Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics 9780192873552, 0192873555

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Aristotelica

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/08/23, SPi

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/08/23, SPi

Aristotelica Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics C H R I S T O P H E R R OW E

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Christopher Rowe 2023 The moral rights of the author have been asserted All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2022942797 ISBN 978–0–19–287355–2 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.001.0001 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

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Contents Introduction

vii

Eudemian Ethics I

1

Eudemian Ethics II

22

Eudemian Ethics III

71

Eudemian Ethics VII/IV

102

Eudemian Ethics VIII/V

180

Appendix

228

Index

256

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Introduction The following Studies are designed primarily to explain the reasoning behind the choices that, line by line, shaped the text of the Eudemian Ethics (EE) printed in the accompanying Oxford text (OCT). As is well known, the transmitted text of EE is in many places highly corrupt. The studies below attempt to justify the solutions I have adopted to the problems of the text and explain why I have rejected rival solutions; they lay no claim to exhaustiveness (not all available solutions are considered), but rather constitute a record of the route by which I arrived at my decision in each case, in conversation mostly with others, in many cases long since gone, sometimes with myself. A secondary function of these Studies is to provide more complete information about the Greek manuscripts than is given in the apparatus.1 An Appendix, at the end of the present volume, brings together full sets of data, for the four primary manuscripts, that reveal not only the relationships between these four manuscripts but also the idiosyncrasies of the three copyists involved, and the typical errors that we tend to find from time to time in all of them. Information about such errors is particularly important insofar as it provides a warning against relying too heavily on ‘what the manuscripts say’, even when there is unanimity between them. True, since the manuscripts represent the only primary evidence we have (with a little help, for two small portions of the text, from Latin translations), we should not be too ready to deviate from them. But they do go wrong, in 1  Frequent references will be found, in the following studies, to ‘the B copyist’. This designation is shorthand for ‘the copyist of B and/or the copyist(s) of any manuscript(s) that may have preceded in the line of descent from the hyparchetype α´ ’: for all we know, either part or indeed all of what I attribute to the activity of the B copyist might properly be attributable to an intermediary or intermediaries. But since we shall presumably never know if that is the case, everything in question may as well be assigned to the copyist of B, i.e. the manuscript the contents of which are actually known to us. L itself may very well be descended directly from the archetype ω, so that references to ‘the L copyist’ can be taken with some safety as being just that. As for P and C, even though their antigraphon, α, is lost, the fact that they are non-­identical twins allows us considerable insight into the contributions of their copyist, Nikolaos of Messina. Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.001.0001

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viii Introduction predictable ways, and quite often all at the same time, as the data put beyond question. The Studies are intended to be read with the text and apparatus. They started life as footnotes to a draft text; they and the apparatus may have been separated physically from each other, but their shared origins will be quickly apparent to the reader.

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Eudemian Ethics I [The style of the titles of the books in PCBL varies slightly: the title can be just ‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων’, or ‘ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων’, or ‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων ἀριστοτέλους’; varying as it may do within a single MS, the style used is evidently arbitrary.] 1214a2 συνέγραψεν (PCBL) on the face of it looks unlikely, given (a) the general pattern of usage of this compound, (b) the fact that such usage can specifically connect it with the writing of prose (n.b. the immediately following ποιήσας); ἀναγράϕω, by contrast, as suggested by Richards, would be a natural choice for the present context, and for ἀν- to become συν-, perhaps especially after the final sigma of ἀποϕηνάμενος, would be well within the limits of the sorts of errors we typically find in these MSS. Nevertheless, the case is still not quite proven (see Dirlmeier1 ad loc.), and given that the policy of the present text is to make as few changes as possible where our primary MSS are unanimous, συνέγραψεν stands. a5 Αmbr.’s placing of the δέ before ἥδιστον corresponds with its pos­ition as it evidently was in the original, i.e. Theognis 256 = πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν, but since Aristotle has announced the lines as poetry, they should be metrical, as they are in the different ­version at NE I.8, 1099a27–8; for that to be the case, unless we read τοῦ for οὗ, the δέ will have tο follow ἥδιστον. —ἐρᾷ τὸ Bessarion: i.e. Bessarion in Parisinus 2042, though he also adds ται above the τὸ, then crosses ται out. (See Preface to text: ‘Bessarion’ in the apparatus here and from now on refers exclusively to this MS, a vast collection of Aristotelian excerpts 1  The absence of a full reference for an author and work cited indicates that bibliographical details of the author/work appear in one or more of (1) the Preface in the sister volume of the present Studies (hereafter ‘Preface to text’), (2) the Bibliography to that Preface, or (3) the list in the same volume of authors that are cited in the apparatus. Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.003.0001

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2  Eudemian Ethics I (1214a5) Cardinal Bessarion wrote out in his own hand; he certainly contributed, especially in the form of marginalia, to other MSS, especially Rav. 210, Marc. 200, and Marc. 213, but since (a) it is usually hard to be sure exactly what is attributable to him in these, and (b) it hardly matters for my purposes, I leave him uncredited there, except in special circumstances, in the same way that I do other named figures we know to have been involved with our MSS, whether because they commissioned, copied, corrected, or commented on them.) The Aldine later makes the correction to ἐρᾷ τὸ independently, no doubt from direct knowledge of Theognis. Bessarion writes out a version of Theognis’ line in the margin of Par. 2042 (πᾶσι δὲ τερπνότατον οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν) above and to the left of the first line of EE, and then tries out τερπνότατον δ’ ἐστ’, apparently as a substitute for the MSS’ ἥδιστον, in the margin opposite that. a6 συγχωροῦμεν Laur. 81,12: an easy mistake (the ου is corrected by another hand [= ‘Laur. 81,122’] to omega, s.l.); it might be a conjecture, but ‘perhaps we don’t agree with him’ is not obviously an improvement on ‘let us not. . .’. a10 In B both μὲν here and the δὲ following have what appears to be a double accent. Similar double accentuation, especially with μὲν, occurs here and there in B; it is not clear why. a10–11 καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος: if there is a problem here, Langerbeck’s solution (simply bracketing καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις) seems better than either of Spengel’s; the second, indeed, given that we are actually going to talk about the κτῆσις of the πρᾶγμα in question, seems to make matters worse. But while there may be some awkwardness in the Greek, it seems tolerable. Woods’s bracketing of τοῦ πράγματος, which after all is prepared for by περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα earlier in the sentence, seems high-­handed when the context is actually about ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα (a9). Inwood and Woolf, in their translation of EE in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (2013: hereafter ‘Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation’), seem covertly to adopt Spengel’s first solution. a13 Dirlmeier interprets the MSS’ ἦν as a ‘philosophical’ imperfect, taking Aristotle to be referring to things he has said prior to the EE (‘once a

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Aristotelica  3 Grundsatz, always a Grundsatz’, to paraphrase Dirlmeier). That, however, involves the unwarranted presupposition that Aristotle thinks of himself as writing the EE as part of a collected body of work. So if it is that sort of imperfect, we would evidently need an unusual, as it were forward-­ looking, use of it, i.e. ‘whatever turns out to have been appropriate. . .’. I prefer a suggestion by Christopher Strachan (in correspondence), who compares Plato, Cratylus 388a10 Τί ἦν ὄργανον ἡ κερκίς; Οὐχ ᾧ κερκίζομεν: ‘this seems to be a sort of aoristic use, akin perhaps to a gnomic aorist designating something that is always or generally the case.’  This is surely more than plausible enough to render Richards’s ­emendation (ὅτιπερ 〈ἂν〉 οἰκεῖον ᾖ) unnecessary.

a23 With δαιμονίᾳ (CBL), the following τινὸς would be orphaned and unexplained; the feminine dative is by attraction to the preceding ἐπιπνοίᾳ. So P’s δαιμονίου it must surely be (presumably it is an emend­ation by the copyist: δαιμονίᾳ, being in both recensiones, is likely to have been in ω, the common source/archetype). Incidentally, Bessarion (ap. Par. 2042) also has δαιμονίου. This is not an independent conjecture of his: my trawl through Par. 2042 makes it almost certain that there, throughout, he was using either (a corrected version of) P, or more probably its descendant Pal. 165, which includes many corrections to P: so for example in the continuation of the present sentence he reads διὰ τὴν τύχην rather than L’s διὰ τύχην (and so he continues right to the end of Book VIII/V). This is in one way a surprise, because Bessarion is other­wise associated with MSS that are mostly descended from L, i.e.  that belong to the other recensio, but in another way it is not so ­surprising, given that P is itself sometimes corrected from a represent­ ative of the recensio Constantinopolitana; see Harlfinger 1971: 9 on the complexity of the relationships between the extant MSS of EE.

a24 ταὐτό: C is the only one of the four primary MSS to write in the crasis mark here (crasis marks are more often than not omitted in all four). a25 εὐτυχείαν PC for εὐτυχίαν: ει for ι in such endings is a signature feature of P and C. a26 τῇ παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων, κτλ: as subject of the sentence, which all of PCBL make it, ἡ παρουσία appears peculiarly redundant; the

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4  Eudemian Ethics I (1214a26) subject is surely εὐδαιμονία, and translators sometimes (see e.g. Solomon [in the Oxford Translation of 1915], Woods, and Kenny [in the Oxford World’s Classics translation]) pretend that it—εὐδαιμονία—­and not παρουσία is actually subject in the transmitted text. One possibility would be simply to bracket ἡ παρουσία, but it would then be a mystery how it ever got into the text. For Spengel’s proposal, i.e. to bracket διὰ instead, and write dative for nominative, a story is much easier to construct: the dative—­because of its position, and the lack of an expressed subject?—was corrupted into a nominative, but then διὰ had to be supplied to make sense of the following genitives. (This story would work rather less well with Spengel’s alternative proposal, 〈ἡ εὐδαιμονία〉 τῇ παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων. . . .) a29 τὶς B2: it is feature of all of PCBL that they tend to accent in­def­in­ite τις/τι, and of B that it likes to give τίς/τί a grave accent. —συναγάγει in Laur. 81,4, a descendant at this point from C, is corrected to συναγάγοι (also in Marc. [descended from L], according to Harlfinger); B too, presumably, was faced with συναγάγει, and made the same correction. All the variants offered by the MSS would, incidentally, have the same Byzantine pronunciation. (‘Errors arising from similarity in pronunciation’, comments Christopher Strachan, ‘are among the most common of all, and very frequent in these MSS.’) b7 ἐπιστήσαντα in P is by attraction to the following ἅπαντα; the two dots, vertically arranged, associated with the -τα ending are converted by P2 to the sign for -ας. —Woods claims that ‘ἐπιστήσαντας [sc. τὴν διάνοιαν] with a dependent accusative and infinitive is doubtful Greek’, but while admitting that there are no precise parallels I think it possible to construe the noun clause, i.e. the accusative and infinitive, as being—­as it were—­in the dative: ‘paying attention, in relation to these things, [to the fact] that every person. . .’. Though strictly δεῖ in b12 might govern ἐπιστήσαντας (sc. ἡμᾶς) here, it is too far away to make that entirely plausible—­hence Allan’s 〈χρὴ〉 and P2’s 〈δεῖ 〉 (see next note); my own view is that the sentence becomes so extended, especially with the—­unexpectedly ­expansive?— explanatory clause ὡς τό γε . . . σημεῖόν ἐστιν in b10–12, that Aristotle simply forgets where he started, and in effect starts again. (Pace Woods, I see no reason why Aristotle should not be claiming that everyone does in fact

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Aristotelica  5 set themselves an end: the list of possible ends is restricted to popular-­ sounding choices [n.b. also the non-­ technical/non-­ Aristotelian use of καλῶς just before the list], and that it would be very foolish not to set oneself an end in life [b10–12] could be taken as evidence for the claim rather than, as Woods suggests, conflicting with it.) b8 δεῖ post θέσθαι suppl. P2, in the margin: but pace P2, and Woods ad loc., the point Aristotle is leading up to is that while everyone sets themselves an end, they need to be careful about their choice; there is no reason (apart from—­what some suppose to be—­an orphaned infinitive) for him to be exhorting them to set themselves an end: cf. preceding note. b12 ‘δὴ sine causa secl. Spengel’, Susemihl, with justification. —ἐν αὑτῷ Victorius (‘γρ.’), and then Bekker, followed by other editors: but what is in the MSS is ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. ‘in the matter in hand’, to be read with πρῶτον rather than, or as much as, with διορίσασθαι. b17 οὐ deest in P1CL: οὐ is added above line in P, surely by a later hand, with an insertion mark. This is one of a significant number of occasions on which B is the only one of PCBL to preserve the right reading. b19 τῆς 〈καλῆς〉 ζωῆς Richards: but καλῆς presumably can and should be understood in any case.

b24 περὶ πάντων: P2 writes ἴσως: περιπάτων in the margin; L’s περιπάτων is post corr., but the corrections in L, evidently currente calamo, are only in the formation of the iota and the alpha, and there was evidently only ever one word.

b35 Spengel’s τῶν πολλῶν 〈ἐπισκεπτέον〉 is part of a solution to larger problems that follow.

1215a1 εἰκῇ γὰρ Victorius (Pier Vettori), annotating one of his copies of the Aldine edition; a brilliant emendation. (This is one of the many conjectures/corrections of his that is not marked by a ‘fort.’ [see Preface to text], just with a ‘γρ.’) For P2’s οἱ μηδὲν see next note. a1–2 περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας P1CL, περὶ  ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας B: Chalkondyles in

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6  Eudemian Ethics I (1215a1–2) Ambr. leaves a gap after περὶ—­something must be missing after περὶ in its precursor, L (and in PC). But what? Spengel’s proposal is pleasingly economical, proposing as it does no more than the loss of the first part of εὐδαιμονίας, but it has its own problems, the worst of which is that it leaves us with two different explanations (εἰκῇ γὰρ . . . a1, ἄτοπον γὰρ . . .) for our not having to consider the views of the many, the second of which follows as if the first was not there; the transposition of ἐπισκεπτέον, which causes this double explanation, then also looks questionable, and one might also ask how likely it is that εὐδαιμονίας would be corrupted to μόνας in a context about εὐδαιμονία (even though stranger things do happen in the text of EE). Dodds’s proposal, for its part, has the advantage over Fritzsche’s (on which it builds, as Fritzsche’s builds on P2’s) that it comes with a beautifully simple explanation of how the mess in the MSS came about, i.e. through a ­copyist’s eye slipping straight from περὶ to πέρι; but it too has important weaknesses: in its prolixity and in the unclarity of the reference of the supplied ταύτης (Fritzsche), seven lines after the περὶ αὐτῆς that might have explained it. My own proposal for completing the sentence goes back to P2’s οἱ (i.e., presumably, οἳ?) μηδὲν λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ

ἁπάντων δὲ καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τούτων τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας (written out in full in the margin of P). My first step, after accepting Victorius’ εἰκῇ γὰρ before λέγουσι, is to suppress the δὲ and supply the περὶ ὧν that is then needed to restore the syntax of the sentence. That would give us, for the sake of argument, περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας,

which would (a) offer a solution that is more economical than either Dodds’s or Fritzsche’s, (b) avoid the problem of the reference of (the supplied) ταύτης, and (c) provide the sort of sense that everyone, beginning from P2, thinks is required. But of course P2’s supplements have no authority, as is confirmed by the lack of syntactical coherence in the sentence he offers us here; and when Aristotle generally spends so much time on, and attributes so much importance to, the endoxa, could he really have announced, out of the blue, that actually it is only the σοϕοί, the experts, that we should listen to on the subject in hand? Surely not. In the present context, the class to be contrasted with οἱ πολλοί would more naturally be the ἐπιεικεῖς, a fairly indeterminate group whose

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Aristotelica  7 chief distinguishing feature is typically that they are not (the) many, and who will make an appearance a few lines down (a12). So περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν ἐπιεικῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας—­except that by borrowing an element of Dodds’s solution (see above), and writing περὶ τούτων, ὧν πέρι, we would begin to have a  story about how the corruption might have started: better 〈περὶ τούτων, ὧν〉 πέρι, then, since strictly it would be the first περί that was lost; the comma, too, is important, in order to avoid the appearance of a mere tautology. Beyond that (apart from noting the double ἐπι-, which might help explain the loss of ἐπιεικῶν?), I merely repeat that we know in this case—­pace Spengel—­that the transmitted text is lacunose. I adopt the reconstruction proposed on three grounds: first, that it gives an appropriate sense, i.e. one that at least does not commit Aristotle to something he would be unlikely to say; second, that it is superior to any alternative presently on offer (see above); and third, that it would be unhelpful, even a dereliction, to reproduce the nonsense we find in PCBL, or to follow Chalkondyles and print a lacuna, or indeed to deploy the obelus, which fastidious readers can easily import for themselves if they prefer. a4 Jackson’s πειθοῦς for πάθους is surely implausible: does persuasion not typically involve λόγος? The mess in L (the copyist has merely run ἀλλὰ and πάθους together) is a lapse, and does not indicate uncertainty around πάθους; and contra Barnes, πάθους/πάσχειν can surely be used by Aristotle on its own to refer to a bad experience/suffering, as at Rhet. II.5, 1382b29ff. a5 There are some traces of a correction above βίον in P, and it is nat­ural to assume that the correction is to βίου, before τοῦ κρατίστου. The mistake, shared by all of PCL, is surprising enough to suggest that βίον was in ω, the common source of PCBL, in which case B is evidently correcting independently. Ambr. (Chalkondyles) also has βίου.

a9 〈τὴν〉 πᾶσαν σκέψιν Dirlmeier: it is true that not literally all σκέψις has to be as specified, just ‘this whole [present] σκέψις’, but πᾶσαν σκέψιν will naturally be read, in the context, as ‘all σκέψις of the sort we are involved in’.

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8  Eudemian Ethics I 1215a10 τῳ B (also P2, crossing out the circumflex accent) provides a vi­able alternative—‘if someone should find it presumptuous . . .’—to the impossible τῷ P1CL. Given that these MSS so regularly confuse omicron and omega, Victorius’ τὸ is also possible; the same consideration renders Fritzsche’s compromise, τῳ 〈τὸ〉, unnecessary. a11 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα: P2 writes ἴσως: καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα in margin.

a14 ἔσται ci. Walzer, for ἐστι: but we can take the reference to be to the acquisition of τὰ διὰ τύχην ἢ διὰ ϕύσιν γινόμενα in general, rather than to what would be true of the acquisition of εὐδαιμονία were it to be one of these. a19 [ἃ] τοῖς αὑτοὺς: τοῖς αὑτοὺς is all that is needed if we take κεῖσθαι to mean ‘be available’ (‘laid up’, ‘in the bank’: see LSJ2 s.v. III); the ἃ could perhaps be descended from an earlier dittography, i.e.  αὐτοῖς for τοῖς before αὑτοὺς. P2’s ἐν τοῖς αὐτοὺς, in margin, preceded by ἴσως, looks  a  non-­starter: εὐδαιμονία might lie ἐν τῷ αὐτοὺς/αὑτοὺς παρασκευάζειν . . ., but scarcely in the individuals doing it. (Woods accepts ἐν, taking τοῖς as neuter: ‘happiness consists in those things which cause human beings . . . to be of a certain kind’, but this would surely be an odd thing for Aristotle to say about happiness, if it is not just a way of making ἐν τοῖς come to the same thing as ἐν τῷ.)

a27 τῶν μὲν 〈οὐδ’〉 Bonitz, τῶν μὲν 〈οὐκ〉 Rav.: one could try arguing that the negative is in effect retrospectively supplied by the following ἀλλ’ ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων—‘some dispute [the title in question] but on the grounds that they labour for the sake of the ne­ces­sar­ies of life [sc. and they must clearly be ruled out on the basis of what has just been said, at some length, about the need to distinguish the goods that constitute happiness and those that are merely its necessary conditions]’. But this is surely too much of a stretch, and in any case no one, or no one that mattered to Aristotle, ever suggested that the ‘vulgar’ and ‘banausic’ lives in question could claim to be best. Rav. sees the need for a negative, but Bonitz’s emphatic οὐδ’ seems preferable. 2  A Greek–English Lexicon compiled by H.  Liddell and R. Scott, revised . . . by H.  Jones . . .  9th edn, with a revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

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Aristotelica  9 a28 In P a first correcting hand puts in an elision mark and rough breathing over what was plainly once ἄλλως, apparently erasing an acute accent after the initial smooth breathing; a second correcting hand then writes ἵσως: τῶν μὲν ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων (not ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ὡς, as reported by Walzer/Mingay) in the margin. The problem is with the ὡς in CBLP2 ἀλλ’ ὡς, which even translators who claim to retain it appear not to translate, and not surprisingly, because it is worse than redundant; the sentence actually works better without it. Spengel’s brilliant emendation—­which gets some slight support from P’s original error, i.e. ἄλλως for ἀλλ’ ὡς, the latter presumably being what was in the common source of PCBL—­gives a perfect sense: the lives in question make no claims at all for themselves precisely because they randomly busy themselves with the necessaries, i.e. with no reference to the larger question ‘what is it for?’ a29 Woods’s τὰς for τῶν before περὶ χρηματισμὸν and Russell’s 〈τὰς〉 τῶν both tidy up the list, perhaps in an attempt to make it all fit better

together, but it is not clear either that they succeed in that, or that it needs to be tidier. a32–3 πρὸς ὠνὰς μόνον καὶ πράσεις scripsi. Ιn P, the rough breathing over ων is apparently changed to (the sign for) -ας, though with the circumflex left in place, and ἴσως: πρὸς ὠνὰς is written either by the same or by a different hand in the margin, apparently with the intention for it to replace ἀγορὰς. (Harlfinger reports that πρὸς ὠν becomes πρὸς ὧν [‘πρὸς ὧν C et p. corr. P2’]; I read the evidence differently, but it is admittedly hard to be quite sure what the sequence of events was.) Ιn C, the iota of πρᾶσι is overwritten with ει; in L a sigma is inserted between πρὸ and ὧν, ὧν marked for deletion, and, if this corrector follows the same convention as others (after all, the point is to make the Greek make sense, and the correctors like the copyists appear generally either to speak Greek or to know their Greek well), πράσει is by implication changed to πράσεις. (Similarly, perhaps, with P2’s correction of πρᾶσι to πρᾶσις; might he even be implicitly deleting ὦν, with L?) B, for his part, if he was faced with the same mess as PCL, as he presumably was, went straight for simplification—­and interestingly both Bessarion, in Par. 2042, and Marc. 213 independently offer the same solution as B;

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10  Eudemian Ethics I (1215a32–3) perhaps it just was the obvious way out. How to explain the mess in PCBL themselves? My own thought is that ἀγορὰς was originally a gloss on ὠνὰς μόνον καὶ πράσεις, but became absorbed into the text, with μόνον corrupted to μὲν—­for which, clearly, there is no use in the context; P2’s reconstruction is consistent with this. a33 τῶν εἰς L1, τῶν οὖν εἰς L2: L2 inserts οὖν above the line (a decent conjecture: resumptive οὖν?). a34–5 τῶν καὶ πρότερον . . . τοῖς ἀνθρώποις secl. Walzer: the whole clause does have something of the feel of a gloss, and would not be missed; on the other hand, if a gloss is what it is, or originally was, it is well adapted to the syntax of the sentence, and there is no compelling reason to expel it. a36 What appears here in the margin in P, i.e. τρεῖς βίοι εἰσὶν ἀρετὴς ϕρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονής, is plainly a summary or heading, not a suggestion for emending the text; L, in its margin, has a more laconic τρεῖς βίοι. a37 ἐπ’ ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες: an alternative to Spengel’s proposals might be to suppose that an ὄντες has slipped out through haplography, but it is easily enough understood in any case. 1215b1 The gap in B after ἀπολαυστικόν is not caused—­as some gaps are—­by any fault in the parchment; a heavy dot resembling a Greek colon appears after ἀπολαυστικόν, and the gap may just be B’s way of indicating the beginning of—­what he sees as—­a new section (cf. on b14 below). b10 ἐρόμενον BP2, ἐρώμενον P1CL: P2 corrects omega to omicron above the line. Either the omega was in ω, the original common source of PCBL, and B made the correction independently, like P2, or else PCL all made the same—­very common—­mistake (omega for omicron or vice versa). b14 ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν: both Russell’s and Richards’s emendations are surely unnecessary; ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν is perfectly intelligible for the required sense, i.e. ‘if it’s a human being we’re talking about’. —There is another slightly shorter gap in B here, after μακάριον εἶναι, also with what looks like a Greek colon (cf. on b1 above).

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Aristotelica  11 b19 δι’ ἃ suppl. P2/3: i.e. P2 writes ἴσως: διὰ προΐενται τὸ ζῆν οἷον νόσους ὠδύνας χειμῶνας in the margin, and then another hand corrects διὰ to δι’ ἃ. b20 For P2’s ὠδύνας, see preceding note. —καὶ is surrounded in C with four dots, indicating deletion. b23 B2 adds a breathing over the second alpha of ἀνακάμψαι: B is often lackadaisical about splitting words/observing gaps between words, and here the ἀν becomes separated from the rest of the word. b24 The μὲν after ἐχόντων is plainly superfluous, ἐχόντων μὲν being a doublet of ἐχόντων μὲν in the next line: so, once again, is B in­de­pend­ ent­ly correcting? b29 κἂν is in the margin in P, with insertion marks there and beside καὶ, which is the first word in the line. b29–30 ἀπέραντον, τί scripsi, ἀπέραντόν τι PCBL: changing the accents—­on which PCBL, as a group, are in any case less than wholly reliable, especially where τις and τίς are concerned—­is a more economical solution than Rav.’s ἀπέραντόν τι 〈οὐ〉, adopted by editors.

b33 πορίζοι PCBL, πορίζει Bekker: the optative fits well enough, given the context (‘who would choose . . . without whatever pleasures x, y, z . . .  might provide?’).

b34 πορίζοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is repeated after προτιμήσειε in P but crossed out, whether by the original copyist, looking back, or more likely by another hand. b35 δῆλον appears in the left margin of C, on the first line on the page, crammed up against the γὰρ, apparently—­messily—­supplied by a second hand, with what looks like a confirmatory eta above, either from this corrector or a third hand. b36 διενέγκοιεν L: the -εν is added as a compendium, unusually for this MS, above the line and above the second iota. 1216a2 μοναρχιῶν: Fritzsche and Susemihl both write μοναρχῶν, following Lat. (the late Latin translation), but Aristotle would surely have

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12  Eudemian Ethics I (1216a2) used μόναρχος (so Rackham); but μοναρχιῶν, on which PCBL all agree, while surprising is not terminally objectionable. a3 ἐν τῷ: editors before Walzer/Mingay for some reason preferred τοῦ, but the unity of PCBL around the perfectly acceptable ἐν τῷ is de­cisive. —τὶ B: as observed above, there is a general carelessness in B about the distinction between acute and grave accents, no doubt partly because of its tendency to integrate accents with characters. a8 καθεύδοντα δὲ: another independent correction by B (the μὲν is nonsensical, as Rav. also sees)? a12 B2 adds οι above the alpha of ταῦθ’. a18 To reiterate: ‘δὴ] δὲ PCL’ indicates, by elimination, that B has the δὴ (attributed by Walzer/Mingay to all of Marc.2, Langerbeck, and Allan); a happy mistake, another independent correction, or did the hyparchetype α´ reproduce a δὴ in ω? a19 ϕαίνονται τάττειν PCL, τάττονται B: ϕαίνονται τάττοντες? a23 ἀληθῶς: the special sign after ἀληθ in C indicating an ending in -ως (cf. πως in b10) seems to postdate the apparently partly erased sign for -ους. a34 The καλῶς proposed by Bonitz for PCL’s καλὰς is found in B. a36 A definite article before ἡδοναὶ here would not be out of place (B, Rackham, and by implication Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation), but ‘there are other pleasures . . .’ makes perfectly good sense, and since it appears in both recensiones we should probably keep it. a38 The ligature used here in B for -αρα in παρὰ is standard, and is barely distinguishable from the one used for -ερι (see e.g. περὶ at 1217b40); ­similarly with the somewhat different ligatures used by P and C, and no doubt also ω. PCBL all not infrequently confuse the two prepositions. 1216b2 λόγου: an upsilon is introduced by a correcting hand—­perhaps contemporaneous with Rav., perhaps not—­in Laur. 81,20 above the iota of λόγοι; also by Victorius in his Aldine. (The abbreviation λόγ´ in C

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Aristotelica  13 [see Walzer/Mingay] indicates that it has the same ending as the previous word, so: λόγοι.) b3 The τοῦ for τὸ, before γινώσκειν, preferred by B2 (introducing a ­ligature for ου over the tau) is an interesting variation. b7 P2 changes the breathing but as usual leaves the other part of the correction—­ὥστ’ to ὥσθ’—to be understood. b8 The μὲν is omitted/deleted in Marc., then by Bekker; Susemihl restores it. b12 τέλος post ἕτερον suppl. Casaubon: we certainly cannot understand τέλος, but nor should we; the sense is ‘there is nothing else ­belonging to astronomy. . . ’. b19 The acute accent on ἤ in B suggests but does not quite make it certain (given B’s sometimes cavalier relation to accents) that the grave on τι is a later addition. b23 ἀνδεῖοι P1: the rho is supplied above by P2 with an insertion mark. b27 Spengel’s conjecture τούτων πάντα (with πάντα as masculine singular) starts from the order τούτων πάντων preferred, without justification, by e.g. Oxon., the Aldine, Bekker, and Rackham, and supposes/ explains χρώμενον in the line below; but Spengel himself remains un­decided between τούτων πάντα (χρώμενον) and τούτων πάντων (χρωμένους). b28 P2 writes ἴσως: χρωμένους in the margin. b35 γνωριμώτατα ends in B in what is apparently a version of the shorthand used for τατα in MSS like P and C; there is a mark below the line of a sort apparently used elsewhere (e.g. at 1217a36) to indicate ­separation between words, which perhaps suggests that one reader might have wanted to read the τατα as ταῦτα. —Richards’s ἀντὶ would be in keeping with Aristotle’s general usage, and I know of no parallels for μεταλαμβάνειν as it would be used here, with acc. and plain gen., of ­taking one thing in exchange for another; nevertheless to print the ἀντὶ would be to close the door on the possibility that the verb could have

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14  Eudemian Ethics I (1216b35) been used in such a way, when PBCL are unanimous in proposing that it can. b38 The genitive τῶν πολιτικῶν, pace Victorius (‘fort. τὸν πολιτικὸν’ in margin), looks sound enough, with τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν, and though we might have expected Aristotle to refer to the politician per se, there is no reason why he should not for once be referring to politicians in general. b40 For Fritzsche’s ϕιλοσόϕου, cf. 1217a1; and the difference between -ον and -ου, when they are written out, is minuscule. However the copyists of PCBL all evidently had ϕιλόσοϕον before them, and it looks vi­able enough. 1217a6 τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων B, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων PCL: translators (Solomon, Woods, Kenny, Inwood/Woolf), reading ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων, take the preceding ὧν (ὑϕ’ ὧν) as referring to ‘reasons’ given or ‘arguments’ made by the subject of the preceding ποιοῦσιν, i.e. the τινες of a1, but this is awkward, because it leaves us with ὑπό occurring twice, in the same sentence less than ten words apart, with the causation/agency assigned to two different things. The difference between them could perhaps be elided, since after all the arguments will belong to the τινες. But in my view it would be more natural to take ὧν itself to refer to the τινες (given that they are the subject of the main verb of the present sentence), in which case ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν κτλ would be epexegetic of ὑϕ’ ὧν; and then ὑπὸ τούτων appears out of place, insofar as Aristotle now introduces a further description of the people already being referred to in the clause (I note that none of the translators mentioned above appears to translate τούτων). Langerbeck recognizes the problems and recommends surgery, cutting out the whole of ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν . . . 7 ἢ πρακτικήν (perhaps as a gloss?). But the lack of ὑπὸ τούτων in B—­whether by chance or by judgement: presumably the copyist of B had the same text in front of him as those of PCL—­offers a more economical solution, namely to take τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων κτλ itself as straightforwardly in apposition to the relative ὧν; I surmise that the relatively unexpected, though perfectly regular nature of the construction led to the introduction of ὑπὸ τούτων as a false correlative of ὑϕ’ ὧν.—ἔχειν post μήτε suppl. Ross:

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Aristotelica  15 Dirlmeier is probably right to say that ἔχειν is to be (and can be) understood. It would certainly have been easier on the eye if Aristotle had written in the ἔχειν, but that is not always his way in EE, even in its more fluent parts. a12 πάντως Langerbeck: but πάντα, ‘in everything’, is surely better. a14 καὶ διότι is the pair of a11 διά τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως. This edition does without parenthesizing brackets, chiefly on the grounds that Aristotle’s parentheses tend to be part of the forward sweep of his argument: that is, rather than being hermetically sealed units, like their modern counterparts, they can include elements that are indispensable to the onward movement of the surrounding argument. That may not be quite the case here, and brackets would in this instance certainly make the text more immediately readable; thus Bekker, then Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay, all bracketing off a13–14 νῦν δ’ . . . τοῖς εἰρημένοις. But in following his train of thought Aristotle quite often writes unwieldy sentences, and if brackets make them more reader-­friendly, they often unhelpfully obscure the argument in the process; even here, a13–14 is actually of a piece with what precedes it. In extreme cases, where a parenthesis actually interrupts the syntax, I use dashes. a19 δὲ: καὶ L; δὲ καὶ Ald., and then also Walzer/Mingay, attributing it  to Walzer. The crucial question, introduced by L’s καὶ, is how far back the proemion is meant to stretch; I take it to be just to the beginning of the last paragraph, which looks to be a proemion par excellence, and so prefer PCB’s δὲ. Walzer/Mingay’s δὲ καὶ derives immediately from Susemihl’s ‘δὲ om. [Oxon. Marc.] // καὶ secl. Spengelius Susem.’ Bekker also had δὲ καὶ (‘δὲ om. [Marc.]’). But PCB all have just δὲ, and I see no compelling reason to combine this, as the expected connective (though connectives are not infrequently missing in EE), with L’s καὶ. a21 ἐπὶ τῷ σαϕῶς (B): i.e. ‘for the sake of clarity’ (see LSJ s.v. ἐπί Β.ΙΙΙ.2), picking up on the σαϕῶς of 1216b34, with εὑρεῖν not part of a  noun clause (i.e. τῷ σαϕῶς εὑρεῖν) but rather a straightforward infinitive after ζητοῦντες; το (PCL) for τω and vice versa is a standard error.

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16  Eudemian Ethics I 1217a34–5 οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: I understand ‘so not participating in the relevant goods either (i.e. those involving movement, as πρακτὰ ἀγαθά do)’—another example of the often elliptical style of EE. a38 What B writes here is apparently πράξεως; it is hard, at any rate, to see what else it could be (at first sight it seems to end -κης, but the accent is against it, appearing as it does over what ought to be a preceding alpha). The mess may reflect the copyist’s own uncertainty about what was in his source. b5 Bessarion evidently saw there was something wrong with τῷ αἴτιῳ, but changed the wrong word. —The same correction he then makes of ἀγαθοῦ to ἀγαθοῖς is also later made by Victorius (with a ‘γρ.’). b10 ἐκείνης: the ἐκείνοις in B is corrected with an eta above the οι. b21 ἰδέας: editors adopt Marc.’s ἰδέαν (also proposed by Victorius, with a ‘γρ.’), not knowing of B’s ἰδέας—­which Bessarion also reads, it seems independently, in Par. 2042. b22 B has a wavy line under the ουο of ὁτουοῦν, perhaps signalling (wrongly) a need for correction; cf. L at b27. b27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν: the evidence overall suggests that ω, the common source of PCBL, lacked the definite article before ἀγαθόν; P inserts it, while B adds a τὸ in a different place, creating a new and different, and wrong, sense. Cf. 1218a14–15 πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει κοινόν, another exactly parallel case where we might have expected the article; perhaps also 1218a21, 38 (L has a wavy line under the omega and omicron of τωόντι, evidently indicating the need for correction; cf. B at b22). b29 πρός τι for πότε in Marc., as reported by Walzer/Mingay (I have not checked), would presumably be attraction to the following πρὸς (τούτοις).

b33 〈τὸ〉 διδασκόμενον is preferred by editors, but the omission of the second article under these conditions is common in EE. (Walzer/ Mingay attributes the article to Rav., while Susemihl, saying that P and Pal. 165 omit it, implies that C, Marc., and Oxon. also have it. C does not; Marc., copying from Rav., presumably does have it, and it would not be particularly striking, or interesting, if Oxon. supplied it independently.)

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Aristotelica  17 b34 παρὰ: B here, unusually, mimics the shorthand for παρά found in MSS like P and C, which the L copyist presumably misread in ω. 1218a2 Bessarion’s πρῶτον for πρότερον is perhaps just an error of transcription (but cf. Spengel at 1217b13); he goes on to write προτέρου for πρῶτου in the next line, as does Spengel, independently, and πρῶτον for πρότερον in a8, all of which plays havoc with the argument (this is a rare lapse on his part). Spengel himself then writes πρότερον for πρῶτον in a5 and a6; it is not clear whether his version does any better than Bessarion’s. a8 Barnes calls Rassow’s conjecture of ἔτι for the MSS’ εἰ ‘palmary’, but (a) the ἢ both provides the required connective and suitably introduces a new (step in the) argument: ‘or else τὸ κοινὸν turns out to be the ἰδέα’, i.e. in all cases, whereas we have just been considering the cases ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον; (b) ἤ and εἰ are not infrequently confused, because the ligature for εἰ in these MSS is close in shape to ἤ, while being clearly distinguishable from ἔτι, which is always written out in full. The latter is not a decisive consideration on its own, but provides support for (a), if (a) holds. a14 Susemihl, and then Walzer/Mingay, accept Rassow’s supplement (τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι· οὐδὲ) between οὐδὲ and δὴ, but such a conclusion is surely obvious enough not to need stating (and in any case one would have expected οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . rather than οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ . . .). Woods, in his commentary ad loc., thinks even more is missed out, sketching what he thinks needs to be added to make a decent argument. But I propose that a satisfactory sense can be made of what the MSS give us. Just as we can easily supply the conclusion that the good is not made more of a good by being ἀΐδιον, so we can supply ‘and if the [form of] the good is more of a good’ to complete what follows: ‘and so (ὥστε), sc. if the ἰδέα is more of a good, then neither (οὐδὲ) is τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸ τῇ ἰδέᾳ (the hypothesis we were working with: a8–9 ἢ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν, κτλ [hence οὐδὲ δὴ]), because it—­a15 κοινόν = τὸ κοινόν, subject­—­belongs to every good [sc. which the form will not if it is somehow more of a good than other goods]’. This is standard Eudemian ellipse. —ταὐτὸ: C alone has the crasis mark.

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18  Eudemian Ethics I 1218a15 ‘γρ. ἢ ὡς’, then (a17) ‘γρ. ἀνομολογουμένων’, Victorius. a23 τάξις καὶ ἠρεμία: or should we read τάξεις καὶ ἠρεμίαι, rather than accepting B’s τάξις—­which appears in Rav., Matr. 4627, and Ambr., all independently, it seems, of B—­in the same phrase? After all, we have just had τάξεις . . . καὶ ἀριθμοί (a19), as part of the same dialectical argument. On the other hand, the plural there could be the cause of the ­plural τάξεις here in PCL. —P2’s ἀριθμοί, in the margin, prefaced with ἴσως, continues the process, substituting for ἠρεμία because of the ­plural τάξεις, and in imitation of a19. a27 γρ: τοῦτο P2 in margin. Τhe γρ is followed by something superscript; probably αι, as Harlifinger says, so γρ[άϕετ]αι, but possibly (see on a38 below) -ον, so γρ[απτέ]ον. a29 ἀλόγοις L: an easy error, perhaps, after the ending -εν. (It is perhaps worth recording that P, for instance, has two separate ligatures/marks for -ως, one of which lends itself easily to being confused with that for -ου; both appear, I notice, in this stretch in P, apparently with no rule as to when or why one might be preferred over the other.) a36–7 Cook Wilson actually proposed to bracket a37–8 ἔτι οὐ πρακτόν as well, but that seems a step too far; it is ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον, ἢ γὰρ . . . ἢ πάσαις ὁμοίως that is suspect, for the following reasons. Aristotle is summing up (ἔχει ἀπορίας τοιαύτας, κτλ). Now ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον . . . either (a) refers back, or (b) refers to some other work. If (a), then he has no need for τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον; the point in question has been made (at considerable length, if only implicitly) in 1217b24–1218a1, and the ones mentioned in the last sentence were already similarly ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένα—­why, then, describe this point thus and not the others? So—­if it is a backward reference—­τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον must have been written by someone else. If (b), i.e. if the reference is supposed to be to some other work, its form is too vague for Aristotle to think it could be useful to a reader, or perhaps even to himself (we should not, I  think, rule out the possibility that he could indulge on occasion in notes to himself ); indeed, it would not even be useful to the glossator. I conclude that the sentence in question refers back to the discussion we

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Aristotelica  19 have just had, and that it was written by someone other than Aristotle; it was a glossator’s amplification of Aristotle’s own summing up, and got itself incorporated into it in the process of transmission. a38 αὐτοαγαθόν B2: there is what looks like a circumflex over the final letter of αὐτὸ and the gap between it and ἀγαθόν, probably intended to indicate that the two words should rather be one. Aristotle presumably cannot be saying that τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν is not itself good, and while αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν could possibly be Eudemian Greek for αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν (P2, regularizing, writes in the margin γρ[απτέ]α: οὔτε αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ or ἔστι: the α, or what looks like α, is superscript: Harlfinger reads γρ[άϕετ]αι), it seems reasonable, in the absence of the definite article from all of PCBL before corrections, to accept the gift from B2, αὐτοαγαθόν being an Aristotelian formation (Met. 998a28). (We might have wished for a def­in­ite article with αὐτοαγαθόν itself, but so too we might have wished for one in 1217b27.) The crasis mark on P2’s τἀγαθόν appears to be written twice, probably as a result of his moving it so that it is more clearly over the first alpha: either that, or P2 intends τ’ ἀγαθόν, which seems unlikely, although oddly Walzer/Mingay prints it in the text. 1218b2 ὑπάρξη CBL: the final character in B is actually somewhat ambiguous; it is probably an eta, but is nonetheless close in some respects to the ligature for ει—­thus illustrating the ease with which the mistake, eta for ει, can be made. b5 πρακτὸν2 in B is split πρα-κτὸν between two lines, and there is what looks like a hyphen before the second part. b6 τοῦτο Laur. 81,42 (and Spengel): but see e.g. 1219a24. b8 L puts a heavy stop after ϕανερὸν (accenting -ὸν), seemingly taking it  as marking the end of the previous sentence, which suggests how a connective could have fallen out (and οὖν [Brandis] would perhaps be the most at risk after -ὸν). Connectives are sometimes absent in EE, but probably not here, where Aristotle is announcing the conclusion of a major set of arguments. b15 τοιαῦτ’/τοιαῦτα is quite defensible, if we take Aristotle to be saying ‘by their being things of such a sort’, i.e. each such as to be something, in

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20  Eudemian Ethics I (1218b15) its own way, κύριον πασῶν, sc. ἐπιστήμων. L’s τοιαύτας looks like a ditto­graphy after ἄλλας, which Bekker then makes into proper Greek. b18 τἄλλα CB1L: B2 adds what looks like a second crasis mark but which is probably a signal to split up τἄλλα into τὰ ἄλλα. b19 τοῦ P1CBL, τὸ1 P2: there are clear signs of an erasure after the τὸ in P; the likelihood is that there was originally a τοῦ, as in CBL, mimicking the following οὗ. —τοῦ P1CBL, τὸ2 P2: here the correction in P is achieved by crude overwriting. b21 Woods adopts Ross’s καίτοι, translating ‘but an efficient cause of health’s existence, not of its being good’, but (a) this would perhaps be an unusual way to use καίτοι; (b) ‘not of . . .’ suggests καὶ οὐ rather than ἀλλ’ οὐ, and (c) τόδε, picking up αἴτιον, as it does, is both a more economical solution for the impossible τότε and makes perfect sense. b28 [μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν]: Aristotle might have c­ hosen to finish a book with the same words he would use to start the next one (minus the connective, which of course won’t fit here), as a way of ­marking the continuity between Book I and Book II, but it seems more likely that someone else did it. (P has the title of the following book, ‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων – – – – β´ ’ starting a line and λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν, officially the last two words of Book I, ending the same line, an arrangement that perhaps suggests the same idea, i.e. that the repetition is there simply to link the two books.) Susemihl’s proposal to bracket either the whole of the last sentence of Book I or the first sentence of Book II is probably excessive, although it must be said that even without μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν, the end of Book I as the MSS preserve it, with its threefold ἄριστον, is distinctly problematical (‘turbata quaedam in his verbis esse monet Bu[ssemaker]’, Susemihl). Allan’s supplement of καὶ after ποσαχῶς gives the sentence a better structure, but it is not clear that Book II actually does examine ‘in how many ways τὸ ὡς τέλος ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν πρακτῶν is also τὸ ἄριστον πάντων’—if that is what Allan intends. Not dissimilar problems arise with the last full sentence of EE VIII/V: there in EE VIII/V I emend, and it may be that surgery is needed here too, but it is hard to see exactly where to begin the cutting. (I might start with the definite

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Aristotelica  21 article before the second ἄριστον, and perhaps the one before the first; but this would be no more than tinkering.) —Against Dirlmeier’s πῶς for ποσαχῶς in b26 there is the previous use of ποσαχῶς at 1217b1, where he mistakenly translates λέγεται ποσαχῶς as ‘wie viele Bedeutungen das Wort hat’, when the reference is plainly to three different views (‘Meinungen’) people take, and/or might take, of τὸ ἄριστον (hence Kenny’s more neutral ‘in how many senses the expression is used’ [Oxford World’s Classics]); in the present context too, in the first few lines of Book II, Aristotle will reintroduce the main three main views on the nature of εὐδαιμονία (ϕρόνησις . . . καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονή, ὧν ἢ ἔνια ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν: Ι.1, 1218b34–6), between which he will choose. So ποσαχῶς fits; πῶς will fit too, but not so obviously better as to justify the emendation.

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Eudemian Ethics II 1218b30 In B, the ordinal number of the book, β-ον, is curiously filled out as βιβλίον, presumably by a later hand, since the superscript -ον is still in place. b31 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα: PCBL all have ταῦτα (i.e. without elision) here as well as in b27, which this line echoes; editors from Bekker onwards print μετὰ ταῦτα there, but μετὰ . . . ταῦτ’ here.

b32 〈ἐν〉 ψυχῇ: P2 writes πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ in the margin, perhaps merely picking out something memorable in the text, but surely indicating that he felt the need for an ἐν. In any case, since ἐκτὸς is presumably said with reference to the soul (with no mention of body, ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ will have to include bodily ones), and relevant goods that are not ἐκτὸς τῆς ψυχῆς will be in it, ‘in the soul’ must be meant, and that cannot be expressed by a plain dative. Bessarion writes ἐν ψυχῇ in Par. 2042. b38 The colon (or perhaps a comma, as in Rackham) after ὑποκείσθω is implicitly introduced by translators (Woods, Kenny, Inwood/Woolf), and looks necessary. 1219a16 ὑγεία B: perhaps part of the ligature for ει has accidentally coincided with the iota, but this mistake has occurred in B before. —ὑγίασις/ὑγίανσις: the latter is what P presumably had before it was ‘corrected’ (by erasure of the nu and extension of the alpha) to ὑγίασις. a20 Neither ταὐτὸ nor αὐτὸ is needed; the sense clearly is ‘the ἔργον of the thing [is] also [the ἔργον] of the ἀρετὴ [of the thing]’. a25 τοῦ: I retain the MSS’ τοῦ—­as referring to ζῆν—­because (a) it is quite possible Greek: cf. e.g. 1218b6–7 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ (τοῦτο Spengel) ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, and Plato, Symposium 173a, 211a; and (b) because, if Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.003.0002

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Aristotelica  23 it is possible, it is lectio difficilior, or at least less expected. Woods objects that with the reading τοῦ (or τούτου) ‘Aristotle will be saying that the ἔργον of soul is to produce life, and the ἔργον of living is, in its turn, an employment and waking state. What seems to be needed is some ­pre-­ miss applying the doctrine that, in the case of some things, their ἔργον is their χρῆσις itself, and not something over and above it.’ Why is ‘the ἔργον of living is . . . an employment and waking state’ not such a premiss? a26 ἡσυχεία P2: an original iota is overwritten with ει. a27 καὶ2 is inserted above the line in P, probably by the original hand. a31–2 ταῦτα δὲ ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι scripsi. Susemihl prints ** αὐτὴ, κτλ (where the αὐτὴ comes from Bekker, who apparently got it from Marc., or possibly Oxon.), which is presumably an invitation to adopt his own conjecture, 〈τὰ ἐν〉 αὐτῇ: he quite often employs lacunas in this way, in order to avoid committing himself and the reader to a particular conjecture. Walzer/Mingay then behaves even more conservatively than Susemihl, throwing in the towel and printing †αὕτη† δὲ ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια. Bekker presumably understood ‘and it / εὐδαιμονία itself [is . . .]’; and what it would be being said to be can be inferred, at any rate, from the ὑποκείμενα mentioned in 1219a30, the specific reference being perhaps to 1218b32–7. But this is not quite satisfactory; we would rather expect something picking up the preceding τὰ δὲ τέλη, κτλ, as with either of Spengel’s proposals or with Susemihl’s (Mingay’s ἀρετὴ is ingenious, but fails to carry conviction). But the singular ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια then looks intolerable. I propose, and print, ταῦτα (Spengel) δὲ ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι (Ross): after ταῦτα had been corrupted to αὕτη (why, in these MSS, is a question that often cannot be answered), the change from plural to singular would be ­natural enough. a35 ἔσται scripsi: εἶναι PCBL; ἀνάγκη post εἶναι suppl. P2, writing ἴσως: ἀνάγκη, in the margin, with insertion marks, in order to explain εἶναι (the beginning of the entry in the Walzer/Mingay apparatus for a33, ‘ἀνάγκη τῆς ἀρετῆς mg. P2, addito ἴσως’, is wrong: ‘εἶναι ἀνάγκη P2, addito ἴσως’ would be right, except that only ἀνάγκη is in the margin, with an insertion mark there and a matching one after εἶναι

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24  Eudemian Ethics ii (1219a35) in the text). Bonitz’s, Fritzsche’s, and Ross’s proposals similarly aim to explain the infinitive. Aristotle is here reaching an interim conclusion, either that ‘the activity of the virtue of the soul’ (Woods, Kenny; similarly Inwood/Woolf) is best, or that the activity of virtue is the best thing of (?) the soul (with Ross’s ἐνέργειαν 〈τὸ〉). The latter interpretation does not strictly require Ross’s extra definite articles (τὴν, τὸ), and indeed their main function is probably to impose his interpretation on the text; but it is surely unattractive in any case, not least given the work that has to be done to accommodate it. If we settle, then, on the other interpretation, the immediate question is how to explain the infinitive εἶναι with which the sentence ends in the MSS. Retaining the infinitive requires at least two emendations, i.e. Bonitz’s ἐνέργειαν for ἐνέργεια ἡ (which might possibly be intended by P2 as a consequence of his supplement of ἀνάγκη), and either Fritzsche’s supplement of δεῖ or P2’s of ἀνάγκη; the only alternative is to suppose, with Inwood/Woolf, that the accusative and infinitive is governed by δῆλον back in a29, and against this is not only the distance of that δῆλον but the fact that δῆλον is typ­ ic­al­ly followed by a ὄτι-clause rather than an accusative and infinitive. (The distance problem would be mitigated if we were to bracket a30–2 ἦν μὲν γὰρ . . . ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι, on the grounds that it not only breaks up the flow of the sentence, but also perhaps is dispensable—­after all, it spells out what we know already. But so does what follows a30–2 [i.e. this is not intrusive material, as at 1220b10–12, 1225b3–6, or 1228a14: qqv.]; Aristotle is formally setting out the argument leading to a big conclusion, and a30–2 includes parts of that argument.) If, on the other hand, we retain the MSS’ nominative, ἐνέργεια, with ἡ, of which L’s ἢ is surely a corruption, the only change required is from εἶναι to ἔσται, and the Greek will be on any account rather easier to construe. While I cannot explain how the corruption of ἔσται to εἶναι could have occurred, or provide any precise parallels, it is, plainly, much easier to defend ἐνέργεια ἡ than it is to defend εἶναι. That is not to say that Bonitz, and P2, may not have been right (if the latter really did intend ἐνέργειαν for ἐνέργεια ἡ), and after all, as noted before, Aristotle in EE is not obviously much concerned with making things easy for the reader. But in such cases the more economical solution must, I think, be held to trump the less; we do not need to make Eudemian style spikier than it

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Aristotelica  25 already is, any more than we need to make it less spiky. (An alternative would be to obelize εἶναι, with ἔσται as a conjecture in the apparatus; but that then entails keeping ἐνέργεια ἡ, which would more or less compel the reader to accept ἔσται in any case, and would amount to using the obelus in the way Susemihl uses the lacuna: see previous note. The only real alternative to emending εἶναι is to obelize the whole of ἐνέργεια ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι, and that seems like overkill if the only obvious problem is with εἶναι.) a40 κατὰ ἀρετὴν BL, κατ’ ἀρετὴν PC: the reading in BL is preferred according to the rule I have adopted, that if the arguments for each of two readings are equally balanced, the one that figures in both recensiones is to be adopted. 1219b12 ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν: τίς in P is inserted above the line by a later hand. b16 τοῦ post ἔπαινος suppl. Bonitz: this supplement would be necessary in most other texts, and every second time I return to this passage I find the omission of the definite article disturbing. That means, however, that I also find no conclusive case for inserting it, in the notoriously laconic EE (note the following τέλους without article, though that is much less surprising). Cf. Fritzsche’s description of b5 μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι as ‘mutilata’, which is surely a reaction to its brevity; his proposals for rewriting (reported by Susemihl) miss the point. b18 Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 186 in defence of the δέ (secl. Langerbeck) deals with only half of the issue, i.e. the placing of the δέ after the participle; the other half is the question why we should need δέ as well as καὶ. The answer is that καὶ is ‘also’; its position, at the ­beginning of the sentence, perhaps itself causes the displacement of the δέ. —ποθὲν οὐθὲν CB: an easy dittography; hardly a significant shared error. (Pace Walzer/Mingay, P has ποτ’, like L.) b20 καθεύδονται BLC2: the ending in both P and C appears above the οντ; in P it is an unambiguous (shorthand) -ες, while in C there is a mess that is legible as -αι: this I take to be a ‘correction’ against another manuscript of an original -ες as in P. By contrast with the last, this is an

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26  Eudemian Ethics ii (1219b20) interesting shared error. Both B and L are interpreting hands, like that in PC, that use shorthand, and the shorthand for -ες is nothing like αι; in add­ition to which, is the middle of καθεύδειν attested anywhere? Either the B and L copyists just happened to make the same strange error, or καθεύδονται was in ω, the common source of PCBL, and PC καθεύδοντες is a correction, perhaps made in α. (Or, if -αι in C is after all original, then καθεύδονται was in α too, and Nikolaos is making the correction in P but not in C.) b22 τῆς ψυχῆς P1: P2 marks τῆς for deletion by surrounding it with four dots. b25 Rackham’s supplement of the definite article before ὀρεκτικὸν would be right, e.g. for NE; for EE it is unnecessary (albeit the αἰσθητικὸν and the ὀρεκτικὸν are different things). b30 εἶναι post ψυχῆς suppl. Russell: another example of unnecessary regularizing or filling out of Aristotle’s Greek. b35 καὶ secl. Ross: Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 319, for this καὶ, is helpful; ‘it has different δυνάμεις all the same, (and) actually τὰς εἰρημένας’. b36 καμπύλῳ: P2 writes στρεβλῷ above καμπύλῳ; perhaps a gloss rather than an emendation? B has what is by now clearly to be taken as a separation mark (B2, presumably) below the line between καμπύλῳ and  the following τὸ, B being particularly inclined to run words together. b37–8 ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς: ‘but [it is white] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς’ works well enough for us not to need Richards’s ἀλλ’ ἢ (but see 1221a23, which if we followed Spengel would be another case of the corruption of ἀλλ’ ἢ to ἀλλά). —οὐκουσία vel οὐκουσιᾳ P (iota subscript [never adscript] generally being omitted in these MSS): the way in which P preserves the necessary οὐκ suggests how it might have fallen out of the others, i.e. by haplography; in C the process may have been helped by the fact that the preceding καὶ is the last word in the line (so, was οὐκ at least in α; even in α´ and ω too?). —τοῦ for τῇ

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Aristotelica  27 before αὑτοῦ is a standard error. Bonitz’s οὐσίᾳ τὀ αὐτό is a possibility, but leaves the MSS’ genitive unexplained and gives a less good sense: ‘the straight is not white but [only] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, and [it is] not the same thing [as it is] οὐσίᾳ’? —ἀϕῃρήσθω Fritzsche: but it is a fact that the μέρος ἀϕῄρηται (b32–3). b39 Victorius’ conjecture (very necessary correction) is once again preceded by γρ. b40 Susemihl’s γὰρ for δὲ, adopted by Walzer/Mingay, comes from the late Latin translation (‘In.’), and is unnecessary; Ross’s supplementary negative, also adopted by Walzer/Mingay, completely ruins the sense (see Donini’s note ad loc.). b41 καὶ αὐξητικοῦ Bonitz, καὶ ὀρεκτικοῦ PCBL: the question is whether an appearance of τὸ ὀρεκτικόν here can be squared with Aristotelian doctrine as both (a) usually understood and (b) reflected in the EE itself. If the answer is no, as I think (Aristotle’s very next sentence surely proves it), then unless we bracket the words, as Susemihl hesitantly suggests, we have little option but to accept Bonitz’s emendation. These copyists, and evidently their predecessors, do make mistakes for no presently observable reason, and this is surely one such case. —εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος: i.e. ‘if [a human being is being considered] as a human being’. The reader is here being asked to supply quite a lot, but not, I think, impossibly much. Dodds’s supplement of ἀνθρώπου would make life easier, and ἀνθρώπου could well have dropped out before the following ἄνθρωπος, but εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος as it stands seems to me viable (Eudemian) Greek. Deleting εἰ, with Ross, is another option, but how then did the εἰ get in? Perhaps by reduplication (η and ει are sometimes confused), but then the story is already too complicated if the transmitted text works. I note that whatever text we adopt, the sense has to be the same, and that is itself reason enough for changing as little as pos­sible. (Walzer/Mingay claims that C has ᾗ, PL ᾖ, Susemihl that P has ᾖ—­Susemihl then proceeding to attribute ᾗ to Bonitz; in fact C and L both have ᾗ, of course without the iota subscript, as does B, and there is less doubt about the breathing in P than about the eta itself, which is a bit of a mess. The problems may start with Bekker, who reads ᾖ without comment.)

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28  Eudemian Ethics ii 1220a1 ἐκεῖναι CB: it is difficult to be quite certain about what B offers; probably ἐκ- rather than ἐν-, but the case shows how easily they are confused. —Walzer/Mingay reports that Ross thought καὶ πρᾶξιν corrupt, and Allan’s ὄρεξιν for πρᾶξιν is more than a little tempting: after all, πρᾶξις is not exactly an ingredient in the mix (whatever mix it is) in the same way as λογισμός, and palaeographically speaking the distance between πρᾶξις and ὄρεξις is not great. On the other hand, reading ὄρεξιν here would render the conclusion in a2–3, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ’ ἔχειν τὰ μέρη, somewhat lame, and it is certainly true that πρᾶξις constitutes the general context within which the relevance or otherwise of the various parts of the soul is being judged. 1220a15 ἀνῆκται/ἀνῆκον: for ἀνήκω, cf. NE VIII.1, 1155b10; it may also be read at IX.6, 1167b4. a18 Richards’s τὸ καὶ is perhaps right, but the MSS’ reading is perfectly defensible. a19–20 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ὑγίειαν: if we conclude that the clause is in­toler­able without a verb, then prima facie Dirlmeier’s 〈ἔχοιμεν〉 might be the favourite, because it picks up a17 ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι πάντες; but ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 〈ἔχοιμεν〉 καὶ ὑγίειαν ὅτι would only work if we accepted Dirlmeier’s bizarre claim ‘dass ἔχειν = εἰδἐναι ist’. (Besides, we have just had ἔχειν in a quite different sense.) I propose we should understand, but not print, ζητοῦντες ἔχοιμεν, i.e. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ὑγίειαν [ζητοῦντες ἔχοιμεν] ὅτι, κτλ. (To deploy the obelus, with Walzer/Mingay, or with Allan suppose a lacuna, which probably comes to the same thing, is to suggest a locus desperatus; that it surely is not.) a28 πὼς/πῶς: this is actually a distinction without a difference, given that some modern editors, e.g. Bywater in NE, prefer to write πῶς instead of πώς in such cases. (Walzer/Mingay curiously leaves out the accent altogether; so too in a33.) a33 καὶ2 deest in BL: and also in PC, except that what follows, 34–5 πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ’ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται (not καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα . . . ϕθείρεται, as reported by Walzer/Mingay), occurs twice in both, linked with a καί. Thus the necessary καὶ before the πρὸς in 34 does appear the second time round. How this bizarre state of affairs came

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Aristotelica  29 about is a mystery; it originated, presumably, in α, the source MS for P and C, since Nikolaos would surely not have created an identical mess for himself on both occasions. There is a gap in P, between the first αὐτῆς and the first ὑϕ’ ὧν, in which there are signs of deletion. a34 ταὐτὰ Bussemaker: but ταῦτα is a perfectly decent antecedent for the following relatives. a35 καὶ πρὸς ἃ Langerbeck: πως ἃ PC; καὶ ἃ B1; πρὸς ἃ L; πως καὶ ἃ B2; καὶ πρὸς ἃ 〈καὶ〉 Russell. B2—­or is it the original hand?—adds πως over line between the preceding ϕθείρεται and καὶ, and the necessary extra accent to ϕθείρεται. I refrain from treating the καὶ before πρὸς as a supplement because the spread of the MSS readings suggests that καὶ πρὸς ἃ, in whatever order, could well have been in their common source, ω; it is in any case clearly what is needed. a35–40 σημεῖον . . . δῆλον secl. Allan: a strange proposal, unless σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι is taken as ‘And there is a proof that . . .’, instead of ‘And there is proof [of what we have just said], namely. . .’. 1220b1 ὅτι secl. Russell (having bracketed the preceding ἐστὶ too): but the ὅτι is surely unproblematic, as Susemihl saw; pace Susemihl, so is the following τὸ [sc. ἐθιζόμενον] ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμϕύτου. On this last (and on other issues), see P. Ferreira, ‘EE 1220a39–b6’, Archai 20, May– Aug. 2017: 123–40. b3 τὸ ἐνεργητικόν: keeping the τὸ, I construe ‘that is how [we] already [get] the [whatever it may be that is] capable of acting [in accordance with the acquired ἦθος]’, which is a stretch but not, I think, too much of one for Aristotle’s Greek/the Greek of EE. Allan’s 〈αὐ〉τὸ is problematic to the extent that ‘it’ should have a clear reference, which (so far as I can see) it does not. b5 τοῦτο μὴ PCL, τοῦτον B: B2 inserts ὴ over the end of a flowery nu that already resembles a mu. b5–6 ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένου [δ’ ] ἀκολουθεῖν [τῷ λόγῳ] ποιότης scripsi: Fritzsche’s supplement of τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν after λόγον, enabling the retention of the following δέ (Bonitz’s vari­ ation on this, λογικοῦ μὲν οὐ for λόγον δυναμένου, is ingenious but

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30  Eudemian Ethics ii (1220b5–6) leaves κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν up in the air), makes this account of ἦθος mimic the description of the ethical ἀρεταί only a few lines before (1220a10–11) even more closely than the patently corrupted text in the MSS (ψυχῆς κατὰ/καὶ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον/ων δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης) already does. I speculate that the transmitted text has its origin in a gloss referring back to those lines, a process that Fritzsche’s supplement would in effect complete. The proposed reading strips back the account of ἦθος to the bare essentials, as well as avoiding the anyway odd repetition of λόγος and the partial reduplication involved in κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον . . . ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. (The Aldine, incidentally, omits τῷ λόγῳ; Victorius restores it in the margin, at the same time as correcting the Aldine’s δυνάμει to δυναμένου.) We end up, on this reading, with just ‘a ποιότης of [that part of] soul that is capable of following according to reason’ (for ἀκολουθεῖν used without a following dative and with a prepositional phrase, see 1233b33–4); except for his retention of τῷ λόγῳ this is also Dirlmeier’s solution. The shorthand δυναμένου (sc. μέρους) might look unlikely on its own, but is well prepared for by a9–11, of which the present passage (I propose) is a summary. (Perhaps a truly conservative editor might declare the ­passage a locus desperatus. But stripping away a redundant δέ to restore sense, and a hardly less redundant τῷ λόγῳ, belongs to a different order of intervention from Fritzsche’s/Bonitz’s remedies by speculative supplement.) —δυναμένη, in the margin of P, marked as a replacement for δυναμένου, is well worth considering. (There is also a mark beneath the δ’, in P, possibly indicating deletion; nor would it be unusual for a ­corrector to make a partial correction and leave the rest to be understood. But can a ποιότης have capacities?) Ross’s own δυναμένης is probably a bridge too far, just after a separate part of the soul has been identified as capable of following reason, i.e. in 1220a8–11. Finally: B too makes a mess of it, but it is perhaps worth noticing that he puts in a mark resembling a Greek colon after ψυχῆς, which seems to indicate that he tried to make sense of his καὶ by taking ψυχῆς with (what on his reading is) the immediately preceding ἦθος. b7 Spengel’s ποιότης τὰ for ποί’ ἄττα is perhaps neat, but unnecessary. (Editors write ποῖ ’ ἄττα, like B, but ποί’ ἄττα, i.e. ποιὰ ἄττα, is surely

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Aristotelica  31 the right accentuation: see Plato, Republic 438b1, etc.) The sense is ‘what it is in the soul that makes our character traits to be of a particular kind’ (Kenny, in the Oxford World’s Classics translation); another example of Eudemian brevity. 1220b10–12 μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων secl. Barnes (CR 42.1 [1992]: 29). A plainly intrusive sentence; either an editorial note (as Barnes suggests), or a marginal gloss. For the phrasing cf. 1221b34–5 τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις. b11 ἀπηλαγμένοις P1: P2 adds a second lambda over the first. b13 ἐπι το πολὺ –––– L: there is no accent on either of the first two words (if the second is meant to be separated from the third: το ends the line). A slightly uneven line under the tau apparently indicates the need for correction; there then follows a gap, half filled by an extended line itself about four characters long. b15 ποιός τις as against ποιότης PCBL: ποιός τις is preferable here to ποιότης insofar as it helps explain the following ἀλλὰ πάσχει, called by Rackham ‘pravum glossema’. I construe ‘[a person] is not of a certain sort κατὰ ταῦτα but [merely] πάσχει’. The της and the τις in (ποιό)της and (ποιός) τις are distinguished in the context of an MS like P and C, and probably also in the MSS that the copyists of B and L had before them, only by the presence or absence of a pair of dots (indicating an iota) above a sigma over the tau, the space between ποιός and τις often being hardly greater than that between ποιό and της (as in P here); and that ποιότης and ποιός τις can actually be confused is shown by the fact that BL have the first and PC the second at the end of this very sentence—­either BL get it the wrong way round there, or PC do. We do not have ποιότης twice in all four MSS, nor do I think we want it twice; and where we need ποιός τις is here before ἀλλὰ πάσχει and not where PC have it, at the end of the sentence. b16 τὰς secl. Susemihl: the term being explained might normally come without the definite article, but since Aristotle has just said τὰς

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32  Eudemian Ethics ii (1220b16) δυνάμεις, λέγω . . . τὰς δυνάμεις looks unobjectionable (a copyist might once have mistakenly repeated the article, but we shall never know). b16–17 Ross’s emendation seems to me to miss the point: κατὰ τὰ πάθη goes first with λέγονται, and only then with οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες. b25 The elongation of the alpha in ὁποιᾳοῦν in P suggests the origin of the stray nu in B’s ὁποιανοῦν. b26 It is tempting to interpret B’s καὶ ἀν as καὶ αὖ, but it is more likely to be a careless repetition of καὶ ἀν(επιστημονικῇ) in the line before. b34 B’s ἄττα is split after the alpha between two lines; B2 mistakenly adds an extra tau at the end of the line. 1220b38–1221a12: for the bracketing of the third item in each group, see on 1221a12. 1221a9 κακ ρία B1, καρτερία B2: the copyist of B seems to have written κακ, followed by a gap, then ρία; then someone else wrote τε over the gap and a rho before that, the rho ending up more over the alpha than the second kappa. a12 The arrangement of the foregoing list in columns is down to editors (in the MSS, the gap between one trio and the next is the same as that between the items in each trio), but the reference to a ὑπογραϕή is enough to justify it. —Christof Rapp proposed, in discussion (in Athens, in 2017), to follow Spengel and bracket the last trio on the basis that it is too intellectual, and is in danger of duplicating the earlier trio κέρδος ζημία δίκαιον, but the list is probably already problematic enough to make it unsafe to start ridding ourselves of particular items or groups of items. The biggest problem is that Aristotle will immediately say ‘all [these πάθη and suchlike, τὰ . . . πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . πάντα] λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν, which is plainly untrue of the third member of each group. If we were to put every third member in square brackets, as somebody’s, probably not Aristotle’s, spelling out of the μεσότης to which each successive pair relates, then that might remove the first of Rapp’s problems and mitigate the second: this is Allan’s suggestion, in his review of Dirlmeier, Gnomon 38 (1966),

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Aristotelica  33 at 148 (‘I think there would be a strong temptation for a shallow systematizer to interpolate the list of virtues, having failed to observe that this would be premature, and that the passage is of a different kind from the comprehensive sketch in E.N. 2, 7’). Allan may well be right; at any rate, given what (according to our MSS) Aristotle says in a13–14, an editor who prints a13–14 as transmitted, i.e. with that πάντα, surely cannot avoid following Allan’s lead. (At any rate δίκαιον in a4 is surely a mistake by someone: δίκαιον may be by far the commonest term for justice in EE, but it does not refer to the inner state of a person, rather to the state of affairs between persons.) Can we really leave him saying, for ex­ample, that πανουργία, εὐήθεια, and ϕρόνησις are related to each other in terms of excess and defect? The idea of the middle or mean will not be (re-)introduced until later, as Allan notes (‘. . . this would be premature’). Round brackets might be of marginal help, insofar as it would allow for the possibility that it was Aristotle himself who indicated the μεσότης to which each successive pair relates, but I have forsworn round brackets in general; and if it was Aristotle, he would not have used them either. a13 Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 473 (‘[ο]ὖν emphasising a prospective μέν’), in response to Ross’s supplement of οὖν, is puzzling; Ross is surely only proposing to supply a connective. But connectives in EE do quite frequently go missing. —τὰ τοιαῦτα: Walzer/Mingay follows Bekker and Susemihl in omitting the τὰ despite having access to the full range of MSS: only P of the primary MSS leaves it out, so it will pre­sum­ably have been in ω. Given that the items that have just been listed might appear (mostly?), at least prima facie, not to be πάθη in the sense defined just before, at 1220b12–14, the τὰ could be important, insofar as it might allow the subject of the sentence to range wider than πάθη, were that to be desirable. In any case there are no obvious grounds for suppressing the article. (Further on πάθη here: one of the most striking points thrown up in a virtual workshop on EE III held in July 2021—­ based in Dublin, with Giulio di Basilio and Margaret Hampson as organizers—­was that the descriptions of the ἀρεταί in EE III tend to focus rather more on πάθη of the agent, what he/she πάσχει, than on his/her actions. Is this perhaps another special feature of EE that marks

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34  Eudemian Ethics ii (1221a13) it off from NE, and might it go some way towards explaining πάθη here in 1221a13?) a18 ὃ B1: B2 strikes through the accent. a19 δὲ καὶ: B2 inserts καὶ above the line. —ὁ del. Bekker: this proposal of Bekker’s surely represents the beginnings of a solution to the problems of the present sentence, if we take it that ἐπιθυμητικὸς describes someone ruled by his or her ἐπιθυμίαι, and that this is to be taken as suggesting someone (καὶ in 20 epexegetic?) who takes all possible op­por­tun­ities for ὑπερβολή—­thus making him/her like the coward (ὁμοίως); but this then seems to make 19 καὶ2, and also (Jonathan Barnes suggests) ὁ1 in 20, redundant. I accordingly bracket both. Barnes’s own solution, the deletion of a19–20 καὶ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ, gives a neater outcome, but leaves the problem of explaining how these words got in, in the first place. (Victorius suggests [‘fort.’] bracketing the καὶ in 20 [that is, just καὶ, not καὶ ὁ, as Susemihl reports]; Dirlmeier prefers [ὁ] ἀκόλαστος καὶ [ὁ] ἐπιθυμητικὸς [καὶ] ὁ ὑπερβάλλων.) a23 πλεονεκτικός, split πλεονεκ-τικός in B between lines, has (what looks like) a hyphen both in the right-­hand margin after the first part and in the left-­hand margin before the second.

a23–4 ‘An Spengel’s ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉 ist nicht zu denken’, says Dirlmeier, with some justification (calling in aid Cook Wilson, ‘On the use of ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉 in Aristotle’, CQ 3 [1909], 121–4). The two other proposals are elegant enough but too elaborate; Dirlmeier’s gives us all we need, and his ex­plan­ation of how the corruption might have occurred is not wholly implausible. —There are two dots over what is probably a version of the shorthand sign for the second δὲ (ἀλαζὼν δὲ) in B. a25 κόραξ B1: the rho is overwritten with a lambda by B2 (or perhaps the original hand). a32 In the Teubner μὲν has dropped out either accidentally or because it is missing in Marc. (but Bekker has it). 1221b1 ἐπὶ secl. Spengel: this ἐπὶ perhaps originated by false analogy with the next one (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις).

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Aristotelica  35 b1–2 τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν: there is no compelling reason to adopt either of Spengel’s proposals for rewriting a perfectly comprehensible phrase. b7 B leaves a small gap after τὰς λογικάς, of three or four characters, perhaps marking the beginning of a new section. b13 Bekker leaves out ὁ before θυμώδης (with Ald.), and is followed by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay, Bekker and Susemihl noting that it is in Marc. and P, Walzer/Mingay that it is in C and L too (it is also in B)— Walzer/Mingay strangely citing the Aldine as authority for omitting it (the Aldine does omit it, but it omits a whole lot else that it should not); just as strangely, neither Susemihl nor Walzer/Mingay here follows their usual practice of printing in square brackets what they are leaving out from their primary MSS (Bekker generally does not use such brackets in the text; maybe the others were just following him on this occasion). But could Aristotle not be saying ‘A person is quick-­tempered by virtue of becoming angry too quickly, while the θυμώδης too is χαλεπός by doing it for too long . . .’? In III.3 χαλεπότης takes over as the opposite of πραότης, and covers all the varieties of anger treated here (see 1231b17–19). Admittedly we do immediately go back to the formulation ‘a person is . . .’ with 14 πικρὸς δὲ . . ., but this is not a sufficient reason for following Ald., Bekker, etc. and omitting the article. —τῷ] ὁ B1, τῳ B2, writing it above the ὁ, complete with iota subscript (worth mentioning, because such iotas tend to be omitted). b15 The text as it stands is surely intelligible without Susemihl’s lacuna after τῆς ὀργῆς: the type in question is marked out by the severity of the ‘punishment’ it metes out in its anger. b16 An accent in B over the second omicron of ὀψοϕάγοι—­itself added by a later hand?—is crossed out by another hand. b16–17 πρόσω ποτέρας P1CB: P2 corrects P1 by striking through the omega and inserting a ὁ before ποτέρας. b19 ἄν πως PCBL: Walzer/Mingay reports L as having ἄνπερ, but it actually has ἄν πως, though unusually—­in order to fit the word in at the end of the line and the page—­it uses the shorthand for ως (which is

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36  Eudemian Ethics ii (1221b19) followed by a mysterious oblique stroke, of a sort that in PC-­ like MSS marks an -ον: did some later reader think L was aiming at πότερον?). —τὸ for τῷ Richards, construing ‘if this [τὸ μᾶλλον πάσχειν] is taken as a question of manner (πῶς)’; I prefer Kenny’s ‘if how means ex­peri­en­cing to excess’ (Oxford World’s Classics). b21 οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ is marginally to be preferred because less expected, and also more emphatic? (For the record, Victorius seems to have ­preferred it.) b22 συνηλημμένον P1: what is apparently another hand overwrites eta with (the sign for) ει. b26 ἐπὶ secl. Eucken, ἔχει Ross: but ἐπὶ with accusative is not impos­ sible here: see LSJ s.v. ἐπί C.I.5. b29 διανοητικαί secl. Ross: perhaps a gloss, but the case is not proven. b39 πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ (PCB) must surely be wrong. In order to talk about soul in general, Aristotle needs only ψυχή, and does not need to specify that the subject is all soul; and—­assuming that ἡ ἡδονή at the end of the sentence is to go, as it must—­it cannot be soul that is πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ὑϕ’ οἵων κτλ. It seems reasonable, then, to focus on L’s πάσα γὰρ ψυχῆς, which plainly invites us to supply a subject to go with it (how else would the genitive arise?), and to suppose that PCB’s πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ was one reaction to the loss of the subject, L2’s (πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς) another, the introduction of ἡ ἡδονή a third. So πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆς 〈ἕξις〉 it is, ἕξις being the only candidate available (it could replace ἡ ἡδονή, as Bonitz suggests, if we adopted PCB’s πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ, but it cannot be said that the resulting sentence reads con­vin­cing­ly, and πᾶσα remains a problem). This is another instance where obeli might be employed (‘[s]i tratta di un passo probabilmente guasto e variamente corretto dagli editori’, Donini), but I think the case for the text printed is sufficiently strong to make this unnecessary. 1222a1 ἡ ἡδονή PCBL: ‘ ἡδονή is a fairly clear case of a word substituted for the right one (here ἕξις ) through anticipation of a

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Aristotelica  37 word just coming’, Richards. But ‘a word just coming’ can be ­anticipated for a particular reason, for example when, as here, the real subject—­w hich is indeed ἕξις —­h as dropped out earlier (see preceding note). a3–4 ἀπαθείας καὶ ἠρεμίας] ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἠρεμίαν L: the nouns could have been attracted, as it were, into the plural by the following plurals, but equally the plurals could have been changed to the more usual and expected singulars. For a similar issue—­ i.e. singular or ­plural?—with ἠρεμία, see on 1218a23. As I choose to print the plurals, however, I admit that the arguments are not so far short of being equal on both sides, which raises a recurring question: if the two recensiones, i.e. the one represented by PCB and the one represented by L, have different readings that appear equally well justified, how do we choose between them? (In the present case I am ultimately swayed by the fact that the plural gives us slightly more; we are after all talking about [what would be] different cases of ἀπαθεία and ἠρεμία.) a11 τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἑκάστην scripsi: τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸν ἕκαστον PCBL. The transmitted text is surely unintelligible as it stands. The τὴν, in the solution proposed, is in all of PCBL but omitted in all modern editions (Susemihl says it is ‘added’ in the Aldine, ‘fors. recte’). That each ἀρετή is a μεσότης καθ’ αὑτὸ, i.e not κατὰ συμβεβηκός, is at least to the point, even if Aristotle has said at 1221b3–5 that it does not need saying. With the recovery of the definite article, plus καθ’ αὑτὸ, the corruption to τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸν ἕκαστον looks more straightforward than it would be from either Richards’s κατ’ αὐτὴν ἑκάστην or Ross’s καθ’ αὑτὴν ἑκάστην; omitting the αὐτὴν/αὑτὴν/αὑτὸν (cf. Spengel’s proposal) would improve matters, that is, in the absence of the definite art­ icle, but why καθ’ ἑκάστην rather than a plain ἑκάστη? If it is true that ἕκαστος tends to come before the definite article, here I suggest it is postponed because it belongs as much with the following μεσότητα as with τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν: in other words, Aristotle starts in general mode, i.e. talking about ἠθικὴ ἀρετή generally, then switches with ἑκάστην to the particular. —καὶ for ἢ: the need for Susemihl’s emendation is not clear. The looser formulation offered by ἢ is surely unexceptionable; either description (or both) might apply.

