has all the characteristics needed to resist integration. The whole is made up of national contingents which are ultimately subordinated to their own country's political authority. Being an instrument of a coalition of states, a core unit which can fulfill the function of a leading party, will hardly be accepted. Time to develop into an institutionalized pattern is lacking. The members of the new organization meet each other for the first time in the midst of a delicate operation. The heterogeneity is both cultural and functional. The UNF are often composed of a great number of national contingents, sometimes very small, drawn from countries all over the world. Ethnic, racial and language differences complicate both internal communication and joint activity. On 15 September, 1957 the UNEF, with a total manpower of less than 6000 troops, was composed of officers and men from 10 nations, from Columbia to Finland and from India to Sweden.73 In 1958 UNTSO, a force of about 500 military and civilians, was drawn 71

Bowman and Fanning, op. cit., p. 361. Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 90, 148; G. C. Bowitz, "Central Administration of U N Security Forces", Frydenberg (ed.), op. cit., p. 105; Bowman and Fanning, op. cit., p. 368. 73 Rosner, op. cit., p. 122. 72

363

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans from 24 countries including China, Honduras, Ireland, Vietnam, Italy a.o.74 The ONUC was even more of a mixture, despite the quantitative dominance of African troops. On 26 September, 1960 there were 18,800 soldiers in the Congo, comprising personnel from 27 countries. A number of units were extremely small - Brazil 9, Burma 9, Ceylon 9, the Netherlands 6, New Zealand 1 - indicating the complexity of the integration problem.75 The Forces in the Congo were confronted with acute linguistic difficulties which continued to be felt throughout the operation.76 The communications system needed, in fact, bilingual operators, who were furnished by the Canadian signal corps. Communication in the field, however, is not only a question of ethnic relations, but also of technical equipment. Being an essential part of the operation, the lack of signal equipment as well as transport was often a threat to the cooperation of the forces. Insufficient standardization of equipment and supplies was, of course, one of the basic logistics problems, one which considerably complicated both performance and communication. In the Congo there were about forty different kinds of vehicles, varying ammunition calibers, five mortar sizes and three types of fighter aircraft. Food problems were numerous: 'Pakistanis had to have their chickens killed in a certain way; Arabs wouldn't eat Israeli jam; Norwegians wouldn't eat Portugese sardines; and so on. Rations have finally standardized down to four diets.'77 One particular problem of organizational fusions had to be solved. Most contingents came with logistics personnel to handle the internal support tasks, whereas the tasks external to the units were not fulfilled.78 So it was often necessary to arrange the division of tasks in the course of operations. Some contingents supplied units for transport and signals; medical needs were met by others; postal services were handled by a third unit, and so on. It is easy to see that effectiveness can be increased by a measure of pre-planned coordination, as has been recommended by a number of experts. The earmarking of contingents and their coordination before 74

Von Horn, op. cit., p. 99. Gutteridge, "The United Nations Force ...", cit., p. 18. Gutteridge, "The United Nations Forces . . c i t . , p. 18; Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 152-153. By December 31, 1960, there were still only six bilingual staff officers. Bloomfield, "Headquarters ...", cit., p. 381. 77 Bowman and Fanning, op. cit., p. 374. 78 Bowman and Fanning, op. cit., p. 372. 75

78

364

United Nations Forces the emergency situation arises could be a modest step toward the integration of the UNF. (c) Consensus and Identity. - The ability to organize a group of soldiers in a military formation is one thing; to motivate them in dangerous situations is quite another. There are particular mechanisms necessary to enforce and maintain a consensus and to create an institutional identity. Charismatic leadership, homogeneity in cultural and social background and frequent interaction between the members can contribute to that end. The UNF showed little sign of the creation of common consent and a common identity. The heterogeneity of the personnel has already been mentioned. Moreover, there is not much chance of an image of military leadership being built up by handling mobs in small Eastern towns or patrolling along a cease-fire demarcation line somewhere in the desert. If UNF soldiers feel loyalty, it will be first of all a national feeling. The 'international soldier' does not and cannot exist as nationalism is deeply rooted and highly appreciated by most people. Serving the cause of peace-keeping only a short time, their frame of reference can only be their own country. UNF have neither a territorial and historical, nor a cultural and social identity of any strength.79 Yet there is a great deal of difference between the participating contingents. As mentioned earlier, the smaller non-competing countries are politically more acceptable and adaptable in UN operations than the great powers. The same is perhaps true of the military units of those countries. Regional ties do not always support military morale. It is reported from the Congo that some African officers seemed to be affected by a 'guilt complex' after taking part in operations in which fellow Africans were killed, sometimes in order to protect European interests.80 Other experiences are different. A most interesting feature of the ONUC operation was the development of a sort of 'regionalism' inside the Force based on the British pattern of military organization, procedure and nomenclature of several Commonwealth contingents (Canada, India, Ghana, Nigeria, Malaya). It is very probably that cooperation could be 79 Von Horn, op. cit., p. 218. The International Civil Service is confronted with more or less the same problems: P. Lengyel, "Some Trends in the International Civil Service", International Organization, Vol. XIII (1959), pp. 531 ff; J. Niezing, "United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations as a Politico-Sociological Problem", Mens en Maatschappij, Vol. XIL (1966), pp. 262-263. 80 Gutteridge, "The United Nations Forces . . . " , cit., p. 20.

365

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans built on such a foundation, while it could also serve to abolish racial barriers. Gutteridge even claims to have observed that a collapse of the UN operation in the Congo as a result of racial fissions was largely prevented by the strong representation of Commonwealth countries.81 The problem of identity will perhaps be the thorniest one of the many besetting a future permanent peace force. This aspect of the UNF has been given too little attention, but some reflections on the subject of future developments show how crucial the problem is.82 (d) Achievement or 'Productivity',83 — Measuring the achievement of an organization is simple if input and output can be related in quantitative terms. Military operations surely cannot be evaluated in this way. A comparison between human sacrifice and political successes, or even between the number of casualties and the importance of the battle, is impossible. The 'output' as such, however, is in most cases subject to a simple binary standard of success or failure, victory or defeat. But UNF operations are normally not started to win a war, but to maintain or restore a military and/or political equilibrium. The simple standard is useless here. Moreover, 'peace-keeping' is a vague expression for an extremely divergent range of international missions. Several authors on the subject have attempted to distinguish a number of basic types.84 The classification proposed by Bloomfield is summarized in Table 3. The differences are crucial. The Military Observers in Kashmir were there mainly to report the very infrequent violations of the case-fire agreement to Control Headquarters, after having advised the local commanders.85 UNFICYP had to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, if necessary, to contribute to the maintenance of law and order, but the dramatic occurrences of civil war in Cyprus laid a heavy strain on the troops.86 In the Congo only 81

