Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays 9781400872879

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A R I S T O T L E ’S RHETORIC

PROCEEDINGS TWELFTH

SYMPOSIUM

OF

THE

ARISTOTELICUM

ARISTO TLE’S RH ETO RIC PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

E D IT E D BY D a v id J.

Furley

A lexander

PRINCETON

a n d

N ehamas

UNIVERSITY

PRINCETON,

NEW

PRESS

JERSEY

C o p y rig h t © 1994 by Princeton U niversity Press “E nthym em e: A ristotle o n the L ogic o f P ersuasion” C o p y rig h t © 1990 by M . F. B urnyeat Published by Princeton U niversity Press, 41 W illiam Street, P rinceton, N e w J e rs e y 08540 In the U n ite d K ingdom : P rinceton U niversity Press, C hichester, W est Sussex ALL RIG H TS RESERVED

L ib r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a t a l o g i n g - in - P u b l ic a t i o n D a t a

P hilosophy and rhetoric : essays on A risto tle ’s R hetoric / edited by D avid J. Furley and A lexander N eham as. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. IS B N 0-691-03232-7 (CL) I . A ristotle. R hetoric. I. Furley, D avid J. II. N eham as, Alexander. P N 173. P 4 8 '1994 808.5— dc20 93-26050 T h is book has been com posed in B cm bo P rinceton U n iv ersity Press books are prin ted on acid-free paper, and m eet the guidelines for perm anence and durability o f the C o m m itte e on P ro d u c tio n G uidelines for B o o k L ongevity o f the C ouncil on L ibrary Resources P rin ted in the U n ite d States o f A m erica 2 4 6 8

10 9 7 5 3

t

T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S

P

reface

vii

D a v id J . Furley In

t r o d u c t io n

xi

Alexander Nehamas S E C T I O N I: T H E A R G U M E N T S OF R H E T O R I C E

n t h y m e m e

of

P

: A

ristotle

on

the

L

ogic

ersuasion

M. F. Burnyeat

3

R h e to riq u e et d iale ctiq u e , et T

R

h e t o r iq u b

o piques

Jacques Brunschwig

57

S E C T I O N II: T H E S T A T U S OF T H E A RT OF R H E T O R I C Some O b serv atio n s on th e I n tr o d u c tio n A r i s t o t l e ’s R

to

h e t o r ic

Eckart Schiitrumpf

99

A r is to tle a n d th e Legitim acy of R h e to ric

Jiirgen Sprute A

r g u m en ts

of

R

117 C

in

o n t e x t

: A

r i s t o t l e ’s

D

efense

h eto ric

M aryM argaretM cC abe T he Uses of E in t h e R

n d o x a

129 : P h ilo so p h y a n d

R h e to ric

h e t o r ic

Glenn W. M ost

167

S E C T I O N III: R H E T O R I C , E T H I C S , A N D P O L I TI C S E t h i c a l - P o l i t i c a l T h e o r y i n A r i s t o t l e ’s R h e t o r i c

John M . Cooper

193

CONTENTS POPULAR MORALITY, PHILOSOPHICAL AND THE

ETHICS,

RHETORIC

Stephen Halliwell

211

L ' O R A T E U R P O L I T I Q U E F A C E À SES

Jean-Louis

CONTRAINTES

Labarrière

231

S E C T I O N IV: R H E T O R I C A N D L I T E R A R Y A R T P I T Y A N D F E A R I N T H E RHETORIC

A N D THE

POETICS

Alexander Nehamas SUBSTITUTION

257

ET C O N N A I S S A N C E : U N E

U N I T A I R E ( O U P R E S Q U E ) DE LA T H É O R I E DE LA

INTERPRÉTATION ARISTOTÉLICIENNE

MÉTAPHORE

André Laks

283

CONTRIBUTORS

307

INDEX

LOCOKUM

309

INDEX

NOMINUM

321

VI

PREFACE

T h e S y m p o s iu m A ris to te lic u m w a s c o n c e iv e d b y P ro fe sso r I n g e m a r D u r ­ in g , o f th e U n iv e rs ity o f G o te b o rg . A t a m e e tin g o f th e C lassical A sso cia ­ tio n o f G re a t B rita in in O x f o r d in 1955, h e su g g e s te d to a n u m b e r o f co lleag u es th a t th e re w as a n e e d fo r a m e e tin g o f A risto te lia n sc h o lars, to discu ss p a rtic u la rly th e “lo s t” w o rk s o f A ris to tle a n d th e re la tio n s b e tw e e n th e y o u n g e r A ris to tle a n d his m a s te r P la to . Plans fo r th is m e e tin g w e re laid d o w n at an in fo rm a l d isc u ssio n a t th e “L a m b a n d F la g ” in St. G iles, O x ­ fo rd , b e tw e e n P ro fe sso rs D u rin g , G w ily m O w e n , a n d D a v id F urley. T h e S y m p o s iu m m e t fo r th e firs t tim e in M a g d a le n C o lle g e O x f o r d fo r a w e e k in A u g u s t 1957, an d its success p e rsu a d e d its m e m b e rs to p r o m o te fu r th e r m e e tin g s at re g u la r in terv als. T h e first m e e tin g w as a tte n d e d b y th e fo llo w in g : F ro m B e lg iu m : A u g u s te M a n sio n , S u z a n n e M a n sio n , P aul M o ra u x , E m ile de S try cker, a n d G e ra rd V erb ek e F ro m F rance: H . D . S affrey F ro m G e rm a n y : M a rio n S o re th a n d P au l W ilp e rt F ro m Italy: A . Ia n n o n e F ro m S w e d e n : In g e m a r D u rin g F ro m S w itz e rla n d , O l o f G ig o n F ro m th e U n ite d K in g d o m : J o h n A c k rill, D o n a ld A llan , R ic h a rd B lu c k , D a v id F urley, G w ily m O w e n , A r th u r P eck, D a v id R ees, Sir D a v id R o ss, G ilb e rt R y le , J o s e p h S k e m p , a n d R ic h ­ a rd W alzer F ro m th e U n ite d S tates: W ern er Ja e g e r, G le n n M o rro w , a n d F rie d ric h S o lm se n T h e re h av e b een m e e tin g s s u b s e q u e n tly e v e ry th re e years. E ach m e e tin g has b e e n fo llo w e d b y th e p u b lic a tio n o f a v o lu m e b ased o n th e p a p e rs p re se n te d . T h e fo llo w in g is a list o f th e m e e tin g s to date, w ith th e p u b lic a ­ tio n d etails o f th e c o n s e q u e n t b o o k s: 1. O x f o r d , 1957. Aristotle and Plato in the M id-Fourth C entury. E d ite d b y I. D iirin g a n d G .E .L .O w e n . S tu d ia G raeca et L atina G o th o b u rg e n s ia . G o te b o rg , i9 6 0 . 2. L o u v a in , i9 6 0 . Aristote et Ies Problemes de Methode. L o u v ain : P u b ­ lic a tio n s U n iv e rs ita ire s , 1961. Vll

3. O x f o r d , 1963. Aristotle on Dialectic: T he Topics. E d ite d b y G .E .L .O w e n . O x fo rd : C la re n d o n P ress, 1968. 4. G o te b o rg , 1966. Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast. H e ra u s g e g e b e n v o n In g e m a r D u rin g . H e id e lb e rg : L o th a r S tie h m , 1969. 5. O o s te rb e e k , T h e N e th e r la n d s , 1969. U n tersu ch u n g en zu rE u demischen E th ik. H e ra u sg e g e b e n v o n P aul M o ra u x u n d D ie te r D a rlfin g e r. B e rlin : D e G ru y te r, 1971. 6. F ran ce, 1972. Etudes sur la M etaphysique d ’A ristote. Paris: V rin, 1979. 7. C a m b rid g e , 1975. Aristotle on M in d and the Senses. E d ite d b y G .E .R . L loy d an d G .E .L . O w e n . C a m b rid g e : C a m b rid g e U n i­ v e rsity P ress, 1978. 8. P ad o v a, 1978. A risto tleo n Science: T h e Posterior A nalytics. E d ite d b y E n ric o B e rti. Padova: A n te n o re , 1981. 9. B erlin , 1981. Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum: Studien z u einigen D ubia. E d ite d b y P au l M o ra u x an d J u r g e n W iesner. B e r lin /N e w Y o rk : D e G ru y te r, 1983. 10. S ig risw il, S w itz e rla n d , 1984. Mathematics and M etaphysics in Aristotle. E d ite d b y A n d re a s G raeser. B e r n /S tu ttg a r t: Paul H a u p t, 1987. 11. F rie d ric h sh a fe n , W. G e rm a n y , 1987. Aristoteles’ “P o litik .” H e ra u s g e g e b e n v o n G u n th e r P atzig . G o ttin g e n : V a n d e n h o e c k & R u p re c h t, 1990. A m e ric a n sch olars a tte n d e d th e elev en E u ro p e a n m e e tin g s. It w a s felt th a t th e tw e lfth m e e tin g , in 1990, sh o u ld b e h e ld in th e U n ite d S tates, if fu n d s c o u ld be fo u n d to tra n s p o rt th e E u ro p e a n p a rtic ip a n ts. P rin c e to n U n iv e rs ity acted as h o s t to th e S y m p o siu m . T h e o rg a n iz e rs re c o rd th e ir g ra titu d e to a n u m b e r o f d o n o rs fo r g e n e ro u s g ra n ts. T h e N a tio n a l E n ­ d o w m e n t fo r th e H u m a n itie s an d th e M e llo n F o u n d a tio n w e re th e m a jo r d o n o rs . In a d d itio n , w ith in P rin c e to n U n iv e rs ity th e S eeg er F o u n d a tio n , th e P h ilo s o p h y D e p a rtm e n t, a n d th e P rin c e to n U n iv e rs ity Press c o n trib ­ u te d h a n d s o m e ly to th e S y m p o s iu m , an d th e D a v id M a g ie ‘97 P u b lic a tio n F u n d o f th e C lassics D e p a rtm e n t assisted in th e p re p a ra tio n o f this v o lu m e . T h e list o f m e m b e rs o f th e T w e lfth S y m p o s iu m is as follow s: F ro m A u stria: M a n frie d K ie n p o in te r an d G len n W. M o st F ro m B e lg iu m : L a m b ro s C o u lo u b a ritsis F ro m France: P ie rre A u b e n q u e , Ja c q u e s B ru n sc h w ig , Je a n -L o u is L a b a rrie re , a n d A n d re Laks F ro m G e rm a n y : W o lfg a n g K u llm a n n F ro m Italy: E n ric o B e rti, M a rio M ig n u c c i, a n d C a rlo N a ta li Vlll

F ro m Sw itzerland: G erhard Seel F ro m the U n ite d K in g d o m : M yles B urnyeat, D avid C harles, Ste­ ph en H alliw ell, G eoffrey Lloyd, and M ary M arg aret M cC abe F ro m the U n ited States: Julia A nnas, Jo h n M . C o o p er, W illiam W F o rten b augh, Elaine F antham , M ichael Frede, D avid Furley, C harles H . K ahn, G eorge K ennedy, A ryeh K osm an, Stephen M enn, A lexander N eham as, M arth a C . N u ssb au m , D eb o rah R oberts, E ck art S chiitrum pf, and Gisela S triker D J F.