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38  Eudemian Ethics ii 1222a12 The breathing on ἅττα in P has been changed from an original smooth to rough—­probably, since Nikolaos generally writes ἄττα as ἅττα, by him; since the L copyist also has ἅττα, ἅττα was possibly in ω, and B is making the correction to ἄττα independently.

a17–18 ἐπεὶ δ’ 〈οὐκ〉 ἔστι Dodds: but (a) there is a ἕξις τις of the sort described (examples of this ‘ἕξις of a sort’—and it will indeed be a curious sort of ἕξις that combines contraries—­ will be given at III.7, 1234b3–4); in any case (b) while ἔστι τις ἕξις is a natural way of saying ‘there is a sort of ἕξις’, ‘there is not a sort of/certain ἕξις’ would be an odd way of saying ‘there is no ἕξις’. For the argument in the sentence, see next note but one. a19 Allan’s τοῦτον μὲν . . . τοῦτον δὲ is surely an improvement on Bonitz’s ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ on syntactical grounds, but no emendation is needed in any case (οὔτε . . . οὔτε Spengel: should that not be μήτε . . . μήτε?). a21 πράξεις Broadie, ἕξεις PCBL: before ἕξεις in P there is (after what appears to be a stray iota attached to τὰς/τὰσ), unusually, a gap containing an erasure, apparently of three letters, none of which is readable; there are traces of a further mark over the third. In B too the initial as­pir­ated epsilon + accent occupy the space of three normal letters; they may be written in over a prior erasure, or else the original copyist at first left a space because he had insufficient information about how to fill it, but then decided on the ἕ (it looks like his hand). Sarah Broadie’s πράξεις for ἕξεις—­proposed in discussion (in Athens, in 2017)—gives a decent argument for the sentence as a whole: ‘Since there is a certain sort of ἕξις as a result of which its possessor in one situation goes along with (?) too much, in another too little of the same thing, necessarily, as too much and too little are opposed to each other and to the mean, so too [in such cases] the [relevant] actions [at least, but not the ἕξεις, here, because there is only one] must also be opposed both to each other and the [relevant] excellence.’ Such an argument also fits well enough with the sentences preceding and following. Given that with ἕξεις there is no observable argument at all (τὰς ἕξεις would suggest that there are already at least two in play, when only one, and only τις ἕξις at that, has

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Aristotelica  39 been announced), and given also the evidence of disturbance in two of the four MSS, πράξεις looks a good bet, i.e. speculative but more than possible—­and it may not be entirely wishful thinking to suppose that the first two erased characters in P (as I pore over these with a magnifying glass) were actually pi and rho. a23 To repeat, the Latin translation from which Ross’s ϕανερὰς derives has no authority and is of little interest, as this case helps to confirm: ϕανερωτέρας is evidently superior. (This is not to deny that this trans­ lator might, in principle, sometimes happen to get things right in­de­ pend­ent­ly, like the secondary Greek MSS, whether by luck or by design.) —ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν in P is post corr.; the copyist evidently at first left out ἐπὶ τὴν, wrote the first four letters of ὑπερβολήν, then wrote ἐπὶ τὴν on top of them. a25 The various supplements suggested, by Ackrill and others, spell out the sorts of things needing to be supplied to make this difficult sentence work, but actually printing any of them seems a step too far. —ταὐτὰ: C has the crasis mark; not so PBL. a31–2 Woods appears to offer no reasons for his excision, and it is hard to see any. a33–4 Bonitz’s emendation might be right, but there is a switch from ἕξεις to their possessors coming anyway. a34 There is no trace of ἐναντίως in P, pace Walzer/Mingay. a35 Walzer/Mingay follows Bonitz in bracketing καὶ2, but cites Denniston 305, which seems to offer grounds for not doing so: καὶ here = ‘again, in turn’? 1222b1–2 The reading τὸ (bis) is attributed to Oxon. by Walzer/Mingay, and accepted by them; I have not checked this, but if Oxon. does have τὸ it will be an example of a standard error (omicron for omega); ἐπὶ τῷ = ‘in the case of ’, which is in all of PCBL, is surely not only acceptable but more apt. b4 οὐ κολακικὸν: ‘if [οὐ κολακικὸν] is absurd, οὐ καταλλακτικὸν (Fritzsche) is inept’, Richards, but his οὐκ εὐκολαστὸν is if anything less

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40  Eudemian Ethics ii (1222b4) convincing (is there any recorded use of the word?), and οὐ κολακικὸν is well defended by Kenny (in a note to his Oxford World’s Classics translation) as a meiosis.

b6 καὶ αἳ scripsi: καὶ αἱ PCL, καὶ B, καθ’ 〈ἃς〉 αἱ Spengel, 〈ᾗ〉 καὶ [αἱ] Rassow. Echoing Bonitz’s defence of καὶ αἱ, Woods claims that both αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις and an understood (nominative) ­antecedent of καθ’ ἃς stand in apposition to ἡ διαλογὴ. But (a) the διαλογὴ is actually of these two sets of things, i.e. τῶν ἕξεων (it is ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξεων, and they are the relevant ἕξεις, so that it would be odd to find them in ap­pos­ition to it); and (b) why are only some of the ἐναντίαι ἕξεις (τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων [sc. αὗται] καθ’ ἃς) picked out as being κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον? These ἐναντίαι ἕξεις are presumably ἐναντίαι to the ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, in which case it is all of them, not some subset of them, καθ’ ἃς ‘people conform to correct reasoning’ (Kenny in the World’s Classics translation). The received text, I conclude, is beyond hope (Susemihl, more mildly, calls καὶ αἱ ‘haud integra’). My modest proposal, to read the MSS’ definite article, αἱ, as the relative αἳ, is not only the simplest expedient but gives a well-­structured if complex sentence: ‘the list has been assembled of the ἕξεις . . . , both [of those] that (αἳ) [are] ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, and of the ἐναντίαι ἕξεις, καθ’ ἃς. . . .’—even if the latter have yet to be formally introduced, as it were, by name (see on 1221a12). b9 Walzer/Mingay’s entry in their apparatus here, ‘ϕανερὸν ὅτι] ϕανερὸν δ’ ὅτι Oxon. Ald., manifestum vero Λ1 : ϕανερὸν δὴ ὅτι

Sylburg’, is a relic of a time when the hierarchy among the surviving MSS of EE was less clear than it is now, or indeed than it was when the Walzer/Mingay edition was published; Sylburg’s δὴ is apparently an attempt to take account of the δέ in two late MSS and as apparently read by an even later Latin translator, and so is of even less interest than the fact that the Oxoniensis and the Aldine misunderstand the syntax of the present sentence. b13–14 [αἱ] ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ [τούτων] τινὲς Woods: Woods translates ‘So it is evident that all or some of these mean states will be virtues’. This seems high-­handed, since Aristotle can perfectly well be saying that

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Aristotelica  41 the ἀρεταί will represent either all or some of ‘these’ μεσότητες; indeed he will explicitly recognize some that are not ἀρεταί in III.7. b16 Allan’s κινήσεως for τινὲς is clever but not compelling. b18 The MSS’ ὂν has no observable function. The similarity between mu and nu in these MSS gives Casaubon’s ὁμοίως the edge over Susemihl’s hesitant proposal simply to bracket ὂν, because it suggests a cause for the dittography that we would probably have to suppose in order to follow Susemihl. That is: it is easier to suppose that a copyist began by mistaking ομ for ον (with an easy change from οιως to ολως following) than that a copyist happened to duplicate an ον before a perfectly intelligible ὅλως. b19 ὁ γάμος P1CB, from ὁ γ’ ἀνος, with bar above ἀνος, the standard formula for ἄνθρωπος—­which duly appears in the margin of P.  b20 μόνον B, μόνων B2: B2 writes an omega over the line above the second omicron, presumably ‘correcting’ against another MS. b32 ἔχει τὸ B, ἔχων τὸ B2: what is probably B2’s version of the sign for -ων appears over the ει. b34 ὀρθὰ is at the end of the line in B, ending with a particularly florid alpha that could be mistaken for an -ας, but is probably not that. b35 μεταβάλλει/μεταβάλλοι: see on b37. b36 οἷον εἰ: P2 writes οἷον ἐστὶ τοῦτο in the margin, preceded by ἴσως, apparently meant as a substitute for οἷον εἰ because the εἰ in P is something of a mess. A small part of what looks like τοῦτο in the margin was sliced off in the binding process, so P2 might once have said more—­ perhaps οἷον ἐστὶ τοῦτο τρεῖς, which is what Walzer/Mingay erroneously reports as (now) being in the margin. b37 μεταβάλλει Richards, μεταβάλλοι PCBL: the following ἐστι surely shows that we need the indicative here; Richards is, I think, also right that we need CB’s indicative in b34 (cf. Susemihl, who prints it without comment). 1223a3 ὃ PCBL, ἃ Fritzsche, [ὃ] Ross: with ὃ, the following πολλὰ would be a plural complement of a singular (‘what is up to human

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42  Eudemian Ethics ii (1222a3) beings . . . makes up many of such things’?), which I think is unlikely enough, if we retain the relative, to make Fritzsche’s ­emendation to ἃ inevitable—­the only alternative being to treat πολλὰ as an adverb, which would leave Aristotle ‘saying that many things that are within human beings’ power are contingent, [when] his position surely is that they all are’ (Woods). (Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation interpret πολλὰ as ‘most’, which might or might not help save Fritzsche’s emendation, but is surely illegitimate.) But in any case ‘the things that are up to human beings . . . make up many of such things . . .’ seems an oddly convoluted way of saying ‘many are’. I therefore agree with Woods that Ross is right to excise the relative; it is at any rate undoubtedly true that many contingent matters are up to us. Spengel’s bracketing of πολλὰ hardly helps (and two other conjectures of his, πολλὰ 〈δὲ〉 and πολλὰ 〈γὰρ〉, are hard to fathom). —ἀνθρώποις is split ἀν/θρώποις between lines in B with (what look like) hyphens in both margins. Such marks are common enough, especially in B, not to need noticing any further; all probably derive from a hand other than that of the original copyist. a3–4 τῶν τοιούτων is supplied by L2 in the margin, with two sets of omission marks in both text and margin, one set in black, one in red—­so presumably introduced by two different readers. a7–8 γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ’ ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ἐστι desunt in CB: is the copyist of B then after all

working from C, or did he and the copyist of C simply make the same mistake? It would be a very common sort of mistake, i.e. by homoioteleuton: ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ταῦτ’ ἐστι / ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ἐστι, and the repetition of γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, plus a quadruple . . . καὶ/ἢ μή might also contribute to unsighting a copyist. It helps that for the moment at least the miscopied version makes sense—­that is, until we get to αἴτιος τούτων οὗτος, but by then it is too late. a11 διὰ secl. Fritzsche: with the διὰ the subject would be ‘a person’ (ψέγεται, κτλ), which is a perfectly regular phenomenon in EE, but the switch to a neuter plural with ὅσων in the next part of the sentence would be extremely harsh. Additionally, the present parenthesis

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Aristotelica  43 (11 ψέγεται γὰρ . . . 14 καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει) is explaining a point that had a neuter plural subject. (This, incidentally, is one case where using brackets [Bekker, Susemihl, Walzer/Mingay] is clearly unhelpful, insofar as it would be hard to get to the conclusion introduced by δῆλον ὅτι in 14 without the contents of the parenthesis—­which is not, then, quite, a parenthesis after all.) So I conclude that τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, κτλ is the subject here, and διὰ originated as a mistaken emendation/filling-­out. Meineke’s οὐ 〈μὰ〉 Δία is something of a curiosity (A. Meineke, Hermes 3 [1869], 162); cf. Jackson at VII/IV.2, 1236a33). a17–18 ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν . . . ὅσα δ’ desunt in B, 17–19 καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν . . . ἀκούσια desunt in PC: thus what PC omit is not

quite what B omits—­and what they keep is plain nonsense, which what B has is not. There are four possibilities: (i) the copyist of α (it being less economical to suppose that Nikolaos made exactly the same mistake twice over), and the B copyist had different readings in front of them; or (ii) they had the same reading before them as the L copyist had, and happened to mess it up in different ways; or (iii) they both had before them the text as it appears in PC, but the B copyist changed it; or (iv) they both had the text as B has it, but the α copyist changed it. Of these four possibilities, (iv) seems the least likely: since the B text actually makes sense, and the α (PC) text does not, the α copyist would have had no reason to prefer the latter, and it is unclear how he could have done so by accident. (i) remains a live possibility, but simply consigns the question how the two different errors arose to the unknown past. In fact, both could be explained by that old favourite, homoioteleuton: one copyist’s eye saw a17 ἑκούσια and a19 ἀκούσια and unwittingly suppressed the second, another’s saw them both and suppressed the first. Let us then rule out (i), for the sake of the argument. That leaves (ii) and (iii). The difference between these is one between chance (ii) and design (iii), and I think the case for the latter is stronger. a19–20 ὅσα δὲ προελόμενος καὶ ἑκὼν πάντα δηλονότι B: having omitted one of the two preceding ὅσα clauses and introduced the second with the μὲν that belonged to the first, B now proceeds to construct a new answering ὅσα δὲ. . . . One has to admire his ingenuity, but his

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44  Eudemian Ethics ii (1223a19–20) solution fails to make sense of the following τοίνυν, as do PCL. Marc.’s crisp . . . καὶ ἑκὼν· δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι both resolves the problem and suggests what its origin was (the borrowing of δῆλον from the next sentence, plus duplication of the ensuing ὅτι; after all a δῆλον in that position, on its own at the end of a sentence, would very often be rounded off with -οτι). Susemihl’s notes ‘19. [= my 20.] δῆλον ὅτι om. [Marc.] // δῆλον om. [P]’, which are essentially mimicked by Walzer/ Mingay, are carried over from Bekker—­the first to misreport δηλονότι as δῆλον ὅτι; it is surprising that none of the three saw the virtues of Marc.’s correction, when after all there is only one δῆλον/δηλον on offer in any of the main MSS. a22 ἆρα P: but the circumflex may be a later addition. —Here, and four words later, B again writes τὶ for τί interrogative; it is clear by now that this is a foible of B’s, and need not be remarked on in future (the next but one interrogative τί in B has an acute only because followed by an enclitic).

a25 δόξειεν 〈ἂν〉 Spengel: this kind of optative without accompanying ἄν appears elsewhere in our manuscripts of Aristotle (see Bonitz, Index 41b6–13), and Bessarion, for one, is happy with it here, but it is of course the exception rather than the rule, and given the ease with which ἄν can drop out (especially after ἕν . . . δόξειεν?), as well as the number of instances of the phenomenon in our notoriously unreliable EE MSS, it seems reasonable to supply it here and elsewhere; if there were once genuine instances in EE, we shall never know.

a29 τὸ post πρῶτον suppl. Casaubon: we might have expected a τὸ in another text, another style; the lack of it is consistent with the style of EE. a31 For the reasoning behind Urmson’s supplement, see Woods. a33 Quotation marks, unknown to/not used by the scribes of PCΒL, are supplied in the margin by L2, here and with other quotations (so also sometimes C2). a34 εἰ βίαιον] εἰ μὴ βίαιον P1C; εἴ τι βίαιον BP2: P2 writes in τι above μὴ in the text. B and P2 both get the right sense but apparently mimic the preceding εἴ τι λυπηρόν; meanwhile P and C, and so presumably α,

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Aristotelica  45 simply make a mistake, if one that fits a certain pattern (εἰ . . ., καὶ εἰ

μή . . .) and works syntactically.

a39 B2 changes περὶ to παρὰ by writing alphas above the epsilon and iota. 1223b1 ἀκρατὴς PC, ἀκροατὴς BL: so ἀκροατὴς was perhaps in α´, but corrected in α? b4 δόξειεν ἂν C2, δόξειε δ’ ἂν C1: C2 makes the change by simply inserting a nu between δόξειε and δ’, without deleting the latter (again, corrections in these MSS are often indicated rather than being fully carried through). Pace Walzer/Mingay, L has only δόξειε δ’ ἂν, with no ­correction; only B has δόξειεν ἂν, along with the corrected C (presumably C2 is correcting independently, not against B; C2 and B do not regularly coincide). b5 τῶνδε: a grave accent over -δε in B is struck through. b5–6 βουλόμενος πράττει desunt in P1CB: P2 writes ἴσως: τοῦτο καὶ βούλεται in the margin. b8 In B there is a presumably later separation mark below the line after γὰρ (which is jammed up against the following παρ’ ). b10–11 ἔτι δ’ ὁ ἀκρατὴς P1, ἴσως: ἔτι δ’ ὁ ἐγκρατὴς P2 in margin. —Allan’s placing of the γὰρ after δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ rather than after the ensuing τῆς ἀκρασίας removes the awkwardness of having Aristotle say that the ἐγκρατής will act more justly than ἀκρασία (hardly something that can do any acting); but would anyone ever suggest that ἀκρασία might actually be ἀρετή? The possibility has been raised, if only fleetingly (b2–3), that the ἀκρατής might somehow act justly, and with Ross’s τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς Aristotle will counter this; a pause/comma before καὶ μᾶλλον makes it an aside, and avoids having him say ‘even more than the ἀκρατής’, which would be at best an odd thing for him to say. Exactly how τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς became τῆς ἀκρασίας is unclear, but pace Dirlmeier ‘the ἐγκρατής δικαιοπραγήσει, and more than ἀκρασία’ would, I think, be even odder (and, taking away the comma, ‘. . . even more than ἀκρασία’ would be simply bizarre).

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46  Eudemian Ethics ii 1223b16 περὶ/παρὰ B: B2 writes alphas above the epsilon and the iota, as before. b17 ἀκούσιον B1C2, ἑκούσιον PC1LB2: so, interestingly, B differs from C, but then is ‘corrected’, reproducing C’s error, while C is actually corrected and now agrees with B.  In C, ἀ is introduced above ἑ, in B ἑκ above ἀκ 1223. b20 βίαιος/βίαιον: L’s βίαιον mimics the preceding two endings. b21 ἀκούσιον B1: B2 writes in ἑκ above the ἀκ. b25 τὸν αὐτὸν: for the justification for accepting C2’s τὸν αὐτὸν (nu introduced above the line after both words, with insertion marks), see next note.

b26 τὸ 〈αὐτὸ〉 Dirlmeier: after much resistance, I am now convinced that this is the best solution to the problem of the corrupt, isolated τὸ in PCBL (ἅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ)—superior whether to Bonitz’s καὶ for τὸ or to the simple expedient of deleting τὸ (Russell), both of which solutions would leave it unanswered how the τὸ got in (although, once more, simple carelessness is far from unusual in these MSS). But if we have τὸ αὐτὸ here, we must have C2’s τὸν αὐτὸν earlier in the sentence. b29 ταὐτὸ: C marks the crasis. b36 γε was apparently in both recensiones; γενέσθαι is unnecessary—­ for EE—­after ὅταν . . . γένηται. I take it that Nikolaos was correcting/ amplifying the bare γε on his own initiative when writing P, but did not choose to do so when writing C. 1224a1 ὡς οὐκ vs οὐχ ὡς Rassow. Pace e.g. Woods, the change is ­unnecessary: from τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ βούλησιν here down to δέδεικται μόνον in a3, Aristotle is summing up his treatment of τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν in the course of the treatment of τὸ κατὰ ὄρεξιν in general, which he has just finished, in order to go on to use what he has said about βούλησις to deal with the κατὰ προαίρεσιν option in a3–5. ‘We showed that τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν was not ἑκούσιον [i.e. not the same thing as τὸ ἑκούσιον]; rather, every action a person wishes is also ἑκούσιον—­but the only thing

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Aristotelica  47 that has [actually] been shown [sc. especially in 1223b29–36] is that it’s possible for someone to act ἑκών even μὴ βουλόμενος’. (So τὸ ἑκούσιον is wider than τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν; but never­the­less everything one does βουλόμενος is ἑκούσιον, and—­1224a3–5—­not everything that we do βουλόμενοι is the subject of προαίρεσις.) a3 Susemihl reports Rieckher and Spengel too as having doubts about μόνον; but see preceding note. a4–5 C2 supplies προαιρεῖται δ’ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίϕνης in the margin. So C is being corrected, at some point, against a representative of the recensio Constantinopolitana; similarly at a12–13 and a33 below, 1225a11, a18–19, a22; P, at least in the present stretch of text, rather less frequently: see 1224a40, ?1225b16. a9 δὲ μικρὸν: B’s free-­flowing hand sometimes merges words, here δὲ and μικρὸν; a later hand inserts a separation mark below the join. ­—προαγαγόντες P post corr.: a second αγ is inserted above the line, currente calamo? a12–13 ἀκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον is supplied by C2 in the margin. a16 τῇ CB: i.e. τῆ, by attraction to the preceding eta. a20 τὴν ϕύσει καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν: the—­unacknowledged—­ supplement of a second τὴν, before καθ’ αὑτὰ, by Susemihl (then by Walzer/Mingay with a false attribution to P and L) is perhaps original to Susemihl himself. Marc.’s ϕύσιν for ϕύσει (see the apparatus in Walzer/ Mingay) is a simple error, already in Laur. 81,4. Bekker has τὴν ϕύσει καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν. a22 Pace Walzer/Mingay, the abbreviation used here in PC is for παρὰ, not περὶ; similarly in a24, a38 . . .  B, who is mainly deciphering the shorthand of an MS like P and C, on this occasion hedges his bets by reproducing the same abbreviation. —ἀψύχων: L2 writes an alpha above the ἐμπ of the ἐμψύχων that is in all of PCBL (Ald. also has ἀψύχων). ἐμψύχων is possible, if we take the following καὶ as epexegetic, but the phrasing is against it. I construe ‘Just as with ἄψυχα [which we have

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48  Eudemian Ethics ii (1224a22) been talking about], so too with τὰ ζῷα, we see . . .’ (that is, the first καὶ belongs with ὁμοίως: I construe ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ἀψύχων, καὶ . . . as ‘And as in the case of ἄψυχα, so . . .’). This is not to say that the reading of PCBL is impossible, just that—­as I think L2 sees—­ ἀψύχων is the better fit, not least because the genitive plurals are not quite a pair, as they would be likely to be if καὶ . . . καὶ . . . were ‘both . . . and . . .’: the second plural has an article, the first not, though Fritzsche proposes to supply one. a24 τι is clearly preferable to τις; there is no reason why Aristotle should have wanted to limit external causation here to human action. a24–5 ἐν μὲν τοῖς, κτλ: the absence of a connective here adds weight to the argument for reading ἀψύχων instead of ἐμψύχων in a22. Aristotle is here directly following up the pairing ἄψυχα/ζῷα, now introducing a difference between ἄψυχα and some ζῷα. a29 B2 adds a rough breathing over B’s ἔ, misreading ἔνεστιν as two words; he appears to do the same—­i.e. add a rough breathing—­to the following ἔν, which gets its accent from the enclitic after it. —ἐν τινὶ ἡλικίᾳ, and not ἔν τινι, because everyone agrees that Aristotle is saying ‘at a certain age’. B2 adds a smooth breathing above the rough beside the accent over the epsilon. a32 πράττοντα L: πράττοντι P1C, πράττοντ B; πράττῃ P2, writing ἴσως: διὰ λογισμὸν πράττη (= πράττῃ) in the margin, presumably in order to explain the preceding ὅταν. That, i.e. reading ὅταν . . . πράττῃ, would be an option, but it would leave unexplained the consensus around at least πράττοντ between PCBL. B probably had πράττοντι before him, written as πράττον with a tau plus two dots arranged horizontally over it to signify an iota (as in both P and C here); not for the first time he hedges his bets, on this occasion—­intelligently—­leaving it ambiguous whether it should be πράττοντι or πράττοντα; the latter, in a MS like P or C, would differ from πράττοντι by having the dots one above the other instead of side by side. a33 χαίρων δέ is supplied by C2 in the margin of C, with insertion marks there and in the text.

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Aristotelica  49 a36–7 τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν is a beautiful example of the spareness of Aristotle’s Eudemian style (‘. . . drags him back from his desires for pleasant things’); neither Bekker’s nor Fritzsche’s changes are needed. (Dirlmeier supplies a comma before Bekker’s ἐπιθυμῶν, which at least explains how it is supposed to work; but he misconstrues the phrase, saying ‘ἡδεῖς [i.e. ἡδεῖαι?] ἐπιθυμίαι sind unerhört’; Woods construes correctly, but makes the same grammatical mistake as Dirlmeier.) a40 οὐ2 deest in P1C1, but ἴσως: ὅτι οὐ λυπηρῶς P2 in margin, οὐ C2 (with insertion marks in both cases). 1224b2 ἄγεται καὶ Apelt: ἄγει καὶ L; [ἄγει καὶ] Brown (as reported by Woods). Accepting Lesley Brown’s suggestion, Woods comments ‘ἄγει could easily have crept in from b[3]’, but Apelt’s proposal is simpler and better palaeographically, and gives a good sense (which L’s active ἄγει does not). b4 The MSS’ reading, δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι μόνοι βίᾳ καὶ ἀκόντες ποιεῖν, clearly cannot stand; the ἐγκρατεῖς and the ἀκρατεῖς are not thought, or said, by anyone to be the only people who act βίᾳ καὶ ἀκόντες (Dirlmeier’s ‘in besonders aufallender Weise’ for μόνοι is unappealing; he provides no parallel for this construal, and the ‘besonders’ is an over-­ egging of an already unsatisfactory pudding). If we do keep ἀκόντες, Jackson’s μόνον οὐ might work, but it is hardly true, according to what Aristotle has said, that ἐγκρατεῖς and ἀκρατεῖς ‘almost’ act βίᾳ καὶ ἀκόντες, even if enkratic and akratic behaviour is acknowledged to have a certain resemblance to acting under compulsion. So, pace Woods, we need Allan’s ἑκόντες. But then, is it true that the ἐγκρατεῖς and the ἀκρατεῖς alone δοκοῦσιν . . . βίᾳ καὶ ἑκόντες ποιεῖν? What about ­people that have to do something on pain of being beaten up, imprisoned, or killed (1225a3ff.)? Aristotle says they act ἑκόντες, and yet they are undeniably under constraint. So now Barnes’s καὶ vel ἅμα begins to have its attractions. But neither καὶ nor ἅμα looks palaeographically plausible. And could it not be said—­could Aristotle not be saying—­that the ἐγκρατεῖς and the ἀκρατεῖς are the only ones who genuinely do appear, in a way, to act βίᾳ καὶ ἑκόντες, the cases introduced in

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50  Eudemian Ethics ii (1224b4) 1225a3ff. being typically thought of as acting ἀκόντες? There is after all πλείστη ἀμϕισβήτησις about the matter, and Aristotle has deployed serious argument to show that it is after all only an appearance. In sum, there is no decisive argument for emending μόνοι (with ἑκόντες for ἀκόντες; but we cannot keep both μόνοι and ἀκόντες). b5 P’s elision, διὰ τιν’ αἰτίαν, is accidental: Nikolaos at first ran τινα and αἰτίαν together, then went back and separated them with the ­elision mark. b7 The L copyist perhaps erased a sigma between his προ and his κείμενον; if so, he at first correctly interpreted the convention for προς in his source (with omicron written above the rho), and then had second thoughts. b9–10 ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ PCB, ἐγκρατεῖ καὶ ἀκρατεῖ L: L’s is probably the usual order, but actually it is the case of the ἀκρατής that is the more immediately relevant here, so that ἀκρατεῖ might be expected to come first. b15 τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν: P2 writes ‘perhaps’ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν in the margin; is that because of the mess originally made (and still visible) of the end of βούλεσθαι in P? b16 ἐπεὶ: ἔτι C2, in the margin, with ἴσως, and editors generally prefer ἔτι. But I think ἐπεὶ should be retained, in its (quasi-)concessive use (‘Although . . .’: see Bonitz, Index 266a55ff., LSJ s.v. ἐπεί B.4, and EE 1225a14 for another example), because the argument now swings back in the opposite direction to the one it has been heading in. b22 κακῶς πράξειν Russell: but is it not a feature of κακά to have bad consequences? We don’t need an explicit reference to the future. b28 ἀκρατῶς, ἐγκρατῶς L1: L2 adds (the shorthand for) ου over the ῶ of ἀκρατῶς and over the sigma of ἐγκρατῶς. b29 ἐπεὶ] ὅτι C2 (not ἔτι, as reported by Walzer/Mingay), writing ἴσως ὅτι above ἐπεὶ in the text. It is not clear why this intervention was felt to be necessary, given that ὅτι would hardly change the sense—­maybe this reader misread C’s ἐπεὶ for ἐπὶ; the sign for ει is somewhat flattened out.

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Aristotelica  51 Alternatively or additionally he might have been misled by the ὅτι in the margin written by someone else and meant to substitute for ἔτι later in the line (see next note but one, on b30 ἔτι/ὅτι); it probably postdates C2.

b30 ϕύσει ἄρχων] ϕύσει ὑπάρχει Rassow; 〈τῶν〉 ϕύσει ἀρχῶν Dodds. There is no justification for Rassow’s emendation, since the transmitted text makes perfectly good sense (provided that we retain the ἔτι following in PCB: see next note), nor for Dodds’s: since ἄρχων fits, we have no need for ἀρχῶν, especially if introducing it requires a supplement in addition. —ὅτι L, C2/3 in margin (for ‘C2/3’: see on b29), for ἔτι: ὅτι looks unlikely, unless the mere presence of λόγος can be the cause of its being ϕύσει ἄρχων. I speculate that the L copyist wrote ὅτι because the following ἐνέσται/ἔνεστι falsely suggested two parallel clauses, each starting with ὅτι; C2/3 either had the same idea, or more likely was correcting from L or a descendant of L. I translate the PCB text, roughly, ‘For both reason, in its natural role as ruler—­for so long as our coming into being is ­uninterrupted and has not been stunted—­will be in us, and desire too, insofar as it accompanies us, i.e. is in us, from our birth onwards.’ Without καὶ ἔνεστι the ἀκολουθεῖ might otherwise be taken as suggesting (absurdly) that desire follows r­ eason—­in that other use of ἀκολουθεῖν—­from our birth. (Pace Susemihl, both P and Bekker have ὅτι in b32.) b31 ἑωμένης LC2: the smooth breathing in C seems to have a rough breathing superimposed. Is this further evidence that C is here being corrected (‘corrected’) against L/a descendant of L? b34 ἑωμένης LC2: rough breathing again superimposed in C. b36 τἄλλα P1L: P2 adds a circumflex above the crasis mark and acute accent. —μὴ κατὰ ϕύσιν: if a supplement is needed, πως (πώς) would be the natural partner for the following ἁπλῶς; it could also come after μὴ κατὰ ϕύσιν, or at the end of the present clause (Solomon); Ross’s 〈πὼς〉 μὲν 〈οὐ〉 is a contender too (the μὲν for μὴ seems to have originated with Spengel), but would be less economical, and οὐ for μή is unnecessary (‘μή is sometimes oddly used in the Aristotelian corpus’, Richards). But I suspect that the qualification, i.e. πως vel sim., is easily supplied in any case. b38 περὶ1/παρὰ: P2 makes the necessary adjustment to change the shorthand for παρὰ to περὶ. B accurately copies the shorthand he was

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52  Eudemian Ethics ii (1224b38) reading for περὶ—­not writing out περὶ in full as he usually, but not always, does. —ἐγκρατῆ καὶ ἀκρατῆ BL, ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ PC: BL’s is the usual order, which is what we might expect in a summing up; on the other hand PCB all had the ἀκρατής first in b9. But a representative of each recensio has ἐγκρατῆ καὶ ἀκρατῆ, so (by my usual rule) I print that. b40 δὲ deest in P, though with a gap of the right length for a δὲ, and I think one has been erased, perhaps in the course of an attempt to make sense of the transmitted text. Before the beginning of the line, which starts with καὶ ἄκοντας, there is a collection of illegible characters, tiny and faded, perhaps part of a longer marginal entry, cut off in the process of binding; these perhaps end βι?, and perhaps include a δ’. —ἑκούσιον P1: corrected to ἀκούσιον by P2, who overwrites the ἑ with ἀ; ἀκούσιον should not therefore be attributed to Bonitz as it is by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay. 1225a1 P2 inserts αὗται here from the margin above, this being the top line of the page. Bonitz and Bussemaker work in the αὗται earlier on (Bonitz as the first word of the sentence, with αἱ shifted to follow μὲν οὖν, Bussemaker after ἀπορίαι), but if it was originally delayed to the end of the sentence it would perhaps have been easier for it to fall out—­or did Aristotle perhaps himself forget that he needed it? Hardly, since αὗται αἱ ἀπορίαι are the focus of the immediately following σχεδὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, κτλ. —δὲ deest in B: the B copyist evidently saw another way of solving the problem of the apparently incomplete couple of lines preceding; if we supply a comma instead of a colon before the σχεδὸν, it begins to work, but apart from problems with syntax it is probably ruled out by a37 μὲν, which needs to be answered by δὲ here. —ἐκ BP2C2, καὶ P1C1L: P2 changes the accented sign for καὶ, at the beginning of the line, to a kappa, and adds ἐ outside the line; C2 writes ἐκ, with ‘perhaps’, in the margin (Walzer/Mingay mistakenly reports L as having ἐκ). a3 Pace Walzer/Mingay, P does not elide κατὰ, but writes it in shorthand, ending with a superscript tau and grave accent; C’s κατὰ is written identically, with the following τὸν written as a tau with a superscript double \, one \ representing the accent, the other the ending, -ον; thus

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Aristotelica  53 C’s τὸν represents a kind of dittography. Quite possibly, since τὸν is in B too, the corruption occurred in α´; Nikolaos made the necessary correction in P but not in C. a5–6 Rackham’s ἀλλὰ for ἀλλ’ ἂν is to accompany Spengel’s participial πράττουσι following; that Spengel’s emendation seems to require this further change does not speak in its favour. a7 A later hand writes a Greek question mark in the margin in P, after ἢ

οὔ, which ends the line.

a8 οὗτοι τοῦτο PC, ἔτι τοῦτο B: neither is better than L’s αὐτὸ τοῦτο; it is easy enough to see how αὐτὸ could have been corrupted to οὗτοι, which is presumably what was in α, less easy to see how αὐτὸ could become ἔτι. Is ἔτι perhaps a conjecture by the B copyist, for οὗτοι in α´ ? a10 ἐϕ’ ἑαυτῷ B: B2 adds a second and clearer rough breathing.

a11 δεῖ secludendum ci. Bonitz: ἐστίν C2; 〈τούτων〉 δὴ C3/4 [for ‘C3/4’ see next note]; καὶ etiam ci. Bonitz; κεἰ Ross. Of the four latter solutions (the last dependent on the bracketing of the following ὅσα), C2’s—­written, with ἴσως, over the δεῖ—­gives us the same outcome as C3’s (ἴσως: τούτων δὴ [Walzer/Mingay mistakenly reports ούτων δὴ] in the margin: probably later than the supralinear in-­text ἐστίν because of the positioning of the insertion mark), only more economically, and Bonitz’s second conjecture is more economical than Ross’s. So of these four either ἐστίν or καὶ is plausible. But then the question is how either, even in their shorthand forms, could have morphed into δεῖ, which was evidently in ω, the common source of PCBL. Ι propose that δεῖ itself originated in someone’s misunderstanding of the infinitive ὑπάρξαι (that someone pre-dating ω). —ὅσα] ἑκὼν P2, erasing ὅσα and r­ eplacing it with ἑκὼν, thus elegantly producing a shortened version of what and C2 and L offer us (see next note), whether with the help of an MS that had the full version or independently. —ἃ μὴ βούλεται ἑκὼν πράττει is supplied in the margin of C, immediately following ἴσως: τούτων δὴ (see last note), and by a different hand. Thus there were three correctors at work in this one line of C, the earliest of which was responsible for the supralinear ἐστίν just before in a10; probably the

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54  Eudemian Ethics ii (1225a11) hand supplying ἃ μὴ βούλεται ἑκὼν πράττει is earlier than the one proposing τούτων δὴ, so the latter in retrospect should be labelled C4 instead of C3. a12 αὐτῷ B1: what seems to be a second hand adds a rough breathing beside the smooth. a15 ϕιλαϕῶν B1: psi is introduced over the phi by B2; as usual in these MSS, a correction is indicated rather than being fully made (i.e. the ­corrector does not here replace the iota with eta). —ἀποκτείνας / ἀποκτείνῃ / ἀποκτείνοι: the ἀποκτείνῃ (ἀποκτείνη) in PC1L causes editors to write εἰ for ὁ at the beginning of the sentence, in Rackham’s and Walzer/Mingay’s case without also adopting Spengel’s ἀποκτείνοι, perhaps through oversight. But C2—­crossing out the final eta, and re­placing it with the shorthand for -ας above—­gives us a better solution (‘the person who killed . . .’). B apparently reproduces the shorthand he found in his source, with a supralinear nu followed by a mark, above the ligature for ει, that is not totally unlike the shorthand C2 uses for -ας, but is probably not that: he may well not have written the ending at all, mimicking the convention of MSS like P and C (though not one they use here: B’s source, I suggest, did) of not completing a word where the manner of its completion is assured by what goes before it, and re­placing the ending with a short oblique stroke, which perhaps typically also stands in for an accent where this is on the right syllable. This, I believe, is what the mark in B represents, and with ὁ preceding ἀποκτείνας would be a reasonable interpretation of what—­I take it—­ was in the text he was copying, i.e. α´ (when he imitates the ­orthography of that source rather than spelling out the word, that typically indicates uncertainty on his part). If the ending in α´ was not spelled out, that would have paved the way for ἀποκτείνῃ in α, under the influence, as it were, of the preceding ἵνα λάβῃ; since the same error occurs in L, I suppose that α´ was itself mimicking the archetype, ω. a16 δεῖ/δὴ: C2 writes δεῖ in the margin, with dots beneath δὴ in the text; B2 writes the ligature for ει above δὴ. a17 C2 deletes the μὴ (= μὴ2) with a dot beneath it and what is pre­sum­ ably a deletion mark (misinterpreted by Walzer/Mingay as εἰ: ‘εἰ mg.

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Aristotelica  55 C2,  ut vid.’) in the margin. C2 is surely right: Kenny (Oxford World’s Classics), keeping μὴ, translates ‘. . . under coercion—­though not by force  or in an unnatural way’, but why μή, and even if μὴ is possible, why the immediate switch to οὐ (ἢ οὐ ϕύσει)? Inwood and Woolf (in the Cambridge translation) try to distinguish the two negatives, with ‘. . . by compulsion (albeit not by force), or at any rate [Russell’s 〈γε〉 in a18] not by nature’, but neither the brackets nor the ‘albeit’ for καὶ is ­con­vin­cing. For further, and surely conclusive, arguments see Woods ad loc., who ends with ‘. . . it is, in any case, clear that in this passage Aristotle regards such cases as cases of compulsion (see 1225a21­–3)’; also Donini. a18 Russell’s supplement of γε is quite dispensable, though if it had been in the MSS it would have fitted well. a18–19 ἕνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ: C2 inserts ἢ μείζονος from the margin after ἕνεκα, striking through the nu of ἂν in the text. a20 ταῦτά γε B: γε fits well enough, but is probably just a duplication of γε at the end of the last sentence. a22 C2 adds ἔχομεν after συγγνώμην in the margin; συγγνώμην happens to end the line. a24–5 ἵνα μὴ χαίρῃ: against Bekker’s deletion of the negative, Hendrik Lorenz and Ben Morison point out to me, in correspondence, that there is someone who could be said to act regularly to avoid pleasure, i.e. the ἐγκρατής. ‘[A]cting in avoidance of pleasure . . . contrasts most sharply with acting in avoidance of pain. In the latter case, voluntary agency is most compromised; in the former case, it is least compromised.’ It is true that Aristotle just now formally completed the discussion of the ἐγκρατής and the ἀκρατής in the context of the voluntary and involuntary (1224b36–1225a2), and has moved on to another way in which λέγονται . . . βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι, οὐ διαϕωνοῦντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως (1225a3–4), so that the ἐγκρατής is not likely to be now uppermost in his mind. Nevertheless that there is someone who can be said to act ἵνα μὴ χαίρῃ, and who some (according to the preceding dialectical context) might say acts ἄκων, is enough to make removing the negative unsafe.

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56  Eudemian Ethics ii 1225a31 ἢ or καὶ? EE VIII/V.2 will introduce the thought that the origins of at least one sort of ἐνθουσιασμός actually lie in us, so the ‘or’ may be quite important. a36–7 P2 writes ἴσως: ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑκόντες λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσίν in the margin, with marks indicating that this is intended to replace 37 ἀλλ’ ἑκόντες, and this provides the basis for a reconstruction of the plainly lacunose transmitted text (‘ἀλλ’ ἑκόντες in ras.’ mysteriously reports Walzer/Mingay of P2’s intervention: this derives from Susemihl, who says—­whether correctly or not, I am not sure—­that there is an erasure under all of ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑκόντες). I prefer to move λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσίν to an earl­ier position, before the ὡς, on the grounds (a) that it makes the syntax generally easier; (b) that the chances are then reduced of its appearing that it is the λόγοι that are βίᾳ πράττοντες, κτλ; and (c) that ὡς now has a clear function, i.e. that of introducing the content of the λόγοι in question, which will be ‘things people say’ rather than ‘accounts [sc. of τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον]’—things, in fact, that they have just been described as saying: see a7 ταῦτα γάρ ϕασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι, and a15–16 εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος (to which Aristotle’s response is ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ὑπομεῖναι τὸ πάθος [a8–9], except under certain carefully defined circumstances). So: οἱ γὰρ μάλιστ’ ἐμποδίζοντες τὸ ἑκούσιον 〈λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσίν〉, ὡς βίᾳ πράττοντες ἀλλ’ 〈οὐχ〉 ἑκόντες (for the ac­cusa­tive after ἐμποδίζοντες see Top. 161a37; for such a use of ἀλλά, LSJ s.v. I.4). But why the par­ti­ciple, πράττοντες (odd, even if we supply e.g. ἦσαν)? I propose an original ἔπραττον, which became πράττοντες by attraction to the following ἑκόντες (the subject of the verb being the people whose λόγοι are being spelled out). This is of course speculation, piling on top of P2’s no less speculative proposal, but he was surely headed in the right direction. Ross’s conjecture gives us much the same sense but rather less elegantly, as does Susemihl’s but at the cost of having to supply rather more; Spengel’s and Dirlmeier’s are both too spare to be useful. Absent any better solution, then, there are in my view only two options: to go with a version of what P2 offers us, or to throw up our hands in despair. But I find it hard to see this as a true locus desperatus; the MSS give us too many signposts for that, however lacunose they

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Aristotelica  57 (the MSS) may be here, and even if we cannot be sure if we are reading the signposts correctly. 1225b1–2 τὰ κατὰ διάνοιαν (without τὴν, which is lacking in both B and L, and incidentally is not in Bekker): pace Spengel and Richards, τὰ seems right. L has in the margin the heading περὶ διανοίας, which suggests, correctly, that the new topic is being understood for the moment as being about διάνοια itself. Aristotle is proposing to get clear about τὸ ἑκούσιον by understanding the complexities of action κατὰ διάνοιαν. b2 ἐναντία L, ἐναντίον PCB: L’s plural is surely preferable with so many ἐναντία about to be announced. b3–6 The dashes I print here replace the brackets that are normally used by editors, and are actually found, just here, in C. They are in fact the only brackets I have found in any of PCBL, and were certainly inserted by a later hand (the opening bracket is written over the suspended point that quite often separates words, or possibly what are taken to be blocks of sense [?], in P and C, sometimes B, while the closing bracket has to be squeezed in), but their absence is certainly felt in PBL, given that what is enclosed by them is a genuinely and irrevocably a parenthesis, actually breaking up the syntax (see next note but one)—which is what C2’s brackets are surely meant to indicate. In general, as noted before, I have spurned brackets because as used by editors they frequently seem to me to obscure the nature of Aristotle’s argument, by isolating the content of (what we call) the parenthesis from what follows; but some means of ‘bracketing off ’ the intrusive material, without isolating/removing it altogether from the flow of the argument, seems required, and dashes seem the best solution (cf. Slings in the OCT of Plato’s Republic). One might suspect the intrusion into the text of a marginal note/gloss (compare 1228a14), and yet the matter introduced is so detailed, and germane, that it seems reasonable to suppose that it was Aristotle himself who chose to interrupt his own flow. b5 ἤτοι ᾧ scripsi: ἤτοι ὡς PCBL, ἢ τὸ ᾧ Bywater. The ᾧ is surely needed, but there seems no good reason for abandoning the ἤτοι, which merely marks the fact that having illustrated the first and third items in

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58  Eudemian Ethics ii (1225b5) the list, i.e. ὃν and οὗ ἕνεκα, Aristotle is now taking up the second. L has ουν written in over the line (in another hand = L2), overlapping both ἤτοι and ὡς; does this writer intend οὖν to substitute for the meaningless ὡς—­meaningless, that is, if the following ὅτι is retained (see next note)—thinking that the new example is a continuation of the previous one, which he, like the original scribe, has identified as involving the daughters not of Pelias but of some unknown Polias (‘. . . or indeed, then, . . .’, which would actually serve, implicitly, to bring in the ᾧ)? For ἤτοι as ‘or’, emphasizing a disjunction, see Denniston 553, which cites the present passage; although this is, admittedly, something of a double-­edged sword, since Denniston also declares the usage ‘very rare’. —Fritzsche’s τοδὶ assumes a ὡς = ὅτι preceding. b6 τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα/τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι: the necessary accusative inside the noun clause introduced by τῷ is, I think, found in C—­or rather, someone found it there (I shall explain). P, C’s twin, certainly has ἀγνοοῦντι, with the telltale pair of dots marking the iota above the supralinear tau. C lacks the dots, and has what looks like a circumflex in their place above the (again supralinear) tau. Now unlike P, C does not have the circumflex over the preceding ου, so what looks like a circumflex may actually be one, only misplaced. There are, then, several possibilities: (1/2) C himself wrote a circumflex over the tau, intending it as such, and omitting either the vertically arranged dots that would signal an iota, like P’s, or the horizontally arranged dots beside the tau and nu that would signal an alpha, whether out of negligence, or because he was uncertain which to write; (3) C forgot the circumflex but put in the horizontal dots signalling an iota, which C2 then joined up and so altered to a circumflex, thus simultaneously removing the iota, and so the ending in -ντι, and supplying the missing accent; or (4) C2 found what we have before us and interpreted it as ἀγνοοῦντα anyway. My view is that the brackets in b3–6 (see last note but one) favour either (3) or (4), insofar as they indicate C2’s recognition of the syntax of the sentence; once he had recognized it, and therefore the correspondence of τῷ ἀγνοουντ (plus ?circumflex over the tau) with τὸ εἰδότα in b2, he could hardly read anything but ἀγνοοῦντα—­thus anticipating Rieckher’s emend­ ation, as necessarily adopted by subsequent editors. Bekker reads τῷ δ’

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Aristotelica  59

ἀγνοοῦντι (with a full stop before it), presumably following Marc., the

descendant of L he has available to him; that he adopts L’s/Marc.’s reading shows that he was way behind (my reconstruction of) C2, getting no further than noticing that there was something odd about the construction of the sentence. (Note: that L too has the dative ἀγνοοῦντι surely shows that that was what was in ω, which makes it less likely that C himself intended to write ἀγνοοῦντα; he might have been uncertain about ἀγνοοῦντι [see above], but he does not positively indicate a preference for the alternative.) b6–7 ᾧ: C2’s ὃ, preceded by ἴσ[ως], is written above the ᾧ, which is itself possibly in ras. —ὃ (actually ὁ, with no accent, but ὃ must be intended) Ambr., ὅτῳ PCBL: the ὅτῳ obviously needs changing, not least if the last item was ᾧ; L. Minio-­Paluello apparently suggested ὃ καὶ τῷ, but the direct interrogative would look even more out of place than PCBL’s ὅτῳ, the other items being expressed by simple relatives. b8 C2 strikes through the omega of C’s ὅσῳ, writing an alpha above it. b11 δ’ ἀγνοῶν PL, διαγνοῶν CB. For the error in CB cf. e.g. 1248b36 δι’ αὑτὰ Bekker: δ’ αὐτὰ L; propter ipsa FL (missing in PCB); delta is

typically written with a flowing sweep downwards from the top of the character, so that δ’ is easily confused with δι’. —ἀγνοεῖν πράττει P2: P2 writes πράττει above the line (this is the top line on the page in P) with an insertion mark after ἀγνοεῖν; the supplement, which Walzer/ Mingay misreports as πρῶτον (and also mislocates), is worthy but unnecessary. —P2/P3 writes ἑκούσιον in the margin after ἐπεὶ, the last word of the top line of the page, but it is hard to see where it is supposed to go in—­if indeed it is intended to go in at all, rather than just adverting to τὸ ἑκούσιον τοῦτ’ ἔστιν in the line before (‘here’s where Aristotle says what ἑκούσιον is’). b12 τὸ] τῷ B bis, as if ἐν rather than ἕν had preceded. b13 ὁ is inserted above the line by C2. —I suspect that B is supplying μὲν1, but I also suspect he is right: μὲν and μὴ are very close, ortho­ graph­ic­al­ly, in shorthand manuscripts like P and C, and presumably those being copied by B and L, and it would not be surprising if μὲν was

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60  Eudemian Ethics ii (1225b13) missing in ω, by haplography (for an example of confusion between μὲν and μὴ, see 1226a25). There is even a possibility that Nikolaos himself started writing μὲν in P before changing the superscript sign to eta; that is, there could be the beginnings of the (also superscript) 〈 for εν behind/underneath the somewhat messy η.

b14 An ἂν would be expected, if not indispensable, here and might easily go missing before ἀγνοῶν?

b15 P2, or possibly Nikolaos himself (it looks like his hand, and it is certainly different from the hand labelled ‘P2’ in the next note), mis­taken­ly inserts εἰ, above the line, between καὶ and μὴ. b16 P2 writes ὃ ἂν ᾖ ῥᾴδιον in the margin with insertion marks there and in the text before ἂν; C2 writes εἰ above ἦ. b17 ἢ1 B, deest in P1CL: ἢ is inserted over the line in the text, with an insertion mark, between ἀμέλειαν and ἡδονὴν by P2. Either α and L each separately missed out the ἢ by haplography before ἡδονὴν, or else ω, and α´, lacked it and B corrected independently; perhaps the second is more likely, but it is hard to decide. b21–4 It is hard to understand, let alone justify, Allan’s proposal to bracket these three lines, although there are problems with the beginning of the sentence in b23–4, μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, κτλ (q.v.). b22 οὐ ταὐτὸ: οὐ τα in P at end of line; P2 attaches υτὸ beside it in the margin. There is, then, a shared error here between C and B. b24 B’s δόξειεν δ’ ἂν probably just reflects its usual enthusiasm for nu ephelkustikon rather than an inherited δόξειεν. Bessarion in Par. 2042 writes δόξειε, with no ἄν, followed by what looks like a comma before δυοῖν. This would be a possibility: as noted before, Aristotle does sometimes omit the ἄν in such cases—­and could δ’ ἂν perhaps have somehow originated in a duplication of δυοῖν? (It is something of a mystery why Susemihl follows Bekker, and Walzer/Mingay then follows Susemihl, in printing καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε δ’ ἂν; surely there is no possible case for the δέ here?)

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Aristotelica  61 b30 δὲ deest in B: and if it were not in PCL, we would hardly miss it either (i.e. because connectives are regularly omitted in EE). b34 προαίρεσις in B is post corr.: the second rho omitted, then supplied above the line—­perhaps by another hand. b35 The clearly redundant ταὐτὸν and the following ἔνια appear in reverse order in Susemihl, then in Walzer/Mingay (not in Bekker, who omits ταὐτὸν and reports γὰρ ταὐτὸν in Marc. and P). b37 ἃ δυνατὸν Fritzsche: Bekker prints ὃ δυνατὸν, following the Aldine, but the Aldine itself gets it from Ambr. So the impossibility of ἀδύνατον had been recognized before Fritzsche, but his emendation is—­surely?— as certain as any emendation can be. 1226a2 It might be a deliberate choice on B’s part to leave out the γὰρ, given that without it and without the preceding τι (and the full stop printed here before τῶν) but with the MSS’ following εἶναι, one gets a sort of sense, if a highly improbable one. Not so with the version in PC (also lacking the τι), though the following infinitive εἶναι, in all of PCBL, still presumably arose because of οἴεται. a4 Russell’s διάμετρον 〈ὅτι ἀ〉σύμμετρος is neither necessary nor even elegant; the parallel with NE 1112a22 is unpersuasive, given that the text as transmitted here in EE makes perfectly good sense.

a5 ἡ: the circumflex in B is apparently added by a different hand; perhaps the same hand that adds a second, clearer rough breathing over the following αὑτῷ. —δόξαν/ δόξα: P2 converts the supralinear sign for -αν to an alpha. a7 οὐδὲν immediately following οὐθεὶς (PCL, Susemihl, Walzer/ Mingay) looks odd; or is there a special reason why it should be οὐδὲν? Bekker thinks not, printing οὐθεὶς . . . οὐθὲν. a12 προαιρεῖται seclusi: the preceding sentence, as PCBL all have it, is strange—­ how exactly does a person προαιρούμενος always ­‘indicate’, or ‘make clear’, what and for what he or she προαιρεῖται? What we see is the action; the information about why people do what they do is frequently absent, for example in the context of

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62  Eudemian Ethics ii (1226a12) relationships—­see EE itself on friendship (‘friends’ are not always what they appear: VII.2, 1237b8–34, etc.). What is clear, and always (ἀεί) clear, about anyone προαιρούμενος is that they προαιρεῖται something, and for the sake of something else. Just so, Woods translates ‘in general a man evidently always chooses something, and chooses for the sake of something’. However this cannot be extracted from what the MSS offer us, i.e. καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται. Woods himself im­pli­cit­ly claims to be following Walzer/Mingay here, which makes no changes apart from Allan’s (unnecessary) supplement of τις after προαιρούμενος; but what the Woods version actually translates is καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ προαιρούμενος τί, καὶ τινὸς ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, i.e. with the τε suppressed, and, I suppose, a change from τίνος to τινὸς (interrogative to indefinite τις). If we keep the τε, as I think we should (τί and τινὸς ἕνεκα are plainly being introduced as a pair), along with the change of accent, and read δηλοῖ, with Woods, as we then must, as ‘is evidently / is clearly’ (for another example, see EE VII/IV.2, 1238a24), then it is the concluding προαιρεῖται that becomes redundant. I speculate that someone misinterpreted τὶ and τινὸς as interrogatives, supplying a marginal προαιρεῖται that then found its way into the text. In any case, the arguments I have presented seem strong enough to justify the small modifications to the traditional text that Ι propose and that Woods implicitly proposed. a13 τὶ/τί: so on my reconstruction B gets it right here, though only by accident because he (nearly?) always writes interrogative τί as τὶ. a15 PCBL δοξάζειν is presumably by attraction to the following infinitives (‘γρ. δοξάζει’ Victorius in margin). a17–18 Pace Allan, there seems nothing wrong with βούλεσθαι μὲν . . . οὐκ ἔστιν, except that one might have wished for a γάρ. a24 αὐτῶν B1, αὐτῆς B2: ης is supplied by B2 above the circumflex of αὐτῶν. So B is evidently here being ‘corrected’ against another MS; the change would otherwise appear unmotivated. That C and L should share the same error here is not so surprising: the difference between a shorthand αὐτῶν (as in P) and a shorthand αὐτῆς (as in C) is small: αὐτ with a large

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Aristotelica  63 circumflex-­like mark over the tau (representing ων) with a circumflex beneath the mark, as against the same mark over the tau with a minuscule sigma beneath. Compare 1220a22, where P has αὐτῶν and C αὐτῆς, with B and L: Nikolaos in P is there independently correcting an original αὐτῆς, and perhaps he and the B copyist are doing the same here—­or, alternatively, Nikolaos in C and the L copyist both happen to make the same mistake. a25 μὲν B2: ὲν supplied over the eta of μὴ. So is B here being corrected against P or a descendant of P? a27 οὐδ’ is in all of PCBL, pace Walzer/Mingay, and looks unobjectionable; missing in the Teubner, presumably by accident. —B2 writes the ligature for ει above the final eta of ἐγχειρήση; it is not perhaps too optimistic to suppose he was aiming for, i.e. signalling, ἐγχειρήσειε, after ἄν. a29 An ‘apodotic’ δέ seems quite possible; less economically, we could accept Solomon’s ἐνίων in the preceding line. a32–5 Susemihl follows Bonitz in transposing wholesale, ‘ut ordo membrorum sit hic: [34]. τὰ–[35], ἐστίν, [32]. τὸ–πρακτόν, [33]. ᾗ–[34]. ἐστίν, [32–3]. ἀλλ’–ἁπάντων’. It is not clear that this major reorganization benefits the argument. Woods reorganizes differently, shifting 34–5 τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐϕ’ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν to follow 32 τὸ δ’ ὅλως οὐ πρακτόν: for his argument, see his notes, but why should 34–5 not be the starting-­point of the following aporia? Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation seems to follow Woods, without the usual warning of a departure from Walzer/Mingay. His revision of Solomon in Aristotle’s Ethics (ed. Barnes and Kenny, Princeton 2014) suggests yet another reorganization which is neither Bonitz’s/Susemihl’s nor Woods’s, but apparently a relative of the former: ‘ἀλλ’–ἁπάντων post [34] ἐστίν transposuerat Rassow’, Susemihl. Interestingly, Solomon’s own original (Oxford) translation, which is based on Susemihl, renders the transmitted and not the re­organ­ized text, and quite successfully, although I prefer a different punctuation from his; similarly Inwood and Woolf. a33 τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν C: the ἐν is marked by C2 with dots for deletion. a34 προαιρετὰ καὶ L: προαιρετικὰ καὶ PCB by dittography.

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64  Eudemian Ethics ii 1226a39 B’s δρῶμεν was independently suggested by Richards, claiming that ‘ “We go wrong by doing so with our senses” is a most unlikely expression’ (Richards, Aristotelica p. 56). But it seems more natural to construe αὐτὸ δρῶντες as ‘doing the thing’, i.e. whatever it is we are doing. B2 corrects to the other MSS’ δρῶντες by writing nu, then tau plus the shorthand for ες above the μεν of δρῶμεν. 1226b2 Since we only need one ἐστι and only L has two, it seems unreasonable of Walzer/Mingay to report ‘ἐστι προαίρεσις om. PC’ instead of quietly omitting L’s second, after προαίρεσις (they are following Susemihl’s ‘ἐστι προαίρεσις om. P’, which was at the time accurate, L not then being in the mix). Perhaps there was a second ἐστι in ω, e.g. ἔστιν before ὡς, and α´ omitted it, and προαίρεσις with it, while L just changed the accent? b4 καὶ βούλεται Ald. is a possibility, after the singular προαιρεῖται; the switch from singular to plural is perhaps hardly noticeable with οὐθείς as subject of the singular verb, but cf. 1226b13–15 προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς . . . βουλεύεται δὲ. b8 πρὸ ἑτέρου / πρὸς ἑτέρου / πρὸς ἑτέρον: I take it that Bessarion’s πρὸ ἑτέρου, in Par. 2042, must be right, after b6 δηλοῖ δέ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό (the ὄνομα is προαίρεσις, not *προσαίρεσις, and no

amount of pleading will make it so). L’s reading, together with that of Laur. 81,4 (which for this part of EE descends from C, and normally reproduces it faithfully), suggests that the origin of the confusion in the MSS may lie in a careless assimilation of πρὸ ἑτέρου to the τοῦτο that begins the next sentence and is actually duplicated in PCB, all of which give us πρὸς ἑτέρου τοῦτο. τοῦτο. . . . The process would have been helped by the way in which the copyist of PC writes—­and presumably also the predecessors of BL wrote—­πρός, i.e. with the omicron placed over the pi and rho, an accent over the omicron, and suppression of the final sigma (i.e. the standard method in PC of writing the -ος ending); πρός and πρό are thus distinguished only by the placing of the omicron + accent, and might then readily be confused, although there are not many other examples of such a confusion in these MSS (one possible example is in L at 1224b7).

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Aristotelica  65 b14 μὴ is supplied by P2 in the margin. b15–16 ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον PCBL, εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον Fritzsche: that βούλευσις can be better or worse might be said to be incidental to the point in hand, which is that no one προαιρεῖται without prior prep­ar­ation in the form of βούλευσις; the addition of (βουλευσάμενος) εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, by contrast, would help justify the emphatic προαιρεῖται . . . μηθεὶς. But since the MSS are unanimous, and the change is not necessary, stet. b18 ἅπαντες: Bonitz’s ἅπαντα would make a pair with b20 πάντα, but aesthetic considerations (as Hendrik Lorenz and Ben Morison remind me) do not by themselves trump unanimity among the MSS. b19 βουλόμεθα1/βουλευόμεθα: it must surely be βουλόμεθα (which, pace Walzer/Mingay, is already in Ald.; Victorius merely confirms it in the margin). Aristotle first confirms why προαίρεσις must be, not ὄρεξις pure and simple, but ὄρεξις of a certain sort, before going on to explain why/how it is specifically ὄρεξις βουλευτική; the shape of the argument is obscured by the brackets introduced by Woods and by Walzer/Mingay. —βουλόμεθα2 P1L, βουλευόμεθα CBP2: so probably both recensiones will have read βουλόμεθα here—­and should, I think, have read that instead of βουλευόμεθα in the preceding clause too. b24 οὐδ’ ὑπόληψις Susemihl: for οὐδὲ . . . οὔτε see Denniston 510 (Walzer/ Mingay). —τοῦ LP2, τὸ P1CB: it is hard to make out what was under the messy τοῦ in P, but something has surely been corrected, and it can hardly have been anything other than τὸ. —Ross’s supplement of τὸ before δοξάσαι is not needed; the omission of the article in such cases in EE is not unusual. b26 The στι of ἔστι is corrected above the line to τι in B; a small gap after οὐκέτι in P is caused by a fault—­actually a hole—­in the parchment; similarly after μία in the next line. b28 Between ἐστὶν and ἢ in B, above the line, another hand appears to have added an aspirated iota, the purpose of which is unclear. b33 δι’ and ἄγνοιαν are split between two lines in B; there is what looks like a—­later—­hyphen (?) in the margin after the δι’ (perhaps to indicate that δι’ is not δ’: see on 1227b17).

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66  Eudemian Ethics ii 1226b36 Bonitz’s supplement of ἅπαν is unnecessary, despite the following πάντα . . . πάντα, implying as it does a degree of stylistic consciousness (cf. Dirlmeier ad loc.: ‘sorgfältig stilisiert’) that the Aristotle of EE does not generally show. (My thanks to Friedemann Buddensiek for insisting on this; cf. on b18 above, and Bessarion at 1227a4 below.) b37 ἑκούσια: Susemihl prints ἀκούσια here by mistake. b39 Neither ἀδικημάτων (Bonitz) nor ποιημάτων (Ross) is con­vin­ cing as a substitute for παθημάτων; but in any case, since Aristotle is talking here about ordinary, non-­philosophical practice, παθήματα can just be taken as ‘things that happen to people’. If so, Woods’s objection that ‘the notion of a premeditated πάθημα is absurd’ misses the mark, and παθημάτων can happily stand. 1227a4 Bessarion in Par. 2042 writes οὔτε ἁπλῶς δόξα, then thinks better of it and crosses out the ἁπλῶς. a6 B’s ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά του βουλεύεται is an interesting variation, presumably of his own doing. a14 Fritzsche’s τούτῳ is attractive (with no comma preceding), but should it be τοῦτον? —ἐκ προτέρου P1, ἐκ ποτέρου P2: ἐκ ποτέρου is written out in margin following a pair of dots; there are corresponding dots above and below the first rho in προτέρου in the text. Allan’s specu­la­tive reconstruction of a13–14 (‘[as for example, whether to go to war or not,] people deliberating about this 〈must start from something prior;〉 but 〈what is αἱρετὸν〉’) expands the transmitted text without obviously improving on it. —δὲ del. Ross, i.e. adopting P2’s ἐκ ποτέρου. a17 εἰ: P2 writes the ligature for ει over what is surely an erased ἢ.

a18 ᾗ αὐτὸς P2 in margin, with ‘perhaps’. Rackham’s ἢ 〈ᾗ〉 is palaeographically plausible, and tempting, but probably falls too close to what begins to feel like a cleaning up of Aristotle’s (Eudemian) Greek; we have only to understand a ὅ τι before αὐτὸς. a22 παρὰ ϕύσιν: PC both have παρὰ, pace Walzer/Mingay (B misreads the standard shorthand for παρὰ in the way these MSS often do).

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Aristotelica  67

a23 διαστροϕῇ Fritzsche: διαστροϕὴν PCBL; καὶ 〈κατὰ〉 διαστροϕὴν Sylburg; διὰ στροϕὴν Jackson. Jackson’s solution, while neat, seems unlikely given that the noun διαστροϕὴ will indubitably figure in a31. Fritzsche wins by a short head over Sylburg (‘alterutrum verum’, comments Susemihl, while printing διαστροϕὴν) because it is marginally less economical to suppose the loss of κατὰ—­the abbreviation of which, incidentally, in PC is clearly distinguishable from that for καί—­than that διαστροϕῇ was attracted into the case of the preceding noun. We can see from the manner of C’s διαστροϕὴν how readily διαστροϕῆ—­no iota subscript—­could have become διαστροϕὴν: the superscript shorthand ending for ην is itself easily mistaken for a superscript eta (even if the accent would be wrong). a24 τὰ] τοῖς Richards. Richards is strictly right in saying we should expect the dative, given the following χρήσασθαι. But I hesitate to emend, construing ‘in respect of some, it is not possible to employ [them]. . .’. —  τ’ ] τε BP2: there is an original elision mark in P, and so pre­sum­ably an original tau, but it has been overwritten, with an epsilon added, in a different ink. a27 ἐστήμης L1: L2 writes πι above the line, overlapping the epsilon and the sigma. a34 There is a small gap after ἀλλ’ εἰς in P because of the hole in the parchment (see above for the other side = P107r). a35 ἐκβῆναι in P is split ἐκβῆ-ναι across a gap caused by the hole in the parchment. a42 Bekker omits the καὶ before ἄμεινον, evidently on the authority of Marc.; Susemihl says it is missing from P too, without recording as Bekker does that P lacks the whole of 41–2 οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει . . . καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν (as do CB); Walzer/Mingay then has ‘καὶ post ἥδιον add. L’, even though it has just said ‘[41–2] οὕτω . . . λυπηρὸν om. PC’. For all we know, the καὶ was in ω, but Marc. was in any case right to leave it out. 1227b16 τὸν λόγον B1, τῶν λόγων B2: B1 wrote τὸν, as he sometimes likes to do, with the tau above the ον, and B2 inserts an omega between

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68  Eudemian Ethics ii (1227b16) them; λόγον he converts to λόγων with an omega above the second omicron. —διαϕθείρει is split between lines in B, with a hyphen (if that is what it is) after διαϕ in the margin. b17 There is a similar hyphen-­like mark after the second δ’ in B as it ends the line: is a reader mistakenly interpreting the δ’, with its top extended downwards, as δι’—by now a familiar confusion in these MSS? b19 C has ἡ μὲν, pace Walzer/Mingay, not ὅτι. There is something before the ἡ, which I would like to have been one of the innumerable versions of the sign for καί, but is probably just a nu written in error after the sign for the final -ον of αἴτιον. b26 Editors since Bekker have preferred συλλογισμὸς (Ambr.) over λογισμὸς (PCBL), but any modern editor, i.e. one who knows that Ambr. is not a primary MS, must surely prefer λογισμὸς. The only problem I can see with λογισμὸς is to see how it differs, here, from λόγος (οὐκ ἔστι λογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος), but then distinguishing between συλλογισμὸς and λόγος is hardly much easier. The Ambr. copyist (Chalkondyles) evidently just liked συλλογισμὸς better. —Since Allan’s version, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴν τοῦτο ὑποκεῖσθαι, actually comes to much the same as the MSS’ ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω,

there is little to be said for adopting it. A positive con­sid­er­ation against it is that it would rob us of the combination ἀλλὰ δὴ (‘avversativa molto forte’, Donini), which builds upon the emphatic τούτου οὐκ ἔστι λογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. b32 Since δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν makes no sense (although editors print it), the question is whether to save the δεῖ, with Rackham, or the τόδε, with Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation; cf. I.8, 1218b19–20. I choose the latter option, for the reasons Kenny gives (Aristotle’s Theory of the Will [London: Duckworth, 1979]: 132) and because it helps with the general structure and shape of the surrounding sentence. —τό δε B2, introducing δε above γε; τόδε is presumably intended, τό and γε just happening to be on two different lines. b40 οὗ ἕνεκα secludenda ci. Richards: in common with other editors, including Bekker and Susemihl, Richards appears not to know about the

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Aristotelica  69 following δεῖ; Walzer/Mingay reports it, in a parenthesis, as being in only C and L, when it is in all of PCBL. But it is surely key: with Fritzsche’s τῷ (for τὸ) προαιρεῖσθαι, it surely gives a perfectly acceptable sense, i.e. ‘. . . through [a person’s] προαιρεῖσθαι [for the sake of] what/the thing [they] should [προαιρεῖσθαι] for the sake of ’; cf. 1227b15. 1228a1 After πράττειν here, after ἐκ τῆς in a2 and after a3 ἀλλ’ οὐ there are small gaps in P because of another fault in the parchment. a2 οὗ secl. Fritzsche: was οὗ introduced by someone who thought—­ bizarrely, after all that Aristotle has said—­that he was now saying that it belonged to προαίρεσις to make the τέλος right? ‘The alternative, keeping οὗ, is to read τὸ instead of τοῦ [at the beginning of the sentence]’, Woods: that would give us ‘the end of the προαίρεσις’s being ὀρθὸν [is] what ἀρετὴ is αἰτία of ’, which is a rather bizarre way of putt­ing what is being said more straightforwardly by the sentence as printed. There are bizarreries in EE, but that is not a reason for adding to their number. a11 ‘ἑκούσια L2, ut vid.’, Walzer/Mingay, but actually L2 corrects L’s ἑκούσια by writing the required alpha above over the epsilon. a13 ἐιστὴν C, with tau over the sigma and an oblique stroke beside it standing in for the ending: presumably -ην. a14 καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς traieci post a15 προαιρεῖται δ’ οὐδείς: if 1225b3–6 ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε . . . τὸ δ’ ἦν κώνειον intruded into the syntax, καίτοι . . . τῆς ἀρετῆς intrudes so violently into the sense of the surrounding sentence that it cannot plausibly even be corralled by dashes (my preferred manner of marking parentheses)— it is, after all, a complete sentence, which separates what comes before from its explanation. (Translators can hide the difficulty: so Kenny [Oxford World’s Classics], with ‘. . . we look at the choice rather than the deeds, even though. . . . This is because. . .’. But καίτοι is not a conjunction [‘even though’: cf. Simon Slings on καίτοι in Plato, Republic VII, 511d1–2 (Slings, Critical Notes on Plato’s Politeia, ed. G. Boter and J. van Ophuijsen, Leiden: Brill, 2005: 113–19)], and while ‘This is because’ can easily refer back over the intervening ‘even though . . .’, the Greek it

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70  Eudemian Ethics ii (1228a14) translates, a bare ὅτι, cannot.) Either καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς originated as a gloss (as the five words introduced by καίτοι at Republic 511d1–2 surely did), or it appears in the wrong place. I have adopted the latter solution, on the grounds that the words are immediately picked up as the first part of the conclusion in 18–19 (αἱρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια), which probably itself makes it too important, as it is in any case, to be hidden away in a parenthesis. —B makes a mess of the beginning of αἱρετώτερον, for which either he or someone else makes amends by inserting a supralinear αἱ before the mess.

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Eudemian Ethics III 1228a23 ἐν 〈ταῖς〉 ἀρεταῖς: at least from Bekker onwards editors have read ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς without comment, suggesting that the ταῖς is in all / the main MSS, the exception being Walzer/Mingay, who claims that it is in P; it is not in fact to be found in any of PCBL. But according to Bekker (I have not checked) it is in Marc. In any case, pace Fritzsche, ἐν 〈ταῖς〉 ἀρεταῖς­—or ἐν ἀρεταῖς, though the ἀρεταί seem too central to the context to be deprived of the definite article—­is what is needed, being essential for a careful restatement of the conclusion in II.5, 1222b12–14: not all ἀρεταί are μεσότητες, because the intellectual ones are not. a24 αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι will be joint subject of the present clause with the preceding αὗται = the μεσότητες which are in the ἀρεταί = the relevant ἀρεταί: ‘and [that] these and the opposing κακίαι are προαιρετικαί ’. The slight modification of the subject, I suppose, requires the αὗται, but is not complete enough to make the τε after μεσότητες εἰσί ‘out of place’ (Richards). Then, with the addition of the κακίαι, the subject has changed again, necessitating a second αὗται, at the end of the present line. An alternative might be to follow Spengel and put L’s αἱ after ἐναντίαι, from where it might easily have fallen out by haplography, in which case Aristotle would be including in his summary (ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . καθόλου εἴρηται) the treatment of the paradoxical ἐναντιότης of the κακίαι, both to each other and to the μεσότητες, that was one of the central points later on in Book II; but this is probably implicit in any case with αἱ where it is in L (deest in PCB). —κακίας B2, unaccountably, writing the shorthand for -ας plus acute accent over the -αι; for confirmation, cf. the -ας in B’s ἐναντίας in 1228b2. Would we be meant to make cor­res­pond­ing changes to the preceding ἐναντίαι, and perhaps to καὶ too: κατ’ ἐναντίας κακίας? (Surely not, but something must have been in the corrector’s mind.) Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.003.0003

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72  Eudemian Ethics III 1228a29 ἐν τῇ διαγραϕῇ: ἐκ was evidently written in error for ἐν in the common source of PCB, i.e. α´. In C Nikolaos corrects to the genitive in line with the ἐκ, while in P a second hand makes the same correction, adding the required sigmas to the two original superscript etas; B or his immediate source behaves like C but then writes γραϕῆς, perhaps in search of sense. —πρότερον for πότερον or vice versa is a common error in these MSS, and an easy one in the presence of the ligature of rho + omicron—­which PC usually copy (or fail to copy), while B’s and L’s practice is to break it into its constituent parts. —καὶ θράσος PC: the καὶ printed by Walzer/Mingay, following Susemihl (Bekker notes that it is in P, but does not print it), is not needed, and not being in B or L, was probably not in ω. a30 ϕόβον/ϕόβος: that C was independently correcting to the accusative looks unlikely, with πότερον beginning the clause instead of πρότερον; evidently ω had πότερον ϕόβον, and three separate copyists (Nikolaos when writing P, and the B and L copyists) independently wrote ϕόβος both because of πότερον and because of θράσος. a32 οὗτος/ὁ τοιοῦτος: ὁ τοιοῦτος would probably be the less expected reading (so preferable as lectio difficilior?); on the other hand it seems more likely for οὗτος to be corrupted—­perhaps via dittography—­into ὁ τοιοῦτος, not least with (κατὰ τὸ) τοιοῦτος following, than ὁ τοιοῦτος into οὗτος. In any case a double τοιοῦτος would feel awkward, especially when there is actually no need for the first. a34 B2 adds a separation mark below the line after οἷος, which ends with an σ; such marks, as noted before, are fairly common in B. a37 P2 overwrites the partially erased iota of ἐπὶ with the ligature for ει, and substitutes ἡ for an erased τῇ; the rough breathing competes with the remains of the old circumflex accent. What C has is actually ἀνδρεῖα (i.e. with no iota subscript), so that the circumflex is (slightly) less strange than it looks; C sometimes has ἀνδρεῖα for the nominative (e.g. b4, 1229a2), but so too sometimes does (Nikolaos in) P. 1228b1 ταὐτὸ: C alone writes the crasis mark; so too with ταὐτὰ.

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Aristotelica  73 b8 The fault in the parchment in P on f. 108r, in 1228a1–4, turns up here on f. 108v, running down from after μεγάλα here in b8 to after b12 ϕαίη and b13 ϕόβου. b10 ὁποῖα P2: with omicron inserted above the pi and the circumflex accent. —πρῶτον deest in PCB: PCB or (one of) their predecessor(s) perhaps read πρότερον for πότερον (see on a30 above), and omitted πρῶτον by a sort of haplography. For the record, L here, unusually, writes πρῶτον with the ending -ον above the tau, connecting with the circumflex accent; such a feature occurs in L, and in B, apparently at ­random. —αὑτῷ: if there is a rough breathing in P, as I think there is, it is by way of correction from a smooth, probably by the same hand. b12 Robinson’s rewriting here—­accepted by Walzer/Mingay—­is impossible to justify; the text as it stands makes perfectly good sense, and a somewhat different sense from the one Robinson imposes on it. — Walzer/Mingay reports εἴη ἂν as missing from P here; it is actually missing from all of P, C, and B in b14, before ἰσχυρὸς.

b13 ϕοβερά. 〈τὰ δὲ ϕοβερὰ〉 ϕόβου Bonitz: that the transmitted text (ϕοβερὰ ϕόβου) is corrupt is certain enough. How then to decide among the solutions offered? Fritzsche’s looks like a non-­starter: ϕοβερά is needed by the last sentence (unless we accept Bussemaker’s drastic . . . μέγα. 〈τὰ δὲ〉 ϕοβερὰ), and cannot be borrowed from there. Of the others, Bonitz’s and Dirlmeier’s proposals have the edge on Spengel’s insofar as they come with a story about how the corruption arose (haplography), and Bonitz’s has much the better story (as for Dirlmeier’s, why the loss of δὲ τὰ as well as of the second ϕοβερά?). One could argue that a second ϕοβερά is unnecessary, because ϕοβερά will be the subject of the present sentence in any case, and that all we require is a connective: supplying δὲ after ϕόβου, we could construe ‘and they [i.e. ϕοβερά, understood from the last sentence] are ϕόβου ποιητικὰ for each person for whom they are ϕοβερά’. Connectives, after all, not unusually go missing in these MSS. But this is a weak justification: why should a connective get lost here? Bonitz explains why: a copyist’s eye leapt straight to the second ϕοβερά, and took the preceding ϕοβερά. τὰ δὲ with it.