Gutteridge, "The United Nations Forces . . . " , cit., p. 21; W. F. Gutteridge, Armed Forces in New States (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 65. 82 See the brilliant essay by H. V. Dicks, "National Loyalty, Identity, and the International Soldier", International Organization, Vol. XVII (1963), pp. 425443. 83 Caplow, op. cit., p. 124. 84 Bowett, op. cit., pp. 266 ff; O. Stokke, "United Nations Security Forces: Some Political Problems"; Frydenberg (ed.), op. cit., p. 29 f; Bloomfield (ed.), International . .., cit., pp. 9 f. 85 For the role of the Military Observers in this area, see Lourie, op. cit., pp. 27 f. 86 See the impressions of a British officer: D. A. D. J. Bethel, "Cyprus 1964", The Journal of the Royal Artillery, Vol. XCII (1965), pp. 87 ff.

366

United Nations

Forces TABLE 3 Classification

Host country Greece Indonesia Kashmir Palestine Korea Suez Lebanon The Congo New Guinea Yemen Cyprus

of peace-keeping

Observation Enforcement and of cease-fires and truces patrol

operations Internal policing

Conventional war

X X X X

X X X

X X X X

X X

X

self-defence was at first permitted, but as the situation worsened, a regular warlike situation developed, culminating in the action against the Katangese mercenary army. There were serious losses in the UNF. On one day (28 April, 1961) more than 40 UNF soldiers were massacred.87 Evidently each type of operation has its own yardsticks of achievement. But, in general, concrete criteria are vague and subjective. It is plausible, of course, to attribute the decline of incidents in the cease-fire zone - shooting, mine explosions, capture of infiltrators - to UNF activity,88 but it cannot be proved, and it is even possible that the incident rate would have declined in the absence of these operations or with the help of other kinds of peace-keeping mechanisms. Contrary to expectation, it seems to be very difficult to measure the achievement degree of the UNF. Since, however, the operations are claimed to be based on a purposeful, rational policy of a global organization, it will be necessary to discuss this curious state of affairs in the next chapter. (e) Conclusions. - The analysis of effectiveness of the UNF makes it clear that both the ad hoc establishment and the multi-national composition exercise a negative influence on the degree of effectiveness of the Forces. 87 Gordon, op. cit., pp. 106 ff, 122 ff. 88 See for statistics of incidents, E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London, Harrap and Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 310.

367

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans The effectiveness is greater wherever some continuity is secured: in allocation: the existence of UNTSO as "in part a substitute for standing staff or even force"; 89 in integration: by rigorous standardization measures in equipment and supply; in consensus: by Commonwealth connections or other forms of regionalism. The effectiveness was also improved where the multi-national heterogeneity could be diminished: in allocation: by delegating transport to one or two powers; in integration: by the use of bilingual personnel in signal units and other means of communication; in consensus: by the Commonwealth connections and by a regionalist composition of the UNF.

4.

LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS: DISCUSSION

A prima vista it would seem to be quite correct to conclude that the peculiar process of legitimation in the political field negatively influences the degree of effectiveness of military operations. Ad hoc legitimation by the UN results in the ad hoc formation of the UNF; the participation of many small states in policy-making brings about a very heterogeneous force; the exclusion of the major powers from the establishment of the UNF creates shortcomings in allocation and operations, and so on. This very plausible conclusion is based on the supposition that military affairs have a 'logic' of their own. The UNF are viewed as a (military) system that has to solve its problems purely in terms of the relevant (i.e. military) functional requirements of the system itself. To ascertain whether these functional problems are solved in a 'satisfactory' way, it is necessary to use a set of standards built into the institutional pattern. As only the standards of national armies are available, all authors on the subject suggest that the effectiveness of the UNF falls far short of those standards. "By the standards of an efficient national establishment, these forces have considerable disadvantages."90 "The present system means, in any emergency, a degree of unpreparedness and improvisation which would be considered crazy in a normal army."91 "United Nations military operations tend 89 90 91

Bloomfield (ed.), International ..., Bloomfield (ed.), International ..., Urquhart, op. cit., p. 350.

368

cit., p. 94. cit., p. 264.

United Nations Forces in the authors' opinion to be inefficient and overly expensive." "The (Standard Operating) procedures for UNEF are probably adequate, but they are below the standards of many national military organizations."92 The difficulty is, however, that the effectiveness of the UNF operations cannot be measured only - or even primarily - by military yardsticks, because the 'normal' autonomy of the military systems does not exist in this case. On the one hand, the actions take place in the borderland between politics and armed activities; on the other hand, the actions, being peace-keeping operations, are often police or para-military as well as military activities. Both functional characteristics require the use of some other norms for effectiveness. The MIXED POLITICAL-MILITARY PATTERN is a consequence of the UN being a multi-purpose organization. The forces serve an international coalition of states, which implies a whole range of different, even conflicting notions of the purpose of their own organization and of political decisions of any importance. The resolutions which bring the UNF into being, as well as the course of operations itself, are a matter of permanent political dispute. It follows that the yardstick with which to measure the operational effectiveness of UNF is necessarily a politico-military one. As has been shown, the presence of the forces is in most cases in itself sufficient to end the hostilities. So to that extent, effectiveness is high. If the main intention is the introduction of a 'face-saving' mechanism in the situation, the acceptance of the UN resolution by the governments concerned already makes it a great success. If a real political solution is intended, e.g. a definite reconciliation of the conflicting parties, the outcome is often less satisfactory. Moreover, it is sometimes impossible to evaluate UNF success without implying the appreciation of the UN members for the results. What seemed to start as an unnecessary intervention may afterwards be regarded as a fully-justified and satisfying operation. Our object, however, is not to analyse effectiveness as such, but to determine the extent to which the special characteristics of the UNF - multi-national composition and ad hoc formation - can be assumed to be of influence on the degree of effectiveness. From the point of view of the UN that influence must surely be positive. As an international force the UNF can be accepted by all nations « Bowman and Fanning, op. cit., pp. 368, 373; Cf. Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 90, 148.

