An Inward-Looking Economy in Transition: Economic Development in Burma since the 1960s 9789814376808

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Occas ional Paper No . XO

An Inward-Looking Economy In Transition Economic Development in Burma since the 1960s

I

titut

r

uth

ian

tudie

ian Studie.

The In titut i g v med by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees mpn mg n min e fr m the Singapore Government , the National ity f ingapore, the various Chamber of Commerce , and i nal and civic rgani zations. A ten-man Executive Committee day-t -da y peration ; it i chaired by the Director, the hi fa ademic and admini trative officer.

An Inward-Looking Economy In Transition Economic Development in Burma since the 1960s

by Hal Hill

and Sisira Jayasuriya

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

CataloJ!uing in Publication Data Hill. Hal An inward-looking eco nom y 1n transit inn : cronnm ic Jc vclormcnt 1n Burma since th e llJ60s/ Hal Hill and Sisira J;~ yas uri y

92 7X

J8

12

Jl

80

1960-70

1970-82

(41

lSI

(b)

(7)

59

04

2K

I:J

~

4 .7

~

CD

Grilw fh u ( E\pcu·h

c

- ·- · - - - -

3:: m c.r. rr. c:;

0

% 19113

1973-IIJ %

1960

Ttrm" or Trad

r

(In milli ons of kyats)

Operating Balance

Overall Balance

Operating Balance

Overall Balance

Operating Balance

Overall Balance

Operating Balance

Overall Balance

-258

-409

-225

461

- 797

- 1.292

7

-854

-24 173 75 -2 10 60 288 269 223 644

- 420 - 1.899

24 178 -5 7 - 196 64 393 19 1 2 16 588

-3 14 - 1.522 - 655 -245 -220 -228 45 174 -3,426

146 6 14 66 38 87 17 1 246 144 715

- 485 -2 .293 - 86 1 21 - 25 1 - 408 - 120 118 - 5.463

17 57 6

IU9 1,00 .J

4 ')

~u

o.x

4 ':1

4 .0

5.~

5.5

) ')

,1.5 .1 .4

4.2

6.0

12 .2

5 .4 J .4

5 .J 12.2 17.7

5 ..\ 16 .9 fl .J

J .4 7.6 4 .X S.ll 5. 1

5.')

32.2

J 9 9.9 17 .5

20 .()

7.f) 2 1. 2 2.5

6 .t{ 6 . _1 0 .9

6.1 t{ I 15 .2

7.0 6. 1 17 I

7.2 IO.!l 26 .6

6 .X 7.8 14 .6

6.1 1) _5 26 .0

IJ..j

.14 . 1

LU

25 .2

9 .4

20 .2

.U

5 .3

2.5 4.1

4 .2

4 .5

.\ .5

6 -1

4 .6

6 .8

4 .3

l. !l

J.l

3.0

J.O

2.7

2.2

4 .9

J . TRADE

4 .2

2.7

44

2-1

J .4

3.5

4 .2

4 . GO P

6 .5

5.2

7 .9

6.4

6.5

5 .7

4 .8

" Prdiminary Sm,Mn .: Bunna . Ministry of Planning and Finance. Report , vari o us issue s . TABLE~ - GROWTH RATES OF FOREIGN TRADE . INVESTMENT AND

CONSUMPTI ON . 1975-84

Im po rt s Export s Co nsumption Investme nt

1981

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

20 .2 - 12 .4 5 .5 3 .6

0 1) ,6 5 .9 19.4

25 . 1 16 . 7 4 .5 48 . 2

37 .8 - 3 .0 4 .5 29 .5

30.4 34 .6

4 .9 15 .9 8.5 - 0 .6 6. 1 8 .0 - 2 .2 13 .8

3.5 19 . 1

1982

1983

10.4 - 18 .7 12.7 0 .6 6 .2 7 .4 13 .6 - 10.2

Sout~n:.: liunnu . Ministry of Planning and Finance, Report , various issues .

