Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace (African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora) [1st ed. 2023] 3031150031, 9783031150036

Citation preview

AFRICAN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE AFRICAN DIASPORA

Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace

Corey L. Barnes

African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora Series Editors

Jacoby Adeshei Carter Department of Philosophy Howard University Washington, DC, USA Leonard Harris Purdue University West Lafayette, IN, USA

The African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora Series publishes high quality work that considers philosophically the experiences of African descendant peoples in the United States and the Americas. Featuring sing-authored manuscripts and anthologies of original essays, this collection of books advance the philosophical understanding of the problems that black people have faced and continue to face in the Western Hemisphere. Building on the work of pioneering black intellectuals, the series explores the philosophical issues of race, ethnicity, identity, liberation, subjugation, political struggles, and socio-economic conditions as they pertain to black experiences throughout the Americas.

Corey L. Barnes

Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace

Corey L. Barnes Department of Philosophy Northwestern University Evanston, IL, USA

ISSN 2945-5995     ISSN 2945-6002 (electronic) African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora ISBN 978-3-031-15003-6    ISBN 978-3-031-15004-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Alpha Stock / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For A. Bell Barnes

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to a number of loving, gracious, and erudite people who have assisted me in completing this book. My first acknowledgment is to my mother, to whom this book is dedicated. You got me to where I am today, and taught me the most important lessons: “Principles are not only good when times are good” and “Know yourself better than people who talk about you.” To Christopher E. Barnes. I always appreciate our philosophical conversations. Your wisdom has been an inspiration throughout the years. Thank you for giving a world of support through the years. To Dr Channon Miller. Your love and support throughout this process has been nothing short of amazing. You are an extraordinary woman, scholar, friend, and love. I would also like to thank Leonard Harris and Jacoby A.  Carter for being such incredible and pioneering Locke scholars, and for including this book in such a great series. You two have done so much of the heavy lifting with evoking interest in Locke’s philosophical writings. This book truly could not have been possible without you. To Bill E. Lawson. This specific project originated from many hours spent in conversation with you about Locke, Douglass, politics, race, life, and some of everything else. Thanks for agreeing to supervise the dissertation from which this book came, and for being a terrific mentor and friend throughout the years. I would also like to thank Howard University’s Moorland-Spingarn Research Center for great help with accessing and copying Locke’s writing.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Lastly, but certainly not least of all, I would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan for the opportunity to publish this book, and for so much patience with me during the process. First book projects are quite steep learning curves. However, you all made my putting this book together as painless as possible.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 Locke and Me   1 Locke and Cosmopolitanism   3 On Method   5 Chapter Overview   7 2 One  Cosmopolitan World, or None 15 Introduction  16 Thick/Thin Moral, Political, Economic, and Cultural Cosmopolitanisms  17 Locke’s Thick Moral Cosmopolitanism  22 Locke’s Thin Political Cosmopolitanism  52 Locke’s Thin Economic Cosmopolitanism  59 Locke’s Thick Cultural Cosmopolitanism  73 Conclusion  87 3 A  Theory of True Democracy 89 Introduction  89 Concepts, Conceptions, and Democracy  91 On Political Democracy 101 On the Value of Political Democracy 129 Conclusion 133

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4 Impediments  to True Democracy and a Cosmopolitan World135 Introduction 135 On the Origins of Race 138 François Bernier, Race, and Liberal and Aesthetic Racism 140 Immanuel Kant, Scientific Race, and Scientific Racism 146 Johann Blumenbach, Racial Degeneration, and Racist Value 161 Arthur de Gobineau, Racial Degeneration, and the Divine Superiority of Whites 169 Conclusion 182 5 A  Theory of Race for Democracy and Cosmopolitanism185 Introduction 186 On the Significance of and Appropriate Starting Point for Understanding Race 187 Locke’s Critique of Anthropological Theories of Race 198 Locke’s Sociocultural Theory of Race 208 Locke on Racism 222 Conclusion 233 6 A  Theory of Value for Democracy and Cosmopolitanism237 Introduction 238 On the Appropriate Starting-Points for Value Theory 239 Locke’s Critique of Value-Objectivity and Value-Subjectivity 245 Locke’s Value-Pluralist Theory of Value 253 Locke’s Value Theory, Democracy, and Cosmopolitanism 264 Conclusion 270 7 Conclusion271 Index275

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

It is not our differences that divide us. It is our inability to recognize, accept, and celebrate those differences. —Audre Lorde (Our Dead Behind Us: Poems) [D]emocracy, looked at nationally or internationally, is seriously beset with internal inconsistencies, political, social, and cultural. It is weakened by these all the more as it tries to pull itself together as a corporate body of United Nations fighting a world defense of democracy. The net prescription is mandatory advice to correct these shortcomings at the earliest possible moment and in the most immediately practical ways, both for health and strength in the arduous war effort and for vision and moral authority in the making of a just and successful peace. —Alain Locke (“Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy”)

Locke and Me Alain Locke is most known for his involvement in the Harlem Renaissance, which conferred to him the name, “The Father of the Harlem Renaissance.” However, he received his PhD in philosophy from Harvard University in 1918, and produced a very large corpus of philosophical work. In addition

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. L. Barnes, Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3_1

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to his involvement in the Renaissance, he was a very sophisticated philosophical thinker. Like many philosophers of his day, Locke was not merely interested in problems related to a highly specialized subfield within academic philosophy. He thought through practical and theoretical problems regarding value, race, democracy, religion, art, education, and cosmopolitanism. And Locke had very radical, forward-looking, and innovative solutions to many of the world’s most pressing problems that I think deserve greater attention. I first became aware of Locke’s philosophical work in Patrick Goodin’s African American Philosophy course while a graduate student at Howard University, where we read his seminal work entitled “Values and Imperatives.” We also learned a great deal about Locke’s thought on race, along with his now famous debate with W.E.B. Du Bois on the place of propaganda in art. I was immediately interested in Locke’s ideas, though I rejected his position on art. (My disagreement was not merely grounded in the fact that I am at heart a Fiskite, and Du Bois must be right.) I would later meet Leonard Harris, who has done more than anyone to evoke interest in Locke’s philosophical work. At Bus Boys and Poets in DC, Harris brilliantly discussed Locke’s life and philosophical views more broadly. After hearing Harris, I immediately knew that I would spend significant time and energy reading and working through Locke’s philosophical views. Sadly, like so many minorities and women in so many academic disciplines (including Du Bois in sociology and history), one can go through an entire doctoral program in philosophy and never hear Alain Locke’s name or read any of his philosophical work. This is particularly galling (though perhaps not too surprising) given that the doctoral programs to which I am referring are American. My book is an added attempt—in a line of scholars to whom I am indebted—to continue to evoke interest in Locke’s philosophical work, Black contributions to philosophy, and Black voices in the Academy more broadly. My contribution to Locke-scholarship aims at two things that have not yet been accomplished. First, this is the first of two books that together aim to systematize Locke’s philosophical thought in way that has never before been done. It seeks to show how the various philosophical subareas about which Locke wrote fit together. Second, in systematizing Locke’s thought, I aim to show that what undergirds and connects the various philosophical subareas about which Locke wrote was his commitment to cosmopolitanism. The commitment to cosmopolitanism underlay and

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motivated his democratic theory, philosophy of race, value theory, and his philosophies of art, religion, and education. And all of the latter were answers to a problem that impeded human progress toward the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community.

Locke and Cosmopolitanism In the second epigraph above, we see Locke’s commitment to a community wherein a just and successful peace has been established. We also see Locke’s commitment to democracy, which he took to be both freedomand equality-affirming. And we see Locke’s commitment to democracy as a political system that ought to be spread throughout the world because of its ability to produce a cosmopolitan community. Despite the many benefits of political democracy, Locke alluded to particular problems that weaken both faith in and the justification for democracy as a freedom- and equality-affirming system of government. These problems threaten to stop the spread of democracy. And insofar as these problems both weaken democracy and threaten to stop its spread the world over, these problems threaten the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. Locke recognized that there were many practical problems that impede the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. He grouped them under three broad categories—namely, over-loyalties to race, nation, and culture. These problems stem from what Locke termed “white supremacy.” White supremacy is a set of beliefs that tends to lead to certain practices. It commits adherents to the beliefs that races are: (1) biological; (2) separated by cultures with different and static values; (3) hierarchized because of value-differences; and where (4) white groups occupy a natural and perhaps enduring position at the top of the racial hierarchy. Endorsing this set of beliefs often leads to and justifies various forms of imposition, oppression, and at worst the annihilation of non-whites. And so, it is an infectious problem that produces whites’ over-loyalty to race, nation, and culture throughout the world, along with an undervaluing of non-white groups who are seen as foreign and culturally inferior. White supremacy is the ideology for what Locke referred to as America’s deepest and most fundamental problem—namely, racism. Those who are committed to white supremacy think that racial traits produce different cultures. And they take culture-differences to be reducible to value-differences. Locke’s philosophy of race and value theory were theoretical answers to white supremacy, which impeded the practice of

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democracy, and by implication impeded the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. However, because Locke was a critical pragmatist, he was not only concerned with theoretical solutions to practical problems. He was also concerned with implementing particular strategies that would solve practical problems. And so this book will be followed by a second book that seeks to discuss how Locke thought the world can be moved from one deeply affected by white supremacy to practicing democracy, and thereby to the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. Therein, I turn to Locke’s philosophies of education, religion, and art as practical strategies for democratizing human hearts. And so these philosophies also serve the end of establishing a cosmopolitan community by moving nations toward the practice of democracy. Now let us return to the present book. Cosmopolitanism implies certain sorts of relations. These I term “healthy social and political relations.” A state needs freedom as both a constitutional and a social value if it is to value peace in relations between states, as well as practice it in its relations with other world-citizens. If a state does not have a freedom-valuing constitution, then such a state will not concern itself with the freedom of other world-citizens, and therefore will not commit to a constitution aimed at lasting peace in the world that is grounded by the possession of certain freedoms by all human beings. And further a state’s citizens need to embrace a freedom-valuing constitution if the state’s goal of seeking a lasting peace in the world is to be supported in practice. If citizens’ values generally reflect the political values of their state’s constitution, and the state’s constitution is not freedom-valuing, then it seems to follow that the citizens of such a state will not affirm a cosmopolitan constitution. Citizens tend to be instantiations of what their states value. If a state requires freedom as a constitutional and social value, then it cannot have disparities in its commitment to the freedom of its citizens. A state that is committed to freedom seems to promote equal rights for all of its citizens, insofar as inequalities in rights seem to produce social instability by leading to fundamental differences in both ideals and how citizens understand themselves and others. People need to understand themselves as deserving neither more nor less of the freedoms of others. Citizens must be committed to the ideal of equal freedoms for all citizens in order for a cosmopolitan community to be established. And so underlying the idea of freedom is the idea that such a state must value the social and political equality of all of its citizens.

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Healthy social and political relations imply a state of affairs whereby citizens can expect equal treatment before the law. No one can be expected to commit to a peace-promoting contract between states if they are treated unequally before the law in their own state. And likewise, no one can be expected to commit to a contract between states that promotes peace among all world-citizens if they do not conceptualize all citizens as worthy of equal treatment before the laws of their own state. We can infer from the preceding that healthy social and political relations rely on or imply respect between states and their citizens, between states’ citizens and their fellow citizens, between states’ citizens and non-­ citizens, and between states and non-citizens. I understand respect to be the perception, attitude of acknowledgement toward, and treatment of a person as a deserving bearer of rights equivalent to the respecting agent’s own rights. I take this notion of respect to be required for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Locke embraced these basic implications as necessary for a just and successful peace. Lockean cosmopolitanism requires healthy social and political relations that imply respect. And we will encounter many aspects of this notion of respect in his various conceptions of democracy. His thoughts about the inconsistency of affirming both cosmopolitanism and democracy on the one hand, and over-loyalties to race, nation, and culture on the other, turned on the above notion of respect. Cosmopolitanism and democracy imply respect, which are rejected by those committed to the above over-loyalties.

On Method Before moving to an overview of the five chapters of this book, allow me a few remarks about Locke’s approach to philosophical enquiry, along with my approach to understanding his thought. Locke tended to begin philosophical enquiry from two standpoints. First, he began philosophical investigations with a clear and careful understanding of where humans were situated at the particular moment of his philosophical inquiry. This implies that he began philosophical investigations with the history that brought humans to where they were situated. And so Locke sought to understand current events and how they developed from history. Second, Locke philosophized from what he took to be possible given anthropological considerations. Any theory that opposed human possibility was useless. Further, if there is a strong human drive in a particular direction,

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then Locke took this to be a powerful (though not always overriding) reason for its inclusion in a theory. And so understanding humanity, how humans developed, and of what humans are capable, were all of great importance to Locke. His cosmopolitanism, democratic theory, philosophy of race, and value theory began from these two starting-points. Now, Locke never wrote a full-length treatise on the themes encountered herein. He never wrote a treatise on cosmopolitanism, democracy, or value theory. Instead, he wrote many essays and shorter work on these three subjects. His most sustained work on race was a set of lectures delivered very early in his life—namely, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations. Furthermore, Locke’s writing about each subject spans nearly forty years. During this time any thinker—particularly one as thoughtful and astute as Locke—would tinker with ideas and revise them in light of new evidence, a greater understanding of history, and occurring events. As such there are holes in Locke’s thinking on each subject. Not all of our questions related to each can be answered, and some are not answered with the specificity that anyone reading or piecing together his views may desire. Some of his thoughts are underdeveloped or incomplete. This informs my approach to Locke’s work. My approach is to take what Locke said over a number of articles that span the years of his life. My conclusions on Locke’s philosophical commitments derive from my having highlighted and interwoven the similarities in thoughts throughout his work. Where there are radical differences in his thought between works and across time, I have chosen the most consistent across time (particularly if later in his life) and tried to flag them for readers. My method for piecing together Locke’s thought is to look at a number of his essays, lectures, and other writings in order to gather some evidence and direction regarding his thought on the subjects mentioned herein. Where there is either underdevelopment or incompletion regarding particular questions, I make inferences to his most likely commitments, given the assumption that Locke intended to hold coherent views. One sees this rather clearly with particular of Locke’s cosmopolitan and democratic commitments. Further, I largely overlook Locke’s life as a contributor to his philosophical thought. I do not deny the impact of his life on his thought; circumstances and events in one’s life undoubtedly shape their thinking about issues related to peace, democracy, race, and value. However, I have chosen to focus my attention almost exclusively on his articles, lectures,

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commentaries, and reviews—without much attention to various associations, events, relationships, and facts about his life. Moreover, I place many of Locke’s views in a contemporary philosophical setting. I both appreciate and take seriously his historical setting—the questions with which he grappled and how issues related to cosmopolitanism, democracy, race and value were understood during his lifetime. And I appreciate the potential unconcern with contemporary questions, taxonomies, and so on—that is to say, contemporary ways of understanding the aforementioned subjects. I have made the decision to include this setting in my understanding of Locke’s thought for two reasons. First, I do not take many of the contemporary ways of understanding these subjects—say, the taxonomies of cosmopolitanisms, ontological and normative accounts of race, or the different models of democracy to which I appeal—to have developed only after Locke. Various ideas and ways of understanding subjects were already in the air well before Locke. For example, many Black intellectuals who thought about race recognized what we understand as racial skepticism and normative racial eliminativism, even though our current terms were not yet applied to them. Second, I think that much of Locke’s thought can aid us in thinking through issues within our current philosophical setting. Applying Locke’s view to current debates (or situating Locke’s thought within current debates) shows how Locke’s views are still relevant. Locke should not merely be taken as an important though overlooked historical philosopher. He was an important philosopher who has been overlooked, and whose thoughts are still philosophically relevant.

Chapter Overview Now, this book is divided into five chapters. Four of the five chapters highlight a theoretical subarea about which Locke philosophized. The basic layout of the book is as follows. The first chapter provides Locke’s cosmopolitan theory. In presenting Locke’s theory, I appeal to a contemporary division in philosophizing about cosmopolitanism—namely, a division that separates thick and thin versions of moral, political, economic, and cultural cosmopolitanisms. Oftentimes when theorists have moral, political, economic, and cultural cosmopolitan views (not all theorists do have each), their views on one—say, their moral cosmopolitanism—bleed into other of their views—say, their political cosmopolitanism. Things are not as neat as the division may make it appear. Lockean cosmopolitanism was

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no exception. Not only were the parts of his cosmopolitan theory—say, his economic and cultural cosmopolitanisms, integrally connected, but his cosmopolitan theory bled into and motivated other parts of his thinking. For example, his moral cosmopolitanism motivated and bled into his value theory. Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism began with the argument that there are moral obligations owed to all humans based solely on a common humanity, without reference to race, gender, nationality, religion, or other communal particularities. However, Locke did not ground this in an internal rights-conferring, morally weighty property such as reason. Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism grounded obligations to humanity qua humanity in the necessitation of peace and order so as to avoid war and chaos. Locke was something of a rights-externalist, where rights were conferred based on external conditions that necessitate conferring rights. Further, his moral cosmopolitanism both allowed and required local commitments. Locke did not require citizens to abandon duties to and love for their state or more local groups. These commitments, however, were not justifiable as ends in themselves. Justification for them lay in their ability to further cosmopolitan ends. Thus, Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism, while it affirmed obligations to family members, specific groups, and states, advanced that these are the best way to achieve cosmopolitan aims and honor our commitments to cosmopolitan values. Moreover, Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism was not grounded in a kind of uniformitarianism where unity was based on dissolving racial, religious, cultural, or national loyalties. Instead, he grounded his cosmopolitanism in pluralism, which promotes both tolerance and reciprocity. Locke took these to be more realistic and affirming principles to ground cosmopolitanism. Locke’s political cosmopolitanism presented the case for a reconfiguration of national sovereignty. He seems to have imagined something like a United Nations as a higher-order, more global power that would ensure the right to vote for world-citizens, fair economic trade, the protection of sovereign states from annexation, and so on. Further, Locke seems to have been moving toward a reconfiguration of voting rights, but where world citizens would be able to vote on particular matters in sovereign states of which they are not local citizens, where states’ actions had world-ranging effects. But more than practices and policies, Locke argued for the need to reconfigure our attitudes toward state sovereignty and voting rights. For Locke, this can only be accomplished with a change in our conception of and attitudes toward our corporate loyalties. For Locke, the first step

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toward peace occurs with joint commitments that soften the ground for peace. This entails that states end imperialist and exploitative efforts. The second step is for states to embrace a democratic constitution, mindset, and practices. And the third step is for states to extend the vote beyond its borders. At this step, states voluntarily transfer some part of their sovereignty to a higher-order, more global power. Locke’s philosophizing about economic matters is severely understudied. And so it is my hope that presenting Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism leads to more discussion about his thoughts on economic matters. Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism centered around answers to what he considered the two economic roots of war. First was unequal access to markets and sources of raw materials. Second was widespread differentials in living standards and economic security. These were major issues for Locke, particularly given the occurrence of colonialism and imperialism that created a market in which non-whites and non-Europeans could not fairly participate. Locke endorsed an economic cosmopolitanism whereby nations are justified in imposing tariffs and restrictions on market goods. And he thought that insertion into the market was justified in order to both expose and eliminate exploitative practices in the market. In this way, Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism was a direct response to colonialism, imperialism, and racism, and the market that these created. Finally, Locke endorsed a cultural cosmopolitanism whereby a flourishing life requires engaging the best and most representative forms of cultures from a rooted position. Though promoting the appreciation of cultures from a rooted position, Locke disagreed with both internal and external coercion to adopt any particular culture. A person should engage different cultures, and should be free to choose which one or ones they take to be “their own.” As is highlighted in Chap. 3 that focuses on democracy, Locke valued individualism, even as he centered life within community. Further, he required cultural reciprocity. He saw cultural reciprocity as necessary for cultural development and respect. And in terms of respect, Locke thought that cultural reciprocity was necessary for both garnering respect from others and seeing others as equals who are worthy of respect. In this way, he thought that cultural reciprocity was one of the greatest weapons against cultural imperialism. For Locke, insofar as eliminating cultural imperialism is necessary for cultivating a cosmopolitan community, cultural reciprocity is a necessary condition for cultivating a cosmopolitan community.

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The second chapter discusses Locke’s democratic theory. Locke was an astute democratic theorist who thought that the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community both required and legitimized the practice and spread of democracy. He took democracy to be necessary for establishing a cosmopolitan community. However, democracy was not merely a political concept. Locke thought about democracy in many ways. To clearly portray his thoughts about democracy, I employ the concept/conception distinction. A concept tells us what some X is, while a conception indicates how the concept of X is to be understood. Locke’s concept of democracy can be expressed as: an attitude and recognition of the basic equality and kinship of all humans that legitimizes autonomy under rational constraints. From this concept of democracy Locke thought through eight conceptions of it—namely, local, moral, political, economic/social, cultural, intellectual, spiritual, and world. He referred to these conceptions as phases, and took them to be historically—though non-teleologically— unfolding throughout the world. Each phase widens the parameters of democracy. As they widen democracy’s parameters, each phase elucidates aspects of the concept, by either the greater inclusion of human groups or application to more areas of human life. After discussing Locke’s concept and conceptions of democracy, I hone in on his thought about political democracy. Specifically, I discuss the type and model of democracy to which Locke committed, whether he took political democracy to be inherently or instrumentally valuable, and why he considered political democracies to be necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Now like many of his cosmopolitanisms, these are not questions that Locke answered directly. Like cosmopolitanism, Locke did not write an extended treatise on democracy or political democracy. However, Locke did give us clues to how he would answer these questions, questions that were of such importance to anyone who would argue that democracy is necessary for establishing a cosmopolitan community. Though Locke did not explicitly argue for a type and model of democracy, I think that he would most likely have endorsed a type of democracy that is representative, but one that opens the door for more direct participation in political decision-making by citizens. Further, I think that Locke would endorse a participatory conception of deliberative democracy. Locke wanted more democracy for more people. However, because of his positionality as a minority living during the political dominance of the Ku Klux Klan, Locke understood that more people participating in a

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democracy would not necessarily lead to either reasonable policies or the cultivation of a more democratic character. In thinking through different models of democracy, Locke worried about both the amount and quality of democratic participation. And so in addition to more democracy for more people, he wanted an increased quality of democratic decision-making. Locke took political democracies to be necessary for the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. In this way, political democracy has instrumental value. However, Locke also advocated for political democracies for reasons that are independent of its necessity to the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. These illustrate that he took political democracies to have inherent value. Like friendship, political democracies have both inherent and instrumental value. Lastly, Locke thought that political democracies are more peaceful than competing systems of government. He offered two reasons in support of this thought. First, democracies are more pluralistic. And being more pluralistic, Locke thought that they are less likely to engage in wars. He took war to more likely result from absolutist and uniformitarian states, which take unconformity to justify aggressive acts of imposition. Second, democracies appeal to the will of the people. Locke thought that appeals to the will of the people best temper engagement in wars. Now, the third chapter illustrates white supremacy and racism as the gravest impediment to the practice of democracy and a democratic attitude. And thus white supremacy and racism were the most significant challenge to thus the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. Rather than highlight a history of practices emerging from white supremacy, this chapter highlights important theoretical moments in the history of white supremacy. To this end I illustrate the beliefs about and commitments to race- and value-superiority at bottom of white supremacy. I do so by appeal to four authors—namely, François Bernier, Immanuel Kant, Johann Blumenbach, and Arthur de Gobineau. (For those of who are either familiar with these authors or unconcerned with ideas other that Locke’s own, feel free to proceed to the fourth chapter.) Each of these authors’ theory of race reified, justified, or reinforced the ideology of white supremacy in important ways. Bernier’s thinking demonstrates two prevalent types of racism with which Locke constantly battled. These are liberal and aesthetic racisms. Liberal racism is the belief that non-European peoples need to be in contact with and learn from Europeans if they are to be a part of history and

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progress. And so liberal racism sees Europe as the center of the universe; it centers the universe around Europe. Aesthetic racism centers beauty around Europeans. It is the belief that human groups or individuals within them are beautiful to the extent that they possess “characteristic” white features. Immanuel Kant endorsed aesthetic racism, but eschewed liberal racism. He rejected liberal racism because he rejected the idea that European culture could have any effect on non-whites. Kant made race and racism a matter of science. He brought physical, psychical, and cultural properties of races under immutable laws. And so Kant provided a scientific racism. Blumenbach began a lineage of reinforcing Kant’s scientized race and racism empirically with his appeal to human skulls. He provided much motivation for American white supremacists who sought to provide craniological measurements for the moral and intellectual inferiority of non-white races. Further, he made “degeneration” a value-laden concept that reached its height in the work of Arthur de Gobineau. Gobineau, expanding “degeneration” as a value-laden concept, produced a divinely legislated and justified, totalitarian white supremacy that was deeply anti-democratic and anti-cosmopolitan. Each theory provided an aspect of white supremacy that blocked respect being conferred to non-­ white people. And so each theory and aspect of white supremacy represented in the third chapter is one to which Locke responded with his theories of race and value. Now to combat white supremacy from a theoretical standpoint, Locke needed both a race and value theory. The fourth chapter elucidates the former. In presenting Locke’s philosophy of race, I begin by discussing his thoughts on the importance of studying race, along with appropriate starting-­points for the investigation. In so doing, I show that Locke had a rather sophisticated philosophical method or approach to doing philosophy—namely that history and human values need be taken into account in any philosophical investigation. In fact, Locke thought that these are present and must be accounted for in any investigation. After discussing Locke’s thoughts on the importance of studying race and the appropriate starting-points for it, I discuss his rejection of anthological conceptions of race that purported that race is biological. For Locke, observance of the appropriate starting points for studying race would lead scholars away from biology and toward history and sociology. His critiques of anthropological theories of race set the stage for his positive race theory. In presenting Locke’s positive race theory, I appeal to a contemporary division of ontological and normative positions on race and race-talk. By

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appeal to the division, I show how Locke rejected particular ontological theories of race—namely, racial naturalism (along with any biological realist account) and racial skepticism. Locke’s theory eschewed any appeal to biology as an acceptable base for racial divisions, though without denying that races exist. And as such, I think that he completed the work of authors such as W.E.B. Du Bois, who wanted to preserve race but in a way that deemphasized biology. Locke had a rather radical racial constructivism that was a category constructionist, performative theory. For Locke, race is an idea—a sort of name under which culture-groups understand themselves—that better binds members of culture-groups together. Instead of being a biological category, Locke took race to be a purely social category. It is a social—or rather communal—value, one that further unifies culture-­ traits of a -type by causing a robust sense of solidarity among those who understand themselves as a unified group with a specific culture-type. Perhaps even more interesting than his ontology of race was his normative position on race. Locke rejected both normative racial eliminativism (that we should eliminate racial categorizations and perhaps even race-talk all-together) and racial reconstructionism (that we should replace “race” either with a nearby term such as “ethnicity” or create a term that more appropriately captures what we intend when calling up certain groups). In what is perhaps the most controversial argument of the book, I advance the view that Locke was committed to a thick racial conservationism, whereby race and race-talk have value even after racial justice has been achieved—that is, after pragmatic reasons that license maintaining race and race-talk are satisfied. Locke thought that culture and cultural development were necessary for human flourishing. Further, he thought that race was necessary for culture and cultural development. Thus, Locke thought that race was necessary for human flourishing. And so Locke thought that race ought to be conserved beyond pragmatic reasons that would license its conservation because it was necessary for human flourishing. After discussing Locke’s thinking on the ontology and normativity of race, I illustrate his understanding of racism. Rather than being determined merely by either beliefs or attitudes, Locke seems to have thought that racism is a kind of practice related to power. One is not racist because of what they believe or feel, but because of what they can do based on the organization of the society within which their actions occur. Having developed the theory of race and racism that he did, Locke provided a powerful argument against much of the white supremacy that

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impeded the practice of democracy, and by implication impeded the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. However, taken by itself, Locke’s philosophy of race is not enough to combat white superiority. Locke’s socio-cultural theory of race can still leave value-hierarchies intact. One might just as easily locate them in history, as opposed to making them timeless derivations from either nature or God. Thus, Locke needed to attack value-hierarchies implicated by white supremacy. Locke’s value theory is the subject of the final chapter. Locke’s aim in addressing the problem of value was to produce a sort of in-between position wherein we might think of values as neither objective nor subjective. Though Locke denied that claims about values were mind-independently true or false, he also denied that their truth or falsity were merely a matter of individual valuations. Locke thought that if we began with the social and political world as the starting-point for value theory, then we would reject either position. He thought that objectivism led to intolerance and mass coercion, while subjectivism led to anarchism and nihilism. And so while objectivism could be used to support racism and white supremacy, subjectivism offered no tools to combat them. Further, Locke thought that neither position could explain our experiences, which he took to be a necessary feature of any adequate theory. Locke’s in-between position— which I refer to as a value-pluralist position—was that there is a kind of mind-independence in the immediacy of value-experience, one which confers valuations a kind of objectivity. Locke took this position to better explain our experiences, progress society, and cohere with other progressive and explanatory theories. And he took his value theory, along with his philosophy of race, to be theoretical tools to combat the racism that was the gravest impediment to the practice of democracy and thus the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. In all, Locke’s cosmopolitan and democratic theories show him to have been very thoughtful on political matters. And I think both his cosmopolitan and democratic theories—along with his race and value theories—are still quite relevant to both today’s Academy and the “real world.” Locke’s theories were innovative and show him to have thought quite deeply about issues related to cosmopolitanism, democracy, race, and value. But more than these, his work shows him to have had a deep concern for his and the rest of humanity’s place in the universe.

CHAPTER 2

One Cosmopolitan World, or None

[S]o-called foreigners really are not, for in relation to each section of the earth, each has its own fatherland, but in relation to the whole circumference of this world, the entire earth is the single fatherland of all and the world is one home. —Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 30, col. 2.1–11 Smith The ‘one world’ of today is neither the religious concept of a world united by the spiritual bonds of a common belief nor that humanist dream of a world intellectually unified by a common tradition of culture. Instead, the one world of today is the much more realistic notion of a world community politically united by a common loyalty to international law and justice and mutually federated by guaranteed reciprocity in communication, trade and culture. This in itself is an obvious practicalization of the basic idea, and to that extent a real gain both in practicability and in vital relevance to the interests and practical understanding of the average man, world citizenship has become a matter of common and vital concern. —Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. L. Barnes, Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3_2

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Introduction At its core, cosmopolitanism requires us to rethink and broaden our conception of community. And because cosmopolitanism asks this of us, it asks us to rethink very essential parts of our identities. These will include our individual and collective commitments to racial, cultural, religious, and national identities. For many cosmopolitans, such a rethinking is necessary to preserve or strengthen community. In a word, rethinking essential parts of our identities is necessary to build peace. Peace requires reshaping our conception of community and our identities given the interconnectedness and interdependence of our world. Our world has a very interdependent and interconnected economic system, where catastrophe in one part of the world negatively impacts the economy of much of the rest of the world. One country’s actions regarding climate affect the entire world. We have the capacity for massive world-wide destruction with nuclear and biological weapons. Because many people are able to fly the world over, diseases and viruses affect nearly every corner of every country. And so given that our actions have wide-ranging—in fact one might say world-ranging—effects, our responsibility must be globalized, and our concern must be extended beyond local borders, however we understand “local borders.” From the preceding, one might infer that cosmopolitanism implies certain sorts of relations that imply a particular notion of respect. I have termed them “healthy social and political relations” in the introduction. Alain Locke embraced these basic implications and the notion of respect that they imply. And Lockean cosmopolitanism highlights other commitments that this basic idea implies. Locke held more of a morally, culturally, and religiously pluralist position than many cosmopolitans who held what he called uniformitarian cosmopolitanisms. Further, Locke seemed to recognize that legal prescriptions (if they are taken to be both necessary and sufficient conditions) fail to establish a cosmopolitan community. Law alone will not establish such a community. Instead, attitudinal aspects of human life that would cultivate respect need also be engaged in a cosmopolitan theory. And he endorsed these views with the belief that if we cannot establish a cosmopolitan community, then our world will descend into chaos. In this chapter, I spell out Locke’s cosmopolitan theory. I do this in a few ways. I show Locke’s cosmopolitan commitments by appeal to a common division in philosophical work on cosmopolitanism—namely, moral,

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political, economic, and cultural cosmopolitanisms. These are often interconnected in a theorist’s cosmopolitan theory, and was certainly the case for Locke. Likewise Locke’s cosmopolitan theories are often connected to other parts of his philosophical thought such as his value theory and philosophies of religion and art. However, it is helpful to distinguish each, and to show how Locke approached each specifically. In this way, I discuss why Locke thought that establishing a cosmopolitan community was necessary—that is, why there was an obligation to do so.

Thick/Thin Moral, Political, Economic, and Cultural Cosmopolitanisms Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown have provided a very useful division for different treatments of cosmopolitanism. They separate and discuss moral, political, economic, and cultural cosmopolitanisms.1 As a moral theory, cosmopolitanism is the view that there are moral obligations owed to all human beings solely on the basis of a common humanity, without reference to race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, political affiliation, state citizenship, or other communal particularities. It asks and answers: What duties do I owe others qua their humanity or possession of some morally relevant property—say reason? And these duties may be prioritized over every other concern—say familial or friendship relationships. The moral cosmopolitan views all humans as “kin,” typically because all humans are possessors of the same morally relevant property. This property indicates the fundamental equality of all humans and grounds an equivalent and indiscriminate moral concern accorded to all humans. Moral cosmopolitanism is perhaps the most important and most heavily debated treatment of cosmopolitanism. Political cosmopolitanism tends to derive from and depend on moral cosmopolitanism. Political cosmopolitanism is a theory about the political rights of states, citizens of states, and world-citizens. It typically regards international relations, or the manner in which states relate to each other, but can focus on world-citizens qua this status apart from states. Some political cosmopolitans advocate for the abolition of all existing states and the establishment of a single world-state. However, most political 1  Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown “Cosmopolitanism” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014) 16.

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cosmopolitans advocate for something far weaker, say a league of nations where states voluntarily organize themselves for the sake of keeping peace or a transfer of some part of their sovereignty to a higher-order, more global power that is established with the consent of nations transferring sovereignty.2 Economic cosmopolitanism promotes the view that: “We ought to cultivate a global economic market with free trade and minimal political involvement.”3 Though endorsed by some economists, this view tends to be rejected by cosmopolitans working in philosophical traditions. Economic cosmopolitanism is useful here because Locke had very interesting things to say about the role of the market and the state of economic affairs as preconditions for practicing democracy and the emergence of a cosmopolitan community. Furthermore, Locke’s thinking on economic matters is missing entirely from Locke scholarship. Finally cultural cosmopolitanism has both a negative and a positive view. Negatively, cultural cosmopolitanism “rejects exclusive attachments to a particular culture.”4 Here, the cultural cosmopolitan rejects the idea that an individual—who may share some group-tie with another—is to be forced physically or coerced ideologically (perhaps by claims of group-­ legitimacy) to endorse or live encumbered by some particular culture. And further, the cultural cosmopolitan rejects the view that one should only view themself as a member of some culture by way of an exclusive attachment. The cultural cosmopolitan can acknowledge cultural attachments for the sake of a good human life, but denies that this implies that a person’s cultural identity should be strictly defined by or confined within any bounded or homogenous subset.5 Positively, cultural cosmopolitanism encourages cultural diversity, cultural participation, and perhaps even the merging of cultures to form new ones or to keep them from becoming stale. On this view, cultural stagnation is the result of exclusivity and separateness. Cultural progression is taken to require diversity, participation, and merging. Now each treatment has “thicker” and “thinner” varieties. Kleingeld and Brown, as well as David Held6 discussed thicker and thinner (also  Ibid., 17–18.  Ibid., 19. 4  Ibid., 18–19. 5  Ibid., 19. 6  David Held, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Order,” in The Cosmopolitan Reader, ed. Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held (Malden: Polity Press, 2013) 229–247. 2 3

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termed “strict” and “moderate”) strands in conversations about moral cosmopolitanism. However, Samuel Scheffler (from whom the division originated) divided conceptual cosmopolitanism into two strands—one relating to “a doctrine of justice” and the other relating to “a doctrine about culture and the self.”7 For Scheffler, the fundamental question regarding “a doctrine of justice” is: To whom are obligations owed? Or: Are there social, as opposed to global, norms of justice? The fundamental question regarding “a doctrine about culture and the self” is: What cultural material allows individuals to flourish? From this division, I think it best to discuss the doctrine of justice as relating to moral, political, and economic cosmopolitanisms, thereby understanding the “thicker” and “thiner” varieties of these as distinct from “a doctrine about culture and the self” that discusses cultural cosmopolitanism. Scheffler tells us that: “Cosmopolitanism about justice is opposed to any view that posits principled restrictions on the scope of an adequate conception of justice.” Norms of justice—as they relate to moral, political, or economic matters—cannot apply to specific subsets of humans, but must apply globally. The thick (or strict) strand promotes the view that just principles, whether they relate to morality, politics, or economic matters, will either never be applied on the basis of specific group affiliation or will best serve the interests of all humans if applied on the basis of specific group affiliation. Here, cosmopolitanism “implies that particular human relationships and group affiliations never provide independent reasons for action or suffice by themselves to generate special responsibilities to one’s intimates and associations.”8 With regard to morality, endorsing a view such as Care Ethics and some conceptions of Virtue Ethics that center particular relationships of care and ground more of an obligation to agents within those relationships without this best promoting the interests of all humans qua their humanity would be problematic for the thick (strict) moral cosmopolitan. For the strict moral cosmopolitan moral principles are justified by equality among all members of the moral community. Either: (1) we cannot have obligations to family members or specific groups above other members of the moral community because morality commands equality 7  Samuel Scheffler, “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism,” in Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 8  Ibid., 115.

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on the basis of humanity; (2) actions toward family members and specific groups are supererogatory; or (3) obligations to family members and specific groups are the best way to achieve cosmopolitan values or aims. Group-specific obligations can be neither independent of nor override moral principles that consider the interests of all humans equally. So, for example, aid to family members, aid to citizens qua that citizenship, or perhaps membership in a local group for the uplift or improvement of that group (say the U.N.I.A.) are either unjustifiable, supererogatory, or must be shown to be the best way of serving the interests of all humans. Thick/strict political and economic cosmopolitanism appeals to similar ideals. For the thick political cosmopolitan, a cosmopolitan community is achieved when a single world state is established and individual sovereign powers are completely dissolved. The reason for this tends to be that there is no basis upon which borders are justified. The existence of borders tends to lead people to view special obligations as primary, implies that states take special interest in citizens of that particular state, and produces conflict between states. In economic matters, trade policies for the betterment of a particular corporation, which are enforced or endorsed by states, and operate to the exclusion of other corporations and states, are unjustifiable. And so the best way to preserve moral obligations to humanity qua humanity is unrestricted access to markets where there is no state-interference. Now a thin (or moderate) cosmopolitan makes room for both universal and specific principles of justice without specific principles serving or being superimposed by universal principles. Here, special obligations to family members can be more meaningful than thick cosmopolitan considerations, and are something for which must be accounted. For the thin cosmopolitan “to say that one is a citizen of the world is to say that, in addition to one’s relationships and affiliations with particular individuals and groups, one also stands in an ethically significant relation to other human beings in general.”9 And so justice is only partially cosmopolitan. We might think that “cosmopolitan and local obligations are of different and incommensurable types, irreducible to one another.”10

 Ibid.  Richard Vernon, Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and Global Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 2. Here, Vernon refers to this idea as “moral dualism.” 9

10

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In terms of morality, a thin cosmopolitan might justify a kind of Care or Virtue Ethics that advocates basic obligations to humanity, while also promoting non-derivative obligations to family members. They might promote the view that there is a general obligation to consider other nations in disaster-relief aid, while suggesting that citizens of a nation are owed special consideration on that basis. A thin political cosmopolitan might advocate a league wherein states voluntarily organize themselves, while maintaining at least some significant part of their sovereignty. And in economic matters, thin cosmopolitans might favor imposing tariffs on imported goods specifically for the purpose of eliminating poverty in their state, instead of allowing the market to care for humans’ needs unrestricted by governmental interference. For the thin cosmopolitan, that we have certain obligations to all other humans is compatible with other obligations that we have to those to whom we are related, with neither sort of obligations being a derivation from the other. We may distinguish questions regarding to whom obligations are owed (a doctrine of justice) from questions about which cultural materials allow individuals to flourish (a doctrine about culture and the self). And as the former have thick and thin versions, so too does the latter. The thick cultural cosmopolitan maintains that one cannot flourish by situating themself within—and thereby cultivating a sense of self through— one cultural community. The thick cultural cosmopolitan “denies that adherence to the values and traditions of a particular community represents a viable way of life in the modern world, and, accordingly, is not inclined to treat an individual’s relationship to a particular cultural community as a potential source of special responsibilities.”11 On this account, flourishing requires appreciation of and engagement with a multiplicity of cultures. And insofar as stagnation is the result of cultural isolation and seems inconsistent with any conception of flourishing, adherence to one isolated culture is a kind of stagnation, and is inconsistent with any conception of an individual’s flourishing. The thin or moderate cultural cosmopolitan “maintains only that people do not need to situate themselves squarely within a particular cultural tradition in order to thrive.”12 This cosmopolitan seems open to the possibility that one may or may not flourish as a result of engaging in a kind of cultural isolation. They merely deny that people must remain rooted in  Ibid., 116.  Ibid.

11 12

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a particular culture, forming their identity through the culture and understanding themselves as fundamentally defined by it. And so the thick or strict cultural cosmopolitan will suggest that the Christian or Muslim who is unable to appreciate the other’s cultural gifts, or the Black nationalist wedded to a “thick” cultural conception of Blackness,13 cannot flourish. The thin or moderate cultural cosmopolitan will claim that remaining rooted in a culture is unnecessary for flourishing. Now with these divisions, we can begin to track Locke’s cosmopolitan doctrine of justice (his conceptions of moral, political, economic cosmopolitanisms) and his cosmopolitan doctrine about culture and the self (his conception of cultural cosmopolitanism) in accordance with how thick or thin each was. I do not take Locke to have had a thin or thick commitment to cosmopolitanism simpliciter, or a thin or thick cosmopolitan doctrine of justice. I understand Locke to have had thin commitments to political and economic cosmopolitanisms, and thick commitments to moral and cultural cosmopolitanisms.

Locke’s Thick Moral Cosmopolitanism Now, Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism is rather complex, and a full appreciation of it involves an interpretation of his value theory. (And so the picture that I will paint of Locke’s view may not be entirely clear until the fifth chapter.) Further, an understanding of how thick his moral cosmopolitanism was can easily lead one to aporia. This is for two reasons. First, though Locke—in many essays—seemed to be a rather thick moral cosmopolitan, his involvement in the Harlem Renaissance and various Black improvement/advancement organizations can easily lead to the belief that he took a universal set of principles of justice to be a mere (but not exhaustive) part of what morality requires. Second, one might take his commitment to value pluralism to be a reason for believing that Locke rejected any sort of universal principles of justice. I argue that Locke thought that key values were or must become universally applicable—particularly for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community that is in no way naturally inevitable, but is pragmatically necessary. These universal values are consistent with and even make possible

13  For an example, see: Tommie Shelby, We Who are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

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the healthy pluralism that Locke endorsed.14 And so I do not take his value pluralism to be inconsistent with his thick moral cosmopolitanism. Further, I argue that while Locke affirmed obligations to family members, specific groups, and  states, he thought that obligations to each are the best way to achieve cosmopolitan aims and honor our commitments to cosmopolitan values. Group-specific obligations are not independent of but derive from universal principles of justice, and so they are justified on the basis of their furthering cosmopolitanism; group-specific obligations serve cosmopolitan aims. As a result he took his involvement in and the existence of the Harlem Renaissance, his endorsement of the Talented Tenth, his commitment to an African renaissance, commitments to groups on the basis of class and race, citizens’ patriotic duties, states’ obligations to citizens, and so on to all be best for and justified by their achieving cosmopolitan aims. To begin, Locke thought—as moral cosmopolitanism suggests—that there are moral obligations owed to all human beings based solely on a common humanity, without reference to race, gender, nationality, religion, or other communal particularities. Locke would agree with Held’s claim that “the ultimate units of moral concern are individual human beings, not states or other particular forms of human association.”15 This idea structured his thinking on political, economic, and cultural cosmopolitanisms, along with how he engaged democracy. Moreover, Locke’s commitment to value pluralism is owed in part to moral cosmopolitanism via the obligation to respect humans (and by implication their cultures) qua their humanity.16 And in fact, Locke made the recognition of our common humanity a condition for the survival of religion. “In some very vital respects God will be rediscovered to our age if we succeed in discovering the common denominator of humanity and living in terms of it and

14  For an extended study, see Corey L.  Barnes, “Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles,” in The Acorn: Philosophical Studies in Pacifism and Nonviolence Vol. 17, No 1 (2017). 15   David Held, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Order,” in The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, ed. Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 12. 16  I argue that Locke’s value theory is also owed to his cultural cosmopolitanism via the necessity of reciprocating with different cultural products to living a good life.

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valuing all things in accordance with it.”17 Renewed faith hinges on our recognition of our common humanity and observance of obligations owed to all human beings on that basis. As will become clear in the next chapter, Locke had a very nuanced understanding of democracy. He had at least eight clear conceptions of the term that are unified under a specific concept. One of his conceptions of democracy was “World Democracy.”18 I understand Locke’s conception of world democracy to be a political, legal, and attitudinal condition of nations and peoples of the world that is a necessary final stage for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. World democracy is the practice of respecting the dignity of all persons from the realization of all conceptions of democracy on an international basis. For Locke, world democracy “presupposes the recognition of the essential equality of all peoples and the potential parity of all cultures.”19 As a condition for a cosmopolitan community, people must both be recognized as bearers of the same rights. For Locke this made persons the ultimate units of moral concern. Such a presupposition gives all humans a claim to certain forms of treatment that ground political, legal, moral, and social obligations. As we will see these obligations extend beyond, though they may be fulfilled through, local groups and relationships. Much of Locke’s work on cosmopolitanism, democracy, and value presupposes the basic equality of all humans. And much of his work is incomprehensible without thinking it as being undergirded by this presupposition. In an essay entitled, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy,” Locke explained the need for the fulfillment of democratic ideals of freedom and equality in democracies, and called for the expansion of these ideals throughout the world. Further, he warned of the consequences for democracy and peace if these ideals were neither fulfilled in democratic nations nor expanded beyond them. For Locke, the basic equality of persons made humans an appropriate claimant to certain rights that are best observed by 17  Alain Locke, “The Gospel for the Twentieth Century,” in World Order, Vol. 38, No 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J. Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2006–2007) 40. 18  Alain Locke has several senses of the term “democracy,” along with an expanded notion of the political democracy of which we colloquially speak. I will explore these in Chap. 3. Also see Christopher Buck, Alain Locke: Faith and Philosophy (Los Angeles: Kalimat Press, 2005). 19  Quoted from Christopher Buck, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Democracy,” in Studies in Bahá’í Philosophy, Vol. 4 (Idyllwild: Charles Schlacks, 2015) 41.

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democratic values. Locke wrote that: “Just as the foundation of democracy as a national principle made necessary the declaration of the basic equality of persons, so the founding of international democracy must guarantee the basic equality of human groups.”20 A read through the article shows that Locke meant this in two ways. First, in acknowledging the aim of spreading democracy after World War II, Locke claimed that success in spreading democracy required recognizing the equality of all ­persons. We cannot successfully make the world safe for democracy while legitimizing group-oppression—that is, without recognizing all humans as equal by supporting the same basic set of rights. Second, as revealed by the end of the article, Locke conceded the aim of spreading democracy. It was justified on the basis of the common equality of humans. As equals, humans have a right to be treated as such. Locke did not think that there were any non-arbitrary reasons to deny the basic equality of humans. And since there were no non-arbitrary reasons, there were no justifiable reasons to deny any human the same basic set of rights. In “Moral Imperatives for World Order,” Locke argued for both the proclivity to and perhaps necessity of being members of local groups, which is a claim that Locke made in more than a few essays.21 Indirectly, Locke raised the question of national and international unity, along with the establishment of a cosmopolitan community given this proclivity and perhaps necessity. Locke’s question was whether our proclivity for and the necessity of being members of local groups prevented human confraternity. His answer was that these need not do so. In moving toward confraternity, what was necessary was the construction of moral imperatives capable of allowing for the satisfaction of this proclivity, but ones that also moved humans beyond local groups. Locke’s goal was to show how we can move beyond local loyalties without abandoning them, given certain changes in our attitudes and our recognition of the basic equality of humans. In a manner similar to the Stoics, Locke theorized a reformation of our conception of local groups in an expansive way that extends to humanity as a whole from an expansion of

20  Alain Locke, “Color: The Unfinished Business of Democracy,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 535. 21  See: Alain Locke, “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).

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our concern for others.22 For Locke, it was in this reformation to expand and extend that humanity will finally realize the “skeletal ideals of universal human brotherhood” that have been around for a while, but that we have failed to live up to because of our proclivity for and benefits from a limited concern for other of our human sisters and brothers. The e­ xpansion and extension that Locke had in mind necessitates an attitudinal change. The attitudinal change does not merely regard how we think about members of groups other than our own in their relationality to us, and thus how much concern for their lives and futures we owe them. In addition to this consideration, we have to change how we think about the appropriate grounds for human unity. “What the contemporary mind stands greatly in need of is the divorce of the association of uniformity with the notion of the universal, and the substitution of the notion of equivalence.”23 We are equal to each other in our diversity because of the commonality of our humanity, and universal concern is owed on that basis. For Locke, we become able to eschew disunity due to difference and in fact appreciate diversity once we see others as standing on equal footing with us. We are able to accomplish this because we have brought them closer to us conceptually. And so: “What we need to learn most is how to discover unity and spiritual equivalence underneath the differences which at present disunite and sunder us, and how to establish some basic spiritual reciprocity on the principle of unity in diversity.”24 From the preceding we may observe that Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism was not grounded in a kind of uniformitarian unity whereby equality and confraternity are the result of dissolving racial, religious, cultural, or national loyalties. Likewise, obligations to humans qua a common humanity need not be grounded in uniformity. We need not ground our obligations to or inclusion of others in unreasonable world-views or ideologies that we all have, beliefs about God that we all share, or cultural products that we all value. Confraternity, the recognition of basic human equality, and our obligations qua a common humanity require more openness, as 22  To combat this form of narrow-minded isolationism and uniformitarianism, Locke envisioned humans embracing a mindset on par with, but with differences from, Hierocles’ and other stoics’ conception of oikeiôsis as it relates to other humans. Oikeiôsis has been used to describe a process through which some person or thing becomes oikeion, whereby the person or thing comes to be treated as an object of concern. See Tad Brennan, The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 156. 23  Alain Locke, “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle,” 135. 24  Ibid.

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they lead us to recognize, appreciate, and reciprocate with diverse others who are acknowledged as standing on equal footing with us in their diversity from us. In this way, Locke’s cosmopolitanism requires more “depth” than the rather “shallow” idea of cosmopolitanism grounded in samenesses. Locke was worried about a kind of bigotry that tended to pervade intellectual, political, religious, and cultural commitments, and even pervaded the views of those who believed in and argued for the spread of democracy, human rights, and world-citizenship. Locke understood and expressed this kind of bigotry by three concepts—namely, absolutism, uniformitarianism, and arbitrary dogmatism. He argued that confraternity and the recognition of basic human equality cannot be grounded in them. In fact, for Locke, the desire for confraternity and the conferring of human rights for these reasons were outmoded phases of democratic thinking.25 Absolutism26 is “the belief that the things (at least some of the things) that one values are ultimately justified (or justifiable) independently of social or historical conditions and that the professed values apply equally to all human beings regardless of any actual social or historical differences.”27 For the absolutist, there are objective, ahistorical values. Now if there are ahistorical values, then one might feel justified in imposing these on groups, either because of the paternalistic belief that imposition helps unfortunate or backward groups obtain what is good, because God/ nature requires all humans endorse these values, or simply because justice or morality requires the imposition. The belief that one is justified in imposing values on groups is expressed by the concept “uniformitarianism.” “Uniformitarianism is the active desire to bring other peoples or culture into conformity with one’s own life-expressions or the life-expressions of one’s culture, nation, religion, etc.”28 Together, absolutism and uniformitarianism form what Locke referred to as uniformitarian universalism. “By uniformitarian universalism 25  See: Alain Locke, “The Five Phases of Democracy,” in World Order, Vol. 38, No 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J.  Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2006–2007). I elucidate Locke’s thinking on the progression of democracy in Chap. 3. 26  For Locke: “Absolutes are concepts or principles that are thought to pertain to all human beings at all times.” 27  Jacoby Adeshei Carter, “Moral Imperatives for World Order: Alain Locke on Pluralism and Relativism,” in Philosophic Values and World Citizenship: Locke to Obama and Beyond, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter and Leonard Harris (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010) 219. 28  Ibid., 220.

