Anglo-Soviet relations, 1917-1921, Vol. 2 9780691655123, 9780691656069, 9780691198576

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ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1917-1921

Volume II

Britain and the Russian Civil War November 1918-February 1920

PUBLISHED FOR THE CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

A LIST OF OTHER CENTER PUBLICATIONS APPEARS AT THE BACK OF THIS BOOK

FATT DAAC TAMA JAMAL LAMA [AAAI [AAMC DAAAL [DAAC DAMA [DAAC [AAMC DAAAL [DAAC DAMA [DAA [AAG DRAKA [DAAC he

= ANGLO-SOVIET =

= RELATIONS, 1917-1921 =

= NOVEMBER 1018 - =

=| FEBRUARY 1920 = = BY RICHARD H. ULLMAN |] 2

= PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY =

= 1968 = =) PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS =

AO renner nnd enn nis

Copyright © 1968 by Princeton University Press London: Oxford University Press

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED L.C. Card: 61-6290

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

To

ELLIOTT PERKINS for his friendship and his example

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PREFACE

Pyytay ey pte tay Tay eet te Atta a Neyer east ety ey Like its predecessor, this second volume of what has now become a three-volume work comprises an account of how the British government dealt with the problems created by the fact that a commu-

nist administration, militantly hostile to the world of bourgeois states, had come to power in Russia during the last cataclysmic year of the World War. The first volume explored the making of British policy during that year, culminating in the beginnings of a military intervention whose implicit (if not avowed) purpose was the over-

throw of the Soviet government in Moscow. The present volume commences with the Armistice which ended the war with Germany. It treats the making of British policy during the following fifteen months, the critical months of the Russian Civil War. Of all foreign governments, that of the United Kingdom was the one most heavily involved—both directly, through the use of its own military, naval,

and air forces, and indirectly, through the provision of material assistance and advice—in the campaign to unseat the Bolshevik regime. By February 1920 this campaign, along with the hopes of the

more realistic anti-Bolshevik Russians, had been almost entirely abandoned. Then it was the British government which led the effort to reach an accommodation between Russia and the West. That effort, made much more difficult by the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, will form the subject of the third and final volume of this study of British statecraft. My aim in the pages that follow has been to focus quite precisely on the Russian Civil War as a problem for British policy makers, and to examine the process by which Great Britain’s commitment

to the anti-Bolshevik side was first enlarged and then liquidated during 1919 as the perceived costs of intervention, and still more the predictable costs of achieving any outcome that might have been labeled “success,” became increasingly apparent. As in Intervention and the War, | have sought to place emphasis upon the making of policy within the government in London and the relationship to that process of the perceptions and actions of British Vil

Preface public servants, military and civilian, in the field. Once again, I have

not attempted systematically to describe the course of British domestic politics and the handling of other contemporaneous problems

of foreign policy, or to trace in detail the development of British public opinion regarding Russia. Neither have I discussed any aspects of the Russian problem at the Paris Peace Conference other than those whose examination is necessary for an understanding of British policy. These several tasks would have vastly lengthened a long book and would only have gone over ground already very well covered by Arno J. Mayer in his remarkable work on the politics and diplomacy of 1918-19, or by John M. Thompson in his solid study of the Russian problem at the Peace Conference.’ Grateful for their ef-

forts, I refer readers to them. Where their concerns have seemed directly relevant to mine, I have of course encompassed them. But I have sought to run narrow and deep, rather than wide. My focus —I emphasize once again—is on the process by which the government of a Great Power extricated itself from a civil war in which it was the leading foreign participant, after it became clear that the war could not be won without the payment of a wholly unacceptable price. +

As I indicated in the preface to Intervention and the War, my original intention was to complete this study in two volumes, the second describing both the liquidation of British intervention in the Russian Civil War and the process of accommodation which culmi-

nated in the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 1921 and London’s extension of de facto recognition to the Soviet government. By late 1965 I had finished what I thought was a final draft. But early in 1966 the government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that it was departing from the previous “fifty-year rule” restricting access to official papers and, as a preliminary measure

on the way towards an eventual thirty-year closed period, would allow access to all papers through 1922. Therefore, I suspended pub1 Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919, New York, 1967; John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, Princeton, 1966. For a treatment of one important segment of British political life, see Stephen R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russtan Revolution, 1917-1924, Cambridge, Mass., 1956. Vili

Preface lication of the second volume and spent three summer months working at the Public Record Office in London and in private collections

to which access also became possible due to the new government policy.”