369

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans without fear of military intervention from competing neighbours. As an ad-hoc-assembled force it can reflect the composition and the political attitude of the UN itself at the moment of emergency. So in this respect the UNF is a real and realistic expression of the UN as an international organization. Any type of permanent force would presuppose an established international legal and political order. Since the UN is in fact a coalition, moving from one equilibrium to another, ad hoc-created military forces are most effective from this point of view.93 The mixed POLICE-MILITARY PATTERN is a consequence of the concrete tasks in the field. As was pointed out earlier, these tasks vary from warlike operations to observation, but most of the activities have some aspects in common. First of all, they are characterized by their emphasis on self-control on the part of the forces, which restricts its functions to control and selfdefence. The incredible delicate role of international troops in a host country is the main reason for this policy. Second, there is never an 'enemy' - the raison d'être of a conventional army. The word 'aggressor' is never mentioned in UN documents. Third, the UNF operations take place in countries which at the time are either split into rival factions or are in open conflict with a neighbouring state. Sometimes the authority of the legal government is restricted, as in Cyprus, or wholly absent, as in the Congo.94 In consequence, the situation is more or less chaotic, and the forces coming from abroad are in danger of becoming entangled in rivalries and intrigues. Fourth, the area to be controlled is often very extensive, thus causing a strain on the small military units of the UNF.95 Situations like these ask for special skills and attitudes on the part of the troops, who generally have little to do with the traditional heritage of the military institution, either morally or technically. As a consequence, the effectiveness of the operations cannot be evaluated by using military standards. It is preferable to work here with para-military criteria, e.g. the capacity and willingness to use the minimum 63

For sound reflections on the subject, see Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 399-403. Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 191 ff. 95 The Irish commander of part of the ONUC found himself in control of an area some six times the size of Ireland, with a force of 4,800 troops of five nations under his command. The ONUC of 19,000 men amounted to only two UN soldiers to every 100 square miles in the Congo. Harris, op. cit., p. 67; Gutteridge, "The United Nations Force . . . , cit., p. 18. 94

370

United Nations

Forces

force, a knowledge of the principles of riot control, a well-organized intelligence service, etc. From the available, very limited information on the subject, it can only be concluded that the effectiveness of the U N F from this point of view is sometimes low. Israel. The commander of UNTSO, General von Horn, found out that means of communication and an intelligence service were non-existent or in short supply, although "the prime necessity for an efficient observer force is first-rate communication, helicopters for observation, transport planes and vehicles, and the air-crew, radio-operators and maintenance staff to keep them functioning on a round-the-clock basis." 98 The Congo. Only a few commanders had the sound knowledge of the psychological factors affecting civil populations required to prevent local calamities. The use of a minimum of force was a mystery to most of the troops involved, with the exception of the well-trained and well-equipped Ghanian and Nigerian police units, which used bamboo sticks and shields in dealing with mobs.97 In the early period there was no organized intelligence service because the force commander felt that since there was no 'enemy' as such, there was no need of it.98 Cyprus. "The basic problem was to know where the peace was broken." 99 We may conclude that the standards against which the effectiveness of the U N F may be measured are not all built into the institutional pattern of the system, but are provided by both political and police evaluation. Unlike 'normal' military forces, the U N F are a much more 'open' type of organization, one directly depending on the political expectations of the formal authority and reacting to the special problems of the task environment. It must be expected that the other criteria of effectiveness mentioned before - the degree of allocation, integration, consensus and achievement - will also be influenced by the special character of the U N F . The concrete question is the extent to which these functional requirements have a 'logic' of their own sufficient to build up a set of standards of effectiveness apart from the political significance and police functions of the force. In other words: what is the functional autonomy of the parts of the system which have to meet the special criteria of effectiveness. 98

Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 62, 98, 204. Gutteridge, "The United Nations Force ...", cit., pp. 19 f; Von Horn, op. cit., pp. 163 f; Bloomfield (ed.), "Headquarters ...", cit., p. 383. 98 Harris, op. cit., p. 67. 99 Bethel, op. cit., p. 87. 87

371

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans In the publications on UNF the main emphasis is laid on the lack of effective functioning in the allocation of resources and the integration of the forces, while both achievement and consensus are noted without much comment. This is a curious phenomenon since organizations, being more or less rationally-constructed social systems, tend to be evaluated first of all on the score of achievement, which means the input-output ratio wherever possible, and only in the second place on the other functional requirements.100 The explanation is perhaps that military philosophy and policy are on strange ground when confronted with the achievement function of the UNF. Since there is no enemy, the 'output' cannot be measured by the standard of victory or defeat. On the other hand, there is a certain effective functioning of allocation and integration in UNF as much as in every other military force: the standards of the normal or national military establishment can be used here. Moreover, allocation, logistics and technical communication in military organizations are delegated - and easier to delegate - to particular divisions: transport, maintenance, signal units, pilots, drivers, operators, etc. Our hypothesis is, therefore, that the functional autonomy of allocation and communication sub-systems makes it possible to apply the standards of the military institutions to these processes, whereas the functional interdependence between achievement and political/police patterns cannot be measured by military criteria. As to the social (not technical) integration and the morale (consensus) of the UNF, military norms are only partly appropriate. The multinational composition of the forces evidently places a heavy burden on the shoulders of the troops. If only a few difficulties have been reported up to now, this may be due to the typical character of the military establishment, which can operate quite effectively despite a certain lack of social integration and consensus. Tactical leadership and cohesion of the small group as well as instrumental facilities and skills predominate over common values and norms. The situation differs according to the operations involved. Where the UNF are engaged in warlike activities (Katanga) or in conventional warfare (Korea), military standards take pride of place. Integration and morale become essential, and achievement can be measured in casualty rates and successful battles. Consequences are recognized and this was particularly so in the Korean War where the Forces were built around a 100

372

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Jacques van Doorn and Jan H. Mans very strong core unit (USA Forces), the communication and integration problems were handled in terms of purely military criteria and an ideology (anti-communism) had to support the morale of the troops. In the Korean case the police functions of the UNF disappeared and the political authority moved into its own sphere, leaving a broad field to military decision-making. In other words, legitimating and operating the military forces were largely separated. Only the crisis between MacArthur and Truman, and the resulting armistice, show that the goal of the operations remained the maintenance of the international status-quo, and was not - as in'normal'warfare - the decisive defeat, and if possible the destruction, of the enemy. The foregoing discussion emphasizes the fact that the UNF are confronted with problems of legitimation and effectiveness which are different from those of the traditional military establishment. It is clear that the military profession is now confronted with a new task: that of seeking the formulas and standards appropriate to the needs of international peace-keeping.