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he means a system of beliefs purporting to convey necessarily true propositions and holding that such truths should be held by, or otherwise imposed on, all persons.”29 Locke considered this kind of universalism to be one of the gravest impediments to the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. Lastly, arbitrary dogmatism is a commitment to a value made “in the absence of any justification for it over other viable options,”30 where these commitments are immune to disputation. Many of the absolutes that agents attempt to impose on others are considered beyond critique and not amenable to debate. And because they are ahistorical, they require no justification by, and cannot be revised in light of, practical considerations and evidence. They are true, beyond critique, debate, or suspicion, and justified without (and therefore not susceptible to changes in) evidence. Locke dismissed the idea that confraternity (and by implication cosmopolitanism) can be grounded in uniformitarian universalism for four reasons. First, uniformitarian universalism is impossible, and thereby impractical.31 Second, uniformitarian universalism would have a very negative effect on culture because it would lead to cultural stagnation. Third, uniformitarian universalism undercuts certain rights that condition peace—namely, liberty. Fourth, uniformitarian universalism—given that it is undergirded by absolutism—is false. Recall from my introductory remarks that Locke tended to begin his philosophical enquiry from two standpoints. First, Locke sought to understand where humans were at the particular time or moment of the philosophical inquiry. Second, Locke philosophized from what he took to be possible given anthropological considerations.32 Philosophy considers occurrent issues and human proclivities, and provides or takes seriously theories about human-possibilities; philosophy takes humans and their world as fundamental starting-points. And so two ideas would have 29  Leonard Harris, Preface to “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 51. 30  Jacoby Adeshei Carter, “Moral Imperatives for World Order: Alain Locke on Pluralism and Relativism,” 221. 31  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” he Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 545. 32  One can see this very early in Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, on the issue of in-group v. out-group thinking, in “The Mandates System: A New Code of Empire” with regard to imperialism, in “Values and Imperatives” and “Value” with values, in The Negro’s Contribution to the Americas’ Culture on the issue of race-consciousness and culture.

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motivated Locke’s thinking on the potential for confraternity and the possibility of an emerging cosmopolitan community. First, Locke was attentive to the fact that groups throughout the world had different “surface-level” values, norms, and world-views. Second, Locke considered human feelings of loyalty to and deep interest in their values, norms, and world-­views. These guide our thoughts and actions. We live by them and will vehemently defend them. From these two facts, Locke came to the conclusion that world-wide conformity to particular values, norms, and world-views is not possible, particularly without wide-scale conflict and mass death, or at least the constant threat of either. Now it is unclear as to whether Locke thought that, if at all possible, confraternity on the basis of conformity would be better than confraternity in diversity. There are reasons for and against this consideration. On the one hand, Locke stated that: “One can appreciate the deep-seated desire and the ever-recurrent but Utopian dream of the idealist that somehow a single faith, a common culture, an all-embracing institutional life and its confraternity should some day unite man [and woman] by merging all his [and her] loyalties and culture values.”33 Here Locke appealed to a softer kind of uniformitarianism that he labeled a Utopian dream, and attributed it to a naïve romantic. However, his claim that one can “appreciate” it can lend to the interpretation that Locke took it to be in some way noble. Perhaps Locke took confraternity in conformity to be a better—perhaps stronger—ground for unity in theory, even if impracticable. If it was undesirable because of the kind of thing that it is, or if it was undesirable because of some practical consideration—say its effect on some other good, then why claim that one can appreciate the desire? And Locke does tell us that “even with almost complete intercommunication within practical grasp, that day [where confraternity is the result of a single faith, a common culture, an all-embracing institutional life] seems distant, especially since we have as great need for cultural pluralism in a single unit of society as in a nation as large and composite as our own.”34 Here, uniformitarianism seems to be more than something appreciable or noble, but the end goal to which something like pluralism becomes a mere stepping stone based on necessity, and given the current state of the world. 33  Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality?,” in Philosophic Values and World Citizenship: Locke to Obama and Beyond, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter and Leonard Harris (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010) 140. 34  Ibid.

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However (on the other hand), Locke seems to have thought that uniformitarian universalism is undesirable because of its effect on culture and culture-production. Cultures remain fresh to the extent that they incorporate new traits from outside of them, and incorporating new traits in this way implies cultural differences and productive (peaceable and respectful) engagements between them. Now, if cultures create, recreate, and result from our values, then cultural differences (which are necessary for cultures to remain fresh) require value-differences. And so, cultures remaining fresh requires different values, which implies a denial of confraternity as the result of conformity. One might take Locke to reject uniformitarian universalism because of its impracticability and its undesirability given our interests in maintaining vibrant cultures. Moreover, uniformitarian universalism undercuts certain rights that condition peace—namely, liberty. Liberty (along with equality and fraternity) is what Locke understood to be a common human denominator.35 This does not mean that it is an “absolute,” but rather it is a value that no individuals or groups living in societies deny. Under reasonable conditions, and with reasonable stipulations, people do not refuse the ability to do as they please when presented with the option. As will become clear below, cosmopolitanism respects and endorses this common denominator value. And so it allows for a plurality of conceptions of a good life.36 This is one of the principled reasons why Locke endorsed democracy, and required its fulfillment in democratic states and international expansion for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Locke thought that true democracies allow a plethora of reasonable conceptions of a good life that respect this common value. In agreement with his conception of particular parts of George Santayana’s Dominations and Powers, Locke understood liberty, along with tolerance, to be democracy’s most functional virtues, and considered absolutism—which undergirds uniformitarian universalism—to be an unreasonable threat to it.37 Finally, uniformitarian universalism—given that it is undergirded by absolutism—is false. As will become clear with an interrogation of Locke’s theory of value in Chap. 6, Locke denied the essential proposition of  Alain Locke, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy,” 534.   Also see, Corey L.  Barnes, “Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles.” 37  Alain Locke, “Santayana,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 141. 35 36

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mind-independent values, imperatives, and absolutes. For Locke, there are no ahistorical concepts or principles that are thought to pertain to all human beings at all times.38 He took values to be grounded in human attitudes and not in reality.39 Values—and as such the philosophies that are constructed out of and about them—are historical.40 The imperatives that we form from them need not be grounded in what are taken to be absolutes, and are certainly not those that are beyond critique or revision. Imperatives are conditioned within societies and through possibilities given human proclivities. Since there are no absolute values, there is no justification for the imposition of values on groups. And so, given these reasons, any workable conception of cosmopolitanism must reject uniformitarian universalism. Rather than being supported by uniformitarian universalism, Locke’s commitments to the basic equality of humans and our obligations to humans qua a common humanity led him to endorse pluralism. For Locke pluralism was both a descriptive and a normative concept.41 In a descriptive sense, pluralism captures an occurrent condition of the world. The world is composed of different cultures that implicate different values, norms, and world-views. Further, the descriptive sense captures the anthropological fact that humans feel loyalty toward, and have a deep interest in, their values, norms, and world-views. In the normative sense, pluralism “goes beyond the mere fact of diversity in the world and seeks to articulate a systematic and comprehensive orientation toward that diversity.”42 Pluralism in the normative sense answers the question: “Given the fact of value-diversity and humans’ interest in their values, how ought we to build amicable relations in the world, and how much value-diversity ought we accept in our attempt to build amicable relations?” It proposes three recommendations given the condition. First, it recommends revising our attitudes toward different values by our accepting diversity. Second, it recommends our finding common 38  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 34. 39  Ibid. 40  In addition to denying that values are absolutes, Locke denied that philosophies are absent values. Pragmatism, positivism, and even behaviorism are value-laden. Values guide our thought. 41  Jacoby Adeshei Carter, “Moral Imperatives for World Order: Alain Locke on Pluralism and Relativism.” 42  Ibid., 218.

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ground in diversity on which to unify. Finally, pluralism recommends efforts to share with others on the basis of a common ground to produce an appreciation for diversity. And so it captures possibilities of human confraternity given the diversity of values and loyalties humans feel to those values. Given the condition of the world, Locke reasoned that a pluralistic cosmopolitan community is much more realistic than one supported by uniformitarian universalism. So,“[w]hat seems more attainable, realistically, is some reconstruction of those attitudes and rationalizations responsible for bitter and irreconcilable conflict over our separate loyalties and value divergencies.”43 Now Locke’s pluralism is not an “anything goes and is justified because it exists or because humans have loyalty to it” kind of pluralism. Locke rejected what he terms an “anarchic relativism.” By anarchic relativism is meant a kind of “weightless” relativism where one casts no judgments on values, norms, or world-views; it is not a relativistic view that accepts all experiences as they are—none are better, none are worse.44 Locke took this kind of pluralism to be at best ineffective for confraternity, and at worst damaging to the aim. Theoretically, anarchistic relativism denies the fact that values are important to us insofar as they guide our beliefs and motivate our actions. As important aspects of our lives, we should take values seriously.45 And any account of action, willing, emotion, belief, and so on is incomplete when undergirded by this kind of relativism. Practically, Locke was worried about the failure to call out actions that disaffirm the pragmatic necessity of peace, along with a failure to commit to bringing about peace. A commitment to peace is a value. However, if peace is no better than any other value, then why work toward it? Mass-murder and genocide are antithetical to peace. However, if neither peace nor mass-­ murder/genocide can be judged better or worse, then why decry the latter? Locke endorsed a version of pluralism that was more systematic than anarchic relativism. Locke’s understanding of pluralism began with a recognition that values are rooted in history; absolute values are to be dethroned. His commitment to dethroning absolute values was wide-­ ranging. These values may be religious, political, intellectual

 Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality?,” 140.  This is a kind of pluralism that Locke attributes, perhaps mistakenly, to William James. 45  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives.” 43 44

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(epistemological/metaphysical/scientific/logical), moral, or aesthetic.46 Again, Locke asked us to relinquish the notion of value-absolutes, not values simpliciter or our preferences for certain of them. Rather than relinquishing our values simpliciter, dethroning our absolute values entails a selection of those values based on what Locke called “functional rightness.”47 Functional rightness has two entailments. First, it entails selecting those values that serve some pragmatic function such as solving particular practical problems. “Solving practical problems” implies a preference for and selection of values for non-arbitrary reasons. And so second, but prior to preference and selection, functional rightness entails an interrogation of our values to see what pragmatic functions they serve. Our preferences for certain values become justified by their pragmatic function, though without being uniformitarian universalist or dogmatic. Why? Values are historical and contextual products, and there are different histories and contexts of the world that might justify certain values in different locations, at different times, and for different lengths of time. Locke wrote that: “Value profession or adherence on that [systematic pluralist] basis would need to be critical and selective and tentative (in the sense that science is tentative) and revisionist in procedure rather than dogmatic, final and en bloc.”48 Now from the preceding quotation we see that Locke bought into the pragmatist conceptions of fallibilism and meliorism. Humans and human sciences are prone to error. However, humans can improve to make progress, both in terms of science and epistemology (intellectual pursuits), and in terms of social and political matters. As is demonstrated in Chap. 6, Locke took there to be a closer connection between facts and values than many thinkers, particularly logical positivists during his lifetime. For Locke, values are perceived with facts. Both move in certain directions given pragmatic considerations. And so, like facts, values should be revised when they no longer possess a practical function. They should constantly be reevaluated in light of new evidence, circumstances, and practical needs because humans are fallible but able to improve. There are a host of epistemological and social/political benefits that derive from dethroning our absolute values in favor of a systematic 46   Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 55. Also see “Values and Imperatives.” 47  Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 56. 48  Ibid., 57.

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pluralism that endorses “functionally right” values. First, Locke thought that systematic pluralism has the value of confirming what he called “basic human values” or “common-denominator values.”49 Locke agreed with absolutists that there are in fact fundamental values. In interrogating our values to see what pragmatic functions they serve, Locke thought that we would discover that particular values exist in most, if not all, societies. Such an existence would give the values a kind of objectivity or universality—though not with the metaphysical grounding desired by absolutists. In the next chapter, we will see three of these values, namely liberty, equality, and fraternity. One might add values such as “belief in God [or ­something or being beyond humanity], commitment to one’s cultural community, respect for human life [or an inability to tolerate irresponsibly ending human life], etc. which though they may have multifarious manifestations, are in a more general way common to most, if not all, groups.”50 For Locke however, pluralism places the universal values on surer grounds than the arbitrary grounds of the dogmatist or metaphysically questionable grounds of the uniformitarian universalist. And so, pluralism provides better reasons for claiming that certain of our values are universal, and reduces the attribution of universality to values that lack them. Beyond the perhaps paradoxical confirmation that there are universal values, pluralism has the benefit of justifying many of our beliefs in universal values. Epistemologically, “the standard of value justification would then not be so very different from the accepted scientific criterion of proof—confirmable invariably in concrete human experience.”51 Locke, like most pragmatists, took experience or empirical evidence—particularly when captured by science—to be a better ground for knowledge than mere belief or logic. Again, because Locke was a fallibilist, he denied that science uncovers indubitable and timeless truths. However, science gives us the ability to falsify hypotheses and replace them with better ones that better explain, predict, and control nature. For Locke, the “true,” as well as the “good” and the “right” are judged to be such because they are better than alternatives.52 And so, universal values grounded in human experience through scientific investigations such as anthropology “would be  Ibid., 56.  Jacoby Adeshei Carter, “Moral Imperatives for World Order: Alain Locke on Pluralism and Relativism,” 221. 51  Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 56. 52  Alain Locke, A Functional View of Value Ultimates,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 84. 49 50

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more widely acceptable and more objectively justified than would ever be possible by either the arbitrary fiat of belief or the brittle criterion of logical consistency.”53 Locke also thought that pluralism would lead to a more objective understanding and comparison of values than uniformitarian universalism. Locke took uniformitarian universalism to be corrupted by uncritical loyalties that color observers’ understanding of values outside of their world-­ view, and skew any comparison of values. Pluralism is a more objective way to understand and compare values in two ways. First, in understanding values, it takes into account the context and history that produced them, and allows for an understanding of them on those terms. And so, with a proper understanding values, one begins by asking: “Why were these values institutionalized”? and “What purpose do they serve or function do they satisfy?” In comparing values, the pluralist asks both: “Do these values satisfy their function better or worse than those that we use to satisfy exact or similar functions?” and “Which values in the comparison better serve ‘basic human values’ or ‘common-denominator values?’” On this basis, the pluralist has better reasons to support conclusions in the comparison of values. More than epistemological benefits, Locke took there to be social/ political benefits to endorsing pluralism. “Now such a [pluralist] rationale is needed for the effective implementation of the practical corollaries of value pluralism—tolerance and value reciprocity, and one might add, as a sturdier intellectual base for democracy.”54 Locke thought that tolerance and reciprocity—the willingness to allow and share with others’ values— are necessary for healthy social and political relations. He was worried about our unreasonable commitment to various ideas, mores, and faiths. And he drew a connection between this unreasonable commitment or loyalty and an unreasonably fierce defense of these, along with our desire to see them spread. For Locke, an unreasonably fierce defense and desire to spread ideas, mores, and faiths is the cause of conflict and the constant threat of it. A willingness to allow others to endorse and express divergent values is necessary for the constitution and political will of a democratic nation. However, this would not go far enough. Locke thought that sharing with others would better allow us to recognize their humanity—the fundamental basis of equality that we all share—and would be a better  Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 56–57.  Ibid., 57.

53 54

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ground for mutual respect than either dismissal of difference or mere acceptance. Pluralism’s being better than these alternatives justified it in a way that delegitimized dismissal or mere acceptance. Additionally, Locke argued that systematic pluralism justifies values with a better psychological base than uniformitarian universalism. Locke lamented a failure to seriously commit to values that are belligerently held but blended with or masked by progressive concepts like tolerance and reciprocity. This failure was owed to each concept’s having “been based on moral abstractions, with vague sentimental sanctions as ‘virtues’ and ‘ideals’….” However, “Rarely have these attitudes been connected sensibly with self-interest or realistically bound up with a perspective turned towards one’s own position and its values.”55 Here, we see Locke’s acknowledgment of a kind of egoism that must be taken into account when thinking about why humans endorse values. Humans act from the motive of self-interest. And values are more seriously committed to when they satisfy self-interests. Humans may pay lip service to arbitrary dogmatisms and abstract moral systems that merely connect concepts and actions to theories of God, virtue, or morality, requiring them merely on that basis with no appeal to human self-interest. And humans may go so far as to kill and oppress in their name. However, these values are thinly held and will be abandoned in favor of values and actions that satisfy self-interest when they run against each other. Merely think of the belligerent Christian who gets offended when Christianity is challenged, or who has a disdain for Muslims, but who’s life doesn’t seem to reflect Christian values, and who rarely if ever attends Church services. Pluralism, because it calls us to justify our commitments to values via their functional rightness, provides a psychological interest for those who are committed to them. Functionally right values can be claimed to be best for self-interested persons because of the practical benefits they provide or problems they solve. Further, on this pluralist basis, values can be debated to test their ability to satisfy our interests. They can be revised or jettisoned when they fail to satisfy our interest via providing benefits or solving problems. By appeal to pluralism the question is not how best to impose arbitrary values or convince people to accept abstract moral systems of which they are a part. The question is how best to debate values’ ability to satisfy our self-interests, and how to show people that these values are in fact in their interests given their concerns and world-views. This  Ibid., 59.

55

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is undoubtedly is a sturdier and more peaceable way to hold and share values given the plurality of value-systems throughout the world. An added benefit for pluralism, about which Locke did not write, but that I would like to briefly highlight, is its ability to critique one’s holding values. Recall that in understanding values, pluralism raises the question: “What purposes do values serve or functions do they satisfy?” Unlike both the anarchistic pluralist or uniformitarian universalist, one might critique another’s holding some value by showing that: (1) the value no longer serves the function for which it was institutionalized; (2) the value no longer does so better than a competing or alternative value would; or (3) the history and context of the community has changed such that the function is no longer relevant, and so the value is meaningless. And so, I do not take Locke’s pluralism to lack the ability to critique values outside of their world-view. It is not merely the “live and let live” approach that Locke himself classified it as.56 All of this has been to show that for Locke, there are certain obligations that we have to others (both positive and negative) that derive from the basic humanity that all persons share. These obligations confer rights that are owed regardless of any particular (and especially accidental) properties that humans have. Again, instead of having these be supported by or leading to uniformitarian universalism, Locke argued that the presupposition of our basic humanity, as a condition of peace—in which we all have an interest—leads us to endorse a pluralism that commits us to select values on the basis of their functional rightness. Now Locke’s claims about human equality, or more appropriately how he grounds human equality, may raise questions about whether Locke was committed to the kind of moral cosmopolitanism that many cosmopolitans promote—what may be regarded as a genuine moral cosmopolitanism. Recall that cosmopolitans tend to ground obligations to humanity qua humanity in certain internal properties such as reason. There is quite a long history of cosmopolitan thought whereby this capacity gives humans an inviolable dignity that makes them appropriate rights-bearers and ultimate units of moral concern. One may question whether Locke took there to be something internal to humanity that grounds basic human equality. If he did not, then one may question whether he had a genuine notion of moral cosmopolitanism. 56  See Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Ideological Peace,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 97 and 102.

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Locke grounded many of his ideas about cosmopolitanism, democracy, and value in pragmatic considerations. He wrote things that liken the following: “democracy and equality are necessary if we want peace in the world” and “respect for and reciprocity with different values are necessary because uniformitarianism is impossible.” Statements like these seem to be conditioned by some higher-order desire that democratic values serve, or seem to imply beliefs or attitudes necessary for dealing with the concrete realities of the world—say the fact that uniformity in values is impossible and belief in or commitment to such an idea is impractical. In “Color,” Locke framed the requirement to spread democracy in the following way: “For better or worse, we face the alternatives of world chaos, world tyranny or world order, and democracy must take serious stock of that. This is what I presume to call democracy’s unfinished business.”57 He later argued that either the world will be wholly slave or free, and its movement in either direction will be the direct result of how much and how consistently democratic ideals govern states.58 In “Democracy Faces a World Order,” Locke claimed that: “Against the background of totalitarian challenge, it has been necessary to envisage a world order consistently and realistically democratic.”59 And still further, at times Locke seemed to make cosmopolitanism a condition of living amicably together given the conditions of contact that colonialism created.60 From claims like the above, it would appear that Locke was making the point that we can either move toward chaos/slavery/hostility or order/freedom/amicability. If democracy succeeds—that is to say if we fulfill and spread certain democratic ideals—then we will move toward order/freedom/amicability. And if we fail to fulfill and spread these ideals, then we will move toward the former. We should spread democratic ideals insofar as chaos/slavery/hostility are not in anyone’s interest. And so the obligations to fulfill and spread democratic ideals in a way that liberates humans in America and oppressed groups around the world do not derive merely from obligations to humans qua their humanity. World chaos/ slavery/hostility are practical problems, and world order/freedom/amicability are in everyone’s interest. Completing democracy’s unfinished business appears to be an experimental project aimed at solving this  Alain Locke, “Color: The Unfinished Business of Democracy,” 534.  Ibid., 535. 59  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” 542. 60  Alain Locke, “Color: The Unfinished Business of Democracy,” 535. 57 58

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practical problem in a way that serves our interests. Thus, statements such as these seem to commit Locke to a kind of pragmatism that may cast some doubt on Locke being committed to moral cosmopolitanism in the way described above. One might object that genuine moral cosmopolitanism is committed to treating people in certain ways for a very specific reason—namely, that one is a human to whom certain obligations are owed. This reason is categorical. Further, one might claim that something—say reason—is necessary to ground the equality of human beings. A practical problem is not “thick” enough to support moral cosmopolitanism. However, Locke’s pragmatism calls for one to be treated in certain ways for hypothetical reasons, which may not be respect-worthy for a genuine moral cosmopolitan. And in addition, Locke may not have an adequate concept to support moral cosmopolitanism. So why not interpret Locke as putting forward the presupposition of human equality and obligations to humanity on pragmatic grounds (or strictly for pragmatic—hypothetical—reasons)? I think that there is no reason to reject Locke’s commitment to pragmatism here. However, Locke’s pragmatic considerations, while perhaps not exhaustive, support his moral cosmopolitanism. Further, though Locke never stated his position directly, there are good reasons to think that he would deny that moral cosmopolitanism is grounded in an internal property—say reason— that gives humans something like an inherent dignity. And so, our obligations to humanity qua humanity may not be grounded in the way that many cosmopolitan thinkers’ obligations are grounded. Rights are not conferred on the basis of internal properties. For Locke, obligations to humanity qua humanity derive in part from the necessitation of peace and order to avoid war and chaos. One comes to possess “human rights” or “rights on the basis of world-citizenship” given a kind of social recognition that peace—as a necessitated social situation—conditions. In this way, Locke would best be classified as a rights-externalist.61 If genuine moral cosmopolitanism is interpreted as being committed to categorical reasons that are owed to an inherent value attributed to certain properties—say reason, and this gives agents “inherent dignity,” then Locke is not a genuine moral cosmopolitan. For Locke, we may have obligations to humanity via the possession of reason. However, this is not owed to the inherent value of reason or a kind of dignity that possessing it 61  For a very interesting defense of rights externalism (particularly as it regards race), see Derrick Darby, Rights, Race and Recognition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

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gives us. Equality is not conferred because of an equal dignity, and humans are not the primary units of moral concern because of the possession of this inherent trait. Given the above, Locke seems to have thought that reason gives us the ability to harbor resentment, hatred, malice, and a host of potentially chaotic and destructive modes of being. War is the result of reason, and chaos is the result of war. In this way, our obligations to humanity may be grounded in reason because of the practical problems related to our possessing reason. Conferring human rights requires a peaceful resolution to practical problems. Equality of persons, parity of cultures, respect for humans, and so on that lead to conferring “human rights” is necessary to avoid chaos that is the result of failing to confer these rights to all those who possess reason. In the end, I find no reason to cede the claim that genuine moral cosmopolitanism requires being committed to categorical reasons, or that those reasons be grounded in agents’ “inherent dignity” via some internal property.62 So, Locke endorsed moral cosmopolitanism, though perhaps not in the way that many moral cosmopolitans would accept. But why claim that Locke was a thick moral cosmopolitan? A significant reason to think that Locke endorsed a thick moral cosmopolitanism is his view of patriotism that derives from his agreement with Franz Boas. In Race and Democratic Society, Boas wrote that “it is my opinion that our first duties are to humanity as a whole, and that in a conflict of duties our obligations to humanity are of higher value than those toward the nation; in other words, that patriotism must be subordinated to humanism.”63 Boas was writing specifically of states’ obligations, and not those of individuals. However, it would be peculiar if Boas would not extend these obligations to individuals. Why argue that states have an obligation to humanity qua humanity over citizens qua citizens if individuals’ obligations are differently construed? Such a construal would end in a tense relationship between individuals and states wherein they live. It seems that the best way to cultivate a citizenry that respects the obligations of states is to construe each one’s obligations on an equal footing. Now there are two possible interpretations of Boas’ words. One might interpret Boas as suggesting that there are no specific familial or group-­ based obligations; all obligations are to humanity, insofar as for any  I do, however, take the potential objection to be worthy of a complete address.  Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality?,” 142. Locke takes this from: Franz Boas, Race and Democratic Society (New York: J.J. Augustin, 1946) 156. 62 63

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Action(A) there is a Choice(B) that conflicts with another Choice(D), where (B) is local and (D) is global. And so for every action a commitment to humanity qua humanity—(D)—is more morally weighty than a local commitment (B). This leaves us with no obligations to family or some local group. There would be no room for local obligations because there are always global concerns, and thus obligations which override local obligations. One might interpret Boas’ words in a second way. One might interpret him as suggesting that there are genuine familial or group-based obligations that do not conflict with obligations to humanity qua humanity. However, when there is a conflict we are morally required to choose based on the more morally weighty obligation, namely the obligation to humanity qua humanity. It is not quite clear which interpretation is correct, and thus with which interpretation Locke was in agreement. The first is clearly thick, while the second clearly thin. Now in passages that Locke did not cite, Boas claimed that: “These opinions bring it about that I am uncompromisingly opposed to all legislation, such as protective tariffs, that is intended to advance the interests of citizens at the expense of foreigners.” This passage seems to commit Boas to thick moral cosmopolitanism.64 However, he later claimed that in “very serious” and “limited” circumstances, some resource can be reserved for citizens so long as it does not come at a “serious loss to other communities.”65 Again, this addition lends to both interpretations. In any event, patriotic actions—actions that privilege a state’s citizens—must either always be immoral or morally permissible only when they do not conflict with an obligation to humanity on that basis. Locke conceded Boas’ words, particularly insofar as they critique a kind of closed-minded and belligerent patriotism. And though Locke did not provide significant context for which way we might interpret Boas, Locke’s use of them was to ground his own thought. Locke denied neither patriotic impulses nor a nation’s obligations to citizens over humanity at large. By implication of these, Locke did not deny obligations to specific local groups over humanity qua humanity. Speaking of the world citizen, Locke tells us that: “The world citizen is not going to be a renegade patriot or an expatriate who lives or thinks as an unanchored cosmopolite.”66 Locke  Boas, Race and Democratic Society, 158.  Ibid. 66  Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality?,” 143. 64 65

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rejected the person who sides with the state or its actions arbitrarily, without critical thought or reflection, and who is easily swayed by nationalist propaganda. This is the unthoughtful agent who resists any criticism of the state merely because it is criticism of the state, or performs some action relative to the state from an unreasonable belief about citizens’ duties. Such an agent is more of a threat to peace than a help. They resist progressive change, considerations of other states or humans, and cultures deemed foreign because “they are a patriot.” For Locke, even in a democracy, these patriots would be “the best of democrats for the worst of reasons— mere conformity.” And if in a tyranny, “these citizens would be the ‘perfect’ Nazis and the best of totalitarians.”67 Locke equally rejected the agent who eschews patriotism by eschewing a commitment to any nation. This is the noncommittal, rootless Diogenesian cosmopolitan who is just as useless to peace as the renegade patriot. This seemingly selfish agent will never call a nation to action, where that action considers its policies in the broader context of its effect on humanity at large. The lone iconoclast will never commit to a local group to assist their flourishing and further the aims or values of cosmopolitanism. They live merely for themself, and in accordance with their own standards. Though not selfish in the same way as the belligerent patriot or dogmatic religionist who desires a univocal set of values expressed the world over, the noncommittal cosmopolitan shirks responsibility to any group. In shirking responsibility to any group, the Diogenesian cosmopolitan shirks the core cosmopolitan commitment of working for peace in the world. In rejecting this cosmopolitan, Locke required both rootedness in a community and some form of patriotism—a sort of devotion to and support for one’s national community. Locke argued for an expanded notion of patriotism, and argued for it as a precondition for the emergence of a cosmopolitan community. Locke’s patriotism—a cosmopolitan patriotism—requires citizens to press their governing nationalities to consider policies beyond their effect on states’ citizenry. Patriotism requires citizens demand that their nations institutionalize policies in light of interests beyond those of their own state and local citizens. The world citizen with a healthy sense of patriotism “is the citizen who will live in intelligent awareness of his [/her] and his [/her] nation’s place in the world, acting or striving to act to force his [/her]

 Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 59.

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nation to act in light of its world responsibilities….”68 And this is precisely why Locke required a sense of patriotism as a precondition for the emergence of a cosmopolitan community. States must be moved from thinking solely in its own interests in order for a cosmopolitan community to emerge. The noncommittal patriot, in living for themself and by their own standards, can never move nations toward the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. They do not love their country enough to desire its moral uprightness. They do not experience pain or shame at their country’s shameful actions, and so is not unsettled or moved to action. They cannot move the nation beyond its own interest from their outsider-­ position. Locke seems to have understood that there is a level of devotion to and support for states necessary for citizens to motivate those who would institutionalize policies that move beyond mere state-interests. Non-citizens cannot vote and perform actions that will move states beyond mere state-interests, and states-persons are less likely to respect demands from non-citizens in the same way that they respect demands from those who express love for and devotion to the state. Locke’s patriot would not demand that their nation act in the interest of another nation, abandoning its obligation to its own citizens and becoming a puppet in the service of other nations. Instead, Locke’s patriot demands that their nation considers policies as obligatory when they serve the interests of all humans. They demand that their nation considers how polices impact people’s lives regardless of the local nation to which those world-citizens belong. Patriots do not allow their nations to sacrifice or exploit non-citizens’ lives for national interests. And they reject their nation’s right to make policies that work against fundamental interests of humanity for more local interests. Here we can see the cosmopolitan patriot’s interest in exploitative policies for the procurement of goods and services, along with environmental policies that affect the larger world. And so Locke seemed to allow—and in fact require—a sense of patriotism for the world citizen. His notion denied blind loyalty, no loyalties, and loyalties disconnected from cosmopolitan ends. In this way, patriotism serves the aims and values of cosmopolitanism, and is justified only on that basis. Likewise, though perhaps inconsistent with his normative view of race, Locke seems to have thought that even the cultivation of a racial identity is justified only if it serves a cosmopolitan aim. Locke thought that racial

 Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality?,” 143.

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identities have a correlative relation to the cultivation of culture.69 Racial identities influence and are in some sense necessary for the cultivation of culture. And as we will see, he argued that one has an ethical duty to become cultured. Though one has this ethical duty, “if I thought it irreconcilable with the future development of internationalism and the approach toward universalism to foster the racial sense, stimulate the racial consciousness and help revive the lapsing racial tradition, I would count myself a dangerous reactionary, and be ashamed of what I still think is a worthy and constructive cause.”70 Racial identities are significant for culture, and culture is a duty. However, from Locke’s words it appears that the obligation to humanity qua humanity is a higher obligation than the obligation to culture. Further, Locke’s words indicate that he had the same justificatory requirement for one’s commitment to local causes—say one committed to the improvement of an oppressed group’s condition. Commitment to some cause or group is justified only by its role in furthering cosmopolitan aims. So let’s say that some agent is thinking about committing to some cause or local group. If the cause or local group is antithetical to or unconcerned with humanity beyond that particular group, then the agent has an overriding reason not commit to the cause or local group. This is not to say that Locke was unconcerned about oppressed groups qua their oppression. Oppression should be eliminated, and the condition of oppressed groups should be ameliorated because they are humans. As humans, members of oppressed groups are appropriate and equal units of moral concern. However, two clarificatory points are needed to understand Locke’s thought about group oppression. First, Locke thought that: “The pursuit of human liberation always occurs through the struggles of particular communities.”71 Grounded in Bahá’í principles, Locke argued that humans “function there [in groups] is to share the loyalties of the group, but upon a different plane and with a higher perspective. He [and she] must partake of partisanship in order to work toward its transformation, and help keep it within the bounds of constructive and controlled 69  Alain Locke, “The Contribution of Race to Culture,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 70  Ibid., 202. 71  Leonard Harris: “Universal Human Liberation and Community: Pixley Kaisaka Seme and Alain LeRoy Locke,” in Perspectives in African Philosophy: An Anthology on ‘Problematics of an African Philosophy: Twenty Years After (1976–1996) ed. Claude Sumner and Samuel Wolde Yohannes (Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University, 2002) 151.

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self-assertion.”72 Particular groups are transformed—either in terms of their condition (moving from oppressed to liberated) or their attitude (moving from unconcerned for others to being concerned with humans beyond the group). However, these more local groups must be engaged, and in a partisan way. Locke seemed skeptical of a nonpartisan concern for humanity at large. This idea was perhaps too abstract to have meaning. And second, Locke thought that ameliorating the oppression of particular groups contributes to furthering cosmopolitan aims unless it comes at the cost of some other group. Working to end oppression comes at the cost of others either by direct oppression or wantonly ignoring others’ struggles. Locke constantly thought beyond local groups. Though local groups are necessary—in terms of both the rootedness that they provide and their function in spreading peace—they should not be the end of our concern. Locke’s thought that obligations and commitments to local groups must serve the ends of cosmopolitanism in order to be justified is shown by appeal to his involvement in various groups, along with his thoughts about progressive social and political policies. That Locke had interests in either establishing or participating in local groups with the broader cosmopolitan aim can be seen very early in his life. Early in Locke’s life as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, Locke co-founded a university society called the Cosmopolitan Club. The club had the charge of promoting “mutual knowledge and sympathy between members of different nationalities residing in Oxford.”73 As envisioned by Locke and the other co-­ founders, the aim was not to force the denial or relinquishment of national identity, as intimated by the charge. Several of the club’s debates centered on both raising awareness of and garnering appreciation for themes related to disparate national literatures, histories, and social contexts of the particular nations with group members therein.74 Several members were inspired to “return to their various countries and serve the interests of their people.”75 Locke himself began learning to understand American racism and its larger context of imperialism and colonization, about which he wrote extensively throughout his life.76 The goal of the club was to  Alain Locke, “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle,” 137.  Quoted from Leonard Harris & Charles Molesworth, Alain L. Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010) 71. 74  Ibid., 71–73. 75  Ibid., 72. 76  Jeffery Stewart, The New Negro: The Life of Alain Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018) 132. 72 73

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broaden individuals’ concern for others, and to do so in a forum that encouraged the sharing of ideas about how best to bring people together. It was “a kind of international club for members to read papers and argue how best to promote cosmopolitanism.”77 Through this club, Locke was able to see particular problems related to specific groups anew. He was able to better connect problems related to African Americans to other groups in the world that faced similar problems, and came to the conclusion that there may require similar solutions to the problems affecting different groups. And though never directly stated, this is perhaps a reason for why Locke required a commitment to local groups in serving cosmopolitan aims. Locke may have thought that many of the problems of particular groups had broader explanations or contexts, and that a solution to these problems required addressing broader explanations or contexts. Beyond his belief that all peoples make up one human family could have been a more practical thought that a particular problem—say racism in America—required a broader solution that requires considering its connectedness with different contexts and problems in the world—say imperialism, colonialism, and economic inequality. And so a solution to racism in America was impossible on its own, and that it must be addressed or solved it in its broader context. A major reason why Locke saw a commitment to a local cause or community as justificatory only by its service to cosmopolitan aims may be that Locke was aware of problems and oppressions as interconnected. In this way, people’s fate and liberatory efforts need be intertwined. Locke’s requirement of a commitment to a local cause as justificatory only by its service to cosmopolitan aims was behind his rejection of what he termed an “insidious form of racialism.” We might understand this racialism as an isolationist counter to racism by an oppressed community whereby the oppressed community adopts and expresses insular attitudes about liberation and policies needed to achieve that end.78 As related to Blacks specifically, it is an extreme, isolated form of Black liberatory efforts, Black nativism, or Black Nationalism. This form of racialism desires  Ibid., 130.  Alain Locke, “Stretching Our Social Mind,” in World Order, Vol. 38, No 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J.  Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2006–2007) 31. 77 78

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complete self-sufficiency and expresses no concern for other races or ethnic groups, oppressed or otherwise. It causes adherents to refuse to union with others for the betterment of those beyond its group, and causes them to reject broader policies or proposed solutions to problems. Locke understood this as an understandable and perhaps inevitable initial response to racism or perhaps some similar form of oppression. Still, it is one that is “not warrantable” and is ultimately counter-progressive.79 For Locke, “just as world-mindedness must dominate and remould [sic] national mindedness [that is, cosmopolitan patriotism must take the place of belligerent patriotism], so we must transform eventually race-mindedness into human-mindedness.”80 And so just as cosmopolitan patriotism is an attitude that must be cultivated as a precondition for the emergence of a cosmopolitan community, other-regarding attitudes of oppressed groups’ must also be cultivated.81 Locke’s rejection of this form of racialism was behind his longstanding desire to see the name and aims of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) change to the National Association of the Advancement of American Democracy (NAAAD).82 One can imagine that this was a mere step toward something like the National Association from the Advancement of World Democracy (NAAWD). So for Locke, the cultivation of certain attitudes does not merely extend to whites, or other members of dominant groups, say Christians. Oppressed groups must also cultivate certain attitudes necessary for ushering in a cosmopolitan community. Oppressed groups must be willing to work with and on behalf of other oppressed groups. Further, Locke would perhaps require forgiveness of and union with oppressive groups so long as their aims are toward political, social, and economic democracy. Moreover, Locke was constantly concerned with a kind of adoption of oppressive and exploitative mindsets taken on by members of oppressed groups. Paulo Freire puts the point well when he wrote that “at a certain point in their existential experience the oppressed feel an irresistible attraction towards the oppressors and their way of life. Sharing this way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In their alienation, the oppressed want at any 79  Locke understands this as a “stage” in responding to racism, one that begins in paternalism, moves through racialism, and ends with groups unifying under a common cause. 80  Alain Locke, “Stretching Our Social Mind,” 30. 81  Ibid. 82  Ibid.

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cost to resemble the oppressors, to imitate them, to follow them.”83 Like Freire, Locke was concerned that the oppressed “adopt an attitude of ‘adhesion’ to the oppressor.”84 For Locke, appeals for and efforts aimed at justice derive practical and moral strength from their connection to larger groups. With specific regard to oppressed African Americans, Locke argued that it was time to “stretch our social minds and achieve thereby a new dynamic as well as new alliances in the common fight for human justice and freedom of which our minority cause is a vital but nonetheless only a fractional part.”85 Locke’s reasoning was two-fold. First, Locke reasoned that a broadened aim—one inclusive of other oppressed or disadvantaged groups—lends more power to the effort. This is the obvious point that the greater the number of allies a particular movement or cause has, the more power and greater likelihood it has to achieve its ends. Second, Locke thought that a group’s unwillingness to work toward liberation for any oppressed group, or to union with other oppressed groups for their liberation, demonstrates a lack of commitment to humanity as equal units of moral concern. As a result of this lack of commitment, one is not really committed to freedom and justice. With regard to the first reason, Locke envisioned unifications with groups via a common cause, one whereby different racial and cultural groups collaborate without completely abandoning specific group-­ interests.86 Groups would unify on the basis of what he called “common 83  Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 30th Anniversary Edition, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2000) 62. 84  Ibid., 45. 85  Ibid. Though Locke envisioned this stretching of African Americans’ social minds to regard more considerations of what is good in a democratic state, Locke obviously intended this to extend beyond America. Immediately prior to this, Locke stateed that “just as world-­ mindedness must dominate and remould [sic] national mindedness, so we must transform eventually race-mindedness into human-mindedness.” Again, for Locke, cosmopolitanism requires a growing attitude that begins with local communities, but extends outward to broader communities. Further, as will be discussed in Chap. 3, Locke saw democracy as necessary for cosmopolitanism, and saw democratic states such as the United States as a necessary light for the spread of both democratic and cosmopolitan ideals. Locke thought that a healthy democracy, one where these ideals are modeled by its citizens, was essential. And so, Locke would require citizens in a healthy democracy—even those committed to local causes or communities—view both problems that they faced and solutions to them more broadly than they local communities. 86  Ibid., 32.

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denominator” dilemmas or demands—those that affected or were desired by all involved groups. African Americans might unify with different groups in “the National Maritime Union, the CIO labor movement…the Southern Farm Tenant’s [sic]” on the basis of their work that aims to alleviate problems faced by each group involved in the respective movements. Though potentially problematic for several reasons—chief among them that particular groups may be marginalized or rejected altogether—this strategy may have the effect of creating more buy-in from non-groups as it relates to specific group-interests not shared by other involved groups. Thus, it can potentially make refusing to hear groups’ claims impolitic or impossible. With regard to the second reason, unwillingness or union with or assist other oppressed groups shows that a group fails to acknowledge a very significant principle of the thing toward which they claim to be working. If justice and freedom demand that all humans be deemed equal—that no human or group has a claim or right to equality where others do not, and one is unwilling to work toward liberation for all, then one does not value equality and thereby justice and freedom. One thereby has no grounds to claim to be working for justice and freedom (but rather some selfishness interest). And one has no grounds to demand—in the name of justice and freedom—that others help to end or be concerned with their particular oppression. If freedom and justice are valued, then they must be valued for all; we must be interested in the freedom and justice of all humans if we are interested in freedom and justice as it relates to ourselves. And if we are unwilling to work toward liberation for any oppressed group, or union with other groups for liberation, then we do not value freedom and justice. Finally if we do not value freedom and justice, then we have no right to claim it for ourselves. We merely shield our selfish desires to improve our position with the concepts “freedom” and “justice.” Lastly, before moving to Locke’s thin political cosmopolitanism, I think it important to highlight that Locke thought that members of certain groups had special obligations. These members had obligations to support particular causes, possess particular interests, and engage in particular practices given groups to which they belong, even as service to these are justified by their use to bring about cosmopolitan aims. So there is an obligation for citizens to be patriots. And patriotism needs to express itself as taking an interest in the liberation of groups beyond those within the state. However, Locke thought that particular citizens as subgroups in a

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state have special obligations that extend beyond those of out-group cosmopolitan patriots. Locke wrote, but never published, a rather controversial work entitled “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire.” As is demonstrated below, it is an important piece for understanding his economic cosmopolitanism. The work is an examination of certain protectorates—termed mandates—for colonized territories as conceived of and supported by the League of Nations. Though Locke lamented the United States for taking no official role in the League of Nations, he credited the United States for taking an unofficial interest in, and for giving support to, the mandates. He cited the interest and support as “considerable and influential,” especially as it regarded African mandates. Locke wrote that: At this critical constructive stage in the development of the mandates system and policy, in both the spheres of its direct jurisdiction and indirect influence, the increased participation and cooperation of enlightened American opinion and assistance is imperatively needed. Further, such participation and cooperation could come in considerable measure from no more logical or desirable source than from the enlightened sections of the Negro-­ American population, as Afro-Americans twice interested and doubly obligated.87

In the passage, Locke discussed the necessity of positive opinions and assistance from US policy-makers. One of the reasons for the necessity of these was its effect on “Negro-Americans.” Undoubtedly, Locke required positive opinions and assistance that affect “Negro Americans” because Locke conceived the United States as having an interest in showing itself better than many attitudes and actions directed against Blacks both in America and abroad. Healthy social relations would require a demonstration to an oppressed group that actions against and attitudes toward members of the oppressed group have change. Additionally, Locke argued that Black Americans have an interest in the liberation of humans qua humanity, but an especial interest as those who feel some connection to Africans affected by the mandates. Further, Black Americans are thought to have an additional obligation. Participation and cooperation are required. However, Locke did not tell us to whom the obligation is owed, or what satisfying these obligations entails. Is the 87  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 515.

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obligation to support the League of Nations? The mandates related to Africa? US efforts are supporting the mandates? Or Africans in some more direct way? Whatever the case may be, Locke thought that certain group members—namely, African Americans—had special obligations given groups to which they belong. Special obligations are behind Locke’s endorsement of Du Bois’ Talented Tenth, and Blacks’ obligation to both appreciate cultures and attain greatness.88 In fact, Locke seems to argue asymmetrical special obligations whereby certain oppressed groups have an obligation to resist complete assimilation and form solidarity groups that express themselves in particular cultural and artistic ways. Locke endorsed this for Celtic and Pan-Slavic groups, and suggested it for Black Americans and Pan-African groups.89 One may question why Locke would require special obligations. One possible explanation derives from Leonard Harris’ thinking on why Locke thought it important for Blacks to be cultured. Harris tells us that: “Locke is acutely aware of the way Afro-Americans are subject to being judged by whites. An individual Black person’s mode of being and the mode of being of Black people as a group were commonly judged identically.”90 Locke may have thought that Blacks have an added obligation for two reasons. First, as suggested by Harris, there is a likelihood that individuals will be judged identically with perceptions of the group to which they belong. If steps are not taken to eliminate the basis of racist judgment, then racism will continue. Second, people have an obligation not to free-ride. And so we might sum up Locke moral cosmopolitanism as a thick moral cosmopolitanism that allows for, and even requires, local commitments. These commitments, however, are not ends in themselves. Justification for them lay in their ability to further cosmopolitan ends. Likewise for Locke, members’ involvement in these local groups are justified only insofar as 88  See Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Race, ed. Jeffery C. Stewart (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1992) 98 & Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture,” The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 89  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Race, ed. Jeffery C. Stewart (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1992) 99–100 & Alain Locke, “The New Negro,” in The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance, ed. Alain Locke (New York: Touchstone Simon and Schuster, 1992). 90  Leonard Harris, “Introduction to ‘The Ethics of Culture,’” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 175.

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they are looking beyond local groups. Involvement in local groups requires members to further cosmopolitan aims.

Locke’s Thin Political Cosmopolitanism Recall that political cosmopolitanism is a theory about the political rights of states, state-citizens, and world-citizens, and that it tends to derive from and depend on moral cosmopolitanism. Recall also that thick political cosmopolitans advocate for the abolition of all existing states and the establishment of a single world-state. Thin political cosmopolitans advocate for something far weaker, say a consortium of states that come together for the sake of keeping peace or perhaps a voluntary transfer of some part of their sovereignty to a higher-order, more global power. Locke endorsed a thin political cosmopolitanism structured along the latter, namely that states voluntarily transfer some part of their sovereignty to a higher-order, more global power. Locke did not say too much about states’ right to sovereignty and organization on that basis. Though Locke’s political cosmopolitanism is not as developed as other of his cosmopolitan commitments, he gave us direction as to what he might say. Like many political cosmopolitan arguments, his political cosmopolitanism was undergirded by his moral cosmopolitanism. In this way, we can take what he said about nations’ right to sovereignty and organization on that basis and, given his moral cosmopolitanism, make inferences about his political cosmopolitan commitments. If we assume that Locke intended to be consistent on the issue, then we may piece together a more complete picture of what his political cosmopolitanism must look like. Locke gave us reason to think that a cosmopolitan community can only be cultivated given a reorganization of states. This reorganization would affect states’ sovereignty. Further, Locke was committed to the view that our attitudes toward states, along with our conception of a state, must be rethought. In “Moral Imperatives for World Order,” Locke made the argument that group-loyalty is both expressive of human nature and is valuable as an expression. For Locke: “Loyalty to corporate unity is a necessary loyalty to something larger than the individual in order to unite men.”91 Loyalty is in some sense necessary given the social nature of human beings; humans are social animals who desire being with and  Alain Locke, “Moral Imperatives for World Order,” 151.

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feeling a sense of belonging among others. It is an expression of those desires. Further, it is valuable because it connects humans to each other, without which humans will exhibit a kind of selfishness that is antisocial. In short, loyalty is important because it brings people together. Now for Locke, we do not simply want to connect with others, we often desire to be a part of something “big”—something far greater than a local community. Our sense of belonging extends, and our sense of being is enlarged by, our being a part of a state, religion, or race. And so, given these desires, we feel immense loyalty to these groups. Locke referred to these as corporate loyalties. We have loyalties to our states, particular religions or sects, races, and ethnicities as an extension of basic desires to be with and belong among others. In having these loyalties, we tend to extend our concern only so far as the limits of our corporate group. This loyalty constrains considerations of others, though malice toward out-group members is not a necessary feature of it.92 “However, the traditional ideas and values associated with human group loyalties are now hopelessly inadequate as a foundation for a larger society and impose limitations on a more comprehensive human society.”93 The fundamental problem that emerges with our overcommitment to group-loyalties is the increased interconnectivity of the world. As the world shrinks, our considerations of others must expand so as to preserve the relations necessary for peace. And so our thinking about and commitment to corporate loyalties must evolve to maintain peace. Certain of our ideas about local loyalties must change. “These basic corporate ideas [that must change] concern (1) the nation as a political corporate idea, (2) the race as a cultural corporate idea, and (3) the sect as a spiritual corporate idea.”94 In speaking about the nation as a political corporate idea, Locke tells us that: “We must give up some of this arbitrary sovereignty in order to prevent war, to get fellowship among nations, to erase conflict boundaries which are potential battlelines.”95 In requiring nation-states to give up some of their “arbitrary” sovereignty, Locke seems to have rejected thick political cosmopolitanism. He did not call for the abolition of states. Use 92  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Race, 20. 93  Alain Locke, “Moral Imperatives for World Order,” 151. 94  Ibid. 95  Ibid.

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of the term implies that there are rights deriving from a state’s sovereignty that are non-arbitrary. Further, use of “some” seems to indicate that not even all arbitrary sovereignty is to be given up. He was not asking states to abandon sovereignty simpliciter. And for these reasons it seems doubtful that Locke argued for a world-state, perhaps of the kind that David Held has proposed.96 A world-state is predicated on states’ abdication of sovereignty to a higher, univocal political order. Locke’s support for the right to sovereignty being granted to territories that were colonized by European nations also supports Locke’s rejection of thick moral cosmopolitanism. Why support granting colonized nations the right to sovereignty if either all nations should relinquish sovereignty simpliciter or relinquish it for the establishment of a world-state? Locke’s description of the sovereignty that must be given up as arbitrary seems to deny either view. Further, recall a fundamental component of Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism. Locke required a sense of patriotism, albeit reconfigured in a way that considers a patriot and their state’s place in the world. This critical cosmopolitan patriotism requires citizens to press their governing states to consider policies beyond their effect on citizenry. It seems that the requirement of patriotism that serves cosmopolitan ends implies that there are sovereign states. Why think that Locke would require patriotism—and require it to be shaped in the way that he did—as a precondition for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community if he endorsed thick political cosmopolitanism? And so we might infer from his moral cosmopolitan requirement of patriotism that Locke did not support thick political cosmopolitanism. Now Locke did support a “democratic world order or democracy on a world scale.”97 And he made claims that lend themselves to supporting either a thick or thin political cosmopolitanism. He tells us that: “A reasonable democratic peace (like no other peace before it) must integrate victors and vanquished alike, and justly.”98 And this has implications for how voting practices should be reconfigured. In “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” Locke argued in favor of cultural pluralism insofar as it protects certain cultural values and institutional forms/traditions of groups that have traditionally been oppressed. He claimed that such protection 96  David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 97  Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 62. 98  Ibid.

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cannot be the result of the voting practices of dominant groups, and cannot result in systems that deny oppressed groups the ability to vote. Instead, “Direct participational representation of all considerable groups must be provided for, although how imperialism is to concede this is almost beyond immediate imagining.”99 This claim can be interpreted in a few ways. First, one might interpret Locke as arguing merely that democratic practices should be extended the world over. States throughout the world must become democracies and must be earnest in their democratic commitments as a condition of peace. Opening up the vote to all local citizens is a states’ expression of being earnest in practicing democracy, and is therefore necessary for peace. The latter half of the claim—namely, “…although how imperialism is to concede this is almost beyond immediate imagining,” seems to lend itself to this interpretation. Imperialistic practices block the extension of voting privileges to all local citizens, choosing instead to grant the right to vote to few citizens of a privileged class. In restricting the right to vote to certain groups, imperialisms reject “true” democracy. Second, (though the above casts doubt on an interpretation of this kind) one might interpret Locke’s claim as promoting a thick political cosmopolitan position whereby nations abdicate the right to sovereignty, voluntarily form a world state, and extend the vote to all on the basis of world-citizenship. Just after Locke made the above claim, he wrote: “That most absolutistic of all our secular concepts, the autonomous, sacrosanct character of national sovereignty, must surely be modified and voluntarily abridged.”100 Though perhaps unlikely, the modification and abridgment of nations’ right to sovereignty might be interpreted quite strongly to mean that states become like territories or local states within a larger whole. Perhaps this is why Locke thought that: “Daring reciprocities will have to be worked out if the basic traditional democratic freedoms are ever to be transposed to world practice, not to mention the complicated reconstruction of economic life which consistent reciprocity will demand in this field.”101 He might have thought that economic structures that provide a certain quality of life guaranteed for all humans—which he would say is a condition of peace—leads to a rather radical reorganization of our notion of state. On this view there must be one political order that regulates  Ibid., 63.  Ibid. 101  Ibid. 99

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economic conditions in a way that provides a particular quality of life to all humans. With his claim about direct participational representation, one might think that Locke was extending the vote beyond what would be considered national borders. He might have intended that people be able to exercise their vote in, or as it relates to, parts of the world that are not thought to be traditional parts of their local state. And so given Locke’s claims about direct participational representation and modifying/abridging sovereignty, one may question how far Locke wanted to extend the vote. Did he envision sovereign democracies where all have the right to vote? Or, was his scope extended beyond the boundaries of a state, principally because states have given up their right to sovereignty in order to form a larger whole? I think that Locke meant to extend the scope of direct participational representation, though not in the way just described. And this leads to a third interpretation. One might think that Locke wanted to extend political democracies and democratic practices. One might also think that such an extension and practices are required for certain international relations between sovereign nations where direct participational representation is only possible given a reorganization of sovereignty—that is to say when nations give up some arbitrary sovereignty. This interpretation takes Locke to require nations give up the right to do as they please—the rest of the world be damned—because world-citizens in other nations have certain rights that are extended to those nations. It allows world-citizens the right to vote on certain matters that relate to nations of which they are not local citizens because the practices of these nations have world-ranging effects. Let’s take two contemporary examples, namely wet-markets and emissions. Consider the world-ranging effects that derive from allowing certain practices in wet-markets or failing to regulate emissions. Diseases and viruses that derive from particular practices in wet-markets may be carried far beyond the boundaries of states wherein wet-markets exist. Likewise, the effects of loose emissions standards on conditions of the earth extend to peoples beyond states wherein emissions regulations are loose. One might question what rights world-citizens have who are affected by, but not residing in, those states. Now one might think that states retain the right to sovereignty. However, one might answer the question by proposing that world-citizens who are affected by states’ actions, but do not reside therein, should be able to vote in ways that restrict those actions. Without being explicit or complete, I think that this is where Locke was headed.

