Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis [1st ed.] 9789811570469, 9789811570476

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Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

Hussein Solomon Arno Tausch

Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis

Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region Series Editor Almas Heshmati, Jönköping University, Jönköping, Sweden

This book series publishes monographs and edited volumes devoted to studies on the political, economic and social developments of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Volumes cover in-depth analyses of individual countries, regions, cases and comparative studies, and they include both a specific and a general focus on the latest advances of the various aspects of development. It provides a platform for researchers globally to carry out rigorous economic, social and political analyses, to promote, share, and discuss current quantitative and analytical work on issues, findings and perspectives in various areas of economics and development of the MENA region. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region allows for a deeper appreciation of the various past, present, and future issues around MENA’s development with high quality, peer reviewed contributions. The topics may include, but not limited to: economics and business, natural resources, governance, politics, security and international relations, gender, culture, religion and society, economics and social development, reconstruction, and Jewish, Islamic, Arab, Iranian, Israeli, Kurdish and Turkish studies. Volumes published in the series will be important reading offering an original approach along theoretical lines supported empirically for researchers and students, as well as consultants and policy makers, interested in the development of the MENA region.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13870

Hussein Solomon • Arno Tausch

Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis

Hussein Solomon Department of Political Studies & Governance University of Free State Bloemfontein, South Africa

Arno Tausch University of Innsbruck Innsbruck, Tirol, Austria

ISSN 2520-1239 ISSN 2520-1247 (electronic) Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region ISBN 978-981-15-7046-9 ISBN 978-981-15-7047-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

“This sophisticated transdisciplinary study combines qualitative and quantitative methods to offer a cutting-edge assessment of the current impact of three macro-dynamics— globalization, democratization, and development—on the Middle East North African (MENA) region. This is essential reading for both area specialists and social science generalists seeking to understand the latest sociopolitical and economic trends affecting the region and the world.” (Manfred B. Steger, Professor of Sociology, University of Hawai’i and Global Professorial Fellow, Western Sydney University) “The Middle East and North Africa can be considered as a case study of the so-called multipolar world. Uncovering an unpleasant truth about this region, Solomon and Tausch indirectly convince us that the project of multipolar world is theoretically inconsistent and practically dangerous anti-utopia.” (Victor Krasilschikov, Chief Research Fellow, the Institute of Scientific Information in Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences)

“Arab MENA countries: Vulnerabilities and constraints against democracy on the eve of the global COVID-19 crisis are of critical importance for two reasons. Firstly, the existing body of knowledge on conflict, violence, and war in Africa and its interconnectedness with conflict in the Middle East does not provide a complete and comprehensive picture of the totality of the phenomenon. Secondly, countries in the Middle East and North Africa share a unique set of security challenges that necessitates an integrated and inclusive approach. Hussein Solomon and Arno Tausch bring their unique expertise of African and Middle East security together in a detailed security analysis of this critical region in a highly recommendable publication”. (Abel Esterhuyse, Professor and Head of Department of Military Strategy, Stellenbosch University) “A must-read research about the Middle East and North Africa. The critical and empirical approach deserves to be praised since it prevents the research from falling into the pitfalls of ideological dogmas and religious fanaticism. Hussein Solomon and Arno Tausch are to be congratulated on such an excellent job!” (Jacques Neriah, Late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Editor of Jewish Political Studies Review) “Hussein Solomon and Arno Tausch make a valuable and critical contribution to our understanding of the recent economic developments in the Middle East and North African region and its impact on the region’s

societies, cultures, and religion. They also discuss the threat of the impending COVID-19 pandemic in the region, a global event that has changed our world.” (Prof. Corli Wittuhn, Vice-Rector: Research, University of the Free State, South Africa) “Solomon and Tausch have produced a valuable contribution to the literature. Prospects for development in the MENA region are set in the context of a balanced appreciation of the different effects of globalization, political culture, governance, and Islam in different countries. Theoretical perspectives are combined with compelling empirical analysis. There is even a consideration, inevitably preliminary, of how different nation states have dealt with the COVID-19 threat. This pandemic will indeed put the spotlight on different approaches to governance as well as the contrast between robust, democratic civic cultures and malign relations between state, religion, and society. For me, based in the UK which has performed egregiously badly in almost every major respect in its initial reaction to COVID-19, analysis of global variance in performance has never been more important. This book, reporting on the varying prospects for development in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, is a significant contribution.” (Calum Paton, Emeritus Professor of Public Policy, Keele University, UK) “An impressive blend of analysis of the many challenges facing the MENA region, from the political and economic to the social and

environmental, all tied together neatly in one book. Importantly, though, it also shines light on the progress made in dealing with these challenges. In a region so prone to oversimplification and stereotyping, this book clears the air with its detail, nuance, and multifaceted perspectives of the region.” (Virgil Hawkins, Professor of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan)

Contents

1

2

Setting the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Definitions of the Regions Used in This Essay . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Arab League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 MENA Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Globalization: The Defining Process of MENA Politics and Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 What We Aim to Achieve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Failing States and Losing Sovereignty? Reflecting on the State and Politics in the MENA Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Reflecting on the Nature of the State in the MENA Region . . . 2.2.1 On “Stateness” and Institution-Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 The Democracy Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 The Interface Between Religion and Politics . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Ineffective Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Demise of the State? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 The Rise of Non-state Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 The Challenge of Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3 Revisiting Religion and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.4 Re-examining Rentier Economies in the Light of Technological Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Signs of Hope? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 1 3 3 3

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4 5 7

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11 11 12 12 13 16 16 18

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19 20 21 22 23

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25 27 29 30 ix

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3

Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current Global Corona Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.2 Background: Assessing Development on the Eve of the Current Global Corona Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.3 Data and Methods for Our Comparisons of the Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.4 Results: Global Opinion Surveys and Data Analyses on the Overall Development Performance in the Arab World, 1960–2019 – the Overall Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.5 Economic Globalization (Inflows) and Higher Inequality in the Arab World: Mixed Results, No Dramatic Effects . . . . . . 58 3.6 The Global Evidence Based on Macroquantitative Data . . . . . . . 68 3.7 Human Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 3.8 Rapid Urbanization, Fertility Decline and Rising Life Expectancies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 3.9 The Cycles of Economic Development and Economic Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 3.10 A Look at Poverty and Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 3.11 Inequality – UTIP Data Series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 3.12 The Effects of Membership of a Country in the Arab League on Global Development and Value Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 3.13 Gender and Freedom – Naming the Real Development Deficits of the Arab MENA Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 3.14 The Arab World on the Eve of the Corona Tsunami . . . . . . . . . 102 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

4

Arab MENA States and Value Change: What Happens When Economic Globalization Is More Rapid Than Cultural Globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Background: Combining Globalization Research and Global Value Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Data and Methods for Our Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Results: The Process of Globalization in the Arab Countries and the Arab MENA Countries by International Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Globalization, Values and Development: A Meta-factor Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 117 . 118 . 119 . 124

. 126 . 132 . 142 . 147

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5

Beyond Patriarchy: Gender, Islam and the MENA Region . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Patriarchy and Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Beyond Patriarchy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

153 153 154 157 160 163 165

6

Sectarianism and the Politics of Identity in the MENA Region . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Theorizing Identity Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Identity Politics in the MENA Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Beyond Identity Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

167 167 168 170 173 178 179

7

Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab Barometer (5) Data About the “Unword” of Middle East Research? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Background: Challenges Confronting Political Islam . . . . . . . . 7.3 A Contested Terrain? Arab Barometer Research on Political Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Methodology and Data for the Study of Political Islam . . . . . . 7.5 Results of a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism, Based on 24 Variables, Weighted Equally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 Towards a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming of Islamism (1), Weighting 24 Components Equally . . . . . . . . 7.7 Towards a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism (2), Built on Five Different Components, Weighted Equally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.8 Towards a Parametric Index of Political Islam, Built on a Principal Component Analysis of the Individual Level Survey Data Results from the Arab Barometer Survey on the Five Survey Items on Political Islam . . . . . . . . . 7.9 A Note on the Drivers of Political Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.10 Prospects and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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215 223 226 229

Overcoming the Environmental Challenge in the MENA Region . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Nature of the Challenge Posed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Overcoming the Environmental Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

233 233 234 237 243 244

8

. 183 . 184 . 185 . 189 . 198 . 201 . 208

. 208

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9

10

Contents

The MENA Region in the Face of Covid-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 The Nature of the Threat Posed by the Virus and Responses To It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 Concluding Insights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

245 245 246 249 250

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Statistical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 Appendix Table 1: Margins of Error at 95% Confidence Interval . . . . . 257 Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

About the Authors

Hussein Solomon holds a D.Litt et Phil (Political Science) from the University of South Africa. Currently he is senior professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Free State. His previous appointments include being executive director of the International Institute of Islamic Studies (2009–2010); professor and director of the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria (2000–2010); research manager at the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (1998–2000); senior researcher at Institute for Security Studies (1996–1998); and research fellow at the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape (1993–1995). In 2011, he was visiting professor at the Osaka School for International Public Policy (OSIPP). Arno Tausch is currently honorary associate professor of economics, Corvinus University, Budapest, Hungary (since fall semester 2010), and adjunct professor (Universitaetsdozent) of political science in the Department of Political Science, Innsbruck University, Austria (since 1988). He entered the Austrian Civil Service on January 1, 1992, and retired from active service on February 29, 2016. He served as an Austrian diplomat abroad and was attaché and later counselor for labor and migration at the Austrian Embassy in Warsaw, 1992–1999. Since 1978, he has taught numerous regular courses in political science, economics, and sociology at universities in Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, and the United States. He has authored and coauthored books and articles for major international publishers and journals, among them 22 books in English, 2 books in French, 8 books in German, and well over 100 articles in peer-reviewed journals and also numerous articles in the media of several countries. His publications also include a number of essays for leading economic and foreign policy global think tanks, and he is a regular contributor to the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs in Israel.

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List of Graphs

Graph 3.1 Graph 3.2 Graph 3.3 Graph 3.4 Graph 3.5 Graph 3.6 Graph 3.7 Graph 3.8 Graph 3.9 Graph 3.10 Graph 3.11 Graph 3.12 Graph 3.13 Graph 3.14 Graph 3.15 Graph 3.16 Graph 3.17 Graph 3.18 Graph 3.19

Graph 3.20 Graph 3.21

Survival to age 65, female (percent of cohort) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Survival to age 65, male (percent of cohort) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Kuwait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Morocco .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . Globalization and inequality in Oman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Qatar . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . Globalization and inequality in Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in the Westbank and Gaza . . . . . . . . Globalization and inequality in Yemen . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . The connection between human development in 2012 and in 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Urbanization in the MENA countries, 1960–2018Note: This and all the following graphs use the MENA country definition of the World Bank, see Chap. 1, above. The country list thus comprises Algeria; Bahrain; Djibouti; Egypt; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Malta; Morocco; Oman; West Bank + Gaza; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; Yemen (https://data.worldbank.org/region/middleeast-and-north-africa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annual growth of the urban population in percent in the MENA countries, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Life expectancy at birth in the MENA countries, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60 60 61 61 62 62 63 63 64 64 65 65 66 66 67 67 68 71

79 79 80 xv

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Graph 3.22 Graph 3.23 Graph 3.24 Graph 3.25 Graph 3.26

Graph 3.27

Graph 3.28 Graph 3.29

Graph 3.30 Graph 3.31 Graph 3.32

Graph 3.33 Graph 3.34 Graph 3.35 Graph 3.36 Graph 3.37 Graph 3.38 Graph 3.39 Graph 3.40 Graph 3.41

Graph 3.42

List of Graphs

Fertility rate (births per woman) in the MENA countries, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Crude birth rates per 1.000 people in the MENA countries, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Crude death rates per 1.000 people in the MENA countries, 1960–2017, compared to the countries of the Euro area . . . . . . . . 82 Gender differences of life expectancy in the MENA countries, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) in the MENA countries as compared to the European Union and the Arab world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Social convergence of the MENA countries. MENA life expectancy in percent of the life expectancy of the European Union (EU-28) and the United States of America, 1960–2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Military expenditure per GDP, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Convergence of the MENA countries in percent of the GDP per capita, PPP in constant 2011 international dollars of the European Union (EU-28) and the United States of America, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 GDP per capita growth (annual percent), 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Spectral analysis of economic growth in the MENA region – periodogram for 1960–2018x-axis: cycle length .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. 86 Time series analysis (analysis of autocorrelation) of economic growth in the MENA region – spectral density for 1960–2018x-axis: lag number (cycle length) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Children out of school in the MENA region, 1960–2018 . . . . . . 87 Adult literacy rate in the MENA region, 1960–2018 .. . .. . .. . . .. 88 Tertiary school enrolment in the MENA region, 1960–2018 . . . 89 Poverty gaps in the MENA region, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Unemployment in the MENA region, 1960–2018 . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . 90 Youth unemployment in the MENA region, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . 90 Prevalence of undernourishment in the MENA region, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Inequality (GINI index, UTIP data) in the MENA region, 1960–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 The aftermath of the Great Depression in the global periphery. Real GDP pc in PPP (1929 ¼ 100) in India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Egypt, calculated from Barro and Ursua (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 The aftermath of the Great Depression in China, Spain, the Netherlands, France and Belgium. Real GDP pc in PPP (1929 ¼ 100), calculated from Barro and Ursua (2011) . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . 104

List of Graphs

Graph 3.43

Graph 3.44

Graph 3.45

Graph 3.46

Graph 3.47

Graph 4.1

Graph 4.2 Graph 4.3 Graph 7.1 Graph 7.2 Graph 7.3 Graph 7.4 Graph 7.5 Graph 7.6

xvii

The aftermath of the Great Depression in Peru, Switzerland, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina. Real GDP pc in PPP (1929 ¼ 100), calculated from Barro and Ursua (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimated Flu death rates during the Great Influenza Epidemic, 1918, predicted by real natural logarithm of GDP per capita in PPP (UK, 1913, ¼ 100) . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . Rising income inequality over time (Pearson correlation of income inequality with the time axis, 1921–1929, calculated from Grinin et al. 2016, based on Piketty, top 1 percent) and the Flu death rates during the great influenza epidemic, 1918–1920. (Barro et al. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Income convergence/divergence over time (Pearson correlation of income convergence with the time axis, 1921–1929, calculated from Grinin et al. 2016, based on Maddison data of a country’s income per capita in PPP, world average ¼ 100) and the flu death rates during the great influenza epidemic, 1918–1920 (Barro, et al. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Delayed economic recovery from the great influenza depression, 1918–1920, in Italy and the United Kingdom, calculated from Barro and Ursua 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

105

105

108

109

110

Globalization in the MENA countries according to KOF dataNote: The definition of the MENA countries included in the KOF data differs from other international statistics and includes Algeria; Bahrain; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Sudan; Syrian Arab Republic; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; West Bank and Gaza; Yemen, Rep . . . . 127 Social globalization in the MENA region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 The effects of globalization on human values and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Overcoming Islamism (see Table 7.3) and Political Islam (see Table 7.11) . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. Religiosity and Political Islam in the region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Prayer and Political Islam in the region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opinions on Turkish President Erdogan and Political Islam . . . World political perceptions and Political Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Educational level and Political Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

223 224 224 225 225 226

List of Images

Image 7.1 Image 7.2

Image 7.3

“Political Islam” in the Arab Barometer SPSS data file . . . . . . . . . . 194 Middle East research without the analysis of “Political Islam” is impossible: screenshots from the Turkish research libraries union catalogue “Toplu Katalog” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 The number of titles on “Political Islam” in different Turkish research libraries, including President Erdogan’s AKP Party’s research library according to the “Toplu Katalog” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

xix

List of Maps

Map 1.1 Map 1.2

The Arab League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The MENA countries (World Bank definition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Map 3.1

Overall life satisfaction according to UNDP/Gallup poll. (Tausch 2019) . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . UNDP/Gallup poll (Tausch 2019) about satisfaction with the labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overall 35 variable development index. (Tausch and Heshmati 2013) Note: the overall 35 variable development index is downloadable from https://www.academia.edu/35044095/ Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_ development_in_the_21st_Century._Crossnational_perspectives_and_European_implications_ Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDP human development index, 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The dynamics of human development, 2012–2017 (as defined by Table 3.2) .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. .

78

Economic globalization de facto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Map social globalization, de facto .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . Social globalization, de iure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Female population with at least some secondary education . . . . . . . . The benefits of social globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arab patriarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pro-market .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . Trust in institutions and involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-violent and law-abiding society .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. .

128 129 130 133 141 142 143 144 145

Map 3.2 Map 3.3

Map 3.4 Map 3.5 Map 4.1 Map 4.2 Map 4.3 Map 4.4 Map 4.5 Map 4.6 Map 4.7 Map 4.8 Map 4.9

4 4 51 53

55 77

xxi

List of Tables

Table 2.1

Freedom from corruption . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .

Table 3.1

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currencya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human development dynamics 2012–2017 in the world . . . . . . . . The partial correlations of membership of a country in the Arab league on global development and value indicators, UNDP human development index and UNDP human development index^2 are constant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The global development performance and rankings of Arab league countries, and Arab MENA countries. (Based on the data collection, Tausch 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Freedom in the Arab world, 2013–2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GDP per capita in PPP (UK ¼ 100) (Grinin et al. 2016) and estimated Flu death rates during the Great Influenza Epidemic, 1918–1920 (Barro et al. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Expected Covid-19 death rates in the Arab MENA countries, calculated from the regression between ln GDP per capita levels in the early twentieth century and the influenza death rates 1918–1920, see Graph 3.44 and Table 3.6 . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. Percentile global development performance of the countries of the Arab League .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. .

Table 3.2 Table 3.3

Table 3.4

Table 3.5 Table 3.6

Table 3.7

Table 3.8 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5

The ranks of the MENA countries and the Arab World in the global process of social globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The variables of our factor analysis about globalization and values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Factor loadings of globalization and values (factor structure matrix) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Factor correlations in our model of globalization and values . . . Percentile global value development of the countries of the Arab League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20 69 72

94

96 102

106

107 112 131 138 139 140 147 xxiii

xxiv

Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3

Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7 Table 7.8 Table 7.9 Table 7.10

Table 7.11 Table 7.12 Table 7.13

List of Tables

Islamism and Political Islam in the Arab MENA countries . . . . . Country scores: Political Islam and Islamism. Percentages of the total population (valid answers only) . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . A UNDP-type of Index “Overcoming Islamism” based on the valid country-level Arab Barometer results with 24 variables, aggregated with equal weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A UNDP-type of Subindex “No Economic Islamism” . . . . . . . . . . A UNDP-type of Subindex “Accepting the West” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A UNDP-type of Subindex “Overcoming Patriarchy” . . . . . . .. . . A UNDP-type of Subindex “Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A UNDP-type of Subindex “Religious Tolerance” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A UNDP-type of index “Overcoming Islamism”, based on its five subcomponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparing the UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism”, based on aggregated 24 variables and the UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism”, based on 5 sub-components . . . . . . . . . . The factor loadings (principal component analysis) of “Political Islam” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Country values for the principal component: Political Islam . . . Regional support for Political Islam in the Governorates of the Arab World . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . .. .

202 203

208 209 210 211 212 213 214

215 216 216 217

Chapter 1

Setting the Scene

Abstract The MENA region is characterized by numerous crises. These range from the Covid-19 pandemic sweeping through the region to religious fundamentalism, violent sectarianism, vast economic discrepancies, pressing environmental challenges, the intrusions of external actors in the region, and a debilitating authoritarian culture. All of these variables are exacerbated or ameliorated by globalization – a reality that no state can wish away. These challenges can be mitigated by political elites engaging in robust institution-building creating structures fit for purpose whilst at the same time laying the foundation of values amongst citizens like trust in those institutional structures. Keywords Globalization · Instability · Institution-building · Values

1.1

Introduction

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its recent prediction,1 now expects the global economy to contract by 3 percent in 2020, much worse than during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. This scenario assumes that the pandemic fades in the second half of 2020 and containment efforts can be gradually unwound. The advanced economies will shrink by
6,1 percent, while China and India still will experience some sort of economic growth by 2 percent in Qatar, Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania and Comoros. Finally, we risk a prognosis on the overall societal effects of the pandemic. There will be rising income inequality over time. And the severity of the epidemic negatively influences international income convergence over time. With the majority of the populations in the Arab world predictably becoming poorer still by international standards after the pandemic, and with income inequality predictably rising, we should finally look at another lesson of history, which might be deduced from the Barro and Ursua (Barro-Ursua macroeconomic data. Available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/barro-ursua-macroeconomic-data, 2011) data. In the United Kingdom, it took practically a decade to recover the pre-pandemic income levels, and in Italy, the crisis was even more severe, and Italian democracy collapsed and Benito Mussolini rose to power in 1922. Keywords Religion · Arab MENA countries · UNDP Arab Human Development Report

3.1

Introduction

Our exercise of standard development accounting attempts to arrive at a synthesis of the performance of Arab countries as they approach the abyss of the impending global economic recession and health crisis, connected with the Corona (Covid-19) pandemic. The choice of our indicators was guided by world system (Frank 1998) and dependency approaches to development (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985) as well as by later globalization-oriented debates about development (Tausch 2012, 2018) and by indicators featuring internal, “home-made” restrictions on democracy and gender equality. The choice of our indicators was also guided by research on Islamism, and the issues of the way, religion, culture and values are structured in the region (Grinin et al. 2018; Solomon and Tausch 2020). First, we debate the background, present an overview of the methods and data and then portray the most important empirical results. We then discuss these results and present the conclusions from our findings. The vulnerabilities of the region and the development of achievements and deficits are our main focus.

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

38

3.2

Background: Assessing Development on the Eve of the Current Global Corona Tsunami

First, we should recall here that the UNDP, in its latest Arab Human Development Report (UNDP 2016), reached the following verdict on Arab Human Development: This flawed Arab model of development depends on inefficient forms of intervention and redistribution that, for financing, count heavily on external windfalls, including aid, remittances and rents from oil revenues. The reliance on unearned income is sometimes dubbed the original sin of Arab economies. Since independence, most countries have seen little change in economic structure. Manufacturing – the primary vehicle for job creation in emerging economies – has registered painfully slow and sometimes negative growth. The public sector has either crowded out and manipulated the private sector or forged uncompetitive and monopolistic alliances, while inhibiting the development of viable systems of public finance. With few exceptions, the private sector is weak and dependent on state patronage, and the business environment hampers the rise of young and independent entrepreneurs. (UNDP 2016)

But the UNDP emphasized at the same time: The state-led development model has created contradictions. It has expanded access to key entitlements, whether public employment or food subsidies, thereby raising some levels of human development. Thus, partly because of the entitlements, societies have been able to lower the incidence of poverty and income inequality, shielding disadvantaged groups from some of the worst economic pressures of our times. However, these ostensibly favourable outcomes have entailed a deeper trade-off in the long run. The gains in human development have rarely translated into gains in productivity and growth, first because the model traps human capital in unproductive public sector jobs, and, second, because it builds a pyramid of privilege whereby economic advantage is restricted to firms and individuals connected to the state and its ruling elites. Arab countries have long preserved social order by distributing unproductive rents (. . .). (UNDP 2016)

On all accounts of standard development accounting (Grinin et al. 2016; Tausch 2010; Tausch and Heshmati 2012), the performance of the Arab countries since the 1960s was mixed at best. For observers, guided by world system (Frank 1998) and dependency approaches to development (Bornschier 1980, 1983; Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao 1979; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985) as well as later globalizationoriented debates about development (Ariely 2018; Gygli et al. 2019; Heggem and Jakobsen 2016; Potrafke 2015; Tausch 2012, 2018) it was always clear that the Arab world ever since the rise of industrialization up to the twentieth century and beyond played only the role of a periphery and semi-periphery. For dependency, world system and several globalization approaches (Bornschier 1980, 1983; Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao 1979; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Grinin et al. 2016; Tausch 2012, 2018), this peripheral or semi-peripheral position implied and still implies several development blockades, like a tendency towards strong and recurrent economic fluctuations, no real long-lasting economic and social convergence with the countries of the centre, a tendency towards a high concentration of life chances and power, political instability and restrictions on or the complete lack of democracy.

3.2 Background: Assessing Development on the Eve of the Current Global Corona. . .

39

A host of studies on the region, however, highlighted by contrast internal, “homemade” restrictions on democracy, such as gender inequalities, Islamism, and issues of the way, religion, culture and values are structured in the region as development impediments by themselves. Chapter 2 of this work assesses the tendency towards failing states and the loss of sovereignty in the MENA region, while Chapter 5 highlights patriarchy and the relationship between gender and Islam in the region. In accordance with this analysis (see Chaps. 2 and 5), democracy indeed must be considered as a development factor on its own (Freedom House 2018; Fukuyama 1995, 2006; Huntington 1993, Popper 2012; Putnam 1983; Schumpeter 1950; Tessler 2002; Tyler, and Darley 1999). The same must be said about the ending of patriarchy: gender inequalities have a devastating effect on development capacities in all fields (Glas et al. 2018; Send 2003; Tausch 2017, 2019; Ucal and Günay 2019). Islamism (Grinin et al. 2018; PEW 2015; Solomon and Tausch 2020; Tausch 2009, 2015; Tausch and Heshmati 2016) and issues of the way religion (Barro 2004, 2012; Barro and McCleary 2003; Elzinga 1999; Glahe and Vorhies 1989; Huntington 2000) culture and values are structured in the Arab world (Abduljaber 2018; Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Dalton and Welzel 2014; Deutsch and Welzel 2016; Giorgi and Marsh 1990; Hofstede 2001; Inglehart 2018; Tausch 2016 Tausch et al. 2014) are portrayed as development impediments by themselves in parts of the existing literature, based on quantitative evidence. We will also duly analyse the available data on gender relations in the region (Glas et al. 2018; Sen 2003; Tausch 2017, 2019; Ucal and Günay 2019). But before we undertake our exercise, we should look around at the world at large, as we drift towards the abyss of the current recession of all global recessions in the period since the Great Depression, 1929, and the Second World War. The vulnerabilities of the Arab world, already present from their development performance 1960–2019, which we analyse here, will only increase, and crises of all sorts, state failures and conflicts will ensue, in a region which at any rate already was prone to state failures and conflicts at an accelerating pace since the end of the Cold War. So, what is the nature of the global recession, which we are now facing? Writing in mid-April 2020, we can safely say that events in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic which originated from the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan, China, are set to fatally change the fortunes of the twenty-first century in January 2020. As the NY Times showed on 22 March 2020 (see Wu et al. 2020), thousands of people from Wuhan did not stop traveling abroad even after the Chinese authorities were aware of the serious pandemic. Not all countries reacted to the crisis with the necessary determination, like South Korea and Singapore. Even the countries of the centre of the global economy, especially the Euro-Zone, by mid-April 2020, are heading towards the abyss of an unprecedented economic recession. In “normal times”, there would have been the hope that somehow a functioning Euro-Mediterranean partnership could have provided a future anchor of stability for the countries from Morocco in the West to Lebanon and the other countries of the Arab East (Mashrek). But what will now be the fate of the MENA countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, when Italy and Spain are in their most delicate hour, caused by the Covid-19 pandemic?

40

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

The Euro-Mediterranean scenario would not only have implied an EU membership perspective for a secular and democratic Turkey but eventually also a similar perspective for Israel, and the enhanced development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership with the majority of the other countries of the region (Tausch 2019). In the early years of the new millennium, the European Union and the then EU-Commission President Romano Prodi indeed greatly promoted this approach and called it the “ring of friends” involving a joint economic area between Morocco and Russia. This “ring of friends” should have been a counter-model to Islamist terrorism after the 9/11 attacks, creating a zone of peace in the Mediterranean. Romano Prodi, the former EU Commission President said at that time: I want to see a “ring of friends“ surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbors, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea. This encircling band of friendly countries will be diverse. The quality of our relations with them will largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side. [. . .] The goal of [i.e. European Union] accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity would have a positive effect. The existing and well-functioning instruments of the EU‘s policy for its neighbors are the foundations for any new approach. We should be able to combine this proposal with the variety of existing partnership, cooperation, association and stabilization agreements. But we must also better exploit their potential and build on this basis. Let me concentrate on the question of what political perspective would best extend the area of stability without immediate enlargement of the Union. We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter.1

An important element in this approach was the still valid idea that democracy and free trade are important requirements for peaceful relations between nations, anywhere in the world (for a survey of the relevant literature, see Tausch 2019). Moderate and organized migration across the Mediterranean would have been part of this model, and it would have been manageable and in terms of its political costs also affordable. But already before the Covid-19 pandemic and recession, we were facing a weak and internally divided European Union, affected by a plurality of internal and external crises, such as Brexit, the lack of real democracy at a European Union level, the malfunctioning of European monetary union and the lack of a coherent European foreign policy. Now, last 23 March 2020 was the day which will go down in European economic history as the day on which the core of the European Union’s hitherto existing neoliberal fiscal policy framework, the Maastricht criteria, were put out of action (D’Elia 2020; on the background see also D’Elia and de Santis 2019). The German Bundesbank, on its official website, still proudly declares that sound public finances are the cornerstone of a stability-oriented monetary union. The EU Member States therefore set out fiscal rules in the Maastricht Treaty and subsequently augmented them with the Stability and Growth Pact. The Maastricht Treaty specifies reference values for the general government sector of the various EU Member States:

1

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm

3.2 Background: Assessing Development on the Eve of the Current Global Corona. . .

41

3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for the government deficit and 60 percent of GDP for government debt (the Maastricht criteria).2

But all that is now history, with foreseeable and very tangible repercussions also for the Arab world further South and East. The Maastricht criteria fixed European economic policy targets of low inflation, a low ratio of gross government debt relative to GDP at market prices below 60 percent, and low long-term interest rates. The International Monetary Fund now already anticipates a global recession of 2.9 percent due to the “corona crisis”.3 Serious model calculations by Warwick McKibbin and Roshen Fernando from the Australian National University (McKibbin and Fernando 2020) expect at least 15–68 million global deaths from the current corona infection and a recession of over 8 percent in the countries of the euro zone. The current pandemic thus threatens to become the primary catastrophe of the twenty-first century. In their study of the 1918–1920 flu epidemic, Johnson and Mueller 2002, which was a similar global disaster concluded that 48 million to 100 million people worldwide fell victim to the “Spanish flu” at the time. Harvard economist Robert Barro (Barro et al. 2020; Barro 2006) speaks quite logically of “rare macroeconomic disasters” that shake the foundations of the global economy with recurrent force and regularity. Both Johnson and Muller as well as Barro et al. 2020, highlight that there is a clear north-south global differential in fatality rates, with highest fatalities to be observed in the weaker countries of the global periphery and semi-periphery. Current World Bank data4 suggest that the Arab world has only 1.6 hospital beds at its disposal for 1.000 inhabitants (the European Union 5.6, the United States 2.9). Equal vulnerabilities loom ahead in view of the impending Corona crisis concerning the benchmark indicator of physicians per 1.000 inhabitants. The Arab world has only 1.1 physicians available per 1.000 inhabitants; in the European Union, this ratio is 3.6, and in the United States, 2.6. Migration of medical personnel compounded the crisis, with the rates of physicians per total population shrinking in many countries of the global periphery and semi-periphery. In their comparison of the effects of the Spanish flu in 1918 and Covid-19 today, Barro et al. 2020, conclude: Both the implications of our findings from the Great Influenza Epidemic for the ongoing coronavirus epidemic are unsettling. As noted before, the flu death rate of 2.0 percent out of the (. . .) total population in 1918-1920 translates into 150 million deaths worldwide when applied to the world’s population of around 7.5 billion in 2020. Further, this death rate corresponds in our regression analysis to declines in the typical country by 6 percent for GDP and 8 percent for consumption. These economic declines are comparable to those last seen during the global Great Recession of 2008-2009. The results also suggest substantial

2

https://www.bundesbank.de/en/statistics/public-finances/maastricht-deficit-and-debt-level/maas tricht-deficit-and-debt-level-793140 3 https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 and https:// www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/der-imf-erachtet-die-corona-krise-als-ernsthaftes-risiko-fuer-dieweltwirtschaft-ld.1544427 4 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sh.med.beds.zs

42

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . . short-term declines in real returns on stocks and short-term government bills. Thus, the possibility exists not only for unprecedented numbers of deaths but also for major global economic dislocation. Although these outcomes for the coronavirus are only possibilities, corresponding to plausible worst-case scenarios, the large potential losses in lives and economic activity justify substantial outlays to attempt to limit the damage. However, extreme mitigation efforts—such as widespread cancellations of travel, meetings, and major events—will themselves contribute to the depressed economic activity. (Barro et al. 2020)

In Europe, the nationwide victim numbers from the flu epidemic in 1918–1920 have a relatively large correlation with today’s corona numbers.5 As if the susceptibility to such disasters had been dislocated forever to southern Europe. We are afraid that the same will happen today in the Arab world. With 1.07 percent per total population, Egypt’s death rate during the flu epidemic of 1918–1920 was among the world’s higher rates, and about equal to those of Austria, China, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Spain and Turkey, but still lower than that of India, Indonesia and Mexico, which were at the lamentable global top. We can roughly say that a fatality rate of around 1 percent corresponded to the countries of what was then the semiperiphery, while higher rates were typical in the world system’s periphery (as to long-run time series data of global development ranging well into the nineteenth century, justifying such assumptions, see Grinin et al. 2016). Taubenberger and Morens (2006), highlighted that the “Spanish flu” hit the world in three waves, with the first one in summer 1918 and a death rate of around 5 per 1.000 persons in the United Kingdom, while the deadliest, second wave occurred more than a year later in November 1918, with a death rate of around 25 per 1.000 persons and a third peak having been reached in March, 1919, with a death rate of 10 per 1.000 persons. If that logic of death were to apply again, the current more than 1,5 million Coronavirus cases and more than 88,000 deaths recorded by 9 April 2020, 4:14 GMT,6 will be nothing compared to the wave of death which could sweep across our globe by 2021, with five times the current rates of infection. In this context, the Italian economist Giovanni Andrea Cornia (Cornia 2019; Cornia and Paniccià 2000) has proven that not only epidemics kill, but also economic crises which hit the world economy with the force of a Tsunami.7 Cornia’s theses on excess mortality led him to conclude that from 1989 to 2014, 18 million people in the region of Eastern Central Europe and the former USSR fell victim to the gradual economic downturns and shock therapies. The hurricane that is now brewing over Europe after the expected health and economic crisis 2020/2021 is Simple Microsoft EXCEL correlations between the mentioned historical data on the Spanish flu and current covid-19 infection data, as reported in https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ 6 https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ 7 The statistics of crude death rates often can work like magnetic resonance imaging of the developments of a social system. Look at the World Bank figures https://data.worldbank.org/ for some of the most dramatic mortality crises of recent decades: South Africa (HIV crisis), Russia (collapse of the USSR), North Korea (famines under the communist dictatorship) and Rwanda (genocide). A final look reveals the public health crisis in the European South (Greece, Italy and Spain) which worsened after the economic crisis of 2008 5

3.2 Background: Assessing Development on the Eve of the Current Global Corona. . .

43

already recognizable. The neoliberal set of rules, which determined Europe’s path after the 2008 financial crisis, has caused death rates to climb since 2008 and led to exactly the situation which Cornia describes in his works. Downgraded hospitals in Italy, Spain, the reduction of public services and health services to the limits of state failure, such as in Greece in the wake of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) austerity packages . . . applied to the population as a whole, we must start from the thesis that the 2008 crisis and the subsequent crises in the Eurozone led to the

44

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

premature death of 1.76 million people (our own calculations, based on https://data. worldbank.org/).8 If Russia could have stabilized the death rate at 10.0 per 1000 as in the Brezhnev era, there are 14 million deaths to date that could have been avoided. If the gross death rate had stabilized at 12.0 as at the beginning of perestroika, still eight million lives could have been saved (our own calculations, based on https://data.worldbank. org/).9

. 8

Crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants in the European Union, according to the World Bank Open Data, available from: https://data.worldbank.org/data, have a clear and straight linear downward trend, which Microsoft EXCEL regression routine (OLS-regression) identifies as being dependent on the time axis with 0,04 as the unstandardized regression coefficient and 86,85 as the constant. Without using more sophisticated models, and predicting crude death rates from this trend after 2008 yields us a first realistic estimate of the crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants in the European Union, if this good health policy trend would have continued. We compared then these predicted crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants with the crude death rates after the crisis of 2008, which really exploded, considering the long-term European advances in public health policy before the crisis of 2008. We then projected for each year the numbers of deaths which would have been avoidable, subtracting the crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants after 2008 from the expected numbers, based on the before-mentioned simple linear regression (regression residuals), which we then weighted with the yearly population figures of the European Union. From 2008 onwards, these figures add up together to 1.76 million human beings who died a death which would have been avoidable had the European Union not experienced the 2008 crisis. 9 Crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants in Russia according to the World Bank Open Data available from: https://data.worldbank.org/data. We compared Russian crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants, as they occurred in Russian history, with the crude death rates which were recorded under Brezhnev (variant 1, crude death rate per 1.000 inhabitants ¼ 10.0) and during the onset of “perestroika” (crude death rate per 1.000 inhabitants ¼ 12.0). A simple linear prolongation

3.2 Background: Assessing Development on the Eve of the Current Global Corona. . .

45

But the neoliberal policy framework, which dominated economic policy making on both shores of the Mediterranean, won’t be easily thrown overboard and will be prolonging the global economic recession, which now sets in. European elites are currently already hurrying to reactivate the neo-liberal “rescue umbrella” (in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s language “Rettungsschirm”, i.e. the European Stability Mechanism, ESM) that will drive Italy and Spain even more deeply into economic stagnation and into even deeper austerity. Nobel laureate Hayek laid the foundation for the corset of neoliberal Europe as early as 1939 (Hayek 1980 (originally 1939); Schulmeister 2018): In a union of states, (economic) politics had to limit themselves to ensuring that personal initiative can develop optimally in the long term. Hayek explicitly welcomed the downward pressure on wages and social conditions in such a union of states. Unfortunately, what a correct prophecy! For the present author, it is clear from the data of the IMF, contained in the Global Development Network Growth Database, (https://wp.nyu.edu/dri/resources/globaldevelopment-network-growth-database/) and in the IMF World Economic Outlook data base, (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx) that before the great financial crisis in 2008, prolonged budget surpluses were extremely rare in the world economy. Great Britain under PM Margaret Hilda Thatcher is one such rare case (1988–1990), and is the only functioning “normal” Western democracy which managed to have a longer budget surplus period without military dictatorship or subsequent state failure, and without enjoying the rare status as an international financial centre (Singapore and Luxembourg) or sizeable oil revenues (Kuwait and Norway). Most instructive for governments both in Europe and the MENA region are the deterrent examples of budget surpluses in Myanmar (under the military rule, 1977–1983); in Chile (under the military dictatorship 1975–1976; 1979–1981; 1987–1988) and in communist Romania shortly before the revolution in 1991 (1980–1991). The last example, where long-run budget surpluses were achieved, ex-Yugoslavia, is just as disturbing. Before Yugoslavia collapsed, it achieved a budget surplus in three periods, from 1986 to 1989.10

of public health policy standards during the waning of the communist system would have at least stabilized crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants enjoyed then in Russia under Brezhnev and enjoyed today by the inhabitants of such countries as Armenia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (variant 1) or at last at the beginning of Perestroika then in Russia or in the region of Central Europe and the Baltics (World Bank terminology) today. What happened, however, ever since was not a stabilization of public health, but one of the biggest mortality crises in modern history after the Second World War. Using the mentioned World Bank data, we arrive at the distressing conclusion that up to 12 million people died prematurely (variant 1) or at least 8 million people (lower variant, 2). Simply comparing crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants in 2017 with those in 2000 reveals another striking aspect: in descending order, Japan, Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Greece, Syrian Arab Republic, Croatia, Albania, Venezuela, RB, North Macedonia, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Mexico, Germany, Serbia and Poland suffered from an increase in their crude death rates per 1.000 inhabitants over the last 20 years. 10 https://www.imf.org/en/Data

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3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

But why is the neoliberal budget logic, called the Maastricht criteria, which dominated the entire globe, and also dominated the MENA region until the onset of the Arab Spring revolts (Bogaert 2013), fundamentally so wrong? In order to understand the policy failures of neoliberalism both in Europe and the Arab World for much of the 1980s, 1990s and beyond, we have to analyse in more detail how budget policy affects the chances for economic growth. At closer inspection, both world regions north and south of the Mediterranean, the European Union and the Arab World, are deeply affected by these malfunctions of the neoliberal political economy. In the European Union, they are responsible for the deep existential crisis of the European South ever since the crisis of 2008, now culminating in the devastation of the health systems in Italy and Spain, and the centrifugal and populist tendencies all across the European continent, and in the Arab World, “Arab Socialism” ceased to exist and, like Eastern Europe and the USSR, was “liquidated”, and Islamism began to fill the vacuum (Grinin et al. 2016, 2018). Followers of the economic theory based on Michal Kalecki (1899–1970; Kalecki 1971) will point out correctly that the private sector of the entire global economy displays a sustained tendency to save more than it invests. The same observation can be made with respect even to the European Union (EU). Almost all EU countries have consistently run budget deficits (very much in violation of the Maastricht Treaty; see Laski and Podkaminer 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). Laski and Podkaminer argue that looking at a national economy from both the income and expenditure sides, we get the following identity: YD þ T þ M ¼ CP þ IP þ G þ X

ð3:1Þ

where YD denotes the disposable income of the private sector, T is the disposable income of the government (all taxes net of all monetary transfers to the private sector) and M is the income of the rest of the world (RoW) from imports of the national economy in question (the left-hand side of (3.1)). On the right-hand side of (3.1), we have private sector expenditures on consumption (CP) and that sector’s gross investment (IP), government expenditure on goods and services (G) and RoW expenditure on the national economy’s exports (X). By simple rearrangement, we get ½ðYD  CPÞ  IP ¼ ðG  TðTaxesÞÞ þ ðX  M ðImportsÞÞ

ð3:2Þ

This is equivalent to: ðSP ðprivate savingsÞ  IP ðprivate investmentÞ ¼ ðG  TÞ þ ðX  MÞ or, finally: NPS ðnet private savingsÞ ¼ D þ E,

ð3:3Þ

3.2 Background: Assessing Development on the Eve of the Current Global Corona. . .

47

i.e. net private savings is equal to the budget deficit plus the rest of the World (RoW) deficit or the current account of the country concerned. Private savings (SP ¼ YD  CP) comprise household savings and profits retained by firms. In (3.2), Laski and Podkaminer denote by NPS ¼ (SP  IP), i.e. the net private savings, by D ¼ (G  T), i.e. the budget deficit and by E ¼ (X  M), i.e. as already highlighted, the RoW deficit (or the current account of the country concerned). Ex post, formula (3.2), Laski and Podkaminer (2014) highlight, always holds because it is an identity. However, they highlight that even as an identity it points up interesting relationships between sectors, especially when statistical data covering longer periods are available. For the world as a whole, we obviously have NPS ¼ D (net private savings are equal to budget deficits); this is an identity which, Lakski and Podkaminer quite correctly argue, links the balances of the private and government sectors aggregated globally. Budget surpluses (D < 0) and even balanced budgets D ¼ 0 do occur, albeit rarely; thus, for monetary economies worldwide, budget deficits (D > 0) seem to be the rule rather than an exception. This applies not only to times of war and disasters, but – at least for the industrial countries disposing of longer statistical records – also to periods of peace. Hence, given that for the world as a whole E ¼ 0 by definition and D > 0 (as shown by long-term statistical records), we have, according to (7.2), NPS > 0. Thus, the private sector of the entire global economy displays a sustained tendency to save more than it invests. Last, but not least, Laski and Podkaminer observe that for NPS ¼ 0 – which can be understood as a minimum requirement to the effect that the private sector should not become indebted in the long run – all countries with a current account deficit (E < 0) must record budget deficits D > 0. All these observations are to be understood as referring to a trend and average values for longer periods – and not as a rule for each country and every year. Laski and Podkaminer also observe that those countries which happen to report budget surpluses (D < 0) very often (although not always) record high E. This must be the case if E > NPS > 0 (e.g. the case of Norway since becoming a major oil exporting country). Kazimierz Laski (1921–2015) also pointed out that private investment (IP) minus private saving (SP) plus government deficit (D) and plus net exports (E) added together always result in zero. So, growth can only be generated by an increase in private investment or by deficit spending or by foreign trade surpluses or by a reduction in the savings rate. The lessons of the European crisis since 2008 to the MENA countries are also clear by analysing the effects of the European Union’s austerity packages (Pollin 1998; Schulmeister 2012, 2012, 2014; Stockhammer 2008; Stockhammer et al. 2020): • The current “integration” of the deficit and debt rule in the EU fiscal pact prescribed to (almost) all EU countries the “Greek way” into depression. The European welfare state was consistently strangled. • The concept of “natural unemployment” used by the EU Commission forced member states to cut wages and reduce unemployment benefits.