INTRODUCTION

It is a co m m o n p lace (th o u g h n o t quite in the sense the term has in this great treatise) to say that the Rhetoric is one o f A risto tle’s m o st neglected w o rk s. T his is especially tru e in connection w ith the philosophical stu d y o f his w ritin g s. T h e X IIth Symposium Aristotelicum, w h ich w as held in P rin ceto n in A u g u st o f 1990, w as intended to address this neglect and, ideally, to p ro v id e th e basis fo r fu rth e r study o f th e Rhetoric. As a m atter o f fact, the S y m p o siu m w as follow ed b y a n o th er conference o n the Rhetoricm H elsinki in 1991, as w ell as by the publication o f G eorge K en n ed y ’s n ew tra n sla tio n ,1 and o f T h o m as C o le’s stu d y o f the origins o f rh eto ric in A ncient G reece;2 and a fu rth e r collection o f essays o n the w o rk is cu rren tly in th e planning p rocess.3 We are th en faced w ith tw o questions. First, w h y has the Rhetoric been neglected for so long? Second, w h y is interest in it g ro w in g at ju s t this tim e? In reg ard to th e first question, it is fair to p o in t o u t that in tere st in the Rhetoric and in rh eto ric generally was p a rt o f the W estern intellectual trad itio n u n til the beg in n in g o f the nin eteen th ce n tu ry .4 R om anticism , how ever, w h ich b ecam e d o m in an t aro u n d that tim e, depended essentially o n den y in g any separation betw een fo rm and content, expression and th o u g h t. T h ese distinctions w ere essential to rhetoric, insofar as th e latter is th e stu d y o f th e best possible m eans for tra n sm ittin g a particu lar m es­ sage to p articu lar audiences on particu lar occasions. R om antic assum p­ tions ab o u t language and com m unication, th o u g h w idely scorned, are still im p licit in m u ch o f o u r th in k in g ab o u t these topics; and such assum ptions leave no ro o m for rh eto ric as traditionally conceived.5 E ven th o u g h rh eto ric played a central p a rt in education and culture u ntil the b eg in n in g o f the nin eteen th century, it had lo n g ceased to be p art o f w h a t p h ilo so p h y w as concerned w ith. T h e reasons are im m en sely co m ­ plex, b u t it w o u ld n o t be to tally inaccurate to say that philo so p h ers w ere m o re co nvinced by P la to ’s attack on rh e to ric in the Gorgias and th e Phae1 See K ennedy 1991. 2 See C ole 1991. 3 See R orty. 4 O n the h isto ry o f the p o sitio n o n rh e to ric in general culture, a n d o n qualifications necessary to this sw eeping claim , see V ickers 1988. 5 C o le, pp. 19-22. Xl

drus th a n b y A r is to tle ’s re s p o n s e to it in th e Rhetoric a n d h is o th e r w r itin g s o n th e s u b je c t. T h e essays th a t c o n s titu te th is c o lle c tio n a d d re ss in m a n y w a y s th e issu e o f P la to ’s c ritic ism s o f rh e to ric , a n d it is n o t n e c e ssa ry to re h e a rse his a r g u m e n ts h e re . T h e c e n tra l id ea b e h in d P la to ’s d is tru s t is th a t p h ilo s o p h y , o r d ia le c tic as h e o fte n called it, c o n sists in k n o w le d g e o f s u b s ta n tiv e tr u th s , re a c h e d t h r o u g h o b je c tiv e in v e s tig a tio n a n d c o m m u n ic a b le to an a p p r o p r ia te a u d ie n c e b y m e a n s o f sy s te m a tic e d u c a tio n o r, in p a rtic u la r cases, u n b ia s e d e x p la n a tio n . R h e to ric , b y c o n tra s t, d o e s n o t in v o lv e th e k n o w le d g e o f tr u th s a b o u t a n y s u b je c t m a tte r. O r a to r s a re c a p a b le o f s p e a k in g p e rs u a s iv e ly o n a n y to p ic y o u ch o o se : th is is w h a t th e y p rid e d th e m s e lv e s o n (cf. Gorgias 4 5 0 b —c). In P la to ’s eyes, h o w e v e r, th is d is q u a l­ ifies rh e to r ic f r o m b e in g a d isc ip lin e (o r techne). L a c k in g s u b s ta n tiv e k n o w le d g e , o ra to rs can c o n v in c e o n ly an ig n o r a n t a u d ie n c e a b o u t m a tte rs th a t n e ith e r s p e a k e r n o r lis te n e r u n d e rs ta n d s . M o r e d a n g e ro u s ly , o r a to r y ad d re sse s issu es o f r ig h t a n d w r o n g a n d can a rg u e o n b o th sid es o f a n y su c h q u e s tio n . B u t, in P la to n ic te rm s , th is s h o u ld b e im p o s s ib le i f o n e k n e w w h a t w a s a n d w h a t w a s n o t rig h t: o n e c a n n o t k n o w w h a t ju s tic e is a n d u rg e th e a d o p tio n o f an u n ju s t c o u rse . O r a to r s , th e n , p e rv e rt th e ir a u d i­ e n c e ’s m o ra l sen se. M o s t d a n g e ro u s ly , d e sp ite th e fac t th a t r h e to ric o p e r­ ates o n th e b asis o f ig n o ra n c e , it is a c tu a lly e x tre m e ly p e rs u a s iv e — m o re p e rsu a siv e , in d e e d , th a n th e k n o w le d g e a b le d isc o u rse o f a d o c to r, an a r­ c h ite c t o r, in p a rtic u la r, a p h ilo s o p h e r. R h e to ric , d e sp ite o r p e rh a p s p re ­ cisely b e c a u se o f its lim ita tio n s , su c c e e d s w h e re scien ce a n d p h ilo s o p h y fail. A t le a st a p p a re n tly , th e n , P la to e s ta b lis h e d a fu n d a m e n ta l c o n tra s t b e ­ tw e e n p h ilo s o p h y a n d r h e to r ic .6 T h e f o r m e r is s u b s ta n tiv e a n d a d d re sse s an a u d ie n c e p r e p a re d to a b s o rb its le sso n th r o u g h th e u n o r n a m e n te d , o b je c tiv e p re s e n ta tio n o f its lo g ic a l s tru c tu re . T h e la tte r is w ith o u t su b ­ sta n c e a n d a d d re sse s a n y a u d ie n c e w h a te v e r th r o u g h th e m a n ip u la tiv e use o f e m b e llis h e d a n d s e d u c tiv e la n g u a g e . R h e to ric a p p e a rs as a p u r e ly fo r­ m a l (a n d th e re fo re p se u d o -) d isc ip lin e , w h ic h u s u rp s th e ro le o f k n o w l­ ed g e . It is a c o s tu m e th a t m a k e s w h a te v e r it c o v ers a ttra c tiv e — w h ic h , in th is a p p lic a tio n o f th e m e ta p h o r , m e a n s “ c o n v in c in g a n d p e rs u a s iv e .” A r is to tle is n o t h im s e lf to ta lly w ith o u t s u s p ic io n s a b o u t rh e to ric . H e is k e e n ly a w a re o f th e fact th a t rh e to r ic a im s a t p ro d u c in g a r g u m e n ts in utramque partem , a n d th u s , b y a r g u in g b o th sides o f e v e ry issue, is c h a ra c ­ te riz e d b y a m o ra l n e u tr a lity th a t p h ilo s o p h ic a l a rg u m e n t d o e s n o t e x h ib it. 6 C o le has challenged such an e x tre m e fo rm u la tio n o f this view . H is thesis is th at, c o n tra ry to th e prev ailin g view th a t traces rh e to ric to th e w o rk o f T isias a n d C o ra x as w ell as to later fifth -c e n tu ry a u th o rs like G o rg ias a n d T h e o d o ru s , P la to is in fact th e first th e o rist o f rh e to ric a nd, d e sp ite his reservations, o rig in a ted it as th e th eo retical stu d y o f eloquence. H e w as fo llow ed b y A ristotle. Xll