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As Chap. 3 will illustrate, Locke thought that we have good reasons to want to see democracy (in a number of forms) spread around the world. And for Locke, spreading democracy is a necessary condition of world peace—that is, to establish a cosmopolitan community. One reason for this is that he was aware of particular practices having world-ranging effects that only democratic nations and practices can adequately and amicably address. He may have thought that an adequate and amicable resolution for practices with world-ranging effects requires world-citizens to be able to vote on the practices of nations to which they do not belong. Locke understood that this ability is not possible when there are nations that are undemocratic. A nation that does not extend the vote to all of its citizens in decisions related to its practices will never extend the vote to or accept the voice/will of world-citizens who do not reside within its borders. Now as it relates to sovereignty, Locke’s main concern during much of his life was imperialism and material exploitation. Locke tells us that: “We must work for enlargement of all our loyalties, but most particularly this one,—of the sovereign self-judging politically expansive nation.”102 Locke was worried about territorial expansion because he saw its destructive capability; in Locke’s view, territorial expansion and exploitation of resources led to both World Wars. And so though I take Locke to have been moving in the direction of extending the vote beyond sovereign borders, he quite clearly saw the immediate problem of expansion and exploitation as a result of sovereignty. For Locke, peace begins by nations’ joint commitment that softens the ground for peace. Certain nations have to abandon a kind of irresponsible sovereignty; they have to end imperialist and exploitative efforts. “Any adjustment involving a curtailment of imperialistic rivalry of colonial policy is for this reason one of the most promising and constructive phases of world reorganization.…”103 This step seems to imply a restoration of land and resources, along with sovereignty to colonized peoples.104 The second step was for nations to embrace a democratic constitution, mindset, and practices. Nations must adopt a system that allowed for all of its citizens to participate in the political process. And further they must cultivate pluralistic attitudes that would allow democracy to flourish. The third step is for  Alain Locke, “Moral Imperatives for World Order,” 151.  Alain Locke: “The Mandate System,” 509. 104  Ibid., 510. 102 103

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nations to extend the vote beyond its borders. And this step requires a voluntarily transfer of some part of sovereignty to a higher-order, more global power. In discussing the newly formed principles of the Atlantic Charter that ultimately formed the basis of the United Nations, Locke reiterated— nearly word-for-word—the passage in “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy” that is under discussion.105 Locke seems to have envisioned something like a United Nations as a higher-order, more global power that would ensure—as far as possible—the right to vote for world-citizens, fair economic trade, the protection of sovereign nations from annexation, and so on. From the above, we see that Locke’s political cosmopolitanism requires a reconfiguration of national sovereignty and potentially voting rights. But more than that, Locke thought that we need a reconfiguration of our attitudes toward and conceptualizations of national sovereignty and voting rights. In this way, Locke called us to rethink our conception of and attitudes toward our corporate loyalties. He saw loyalties, in their extreme forms, to be expressed in totalitarian nations. Still, to a lesser degree, he recognized them in democracies. In discussing the rise of totalitarianism in Europe and problems that a thick conception of the nation produces, Locke wrote that: “The ‘one race, one nation, one culture’ criterion of contemporary German and Italian totalitarianism represents an extreme development of the modern practice of the sovereign national state, and, however apparently opposed, is based on principles involved in less extreme form in the practice of other nations.”106 Locke thought that these totalitarian nations had “no monopoly on power politics, imperialist militarism and economic exploitation, racist rationalizations of world rule and dominance, at the harsh persecution of selected minorities, or the doctrinaire bigotries of cultural superiority.”107 For Locke: “Many an idol of the tribe and nation must fall in the dust of this reconstruction….”108 Locke listed three idols that coincide with three cosmopolitanisms—namely, political, economic, and cultural idols. First is the “ancient political idol of the sovereign, essentially irresponsible  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” 544.  Alain Locke, “Minorities in Europe,” in When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts, ed. Alain Locke and Bernhard J.  Stern (New York: Hines, Hayden, & Eldridge, Inc., 1946) 653. 107  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” 541. 108  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” 544. 105 106

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nation. Politically sacred though it be, if we really mean to renounce force as an instrument of national policy, we must repudiate it. The totalitarian spectre has put another cast on this ancient tradition of the self-arbiter nation, or rather, torn the legal mask from its face, so that we can see the real barbarity of its character.”109 However, there is a second idol that needs to be addressed. It is “that twin idol of economic force-majeur, making its own profit-rights by might, by which peace-time plunder and exploitation were legitimated. To belligerent and irresponsible nationalism it added the practice and justifications of economic imperialism, which if not curbed or liquidated, will scotch any progressive world order from its very inception.”110 Locke’s thinking on political cosmopolitanism led to a discussion of his economic cosmopolitanism. Such a cosmopolitanism follows from a worry illustrated with his political cosmopolitanism— namely, a kind of irresponsible nationalism that fed and justified expansionism and imperialism. And for Locke these were responsible for both World Wars. Because public officials embraced an understanding of states such that they were the fitting end of activity and the sole object of concern, states institutionalize policies solely for their benefit and took every effort to exploit weaker states for their natural resources.

Locke’s Thin Economic Cosmopolitanism Recall that economic cosmopolitanism regards a relationship between commerce and restrictions or tariffs imposed by states. Thin economic cosmopolitans favor the imposition of tariffs or restrictions on goods. They might advocate imposing tariffs on imported goods specifically for the purpose of eliminating poverty in local states, or may advocate imposing restrictions on certain goods due to safety concerns. And so thin economic cosmopolitans allow governmental interference in commerce. Thick economic cosmopolitans advocate a global economic market without state-interference. On their view the market should be able to care for human needs unimpeded by states. Locke endorsed a thin economic cosmopolitanism, where states’ imposition of tariffs and restrictions are justified under certain conditions. Insertion into the market is justified to expose and eliminate exploitative practices in the market, and further to ensure that these practices do not continue to pervade the market. And so  Ibid.  Ibid.

109 110

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Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism is a direct response to colonialism, imperialism, and racism, and the market that these created. A great source for seeing Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism more broadly is his controversial work entitled “The Mandate System.” As has already been stated, the work examined certain protectorates—termed mandates—for colonized territories as conceived of and supported by the League of Nations. Additionally, the work examined the causes of World War I and prescribed actions necessary to avoid a World War II. In Locke’s view, “More and more it becomes evident that the basic causes of the late European War were extra-European. Primarily it was the rivalries of economic imperialism that molded the alignments and oppositions of the Great Powers and along with these the underlying issues of the conflict.”111 And so, we are able to see a correlation between Locke’s political and economic cosmopolitanisms.112 Now the core of Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism is the pragmatic relationship between economic matters and stable conditions necessary for peace. For Locke, instability in economic matters most assuredly makes the world ripe for war. He theorized there to be two basic economic roots of war—namely, “unequal access to markets and sources of raw materials and widespread differentials of living standards and economic security.”113 These roots, even without producing war, keep states in constant threat of it. The two basic economic roots of war keep poor states impoverished, and impoverishment keeps these states at sustained risk of continued economic and political exploitation. Further, poorer states maintain internal conflict resulting from external decision-making. The resulting internal instability conditions war within these states. Moreover, poorer states harbor justified resentment and animosity toward richer ones, even those that have democratic constitutions. And insofar as these richer, democratic states tend to be colonizers, poorer states view their democratic constitutions as empty. This lessens the likelihood that poorer states buy into democracy, which Locke took to be necessary for the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, given colonialism and imperialism, poorer states tend to be non-white and non-European. Richer states, which tend to be white and  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 509.  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” 544. 113  Ibid., 543. 111 112

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European, have a constant motive to be aggressors toward poorer states that tend to be militarily weaker. Beyond aggression toward poorer states, richer states have a motive to war with other rich states for control over poorer ones. And so richer democratic states fail to possess a democratic spirit; they are democracies in name only. In this way, richer states’ democratic constitutions are in fact empty. It is on this basis that Locke took unequal access and widespread differentials to justify tariffs and restrictions on commerce. But more than that, these reasons justify reconstructing relationships between states. In describing Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism, we need to first answer what Locke had in mind with these two economic roots of war. What is meant by unequal access to markets and sources of raw materials? And what is meant by widespread differentials in living standards and economic security? Essentially, given the backdrop of colonialism and imperialism, Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism was an attempt to address these two roots. Locke understood unequal access to regard two interrelated sources— namely, markets and raw materials. In the market, many individuals and groups have either been barred from or severely limited in participating in the sale of goods and services. The market was a racialized market wherein non-white groups and their members could not sell goods and services at what can only be termed “white market rates,” and were severely limited in terms of the groups from whom they could purchase goods. And so the market seemed to operate at two interdependent levels for the benefit of whites. There was a market rate for white sellers and buyers that was in some sense influenced by a separate “non-white market rate.”114 Whites could participate, buy, and sell more freely, and better dictate the terms of sale and purchase when dealing with non-whites. The sale of services exacerbated the unequal access to markets. Locke was deeply concerned about curtailing one’s ability to sell their labor as they please. He thought that humans had the basic right of the freedom of labor.115 He was acutely aware of the extent to which labor was taken or stolen, and was aware of just how little legal statutes did to ensure all individuals’ freedom of labor. He showed this clearly by looking at practices in Liberia, Fernando Po (Bioko), the Cameroons, The Transvaal, Rhodesia, the Congo, and the United States, and in looking at practices by Firestone  Ibid., 516–517.  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 518–519.

114 115

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Rubber Corporation and the J.G. White Corporation.116 Though transatlantic slavery had ended, domestic slavery, debt slavery, pawning (a system whereby in return for money, a human—in many cases a child—may be given for an indefinite period for indentured service without compensation), and forced labor existed. These practices were more of the norm in colonized territories. They allowed nations and corporations to exploit non-white labor in ways that built corporate or European nations’ wealth at the expense of non-white, non-European groups. Locke understood there to be three principal ways of achieving extensive economic exploitation that related to labor. First, “there was the wholesale drafting of labor from native communities to engage in ‘public work’ projects, either as civilian labor required to work under labor law draft at arbitrarily fixed wages or forced to labor on public works as the equivalent of prescribed military service.”117 From this we can see the ways in which legal statutes worked to impoverish natives of different lands. Second, “there had grown up, especially in the African colonies and protectorates, the procedure of assessing poll or hut taxes in currency, which forced the male native population more or less wholesale into the fly-traps of concessionary companies and plantation owners, who usually gave arbitrary wages, unsanitary working conditions in many instances, and arbitrarily enforced work contracts.”118 Third, “there was the wholesale recruitment of native labor by labor agents or indirectly through quota assessments on native chieftains, by which workers were drafted for short­or long-term service, the former generally without remuneration beyond upkeep, and the latter frequently on contracts which these workers signed under coercion after being drafted.”119 For Locke, though many of the projects undertaken were noble, their nobility justified exploitative tactics, insufficient working conditions, and inadequate pay. Further, much of the economic underpinnings of the projects were designed to benefit “foreign investors and the export trade rather than the internal development of the country or the conservation of its natural resources.”120 And so within the

116  Alain Locke, “Slavery in the Modern Manner,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Also see, Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 519. 117  Alain Locke, “Slavery in the Modern Manner,” 302. 118  Ibid. 119  Ibid. 120  Ibid.

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racialized market, non-whites were restricted in terms of purchasing and selling goods, and this included contracting out their own labor. From the above, we see just why whites were able to benefit maximally from non-white participation in the racialized market. Whites had European nations’ backing to pressure non-whites to buy and sell goods and services at rates far below their desires. These nations could pay, threaten, and form laws that restrict non-whites’ ability to enter into contracts or participate to their maximal benefit. These kinds of practices were not limited to colonized territories, but were both existent in and supported by democracies such as the United States.121 The inequality of access in terms of selling goods implied access to raw materials that could be sold. Certainly a lack of status as humans equal to whites created barriers for non-whites to engage the market fairly or as equals motivated by self-interest. However, more equality in terms of selling goods was unhelpful given colonial efforts that stripped non-European states of marketable raw materials. The inequality in raw materials for non-­ whites and non-European countries was the direct result of practices aimed at syphoning resources from non-European states.122 Colonization and imperialism made it impossible for persons, corporations, or states that were non-white and non-European to engage the market. Native peoples lacked ownership of raw materials, even in their own resource-rich lands. And so, unequal access in the sale of goods and services was only half of the problem. The effect of a failure to possess raw materials was a proliferation of poverty in poor states and among non-white groups, and amassed wealth, hostility, and aggression toward poor states, along with fierce competition by rich ones for control of poorer, resource-rich lands. Now Locke understood widespread differentials to regard two related sources—namely, living standards and economic security. With regard to differential living standards, Locke took the differences to begin, not so much with a lack of wages able to provide basic life-necessities, but from conditions and implications surrounding work itself. He was aware of and concerned with the fact that the exploitation which led to differences in living standards was not merely about wages, but about conditions that shortened life-expectancy and took away from the ability to possess or cultivate talents/interests. He was concerned with many non-white people throughout the world being subjected to conditions under which they  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 516 and 519.  Ibid., 516.

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suffered deleterious effects. Non-whites suffered from the poorest of working conditions, over-work due to unsustainable workdays, and coercion. As we will see, Locke was committed to the view that what ultimately makes lives worth living is an appreciation of culture, friendship, and deep contemplation. Austere working conditions due to exploitation denied these. And so certain of the living standards that Locke had in mind were ones that allow an appreciable life—namely, health and life-satisfaction through the fulfillment of talents and interests outside of work. No less important for Locke are living standards that make a life possible. These relate to being paid enough to support oneself and one’s family. Insufficient pay creates instability in terms of adjusting to new social and environmental conditions, dealing with loss, sickness, or unplanned problems, along with planning for the future. In a word, vast inequality in pay produced no-to-little economic security for non-whites. Many people within poorer states lacked stable income or resources to support their lives and adjust to changing conditions because of unequal access to the market, exploitation of labor, and the lack of raw materials. Now these are serious problems for both exploited and exploiter states, and are conditions that render a cosmopolitan community impossible. Again, the ultimate end of these conditions is war or the threat of it. And Locke proposed several solutions that center on the imposition of tariffs and restrictions, and the insertion of states into the market—via treaties— to ensure fair practices. First, an important note. Locke, perhaps unlike many of his contemporaries, was an incrementalist. He was committed to the view that, under certain circumstances, social or progressive change should occur “in stages,” or by degrees.123 Locke thought that: “There may be a period for the gradual extention [sic] of a right, but not the creation of a right or its recognition, this holds for races and classes.”124 This is a part of what makes “The Mandates System” a rather controversial work. It can be read as proposing a “better colonialism,” which may strike some as rather cringeworthy.125 I read Locke’s incrementalism as aligning with his pragmatic commitments. His incrementalism that views social progress as

 See: Alain Locke “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle.”  Alain Locke, “The Dilemma of Segregation,” in The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 4, No. 3, The Courts and the Negro Separate School (Jul., 1935) 408. 125  I am thankful to Jacoby Carter for raising this as an objection to Locke’s essay. 123 124

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requiring stages is a combination of three pragmatist traits, namely fallibilism, an appeal to experience as a guide for theory, and meliorism. It is a rather obvious point that Locke thought the world can be made better by human effort, and philosophized about how best to describe and solve concrete social problems. In the end, Locke’s proposal of the necessity of our establishing a cosmopolitan community was to solve the concrete social problem of how humans are able to continue to live on the earth; the world must become one or it will “become none.” However, solving concrete social problems should be guided by actual experiences and not mere proposals given abstract moral claims. This was particularly true for Locke given the fallibility that, while only potentially inimical, is a fundamental part of what makes us human. For Locke, we should form certain beliefs as hypotheses that are adjusted in light of new experiences. Experiences will give our beliefs new and better evidence at each step in light of which we revise them. Locke’s thinking was that radical change lessens the possibility that our beliefs are guided by our experiences. We are talking about big leaps with radical social change. Big leaps disallow new evidence and new experiences to guide and adjust social programs aimed at by radical change, and disallow emergent problems to be thought through and addressed. Further, radical social change tends to derive from abstract moralizing. Abstract moralizing fails to consider the world in which we all live and the world as it will be after change occurs. In this way, someone like Locke would have thought that avoidable disaster was much more likely as a result of radical change. And he would have thought that adjusting afterward would be much more difficult than adjusting after incremental change. Still further, Locke would have thought that radical change would more likely suffer from effects of reactionary forces discontent with the radical nature of the change. Locke considered the variety of mindsets affected by radical social change. And he seemed aware that many of those mindsets were ill-equipped to handle radical movement, either because of bigotry, blind appeals to custom, or comfort with familiarity. And so he would have been concerned that social instability would be the likely result of radical change. For Locke, changes in mindsets need be cultivated during stages of social progress. And time is needed to cultivate newer, more progressive mindsets via programs related to education, art, and religion. And so a thinker like Locke would have thought that radical change was doomed to fail—either by leaps that were not pragmatically justified or by reactionary forces discontent with the radical nature of change. Incremental

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social change, on the other hand, allows for new adjustments at each step. Experiences and new evidence are able to dictate what adjustments are necessary for each stage. And so if it is true that there is a solution for every problem, and a problem for every solution given human fallibility, then incrementalism would allow us to be better able to adjust, and to end with changes that further our aims. Further, these changes can occur alongside and incorporate efforts to change mindsets that lessen antagonistic reactions. It is in light of this that we should read Locke’s “Mandate System,” and a number of his solutions to the economic effects of colonialism and racism more broadly. Now insofar as it concerns his economic cosmopolitanism, Locke’s solution to colonialism and racism began with putting an end to the condition of colonial expansion itself, along with a phased return of colonized lands and raw materials to peoples from whom land was taken.126 Colonial efforts were, as we have seen, an implication of irresponsible nationalism. And it was an obvious point to someone like Locke that cultivating a cosmopolitan community requires the cessation of efforts to colonize territories. But more than that, he thought that the return of colonized land is necessary for both the increase of material wealth required for fairer participation in the market and the spread of democracy. In terms of the former, wealth in part results from ownership of lands and raw materials, which natives of colonized territories lacked. In terms of the latter, so long as lands are coveted by colonizers, natives will rightly reject democratic institutions, and colonizing “democracies” will fail to practice democracy—that is, colonizing democracies will be democratic in name only. And so Locke recommended: “The establishment of the principle of the non-alienation of native land, and as a necessary corollary re-­allocation of dispossessed native tribes under government supervision and with compensation to European title holders in areas where this alienation of land has flagrantly dislocated native life.”127 One might question the latter half of the second part of the conjunct— namely, that “European title holders in areas where the alienation of land has flagrantly dislocated native life” be compensated. Why should those who have either participated in or benefited from colonial efforts be compensated for what we might understand to be unjust shares of land and/ or resources in a racialized market? This is a question for which Locke did  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 510.  Ibid., 520.

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not provide an answer. He might have thought that compensation was necessary either for buy-in or as a means of curbing austerely negative reactions from title holders. It is, however, fairly clear that he did not think that natives or states established by and for natives should bear the responsibility for the compensation. The compensation should come from those European nations supervising the transition of dispossessed lands to natives. And in all likelihood, the compensation should derive from taxation in European states. Further, one might worry about Locke’s endorsement of mandates that recommend any sort of phased return of colonized land—as is recommended by the above—particularly given the language that surrounded various mandates and used by crafters of the League of Nations. In quoting Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, Locke wrote that: “Declaring that there should be applied to these countries and their people ‘the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation.’” This language appeals to many stereotypes about non-white peoples, namely that they are uncivilized and need whites to either civilize them or show them how they might become civilized. At best, it appeals to liberal racism. And undoubtedly, this liberal racism was behind much of the gradated supervisory classes—A, B, and C—to which the League appealed in the mandates project. And so one might ask: “Did Locke buy into the idea that these groups need civilization, and thus that there need be a phased return of colonized land?” And if not, then why appeal to the idea of a phased return and not an immediate return of colonized land (and resources) to native populations? It is an open question as to how much Locke bought into the problematic notion that non-European peoples need civilization and guidance. At various points, Locke tended to endorse this thinking. For instance, he referred to many African peoples as “undeveloped.”128 And he referred to certain non-European countries as “backwards.”129 Without placing too much emphasis on this question, one might propose that either the primary or an ancillary worry that Locke would have had stems from his motivation for endorsing incrementalism. Locke would have worried that large leaps—perhaps even conceptual or linguistic—might create greater instability than more gradual steps, with problems that cannot be carefully thought through or addressed. And further, large leaps would almost  Ibid., 516.  Alain Locke, “Slavery in the Modern Manner,” 301.

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certainly have created a backlash from whites, corporations, and European states with deep interests in colonized lands and raw materials. It is not that these whites, corporations, and European states are the standard bearers of justice or practical considerations. Locke should not be read as having placed too much emphasis on the comfort of these groups. However, if peace is the ultimate goal, and war or austere pushback is a certain result of some action, then one has a weighty reason not to commit that action (for someone like Locke). Whites, corporations, and European states need to buy into the practice of true democracy. And they need to buy into actions necessary to bring about a cosmopolitan community. If these are true, then how whites, corporations, and European states will react to the return of land to natives from whom land was stolen needs to be taken into account. Lastly, one might question why, in addressing the phased return of colonized land and raw materials to different natives throughout the world, Locke did not address the issue of a return of lands and perhaps recompense to Indigenous groups in America. This appears to be a serious oversight for someone concerned with colonialism, imperialism, democracy, and cosmopolitanism. Locke envisioned the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. The cultivation of this community requires addressing colonialism and imperialism, and requires both the spread of democracy, as well as democratic states living up to democratic constitutions. Further, Locke both lived in the United States and thought that the United States must be a light for the spread of democracy by showing a commitment to the practice of true democracy.130 Given these, one would expect him to have offered statements about the colonization of Indigenous lands and resources and the necessity of redressing colonization on behalf of Indigenous groups. And yet, rather inexplicably, there is no work of which I am aware wherein Locke offered statements or commentary on this issue. Now after the immediate cessation of colonial efforts and the return of colonized land and raw materials to natives from whom land was taken, these lands must be recognized as sovereign—they must be granted the right to self-determinacy. Locke understood that it is not enough to merely end colonial practices. And he understood that a returned of those lands to natives required recognizing them as sovereign states for the purpose of ensuring their protection. Further, he understood that political 130  Alain Locke, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy,” 540 & and “Democracy Faces a World Order,” 547.

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autonomy is necessary for economic autonomy, which is an implication of fair participation in the market. Political and economic autonomy lead to governmental imposition that aims at the “suppression of all forms of forced labor by international convention, as the result of either direct or indirect pressure, including currency taxation, and the maintenance of open competitive labor markets by some system of labor contract laws and the responsible government supervision.”131 Locke was committed to a revision of market practices that disadvantage non-whites and non-Europeans via a reorientation of the racialized market that benefited white participants and European states. And Locke seemed to doubt that the market could correct them without imposition. And so, there needs to be “strict supervision of valid concessions, the prohibition of general monopolies, and the curtailment of large-scale concessions except on short-term lease, and the gradual abrogation or conversion of long-term leases in effect.”132 Here, Locke promoted the insertion of governments into the market to ensure fair practices, particularly given both the history of and mindset to endorse the racialized market. Thus, Locke would have rejected a thick economic cosmopolitanism that advocates a global economic market without state-­ interference. His rejection was grounded in conditions of colonialism, imperialism, and racism that created a racialized market to the disadvantage of non-white and non-European groups. Locke seems to have thought that left to its own care, the market would be manipulated to continue exploitative practices that prevent what he termed “the basic right of the freedom of labor” and the continued syphoning of raw materials that could only perpetuate the two economic roots of war. And he was suspicious that pure rational self-interest and the aim of economic advancement by all parties were enough to solve many of the problems of colonialism, imperialism, and racism that pervaded the market. Instead, particular democratic values must be infused into the market to cultivate new behaviors. Locke tells us that: “Our soul-less, long-armed ducats and dollars, inherently without personal and moral responsibility, have actually multiplied the ways and means of economic exploitation and increased the possibilities for the abridgment of human liberty.”133 Purely economic motivation had created and would sustain exploitative efforts. A  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 520.  Ibid. 133  Alain Locke, “Slavery in the Modern Manner,” 299. 131 132

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new democratic mindset that considers agents beyond their economic use must be cultivated to bring exploitation to an end and promote the kind of market necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. The first steps toward cultivating these personal and moral behaviors were legal protections that require the insertion of governments. And for Locke, it would take more than a few governments banded together to accomplish this end. Locke raised the question, “what standard, and what agency of inspection, one may pertinently ask will guarantee this, without expert definition of what safe working conditions, fair contract and wage, open labor markets, and reasonable guarantees really are?”134 Locke answered the question with the assertion that: “No country, perhaps, can be expected to hold itself to strict accountability or a disinterested judgment for satisfactory humanitarian treatment of large subject populations, especially those under non-native colonial administration.”135 No singular country’s insertion would be enough. And no single country could be trusted. Locke was aware that colonial, imperial, and racist mindsets still pervaded European nations that had democratic constitutions. And so: “International agreement is the only safe guarantee, and the mutual guardianship of international opinion the most effective machinery of operation.”136 There needed to be checks on behaviors from other nations. And this is undoubtedly why something like a United Nations as a higher-­ order, more global power would have been necessary. Locke’s commitment was furthered by his understanding of the significance of the basic right of the freedom of labor. For Locke, one’s ability to contract their labor was necessary to having the basic right of human liberty.137 And so, human liberty is abridged to the extent that the basic right of the freedom of labor is infringed upon or denied. Locke tells us that: “The question of forced labor, in fact, definitely links up the question of economic freedom with the principles and sanctions of personal freedom, and so raises the standard of a new crusade for the emancipation of labor on a world scale. The sentiment against the abridgment of human liberty has halted too long at the artificial line of legal slavery, and stood helpless  Ibid., 301.  Ibid. 136  Ibid. 137  As demonstrated in Chap. 3, Locke thought that the spread of democracy was necessary because it preserves the basic right to human liberty, which he understands as an act of free association. Also see:  Corey Barnes, “Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles.” 134 135

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before all those clandestine forms that are slavery just as well, for all that.”138 Nations’ imposition was necessary to safeguard human liberty. To what extent are governments expected or allowed to insert themselves into the market? For instance, what are the consequences of infringing upon the basic right of the freedom of labor? Locke thought that there should be embarrassment levied against states and corporations that abridge the basic right of the freedom of labor, deepen unequal access to markets and raw materials, and further widespread differentials of living standards and economic security. And he seemed willing to accept more austere actions, such as death penalties for certain kinds of violations.139 In this way, one might infer that he was willing to accept war as a result of widespread national infringements—given the satisfaction of certain conditions. However, tariffs are one of the more useful tools to which Locke appealed in correcting inequalities in the market. One might also think that Locke would recommend tariffs imposed on European countries to increase the standard of living in colonized territories. One might infer this given what he stated about the problems of living conditions around the world, along with what he praised and recommended about increasing living standards in the United States. Locke praised Woodrow Wilson for his implementation of the income tax amendment. For Locke, this is an important step in the five phases of democratic progression. Locke tells us that: “The income tax amendment was an initial step in social democracy as distinguished from the purely political,—a step toward economic equality through the partial expropriation of surplus wealth for the bene.t of the commonwealth.”140 Locke took this to be important to address the illusion of economic democracy that the United States thought it had. For Locke, economic democracy requires that, “guaranteed to all citizens certain minimal standards of living and the right to earn a living.”141 Again, Locke thought that a minimal standard of living gives the ability to cultivate talents/interests that makes life worthwhile. It also gives one economic security that is necessary in an uncertain world and make life possible. The right to earn a living produces the same, and preserves the basic right of the freedom of labor. It is undoubted that Locke would have extended considerations of minimal  Alain Locke, “Slavery in the Modern Manner,” 298.  Ibid., 301. 140  Alain Locke, “The Five Phases of Democracy,” 47. 141  Ibid. 138 139

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standards of living the world over. And it is at least reasonable to think that he would extend tariffs to address minimal standards of living throughout the world. Finally, one might have doubts about buy-in given white and European appeals to self-interest in the market. Though Locke was suspicious of self-­ interest as the only motivator in the market, Locke was not too worried about the reply that states have too deep an interest in maintaining exploitative practices because of self-interest. Locke thought that given appropriate initial steps, an appeal to self-interest vindicates fair market practices. Locke tells us that: “Any checking or revision of economic exploitation must be reinforced by a clear understanding of this mutual dependence and the realization that the most selfish motives alike dictate care and moderation in the manipulation of these large economic areas.”142 Locke thought that the self-interested nation has a motive to avoid economic exploitation and promote fair market practices in three ways. First, “land expropriation leads to forced labor, and by way of that to the disintegration of normal self-supporting native life, and this in turn to depopulation, economic dependency and lowered capacity for consumption of goods.”143 In this sense, economic over-exploitation leads to an unsustainable cycle that is self-defeating. Second, “too rapid depletion of natural resources adversely affects both the present and the future world market or necessary commodities.”144 Exploitation will over-produce supplies that lead to scarcity in raw materials with prohibitive prices. Lastly, “closed and artificially regulated areas, government influenced prices and the practice of ‘dumped’ or forced export markets disturb the natural balance and growth of trade and produce trade slumps in which the forced gains are more than counterbalanced.”145 And so, though in some sense self-interest created the problem of the racialized market, Locke denied that it need prohibit progressive economic policies. We may return to the second epigraph of this chapter. Locke envisioned a cosmopolitan community wherein mutual or reciprocal trade occurred. He thought that reciprocal trade can occur in a capitalistic market. Though capitalistic markets had been a motivating factor for color and race prejudice, he did not promote socialism or communism as a condition of  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 517.  Ibid. 144  Ibid. 145  Ibid. 142 143

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establishing a cosmopolitan community. However, Locke’s cosmopolitan community required revisions to the racialized market that disadvantaged poorer non-whites and non-Europeans. And thus his economic cosmopolitanism centered on addressing problems caused by colonialism, imperialism, and racism. For Locke, a community wherein reciprocal trade occurs requires an end to colonial and exploitative efforts. Further, he thought that there should be a level below which human lives should not fall. Nations need to work to establish bare minimal standards of living. As a result, a cosmopolitan community is only possible given better economic conditions for the worst off. The worst off have no-to-little access to markets, raw materials, and fair working conditions. Further, they bear the burden of very low living standards and economic security. Market-­ intrusion is necessary to eliminate these inequalities and make reciprocal trade between equals possible. Now with having described his thick moral, and thin political and economic cosmopolitanisms, I now turn to Locke’s thick cultural cosmopolitanism.

Locke’s Thick Cultural Cosmopolitanism Locke drew a connection between political, economic, and cultural circumstances in perhaps a deeper way than most cultural cosmopolitans. He tells us that: “Hand in hand partners with these [colonial] political and economic policies have gone their important and characteristic rationalizations,—the sustaining ideologies and of dominant and superior races, of dominant and superior cultures.”146 And just as we find a correlation between his political and economic cosmopolitanisms, so we might expect to see a correlation between his economic and cultural cosmopolitanisms. The reason is that just as his political and economic cosmopolitan commitments were in response to colonization and imperialism, in many ways, so too was his cultural cosmopolitanism. Now recall that cultural cosmopolitanism is a view about the role of cultures’ centrality to what makes a good life. And recall that cultural cosmopolitanism has a negative and positive view. Negatively, it rejects the idea that an individual should be forced physically or coerced ideologically (perhaps by claims of group-legitimacy) to endorse some particular culture. It also rejects the view that one should only view themself as a member of some culture by way of an exclusive attachment. Positively, cultural  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a New World Order,” 544.

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cosmopolitanism encourages cultural diversity, cultural participation, and perhaps even cultural merging. The thick cultural cosmopolitan believes that a person cannot flourish by situating themself within only one cultural community. The thin cultural cosmopolitan endorses a weaker claim, namely that people need not situate themselves within only one particular cultural tradition in order to flourish. Locke endorsed a thick cultural cosmopolitanism whereby a flourishing life requires engaging the best of a multiplicity of cultures from a rooted position. And this engagement, along with cultural reciprocity, is necessary for cultural development. Further, cultural reciprocity is necessary for both garnering respect from others and seeing others as equals who are worthy of respect. Moreover, cultural reciprocity is the solution to the problem of cultural imperialism. And insofar as eliminating cultural imperialism is necessary for cultivating a cosmopolitan community, cultural reciprocity—which is the solution to cultural imperialism—is a necessary condition for cultivating a cosmopolitan community. In order to understand Locke’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism, we need to understand cultures’ role in the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. And in order to do that, we need to understand what culture is and how it is related to human life. Locke did not commit to a singular understanding of culture throughout his life.147 This is in part due to his realization (during the late 1940s and early 1950s) that a conception that he endorsed earlier in life (during the 1920s) served bourgeois, market-­ driven, and imitationist desires.148 And one might take his later conception to better reflect both the human condition and a cosmopolitanism led

147  For example, Locke seems to have different definitions and conceptions of culture in: “The Ethics of Culture”; “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace”; “Frontiers of Culture”; and seemingly “The Contribution of Race to Culture.” 148  See, “Frontiers of Culture” for an extended discussion. Perhaps we might preserve something like consistency in Locke’s thinking by drawing an important distinction between “culture” and “being cultured.” Culture might be all those customs, traditions, and so on of a group (the set of idioms, styles, and temperaments that are open to adoption for a group), while being cultured may regard understanding, appreciating, and living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression.

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from below.149 However, there is much in his early conception that reflects a deep commitment to cosmopolitanism. Locke’s early conception took culture to be a condition of understanding, appreciating, and living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression.150 Culture has its beginnings in education, since education’s aim is to teach one to live and live well, and culture is a condition of living well. Though culture has its beginning in education, culture is construed as taking an interest in forms of human expression beyond what is practically necessary or required by education. Culture takes such an interest in an imaginative and pensive way. “Science penetratingly studied, can yield as much or more culture than the humanities mechanically studied.”151 So two people can study, understand, appreciate, and perhaps even live up to or produce artistic work like Kara Walker’s. For Locke, the cultured person will be the person who need not learn it and does not commit to it merely to pass a test. Further, they engage it creatively and with deep reflection. Their interest in Walker’s work means something to them in a way that cannot or will not be grasped by the person who is either mechanical in their approach or is merely attempting to earn a grade or make a living. The point is that the pursuit of culture is for its own sake and is a life’s commitment. “These ‘forms of expression,’ found in the arts, humanities, and sciences, develop and communicate a kind of knowledge, an engagement of the intellect, that is valuable for its own sake.”152 It is

149  This potential objection to Locke’s cultural cosmopolitanism would claim that, given Locke’s early conception of culture, cultural standards would be imposed on the masses of peoples from those in a more privileged position. This would equate to a kind of cultural imperialism that Locke rejected. The objector would recommend understanding cultural development as a more natural occurrence reflecting cultural sharing in ordinary modes of life. A representative of a view such as this is Stuart Hall. 150  Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture,” 176–177. Locke tells us that it is the “capacity.” However, Locke cannot mean this in the strict sense. One who fails to develop their talents, and fails to understand and appreciate the best and most representative forms of human expression may in fact have the capacity. The failure to put forward the effort seems to take away the possibility of construing them as cultured. Still, if Locke meant “capacity” in the strict sense, then this person would have to count among the cultured. Locke must mean, “being in a state or condition of…,” or “at least striving towards….” 151  Ibid., 181. 152  Rose Cherubin, “Culture and the Kalos: Inquiry, Justice, and Value in Locke and Aristotle,” in Philosophic Values and World Citizenship: Locke to Obama and Beyond, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter and Leonard Harris (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010) 7.

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not something gained or developed for something higher than itself, and is not the sort of thing in which one has a fleeting interest. On his early view, Locke understood culture to relate to both the mind and the senses. There is a reciprocal relationship between them such that cultivating the one by understanding, appreciating, and living up to the best requires cultivating the other. “The [woman and] man of culture is the [woman and] man of trained sensibilities, whose mind expresses itself in keenness of discrimination and, therefore, in the cultivated interests and tastes.”153 Locke took a description of culture beyond a discussion of “speech, the fine arts, and music.” Training ultimately develops a personality. And this personality requires development of two basic aspects, “the great amateur arts of personal expression—conversation and manners.”154 Expressions are not merely artistic, but regard the use of language, mood or circumstantial reactions, posture, and perhaps even nonverbal cues such as facial expressions and gestures. It regards the kinds of conversation in which a person engages and the ways in which they engage them. Additionally, culture regards acing in a way that is socially acceptable and respectful to others. So for Locke, understanding, appreciating, and living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression did not merely regard creative or imaginative expressions. One understands, appreciates, and lives up to the best of what humans are or can be, and this involves ethical and moral activity. The organization of one’s life, along with how one fulfills obligations to others are implicated in culture. And so culture regards the development of a personality with a refined disposition and particular traits of character capable of performing actions representative of the best. One needs to develop attention to detail, sticktoitiveness, courage, honesty, and even something like wit or lightheartedness as character-­ traits or perhaps even Aristotelian virtues. Locke argued that the cultured individual needs to develop an ability to separate themself from the crowd and stand alone.155 This takes courage. And anything related to understanding and living up to or producing something difficult requires attention to detail and sticktoitiveness. Honesty seems necessary because the person cannot be pretentious, a charlatan, a liar, or a bullshitter—as these involve a kind of fraudulent behavior. In fact, Locke seems to have thought  Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture,” 178.  Ibid., 181. 155  Ibid., 180. 153 154

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that culture is developed with or equivalent to the whole of one’s character in the same way that Aristotle thought of the virtuous agent. Locke tells us that: “Culture likewise is every inch representative of the whole personality when it is truly perfected.”156 Like Aristotle’s notion of eudemonia as a state of living well and doing well, or living in accordance with virtue—that is, living excellently, Locke’s cultured person is one who exemplifies excellence in personality and pursuits for the purpose of living well. This can only result in a life lived excellently via activity.157 Now Locke’s rather high bar for culture neither depends on nor necessarily responds to what is popular in society. In addition, what it responds to need not be practically useful. Popular expressions may change, and they are endorsed for all sorts of unreflective reasons. Further, at times one’s society may be rather uncultured or dull. And still further, use-values for expressions may change. However, Locke thought that the best or most representative forms of human expression are rather stable or more objective than mere dependence on one person, group, or society. Though owing itself to history, and thus neither by nature simpliciter nor by human nature, “culture centers about the great human constants, which, though not rigidly unchangeable, are nevertheless almost as durable as those great physical constants which science makes so much.”158 Culture seems to regard lasting and widespread aspects of human expression. These will be the more fortified ideas and ideals by which Locke believed posterity will judge each phase of human development. Connecting the two points—that culture regards the development of a personality and that the best or most representative forms of human expression are rather stable—Locke seems to have relied on a fundamental idea when thinking about culture and the possibility of peace. The idea is that there is relative consistency and stability across societies such that there can be a “best of human expression.” There are rather consistent valuations of personalities, and something rather constant in other forms of expression such that certain of them get judged better or worse in the same way across societies. So Locke thought that there is something horizontal about the relationship between culture and societies; the best or  Ibid., 183.  Rose Cherubin’s “Culture and the Kalos: Inquiry, Justice, and Value in Locke and Aristotle” is an excellent paper on the connection between Locke’s conception of culture and Aristotle’s view of the beautiful or noble. 158  Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture,” 179. 156 157

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most representative forms of human expression implicate something widespread about human life and human societies. And Locke thought that there is something vertical about the relationship between culture and societies; the best and most representative forms of human expression implicate something constant or lasting about human life and human societies. And so the best and most representative forms of human expression reaches beyond a particular set of idioms and styles from within a tradition and expresses something quintessentially human. Locke provided an example of this when discussing William Grant Still’s “And They Lynched Him On a Tree.” The work was grounded in the particularities of Negro idiom and history. However, the work was an expression possessing something more universal—something fundamentally human. It possessed something that was constantly and stably appreciable across societies. The work “universalizes and expands a Negro tragedy into a purging and inspiring plea for justice and a fuller democracy.”159 It blended two worlds, “representing first the tragically divided and hostile majority and minority groups, and finally the united chorus of citizens aware of their ultimate solidarity of interests,” and did so in a way that showed cultural exchange, blending “Negro” elements of folk expression and choral aspects with Greek tragedy to grasp what is elemental in the human experience.160 One aspect of Locke’s thinking that seems rather resistant to change was his idea that we have a particular kind of duty to be cultured.161 He expressed this by either stating it outright or discussing the importance and centrality of culture to our lives.162 Locke took this duty to be self-­ imposed. Though he did not specify exactly why we have this duty, his reasoning is rather obvious. The duty to culture is a self-imposed duty—a duty to self—that is owed to the necessity of culture for living a flourishing life, and everyone’s having the aim of flourishing. The duty is a result of our basic aim of flourishing and culture’s role therein. To return briefly to economic cosmopolitanism, one can see why Locke was so concerned with the burden placed on those who suffer from very poor working conditions, over-work due to unsustainable workdays, and 159  Alain Locke, “Ballad for Democracy,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 530. 160  Ibid., 530–531. 161  Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture,” 176. 162  See Alain Locke, “Frontiers of Culture,” 231.

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coercion due to exploitation. These conditions depreciate the value of life by stripping persons of a critical means through which they flourish— namely, the ability to commit to understanding, appreciating, and living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression. One will likely fail to satisfy the self-imposed duty to culture when one suffers from very poor working conditions, is over-worked due to unsustainable workdays, or is coerced due to exploitation. And so one is robbed of the ability to fulfill an important self-imposed duty under certain conditions. Living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression implies an engagement with and sharing of diverse cultural elements throughout the occurrent and historical world. And so culture, construed as it is, implies cultural reciprocity. Locke understood cultural reciprocity to be “a general recognition of the reciprocal character of all contacts between cultures and of the fact that all modern cultures are highly composite ones.”163 Cultures do not arise from the work of one group to the exclusion of others. Though a group may be taken as representative of a culture via thematic tendencies, common idioms, styles, and forms, an honest investigation into them reveals their composite natures. Locke tells us that: “There is and always has been an almost limitless natural reciprocity between cultures. Civilization, for all its claims of distinctiveness, is a vast amalgum [sic] of cultures.”164 The recognition that cultures do not arise from the work of one group to the exclusion of others served a number of interests. First, as is discussed below, it cures cultural imperialism and chauvinism by the recognition that no group can take complete credit for its own culture or “Culture” more broadly. And so, “civilization is not the product of a single people, and that all great national cultures are composite in character and derivation.”165 Second, it is a necessary concept for the maintenance of cultural production. Locke encouraged cultural participation and cultural merging because these keep cultures from becoming stale. Third, (and for the more immediate discussion) the recognition leads to a desire to share with and participate in different cultures, which is required for  Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” 73.  Alain Locke, “The Contribution of Race to Culture,” 203. 165  Alain Locke, “The Negro’s Contribution to the Culture of the Americas,” Lecture 1: “Race, Culture, and Democracy,” in African American Contributions to the Americas’ Cultures: A Critical Edition of Lectures by Alain Locke, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 13. 163 164

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understanding, appreciating, and living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression. And so the idea of cultural reciprocity gives us insight into Locke’s thick cultural cosmopolitanism. The necessity of sharing with and participating in different cultures is principally why Locke must be taken to have committed to thick cultural cosmopolitanism. Locke doubted that one can satisfy the self-imposed duty to culture (the satisfaction of which is necessary for living a flourishing life) without sharing with and participating in diverse cultures. If Locke was serious about understanding and appreciating the best and most representative forms of human expression, then he must have thought that one must engage different cultures in order to understand and appreciate them. I cannot merely appreciate Black culture, or a specific Black culture—say, African American culture. My appreciation must expand beyond a singular cultural community, learning Japanese, Mexican, German, and Indian cultures. Seemingly, one cannot appreciate what is best and most representative as a form or human expression in their own culture without seeing it in others. And so situating oneself within a singular cultural community cannot lead to a well-­ lived life. If culture is necessary for living a well-lived life, and culture implies engaging with diverse cultural communities, then living a well-­ lived life implies engaging with diverse cultural communities—extending beyond one cultural community. Now since Locke believed that one cannot flourish by situating themself within—and thereby cultivating a sense of self through—one cultural community, he rejected the idea that an individual should be forced physically or coerced ideologically to endorse some particular culture.166 Force or coercion curtails flourishing. And further, Locke rejected the idea that one should only view themself as a member of some culture by way of an exclusive attachment. People have the aim of flourishing. And a serious commitment to it imposes duties to extend our cultural landscape. Still, in the same way that Locke required a moral cosmopolitanism from a situated location (he required cosmopolitan patriotism), he also required engaging with diverse cultures from a rooted perspective (he required rooted cultural cosmopolitanism).167 When connecting Locke’s  Alain Locke, “Frontiers of Culture,” 233.  And like Locke’s commitment to patriotism, his commitment to rootedness is tempered. In “Frontiers of Culture,” Locke tells us that: “We can afford to be culturally patriotic but never culturally jingoistic.” See p. 234. 166 167

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cosmopolitanism with his critical pragmatism, Judith Green argued that: “Locke’s ‘critical pragmatist’ cosmopolitanism expresses a reflective sense of rootedness in one’s culture of origin that leads to a critical loyalty to it, simultaneous with and conditioned by deep interest in and concern for the well-being of other cultures, civilizations, and the processes of growthpromoting peaceful exchanges among them.”168 We might think of rooted cultural cosmopolitanism as the necessity of embracing a culture that one calls their own, and extending beyond it to share with other cultures. Locke did not think that one could possess a clear sense of self without seeing a particular culture as theirs—that is, one cannot develop a sense of who they are, which we might take to be a necessary condition for living a flourishing life, by embracing all culture-products without any particular commitment. So, a Diogenesian cultural cosmopolitan who picks and chooses from many cultures without seeing any as theirs is either impossible or unable to flourish. Just as Locke thought that a person must see a culture as theirs, he thought that groups must not be forced to assimilate or have the aim of merely imitating another particular culture. Either disallows group-­ flourishing, which ultimately affects individuals’ flourishing because they are classed or class themselves within groups. And so Locke argued in favor of cultural “integrationism,” while rejecting cultural “assimilationism.”169 As an integrationist, Locke promoted collaboration and fraternization. And Locke promoted the view that living well amounts to agents being able to realize themselves and to craft a worthwhile good life, reflecting on a range of options and contemplating how their preferred lives are to be pursued given how they see themselves. Agents should be able to participate in any culture. “Culture-goods, once evolved, are no longer the exclusive property of the race or people that originated them. They belong to all who use them; and belong most to those who use them best.”170 And so states that have a democratic constitution and a cosmopolitan aim should allow a plethora of cultures because they promote a plethora of different conceptions of a good life. States should not 168  Judith M. Green, “Cultivating Pragmatist Cosmopolitanism—Democratic Local-and-­ Global Community amidst Diversity,” in Pragmatism and Diversity Dewey in the Context of Late Twentieth Century Debates, by Judith M.  Green, Stefan Neubert, and Kersten Reich (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 62. 169  Leonard Harris, “Introduction to ‘Frontiers of Culture,’” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 229. 170  Alain Locke, “The Contribution of Race to Culture,” 206.

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promote a singular conception, thereby making it more difficult or impossible to embrace other legitimate conceptions. And what this entails is promoting cultural exchange and interplay. And yet, however true all of this may be, “so far as I can understand history, it [a culture-product] is always a folk-product, with the form and flavor of a particular people and place, that is to say, for all its subsequent universality, culture has root and goes in that social soil which, for want of a better term, we call ‘race.’”171 Culture-products derive from a particular place, in response to a particular set of conditions, and can only exist by certain idioms, styles, and forms representative of some group. Further, even though Locke required a level of social assimilation—that is, assimilation to a common civilization type172—Locke advocated for cultural pride, which (like patriotism) requires a commitment to and valuing of a particular group.173 For Locke, cultural rootedness, which implies a kind of pride that rejects mere cultural imitation, was especially necessary for oppressed races. For oppressed races political recognition requires gaining a kind of recognition through being thought to have contributed to the best and most representative forms of human expression. When speaking about culture-citizenship, by which he meant a kind of group-recognition conferred upon those who have contributed to Culture, Locke tells us that: “Until alien [group talents and] certain representative products are developed (which products for their sheer intrinsic worth are worthy of incorporation into the joint culture), I fancy no really final and satisfactory race recognition will be accorded[.]”174 And for Locke, this cannot occur through mere imitation of another group’s culture. Now it was not lost on Locke that his claim played into a racist stereotype about oppressed group-contributions that was at best half-true, given the slavery and imperialism that may have stunted groups’ cultural developments. However, Locke saw that political recognition must take this  Ibid.  Like Du Bois, Locke seems to have doubted that two races are able to live in the same country without embracing similarities in overarching political aims. Still, like Du Bois, Locke rejected cultural assimilation as a form of imitation and denial of self. See: W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” in The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: The Essential Essays, ed. Nahum Dimitri Chandler (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015) 57–58. 173  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 97. 174  Ibid., 99. 171 172

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stereotype into account, and must respond to it. And so Locke, like Du Bois responding to biological racial realism,175 saw that this stereotype can be a useful tool for galvanizing members of oppressed races to commit to cultural development and artistic output. Racist and xenophobic stereotypes, fanatical religious orthodoxy, and overweening patriotism led to and were used to justify particular responses to groups’ culture-products. On the one hand they produced and were used to justify either an ideology of cultural superiority or imperial practices. These were dominant group-responses. On the other hand, they produced and were used to justify a counter-cultural chauvinism as an oppressed group-response. Locke understood all of these responses to block any true sense of cultural sharing and development, and thereby block all persons’ flourishing and the basic recognition of equality and fraternity needed to cultivate a cosmopolitan community. Racist and xenophobic stereotypes, fanatical religious orthodoxy, and overweening patriotism all went a ways to producing the idea that certain groups’ had nothing of value in terms of contributions to the kingdom of Culture. European groups saw themselves as culturally superior to other groups throughout the world. The perception of cultural superiority led either to the refusal to acknowledge these groups’ culture or to the thought that cultural development required an endorsement of the superior culture—and so justified colonial and imperialistic practices. Speaking of the latter, Locke argued that “an almost irreconcilable contradiction of true cosmopolitanism…is our almost chronic mindset of cultural imperialism.”176 Locke understood cultural imperialism as the “false identification of nationality with culture and its bigoted and tactless objectives of unity through imposed conformity….”177 Locke recognized there to be an imposition on citizens of a state to conform to cultural standards or products because these were considered superior to others. These were racialized such that standards or products that were connected to members of some race get conceptualized as representative of the nation. Conformity to these standards or products were considered a condition of “true” membership in that nation. In America today, what is connected to “whites” is considered “American,” such that being an American requires conformity to those standards and products. Rejection of those standards  See: W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races.”  Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality?,” 141. 177  Ibid. 175 176

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and products is considered un-American. Patriotism is seen as endorsing what is connected to or representative of whites. The result is either conformity to standards and products (many of which claim Black inferiority as content within the standard or product) or devaluation as un-American. The result of either is racial animus or non-white groups being demeaned and led to self-hatred. And so Locke tells us that cultural imperialism “is even more insidious and divisive than its political and economic counterparts, and threatens, long even after the liquidation of empire, to raise additional barriers, difficult for constructive world attitudes to surmount.”178 Thus, Locke thought that one of the highest disservices to the cause of world citizenship is militant and exclusivist cultural pride.179 Now because Locke was concerned about the effect of exclusivist cultural pride, he concerned himself with a counter-cultural chauvinism deriving from oppressed groups. Locke tells us that “where as in the case of the Negro there are no group differentials of language or basic culture patterns between the majority and the minority, cultural chauvinism is all the more ridiculous and contrary to fact.”180 The problem that Locke had with counter-cultural chauvinism was that it circumscribed “minority art up in a spiritual ghetto and deny vital and unrestricted creative participation in the general culture.”181 Two results derive from counter-cultural chauvinism. First, it stagnates cultural development. Cultural development requires interplay between groups. Counter-cultural chauvinism isolates the culture of the group such that it stales. Second, it forces or coerces group-members to endorse some particular culture. Force or coercion disallows an understanding, appreciation of, and living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression. This has the result of restricting members of oppressed groups from living a flourishing life. Further, all these responses cause cultural conflicts that lead to the threat of war.182 Locke proposed more sympathy and tolerant mutual understanding to combat both dominant- and oppressed-group responses to racist and xenophobic stereotypes, fanatical religious orthodoxy, and overweening patriotism. “What seems to be most necessary for cultural sympathy and  Ibid.  Ibid. 180  Alain Locke, “The Negro’s Contribution to American Culture,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 241. 181  Ibid. 182  Jacoby Carter, “New Moral Imperatives for World Order,” 224. 178 179

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tolerant mutual understanding is the development of attitudes supplanting the cultural arrogance which is such a chronic inheritance from the old tradition of a proprietary concept of culture.”183 We need to develop a new attitude toward culture. And for Locke, when “this psychological distance between cultures has been cut down, we shall be more minded to emphasize similarities rather than divergence.”184 A new attitude toward culture, and the emphasis on cultural similarity rather than difference leads to more respect for both culture-types and culture-groups. And so a new attitude is necessary to both garner respect from others and to see others as equal beings who are worthy of respect. Locke proposed three basic corollaries related to culture to move us more toward a mindset that emphasizes cultural similarities rather than differences. These three corollaries derive from Locke’s commitment to cultural relativity and were: cultural equivalence; cultural reciprocity; and limited cultural convertibility.185 Locke understood cultural equivalence as a principle “under which we would more wisely press the search for functional similarities in our analyses and comparisons of human cultures; thus offsetting our traditional and excessive emphasis upon cultural difference.”186 The first principle “prescribes an active search for functional…equivalence in values across cultures.”187 This principle both served Locke’s understanding of culture and promoted sympathy and tolerant mutual understanding. As we have seen, Locke’s conception of culture as the best and most representative forms of human expression implies relative consistency and stability across societies. The first principle provides more  objective grounds for the determination of what is consistent and stable across cultures. Furthermore, cultural equivalence allows us to better emphasize the similarities between cultures by moving us beyond superficial differences to those quintessentially human functions that culture-products serve.188 By emphasizing similarities rather than differences, groups sympathize with and are more willing to tolerate cultures other than their own.