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3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

What future is ahead of the MENA countries, if even the future for the Eurozone is so bleak? Our data analysis will try to shed some light on this.

3.3

Data and Methods for Our Comparisons of the Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies

This chapter was written in the tradition of macroquantitative development research. We especially mention what can be termed “development accounting” (see: Grinin et al. 2016; Tausch 2010; Tausch and Heshmati 2012, 2013). We also portray our research results at the level of choropleth maps.11 Our macro-comparative methodology is also oriented by recent advances in this field (see Babones 2014; Holland and Campbell 2005; Tausch et al. 2014). We also apply advanced econometric time series techniques, like spectral analysis and analyses of autocorrelations, to the MENA country data (as to the description of these techniques, see Grinin et al. 2016). General datasets used in the present analysis were as follows: • Global Development Network Growth Database, https://wp.nyu.edu/dri/ resources/global-development-network-growth-database/ based on IMF. • IMF World Economic Outlook data base, freely available from https://www. imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx. • KOF Globalization Index. Data definitions and free download available from: https://kof.ethz.ch/prognosen-indikatoren/indikatoren/kof-globalisierungsindex. html.12 • UNDP Human Development Data. Data definitions and free download available from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data. • UTIP Inequality Index. Data definitions and free download available from: https://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html. • World Bank Open Data. Data definitions and free download available from: https://data.worldbank.org/. In addition, special emphasis was given to dependency and world system approaches to development, which received a large-scale empirical confirmation in Tausch and Heshmati 2013 (see also Bornschier 1980, 1983, Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao 1979; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Tausch 2010, 2012; Tauscha and Heshmati 2012). Datasets for these investigations were as follows:

11

The choropleth maps of this chapter were drawn using the free software developed by Robert Mundigl, available at https://www.clearlyandsimply.com/. 12 Data definitions for the current version of the KOF Index are available from: https://ethz.ch/ content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization/2018/Definitions_2018_ 2.pdf.

3.3 Data and Methods for Our Comparisons of the Achievements and Deficits of the. . .

49

• Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao (1978) • Müller and Bornschier (1988) • Tausch 2012 [International Macroquantitative Data. Faculty of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest (with data definitions and sources). Free download available from http://www.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id¼47854&tx_ ttnews%5Btt_news%5D¼0&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D¼31638&tx_ttnews% 5BcalendarYear%5D¼2012&tx_ttnews%5BcalendarMonth%5D¼6& cHash¼af8ef6888f7c9922b83b113f71c1ca32] More recent databases, integrating dependency and world system approaches with conventional economic theories and the sociology of world values research are: • Tausch 2019. [Migration from the Muslim world to the West: Its most recent trends and effects. Jewish Political Studies Review, 30(1–2), 65–225, available at http://jcpa.org/article/migration-from-the-muslim-world-to-the-west-its-mostrecent-trends-and-effects/ (with data definitions and sources). Free data download available from https://www.academia.edu/37568941/Migration_from_the_Mus lim_World_to_the_West_Its_Most_Recent_Trends_and_Effects] • Tausch and Heshmati 2013 [Globalisation, the human condition, and sustainable development in the twenty-first century: cross-national perspectives and European implications. London, New York and Delhi: Anthem Press (with data definitions and sources). Free data download available from https://www. academia.edu/35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_ developm ent_in_the_21st_Century._Cross-national_perspectives_ and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file] Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIV),13 available at many academic research centres around the world and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix (Tausch et al. 2014).14 The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called promax rotation of factors (Tausch et al. 2014), which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited rotation of factors in the context of our research.15 Since both our data and the statistical methods used are available around the globe, any researcher can repeat our research exercise with the available

13

https://www-01.ibm.com/software/at/analytics/spss/ https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software. The authors express thanks to the Department of Political Science, Innsbruck University, https://www.uibk.ac.at/ politikwissenschaft/index.html.en for the opportunity to be able to use the software. 15 Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But, for example, in attempting to understand the recent pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, it would be ridiculous to assume that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and anti-European Union attitudes. 14

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

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open data and should be able to reproduce the same results as we did. Literature searches were carried out with the Scopus data base.16

3.4

Results: Global Opinion Surveys and Data Analyses on the Overall Development Performance in the Arab World, 1960–2019 – the Overall Balance

Confronted by the often dramatic and stark statements about the state of development in the Arab MENA region and the Arab world in general (see Chap. 4 of this work), we have to start with the certainly surprising contention that the United Arab Emirates are in the global leadership league together with such countries as the Netherlands, Scandinavia and Austria. Oman does not fare much worse and is on par with such countries as Germany and the United States of America. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia play in the same global life satisfaction league as several other leading Western democracies. Algeria and Libya are in the same league as the EU member states like Italy, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, while Morocco and Jordan are still in the same global overall life satisfaction league as the European Union member states Portugal, Latvia and Romania. Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan and Iraq belong to lower ranks of global life satisfaction, but this is still a place which they share with the NATO and EU member states Hungary and Bulgaria. Very much down the list are Syria and Yemen, ravaged by civil wars. Given that a large part of the social science literature on the Arab world is dominated by considerations of political instability, conflict and tensions, our results about a relatively high life satisfaction in the region most probably will be surprising to a large part of our audience.17 Confronted with such empirical data, it is imperative to recall that already very early on in the social science debate on terrorism, Crenshaw 1981, with good reason warned: Terrorism per se is not usually a reflection of mass discontent or deep cleavages in society. More often it represents the disaffection of a fragment of the elite, who may take it upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority unaware of its plight, unwilling to take action to remedy grievances, or unable to express dissent. This discontent, however subjective in origin or minor in scope, is blamed on the government and its supporters. (Crenshaw 1981)

Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019), in their survey article in the “Journal of Economic Literature” that 95 of the global 527 terrorist groups, which started their campaigns before 2002, and 40 of the 105 terrorist groups, which started their campaigns after 2002, were located in the MENA region. Gaibulloev and Sandler 16

https://www.scopus.com/home.uri. The authors express thanks to the Department of Development Studies, Vienna University, https://ie.univie.ac.at/en/ for the opportunity to be able to use Scopus. 17 Google scholar, by April 10, 2020, lists 36137 pieces of literature, quoting Huntington, 2000.

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(2019), found that there is little convincing evidence supporting globalization as a cause of transnational terrorism and that neither very low nor very high GDP per capita is conducive to terrorism. At low GDP per capita, subsistence is an overriding concern, thus limiting terrorism. At high GDP per capita, grievances are not great, and society invests in counterterrorism, thus curbing terrorism. Moreover, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019, maintained that strong democracies limit terrorisminducing grievances through political access. In contrast, anocracies lack the means to respond rigorously to terrorism and only offer intermediate levels of political access. Along a regime spectrum with autocracies and strong democracies at the endpoints, anocracies are anticipated to experience the most domestic and transnational terrorism, thus giving rise to an inverted U-shaped regime-terrorism relationship. As autocracies are transformed into fledgling democracies or anocracies, the risk of greater terrorism surfaces so that preventive actions must be in place to protect against this risk. So, our Map 3.1 establishes overall life satisfaction in the region. In the recent literature on MENA development, Bhatia and Ghanem (2017), highlighted the fact that most published empirical studies hitherto failed to demonstrate any link between unemployment and radicalization. Bhatia and Ghanem (2017), in their empirical study, based on the Gallup World Poll, maintain that unemployment on its own does not impact radicalization, but that unemployment among the educated leads to a greater probability of radicalization. Relative deprivation might be an important driver of support for violent extremism. Individuals whose expectations for economic improvement and social mobility are frustrated; they are at a greater risk of radicalization (Bhatia and Ghanem 2017). Our data about

2,29 to 2,90 2,90 to 3,51 3,51 to 4,13 4,13 to 4,74 4,74 to 5,35 5,35 to 5,96 5,96 to 6,58 6,58 to 7,19 7,19 to 7,80 7,80 or more

Map 3.1 Overall life satisfaction according to UNDP/Gallup poll. (Tausch 2019)

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3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Map 3.1 (continued)

the low satisfaction of Arab publics with the labour market only partially support this contention (Map 3.2). Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Gulf States, and interestingly as well, Algeria, Libya and even Iraq belong to the league of better labour market performers, and even Morocco and Tunisia perform better than the majority of the countries of the European Union and Japan. The real problem on this account is presented by Egypt (see also Bertoni and Ricchiuti 2017). Map 3.3 features the final results of a multivariate indicator analysis of the development performances of the countries in the world system (Tausch and Heshmati 2013). These performances were standardized along a scale, ranging from 0 (worst value) to 1 (best value). The chosen variables corresponded to seven different dimensions such as:

3.4 Results: Global Opinion Surveys and Data Analyses on the Overall Development. . .

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-8,00 to 1,00 1,00 to 10,00 10,00 to 19,00 19,00 to 28,00 28,00 to 37,00 37,00 to 46,00 46,00 to 55,00 55,00 to 64,00 64,00 to 73,00 73,00 or more

Map 3.2 UNDP/Gallup poll (Tausch 2019) about satisfaction with the labour market

Democracy Economic growth Environment Gender Human development R&D Social cohesion The performance scores, calculated according to the well-known UNDP index practice, were combined into a single index, based on a list of 35 variables. • • • • • •

Democracy: Combined failed states index Democracy: Civil and political liberty violations Democracy: Corruption avoidance measure Democracy: Democracy measure Democracy: Global tolerance index Democracy: Rule of law

• • • •

Economic growth: Crisis performance factor Economic growth: IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 Economic growth: IMF prediction growth rate in 2010 Economic growth: Economic growth in real terms per capita per annum, 1990–2005

• Environment: Ecological footprint (gha per capita) • Environment: ln (number of people/million inhabitants 19802000 killed by natural disasters per year + 1)

54

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Map 3.2 (continued)

• • • • • • •

Environment: Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP Environment: Carbon emissions per capita Environment: Environmental performance index (EPI) Environment: Environmental sustainability index (ESI) Environment: Happy life years Environment: Happy planet index Environment: Avoiding net trade of ecological footprint gha per person

• • • •

Gender: Closing economic gender gap Gender: Closing educational gender gap Gender: Closing health and survival gender gap Gender: Closing of global gender gap overall score 2009

3.4 Results: Global Opinion Surveys and Data Analyses on the Overall Development. . .

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0,29 to 0,35 0,35 to 0,41 0,41 to 0,47 0,47 to 0,53 0,53 to 0,58 0,58 to 0,64 0,64 to 0,70 0,70 to 0,76 0,76 to 0,82 0,82 or more

Map 3.3 Overall 35 variable development index. (Tausch and Heshmati 2013) Note: the overall 35 variable development index is downloadable from https://www.academia.edu/ 35044095/Globalization_the_human_condition_and_sustainable_development_in_the_21st_Cen tury._Cross-national_perspectives_and_European_implications_Codebook_and_EXCEL_data_file

• Gender: Closing political gender gap • Gender: Gender empowerment index value • Human development: Infant mortality (2005) • Human development: Female survival, probability of surviving to age 65

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3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

• Human development: Human development index (HDI) value 2004 • Human development: Life expectancy (years) • Human development: Life satisfaction (0–10) • R&D: Country share in top world 500 universities • R&D: Per capita world-class universities • R&D: Tertiary enrolment • Social cohesion: Quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20 percent • Social cohesion: Unemployment rate For nine of these indicators, a high numerical value implied a negative development balance as follows: Negative 1 Combined failed states index Negative 2 Civil and political liberty violations Negative 3 Ecological footprint (gha per capita) Negative 4 Infant mortality (2005) Negative 5 Quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20 percent Negative 6 Unemployment rate Negative 7 ln (number of people per million inhabitants 1980–2000 killed by natural disasters per year + 1) Negative 8 Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP Negative 9 Carbon emissions per capita For the rest of the 35 indicators, positive numerical values were associated with a positive development balance. The 20 best placed countries of this global comparison were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Sweden Finland Norway Switzerland New Zealand Denmark Netherlands Austria USA Iceland United Kingdom Germany Ireland France Australia Canada Belgium Costa Rica

3.4 Results: Global Opinion Surveys and Data Analyses on the Overall Development. . .

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19. Spain 20. Slovenia As Tausch and Heshmati 2013, highlighted, Third World countries with advanced human development, like Costa Rica, Chile, Panama, Uruguay and Argentina, are ranked very favourably, and also the State of Israel most definitely belongs to the group of the 30 countries of the world with the highest overall development level, which includes democracy, economic growth, environment, gender, human development, research and development, and social cohesion. Guyana, Tunisia and Albania are the leading Muslim countries along this scale, but their rank on the combined index, equally weighting the UNDP standardized performance for six indicators of democracy, four indicators of economic growth, nine indicators of the environment, six indicators of gender equality, five indicators of human development, three indicators of research and development, and two indicators of social cohesion, is rather disappointing, showing that several Eastern European countries still outside the European Union, and Latin American countries are ahead of most member nations of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation. The five least developed countries according to the scale presented in Tausch and Heshmati 2013, are Equatorial Guinea, Swaziland, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe. The worst performance in the European Union according to Tausch and Heshmati 2013, is to be encountered in Romania, which is placed rank 67 of world society, just ahead of Tunisia, and only eight ranks ahead of the emerging economy of People’s Republic of China. Costa Rica, Israel, Chile, Panama, Uruguay, Argentina, Barbados, the Bahamas, the Philippines, Cuba, Hong Kong, the Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Peru, Thailand, Mauritius, South Korea, Dominica, Ecuador and Singapore would all be better qualified to run for European Union membership than the worst placed EU member countries Bulgaria (ranked 54), Estonia (ranked 56), Malta (ranked 62) and Romania (ranked 67). Colombia, Jamaica, Belize, Trinidad, Mexico, Guyana, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Malaysia and Mongolia all are better placed than the worst-placed EU-27 member states, thus shattering once more the tenets of Eurocentrism, which are at the basis of European exclusivity in the policy of EU enlargement, especially vis-à-vis the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean. The global ranks of the Arab countries in this international comparison combining democracy, economic growth, environment, gender, human development, R&D and social cohesion were: 67: Tunisia 82: Jordan 86: Bahrain 94: Morocco 97: Egypt 98: Oman 103: Lebanon 104: Kuwait 106: Saudi Arabia

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3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

107: Algeria 110: Syria 115: United Arab Emirates 126: Libya 133: Qatar 140: Mauritania 146: Comoros 150: Yemen 153: Djibouti 167: Sudan

3.5

Economic Globalization (Inflows) and Higher Inequality in the Arab World: Mixed Results, No Dramatic Effects

Our analysis reveals quite considerable contradictions to the way the Arab world is perceived most of the time in international debates. Scopus lists, by 13 April 2020, none the less than 53 research articles featuring “inequality” and the “Arab world”, and a simple Google search, by the same date, lists such important sources as Brookings,18 Carnegie,19 and the World Bank,20 all speaking about high rates of inequality in the Arab world. Yet, as especially the World Bank already advises its readers, the MENA countries not only did reach the Millennium Development Goals related to poverty reduction and access to infrastructure services, but also made important strides in reducing hunger, child and maternal mortality, and increasing school enrolment.21 The World Bank rather talks about wealth inequality and admits that income expenditure inequality, measured by the Gini index, did not worsen in most MENA economies in recent years and remained low to moderate by international standards.22 Yet, as the World Bank remarks, starting in late 2010 there were revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, a rebellion that has led to a

18

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2015/02/04/how-unequal-are-arabcountries-2/ 19 https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/05/31/arab-1-inequality-and-development-event-6901 20 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/pdf/Inequality-uprisings-andconflict-in-the-Arab-World.pdf 21 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/pdf/Inequality-uprisings-andconflict-in-the-Arab-World.pdf 22 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/pdf/Inequality-uprisings-andconflict-in-the-Arab-World.pdf

3.5 Economic Globalization (Inflows) and Higher Inequality in the Arab World: Mixed. . .

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protracted civil war in Syria, and widespread popular discontent in many other countries.23 The World Bank concludes in its study that Standard development indicators failed to capture or predict the outburst of popular anger during the spring of 2011.24

To measure these trends on a country-to-country basis, we used the following data. Globalization ETH Zurich globalization time series data (KOF data 2018, version 2007; variable ai; https://kof.ethz.ch/prognosen-indikatoren/indikatoren/kofglobalisierungsindex.html; download per 1 September 2019; as to the debates about the Index, see also Tausch and Heshmati 2012. The Zurich data, used in our graphs, refer to the ETH economic globalization time series only, which covers “actual flows”, combining trade (percentage of GDP); foreign direct investment (flows, percentage of GDP); foreign direct investment (stocks, percentage of GDP); portfolio investment (percentage of GDP); and income payments to foreign nationals (percentage of GDP). Inequality https://utip.lbj.utexas.edu/data.html; Estimated Household Income Inequality (EHII) data set - is a global dataset, derived from the econometric relationship between UTIP-UNIDO, other conditioning variables and the World Bank’s Deininger and Squire data set. GINI indices of inequality. Arab female and male survival rates to age 65 as percent of the respective age cohort show the considerable convergence of life chances in the Arab world in comparison to the Eurozone and the other Western democracies (Graphs 3.1 and 3.2). While conventional, “globalisation-critical” development research is replete with evidence about rising globalization and rising inequality on a global level (see also Tausch and Heshmati 2013), the Arab country-to-country evidence, reproduced here, flatly disproves the hypothesis that the “Arab Spring” was a revolution against rising globalization and against rising income inequality. What follows here are the graphs, supporting our strong and generalized argument for the region (Graphs 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17). With popular hypotheses about globalization and inequality thus dispelled for the region, we move on to refute another popular myth: the myth of overall deficient development.

23

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/pdf/Inequality-uprisings-andconflict-in-the-Arab-World.pdf 24 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/303441467992017147/pdf/Inequality-uprisings-andconflict-in-the-Arab-World.pdf

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Graph 3.1 Survival to age 65, female (percent of cohort)

Graph 3.2 Survival to age 65, male (percent of cohort)

3.5 Economic Globalization (Inflows) and Higher Inequality in the Arab World: Mixed. . .

Graph 3.3 Globalization and inequality in Algeria

Graph 3.4 Globalization and inequality in Egypt

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Graph 3.5 Globalization and inequality in Iraq

Graph 3.6 Globalization and inequality in Jordan

3.5 Economic Globalization (Inflows) and Higher Inequality in the Arab World: Mixed. . .

Graph 3.7 Globalization and inequality in Kuwait

Graph 3.8 Globalization and inequality in Libya

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Graph 3.9 Globalization and inequality in Morocco

Graph 3.10 Globalization and inequality in Oman

3.5 Economic Globalization (Inflows) and Higher Inequality in the Arab World: Mixed. . .

Graph 3.11 Globalization and inequality in Qatar

Graph 3.12 Globalization and inequality in Saudi Arabia

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Graph 3.13 Globalization and inequality in Syria

Graph 3.14 Globalization and inequality in Sudan

3.5 Economic Globalization (Inflows) and Higher Inequality in the Arab World: Mixed. . .

Graph 3.15 Globalization and inequality in Tunisia

Graph 3.16 Globalization and inequality in the Westbank and Gaza

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Graph 3.17 Globalization and inequality in Yemen

3.6

The Global Evidence Based on Macroquantitative Data

First, we document here the economic growth rates of the Arab world in comparison to the Eurozone and the OECD countries since 1960, based on the World Bank data base (Table 3.1). Yes, Arab economic growth was characterized by stronger fluctuations than in the Eurozone and in the OECD countries. In 1978, 1981–1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2001–2002, 2009 and 2017, the Arab world experienced a recession in real terms, but in 1976–1977, 1979–1980, 1990, 1992–1993, 1998, 2003–2010, 2012–2013, and in 2016, Arab economic growth was faster than the growth of OECD countries. In the following, we will carefully look at the data provided by the UNDP and the World Bank to further dispel the hypothesis that Islamic fundamentalism is caused by accelerated urbanization and failed modernization (Castells 2011).

3.7

Human Development

Recent data analysed in this section suggest that in terms of the UNDP Human development index (HDI), which can be regarded with justification as the most reliable single yardstick of international development today, the MENA region and the Arab world in general are not at the bottom of the international league tables. The HDI is based on three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy

3.7 Human Development

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Table 3.1 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currencya Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Arab world

Euro area

OECD

12.3 4.8 3.9 8.0 5.7 0.3 11.9 9.6 1.6 5.2 1.7 3.3 2.7 0.4 9.1 1.2 3.1 0.6 0.6 0.4 2.2 2.0 3.0 0.3 3.3 0.6

5.6 5.4 5.1 4.6 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.9 6.3 5.2 3.2 4.2 5.5 2.6 1.3 4.6 2.7 2.7 3.4 1.7 0.1 0.4 1.2 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.3 4.0 3.7 3.1 2.1 0.9 1.1 2.2 2.2 1.4 2.5 2.8 2.7 3.5 1.8

3.1 4.4 4.1 5.2 4.2 4.9 3.5 5.2 4.4 1.2 2.6 4.3 5.0 0.0 0.8 3.8 2.8 3.4 3.0 0.5 1.2 0.5 2.0 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.8 3.8 3.0 2.2 0.5 1.1 0.3 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.7 2.1 2.5 3.3 0.7 (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Arab world 1.5 3.1 6.9 3.4 4.0 2.1 3.3 2.0 2.3 1.3 4.3 0.9 0.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.1

Euro area 0.5 0.2 1.7 1.2 2.7 2.5 0.1 4.8 1.9 1.9 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.8 1.6 2.4 1.7

OECD 0.8 1.3 2.5 2.1 2.3 1.9 0.5 4.1 2.3 1.3 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.9 1.7

a

Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. A long and healthy life is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge level is measured by mean years of schooling among the adult population, which is the average number of years of schooling received in a life-time by people aged 25 years and older; and access to learning and knowledge by expected years of schooling for children of school-entry age, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of school-entry age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates stay the same throughout the child’s life. Standard of living is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant 2011 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion rates.25 In Graph 3.18, we shortly describe the methodology which we used to measure Arab progress in human development between 2012 and 2017. We used a simple, EXCEL-based linear OLS regression, predicting the HDI country values in 2017 by

25

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/EGY.pdf

3.7 Human Development

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Graph 3.18 The connection between human development in 2012 and in 2017

the country values in 2012. Countries, which were above the predicted regression line, performed well, while the countries below the line did not perform well. Table 3.2 lists our results for 2012–2017. In order to make our results clearly visible on a Choropleth map, we rank the countries according to the size of the residual from the regression of Graph 3.18. Arab HDI levels above or very much above the lowest-ranked countries of the European Union (Bulgaria and Romania) were recorded in United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman. Performances above the regression line (in descending order) were recorded in Bahrain, Morocco, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Mauritania, showing that positive progress in Human Development is possible in the Arab world. The performances below the regression line are the real trouble-spots of the region, especially Syria, Yemen and Libya, and also the growth of the human development index over time in Lebanon, Comoros, Kuwait, Jordan, Djibouti, Algeria, Qatar, Sudan and Tunisia was far from satisfactory. So, Maps 3.4 and 3.5 enable our readers to make a judgement of their own about the league tables, to which the Arab world belongs nowadays in terms of human development. In the following, we will offer a time series perspective of MENA country developments since the 1960. Debating the Arab revolts since 2011, Shamaileh, 2018, weighs the argument that the Arab Spring was the product of an angry Arab youth revolt against traditional Islamic norms and neoliberal economic policies, but questions that these arguments may not have much empirical support, while economic and religious conditions likely influenced the trajectory of these uprisings in nuanced ways (see also Campante and Chor 2012). A myriad of explanations exist as

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Table 3.2 Human development dynamics 2012–2017 in the world Country Syria Yemen Libya Venezuela Dominica South Sudan Central African Republic West Bank + Gaza Equatorial Guinea Belize The Bahamas Brunei Darussalam El Salvador Burundi Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Lebanon Belarus Liechtenstein Barbados Comoros Tajikistan Sierra Leone Italy Argentina Ukraine Denmark Suriname Kuwait Chad United States Tonga Vanuatu Hungary Jordan Federated States of Micronesia Madagascar Trinidad and Tobago Cuba Liberia Andorra

HDI 2012 0.6314 0.5047 0.7406 0.7740 0.7211 0.3880 0.3652 0.6866 0.5889 0.7063 0.8072 0.8523 0.6699 0.4084 0.7178

HDI 2017 0.5357 0.4519 0.7056 0.7608 0.7151 0.3877 0.3668 0.6858 0.5906 0.7076 0.8071 0.8533 0.6742 0.4172 0.7227

Predicted HDI 2017 0.6497 0.5248 0.7574 0.7904 0.7382 0.4098 0.3873 0.7042 0.6078 0.7236 0.8231 0.8676 0.6877 0.4298 0.7349

Residual 0.1140 0.0729 0.0518 0.0296 0.0231 0.0220 0.0205 0.0184 0.0172 0.0161 0.0160 0.0143 0.0135 0.0126 0.0122

Score for HDI dynamics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

0.7514 0.8026 0.9127 0.7947 0.4933 0.6417 0.4069 0.8740 0.8182 0.7429 0.9240 0.7111 0.7958 0.3907 0.9178 0.7167 0.5918 0.8304 0.7265 0.6163

0.7567 0.8075 0.9161 0.8003 0.5033 0.6500 0.4190 0.8798 0.8248 0.7507 0.9295 0.7196 0.8031 0.4040 0.9239 0.7256 0.6026 0.8378 0.7354 0.6273

0.7680 0.8186 0.9271 0.8108 0.5136 0.6599 0.4284 0.8890 0.8340 0.7597 0.9382 0.7284 0.8118 0.4124 0.9322 0.7339 0.6107 0.8460 0.7435 0.6349

0.0113 0.0110 0.0110 0.0105 0.0103 0.0099 0.0094 0.0092 0.0091 0.0089 0.0088 0.0088 0.0087 0.0085 0.0083 0.0082 0.0081 0.0081 0.0081 0.0076

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

0.5067 0.7745 0.7674 0.4202 0.8485

0.5192 0.7839 0.7773 0.4351 0.8577

0.5268 0.7908 0.7839 0.4415 0.8638

0.0076 0.0069 0.0066 0.0064 0.0062

36 37 38 39 40 (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Country The Gambia Guyana Germany Jamaica Austria Kiribati Switzerland Papua New Guinea Lesotho Azerbaijan Netherlands Niger Israel Australia Afghanistan Haiti Belgium Norway Djibouti Algeria Qatar Solomon Islands Sri Lanka Sudan Luxembourg Eritrea Finland Estonia New Zealand Mali Guinea-Bissau Singapore Korea, South Montenegro Samoa Slovakia Tunisia Uruguay Antigua and Barbuda Moldova Croatia France

HDI 2012 0.4453 0.6416 0.9277 0.7208 0.8987 0.5985 0.9352 0.5298 0.5047 0.7451 0.9210 0.3360 0.8929 0.9288 0.4815 0.4813 0.9053 0.9422 0.4588 0.7404 0.8437 0.5294 0.7565 0.4851 0.8921 0.4215 0.9080 0.8586 0.9049 0.4079 0.4366 0.9200 0.8901 0.7999 0.6974 0.8416 0.7194 0.7895 0.7646 0.6835 0.8164 0.8864

HDI 2017 0.4601 0.6536 0.9360 0.7322 0.9078 0.6118 0.9440 0.5443 0.5197 0.7570 0.9306 0.3539 0.9032 0.9386 0.4977 0.4979 0.9161 0.9525 0.4760 0.7538 0.8556 0.5460 0.7700 0.5025 0.9039 0.4400 0.9197 0.8710 0.9167 0.4269 0.4553 0.9320 0.9026 0.8137 0.7128 0.8552 0.7347 0.8039 0.7795 0.6998 0.8311 0.9008

Predicted HDI 2017 0.4662 0.6598 0.9419 0.7379 0.9133 0.6173 0.9493 0.5496 0.5248 0.7618 0.9353 0.3585 0.9076 0.9430 0.5020 0.5017 0.9198 0.9562 0.4796 0.7572 0.8591 0.5492 0.7731 0.5055 0.9068 0.4428 0.9224 0.8738 0.9194 0.4293 0.4577 0.9343 0.9048 0.8159 0.7148 0.8570 0.7365 0.8056 0.7811 0.7011 0.8322 0.9011

Residual 0.0061 0.0061 0.0059 0.0056 0.0056 0.0055 0.0053 0.0053 0.0051 0.0049 0.0047 0.0046 0.0044 0.0043 0.0043 0.0038 0.0037 0.0037 0.0036 0.0035 0.0035 0.0032 0.0031 0.0030 0.0029 0.0028 0.0028 0.0027 0.0027 0.0025 0.0024 0.0023 0.0023 0.0022 0.0020 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0015 0.0014 0.0011 0.0003

Score for HDI dynamics 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Country Cape Verde Romania Nigeria Japan Macedonia Zambia Saint Lucia Mauritania Greece Mexico Iran Malawi Oman Indonesia Armenia Honduras Albania Cyprus United Arab Emirates Panama Serbia Russia Turkmenistan Portugal Ghana Egypt Saudi Arabia Spain Mozambique Rwanda Kazakhstan Peru Palau Mongolia Canada Philippines Paraguay Slovenia Fiji Uganda Colombia Malaysia

HDI 2012 0.6359 0.7953 0.5119 0.8946 0.7398 0.5686 0.7297 0.4990 0.8542 0.7569 0.7810 0.4549 0.8042 0.6754 0.7373 0.5968 0.7672 0.8522 0.8455 0.7705 0.7678 0.7977 0.6860 0.8288 0.5697 0.6749 0.8347 0.8729 0.4119 0.5004 0.7808 0.7293 0.7785 0.7199 0.9076 0.6773 0.6800 0.8772 0.7193 0.4915 0.7254 0.7806

HDI 2017 0.6540 0.8112 0.5318 0.9092 0.7567 0.5881 0.7470 0.5196 0.8699 0.7740 0.7981 0.4766 0.8210 0.6940 0.7551 0.6167 0.7849 0.8688 0.8628 0.7893 0.7867 0.8163 0.7063 0.8471 0.5917 0.6956 0.8533 0.8910 0.4366 0.5239 0.8004 0.7498 0.7985 0.7408 0.9260 0.6989 0.7017 0.8962 0.7408 0.5163 0.7470 0.8018

Predicted HDI 2017 0.6542 0.8114 0.5319 0.9092 0.7567 0.5879 0.7467 0.5192 0.8695 0.7735 0.7973 0.4757 0.8201 0.6931 0.7542 0.6156 0.7836 0.8675 0.8609 0.7869 0.7843 0.8137 0.7036 0.8444 0.5889 0.6926 0.8503 0.8879 0.4333 0.5206 0.7971 0.7463 0.7948 0.7370 0.9220 0.6950 0.6976 0.8922 0.7364 0.5118 0.7424 0.7969

Residual 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0019 0.0024 0.0024 0.0026 0.0027 0.0028 0.0028 0.0030 0.0030 0.0032 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034 0.0035 0.0037 0.0038 0.0039 0.0039 0.0040 0.0041 0.0044 0.0045 0.0046 0.0049

Score for HDI dynamics 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Country Costa Rica Kyrgyzstan Saint Kitts and Nevis Benin Grenada Gabon Brazil Vietnam Nicaragua Thailand Nepal Mauritius Hong Kong Czech Republic Latvia Pakistan Burkina Faso Timor-Leste Iraq Swaziland Bhutan Chile Dominican Republic Senegal Ecuador United Kingdom Uzbekistan Cambodia Zimbabwe Cameroon Burma Guinea Seychelles Namibia Sweden Bulgaria Kenya Tanzania Lithuania Maldives Iceland Ethiopia

HDI 2012 0.7722 0.6488 0.7557 0.4887 0.7494 0.6785 0.7359 0.6696 0.6327 0.7310 0.5476 0.7667 0.9111 0.8652 0.8242 0.5345 0.3943 0.5986 0.6593 0.5609 0.5849 0.8185 0.7097 0.4758 0.7257 0.8976 0.6827 0.5529 0.5046 0.5261 0.5487 0.4276 0.7698 0.6174 0.9075 0.7859 0.5595 0.5065 0.8311 0.6877 0.9086 0.4296

HDI 2017 0.7939 0.6722 0.7778 0.5146 0.7719 0.7022 0.7592 0.6940 0.6577 0.7547 0.5740 0.7901 0.9326 0.8876 0.8471 0.5616 0.4234 0.6249 0.6853 0.5883 0.6124 0.8429 0.7358 0.5051 0.7519 0.9215 0.7098 0.5820 0.5346 0.5559 0.5783 0.4591 0.7965 0.6465 0.9328 0.8130 0.5899 0.5377 0.8581 0.7169 0.9349 0.4627

Predicted HDI 2017 0.7886 0.6669 0.7723 0.5090 0.7661 0.6962 0.7527 0.6874 0.6510 0.7479 0.5671 0.7832 0.9256 0.8803 0.8399 0.5542 0.4160 0.6174 0.6773 0.5802 0.6039 0.8343 0.7270 0.4963 0.7427 0.9122 0.7003 0.5723 0.5248 0.5460 0.5682 0.4488 0.7862 0.6359 0.9220 0.8020 0.5788 0.5266 0.8467 0.7052 0.9231 0.4508

Residual 0.0053 0.0053 0.0056 0.0056 0.0058 0.0061 0.0065 0.0066 0.0067 0.0068 0.0069 0.0069 0.0070 0.0073 0.0073 0.0074 0.0075 0.0075 0.0080 0.0081 0.0085 0.0086 0.0088 0.0088 0.0092 0.0093 0.0095 0.0097 0.0098 0.0100 0.0100 0.0103 0.0104 0.0106 0.0108 0.0110 0.0111 0.0112 0.0115 0.0116 0.0118 0.0119

Score for HDI dynamics 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Country Bosnia and Herzegovina Bolivia Morocco China Georgia Laos Poland Malta Turkey Republic of the Congo Botswana Togo Democratic Republic of Congo South Africa Cote d’Ivoire Angola Sao Tome and Principe Guatemala India Ireland Bangladesh Bahrain

HDI 2012 0.7394 0.6620 0.6354 0.7217 0.7502 0.5687 0.8360 0.8493 0.7602 0.5726 0.6830 0.4661 0.4195

HDI 2017 0.7685 0.6925 0.6665 0.7517 0.7798 0.6013 0.8651 0.8782 0.7906 0.6063 0.7166 0.5032 0.4575

Predicted HDI 2017 0.7562 0.6799 0.6537 0.7388 0.7668 0.5879 0.8515 0.8646 0.7767 0.5918 0.7006 0.4867 0.4408

0.6643 0.4544 0.5433 0.5513 0.6127 0.5996 0.9018 0.5665 0.7998

0.6990 0.4923 0.5812 0.5895 0.6503 0.6398 0.9384 0.6082 0.8461

0.6822 0.4752 0.5628 0.5708 0.6313 0.6184 0.9164 0.5857 0.8158

Residual 0.0122 0.0126 0.0128 0.0129 0.0130 0.0134 0.0136 0.0136 0.0139 0.0145 0.0159 0.0165 0.0167 0.0169 0.0171 0.0183 0.0187 0.0190 0.0214 0.0221 0.0224 0.0303

Score for HDI dynamics 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188

to how and why these uprisings differed, yet, as Marc Lynch (2014) highlighted, a confluence of factors influenced the nature and tentative outcome of each uprising. Etling, 2018, for his part, debates as possible reasons for the uprisings, such as economic grievances, neoliberal policies, diminished public sector employment opportunities, reduction in employment levels, high population growth rates culminating in a youth bulge and progress in higher education which led to an excess supply of labour. Such list of arguments usually also includes the rise in unemployment rates and growing inequality coupled with a rise in food prices, while the interaction of high youth unemployment rates and cultural norms, such as the central role of marriage, constitutes an obstacle for many young people in the transition to adulthood (Etling 2018). However, a closer look at the MENA World Bank data dispels most of these arguments.

3.7 Human Development

0,28 to 0,35 0,35 to 0,43 0,43 to 0,50 0,50 to 0,58 0,58 to 0,65 0,65 to 0,73 0,73 to 0,80 0,80 to 0,88 0,88 to 0,95 0,95 or more

0,28 to 0,35 0,35 to 0,43 0,43 to 0,50 0,50 to 0,58 0,58 to 0,65 0,65 to 0,73 0,73 to 0,80 0,80 to 0,88 0,88 to 0,95 0,95 or more

Map 3.4 UNDP human development index, 2017

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-22,38 to 1,00 1,00 to 24,38 24,38 to 47,75 47,75 to 71,13 71,13 to 94,50 94,50 to 117,88 117,88 to 141,25 141,25 to 164,63 164,63 to 188,00 188,00 or more

Map 3.5 The dynamics of human development, 2012–2017 (as defined by Table 3.2)

3.8

Rapid Urbanization, Fertility Decline and Rising Life Expectancies

Undoubtedly, the region experienced an enormous urbanization process between 1960 and today, with two-thirds of the MENA population now living in cities (Graph 3.19). The annual urban population growth rate at the beginnings of the 1960s was 5 percent and diminished in a somewhat erratic way right to the 1990s and rose again around 2008/2010 to fall again ever since (Graph 3.20).

3.8 Rapid Urbanization, Fertility Decline and Rising Life Expectancies

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Graph 3.19 Urbanization in the MENA countries, 1960–2018 Note: This and all the following graphs use the MENA country definition of the World Bank, see Chap. 1, above. The country list thus comprises Algeria; Bahrain; Djibouti; Egypt; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Malta; Morocco; Oman; West Bank + Gaza; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; Yemen (https://data.worldbank.org/region/middle-east-andnorth-africa)

Graph 3.20 Annual growth of the urban population in percent in the MENA countries, 1960–2018

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Graph 3.21 Life expectancy at birth in the MENA countries, 1960–2018

The rise in life expectancy was really spectacular, from below 50 years in the 1960s to almost 75 years in the contemporary period (Graph 3.21). Equally astonishing was the demographic transition taking place in the region, revisiting early modernization theories and contemporary globalization theories (Mauldin et al. 1978; Hendi 2017). Hendi (2017) examines differences in fertility between pairs of countries over time. Convergence in fertility between pairs of countries is, according to Hendi, 2017, hypothesized to result from increased cross-country connectedness and cross-national transmission of fertility-related schemas. The impact of various cross-country ties, including ties through bilateral trade, intergovernmental organizations and regional trade blocs, on fertility convergence, reported in Hendi’s study is considerable, and the impact would suggest that globalization positively affected the demographic transition in the MENA countries. Following this logic, MENA trade with rich countries, joint participation in the UN and UNESCO, and joining a free trade agreement, all contributed, Hendi’s argument (2017) would be, to fertility convergence between richer countries and the MENA countries (see also Graphs 3.22, 3.23, and 3.24). In the following, we will analyse with the necessary care the empirical tendencies of gender discrimination, as they reflect themselves in the data about “missing women”. According to Sen 2003, the problem refers to the terrible deficit of women in substantial parts of Asia and north Africa, which arises from sex bias in relative care. Sen stated that the numbers are very large indeed. He found the number of missing women in China to be 44 m, in India 37 m and so on, with a total that easily exceeded 100 m worldwide, a decade or so ago: the ratio of women to men in the total population, while changing slowly (Sen 2003). According to Sen, female disadvantage in mortality has typically been reduced substantially, but this has been

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Graph 3.22 Fertility rate (births per woman) in the MENA countries, 1960–2018

Graph 3.23 Crude birth rates per 1.000 people in the MENA countries, 1960–2018

counterbalanced by a new female disadvantage – that in natality – through sex-specific abortions aimed against the female foetus. Graphs 3.25 and 3.26 look at the World Bank data from which – at least in principle – this problem of “missing women” in the Arab world can be estimated roughly.