Once I began, I realized that the new materials—particularly the Cabinet, Foreign Office, and War Office papers in the Public Record Office—would enable me to treat the making of British policy on a scale so different from that on which my earlier manuscript was written that minor revision would be impossible and that, indeed, a fundamentally different book would result. A glance at the footnotes of this volume will indicate the importance to my purposes of these new materials.* Along with a decision to rewrite the original

manuscript drastically came a decision to divide it in two. This seemed good sense, and not only because of the bulk of the rewritten

work: in fact, the events with which it dealt had never fit easily together, and I had in any case divided the earlier manuscript into two parts, one treating the end of intervention, the other the process of reaching the Anglo-Soviet accord of March 1921. Now the two

parts will be separate books, each one, like Intervention and the War, presuming to stand alone. +

This book has been written in the interstices of a full-time teaching schedule at Harvard and at Princeton. Many individuals at both of these universities, and elsewhere, have assisted me in many ways. It is my pleasure to acknowledge these debts.

I am grateful to the Milton Fund of Harvard and the Center of International Studies and the University Research Fund of Princeton for enabling me to spend summers in England doing research. Mrs. 2 The most valuable of these collections for the purposes of the present volume were the Curzon Papers and the Balfour Papers. Other collections, principally the Milner Papers, had previously been placed at my disposal without restriction. Two most important collections—those of Lloyd George and Churchill—remain unavailable for general scholarly use at the time of going to press for the present volume. 8 In citing materials from the Public Record Office I have used the standard Record

Office notation system to indicate the department of origin: Cab. (Cabinet and Cabinet Office), F.O. (Foreign Office), and W.O. (War Office). Cabinet papers, of course, include those from all departments which the Cabinet Office circulated (either at its own volition or by ministerial request) to members of the Cabinet. Because of the thoroughness with which the Cabinet Office went about the task of sifting departmental papers for wider circulation, I have not felt it necessary for the purposes of this study to use the files of additional departments, such as the Home Office and the Admiralty. 1X

Preface Faith Henson and Mrs. Dorothy Rieger, my secretaries at Lowell House, Harvard, and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, cheerfully did the bulk of the typing of the two successive versions of the manuscript. Robert Bunsel-

- meyer, of Yale, came to my rescue by doing for me a piece of research which I had overlooked. Invaluable assistance with Russian translation was rendered by Alastair N. D. McAuley and my wife, Yoma Crosfield Ullman, who has also done much to see the manuscript through the press. Robert I. Rotberg and Paul M. Shupack read and criticized the earlier version of the manuscript; Ernest R. May and Arno J. Mayer brought their unrivaled knowledge of the politics and diplomacy of the First World War and its aftermath to the criticism of the present version. I am indebted to them all. Crown-copyright material in the Public Record Office, London, is

published here by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. The overworked staff of the Record Office were unfailingly helpful to me during my work there in the summer of 1966; I am most grateful to them. Material from the Curzon Papers is published here by permission of Viscount Scarsdale, who kindly allowed me to use them at Kedleston before their shipment to the

India Office Library, where they are now housed. During a previous summer’s visit, Mariott, Lady Ironside, allowed me to use and

to quote from the unpublished diaries of her late husband, FieldMarshal Lord Ironside; to her and to Colonel R. Macleod, who did much to facilitate my access to the diaries, I am much indebted. Similarly, I wish to express my gratitude to Major Cyril J. Wilson, who allowed me to use and to quote from the unpublished diaries of his late uncle, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. I should also like to express my indebtedness to the following:

to Mr. Mark Bonham-Carter for permission to use and to quote

from the Asquith Papers in the Bodleian Library, Oxford; to the Trustees of the British Museum for permission to use and

to quote from the Balfour Papers and those of Lord Robert Cecil;

to the Library of the University of Birmingham for permission to use and to quote from the Austen Chamberlain Papers; to Viscount Davidson of Little Gaddesden for permission to use and to quote from his own papers; to the Warden and Fellows of New College, Oxford, for permisx

Preface sion to use and to quote from the Milner Papers now in the Bodleian Library; and to the Library of Yale University for permission to use and to quote from the papers of Colonel E. M. House, Frank L. Polk, and Sir William Wiseman.