5.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY PROFESSION

The relevance of the UNF, expressed in quantitative data, is not very impressive. Only a minority of the military in the world have ever been in contact with UN operations. Only a few smaller countries have charged relative greater numbers of military personnel with UN missions. The qualitative aspect is, however, much more important. The simple fact that military men from more than 30 countries have served some time in an international force, a completely new type of politicomilitary organization, requires at least a tentative analysis of the place of the UNF in the development of the military institution. Leaving aside other forms of military organization,101 three major types can be observed: the traditional national army, the ideological army, and the international army (see Table 4). Our hypothesis is that the political changes of the last half century have tended to further a transition from the national to the ideological type. Not only the rise of 101

The armies of the new states, with their extremely strong tendency to intervene in internal political affairs, can be viewed as a fourth type, structurally representing a certain number of traits in common with the UNF. See Gutter-

idge, Armed Forces ...", cit., vii. 374

United Nations Forces totalitarian political systems,102 but - in reaction to these - the tendency toward the politicization and ideological indoctrination of the military in a number of democratic states demonstrates this development.103 These political tendencies are directly related to the transition from limited to total warfare. The 'absolute' doctrine in military theory is an expression of the changing outlook in the modern armed forces. The same development, however, has stimulated a progressive 'pragmatic' philosophy of war.104 By contrast, the pragmatists emphasize the necessity to adapt to the changed face of war, claiming that traditional concepts like sovereignty, show of military strength and the total defeat of the enemy are losing their meaning. Their operational code is moving toward a constabulary concept: continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeking viable international relations rather than victory.105 The most explicit realization of the constabulary device can be observed in the UNF. For in this respect these forces are the opposite of the modern politicized totalitarian army: pragmatism as against absolutism, voluntarily solidarity and plurality as against enforced cohesion and uniformity and expert assistance as against ideological missionarism. The future international army, being a permanent global police force, can only be created by a progressive transformation of the traditional national forces into multi-national supported, integrated and controlled forces. The politicized army of the totalitarian state is a blind alley, or worse, a step back toward the centuries of the crusades and the wars of religion. If we look for historical comparisons, we find that the UNF have some traits in common with many of the armies of the 16th, 17th and 18 th centuries: the pre-national armed forces. Like those armies, the UNF have an ethnically mixed composition, are free from political commit102

E. Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965); E. F. Pruck, "Streitkräfte und Partei", Osteuropa, Vol. XIV (1964), pp. 893-902; S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics (London and Dunmow, Pall Mall Press, 1962), pp. 99-109. 103 Cf. the doctrine of the "guerre révolutionnaire" in France and the "political warfare" concept in the USA. M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 303 ff, 322 f. 104 Janowitz, Professional Soldier ..., cit., pp. 264 ff. 105 Janowitz, Professional Soldier ..., cit., pp. 418 ff; M. Janowitz, "Armed Forces In Western Europe: Uniformity and Diversity", European Journal of Sociology, Vol. VI (1965), pp. 234 ff.

375

Jacques van Doom and Jan H. Mans ments and still require professional skill and a 'cosmopolitan' outlook. The comparison is, of course, partly inappropriate. It may, however, draw attention to a curious consequence of political non-commitment, the mercenary army, which in those centuries formed an adequate solution to the problem of setting up armed forces outside the authority of the state. The capitalist tendency towards militarism has now practically disappeared. Nevertheless there is a symbolic significance in the armed conflict between Katangese mercenaries and UN Forces in the Congo in recent years. If military professionalism can degenerate on the one side into totalitarianism, mercenarism constitutes a perversion in the opposite direction. Both types of professional degeneration indicate the fundamental problem of the UNF as a challenge to the military profession. At the present time the military have vested interests in the nation-state. The military, unique in serving one client only - the national government as monopolist - have been professionalized by the intervention of the state.106 Although 'cosmopolitan' in outlook, being a profession, they are at the same time 'local' in orientation: the national institution par excellence. In any case the nationalization and subsequent democratization of the army carry some dangers for professionalism. This historical process, beginning in the first decades of the 19th century, has been a decisive step toward both the military intervention in politics and the politicization of the armed forces.107 It may be hypothesized that the emergence of international forces will help to strengthen the professional pattern of the military. The opportunity to train and to operate in an international atmosphere and to cooperate in international organizations may lead to a gradual renaissance of professionalism in the military establishment. The content of the reprofessionalized concept will, however, be quite new in that the constabulary philosophy will be the 'core' of the future professional pattern. Old soldiers never die, and neither does their institution, but it must be reconstructed in accordance with the future international order.

109

J. A. A. van Doorn, "The Officer Corps: a Fusion of Profession and Organization", Journal of European Sociology, Vol. VI (1965), pp. 270 f. 107 Finer, op. ext., pp. 210 ff.