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Graph 3.24 Crude death rates per 1.000 people in the MENA countries, 1960–2017, compared to the countries of the Euro area

Graph 3.25 Gender differences of life expectancy in the MENA countries, 1960–2018

In the MENA region, differences in life expectancy to the advantage of females have increased, and the sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) in the Arab world is lower than that of the European Union, but in the MENA countries and the Arab world, there was a rise of the sex ratio during the time of the Arab Spring and thus a reversal of the positive trend away from the “missing women” phenomenon.

3.8 Rapid Urbanization, Fertility Decline and Rising Life Expectancies

83

Graph 3.26 Sex ratio at birth (male births per female births) in the MENA countries as compared to the European Union and the Arab world

Graph 3.27 Social convergence of the MENA countries. MENA life expectancy in percent of the life expectancy of the European Union (EU-28) and the United States of America, 1960–2019

Graph 3.27 portrays the social convergence of the MENA countries as compared to the European Union (EU-28) and the USA. MENA life expectancy in percent of the life expectancy of the European Union (EU-28) and the United States of America, 1960–2019 rose from around 65 percent in the 1960s to above 90 percent in the contemporary period. In the following, we will present our analyses of the cycles of economic growth in the region.

84

3.9

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

The Cycles of Economic Development and Economic Convergence

High military outlays were certainly a growth constraint in the region, but military expenditures per GDP decreased from their peaks in the 1970s and 1980s to far lower levels in the contemporary period (Graph 3.28). The standard measure of economic convergence nowadays, the percentage of the purchasing power of a poorer country or region, measured by the GDP per capita, PPP in constant 2011 international dollars as a percentage of the leading regions in the world economy, the European Union (EU-28) and the United States of America, 1960–2018, show a fairly constant increase in the decade before the onset of the “Arab Spring”, only to stagnate at a constant level, as it did in the 1990s (Graph 3.29): Annual GDP per capita growth of the region (see also Table 3.1, above) was often considerable, but the time series shows quite large fluctuations (Graph 3.30). Applying the well-known standard econometric techniques of spectral analysis and analysis of autocorrelation (see Grinin et al. 2016), we arrive at the conclusion that economic cycles in the Arab world are characterized by normal 3-year and 5-year and 8- to 8-year short-term fluctuations and by a strong long-term, 25 to 33-year Kuznets cycle (see Grinin et al. 2016) (Graph 3.31). The analysis of autocorrelation confirms our hypothesis about the length of Arab economic cycles, derived from spectral analysis (Graph 3.32).

Graph 3.28 Military expenditure per GDP, 1960–2018

3.9 The Cycles of Economic Development and Economic Convergence

85

Graph 3.29 Convergence of the MENA countries in percent of the GDP per capita, PPP in constant 2011 international dollars of the European Union (EU-28) and the United States of America, 1960–2018

Graph 3.30 GDP per capita growth (annual percent), 1960–2018

86

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Graph 3.31 Spectral analysis of economic growth in the MENA region – periodogram for 1960–2018 x-axis: cycle length

3.10

A Look at Poverty and Unemployment

Our next MENA country development pattern analysis features the data on poverty. While there was a staggering rate of 40 percent of all school children at primary school age out of school, this percentage has now been reduced to some 5 percent, although since the Arab Spring and the political convulsions connected with it, this percentage has lamentably enough increased again (Graph 3.33). Adult literacy rates in the region have increased from 40 to 80 percent. Today, World Bank data26 suggest that aggregate adult literacy rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are 66 percent, in South Asia 72 percent, in the Arab world 75 percent, in Latin America and Caribbean 94 percent and in East Asia and Pacific 96 percent. Considering that even in the European Union member state Malta (2018), 5 percent of the adult population were unable to read and write; adult literacy rate in the region reveals a really appalling development deficit.

26

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS

3.10

A Look at Poverty and Unemployment

87

Graph 3.32 Time series analysis (analysis of autocorrelation) of economic growth in the MENA region – spectral density for 1960–2018 x-axis: lag number (cycle length)

Graph 3.33 Children out of school in the MENA region, 1960–2018

88

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Graph 3.34 Adult literacy rate in the MENA region, 1960–2018

After all, the Quran, in its first commandment states: Sūrat l-Isrā (The Night Journey), 17, 14: Pickthall translation: (And it will be said unto him): Read thy Book. Thy soul sufficeth as reckoner against thee this day.27 In Somalia, Mauritania, Yemen Rep., Comoros, Sudan, Egypt, Arab Rep. and Morocco, adult literacy rates were (in ascending order) below 75 percent. In Tunisia, the adult literacy rate was only 79 percent, and in Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Libya, adult literacy rates were between 80 percent and 90 percent. Only in Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Malta, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, West Bank and Gaza, and Jordan (ascending order), adult literacy rates were above 90 percent (Graph 3.34). Tertiary education enrolment rates in the Arab world are also often very low. In Oman, Syria and in the West Bank and Gaza, tertiary enrolment rates were at least equal to or above the world average of 38 percent, and in Bahrain, Algeria and Kuwait, these enrolment rates were above 50 percent, and in Libya and Saudi Arabia, they were above 60 percent. But tertiary enrolment rates below 20 percent were recorded in Somalia, Djibouti, Mauritania, Comoros, Yemen Rep., Iraq and Qatar, and 20-38 percent (world average) in Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Arab Rep. and Morocco (Graph 3.35). Our analysis of poverty gaps in the MENA region indicates that poverty gaps exhibit two trends in the region – a secular, long-run setback and decrease of the poverty gaps, measured by the three well-known World Bank purchasing power (PPP) benchmarks of 1.90$, 3.20$, 5.50$ a day, and a lamentable short-run setback

27

http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter¼17&verse¼14

3.10

A Look at Poverty and Unemployment

89

Graph 3.35 Tertiary school enrolment in the MENA region, 1960–2018

Graph 3.36 Poverty gaps in the MENA region, 1960–2018

and increase of the poverty gaps during the neo-liberal transformations of the 1990s and in the wake of the Arab Spring (Graph 3.36). These setbacks in the 1990s and in the wake of the Arab Spring surely coincide with the statistics of unemployment, which closely correlates with the downswings in the economic cycle (Graph 3.37).

90

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Graph 3.37 Unemployment in the MENA region, 1960–2018

Graph 3.38 Youth unemployment in the MENA region, 1960–2018

This is especially true for the rates of youth unemployment, which reaches a staggering quarter of the entire age group (Graph 3.38). Undernourishment has also increased in the wake of the Arab Spring and is again above 9 percent of the total population (Graph 3.39).

3.11

Inequality – UTIP Data Series

91

Graph 3.39 Prevalence of undernourishment in the MENA region, 1960–2018

3.11

Inequality – UTIP Data Series

In the following, we would like to analyse the evolution of inequality in the Arab MENA countries in the larger perspective of what we have been saying above about the indicators of poverty and inequality. Based on the UTIP inequality data, presented above in conjunction with the KOF data series of globalization (Graphs 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17), we are The UNDP Arab Human Development Report, 2016, sharply criticizes the statesector orientation of the region: These rents are not merely revenues generated outside the economy in the form of oil and aid, but politically mediated rents created through economic controls, licences and monopolies. The region is one of the most protected in the world. The movement of goods, people and capital is subject to tight restrictions. The behind-the-border barriers that generate trade frictions are more pervasive in the Arab region than elsewhere. The trade regime is even more restrictive in the resource-rich, labour-abundant economies of the region, precisely where private sector employment generation is most required. While the model has created an adverse legacy of entitlement that aims to sustain some individuals from conception to coffin, it has also fostered political marginalization, economic deprivation and social exclusion. Thus, the associated trade frictions push firms without political or social connections to the margins of the economy, and opportunities for absorbing young entrants to the workforce are lost. The model thereby hobbles promising enterprises, discourages economic efficiency and deters young talents because its goal is not to promote innovation or competition, but solely to preserve access to wealth and power among a few. The result is a top-down model that is based on hand-outs (. . .). (UNDP 2016)

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3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Graph 3.40 Inequality (GINI index, UTIP data) in the MENA region, 1960–2018

But, at the same time, the UNDP (2016) also recognized that this pattern of development expanded access to key entitlements, whether public employment or food subsidies, thereby raising some levels of human development. Thus, the UNDP correctly argues, partly because of the entitlements, societies have been able to lower the incidence of poverty and income inequality, shielding disadvantaged groups from some of the worst economic pressures of our times (UNDP 2016). The combined time series results for all the countries of the region with available data support this view (Graph 3.40).

3.12

The Effects of Membership of a Country in the Arab League on Global Development and Value Indicators

Based on the extensive development accounting data collection contained in Tausch, 2019, we arrive at the following and rather depressing analysis of the development deficits of the Arab world, which repeat the analysis provided by the UNDP Arab Human Development Report, 2016. For the readers of UNDP 2016, the issues being dealt with in our partial correlation analysis of Arab League membership with global indicators of social, economic and value development, with the UNDP Human Development Index and its square constant, will be no surprise: youth disempowerment, deficits in education, high unemployment and precarious jobs, the exclusion of young women, substantial health challenges, violent radicalization, patriarchy, low social and religious tolerance, inequality of opportunity in education, the challenges facing women, the effects of social and political conservatism, problems in the health

3.13

Gender and Freedom – Naming the Real Development Deficits of the Arab MENA. . . 93

sector, war and violent conflict, a high migration pressure, the flight of human capital, all these phenomena, mentioned by the UNDP team under the leadership of Jad Chaaban (Team Leader) reappear in the high and significant partial correlations of Arab League membership with indicators of social, economic and political deficits. The list is long indeed. Independent of the level of achieved human development and its square, Arab countries – ceteris paribus – will be characterized in a significant way and more than other countries of world society by antisemitism, militarism, carbon emissions, outward migration, unemployment, human inequality, terrorism and unemployment. Arab countries will – ceteris paribus – have problems in the health sector, will have a low deregulation of their economic activities and hence will discriminate against the private sector, will discriminate against women in education and in politics, will have low social security expenditures, will have had a slow economic growth rate from 2007 to 2014 and will have a low labour force participation rate of their migrants at home. Their political systems will enjoy only very low trust by its citizens, and several indicators of the quality of education and the environment will perform badly. Effective democracy and support for civil society as well as social globalization will be low, and there will a lack of a climate of religious and social tolerance in society. Labour force participation rates will be also low. All these statements are independent of the level of human development, measured by the UNDP human development index (Table 3.3).

3.13

Gender and Freedom – Naming the Real Development Deficits of the Arab MENA Countries

The “litany” of development deficits of the region, already exposed by the UNDP 2016, highlighted, as we stated above, such areas as education, employment, gender equality, radicalization and tolerance. Our percentile performance analysis28 of the Arab countries and the Arab MENA countries in world society reveals that they perform the following way in world society (Table 3.4): Bottom 50–75 Percent Gallup poll about satisfaction: overall life satisfaction index Gallup poll about satisfaction: health care quality Optimism and engagement Infant mortality 2005 Human development index (HDI) value 2004 Gallup poll about satisfaction: job Life expectancy (years) (by 2010)

28

We of course duly considered that, for example, a high unemployment rate is bad for development.

94

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Table 3.3 The partial correlations of membership of a country in the Arab league on global development and value indicators, UNDP human development index and UNDP human development index^2 are constant

ADL 100 (antisemitism) Annual population growth rate, 1975–2005 (percent) Civil and political liberties violations Military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) Military expenditures per GDP Carbon emissions per capita Net migration rate Net international migration rate, 2005–2010 Total unemployment rate of immigrants (both sexes) Coefficient of human inequality 2013 Global terrorism index Unemployment rate Gallup poll about satisfaction: health care quality Share of people without religion per total population Deregulation index 2013, World Bank Health expenditure as percent of GDP Female share of seats in parliament Social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO) Closing educational gender gap Slope 2007–2014 GDP pc growth Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes) Social protection (ILO) Trust in institutions Gallup poll about satisfaction: education quality Female population with at least some secondary education ESI index component social and institutional capacity Overall civil society index UNDP education index closing political gender gap Environmental performance index (EPI) ESI-environment sustainability index (Yale Columbia)

Partial correlation with Arab league (human sec Kuznets constant) 0.826 0.536

Error p 0.000 0.000

Df 97 161

0.479 0.452 0.447 0.387 0.370 0.323 0.285

0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

165 151 123 162 173 163 166

0.253 0.212 0.207 0.172

0.003 0.009 0.012 0.036

139 147 143 146

0.188

0.013

173

0.188 0.202 0.208 0.208

0.015 0.007 0.005 0.032

166 175 175 104

0.223 0.248 0.258

0.010 0.004 0.001

129 131 166

0.274 0.274 0.278

0.000 0.045 0.001

159 52 130

0.285

0.000

154

0.291

0.001

137

0.291 0.297 0.307 0.314 0.331

0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

52 166 129 143 137

(continued)

3.13

Gender and Freedom – Naming the Real Development Deficits of the Arab MENA. . . 95

Table 3.3 (continued)

Democracy movement Percentage of women in government, all levels Effective democracy index Overall 35 variable development index, based on 7 dimensions Social globalization, overall index (KOF-Index, ETH Zurich) Mean years of schooling 2013 Climate of personal non-violence (based on world values survey) Social globalization, de jure index LFPR 55-59 (labour force participation rate) Global tolerance index (based on world values survey) Democracy measure Closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 Closing economic gender gap Very favourable or somewhat favourable opinion of Israel (2013) (based on PEW survey) No redistributive religious fundamentalism (based on world values survey) Gender empowerment index value Feminism (based on world values survey) Dissent with the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws (based on world values survey)

Partial correlation with Arab league (human sec Kuznets constant) 0.347 0.360 0.381 0.385

Error p 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000

Df 52 161 161 126

0.387

0.000

177

0.388 0.443

0.000 0.001

177 52

0.465 0.489 0.498

0.000 0.000 0.000

177 162 67

0.518 0.556

0.000 0.000

146 129

0.605 0.646

0.000 0.003

129 17

0.657

0.000

52

0.669 0.733 0.772

0.000 0.000 0.000

71 52 46

Expenditure on education Gallup poll about satisfaction: freedom of choice Environmental performance index (EPI) Average annual HDI growth 2000-2013 Female population with at least some secondary education Coefficient of human inequality 2013 Ecological footprint (g ha /cap) Ecological footprint per capita Overall 35 variable development index Mean years of schooling 2013 ESI index component social and institutional capacity Tertiary emigration rate

Human development index (HDI) value 2004

Gallup poll about satisfaction: Overall life satisfaction index Gallup poll about satisfaction: Health care quality Optimism and engagement Infant mortality 2005 0.0354 27.3750

0.0354

33.2105 0.7415

51.1176

47.5500

0.7064

5.2765

Arab MENA countries

5.1500

Arab League

168

168

59

150

153

92

76

32

81

77

92

92

32

81

77

(continued)

54.76

54.76

54.24

54.00

50.33

Number Global Rank Global rank percentile Arab performance of Arab MENA MENA MENA countries countries countries countries for the performance ranking

Table 3.4 The global development performance and rankings of Arab league countries, and Arab MENA countries. (Based on the data collection, Tausch 2019)

96 3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Gallup poll about satisfaction: Freedom of choice Environmental Performance Index (EPI) Average annual HDI growth 2000-2013 Female Population with at least some secondary education Coefficient of human inequality 2013 ecological footprint (g ha /cap) ecological footprint per capita overall 35 variable development index

Gallup poll about satisfaction: Job Life Expectancy (years) (by 2010) Expenditure on education

Table 3.4 (continued)

68.4832 0.6257 44.8250

24.6875 3.0383 3.0383 0.5173

66.0011

0.7038

41.0000

25.7889

2.9143

2.9143

0.5019

4.5462

4.6933 65.4706

70.5417

69.0786

62.7000

72.7647

70.1000

170

139

139

143

158

155

170

153

153

139

149

108

52

52

54

97

91

98

87

86

78

83

108

87

87

89

97

91

98

87

86

78

83

(continued)

63.53

62.59

62.59

62.24

61.39

58.71

57.65

56.86

56.21

56.12

55.70

3.13 Gender and Freedom – Naming the Real Development Deficits of the Arab MENA. . . 97

7.6571 56.0667

-0.1758

7.2750

-0.5150

53.2222

-0.1758

Trust in institutions

Gallup poll about satisfaction: Education quality Happiness. good health

Health expenditure as % of GDP

Effective Democracy Index Total unemployment rate of immigrants (both sexes) Democracy movement

Female share of seats in parliament Global terrorism index

38.2385

36.8133

-0.5271

-0.5271 4.8941

12.7250

14.8842

5.1150

12.3813

4.0254

3.9631

11.8122

12.9765

13.3450

-0.5150

7.0000

6.4300

Mean Years of Schooling 2013 ESI Index Component Social and Institutional Capacity Tertiary emigration rate

Table 3.4 (continued)

179

59

170

165

151

179

59

134

59

151

141

181

137

45

43

123

39

128

41

90

39

52

92

117

137

45

127

123

112

128

41

90

39

99

92

117

(continued)

76.54

76.27

74.71

74.55

74.17

71.51

69.49

67.16

66.10

65.56

65.25

64.64

98 3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

WVS: dissent with the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws ESI-Index Environment Sustainability Index (Yale Columbia) Feminism

Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP Climate of personal nonviolence closing educational gender gap Overall Civil Society Index closing health and survival gender gap No redistributive religious fundamentalism unemployment rate

Table 3.4 (continued)

12.5000

13.6429

-0.6718

-0.7725

-0.7725

-0.6718

0.9684

0.9692

43.4769

-1.4865

-1.4865

42.9133

0.9312

0.9253

0.3508

-0.4489

-0.4489

0.3508

472.6493

442.8083

59

141

51

147

59

133

59

133

59

167

50

119

42

27

48

108

47

104

46

39

50

119

42

120

48

108

47

104

46

128

(continued)

84.75

84.40

82.35

81.63

81.36

81.20

79.66

78.20

77.97

76.65

3.13 Gender and Freedom – Naming the Real Development Deficits of the Arab MENA. . . 99

ADL 100 (avoding Antisemitism) closing economic gender gap gender empowerment index value

Civil and Political Liberties violations Carbon emissions per capita closing political gender gap closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 Global tolerance index

0.2463

0.2463

0.3838

0.3838

0.4259

0.5938

0.5949

0.4306

0.0495

0.0547

81.8000

12.2850

10.4211

81.8000

5.6563

5.6316

-5.7857

-5.4000

75

133

101

71

133

133

166

169

150

74

125

7

66

123

122

16

22

130

146

74

125

94

66

123

122

150

147

130

146

98.67

93.98

93.07

92.96

92.48

91.73

90.36

86.98

86.67

85.88

Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes) Democracy measure

170

Table 3.4 (continued)

53.0500

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

55.1053

100

3.13

Gender and Freedom – Naming the Real Development Deficits of the Arab MENA. . . 101

Trust in institutions Gallup poll about satisfaction: education quality Happiness, good health Female share of seats in parliament Global terrorism index Effective democracy index Total unemployment rate of immigrants (both sexes) Bottom 75 Percent or Worse Democracy movement Health expenditure as percent of GDP Carbon emissions per million US dollars GDP Climate of personal non-violence Closing educational gender gap Overall civil society index Closing health and survival gender gap No redistributive religious fundamentalism Unemployment rate WVS: dissent with the opinion: religious authorities should interpret the laws ESI-index environment sustainability index (Yale Columbia) Feminism Labour force participation rate of migrants (both sexes) Democracy measure Civil and political liberties violations Carbon emissions per capita Closing political gender gap Closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 Global tolerance index ADL 100 (avoding antisemitism) Closing economic gender gap Gender empowerment index value Our next percentile performance analysis is about the performance of the Arab world on the well-established freedom indicators, compiled by Freedom House (Table 3.5).29

29

https://freedomhouse.org/

102

3 Achievements and Deficits of the Arab MENA Economies on the Eve of the Current. . .

Table 3.5 Freedom in the Arab world, 2013–2018 Country/ territory Tunisia Comoros Lebanon Morocco Jordan Kuwait Algeria Iraq Mauritania West Bank and Gaza Djibouti Egypt Qatar Oman United Arab Emirates Yemen Bahrain West Bank + Gaza Libya Sudan Saudi Arabia Somalia Syria

3.14

Freedom score 2018 70 55 43 39 37 36 35 31 30 28

Freedom score 2013 59 55 49 43 34 41 35 24 34 30

Increase/decrease of freedom (freedom development, 2013– 2018) 11 0 6 4 3 5 0 7 4 2

Global percentile performance, 2018 42.58 55.98 66.03 69.38 69.86 71.29 71.77 73.21 75.12 77.51

26 26 24 23 17

29 41 28 26 22

3 15 4 3 5

78.95 79.43 80.38 81.82 87.56

13 12 12

25 18 19

12 6 7

89.47 90.43 91.39

9 8 7

43 7 10

34 1 3

94.26 94.74 95.69

7 1

2 5

5 6

96.17 100.00

The Arab World on the Eve of the Corona Tsunami

As we already outlined in our Introduction, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its recent prediction,30 now expects the global economy to contract by 3 percent in 2020, much worse than during the 2008–09 financial crisis. This scenario still assumes that the pandemic fades in the second half of 2020 and containment efforts can be gradually unwound. The advanced economies will shrink by 6.1 percent, while China and India still will experience some sort of economic growth by 0,500 with: • • • •

Social Globalisation, de jure index Social Globalisation, de facto index Overall 35 variable development index Economic Globalisation, de jure index

4.6 Conclusions

145

-4,00 to -3,39 -3,39 to -2,79 -2,79 to -2,18 -2,18 to -1,58 -1,58 to -0,98 -0,98 to -0,37 -0,37 to 0,23 0,23 to 0,84 0,84 to 1,44 1,44 or more

Map 4.9 Non-violent and law-abiding society

• • • •

No redistributive religious fundamentalism Economic Globalisation, de facto index Feminism Climate of personal non-violence

The factor correlations (Table 4.4) clearly establish the negative effects wielded by MENA patriarchy on the benefits of social globalization, substantiating the analysis of patriarchy in the region in the present book (see Chap. 5). In the present Chapter, we also could show that there is a stronger negative effect from de iure social globalization on MENA patriarchy. Modern societies, characterized by high de iure social globalization, are however societies where trust is eroding. Ceteris paribus, economic globalization, de facto, is associated with MENA patriarchy, the lack of support for pro-market attitudes, but is slightly and

146

4 Arab MENA States and Value Change: What Happens When Economic. . .

Graph 4.3 The effects of globalization on human values and development

positively associated with trust and non-violent attitudes. The bitter lesson for Arab decision makers wishing to increase economic globalization, but wanting to keep patriarchy intact is that if you want to enjoy the benefits of the globalization process, you have to permit a higher social globalization de iure. The risk that they are taking, though, is that such fully “modernized” societies, societal trust can erode. We think that a functioning democracy will be the best guarantee against such an erosion. On an overall basis, one can maintain that the certain optimism, corresponding to the economic and human rights data, emerging from the Arab world, is reflected also in our Index of the Development of Civil Society. As we already mentioned above, the Overall Civil Society Index was already presented in Grinin et al. (2018), and was based on a weighting of the factor scores by the Eigenvalues of the factor analytical model presented in Grinin et al. (2018). There is some hope for the Arab world, and a more egalitarian development and a decisive step away from the hitherto existing high indices of Human Inequality would accelerate this positive scenario. Table 4.5 lists these results.

Literature

147

Table 4.5 Percentile global value development of the countries of the Arab League

Country

Algeria Bahrain Comoros Djibouti Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mauritania Mor occo Oman West Bank and Gaza Qatar Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Y e me n

Gallup poll about satisfaction: Overall life satisfaction index50 42.5 6 0 .8 90.8 78.4 85.6 7 0. 6 55.6 26.8 7 5. 2 40.5 69.9 6 0. 1 15.7 xx 17.0 21.6 xx 74. 5 99.3 76.5 9.2 88 .2

Overall Civil Society Index

89.8 9 1. 5 xx xx 88.1 8 6 .4 59.3 69.5 94 .9 61.0 xx 57. 6 xx 83.1 15.3 xx xx xx xx 40.7 xx 6 4. 4

Literature Abduljaber, M. (2018). Effects of modernization and globalization on values change in the Arab World. Changing Societies & Personalities, 2(2), 161–182. Achilov, D. (2013). Social capital, Islam, and the Arab spring in the middle east. Journal of Civil Society, 9(3), 268–286. https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2013.816541. Aksnes, D. W., & Sivertsen, G. (2019). A criteria-based assessment of the coverage of scopus and web of science. Journal of Data and Information Science, 4(1), 1–21. Alesina, A., & Ferrara, E. L. (2000). The determinants of trust (No. w7621). National Bureau of Economic Research. Al-Mulali, U., & Ozturk, I. (2015). The effect of energy consumption, urbanization, trade openness, industrial output, and the political stability on the environmental degradation in the MENA

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Chapter 5

Beyond Patriarchy: Gender, Islam and the MENA Region

Abstract Patriarchy has its origins in the Middle East. This legacy is still apparent in the Middle East where gender discriminatory legislation and attitudes remain the norm. What are the reasons for such misogynistic practices? For some scholars, the Islamic faith and related cultural practices lay at the heart of the problem. Others place their emphasis on more structuralist explanations such as economic considerations and ongoing insecurity in the MENA region. Despite the challenges confronting women, this chapter also maps the positive trends of a post-patriarchal order in the region. These include women taking up arms to defend themselves, political mobilization on the part of women as they challenge both authoritarianism and patriarchy and the rise of feminist Islamic scholarship. The momentum for a post-patriarchal order also exists because of changing inter-generational attitudes about the place of women in society. A younger, more educated generation holds less gender bias than their parents’ generation. Keywords Gender · Islam · Masculinity · Patriarchy · Sexual violence

5.1

Introduction

It was in the Ancient Near East (specifically Mesopotamia) – where patriarchy first developed between 3100 BC and 600 BC. (Lerner 1986). It was, however, only in 1947 when Max Weber first used the term “patriarchy” to describe a system of government where men used their positions as heads of households to rule societies. Whilst Weber’s use of the term was innovative in that it linked what was until then regarded as a largely social issue with the state, it is equally true that Weber was more focused on the intergenerational issue than the oppression of women. More specifically, Weber was concerned about the domination of younger men who were not household heads (Walby 1990). Radical feminists appropriated the term in the 1990s to refer to a “. . .system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women. The use of the term social structure is © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6_5

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important here since it clearly implies rejection both of biological determinism, and the notion that every individual man is in a dominant position and every woman in a subordinate position” (Walby 1990). There are three inter-related reasons why identifying patriarchy in this way is important. First, reference to social structures and practices suggests that the practices of patriarchy were constructed and can be deconstructed as several European countries could attest to. Behaviour – both individual and institutional – therefore can be unlearned (Lerner 1986). Second, issues of gender are mediated through other variables like class, race, ethnicity and religious affiliation. Third, patriarchy viewed systemically allows one to understand the oppression of women from work place to the home, from issues of culture and faith to the administration of the state. Such an expanded view of patriarchy is imperative if one consider the origins of this practice and its institutionalization. The evolution of patriarchy is intimately connected with the changing organization of kinship (matriarchal and matrilineal to patriarchal and patrilineal), religion (the ascendancy of male god figures over female goddesses). Moreover, patriarchy is linked to issues of ownership and domination. The appropriation of women’s sexual and reproductive capacity by men was followed by the institutionalization of private property and the emergence of class stratification. Similarly, the enslavement of women preceded the enslavement of other groups. The first states, meanwhile, owe its origins to the patriarchal family. The earliest states therefore had a vested interest in the subordination of women and the earliest law codes institutionalized this subordination. By the second millennium BC, Babylon already had legislation controlling women’s sexuality (ibid 1986). Attempting to control women’s sexuality has been an enduring feature of MENA society. The most recent fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, for instance, found that almost a third (32 percent) of Egyptians approved of the barbaric practice of female genital mutilation. From the foregoing, it would be difficult to dispute the logical conclusion of Gerda Lerner, “Men learned to institute dominance and hierarchy over other people by their earlier practice of dominance over the women of their own group” (Arab Pulse 2020). Conversely, the emancipation of women is intimately associated with true societal emancipation. It is not coincidental, therefore, that the MENA region is characterized by both a democratic deficit (as discussed in Chap. 2) and the subjugation of women. By employing the concept of patriarchy, this chapter seeks to explore the current status of women in the MENA region, to explain how this situation came about as well as to examine a MENA region where patriarchy ceases to exist.

5.2

Current Status

It is abundantly clear that women in the Middle East North Africa region have experienced the least progress in gender equality than any other region in the world (Ross 2008). Nemat Shafik describes the MENA region in this way:

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. . . the largest gender gap of any region in the world, despite the considerable evidence that gender equality is associated with higher economic growth and improved human development. Middle Eastern and North African women are consistently under- represented in schools and labour force, they die relatively younger than their sisters in other parts of the world, and they give birth to a large number of closely-spaced children that jeopardizes their own and their children’s health (Kazemi 2000).

Given the widely held view that women belong in the domestic sphere focusing on keeping house and child-rearing, there are low rates of participation of women in the labour force (Robbins and Thomas 2018). Only 24 percent of women in the MENA region are employed, whilst the figure for their male counterparts is 77 percent (Bremer 2017). Moreover, according to a report of the International Labour Organization (2018), young women with higher education have less chance of entering employment than their less-educated male counterparts. This holds negative consequences not only for the household economy and the economy at large but also enables woman’s greater dependence on their male family members (husbands, fathers, brothers). In the process patriarchy, built as it is on vertical power relations, is further entrenched. The absence of women in positions of power is quite glaring in the MENA region. Their absence in governance is made possible by both patriarchal attitudes and women’s own relative disinterest in politics. According to the Arab Barometer, the majority of respondents believe in limiting the role of women in society. Within the home, 60 percent believe that the husband should be the final decision maker in matters impacting the family. Moreover, only a third of the Arab public believe that women are as effective as men in public leadership roles. There is however regional variations. Whilst four-fifths of Algerians and Egyptians believe that men are better political leaders, the figure for Tunisia and Lebanon is 55 percent and 52 percent respectively (Robbins and Thomas 2018). Part of the problem could well lay with women – more than half of whom display no interest in politics. Whilst 28 percent of Tunisian and Palestinian women express interest in politics, the comparative figure for Algeria and Jordan is 10 percent and 9 percent, respectively (ibid 2018). This relative disinterest could be related to the fact that the state and its apparatus has lost legitimacy and credibility (a process discussed in Chap. 2) and that women see no need to engage with it. This, perversely, however may serve to reinforce their discrimination. Without women challenging patriarchal governments, the state can dismiss the gender dimension in policy-making processes as it is one less constituency they need to bother with. In Latin America and the Caribbean, women have learned this lesson the hard way. Recognizing that their concerns will only be addressed by legislators if they remained engaged with political processes, women in Latin America and the Caribbean have formed Regional Feminist Action Groups to ensure that law-makers take their concerns into consideration (Reperger 2018). Women in the MENA region are however learning this and increasingly women are beginning to engage with political processes – on the streets and in parliaments as will be discussed below. An important caveat, however, needs to be borne in mind. Political processes cannot be separated from social norms. Thus, whilst women have won the right to vote in many

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countries, they are often prevented by social norms which allow husbands, fathers and brothers to tell them how to vote or prevent women physically from exercising their democratic rights to either cast a ballot or engage in political activism (Habib 2018). Sexual violence, meanwhile, has increasingly become weaponized from the killing fields of Rwanda and Bosnia to the Middle East. Often, it forms part of a strategy of ethnic cleansing. The employment of rape is also used in the various conflicts plaguing the MENA region as part of a strategy of causing shame and demoralization amongst the target population (Oppenheimer 2019). In Syria, government forces have used rape to intimidate and ethnically dominate communities associated with rebels. Islamic State, meanwhile, has systematically imprisoned and raped Yazidi women. In both Iraq and Syria, other forms of sexual violence are also routinely used, including sexual torture, forced incest and forced abortions. Exploiting their economic vulnerability, women refugees fleeing these war zones into countries like Lebanon and Jordan are also routinely sexually abused by landlords and potential employers. It is also important to acknowledge that in the MENA region with its hyper-masculinity cultural norms, males are also targeted for rape in conflict zones as part of a deliberate strategy to demoralize the proverbial other (Crawford et al. 2014). Rape, however, is not only confined to the warzones of Iraq and Syria. Repressive governments often make use of rape as a form of intimidation against pro-democracy activists. In Sudan, tens of thousands of women – students and teachers, housewives and street traders – took to the streets to protest against the brutal and corrupt three decade rule of Omar al-Bashir. Under pressure, Al-Bashir was compelled to step down in April 2019. A military junta replaced Al-Bashir’s decrepit rule. Women, however, once more mobilized on the streets of Khartoum, Omdurman and Port Sudan as they sought to pressure the junta to transfer power into civilian hands. This prompted the military to crack down on pro-democracy activists from 3 June 2019. Women were particularly targeted by security forces. What happened next was scores of rapes and sexual harassment of these women. Hala al-Karib notes that this was a form of intimidation to force these women “back into the home” as well as retribution for their role in overturning the political order (Middle East Monitor 2019). In Egypt, a similar dynamic is at play according to a report of the International Federation for Human Rights. As in Sudan, Cairo deploys sexual violence in an effort to eliminate public protest. The report cites one such ordeal of a female student, I saw an officer who was grabbing a young woman by the breasts and I said to him: “If you want to arrest her, then arrest her, but you have no right to touch her breasts”. He grabbed me exactly as he had her, before calling two other officers to come and hold me. They beat me, insulted me. In the van they insulted me and beat me so much that I could no longer stand up. Two soldiers started to assault me. The officer from the start got into the van and said to me: “Come here I’s going to show you if I’m a man”. He sexually assaulted me, the soldiers laughed, and then he raped me completely. I was paralysed, I started to vomit blood. My life is ruined. I’m afraid of my son, my husband and even my father (BBC 2015).

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Neither is this an isolated case. Such sexual violence is systematic and is designed to intimidate. As Amnesty International noted, “The very high level of repression involves an underlying violence. Security forces are using force to keep people under control and punish those who dare to go against the authorities. This explains why they mainly use sexual violence” (Middle East Eye 2015). In the cases of both Sudan and Egypt, the persistence of systemic rape and sexual violence is linked to the “omnipotence of the security forces.” It is no coincidence that such actions took place during the dictatorship of Al Bashir who came to power in 1989 through a military coup and that in Egypt these incidents increased following the coming to power of Al Sisi in a military coup in 2013 (ibid 2015). In an environment with personalized rule, inversed civil-military relations and a resultant democratic deficit, accountability does not exist and impunity of the security forces is the norm. It is therefore essential to link women’s rights with the broader human rights struggle and the imperative for democracy. The persistence of sexual violence is not only a phenomenon confined to war zones and as a tool of political repression. Because sexual violence is fundamentally linked to patriarchy, it exists in other settings in the MENA region. Indeed, it is a daily lived experience for many women. The latest statistics from the Arab Barometer Wave V clearly demonstrates this sad truism. Twenty-nine percent of women experienced verbal sexual harassment and 18 percent physical sexual harassment. Young women aged between 17 and 28 years old are particularly prone to such sexual harassment (Bouhlila 2019). What is noteworthy is that Tunisia which has the most female friendly legal code in the Arab world has the lowest percentage (2 percent) of sexual harassment in the MENA region. This suggests that the enactment and enforcement of legislation which deliberately counters patriarchy might well result in greater disincentives to engage in sexual harassment. Whilst sexual harassment against women is largely an urban phenomenon, domestic violence against women remains a rural occurrence. Countries with the largest female victims of domestic violence according to the Arab Barometer include Yemen (26 percent), Morocco (25 percent), Egypt (23 percent), Sudan (22 percent) and Algeria (21 percent) (Bouhlila 2019). The fact that a cultural taboo exists from speaking out against such domestic violence also allows it to continue to fester in the shadows. As it is regarded a private or family matter, victims seek help from inside the family. Invariably, the abuse continues. The fact that victims are often financially dependent upon the perpetrator also results in the abuse not coming to light.

5.3

Patriarchy and Islam

The debate amongst scholars about the relationship between gender and Islam is often acrimonious (Kazemi 2000). Generally there are two scholarly camps. One supports a cultural interpretation where patriarchy is an inherent attribute to Muslim identity. From this perspective, Islamic norms therefore provide the greatest impediment to women’s socio-economic and political advancement. Structuralists,

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however, argue that the persistence of systemic discrimination against women has its roots in the structural conditions existing in MENA countries (Alexander and Welzel 2011). Those subscribing to the cultural interpretation for patriarchy note how women are excluded from speaking at the pulpit during Friday congregational prayers and how women are compelled to pray behind men and sit behind me during community events. The fact that no women have become heads of state in the MENA region is also striking. Muslim women, however, have become heads of state in other Muslim majority countries, notably Bangladesh and Pakistan. Explaining this apparent contradiction, Maha Elgenaidi (2019) explains that this does not represent acceptance of female political leadership, rather a woman’s political position is determined by her relationship to a male family member – a father, husband or brother. Women’s discriminatory personal status in law and criminal code are rooted in both the Qur’an and the Hadith (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammed). A daughter for instance inherits from her parents only half of that of her brother. In cases of divorce, the mother can only enjoy custody of her child for the first two years after the child’s birth. In Shia Iran, meanwhile, marriage based on a temporary contract or muta’a is common. This practice hardly protects the rights of women in the marriage. The testimony of a man in a court of law is viewed as twice as valuable as that of a women. Some so-called Islamic laws based on questionable Hadith actually deny women the right to be a head of state (AbuKhalil 2005). In Lebanese civil law, married women are regarded as wards of their husbands and are therefore de facto second class citizens (Kazemi 2000). This diminution of the role of women in Islam came about because early ulama’ viewed women’s duties and functions in society from the perspective only of their being “daughters,” “sisters,” “wives” or “mothers” (Ramadan 2009). From this position, women’s roles were always ancillary to their male counterparts – their fathers, brothers, husbands or sons. The subordination of women was therefore entrenched from Islam’s early beginnings. These early Islamic interpretations, according to As’ad AbuKhalil (2005), have also resulted in religious sanctions for such sexist practices as a wife’s complete obedience to her husband and the stigmatization of menstruation. Despite changes in legal practices in the Muslim world, patriarchal family laws have remained largely intact. Explaining this disconnect Leila Ahmed opines, “. . .family law is the cornerstone of the system of male privilege set up by establishment Islam. That it is still preserved almost intact signals the existence of enormously powerful forces within Middle Eastern societies determined to uphold male privilege and control over women” (Ahmed 1992). With the penetration of new technologies in the MENA region, states have attempted to control women in more sophisticated ways. The Saudi government, for instance, has sponsored an application called Absher. This has been downloaded 11 million times in the kingdom by February 2019 and allows male guardians (fathers, brothers, husbands) to set travel restrictions on women’s visas, effectively preventing them from leaving the country (Solomon 2019). Leila Ahmed’s a description reinforces Gerda Lerner’s position elucidated earlier in this chapter where she explains the formation of the first states in the Middle East

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resting on patriarchal families and where the first legislation was focused on controlling women’s sexuality. Utilizing data from the Arab Barometer, Kcuinskas and Van der Does (2017) reinforce these cultural explanations for gender discrimination. In their article, they demonstrate that Political Islam is strongly related to Muslim men’s patriarchal attitudes across the MENA region. Inglehart and Norris (2003a, b), meanwhile, whilst confirming the cultural chasm that exists between the “West” and Islam, also note a very important caveat. Whilst Muslims continue to support democratic norms, they oppose the emancipation of women. Recent opinion polls from the Arab Barometer to the World Values Survey give evidence to Inglehart and Norris’ position. Moghadam, however, rejects the cultural perspective noting that patriarchy existed prior to the emergence of Islam in the MENA, that other faiths are no less patriarchal than Islam and that the persistence of discrimination of women in the region needs to be found in the broader socio-political and economic order within which patriarchy is practiced (Moghadam 2003). Also stressing the structural context as opposed to Islam, Ross (2008) blames oil not Islam for the patriarchy in the region, “Oil production reduces the number of women in the labour force, which in turn, reduces their political influence. As a result, oil-producing states are left with atypically strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political institutions.” There is an emerging group of scholars who do no neatly sit in either the cultural or structuralist camp. Rather these straddle the two camps – in the process rejecting simplistic binary positions. Amongst these more nuanced scholars is Arno Tausch. Whilst there is a connection between the Islamic faith and patriarchy, Arno Tausch (2019) reminds us that violence against women is wide-spread – going far beyond Muslim majority countries – from Serbia to Zambia and from the Philippines to India. This suggests that other factors need to be taken into account. Drawing from Hayek’s neoliberal political economy approach, Tausch suggest that the decay of property rights and disrespect for family values could explain the preponderance of intimate partner violence across the Muslim world. The fact that more Muslims in the MENA region are becoming secular in their orientation (as discussed in Chap. 2) lends credence to Tausch’s explanation. Quoting the famous line of Fyodor Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov – “If God doesn’t exist, everything is permitted” – Tausch (2019) warns against simplistic arguments which relate to the status of women as a result of Islam. General lawlessness and the weakness of state structures also contribute to the violence perpetrated against women since there are little consequences for one’s actions. The fact that the failed state of Yemen has the highest domestic violence incidents lends further weight to Tausch’s conclusions. The violence currently convulsing the Middle East also threatens men’s ability to achieve masculine ideals. This, in turn, may fuel their overcompensation in engaging in acts of gender violence and insisting on male supremacy in every sphere (Kcuinskas and Van der Does 2017).