B u t A ris to tle also h a s a m o re re la x e d c o n c e p t o f dialectic th a n P lato : d ia le c tic fo r h im is a sty liz e d m o d e o f c o n v e rsa tio n , a im in g at th e d efen se o r d e m o litio n o f a p o s itio n a rb itra rily a ssig n e d to its p a rtic ip a n ts. D ia le c ­ tic, so c o n c e iv e d , is fo r h im a n esse n tia l a sp e c t o f th e p u rv ie w o f p h ilo s o ­ p h y a n d essen tial as p re p a ra tio n fo r scien tific a rg u m e n t. R h e to ric , h e a r­ g u es, is a k in to d ialectic b ecau se n e ith e r o f th e m has a p e c u lia r su b je c t m a tte r o f its o w n : su c h a lack d o e s n o t fo r h im , as it d id fo r P la to , d isq u a l­ ify a p ra c tic e f ro m th e sta tu s o f a d isc ip lin e o r techne; a n d th e v e ry sa m e c o n s id e ra tio n s , in te re s tin g ly e n o u g h , d iv id e P la to a n d A ris to tle o n th e q u e s tio n o f th e sta tu s o f p o e try . F u rth e r m o r e , th e o r a to r fo r A ris to tle m u s t h av e c o n sid e ra b le u n d e r ­ s ta n d in g o f eth ic a l a n d p o litic a l issues, b ecau se th e se a re th e m o s t im p o r ­ ta n t su b je c ts a d d re sse d in p u b lic sp e a k in g . W ith o u t h a v in g th e e x p lic it, sy ste m a tic k n o w le d g e re q u ire d o f th e p h ilo s o p h e r, th e o r a to r — o r at least th e g o o d o ra to r, w h o m it is th e p u rp o s e o f th e Rhetoric to tra in — m u s t k n o w e n o u g h a b o u t eth ics a n d p o litic s to b e a g o o d citizen . In th is w ay, rh e to ric is c o n n e c te d to tw o p h ilo s o p h ic a l d iscip lin es: d ia lec tic o n th e o n e h a n d a n d o n a c c o u n t o f its m e th o d a n d eth ic s an d p o litic s o n th e o th e r o n a c c o u n t o f its m o s t c o m m o n su b je c t m a tte r. A ris to tle th e re fo re d o es n o t c o n s id e r rh e to ric a s h a m , a “ k n a c k ” (empeiria), o r a f o r m o f fla tte ry (kolakeia), as P la to d id (Gorgias 462c, 46 3 b ), b u t a d isc ip lin e in its o w n rig h t. B e in g a d isc ip lin e , rh e to ric can b e ta u g h t sy ste m atic ally . A n d th e R heto­ ric is A r is to tle ’s o u tlin e o f th e m a in to p ic s th a t o ra to rs m u s t m a s te r b e fo re th e y can ex ercise th e ir c ra ft su ccessfully. O n c e a g a in , th e se issues are a d d re s s e d in d e ta il in th e essays th a t fo llo w . T h e y c o n c e rn th e m e th o d s o f p e rs u a s io n th a t are p r o p e r to a sy ste m a tic field, th e c h a ra c ter o f th e sp e a k e rs w h o u se th o s e m e th o d s , an d th e e m o tio n s a p p ro p ria te fo r sp e a k e rs to in d u c e in th e ir liste n e rs so th a t th e y w ill b e c o n v in c e d a n d react p o sitiv e ly . A ll th re e to p ic s c o n n e c t rh e to ric w ith p h ilo s o p h y : th e first esta b lish e s a re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n rh e to ric o n th e o n e h a n d a n d dialectic a n d lo g ic o n th e o th e r, th e s e c o n d a n d th ir d relate it to eth ics a n d m o ra l p sy c h o lo g y . In a d d itio n , A r is to tle ’s d isc u ssio n o f p ity a n d fear in c o n n e c ­ tio n w ith th e a u d ie n c e ’s e m o tio n s a n d his tr e a tm e n t o f m e ta p h o r w h e n , in B o o k III o f th e w o r k , h e tu rn s to an e x a m in a tio n o f rh e to ric a l d eliv ery , e sta b lish c o n n e c tio n s b e tw e e n rh e to ric a n d p o etics. T h e essays p re s e n te d in th e 1990 s y m p o s iu m a n d c o lle cte d h e re are p rim a rily in te n d e d to e x a m in e th e se v a rio u s re la tio n s. AU o f th e m a d d re ss sp ecific te x ts o f th e Rhetoric itself, b u t all o f th e m also c o n n e c t th e Rhetoric w ith A r is to tle ’s lo g ical, m e th o d o lo g ic a l, e th ic a l/p o litic a l, a n d p o e tic v ie w s a n d treatises. A fu r th e r c e n tra l c o n c e rn is, o f c o u rse , th e issue w h e th e r A ris to tle d o e s o r d o es n o t r e s p o n d to P la to ’s ch a lle n g e a g a in st rh e to r ic su c c e ssfu lly — in d e e d a n u m b e r o f th e essays in c lu d e n e w effo rts to d e te rm in e p re c ise ly w h a t th a t c h a lle n g e w as. XlH

T his b rin g s us to the second question w e asked above: W hy is there a n ew in terest in the Rhetoric at this tim e? P art o f the reason surely is that it has b eco m e clear to scholars o f classical p h ilosophy that to un d erstan d th eir field, they need to un d erstan d every th in g that the authors they ad­ dress considered as part o f it. E ven th o u g h w e today do n o t consider rh eto ric as a subject to be addressed by philosophers, b o th Plato and A risto tle th o u g h t it was. A nd it is unlikely that w e shall u n d erstan d w h at th ey to o k p h ilo sophy to be, and thus that w e shall u n d erstan d them , unless w e lo o k in som e detail at all the subjects they considered essential to their enterprise. M etaphysics and epistem ology, logic, ethics, and politics con­ stitu te the core o f the philosophical interests o f m o st c o n tem p o rary philos­ ophers. B u t the ancient philosophers to o k ph ilo so p h y to be so m eth in g b roader. W h eth er they w ere correct o r n o t is n o t a question that can be answ ered w ith o u t stu d y in g w h a t precisely they also included in their purview . A nd w h e th e r the areas in w hich o u r interests overlap are as sim ilar as w e so m etim es suppose cannot be determ in ed w ith o u t k n o w in g the exact relations they w ere supposed to bear to the areas w e have so far neglected. M o re generally, w e have seen in recent years a g ro w in g in terest in rh eto ric as a w hole. A large p art o f that interest is negative, lam enting the fact th at m o d e rn m edia o f m ass com m unication, fro m new spapers to television, have degraded rh eto ric to such an ex ten t that they actually th reaten the p ro p e r functioning o f dem ocracy. T h ere are tw o aspects o f this situ atio n w h ich should be im p o rta n t for scholars o f classical philoso­ p h y as w ell as for philosophers and a m ore general audience. T h e first is th at th e m o st co m m o n criticism s o f co n tem p o rary public discourse are rep etitio n s o f P la to ’s attack against the rh eto ric o f his tim e .7 B ut P la to ’s attack against rh eto ric w as p a rt o f his attack against dem ocracy. Seeing these criticism s m ade in the nam e o f defending dem ocracy constitutes a deep irony. T h e second aspect is th at the “p ro p e r” rh e to ric w ith w h ich the d eg rad ed cu rren t m ode is being contrasted w ith is ju s t the rh eto ric Plato d en o u n ced and A ristotle defended— the rhetoric ap propriate for c o m m u ­ n ication betw een one speaker and a relatively sm all g ro u p o f physically p resen t listeners. B u t this constitutes a double irony: “P la to n ic ,” hence arg u m en ts m o tiv ated by o p p o sitio n to dem ocracy, are given against cu r­ ren t rh etorical practice, b u t the latter is contrasted n o t w ith th e p h ilo so p h i­ cal discourse Plato advocated b u t w ith the very rh e to ric he denounced. O n e should seek the explanation o f this second ironic fact in the success o f A risto tle’s Rhetoric in convincing generations o f audiences that P la to ’s fears m ay n o t have been finally justified. T his is itself a fu rth e r reason w h y this w o rk needs to be studied anew, and in detail. W hat w e need to k n o w is 7 F o r a c h a ra c te ristic in sta n c e o f th is v ie w , see P o s tm a n 1985. XlV

h o w A risto tle, i f this diagnosis is correct, w as as successful as he w as, w h a t the detailed stru ctu re o f his a rg u m e n t against P lato and o f his v iew o f rh e to ric w ere, and w h e th e r he succeeded because o f the philosophical force o f his v iew o r because o f its rhetorical pow er. T h ese last general and speculative questions are n o t the p rim ary concern o f th e essays th at follow. B ut the essays do address issues that m u st be resolved i f th e general questions are even to be posed correctly. W ith o u t giv in g ex pression to a single overall approach to the Rhetoric, this collec­ tio n exam ines th e w o rk as a unified w h o le8 in an effort to place it w ith in the co m p lex n e tw o rk co n stitu ted by A risto tle ’s philosophical view s. It is o u r h o p e that the result o f this effort w ill shed lig h t o n b o th the Rhetoric and o n A risto tle’s p h ilo so p h y as a w hole. Princeton, January 1993

A

B

lexa n der

N

eham as

ib l io g r a p h y

T h o m a s C o le , T h e O rigin s o f R hetoric in A n c ien t G reece (B a ltim o r e : T h e J o h n s H o p k in s U n iv e r s it y P ress, 19 9 1 ). G e o r g e A . K e n n e d y , A risto tle on R hetoric: A T h eo ry o f C iv ic D iscourse, N e w l y T rans­ lated, w ith Introduction, N o tes, and A ppen dices ( N e w Y ork : O x f o r d U n iv e r s it y P ress, 19 9 1 ). N e i l P o s tm a n , A m u sin g O u rselves to D eath ( N e w Y ork : V ik in g P re ss, 1 9 8 5 ). A m e lie O . R o r ty (e d .), E ssays on A risto tle 's "R h etoric” (m s. in p r e p a r a tio n ). F ried rich S o lm s e n , D ie E n tw icklu n g der aristotelischen L o g ik und R h e to rik , N e u e P h ilologische U ntersuchungen (B erlin : W e id m a n n , 1929). B r ia n V ic k e r s, In D efence o f R hetoric (O x fo r d : C la r e n d o n P ress, 1988). 8 A n d thus, at least implicitly, rejecting the developm ental vie w o f Solm sen 1929.