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74  Eudemian Ethics III 1228b14 Neither Russell’s καθ’ ὅσον nor Walzer/Mingay’s ᾗ seems a clear improvement on ᾧ, which is in any case perfectly intelligible; ᾗ in b22 and 24, cited by Walzer/Mingay, seems to function rather differently. b16 The emendation in the second edition of the Basle Aristotle (ϕοβεῖσθαι), adopted by Walzer/Mingay, misses the point of ποιεῖσθαι. There are many great ϕοβερά for the ἀνδρεῖος (b12–13), in particular because he goes out to face them, unlike the coward; ϕοβερά are the sorts of things to create fear for a person (b13–14); so the ἀνδρεῖος will actually create many great fears for himself—­which he ὑπομένει (b10). At any rate such a defence of ποιεῖσθαι looks reasonable enough to make it unsafe to print ϕοβεῖσθαι (the general sense will anyway be the same—­and less interesting with ϕοβεῖσθαι). b21 A second breathing is apparently added above οὔ by B2. b26 This ϕοβερὰ after ἁπλῶς might have originated as a gloss; the spare Eudemian style might easily leave it to be supplied by the reader. But it is probably more economical to suppose that it fell out in L (or a predecessor of L, if any, that postdated ω). b28 Allan’s supplement of ϕαίνεται is unnecessary, given that we have been operating throughout with the idea of things’ being ϕοβερά to/for someone. b35 οἱ πολλοί and οἱ πλεῖστοι: οἱ πολλοί can mark out different cat­ egor­ies, either the majority or ‘the [unsophisticated/banausic] many’, in which case we can take καὶ as epexegetic: ‘i.e. the majority’. If that is at all possible, as it surely is, no emendation is required. b37 οἱ δὲ P2, writing ἴσως: οἱ δὲ ὑϕ’ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ in the margin. As P2 sees, Aristotle here turns to the counterparts of the sick, the weak, and the coward, i.e. the ἀνδρεῖος together with the strong and the healthy, with whom he started comparing the ἀνδρεῖος in b31. The alternative, taken by Victorius and a number of others, is to suppose a lacuna before the καὶ ἔτι (so Susemihl); Bonitz’s proposal for filling the gap (the one he likes, which I give in the apparatus: see Susemihl for his rejected alternative) adds little to what P2 achieves with considerably greater economy and even elegance.

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Aristotelica  75 1229a3 τοῦτον PL, both misreading the sign for -ων as a circumflex, and taking the reference to be to λόγος? (Or: is the reference to λόγος?) Walzer/Mingay’s report that C has τοῦτο stems from just such a misunderstanding: that C intends τούτων is clear, τούτων being written as του with tau over the upsilon and the sign for -ων above, with an acute accent following. (Casaubon’s τοῦτο is a candidate, but it seems that a nu was in ω.) a5 B2 adds a nu over the sigma of μόνος. a9 Strictly speaking, of course, it is not τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ ϕθαρτικὰ that are fine but rather the withstanding of them, but the

slight illogicality is surely permissible; there is no need to follow Allan and emend καλὰ to καλὸν.

a11 B2 writes in ον above the ος (anticipating Rackham’s surely necessary emendation). a12–13 The loss of τὰ after ὁμοιότητα is no surprise. a16 Bonitz’s ἴσασι, supplied after ἀλλ’ ὅτι, is easily understood in any case (another example of EE’s telegraphic style); Jackson’s emendation, with εἰδέναι understood at the end of the sentence, is thus simply unnecessary. a18 τὰ ϕερόμενα = ‘whatever comes’ (Kenny); for a similar idiom see 1229b27. a19 B2 writes in οἱ above the εἰ. a23 καὶ is surely required: the shorthand sign for καὶ, as it is sometimes written in MSS that use it, is not too far removed from ἢ. a24 PL clearly write ἀποκτείνας; the error in CB, if that is what it is, presumably originates in the similarity of the signs for -ας and -ειν, the former in effect joining the two oblique strokes of the latter at the bottom; how similar can be seen by comparing the C copyist’s -ειν in ὑπομένειν at 1229a9 with his -ας in ἀνδρείας two lines later. (B here, unlike C, writes out the ending, being for the most part in the business of deciphering the shorthand, ligatures, etc. that are part of C, P, and other MSS like them.) Or: is ἀποκτείνειν possible—­Victorius prefers it

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76  Eudemian Ethics III (1229a24) to ἀποκτείνας—­if taken with μυθολογούμενος? Probably not; if Theseus is ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος, he is hardly a tyrannicide. a26 The acute accent on σύες in P looks original, a circumflex apparently being added later—­and then struck through twice (so σύες is both P1 and P3). Is the circumflex in CB possibly a surviving trace of an ori­ gin­al θῆρες, as in L? Still, θῆρες is surely wrong, since θῆρες would not need to be qualified as ἄγριοι. But perhaps we should read ὕες, which is the usual Attic form (and the one Aristotle uses in NE). a31 οὐδὲ μία PC: actually οὐ δὲ μία, but οὐδέ in PC is typically written with οὐ plus the special sign for δέ, and it seems likely that this is for convenience, here and elsewhere, rather than in order to make οὐδέ into two words. a37 προσδεχομένης B1: B2 introduces οι above the eta. a41 οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι: it is perhaps commoner for EE not to repeat the definite article in such cases, but since it is in a representative of either recensio, by my rule we should include it. a42 ὅσων B2: the mark B2 introduces over the ending of ὅσοις can only be a version of the sign for -ων. 1229b3 Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay both follow Victorius in bracketing the καί before δειλοί. But why should Aristotle not be saying that these people are also/actually δειλοί? b4 Bekker reports περὶ in P (i.e. τὴν περὶ τούτου), but does not print it; Susemihl does print it, and Walzer/Mingay follows suit, saying that it is not in L. But what is in P, and in C too, is παρὰ (as one can see by comparing the way περὶ is written in both just before), and παρὰ is anyway more likely than περὶ, especially since we have just had περὶ τὸν θάνατον, and τούτου itself presumably refers to death—­which is why Bekker probably omitted (what he thought was) περὶ here. παρὰ remains a possibility, but since the plain genitive is respectable enough and appears in B as well as L (i.e. in a representative of each of the two recensiones), I opt for that. b5 θερμασίας in P, written in above the line, is perhaps a gloss rather than an emendation? Glosses, on the other hand, are usually in the margin.

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Aristotelica  77 b6 τὰ τοιαῦτα B2, adding ὰ above -ὰς, alpha over -ας, and a circumflex over the upsilon. —B’s ὑπομενητικὸς, which according to LSJ appears as an alternative reading in several texts, might just be right; B also has ὑπομενητικός at 1232a26, where PC have ὑπομενετικός but L has ὑπομονητικός (so that ὑπομενητικός could have been in ω, in one or both places). 1229b14–1230a35 τὰ μὲν οὖν ϕοβερά . . . αἰσχρὸν γάρ desunt in B: this is an exceptionally large gap, not explainable in any of the usual ways, i.e. haplography, dittography, homoioteleuton—­or, probably, even carelessness of the usual sort, because, strikingly, what is missing is a whole section, namely the last section of the discussion of courage, in which Aristotle makes further distinctions about the causes or occasions of fear. I call it a ‘whole section’: what I intend by this is that if we did not have the passage in the other MSS, we would not necessarily miss it—­although, having it, we can see that it makes a number of important points, some of which are, indeed, some of the most interesting in the whole discussion of courage. On the other hand it is hard to see why anyone would make a deliberate decision to leave the section out. Nor can there be any question of the accidental loss of pages, because if the codex from which B was copied was of the same general type as B itself, or P, C, or L (which seems likely), individual folios are hardly more easily separable individually than the pages of a bound modern book. (We certainly have not lost part of B itself: the break starts after the first word of the seventh line.) The only remaining explanation appears to be that the copyist turned two pages at once, thus missing two sides of text, the beginning and end of which happened to coincide with our section: so, carelessness of a different kind from the usual. As it happens, the sixty or so missing lines do make up roughly two sides of the dimensions we find in B, though considerably less than two sides of P or C (rather more than two in L, in which the characters are larger, lines shorter, and there are fewer lines to the page). If there is any truth in this story, it is con­firm­ation—­if by this stage any confirmation were needed—­that the ori­gin­al from which B was copied cannot have been C or P: for the record, the missing passage starts five lines from the bottom of f. 116v in C, not at the end of a line, and ends at the end of the seventh line of f. 117v; the picture is similar for P.

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78  Eudemian Ethics III 1229b15 P2 strikes through τῆς, and adds ικῆς in a curious downward sweep beside ϕθαρτῆς­—itself written with tau above the rho, and a circumflex over the tau—­in the margin, ϕθαρτῆς being the last word in the line. P  is here surely being corrected against L or one of its descendants. b16 καὶ2 deest in PC: and dispensable?

b22 τὴν ψυχὴν 〈ἔνια〉 Robinson: perhaps superior to Ross’s supplement of τινὰ after καὶ, but ‘some’, however it might be spelled out, can readily be understood in any case. b23 οὖν post οἱ μὲν suppl. Bonitz: but does an οὖν fit here? Aristotle is  now introducing a new observation, not something that obviously derives from (what I have presented as) the preceding paragraph, or indeed the one before that. We might miss a connective here, but which should it be? —Susemihl writes ἐπιψεύδονται without comment (or authority). b32 The sign for καὶ in L is supplied by another hand above the line between δὲ and δι’. —No nu ephelkustikon in PCL, as (nearly) always in these MSS at the end of a sentence before another starting with a consonant, even with no regular punctuation marking the end of a sentence; B has the nu, but probably only because it has a liking for them. b35 A διὰ (suppl. Rackham) has obviously to be understood before ϕυγὴν in any case; I take it that after διὰ ταύτην . . . δι’ ἄλλην . . . this is

easy enough. —Here and in 1230a19 it is reasonable to suppose that the ἂν dropped out because of the following ἀνδρεῖος, even though it is not inevitable that it was originally in either place (see note on II.7, 1223a25). b36 Nikolaos’ eye apparently slipped, when he was writing C, to

ἀποθνήσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος in 38, reproducing it here; C2 (or just pos-

sibly Nikolaos himself?) then marks the three words with dots above and below for deletion. b40–1 P2 writes ἴ[σως] ἔχει in the margin with insertion mark in the text between ἑτοίμως and ἀποθνήσκειν; ἔχει would explain the

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Aristotelica  79 adverb, but the solution proposed by a correcting hand in Laur. 81,4 (anticipating Bekker) is more economical. 1230a12 Opposite the line ending with εἶεν and beginning with τοῦτο ἀνδρεία there is something in the margin of P that I have not succeeded in deciphering; there is no insertion mark in the text and it was probably not intended as a correction. a19 αἰτίων] ἀνδρείων Spengel. Richards apparently takes ἀνδρείων to be original, since he says that it should be omitted: ‘Neither here nor in the Nicom. Ethics are they held to be ἀνδρεῖοι’. But Aristotle could surely have called the people in question ἀνδρεῖοι, as it were in scare quotes. Still the case for ἀνδρείων is not quite made: Aristotle could, I think, have written αἰτίων, given that all the focus of the context is on the causes/ motivation of the various types of ἀνδρεῖοι; the switch from αἴτια to the people moved by them would not be incompatible with the kind of shorthand we find elsewhere in EE (for a similar if less harsh switch, see b10–11, where we move from different types of ἀκολασία in the opening genitive absolute [b9] to what must be masculine plurals, ἀλλήλων and τῶν ἄλλων). Again, ἀνδρείων looks redundant, except perhaps as a way of explaining how αἰτίων might have made its way into the text (but then how would ἀνδρείων have been mistaken for αἰτίων?). Bracketing αἰτίων then looks attractive, and perhaps αἰτίων originated as a gloss. But why would anyone feel the need to gloss πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, which on its own would hardly be mysterious: ‘of all such people/types . . . ’? Stet αἰτίων. —ἂν suppl. Spengel: cf. n. on 1229b35. a22 ἐλεγχείη P1: there are, I think, traces of a nu being added over the (already supralinear) eta by P2. a25 P2 writes ὁμοῦ above ὁμόσε. a26 ϕοβούμενον Casaubon, τὸ ϕοβερὸν Russell: Casaubon’s emend­ ation seems right, in a context dominated by the singular, Russell’s high-­handed. Donini keeps the MSS’ ϕοβουμένους, calling Russell’s conjecture ‘del tutto superflua e banalizzante’ (not unreasonably). Presumably he accepts Spengel’s ἀδοξήσουσι, but actually that is a ­bigger change than making a surprising plural, ϕοβουμένους, into a singular.

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80  Eudemian Ethics III 1230a27 μὴ νομίζειν appears to be written over an original ἀποθανεῖσθαι in P, quite probably by Nikolaos himself; he missed it out, going straight to ἀποθανεῖσθαι, then realized his mistake, over­wrote it with μὴ νομίζειν, then followed it with another ἀποθανεῖσθαι. The correction is messy, with the first theta still intact between μὴ νομίζειν; corrections by later hands perhaps tend to be neater? a36 B resumes here, with περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν. a37 P2 writes ἴσως: ἔχει in margin, with insertion mark in text. a40 πως/πῶς: the accent is neither here nor there, given the record of these MSS, and ‘not subjected to κόλασις of some sort’ seems to make perfectly good sense—­κόλασις can take different forms. The only advantage of Victorius’ πω would be to explain the πως, were that to be problematical, since one might say that πω is anyway already implicit in the perfect participle. 1230b1 ἰατευόμενος C1: the rho is added in, in a lighter ink, over the line between the tau and the epsilon. Dirlmeier’s defence of the present ἰατρευόμενος is weak (‘not [even?] being under treatment’?); κόλασις is not wholly appropriate to the case of the ἀκόλαστος, despite being embedded in the name (κεκολασμένος πως), so Aristotle brings in ἰάτρευσις in support. Dirlmeier’s argument that the form ἰατρευμένος is not found elsewhere is particularly unconvincing: it is perfectly regular, we do find the active ἰάτρευκα, and there will inevitably be some forms that are missing from the limited range of Greek literature still extant. —ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος: translators—­e.g. Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation and Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation—­are obviously right to translate this as if it were neuter, the sense being ‘not κεκολασμένος / ἰατρευμένος, just as if we were talking about cutting’—the cutting being transferred to the person (i.e. the one not κεκολασμένος), when the real application of the cutting is to a thing, as the immediate switch in b2–3 to the neuter shows; the same thing happens in reverse with b4 τὸ ἀκόλαστον, etc., which refers to the person (no thing was ever ἀκόλαστον). The reference of τούτων (καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός . . .) is to the person and the object of the cutting. See further below on 1230b7–8.

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Aristotelica  81 b2 τότε P, i.e. written as P would normally write τότε, with the second tau over the omicron followed by an acute accent, no epsilon. b7–8 ἔτι δ’ ἄλλον τρόπον . . . : how many types of ἀκολασία are there supposed to be? Three, I take it: the main type is illustrated by—­but not restricted to—­children (hence the colon printed after παῖδες in b6), the other two bring those now introduced: (1) those who are hard to ‘cure’, and (2) those whom it turns out to be impossible to cure. The latter type may seem to reintroduce the category of the ἀδύνατον (κολάζεσθαι) that seemed to be excluded by a39–b2, but the difference—­I take it—­is that a human being is something πεϕυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, even if some individuals actually turn out not to be curable. (Hence the switch to the neuter in b2.) b12–13 διεγράψαμεν . . . μεταϕέρομεν: where exactly did we/Aristotle do this? It is hard to understand Dirlmeier’s claim that the relevant types, i.e. those called ἀκόλαστοι κατὰ μεταϕοράν, were ‘schematisch aufgezeichnet’ in III.3, 1221a19–22; or is such a reference to them meant to be hidden in 1221a20 ὑπερβάλλων πᾶσιν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται? Alter­ natively something has been lost—­in or around 1221a20, Solomon suggests, reasonably enough; or Aristotle’s memory for once failed him. —PCB’s ὄνομα seems just possible, but L’s ὀνομάζοντες is preferable. b13 Susemihl’s δὲ for the MSS’ γὰρ seems required, unless the sort about to be discussed, the ἀναίσθητοι, are some of the ἄλλοι from whom the ἀκόλαστοι have just been said to differ (b11), with διεγράψαμεν . . . μεταϕέρομεν as a parenthetical note interrupting the syntax. But οἱ ἄλλοι (τῶν ἄλλων, b11) are rather just the general run of mankind. b14 πρὸς ταύτας τὰς Spengel: unnecessarily: they are the same pleasures, after all? —Rieckher proposes a lacuna after ἡδονὰς, the case for which is unclear: if the text as transmitted gives a good sense, as it does here, there is no point in speculating that it might once have given an even better one. b15 Susemihl prints τοιούτους without mentioning that this is a conjecture: PCBL all have the dative, as evidently does Marc., to judge by the fact that Bekker prints it without comment. (Susemihl goes on to

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82  Eudemian Ethics III (1230b15) conjecture a lacuna after τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν [‘〈, οἷον **〉’], on which see Dirlmeier: ‘S.  hat das Pronomen nicht verstanden’.) b16 ἐπι πόλεως B2: B2 writes an epsilon and a ligature for -ως above the -αιον of ἐπιπόλαιον, thus ‘correcting’ B against an MS like P and C. b17 πᾶσιν in B is post corr., i.e. from πᾶσαν, the body of the second alpha being filled in, probably by the original hand. b19 The first omicron in P’s κωμοδιδάσκαλοι is overwritten with an omega; there are also traces of an earlier correction over the line. b31 Both Fritzsche’s and Russell’s supplements represent further ­unnecessary filling out of Aristotle’s Greek. b35 κηλούμενοι P2: an original alpha in P is heavily overwritten with an eta. —Walzer/Mingay wrongly reports a περὶ for παρὰ in C here. b36 Editors typically write a full stop after Σειρῆσιν (Walzer/Mingay even begins a new paragraph), but a comma seems better: ‘such-­and-­ such and such-­and-­such would not seem to be ἀκόλαστος, but rather [the ἀκόλαστος is] περὶ . . . τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἁπτά’. b37 τἆλλα θηρία in P is written over something else, most of which was erased but some of which is still visible—­especially a rho between τἆλλα and θηρία, which other traces beneath τἆλλα suggest may have been the end of a ἅπερ. My diagnosis is that there was originally a ­dittography in P, probably of περὶ ἅπερ, followed immediately by τἄλλα but without θηρία (i.e. περὶ ἅπερ περὶ ἅπερ τἆλλα), all of which P2 erased and replaced with περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τἆλλα θηρία from an MS like L; the new ἅ and περ are separated, perhaps to make up the available space after the suppression of the second περὶ ἅπερ. Some aspects of the above reconstruction are admittedly speculative, but it is certain both that there was erasure and rewriting, and that there is room for no more than one word after the stray rho after τἆλλα and before the following μόνον. In other words (I submit), θηρία was originally missing from P as well as from CB.

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Aristotelica  83 b39 αἰσθήσεων looks an attractive alternative to αἰσθητῶν, but we have been talking about things sensed rather than the senses—­or is this perhaps why αἰσθήσεων got changed to αἰσθητῶν? 1231a8 Fritzsche’s supplement of μὴ before καθ’ αὑτὰς is a necessity, with καθ’ αὑτὰς δὲ following in a10–11. —αἷς Spengel: since χαίρειν can be used with an internal acc. of the thing enjoyed, there seems no pressing need to accept Spengel’s emendation—­however much datives otherwise dominate in the context, and however easy it is to suppose assimilation of the relative to the preceding -ὰς. —μὴ PCBL, ἢ Fritzsche: for a copyist who was paying attention, μὴ for ἢ (i.e. ἢ1) might be the natural thing to write once the preceding μὴ had been left out. a9 Marc. has ἑτέρου for ἑτέραν, which is endorsed by Fritzsche. Now the general policy of the present edition is only to cite derivative MSS where there is a problem (i.e. in the primary MSS) and they have something that helps or might help solve it; here there is no problem, and Fritzsche’s endorsement of ἑτέρου dates from a time when the status of Marc. was unknown, as does his endorsement—­following Bekker and Bussemaker—­of Marc.’ s surely erroneous οἷαι for οἷον before αἱ in the next line. This might suggest a certain inconsistency: I cite more recent conjectures, so why not alternative readings in later MSS that may themselves have been conjectures rather than simple errors? My reply is that by and large the copyists were just that, copyists, not editors, and that it is therefore reasonable—­by and large—­to begin by assuming that vari­ations in the lesser MSS are mistakes, and to call such MSS in aid only where their primary counterparts let us down. a11 The ἀν- of ἀνθῶν is a later correction in L, being heavily written over something else (heavily enough to obscure it completely). a12 τὰ Casaubon for τὰς (bis): but ὀσμάς can readily be understood from ὄζειν. —ἐπεὶ καὶ: ‘Although in fact . . .’ (the comparison with τὰ θηρία will only take us so far). a14 ὅσων B2 for ὅσοις B1 (bis): on the first occasion B2 instals the shorthand for -ων (resembling an extended circumflex, with a twirl at the end) above the οις; on the second he writes out ων above οις.

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84  Eudemian Ethics III 1231a16–17 ἀλλὰ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὸν ϕάρυγγα γεράνου B: it would perhaps be too hasty to write off τὴν χεῖρα (sc. μακρὰν) καὶ as an invention by the B copyist (or a predecessor, if there was a chain leading from the hyparchetype). There evidently was someone called Philoxenus, whose failings were well enough known to be mentioned not only by Aristophanes (Wasps 84, Clouds 686, Frogs 934) but by Eupolis (fr. 235). Rackham in  the Loeb translation suggests that he was a comedy character: ‘Mr Hospitable, son of Mistress Belch’ (Dorothea Frede makes the same suggestion independently, in Aristoteles. Werke, in deutscher Übersetzung, Band 6: Nikomachische Ethik, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020, on 1118a32–3: see below), on which V. Castellani comments: Although because of his father’s improbable proper name Eruxis (genitive Eruxios or Eruxidos), ‘Belch’, it was not unreasonable for . . . Rackham to pronounce the gourmand ‘. . . a character of comedy, though later writers speak of him as a real person’, evidence for an historical Philoxenos whom not only Aristophanes . . . but also . . . Eupolis mentioned suggests that we have not a complete fiction but a caricature. Part of the joke Aristotle repeats for us seems to lie in an invented (?) name Eruxis (whom—­or, rather, which—­the Frogs makes Philoxenos’ son); but part, I believe, also depends upon a lost comic scene in which Philoxenos must have uttered his grotesque and unforgettable prayer. (There is no non-­comic evidence that any person named ‘Eruxis’ ever existed; four men named ‘Eruxias’, three of them Athenian, are attested.) (V. Castellani, ‘Drama and Aristotle’, in J. Redmond (ed.), Drama and Philosophy (= Themes of Drama, vol. 12), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990: 35 n. 10)

If this is right, then it is not impossible that B’s version fills out the one we find in the other MSS—­and also, in slightly different form, in NE, which in Bywater’s text reads ‘This is why a certain gourmandizer (τις ὀψόϕαγος ὢν) actually prayed for a throat longer than a crane’s’ (NE III.10, 1118a32–3). Interestingly, Philoxenus turns up in the MSS of NE too, after the τις in 1118a32, though Bywater omits it from the text itself, commenting ‘post τις add. ϕιλόξενος ὁ ἐρύξιος KbΓ ’. Bekker’s NE apparatus suggests a much more complicated story with the MSS, which indicates that Philoxenus was a part of the NE tradition as well as that of EE (there is little evidence of

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Aristotelica  85 cross-­contamination between the two Ethics, outside their shared interest, whatever that might have been, in the books we usually refer to as NE V– VII). But since the name fits so badly after τις in NE, it must surely have originated as a gloss, written by someone who could independently connect the saying with its author, who by this stage is known only—­if Castellani is right—­from his caricature. (My—­highly speculative—­hypothesis is that B’s version, ‘. . . gourmands do not wish for a long tongue, but rather for a long arm and the gullet of a crane’ is a fuller version of the original ‘grotesque prayer’, one which might just have originated with Aristotle himself. But the evidence of P, C, and L is probably against it.) a17 ἐξύριδος B1: B2 inserts three dots in an inverted triangle over the upsilon, indicating the need for correction: to what? a25 ὅσα μὴ: P2 writes οἱ μὲν in the margin, apparently to be read after ὅσα (or perhaps for μὴ?), to match the ensuing οἱ δ’ (an ingenious but impossible way of construing the sentence). Walzer/Mingay’s positioning of the ensuing colon after ἀκρατεῖς instead of after ἐγκρατεῖς may be a simple mistake; perhaps not, because it gives a kind of sense, but putt­ing it after ἐγκρατεῖς plainly works better. a28–b2 ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν . . . προσαγορευομένη desunt in B: another significant gap in B, though much shorter than the last, again for no immediately obvious reason, although on this occasion we would have missed the omitted section insofar as it sums up the treatment of σωϕροσύνη and its opposing κακίαι. On the other hand, the sentence with which B resumes fits perfectly with the one after which it breaks off, and that presumably has something to do with the omission. a33 We might have expected ἢ λυπεῖσθαι as in the next line but one (or οὐδὲ?), but καὶ works if the two items are just being lumped together as features of ἀκολασία. 1231b2 B resumes at this point, i.e. with ἀκριβέστερον δὲ. b7 πώς: for the record, PCBL all have πῶς, which is how they write my πώς. b10 P2 writes δουλογνώμωνα above the line over ἀνδραπωδώδη: a gloss, not a correction? —We should not give up too easily on the MSS’ ἀνόητον, given that there is no systematic correspondence between Book III and the list of πάθη that we actually have in Book II: so for

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86  Eudemian Ethics III (1231b10) example ἀναλγησία has appeared at 1231a34 in a different role from the one it had at 1220b38 and 1221a16, i.e. as the deficiency cor­res­pond­ing to the excess labelled ὀργιλότης. If we were looking for a substitute for ἀνάλγητον, it might be hard to resist Russell’s ἀόργητον (which is perhaps what Rackham intended, instead of the ἀνόργητον he prints here, having substituted ἀοργησία for ἀναλγησία in Book II: in any case ἀνόργητος barely exists; one supposes Russell was merely ­correcting Rackham). But after ἀνδραποδώδη either ἀνάλγητον or ἀόργητον would look tame: Aristotle is already thinking about people who easily put up with being kicked around, as the sequel shows (σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς . . . προπηλακιζομένους εὐχερῶς). In which case ἀνόητον is not a bad fit; Dirlmeier is right to compare the use of ἠλίθιος in the same context in NE (IV.5, 1126a4–5). b13–14 B2’s modifications to the sequence τῷ . . . τὸ, τῷ . . . τὸ, τῷ . . . τὸ seem unsystematic and anyway pointless. b22 ἕξεις is corrected to ἕξις in B with an iota above the ligature for ει. b39 χρημαστικήν B1: B2 writes in τι above the αστ. 1232a4 PCL’s ὑποδήματα—­Walzer/Mingay makes unnecessarily heavy weather of its report of PC here—­is clearly wrong; B’s ὑποδήματι is all that is needed (and would have been palaeographically quite respectable as an emendation, unlike either of Robinson’s; Rackham’s supplement of  ᾗ (on which Robinson builds; but why the dative ὑποδήματι after ᾗ  in his versions?) merely spells out what is to be understood in any case). a12 In C there is a sign, ∞, in the margin opposite the line ending . . . ϕειδωλὸς2, and beginning with a11 ἧττον, which seems to indicate a curiosity/something needing attention—­perhaps what PCB read as *κίβιξ. a13 Bekker writes ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προσίεσθαι for the MSS’ ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προΐεσθαι without comment, and perhaps it does not need one. a20 Β2 writes αἴτι above εὔδι. The curious formation εὔδιον comes close to confirming Bonitz’s highly plausible ἴδιον. How did it arise? Was there perhaps an ἀΐδιον in ω (the common source of PCBL)?

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Aristotelica  87 a21 Neither Fritzsche’s nor Ross’s supplement appears necessary, since κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν κτλ can be taken with λανθάνει. a22 ταὐτὸ: only C has the crasis mark; also in a25 (ταὐτὰ). a24 ἐλευθερίῳ Ambr.2: the first two letters of ἀνελευθερίῳ are marked with dots for deletion. Here as elsewhere Susemihl attributes a correction to Ald. that Ald., at least ultimately, derives from Ambr., a manuscript evidently unavailable to Susemihl. a24–5 P makes something of a mess of καὶ ὁ (if that is what he is writing). a25 P2 writes what looks like ἴ[σως]: γείτονες in the margin with no insertion marks; the ἴσως shows that γείτονες is meant as a conjecture for ὅμοροι. a27 ὁ μὲν ὧδε ὅδ’ ὧδε B2: writing ὅδ’ above the line between the two ὧδεs. a31 ἔτι Spengel: ὅτε PCBL; ὅτι ci. Susemihl; †ὅτε† et lacunam pos. Russell. ὅτε will not work, and ὅτι is scarcely better, even if it can sometimes mean ‘because’; that (μεγαλοψυχία) πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν ϕαίνεται is hardly a reason for the apparent similarity just mentioned. There being no grounds to suspect a lacuna (Russell) apart from the bad fit of the MSS’ ὅτε, I see no alternative to Spengel’s ἔτι, to which surely no one would have raised any objection had it been in the tradition. (Mingay takes up Russell’s suggestion of a lacuna and conjectures δοκεῖ, 〈διὰ κοινόν τι〉 ὅ τε 〈κριτικόν ἐστι〉 καὶ, in which she is influenced by the following καὶ γὰρ, supposing that it needs to be preceded by some prior mention of a ‘power of discrimination’, i.e. κρῖναι; but this is perhaps given by a30 δυνάμεως, which could reasonably be taken, at least in retrospect, as precisely such a power [what other sort of power/capacity would Aristotle have in mind?]. Russell is evidently concerned, as perhaps is Mingay, about the unannounced switch of subject from the μεγαλόψυχος to μεγαλοψυχία, but while this is harsh it seems tolerable: c.f. e.g. 1233a38–b1, where similar issues arise.) a34–5 περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα [εἶναι ἡδέα]: the deletion of εἶναι ἡδέα is attributable to Walzer/Mingay, being a combination of Spengel’s and Richards’s proposals for remedying the text (Walzer/Mingay punctiliously but

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88  Eudemian Ethics III (1232a34–5) unnecessarily prints [εἶναι] [ἡδέα]). Spengel rightly saw ἡδέα as a doub­ling up of the following ἡ δὲ, while Richards says ‘εἶναι is an erroneous repetition of the εἶναι in [the previous line]’; both things are surely true. If Spengel meant to keep εἶναι, it is not clear what he thought its function was, and ἡδέα as retained by Richards is either redundant or actually out of place. (Simpson’s εἰ καὶ ἡδέα for εἶναι ἡδέα is ingenious, but his paraphrase, designed to show how the pleasantness of things could be relevant here, mainly serves to show that it is not.) a37 καὶ ἡ ἀρετή is perhaps prima facie disturbing both because the main subject of the sentence is ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ, and because αὐτῇ in the following clause has to refer back to the special ἀρετή of μεγαλοψυχία, something that is already difficult enough—­though quite possible—­after ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ; it may also look redundant, given that ἀρετή is already doing the judging. So perhaps Spengel is right to bracket it. On the other hand Aristotle presumably adds ἅπερ ὁ ϕρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε in order to avoid the appearance of saying that the ethical ἀρεταί themselves do the intellectual work; might he not then have added καὶ ἡ ἀρετή to remind us that of course ἀρετή itself is co-­involved with the operation of ϕρόνησις? 1232b1 τὰ παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλα are ‘things irrationally deemed great’ (Kenny), not ones ‘so great that reason forbids your facing them’ (Richards), which would not fit the cases that follow that of ἀνδρεία, i.e. those of the σώϕρων and the ἐλευθέριος. b2 μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαι εἶναι scripsi, μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι PCBL: the text as it stands must be corrupt, insofar as μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν would have to be understood as ‘for (the ἀνδρεῖος) does think 〈being afraid in the face of big dangers big〉—big among the things that are shameful’, which is surely too much of a stretch even for ΕΕ. Jackson’s solution is palaeographically apt, but the repetition οἴεσθαι/οἴεται looks limp. My suggested μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν accepts the spirit of Jackson’s emendation while (a) perhaps explaining better how the corruption might have occurred, and (b) matching the shorthand evident in the following πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν ϕοβερόν: ‘[the ἀνδρεῖος thinks (a supplement justified by the fact that we are talking about attitudes)]

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Aristotelica  89 thinking [facing dangers] a big thing is something shameful’. If this is too extreme/too shorthand, Solomon’s μέγα γὰρ 〈ἡγεῖσθαι〉 οἴεται εἶναι would be a fair alternative; Richards’s μέγα γάρ 〈τι ϕοβεῖσθαι〉 οἴεται εἶναι looks like a shot in the dark. Dirlmeier’s τὸ αἰσχρὸν for τῶν αἰσχρῶν offers a different, and blander, kind of solution: ‘als «gross» sieht (d)er (Tapfere) nur das Minderwertige an’—a solution that moreover seems to start from a misunderstanding of Jackson’s ‘for it (sc. bravery) considers it disgraceful to hold them great’ (‘versteht also [comments Dirlmeier] τῶν αἰσχρῶν als Neutrum. Und soweit wenigstens hat er recht’, but Jackson is surely, and rightly, treating τῶν αἰσχρῶν as a partitive genitive). On my proposal, καὶ πλῆθος οὐ πᾶν ϕοβερόν explains or expands on μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσχρῶν in the context of ἀνδρεία. b6 It seems useful to follow Jackson in writing ὅ τι for ὅτι (which is in  all of PCBL, pace Walzer/Mingay), just to make clear that it is ‘what(ever)’. b9 κατεψηϕισμένος gives the right sense: having been condemned by the judges, Antiphon compliments Agathon for praising his defence speech. (Marc. has κατεψηϕισμένως as a descendant of L, and is not a separate witness to that reading, as Walzer/Mingay’s report might suggest.) b10 εἶναι: sc. δοκεῖ, understood from b4; Aristotle is continuing his account of the endoxa. b11–12 πλούτου πὲρι σπουδάζειν C, πλούτου σπουδάζειν B: it may well be that the accent on περι in C has drifted from the iota; if anastrophe is intended, then the sentence in C would have the same shape as in B. C surely had the ὧν in front of him, since P writes it (and they are working from the same exemplar); B’s source may or may not have had περὶ ὧν—­probably it did, and B just misses it, perhaps because he is ­misconstruing the sentence. b12 ϕροντίζειν: again sc. δοκεῖ. Against Casaubon’s ϕροντίζει see the following note. b13 λυπεῖσθαι τ’ ἂν scripsi: PCB’s future indicative with ἂν being ­impossible, and L’s λυπηθήσαι τ’ ἂν even more so, Richards’s λυπηθήσεται looks a reasonable bet. But why the future, and why the ἄν, in all of

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90  Eudemian Ethics III (1232b13) PCBL? It should rather be an optative, which would make perfectly good sense, and Richards agrees, preferring his other suggestion, λυποῖτ’ ἂν. This is the best solution on offer with the optative: λυπηθήσοιτ’ ἂν, which Bekker may have got from Oxon., is according to Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb (London: Macmillan, 1889): §203 impossible (‘. . . the future optative . . . was never used with ἄν’, a conclusion I have no [other] evidence for rejecting); and λυπηθήσαιτ’ ἂν and λυπήσαιτ’ ἂν, recorded by Susemihl as occurring among the deteriores, seem scarcely more helpful. But we need the infinitive, in view of (a) the preceding ϕροντίζειν, (b) the following χαίρειν (in L), and (c) the theta that is another common factor in the readings in the primary MSS, so λυπεῖσθαι ἂν instead of λυποῖτ’ ἂν; but we should also accommodate the tau, another common factor, which we can do by keeping L’s τ’, which gives us ‘and [so the endoxon continues] he would both be pained if . . . and be pleased when. . .’. b17 In bracketing the καὶ Susemihl is following what I call ‘Lat.’, the late Latin translation from the Aldine; so too with his δὴ for δὲ in the next sentence. Rackham’s proposal starts from Susemihl’s, is more elegant Greek but is even less necessary; ‘contemptuous of the many and of reputation’ works quite as well in Greek as it does in English. b22 τιμία Solomon, τιμίαν PCBL: τιμή is so firmly established as subject that we would surely expect a nominative, despite Richards’s no doubt correct claim that the rule for such noun clauses is not always observed. As for his own conjecture, the argument that it is ‘strange’ for τιμή itself to be called τιμία is unconvincing, since anyone can perfectly well be honoured without their being worthy of it. That is surely Aristotle’s point: τιμή will only be τιμία if there is a basis for it (if it is ‘bestowed for honourable reasons’, in Inwood and Woolf ’s helpfully free rendering of τιμία(ν) in the Cambridge translation), and he goes on immediately to say what constitutes such a basis. b25 ἑκάστη1 secl. Russell: if we lost ἑκάστη, with ἑκάστη αὐτῶν in the next clause we would scarcely miss it; but the doubling of ἑκάστη puts the emphasis exactly where it needs to be (we might have expected greatness to be associated with an ἀρετή that has μέγα in its name, but actually it is associated with each and every one).

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Aristotelica  91 b27 ὥσπερ: Walzer/Mingay prints ὥστε, following the Latin translation (quare), but that is itself evidently either a slip or a deliberate conjecture on the part of the translator. b29 Editors print PCL’s τὰ δ’ ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, but this is distinctly odd, if the reference is to b17ff., i.e. to a passage that does not ‘classify’ (Kenny, Oxford World’s Classics) goods that are other than τίμια, but rather just explains why some that might appear τίμια are actually not. Nor is there any other discussion of τίμια in relation to other goods that would fit the bill, either in the undisputed Eudemian books or in the ‘common’ books (MM 1183b20–1 has a division of goods that starts with τίμια, but that would hardly help here). But there is also a larger problem. If πρότερον does refer to b17ff., then the ἀγαθὰ that are τίμια will be ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν (b23–4); but Aristotle is about to say (b29–30) that only some τῶν τοιούτων . . .  ἀγαθῶν, i.e. presumably, of those being said now to be τίμια (ἐστὶν ἔνια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια, b28–9), are μεγάλα κατ’ ἀλήθειαν— i.e. only some of those ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστίν are μεγάλα κατ’ ἀλήθειαν. Since this is plainly nonsense, τίμια here in b29 must refer, not to the goods Aristotle himself has just said to be such, but rather to the ones people generally value, which is after all where we started in b11–17. Aristotle is retracing his steps: some goods are τίμια, but only some of these are truly so, because they have the right μέγεθος. In short, ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον is intrusive, despite the fact that Aristotle is actually going back to something he said before (only not a διορισμός). The division Aristotle is introducing now, in b28–9, is precisely not the one he has just made (so not Solomon’s τὰ δ’ οὔ, ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, combining B with PCL, as it turns out)— although a reader might easily have supposed it to be: ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, I propose, originated as a gloss, starting from b18 διορίσαντας, that somehow found its way into all of P, C, and L but not into B. That B has οὔ in place of PCL’s ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον could be down to the initiative of the copyist (abridging, maybe, as he sometimes seems to do: see e.g. b11–12), but the difficulties involved in defending the three offending words are so great that even if he was here acting on his own, he was right.

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92  Eudemian Ethics III 1232b39 All the emendations listed are unpersuasive; none does any more than spell out the sort of thing we would need to supply in any case to make sense of the transmitted text. 1233a3 οἷον ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν Spengel: according to Susemihl, Spengel only changed ἀξιοῖ to ἀξιοῦν. As Richards says, he should have changed οἷος to οἷον too, and it seems doubly (or triply) charitable to include that as part of Spengel’s proposal, given both that it is unclear whether Richards knew independently what Spengel proposed and that I myself have been unable to check; the mistake may lie in Susemihl’s reporting. a6–7 τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ Fritzsche: but why not ‘and this is how we define the μεγαλόψυχος [a regular Aristotelian usage of ἀποδίδοναι: ‘syn. ὁρίζειν’, Bonitz, Index 80a54], and not in relation to what is useful’? a9 περὶ Ross, with an eye to a11–12 ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα . . . ; but as Walzer/Mingay points out, 1222a23–4 gives direct and relevant parallels for ἐπὶ here. a12 μικρόψυχος Fritzsche: but the following immediate change of construction is not untypical of EE. a13 B simplifies—­perhaps because puzzled by ὑπαρχόντων δι’ ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἠξιοῦντο? a19 μεγάλῳ2 (μεγάλω) L1: nu is added between words by L2. —μικρὸν B1: B2 writes ῶ above the omicron. a20 P2 supplies μικρῶν from the margin (with insertion marks there and in the text), but the supplement—­pace Spengel, who proposed it ­in­de­pend­ent­ly—­is not needed, given that μικρῶν must in any case be understood. a20–1 Susemihl prints οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι without comment; Walzer/Mingay, omitting the μὴ, then attributes it to ‘codd.’, but it is not in any of PCBL, or Bekker, nor do we need it. The sequence οὔτε . . . καὶ (a21) would apparently be unparalleled in prose (see Denniston 505); the solution attributed to Robinson by Walzer/Mingay should probably read τῷ οὐδὲ, which might be right but is less economical than Spengel’s and has no clear compensating advantages. a25 P2 writes οὐκ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν in the margin with an insertion mark there corresponding to one before ἀξιοῖ; we need the negative but not

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Aristotelica  93

ἑαυτόν. —εἴποι/ἐποίει: Susemihl prints ἐποίει because of Lat. faceret,

and Walzer/Mingay follows suit. But the Latin translator writes what he does simply because he expects an imperfect indicative to match the following ἦν; that a correcting hand in Laur. 81,4 has the same idea does not lend it any more authority. Since εἴποι fits, and it is in all of PCBL, we should keep it. a26 Having preferred P(CB)’s εἰ over L’s ἢ (which he attributes to Marc.), Susemihl then has to follow Marc. in omitting the following ἂν, but immediately runs into problems with the corresponding ἢ only seven words further on; that then forces him into positing a lacuna before it. With ἢ here (i.e. ἢ1) all is in order; difficulties only arise if like Susemihl—­and the others whose solutions to the mess then made of the rest of the sentence he reports—­we refuse L’s gift of the first ἢ. a27 P2 writes ἂν είη in margin, with insertion marks there and in text. Τhis ‘P2’ is a different hand from, and apparently earlier than, the one that made the necessary supplement of οὐκ in a26. a29 C has μέγα twice, at the end of a line and then at the beginning of the next; either he or another hand marks the first with dots for deletion. a38 ἔχουσι Casaubon (according to Susemihl): to emend in this way is merely to cleanse the text of an irregularity that is too common to be accidental, i.e. an unexpected change of subject from the ἕξις to its possessors: for a similar irregularity/looseness of construction see the next sentence (οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις . . .). 1233b4 Unless the form ἀγαθοδαιμονισταί is found elsewhere (and for what it is worth, LSJ only cites the present passage), it seems reasonable to keep ἀγαθοδαιμονιαστὰς, with Bekker, given that this form is apparently attested—­in a Rhodian inscription = IG 12 (1).161. The L copyist draws attention to it by writing it out in the margin, in the nom­ina­tive, perhaps as a curiosity? b8 P2 writes παρὰ above περὶ (which happens to be the first word of the first line on the page). —Kenny attaches his δεῖ δὲ πρέπον 〈καθ’ ἕκαστον〉 εἶναι to the second of Jackson’s conjectures for the reconstruction of what follows (i.e. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πράττοντος κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ περὶ ὃν, b8–9).

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94  Eudemian Ethics III

1233b8–9 καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρέπον κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ 〈τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν〉 πρέπον scripsi: καὶ γὰρ τὰ πρέποντα κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ 〈τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν〉 πρέπον P2. P2’s solution has Aristotle pausing to confirm, for the sake of precision, that the relation between τὸ πρέπον and τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν is two-­way (καὶ . . . καὶ = ‘both . . . and’; similarly with the following two καὶs, i.e. b9 καὶ περὶ ὃ and b11 καὶ αὐτῷ [the agent]). The only real alternatives, given the difficulty of choosing between all the other proposals, each in its way as speculative as the next (nor have I listed all those available: e.g. there is another by Donini, based on Dirlmeier’s), are either to mark a lacuna with Fritzsche and Susemihl, or to obelize with Walzer/Mingay; but the economy of P2’s proposal—­overwriting what was surely τοῦ with τὰ, and inserting τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν above the line, this being still the top line on the page, with an insertion mark after καὶ—­seems to me to make it plainly preferable to throwing up our hands in desperation. However in the course of mounting a defence of P2 I have in effect thrown doubt on his τὰ πρέποντα, insofar as on my reckoning, and I imagine on his, καὶ . . . τὰ πρέποντα κατ’ ἀξίαν will be picking up b7 τὸ πρέπον κατ’ ἀξίαν ἐστίν; why then the shift to the plural, τὰ πρέποντα? Answer: because of that final tau, which (written above the nu) constitutes the whole of the ending of πρέποντος as written in P and C, and as it might well have been written in the MSS being copied by B and L too, the genitive being understood from the preceding τοῦ: in other words, the distance between τοῦ πρέποντος, τὰ πρέποντα, and τὸ πρέπον is not as great as it may seem. A number of the solutions proposed to the problems of this sentence build on that genitive (making τοῦ πρέποντος into τοῦ πράττοντος), but I suggest that, given the general attractiveness of P2’s reconstruction, it will make it even more attractive to suppose that the genitive and the tau of πρέποντ were the consequence of someone’s trying to make sense of the sentence once τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν had fallen out (τὸ, perhaps, going first). τοῦ πράττοντος in any case looks like a false start for any reconstruction, since the reference to the agent is already well embedded, in the shape of b11 καὶ αὐτῷ (in the same sentence: Kenny, in the Oxford World’s Classics translation, partially disguises the problem by putting a full stop before καὶ αὐτῷ, and continuing ‘Moreover, it must be appropriate . . . for the agent himself ’, even though in his reconstruction ‘. . . must be appropriate to the agent’ was already in b8–9).

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Aristotelica  95 b12 ᾤοντο for ᾤετο: Spengel’s alternative and less attractive suggestion is that the name of a comic writer has fallen out after ᾤετο; the singular on its own certainly looks intolerable—­as it evidently appeared to B2, who makes Θεμιστοκλεῖ into a nominative, writing ῆς above the εῖ. Was such an error the original cause of the preceding singular ᾤετο? b14 ἔχει scripsi, ἔχων PCBL: I propose that ἔχει was readily corrupted after ἔτυχεν, making nonsense of the following relative pronoun. See next note. —ὃ] ?ἢ P2: Susemihl, followed by Walzer/Mingay, reports P as reading ἃ, but there is beyond doubt a correction here, one that involves a change of breathing from rough to smooth, and what is written in below the new breathing is not an alpha. What can just be made out is more like the squat H-­shape that etas in these MSS can have, though ἢ barely makes sense as a correction. What was underneath it was no doubt ὃ, in line with CBL, and the corrector seems to have had the same sort of problem with ὃ as Fritzsche, who solves it by excision, evidently following the Latin translation. But ὃ does make sense if we read ἔχει for ἔχων just before (see preceding note: Walzer/Mingay keeps both ὃ and ἔχων, but I think the intention must have been to bracket ὃ). I understand ‘And another sort/ person has a random attitude to worth, which none of the ones mentioned does’, which also fits well with the following καὶ ἐπ’ ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως κτλ. b15 ὡς αὕτως B: ὡς ends one line, αὕτως begins the next. b15–16 Casaubon’s reconstruction is surely right. How the first οὔτ’ became ὡς is anybody’s guess, but the corruption of οὔτ’ ἀν- to ὄταν would be easy enough. b19 It might seem more likely that παθηματικαί would be reduced to παθητικαί than that παθητικαί would be expanded to παθηματικαί, but the latter is evidently as uncommon a formation as παθητικαί is common, especially in Aristotle. b20 Fritzsche’s bracketing of γὰρ entails the suppression of b21 ἐστι; when added to his ϕθονερὸς τῷ for ϕθόνος τὸ, the sum is an extravagantly unnecessary intervention.

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96  Eudemian Ethics III 1233b22 ‘ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ corrupta’, Susemihl, and it is hard to disagree with him. Donini retains ἐπὶ τὸ, translating ‘. . . del malevolo, che si volge agli stessi oggetti’, and interpreting these same objects as good and bad fortune. But τὸ αὐτὸ is singular, and on the face of it it would have to refer back to good fortune alone, or to those deservedly enjoying it (b21). The ligature for στ makes ἐστι, if it is written out in full, easily corruptible into ἐπί (and vice versa); once the corruption had taken place in this case, a τὸ might easily find its way in. (So Spengel’s emendation should perhaps strictly be recorded as ἐστὶ [τὸ] αὐτὸ.) b23 ὁ χαίρων Richards, for ἐπὶ τῷ χαίρειν: with a comma preceding. —κακοπραξίαις B: B2 adds a gamma above the xi. b24 μεσητικὸς B1: B2 adds a supralinear νε before the με. b27 θεὸν in Laur. 81,4 is changed by another hand to θεῶν—­a reading that might deserve a second glance, though the normal, if not universal, use of an abbreviation for θεός would complicate any explanation of how the corruption might have come about. b32 ἅπασιν P2: P2 writes sigma over what was ντα, as in C, then iota + nu extending into margin; Bessarion removes the redundant (final) nu. We could read ἅπασι, but there is no overwhelming case for it; ἅπαντα, which was presumably in ω, will do perfectly well. b34 Robinson’s supplement is perhaps on stylistic grounds, after ἅπαντα  . . . ἁπάσας . . . ἅπασαν. b35 βέλτιστος B1: B2 adds a nu above the final sigma. b37 ἀκαταϕρονητικὸς P1CBL: P2 has almost but not quite erased an initial ἀ, adding a καὶ in the margin (Bessarion duly reads καὶ καταϕρονητικὸς). A lost ἀλλὰ, as supplied by Ambr., would begin to explain the curious ἀκαταϕρονητικὸς. b40 The shorthand for -ους and that for -ως are very similar; ἁπλοῦς must have been in ω, but if Nikolaos, the PC copyist, read it in the same MS once as ἁπλοῦς and at another time as ἁπλῶς, the B copyist might easily make the same mistake, especially since ἁπλῶς actually makes sense. (Actually the sign in C is somewhat ambiguous, as perhaps is that in B; and that the B copyist does not write out the ending, as he more usually does, may signify doubt on his part.)

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Aristotelica  97

1234a9 ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉 is attributed to Casaubon by Richards, to Richards by Walzer/Mingay, and to Rackham by himself and by Dirlmeier; at least Rackham and Dirlmeier must be wrong (for Casaubon I usually rely on Susemihl, as does Walzer/Mingay; if Richards’s attribution is right, it is surprising that Susemihl does not mention Casaubon’s supplement). a11 τὰ δὲ μὴ καὶ PL: the καὶ is squeezed in between μή and the following κατὰ in L, apparently by the original hand and after μὴ κατὰ had already been written. a13 ?μέν B: if this indeed intended to be μέν, it would be surprising (in this position, especially with the acute accent). B will have been copying a supralinear eta: the eta and accent appear in P and C, and no doubt in other MSS in their tradition, above the mu, and the eta in C is quite flamboyant, that in P even more so; perhaps, copying such an eta, and unsure quite what it is, B ends up with what looks all too like what he uses for -εν (with acute accent). a15 εὐτραπελείας P (also Bessarion): the same copyist, Nikolaos, in C, copying from the same original, shortens to εὐτραπε, with lambda plus / above the πε; he may have intended εὐτραπελείας in C too. a16 τοιονδί L post corr.: the iota is written heavily over something else, presumably an epsilon. a17 σκῶμμα: a later hand writes σῶμα op­pos­ite in the margin in P. a18 ἀμϕότεραι/ἀμϕότεροι: B writes ἀμϕοτερ, with the tau plus ligature for ερ above the omicron, where the accent should be, while PC have a typ­ical ἀμϕότερ with οι above the rho; the result, for B, if not the intention, is to leave the ending open between masculine and feminine. Β’s behaviour here mimics that of (MSS like) P and C, which frequently leave the endings of words to be understood; his treatment of ἐναντίον—­ἐναν, with tau + dots indicating an iota followed by an accent floating over the αν—­in b12 below is another example. The phenomenon sometimes occurs at the end of a line, but as the examples here in a18 and in b12 show, not always. Not infrequently B just prefers not to spell things out as he normally does, in my view typically when he is uncertain: according to the convention he is mimicking we should

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98  Eudemian Ethics III (1234a18) here anyway read his ἀμϕοτερ as ἀμϕότεραι, that being the only possible right ending, but I think it quite likely that α´ itself had ἀμϕότεροι, which would explain both what we find in PC and the B copyist’s am­biva­lence (if that is what it is). a22 τεχθὲν B1, λεχθὲν B2: the word being split between two lines, the first part is written as τε at the end of the first, with a lambda later added over the tau. a26 A definite article before ἐναντίαι κακίαι, as supplied by Ambr. (actually added in the margin, after οὐδὲ at the end of the line: possibly by a second hand), would surely be intrusive: οὐδ’ ἐναντίαι κακίαι = ‘nor are there opposing κακίαι/κακίαι ἐναντίαι to them’. Kenny translates, with the article, ‘and their opposites are not vices either’: this might perhaps be idiomatic Greek, with attraction from neuter to feminine plural before κακίαι, but it looks unnecessarily difficult—­especially when it also involves an emendation. (The issues here are somewhat reminiscent of those in the first sentence of Book III.) a30–1 ϕύσει καὶ Spengel: Spengel also suggested ϕυσικὴ καὶ. a33 δ’ suppl. Ross, καὶ ante ἡ Rackham: some sort of connective is needed, and Rackham’s suggestion seems at first sight preferable, given the ease with which καὶ and ἡ as written in some hands could be mistaken for each other (so: haplography?). On the other hand, one might expect a δέ answering a31 μέν, and ϕθόνος and νέμεσις in a way—­the one paired with injustice, the other with justice—­go together, leaving αἰδὼς, as paired with σωϕροσύνη, as a contrasting case. The next δέ, in ὁ δ’ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς . . ., does not seem to fit the bill, i.e. as a counterpart to a31 μέν. 1234b1 ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις C2: ἐν written in above the line with omission mark. b5 ᾦσιν Marc.2: an original εἰ is overwritten with ᾦ. b10 ‘γρ. οἷον ἠλιθιότης τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα’ P2 in margin, sprawling down to b16. b13 As Rackham says, Bonitz should have preferred θράσος to θάρσος—­the former usually indicating rashness, the latter courage; but that looks enough to allow the reading of PCΒ, as printed, to stand.

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Aristotelica  99 b16 περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται L: that is, the last five words appear in L alone among our four primary MSS. Editors print λεκτέον in the text in place of λέξεται: so Bekker, and then e.g. Rackham, helped by Susemihl’s attribution of λέξεται to the Aldine, which implies that λεκτέον is in other MSS (but not in P, according to Susemihl: περὶ . . .  λεκτέον, he says, is missing from there). But the Aldine only has λέξεται because it is a descendant of L, as are all the MSS Susemihl refers to apart from P, C, and Pal. 165; and λέξεται is missing from the latter three because they belong to the recensio Messanensis, in which the whole sentence is missing. Bekker’s λεκτέον is actually found only in Marc., and thus lacks any authority, being just a regularization of L’s Greek, in recognition of the plain fact that λέξεται would be a distinctly odd way for Aristotle himself to announce justice as the next subject: for after all not only is λεκτέον more Aristotelian, it is not clear that λέξεται is classical Greek at all (moreover: does ‘[justice] will be spoken about’ not sound like a gloss?). But that then throws further doubt on the authenticity of the whole sentence that contains it, given (a) that the ­sentence, i.e. περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται, is absent from PCB, (b) that the first sentence of the book that follows in L and is announced in PC itself begins with the δέ we expect after 1234b13 μέν, and (c) that this first sentence itself, like the last sentence of Book III, begins περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, and so looks like a doublet rather than a continuation. I  conclude that περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται must have been a later addition/gloss, dating perhaps from a moment when the sequence of books in EE was less secure than it appears from P, C, and L. So there is no formal announcement in EE III of a following book on justice. This gives added significance to the fact that B, which in general evidently belongs to the same recensio as P and C, nevertheless unlike them, and unlike L, labels the following two books—­if the second of the two is to count as a book rather than a fragment of one—­as δ-ον and ε-ον: at the beginning of B’s fourth book B2 writes a flowery Δ-ον, mirroring B1’s δ-ον, in the margin. Without περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται, there is then a smooth transition to the book on friendship in B, which starts its Book IV/δ´ with περὶ δὲ ϕιλίας, but not so in PCL, which begin their Book VII with no connective. In other words, B behaves for all the world as if there is nothing between III and the book on friendship; PC do not

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100  Eudemian Ethics III (1234b16) behave like that, and would not even without περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται and the incipits of ‘IV–VI’, which now appear in PC between Book III and the beginning of their Book VII. On the other hand, the transition from an EE VI = NE VII to an EE VII in PC, as in L (writing out ‘EE IV–VI’ = NE V–VII in full), would be noticeably smoother than the transition from NE VII (περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας . . .  εἴρηται, . . .· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ ϕιλίας ἐροῦμεν) to NE VIII (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ϕιλίας ἕποιτ’ ἂν διελθεῖν· . . .). Or perhaps smoothness should not be looked for in the movement between books, when what might well be uppermost in the author’s, and/or copyists’, minds could be the need to mark the connection between the end of one physical document (scroll) and the beginning of another. This is acknowledged, in the present text, by having the book end with a colon; a sentence beginning περὶ μὲν οὖν (περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, κτλ) cries out for a corresponding δέ, a cry that will be answered, in different ways, both in B and in PCL. (Compare the more problematic ‘ending’ of Book VIII/V.) b16–17 Counting in the title of the next book of EE, which in P shares the line before ‘EE VII’ begins with the incipit of ‘EE VI’ (in C the new book title occupies a separate line), there are four ordinals, and P2 (though it is just possible that Nikolaos was here himself doing the corrections: ‘P2’s’ hand is not so different) certainly changes the last two of the four: in both cases there has plainly been erasure, and it is beyond reasonable doubt that P originally had ϛ-ον and ζ-ον, like C and L (actually the or­dinals in L are written α´, etc.). There is no evidence that the first two of the four ordinals in P have been changed, although they have evidently been overwritten with a new δ and ε (the ones we see are uniform with the following ζ and η): the red colouring that originally went with all four numbers survives with them, whereas it has all but disappeared with the last two. However there are clear signs of erasure before all the first three ordinal numbers, and extending under ἠθηκῶν εὐδημίων in each case. My proposal, as printed in the apparatus to—what I call—1234b16–17, is that what Nikolaos wrote in P, and what P2 (perhaps Nikolaos himself) was correcting, was ἠθικῶν νικομαχείων δ-ον: Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, ἠθικῶν νικομαχείων ε-ον, Ἐπείδε τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες, and ἠθικῶν νικομαχείων ϛ-ον:- Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα

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Aristotelica  101

ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν. The ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων in the fourth

title—­without the errant eta for iota in the preceding three titles—­is original, and there is no reason to think that P did not have ἠθικῶν rather than ἠθηκῶν in the first three cases too (the incipits are surely in Nikolaos’ hand, as I think at least the original book titles would have been, although in some other MSS, e.g. L, they were evidently entrusted to someone else). Then ἠθικῶν . . . is erased, and the erasure extends to the right, beyond ἠθηκῶν εὐδημίων and before the ordinals, in all three cases by roughly the length by which νικομαχείων exceeds εὐδημίων. In other words, I hypothesize that Nikolaos transferred the first three book headings from NE along with the three incipits, adapting only the numbering to fit with EE, and he or someone else later changed the book titles (with ἠθηκῶν for ἠθικῶν, εὐδημίων for νικομαχείων), intro­du­ cing ζ-ον for ϛ-ον at the same time, together with ηον for ζ-ον in the title of the new book. Appended to the three incipits in C, apparently by Nikolaos himself (Harlfinger 1971: 38), is the helpful marginal note ζήτει ὄπισθεν, i.e. ‘look [for these books] back [in the Nicomachean Ethics, preceding in the codex]’, and quite possibly that was what he was doing when he wrote the incipits in both MSS: note the bizarre Ἐπείδε for Ἐπεὶ δὲ in the second incipit in P, which we find in the opening to NE VI itself in P—­also in the corresponding incipit in Pal. 165, a faithful descendant of P. (Against this is that P’s NE VII opens, not with μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, as in the corres­ponding incipit here, but μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ; on the other hand the placing of δὲ in the incipit to EE VI/NE VII is unusual, and it would not be surprising if when writing the incipit Nikolaos put it back in the place where it would be expected, after μετὰ.) —The entry here in the apparatus for ‘1234b16–17’, and for ‘1234b17’ at the beginning of Book VII/IV, is manu­fac­tured, insofar as in Bekker b17 (in my numbering; actually b15–17 in Bekker’s) is just the gap between Books III and VII, empty apart from a large eta announcing VII itself.

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Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1234b17 (the book heading): so, to follow up on the previous note, the new book is given two different numbers by PCBL, i.e. VII (PCL) and V (B), and in the case of PCL two different versions of the same number, i.e. ζ´ (P1CL) and η´ (P2). The latter represent two different numbering systems, which is of particular significance for EE: in short, the system P1CL are using is newer than the other, and in the Aristotelian corpus used only for the pseudo-­Aristotelian Problemata and the EE: see O.  Primavesi, ‘Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: vier Kapitel zur frühen Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum’, Philologus 151 (2007): 51–77, esp. 70–3. b18 B2 writes τίς above πῶς. b19 Since the subject, ϕιλία, is already in the air, it seems that the emphasis should fall, with L, on μοναχῶς (i.e. μοναχῶς should precede λέγεται). In P, the second half of μοναχῶς, together with λέγεται, seems to be written over something else. b20 The supplement of εἴδη in the margin of Laur. 81,4—­often quite inaccurate, but with many intelligent corrections by one or more hands—­looks attractive: with πλεοναχῶς twice just before, it is hard to imagine Bonitz’s/Russell’s ποσαχῶς falling out, despite Walzer/Mingay’s imprimatur (i.e. of Russell’s version, which presumably suggests the corruption of χῶς into ἐστίν: by no means impossible, given the shorthand used in MSS like P and C for ως and ἐστι). This would not be the only occasion when the copyists of PCBL and/or their predecessors had problems with εἴδη: see e.g. 1236a17, where it has certainly fallen out in PCB. Donini is, I think, wrong to suggest that εἴδη can be easily (‘benissimo’) understood with πόσα, without needing to be written out, and it certainly could not be understood in 1236a17; πόσα on its own, in the Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.003.0004

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Aristotelica  103

context, would be baffling, given that even as it is, with πόσα 〈εἴδη〉, one has to supply ϕιλίας.

b29 ἅλις ϕίλους ποιῆσαι Jackson: Jackson’s emendation gives what is plainly the right sense at the least cost. To keep the transmitted text one would have to take the ἀλλά as introducing a command (see LSJ s.v. ἀλλά II.2): ‘Well, sc. they say (from b27 δοκεῖ ), just make them into friends!’, with imperative represented by infinitive in indirect speech; for ποιέω εἰς, LSJ s.v. ποιέω IV. I would myself not quite rule this out; but a defence that depends on supposing the presence together of so many unusual features is hardly compelling; and it is worth noting that the Byzantine pronunciation of ἅλις and ἀλλ’ εἰς would have been the same (also: cf. 1238a3 ἁλῶν] ἄλλων P1CB). b33 The arguments for and against B’s καὶ before τὸν ϕίλον are prob­ ably about evenly balanced: it would perhaps be easier for καὶ to drop out than to find its way in, and it looks attractive enough if taken as emphatic; on the other hand it is hardly necessary, which counts against it given EE’s generally economical style (similarly with L’s spelling out of the εἶναι). So by the rule laid down before, that where two readings are equally plausible the one found in L plus one representative of the other recensio is to be favoured, I omit the καὶ. 1235a2 ἑταίρων/ἑτέρων: ἑτέρων would look in place were it on its own; coming after two specified groups of others, it looks distinctly odd, and ἑτέρων and ἑταίρων would be easily confused in a context like this (especially since the Byzantine pronunciation of both would be the same). Against ἑταίρων, one might say that if συγγενῶν is not to be redundant, οἰκείων must surely already include one’s ἑταῖροι; but that, I think, is just the point—­συγγενῶν and ἑταίρων spell out the two main types of οἰκεῖοι in question (hence my commas around ἢ μετὰ συγγενῶν ἢ μεθ’ ἑταίρων). The real problem is with the following ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός: see next note. —ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός, coming after ἑταίρων (or ἑτέρων, for that matter), looks ­misplaced, since it rather glosses συγγενῶν. Βut it would look implausible even there, since συγγενῶν hardly needs to be explained, at least by Aristotle. In which case I conclude it is someone else’s gloss that has got

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104  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1235a2) into the text but away from what it is glossing (glosses t­ ypically hang loose, as it were, in the margin). a6 Spengel’s παραλαμβάνοντες perhaps fits marginally better than περιλαμβάνοντες in the context, and παρα and περι have been and will be confused in these MSS many times over; but περιλαμβάνοντες is probably to be preferred, especially given 1239b8 συμπεριλαμβανόντων, which refers back to the present context. a8 Either the L copyist knew his Homer, or the full line (= Odyssey 17.218) was in his source; that Nikolaos has ἀεὶ in P tends to confirm that it, or αἰεὶ, was indeed there in ω, the common source. To judge by the non-­metrical ἀεὶ he is treating the preceding ὡς as ‘that’, so that what is said, for him, begins with ἀεὶ or τὸν ὅμοιον. When writing C, in effect he takes the process a stage further: since what is in question is anyway a general rule, ἀεὶ becomes actually redundant—­or else he left it out through simple carelessness. Or perhaps αἰεὶ/ἀεὶ was neither in α´, since B lacks it, nor in α, and ἀεὶ in P is thanks to Nikolaos’ own memory  of Homer? In any case in Aristotle’s sentence ὡς serves a double function, both as part of the original quotation (Aristotle certainly knew his Homer), i.e. as a causal ὡς, and as ‘that’: the following καὶ γὰρ, which pace Susemihl is not part of the next saying, operates as if the sentence were perfectly regular, which it would not be with causal ὡς, and the third saying, Ἔγνω δὲ, conveniently includes a connecting part­icle. Here it will do no harm, if the beginnings of quotations are to be marked at all, to simplify and pretend that the first quotation here begins with ὡς (which it does, but also does not), but in other cases it is not so simple. a9 Walzer/Mingay’s report of περὶ for παρὰ in C here is mistaken. a10 διακοσμοῦσιν: in C an extra character between the first omicron and the sigma has been erased. a12 PCΒL all elide κύνα; another illustration, perhaps, of the absence of a clear demarcation between cited material and what it is embedded in. —κεραμίδος: LSJ has ‘[κεραμ]ίς, -ίδος, . . . Ion. and later -ῖδος, Emp. ap. Arist. EE 1235a12, MM 1208b11’, but PCBL all have κεραμίδος here (as

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Aristotelica  105 does another MS of EE I have checked, at random, namely Laur. 81,12); the circumflex appears to come from Marc. via Bekker, as it does in MM. (Victorius also inserts it, and Susemihl has it; Walzer/Mingay corrects to κεραμίδος.) a17 C may (unusually) have an iota subscript under the alpha of ἐρᾷ, but it is more likely a mark to separate ἐρᾶ and μὲν, which have somewhat merged. a18 C’s way of writing τοὐναντίον, with the ligature for ου plus crasis mark above the tau, then ναντίον after a small gap, helps to explain the origin of the error in PCB, i.e. reading the first three letters of τοὐναντίον as τοῦ. In P the ἐκ is mostly erased and—­apparently—­replaced by the ligature for ει plus lunate sigma (so εἰς τοὐναντίον P2, ον for ου being left to be understood); B2 goes the other way, regularizing the anom­al­ ous ἐκ + accusative with a ligature for ου above the already supralinear ον of τοὐναντίον. a19 Between κοτεέι and the sign for καὶ in C there is an emphatic mark looking like a rough breathing, perhaps marking the end of the quotation. a19–20 Jackson proposes reading τἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεϕόμενα πολέμι’  ἀλλήλοις ζοά, ‘a perfect trochaic’. As he says, the sentiment is not presented as Aristotle’s own view, and he may well be right that it is a quota­tion from an unknown poet; but it is perhaps a step too far to suppose that Aristotle was necessarily quoting it as a line of verse, rather than just rehearsing a ὑπόληψις that originated in such a line. a22–3 Τῷ πλέονι δ’ αἰεὶ . . . κατάρχεται: none of the MSS seems to recognize that the quotation is in verse, let alone that it is in iambics; it seems reasonable nonetheless to suppose that Aristotle would have quoted the two verses as verses, and to restore them and present them as such—­after all, the copyists’ unreliability is proven, and while Aristotle is plainly not always too concerned about accuracy in quotation, on the whole he can be assumed to know his sources better than the copyists evidently did. a26–7 Aristotle knows about metre, and surely knows his Homer, while a copyist might know neither: I have little hesitation in restoring ἔκ τ’ in

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106  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1235a26–7) Iliad 18.107 (Rackham’s κἀξ would be a halfway house, and perhaps palaeo­graph­ic­al­ly plausible). a28 P2’s θήλεος is produced with a lambda that largely obscures an unerased rho and iota. a29 I resist supplying οὖν after μὲν with Susemihl, on the (usual) grounds that EE, on the evidence we have, quite frequently omits connectives where we might have expected them. —In B, instead of an alpha in λίαν there is a gap that might accommodate two letters between the λί and the nu; something may have been erased, but if so it has not been replaced. There is a similar situation, on a larger scale, in a36–7 below, though there the problems are shared with PCL. a30 Casaubon’s supplement of καὶ is surely justified: the preceding τε requires an answering καὶ, and κεχωρισμέναι τοσοῦτον is plainly a different description from λίαν καθόλου, not part of the same description. a31 ἐγγυτέρω/ἐγγυτέραι: with other feminine plural endings in the offing, corruption from ἐγγυτέρω (sc. ἔχουσι) to ἐγγυτέραι is more likely than vice versa. a32 τοὺς deest in B: B also leaves a gap after the phi of the following ϕαύλους. There may have been some erasure and correction here: the whole of ϕαύλους might be in a different hand. a35 Fritzsche proposed the γοῦν found in B and generally preferred by editors, with reason. a37 ἄχρηστα: alpha, breathing, and acute accent in P are added later = P2, who leaves the original grave on the final alpha. C’s χρησταὶ is prob­ably because of the καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται it has following. —καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ αὑτῶν scripsi: Sylburg’s proposal is unattractive inter alia because it fails to give any clear sense, or point, to τοιαῦται; von Fragstein’s hardly does better on this score (τοιαῦται on his account = concerned with usefulness: cf. Dirlmeier’s critique of Fragstein here), and in general stretches credulity, not least because prostitutes getting rid of unwanted hair (von Fragstein’s idea: why not unwanted embryos?) looks an unlikely way of bringing in Socrates’ reflection on the fate of our spittle, hair, and nails (ὥσπερ

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Aristotelica  107

Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον, κτλ). What is needed is a

general statement or observation that Socrates could have made. This is provided by Bonitz’s proposal, and from his καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν to καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν is not a great distance. I  merely question the genitive: hence my τὰ αὑτῶν, and actually the resemblance between καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ αὑτῶν and καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν seems still greater. Why the gap in the MSS? I suggest that once the corruption had taken place a subsequent copyist—­either the ω copyist, i.e. the copyist of the common source of PCBL, or one of his predecessors—­was faced with the same problem that Sylburg and von Fragstein were trying to solve, i.e. how to fill out the τῶν, and just threw in the towel. 1235b8 τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γνῶναι PCL, τοῖς δ’ οὐ B: another case of B simplifying. PCL’s text certainly needs a fair bit of filling out for it to make sense (Ross suggests the bare minimum); is this what bothered the B copyist? b11 P2 offers ἀποτυχίαις below the line, which happens to be the last line on the page. b14 Pace Walzer/Mingay, before correction Laur. 81,4 chimes with PCBL; λόγος is inserted by another hand over the line. —τά τε P: I hazard that it is less likely that three hands—­one the same as P’s—should independently omit this τε than that one should supply it. It is in equal measure (a) an easy supplement and (b) dispensable, especially after ἅμα; so, applying the usual rule (if the arguments are equally balanced, print what is found in both recensiones), I omit it. b15 μάλιστα: the final alpha is not written out in PC; if there is an elision, they would normally mark it. B probably elides because he is copying from a MS like P and C, and misinterprets the lack of the alpha. b22 Οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ ϕιλεῖ: it seems best to treat this as a slightly misquoted but complete iambic verse with γὰρ intruding (see n. on 1235a8). Even if Euripides did write οὐκ ἔστ’ rather than οὐθεὶς (Troades 1051), the difference is rather small, and could well be the result of Aristotle’s misremembering, or deliberate misquoting; we could restore οὐκ ἔστ(ι), but this would be high-­handed.

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108  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1235b25 I have noted before that EE fairly often does without connectives; Nikolaos in P, I hazard, is going off on his own. It would in any case ­perhaps be difficult to defend printing P’s δὲ here and not its τε in b14 above. 1235b39–1236a1 Kenny (Oxford World’s Classics) reads οὔτε ὄξος παρεγχειροῦσιν, translating ‘would not even pass up wine that is no better than vinegar’, but that would involve an otherwise unparalleled use of παρεγχειρεῖν (and require an οὐδέ for the MSS’ οὔτε); Robinson’s οὗτοί γε gives much the same sense at rather less expense. 1236a5 καὶ καθεστῶτα P: is the καὶ the result of dittography? A καὶ here would anyway be problematic. a8 τὸ ἀγαθὸν for τὰ ἀγαθὰ, Spengel: but ‘are ἀγαθὰ’ is easily understood with τὰ ἀγαθὰ. a10 Bonitz’s ἔτι δὲ has no obvious advantage over the perfectly re­spect­ able ἐπεὶ δὲ, nor is it clear why Walzer/Mingay prefers it, given that both C and L have ἐπεὶ δὲ (as does B); probably they just took over Susemihl’s reading here. P’s aberrant ἐπείδε is evidently a mistake for ἐπεὶ δὲ rather than ἐπειδὴ (Bekker), not just because ἐπεὶ δὲ was evidently in ω but because there is the same—­curious—­mistake at the beginning of P’s NE VI, repeated in the incipit of EE V (but not in C). a11 F. Breier proposed καὶ in a review of Bonitz 1844 (see Dirlmeier). a13 Bekker’s use of punctuation and brackets to save the ὥσπερ in the MSS before καὶ ἄνθρωπον self-­evidently fails; the ὥσπερ derives from a misunderstanding of the (quite complex) structure of the sentence. — 〈τῷ〉 τοιόνδε Bonitz, 〈ὅτι〉 τοιόσδε vel 〈ᾖ〉 τοιόσδε Richards: Bonitz’s conjecture seems preferable to either of Richards’s on the grounds (a) that it is more economical, and (b) that these MSS frequently confuse τῶ = τῷ with τὸ, and τὸ might easily have fallen out by haplography before τοιόνδ’. Richards’s first suggestion makes it look as if he thinks Aristotle would be going for symmetry (with the ὅτι in the following clauses), which is possible but hardly persuasive, while his second has nothing to recommend it except as an alternative to the first. He is surely wrong to say that ‘〈τῷ〉 τοιόνδε could not stand without an εἶναι as in

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Aristotelica  109 [a8–9] above’; in EE, it surely can, perhaps especially if it has just appeared with one. a15 δὴ or δὲ? What is coming is ‘not an inference from what has been said about ϕιλεῖν, but supplementary to it’ (Jackson); true, but δὴ can be taken as emphatic, leaving the sentence, not unusually for EE, without a connective. This is perhaps how Donini takes it, with ‘E diventa appunto amico quando. . .’. Incidentally, we would get the same with Dirlmeier’s δὲ δὴ (Donini’s notes lean heavily on Dirlmeier’s commentary); but it is in any case natural for the translator to supply missing connectives. a17 ‘ἴ[σως] εἴδη’ P2 in margin (Bessarion has it too, probably from Pal. 165, which includes this correction to P). a20 Jackson is right in saying that we can do without Bonitz’s γὰρ; either we take the καὶ before ψυχὴν as epexegetic, or we mentally supply another ὥσπερ (which probably comes to the same thing). a22 Bonitz’s ἐν πᾶσιν must surely be right: ἐν ἡμῖν makes no sense, the point being that the λόγος of the πρῶτον has to be in (the λόγος of) all the items of which the πρῶτον is πρῶτον, which will hardly be us under any imaginable circumstances. The ἡμῖν in Richards’s proposal is an ‘ethical’ dative (‘it would be very hard to account for ἡμῖν taking the place of πᾶσιν’, he says; less hard, surely, than to justify an ethical dative just here). a24 Solomon’s supplement of a second τὸ is unnecessary given the nature of the EE ’s style. a25 The supplement of τὸ is again unnecessary; ‘καθόλου being (according to them?) τὸ πρῶτον, they suppose πρῶτον καθόλου’ makes the point snappily but perfectly well. a26 ψεῦδος is to be preferred over PCB ψευδές in relation to general Greek usage? a28 Bonitz’s supplement of the article is right: we need a definite collection of ἄλλαι for the following αἱ δ’ to refer to. a29 οἱ Victorius, αἱ PCBL: the alpha in P could possibly be taken as an omicron, but αἱ is evidently what was in ω, the common source of

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110  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1236a29) PCBL. —μὲν B: a superscript eta, if sufficiently flowery, sometimes bears a resemblance to the superscript sign for -εν. a30 οὖσα P2: the abbreviation for -αν in P is changed to an alpha. It is tempting to write οὔσης, on the grounds that the subject of the ὡςclause is not strictly the object of the following main clause; however, in a way it is (part of) the object of that clause insofar as there is an implied ‘(they say that) it would be’. The ‘correction’ to P, i.e. οὖσα, would only work if the ὡς-clause belonged to the previous one, which it cannot. (N.b.: I omit the comma after ἄν, introduced by Bekker, simply because I also omit his comma after πρώτη; the main clause clearly begins with ὡς.) a31 Spengel’s supplement of τρία would help the case for PCB’s εἴδη (for ἤδη), impossible as it is on its own; nevertheless, the supplement looks unattractive in itself (why the genitive τῶν γὰρ ῥηθέντων?), and it is positively redundant with τριχῶς coming in the next clause. L’s ἤδη then looks right, despite Russell’s doubts as reported by Walzer/Mingay (‘†τῶν . . .  ἤδη† Russell’), if we construe ‘for it was one of the things we said before’. a34 Ross’s supplement of δ’ is perhaps right, but once again there are too many cases in the MSS where the expected connectives are missing to make it an easy choice to supply them. —διὰ secl. Bessarion: a simple error on the copyists’ part, after διὰ four times in the last two lines, and with another just coming. Jackson’s attempt to preserve a δια, with ἐστι νὴ Δία, is inventive but unconvincing, despite the νὴ Δία attested at Politics III.10, 1281b18. Would the observation currently being made warrant such an exclamation, whatever one says about the Politics ­context? (Note: Walzer/Mingay’s attribution of Jackson’s proposal to Meineke is a mistake, deriving from Dirlmeier’s mistaken suggestion [ad loc.] that Jackson ‘wiederholt dasselbe was A. Meineke . . . zu 23a11 versucht hatte’; in fact what Meineke conjectured there was οὐ 〈μὰ〉 Δία.) a35 χρήσιμοι/χρήσιμον: the neuter singular would not need an εἶναι following.

a37 ἔσκε/ἔστε: see LSJ, revised supplement (1996), s.v. ἔσκε, replacing the comment under ἔστε in LSJ, which ran ‘ἔσκε . . . may be f(alsa) l(ectio)’ with ‘= εἰς ὅ κε [i.e. ἔστ’ ἄν], until, ἔσκε μάχηται Archil. 15 W’— though ‘until’ is clearly not the sense Aristotle wants here (cf. Rackham).