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Beyond Patriarchy?

Whilst the marginalization and oppression of women is a sad truism of MENA countries, this should not be accepted as a norm. Patriarchy was constructed and can be deconstructed. Sylvia Walby (1990) reminds us that gains made by Western feminists during the twentieth century was a result of both active resistance made against patriarchal values as well as by rapidly changing context, in particular, the demand by capitalists for more labour in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The challenge for feminists then is to actively resist their marginalization in conjunction with other progressive players as well as to utilize the tectonic changes that the Middle East is undergoing – from the penetration of the internet to making common cause with progressive forces in society to open up the democratic space. Democratic space in this sense does not only mean the fight for the ballot but also emancipation in every sense – including freedom from patriarchy. There is reason to believe that some of this is beginning to happen in the region. Consider, for instance, how Morocco’s rural women in an effort to access land from conservative tribal authorities, formed themselves into action committees called Sulaliyyates. Not only did these challenge tribal authorities but also women’s subordination in the family and the work place (Langohr et al. 2016). We discuss the rise of a post-patriarchy order in this section from the perspective of women challenging the protection myth, women taking to the streets and challenging the repressive order and a growing challenge to fundamentalist patriarchal interpretations of Islam from amongst Muslim scholars – both male and female. Patriarchal definitions of masculinity and feminity view women as protected whilst men are seen as the protectors. Tickner and Sjoberg (2013) challenge this myth of protection which views men as going out to wage wars in defence of vulnerable women and children. However, they point out that women and children constitute 90 percent of all casualties of war by the turn of the century and that 75 percent of those who fled armed conflicts were women and children. Kurdish women have aggressively challenged this patriarchal narrative when they first picked up arms to defend their homes, their children and their communities. These Kurdish female fighters came to prominence in October 2017 when photos of them capturing the erstwhile Islamic State capital of Raqqa (Oppenheimer 2019). Formed in 2013 as the Women’s Protection Units (YPG) of the Syria Democratic Forces, these women played a key role in securing Rojava, the Kurdish autonomous region in Syria. A YPG spokeswoman, Nesrin Abdullah, passionately declares that they have taken up arms not merely to protect their communities and create a more democratic society – but one which also ends patriarchy, “There is no other system like ours anywhere else in the world – an administration that promoted and has achieved gender equality” (Oppenheimer 2019). From her response, it is clear that Abduallah understands the connection between her attempts at defending her community and eradicating patriarchy as part of an effort to create a more egalitarian society. The existence of the YPG also makes a mockery of patriarchal myths of strong men defending weak women.

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There is reason to believe that women’s experiences in mobilizing against authoritarian regimes in the region have resulted in a new consciousness on their part where they see the connection between their own oppression and the need for emancipation of the broader society. When women took to the streets against Al-Bashir in Sudan it was their awareness of how fuel shortages and inflation brought on by corrupt and inefficient governance were increasing household food insecurity. Following the July 2019 agreement between the military junta and the alliance of opposition parties, there was an effort to force women back into the home to play their “traditional” roles. However, women have remained politically engaged and mobilized – decrying everything from the persistence of sexual harassment to demanding for the prosecutions of those involved in wrong-doing from the Bashir era (Middle East Monitor 2019). Women’s activists are also pushing back on the streets of Tehran, Ankara and Algiers. In Tehran, women’s grassroots movements are calling on Islamic Republic to fulfil their promises of social justice and gender equality. Their resistance to patriarchy has taken the form of disobedience, refusal and subversion (Kazemi 2000). Initially their activism sought to reform the rule of the mullahs within the prevailing system spurred on by a reformist president – President Khatami who demonstrated greater receptivity to gender equality. In the past two years, women’s groups in Iran are increasingly calling for the end of Iran’s post-1979 system of governance as they view such theocracy as antithetical to the cause of gender emancipation. In Ankara, feminists have taken on domestic violence by forming the Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation in an effort to collectively fight abuse in the family (ibid 2000). Meanwhile, in Algiers, women have been at the forefront of the protest movement against the establishment or what Algerians term a “Le Pouvoir” – the cabal of generals, businessmen and politicians of the ruling party which govern this North African country. For 19-year-old Miriam Saoud, it was to see the back of this political elite which has impoverished ordinary Algerians through their corrupt practices. For 22-year-old political science student Amina Djouadi, it was about real political representation for male and female citizens (Guerin 2019). Whilst the presence of this younger generation of women makes sense given the fact that half of Algeria’s population is below thirty years of age, and these bear the brunt of unemployment, older women have also been on the Algerian streets. Elderly women like Nissa Imad were also on the streets protesting. All five of her children are unemployed. Explaining her presence against the barricades she defiantly states, “I am here for the young, for our kids. There’s nothing for the young generations. No jobs and no houses. They can’t get married. We want this whole system to go” (ibid 2019). It is clear from the narratives of these women that they see the connection between their daily lived experiences of disempowerment and marginalization and the broader structural causes and therefore are actively seeking the ending of this patriarchal and oppressive political and economic order. Muslim feminists have taken on patriarchy from within Islam. Adopting a liberal paradigm, these feminists are attempting to adapt the religion to make it more relevant to the contemporary period. Muslim feminists maintain that the dominant

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patriarchal interpretations of Islam do not reflect an authentic Islam (Ebbit 2016). Rather, pre-Islamic cultural norms seeped into the faith in the manner Gerda Lerner described in our introduction. Islamic feminism, according to Iranian scholar Nesta Ramazani, “. . .helps Muslim women’s emancipation by allowing for a more nuanced critique of gender discrimination in Islam, without disregarding the importance of the faith” (ibid 2016). In other words, it allows for women to be both Muslim and modern simultaneously. In keeping with this liberal tradition, Zainah Anwar critiques Muslim husbands who beat their wives. She believes that domestic violence is fundamentally un-Islamic as it contradicts Islamic values of compassion, serenity, dignity and kindness. She notes, too, that the Qur’an calls on men and women to be each other’s friend and protector (Kasraoui 2019). Anwar also notes the practice of Islamists to selectively quote from the Qur’an. This is evident when it comes to polygamy. Whilst Islamists quote the Qur’anic verse which allows Muslim men to marry up to four wives, this is not the entire verse. The verse goes on to state “. . . if ye fear that ye cannot do justice (to so many wives) then marry one” (ibid 2017). Justice, as used in the Qur’an, is all-encompassing and refers to not only equality of food and accommodation to one’s wives but also love and affection. As such absolute equality is impossible to achieve, monogamy, not polygamy, is the norm in Islam (Khan and Ur Rehman 2016). In similar vein, Maha Elgenaidi (2019) reiterates the Islamic conception of God as The Just. Therefore, anything which is manifestly unjust, including injustice against women is not simply wrong but a sin. Muslim male scholars too are beginning to question Islamic fundamentalist interpretations of gender relations. Responding to the issue of veiling women, Raficq Abdalla and Moshamed Keshavjee (2018) prove that Islamic jurisprudence borrowed from Christian and pre-Islamic pagan traditions. Whilst the Qur’an calls on Muslim men and women to be modestly attired, early Muslims copied the customs of Zoroastrian Persians and Christian Byzantines when forcing women to cover up. By demonstrating the man-made origins of shari’a, these scholars have relieved Muslim women to regard the hijab, niqab or burqa as a religious duty (Ebbit 2016). The MENA region is engulfed in tectonic economic, political and socio-cultural changes wrought by processes of globalization, technological innovation and urbanization. These have fundamentally transformed the region towards greater levels of education and labour market participation. In the process, it is contributing to less Muslim support for patriarchal values. As people acquire more education, they grow more tolerant and egalitarian in their values. This serves to undermine patriarchal values. Younger people in the MENA region are more educated than their parents’ generation and demonstrate less patriarchal values according to various surveys undertaken. Moreover, despite the contradictory attitudes displayed by Muslims in supporting democracy but not that much in support of women’s emancipation, work by Alexander and Welzel (2011) demonstrates that the more political open societies become, the less patriarchal they are. Similarly economic changes in MENA societies have seen more women entering the work force. Not only are these women financially independent but they choose to either marry later in life or choose

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non-traditional forms of cohabitation. These developments also serve to undermine fundamentalist patriarchal norms (ibid 2011).

5.5

Conclusion

This chapter began with the truism that one cannot understand patriarchy narrowly – for instance – women’s representation in public institutions. Women’s activists in the West secured the right to vote in the early part of the twentieth century but gender discrimination was still a reality in other areas – such as women’s participation in the armed forces or the discrimination they faced in the area of differing pay-scales in the work place. It is imperative that the gains made by women’s activities and other progressive forces in the MENA region need to be consolidated and expanded upon. Outside actors, for instance, the World Bank, bilateral donors and international development agencies should make their loans and assistance conditional on improvements in women’s rights. Moreover, these international bodies could also assist female enterprise development and creation. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has made clear in their report, female-owned businesses often are often home-based enterprises with little capacity to scale up on account of a dearth of capital. With even modest sums ejected into these businesses, they could grow and women could become financially independent of their male “guardians.” Research conducted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) (2018) has also noted how the provision of such micro-finance to female entrepreneurship together with skills training to grow their businesses has resulted in an improvement in women’s self-esteem from countries as diverse as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Despite the MENA region having the largest gender gap of all regions in the world, there is hope too. Attitudes are changing and becoming less patriarchal. The Arab Barometer starkly demonstrates this. Seventy-five percent in the MENA region support women’s access to tertiary education, 84 percent believe that women should be allowed to work in the labour force, whilst 62 percent believe that women should be allowed into political office. What account for these progressive attitudes? First, there seems to be a generational divide with younger people (which comprise the majority in the MENA region) holding less patriarchal views. Second, with access to tertiary education, those holding post-secondary qualifications are less discriminatory in their attitudes than those without post-school qualifications (Robbins and Thomas 2018). The momentum for a post-patriarchal MENA region is therefore increasing. Awareness of the economic costs of patriarchy is also waying on the minds of the region’s policy-makers. According to the OECD, the region is losing US$ 575 billion per annum as a result of gender-based discrimination in laws and social norms. Furthermore, the OECD notes that by merely raising women’s participation in the work force to the same levels as that of men could boost the GDP of MENA countries by 26 percent (Bremer 2017). Recognizing this, governments are reacting

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positively. In the UAE whilst women make up 40 percent of the private sector’s employees, they constitute 66 percent of all public sector workers. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, which is known for its religious conservatism has set the target of 30 percent female participation in its labour force as part of its National Vision 2030. Moreover, a Price Waterhouse Cooper survey of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt found that two-thirds of the public are in favour of government intervention in private companies to set targets for gender diversity (Ashkar 2019). Changing attitudes are increasingly reflected in government policies. Morocco’s Mudawannah (family code) makes men and women equally responsible for the wellbeing of their family (Kasraoui 2019). In Tunisia, meanwhile, President Beji Said Essebi established a Commission for Individual Freedoms and Equality in 2018. Following recommendations from this commission, a raft of gender friendly legislation was enacted. These included equal inheritance between the sexes, overturning the ban which prevented women from marrying outside of their faith and criminalizing violence against women (Al Jazeera 2017; Mantashe 2018). On the political front, too, there has been progress. Whilst the Inter Parliamentary Union is correct in noting that elected female representatives in the MENA region lag behind all other countries in the world, it is important to note women have served as ministers in Syria, Jordan Egypt, Iraq and Tunisia. Moreover, Turkey has had a female president and Iran a female vice-president (AbuKhalil 2005). The inclusion of women in political processes and their representation in the region’s parliaments is imperative not only for the cause of women’s emancipation but in an effort to deepen the democratic experience in countries. Despite women constituting only 17 percent of Moroccan parliamentarians, they asked 58 percent of the questions (Langohr et al. 2016). In the process, refuting notions of women being docile, largely passive and giving way to their male peers. It is important to note that female members of parliament in countries like Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco did not only confine themselves to focusing on issues of women’s and children’s right but also on issues of economics and education (ibid 2016). This suggests that these women see the connection between their lived experiences and broader structural conditions which lead to their marginalization. Given women’s increased visibility in the political sphere from the Arab Spring to the current wave of protests from Algiers and Tehran to Lebanon and Baghdad, the possibility that female political representation will increase in the region is highly likely. None of this means the road to gender equality will be without difficulty. In Saudi Arabia, the persistence of so-called honour killings and a push-back against liberal reforms is discernible (Bustanji 2020). In the final instance, it is best for the men and women of the MENA region to find their inspiration in the sage advice from Maha Elgenaidi (2019), The task of overcoming patriarchy cannot be left to women, as if they bore responsibility for their oppression; rather, men must take responsibility for changing a situation which was created and is maintained by men. Achieving complete equality is a task that requires men and women working together.

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Khan, M. A., & Ur Rehman, H. (2016). Polygamy in Islam: A critical analysis. Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological Sciences, 6(10), 138. Langohr, V., Lynch, M., & Baker, L. (2016). The changing face of women’s political participation in the Middle East. Retrieved January 23, 2020 from https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/05/ 10/changing-face-of-women-s-political-participation-in-middle-east-pub-63560 Lerner, G. (1986). The creation of Patriarchy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mantashe, T. (2018). Tunisia protest against societal reforms. Retrieved August 7, 2018 from https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/04/tunisia-protest-against-society-reforms// Middle East Eye. (2015). Rape to silence: Sexual violence by police rampant in Sisi’s Egypt. Retrieved January 23, 2020 from https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/rape-silence-sexualviolence-police-rampant-sisis-egypt Middle East Monitor. (2019). Sudan urged to ensure justice for raped women protesters. Retrieved January 23, 2020 from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190719-sudan-urged-to-ensurejustice-for-raped-women-protesters Moghadam, V. (2003). Modernizing women: Gender and social change in the Middle East. Colorado: Lynne Rienner. Oppenheimer, S. (2019). These Kurdish women helped fight off ISIS. Retrieved January 23, 2020 from https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/.premium.MAGAZINE-these-kurdishwomen-helped-fight-off-isis-now-they-re-the-no-1-target-in-syria-1.8130721 Ramadan, T. (2009). Radical reform: Islamic ethics and liberation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reperger, S. (2018). Feminist politics holds the key to a post-patriarchal social order. Retrieved January 30, 2020 from https://www.fes-connect.org/trending/feminist-politics-holds-the-keyto-a-post-patriarchal-social-order/ Robbins, M., & Thomas, K. (2018). Women in the Middle East and North Africa: A divide between rights and roles. Retrieved January 23, 2020 from https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/ uploads/AB_WomenFinal-version05122018.pdf Ross, M. (2008). Oil, Islam and women. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 107–123. Solomon, H. (2019). Reforming Saudi Arabia under Mohammed Bin Salman. Retrieved January 23, 2020 from http://www.mei.org.in/c555 Tausch, A. (2019). Multivariate analyses of the global acceptability rates of male intimate partner violence (IPV) against women based on World Values Survey Data. International Journal of Health Planning Management, 34(2), 1155–1194. Tickner, J. A., & Sjoberg, L. (2013). Feminism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & L. Sjoberg (Eds.), International relations theories: Discipline and diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walby, S. (1990). Theorizing patriarchy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Chapter 6

Sectarianism and the Politics of Identity in the MENA Region

Abstract The politics of identity is a source of major conflicts across the MENA region. Rejecting essentialist notions of identity, this chapter argues that sectarianism only becomes an issue when it is instrumentalized by political entrepreneurs. It examines how sectarianism has played out in Syria and Libya as well as the quest for an independent Kurdistan. The chapter explores the different approaches adopted by MENA states to manage the politics of difference. These include secessionism, federalism, consociationalism and nation-building. Various country case studies are provided as each of these approaches is assessed – from Syria and Morocco to Lebanon and Oman. Ultimately, however, the politics of identity calls upon mature political leadership with a vision and intellect to forge inclusive nation-states in an increasingly fractious region. Keywords Identity · Consociationalism · Federalism · Nation-building · Secession

6.1

Introduction

From Columbia to Chechnya, from India to Iran and from Angola and Algeria to Afghanistan, the world is witnessing a return to the “cult of origins” where difference often means destruction, destitution, despair and death (Krause and Renwick 1996). This is not an overstatement. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the world is divided into 195 countries, the planet actually only consists of 5000 distinct ethnic groups – not mentioning religious or linguistic divides and the perennial economic cleavages. Indeed, only 9.1 percent of the globe’s states are ethnically homogenous (Davies 1996; Poku 1996). Effective nation-building is key to harmonious co-existence and common citizenship. Narrow ethno-centric nationalisms and religious fundamentalism undermine this collective imperative. Where such inclusive

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6_6

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nation-building is absent, tragedy beckons. The 1994 Rwandan genocide, the killing fields of the former Yugoslavia and the systematic purging of Yazidis by Islamic State all underline this truism. The MENA region has not been immune to the politics of identity. There is an old Bedouin proverb, “I, against my brothers. I and my brothers against my cousins. I and my brothers and my cousins against the world” (Haji 2017). This saying encapsulates the central problem of identity politics in the MENA region. Negative identity politics lay at the root of state formation and also serves to prevent social cohesion and thereby contributing to the fragility of states in the region. The politics of identity creates permanent divisions of inhabitants of the MENA states into “insiders” and “outsiders” and makes it impossible for any common citizenship to develop. To be clear, identity politics is not necessarily negative. It promotes social cohesion as it provides individuals with a sense of belonging. This politics of belonging is central to the notion of a “nation-state.” However, when belonging is coached in exclusivist or nativist terms, when social-economic benefits are perceived to be accrued to certain groups and not others and where one’s cultural and religious traits and language is marginalized or disrespected, this not only undermines true nation-building but also contributes to political instability. The case of the Kurds is instructive here. Such political instability is further exacerbated when neighbouring states contribute to widening sectarian divisions in one’s country in an effort to secure certain strategic advantages as polarizing Shia-Sunni divisions would attest to. In this chapter, we begin by examining the nature of identity politics. Following this, we move from theoretical constructs to the nature of identity politics in the MENA region. Finally we turn to a world in which identity politics may be transcended.

6.2

Theorizing Identity Politics

It is an altogether human yearning to know who one is and who shares these characteristics we identify within ourselves. Knowing who one is essential to the security of individuals. Despite processes of modernization: the construction of skyscrapers, the development of the Internet and ubiquitous nature of social media as well as talk of a Fourth Industrial Revolution, humanity still struggles with the perennial question of who am I? Contrary to modernization theory this search of identity “. . . may be of increasing importance in an age of bureaucratization and impersonal mass society, and a world of political alienation and isolation” (Davies 1996).

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This quest for identity is intrinsically linked to issues of recognition, dignity and respect. Francis Fukuyama (2019) eloquently argues: the inner sense of dignity seeks recognition. It is not enough that I have a sense of my own worth if other people do not publicly acknowledge it or, worse yet, if they denigrate me or don’t acknowledge my existence. Self-esteem arises out of esteem by others. Because human beings naturally crave recognition, the modern sense of identity evolves quickly into identity politics, in which individuals demand public recognition of their worth. Identity politics thus encompasses a large part of the political struggles of the contemporary world, from democratic revolutions to new social movements, from nationalism and Islamism to the politics on contemporary American university campuses. Indeed, the philosopher Hegel argued that the struggle for recognition was the ultimate driver of human history, a force that was key to understanding the emergence of the modern world

Two caveats are crucial at this juncture. First, such self-identification as part of a particular group, Rothschild (1997) stresses, is subjective rather than objective. It is a perceived sense of common origins and interests which may or may not be true. Such perceptions are malleable. Therefore, identities are malleable and dynamic. Accordingly Krause and Renwick (1996) poignantly note that “. . . identities are constructed and therefore can be deconstructed and reconstructed anew.” What this suggests is that a state could engage in nation-building – creating a sense of belonging for all its diverse citizens. Oman has created such a national identity and therefore has achieved greater social cohesion and peace. Conversely, political elites more could manipulate such identities in an effort to “divide-and-rule.” Such tactics might well provide short-term gain, but in the long-term will undermine stability in any polity. Iran’s discriminatory practices against its minority Sunnis and Saudi Arabia’s repression against its minority Shias merely adds to the troubles confronting Tehran and Riyadh. Indeed, the Sunni-Sectarian divide which wracks much of the Middle East relates to Iran and Saudi Arabia enflaming these differences as they seek pan-Islamist leadership in the Muslim world (Watkins 2018). Second, it is imperative to also understand that a single individual juggles multiple identities simultaneously – belonging to a particular ethnic grouping, a religious denomination, a race, a socio-economic class, a geographic area and so forth. How an individual chooses one identity as the dominant one depends upon a number of external variables. Consider the case of the Jews in the MENA region. Following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, an anti-Semitic backlash in Arab countries resulted in 900,000 Jews being forced to leave their homes and seek sanctuary elsewhere (Solomon and Tausch 2020). It did not matter that these Jews were Iraqi by birth or spoke Arabic or belonged to the same socio-economic class as their Arab neighbours. The fact that they were Jewish was the only identifier in the eyes of their Arab neighbours. Given the animosity confronting them, these Jews also laid greater emphasis on group solidarity and saw their interests being protected only by the Jewish state of Israel which the vast majority emigrated to.

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Identity Politics in the MENA Region

Sectarianism has ravaged much of the MENA region. Leon Goldsmith (2015) writes of sectarian entrepreneurs who pursue political objectives by mobilizing, provoking and adding to the violent expression of sectarian identities. Such sectarian entrepreneurs include the regimes who exploit the politics of identity to maintain their privileged access to power by creating patronage networks for their co-sectarians whilst often demonizing the proverbial other (ibid, 2015). Indeed, one could well argue that many of the ruling elites and concomitant sectarianism was as a product of this politics of identity. Across the MENA region, one has families and extended kinship networks monopolizing political and economic power rendering social exclusion and alienation inevitable and nation-building impossible (Jung 2010). Jajati Pattniak (2010) refers to this type of form of government as clan-based structural governance. In Saudi Arabia, despite an ostensible reform agenda and the trappings of democratic institutions like an elected 178-member Municipal Council and a Council of Ministers (cabinet), power is still concentrated in the hands of the country’s 25,000 princes. Within this extended royal family, it is the Sudairi faction who are politically dominant and their interests are represented in the Royal Council which is more influential than any electoral body (Pattniak 2010). There has been an attempt by these families to enhance their legitimacy by including other tribes and select members of the clerical class and the business community (Jung 2010). Kuwait’s ruling Al-Sabah family, for instance, have bolstered their power base through an alliance with the country’s merchant class. Whilst the Al Sabahs controlled political and military power, the merchant class have dominated the economic life of the Kingdom (Alam 2010). Such arrangements, however, have largely taken on the form of co-option as opposed to a genuine process of inclusion. Far from attempting to bridge the sectarian divides in their country, the Royal Family has adroitly played on the divides to maintain their power. The Sunni hadar (townspeople) from which the merchant class emanates makes up 35 percent of the population. The Shi’a who migrated from Persia in the early twentieth century constitute 17 percent of the population, whilst the Bedouin tribes make up 45 percent of Kuwait. The Al Sabahs have exploited the tensions between Sunni and Shi’a, rural and urban divides, and Islamist against modernists in an attempt to secure their throne (ibid, 2010). The politics of identity, however, is not merely a national issue and has major regional implications. As Chap. 2 highlighted, the region constitutes a conflict system where sources of insecurity in one country impact that of neighbouring states. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of the quest for an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds are an ancient people who have lived for 3000 years in the mountainous regions of north-west Iran, the north-eastern part of Iraq, and eastern Turkey. They constitute the largest ethnic minority in the Middle East. Despite their political fragmentation into three so-called nation-states, they have maintained their separate language, culture and customs. Despite their Sunni Muslim identity, they have always sought an independent state they could call

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home – a Kurdistan. Kurdish national aspirations have been acknowledged by the international community as far back as the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. A year later, at the Treaty of Sevres, the victorious Allied Powers reiterated the need for an independent Kurdish state. Yet, a mere three years later, at the Treaty of Lausanne, which gave rise to the modern states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey, Kurdish national aspirations were thwarted (Callimunopulos 2012). Despite rhetorical support, the international community has largely abandoned the Kurds for political reasons given the resistance of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to the creation of a contiguous Kurdish political entity (Riamei 2010). US President Donald Trump may be continuing this tradition of raising, only to dash, such national aspirations. Despite the fighting done by Kurdish forces against Islamic State, with US encouragement and support, Washington decided to give Ankara a green light to invade and occupy northern Syria in October 2019 (Schwarz 2019). Turkey under an increasingly autocratic President Erdogan views the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) which seeks an independent Kurdish state within Turkey’s borders as being intimately connected with the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party in northern Syria and seeks a buffer zone to prevent a Pan-Kurdish state from developing (BBC 2019). The Kurdish question for national self-determination lives on despite setbacks such as these. Fuelling this quest for a Kurdish state is the discrimination and worse they experience in the countries they are currently occupying. Michael Kelly’s (2008) book on the position of Iraqi Kurds during the reign of Saddam Hussein is instructive here. As Kurds were literally confronted with genocide, as witnessed in the chemical attack on Halabja, the desire of Iraqi Kurds to secede grew ever more intense. A cultural and political genocide against the Kurds is currently underway in Turkey with an increasingly ethno-centric Turkish nationalism evident. This has witnessed attacks on Kurdish music and theatre production as well as closing the political space for Kurds to be integrated into a more inclusive Turkish nationalism (Kingsley 2019). Suffice to say that without more inclusive policies in host nations, the dream of a united Kurdistan will appear ever more appealing to the Middle East’s largest ethnic group without a state of their own. In Syria, too, the failure to manage the politics of identity is self-evident. The catalyst for the civil war in Syria was the eruption of peaceful protests in 2011 against the Al-Assad dynasty in power since 1970. Whilst part of the wave of protests which was overturning regimes as part of the Arab Spring, the reality is that Syria’s future as a contiguous territorial entity was always in doubt given the demographic make-up and the harsh realities of economic and power configurations. The dominant Alawites, which Bashar Al-Assad is part of, make up only 12 percent of the Syrian population. The Alawites are a branch of Shia Islam. The majority of Syrians, however, are Sunni. Christians and Yazidis also add to the religious mix. Beyond religious divisions, there are also ethnic and linguistic cleavages. These include Arabs, Circassians, Druze, Kurds, Palestinian and Turkmen. Then there are the political and ideological differences – from nationalists to socialist, from militant Islamists to secularists (Fukuyama 2019). There was never any sense of a single, overarching national identity. Three reasons account for this. The first relates to how the Alawites achieved their

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ascendancy when the region was ruled as a French colony. Paris recruited the Alawites and they were integrated into French military structures. As a result, their legitimacy was always called into question. The Alawites, consequently, were always loathed by other groups in Syria in colonial times and after independence. Second, no national identity is possible where one group dominates politically and draws economic benefits from the state disproportionately as a result of this political domination. This was a process described in Chap. 2 of the study. Despite the co-option of some elites from other groups, Alawite dominance was all too apparent and those elites who joined the ranks of the government lost credibility amongst their own followers. Third, given their lack of legitimacy and inability to articulate and receive popular “buy-in” for a shared nation-building project, the Al-Assads have always resorted to brutal repression (Fukuyama 2019). Unsurprisingly, this alienated the majority of the populace further. In an attempt to perpetuate his rule, Bashar Al-Assad has turned to Tehran and Moscow. The entry of Shia Iran and its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, has only served to further fuel the sectarian divides in the country whilst serving to further isolate Damascus from other Arab states. The entrance of Moscow, a long-time ally of Bashar and his father Hafez, has allowed the regime to make military gains against the rebel formations arrayed against his decrepit rule (Al Jazeera 2020). Russia’s military support, especially its aerial bombardments of densely populated civilian areas, has only served to further erode the remaining legitimacy of the regime whilst stiffening Al-Assad’s resolve not to engage in negotiations or some comprise with the rebels. Whilst such military solutions are certainly providing short-term gains, it makes reconciliation and therefore any future nation-building impossible. Of course, Syria is not the only country confronting the consequences of a weak or non-existent national identity as Libya can attest to (Fukuyama 2019). Historically, Libya has never succeeded in creating an inclusive political entity divided in geographic, ethnic and religious terms. Geographically, the country has been divided between Tripolitana, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. These geographic divisions have been reinforced by ethnic cleavages: Arabs, Berbers and Toubous (Filiu 2015). To these divisions are the religious dimension. The Berber or Amazigh population of Libya do not belong to mainstream Sunni Islam. Rather they are Ibadi Muslim and have suffered persecution because of their religious beliefs. It should come as no surprise then that Berbers took an active part in the 2011 uprisings which resulted in the overthrow of Gaddafi (United World International 2020). Following the ouster of Gaddafi, the country’s divisions became wider and more entrenched. Self-styled Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) represent those communities in southern and western Libya who benefited from Gaddafi’s reign, who have lost Tripoli’s patronage and who have taken up arms against the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA, in turn, represents those forces which fought against Gaddafi during 2011. Adding to further polarization, Islamist forces embedded within Haftar’s forces are adding to the political, economic and clan divides (Lacher 2019). The civil war in Libya demonstrates the failure of the post-2011 dispensation to reconcile differences between groups.

6.4 Beyond Identity Politics

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Beyond Identity Politics

How does one manage identity politics? Is it possible to go achieve a polity at peace with itself despite the prevalence of “the cult of origins” alluded to in our introduction? In this section, we present four alternatives: secession, federalism, powersharing and nation-building. Whilst secessionism is often regarded as a last resort to escape sectarian strife since it is the most politically unpalatable option. It entails allowing a group to secede and thereby govern themselves – retaining the territory which they inhabit which was once part of a sovereign state. Examples of these include Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia, Lithuania’s from Russia and South Sudan’s from Khartoum and the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia into independent polities (Gurr 1995). Whilst this is an extreme method of escaping negative identity politics, it should be considered as a viable option when civil war has become so ruinous that the costs of secession may be more bearable than maintaining the current borders of an existing sovereign state. Commenting on this fraught issue, Gal Luft (2015) opines, “Sometimes a divided country is better than a broken and hopeless one.” Libya confronts such a stark reality. Despite international mediation attempts, the primary fault line between forces of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) has grown ever deeper (Laher 2019). Beyond this primary fault line, lay a constellation of other armed actors. Indeed, there are a staggering 1700 militias operating in this strife torn country. These militias are formed along lines of clan, criminal and Islamist lines (Solomon 2016). Should secession be considered in Libya? What form would it take? If one accepts the partition of the country along the lines of the balance of forces between those of the LAAF and the GNA, what prevent these rather fragile political entities from disintegrating further as clan militias and Islamist forces carve out their own niche within the divided country? The situation is somewhat clearer in Syria. Despite military control thanks to Russian airpower and Iran’s proxies supporting Al Assad, it is clear that the days where the 12 percent Alawite minority control the other 88 percent of the population is not sustainable as the seething Sunni resentment and the establishment of Kurdish states on Syrian sovereign territory will testify to. A less extreme form of separation is federalism. This allows for the sharing of power between different groups, especially where a group is contiguous with a particular geographic region. At its core, federalism devolves power from the centre to regional units where the powers of each are clearly demarcated and constitutionally enshrined (Coakley 1993). Such autonomy may well provide aggrieved groups with a stake in the sovereign states and may well appease demands for secession. On the other hand, autonomy may result in greater fragmentation as groups use autonomy as a half-way towards outright secession. Moreover, federalism comes with greater financial burdens, think of the replication of state capitals and the additional layers of bureaucracy (Horowitz 1985). The track record of federal arrangements is more successful in better resourced developed countries than in under-resourced developed states. Federalism also

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requires greater intellectual and technocratic capabilities from the state. For federalism to work, the separation of powers between centre and regional entities has to be periodically renegotiated given changing realities. Moreover, these federal arrangements have to be augmented with other consociational measures at sub-regional level to maintain the stability of the polity (McGarry and O’Leary 1994). Ultimately, the success of federal arrangements is also dependent upon the political maturity of the leadership in countries implementing it – willing to bear short-term costs for long-term stability. Moreover, this political leadership in an effort to be more inclusive will need to pursue minimax strategies as opposed to zero-sum games. Compromise in such minimax strategies is key. Following on our earlier discussion in Chap. 2, the capacity of MENA states is in doubt and the political elites have deliberately widened sectarian divides in an effort to draw short-term political advantage. Despite the challenges of federalism, there is space to consider it within the context of some MENA states. The case of Morocco and the Western Sahara does come to mind here. The former Spanish colony of Western Sahara was annexed in 1975 by Morocco citing ancestral and political ties. These claims were rejected by the Polisario Front representing the Saharawi people and a 16-year long insurgency ensued. The United Nations finally brokered a ceasefire arrangement between the Moroccan government and the Polisario Front in 1991. At the time of the signing of the agreement, Morocco controlled 80 percent of what the Polisario Front claimed was the sovereign Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (BBC 2018). Whilst the SADR has received international and diplomatic recognition by some states, the joint economic and diplomatic offensive launched by King Mohammed VI has seen the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition of the SADR as well as Morocco’s triumphant return to the African Union. Given the seismic political changes underway in Algeria, it is uncertain how long the Polisario Front will continue to receive support from Algiers. At the same time, residents of this impoverished area are refugees in Algeria or internally displaced within the borders of the Western Sahara whilst tensions inside the Polisario Front are brewing as a younger generation prepares to take over the reins from the older leadership. Given the political realities on the ground, the most viable option may well be Morocco’s Autonomy Plan. This seeks to reconcile Morocco’s claims of sovereignty over the territory with the desire for self-determination on the part of the Saharawis (Pidoux 2019). Genuine, cooperative federalism with supporting sub-regional conflict resolution mechanisms and the equitable distribution of economic benefits might well prove to put an end to this long-running conflict. Beyond secession and federalism, a third method of responding to virulent identity politics is power-sharing – often referred to as consociation or consociationalism (Rabie 1994). Far from dragooning people into one identity, power-sharing does two things. First, it actively acknowledges different identities. Second, it views these multiple identities as legitimate (Gurr 1995). Power-sharing arrangements are characterized by four elements. These include the involvement of major groups in power-sharing at executive level; the possibility of a minority veto on certain crucial issues; the internal autonomy of groups where it is desired most;

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and proportional representation and proportional allocation of public funds and posts in the civil service (Solomon and Matthews 2001). Such power-sharing agreements prevent the marginalization of one group and can thereby create a spirit of loyalty to the state. However, for it to work optimally, leaders must be viewed as legitimate by their own constituency and their constituency also have to receive the material benefit of such power-sharing arrangements (Rabie 1994). As with federalism, such consociationalism needs to be periodically renegotiated given changing circumstances and it requires successive generations of leadership to remain committed to power-sharing with its concomitant compromises (McGarry and O’Leary 1994). Lebanon’s power-sharing system has been unravelling in recent years and it is instructive to examine the reasons for this. Christian Lebanese, the majority of whom are Maronite Christians, constitutes 33.7 percent of the population. Shia and Sunni Muslims are fairly equal in number with 30.6 percent being Sunni and 30.5 percent Shia. Druze are 5.2 percent following by minuscule numbers of Jews, Baha’i, Buddhists and Hindu (Central Intelligence Agency 2020). Lebanon’s “confessional system” of governance links power-sharing arrangements to religious identification. Thus, the Lebanese President always hails from the Maronite Christian community. The Prime Minister is always a Sunni Muslim, whilst the speaker of parliament is reserved for a member of the Shi’a community. This latter position was devoid of actual power and Lebanese Shi’a opposed the confessional system believing that it marginalized their voice (Mandaville 2014). Hezbollah’s founding manifesto in 1985 also initially vehemently opposed this Shi’a marginalization in Lebanon’s power sharing agreement and the privileged status of Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims. However, following the signing of the 1989 Ta’if agreement Hezbollah became more supportive of the confessional governance system. The Ta’if agreement provided official recognition to Hezbollah as a resistance movement. Not only did this increase its prestige but it meant that Hezbollah remained armed whilst other militias were disarmed (Daher 2017). Hezbollah also managed to master the art of sectarian politics where they and they alone were identified with the Shia bloc through the provision of social services from education and healthcare, garbage collection, electricity and water provision. Much of these social services were funded through the US $100 million that Hezbollah received annually from Tehran (Mandaville 2014). In 1991 Hezbollah began to run its own television station Al Manar (The Beacon) as well as founding The Educational Institute (al-Mu’assasa al-Tarbawiyya) which provides educational services thereby contributing to an ideal Shi’a society. The educational and social services provided together with its media outreach all contributed towards identifying Hezbollah as the only legitimate representative of the Lebanese Shi’a community. It also promoted the Islamization of the Shi’a community as it sought to control the narrative of both constituted a good Shi’i as well as obedience to Hezbollah’s leadership (Daher 2017). Despite its initial resistance to Lebanese sectarian politics, Hezbollah drew benefit from it and mastered the art of deploying identity for political objectives. Hezbollah has actually made use of the confessional governance system to create a state within a state. As such, it has resisted calls from the Lebanese street to reform or

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radically alter the current power-sharing agreement in Lebanon. Hezbollah resisted the call from ordinary Lebanese in 2011, as part of the Arab Spring, to rid the country of such sectarian identity politics. In 2015, more animated calls for an end to the confessional system of governance arose with demonstrators again taking to the streets. Once more, Hezbollah resisted an end to the politics of division. Its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah whilst publicly arguing that his organization adopted a neutral position, worked with other sectarian political elites, despite ideological and political differences, to thwart popular forces calling for an end to the confessional system. Nasrallah also labelled those calling for an end to the current system “Takfiris” and Zionist agents (Daher 2017). Whilst making common cause with other political elites, Hezbollah was slowly controlling the Lebanese state from within. Its armed forces, some analysts note, are more powerful than that of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Its insidious control of the Lebanese state, meanwhile, continued apace and by February 2020 Lebanese President Michael Aoun felt compelled to publicly deny that Hezbollah is leading the new government (AMN 2020). Hezbollah’s support for the sect-based party system, however, is going against popular opinion on the Lebanese street and makes little financial or governance sense. As alluded to earlier, one of the key characteristics of effective power-sharing systems is that not only leaders, but their constituency must also materially benefit from confessional governance. This is clearly not happening in Lebanon where the same families have been in power since the end of the civil war. Patronage networks and nepotism as opposed to the requisite technical skills have resulted in not only ineffective governance but also entrenched corruption. Lebanon has one of the planet’s largest debt loads. Government debt is more than 150 percent of gross domestic output and prospects of a sovereign default are highly likely. The central bank and local lenders were compelled to restrict the transfer of monies abroad as a result of a severe shortage of foreign exchange. This economic crisis has resulted in Lebanese to take to the streets since October 2019. These protests forced the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri to resign (Elbahrawy and Abu Omar 2020). The new administration of Hassan Diab has turned to the International Monetary Fund for assistance but they, together with the World Bank, have warned of the implosion of the Lebanese economy without an improvement of electricity supply, reforming education and liberalizing the telecommunications sector (Elbahrawy and Abu Omar 2020). Given the overlapping connections between sectarian political and economic leadership, however, Prime Minister Diab is unable to undertake such reforms. It is precisely for this reason that protests have continued against the new administration calling for new electoral laws which would entail the elimination of the confessional governance system which has impoverished ordinary Lebanese whilst promoting sectarianism and exacerbating the governance crisis. Hezbollah, once again, has resisted any change to the current system and may well find itself on the wrong side of history (Kranz 2020). The Lebanese power-sharing experiment demonstrates the danger of allowing one group to amass power at the expense of other groups (for instance, allowing Hezbollah to retain its armed militias), to create

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a state within a state and allowing it to take over as well as excluding the majority of the population from materially benefiting from the system. The latter takes on added significance when an economy is imploding. Finally, there are nation-building approaches to overcome sectarian divides. Whilst the cleavages of state and society across the MENA region exist, it does not mean that it should be accepted as a norm. One could be Turkmen, Iraqi and Muslim simultaneously. Similarly, one could be both Coptic Christian, Egyptian and Arab. Identity formation as we noted earlier is not merely as the result of subjective consciousness but also objective conditions which include inclusive political processes and socialization agents encouraging a national identity. As Welsh (1993) has argued very few of the world’s states are true nation-states, only about 20 states are ethnically homogeneous. Thus, national identity has to be constructed. Inclusive nation-building, as opposed to elite co-option strategies pursued by MENA leaders, would entail promoting the idea of a common shared nationhood and creating a collective sense of belonging stressing the territory we share, a shared history and future goals all can buy into (Hazleton 1998). Horowitz (1985), however, warns that nation-building will fail if political and economic disparities between groups are not reduced. This is especially important where a particular group benefits disproportionately from the largesse of the state based on their ethnicity, clan affiliation or religious identity as we have seen in the cases of Libya and Syria. Oman under Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said provides important lessons in successful nation-building. Sultan Qaboos reigned from 1970 to 2020 and moved his country from conflict to relative peace and prosperity. In 1970, when he ascended the throne, Oman was a near medieval society mired in poverty and conflict. In the southern Dhofar Province, a Marxist rebellion supported by the neighbouring People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was raging (Feierstein 2020). The Dhofar Liberation Front sought independence from Muscat (Keeler 2020). The country was also plagued by reinforcing sectarian fault lines. Whilst Sunni Muslims inhabited the southern and central areas from Dhofar to Shraqiyah, Ibadhi Muslims occupied the interior and northern regions of the country. Ibadi Muslims are distinct from Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and trace their origins to the Khawarij who were the first dissenters in Islam (Johny 2010). Approximately 5 percent of the population consisted of Shi’a Muslims who despite their small size were quite influential (Goldsmith 2015). Demonstrating superior political acumen, Sultan Qaboos went about uniting his fractious nation though policies of nation-building, inclusiveness, socio-economic development and reconciliation. Whilst bringing an end to the Dhofar rebellion, he understood that there were genuine grievances driving the rebellion. Consequently, he championed the economic development of the erstwhile neglected southern region and he brought Dhofar’s leadership into Oman’s government (Feierstein 2020). The modest hydrocarbon reserves of the country were harnessed for the good of the country by ensuring that all groups’ socio-economic needs were met. Recognizing that these socio-economic needs will not be met without a capable state, note our discussion in Chap. 2, Sultan Qaboos reconfigured the civil service and the military to ensure that it was fit for purpose (ibid, 2020). Whilst Sultan Qaboos was

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an Ibadhi, there was no privileged access by Ibadhis to state levers nor were they drawing disproportionate socio-economic benefits from the state. Inclusive governance was the key. Moreover, unlike other MENA states, Muscat was at pains to defuse rather than incite sectarian tensions. Sub-national identities and Oman’s diversity were celebrated by the political system with different religious faiths and tribal sheikhdoms all represented in both the executive Council of Ministers as well as the Majlis Oman or Omani Parliament (Goldsmith 2015). Recognizing the fact that religious extremism could enflame sectarian tension, religious moderation and tolerance was promoted by the state. Conversely any type of religious fundamentalism – whether Sunni, Shia or Ibadhi – was not countenanced by the state. In 2005, there was an attempt on the part of a fringe minority group involving some 70 academics and military officers to establish an Ibadhi Imamate. Muscat promptly quashed the attempt. The success of Oman’s strategy is evinced in the fact that there were no Omanis recruited into the ranks of Islamic State (ibid, 2015). If there is one criticism to be levelled against Oman’s, otherwise successful nation-building approach is the fact that it was too closely associated with the person of Sultan Qaboos who reigned for 50 years. It was he who reached out a conciliatory hand to the rebellious south, he who cajoled recalcitrant tribal sheikhs to partake in inclusive politics, he who created a capable state and had the political acumen to ensure that the benefits of state largesse was to be shared by all. Oman’s successful nation-building attempt was therefore inextricably linked with the person of Sultan Qaboos. With his passing away on the 10 January 2020, it is unclear if his successor, Haithim bin Tariq, has the necessary political acumen or legitimacy of his predecessor. Indeed, Haithim bin Tariq is a relatively unknown. He served as SecretaryGeneral in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 2002 and that constitutes his public role (Keeler 2020). If there is one lesson we can draw from Omani nation-building is that the long-term sustainability of these processes needs to be better institutionalized and less personalized.