SECTION I THE A R G U M EN TS OF RHETORIC

E N T H Y M E M E : ARISTOTLE O N THE L O G I C OF P E R S U A S I O N

M. F. B U R N Y E A T

s i c o n tin g e n t controuersa confessis p ro b a re , f i x esset in hoc g e n e re u su s o ra to ris

Quintilian

T

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N

eed

fo r

H

is t o r y

A n y m o d e rn logic b o o k th at b o th ers to m en tio n e n th y m em e w ill say th at an e n th y m em e is an abbreviated syllogism ; that is, a categorical syllogism in w h ich o n e o f the prem ises o r th e conclusion is n o t stated b u t u n d e rsto o d o r held in m in d (en thum di), the m in d o r thumos in question being th at o f the speaker. T h e speaker does n o t express the w h o le o f th eir reasoning b u t holds p a rt o f it back.* It is cu sto m ary to distinguish three orders o f en th y m em e, one fo r each o f the three parts o f a syllogism w hich m ay be left u nexpressed. B y w ay o f illu stratio n , w e m ay take the exam ple used in a once-fam ous discussion o f e n th y m em e by Sir W illiam H a m ilto n :1 E v ery liar is a cow ard; C aius is a liar; T h erefo re, C aius is a cow ard. P urists m ay quibble that it is u n -A risto telian to ad m it sin g u lar p ro p o si­ tions like “ C aius is a liar” into syllogistic, b u t so far as trad itio n al logic is co n cerned the above is a straig h tfo rw ard exam ple o f a first-fig u re syllo­ g ism in Barbara. A ccordingly, if you suppress the first (m ajor) prem ise, you get an e n th y m em e o f the first order: C aius is a liar; T h erefo re, C aius is a cow ard. * T h is article so m e tim e s u ses their as a gen d er-n eu tral p ro n o m in a l ad jective and they as a g en d er-n eu tra l p ro n o u n , in accord an ce w ith a u sa g e that g o e s back to th e fifteen th century. 1 Lectures on Logic L ecture X X .

I f you suppress the second (m inor) prem ise, you get an e n th y m em e o f the second order: E v ery liar is a cow ard; T h erefo re, C aius is a cow ard. If you leave th e conclusion unexpressed, you get an en th y m em e o f the th ird order: E v ery liar is a cow ard; A nd C aius is a liar. T h is d o ctrin e o f the en th y m em e is com prehensive, orderly, and totally useless. I f you ask w h y it is set fo rth in tex tb o o k s such as Irv in g C o p i’s Introduction to Logic, the answ er is: because it w as there in the bo o k s that C o p i read, and for no o th er (good) reason. 1 do n o t in tend this as a criticism . I f you are w ritin g a logic b o o k and w a n t to m ake ro o m in it for the traditional, so-called “A risto telian ” logic, th en you have to have a section on the en th y m em e, for there has alw ays been a section on e n th y m em e in the traditional logic b ooks; it is p art o f the b aggage w h ich has been drag g ed th ro u g h the centuries w ith the label “A risto tle” on one side and “lo g ic” on the other. T h e tro u b le is that, hav in g w ritte n that section, you have to proceed im m ediately to so m e­ th in g else, for no one has ever found it possible to do an y th in g w ith the d o ctrin e b u t copy it o u t for the u m p te e n th tim e. It hardly helps to be told th at it w as A risto tle’s view that the m o st im p o rta n t part o f a train in g in the art o f p ublic speaking is to m aster en th y m em e. Ju s t try stu d y in g the tw o pages C o p i devotes to e n th y m em e2 w h en you n ex t have to give an afterd in n er speech. T h e reason w h y the traditional d octrine o f the e n th y m em e is useless w as w ell p u t by Sir W illiam H a m ilto n . T h e d octrine invites us to consider ab breviated syllogism s as a distinct fo rm o f reasoning alongside un ab ­ breviated syllogism s. T he fact is, how ever, that the distin ctio n betw een abbreviated and unabbreviated syllogism s is n o m o re than a distinction b etw een tw o w ays o f expressing one and the sam e fo rm o f reasoning. L ogic is ab o u t arg u m en ts, ab o u t w h e th e r conclusions follow fro m p re m ­ ises. It is neith er here n o r there that in presenting an a rg u m e n t som eone m ay feel it unnecessary to state all their prem ises explicitly. It is still those prem ises fro m w hich their conclusion is draw n, those prem ises w h o se relation to the conclusion determ ines w h e th e r they have reasoned w ell o r badly, hence those prem ises w h o se relation to the conclusion is an object o f 2 P p. 2 2 4 -2 5 .

logical stu d y .3 T h ere is no m ore logical interest o r utility in g ro u p in g to g e th e r arg u m en ts that are incom pletely expressed than there w ould be in g ro u p in g to g eth er arg u m en ts that are overelaborately expressed, o r argu­ m ents th at are obscurely o r w ittily expressed. A logic o f incom pletely expressed reasoning is as red u n d an t as a logic o f in d ig n an t reasoning. So h o w did this redundancy com e about? M y contention w ill be that the n am e enthym em e did once stan d fox so m eth in g o f logical in terest and rh e­ torical utility. B u t to recover it w e need to unravel the h isto ry that tu rn ed it into the useless relic o f the te x tb o o k trad itio n . T h e m o st recent episode in the h isto ry is the th ird o rd e r o f en th y m em e, w h ere the p ro p o sitio n suppressed is the conclusion o f a syllogism . It was actually Sir W illiam H a m ilto n w h o p u t th ird -o rd e r en th y m em es firm ly o n the m ap in m o d ern tim es, insisting th at they w ere as co m m o n in everyday arg u m en tatio n as the o th er tw o orders and that the traditional d o ctrin e o f the en th y m em e was incom plete w ith o u t them . T h e fact that m o d ern logicians h ad usually failed to recognize m o re than tw o orders o f en th y m em e w as for H am ilto n h im self an internal illogicality that supplied an additional reason for sp urning a d octrine h e to o k to b e erroneous in principle. Ironically, how ever, the effect o f his in terv en tio n w as that sub­ seq u en t logic books in corporated th ird -o rd e r en th y m em es as a positive p art o f the doctrine. T h e reason w h y logicians previous to H am ilto n had said little o r n o th ­ ing ab o u t th ird -o rd e r enthym em es w as a reason o f h isto ry rather th an o f logic. In w ritin g ab o u t the enthym em e, m o st logicians to o k them selves to be ex p o u n d in g A ristotle, and A risto tle’s account o f the e n th y m em e says n o th in g ab o u t suppressing conclusions. H a m ilto n w as n o t the first to challenge the credentials o f the traditional doctrine as an accurate inter­ p retatio n o f A risto tle,4 b u t he w as the first to insist on separating that h isto rical qu estio n fro m the logical question w h e th e r the d octrine should be p reserved o r th ro w n away. H e gave excellent reasons for th in k in g that the d o ctrin e w as neither g o o d A ristotelian exegesis n o r g o o d logic, and sh ould consequently be th ro w n away. B ut n o t everyone to o k note. T he d o ctrin e lived on b o th as A ristotelian exegesis, e.g ., in the w idely used co m m en tary on the Rhetoric b y E. M . C o p e ,5 and in su n d ry logic books. 3 T h e sam e h o ld s i f w e ad m it, w ith L eibniz (N ew Essays on Hum an Understanding p .76), th at internal reasoning m ay be e n th y m e m a tic also. A P o . 1.10, 7 6 b 2 4 -2 5 , cited b y H a m ilto n and b y Pacius p. 265, does n o t deny th at people m ay o m it prem ises w hen th in k in g an a rg u m e n t j u s t as easily as w h en speaking it; M A 7, 201225-29, n o t cited b y th em , seem s to allow it. 4 In Discussions pp. i s 1 -5 6 (from T he Edinburgh R e v ie w o i 1833), he traces his predecessors on several o f the points at issue back to R u d o lf A gricola's D e Inventione Dialectica o f 1485 (B ook II chap. 14). 5 C o p e Commentary II pp. 220—21. C f. also C o p e Introduction pp. 102—4, w h e re th e m ain tex t follow s H a m ilto n b u t the n o te rejects him and retu rn s to th e traditional doctrine.

N o w , h o w e v e r, th e r e w a s n o lo n g e r a h is to ric a l ra tio n a le fo r p u tti n g it in th e lo g ic b o o k s n o r a lo g ic a l ra tio n a le fo r fin d in g i t in A ris to tle .

A T

extual

Intrusion

T h is b r in g s us to th e n e x t q u e s tio n . G iv e n th a t A r is to tle ’s a c c o u n t o f th e e n th y m e m e says n o th in g a b o u t s u p p r e s s in g c o n c lu sio n s, w h a t w a s th e b asis fo r th in k in g it d id say s o m e th in g a b o u t s u p p re s s in g o n e o f th e p r e m ­ ises? H a m ilto n s u p p o s e d th a t th e m a in b asis w a s a s e n te n c e f r o m Prior A n a lytics a . 27 w h ic h h as th e a p p e a ra n c e o f a d e f in itio n o f e n th y m e m e : A n e n th y m e m e is an in c o m p le te (ateles) sullogismos f r o m lik e lih o o d s o r s ig n s .6 (7 o a io ) T h is is th e te x t as it w a s firs t p r in te d in th e A ld in e o f 1495. It is also th e te x t q u o te d in th e le m m a to P h ilo p o n u s ’s c o m m e n ta r y o n th e p a ssa g e (in A P r . 4 8 1 . 19). T h e c ru x is th e w o r d ateles, w h ic h has th e s u p p o r t o f th e f irs t h a n d in C , an e le v e n th -c e n tu ry m a n u s c r ip t th a t s h o w s a h ig h le v e l o f a g r e e m e n t w ith th e G re e k c o m m e n ta to r s .7 T h e fac t th a t ateles re c u rs in P h ilo p o n u s ’s q u o ta tio n d o e s n o t n e c e s sa rily m e a n th a t P h ilo p o n u s re a d it, o n ly th a t th e m e d ie v a l c o p y ists w h o w r o te o u t th e le m m a fo r his c o m m e n ta r y d id s o .8 B u t w h e th e r o r n o t th e c o m m e n ta to r s re a d th e te x t in p re c is e ly th is f o r m — w ith th e w o r d ateles— th e q u o ta tio n c e rta in ly re p re s e n ts th e ir u n ­ d e r s ta n d in g o f th e e n th y m e m e . B o th P h ilo p o n u s a n d th e m u c h e a rlie r A le x a n d e r s ta te th a t an e n ­ th y m e m e is a s y llo g is m w ith o n e p r e m is e o m itte d . In th e ir e x a m p le s it is a lw a y s th e m a jo r p re m is e . P h ilo p o n u s (in A P r. 3 3 .1 0 —23; cf. in A P o . 5 2 .1 9 —25)9 a c tu a lly sp ecifies th e m a jo r as th e o n e o m itte d a n d c o n ju re s u p a v a r ie ty o f re a so n s w h y o r a to r s n e e d to s h o r te n th e ir s y llo g is m s in th is w a y .10 A d m itte d ly , th e Prior analytics se n te n c e d o e s n o t in fa c t say th a t th e 6 ένΙΚιμημα μέν οΰν έστι συλλογισμός άτελής έξ είκότων ή σημείων. 7 Ross Analytics p. gz. 8 W allies’ apparatus im plies agreem ent on the lem m a over the full range o f relevant P hiloponus m anuscripts. O n tw o m inor points, C and the lem m a diverge: C has δέ for μέν ούν (cf. p. 9 below ) and inserts κ α ί before σημείων. A n o th er variant is έκ before σημείων in n (W illiams p. 48). 9 W here the second o f these references speaks o f ένθυμήματα, the first speaks instead o f τους π αρ ά τοΐς όήτορσι μονολημμάτους λεγομένους συλλογισμούς. T his alternative n o m en ­ clature is studied and explained below. Wallies p. xiv prints a scholium , ascribed to P hiloponus, w hich explicitly equates ένθύμημα w ith συλλογισμός μονολήμματος Ρητορικός. 10 For exam ple, because it saves tim e w hen the w ater clock is ru nning, o r because the audience w ill p u t their trust in a prem ise they supply for them selves. A m ore interesting reason, added to Philoponus’s list by David (Tolkovaniye A nalytiki Aristotelya, R ussian trans­ lation from the A rm enian by S. S. A revshatyan, Yerevan 1967, pp. 101-2), is that the m ajor prem ise is likely to be false and so needs to be hidden. A m m onius in A Pr. 27.14-33, on the o th er h and, does allow for suppressing the m inor.