 Alain Locke, “World Citizenship: Mirage or Reality?,” 144  Ibid. 185  This will undoubtedly strict the reader as odd. How can one who endorses thick moral cosmopolitanism also commit to cultural relativity without contradiction. 186  Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” 73. 187  Jacoby Carter, “New Moral Imperatives for World Order,” 225. 188  Moreover, this principle provides an objective way for cultural comparison. 183 184

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We have already seen that cultural reciprocity is “a general recognition of the reciprocal character of all contacts between cultures and of the fact that all modern cultures are highly composite ones.” “It begins by initially fostering a disposition toward cultural toleration in the hope that such toleration will lead to mutual respect, which would in turn serve as a foundation upon which to base reciprocal exchanges between cultures.”189 Again, cultural reciprocity challenges the notion that particular groups are solely responsible for their own products, and are the only ones to have contributed to Culture. And so cultural reciprocity mitigates both cultural imperialism and chauvinism. In so doing, it works to eliminate notions of superior and inferior cultures that go hand-in-hand with racist and xenophobic stereotypes, fanatical religious orthodoxy, and overweening patriotism. Additionally, it works against stereotypes, orthodoxies, and jingoism. If certain cultures or culture-products are truly superior or inferior, then they become so only insofar as they serve their function better or worse relative to other cultures or culture-products. Finally, Locke proposed limited cultural convertibility. He claimed that “since culture elements, though widely interchangeable, are so separable, the institutional forms from their values and the values from their institutional forms, the organic selectivity and assimilative capacity of a borrowing culture becomes a limiting criterion for cultural exchange.”190 Locke understood that not all cultural products and values between groups function in the same way; not all values are constants. And so we should accept that there are “limited degrees of commensurability and translatability of meanings and values between cultures.”191 Though we should acknowledge and accept this, we need not uphold barriers between culture-groups. Rather than disparage groups given limitations of commensurability and translatability of meanings, we should see limitations as opportunities for cultural sharing and development. And so we can address cultural imperialism and chauvinism with these three correlates. In so doing, we commit to cultural conditions necessary for both flourishing lives and cultivating a cosmopolitan community.

 Jacoby Carter, “New Moral Imperatives for World Order,” 225.  Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” 73. 191  Leonard Harris, “Introduction to ‘Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,’” 67. 189 190

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Conclusion We might conclude a discussion of Locke’s cosmopolitan commitments with a few remarks about what kinds of actions need to be ended, and what types of actions need be implemented as conditions for the possible emergence of a cosmopolitan community. We might label these negative and positive commitments. Negatively, the following must be overcome: irresponsible national sovereignty; uniformitarianism; power politics; military imperialism; economic imperialism; and the bigotry of cultural superiority. Positively, the following need to be brought about: a restoration of native lands; a pluralistic mindset and approach to value; and cultural relativism with its three corollaries of cultural equivalence, cultural reciprocity, and limited cultural convertibility. Now, Locke was committed to the idea that a political requirement for the possible emergence of a cosmopolitan community is that nations adopt a democratic constitution. More than the mere adoption of a democratic constitution, Locke thought that nations need to adopt several properties of a democratic mindset. And so Locke had a very intricate and well-­ thought-­out theory of democracy that derived from and served his cosmopolitanism. Locke’s democratic theory is the subject to which I now turn.

CHAPTER 3

A Theory of True Democracy

Democracy is not merely a form of government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. It is essentially an attitude of respect and reverence towards fellow men. —Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, Annihilation of Cast Democracy, of course, is one of the basic human ideals, but as an ideal of human association it is something quite superior to any outward institution or any particular society; therefore, not only is government too narrow to express democracy, but government from time to time must grow to realize democracy. —Alain Locke, “Five Phases of Democracy: Farewell Address at Talladega College”

Introduction In the last chapter, I intimated that Alain Locke was committed to what has become known as normative democracy, or the view that there are moral (or, in Locke’s case, pragmatically necessary) foundations for democracy. Locke was committed to the view that democracy is a necessary condition for the possibility of a cosmopolitan community; the spread of democracy is a necessary condition for peace. In fact, its necessity for a cosmopolitan community goes a ways to justify its spread throughout the

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world. However, one might ask a number of questions about Locke’s commitments to democracy. First, what did Locke mean by democracy? Second, what are its values and ideals? Third, why are its values important for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community? Connected to its importance for a cosmopolitan community, is it inherently or instrumentally valuable? Why favor democracy over other competing political forms of government? This chapter explores Locke’s thinking on democracy, and relates it to his cosmopolitan considerations. Now as the second epigraph above indicates, Locke took democracy to be a basic human ideal of association. However, as is indicated by the latter part of that sentence, the sense in which Locke discussed democracy was not political. Democracy is something more. Locke did not understand democracy merely as a political form of government. As Christopher Buck has pointed out, Locke had many conceptions of democracy.1 Unless one realizes Locke’s manifold conceptions, the later part of the epigraph will appear paradoxical. How might a political democracy grow to realize democracy if democracy is a mere political conception? Locke thought that members of a political democracy may fail to appreciate its ideals due primarily to a failure to possess particular thoughts about and attitudes toward certain of its citizens or other citizens of the world. Locke thought that such an undemocratic pattern of thought and attitude was rampant in America, primarily with whites’ inconsistent commitments to the “spiritual” products of Blacks, Indigenous Americans, and Jews.2 Whites reveled in the gifts of these groups, but reviled their humanity. And worse yet, many whites were committed democrats (those who profess democratic ideals) who saw no contradiction in their commitments to democracy and their beliefs about and attitudes toward these groups. And so for Locke: “Democracy, we must realize, can be even more vitally threatened and frustrated by undemocratic attitudes and practices from within than it can be effectively challenged or defeated by anti-democratic enemies from without.”3 A functioning political democracy is only as democratic as its citizens’ inner thoughts/feelings about and practices toward other persons.  See Christopher Buck, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Democracy,” in Studies in Bahá’í Philosophy and Alain Locke: Faith and Philosophy, chapter ten. 2  Alain Locke, “The Preservation of the Democratic Ideal,” in World Order, Vol. 38, No. 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J. Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2006–2007) 27. 3  Alain Locke, World View on Race and Democracy: A Study Guide in Human Group Relations (Chicago: American Library Association, 1943) 1. 1

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In discussing Locke’s thought about democracy, I begin by separating an overarching concept of democracy from eight conceptions of democracy that Locke endorsed.4 Afterward, I focus on political democracy specifically. In so doing, I answer what type and model of political democracy Locke endorsed. I then provide Locke’s answer to political democracy’s value, the requirement to spread it throughout the world, and thus why its values are of such importance for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. As such I provide answers to why it is favored over other forms of government, along with its inherent or instrumental value.

Concepts, Conceptions, and Democracy Deriving from the work of H.L.A. Hart,5 John Rawls,6 and Tyler Burge,7 Michael Hardimon distinguished a concept from a conception in the following way: “To characterize an idea as a concept of X is to characterize it as the object of a possible correlative conception of X and conversely. The terms ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ operate in tandem. The concept of X specifies what X is. It is the definition of X; X’s concept gives us X’s logical core. A conception of X indicates how the concept of X is to be understood.”8 A conception of X specifies but one way in which the concept of X can be understood; X’s conception is one possible way of articulating X’s concept. Taking cues from Hart, Rawls, Burge, and Hardimon, I would like to illustrate Locke’s concept of democracy, and then elucidate his eight different conceptions of it. Now there are reasons to think that Locke would reject either a concept/conception distinction as applied to democracy or the view that democracy can be captured by a single definition. When speaking of a concept of democracy, Locke tells us that we should “treat democracy as a 4  Christopher Buck highlights nine conceptions of democracy in Locke’s work. It is my view that there is no distinction between cultural and racial democracy, where racial democracy in not included in cultural democracy. Racial democracy, if discussed apart from cultural democracy, would be merely a more focused discussion of cultural democracy. Further, I take Locke to refer to social democracy as economic democracy. Locke’s work seems to illustrate this. Buck’s own description of it seems to link it to spiritual democracy without significant distinction. 5  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961) 115–119. 6  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) 5. 7  Tyler Burge, “Concepts, Definitions, and Meaning,” in Metaphilosophy Vol. 24, no. 4 (October 1993) 316. 8  Michael Hardimon, Rethinking Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017) 28.

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dynamic, changing and developing concept, to consider it always in terms of an expanding context, and to realize that like any embodiment of human values, it must grow in order to keep alive.”9 Conceptualizing the concept of democracy as one unchanging and completed idea without historical and contextual influence closes both possibilities and our minds/ attitudes. “[T]hrough considering democratic principles so non-­ historically, we know and advocate them in a chronicly [sic] dogmatic doctrinnaire [sic] way. And another consequence even worse, [sic] than this, we do not expect democracy to change and do not fully realize the necessity for its constant growth.”10 It would appear from these claims that Locke would reject a single or lasting definition of democracy. Democracy can be, and in fact needs to be, a number of things without a logical core. Democracy seems to change sporadically given historical and perhaps even social contexts. Still, after having made the claim that democracy is a dynamic, changing, and developing concept, Locke applied the claim to its practice in America and throughout the world. From that application it would appear that Locke was highlighting the development of democracy in such a way that it applies to a greater number of people. Democracy, as a “dynamic, changing, and developing concept,” seems to regard its expansion to greater populations and in vaster areas of human life—that is, as it relates to economic securities, political participation, cultural selection, and so on. Locke required wider-spread application of democracy and the democratization of a number of aspects of life for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. And so, as opposed to reading Locke as rejecting a single or lasting concept of democracy, I read him as setting up conditions for his many different conceptions of democracy. It would appear to me that Locke merely lacked the language of a concept/conception distinction. Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth tell us that “Locke saw democracy as more a system of social values than a mechanism or procedure for mediating political power and interests.”11 Harris and Molesworth indicate that Locke located democracy within a political structure, as 9  Alain Locke, “Creative Democracy,” in World Order, Vol. 38, No 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J. Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2006–2007) 41. 10  Ibid. 11  Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth, Alain L. Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 329.

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opposed to merely forming the basis of it. Democracy is not a political concept, though Locke took there to be a political conception of democracy. Buck provides the same starting point, namely that Locke thought that “democracy was a much broader concept than its narrow political definition,” and tells us that: “Democracy is a process of progressive equalizing.”12 However, progressive equalizing is not a mere external process. It derives from an internal motivation that itself derives from a particular understanding of what it means to be human. Locke expressed the heart of his concept of democracy in the following sentence: “The prospects of broadening the scope of [political] democracy or of deepening its quality where it already prevails both depend on democratizing the hearts and minds of its adherents towards the progressive removal of whatever barriers still obstruct the basic democratic equality and fraternity of [hu]man[s].”13 Political democracy depends on something more fundamental and internal to citizens within any political democracy; it depends on a mindset. We might express Locke’s concept of democracy as an attitude and recognition of the basic equality and kinship of all humans that legitimizes autonomy under rational constraints.14 This concept is a combination of three more basic ideas that Locke took to undergird it—namely, liberty, equality, and fraternity. For Locke, humans have a natural desire to assemble into groups and to associate with other humans. And humans have a desire to do so when not compelled by external conditions of power. Locke thought certain assumptions to be operative in associations where contact is not structured by power—that is, when contact is “free.” Locke called these “basic ideals of human association.” Basic ideals of human association are assumptions that are operative under conditions where humans freely associate.

12  Christopher Buck, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Democracy,” in Studies in Bahá’í Philosophy: Selected Articles, ed. Mikhail Sergeev (Swampscott: M-Graphics Publishing, 2015) 30. 13  Alain Locke, World View on Race and Democracy: A Study Guide in Human Group Relations 1. 14  In a work entitled, “Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles,” I understood Locke as defining “democracy” to “mean something like the desire for liberty or fraternity, or the presumption on the part of a person that he/she is equal to all other human beings qua their being human.” This is a rather sloppy and scholastically immature way of providing the definition presented here.

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Elsewhere, I have argued that Locke took liberty, equality, and fraternity to be basic ideals of association.15 With regard to liberty, Locke accepted both a negative and positive sense of the term. He took liberty to “connote the absence of coercion without just cause, as well as the ability to pursue different conceptions of the good.”16 Locke also took liberty to connote the possession of certain goods that would protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom. Beyond liberty, Locke took equality to be a basic ideal of association. For Locke, each person in an association that is not structured by power assumes themself to be equal in value to every other person in important, fundamental ways. Each person’s voice and perspective is assumed to be valued in the association. And so a basic equality of persons is thereby assumed. Finally, Locke took fraternity to be a basic ideal of association. For Locke, free associations assume “the willingness to share with others in a nonthreatening but mutually affirming manner.”17 Now Locke appealed to these three basic ideals of association with the concept “democracy.” However, Locke also appealed to many different conceptions of democracy. His goal was to describe many of the conceptions as the historical—though non-teleological—unfolding of the concept of democracy throughout the world. History shows democracy as spreading. Each “phase” widens the parameters of democracy, elucidating aspects of the concept either by the greater inclusion of human groups or application to more areas of human life. Locke sought to highlight the historical movement of democracy by the expansion of conditions where contact became less structured by power because of the greater degree of democratization of human hearts and minds. Greater democratization of human hearts and minds led to greater inclusivity as well as certain practices in aspects of life that decrease power-structured contacts. Though Locke referred to democracy as a basic human ideal, which should license the inference that he took it to have originated in either Africa or Asia (or perhaps some other, more ancient location), he proposed that democracy had its beginnings in Greece. In Greece, the democratic ideal was local, and thereby narrow and exclusionary. Locke referred 15  Corey L.  Barnes, “Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles,” in The Acorn: Philosophical Studies in Pacifism and Nonviolence Vol. 17, No 1 (2017). 16  Ibid., 11. 17  Ibid., 13–14.

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to this phase as “local democracy.” Local democracy can be understood as the accordance of dignity to members of a very local group of people, modeled on a fraternity whereby like-mindedness and a very particular social/political status in a very specific polis are required for membership. “It excluded foreigners, slaves and women.”18 Here we see the very limited application of the concept of democracy at an infant and perhaps fragile stage. There were not many people in Greece to whom democracy applied. And there were not many areas of human life where the application of this concept flourished for members of this limited group. Locke suggested that there was a historical progression of the concept of democracy with the rise of Christianity, which expanded borders and extended democracy to more humans. He called this second phase “moral democracy.” Moral democracy is the accordance of dignity via moral equality to all members of the human race, though with the historical qualification of their adherence to Christianity for its application. This phase of democracy captures something essential to the expansion of the concept of democracy. It captures the particular understanding of what being human means. Humans are one family and are equal, one with another. And these two facts should be recognized and should motivate human action. The understanding of what being human means motivates certain thoughts, attitudes, and practices. Though moral democracy applies democracy to more people than local democracy, the qualification of Christianity as a condition of according dignity caused the practice of this conception to fail in three ways. First, the qualification rendered the conception false. If accepting Christianity was a condition for according dignity via moral equality such that one could not be treated with dignity (or as a moral equal) if one was not Christian, and if the conception required treatment for its truth such that the conception is true only if all members of humanity are treated with dignity (or as moral equals), then the conception is false. Second, the Christian church failed to grant political rights to all citizens, and failed to protect basic freedoms like the freedom of conscience, association, and expression. It thereby restricted essential means of protecting liberty for all humans. And in requiring conversion for non-Christians, moral democracy restricted liberty, which was a basic ideal of human association. Third, 18  Alain Locke, “The Five Phases of Democracy: Farewell Address at Talladega College,” in World Order, Vol. 36, No 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J.  Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2005) 46.

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the qualification did not allow groups such as Muslims or Atheists to commit to their conception of a good life. Disallowing different conceptions of the good life would undoubtedly restrict the application of positive liberty. And so, while the first failure illustrated that moral democracy failed to recognize the basic equality and kinship of all humans, the second and third failures illustrate that moral democracy failed to capture the concept’s appeal to autonomy under rational constraints. “The third great step in democracy came from [P]rotestant lands and people who evolved the ideal of political equality: (1) equality before the law, and (2) political citizenship.”19 Locke understood the third phase of democracy as “political democracy.” Political democracy is the accordance of both equality before the law and citizenship rights to individuals within a democratically constituted polis from the foundational premise of the moral equality of all human beings. Political democracy takes the fundamental aspect of moral democracy seriously, and declares that moral equality requires certain legal entitlements. It is a very important phase in the historical development of the concept of democracy because it possessed a greater power to fulfill one very important democratic ideal—namely, liberty. And liberty is significant for a critical part of the concept of democracy—namely, autonomy under rational constraints. Political democracy guarantees negative liberty in protecting freedoms related to conscience and expression,20 and thereby provides freedom from arbitrary authority.21 Though political democracy does well for elucidating the concept of democracy, and though it is necessary for the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community, there is a problem with political democracy’s ability to fully capture the concept of democracy. Political democracy’s problem is in part depicted in the epigraph above. Locke thought that more democracy than mere political democracy is needed to safeguard political democracy.22 Further, this particular conception lacked an essential elucidation of autonomy under rational constraints. Locke thought that freedom from arbitrary authority was insufficient for both a full realization of the concept and the continued life of political democracies. Recall that Locke endorsed both negative and positive conceptions of liberty. Political democracy highlights negative liberty. The fourth stage of  Ibid.  Ibid. 21  Ibid. 22  Alain Locke, “The Preservation of the Democratic Ideal,” 27. 19 20

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democracy highlights positive liberty. “The fourth crucial stage in the enlargement of democracy began, I think, with the income tax amendment.”23 Locke labeled this stage “economic (or social) democracy.” Economic/social democracy is the promotion of dignity through economic guarantees by the partial expropriation of surplus wealth for the benefit of the commonwealth within a political democracy. Locke thought that in order to respect the dignity of persons, “we must have guaranteed to all citizens certain minimal standards of living and the right to earn a living.”24 If we take the dignity of persons seriously, then not only do we need legal entitlements that protect us from arbitrary authority, but additionally we need guarantees to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom. Negative liberties that are the result of political democracy require access to certain things—education, healthcare, employment opportunities, and so on—that are provided by: (1) a minimal standard of living for those who cannot work, as well as those who can and are willing to work; and (2) the right to earn a living. These allow individuals to craft a life that matches their chosen conception of a good life. And they also allow for an appreciable life through the fulfillment of talents, and satisfy the duty to culture. Access to these justifies expropriation of surplus wealth in a political democracy. “Locke thought that political freedom ought to lead to economic equality”25—where equality is here captured by fairness. Economic equality is necessary to complete and secure political equality. Economic democracy elucidates the concept of democracy by requiring conditions that promote a truer sense of equality and makes autonomy under rational constraints possible. That we have greater economic equality and legal entitlements as protections of autonomy is one thing. However, Locke denied that these would eliminate bias and prejudice, and he argued that these would not completely counteract the occurrent effects of bias and prejudice in a society. And so: “A fifth phase of democracy, even if the preceding four are realized, still remains to be achieved in order to have a fully balanced society.”26 Locke referred to the fifth phase as “cultural democracy.” Cultural democracy is the respect for human dignity by mutual respect for 23   Alain Locke, “The Five Phases of Democracy: Farewell Address at Talladega College,” 46–47. 24  Ibid., 47. 25  Christopher Buck, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Democracy,” 34. 26  Alain Locke, “The Five Phases of Democracy: Farewell Address at Talladega College,” 47.

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the right of difference accorded to minority groups and individuals, both within and between political democracies. Locke claimed that early versions of cultural democracy were realized with the rise of political democracy when there was emphasis placed on the freedoms of expression, worship, and conscience to protect those who either were not Christian or were not within a particular Christian sect.27 However, during his lifetime, Locke recognized bias and prejudice to track along race, ethnicity, and cultural differences more broadly. Bias and prejudice blocked protections of negative and positive liberties for groups on the basis of difference, and created insurmountable barriers to equality for which political and economic equality could not account. Locke tells us that “the fact that a man cannot afford to buy a decent house for his family involves the problem of economic inequality; but, on the other hand, the man who through social prejudice is refused the purchase of a house though he can afford to buy it confronts us with an example of cultural inequality.”28 Locke saw this with racial segregation, religious bias, and ethnic exclusion. Locke considered cultural democracy to be a very important conception, without which “[political] democracy may go into total collapse.”29 His reason was that cultural democracy is a movement toward the “heart” of democracy; cultural democracy moves us closer to the internal mindset—the thoughts/feelings about and attitudes toward certain citizens of a state or of the world—upon which the fullest expressions of other conceptions of democracy (moral, political, and economic/social) rest. “A [political] democracy is a system of government and corporate living in which there is no distinction between minority and majority rights; and under which life is safe and equally abundant for all minorities.”30 However, it takes cultural democracy (among other conceptions) for the realization and consistent practice of this ideal democratic polity. “The first five dimensions may be roughly characterized as ‘Historical Democracy,’ as they are sequenced in Locke’s paradigm of social evolution.”31 The sixth, seventh, and eighth conceptions require much more for their realization, and so have not become realized to any significant degree. The sixth conception of democracy is “intellectual  Ibid.  Ibid. 29  Ibid. 30   Alain Locke, [Notes] Democracy—Political, Economic, and Cultural, quoted in Christopher Buck, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Democracy,” 30. 31  Christopher Buck, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Democracy,” 31. 27 28

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democracy.” Intellectual democracy is the respect for human dignity by the renunciation of dogmatic and absolute claims to truth and values. Locke understood intellectual democracy to relate to propositional attitudes. A commitment to it derives from the recognition of the fallibility of the human mind. Academically, intellectual democracy relates to science just as much as it relates to the humanities. Locke thought that the scientific point of view must make a place for values, and the humanities must respect the scientific method. And so: “Scientists should see that the values of the humanist were important in guiding judgment, just as humanists should see that the analytic approach of the scientist was a useful instrument in establishing truth.”32 Beyond science and the humanities, Locke broadened the conception to epistemological views simpliciter, including religious, political, cultural, and social views.33 Intellectual democracy displaces bigotry and arbitrary orthodoxy, and promotes tolerance and value reciprocity. Locke argued that “we cannot, soundly and safely at least, preach liberalism and at the same time abet and condone bigotry, condemn uniformitarianism and placate orthodoxy, promote tolerance and harbor the seeds of intolerance.”34 Intellectual democracy, in promoting tolerance and value reciprocity, promotes pluralism, which he took to be necessary for liberalism to flourish. In so doing, the conception further elucidates the concept of democracy by best legitimizing autonomy under rational constraints because it allows the widest range of rational ideas and worthy conceptions of a good life. Without intellectual democracy, people can no more craft their conception of the good life than they could if they lacked moral, political, economic (social), or cultural democracy. The seventh conception is “spiritual democracy,” and is the conception that most matches Locke’s concept of democracy.35 Spiritual democracy is a commitment to the dignity of persons from “a state of mind, a province of

32   Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth, Alain L.  Locke: The Biography of a Philosopher, 333. 33  Leonard Harris, Preface to “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 55. 34  Ibid., 57. 35  Alain Locke, “The Gospel of the Twentieth-Century,” in World Order, Vol. 36, No 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J. Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2005) 40.

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the heart, a radiation of attitudes”36 that motivates fairness in practice, cooperation for the common good, and mutual respect for and exchange of diverse cultures. Speaking specifically about political democracy, Locke tells us that: “Constitutional guarantees, legal and civil rights, political machinery of democratic action and control are, of course, the skeleton foundation of democracy, but you and I know that attitudes are the flesh and blood of democracy, and that without their vital reenforcement [sic] democracy is really moribund or dead.”37 Spiritual democracy must be developed through political, economic/social, cultural, and intellectual democracies, even as it reinforces them. And it is the greatest expression of the fundamental premise of moral democracy; it expresses the fullness of the accordance of dignity via moral equality to all members of the human race. Spiritual democracy is thought to solve the most basic problems of political democracies. Locke saw an overemphasis placed on materiality and the existence of prejudice as pervasive problems in America. However, these two problems were derivations from a more fundamental problem— namely, selfishness. Selfishness produces or allows “false human values, a blind ness [sic] of heart, an obstruction of social vision.”38 Spiritual democracy was Locke’s answer to selfishness, without which political democracies—no matter how wealthy—could not survive. It is the best—though not the last—elucidation of the concept of democracy. The eighth and final conception of democracy that Locke proposed was “world democracy.” As stated in the previous chapter, world democracy is the practice of respecting the dignity of all persons from the realization of all conceptions of democracy on an international basis. It is the manifestation of the moral, political, legal, economic, social, intellectual, and attitudinal conditions of nations and peoples of the world. Democratic nations, constructed on the premise of human equality, provide negative and positive liberties. Further, they respect the right to difference of its own as well as world citizens. Still further, citizens are committed to the dignity of persons via a mindset that motivates fairness, cooperation, respect, and reciprocity between democratic nations. And so, world democracy is the necessary final stage or phase before the establishment of a cosmopolitan community.

 Christopher Buck, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Democracy,” 39.  Alain Locke, “The Preservation of the Democratic Ideal,” 39. 38  Alain Locke, “The Gospel of the Twentieth-Century,” 40. 36 37

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On Political Democracy Recall that Locke’s conception of political democracy is the accordance of both equality before the law and citizenship rights to individuals within a democratically constituted polis from the foundational premise of the moral equality of human beings. Now this does not quite give us enough to answer why political democracies are necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Another form of government might very well satisfy tenets of moral, economic (social), cultural, intellectual, and spiritual democracy better than this form of government. Further still, this understanding does not answer whether political democracy has inherent or mere instrumental value. Moreover, the type and model of democracy that Locke endorsed is not clear from this conception. Knowing what type and model Locke endorsed seems to be necessary for determining what value democracy has, and why it is necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. So, did Locke endorse direct or representative democracy, and did he endorse a liberal, participatory, deliberative, or some other model of democracy? Locke never wrote an extended treatment of democracy. And so Locke does not have a text that scrupulously describes the type and model of democracy to which he was committed. This should not prevent us from piecing together his likely view. My method for piecing Locke’s democratic view together is to look at a number of his works in order to gather some evidence and, when taking into account his cosmopolitan theory and the above phases of democracy, to make inferences as to which type and model of democracy he was most likely committed (of course given the assumption that he intended to hold coherent views). And so my approach to understanding Locke’s democratic commitments mirrors my method for piecing together his moral, political, economic, and cultural cosmopolitanisms. Let us first examine whether Locke wished to endorse a direct or representative type of democracy. As is rather standard, I understand a direct democracy to be a form of democracy where citizens decide on laws and public policies themselves, making political decisions without elected representatives. Representative democracies are those whereby citizens elect representatives to represent their wills. Again, Locke never expressed a clear and explicit commitment to either direct or representative types of democracy. And there are good reasons to think that Locke would endorse either of the two types.

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Speaking in favor of a representative type of democracy, it is rather unreasonable to think that Locke would not see problems with cosmopolitanism being grounded in or allowing for direct democracies. The sheer number of people the world over would make political decision-­ making extraordinarily inefficient, if at all possible. And recall that Locke seems to have wanted democratic participation from outside of a country when a country’s policies have world-ranging effects. As a pragmatist, Locke would be deeply concerned about the inefficiency of direct democracy for solving basic problems that arise in various aspects of government within nations, increased intercommunication between nations, and voting-­practices related to policies that have world-ranging effects. Recall also that Locke endorsed a thin political cosmopolitanism that would require states voluntarily transfer some part of their sovereignty to a higher-order, more global power. The formation of a higher-order, more global power seems impossible without representative democracies. There must be some persons making up the more global power to whom some part of countries’ sovereignty is transferred. This group would represent the will of world citizens in making laws that apply to nations under it. And so Locke—being committed to efficient problem-solving and a thin political cosmopolitanism—would probably have endorsed some form of representative democracy as required by both suitable life in complex societies such as the United States and cosmopolitan relations between complex societies. Though Locke would seemly endorse some form of representative democracy, it is clear that Locke would endorse much more inclusion in political decision-making from citizens. Locke appreciated the historical movement of democracy from its exclusive locality, extending outward to more people. He also wanted humans to have the agency and tools that would give them more autonomy. His praise seemed to be directed toward the expansion of the right of citizens to more directly decide laws and policies on the basis of a shared and equal humanity. And Locke would seemingly have thought that the equality of humans was an appropriate basis to grant humans direct participation in political decision-making. Further, Locke saw maximal inclusion in political decision-making as necessary for protecting group-interests. As quoted when engaging his political cosmopolitanism, Locke thought that: “Direct participational representation of all considerable groups must be provided for….”39 As  Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 63.

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intimated in the first chapter, one of Locke’s worries in “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy” was the relationship between cultural values and a democratic world order. A democratic world order cannot admit cultural superiority, and “it must respectfully protect the cultural values and institutional forms and traditions of a vast congeries of peoples and races— European, Asiatic, African, American, Australaisian [Australian].”40 Locke saw more direct participational representation as a necessary protection of groups’ interest in preserving their cultures and a necessary limit to claims of cultural superiority. Now it is unclear what form “direct participational representation” would take. In other words, Locke may not have meant that citizens should have the right to directly decide laws and public policies, particularly if his words should be interpreted to mean that world-citizens have certain rights that extend beyond nations of which they are citizens. Locke could very well have meant that citizens must be allowed to vote representatives into power at much greater rates than was then current, and thus could have been rejecting exclusionary practices from the process of electing representatives. His appeal to increased participation in political decision-­making could (and in fact I think that it does) support a representative model. I think that Locke would have endorsed a type of democracy that is representative, but one that opens the door for more direct participation in political decision-making from citizens. Though it appears that Locke would endorse a representative type of democracy, the model of democracy he would endorse is also important. His writings, the above conceptions of democracy, and his cosmopolitanism all commit him to a model of democracy that likens that proposed by Cristina Lafont.41 This view is a deliberative model of democracy that is sensitive to demands for increased or larger-scale participation from non-­ expert citizens. Though Locke did not have a vision for institutionalizing this model of democracy, I think that he was most likely committed to something of a participatory conception of deliberative democracy. Before turning to Locke’s model of political democracy, it is important to note that Locke would not find the model incompatible with or complete without basic principles promoted in a liberal democracy. And Locke would not deny liberal democracy legitimacy in promoting a participatory  Ibid., 62–63.  Cristina Lafont, Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). 40 41

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conception of deliberative democracy. I understand liberal democracy as a democratic state grounded in liberal values—that is, one that “uphold[s] the values of freedom of choice, reason and toleration in the face of tyranny, the absolutist system and religious intolerance.”42 Locke’s conception of political democracy, along with the sources from which Locke drew to develop this conception, both seem to indicate that he had liberal democracy in mind when thinking through political democracy. Further, Locke’s cosmopolitan commitments place Locke squarely within the tradition insofar as cosmopolitanism requires all of the above tenets as conditions for its possibility. His appeal to equal protection under the law, human and civil rights, a market economy, private property, minimal standards of living with regard to his conception of economic (social) democracy, and his appeal to the basic right of the freedom of labor were all appeals to common liberal democratic ideals. Still further, Locke’s notion of tolerance—a notion so central to his cosmopolitanism, democracy, and value theory—was influenced by the classical liberalism of John Locke.43 Moreover, in “The Mandates System,” when discussing minimal guarantees of the mandates charter, Locke appealed to certain liberal democratic principles that serve as preconditions for the just establishment of protectorates. For Locke, justly established protectorates should include: “The establishment of the principle of economic autonomy of colonial areas by formal adoption of the policy of the expenditure of the public revenues within the area, and the creation of local native treasuries for local developments.”44 They should also include: “The guarantee of the rights of appeal and petition, of the freedom of worship, conscience, public utterance and right of assembly.”45 Here Locke appealed to economic autonomy and private property, equality before the law, the rule of law, and liberal freedoms of worship, speech/thought, and assembly. Like his conception of political democracy and his cosmopolitan commitments, Locke’s claims were congruent with liberal democratic principles. Now my intent is not to distance Locke from a perspective that is essential to his critical pragmatism, and that would have been quite influential  David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006) 59.  Greg Moses, “Two Lockes, Two Keys: Tolerance and Reciprocity in a Culture of Democracy,” in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, Culture, Race, and Education, ed. Leonard Harris (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) 163. 44  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 520. 45  Ibid., 521. 42 43

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to his thought about political democracy. I want to situate Locke within an African American perspective whereby he engaged democracy from “within the veil.”46 Specifically, I want to be sure to highlight that Locke was entrenched within the Black liberal tradition. Michael C.  Dawson understands Black liberalism to be a version of American liberalism, with a few varying kinds—namely, militant egalitarianism, disillusioned liberalism, and Black conservatism. Within the Black liberal tradition, militant egalitarians tend to be critical of and yet add to American liberalism in many important ways. It incorporates particular tenets that are either deemphasized in or excluded from American liberalism more broadly. I read Locke as having endorsed a version of militant egalitarianism. In addition to upholding the values of freedom of choice, reason, and toleration in the face of tyranny, the absolutist system, and religious intolerance, American liberalism “is usually defined in such a way as to privilege the autonomy and liberty of the individual and the sanctity of private property while maintaining a deep skepticism of central state power.”47 For Dawson, militant egalitarians, while accepting the former liberal tenets, reject the privilege accorded to individualist interpretations of autonomy and liberty. Instead, militant egalitarians favor a kind of communitarianism. With American liberalism: “Self-determination is defined for the individual, while Blacks and others such as Native Americans tend to define it for the group.”48 Alain Locke, particularly given his endorsement of the “Talented Tenth”49 and the politics of “racial uplift,”50 fits square within the communitarian view that is promoted by radical egalitarians. For Locke, much like Black liberals: “The advancement of the self,

 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003).  Michael C.  Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001) 272. 48  Ibid., 255. 49  See: Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, p.  98; Alain Locke, “The Ethics of Culture”; and Zachery R.  Williams, In Search of the Talented Tenth: Howard University Public Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Race, 1926–1970 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009). 50  For a primer on the politics of racial uplift, see: Kevin K.  Gaines, Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 46 47

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the liberation of the self, is a meaningless concept outside the context of one’s community.”51 Further, militant egalitarians—along with Black liberals generally—are suspicious of the American liberal appeal to a strict separation between the public and private spheres, along with the skepticism of a strong central state that tends to go along with the American liberal view. Because Black liberals generally take the history of racial oppression to be a starting-point for political philosophy, being unwilling to theorize without accounting for it, they tend to endorse the view that a strong centralized state is necessary to protect racial-minority rights and aims toward autonomy. It is not the case that Black liberals have an uncritical trust in the state. Rather, they endorse this view with an understanding that the state has so often been an institution of Black oppression. However, they “have found more to fear in markets and at the subnational levels of government than from the central state.”52 And so, despite a history of governmental oppression, many Black liberals “demand with great regularity that the national government intervene in subnational governments, regulate markets, enact national economic policies that are highly redistributive, and regulate behavior in civil society more generally.”53 As we have seen with his economic cosmopolitanism, and as will be shown in my next book with his philosophy of education,54 Locke endorsed this tenet. Locke was a radical egalitarian who wanted “the state to have the capacity and responsibility not only to insure racial fairness, but also to provide economic opportunity for all of its citizens.”55 And like many radical egalitarians, Locke rejected outright revolution and considered socialism to have been deeply flawed on democratic grounds. Thus, as is indicated by his economic cosmopolitanism and conception of economic (social) democracy, Locke supported a highly regulated capitalism.56 Additionally, radical egalitarians within the Black liberal tradition place an emphasis on activism as a tool for advancing and ultimately achieving 51  Michael C.  Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, 255. 52  Ibid., 258. 53  Ibid., 263. 54  The practical aspects of Locke’s philosophy—namely his philosophies of art, religion, and education—will be the subject of a forthcoming book. 55  Michael C.  Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, 258. 56  Ibid., 259; Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire.”

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justice. Progress involves activism, without which advancement for either the race or the country can be achieved. Locke saw protest as a tool for advancing and ultimately achieving justice, and as an educative tool more broadly. He lauded protest as an option for African Americans searching for justice, claiming that: “We have made more substantial gains in the militant phases [of our history] than in others.”57 He was committed to protest as a legitimate form of activism so long as it is “based on ideals that transcend particular group interests.”58 This aligns with his moral cosmopolitanism that requires commitment to and actions on behalf of particular groups be justified on the basis of their furthering cosmopolitanism. Locke illustrated this commitment to activism as both necessary and an inevitable reaction to oppression: The return of the minority to its own culture is rarely a mere retreat back to the old conservatism and former provinciality of culture. Occasionally it may be so rationalized, but this is a protest reaction mainly. In actuality, the cultural revival is a grafting of adopted elements of the invader’s culture upon traditions and symbols of the old. The cultural potentialities of such modified cultural nationalism are more sound and promising than the occasional more narrowly conceived nationalisms of minorities, who react so violently to the majority pattern that they imitate it in reverse.59

Locke understood that an adoption of elements of the dominant and oppressive group’s culture, and a grafting of it with older elements of the minority’s own culture could be a form or protest. This protest was a form of activism that aims to reject certain modes of oppression. Locke saw a counter (perhaps chauvinistic) racialism as protest, along with activism more broadly, as both necessary and inevitable because of what they provide for both oppressed and oppressive groups. They give oppressed groups confidence and a perception of themselves as worthy of 57  Alain Locke, “The Negro Group,” in Group Relations and Group Antagonisms: A Series of Addresses and Discussions, ed. Robert M.  MacIver (New York: Institute for Religious Studies, 1944). 46–51. 58  Talmadge C. Guy, “Adult Education and Democratic Values: Alain Locke on the Nature and Purpose of Adult Education for African Americans, in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, Culture, Race, and Education, ed. Leonard Harris (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) 226. 59  Alain Locke, “Minority Reactions and Counter-Assertion” in When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts, ed. Alain Locke and Bernhard Stern (New York: Hines, Hayden, & Eldridge, Inc., 1946).

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those political rights that are not being afforded to them. And thus they give them both confidence and motivation to move an unjust nation toward justice via activism. For oppressive groups, protest and activism provide an image of humans willing to struggle for freedom and justice that is necessary for seeing oppressed groups as fit for those political rights that they are being denied. Locke seemed to laud the historical progression from paternalism to minority-group activism. Locke tells us that: Concurrent with these trends [in the realignment of policies and programs] are certain corollaries which flow quite inevitably from them. We may mention three: first, the gradual obsolescence of the paternalistic and traditionally philanthropic approaches; second, marked increase in the participation of Negro leadership and in critical protest on the part of Negro public opinion, and third, the beginning, at least, of cooperative action on the part of a growing number of interracial organizations as directed pressure groups.60

The first stage provided a necessary first step, but did not lend to self- or other-respect. It merely produced pity, and ultimately turned into contempt. And to be clear, Locke was critical of protest as, in many ways, a problematic second stage that cannot alone achieve justice. In the end, groups need to work together to achieve justice; social justice is not the kind of thing that a single group can achieve. However, Locke lauded this historical progression because he took self-assertion to be necessary for both self- and other-respect. Like many radical egalitarians: “Activism is important because one needs to prove one’s worth as a citizen and that one can emancipate oneself, that one deserves freedom.”61 This seems a necessary step toward cooperation. “Thus, it would seem, in a cycle normal for most social problems and causes, the American race problem is running a typical course from philanthropic, paternalistic approaches and techniques of amelioration to reformist liberal sponsorship, and then after passing through an acute protest stage of minority self-assertion with its accompanying chauvinism, to broaden out finally into integrated mass movements of general social reconstruction and reform.”62 60  Alain Locke, “Whither Race Relations? A Critical Commentary” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 324. 61  Michael C.  Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, 260. 62  Alain Locke, “Whither Race Relations? A Critical Commentary” 324.

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Connected to the necessity of activism is the radical egalitarian commitment to a radical agenda. “The programmatic agenda Black egalitarians deem necessary to achieve equality, while still consistent, at least in their view, with liberal democracy, necessitates a political and economic program that can only be considered radical by the standards of the theory and practice of the American Creed.”63 These agendas are radical because they are at odds with much of the American liberal commitment to individualism, the unfettered accumulation of private property, and the stark division between the public and private spheres. Locke’s theoretical view necessitated a program that would be classified as radical. In the second work that aims to systematize Locke’s view, elucidating his practical philosophies of religion, art, and education, we will see many of the programs that Locke set forth as a means to solve race- and value-related problems that prevent both the practice and the spread of democracy, and thus inhibit the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. Now to classify Locke as committed to liberal democracy and Black liberalism more precisely are correct enough. However, in my view, these classifications lack sufficient specificity. I think that Locke is also squarely within the tradition of modern liberalism, much of which is in agreement with and supports His Black liberal, radical egalitarian position. Gerald Gaus wrote that “the essence of modern liberalism is a particular theory of human nature.”64 Following insights from Zevedei Barbu, Gaus understood modern liberalism to be (in part) “the unique democratic personality [whereby] the individual sees himself both as a unique manifestation of humanity, an end in himself, and as a member of a group.”65 Modern liberals attempt to combine and reconcile efforts toward individuality and sociability. However, modern liberalism is more than that. “Modern liberalism is not characterised here simply by the attempt to reconcile individuality and sociability but, in addition, by (i) the form that reconciliation takes and (ii) the way in which the theory of human nature is used to justify liberal democratic institutions.”66 For the modern liberal, reconciliation is a process whereby neither individuality nor group membership come to exhaust the human. Modern 63  Michael C.  Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies, 268. 64  Gerald Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983) 9. 65  Ibid., 2. 66  Ibid., 6.

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liberals reject classical liberalism’s “vision of [women and] men as essentially independent, private and competitive beings who see civil association as a framework for the pursuit of their own interests.”67 For the modern liberal, we cannot complete our own natures, but “look to others to complete our nature.”68 And so liberal principles are not merely construed in protectionist terms. Modern liberals stress human dependence or interdependence over independence, cooperation over competition, and mutual appreciation and sharing over private enjoyment in an effort to complete our natures.69 “Because we are incomplete, absorption in our own individuality is not truly satisfying; we are driven outside ourselves, and take an interest and delight in the individuality of our fellows.”70 Likewise, modern liberals reject a reading of Marxism or jingoism whereby individuality is eliminated by communal subsumption.71 Rather than promoting the primacy of either individuality or sociability, modern liberals explain sociability as supportive of individuality and necessary for its possibility. In my view, Locke endorsed this modern liberal view. Like modern liberals, Locke promoted a view of human nature whereby human sociability is consistent with and supportive of human desires toward individuality, and does not displace it. Sally Scholz discussed this aspect of Locke’s philosophy of art via an examination of his essay entitled, “Negro Youth Speaks.”72 In the essay, Locke lauded New Negro artists’ tendency toward finding and asserting themselves (which is the core of the modern liberal conception of individuality).73 He saw this as markedly different from prior generations of African American artists. And he saw this as necessary for both self- and other-respect, along with self- and group-development. However, as both Scholz and Harris highlight, Locke thought that individuality is both constructed within and requires community (whereby

 Ibid., 7.  Ibid., 55. 69  Ibid., 7. 70  Ibid., 55. 71  Sally J. Scholz, “Individual and Community: Artistic Representation in Alain L. Locke’s Politics,” in Transactions of the Charles S.  Peirce Society, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (Summer 2003) 496. 72  Ibid. 73  Alain Locke, “Negro Youth Speaks,” in The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance, ed. Alain Locke (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997) 47–48; and Gerald Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man, 15–16. 67 68

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one forms and finds a sense of belonging).74 Individuals are drawn together as members of a particular community. Being members of a community, humans find a sense of belonging among others with whom we are concerned, and have a particular devotion to those groups wherein belonging is found. As was indicated with his political cosmopolitanism, devotion to a group—as expressed by the conception “loyalty”—is necessary given the social nature of human beings; humans are social animals who desire being with and feeling a sense of belonging among others. And so for Locke: “The two essential elements of democracy, after all, are (1) the freedom of the individual and (2) the artist’s (individual’s) responsibility to the masses.”75 Moreover, like modern liberals, Locke thought that humans “possess a wide range of capacities, the cultivation of which constitutes the essence of individuality.”76 It is partly for this reason that Locke thought that there should be minimal standards of living and the basic right of the freedom of labor. These allow humans to develop particular unique capacities such that we can better develop and express our individuality. Modern liberals like Locke emphasize careers or vocations when thinking about individuality and the cultivation of particular capacities given the amount of time that humans in complex modern societies devote to them. But more than merely developing capacities, Locke favored humans developing capacities in a way that supports the cultivation of unique individuals. This is what was behind Locke’s fierce advocation of cultural pluralism, along with a kind of openness within culture-groups that marked his cultural cosmopolitanism. For Locke, democracy and cosmopolitanism require pluralism, and pluralism requires respect for and the promotion of difference. “These principles [of a successful liberal democracy] call for promoting respect for difference, for safeguarding respect for the individual, thus preventing submergence of the individual in enforced community, and for the promotion of commonality over and above such differences.”77 Locke’s commitment here is justified by his thinking that humans live best when we are able to cultivate unique capacities. 74  Leonard Harris, “Alain Locke and Community,” in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1997). 75  Sally J. Scholz, “Individual and Community: Artistic Representation in Alain L. Locke’s Politics,” 499. 76  Gerald Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man, 17. 77  Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 61.

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Though Locke supported humans developing capacities in a way that supports the cultivation of unique individuals, he rejected two kinds of lives—purely spontaneous lives on the one hand and narrow lives on the other. Both types of lives are rather unreflective.78 Recall that Locke rejected the jingoist as a kind of renegade or belligerent patriot who is rather narrow-minded, along with a Diogenesian cosmopolitan. Locke’s rejection of these kinds of lives was, in addition to their pragmatic stagnation and potential regressiveness, contrary to the formation of unique individuality. Likewise, with regard to cultural cosmopolitanism, recall that Locke rejected cultural imitation or assimilation, a Diogenesian cultural cosmopolitan who picks and chooses from cultures without seeing any as their own, and physical or ideological coercion to endorse some particular culture. These all curtail the development of unique individuals; these circumscribe individuality. Instead, Locke required both a cosmopolitan patriotism and a rooted cultural cosmopolitanism that are both reflective of and allows for the development of unique individuals from within and supported by communities wherein unique individuals cultivate a sense of belonging. And moreover, these allow for both a healthy sense of pride for, devotion to, and concern about others within the community. In part, Locke was committed to cosmopolitan patriotism and rooted cultural cosmopolitanism as efforts to combine and reconcile human individuality (the person who is not circumscribed by blind loyalty to a state or culture, but who thinks for themself) and sociability (the person who has developed a sense of belonging within groups because of both a basic human drive and groups’ necessity for cultivating individuality). And so, Locke is classifiable as a modern liberal. It is also quite clear that Locke supported something of a participatory, deliberative model of democracy. Participatory democracy promotes a society where there is equal “participation in the making of decisions…and equality of power in determining the outcome of decisions.”79 It “gives pride of place to the democratic ideal of self government, that is the idea that the processes of political opinion and will-formation in which citizens (actively and/or passively) participate should effectively influence and shape the laws and

 Gerald Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man, 36–38.  Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 43. 78 79

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policies to which they are subject.”80 Participatory democracy places an emphasis on greater and more expansive inclusion of citizens in the political decision-making process. And “the justification for a democratic system in the participatory theory of democracy rests primarily on the human results that accrue from the participatory process. One might characterize the participatory model as one where maximal input (participation) is required and where output includes not just policies (decisions) but also the development of the social and political capabilities of each individual, so that there is ‘feedback’ from output to input.”81 For the participatory theorist, greater participation not only leads to policy decisions that better reflect the will of citizens, but also “develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so.”82 And so, participatory democracy is deeply educative insofar as it develops both the characters and commitments of citizens. Aside from the maximal participation in political decision-making and the development of the social and political capabilities of citizens, there is another aspect of participatory democracy that I would like to highlight. Participation is not merely construed as related to what has traditionally or conventionally become known as political decision-making. Instead, the notion and “scope of the term ‘political’ is extended to cover spheres outside national government.”83 Participation must extend to the whole of society inclusive of social institutions. The participatory theorist wants more people participating in political decision-making, strictly speaking, as well as more areas of life such as in industry and vocational areas. “The most important area is industry; most people spend a great deal of their lifetime at work and the business of the workplace provides an education in the management of collective affairs that is difficult to parallel elsewhere.”84 If democracy is construed as offering citizens maximal control over their lives, and industry and vocation occupy large spaces in citizens’ lives (in terms of the devotion of time, energy, and thought), then a democratic system should extend to both industry and vocation. Further, if democratic participation is educative, and having an educative aspect gives democratic participation value, and further if most people spend a 80  Cristina Lafont, Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy, 24. 81  Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 43. 82  Ibid., 42–43. 83  Ibid., 106. 84  Ibid., 43.

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great deal of their life at work, then democratic participation should extend to the workplace to increase its educative value. Moreover, the participatory theory sees spheres such as industry and vocational areas as political systems in their own right, such that a democratic structure must extend to them in order to be adequate. Now a more generalized reason for advocating more expansive participation is the intertwining of political and social institutions. The power promoted in one extends to and in some sense determines the other. “The theory of participatory democracy is built round the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another. The existence of representative institutions at national level is not sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at that level socialisation; or ‘social training’, for democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed.”85 For the participatory theorist, participation must extend beyond politics to those networks with which politics is bound up. In this way, participatory democracy highlights the intertwining of power (economic, racial, gendered, sexual, etc.), autonomy, social and political capabilities, and political decision-making. It seeks to account for the often overlooked belief that abstract notions of political equality are rather meaningless without a democratized society, that is, one that extends beyond political equality insofar as what we might take to be political equality is bound up with power. We might sum up the participatory model as one that “fosters human development, enhances a sense of political efficacy, reduces a sense of estrangement from power centres, nurtures a concern for collective problems and contributes to the formation of an active and knowledgeable citizenry capable of taking a more acute interest in government affairs.”86 Locke’s thought about political democracy was in agreement with these aspects of the participatory view. Locke’s concept of democracy commits him to autonomy under rational constraints, which seems impossible without a full sense of  self-­ government and political equality. Direct influence and the ability to shape the laws and policies to which citizens are subject seem necessary for self-­ government and  political equality. If direct influence and the ability to shape the laws and policies to which citizens are subject are necessary for  Ibid.  David Held, Models of Democracy, 212.