6.5

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the debilitating consequences of the politics of identity. It has also explored ways in which these sectarian divides could be overcome thereby realizing the goal of nation-building. In Chapter 2, the linkage between the dearth of democracy and weak institution-building and the consequent weakness of Arab states was discussed. In Chapter 4, our discussion of patriarchy stressed that gender emancipation is impossible under authoritarian conditions. Just as women rights are intrinsic to broader processes of democratization, so is the connection between nation-building and democratization. As Francis Fukuyama (2019) has emphasized: A liberal democracy is an implicit contract between citizens and their government, and among the citizens themselves, under which they give up certain rights in order that the government protects other rights that are more basic and important. National identity is

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built around the legitimacy of this contract; if citizens do not believe they are part of the same polity, the system will not function.

Given the religious divides alluded to earlier in this chapter, as part of the process of democratization, religious fundamentalist doctrines and narratives need to be eschewed and a new post-Islamist discourse needs to take root in society and the body politic. Religion, as we have witnessed in Libya and Lebanon, has tended to reinforce existing sectarian cleavages. Here, there is hope. As described earlier in the book, younger Arabs are less traditional in their attitudes, more cosmopolitan, less religiously inclined and more forward-thinking. This is the antithesis of Islamist discourses which are so dogmatic in their approach. Given the youthful demographics in the MENA region, there is optimism that a less fundamentalist, more inclusive post-Islamist narratives will expand its appeal.

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Filiu, J. (2015). From Deep state to Islamic state: The Arab counter-revolution and its jihadi legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fukuyama, F. (2019). Identity: Contemporary identity politics and the struggle for recognition. London: Profile Books. Goldsmith, L. (2015). Immunizing against Sectarian “Sickness”: The case of Oman. Middle East Institute, November 12, 2015. Gurr, T. R. (1995). Transforming ethno-political conflicts: Exit: Autonomy, or access. In K. Rupesinghe (Ed.), Conflict transformation. New York: St Martin’s Press. Haji, N. (2017). The sweetness of tears. Retrieved February 3, 2020, from https://www.goodreads. com/quotes/744666-there-is-an-old-arab-bedouin-saying-i-against-my Hazelton, W. A. (1998). Ending violent ethnic conflicts: Separating or sharing as options for negotiation. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 4(3), 104–105. Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Johny, S. (2010). Building representative institutions in a traditional society: The political reform process in Oman. In G. Dietl (Ed.), Democracy and democratization in the Gulf. Shipra: New Delhi. Jung, D. (2010). Modern states or family enterprises? Some theoretical reflections on democratization and state formation in the Gulf region. In G. Dietl (Ed.), Democracy and democratization in the Gulf. Shipra: New Delhi. Keeler, L. (2020). Can Oman survive its own neighbourhood after the death of Sultan Qaboos? Retrieved February 17, 2020, from https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/01/can-oman-survive-itsown-neighborhood-after-the-death-of-sultan-qaboos/ Kelly, M. J. (2008). Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish genocide. Westport: Praeger Security International. Kingsley, P. (2019). Amid Turkey’s Purge, a renewed attack on Kurdish culture. Retrieved February 20, 2020, from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/world/middleeast/amid-tur keys-purge-a-renewed-attack-on-kurdish-culture.html Krause, J., & Renwick, N. (1996). Introduction. In J. Krause & N. Renwick (Eds.), Introduction to identities in International Relations. Oxford: MacMillan Pressing Association with St. Anthony’s College. Kranz, M. (2020). Why protestors want Lebanon’s new government to pass a new electoral law. Retrieved February 18, 2020, from https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/ lebanon-protesters-new-electoral-law-ruling-political-elite.html Lacher, W. (2019). Who is fighting whom in Tripoli: How the 2019 civil war is transforming Libya’s military landscape. Retrieved 15 February 2020, from http://www.smallarmssurvey. org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-2019.pdf Luft, G. (2015). Plan B for Libya. Retrieved January 20, 2020, from https://www.meforum.org/ 5534/partition-libya Mandaville, P. (2014). Islam and politics. London: Routledge. McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (1994). The political regulation of national and ethnic conflict. Parliamentary Affairs, 47(3), 111–112. Pattnaik, J. (2010). Democratization in Saudi Arabia. In G. Dietl (Ed.), Democracy and democratization in the Gulf. New Delhi: Shipra. Pidoux, F. (2019). Morocco and Western Sahara: The decades long war of attrition. Retrieved February 16, 2020, from https://theconversation.com/choose-life-floating-over-sydney-whatdoes-the-law-say-about-political-skywriting-122054 Poku, N. (1996). Colonialism and sub-Saharan identities. In J. Krause & N. Renwick (Eds.), Introduction to identities in International Relations. Oxford: MacMillan Pressing Association with St. Anthony’s College. Rabie, M. (1994). Conflict resolution and ethnicity. Westport: Praeger. Riamei, L. Y. (2010). Democratic experiment in Iraqi Kurdistan, 1991–2003. In G. Dietl (Ed.), Democracy and democratization in the Gulf. New Delhi: Shipra.

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Rothschild, D. (1997). Managing ethnic conflict in Africa: Pressures and incentives for cooperation. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Schwarz, J. (2019). The U.S. is now betraying the Kurds for the eight time. Retrieved February 10, 2020, from https://theintercept.com/2019/10/07/kurds-syria-turkey-trump-betrayal/ Solomon, H. (2016). Islamic State and the coming global confrontation. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan. Solomon, H., & Matthews, S. (2001). Transforming ethnic conflicts. In H. Solomon & A. Thomashausen (Eds.), Politics of identity and exclusion in Africa: From violent confrontation to peaceful cooperation. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Johannesburg. Solomon, H., & Tausch, A. (2020). Islamism, crisis and democratization: Implications of the world values survey for the Muslim world. Cham: Springer. United World International. (2020). The Berber factor in African geopolitics. Retrieved February 20, 2020 https://uwidata.com/8129-the-berber-factor-in-african-geopolitics/ Watkins, J. (2018). Beyond Sectarianism? Transnational identity politics and conflict in the modern Middle East: Past, presents and futures. Retrieved February 3, 2020, from https://blogs.lse.ac. uk/crp/2018/11/07/beyond-sectarianism-transnational-identity-politics-conflict-in-the-modernmiddleeast/ Welsh, D. (1993). Domestic politics and ethnic conflict. Survival, 35(1), 63–80.

Chapter 7

Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab Barometer (5) Data About the “Unword” of Middle East Research?

Abstract Political Islam has been a major force across the MENA for much of the twentieth century. Reaching the zenith of their political ascendancy in the immediately aftermath of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, it is clear that Islamism is on the wane across the region. Opinion polls demonstrated that the Arab street, in particular the youth, are becoming more secular, less conservative in their attitudes and more suspicious of the role of religion in the public sphere. What is driving this disenchantment with Islamist parties relates to their aligning themselves with antidemocratic forces, the endemic corruption and nepotism they have demonstrated once in office, their inability to govern and their internal divisions. Our multivariate empirics of the support rates for Political Islam in the region relied on data from the Arab Barometer survey (5). If the people of the entire Arab world had a free vote in a referendum, the following rules and regulations still would gain an absolute majority: • • • •

Against a marriage of a female with a man who does not pray. Terrorism against the USA is a logical consequence of US interference in the region. Males are better political leaders. The USA, the UK and Israel pose the greatest threat to the stability and well-being of the region. • Banks should not be allowed to charge interest. More than a third of Arab opinion still supports, among others, the following contentions: • • • • •

In favour of Shari’a using physical punishments. A woman cannot be prime minister/president. In society, non-Muslims’ rights should be inferior. Rejecting neighbours – people of a different religion. Shari’a should restrict women’s role.

From the Arab Barometer data, we constructed parametric and non-parametric indices of Overcoming Islamism and of Political Islam. The indices show a very high

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6_7

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correlation with each other. The country values of the Index components are found in Table 7.2. Islamism is defined as high values along our 24 indicators across the board. Table 7.3 reports our UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism” based on the valid country-level Arab Barometer results with 24 variables, aggregated with equal weights. Tunisia, according to Table 7.3, is the country whose population is rendering least support for Islamist worldviews, followed by Lebanon and Iraq. Yemen, Sudan and Algeria are the three Arab nations, whose population still lends biggest across-the-board support for the 24 Islamist positions under consideration here. We could show the close relationship between support of the most salient global Islamist leader today, Turkish President Erdogan, and Political Islam among the interviewed Arab publics. Support for Political Islam is also still very clearly connected to AntiWesternism in the region. Political Islamist hatred against the West now also features the United Arab Emirates with its close cooperation with Western countries and its world class Universities as a victim of this prejudice. As a rule, the advancement of education reduces the extent of support for Political Islam. A post-Islamist future beckons the region and those Islamist parties who make the successful adaptation to this new reality will thrive. Those who do not will be confined to the dustbin of history. Keywords Political Islam · Turkey · Qatar · Muslim brotherhood · Arab barometer · Multivarlate analysis

7.1

Introduction

There is a body of scholarship that would suggest that in Muslim majority countries and in the Arab world in particular, there is a severe problem with the advancement of democratization and secular politics. The esteemed scholar of the Middle East, Bernard Lewis, has stated that there is no distinction between religion and state in Muslim countries since there is no equivalent in the Qur’an of Jesus who “. . .enjoined his followers to render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and to God that which is God’s” (Hashemi 2009). Political Islam or Islamism would certainly subscribe to such a position. Islamists strive to arrive at an ideal Muslim state re-creating the first Islamic state in seventh century Medina. There is a belief that such a state drawing inspiration from the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet Muhammed is essential for the attainment of a complete Muslim life (Kuru and Kuru 2008). Despite their tactical (proselytization, political activism, or militant jihadism) and ideological – Shia or Sunni – differences, all these groups have one thing in common. They share a rejection that any separation can exist between religion and faith and a rejection of democracy. For Islamists, Islam transcends the confines of a religion and also constitutes a political, economic and social system (Osman 2017). This certainly reinforces the position of Bernard Lewis. This God-given system of governance takes precedence over any man-made creation, such as democracy. Democracy, with its inherent popular sovereignty, in their estimation is a sin since

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God is supposed to be the source of all authority (hakimiyya) – not the people (Kazmi 2017). The government exists to fulfil God’s edicts and not to govern on the basis of any social contract. There has certainly been a resurgence of Islamism since the twentieth century with the establishment of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the establishment of the Shi’a militant Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1985, Hamas in the Palestinian territories in 1987, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Qaeda, Islamic State and various regional groupings like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabaab in Somalia. Political Islam in the MENA region was fuelled by the failure of secular politics (think here of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Assads’ rule in Syria), Arab nationalism (Nasr’s Egypt), government repression (the Shah’s brutal Savak in Iran) which together made democratic governance impossible. The absence of responsive governance, especially in the economic sphere, resulted in popular alienation from political regimes. The penchant of Islamists with their attendant charities – from support to orphanages and the aged, providing start-up capital to small business or free medical assistance – resulted in huge support for Islamist parties. Small wonder then, that Islamists were the major beneficiaries of the 2011 Arab Spring protest movements sweeping across the Arab World. Almost a decade later, however, Islamists seem to be on the retreat as a result of their governance failures, their inability to open up political processes, as well as a huge values change sweeping across youth in the MENA region especially as it relates to the place of religion in society and Arab youth’s increasing hostility to more conservative and traditional values. The chapter raises the prospect of whether a post-Islamist or civil Islamic future beckons the inhabitants of this region.

7.2

Background: Challenges Confronting Political Islam

One of the major changes confronting Islamists is the sea change in values – especially amongst urban youth. The Arab Barometer in conjunction with the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) survey of over 25,000 Arabs covering ten countries and the Palestinian territories prove without doubt that secularism is on the rise across the MENA region. Whilst 14 percent of Tunisians regarded themselves as having no religious affiliation in 2013, the figure in 2019 more than doubled to 31 percent. In Libya, the percentage of non-religious people increased from 11 percent to 25 percent over the same period. The number of those who identified themselves as having no religious affiliation increased in Morocco from 4 percent to 13 percent between 2014 and 2019, whilst in Algeria, the equivalent figures are 8 percent and 13 percent. In Lebanon, ironically the country most wracked with religious strife, less than 25 percent of the population identify themselves as being religious (Zuckerman 2019). Perhaps this calamitous drop in religiosity in Lebanon is not unprecedented. The Arab Youth Survey of 2019 which conducted thousands of interviews with 18–24-year-olds found that the majority blamed religion and its

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attendant sectarianism for the conflicts in their region. Another two-thirds of youth believed that religion was playing too big a role in Middle East whilst half believed that “the Arab world’s religious values are holding the Arab world back” (Sanderson 2019). The rise of this secularism is remarkable if one considers that in much of the MENA region, there are robust anti-atheist laws in place and a pervasive anti-secular culture. In Egypt, for instance, publicly espousing an anti-religious perspective can result in your being incarcerated for 5 years (Zuckerman 2019). Beyond secularization, even amongst the religiously observant, there are differences between those subscribing to more orthodox Islamist views as well as others opting for a more modernist, reformist interpretation of the place in Islam in the modern world (Ciftci et al. 2019). Given processes of urbanization, modernization and globalization facilitated by modern technology data from the World Values Survey and Arab Barometer suggest that Arab society is becoming more secular and more liberal in their orientation (Abduljaber 2018). This values change holds profound consequences for the future of Political Islam. The BBC News Arabic conducted a poll in 2012–2013 and again in 2018–2019 which involved 25,000 people from Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, West Bank + Gaza, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. The survey demonstrated that trust in Islamist groups and organizations fell calamitously across the MENA region. In Jordan and Morocco, trust in the Muslim Brotherhood declined by 20 percent since 2012–2013, whilst in Sudan, support for the Brotherhood dropped further by 25 percent – from 49 percent to a mere 24 percent. Support for Ennahda in Tunisia also declined by 24 percent whilst Palestinian support for Hamas declined to 22 percent from 48 percent over the 2012–2019 period (The National 2019). First, Islamist political parties have made political choices which were perceived to be either supporting reactionary incumbents or actively frustrating the democratic aspirations of citizens in their countries. Such was the case in Sudan where Islamists twice supported the men in uniform – first General Nimeiri in 1969 and then General Bashir in 1989 – to come to power via coups. Whilst drawing economic largesse and enjoying the patronage from the military, Islamists lent political legitimacy to the armed forces. With the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir on the 11 April 2019, Islamists under the umbrella of the Popular Congress Party has little support on the Sudanese streets. Hafiz Ismail has argued that Political Islam’s support for the Bashir regime has become toxic for the future of Political Islam in the country. He states: “Before the coup in 1989, the slogan was `Islam is the solution’. But after 30 years of power, after 30 years of corruption and killing, they can’t claim the moral high ground any more” (Beaumont and Salih 2019). A similar dynamic is at play in Algeria. The country’s largest political party, the Movement of Society for Peace did not initially participate in the demonstrations wracking the country through 2019 against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. As such they were viewed as supportive of the existing regime. When it appeared that the regime was losing control, the Islamists joined the protests so late that their participation was viewed as both insincere and extremely opportunistic. Bouteflika did resign in April 2019. Given the public antipathy

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towards the Movement of Society for Peace, they chose not to field a candidate for the 12 December 2019 presidential elections (Wilson Centre 2019). Second, the disenchantment with Political Islam is greater among in those states or territories which is governed by Islamist parties such is the case in Hamascontrolled Gaza and Erdogan’s Turkey. Hamas, an offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Throughout 2019, Gazans protested against Hamas’ misrule, the imposition of taxes on basic goods like bread and beans. These taxes were resented since Gazans accused of Hamas politicians of enriching themselves (Akram 2019). Indeed, corruption is rife amongst the Hamas leadership. Whilst the average wage in Gaza is US$ 360 per month, luxury villas and five-star hotels flourish by the sea and Mercedes Benz and BMW dealerships all cater for the senior Hamas leadership (Rehov 2019). This corruption has been exposed in depth by Suheib Yousef, a son of the co-founder of Hamas – Sheikh Hassan Yousef (Staff 2019). Such corruption stands in direct opposition of such normative values like justice and service to society that a nominally Islamic party is supposed to represent. Popular disenchantment with Hamas was the logical conclusion. As protestors challenged Hamas’ authority throughout 2019 under the slogan: “We want to live!”, Hamas responded violently. According to Amnesty International, hundreds of protesters were beaten, arbitrarily arrested and tortured. Journalists were attacked as freedom of expression was curtailed (Akram 2019). Turkey’s Islamists in the form of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) first came to occupy the national stage in 2002 securing an impressive 66 percent of the seats in parliament. Promising clean government, its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan came across as a pious conservative Muslim. The impressive economic record and democratic gains the AKP produced in its first years of governance resulted in some suggesting that in the AKP model, Islamism and liberal democracy can be reconciled. But this was not to last. The AKP’s mismanagement of the economy resulted in the Turkish lira losing almost three-quarters of its value between 2011 and 2019. Erdogan’s large ego together with the personality cult he created around himself resulted in fall-outs with erstwhile allies like Fethullah Gulen and AKP “heavyweights” such as Abdullah Gul. The political space in Turkey drastically contracted as democratization was jettisoned in favour of the neo-Ottomanism with Erdogan seeing himself as a new Sultan or even Caliph. Then there is the endemic nepotism and corruption such as Erdogan appointing his son-in-law as Minister of Finance (Pipes 2019). Examples of corruption are legion in Erdogan’s Turkey. A 2019 internal report leaked to the press demonstrated how Istanbul municipality provided a total of US $146 million to AKP-affiliated foundations. One of the largest beneficiaries of this was an educational foundation where Bilal Erdogan, President Erdogan’s son, sits on the committee. This foundation received US$ 13.2 million. Another foundation where the president’s daughter sits on the executive board received US$ 9.1 million. Selcuk Bayraktar, Erdogan’s son-in-law, also received US$ 7 million of council funding for his NGO (Ahval 2019). Such mis-governance stands in sharp contrast to the Islamic values the AKP promised to uphold. Under the circumstances, Turks are losing faith in Political Islam. This is best reflected in a recent poll conducted by PEW which demonstrated

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that only 12 percent of Turks support making Shari’a the official law of their country (Lipka 2017). The issue of poor governance leads us to the third factor accounting for the decline of Islamists’ popularity. It proved the undoing of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood during the disastrous year they were in power. Proponents of Political Islam have no real solutions for the grave economic challenges confronting the region’s youth. Appeals to religiosity grow increasingly thin when there is no food in one’s cupboard, no roof over one’s head and no prospects of formal employment. In the 2017–2018 Arab Opinion Index that surveyed 18,830 respondents across 11 Arab countries, a paltry 1,39 percent of respondents viewed the economic conditions in their respective countries positively. This was hardly surprising given the fact that 30 percent of citizens also live in need – meaning that their household’s income does not cover their recurrent monthly expenditure. Moreover, 33 percent of respondents regard unemployment, poverty and price inflation as their most pressing challenges confronted (Doha Institute 2018). As discussed earlier in this volume, it is the youth who are most affected by this economic malaise. Small wonder, then, that they are the most disenchanted with Political Islam. Fourth, divisions amongst Islamists have also soured public opinion towards them. In Jordan, after a 7-year hiatus on contact between Islamists and the monarchy, King Abdullah met with members of Al Islah in April 2019. The discussions were hailed by the group as positive despite the thorny issues raised pertaining to the status of Jerusalem and the Trump Administration’s Middle East peace plan. However, other Islamists in the Islamic Action Front protested any normalization of relations with Israel, rejecting Washington’s peace plan. The resultant tensions resulted in greater polarization amongst Jordan’s Islamists (Wilson Centre 2019). Such divisions also bedevil Egypt’s Islamists. There are inter-generational tensions that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has failed to breach in the aftermath of the coup which toppled them from power. Whilst the older generation seeks to topple El-Sisi peacefully through an alliance with other secular and nationalist parties, the younger generation has increasingly embraced jihadist ideologies which have sought to overthrow the current incumbent through violence (Counter Extremism Project 2017). Whilst the older generation seeks to gradually Islamize society, the younger generation seeks to do this through revolutionary means. These tensions were already apparent in February 2014 during the Brotherhood’s internal elections when 65 percent of the old guard were placed by a younger generation. Whilst the old guard recognize Mahmoud Ezzat as Supreme Guide, the younger generation first put their faith in Mohamed Taha Wahdan who ran the Brotherhood’s Crisis Management Committee which served to have de facto control over events on the ground. Following his arrest in 2015, these “young Turks” have coalesced around Ahmed Abel Rahman who has established the Office for Egyptians Abroad whilst in exile in Turkey (Counter Extremism Project 2017). Taken together, these four variables have contributed to the waning of Political Islam across the MENA region. This begs the question of what the future holds for Islamism?

7.3 A Contested Terrain? Arab Barometer Research on Political Islam

7.3

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A Contested Terrain? Arab Barometer Research on Political Islam

The Arab Barometer, our chosen survey instrument (https://www.arabbarometer. org/), measures the opinion profiles of over three-quarters of the entire global Arab population of the world and surveys opinion in 11 of the 22 Arab countries at regular intervals. As any user of such scientific documentation services as “Scopus” will know,1 the Arab Barometer has long been known to readers of such scientific journals as “The Lancet” and “Political Research Quarterly” as an important source for public health research and social science analysis. It recently has made its last survey wave available free of charge to the global scientific community these days (Wave 5, 2018-2019). Its weight for opinion polling in the Arab world is best shown by over 50 widely cited studies. So, the Arab Barometer offers its data on the real existing opinion profiles of the Arab world to every person on the globe. Statistical programmes such as IBM-SPSS or SAS can even be used to analyse whether Arabs who would like to emigrate to Western countries differ significantly in their opinions from the overall population, and how the overall political and religious opinions recorded differ from those Arab respondents who identify themselves with the victims of domestic violence. The research team, which is responsible for the Arab Barometer, which complies with all the rules of modern representative opinion research, includes: Professor Mark Tessler from the University of Michigan as well as research figures from the Arab world who can hardly be accused of “Islamophobia” such as Amaney Jamal, Professor of Political Science in Princeton; Khalil Shikaki, Director of the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research; Darwish Al-Emadi, Chief Strategy and Development Officer, Qatar University; Musa Shteiwi, professor at the University of Jordan; etc. Since the term “Political Islam” is not free from controversies nowadays, especially among some Western academics (see below), who seem to follow what Lewin (2019) and Fishman (2019) call the “Red-Green Alliance” between the radical Left and Islamism, which makes itself felt on many campuses of the Western world, we mention here that questions fielded by the team about “Political Islam” (question batteries 605 and 606 of the Arab Barometer project), clearly and explicitly identified in the Arab Barometer, include attitudes on the desired or rejected interference of religious leaders in elections; the desirability of religious leaders in political offices; the desirability of the influence of religious leaders in making political decisions; the question of the private nature of religious practice; and finally whether religious leaders are more corrupt or less corrupt than non-religious political leaders. These results on the interpretation of Islam in the region, which can be downloaded from https://www.arabbarometer.org/, are particularly exciting: if 1 https://www.scopus.com/home.uri. The authors express thanks to the Department of Development Studies, Vienna University, https://ie.univie.ac.at/en/ for the opportunity to be able to use Scopus.

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Muslims are to have more rights than non-Muslims, is it necessary to wear the Hijab or not; may banks charge interest; has Sharia priority over the will of the sovereign, should the enforcement of Islamic law be associated with corporal punishment; must Sharia restrict women’s rights or not; etc. Now, to write an empirical scientific essay about “Political Islam” is also to enter into the midst of a political controversy that now is raging in Europe and in the West in general. Thus, we arrive at the contested terrains of political science research on “Political Islam”. In the apparent wave of “political correctness” sweeping across campuses and the media in the West, leading University professors and liberal media commentators now extol themselves in “warning” against using the term “Political Islam” altogether (Biskamp 2018; Müller-Uri and Opratko 2016; Opratko 2017, 2019). In his major analysis of this “Red-Green” de-facto alliance between the radical academic left and the Islamists, Eyal Lewin, assistant professor at the Political Science Department at Ariel University and a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa in Israel, aptly describes (Lewin 2019), how according to Gramsci, intellectuals do not necessarily have to remain the permanent proponents of the ruling class; they could also become its opponents. Artists and engineers, who are naturally close to industrial labor, alongside journalists and academics, can become the new autonomous intellectuals who will combat the hegemonic culture. In order to prevail and take power, the lower class, according to Gramsci, must break the hegemony of the established elites, undermine traditional loyalties, and assume full control of civil society.

Lewin is correct in insisting that Gramsci’s followers were well aware of this process and of the time and effort that it demanded. Lewin quotes the example of Rudi Dutschke, the prominent leader of the leftist German protest movement of the 1960s and a forerunner of the Green movement in the 1970s, who asserted that demonstrations were not sufficient to prevail over the Western capitalist system. Rather, Lewin (2019) emphasizes, he called for a long march through the state’s institutions where power was concentrated. Evoking the 1934–1935 Long March of the communist Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Dutschke called for penetrating the establishment and conquering it from within. Interpreting Gramsci, he believed that in order to achieve radical change and overthrow the hegemonic culture, activists should become an integral part of the social system and its machinery. Moreover, they should produce working-class intellectuals who would reshape the dominant culture and replace it. (Lewin 2019)

Lewin also highlights that the use of Gramscian strategies by the Red-Green Alliance between the radical left and the Islamists is now widespread in the West. “Londonistan” is a good example for this (Phillips 2007). Melanie Phillips describes the capture of social institutions – the school system, the universities, the churches, the media and the legal system and describes how the intellectual elite was persuaded to sing from the same subversive song-sheet, so that the moral beliefs of the majority would be replaced by the values of those on the margins of society, the perfect ambience in which the Muslim grievance culture could be fanned into the flames of extremism. (Phillips 2007)

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As an example of this “song-sheet”, Florian Große recently wrote in Germany’s flagship liberal weekly paper “Die Zeit” that even “Islamism” is “an unword”: Islamism is a concept of struggle and bad propaganda. Evil because it is accepted across society. And it is an unforgivable insult to those who live their faith peacefully. When we use the word “Islamism”, we make it clear that we are not interested in peaceful coexistence in the world, but that we need enemies to distract us from our own mistakes. (Florian https:// www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2011-11/leserartikel-unwort-islamismus, translated by the authors)

Since 2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to be at the forefront of those politicians who vehemently oppose using terms such as “Islamism” or “Political Islam” altogether. Ahead of the EU summit in Malta on 3 February 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel paid a visit to Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan lectured her not to use the expression “Islamist terror”2. Answering questions at a press conference in Ankara on 2 February 2017, Erdoğan objected to his guest’s use of the expression. He said, as quoted by the website of the Turkish presidency: The ‘Islamist terror’ expression gravely saddens us as Muslims. Such an expression cannot be used; it is not right because Islam and terror don’t go side by side. Islam literally means peace; it cannot be associated with terror. Therefore, mentioning it side by side [with] terror saddens adherents of this religion3.

Merkel, for her part, underlined the importance Germany attaches to the freedom of religion as a necessity of democracy. She said: We are making every effort in our power in order to enable Muslims in Germany to live their faith freely. And Islamic associations in Germany have stood against every kind of terror. Thus, there is a difference between the terms of ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist.’ I am of the belief that our people greatly appreciate Muslims and we need to join forces against this terror4.

To correctly capture the atmosphere of this debate, which you will nowadays encounter not only in Europe but in other Western countries as well, we further report here that Ümit Vural, the President of the official Islamic Community in Austria (IGGÖ), recently said: “Political Islam has become a pure concept of struggle”. The star guest of an event that took place in Vienna, Austria, at the end of March 2019 which should problematize this term was Professor John Esposito from Washington, who previously published studies with this title himself (see below). Vienna’s influential Daily, Die Presse, reported on 25 March 20195:

2

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/erdogan-tells-merkel-to-abandon-expres sion-islamist-terror/ 3 https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/erdogan-tells-merkel-to-abandon-expres sion-islamist-terror/ 4 https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/erdogan-tells-merkel-to-abandon-expres sion-islamist-terror/ 5 https://www.diepresse.com/5601347/iggo-chef-vural-politischer-islam-zum-reinen-kampfbegriffverkommen

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“Political Islam has become a mere concept of struggle. Empty of content and used populistically to attack Muslims”, says Ümit Vural. The President of the Islamic Community in Austria (IGGÖ) is heavily criticizing politics, which he believes is misusing the topic for political games. Especially if political leaders “describe Muslims without foundation as supporters of Political Islam”, one has to take this seriously. Vural opened a conference at the Hilton Hotel in Vienna on Monday morning, which should precisely define the term and scientifically process it. Several scientists were invited, including John L. Esposito from Georgetown University in Washington D.C., who was invited to the keynote speech. (. . .) Vural mentions that, in the past few days, the FPÖ (i.e. the main right-wing populist party in Austria) and its sympathizers in particular have not grown tired of calling him and the IGGÖ Islamist. “Free of factual substrate, hostile – such comments have only encouraged us to organize this conference.” The instrumentalization of the term is an occasion to “help those circles to get off the wrong path,” said Vural. He demands that the term “Political Islam” should not remain in the hands of politics, but “in the careful hands of scientists and experts”. (Die Presse, reported on March 25, 2019 (https://www.diepresse.com/5601347/iggo-chefvural-politischer-islam-zum-reinen-kampfbegriff-verkommen)

The IGGÖ President also received support from one of Europe’s leading former Christian Democratic politicians, Erhard Busek, who was invited as the second speaker for the opening. According to the former Christian Democratic ÖVP Vice Chancellor, more rationality should be brought into the discussion, because it is “currently highly irrational”. Already back in 2009, the Guardian remarked in a similar vein: Moreover, rightwing, xenophobic political ideologues, especially in the United States and Europe, recklessly connect all versions of Political Islam with al-Qaida (. . .) Also, if all “Political Islam” is defined as those who use the democratic system to exalt a polarising and violent version of Islam inspired by Sharia law, then how do we explain Turkey’s successful AKP: a pro-western, democratic party that won the popular vote due to its adherence to conservative, Islamic values. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jan/ 23/religion-islam-doha-debates

Recently, the internationally recognized Catholic theologian and social researcher Paul Zulehner joined this debate and declared that the discourse on “Political Islam” is an “unword” (see his comments in the Austrian liberal daily “Standard” of 16 January 2020 (https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000113337139/diekopftuchkraenkung-und-ihre-fatalen-folgen). He said that, after all, one speaks about “political theology” also in the Catholic world. But the “Political Theology” proposed by Johann Baptist Metz (1928–2019) just as later liberation theologies were an attempt to introduce elements of the “critical theory” of Horkheimer and Adorno and numerous elements of the political economy of underdevelopment (“dependencia”) into Catholic thought. The point is that such theological thinking has absolutely nothing to do with today’s “Political Islam”, which goes back to the anti-Semitic ideology of Hasan al-Bannā (1906–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood he founded. Gustavo Gutierrez and all the other theologians of the Catholic South wanted no Sharia with corporal punishment and a rule of the Mullahs. Among other things, this is what distinguishes these political theologies from Political Islam. Gustavo Gutierrez and the theologies of the global Catholic South also have nothing to do with Millî Görüş, Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011) and Turkish Islamism, all of which were able to undermine

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the foundations of the secular Turkish Republic based on the erosion of the headscarf ban under Erdogan (see above). As the profound and widespread social science work by Angel Rabasa (on the rise of Political Islam in Turkey; Rabasa and Larrabee 2008), Gilles Kepel (on Political Islam and jihad, Kepel 2002), Joel Beinin (Beinin and Stork 1997) and others have sufficiently demonstrated that research and also political strategies against Political Islam are not only necessary, but a question of survival among the countries that are still classified as “free” in the world today. Professor John Esposito, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. and Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim–Christian Understanding at Georgetown, and certainly an academic figure who does not enjoy the universal acceptance of members of the discipline of Middle East studies6, himself was crystal clear in saying in Esposito 2012: The phenomenon known as Political Islam is rooted in a contemporary religious resurgence in private and public life. On one hand, many Muslims have become more observant with regard to the practice of their faith (prayer, fasting, dress, and family). On the other, Islam has re-emerged as an alternative to the perceived failure of secular ideologies such as nationalism, capitalism, and socialism. Islamic symbols, rhetoric, actors, and organizations have become sources of legitimacy and mobilization, informing political and social activism. The governments of Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan have made appeals to Islam in order to enhance their legitimacy and to mobilize popular support for programs and policies. Islamic movements span the religious and political spectrum from moderate to extremist. Among the more prominent have been Muslim brotherhoods of Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan, Jamaat-i-Islami in South Asia, the Refah party in Turkey, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, al Nahda in Tunisia, Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and Gamaa Islamiyya and Jihad in Egypt. (Esposito 2012)

Esposito (2012) added that the causes of resurgence have been religio-cultural, political and socioeconomic. Issues of faith, politics and social justice – authoritarianism, repression, unemployment, housing, social services, distribution of wealth and corruption – intertwine as catalysts. Muslim brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan, Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan, the Refah Party in Turkey, al-Nahda in Tunisia, and Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria eschew violence and participate in electoral politics. At the same time, Gamaa Islamiyya in Egypt, Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, and Jihad organizations in many countries have engaged in acts of violence and terrorism. (Esposito 2012)

Global Middle East research simply cannot do without the term “Political Islam”. At every good university in the world, a 100-introductory course on Middle East research will point out that the world’s largest magazine database, Scopus, contains 816 studies on the subject of “Political Islam”. Not a few of these articles were written by leading global Muslim researchers.

6

http://martinkramer.org/sandbox/tag/john-esposito/

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

The respected Eminences of this contemporary Holy Inquisition, the Cardinals of politically correct political science, might decide that Grinin et al. (2018), Solomon and Tausch (2020) as well as the other empirical literature, quoted in this chapter, should be burnt immediately on the stacks of prohibited books. It would border on racism and xenophobia not to admit that outstanding Arab researchers who teach in Princeton, Qatar and Amman such as Amaney Jamal, Darwish Al-Emadi and Musa Shteiwi respectively use the term “Political Islam” as outlined and measured it in the “Arab Barometer”. According to the “Arab Barometer” team, “Political Islam” occurs whenever the following opinions are held in the region: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

It is better if religious leaders hold public offices. Religious leaders should influence government decisions. Religious leaders are less corrupt than civil ones. Religious leaders should influence elections. Religious practice is not a private matter.

Image 7.1 is a direct screenshot from the SPSS file, which is globally distributed by the Arab Barometer consortium. The five variables, which are absolutely necessary for Middle East research, are denominated as measuring “Political Islam”. Images 7.2 and 7.3 are screenshots from the library union catalogue of the Turkish Republic, the Toplu Kat,7 showing that in Turkish research libraries,

Image 7.1 “Political Islam” in the Arab Barometer SPSS data file

7 http://www.toplukatalog.gov.tr/index.php?_f¼1&the_page¼1&cwid¼2&keyword¼%22political +islam%22&tokat_search_field¼2&order¼0&command¼Tara#alt

7.3 A Contested Terrain? Arab Barometer Research on Political Islam

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Image 7.2 Middle East research without the analysis of “Political Islam” is impossible: screenshots from the Turkish research libraries union catalogue “Toplu Katalog”

Image 7.3 The number of titles on “Political Islam” in different Turkish research libraries, including President Erdogan’s AKP Party’s research library according to the “Toplu Katalog”

certainly not to be accused of “Islamophobia”, there are none the less than 285 titles on the subject of “Political Islam”, including 10 titles in the scientific library of President Erdogan’s AKP Party. In addition, the Arab Barometer, co-financed by Qatar, certainly not a country to be accused of “Islamophobia” in the sense of Biskamp (2018), Müller-Uri and

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Opratko (2016) and Opratko (2017, 2019) also includes dimensions of Political Islam in the areas of: • • • • •

Economy Hatred of the West Patriarchy Rejection of liberal democracy and the rule of law Religious intolerance

In one of the most promising international studies using Arab Barometer data, Dilshod Achilove (Achilov 2016) uses the following Arab Barometer items to distinguish between politically moderate and politically radical Islam: (1) Support for political pluralism (Q246.1) – Parliamentary system in which all political parties (left, right, Islamic) can compete. (Q225.1) – Competition and disagreement among political groups is not bad. (Q255.2) – National leaders should be open to diverse political ideas. (2) Support for individual civil liberties and political rights (Q245.1) – Support for democratic political system (public freedom, equal political rights, balance of power, accountability and transparency). (Q402.1) – Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people. (3) Accommodative (inclusive) support for both Shari’a and secular law (Q402.3) – Government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of people in some areas and implement Shari’a law in others. (4) (In)tolerance toward political pluralism (Q246.2) – A parliamentary system in which only Islamic political parties and factions compete in elections. Politically radical Islam is defined by (1) Neglect for democratic elections and competition (Q246.4) – A system governed by Islamic law in which there are no political parties or elections. (2) Exclusive support for rule of the Shari’a law and political influence of clerics (Q402.2) – Government should implement only the laws of the Shari’a. (Q401.1) – Men of religion should have influence over how people vote in elections. (Q401.3) – Men of religion should have influence over government decisions. Achilov (2016) conducted a principal component analysis to empirically explore the multifactor distinction of Political Islam. In order to control for the “Islamist” aspect of conceptualization (i.e., to distinguish it from more general support for

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pluralist democracy), only respondents who (1) practice Islam (pray and read the Qur’an) and (2) believe that “religious practice is not a private matter and should not be separated from socio-political life” were included in the factor analysis. While four survey items loaded at or above 0,44 for a factor of PM Islam, five items loaded highly for a factor of PR Islam. Achilov (2016) conceptualized two distinct forms of support for Political Islamic ideology: politically moderate and politically radical Islam. On the basis of a multivariate regression analysis, Achilov (2016) arrived at the conclusion that religiosity matters, but that its substantive effects on collective political action are small and highly context dependent. Religiosity’s effect on political activism varies from state to state. Nevertheless, personal piety remains an important contributing factor in explaining collective protests in the MENA. Second, Muslims with higher levels of ideological support for politically moderate Islam appear more likely to join in nonviolent, collective political protests. Moderate Islamism is operating under “a model for pragmatic change” and the collective voice of politically moderate Muslims will be central. Third, Muslims with higher levels of ideological support for politically radical Islam seem less likely to participate in elite-challenging collective protests. Political moderates may persist on working within existing structures to challenge the elites such as in Algeria and Yemen. In the Kingdom of Jordan, by contrast, political radicals emerge as a potent oppositional force with a much louder collective voice than political moderates. Fourth, memberships in civil society organizations, Internet usage and the levels of education reveal significant substantive effects on protest behaviour. The Internet has become an inseparable component of online social networking as a key organizational resource. Fox et al. (2016) analysed the Arab Barometer data to find out the relationship between gender attitudes and general political attitudes. Using available data from consecutive rounds of the Arab Barometer survey, Fox et al. (2016) examined changes in attitudes in nine countries with two rounds of Arab Barometer during and post Arab Spring (Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza). The authors found that support for “Muslim feminism” (an interpretation of gender equality grounded in Islam) has increased over the period and particularly in Arab Spring countries, while support for “secular feminism” has declined. In most countries examined, relatively high degrees of support for gender equality co-existed with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal status codes pertaining to women (Fox et al. 2016). In this analysis, the dependent variables included the Arab Barometer items. A. The government and parliament should enact inheritance laws in accordance with Islamic law. B. The government and parliament should enact personal status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with Islamic law. C. Gender-mixed education should be allowed in universities. D. Women should wear modest clothes without needing to wear a hijab.