376

United Nations

Forces

ABBREVIATIONS CENTO NATO OAS ONUC SEATO UK UN UNEF UNF UNFICYP UNOGIL UNTSO

Central Treaty Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organization of American States Operations des Nations Unies au Congo Southeast Asia Treaty Organization United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Emergency Force (Suez) United Nations Forces United Nations Force in Cyprus United Nations Observer Group in the Lebanon United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Palestine) NETHERLANDS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS,

ROTTERDAM

and ROYAL MILITARY ACADEMY, BREDA, THE NETHERLANDS

3 77

SUBJECT INDEX

Academies, Military Argentina, 322, 324, 331 Australia, 138-141 France, 211, 266 German Democratic Republic, 49 Great Britain, 96-98, 266, 278 Ireland, 120, 124-125 Pakistan, 278-283 Poland, 230, 234 Russia, 241, 243 South Korea, 308-309 Sweden, 81 Africanisation of the Army, 261-263 Alienation of the military, 61-70, 233 Antimilitarism, 156-158 Aristocracy, see Elites, military Armament, 185-201 arms race, qualitative, quantitative, 196-198 disarmament, 37-38, 199 rearmament, 50, 171-184, 188-201 Armed Forces see also Developing Nations citizen army, 45-47, 62, 87, 118119, 127-147, 182-183 guerilla army, 46-47, 231, 247, 306 international army, see Peacekeeping Forces mercenary army, 231, 275, 375 militia, see citizen army size of, 19-20, 34-36, 192, 201 Atomic Weaponry, 173, 185-189, 193195, 198 Civil-Military Relations

378

and professionalization, 55-70 Argentina, 317-341 comparisons, 59-63, 202-228 democratic model of, 109, 111112, 122, 324 France, 59-63, 202-218, 223-228 frontier tradition, 46, 131, 134 Germany, 59-63, 171-184, 202-222, 227-228 Japan, 59-63 'nation in arms', 45-47, 129-135 Pakistan, 287-297 Poland, 229-239 Russia, 59-63, 244-245 Soviet Union, 59-63, 158-162 Sweden, 80-83 typologies of, 28-30, 41-42 United States, 59-63 Citizen Army, see Armed Forces Coalition, Political, 345-360, 369 Communism, 43, 49-50, 148-168, 229, 233-239, 246-256 Constabulary Concept, 32-33, 37, 48, 109-126, 183 Coup d'état, see Developing Nations Intervention in Politics Democratization of the Officercorps, 27-28, 48-49, 89, 121, 124, 182, 211-213, 234-238, 247-248, 375 Developing Nations, 19-21, 111-112 African countries, 259-273 Argentina, 317-341 military assistance, 265-267, 286, 291

Subject

Index

military intervention in politics, 19, 43-44, 58-59, 70, 202-203, 267268, 271-273, 285-297, 327-329, 332-333, 337, 339 Pakistan, 273-297 social recruitment of officers, 28, 274-276, 307-316, 332, 340 South Korea, 298-316 weakness of civilian institutions, 28, 268-270, 285, 287-289, 301304, 326-328 Disarmament, see Armament Economic Interests and the Role of the Military, 21-22, 50-51, 171174, 179-181, 188-201 Effectiveness of Military Operations, 360-373 Elites, Military, 42, 48-50, 125 aristocratic, 24-26, 89-93, 99-108, 210-211 Great Britain, 84-108, 137 Poland, 230, 234 Russia, 242-243 Soviet Union, 151-158, 249-251 Sweden, 71-83 Ethnic Composition of Armies, 244, 260-261, 274-276, 278, 283, 374375 Expenditures on Defense, 20, 121122, 193, 201, 263, 265, 274 Fascism, 49, 61-63, 66, 181, 326-328, 330-333 Guerrilla Army, see Armed Forces 'Innere Führung', 182-183 International Relations and the military, 30-33, 37-38 judging the international situation, 71-83 Internationalization of the Military, 47-48, 111, 352-354, 365, 373-375 Regionalism, 348, 358-359, 365366, 368 Intervention in Politics see also Developing Nations and political culture, 202-203, 350.355 and professional ethos, 43-45, 216222 France, 202-218, 223-228

Germany, 202-222, 227-228 Poland, 233 Legitimation of Military Activities, 347-360 Mercenery Army, see Armed Forces Militarism, 22-24, 84-88, 128-129, 340 Military Elites, see Elites, Military Military Intervention in Politics, see Intervention in Politics Military Profession, see Profession, Military Nationalism and the Military, 45-47, 55-70, 71, 375 Peace-Keeping Forces, 30-33, 114117, 126, 345-377 see also Constabulary Concept classification of, 366-367 effectiveness, 360-373 fire Brigade Concept, 126 police force, 20, 33 police-military pattern, 370-371 politico-military pattern, 369-370 special surveillance force, 34-35 Political Culture and the Military common, 350-355 level of, 202-203 Profession, Military see also Democratization of the Officercorps Internationalization of the Military Intervention in Politics Peace-Keeping Forces Social Origin of Officers Social Status of the Military Technology Profession, Military crisis of, 23-24, 55-70 education, 93-98, 124, 142-143, 153-154, 234, 241, 253-254, 278283, 314-316 general development, 22-24, 41-42, 55-70, 216-217, 373-376 military managers, 23-24, 123, 290 political commitments, 42-45, 4950, 59-63, 149, 158-162, 238239, 247-249, 251-256, 371-376 political preferences of officers, 7783

379

Subject professionalism, ascriptive, 56-59, 67 Professionalization of the Military, 47-48 Argentina, 321-325, 340 Australia, 140-142, 147 Poland, 229-232 Russia, 243-244 Soviet Union, 247-251 Social Origin of Officers see also Democratization of the Officercorps Elites, Military Social Origin of Officers Argentina, 332, 340 Australia, 143-145 France, 211-212 General development, 26-28, 4849, 104 Germany, 178, 181-182, 211-212 Great Britain, 89-93 Ireland, 120-121 Poland, 235 Russia, 243 South Korea, 308 Soviet Union, 247-248 Sweden, 80-81

380

Index

Social Status of the Military Australia, 128-129, 137-138 frontier communities, 46 Germany, 174-178 Great Britain, 107 Ireland, 116-117 Poland, 231-233, 235-237 Soviet Union, 254-256 Sociology of the Military, 15-19, 3941 Technology and the military profession, 16, 23, 47, 124, 136-137, 148-168, 242, 252-253 commanders versus technocrats, 151-158 commissars versus technocrats, 158162, 248-250 mechanization, 192-198 Tribalism, 260-261, 276 War civil war, 16, 24, 112-113, 123, 246, 366-367, 370 limited war, 16, 19, 24, 372-373 opinions on risk of, 71-76, 83 strategic concepts, 150-151, 162166, 185-188, 194, 281