M . F. B U R N Y E A T

in c o m p le te n e ss o f an e n th y m e m e resid es in th e su p p re ssio n o f a p rem ise rather than o f th e co n clu sio n ; it ju s t says that the e n th y m e m e is in c o m ­ p lete. B u t th e illu stration s in th e rest o f th e chapter w o u ld g iv e P h ilo p o n u s e v e r y reason to take it that w a y .11 P h ilo p o n u s also g iv e s a d eriv a tio n o f e n th y m e m e n o t fr o m en thumoi, b u t fro m enthumeisthai: It is called e n th y m e m e b ecau se it leaves o n e p rem ise fo r th e m in d to th in k (enthumeisthai) 12 (in A P o . 6 .2 —3) T o th is I shall b e retu rn in g later. A s for A lex a n d er, h e d escrib es th e e n th y m e m e as “d ep riv ed o f c o m ­ p leten ess and o f b e in g u n q u a lifie d ly su ch as it is m ea n t to be, b eca u se it is co n tra cted in to lesser c o m p a ss” 13 (in Top. 6 2 .9 —13). Is th e p hrase “d e­ p rived o f c o m p le te n e s s” (apheiremenon to teleion) a sig n that A lex a n d er already read ateles? A ltern a tiv ely , d id h is la n g u a g e in sp ire s o m e o n e to j o t d o w n th e w o r d ateles in th e m a rg in o f their tex t, o r e v e n to e m e n d th e te x t itself? A t this sta g e su ch q u e stio n s m a y w e ll se em w h o lly u n a n sw era b le, b u t I shall return to th e m at th e en d o f th e in v estig a tio n . M e a n w h ile , there is n o d o u b t that th e first h and in C has it w r o n g . A teles sh o u ld b e d eleted ; s o m e o n e d id in fact m a k e a th o r o u g h j o b o f erasin g th e w o r d .14 AU th e o th er sig n ifica n t m ss w r ite th e sen ten ce w ith o u t ateles, 11 I c o n c e n tra te o n P h ilo p o n u s at th is p o in t b ecau se fo r th e s e c o n d b o o k o f th e Prior A n a lytics th e o n ly c o m m e n ta r y w e h a v e is th e o n e th a t c arrie s h is n a m e (p e rh a p s w r o n g ly : W allies (Pracf.) p p . v i—vii su g g e sts th a t th e c o m m e n ta r y o n th e se c o n d b o o k is in fact b y so m e o n e else). T h e o th e r c o m m e n ta to r s ’ v ie w s o n e n th y m e m e e m e rg e , as w e sh all see, m a in ly in th e d is ta n t c o n te x t o f A P r . 1.1. 12 έ ν θ ΰ μ η μ α δ έ λ έ γ ετ α ι δ ιά τ ό κ α τα λ ιμ π ά ν ε ιν τ φ ν φ έ ν θ υ μ ε ϊσ δ α ι τή ν μ ία ν π ρ ό τ α σ ιν . C f. M in u c ia n u s D e Epicheir. 343-4- d S p e n g e l-H a m m e r. 13 ά φ η ρ η μ έν ο ν τ ό τέ λ ε ιο ν κα'ι τό ά π λ ώ ς ε ίν α ι το ιο ΰ τ ο ν έφ ’ φ έ σ τι δ ιά τη ν ε ις τ ό ελ α ττο ν συστολήν. 14 So th o r o u g h th a t it is o n ly b y inference— a c o rre c t in feren c e, n o d o u b t— th a t e d ito r s are ab le to w r ite “ ά τελ ή ς C 1 ” in th e ir a p p a ra tu s. I a m g ra te fu l to P h ilip p e H o f fm a n n fo r th e fo llo w in g re p o rt: A p re s σ υ λ λ ο γισ μ ό ς u n g r a tta g e d e circa 5 /6 le ttre s p o u r ra it c o n v e n ir p o u r ά τελή ς, mais b ie n q u e q u e lq u e s e x tre m ite s d e le ttre s so ie n t co n se rv e e s, e t m a lg re u n e x a m e n au x ray o n s u ltra -v io le ts (la m p e d e W o o d ), j e n ’ai p u a c q u e rir la c o n v ic tio n q u e telle est b ie n la Ιεςο η . J e n ’ai pas vu ce tte le g o n , m a is elle est p o ssib le (v ra ise m b la b le ? )— la p re m ie re le ttre e ta it u n e v o y elle p o r ta n t un e s p rit d o u x ( = ά — ?), Ia d e rn ie re u n s ig m a σ (?). A c c e n t g ra v e s u r la d e rn ie re sy lla b e σ (— ή ς ?). P e tite sc h o lie a u -d e ssu s d e ce g ra tta g e : δ ε ϊτ α ι γ (ά ρ ) έξω·θ·(εν) δ ρ ο υ . T h is s c h o liu m , to w h ic h I shall re tu rn , m u s t b e a n e x p la n a tio n o f ά τελ ή ς to th e effe ct th a t th e a r g u m e n t is in v a lid w ith o u t s u p p le m e n ta tio n ; th e te r m in o lo g y d e riv e s (d ire c tly o r in d i­ rectly ) f ro m A P r. 1.1, 2 4 b 2 i - 2 . F o r a fasc in a tin g s tu d y o f tw o “ g r a tta g e s ” in th e Topics p a rt o f C (w ritte n b y a d iffe re n t h a n d ), see B ru n s c h w ig “ O b s e r v a tio n s .” C o n v e rs e ly , W illiam s p . 48 (cf. p p . 6 - 7 ) r e p o rts th a t in n ά τελ ή ς w a s in se rte d b y th e h a n d o f a c o rre c to r.

w h ic h w as first stig m a tiz e d as a gloss b y Pacius in 1597.15 T h e sen ten ce sh o u ld read , “ A n e n th y m e m e is a sullogismos fro m lik e lih o o d s o r s ig n s .” A n d o n ce Pacius h a d p o in te d th is o u t, th e lo n g e r v ersio n , w h ic h h a d b een sta n d a rd in e d itio n s o f th e Organon since th e A ld in e a h u n d re d years earlier, b ecam e a r a r ity .16 So th e illu sio n th a t th e tra d itio n a l d o c trin e o f th e en ­ th y m e m e goes b a c k to A risto tle h im s e lfis n o t to be b la m e d e n tire ly o n th e w o r d ateles in Prior Analytics 2.27. T h e glo ss is n o t th e cause b u t th e c o n ­ seq u en ce o f d a m a g e d o n e m u c h earlier, in th e tim e o f th e c o m m e n ta to rs.