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The independent variables of the analysis were: • • • • • • •

Support for political secularism Support for secular democracy Support for legal secularism Anti-Westernism Religiosity and religion Age Marital status

The multivariate analysis of the data showed that support for Islamic interpretations of policies pertaining to women’s rights increased over the Arab Spring period particularly in Arab Spring countries. Relatively high degrees of support for gender equality seem to co-exist with a preference for Islamic interpretations of personal status codes pertaining to women. With large majorities of individuals endorsing preferences for “mixed” political and legal systems that allow for a greater incorporation of religion into public life, gender equality is not being viewed as inimical to Islam. The region over this time period was characterized by relatively low support for secular interpretation of women’s status. As the last study, we mention Robbins (2015) building on the evidence and methodology accumulated in Jamal and Tessler (2008), Robbins (2009), Tessler (2010) and Tessler et al. (2012). Robbins (2015) found out that as a consequence of the Arab Spring, Tunisians became far more concerned about democracy’s potential downsides and worried increasingly that, even if generally preferable, it might not be right for their country. Egyptian attitudes toward democracy, by contrast, changed little. Egyptian support for democracy held steady, and Egyptians were no more worried about democracy’s possible shortcomings after the uprising than they had been before. Meanwhile, despite the transition, early 2013 found Egyptians to be among the least likely people in the Arab world to say that their country was democratic, or to find democracy suitable for their country. Robbins (2015) also found that Egyptians blamed problems associated with their country’s transition not on democracy itself but on Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood.

7.4

Methodology and Data for the Study of Political Islam

Our methodology, which used the Arab Barometer (5) data file8 and the IBM-SPSS version 24 statistical programmes,9 closely follows the index construction methodology, amply described in Tausch et al. (2014). We will first present results from an

8

https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/ https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software. The authors express thanks to the Department of Political Science, Innsbruck University, https://www.uibk.ac.at/politikwissenschaft/index. html.en for the opportunity to be able to use the software. 9

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UNDP Human Development Index type of indicator (non-parametric indicator), which projects every variable, used in the analysis, onto a scale, ranging from 0 (lowest value) to 1 (highest value). The simple, very down-to-earth methodology, disseminated by the UNDP across the globe always can be explained to the general readership of this book in a very simple way, and the readers, familiar with social science statistics, are recommended to skip over the following lines. One first looks at the given indicator value of a given country, say the access of the population to safe drinking water. Let us assume that in country x, only 50 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water. If our analysis then reveals, that in the best country under scrutiny, country y, say, 95 percent of the population have access to safe drinking water, while in the lamentable country z with the worst record of providing its population with safe drinking water, the provision rate is only 30 percent, the UNDP type “Index of the Provision of Drinking Water” would be: (1) Country x Index value ¼ (country x under observation value minus value of the worst performing country)/(value of the best performing country minus value of the worst performing country) (2) Country x score Index of the Provision of Drinking Water ¼ (50–30 percent)/ (95–30 percent) (3) Country x score Index of the Provision of Drinking Water ¼ 0,308 The UNDP Index methodology10 has become more sophisticated over the years and uses mathematical variations of the original idea, now applied for decades since the publication of the first UNDP Human Development Report in 1990. Much to the detriment of inter-temporal comparability, the variables used in the computation of the Human Development Index changed over the years, and the same can be said about the now startling variety of other UNDP Human Development Report Indices: the Human Development Index (HDI), the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).11 These indices are available not only at the country-to-country world level but also for an immense variety of regions of our globe, contained in the macro-regional reports like Africa or Latin America and the Caribbean and the country reports.12 In the vast literature, surveyed in Tausch et al. (2014), there are two ways to add together the results from the different components, making up an UNDP-type of performance Index indicator: simply adding the results together, or first grouping them together to various subcomponents, and only from there to arrive at the final results. In our essay, we present the results from both methodologies. We eliminated the missing or refused responses and base our results on the vast majority of the valid responses. Our non-parametric indicators thus rely on the aggregate valid country results of the latest wave of the Arab Barometer.

10

http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries 12 http://hdr.undp.org/en/global-reports 11

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Parametric indicators usually rely on advanced statistical methods, such as principal component analysis (see Tausch et al. 2014). In plain everyday languages, such an analysis extracts an overriding indicator, mathematically best representing the component variables and their correlation matrix. We again eliminated the missing or refused responses and base our results on the vast majority of the valid responses. Our parametric index thus relies on the original survey respondents of the survey, and calculates the country results, based on principal component factor scores. The Arab Barometer list of the 24 variables, on which our indicators are based, are in alphabetical order. These 24 indicators all measure Islamism, while the 5 indicators number 13 to number 17 measure Political Islam proper: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Against marriage of a female relative: one who does not pray. Against neighbours: different denomination in Islam. Against neighbours: different religion. Banks should not be allowed to charge interest. Economic relations: preference: Iran. Economic relations: preference: Qatar. Economic relations: preference: Turkey. Greatest threat: stability: USA, UK, ISR. Greatest threat: well-being: USA, UK, ISR. Islam requires hijab. Men better at political leadership. Non-Muslims’ rights should be inferior. Political islam: agreement: country better off with religious leaders in office. Political islam: agreement: relgious leaders should influence government decisions. Political islam: Religious leaders not as corrupt as non-religious leaders. Political islam: Religious leaders should interfere in elections. Political islam: Religious practice is not a private matter. President Erdogan (very) good. Sharia: government restricting women’s role. Sharia: government using physical punishment. University education more important for males Violence against US logical consequence of interference in region. Woman cannot be prime minister/president. Women have no equal rights to make the decision to divorce.

We present the valid country values, the population-weighted results for the entire region and our aggregate non-parametric and parametric indicators. The population data used in our work relied on the following sources:

7.5 Results of a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism, Based on 24. . .

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1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Arab_countries_by_population 2. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 3. https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/state-of-palestine-population/

7.5

Results of a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism, Based on 24 Variables, Weighted Equally

Table 7.1 lists the support rates for Islamism and Political Islam in the region on a population-weighted basis. Such a weighting is very much necessary, since, for example, opinion in Egypt with its huge population has much more weight for the entire Arab world than, say, Lebanon or the West Bank and Gaza. If the people of the entire Arab world had a free vote in a referendum, the following rules and regulations would handsomely still gain an absolute majority: • • • • • •

Against marriage of a female relative: one who does not pray Violence against us logical consequence of interference in region Men better at political leadership Greatest threat: stability USA, UK, ISR Banks should not be allowed to charge interest Greatest threat: wellbeing USA, UK, ISR More than a third of Arab opinion supports the following contentions:

• • • • • • • • • • •

President erdogan (very) good Islam requires hijab Economic relations: preference: Turkey Political islam: agreement: country better off with religious leaders in office Sharia: government using physical punishment Political islam: religious practice is not a private matter Economic relations: preference: qatar Woman cannot be prime minister/president Non-Muslims’ rights should be inferior Against neighbours: different religion Political islam: agreement: relgious leaders should influence government decisions • Sharia: government restricting women’s role • Against neighbours: different denomination in islam Only the following positions are real minority positions, having the support of less than 1/3 of the entire surveyed Arab population:

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Table 7.1 Islamism and Political Islam in the Arab MENA countries

Economic relations: preference: IRAN University education more important for males Political islam: religious leaders should interfere in elections Women have no equal rights to make the decision to divorce Political islam: religious leaders not as corrupt as nonreligious leaders Against neighbours: different denomination in Islam Sharia: government restricting women’s role Political Islam: agreement: relgious leaders should influence government decisions Against neighbours: different religion Non-Muslims’ rights should be inferior Woman cannot be prime minister/president Economic relations: preference: Qatar Political Islam: religious practice is not a private matter Sharia: government using physical punishment Political Islam: agreement: country better off with religious leaders in office Economic relations: preference: Turkey Islam requires hijab President Erdogan (very) good Greatest threat: wellbeing US, UK, ISR Banks should not be allowed to charge interest Greatest threat: stability US, UK, ISR Men better at political leadership Violence against US logical consequence of interference in region Against marriage of a female relative: one who does not pray

• • • • •

% of the total Arab population 22.1 23.7 23.8 31.5 33.1 33.6 34.9 35.8 35.8 37.3 38.8 40.6 41.4 44.2 45.0 46.8 47.4 49.5 52.7 53.8 53.9 69.3 70.1 76.2

Political islam: religious leaders not as corrupt as nonreligious leaders Women have no equal rights to make the decision to divorce Political islam: religious leaders should interfere in elections University education more important for males Economic relations: preference: Iran

In Table 7.2, we report the country results. We mark each result above 1/3 support rates for Islamism/Political Islam:

Political Islam: agreement: relgious leaders should influence government decisions

Political Islam: religious leaders should interfere in elections Political Islam: agreement: country beer off with religious leaders in office

22.0

46.6

48.7

45.7

8.8

37.3

Algeria Egypt

49.3

33.3

24.4

Iraq

35.1

39.3

27.0

20.8

16.9

27.6

33.0

27.4

28.5

26.6

46.3

26.1

33.7

35.4

23.2

55.1

67.0

29.0

25.1

27.5

24.7

(continued)

43.6

38.6

40.4

Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Westban Sudan Tunisia Yemen k + Gaza

Table 7.2 Country scores: Political Islam and Islamism. Percentages of the total population (valid answers only)

7.5 Results of a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism, Based on 24. . . 203

31.8

74.3

44.3

62.3

37.3

Sharia: government using physical punishment

33.0

41.8

Non-Muslims’ rights should be inferior Islam requires hijab Banks should not be allowed to charge interest

42.7

33.7

40.4

Political Islam: religious leaders not as corrupt as nonreligious leaders

27.8

55.2

Political Islam: religious practice is not a private maer

Table 7.2 (continued)

21.8

67.0

52.2

22.5

28.2

24.1

43.9

81.7

52.7

23.6

26.9

54.3

31.4

60.4

26.2

20.7

34.2

21.0

33.8

79.7

47.0

36.9

30.7

39.3

44.1

46.1

42.5

29.1

28.7

56.5

33.0

73.3

61.1

26.8

28.0

57.3

58.5

50.2

26.0

51.5

32.9

54.9

20.0

61.7

10.2

27.6

31.0

28.9

76.0

71.7

57.8

70.7

37.0

54.3

204 7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Men beer at political leadership

73.0

73.1

34.0

61.5

minister/president

9.4

22.3

Economic relations: preference: Iran Woman cannot be prime

15.9

16.0

38.8

54.5

34.5

30.9

Economic relations: preference: Turkey

Sharia: government restricting women’s role Economic relations: preference: Qatar

72.8

32.1

34.8

48.1

30.9

34.9

74.7

39.4

27.5

82.6

76.9

27.5

49.6

21.1

38.2

44.0

47.0

27.4

71.3

44.7

16.2

31.4

10.2

35.4

42.0

19.8

20.0

59.8

54.1

37.7

66.3

34.6

38.2

73.8

56.2

23.7

83.3

49.3

34.4

75.3

76.6

35.7

57.1

31.4

38.8

64.4

51.9

23.6

(continued)

70.8

47.2

18.7

60.8

55.9

48.2

7.5 Results of a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism, Based on 24. . . 205

34.4

80.1

Against neighbors: different denomination in Islam

Against marriage of a female relative: one who does not pray

82.4

46.0

40.6

32.3

29.7

32.6

27.4

21.8

Against neighbors: different religion

University education more important for males Women Have No equal rights to make the decision to divorce

Table 7.2 (continued)

62.9

16.3

21.4

18.9

21.1

63.0

35.7

18.2

21.0

16.9

45.6

3.2

22.4

12.5

10.1

81.6

46.7

55.7

25.6

16.4

61.4

39.9

36.1

24.8

15.9

66.7

31.3

30.7

18.9

13.5

93.6

23.9

34.0

51.8

29.1

25.4

23.8

28.4

18.3

20.9

95.1

26.7

55.2

46.0

30.9

206 7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

17.4

60.3

59.7

72.0

38.8

39.1

President Erdogan (very) good Greatest threat: stability US. UK. ISR Greatest threat: well-being US. UK. ISR

76.5

68.3

Violence against us logical consequence of interference in region

50.6

53.2

41.6

61.7

58.3

60.4

83.6

68.7

83.3

84.6

30.8

80.1

44.2

48.4

23.1

57.6

42.0

44.2

65.5

52.8

91.0

89.2

72.2

78.4

64.5

65.3

81.4

77.3

39.1

49.0

69.4

47.6

41.0

39.6

55.3

84.1

7.5 Results of a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism, Based on 24. . . 207

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

In the following, we will report on our efforts to construct an Index of Overcoming Islamism.

7.6

Towards a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming of Islamism (1), Weighting 24 Components Equally

The results of Table 7.2 render themselves for a social scientific Index construction. Islamism is defined as high values along our 24 indicators (see above) across the board. The overcoming of Islamism implies low values along our 24 indicators (see above). Table 7.3 reports our UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism” based on the valid country-level Arab Barometer results with 24 variables, aggregated with equal weights. Tunisia, according to Table 7.3, is the country whose population is rendering least support for Islamist worldviews, followed by Lebanon and Iraq. Yemen, Sudan and Algeria are the three Arab nations, whose population lends biggest across-the-board support for the 24 Islamist positions under consideration here.

7.7

Towards a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism (2), Built on Five Different Components, Weighted Equally

Our next results, which we report here, are based on the technique, commonly encountered in such major social scientific works as the current United Nations Human Development Reports, grouping the variables into subcategories. In our Table 7.3 A UNDP-type of Index “Overcoming Islamism” based on the valid country-level Arab Barometer results with 24 variables, aggregated with equal weights Tunisia Lebanon Iraq Morocco Egypt Libya Jordan Westbank + Gaza Algeria Sudan Yemen

UNDP-type index Overcoming Islamism 0.688 0.675 0.607 0.599 0.586 0.561 0.463 0.438 0.408 0.271 0.271

7.7 Towards a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism (2), Built on Five. . .

209

Table 7.4 A UNDP-type of Subindex “No Economic Islamism”

Egypt Libya Morocco Algeria Iraq Yemen Lebanon Tunisia Sudan Westbank + Gaza Jordan

Banks should be allowed to charge interest 1.000 0.041 0.715 0.149 0.296 0.201 0.427 0.401 0.632 0.168

Economic relations: no preference for: Iran 1.000 0.770 0.641 0.563 0.139 0.685 0.023 0.000 0.151 0.020

No preference for: Qatar 0.912 1.000 0.342 0.571 0.689 0.314 0.448 0.374 0.004 0.310

No preference for: Turkey 1.000 0.769 0.343 0.421 0.517 0.327 0.580 0.273 0.111 0.132

Subindex No Economic Islamism 0.978 0.645 0.510 0.426 0.410 0.382 0.370 0.262 0.225 0.158

0.000

0.385

0.000

0.000

0.096

case, the overall performance on our Index of Overcoming Islamism is measured by the unweighted averages of the five subcomponents of the index: • • • • •

No Economic Islamism Accepting the West Overcoming Patriarchy Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law Religious Tolerance

The original data for these calculations are again contained in Table 7.2. In the following, we list the results for the different sub-indices. Egypt, Libya and Morocco are relatively free from economic Islamism (Table 7.4), which is centred around the opinion that banks should not be allowed to charge interest and the desire to increase economic relations with Iran, Qatar and Turkey. The countries and territories most inclined to economic Islamism are Jordan, the Westbank and Gaza, and Sudan. Table 7.5 lists the results for the sub-component “Accepting the West”, based on the rejection of the idea by Arab publics that the USA, the UK and Israel are the greatest threat to the stability and well-being of the region. Likewise, “Accepting the West” also will be linked to a negative assessment by Arab publics of the neo-Ottoman and Islamist strategy of the current Turkish President Erdogan, and finally, “Accepting the West” also is measured by the idea held by Arab publics that violence and terrorism against the United States of America is not the logical consequence of US interference in the region. The Arab publics in Libya, Tunisia

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Table 7.5 A UNDP-type of Subindex “Accepting the West”

Libya Tunisia Morocco Iraq Algeria Egypt Yemen Jordan Sudan Lebanon Westbank + Gaza

Not greatest threat to stability: USA, UK, ISR 0.810 0.798 0.892 0.714 1.000 0.574 0.985 0.571 0.473 0.090 0.000

Not greatest threat to wellbeing: USA, UK, ISR 0.901 0.999 0.943 0.779 1.000 0.603 0.964 0.631 0.512 0.149 0.000

No positive opinion of TRK president Erdogan 0.914 0.215 0.273 0.635 0.175 1.000 0.428 0.000 0.032 0.797 0.172

Violence against the USA not logical consequence of interference in region 0.727 1.000 0.857 0.613 0.432 0.209 0.000 0.421 0.187 0.110 0.155

Subindex Accepting the West 0.838 0.753 0.741 0.685 0.652 0.596 0.594 0.406 0.301 0.287 0.082

and Morocco are the most pro-Western publics in the region, while hatred against the USA, the UK and Israel is most widespread in the Westbank and Gaza, in Lebanon and in the Sudan. The following tables, Tables 7.7, 7.8, list our sub-components “Overcoming Patriarchy” and “Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law”. The sub-component “Overcoming Patriarchy” combines the opinions of Arab publics which accept the marriage of a female relative to someone who does not pray, reject the notion that Islam requires women wearing the Hijab, think that men are not better at political leadership, reject a Shari’a where the government restricts women’s role, accept the importance of University education for females, think that a woman can exercise the role of a Prime Minister or President and finally also favour the notion that women have equal rights to make the decision to divorce. The least patriarchyoriented Arab societies are Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco, while patriarchy is most strongly supported by Arab publics in Yemen, Sudan and Egypt (see Table 7.6). “Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law” is a sub-component which in many ways would help to apply the validity of the legal thought of the Austrianborn scholar of the theory of law, Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) (Kelsen 1996; Dyzenhaus 1997; Matos 2013), and it is based on the combination of the rejection of the five dimensions of Political Islam (country not better off with religious leaders in office, religious leaders should not influence government decisions, religious leaders just as corrupt as non-religious leaders, they should not interfere in elections

Lebanon Tunisia Morocco Westbank + Gaza Jordan Iraq Libya Algeria Egypt Sudan Yemen

Islam does not require Hijab 0.693 1.000 0.381 0.023

0.184 0.193 0.293 0.480 0.000 0.697 0.087

For marriage of a female relative: one who does not pray 0.709 1.000 0.483 0.407

0.460 0.461 0.193 0.214 0.181 0.021 0.000

0.207 0.253 0.289 0.247 0.246 0.000 0.302

Men not better at political leadership 0.816 0.634 1.000 0.411 0.842 0.541 0.523 0.706 0.559 0.510 0.000

Against sharia: government restricting women’s role 0.844 1.000 0.428 0.998

Table 7.6 A UNDP-type of Subindex “Overcoming Patriarchy”

0.675 0.472 0.699 0.439 0.171 0.085 0.000

University education not more important for males 1.000 0.480 0.725 0.837 0.529 0.706 0.403 0.000 0.659 0.292 0.342

Woman can be prime minister/ president 0.968 0.720 1.000 0.644 0.784 0.837 0.666 0.563 0.497 0.000 0.149

Women have equal rights to make the decision to divorce 1.000 0.852 0.687 0.839

0.526 0.495 0.438 0.379 0.330 0.229 0.126

Subindex Overcoming Patriarchy 0.861 0.812 0.672 0.594

7.7 Towards a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism (2), Built on Five. . . 211

Lebanon Tunisia Egypt Iraq Libya Westbank + Gaza Jordan Morocco Algeria Sudan Yemen

Rejecting Political Islam: relgious leaders should not influence government decisions 1.000 0.873 0.965 0.172 0.643 0.623

0.583 0.829 0.274 0.000 0.336

Rejecting Political Islam: Country not better off with religious leaders in office 1.000 0.788 0.407 0.672 0.791 0.631

0.554 0.413 0.366 0.000 0.567

1.000 0.870 0.000 0.558 0.249

Rejecting Political Islam: religious leaders as corrupt as non-religious leaders 0.461 0.695 0.498 0.905 0.720 0.918 0.424 0.452 0.098 0.360 0.000

Rejecting Political Islam: religious leaders should not interfere in elections 0.406 0.498 1.000 0.507 0.378 0.546

Table 7.7 A UNDP-type of Subindex “Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law”

0.082 0.022 0.058 0.067 0.082

Rejecting Political Islam: religious practice is a private matter 1.000 0.782 0.813 0.915 0.497 0.000 0.573 0.570 0.566 0.312 0.000

Against Sharia: government using physical punishment 0.797 1.000 0.594 0.968 0.753 0.767

0.536 0.526 0.227 0.216 0.206

Subindex Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law 0.777 0.773 0.713 0.690 0.630 0.581

212 7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

7.7 Towards a Non-parametric Index of Overcoming Islamism (2), Built on Five. . .

213

Table 7.8 A UNDP-type of Subindex “Religious Tolerance”

Lebanon Iraq Jordan Tunisia Westbank + Gaza Morocco Sudan Algeria Egypt Libya Yemen

Accept neighbours: of a different denomination IN Islam 1.000 0.699 0.255 0.528 0.355

Accept neighbours: of a different religions 0.889 0.916 1.000 0.729 0.666

Non-Muslims’ rights should be equal 1.000 0.964 0.943 0.863 0.878

Subindex Religious Tolerance 0.963 0.860 0.733 0.707 0.633

0.157 0.526 0.283 0.018 0.000 0.462

0.522 0.579 0.616 0.404 0.000 0.015

0.833 0.385 0.579 0.755 0.676 0.000

0.504 0.497 0.493 0.392 0.225 0.159

and religious practice is a private matter) and opposition to a Shari’a which applies physical punishment. The Arab nations, whose publics most consistently accept liberal democracy and the state of law are according to the Arab Barometer data, analysed here Lebanon, Tunisia and Egypt, and, according to our data analysis, liberal democracy and the state of law are least supported in Yemen, Sudan and Algeria (see Table 7.7). Table 7.8 presents the sub-component “Religious Tolerance”, which combines the acceptancy of neighbours of a different denomination in Islam, and neighbours of a different religion by Arab publics with the support by these publics for the rights of non-Muslims in society. Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, according to this data analysis, are the Arab societies with the highest degree of religious tolerance, while Yemen, Libya and Egypt are the least religiously tolerant societies in the Arab world. Table 7.9 now lists the results of the combination of our five sub-components (No Economic Islamism; Accepting the West; Overcoming Patriarchy; Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law; Religious Tolerance) for the construction of our final overall index “Overcoming Islamism” by the Arab publics, surveyed in the Arab Barometer. Not surprisingly, Tunisia again heads the list, followed by Lebanon and Iraq, while Yemen, Sudan and Algeria are the countries where Arab publics still most consistently support Islamism, as defined by the 24 indicators of our study. Table 7.10 finally compares the results of our two attempts to construct a non-parametric index of overcoming Islamism – one based on the averages of the results of the 24 indicators, simply added together, and one based on the prior calculation of five subcomponent indices which are only then added together in Table 7.9. But the two methods of indicator construction wield very similar results, and without presenting the scatterplot, it suffices to say here that the two results have 98,27 percent of the variance in common.

Tunisia Lebanon Iraq Morocco Egypt Libya Jordan Westbank + Gaza Algeria Sudan Yemen

Accepting the West 0.753 0.287 0.685 0.741 0.596 0.838 0.406 0.082

0.652 0.301 0.594

No Economic Islamism 0.262 0.370 0.410 0.510 0.978 0.645 0.096 0.158

0.426 0.225 0.382

0.379 0.229 0.126

Overcoming Patriarchy 0.812 0.861 0.495 0.672 0.330 0.438 0.526 0.594 0.227 0.216 0.206

Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law 0.773 0.777 0.690 0.526 0.713 0.630 0.536 0.581

Table 7.9 A UNDP-type of index “Overcoming Islamism”, based on its five subcomponents

0.493 0.497 0.159

Religious Tolerance 0.707 0.963 0.860 0.504 0.392 0.225 0.733 0.633 0.435 0.294 0.293

Overall Index, “Overcoming Islamism”, based on its five components 0.661 0.652 0.628 0.591 0.602 0.555 0.459 0.409

214 7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

7.8 Towards a Parametric Index of Political Islam, Built on a Principal. . .

215

Table 7.10 Comparing the UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism”, based on aggregated 24 variables and the UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism”, based on 5 sub-components

Tunisia Lebanon Iraq Morocco Egypt Libya Jordan Westbank + Gaza Algeria Sudan Yemen

UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism”, aggregating 24 variables 0.688 0.675 0.607 0.599 0.586 0.561 0.463 0.438

UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism”, based on 5 sub-components 0.661 0.652 0.628 0.591 0.602 0.555 0.459 0.409

0.408 0.271 0.271

0.435 0.294 0.293

In the following paragraphs, we will compare these results based on a non-parametric index construction with results from a parametric index.

7.8

Towards a Parametric Index of Political Islam, Built on a Principal Component Analysis of the Individual Level Survey Data Results from the Arab Barometer Survey on the Five Survey Items on Political Islam

Our parametric index of Political Islam relies on a straightforward principal component analysis of the Arab Barometer (5) data, specifically designated as such in the data file (see also, above, Image 7.1). Principal component analysis is described at length, among others, in Tausch et al. (2014). The analysis specified that only one component is extracted, which explained 39,586 of variance. Table 7.11 lists the “factor loadings”. The highest factor loading is achieved by the variable, which measures the support of (or opposition to) Arab publics for (against) religious leaders in office. Table 7.12 lists the country values of our calculations, the number of observations (respondents) with valid answers per country and the standard deviations of our dimension “Political Islam”. The strongest opposition to political by Arab publics was voiced in Lebanon, Tunisia and Iraq, and Arab publics were lending the strongest support for “Political Islam” in Sudan, Algeria and Yemen. Table 7.12 listed the country results, while Table 7.13 disaggregates our support for Political Islam figures (N > 30) down to the level of the Governorates of the Arab world. The data show the considerable differences both between and within the countries of the Arab Barometer.

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Table 7.11 The factor loadings (principal component analysis) of “Political Islam”

Political Islam: disagreement: religious leaders should not interfere in elections Political Islam: disagreement: country better off with religious leaders in office Political Islam: disagreement: relgious leaders should influence government decisions Political Islam: disagreement: religious practice is private matter Political Islam: disagreement: religious leaders as corrupt as non-religious leaders

Political Islam 0.517 0.712 0.673 0.678 0.541

Table 7.12 Country values for the principal component: Political Islam Country Lebanon Tunisia Iraq Egypt Morocco Libya Jordan West Bank and Gaza Yemen Algeria Sudan

Political Islam 0.441 0.268 0.247 0.229 0.035 0.018 0.109 0.138 0.244 0.408 0.491

N 2263 1986 2281 1946 1520 1739 2141 2239 2190 1792 1530

Standard deviation 0.985 0.916 1.049 0.943 1.318 0.733 0.842 0.932 1.144 0.769 0.757

For the readership of this analysis, Table 7.13 can have manifold practical benefits. For the academics, studying Political Islam, follow-up studies might be considered, concentrating on the most and the least radical Governorates. For international business leaders and investors, government officials and security planners, Table 7.13 offers a hitherto unknown microscopic view of radicalism in the Arab World at the regional level. A scientific very worthwhile enterprise for future studies would be to correlate the data from Table 7.13 with the regional human development data available from the UNDP country human development reports.13

13

http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national

7.8 Towards a Parametric Index of Political Islam, Built on a Principal. . .

217

Table 7.13 Regional support for Political Islam in the Governorates of the Arab World

GOVERNORATE

Sa'dah Amran Red Sea West Darfur Blue Nile Deir al Balah Al Mahwit Mascara Sennar B.B. Arreridj Constantine Medea Guelmim-Oued Noun South Darfur Amanat Al Asimah Setif Dhamar Abyan Gedaref Hadramaut Central Darfur Batna Mila Skikda Djelfa Kassala

Average support for Political Islam 1.128 1.065 1.029 0.827 0.806 0.781

N

Standard Country/Terr deviation itory

60 55 50 35 44 115

0.965 0.988 0.771 0.736 0.564 0.971

0.703 0.682 0.681 0.671 0.645 0.644 0.634 0.620 0.606 0.596 0.578 0.562 0.556 0.551 0.523 0.520 0.518 0.489 0.485 0.479

44 51 73 56 53 51 55 152 201 121 144 46 72 117 30 73 86 50 75 93

1.010 0.588 0.631 0.502 0.673 0.743 1.122 0.544 1.211 0.780 1.053 1.033 0.971 1.069 0.656 0.800 0.578 0.672 0.552 0.848

Yemen Yemen Sudan Sudan Sudan West Bank and Gaza Yemen Alegria Sudan Alegria Alegria Alegria Morocco Sudan Yemen Alegria Yemen Yemen Sudan Yemen Sudan Alegria Alegria Alegria Alegria Sudan (continued)

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Table 7.13 (continued)

Biskara Khartoum The Island Al Hudaydah Bejaia Annaba Hajjah Mostaganem East Darfur Jijel Messilia Madaba Blida Ad Dali Bouira Almarj Tiaret 'Adan Nile River West Kordofan North Kordofan Gaza

0.478 0.477 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.456 0.447 0.445 0.444 0.436 0.432 0.395 0.394 0.393 0.392 0.388 0.387 0.384 0.379 0.377 0.362 0.359

59 292 205 230 54 55 139 53 51 49 52 49 59 60 44 46 49 77 57 56 96 258

0.716 0.810 0.687 0.882 0.719 0.792 1.111 0.856 0.817 0.805 0.617 0.744 0.749 0.890 0.645 0.629 0.703 0.946 0.493 0.690 0.740 0.916

Khan Yunis

0.338

150

1.102

Sana'a Maysan Ajioun Misrata Hebron

0.336 0.307 0.288 0.287 0.286

91 73 49 202 275

1.211 0.866 0.814 0.650 0.726

Jerash North Darfur Rafah

0.269 0.266 0.254

58 76 99

0.889 0.805 1.173

Alegria Sudan Sudan Yemen Alegria Alegria Yemen Alegria Sudan Alegria Alegria Jordan Alegria Yemen Alegria Libya Alegria Yemen Sudan Sudan Sudan West Bank and Gaza West Bank and Gaza Yemen Iraq Jordan Libya West Bank and Gaza Jordan Sudan West Bank and Gaza (continued)

7.8 Towards a Parametric Index of Political Islam, Built on a Principal. . .

219

Table 7.13 (continued)

South Kordofan Sousse-Massa Qalqilya

0.250 0.249 0.248

44 147 57

0.821 1.211 0.746

Oriental Algiers Oran Menoufia Al Jabal AL Gharbi Irbid South Jabalia

0.246 0.224 0.219 0.217 0.212 0.197 0.181 0.175

110 148 111 87 112 428 243 132

1.366 0.828 0.830 1.009 0.850 0.850 0.704 1.205

Tlemcen Nabulus

0.163 0.162

52 143

0.822 0.679

Karak White Nile Tafila Tubas

0.156 0.148 0.144 0.139

97 77 36 56

0.770 0.848 0.809 0.693

Jenin

0.128

143

0.749

Laayoune-Sakia El Hamra Al Mafraq Murzuq Tobruq Najaf Derna Nabatieh Marrakech-Safi Amman Dhi War Fès-Meknès

0.119

38

1.031

Sudan Morocco West Bank and Gaza Morocco Alegria Alegria Egypt Libya Jordan Lebanon West Bank and Gaza Alegria West Bank and Gaza Jordan Sudan Jordan West Bank and Gaza West Bank and Gaza Morocco

0.115 0.114 0.102 0.099 0.098 0.090 0.071 0.070 0.065 0.064

107 36 56 98 56 133 223 821 149 187

0.884 0.604 0.554 0.877 0.474 0.808 1.311 0.854 1.020 1.402

Jordan Libya Libya Iraq Libya Lebanon Morocco Jordan Iraq Morocco (continued)

220

7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Table 7.13 (continued)

Raymah Salfit

0.062 0.038

57 59

1.083 0.880

Al Balqa Ma'an Jerusalem

0.035 0.031 0.026

118 44 226

0.744 0.817 0.970

Azurqa Benghazi Karbala Nalut Ma'rib Al Murqub Manouba Monastir Al Jawf Tripoli Tulkarem

0.021 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005

295 94 78 40 40 189 63 103 59 348 90

0.844 0.642 1.090 0.699 1.242 0.572 0.760 0.602 1.016 0.777 0.667

Jerico

-0.006

53

0.632

Al Mahrah Tipaza Wasit Ibb Kairouan The Lake Drâa-Tafilalet Aqaba Dakahlia Nabeul Sebha Tiz-Ouzou Sirt Al Jabal Al Akhdar

-0.017 -0.022 -0.024 -0.031 -0.033 -0.040 -0.044 -0.065 -0.074 -0.084 -0.087 -0.089 -0.095 -0.097

40 58 92 240 115 148 83 39 131 124 40 58 39 84

1.010 0.774 1.124 1.213 1.006 0.789 1.373 0.830 0.969 0.740 0.676 0.672 0.491 0.559

Yemen West Bank and Gaza Jordan Jordan West Bank and Gaza Jordan Libya Iraq Libya Yemen Libya Tunisia Tunisia Yemen Libya West Bank and Gaza West Bank and Gaza Yemen Alegria Iraq Yemen Tunisia Egypt Morocco Jordan Egypt Tunisia Libya Alegria Libya Libya (continued)

7.8 Towards a Parametric Index of Political Islam, Built on a Principal. . .

221

Table 7.13 (continued)

Al Zawia Jendouba Basra Eastern Zaghouan Ramallah

-0.114 -0.121 -0.131 -0.133 -0.134 -0.137

121 76 180 129 32 182

0.911 0.772 0.833 0.880 0.896 0.706

Beja Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima Sfax Rabat-Salé-Kénitra Assiut Bizerte Giza Sousse Lahij Ben Arous Shabwah Sulaymaniya Sidi Bouzid Western Nuqat Al Khams Sohag Tunis Damiea Bekaa Al Bayda Babylon Erbil Aswan Siliana Kafr El Sheik Baghdad

-0.138 -0.140

62 166

0.775 1.297

Libya Tunisia Iraq Egypt Tunisia West Bank and Gaza Tunisia Morocco

-0.141 -0.149 -0.149 -0.150 -0.159 -0.169 -0.174 -0.177 -0.190 -0.196 -0.199 -0.211 -0.212 -0.216 -0.242 -0.242 -0.252 -0.264 -0.267 -0.268 -0.282 -0.282 -0.287 -0.290

177 187 90 82 175 122 100 120 60 120 78 99 102 102 191 33 115 70 125 96 30 43 72 540

0.893 1.261 0.830 0.859 0.982 0.865 1.046 0.808 1.388 0.920 0.834 1.064 0.928 0.823 0.859 0.992 0.705 0.964 1.279 0.904 0.898 1.089 0.617 1.066

Tunisia Morocco Egypt Tunisia Egypt Tunisia Yemen Tunisia Yemen Iraq Tunisia Egypt Libya Egypt Tunisia Egypt Lebanon Yemen Iraq Iraq Egypt Tunisia Egypt Iraq (continued)

222

7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Table 7.13 (continued)

Beni Suef Jafara Kasserine Kirkuk Fayoum Gafsa Minya Béni Mellal-Khénifra Cairo Baalbek Kef Kaliobeya Alexandria Salahaddin Diyala Qadisiyah Ta'izz Grand CasablancaSeat Qena Bethlehem

-0.292 -0.302 -0.312 -0.313 -0.313 -0.345 -0.370 -0.370 -0.371 -0.374 -0.382 -0.391 -0.399 -0.418 -0.423 -0.444 -0.449 -0.454

65 96 80 88 82 67 114 104 207 102 45 113 112 101 92 76 260 206

0.946 0.812 0.949 0.931 0.897 0.887 1.082 1.548 0.969 1.194 0.996 1.108 0.951 0.934 1.204 1.214 0.980 1.150

Egypt Libya Tunisia Iraq Egypt Tunisia Egypt Morocco Egypt Lebanon Tunisia Egypt Egypt Iraq Iraq Iraq Yemen Morocco

-0.462 -0.482

71 201

0.816 0.970

North Anbar Nineveh Medenine Ariana Mt Lebanon Tatouine Akkar Mahdia Beirut Gabes

-0.522 -0.524 -0.537 -0.544 -0.559 -0.587 -0.590 -0.632 -0.633 -0.669 -0.954

328 114 259 91 98 944 30 157 74 241 62

0.820 1.038 1.027 0.894 1.135 1.042 1.114 0.592 0.984 1.137 1.014

Egypt West Bank and Gaza Lebanon Iraq Iraq Tunisia Tunisia Lebanon Tunisia Lebanon Tunisia Lebanon Tunisia

7.9 A Note on the Drivers of Political Islam

223

Graph 7.1 Overcoming Islamism (see Table 7.3) and Political Islam (see Table 7.11)

7.9

A Note on the Drivers of Political Islam

At the end of our journey into the worlds of Political Islam, we show some salient relationships which emerge from our empirical data. Graph 7.1 shows the close relationship between overall Islamism and Political Islam proper. None the less than 82,53 percent of the variance of Political Islam is explained by the overall Index of Overcoming Islamism. Graph 7.2 looks at the relationship between self-professed religiosity and Political Islam, and Graph 7.3 analyses the relationship between the frequency of prayer and Political Islam. The lamentable conclusion from these data is that up to now, there is a great vacuum for those Arab publics looking for a modern Muslim spirituality disconnected from Political Islam with its calls for religious leaders interfering in elections, occupying leadership positions of the country and overseeing the concrete, day-today tasks of government. Sooner or later, Arab publics will discover that their Muslim spirituality is indeed a “private matter” and that religious leaders can be as decent or corrupt as non-religious leaders. Graph 7.4 shows the relationship between support or critique of the most salient global Islamist leader today, Turkish President Erdogan, and Political Islam among the interviewed Arab publics. Support for Erdogan and his neo-Ottoman project is clearly connected to the extent of support for Political Islam.

224

7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Graph 7.2 Religiosity and Political Islam in the region

Graph 7.3 Prayer and Political Islam in the region

Support for Political Islam is also very clearly connected to Anti-Westernism in the region. Political Islamist hatred against the West now also features the United Arab Emirates with its close cooperation with Western countries (and its world class Universities!) as a victim of this prejudice (Graph 7.5).

7.9 A Note on the Drivers of Political Islam

Graph 7.4 Opinions on Turkish President Erdogan and Political Islam

Graph 7.5 World political perceptions and Political Islam

225

226

7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

Graph 7.6 Educational level and Political Islam

Our final graph analyses the connection between educational level and support for Political Islam: as a rule, the advancement of education reduces the extent of support for Political Islam (Graph 7.6).

7.10

Prospects and Conclusions

We began this chapter with a quote from Bernard Lewis putting forth an argument that has been regarded as part of established doctrine on Middle East studies – that Islam cannot be democratized, that Muslims and Arabs cannot view themselves as independent from the divine. Such a perspective, however, ignores the scepticism, rationalism and humanism in Arab history as Phil Zuckerman alludes to in his work. Zuckerman quotes numerous Arab scholars who reflected on this tradition. There was the ninth century sceptic Ibn al-Rawandi who negated Islam as he advocated free thought. Also of the ninth century, there was the critical rationalism of Muhammad Al-Warraq who doubted the existence of a god and the veracity of divine revelation. Muhammad al-Razi, meanwhile, advanced the study of the natural sciences as he questioned the divinity of the Qur’an. Then there was the secular humanism of Omar Khayyam of the eleventh century and the twelfth century towering intellect of the founding father of secular philosophy – Averroes (Zuckerman 2019). Tapping into this secular, humanist and critical rationalist tradition, Muslim scholars are increasingly examining a post-Islamist future. Asef Bayat describes a

7.10

Prospects and Conclusions

227

present where Islamism increasingly loses legitimacy on account of their system’s contradictions and failures. Compelled by a combination of these anomalies and societal pressure, these have to reinvent themselves. This reinvention is revolutionary in that it entails a qualitative shift in their ideological position. Whilst Islamism is characterized by universalism, exclusivism, obligation and a monopoly of religious truth, post-Islamist movements stress ambiguity and multiplicity, inclusion and compromise in principles and practice, and responsibility. It is important to acknowledge that this post-Islamism does not represent the jettisoning of religion in the public sphere as in France. Rather, post-Islamism refers to an inclusive religiosity – one which is compatible to liberal democratic norms (Bayat 2006). Ali Eteraz (2007) notes that post-Islamism recognizes that politics rather than religion provides for the welfare of this life. These changes already started appearing in the mid-1990s when the Al-Wasat Party in Egypt was formed as an alternative to both militant Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Whilst Wasat regarded itself as an Islamic party, it welcomed secularists and Christians into it fold, rejects religious or gender discrimination, is opposed to an extra-constitutional body of clerics, as in Iran, which can veto laws, and supports the separation of powers (Eteraz 2007). Tunisia’s Islamists in the form of Ennahda has increasingly distanced itself from its Muslim Brotherhood origins and is recasting itself as a Muslim Democratic Party in the vein of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union. In the November 2019 elections, Ennahda’s candidate for prime minister, Habib Jemli, made it clear that the selection criteria for any cabinet members would be efficiency and integrity not party or religious affiliation (The Wilson Centre 2019). Another dimension of a post-Islamist MENA region is highlighted by the emergence of civil Islam. Contrary to Islamism which is state-centric and a political ideology, civil Islam focuses on the individual Muslim’s spiritual development and the promotion of the general conditions necessary for human society to flourish. These include religious freedom, human rights, economic development, rule of law, communal harmony and social justice. Whilst not involved in party political activities, those Muslims subscribing to civil Islam do not endorse adopting a hermit stance to the world. Their participation, however, takes the form of civic activism – from child welfare to educational foundations (Komecoglu 2020). There is an inherent danger here on the nature of this civil Islam since critics might well argue that this is precisely how Islamist organizations have made inroads into local population – with their civic activism. It is always difficult, however, to assess the true intentions of such organizations. Our empirics of the support rates for Political Islam in the region relied on data from the Arab Barometer survey (5). In the main table of this chapter, Table 7.1 listed the support rates for Islamism and Political Islam in the region on a population-weighted basis. If the people of the entire Arab world had a free vote in a referendum, the following rules and regulations would handsomely still gain an absolute majority:

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7 Political Islam in the Arab MENA Countries: The Evidence from the Arab. . .