1984 8.3 19.5 4 .9 10.7

26

A

INWARD-LOOKING ECONOMY IN TRANSITION

mea ures were taken to raise domestic sav ings . these were not adequ ate to finance the level of in vestment required to ac hieve the des ired growth rates. Con equentl y. the prev iou policy of se lf reli ance was rela_xed and increa ing use ha been made of ex tern al funds throu gh fore1gn a1d , conce sionary l oa n ~ as we ll as commerci al borrow ings (Table 9). TABLE

9. FINA NCING INV ESTMENT . 1'170-83

(In mill t o n ~ of kvat at current prices )

1970

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

Gro" Domc't' r apot al Fonna110n

1.23 1

2.340 ( /0)

2.836 ( /0 )

.1.844 ( 13)

5 .778 ( 18)

7.876 (22)

X.293 (2 1)

9.792 (23)

10.579 (23 )

10 .84 1

(12)"

~ o rc 1 g n

277 (23)"

329 ( 14)

287 ( 10)

464 (27)

1.559 (37)

2.900

3.024 (36)

1.624 ( 17)

1.9 10

2.837 (26)

Sav 1ng

(37)

(37)

(22)

• Figures in parentheses ar e Gross Domesti c Ca pital Forma ti on as a proportion of GDP . " Figures in parentheses are shares of Foreign Savi ng in Gross Domesti c Capital Formation . SouRCL: Asia n Developme nt Bank ( 1984) .

More effecti ve and broad-based taxati on poli cies were a key objective of the taxation reforms undertaken in 1976. The Commodities and Servi ces Tax , which replaced man y indirect taxes, was broader and had higher effective tax rates. Thi s led to an initial improvement in govern ment reven ues; however, subsequent growth in tax revenues has not kept up with the increase in the ta x base. Revenue growt h from other sources was faster and benefited from the expansion of timber and ri ce ex ports. The low level of exports had meant that Burma obtained a relatively low proportion of government revenues from ex port ta xes. Thi s changed as exports bega n to recover and the Export Price Equ ali sation Fund (EPEF), which acts as a tax on profitable ex ports and a subsid y on unprofitab le ex ports, became a more important revenue source . Increased public sector investment has resulted in the grow th of SE capital ex pendilures. Despite generally improved performance, their cash defi cits have increased, contributing to a larger consolidated public-sector deficit, which rose from 3 per cent ofGDP in 1977 to 16 per cent in 1982. While ex ternal fund s helped to finance part of thi s defi cit , the gove rnment had to increase its borrow ings from the domesti c banking sector as well. A a res ult , total money supply increased relatively rapidly , in the last decade outstripping the rate of GOP grow th . However, two factors have helped to contain the inflationary pressures arising from this. Firstly , monetization of the Burmese economy would have advanced con iderably during this period compared to the first decade of the military government. Secondly , a significant increase in private- ector savi ngs wa recorded .

MACRO-ECONOM IC PERFORMANCE

27

Such sav in gs are usually he ld in the forn1 of sav ings deposits and sav ings certificates in the bankin g sector. In contrast to many developing countries, the rea l rate of return on savi ngs has bee n positive in recent years . Furthermore. interest incomes are exe mpted from tax. Most of thi s increase in private-sector sav ings has gone into the public sector, whose share of official domestic credit was about 90 per ce nt in 1984 . Despite the higher level of domesti c sav ings, ex ternal finance has been crucial to the maintenance of a hi gh rate of inve ·tment. Some aid and credit had come in durin g the early 1970s: between 1972 and 1975. aid and loans worth $378 million came from Wes tern countri es, primarily from Japan and West Germany (Harriman 1976). In 1973. Burma joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In 1976 . the Burma Aid Consultative Group was formed consisting of Australia. Britain. Canada, France. West Germany , Japan, USA and represe ntatives from the World Bank (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , the ADB and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This marked the beginning of a substantial increase in external assistance and borrowings. Disbursed foreign grants and loans increased fivefold between 1976 and 1980, most of the loans being on concessionary terms. In 1976, 14 per cent of gross domestic capital formation came from foreign sources . After reaching 37 per cent in 1982. it declined to 26 per cent in 1983 (Table 9) . Of the public sector investment in 1983 , 40 per cent was externally funded . Since foreign funds enabled the purchase of vitaJ intermediate inputs and machinery . even these figures underestimate the true importance of the contribution of foreign funds to the development effort of the economy, which had previously been starved of foreign exchange .

Price Stability On the basis of official figures , Burma appears to have had considerable success in maintaining price stability in recent years. Of course, the limitations inherent in using official price indices in an economy with many administered prices and active '· quasi -legal" open markets must be stressed . However, official figures on price movements in the nonregulated markets show that the ratio of official to open market prices for many major goods have been relatively stable (Table I0) . If these are accurate, the underlying trends in price movements are probably captured reasonably well by the official price indices . According to the latter, inflation has been kept to a minimum since 1977 with very little movement in the price indices; after 1982 , however, inflation has risen somewhat (Figure 3). This contrasts with the 1973-76 period , which was characterized by high rates of inflation . Even the official price index rose by over 50 per

300

FIGURE 3.

l

PRICE INDICES N

::00

CPI (Rangoon) 1972 = 100 GOP Denalor 1969170 = 100 250

N D E X

200

)>

z

-i

/-------........

l

z~

-

)>

;;c

----

/

'?