R

iv a l

D

e f in it io n s

T h e q u e s tio n n o w b ec o m e s th e fo llo w in g : Shall w e accept th e Prior A n a ­ lytics sen ten ce, m in u s th e w o r d ateles, as A ris to tle ’s c o n sid ered d e fin itio n o f e n th y m e m e ? T h e Rhetoric d oes o n th re e occasions sta te th a t an en ­ th y m e m e is a sullogismos c o n stru c te d fro m lik elih o o d s o r signs (1.2.14, 1357232-33; 1.3 .7 , 135937-10; cf. 2 .2 5 .8 , 1 4 0 2 ^ 3 - 2 0 ) . B u t is th is its essence o r d efin itio n ? Sir W illia m H a m ilto n ’s an sw e r, w ith Pacius a n d o th e rs, w as “y e s .” A c c o rd in g to H a m ilto n , th e re a so n w h y th e tra d itio n a l d o c trin e o f th e e n th y m e m e , besides b e in g b a d lo g ic , is also b a d A risto te lia n ex egesis is th a t, o n ce ateles is ejected as a g loss, it can b e seen th a t A risto tle defin es th e e n th y m e m e n o t b y its fo rm (as an in c o m p le te sy llo g ism ), b u t b y its m a t­ ter, as a sy llo g ism fro m sig n s an d lik e lih o o d s .17 A n d this a c c o u n t o f w h a t th e e n th y m e m e m e a n t to A risto tle has b een accepted b y n e arly e v e ry b o d y w h o has w ritte n o n th e su b je c t since H a m ilto n ,18 w ith th e e x c e p tio n o f co u rse o f th o se few , like C o p e , w h o d e fen d ed th e tra d itio n a l d o c trin e o f th e e n th y m e m e as g e n u in e ly A risto te lia n , a n d so m e c o m p ro m ise rs w h o h o p e d th a t A ris to tle co u ld d istin g u ish th e e n th y m e m e b o th b y its p ro b a ­ b ilistic m a tte r a n d b y its tru n c a te d f o r m .19 15 Pacius’s len g th y and im pressive n o te ad loc. has m u ch in c o m m o n w ith H a m ilto n ’s discussion. H is first edition o f 1584 prin ted άτελής and signaled the variant κ α ί before σημείων. N o w he re p o rts th at he has looked at four m anuscripts and found άτελής absent from them all. 16 A check in th e C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity L ibrary uncovered no pre-1597 te x t w ith o u t άτελής and ju s t tw o p o st-iS 9 7 editions w ith άτελής (Buhle, l792;W eise, 1843). O n t h e o th e r hand, Facciolati p. 19 still talks in 1724 as i f his oppo n en ts cite άτελής and need P acius’s correction. A n early exam ple o f resistance to Pacius is B alfour p. 505 in i6 r6 . 17 H e argued fu rth er (Logic p. 389) that if άτελής w as retained, it need n o t refer to the incom plete form o f the syllogism b u t could m ean m erely th at “ the reasoning fro m signs and probabilities affords n o t a perfect o r necessary inference. ” 18 A u th o rs in different fields w h o acknow ledge H am ilto n include O w en I p. 239; Je b b Attic Orators Il pp. 289-90; Keynes p. 212; Seaton; M cB urney p. 131. T h e H a m ilto n ian view has even left its m ark o n the entry u n d e r enthymeme in the O xford English Dictionary. 19 G ro te pp. 2 02-3; Jo sep h PP- 350—5 rn. O n this H a m ilto n ’s c o m m e n t (Logic p. 389) rem ains valid: “A syllogism from signs and likelihoods does n o t m o re naturally fall in to an elliptical form than a syllogism o f any o th e r m atter ”

N o n e th e le ss, I d o n o t th in k th a t w e sh o u ld jo in th e ch o ru s o f ap p ro v al fo r H a m ilto n ’s acco u n t unless w e can g ive an affirm ativ e a n sw e r to th ree q u e stio n s. F irst, g iv en th a t A risto tle d id n o t w rite ateles, d id he w rite th e rest o f th e sentence? F o r in th e m ss, an d in all e d itio n s b efo re R oss, th e sen ten ce app ears at line 10, b e tw e e n einai a n d lambanetai, w h e re it seem s to in te rru p t th e analysis o f signs. It w as tra n sfe rre d to th e b e g in n in g o f th e c h a p te r b y R oss, w h o s e n o te o n th e su b je c t reads as follow s: T h e se w o rd s sh o u ld sta n d at th e b e g in n in g o f th e ch ap ter, w h ic h in its tra d itio n a l fo rm b eg in s w ith a stra n g e a b ru p tn ess; th e v ariatio n s in the M SS b e tw e e n de a n d men oun m ay p o in t to th e se n te n c e ’s h av in g g o t o u t o f place an d to v a ry in g a tte m p ts h av in g been m ad e to fit it in. If th e w o rd s are m o v e d to 2a, th e c h a p te r a b o u t enthumema b eg in s ju s t as th o se a b o u t epagoge, paradeigma, apagoge, a n d enstasis d o , w ith a s u m ­ m a ry d e fin itio n .20 B u t R o ss’s re a so n in g is w ro n g . T h e ch ap ters o n epagoge, paradeigma, and apagoge d o n o t b e g in w ith a s u m m a ry d e fin itio n . T h e y b e g in w ith a syl­ lo g istic analysis to th e effect th a t y o u g e t an epagoge, a paradeigma, an apagoge, w h e n su ch an d such c o n d itio n s are satisfied b y th e th re e te rm s o f a sy llo g ism . N o o n e co u ld p o ssib ly c o m e to u n d e rsta n d w h a t an apagoge o r a paradeigma is fro m th ese an alyses;21 an u n d e rsta n d in g o f w h a t w e are an ­ aly zin g is p re su p p o se d . It is th e im m e d ia te ly p rec ed in g c h a p te r on o b jec­ tio n (enstasis) th a t resem b les 2.27. J u s t as 2.27, in th e fo rm tra n s m itte d by th e m ss, b eg in s w ith a tech n ical s ta te m e n t a b o u t lik e lih o o d a n d sig n b e in g certain k in d s o f p re m ise , so 2 .2 6 b eg in s, n o less a b ru p tly and technically, b y e x p lic a tin g o b je c tio n as a certain k in d o f p rem ise (69337).22 Since likeli­ h o o d a n d sign, especially th e seco n d , are w h a t 2.27 p ro c ee d s to study, it does n o t n eed to s ta rt w ith th e re m a rk a b o u t e n th y m e m e . T h e m y s te ry (to be re so lv e d later) is w h e th e r th e re m a rk has a n y b e tte r p o in t o r fu n c tio n in its tra d itio n a l place at 70a 10.23 T h is ta k e s m e to th e seco n d o f th e q u e stio n s w e m u s t a n sw e r in the affirm a tiv e b e fo re w e can ag ree w ith H a m ilto n th a t e n th y m e m e s are d e­ fin e d as sy llo g ism s fro m lik e lih o o d s o r sig ns. S u p p o sin g A risto tle d id w rite th e sen ten ce, so m e w h e re o r o th e r in th e ch ap ter, does sullogismos m e a n “s y llo g is m ” ? F o r it is q u ite certain th a t sullogismos in A risto tle u s u 20 A n a lytics p p . 5 0 0 -5 0 1 . A c c o rd in g ly , R o ss p re fe rs δέ to μέν ο ΰ ν (cf. η .8 ab o v e). H is tr a n s p o s itio n is a c c e p te d b y M ig n u c c i, b u t re je c te d as u n c o n v in c in g b y C o lli a n d S m ith . 21 A s R o ss h im s e lf a d m its w h e n c o m m e n tin g (p . 488) o n th e in itial c h a ra c te riz a tio n o f π α ρ ά δ ε ιγ μ α at 2 .2 4 , 6 8 b38~ 39. 22 2 .2 7 , u n lik e 2 .2 6 , a d d s n o n te c h n ic a l d e fin itio n s o f lik e lih o o d (7 0 3 4 -5 ) a n d sig n (7 0 a 7 9) to e x p lain a n d s u p p o r t (γάρ) th e tech n ical e x p lic a tio n s at 7 0 3 3 -4 , 6 - 7 . O n th e sig n ifican ce o f th is d is tin c tio n in 2 .2 7 b e tw e e n tech n ical a n d n o n te c h n ic a l levels, see f u rth e r B u rn y e a t p p. 1 9 7 -9 8 . 23 S m ith ’s tra n s la tio n p u ts th e se n te n c e in p a re n th e se s.

ally does not m e a n “ sy llo g is m ” ; so m e e x p e rts w o u ld d e n y th a t it ev er d o e s .24 T h ir d , s u p p o sin g b o th th a t A risto tle w ro te th e sen ten ce an d th at sullogismos h e re m e a n s “ s y llo g is m ,” does th e sen ten ce g iv e us A risto tle ’s d e fin itio n o f e n th y m e m e ? I w a n t to arg u e, a g a in st Pacius a n d H a m ilto n , th a t th e se n ten ce is n o t A ris to tle ’s d e fin itio n o f e n th y m e m e , and, g o in g fu rth e r, th a t ev en i f w e b o th ac c e p t th e sen ten ce as A risto te lia n a n d s to p tra n sla tin g sullogismos b y “s y llo g is m ,” it still d oes n o t g iv e us A ris to tle ’s d e fin itio n o f e n th y m e m e . T h a t is, th e A risto te lia n e n th y m e m e is to be ex p la in ed n e ith e r as an a b b re ­ v ia te d sy llo g ism in a c c o rd an ce w ith th e tra d itio n a l d o c trin e , n o r as a sy llo g ism fro m lik e lih o o d s an d signs in a c c o rd an ce w ith th e H a m ilto n ia n re v isio n , n o r ev en as a sullogismos in s o m e o th e r sense fro m lik e lih o o d s o r sig n s. It m ay be tru e th a t an e n th y m e m e is a sullogismos fro m lik e lih o o d s o r sig n s, b u t th is is n o t its d e fin itio n .

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L et us o p e n A ris to tle ’s Rhetoric an d tr y to read it w ith an eye u n tra m m e le d b y to o m a n y stra n d s o f h isto ry . W e are, le t us im a g in e, stu d e n ts at th e a fte rn o o n lectu res w h e re — as th e s to ry g o e s ,25 an d it is n o w o rse a s to ry th a n m a n y o th e rs — A ris to tle ta u g h t easier an d m o re p o p u la r su b jects like rh e to ric . W e m ay k n o w little a b o u t sullogismos a n d even less a b o u t the sy llo g ism , b u t A risto tle a p p a re n tly ex p ects us to b e fa m ilia r w ith th e te rm enthumema, o r a t least to have a r o u g h idea o f its m e a n in g , fo r he offers no e x p la n a tio n o r e lu c id a tio n w h e n he first uses th e w o rd at 1.1.3, 13 5 4 a11— 16. H e is c o m p la in in g th a t c u rre n t h a n d b o o k s o n rh e to ric say n o th in g a b o u t e n th y m e m e s . W h y is th is a fault? B ecause pistis, p ro o f, is w h a t the I a rt o f rh e to ric , q u a a rt, is all a b o u t, a n d e n th y m e m e s are th e b o d y o f p r o o f (soma tes pisteds). T h e m e ta p h o r is n o t lu m in o u s ly c le a r.26 B u t th e re is n o d o u b t th a t w e are b e in g to ld th a t e n th y m e m e s are th e m a in o r th e m o s t im p o r ta n t p a rt o f pistis. A n d th is, to rep eat, is a m essag e th a t A risto tle ex p ects his a fte rn o o n stu d e n ts to u n d e rsta n d , w ith o u t fu rth e r e x p la n a tio n o r elu c id a tio n , at the v e ry b e g in n in g o f th e co u rse. So w h a t w o u ld th e w o rd enthumema m e a n to 24 B arnes, “P ro o f and the S yllogism ” p. 23. C f. Solm sen Entwicklung, pp. 41—42; Ross, Analytics, p. 291. 25 P hilodem us, A ulus Gellius, Syrianus apud D iiring pp. 299, 314, 431. 26 M y o w n view on this m u ch debated m a tte r is that σώμα c ontrasts w ith π ρ οσ ϋ ή κ α ι (the parentheses Ross p u ts ro u n d a t γα ρ π ίσ τεις . . . π ροσθή κα ι are a disaster), and th at προσ-θηκαι is by no m eans as pejorative a term as som e have supposed. LSJ illustrates the m eanings “addition; appendage; auxiliary” (cf. Q u in tilian Inst. 5 .8 .1 -2 on appeals to e m o tio n as auxiliurn atque ornamentum argumentorum). T h e charge against the han d b o o k s is like th e charge A risto tle a n d Plato m ake against Presocratic m aterialists: they treat σ υνα ίτια as α ιτία . T h ere is th en n o inconsistency w ith 1.2.3, I 35 J e tiens a re m e rc ie r p lu s p a rtic u lie re m e n t m o n c o m m e n ta te u r C a rlo N atali: ses conseils et c ritiq u es m ’o n t ete d ’u n g ra n d secours. Les echanges avec P ie rre A u b e n q u e , Jacques B ru n sc h w ig et J o h n C o o p e r m ’o n t eg alem e n t beaucoup a p p o rte . E nfin, M yles B urn y eat, d o n t les a rg u m e n ts su r la skiagraphia et la skenographia etaien t p a rtic u lie re m e n t aceres, m ’a p e rm is de m ie u x a ffirm er m o n p ro p o s.