• Against a marriage of a female with a man who does not pray. • Terrorism against the USA is a logical consequence of US interference in the region. • Males are better political leaders. • The USA, the UK and Israel pose the greatest threat to the stability and well-being of the region. • Banks should not be allowed to charge interest. More than a third of Arab opinion supports, among others, the following contentions: • • • • •

In favour of Shari’a using physical punishments. A woman cannot be prime minister/president. In society, non-Muslims’ rights should be inferior. Rejecting neighbours – people of a different religion. Shari’a should restrict women’s role.

From the Arab Barometer data, we constructed parametric and non-parametric indices of Overcoming Islamism and of Political Islam. The indices show a very high correlation with each other. The country values of the Index components are found in Table 7.2. Islamism is defined as high values along our 24 indicators across the board. Table 7.3 reported our UNDP-type Index “Overcoming Islamism” based on the valid country-level Arab Barometer results with 24 variables, aggregated with equal weights. Tunisia, according to Table 7.3, is the country whose population is rendering least support for Islamist worldviews, followed by Lebanon and Iraq. Yemen, Sudan and Algeria are the 3 Arab nations whose population lends biggest across-the-board support for the 24 Islamist positions under consideration here. The results based on our Index of Overcoming Islamism measured by the unweighted averages of five subcomponents: • • • • •

No Economic Islamism Accepting the West Overcoming Patriarchy Accepting Liberal Democracy and the State of Law Religious Tolerance

Not surprisingly, Tunisia again heads the list, followed by Lebanon and Iraq, while Yemen, Sudan and Algeria are the countries where Arab publics still most consistently support Islamism, as defined by the 24 indicators of our study. Our parametric index of Political Islam relies on a straightforward principal component analysis of the Arab Barometer (5) data, specifically designated as such in the data file. The strongest opposition to Political Islam by Arab publics was voiced in Lebanon, Tunisia and Iraq, and Arab publics were lending the strongest support for “Political Islam” in Sudan, Algeria and Yemen. Table 7.12 listed the country results, while Table 7.13 disaggregates our support for Political Islam figures (N > 30) down to the level of the Governorates of the Arab

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world. The data show the considerable differences both between and within the countries of the Arab Barometer. None the less than 82,53 percent of the variance of Political Islam is explained by the overall Index of Overcoming Islamism. One of the lamentable conclusions from our data is that up to now, there is a great vacuum for those Arab publics looking for a modern Muslim spirituality disconnected from Political Islam with its calls for religious leaders interfering in elections, occupying leadership positions of the country and overseeing the concrete, day-to-day tasks of government. Sooner or later, Arab publics will discover that their Muslim spirituality is indeed a “private matter” and that religious leaders can be as decent or corrupt as non-religious leaders. We also could show the close relationship between support of the most salient global Islamist leader today, Turkish President Erdogan, and Political Islam among the interviewed Arab publics. Support for Political Islam is also very clearly connected to Anti-Westernism in the region. Political Islamist hatred against the West now also features the United Arab Emirates with its close cooperation with Western countries (and its world class Universities!) as a victim of this prejudice. As a rule, the advancement of education reduces the extent of support for Political Islam. Despite the challenges and hidden dangers on the basis of the tremendous values change across the MENA region, the demise of Political Islam in the long term is occurring. This might well herald the beginning of more stable, prosperous and open polities for the long-suffering inhabitants of this blighted region.

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Chapter 8

Overcoming the Environmental Challenge in the MENA Region

Abstract The triple challenge of climate change, increasing populations and rapid urbanization is creating unique challenges to MENA countries. Whilst coastal cities like Alexandria risk falling into the sea due to rising sea levels, the Dead Sea is drying up and Jeddah experiences annual floods. The challenges are made worse by government mismanagement through poor town and regional planning or looking for short-term solutions to waste-management as opposed to seeking more sustainable solutions. Environmental challenges can be mitigated through innovative forwardlooking solutions with MENA states working in partnership with civil society, the private sector, neighbouring states, and international stakeholders such as the World Bank. Morocco’s partnership with the World Bank and the private sector to arrive at a more sustainable waste management system, Jordan and Israel working together to save the Dead Sea, and the nascent promise of the Nile Basin Initiative are all different facets of attempts at overcoming environmental challenges posed. Keywords Climate change · Desalination · Environment · Sea level · Water

8.1

Introduction

Whilst war in Syria and Yemen, the possibility of conflict with Iran, sectarian conflict and economic stagnation have preoccupied the minds of Arabs of late, it is equally clear that environmental challenges are increasingly coming to the fore. This is evident in results from Wave 5 of the Arab Barometer. Seventy percent of those surveyed regard water pollution as a very serious threat, whilst 66 percent regarded the collection and disposing of trash as a very serious threat. A further 44 percent regard air quality in their area as a serious threat to their life and lifestyle (Green 2019). What accounts for this growing environmental concern? The steep rise of population growth, evinced by the youthful demographic pyramid across the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, is placing strain on already fragile ecosystems, made worse by climate change.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6_8

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Massive urbanization is also adding further strain to local governments across the region. There was a 400 percent growth in urbanization between 1970 and 2010 and the pace of urbanization between 2010 and 2050 is expected to be 200 percent. To put it into perspective whilst 56 percent of the total population of 357 million MENA citizens lived in cities in 2010, by 2050, 68 percent of the region’s 646 million residents will live in cities. This makes the Arab countries amongst the most urbanized in the world. Of course, there are regional variations. Whilst Egypt is currently 43 percent urbanized, the figure for Lebanon is 87 percent and places like Dubai are de facto city-states and is practically 100 percent urbanized (Schafer 2013). How governments, local and national, respond to the threats posed will determine the future of the region as a whole. What this paper seeks to do is to map out the nature of the environmental challenge and what governments can do to mitigate it deleterious impact on its citizens.

8.2

Nature of the Challenge Posed

The MENA region, together with the rest of the planet, is getting hotter. Unlike the rest of the planet, the heat in the MENA region will be experienced far more severely as a result of the phenomenon of “desert warming amplification” which creates a feedback loop that intensifies heat in already-hot desert climates (Kramer 2016). Soil, already dry, will become drier holding tremendous risks for food insecurity. An already inhospitable climate will increasingly becoming uninhabitable. According to researchers from Germany’s Max Planck Institute who had assembled data from 1986 to 2005 and compiled over two dozen models, even under the best-case models, temperatures are set to rise by 4
C across the MENA region by 2050. Heatwaves by 2050 will be ten times more frequently, than currently, experienced. By 2050 summer temperatures in the MENA region will stay above 30
C whilst day time temperatures will hover at 46
C. The latter will increase to 50
C by the year 2100 (Dvosky 2016). There is already evidence for this future scenario. In 2016, the MENA region recorded its highest temperature of 54
C at Mitribah in Kuwait and Basra in Iraq saw temperatures soar to 53.9
C. In June 2017 in Sweihan in Abu Dhabi, the thermometer passed 50
C. At the same time in Dubai, the government appealed to motorists not to leave aerosols in their vehicles after canisters exploded setting alight several cars (Broom 2019). Moreover, as a result of protracted drought since 1998, desert dust has accumulated in the atmosphere over Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria making the likelihood of increased sand storms an inevitability. This will be further exacerbated by climate change (Dvosky 2016). Neither will this impact be confined to the environmental sphere. Many analysts have noted how the current Syrian civil war has its roots in the environment – specifically the severe 2006-2010 drought. This compelled 1.5 million farmers to leave their land and migrate to the city. In the process, not only was food insecurity increased but also greater political friction and social instability (Stang 2016).

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To be clear, the 2050 scenario, apocalyptic as is, is a result of climate change and global warming whose negative consequences is already self-evident across the length and breadth of the MENA region today. Saudi Arabia and the city-states in the Gulf as well as Libya had already exceeded their renewable freshwater resources by 2010 (Sowers et al. 2011). Many citizens of the MENA region are already receiving inadequate, erratic or polluted water supplies and are fueling discontent with governments across the region. This is made worse, by the fact that in some countries those who are politically connected have better access to clean water than others. This unequal access is especially evident in the informal sprawling urban dwellings dotting the MENA. This is likely to intensify as precipitation is expected to decrease by up to 30 percent across the region. In Morocco, decrease in the rainfall over the Atlas mountains is already translating into a reduction in the flow of majority rivers and having a negative impact on the replenishment of the aquifers of the Draa, Souss-Messa, Tadla and Ziz basins (Sowers et al. 2011). Also considering the case of the Dead Sea in Jordan which has shrunk by a third over the past twenty years as a consequence of lower precipitation, more water being siphoned off the River Jordan and increased evaporation rates as a result of higher temperatures. The future of the Dead Sea looks bleak with its expecting to shrink more than 1.2 metres annually (Broom 2019). This also constitutes a major blow to the Jordanian economy, dependent as it is on revenues from tourism. Climate change is also evident in a World Bank report which declared the MENA region to be among the most vulnerable regions on earth to rising sea levels. The historic Egyptian city of Alexandria which is inhabited by 5 million people is literally sinking as sea levels rise. Lives have already been lost as apartment blocks collapse opposite the picturesque seafront. Neither is Alexandria confronting this unfolding tragedy alone. Coastal areas in Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates are all at risk as sea levels are expected to rise by half a metre by 2099 (Broom 2019). These rising sea levels have negative consequences for food security since one consequence of rising sea levels is the intrusion of seawater in coastal aquifers and wells causing the salinization of water there. To compound the issue, it is these coastal plains which are the most fertile and the most cultivated in the MENA region. Much of Morocco’s agricultural exports, for example, are concentrated in the Souss-Messa basin, a coastal region in south-western Morocco. This aquifer is not only suffering from salination as a result of the intrusion of sea-water but also over-exploitation as a result of burgeoning population demands. This over-exploitation is evident in the man-made contamination of his aquifer (Sowers et al. 2011). The Saudi city of Jeddah, meanwhile, has been experiencing annual floods since the 1960s as a result of violent storms. These storms and resultant floods have grown in intensity as a result of climate change. The damage to lives and property has been exacerbated however by poor urban planning. The city’s haphazard expansion, as a result of increased urbanization, has resulted in routes through which water used to be drained from is now built over. With the water trapped, the impact of the floods is felt more intensely (Broom 2019). The Saudi example suggests that whilst climate

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change is a reality, its impact could be mitigated through the implementation of sound policies. These environmental challenges hold political implications and further exacerbate state fragility across the MENA region. This is most graphically witnessed in Lebanon. Given the twin challenges of demographic momentum and urbanization, Beirut has been encountered problems with garbage disposal since 1998. The Naameh landfill, in southern Beirut, was opened as an emergency measure since other landfills had reached their capacity. This emergency site was supposed to close in 2001. However, by July 2015, and despite being overfilled, it was still being used as a dumping site. Residents of Naameh, concerned about the health hazard posed decided to close the roads to Naameh. Without any alternative landfill, trash began to accumulate across Beirut’s streets and beyond. This angered ordinary Lebanese who not only paid their rates but also an additional fee to recycle the trash under the Zero Waste Act. However, only 6 percent of Lebanon’s waste is recycled. The incompetence displayed by the government together with questions being raised on where the additional fee for recycling went to resulted in mass protests. Tens of thousands of people began taking to the streets from 23 August 2015. Whilst initially peaceful and focused on demands for a solution to the challenge of waste management, this soon began took a violent turn with protestors demanding for a new government given the current one’s incompetence (Petre 2015). As one youth activist noted, “The root cause of the waste crisis in Lebanon is not technical but political. There is no political will to solve the problem – from one side mainly because of the failure of state institutions and a deadlock in decision making within the cabinet; and from the other, because multiple political actors with vested interests have been blocking any solution” (The World Bank 2016). Of all the plethora of environmental threats confronted, perhaps none is more pressing than water. Between 80 and 100 million of the MENA’s citizens will suffer from water stress by 2025 (ibid, 2016). Beyond the human suffering, it is access to water, where one starkly witnesses the political and geo-strategic dimension of environmental challenges. Iraq has historically always relied on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers to meet its needs. However, Iraq has lost more than half of the water from these rivers. This, in turn, is resulting in the real prospect of rising food insecurity as four million square miles of fertile lands is reclaimed by the evercreeping desert (Neriah 2019). The reduced water flow has compromised Iraq’s ability to secure a stable electricity supply to its teeming cities. Iraq’s electricity generation used to stem from its twelve hydro-electric stations on its rivers. However, the reduced flow from these rivers has resulted in Baghdad unable to generate electricity to the same level it was accustomed to. The resulted intermittent electricity supply to the country’s major cities also served to fuel unrest across the nation as Iraqis protested water shortages and erratic electricity supply. The reason for Iraq losing more than fifty percent of its water was a direct consequence of activities of Iran and Turkey. Tehran has diverted 42 rivers and springs from flowing into Iraq as they have prioritized their own needs over that of its neighbour. The fact that this diversion of water is taking place with Iraq, a country with whom Iran enjoys friendly relations, suggests the seriousness with which Iran views the threat of

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water insecurity. Ankara, too, has contributed to Iraq’s increasing water woes. Turkey has built five huge dams on the Tigris, thereby decreasing the amount of water going downstream into Iraq (Neriah 2019). A similar dynamic is taking place between the Egypt and Ethiopia regarding the waters of the Nile. Egyptian history is intertwined with that of the ebbs and flows of the River Nile. The Blue Nile provides 85 percent of Egypt’s water needs. Cairo, however, is facing a looming calamity – a water shortage the like of which the country has not experienced for seven millennia. As with Iraq, the cause is a foreign country. In this case, Ethiopia which has begun construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the waters of the Blue Nile. Once completed in 2022, it will be the largest hydro-electric power facility on the African continent. Its construction holds huge challenges to Egypt. It has been estimated that Egypt would lose 80,000 hectares of agricultural land to desertification with each two percent drop in the flow of the waters of the Blue Nile. As with Iraq, the decrease in water flow to Egypt’s Aswan Dam would negatively impact on electricity generation. Under these circumstances, Cairo has threatened military strikes against the Ethiopian dam. In March 2020, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi met with the Egyptian High Command and called on the country’s armed forces to be at the highest level of combat readiness so that they can defend any threat to Egypt’s national security. Commentators believed that this was in response to Ethiopia continuing with the construction of GERD despite Cairo’s protestations (Abu Hableh 2020). Increased water stress may well make prospects of a water war a possibility.

8.3

Overcoming the Environmental Challenge

We began this chapter by providing insights from the Arab Barometer that demonstrates that environmental challenge is increasingly viewed with concern by vast swathes of the Arab public. What is important regarding this survey is that there was little difference in the views of those in rural or urban settings, across the gender divide or indeed between the different income groups (Green 2019). This suggests that the environment is a cross-cutting issue on which the majority could agree upon. Governments across the MENA region should build on this consensus in promoting and strengthening environmentally friendly legislation from building codes in cities to better management of water resources in rural settings. Whist there is consensus in Arab public opinion surveys on the seriousness of the environmental challenge confronted this does not necessarily translate into action. Research has demonstrated that only 25 percent of the MENA public comply with current environmental legislation, only 17 percent would support their government to impose penalties or taxes in an effort to protect the environment, whilst a paltry 7 percent would support national or local government funds to be utilized to create an environmental protection fund (Statista 2017). What this suggests is that government needs to lay greater emphasis on environmental education in schools and

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university curricula as well as social campaigns to draw the connection between a deteriorating environment’s impact on human life and lifestyle of ordinary citizens. The Arab Barometer makes clear that those with a higher education are more attuned with environmental concerns than those who are less educated. On the issue of water pollution, for instance, 67 percent of those with a basic education regard it as an important problem, as opposed to 71 percent with a secondary education and 74 percent with a higher education (Green 2019). This public education and social messaging on environmental considerations are important to ensure public involvement and initiatives to protect the environment. One such public initiative is EcoMENA (2019) which is a volunteer-driven movement aiming to increase environmental awareness through a robust social media campaign and also seeking to foster greater environmentally sustainable development projects from renewable energy and waste management to energy efficiency, the promotion of green building technologies and resource conservation. In Lebanon, the YouStink social media movement was launched to raise awareness about waste management and to pressurize government to recycle waste (Petre 2015). Such public initiatives should not detract from the fact that the primary responsibility for governance lay with the regimes in power across the region. Governments seem unable to prioritize core areas which need immediate intervention. Egypt is a case in point. Confronted with rising sea-levels which would displace 6 million Egyptians and the loss of 15 percent of arable land, Cairo chose to invest in a new multi-billion dollar capital as opposed to make investments in protective coastal structures (Sowers et al. 2011). The questionable capacity of MENA states to effectively exert governance is also evident in their inability to prevent private actors from expropriating water at will. Half of Jordan’s 2000 water wells are illegally constructed and over-exploited posing severe risk of increased water stress in the future. Similarly, in the Sanaa basin, Yemen has been unable to prevent the illegal drilling of wells as unscrupulous individuals use this water to plant the narcotic qat (ibid, 2011). The onset of the civil war in Yemen and the demise of any semblance of governmental authority has only made these activities more rampant. Across North Africa, too, the illegal pumping of aquifers is undermining long-term prospects for future sustainability and makes the implementation of any coherent national strategy all but impossible. As primary cities morph into metropolitan and mega-urban regions, the issue of urban governance with its attendant authority conflicts and governance voids will come more to the fore. There are some laudable initiatives in this regard. Abu Dhabi’s Masdar Initiative, for instance, has environmentally-friendly building codes and town and regional planning which aims to create a green city. In addition, solar power is increasingly the norm in Abu Dhabi (Stang 2016). Despite exceptions like Abu Dhabi, regionally, MENA states have performed poorly when confronting environmental degradation. Why is this so? Current governance frameworks are a poor fit to the challenges confronting local and national governments. The current highly centralized structures – itself a product of the democratic deficit alluded to in Chap. 2 – serve to weaken relationships between citizens and local government. With inclusive government impossible,

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there is no local ownership or buy-in to enforce green legislation and the like. Moreover, such highly-centralized governance structures also undermine local authority efficiency (Schafer 2013). As Gerald Stang (2016) has noted so eloquently, . . . the continued environmental degradation would seem to indicate the limited effectiveness of regulatory instruments, which require effective governance to enforce. MENA countries have been ruled mostly by authoritarian regimes – with limited political accountability – which have too often used the state to distribute economic rents rather than make long-term investments in their economies, societies, and environments.

This inefficiency is exacerbated if one considers the nepotism and corruption alluded to earlier in this volume. The nature of the state has to change fundamentally from its current rentier state configuration and resultant patronage networks to a more democratic inclusive polity. With the price of hydro-carbons on the decline states need to tax its citizens. These taxes are essential if states are to respond to the challenges of climate change and investing in green renewable energy and reconfigure cities to make them more eco-friendly. However such taxes will not be forthcoming without representation. The need for more decentralized and inclusive governance is especially acute in the water sector. Commenting on this aspect, Sowers et al. (2011) note, “Legacies of centralized systems of planning, taxation, and revenue distribution have rendered multi-scalar governance mechanisms weak in terms of organizational capacities and integration with local constituencies. Cities, provinces, and other subnational levels of government are not significant players in identifying vulnerable populations or planning for increased hydrological risk. Voluntary associations are tightly regulated in most of the authoritarian states of the region, while a variety of communal services, charities and forms of Islamist collective mobilization are seen as a threat to state integrity and legitimacy.” Climate change-induced water scarcity also necessitates that government approach the issue with greater emphasis on innovation and sustainability. Political elites in the MENA region have largely responded to water scarcity by focusing on the supply side building large dams, utilizing desalination techniques, transferring water between basins, tapping into groundwater aquifers and importing virtual water through food imports (Sowers et al. 2011). Desalination plants are expensive, dams and aquifers do not adequately deal with loss of precipitation, increased evaporation, poor and inefficient water usage or the poor quality of existing infrastructure. Many of these aquifers are also heavily contaminated. Saudi Arabia has made use of the Saq aquifer. This aquifer, however, is highly radioactive and poses health risks to the population consuming its water. Therefore more investment in remediation is needed (ibid, 2011). As for the importation of food, the Gulf States have for the past two decades been purchasing overseas farms, securing long-term leases of arable land and guaranteed purchases of rice crops in exchange for developmental finance. Countries targeted by Gulf States include Algeria, Morocco and Sudan closer to home as well as Asian countries like Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. However, in recent years, there has been much domestic opposition to these agreements with Gulf

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countries. In Cambodia, for instance, when the agreement to provide Kuwait for long-lease or rice-producing land became public, NGOs, small farmers and the political opposition mobilized to scuttle the deal (Sowers et al. 2011). Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that land transfers or long-term leases are politically viable in target states. These are some of the constraints MENA states are confronted with when focusing merely on the supply side of water scarcity. What regional governments have been loathe to do is engage in adaptive governance strategies which focus on the demand side. By adaptive governance, we mean the development of the necessary political and institutional capacity to ensure continuous and virtual water supply and quality. Such governance relies on social capital, the buy-in of non-state actors which authoritarian governments in the region with their tarnished democratic credentials have resisted. Under no circumstances, do political elites want to surrender centralized policy making and effectively give up sole control. Yet such inclusive governance is imperative for integrated water resource management. Such an inclusive water management system helps to prevent unequal access to water and connects water access to population growth in key nodes whilst allowing greater coordination of a scarce resource across different ministries, for example, agriculture and industry. Strategies on the demand side would include enhancing effective water usage and conservation promotion (Sowers et al. 2011). Earlier we discussed Lebanon’s disastrous waste management system. Other countries in the MENA region, however, demonstrate what is possible when state actors work in partnership with international stakeholders to resolve this issue. A decade ago, Morocco’s waste sites were mismanaged whilst toxic effluent flowed through towns, into rivers and found its way into the Atlantic Ocean. Unregulated dumping sites were scoured by waste-pickers for valuable scraps as these sought to earn a living. Injuries occurred quite often amongst waste-pickers as they rummaged through the trash without any protection. This has since changed following an intervention of the World Bank working in partnership with Moroccan authorities and the private sector to arrive at more sustainable solutions to waste management. The underlying object was to ensure that recycling of household garbage increase from 5 percent in 2016 to 20 percent in 2022 (The World Bank 2016). The newly created Oum Azza landfill site, which is run by a private operator, is the largest collecting and landfilling operation currently in the Maghreb. It takes in 850,000 tons of refuse per annum. Moreover, the private operator, recognizing the need for local buy-in and cognizant of the economic situation in Morocco, sponsored a cooperative for waste-pickers and constructed a sorting facility so that incomes could be earned by waste-pickers in safer and more organized conditions. The kingdom seeks not only to overcome the challenges of urbanization and population growth but is also attempting to transform these challenges into opportunities for growth. At the Oum Azza landfill, for instance, biogas is captured from organic waste and sold to fuel electricity to the national grid (ibid, 2016). It is this kind of forward thinking and innovation which is sorely needed if MENA countries want to overcome the environmental challenges posed.

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Given the regional dimension of the environmental threats posed, there is a need for greater regional cooperation amongst states. Such cooperation would entail that despite strained political or economic ties, states see the value of their cooperation in confronting a common challenge. The 1994 Israel–Jordan peace agreement also recognized the quest for fresh water supplies that both countries were confronted with. A Joint Water Commission was duly established and aimed to engage in joint water infrastructure development, joint project management and to regulate water sharing between the neighbours (Stang 2016). The fact that this cooperation has endured for almost three decades despite the political tensions between Amman and Jerusalem is testimony to the seriousness with which water security is viewed. In similar vein one, could note the existence of the Oman-based Middle East Desalination Research Centre which includes Israel and other Arab countries (ibid, 2016). Israel and Jordan have agreed also to jointly fund a pipeline to the Dead Sea from the Red Sea as they attempt to save it from shrinking further. Whilst a laudable initiative, there is some concern that the Dead Sea’s fragile ecosystem will be harmed as water from the Red Sea changes the alkalinity in the Dead Sea’s water content (Broom 2019). Despite this criticism, no viable alternative is proffered by critics. Such joint and regional ventures are needed to increase water security across the region and may well serve as a confidence-building mechanism to ensure that cooperation learned in the environmental arena could be applied to other areas of contention between states. Could such a model be applied to Egypt and Ethiopia given their fraught tensions over the waters of the Nile? At face value, the answer is negative. After all, both countries have been taking unilateral measures without consultation with the other party despite mediation from Washington and the involvement of the World Bank. Moreover, Cairo has been making threats of military action against Addis Ababa. However, despite the threats being made, the military option is unlikely on account of the challenges posed by geography, military capabilities and geo-politics. Both these countries also have linkages to other players – both regional and international. These outside players could assist by using their leverage to force both countries to come to the negotiating table and achieve compromises. Such compromises would entail understanding the positon of the other. The Nile holds an average flow of 84 billion square metres per annum (Mahlakeng 2020). According to Egypt, the construction of GERD would threaten its own share of the river by 55.5 billion cubic metres (Abu Hableh 2020). However, one can also understand the position of Ethiopia. Eritrea and Ethiopia contributes 85 percent to the water of the Blue Nile yet because of a colonial agreement, Egypt and Sudan benefits 100 percent from its waters but upstream countries cannot make use of the waters for their own growing needs (Mahlakeng 2020). Despite the seemingly intractable position between the parties, there is hope. Egypt is not opposed to filling the GERD with waters from the Nile but simply asks that it does not take place in one go. Doing so, will immediately having a deleterious impact on Egypt for years to come (Abu Hableh 2020). In the short term, then, the solution seems to be for

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Ethiopia to fill the GERD with the waters of the Blue Nile in stages to stagger the impact on Egypt. In the longer term, riparian countries should explore the idea of using the waters of the Nile more cooperatively and multilaterally. The obvious place to start is re-energize the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) which began in 1999. The idea behind it was to promote regional peace and security and to share the socioeconomic benefits of cooperatively utilizing the waters of the Nile (Mahlakeng 2020). Distrust is what collapsed the NBI as riparian states did not think that other states will abide by commitments made and take more from the waters of the Nile than allotted by the agreement. Such distrust is pervasive amongst the states of the region and served to undermine the aquifer coordination mechanism between Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. Such distrust was also pervasive between Chad, Egypt and Libya as they sought an aquifer agreement and undermined the agreement between Beirut and Damascus over the waters of the Nahr al-Kabir al Janoubi and Orontes Rivers (Stang 2016). Such distrust is perhaps understandable in a region where states have historically made use of such negotiations and agreements to lull their neighbours into a fall sense of security whilst illegally appropriating more water. Such was the case between Iraq and Turkey. Turkey formed a Joint Technical Committee with Iraq in 1980 to ensure equitable sharing of the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Various agreements were signed on water appropriations from the basin between the two countries in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Despite the ongoing negotiations and various agreements signed, Ankara was busy building more than a dozen dams in the basin, seriously undermining Iraq’s water security (ibid, 2016). There are other regional non-state-centric initiatives which are attempting to place greater emphasis on regional collaboration in an effort to respond to water scarcity. These include the Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Programme (METAP) established in 2002 and the Arab Water Council in 2004. Four aspects are important to note about both these initiatives. First, they are regional in scope. Second, they include non-governmental organizations. Third, they involved technical experts. Fourth, they are multi-donor funded projects also bringing in the private sector (Sowers et al. 2011). Whilst these are all positive, one might well ask why has effective water usage not resulted from these deliberations and cross-sector, multistate collaborations. The answer goes back to the centralized and dysfunctional nature of governance alluded to earlier in the chapter. Regimes across the region are also obsessed with their own security. In the process, their narrow focus on short-term political survival harms prospects of long-term environmental security. For instance, despite recommendations by experts in these bodies to create water users associations, governments have not legally recognized these, nor have they attempted to devolve decision-making over local irrigation to such associations. Egyptian climate researchers, meanwhile, were prevented in their international collaboration efforts to use satellite imagery to understand the impact of climate change. Cairo rejected it

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on account of dubious national security considerations. Such challenges that scientists in the MENA region confront add to the emigration of scientific skills abroad – so-called brain-drain migration. This, in turn, undermines the capacity of states to respond to the environmental challenges posed (Sowers et al. 2011).

8.4

Conclusion

The MENA region according to the National Aeronautical Space Agency (NASA) is undergoing its worse dry period for 900 years. The prognosis for the future does not look any better if one considers the scenario up to 2100 for the MENA region which researchers at the Max Planck Institute have meticulously researched. These environmental challenges have geopolitical impact and should be everyone’s concern. Recurrent drought have contributed to the civil war in Syria and resulted in the displacement of over 2 million Yemenis (Kramer 2016). This population displacement will gather pace as the impact of climate change intensifies. Europe is barely coping with the current wave of refugees from the MENA region fleeing political turmoil and economic downturn. How will Europe cope with much larger numbers of MENA citizens fleeing environmental catastrophe? Consequently, what is happening in the MENA region is everyone’s problem. This is a fact that is recognized by international actors. The Paris Agreement which came into force on 4 November 2016 aims to craft a global response to limit the impact of climate change by limiting global temperature rising to well below 2
C. A key instrument in order to do this is by limiting global carbon emissions. The withdrawal of the United States, which together with China contributes 40 percent of global carbon emissions, is a setback for global efforts to fight climate change (United Nations Climate Change 2019). At the regional level, the World Bank is currently spending US$ 1.5 billion to fight climate change in the MENA region (Broom 2019). Such initiatives are, however, hampered by the fact that the World Bank has to work within national structures which are not always fit to purpose. Adaptive governance, inclusive governance and democratic governance has to be the norm. The fact that countries from Egypt to Qatar have already begun to integrate the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals into their legislation would be a good place to start the dialogue (Stang 2016). Clearly more needs to be done at the level of developing partnerships between state and non-state actors in domestic settings, between regional neighbours and international actors to ensure that a more effective interface is created when dealing with environmental challenges. Let us not forget, too, that because environmental challenges are felt at the local level, the primary responsibility lay with states in the region who are far from ready – at the levels of organizational configuration, institutional capacity or political will – to confront the looming environmental catastrophe.

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Literature Abu Hableh, A. (2020). Egypt’s options in the Renaissance dam crisis. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200313-egypts-options-in-the-renaissance-damcrisis/ Broom, D. (2019). How the Middle East is suffering on the front lines of climate change. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/middle-east-front-lines-cli mate-change-mena/ Dvosky, G. (2016). Extreme heat will make parts of the Middle East uninhabitable by 2050. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://gizmodo.com/extreme-heat-will-make-parts-of-themiddle-east-and-afr-1774311994 EcoMENA. (2019). Echoing sustainability in MENA. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www. ecomena.org/ Green, J. (2019). Environmental issues in the Middle East and North Africa. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/environment-10-17-19-jcg. pdf Kramer, S. (2016). Skyrocketing temperatures means parts of the Middle East could be uninhabitable by 2050. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www.businessinsider.com/ global-warming-migration-middle-east-north-africa-2016-5?IR¼T Mahlakeng, M. K. (2020). Tension over the Nile: Egypt, Ethiopia and the United States. RIMA Occasional Papers 8 (4), Retrieved March 16, 2020, from https://muslimsinafrica.wordpress. com/2020/03/06/tensions-over-the-nile-egypt-ethiopia-and-the-united-states-dr-mahlakengkhosi-mahlakeng/ Neriah, J. (2019). A scorecard on the first decade after the Arab Spring. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from https://jcpa.org/article/a-scorecard-on-the-first-decade-after-the-arab-spring/ Petre, C. (2015). #YouStink: The environmental youth movement in Lebanon. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/youstink-environmental-youth-move ment-lebanon Schafer, K. (2013). Urbanization and urban risks in the Arab Region. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from https://www.preventionweb.net/files/31093_habitataqabaurbanresillience.pdf Sowers, J., Vengosh, A., & Weinthal, E. (2011). Climate change, water resources, and the politics of adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa. Climate Change, 104(3–4), 599–627. Stang, G. (2016). Climate challenges in the Middle East: Rethinking environmental cooperation. MEI Policy Paper 2016-2. Washington: Middle East Institute. Regional Cooperation Series. Statista. (2017). Public opinion on level of environmental protection by selected countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as of June 2017. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/868271/mena-public-opinion-on-level-of-environmentalprotection/ The World Bank. (2016). Waste Management key to regaining public trust in the Arab World. Retrieved March 9, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/03/14/wastemanagement-key-to-regaining-public-trust-arab-world United Nations Climate Change. (2019). Paris Agreement. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from https:// unfccc.int/about-the-un-climate-change-conference-december-2019

Chapter 9

The MENA Region in the Face of Covid-19

Abstract With the Covid-19 pandemic sweeping across the MENA region, how are the region’s governments responding to the threat posed. Some like the UAE have been ahead of the curve taking a slew of pre-emptive measures to minimize infections. Others, like Iran and Turkey, inadequate, delayed and fragmented responses have resulted in their becoming epicentres of the spread of the virus. War-ravaged Libya and Yemen, meanwhile, have no capacity to control the virus. Neither does Tripoli and Aden control the entire country in order to take the necessary steps to curb infections. What is needed are leaders with the necessary foresight to mitigate the impact of the virus whilst preparing for a regional and international order. Keywords Pandemic · Corona virus · Leadership · New World Order

9.1

Introduction

We began this volume with the multi-faceted crises engulfing the MENA region. With tens of thousands infected across the region and thousands of lives lost, it is clear that Covid-19 will exacerbate governance failures, sectarianism, tensions between secularists and Islamists and deepen economic cleavages within and between the states. The impact of the corona virus will serve to exacerbate the multiple crises besetting the region. The esteemed historian Yuval Noah astutely observed, “The storm will pass, humankind will survive, most of us will still be alive, but we will inhabit a different world” (Dorsey 2020). It is clear that the MENA region will not be the same after this pandemic. What form the post-pandemic region will take is dependent upon the choices governments make. As in our discussion on the environment, whilst global climate change cannot be wished away, its effects could be mitigated as a result of sound governance. During the influenza epidemic of 1918 some authorities managed to successfully slow the infection and keep mortality rates low, whilst others acted too slowly and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6_9

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ineffectively and consequently paid a huge price. This is starkly brought out by the reactions of two US cities – St. Louis and Philadelphia in the face of the 1918 influenza epidemic. St. Louis responded early and aggressive towards the threat posed. Philadelphia’s delayed response, meanwhile, resulted in eight times more fatalities than St. Louis (Du Plessis 2020).

9.2

The Nature of the Threat Posed by the Virus and Responses To It

As in the case of these American cities, some states in the MENA region have reacted pre-emptively and have contributed to flattening the curve of infections in their countries. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, began implementing social distancing measures whilst the virus was still at its infancy. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, adopted an aggressive approach towards the virus, including a curfew from dusk to dawn. Riyadh also adopted other radical steps like preventing religious pilgrimage to two of Islam’s holiest places – Mecca and Medina. Iran’s belated response and initial denials have transformed it into the epicentre of the Covid-19 pandemic in the Middle East with tens of thousands of infections. The first reported Covid-19 deaths in the MENA region occurred in the Iranian holy city of Qom when two Shia pilgrims die as a result of the virus. Despite this knowledge, Tehran decided to proceed with the 21 February 2020 parliamentary elections in a dubious attempt to bolster their flagging legitimacy (Riboua 2020). Soon, every province and every city across Tehran was affected (Gambill 2020). The lies emanating from Tehran, its refusal to impose a lockdown on its population in February 2020 has also allowed the virus to spread into other countries, including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon (Frantzman 2020). The mullahs in Tehran, meanwhile, have also continued their anti-Western and anti-US rhetoric in the face of the pandemic. In an effort, to distract the public’s attention from their own failed responses, Iran has accused Washington of developing a special strand of the virus, which specifically honed in on Iran and Iranians (Gambill 2020). The Iranian public, however, is quite sophisticated and can see through the excuses of their leadership with many questioning the regime’s propensity to fund regional military ventures as opposed to funding health services. Tehran has also attempted to politicize the virus by requesting international relief from the crippling sanctions imposed on it whilst at the same time turning aid away in the form of Doctors without Borders (Frantzman 2020). Of course, Iran is not alone in following the “Philadelphia option”. By April 2020, Turkey has had the highest acceleration of Covid-19 cases in the region largely on account of its mismanaged health system. When the virus first appeared on Turkish soil, social mobility was not prevented and testing was confined to only those who had travelled abroad. Given processes of urbanization described earlier in this volume, it is no coincidence that it is densely populated cities, which are most

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vulnerable. Sixty percent of all Covid-19 cases were located in the commercial capital of Istanbul, which accounts for 20 percent of Turkey’s total population. The pandemic also highlighted the failures of Turkey’s shambolic health system from the lack of organization to the shortage of equipment, beds, and health workers. Under the circumstances, the scathing pronouncement of the Istanbul Chamber of Physicians is understandable, “It is evident that hospitals in the city have not prepared adequately in the two and a half months since the virus first came into the spotlight” (Wilks 2020). In many ways, the Corona virus has brought into sharp relief the tensions inside countries, specifically as it relates to the ever-widening gap between haves and havenots and between foreign-born residents and citizens. Qatar is a case in point. Whilst boasting the largest per capita income in the world and having a skyline dotted by skyscrapers and a superb health system for citizens, it is easy to forget that 85 percent of this emirate’s resident are foreign migrant labourers who live in squalid conditions rendering Qatar ripe for infection (Gambill 2020). Reports of Doha cordoning off the migrants quarters would almost certainly serve to exacerbate tensions inside the country (Pattison and Sedhai 2020). A similar dynamic is at play in the Al Qaif province of Saudi Arabia – a Shia majority province. When Riyadh placed the entire province under lockdown, Shia residents felt they were being unfairly targeted. Shia citizens have always felt marginalized. With the lockdown and attendant differential treatment towards the Shia, existing cleavages betwen Shia and Sunni in the kingdom have been exacerbated (Bianco 2020). The Saudi case suggests that where governments do engage in draconian legislation such as enforced lockdowns, it works better when governments are viewed as legitimate and that they practice inclusive governance. The actions they embark upon are then viewed as acting in the national interest. The differing reactions of citizens in Tunisia illustrate the point well. Tunis has a new government, which came to power in February 2020. It is viewed as an expression of the will of the electorate and therefore legitimate. Despite imposing strong containment measures such as a curfew and the closure of all borders for international travel, the government has received no push-back from its citizens. Tunisians, in fact, support the government’s actions. The situation is markedly different in Algeria where the regime does not enjoy popular legitimacy. Algiers ban on political gatherings was seen as an opportunistic move on the part of the regime to quell the protests in the country which has been taking place for more than a year (Bianco 2020). Notwithstanding the human costs, the impact would be felt most on the economic front as capital markets tumble, tourists evaporate in the midst of a ban on flights and lockdowns and oil prices contract. Chinese buyers contribute a significant portion of real estate transactions in Dubai (Ng 2020). With China still recovering from the virus, these Chinese buyers have postponed making new purchases. Given the bubble economy of Dubai with its glut of property, even before the virus, this city-state is confronting economic catastrophe. With the UAE cancelling its Expo 2020 and Saudi Arabia not allowing the annual haj pilgrimage to take millions, hundreds of millions of dollars were lost for both states. The UAE was expected to attract 25 million visitors to its Expo 2020 event which was to be held in October 2020 and Saudi Arabia received 20 million religious pilgrims each year (ibid, 2020).