Princeton, New Jersey R.H.U. June 1967

X1

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CONTENTS TAAL TAAAK JAAAL JAMAL [AAKA PAAAL TAAAA TAAAL TAAAL TAAMG DAMA DAAAG DAAAG DAMAL [AAMC LOAAC LAAAL LAME LLAMA [BAA [AAC [DAA | BAA [AAI | BAA FAA

PREFACE Vil CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS XV1l

I. INTERVENTION AND THE ARMISTICE: THE MILITARY

CONFRONTATION 5

IN LONDON 59

Il. INTERVENTION AND THE ARMISTICE: DISCUSSIONS

III. THE PEACE CONFERENCE: PRINKIPO AND AFTER 99 IV. THE PEACE CONFERENCE: THE BULLITT MISSION

AND THE PROBLEM OF KOLCHAK 136

NORTH RUSSIA 171

V. THE END OF INTERVENTION: WITHDRAWAL FROM

VI. THE END OF INTERVENTION: THE FAILURE OF

KOLCHAK AND DENIKIN 204

VII. THE END OF INTERVENTION: THE BALTIC REGION 254 VIII. THE END OF INTERVENTION: POLICIES AND POLITICS 294

IX. BRITAIN AND THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR 347 APPENDIX: FINANCIAL COSTS OF INTERVENTION 365

INDEX | 379

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 369

X11

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MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS Maps

European Russia 1919 2

Siberia I919 3

ItLustrations following page 204

Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George at Paris during the Peace Conference

Wilson, Clemenceau, Balfour, and Sonnino during the Peace Conference

General V. V. Marushevsky and Major-General Edmund Ironside inspecting Russian civilian guards at Archangel Allied blockhouse in North Russia R.A.F. Sopwith “Camel” preparing for takeoff in North Russia

General Lord Rawlinson and General Ironside interrogating a Bolshevik prisoner

Howitzer and gun crew in North Russia British gun post guarding a railway bridge during the evacuation of North Russia General Ironside and officers reviewing troops at Archangel Priests at Ekaterinburg blessing Russian troops

Czech armored train in Siberia Naval guns on an armored train, Vladivostok British armored train, North Russia Bolshevik prisoners, Siberia

General Rudolf Gaida Bayonet drill at the training school run by the British military mission on an island in the bay off Vladivostok Sir Charles Eliot at his desk, Vladivostok

A battalion of the Hampshire Regiment marching through Vladivostok

Note: for photographs of General Sir Henry Wilson, Major-General

Alfred Knox and Brigadier-General J. M. Blair, Admiral Kolchak, and G. V. Chicherin and Maxim Litinov, see

| Volume I.

XV

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CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS

gory yy ymyt yyy yyy yyy 1918

30 October—Armistice between Allies and Turkey 31 October—War Office orders occupation of Baku and oil fields 6 November—Sixth All-Russian Congress of Soviets proposes peace to Allies 7 November—first anniversary of Bolshevik seizure of power 11 November—Armistice between Allies and Germany 14 November—Cabinet decides to occupy Batum-Baku railway

17 November—coup at Omsk establishes Kolchak as “Supreme Ruler of All Russia” 14 December—General Election returns Coalition with vastly increased majority 18 December—French expeditionary force lands at Odessa 24 December—Litvinov addresses peace note to President Wilson December-January (1919)—Czechs abandon front in Siberia, saying

they will not fight for Kolchak IQI9

12 January—Peace Conference opens at Paris 23 January—Allies invite all Russian factions to attend peace conference on Princes Islands (Prinkipo) in Sea of Marmora 24 January—Bolsheviks call for a congress at Moscow to found new

revolutionary International (the Comintern) January-March—Britain torn by industrial unrest and riots by service-

men awaiting demobilization 4 February—Soviet government accepts Prinkipo invitation; it is rejected by the several anti-Bolshevik administrations 15-17 February—Churchill, in Paris, unsuccessfully tries to get Supreme Council agreement for massive effort of intervention, 4-6 March—decision for early withdrawal of British troops from North Russia and Caucasus 8-14 March—Bullitt talks with Soviet leaders in Petrograd and Moscow, gets peace terms from them 22 March—Communist regime under Bela Kun established in Hungary XVII