NAME INDEX

Abrahamsson, B., 41, 75, 78-79, 80 Abrams, Ph., 87, 89, 105, 107, 110 Achebe, Chinua, 270-271 Adamson, L. A., 142 Ahmed, M., 289 Akbar Khan, M„ 287 Alekseyev, 243 Alexander, H. T., 259 Ali Khan, L„ 287 Allen, R. C., 302 Allport, G. W„ 77 Almond, G., 324, 340 Ambler, J. S., 43, 45 Andreski, St., see Andrzejewski, St. Andrzejewski, St., 48, 84, 87, 321 Ankrah, 262, 270 Anon, 322 Antonov, N., 158 Andujar, G„ 323 Aristophanes, 146 Asghar Khan, 284 Ataturk, Kemal, 58 Auchinlek, C. J. E„ 279 Austin, D., 268, 269 Ayub Khan, M., 278, 281, 284, 285286, 288-296 Azam Khan, 292 Babur, 281 Bacon, R., 76 Balbin, R., 335 Baranov, A. O., 161 Barrow, G. de S., 106 Basseches, N., 243-244 Baur, W„ 181

Bean, C. E. W„ 129, 130-131, 134, 143 Beddie, B. D., 147 Bell, M. J. V., 44, 266 Bellah, R. W„ 64 Beloborodov, 154 Beltrân, V. R., 41, 44, 47 Ben Bellah, 270 Benoit, E„ 198, 200 Bethel, D. A. D. J., 366, 371 Bigler, R. R., 39 Biriuzov, 154, 159-160 Bird, W. D., 76 Blake, R., 85 Blarney, Th., 144 Blank, Th., 173 Bloomfield, L. P., 361-362, 364, 366, 368, 371 Blücher, 247 Bodjollé, 268 Bokassa, 269, 271 Boland, F., 116 Bonham-Carter, V., 102 Bond, B., 85 Bouju, P. M., 224 Boulding, K. E., 200 Bowett, D. W., 345, 351-352, 358359, 366 Bowitz, G. C., 363 Bowman, E. H., 352, 362-364, 369 Bracher, K., 208 Brandt, Gerhard, 172, 188, 191 Brezhnev, L. I., 168, 253 Brice, B„ 268 381

Name Index Brown, N„ 195, 198 Brun-Bronowicz, J., 231 Bubnov, A. S., 246 Buchan, A., 195, 198 Budenny, S., 152, 156, 246 Budennyi, see Budenny, S. Budny, T. R., 236 Bunge, A., 319 Burns, E. L. M., 367 Caplow, Th., 360, 366, 372 Carlsson, G., 180 Carnes, W. E., 91 Carsten, F. L., 60 Challe, M„ 214-215, 225-226 Challener, R. D., 45 Chang, J. M., 303, 309 Chassin, L.-M., 214 Chengis Khan, 281 Choudri, 285 Chung Hee Park, 302 Chung, J. S., 300 Churchill, W„ 282 Cieplewicz, M., 232 Ciria, A., 327, 329 Clement, E. W., 64 Clode, M„ 86, 106 Coleman, J., 324, 340 Comte, A., 179-180 Coser, L., 68 Craig, G. H„ 204 Crick, B„ 86 Cutlack, F. M„ 136 Dabrowski, J., 230 Dacko, 269 Dahrendorf, R., 178 Dallin, A., 215 Davies, W. E „ 146 De Gaulle, Ch„ 58, 203, 209, 214, 225-226 De la Gorce, J. M., 204 Dellepiane, 323 Demeter, K., 60, 63, 178, 211-212 Denikin, A. I., 243, 245 De Reuck, A., 348 De Toqueville, Alexis, 210 Deutsch, K. W„ 301, 320 De Valera, E„ 114 Dewey, J., 76-77 Dicks, H. V., 366 Diori, H., 267 Di Telia, G„ 325, 330

382

Djilas, M., 152 Drake-Brockman, G., 140 Egge, B„ 356 Eide, A., 346 Ely, 208 Encel, S., 46, 130 Engels, Friedrich, 130 Epishev, A., 159 Erikson, R., 75 Esmonde, 113 Etzioni, A., 350, 358 Evan, W. M., 34 Evans, H., 278 Fajuyi, 262 Fanning, J. E „ 352, 362-364, 369 Farrel, E. J., 329 Fedotoff White, D. D., 243 Feld, M. D., 40, 45, 69, 150, 166 Finer, S. E „ 40, 42-45, 85, 87, 106, 202, 299, 304, 321, 331, 334, 336338, 340, 375-176 Finlay, C. H., 144 Florit, A., 335, 340 Foot, M. R. D., 45 Forester, C. S., 91 Fourastie, J., 64 Fox, A. B., 353-354, 356 Fränden, O., 81 Friedrich, C. J., 196 Frondizi, A., 334, 335 Frunze, M., 246 Frydenberg, P., 352, 356, 362-363, 366 Frye, W. R., 353 Fuller, J. F. C., 193 Galbraith, J. K „ 189, 198 Galetti, A., 320, 327, 329 Gallo, E., 327 Garthoff, R. L „ 49, 249 George, L., 136 Germani, G., 319-321, 326, 330, 334, 338 Gesek, T., 237 Giap, V. N„ 47 Ginsburgh, R. N., 162 Girardet, R „ 60, 63, 204, 210, 212 Glickman, H., 265 Goerlitz, W., 204 Golovin, N., 245 Gonzales, E., 323

Name Index Goodrich, L. M., 349, 353, 357, 359 Gordon, K., 351, 356, 359, 367 Gould, J., 84 Gracey, 278 Grechko, A., 254 Grivas-Dighenis, G., 47 Grondona, M., 336 Gross, L., 357 Guevara, Che, 47 Guido, J. M„ 335 Gutteridge, W„ 40, 43, 346, 361-362, 364-366, 370-371, 373 Guttsman, W. L., 91, 96, 103 Gwynn, D., 113 Habibullah, 285 Hahlweg, W„ 153 Hahn, Bae-ho, 308 Hammond, P. Y., 194 Han, Tae-yon, 303 Harrinton, 130 Harris, H. E. D., 112, 123, 126, 354, 362, 370-371 Harris, S. E„ 196 Heiman, L., 281 Hermes, W. G., 308 Herter, Ch. A., 309 Hetherington, J., 137, 143 Hitler, Adolf, 58, 171, 177, 203, 206, 209, 218-222 Hittle, J. D., 255 Hoffmann, S., 348, 352 Höhn, R., 46 Hoskyns, C., 262 Howard, M., 128 Hungerford, T. A. G., 132 Huntington, S. P., 39, 44, 58, 60, 63, 71-72, 74, 76-77, 83, 87, 91, 110, 128-129, 183, 194, 196, 304, 317, 321 Iashkin, G., 156 Ignatyev, 248 Ihsanul Haq, 280 Imaz, J. L„ 328-329, 332, 334-335, 338, 340 Inglis, K. S., 129, 134 Irigoyen, H., 323 Ironsi, 262, 271 Ismay, Lord, 282 Jackson, J. A., 48, 354, 362 Jaide, W., 176