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Aristotelica  111 a38 Editors prefer to write γιγνώσκουσιν for the sake of the metre, as—­I suppose—­Aristotle would have done; if, that is, it is verse, as it appears to be. b4 ὁ ϕιλούμενος Fritzsche, τῷ ϕιλουμένῳ PCBL: Fritzsche is obviously right, the point being about the difference between an object loved and a person who is loved as a friend, the key difference being that the friend loves you back. (An accent on the iota in B is crossed out.) b5 ὁ ἀντιϕιλῶν B: is B trying to make the best of τῷ ϕιλουμένῳ? b6 Russell’s proposal to change to the plural ignores the fact that in such Eudemian contexts sudden switches from plural to singular and vice versa are common. Without Bessarion’s μόνος the switch here would be more difficult—­and it is in any case surprising that both Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay chose to stick with μόνον (μόνος is what most trans­ lators seem to translate). b8 P2 changes the nu at the end of ἀνθρώπων in P to a sigma, which by the conventions apparently in play in these MSS is enough to signal an ἀνθρώπους. Editors from Bekker onwards all print the singular, which they claim to be in P; it is not, but it is found in Pal. 165. The copyist of this MS generally follows P closely, and here, perhaps, he meant to do so too, reading -ων as -ον—­either because he ignores P2’s sigma, or more likely because the sigma postdated him, as some of ‘P2’ surely did (ex­ample: 1239b18); all of which suggests the simplest of explanations for the original error, i.e. omega for omicron. So ἄνθρωπον it is. —ἱμέροις P1CB2: τοῖς ἡμέροις P2 in margin; B2 adds ἱ above the line after the rough breathing of ἡμέροις. Was he correcting against P or C—­or was he, and was the PC copyist, trying to make sense of the genitive preceding? B evidently had ἡμέροις in front of him, as did L; did PC? Or was the identity in Byzantine pronunciation between eta and iota a factor here? —An eta is inserted in Laur. 81,4 over the line between the two lambdas of ἄλλα; by the usual convention, the remaining part of the correction, i.e. the addition of another lambda, is taken for granted. b14 The double negative we find in PCL is awkward and unnecessary; the solution in Ambr. is neat enough, but with οἱ δ’ οὖν we can explain the origin of the οὐ—­and a δ’ οὖν, for which B’s δ’ οὐ offers some support, looks in place: see Denniston 460.

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112  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1236b15 B’s omission of the οὐ after ἀλλὰ, with οἱ δ’ οὐ before it, makes some sort of sense, if not the right one; οἱ δ’ οὖν . . . ἀλλ’ οὐ does the job much better—­and with B’s version the μέν before the ἀλλὰ would be redundant, and the ἀλλὰ too. (It is perhaps mere coincidence that the final alpha of the ἀλλὰ in B sprawls in such a way as to make it look at first sight as if it was offering ἀλλ’ οὐ without the elision mark.) b16 The corruption of ὑπομένουσιν into a—­wholly inappropriate— ­ὑπονοοῦσιν would not be difficult, given e.g. the similarity between mu and nu in the hand e.g. of the PC copyist Nikolaos; so, I imagine, with a copyist predating any of our MSS. —It is hard to make sense of ὡς here. Richards’s ἧς ἂν is ingenious, but would probably only be preferable to Jackson’s ἕως on the basis of letter-­count, which experience shows is not necessarily a prime consideration in these MSS. b17 οὐδ’ οἱ δι’: B2 adds the οἱ over the line—­without adding the neces­sary extra delta, but I assume that once again a correction is being indicated rather than being fully carried through. οὐδ’ οἱ δι’, then, and not for the first time B seems to be being corrected from a manuscript like P or C. b19 βίαιος CB: hardly a significant shared error, when we reflect that when writing P the same copyist himself read as βέβαιος what he read as βίαιος when writing C. b23 ἀδύνατον: it is interesting that even Bekker was content to read δυνατόν with the MSS, which gives exactly the wrong sense. —λίπεται P1: P2 adds the epsilon over the line.

b25 ὡς ἔτυχεν is not only in all of PCBL but is idiomatic; Susemihl’s ὡς ἔτυχον, taken over by Walzer/Mingay—­which records ἔτυχεν as only being in C—­is surely a simple slip (Bekker has ὡς ἔτυχεν). b28 PCBL’s τις has been defended, but the cost is too high; what we plainly need is something like ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—­which is what we get with ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ. —Ross’s ἀληθινῶς is intended to pair with the following ἁπλῶς, but ὁ ἀληθινὸς ϕίλος καὶ ἁπλῶς is easily read as

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Aristotelica  113

ὁ ἀληθινὸς ϕίλος καὶ ἁπλῶς ϕίλος, which is just another way of saying ὁ ἀληθινῶς καὶ ἁπλῶς ϕίλος. b29 Ross’s ἔστιν ὁ would give us a main clause, which otherwise will not materialize until b31, but ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι’ αὑτὸν αὐτὸς αἱρετός hardly follows from the preceding two premisses, as—­if this is the main clause—­b27 ἐπεὶ would mean it should be. —ὁ δι’ αὑτὸν αὐτὸς (Victorius): the long list of variations in the MSS shows how little reliance is to be placed on breathings in such cases; I  shall continue nonetheless to record them. P3’s ὁ δὲ δι’ αὐτὸν/αὑτὸν αἱρετός appears in the margin below the line in P, this being (the end of) the last line of P 115r. Interestingly, that proposal then becomes in­corp­or­ated into the text of Pal. 165, which intends to be as faithful a copy of P as it can be, the result being ὁ δι’ αὐτὸν ὁ δὲ δι’ αὑτὸν αἱρετὸς; this then is itself corrected, by what appears to be the first of two correcting hands in the MS, through the insertion from the margin of an αὐτὸς after αὐτὸν. I cite this as a living example, as it were, of the way marginalia can find their way into the text (a phenomenon often called to aid in the ­resolution of textual problems). b30–1 Between the MSS’ ὡς and Spengel’s ᾧ, I prefer the former, taking Aristotle to be saying ‘just as a person [in this sort of friendship] wishes good things for [the friend] because of the person he [the friend] is, so he must also choose him to be [sc. such, i.e. ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός and ἡδύς]’; pace Kenny (Oxford World’s Classics translation) and Inwood and Woolf, wishing the friend to continue to exist is hardly relevant to the present argument. The unnecessary obeli in Walzer/Mingay around αὐτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι εἶναι perhaps stem from Susemihl’s comment ‘αὐτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι vix sana’. b31 ὁ δ’ ἀληθινὸς ϕίλος κτλ: the δὲ is perhaps, strictly, apodotic—­if the present clause is, as I take it to be, the main clause we have been expecting since b27 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν; but so far is it from b27 that we seem to need a connective, i.e. δὲ, here anyway. b33–4 Delaying the γάρ until after πότερον is surely intolerable (even in EE)?

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114  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1236b37 P2 supplies ἄν from the margin, with an insertion mark in the text. The MSS reading invites us, impossibly, to take ἁπλῶς with κακά, and then leaves τύχῃ without a function; Mingay’s proposal, moving ἁπλῶς so that it qualifies ϕευκτά, also makes τύχῃ a puzzle: if it is a dative singular, . . . ἀλλὰ κακὰ τύχῃ looks barely possible as Greek. In short, Jackson’s emendation can scarcely be improved on. b39 P has a small gap after the second ἀγαθά, which it chooses to fill with four small red dots in diamond formation (letters are also often coloured in, in red, in P, apparently on a random basis, usually initial letters); something may well have been erased after οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά. 1237a2 τοῦτον is not, perhaps, quite impossible, but a switch to a personal object here would be jarring, and even if EE can make sudden switches, they do not normally jar quite as much as this one would. a3 B curiously separates ὅ and πως with what looks like a comma. —The MSS’ εὐθέτως by itself surely cannot be right. With Richards’s εὔθετος, I construe ‘[A human being is] fitted and on the way [πρὸ ὁδοῦ] [towards that end, just] qua human’. Richards’s alternative proposal, εὐθέτως δὲ 〈ἔχει〉, is less economical, given the frequency with which omicron and omega are interchanged in these MSS (as with Richards’s first proposal they would have been with εὐθέτως for εὔθετος). a4 Jackson’s supplement of ὁ before ἄνθρωπος is part of the larger proposal that includes transferring a6–7 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα to a3, following οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται; there seems little that is useful in the proposal as a whole. But Jackson is surely right to dismiss the several earlier attempts to ameliorate the passage made or reported in Susemihl’s apparatus, which overstate the difficulties of the context, as does Dirlmeier (and, I think, Jackson himself). a5–6 I bracket ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐϕυὴς ἀϕυοῦς on the grounds that the words are patently intrusive. (1) ‘a is x and y, because for a by nature z, and similarly b instead of c, and d [instead of ] e’ makes no sense: there is no comparison of one thing with another in  εὔθετος δὲ καὶ, κτλ; (2) the comparison of man and woman has no  ­relevance to the argument, and (3) neither has that between the

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Aristotelica  115 well ­endowed and the poorly endowed. On the other hand it is not ­difficult to imagine a reader wanting to qualify Aristotle’s quite striking claim about humankind as a whole, i.e. εὔθετος . . . καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὤν: wouldn’t he surely want to say that the male was superior to the female, and that some people are better equipped to progress than others? The answer to both questions is yes, but his general point is what matters here, and it stands (I take it) despite both qualifications; indeed it would be unhelpfully obscured if they were introduced here. I conclude that the words are a gloss that came to be incorporated into the text. a5 ‘Pessime’, comments Susemihl on Fritzsche’s second conjecture (ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ), and it is hard to disagree. a5–6 Jackson explains his εὐϕυὴς εὐϕυοῦς as ‘the clever son of a clever father’, ‘find[ing] it difficult to believe, either that εὐϕυὴς ἀϕυοῦς will stand for εὐϕυὴς ἀντὶ ἀϕυοῦς, or that ἀντὶ has been dropped [i.e. has dropped out]’: this in response to Susemihl’s hesitant proposal of εὐϕυὴς 〈ἀντ’〉 ἀϕυοῦς. That Aristotle should omit the ἀντὶ second time round seems to me perfectly possible, but in any case I think the whole of ὁμοίως δὲ . . . ἀϕυοῦς is suspect: see last note but one. a6 καὶ ἀνάγκη scripsi: ἀνάγκη καὶ PCB; ἀνάγκη L; there is also in B something that might—­at a stretch—­be interpreted as a version of the ligature for γὰρ over καὶ (B2). We surely do need a connective: one of the main causes of interpreters’ worries over the preceding couple of lines is that the MSS’ plain ἀνάγκη makes it look as if it begins an apodosis—­ which, as things stand, lacks a protasis (‘Spengelius . . . probe intellexit periisse initiium protaseos’, Susemihl), and a protasis cannot easily be engineered. But γὰρ seems wrong. I suggest, rather, that ἀνάγκη, κτλ begins an independent sentence that builds on the new and important statement διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἡ ὁδός. If so, Aristotle says, then τὰ καλὰ had better be ἡδέα, only he chooses not to express this as a consequence, merely as another claim. The καὶ, on this account, belongs not, as PCB have it, after ἀνάγκη—­where it has no obvious function—­but before it. a7 σπουδαῖον in the MSS is perhaps influenced by their τοῦτο just before (or by ἀνάγκη in what I treat as the preceding sentence; the

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116  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1237a7) ac­cusa­tive would make some sense if there were a comma instead of a full stop after ἡδέα). a13 ὀξέων P1CB: a simple transcription error, to judge by the ligature for εξ as it appears in P, e.g. at a34 below; corrected in P with the ­insertion of a tiny epsilon with rough breathing over the left-hand end of the supralinear mark for -ων—­noticed by Pal. 165, which has no problem in reading ἕξεων. a14 Jackson’s proposal gives the right sense, and can claim a sort of palaeo­graph­ic respectability: ‘.  .  .  ΤΟΚΑΛ might represent ΤΟΙΔΙ: for Κ = Ι, Α = Δ, Λ = Ι . . .’, and ΟΝΤΡΟΠΟΝΤΟ is not a world away from ΟΝΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ. But it is easily demonstrable that by no means all mistakes in these MSS go back to misreadings of uncial/ majuscule; that may be a factor, but experience shows that we also have to allow both for simple slips even in the copying of minuscule and for mistakes stemming directly from a misunderstanding of the sense rather than from the shape of the characters. (This obviously does not mean that anything goes; in a philosophical text, fortunately, we usually have a clear steer from the surrounding context [see Preface to text and ap­par­atus], as we do in the present case, about the kind of thing that is more than likely to be being said.) Thus we need not insist e.g. that whatever underlies the corrupt τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον need have occupied exactly the same space/contained the same number of characters, although it will not damage the prospects of any solution if it does. I suspect myself that ὃν τρόπον is somewhat fancy for the EE, and that the ubiquitous οἷον would suit its style better; τοιοῦτον meanwhile could result from simple inversion of  οἷον τὸ after corruption had begun with the hopeless τὸ καλὸν. Combining this with the first part of Jackson’s proposal, we then have τοισδί, οἷον  τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι. However, unless we put more weight on Jackson’s argument (above) than I have suggested it deserves, the ­plural  τοισδί seems unnecessary, in a context that is following up/­ developing a12 ὁ τῳδὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν. So: τῳδί, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι—­almost Bonitz’s original solution, but with τῳδί for his αὐτῷ, which seems plucked out of the air. (Dirlmeier offers an unnecessarily expanded version of Bonitz.)

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Aristotelica  117 a20 ϕιλίας C2: the sign for -ας is added after C’s superscript alpha (for which see 1237b5); i.e. C2 changes to the genitive without erasing or over-­ writing. A strange correction: was he thinking of pleasure-­friendship? a22 δὴ: it is tempting to write δὲ for δὴ (though no one seems to have suggested it), in order to make the πότερον just coming parallel to the last two; but actually this new question seems to be an expansion of the second, offering an explanation as to why the answer to that previous question should be a yes—­a yes being already implied by the suppression of the expected alternative (i.e. πότερον . . . without the expected ἢ . . .). The next sentence similarly gives us a reason for assenting to the idea introduced by this third πότερον. —Bekker’s ἀγαθὸν (adopted by both Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay on the basis of Lat. bonum) mistakes the sense: ‘is it because he is good that the exercise of love seems to involve pleasure?’, Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation. a30 P2 corrects to τελεωθέντι with the lightest of touches, converting the top dot of the two vertically arranged dots signalling the (τ)α ending into an iota and adding the two horizontally arranged dots above it that typically accompany iotas. a34 αὐτὴ (Ambr.) looks right: it is not just first ϕιλία that is the ἕξις ἀϕ’ ἧς, κτλ, but rather ϕιλία in general, which is the subject in what immediately follows. This is one of a number of cases where Ambrosianus E40 sup. makes useful interventions that used to be attributed to Oxon. or the Aldine, both of which are descended from Ambr. a36 None of the three proposals to improve on δυνάμεως . . . πάσης, Bonitz’s two or Richards’s, is persuasive; ἔργον is easily supplied from a34 with the genitive, and the point is simple: ἕξεις are being distinguished from δυνάμεις (e.g. the capacity to heal: see Dirlmeier 397–8). a38–9 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι ϕιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ ϕιλίας: none of the four conjectures listed succeeds in improving on the MSS: ‘[which is why the pleasure is in loving, not in being loved,] because [loving is the ἐνέργεια belonging to ϕιλία, and] being loved is [merely] the ἐνέργεια of a lovable object, whereas the activity of loving belongs to ϕιλία too [sc. as well as to the activated ϕιλητόν]’. Pace Jackson, I find

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118  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1237a38–9) nothing ‘absurd’ about the idea that ϕιλεῖσθαι is an ἐνέργεια, if that is taken as an activation of the lovable object. Kenny objects, in cor­res­pond­ence, that ‘ἐνέργεια is an activity, not an activation’, but I think that the καὶ confirms that this is Aristotle’s intention; Rackham’s solution, which Kenny adopts (in the Oxford World’s Classics translation), takes no account of the καὶ. a40 ἐπεὶ καὶ / ἐπεὶ δὲ: if ἐπεὶ introduces a new sentence here, i.e. with δὲ, there is no main clause; in any case, the ἐπεὶ καὶ we find in CB gives a better sense: ‘In fact, though [ἐπεὶ in its concessive use: LSJ s.v. ἐπεί B.4, sc. despite the fact that we have been saying that active ϕιλία is in the person loving, and so different from the realization of the δύναμις of a beloved object], active loving still does have an outside aspect, one relating to a ἕτερον’. 1237b1 ὅ secl. Bonitz: necessarily; the ὅ is presumably someone’s attempt to make sense of a preceding τὸ ϕιλούμενον, itself arising from the common confusion of omega and omicron combined with the lack of iota subscript. b2 While accepting τῷ for καὶ (ϕίλῳ), I acknowledge that it is an odd mistake for a copyist to make. Should we perhaps think of reading καὶ ϕίλος? b4 ἄλλο/ἄλλῳ/ἄλλος: Susemihl claims that there is a correction in P from ἄλλος to ἄλλῳ, while Walzer/Mingay claims it is the other way round. The evidence probably favours Walzer/Mingay: one half of the superscript omega—­a squashed figure of eight on its side, one half of which would give us the standard way of signalling an -ος ending—­is slightly fainter than the other (suggesting possible erasure), but is undoubtedly still there. But in any case I think ἄλλος is wrong (as, clearly, is ἄλλῳ). The sense is ‘[and not for being] something else’ (i.e. not μουσικὸς or ἰατρικός, or . . .), as Kenny has it in the Oxford World’s Classics translation, though without noting a change of reading from Walzer/Mingay’s ἄλλος. Or perhaps Kenny is saying that ἄλλος itself, in the context, can be taken as ‘something else’, that being shorthand for ‘someone with a feature/features other than the ones he has’. And maybe he would be right, but the idea of a friend’s being ἄλλος, or ἕτερος, has

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Aristotelica  119 another and more important role to play in the whole discussion of friendship, and especially in the most recent part of it, i.e. insofar as the separation between the one loving and the one loved is both essential to and creates some of the problems, for Aristotle, with understanding friendship itself. Would αὐτὸν γὰρ ϕιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος not introduce an unnecessary ambiguity? Perhaps not. But I prefer the ἄλλο (from a  correcting hand in Laur. 81,4, and independently conjectured by Jackson, who provides his own argument for it), not least on palaeo­ graph­ical grounds: instances of omega for omicron (and vice versa), as often noted, are quite common in these MSS, and the distance separating ἄλλῳ from ἄλλος, given the typical shorthand for the -ος ending, is anyway somewhat greater than from ἄλλο to ἄλλῳ (ἄλλω). (For the record, Donini too has ‘something else’, i.e. ‘altra cosa’, accepting ἄλλο from Jackson.) —οὐχ is split οὐ/χ between lines in B, with a hyphen-­like sign in the margin beside the chi. b5 δὴ P1/δεῖ P2: P2 overwrites the eta with an ει. The ει ligature, if that is what it is, still looks remarkably like an eta, but Pal. 165, which typ­ic­al­ly copies P with exemplary accuracy, and incorporates corrections, writes a straightforward δεῖ. Interestingly, the roughly contemporaneous Laur. 81,4 is also corrected (= Laur. 81,42) to δεῖ, the correction here being made to a part of the text that stems from the other recensio, i.e. (what Harlfinger calls) the Constantinopolitana. So δὴ was in both recensiones, but is eventually corrected in the descendants of both. b6 εἰ γὰρ Bekker, τί γὰρ PCBL: the question that would be introduced by τί seems to answer itself; putting the question mark after δυσώδης instead of after λείπεται, where it would naturally be placed, leaves us without enough to form a question at all—­we would surely need τί εἰ, but then supplying an εἰ to go with the τί is a less economical solution, and gives a less plausible sequence, than simply substituting εἰ for τί. b7 τῷ Fritzsche: i.e. ‘for he [the one loved] ἀγαπᾶται with [by means of?] good will’? τὸ εὐνοεῖν is surely the subject, and ἀγαπᾶν is being used in the sense of ‘be content with’, giving us ‘for good will is enough [in this case]’. (If the passive is uncongenial, maybe ἀγαπᾷ γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν?) —B2 writes in the required μή above δή. Richards’s claim that

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120  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1237b7) συζῇ δὲ μή is ‘impossible’, presumably because of the switch from impersonal to personal subject, is unwarranted, first because such a switch would not be so unusual for EE, and second because the subject of συζῇ is itself close to being impersonal (‘one doesn’t . . .’). On the other hand his—­equally unnecessary—­rewriting, οἷον εἰ σϕόδρα δυσώδης γίνεται, ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν, συζῆν δὲ μή, is more restrained than Jackson’s bizarre reconstruction, based on his usual hypothesis of  corruptions of uncial/majuscule: τί γὰρ 〈ὁ〉 σϕόδρα δυσώδης ϕιλεῖται; ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τὸ εὐνοεῖν εὖ ὄζειν δὲ μή. In Jackson’s rendering, or paraphrase, this gives us ‘[. . . and no attendant circumstances should neutralize the good.] For instance, why is it that people are fond of a σϕόδρα δυσώδης? It is because they like his good will in spite of his infirmity.’ b11 There is an extended mark in B under the usual dots above the iota of κεκριμμένον; its significance is unclear. b16 B2 appears to insert an alternative ligature for -ου over the second upsilon (= ὑποζουγίου?). —The supplement of εἶναι appears necessary here: Dirlmeier may well be right in saying that Aristotle is capable of leaving it out (he refers to the examples in Bonitz, Index, s.v. Ellipsis), but the ellipse seems too harsh here: contrast the case in b22 below, where the εἶναι is easily supplied from the following εἰσίν. b19–20 P2 writes ἴσως: εἶναι ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰσὶ ϕίλοι in the margin, with an insertion mark after βούλεσθαι—­evidently trying to make the best of the loss of the negative before βούλεσθαι. I bracket the first ϕίλοι on the grounds that it is not only not needed but is intrusive; a copyist has, perhaps, taken a shine to βούλονται ϕίλοι in b17. Richards says ‘[εἶναι] cannot be understood’; if we keep the first ϕίλοι here, he would be right. b21 P2 inserts εἰ above the line, with an insertion mark in the text. b21–2 The variant in B, οὐχ οἳ, is at least interesting. b22 With εἰσίν coming, an εἶναι can surely be understood here, pace Richards. —εἰσιν B: B more often deploys nu ephelkustikon than do PCL, his habit here coinciding with modern conventions.

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Aristotelica  121 b23 εὐδιάλυτοι CB: an easy mistake, perhaps; C starts to make it again two lines further on (see next note), but recovers himself. b25 εὐδιάβλητοι C post corr.: the copyist seems to have started writing εὐδιάλ, as in 23, then corrected the lambda to beta, finishing with λητοι. b26 P2 inserts a kappa above the -δὲν of οὐδὲν. b27 αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος B1, ταύτῃ γὰρ ἄπιστος B2: it is hard, in fact, from the physical evidence to see which came first. In favour of supposing it was αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος is (a) that we can explain how it came about, i.e. by dittography after αὕτη ἡ ϕιλία, and (b) that αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος is nonsense, so that the need for correction would be clear, and ταύτῃ γὰρ ἄπιστος makes rather a good sense—­so that the simple expedient of adding a tau before αὕτη, as I propose B2 did, would be an advance. b30 τὰ LP2B2: alpha and grave accent are superimposed on the οῦ in P, alpha written in above it in B. b32 τὰ τῶν ϕίλων CB: cf. 1238a16. —προσνέμεται: the προσ in P is indicated by means of its—­and C’s—­usual convention for -ος, i.e. with an omicron over the preceding letter, and no sigma actually marked. The sigma is added over the omicron by B2; B himself curiously separates προ from νέμεται, and the way in which the προσ- is marked in P too is generally reserved for a separate πρός. Such, presumably, was the ­origin of the error in CBL. b34 P2 adds οὖν in the margin with an insertion mark, but without a visible matching insertion mark in the text; P3 writes in ἀρα over the gap between γίγνεται and ἡ with an insertion mark, either not noticing or ignoring the preceding correction. Either οὖν or ἄρα will do, if we need a connective; because connectives are so often missing in EE I hesitate, as I have in a number of other cases, to put one in. b36 ϕίλοι P1, ϕίλου P2: P2 changes the second iota in P1CBL ϕίλοι to upsilon. b37 δοκεῖν P1: P2 overwrites the double oblique stroke normally used for -ειν, as it is here in C, with the ligature for ει. —τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος:

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122  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1237b37) L’s genitive is perhaps more likely than PCB’s accusative not just because the more idiomatic, but because τὸν for τοῦ before νοῦν, with ἔχοντα naturally following, would be an easy mistake. If this story is accepted, γε will be B’s own invention, and this will spare us having to explain how it fell out independently from L and α, especially when it looks so much in place. 1238a1 Pace Walzer/Mingay, οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας is clearly what Nikolaos wrote in P, though he has some trouble squeezing ἡμέρας in at the end of the line. a3 ἁλῶν/ἄλλων P1CB: there are signs that the breathing in P was ori­ gin­al­ly smooth, and has been made rough; an acute accent on the alpha has been turned into a circumflex bestriding the lambda, and it is also quite likely that a second lambda has been erased. What is certain, I  think, is that P did not have ἁλῶν until P2 came on the scene. This receives confirmation from the fact that Pal. 165, which generally follows P faithfully and incorporates corrections (as e.g. with δεῖ at 1237b5), reads ἄλλων here: in other words, the correction to ἁλῶν had not yet been made. The history of the corrections to P is complex, as the example of 1237b34 (q.v.) suggests. —P2 writes τῶ in the margin, with insertion marks there and in the text before ἁπλῶς. a4 The cost of not accepting Bussemaker’s εἰ ὁ is that the second ϕίλος (surely) has to go. The εἶεν in PCBL suggests that there was something more there than εἰ, and Fritzsche’s δὴ is no more than a place-­filler. a5 δὲ2 B, deest in PCL: a connective is certainly needed here, though Bekker does without it; Susemihl follows others in getting a δ’ from Lat. autem. Does the B copyist supply it himself, or did α and L each in­de­ pend­ent­ly omit it? a6 ?ὡς P2 in margin, ?ὧν P3 above the line after ὥστε: both faint traces, but it is worth recording that they are there, presumably as conjectures.

a7 (?) [τῷ] τοῦτο P2, [τῷ] τοῦτο 〈τῷ〉 Jackson: P2 writes τοῦτο in the margin below τούτου (this is the last line on the page), and I believe the intention to be for τοῦτο to replace the whole of τῷ τούτου, despite the fact that Pal. 165, copying a corrected P, reads τῶ τοῦτο (the usual

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Aristotelica  123 rule, the corrector’s aim being to get the text to make sense, is that a correction needs only to be indicated, not fully carried through, and τῷ τοῦτο is plainly as meaningless as τῷ τούτου: in other words, Pal. 165 on this occasion mistakes P2’s intentions). And P2 is surely right: τοῦτο is all we strictly need. But how would τοῦτο ever have become τῷ τούτου? From this perspective Richards’s τὸ αὐτὸ looks better; but why the genitive τούτου? Jackson’s proposal comes with the advantage of a story: τοῦτο τῷ, let us suppose, first became τῷ τοῦτο by simple inversion, τοῦτο then being replaced by τούτου by dittography; yet his τῷ after τοῦτο looks unconvincing when a plain ἄλλῳ follows in the next line. An alternative would be to accept Dirlmeier’s τοιοῦτον (without the unnecessary supplement of καὶ, which he takes over from Spengel’s rather different reconstruction: see on a8 below). The simplicity of P2’s solution, however (without Jackson’s 〈τῷ〉), seems to me ultimately to win out. —καὶ εἰ μή / εἰ δὲ μή / ἢ καὶ μή / εἰ καὶ μή: PCB’s εἰ καὶ μή, accepted by Walzer/Mingay, looks impossible, because we need a con­nect­ive. Hence Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation give us ‘and even if ’, but without adding an extra καὶ in the text (cf. Dirlmeier’s 〈ἢ〉 εἰ καὶ), and ‘even if ’ only fits with Fritzsche’s σπουδαῖος for σπουδαίῳ in the next line (see below). L’s ἢ καὶ is a possibility, but the following μή is in favour of an εἰ (despite 1237b7: we should probably not multiply the unusual unnecessarily), which leaves Richards’s εἰ δὲ and καὶ εἰ, and εἰ δὲ before the μή looks immediately more attractive, because more familiarly Aristotelian, than καὶ εἰ μὴ: ‘but if not, then abstractly good for the virtuous man and good to another because he is useful’ (Kenny in the Princeton Aristotle’s Ethics). (Richards’s two proposals, καὶ εἰ and εἰ δὲ, are actually part of a larger rewriting the need for which he does not explain.) However, I prefer καὶ εἰ because it gives us an easier path to the MSS’ readings: ω, I suppose, or one of its predecessors, inverted καὶ and εἰ, and εἰ became ἢ in L, as it so often does in these MSS. a8 Apparently diverging from Walzer/Mingay in adopting Fritzsche’s σπουδαῖος for σπουδαίῳ, Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translates ‘Alternatively, a man may not be good in the abstract, but good for the other by being useful’. But the sentence started with the situation where there is συμϕωνία between being ἀγαθὸς ἁπλῶς and being

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124  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1238a8) ἀγαθὸς τινί, and if ‘a man [is] not good in the abstract’, and neither is the other person, we will have left that συμϕωνία behind. And it would  surely be confusing for Aristotle suddenly to use σπουδαῖος here instead of ἀγαθός for the ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός whose goodness ἄλλῳ is at issue; much less confusing if the σπουδαῖος is ὁ ἄλλος himself, whose own goodness or otherwise for the ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός is not presently relevant. So σπουδαίῳ is what is needed. (Fritzsche proposed σπουδαῖος independently of Spengel’s elaborate and unhelpful reconstruction of the sentence, i.e. ὅς ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός καὶ ἄλλῳ, [εἰ καὶ μὴ] ἁπλῶς μὲν 〈ὅτι〉 σπουδαῖος, but then goes in for some of the same, suggesting—­ even less helpfully—­ἐστι χρήσιμον for ὅτι χρήσιμος.) a9 κωλύει: P2 changes the sign for -ειν to the ligature for -ει. a14 Richards’s comment ‘ϕιλία is an excellence of nature’, supporting his removal of the definite article, misconstrues: τῆς ϕύσεως is a genitive of comparison after κάλλιον. a15 There could be an original iota on its own under the somewhat messy ει in P’s ἀτυχεῖαι, but ἀτυχεῖα is standard in P. a16 P2 writes τὰ in margin, with insertion marks both there and in the text before τῶν ϕίλων (Jackson had the same idea). a18 καὶ δυστυχίαι scripsi, on the grounds that at least καὶ and δυστυχίαι were in ω (given what P and L have), and that the omission of the second αἱ (n.b. P: αἱ εὐτυχεῖαι καὶ δυστυχεῖαι) would be typical for EE. a20 P2’s τυχόν looks not only possible, pace Dirlmeier, but perfectly acceptable—‘what was useful, as it happened’ (so: not bad Greek for διὰ τὸ τύχον χρήσιμον). τυχών was evidently in the common source of PCB (beneath the mark for the -ον ending in P there are clear signs of an erased sign for -ων), representing the typical confusion between omicron and omega. L’s ἀτυχ (at the end of a line, and with what resembles a Greek colon in the margin beside it) is evidently despairing. Once he had started with ἀτυχ, the only possible ending that would make sense is -οῦντας: did someone perhaps once gloss an original and corrupt τυχών with ἀτυχοῦντας (cf. Susemihl’s τυχόντας, based on Lat. comparatos?), which L began incorporating before giving up?

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Aristotelica  125 a23 ὄνοις P1, οἴνοις P2, adding the necessary iota above the line. —ὀδέσμασιν C1: C2 heavily overwrites the omicron with what is pre­ sum­ably intended as ἐ, though the result looks more like a filled-­in omicron with a (new) smooth breathing attached. —P adds an epsilon to κείνων at the beginning of its (P’s) line, although the ἐ is actually there already at the end of the last (there are other signs of such over-­ correction in this stretch in P). a24 Either the L copyist was presented with a gap and duly reproduced it, one of his predecessors having realized something was missing and chosen not to supply anything, or else he himself could not establish what he should be writing (cf. on a20 above). (Ambr. reproduces the gap in L, slightly lengthening it; Ald. then fills with ἡδὺ.) The following καὶ οὐ γλυκύ makes much better sense if preceded by γλυκὺ here, and is perhaps more likely—­at any rate given the shaping of the characters in MSS like P and C—­to have fallen out before ταχὺ. —χρόνον/χρόνῳ: P2 erases a superscript omega and replaces it with -ον (though there are exceptions, the general degree and accuracy of the corrections in P, at least in Book VII/IV, is increasingly apparent). Either B himself is correcting, or his χρόνον was in ω, the common source of PCBL, and the copyist of PC, or more likely α, and of L both wrote χρόνω by dittography after πλείω. a25 καὶ3 is in P as well as the other MSS, pace Walzer/Mingay (whose reporting of P, especially, continues to be at best patchy, though in this case the mistake is shared by Susemihl). a27 The nu added over the final epsilon in ὁμολογήσειε in P, plus a dot over the preceding ει, probably indicates the correction to -αιεν. —Neither ὅτι (Fritzsche) nor οὐχ ὅτι (Ross) seems to improve on the MSS’ οὐκ; if I understand them, both conjectures make the argument more difficult than it actually is. a28 πώματος PCB1: B2 adds ό above the ώ. a29 Jackson’s supplement of οὐ is necessary for the sake of the sense and because of the following ἀλλὰ, which is obviously not accounted for by the οὐχ before ἡδύ.

a30 The infinitive ἐξαπατᾶν is needed: τοῦτο . . . 〈οὐ〉 διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον οὐχ ἡδύ . . . ἐξαπατᾶν is what οἱ πολλοί say. I construe the whole

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126  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1238a30) sentence as ‘οἱ πολλοί would agree, not on the basis of τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα alone but just as in the case of drink they call something “too sweet”, [saying] that this is not pleasant not because of τὸ ἀποβαῖνον but because it/its effect does not continue, although it deceives at first’. (‘Too sweet’: i.e. ‘sweet, yes, but just a bit too sweet’—the usual Eudemian brevity.) This is a slightly different version of a24–5 τὸ μὲν γλυκὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, framed now as an endoxon. τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα may include ‘after-­effects’ (Kenny, Oxford World’s Classics), but I think they are more broadly ‘consequences’: I agree with Dirlmeier that there is likely to be a reference to Plato’s Protagoras here, in which οἱ πολλοί are portrayed for the sake of the argument as making choices in full awareness of future disadvantages as well as of present benefits. (Much of the rest of Dirlmeier’s analysis, however, is hard to accept.) a31 ἡ2 P2: his correction of αἱ to ἡ is distinctly messy. a32 τὴν/τῆς: in P, the original reading was clearly τὴν, as in C. This is one of a number of cases where there is a reasonable case for suspecting that P was at some point, and at least in some parts, corrected (sometimes, as here, ‘corrected’) against a manuscript like L. a35 It might perhaps be right to supply δὲ after κακῷ, which would give us the line as quoted—­as a complete iambic line—­in 1239b22. However the line may have originated there as a gloss (see note ad loc.), and it is quite possible, given Aristotle’s practice elsewhere in EE, and notwithstanding my reliance elsewhere on his presumed knowledge of/sensitivity to metre, that he omitted the δὲ here because he was adapting the line to the context, having already written a connective καὶ. —C has a dot under the kappa of συντέκεν, indicating at least uncertainty. —ἡδονῇ: P2 appears to apply the circumflex. a36 οὐχ for καὶ before ᾗ ϕαῦλοι is surely indispensable (as the translator of ‘Lat.’ saw), given the general run of sense this gives, and the following ἀλλά.

1238b1 ᾗ: Bonitz’s proposal, ἢ 〈ᾗ〉, wins out over the others listed for simplicity if nothing else, but is still not simple enough. Aristotle will surely not be interested in the possibility of the ϕαῦλοι being friends on the basis of usefulness qua ϕαῦλοι, especially after what he has said

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Aristotelica  127 about them in 1237b27–34, only in the possibility of their being friends qua neither ϕαῦλοι nor ἀγαθοί. So just ᾗ for ἢ; for a similar error in the MSS see b6 below. Rackham oddly marks the words preceding his supplement, i.e. οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, as a parenthesis; the only justification for that seems to be that it helps the supplement work. b2 ϕαύλῳ/ϕαύλων: a genitive might work, but in view of the χρήσιμος following it had better be singular and not plural. L’s ϕαῦλον illustrates the typical mix-­up of omicron and omega. —χρήσιμος P/P2: P2 might be adding a sigma to an original χρήσιμος in P, written as usual with the  omicron alone over the preceding letter, but actually the omicron seems to be an addition as well as the sigma. So there is an erasure, either of a sign for -ον, or else of a rightward-­leaning oblique stroke after χρήσιμ of the sort often used to cover endings where these are in any case clear; in the latter case, and I think there is a trace of such a mark, P2 would then be stepping in to provide the clarity which P himself did not. There is also something else in the left-­hand margin opposite the present line in P which may or may not be connected with this correction by P2, but in any case it is presently indecipherable. b6 Contra Rieckher, I see no objection to τὰ ἁπλᾶ [ἀγαθά] = τὰ ἁπλῶς [ἀγαθά]. —ᾗ Susemihl: from quatenus Lat. (to which Susemihl assigns an authority it does not have [see next note]; but ᾗ is in any case undoubtedly right). b6–7 ᾗ πενία συμϕέρει ἢ νόσος: pace Bussemaker (followed by Walzer/ Mingay), it is hard to extract a decent sense from the Latin version, paupertati aut morbis (which is where Bussemaker’s datives come from), whereas the MSS’ reading fits well, the thought being the (by the way, Socratic) one that in certain circumstances poverty and disease may actually be beneficial, e.g. if they stop an agent doing something damaging to himself/herself and/or others. b8 ποιεῖν/πιεῖν: P2 erases the omicron; B2 adds iota above the οι. —All three suggested supplements after βούλεται—­both of Fritzsche’s, and Richards’s—­fill out, unnecessarily, what has to be, and can be, understood anyway.

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128  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1238b11 οἷον is supplied over the line by B2 (or just possibly by the ­ori­gin­al hand). —The correction to ἔτι from ἐπὶ (if there is a correction, as I think there is) in P seems to be effected by adding ink to the second upright of the original pi. —To find ᾗ in B is slightly generous: the circumflex is certainly there, the breathing at best ambiguous—­but in B it often is, and he could hardly intend ᾖ in this position. b12 εἶεν Ald., εἰσιν PCBL: to retain the MSS’ εἰσιν we should need to read ἂν καὶ 〈μὴ〉 σπουδαῖοι after it, i.e. μὴ with Bonitz and σπουδαῖοι with L, which is perfectly possible but offers what I take to be a somewhat less good sense; Aristotle is surely not inclined to make the general claim that the non-σπουδαῖοι are not ὁμιλητικοί. P2 writes γρ.: οὕτως in the margin, with insertion marks there and in the text after εἰσιν. —ἂν is written in by Β2 above the ἐν. —Bonitz’s μὴ is needed if we accept L’s σπουδαῖοι; that it would have to be supplied if we do read σπουδαῖοι is sufficient reason for not going with L. b16 εἰσιν ἀρετῆς: PCB’s is the more striking, i.e. unexpected, order, and I adopt it for that (not particularly compelling) reason. b17 It is tempting to read Fritzsche’s ὑπεροχήν for ὑπερβολήν, but there are examples of ὑπερβολή in the sense of ‘superiority’. —[ἀρετὴ] Rackham: evidently not knowing Rackham had anticipated him, Kassel too (R. Kassel, ‘Peripatetica’, Hermes 91 [1963], 54) proposes to bracket ἀρετὴ, comparing 1242a32–5 πατρὸς δὲ καὶ θεοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ [sc. ϕιλία] ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον . . . καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ϕύσει ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν ϕύσει ἀρχόμενον: ‘Durch diese schlagende Parallele wird die Streichung von ἀρετή an unserer Stelle schon fast erzwungen. Auch hier setzt das  ausweitende καὶ ὅλως voraus, dass eine bestimmte zur Gruppe ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου gehörige ϕιλία schon genannt worden ist, eben θεοῦ (sc. ϕιλία) πρὸς ἄνθρωπον, von der dann auch Zeile [26] f. ohne weiteres, als von etwas schon eingeführtem, geredet wird. . .’. This argument is persuasive, but not quite decisive: the preceding ὥσπερ will introduce an illustration of superiority at least as readily as, if not more readily than, an example of friendship based on it. Kenny (Oxford World’s Classics) demonstrates how the sentence will work, while also

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Aristotelica  129 reproducing its awkwardness: ‘Another variety of friendship is based on superiority—­the kind of superiority that the virtue of a divinity has . . .’ (Inwood and Woolf ’s ‘But there is another distinction . . . , which goes together with superior virtue’ would perhaps be ἡ καθ’ ὑπερβολήν 〈ἀρετής〉?). Nor would this be damagingly inconsistent with NE VII [‘=’ EE VI].1, 1145a25–7, adduced by Kassel: for Aristotle to say in one context that the ἕξις of god is τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς is not necessarily inconsistent with his saying, in another, that god’s ἀρετή is superior to that of a human being. —I confess to finding Dirlmeier’s defence of ἀρετὴ against Rackham and Kassel, spreading over nearly two pages, and combined with praise for Kassel’s ‘scharfsinnige Argumentation’ (to the main part of which he does not reply), largely incomprehensible. Rackham’s Loeb EE Dirlmeier (122) declares in general to be ‘leider fast wertlos’; here is one place that belies such a description. (For the only other intervention in EE in Kassel’s Hermes piece see b9 above. The deletion of βούλεται goes with a supplement of ἁπλῶς after the preceding βούλεται (b8), in which Richards anticipates him. We can certainly do without the second βούλεται, but that is not a reason to remove it, given that it is in all of PCBL.) b20 ἶσον1 B2: the circumflex accent in B is added over the acute; once again the suspicion must be that B is being corrected against (an MS like) P or C in the way that P is against (an MS like) L. —δ’ deest CB: in C at the end of a line. —ἶσον2 B2: circumflex is again added over acute. b22 ἄλλη/ἄλλην/ἄλλων: B apparently misreads the sign for -ην, as in PC, as -ων; the two signs are close to each other, the latter being larger, the former being mostly located over the final letter of the stem. b25 τὸ videtur defuisse in C: I think Nikolaos in C originally wrote out ὁμοίως ἄν- (the line ends there). Another hand then writes in a ligature for -ως above the iota and a thick, elongated character blotting out the omega while converting the final sigma to ὸ; I can only assume that the  character substituting for the original omega is a tau, though it would be a strange one. b26–7 ἴσως: ἀντιϕιλεῖται ὡς ϕιλεῖ P2 in margin, presumably himself dropping the τῷ, and choosing to save the first passive rather than the

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130  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1238b26–7) second, but at the cost, counterintuitively, of making the complainant rather than god the (grammatical) subject of the complaint. Casaubon’s ἀντιϕιλεῖ is indebted to Lat.’s (the late Latin translation’s) vicissim ipse diligat; τῶ ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι in the MSS is presumably a corrupted repetition of b25 τὸ ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι. b27 καὶ ἀρχομένῳ: emendation is unnecessary; ‘it would be ­ridiculous if . . . , or for the ruler and the ruled’, while loose, makes good sense. b29 The received text, καὶ ἡδονή διαϕέρει οὐδὲν ἥ τε, κτλ, surely cannot stand, nor any version that has the two cases of pleasure being no different from each other, (a) because they are in fact different and (b) if they were the same there would be no point in Aristotle’s introducing the point here (Fritzsche’s καίτοι in effect acknowledges this: ‘and yet . . .’). Spengel’s deletion of οὐδὲν would be one way out, but raises the question how the οὐδὲν got there in the first place. Jackson’s οὐδ’ ἓν for οὐδὲν, for its part, is undoubtedly ingenious (Dirlmeier calls it ‘elegant’, Donini ‘brilliant’), but one wonders why, having said that two things differ, Aristotle would immediately add ‘and are not one thing’. By contrast Bonitz’s proposal, keeping οὐδὲν and reading ἧττον for ἥ τε, is not only palaeographically respectable but actually helps to cement the sentence into the context: the person in a position of superiority loves, we have been told, in a different way from the corresponding inferior, and no less does the pleasure enjoyed by the αὐτάρκης / the superior from his loving differ, whether from his loving a possession—­a slave, presumably?—or a son, from the pleasure enjoyed by an indigent receiving bounty. (Pleasure has of course been said to be a central ingredient in ϕιλία.) The compression is extraordinary, but not so unusual for EE. Similarly Dirlmeier, commenting on ἢ παιδί (he too accepts Bonitz’s solution): ‘. . . EE ist so reich an Ellipsen, dass ich auch hier eine solche vermute ohne aber im Text etwa herstellen zu wollen ἢ 〈τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ〉 παιδί ’. b32 P2 writes ἡ in the margin with insertion marks there and in the text after ἡδονὴν: i.e. presumably, ἡ ϕιλία, given the singular verb following in PCBL.

b37 The second accent on εὕρηκεν in P perhaps confirms what we know already, P and C being from the same original: namely, that the

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Aristotelica  131 copyist had εὑρηκέναι before him, as did B. But as Bonitz saw, it must originally have been εἴρηκεν; then the question is who said it. Bonitz’s ἐκεῖνος is attractively neutral, Jackson’s Αἴνικος has its palaeograph­ ical attractions, but Russell’s Εὔνικος at least gives us a name of a poet  for whom we have other evidence, however little—­and surely Aristotle would have given a name. —ὁ secl. Jackson, but perhaps it should stand, given that, as we have seen, quotations in this particular text (and maybe more generally in Aristotle?) are not completely ­separated off from the surrounding text in the way they are by the modern convention of quota­tion marks; here that prevents the use even of the modest convention I have adopted for marking at least the beginning of a quotation, i.e. a capital letter: so ὁ ἐρώμενος, not ὁ Ἐρώμενος. —ἐρωμένος B1: it is interesting that B has the accent appropriate to ἐρρωμένος: is that the reason why B2 proceeds to add in the extra rho over the line, or—­again—­was he correcting B against another MS, like P or C? (In any case ἐρρωμένος was probably in the MS B was copying; he sees the need to drop one of the rhos, but fails to change the accentuation.) 1239a2 καὶ ante κατὰ1 suppl. Rackham: and it is true that a, b, καὶ c is not a normal sequence, even in Aristotle; an alternative would be to suppress the following καὶ. a3 In this case the circumflex on ἴσον in B seems to be original. a4 ὑπεροχήν ἐστιν B: the copyist mistakes the ligature for ει for an epsilon, and then the sigma is easily assimilated to the ligature for στ. a5 A beautiful example of haplography in B (ἂν/ἀνὴρ). B2 writes in the ligature ει above the line between γὰρ and ἀνὴρ. a10 Spengel’s δεῖ is there to explain the following infinitive ἀξιοῦν (a11, PCBL), but ‘one must think it right for . . .’ looks pleonastic; we need either ‘one must . . .’ or ‘it is right for . . .’, not both. Better, then, to keep ἀεὶ, with Bekker, Susemihl, and Walzer/Mingay, and change ἀξιοῦν to ἄξιον with Bonitz. Spengel’s emendation is part of a larger rewriting, i.e. ὑπεροχήν δεῖ [δὲ] τὸν ὑπερέχοντα κτλ., which avoids the pleonasm but is anyway unnecessary.

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132  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1239a14 οὐδὲν ἰσχύει: that this is the intention of the correction in Laur. 81,4 is clear, even if the details are not; the important novelty is a grave accent appearing over the original epsilon. (Victorius writes ‘fort. οὐδὲν ἰσχύει’ in the margin.) I note however that τὸν μικρὸν, written in error for τὸ μικρὸν at the beginning of the sentence, is not corrected. (Or is that further correction presupposed, once given the restoration of οὐδὲν ἰσχύει?) a21 διατί L: δια and τὶ are separated in L only because split between lines; δια has no accent. a23 οὐ P1, ὁ P2: most of P’s original upsilon is erased by P2, with smooth breathing heavily altered to rough. a28 Rackham’s ϕιλούμενος for ϕιλότιμος is entirely unnecessary: ἐκεῖνος is naturally taken as being the one who χαίρει μᾶλλον τῷ ϕιλεῖσθαι, and the sentence as a whole, with ϕιλότιμος, gives more or

less the same sense that Rackham claims to get from it, in a more convoluted way, with ϕιλούμενος. a30 Spengel’s dative might be right, and would certainly work, but it does no harm to have the genitive, understanding ϕίλος from just before. a30–1 ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκῃ ἐνεργοῦντι: P2 supplies ϕιλεῖν in the margin above, this being the top line in P, with insertion marks in both the text, after ἐνεργοῦντα, and in the margin before ϕιλεῖν. But we have no need of the supplement: Richards’s emendation is splendidly economical, and the result is elegantly laconic: ‘For [pleasure] is necessarily inherent in the active exercise of love’, Kenny, translating Richards’s text, in the Oxford World’s Classics translation. a31 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός: in P the original copyist writes ϕιλ at the end of the line, presumably meaning to complete the word—­as ϕιλεῖν, presumably, as in CBL—­in the next line, but then failing to complete it; P2 adds εῖσθαι to the ϕιλ in the margin. a34 Susemihl’s punctuation must be right (σημεῖον δέ· ἕλοιτ’ ἂν). Victorius, who significantly increases the amount of punctuation in the Aldine, uses a comma.

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Aristotelica  133 a35–6 The MSS’ ὑπερβολαῖς is plainly hopeless; NE 1159a28–9 is prob­ ably enough to justify Victorius’ conjecture of ὑποβολαῖς. a38 With the omission of αὑτοῦ/αὐτοῦ, καὶ and ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν the text in B still gives a sense, but an impoverished one by comparison with PCL’s. b1 Bekker, Susemihl, and Walzer/Mingay all by implication suggest ­unanimity among the MSS around τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕιλεῖν ἕνεκα, but PC here deserve a second look. After τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ both have a simple ϕι with lambda above the iota, followed by an acute accent, and this in my view ought to be read as ϕίλου, not as ϕιλεῖν, coming as it does after τοῦ (i.e. directly after a genitive, not after the infinitive ποιεῖν). I also think that ϕίλου—­which is also in B—­gives a better sense than L’s ϕιλεῖν, γινώσκειν . . . τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα nicely contrasting with a37–8 γινώσκεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα. B1’s τοῦ ϕιλεῖν καὶ is presumably a mistake (B2 writes ου above the -ειν of ϕιλεῖν, but that makes things worse). b3 In these last few lines, and indeed in the next few, B puzzlingly seems to offer an abbreviated version of what is preserved in the other MSS; b1 is an exception. b8 ὑπὸ: C has what could just have been read as ἀπὸ (and is so reported by Walzer/Mingay), apart from the rough breathing; the style of the ­upsilon in P has a certain similarity to C’s. On συμπεριλαμβανόντων (‘including’), see note on 1235a6 above; emending both here and there, Spengel presumes an identical corruption in two widely sepa­ rated but connected places, which is possible but implausible when (συμ)περιλαμβανείν will fit in any case (similarly Walzer/Mingay). b10 καὶ περὶ τούτων desunt in B: once again, how to explain these omissions in B? It is not a regular feature of this MS, but is especially noticeable in the last twenty lines or so. After this, with some minor exceptions, it begins once again to look more like the other MSS. b14 P2 writes γρ.: ἐς ἑσπέραν in the margin. b15 συμμεταβάλλωσιν von der Mühll: but συμβάλλειν here is ‘make contracts’ (cf. 1237b26). —P2 conjures up οὐ out of οἱ by over­writing.

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134  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1239b18 δὲ seclusi: we surely need either the καὶ before ἕκαστον—­which must be connective?—or δὲ, not both; for straightforwardly linking two observations καὶ is perhaps marginally preferable. (Rackham’s ‘and also everything . . .’ would surely, in this context, be ἕκαστον δὲ καὶ . . .’?) b19 Apelt’s διαλέξεις is a neat solution that might simultaneously help to explain the definite article in PCB (perhaps the rarity of the word itself help cause the corruption?). However, ἕξεις looks quite acceptable; is it not true that people in the same family grouping who share the same characteristics tend to take pleasure in those characteristics? Jackson’s replacement of διὸ καὶ ϕωναὶ καὶ ἕξεις with διὸ καὶ ἐϕ’ ὧν δίκαιαι ἕξεις is surely only worth recording as a curiosity. (συνημερεύσεις is evidently a hapax: not just Rackham’s ‘society’, for which there are more ordinary words; more Inwood and Woolf ’s ‘pastimes’?) b22 Κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ seclusi: that the line has no introduction, and that the same line was cited only a few pages back 1238a35 strongly indicates that it originated, in this location, as a gloss. b32 ὥστε Rieckher: but there is a clear sense that Aristotle is building a  case against friendship between opposites, to which the observation introduced by ἔτι here contributes. b36 Without Spengel’s ὄτι the sense would have to be ‘[sc. and] not in the mean, whichever it is’, which is difficult enough without a con­nect­ ive; but in any case since the preceding εἰ δὲ μή stands for εἰ δὲ μή εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, the sentence has already told us that the ἐναντία are not in the mean. What we have not been told, explicitly, is that their not being in the mean is what causes them to be ἀεὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ. b38 πᾶσι LB2, πᾶσαν P1CB1, πᾶσιν P2: the -ιν in P is surely written by a later hand; either an original -αν has been erased (and there is perhaps a faint trace of it), or else the P copyist was faced with πᾶσαν, knew it was wrong but did not commit himself to an alternative, leaving a gap. This would not be the only case of such a phenomenon in P, but in this case is unlikely, given that with two dative masculine plurals following πᾶσιν would be the obvious choice (so I think -αν was originally there, the nu

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Aristotelica  135 encouraging the redundant nu in the new ending). In B two iotas appear to be written above the -αν, one with and one without the two dots usually associated with iotas: so Β2 and B3? 1240a2 In B ῥαθύμοις ends the last line on the page, and the θύμοις unusually spills out into the margin; it receives what is apparently a modest decoration—­three dots in a triangle—­underneath, as it were by way of compensation. a4 καθ’ αὑτὸ δὲ appears in the margin of P, clearly marked as intended to replace καὶ. a6 Walzer/Mingay adopts a οἱ before ϕιλούμενοι that Bekker and Susemihl get from Marc.; it is not in any of PCBL, and in EE is not missed. a8 C’s loss of δὲ is no doubt helped by the fact that the preceding περὶ ends a line; the copyist’s eye slips to what περὶ governs. —Susemihl accidentally omits the τοῦ, apparently causing Richards, who is not in­de­ pend­ent­ly checking the MSS, to comment ‘περὶ δὲ 〈τοῦ〉 seems necessary’. Walzer/Mingay wrongly claims that it is not in P. a11 ϕίλους deest in B: in this case what is lacking in B is something that could easily be understood. a13 Richards deletes ἡ on the grounds that ϕιλία is the predicate, which it is: ‘this friendship is [sc. ϕιλία] κατὰ ἀναλογίαν’; he seems to have missed the preceding αὕτη. a15 δι’ ὃ scripsi, δι’ ἃ PCBL: it is not the two elements involved, themselves, that explain what follows, but the fact that there are two elem­ents involved, which is what is picked up by the τῷ in the next line; as it happens, δι’ ὃ is what all translators actually translate, and I think it would be hard for them to do otherwise, given the logic of the sentence. Such a corruption, i.e. δι’ ὃ to δι’ ἃ, is perhaps easy enough after ἐν δυσὶ . . . διῃρημένοις. I write δι’ ὃ rather than διὸ on the grounds that δι’ ὃ would have made the corruption easier (B, incidentally, omits the elision mark, writing διἃ). —Susemihl’s supplement of ὡς is essential, as the Latin translator saw (‘velut’), since otherwise οὕτως would be left

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136  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1240a15) high and dry: ‘which is why a person is ϕίλος to himself more in the way, in the case of the ἀκρατής and ἐγκρατής, we said that they were in a way (πὼς) ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων’. PCB’s πῶς should be taken as πὼς, although their copyists probably took it as interrogative (but note L’s πως), as do modern translators despite the contortions required to do so; this is one case where accenting πὼς instead of πῶς, i.e. for ‘in a certain way’, is helpful. a17 With ὅμοιον, the following τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα will be an ­accusative of respect: ‘and it’s similar with all such questions’ (Spengel’s ὅμοια actually resembles the sort of mistake the copyists might easily have made, aligning the adjective with the following three neuter plurals). a20 διῃρημένως PCBL, BL with an iota subscript: such iotas appear in these MSS, if they do, especially when they occur in the middle of a word rather than in the ending—­and rather more frequently in B than in PCL. —ἴ[σως]: ᾗ (= ἧ) P2 in margin; there are also signs of an earlier correction in the text itself, though I think it may just be an alternative ligature for ει. a21 ἴ[σως]: ᾗ (ἧ) δ’ οὐ in right margin of P, with insertion marks there and in the text. Bekker’s εἰ is of a pair with P1CB’s εἰ in the preceding line; the double πως following is against him, as is the textual evidence (ᾗ L, ἡ P1CB). a22 The ὡς after ἕξεως is presumably by dittography. I think Bekker (who here unusually uses square brackets rather than just omitting ὡς) is right that we can do without a verb, but if one is needed Spengel’s εἰσιν would be harmless; Russell’s proposal to replace the διωρισμένοι following with διορίζονται fails to convince. a27–8 μὴ ὅτι τὸ εἶναι, τούτον ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα ϕιλεῖν scripsi: μήτοι τὸ εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα ϕίλος εἶναι Jackson; μὴ ὅτι τὸ εἶναι, τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα ϕίλος εἶναι Dirlmeier. The MSS present us with a mess, to which a combination of Jackson and Dirlmeier offers a solution. Jackson’s μήτοι has the better claim paleographically, but there are evidently no parallels for the use he has in mind (‘still less’), in Aristotle or anywhere else: Bekker records two examples of μή τοί γε

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Aristotelica  137 in Aristotle, but they are quite different, involving a quasi-­imperative sense. Dirlmeier, following Bender, proposes μὴ ὅτι, and in the absence of any better alternative I accept that, in the sense of ‘let alone’ (Dirlmeier’s ‘geschweige denn’, nedum). What Aristotle requires is not to exclude τὸ εἶναι specifically, only to make clear that there is no reference to τὸ εἶναι either: some people think friendship is a matter of wishing someone to exist irrespective of whether the wisher is bestowing any of the goods mentioned in the previous endoxon/τρόπος, or indeed bestowing existence itself—­well, of course people love their children. (Dirlmeier’s own explanation of the clause, as referring to the one loving distributing himself, i.e. between friends, as per NE 1171a3, probably makes too much of διανέμειν as ‘distribute’, when it can be just ‘assign’; the point is just to distinguish this τρόπος completely from the previous one; and in any case a reference to self-­ distribution would be irrelevant here.) —τούτον ἂν δόξειε: changing the MSS’ τούτῳ to τούτον is more economical than changing ϕιλεῖν to ϕίλος εἶναι, and writing a dative before ἂν δόξειε in error instead of the necessary accusative would be easy enough. The gap in L, caused presumably by preceding, and irretrievable, corruption after the initial μὴ, amounts to nearly a line. This is one of a handful of contexts in which Harlfinger’s hypothesis that L is a direct descendant of ω, the common ultimate source of PCBL, comes under significant strain. a31 ὁ P1, οἱ1 P2: P originally started the line with ὁ; P2 erases the ori­gin­al omicron, substitutes an iota and adds an omicron outside the margin. —τὸ ἑαυτοῖς: understand ἀγαθόν (τὸ ἑαυτοῖς [ἀγαθόν]), and indeed a lot more; another example of EE at its most succinct (cf. also next note). a32 Fritzsche’s supplement of ἂν μὴ is unnecessary; it would be entirely characteristic of EE to omit it the third time round. a33 The two words ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν are not just (1) in the wrong place (the following example relating to slaves and their masters explains μὴ δι’ ἕτερόν τι and not ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν); it is also odd, as Jackson observed, (2) that ἀγαπᾶν should suddenly be used in place of ϕιλεῖν (notwithstanding Dirlmeier’s reference to NE 1167b32), and (3) θήσομεν looks strangely assertive in a context that is essentially concerned with

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138  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1240a33) endoxa, unless it is engineered, implausibly, into a question. Susemihl’s proposal, i.e. making ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν follow οὐ δι’ αὐτούς in the line below, only deals with (1)—and if we are going to relocate the words, they might fit better after συναλγεῖν (which is where Kenny’s World’s Classics translation and Inwood/Woolf in the Cambridge translation seem covertly to place them, as perhaps Robinson does too: see next note). I propose that the words originated as a gloss, originally inserted in the margin by someone who thought, rightly, that the sentence was incomplete, especially given the way it resumes, without warning, the list of criteria people use for ϕιλία after a comment about how some of these conflict. But such awkwardnesses are not out of character for the EE, or indeed for the present context as a whole (for perhaps an even more extreme case see b8 καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα, κτλ). We are required to fill out with something like ‘[people] also [think] grieving with someone [a feature of friendship]’, and can easily do it for ourselves. In any case as it stands, with ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν, the structure of the sentence (pace Dirlmeier) is surely unsupportable. Fritzsche’s complete proposal runs . . . ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν 〈οὐχ〉 οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ αὐτοὺς, 〈ἀλλ〉 ὥσπερ . . . , which either increases the awkwardness of the sentence or just spreads it more widely. a35 If we were to keep ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν, and keep it where it is, Robinson’s deletion of the negative before δι’ αὐτοὺς would probably be necessary; by the same token, that the negative is there in the MSS constitutes further evidence of the intrusiveness of ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν. a37 B2 corrects ὀϕείλει to ὁ ϕίλος by writing ὁ, ι and -ος above the line in the text. a38 εἴ τε μή Jackson: the τε is intended to pick up the MSS’ μάλιστά τε at the beginning of the sentence, but this looks at best contrived. a39 A supplement is certainly needed (τὸ γὰρ supplevi), but τὸ γὰρ will be enough, leaving χαίρειν to be understood, in line with the general succinctness of the surrounding context; that Lat. supplies it (gaudere) is no surprise, since any translator will have to spell it out. (Putting in χαίρειν would allow us to explain the loss of τὸ γὰρ, by homoioteleuton, but then, τὸ γὰρ might be equally at risk without χαίρειν there to explain it.)

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Aristotelica  139 1240b3 The deletion of μὴ by P2 is done inconspicuously by means of dots beneath it. b6 οὐδὲ χάριτος P1L, οὐ χάριτος CB: the MSS’ readings are clearly not right. Apelt’s οὐδὲ χάριν τινός, ‘nor for the sake of something/someone’, is palaeographically defensible but would say much the same as the ­preceding διά τι ἕτερον, while Robinson’s supplement of ἔνεκα both preserves οὐ(δὲ) χάριτος and is plausible in itself (‘to curry favour’, or ‘to return a favour’?). But Spengel’s οὐδὲ χάριτας, ‘nor [because of] favours [being given/returned]’ gives the same sense more economically (and succinctly). There are traces of a correction in P, possibly including the addition of ιρ to χα´, i.e. the first part of χάριτος, that ends the line: Susemihl reports ‘χαίρει τι (?) mg. rc. Pb [= P]’, but the τι, if that is what it is, is floating free opposite the line above the present one (something else was perhaps also once added after ριτος at the beginning of the next line; or else the -ος ending is in ras.). b7 Bonitz’s ϕιλεῖσθαι plus the Aldine’s βούλεσθαι for the following βούλεται, giving us Susemihl’s δοκεῖ γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι, flow from accepting L’s δοκεῖ at the beginning of the sentence. But as L’s own βούλεται suggests, and as PCB confirm, δοκεῖ is a simple error. Not, then, ‘he seems to want to be loved’, but ‘he wants to seem (δοκεῖν in emphatic first position) to love, not actually to love’. b7–8 P2 writes ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ ϕιλεῖν in the margin, with marks to indicate that it is to replace ἀλλ’ οὐ ϕιλεῖν. b8 Russell’s συνεῖναι for εἶναι is a superficially attractive proposal, but Aristotle is continuing to show how ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναϕέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα, and it would be a big omission if (wishing x) to exist was missing from the list. (Besides, is there a difference between συνεῖναι and συζῆν, which comes next in the list? Would Aristotle need both?) b11 Contra Richards, ἴσως is a more striking way, in this context, of ­saying ἔστιν ὡς; contra Rackham, the point of ἴσως—­surely—­is to qualify the preceding οὕτω (in which case οὕτως for ἴσως would in a way overturn not only what the MSS say Aristotle is saying, but what we would expect him to be saying: we don’t actually live with ourselves).

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140  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1240b11) Dirlmeier defends ἴσως by taking it to mean ‘on an equal footing’ (comparing b3); in any case ἴσως must stand. b12 There is no trace in L of the δὲ γὰρ reported by Walzer/Mingay. b18 ὅμοιος Bekker, ὅμοιοι PCBL: Fritzsche’s ὁμοιοῖ is neat, but surely impossible; ‘be like’ ought to be ὁμοιοῦσθαι? Simple dittography on the part of a copyist (i.e. with ὅμοιοι)? b19–20 γρ: ϕύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθός P2 in margin. b20 B2 writes ος above the ὸν of ἀγαθὸν. b21 ὕστερος: or should this be ὕστερον, given that five adverbs follow? —P2 produces τῶ by adding the necessary vertical stroke in the bottom of the ligature for τό, and converting the grave accent to a circumflex. b22 πότερον to πρότερον: P2 converts the omicron to rho, and installs an omicron next to it—­actually in the bottom of P’s mark for -ον, the ligature for τερ being above the original omicron. —P2 writes με above the small gap between the ligature for ετα and the lambda of μεταληπτικός; he does not complete the correction by changing πτ to a simple tau, nor does he need to—­Pal. 165, which is generally a faithful copy of P, then evidently reads μεταμελητικός without difficulty. b23 P2 writes οὐδ’ ὥσπερ in the margin, with an insertion mark there and above the εἰ δεῖ in the text (Susemihl mistakenly reports P2 as supplying οὐδ’ before b22 ὥσπερ1). One can see why this reader might have thought a negative necessary, after a string of them, but εἰ δεῖ is ‘if we really must’, i.e. bring the sophists in, ‘as with that (silly) business of Coriscus and σπουδαῖος Coriscus’; taken with the following γὰρclause, the phrasing combines brevity with a certain elegance. b25 τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον: neither Richards’s nor Dirlmeier’s emendation is helpful; both seem to take Aristotle here as describing the ἀκρατής, which is surely impossible. Far from being ‘unmeaning’, τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον looks perfectly in order (‘the same amount of [the two Coriscuses, i.e. the person and the good person] is σπουδαῖον’).

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Aristotelica  141 b26 Some translators appear unwilling to treat this talk of ‘killing themselves’ as literally intended; but can Aristotle not be saying that if the good (have reason to) lay charges against themselves, they actually—­ being good—­do kill themselves? (Or does their being good, for Aristotle, rule out the possibility that they could ever have reason to kill themselves?) b27 P2 writes τὸ εἶναι in margin, with insertion marks there and before εἶναι in the text. b30–1 P2 writes ἴσως: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἵππος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ οὐκ ἄρα ϕίλος in the margin; apart from the puzzling substitution of ἐστὶν for P’s οἷον, this seems to me to be right. Neither lacuna (Susemihl) nor supplement (Rieckher, Richards, Ross) after οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ is in my view necessary: a negative in the clause is easily understood (‘as for example a horse is not . . .’) from the preceding οὐ as supplied by P2, who is followed by Spengel, and a δοκεῖ, similarly, is ­easily understood from the preceding μὲν-clause; then ‘is not . . .’ can be filled out with ἀγαθός, ὀρεκτός, vel sim., without this having to be spelled out. After all, the idea of a horse being anything itself to itself is absurd. Given the frequently elliptical style of EE, I propose that we should not expect an overt signal for us to go back to b26–7 ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός, i.e. the beginning of the last sentence. b33 If the MSS’ παῖς is unacceptable, as editors from Susemihl appear generally to have agreed, then νοῦς is a possible replacement. It would be used in a role more general than that assigned to it in NE VI ‘=’ EE V, but such a use is familiar enough in the undisputed books of both works: NE IX.8, 1169a17 πᾶς . . . νοῦς, called tentatively in aid by Mingay, is a case in point. As for the question how νοῦς could have morphed into παῖς (πᾶς νοῦς aside: ὁ πᾶς νοῦς for ὁ παῖς would sit uneasily with the specific ἤδη γὰρ τότε), the general unreliability of the MS tradition plus the fact that children are already the subject of the sentence might be explanation enough. Yet the case for emendation is not yet quite made. The context is all about individuals’ relationship to themselves: why should Aristotle not be talking here about παῖδες—­not, now, any longer παιδία, but old enough to have a relationship with themselves by virtue

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142  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1240b33) of their acquisition of προαίρεσις and λόγος? (This would help meet Dirlmeier’s point that children are already the subject, so rendering ὁ παῖς redundant.) The sense in any case is scarcely affected: what διαϕωνεῖ in the παῖς will be either νοῦς or λόγος with ἐπιθυμία. But I  resist emending, partly because it would be hard to choose which to read, νοῦς or λόγος (Fritzsche himself is undecided; προαίρεσις [von Fragstein] could be aligned with ἐπιθυμία), but also because, as I have suggested, παῖς might be a better fit with the context. Stet. 1241a4 ταὐτόν: only C has the crasis mark. a7–8 I propose that once εὔνοια had usurped the place of ϕιλία after ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ, the eye of a copyist went straight to εὔνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου in one recensio (in fact, in α´), not in the other (i.e. in L, or its predecessor if there was another MS between L and ω); the only objection to this is, I think, that εὔνοια is perhaps in a strange position—­ but perhaps not. P2’s δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ εὔνοια οὐ τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, written in the margin, is presumably intended as a substitute for the mess in the text, though with no insertion marks and no prefatory ‘ἴσ.’ or ‘γρ.’ it could just be a gloss giving the main sense. a9 εἴτε δὴ (Susemihl): copyists could well be forgiven for forgetting the εἴτε in a6, which is naturally answered by another; the δὴ then ac­know­ ledges that it has been some time since that εἴτε. L perhaps understood ἡ [εὔνοια], which is impossible; Marc. then reasonably substitutes ἦν for L’s ἡ, but εἴτε δὴ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος ϕιλίᾳ will suffice by itself, picking up as it does from a5–6 οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ καθ’ ἡδονήν ἐστιν [εὔνοια], εἴτε γὰρ. . . . a11 P2 overwrites P’s original beta in βούλεσθαι with a beta of a sort more familiar to us, and perhaps to him. a15 In common with von Fragstein, I see no need to posit a lacuna before δοκοῦσι: ‘Zuvor war gesagt, die εὔνοια sei nur der Anfang der Freundschaft . . . das soll begrundet werden: denn die “ganzen” Freunde (man verzeihe den Ausdruck!), οἱ ϕίλοι, begnügen sich nicht mit dem εὐνοεῖν, sondern fordern das ὁμονοεῖν. —Damit ist in eleganter Weise der Übergang von der Eunoia zur Homonoia geschaffen . . .’ (p. 330). The

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Aristotelica  143 apparatus need not be burdened with the various suggestions for filling the supposed lacuna (see Susemihl). a16 Dirlmeier’s οὔτε is meant to pair with the MSS’ οὔτε in a18. a17 πρακτικὰ/πρακτὰ: P2 erases -ικὰ and substitutes ὰ. a18 P2 writes οὐ μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ὄρεξιν, prefaced by ἴσως, in the margin at the bottom of the page. But such rewriting is unnecessary: presumably Aristotle means us to understand a second μόνον with κατὰ ὄρεξιν. a18–19 ἔστι γὰρ τἀναντία τὸ κινοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν: the phrasing offered us by the MSS is certainly unexpected, but I cannot see anything terminally objectionable about it. I construe ‘for it is possible for what moves [us] to desire in opposite ways’, ἐπιθυμεῖν being used here, as not infrequently in Aristotle, of desire in general. Richards comments, of his own ­proposal, that it ‘does not well account for τὸ κινοῦν. Might we think of τἀναντί’, ἂν τύχῃ, νοεῖν [presumably followed by 〈καὶ〉 ἐπιθυμεῖν]?’ To which the answer is, surely not. One of Dirlmeier’s two objections to the transmitted text, that κινεῖν does not take the infinitive, is curiously off the mark, while his other objection, that ἐπιθυμεῖν does not take the accusative, can be met by referring to several cases of τἀναντία in Aristotle being used in a quasi-­adverbial way (Bonitz, Index 247b26–8); and editors retain the following τοῦτο—­to what, if not to τὸ κινοῦν, will it refer? (In common with other translators, Dirlmeier treats διαϕωνεῖ as impersonal, and τοῦτο as accusative of respect, which is perhaps pos­ sible but hardly immediately and obviously attractive.) —This is one of those several moments where in my view it is important not to iron out what appear to be special features of EE in order to produce uniformity with the NE (a goal that was important only, or mainly, so long as the authenticity of EE was suspect) and/or our general expectations of Aristotle; fortunately, as the various suggested emendations confirm, the broad sense, here, of what he is saying is not in doubt. a20 οὐδ’ εἰ P2: Susemihl mentions still more proposed emendations of οὐ δεῖ (P1CBL) than those I have listed, but they are all surely trumped by the simplicity and elegance of P2’s (writing an elision mark above the

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144  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1241a20) line followed by a smooth breathing superimposed on the circumflex of οὐ δεῖ, with a confirmatory ει in the margin, probably by the same hand), even if it requires the following change—­one P2 also makes—­from ὁμονοεῖν to ὁμονοεῖ (changing the supralinear mark for -ειν to the ligature for ει); after all, the infinitive would be a natural consequence of the corruption to οὐ δεῖ. I construe ‘nor, if a person ὁμονοεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, will they [always] do so κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν too’ (cf. Rackham); Susemihl’s peremptory dismissal of P2’s proposal (‘perperam rc. Pb’) seems to me an unusual lapse of judgement on his part. a21 P2’s εἴ γε in the margin may have lacked the accent; in any case another hand seems to add a breathing and accent above the original breathing. a24 διὸ: Donini proposes δι’ ἣν because he cannot see how Aristotle can say ‘which is why οἱ ϕαῦλοι cannot ὁμονοεῖν’, and then immediately go on to say there is another sort of ὁμονοία according to which they can. I assume that we are supposed to supply κατὰ ταύτην; in any case the ἑτέρα ὁμονοία will be ὁμονοία of a secondary and inferior sort. a29 ὑπάρχειν post ἀμϕοῖν suppl. P2: in the margin, with insertion marks there and in the text. a29–30 οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ’ PL, οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες C, οἱ ὁομονοοῦντες B: because of that extra omicron it looks reasonable to suppose that B had οἱ δ’ ὁμονοοῦντες in front of him, whereas—­to judge from P—­C had οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ’. a35 ϕιλοῦντες in P1CBL is presumably by attraction, as it were, to the following participles; it has nothing to recommend it. P2 achieves ϕιλοῦσιν by a mixture of erasure and overwriting. a35–6 In P there appears a heading in the margin, which runs διατί μᾶλλον ϕίλοι (unless part of the last word has been cut off in the process of binding; probably not, because there is a clear acute accent over the first iota of ϕίλοι) οἱ ποιήσαντες αὐτοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες ἑαυτοὺς ποιήσαντες; clearly the heading was entered before the ­corrections, in the shape of P2’s οἱ ποιήσαντες εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὖ τοὺς ποιήσαντας, were made to the text, in the text itself.

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Aristotelica  145 This is no surprise, because the hands—­and the shades of the ink—­in the marginalia, and in the corrections in the text, often differ: we are reading the responses of multiple readers. B2 adds the sign for -ας above the -ες of παθόντες in the text, which is a further sign of B’s being corrected against (a manuscript like?) P or C. —That Bessarion in Par. 2042 reads P2’s text here is one of a number of instances that confirm he was working from the P tradition after at least one layer of corrections; another such case may be at 1241b9, where like P2 he supplies the article with μήτηρ. But he is also certainly doing some correction of his own: so e.g. at 1241b6 and 8 (see apparatus). a37 ὑπολάβοιεν BP2: P2 adds the ligature for -εν over the iota and marks the -μεν of ὑπολάβοιμεν (which I think must be original, despite the unusually flamboyant -εν) for deletion. a38 Would PL’s αὐτῷ, preferred e.g. by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay, not naturally refer to the recipient rather than the benefactor/lender? —συμβαίνειν ΒP2: P2 inserts a version of the mark for -ειν over the -ει. συμβαίνει was evidently in ω, the ultimate common source of PCBL; B, it seems, is correcting independently (not for the first or last time). a38–9 τῷ μὲν γὰρ Fritzsche: τὸ μὲν γὰρ P1, ὁ μὲν γὰρ P2. An erasure certainly underlies the ὁ in P, and the signs are that what was erased was a τὸ, as in CBL; the typical confusion of omicron for omega, then, in ω, made worse by P2. 1241b4–5 καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων is certainly out of place here; it plainly belongs where it appears again, in b7. b9 P2 writes the ἡ proposed by Fritzsche above the mu of (the ab­bre­vi­ ation for) μήτηρ; it is not needed. b12 ἡ2 secl. Fritzsche: von Fragstein urges us (and more immediately, Susemihl, who accepts Fritzsche’s deletion) to recognize the fact ‘dass Ar. Zitaten etc. gegenüber sich recht frei verhalten kann, sie insbesondere gern in einen vorhandenen syntaktischen Zusammenhang einbaut. Hier aber wird der Artikel vor ϕιλότης als Kennzeichnung des Subjekts geradezu verlangt durch das vorhergehende ἡ ϕιλία ἐν ἰσότητι’ (p. 332). I am persuaded.