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Egypt, meanwhile, is losing an estimated US$ 1 billion per month in lost tourist revenues (Bianco 2020). It is perhaps in tumbling oil prices where the greatest economic impact will be felt most. Oil is the core export for most Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Even before the pandemic, the price of a barrel of oil was on its way down largely as a consequence of US shale oil production and alternative renewable energy resources coming online. The oil price also went onto free-fall falling after OPEC and Russia failed to arrive at a mutual agreement to cut oil production. Irked with Moscow’s recalcitrance, Riyadh decided to flood the market with oil resulting in the oil price to calamitously decline. The impact of the pandemic will further depress the oil price as demand dries up. By March 2020, the price of a barrel of crude oil was US$ 31.35. Consider that at the beginning of the year the price of the same barrel was an estimated US$ 60. Whilst oil prices are expected to stage a moderate come-back and trade at US$ 40 per barrel by December 2020, this is far below the break-even point for the oil producers of the MENA region (Ng 2020). This, in turn, holds political consequences. The rentier economies of the region are no longer sustainable and will have to tax their citizens. Will MENA citizens echo the battle-cry of American colonists against their British overlords in the 1700s and cry out in rage: No taxation without representation? It is clear that the already fragile polities across the region and ruling elites whose grasp of the political reins of power were always tenuous will have to open up political processes. When discussing the impact of Covid-19, it is imperative to add a caveat. As per our introduction to this volume, the MENA region consists of states with differing capabilities, with widely divergent health systems and governance structures. Whilst GCC countries have a GDP per capita of between US$ 20,000 and US$ 70,000 and can spend considerably, more on health infrastructure, the same is not true of war-ravaged Yemen whose health system is ranked an abysmal 120th in the world (Arezki and Nguyen 2020). The war raging on its territory has also damaged health infrastructure and created large numbers of internally displaced people. A further 300,000 refugees largely from Africa add to its burden. Yemen’s health system inability to respond to the corona virus is already reflected in the fact that the country has been unable to control a cholera outbreak that has been raging across the country for 4 years and affecting two million of its citizens (Bianco 2020). A similar dynamic is at play in war-ravaged Syria where whole cities are locked down, where almost half a million people have no water and little access to health facilities on account of the shelling of hospitals (Frantzman 2020). Syria also poses a regional vector for contamination if one considers the 5.5 million refugees residing in neighbouring states in unsanitary camps (Bianco 2020). Neighbouring Lebanon, meanwhile, cannot embark on a stimulus package in the face of the pandemic. It defaulted on a US$ 1.2 billion Eurobond payment. As its economy is in free fall, it does not have the wherewithal to fund its faltering health infrastructure. The shortage of foreign currency has also prevented Beirut from importing much-needed medical supplies. 2020 marks a century since Lebanon came into being (Riboua 2020). There will be no centennial celebrations as the year may well mark the country’s annus horribilis. Similar to Lebanon, Iraq’s health

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system has been mismanaged for years on the part of the authorities. In Iraq, local authorities have no financial or technical resources to deploy against this health catastrophe (Riboua 2020). The shortage of medical supplies and equipment and dearth of competent staff in the nation’s hospitals speak to the decades of neglect of the health sector. Only 2.5 percent of Iraq’s US$ 106.5 billion revenues is allocated to health. Another problem challenging Baghdad’s response to the pandemic is the fact that the government enjoys scant legitimacy amongst its citizens. This was revealed in early March when health authorities banned public gatherings in an effort to flatten the curve of new infections. Demonstrators, however, refused to end their public protests, questioning the government’s motives in imposing the ban in the first place. According to the Iraqi Commission for Human Rights, more than 600 demonstrators were killed by security forces, and government-supported militias. When this failed to quell the protest movement, government – so the narrative goes – made use of the real threat of the pandemic spreading to curb all public protests. One of those protesting was Alqasem Ahmed, a journalist. He summed up much of the protestors attitude to the ban on public gathering when he stated, “We see Covid-19 as a small threat when we are being killed with guns and live bullets. We have been facing death, poverty and corruption since 2003. This is the real virus and I don’t think we will find a cure” (Allinson 2020). The pandemic also brought into sharp scrutiny the close ties between the regimes in Baghdad and Tehran. Earlier in this volume, we discussed how Iraqis demonstrated against undue Iranian influence over their government, including storming an Iranian consulate and setting alight the Iranian flag. Iran and Iraq share 21 border crossings. Whilst Baghdad insisted that all such border crossings were closed on fear of contagion spreading from Iran to Iraq, Tehran’s ambassador denied this. This prompted protestors to mobilize under the hashtag “Shut the borders with Iran.” They proceeded to block the road to one such border crossing in Diyala province. The seeming inability to close borders with Iran and the affinity between Iraq’s fractious political leaders with the Iranian regime has resulted in further distrust towards the government and ordinary citizens questioning whether Iraq is a sovereign state or an Iranian colony (Allinson 2020).

9.3

Concluding Insights

Every crisis brings opportunities. The devastation wrought by the Black Death to Europe between 1347 and 1353 resulted in greater reorganization and reconfiguration of European society setting the basis for the Renaissance (Du Plessis 2020). In order for a Renaissance to occur in the MENA region, James Dorsey remind us that it depends upon “. . .governments and elites that have the foresight and the political will to build a new world order that is not only equitable but also creates the political, economic and social conditions for management of future pandemics at a potentially lower social and economic cost for all” (Dorsey

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2020). It is tempting to assume that with the COVID-19 virus raging across borders that political elites will demonstrate this foresight; that countries will bury past enmities and join forces against the pandemic. Despite these trying circumstances, old habits persist notwithstanding the existential nature of the threat confronted. In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, militants in the Gaza Strip decided to launch missiles on Israel whose armed forces retaliated against various Hamas targets (Abu Amer 2020). Neither has the pandemic ameliorated the deep sectarian divisions within the region. Saudi Arabia intercepted two ballistic missiles fired by Tehranaligned Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Saudi capital, Riyadh, as well as the city of Jizan were targeted (The Jerusalem Post 2020). As Libya’s Tripoli-based Government of National Accord announced the country’s first Covid-19 case, Khalifa Haftar’s forces pummelled the capital with airstrikes (Daraghi 2020). As Yuval Noah stated, the world we will occupy post the pandemic will be a different one from the one we currently inhabit. This new world will require new ways of doing things as opposed to relying on old habits that have led the region to ruin. In the pages of this volume we have demonstrated the positives: inclusive polities, post-patriarchal societies, dynamic economies, secular polities and green technologies. For the MENA region to experience its own Renaissance, it needs political leadership to demonstrate the foresight to make a New World Order possible. Evidence from the Arab Barometer suggests that the region’s people are ready for this new dawn.

Literature Abu Amer, A. (2020). Rocket fired toward Israel amid corona virus outbreak in Gaza. Retrieved April 3, 2020, from https://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/gaza-rocket-israelhamas-pressure-siege-coronavirus.html Allinson, T. (2020). Coronavirus in Iraq: Bullet, repression, Iran trump COVID-19. Retrieved March 4, 2020, from https://dw.com/en/coronavirus-in-iraq-bullets-repression-iran-trumpcovid-19/a-52624119 Arezki, R., & Nguyen, H. (2020). The corona virus’ potential effects on the Middle East and North Africa. Retrieved March 31, 2020, from https://www.worldbank.org/arabvoices/coronaviruspotential-effects-middle-east-and-north-africa Bianco, C. (2020). Infected: The impact of the coronavirus on the Middle East and North Africa. Retrieved March 31, 2020, from https://www.ecfr.eu/commentary-infected-the-impact-of-thecorona-virus-on-the-middle-east-and-no Daraghi, B. (2020). Libya war left unimpeded by coronavirus outbreak. Retrieved April 8, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/world-middle-east/libya-war-coronavirus-north-africa-unhaftar-covid-19-a9426146.html Dorsey, J. M. (2020). Refugees and shantytowns in MENA and beyond imperil global public health. Retrieved April 2, 2020, from https://www.mei.org.in/commentary-598 Du Plessis, Q. (2020). An unprecedented crisis: The economic ramifications of Covid-19. Retrieved April 4, 2020, from https://www.mg.co.za/article/2020-04-04-an-unprecedented-crisis-theeconomic-ramifications-of-covid-19 Frantzman, S. (2020). COVID-19 widens the divide in the fractured Middle East. Retrieved March 28, 2020, from https://www.meforum.org/60653-covid-19-widens-the-divide-in-middle-east

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Gambill, G. C. (2020). Roman on the Arab Gulf States’ reaction to the coronavirus pandemic. Retrieved March 28, 2020, from https://www.meforum/org/60613/roman-on-arab-gulf-statesreaction-to-coronavirus Ng, A. (2020). Three ways the corona virus could have an impact on Middle East economies. Retrieved March 12, 2020, from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/12/three-ways-the-coronavirus-could-impact-the-middle-east-economies.html Pattison, P., & Sedhai, R. (2020). Covid-19 lockdown transforms Qatar’s largest migrant camp into virtual prison. Retrieved April 7, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop ment/2020/mar/20/covid-19-lockdown-turns-qatars-largest-migrant-camp-into-virtual-prison Riboua, Z. (2020). Coronavirus experiences on the ground in the Middle East. Retrieved March 24, 2020, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasources/coronavirus-experienceson-the-ground-in-the-middle-east The Jerusalem Post. (2020). Saudi Arabia intercepts two missiles fired by Yemen’s Houthis. Retrieved March 29, 2020, from https://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Rockets-interceptedover-Riyadh-Jazan-in-Saudi-Arabia-622745 Wilks, A. (2020). Why Turkey is facing steep curve of new coronavirus cases. Retrieved April 2, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/turkey-facing-steep-curve-coronavi rus-cases-200402131247613.html

Chapter 10

Conclusions

Abstract The Middle East North Africa region stands at the precipice of the proverbial cliff confronting numerous challenges. These challenges may be divided into three separate but interacting clusters: globalization, democratization and development. How the regimes respond to these challenges will define the future of the region for years to come. Keywords Egypt · Libya · Morocco · Iraq · Yemen · Lebanon · Tunisia · West Bank · Gaza · Sudan · Jordan

The Covid-19 pandemic currently demonstrates without doubt that globalization is a reality which cannot be wished away. The corona virus demonstrated no respect for territorial frontiers, national borders or sovereignty. In light of this virus, many national governments proved not up to the task. This, after all, is a region with only 1.1 physicians for every 1000 inhabitants whereas the EU has a ratio of 3.6 per 1000 inhabitants. Despite Tehran’s adversarial relationship with the global order, post-Islamic Revolution Iran approached the International Monetary Fund for the first time requesting a US $5 billion loan to help fight the pandemic. This represents abundant evidence where state authority is on the wane whilst the global order is increasingly is on the ascendancy despite attempts by states to retreat into some nationalist enclave. Those MENA states who recognize this fact such as Morocco will thrive. Recognizing its inability to arrive at an effective waste management system, Morocco turned to the World Bank and the private sector for assistance. The resultant waste management system demonstrated how future public–private partnerships could overcome many of the region’s challenges. Not all international actors are positive, however. The growing engagement and influence of Moscow in the MENA region from arms sales to being directly involved in the Syrian civil war points out the dark side of some global actors. The same is true of the environment. No national strategy can work to reverse global climate change. With soaring temperatures, decreasing precipitation, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6_10

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increasing desertification and between 80 and 100 million residents of MENA experiencing water stress by 2025, countries need to work together to mitigate this looming calamity. Sovereignty needs to be pooled, regional institutions need to be empowered and global institutions need to be harnessed if the region is to avoid the fate predicted for it by the Max Planck Institute that it would be uninhabitable by 2050. Globalization is also manifested in other ways – both good and bad. Economically, the region has been truly integrated in world trade systems. This has witnessed many countries to grow prosperous, boasting some of the highest GDP per capitas in the world. On the downside, a truly global economy has come into being which is resulting in greater competition for the region’s hydro-carbon producers from the US Shale Gas Company’s to Russia’s own energy exports. The falling price of oil will compel these states to re-examine not just their economies’ dependence on energy exports but also re-examine the very foundations of their rentier economies. There are also the social aspects of globalization which is greatly aided not just by travel and satellite television but also by the ubiquitous internet. This social globalization is resulting in changing attitudes and values across the MENA region. Parents, as a result of globalization, are more willing to teach their children to be more tolerant of others in an effort to prepare their offspring for a more integrated future world. This stands in sharp contrast to traditional Islamist values. In addition, other benefits of social globalization include pro-market attitudes, less patriarchal values and more non-violent and law-abiding citizens. Of course, there are other more sinister – Islamist -forces also making use of travel and the internet to spread their message of hate – for both secular forces, modernization trends and processes of globalization. However, there is reason to hope that the appeal of Islamism is on the wane. The Arab Youth Survey demonstrated that 66 percent of the region’s youth are of the opinion that religion is playing too big a role in the Middle East and is to blame for the sectarian violence engulfing the region whilst holding the region back from its true potential. This value change taking place together with the economic strains placed on rentier states and the more secular values taking root in the Middle East all promote democratization in the region. Indeed, democratization, according to the Arab Barometer is embraced by 80 percent of Arabs. This finding suggests that the families in power across the MENA region are increasingly at odds with their own people. The narrow basis of these regimes also serves to undermine their legitimacy. Whether it is the tiny minority of religious guardians in the case the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 12 percent of Alawites attempting to control Syria or the 25,000 princes in Saudi Arabia – stability demands a more inclusive polity. In a desperate attempt to bolster their flagging their legitimacy these regimes have attempted to infuse religion into politics. Various surveys discussed in this volume, however, demonstrate that this has resonance amongst the Arab masses who have seen their quality of lives dropping whilst under the yoke of authoritarian rule. Moreover, whilst there was an implicit bargain struck between these regimes and their citizens – political acquiescence in exchange for material benefit – given the straitened economic conditions, these regimes cannot fulfil their own end of the

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bargain. It is the youth, of course, who bears their weight of the dire economic conditions and with youth unemployment soaring, violence and protest have become the norm across the MENA region from the Arab Spring to today’s protests on the streets of Algiers, Baghdad, Beirut, Istanbul and Tehran. The plan for some states to begin taxing their citizens will only serve to increase demands for greater popular representation and more inclusive polities. Whilst accountability, rule of law and freedom are norms which all democracies aspire to, it also promises effective governance through voting out incompetent incumbent elites. The concomitant dearth of democracies in the MENA region has allowed nepotism and patronage networks to flourish and corruption to take root whilst ordinary citizens suffer. Appointments on the basis of who you know as opposed to what you know have also resulted in a lack of effective institutions. Being a good Shi’a and believing in the rule of the Ayatollah Khamenei does not make one a good physician as Iran’s tragic responses to the corona virus aptly illustrates. Finally, there is development. No development is possible without democratic polities, which are open to the world (globalization). It was demonstrated in our discussion on the environment that decentralized policies is essential not only for sustainable environmental but also to enhance local ownership and support to enforce green legislation, integrated water resource management and the like. Governments, however, prefer continuing with centralized control that is preventing societies from adapting to changed climate conditions. Neither is development possible when patriarchal social norms exist which prevent women from seeking their rightful place in the labour force. The MENA region, it was estimated, is losing US$ 575 billion per annum as a result gender-based discrimination and social norms. Neither is development possible in societies riven by corruption or where the military in Egypt has its tentacles in every facet of the economy as opposed to the private sector. Current governance frameworks are a poor fit to the triple challenge posed by globalization, democratization and development. Whilst MENA governments are attempting to reform, these tend to remind one of the reforms superficially undertaken by the Ottoman Empire as they sought to escape the label of the “Sick Man in Europe” and play catch-up with the more advanced West. Such piece-meal reforms did not halt the decline of the Ottomans, neither will it turn around the fortunes of the MENA countries. Now is the time for courageous acts of leadership on the part of governments across the region to engage in radical reforms if they seek stable and prosperous societies. There can be no prevarication when one is on the precipice.

Statistical Appendix

Appendix Table 1: Margins of Error at 95% Confidence Interval

Sample size N 20 30 40 50 75 100 250 500 1.000 2.000

Error margins (+ ) for the resulting percentages 10% or 90% 13.1% 10.7% 9.3% 8.3% 6.8% 5.9% 3.7% 2.6% 1.9% 1.3%

Error margins (+ ) for the resulting percentages 20% or 80% 17.5% 14.3% 12.4% 11.1% 9.1% 7.8% 5.0% 3.5% 2.5% 1.8%

Error margins (+ ) for the resulting percentages 30% or 70% 20.1% 16.4% 14.2% 12.7% 10.4% 9.0% 5.7% 4.0% 2.8% 2.0%

Error margins (+ ) for the resulting percentages 40% or 60% 21.5% 17.5% 15.2% 13.6% 11.1% 9.6% 6.1% 4.3% 3.0% 2.1%

Error margins (+ ) for the resulting percentages 50% 21.9% 17.9% 15.5% 13.9% 11.3% 9.8% 6.2% 4.4% 3.1% 2.2%

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6

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Name Index

A Abduljaber, M., 27, 39, 118, 120, 121, 186 Acaravci, A., 122 Achilov, D., 122, 196, 197 Adorno, T.W., 192 Aksnes, D.W., 120 Alesina, A., 4, 39, 123 Alexander, A.C., 158, 162 Al-Mulali, U., 122 Aly Ezzat, D., 122 Ariely, G., 38, 118, 120

B Babones, S., 48, 124 Bajo-Rubio, O., 118, 120 Ballmer-Cao, T.H., 5, 38, 48, 49, 123 Barber, B., 119, 120 Barro, R.J., 4, 39, 41, 42, 103–111 Bastian, B.L., 122 Berelson, B., 80 Berggren, N., 118, 121, 122 Billiet, J., 4, 5, 123, 124 Bogaert, K., 46 Bornschier, V., 5, 37, 38, 48, 49, 123

C Campante, F.R., 71 Campbell, J., 48, 124 Castells, M., 68, 119, 120 Cavatorta, F., 123 Chakroun, M., 122

Chase-Dunn, C., 5, 37, 38, 48, 123 Chor, D., 71 Ciftci, S., 28, 186 Cohen, E., 27

D Dalton, R.J., 39 Darley, J.M., 39, 123 Davidov, E., 4, 5, 123, 124 D’Elia, E., 40 Deutsch, F., 39, 120, 121 Driessen, M.D., 122

E Elzinga, K.G., 39, 123 Etling, A., 76

F Farhani, S., 122 Ferber, M.A., 123 Ferrara, E.L., 4, 123 Frank, A.G., 37, 38 Fukuyama, F., 12, 26, 29, 30, 39, 123, 172, 178

G Giorgi, L., 39, 124 Giuliano, P., 39 Glahe, F., 39, 123 Glas, S., 39, 122

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6

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Name Index

Grinin, L., 4–6, 37–39, 42, 46, 48, 84, 103, 106, 108–110, 123, 134, 135, 137, 146, 194 Günay, S., 39, 122 Gygli, S., 5, 6, 38

N Nelson, J.A., 123 Nilsson, T., 118, 121, 122 Norris, P., 4, 123, 124, 159

H Hayek, F.A., 4, 45, 123, 159 Heggem, I.Ø., 38, 120 Hendi, A.S., 80 Heshmati, A., 5, 6, 39, 48, 49, 52, 55, 57, 59, 117, 122, 124, 134, 198–200, 215 Hofstede, G.J., 4, 39, 123 Holland, J., 48, 124 Huntington, S.P., 39, 123

O Obirek, S., 5 Oishi, S., 123 Omri, A., 122 Ozturk, I., 122

I Inglehart, R.F., 39, 118, 120, 123, 124

J Jakobsen, T.G., 38, 120 Johnson, N.P., 41

K Kalecki, M., 46 Karoui, H., 49, 118, 122, 123, 198–200, 215 Korotayev, A., 37, 38, 48 Kuznets, S., 84, 95, 122

L La Ferrara, E., 4 Laski, K., 46, 47 Lerro, B., 5 Lipset, S.M., 4, 123 Lynch, M., 76

M Marsh, C., 39, 124 Mauldin, W.P., 80 McCleary, R.M., 4, 39 McKibbin, W.J., 41 Michael, R., 171, 176 Minkov, M., 4, 123 Muller, G.P., 5, 41, 49, 123

P Podkaminer, L., 46, 47 Pollin, R., 47 Popper, K.S., 39 Post, S.G., 47, 123, 250 Potrafke, N., 38 Putnam, R.D., 39

R Robbins, M., 23, 155, 163, 198

S Schalembier, B., 120 Scheepers, P., 122 Schulmeister, S., 45, 47 Schumpeter, J.A., 39 Schwartz, S.H., 123 Sen, A., 39, 80 Shamaileh, A., 28, 71 Sivertsen, G., 120 Solomon, H., 2, 5, 6, 18, 21, 23, 27, 29, 37, 39, 73, 158, 169, 173, 193, 194 Sowers, J., 122, 235, 238–240, 242 Spierings, N., 22 Stark, R., 50, 173 Stockhammer, E., 47 Sykes, Z., 12, 80

T Taubenberger, J.K., 42 Tausch, A., 2, 27, 118, 159, 169, 193 Tessler, M., 39, 122, 189, 198 Tyler, T.R., 39, 123

Name Index

261

U Ucal, M., 39, 122

Welzel, C., 39, 120, 121, 158, 162 Wu, L., 15

V Vorhies, F., 39, 123

Y Yan, H.D., 118, 120 Younsi, M., 122

W Wegner, E., 123 Weinthal, E., 235, 239

Z Zali, M.R., 122

Subject Index

A Afghanistan, 21, 73, 167, 185, 193, 246 Age, 22, 55, 59, 60, 70, 86, 90, 134, 136, 161, 168, 198 Albania, 45, 57, 74 Algeria, 3, 20, 22, 27, 28, 50, 52, 58, 61, 71, 73, 79, 88, 102, 107, 111, 119, 127, 131, 137, 155, 157, 167, 174, 185, 186, 193, 197, 208–211, 213–216, 228, 239, 242, 247 Al Islah, 188 Al Qaeda, 13, 23, 185 Al Shabaab, 185 American Psychological Association (APA), 123 Andorra, 72 Angola, 76, 167 Annual population growth, 94 Anti-defamation league (ADL), 94, 101 Antigua and Barbuda, 73 Antisemitism, 93, 94, 101 Arab barometer, 6, 22, 23, 27, 121, 154, 155, 157, 159, 163, 184–229, 233, 237, 238, 250, 254 Arab league, 3, 5, 18, 92–96, 112, 135, 147 Arab nationalism, 185 Arab spring, 2, 13, 18, 22, 29, 46, 59, 71, 82, 84, 86, 89, 90, 164, 171, 176, 185, 197, 198, 255 Arab Water Council, 242 Argentina, 57, 72, 103–106

Armed forces (the army), 2, 13, 20, 21, 163, 176, 186, 237, 250 Armenia, 45, 74 Aswan dam, 237 Australia, 56, 73, 103, 106 Austria, 42, 50, 56, 73, 103, 106, 191, 192 Average annual HDI growth, 95 Azerbaijan, 73

B Bahamas, the, 57, 72 Bahrain, 3, 14, 18–20, 57, 71, 76, 79, 88, 102, 107, 111, 127, 131, 137, 246 Bangladesh, 76, 119, 158 Banks, 19, 26, 176, 190, 200, 201, 209, 228 Barbados, 57, 72 Belarus, 72 Belgium, 56, 73, 103, 104, 106 Belize, 57, 72 Benin, 75 Bhutan, 75 Bolivia, 76 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 45, 76 Botswana, 76 Brazil, 57, 75, 103, 106 Brunei Darussalam, 72 Bulgaria, 50, 57, 71, 75 Burkina Faso, 75 Burma, 75 Burundi, 72

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 H. Solomon, A. Tausch, Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7047-6

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264 C Calvinist work ethics, 124, 137 Cambodia, 75, 239, 240 Cameroon, 75 Canada, 56, 74, 103, 106 Cape Verde, 74 Carbon emissions, 54, 56, 93, 94, 101, 243 Central African Republic, 72 Chad, 72, 242 Charging interest, 190, 200, 203, 204, 209, 228 Child qualities, 134 Chile, 45, 57, 75, 103–106 China, 1, 15, 26, 39, 42, 57, 76, 80, 102–104, 243, 247 Christians, 162, 171, 175, 177, 192, 227 Civil and political liberties, 53, 56, 94, 101 Climate change, 2, 7, 233–235, 239, 242, 243, 245, 253 Climate of personal non-violence, 95, 101, 123, 137, 145 Coefficient of human inequality 2013, 95 Colombia, 57, 74, 103, 106 Combined failed states index, 53, 56 Comoros, 3, 58, 71, 72, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111 Competition, 91, 134, 136, 196, 254 Congo, Democratic Republic, 76 Congo, Republic of the, 76 Consociationalism, 6, 174, 175 Corona virus, 2, 245, 247, 248, 255 Corruption, 5, 6, 13, 19, 20, 22–24, 176, 186, 187, 193, 239, 249, 255 Corruption avoidance, 53 Costa Rica, 56, 57, 75 Cote d'Ivoire, 76 Covid-19, 1, 7, 37, 39–42, 107, 245–250, 253 Crisis performance factor 2008-2011, 53 Croatia, 45, 73 Cuba, 45, 57, 72 Cyprus, 74 Czech Republic, 75

D Daily prayer, 193, 223, 224 Dead Sea, 235, 241 Democracy, 2, 13, 37, 134, 157, 178, 184, 255 Democracy measure, 53, 95, 101 Democracy movement, 95, 101, 123, 135, 137 Demographics, 3, 5, 7, 20, 22–23, 30, 80, 171, 179, 233, 236 Denmark, 19, 56, 72, 103, 106 Deregulation index, 94 Desalination, 239, 241

Subject Index Development, 4, 14, 37, 118, 155, 168, 187, 238 Djibouti, 3, 58, 71, 73, 79, 88, 102, 112, 147 Dominica, 57, 72 Dominican Republic, 57, 75 Drought, 234, 243

E Ecological footprint, 53, 54, 56, 95 Economic globalization, 58–59, 122, 126, 127, 135, 141, 144, 146 Ecuador, 57, 75 Effective democracy index, 95, 101 Egypt, 2, 12, 42, 119, 156, 185, 234, 247, 255 El Salvador, 57, 72 Environment, 3, 14, 38, 53, 54, 57, 93, 101, 122, 157, 234, 237–239, 245, 253, 255 Environmental Performance Index (EPI), 54, 94, 95 Equatorial Guinea, 57, 72 Eritrea, 73, 173, 241 Error margins, 257 ESI index, 94, 95, 101 Estonia, 50, 57, 73 Ethiopia, 26, 75, 173, 237, 241 European monetary union, 40 European Union (EU), 17, 18, 40, 41, 44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 57, 71, 82–86, 191, 253 Eurozone, 43, 48, 59, 68 Expenditure on education, 95

F Failed states, 26, 53, 56, 159 Family, 1, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22, 134, 137, 154, 155, 157–161, 164, 170, 176, 193, 254 Federalism, 6, 173–175 Feeling of unhappiness, 134, 136 Female share of seats in parliament, 94, 101 Female survival, probability, 55 Feminism, 95, 101, 123, 136, 137, 145, 162, 197 Fertility, 78–84 Fiji, 74 Finland, 56, 73, 103, 106 France, 56, 73, 103, 104, 106, 227 Freedom from corruption, 19, 20 Freedom house, 13, 39, 101 Friends, 40, 134, 137, 162 Fundamentalism, 2, 16, 68, 95, 101, 119, 123, 136, 137, 145, 167, 178

Subject Index G Gabon, 75 Gallup poll, 51, 53, 93, 94, 101 Gambia, The, 73 GDP pc growth, 94 Gender, 2, 5, 6, 37, 39, 53, 54, 57, 80, 82, 93–102, 120, 126, 130, 132–134, 136, 142, 153–164, 178, 197–199, 227, 237, 255 Gender empowerment index, 55, 95, 101 Gender gap, 6, 54, 94, 95, 101, 155, 163 Gender-mixed education, 197 Georgia, 45, 76 Germany, 45, 50, 56, 73, 103, 106, 191, 227, 234 Ghana, 74 GINI income, 58, 59 Globalization, 4–6, 37, 38, 48, 49, 58–59, 61, 64, 67, 80, 91, 93, 95, 118–146 Global terrorism index, 94, 101 Global tolerance index, 53, 95, 101 Governments, 6, 7, 11, 13–15, 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 40, 42, 45–47, 50, 95, 120, 134–136, 153, 155, 156, 158, 163, 164, 170, 172–174, 176–178, 185, 187, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200–202, 210, 211, 216, 223, 229, 234, 236–240, 242, 245, 247, 249, 250, 253, 255 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), 237, 241 Greece, 42, 43, 45, 74, 103, 106 Grenada, 75 Guatemala, 76 Guinea, 57, 72, 73, 75 Guinea-Bissau, 73 Gulf, 14, 18, 28, 52, 132, 235, 239, 248 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 18, 21, 248 Guyana, 57, 73

H Haiti, 73 Hamas, 28, 185–187, 193, 250 Happiness, 101, 123, 137 Happy life years, 54 Happy planet index (HPI), 54 Hard work does not bring success, 134, 136 Health care quality, 93, 94 Health expenditure, 94, 101 Hezbollah, 172, 175, 176 Honduras, 74 Hong Kong, 57, 75

265 Household income, 59, 188 Human development index (HDI), 56, 70, 71, 77, 92–95, 132, 143, 199 Human inequality, 93, 95, 146 Humanism, 226 Hungary, 42, 50, 72 Hydrocarbons, 11, 14, 26, 177

I IBM, 106, 125, 189, 198 Iceland, 56, 75, 103 Identity politics, 168–174, 176 Income differences, 56, 134, 137 India, 1, 42, 76, 80, 102–104, 106, 159, 167 Indonesia, 42, 74, 103, 106, 119, 239 Inequality, 5, 6, 38, 39, 48, 58–59, 61, 64, 67, 76, 91–92, 94, 108, 109, 111, 120, 124, 199 Infant mortality, 55, 56, 93 Insecurity, 17, 134, 136, 161, 170, 234, 236 International Labour Organization (ILO), 94, 155, 163 Internet, 25, 28, 121, 128, 129, 132, 144, 160, 168, 197, 254 Involvement in politics, 123, 137 Iran, 3, 6, 12, 15, 16, 20–25, 27, 74, 79, 119, 127, 131, 158, 161, 164, 167, 169–173, 185, 193, 200, 202, 209, 227, 233, 236, 246, 249, 253–255 Iraq, 3, 12, 17, 20–23, 27, 28, 50, 52, 62, 71, 75, 79, 88, 102, 107, 111, 127, 131, 137, 156, 164, 170, 171, 185, 186, 197, 208–211, 213, 215, 228, 234, 236, 242, 249 Ireland, 56, 76 Islam, 2, 16, 39, 157, 171, 246 Islamic law, 158, 190, 196, 197 Islamism, 6, 37, 39, 46, 169, 185, 187–189, 191, 192, 197, 200, 208–215, 223, 227–229, 254, BNF–202 Israel, 3, 13, 15, 27, 40, 57, 73, 79, 95, 121, 127, 131, 132, 143, 169, 188, 190, 209, 228, 250 Italy, 29, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50, 72, 103, 106, 109–111

J Jamaica, 57, 73 Japan, 22, 45, 52, 74, 103, 106 Jewish state, 169

266 Jordan, 3, 13–15, 17, 22, 23, 28, 50, 57, 62, 71, 72, 79, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 127, 131, 132, 155, 156, 163, 164, 186, 188, 189, 193, 197, 208–211, 213–216, 235, 238 Justice and Development Party (AKP), 29, 187, 192, 195 Justifiable, 134, 135

K Kazakhstan, 74 Kenya, 75 Kinship, 154, 170 Kiribati, 73 Korea, South, 39, 57, 73 Kurdistan, 21, 171 Kuwait, 3, 12, 14, 20, 45, 57, 63, 71, 72, 79, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 127, 131, 164, 170, 234, 235, 240, 246 Kyrgyzstan, 75

L Labour force participation rate (LFPR), 93–95, 101 Laos, 76 Latvia, 45, 50, 75 Lebanon, 3, 7, 17, 20–22, 25, 27, 39, 57, 71, 72, 79, 88, 102, 107, 111, 127, 131, 137, 155, 156, 164, 175, 176, 179, 185, 193, 197, 201, 208–211, 213, 215, 228, 234, 236, 238, 240, 246, 248 Leisure time, 134, 137 Lesotho, 73 Liberia, 72 Libya, 3, 14, 17, 19–21, 26–28, 50, 52, 58, 63, 71, 72, 79, 88, 102, 127, 172, 173, 177, 179, 185, 186, 193, 208–211, 213–216, 235, 242, 250 Liechtenstein, 72 Life expectancy (LEX), 56, 70, 80, 82, 83, 93 Life satisfaction (0-10), 56 Life satisfaction index, 93 Lithuania, 45, 50, 75, 173 Luxembourg, 45, 73

M Maastricht criteria, 40, 41, 46 Macedonia, 45, 74 Madagascar, 72 Malawi, 74 Malaysia, 42, 57, 74, 103, 104, 193 Maldives, 75

Subject Index Mali, 73 Malta, 3, 57, 76, 79, 86, 88, 191 Market economy, 123, 136, 137 Mauritania, 3, 20, 58, 71, 74, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111 Mauritius, 57, 75 Mean years of schooling, 70, 95 Mediterranean environmental technical assistance programme (METAP), 242 MENA patriarchy, 140, 141, 145 MENA region, 1, 2, 5–7, 11–30, 39, 45, 50, 68, 82, 86–92, 103, 122, 126, 130–132, 135, 143, 153–164, 167–179, 185, 186, 188, 227, 229, 233–243, 245–250, 254, 255 Mexico, 42, 45, 57, 74, 103 Micronesia, Federated States of, 72 Migration, 40, 41, 49, 93–95, 121, 124, 243 Military expenditures, 84, 94 Military personnel rate, 94 Moldova, 73 Mongolia, 57, 74 Montenegro, 73 Morocco, 3, 12, 16, 20, 23, 28, 29, 39, 40, 50, 52, 57, 64, 71, 76, 79, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 119, 127, 131, 157, 160, 163, 164, 174, 185, 186, 193, 208–211, 213–216, 235, 239, 240, 253 Mozambique, 74 Muslim brotherhood, 21, 28, 185–188, 192, 193, 198, 227 Muslims, 2, 15, 49, 119, 157, 169, 184

N Namibia, 75 National Aeronautical Space Agency (NASA), 243 Nepal, 75 Nepotism, 5, 6, 19, 28, 176, 187, 239, 255 Netherlands, 50, 56, 73, 103, 104, 106 New Zealand, 19, 56, 73, 103, 106 Nicaragua, 57, 75 Niger, 73 Nigeria, 74, 185 Non-Muslims, 27, 121, 190, 201, 213 Non-violent and law abiding society, 123, 137, 140, 145 Norway, 45, 47, 56, 73, 103, 106

O Oman, 3, 14, 20, 50, 52, 71, 74, 79, 88, 102, 112, 127, 131, 169, 177, 178, 241 Optimism and engagement, 93, 123, 137

Subject Index Ottoman, 2, 12, 13, 29, 255 Overall civil society index, 94, 101, 137, 146 Overall 35 variable development index, 55, 95, 135, 144

P Pakistan, 21, 75, 158, 185, 193 Palau, 74 Palestine (Gaza and Westbank), 13, 193 Panama, 57, 74 Pandemic, 1, 7, 37, 39–41, 102, 103, 107–111, 245–250, 253 Papua new guinea, 73 Paraguay, 74 Paris agreement, 243 Patriarchy, 6, 39, 92, 140–142, 145, 146, 153–164, 178, 196, 209–211, 213, 214, 228 Patronage, 14, 18, 19, 26–28, 30, 38, 170, 172, 176, 186, 239, 255 Peru, 57, 74, 103–106 PEW, 23, 39, 95, 187 Philippines, 57, 74, 103, 159 Poland, 45, 50, 76 Police, 21, 25, 134, 136 Political Islam, 2, 6, 159, 184–229 Politics, 3–6, 11–30, 45, 93, 123, 134, 136, 137, 155, 167–179, 184, 185, 192, 193, 227, 254 Portugal, 50, 74, 103, 106, 132 Post-Islamism, 227 Precipitation, 235, 239, 253 Press, 49, 124, 129, 132, 134, 136, 187, 191 Private vs. state ownership of business, 134, 136 Pro market, 141, 143, 145, 254

Q Qatar, 3, 14, 16, 20, 21, 23, 58, 65, 71, 73, 79, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 127, 131, 137, 189, 194, 195, 200–202, 209, 235, 243, 247 Quintile share, 56 Quran, 88

R Rationalism, 226 Regional conflict systems, 17 Reject neighbours, 134 Religion, 5, 6, 12, 16, 20, 22–25, 27, 28, 37, 39, 94, 121, 134, 136, 137, 154, 161, 179,

267 184–186, 191, 193, 196, 198, 200–202, 213, 227, 228, 254 Religious authorities, 95, 101, 134, 136 Religious fundamentalism, 16, 95, 101, 123, 136, 137, 145, 167, 178 Religious guardianship, 16 Religious leaders, 189, 194, 200, 202, 210, 215, 216, 223, 229 Religious minorities, 254 Rentier economies, 25–27, 248, 254 Role of government, 210, 211 Romania, 30, 45, 50, 57, 71, 74 Rule of law, 53, 196, 227, 255 Russia, 15, 40, 42, 44, 45, 74, 103, 106, 121, 173, 248 Rwanda, 42, 74, 156

S Saint Kitts and Nevis, 75 Saint Lucia, 74 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 72 Samoa, 73 Sao Tome and Principe, 76 Saudi Arabia, 3, 12, 14, 16, 19–21, 26, 50, 52, 57, 65, 71, 74, 79, 88, 102, 107, 111, 119, 127, 131, 132, 164, 169, 170, 193, 234, 235, 239, 246, 247, 250, 254 Sea levels, 235, 238 Secession, 6, 173, 174 Secondary education, 94, 95, 132, 133, 238 Sectarianism, 6, 28, 167–179, 186, 245 Secularism, 185, 186, 198 Security relations, 15 Senegal, 75 Serbia, 45, 74, 159 Seychelles, 75 Shari'a law, 196 Sierra Leone, 26, 57, 72 Singapore, 39, 45, 57, 73, 103 Slovakia, 50, 73 Slovenia, 45, 57, 74 Social globalization, 6, 93, 95, 121, 127, 129–132, 135, 141, 143, 144, 146 Social media, 22, 168, 238 Social protection, 94 Social security expenditure, 93, 94 Solomon Islands, 73 South Africa, 30, 42, 76, 103 South Sudan, 72, 173 Sovereignty, 5, 11–30, 39, 174, 184, 253, 254 Spain, 29, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, 57, 74, 103, 104, 106 Sri Lanka, 57, 73, 103, 104, 106

268 State of health, 134, 136 Sudan, 3, 7, 20, 27, 28, 50, 57, 58, 66, 71, 73, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 119, 127, 156, 157, 161, 186, 193, 197, 208–210, 212–216, 228, 239, 241 Suriname, 72 Sustainable development goals (SDGs), 243 Swaziland, 57, 75 Sweden, 56, 75, 103, 106 Switzerland, 5, 56, 73, 103–106, 118 Sykes-Picot Line, 12, 20 Syria, 3, 14, 17, 19–21, 23, 25, 50, 58, 59, 66, 71, 72, 79, 88, 102, 112, 156, 160, 164, 171–173, 177, 185, 233, 234, 243, 248, 254

T Tajikistan, 72 Taliban, 185 Tanzania, 75 Technology, 12, 22, 26, 27, 29, 119, 128, 158, 186, 238, 250 Terrorism, 40, 50, 51, 93, 94, 101, 183, 193, 209, 228 Tertiary emigration rate, 95 Tertiary enrolment, 56, 88, 89 Thailand, 57, 75, 239 Timor-Leste, 75 Togo, 76 Tonga, 72 Top world 500 universities, 56 Transparency international, 19, 24 Trinidad and Tobago, 72 Trust, 4, 22, 28, 93, 94, 101, 123, 136, 137, 140, 141, 144, 145, 186 Tunisia, 3, 7, 13, 19, 20, 28, 29, 50, 52, 57, 58, 67, 71, 73, 79, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 127, 131, 155, 157, 163, 164, 186, 193, 197, 208–211, 213, 215, 227, 228, 235, 242, 247 Turkey, 15, 17, 20, 21, 40, 42, 76, 103, 132, 164, 170, 171, 187, 188, 191–193, 200, 208, 209, 236, 242, 246 Turkmenistan, 74

U Uganda, 74 Ukraine, 30, 72 UNDP, 38, 48, 51, 53, 57, 68, 77, 91–94, 124, 198, 199, 208–211, 213–216, 228 UNDP education index, 94 UNDP human development index (HDI), 68, 77, 92, 93, 199

Subject Index Unemployment, 22, 24, 47, 51, 56, 76, 86–94, 101, 161, 188, 193, 255 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 3, 13, 14, 18, 20, 50, 58, 71, 74, 79, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 127, 131, 137, 164, 224, 229, 235, 246, 247 United Kingdom, 42, 49, 56, 75, 103, 109, 110, 125, 210 United Nations, 13, 19, 134, 136, 174, 208, 243 United States, 11, 18, 26, 41, 50, 72, 83, 84, 103, 192, 209, 243 University, 5, 6, 28, 41, 49, 50, 56, 120, 125, 134, 136, 169, 189, 190, 192, 193, 197, 198, 200, 202, 206, 210, 211, 224, 229, 237 Urbanization, 7, 27, 30, 68, 78–84, 119, 122, 162, 186, 234–236, 240, 246 Uruguay, 57, 73, 103–106 Uzbekistan, 75

V Vanuatu, 72 Venezuela, 45, 72, 103, 106 Vietnam, 75, 239

W Waste management, 236, 238, 240, 253 Water security, 241, 242 Welfare mentality, 124, 137 % Women in government, all levels, 95 Work, 5, 17, 22, 39, 42, 43, 50, 103, 124, 134, 136, 137, 154, 160, 162, 163, 174, 175, 193, 200, 208, 226, 240, 243, 247, 253 World Bank, 3, 4, 19, 24, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 58, 59, 68, 76, 79, 81, 86, 88, 94, 124, 163, 176, 235, 236, 240, 241, 243, 253 World values survey (WVS), 6, 22, 27, 95, 120, 121, 123, 124, 133, 134, 137, 159, 186

Y Yemen, 3, 7, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 50, 58, 68, 71, 72, 79, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 127, 131, 157, 159, 177, 186, 197, 208–210, 212–215, 228, 233, 238, 248, 250 Younger female generation, 163

Z Zambia, 74, 159 Zimbabwe, 57, 75