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autonomy under rational constraints, and these are properties of the participatory model, then Locke would be committed to the participatory model. And again, Locke lauded the expansion of democracy to more people, which are important aspects of participatory democracy. In a sense, he seemed to view participation as in part legitimatizing laws and policies. Locke’s reason for endorsing this view was because he saw the expansion of democracy as a sign of increased political and perceived human equality, and he was aware that political and perceived human equality were sorely lacking throughout the world.87 Further, he saw the expansion of democracy as increasing contact that is not structured by power. Additionally, Locke lauded more democracy for more people because he saw greater inclusion in the political process to be necessary for the protection of rights for minorities. Locke’s praise for the expansion of democratic decision-making to more areas of human life extended to industry and vocation. In this way, he saw the intertwining of political and social institutions in terms of power that is a staple of participatory democracy. My intuition is that this is why Locke supported unionizing groups such as the National Maritime Union, the CIO labor movement, the Southern Farm Tenant’s [sic] Association, and the like.88 In “Stretching our Social Mind,” Locke put his support for these unions in term of interracial group-organizing. In addition, I think that Locke desired the extension of democratic mechanisms, and saw unionizing as assisting in this extension. I think he wanted to extend democratic mechanisms to all areas of “professional, intellectual, cultural and religious organization[s]”89 throughout democratic nations. Further, though Locke spoke of cultural democracy as being necessary in addition to political and economic (social) democracy, Locke understood the influence that political inequality has on economic (social) and cultural areas and institutions, and vice versa. Segregation was a process by which economic (social) and political institutions played on and mutually reinforced each other.90 And pragmatically, Locke understood the extension of democratic mechanisms to the workplace as necessary to protect  Alain Locke, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 535. 88  Alain Locke, “Stretching Our Social Mind,” in World Order, Vol. 38, No 3, ed. Christopher Buck and Betty J.  Fisher (Wilmette: the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís Of the United States, 2006–2007) 32. 89  Ibid. 90  Alain Locke, “The Dilemma of Segregation,” in The Journal of Negro Education, Vol. 4, No. 3, The Courts and the Negro Separate School (Jul., 1935). 87

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minorities and workers from exploitation and exclusion, and as a means of fighting against segregation. Moreover, one might think that Locke saw democratic participation as deeply educative. Democratic participation could teach citizens to respect other citizens as politically and humanly equal. The process of increased democratic participation and its occurrence in expanded areas of human life such as industry and vocation could lead to intellectual sharing and reciprocity that cultivated greater respect. Each could also lead to the perception of others’ equal humanity that was such an important part of both Locke’s democratic and cosmopolitan thought. More than merely developing the social and political capabilities of citizens, democratic participation is necessary for the development of national pride and a commitment to political democracy. Locke understood democratic participation as necessary for developing a healthy patriotism.91 Recall once more that Locke required cosmopolitan patriotism. Why think that citizens would cultivate this needed patriotism without the ability to equally participate in political decision-making? Further, it would appear that citizens’ patriotism is cultivated to the extent that they are maximally able to participate in decision-making processes, which would include the ability to participate in decisions related to industry and vocation. Now an additional reason to think that Locke would have endorsed a participatory view is that it is clear that he saw a similar problem with classical liberalism that many proponents of participatory democracy voice. Like those who tend to embrace participatory democracy, Locke saw flaws with classical liberalism’s appeal to atomistic individuals. Classical liberals tend to construe women and men as mere singular beings with one primary concern, which is to advance their own goals. This sets citizens and society at odds, and makes the goal of liberal principles protective, allowing citizens to satisfy their primary concern. As has been intimated in discussing Locke’s radical egalitarianism, humans are caught up in and to some extent determined by a web of relations that helps to create and cultivate goals. And so, though Alain Locke’s notion of tolerance was influenced by John Locke, “whereas John Locke’s epistemology emphasizes the experience of individual judgment as fallible choice, Alain Locke calls attention to the ways that we cultivate attitudes as socialized norms.”92  Alain Locke, “The Mandate System: A New Code of Empire,” 514–515.  Greg Moses, “Two Lockes, Two Keys: Tolerance and Reciprocity in a Culture of Democracy,” 163. 91 92

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Though John Locke is not an American liberal, American liberalism relies heavily on his thoughts. “And whereas John Locke encouraged tolerant dialogue as a means to improve our individual judgment-making process, Alain Locke encourages intergroup reciprocity as a method to enhance our normative cultural process of attitudinal socialization.”93 For Alain Locke, liberal principles were thereby not merely protective, but developmental. A consequence of classical liberalism’s construal of humans as atomistic beings aiming only to advance their individual goals is that humans are assumed to be free and equal. Classical liberalism “generally assumes what has, in fact, to be carefully examined: namely, whether the existing relationships between men and women, Blacks and whites, working, middle and upper classes, and various ethnic groups allow formally recognized rights actually to be realized.”94 Locke noticed this liberal assumption and rejected it given his concern for and knowledge about racial issues in American life, African American perspectives influencing his critical pragmatism, and perhaps given his sexual orientation. Humans live within and are in some sense determined by a web of power-relations. And in this way, many citizens within liberal democracies are neither free nor treated as equal. Locke illustrated this concern with classical liberalism’s assumption of human freedom and equality when discussing the role of the African American artist,95 African American art in general, African American education, his theory of race and solutions to race-related issues,96 and his cosmopolitan theory. Locke also illustrated the web of power-relations in which humans live when discussing the importance of economic (social) democracy. Recall that Locke thought that political freedom ought to lead to economic equality, and that the latter is necessary to complete and secure the former. And Locke’s claims about economic (social) democracy demonstrate that economic opportunities and advances affect political equality in a different way. Locke was aware that one is more likely to feel motivated to participate in political decision-making from the belief that their participation will  Ibid.  David Held, Models of Democracy, 209. 95  Alain locke, “The New Negro” in The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance, ed. Alain Locke (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997). 96  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations: Lectures on the Theory and Practice of Race, ed. Jeffery C. Stewart (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1992). 93 94

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matter, and is more likely to feel empowered to participate in the political process to the extent that they possess autonomy in the web of relations within a political community. And he seems to have accepted the participatory theorist’s view that: “If people know opportunities exist for effective participation in decisionmaking, they are likely to believe participation is worthwhile, likely to participate actively and likely, in addition, to hold that collective decisions should be binding.”97 This understanding lay in the background of Locke’s appeal to patriotism and his rejection of uniformitarianism. The uniformitarian’s attempt to bring others’ cultures into conformity with their own ultimately ends in denying effective participation in decision-making when they have the power to do so—that is, when there are power-relations in the political community that favor the uniformitarian’s. Valuing diverse perspectives, life-expressions, and cultures—particularly as it influences a person’s political thought—lead to a greater ability for citizens to see themselves reflected in decision-making processes, which in turn produces greater participation. Further, valuing diverse perspectives in political decision-making processes is more likely to get citizens to see laws and policies as binding because citizens are more likely to see them as legitimate given the process from which they derived. “On the other hand, if people are systematically marginalized and/or poorly represented, they are likely to believe that only rarely will their views and preferences be taken seriously, weighted equally with those of others or assessed in a process that is fair or just.”98 Uniformitarianism causes marginalization. And that seems to be why Locke was to some extent sympathetic to counter-racialism.99 Where opportunities for political participation are restrictive or lacking, endorsement of the political process decreases or is non-existent. Citizens who are rejected from opportunities to participate in political decision-making reject the legitimacy of the political process, and thereby more often reject the legitimacy of laws and policies with which they do not agree. Even though Locke would seemingly endorse a participatory theory of political democracy, I think that Locke would reject a pure participatory model. Merely legitimizing democratic outcomes by a procedure of  David Held, Models of Democracy, 212.  David Held, Models of Democracy, 212. 99  See: Alain Locke, “Stretching the Social Mind,” 31; and Alain Locke, “The Predicaments of Minorities” and “Minority Reactions and Counter-Assertion” in When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts, ed. Alain Locke and Bernhard Stern (New York: Hines, Hayden, & Eldridge, Inc., 1946). 97 98

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majority rules can lead to blind deference that limits self-government.100 Simple participatory democracy that legitimizes political decisions by maximal participation forces those in the minority to blindly accept and defer to policies that may appear unjustifiable or morally reprehensible to them.101 Locke was also concerned about the potential for tyranny imposed by the majority upon which minority rights become infringed.102 In addition to blind deference, legitimizing democratic outcomes by a procedure of majority rule can lead to injustice for racial and cultural minorities. During Locke’s life, the Ku Klux Klan had a tremendous influence on America and American political decision-making.103 One might imagine that increasing participation among members of this group and its sympathizers would not lead to better (more pragmatically or morally justifiable) outcomes. Today, white nationalism and more forceful claims supporting white supremacy are on the rise. Again, merely increasing political participation does not guarantee better outcomes. For Locke, cultural minorities and their right to cultural difference must be protected, as evidenced by Locke’s appeal to his above conception of cultural democracy and aspects of his moral and cultural cosmopolitanisms. Mere appeals to increased participation do not ensure this, and would not further intellectual democracy, about which Locke was deeply concerned. Increased participation must be supplemented with reasoned and reasonable participation. And so contrary to theorists such as Paul J. Weithman, who thought that Locke would likely reject deliberative democracy, I think that Locke would have wanted a participatory model that was sensitive to the demands of deliberative democracy. We may understand deliberative democracy as “a theory of democratic legitimacy that traces the authority of laws and policies to the public

100  Cristina Lafont, Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. 101  Ibid. 102  Alain Locke, “Power Politics and Dominance,” in When Peoples Meet: A Study in Race and Culture Contacts, ed. Alain Locke and Bernhard Stern (New York: Hines, Hayden, & Eldridge, Inc., 1946) 361. Also see, Paul J.  Weithman, “Deliberative Democracy and Community in Alain Locke,” in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. LXXIV (May 1997). 103  Wyn Craig Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

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exchange of arguments among free and equal citizens.”104 In accordance with Weithman’s view, we might see deliberative democracy as being committed to three theses—namely, The Deliberation Thesis (DT), The Anti-­ pluralist Thesis (AT), and The Transformation Thesis (TT). DT suggests that: “Political decisions should be the outcomes of deliberative political procedures in which citizens participate and are known to participate as free political equals.”105 AT posits that: “Deliberation should be focused on the advancement of the public good rather than on the satisfaction of group, class or regional interests.”106 And finally TT proposes that: “[D]eliberative politics can transform preferences” and “can transform the citizens who hold the preferences”107 So, in a deliberative democracy, “individuals should always be prepared to defend their moral and political arguments and claims with reasons, and be prepared to deliberate with others about the reasons they provide.”108 Individuals understand themselves as equals who advocate for laws and public policies that serve the common good and can alter their perspectives in light of more reasonable arguments. These three criteria for deliberative democracy seem to align with Locke’s view. So, why not take him to endorse deliberative democracy? Weithman thought that Locke would endorse DT, but would have reservations about endorsing the second and third theses. With regard to the second thesis (AT), Weithman thought that there are at least three ways to conceptualize “the public good.” Either citizens must: (1) “put forward only proposals which they reasonably believe will advance the public good, and which they reasonably believe others can reasonably see as consistent with this requirement”; or they must (2) “advance only proposals which they themselves can defend by reasonable, explicit appeal to the public good”; or they must (3) “be prepared to justify their political proposals by appealing to the principles and their implications for constitutional essentials.”109 104  Hélène Landemore, “Deliberative Democracy as Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy,” in Daedalus, Vol. 146 (2017) 51. 105  Paul J. Weithman, “Deliberative Democracy and Community in Alain Locke,” in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. LXXIV (May 1997), 347. 106  Ibid. 107  Ibid., 348. 108  Carol Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited” (APSA Presidential Address), in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2012), 8. 109  Paul J. Weithman, “Deliberative Democracy and Community in Alain Locke,” 349.

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There are good reasons to believe that Locke would reject 3. There is no reason to think that Locke took there to be any one way to read the constitution, and certainly not a single way on which all or most Americans agree. Further, I think that Locke would be skeptical of 1. He would not merely be concerned that arguments are made in favor of what is taken to serve the public good. He would also be concerned with how the arguments are made. Locke would be require the production of arguments that are neither manipulative, paternalistic, nor appeal to or further stereotypes about groups, and so on. And so arguments need not only be for laws and policies that serve the common good, but presented in a way that do not dehumanize groups or group-members. The most plausible proposal is 2—that citizens must “advance only proposals which they themselves can defend by reasonable, explicit appeal to the public good.” Weithman’s claim was that Locke would reject AT on two grounds. First, he read Locke as suggesting that “group-transcendent norms are unreliable motives for political action because they exert their motivational ‘pull’ only episodically.” And second, “it is a mistake to suppose that members of historically oppressed groups are under any such obligation, even prima facie.”110 For evidence supporting the first, Weithman cited a passage from “Unity Through Diversity” where Locke seemed to both claim the impossibility of fully transcending group-interested actions and affirm the naturalness of these actions.111 Now we might say that group-­interested actions are never fully transcended if we mean that when we act, we act with the interests of some group in mind. However, if we understand “fully transcend” to mean incapable of acting to satisfy anything other than local group-interest, then the claim that it is impossible to fully transcend group-interested actions contradicts Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism and seems to raise questions about how he both understands and lauds the spread of democracy.112 If episodic transcendences of groupinterests are all that is possible, then cosmopolitanism is impossible. And further, why laud the spread of democracy? Further, it seems unreasonable to think that Locke would end with the view that group-transcendent norms are unreliable motives, given that  Ibid., 350.  Alain Locke, “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 135. 112  Recall that Locke is committed to group-interested actions only insofar as they serve cosmopolitan ends. 110 111

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Locke fought against whites acting from white-interests to the disadvantage of Blacks, Christians acting from Christian-interests to the disadvantage of non-Christians, and imperialist European nations acting from European-interests to the disadvantage of non-European nations. Why demand whites, Christians, and European nations change their behavior toward non-groups if this can at best only occur sporadically? It seems quite unreasonable to think that Locke required sporadic or episodic transcendences of racism, xenophobia, chauvinism, and imperialism. Still further, Locke’s own words in the remainder of the article (and throughout much of his corpus) seem to challenge the view. Now it is true that in several works Locke conceded a naturalness and occurrence of local group-interested thought and actions.113 However, Locke never ended with this naturalness, and always seemed to problematize the occurrence of it when discussing the possibility of peace. In this way, he constantly argued that we expand what “group-interest” means by expanding our idea of groups and group-members. And he constantly argued for the need to move beyond the occurrence of more local group-interested thought and actions. Locke was aware of both the actualized and necessary evolution of group-thought—that groups must expand their conception of group-­ members such that there exists groups within larger groups to which obligations are owed for the promotion of peace. Locke wrote that “any remedy [to modern ills] seriously proposed must be fundamental and not superficial, and wide-scale or universal rather than local or provincial.”114 Though Locke thought that we cannot work for “humanity” without working for groups—many of them being local—he required that our sight always be toward how working for local groups furthers the promotion of peace via fulfilling obligations toward larger groups, along with taking an interest in their calls for justice.115 Our commitment to local groups is justified by its role in and furtherance of cosmopolitan aims. This  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 20.  Alain Locke, “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle,” 134. 115  This idea is even expressed at the beginning of the article that Weithman cites. Locke tells us that: “And so the most usual sanctions of contemporary thinking even for partisan and sectarian causes are the words ‘universal,’ ‘international,’ ‘human.’ Ten years ago, national, racial, or some equivalent circumscribed loyalty and interest would have been unquestioningly assumed, and agitated almost without apology as axiomatic. I regard this change, although as yet a negative gain, as both one of the most significant and positive steps forward that humanity has taken,-or rather,-has been forced to take.” 113 114

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notion is the heart of both his cosmopolitan theory and the article from which Weithman took the relevant passage. When providing his overall point, Locke stated that the Bahá’í believer’s “function there is to share the loyalties of the group, but upon a different plane and with a higher perspective. He must partake of partisanship in order to work toward its transformation, and help keep it within the bounds of constructive and controlled self-assertion.” Here, Locke seems to have been claiming that the Bahá’í believer116 performs actions from the motive of loyalty to the group. However, they seem to derive justification from their furthering a higher aim—namely, working toward social and cultural transformation to promote tolerance through pluralism and a kind of unity grounded in them. I agree with Weithman that Locke took universal norms to be in the initial phases of taking root in the moral culture of his time.117 And again, Locke understood group-interest to be a natural motivator. However, Locke took the basis for unity in diversity to be abstracting differences to see more basic commonalities. This forms the basis for the kind of appeal to the public good that Weithman denied. Subsequent to the passage that Weithman cited, Locke tells us that: “It is just at this juncture that the idea of unity in diversity seems to me to become relevant, and to offer a spiritual common denominator of both ideal and practical efficacy. What the contemporary mind stands greatly in need of is the divorce of the association of uniformity with the notion of the universal, and the substitution of the notion of equivalence.”118 What Locke seems to have thought is that we can transcend the articulation of group-interest as a narrow, particularized motivation that seeks unity, though not through uniformity. Locke thought that this transcendence can occur with our understanding our basic human equality, along with pluralism. “What we need to learn most is how to discover unity and spiritual equivalence underneath the differences which at present so disunite and sunder us, and how to establish some basic spiritual reciprocity on the principle of unity in diversity.”119

116  I take Weithman to be appealing to the believer as a representative of the citizen by extrapolating his point and applying it to all citizens. 117  Paul J. Weithman, “Deliberative Democracy and Community in Alain Locke,” 350. 118  Alain Locke, “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle,” 135. 119  Ibid.

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Now Weithman’s second reason for why Locke would reject AT was that members of historically oppressed groups are under no such obligation to act from group-transcendent norms. However, Weithman’s claim is wrong if he meant that members of historically oppressed groups have no obligation to act for the interests of the common good that is beyond (but not against) their particular interests. In “The Negro Vote of 1936” (written the same year as “Unity Through Diversity”), Locke—speaking of how and why “the Negro” should exercise their political will—stated that “it is more important to him [and her] in the long run to have common justice to the common man than special favor to himself [and herself] as a handicapped minority or special protection as an oppressed group. It is safer and sounder to arrive at the fulfillment of the Negro’s hope and just due through general social justice, through federally initiated and subsidized social welfare than by any special legislation or particular pampering or coddling.”120 Here, Locke seems to have been either making a prescriptive claim that is disguised as a descriptive one or lauding Blacks for voting in the interest of the common good without exclusive attention to group-benefits. The “Negro knows best what the whole country needs,” and this is a “flexible, fearless humanized executive program of progressive social action, with the spirit of social justice and humane responsibility for the humblest and most handicapped citizens, regardless of race or creed, but not regardless of condition.”121 Blacks “have only to contend for fuller and fairer inclusion in the economic relief, the federally controlled working conditions, the publicly enlarged industrial opportunity and publicly subsidized measures of welfare and social security which the New Deal has tried to bring and which it is committed to continue and expand.”122 The preceding claims seem to support Locke’s commitment to AT, and shows a rejection of Weithman’s claim in a way that is more in line with Locke’s commitment to his conception of economic (social) democracy. Furthermore, in addition to Locke’s rejection of racialism, I think that a commitment to AT was behind his desire to see the name and aims of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) change to the National Association of the Advancement of American 120  Alain Locke, “The Negro Vote in 1936,” The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 529. 121  Ibid. 122  Ibid.

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Democracy (NAAAD).123 Locke was always thinking about, but beyond, local groups. And so for Locke, “all forms of nationalism, ethnic loyalty, racial preference and tribal alliegences held less merit than commitment to culture-citizenship [or cosmopolitanism].”124 Now it is clear that Locke did not demand that Blacks and other oppressed groups carry the burden of appealing to the common good without their group’s good being considered. And it is clear that Locke denied that this demand carries weight absent majority groups giving up their oppressive tactics, motives, and beliefs. I agree that for Locke: “It may be reasonable to ask members of oppressed groups to abide by antipluralist constraints when they have been provided with evidence of the good faith of advantaged groups.”125 I am not sure that Locke would think that there need be lots of evidence for this, as Weithman seems to think. Given Locke’s statements in “The Negro Vote of 1936,” whites and other oppressive groups need not repent, but rather show a good faith effort. And so if repenting entails “contrition, petition for forgiveness, a willingness to redress wrongs and a resolution to change one’s heart and conduct,”126 then it would appear that a good faith effort is perhaps contrition and a resolution to change one’s heart and conduct. Contrition is necessary to show that it is not merely self-interest that motivates the change in conduct, but that it is a true change of heart. And a change in heart is necessary to motivate a consistent change in conduct such that spiritual democracy is satisfied. Lastly, Weithman thought that Locke would be suspicious of DT because “political activity — even activities associated with participation in deliberative politics — will play a relatively minor role in building community among a society’s races, religions, and cultures.”127 I agree with him insofar as he thought that any transformation of preferences and mental states must include more than political deliberation and participation. Education, culture, and religion are all necessary. However, I reject the claim that Locke took participation in deliberative politics to play a minor or minimal role in transforming preferences and changing minds. Locke’s notion of intellectual democracy seems to have been pretty committed to  Alain Locke, “Stretching Our Social Mind,” 30.  Leonard Harris, “Alain Locke: Community and Citizenship,” in The Modern Schoolman, Vol. LXXIV (May 1997), 337. 125  Paul J. Weithman, “Deliberative Democracy and Community in Alain Locke,” 350. 126  Ibid., 351. 127  Ibid., 348. 123 124

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abdicating political absolutes. His rather expansive, participatory conception of political matters, whereby he expanded political matters to families and the workplace seem to commit him to the importance of politics and the deliberation that would occur in these spaces. Locke would extend political deliberation to spheres within industry, vocation, and family life. And further, I do not take it to be fair to say that a proponent of deliberative democracy denies or marginalizes the importance of religion, culture, and education to changing people’s attitudes and minds. Now a participatory, deliberative model supports Locke’s incrementalism and commitment to pluralism. Recall that one of the reasons why Locke endorsed incrementalism rather than radical change was because radical change would more likely suffer from effects of reactionary forces discontent with the radical nature of change. A participatory, deliberative model forces citizens to “engage each other’s views, perspectives, and reasons. In addition to making up their own mind, their shared aim is to transform actual public opinion by getting as many citizens as possible to endorse their considered judgments so that they become considered public opinion.”128 This allows change to occur at a pace that lessens destabilizing reaction and legitimizes progressive laws and policies “by enabling citizens to endorse the laws and policies to which they are subject on their own accord instead of being coerced into blind obedience….”129 For Locke, like Lafont, there is no shortcut for reaching the goal of getting citizens to endorse laws and politics to which they are subject on their own accord.130 “[O]nly the long, deliberative road can get us there.”131 And this includes an “ongoing process of political opinion- and will-formation in which participants can challenge each other’s views about the r­ easonableness of coercive policies they all must comply with, and relieve justifications based on reason and considerations that they find acceptable….”132 In arguing that Locke would find a participatory, deliberative model of political democracy attractive, I want to be clear that (just as he would probably reject a pure participatory model) he would not support a pure deliberative model. Mere appeals to selective deliberation and good policy-­ related results from a deliberative process would not be sufficient for 128  Cristina Lafont, Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy, 103. 129  Ibid., 168. 130  Ibid. 131  Ibid. 132  Ibid.

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justifying political decisions. And so, Locke would reject a view like epistocracy, or a rule of those who know best. A careful consideration of Locke’s commitments illustrates why. First, Locke would have recognized that less deliberation among the citizenry would lessen political decision-makers’ incentive to justify their decisions. And if a large number of people are excluded from the deliberative process, then many of the policies—and in fact the decision-making process itself—may become dogmatically held by those “knowers” responsible for institutionalizing policies, with the values underlying them becoming absolutes. And so Locke would view increased participation in the deliberative process to be important for the renunciation of dogmatic and absolute claims to truth and values. Increased participation from citizens increases the likelihood that decisions will be reevaluated in light of new evidence. And a constant reevaluation continuously justifies political decisions. Second, as a pragmatist, Locke was committed to the idea that humans are fallible. And so while there might be persons who know best, no persons know all or completely. Including more participation in the deliberative process takes human fallibility seriously. Why? Locke would have thought that those who do not know best still have insights or experiences that could improve political deliberation or its outcomes. Third, both spiritual and intellectual democracies rely on reciprocity. Intellectual democracy relies on and is impossible without the exchange of ideas via healthy debate. Spiritual democracy relies on a willingness to cooperate for the common good, which necessitates listening to and embracing opposing views that might be more justifiable than one’s own. If it is the case that epistocracy excludes citizens from the deliberative (and ultimately the policy-making) processes, and if such exclusion forces citizens into blind deference—which seems to run the risk of lessening a commitment to democracy because political decisions may not be justifiable to those who are excluded from the process, then one has reason to worry that both spiritual and intellectual democracies are lost in epistocracies. Now I do not think that Locke would deny that there are certain groups who know better or are better equipped to make effective policy-related decisions than others (though Locke would endorse the view that each person is the best judge for his own individual good). Locke’s appeal to a Talented Tenth that is largely responsible for racial uplift seems to indicate that there are certain persons who know better or are better equipped to

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make effective policy-related decisions than others.133 However, Locke thought that there are more important consequences than institutionalizing good policies. And so, the state of democracy is in a better place when more citizens participate in political matters. Citizens are better able to develop a democratic character (those invested in the ideals of democracy) when they do not blindly submit to the wills of those who know best. Again, Locke’s notion of intellectual and spiritual democracies seems to suggest that the development of a democratic character requires active participation in political decision-making. Locke would endorse the claim that: “Since citizens’ beliefs, attitudes, interests, values, and actions (even as private subjects, consumers, etc.) decisively determine the shape of the polity, the chances that most laws, policies, and political programs will succeed cannot be improved without also improving the attitudes, interests, and values of the citizenry.”134 If we want laws, policies, and political programs to reflect our democratic values, then we need to account for the attitudes, interests, and values of citizens. We will need to influence, and in some sense change, the citizens’ characters. And changing citizens’ attitudes, interests, and values will require greater participation in political decision-making. In addition to developing a democratic character, citizens learn more from participation. Engagement in political deliberation teaches citizens about political democracy. In addition to its benefit for producing sounder political decision-making, teaching citizens about political democracy and political matters seems necessary for cultivating an appreciation—in fact a love—for political democracy, along with the other conceptions of democracy that are necessary for cultivating a cosmopolitan community. And in so doing, participating in political deliberation seems to cultivate a healthy sense of patriotism, and with it a sense of patriotism that holds democracies accountable for institutionalizing laws and policies that match

133  See: Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 98 and “The Ethics of Culture.” Now, one might legitimately see a contradiction in one being committed to both the Talented Tenth and rejecting epistocracy, insofar as one might claim that the Talented Tenth is a notion that, at its center, is committed to the view that racial uplift should be placed in the hands of those who know best, with the masses merely taking the direction of this group. An argument for why this rendering of the Talented Tenth is incorrect is a subject of a forthcoming paper. 134  Cristina Lafont, Democracy without Shortcuts: A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy, 86.

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democratic values. And so participation in the political process helps to eschew both Diogenesian cosmopolitanism and belligerent patriotism. It would appear that Locke was a sophisticated thinker when it came to democracy. He had a number of different and important conceptions that can be captured with an overarching concept. Further, it would appear that Locke was a complex thinker with regard to political democracy. But why political democracy? What value does political democracy have for establishing a cosmopolitan community? Is it the only form of government that could be the political foundation for a cosmopolitan community? Did Locke take it to have value beyond its ability to establish a cosmopolitan community? It is to these questions that I now turn.

On the Value of Political Democracy Locke took political democracies to be necessary for the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. In fact, political democracies derive a part of their legitimacy from their necessity for cultivating such a community. Spreading democratic constitutions the world over is necessary because world peace is pragmatically necessary. And so political democracy has instrumental value. However, Locke also advocated for political democracies and their expansion for a number of reasons that are independent of its necessity for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Locke saw democratic constitutions as inherently more peaceful than other constitutions. Thus, Locke took political democracies to have inherent value. From the above concept of democracy and articulative ideas found within its many conceptions, we can see why Locke took democracy to be so fundamental for establishing a cosmopolitan community. Locke’s concept of democracy requires us to rethink and broaden our understanding of community. It requires us to remove whatever barriers obstruct our attitude toward and recognition of human equality and kinship, both of which are vital for cosmopolitanism. And further, the concept seems to form the basis of the respect and healthy social and political relations that are required for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community.135 In different ways, Locke denied that other forms of government can embody this form of respect. 135  Recall from the introduction that respect, as applied to a person because of dignity, is the perception, attitude of acknowledgement toward, and treatment of a person as a deserving bearer of rights equivalent to the respecting agent’s own rights.

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Locke saw democracy as necessary for cosmopolitanism, and saw democratic states such as the United States as a necessary light for the spread of both democratic and cosmopolitan ideals. Locke argued that “democracy’s present task and highest duty is to midwife this new [cosmopolitan] society into being—and may it be a truly democratic society in the sense that being born into it will automatically confer on everyone, everywhere, the basic rights asserted to be naturally and inalienably human.”136 Democratic states should spread democracy, not by engaging as aggressors in war, but by being a kind of light that people of other nations would demand and work to cultivate. It seems that Locke thought that democracy possesses many values to which people are or would be attracted, if only political democracies live up to democratic values. Locke’s reason was that democratic values are basic values of free association, and as such have a kind of pervasive (though non-natural or mind-independent) value.137 Now it would appear that Locke saw democracy as necessary for establishing a cosmopolitan community for a number of reasons. If one considers parts of Locke’s answers to moral, political, economic, and cultural cosmopolitanisms, and one then considers how Locke understood both the concept and so many conceptions of democracy, then it appears that democracy is the only way to satisfy his cosmopolitan demands. Consider Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitanism demands respect for the dignity of all persons, which leads to and requires political equality and equality before the law. He took political democracy to be valuable because, when practiced, it is committed to the dignity of all persons who are appropriate bearers of equal rights. Locke denied this of ideal autocracies such as absolute monarchies and totalitarianisms when discussing the governments of Japan and Germany during World War II.138 He reduced these two governments to slave states that are diametrically opposed to values of political equality and equality before the law. Without being diametrically opposed to values of political equality and equality before the law, my suspicion is that Locke would say the same think of oligarchies, plutocracies, and timocracies.

136  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a New World Order,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 547. 137  Corey L.  Barnes, “Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles.” 138  Alain Locke, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy,” 534.

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Political democracy also seems necessary to satisfy Locke’s economic cosmopolitanism. Recall that Locke theorized there to be two basic economic roots of war—namely: (1) unequal access to markets and sources of raw materials; and (2) widespread differentials of living standards and economic security. With his economic cosmopolitanism, and especially when coupled with his conception of economic democracy, it is clear that Locke would reject plutocracies’ capacity to address these two basic economic roots of war. And so, Locke would undoubtedly deny that plutocracies have the ability to cultivate a cosmopolitan community. Now it is clear that he thought that political democracies such as the United States had more than a minor role to play in creating and proliferating unequal access to markets and sources of raw materials, along with widespread differentials of living standards and economic security. Still, Locke thought democracies to be the only form of government capable of dealing with these problems.139 Democracies are the best chance that  humanity has to address these problems. Plutocracies, oligarchies, timocracies, and autocracies have no motivation to end colonization, eliminate an unequal and racialized market, end forced labor and promote the basic right of the freedom of labor, and provide better working conditions, securities, and a guaranteed minimal living wage to citizens. And further, these would never look to do so (or see the value of such being done) on a world scale. Ultimately, I think that Locke’s reasoning would be that what motivates these cosmopolitan values is a commitment to human dignity that these forms of government all fail to appreciate. Political democracies are also necessary to satisfy Locke’s conception of cultural cosmopolitanism. In addition to other forms of government described above, consideration of Locke’s cultural cosmopolitanism illustrates why theocracies cannot cultivate such a community. Locke’s cultural cosmopolitanism promoted the view that a flourishing life requires engaging the best of a multiplicity of cultures from a rooted position. And so Locke required a governmental structure that promoted cultural reciprocity. At its base, such a governmental structure needs to be committed to pluralism. Theocracies, along with the forms of government mentioned above, all reject pluralism in a way that is necessary to satisfy Locke’s thick cultural cosmopolitan demands. Political democracies that are committed  Ibid.

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to Locke’s conceptions of cultural and intellectual democracies will value pluralism, and thus allow for the flourishing life of the cosmopolitan community that Locke envisioned. It promotes reciprocity that allows citizens to fulfill the duty to culture. And so Locke required political democracies as a condition for the possible emergence of a cosmopolitan community. As such, political democracy has instrumental value. But in addition to its value for cultivating a cosmopolitan community, Locke also thought that democracy was intrinsically valuable. For Locke, political democracies are less prone to war than other forms of government. In juxtaposing democracy and autocracy, Locke argued that the world faced two alternatives, world chaos through tyranny or world order through freedom. He then linked democracy with order and autocracy with chaos.140 For Locke, either democracy will expand the world over and there will be order because it promotes freedom, or the world will lapse into chaos through tyranny. Locke seems to have thought that democracies are more peaceful for a couple of reasons. First, democracies are more pluralistic, and war is most often the result of absolutism and uniformitarianism. Pluralist nations are much more accepting, less cruel, and less domineering than absolutist and uniformitarian ones. The latter are more closed-minded, think violence in the face of disagreement is more justifiable, and suppose that those with diverging opinions are less human than pluralistic nations. Further, absolutist and uniformitarian nations will reason that there is justification to suppress certain conceptions of the good life and impose values onto others. They all make claims to specific worldviews that are true and must be accepted, with nonconformity justifying aggression. Second, democracies appeal to the will of the people, and such appeals tend to temper engagement in wars. This slows the speed at which democracies go to war, and takes war out of the hands of a few with suspicious motivations. Further, it places the decision to go to war in the hands of those who will most often bear the financial and human burdens of war—namely, citizens. Rulers who are less likely to shoulder these burdens have less opportunity to decide the fate of others.

 Ibid.

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Conclusion So, political democracy is necessary for the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. And Locke thought that political democracies—America specifically—had an obligation to spread democracy. American democracy must become a light for the world. It must do so because peace is pragmatically necessary. Yet, Locke thought that true democracy was sorely lacking in America and throughout the world. Political democracies during Locke’s life failed to embrace democracy. Political democracies—particularly America—failed to embrace democracy because they failed to realize what is required for political democracies to live up to their professions and values. For Locke, “American democracy is not a political theory, but a social instinct. As patriotism, it is sheer rhetoric, bombastic and effusive; as a deep conviction, it is almost religious in its intensity and individual hold upon every citizen.”141 This kind of instinct allowed Americans and democracies throughout the world to see no contradiction in being committed to both democracy and xenophobia (particularly racism). Locke thought that the vast majority of white Americans were uncommitted to democracy in a way necessary to spread it effectively, and thus to cultivate a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, “democracy, looked at nationally or internationally, is seriously beset with internal inconsistencies, political, social, and cultural.”142 It is to these internal inconsistencies—what is actually practiced in political democracies—and what motivates them that I now turn.

141  Alain Locke, “The American Temperament,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 432. 142  Alain Locke, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy,” 538.

CHAPTER 4

Impediments to True Democracy and a Cosmopolitan World

But yet they that have no ‘science’ are in better and nobler condition, with their natural prudence, than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general rules. For ignorance of causes and of rules does not set men so far out of their way as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary. —Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [I]t is a strange thing—in fact, an ironical thing—that the moral appeals have been so singularly ineffective in this vital matter of human relations; and that, while we are all willing to give abstract adherence to the principle of human equality and the brotherhood of man in our theory, in our actual practice we stray so completely from it. —Alain Locke, “The Negro Group”

Introduction In 1944, Alain Locke was asked to contribute to a series of addresses and discussions surrounding minorities and group-antagonisms in America. Alain Locke’s contribution was on Black Americans. In the lecture, Locke quite clearly discussed what he thought was America’s deepest and most

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. L. Barnes, Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3_4

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foundational problem—namely, racism. At its base, America’s problem with racism has proliferated from and can only be solved by addressing whites’ attitudes toward Blacks. And for Locke, “the Negro minority problem is a very deep indictment of American democracy; and has also had marked effect on our practice of democracy.”1 Locke took this problem to undergird, lead to, or be attached to every other problem in America. And so Locke felt that “in talking against American racial prejudice we are at the same time talking against religious prejudice, cultural prejudice of all kinds, and even social class prejudice to a certain extent.”2 This is because “the Negro situation has perpetuated the psychology, the social habit of discrimination, and that other minorities [religious, cultural, ethnic, etc.] have indirectly suffered from its presence.”3 Locke thought that, if not corrected, this situation would have ruinous implications for the practice and spread of democracy, and ultimately for the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. First, recall that Locke thought that America must midwife world democracy. America must become a light of democracy that the world desires. Thus, America has a large role to play in cultivating a cosmopolitan community. However, this can only occur if America practices democracy and not pays it mere lip-­ service. And to practice democracy, white Americans must eschew their prejudices. Second, “anyone who observes the Negro closely will see his general public sentiment is approaching a militant phase—a very militant phase.”4 Locke was concerned that Blacks—frustrated with failed promises, empty rights, and undemocratic practices in a democracy—may turn either to undemocratic nations, aims, and practices, or fail to support the democratic cause in a way that is necessary to midwife a cosmopolitan community. And so the result may be democracy’s demise, which would dash any hopes of cultivating a cosmopolitan community. Locke thought that racism was America’s deepest and most fundamental problem. And he took it to be grounded in white supremacy. White supremacy is a set of beliefs—a sort of ideology or worldview—that tends to produce certain practices. First is the belief that there are races, where races are understood on the basis of biological differences separating 1  Alain Locke, “The Negro Group,” in Group Relations and Group Antagonisms, ed. R.M. MacIver (New York: Institute for Religious Studies, Harper & Brothers, 1944) 49. 2  Ibid. 3  Ibid. 4  Ibid., 53.

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species or subspecies of humans. Second is the belief that differences separating human races necessarily produce particular cultures with different values. Third is the belief in a hierarchy of human values that allows racial groups to be rank-ordered. And fourth is the belief that white peoples occupy a position at the top of the hierarchy of races. Endorsing this set of beliefs leads to prescriptions that justify various forms of imposition, oppression, and, at worst, annihilation by whites. As such, the ideology or worldview of white supremacy had an anthropology regarding race and a value theory behind it that it both created and reified. It also had prescriptive norms that licensed imposition, oppression, and even annihilation. And for Locke, this causes the over-loyalty to a white nation, a white race, a white culture, a white religion, and a religion of whiteness that are internal inconsistencies for the practice of democracy in America and throughout the world. Now white supremacy, as a descriptive and prescriptive set of beliefs about how non-white and white racial groups relate, is not without evolution. The set of beliefs evolved both in terms of ideological commitments and the authors who shaped them. Rather than highlight the history of practices emerging from white supremacy, this chapter highlights important theoretical moments for white supremacy throughout history. I highlight these moments by looking at the works of four authors—namely, François Bernier, Immanuel Kant, Johann Blumenbach, and Arthur de Gobineau. Each of these authors’ theories of race created aspects of, reified, justified, popularized,  or reinforced the ideology of white supremacy in important ways, and thereby adds a significant reason why respect was not conferred to non-white groups in America and throughout much of the world. For Locke, the endorsement of these theories limited the practice of true democracy, and must be overcome in order to cultivate a cosmopolitan community. François Bernier’s thinking demonstrates two prevalent types of racism with which Locke constantly battled. These are liberal and aesthetic racisms. Immanuel Kant made race and racism a matter of science; Kant scientized race and racism. Blumenbach began a lineage of reinforcing scientized race and racism empirically with his appeal to human skulls. What Blumenbach provided became instrumental for the American racism of Samuel George Morton, Josiah Clark Nott, and others who sought to provide craniological measurements for the moral and intellectual inferiority of non-white races. Further, Blumenbach made “degeneration” a value-laden concept that reached its height in the work of Arthur de Gobineau. Gobineau produced a divinely legislated and justified,

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totalitarian white supremacy that was deeply anti-democratic and anticosmopolitan. Each theory provides an aspect of white supremacy that blocked respect being conferred to non-white people. And so each theory and aspect of white supremacy represented in this chapter is one to which Locke responded with his theories of race and value.

On the Origins of Race The beginnings of the concept of race is quite difficult to determine. Most scholars believe that racial thinking had its beginnings in the Western world. And most scholars think that race emerged during the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries.5 However, there are scholars who locate racial divisions that laid the grounds for racism as early as the twelfth century.6 There is evidence that racial differences were noticed, and that racial animus existed as early as the ninth century when Al-Jahiz responded to what he considered the growing disparagement of Black Muslims by white Muslims.7 And a few historians locate either race or racial thinking that lend themselves to racist or proto-racist divisions in Western history in Ancient Greece or Rome.8 Now a few theorists deny that racial thinking is locatable in the West. For example, Ron Mallon argued that “recent work by cognitive and evolutionary psychologists suggests that such essentialism is a product of culturally canalized, domain-specific, and species-typical features of human psychology.”9 What this indicates is that the “common explanation of the content of a break in racial thinking is wrong, and casts some doubt on the thesis that genuinely racial thinking is a culturally and historically local invention.”10 Racial thinking, as a derivation from an essentializing 5  Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 6  George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) & Geraldine Heng, The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 7  ‘Uthman ‘Amr Ibn Bahr Al-Jahiz, The Glory of the Black Race, trans. Vincent J. Cornell (Los Angeles: Preston Publishing Co., 1981). 8  Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) & Robert Hood, Begrimed and Black: Christian Traditions on Blacks and Blackness (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1978). 9  Ron Mallon, “Was Race Thinking Invented in the Modern West,” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2013) 77. 10  Ibid.

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mechanism in human psychology, is ingrained in human behavior. It is not the kind of thing that emerged in a particular location or at a particular time. Perhaps ironically, Alain Locke might have agreed with Mallon. In an early lecture on race, Locke argued that: “The sense of race really almost antedates anything in its name…because just as long as you have groups of people knit together by a kinship feeling and [who] realiz[e] that different practices [operate in] their society from those which [operate in other societies and therefore] determine their treatment of other groups, [then] you really have what is the germ [of] the race sense.”11 For Locke, though “race” is a more modern term, racial thinking derives, not so much from a psychological disposition to essentialize, but from a kinship feeling that creates out-groups. Race senses first began “[w]here people feel that there is something in kinship relationship which makes a great difference and makes one code prevail among them and another code prevail among their neighbors….”12 And so for Locke, the roots of race are found where there are in-groups and out-groups separated by particular practices. Perhaps both Locke and Mallon are on to something. One might accept their thoughts about race deriving from either an essentializing mechanism in human psychology or kinship feeling rooted in and making use of cultural practices. However, one might still think that “race”—as the particular concept that we employ—has roots in history. So “wherever one sees the roots of the concept, the term ‘race’ was first used in 1684 in something like its contemporary meaning of a major division of humanity displaying a distinctive combination of physical traits transmitted through a line of descent [and corresponding to or correlated with a particular region].”13 And thus I will begin with the person who many believe to have  first used the term race in this distinctive way—namely, François Bernier.14 11  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, ed. Jeffrey C.  Stewart, (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992) 20. 12  Ibid., 20–21. 13  Tommy L. Lott and Robert Bernasconi, “Introduction,” in The Idea of Race, ed. Tommy L. Lott and Robert Bernasconi (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000) viii. 14  It is important to note that Justin Smith highlights that “the Spanish-Inca philosopher Garcilaso de la Vega uses the term ‘race’ several decades earlier than Bernier to describe the conceptualization of human diversity in South America.” Though this is the case, he still admits that “Bernier’s work is novel in that it seeks to find a small number of basic human types throughout the world, rather than simply a long list of differences in facial and bodily traits from one canton or village to the next.” See, Justin E.H.  Smith, Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015) 144–145.

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François Bernier, Race, and Liberal and Aesthetic Racism François Bernier (1620–1688) published “A New Division of the Earth” anonymously in 1684. Therein, as it regards understanding divisions of humans into groups, he tells us that: “Geographers up to this time have only divided the earth according to its different countries or regions.”15 Bernier saw his account as unique insofar as he produced a higher taxa than was before accepted. Rather than accepting that there were as many peoples as there were countries, regions, or perhaps culture-sets, Bernier thought that “there are four or five species or races of men in particular whose difference is so remarkable that it may be properly made use of as the foundation for a new division of the earth.”16 These races or species were whites, Africans, Asians, Lapps, and perhaps Americans.17 Bernier made racial divisions on the basis of physical features—namely, nose and lip shape and size, skin color and texture, hair volume and texture, and features related to the structure of the mouth.18 Still, he denied that all of these physical features need be different for each race. And he denied that any were necessary and sufficient to make individuals members of a race in a way that seemingly denied essential racial  properties.19 In this way Bernier’s account moved closer to but lacked scientific precision. So Bernier appealed to four or five species or races. It is important to note that: “By ‘species,’ [when discussing races,] early modern authors could not have intended the meaning commonly attached to this term today—namely, that each race is an isolated reproductive group….”20 Polygenesis, as an explanation for racial differences, did not emerge until after the early modern period. The term “race,” as understood by Bernier and carried throughout early modern European conceptions of race, was understood as a relatively isolated reproductive community. For Bernier 15  François Bernier, “A New Division of the Earth,” in The Idea of Race, ed. Tommy L. Lott and Robert Bernasconi (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000) 1. 16  Ibid., 1–2. 17  Though it would appear that Bernier excludes “Americans” from being a distinct race, he does suggest that there are “four to five” races, and discusses four, in addition to “Americans.” Thus, he seems to be ambivalent as to whether “Americans” are a race. 18  Ibid., 2. I draw the minimal conditions for racial difference from Bernier’s distinction between whites and Blacks. 19  Bernier claims that Asians and whites share the same skin color. 20  Justin E.H.  Smith, Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy, 141.

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and early moderns, “race is a lineage within a given kind of animals (or, later, humans) that tends, as a result of interbreeding across several generations, to share a number of the same traits.”21 At times, “race” and “species” were conflated (as seems to be the case for Bernier). However, when the two terms were not conflated: “Neither ‘species’ nor ‘race’ implied necessary reproductive isolation. The principal semantic difference between ‘species’ and ‘race,’ where these in fact differed, had to do with the fact that the former focused on physical traits of creatures, while the latter also recalled to mind the lineage or generative series from which—to return to the deepest etymology of the term—these traits flow.”22 Bernier’s account marks a “significant methodological departure from the old way of seeing humankind in terms of the age-old distinctions between Christian and heathen, man and brute, political virtú and religious faith.”23 Bernier’s account pressed past a theological scheme of classification to a logical classificatory scheme that “ordered humankind in terms of physiological and mental criteria based on observable ‘facts’ and tested evidence.”24 As Bernier claimed, he organized humankind into vastly fewer groups than the national or canton-related distinctions of his contemporary travelers. Bernier could only have organized humans in this way given the early modern European methodological scheme. And so, Bernier’s division was innovative because it added a higher taxonomical division to national physiognomy. Furthermore: “What Bernier is among the first to say is…that physical traits are rigidly correlated with races, and that races in turn are rigidly correlated with regions.”25 Without the “scientific” precision that Kant added to racial categorization, Bernier moved “race” closer to a natural division of humans based on laws that made persons’ physical and characterological traits fixed in accordance with specific geographical regions. In so doing, Bernier “invented the modern concept of race by substituting the term ‘race’ for what had previously been conceptualized under the notion of species. ‘Race’ ceases to denote a potentially morphologically variable chain of descent, and comes to denote a fixed and bounded  Ibid., 143.  Ibid. 23  Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West, 191. 24  Ibid., 187. 25  Justin E.H.  Smith, Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy, 148. 21 22

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population of morphologically homogeneous individuals.”26 In short, Bernier was the first to suggest immutable traits of what Michael Hardimon termed “the ordinary concept of race.”27 For Bernier, there are physical features that are passed down through ancestry and derive from a specific geographical location, where migration of persons alone (without interbreeding with other races) would not change inheritances of the physical features. Now Bernier is important for a couple of reasons beyond his innovation of the concept of race. He is important because he was an early exponent of certain aspects of the ideology of white supremacy to which Locke’s philosophies of race and value responded. Justin Smith tells us that: “While Bernier may not have been the founder of scientific racism…it is nonetheless correct to identify him as an early exponent of liberal racism.”28 Smith understands liberal racism as endorsing the belief that non-European peoples need to be in contact with and learn from Europeans—that they must be “brought in the fold of European history”—if they are to be a part of history at all, and if they are to progress as peoples or add anything to human progress. And so liberal racism centers Europe geographically in terms of time, intellectual space, human experience, the ability to be a part of and determine the course of events, and matters involving development and movement which include creativity and imagination. Smith’s claim that Bernier is an early exponent of liberal racism derives from Bernier’s description of the Mogul Empire, where he “appears to perceive racial difference through the lens of political order, taking the ruling Moghuls as white, irrespective of their nationality, while identifying the ‘pagan’ (i.e., non-Muslim) masses as uniformly brown….”29 This scheme—so familiar during Locke’s lifetime—along with one that placed Muslims in the same Judeo-Christian lineage and gave them pride of place over non-Judeo-Christian lineages, led Bernier to disparage Hindus in the Empire. “The Muslim elite was part of the same world as were the Christian Europeans; even if there was a long history of conflict between Christians and Muslims, it was still a shared history. The Hindus by contrast fell  Ibid.  Michael Hardimon, “The Ordinary Concept of Race,” in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. C, No 9 (Sept. 2003). 28  Justin E.H.  Smith, Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy, 151. 29  Ibid. 26 27

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altogether outside of that history, and Bernier treated them, accordingly, as entirely foreign.”30 What Bernier’s liberal racism entails is the denigration of values and culture-products perceived as non-European. With a denigration of these values and culture-products comes the denial of a valuable existence for non-European groups, as well as an overvaluation of whiteness in terms of existence. And so, when it is judged that non-European groups are able to adopt European values—that is, when they are able to progress—it is judged that they must do so. And so the judgement that non-European groups can adopt European values justifies imposition, oppression, or annihilation. If a group is able to adopt European values, then imposition and perhaps oppression (that is taken to  serve non-European groups’ interest) are justified to bring them into the fold of European history. And annihilation is justified in the case that non-European groups refuse to adopt European values or resist the imposition/oppression. However, failure to be judged capable of adopting European values fared non-­European groups no better. If a group is not able to adopt European values—that is, if they are not capable of progress, then oppression and perhaps annihilation are justified because both humanity and moral obligations are reserved for groups that are able to progress. And further, history demands progression. Progress may license annihilating groups who impede it. European imposition, oppression, or annihilation is justified in either case. Beyond liberal racism, Bernier is important for being an early exponent of aesthetic racism, which overvalues whiteness as an aesthetic category, and claims that human groups or individuals within them are beautiful to the extent that they possess “characteristic” white features. One can find aesthetic racism in Bernier’s categorization of ruling Moghuls as white and underclass “pagans” as brown. One can also find it in his description of races in “A New Division of the Earth.” When speaking of the Egyptians and Indians, Bernier claimed that they were very black. However, he did not attribute the blackness to being a racial property. Instead, Egyptians’ and Indians’ blackness is “accidental,” that derives from exposure to the sun. But “for those individuals who take care of themselves, and are not obliged to expose themselves so often as the lower class, are not darker than many Spaniards.”31 Note the contrast between higher and lower class Egyptians and Indians that was organized along racial lines. As it regards  Ibid.  François Bernier, “A New Division of the Earth,” 2.

30 31

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aesthetic racism, note the role that self-care and exposure to the sun played in maintaining a “beautiful” skin color—a color likening a European group. Further, one may note Bernier’s aesthetic racism in his description of women throughout the world. Now to be fair to Bernier, he did claim that there were beautiful (and ugly) women in every race. And so there were beautiful non-European women as well as ugly European women. However, women’s beauty was always determined by the extent to which they approximated whiteness. And though Bernier did not say as much, he most likely thought that ugly European women were ugly to the extent that they deviated from whiteness. And so for Bernier, there were beautiful women who were Black. However, their beauty was possessed by those “who had not those thick lips and that squab noses” characteristic of Black Africans. Of women in the Indies, which seems to have been Asian groups of the “East Indies,” Bernier wrote that “some are coloured of ever so little a yellow, who are very much prized, and whom I found also very much to my taste; for that shade of yellow is vivid and brilliant, and has none of that ugly and livid paleness of jaundice.”32 This group is beautiful to the extent that they lack the stereotypical “yellowish” color commonly attributed to Asians. Further, one must note the arrogance in Bernier’s thought. While he claimed that these women accord to his taste, he seems to have wanted to claim that the peoples of the Indies themselves recognize the natural and objective beauty of “whiteness.” They are “prized” among the peoples in the Indies. Bernier continued by asking his readers to imagine themselves “a beautiful and young French girl, who is only just beginning to have jaundice, and instead of that sick, pale visage, and those yellowish eyes, dull and languishing, give her a healthy face, soft, laughing, and beautiful and very amorous eyes, and you will have as near an idea of them as I can give you.”33 Women of the Indies are beautiful to the extent that they approach French women’s beginning bout with illness. When speaking of the women of the Ganges at Benares, Bernier wrote that women in the kingdom of Cashmere’s beauty was in part attributable to their being “as white as those of Europe” and that “although the women of Lahore are brown like the rest of the Indian women, still they seem to me more charming than all the others….”34 So, women of the  Ibid.  Ibid., 2–3. 34  Ibid., 3. 32 33

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kingdom of Cashmere were in part beautiful because of their white skin, and women of Lahore were beautiful despite their brown skin—likely because they were thought to possess other “white” features. Now Bernier did say that the Turks, which were an Asian group in accordance with his racial division, had beautiful women. However, he seems to have attributed this to a Greek influence. So, they are Asian, but their beauty stemmed from a European source. And lastly, Bernier conceded beauty to women from Mingrelia, Georgia, and Circassia, which also seem to have been Asian groups. In fact, he seems to have agreed with a claim by travelers that they are the most beautiful in the world. However, their appeal was because of their characteristic “white” features. These groups would come to symbolize white beauty with the work of Johann Blumenbach.35 And so if liberal racism centers Europe geographically in terms of time, intellectual space, human experience, the ability to be a part of and determine the course of events, and matters involving development and movement which include creativity and imagination, aesthetic racism centers Europe geographically in terms of desirability, interest, style, nature, and in many ways godliness. Europe, then, has a privileged place that is natural and divine, and has an attractiveness to which all others should aspire. Now, though Bernier and his division are important for understanding Locke’s philosophies of race and value, they are not the scientific theories to which Locke responded directly. Locke’s philosophies were made in consideration of theories of race and race-contacts that either deny races as facts in the world or those that take races to be natural. Those that take races to be natural draw a necessary connection between race and culture, and then deny that certain races have cultures that possess anything of value. Then they deny that races who produce disvalued cultures are worthy of respect equal to whites. Most of his work took aim at Arthur de Gobineau.36 Specifically, Locke responded to three claims that are fundamental in Gobineau’s work. First, Gobineau argued that races are products of God. Second, Gobineau argued that there is a necessary connection between race and culture such that races must produce certain culture-­ products which can be objectively judged to have greater or lesser value 35  Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010) 43–45, 77. 36  Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value: An Introduction” (Unpublished Emory University Doctoral Thesis, 1975) 131.

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than the culture-products of other races.37 Third, Gobineau argued that race-mixing and culture sharing explained the decline of great civilizations in a way that vehemently contrasted cosmopolitan aims. With few exceptions, Gobineau’s ideas were not original. The idea that races are natural and that certain races are superior to others because culture-­productive capacity is fixed is an idea that can be found earlier in the history of race—in both Immanuel Kant’s and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s writings. Each had a much more scientific theory of race. Each added aspects of white supremacy, to which Locke responded. And each set up a discussion of Gobineau’s anti-democratic and anti-­ cosmopolitan account.