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146  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1241b16 ‘Perhaps the Greek should be emended to give “not similar” (to those mentioned)’, Rackham; but there is no reason why Aristotle should not be saying that the following pairs resemble each other—­which would be rather more to the point. b19 Jackson’s οὐδ’ ἕν for the οὐδέν deleted by Fritzsche has the weakness that οὐδ’ ἕν would be quite redundant. Kenny translates it ‘and has no unity of its own’, but that somewhat fills out οὐδ’ ἕν, which on the face of it just spells out what is already implicit in the second item’s being contrasted with the first. Dittography, then, before οὐδὲ (Dirlmeier), or else οὐδέν originated in a gloss by someone thinking along the same lines as Jackson. b20–1 Richards claims that ἀμϕοτέρων is the predicate, but we can surely read τὸ ἀμϕοτέρων τοῦ ἑνὸς οὗ ἕνεκά ἐστιν as τὸ ἀμϕοτέρων οὗ ἕνεκα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν; this is more awkward than Richards’s rewriting, but quite workable. b24 ἢ secl. Bonitz: pace von Fragstein, it would be odd—­see e.g. Politics IV.4—­for Aristotle to say that χρηματιστικαὶ κοινωνίαι (b25) were not μόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, which is what he would be saying with this ἢ, pairing as it would have to with the second ἢ in the next line. Bonitz’s second suggestion, replacing ἢ with πῃ, reflects an understandable unease—­visible also in Fritzsche’s positing of a lacuna before ἢ μόριον—­both with the following singular μόριον and with the idea that ‘the other κοινωνίαι’ are part[s] of the κοινωνίαι of the city, when they surely themselves are those κοινωνίαι. What we might perhaps have expected is μόρια τῆς τῆς πόλεως κοινωνίας, but that is not what the MSS offer us. Kenny’s ‘subset’ for μόριον (in the Oxford World’s Classics translation) mitigates the problem a little, and perhaps enough to ward off the temptation to print μόρια τῆς τῆς. . . : ἡ τῶν ϕρατέρων ἢ τῶν ὀργεώνων [κοινωνία] certainly suggests that we are dealing with types of κοινωνία. —B2 supplies πο above the μο of μόλεως. —ἡ τῶν LP2: there are clear signs of erasure beneath the P2’s clumsy ἡ, and slightly less clear signs of the emendation of τῆς to τῶν through the substitution of a circumflex for the usual miniature sigma over the tau used for τῆς, the original circumflex above that miniature sigma now

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Aristotelica  147 serving as the sign for ων. (These details might just be of interest in relation to the problematic τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν: see above.) b25 συγγενῶν P2, written in above ϕρατέρων, might perhaps be a gloss rather than a correction. —ὀργέων, as gen. pl. of ὀργεύς (see the revised supplement to LSJ [1996]) is the most economical replacement for the MSS’ ὀργίων here, but ὀργεώνων, adopted by Walzer/Mingay, remains an option; P2’s μυστηρίων, for its part, written in above ὀργίων, may be another gloss like his συγγενῶν. —χρηματικαὶ CBL was, evidently, what was in ω; Nikolaos evidently corrected to χρηματιστικαὶ here in P but not when he was writing C.  Laur. 81,4, in the part ultimately descended from L, typ­ic­al­ly repeats the original error; PCB all make the reverse error with ἀριστοκρατική in b30, i.e. writing ἀριστοκρατιστική, CB in b36 too—­where P2 corrects ἀριστοκρατική to ἀριστοκρατιστική. —How ἔτι πολιτεῖαι got into the text is unclear. The problems with this sentence as a whole are sufficiently large and numerous to make it tempting to ob­el­ize it, but the general sense is clear enough. b26 ἐν οἰκείοις vs ἐν οἰκίαις (Fritzsche): why not ‘among family-­ members’? b27 A combination of the readings in L and P1CB gives us παρεκβάσεις well enough. P2 corrects, and may mean to offer us παρεκβάσεις, but it is hard to be certain about his intention; Pal. 165 (which I have not been able to check here) might help, if it was copied after P2’s intervention. b33 B2 writes in ει written above the ἤ of ἤδη. b34 πολιτικὴ vs δημοκρατικὴ: some qualification of ἡ κοινωνία is plainly required, given that we are to be told that there are some κοινωνίαι that are not κατ’ ἀριθμόν; if the choice is between a πολιτικὴ and a δημοκρατικὴ κοινωνία, then as Dirlmeier says, Aristotle would presumably refer to the ὀρθή version, not the παρέκβασις. —ἡ ἑτιρικὴ (= a Byzantine ἑταιρικὴ?) is written by P2 in the margin above, this being the top line of the page. b36 ἀρίστη: a second hand writes in ιστ above the ετ in B’s ἀρετὴ. The  ἀρίστη is striking, but once the article is restored (Ross) there is no reason to bracket it, with Bussemaker—­who, to do him justice, was

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148  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1241b36) only trying to save the sentence, in the absence of Ross’s supplement: Aristotle and everybody else would be all too familiar with self-­declared ­‘aristocracies’. —C has the crasis mark on ταὐτὸν. 1242a1 P2 evidently corrects λέγων, probably to λέγονται. a3 καὶ υἱῶν: the corruption to πρὸς υἱόν in C and B would be easy enough, with a dittography after the abbreviation for πατρὸς = πρς´ (with bar over), and with a typical omicron for omega. Autrement dit, this is an interesting but not particularly significant shared error. a4 κατ’ ἀριθμῶν B1: B2 writes what may charitably be interpreted as the sign for -ον, plus appropriate accent, above the omega. a6 There is a gloss on πρέσβειον in P, at the top of the page, partly cut off in the binding process, which appears to have read πρέσβειον τὸ ἐν τινὶ δῶρον. —The μὲν here is presumably answered by a8–9 μόνη δ’ ἡ πολιτικὴ, κτλ. a7 The conjecture αὐταρκεῖν for the impossible αὐτάρκει/αὐτάρκη of  the MSS, reportedly in the third edition of the Basle Aristotle, is un­attract­ive, despite its being enshrined in LSJ, the only other example of αὐταρκεῖν in the required sense being from the third century ce; and it is easily trumped by P2’s αὐτάρκεις (reported as perispomenon by Walzer/Mingay, which might have seemed to support their adoption of αὐταρκεῖν), with or without P3’s addition—­I think it is from a different hand—­of εἶναι (an anticipation of Casaubon), which is added after διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐτάρκεις in the margin. I prefer αὐτάρκεις without εἶναι on grounds of economy. Β2 writes an eta above B’s ligature for ει. a8 γ’ is squeezed in between its two neighbours in L, perhaps by the ori­ gin­al hand. a9 Pace Walzer/Mingay (‘ϕιλίαι] ϕιλία L’), ϕιλία is in all of PCBL. Ald. has ϕιλίαι (a not unreasonable correction), against which, in the margin, Victorius writes ϕιλία, from his Laurentian sources (recorded by Susemihl as ‘Cv’ = ‘codex Victori’: see Preface to text); Bekker reads ϕιλίαι without comment; Susemihl follows Bekker while acknowledging the presence of ϕιλία in Marc.

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Aristotelica  149 a10 ὡς ϕίλοι, properly understood, makes the same point as Richards’s ὡς ἴσοι. a11 τῷ P1: P2 overwrites the original omega (as usual the iota subscript is not marked) with omicron. a13 Editors have given up on ὅλον (PCBL) on the entirely reasonable grounds that if tool and soul were declared a single whole, then πρίων and τέχνη will have a common purpose, which has just been denied. But οἷον, the obvious substitute (and what perhaps lies behind Lat. ut), is  not much better: there would evidently be no need for οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή if only Aristotle had written πρίων καὶ τεχνίτης—­so why didn’t he? Furthermore a saw is a tool, even if a τέχνη isn’t a τεχνίτης; so why οἷον, exactly, and would we not easily read τέχνη as standing for its possessor in any case? The solution, I propose, is to take notice of P’s ἄν, which is evidently down to Nikolaos himself and not to any later hand: the point is that if πρίων and τέχνη were ἕνεκα κοινοῦ τινος, then they would be a ὅλον (which they are plainly not: a tool is not part of the soul). Quite what would have been in ω, or in ά or α, on this hypothesis, is unclear, but in my view the manuscript evidence so far as it goes is consistent with the supplement (ἦν) that—­I propose—­is required by the context and the argument. I have considered the possibility of doing without the supplement, but rejected it, along with the still more conservative option of obelizing ὅλον γὰρ or ὅλον ἂν (which?); the proposed text is, after all, founded on a defence of the MSS’ ὅλον, and is to that extent—­not forgetting the recognition of the presence in the MSS of both γὰρ and ἂν—­already itself fairly conservative. a15 Fritzsche might be right, and τὸ is all we actually need, but the extra noise, as it were, in the MSS (τοῦτο) suggests that there was ori­gin­al­ly more: so, αὐτὸ τὸ with Bonitz. a16 Would Susemihl have suspected a lacuna if Aristotle had stuck with the saw instead of changing the example? a17 Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay print ἡ ἐνέργεια, but the article does not appear in any of PCBL, or indeed in Bekker, and is not needed (especially in the—­usually, relatively—­laconic EE).

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150  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1242a20 τι or τί? Given that the accentuation of τι/τί in these MSS is wayward at best, there is perhaps little evidential value in their agreement here; but it at least offers an opportunity to ask about the justification for the decision by editors (including myself) to change the accentuation to δίκαιόν τι. Could Aristotle not be saying that ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ ϕίλῳ ὁμιλεῖν is to look for what (the) just is, given τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς ϕίλον? (Probably not.) Note: P and C both use shorthand for ἐστι, and so neither use nor fail to write nu ephelkustikon here; since B particularly likes it and PCL do not, I assume that he is on his own here too. a21 B2 corrects a21 κοιρωνεις to κοινωνοῖς by writing οῖς above the εις. A nu in an MS like P or C is not unlike a rho; B2 leaves the rho uncorrected, presumably (by the usual convention) taking a change to nu for granted with the correction to the ending. a22 ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν Casaubon, ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου μόνον οὐ πολιτικὸς PCBL: once the οὐ had been absorbed into the abbreviation for ἄνθρωπος before it, a copyist might well have felt that a negative was needed because of the following ἀλλὰ καὶ (so, μόνον οὐ). The nominative πολιτικὸς was perhaps by attraction to the original nominative ἄνθρωπος; more than one level of corruption is visible here (with a further level in the Latin translation [Lat.], with homo enim solus non solum civile). a24 συνδυάζεται, from συνδοιάζεται PCBL: or perhaps συνδυαστικὸν (cf. NE VIII.12, 1162a17)? That would fit the syntax of the following reconstruction better, but it would be a step too far to print it. —καὶ2 secl. Bussemaker: but why not ‘both’? The point is that the female c­ ouples as temporarily as the male. a25 ἄλλως δὲ διὰ βίου μοναυλικόν scripsi: ?ἀλλ’ εἰ? διὰ βίου συναυλικὸν P2; ἀλλ’ αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν P1CBL; ἄλλοτε δ’ ἰδιάζει μοναυλικόν Fritzsche; ἀλλ’ ἰδίᾳ οὐ μοναυλικόν Spengel; ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν οὐ μοναυλικόν Richards. Richards says ‘καὶ and λίαν often go together’, but that hardly helps justify the λίαν itself (‘emphatically not’? I find no parallels for this). Editors and translators like Spengel’s proposal, perhaps faute de mieux, but ἰδίᾳ is a problem: if it means ‘in private’, then there is a question why is it placed before the negative, and with

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Aristotelica  151

μοναυλικόν there it looks redundant; if it means ‘in a special sense’

(Inwood and Woolf, in the Cambridge translation), what exactly is the special sense? I think this just comes out as ‘emphatically’ (cf. Richards), which seems an unlikely use of the Greek ἰδίᾳ. Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation reads ἰδίᾳ with κοινωνικόν, which does better by ἰδίᾳ but hardly convinces, given the order (‘in a special way not μοναυλικόν but κοινωνικόν’ (so not μοναυλικόν too ‘in a special way’?). Fritzsche’s proposal is more straightforward, making good use of the ποτὲ in the line before, and generally fitting the context impeccably; palaeographically it looks respectable too. But if ἰδιάζει = ‘lives on its/ his own’, we hardly need μοναυλικόν as well. Still, μοναυλικόν is the one item that has the full support of all of PCBL, if we set aside the fact that they make αὐλικόν a separate word, μον part of another; ἰδιάζει is then the problem (μοναυλικόν itself will probably be a hapax legomenon, but cf. συνδυαστικὸν in NE, cited above, for a comparable coinage). Here, I think, P2 rides to the rescue with διὰ βίου, just legible, above the line, with something illegible preceding it: a phrase that, with ἄλλως instead of ἄλλοτε, gives full expression to the contrast Fritzsche had in mind. Now of course Aristotle recognizes that some animals mate for life (pigeons, for example, οὔτε συνδυάζεσθαι θέλουσι πλείοσιν, οὔτε προαπολείπουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν πλὴν ἐὰν χῆρος ἢ χήρα γένηται: Hist. An. 612b32–4), but what he will be saying here—­given Fritzsche’s/my reconstruction—­will be true of a sufficiently large proportion of τἆλλα ζῷα to permit it as a generalization: there are of course other simi­lar­ ities between animal and human behaviour, for example the tendency of  some animals to live in groups, but they too are irrelevant to the ­comparison in hand (no other animal is κοινωνικόν in the way/to the extent that human beings are). Now it is true that ἄλλως δὲ διὰ βίου μοναυλικόν will be speculative, and a truly conservative approach might confine it to the apparatus. On the other hand there seems to me sufficient basis for the speculation to justify printing the reconstruction (not least given the fact that in a MS like P or C, i.e. of the type from which B and L are also likely to have been copied, only half of the characters I propose were originally there between ἀλλ and μον αὐλικόν would actually have been written out in full—­in fact, not counting διὰ,

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152  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1242a25) which I retain, only two [βι]: shorthand, as experience of these MSS shows, is especially prone to corruption). The Spengel/ Richards version gives us the sequence οὐχ ὥσπερ τἆλλα ποτὲ συνδυάζεται . . . , ἀλλὰ . . . οὐ μοναυλικόν, ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν, i.e. ‘not pairing like the other animals, but not solitary, but rather κοινωνικὸν’, the awkwardness of which is obscured by Kenny’s ‘. . . not like other animals who copulate. . . . No, humans are not solitary animals, but gregarious in a special way’, or Inwood/Woolf ’s ‘Unlike other animals, a human being does not mate . . .; but in a special sense human beings are not solitary animals, but prone to forming a community. . .’. One strength of P2’s conjecture is that it avoids the οὐ—­tempting as an explanation of the MSS’ δύ(μον)—that makes ἀλλ . . . μοναυλικόν refer directly to human beings rather than an extension of the comparison with other animals. Two successive ἀλλάs will work, but it is not clear to me that creatures that ποτὲ συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι are necessarily thereby μοναυλικά; that is something that needs to be specified separately, in order for them to be contrasted with the human animal as κοινωνικὸν. a27–8 οἰκία δ’ ἐστί τις ϕιλία: ‘the expression is odd’, says Richards. ‘Should it not be ἐν οἰκίᾳ, as in [a]40?’ But the result if we read ἐν οἰκίᾳ would be weaker still: we know that there is friendship in a household, because we have been told so repeatedly; and why ‘a certain sort of ’ ϕιλία, τις ϕιλία, if the reference is to ϕιλία in the household, which is of a perfectly ordinary sort? a28 καὶ1 is added in above the line by P2. a31 Fritzsche’s ὑικὸν is bizarre, Susemihl’s ἐπιεικὲς and Richards’s συγγενικὸν merely bland. In any case no emendation is needed (see Dirlmeier), this being just another example of the extreme brevity of which Aristotle is capable in EE: health, like justice, involves balance. a32 If ϕιλία between wife and husband is not χρήσιμον (οὐ χρήσιμον PCB), what is it? We need a positive description. a35 Bessarion’s τὸ (Par. 2042) would fit only in a general statement— ­ὅλως—­that did not apply specifically to ϕίλοι.

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Aristotelica  153 a36 The definite article will apparently do the same job as Jackson’s ᾗ; the reference is to a4–6, where we have been told that not all friendships between brothers are κατ’ ἰσότητα (as ἡ ἑταιρικὴ is). a37 Susemihl accepts Nauck’s restoration of αὑτὸς (Sophocles fr. 684). The usual question whether Aristotle will have quoted Sophocles ac­cur­ ate­ly does not arise here, since without αὑτὸς much of the point of the quotation would disappear. 1242b6 The only way of saving the MSS’ ἀμϕισβητησάντων appears to be to take it as referring to the Sophoclean example just cited, but this is a stretch: how much is ‘clear’ from the particular dispute there, and why the past tense? Bonitz’s ἀμϕισβητηθέντων puzzlingly keeps that tense (‘things that have been disputed’?); ἀμϕισβητουμένων might be better, but that is less convincing, palaeologically, than Fritzsche’s simple ἀμϕισβητήσεων. How -σεων would have become -σάντων is not obvious, but much stranger things than this happen in these MSS. b6–7 ἐν μὲν τῷ PCBL: but in P only the second time round (as it were). After ἐν μὲν P writes γὰρ τὸ, then repeats καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἡ δὲ κατ’ ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν from b4; next he crosses out everything from b5–6 τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς to ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, and starts again: τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμϕισβητησάντων δῆλον, ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται, κτλ. ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν seems  to have taken Nikolaos’ eye back to b4–5 ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν. b8 Marc.’s ἀντεστραμμένως for ἀνεστραμμένως, adopted by Dirlmeier, then Walzer/Mingay, is tempting—­a mark above the first epsilon in B might possibly indicate that one reader of that MS was similarly tempted—­but the change is unnecessary (it may even be an error of transcription). b10 Bonitz’s διακείμενος must be right; it may be syntactically incorrect, but ὁ ὑπερέχων is at least the logical subject of the sentence (and obviously in the position of ἄρχων). b11 ἀλλὰ here is presumably apodotic (Denniston 11–13).

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154  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1242b18 ἡ vs οὐ before κοινωνία: for Fritzsche’s οὐ we are asked to compare NE VIII.14, 1163a29, but λειτουργία ἡ ϕιλία already says essentially the same as the Nicomachean line (which does not mention κοινωνία). In any case, to repeat an important point, appeals to what NE says are much less attractive now than they were in Fritzsche’s or in Susemihl’s time, when the latter could give EE the title [Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia] Eudemi Rhodii Ethica. b19 B’s ἀνισῶσαι (accent omitted) is a perfectly good alternative reading; Aristotle uses both verbs. b20 It is hard not to share Russell’s doubts about καὶ θεῷ, which on the face of it looks a bit like a gloss—­or rather would, were it not that without καὶ θεῷ there would be no role for the first καὶ (καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι ϕύσει). b20–1 Richards comments on his own conjecture (πρὸς τοῦ ἀρχομένου) ‘but there are parallels for the accusative. See my note on Thuc. 5.105.1 (Class. Quart. 8.75)’. b24 ὡς vel καὶ vel τῷ post ὁμοίως Richards: but ὁμοίως surely pairs with the καὶ after Οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας. ‘It’s the same with Οὐκέτι γινώσκουσιν . . . as it is with οἱ πολῖται ὅταν . . .’ (so,  but more elegantly, Inwood/Woolf in the Cambridge translation): a  loose construction, maybe, but it half-­acknowledges that the same quotation has appeared a few pages before. b25 If Aristotle wrote μεγαρῆας, correctly, last time round (i.e. at 1236a37–8), which from the evidence of the MSS seems likely, then pre­sum­ ably he did so here too, a few pages later; especially since he is, in effect, here referring to that previous citation of the line (see preceding note). b28 Susemihl accidentally omits ὡς in the Teubner; relying on Susemihl, Richards proposes εὖ ποιῇ 〈ἅτερος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ἂν〉 ὁ θεός. b28–9 ὁ ἕτερος Ross: i.e. in order to return benefits received? The reference to god here is slightly unsettling, but he plays a noticeably more prominent role in EE than in NE; b20 above is another place where he pops up unexpectedly.

b29 In defence of ἢ (τῆς λειτουργίας): why not ‘an equal share of the good or the service’, i.e. depending on whether one is looking at it from

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Aristotelica  155 the point of view of the one for now ἄρχων or the one for now ἀρχόμενος? But actually no defence is needed: Susemihl, and then Walzer/Mingay, write καὶ only because of Lat., which here just misses the point. b32 P2 fills the gap with εἰς τὸ (once again, P appears to be being corrected against a representative of the other recensio). b34 B2 inserts the sign for -αν above the iota of ὅτι. 1243a3–4 It is not certain that P originally had οἱ δ’ ἡμεῖς, thanks to the  completeness of P2’s over­writing, but ω—­the common source of PCBL—­surely had it. The correction by P2 is made both by over­writing in the text and with οἱ δ’ ἡδεῖς in the margin; either separate hands were behind the two corrections, or the same hand adds the correction in the margin to make amends for the mess he made in the text. a5 μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἑταιρικῶς: the sense is ‘not νομικῶς, i.e. ἑταιρικῶς’, which would be somewhat easier with Rackham’s ἀλλ’. a9 δὴ καὶ CBL (for δίκας)—and probably P1 too, though the overwritten correction makes it difficult to be sure. a10–11 Richards’s attempt, with ἀλλότριον, to forge a link with Republic 405b is less than compelling. —δίκαιον looks perfectly acceptable: ‘it’s not the nature of the good to require justice [between them]’. a11 Ross’s οὗτοι for οἱ is unnecessary; the reference is clear enough with οἱ δέ. a13 Rackham suspects πῶς ἑκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ to be a gloss (alternatively proposing ἐγκαλέσει; but is not ἐγκαλεῖ a future in any case [see Dirlmeier]?). a15 τὸν δίκαιον (PCBL) = ‘the one in the right / with the just claim’? Possible, but what follows focuses on the justice of the case rather than of the person. a16 τὸν πεπονθότα P2: P2 writes ον above the line between τῶ and πεπονθότι, which by the usual convention indicates that πεπονθότι is to be emended accordingly. P2’s text would then run: . . . πόσον ἢ ποῖον, ἢ τὸν πεπονθότα, which is a possible solution, and would give us roughly the same sense as Fritzsche’s solution.

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156  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1243a19 παιδιὰν in Ambr. is then ‘corrected’, above the line, back to παιδείαν. a20 εἴρηται on its own looks acceptable, the reference being to 1243a2ff. a22 τοιοῦτον/τοιοῦτο: editors prefer τοιοῦτο (following Marc. and Bekker), but since τοιοῦτον is another, Attic, form of the neuter singular of τοιοῦτος, and PCBL all have it, I see no reason not to keep it. —ὠϕέλειαν in P seems to have been completed by another hand; P1 had ὠϕέλαν, the ει being a later addition, squeezed as it is between ὠϕέλ and the following πόσον (beneath the—­original—­supralinear sign for -αν). a23 The epsilon in ἐδύνατο in P and C seems to have been written in, heavily, over something; what either had is unrecoverable. The double augment in L’s ἠδύνατο is somewhat rare, and I suppose should be kept for that reason, as lectio difficilior—­in which case it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was once in P and C. (B, then, corrected in­de­pend­ ent­ly.) N.b. at 1243b11 P writes ἠδύνατο straightforwardly, while C again has epsilon written over something, possibly eta.

a24–5 καὶ μεταλαμβαν〈όντ〉ων [καὶ] ἀμϕιβάλλει scripsi: καὶ μεταλαμβαν〈όντ〉ων καὶ ἀμϕιβάλλει Apelt. The transmitted text (καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμϕιβάλλει is in all of PCBL) is plainly corrupt.

Apelt’s solution is the most elegant of those available (pace Dirlmeier), except that (a) I think the second καὶ needs to be eliminated, whatever function it might have being already fulfilled by the first, and (b) I would translate not ‘[auch = καὶ1] wenn sie [αὐτῶν understood] ein Tauschgeschäft machen’ but rather ‘also when they [i.e. the people concerned, whoever they are] are the recipients, there is doubt [sc. and dispute]’. Inter alia, this allows a decent sense for ἀμϕιβάλλειν, in line with its use in a12. (ὁτὲ [δέ] = ‘sometimes’, at the beginning of the sentence, on its own is evidently rare.) a29–30 τι ὡς Jackson, bis: the ὡς looks attractive in both cases, the τι less so, being there only to explain how we got to πως; better then to stick with πῶς, understanding ‘one of them thinks they should [work on the basis of] how. . .’.

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Aristotelica  157 a30 διείπωνται is in C as well as in the other MSS, pace Walzer/Mingay. a34 P2’s ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ ϕιλική in the margin, of which ἡ δ’ ἠθικὴ is from a31, restores some sense to a text lacking a31–5 εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν . . . καλλίων μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ, but does so in way that suggests that P2 was not here correcting against a text that included a32–5 (other restorations in P are plainly against a more complete MS). a35 ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι: Richards is probably right in saying PCB’s definite article should be excluded; ὡς ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι καὶ δι’ ἀρετὴν ὄντες [sc. ϕίλοι] is all that is needed. 1243b1 P2 writes ἴσως: τὴν καλλίω ϕιλίαν in the margin, but there is what appears to be a sigma added to the mix of the ending of ϕιλίαν, pre­sum­ably by another corrector who perhaps thought, wrongly, that a genitive might be in order, i.e. τὴς καλλίονος ϕιλίας (the correction being merely indicated, as so often, rather than being carried completely through). τῆ in P1CBL = τῇ for τὴν is not so surprising given the nature of the shorthand for τήν, which looks like a tau with a circumflex (with grave/acute accent following); what is surprising is that the more egregious error, of an accusative (καλλίω) bracketed by two datives, should appear/survive in both recensiones. b4 πολιτικοί: P2 adds ικ above the line. b6 P2 inserts δὲ above the accent belonging to and following δέον (the accent being displaced by the sign for -ον). b7 διποντο is split δι/ποντο in P between two lines; ει is added later to the end of the first line. b11 I take εἰδύνατο in B to be a corruption of ἠδύνατο (the ligature for ει and eta being regularly confused), which is what the original common source of PCB will have had; C2 writes an epsilon over what was surely an eta. Since L too has it, ἠδύνατο was evidently in ω. —P2 writes ἴ[σως]: ἕξει in margin, with insertion marks there and in the text. b14 A corruption of τοῖς to ταῖς after ἐν ταῖς ϕιλίαις is easier than vice versa.

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158  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1243b15  ‘ἰδεῖν non intellegit Spengelius’, Susemihl: why not? b17 Defending the transmitted reading, ὡς τὸν ἡδὺν, Dirlmeier compares τὸν ἡδὺν at 1244a38, but the situation there is different; more comparable is 1243a35 ὡς ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι. But why not understand τὸν ἡδὺν [ϕίλον]? Fritzsche’s solution, τὸν ὡς ἡδὺν, involving simple inversion, is not unattractive, if one is prepared—­as Fritzsche evidently was, and as I am—­to entertain an(other) not so usual use of ὁ, ἡ, τό as a demonstrative (cf. e.g. 1244b33), and Apelt’s ὡς τιν’ ἡδὺν (‘nicht zu ­diskutieren’, Dirlmeier) is also possible; but we do not need either. b20 παντὶ τινός/τί ἀντὶ τίνος: as Jackson saw, the pi screams out, as it were, to be τι. (Should we keep the accent τινός as in CB, and accent τὶ accordingly?) b25 Marc.’s ὡμίλει seems a necessity, given that the rest of the story is in the past tense. —P2 here writes in the margin ἴσως: ὁ δ’ ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν, ἔϕη οὕτω δεῖν αὐτὸν ὑποσχόμενον ἐκείνῳ εὐϕρᾶναι δηλονότι. b29 ἐνταῦθα/ἐνταῦθ’: if there is a natural pause following, as editors suggest by their—­rightly—­printing a comma, an elision looks odd (this is not poetry, after all). It is also tempting to bracket this καὶ ἐνταῦθα as a doublet of the immediately preceding one. —P2 changes the ligature for ου over the second lambda of ἀλλου to make it the negative by adding elision mark and breathing (also, strangely, an accent?), and quite pos­sibly he intended ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅρῳ—­a correction, as often, being signalled rather than fully carried through; perhaps, then, another example of P’s being corrected against another MS, although the unusual lack of an accent on P’s ἀλλ- (unusual, that is, if P was writing ἄλλου), if ori­ gin­al, might itself have suggested the change. —λόγου B1: B2 appears to write an omega over an original ου; the result is a mess. b31 μὴ τῷ: μὴ appears over the τὸ in B, possibly added by a later hand. b32–3 Walzer/Mingay’s report, ‘[32] ἰσασθήσεται] μετρεῖται C  32–3 τὰ . . . μέτρον om. C’, is misinformed: P behaves, as it does much more often than not, in exactly the same way as C, and both leave out 32–3 ἰσασθήσεται . . . τὸ ἀνάλογον (μέτρον is not omitted, as Walzer/

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Aristotelica  159 Mingay claims; a shadow of it may remain in the report ‘ἰσασθήσεται] μετρεῖται C’). The eye of a previous copyist in this recensio—­ presumably that of α´—moved from b31 τὸ ἀνάλογον (as he had it before him: properly τῷ ἀνάλογον) here to τὸ ἀνάλογον in what was his next line.

b32 ταῖς Rackham: in defence of the MSS’ τοῖς cf. 1243b14.

b34 τί 〈ἡ〉 σοϕία scripsi: τῇ σοϕίᾳ PCBL; τί σοϕία Bonitz. Bonitz’s τί is surely right, given the following εἶτα τί, but the corruption would have been easier (and this is at least a consideration) with an original τί ἡ, combined with the absence of iota subscripts; the definite article would itself be quite in place. —Were τὸ πλούσιον to stand, we would have to print Rackham’s supplement of εἶναι (it seems just too much to understand, here). Richards’s τὸν πλοῦτον seems preferable on grounds of economy, and also of appropriateness: the comparison is between wisdom and wealth, not between wisdom and being wealthy. (And if it were, why not τὸ〈ν〉 πλούσιον?)

b35 πρὸς ἑκάτερον: Fritzsche’s emendation to πρὸς ἑκατέρου initially seems necessary. Why would Aristotle write δοθὲν πρὸς ἑκάτερον instead of δοθὲν ἑκατέρῳ? But actually the πρὸς is im­port­ant, because the point is exactly about the relationship of what is δοθὲν to each of the two sides, not just what has been given them. That may well be what editors have in mind when they keep ἑκάτερον, but it will only be properly assured, I think, by Richards’s τί 〈τὸ〉 δοθὲν. (Richards also suggests, as an alternative to εἶτα τί 〈τὸ〉 δοθὲν, εἶτα τἀντιδοθὲν: ingenious, but implausible and anyway unnecessary.) —ἥμισυ may perhaps also be in Marc., according to Susemihl.

b37 ἔστι δὲ κἀνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμϕισβήτησις: at the top of the page in P (= f. 121r.) is something, partly cut off in the process of binding, that reads ἑκατέρων ἀμϕισβητουμένων ζήτησις; it slopes down to the right, and there may once have been more of it to the left. It could just possibly be a suggestion for improving ἀμϕισβήτησις, which happens to be split between two lines (ἀμϕισβή-τησις)? More likely it is a gloss; on the other hand some of the ‘corrections’ in P in this book are hardly more helpful than this would be.

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160  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1243b38 ϕήσωμεν P: there are traces of something to the right of this line in P that might possibly once have read ἂν ϕῇ ὁ. 1244a2 After χρήσιμα, in the margin, in P there is something that is now partly illegible (?εἴπερ?), as there also is opposite the line above; quite separately, there are three dots forming an upside-­down triangle between χρήσιμα on one line and πρόβλημα directly below it on the next—­the sort of mark that often signifies an intervention or a need for one, though it is hard to see what difficulties anyone might find just here. a3 Jackson’s τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν τὰ ἴσα δυναμένῳ is elegant, but a reference to equal return would surely be odd, given that the question is about to be said to be the same as whether one should εὖ ποιεῖν a friend or a good person (a person as a friend or as good); only with a certain sort of friend (or ‘friend’?) would one look to see whether he is capable of returning an equal amount of good. Jackson’s ἴσα is actually only there to explain the MSS’ καὶ, retained by Walzer, and perhaps this καὶ came to be inserted simply as a consequence of the conversion of ἀντιποιεῖν τι into another dative participle like δυναμένῳ. Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation render Walzer’s text as ‘for someone who is also able to reciprocate’, but that would surely be τῷ καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν τι δυναμένῳ. Keeping the MSS’ reading, Kenny in the Oxford World Classics translation offers ‘. . . to a person who makes a return and is in a position of power’; that, or ‘and is in a position to do so’, would be the only way of explaining the καὶ where the MSS have it, but whether or not someone has power is hardly a relevant factor in the context, and that the person is in a position to make a return is a given, if he is making one. Thus I read Walzer’s text minus the καὶ. a9–10 Rieckher suspects a lacuna before ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον, but it is reasonable enough to take the ἐκεῖνο as referring to the original problem—­even if this was said to be the same (sc. in some respects?) as the one just discussed. —B2 adds οι above the iota of τι. a11 λόγων Bussemaker: the plural is probably needed if it is to be followed by λόγους—­ which itself is probably needed to explain the

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Aristotelica  161

εἰσ- that has become attached to ϕέροις/ης at the end of the verse (the two lines together = Euripides fr. 890). —There seems no particular reason to accept Nauck’s conjecture of δίκαιως.

a12 δεῖ B1, δὴ B2: eta with grave accent is inserted in B above the εῖ—­as occasionally elsewhere, B looks as if it could be being corrected (here, ‘corrected’) against an MS like P or C. a13 ἀλλ’ ἔστιν, ἄλλα δὲ τῇ μητρί: P2’s version is written out in the ­margin, with insertion marks there and in the text (importantly, correcting the accent on ἄλλα), and prefaced by ἴσως; its supplement of ἃ δεῖ is  not needed, because it would merely spell out what can be understood  in any case. Susemihl’s emendation, for its part, is elegant but unnecessary. a14 πόσας P1, πάσας P3? Here in P the original omicron of πόσας has been changed to an alpha; there are both acute and circumflex accents above the omicron/alpha; and the sign for the ending -ας may not be original. One story that could be told to explain this state of affairs is that as P ended the line with πόσ, he meant but forgot to provide the missing ending -ας at the beginning of the next line; P2 then changed omicron to alpha and acute to circumflex, thinking πόσ was πᾶς, but then P3, correcting perhaps against another MS, added -ας and reinforced the acute accent. πάσας would then be attributable to P3. That Β alone out of PCBL has the (obviously) required πάσας raises the usual question: did the PC and L copyists make the same mistake in­de­pend­ ent­ly, or is B independently correcting (for the record, Ald. does so)? a16 ἄλλα δὲ B, ἀλλὰ δὲ PC, ἄλλαι δὲ L: this spread perhaps suggests that ἄλλα was in ω, and is preserved in B (either that, or the B copyist happened to be more awake). —P2 merely writes the ligature for εἰ over the iota of οὐχὶ, which happens to be at the end of the line; i.e. he does not change the chi, that change being taken for granted as a consequence of the εἰ. a17 P2 writes in the margin ἴσως: οὐδ’ ᾧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν.

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162  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1244a18 οὗτος/οὕτως: there may be signs of a correction to the ending in P; just possibly an original -ος has been erased and changed to -ως. —οἱ/οἳ: only the relative, surely, will make sense, as Susemihl saw. a19 τούτο B1: B2 adds an omega above the second omicron (so bringing B into line with PCL). Quite possibly the τούτῳ/τοῦτο originated as a doub­let of the preceding τοῦτο. In any case even τούτῳ makes no sense, and translators either explicitly follow Rackham in bracketing it, or follow him implicitly by ignoring it. —ἐρρωμένῳ PCB2: a second rho is added in B, as at 1238b37; a further sign of correction—­or in this case ‘correction’—of B against another representative of the recensio Messanensis. —Richards says οὐ δέον is ‘very pointless’; is it not rather an important qualification? —Pace Walzer/Mingay, there is no δ’ preceding οὐδ’ in C, just the kind of mark these MSS often use for dividing between words; there is no accent, which there would be if δὲ was intended. a24 ἄλλῳ δὲ L, ἄλλως δὲ P1CB, ἄλλως P2, ἀλλὰ δὴ Fritzsche. The con­ nect­ive δὲ is erased in P, leaving a tell-­tale gap. Fritzsche’s proposal goes on to suppress the next δὲ and supply 〈τῷ δὲ〉 before a25 τὸ συναλγεῖν; Susemihl is surely right to describe this as ‘falsum’, along with Rieckher’s hardly more intelligible proposal. a25 συναγεῖν P2, erasing the second αγ of συναγαγεῖν while apparently making a mess of the sign for -ειν and the circumflex above the line. Does he do enough, under the usual convention of minimalist ­correction, to signal the complete change to συναλγεῖν? a27 οὐδείς secludendum ci. Fritzsche: but why not a double negative (plus delayed connective) for emphasis? —Bekker reports a δ’ after πολλοὶ in Marc., but it (or δὲ) is in all of PCBL. a28 οὐκ ὤν: whatever it was that P had originally has been erased, and a curious amalgam of οὐκ and ὤν substituted: οὐκ with the sign for ων and a smooth breathing, beneath that sign, above the kappa. —An ori­gin­al ὁ before τοῦ εἶναι is plainly overwritten with ἡ in P, probably by the original hand. a29 τῷ post οἱ suppl. P2: P2 writes τῷ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν in the margin, with insertion marks there and in the text, between οἱ and the following καθ’.

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Aristotelica  163 a30 ὄντι CB, for δόντι: perhaps a significant shared mistake, given that P has the required δόντι—­or did the PC copyist, Nikolaos, correct his source when writing P, not when writing C, while the copyist of L overcorrected, with δίδοντι (so that ὄντι was in ω, the original common source of PCBL)? a32 δὲ post ἀδικοῦσι supplendum ci. Susemihl: but (by now a familiar point) EE, as we have it, frequently introduces new material without a connective. a33 τὸν ἔχοντα or τοὺς ἔχοντας for τὰ ἔχοντα? Given that the first involves only one correction, the second two, and that sudden switches from plural to singular (and vice versa) are very common in EE, Bonitz’s proposal trumps Casaubon’s. The word-­order is slightly odd, and Richards’s μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ ϕιλοῦσι τοῦ ἔχοντος is not unattractive, but the EE rarely sets out to be attractive. —ϕιλεῖν κἀκείνοις scripsi: ϕιλεῖ κἀκείνοις PCBL; ϕίλοι κἀκείνοις Bekker; ϕίλοι κἀκείνῳ Rackham. Walzer/Mingay reports P2 as writing κἀκείνους, but though P is a little messy here I see no trace of an -ους. So now the important question is why the copyists should ever have written the dative κἀκείνοις, and I propose that ϕιλεῖ is a corruption of an original ϕιλεῖν: ‘that is why loving is for them too as when someone chooses. . .’. A substantive infinitive without the article in EE is not, I think, in itself, a problem (cf. e.g. 1246a29; also note on 1248a13), though it might well have been a problem for a copyist—­one copying intelligently—­who suddenly came across it. The remaining question is whether even the Eudemian Aristotle could have used the following οἷον in the way all this would require (‘as when’); I  suggest the present context is evidence that he could. a34–5 Rackham treats the whole of a34–5 οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον εἵλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο as a parenthesis, so that the following χρησιμώτερος refers to the ἐκεῖνος who surfaces in his reconstruction. This is to say the least ungainly, and why in any case should we not take it to be the wealthy person that is chosen for his wealth rather than for himself, because his money is more useful (as wine is valued for its sweetness, not for its being wine)? —καὶ ὅτι

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164  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1244a34–5) χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο desunt in PCB: a copyist’s eye (i.e. the eye of the copyist of α´) skipped from one εἵλετο to the next. The words are not, pace Walzer/Mingay, supplied in the margin in P. a35 The signs of the correction to δὴ ἀγανακτεῖ in P, through erasure and overwriting, are clear. a36 οἱ is written in above the ὅ in B; P2 writes ἴσως: ὧδε ἢ τόδε ἐγκαλοῦσιν in the margin. (Walzer/Mingay reports ‘οἱ δ’ LV’, but Victorius/Vettori is actually correcting a descendant of L [i.e. the Aldine], and L itself has ὅ δ’; Victorius is right, but is anticipated by the hand correcting B.) b3 εἴ τε P1, εἴ τὶ P2: once again P shows signs of having been corrected against a representative of the other recensio, with the iota of τὶ heavily written over what must have been an epsilon (given the accent on the preceding εἰ); the two dots that typically go with an iota, plus what appears to be a heavy grave accent, are added for good measure. —While PCL all suggest a lacuna after τούτῳ, B gives no indication that anything is missing, and indeed the sentence as it stands seems to make perfectly good sense. Not only that, but it is hard to see what might be supplied: von Fragstein’s τῷ αὐταρκεστάτῳ would be no more than a place-­filler, though better than Spengel’s ἀναγκαῖος. Because there is no gap in one of the primary MSS, convention allows me not to mark a lacuna in the text. But it remains a serious question why PCL should all show a gap here. Presumably there was such a gap in ω; my hypothesis, which will be as good as any, is that it was caused by the erasure of a doublet. Here is a story to go with the hypothesis: the copyist of one of PCBL’s common ancestors omitted ἔσται τούτῳ ϕίλος, passing straight to εἰ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται ϕίλος, which he then repeated (the double ϕίλος being the immediate culprit in both cases); he then went back, erased εἰ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται ϕίλος in its first appearance and replaced it with ἔσται τούτῳ ϕίλος, with the result: spatium vacuum viginti fere litterarum (which B chooses to ignore). b4 εἰ1 δὲ B: there are signs here, as sometimes elsewhere, that the copyist of B or one of his predecessors is trying to make his own sense out of the passage—­here, I think, unsuccessfully, although some editors, e.g. Fritzsche

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Aristotelica  165 and Susemihl, do themselves have a new sentence starting here, without a connective. —ἢ οὐ; (von Fragstein) is surely right—­how else to make sense out of what PCL give us? For B, cf. preceding note (is the omission of ἢ οὐ deliberate, and part of his particular attempt to make sense of the context?). On the punctuation: I speculate that this is an instance where the second alternative after πότερον is left to be supplied (LSJ s.v. II.3), but a peculiar instance, in which there turns out—­so far, at least—­ only to be one possibility, i.e. that the self-­sufficient will not need friends, because in raising the question whether they will, Aristotle finds himself actually giving an argument why they will not—­and so breaks off (hence my full stop before ‘Or not?’, indicating that this is not the expected second alternative, just the negation of the first) in order to apply that argument to the case in hand, that of the good person. —εἰ2 / ἢ / καὶ / εἰ δ’: the repetition of ἢ (PCBL) would be surprising, given that the possibility now being raised is actually the same as the one introduced by the preceding ἢ οὐ, that is, if we accept von Fragstein’s ἢ οὔ. If we do accept it, then Fritzsche’s proposal will not work, but Dirlmeier’s εἰ δ’ does, though I prefer to do without the δέ—­I see a snappy answer to the direct question that broke off the indirect one. (If we reject von Fragstein’s conjecture [ἢ οὔ;], then the best solution might be to go with B and ignore PCL’s ἢ ὁ, which is behind ἢ οὐ, altogether. But then how did it get there? The sequence ἢ ὁ ἢ may be what caused one reader of P to put a cross in the left-­hand margin opposite this line: the second ἢ appears partly erased.) —ἔσται 〈ὁ〉 ἀγαθὸς Susemihl, ἐστιν 〈ὁ〉 ἀγαθὸς Spengel: both apparently move the ὁ from PCL’s preceding ἢ ὁ to here while omitting that ἢ and accepting Fritzsche’s καὶ for the second ἢ; but I think the article is needed anyway. b5 καὶ Sylburg for εἰ PCBL: Sylburg’s own construal and punctuation of the context were evidently much like Susemihl’s, i.e. with εἰ κατ’ ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται ϕίλος starting a new sentence. b6 δεῖται P2: ται is written in above σθαι; perhaps this hand interpreted the following αὐταρκῶς as αὐτάρκης? —αὐταρκῶς 〈ἔχων〉 I attribute to P3 because the ἔχων is evidently written—­in the margin, with insertion marks there and in the text—­by a hand other than the one that changed δεῖσθαι to δεῖται. (Victorius’ αὐτάρκους is written in the

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166  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1244b6) margin without ‘γρ.’, ‘m.l.’, or any other mark [see Preface to text]: was it, to him, so obvious a correction as to need no comment?) Bekker surprisingly prints P’s αὐταρκῶς, which is (a) wrongly accented, and (b) makes no sense without P3’s ἔχων. b9 Ald., followed by subsequent editors, writes οὐδενὸς; Victorius, above the text, notes the theta in his Laurentian source(s). —δεήσεως L: the shorthand conventions for εως and εται, which L or its predecessor(s) is interpreting, are easily confused; see on b16 below for another illustration, the mistake there being the other way round. b10 οὗ γε μηθὲν ἐνδεής ποτε Richards: this emendation of a horribly corrupt locus is evidently superior to its rivals, which either defend the indefensible (Décarie, developing a suggestion by G. Widmann, Autarkie und Philia in den aristotelischen Ethiken, diss. Tübingen, 1969, p. 71) or have Aristotle merely, and uncharacteristically, repeating himself. Richards actually proposed ‘μηδ’ (or μηδὲν)’, but μηδὲ seems to get the emphasis wrong—­the point about the god’s lacking nothing has already been made well enough, and Aristotle is now making an inference from it for all time. Richards is counting characters; my adaptation of his emend­ ation simply presumes haplography (μηθὲν ἐν-). b13 ἀεὶ Spengel: δεῖ would surely be pointless after ἀνάγκη—­as would δεῖν. b16 τοῦτο P2 for τότε, squeezing in a ῦ between το plus superscript tau = τότε and the following ϕανερὸν. —For χρήσεται CB see on b9: either α´ used the wrong convention for εως (quite similar in appearance), which Nikolaos corrected when writing P; or else there were two mistakes involved, C and B separately misreading/misinterpreting the convention for εως as that for εται. b17 ὁ δι’ ἀρετὴν ϕίλος μόνος: we might have expected οὐ δι’ ἀρετὴν ϕίλος μόνος (PCBL), because that is what we have previously been told, but it would make nonsense of what follows. The definite art­icle is needed, and after all, so long as we do not adopt Walzer/Mingay’s full stop after ὠϕελείας, that ὁ δι’ ἀρετὴν is ϕίλος μόνος is just part of what ϕανερὸν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν (b16); Aristotle is still setting up the ἀπορία

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Aristotelica  167 that we are about to be told we have to look into (b22). (οὐ for ὁ is not an unusual mistake in these MSS: cf. e.g. 1245a18.) b18 ὦσιν P2, erasing and overwriting; another case of over-­ correction of P. b20 Susemihl attributes the obviously correct ποιήσοντας to a correcting hand in Marc.; I have not checked Marc. here, but Bekker says it originally had ποιήσαντας. —ἀμείνω P2, erasing the sign for ων above the είν and writing in omega above the nu. —C’s κρίσις is consistent with ἀμείνων, but hardly with the intervening ἔχομεν. b20–1 ‘ἢ μίαν C’, Walzer/Mingay; C in fact has ἢ μετ’, like P (and B and L).  b21 Sylburg’s μάλιστά τε—­or Spengel’s εἴ γε μάλιστα (less eco­nom­ ic­al­ly)—gives what is surely the required sense (with a straightforward explanation of the corruption, i.e. inversion). b22 P2 squeezes in a tau after μεν, followed by the two dots that accompany an iota, after the supralinear sign for -εν; the acute accent, belonging to μὲν and following the -εν, is original, and confirms that τι was in α. b23 λανθάνει P2: the ει ligature is plainly added later in P by a different hand, presumably over an erased supralinear ειν (i.e. the standard ­double oblique stroke for that ending, as in C). —τὴν παραβολήν: the comparison between the ἀγαθός and god, which has led us to leave out the important ingredients of συναισθάνεσθαι and συγγνωρίζειν (b26). b26–7 τὸ αὐτὸν Kosman: Kosman’s argument (Ancient Philosophy 24 [2004]: 138) that it is our own perceiving and knowing that Aristotle is saying is most desirable to us is surely correct, but that is a point he (Aristotle) is working up to, and will arrive at—­at least as I propose to reconstruct the text—­in the next sentence (see on b30 below); in other words both Kosman and in a different way the correcting hand in Marcianus 213 are, I think, jumping the gun. b27 PCB resume here, with αἱρετώτατον, a shared predecessor of theirs  (so: α´) having leapt from b25 τὸ γνωρίζειν to τὸ γνωρίζειν (αἱρετώτατον) here.

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168  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV

1244b30 καὶ μὴ 〈αὐτὸν〉 scripsi: with no supplement after the καὶ μὴ, Aristotle would be saying ‘if one . . . treated knowing and not [knowing], itself by itself ’, which would be at best pointless; what is needed is a contrast, not to γινώσκειν, but to αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ. Robinson’s proposals fill the gap in the wrong way: it is not one’s knowing oneself that is in question, rather oneself ’s doing the knowing—­for which a plain αὐτὸν will suffice (καὶ μὴ αὐτὸν = καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸν [subject: cf. Kosman ap. note on b26–7 above] γνωρίζειν). b30–2 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, κτλ: ‘glossam esse haud sine successu ostendere conatus est [Cook] Wilson’, Susemihl, and I agree. There are two particular problems: (1) what does the τοῦτο refer to (the translations I have consulted only increase the puzzle)? (2) ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, κτλ not only interrupts the sentence surrounding it, separating protasis from apodosis, but—­given the lack of an obvious reference for τοῦτο—­is neither connected to that sentence nor adds anything to it. Whoever originally wrote the gloss was perhaps identifying the present sentence as containing (the core of?) what Aristotle said in b23 λανθάνει us (hence ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, i.e. at b23); or else he was commenting on the whole of the present discussion, anticipating/ mirror­ing what Aristotle will say at 1245a28–9. b32 P2 deletes ἢ by placing a pair of dots beneath it. b33 τὸ δ’ [sc. ἐστιν] ὅμοιον . . . : the demonstrative use of ὁ, ἡ, τό seems to be something of a speciality in EE. τῷ δ’ ὅμοιον τὸ ζῆν vel τὸ δ’ ὅμοιον τῷ ζῆν Spengel: but the genitive with ὅμοιος does occur. b34 δὴ Spengel: unnecessarily; ‘but’ fits at least as well as, if not better than, ‘then’. —τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν: i.e. to perceive oneself to be perceiving and know oneself to be knowing—­a move that will be justified in what follows? b35 καὶ is surely redundant: why should living be said to be ‘also’ αἱρετόν? A merely emphatic καὶ seems unlikely. 1244b36–1245a1 Brandis’s τὸ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην ϕύσιν seems the simplest way of making sense of P1CL’s τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην ϕύσιν. I take it that ἡ τοιαύτη ϕύσις is one that makes us

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Aristotelica  169 capable ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν (b34). Aristotle has set out to show it to be εὔλογον that τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν should be αἱρετώτερον, and this he does by putting together two things that have been agreed, namely (1) that life, understood as a certain sort of γνῶσις (b28–9) is desirable, and (2) that so too is the good (sc. for us); from (1) and (2), i.e. b36 τούτων, it follows that (it is also desirable) that we have the relevant sort of nature (one capable of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι . . .), given that it has been shown that perceiving and knowing ourselves includes perceiving ourselves perceiving and knowing (that, pre­sum­ably, being a corollary of its being us, not someone else, doing the perceiving and knowing). B’s ἔχουσι represents a different, intelligent, but ultimately failed attempt to explain the meaningless τοῖς he evidently had before him. So too P2’s version, which I reconstruct from the barest hints, i.e. (i) a curious mark (following the slightly displaced circumflex over τοῖς, and so ending up over the upsilon of ὑπάρχει/ειν) that I very tentatively read as the sign for οις plus a rough breathing, (ii) an -ει apparently taking the place of an erased -ειν (so: ὑπάρχει), and (iii) a rough breathing, following another unidentified mark, over τῆς. P2’s version, if that is indeed what he had in mind with this even more than usually minimalist set of corrections (οἷς replacing τοῖς, ἡ re­placing τῆν, with the consequential change of τοιαύτην ϕύσιν to the nominative assumed), would do much the same as B’s version, if perhaps more ­elegantly, but fails like B’s to offer a useful sense (‘it is the same for . . .’: what will be the same for them?). Fritzsche’s introduction of  δεῖ saves ὑπάρχειν, and the accusatives, but the resulting sense is again im­plaus­ible; similarly with Richards’s solution, and with Mingay’s (which has other problems of its own). Dirlmeier’s reconstruction, on the other hand, which is like Brandis’s but with τῷ in place of τὸ, deserves attention, even if not his interpretation of it: ‘life and the good’, he has Aristotle say, ‘[are desirable] because ἡ τοιαύτη ϕύσις αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει’, where αὐτοῖς is life and the good, and ἡ τοιαύτη ϕύσις is ‘jener bekannte Wertcharakter’. It will be better, I think, to take ἡ τοιαύτη ϕύσις as ­suggested above (a nature capable of τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι . . .), and αὐτοῖς as referring to the agent/agents: life and the good are desirable to them and so their (the agents’) having that sort of nature is too.

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170  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1245a2 P2 overwrites the εὐ of εὐτυχείας with συσ, the upsilon with οι, and appears to convert the ligature for ει into an iota, if somewhat clumsily. a2–3 I take καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν as beginning the apodosis of the conditional sentence, with ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἱρετοῦ τάξει as the implied complement of the following ἐστιν (this to explain the punctuation I  adopt, in common with other editors: colon after τῆς ὡρισμένης ϕύσεως, full stop after a4–5 ὥστε . . . βούλεσθαί ἐστιν). a3 αἱρετὸν P1, αἰσθητόν P2: P has αἱ at the end of one line, and ρετὸν at the beginning of the next; P2 erases the ρε and substitutes σθη, with the σθ outside the margin; the change to a smooth breathing is taken for granted. a9–10 διὰ τούτων B1, διὰ τοῦτο B2, inserting a circumflex above the upsilon, omicron above the omega. a13–14 τὸ συνεσθίειν ἢ τὸ συμπίνειν: pace Bonitz, it seems easy enough to keep the accusatives and understand αἱρεῖσθαι—­so long, that is, as we do not, with Walzer/Mingay, make the whole of a12–13 ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις . . . down to a19 ἡ δ’ ὁμοιότης ϕιλία into a parenthesis; a move that seems extraordinary in any case, given that what ϕαίνεταί γε in a19 is surely the opposite of the idea proposed before the supposed parenthesis? a15 B’s εἰ at least makes syntactical if not any other sort of sense of the following ἀναϕέρεις. This is not the first time this copyist has made his own attempt at correction. —ἀναϕέρεις P1, ἂν ἀϕέρεις P2, ἂν ἀϕέλεις P3: Pal. 165 reads ἂν ἀϕέρεις, which—­given the profile of this copyist—­ more than likely means that the breathing over the second alpha was there in his P (i.e. enough to give ἂν ἀν-), but lambda had not yet been substituted for the rho. a16–17 τοῦτε . . . τοῦτε B: B2 writes (a ligature for) ου above του in both cases, the second time with an acute accent. a18 μανθάνειν P1, μανθάνων P2/3: what was ειν in P is marked for correction, and the correction is then carried out, probably by a different

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Aristotelica  171 hand; Pal. 165 has μανθάνων, so postdating either the first or both corrections. a20 ἡδεῖον P1C1, ὡς B: P and C overwrite the ligature for ει with iota; Pal. 165, copying P after its correction, has ἥδιον. B here presents an interesting alternative reading, though how he got to it from ἥδιον, if he did, is a mystery. a21 Ross’s ἑκάστῳ must surely be right, not least to explain the following three datives (a22–3 τῷ . . . τῷ . . . τῷ . . . , i.e. τῷ μὲν sc. ἐπιβάλλει κοινωνεῖν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, κτλ: cf. Rackham). a22–3 Thrice τῷ B1, thrice τὸ B2, writing ὸ above the omega on all three occasions. B2 is rightly puzzled about the datives, which after ἔκαστον (instead of ἑκάστῳ) in a21, then a nominative in the following relative clause, have nothing to explain them; and τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ . . . τὸ δὲ is not the worst solution. a24 P2 writes μακράν in the text above τηλοῦ; a gloss on τηλοῦ rather than an emendation? —ὡς οὐ δέον scripsi: ὡς οὐ δεῖ PCBL; ὥστ’ οὐ δεῖ Fritzsche. The question is whether to preserve the ὡς or the δεῖ, and I prefer the first option, on the grounds that ὥστ’ οὐ δεῖ . . . takes us back to καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ ϕίλῳ and in effect just repeats it, while ὡς οὐ δέον . . . at least derives the lesson from the quotation. Paleographically there is not much to choose between the two solutions: with Fritzsche’s the loss of a tau, with my own the change of one ending to another that, given the signs/conventions in play, is very similar. a25 τοῦτο γινόμενον scripsi: τούτου γινόμενον PCL, τοῦτο γενόμενον B. B’s reading, i.e. of a perfectly regular neuter accusative absolute, perhaps shows the origin of the apparently peculiar error in PCL (genitive combined with accusative, the latter being original, as I suppose). B’s γενόμενον for γινόμενον is by dittography after γενέσθαι; τοῦτο, as is generally accepted, is friendship, with or without reference to shared activity (perhaps without, this being to all appearances a separate endoxon, unless we accept Rackham’s δὴ in a23: ‘and so it is pleasanter . . .’). To have two successive accusative absolutes in the same clause—­the first, δέον, admittedly a conjecture—­seems unobjectionable; and there is

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172  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1245a25) clear evidence for a neuter participle in the second case in both recensiones, so an accusative absolute it will be by the usual and reasonable rule (ceteris paribus, to prefer what is in both). a26 P2 adds a supralinear οὗ after οὐχὶ, so presumably intending οὐχ οὗ, which is a fair rival to L’s οὐχ ᾗ (with ᾗ squeezed, I think by the ori­gin­al hand, between οὐχ and μάλιστα, though it cannot be ruled out that there was originally an iota where the ᾗ now is—­or indeed that the correction was made by someone else, but it looks like L’s hand). a30 B may supply δέ (δ’ ) on his own initiative, in which case this might be another case where EE leaves out an expected connective. But if we are to have one, δέ fits, it is in one of the primary MSS, and it trumps Fritzsche’s οὖν, given that the following ἔνθεν looks forward and not backward. a31–2 Two dots (P2) under the first ἄλλος in P seems to mark it for deletion. a32 Richards’s πάντα would spell out what is presumably implicit in any case; Ross’s τὸ seems to offer us something Aristotle might have written but apparently did not. a38 τὸ2 PCB, τὰ L: Bekker read τὰ, which he got from Marc., while noting that P had τὸ; Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay then both write τὰ without comment. But τὸ, with the infinitive συνήδεσθαι, makes perfect sense, is less expected before ϕορτικὰ, and would more easily be corrupted before ϕορτικὰ than would τὰ to τὸ; τὸ then it must be. —οἷον τὸ ci. Spengel, for μὲν: many of Spengel’s corrections and conjectures remain quite fundamental for the restoration of the text; others, like the present one (or ἡδέα for ἡδὺ in the next line), are unnecessary, and I have long since ceased to record them all. a40 Robinson’s αὑτοῦ, adopted by Walzer/Mingay, is a strange proposal, since surely one is always aware of oneself anyway in such circumstances; Aristotle has just said that being aware of a friend is in a way to be aware of oneself, and now he justifies sharing vulgar pleasures with a friend on the basis that in them one is always aware of one’s friend’s enjoyment too (sc. and therefore [even more?] of one’s own). —P2 writes

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Aristotelica  173

αἰσθάνεσθαι in the margin, with marks there and in the text to indicate that it is to replace αἴσθησις. 1245b1 θεωρεῖ P2, overwriting the sign for ειν with the ligature for ει and inserting a new circumflex having (partially) erased the old one. b2 There is an insertion mark after (actually slightly under) the final, superscript, omega of ἀγαθῷ in P, with something paired with it in the margin that could possibly be ὁ νοῦς (the first three letters are reasonably clear, the last two actually illegible); if so, it may be that this insertion goes with P2’s θεωρεῖ earlier in the line, although the marginal intervention is faded, in a way that the ει of θεωρεῖ is not, and may be earlier—­ perhaps then motivating θεωρεῖ? b3 εἰ δ’ αὐτὸν P2: with Fritzsche I understand ἡδύ ἐστι, from b1 ἥδιον; there is no need for Dirlmeier’s supplement of δεῖ. The correction from εἰ δυνατὸν in P is skilfully done, but there is enough—­the formation of the tau, and traces of erasure after it—­to suggest that this was not a brilliant conjecture by P himself, but by a later hand; certainly εἰ δυνατὸν is what was in ω, the common ancestor of PCBL. b4 ἡ κοινωνία P2: a smooth breathing and grave accent in P over η is changed to a rough breathing; supralinear -αν is erased and replaced with an alpha. The change is confirmed by ἡ κοινωνία in Pal. 165, P’s direct, and generally slavish, descendant. b5 Fritzsche’s supplement of δεῖ surely spoils the sense: ‘hence [= by which reckoning] theorizing and feasting [sc. are things reasonably enjoyed in company], not things involving [mere] feeding and other necessities’; this is the Eudemian Aristotle at his most concise. —τὰ1 secl. Walzer, accepting Collingwood’s supplement of γὰρ and Fritzsche’s of δεῖ; none of the three changes is necessary, and indeed together they play havoc with the rest of the sentence (ἀλλὰ ἀπολαύσεις at the end becomes particularly problematic). b6 That a γὰρ and a negative have gone missing is surely beyond doubt. Of Susemihl’s two conjectures I prefer αἱ τοιαῦται 〈γὰρ οὐχ〉 ὁμιλίαι; the other, αἱ τοιαῦται 〈ὁμιλίαι γὰρ οὐχ〉 ὁμιλίαι, has the advantage of

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174  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1245b6) suggesting how γὰρ οὐ might have been lost (a copyist’s eye moving straight to the second ὁμιλίαι), but is comparatively speaking a shot in the dark, as are Fritzsche’s and Rackham’s versions. Just indicating a lacuna in the text, with Susemihl, is respectable enough but overly ascetic, and given that in any case αἱ τοιαῦται = αἱ τοιαῦται ὁμιλίαι, a copyist might well have brought in ὁμιλίαι too early, then forgotten the γὰρ οὐχ (in which case Susemihl’s other conjecture would be an overcorrection). b7 οὗ P2: the circumflex and rough breathing in P are clearly later add­itions. b8 τέλους LP2: that P has been corrected inter alia against L or a descendant of L is by now well beyond doubt. P2 adds a ligature for ου above the omicron of τέλος. b11 ϕανερόν BP2: the supralinear ον and the accent in P are plainly later than P1. It is wrong to suggest, as does Susemihl, followed by Walzer/ Mingay, that P, i.e. Nikolaos, simply left out the ending—­that is not his way; the erasure of the original supralinear omicron and accent has just been more complete than it often is. So now the question is how B comes to have ϕανερόν when PCL all have ϕανερός; did the PC/α and L copyists just happen to make the same mistake, or did B make the right move independently (i.e.: was ϕανερός in ω, or not?). b14 Rieckher’s supplement of a negative should be rejected: if as Aristotle says the comparison/analogy is true, then the problem lies in its σύνθεσις, i.e. the way it is put together/applied (with/to the actual case). Of course it is true that if the σπουδαῖος human being were to be fully comparable to a god (see note on b15 ἠξίου below), then the comparison and the argument based on it would go through, but as Aristotle explains, he is not, so it fails. —οὐ in P is plainly a later addition. The τοιοῦτος following, which is the first original word in the line, is inset, and οὐ spreads from the margin into the beginning of the gap; something, then, has been erased, and since there is room only for one character, and C reads ὁ, it is a sure bet that that was what Nikolaos wrote in P, having found it in α. b15 οἷον was perhaps what was in ω; B’s οἷος is a simple and natural correction—­so simple and natural that it is hard to see how οἷον ever

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Aristotelica  175 got into the tradition. Bessarion in Par. 2042 writes οἷος. —Dirlmeier’s ἠξίου, sc. ὁ λόγος, is simple and elegant (this is where the comparison went wrong), but Bessarion’s ἠξίουν comes a close second. b17 It is tempting to emend βέλτιον to βελτίων, since ὁ θέος is ir­rev­oc­ ably masculine, but βέλτιον works well enough as an adverb (‘his mode of well-­being is better . . .’). b18 αὐτὸν αυτός P2: the supralinear ον and ος and the accents in P are clearly later additions, over erasures; the breathing on αὐτός has also been erased, perhaps because it was to be changed from rough to smooth. b23 Because of the way the right-­hand side of an upsilon tends to merge with a following sigma/ligature for στ, the difference between πλείστοις and πλείστους is tiny and corruption from one to the other correspondingly easy; Donini’s defence of the accusative is probably not worth the  gymnastics involved (understanding an ἔχειν). πλείστους P1, πλείστων P2: this is in the first line on the page in P; P2 writes ὡς πλείστων above the line in the top margin. b25 πολλοῖς P1, πολλοὺς P2: the remains of the sign for οις are still partly visible in P; the grave accent is added, the sign for ους squeezed in. b30 ἄλλο Richards; ἀλλ’ PCBL; ἅμα Jackson. ἅμα would be redundant; Richards’s alternative proposal, ἄλλως, might be more pleasing in palaeo­graph­ic­al terms (haplography before ὥσπερ), but ἄλλο fits better after τοῦτο. Donini defends the transmitted text, translating ‘[if on the other hand it is not possible,] per lo meno scelgono . . .’, but ἀλλά in this case would perhaps be taking on an unusual role. b31 Casaubon writes τὸν Ἡρακλῆ, following the Latin translation’s Herculem, but why not a dative of advantage, with an αὐτὸν understood after θεὸν or εἶναι? Von Fragstein evidently agrees. —C has ἢ, pace Walzer/Mingay, like PBL. b33 εἴποιεν: the subject, as Walzer/Mingay suggests, is b29 πάντες. In any case ω, the common original source of PCBL, surely had εἴποιεν; P2 adds the sign for εν over the final epsilon. —The MSS’ ὃν is surely right, as von Fragstein says (sc. λόγον, after εἴποιεν).

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176  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 1245b38 ὡς ἡδὺ: three suggested emendations, and especially Fritzsche’s, offer something rather more banal than what the MSS reading gives us; why not ‘nothing should be as painful to a friend as his friend is a pleasant thing’? b40 τὰ P2: the alpha and grave accent in P evidently supersede an erased, original mark for ων plus circumflex above the tau. 1246a1 The καὶ seems no more needed before λυπουμένου τοῦ ϕίλου (Richards) than it is in its present position, where it seems to require an infinitive, σκοπεῖν, to precede it rather than a participle (the friends in question want to avoid appearing to look to their own interests, not to avoid plainly looking to them); the only solution seems to be to bracket it. —τοῦ/τὸ: omicron plus grave accent replace ligature for ου plus ­circumflex in P. a2 Contra Susemihl (lacunam ante ἔτι pos. Susemihl) the nominative inside the following noun-­clause τὸ κουϕότεροι εἶναι . . . shows that the subject is still the same as that of the previous sentence; ἔτι δὲ introduces something else that suffering friends want to avoid appearing to choose. —μόνοι P2/3, μόνον P1: P2 writes οι over the signs for -νον, while P3 adds μὴ μόνοι in the margin. a5 B’s ἐπει δὴ probably = ἐπειδὴ; the absence of an accent on ἐπει, despite the fact that B is marginally less strict about including accents than PBL, is more significant than the gap between ἐπει and δὴ, because B is also less strict in observing the divisions between words. Casaubon’s ἐπεὶ δὴ must anyway be right, because Aristotle is now drawing an inference from the preceding sentences—­it is indeed already clear, from what has been said, that people disagree about the weight attaching to τὸ ἅμα. —At least one hand adds an acute accent over the first omicron of ποσον in P—­without deleting the original grave over the second omicron. a7 συνδεικνεῖν in B has a neat pi above the kappa. a8 Pace P2 (writing γρ.: οὕτω δ’ ἂν μὲν in the margin), the only way of saving the ἂν would be to read the following negative as οὗ: see the next part of the present note. —Jackson reads οἱ δ’ ἅμα μὲν τοῦ εὖ

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Aristotelica  177

βούλονται, sc. τοὺς ϕίλους μετέχειν, which gives a more than passable sense, but requires a further and much less plausible change in what ­follows (see below). To read οὗ βούλονται for οὐ βούλονται would be even more conservative, even preserving the preceding ἂν, giving us ‘but o ­ thers [think/say friends should share only] if [ἂν] it is [sc. ᾖ] what they [the friends] actually want them [i.e. their friends, to share in]’, the ‘only’/‘actually’ representing the μέντοι, which would have to be either ‘asseverative’ μέντοι, i.e. intensifying βούλονται, or the adversative use (or a mixture of both: see the examples of μέντοι cited in Bonitz’s Index)—or, if that is too much to ask, we could try οἱ δ’ ἂν μὲν τοίνυν οὗ βούλονται, with μὲν looking forward to a suppressed δέ-clause, and τοίνυν in a ‘transitional’ use (Denniston 575–6). At this point, however, it all begins to feel like a defence of the indefensible: Casaubon’s αὖ is the only change required, and the μέντοι can be taken just as emphasizing the degree of opposition from this new group (οἱ δ’ ) whose argument for their complete rejection of the other view is now given. —ἐπειδὴ εἴ γε Jackson, ἐπειδή γε P1, ἐπεὶ B, ἐπεὶ δέ γε CL, ἐπεὶ δ’ εἰ γε P2. The δέ in CL is surely superfluous, unless with Susemihl we suppose a lacuna following; its origin is surely hinted at in the ἐπειδή that was once in P, altered by P2 to ἐπεὶ δ’ (εἰ), which is then faithfully reproduced in Pal. 165; at some earlier point, on the plausible story suggested by Jackson’s proposal, the o ­ riginal εἰ had been swallowed up by ἐπειδὴ. —B may have τις, but still writes ἐπεὶ before it. a9 P2 has ‘γρ.: ἥδιον εἶναι δηλονότι’ in the margin (more than likely written on top of an earlier intervention), marked as to be supplied after ὁμολογῶσιν, and in principle this is right—­we do have to supply ἥδιον, as most translators do; the only real question is whether actually to print  ἥδιον, which on balance, I think, in EE, is unnecessary. Jackson’s ὁμολόγους εἶναι (‘are on a par’) has to meet the objection that the parity of those doing supremely badly together and those doing supremely well apart does not follow from the position being rejected, the consequence of which—­if togetherness is all (the relevant ὑπερβολή)—would be that doing supremely well separately from others would, absurdly, be less desirable than togetherness in supreme suffering. The subjects of

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178  Eudemian Ethics VII/IV (1246a9) ὁμολογοῦσιν are the holders of the view being rejected; that the verb is not in the infinitive (cf. Richards’s proposal) is perhaps explained by the fact that Aristotle will himself be one of the resisters: ‘if one is going to take their position to the extreme, those who say that togetherness is all are actually conceding. . .’. a10 Susemihl presumably suspects a lacuna because we have actually been talking—­inter alia—­περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας (how then can he say that this subject is like the previous one?). But what Aristotle has just been advocating (cf. preceding note), from the beginning of this little section (a3 ἐπεὶ δ’ αἱρετὸν τό τ’ εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα . . .), is a compromise p ­ osition, and he now continues to press this specifically in relation to the sharing or otherwise of misfortune. a12 It is just possible that P2 intends προσεῖναι rather than παρεῖναι (Susemihl, Walzer/Mingay), and that may be how the copyist of Pal. 165 read him (Walzer/Mingay says so: I have not checked), but I think if he did he was mistaken—­it is an alpha, I think, above/between the pi and rho added by P2. a13 ὁτὲ P2, correcting the supralinear, half-­moon sign for -αν—­the α´ copyist was remembering the preceding ὅταν—­to epsilon by adding a bar in the middle, adding a grave accent and crossing out the original accent on the omicron. —τοὺς τοιούτους: i.e. friends, even when their presence is not going to make any practical difference. If we find τοὺς on its own (PCL) intolerable, Sylburg’s anodyne αὐτοὺς will work well enough, but B’s reading gives us something that is not only more interesting but actually true, and it is quite possible that τοιούτους dropped out twice (in L and in α) independently, by homoioteleuton. —ἡδίστους P1: P2 overwrites the sign for -ους with that for -ον. a14 P2 writes in the margin ἴσως· τρόπον κατὰ μἀλα εὔλογον· ϕησὶν δηλονότι: I take it that what comes after the second colon is saying ‘that is clearly what Aristotle means’), so that τρόπον κατὰ μάλα εὔλογον is intended as a conjecture, not definitively to be installed in the text. a15 τὸ μὲν (Richards) would be more regular, but this is not a clinching argument in EE.

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Aristotelica  179 a17 ἡδὺς B2: B2 seems, unhelpfully, to write in an -υς above the upsilon of ἡδύ. a20 τοῦτ’ P2, τότ’ P1CB, τό τε L: the original omicron in P is changed to ου. a23 Against Rackham’s ἀπεῖναι, I agree with Dirlmeier that Aristotle is already thinking of cases like the one mentioned immediately after, of inferior lovers killing their beloveds. (Or, at any rate, that is possible enough to make emending the MSS’ εἶναι unsafe.) —〈ἂν〉 ἀνάγκη 〈ᾖ〉 αὐτοῖς (Kyrgiopoulos: his version of the rest of the sentence is, however, quite different from the one I print) is Fritzsche’s conjecture minus his further supplement of εἶναι (regularizing/filling out, as he not infrequently does); we could perhaps do without the ᾖ too, but there is noise in the MSS beyond a bare ἀνάγκη. a24 There is what appears to be a second augment over ἐρωμένους in B. a25 αἰσθάνεται Richards: but αἰσθάνεσθαι reports what the lover thinks, not what is true of him. a26 After . . . ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν, PC add the first four words of (what they call) Book VIII (‘: ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἄν τις : —’), before—­on the next line—­giving the new book’s title.

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Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 1246a26 bis (the book heading): the new book, like the last one, is given two different numbers by PCB, i.e. VIII (PC), P2 again applying a different Greek numerical system, and V (B). L, for its part, does not number it as a separate book at all, simply leaving a gap of one line, but this is certainly an accident: see next note. Bekker follows Marc. (itself following the apparent example of L) and treats the next three chapters as a continuation of VII (hence my fictional ‘1246a26 bis’ above, introducing the book title, a27 being—in my numbering—the first line of what Bekker calls VII.13—a26 in his), while noting in his apparatus that P and Pal. 165 begin Book θ here, Marc. 200 Book ε. It is true that these three last chapters are hardly, quite, a complete book (see below), but in no way do they continue the treatment of ϕιλία that occupies Book VII/ IV. (Marc.[213] actually makes the gap of a single line after VII in L—the same gap as L leaves between earlier books—even smaller: πράττειν, the last word of the last line of VII, is followed in the same line by ἀπορήσειε, the first word of our VIII/V, after a space of a mere six or seven characters.) a27 πορήσειε L: someone other than the copyist, presumably, was meant to put in the first, ornamented, letter, but failed to do so; it would also have been his task to put in the title of the book (ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων η´ ), in the same red ink. In other words, so far as the copyist himself was concerned, this was the beginning of a new book, and the lack of a book title/heading is merely accidental. But that is not the end of the matter. The new ‘book’ begins with a singular abruptness—­witness the attempt of a glossator (for which see the next note) to make VIII/V into a continuation of the discussion of friendship in VII/IV; noting the abruptness, Spengel proposes to mark a lacuna at the beginning of the ‘book’, and Susemihl follows him. VIII/V also ends in a way that Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe, Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.003.0005

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Aristotelica  181 suggests that something more either was to follow or actually did once follow. My own proposal (for which see Rowe 2022 and Rowe forthcoming 3 [see the bibliography to the Preface of the accompanying text volume]), partly following Dirlmeier (366–7) and others, is that the fragment was ori­gin­al­ly designed as part of a larger whole (a full ‘book’) intended not to f­ ollow but to precede Book VII/IV, but was then replaced by a new book at least closely resembling what we know as the second of the ‘common’ books, i.e. NE VI ‘=’ EE V. Finding this now isolated fragment, an editor (I surmise) placed it in its present position, after the discussion of friendship, by false analogy with the closing chapters of NE (X.6–8); VIII.3, at least, can be seen as rounding off EE in a way not dissimilar to the way that X.6–8 completes NE—or rather could be so seen, if it were not for the sentence or part-sentence with which it ends: in effect, ‘So much for that subject [sc. and now for the next one]’. —ϕίλῳ (LC2, B) here in a27 is plainly intrusive, the subject being now not friendship but ἐπιστήμη, and neither P nor C have it. But since both B and L do have it, then it was presumably in ω, and one can only suppose that it originated in a gloss like the one in P, εἰ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ χρήσασθαι (apparently as a subject heading, in the margin where there is room for it, which happens to be beside the last lines of Book VII), written by someone (P2) trying to make sense of the abrupt transition by treating this first line as a continuation of the treatment of ϕιλία. C2, adding ϕίλῳ above the line in the text itself, is either doing the same as P2 or is correcting against another MS. B’s ἐϕ’ ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ, meanwhile, suggests a way of keeping the hopelessly intrusive ϕίλῳ that is by no means unintelligent. a27–8 ἐϕ’ ἃ vs ἐϕ’ ᾧ: Allan preferred ἐϕ’ ἃ, but in support of ἐϕ’ ᾧ see 1227a24 αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ χρήσασθαι κτλ.

a28–9 ἢ 〈ᾗ〉 αὐτὸ ἢ αὖ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: another possibility might be  to read ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ αὖ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (which is perhaps what Inwood/Woolf ’s proposal to do without the supplement would amount to [in the Cambridge translation]: it has to be a dative after χρήσασθαι, and omicron for omega would be a standard error), but even if something is used κατὰ συμβεβηκός it will still surely be used αὐτό. It is tempting to go with Jackson and do without the first ἢ, but since the

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182  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1246a28–9) whole point of καὶ τοῦτο is to introduce alternatives, the ἢ seems necessary—and either it or the ᾗ would always be at risk of omission by haplography. a29 εἰ Spengel vs ᾗ Jackson (ἢ PCBL). Jackson’s ᾗ for ἢ is neater, but if Aristotle is saying what this would have him saying here, he would be saying the same thing at greater length in the next line (ὅτι μὲν ὀϕθαλμός, κτλ). I construe ‘for example, if [it’s] an eye’ (as opposed to Sylburg’s/ Allan’s ‘if [it’s a matter of using the] eye/eyes’). —ὀϕθαλμὸς: B squeezes in what looks like ὀϕθαλμη—and was perhaps read by B2 as ὀϕθαλμη: see on a31 below—at the end of the line. B does sometimes use shorthand, often with a flourish, especially at the ends of lines, in a way not found in P or C (L, for its part, tends to write everything out), but it is still hard to make what we have into ὀϕθαλμὸς; on the other hand it would be a surprising error, since B is evidently a Greek speaker, and one moreover who happily recognizes ὀϕθαλμός and ὀϕθαλμῷ in the next sentence. —Ross’s ἢ is unnecessary before ἰδεῖν, as is Robinson’s ἢ πρὸς τὸ or ἢ ὥστε: substantive infinitives without the definite article are not uncommon in EE. a30 Jackson’s αὐτὰ reflects the same worry as does Spengel’s supplement of χρεῖαι, namely that χρεῖαι/χρήσεις is just too much to be left understood, i.e. from χρήσασθαι in a27; I think not. a31 ὀϕθαλμη B2: what looks like a slimline η is added over line after the ος, apparently incorporating the original accent on ὀϕθαλμός, perhaps for the sake of consistency with (what B2 took to be?) B’s ὀϕθαλμη two lines before; alternatively, it is just an unusually formed accent. —ἦν δ’ ὀϕθαλμῷ: once again there is extreme ellipse (understand χρήσασθαι/χρῆσθαι). —Given the general absence of iota subscripts, Jackson’s ἄλλῃ would be unobjectionable; but he reads ἄλλῃ only because he has got rid of the preceding αὗται. a33 ἐπιστήμῃ or ἐπιστήμη: as with the preceding ἄλλη/ἄλλῃ, either choice is open to any and every editor; the dative (‘similarly, then, with the use of ἐπιστήμη’), evidently first proposed by Spengel, is preferable because χρῆσθαι clearly has to be understood in what immediately follows, i.e. with ἀληθῶς (why, then, not here?).