8

/ / /

;>rt's

730 .!( (24)

c:m

O th er~

Total

.\.000 .8 ( 100)

·' Pnce nt a ~ l· L> l t
::1

)>

COMMERCIAL CROPS Tobacco Virginia (green ) Burmese Rubber Sugar-cane

r

0

2,798 735 233 13. 18

3.607 8 17 276 13.31

2,438 !ill

272 14 . 11

3,292 840 286 14 .59

3.6 14 I:S II

28Y 14 .71

3.244 ':102 2':15 14 .00

J .07J

')07 301:1 2101

.1. 186 1. 11:1 1 J-1n anJ tran s mi s~ o o n . anJ Jepartnoent al U'C' molilo>n moll! on Electricit y c·onsumption

n ;o n ;o n ;o

74

7~

211

IX Ill

l./1

i ',X 4ll\

2I I

II

~Wh

Of which : lndustnal Domestic· Other

. Preliminary .

•y,.

.p

g1 en th t: ry ltm J ome,tl c prices for oi I and other energy source!> . The transport sector ha r sponded to incrca ~e d demand!> nt tr 1ght and passenger traffic. Domesti c fre ight rose from 63 .7 mill1on metri c ltln!'> in 1979 to an e timated 84 .5 million metn c tOn!'> 111 I ~H J Much ot the increase was carri~ by the pnvate ector, wh o~e grow th wa~ tacil1tatcd h ~ an expanded road network . Although major road!> I"U n1on H1 gh-way, .. l have barely expanded si nce 1961 (from 2.2~4 to 2.452 mile ). the I ngth of " main roads " has ri en almost threefold . ince the earl I ~ 7 0~ . mad freight and passenger traffi c have ex panded more rap1dl th an e11hcr nu l or water transport : the former ha grown more ·low l bc::ca~e ol the substantial capital co ts of expan ion . the latter be au e of th lim i t a ti on~ of geography and the rundown state of the inland b at lleet. Detailed price data are unavailable , but it i · lik ly that regional unofficial price variation are very large (for example . it i r ported that

SECTORA l . OF.Vf:LOPMENTS

6/

th e black -mark et price of petro leum in Mandalay is se ven times the utlicial pri ce. whereas the difference in Ran goo n is three times ). Conse4ucntly . the social return s. through more efficie nt marketing networks . to in vestme nt in an ex panded transport network are li ke ly to be ex tremely hi gh . One prohle m with the road network . inherited from the colonial era. is the north -south orientation nf much of the ex istin g network . The go ve rnment also rccog ni t.es th at its emph asis on re gional deve lopment requires an impro ved transport nt.:t wo rk However. it is said to be somewhat relu ctant to inves t in an ex panded eas t-we t network to the ex tent that it may provide additi onal im pe tus to the already flouri shing illega l trade . Apart from these limitati ons and the re lative ly modest pno rit y ass igned to roads and bridge appea r to be reaso nabl y acc urate do lend some plausibility to the re li ab ilit y of th e data . Neve rtheless. one would need to take acco unt of the prese nce of frin ge benefit s. and th e fac t th at th e CPI may not be the appropri ate de ll ator . The hi gher agricultural wages . compared to th at in th e manufac turin g sector. arc somew hat pu zzling. but may be exp li cable in terms of reg ul ated wages in the (s mall ) state-ow ned ag ri cultural ~ec t o r . Assuming th ai the J atCJ are reasonabl y acc urate. th e main co nclu sion is th at th e relati ve ly bcuer-oll and more sec ure workers in reg ul ar wage em pl oy ment ha ve sutlcreJ a substantial dec line in li vi ng stCJ nd ards . But such a co n c lu~i o n doe!- not necessaril y impl y that rea l earnin gs for the wo rk -force as a who le have dec lined. Rather, it may simply suggest Jh at the earnin gs differential betwee n workers in the "orga ni zed " and " unorga ni zed " ~ec tor s ho ~ narrowed. In the abse nce of detai led studi es of th e labo ur morkel these conclu ions remain at best spec ul ati ve. In any case. the tendency for rea l wages to dec line rap idl y until the mid- 1970s was probabl y indi cati ve of the mu ch slowe r expa nsion in wage employment opportunities in relation to the estimated 2.2 p r ent onnu al growth in population . Between 1969 and 1976 . gove rnment es tim a te~ based on very weak stati sti cal data put em ployme nt grow th in ag n culture at 1.6 per cent and non-agricultural employ ment grow th at 2.5 per cc nl. Estimates of unemployment , too , show that both rural and urban un em ployment has been growing during thi s peri od. though these es timate suffer from both co nceptual and stati sti cal weakne!->ses already referred to . In the early 1980s. international agencies estimated urban unempl oyment to be a little over 13 per cent, broadl y confirming the earlier fi gure for