Immanuel Kant, Scientific Race, and Scientific Racism Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) provided his thoughts about racial divisions, or his natural history of the human species, in three works—namely, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” “Determination of the Concept of a Human Race,” and “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy.” However, to get the clearest sense of Kant’s thinking on human divisions, one also needs to engage Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, “Physical Geography,” and his lectures on anthropology. Kant’s claims about race were made to show that all humans had the same origin—that we are all members of the same species, which was against those who thought that racial distinctions signified differences in origin.38 “One of Kant’s chief aims in developing his theory of race was to defend monogenesis and the biological unity of the human species against the polygenetic views of authors like Voltaire and Lord Kames, vies that had developed in response to the intensified European encounter with alien peoples of Africa and the Americas over the preceding century.”39  Ibid.  Immanuel Kant, “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” in Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 39  Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 48. 37 38

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And so, by the time that Kant’s thought about race emerged, the debate between monogenesis and polygenesis was in full force. Kant defended monogenesis for two reasons. First, Buffon’s rule—that members of the same species were those that produced fertile young— validated it.40 For Kant, Buffon provided a rule or law according to which one might objectively specify taxonomical classifications. And this was different from and superior to a method that specified taxonomical classifications from mere observation. Second, Kant thought that polygenesis failed to explain why nature would allow half-breeds.41 Kant thought it doubtful that two different species’ generative forces could beget fertile young or allow half-breeds. The more likely result was that either two different generative forces would be incompatible with each other or that one would eliminate the other.42 Thus, though a racist, Kant’s racism was neither one grounded in the exclusion of certain races from the human community nor one grounded on the belief that there are different kinds of human beings with superior or inferior traits. Now the attempt to unify humanity did not make Kant’s writings about race innovative. What made his work innovative was that with it Kant began a rather lengthy list of philosophers, anthropologists, and other scientists who attempted to make racial divisions a matter of science; Kant “scientized” race. Kant “gave the concept sufficient condition for subsequent users to believe that they were addressing something whose scientific status could at least be debated.”43 Until Kant, European racial distinctions were made by travelogues, Christian missionaries, and readers of the former, who either provided information about different peoples’ appearances and customs or merely wrote about others’ explorations, without a kind of scientific justification. Bernier, in accepting a modern methodological approach to understanding the world, and in producing a 40  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” in Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 84. 41  Immanuel Kant, “Determination of a Concept of a Human Being,” in Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 152. 42  Ibid., 155–156. 43   Robert Bernasconi, “Who Invented the Concept of Race?: Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race,” in Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001) 11.

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schema of divisions that rigidly categorized groups’ physical features by region, certainly moved closer to a scientization of race. In so doing, Bernier put pressure on philosophers and early anthropologists to develop a more academically/scientifically rigorous notion of race.44 However, it was Kant who sought to bring the natural history of the human species under laws. He wanted to derive anthropological principles that relate to physical and psychological character. This included the character of persons simpliciter, the character of the sexes, and of course the character of peoples (both nations and races). With the latter, Kant attempted to understand peoples in regard to natural ability, sensibility, and moral disposition. When defining “race” in “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” Kant wrote the following: “Among the subspecies, i.e., the hereditary differences of the animals which belong to a single phylum, those which persistently preserve themselves in all transplantings (transpositions to other regions) over prolonged generations among themselves and which also always beget half-breed young in the mixing with other variations of the same phylum are called races.”45 In “Determination of a Concept of a Human Being,” Kant understood “race” in the following way: What comes into question for establishing a division of the species into classes are physical characters through which human beings (regardless of their sex) differ from one another, more precisely, only those physical characters which are hereditary. Now these classes are to be called races only if those characters are unfailingly hereditary (in the same class as well as in the mixing with every other). Thus the concept of a race contains first the ­concept of a common phylum (Between Kingdom and class on a porphyrian tree), second necessarily hereditary characters of the classificatory difference among the latter’s descendants.46

With the addition of monogenesis, Kant appealed to the same “ordinary concept of race” about which Hardimon writes and to which Bernier appealed. For Kant, race is defined as: (1) a subspecies of a common phylum or ancestor; (2) with hereditary traits that are physical; (3) that occur (or are passed down) unfailingly throughout a lineage; and (4) that derive from a specific geographical location that is responsible for the traits.  Ibid., 13.  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 85. 46  Immanuel Kant, “Determination of a Concept of a Human Being,” 153. 44 45

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Again, Kant was able to account for “1” by appeal to Buffon’s rule. Because all human races can beget fertile children with one another, they all derive from a single phylum. Thus: “The concept of a race is therefore: the classificatory difference of the animals of one and the same phylum in so far as this difference is unfailingly hereditary.”47 Kant seems to have claimed that there are at least two ways to understand divisions that relate to the natural world—namely, school-related and phyletic divisions. For Kant, phyletic divisions deal with laws of propagation concerning phyla that divide animals according to relationships in terms of generation, and so regard inner properties. This division brings the classification of animals under laws—presumably because they regard generation and what is necessary to get it. For Kant, this phyletic division is opposed to a concept that he terms “schools.” A school-related division deals with classes that divide animals according to resemblances, regards outer observations, and which brings groups under titles. At best, school-­ related divisions lead to memory. They are more malleable and subject to observations, observational limitations, and perhaps human needs. Phyletic divisions lead to understanding. They are static and objective. Kant’s scientization of race is supposed to derive from the law-like nature of human generation. If correct, then Kant’s racial divisions should be static, objective divisions that relate to the understanding and regard inner properties that science could capture. From the above we see that Kant furthered Bernier’s innovation that physical traits are rigidly correlated with races, and that races in turn are rigidly correlated with regions. Racial traits, as static and objective properties that science can capture, are unfailingly passed down through ancestry, and are very rigidly correlated with regions. Kant’s reasoning was, as we will see, that the air and sun of a region is responsible for how peoples occupying those regions have developed. Kant’s rigidity accounted for his separation of races from strains, varieties, and sorts, and it played a major role in his scientific racism. Now for Kant, there are three primary conditions of race as subspecies of the same kind. First, there are species-related traits that are continued across races. Second, racial traits are only those that are passed down unfailingly. Third, racial traits, when mixed with diverging traits, always beget half-breeds. These conditions go a ways toward explaining why there are so few races, even when there is so much human variation, and  Immanuel Kant, “Determination of a Concept of a Human Being,” 154.

47

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variation that can be captured under non-racial “laws.” Certain traits, such as hair color are persistently preserved, but do not beget half-breed offspring (strains). Other traits, such as a proclivity for recessive hairlines, are preserved often, but not unfailingly (varieties). Still others, such as height or build, produce half-breeds, but are not persistently preserved (sorts). Kant might have thought that the latter provide so many “laws” for subgroups within races, or perhaps something of a “national character” underneath overarching or higher-order racial classifications. Kant divided humanity into four races that accord to four specific skin colors, four regions of the earth, and what he took to be the four climate-­ types. His racial classifications are as follows: “Black” Negroes who were developed in humid heat; “Yellow” Hindustanis who were developed in dry heat; “White” Europeans who were developed in humid cold; and “Copper-Red” Hunnishes who were developed in dry cold.48 For Kant, all other groups were either mixed races or incipient races that have “not yet resided long enough in the climate to completely assume the respective character of the race.”49 Comparing Kant’s and Bernier’s theories illustrates a constant in European thinking about race—namely, that with the exception of the very broad categories of “Black” and “White,” racial categorization varies over time and across space. Historically, we find as few as two, and as many as sixteen, races. And further, racial properties—those features that are taken to be necessary indicators of racial group belonging—are just as inconstant. With the exception of skin color, racial properties have been wildly divergent. Some authors had few properties such as mere skin color, while others purported properties as rigid as distinct bodily smells and cranial sizes.

48  Kant’s thinking with regard to this group is a bit confusing. Kant inconsistently employed terms and traits to describe this group. In parts of “Of the Different Races of Human Beings” Kant called this race “Hunish,” “Mongolian,” and “Kalmuchian,” discussed them as deriving from Khoshuts, described them as “red,” and claimed that “Americans” are “a Hunnish race that have not yet fully adapted.” In other parts of the same work—most notably as it regards degeneration from the phyletic race—Kant referred to this race as “American,” and described them as “Copper-Red” as if to suggest that “Americans” are the race. In “Determination of the Concept of a Human Race,” Kant referred to this group as “American,” limited them almost exclusively to America, and seemed to include Chinese groups among the “White” Europeans. 49  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 87.

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In comparing Kant and Bernier, Kant included Turkish and Tartaric peoples among the “Whites,” while Bernier classified them as Asian. For Kant, Laplanders were an incipient race of either “White” Europeans or “Red” Hunnishes,50 while they were an independent race for Bernier. Kant thought that “Americans” (Indigenous groups) were an incipient race deriving from the “Red” Hunnish race, while Bernier equivocated, either classifying them as a race or (more likely) a subgroup of Europeans. Bernier thought that Indians (Hindustanis) were white, while Kant took them to be an independent race. And so peoples of “the states of the Grand Mogul” were white to Bernier, while they could not have been white for Kant. Now Kant thought that races emerged in accordance with laws, given the purposiveness of nature. Nature (or perhaps God) intended both a great range of human diversity51 and that humans populate the entire earth.52 To accomplish this, nature (or God) fixed creations with the generative potential to adapt to any climate and condition. Species do not develop haphazardly, and do not merely adapt to conditions by external mechanical laws. Instead, nature fixed them with what he referred to as “germs.” “The purposive character in an organization is surely the general reason for inferring a preparation that is originally placed in the nature of a creature with this intent, and for inferring created germs, if this end could only be obtained later on.”53 In describing “germs,” Kant wrote that: “The grounds of a determinate unfolding which are lying in the nature of an organic body (plant or animal) are called germs, if this unfolding concerns particular parts; if however, it concerns only the size or relation of the parts to one another, then I call them natural predispositions.”54 They are “the potentialities that are involved in the generative power and which are the immediate cause of human species differentiation.”55 The human species was designed with the special capacity to adapt to any of the four climates by possession of

 Ibid., 88 & 91.  Ibid., 86. 52  Ibid., 90. 53  Immanuel Kant, “Determination of a Concept of a Human Being,” 156. 54  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 89. 55  Jimmy Yab, Kant and the Politics of Racism: Toward Kant’s Racialized Form of Cosmopolitan Right (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) 82. 50 51

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the original phylum’s generative force.56 Germs are innate to human nature, and allow humans to achieve a kind of perfection given environments into which they are placed. Though human beings were destined for all climates, settlement in a particular climate for a lengthy period of time at or toward the beginnings of human history allowed particular germs to flourish, while suppressing others because of a lack of need. Germs’ flourishing and suppression were caused by the necessity to adapt to air and sun within environments. Kant thought that once particular germs flourished or were suppressed, these developments were reproduced in humans’ offspring unfailingly. Flourishing and suppressed germs continue in humans’ offspring irrespective of changes to the offspring’s environment. The differences in the suppression and flourishing of germs are what account for racial differences and their permanence.57 For Kant, physical racial properties are thought to help races adapt to their environments and insure “the development and perfection of all human talents would occur, regardless of what climatic conditions people found themselves in.”58 Kant claimed that: “the red-brown color [of Indigenous American groups] appears (as an effect of aerial acid) to be as suitable to the cold climate as the olive-brown color [of the Hindustanis] (as an effect of the alkaline-bilious nature of the fluids) to the hot region… .”59 For Kant, Black skin was either necessary to release “phlogiston” from the body or derived from the necessity of doing so. He claimed that: “Now already the strong odor of the Negroes, which cannot be helped through any cleanliness, gives cause for conjecturing that their skin removes much phlogiston from the blood and that nature must have 56  As an aside, Kant thought that the human species being destined in this way was evidence that humans were on a path toward the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Kant reasoned that humans were destined to spread across the earth because nature intended humans to seek peace. 57  And so Kant opposed a number of his contemporary interlocutors. He opposed those who denied that different races were of the same species. He opposed those who thought that human difference was explained by different phyletic origins that were all human. He opposed those who conceptualized human difference as shaped merely by external factors. And—perhaps oddly given his commitment to the perfection of humanity in any environment—he opposed those who thought that long-term exposure to different environments could reshape human races after germs unfolded in particular ways. 58  Robert Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 98. 59  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 92.

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organized this skin so that the blood could dephlogistize itself in them through the skin in a far greater measure than happens in us, where that is for the most part the task of the lungs.”60 And so, “it was an arrangement very wisely made by Nature to organize their skin such that the blood, since it is does not by far sufficiently remove enough phlogiston through the lungs, could dephlogistize itself much more strongly through the skin than is the case with us.”61 As one can imagine, Kant thought that: “In the whites, however, this iron that is dissolved in the fluids would not be precipitated at all and thereby would indicate at once the perfect mixture of the fluids and the strength of this human sort ahead of the others.”62 Now, given the above definition, Kant would have us believe that only physical properties—most notably skin color—account for differences separating races. Racial differences should not be determined by psychological, characterological, and moral differences. However, when speaking about different races, Kant left this thinking behind. Kant endorsed the view that there are biobehavioral essences for races that are heritable, shared by all and only members, and explain behavioral, characterological, and cultural dispositions. And so non-physical traits figure prominently in his scientization of races. In this way, Kant came to endorse a scientifically verifiable hierarchy of races. Recall that Kant divided the races by color, in accordance with climate-­ types in different environments. Again, his racial classifications were: “Black” Negroes, who were developed in humid heat; “Yellow” Hindustanis, who were developed in dry heat; “White” Europeans, who were developed in humid cold; and “Copper-Red” Hunnishes, who were developed in dry cold. Kant linked necessary characterological properties—namely, temperament—to these climate-types. For Kant, more than just the effect on skin color, climate-types have an effect on the heaviness and temperature of peoples’ blood. The heaviness and temperature of the blood determine temperament.63 Temperament, then, goes a ways to affect intellectual ability and susceptibility to moral behavior. As such, groups’ temperament, intellectual ability, and susceptibility to moral  Immanuel Kant, “Determination of a Concept of a Human Being,” 156.  Ibid. 62  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 94. 63  Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 386–387. 60 61

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behavior are determined by climate-types, and come to be as stable as physical properties.64 In fact, they seem to derive from physical properties. Peoples living in a warm, moist climate [humid heat] are marked by a sanguine temperament; “Black” Negroes, then, have a sanguine temperament. Being “light-blooded,” “Black” Negroes possess positive temperaments of gaiety or light-heartedness and negative temperaments of foolishness. For Kant, those with a sanguine temperament are childlike, lazy, and lack foresight. “He [the “Black” Negro] makes promises in all honesty, but does not keep his word because he has not reflected deeply enough beforehand whether he will be able to keep it. He is good-natured enough to render help to others, but he is a bad debtor and always asks for extensions.”65 Further, “He is not usually an evil human being, but he is a sinner hard to convert; indeed, he regrets something very much but quickly forgets this regret.”66 In this way, Kant’s thinking matched many of the racist tropes of Blacks. Peoples living in a warm, dry climate [dry heat] are marked by a choleric temperament; “Yellow” Hindustanis, then, have a choleric temperament. Being “hot-blooded,” “Yellow” Hindustanis possess a positive temperament of vivacity and a negative temperament of rashness. For Kant, those with a choleric temperament are rash, love order, arrogant, easily offended, and unhappy. Further, “He [the “Yellow” Hindustani] is busy, but reluctant to undertake business himself just because he is not persistent in it; and therefore he likes to be the mere commander in chief who presides over it, but does not want to carry it out himself.”67 Here, Kant portrays those with a choleric temperament as ambitious, but without resolve or responsibility. Hindustanis are fakes, who have an appetite for power, but who shirk the responsibility of work. Peoples living in a cold, dry climate [dry cold] are marked by a melancholy temperament; “Copper-Red” Hunnishes, then, have a melancholy temperament. Being “heavy-blooded,” “Copper-Red” Hunnishes possess a positive temperament of coolness or depth, and a negative temperament of depressiveness. Those with a melancholy temperament think deeply. However, they are rather self-concerned, and “are apprehensive, 64  Mark Larrimore, “Race, Freedom and the Fall in Steffens and Kant,” in The German Invention of Race, ed. Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) 113. 65  Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 386. 66  Ibid. 67  Ibid., 387.

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mistrustful, and suspicious, and thereby also insusceptible to cheerfulness.”68 Like Blacks, Kant’s claims about Hunnishes track many tropes about Asians. And finally peoples living in a cold, moist climates [humid cold] are marked by a phlegmatic temperament; “White” Europeans, then, have a phlegmatic temperament.69 Being “cold-blooded,” “White” Europeans possess a positive contemplative temperament, and a negative “inactive” temperament. “Phlegm, as weakness, is the propensity to inactivity, not to let oneself be moved to business even by strong incentives. Insensitivity to such stimuli is voluntary uselessness, and the desires aim only at satiety and sleep.”70 It is not too clear as to how this is negative. However, for Kant, there is much more positivity reserved for the phlegmatic temperament. “Phlegm, as strength, on the other hand, is the quality of not being moved easily or rashly but, if slowly, then persistently. — He who has a good dose of phlegm in his composition warms up slowly, but retains the warmth longer. He does not easily fly into a rage, but reflects first whether he should become angry; when the choleric person, on the other hand, may fall into a rage at not being able to bring the steadfast man out of his cold-­ bloodedness.”71 And further, those with a phlegmatic temperament— “White” Europeans—even with a “quite ordinary portion of reason,” possess more rationality than other races. “His fortunate temperament takes the place of wisdom, and even in ordinary life one often calls him the philosopher. As a result of this he is superior to others, without offending their vanity.”72 Whites are, for Kant, superior to other races—as a matter of the possession of superior psychological traits that derive from physical properties. More than promoting white superiority, Kant provided a clearly ordered hierarchy of races where all races are disparaged excepting “White” Europeans. In Kant’s works, Blacks and Indigenous Americans are the usual targets of his disparagement, though Hindustanis and Hunnishes (more broadly) do not escape a clear place of diminished value on the racial hierarchy. Kant claimed that laziness and immorality are inherently  Ibid.  Mark Larrimore, “Race, Freedom and the Fall in Steffens and Kant,” in The German Invention of Race, ed. Sara Eigen and Mark Larrimore (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) 113. 70  Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 386–387. 71  Ibid., 387. 72  Ibid. 68 69

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found in Blacks. Weakness and lack of intelligence are inherent to Indigenous Americans. These inferior traits, Kant thought, derive from the manner in which the two races’ germs unfolded given either the environments in which they developed or their premature migration. Speaking of Blacks, Kant claimed that “humid warmth is beneficial to the robust growth of animals in general and, in short, this results in the Negro, who is well suited to his climate, namely strong, fleshy, supple, but who, given the abundant provision of his mother land, is lazy, soft and trifling.”73 Negroes have little to no motivation to work, are “soft,” and are prone to immoral behavior. They must be made to work (perhaps they are fitting slaves) and should be heavily surveilled given an inclination to immoral behavior. For Kant, Blacks’ psychological disposition is by nature, owing to the abundance of raw materials and the ease of harvesting them that sub-Saharan Africa provided. Changing geographical locations, introduction to Christian values, coming into contact with European cultures, and so on will not work. Blacks’ germs have unfolded in such a way as to make their deficient psyches fixed. And so, Kant’s racism is much more virulent than Bernier’s liberal racism. It not only centers Europe, with no place for difference, but also denies that other races have any possible place in history. And further, certain races’ positionality has been determined either by nature or God. Certain races are simply incapable of culture and progress.74 The lack of capacity to contribute to culture and progress marked Blacks and Indigenous Americans as valueless. Kant illustrated the extent to which Blacks were valueless in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Agreeing with Hume, Kant claimed that: The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a Negro has demonstrated talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who have been transported elsewhere from their countries, although very many of them have been set free, nevertheless not a single one has ever been found who has accomplished something great in art or science or shown any other praiseworthy quality, while among the whites  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 93.  Immanuel Kant, “Lecture of the Winter Semester 1777–1778 based on the transcription Pillau,” in Lectures on Anthropology, ed. Allen W.  Wood and Robert B.  Louden, Trans. Robert R. Clewis, Robert B. Louden, G. Felicitas Munzel, and Allen W. Wood, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 276. 73 74

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there are always those who rise up from the lowest rabble and through extraordinary gifts earn respect in the world.75

When entertaining the possibility of there being a Black carpenter in Africa, Kant claimed: “There might be something here worth considering, except for the fact that this scoundrel was completely black from head to foot, a distinct proof that what he said was stupid.”76 Blackness, as a physical racial property, was indicative—in fact was indubitable proof—of disvaluable psychological properties; blackness was a natural, physical indicator of both dishonesty and stupidity. For Kant: “The Negroes, however, are also no longer susceptible of any further civilizing….”77 And so, the dishonesty and stupidity that were indicated by black skin were just as permanent and transgenerational as black skin. Moreover, Kant seems to have thought of Blacks as very simple, childlike figures who are unconcerned with abstract thought or complex problem-­solving. Kant claimed that Blacks “are full of affect and passion, very lively, talkative and vain. They acquire culture, but only a culture of slaves; that is, they allow themselves to be trained. They have many incentives, are also sensitive, afraid of beatings, and also do many things out of honor.”78 Oddly, the province of nature (or perhaps God) failed to have humanity achieve its perfection in humid heat, as this has caused the “ugly black skins” and other distasteful physical properties such as Blacks’ “softness” and stench, along with psychological properties such as laziness and propensity to immoral behavior. And yet, however disparaged Blacks were in Kant’s racial views, Indigenous Americas were equally, if not more, devalued. Kant seems to have thought that Indigenous Americans lack estimable physical and psychological properties because they migrated too 75  Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, in Anthropology, History, and Education, ed. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Robert B. Louden, Holly Wilson, Allen W. Wood, Günter Zöller, and Arnulf Zweig, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 59. 76  Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, 61. 77  Immanuel Kant, “Lecture of the Winter Semester 1777–1778 based on the transcription Pillau,” 276. 78  Immanuel Kant, “Lecture of the Winter Semester 1777–1778 based on the transcription Menschenkunde,” in Lectures on Anthropology, ed. Allen W. Wood and Robert B. Louden, Trans. Robert R. Clewis, Robert B. Louden, G. Felicitas Munzel, and Allen W. Wood, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 320.

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quickly—that is, Indigenous Americans migrated from “Asia” to “the Americas” before their germs unfolded properly or adapted to one specific climate. He claimed that “the Americans appear to be a Hunnish race which has not yet fully adapted.”79 For Kant, this led Indigenous Americans to possess a “half extinguished life power that can be viewed most easily as the effect of a cold region of the world.”80 And so Kant postulated that Indigenous Americans would die out, and that occurrent rates at which Indigenous Americans were dying were not the result of European extermination, but natural—biological—weakness or a lack of vigor. He claimed to “believe even now that they will attain to no perfection, for it appears that they will all be exterminated, not through acts of murder, for that would be gruesome! but rather that they will die out. For it is calculated only a twentieth part of all the previous Americans are still there.”81 For Kant, early migration led to a host of problems that allowed him to rank Indigenous Americans below Blacks, as the lowest group on a rank-­ ordered racial hierarchy. Even though Blacks were no longer susceptible to being civilized, “they have instinct and discipline, which is lacking in the Americans.”82 Though Blacks lack temperance, prudence, intelligence, any will to be industrious, and are prone to immorality, they possess certain properties that are useful for survival. They possess the capacity to react, and can set a plan and follow through with it. Thus, though Blacks were disparaged and lacked any value in terms of culture and progress, they seem to be able to operate based on a maxim, and thus can follow the categorical imperative in a way that gives them dignity and thus moral value. Indigenous Americans lacked both instinct and discipline. Kant may have thought that Indigenous Americans’ lack of instinct and discipline explained why they will not see the end of history. And the implication that Indigenous Americans lacked discipline might license the inference that for Kant, though they are human, Indigenous Americans lacked dignity such that they can be used as a mere means to persons’ ends. Kant claimed that: “All these [American] savages have little feeling for the beautiful in moral understanding, and the generous forgiveness of an injury, which is at once noble and beautiful, is completely unknown as a  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 88.  Ibid., 92. 81  Immanuel Kant, “Lecture of the Winter Semester 1777–1778 based on the transcription Pillau,” 274. 82  Immanuel Kant, “Lecture of the Winter Semester 1777–1778 based on the transcription Pillau,” 276. 79 80

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virtue among the savages, but rather is disdained as a miserable cowardice.”83 In addition to having a half-extinguished life force and lacking essential survival skills, Indigenous Americans lack a disposition to appreciate particular principles and propositions related to abstract thought. Indigenous Americans either cannot or can hardly appreciate the beauty implicated in moral behavior, and perhaps cannot appreciate morality itself—again, an indication that Kant thought that Indigenous Americans lacked moral worth. As opposed to Blacks and Indigenous Americans—and to some degree Hindustanis and Hunnishes (more broadly)—Kant took whites (as a race) to be unproblematic or completed. “Humanity has its highest degree of perfection in the white race.”84 Kant thought that whites had more exemplary physical features than other races, which stemmed from elements natural to white Europeans’ blood. Recall the disadvantages that nature or God gave Blacks with regard to iron and phlogiston in our blood. “In the whites, however, this iron that is dissolved in the fluids would not be precipitated at all and thereby would indicate at once the perfect mixture of the fluids and the strength of this human sort ahead of the others.”85 Whites, by nature or God, are superior to all other races, and will be so for the remainder of human history. It is as scientifically demonstrable as elements composing blood. And so for Kant, “the White race possesses a natural character that is absolute, in the sense that it has all the necessary ingredients for moral action.”86 In the way illustrated above—namely, in providing scientific backing for the concept of race and racial divisions, Kant scientized racism. Kant did more than simply promote the superiority of whites along the same lines as authors like François Bernier. Liberal and aesthetic racisms, and even devaluing intellectual and characterological capacities of non-whites that are trademarks of scientific racism, were not new. What was new (that is, what Kant added to the history of racism) was a justification for racism by appeal to science.

 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime,  Immanuel Kant, Physical Geography, in Natural Science, ed. Eric Watkins, trans. Lewis White Beck, Jeffrey B. Edwards, Olaf Reinhardt, Martin Schönfeld, and Eric Watkins (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 576. 85  Immanuel Kant, “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” 94. 86  Jimmy Yab, Kant and the Politics of Racism: Toward Kant’s Racialized Form of Cosmopolitan Right, 32. 83 84

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Kant connected scientifically measurable physical properties to intellectual, aesthetic, cultural, and characterological properties where one was explained by the other, and in fact came to represent the other. In Kant’s view, physical properties are not just correlated with superior/inferior intellects, vigor, industriousness, beauty, and cultures. These were explained by physical properties, and were so explained in a way that was supported by science. In this way, Kant took science to justify claims of white supremacy. Kant’s new racism—his scientific racism—“seems to directly peg the absence of reason to physical traits that are supposed to be markers of racial difference. It is not just that dark-skinned people are cut off, for contingent biographical reasons, from the proper training and deployment of reason, but that they are cut off from reason because of their dark skin.”87 Kant’s scientized race and racism, while it did not begin or lead to colonialism, slavery, extermination, and oppression, provided backing for these—even as Kant endorsed colonialism, slavery, and oppression in at least his early, pre-critical works. Kant’s scientized race and racism had many implications for both the ways that groups were understood, along with thoughts about how nature had designed and permanently fixed them. An implication of Kant’s thought is the idea of a Black slave who, by nature, was happy with their enslaved status and unconcerned with freedom. Black slaves were stereotyped as being unreceptive to the idea of freedom because work without a master scared them. Black slaves were taken to be jolly and in need of a patriarchal master. These stereotypes justified the continuation of trans-generational slavery because Blacks’ laziness, lack of industriousness, and jovial disposition were natural. And so, Kant’s scientized conception of race and racism provided scientific support for dominant caricatures of Blacks during slavery—namely, the Mammy, Coon, Tom, and Picaninny. These stereotypes portrayed Blacks as childlike and stupid though harmless, and had the aim of justifying slavery while affording whites psychological comfort. Ironically, Kant’s scientized conception of race and racism also provided scientific support for stereotypes created for Blacks postbellum— namely, the “Mandingo,” “Jezebel,” “Black Brute,” and “Sapphire.” These stereotypes portrayed Blacks as intemperate, lascivious, violent, and incapable of morality that had the aim of re-instituting slavery. Thus Kant 87  Justin E.H.  Smith, Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy, 228.

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provided scientific backing for statements such as the following: “In the free black, the principle of idleness and dissipation triumphs over that of accumulation and the desire to better our condition; the animal part of the man gains the victory over the moral, and he, consequently, prefers sinking down into listless, inglorious repose of the brute creation, to rising to that energetic activity which can only be generated amid the multiplied, refined, and artificial wants of civilized society.”88 At its base, Kant’s philosophical anthropology provided a necessary support for value-hierarchies in support of white supremacy. It connected nature (or God) to value-­ hierarchies in a scientific way. Now “Kant had no significant influence on the development of racial thinking in America, but his younger contemporary and correspondent, Johann Frederich Blumenbach did. Lines of research into racial differences that he had opened were pursued here, especially the comparative measurements of skull sizes, facial angles, brain capacity, and the like.”89 And so, Blumenbach—particularly as a central figure in the development of race and anthropology—becomes a figure of importance for understanding the particular kind of thinking against which Locke’s philosophy of race and value theory were set. I turn now to Blumenbach’s notion of race that influenced America, and the kind of racism that it introduced.

Johann Blumenbach, Racial Degeneration, and Racist Value Johann Blumenbach (1752–1840), whose thinking on race heavily influenced American conceptions, is widely considered to be the founder of anthropology. Blumenbach’s philosophical anthropology diverged from Kant’s in many ways. On the surface, Blumenbach was closer to promoting the intellectual equality of all human races, and promoted the ability of all races to improve.90 He argued that whites were a primeval race in a way that centered them as a matter of creation and evolution, whereas Kant did not—though he approached it. And further he broke away from the typological thinking at the center of Kant’s views. However, like Kant’s conception of race (and contrary to many commenters), Blumenbach’s  Thomas R. Dew, “Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislation”  Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development 70. 90  Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) 262. 88 89

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conception rank-ordered humanity, and did so by appeal to science. In fact, with his appeal to measuring skulls, Blumenbach added specific “scientific” backing to Kant’s mere theoretical assertions. In so doing, Blumenbach is important—particularly for American conceptions of race—because he provided measurable data for Kant’s scientized race and racism. The concept of degeneration, along with human skulls, came to be useful for both aesthetic judgements and measurements of intellectual acuity for different races. And so the ways in which races are rank-ordered, and thus worthy of respect, are essentially the same for both authors. Like Kant’s philosophical anthropology, Blumenbach’s presented challenges for the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community because of its use in justifying disrespect conferred to non-white peoples in a way that is contrary to true democracy. Like Kant, one of Blumenbach’s chief anthropological aims was to defend monogenesis. And much like Kant, Blumenbach employed the idea of races’ “degeneration” from an “original race.” Blumenbach proposed the idea of an occurrent “primeval race,” while Kant proposed a no longer existent “phyletic race.” Now Blumenbach provided two ways to think about human origins—namely, “whether the origin can be traced to degeneration, or whether it is not so great as to compel us rather to conclude that there is more than one original species of man.”91 Blumenbach apparently thought that if monogenesis was true, then degeneration was also true—that many races degenerated from an original race.92 And if degeneration did not explain diverse races, then polygenesis was true. Ultimately for Blumenbach, polygenesis arbitrarily defined differences, and was therefore problematic.93 His defense of monogenesis stemmed from claims about species-­ inclusion. Blumenbach claimed that “animals belong to one and the same species, if they agree so well in form and constitution, that those things in which they do differ may have arisen from degeneration.”94 Blumenbach thought that species-inclusion relied on exactnesses in the essential nature or construction of animals, perhaps with regard to shape and function. 91  Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, 3rd edition, in The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (Boston: Milford House, 1973) 188 92  Justin E.H.  Smith, Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference: Race in Early Modern Philosophy, 253. 93  Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013) 262. 94  Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, 188.

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Blumenbach continues: “We say that those, on the other hand, are of different species, whose essential difference is such as cannot be explained by known sources of degeneration, if I may be allowed to use such a word.”95 Now the aforementioned defense of monogenesis—much like Kant— led Blumenbach to the belief that tracing human history back to the original race was a chief aim of anthropology. For both, an investigation into the physical history of humanity had the aim of matching the original race with some occurrent race, if at all possible. In both Blumenbach’s and Kant’s construction, the superior race was the one that most matched the original. However, in Blumenbach we begin to see a shift in the concept of degeneration from an original race. We see seeds for the view that the superior race is superior because it either was the original race, or most matched it. A race’s location on a rank-ordered scale derives from its positionality in relation to the original race. Thus, degeneration became a value-laden term, where it came to mark a decrease in human value—aesthetically, intellectually, behaviorally, and culturally—by either nature or God. So, degeneration was a value-laden concept for Blumenbach. As it regards degeneration and humankind, Blumenbach listed several traits as those that are altered when degeneration occurs. These are color, hair texture, stature, figure/proportion of parts, and most importantly, skull size.96 And the causes of degeneration set the stage for value-hierarchies as implications of racial superiority. Blumenbach provided a theory of degeneration by first constructing a theory of generation, whereby he proposed that generation is the result of the interplay between physical and immaterially God-infused substances. Of the causes of degeneration, Blumenbach claimed that changes in the animal occur when certain external stimuli have constant effects on the formative force of an animal over several generations.97 Now for Blumenbach, the formative force is that which exists within the sperm cell of a male that has the essential form, force of development, and (teleological) future of the animal therein. Blumenbach argued: “That the genital liquid is only the shapeless material of organic bodies, composed of the innate matter of the inorganic kingdom, but deferring in the force it shows, according to the phenomena; by which its first business is under  Ibid.  Ibid., 191–194. 97  Ibid., 196 95 96

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certain circumstances of maturation, mixture, place, &c. to put on the form destined and determined by them.…”98 Sperm cells are infused by God with a form that develops and performs certain functions. He distinguished this formative force as an invisible and perhaps unintelligible or indescribable force that was “excited by the stimuli which belong to it, that is, by the kindling of heat in the eggs during the process of incubation. But as other vital forces, as contractility, irritability, &c. put themselves out only by the mode of motion, this, on the other hand, of which we are talking, manifests itself by increase, and by giving a determinate form to matter.”99 For Blumenbach, this allowed each animal to replicate itself through propagation. “Now the way in which the formative force may sometimes turn aside from its determined direction and plan is principally in three forms.”100 Blumenbach argued that these forms are either genetic mutations that we might think of as deformations, cross-fertilization/breeding, and degenerations into varieties. As stated, degenerations occur when formative forces begin to alter to accommodate changes in climate or diet, or differences in modes of life (cultivation, education, habit, etc.). Thus, with regard to the varieties of the human race, changes in climate, diet, and/or modes of life have caused the singular human race to degenerate from an original group. Unlike theorists such as Kant, Blumenbach claimed that unnatural sources like education can contribute to degenerations, and denied that degenerations need be permanent.101 Blumenbach claimed that there were five varieties of human beings that were owed to degeneration.102 Like Kant, each variety had its own unique skin-color. There were “white” Europeans, “yellow/olive-tinged” Mongolians, “copper” Americans, “tawny” Malays and those of the Southern Archipelago, and “tawny-black” Ethiopians. These varieties are primarily the results of exposure of the skin to air and sun. Blumenbach wrote that “the approximate cause of the adust or tawny colour of the external integuments of the skin, is to be looked for in the abundance of  Ibid., 194  Ibid., 195. 100  Ibid. 101  Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West, 208. 102  Blumenbach originally provided four varieties of human beings in the earlier 1775 publication of On the Natural Variety of Mankind. However, by the 1795 edition, he claimed that there were five principal varieties of human beings, insofar as he added the American (Natives) to the variety of natural races and reshuffled the configuration of races. 98 99

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the carton in the human body, which, when it is excreted with the hydrogen through the corium, and precipitated by the contact of the atmospheric oxygen, becomes imbedded in the Malpighian mucus.”103 And so, Blumenbach explained skin color in much the same way as did Kant. Blumenbach’s assertion of differences in human skin color that have been caused by exposure to air and sun is innocent enough. However, Blumenbach made assertions about skin-color that clearly contributes to racial superiority. Blumenbach rank-ordered human beings by placing whites at the top of a rank-ordered hierarchy in terms of aesthetic valuation, social values, and intellectual properties. Much in the same way as Bernier, but with supposed scientific backing, Blumenbach appealed to aesthetic racism. He claimed the brilliance of white skin, particularly in comparison to the “jaundiced” skin of every other race.104 For Blumenbach, warmer climates had an effect on non-whites’ skin and liver, causing both the jaundiced skin and sickly white region of the eyes. And this is, in turn, caused by the “abnormal” amounts of carbon buildup in the blood that must be purified.105 As such, for Blumenbach, non-whites’ liver and skin (which are the two principal organs of blood-purification) work too hard. And so non-white skin color was taken to be abnormal in a way that sets whites as both the standard of normality and the most aesthetically pleasing.106 Blumenbach furthered his aesthetic overvaluation of whites with his claim for why he preferred to name whites the “Caucasian” variety: “I have taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because of its neighborhood, and especially its southern slope, produces the most beautiful race of men.”107 On his account, whites have more aesthetic worth than every other race. This claim was supported both by the attribution of perfect symmetry to the white face and the belief that white color is “the primitive colour of mankind, since…it is very easy for that to degenerate into brown, but very much more difficult for dark to become

 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, 211.  Ibid. 105  Ibid. 106  More than this, one can infer that Blumenbach thought that non-white people are abnormal, insofar as the manner in which non-white bodies function is to some extent unnatural and contrary to its proper function. This inference is licensed by Blumenbach’s likening the occurrences of non-white’s skin-behavior with a pathology. 107  Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, 213–214 & 269. 103 104

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white, when the secretion and precipitation of this carbonaceous pigment has once deeply struck root.”108 And finally Blumenbach’s aesthetic racism is clearly displayed in his description of every non-white racial variety.109 Blumenbach was careful in choosing adjectives and adverbs when describing the varieties of humans. Whites’ cheeks are “rosy,” their chins are “full” and “rounded,” their faces are “handsome,” and their skulls are “beautiful.” Non-whites’ hair is “stiff,” their foreheads “knotty” and “uneven,” and their noses are “turned-up” and “apish.” Blumenbach loaded his descriptors of non-­ white races with value-laden aesthetic terms, such that readers will come away with a devalued view of non-whites. Blumenbach furthered his over-valuation of whites with claims about diverging social values, which he took to derive from claims about skin-­ color. Blumenbach praised whites for valuing healthier dietary lifestyles and leisure in comparison to non-whites. For Blumenbach, disvalued social values contributed to the jaundiced skin-color of non-whites.110 In this way whites’ cultural values are more conducive with “the Good,” and thus more respect-worthy than non-whites’ cultural values. This claim became useful for explaining why whites have superior physical traits. Moreover, Blumenbach made statements about the behavioral properties of the races that promoted whites’ superiority. Blumenbach claimed that “the temperament of most inhabitants of tropical countries is choleric and prone to anger.”111 Though not from a tropical climate, Blumenbach equally disparaged Asians, who he described as “depraved” and “perfidious of spirit and manners.”112 He claimed that the effects of climate on non-white people—the same effects that produced skin, eye, and liver deficiencies—produced psychological effects that made certain varieties of humankind more irascible, and thus more unhappy and prone to violence. Blumenbach claimed that the darker the color, the more of an effect that climate had on humans’ skin and liver. From this, one is licensed to infer that whites are least irascible, while blacks are most irascible. In fact, one has a clear hierarchy of temperament—in terms of proclivities toward unhappiness and violent behavior. Like Kant’s thinking, Blumenbach’s  Ibid., 265 & 269.  Ibid., 209–215 & 264–275. 110  Ibid., 214. 111  Ibid. 112  Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West, 207. 108 109

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hierarchy was both grounded in nature/God and able to be captured by science. Now Blumenbach seemed to waver on the permanent inferiority of non-whites’ intellectual capacities. Still, he seems to have maintained a racial hierarchy relating to intelligence. In his later writings, Blumenbach argued that non-white races were capable of cultivating intellectual gifts if they are exposed to white cultures—that is, Blumenbach seemed to accept liberal racism. In Contributions to Natural History, Blumenbach conceded that Blacks have intellectual gifts, and that they possess the ability to rival whites in areas that require advanced levels of abstraction or reasoning skills. He cited Anton Amo and Phillis Wheatley, and claimed to possess works by Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein. He stated clearly that he refuted the idea that “the negroes are specifically different in their bodily structure from other men, and must also be placed considerably in the rear, from the condition of their mental capacities.”113 However, Blumenbach does not seem to have thought that blacks can maximize their intellectual capacities without contact with whites. Consider Blumenbach, who tells us that: I am of opinion that after these numerous instances I have brought together of negroes of capacity, it would not be difficult to mention entire ­well-­known provinces of Europe, from out of which you would not easily expect to obtain off-hand such good authors, poets, philosophers, and correspondents of the Paris Academy; and on the other hand, there is no so-called savage nation known under the sun which has so much distinguished itself by such examples of perfectibility and original capacity for scientific culture, and thereby attached itself so closely to the most civilized nations of the earth, as the Negro.114

Here, while admitting the capacity for intellectual acuity in Blacks, Blumenbach seemed to both suggest that this capacity is more observable in Europe, that Black lands were savage and uncivil, and that Blacks need to come into contact with “civilized” (code for “European”) nations for their intellectual development. Thus, Blumenbach denied the permanency of white intellectual superiority that Kant admitted, while he affirmed the equivalent racial superiority with which Kant ended. Blumenbach provided a non-permanent and malleable, but natural version of racial 113  Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Contributions to Natural History, in The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (Boston: Milford House, 1973) 305. 114  Ibid., 312.

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superiority that was equally problematic for establishing a cosmopolitan community, and was equally harmful to true democracy. In fact, it appears that Blumenbach’s version of racial superiority promoted that blacks must acknowledge the superiority of European values in making strides to develop their intellectual acuity. Thus, even if it could somehow lead to the establishment of a cosmopolitan community, adopting Blumenbach’s beliefs would lead to a uniformitarian method of establishing a cosmopolitan community, one where strict and intolerant adherence to some set of European values is the only basis for a lasting peace. Blumenbach’s white supremacy is best seen in and derives from his description of the degeneration of varieties of humans simpliciter. For Blumenbach, “the Caucasian was the most beautiful and preeminent because of the convergence in shape of skull and beauty toward the mean primeval type.”115 All races degenerated from the Caucasian. One might take this primeval race to relate to Aristotle’s “golden mean.” Caucasians are the mean-state between two extremes—between excess and deficiency. At one extreme was the Ethiopian, and at the other was the Mongolian. Between the Ethiopian and the Caucasian was the Malaysian, and between the Mongolian and the Caucasian was the American. This kind of schema made Blumenbach’s hierarchy a kind of pyramid, and seems to explain why whites were so centered in his thinking. Blumenbach’s “scientific” notion of human degeneration into varieties was backed by the emphasis that he placed on human skulls. It was from skulls that Blumenbach chose five races. And much of his aesthetic, liberal, and scientific racisms were backed by his obsession with skull sizes. For example, he reserved the title of “most handsome and becoming” for Caucasian skulls. For Blumenbach, they possessed a symmetry, the spacing of features, and particular measurements such as the size of these skulls’ eye sockets that justified the title. And so human skulls factor prominently into his claims of white supremacy. “Blumenbach measured skulls in a number of ways, inaugurating a mania for ever more elaborate measurement. Placing scores of human skulls from around the world in a line and measuring the height of the foreheads, the size and angle of the jawbone, the angle of the teeth, the eye sockets, the nasal bones, and also Camper’s facial angle, Blumenbach came up with what he called the norma verticalis.”116  Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West, 208.  Irving Nell Painter, The History of White People, 75.

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His emphasis on human skulls and their use for both racial division and a rank-ordered hierarchy of races provided a basis for the type of racism that Americans would develop. “Lines of research into racial differences that he had opened were pursued here, especially the comparative measurement of skull sizes, facial angles, brain capacity, and the like.”117 In America, Blumenbach’s work assisted a scientific racism that coupled with and reinforced over-loyalty to a white nation and perceived white culture that connected to the rise of Darwinism, and produced social Darwinism. Much of what Blumenbach laid down—particularly as it relates to degeneration—reach the height of its use in white supremacy in the work of Arthur de Gobineau. Gobineau provided a racist theory of nationalism that was grounded in divinity and a fervid denial of democracy and human confraternity. This is the theory to which Locke responded most directly, and of which he was most fearful, particularly given its direct refutation of democratic and cosmopolitan aims.

Arthur de Gobineau, Racial Degeneration, and the Divine Superiority of Whites Arthur de Gobineau’s (1816–1882) theory of race was the theory that Locke responded to more directly than any other author. This is for good reason. Though Gobineau did not argue the inferiority of Jews, his work is acknowledged to have had a momentous effect on Nazism and fascism—two ideologies against which Locke argued vigorously. “Their [Nazis and fascists] debt to Count Arthur de Gobineau was considerable and openly acknowledged.”118 And his racists, nationalists, and xenophobic views were very well received in America. They were praised by Josiah Nott and translated from French to English by Henry Hotze—both fervent defenders of white supremacy. Further, Gobineau’s challenge to both true democracy and the aims and values of cosmopolitanism are arguably unparalleled. Gobineau’s view took the concept of racial degeneration and placed it into an argument for nationalism, and against equal rights, democratic decision-making, and the promotion of pluralistic peace among humanity.  Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development, 70.  Michael D. Biddiss, “Gobineau and the Origins of European Racism,” in Race, Vol. 7, No 3, (1966) 255 & Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century 280. 117 118

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Unlike Kant’s and Blumenbach’s thought, Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology did not emerge out of an attempt to defend monogenesis. In fact: “He decided not to take a position between monogenesists and polygenesists, pointing out the flaws in both assertions.”119 A further, but related, difference is that Gobineau seemed to assert that there were only three primary races—namely, “Blacks,” “Yellows,” and “Whites.”120 He seemed to argue that there were different sub-races within each. From this assertion, and when coupled with his belief that “white peoples had experienced an isolated development,” one might infer that he endorsed polygenesis.121 Rather than a discussion of monogenesis, and subsequently an original race that may have or most matched some occurrent one, Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology emerged out of his attempt to satisfy two overarching inquiries. First, Gobineau inquired into the nature of a society’s failure. He wanted to “know not merely the immediate causes of the plagues that are supposed to chasten us, but also to trace the more remote reasons for those social evils which the most meagre knowledge of history will show to have prevailed, in exactly the same form, among all nations that ever lived, as well as those which survive to-day, evils that in all likelihood will exist among nations yet unborn.”122 In short, his first inquiry was: “Why do societies decline and fail?” Relatedly (though of less importance) he wanted to know: “What underlying reasons can be provided for social ills throughout the history of peoples’ contact with each other?” Now Gobineau’s view of “society” was somewhat common for his day, but is far less common in our world. Gobineau understood a society as “an assemblage of men moved by similar ideas and the same instincts; their political unity may be more or less imperfect, but their social unity must be complete.”123 A society is not a polity, and does not depend on a shared political vision. A society is a group unified, not so much by political ideals, ideologies, or aims, but rather an inner drive or psychological disposition that produced a worldview. A society for Gobineau was either a race in a rather thick sense (where biobehavioral essences distinguish the groups) or a derivation from or completion of a race thus construed.  Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms: From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century 281.  Ibid. 121  Ibid. 122  Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Howard Fertig, 1999) ix–x. 123  Ibid., 7. 119 120

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Gobineau’s answer to how societies fail was grounded in the blending of unequal races.124 In this way, Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology was an attempt to satisfy a second overarching inquiry—namely: “Are there serious and ultimate differences of value between the human races; and can these differences be estimated?”125 Gobineau thought that races were unequal by God. Unequal races, living together in such a way that equality is conferred to unequals, was a plague that caused societies to decline and ultimately fail. And so contrary to authors like Kant who argued that racial differences, though permanent, are owed to environments, and authors such as Blumenbach and Bernier who argued that races can improve, Gobineau sought to show that: (1) there were value-­ differences separating the races; (2) these were not owed to environments, either natural or artificial (social); and (3) biobehavioral racial properties were permanent such that no improvement is possible for inferior races. Doing so would allow him to assert that inequality was the cause of societies’ decline and ultimate decay. Gobineau’s thinking on the decline and failure of societies had serious implications for true democracy and for establishing a cosmopolitan community. What this explanation for the failure of states amounts to is that cosmopolitan aims and values are irrevocably harmful to the world. Cosmopolitans value people being brought together in a way that naturally leads to valuing diverse cultures. Valuing diverse cultures—on a Lockean account—necessitates greater inter-cultural participation, particularly since one has a duty to be cultured. Such a practice requires conferring equal rights, and therefore equal respect, to all persons. And conferring equality to all humans would almost assuredly lead to an increase in interracial unions. While Gobineau conceded that principles of cosmopolitanism are noble, he took them to be both unnatural, destructive, and regressive in terms of human progress. And so Gobineau endorsed, and in fact aimed to justify, whites’ over-loyalty to nation, race, culture. Gobineau used God to justify whites’ over-loyalty to nation, race, and culture, against true democracy and cosmopolitanism. For Gobineau, God’s hand guides history. Gobineau wrote that: “The wisdom of the ancients yields little that throws light on the subject [of why society decline], except one fundamental axiom, the recognition of the finger of God in the conduct of this world; to this firm and ultimate principal we  Ibid., xii.  Ibid., 26.