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Aristotelica  183 a34 Spengel’s χρήται or χρήσεται for χρῆσθαι improves the syntax, but it is not clear that it needs improving. χρῆσθαι simply continues the same construction as the two preceding infinitives—‘there is x-ing and y-ing, just as when someone ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ [there is] z-ing’; with μεταστρέψας τὴν χεῖρα, the sentence resumes the clause ὅταν ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράψῃ (which Walzer’s supplement of καὶ before ὡς, itself intended to help out with the syntax, surely makes more difficult). Here we are dealing not just with ellipse but with an extreme looseness of syntax that some—like Spengel and perhaps Walzer—may find in­toler­ able, but syntactical looseness is surely of a pair with an elliptical style; since we have ample evidence of both, especially in this last book of EE, and if by and large we can extract a decent sense from the text as it stands, as I think we can, then I see no good reason for embarking on the ­hopeless task of deciding which particular rewriting of the MSS to prefer over any other. a35 I understand the καὶ . . . ποτε, i.e. in καὶ τῷ ποδί ποτε, as ‘and actually [sc. there is a real-life case of μεταστρέϕειν τὴν χεῖρα]’; for a similar way of introducing an illustration, with a plain καί, see, e.g. 1247a18–19. No emendation is needed, and Moraux’s in particular should be resisted, because it introduces a banality: we hardly need to be told that ὡς ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ is a change of use. a36 So laconic is Aristotle in this context that it seems unwise to insist on a definite article with ὀρχηστρίδες. (LSJ s.v. ὀρχηστρίς refers to a falsa lectio here of ὀρχηστριάδες, which probably comes via Bekker. Harlfinger reports that Matr. 4627 [Laskaris] and Ambr. [Chalcondyles] similarly correct to ὀρχηστριάδες: PCBL all accent ὀρχηστρίαδες, where the accent perhaps already suggests the original and proper reading.) 1246b1 Another omission in B brought on by inherited nonsense (εἰ

δίκης εἰ)?

b3 ἃ ante καὶ2 suppl. Fritzsche, ἅπερ Spengel: τὰ αὐτὰ καί is enough for the sense ‘the same things as’; ἃ might well have fallen out after the final alpha of αὐτὰ, or ἅπερ before ἀπὸ, but—once again­—the temptation to supply what we might feel more comfortable with should be resisted in the context of EE (and particularly in this book, the style of which

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184  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1246b3) inclines even more towards brevity than usual; no doubt this is a contributory factor in its ubiquitous corruption). b6 ἀλλ’ ἔτι εἰ Kenny: Kenny’s emendation (or Spengel’s second proposal, but ἔτι εἰ for ἐπεὶ is the more economical change) is surely in­dis­pens­ able, given that the chapter will end with an emphatic declaration that ϕρόνησις is not ἐπιστήμη. That Aristotle should here start his new argument, however dialectical, by saying ‘since it is’ is surely impossible, pace von Fragstein’s—implicit—claim that ἐπεί can be read as including the qualification ‘nach der Annahme einiger’. b7 κἀκείνῃ: Walzer/Mingay prints κἀκείνη, which—by now a familiar point—is just as legitimate a reading of MSS that tend not to mark iota subscripts, especially in endings; I choose to read κἀκείνῃ, with Susemihl (‘the same as it’, i.e. as ἐπιστήμη: cf. 1247a1). b8–9 εἰ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἡ ἑκάστου χρεία: Rackham is right to reject Bussemaker’s suppression of the article, wrong to suppose we need the ἦν to be spelled out. b11 στροϕήν P2: the sigma in P is plainly a later addition (Victorius has ‘γρ. τροπὴν’ in the margin of his Ald., then later writes στροϕὴν beside it). —κυρία post τίς suppl. Robinson: κυρία is to be understood in any case, with no need for it to be spelled out. b12 ἐπιστήμη γε ἢ νοῦς L: given that there are other gaps in PCB in the immediate context, it is in prin­ciple possible that they omit ἢ νοῦς too in  error, and that the words were in the original common source of PCBL (ω). However I agree with Spengel and Bussemaker that they are intrusive, on the simple grounds that there is and has been no argument for ruling out νοῦς as well as ἐπιστήμη: ἢ νοῦς, I suppose, was ori­gin­ al­ly someone’s gloss, perhaps prompted by the γε (ἐπιστήμη γε), or possibly by the argument of the next chapter (q.v.)—although there only the most general role is given to νοῦς and νοεῖν as such (cf. b15 below), and in such a role, at least in the present context, it would actually add little or nothing to ἐπιστήμη. (Did the glossator perhaps have in mind the specialized νοῦς of NE VI ‘=’ EE V, functioning as a kind of perception? Pace Dirlmeier [who thinks ἢ νοῦς is Aristotle, translating νοῦς as

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Aristotelica  185 ‘Intuition’: ‘Sollte das ein Zusatz sein, so müsste der Glossator seinen Ar. sehr gut gekannt haben’], it would be odd indeed for Aristotle himself to introduce that here, i.e. in a context where νοῦς is used consistently in a non-specialized role, as it is in EE VIII/V as a whole.) There is one problem: according to Harlfinger’s stemma there is a direct and uninterrupted line between ω and L, in which case the original gloss would have to have been in ω itself: either, then, it was taken up into the text in L but not in the other recensio, or, alternatively, the gloss was introduced into ω after α´, the hyparchetype of PCB, had been copied from it. But I also would not rule out the possibility that there was at least one other copyist at work between ω and L. (It is hard, incidentally, to see why an editor proposing to omit ἢ νοῦς should put it in square brackets, as Susemihl does; that would normally suggest that the omitted words were in all the primary MSS, which they are not in this case.) b12–13 The loss from PCB of χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ is evidently caused by simple haplography (in α´ ), and not by

puzzle­ment about the argument, though that would be understandable: cf. Kenny’s note (Oxford World’s Classics translation ad loc.). Could Aristotle be supposing that ϕρόνησις/ἐπιστήμη would ‘rule over’ ἀρετή insofar as, in the imagined scenario, it would be the sole factor in determining whether the agent’s actions are good or bad (irrespective of any division in the soul such as the one just about to be introduced with the ἀκρατής)? Spengel’s 〈αὐτὴ〉 αὑτῇ is bizarre, not least in light of the sentence that follows. b13–14 τίς οὖν ἐστιν; The τίς is perhaps surprising, and a number of translators, Woods, Kenny, and Inwood/Woolf among them, appear implicitly to emend to τί (‘What, then, is it?’ ‘So what is it?’). In light of what follows, Jackson’s construal of the question as τίς οὖν ἔστιν, sc. ὁ τὰ τοιαῦτα παθών, i.e. who there could be that can / under what circumstances can anyone be said to act ἀϕρόνως ἀπὸ ϕρονήσεως (answer: perhaps the ἀκρατής), is perhaps right, but is hardly the most intuitive reading; I myself incline towards taking it (despite b11–12 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη γε) as τίς, sc. ἐπιστήμη—‘so what ἐπιστήμη is it?’ As Aristotle will affirm at the end of the chapter (b36–8), and as has been confirmed in the preceding sentence by the exclusion of the one

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186  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1246b13–14) plausible candidate, ἀρετή, there just is nothing more powerful than ἐπιστήμη. b15 The choice between πὼς and πῶς is, again, in such a case as this, a matter of choice; I prefer, and have consistently preferred, the first, to avoid confusion. b16–17 τἀναντία. ἢ ἔστι Jackson: the apparatus for once lists the various supplements (offered to explain the MSS’ τἀναντία η σϕι/τἀναντία ***σϕι) not chronologically but in ascending order of redundancy and/ or desperation (Susemihl has an even more elaborate proposal). All are based on the erroneous belief, of which Jackson alone is innocent, that the MSS together contain evidence of a lacuna—when (a) there is a gap only in L among the three that offer the mysterious σϕι, and (b) it is not unusual for the copyist of L to resort to leaving a gap when faced with a problematic bit of text. In other words he is merely giving a signal that something is amiss, which P2 and C2 do by inserting dots over σϕ (P2) and σϕι (C2). It seems reasonable to suppose that η σϕι was in ω (and more than likely, given B’s behaviour, in α´ too: this, Ι suspect, another case of omission—here of a whole sentence—signalling perplexity), and ἢ ἔστι δῆλον ὅτι, κτλ—with a full stop after τἀναντία—not only represents a minimal departure from the puzzling sequence of characters the MSS bequeath to us but actually makes sense. b18 Jackson suggests we should retain ἄνοια here (rather than accepting Spengel’s ἄγνοια), and read it in place of the MSS’ ἄγνοια in b26 and 27 too, on the grounds that ‘ἄνοια and not ἄγνοια is the intellectual vice which answers to the intellectual virtue of ϕρόνησις’ (1913: 205–6), but that looks like a mere assertion, and in any case ἄγνοια is what is generally being paired with ϕρόνησις in the present dialectical context, and with ἐπιστήμη, with which ϕρόνησις is alternating; it would also be the natural pair of ἐπιστήμη. See further on b22. —ἑτέρᾳ μεταποιοῦνται Jackson: ἑτέρᾳ, with no iota subscript marked, as usual, might easily become ἑτέραι (PCL) before the plural verb. (Or could the iota in the MSS’ ἑτέραι be an adscript? Since there is no other evidence of such surviving adscripts in any of PCBL, I exclude this possibility.) I construe this ἕτερᾳ (sc. ὁδῷ: LSJ s.v. ἕτερος) as if it were ἑτέρως: ‘they lay claim to

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Aristotelica  187 roles in one or the other way’, i.e. either the ἄλογον dominates, or λόγος, and this happens even if / also if (κἂν, a16) it is the non-reasoning part that is as it should be, the reasoning part not. —B resumes with ὥστ’. b18–19 τὸ PCBL, τ’ οὐ Jackson: PCBL’s τὸ would be possible but somewhat oddly placed, not least when it is evidently redundant in the context of Eudemian style. Βut it is in any case a negative we need—unless we read τε, which, with Allan’s τε for ὥστε after ἀϕρόνως in the next line, would give us a double τε . . . καί; this solution, however, soon runs into trouble (see on 19 ὥστε below). —On the reconstruction proposed, the reasoning part is here envisaged as negating the δικαιοσύνη of the nonreasoning, which would be a misuse of reasoning. Of course reasoning is not the same as ϕρόνησις; but we have not yet escaped completely from what can be called the single-use argument (εἰ δὲ ἁπλῆ ἡ ἑκάστου χρεία ᾗ ἕκαστον κἂν ϕρονίμως ἔπραττον οὕτω πράττοντες, b8–9). b19 Spengel’s supplement of ἀρετῇ after καὶ1 (χρῆσθαι καὶ) is an un­eco­ nom­ic­al way to save the καὶ, which can in any case plausibly be taken as epexegetic. —Allan’s τε for ὥστε is palaeographically impeccable (dittography after the ως of ἀϕρόνως), but would link ἀϕρόνως to the following τἀναντία (ἀϕρόνως τε καὶ τἀναντία), which would surely take the argument nowhere: the natural pair for χρῆσθαι ϕρονήσει ἀϕρόνως would be χρῆσθαι ϕρονήσει ϕρονίμως, whereas what Aristotle is leading up to is the possibility of ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι ϕρονίμως: cf. on b28–9 below. (Walzer/ Mingay adopts Allan’s emendation, but accidentally makes nonsense of it by printing a comma after ἀϕρόνως.) b20–1 Spengel’s conjecture, τὴς μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴς 〈ἐνούσης〉, although less economical than his preferred τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν, does a better job of explaining the MSS readings here, and sets up a nice pair with ἀγνοίας ἐνούσης in b23 (q.v.). With τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετὴν, the placing of what would be the grammatical object so far ahead of the verbs governing it (b22 στρέψει, ποιήσει) is also awkward. b22 στρέψη P1: P2 appears to overwrite an original eta with the ligature for ει.

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188  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 1246b22 To fill his first lacuna in this line, Susemihl supplies (exempli gratia) 〈καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἀρετὴν στρέψει ἡ ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἄγνοια〉, perhaps to balance b24–6 καὶ πάλιν . . . ἡ ἐγκράτεια; but that seems unnecessary, the point of 24–6 being to give weight to the suggestion that ἀρετή in the ἄλογον might correct κακία in the λογιστικόν (why not, if it works the other way round, with the familiar phe­nom­ enon of ἐγκράτεια?). Susemihl’s filling for his second lacuna, ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, is more plausible than his proposed filling for the first, but surely ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ is readily understood here; where else would we expect to find ignorance? b23 The difference, orthographically, between ἄγνοια and ἄνοια is so small, and the MSS so consistently muddle them, that there seems little point in trying, as some do, to defend ἄνοια here or anywhere else in the present context (cf. on b18 above); ἄγνοια is what is required, and what we finally get in all of PCBL in b25 and 26. —The obvious and necessary correction to ϕρονίμως is made by Ambr. (D. Chalkondyles) as well as by Matr. 4627 (K. Laskaris). b26 πράττη B—apparently mistaking the typical double oblique strokes that signal -ειν for a (straight-sided, uncial-like) eta. b26–7 ἔσται καὶ [ἡ] ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ϕρονίμως, sc. ϕρονήσει χρῆσθαι: cf. χρῆσθαι . . . ϕρονήσει ἀϕρόνως in b19, and ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι ϕρονίμως (Moraux) in the next sentence (i.e. b28). I take it that ϕρόνησις in this case is ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας in that it has been brought about by ἡ . . . ἀρετὴ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ, which has turned round the ἄγνοια in the reasoning part and made it judge correctly, as specified in b21–3. b28–9 Moraux’s τὸ ἀγνοίᾳ χρῆσθαι ϕρονίμως must surely be right. Spengel’s ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας χρῆσθαι 〈ϕρονήσει〉 ϕρονίμως spells out what would surely

have to be understood with the MSS’ text, not least given b19, but it is rather acting ϕρονίμως as a result of ἀρετή (ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ) ‘turning ἄγνοια round’ (στρέϕειν, b23), not ‘using wisdom wisely as a result of folly’ (Rackham), that was the focus of the preceding discussion. I imagine a copyist writing ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας instead of τὸ ἀγνοίᾳ under the influence of the previous sentence (the immediate repetition of ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας ϕρονίμως, even with the addition

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Aristotelica  189 of χρῆσθαι, in any case immediately suggests the possibility of contamination). b29 There is a case against οὐδαμῶς, but it is not proven (least of all by what the Latin translation (‘Lat.’) gives us, i.e. [in ceterarum] nulla). b30 The καὶ is written in above the ἢ in B—if καὶ is what is intended. b30–1 ἀλλ’ οὖν PCBL: this ἀλλ’ οὖν I take, tentatively, to be a version of the apodotic variety recognized by Denniston 444; ‘[ἀκολασία may disrupt an(other) ἐπιστήμη like medicine,] but for sure. . . ’. —ὁ for οὐ, as we have seen, is not unusual in these MSS. b31 Robinson’s supplement of ἡ ἀρετή after ἄγνοιαν at first sight seems essential, given that the ‘turning’ of ignorance by ἀρετή in the nonreasoning part is what Aristotle has just been talking about. Some recent translators have done without it, but nevertheless construed the context in the same way: thus Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation has ‘but the contrary of intemperance does not convert ig­nor­ance into knowledge’, while in the Cambridge translation Inwood and Woolf propose ‘but if it is the opposite it does not pervert ig­nor­ance’. The latter translation raises the question: what is the ‘it’? Surely not ἀκολασία, which seems the only candidate; it can hardly be the opposite of itself. English, like many modern languages, can manage without raising that question, as in ‘Who was that?’ ‘It was Aristotle’, but Greek, with the gendered ἐναντία, cannot. Kenny’s slightly freer version is similarly problematical. In short, if Aristotle is to be saying what Kenny, Inwood and Woolf, and Robinson want him to say, we need Robinson’s supplement; without it the translations offered are literally impossible. But the interpretation in question does not fit with what follows. Aristotle says ‘but it [whatever ‘it’ is] does not convert/pervert/turn ignorance if it [again, whatever this ‘it’ is] is ἐναντία, because of there not being ὑπεροχή in it but rather ἀρετή’s being generally in this relation [i.e. of ὑπεροχή] to κακία’ (the whole of ‘because of . . . κακία’ forming a single noun-clause with τό + infinitive). Now the translations cited break this explanation into two distinct parts, with a full stop between them (‘Virtue in total, however. . . ’. ‘Rather, it is virtue in general that . . .’), which obscures the fact that ‘ἀρετή’s being generally in this relation to κακία’ is part of the explanation as to why ‘it’ does not convert, etc., ignorance if it is ἐναντία. If ‘ἀρετή’s being generally in this relation to

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190  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1246b31) κακία’ is part of that explanation, then plainly ‘it’ cannot be ἀρετή, but must rather be κακία, or rather the species of κακία that just figured earl­ier in the sentence, i.e. ἀκολασία. So Robinson’s supplement must be definitively rejected: Aristotle is saying that ἀκολασία στρέϕει medical or grammatical knowledge, but not any sort of scientific ­ignorance if it is ἐναντία to it, where either the first ‘it’ refers to the ἀκολασία and the second to the ignorance or vice versa, the point being just that they have to be in opposition, as ἀκολασία and knowledge were in the preceding example, and as ἀρετή/κακία in the non-reasoning and reasoning parts were in the discussion that led up to those ἄτοπα outcomes now being dismissed. One of the main features of that discussion was that it introduced a further cause of the disruption of knowledge (other causes having been ruled out), itself expressed in a somewhat bizarre form—πὼς ἀκόλαστος ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἔχων νοῦν, b15—that directly leads to those ἄτοπα results, but nevertheless itself has a parallel in the case of other kinds of knowledge: ἀκολασία can disrupt medical, or grammatical, or . . . knowledge. But there is no parallel, in such cases, for the overturning of ignorance, dreamed up in the preceding dialectical discussion, by the non-reasoning part—here represented by ἀκολασία/κακία, as being the only source of disruption there can be from that quarter, in the real world, for ἐπιστῆμαι. —διὰ: Susemihl writes διὸ, evidently a simple error. —ἐνεῖναι, if that is what it is, in P is a mess; what was underneath the correction (and successive hands may have been at work) is hard to make out. b33 Susemihl supplies ἃ after πάντα (which is actually where B has it), claiming to follow the Latin translation and Victorius, but the sense surely demands that it should be before ὁ ἄδικος; and that is where a later marginal note by Victorius places it, preceded by ‘fort.’ (anticipating Jackson). b34 B2’s ἕν ἐστιν is a mistake illuminated by the hyphen, or what looks remarkably like a hyphen, in the margin in L, after the ἔν- of ἔνεστιν, which happens to be split between two lines; that is, a reader of L was marking that ἔν εστιν was not (as the correcting hand in B took ἔνεστιν, whether split in his source as in L or not) ἕν ἐστιν. b35 ἐκεῖναι PCBL: ἐκείνων Moraux. But there is a special edge to ἐκεῖναι: Socrates, Aristotle’s opponent in the whole of this chapter, did

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Aristotelica  191 not recognize such ἕξεις, since he did not divide off a non-reasoning part of the soul for them to belong to. —αἱ ἀλόγου scripsi, αἱ ἄλλου PCBL: it seems important that the nature of the other part should be mentioned here, i.e. that it is ἄλογον, not just other than the part that reasons (cf. preceding note, on ἐκεῖναι). I also doubt whether ἄλλου by itself can stand for τοῦ ἄλλου μέρους (τῆς ψυχῆς), as ἀλόγου can, in its own way, in the present context. Jackson’s ϕρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ, ἐκεῖναι δ’ ἄλλου ἕξεις is neat enough (apart from the problem just raised about ἄλλου), but gives an inappropriate sense: that the ἕξεις belong to a different part of the soul is of course true, for Aristotle, but it could hardly be said to be one of the consequences of the preceding argument. Rather, the conclusion is what the MSS say it is, i.e. that people’s being ϕρόνιμοι goes along with the goodness of the ἕξεις of their ἄλλο (ἀλόγον) part. b38 It looks as if the ultimate common source of PCBL (i.e. ω) had γνώσ followed by a small gap (the precise size of which will be affected by the presence or absence of ligatures, etc.). Bekker, not knowing of B, duly prints γνώσ (with no punctuation following, just a new paragraph) after the L tradition as represented by Marc. and Oxon., leaving Spengel to complete it in the way the B copyist had already done, evidently on his own initiative. Pace Spengel, to judge by parallels elsewhere in these MSS the gaps in PCL are more likely to have originated in problems some previous copyist prior to ω had in deciphering the ending of γνώσεως than in a larger lacuna. b39–40 καὶ ἀρετὴ C: καὶ ἀρετὴν PBL; et virtutem BF; κατ’ ἀρετήν Jackson. C here is the clear outlier, given the agreement of PBL and BF, but I think its καὶ ἀρετὴ is nevertheless right: Jackson’s argument against it, that ‘with καὶ ἀρετή, the sentence suggests that εὐτυχία may take the place at once of ϕρόνησις and of ἀρετή, whereas the context shows that εὐτυχία is regarded as a possible substitute for ϕρόνησις only’ (208), is, I think, unconvincing. The language of 1247b24–5 and 1248a6 (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν . . . ὡς δεῖ καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε / ἐπιθύμησεν ὧν ἔδει καὶ ὅτε ἔδει, the subject/s in both cases being those/the person relevantly εὐτυχεῖς/ής) in my view rather suggests that the ‘εὐτυχία’ under discussion is being thought of precisely as a possible substitute for both ϕρόνησις and ἀρετή, which of course have just been said, firmly,

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192  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1246b39–40) to go together. (Hence what I think is Aristotle’s careful use of εὐπραγία: the question presently under discussion is what makes for / brings about good acting, not what makes for / brings about a good life, closely connected though the two things may be.) The reason why the second of the two subjects in the sentence (i.e. ἀρετή) is delayed, I propose, is because the first has been the subject of the immediately preceding sentence, καὶ ἀρετή being added as an afterthought, for the sake of clarity. I disagree too with Jackson’s claim that ‘the accusative ἀρετήν, because of its difficulty, . . . represent[s] a genuine tradition’, because, I argue, it would be a typical error, for ἀρετή, in these MSS, after the ­accusative εὐπραγίαν (although, Jackson might respond, καὶ for his own κατ’ would be another typical error, which would then have cleared the way for C’s nominative, ἀρετή). —These εὐτυχεῖς are evidently ­people of whose lives Aristotle would approve; why else would he even momentarily entertain the possibility, as he will go on to do, that god or the divine is somehow involved in their success (1248a24ff.)? On the other hand they lack the right ἕξεις as well as ϕρόνησις. One hypothesis might be as follows. The aim of VIII.2 in general is to get some more things straight with Socrates (following VIII.1), and with Plato. They claim that good acting, when properly understood, is all down to ἐπιστήμη (see 1247b15–16), and this has the effect—since the relevant knowledge, they suppose, will be in very short supply—of saying that actually nobody acts well, or only a few do so. No, Aristotle retorts, we recognize (ϕαμέν, 1246b40; οὓς λέγομεν εὐτυχεῖς, 1247a37) that ­people do get things right even if they lack ἐπιστήμη. It is striking how many times the term ἐπιστήμη comes up in the chapter—at least as many times as ϕρόνησις, and this despite the clear ruling at the end of VIII/V.1 that ϕρόνησις is not (an) ἐπιστήμη; in fact it is introduced, apparently now as interchangeable with ϕρόνησις, as early as the third line of the chapter. Is that perhaps just because Socrates is so much still in Aristotle’s mind? So how to account for the phenomenon in question (Aristotle asks), i.e. that people can get things right even without know­ ledge? What the εὐτυχεῖς have, it will turn out, is a special variety of ἐνθουσιασμός (1248a35), which allows them to get to the right answer almost as quickly as those with ἐπιστήμη / ϕρόνησις / σοϕία do (1248a35–8). If this is along the right lines, ch. 1 will then run straight in

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Aristotelica  193 to ch. 2: ‘nothing is stronger than ϕρόνησις. But wait a minute—we do seem to say that good acting isn’t restricted to the ϕρόνιμοι; people do seem to act well without reasoning well (indeed, even without reasoning, which makes Socrates wrong twice over—or even three times, since he claimed that εὐτυχία was actually itself ἐπιστήμη: 1247b15–16). How so?’ VIII/V.1 is not, then, a ‘fragment’ on its own, as Moraux and others have claimed; if there is a fragment, it is Book VIII/V itself. 1247a1 ποιούσης B, εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L: the εὐ/εὖ is by dittography after εὐτυχίας, as the combination of B and BF confirms. Fritzsche’s ἐμποιούσης saves the εὐ, as it were, but why ἐμποιεῖν? εὐπραγία is not an internal state. —κατὰ Spengel: the corruption of κατὰ to καὶ would be easy enough, but ‘. . . and the same effects as . . .’ (epexegetic καί) works well enough. a4 πολλοὶ Jackson, accepting Bekker’s οἱ for ἔτι in the next line; he thinks this should have a correlative. a5 Jackson’s πολλῷ μᾶλλον πολὺ μέντοι καὶ τύχης implausibly combines L’s reading with BF  ’s, presumably in an attempt to explain the latter; but μᾶλλον for μέντοι, I suppose, was a consequence of someone’s reading πολλῷ for the (already) corrupt πολλοὶ we find in PC. a7 οὗτοι: one might have preferred τοιοῦτοι, but since οὗτοι is by no means impossible, it should stay (οὗτοι 〈τοιοῦτοι〉 might be worth considering?). —Ambr.’s οὐ τῷ is presumably an independent conjecture (by Demetrios Chalkondyles), confirmed by BF, and supported by the lack of the expected sigma in οὕτω(ς) before a vowel in all of PCBL. a11 τῷ τοδὶ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν (Kyrgiopoulos) is not only the simplest resolution of the MSS’ readings but makes good sense, the point being to distinguish the characteristics we are born with that we just have from those that belong to us more loosely ‘by nature’ from the start: ‘[people differ immediately they are born] by having a this that is such-and-such’. B’s τῷ τοιόνδε δεῖν ἔχειν could possibly point to an original τῷ 〈τοιονδὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι〉 τοιονδὶ δεῖν 〈καὶ〉 ἔχειν, i.e. exactly what BF seems to represent; we would only have to suppose haplography, followed by the omission of what would now be a redundant καὶ. But BF’s version is in

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194  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1247a11) itself hard to accept: ‘by [the rule that] something such-andsuch κατὰ τὸ εἶναι must also have such-and-such’? This might be improved with a οὕτως in place of the second τοιονδὶ, but the outcome would surely be no more than a banality. Was the author of BF here perhaps trying his own hand at improving the transmitted text? a13 C2 writes in the missing ἡ over the line between ἄλογος and ϕρόνησις, with an insertion mark below. a14 πράττει vs πράττοι: cf. the indicative in the next line—and anyway, what the ϕρόνιμος agent is able to explain is what he is doing. The οι (visible also in BF’s operetur) was perhaps originally by assimilation to the following οἱ. a15 Editors until Walzer generally interpreted the MSS’ τέχνη, without comment, as a nominative, as did the translator of BF (ars); it seems to me that though a nominative makes sense Walzer is right to take it as a dative (‘if they were able to say, it would be by means of τέχνη’)—an option that was always available given the typical lack of iota subscripts in endings in these MSS. (Ald., which does have them, does not have one here, nor does Victorius insert one.) —Jackson’s ὅτι (ὅτι δὲ [sc. κατορθοῦσι], ϕανερόν, ὄντες ἄϕρονες) will surely find few supporters, and goes against his normal policy of respecting BF (whose amplius surely represents ἔτι). —BF ’s enim after ἔτι is implausible: ‘for in addition’? Dirlmeier accepts γὰρ, but that would only be defensible if we thought BF always and necessarily right, which it is not: see e.g. on a11, and on a26 below. —If we keep ϕανερὸν, we need Spengel’s supplement of ὅτι; it is more economical to adopt Spengel’s originally conjectured ϕανεροὶ (BF ’s manifestum = PCBL, followed as it is by insipientes existentes). a16 It would be easy to do without μὲν—which seems good enough reason to keep it; the corresponding δέ clause is perhaps forgotten as the following example expands. (BF ’s quidem = μὲν.) a17 δοκεῖ PCBL, ἐδόκει Sylburg: the translator of BF was himself perhaps faced with δοκεῖ . . . εἶναι, and quietly emended this to ἦν, in the knowledge that the reference must be to the past. Sylburg’s proposal looks attractive until we come to a20 ὡς λέγουσιν: Aristotle is, it seems,

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Aristotelica  195 talking about people in the present looking back to the past, in which case I propose taking the εἶναι after δοκεῖ as an imperfect infinitive after δοκεῖ, if only hesitantly, (a) given that I do not have a parallel to offer (beyond those in Goodwin, Moods and Tenses §119), and (b) when the corruption from ἐδόκει to δοκεῖ would be easy. —χρυσίον B: B is evidently making his own sense of the πλέον he found following. a18 Victorius: ‘γρ. πλέων’ in the margin of his copy of Ald. a19 For ὑπὸ τῶν BF offers ab hiis qui, with no verb following the relative: I cite this as an illustration of the fact that the relationship of BF to any Greek text is complex (could the MS from which it was copied really have read ὑπὸ τῶν (or τούτων) οἳ, with no following verb?), i.e. that even BF is not simply a word-for-word transcription. a19–20 δι’ εὐήθειαν ὡς λέγουσιν secl. Allan: the words do have something of the feel of a gloss—nothing substantial would be lost without them, and ejecting them would then clear the way for Sylburg’s ἐδόκει in a17; but this is too thin a basis for bracketing the words. BF ’s dixerunt is perhaps the translator’s own invention, following his erat in a18. a20 ὅτι (quod BF) here has been introduced—so I propose—by false ana­ logy with a16 ὅτι, where οὐχ ὅτι = ‘not only’, or ‘not just’, is answered by ἀλλὰ καὶ here. Barnes points to a similar error at Poetics 1448b35. That people are silly about things other than those in which they are successful, like Hippocrates about geometry, is of no interest (‘not just . . .’); the question is whether they are ἄϕρονες about the very things in which they do succeed as well (καὶ). —ἐν οἷς: Bessarion (in Par. 2042) got there first, before Victorius (‘γρ. ἐν οἷς’); Ambr. got halfway there with ἐν ἐνίοις. a20–1 περὶ γὰρ ναυκληρίαν: BF circa naucliriam enim = περὶ ναυκληρίαν γὰρ? a21 δυνατώτατοι B: the B copyist was perhaps faced with the same υ for ει (δεινότατοι L) as PC, and made the wrong correction—or did he get it right? δυνατώτατοι is far from being impossible, and BF ’s maxime industri (or industrii) is not the most obvious translation of L’s δείνοτατοι. a22 Jackson derives his βάλλει ἕξ from BF ’s iacit ex (eo quod naturam habet benefortunatam), supposing a corruption in the Latin from sex to

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196  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1247a22) ex, and continuing καθὰ ἦν ϕύσει, τῷ τὴν ϕύσιν ἔχειν εὐτυχῆ ἐστὶν εὐτυχής: ‘. . . the Greek and Latin traditions are [again] irreconcilable, and again I think they must be combined’ (210). Quite apart from our needing to ask (again) about how ‘Greek and Latin traditions’ could have come apart in the first place, the result of combining them here results in a pleonasm sufficient on its own to bring Jackson’s method into disrepute. I myself think that here the translator is paraphrasing: ex eo quod naturam habet benefortunatam is his—­ ­ rea­son­able—take on καθ’ ἣν ϕύσει ἐστὶν εὐτυχής. In sum, what PCBL have is perfectly acceptable: what the lucky dice-player throws is what he wants to throw, and does not need specifying (καθ’ ἣν, sc. βολήν: Collingwood). a24 κακῶς νεναυπηγημένον: male regibilis BF, at best an over-translation. a25 Jackson defends the δὲ by saying ‘πολλάκις δὲ may stand for καὶ τοῦτο πολλάκις’, a claim that few, I think, would be inclined to accept; and the lack of anything corresponding to δὲ in BF ought to count against it, at any rate by Jackson’s own rule (i.e. always to take notice of what BF says). —BF ’s propter se ipsam confirms Bekker’s δι’ αὑτό (if it needed confirmation). a26 P2 writes his supplement ἀλλ’ οὗτος εὐτυχ´ (= εὐτυχὴς: εὐτυχῶν Matr. 4627) τὸν δαίμον’ ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν in the margin with an insertion mark (plus κείμ[ενον]) above it, corresponding to a similar mark in the text after ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν. This supplement must derive from L or a descendant of L, but its ul­tim­ate origin, i.e. the ultimate origin of what we find in L, must surely have been in a gloss, for the following reasons. (1) The repetition of ἔχει(ν) κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν is odd, and fits particularly badly with the usually spare style of EE. (2) The sentence anticipates what will be said, more economically, in the next sentence. (3) The sense of redundancy is increased by the repetition of ἀλλά (one sentence, i.e. the preceding one, and one ἀλλά, will suffice: note Fritzsche’s bracketing of the new ἀλλά, though he accepts the more problematic repe­ ti­tion of ἔχει[ν] κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν). (4) The elision of δαίμονα (in L, as well as P2, pace Walzer/Mingay) is odd; and (5) the sentence will in any case need emendation to make it look like something Aristotle could have

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Aristotelica  197 written. The sense is plainly ‘But could this sort of εὐτυχής really have a god as steersman?’, and (6a) the ἀγαθόν is then out of place (less so in a gloss?); moreover (6b) we would need either οὗτος 〈ὁ〉 εὐτυχὴς (conjectured by Susemihl) or 〈ὁ〉 οὕτως (sic BF; οὕτως Fritzsche) εὐτυχὴς, i.e. in addition to losing ἀγαθόν at the end. The ἀγαθόν (i.e. bonum) is actually missing in BF, but BF is in any case otherwise less than helpful, apparently giving us what is, if anything, another version of the preceding sed quia habet gubernatorem bonum (which itself adds weight to the idea that we are dealing here with a gloss). —The fact that what we find in the margin of P coincides almost exactly with the form of the sentence in L, including the truncation of εὐτυχής by two letters (and the elision of δαίμονα), is striking. In P, εὐτυχ´ is evidently deliberate truncation, i.e. shorthand; does the truncation in L betray the origin of the sentence there, i.e. in a glossator who used the same shorthand, foreign to the L copyist? The gloss would be of a recognizable type, singling out a point that particularly interested the reader; this is perhaps the category to which the frequent headings in P, especially, belong. Either the gloss was added to ω after the hyparchetype of the recensio Messanensis (α´ ) had been copied from ω, or else it was in the margin of a putative descendant of ω in the other recensio predating L. (There is no more reason to print this sentence, bracketed, in the text, if it is indeed a gloss attached to a single MS, than there is for so treating the many other such inorganic elements we find attached to one or more MSS.) a28 ϕυσειόω B1: B2 introduces an accent above the upsilon, ἢ + ν above the ειό. (Thus PCBL all end up with the uncontracted form νόῳ, which is at least worth remarking: I resist the temptation to correct to νῷ.) a28–9 κατορθοῦν, τὰ δὲ δύο μὴ ἔστι: BF gives us, nonsensically, dirigencia autem non sunt. a31 Spengel’s εὖ for εἰ is the first instalment of a major recasting of what follows—he later changed his mind, and surely rightly; with one exception, for which see the next note but one, the sentence seems to work well enough. a32 ἀλλ’ εἴπερ: qui autem BF. Did the translator have ἀλλ’ ὃς before him, or was he just doing his best with the difficult ἀλλ’ εἴπερ? —utique

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198  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1247a32) videbitur BF: was ἂν δόξειε (utique = ἂν) in BF ’s Greek text, or did the translator supply it to explain the infinitive following (τοιοῦτον εἶναι PCBL)? I suppose the latter, as does Fritzsche: εἴη for εἶναι is (a) palaeo­graph­ic­al­ly more plausible and (b) more economical than supplying δόξειε. a33 οἷον: no equivalent in BF, even following a talis (indeed, what BF offers here overall is quite unworkable: qui autem [ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, a32] propter fortunam benefortunatus non utique talis videbitur esse causa semper eiusdem aut ut in pluribus). a34 Langerbeck’s ᾗ might be preferred on palaeographical grounds to Fritzsche’s ὅτι, but the latter makes a better pair with the following ὥσπερ ὅτι; BF ’s quia clinches it. I note that the sentence that B gives us, without τοιοσδὶ, makes a certain kind of sense—if not the right one. a35 Harlfinger reports the absence of ὁ from Neap.; with Neap. predating Marc., it and not Marc. (Bekker, Susemihl . . .) should get the credit for a necessary emendation. (The wrong accent on the following γλαυκὸς suggests that somebody thought there was a reference to a Γλαῦκος; cf. Plato, Phaedo 108d4–5.) —οὐκ ὀξὺ ὁρᾷ: non acute BF (i.e. apparently omitting ὁρᾷ). 1247b1 Jackson could have kept BF ’s quorumcunque/ὅσων as well as adopting its fortunati/εὐτυχεῖς by construing, with Kenny (in the Oxford World’s Classics translation), ‘the fortunate are those whose goods are caused by good luck’, i.e. by making ὅσων a possessive genitive, with the second genitive, ἀγαθῶν, governed by αἰτία. There are signs here, with ὅσων αἰτία τύχη ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθῶν, of a rare stylistic, even epigrammatic, flourish (rare, that is, for EE)­—one that, one could argue, might actually be completed by having τύχης rather than εὐτυχεῖς before the ὅσων: ‘to τύχη belong those ἀγαθά that are caused by ἀγαθὴ τύχη’; and a corruption from τύχης to εὐτυχεῖς (as would be evidenced by BF’s fortunati), after another εὐτυχεῖς, might be easier than vice versa. In that case εὐτυχεῖς/fortunati would have originated in a simple dittography, whether of εὐτυχεῖς or of fortunati (BF has  . . . benefortunati. fortunati . . .)—helped along by the following plural ὅσων/quorumcunque.

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Aristotelica  199 But after all this is said, there is a worrying sense of un-Aristotelian banality about a declaration that ‘to τύχη belong what goods good τύχη causes’: what else would they belong to? εὐτυχεῖς, by contrast, would round out the argument nicely—with what is still a certain flourish in the following relative clause. b3 οὐκ ἔτι is split between two lines in B; B2 adds (what looks like) a hyphen after οὐκ at the end of the line. b4 Langerbeck’s ἐξαιρετέα is an entirely unnecessary proposal, not least in light of segregandum BF. b7 Shorey’s ἄδηλον is perhaps tempting, but ἄλογον makes good sense; there is no reason why Aristotle should have used the same adjective here as at Physics 196b6 (Walzer/Mingay), especially since he uses a different noun to follow, λογισμός instead of the Physics’ διάνοια, and actually ἄλογον fits well with λογισμός. (The repetition of the root λογadds to the point: ἄλογος, to human λογισμός at least.) b8 Β2 inserts ου over the final letter of (the abbreviation for) ἀνθρώπῳ. That the same abbreviation cannot serve for both ἄνθρωπος and ἀνθρώπινος is confirmed by the correction in P (from ἀνῴ with bar to ἀνίν plus bar and following superscript omega). b9 πρόβλημ’ ἂν L: the L copyist perhaps found πρόβλημα in the abbreviated form we have in PC, with a kind of elongated mu over the eta (and no elision mark); πρόβλημα is written out in full, and unelided, in B, as it is unelided (i.e. with no elision mark) in PC. —In C ‘δὲ sup., eadem manu’, Walzer/Mingay reports, but what they are describing is the standard way in which Nikolaos, the scribe of P and C, writes ἐπειδή; what P has here is identical to what is found in C. b10–11 κατορθώσαιεν: P2 adds the sign for εν after the superscript αι (which shows that the εν is later: if it had been original, the preceding αι would not be superscript). Quite how he would have construed διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθώσαιεν is unclear: that he would have thought that a change from ἀπο to αὐτὸ would automatically follow seems unlikely; he is perhaps just noticing the preceding ἄν and correctly inferring that it should be followed by an optative—in which case he is halfway towards Jackson’s

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200  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1247b10–11) solution (διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ κατορθώσαιεν), which is well supported by BF ’s propter idem. —One καὶ πάλιν after κατορθώσαιεν is enough—‘why would they not also succeed again διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ, and again?’; we do not need L’s two (cf. Dirlmeier). On Susemihl’s . . . καὶ πάλιν ἄν; ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι ἓν, καὶ πάλιν: (a) if ἀλλὰ is to be derived from BF ’s sed (‘ἀλλὰ . . . add. [BF]’, Susemihl; cf. Jackson, reporting sed after iterum), we should notice that at least in some MSS BF more plaus­ibly has iterum si . . . rather than iterum sed (my thanks to Terry Irwin for pointing this out); (b) according to LSJ, this is the sole occurrence of ἀποκατορθόω (interpreted as ‘recover one’s prosperity’, which is what the verb ought to mean, if it existed, but cannot be meant here). BF ’s unum (Susemihl’s ἕν, in his 〈ἀλλὰ〉 διὰ τὸ ἀποκατορθῶσαι ἓν) is surely a corruption, like the ἀπο- in ἀποκατορθῶσαι; the hopelessness of the infinitive in BF itself propels us in the direction of Jackson’s κατορθώσαιεν. b11 τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον: BF here certainly hits the nail on the head; our MSS’ reading gives entirely the wrong sense, but once τοῦ was misread as τὸ, the rest would easily follow. b12 Editors infer τοῦτο from BF  ’s hoc, but it is already in B, which resumed with οὐκ ἄρα (how it came to leave out διὰ τί οὐ . . . τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον is anybody’s guess). —ἄλλο ταν P1: P2 adds the necessary elision mark, rough breathing, and accent to give ἀλλ’ ὅταν; there is also a separation mark beneath the lambda and omicron, inserted perhaps by a third hand. The positioning of the omicron in C, next to the second lambda and away from the ταν, may suggest that Nikolaos, the PC copyist, started making the same mistake when writing C; if so, he self-corrects. The origin of the error may well have been in ω, since BF has sed cum: B, I suppose, makes the correction on his own initiative, as does C (perhaps), after that false start.

b13 〈ἀπ’〉 ἀπείρων καὶ ἀορίστων: something is needed to rescue the two genitives from orphanhood, the loss of an απ before another (and after ἀποβαίνῃ) would hardly be surprising, and BF ’s ab rounds off the case for the supplement. —Jackson’s τῳ is in one way exactly what is needed before ἀγαθὸν: εὐτυχία/ἀτυχία is a matter of things ‘coming together’, for good or for ill, for a particular individual (and omicron for omega, and vice versa, is a regular phenomenon in these MSS—to repeat

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Aristotelica  201 a by now more than familiar point). But the possibility that something good might repeatedly happen like this for someone (τινί ) will be introduced in the next sentence (b16–18 τί οὖν κωλύει, κτλ). So to this extent Dirlmeier is right in saying (485) that a reference to what is good for someone is out of place here, and his ὃ, from BF ’s quod, is to be preferred. b15 εὐτυχεῖν vs εὐτυχεῖς: Allan’s supplement of γίνεσθαι is unnecessary, since εὐτυχεῖν would have to be understood in any case, i.e. after ἐμάνθανον. Spengel’s εὐτυχεῖν, however, is a conjecture of a different order. The point behind τινες εὐτυχεῖς would presumably be that if knowledge were involved, only some εὐτυχεῖς would acquire it, just as only some practitioners of any other ἐπιστήμη actually master it. But it would be unusual for Aristotle to refer to inferior practitioners of an ἐπιστήμη in such a (general) context; the point here in any case is just that if εὐτυχία were a matter of ἐπιστήμη, some people would be able to learn it, in the same way that (only) some people learn mathematics or medicine. But then all of the εὐτυχεῖς, not just some of them, ἐμάνθανον (or rather ἔμαθον) ἂν εὐτυχεῖς εἶναι/γίνεσθαι, since learning would be—on the present hypothesis—the only route to εὐτυχία. So εὐτυχεῖν, I think, it must be. b16 Susemihl thinks the definite article may be needed before Σωκράτης on the grounds that the reference appears to be to the Platonic Socrates (Euthydemus 279d), though he adds ‘at fort. retinendum est Σωκράτης propter praeteritum ἔϕη’. But Aristotle surely can refer to Plato’s Socrates in the past tense (1246b37 would be a case in point, if as I think the reference there is to Plato’s Protagoras); if he does, then that will blur the distinction between Plato’s and the historical Socrates, so that despite LSJ (s.v. ὁ, ἡ, τό B.I.c), a reference to the latter will not always require the article. (There is already just such blurring, perhaps, in I.5, 1216b2–8.) b16 B’s συμβαίνειν seems preferable to L’s συμβῆναι, with πολλάκις, and is probably supported by PC’s corrupt συμβαίνῃ as well as by ­accidere in BF (pace Walzer/Mingay, L has συμβῆναι τινὶ, not συμβῆναί τινι).

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202  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 1247b17–18 Might οἷον ἂν εἶεν (PCL; B is out of play) derive from an original οἷον ἂν εἰ εἴη? Perhaps not, but one would ideally like some explanation of how the plural arose: Fritzsche conjectures οἷον εἰ ἐν τῷ κύβους ?〈βάλλειν〉? ἀεὶ μακαρίαν βάλλοι. b18 κοίβους P1: P2 overwrites an ori­gin­al οι with an upsilon.

b19 ἔνεισιν is written outside the right-hand margin, at the bottom of the page, in C; evidently the copyist left it out, started the next folio with ὁρμαὶ, then went back and put in the missing word. b20 There is a curious gap in the text in C after αὗται, filled with two dots, and not caused by any fault in the parchment. —B2 overwrites B’s original ἡ for εἰ with the ligature for ει plus smooth breathing. b21 ἡδέος Β2, inserting ος above the supralinear ligature for ως—which B does not normally use, its general practice being to write things out in full. —καὶ ἡ secl. Spengel before ὄρεξις, following the Latin version, i.e. not BF but the other, later one; but what this offers us (siquidem naturalis est per cupiditatem iucundae rei appetitus) is surely nothing more than a simplification; and how reliable in general is this Latin translation, as opposed to BF? (Answer: not very.) BF itself makes a mess of the beginning of the sentence (et primi [for our καὶ πρότεραι] ipsi sunt natura quidem si propter concupiscenciam delectabilis et appetitus natura quidem ad bonum tendet semper), and I think of the end of it too—see next note. I propose with some confidence that there is nothing wrong with the text transmitted by our MSS: ἡ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος is ἡ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος ὁρμή, ὁρμαί having been the subject of the preceding sentence, and the following καί is then epexegetic: ἡ δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέος, i.e. ἡ ὄρεξις (n.b. the singular ἐστι covering both subjects, although this is not decisive by itself). Jackson inserts a comma after ἡδέος, making ἡ ὄρεξις the subject of the following verb (see next note), but I suggest that for this to work ϕύσει γε would have had to precede καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις; and if Jackson is right, why the καὶ? b22 πᾶσα Allan: πᾶσα what? Neither πᾶσα ὁρμή nor πᾶσα ὄρεξις looks an attractive alternative to πᾶν; why should Aristotle not use a vague ‘everything’, just in order to avoid having to specify what, exactly,

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Aristotelica  203 would βαδίζειν towards the good? On Jackson’s πάντοτε (semper BF) see preceding note: BF is less reliable than he proposes. b23 BF ’s indocti is surely wrong; if singers sing without knowing how to, i.e. without expertise, it seems to follow anyway that they will be indocti (so that if οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ᾄδειν is right, which we have no reason to doubt, we wouldn’t need indocti—or Jackson’s ἀδίδακτοι). We also need  some sort of explanation for the wild ἄδικοι in PCBL, which Sylburg’s ᾠδικοὶ provides while also paving the way appropriately for/fitting well with οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι ᾄδειν—as BF ’s reading does not, though in any case this translator did not have ᾄδειν in front of him, to judge by his quae oportet. —Laur. 81,42’s ἀδικεῖν at least fits with the preceding ἄδικοι. b24 Jackson’s supplement of ᾗ looks as certain as any intervention in this highly corrupted context; the article could in principle itself have been a misread ᾗ, but looks indispensable. b25 There is nothing corresponding to καὶ οὗ δεῖ in BF. b26 κατορθώσουσι: cf. following future tense in PCBL as well as BF. b28 ἐπι το πολύ L: the L copyist seems uncertain about whether he is writing three words (the spacing suggests three) or one (two are missing accents); B commits himself to one. b29 P2 adds an acute accent under the circumflex of ἆρα, after the breathing. b31 ἐν οἷς: Spengel’s εἰ could be preferred to ἐν οἷς on grounds of economy and the parallel with the following καὶ πάλιν ἐν τούτοις εἰ ἐβούλοντο, but such arguments do not trump BF here. (Jackson here as elsewhere unsuccessfully tries to combine both the MSS’ and BF ’s readings.) b32 κατορθοῦντες: the middle/passive κατορθοῦνται, as found in PCB,  is probably impossible (κατορθοῦται at NE 1106b26 is surely impersonal). An alternative might be to read δοκοῦντες κατορθοῦσι, but even supposing that the endings of the two words could have become switched in this way, the emphasis in the clause, in the context,

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204  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1247b32) is on the agents’ κακῶς λογίσασθαι δοκεῖν rather than their success, so that it is appropriate that the latter, their success, rather than their failure in reason­ing should find itself relegated to a participle. —καὶ secl. Bussemaker: there seems to me no point to the καὶ (et BF); did it ori­gin­ate with the corruption of κατορθοῦντες to κατορθοῦν τε (L), PCB’s κατορθοῦνται being a further corruption of that (cf. BF dirigunt)? Bussemaker’s alternative conjecture of κατευτυχῆσαι, approved by Fritzsche and adopted by Walzer/Mingay, is neat, but the compound form would be uncalled for in a context in which the subject of inquiry is εὐτυχία itself. κατευτυχεῖν at 1229a20 has a different sense, irrele­vant to the present case.

b33 Fritzsche’s 〈ἐν οἷς〉, εἰ ἐβουλεύοντο, 〈ἐβουλεύοντο〉, like other interventions recorded in Susemihl’s apparatus, is quite unnecessary in light of Jackson’s solution to the genuine problems in what immediately follows (q.v.). —Jackson’s ἄλλο solves the problem of the impossible ἂν at a much lesser cost than Fritzsche’s rewriting (see previous note). There is what looks like a dot over the ἂν in C, which if intentional might indicate uneasiness about it on the part of one reader. For the immediately following ἢ BF unhelpfully offers secundum quod (= ᾗ). b34 τἀγαθόν: the definite article is surprising, but I construe ‘if the good they wished for was other or lesser than. . .’. —Opposite the end of the three lines in P beginning with τοίνυν εὐτυχεῖν is what was apparently  a gloss, now indecipherable and partly cut off in the process of binding. b35 κατόρθωσεν in B is corrected by the insertion of an omega above the omicron. b37 We should probably resist the temptation to emend δοκῶν to δοκῇ (Mingay): see LSJ s.v. μέν A.4 (‘one of the correlative clauses is sts. independent, while the other takes the part. or some other dependent form’). BF  ’s visa probably = δοκῶν. —The obvious correction from ὀρθῶς to ὀρθὸς also appears in Matr. 4627 and Marc. (Harlfinger); Victorius supplies it without comment. —The MSS’ τύχη can be read as either τύχη or τύχῃ; the context shows, pace BF, that τύχη cannot be the

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Aristotelica  205 subject here. —Dirlmeier is surely right to take the reference of αὐτοῦ to be the λογισμὸς: cf. ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε δι’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐλογίσατο πάλιν οὕτω immediately following. The desire sparked off the reasoning even if the reasoning was wrong. Inwood and Woolf ’s ‘the cause of the success’ (in the Cambridge translation) is not impossible, but it is hard to pass over the masculine singular λογισμὸς immediately preceding αὐτοῦ and make αὐτοῦ refer to something else (it / the thing done / the success). b38 Dirlmeier’s supplement of ἐπιθυμία originates in BF, which however misconstrues the whole sentence, making τύχη the cause, and subject of the following main verb ἔσωσεν, with our MSS’ αὐτὴ (δ’ ) ὀρθὴ οὖσα appearing as (concupiscencia) ipsa recta existente = αὐτῆς ὀρθῆς οὔσης. (The paraphrase of BF contained in two MSS described in Lacombe et al., Aristoteles Latinus I [1939], no. 35 [fourteenth century] and no. 326 [early fifteenth century], confirms this construal: in quibus enim quis male ratiocinasse videtur, et ea relictus impetus et appetitus direxit, recta concupiscencia existente, recte bona fortuna causa esse videtur, et non recta existente, mala.) For an equally egregious misreading, see Jackson, who creates a text that he translates ‘And in this case, when reasoning seems to be incorrect and nevertheless of itself brings about the result, whilst the desire on its part is rightly directed, it is the desire which, being rightly directed, brings about the right result’. It is hard to see how BF  ’s own extraordinary misconstrual could have arisen if ἐπιθυμία in some form had not been there in its original Greek text, and I therefore agree with Dirlmeier that it should be included in ours, even though the text would work without it: i.e. if we place the comma after rather than before αὐτὴ/αὕτη. ὁρμὴ/ὄρεξις was the main subject of the preceding sentence, and there would be nothing to prevent it from continuing in the role. This is, incidentally, another part of the text that makes it clear that BF  ’s version is no mere word-for-word transposition from Greek into Latin that a critic might have hoped for. —ἔξωσεν PCBL: B writes what looks like a zeta over the xi of ἔξωσεν; it could, just, be intended as a sigma, but that is hopeful, and it is more likely to be meant to bring B into line with P or C (or . . .), whose xi, if that is what

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206  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1247b38) it is, looks remarkably like a zeta. —­‘[36–8] καὶ . . . ἔσωσεν susp. Allan’, reports Walzer/Mingay, which proceeds to obelize the whole of it. Such a counsel of despair seems to me overdone; the passage is difficult, but ultimately intelligible, and it is perhaps its difficulty that has helped lead to its corruption in the MSS. b39 ἐλογίσαντο Spengel: but why should Aristotle not switch from ­plural to singular (‘a person’)? —καὶ οὕτως ἠτύχησαν Spengel: on the plural see previous note; as for the proposed change of order, Spengel misses Aristotle’s point, which is that the person reasoned in the same way and yet ἠτύχησεν, this being meant to (help?) confirm that the outcome had nothing to do with the λογισμός. The pairing of ὄρεξις and ἐπιθυμία in the next sentence shows that we are still talking about πράξεις ἀπὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς, as introduced at b29–30, not some new cat­ egory, i.e. one involving specifically irrational appetite as against rational desire; in this context no such distinction appears to be in play. 1248a1 〈ἢ〉 ἡ: if, as seems inevitable (see next note), καὶ τύχη διττή is to  be transposed to the end of the sentence, then the following ἢ πλείους . . . surely requires a corresponding ἢ preceding it (Aristotle is setting up a genuine dilemma, which he will begin resolving in the next sentence: see ad loc.); but equally ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία seems to require a definite art­icle (ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία κἀκείνη would read strangely, εὐτυχία ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνη hardly less so); thus rather than supposing the corruption of ἢ to ἡ, I prefer to supply ἢ before ἡ, such an omission easily occurring through haplography. —καὶ τύχη διττή makes no sense here after ἀλλὰ μὴν 〈ἢ〉 ἡ ἐνταῦθα εὐτυχία, but perfect sense at the end of the sentence.

a2 κἀκείνη is better than κἀκεῖ (a) because it gives us the necessary reference to the type introduced in b31 rather more clearly, and (b) because κἀκεῖ would have to be taken as shorthand for ἡ ἐκεῖ εὐτυχία, which is not impossible but also not attractive given that our MSS give us a better alternative. The persuasive force of BF  ’s et ibi is hardly enhanced by its handling of the rest of the sentence: at vero si hic bona fortuna et fortuna duplex et ibi eadem aut plures bone fortune. a3 ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁρῶμεν κτλ: I think it important not have a new paragraph beginning here, as some modern editors do (but not Susemihl). The dilemma ­centres on the first of the two sorts of (alleged) εὐτυχία we

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Aristotelica  207 have just been discussing, namely the sort in which agents somehow succeed in repeatedly getting things right because their ὁρμὴ/ὄρεξις is rightly directed even though their reasoning is faulty: is that sort of case (ἐκείνη, a5) one of genuine εὐτυχία or not? Aristotle now starts his attempt to resolve the dilemma with the general point that the cause of εὐτυχία cannot be ἐπιστήμη (sc. as he has described Socrates as holding), or λογισμός—as we have said it is not in the problematical sort of case we are dealing with. So that (ἐκείνη) looks as if it could be a sort of εὐτυχία. But is it really? a6 ‘ἔστιν C: om. PL’, Walzer/Mingay: actually it is in P and L (also in B, est BF). —εἰ Spengel: that εὐτυχία could desire anything (ἣ PCB, que = quae BF, with εὐτυχία as antecedent) is inconceivable, ἢ is unhelpful towards any sort of sense, η and ει are quite often confused in these MSS, and the omission of a connective after a question is itself not uncommon in EE. So Spengel’s εἰ, which begins to introduce some sense, and a good one, seems the obvious choice. (‘It is doubtful’, says Woods of 1248a6–9, ‘if the text can be reconstructed with even moderate plausibility’, and anyone looking at what he says ‘[t]he MSS have’ might be inclined to agree. But the story told by ‘the MSS’ is actually more various, and more informative, than he suggests, especially if one includes the evidence from the Liber de bona fortuna.) —ὅτ’ ἔδει, λογισμός B: B’s reading, given Spengel’s εἰ (which Jackson also accepts) at the beginning of the sentence, offers a more economical, and actually more elegant, version of what Jackson proposes, the use of a verb (in this case ἐπεθύμησεν) with a subject otherwise unspecified being quite regular in the EE). a7 γ’ suppl. Jackson, from quidem BF: for quidem = γε see e.g. 1248a18. I construe ‘λογισμὸς of a human sort certainly won’t be [the] αἴτιον of this, for x (for the value of which, see following notes) surely is not πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον, but the agent/his λογισμὸς/λόγος [in this case] διαϕθείρεται ὑπὸ τινός’ (= ‘for while x surely isn’t . . . , the agent/his λογισμὸς . . .’). Alternatively, if quidem = μὲν, it promises an answering δέ-clause which we then have to supply for ourselves: ‘λογισμὸς of a human sort certainly won’t be the αἴτιον [sc. but there is rationality involved somehow], for x is not πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον’ (see LSJ s.v. μέν A.2); but this looks more difficult. Spengel’s proposal of a lacuna in a6 is unnecessarily despairing.

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208  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 1248a7 The genitive τούτου, I think, without αἴτιον would be odd. If we did not already know that the desire’s being right in the case in question is not attributable to human calculation, we cannot have been paying attention; but Aristotle is hinting at the explanation he is about to give of the strange situation in which people regularly desire rightly but without thinking rightly, i.e. an explanation involving something more than human. See preceding note. (οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον τοῦτο . . . , I take it, explains why we need to be told λογισμός 〈γ’〉 ἀνθρώπινος οὐκ ἂν τούτου εἴη 〈αἴτιον〉: the phenomenon in question can surely not be wholly and completely ἀλόγιστον, if the outcome is as it would have been if there had been λογισμός: see below.) —B’s δὴ, which we also find in Ambr. (BF  ’s utique?), is what anyone would write in place of PCL’s δεῖ. a8 οὗ γε Jackson for οὔτε PCBL (neque BF, οὐδὲ Susemihl): it would surely be extraordinary were Aristotle suddenly to be saying that the desire in question is not ϕυσική, when the supposed sort of εὐτυχία in question has been set up as κατ’ εὐϕυΐαν ὀρέξεως (1247b40); extraordinary, at least, were he to be saying that without giving any reason for doing so. Susemihl’s οὐδὲ, then, is no more than a grammatical improvement on the MSS reading. Jackson’s οὗ γε, by contrast, has Aristotle saying something that is not only consistent with but adds something important to what he has said before: why should he not propose that when desire gets it right, apparently naturally, i.e. by being directed somehow—repeatedly—towards the right object without the aid of reason, this is nevertheless not πάμπαν ἀλόγιστον? It could at any rate be said that desire in this case homes in on what we should have expected to have been established by λογισμός. a9 διαϕθείρεται ὑπὸ τινός: the question now is what it is that διαϕθείρεται. I propose that it is the agent—who is after all the subject both of the next sentence and of the conditional clause in the previous one. ‘By nature’ the agent would not just desire well, but reason well too: here, something unspecified has caused his reasoning to go awry (I firmly resist supplying ὁ λόγος after διαϕθείρεται). a10 Walzer/Mingay reports ‘τοῦτο fort. V’; in fact Victorius writes ‘γρ. τοῦτο’ in the margin of his copy of the Aldine (but B has it anyway).

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Aristotelica  209 —P2 adds an alpha over the ligature for αρα of παρὰ2, to confirm that it is παρὰ and not περὶ, as B here has it; as I have often noted before, the ligatures for (π)αρα and (π)ερι are confusingly similar. a13 Susemihl, Jackson, and others are persuaded by the MSS’ bare εὐτυχεῖν, and it would not be the first time in EE that an infinitive has been used as a noun without the article: see e.g. 1246a29 (perhaps), and note on 1244a33. However, it feels too stark here, as a way of referring to εὐτυχεῖν in general, as it must (which probably also rules out another candidate, εὐτυχεῖ, understood with an indefinite personal subject). Dirlmeier’s proposal, εὐτυχεῖται, is respectable, and may even have some authority insofar as it apparently follows BF (if it does); on the other hand (a) the loss of a preceding τὸ is perhaps more likely than the corruption of εὐτυχεῖται to εὐτυχεῖν, (b) BF has its own failings, and (c) might ὅτι ϕύσει τὸ εὐτυχεῖν not itself be rendered as quod natura benefortunate agatur? a14 οὐ post ἀλλά suppl. Jackson: contra BF, which has sed propter naturam. a15 L’s οὐδ’ (‘nor does it demonstrate that τύχη is not even cause of anything’) is surely superior to the others’ οὐδὲν, which would only work  without the following αἰτία οὐθενὸς, or else at the cost of our adopting Jackson’s supplement οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τύχη before αἰτία, which is excessive. Or should we just follow BF (and Ambr.) and read οὐκ? My view is that BF is here simplifying, as it sometimes does. a17 μέντ’ ἂν: BF has quidem utique, which apparently is μὲν ἂν. —P2 adds a circumflex across the acute accent of ἀρα. a18 οὗ in P seems originally to have been οὐ. a20 If we are to go with BF, Susemihl’s καὶ πρὸ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι for PCBL καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐβουλεύσατο is clearly superior to Bussemaker’s πρότερον ἢ βουλεύσασθαι, but BF  ’s version is surely inferior to that of our Greek MSS.

a21 Both Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay accept Spengel’s πρότερον 〈ἢ〉; Barnes (CR 1992: 29) thinks supplying ἢ ‘debilitates the sense. Aristotle

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210  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1248a21) means: “nor did he think first to think, and then think . . .” ’. But this use of νοεῖν, as ‘think to’ (cf. LSJ s.v. νοέω II), looks out of place here; the last thinking in the putative series presumably will not be a matter of thinking to. Bessarion’s beautiful πρὸ τοῦ (in Par. 2042) here carries the day, being both a better explanation of BF  ’s priusquam (intelligeret) than Spengel’s and better palaeographically; πρὸ τοῦ might easily be mistaken for (the shorthand for) πρότερον, with priority in the air. a22 Bessarion, in Par. 2042, first writes νοῦς ἀρχὴ for the συνοῦσα ἀρχὴ he would presumably have found—given that that is what is in all of PCBL, and as far as I have checked, in all their known descendants—in whatever MS he was copying from (probably Pal. 165). But he then crosses out νοῦς ἀρχὴ and writes νόησις ἀρχὴ after it. νόησις is not un­attract­ive, but νοῦς is surely at least part of what was corrupted into συνοῦσα. Τhen the question is whether or not to put in the definite art­ icle, with Casaubon, and the following βουλή, without article, rather suggests we should do without it. Casaubon’s ὁ, like Jackson’s εὖ, is there to account for the συ(νοῦσα). I prefer however, to start at the other end: νοῦς—I propose—is corrupted into νοῦσα by attraction to the feminine before ἀρχὴ following, and the συ- is added to make νοῦσα into Greek. If a masculine definite article had been present, that would have made the change to νοῦσα less likely. a25 διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη [τὸ] εἶναι τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν scripsi: the text I print is Walzer’s except in relation to his two bracketed items. (The result is not a banality: the contrast is with τύχη, the chief feature of which is that it is supposed to produce results that are anything other than τοιοῦτο, i.e. specifiable.) What is before εἶναι in the MSS is τὸ, not τῷ, and the meaningless τὸ τοῦτο is itself surely a corruption of τοιοῦτο; after this new τὸ, δύναται might readily become δύνασθαι. But the main issue here, as Walzer saw, is whether or not we accept what I shall for convenience call BF  ’s version, which includes the idea that the sort of ἀρχή being introduced will be one whose being/nature it is to be the ἀρχή of things without requiring another ἀρχή outside / prior to / sep­ar­ate from itself. If we do follow BF, we need only keep the first τὸ, i.e. the one before εἶναι, and make τὸ εἶναι an accusative of respect; we can then dispense with Dirlmeier’s supplement of κατὰ, and Susemihl’s τῷ (which he and others

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Aristotelica  211 claim to get from BF; Walzer/Mingay compounds the error by implying, in both text and apparatus, that it is in the Greek MSS). But it is hard to see how the idea in question would be rele­vant to the argument, even if it happened to be true, i.e. that the sort of ἀρχή being introduced will be one whose being/nature it is, etc. The sole piece of evidence for its presence is that first τὸ (that itself being the origin of BF  ’s secundum [esse]), which then becomes as dispensable as the idea it would introduce. a27 δὴ has no counterpart in BF. —Dirlmeier’s καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖνο = BF  ’s et omne illud, which Dirlmeier fills out, implausibly, in his translation, with ‘in der Seele’, going on to describe Jackson’s emendation as ‘überflüssig’. In any case BF  ’s Greek text need not have differed importantly from PCBL’s καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνῳ, since it might well have included the recurrent error of omicron for omega. However PCBL’s ἐκείνῳ is also problematic: we really would need Spengel’s ἐκείνῃ, along with his [καὶ] κἂν, as we would, equally, if we accepted Ross’s proposal. (A sudden ἐκεῖνος here referring either to the agent, or perhaps to the sort of [ἐυτυχής] agent we have been talking about, looks unlikely, when the question just asked was about the soul.) Jackson’s proposal looks impeccable: an essential part in the process of corruption will, I think, have been the introduction of ἐκεῖνο, induced by the neuter πᾶν and the omission of κινεῖ by haplography (the next sentence certainly begins with κινεῖ), with ἐκεῖνο then itself being corrupted into ἐκείνω = ἐκείνῳ. (Kenny, in his World’s Classics translation, but not in Barnes/Kenny Aristotle’s Ethics, reads καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖ νῷ 〈κινεῖ〉 [‘adapting a conjecture of Jackson’s’], which is palaeo­graph­ic­al­ly unexceptionable, but gives νοῦς a role that appears hard to marry with other things said about it in the context.) a29 There are good reasons for following BF here and supplying καὶ νοῦ after καὶ ἐπιστήμης, or better in a30 before πλήν: (a) a mention of νοῦς here prepares for τοῦ νοῦ in the next sentence; (b) if in NE VI ‘=’ EE V νοῦς is itself τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον, and first cause, as it were, of thought, in the present, Eudemian, context—see esp. a19–22 above—νοῦς is plainly not this, but just the faculty of reasoning, or reasoning itself, apparently indistinguishable from λόγος in the preceding sentence, so that any apparent conflict with NE VI ‘=’ EE V, however we should regard that (i.e. whether as Nicomachean, Eudemian, or both), is merely verbal; and

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212  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1248a29) (c) a33 will say anyway that the ἀρχή in question is κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ (though only in L: see below). But contra (a), given the way Aristotle shifts between λόγος, νοῦς, ϕρόνησις, and ἐπιστήμη in the chapter generally, the transition to νοῦς in the next sentence would be smooth enough in any case; contra (b), if νοῦς in this context is indeed being used in the generic way suggested, it is hard to see what supplying it here would add; and contra (c) given that the idea of the ἀρχή as κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ will be introduced in a33, there is no necessity for it to be introduced here. The case is very similar here to that at 1246b12, with the only difference that there it was L that introduced νοῦς, while here it is apparently BF. Once again I suspect (BF  ’s reading originated in) a gloss, by someone who had read ahead, and/or remembered NE VI ‘=’ EE V, and/or had a special interest in the topic of νοῦς; perhaps, if we bear in mind the theological context within which BF circulated, it might even have been the author of BF himself. In any case one can have little confidence that Aristotle wrote καὶ νοῦ here, and I therefore do not print it; and my replies to arguments (a)–(c) above together serve to confirm that its presence or absence makes not a jot of difference to our understanding of Aristotle’s own argument. a30 In deleting εἴποι Jackson is following BF, which has nothing to correspond to / in place of εἴποι, having already placed erit = εἴη after utique = ἂν (see apparatus). The question, as so often in this chapter, is how closely we should follow BF. I continue to follow a middle course, attempting both to respect BF and to account for the tradition represented in our MSS. Hence my conjecture of εἴη ποτε for εἴποι PCBL, in order to acknowledge the ποι in the MSS’ εἴποι, if their εἴ- is the remains of an original εἴη: the delaying of εἴη and the addition of ποτε, I suggest, signal that the question being asked is a momentous one (what could be κρεῖττον even [καὶ] than ἐπιστήμη . . .’, sc. especially after what we said at the end of the last chapter?). a30–1 διατοῦτο P1: P2 adds a grave accent to the δια. a31 Walzer/Mingay suggests that both ὃ and οἱ are in the MSS, but PCBL all have οἱ, not ὃ, while with BF it is the other way round (quod . . .  dicebatur). —οἳ 〈ἃ〉 ἂν Jackson, 〈οἳ〉 οἷ ἂν Smith: what either supplement gives us can be understood in any case.

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Aristotelica  213 a33 That τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ is missing from PCB means, interestingly, that these MSS, lacking τοῦ νοῦ in a29–30 (BF, Jackson) too, do not describe the ἀρχή in question as κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ at all. Does this mean that τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ was not in the text of ω, and that it too originated as a gloss? (τοιαύτην ἣ κρεί in L appears to be post ras., but it is doubtful whether this affects anything.) On the other hand, in this case a reference to νοῦς, in the generic sense (= reasoning capacity), forms an organic part of, or at least adds to, the explanation (a33 γὰρ) as to why βουλεύεσθαι οὐ συμϕέρει αὐτοῖς. Why, then, did it fall out of the line of descent leading to PCB? Was it because βουλεύσεως had already been corrupted to βουλήσεως (if so, that did not worry the L copyist, or any predecessor of his), or was it perhaps removed/omitted by someone who knew his NE VI ‘=’ EE V? On balance, it seems right to print τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ as part of the text. a34 βουλεύσεως ‘[printed in S(usemihl) without comment] should perhaps be ascribed to the Basel editors’, Barnes: Susemihl took it over from Bekker, who similarly prints it without comment; but Susemihl does restore the art­icle τῆς, omitted by Bekker. If we commit to keeping τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ (see preceding note), it must certainly be βουλεύσεως, not βουλήσεως; further against βουλήσεως, and in favour of keeping τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ, we should note that the ὁρμή that governs the εὐτυχεῖς has so far been characterized as ἐπιθυμία rather than βούλησις. a34–5 καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι (scripsi), καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν Spengel, οὐδ’ ἐνθουσιασμόν Langerbeck: in order to decide between these alternatives to the impossible καὶ ἐνθουσιασμοί in PCL, and BF  ’s equally impossible neque divinos instinctus, we need to review the whole sentence. Those who possess reason (οἱ δὲ τὸν λόγον) must themselves be subject to the same ἀρχή—which is, after all, supposed to be ἀρχή κινήσεως in the soul generally, a26–7—as the εὐτυχεῖς, even if it operates in different ways in the two cases. If so, it is the εὐτυχεῖς that are the subject of the following οὐχ ἔχουσι, not those who have reason; what they, the εὐτυχεῖς, οὐχ ἔχουσι is λόγος; and with the next

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214  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1248a34–5) sentence beginning ἄλογοι γὰρ ὄντες, they must also be the subject of the following τοῦτο δ’ οὐ δύνανται. So τοῦτο in both τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔχουσι (or should we read τοῦτον with B?) and τοῦτο δ’ οὐ δύνανται must be reasoning. Indeed the second τοῦτο δ’ can function as it does just by virtue of its picking up the first, and commentators and translators generally seem to agree that the second must refer to reason/deliberation. I construe ‘. . . for they [the εὐτυχεῖς] have a sort of ἀρχή that is stronger than νοῦς and deliberation, while others [have (that is, understood from the preceding ἔχουσι, not the following one)] reasoning, but they [the εὐτυχεῖς] do not have this [i.e. ­reasoning], and they are inspired [καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι, as I propose] but are incapable of this [reasoning]’. Langerbeck’s οὐδ’ ἐνθουσιασμόν (deriving from BF  ’s neque divinos instinctus) for the MSS’ καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόι entails—impossibly, as I have argued—that the possessors of λόγος do not have the ἀρχή either; but then the whole sentence in BF (qui autem racionem [sc. habent] hoc autem non habent neque divinos instinctus, hoc autem non possunt) is another mess. If we put brackets around οἱ δὲ τὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔχουσι, with Susemihl, then Spengel’s καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόν would work, at least syntactically, but it would not do much for the overall sense (and, I add, since brackets as such are not part of Aristotle’s armoury, it is surely dangerous to  build them, or indeed dashes, into any reconstruction in such a way  as  actually to make the parenthesis break up the syntax: here, ἐνθουσιασμόν would turn out to be governed by the first ἔχουσι, back at the beginning of the line before). Hence my conjecture, καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι—or perhaps ἐνθουσιῶσι, but ἐνθουσιάζουσι is closer to the hopeless ἐνθουσιασμοί in the MSS and to BF ’s instinctus = ?ἐνθουσιασμούς; cf. I.1, 1214a24 ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες (on the absence of ὥσπερ here, cf. the second note on a36 below). (This is another place where a truly conservative editor might have introduced obeli; I am encouraged not to do so by the fact that the text I propose makes only a single change, and that by no means an extravagant one, to the reading of the MSS.) a36 τοῦ τῶν/τούτων: without Sylburg’s tiny emendation—tiny especially when the divisions between words in these MSS are not always

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Aristotelica  215 observed, and accents can be wayward—there seems no explanation for the following infinitive. τούτων ϕρονίμων καὶ σοϕῶν would anyway be peculiar Greek; and why ‘these’? —ϕρονίμων καὶ σοϕῶν: ‘ironice’, says Mingay, as it would have to be if we retained the impossible τούτων (as Walzer/Mingay does); but the following τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, sc. μαντικήν, indicates that Aristotle is using μαντική to cover what ­people see through reason as well as what the εὐτυχεῖς in question see, with the help of the θεός/θεῖον in them, despite their lack of the cap­ acity to reason efficiently. a38 ὑπολαβεῖν Ross: but why not ‘and one should practically take/ receive (= ἀπολαβεῖν) it as that arising from λόγος’? (Rackham, adopting a quite different interpretation, and one that seems impossible to square either with the way the argument has gone so far or with the way it will continue, keeps ἀπολαβεῖν but translates in a way that suggests ὑπολαβεῖν: ‘only the divination that is based on reason one must not specify’ (?).)

a38–9 οἱ μὲν δι’ ἐμπειρίαν οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν [τε] ἀν〈τὶ τοῦ〉 τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι: editors generally have bracketed τε, which has no counterpart in BF and is evidently dispensable; beyond that there is little or no agreement about what to make of this line (BF is of no help). But two things, I think, are fairly certain: first, that οἱ μὲν . . . and οἱ δὲ are subsets of the εὐτυχεῖς under discussion (these being the focus both of what has preceded, and of what follows: a description here of some other sort of people would be entirely pointless); second, that the verb σκοπεῖν would typically be used of rational inquiry, which we have been told is not something that such εὐτυχεῖς do, or at any rate do successfully. So there should be a contrast between ἐμπειρία and συνήθεια, on the one hand, and σκοπεῖν, or rather τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι, on the other. (Both Kenny in the Oxford World’s Classics translation and Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation evidently take χρῆσθαι as ‘consult the oracle’: that is perhaps the only way of even beginning to make sense of the transmitted text, as printed in Walzer/Mingay [albeit with the τε obelized], but that text is syntactically unworkable.) Both ἐμπειρία and συνήθεια are, I propose, examples of non-rational processes, i.e. ones leading to success, which are part of the current story

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216  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1248a38–9) about εὐτυχία (this notwithstanding 1247b14: ἐμπειρία does not itself constitute ἐπιστήμη, only a possible basis for it); hence the ensuing τῷ θεῷ δὲ αὗται, attested by all of PCBL, where αὗται, unless we emend it away, must refer to ἐμπειρία and συνήθεια, and where ὁ θεός must still be, as it was, part of the explanation of our special sort of εὐτυχία. That the sentence is contrasting ἐμπειρία and συνήθεια with the use of reason is consistent with the ἀλλά (BF has quidem) intro­du­cing it: we have just been told, with the reconstruction I have suggested, that the μαντική practised by our εὐτυχεῖς is almost as quick as that of the ϕρόνιμοι καὶ σοϕοί, but (ἀλλά) there is a difference, because the εὐτυχεῖς achieve what they do by different processes that— so I propose Aristotle to be saying—do not involve inquiry, but rather substitute for it. Hence my conjecture οἱ μὲν δι’ ἐμπειρίαν [sc. κατορθοῦσι] οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν [τε] ἀν〈τὶ τοῦ〉 τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι: τοῦ, I speculate, was lost before τῷ; then ἀντὶ became ἄν τε, then ἔν τε, then by standard inversion τε ἐν. This is of course highly speculative, but whatever it was that Aristotle originally wrote, what he intended must, I think, have been something of the sort, and I am further encouraged to print the conjecture by the unattractiveness of the alternatives on offer, Spengel’s having no clear regard to the sense, Dirlmeier’s being part of larger and even more speculative rewriting of a36–41 as a whole. (As usual, readers are at liberty to introduce their own obeli: perhaps around τε ἐν rather than just τε as in Walzer/Mingay.) a39 Spengel’s θείῳ is presumably because of the following τοῦτο; but we had θεός followed by τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον in a27–8; why should we not (implicitly) have the same here? —Jackson’s δύνανται for δὲ αὗται is part of another wholesale, and unconvincing, rewriting of a38–41; BF  ’s per se = αὐταί ? a39–40 Should we read καὶ or γὰρ after τοῦτο? καὶ is at first sight surprising. There are so many surprises in the context as a whole that one should not change it just for that reason (or because we miss a con­nect­ ive, there being many such missing connectives in EE). But further, I propose that there is real point to the καὶ. τοῦτο is presumably the faculty or capacity responsible for the ‘divining’: ‘this also sees the future

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Aristotelica  217 and the past’, says Aristotle, in what I speculate is a reminiscence of Homer’s Calchas, who knew τά τ’ ἐόντα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα, thanks to the μαντοσύνη given him by Phoebus Apollo (Iliad I.70–2). Aristotle’s εὐτυχεῖς are familiar with the past, through ἐμπειρία or συνήθεια, and the mantic element, the divine, in them can see future and present too. This amounts to a rationalization of, or, better, commentary on, the Homeric lines: after all, not only did Aristotle know his Homer, he had an interest in divination. For more on this whole context, see Rowe forthcoming 3 [see bibliography to Preface in text volume]. 1248b1 καὶ secl. von Arnim: not without reason, but the case against καὶ is not quite proven (‘and [it is] just as . . .’?); et in BF. b2–3 ὁρωμένοις in b3 is surely right (see next note for a particular argument for it); it would not be surprising, I think, if this was what is translated by BF as visibilia. So, . . . ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον. BF  ’s version of the whole sentence (as reported by Jackson: I rely on his version in most cases) is actually gibberish, running . . . et quemadmodum ceci [= caeci] memorantur magis amissisque hiis que [= quae?] ad visibilia virtuosius esse quod memoratur, i.e. something like καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ τυϕλοὶ μνημονεύονται μᾶλλον ἀπολυθέντων τε τούτων [= τοῦ τῶν?] ἃ[?] πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς/ ὁρωμένοις ἐρρωμενέστερον [σπουδαιότερον Jackson] εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον; by comparison the version in PCBL is a model of clarity and simplicity, requiring only a single emendation of our Greek text, i.e. ὁρωμένοις for εἰρημένοις. (Jackson tries to save the day, not for the first  time, by combining the MSS’ with BF  ’s reading: . . . ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρατοῖς εἶναι, τῷ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις σπουδαιότερον εἶναι τὸ μνημονεῦον [. . . ‘more earnestly addressed to what has been said’], which apart from anything else looks bloated.) Here is one place where privileging BF over our Greek MSS does not look helpful; if we had only BF here, we could scarcely even begin to reconstruct the text. The origin of virtuosius, I speculate, lies in someone’s failed attempt to emend the corrupt εἰρημένοις, i.e. ἐρρωμένως, which finds its way into the text, and then—adapting itself to the context—becomes ἐρρωμενέστερον. At any rate the similarities between ὁρωμένοις, εἰρημένοις, and ἐρρωμένως provide food for thought.