S E C T I O N IV RH ETO RIC AND LITERARY ART

P ITY A N D FEAR IN T H E R H E T O R I C A N D THE P O E T I C S

ALEXANDER NEH AM A S

I E v e n w h e n h e feels h is case h a s b e e n v e ry s tr o n g , A ris to tle is u n lik e ly to re sist in tr o d u c in g an a d d itio n a l a r g u m e n t in to a p h ilo s o p h ic a l d isc u ssio n i f o n e is av ailab le to h i m . 1 P e rh a p s th e b e s t e x a m p le o f th is c o n sists o f c h a p te rs 2 - 3 o f Physics 1: h a v in g c la im e d th a t, as a n a tu ra l p h ilo s o p h e r, he n e ed n o t a rg u e a g a in s t M e lissu s a n d P a rm e n id e s (b ecause th e ir m o n is m a n d th e ir d e n ia l o f m o tio n p u t th e m o u ts id e th e d o m a in o f n a tu ra l p h ilo s o ­ p h y s tric tly sp e a k in g ), A ris to tle p ro c e e d s to a rg u e a g a in st th e m a n y w a y — echei gar philosophia he skepsis (185320). B u t his c ritic ism s o f th e th e o r y o f F o rm s in M etaphysics 1.9, 99oa33ff. a n d 13.4—5, io y e b y fE , as w e ll as his d is p u te w ith P la to o v e r th e F o r m o f th e G o o d in Nicom achean Ethics 1.4, 1 0 9 5 a13 ff., are also g o o d cases in p o in t. It is th e re fo re re la tiv e ly s u rp r is in g th a t in cases w h ic h in v o lv e n o t s im p ly d is a g re e m e n t a b o u t p a rtic u la r v ie w s o n a sp ecific to p ic , b u t th e m o r e g e n e ra l issu e w h e th e r a w h o le field o f in q u ir y is o r is n o t le g itim a te , h e o fte n se em s to b e a v o id in g a d ire c t c o n f r o n ta tio n w ith h is o p p o n e n t. T h is is tr u e b o th in th e Rhetoric a n d in th e Poetics, w o rk s th a t a rtic u la te in d eta il th e s tr u c tu r e o f fields a n d p ra c tic e s a g a in st w h o s e v e ry e x iste n c e P la to h a d a rg u e d v ig o ro u s ly . T h e Gorgias a n d th e Phaedrus d e n ie d th a t r h e to r ic as tra d itio n a lly c o n c e iv e d c o u ld b e an a rt, th o u g h th e la tte r al­ lo w e d fo r th e p o s s ib ility o f a rh e to r ic th a t tu r n s o u t to b e s tr a ig h tfo rw a rd ly a p a r t o f p h ilo s o p h y (2590—2710). T h e Ion a n d th e Republic p r o d u c e d a list o f a c c u sa tio n s a g a in s t p o e tr y in g e n e ra l, a n d tra g e d y a n d ep ic in p a rtic u la r. 1 T h is a rtic le , p r e p a r e d f o r th e 1990 S y m p o s iu m A r is to te h c u m , also a p p e a r s in A m e lie O k s e n b e r g R o r ty , e d ., E ssays on A ristotle's P o e tic s ( P r in c e to n : P rin c e to n U n iv e r s ity P re ss , 1992) p p . 2 9 1 - 3 1 4 . I a m v e r y g r a te fu l f o r th e r e s p o n s e o f M a r th a N u s s b a u m , w h o w a s m y c o m m e n ta to r , as w e ll as f o r th e c o m m e n ts o f S te p h e n H a lliw e ll a n d G ise la S trik e r o n th e o c c a s io n o f th is p a p e r ’s o r ig in a l p re s e n ta tio n . A m e lie O k s e n b e r g R o r t y re a d a n e a r lie r d r a ft a n d g a v e m e d e ta ile d a n d v a lu a b le s u g g e s tio n s . S a ra h B r o a d ie ’s e x te n s iv e c r itic is m s o f tw o v e r s io n s o f th e essa y le d m e to m a k e a n u m b e r o f se rio u s a lte r a tio n s a n d a d d itio n s . I a m p a r tic u la r ly g r a te fu l to h e r.

Yet th e ex a ct n a tu re o f A risto tle ’s a n sw e r to P la to ’s ch arg es ag a in st the p o ets can still, as I h o p e to show , p ro v o k e dispute: D oes A risto tle arg u e th a t p o e try benefits th e e m o tio n s o r th at it is co g n itiv ely im p o rta n t (or b o th )?2 A n d w h a t are th e co n sid eratio n s th at en title h im to b eg in th e Poetics o n th e a s su m p tio n th a t p o e try (along w ith p oetics itself, w h ic h is its study, 1447a 12) is an a rt in the first place? T h e Rhetoric raises sim ilar questions: W here, exactly, does A risto tle a rg u e th a t rh e to ric is a real techne? D oes h e believe, an d o n w h a t ex p licit g ro u n d s , th a t th e ab ility to p ersu ad e o th e r p eo p le o f o n e ’s v iew s, in d e p e n ­ d e n tly o f th o se v ie w s ’ co n te n t, is ethically acceptable? In his a rg u m e n t w ith G o rg ias, S ocrates h ad claim ed th at rh e to ric could n o t be an a rt unless it ad d ressed a specific s u b je c t-m a tte r o f its o w n . W h en G o rg ia s finally claim ed th a t rh e to ric ian s te a c h ju stic e an d in ju stice to th e ir stu d e n ts, Soc­ rates c o u n te re d th a t i f th at w e re th e case th en , c o n tra ry to G o rg ia s’s o w n earlier in sistence, rh e to ric co u ld n ev e r be used fo r u n ju st p u rp o se s (Gorgias 449a—461b). B o th the q u estio n o f its su b je c t-m a tte r an d th e n a tu re o f its eth ical statu s w ere th ere fo re left u n re so lv e d . In th e Phaedrus, S ocrates a rg u e d th a t rh e to ric ian s, i f th e y are to have an a rt a n d to p ro d u c e tru e beliefs in an au d ience a b o u t m a tte rs o f rig h t a n d w ro n g , m u st m e e t tw o co n d itio n s: th e y m u s t th em selv es possess stric t k n o w le d g e o f th o se m at­ ters (259ε—260a) an d th ey m u s t b e ex p erts o n the n a tu re o f th e h u m a n soul; o th e rw is e th e y w ill n o t k n o w h o w b est to address th e p a rtic u la r s o rt o f p eo p le th e y arc c o n fro n te d w ith o n each p a rtic u la r o ccasion (2706—2710). Y et A ris to tle ’s Rhetoric b eg in s w ith th e b a ld sta te m e n t th a t rh e to ric is parallel to dialectic because, “in a w a y ” (tropon tina), b o th co n c e rn all to p ics— th u s co m p letely sid estep p in g th e o rig in a l a rg u m e n t o f th e Gorgias to th e effect th a t each art m u s t have its o w n p a rtic u la r su b je c t-m a tte r— and goes o n im m e d ia te ly to characterize it as a m e th o d ic a l p ractice (hodos). A risto tle re tu rn s to this p o in t a n d insists o n it at I3 55b25—34. H e does, in fact, a little later concede to P lato th a t th e su b ject o f rh e to ric can b e m o re n a rro w ly c o n stru e d as sim ilar to th at o f he peri ta ethe pragmateia (1.2.7, 1356226); h e agrees w ith G orgias, in o th e r w o rd s, th a t rh e to ric is c o n ­ cern ed w ith ju stic e an d in ju stice b ro a d ly conceived (cf. 1.4.5, 13 59b I ο­ ι i). B u t h e denies th at th e rh e to ric ian needs to have k n o w le d g e o f ethical m a tte rs in a n y th in g like th e stric t sense th at P lato h ad c o n sid e re d neces­ sary. H e also leaves th e q u estio n o f the rh e to ric ia n ’s o w n ethical ch a rac te r u n a n s w e re d .3 2 T h e fo rm e r a lte rn a tiv e is v e ry firm ly e n tre n c h e d . B u t a re ce n t v e rsio n , o ffere d b y H a lliw e ll in A risto tle ’s Poetics , is n o w u n d e r atta ck b y N ic k o la s P a p p a s, w h o , in “ T h e Poetics’ A r g u m e n t A g a in st P la to ,” a rg u es in favor o f th e second. 3 R h e t. 1.1.11, 1355314—18; 1.4.6, I 3 5 9 b i2 —16. T h e fo rm e r passage so u n d s v e ry m u c h like S o c ra te s’s a rg u m e n t th a t in o rd e r to k n o w w h a t th e tru th is like, a n d th e re fo re b e p lau sib le to an au dience, th e rh e to ric ia n m u st first k n o w w h a t th e tr u th its e lf is. B u t A ris-