SOC I AL DEVELO PM ENT

65

Rangoon and Mandalay of 14 pe r cent cited by Stei nberg ( 198 1, p. 188) . The ca pital-intensive nature of parts of the state ind ustri al sector may have been a constraint on empl oyment growth. A move towards more labourintensive manufacturin g and a change in the emphas is on heavy industry is likely to enhance the employment ge neratin g capaci ty of the inJustri al sector. Even in other sectors. such as min ing, substanti al employment ma y be created if the choice of techniques is made in an appropriate manner . and there is substant ia l potential for employ ment growth in the servi ce sector. It needs to be emphasized that about 90 per cent of employment is currentl y in the private sector and that this share is unlikely to alter substantiall y in the med ium term . Therefore. overall employment growth in the economy is li ke ly to be determi ned to a large extent by developments in the private sector.

VII

Future Prospects

During the last decade , Burma has been comparatively successful in achieving fairly rapid economic growth while maintaining price stability . Thi s sati sfactory performance was related to the more liberal policy towards utilizing external fund s and ass istance, which enabled high level s of investment to be maintained . In the industrial sector , thi s policy helped alleviate the chronic shortages of spare parts and raw material s, contribut ing to higher capacity utilization and greater productivity. Similarly , the agricultural sector benefited from imports of inputs (such as fertilizer) and new technology which facilitated rapid growth in the adoption of new technologies . leading to substantial production increases. While the past decade has been one of considerable achievements in most of the economic sectors , Burma is rapidly approaching a situation where the maintenance of the growth momentum will be more difficult without substantial policy changes. As Burma enters its fifth decade of independence, the factors which led to a resurgence of economic growth in the 1970s are unlikely to provide the basis for sustaining such growth . The past growth in the industria·! and agricultural sectors involved , essentially , improvements in productivity through higher capacity utilization in industry and technical change in agriculture . Similar improvements will be more difficult in the future as the "slack" in under-utilized capacity in industry and new technologies in agriculture (particularly in rice) are reaching their limits in the short to medium term . Production gains in the future will require higher investment levels, continuing access to imported intermediate and capital goods, and more fundamental policy reforms . The debt service issue has emerged as a major constraint , since the ratio has risen sharply after 1980. One of the consequences of the more liberal policy towards foreign borrowings was the rapid growth of imports - mainly capital and intermediate goods - which outstripped export growth . While domestic production grew rapidly , the value of exports grew much more slowly, partly because domestic consumption also rose quickJy, and partly because of adverse international price movements . This was particularly so with rice . Exact estimates are not available, but the data suggest that apparent per capita rice consumption (that is, production less exports, net stock changes, losses, and so forth) rose by as much as 20 per cent over the period 1974-85 . M.e anwhile, international