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218  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 1248b6 Although it is hard to see how κατορθωτικός could become διορθωτικός by mistake, after both κατορθοῦν and κατὰ (τὴν ὁρμὴν), BF ’s directivus = κατορθωτικός (κατορθοῦν = dirigere) is hard to resist. ‘Tends / has the capacity to make things right’, διορθωτικός (‘rectificatory’, NE V ‘=’ EE IV.2, 1131a1), would fit in the case of θεία εὐτυχία, given that things would certainly be going awry for this sort of εὐτυχής, in the absence of reason, without the intervention of τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ θεῖον; it would scarcely fit in the other case (ὁ δ’ ἕτερος ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, sc. κατορθωτικός/διορθωτικός), where the εὐτυχής has nothing to do with his own good fortune. Maybe there we are just expected to supply ‘succeeds’, the essential point being the contrast κατὰ/παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν? But that would already be halfway to conceding that we need κατορθωτικός in the first place. b11 BF  ’s/FL  ’s vocamus (BF unaccountably includes the first two sentences of the new chapter, which are not on good fortune at all, and say as much; ‘FL’ = fragmentum Latinum, a Latin translation of VIII.3 found in combination with BF as well as without it [see Dirlmeier 119–20], and therefore possessing a similar level of usefulness and authority) might tempt us into going with Jackson and Ross and reading καλοῦμεν, present, on its own (‘Damit ist das Präsens gesichert’, Dirlmeier), especially since it hard to see where ‘we’ called it καλοκἀγαθία before. But BF, as we have seen, is not always right, and can also cut corners; so too FL, and it seems unsafe to follow them here. b12 None of PCBL writes καλοκἀγαθία with the crasis mark; they do tend to recognize its presence in the corresponding adjective(s). b18 καὶ post ἀλλὰ suppl. Bussemaker: before καθ’, καὶ might easily have fallen out, but ἀλλὰ after οὐ μόνον is not always followed by καί; as for the sed et in FL, the translator perhaps had the same instinct as Bussemaker—although he / his source does better than our MSS on more than one occasion (see below). b19 B’s τὴν seems to me desirable: there is a difference, and not just a difference of names; so what is the difference? b21 Solomon’s construal, in the original Oxford translation, seems enough to justify πάντα (and the preceding ὄντα): ‘which, existing

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Aristotelica  219 (better ‘being’?) all of them for their own sake’. But we should note that there is nothing to correspond to πάντα in FL. b22–3 καὶ γὰρ: this γὰρ is in all of our MSS, and is supported by an enim in FL (albeit with another, and somewhat bizarre, enim preceding); there seems no good reason to omit it, as does Bekker, then Susemihl (without remarking on the omission; Walzer/Mingay refers to it in the apparatus). b25 After ὑγίεια without a definite article, I see no reason not to follow BL and leave ἰσχύς similarly without article. —Bekker writes ἀγαθὰ without comment, while Susemihl notices that his main MSS have τἀγαθὰ, as does Walzer/Mingay; none indicates the authority for ἀγαθὰ—which, as it now turns out, belongs to B. b32 οὐδὲν ὀνήσεται: Langerbeck’s emendation of the impossible οὐδ’ ὀνήσειε (the absence of ἄν is one thing, but the active ὀνήσειε is another) is simple and quite elegant, except for the retention of οὐδέ— ‘not even’ is not needed, rather ‘not at all’. Richards’s ὀνηθείη, relying on a parallel in Xenophon, might be a rival for οὐδὲν ὀνήσεται, but is less economical insofar as it also has to call in aid Spengel’s ἂν. b34 τοῖς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ [τοῖς τοῦ] ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις: B2 writes an eta over the original eta of τῆς in B’s τῆς τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου (so changing τῆς to τῇ), which gives a perfectly good sense, but one that has Aristotle more or less repeating the same parallel as in b32–3 οὐδ’ ὁ κάμνων τῇ τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος τροϕῇ χρώμενος rather than introducing a new one, as in PCL (i.e. mutton dressing as lamb). I  bracket the second τοῖς τοῦ because it separates the ὁλόκληρος from the ὑγιής, when they are surely one and the same, as FL appears to agree; the καί is epexegetic, ὑγιὴς καὶ ὁλόκληρος corresponding to ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνάπηρος. Copyists seem to have assumed an identity between the κάμνων and the ἀσθενής—the B copyist certainly does, when he writes ὑγιαίνοντος for ὑγιοῦς in b34; this is why they like the feminine (τῆς), even if the case is wrong (τῆς, sc. τροϕῆς). But then τοῖς τοῦ will be needed to go with ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις, or just τοῦ in  the case of B, to go with ὁλοκλήρου. N.b. even if there were two cases involved here (i.e. if the ὁλόκληρος were intended to be distinct from the ὑγιής), the ­repetition of τοῖς τοῦ would be unlike the usual

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220  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1248b34) Eudemian style, especially after ὁ ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνάπηρος, supposing that that in the present context could ever refer to two ­separate cases. b36 I prefer δι’ αὐτὰ (Ald.) to Bekker’s δι’ αὑτὰ on the grounds that the person is the logical subject of the sentence (cf. πρακτικὸς following); L (the only main MS in play here) in any case has the smooth breathing. The corruption of δι’ to δ’ (and vice versa), as here in L, is not uncommon in these MSS. —Ald., followed by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay (but not Bekker), reads αὑτῶν, but the main MSS’ αὐτῶν is surely preferable, τὰ καλά not being the subject. 1249a1 These, or some of them, being Spartans, we—even a copyist, at some time, in some place?—might think—and indeed do think: see note at the end of the present entry—ἄγριοι appropriate, but it hardly fits the context: why would the following τὰ . . . ϕύσει μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, introduced with a γάρ, constitute a reason for their being ἄγριοι? It should be noted that the orthographic distance between ἀγαθοί, surely the only possible emend­ation, and ἄγριοι is small. (From his control MS(S), Victorius notes the alternative ἄγριοι to Ald.’s ἀγαθοὶ, but rightly does not prefer it.) This is one of those very many places where the argument ‘preferable because in all the manuscripts’ surely carries little weight; we should not forget that all the extant manuscripts descend from a single archetype, and their many shared corruptions, which as will be more than evident by now are on a considerable scale, are ­inherited from that single document (and its predecessors) [Note: the preceding was written before the publication of T. Irwin, ‘The wild and the good: conditions for virtue in the Eudemian Ethics’. In Giulio di Basilio (ed.), Investigating the Relationship Between Aristotle’s Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics (Routledge, London, 2022: 188–206). The paper argues strongly for the retention of ἄγριοι: as indicated by my retention of ἀγαθοὶ, I remain unconvinced by Irwin’s argument (the ori­ gin­al version was delivered to a workshop in Dublin in 2018), but I acknowledge that the entry above represents a quite inadequate response to it. It should be added that quite a lot hangs on the main point at issue; I look forward to returning to the question on a future occasion.]

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Aristotelica  221 a2 Solomon’s supplied second ἀγαθὰ is implicit in any case and need not be spelled out, after 1248b26–7. Richards’s reordering—‘The argument seems to need ἀγαθὰ μὲν ϕύσει, or even ϕύσει ἀγαθὰ μέν’—probably misses this point. —δὲ Victorius: any authority that FL’s autem might have is somewhat undermined by its autem in 1248b41, where γὰρ is hardly avoid­ able, but here δέ is plainly needed in any case. (It is probably wrong to talk about ‘authority’ in the context either of FL or of BF; both surely do go back to a Greek manuscript or manuscripts that predate our PCBL, but both contain peculiarities. Still, FL does much better than one might have supposed from Dirlmeier’s reports, based as they are on a single MS. [I am grateful to Victor Gonçalves de Sousa, of São Paulo University, for providing me with access to Dieter Wagner’s c­ ritical edition of FL; one may wonder how much less wayward BF itself would look with a full collation of all its many MSS.]) a3 ὑπάρχει Matr. 4627 (also Ald.): again, the emendation is scarcely avoidable. —The supplement 〈ὅσοις δ’ ὑπάρχει δι’ αὐτὰ〉 (proposed by Dirlmeier [not Zeller, pace Walzer/Mingay], except that he prefers αὑτά, following Bekker’s preceding δι’ αὑτά [= B]: for the smooth breathing, see on 1248b36) is a transcription of FL’s quibuscumque autem existunt propter ipsa, and it seems that we must adopt it, since otherwise it is hard to explain how this extra, and wholly necessary, addition to our text could have got into FL’s source; its author is not in the habit of restoring the text so extensively—and successfully—by himself. ‘[N]on hanno infatti di per sé il possesso delle cose belle, 〈quelli invece che lo hanno infatti di per sé〉 dirigono anche le decisioni a oggetti belli e buoni’, Donini, printing Walzer/Mingay’s text opposite, but commenting in a note ad loc. on their odd placing of a comma after rather than before the supplement. Kenny’s 〈ἃ〉 (Barnes/Kenny, Aristotle’s Ethics [2016]), which is a simplified version of his original 〈τὰ δὲ καλὰ δι’ αὑτά〉 καὶ (Aristotle and the Perfect Life [1992]: 13 n. 15), would do much the same job as ὅσοις δ’ ὑπάρχει δι’ αὕτα more economically, but here it seems Aristotle went for a fuller version. —After either supplement, Ross’s καλὰ κἀγαθά in a4 is pointless, and indeed one can wonder if such a neuter plural is even possible (see Kenny, in the same footnote).

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222  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 1249a7 Susemihl retains the MSS’ καλὰ, placing commas around the preceding relative clause, but construing the plural is still too difficult to make the defence worthwhile. —διὸ Solomon: an obviously necessary emend­ation: that τὰ ϕύσει ἀγαθά are καλά for the καλοσκἀγαθός is a consequence, not an ex­plan­ation, of the preceding claim about καλὰ (see Woods). —τὰ τῇ ϕύσει: it seems marginally more likely, in a context where ϕύσει without the art­icle is the norm, that the article would have dropped out than that PCB’s source would have added it. (I admit that the argument could go either way; there are many cases like this where any decision will in the end be somewhat arbitrary.) a10 τούτῳ Ambr.: πλούτῳ PCBL; videtur defuisse FL—or did the translator just decide to omit a meaningless πλούτῳ? a11 It is hard to see what is wrong with καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ (PB), of which what is in L is evidently a truncated version; Dirlmeier’s proposal is driven simply by the Latin translations (hec FL, ea Lat.), and they, here, and he merely impoverish the MSS’ text. Ross’s, by contrast, adds something to it, elegantly but unnecessarily. a13 There is nothing corresponding to τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ καὶ καλά in FL. a14 καὶ is inserted above the line in L, probably by the original copyist, between γὰρ and καλὰς, with an insertion mark. a18 The ει in διείρηται in P is—I think—written over an original eta; in other words, διήρηται was what was in the source MSS of PB and of C (so: in α´ ); P2, correcting against L or a relative of L, mistakes δ’ εἴρηται for διείρηται (or does he intend δ’ εἴρηται?). For the possibility of confusion between δ’ and δι, see 1249b21 (in P and C), etc. a19–20 ὅτι τά τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ PCB: i.e. both καὶ καλὰ καὶ τὰ τε ἁπλῶς after the first ἡδέα and the final ἡδέα itself are missing. a19 καὶ2 τά or τά τε2? Either καὶ or τε would pair happily with τά τε1, but it is probably easier to see how an unwanted καί crept in than an unwanted τε after καὶ καλ(ὰ), and especially when it might look as if that καὶ had already paired off with τε1.

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Aristotelica  223 a23 ὃν BP2C2, ὃ P1C1L: P2 and C2 squeeze the nu in between the ὃ and the following alpha. ὃ, being in PCL, was apparently in ω, with B making the obviously necessary correction independently? a25 Collingwood’s more palaeographically respectable alternative sadly has to trump the elegance of Allan’s first proposal: the loss of εἰ before εὖ is easier to envisage than the corruption of ἔσται to εὖ. —All of PCBL have ὑγιαῖνον in this line (pace Walzer/Mingay). 1249b1 οὐκ is split between two pages in C, with οὐ at the end of one and the κ beginning the next; evidently this copyist cares as little for the integrity of a page as he, and the other copyists, do for that of a line. —ἐπαινετὸν C, and possibly P too; the following δὲ in P is un­usual­ly written out in full, probably over something else and in what looks like a different hand, perhaps to fill the gap that would be left by the change to ἐπαινετῶν, which would paradoxically reduce the space required. b2 Bekker omits τῆς before ἕξεως; Susemihl puts it back on the authority of ‘In. [= Lat.] Fr[itzsche]’, but actually it is in all of PCBL. —περὶ secl. Zeller, with good reason: αἱρέσεως and ϕυγῆς are a nat­ural pair, with ϕυγῆς amplifying b1 αἱρέσεις, and αἱρέσεως needs the following genitives as much as ϕυγῆς; περὶ, already looking awkward after ὅρον, makes it look as if ϕυγῆς (χρημάτων πλήθους, etc.) is something new and separate rather than the correlative of αἱρέσεως—and it (περὶ) would probably also be happier with an accusative. That there is no counterpart to περὶ in FL provides support for the deletion. But Zeller’s rewriting of what follows, i.e. ϕυγῆς 〈καὶ περὶ〉 χρημάτων πλῆθος καὶ ὀλιγότητα, is surely superfluous. b3 In P, there is a probably accidental mark beneath the accent following the shorthand for the ματων of εὐτυχημάτων; above the accent there are also what may be traces of something, now indecipherable, by a later hand. b5 τροϕὴν PCB, τὴν τροϕὴν L: I side here with PCB on the grounds that the article is not needed, and that it would fit the generally spare style of EE not to have it.

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224  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 1249b8 Like Richards, I can make little or no sense of κατὰ here before τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Richards’s argument that we would expect a τὴν before the κατὰ is not so persuasive, in the context of EE; more to the point is his observation that it is the ἐνέργεια that is usually κατά the ἕξις: see e.g. 1219a39–40. b9 τὴν deest in L: the article is surely required here (in contrast with b5 above). b11 There is a gap here in P, before ἀρχομένου, corresponding in length to about 9–10 characters, which is caused by a hole in the page. b15 B’s ἐπιτακτικὸς ἄρχων, where ἐπιτακτικὸς is supported by FL ordinativus, anticipates one of Richards’s conjectures; his other conjecture, ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχει, would be smoother—but suspect because of it? —Puzzlingly, Walzer/Mingay rejects Robinson’s second conjecture (ἄρχει τὸ θεῖον) here but reads τοῦ θεῖου for τοῦ θεοῦ in b19 and τὸ 〈ἐν ἡμῖν〉 θεῖον for τὸν θεὸν in b22. As Barnes crisply comments (CR 42 [1992]: 30), ‘Robinson should be swallowed either whole or not at all— and plainly not at all’. b16 διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, διώρισται δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις transposui post b17 οὐθενὸς δεῖται: my reasoning is that if we try taking ἐπεὶ in the following ἐπεὶ-clause as ‘since’, that seems to require our knowing immediately what the two uses of οὗ ἕνεκα are, when the function of διώρισται δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις seems to be to avoid spelling it out. Rather, I propose, ἐπεὶ is to be taken in what I have sometimes earlier called its ‘(quasi-)concessive’ use (though Bonitz calls it straightforwardly ‘concessive’: Index Aristotelicus 266a55), the effect being that Aristotle rows back from what ἀλλ’ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ ϕρόνησις ἐπιτάττει might suggest, i.e. that god might be in need of something. On this construal, the ἐπεὶ-clause connects directly with what comes before διττὸν δὲ τὸ . . . , which, placed where it is in the MSS, would then be explaining something before we had been told exactly what needed explaining. b19 I prefer L’s ordering (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μάλιστα) as the less expected and because of FL’s dei maxime contemplationem.

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Aristotelica  225 b23 That there is no counterpart to the δὲ after αὕτη in FL is surely another piece of evidence confirming that FL, like BF, is not consistently a word-for-word rendering of the Greek. —ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ PCBL is strikingly devoid of substance as well as syntactically odd; and similarly with the emendations offered by Rackham, Richards, and Dirlmeier: it would be surprising if ‘this’ wasn’t how it is with the soul. Why would it not be, if ‘this’ is how it has just been said to be? We would hardly miss it if we were not told, as we would be with Richards’s solution, that that is how it should be, not least since we are about to be told the same in different terms. Leaving out a single letter (tau), on the other hand, and transforming ῇ into ἡ, dative into a nominative (so: ἡ ψυχή), gives us something that is not only syntactical but informative, and has stylistic parallels—if, I suppose, the ‘this’ is that part of the soul Aristotle is currently labelling τὸ θεωρητικόν, which he has just ­assimilated, once more, to ὁ θεός (parallels for such a use of ἔχειν: e.g. at 1224b29–30, 1248a33–4). This proposal is of a piece with the retention of the MSS’ ἄλλου in the next line (see below). The ἔχει is in emphatic position: ‘And the soul does have this . . . (sc. despite what the discussion of εὐτυχία in VIII.2 may have suggested? See further on b25 ἄλλου below.). b23–4 The idea that ‘this’ is the ὅρος ‘of ’ the soul is odd, but the very repetition of ψυχή + definite article, with τῆς ψυχῆς still to follow in the next line, looks even odder. I suspect a version of dittography (τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ / οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς). An alternative that this might suggest is to bracket ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ altogether; but see note on b25 ἄλλου below. (Another possibility: οὗτος τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ὅρος ἄριστος? But the dative would be strangely placed, and a sequence of three occurrences of ψυχή + definite article in the same short sentence would still seem at least one too many.) b24 Susemihl’s ἂν ἥκιστα αἰσθάνηται on balance seems to take on board more of the evidence available, such as it is, than do the others, that evidence including FL’s cum minime senserit; that by itself might well have served equally as a translation of Zeller’s τὸ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι, but none of PCBL has the infinitive either. The τὰ in all of PCBL is by false analogy with ἥκιστα. Allan’s τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἥκιστα

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226  Eudemian Ethics VIII/V (1249b24) αἰσθάνεσθαι presupposes the usual shorthand for ἄνθρωπος, but still seems to add unnecessary bulk to Zeller’s proposal; similarly Robinson’s ὅταν to Susemihl’s ἂν = ἐὰν. b25 ἄλλου MSS, ἀλόγου Fritzsche: the in­ fer­ ior Latin translator, with  alteram irrationalemque, mostly got there—either following the in­corp­or­ation of a gloss in the text, or on his own initiative—before Fritzsche. But both, I propose, are wrong: Aristotle wrote ἄλλου = the part of the soul other than the part (now) referred to at the beginning of the sentence. What it will be ‘to perceive / be aware of the remaining part of the soul ἥκιστα, ᾗ τοιοῦτον’ will be to perceive it ἥκιστα insofar as it is other, i.e. other than rational, that other part itself still being rational to the extent that it is capable of listening to reason. What exactly either of the two parts includes is not clear, but my own view is that b14 οὕτω δ’ ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν is saying that the counterparts of both medicine and health (ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια, b12–13) are intended to be included in (what is being referred to here as) τὸ θεωρητικόν: i.e. τὸ θεωρητικόν includes both ‘god’ and ϕρόνησις— the latter, of course, being the counterpart of ἰατρικὴ, ‘god’ of ὑγίεια. That, it seems to me, is the inescapable logic of b12–16 (note the surprising sentence ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινος, 1226b26–7—surprising, that is, against the background of a clear distinction between theoretical and practical reason, of the sort we find in NE VI ‘=’ EE V: see e.g. NE (EE) 1139a27–8). If this is indeed what Aristotle intends, it will give added point to ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή. It may be—so I think Aristotle argued in VIII/V.2 —that many people live quite successfully without reasoning (thanks to the operation of god / a divine element in them too); but reason­ing is a part of us, and that is what should guide us in our choices. But another, and perhaps more immediate, contrast will be with the case of the Spartans, earlier in the present chapter, for whom external goods are the goal in themselves. b25 Bekker prints ᾗ without comment, and it is indeed an obvious correction. b27 B2 writes in an omega above the αι of ἔσται. —By marking a lacuna after the last sentence of VIII/V, as he had before its first (and by ending

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Aristotelica  227 the last sentence with a Greek colon, which I reproduce—after all, the sentence starts with a μέν), Susemihl advertises the book as a fragment. Allan, by contrast, does his best to make it into a whole by bracketing the last sentence; in which we have no reason to follow him, especially when the ‘book’ starts with a similar abruptness. Further, I believe that a book may end with a μέν-clause, to be answered by a δέ in the following book (EE III is a likely example: see note ad loc.). In the present case this would be consistent with the proposal, made by Dirlmeier and others, that EE VIII/V originally preceded VII/IV, although its beginning would be likely still to mark it as a fragment. —After EE, P goes straight into the Economicus without even a line’s break; οἰκονομικός — — — α′ is written in the half of the line left after ἔστω εἰρημένον : —. But at least the title is in red, and there is the same min­imal decoration as at the beginning of EE, which started with a similar lack of fanfare. C, for its part, gives the title of the Economicus a separate line. B has a band of decoration before the title of the new treatise; meanwhile EE in L ends little more than two lines into a page, without flourish. The rest of that page in L is left blank, and there are then several empty folios before the beginning of the only other work in the codex, the Hieroglyphica of ‘Horapollo’, which is prefaced with Ὡραπόλλωνος Νειλώου Ἱερογλυϕικὰ, ἃ έξήνεγκε μὲν αὐτὸς αἰγυπτίᾳ ϕωνῇ μετέϕρασε δὲ Φίλιππος εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα διάλεκτον : —. (This inscription is barely readable in L itself; I have copied it from Laur. 81,20, which follows L faithfully from 1232a3 ἡ πώλησις, the first part being directly descended from C.)  

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appendix

Data for the Relationships between the Primary Manuscripts (1) (Presumed) errors shared by all of PCBL 1214a5 〈δ’ 〉 // ἐρᾷ τὸ] ἐρᾶται PCBL // 26 τῇ παρουσίᾳ] ἡ παρουσία PCBL // [διὰ] // 28 〈τὰς〉 // 1214b33 μεταβαλοῦσιν] μετάβαλλουσιν PCBL // 1215a1 εἰκῇ γὰρ] εἰ μὴ γὰρ P1CBL // 19 [ἃ] // 27 〈οὐδ’〉 // 28 〈ἀλλ’〉 // 1215b5 〈ἕτερος〉 // 19 〈δι’ ἃ〉 // 1215b29–30 ἀπέραντον, τί] ἀπέραντόν τι PCBL // 1216a1 Ἆπιν] ἄπιν PCBL // 12 τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα] τοιαῦθ’ ἇττα PCLB2, ταῦθ’ ἇττα B1 // 16 Σαρδανάπαλλον] σαρδανάπαλον PCBL // 1216b2 λόγου] λόγοι PCBL // 1216b19 ἤ τι] ἢ τί PCL, ἤ τὶ B // 28 χρωμένους] χρώμενον P1CBL // 31 πάντας] πάντως PCBL // 1217b5 τὸ αἰτίῳ] τῷ αἰτίῳ PCBL // ἀγαθοῖς] ἀγαθοῦ PCBL // 6 ὑπάρχειν] ὑπάρχει PCBL // 41 ἑτέρα] ἑτέραι PCBL // 1218a8 ἢ] εἰ PCBL // 15 ἢ ὡς] πῶς PCBL // 17 ἀνομολογουμένων] ὁμολογουμένων PCBL // 27 τοῦτο] τότε P1CBL // 38 αὐτοαγαθόν] αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν P1B1CL // 1218b8 〈οὖν〉 // οὔτε] οὐδὲ PCL, οὐδ’ B // 19 τὸ2] τοῦ P1CBL // 21 καὶ τόδε] καὶ τότε PCB, καὶ τό τε (vel τότε) L // 22 τοῦ] τὸ PCBL

EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1218b32 〈ἐν〉 // 36 πᾶσιν] πᾶσι PCBL // 1219a29 τέλεον] πλέον PCBL // 31 ταῦτα] αὕτη PCBL // 35 ἔσται] εἶναι PCBL // 1219b17 τέλους] τέλος PCBL // 25 πῃ] μὴ PCBL // 38 τῇ αὑτοῦ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ PCBL // 39 ϕυτικόν] ϕυσικόν PCBL // 41 καὶ αὐξητικοῦ] καὶ ὀρεκτικοῦ PCBL // 1220a16 διὰ τίνων] διά τινων PCBL // 17 ἀεὶ] δεῖ PCBL // 28 ϕθείρεσθαι πὼς] ϕθείρεσθαί πως PCBL // 33 πὼς bis] πῶς bis PCBL // 1220b2 κινεῖσθαι πώς] κινεῖσθαί πως PCBL // 6 [δ’ ] // [τῷ λόγῳ] // 10–12 [μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων] // 15 ποιός τις] ποιότης PCBL // 1220b38–1221a12: tertium quidque in his lineis omnibus secludendum // 1221a19 [ὁ1] // [καὶ] // 20 [ὁ1] // 23 ἢ] ἀλλ’ PCBL // 1221b1 [ἐπὶ] // 19 ἂν πῶς] ἄν πως PCBL // 22 ἤδη] δὴ PCBL // 39 〈ἕξις〉 PCBL // 1222a1 [ἡ ἡδονή] // 1222a11 τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἑκάστην] τὴν καθ’ αὑτὸν ἕκαστον PCBL // 21 πράξεις] ἕξεις PCBL // 28 〈ὃς〉 // 38 ϕιλόπονοί ἐσμεν] ϕιλόπονοι ἐσμέν PCBL // 40 ἐναντίαν] ἐναντία PCBL // 42 πραότητι] πραότητα PCBL // 1222b18 ζῷον ὁμοίως] ζῷον ὂν ὅλως PCBL // 35 μεταβάλλει] μεταβάλλοι PCBL //

EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

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A ppe n d i x   229 1223a3 [ὃ] // 11 [διὰ] // 13 αἴτιοί ἐσμεν] αἴτιοι ἐσμέν PCBL // 20 δῆλον[ότι] // 25 〈ἂν〉 // 1223b11 τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς] τῆς ἀκρασίας PCBL // 25 τὸν αὐτὸν] τὸ αὐτὸ PC1BL // 26 〈αὐτὸ〉 // 33 γένηται] γίνηται PCBL // 1224a19 ταῦτα] τοῦτο PCBL // 22 ἀψύχων] ἐμψύχων PCBL1 // 24 τι] τις PCBL // 29 τινὶ] τινι PCBL // 30 γάρ ϕαμεν] γὰρ ϕαμὲν PCBL // 31 ἀλλὰ τὸν] ἀλλ’ ὅταν PCBL // 1224b4 ἑκόντες] ἄκοντες PCBL // 26 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 29 τι] τί PCBL // 40 ἑκόντας] ἄκοντας PCBL // ἀκούσιον] ἑκούσιον P1CBL // 1225a1 〈αὗται〉 // 11 [δεῖ] // 17 [μὴ] // 36 〈λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσιν〉 // 37 〈οὐχ〉 // 1225b1 δὴ] δεῖ PCBL // 5 ἤτοι ᾧ] ἤτοι ὡς PCBL // 7 ὃ] ὅτῳ PCBL // 14 〈ἂν〉 // 24 [δ’ ] // 35 [ταὐτὸν] // 37 ἃ δυνατὸν] ἀδύνατον PCBL // 1226a2 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // ἦν] εἶναι PCBL // 5 δόξα] δόξαν P1CBL // 12 τινὸς] τίνος PCBL // [προαιρεῖται] // 13 τινὸς] τίνος PCBL // 15 δοξάζει] δοξάζειν PCBL // 33 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 1226b17 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 19 βουλόμεθα1] βουλευόμεθα PCBL // 23 πάντως] πάντος PCBL // 24 διὰ τί] διατί PCBL // 29 αἴτιόν ϕαμεν] αἴτιον ϕαμὲν PCBL // 1227a2 πῃ] πῆ PCBL // 15 τοῦτ’ ἔστι] τουτέστι PCBL // 18 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PCBL // 23 διαστροϕῇ] διαστροϕὴν PCBL // 32 διαστροϕῇ] διαστροϕὴν PCBL // 34 γὰρ ἔστιν] γάρ ἐστιν PCBL // 42 [καὶ] // 1227b 6 αὐτή] αὕτη PCBL // 11 ϕιλόγλυκυς] ϕιλόγλυκος PCBL // 39 τῷ] τὸ PCBL // 1228a2 [οὗ] // 7 σπουδαῖός ἐστιν] σπουδαῖος ἐστὶν PCBL // 15–16 καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς post 13 εἰς τὰ ἔργα habent PCBL 1228a23 〈ταῖς〉 // 29 πρότερον] πότερον PCBL // 1228b13 〈τὰ δὲ ϕοβερὰ〉 // 37 οἱ δὲ] καὶ ἔτι P1CBL // 1229a11 μόνον] μόνος PCB1L // 13 〈τὰ〉 // 23 καὶ] ἢ PCBL // 40 λυπήσεται] λύπη ἔσται PCBL // 1229b2 ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι] ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσί PCL, ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσίν B // 13 ϕαίνηται] ϕαίνεται PCBL // 15 λύπης ϕθαρτικῆς] λύπης τῆς ϕθαρτῆς P1CL (desunt in B) // 32 ὑπομένουσιν] ὑπομένουσι PCL (deest in B) // 35 〈ἂν〉 // 40 〈ἂν〉 // 40–1 ἑτοίμος ἀποθνήσκειν] ἑτοίμως ἀποθνήσκειν P1CL (deest in B) // 1230a12 δι’ ὃ] διὸ PCL (deest in B) // 19 〈ἂν〉 // 26 ϕοβούμενον] ϕοβουμένους PCL (deest in B) // 28 οὐδὲ] οὔτε PCL (deest in B) // 37 διὰ τί] διατὶ PCBL // 〈ἔχει〉 // 40 πως] πῶς PCBL // 1230b1 ἰατρευμένος] ἰατρευόμενος PBLC2, ἰατευόμενος C1 // 1230b13 δὲ] γὰρ PCBL // 19 κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι] κωμοδιδάσκαλοι P1CL, κωμοδοδιδάσκαλοι B // 22 περὶ τίνας] περί τινας PCBL // 1231a8 μὴ deest in PCBL // ἢ] μὴ PCBL // 17 Ἐρύξιδος] ἐξ ὔριδος PCL, ἐξύριδος B1 // 23 ἡδονὰς] ὀσμὰς PCBL // 36 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCL (deest in B) // 38 ὥστ’ εἰ] ὥστε PCL (deest in B) // 1232a13 προσίεσθαι] προΐεσθαι PCBL // 21 λανθάνει] λανθάνειν PCBL // 24 ἐλευθερίῳ] ἀνελευθερίῳ PCBL // 31 ἔτι] ὅτε PCBL // 34–5 [εἶναι ἡδέα] // 1232b2 μέγα γὰρ οἴεσθαί εἶναι] μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι PCBL // 13 λυπεῖσθαι τ’ ἂν] λυπηθήσεται ἂν P, λυπηθήσετ’ ἂν

EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

230  A ppe n d i x CB, λυπηθήσαι τ’ ἂν L // 20 ἐπὶ τίνι] ἐπί τινι PCBL // 22 τιμία] τιμίαν PCBL // 26 παρὰ] περὶ PCBL // 31 ζητητέος] ζητητέον PCBL // 1233b1 καλοῦσί τινες] καλοῦσι τινὲς PCBL // 5 ἐκείνως] ἐκεῖνος PCBL // 8–9 τὸ πρέπον] τοῦ πρέποντος PCBL // 9 〈τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν〉 // 12 ᾤοντο] ᾤετο PCBL // 14 ἔχει] ἔχων PCBL // 15–16 οὔτ’ ἐλευθέριος οὔτ’ ἀνελεύθερος] ὡς ἐλευθέριος ὅταν ἐλεύθερος PCBL // 22 ἐστὶν αὐτὸ] ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ PCBL // 33 μὴ] μήτε PCBL // 37 〈ἀλλὰ〉 // καταϕρονητικὸς] ἀκαταϕρονητικὸς P1CBL // 1234a1 καθ’ αὑτοῦ] κατ’ αὐτοῦ PCBL // 19 ὁ δυνάμενος] τὸν δυνάμενον PCBL // 22 〈μὴ〉 // 30–1 ϕύσει καὶ] ϕυσικαὶ PCBL // 33 δ’ deest in PCBL // 1234b5 ὦσιν] εἰσὶν PCBL // 10 τε] δὲ PCBL

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1234b20 εἴδη deest in PCBL // 29 ἅλις ϕίλους ποιῆσαι] ἀλλ’ εἰς ϕίλους ποιῆσαι PCBL // 1235a2 ἑταίρων] ἑτέρων PCBL // [ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός] // 3 ἐστὶν] ἔστιν PCBL // 15 ἐρώμενον] ἐρωμένον PCBL // 16 ἐπιθυμεῖν] ἐπιθυμεῖ PCBL // 22 αἰεὶ] ἀεὶ PCBL // 23 τοὔλασσον] τὸ ἔλασσον PCBL // 26 ἔκ τ’ ] καὶ PCBL // 30 〈καὶ〉 // 37 καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ αὑτῶν] καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν, deinde spatium vacuum quinque fere litterarum PCBL // 1235b4 〈ὅμοιον〉 // 14 λόγος] λοιπὸς PCBL // 21 ϕιλοῦμεν οὗ] ϕιλούμενον PCBL // 34 ὑγιαίνοντί ϕαμεν] ὑγιαίνοντι ϕαμὲν PCBL // 39 οὗτοί γε] οὔτε PCB; οὔτε γε L // 1236a13 οὕτω] ὥσπερ PCBL // 16 πως] πῶς PCBL // 22 ἐν πᾶσιν] ἐν ἡμῖν PCBL // 28 〈τὰς〉 // 29 οἱ] αἱ PCBL // 34 [διὰ] // 37 τόσσον ϕίλος] τὸν σοϕὸν ϕίλον PCBL // 38 γιγνώσκουσιν] γινώσκουσιν PCBL // Ἀθηναῖοι] ἀληθῆναι PCB, ἀθῆναι L // 1236b4 ὁ ϕιλούμενος] τῷ ϕιλουμένῳ PCBL // 6 μόνος] μόνον PCBL // 8 ἄνθρωπον] ἀνθρώπων P1CBL // ἄλληλα] ἄλλα PCBL // 15 οὐθὲν] οὐθεὶς PCBL // 16 ὑπομένουσιν] ὑπονοοῦσιν PCBL // ἕως ἂν] ὡς ἂν PCBL // 23 ἀδύνατον] δυνατόν PCBL // 24 〈ἡ〉 // 28 τι] τις PCBL // 33–4 ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν πότερον] ἔχει ἐπίστασιν πότερον γὰρ PCBL // 37 ἄν πως τύχῃ] ἁπλῶς τύχῃ P1CBL // 1237a2 τοῦτο ἡ] τοῦτον PCBL // 3 εὔθετος] εὐθέτως PCBL // 7 ταῦτα] τοῦτο PCBL // σπουδαῖος] σπουδαῖον PCBL // 14 τῳδί, οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι] τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον γυμνάζεσθαι PCBL // 17 ἡ2] εἰ PCBL // 25 ἡδεῖ] εἴδει PCBL // 29–30 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 30 τελεωθέντι] τελεωθέντα P1CB; τελειωθέντα L // 32 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 34 αὐτὴ] αὕτη PCBL // 37 〈ᾗ〉 // 1237b1 τῷ ϕιλουμένῳ] τὸ ϕιλούμενον PCBL // [ὅ] // 2 τῷ] καὶ PCBL // 4 ἄλλο] ἄλλῳ PCBL // 5 δεῖ] δὴ P1CBL // 6 εἰ γὰρ] τί γὰρ PCL, τὶ γὰρ B // 8 ἣν] ᾗ PCBL // 11 μηδὲ] μὴ δὲ PCBL // 12 [οὐ] // 16 〈εἶναι〉 // 19 [ϕίλοι] // 35 ἔδει] δεῖ PCBL // 36 ϕίλου] ϕίλοι P1CBL // 1238a3 δεῖ] εἰ PCBL // 4 εἰ ὁ] εἶεν PCBL // 7 [τῷ] // 9 ϕίλον] ϕίλος PCBL // κωλύει] κωλύειν P1CBL // 14 ὅ τε] ὅτι PCBL // 16 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCBL // 22 ταχύ] ταχύς PCBL // 23 οἴνοις]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   231

ὄνοις P1CBL // 24 γλυκὺ deest in PCBL // 29 〈οὐ〉 // 31 ἡ2] αἱ P1CBL // 35 συντέτηκεν] συντέκεν PCBL // ἡδονῇ] ἡδονή P1CBL // 36 οὐχ] καὶ PCBL // 37 ϕιλῳδὸς] ϕειδωλὸς PCBL // 1238b1 ᾗ] ἢ PCBL // 6 ᾗ] ἢ PCBL // 7 〈καὶ〉 // 12 εἶεν] εἰσιν PCBL // ἢ ᾗ] ἢ εἰ P1CBL // 22 διαϕοραὶ εἰσίν] διαϕοραί εἰσιν PCBL // 26 [τῷ] // 27 ἀντιϕιλεῖ] ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι P1CBL // 32 〈οἱ〉 // εἰσιν] ἐστιν PCBL // 36 αὐτοῖς] τῆς PCBL // 1239a11 ἄξιον] ἀξιοῦν PCBL // 14 οὐδὲν ἰσχύει] οὐδ’ ἐν ἰσχύι PCB, οὐδ’ ἐνἰσχύι L // ξύλου] ξύλῳ PCBL // 16 〈τὸ〉 // 21 διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // 23 ὁ] οὐ P1CBL // 31 ἐνεργοῦντι] ἐνεργοῦντα P1CL, deest in B // τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλ συμβεβηκός P1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖν συμβεβηκός CL, συμβεβηκός γὰρ τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 34 δέ] δ’ PCBL // 35–6 ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς] ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς PCL, desunt in B // 38 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 1239b18 ταὔθ’ ] ταῦτ’ P1, ταῦθ’ CBLP2 // [δὲ] // 22 [Κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ] // 31 διὰ τὸ οὕτω] διὸ οὐ τὸ PCB, διὸ οὐ τῷ L // 36 〈ὄτι〉 // 1240a10 κρίνουσι] κινοῦσι PCBL // 15 δι’ ὃ] δι’ ἃ PCBL // 〈ὡς〉 // 20 διῃρημένοις] διῃρημένως PCBL // πως bis] πῶς bis PCBL // 22 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PCBL // [ὡς] // 31 οἱ1] ὁ P1CBL // 33 τὸ] τῷ PCBL // [ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν] // 36 γε] τε PCBL // 38 εἴτε] ὅτι PCBL // 〈ὅτι〉 // 〈39 τὸ γὰρ〉 // 1240b3 [μὴ] // ψυχὴν] ϕιλίαν PCBL // 10 μηδὲ] μὴ δὲ PCBL // 18 ὅτι γάρ πῃ] ὅτι γὰρ πῇ PCBL // ὅμοιος] ὅμοιοι PCBL // 20 ὁ δ’ ] οὐδ’ PCBL // 22 μεταμελητικὸς] μεταληπτικὸς P1CBL // 26 αὑτοῖς] αὐτοῖς PCBL // 31 〈οὔ〉 // 1241a18 οὐδὲ] οὔτε PCBL // 20 οὐδ’ εἰ] οὐ δεῖ P1CBL // ὁμονοεῖ] ὁμονοεῖν P1CBL // 22 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα PCBL // 32 τοῦ τὸν] τοῦτον PCBL // 35 διὰ τί] διατί PCBL // ϕιλοῦσιν] ϕιλοῦντες P1CBL // 36 εὖ τοὺς] αὐτοὺς PL, αὑτοὺς CB // 38–9 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀϕείλεται] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὠϕελεῖται P1CBL // 1241b1 δὲ] δὴ PCBL // 4–5 [καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων] // 6 αὑτῶν] αὐτῶν PCBL // 8 αὑτῶν] αὐτῶν PCBL // 10 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PCBL // 12 τι] τί PCBL // 13 τι] τί PCL; τὶ B // 19 [οὐδέν] // 24 [ἢ] // 25 ὀργέων] ὀργίων PCBL // [ἔτι πολιτεῖαι] // 28 [τῶν] // 34 〈πολιτικὴ〉 // 36 〈ἡ〉 // 1242a15 αὐτὸ τὸ] τοῦτο PCBL // 22 ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν] ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου μόνον οὐ πολιτικὸς PCBL // 24 συνδυάζεται] συνδοιάζεται PCBL // 25 ἄλλως δὲ διὰ βίου μοναυλικόν] ἀλλ’ αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν P1CBL // 26 συγγένεια ἐστίν] συγγένειά ἐστι(ν) PCBL // 28 ἥπερ] ἤπερ PCBL // 37 ἀπεδείχθην] ἀπεδείχθη PCBL // πατὴρ] πατρὸς PCBL // αὑτὸς] αὐτὸς PCBL // 1242b6 ἀμϕισβητήσεων] ἀμϕισβητησάντων PCBL // 7 τῇ] τῷ PCBL // 10 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL // διακείμενος] διακείμενον PCBL // 14 εἰσήνεγκαν] εἰσήνεγκεν PCBL // 24 γιγνώσκουσιν] γινώσκουσιν PCBL // 25 Μεγαρῆας] μεγαρεῖς PCBL // 35 αὑτοῖς] αὐτοῖς PCBL // 1243a4 ἡδεῖς] ἡμεῖς P1CBL // 9 δίκας] δὴ καὶ P1CBL // 15 τὸ1] τὸν PCBL // 16 ἦν] ἢ PCBL // 17 θεά σμικρὸν] θεὸς μικρὸν PCBL // 18 δὲ2] γὰρ PCBL // 19 παιδιὰν] παιδείαν PCBL // 22 τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 23 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PCBL // 24 αὑτῷ]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

232  A ppe n d i x

αὐτῷ PCBL // μεταλαμβαν〈όντ〉ων [καὶ] // 32 ἐστι] ἐστὶ L (deest in PCB) // 33 διότι] διατί L (deest in PCB) // 34 ἄρχονται] ἔρχονται PCBL // 1243b1 τὴν καλλίω ϕιλίαν] τῇ καλλίω ϕιλίᾳ P1CBL // 10 ἀποδῴη] ἀποδῶ ἢ PCBL // 15 χαλεπὸν γὰρ] γὰρ χαλεπὸν PCBL // 20 τί ἀντὶ τίνος] παντί τινος P1L, παντὶ τινός CB // 25 ὡμίλει] ὁμιλεῖ PCBL // ὁ δ’ ] ὅδ’ P1CBL // 27 ὅμως] ὅπως PCBL // 29 ἐνταῦθα] ἐνταῦθ’ PCBL // τῷ] τὸ PCBL // 34 τί 〈ἡ〉 σοϕία] τῇ σοϕίᾳ PCBL // τὸν πλοῦτον] τὸ πλούσιον PCBL // 35 〈τὸ〉 // ἥμισυ] ἡμῖν PCBL // 38 ϕῇ ὁ μὲν] ϕήσωμεν PCBL // 38 ἀλλ’ ὡς] ἄλλως PCBL // 1244a3 ἀντιποιεῖν τι] ἀντιποιοῦντι PCBL // [καὶ] // 9 ὁ δὲ] διὸ PCBL // 11 λόγων] λόγον PCL, deest in B // λόγους] λόγου PCBL // 12 ἐκεῖνος] ἐκείνοις PCBL // ἔργον 〈ὃς〉] ἔργα PCBL // 16 οὐκ εἰ] οὐχὶ P1CBL // 17 συζῆν2] εὖ ζῆν P1CBL // 18 ἀλλ’ ὁ] ἀλλὰ PCBL // οἳ] οἱ PCBL // 19 [τούτῳ] (τούτο B1) // οὐδενός] οὐδ’ PCBL // εἰσιν] εἰσὶν PCBL // 23 τῷ ὁποιῷ δή] τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ PCBL // 33 τὸν ἔχοντα] τὰ ἔχοντα PCBL // ϕιλεῖν] ϕιλεῖ PCBL // 35 δὴ ἀγανακτεῖ] δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν P1CBL // 36 οἱ δ’ ] ὅδ’ vel ὅ δ’ P1CB1L // 1244b4 ἢ οὔ] ἢ ὁ PCL (desunt in B) // εἰ2] ἢ PCBL // 〈ὁ〉 // 5 καὶ] εἰ PCBL // 7 εὐϕρανούντων] εὖ ϕρονούντων PCBL // 10 οὗ γε μηθὲν ἐνδεής ποτε] οὔτε μηθὲν δεσπότου PCBL // 13 ἀεὶ] δεῖ PCBL // 16 ὁ] οὐ PCBL // 20 ποιήσοντας] ποιήσαντας PCBL // ἀμείνω] ἀμείνων P1CBL // 21 μάλιστά τε] τὲ μάλιστα P1CBL // 29 δεῖ τιθέναι] διατιθέναι PCBL // 30 〈αὐτὸν〉 // 30–2 [ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ... μὴ λανθάνειν] // 1245a3 αἰσθητόν] αἱρετὸν P1CBL // 3 τῷ] τὸ PCBL // 4 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL // 5 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PCBL // 12 πως] πῶς PCBL // 13 κοινῶν] κοινωνῶν PCBL // 15 μὴν] μὴ PCBL // 17 οἷόν τε] οἴονται PCBL // 18 μανθάνων] μανθάνειν P1CBL // ὁ] οὐ PCBL // 21 ἑκάστῳ] ἔκαστον PCBL // 23 τὸ ἅμα δεῖν] τολμᾶ δὴ PCBL // 24 δέον] δεῖ PCBL // 26 συζῆν] εῦ ζῆν PCBL // 35 γε] τε PCBL // 37 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL // 1245b3 δ’ αὐτὸν] δυνατὸν P1CBL // 4 ἡ κοινωνία] ἢ κοινωνίαν P1CBL // 4 γε] τε PCBL // 6 〈γὰρ οὐχ〉 // 15 ἠξίου] ἀξίου PCBL // 23 πλείστοις] πλείστους P1CBL // 25 δεῖ] ἀεὶ PCBL // 28 τὸ] τῷ PCBL // 30 ἄλλο] ἀλλ’ PCBL // 39 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCBL // 40 αὑτῶν] αὐτῶν PCBL // 1246a1 [καὶ] // 2 μόνοι] μόνον P1CBL // 4 αἱρετώτερόν] αἱρετόν PCBL // 5 πόσον] ποσὸν P1CBL // 6 καὶ οἴονται] καὶ οἷον καὶ PCBL // 7 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα PL, ταῦτ’ CB // 8 αὖ] ἂν PCBL // 9 ὁμολογοῦσιν] ὁμολογῶσιν PCBL // 12 ἀπεῖναι] εἶναι P1CBL // 13 τὸ δὲ] τὸν δὲ PCBL 1246a28 〈ᾗ〉 // ἢ αὖ] ἡδὺ PCBL // 29 εἰ] ἢ PCBL // 31 ἐστιν] ὅτι PCBL // 36 ὀρχηστρίδες] ὀρχηστρίαδες PCBL // εἰ δὴ] εἴδη PCB, ἤδη L // 36 ἀρεταὶ] ἄρισται PCBL // 38 ἀδικήσει] εἰ δίκης εἰ PCL (deest in B) // 1246b6 ἀλλ’ ἔτι εἰ] ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ PCBL // 8 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα PCBL // 11 στροϕήν] τροϕήν PCBL //

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   233 15 εἰ δή] ἤδη PCB1L // 16–17 τἀναντία. ἢ ἔστι] τἀναντία η σϕι PC, inter τἀναντία et σϕι habet spatium vacuum trium fere litterarum L (desunt in B) // 17 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PCL (deest in B) // 18 ἄγνοια] ἄνοια PCL (deest in B) // 18–19 τ’ οὐ] τὸ PCBL // 21 〈ἐνούσης〉 // ἐν] μὲν PCBL // ἀλόγῳ] λόγῳ PCBL // 23 ἀγνοίας] ἀνοίας PCBL // ϕρονίμως] ϕρονίμῳ PCBL // 25 ἀκολασίαν] κὁλασιν ἂν PCBL // 26 [ἡ] // 30–1 ἀλλ’ οὖν οὐ] ἀλλ’ οὖν ὁ PCBL // 33 〈ἃ〉 // 35 αἱ ἀλόγου] αἱ ἄλλου PCBL // 36 Σωκρατικόν] σῶμα κρατητικόν PCBL // 1247a1 τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ] τῆς ἐπιστήμης PCBL // 5 ἔτι] εἰ PCBL // 7 οὐ τῷ] οὕτω PCBL // 14 διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // πράττει] πράττοι PCBL // οἱ] οἵ PCBL // διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // 15 ϕανεροὶ] ϕανερὸν PCBL // 18 πλέων] πλέον PCBL // 20 [ὅτι] // ἐν οἷς] ἐνίοις PCBL // 25 [δὲ] // δι’ αὑτό] δι’ αὐτό PCBL // 33 εἴη] εἶναι PCBL // 34 〈ὅτι〉 // 35 [ὁ] // γλαυκὸς] γλαῦκος PCBL // 1247b1 εὐτυχεῖς] τύχης PCBL // 1247b2 οὐκ] ἢ PCBL // 3 οὐκ αἰτία] οὐκέτι PCLB2, οὐκ ἔτι B1 // 8 ἀνθρωπίνῳ] ἀνθρώπῳ P1CB1L // 9 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπειδὴ PCBL // 10 διὰ τί] διατί PC, διατὶ L (deest in B) // 10–11 αὐτὸ κατορθώσαιεν] ἀποκατορθώσαι P1CL (deest in B) // 11 τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον] τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτ’ αἴτιον PL, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο αἴτιον C (desunt in B) // 13 〈ἀπ’〉 // ὃ] τὸ PCBL // 14 ἐμπειρίαν] ἀπειρίαν PCBL // 15 εὐτυχεῖν] εὐτυχεῖς PCBL // 17 τοιοσδὶ] τοῖς δεῖ PCL (deest in B) // 18 εἴη] εἶεν PCL (deest in B) // μακαρίαν] μακρὰν PCL (deest in B) // 23 ᾠδικοὶ] ἄδικοι PCBL // εὖ] οὐ PCBL // 24 〈ᾗ〉 // 25 καὶ τότε] καὶ πότε PCB, ποτὲ L // 26 κατορθώσουσι] κατορθοῦσι PCL, κατορθοῦσιν B // 27 ᾄσονται] ἔσονται PCBL // οὐ] οἱ PCBL // 31 〈ἐν οἷς〉 // 32 κατορθοῦντες] κατορθοῦνται PCB, κατορθοῦν τὲ L // [καὶ] // 33 ἄλλο] ἂν PCBL // 34 〈ἢ〉 // 37 ὀρθὸς] ὀρθῶς PCBL // 38 〈ἐπιθυμία〉 // ἔσωσεν] ἔξωσεν PCBL // 1248a1 〈ἢ〉 // καὶ τύχη διττὴ post 2 αἱ εὐτυχίαι transferenda // 7 〈γ’〉 // 〈αἴτιον〉 // 8 οὗ γε] οὔτε PCBL // 10 παρὰ λόγον] παράλογον PCBL // 13 〈τὸ〉 // 21 πρὸ τοῦ] πρότερον PCBL // 22 νοῦς] συνοῦσα PCBL // 24 ἢ] εἰ PCBL // 25 [τὸ] // 27 καὶ πᾶν ἐκεῖ κινεῖ] καὶ πᾶν ἐκείνῳ PCBL // 30 εἴη ποτε] εἴποι PCBL // 31 ὃ] οἱ PCBL // 32 κατορθοῦσιν] κατορθοῦν PCBL // 34 βουλεύσεως] βουλήσεως PCBL // 34–5 καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι] καὶ ἐνθουσιασμόι PCL (deest in B) // 36 ἐπιτυγχάνουσι] ἀποτυγχάνουσι PCL, ἀποτυγχάνουσιν B // τοῦ τῶν] τούτων PCBL // 39 [τε] // (ἀν)τὶ τοῦ desunt in PCBL // 41 οὕτως] οὗτος PCBL // 1248b1 τοῦ λόγου] τοὺς λόγους PCBL // 3 ὁρωμένοις] εἰρημένοις PCBL // 6 κατορθωτικός] διορθωτικός PCBL // 14 οὐδὲ] οὐδὲν PCBL // 20 αὑτὰ] αὐτὰ PCBL // 21 ἀϕ’ ὧν] ἐϕ’ ὧν PCBL // 23 αἱ2] οἱ PCBL // 32 οὐδὲν ὀνήσεται] οὐδ’ ὀνήσειε PCBL // 36 δι’ αὐτὰ] δ’ αὐτὰ L (desunt in PCB) // 1249a1 ἀγαθοὶ] ἄγριοι PCBL // 2 δὲ] γὰρ PCBL // 3 ὑπάρχει] ὑπάρχειν PCBL // 〈ὅσοις δ’ ὑπάρχει δι’αὕτα〉 // 7 καλὸν] καλὰ PCBL // ᾖ] ἢ PCBL // 10

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

234  A ppe n d i x

τούτῳ] πλούτῳ PCBL // 13 καλῷ κἀγαθῷ] ἀγαθῷ PCBL // 19 [καὶ] // 20 〈ὁ〉 // 25 〈εἰ〉 // 1249b2 [περὶ] // 5 εἴπειεν] εἴποιεν PCBL // 8 καὶ] κατὰ PCBL // 11 [καὶ2] // 12 ἑαυτοῦ] ἑαυτῶν PCBL // 16 διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, διώρισται δ’ ἐν ἄλλοις post 17 οὐθενὸς δεῖται transferenda // 23 ἡ ψυχή] τῇ ψυχῇ PCBL // 24 [τῆς ψυχῆς] // ἂν] τὰ PCBL // 25 ᾗ] ἢ PCBL

(2) Readings shared by PCB and not in L or in L and not in PCB EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1214a5 τις] τίς L // 20 ϕαύλως] ϕαύλοις L // 21 χρηστῶς] χρηστοῖς L // 24 τὴν deest in L // 1214b21 ὑπάρξειεν] ὑπάρξαιεν L // 22 ἑκάστην] ἑκάστων L // 24 περιπάτων] περὶ πάντων P1CB // 28 νομίζουσιν] νομίζουσι L //1215a4 ἀλλὰ πάθους] ἀλλὰπαθους L // 13 ἐστιν] ἐστι L // 1215b8 ὧν] ὃν L // ἄτοπος] ἄτοπον L // 15 περὶ] παρὰ L // 31 τῆς deest in L // 1216a2 οὐδὲ] οὐ L // 4 ἀνέγερτον] ἀνέργετον L // 5 ὁποσωνοῦν] ὁποσονοῦν L // 17 τὸν] τὸ L // 31 ποία] ποίά L // 1216b40 ϕιλόσοϕον] ϕίλοσοϕον L // 1217a19 δὲ] καὶ L // 41 ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν] ἀνθρωποπρακτῶν L // 1217b13 ἔχειν] ἔχει L // 14 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε L // 17 τῆς deest in L // 21 ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν bis L // 34 παρὰ] περὶ L // 1218a1 σχολῇ] σχολῆς L // 1218a16 δεικνύουσι] δείκνυσι L // 24 ταῦτα] αὐτὰ L // 26 λέγεται] λέγονται L // 29 ἀλόγως] ἀλόγοις L // 30 τό τε] τότε PCB // 32 ὄψεως] ὄντως L // 1218b1 ὑπάρξαι] ὑπάρξας L // 12 τοῦτ’ ] τούτων L // 13 ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν] ἀνθρωποπρακτῶν L // 15 γὰρ] δὲ L // τοιαῦτ’ (τοιαῦτα B)] τοιαύτας L // 21 ὑγιεινὸν] ὑγιαίνειν L // 23 δείκνυσιν οὐθεὶς] δεικνύουσιν οὔθ’ L // ὑγίεια] ἡ ὑγίεια L

EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

1218b32 τὰ ἀγαθὰ] τἀγαθὰ L // 35 ὧν ἢ ἔνια] ὧν ἔνια L // 1219a1 ἐστί ] ἔστι L // 3 γὰρ deest in L // 5 καὶ πλοίου] καὶ τοῦ πλοίου L // 11 ὑπέκειτο] ὑπέκειται L // 24–5 ἔτι ἔστω] ὅτι ἔστω L // 31 ἢ] ἡ L // 32 ἢ] ἡ L // 34 ἡ] ἢ L // 1219b19 ἥμισυν] ἥμισυ L // 31 μετέχειν] μετέχει PCB // 32–3 εἰ δέ τι ἐστὶν] εἰ δ’ ἔστιν PCB // 1220a11 δὲ deest in PCB // 15 μόρια] μοῖρα L // 21 τῶν deest in L // 36 καὶ2 deest in PCB // 40 δ’ ἐστὶ] δέ ἐστι L // 1220b3 ὃ] καὶ PCB // ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις] ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς L // 7 ἔσται] ἔστι PCB // 9 ταῦτα λέγονται] λέγονται ταῦτα L // 1221a18 ὁ] ὃ PCB1 // 18 ὅτ’ οὐ] ὅτου L // 1221b14 πλήκτης δὲ . . . 15 ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς desunt in PCB // 16 τῷ] τὸ L // 16–17 πρὸς ὁποτέρας] πρόσω ποτέρας P1CB // 19 πῶς λαμβάνειν] προσλαμβάνειν PCB // 29 λόγον] λόγου L // 32 τῆς deest in L // 39 πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ PCB, πάσα γὰρ ψυχῆς L1 // 40 πέϕυκε . . . βελτίων desunt in PCB // 1222a2 εἶναι ϕαμὲν] ϕαμὲν εἶναι L // 3–4 ἀπαθείας καὶ ἠρεμίας] ἀπάθειαν

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   235

καὶ ἠρεμίαν L // 34 ἐναντίος] ἐναντίως L // 38 μὲν deest in PCB // 1222b2 μὴ deest in L // 11 εἰσί] εἰσίν PCB // 32 ἔχοντος] ἔχων τὸ PCB2; ἔχει τὸ B1 // 34 ὀρθὰς] ὀρθὰ PCB // 39–40 οὔτε λέγειν desunt in PCB // 1223a4 τῶν τοιούτων desunt in L // αὐτοί] αὐταί PCB // 7 κύριός ἐστι] κύριος ἐστὶ L // 22 τί τὸ2 desunt in L // 24 καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον desunt in PCB // 25 δὴ] δὲ PCB // 27 παρὰ] περὶ PCB // 34–5 τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν desunt in PCB // 1223b5–6 βουλόμενος πράττει desunt in P1CB // 11 ἐγκρατὴς] ἀκρατὴς P1CB // 20 βίαιος] βίαιον L // 30 τοῦτ’ ] τοῦτο L // 35 γένηται] γίνηται PCB // 1224a4–5 προαιρεῖται δ’ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἐξαίϕνης desunt in PC1B // 8 διανοούμενόν πως] διανοούμενον πῶς L // 12–13 ἀκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον desunt in PC1B // 32 πράττοντα] πράττοντι P1C, πράττοντ B // 33 χαίρων δέ desunt in PC1B // 35 τ’ deest in PCB // 37 τὴν deest in L // 40 οὐ2 deest in P1C1B // 1224a40–1224b2 ἡ δὲ πειθὼ . . . ἀλλ’ ἑκών desunt in PCB // 1224b6 τις] τι L // 7 τῷ] αὐτῷ L // προσκείμενον] προκείμενον L // 9–10 ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ] ἐγκρατεῖ καὶ ἀκρατεῖ L // 18 ἀπ’ deest in PCB // 24 ἄκοντά ποτε] ἄκοντα ποτὲ L // 28 ἀκρατοῦς] ἀκρατῶς L1 // ἐγκρατοῦς] ἐγκρατῶς L1 // 1225a3 δὲ deest in PCB // 11 ἃ μὴ βούλεται ἑκὼν πράττει desunt in PC1B // 14 ὁ] οὐ L // 18–19 ἕνεκ’ ἂν κακοῦ PC1B, ἕνεκ’ ἂν μείζονος κακοῦ L // 20 τιθέασι] τιθέασιν PCB // 22 ἔχομεν deest in PC1B // 25 ἀνάγεται] ἀναγάγεται L // 1225b2 ἐναντία] ἐναντίον PCB // 5 Πελιάδες] πολιάδες PCB // 6 δ’ deest in PCB // 10–11 τοῦτ’ ἔστιν] τουτέστιν PCB // 20 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν L // 27 γὰρ deest in L // 39 ἀνάγκη] ἀνάγκη μὲν PCB // 1226a2 τι1 deest in PCB // 6 τι deest in PCB // ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν desunt in PCB // 10 ἕνεκεν] ἕνεκα L // 12 τε] τὲ L // 19 οὖν deest in PCB // 20 ἡ] ἢ L // 29 καὶ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι] συμβουλεύσασθαι PCB // 32 τὸ] τὰ L // ἀλλ’ deest in PCB // 33 ᾗ deest in L // 34 προαιρετὰ] προαιρετικὰ PCB // 1226b2 προαίρεσις deest in PCB; προαίρεσίς ἐστιν L // 8 πρὸς ἑτέρου τοῦτο PCB, πρὸς ἑτέρον L // 13 τοῦτο πάντες] πάντως τοῦτο L //14 μὴ deest in P1CB // 16 βουλεύεται] βούλεται L // 21 βουλεύσασθαι] βουλεύεσθαι L // 29 τοῦ] του L // 33 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν L // 1227a13–14 ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν desunt in PCB // 15 δι’ ὅ] διὸ PB, διό C, δι’ οὗ L // 27 ἐπιστήμης] ἐστήμης L1 // 41–2 οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει . . . καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν desunt in PCB // 42 ἄμεινον] καὶ ἄμεινον L // 1227b7 τίς deest in L // 8 καὶ2 deest in PCB // 27–8 ἀλλ’ εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή desunt in PCB // 29 παλαῖσαι] παλαίσαι L // 37 δ’ ἐστὶ] δέ ἐστι L // 1228a2 αἰτία deest in PCB // 2–3 διὰ τοῦτο] διατοῦτο L // 11 ἀκούσια] ἑκούσια L1 // ψέγεται] ψεκτά L // τὰ ἀγαθὰ] τἀγαθὰ L // 12 ἐπαινεῖται] ἐπαινετά L // 16 μὴ deest in L // 18 ποῖός τις] ὁ ποῖός τις L EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a24 αἱ deest in PCB // 32 οὗτος] ὁ τοιοῦτος PCB // 1228b1 πλὴν] πλὴν ὡς PCB // 1228b6 καὶ2 deest in L // 10 πρῶτον deest in PCB //12 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ L //

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236  A ppe n d i x

αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ PC1B // 13 πολλὰ deest in L // 14 ἰσχυρὸς] εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς L // 19 τὸ ἀγαθόν] τἀγαθόν L // 20 καὶ1 deest in L // 26 ϕοβερὰ deest in L // 28 ἃ ἔστι] ἅ ἐστι PCB // 1229a3 αἱρεῖσθαι] ἀναιρεῖσθαι L // 16 τὰς] τοὺς L // 18 ϕερόμενα] ϕοβερά L // 21 εὐέλπιδας] ἐλπίδας PCB // 40 οἱ deest in L // 1229b1 οἱ deest in L // 3 καὶ δὴ καὶ] καὶ δὴ L // 15 δὴ ὅτι] διότι L // 25 σϕόδρα] σϕοδρὰ L (deest in B) // 26 σϕόδρα] σϕοδρὰ L (deest in B) // δ’ ] δὲ L (deest in B) // 1230a9 εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρεῖαν PC, τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἶναι L (desunt in B) // 29 δὲ πῶς] δέ πως PC (desunt in B) // 32 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα PCB // 1230b4 δέ deest in L // 8 διὰ κολάσεως] δι’ ἀκολασίας PCB // 12 πρότερον] πότερον PCB // 23 πάντα] ἅπαντα L // 33 ἀϕροδισιάζειν] ἀϕροδιάζειν L // 35 κηλούμενοι] καλούμενοι P1CB // 36 Σειρῆσιν] σηρίσιν L // 37 θηρία deest in CB, videtur defuisse in P1 // μόνον] μόνα L // 39 αἰσθητῶν] αἰσθήσεων L // 1231a20–1 ὀψοϕαγία καὶ λαγνεία] λαγνεία καὶ ὀψοϕαγία PCB // 29 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] ἐπι το πολὺ L // 31 τε] τὲ L // 32 οὐ] καὶ L // 33–4 καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες desunt in PC (et in B) // 1231b3 τοῦ γένους] τὸ γένος L // 5–6 καὶ χαλεπότητος desunt in PCB // 6 τὸν] τὸ L // 11 μηδ’ ] μὴ δ’ L // 20 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L // 23 οἷς2] οἷς οὐ PCB // 25 ἂν deest in L // 26 τοῦ2 deest in L // 31 ἄσωτος] ἄσωματος L // 37 ἀσωτίας] ἀσωτείας PCB // 1232a6 ἂν εἴη] εἴη ἂν L // 12 κίμβιξ] κίβιξ PCB // 13 μὴ deest in PCB // 14 κίμβιξ] κίβιξ PCB // 16 λαϕύκτης] ϕυλάκτης L // 35 ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον] ἡ περὶ τὰ ἕκαστον L // 1232b4–5 δοκεῖ τοῦτο] τοῦτο δοκεῖ L // 14 χαίρειν] χαίρει PCB // 24 ἐστίν] ἐστιν L // 28 δ’ ἐστὶν] δέ ἐστιν L // 29 δ’ 2 deest in PCB // 30 κατ’ ] κατὰ L // 31 αὑτούς] αὐτοὺς L // 32 δ’ deest in PCB // 37 ἀξιοίη] ἀξιῴη L // 1233a1 ἐνταῦθα] ἐνταῦθ’ L // 2 ὢν ἄξιος] ἄξιος ὢν L // 3 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν] τοιοῦτος ἐστὶν PCB // 9 τὸ] τῷ L // 19 μεγάλων2] μεγάλῳ L1 // 23 γένοιτ’ ] γένοιτο L // 26 ἢ1] εἰ PCB // 27 ἐλαττόνων ἔτι] ἔτι ἐλαττόνων L // 33 ἔστιν] ἔστι L // 37 τῇ deest in PCB // 1233b18 μὲν] μὲν γὰρ L // 19 παθητικαί ] παθηματικαί PCB // 36 ἀρεσκείας] ἀρεσκίας PCB // 39 δ’ ] δὲ PCB // 1234a6 περὶ] παρὰ L // 10 προσίεται] προσίεσθαι L (deest in B) // 11 τὸν deest in L // 32 πρὸς ἄλλον γὰρ] πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον L // 1234b8 καθ’ ] κατὰ L // 9 κατ’ ] κατὰ L // 11 ἐναντιώτερον] ἐναντιώτατον L // 12 ἐναντίον] ἐναντιώτερον L // 13 τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος] τὸ θάρσος πρὸς τὸ θράσος L // 16 περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἤδη λέξεται post σχεδόν habet L EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1234b33 τὸν ϕίλον] καὶ τὸν ϕίλον B; τὸν ϕίλον εἶναι L // 1235a13 οὖν deest in PCB // τὸ2] τὸν L // 17 μὲν] μὲν οὖν PCB // 17 πάντων] πάντων γὰρ PCB // 18 εἰς τοὐναντίον] ἐκ τοὐναντίον P1CB1 // ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν] ὅμοιον ἔχει ἐχθρὸν L // 23 ἐχθρᾶς] ἔχθρας L // θ’ ] τε PCB; τὲ L // ἡμέρας] ἡμέρα L // 25 ϕίλα] ϕἰλοι L // 31 ἐγγυτέρω] ἐγγυτέραι L // 1235b11 ἀτυχίαις] ἀποχίαις P1CB // 14 δὴ] δὲ L // 33 αὐτὰ] αὐτῷ PCB // μὲν deest in L // 35 οὔ deest in PCB

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   237 // ϕαρμακείας] ϕαρμακίας PCB // 37 καὶ deest in PCB // 1236a13 τὸν] τὸ PCB // 17 εἴδη deest in P1CB // 26 ψεῦδος] ψευδές PCB // 32 ἤδη] εἴδη PCB // 35 χρήσιμοι] χρήσιμον PCB // 36 Γλαῦκ’ ] γαῦκ’ PCB // 38 Ἀθηναῖοι] ἀληθῆναι PCB, ἀθῆναι L// 1236b22 ἐστι] ἔστι PCB // 23 πάσας] πᾶσαι PCB // 38 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ PCB // 39 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν L // 1237a5–6 ἀϕυὴς εὐϕυῶς PCB, ἀϕυὴς εὐϕυοῦς L // 6 καὶ ἀνάγκη] ἀνάγκη καὶ PCB, ἀνάγκη L // 12 τῳδὶ] τῷ δι’ PCB // 13 ἕξεων] ὀξέων P1CB // 21 πότερον] καὶ πότερον L // 25 οὕτω] οὕτως PCB // 26 ἀναγνωρίσεις] γνωρίσεις PCB // 30 τελεωθέντα P1CB, τελειωθέντα L // 31 ἀντιπροαίρεσις] ἀντὶ προαιρέσεως L // 32 ἡ2 deest in L // 1237b2 ἢ] ᾗ L // 16 οὐδ’ ] οὐκ PCB // 19 οὐ deest in PCB // 21 εἰ deest in P1CB // 26 οὐδ’ ἐν] οὐδὲν P1CB // 29 εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν] εὐεξαπατη­ τότεροι εἰσὶν L // 30 τὰ] τοῦ P1CB1 // 31 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε L // 34 γίγνεται] γίνεται L // 37 δοκεῖ] δοκεῖν P1CB // 37 τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος] τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα PC, τόν . . . νοῦν ἔχοντα B // 1238a3 ἁλῶν] ἄλλων P1CB // 9 οἷόν τε] οἴονται PCB // 18 αἱ add. L // 20 ὄντως] οὕτως PCB // τυχόν] τυχών P1CB, ἀτυχ L // 27 ὁμολογήσαιεν] ὁμολογήσειε P1CB // 28 πόματος] πώματος PCB1 // 36 ᾗ] οἱ PCB, ἢ L // μὴ δι’ ἕτεροι PCB, μηδ’ ἕτεροι L // 38 ἀλλήλοις] ἀλλήλους L // 1238b2 ϕαύλῳ] ϕαύλων PCB, ϕαῦλον L // 8 πιεῖν] ποιεῖν P1CB1 // 12 σπουδαίῳ] σπουδαῖοι L // 16 εἰσὶν ἀρετῆς] ἀρετῆς εἰσιν L // 24 ἡ δὲ] ἢ PCB // 37 ἐρώμενος] ἐρρωμένος PCB2, ἐρωμένος B1 // 1239a3 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 17–18 οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς] οὐδ’ αὐτὸ ὡς ἐπιζητοῦσι PCB // 19 δὴ] δὲ L // 1239b8 ὑπὸ] ἀπό L (deest in B) // 15 οὐ] οἱ P1CB // 16 βέβαιος] βεβαία L // οὕτω] οὕτως PCB // 19 ἕξεις] αἱ ἕξεις PCB // 21 τοὺς ϕαύλους] τοῖς ϕαύλοις PCB // 31 τὸ PCB, τῷ L // γίνεσθαι] γένεσθαι L // 38 πᾶσι] πᾶσαν P1CB1 // 1240a3 οὖν] γὰρ PCB // 11 τὰ] τὸ PCB // 15 οὕτως] οὗτος L // 16 εἴρηται πῶς PCB, εἴρηταί πως L // 18 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ L // 20 εἰ P1CB, ἡ L // 21 ᾗ] ἡ P1CB // 24 τἀγαθὰ] τὰ ἀγαθὰ L // 27–8 μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξαιεν PCB, μὴ τὸ [spatium quadraginta fere litterarum] δόξειε L // 31 ἂν deest in PCB // οἱ2] ὁ L // 1240b2 τῆς deest in L // 7 δοκεῖν] δοκεῖ L // 14 αὑτῷ1] αὐτῷ L // ᾗ] ἡ L // αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ L // 19 αὑτῷ1] αὐτῷ L // 21 οὔτε] οὔθ’ L // τῷ] τὸ P1CB // 24 τὸ] τῷ L // 27 ζητεῖ] ζητεῖται PCB // 29 εἶναι] εἶνα L // 34 οὐθέτερον] οὐθ’ ἕτερον PCB // ἐϕ’ αὑτοῖς] ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς PCB // 35 ἀλλὰ κἂν διαϕέρωνται] ἀλλὰ διαϕέροντα PCB // συγγενεῖς ἔτι] ἔτι συγγενεῖς PCB // 1241a6 τἀγαθὰ] τὰ ἀγαθά L // 7–8 οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὔνοια desunt in P1CB // 9 εἰ δὴ PCB, εἰ δ’ ἡ L // 17 πρακτὰ] πρακτικὰ P1CB // ὁμονοοῦσι] εὖ νοοῦσι PC, εὖ νοοῦσιν B // 21 ὁμόνοια] ἡ μόνοια L // 29 ὀρέγωνται] ὀρέγονται PCB // 32 ἑκάτερον] ἑκατέρου L // 38 συμβαίνειν] συμβαίνει P1CL // 1241b12 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 14–15 ὅστις ἀεὶ δὴ PCB, ὅστις ἀεὶ διὰ L // 22 ἀϕαιρετόν] ἀϕαιρετέον L // 24 ἡ τῶν] ἡ τῆς P1CB // 27 παρεκβάσεις] παρεκβάσεως P1CB, παρεισβάσεις L // γὰρ] δὲ PCB // καὶ2 deest in L // 29 ἀριστοκρατικὴ]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

238  A ppe n d i x

ἀριστοκρατιστικὴ PCB // 31 τὰ δίκαια] τὸ δίκαιον PCB // 32 τὸ ἴσον] τὸ ἶσον PCB // 1242a1 λέγονται] λέγων P1C, λέγω B // 6 πρεσβείων] πρέσβειον PCB // 7 αὑτάρκει PC, αὐτάρκει B1, αὐτάρκη LΒ2 // 11 τὸ1] τῷ P1CB // 16 τὸ2] τῷ L // 18 δοῦλος] εἶδος PCB // 21 τισὶ] τίσι PCB // 30 τὸ deest in PCB // 32 ὡς] οὐ PCB // 38 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 1242b7 ἀλλ’ deest in L // 8 αὐτὸς] αὐτὸ L // 11 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 14 ἴσον1] ἶσον PCB // ἴσον2] ἶσον PCB // 15 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 21 δὲ] καὶ L // 27 καὶ ἄρχον] καὶ ἄρχων L (deest in B) // 29 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 35 ἡ deest in L // 1243a8 ἴσον] ἶσον PCB // 11 πιστοὶ] τῆς τοῖς PCB, τοῖς L // 23 οὐ τί] οὔ τι PCB, οὔτι L // 31–2 εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν . . . 34 ἡ ἠθικὴ desunt in PCB // 35 ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι] οἱ ἠθικοὶ ϕίλοι PCB // 36 ἕτεροι] ἕταιροι L // 1243b7 ἐπεὶ] ἐπειδὴ L // 8 ὑποκρινάμενος μηδ’ ἕτερος PCB, ὑποκρινόμενος μηδέτερος L // 14 τοῖς] ταῖς PCB // 16 ἑνὶ δὲ τῷδε τῷ PCB, ἑνὶ τῷδε τῷ L // 20 Παμμένης] μαμμενὴς PCB // 21 ὅλως] ὅλος PCB // 26 ἐποίησε] ἐποίησεν PCB // εὐϕρᾶναι] εὐϕράναι PCB // 28 μὲν deest in L // 32–3 ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα . . . τὸ ἀνάλογον desunt in PCB // 36 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L // 1244a8 ὁ δὲ ἔσται οὔπω δέ desunt in PCB // 11 εἰσϕέροις PCB, εἰσϕέρης L // 18 οὗτος] οὕτως P1CB // 22 γὰρ deest in PCB // 24 ἄλλῳ] ἄλλως PCB // 25 ἄλλῳ] ἄλλως PCB // συναλγεῖν] συναγαγεῖν P1CB // 29 ὁ] οἱ PCB // 29–30 καὶ ποιήσας εὖ . . . ὑπάρχειν desunt in PCB // 32 ἀλλήλους ἔνιοι] ἔνιοι ἀλλήλους L // 34–5 καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο desunt in PCB // 37 ζητήσαντες] ζήσαντες L // 1244b3 εἴ τις] εἴ τε P1CB, εἴ τι L // 6 αὐτάρκους] αὐταρκῶς PC, αὐταρκῆ B, αὐτάρκως L // 7 αὑτῷ ἱκανὸς] ἱκανῶς αὐτῷ L // 9 δεήσεται] δεήσεως L // 23 λανθάνει] λανθάνειν P1CB // 24 λαβοῦσι] λαβοῦσιν L // 25 ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν . . . 27 γνωρίζειν desunt in PCB // 28 διὰ τοῦτο] διατούτο L // 33 ἀνθ’ αὑτοῦ] ἀντ’αὐτοῦ L // 1245a1 ἐστιν] ἔστιν L // 2 αἱρετοῦ] ἑτέρου L // 7 μὲν deest in L // 15 ἀναϕέρεις P1CB, ἀναϕἐρει L // 21 οὗ] οὐ PCB // 23 διό ϕησι] διὸ ϕησὶ L // 26 οὐχὶ P1CB, οὐχ ᾗ L post corr. // 28 ὁ μὲν τοίνυν] ὁ μέντοι οὖν PCB // 29 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L // 33 τὴν deest in L // 34 τὸ deest in L // 37 πως] πῶς PCB // 38 τὸ2] τὰ L // 1245b7 οὗ] οὐ P1CB // 8 τέλους] τέλος P1CB // 17 ἄλλο τι] ἀλλότριον PCB // 18 αὐτὸς αὑτόν] αὐτὸς αὐτόν L // 25 πολλοὺς] πολλοῖς P1CB // 33 ἐκέλευσεν] ἐκάλεσεν L // 34 Διοσκόρους] Διὸς κούρους L // 40 τὸ] τῶν P1CB // 1246a1 τὸ] τοῦ P1CB // 3 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἅμα desunt in PCB // 13 ὁτὲ] ὅταν P1CB // 14 καὶ μάλ’ εὔλογον] καὶ μᾶλλον εὔλογον P1CB // 15 τοῦτο] ταῦτα L // 19 εἰ αὐτός] εἰ ὁ αὐτός PCB // ᾖ] ἢ PCB // 20 τοῦτ’ ] τότ’ P1CB // 21 καὶ deest in L // 24 οἰκείου deest in PCB // 25 ὅτι] ὅ τί L EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

1246a27 ἀπορήσειε] πορήσειε L // 27–8 ἐϕ’ ᾧ] ἐϕ’ ἃ L // 32 ϕαγεῖν] ϕυγεῖν PCB // 34 δὴ νῦν] δὴ L // 36 εἰ δὴ] εἴδη PCB, ἤδη L // 37 εἶπαν PCB, εἶπε L //