B o th th e Rhetoric, th en , and the Poetics b eg in b y p re su p p o sin g th at th eir su bjects— o ra to ry and fiction, respectively— are technai th at can be stu d ied system atically, th o u g h in n eith er case does A risto tle p ro m ise the precision P lato had d em an d ed . B o th w o rk s give the stro n g im p ressio n th a t the practices w ith w h ich they are concerned are o f significant benefit b o th to in d iv id u als and to society, th o u g h in n eith er case does A risto tle m ake his reasons for th in k in g so u n co n tro v ersially clear. In w h a t follow s I p ro p o se to ask, in an o b lique m anner, w h e th e r A risto tle did in fact face the chal­ lenges P lato h ad issued against b o th fields, h o w he pro ceed ed to m eet th em , and h o w successful he w as in his endeavor. I w ill ap p ro ach the set o f q uestions re g ard in g the technical status o f o ra to ry b y m eans o f an ex am in atio n o f A risto tle ’s tre a tm e n t o f the e m o ­ tions ( pathe) in Rhetoric II. A ristotle, I believe, is p ro m p te d to discuss this issue in detail b y the re q u irem en t expressed in the Phaedrus th at o ra to rs k n o w en o u g h ab o u t the soul to be able to tailo r th eir presen tatio n s to the em o tio n al needs o f the d ifferent k in d s o f audiences th at th ey fin d th e m ­ selves add ressin g o n different occasions. H is detailed ex a m in a tio n o f the em o tio n s is in ten d ed to sh o w th at o rato rs possess a p p ro p riate k n o w led g e ab o u t th e em o tio n s even th o u g h th e y are n o t, and n eed n o t be, p h ilo so ­ p hers. T h e y need n o t, th at is, have the sy n o p tic and system atic u n d e r­ stan d in g o f th e soul, o f its place in nature, an d o fits various kinds th at P lato had re q u ired o f th e m (Phdr . 27od ff.). Rhetoric II, th en , is an in d irect a tte m p t o n A risto tle ’s p art to d isarm one o f P lato ’s m ain criticism s o f th e claim s o f o ra to ry to be a techne. T o the ex ten t th at A risto tle answ ers P lato, he does n o t d o so by m eans o f a explicit a rg u m e n t b u t rath er b y th e te x tu re o f his d e m o n stra tio n o f th e s o rt o f k n o w led g e a b o u t e m o tio n th at o ra to rs need and in fact have. B efore I tu rn to this tex t, h o w ever, let m e anticipate o n e o f th e im p licatio n s o f m y reading. A fter lo o k in g at em o tio n s generally, I shall focus o n p ity (eleos) and fear ( phobos ) in particular. Wc shall th en see th at the stru c tu re o f A risto tle’s discussion does n o t fit at all w ell w ith o u r m o st usual w ays o f u n d ersta n d in g th e Poetics. F or w e shall find first that, in general, A risto tle envisages th at th e e m o tio n s can be refined and im p ro v ed b y considerations and processes th at are essentially rational. N o such factors ap p ear to be involved in th e fam ous last clause o f his definition o f trag e d y in the Poetics (i4 4 9 b 2 4 —29), w h ich is m o st often read as co n cern in g eith er th e elim ina­ tio n or, m o re plausibly, the p urification, o f p ity an d fear. Second, w e shall also discover th at the stru c tu re A risto tle attrib u tes to th e em o tio n s g en e r­ ally an d to p ity and fear in p artic u la r— th at is, b o th the o bjects to w a rd to tle ’s p o in t g oes ex actly in the o p p o site directio n : because th e tru th a n d w h a t has verisim ili­ tude are sim ilar, h e argues, the latter is all the rh e to ricia n needs to k now . C f. C o o p e r, “ E th ical-P olitical T h e o ry in A risto tle ’s Rhetoric,” this vo lu m e. F o r A risto tle ’s tex t, h e re and elsew here in this essay, I re ly o n K assel, Aristotelis A rs Rhetorica.

w h ic h th ey are d irected and th e reactions th ey p ro d u c e in th o se w h o ex p erien ce th e m — m akes it im p o ssib le to m a in ta in th a t th e katharsis to w h ic h th a t d efin itio n refers is a p ro cess th a t involves th e e m o tio n s in any way. B u t i f this is so, th e n it is u n lik ely th at the d efin itio n o f tra g e d y contains a re p ly to P la to ’s charge in the Republic th a t p o e try “feeds an d in flam es” th e passio n s (6o6d3—6). A n d this in tu rn suggests th at A risto tle m ay be avoid­ in g a d irec t c o n fro n ta tio n w ith P lato n o t o n ly o n th e statu s o f p o e try as a techne b u t also o n th e q u estio n o f the benefits a n d h a rm s it is capable o f co n fe rrin g u p o n us. A t th e v ery least, it su g g ests th a t even i f A risto tle is c o n fro n tin g P lato o n this latter p ro b le m , he is n o t d o in g so th ro u g h his v ery d efin itio n o f trag e d y itself. We shall then have to raise tw o q u estio n s, n e ith e r o n e o f w h ich can be easily answ ered: W here does A risto tle address P la to ’s ethical challenge? A n d is this a challenge th at has been, o r can be, successfully m et? In s h o rt, b o th o n th e technical an d o n the ethical level, n e ith e r the Rhetoric n o r th e Poetics seem to m e to o ffer th e d irec t o p p o sitio n to P la to ’s v iew s w h ich in so m an y o th e r cases characterizes A ris to tle ’s re sp o n se to his teach er in p artic u la r an d to his o p p o n en ts in general. W h y A ris to tle ’s ap p ro ach is m o re indirect in these cases is a q u estio n as im p o rta n t as it is difficu lt to answ er: it is, in fact, at least as difficult to an sw e r as th e general th eo retical q u estio n , still in m y o p in io n u n an sw e red , w h e th e r th e c o n ­ fro n ta tio n b etw een P lato and A risto tle on these topics has ev e r been resolved. A t th e b eg in n in g o f th e Rhetoric, A risto tle d istin g u ish es th ree “ tech n i­ cal” (entechna) m o d es o f persu asio n (eide pisteds) o ra to rs can use: sp eak in g itself, w h ich proves o r appears to p ro v e the conclusions w e w ish to reach; p re sen tin g o u r ch aracter in a w ay th a t w ill advance o u r cred ib ility a n d o u r cause; an d creating the p ro p e r fram e o f m in d in o u r listeners, in o rd e r to disp o se th e m to w a rd ju d g in g in o u r favor (1.2.11, I3 5 6 b 3 5 ff). It m ay seem th at A risto tle in tro d u ce s b o th th e second a n d th e th ird o f these k in d s o f p ersu asio n as a resp o n se to th e Phaedrus, because b o th in ­ v o lve th e p ro p e r tre a tm e n t o f the audience. Still, it is clear th at o n ly the th ird p ro v id es an an sw er to Socrates, w h o w as co n cern ed n o t w ith the sp e a k e r’s ch aracter b u t w ith th e fact th a t th e tru e o ra to r sh o u ld k n o w w h a t k in d s o f soul, w h a t kinds o f people, w o u ld be affected b y w h a t k in d s o f speech and, accordingly, p ro d u c e th e ap p ro p ria te o ra tio n in each in stan ce CPhdr. 2 7 1 b !—5). C haracteristically, an d co n sisten tly w ith his general view s o n th e status o f rh eto ric, A risto tle does n o t th in k th at it is necessary for th e o ra to r to possess a n y th in g th at even approaches th e rig o ro u s ex act­ ness (pase akribeia) o f th e scientific k n o w le d g e o f the soul and its affections (pathemata) w h ic h Socrates h ad d em an d e d . B u t equally characteristically, in stead o f m ak in g the general p ro g ra m m a tic re m a rk s P lato h ad co n sid ered

s u ffic ie n t r e g a r d in g th a t k n o w le d g e , A r is to tle d e v o te s a lo n g s tre tc h o f his w o r k (R h e t. 1 .2 .1 —2 .1 7 .6 , 13551^25-I 3 9 ib 8 ) to a d e ta ile d e x a m in a tio n o f th e e m o tio n s a n d c h a ra c te r-ty p e s to b e f o u n d in v a rio u s au d ie n c e s. In th is w a y h e s u p p lie s th e o r a to r w it h h ig h ly sp ecific a d v ic e o n h o w to a d d re ss ea ch a u d ie n c e effectiv ely . T h e c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n th e Rhetoric a n d th e Phaedrus is th e re fo re c o m ­ p le x . T h o u g h A r is to tle refu ses to re q u ire th e e x a c t k n o w le d g e P la to d e­ m a n d e d o f th e o ra to r , h e ta k e s th e n e c e ssity o f b e in g a c q u a in te d w ith th e a ffe c tiv e sid e o f o n e ’s a u d ie n c e e x tr e m e ly se rio u sly a n d d isc u sse s it in e x h a u s tiv e d etail: in r a th e r v a g u e te rm s , P la to calls fo r d e ta ile d k n o w le d g e ; in v e ry d e ta ile d te rm s , A ris to tle a rtic u la te s a r o u g h a n d re a d y fa m ilia rity .4 In so d o in g , h e also p ro v id e s u s w ith e x tr e m e ly v a lu a b le in f o r m a tio n a b o u t th e e m o tio n s o f p ity a n d fear, w h o s e im p o rta n c e to th e th e o r y o f tra g e d y in th e Poetics is m a tc h e d o n ly b y th e a llu siv e n ess w ith w h ic h th e y a re tre a te d in th a t w o r k . It is also i m p o r ta n t to n o te th a t th e Rhetoric g iv es special e m p h a s is to th e r e q u ir e m e n t th a t b o t h th e s p e a k e r’s c h a ra c te r a n d th e a u d ie n c e ’s e m o tio n s b e m a n ife s te d a n d a ffe c ted , re sp e c tiv e ly , b y e le m e n ts o f th e oration itse lf (1dia tou logou, 1 .2 .4 , ! 35