fl lTURE PROSPECTS

67

rice prices have been declinin g almost continuously since 1981. Indeed , real rice prices - nominal prices deflated by the index of unit values for manufactures - declined by about 66 per cent from 1975 (a "normal" year for rice prices) to 1985. Most of thi s decline occurred after 1981 . when even nominal pri ces declined by more than 25 per cent. The resulting balance of payments difficulties led to increased reliance on commercial bank borrowings at high interest rates . Although the debt burden is not high in absolute terms, it is considerable in relation to the small (official) foreign trade sector. The problem is likely to be particularly acute in the immediate future because of the profi le of maturing debt. But even in the longer term , a strategy of continuing to rely on foreign borrowings to finance capital formation and growth , without simultaneously expanding the economy 's export capacity, is likel y to run into serious difficulties. This is so because most of the factors underpinning Burma' s balance of payments are unlikely to move favourably in the foreseeable future . The prospects are not good for any of the country ' s major exports . International prices for rice are depressed , and Burma faces intense pressure from established major exporters such as Thailand and the United States , who are better able to offer attractive commercial arrangements in a thin and volatile market . The removal in early 1986 of the rice premium in Thailand- a major disincentive to expanded production in the pastas well as United States subsidies for grain exports are both likely to further depress rice prices . On the demand side , there is little likelihood of Indonesia again becoming a major rice importer. Moreover, many of the rice deficit countries in the Middle East and Africa have little foreign exchange, and the alternative of barter deals offers little to Burma. Prospects elsewhere may not be as gloomy, but neither are they particularly encouraging . The anticipated resurgence in growth in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries , following the decline in oil prices , will benefit those countries with a viable export base and which possess established market channels . Burma does not fit into either category . For one thing , Burma is not sufficiently integrated into the world economy for global revival to be a major ·'engine of growth ' ' . In any case, that part of the engine to which it is most closely connected - Japan - has continued to grow quite fast in the 1980s when other countries (notably in the EEC) have slowed down . There may be some market niches in manufacturing which Burma can fill , in the absence of major policy changes, but it needs to be emphasized that three large Asian countries (China, India, Indonesia) are all vigorously promoting labour-intensive manufactures . Better prospects may exist m agriculture , but much will depend on the extent to which the crop diversification programme succeeds. in

68

A

WARD -LOOK I G I: CONO 1Y I

TRANS IT ION

ex panding produ cti n in a rea ~ with good cx pon potent tal. Medium -tem1 prospects for teak pri ce are o n ~ id e red to be more promi sin g. but Burma i unlikely to be ab le to ex pand it - ex pon vo lum e ~ signifi ca ntl y becau se it i currentl y ex ploiting it reso urce~ at cl o~e to max imum sustainable limits. The oo ly rea ll y bright piece of economi c news is the projected fall in intere t rat e~. but thi ~ may come too late to prov ide substantial relief. unhermon.:, the count ry ' intern ati onal reserves arc so slim that a , trategy of ridtn g out the current diffi culties in anti cipation of projected gains in the medium term i!-> not poss ible. The Burmese Governme nt therefore face s a major dilemma. On the one hand . the decade after 1974 saw a reversa l of the previous trends of tagnation and dec line . General living standard s for much of the population probabl y rose moderately after 1974 . Economic contact with the out side world - capi tal, technology , consumer goods, tourism, and even Burme e student abroad - increased markedly compared to the period 1962-74 . There will , undoubtedl y, be continuing pressure on the government to maintain the " momentum of ri sing expectations" which this (very limited) liberali zati_on enge ndered. Conversely , the government 's room to manoeuvre is severely restricted . Continuing growth requires more foreign capital and technology for the country ' s import-intensive manufacturing industries and other ectors . Yet , further large borrowings are not possible in the absence of major policy reforms. If the political environment was conducive to these reforms - or if international creditors were in a position to demand them - this would be the most desirable course of action . But neither of these conditions is pre ent. Indeed it is quite possi ble , in the short run, that the present difficulties will reinforce deep-seated suspicions regarding the desirability of increased economic contact with the outside world . It is possible for the government to tum inward again , restricting borrowings to ervice current debt commitments and little else . However , the cost would almost certainly be a sharp reduction in growth , and the pressi ng is ue of structural reform (pricing, state enterpri se performance , the role of the private ector) would be deferred but not removed . The response of the government to the precarious balance of payments and to the prospect of continuing unfavourable terms of trade will play a major part in the country ' s economic fortunes in the next decade and beyond .