Janowitz, Morris, 21, 32, 39-40, 4345, 48, 60, 65, 71, 77, 79-82, 92, 103-104, 109-111, 122-123, 125, 137, 141, 144, 148, 150-151, 182183, 202, 209, 214, 280, 290, 299, 304, 313, 321, 323, 375 Jaruzelski, W„ 235, 238 Jasinski, J., 230 Joffe, E„ 47, 49, 375 Johnson, J. J., 59, 268, 304, 311, 317, 320, 324, 327, 330, 340 Jouhaud, E., 214 Justo, A. P., 323, 326 Kahn, H. D., 87 Kalb, B„ 304 Kamenev, S. S., 246 Kang, In-sop, 308 Karefa-Smart, J., 359 Kasavubu, 269 Katoka, 270 Kaufmann, W. W., 186 Kelly, G. A., 58, 60, 204 Kelly, N„ 130 Kennedy, J. F., 117 Kenyatta, Y., 268 Kerensky, A. F., 245 Khan, F. R., 392 Khrushchev, N., 163-165 Kipling, J. R., 118 Kim, C. I. Eugene, 41, 44, 301-302, 305-307, 313 Kim, Chong-p'il, 308-309 Kim, Chung-yop, 303 Kim, Han Kyo, 306 Kim, Ke-so, 302, 305 Kim, Kyu-taik, 308 Kim, Sung-tai, 302 Kim, Yung Seung, 309 Klausenitzer, F. A., 182 Kniaziewicz, K., 230 Knight, J., 348 Kolb, W. L., 84 Kolkowicz, R., 41, 43, 45, 50, 149, 160-161, 163-164 Konev, I., 152, 254 Kork, 246 Kornilov, A., 241-242 Kornilov, L. G., 245 Kosciuszko, T., 230 Koslov, S., 165 Kotani, H., 353-354, 356, 359 Kovalerchuk, D., 161 383

Name Index Krasilnikov, 164 Kristianson, G. L., 146 Kuark, Y. T., 300 Laffin, J., 132-134 Lagovsky, A., 242 Lall, B. G., 355-356 Lamizana, 272 Lang, K., 41, 43, 45, 48, 219 Laulicht, J., 200 Lauterpacht, H., 56 Lebedev, 246 Lee, Chang-yul, 300 Lee, J. E„ 139 Leer, Joung-sik, 307, 311 Legg, F., 140 Lengyel, P., 365 Le Prestre, S., 153 Leverrier, J., 231 Le Vine, V., 266 Lewis, B., 58 Liddell Hart, B. H., 135 Lieuwen, E., 304, 321 Lindzey, G„ 77 Lipset, S. M., 21, 80, 330 Livingstone, A., 87 Lonardi, E., 333 Long, G., 138-139 Lourie, S., 356, 366 Lovatt, 133 Lovell, J. P., 299 Lutynska, K„ 236 MacAlister, L. N., 299 MacArthur, D., 358 MacCracker, J. L., 113-114 MacDonald, R. W., 348 MacEoin, 126 MacLaughlin, Jr., W. H., 190 MacMunn, G., 275 MacMurtrie, F. E., 76 MacNamara, J., 124 Makeev, 155 Malaparte, C., 222 Maligne, A. A., 322 Malinovskii, R., 153, 157, 253-254 Malinovsky, R., see Malinovskii, R. Mann, L., 132 Mans, J. H„ 41, 48 Mao, Tse-tung, 43, 47 Mba, 267 Meinecke, F., 64 Mekhonoshin, 255

384

Menzies, R., 147 Messervy, 278 Meyer, F„ 136, 143 Miksche, F. O., 152 Millar, T. B„ 147 Miller, S. N„ 27 Millis, W., 37, 46 Mills, C. W., 50 Milyutin, D., 241, 255 Milyutin, N„ 241 Mirza, I., 288-289 Mitsukini, Tokugawa, 64 Monash, J., 129, 132, 134, 136, 139, 145 Monro, Ch. C., 106 Morgenthau, H. J., 353, 370 Morton, D., 37 Mosca, G., 48-49, 87-88, 105-106, 210 Mun, Ch'ang-sik, 305 Muqeem Khan, F „ 291 Musa, 278, 284, 293, 295-296 Namier, L. B., 63 Nasser, G. A., 282 Nasution, A. H., 47 Nef, J. U„ 198 Nehru, M., 278 Neumann, P., 174 Newsome, D., 106 Nicholas, H„ 352 Niezing, J., 365 Nikitin-Zubrovsky, S., 247 Nkrumah, K„ 266, 270 Noelle, E „ 174 Nolan, S., 130 Nyerere, J., 20 Nzeogwa, 261, 270 Odgers, G., 133 Oh, Byung-hun, 303 Ojukwu, 262 Ongania, J. C., 336-337 Oppenheim, L., 56 Orona, J. V., 323, 326, 328 Ortiz, R. M., 328 Osgood, R. E., 194 Osmond, J. S., 87 Osipov, Z. S., 153 Otley, C. B., 41, 48, 92, 96, 98, 106 Otu, 270 Padelford, N. J., 349, 353, 357, 359 Pak, Chong-hui, 309