Chronology of Principal Events 25 March—Lloyd George’s “Fontainebleau Memorandum” warns that harsh terms will foster Bolshevism in Germany 6 April—French withdraw all troops from South Russia g April—2oo M.P.’s send telegram to Lloyd George in Paris urging government to have no dealings with Soviet regime g April—War Office recruits two-brigade relief force for North Russia

16 April—Lloyd George assures House of Commons that government will have no dealings with Soviet regime 27 May—Council of Four sends Kolchak note assuring him of support and hinting at recognition provided he pursues liberal policies g June—Red Army takes Ufa, marking beginning of Kolchak retreat June—U’S. troops leave North Russia 11 June—Cabinet approves Churchill plan providing for offensive by relief force in North Russia in order to bring about link with Kolchak 25 June—Denikin takes Kharkov 26 June—Labour Party annual conference passes strong resolution against intervention in Russia, hinting at industrial action to stop it 23 June—signing of Treaty of Versailles 3 July—Denikin, at Tsaritsyn, launches Volunteer Army on “Moscow campaign” g July—Reichstag ratifies Treaty of Versailles, ending state of belligerence and removing legal foundation for blockade of Russian coasts; Allies nevertheless continue blockade 7-23 July—mutinies among White forces convince Ironside that they will not be able to hold front against Red Army in North Russia; he decides upon early and complete British evacuation 29 July—Cabinet decides that North Russia evacuation will be military operation, unaccompanied by attempt at negotiations with Bolsheviks; it decides also to curtail British aid to Kolchak and to concentrate it instead on Denikin 1 August—Kolchak’s retreat has taken his forces more than half distance from Urals to Omsk 12 August—Cabinet decides on “final packet” of aid for Denikin 8 September and 1 November—the two British battalions in Siberia depart 24 September—Cabinet decides upon change in policy toward Baltic XVill

Chronology of Principal Events states; it can send no more aid, nor can it advise them not to make peace with Moscow 27 September and 12 October—British forces depart from Archangel and Murmansk 12 October—Yudenich begins offensive aimed at taking Petrograd 13 October—Denikin takes Orel, 250 miles from Moscow

20 October—Red Army recaptures Orel from Denikin and turns back Yudenich in outskirts of Petrograd mid-October—British troops withdraw from Caucasus, leaving only small garrison at Batum 8 November—Lloyd George, speaking at Guildhall, implies that in-

tervention had failed and that government would pursue new policy toward Russia 12 November—Kolchak abandons Omsk to Red Army 17 November—attempt at coup by leftist opposition to Kolchak at Vladivostok is easily put down 20 November—Cabinet decides that British warships on blockade

duty in Baltic, now to be withdrawn for winter, will not return in spring 25 November—last remnants of Yudenich’s North-Western Army flee to Estonia 25 November—negotiations begin in Copenhagen for Anglo-Soviet agreement on exchange of prisoners 1920

16 January—Lloyd George secures agreement of Supreme Council to

permit trade with Russian cooperative organizations, now controlled by Soviet government 19 January—Supreme Council agrees on de facto recognition, and aid, for Caucasus states 7 February—Kolchak executed at Irkutsk

12 February—signing of Anglo-Soviet agreement on prisoner exchange 20 February—Red Army enters Archangel and Murmansk

26 March—Denikin and Volunteer Army abandon mainland, take refuge in Crimea 1 April—last U.S. troops leave Siberia; Czechs depart during summer, while Japanese remain until late 1922 XIX

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ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1917-1921

Volume II Britain and the Russian Civil War November 1918-February 1920

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