Appendix A Note On Da ta Limita tions

Economic data on Burma are seve rely limi tcu . Except fo r a limited number of offi cial publications. reports of interna tio nal age ncies. and the (usuall y bl and ) intern ational and do mestic pre ·s coverage. there are almost no other bas ic sources of da ta. Eve n the limited offi cial data suffe r from a number of majo r weaknesses . Firstl y, they tend to be hi ghl y agg regateu in ma ny cases. and their scope is not well defin ed . Secondly. their acc uracy and re liability are hi ghly questionable . Estimates of popul at ion. labo ur force and employment. and trade and consumption of many commodit ies are ve ry crude . (Population fi gures, fo r example. are based on a constant 2. 2 per cent per annum growth rate th roughout the 1970s and the fi rst half of the 1980s .) The ex istence of much qu as i-lega l and outri ght illegal economic acti vity res ults in major data collection problems. Thi s relates not onl y to estimates of the size of the " unoffic ial sector", but also to trends in this sector over time. Peri odic gove rnment pres ure on illega l economic ac ti vit y, for example, has the effect of arti ficiall y intlating the importance of official transactions to the extent that there is a reclass ification between sectors. Foreign trade volumes are enormou ly under-estimated, with almost all consumption goods imports, and ex ports which pay for them, pass ing throu gh non-legal channels whi ch do not enter official statistics . The domestic servi ce industries, too, and other goods which do not enter international trade would suffer from considerable under-estimation due to the large bl ack market in many goods and serv ices . In ge neral, statistics pertaining to sectors dominated by pri vate firms are likely to be underestimated . However. due to lower offi cial prices of state- ector products. pri vate-sector products may be proportionately over-estimated, depending on the choices of prices in valuing sectoral outputs. There is considerable pres ure to meet plan targets in most sectors. Where output is di ffi cult to meas ure accurately or where over-estimates are unlikely to be ea · il y detected , data quality may again be qp ite poor. Thus, while overall trends may be reasonably accurate, actual production fi gures in some of the agri cultural products are probably les reliable. The mult iplicity of markets give rise to a multipl ic ity of price . Wh ile open-market prices of some commoditie are reported in offi cial publication , it is not clear whether they refer to identical products. Where

69

70

A

I WA RD -LOOK ING ECO OMY I

TRA SIT IO

imported g od of uperi or qu alit y may be sold in the open marke ts, part of Lhe pri e difference may refl ect uch quality differences . Since th e v lumc traded in unofficia l markets are not kn own, it is diffi cult to evaluate producer and con umer res ponses to changing economi c situ ati ons. One effec t i th at . uppl y and consumption elasti ci ties for variou s pr ducts are virtuall y unobtainable from Burma and projecti ons are n ces aril y very crude. Another is th at multiple pri ces and inadequ ate information about the markets make it ve ry difficult to obtain reasonabl y s und e timare of the true scarcity va lues of major commodities, e peciall y for non-tradable goods. This is, clearl y. an important constraint to proper plannin g and resource allocati on.

Notes

I . The focus o f thi s p;:~pe r is on the pcriPd Jtkr 1962 . The re arc scvc rJI useful ana lysrs of econo mic deve lopment bdore 19o2 . Sec. 111 partic-u lar . And ru ' ( 1 9~ 7). Furn 1va ll ( 1957). Hage n ( 1956) . and Walinsky tl%2) Burma . Director n f lnf~>rm;~ ti n n tl960)" informati ve. although it is essen ti all y ;~ pn lit i c;~ l doc- umenl. 2. As noted . ;~ n assess ment of ec-onom ic deve lopment\ 1n Bum1a ~ 1n cc I Ll62 1s g r~a tl y limited by th e pauci ty of data Jnd :mal ys " . T here " no ec,> nomlc J~>urn ; d published 1n or on Bunna . Reg ul ar monitonng L> f the econom y 1s c0 nductcd by the mh: m ;~ ti ona l deve lopment agencies. but the d1 stributi l>ll of the1r report s 1s re stn cted . !though not primaril y co nce rned wit h the ec0nom y. the c·haptcr' l>n Burma in th ~ ;~ nnu a l So11theust Asian Affairs (Si nga pore: see in particu lar the very detai led review o f Burm;~ in 1 9~J by Th an. 1984). and Asia Yearbook ( Hong Kong) wnta 1n much useful 1nfom1ation . as does the annual survey in Asian Sun·er . Foreign press reportm g on Burma IS si mil arl y very limited. The mos t th orough ;~nd reasonab ly up-to-date examina ti on o f de ve lopments since 1962 is Steinberg 1 198 1). See abo Si l ve rstem ( I 977). 3. For a more detailed examination 0f the lirst three plans . see Stemberg ( IQ8 1. 1983 ). 4. For a discuss ion of these issues. st:e Choksi I 1979). Jones. ed . ( 1982). and L al ( 1980). 5. For a review nf industriali zati on 1n the post-Indepe ndence e r;~ through to the mid - l lJ70s. see My int ( 1978) . Some o f th e is>ues ex amined 1n th1 s ~ec ti o n Jre co nsidered in more dt'tail in Hill ( 1 9::\ ~ ). 6 . Roemer ( 1979 ) provi des a usefu l survey ,,f issues re lated to the economi cs of minera l (a nd agri cultural ) processi ng . The inability to increase domestic minera l processing needs to be assessed on an mdustry -by -1ndustry bas is. Lim t 1980) suggests that domesti c processing o f tin (at least into lin-plate) may not necessaril y be econom ica ll y viable in d