Name Index Palin, 102 Paret, P., 215 Paul, J., 200 Paxton, G. O., 207, 212 Perón, Eva D., 331 Perón, J . D., 328-330 Perry, W., 136 Petersen, K. S., 349 Petukhov, V., 155 Picht, G., 172, 182-183, 186, 188 Pilsudski, J., 232-233 Pitt, B., 136 Pliev, I., 159 Podol'skii, A., 161 Podvoisky, 246 Pohoski, M., 235 Poniatowski, St. A., 230 Prasad, N., 275 Primakov, 246 Pruck, E. F., 375 Prusanov, L., 254 Pye, L. W., 304 Ramanantsoa, 264 Ramos, J . A., 323, 326 Rapoport, D. C., 130, 317 Rattenbach, B., 321 Raven, S., 107, 137 Raza, N. A. M„ 287 Razzell, P. E., 87, 89, 100 Read, J., 37-38 Real, J. J., 329 Reishauer, E. O., 303 Rikhye, I., 352 Roberts, M„ 43 Robertson, W., 102 Rodríguez, A. G., 322 Rodríguez, M. A., 326 Romero, J. L., 329 Rosenthal, A. M., 304-305 Rosner, G., 345, 356-357, 361 Rotmistrov, P. A., 156 Rowe, J. W., 335 Russet, B. M., 19, 20, 191 Rustow, D. W., 304 Ryan, A. P., 203 Rybkin, 161 Rychagov, 249 Ryou, Kiyomiya, 305 Saint Simon, 179 Salan, P., 226, 233 Salisbury, 74

Samusenko, 154 San Martin, 323, 326 Sarapata, 236 Sardauna, 261 Sarsfield, 123 Sayeed, Khalid Bin, 41, 43, 283, 295 Scalapino, R. A., 298, 309 Schaffer, B. B., 138-139, 141, 147 Schelling, Th. C„ 37 Scherger, F., 133 Scheuch, E. K„ 172, 179 Schilling, W. R„ 194 Schlesinger, J. R., 189 Schmidt, H„ 195, 198 Schnitzler, A., 128 Schulze, K. H., 49 Scitovsky, T., 189 Selser, G., 318 Senghor, 264 Senji, Tsuboe, 308 Shaposhnikov, 246 Shaw, E „ 189 Shearwood, A., 132-133 Shelepin, A. N., 168 Sherel, V., 161 Shils, E „ 59, 312 Shireibu, Chosen Chusatugun, 306 Sigal, S., 327 Silvert, K„ 320, 330-331, 334, 338 Sin, Sang-ch'o, 298 Singer, J. D„ 346 Smilevetz, D., 161 Snyder, G. H., 194 Soglo, 272 Sokolovsky, V. D., 186 Sotokufu, 307 Spencer, H., 51 Spry, G., 354, 358 Stawecki, P., 233 Stefaniak, E., 324 Sternberg, F., 198 Stokke, O., 366 Strand, D., 82 Strange, L. A., 131 Strauss, F. J., 173, 196 Stuber, E., 49 Sumasenko, 154 Sventsitsky, 243 Swonley, J . M., 50 Sylvanus Olympio, M., 267-268 Syngman Rhee, 301-302 Szczepänski, J., 234 Szostkiewicz, S., 237

385

Name Index Takeki, Aso, 305 Tarshis, L„ 189 Thimayya, 278 Thomas, J. P. H„ 210, 224 Thompson, E. P., 87 Thompson, F. M. L., 91 Timoshenko, S., 254 Tshombe, M., 269 Tukhachevsky, M., 247-248 Turner, E. S., 94 Uborevich, 246 Umrao Kahn, 290 Uriburu, 326-327 Urquhart, B. E„ 350, 352, 368 Vagts, A„ 22, 66, 84-85, 128 Van Doorn, J. A. A„ 41, 48, 104, 348, 375 Vasey, G., 142 Vasilevsky, A., 253 Vatselis, 246 Von Baudissin, W., 183 Von Bernhardi, F., 76 Von Blücher, G. L., 64 Von Friedeburg, L„ 47, 50, 183, 185 Von der Goltz, R., 206 Von Hindenburg, P., 208 Von Horn, C., 352, 356, 359, 361365, 369-370 Von ManteufeL, E., 232 Von Raven, W., 183 Von Roenne, A., 215 Von Schleicher, K., 208 Von Staufenberg, C. Schenk, 215 Von Tresckow, H., 215 Voroshilov, K. Ye, 246, 249

386

Waldman, E., 181 Watkins, T. H., 362 Wecter, D., 146 Weinstein, A., 194 Weltz, F., 175-176 Wesolowski, W., 236 Western, J. M., 87 Wheeler-Bennett, J. W„ 204, 212 Wiatr, J. J „ 41, 49, 234-237 Wilcox, F. O., 353, 358 Wilkes, J., 147 Wilkinson, R„ 107 Wilkinson, W. H., 305 Windham, W., 136-137 Windsor, Ph., 195, 198 Wollenberg, E., 246-247, 255 Wolfe, T. W„ 163 Wood, D., 263 Wright, Irving, 37 Yahya, 284, 295 Yefimov, N., 247 Yi, Kuk-ch'an, 302 Yi, Nab-gap, 303 Yi, Pyong-do, 305 Yoon, Ch'ung-jo, 301 Yoshihashi, Takehiko, 58 Youlou, 266, 267 Yun, Po-son, 303 Zaionchkovsky, P. A., 241 Zakharov, M. V., 154, 163, 168 Zapf, W., 181 Zarnowski, J., 234 Zeromski, S., 231 Zhukov, G., 256 Zymelman, M., 325

We are preparing, as a companion volume to the present one:

MILITARY PROFESSION AND MILITARY REGIMES: COMMITMENTS AND CONFLICTS edited by Jacques van Doom

Table of Contents: JACQUES VAN DOORN: I n t r o d u c t i o n

BENGT ABRAHAMSON: Military Professionalization and Estimates on the Probability of War ALBERT BOPEGAMAGE: Caste, Class, and the Indian Military: A Study of the Social Origins of Indian Army Personnel DARIO CANTON: Military Interventions in Argentina: 1966

1900-

B. J. DUDLEY: The Military and Politics in Nigeria: Some Reflections OLOF FRANDEN: Notes on Mobility Into and Out of the Swedish Officer Corps J6ZEF GRACZYK: Social Promotion in the Polish People's Army JAN H. MANS: United Nations Forces: The Strain Between Proposal and Reality ALI A. MAZRUI: Anti-Militarism and Political Militancy in Tanzania DAVID N. SOLOMON: The Soldierly Self and the Peace-Keeping Role: Canadian Officers in Peace-Keeping Forces JERZY WIATR: Social Prestige of Professional Officers: Approaches to Comparative Studies P. ZHILIN: The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: Fifty Years of Experience in Military Construction ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG: Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa: A Preliminary Report

M O U T O N • P U B L I S H E R S • THE H A G U E