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must adhere.”126 For Gobineau, the law by which societies fail is divinely inspired such that “all societies perish because they are sinful.”127 This is important because it shows that any aims, values, or principals causing states to fail are sinful, and therefore contrary to God’s commands. Thus, human aims toward values or principals of true democracy and cosmopolitanism are sinful and are contrary to the command of God. Further, if God’s hand guides  the conduct of this world, then God is behind the failure of societies that embrace true democracy and cosmopolitanism. And so for Gobineau, true democracy and cosmopolitanism—because they are sinful—are divinely unjust. Thus, if America had the aim of midwifing a democratic world, then America is sinful and behaving contrary to the command of God because of this aim. Moreover, if white supremacy progressed culture or civilization, and God desires the progression of culture and civilization, then white supremacy was more than permissible or justified. White supremacy was both righteous and commanded by God. And if so, then God truly is a white racist. In arguing that mixing blood leads to the decline and decay of societies, and that principals that promote it are sinful, Gobineau listed conditions that are neither necessary nor sufficient causes of societies’ failure. These conditions were fanaticism, luxury, moral corruption, and irreligion. For Gobineau, fanaticism cannot be the cause of decline and decay in societies because there have been European nations that have decayed without practicing fanaticism. Additionally, there have also been New World societies that have possessed power and wealth at the height of embracing fanatic views or practices. “Thus fanaticism does not cause the fall of States.”128 Still further for Gobineau, luxury is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the decay of a state because he claimed to observe such in England and Russia, two states that he claimed were at the height of their vitality. Very interestingly, Gobineau claimed that moral corruption is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the decline and decay of a society. Gobineau’s reasoning was that: “From the beginning of history, there has been no human society, however small, that has not contained the germ of every vice.”129 While not claiming that moral corruption goes  Ibid., 3.  Ibid. 128  Ibid., 8. 129  Ibid., 9. 126 127

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hand-in-­hand with the formation of societies, Gobineau seems to have thought that societies have not functioned without every imaginable vice. Moreover, Gobineau claimed that there need not be an imbalance between moral and immoral agents in any society for it to decline and decay, where moral agents are outnumbered by immoral agents. To the contrary, Gobineau claimed that “men of strong character, men of talent and energy, so far from being unknown to human societies in the time of their decadence and old age, are actually found in greater abundance than in the days when an empire is young.”130 The societal temperament was more moral in periods of societal decline. Gobineau wrote that “the ordinary level of morality is higher in the later period than in the earlier.” Gobineau’s claim was that in decline, societies becomes more moral, both as an entity possessing a greater quantity of moral agents and as an entity possessing more moral laws and values. “Far from admitting the superior moral character of early societies, I have no doubt that nations, as they grow older and draw nearer their fall, present a far more satisfactory appearance from the censor’s point of view.”131 For Gobineau, “the real vitality of a nation has little to do with its moral condition.”132 Gobineau’s belief that moral corruption is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of societies’ decline and decay is interesting because of the seeming distinction drawn between morality/moral corruption and righteousness/sin. Both moral laws/values and an increase in moral men seem to be operating contrary to God’s commands in a declining society; societies’ increasing moral commitments lead it to sin because their laws/values confer equality to natural unequals—that is, because of their moral commitments. This is interesting because one might think that either a moral agent or moral laws cannot be sinful. However, what we see here is the strength of the idea of a hierarchy in nature whose respect is mandated by God. One can think of this by appeal to the idea of a Great Chain of Being.133 From it, one can infer the power of the belief in and  Ibid., 11.  Ibid., 10. 132  Ibid., 12. 133  See Arthur O. Lovejoy’s The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea. In this text, Lovejoy tells us that: “No history of the biological sciences in the eighteenth century can be adequate which fails to keep in view the fact that, for most men of science throughout that period, the theorems simplicity in the conception of the Chain of Being continued to constitute essential presuppositions in the framing of scientific hypotheses.” Though Lovejoy is speaking primarily about biology, I would argue that anthropology appeals to the same idea. 130 131

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commitment to non-white inferiority. Treating non-white (lesser) beings equally will be sinful, and will be sinful even if we assume the morality of the principals aiming at conferring equality to non-white beings. It is equally interesting that Gobineau argued that irreligion, which he describes as merely the loss of the faith of the “fathers” of the society, is neither a necessary nor sufficient factor that causes decline and decay. Gobineau’s reasoning was that he saw no discontinuity in the religious views of (European) nations, particularly before Christianity.134 This is interesting because one would expect Gobineau to have argued that societies have failed insofar as they were not Christian, and that any Christian society that loses its commitment to Christianity would decline and decay. However, Gobineau seems to have thought that even Christian states decline and decay, and their failure has nothing to do with a loss of faith in the fathers of Christianity. And so Gobineau thought that he has “shown that fanaticism, luxury, and the corruption of morals have not necessarily any power of destruction, and that irreligion has no political reality at all….”135 Rather than fanaticism, luxury, the corruption of morals, and irreligion, societies decline and decay because they degenerate. When a society degenerates, it “has no longer the same vigor as it had of old in battling with the dangers of life.…”136 A society begins to decline and ultimately decays because it loses the vigor and vitality that brought it together and made it what it is. Now recall that in Blumenbach we saw the seeds of “degeneration” becoming a value-laden term. The concept “degeneration” was perhaps at its height as a value-laden term in Gobineau’s thought. Consider Gobineau’s description of degeneration: The word degenerate, when applied to a people, means (as it ought to mean) that the people has no longer the same intrinsic value as it had before, because it has no longer the same blood in its veins, continual adulterations having gradually affected the quality of that blood. In other words, though the nation bears the name given by its founders, the name no longer connotes the same race; in fact, the man of a decadent time, the degenerate man

 Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, 13.  Ibid., 18. 136  Ibid., 25. 134 135

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properly so called, is a different being, from the racial point of view, from the heroes of the great ages.137

God infused a degree of vigor and vitality into the blood of each race. And so each race’s blood has a particular value. The degree of vigor and vitality that characterizes the blood of different races is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively equal. As such, races have not been created equally. Some races are more valuable than others; there are superior and inferior races that were created to be such by God. This God-given vigor and vitality within the blood of races accounts for certain race’s ability and inability to produce cultural gifts and civilizations. Gobineau thought that when blood mixture occurs between superior and inferior groups, the vigor and vitality of the superior blood diminishes. Thus, the cultural gifts and civilizations of superior races decline and decay. Now, if the blood of particular races is divinely infused with certain talents for greatness, then these groups must have some kind of teleological end for which the blood was given.138 Given this idea, Gobineau must have thought that blood admixture with inferior groups would be sinful, insofar as diminishing the God-given vigor in the blood of the superior race may cause it to fail to produce the end for which its blood was given. Now in proving that the decline and decay of societies are caused by degeneration, Gobineau provided a way to conceptualize a people’s formation into a society that leads up to civilization. A people’s formation occurs with the cultivation of laws and customs, and thus the crafting of ways of living according to its God-given shared ideas and instincts. Gobineau wrote that: “I take a people, or better, a tribe, at the moment when, yielding to a definite vital instinct, it provides itself with laws and begins to play a part in the world. By the mere fact of its wants and powers increasing, it inevitably finds itself in contact with other similar  Ibid.  This idea of a teleological end for which the blood of a race was given is also inferable from p. 39 of The Inequality of Human Races, where Gobineau tells us that “if on the one hand human societies are called equal, and on the other we find some of them frivolous, others serious…it stands to reason that these differing nations must have destinies which are also absolutely different, and, in a word, unequal.” Further, when speaking of laws deriving from a people, Gobineau wrote that: “We cannot admit that the institutions thus invented and moulded by a race of men make the race what it is. They are effects, not causes. Their influence is, of course, very great; they preserve the special genius of the nation, they mark out the road on which it is to travel, the end at which it must aim.” 137 138

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associations, and by war and peaceful measures succeeds in incorporating them with itself.”139 Peoples form into a society or race, and as such aim to make the world or some part of it in its image. Gobineau posited the formation of races to accord to two laws—one of repulsion and the other of attraction. The two laws “act with different force on different peoples. The first is fully respected only by those races which can never raise themselves above the elementary completeness of the tribal life, while the power of the second, on the contrary, is the more absolute, as the racial units on which it is exercised are more capable of development.”140 Repulsion is necessary to possess and exercise the will to make the world or some part of it in its image. More than merely being a part of the world, races want the world to become like them—to take on their character. And so, races must be repulsed by what is “other than” them. The formation of a society also required attraction. Attraction is necessary for the same end, but for a different reason. Races want the world to be made in their image, and realize that others must be brought into their world. And so races are attracted to others, but on their terms. Here we can see Gobineau’s naturalistic denial of pluralism. Races desire a world only in their image—one that accords to their ideas and instincts. Gobineau posited two stages of civilization at which races can be observed, with an additional mode of living that is below the first stage. Gobineau thought that not all humans could achieve civilization. The Polynesian negroes, Samoyedes, and the majority of African races were backward and incapable of it.141 In fact, Gobineau thought this to be true of “the vast majority of the pure-blooded yellow and black races.”142 Undoubtedly, Gobineau thought that one explanation was that each of these groups possessed weak vigor and vitality. Another reason was that they were too repulsed by the second law of civilization—namely, the law of attraction. Races that are incapable of civilization do not attempt to attract others into their group. As a result, they do not cultivate laws and customs. Contrary to pure-blooded Yellow and Black races, those who have reached the first stage of civilization “understand that if they wish to  Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, 26.  Ibid., 30. 141  Ibid., 27. 142  Ibid. 139 140

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increase their power and prosperity, they are absolutely compelled, either by war or peaceful measures, to draw their neighbors within their sphere of influence.”143 For Gobineau, races at this stage have some of the characteristics of a highly developed civilization such as class distinctions and an industrial system. Still, Gobineau thought that those at this stage are stagnant. And so, races at this stage have a will to see laws and ways of living crafted in accordance with their vigorous blood. They understand their place in a world of competition with other races who want the same, and they understand that incorporating other races is necessary for their end. However, for whatever reason—Gobineau listed a failure to fully assimilate slaves—these races’ civilizations stagnated. Finally, “there are others, more imaginative and energetic, whose ideas soar beyond mere brigandage. They manage to conquer great territory, and assume rights of ownership not only over the inhabitants, but also over their land.”144 This is the highest stage of civilization, and races who accomplish this are the highest or qualitatively better races. He preserved this stage for whites. In fact, whites—particularly Aryans within the white race—are responsible for every civilization. Gobineau, in attempting to craft a history to fit his theory (or rather his desires), argued that Yellow races (Asians) moved from America to Asia after ancient “Asian” civilizations were established in order to explain ancient Asian civilizations as white. These civilizations were, for Gobineau, actually Aryan civilizations. And so if the Great Chain of Being organizes beings in distinct ways and tells us how to relate to each type on the chain, then within the chain there is a chain of human races that tells us how much respect we must accord to humans that regards the stage of each race’s civilization. Ultimately races’ ability to achieve civilization, and thus their place on the chain, derives from the vigor in the blood with which God has infused the different races. So different stages of civilization accord to different races. Certain races are qualitatively better than others because of the vigor or vitality given to them by God. However, one might question what this has to do with true democracy and cosmopolitanism. While Gobineau did not use the word “cosmopolitanism,” he clearly had it in mind when considering the decline and decay of societies. Gobineau thought that every state, at its beginning, both recognizes and respects a fundamental principal that it loses sight of as it matures—namely, that human races are unequal. “Every people, great  Ibid., 28.  Ibid.

143 144

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or small, has begun by making inequality its chief political motto. This is the origin of all systems of caste, of nobility, and of aristocracy, in so far as the last is founded on the right of birth.”145 Gobineau thought that respect for this divinely mandated and therefore natural principle was necessary for civilization. And Gobineau reasoned that “[t]he stronger will play the parts of kings and rulers in the tragedy of the world. The weaker will be content with a more humble position.”146 Natural inequality ought to inform how agents relate to each other, and ought to inform the ways in which goods and right are distributed. Natural inequality in the races’ blood justifies unequal distribution, and the fairness of unequal distribution justifies permanent castes and classes. And so permanent castes and classes are required for civilization. Civilization presupposes inequality and a strict regard for the principal of inequality. Problems arise when, as societies mature, the stronger and lesser races begin to behave more favorably toward each other, and in part because of interracial unions, reject the principle of natural inequality in favor of the idea of human equality. “I have already mentioned that as nations become greater, more powerful, and more civilized, their blood loses its purity and their instincts are gradually altered. As a result, it becomes impossible for them to live happily under the laws that suited their ancestors.”147 Gobineau seems to have thought that blood-mixing is both a cause of ideas of human equality and derive from it. It is probable that he thought that initial blood-mixing causes an evolved moral sense, which causes ideas of human equality, which in turn leads to greater blood-mixing. Races’ blood-mixture lessens the purity of superior races’ blood while granting equality in the distribution of goods and rights. This affects posterity. “New generations have new customs and tendencies, and profound changes in the institutions are not slow to follow.” And so blood mixing and an adoption of the idea of human equality lead to radical changes to laws and customs, and thereby to institutions deriving from the vigor and vitality of the race’s blood. The result is the decline and decay of the society. Therein, unequals become equals, and the institutions that produced civilization are no longer able to be preserved. Gobineau wrote that “when the majority of citizens have mixed blood flowing in their veins, they erect into a universal and absolute truth what  Ibid., 36.  Ibid., 39. 147  Ibid., 42. 145 146

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is only true of themselves, and feel it their duty to assert that all men are equal.”148 Gobineau continued: “They are also moved by praiseworthy dislike of oppression, a legitimate hatred towards the abuse of power; to all thinking men these cast an ugly shadow on the memory of races which have once been dominant, and which have never failed…to justify to some extent many of the charges that have been brought against them.”149 (Note that these groups become more democratic and contrary to what tyranny demands). Thinking in this way causes citizens (both the greater and weaker race-members who compose a society) to reject the laws of the ancestors that observed the natural and divinely mandated principal of inequality, upon which high civilization was built. As a result, laws and customs change.150 And this movement away from the laws and customs of the ancestors causes decline and decay. It is clear that Gobineau did not think that this movement toward human equality is immoral. Gobineau took the “dislike of oppression” to be praiseworthy. He referred to the morality of humans in the late stages of a state’s life as noble, and applauded members of societies for their devotion to cosmopolitan ideas of human brotherhood. Still, Gobineau thought that this idea of human brotherhood is both contrary to fact and nature: “The curious point is that the theory of equality, which is held by the majority of men and so has permeated our customs and institutions, has not been powerful enough to overthrow the evidence against it; and those who are most convinced of its truth pay homage every day to its opposite.”151 If human brotherhood is contrary to both fact and nature, then true democracy and cosmopolitanism (which rely on the idea of human brotherhood in claiming that all humans are citizens of the world) are both contrary to fact and nature. Now recall Locke’s conceptions of democracy—most notably, his notions of both moral and political democracy. These require acknowledgement of human equality, which is a staple of Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism. Recall that Locke’s moral cosmopolitanism relies on respect for all humans. Gobineau viewed this thinking as inconsistent with the factual, natural, and divinely mandated principal of racial superiority (as an inequality of gifts distributed to human races, where white Europeans  Ibid., 36.  Ibid., 36–37. 150  Ibid., 42. 151  Ibid., 38. 148 149

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possess greater intellectual, aesthetic, and bodily gifts), which implies value-­hierarchies. However laudable, conferring equality of rights, goods, and offices are sinful. For Gobineau, there was a natural order to the universe that ought to be regarded. Regard for this natural order requires inferior races understanding their inferiority, and thus accepting the humble positions in a state that are proper to them. Superior races must understand their superiority and rule over inferior races. Likewise, Gobineau seems to have thought that a good state can be oppressive—even tyrannical, so long as those who are oppressive are those who ought to rule, and so long as they rule in a manner that is consistent with their ancestors. Gobineau wrote that: “From mere declamation against tyranny, men go on to deny the natural causes of the superiority against which they are declaiming. The tyrant’s power is, to them, not only misused, but usurped. They refuse, quite wrongly, to admit that certain qualities are by a fatal necessity the exclusive inheritance of such and such a stock.”152 For Gobineau, tyrannical qualities, power, and actions are the right of the superior race. Unlike Locke and others committed to true democracy and cosmopolitanism, Gobineau did not think that healthy social and political relations imply respect. Inequality in rights, and therefore inequality in respect, is the basis of healthy social and political relations. Cosmopolitanism and the equality in respect that it requires destabilizes societies and civilizations. And so Gobineau provided a rank-ordered racial hierarchy that likens Bernier’s, Kant’s, and Blumenbach’s. Like each author, Gobineau’s racial hierarchy was rooted in a cultural hierarchy that implies a value-hierarchy. The cultural hierarchy was cashed out in terms of whites’ intellectual, aesthetic, and bodily superiority. In giving us his racial hierarchy, Gobineau took there to be three human types: Black; Yellow; and white. Now for Gobineau: “The negroid (black) is the lowest, and stands at the foot of the latter, the animal character, that appears in the shape of the pelvis, is stamped on the negro from birth, and foreshadows his destiny. His intellect will always move within a very narrow circle.”153 And though Gobineau argued that the intensities of Black people’s desires, passions, and will—in a word, sensations—are strong, he thought that: “The very strength of his sensations is the most striking proof of his inferiority.”154  Ibid.  Ibid., 205. 154  Ibid. 152 153

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Blacks’ sensations lead them to violently pursue objects of desire. Thus blacks are irrevocably immoral.155 Further, Blacks’ overemphasis on sensations illustrates a deficiency in and inability to operate from reason. The Yellow type is the exact opposite. Asians lack ambition and physical energy, are apathetic, and have feeble desires.156 This lack of ambition causes mediocrity, and feeble desires cause comfort with life that could never create beauty or technology. Like Kant, Gobineau argued that Asians are superior to Blacks, insofar as they are neither violent nor antisocial. Asians can at least temper their wills in such a way that allows them to create and live within society. Thus, civilization is at least possible for Asians. However, much like Kant, Gobineau seems to have thought that Asians have reached the pinnacle of their potential, and will be a stagnant race as history proceeds. Whites have a higher intellectual capacity than both Asians and Blacks. Whites possess but can temper their passions and appetites. They are ambitious—setting them above Asians in their capacity for innovations, and yet not too ambitious—setting them above blacks in their ability to temper their wills.157 In terms of morality, Gobineau wrote: “When they are cruel, they are conscious of their cruelty…”,158 which seems to suggest that whites are at least conscious of moral obligations, and therefore have the capacity for moral principles. Further, being conscious of cruelty seems to imply a greater capacity for empathy, as it seems to be the case that one who lacks consciousness that one is being cruel will not empathize with others. Unlike both the “Yellow” and “Black” races, whites have honor, which gives them “reasons why they should surrender this busy life of theirs, that is so precious to them.”159 It would appear that for Gobineau, whites are able to appreciate altruistic behavior in a way that neither Blacks nor Asians can. And so for Gobineau, there exists a racialized value-hierarchy undergirding races’ cultures. These hierarchies, particularly as relating to Blacks, are immune to influences such as Christianity and European education.160 Christianity and white education can only affect those who have the  Ibid., 206.  Ibid. 157  Ibid., 207. 158  Ibid. 159  Ibid. 160  Ibid., 69. 155 156

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capacity to be civilized. As such, the hierarchies are permanent and unchangeable.161

Conclusion Each of the above authors represents a prevalent mode of thinking in America and throughout the world during the time in which Locke lived and wrote. And each mode of thinking works against the practice and spread of a democratic mindset or attitude. Each author was committed to the idea that white people(s) (no matter how “white people” was understood) are superior to non-white peoples. Each appealed to white supremacy. They subscribed to the belief that there are races, where races are understood on the basis of biological differences separating species or subspecies of humans. They endorsed the belief that differences separating the human races necessarily produce particular cultures with different values. They subscribed to the belief in a hierarchy of human values that allows racial groups to be rank-ordered. And they promoted the belief that white people(s) occupy a position at the top of the hierarchy of races. Each author’s appeal to white supremacy was grounded in differences in aesthetic, physical, and psychical properties that have an effect on races’ cultures. Each took racial properties to produce culture-differences, which implicate value-differences. Given these differences, each thought that races’ values can be rank-ordered. Insofar as European culture was normalized and privileged, white people had greatest value in the rank-order. On this point, Locke tells us that “the denial of [cultural] equality, through the hard discipline it inflicts, has just this tendency to spur on and build up a moral and spiritual superiority.”162 Bound up with the commitment to the idea that whites are culturally superior to non-whites is the idea that non-whites are less worthy of respect and rights, and perhaps even less human. Inequalities in the capacity for culture lead to beliefs about a group’s worthiness to be full and equal rights-bearers. These beliefs result in and justify unequal treatment.

 Ibid., 117–140.  Alain Locke, “Should the Negro be Encouraged to Cultural Equality?” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 105 & Alain Locke, “The Poetry of Negro Life,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 286. 161 162

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All four authors were committed to this line of thinking, which was quite pervasive in the world wherein Locke wrote. The pervasiveness of beliefs in white superiority and non-white inferiority seemed to license a higher-order belief—a kind of expectation—that peoples of the world accept and organize their lives in accordance with these beliefs. Locke took the pervasiveness of belief in white superiority and non-white inferiority to be the most serious challenge to democracy and cosmopolitanism. Locke wrote that: “Even in circles that are so representative and stable that they should have no hysteria on the subject of race amalgamation, ‘no social equality,’—in short, ‘White Supremacy,’—is held to be the one reservation every typical White man is supposed to make and every typical Negro is expected to concede.”163 White supremacy was an ideology that whites expected other whites to embrace. It formed the basis of a sort of contract that structured how whites were expected to relate to themselves and (or over) others. Worse, every non-white person was expected to concede it. Whites expected to govern the world, placing other whites over non-whites in business, law, education, and so on. And non-whites were expected to acknowledge whites’ legitimate right to do so.164 Locke argued that white supremacy needed to be combatted with cultural recognition. “Cultural recognition, on the other hand, means the removal of wholesale social proscription and, therefore, the conscious scrapping of the mood and creed of ‘White Supremacy.’ It means an open society instead of a closed ethnic shop. For what? For making possible free and unbiased contacts between the races on the selective basis of common interests and mutual consent, in contrast with what prevails at present,— dictated relations of inequality based on caste psychology and class exploitation.”165 Locke recognized that the removal of white supremacy is a movement toward cosmopolitanism—namely, the opening up of society in a way that promotes the free and unbiased contacts in a way that serves common interests from mutual consent. What is required if we are to move toward cosmopolitanism is a displacement of white supremacy, which relies on differences in the worth of races that is grounded in differences in cultures with value-systems that can be rank-ordered.

 Alain Locke, “Should the Negro be Encouraged to Cultural Equality?” 288.  Locke makes a similar argument relating to white superiority and its function in the world in Race Contacts, p. 29. 165  Alain Locke, “Should the Negro be Encouraged to Cultural Equality?” 288. 163 164

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Locke sought to displace white supremacy in two ways. First, Locke attempted to rethink the concept of race. He argued that racial differences are neither products of nature nor God, but are socio-historical products. Cultures, though connected to races, do not derive necessarily from them. Second, Locke produced a value theory that sought to displace the value-­ hierarchy that undergirds white supremacy. He sought a value-theory that supports the democratic and cosmopolitan requirement of pluralism. He argued against the view that certain values are “better” than others in a way that would elevate any race over another. I now turn to Locke’s philosophy of race, saving Locke’s value theory for the final chapter.

CHAPTER 5

A Theory of Race for Democracy and Cosmopolitanism

Reason, feeling, and imagination, united in the most beautiful dance, are the Graces of life…. Oh, how has anybody dared to accuse nature of denying this beautiful harmony of predispositions to nine-tenths of our brothers! For the point of unification of all nations lies in the core of their essence…. —Georg Forster, “On Local and General Bildung” “By ‘world civilization’ we do not necessarily mean an approximation to a single type of social culture, but we do mean that no social culture in the present day world will be ignorant of other types or object to [some kind of] contact with other types, which certainly means that no matter how much a line is drawn theoretically between races, the practical demands of present day life necessitate the contact of races, and an increasing contact of races[.] And if so, it would seem that the very nature of modern civilization itself [demands] a regeneration of the false conceptions of race which have aimed at least to thwart [racial progress] or to turn to unfavorable tendencies the contacts between races of divergent [social culture] and divergent heredity. False conceptions of race[,] therefore[,] are an obstacle to modern progress and a menace to modern civilization[, and they] need to be exterminated if possible by the cooperation of as many scientific [investigations] as is possible.” —Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. L. Barnes, Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3_5

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Introduction The kind of thinking promoted about racial difference by François Bernier, Immanuel Kant, Johann Blumenbach, and Arthur de Gobineau impedes true democracy and the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. All of these authors represent moments in the evolution of white supremacy, which Locke took to be a pervasive threat to a just and successful peace. They all drew a necessary link between race and culture such that whites were rank-ordered above all other races in a way that either limited racial contact or dictated it in a pernicious way. Whoever was considered white, along with whatever was considered (white) European culture and values, were taken to be inherently and unalterably better than all other races and their cultures and values. The kinds of liberal, aesthetic, scientific, and divinely legislated totalitarian racisms promoted by these thinkers and endorsed by millions in America and throughout the world resulted in over-loyalties to a white nation, race, and culture with religion. And ultimately these racisms imply that whites are more respect-worthy than non-­ whites. Locke developed his theory of race to combat these racisms that support white supremacy, and in service to democracy and cosmopolitanism. In this chapter, I elucidate the first of Locke’s two-part response to white supremacy—namely, his philosophy of race. Locke had a rather peculiar view of race both for his time and among Black intellectuals. His socio-cultural view of race that denied any biological content is valuable in its own right, particularly when weighed against competing views. Additionally, Locke’s view is important because it serves as a foundation for his axiology. “Locke’s interest in the idea of race stems primarily from his attempt to combat notions of national, racial, and cultural superiority.”1 And combating these—when supported with a value theory having the same end—is necessary for the practice of true democracy and for cultivating a cosmopolitan community. In fact, one might say that there is an ontology of race that motivated his axiology. If we are to understand his axiology, then we must begin by understanding the theory of race motivating it. In elucidating Locke’s philosophy of race, I begin by looking at what Locke took to be the significance of and appropriate starting-points for 1  Ernest D. Mason, “Alain Locke on Race and Race Relations,” in Phylon, Vol. 40, No. 3 (4th Qtr., 1979) 342.

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inquiry into race. After showing why studying race is important, and how one should begin the investigation, I illustrate Locke’s refutation of anthropological theories of race. For Locke, anthropological theories of race failed both because of their failure to observe the adequate starting-­ points for inquiry into race and because of their reliance on biology to account for racial differences. For Locke, while race was in fact many things, it was not biological. Observing particular starting-points and critiquing anthropological theories of race provided Locke the intellectual space to craft his unique socio-cultural theory of race. And so after discussing Locke’s critique of anthological theories, I discuss Locke’s positive racial view. Locke argued that race is a product of history. In fact, race is itself a culture-product—a sort of value that better unifies members of a group around a shared culture-type.2 After discussing Locke’s ontology of race, I discuss Locke’s answer to the normative question of race—namely, what we ought to do with race. Locke seems to have thought that race is of value beyond pragmatic reasons that would license conserving it. Race had value because of its necessity for culture. I end with a discussion of Locke’s views of racism, along with his statements on so many “fallacies of race.”

On the Significance of and Appropriate Starting Point for Understanding Race Locke wrote about and lectured on race for most of his mature life. Further, he produced a rather novel ontology of race. His account of what race is pervaded his evaluations of drama, literature, poetry, and music. And he took race to have pervaded all of American life. As such, understanding race was extraordinarily important to him. He took race prejudice (racism) to be America’s deepest and most fundamental problem because it perpetuated the psychology and the social habit of discrimination that affected so many groups. Thus he thought it possible to engage 2  I take Locke’s socio-cultural conception of race to be consistent with both his cultural pluralism (on the one hand) and cultural nationalism (on the other) as they applied to art, along with his social philosophy more broadly. Locke’s cultural nationalism will be discussed in the forthcoming book on Locke’s philosophies of religion, art, and education. For a discussion of Locke’s cultural nationalism, see: Tommy Lee Lott, “Nationalism and Pluralism in Alain Locke’s Social Philosophy,” in Defending Diversity: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives on Pluralism and Multiculturalism, ed. Lawrence Foster and Patricia Herzog (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994).

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and move toward solving a host of social problems by attending to race. Perhaps surprisingly, Locke took race to explain something more fundamental about humanity and human contacts. And so, even abstracting from “racial” to “human,” studying race could be immensely valuable. Moreover, he consistently thought that engaging race required a particular starting-point if theories about it are to be of value. Solving deeply rooted American problems involved engaging race, and engaging race required meticulous clarification and a careful approach. His important early lectures on race, collected and entitled: Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, presents a sustained treatment of race, and began with both the importance of and appropriate starting-point for understanding it. Locke took race to be important not merely because of its role in understanding occurrent social problems. Additionally, he took race to play a role in explaining human nature. Now the importance of race, race-­ talk, and racial categorization led Locke to refute racial eliminativism, which is the normative view that recommends the elimination of appeals to racial categorization, if not race-talk altogether. Locke engaged eliminativist arguments that were motivated by two commitments. First is the view that recommends elimination on epistemological grounds. On this view, we cannot make sense of the term “race,” and by implication racial categorizing. Eliminativism for epistemic reasons claims that a minimum requirement for belief is that we have clear ideas about the content of our beliefs—that is, at a minimum, we ought to believe that about which we can have clear ideas. If we cannot have clear ideas about some X, then we ought not believe X. The eliminativist then provides reasons for why we cannot have clear ideas about “race” or race-terms such as “Black.” Thus, we ought to eliminate racial categorization and perhaps even discourse about it. In acknowledging the view, Locke wrote that “so complicated the idea and conception of race that there are a great many people who fancy that the best thing that can be done, if possible at all, is to throw race out of the categories of human thinking.”3 Additionally, Locke engaged the view that recommends elimination on moral grounds, which was apparently a popular view during the time in which Locke wrote his lectures.4 Eliminativism for moral reasons claims 3  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992) 1. 4  This is a view to which a number of African American intellectuals—Martin Delany, W.E.B. Du Bois, Edward Blyden, and so on—responded.

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that it is permissible to commit to racial categorizations only if racial categorization does not lead to harm. However, racial categorization leads to harm. Therefore, it is impermissible to commit to racial categorization.5 Locke tells us that: “I will grant you that the social thinking that has clustered about the concept of race has been in most instances very paradoxical and in other instances pernicious[.]”6 With these words, Locke conceded the point that race had been harmful. Despite epistemic and moral eliminativist claims, “even if it were possible to eliminate the concept that has been the center of so much social thinking, let us not presume, at least at the outset of a study professing a critical basis, that it would be desirable.”7 In fact, Locke was “fundamentally convinced that the term ‘race,’ the thought of race, represents a rather fundamental category in social thinking and that it is an idea that we can ill dispense with.”8 Instead of motivating eliminativism, “the more thought of the right kind [that] can be centered in it, the more will the term [race] itself be redeemed, in the light of its rather unfortunate history.”9 Locke took racial eliminativism to fail for a number of reasons. First, by use of “even if it were possible,” Locke seems to have doubted that the concept of race was eliminable. And so for Locke, attempts to eliminate race-talk and racial thinking are rather useless. Our best bet is to understand how it is used, from where its use derived, what our use implies, to what it tends to lead, and what we are able to do with it given all of these. Locke’s doubt about the ability to eliminate racial categorization stemmed from his belief about the naturalness of categorization, one that serves a deep psychological interest, and (perhaps surprisingly) its service to cultural progress. Locke thought that categorization is a natural human phenomenon, and that race has come to serve as a way of categorizing humans rather easily. Its ease and usefulness to humans makes it the kind of thing that,  One might argue in favor of racial eliminativism irrespective of their stance on the ontology of race. See: Bernard Boxill, “Why We Should Not Think Ourselves as Divided by Race,” in Racism in Mind, ed. Michael P. Levine and Thomas Pataki (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) for an argument that eschews discussions of the ontology of race in arguing for racial eliminativism. 6  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 1. 7  Ibid. 8  Ibid. 9  Ibid. 5

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once introduced, will not be completely eliminated. For Locke: “The sense of race really almost antedates anything in its name, in the etymology of it, because just as you have groups of people knit together by a kinship feeling and [who] reali[z]e that different practices [operate in] their society from those which [operate in other societies and therefore] determine their treatment of other groups, [then] you really have what is the germ [of] the race sense.”10 Locke traced this practice back to the formation of the earliest attempts to establish empires, and seems to have thought that it is inseparable from group-formation at any social level. Racial distinctions are grounded in the age-old way of recognizing that there are other human groups in the world who do not perceive and act in the world in the same ways as one’s own group. This recognition leads to a “kinship feeling” with other in-group members, and an understanding of how others are to be treated. In other words, one recognizes that others navigate the world differently from them, and this recognition creates in them a greater appreciation for the manner in which the one navigates the world. Consequently, a bond with those who share ways of navigating the world is more strongly formed. And so race is grounded in the basic recognition of difference, confraternity with those who are considered in-­ group members, and considerations of how to treat others from out-groups. And as stated, Locke took this to be natural to social beings. Locke’s thinking on the ineliminability of racial categorization is not inconsistent with his commitment to cosmopolitanism. The idea that humans naturally make distinctions between in-group and out-group members, and that categorization—even racial categorization—serves a deep psychological interest, contradicts neither the aim nor necessity of cosmopolitanism. In fact, one might say that the basic social psychology from which racial categorization derives can actually serve cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism relies on eliminating neither races nor the natural phenomenon of categorizing that recognizes in-groups and out-groups more broadly. Locke did not conceptualize recognizing difference, categorizing, or thinking in terms of in-groups and out-groups as necessarily leading to alterity, which we might think of as “othering.” “Othering” implies emphasizing differences—perhaps in terms of physical appearance, culture-­ products, values, religious commitments, sexual orientation, and so on— in a way that leads to thinking of “out-groups” as inferior or less worthy  Ibid., 20.

10

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of respect, and where harmful treatment is the result of the thinking. Locke tells us that: “The race sense, as you see, is something which is not vicious in itself, but which may become so if invidious social practices are based upon it.”11 Race becomes vicious when harmful social treatment results from and is owed to racial categorizing, perhaps serving some other need—say an economic need. And so racial-hierarchies are not the necessary result of the natural phenomenon of categorizing based on racial in-­ groups and out-groups. Whites, Blacks, Asians, and so on may conceptualize differences in groups (and do so in terms of broad, perhaps inaccurate ways). They may have and express some sense of confraternity with other members of their group because of it, and have and express preferences for particular cultural products because of the confraternity. However, for Locke, none of this implies devaluing or inferiorizing others. And none of it implies exclusivity to those cultural products in a way that comes at the cost of understanding, appreciating, and living up to the best and most representative forms of human expression when such relates to out-­ groups’ cultural products. For Locke, mere appeal to racial categorizations need not imply distinguishing in-group racial members from out-group races on a rank-ordered basis. Now recall Locke’s argument from the first chapter that cultural progression is composite in nature. The composite nature of cultural progression is grounded in pluralism and reciprocity between cultural, and therefore racial, groups. Cosmopolitanism, which relies on tolerance and reciprocity as derivations from pluralism, actually needs differences in cultural, and therefore racial, groups and their values. This partially explains Locke’s acceptance and admiration of a counter tendency to complete social assimilation. Locke tells us that “although it is seemingly natural for what we might call [social osmosis or] natural assimilation (natural mixing) [to take place,] it is very fortunate [for] human contacts [that the opposite tendency exists.] All of the fundamental tendencies of earlier civilizations are counter tendencies to [assimilation] and run against the current of the natural instincts of human beings. So much so[,] that the civilized human being has these distinctions ingrained in his disposition by centuries of heritage.”12 Moreover, differences in groups and their values actually justifies Locke’s claim that the highest type of art is that which is both universal (in its ability to reach members of any culture in the world)  Ibid.  Ibid., 47.

11 12

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and particular (as an expression of the will, aspirations, and temperament of a specific group).13 Recall also that, in addition to emphasizing difference and the need to embrace it, Locke was committed to looking past differences to what makes us similar. He was committed to the common humanity that lay underneath all of our cultural differences. Further, he argued that what is fundamental to cosmopolitanism is understanding what makes every cultural group similar. Cultural constants account for the similarity in cultural groups. Cultural constants must be at play in order for a community to exist. These constants are what allows social cohesion and relations that are healthy enough for shared living. All communities will have these. And to some degree, all communities must remain faithful to them. And so it is important to remember that though Locke valued differences, he wanted different groups to recognize their common human nature as well as the cultural constants underlying their differences. This would lead to unity in difference. Again, for Locke: “The distinctions are not harmful in themselves, but harmful only as they are unjustly perpetuated or irrationally practiced.”14 Now return to Locke’s rebuttal to racial eliminativism. Locke also took racial eliminativism to fail because it was not beneficial, and was therefore undesirable. Locke recognized that racial categorization could unify and elevate politically oppressed groups who were grouped together into “races.” While rejecting biological accounts of race, Locke tells us that: “While it may be that the social perpetuation of race is legitimate and necessary in the interest of the development of civilization, we must further admit that it is of advantage to a group when it can consider itself an ethnic unit[.]”15 The groups to which Locke referred were oppressed groups. Locke’s understanding of race—as a term that unifies a group with a particular set of values—makes race the kind of thing in which groups—particularly oppressed groups—have some investment. Like many of his contemporary Black authors, he took race to be a necessary concept for politically and socially oppressed groups. One might recall his endorsement of ideas such as the Talented Tenth, which had the aim of uplifting 13  Alain Locke, “The Negro Spirituals,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 105 & Alain Locke, “The Poetry of Negro Life,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 58. 14  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 47. 15  Ibid., 12.

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Blacks in America. This can only be appealed to if racial categorization was legitimate. As a pragmatist, Locke would have denied that racial eliminativism was beneficial because it comes at a loss of the explanatory power that “race” and categorization on that basis provides. Not only can race explain the experiences of those within the various racial categories—experiences that require and license unity, and are psychologically and socially necessary— but for Locke, “race” gives us insight into the inter-workings of larger social relationships. This is why Locke could claim that race was America’s deepest and most fundamental problem in the manner in which he did. “Race” tells us both how society is and how it ought to be structured. It helps us to answer why certain individuals face certain problems, and it is necessary to inform us of what we need to do in order to improve those problems. And so, “race” is integrally connected to justice; it is important for both understanding and shaping society in an equitable way. Locke argued that studying race “is an important phase of social study and for us important far beyond any consideration of race relationships, because the same tendencies which separate class groups (and groups other than class groups) in society, will be identical with those that affect the racial groups.”16 Locke thought that class-conflicts and general societal-­conflicts follow the same trends as race-conflicts. He thought so either because the same vicious in-group/out-group thinking was at play or because race played such a big role in class and other societal divisions.17 Thus, “a systematic study of race contacts will teach us a great deal concerning the actual nature of human society.”18 On the issue of race-feelings and class-feelings, relations, and conflict, Locke insisted that “race feelings (group sense that moves on racial lines) is only different in degree and not different in kind from class sense and class groupings.”19 Now Locke did not explain in what way he used “degree.” He seems to have thought that there are generally more intense feelings of confraternity that occurs with race-feelings, and thus the potential for more animus that occurs with  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 42  Interestingly, Locke remained silent on the issue gender-conflicts and sexual-conflicts. In Locke’s corpus, there seems to be no essay and, more surprisingly, no part of an essay dedicated to these issues. Locke was a gay black man. And so one might expect Locke to have something to say about homophobia. Still, Locke failed to incorporate the study of these issues into his thinking on either society, democracy, or cosmopolitanism. 18  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 42–43. 19  Ibid., 44. 16 17

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in-­group/out-group racial contacts, than with class-feelings. However, he thought that class-feelings can occasionally be just as intense as race-­ feelings, which can produce conflicts that are just as violent as race-­feelings. And in the case of the caste system of India, Locke thought that class divisions have actually created racial distinctions. Finally, recall that Locke rejected racial eliminativism that was motivated by epistemic concerns. This kind of eliminativism is often undergirded by racial skepticism, which is an ontological view that purports that races are fictions, having no reality. If we can have no clear ideas about “race,” then there can be nothing to which the term “race” or racial categorizations refer; there is nothing of which the term “race” can be true. Thus, there are no racial categories. Locke’s third reason for rejecting racial eliminativism was that he rejected the idea that we cannot have clear ideas about race. And Locke rejected the racial skepticism that tends to undergird this type of eliminativism. Locke thought that: “Race is not one thing—it is many things. In fact it has so many meanings that even were each meaning scientifically correct[,] there would necessarily arise conflict among such meanings, which would precipitate certain problems.”20 Locke thought that if we are careful, and begin with the fact that race need be neither biological nor univocal in meaning, then we can have clear ideas about it. Like democracy, Locke took there to be several conceptions of race. Though unlike democracy, he only provided one legitimate conception of race. In any event, at least one conception of race is true, and thus does refer to things in the world. For Locke, “the extent to which we can clarify our concept determines the extent to which we can clarify our thinking [about] it.”21 And so, “race is elusive but not necessarily meaningless.”22 So Locke thought that studying race was important, particularly for understanding human history and solving problems. Thought about the importance of studying race led Locke to reject both racial eliminativism and racial skepticism. In addition to thinking through why it is important to study race, Locke thought that there was a specific starting-point for

 Ibid., 2.  Ibid. 22  Clevis Headley, “Alain Locke: A Sociocultural Conception of Race,” in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, Culture, Race, and Education, ed. Leonard Harris (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) 203. 20 21

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investigating it. In fact, one might infer that clear thought about the different conceptions of race requires clear starting-points. Now recall from the first chapter that Locke tended to begin his philosophical enquiry from two standpoints. First, Locke began philosophical investigations with a clear and careful understanding of where humans were situated at the particular moment of his philosophical inquiry. Second, Locke philosophized from what he took to be possible given anthropological considerations. These two apply to race just as they apply to Locke’s philosophical approach more broadly. Locke thought that a necessary starting-point for investigating race was that it is grounded in a very human phenomenon of recognizing difference and the confraternity with members of an in-group from which recognizing difference results. This is an important starting-point, since it would appear that beginning with this starting-point disallows negative judgments for persons noticing that others around them are different. Merely noticing racial, cultural, or religious differences do not make a person morally suspect. Locke feared that seeking to either eliminate all distinctions or failing to see distinctions between individuals can be just as harmful as “othering” people—particularly in a world or society where such was not the dominant practice. Attempts at failing to see distinctions could become a weapon for ignoring harmful biases, while seeking to eliminate differences could end in uniformitarianism. This cashes out to failing to be tolerant toward anything conceptualized as difference, and forcing the dominant culture’s values and products on everyone the world over, while eliminating the drive toward individuality.23 Further, in terms of a necessary starting-point for investigating race, Locke took there to be an intimate connection between race and society. We have to begin with how race is understood and operates within society, and from a view of how we want society to look with race as a part of it. This connection led Locke to look at race through normative lenses, and to reject any emphasis on or attempt to investigate race from within purely biological restraints—especially since these deny society and culture as influences on races. Locke raised the questions, “what of a pure science of race? Is it necessary? Is it desirable? Is it possible if it were desirable and necessary?”24 By “pure,” Locke seems to have had in mind one that is only 23  Alain Locke, “Democracy Faces a World Order,” in The Works of Alain Locke, ed. Charles Molesworth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 545. 24  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 7.

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defined in terms of and measured by physical science. For Locke, there is no requirement to promote race (think it as real and that it ought to hold a place in our discussions about the world) only if it is capturable by physical science. Locke took race theory to be a social science, and therefore a field that “has and must have correlation with our practical ideas of human society.”25 As stated below, race is socio-culturally determined. Ultimately Locke thought that race could not be captured by physical science at all. Locke also thought that our conceptions of race, “must reinforce what is currently believed about human society.”26 In this way, “race theory is essentially committed to historical bias.”27 Race, “like history itself, must incorporate the factor of human belief, because history is not merely a record of facts, but as well, a record of beliefs, and an historical opinion (be it an individual opinion or a group opinion) [which] is as important a factor of history as the objective fact itself.”28 Here it might appear that Locke thought that race and race theory must not stray too far beyond ordinary conceptions of it. In this way, in order to be talking about “race,” we must be informed and limited by what ordinary users mean when in discourse about race. Shortly after linking history and race together, Locke claimed that even though it were realized, “it would be impracticable, particularly as contrasted with whatever current practical theories of race are prevailing in society.”29 If Locke thought both that race theory must not stray too far beyond our ordinary conceptions of race, and that it need not be biological in order to be promoted, then he must not have thought that ordinary language users of the term purported it to be biological. This conclusion would be rather mystifying, perhaps ahistorical and thereby unreasonable. Further, the proposition that our theorizing about race needs to match what society already thinks about it seems not to square with Locke’s more revolutionary account that he thought ought to be endorsed. I think that the best way to understand Locke here is to be claiming that, like history, human feelings seem to dictate race such that there can be a plethora of “truths” that derive from the effect of perception and beliefs on how “objective” content (historical events and races) is interpreted.  Ibid.  Ibid. 27  Ibid. 28  Ibid. 29  Ibid., 8. 25 26

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Now it is clear that Locke thought that theories of race should be informed by a normative view of society—that we should look to what we want society to be in thinking about race. Locke thought that “instead of a perfectly objective science of human society, that we should have a corrective or a normative conception of society which should aim to improve upon and better those predominant notions and ideals which are prevalent.”30 Practical considerations that aim at a better society should lead us to adopt and promote particular notions of race—perhaps incrementally, if these notions should not stray too far from societal notions at any particular time. For Locke, “we have little use for a merely abstract notion of race” insofar as it will not further our practical considerations that aim at a better society. And so, even if a purely scientific notion of race were possible, it is useless. Race “is only [useful] from the scientific point of view [when] dealing with social origins [of] primitive groups and practices, as a guide to the relative value of the hereditary and the environmental influences upon social groups.”31 Society is an evolving entity that requires concepts aimed at its improvement. A purely scientific notion of race may very well be explanatory on some level. It might assist in an explanation of human development over the distant past. And so it can answer questions about how we arrived at a particular point in human history. However, answering questions related to human development cannot answer the full range of questions required to progress society. In fact, it cannot answer many questions related to either how race—with its many conceptions—is understood or what role in society it ought to have. Fundamentally, Locke thought that both the importance of and starting-­point for studying race are both bound up in its being derived from very natural phenomena and its connection to society. For Locke, when this idea is coupled with American history and its practice of distinguishing people along racial lines, we should not anticipate race’s disappearance. Further, the significance of studying race is bound up in its telling us something about social relationships and social conflicts. These can give us insight into how to improve society. With this understanding of the significance of studying race, along with a proper starting-point, Locke critiqued particular aims relating to anthropological investigations into race, along with biological notions of race that lie at the heart of anthropological investigations.  Ibid.  Ibid.

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Locke’s Critique of Anthropological Theories of Race Locke took anthropology to aim at describing the physical characteristics of humanity. Anthropologists extended this aim to race, and attempted to specify psychological and cultural characteristics that derive from physical ones. Locke argued that the first problem with anthropological theories of race was “discovering some criteria of true race, of finding some clue to the inter-connection between physical character, and group-behavior, psychological and cultural traits.”32 Essentially, Locke denied that there were any physical characteristics that necessarily correlate with or distinguish racial groups. Thus there could be no racial characteristics that are psychological and cultural, and that derive from physical ones. Locke critiqued a number of anthropological aims in investigating race. In his view, anthropology aimed to derive universal and static laws about races’ development without adequate attention to history, and specifically without social and cultural influences on race. Anthropology needed history, and Locke seems to have thought that history needed anthropology. “History and the science of human society cannot be put upon a strictly scientific and comparative basis until a sounder and broader anthropology has been achieved.”33 Though reciprocity is needed, anthropological aims denied the necessity of a historical perspective. Anthropologists’ aims to derive universal and static laws about racial development without history led them beyond the merely descriptive limits of its discipline. They aimed to justify existing notions of naturally and invariably superior and inferior races. Locke further criticized anthropologists for their failure to take into account a necessary pragmatic end for investigations, which was the pragmatic necessity of increased racial progress. Essentially, Locke criticized anthropology for lacking attentiveness to necessary starting-points for investigating race. Beyond lacking attentiveness to necessary starting-­ points, Locke criticized anthropological theories’ insistence on a biological foundation for race. For Locke, biological theories of race are false; they cannot be substantiated within any science. And so anthropology, which promoted biological theories, promoted theories that were false. 32  Alain Locke, “The Problem of Race Classification,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 168. 33  Ibid., 172–173.

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These critiques allowed Locke the intellectual space to craft his own theory of race that he took to be both more verifiable by its appropriate science and more useful for both democracy and establishing a cosmopolitan community. Let us start with Locke’s critique of faulty anthropological starting-­ points. Locke criticized anthropologists’ aims to establish universal and unchanging laws about race that neither rely on nor respond to history. Locke took anthropologists to have attempted to study humans with the method of a “pure” science that he took to be both impossible and undesirable. In this way, they denied that history was responsible for races’ advantage or disadvantage, and they insisted that both history and races’ advantage/disadvantage were shaped by natural laws. One can see these commitments with the respective philosophical anthropologies of Bernier, Kant, Blumenbach, and Gobineau. Each author aimed toward either requiring or producing static natural laws about races such that human societies were developed from these laws. The development of specific societies were inevitable, natural, and unchangeable after races were either affected by nature or God. These laws accounted for Bernier’s claim that whites were the ruling class of the Moghul Empire, Kant’s discussion of the natural inferiority and inability of Blacks and Indigenous Americans to be civilized, Blumenbach’s claim that whites— because of their skin, diet, lifestyles, and leisure—possess an ability to live better lives than other races, and Gobineau’s claim that whites were responsible for every civilization. For each, particular cultures or cultural aptitude necessarily followed from races. Historical and societal factors do nothing to explain or change races or their futures. Rather, historical development—with racial advantage/disadvantage—was thought to be more of a factor of racial development. And thus an examination of group contact was unnecessary to explain races and their occurrent advantage/ disadvantage. Races’ advantage/disadvantage were taken to be products of either nature or God. As a result of the above anachronistic relationship between race and historical influences, many early anthropologists found little wrong with either colonization or imperialism. Colonization and imperialism were— for these anthropologists—explained or excused by racial groups’ inherent properties, instead of racial groups’ advantages/disadvantages being explained by colonization and imperialism. And so an endorsement of colonization and imperialism often followed from the static laws of race-­ development that were the aims of anthropological investigations into race.

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Additionally, anthropology was plagued with bias. For Locke, while claiming to be a descriptive science, anthropology possessed a harmful normative aim. Though falsely, but perhaps purposefully, attributing its beginning to Gobineau and excluding Blumenbach from the troublesome history of anthropology, Locke claimed that anthropology aimed not so much to sketch the various races and their respective properties, but to justify notions of white superiority and non-white inferiority—that is, to justify white supremacy. “It has set out, therefore, to prove something which has already been made a basic assumption of the science in question. It has devoted its [research and methodology not toward a] descriptive end[, but toward proving the existence of] certain superior race types and certain inferior race types….”34 So, instead of starting with the appropriate question: “Are there races, and if there are races then what are their differences?” anthropology began with the question: “Which races are superior?” or the more pernicious question: “What accounts for whites’ superiority?” We see this in Kant, who claimed that race regards only those physical differences that are unfailingly reproduced, only to divide races in accordance with psychological, intellectual, and moral differences. While accepting the legitimacy that race theory discuss dominant and subordinate races, Locke thought that anthropology sought evidence for a racial hierarchy in a way that expanded throughout the history and future of humanity. Anthropologists were willing to craft history, project to the future, and imagine human possibility to suit the aim of justifying whites’ superiority. And so dominant and subordinate, advantageous and disadvantageous races were not limited to occurrent periods. Races were made into superior and inferior races by nature and without appeal to historical contact. This normative bias hindered anthropology from being a proper science. Now for Locke, a proper science need neither exclude values nor deny human influence. And so anthropology’s failure to be one had nothing to do with its involvement in what is characteristically human—namely, its lacking value-neutrality. Locke considered psychology and the newly born sociology to be sciences. And he considered race theory—as a social science—to require scientific investigation. However, he did not consider psychology, sociology, or race theory to be “pure” sciences. Pure sciences denied any reliance on social structures, human motivations, history, and historical biases for their answers. And further, they purported  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 3.

34

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value-neutrality. Sciences that purported to be pure were mathematics, biology, logic, and anthropology, among others. Ultimately, for Locke, there were no pure sciences. As we will see in the next chapter, no science was either completely divorced from value or ahistorical. “Pure” sciences purport what is false. And so anthropology’s universal and static laws that were ahistorical and value-neutral were false. Beyond this, however, it was plainly hypocritical in possessing the normative bias that led it to attempt a proof of white supremacy. Locke thought that every science is historically situated and influenced. Further, all sciences are informed by values. Still, he esteemed disinterested and dispassionate scientific investigations. We might consider scientific investigation to be disinterested when the investigator does not commit to ideological or biased objectives as presuppositions for inquiry. And we might consider an investigation dispassionate when it does not offer claims from the ground of personal emotions.35 Locke required these values in race theory if it is to be a proper science. He argued that though race theory requires history and is value-laden, “we must approach the subject without prejudice.”36 “The scientific eye sees impartially and it tries to see the object as it is in itself.” He argued that “if there has been anything that has hindered the observation of the phenomena of race contacts it has been that unscientific point of view which has colored, favorably or unfavorably, the facts so that it has been almost impossible to extract any clear scientific attitude or scientific result from the process.”37 In fact, Locke thought that partiality was more of a problem for race theory than ahistoricity. Ahistoricity is problematic insofar as it seeks to understand and solve problems without accounting for humans’ proper influence on them. Losing sight of how problems arise in the process of history causes us to lose sight of how social structures have produced and shaped the boundaries of our knowledge. In this way, we take much for granted with the problems emerging in history and our proposed answers to them. But partiality causes us to engage investigations that extend beyond their limits. Partiality caused each of the authors discussed in the last chapter, as well as much of anthropology surrounding race, to attempt 35  For the second half of the conjunct, see: Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 63. Locke, in telling us that he has concluded the disinterested part of his discussion of race and race contacts, claimed that he will not condemn modern race creeds beyond scientific and reasonable explanations. 36  Ibid. 37  Ibid., 42.

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to justify notions of supposed racial superiority/inferiority. “It isn’t that we haven’t had considerable observation of the actions and reactions of social [groups,] but because so much of it has been prejudiced, favorably or unfavorably[,] that so much must be discarded as essentially unscientific and as not aiding the situation one way or another.”38 For Locke, partiality—whether despicable or admirable—unduly informs the aims of the discipline under consideration. And this manipulates the kinds of questions asked, the history and evidence that need be taken into account, and the acceptability of answers to those questions. The universal and static laws that anthropologists sought to derive could never be established given the partiality that motivated the discipline. Now Locke did not object to establishing historically informed generalities or tendencies as “laws” within sciences. However, these “laws” should be thought of as quasi-principles that are useful tools in a discipline such as race theory. In investigating and understanding race, Locke claimed that: “We want to try to record those forces that are invariable phenomena of racial contacts and we want also to see if in investigating these phenomena[,] we [can] catch their drift or tendency.”39 It is important to note that Locke had a rather loose notion of “invariance” in the preceding sentence. For Locke: “Our effort isn’t to find a [natural] law, [that is,] to arrive by very hasty generalization at anything which might be construed as law, but simply to observe as calmly and dispassionately as we can, the phenomena attendant upon race contacts.”40 Locke took natural—that is, ahistorical—laws to be establishable only by denying relevant information and making unwarranted leaps to conclusions. Locke perhaps thought this given the imbalance between what is needed to establish or verify natural laws—namely, complete knowledge (at least about some kind), and what is taken to be a mark of humanity given human history— namely, fallibility. If humans are fallible, then human knowledge is incomplete. And if human knowledge is incomplete, then humans cannot establish or verify natural laws. Humans would need complete knowledge about the objects of natural laws in order to firmly establish or verify them. Locke gave us a clue to this thought with the following:

 Ibid.  Ibid., 41. 40  Ibid. 38 39

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It is useless to argue that because the scale of ultimate operation is the whole vast range of the life history of the human species, such factors as are admittedly common for both long and short-term change and development cannot be profitably investigated within the restricted field of short-term observation available. Indeed with respect to their morphological connection with one another, and the question of their physiological correlation or independent variability, they can only be approached in this way.41

Locke thought that verifying natural laws of race would require a tremendous amount of information, spanning “the whole vast range of the life history of the human species.” We cannot conjecture from the short-term observation of our recent history to the beginnings and future history of humanity in the way that these natural laws of race purported. Locke took the case of African Americans as his example: “Enough evidence has already scientifically gone to waste in seven or eight generations of the history of the Negro stocks in America, to have solved the questions of the relative fixity or variability as well as the determinate correlation of these important moot factors, without a determination of which race classification in anthropology cannot hope to establish itself upon either an exact or a truly descriptive basis.”42 Instead of fixed and invariable natural laws, Locke appealed to generalities that can guide scientific investigations. For Locke: “If some of these phenomena should prove to be more or less invariable under similar conditions, we, of course, will be justified scientifically in assuming that we have come into sight of some law of social relationship.”43 Locke’s race theory seems to be grounded in the justification for asserting good inductive principles to show that we have powerful reasons to believe that future race-contact will resemble the past, rather than deductive certainty. Some phenomena tends to replicate given historical and/or environmental conditions that are similar. We are licensed to be guided by principles based on generalities or tendencies in group-contact after many historical connections between phenomena and environmental similarities. So as it regards race, Locke thought there to be generalities that can be tracked. These generalities involve history, and follow consistent generalities in social-groups. We might take these to be “laws,” and regard how groups tend to interact given tendencies within in-groups and between  Alain Locke, “The Problem of Race Classification,” 170.  Ibid. 43  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 41. 41 42

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out-groups, assimilative/isolationist tendencies, and conflict when groups interact. And so for Locke, “laws” of race are tendencies that have become rather stable through constant contact. Again, anthropology’s aim was to derive universal and static natural laws, which Locke denied can be verified. There is one additional problem that anthropology had in its aim to derive universal and static laws that deny history in races’ development. In the attempt to derive these laws, anthropologists studied human development and contact like geographers aimed to study the development of rocks. Humans were reduced to objects placed on earth without agency and moved around by nature or God, much like rocks or soil. Now to be clear, Locke would deny the “purity” of geography on the grounds that he denied that geography excluded human values or was not led by them in its progression as a discipline. Anthropology, however, was fundamentally flawed insofar as its aims implicate the denial of human motivations as determining factors in human movement. Humans are motivated by values and biases, and cannot be studied like inanimate objects lacking the capacity to value the world around them. Even though there are no “pure” sciences, anthropologists’ aim to study humans in the way that “pure” sciences purport fails miserably. Instead, history must be thought to participate in the production and movement of humans, insofar as human behavior and even human physical properties change with alterations to society and culture. Anthropological theories of race failed to take history into account in their aim to derive universal and static laws. The failure of anthropological theories to take history into account is in part explained by their biological, rather than social and historical, foundation. And this was perhaps the most significant theoretical problem with anthropological investigations into race. Consider Locke’s statement: “The problem of anthropology today is not the problem of facts but of proper criteria for the facts; the entire scientific status and future of the consideration of [hu]man’s group characters rests upon a decisive demonstration of what factors are really indicative of race, retrieving the science from the increasing confusion and cross-classification that the arbitrary selection of such criteria has inevitably brought about.”44 Though there is no agreement as to exactly which racial characteristics were relevant, anthropology required that relevant racial characteristics be biological. Anthropological theories then took biological properties to explain society and culture, along with the ­movement of history. In this way, anthropology assumed too much, and  Alain Locke, “The Problem of Race Classification,” 164.