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   239 1246b 9 ᾗ] ᾖ PCB // 11 ἔτι deest in PCB // 12 ἐπιστήμη γε] ἐπιστήμη γε ἢ νοῦς L // 12–13 χρῆται γὰρ αὐτῇ· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἀρετὴ desunt in PCB // 16 ἡ deest in PCB // 17 ἐν μὲν] μὲν ἐν L // 20 τὴς] ταῖς PCB // 21 ποτὲ] πότερον PCB // 30 στρέϕει] τρέϕει L // 35 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L // ϕρόνιμοι] ϕρόνιμαι PCB // 1247a1 ποιούσης] εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L // 2 ἆρ’ ] ἄρ’ L // 5 πολὺ] πολλοὶ PCB // 15 ἔτι] ἔστι L // 16 μὲν deest in L // οὐθὲν deest in PCB // 18 πολὺ χρυσίον] πολυχρυσίον PC, χρυσίον B // 19 πεντηκοστολόγων] πεντηκοστῷ λόγων PCB // 22 οὐθέν] οὐδέν L // 26 post κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν L habet ἀλλ’ οὗτος εὐτυχ [spatium duarum litterarum] τὸν δαίμον’ ἔχει κυβερνήτην ἀγαθόν // 28 ἐπιτροπείᾳ] ἐπιτροπίᾳ L // 33 ἢ ὡς] εἰ ὡς PCB; ὡς L // 34 ὥσπερ ὅτι] ὅτι ὥσπερ PCB // 1247b2 οὕτως] οὕτω L // 7 ἄλογον] ἀνάλογον L // 9 πρόβλημα ἂν] πρόβλημ’ ἂν L // 10 διατί PC, διατὶ L (deest in B) // καὶ πάλιν] καὶ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν L // 16 συμβαίνῃ PC, συμβῆναι L // 18 κύβους] κοίβους P1C (deest in B) // 21 ἡδέος] ἡδέως PCB1 // 25 καὶ πότε PCB, ποτὲ L // 31 ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον] ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίων P, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίον CB // 32 κατορθοῦνται PCB, κατορθοῦν τὲ L // 39 οὕτω] οὕτως PCB // 1248a4 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι L // 6 ἣ PCB, ἢ L // 9 οὖν] ἂν PCB // 15 οὐδ’ ] οὐδὲν PCB // 19 δὴ deest in L // 26 τοῦτ’ ἔστι] τουτέστι PCB // 28 οὐ deest in PCB // 29 ἀλλά τι] ἀλλὰ τί PC, ἀλλὰ τὶ B // 32 βουλεύεσθαι] βουλέσθαι L // 33 τοιαύτην ἣ κρείττων τοῦ νοῦ καὶ desunt in PCB // 37 μόνον] μόνων PCB // 41 εὐθυόνειροι] εὐθυώνειροι L // 1248b5 οὗτος] οὕτω PCB // 11 διαρθρωτέον] διορθωτέον PCB // 15 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὅλον μὲν] οὐθεὶς μὲν ὅλον PCB // 35–6 τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ καλὰ ὑπάρχειν . . . εἶναι desunt in PCB // δι’ αὐτὰ] δ’ αὐτὰ L (desunt in PCB) // 37 αἵ τ’ ] αἵ τε PCB // 39 οἵαν] οἷον PCB // Λάκωνες] λάκονες L // 1249a7 τῇ deest in L // 18 δ’ εἴρηται] διήρηται P1CB // ποῖόν τι] ποῖον τι L // 19 καὶ καλὰ (καὶ) τὰ τε ἁπλῶς desunt PCB // 20 ἡδέα deest PCB // διὰ τοῦτο] διατοῦτο L // 21 τοῦτο] τούτου PCB // 24 ὑγιαῖνον] ὑγιεινὸν L // 1249b3 πλήθους] πλῆθος PCB // ὀλιγότητος] ὀλιγότης PCB // 5 τροϕὴν] τὴν τροϕὴν L // 9 τὴν deest in L // 11–12 ἂν δέοι] δὴ δέοι PCB // 18 ἥτις] εἴ τις L // 19 τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μάλιστα] μάλιστα τήν τοῦ θεοῦ PCB // 21 ἥτις] εἴ τις L // 24 ὁ deest in PCB // αἰσθάνηται] αἰσθάνεται L

(3) Readings shared by BL and not in PC or by PC and not in BL (readings in BL presumed correct are in bold) EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1214a25 εὐτυχίαν] εὐτυχείαν PC // 29 συναγάγοι] συναγάγει PC, συναγάγη L // 1214b12 σημεῖόν ἐστι] σημεῖον ἐστίν B, σημεῖον ἐστί L // 17 ὥστε] ὥστ’ PC

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

240  A ppe n d i x // 23 οὔτε1] οὔτ’ PC // 1215a26 ποιὰς τινάς] ποιάς τινας BL // 7 ἐρωτηθεὶς] ἐρωτιθεὶς PC // 1215b24 μηδεμίαν] μὴ δὲ μίαν PC // 26 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν BL // 30–1 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1216a20 οὐδεμίαν] οὐδὲ μίαν PC // 23 ἀληθῶς] ἀληθoῦς PC1 // 1216b33 πως] πῶς BL // 1217a24 βελτίονος τινὸς] βελτίονός τινος PC // 1217b19 οὐδεμίαν] οὐδὲ μίαν PC // 1218a14 ὥστε] ὥστ’ PC // 36 οὐδεμιᾷ] οὐδὲ μιᾷ PC // 1218b9 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν] ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν PC; ἀγαθόν ἐστι L // 25 οὐδεμίαν] οὐδὲ μίαν PC

EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

1219a26 ἀργία] ἀργεία PC // ἡσυχία] ἡσυχεία P1C // 28 ἄρ’ ] ἄρα PC // 40 κατὰ ἀρετὴν] κατ’ ἀρετὴν PC // 1219b20 καθεύδοντες] καθεύδονται BLC2 // ἀργία] ἀργεία PC // 1220a2 ἄρα] ἆρα PC // 33 καὶ2 deest in BL // 34–5 πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ᾽ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται] πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ

χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ’ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ’ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται PC // 35 καὶ πρὸς ἃ] πως ἃ PC, καὶ ἃ B1, πρὸς ἃ L // διατίθησι] διατίθησιν PC // 1220b13 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] επιτοπολὺ B; ἐπι το πολὺ –––– L // 16 ποιότης] ποιός τις PC // 18 αἴτιαί εἰσι] αἴτιαι εἰσὶ PC // 22 ἐστὶν] ἔστιν BL // 1221a28 μηδεμίαν] μὴ δὲ μίαν PC // 1221b5 οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC // 1222a17–18 ἔστι τις] ἔστι τίς PC // 19 οὗ μὲν . . . οὗ δὲ] οὗ μὲν οὖν . . . οὗ δὲ PC // 1222b8 πρὸς τίνα] πρός τινα PC // 12 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 20 μόνον] μόνων PC // 42 τῶν ὕστερον] τῶν ὑστέρων BL // 1223a5 ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν] ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος B, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν L // 17– 19 καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν . . . ἀκούσια desunt in PC // 27 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1223b1 ἀκρατὴς] ἀκροατὴς BL // 5 ὃ] ὁ PC // 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 9 ἀκρατεύεσθαί ἐστιν] ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστιν B, ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν L // 32 τις] τίς PC // 1224a12 τό τε] τότε PC // 1224b38 περὶ] παρὰ P1C // ἐγκρατῆ καὶ ἀκρατῆ] ἀκρατῆ καὶ ἐγκρατῆ PC // 1225a10 ἐϕ᾽ ἑαυτῷ] ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ PC // 30 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1225b2 κατὰ διάνοιαν] κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν PC // 8 ἄρα] ἆρ’ P, ἆρα C // 13 ὁ deest in PC1 // 23 ταὐτόν ἐστιν] ταυτόν ἐστι PC, ταῦτά ἐστι L // 34 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1226a26 γένεσίς ἐστιν] γένεσις ἐστὶν BL // 1226b13 ἕως ἂν εἰς] ἕως ἂν ἢ εἰς PC // 26 διὰ λογισμοῦ] διαλογισμοῦ PC // 1227a13 πολεμῶσιν] πελεμῶσι PC, πολεμῶσι B // 17 ὅ τι] ὅτι BL // 25–6 μὴ ἔστιν] μή ἐστιν PC // 26 μὴ ἔστιν] μή ἐστιν PC, μὴ ἐστιν L // 27 μὴ ἔστιν] μή ἐστιν PC // 33 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 1227b29 οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC // 1228a17 τις] τίς PC EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a23 μεσότητες εἰσί τε] μεσότητές εἰσί τε PC; μεσότητες εἰσὶ τὲ L // 29 θράσος] καὶ θράσος PC // 1228b10 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ BL // 22 ὠϕέλιμα] ὠϕέλημα PC // 27 ταῦτα] ταῦτ’ PC // 33 μηδεμιᾶς] μὴ δὲ μίας PC // 1229a31 οὐδεμία]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   241

οὐδὲ μία PC // 1229b4 τούτου] παρὰ τούτου PC // 1230b16 ἐπιπόλαιον] ἐπι πόλεως PCB2 // 37 τἆλλα] τἄλλα BL // 1231a14 ὅσων] ὅσον L, ὄσοις B1 // 24 ὑπερβάλλῃ] ὑπερβάλῃ PC // 1231b10 ἀνδραποδώδη] ἀνδραπωδώδη PC // 19 ἀνδραποδώδης] ἀνδραπωδώδης PC // 20 τις] τίς PC // 29–30 χαίρων μᾶλλον] μᾶλλον χαίρων PC // 1232a26 ὑπομενετικὸς] ὑπομενητικὸς B, ὑπομονητικὸς L // 1232b2 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα PC // 1232b8 Ἀγάθωνα] ἀγάθονα PC // 22 τἆλλα] τἄλλα BL // 24 οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC // 34 τινα] τινὰ PC // 1233b2 τις] τίς PC // 5 μηδὲ] μὴ δὲ BL // 23 τῷ] τὸ PC // 1234a16 αὑτόν] αὐτόν BL // 18 ἀμϕότεραι] ἀμϕότεροι PC // 20 αὑτὸν] αὐτον BL EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1234b30 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 33 τὸν ϕίλον] καὶ τὸν ϕίλον B, τὸν ϕίλον εἶναι L // 1235a25 οἱ] οἵ PC // 29 τε] τὲ BL // 1235b2 ἄχρηστος] ἄχρηστον PC // 9 ἀτυχίας] εὐτυχίας BL, εὐτυχείας PC // 37 σκότει] σκότῳ PC // 1236b8 ἡμέροις] ἰμέροις P1CB2 // 11 οἱ] οἵ B, οὐ L // 17 οὐδ’ οἱ δι’ ] oὐ δι’ B1L // 23 λείπεται] λίπεται P1, λύπεται C // 1237a8 τὸ] τῷ PC // οὐδὲ μίας ἡμέρας] οὐδεμίαν ἡμέραν BL // 15 ἀτυχίαι] ἀτυχεῖαι PC // 16 εὐτυχιῶν] εὐτυχειῶν PC // 18 εὐτυχίαι] εὐτυχεῖαι PC // 19 ἀτυχία] ἀτυχεία PC // 1238b6 τὰ ἁπλᾶ] τὰ ἁπλά PC // 20 ἴσον1] ἶσον PCB2 // ἴσον2 ἶσον PCB2 // 22 ἄλλη] ἄλλην PC, ἄλλων B // 29 ἧττον] ἥ τε PC, ἡ τέ B, εἰ τε L // 1239b1 τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα] τοῦ ϕιλεῖν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα B1, τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕιλεῖν ἕνεκα L // 1239b22 Κακὸς κακῷ δὲ] κακὸς δὲ // 1238a1 κακῷ BL // 1240a1 ἀνομοίοις] ἀνομίοις PC // 8 αὐτὸν] αὑτὸν PC // 13 κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν] κατὰ ἀναλογίαν PC // 17 πρὸς ἄλληλα] προσάλληλα PC // 19 τις] τίς PC // 1240b5 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PC1 // 6 διά τι] διατί PC, διότι B // 21 λοιδορεῖται] λοιδωρεῖται PC // 23 τε] τὲ BL // 34 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν BL // 1241a5 οὔτ᾽bis] οὔτε bis PC // 17 εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ PC // 22 ἀλλήλους] ἀλλήλοις PC // 27 ὥστ᾽ ] ὥστε PC // 1241b26 συνυπάρχουσι] συνυπάρχουσιν PC // 1242a23 τἆλλα] τἄλλα BL // 1242b22 ἴσα] ἶσα PC // 27 καὶ ἄρχον] deest in B, καὶ ἄρχων L // 32 εἰς τὸ2] εἰστὸ PC // 1243a31 εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ PC // 1243b3 ἀξιωτέον] ἀξιοτέον PC // 5 ἐλυσιτέλει] ἐλυσιτέλη PC // ἐκείνως] ἐκεῖνος B, ἐκείνους L // 11 ἠδύνατο] εἰδύνατο B, ἐδύνατο LC2 // 19 ἄλλου] ἀλλ’ οὐ PC // 34 τί2] τὶ BL // 1244a9 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν PC, ἔστιν L // 13 ἄλλα] ἀλλὰ P1C // 16 τἀναγκαῖα] τὰ ἀναγκαῖα PC // 19 ἐρωμένῳ] ἐρρωμένῳ PCB2 // 23 τἀκείνῳ] τὰ ἐκείνῳ PC // 1244b4 εἰ1] εἰ δὲ B, ἢ L // 15 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 20 αὐτάρκεις] αὑτάρκεις PC // 29 τις] τίς PC // ποιήσειε] ποιήσειεν BL // 32 ἔστι] ἐστὶ BL // 1245a2 εὐτυχείας P1C, εὐτυχίας B, εὐστοχίας L // 5 τοιονδὶ] τοιόνδη P, τοιὸν δὴ C // βούλεσθαί ἐστιν] βούλεσθαι ἐστιν B, βούλεσθαι ἐστίν L // 9–10 διὰ τοῦτο PC, διὰ τουτων B1, διατοῦτο L // 19 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 20 ἥδιον] ἡδεῖον P1C1, ὡς B // 21 καθ’ ὅσον] καθόσον PC, καθ’ ὅσόν B // 38 τὸ1] τῷ PC // 1245b14 οὐ] ὁ P1C,

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

242  A ppe n d i x deest in B // 32 θητεύειν] θηπεύειν PC, θηστεύειν B // 33 εἴποιεν] εἴποιε P1C // 1246a7 ἥδιον] ἡδεῖον PC // 11 ἀτυχίας] ἀτυχείας PC // 24 συναποκτιννύασι] συναποκτειννύασι P1C

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

1246a27 ἑκάστῳ] ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ LC2, ἐϕ’ ἑκαστῳ ϕίλῳ B // 32 ἀποδόσθαι] ἀπόδοσθαι PC // 1246b12 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 16–17 τἀναντία. ἢ ἔστι] τἀναντία η σϕι PC; inter τἀναντία et σϕι habet spatium vacuum trium fere litterarum L (desunt in B) // 20 τῆς] ταῖς PC //1247a1 εὐτυχίας] εὐτυχείας PC // ποιούσης] εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L // 11 τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιὸν δεῖ ἔχειν PC, τῷ τοιόνδε δεῖν ἔχειν B, τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ ἔχειν L // 13 ἡ deest in PC1 // 23–4 ἔξωθέν τι] ἔξωθεν τί PC // 29 μὴ ἔστι] μή ἐστι PC, μὴ ἔστιν B // ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // 33 ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] ἐπιτοπολὺ B, ἐπιτοπολύ L // 1247b10 διὰ τί] διατί PC, διατὶ L (deest in B) // 16 εὐτυχίαι] εὐτυχείαι PC // 28 ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] ἐπιτοπολύ B, ἐπι το πολύ L // 29 ἄρα] ἆρα P1C // εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC // 38 αὐτὴ PC, αὐτὴ δ’ BL // 40 εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC // 1248a1 ἀλλὰ μὴν] ἀλλαμὴν PC // εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC // 2 εὐτυχίαι] εὐτυχείαι PC // 5 εὐτυχίας] εὐτυχείας PC // εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC; ἡ εὐτυχία L // 10 παρὰ λόγον] παράλογον PC // 31 οἳ ἂν] οἷαν PC // 1248b4 εὐτυχίας] εὐτυχείας PC // 7 εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC // 25 ἰσχύς] ἡ ἰσχύς PC // 28 περιμάχητα] περι μάχητα P; περὶ μάχητα C // 29 εὐτυχίαι] εὐτυχείαι PC // 30 δ᾽ deest in PC // 33–4 τῆς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις PC, τῆς τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου B1, τῆς τοῦ ὑγιοῦς καὶ τοῖς τοῦ ὁλοκλήρου κόσμοις L // 1249a6 πράττουσι] πράττουσιν PC; πράττωσι L // 26 περὶ] παρὰ PC // 1249b1 τινα] τινὰ PC // 18 κτῆσις] κτίσις PC // 21 δι᾽] δ’ PC

(4) Readings in C not found in PBL (readings in C presumed correct are in bold) EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1214a24 ταὐτό] ταυτὸ PBL // 1214b1 συμβάλλεσθαι] συμβάλεσθαι C // 26 οἷόν τε] οἷον τὲ C // 1215b20 χειμῶνας] καὶ χειμῶνας C1 // 33 τις] τίς C // 35 δῆλον deest in C1 // 36 διενέγκειε] διηνέγκειε C, διενέγκειεν B, διενέγκοιεν L // 1216a6 τινὸς] τοινὸς C // 1216b14 θεωρῆσαι] θεωρίσαι C // 22 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C, ἀνδρία B // 1217a13 ὁπόταν] ὁπότ’ ἂν C // 1217b10 τἆλλα] τἄλλα PBL // 1217b14 ὕστερον] ὕστεστερον C // 27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν] τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν P, τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν B; τωόντι ἀγαθόν L // 1218a10 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C, ἀνδρία B // 1218b19 αἴτιον] αἵτιον C

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   243 EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

1219a20 λέγομεν] λέγωμεν C // 1220b10 ἀπαθεῖς] ἀπαχθεῖς C // 1221a24 ἀλαζὼν] ἀλλαζὼν C // 1222b1 καίτοι] καί τι C // 1224b35 γίνεται] γίγνεται C // 36 τἆλλα] τἄλλα P1L, τ’ἄλλα B // 1225a25 τοῦτο ἔστιν] τοῦτο ἐστὶν P, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν C, τοῦτό ἐστιν L // 1225b8 ἆρα] ἄρ’ P, ἆρα C // 1226b8 οἷόν τε] οἷον τὲ C, οἷον τε L

EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a30 ϕόβον] ϕόβος PBL // 37 ἀνδρεῖᾳ C // 1228b4 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C // 12 μεγάλα] μεγέλα C // 1229a2 ἀνδρεῖα C // 13 τὰ αὐτά] τὰ αὑτὰ C // 31 ἀνδρεῖα C // 1229b1 σϕόδρα τινὲς] σϕόδρά τινες C // 31 ἀνδρεῖα C // 36 οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος post ἀποθνήσκειν add. C1 // 1230a3 Χείρωνα] χείρονα C // 10 ἱστοὺς] ἰστοὺς PL (deest in B) // 20 τὸν Ἕκτορά ϕησιν] τὸν Ἕκτορα ϕησὶν PL (deest in B) // 1230b25 τε] τι C // 1231a36 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν C (deest in B) // 1231b17 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν] τοιοῦτος ἐστίν PBL // 1232a5 τῆς] τῶν C // 21 του] τοῦ PBL // 1232b11–12 πλούτου, περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν] πλούτου πὲρι σπουδάζειν C, πλούτου σπουδάζειν B // 34 τηλικούτων] τοιλικούτων C // 1233b19 καὶ deest in C // 31 κολακείας] κολακίας C // 40 αὐθέκαστον] αὑθέκαστον C // 1234a20 ᾖ] ᾗ C // 1234b9 αἴτια] αἵτια C

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1234b24 τοῦτό ϕασιν] τοῦτο ϕασὶν PBL // 1235b37 τὸ] τῷ C // 1236a12 ἕκαστον] ἕστατον C // 1236b31 αὐτὸν] αὑτὸν C // 1238a23 ἐδέσμασιν] ὀδέσμασιν C1 // 1238b11 τινος] τινὸς PL; τις B // 25 τὸ videtur defuisse C // 1239a20 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν PBL // 1240a8 δὲ deest in C // 9 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 15 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 18 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 19 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 25 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PBL // 29 αὐτὴν] αὑτην C // 35 αὐτοὺς] αὑτοὺς C // 39 ἐγγύτατα] ἐγύτατα C // 1240b5 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 10 ζῆν] ζεῖν C // 13 αὐτὸν] αὑτὸν C // 14 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 17 αὐτοῦ] αὑτοῦ C // 18 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 19 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 25 αὐτὸν PBL, αὑτοῦ C // 28 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 30 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς C // 1241a7 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PL, αὑτὰ B // 1241b10 τῆς2] τοῖς C // 11 τό τε] τότε C // 1242b13 ἴσου] ἶσου C // 18 ἄρα] ἆρα C // 38 ἀμϕότερα] ἀϕότερα C // 1244b10 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ C // 20 κρίσιν] κρίσις C // 1245a5 τὸ] τὸν C // 38 αὑτόν] αὐτον PBL // 1246a17 αὐτούς] αὑτοὺς C

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

1246a35 ποδί ποτε] ποδὶ ποτὲ C // 1246b 39–40 καὶ ἀρετή] καὶ ἀρετήν PBL // 1247a2 ἐστι] ἐστὶ C // 7 οὗτοί εἰσιν] οὗτοι εἰσὶν PBL // 13 ἄλογος] ἄλλογος C // 21 δεινότατοι] δυνότατοι P, δυνώτατοι C, δυνατώτατοι B // 1248a24 τις] τίς C // 1248b17 κατὰ ταυτὰ τὰ P, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὰ C, κατὰ ταῦτα B, κατ’ αὐτὰ τὰ L // 1249a23 ἔστι τις] ἔστι τίς C, ἐστί τις B // 1249b1 ἐπαινετῶν] ἐπαινετὸν C

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

244  A ppe n d i x

(5) Readings shared by CB and not in PL or shared by PL and not in CB (readings in CB presumed correct are in bold) EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1214b1 διαμϕισβητοῦσι] διαμϕισβητοῦσιν CB // 1215b16 κρῖναι] κρίναι PL // 1216b10 οὐ πῶς] οὐ πώς P, οὔ πως L // 40 διὰ τί] διατί PL // 1218a33 αὐτό τι] αὐτὸ τί PL // 1218b4 τι] τί C, τὶ B

EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

1218b36 εἰσὶ] εἰσὶν CB // 1219a3 τι] τί PL // 1219b18–19 ποτ’ οὐθὲν] πόθεν οὐθὲν CB // 1220a1 ἐνεῖναι] ἐκεῖναι CB // 6 γὰρ deest in CB // 1220b1–2 ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς] ὑπαγωγῆς CB // 1221a18 ὅτ᾽ οὐ] ὅτου PL // 1221b8 διωρίσθω] διορίσθω CB // 21 οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ] οὐ γάρ ἐστιν PL // 1222b35 μεταβάλλει] μεταβάλλοι PL // 1223a6–8 γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε . . . ὅσα δ’ ἐϕ’ αὑτῷ ἐστι desunt in CB // 1224a16 τῷ] τῇ CB // 1225a2 κατὰ ἄλλον] κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον CB // 34 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε CB // 1225b11 δ’ ἀγνοῶν] διαγνοῶν CB // 19 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον] τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον CB // 22 οὐ ταὐτὸ] desunt in CB // 1226a1 δῆλον ὅτι] δηλονότι PL // 1226b6 δέ πως] δὲ πῶς CB // 1227a20 βουλεύσαιτο ἂν] βουλεύσαιτ’ ἂν CB //1227b13 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν PL // 20 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν PL

EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a30 ἐστί] ἐστι CB, ἔστι L // 1229a2 τὸ] τῷ CB // 3 τούτων] τοῦτον PL // 1229a24 ἀποκτείνας] ἀποκτείνειν CB // 26 σύες] σῦες CBP2, θῆρες L // 28 καὶ deest in PL // 41 οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι] αἰσχυνόμενοι CB // 1232a6 χρήσεώς ἐστιν] χρήσεως ἐστίν CB // 1232b13 λυπηθήσεται ἂν P, λυπηθήσετ’ ἂν CB, λυπηθήσαι τ’ ἂν L // 1233b40 ἁπλοῦς] ἁπλῶς CB // 1234a11 τὰ δὲ μή] τὰ δὲ μή καὶ PL // 26 οὐδε] οὐδ᾽ CB

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1235a8 αἰεὶ] ἀεὶ P, deest in CB // 1236a27 πάντ’ ] πάντα CB // 1236b10 λέγουσιν] λέγουσι PL // 15 ἐπεὶ] ἐπὶ CB // 19 βέβαιος] βίαιος CB // 34 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ CB (C post corr.?) // 1237a1 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ CB (C post corr.?) // αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 40 καὶ2] δὲ PL // 1237b23 εὐδιάβλητοι] εὐδιάλυτοι CB // 32 τὰ] τὰ τῶν CB // 1238a18 καὶ δυστυχίαι] καὶ δυστυχεῖαι P, desunt in CB, καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι L // 1238b20 δ’ deest in CB // 31 ὡς δ᾽ αὔτως] ὡς δ’ αὕτως PL // 1239b10 εἰσι] εἰσὶ PL // 23 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 1240b5 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PL // 6 χάριτος P1L, οὐ χάριτος CB // 11 αὐτὸς] αὑτὸς CB // 12 αὑτόν] αὐτόν PL // 17 αὑτὸν] αὐτὸν PL // 19 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 27 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 28 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 30 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL / 1241a2 ταυτὰ PL, ταῦτα CB // 6 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ CB // 29–30 οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ’ ] οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες C, οἱ ὁομονοοῦντες B // 36

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   245

αὐτοὺς P1L, αὑτοὺς CB // 38 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ PL // 1241b11 διωρίσθω] διορίσθω CB // 36 ἀριστοκρατικὴ] ἀριστοκρατιστικὴ CBP2 // 1242a3 καὶ υἱῶν] πρὸς υἱόν CB // 27 ἔστι τίς PL, ἐστὶ τίς C, ἔστι τις B // 1243b20 παντί τινος P1L, παντὶ τινός CB // 37 δὲ] γὰρ CB // 1244a30 δόντι] ὄντι CB, δίδοντι L // 1244b16 χρήσεως] χρήσεται CB // 1245a38 πως] πῶς CB // 19 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PL // 24 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε CB // 1245b33 ἐπεί τις] ἐπεὶ τίς PL // 1246a4 πως] πῶς CB // 7 ταὐτὰ] ταῦτα PL, ταῦτ’ CB EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

1246b2 μὴ ἔστιν] μὴ ἐστὶν P, μή ἐστιν CB // 6 ἀληθές τι] ἀληθὲς τί PL // 16 ἂν] ἐὰν CB // 18 ὥστε] ὥστ’ CB // 22 στρέψει] στρέψη P1, τρέψει L // 1247b12 ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν] ἄλλο ταν P1, ἄλλο τ’ ἂν L // 31 ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον], ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίων P, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίον CB // 35 δεῖ] δὴ CB // 1248b20 αὑτῶν] αὐτῶν PL // 28 γὰρ] δὲ CB // 31 τὰς deest in CB // 37 καλὰ] καλά PL // 1249a23 ἔστι τις], ἔστι τίς C, ἐστί τις B

(6) Readings in B not found in PCL (readings in B presumed correct are in bold) EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1214a1 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCL // 8 ἥδιστόν ἐστιν] ἥδιστον ἐστίν Β // 12 περὶ deest in B // τοῦ πράγματος desunt in B // 18 τὴν χροιὰν] τῇ χροιᾷ B // 30 συναγάγοι] συναγάγει PC, συναγάγη L // 1214b8 αὐτοῦ] αὑτοῦ B // 12 δὴ δεῖ] δεῖ δὴ B // 17 οὐ deest in P1CL // 28 εἶναι deest in B // 31 παραϕρονοῦσι] παραϕρονοῦσιν B // 32 διαπορήσειε] διαπορήσειεν B // 1215a2 περὶ deest in B // 3 μηθὲν] μηδὲν B // 5 βίου] βίον P1CL // 10 τῳ] τῷ P1CL // 18 κεῖσθαι] κεῖσθαι καὶ B // 19 ποιούς τινας desunt in B // 22 τί ] τὶ B // εἶναι deest in B // 30 τὰς1] τοὺς B // 1215b1 post ἀπολαυστικόν spatium vacuum quattuor fere litterarum B // 10 ἐρόμενον] ἐρώμενον P1CL // 17 τί ] τὶ B // 20 περὶ ὠδυνίας P1CL, περιοδυνίας B // 21 γε] τε B // 23 ὑπομείνειεν] ὑπομείνοιεν B // 24–5 ἐχόντων ἡδονὴν] ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονὴν PCL // 35 ὢν ἀνδράποδον] ἀνδράποδον ὢν B // 36 διενέγκειε] διηνέγκειε C, διενέγκειεν B, διενέγκοιεν L // 1216a3 τί] τὶ B // 8 καθεύδοντα δὲ] καθεύδοντα μὲν PCL // 10 τί 1] τὶ B // τί 2] τὶ B // 12 τοιαῦθ’ PCLB2, ταῦθ’ B1 // 18 δὴ] δὲ PCL // 18–19 ϕαίνονται τάττειν] τάττονται B // 19 οὔτ’ ] οὔτε B // 31 τίς] τὶς B // 32 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 34 καλῶς] καλὰς PCL // 35 ἡδονὰς τινὰς] ἡδονάς τινας PCL // δεῖ] δεῖ γε B // 36 ἡδοναὶ] αἱ ἡδοναὶ B // 38 περὶ1] παρὰ B // 40 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 41 ἐστιν] ἐστίν PC, ἐστι L // 1216b4 τί] τὶ B // 11 δὲ] δ’ B // 12 ἕτερόν ἐστι] ἕτερον ἐστὶ B // 13 ἐπιστήμης bis B // 19 ἤ τί PCL ἤ τὶ B // 22 ἀνδρία B // 32 οἰκεῖόν τι]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

246  A ppe n d i x

οἰκεῖον τί CL, οἰκεῖον τὶ B // 35 γνωριμώτερα] γνωριμώτατα B // 1217a3 ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας] ἀλλοτρίους τῆς πραγματείας λόγους B // 4 ὁτὲ2] ὀτὲ B // 6 τῶν μήτ᾽ ἐχόντων] ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων PCL // 16 ϕησιν] ϕησὶν B // 17 γὰρ] δὲ B // 21 ἐπὶ τῷ] ἐπὶ τὸ PCL // 23 τοῦτο deest in B // 26 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν B // 30 ζῇ] ἐστι B // 32 μέν ἐστιν] μὲν ἐστὶν B // 34 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 37 λέγεται] λέγομεν B // 38 ὑγίειαν] ὑγείαν B // 1217b1 τί ] τὶ B // 2 ϕασὶ] ϕασὶ μὲν B // 6 τἀγαθοῦ] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ // 8 ἀγαθοῖς2] ἀγαθοῦ B // 10 ἐκείνης] ἐκείνοις B1 // 13 πρῶτον τοῦτον] τοῦτον πρῶτον B // 18 τε] τὲ B // 21 ἰδέας] ἰδέαι PCL // 24 ἔπειτ’ εἰ] ἔπειτα εἰ B // 27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν] τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν P, τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν B, τωόντι ἀγαθόν L // 28 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 34 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // οὐδὲ2] οὐδ’ B // 1218a1 αὐτό γε] γε αὐτὸ B // 10 ἀνδρεία] ἀνδρεῖα C, ἀνδρία B // 12 τί ] τὶ B // 20–1 τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν] τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ἀγαθόν B // 23 τάξις] τάξεις PCL // 30–1 ἐϕίεσθαι ἑνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ] ἑνὸς τινὸς ἐϕίεσθαι ἀγαθοῦ B // 32 ὑγιείας] ὑγείας B // 1218b8 οὐδὲ PCL, οὐδ’ B // 9 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν] ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν PC; ἀγαθόν ἐστι L // 15 τοιαῦτ’ ] τοιαῦτα B, τοιαύτας L // 17 αὑτὸ] ἑαυτὸ B // 20 τοδί, ἀνάγκη] τὸ δι’ἀνάγκην B // τόδε] τόδ’ B EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

1219a4 χρῆσίς ἐστι] χρῆσις ἐστι PC, χρῆσις ἐστίν B // ἀρετή ἐστιν] ἀρετὴ ἐστίν PCL // 5 καὶ πλοίου] καὶ τοῦ πλοίου L, καὶ πλοίου bis B // 12 τἆλλα πάντα] τ’ ἆλλα πάντα C, πάντα τ’ ἄλλα B, τἄλλα πάντα L // 16 ὑγίεια] ὑγεία B // οὐδ’ ἰάτρευσις] οὐδ’ ἡ ἰατρεία B // 17 ὅρασις] ὄρασις B // 18 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 23 σπουδαῖον] σπουδαίου B // 29 δὲ] δ’ B // 1219b10 οὐχ οἱ] οὐχὶ B // 12 διὰ τί] διατί PCL, διατὶ B // 22 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 26 μετέχουσι] μετέχουσιν B // 28 μετὰ ταῦτα] μετὰ τοῦτο B // 34 οὔτ’ 2] οὔτε B // 39 ἐστὶ μέρος ψυχῆς] μέρος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς B // 40 οὐδ’ αἱ] οὐδὲ B // 1220a3 ταῦτ’ ] ταῦτα B // 10 ἐπιτακτικόν ἐστι] ἐπιτακτικὸν ἐστι B // ᾗ] ἣ B // 12 ποῖός τις] ποῖος τίς B // 15 ἀνῆκται] ἀνῆκον B // 21 τί] τὶ B // 24 γίγνεσθαι] γίνεσθαι B // 28 γίγνεσθαι] γίνεσθαι B // 30–1 διάθεσίς ἐστιν] διάθεσις ἐστιν B // 39–40 λυπηρά ἐστι] λυπηρὰ ἐστὶ P, λυπηρά ἐστιν B // 1220b5 ἦθος τοῦτο] τοῦτο ἦθος B // κατὰ] καὶ B // 6 λόγον] λόγων B // 7 ἄττα] ἅττα PCL // 10 τῷ] τὸ B // 25 ὁποιᾳοῦν] ὁποιανοῦν B // 26 καὶ1] καὶ ἀν B // 32 ἑκάτερόν ἐστιν] ἑκάτερα ἐστιν B // 34 ἄττα] ἅττα PCL // 35 μεσότητα τινά] μεσότητι κοινά B // 39 ἀνδρία B // 1221a5 ἀσωτία] ἀσωτεία PCL // 9 καρτερία] κακ ρία (sic) B1 // 19 δὲ καὶ] δὲ B1 // 23 ζημιώδης] ζημιότης B // 25–6 πλείω συνεπαινῶν] πλείοσιν ἐπαινῶν B // 34 σαλάκων] μεγαλοπρεπὴς B // 1221b3 ἐστίν] ἐστιν B // 6 ἔστι] ἐστὶ CL, ἐστὶν B // 11 τῷ] ὁ B1 // 21 τις] τίς PCL, τὶς B // 22 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // τε] γε B // 30 ἔχει] ἔχειν B // 1222a1 ταῦτά ἐστιν] ταῦτα ἐστὶν C; ταῦτα ἐστιν B // 12 ἄττα] ἅττα PCL // 35 ἔνθα δὲ desunt in B // 1222b1 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν B // 6 καὶ αἱ PCL, καὶ B // 7 τίς] τὶς B // 8 ἀποβλέποντας] ἀποβλέποντα

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   247 B // 13 ἐστί] ἐστίν B // 18 ϕυτὸν] ϕυτῶν B // 19 πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν P, πράξεων τινῶν ἐστιν CL, πράξεών τινων ἐστὶν B // 29 κινήσεώς τινος] κινήσεως ἐστίν B // 37 ἐστί] ἐστίν B // 39 δ’ ] δὲ B // 40 μηθὲν] μηδὲν B // 42 εἴ πέρ ἐστιν PCL, εἴ περ ἐστιν B // 1223a2 συμβαῖνον ἐστί PCL, συμβαῖνον ἐστι B // γε] γ’ B // 3 τἀναντία] τὰ ἐναντία B // ἐστι deest in B // 4 καὶ] καὶ αἱ B // 5 ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν] ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος B, ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν L // 9 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 14 ἡ2 deest in B // 15 ταῦτ᾽ ] ταῦτα B // 17–18 ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν . . . ὅσα δ’ desunt in B // 19–20 πάντα δ’ ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἑκὼν δηλονότι τοίνυν ὅτι PCL; ὅσα δὲ προελόμενος καὶ ἑκὼν πάντα δηλονότι τοίνυν ὅτι B // 33 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 34 εἴ βίαιον] εἴ τι βίαιον BP2, εἰ μὴ βίαιον PC // 37 ταῦτ’ ] ταῦτα B // 39 ὁ] ὃ B // 1223b4 δόξειεν ἂν] δόξειε δ’ ἂν PC1L // 5 ἑκών τις] ἑκὼν τίς P, ἑκὼν τις B // 9 ἀκρατεύεσθαί ἐστιν] ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστιν B, ἀκρατεύεσθαι ἐστίν L // 14 τὸ μὲν] μὲν τὸ B // 16 παρὰ] περὶ B1 // 17 ἀκούσιον] ἑκούσιον PC1LB2 // 20 παρὰ] περὶ B // ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 21 ἑκούσιον] ἀκούσιον B1 // 22 ἔοικε] ἕοικε B // 33 πράττει] πράττη B // 34 μὲν] μὴ B // 39 δ’ ] δὲ B // πάλιν deest in B // 1224a6 ἕν τι] ἕν τε τι B // 11 τί PCL, τὶ B // 14 πρῶτον] πρότερον B // 20 ὁρμὴν] ὀρμὴν B // 23 ἐπὶ deest in B // 29 ἔν τινι PCLB2, ἕν τινι B1 // 32 πράττοντα] πράττοντι P1C, πράττοντ B // 34 ἀμϕισβήτησις ἐστίν] ἀμϕισβήτησις ἐστιν B // 35 ὁρμὰς] ὀρμὰς B // 1224b5 τινα deest in B // 11 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 16 ἔνεστι] ἔνεστιν B // 26 ἐν] ἐν τῇ B // τί PCL, τὶ B // 32 ἔνεστιν] ἕν ἐστιν B // 34 γιγνομένοις] γενομένοις B // πᾶσι] πᾶσιν B // 36 τἆλλα] τἄλλα P1L, τ’ ἄλλα B // 1225a1 δὲ deest in B // 6 ὦσιν] ὦσι PCL // 8 αὐτὸ] οὗτοι PC, ἔτι B // 12 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ B1 // 14 ἐστί τις] ἔστι τίς P, ἐστὶ τίς CL // 15 ἀποκτείνας] ἀποκτείνῃ PC1L // 19 αὑτῷ] ἑαυτῷ B // 20 ταῦτα] ταῦτά γε B // 25 τοῦτο ἔστιν] τοῦτ’ ἐστιν PC, τοῦτό ἐστιν L // 29 οὔτ’ ] οὔτε B // 35 μάλιστ’ ] μάλιστα B // 1225b8 ὅσα] ὅσῳ C1, ὅσον B // 9 ἑαυτῷ] αὑτῷ B // τὸ2] τῷ B // τὸ3] τῷ B // 13 μὲν1 deest in PCL // ἔστι] ἔστιν B // 15 τίς PCL, τὶς B // 16 εἰ] ἦ P1C1, ἢ B // ἔχει] ἔχῃ B // 17 ἢ1 deest in P1CL // ταῦτ’ ] ταῦτα B // 21 πέϕυκε] πέϕυκεν B // 23 ἐστιν] ἐστι PCL // 24 ζητοῦντι] ζητοῦνται B // δόξειε δ’ ἂν PCL, δόξειεν δ’ ἂν B // 30 δὲ deest in B // 1226a1 τί PCL, τὶ B // 2 γὰρ deest in B // τι2] τί PCL, τὶ B // 7 οὐθὲν] οὐδὲν PCL // 13 τὶ] τι PCL // 23 ἐνδέχεσθαι] ἐνδέξασθαι B // 24 δ’ ] δὲ B // 25 μέν] μή CL, μὴ B1 // ἐστι] ἔστιν B // 27 ἐγχειρήσειε] ἐγχειρήση B1 // 34 προαίρεσίς ἐστιν] προαίρεσις ἐστὶν B // 35 ἐστίν] ἐστὶν B // 39 δρῶντες] δρῶμεν B1 // 1226b2 βούλησίς ἐστι] βούλησις ἐστὶν B // 16 δὲ] δ’ B // ἐστι] ἐστὶ B // δυνατῶν καὶ] δυνατῶν CL, δυναμένων B // 17–18 μέν ἐστιν] μὲν ἔστιν B // 21 βούλευσίς ἐστι] βούλευσις ἐστιν B // 24 οὔθ’ ὑπόληψις] οὔθ’ ἡ ὑπόληψις B // 26 οὐκέτι] οὐκ ἔστι B1 // 27 αἰτιῶν] αἰτίων PCL // 28 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // διατί PCL, διατὶ B // ἕνεκά ἐστιν] ἕνεκα ἐστὶν B // 39 οἳ] οἱ PCL // τὰ δ’ ἀκούσια desunt in B // 1227a4 ἐστί] ἐστὶν B // 6 βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά τινος PCL,

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248  A ppe n d i x

ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά του βουλεύεται B // 9 τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν] τουτέστιν PC, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν L // 16 τί PCL, τὶ B // 17 ἢ P1CL, καὶ ἢ B // 21 στρατοπεδεύσηται] στρατοπεδεύσεται B // 22 τὸ1 deest in B // ἐστι] ἐστιν B // παρὰ] περὶ B // 25 τ’ ] τε BP2 // 26 μὴ ἔστιν] μή ἐστιν PC, μὴ ἐστιν L // 27 ἡ deest in B // 30 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 1227b7 ἐστι] ἐστιν B, ἐστὶ L // 15 τισὶ] τισι B // 25 δὴ] δεῖ B // 32 τόδε] τό γε B // 39 ἐστίν] ἐστιν B // 1228a4 οὐ τί] οὐ τὶ B, οὔ τι L // 8 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 9 οὐδεμία] οὐδὲ μία PC, οὐμία B // 10 ψεκτὸν] ψεκτον C, ψεκτὴ B // 15 μὲν ϕαῦλα] ϕαῦλα μὲν B // 17 ὁποία τις] ὁ ποία τίς C, ὁ ποῖα τίς C, ὁ ποῖα τις L // 18 μὲν deest in B EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a23 μεσότητες εἰσί τε] μεσότητές εἰσί τε PC; μεσότητες εἰσὶ τὲ L // 29 ἐν τῇ διαγραϕῇ] ἐκ τῇ διαγραϕῇ P1, ἐκ τῆς διαγραϕῆς CP2, ἐκ τῆς γραϕῆς B // 1228b1 ποιοῦσι] ποιοῦσιν B // 2 τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν] τῷ μὲν θαρρεῖν γὰρ B // 3 ὑπερβάλλουσι] ὑπερβάλλουσιν B // 7 τὸ ἐναντίον] τοὐναντίον B // 8 μεγάλα] ὀλίγα B // 17 ἀνδρία B // ἄϕοβον] ἀϕόβους B, ϕόβον L // 17 ἐν τῷ desunt in B // 23 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 29 ἠρέμα] ἡρέμα B // 33 ὁ] ὅ PCL // 40 οὐθέν] οὐδέν B // 1229a10 κελεύει] κελεύοι B // 19 οἵ] εἰ B1 // 37 προσδεχομένοις] προσδεχομένης B1 // 42 ὅσων] ὅσοις B1 // 1229b2 εἰσι] εἰσί PC, εἰσίν B // 6 ὑπομενετικὸς] ὑπομενητικὸς B // 11 λέγεται μόνοις] μόνοις λέγεται B // 13 ὅταν] ὁτ’ ἂν B // 1229b14–1230a35 τὰ μὲν οὖν ϕοβερά . . . αἰσχρὸν γάρ desunt in B // 1230b10 εἰσὶ] εἰσὶν B // 19 κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι] κωμοδιδάσκαλοι P1CL, κωμοδοδιδάσκαλοι B // 25 τὸ γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν] τὸ ἁπτόν καὶ τὸ γευστὸν B // 31 γοῦν] οὖν B // 32 ᾄδοντος] ᾅδοντος B // 33 μήτε ἐσθίειν] μήτ’ ἐσθίειν B // 1231a14 ὅσων] ὅσον L, ὄσοις B1 // 15 ἔοικεν] ἕοικεν B (bis) // 16–17 ἀλλὰ τὸν ϕάρυγγα] ἀλλὰ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ τὸν ϕάρυγγα B // 25 λέγονται] λέγωνται B // 1231a28–1231b2 ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν . . .  προσαγορευομένη desunt in B // 1231b9 ἐστι] ἐστὶ B // 14 τῷ1] τὸ B1 // τῷ2 ] τὸ B1// τὸ2] τῷ B1 16 ἐνταῦθ’ ] ἐνταῦθα B // 19 ὁποίοις] οἷς B // 22 ἕξις] ἕξεις B1 // 23 οὐκ deest in B // 26 ἀνδραποδώδους] ἀνδραπωδώδους PCL // 33 ἐπὶ deest in B // ὁ2 deest in B // 34 ἔσχατα εἰσὶ] ἔσχατά εἰσι PCL // 39 χρηματιστικήν] χρημαστικήν B1 // 1232a4 ὑποδήματι] ὑποδήματα PCL // 4 νόμισμά ἐστιν] νόμισμα ἐστὶν B // 11 περὶ μόρια] ἀνελεύθερα B // 17 ἀπὸ] τοῦ B // 20 ἴδιον] αἴτιον PCLB2, εὔδιον B1 // 23 συμβέβηκεν] συμβέβηκε PCL // 26 ὑπομενετικὸς] ὑπομενητικὸς B, ὑπομονητικὸς L // 28 δὲ] δὲ καὶ B // 33 ἐπαινετόν] ἔπαινετόν B // 37 κελεύσειε] κελεύσειεν B // 1232b7 τί] τὶ B // 10 μάλιστ’ ] μάλιστα B // 11 ὧν deest in B // 23 ἀγαθὰ τίμια] τίμια ἀγαθὰ B // 25 μεγαλοψύχους] μεγαλοψύχως B // 26 ἔστι] ἐστί B // τις] τίς PCL // 29 τὰ δ᾽ οὔ] τὰ δ’ ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον PCL // 33 ἑαυτὸν τούτων] αὑτον αὐτῶν B // 36–7 μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν . . . μεγάλων desunt in B // 1233a1 ἑαυτόν]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   249

αὑτὸν B // 11 οὐκ ὄντες] μικροὶ ὄντες B // 13 δι’ ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἠξιοῦτο (ἠξιοῦντο PC)] αὐτῷ μεγάλων B // 14 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 16 διορισθέντων] ὡρισθέντων PC, ὁρισθέντων B // 19 μικρῶν] μικρὸν B1 // 21 ἔχει, καὶ desunt in B // 22 ἐστι] ἔστι B // 27 καὶ deest in B // 28 ἄρχειν μὴ] μὴ ἄρχειν B // 38 παρὰ μέλος] παραμέλος B // 1233b11 αὐτῷ] αὑτῷ B // 15 ὡσαύτως] ὡς αὕτως B // 21 πράττουσίν ἐστι] πράττουσιν ἐστὶν P, πράττουσιν ἐστιν B // 23 κακοπραγίαις] κακοπραξίαις B1 // 24 νεμεσητικός] μεσητικός B1 // 28 μηδεμιᾶς] μὴ δὲ μιᾶς P, μηδὲ μιᾶς C, μιᾶς L // 31 ϕιλία] ϕιλίας B // 35 βέλτιστον] βέλτιστος B1 // 36 αὐθαδείας] αὐθαδίας B // 38 πάντων] πάντα B // ἄρεσκος] ἄρεστος B // 1234a5 ἀγροίκου] ἀδίκου B // 9–10 ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς προσίεται desunt B // 18 μέν] μέν οὖν B // 22 λεχθὲν] τεχθὲν B1 // 27 πάντ’ ] πάντα B // 30 πως] πῶς PCL // 1234b6 γίγνονται] γίνονται B // 7 δὲ] δ’ B // 8 ὁτὲ] ὀτὲ B // 9 ὁτὲ δὲ] ὁ δὲ B EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1234b17 ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων ζ-ον P1C, ἀριστοτέλους σταγειρίτου ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων δ-ον B, ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων ζ´ L // 18 περὶ] περὶ δὲ B // ποῖόν τι] ποῖον τί C, ποῖον τί ἐστὶν B // τίς] πῶς B1 // 20 ἐστίν] ἔστίν B // 21 τί] τὶ B // 33 τὸν ϕίλον] καὶ τὸν ϕίλον B // 1235a14 τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ] τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον B // 17 τὸ deest in B // 22 πλέονι] πλέιονι B // 26 ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι desunt in B // 27 ἀπόλοιτο] ἀπόλλοιτο B // 29 εἰσί] εἰσίν B // 32 τοὺς deest in B // 35 γοῦν] οὖν PCL // 1235b8 τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γνῶναι] τοῖς δ’ οὐ B // 15 μάλιστα] μάλιστ’ B // 16 τὰ ἐναντία] τἀναντία B // 20 καὶ deest in B // 35 σώματι] σώματα B // 36 σώματι] σώματα B // 1236a1 ἀδιαϕθόρῳ] ἀδιαϕόρῳ B // 8 τοιόνδ’ ] τοιόνδε B // 12 τι] τε B // 17 καθ’ ἓν] καθ’ ἑνὸς B // 23–4 ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου desunt in B // 29 μὴ] μὲν B // 38 Μεγαρῆας] μεγαρέας B // 1236b5 ἀντιϕιλῶν] ὁ ἀντιϕιλῶν B // 10 συνεδρείας] συνεδρίας B // διεδρείας] διεδρίας B // 11 οἱ] οἵ B, οὐ L // 14 οἱ δ’ οὖν] οὐδ’ οὐ PCL, οἵ δ’οὐ B // οὐ deest in B // 30 τἀγαθά] τ’ ἀγαθὰ B // 39 τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά] τὰ ἁπλῶς εἶναι ἀγαθὰ ἀγαθὰ B // 1237a1 αὐτόν] αὑτόν B (C post corr.) // 3 ὅπως] ὅ πως B // 9 τἀγαθὸν] τὸ ἀγαθὸν B // 20 τί] τὶ B // ποτ’ ] πότε B // ἐστὶ] ἔσται B // 21 κἂν εἰ μὴ] κἂν ᾖ μὴ P, κἂν μὴ B // 1237b2 ᾗ2] ᾖ B // 4 ᾗ] ἦ B // 7 μή] δή B1 // 11 κεκριμένον] κεκριμμένον B // 15 γυναικός] γαναικός B // 21 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 21–2 οὐδ’ εἰ] οὐχ οἳ B // 23–4 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον] τὸν τοῦτον τρόπον B // 27 ἄπιστος γὰρ] αὕτη γὰρ ἄπιστος B1 // 31 ϕίλου] ϕαύλου B // οὐθεὶς] οὐδεὶς B // 37 τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος] τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα PC, τόν γε νοῦν ἔχοντα B // βέλτιον] βέλτιστον B // 1238a5 τῷ1] τὸ B // δὲ2 deest in PCL // 20 δὲ] γὰρ B // 24 χρόνον] χρόνῳ P1CL // 1238b5 τὰ ἀγαθά] τἀγαθά B // 11 τινος] τινὸς PL, τις B // οἷον deest in B1 // ᾗ] ἢ PCL // ἔνι] ἐνὶ P, ἑνὶ CL,

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

250  A ppe n d i x

ἕνι B // 12 ἂν] ἐν B1 // 20 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 24 post ἀρχομένου e b19 καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον iterum ins. B // 28 τοῦ ἄρχοντος] τὸν ἄρχοντα B // ϕιλεῖν2 deest in B // 29 ἧττον] ἥ τε PC, ἡ τέ B, εἰ τε L // τοῦ] τῷ B // 30 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ PCL // 37 τοιαῦτ’ ] τοιαῦτα B // 1239a4 ὑπεροχήν εἰσι] ὑπεροχήν ἐστιν B // 5 ἂν εἴη εἰ desunt in B1 // 12 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 22 κατ’ ἰσότητα] καθ’ ἵσότητα B // 23 κόλαξ] κόραξ B // 26 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ] ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἐστίν B // 28 ϕιλότιμος μᾶλλον] μᾶλλον ϕιλότιμος B // 30–1 ἔνεστι γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα P1CL, desunt in B // 31 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλ συμβεβηκός P1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖν συμβεβηκός CL, συμβεβηκός γὰρ τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 33 τὸ2] τῷ B // ϕιλεῖσθαι] ϕιλεῖσθαι ἔστι B // 35–6 ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς] ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς PCL, desunt in B // 36 ποιοῦσι] ποιοῦσιν B // 37 ἐθέλειν] θέλειν B // 38 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ CL, deest in B // καὶ deest in B // τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν desunt in B // 1239b1 τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα] τοῦ ϕιλεῖν καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕίλου ἕνεκα B1, τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ ϕιλεῖν ἕνεκα L // 3 γινώσκουσι γάρ ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκονται desunt in B // 5 ἀντιϕιλεῖσθαι] ἀντιϕιλεῖν B // 6 κατ’ ἰσότητα] καθ’ ἵσότητα B // οἱ καθ’ desunt in B // 7–8 καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς desunt in B // 8 ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπεριλαμβανόντων desunt in B // 9 τὸ ἐναντίον] τοὐναντίον B // 10 καὶ περὶ τούτων desunt in B // 23 αὐτὸ] αὑτὸ B // 32 συμβεβηκός ἐστι] συμβεβηκὸς ἐστὶ B // 39 ἐστί] ἐστίν B // 1240a4 καὶ deest in B // 8 ἢ μή desunt in B // 11 ϕίλους deest in B // 15 ϕιλεῖν] τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 17 πὼς] πῶς PCL, πως B // 25 ἀγαθὰ] τἀγαθὰ B // 1240b3 ἀληθῶς] ἀληθεῖς B // 6 διά τι] διατί PC, διότι B // 23 εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ] εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ εἰ δεῖ B // 26 αὐτοις PC1L, αὐτούς B // 28 δύ’ ] δύο B // 32 προαίρεσιν] προαίρεσις B // 1241a11 ἐστί] ἐστὶν B // 14 ἔοικεν] ὡς ἔοικεν B // 16 πάντα] ταῦτα πάντα B // 25 τοὺς] τὸ B // 36 παθόντας] παθόντες B1 // 37 ὑπολάβοι μὲν] ὑπολάβοιμεν P1CL, ὑπολάβοιεν BP2 // 38 συμβαίνειν] συμβαίνει P1CL // 1241b3 σπουδὴ ἐστὶ] σπουδή ἐστι PCL, σπουδή ἐστιν B // 9 διορίζουσι] διορίζουσιν B // 13 πολιτεῖαι] πολιτείαι B // τι] τί PCL, τὶ B // 20 διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν] τὸ ἀγαθὸν διαιρετὸν B // 21 ἕνεκά ἐστιν] ἕνεκά ἐστι B // 24 πόλεως] μόλεως B1 // 25 πολιτεῖαι] πολιτείαι B // 26 πολιτεῖαι] πολιτείαι B // 27 ἐπὶ deest in B // 30 τυραννὶς] τοραννὶς B // 33 εἴδη] ἤδη B1 // 36 ἀρίστη] ἀρετὴ B1 // 38 δὲ] δ’ B // 1242a1 λέγονται] λέγων P1C, λέγω B // 3 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 4 κατ᾽ ] κατὰ B // ἀριθμὸν] ἀριθμῶν B1 // 7 δοκοῦσι] δοκοῦσιν B // 19–20 δίκαιόν τι ἐστίν] δίκαιον τί ἐστι PCL, δίκαιον τί ἐστιν B // 21 κοινωνοῖς] κοιρωνεις B1 // 37 τι] τοι B // 1242b3 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 11 κατ’ ] κατὰ B // 17 συζεύγνυσι] συζεύγνυσιν B // 19 ἀνισάσαι] ἀνισῶσαι B // 27 καὶ ἄρχον] deest in B, καὶ ἄρχων L // 34 ὅταν] ὅτι B1 // 36 καὶ deest in B // 1243a8 ἐστὶ] ἐστιν B // 11 οἱ] οἵ B // 13 αὑτοῖς] αὐτοῖς PCL // 14 πιστεύσωσι] πιστεύσωσιν B // 23 ἠδύνατο] ἐδύνατο BP2C2 // 34 δὲ] δ’ B // 35 τι] τί PCL // 1243b3 οὐθὲν] οὐδὲν B // 10 προαίρεσιν] τὴν

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   251

προαίρεσιν B // 14 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται] γίνεται πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα B // 29 λόγῳ] λόγου B1 // 31 μὴ τῷ] μὴ τὸ PCL, τὸ B1 // 1244a3–4 πρόβλημά ἐστι] πρόβλημά ἐστιν B // 9 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν PC, ἔστιν L // 10 λέγει Εὐριπίδης] Εὐριπίδης λέγει B // 11 λόγων] λόγον PCL, deest in B // ἂν deest in B // 11 ἔργον] ἔργων PCL // 13 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν B // 14 πάσας] πόσας P1CL // 16 ἄλλα] ἀλλὰ PC, ἄλλαι L // 19 τούτῳ PCL, τούτο B1 // 27 εἰσι] εἰσί PCL, εἰσιν B // 1244b4 εἰ1] εἰ δὲ B, ἢ L // ἢ οὔ] ἢ ὁ PCL, desunt in B // 5 τί] τὶ B // 6 αὐτάρκους] αὐταρκῶς P1C, αὐταρκῆ B, αὐτάρκῶς L // 17 ὅταν γὰρ] ὅταν μὲν γὰρ B // 18 μηθενὸς] μηδενὸς B // 24 τί] τὶ B // 36 ἐκ τούτων desunt in B // 1244b36– 1245a1 τὸ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην ϕύσιν] τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην ϕύσιν P1CL, τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ἔχουσι τοιαύτην ϕύσιν B // 1245a2 συστοιχίας] εὐτυχείας P1C, εὐτυχίας B, εὐστοχίας L // 5 βούλεσθαί ἐστιν] βούλεσθαι ἐστιν B, βούλεσθαι ἐστίν L // 9–10 διὰ τοῦτο] διὰ τουτων B1, διατοῦτο L // 11 ὅτι deest in B // 15 ἢ] εἰ B // 19 καὶ deest in B // 20 ἥδιον] ἡδεῖον P1C1, ὡς B // 25 τοῦτο γινόμενον] τούτου γινόμενον PCL, τοῦτο γενόμενον B // 29 γινόμενον] γιγνόμενον B // 30 δ᾽ deest in PCL // 1245b3 καὶ2 deest in B // 11 ϕανερόν] ϕανερός P1CL // 15 οἷος] οἷον PCL // 19 ἐστιν] ἐστίν PC, ἐστι L // 27 ὁτὲ] ὀτὲ B // 28 ὁτὲ] ὀτὲ B // 32 θητεύειν] θηπεύειν PC, θηστεύειν B // 1246a5 ἐπεὶ δὴ] ἐπειδὴ PCL, ἐπει δὴ B // 7 συνδειπνεῖν] συνδεικνεῖν B1 // 8 τις] τίς PCL // 13 τοὺς τοιούτους] τοὺς PCL // 16 τὸν ϕίλον θεωρεῖν] τὸν θεωρεῖν τὸν ϕίλον B // 18 ἄλλο τι] ἄλλό τι B EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

1246a27 ἑκάστῳ] ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ LC2, ἐϕ’ ἑκάστῳ ϕίλῳ B // 28–9 ἢ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ κατὰ συμβεβηκός PCL, ἢ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός B // 31 ὅτι μὲν] ὅτι μὲν δὴ B // 38 ἀδικήσει ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης . . . 1246b1 ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ­desunt in B // 1246b3 ἀλλὰ] ἀλλ’ B // 16–18 ἢ ἔστι . . . ἕτερᾳ μεταποιοῦνται desunt in B // 33 πάντα] πάντα ἃ B // 38 γνώσεως] γνώσ PCL // 1247a1 ποιούσης] εὐποιούσης PC, εὖ ποιούσης L // 5 ἐστὶ] ἐστιν B // 11 τῷ τοδὶ τοιονδὶ ἔχειν] τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιὸν δεῖ ἔχειν PC, τῷ τοιόνδε δεῖν ἔχειν B, τῷ τὸ δεῖν τοιονδὶ ἔχειν L // 14 διατί1 PCL, διατὶ B // διατί2 PCL, διατὶ B // 21 δεινότατοι] δυνότατοι P, δυνώτατοι C, δυνατώτατοι B // 28 ϕύσει ἢ νόῳ] ϕυσειόω B1 // 29 μὴ ἔστι] μή ἐστι PC, μὴ ἔστιν B // 34 τοιοσδὶ] τοῖος δεῖ P, τοῖος δὴ CL, deest in B // 36 ἐστὶν] ἐστιν B // 37 εἰσὶν] εἰσιν B // 1247b3 οὐκ αἰτία] οὐκέτι PCLB2, οὐκ ἔτι B1 // 7 ὁριζόμενοι] ὀριζόμενοι B // 10 διὰ τί . . . 11 τὸ αὐτὸ αἴτιον desunt in B // 12 τοῦτο] οὐ τὸ PC, οὐτὸ L // 15 αἱ deest in B // 16 συμβαίνειν] συμβαίνῃ PC, συμβῆναι L // 17 οὐχ . . . 18 βάλλειν desunt in B // 19 τί] τὶ B // ἆρ᾽] ἄρ’ PCL // 20 εἰ] ἡ B1 // 21 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 23 ᾄδειν] ἅδειν B // 24 πέϕυκε] πέϕυκεν B // 26 κατορθώσουσι] κατορθοῦσι PCL, κατορθοῦσιν B // 30 ὁρμῆς] ὀρμῆς B // 34–5 εὐτυχεῖν διὰ ϕύσιν ἐνδέχεται]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

252  A ppe n d i x

εὐτυχεῖν ϕασὶ διὰ τύχην ἐνδέχεται B // 35 ὁρμὴ] ὀρμὴ B // κατώρθωσεν] κατόρθωσεν B1 // 1248a3 παρὰ] περὶ B // 5 εὐτυχία] εὐτυχεία PC; ἡ εὐτυχία L // 6 ὅτ᾽ ἔδει] ὅτε ἔδει τὸ PC; ὅτε ἔδειτο L // 7 δὴ] δεῖ PCL // 9 ὑπὸ τινός] ὑπό τινος B // μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ] μὲν ἂν δοκεῖ PC, μὲν ἂν δοκοῖ B // 10 τοῦτο] τούτου PCL // παρὰ1] περὶ B // 17 ἆρ᾽ ] ἄρ’ P1CL // 22–3 οὐδὲ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι bis B // 23 ὥστ’ ] ὥστε B // 25 διὰ τὸ τοιαύτη [τὸ] εἶναι τοιοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν] διατί τοιαύτη τὸ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν PCL, διατὶ τοιαύτη τὸ τοῦτο δύνασθαι ποιεῖν B // 26 τίς] τις B // 29 τί] τὶ B // ἂν κρεῖττον] κρεῖττον ἂν B // 30 πλὴν] ἢ B // 34 τοῦτο δ’ ] τοῦτον B // 34–5 καὶ ἐνθουσιάζουσι desunt in B // 36 ἐπιτυγχάνουσι] ἀποτυγχάνουσι PCL, ἀποτυγχάνουσιν B // 1248b1 ἀπολυομένου τοῦ λόγου] ἀπολυομένους τοὺς λόγους PCL, ἀπολυομένου τοὺς λόγους B // 2 μνημονεύουσι] μνημονεύουσιν B // 16–17 τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον] τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν B // 17 τὸ1] τῷ B // 18 καθ’ αὑτὰ] κατὰ ταυτὰ τὰ P, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὰ C, κατὰ ταῦτα B, κατ’ αὐτὰ τὰ L // 19 τὴν deest in PCL // 21 ἐπαινετά ἐστιν] ἐπαινετὰ ἐστίν B // 25 οὐδὲ τὸ] οὐδέ τοι B // ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαθὰ] ἀλλὰ τἀγαθὰ PCL // 26 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων] ἐπ’ ἄλλων B // 30–1 βλαβερὰ τισὶ] βλαβερά τισι B // 34 ὑγιοῦς] ὑγιαίνοντος B // κόσμοις deest in B // 1249a3 δι’ αὐτά] δι’ αὑτά B // 6 πράττουσι] πράττουσιν PC, πράττωσι L // 7 διὸ] διότι PCL, δι’ ὅ τι B // 11 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // 13 ἐστι] ἐστιν B // δ’ ] δὲ B // 16 κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττει] καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκὸς τὰ καλὰ πράττειν B // 23 δ’ ] δὲ B // ἔστι τις] ἔστι τίς C, ἐστί τις B // ὃν] ὃ P1C1L // 1249b15 ἐπιτακτικὸς] ἐπιτακτικῶς PCL // 16 ἐπιτάττει] ἐπιτάττοι B // 17 κεῖνός] τινος B // γε] τε PCL, τὸ B // 21 ὅρος] ὄρος B

(7) Readings shared by PB and not in CL or in CL and not in PB (readings in PB presumed correct are in bold) EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1214b35 ἐλάττων] ἐλάττω CL // 1215a6 εἰσίν] εἰσί CL // 32 μισθαρνικάς] μισθανικάς CL1 // 33 τῶν δ᾽ εἰς] τῶν εἰς CL1 // 1215b27 συναγάγοι] συναγάγει CL // 1217a1 οἳ] οἱ PB // 32 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν PB // 36 κρείττοσιν] κρείττουσιν CL // 1217b33 διδάσκον] διδάσκων CL

EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

1219a6 γάρ τι] γὰρ τί CL // 1225a7 γάρ ϕασιν] γὰρ ϕασὶν PB // 1225b10 ταῦτ’ ] ταῦτα PB // 1226a4 ἡ] ἢ CL // 24 αὐτῶν] αὐτῆς CLB2 // 1226b9 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν PB // 1227a28 τῆς] τοῖς CL // 1227b41 τῶν] τῆς CL

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   253 EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a30 πως] πῶς CL // 1230a36 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν PB // 1231a11 εἰσίν] εἰσιν C, εἰσι L // 1233a23 αὑτοὺς] αὐτοὺς CL // 24 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν PB // 1234b1 τοῖς ἄκροις] ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις PBC2

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1235a37 ἄχρηστα ] χρηστὰ P1B; χρησταὶ C // 1236b30 αὑτὸν ] αὐτὸν PB // 1237a19 πότερον ἔστιν ] πότερόν ἐστιν CL // 1238b11 ἔνι ] ἐνὶ P, ἑνὶ CL, ἕνι B // 34 ποιῶσιν ] ποιῶσι PB // 1239a31 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλ συμβεβηκός P1, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ϕιλεῖν συμβεβηκός CL, συμβεβηκός γὰρ τὸ ϕιλεῖν B // 1242a13 τινος] τινός CL // 1246a8 ἐπειδὴ εἴ γέ ] ἐπειδή γε P1, ἐπεὶ δέ γε CL, ἐπεὶ B

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

1247a34 τοιοσδὶ] τοῖος δεῖ P, τοῖος δὴ CL, deest in B // 1247b19 ὁρμαὶ] ὀρμαὶ PB // 1249a11 καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ] καὶ αὑτὰ τὰ C, καὶ αὐτὰ L

(8) Readings found in P and not in CBL (readings in P presumed correct are in bold) EUDEMIAN ETHICS I

1214a23 δαιμονίου] δαιμονίᾳ CBL // 1214b5 δ’ 2] δὲ P // 7 ἐπιστήσαντας] ἐπιστήσαντα P1 // 1215a15 οὐδὲ2] οὐδὲ διὰ P // 19 αὑτοὺς] αὐτοὺς CBL // 28 〈ἀλλ’〉 ἄλλως] ἄλλως P1, ἀλλ’ ὡς CBLP2 // 1215b34 post προτιμήσειε iterum scripsit πορίζοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις P1 // 36 διενέγκειε] διηνέγκειε C, διενέγκειεν B, διενέγκοιεν L // 1216b7 ὥσθ’ ἅμα] ὥστ’ ἅμα P1 // 8 ἅμα] ἄμα P // 22 ἐστίν] ἐστι P // 23 ἀνδρεῖοι] ἀνδεῖοι P1 // 27 πειρατέον] πειράτον P // 32 οἰκεῖόν τι] οἰκεῖον τί CL, οἰκεῖον τὶ B // 39 τὸ τί] τὸ τὶ P // 1217a16–17 ὁ λόγος. ἔστι] ὁ λόγος ἐστί. ἔστι P // 19 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν P // 1217b21 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν P // 27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν] τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν P, τὸ τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν B, τωόντι ἀγαθόν L // τό τε] τότε P // 37 θεωρῆσαι] τὸ θεωρῆσαι P // 1218a34 ἴδιόν τι] ἴδιον τί P // 1218b2 ὑπάρξει] ὑπάρξη CBL // ἰατρικὴ] ἡ ἰατρικὴ P // 4 πολλαχῶς] ποσαχῶς CBL // 18 τἆλλα] τἄλλα CB1L

EUDEMIAN ETHICS II

1219a16 ὑγίανσις] ὑγίασις CBLP2 // 1219b1 τό τε] τότε P // 8 εὔδαιμον] εὐδαῖμον CBL // 38 οὐκουσία vel οὐκουσιᾳ P, οὐσία vel οὐσίᾳ CBL // 1220a9 διανοητικαὶ] διανοτικαὶ P // 22 αὐτῶν] αὐτῆς CBL // 39–40 λυπηρά ἐστι]

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

254  A ppe n d i x

λυπηρὰ ἐστὶ P, λυπηρά ἐστιν B // 1220b11 ἀπηλλαγμένοις] ἀπηλαγμένοις P1, ἀπηλεγμένοις L // 18 δέ εἰσιν] δὲ εἰσὶν P // 23 πρὸς ἄλληλα] προσάλληλα P // 1221a13 τὰ τοιαῦτα] τοιαῦτα P1 // 17 καὶ3 deest in CBL // 1221b6 ἔστι] ἐστὶ CL, ἐστὶν B // 22 συνειλημμένον] συνηλημμένον P1 // 1222a37 ἀϕέστηκε] ἀϕέστηκεν P // 1222b9 ἐπισκεπτέον] σκεπτέον P // 19 πράξεών τινών ἐστιν] πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν P, πράξεων τινῶν ἐστιν CL, πράξεών τινων ἐστὶν B // 1223a22 ἄρα] ἆρα P // 23 ἐπεἰ δὲ] ἐπεί δε P // 1223b8 παρ’ ὃ] παρὸ P // 36 γε] γενέσθαι P // 1224a31 διὰ λογισμὸν] διαλογισμὸν CBL // 40 ὥσθ’ ] ὥστε P // 1224b40 δὲ deest in P // 1225a12 πώς] πως P, πῶς CBL // 14 ἐστί τις] ἔστι τίς P, ἐστὶ τίς CL, ἐστί τις B // 25 τοῦτο ἔστιν] τοῦτο ἐστὶν P, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν C, τοῦτό ἐστιν L // 26 ἐστὶ] ἐστι P, ἔστι CBL // 1225b8 ἄρα] ἆρ’ P, ἆρα C // 1226a1 οὐδ’ ] οὐδὲ P // 23 βουλεύσασθαι] βουλεύασθαι P1 // 25 μέν] μή CL, μὴ B1 // 30 ἐστι] ἐστὶ P // 33 τῶν ἡμῖν] τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν C1BL // 1226b16 δυνατῶν καὶ] δυνατῶν CL, δυναμένων B // 1227b10 ποιός τις] ποῖός τις CBL // 12 ποιός τις] ποῖός τις CBL // 1228a17 ὁποία τις] ὁ ποία τίς P, ὁ ποῖα τίς C, ὁ ποῖα τις L EUDEMIAN ETHICS III

1228a25 λέγωμεν] λέγομεν P // 29 ἐν τῇ διαγραϕῇ] ἐκ τῇ διαγραϕῇ P1, ἐκ τῆς διαγραϕῆς CP2, ἐκ τῆς γραϕῆς B // 30 ἐστί] ἐστι CB, ἔστι L // 1228b20 ἀγαθά ἐστιν] ἀγαθα ἔστιν P // 33 τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν] τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶν CBL // 37 θᾶττόν τε] θᾶττον τὲ CBL // 1229b27 ὑπομένει] ὑπομένοι P (deest in B) // 1230b2 τό τε] τότε P // 8 ἀνίατοι] οἱ ἀνίατοι P // 29 ὀσϕρήσεως] ὀσϕρίσεως P // 31 τις] τίς P // 1231b25 τις] τίς P // 1232a1 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν CBL // 1233a20 ἄξιον] ἀξίῳ P // 1233b7 ἐστίν] ἐστιν P // 8 παρὰ] περὶ P1 // 1234a15 εὐτραπελίας] εὐτραπελείας P

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII/IV

1235a8 αἰεὶ] ἀεὶ P, deest in CB // 27 ἂν deest in P // 28 θήλεος] θηριεος P1 // 1235b14 τὰ] τά τε P // 25 περὶ] περὶ δὲ P // 32 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν P // 1236a5 καθεστῶτα] καὶ καθεστῶτα P // 10 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπείδε P // 1236a16 λανθάνῃ] λανθάνει P // 25 τὸ deest in P // 1236b3 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν P // 1237a4 καὶ deest in P // 21 κἂν εἰ μὴ] κἂν ᾖ μὴ P, κἂν μὴ B // 1237b28 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ P // 32 προσνέμεται] προνέμεται CB1L // 1238a18 καὶ δυστυχίαι] καὶ δυστυχεῖαι P, desunt in CB, καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι L // 1238b2 χρήσιμος] χρήσιμον CBL // 11 ἔτι] ἐπὶ P1 // 37 εἴρηκεν Εὔνικος] εὕρηκέν νεῖκος P; εὕρηκεναι νεῖκος CBL // 1239a6 δὲ2 deest in CBL // 27 ϕιλητικὸς] ϕιλοτικὸς P // 38 αὑτοῦ] αὐτοῦ CL, deest in B // 1239b19 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ P // 34 εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ P // 1240a2 εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ P // 9 ϕίλος] ϕίλω P // 15 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ P // 31 πρὸς ἄλληλα] προσάλληλα P // 1240b22 πρότερον] πότερον P1 // 1241a5 οὔτ’1] οὔτε P // 31 ᾖ] ᾗ P //

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

A ppe n d i x   255 1241b16 σύνορα] συνορᾷ CBL // 25 χρηματιστικαὶ] χρηματικαὶ CBL // 34 ἡ ἑταιρικὴ] ἡ ἑτερικὴ P1 // 1242a5 ἐπιλαμβάνουσι] ἐπιλαμβάνουσιν P // 33–4 εὖ ποιήσαντος] εὐποιήσαντος P // 1243b4 πολιτικοί ] πολιτοὶ P1 // 7 διείποντο] διποντο P1 // 9 ἐστὶν] ἔστιν P // 13 ϕήσῃ] ϕήσει P // 1244a15 ἔστιν] ἐστὶν P, ἐστιν CBL // 21 πώς] πῶς P, πως CBL // εἰσι] εἰσὶ CBL // 26–7 λέγονται τινά] λέγονταί τινα CBL // 30 δόντι] ὄντι CB, δίδοντι L // 1244b15 εἰς τὸ] εἰστὸ P // 22 μέν τι] μέν P1 // 1245a16–17 τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε] τοῦ τε διδάσκειν οὐτε C, τοῦτε διδάσκειν τοῦτε B1, τοῦτε δοκεῖν οὔτε L // 1245b40 ϕαίνωνται] ϕαίνονται P // 1246a13 ἥδιστον] ἡδίστους P1 // 18 διὰ τὴν] διατὶ P

EUDEMIAN ETHICS VIII/V

1246a34 χρῆσθαι] χρῆσται P // 1246b8 ἁπλῆ] ἁπλὴ P // 34 ἐν τῇ] ἐντῇ P // 1247a21 δεινότατοι] δυνότατοι P, δυνώτατοι C, δυνατώτατοι B // 34 τοιοσδὶ] τοῖος δεῖ P, τοῖος δὴ CL, deest in B // 1247b12 ἀλλ’ ὅταν] ἄλλο ταν P1; ἄλλο τ’ ἂν L // 31 ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον] ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίων P, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοὐναντίον CB // 1248a30–1 διὰ τοῦτο] διατοῦτο P1 // 1248b5 ἐστιν] ἐστὶν P // 18 καθ’ αὑτὰ] κατὰ ταυτὰ τὰ P, κατὰ ταὐτὰ τὰ C, κατὰ ταῦτα B, κατ’ αὐτὰ τὰ L

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/08/23, SPi

Index accentuation, double  2 ἄν, optative without in main clauses  44, 60, 78, 79, 219 B copyist  vii n.1 Bessarion  1–2, 3, 9, 16, 17, 22, 44, 60, 64, 66, 96, 97, 109, 110, 111, 145, 152, 175, 210 book endings  20–1, 100–1, 179, 180, 226–7 book titles, style of  1 Breier, F.  108 Castellani, V.  84–5 Chalkondyles, D.  5, 7, 68, 188, 193 conjectures in derivative MSS  83 connectives, absence of  15, 19, 33, 48, 61, 73, 78, 98, 106, 108, 109, 110, 121, 163, 164–5, 172, 207, 216 Cook Wilson, J.  18, 34, 168 crasis marks  3, 17, 39, 51, 72, 87, 105, 142, 148, 218 divergence between EE and NE  143, 154 ellipsis  16, 17, 24–5, 26–7, 29, 49, 75, 108, 108–9, 120, 126, 130, 138, 139, 141, 173, 182, 183 ἐπεί, concessive  50, 83, 118, 224 Ferreira, P.  29 Frede, D.  84 imperfect tense, ‘philosophical’ use of  2–3 incorporation of marginalia  113, 114–15 iota subscript  26, 27, 35, 67, 72, 105, 118, 136, 149, 159, 182, 184, 186, 194 Irwin, T.  220

Kassel, R.  128–9 Kosman, L.  167–8 L as direct descendant of ω 137 Laur. 81,4  4, 19, 47, 64, 79, 93, 96, 102, 107, 111, 119, 132, 147, 203 Laur. 81,12  2, 105 Laur. 81,20  12, 227 L copyist  vii n.1 Nikolaos of Messina  vii n.1, 38, 46, 60, 78, 80, 96, 100–1, 104, 108, 112, 149, 153, 174, 199 nu ephelkustikon  60, 78, 120, 150 Pal. 165  3 parentheses  15, 24, 32–3, 43, 57, 69–70, 214 poetry, quotation of  1, 105, 107, 111 Primavesi, O.  102 pronunciation, Byzantine  4, 103, 111, 147 quotation marks  44, 131 shorthand  25–6, 47, 59, 75, 102, 150, 152, 183, 197 Slings, S.  57, 69 uncial script  116, 120 Victorius  5–6, 8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 27, 30, 34, 36, 62, 65, 74, 75–6, 80, 105, 109, 113, 132, 133, 148, 164, 165, 166, 184, 190, 194, 195, 204, 208, 220–1 Wagner, D.  221 Widmann, G.  166