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further failed to take into account the ways that human biological properties (many of which were taken to be racial properties) are malleable and change with the society and culture that they purported to explain. For Locke, anthropological theories’ greatest failure was that they rested upon a false foundation—namely, biology. Locke thought that biological properties that purported to be racial lacked sufficient stability to ground an adequate theory of race. His thinking rested on and extended an observation of properties believed to be racial. Locke anticipated Richard Lewontin’s observation that there is more diversity within racial groups than there is between them.45 He argued that: “Because of differences [in] anthropological [factors,] anthropological points of comparison have now been reduced to such a narrow margin in each instance that the variations between individuals of the same race, and even the same nation, more than outspan the maximum variability between what are regarded as cognate races of mankind.”46 Now, of course, Locke did not make the observation by looking at genetic material, as Lewontin did. Locke understood the claims about the biological properties thought to be indicative of racial group membership in some one race, and observed much more distinction between members therein when compared with members of different races. “To put it in terms of a concrete example, one can find more variability in the [anthropological differences] between one class of Frenchmen and another class of Frenchmen than when you take an average European and [compare him with] an [average] African or a Malay.”47 This led Locke to reject biology as a foundation for race. Locke noticed a number of problems with biology and race that are commonly referenced by racial constructivists and skeptics.48 He was aware of variations in conceptions of race over space and time. There was virtually no consistent number of races or requisite classificatory properties at any point in history. Locke noticed the messiness or failure to categorize members of any particular race no matter which biological properties were taken to be requisite. And he noticed the rather a­ rbitrariness in both the biological properties that were taken to be racial and the lines 45  Richard Lewontin, “The Apportionment of Human Diversity,” in Evolutionary Biology, Vol. 6 (1972). 46  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 5. 47  Ibid. 48  Clevis Headley, “Alain Locke: A Sociocultural Conception of Race,” 200.

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drawn for racial divisions.49 Locke lived much of what Ian Haney López pointed out: Alabama and Arkansas defined anyone with one drop of “Negro” blood as Black; Florida had a one-eighth rule; Georgia referred to “ascertainable” non-White blood; Indiana used a one-eighth rule; Kentucky relied on a combination of any “appreciable admixture” of Black ancestry and a one-­ sixteenth rule; Louisiana did not statutorily define Blackness but did adopt via its Supreme Court an “appreciable mixture of negro blood” standard; Maryland used a “person of negro descent to the third generation” test; Mississippi combined an “appreciable amount of Negro blood” and a one-­ eighth rule; Missouri used a one-eighth test, as did Nebraska, North Carolina, and North Dakota; Oklahoma referred to “all persons of African descent,” adding that the “term ‘white race’ shall include all other persons”; Oregon promulgated a one-fourth rule; South Carolina had a one-eighth standard; Tennessee defined Blacks in terms of “mulattoes, mestizos, and their descendants, having any blood of the African race in their veins”; Texas used an “all persons of mixed blood descended from negro ancestry” standard; Utah law referred to mulattos, quadroons, or octoroons; and Virginia defined Blacks as those in whom there was “ascertainable any Negro blood” with not more than one-sixteenth Native American ancestry.50

And so, for Locke, if race was biological, then there would not be variations in conceptions, arbitrariness of racial traits and divisions, or messiness/failure to categorize racial group members. Since all of these were in fact the case, then race could not be biological. Instead, Locke took race to be a biological fiction. Locke tells us that: Really, when the modern man talks about race[,] he is not talking about the anthropological or biological idea at all. [He is really talking about the historical record of success or failure of] an ethnic group. As I pointed out, these groups, from the point of view of anthropology, are ethnic fictions. This does not mean that they do not exist[,] but it can be shown [that these groups do] not have as [permanent] designations those very factors upon which they pride themselves. They have neither purity of [blood] nor purity of type. They are the products of countless interminglings of types[,] and

 Alain Locke, “The Problem of Race Classification.”  Ian Haney-López, White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: NYU Press, 2006) 83. 49 50

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they are the results of infinite crossings of types[.] They, however, maintain in name only this fetish of biological [purity.]51

Like art and artistic development, race—in terms of biology—is a composite. It is a composite of groups with all sorts of physical properties coming into contact with one another. Locke denied Kantian essentialism in more observable physical features, as well as the purity of (divinely inspired) blood with divergent energies, amounts of vigor, or talents to which Gobineau appealed. Races are biologically blended. And further biological factors in races are subject to change with or without changes to races or race-terms. Thus, biological factors are unreliable as clues to any acceptable theory of race.52 However, again, Locke wanted to deny that race was a fiction simpliciter. Race had a sociological meaning. And so, for Locke, race is not biological. Rather, race is social and cultural inheritance. At best, biology can only tell us about certain aspects of the history of groups. “Because it is manifest that if these [biological] factors, instead of being static, are variable…then there is no physical basis for the sociological concept of race.”53 Race, for Locke, will be purely sociological. And insofar as this sociological account takes history into account, Locke argued that “there are no static factors of race at all.”54 For Locke, even color—especially color—is arbitrarily connected to race. Principally, for Locke, when we look at race, we have to look at historical—that is, social and cultural—factors. We cannot, however, look at culture in a way that anthropologists have; we cannot look at culture in a way that reshapes and justifies white supremacy. Anthropologists were committed to proving how racial groups unfailingly and ahistorically produce certain cultures from the possession of certain values because of how either nature or God made them. For anthropologists, exploitation, colonialism, and other modes of oppression were effects of natural racial differences. And so racial inequalities in society were justified by racial differences. For Locke: “Racial differences parallel what we know in human society as racial inequalities.”55 However, racial differences are not the cause of racial inequalities. Instead of explaining inequality with appeals to biological  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 11.  Ibid., 5. 53  Ibid., 5. 54  Ibid., 10. 55  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 9. 51 52

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racial properties, we should explain race inequality by historical, social, and economic factors. Racial inequalities emerge out of conditions that produce inequality. For Locke, the practical end of anthropology, which engages race-differences, should be to eradicate these inequalities. Locke divided the science of anthropology into two views. The first, Locke described as the older (foundational) view. This view relied on an assumption of human races as static products of either nature or God’s design. As static products, races necessarily produce certain types of cultures that can be ranked-ordered, and whose value can be objectively determined. Locke distinguished this view from a more modern view. The modern view took race to be dynamic.56 The dynamic character of race was owed to a deemphasis on biology and a place reserved for the inclusion of sociological data. Locke’s acceptance of many of the themes of the latter led him to incorporate history, culture, and pragmatic ends into his thinking on the divisions of human races. And he incorporated economic factors into his thinking on race-conflict, race-prejudice, and racism. Locke’s inclusion of history into the conversation of race allowed him to observe “the extent to which race functions, not as a sharply defined concept embedded in a natural scientific theory, but as a conceptual artifact readily malleable to cultural exploitation.”57 Conceptions of race will then have the pragmatic end of challenging the exploitation and oppression involved in racism. It is to Locke’s notion of race that I now turn.

Locke’s Sociocultural Theory of Race We saw that Locke rejected biological notions of race. According to Locke, one of the most pernicious fallacies of race was the “biological fallacy.” The biological fallacy “predicates a physical race for every practical social grouping that it finds necessary.”58 Those who commit this fallacy argue that race is biological, and that certain physical properties necessarily distinguish races. This fallacy tends to commit those who hold it to a discredited typological thinking. For Locke: “Physical race integrity, however, does not exist within the very groups that seem to predicate so much of their practices upon principles of race.”59 Locke observed that there is just  Ibid., 6.  Clevis Headley, “Alain Locke: A Sociocultural Conception of Race,” 201. 58  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 74. 59  Ibid. 56 57

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as much, if not more, diversity in physical properties within any purported racial group than between them. And so, there can be no physical properties—certainly readily available ones—that necessarily distinguish races. Further, he recognized many of the themes that both racial constructivists and skeptics notice about race. And so, race is a biological fiction. Any theory of race that relied on biology cannot be adequate. While denying biological realist theories of race, Locke was no racial skeptic. That race was a biological fiction did not license the implication that races do not exist—that they were fictions simpliciter. Race exists in many ways; it is not one thing, but many things. What was required was clear thought about race. This would lead to our picking out the correct reference-content for race. This thought about and application of the term “race” led him away from anthropology and its dependence on biological accounts of race. He argued “the urgent need to shift from the anthropological perspective, with its emphasis on the biological and physical aspects of race, to the ethnological perspective, with its emphasis on social and historical factors.”60 In turning toward an ethnological perspective, Locke looked to culture, though not in the way that anthropologists did. Race did not explain culture, though there was a connection between them. In an essay entitled “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” Locke attempted to answer a longstanding impasse regarding the relationship between races and cultures. On one side of the debate, theorists took culture to depend on race, and race to be biological. These theorists argued that races, of necessity, produce particular cultures. Cultures derive from biological properties that owe their existence to either nature or God. Kant’s, Blumenbach’s, and Gobineau’s thought illustrates the tendency in anthropological views of race to draw a causal relationship between race and culture in this way. Each purported a biological notion of race, and one that drew such a causal relationship between race that is biologically determined and culture as necessarily derived from races. On the other side of the debate theorists denied any correlation between race and culture. On this view, races either had no specific cultures or their cultures were more or less arbitrary and inconstant. Racial groups have a proclivity to create and embrace any cultural production, and no race’s culture or capacity for producing it is permanent. Now the denial of a causal or even correlative relationship between race and culture did not rule out race being biological. Many authors who endorsed this view also  Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke on Race and Race Relations,” 342.

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argued that race is biological, even if only loosely biological—that is, even if there are no static biological properties that determine racial group membership. What proponents of this view purported was that there is no connection between race and culture, no matter whether or not race was biological. Locke argued that “we do not need to deny the existence of these characteristic racial molds in denying that they are rooted in ‘inherent hereditary traits either in biological or a psychological nature.’”61 In Locke’s view, both sides of the debate failed to accord history an adequate place in understanding race and culture. Locke thought that if we take history into account, then we would see that there is a correlative relationship between race and culture. With a careful eye to history, he argued that “there are certain ethnic traits the peculiarly stable and stock character of which must be interpreted as ethnically characteristic.”62 We can both notice and predict cultural traits and types in racial groups. While it is true that there are no internal racial group properties from which cultural traits derive, the correlation between them is significant. And so Locke sought a middle-­ ground between the two views. Race is not biological. And so culture cannot derive from biological properties. However, there is some correlation between race and culture. It is out of this debate that Locke carved out his clearest theory of race. For Locke, history and social environmental conditions arising therein account for in-group and out-group formations; they create in persons senses of kinship feeling deriving from a recognition that there are other human groups in the world who do not perceive and act in the world in the same ways. Social environmental factors arising in history present groups with particular stresses to which those groups respond. Particular stresses lead groups to produce culture-traits. Particular subgroups, having participated in making and extending the life of culture-traits, tend to embrace them more completely than do others. They become significant parts of a type of culture linked with the identity of the group. They become attributable to or characteristic of subgroups given both stereotypes about and endorsements by their members. And so certain culture-­ traits become more socially solidified. The members within the subgroups 61  Alain Locke, “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 191. 62  Ibid., 190.

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accept them as a part of their identity, thereby defining themselves by an acceptance of and “acting out” or “acting from within” a type of culture. And so Locke attempted to loosen (without breaking) the connection between race and culture. Locke’s position: differing from that of the school of interpretation which denies all significant connection between racial and cultural factors, does not deny that race stands for significant social characters and culture-traits or represents in given historical contexts characteristic differentiations of culture-type. However, it does insist against the assumption of any such constancy, historical or intrinsic, as would make it possible to posit an organic connection between them and to argue on such grounds the determination of one by the other.63

Race and culture have something to do with each other, as Locke defined race in terms of the culture-traits that are preserved by a group of people in a culture-type. Locke argued that “race stands for significant social characters and culture-traits.”64 Still Locke denied that there is a causal relationship between race and culture, such that productions must derive from specific people due to their innate ability, as was purported by anthropologists and social evolutionists. The latter took there to be stages of cultural progression that corresponded to racial evolution.65 For Locke, race is culture–heredity, though without there being any static trait within races’ cultures. Locke’s denial of social evolutionists’ claims was grounded in two facts beyond their commitment to the biological fallacy. First, primitivism and advancement in culture can be found in a number of different peoples at different times, which suggests that there is no cultural evolution occurring among peoples.66 An appeal to history shows that cultural progress waxes and wanes, even when observing one people’s history. Second, Locke thought that culture-traits and cultural development are both composite.67 Culture-traits arise from and develop by a mixture or blending of  bid, 189.  This interpretation is seemingly confirmed on pg. 192, where Locke states that: “Race in the vital and basic sense is simply and primarily the [sic] culture-heredity,” and on pg. 195, where Locke states that: “Race operates as tradition, as preferred traits and values, and when these things change culturally speaking ethnic remoulding is taking place.” 65  Alain Locke, “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” 189. 66  Ibid., 188–190. 67  Ibid., 195. 63 64

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difference; different peoples are responsible for cultural traits and cultural development across time. Though culture-traits emerge from a mixture or blending of peoples, Locke thought that culture-types explain and differentiate racial groups: The best consensus of opinion then seems to be that race is a fact in the social or ethnic sense, that it has been erroneously associated with race in the physical sense and is therefore not scientifically commensurate with factors or conditions which explain or have produced physical race characters and differentiation, that it has a vital and significant relation to social culture, and that it must be explained in terms of social and historical causes such as have caused similar differentiations of culture-type as pertain in lesser degree between nations, classes, and even family strains.68

Locke’s claim about “physical race characters” was not a concession that “physical race” is a true conception of race. He seems to have been contrasting “race,” which is a sociocultural conception, with properties falsely taken to indicate race—namely, physical properties. Race is commensurate with cultural factors, which derive from historical and social conditions and not physical ones. Locke thought that races begin, much like nations, tribes, and classes, as historical and socially contingent. Historical and social conditions section off people in certain sorts of ways that tend to produce a varying degree of proclivities toward certain values, ways of seeing the world, modes of expression, and so on. These cash out in the varying styles of beauty, customs, technological advances, and other survival/non-survival related modes of interaction as responses to certain environmental factors that are the specific traits and innovations of a type of culture. “The type itself may have been established by accident or fortuitous combinations of historical circumstances….”69 Locke seems to have thought that aleatory experiments with solutions to stresses, in some cases combined with unintentional, unguided, or unplanned encounters and environmental occurrences, lead groups to construct various culture-types. And so history and social factors are responsible for the development of cultures. Internal properties deriving from nature or God do not produce them. And neither do “group-genius” nor a kind of Geist.  Ibid., 192.  Ibid., 195.

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On Locke’s account, race is an idea—a sort of name under which groups understand themselves—that better binds members of culture-­ groups together, where culture-groups are those that more or less embrace culture-types. Thus, race itself becomes a value, one that further unifies culture-traits by causing a robust sense of solidarity amongst those who understand themselves as a unified group with a specific culture-type. For Locke: “Race accounts for a great many of the specific elements of the cultural heredity, and the sense of race may itself be regarded as one of the operative factors in culture since it determines the stressed values which become the conscious symbols and tradition of the culture. Such stressed values are themselves factors in the process of culture making, and account primarily for the persistence and resistance of culture-traits.”70 Race is a name that strengthens the bonds of culture-group members who accept culture-traits as parts of their identity and perhaps are stereotyped as having the cultural identity. Race is a value because of the way that its use promoted unity among members. And promoting unity concretized many of the cultural traits of the type for which it came to stand; it subsumed culture-traits, all the while concretizing subgroups’ bond with each other. So we might categorize Locke as a racial constructivist about race. Now Locke’s conception of race seems similar to what we would describe as “ethnicity.” The latter is often conceptualized as something akin to “a cultural grouping—involving shared language, customs, social meanings, cultural formations—that typically (but not always) relies for its existence and coherence on geographical and genealogical connections, and sometimes carries (defeasible) presumptions about appearance.”71 And so one may ask: Why not replace “race” with “ethnicity”? Locke was aware of this question, and rephrased it with the following statement: “So considerable is the shift of emphasis and meaning that at times it does seem that the best procedure would be to substitute for the term race [with] the term culture-group.”72 Though Locke was aware of the question, he denied that we should replace “race” with “ethnicity.” And he seemingly denied that we should replace “race” with some nearby

 Ibid.  Sally Haslanger, “Tracing the Sociopolitical Reality of Race,” in Race: Four Philosophical Views, ed. Quayshawn Spencer, Chike Jeffers, Sally Haslanger, and Joshua Glasgow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019) 27. 72  Alain, Locke, “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” 194. 70 71

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or constructed term that would pick out social or cultural groups in a way that was perhaps less problematic than “race.” In denying that we should substitute race with another term, Locke may have had arguments made in Race Contacts in mind. Recall that the race sense is the basic recognition of difference, confraternity with those who are considered in-group members, and considerations of how to treat others from out-groups. And recall that it is natural to human beings. Race is a term that concretized subgroups’ bond with each other by concretizing a commitment to cultural-traits of a cultural-type. Locke may have thought that “ethnicity” and other substitutionary terms lacked the ability to concretize either subgroups’ bond with each other or their commitment to cultural traits in the way that “race” could. Or perhaps his commitment to use of the term “race” has to do with the starting-point that race is ineliminable that he argued in Race Contacts. If “race” is ineliminable, then there is no point in attempting to replace it with other terms—particularly if it has these practical benefits. More likely than the above, Locke saw race as a way to bond members of what many may have recognized as different ethnic groups—for example, African Americans and Haitians. Members of these groups will more likely be stereotyped and become targets of racial prejudice and discrimination in the same way. They could benefit culturally and politically by a kind of unity that the term provides. This unity is made more effective given a term that they both share—namely, “Black.” After all, Locke was well aware of the Caribbean influence on the Harlem Renaissance. And he actively promoted African American, Haitian, and African unity, along with increased cultural sharing. And furthermore African Americans and Haitians can best explain and predict occurrences in their lives by use of the term. It is truer to say that some person who is German and would be classified racially as white believes themself to be superior to a Haitian who would be classified racially as Black because they are racially Black than because they are ethnically Haitian. This German man or woman may lack awareness of Haitian customs or may care nothing that the person practices them. And further, the German man or woman probably thinks themself superior to Ghanaians and African Americans just as much. And so it would be truer to say that the German man or woman thinks themself superior to the Haitian because of their race rather than their ethnicity. Now, in addition to being a value that concretizes members around culture-traits of a culture-type, Locke tells us that race lies in “that

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particular selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to certain others which is characteristic of all types and levels of social organization.”73 Note again Locke’s appeal to the “race sense” in his social and cultural conception of race. And so “[i]nstead therefore of regarding culture as expressive of race, race by this interpretation is regarded as itself a culture product.”74 As a racial constructivist about race, Locke seems committed to a type of racial category constructionism, where the creation and persistence of race is brought about by cultural practices that represent a certain race as the particular one that it is.75 At least in “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” the type of racial category construction to which Locke was committed was something of a performative theory of race. On this account, race exists and operates within a matrix of preferring certain culture-traits within a culture-type and performing certain social roles related to some specified culture-type that, when performed, make one a member of that race.76 Locke was not the kind of racial constructivist who argued that one is a member of a particular race merely because they were perceived to be such by others. It is not clear as to whether Locke would say that one is a member of RaceX only if one prefers a certain culture-type, or whether this preference is a necessary but not sufficient requirement that must be supplemented with a certain social perception or particular visible physical features. Whatever the case Locke thought preferences and performances, independent of mere social perception, make one a member of some race. “Race operates as tradition, as preferred traits and values….”77 This committed the person to performance as a requirement of racial group membership. Ultimately for Locke, a member of RaceX is a member of RaceX because, and to the extent that, they prefer (and seemingly performs from  Ibid., 195.  Ibid., 193. 75  For a discussion of category construction, see Ron Mallon, The Construction of Human Kinds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 49–51. 76  Locke is not at all consistent on the metaphysics of race throughout his life. His view seems to diverge with both age and settings where particular essays were delivered. For instance, in Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, Locke seems committed at times to skepticism, and at other times to constructionism. In at least one of his lectures in Haiti, Locke seems committed to a thick biological realism. See: Alain Locke, “The African Heritage and Its Cultural Significance,” in African American Contributions to the Americas’ Culture: A Critical Edition of Lectures by Alain Locke, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 77  Alain Locke, “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” 195. 73 74

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their preference) culture-traits (v1, v2, v3,…vn) that are accepted as being the content of culture-typeR. It would appear that performance is necessary because the member of RaceX understands (identifies) themself as a member of RaceX in solidarity with others, which requires a certain public embrace or expression—an acting out—of culture-traits (v1, v2, v3,…vn). So race is sociocultural. It is the result of historical and social conditions that pull groups together, along with practices that respond to stresses that lead to proclivities for certain members of groups to prefer and reject particular traits as their own, performing actions from those preferences. Race is the concept under which these similarities in how some sociocultural group is unified. And further, it is a value in itself “since it determines the stressed values which become the conscious symbols and tradition of the culture.”78 After social and historical factors group what will become races together, they face certain conditions that produce certain ways of engaging those conditions, whether consciously or unconsciously. These are culture-traits. These ways become “canonized” by some subgroup that participates in making the cultural traits. The canonized set of traits will be the subgroup’s culture-type. What this implies is that the subgroup will begin to see these traits as “theirs,” or as markers of their group-­ identification; these traits become a large part of how the group members identify with themselves—it strengthens the “we” in group self-concepts. Over time, a technique, way of expression, and so on will be emphasized more greatly, become more developed or expanded, and will be so because of its having been “canonized” by the group. However, one might question why culture-types are “canonized.” To use Locke’s terminology, why do culture-types become “stable and stock?” For Locke, it would appear that certain culture-traits are “stable and stock” for two reasons. First, culture-traits within a culture-type become traditions, and may be honored on that basis. Though arising from pressures that groups face, these need no longer serve a purpose or account for stresses that races face. They receive a sort of honored status, and are duplicated and get passed down on that basis. Second, continued living in an environment where certain responses are necessary to deal with stresses leads to the stability of association between races and cultures. Perhaps culture-traits help to attain a sense of being or belonging for racial group members. Or, perhaps they help to achieve a race’s validation or

 Ibid., 194.

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affirmation of their humanity in the face of disaffirmation. Consider Ralph Ellison, who puts the point in the following way when discussing the blues: The blues is an impulse to keep the painful details and episodes of a brutal experience alive in one’s aching consciousness, to finger its jagged grain, and to transcend it, not by the consolation of philosophy, but by squeezing from it a near-tragic, near-comic lyricism. As a form, the blues is an autobiographical chronicle of personal catastrophe expressed lyrically…. Let us close with one final word about the blues: Their attraction lies in this, that they at once express both the agony of life and the possibility of conquering it through sheer toughness of spirit. They fall short of tragedy only in that they provide no solution, offer no scapegoat but the self.79

The blues is a response to extreme stresses—a survival tool—that groups have created and embrace. It is conditioned by circumstances wherein groups realize that they cannot escape the pain of life. Given these conditions, they must face the pain. And facing the pain requires smiling or sharing a laugh in the face of it so that survival is possible. Now Ellison did not attempt to racialize blues-culture (unlike thinkers such as Houston Baker, Jr. and Amiri Baraka).80 However, one can very easily make the connection between the blues and Blacks (specifically given its development by Black Americans and the use of Africanisms). Still, his implicit point was that blues is a culture-product that derives from and is embraced in a particular set of stressful conditions with which at least some group deals. One might suggest that culture begins as a group-response to better deal with the stresses that their environments, whether physical or social, impose upon groups. The blues, in being a response to certain conditions with which a group must deal, gets included into the identity of the group with a racial name. This culture-trait gets emphasized in locations where this race’s members meet and when the race engages other races. Culture-­ traits therein develop and expand to create new traits. Race, then, is the name that canonizes or organizes traits within, connected to, and extending beyond the blues. Thus, the correlation between the two maintains a 79  Ralph Ellison, “Richard Wright’s Blues,” in The Antioch Review, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer, 1999) 264, 275. 80  See: Amiri Baraka, Blues People: Negro Music in White America (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999) & Houston A.  Baker, Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature: A Vernacular Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

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“stable and stock” character without being biological. There is a correlation between race and culture such that races identify with certain cultures rather stably because of certain historical and social conditions that have in some sense canonized their responses in a particular way. The race then values the culture-traits through continued emphasis, development, and expansion. Thus, “these determine what is the dominant pattern in any given culture, and it is toward these dominant so as social norms that social conformation converges and according to which it eventually establishes the type.”81 Again, none of this is to suggest that Locke thought that culture-traits and culture-types have been or must remain separately developed or appreciated. Locke did not think that races make exclusive claims on culture-­ traits, or that those traits are a result of that race’s production alone. Traits are of a culture-type that have become characteristic of that race. This means that they have been adopted and canonized by a race. However, Locke thought that we cannot honestly say that traits are exclusive products of any one race when we take an earnest look at the development of these traits. “Indeed, the evidence shows most cultures to be highly composite. Sometimes there seems to be a race relatively purely physically with a considerably mixed culture, sometimes, perhaps more frequently, a highly mixed race with a relatively fussed culture. But in the large majority of cases the culture is only to be explained as the resultant of the meeting and reciprocal influence of several culture strains, several ethnic contributions.”82 Reciprocation is one of the means by which culture-­traits are produced. And reciprocation and the composite nature of culture-traits are the reason why races can come together to establish a cosmopolitan community. So Locke was a racial constructivist about race. And his particular account of racial constructivism was a category constructionist performative theory. He rejected biological realism and racial skepticism as descriptive views about race. The former claims that races are biological, while the latter claims that races do not exist. He also rejected particular normative accounts of race. He rejected normative racial eliminativism and racial

 Alain Locke, “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” 194.  Ibid., 195.

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reconstructionism.83 The former claims that we should eliminate racial categorization and perhaps even race-talk, while the latter purports that we should replace race and race-terms with terms that could only be used to pick out social groups. Now from the above, and particularly when taking into account his thick cultural cosmopolitanism from the first chapter, I argue that Locke endorsed a thick racial conservationism as a normative view. Racial conservationists recommend conserving racial categorization and race-talk. There are thin and thick versions of racial conservationism. Thin racial conservationists argue that race should be conserved only for pragmatic reasons.84 For the thin conservationist, there is nothing inherently valuable about the concept or racial divisions. And after a point in the future, race will no longer be needed—provided that the pragmatic reasons that license maintaining race and race-talk are satisfied. And so, thin racial conservationism can be said to have the same end as racial eliminativism. The point of difference between them is the precise point at which race and perhaps race-talk ought to be eliminated. Obviously both eliminativists and thin conservationists are interested in justice. Eliminativists think that eliminating race immediately takes us closer to justice, while conserving it moves us further away from it. Thin conservationists think that eliminating race eliminates something essential to either achieving or accounting for justice, and conserving it makes both possible. Both agree, however, that there is a point at which race and racial divisions will not be necessary. Consider W.E.B.  Du Bois, who wrote that: “As 83  Jacoby Adeshei Carter has argued that Locke is in-between reconstructionism and eliminativism. However, his understanding of either diverges from mine. He understands a reconstructionist as one who believes “that a thorough redefinition of race is necessary.” The redefinition to which Carter refers is the denial of a biological notion of race, and a unique and purely social notion of race. On this point, I agree. However, I understand reconstructionist as not wanting to change how we think of race, but the term employed or that captures our thought. Both Carter and I agree that Locke dismissed changing the term. Further, Carter argues that Locke leans toward eliminativism because he wants “to eliminate certain race practices, race creeds, and some pernicious forms of race prejudice.” I agree with Carter on this point. However, I understand an eliminativist as one who thinks that eliminating racial categorization and perhaps discourse about race is the best way to eliminate pernicious practices, creeds, and prejudice. See: Jacoby Adeshei Carter, “Between Reconstruction and Elimination: Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Race,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Race, ed. Naomi Zack (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) 202. 84  See: Paul Taylor, “Pragmatism and Race,” in Pragmatism and the Problem of Race, ed. Bill E. Lawson and Donald F. Koch (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004).

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American Negroes, we believe in unity of racial effort, so far as this is necessary for self-defense and self-expression, leading ultimately to the goal of a united humanity and the abolition of all racial distinctions.”85 In Dusk of Dawn, Du Bois took “race” to be a necessary concept around which a group unifies in order to combat oppression, build community given oppression, and create culture that garners respect. However, he took there to be a point at which race would no longer be needed. At that point, race ought to be abolished. Thick racial conservationists argue for the continuance of race and race-­ talk, even after racial justice has been achieved—that is, after pragmatic reasons that license maintaining race and race-talk are satisfied. Some thick conservationists argue that there are reasons inherent to the concept that promote its conservation. Perhaps there is some inherent goodness in being a part of a racial group. My argument is that Locke thought that races were of value beyond both its ineliminability and beyond its pragmatic explanatory and unificatory importance. He agreed with Du Bois that self-expression and self-protection were powerful reasons in favor of conserving races. And he agreed that eliminating race and race-talk lacked the benefits that conserving it possesses. Additionally, however, Locke seems to have thought that race was necessary for both culture and cultural development, both of which exist and have value in a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, beyond culture’s role in developing a cosmopolitan community, culture and cultural development are necessary for human flourishing, without which humans cannot flourish. He seems to have thought that cultures and cultural development require racial differences. Insofar as culture and cultural development is—and will always be—of value, race ought to be conserved. And this is even beyond achieving racial justice. For Locke, race is a value that concretizes members around culture-­ traits of a culture-type. There should be races as long as there are and should be culture-types. Further, cultural development requires multi-race involvement, which requires race and racial categorizations. Race and racial categorizations will be valuable as long as cultural development is valuable. Locke tells us this in an essay entitled “The Contribution of Race to Culture.” Locke began the article with the words: “The proposition that race is an essential factor in the growth and development of culture, and expresses 85  W.E.B. Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept, ed. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 159.

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culturally that phenomenon of variation and progressive differentiation so apparently vital on the plane of development of organic nature, faces the pacifist and internationalist with a terrific dilemma, and a consequently difficult choice.”86 The essential question was “can we have the advantages of cultural differences without their obvious historical disadvantages?”87 For Locke, the proposition that race is an essential factor in the growth and development of culture is true. And he answered the question in the affirmative. In fact, he tells us that if he “thought it irreconcilable with the future development of internationalism and the approach toward universalism to foster the racial sense, stimulate the racial consciousness and help revive the lapsing racial tradition, I would count myself a dangerous reactionary, and be ashamed of what I still think is a worthy and constructive cause.”88 If race is irreconcilable with cosmopolitanism, then he would be obligated to abandon race. However for Locke, race and cosmopolitanism are reconcilable. Locke’s thinking on how they can be reconciled was grounded in the recognition that cultures are composite. In any event, he took race to be valuable beyond the achievement of justice, the conservation of which is necessary for culture and cultural development. “The difficulties of our social creeds and practices have arisen in great measure from our refusal to recognise this fact. In other words it has been the sense and practice of the vested ownership of culture goods which has been responsible for the tragedies of history and for the paradoxes of scholarship in this matter. It is not the facts of the existence of race which are wrong, but our attitudes toward those facts.”89 For Locke, because of its necessity for culture, race is “useful in human life and desirable to perpetuate.”90 That Locke seems to have been a thick racial conservationist does not mean that he took races to be incapable of change. Racial groups change with shifts in culture-traits of culture-types. And further, Locke’s thick racial conservationism did not take racism or racial prejudice to be permanent. And he did not take racism or racial prejudice to be necessary for maintaining race, producing and appreciating culture, or cultural 86  Alain Locke, “The Contribution of Race to Culture,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 202. 87  Ibid. 88  Ibid. 89  Ibid., 203. 90  Ibid.

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development. Racism had no value. It impeded the practice of democracy and hindered the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. Ultimately Locke thought that we can (and should) have racial categorization in a cosmopolitan community. He thought that we can appreciate difference and engage in cultural sharing—one race with another—without the perniciousness of racism. Let us now turn to Locke’s thought about racism.

Locke on Racism Locke denied biological realism about race, and argued in favor of racial constructivism. Further, he seems to have been committed to thick racial conservationism. And so he thought that racial categorizations need not be divisive. Recall that for Locke, race derived from a basic race sense that “need not be vicious in itself, but which may become so if invidious social practices are based upon it.” Race becomes vicious when racist practices derive from it. Race and race contacts, which are grounded in a particular sense, need not lead to harmful consequences. However, Locke thought that race contacts do not occur without some initial friction. As such, Locke thought that races (at least unconsciously) have initial difficulty committing to the kind of reciprocity necessary to cultivate a cosmopolitan community. The race sense must be cultivated in an environment that is conducive to healthy race contacts—namely, a truly democratic society. To get a sense of the invidious social practices that make race vicious, we need to step back and look at how they begin, grow, develop, and flourish, as well as the basis of their contact one with another. In Race Contacts, Locke provided us with a theory of how societies emerge. It is from this theory that Locke discussed how races emerge, develop, and flourish. In discussing the emergence of societies, Locke demonstrated healthy race contacts in areas when peoples meet. Racism disrupts healthy race contacts by perverting particular natural tendencies. Now Locke likened Du Bois in thinking that societies begin, not so much from a contract created by rational individuals aiming to protect their lives and interests, but by humans naturally coming together on the

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basis of kinship ties.91 Both Du Bois and Locke seemed to endorse an evolutionary theory of societal formation, where societies are an evolution of the family. Locke seems to have had in mind a loose collection of individual families existing before the formation of states. These families have no set traditions or value-systems. As families come together, they become a “people.” Locke claimed that: “If you will stop to consider ‘peoples’ as a sort of term that mediates between the [kinship] type and the larger ethnic group, what we mean by ‘people’ in the political sense is simply the large group or collective of folk that do more or less have a common consciousness.”92 The “kinship type” to which Locke referred are families bound together by blood, while the “ethnic group” is a race. A people more or less understand themselves and the world in a particular sort of way, and it is on this basis that they are bound together. Yet for Locke, a people is not yet a race. A people is in-­ between a collection of families having no worldview in common, and a race is a group with members understanding and identifying themselves with a culture-type that is signified by a name. So for Locke: “The basis of all social organization is upon some sort of kinship; in that sense [,it is clear] that kinship is really at he root of human society.”93 Social organization requires cohesiveness—a type of familiarity or affinity with each other wherein members think themselves to be linked to each other in some fundamental way. And so groups understanding themselves in different sorts of ways as apart from other groups forms the basis of any social organization in any human society—including one that is truly democratic or cosmopolitan. (Again, Locke’s cosmopolitan community is not uniformitarian, and his thinking on democracy promotes 91  See: W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Conservation of Races,” in The Problem of the Color Line at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: The Essential Essays, ed. Nahum Dimitri Chandler (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015) 53–55. In this essay, Du Bois argued that races are more sociohistorical than biological (though they begin in biology insofar as they begin with families). For Du Bois, races emerge as differences in the “ideals of life” (the values, strivings, traditions/rituals, etc.) begin to crystalize. Races begin as families (and thus have something to do with biology). As these families begin to share a common history and “ideals of life,” growing into cities and then into larger nations, the emphasis on blood lessens. Here, we are able to see that the formation of the state begins in families forming bonds, but is realized in the confraternity shared between members embracing common “ideals of life.” 92  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 20 93  Ibid.

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difference.) For Locke, primitive civilizations were linked by blood. “A primitive civilization made its [kinship] naturally, there being very little infusion of new blood[.] Anything large enough to constitute a city or state or tribe had this ethnic relation and was of one kith and kin.”94 As a people develops, they organize more so on the basis of common values, emphasizing blood-kinship bonds less, but requiring endorsement of a particular worldview. Races extend the emphasis on a particular worldview to a preference for and performance of traits of a culture-type. Societies begin with individual families coming together on the basis of kinship ties. These families blossom out to form larger communities on the basis of shared values. However, one might wonder why families blossom out in this way. What leads families to form larger communities with other families to become a people if the aim is not to contract with each other to better secure their lives and interests? Locke thought that what moves families to bind with each other is a natural desire that people have to assemble into groups. Locke argued that there is a natural tendency in humans to assemble that was grounded in a desire for community with others. This tendency would lead humans toward “complete assimilation” if left unchecked. Locke thought that though the natural tendency to assemble is good, it needs to be checked. Checking the natural tendency in humans to assemble served the end of a pluralistic and non-uniformitarian cosmopolitanism by promoting difference. “Incomplete” assimilation allows different peoples to develop different cultures. Recall Locke’s claim that: “Consequently[,] we see that although it is seemingly natural for what we might call [social osmosis or] natural assimilation (natural mixing) [to take place,] it is very fortunate [for] human contacts [that the opposite tendency exists.]” Complete assimilation of all groups is then undesirable. These tendencies—to assemble but to recognize the need for difference— seem to mirror Locke’s view of the human being who desires to be within a group but not be completely dissolved therein; these tendencies seem to mirror his modern liberal leaning. “All of the fundamental tendencies of earlier civilizations are counter tendencies to [assimilation] and run against the current of the natural instincts of human beings. So much so[,] that the civilized human being

 Ibid.

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has these distinctions ingrained in his disposition by centuries of heritage.”95 The tendencies of earlier civilizations (Locke’s example was India’s caste system) are social divisions that counter the natural tendency to assemble. Locke continued: “The distinctions are not harmful in themselves, but harmful only as they are unjustly perpetuated or irrationally practiced.”96 The practice against the natural tendency toward complete assembly—a counter that promotes divisions, particularly on the basis of the race sense that informs in-group and out-group recognition—becomes harmful when it leads to disrespecting members of out-groups. So Locke thought that societies ultimately derive from a natural tendency to assemble, but that that tendency needed to be checked. And so diverse groups are desirable in community. Diversity in races and thus in cultures and values are initially acrimonious. Locke argued that race “intensifies therefore with contacts and increases with the increasing complexity of the culture elements in any particular area. A diversity of cultural types temporarily at least accentuates the racial stresses involved, so that even when a fusion eventuates it takes place under the conditions determined by the resistance developed and the relative strength of the several cultural components.”97 Racial stresses, and therefore racial conflict, increase as races meet. It is in the nature of race contacts that races cling to and rather harshly emphasize their own culture-types. In this way, while diverging from Gobineau, Locke’s thought made use of his argument that races have a natural repulsion of other races. If Gobineau’s argument holds, then races would be incapable of reciprocating culture, which is necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Instead, Locke held that there is an initial resistance to other cultures, even as there is a natural tendency to assemble. The initial resistance is not an innate repulsion. Therefore, it is one capable of being overcome. Further, there can be no claims made that requiring groups to abandon resistance to others’ cultures is contrary to nature or God’s divine command. Now insofar as Locke thought that there is initial resistance to other groups’ culture-types, he was committed to the view that groups cling harder to the racial names under which these culture-types are referenced. Though not explicitly stated, it is perhaps the case that he thought that racial groups cling to culture-types and racial names harder in times of  Ibid., 47.  Ibid. 97  Alain Locke, “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” 195. 95 96

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initial contact with other groups because of a perceived threat to their values; out-group cultures are perceived as threatening to supplant in-­ groups’ cultures. Certainly for Locke: “There is a violent intensification whenever race contacts pass from one stage or level to another, especially when they pass from an automatic to a voluntary basis….”98 And so resistance to groups’ culture-types, along with racial antagonism that may stem from the initial resistance, can wax and wane. They can change with variables in communities wherein different races live. Alterations, particularly radical ones in race contacts evoke intense clinging to culture-types and antagonism. “Race feelings [have] [. These feelings become] intensified [with] marked variations [of population,] largely, I fancy, because groups become conscious of themselves whenever there is change[.]”99 And this might also be a reason why Locke endorsed incrementalism. Incremental progression abates intense race feelings that prolong unhealthy resistance to different culture-types that intensify race antagonisms. And so we can see that Locke did not have a quixotic view of race-­ relations. For Locke, initial resistance and antagonism are natural occurrences given the natural phenomena of “that peculiar selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to certain others” that is the ground of racial identity and the feeling that culture-types must be protected when there exists a possibility of imposition. Racial antagonism is something that must be engaged carefully. It must be engaged with a careful eye to reactions to racial progress and cultural sharing. However, Locke thought that this conflict can be mitigated and even eliminated when engaged by an earnest attempt to understand other groups’ culture-types. For Locke, we must begin with a rejection of the assumption that our own culture-­ types are inherently of greater value than others’. This is the problem of value-hierarchies that his theory of value was to solve. The problem is that racism blocks this earnest attempt, and deepens racial antagonism. Recall that there is a natural social tendency or instinct that is captured by the race-sense, a natural social tendency to amalgamate, and a natural social tendency to resist complete amalgamation that recognizes the need for difference. Racism perverts these normal social instincts. Locke described racism (as racial prejudice) in the following way:  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 54.  Ibid., 56.

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[P]rejudice…is simply an abnormal social sense, a [perversion] of a normal social instinct, which falsely attributes to certain arbitrary ethnological and biological factors, sociological and social standards which do not pertain to them at all, and which therefore operate to bring about the discrepancies which we confront when we see people who are on the way to conforming to the civilization type, denied participation and recognition in society, as if nothing mattered but their color or their kind.100

There are a few ways to understand what racism is. Doxastic accounts of racism purport that racism is rooted in false beliefs or other cognitive defects that are typically irrational. Volitional accounts claim that racism is rooted in vicious affective states. Locke’s account of racism may not be easily classifiable in accordance with any theory of racism. At times, he referred to it as “race antipathy.” Use of “antipathy” signals an affective state—namely, hatred or ill-will. At other times, he used “race prejudice.” Use of “prejudice” seems to call up false beliefs. And further, Locke claimed that “race prejudice, in so far as we are scientifically able [to determine it, is rooted in a] psychologically false standard of social judgment.”101 Beyond these views, Locke wanted to emphasize the role that color has to do with one’s ability to participate in society. In my view, Locke was not so much interested in feelings or beliefs that may not affect life-chances. Perhaps he should have been, since he was a rigorous cosmopolitan thinker. However, Locke was concerned with how color and perceived “kind” affected one’s income, ability to vote, educational opportunities, health and health care, and so on. My intuition is that for Locke, racism is a kind of practice related to power. False beliefs or affective states might be implicated, but are not sufficiently defining features of racism. Racists place an excessive emphasis on the race sense and resistance to complete assembly. They take the race sense to license the ill-treatment of “others,” and they are deficient in the desire—in fact they have a disdain— for assembly with members of other races. The desire to assemble with others becomes perverted by beliefs about other races’ bodies and culture-­ types as signals to deeper differences. The deeper differences are value-­ related, and linked with beliefs about other races’ intellectual, aesthetic, and physical traits. Races’ values are taken to be expressed by color or particular physical traits that may be taken to be inherent, but which  Ibid., 79.  Ibid., 71

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nevertheless come to define members of races. And most importantly, members of other races are denied social participation and recognition; in a word, racial group members are denied respect. Phenotypes that signal value-differences become the basis of various modes of social participation and recognition. Now Locke was quite clear that the antipathy that motivates racism is neither natural, permanent, nor uncontrollable. This is so even if it is instinctive, and even if the race sense and the natural tendency to resist complete assembly (of which racism takes advantage) are natural. “Race antipathy is instinctive (it is a matter of instinct [and] it is a matter of individual instinct) which would seem to be contrary to the position that we have taken that as a matter of fact, society can control it, and individuals can control it.”102 Here, Locke seems to have meant that race antipathy need not be linked to or motivated by reasons or a kind of conscious commitment. A racist need not think: “I will disrespect some member of another RaceG under certain conditions or commit my life to disrespecting members of that race.” They need not be aware of their hatred toward members of RaceG. And they need not think: “Members of RaceG are inferior for reasonst, k, and v.” “It must not be argued[, however, that] because it is instinctive in appeal and operation that it is spontaneous. It is not: it is cultivated, very often deliberately cultivated, and much is not only cultivated but controlled and modified. It can be controlled and modified, and [when] left to itself, it subsides.”103 By use of “spontaneous,” Locke seems to have had in mind that it is not something naturally developing, inevitable, uncaused, or uncontrolled by human actions. Locke seems to have been aware of a basic idea to which contemporary social constructivists appeal—namely, that persons in power (whether it be economic or political) have cultivated racial antipathy because it serves their interests. And he seems to have been well aware of the careful cultivation of racial antipathy for economic gains.104 In fact, Locke seemed to be aware of the relationship between economic advantage, culture, and values such that advancing a type of culture and values were to serve economic interests: “Commercial imperialism means the effort on the part of [Anglo-Saxon nations] to further trade dominance [by] foist[ing] their civilization upon any group having an  Ibid., 54.  Ibid., 54. 104  Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, 32. 102 103

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alien civilization that they can persuade or force to adopt it. If the force of persuasion is [successful,] then the conquest is [primarily on the economic side….”105 Persuading non-white races that their cultures and values are inferior to white cultures and values serves the economic end of trade dominance. For Locke, economic dominance lay at the heart of modern modes of imperialism, and was the reason for promoting a single legitimate civilization. This opposes ancient imperialism, which allowed many types of legitimate civilizations. Locke tells us that ancient imperialism “didn’t interfere with the actual life of the people very much and whatever of formal adoption of Roman law and Roman institutions [they demanded] was only formal, and [they] invariably incorporated a good deal of the actual civilization and culture of the group.”106 “Modern imperialism, contrasted with ancient imperialism, attempts quite the opposite thing. There is the belief that there can be only one civilization, instead of the ancient belief that there could only be one empire.”107 However, “the cause which really led modern empires to substitute their civilizations for that of [the] groups they conquered was, after all, an economic cause.”108 Locke observed that: “The civilization of Europe, then, thrives, from the imperialistic point of view, upon an economic basis of an adoption of the goods of European civilization through a false imposition of European civilization upon the social life of whatever group may come within its control and influence.”109 And so for Locke, the real motive behind the kind of liberal racism promoted by authors like François Bernier was economic. And economic advancement in part allowed the missionarism that promoted liberal racism. Locke drew a connection between the missionary, the trader, and the solider, and argued that: “The very profitableness of empire has made it possible for European civilization to indulge in missionarism to the extent that it has. If [missionarism] had not been a valuable political and economical practice, [then] imperialism[,] without it, would have either changed its whole tenor or else the practice would have lapsed.”110 And so, we need not take racism, as an outgrowth of the race sense and the tendency to resist complete assembly, to be “spontaneous.” They are the  Ibid.  Ibid., 25. 107  Ibid. 108  Ibid. 109  Ibid., 26. 110  Ibid., 27. 105 106

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result of serving the interests of those either with or seeking political or economic power. All of this is to demonstrate that for Locke, “although we cannot actually influence social instincts, by taking advantage of the variation in these instincts, we can actually train them in one direction or another.”111 This is a part of the reason why true democracy is of such importance. A truly democratic environment will cultivate each instinct in a healthy way. It supports the tendency to assemble, but in a way that preserves difference, respects the right to be different, and thereby does not require dissolution into a single group. That a society purports to be democratic is rather irrelevant. Locke argued that: [Race] antipathies originate in [the feelings groups have for other] groups[;] [the] spread [of such antipathies] to new communities [is not] by accident [and will continue to occur unless] there [is] some way in which the controlling external conditions can be checked. At any rate, until these can be explained, race prejudice will remain something of an enigma. It seems to be peculiarly enigmatical, because it is prevalent in the very kind of society that professes to be free from it, namely, a democratic society[. Such societies] are more often the prey of such feelings than monarchical societies. That is true of class issues and doubly true of race issues.112

Simply having a democratic structure can exacerbate racism. This is perhaps owed to it being undergirded by liberal values regarding individual autonomy and a more fluid class structure. The real question—answered by Locke’s theoretical value theory and his practical solutions of art, education, and religion—is: “How do we move from where we are to a true democracy?” Now Locke discussed various fallacies that motivated or were promoted by racists. I discussed the biological fallacy. Locke examined five more fallacies of race—namely: the superiority fallacy; the fallacy of the masses; the fallacy of the permanency of race types; the fallacy of race ascendancy; and the fallacy of automatic adjustment. These fallacies derive from, justify, motivate, or were produced by anthropological theories of race, and they reify white supremacy. For Locke, they “lie [back] of certain practices” of white supremacy.113  Ibid., 54.  Ibid., 70. 113  Ibid., 63. 111 112

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The superiority fallacy “misrepresents and elevates social and political success] into a biological and ethnological sense [of race] which[,] in fact[,] is not commensurate at all with the practical sense of race which has developed through history.”114 In other work, Locke referred to this fallacy as the fallacy of the “block conception” of race. This fallacy extends the biological fallacy that purports that certain physical properties necessarily distinguish races, and commits those who hold it to a discredited typological thinking. It adds that certain races are superior because of certain physical properties. This fallacy lumps racial group members together “unfairly with respect to their [races] cultural capacities and attainments.”115 Locke thought that “identifying abstract racial types with actual social races underlies” this fallacy.116 Locke tells us that “one assumes that blood as mixture acts as a ‘cultural leaven’ and not merely as an activating agent, and that it always works from so-called ‘higher’ to so-called ‘lower’ instead of on a reciprocal basis.”117 Now Locke did not deny the possibility that some races’ civilizations were superior to others, if by “superior” was meant “dominant” or “successful in being spread to a vaster number of people.” However, four factors need to be taken into account. First, no civilization is owed to one race. Second, civilizations wax and wane within any given time-period. Third, since races are historical constructions, every civilization owes itself to historical forces. Fourth, a civilization that is politically or socially dominant or successful is not superior because of it. For Locke, those who commit this fallacy “think that because they have made their type represent what it does that those virtues and qualities are inherent and hereditary[,] and that the accidents and practices of history have been caused by these virtues. They therefore think that it is necessary to be of that race to be a full participant of the civilization type and that really this is a sort of false attribution of cause to what, after all, is merely an effect.”118 The fallacy of the masses judges racial achievement and cultural value in terms of the aggregate population. For Locke, though prevalently endorsed, this fallacy was quite ridiculous. He argued that “significant as  Ibid., 73.  Alain Locke, “The Problem of Race Classification,” 169. 116  Leonard Harris, “Introduction to ‘The Problem of Race Classification,’” in in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 163. 117  Alain Locke, “The Problem of Race Classification,” 169. 118  Ibid. 114 115

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that is from the point of view of statistics it proves nothing from the point of view of the judgment of group [characteristics] because the essential factor is not the aggregate, but the distribution [of a characteristic in a population] in the first place, and the proportionate rate of increase in the second place.”119 Additionally, Locke thought that history showed this practice to be unwarranted. “In history, in any sound history, we never judge people in aggregates[:] we judge them in terms of their representative groups and their most representative [people] and often[,] perhaps[,] their most unique achievements.”120 The fallacy of the permanency of race types purports that certain races and their cultures and values will be dominant, successful, and superior for all of the history and future of humanity. This is perhaps the role of nature or God in many of the biased anthropological theories of race. For Locke, “the most successful class type or race type must rise to a climax and fall[,] and there is no permanence to be attributed to them[.] >”121 Again, culture-­types wax and wane, and none are permanently successful. Locke thought that it is in the nature of successful culture-types to be supplanted. Perhaps he thought that as historical and composite products, development requires progression, and progression requires culture-types being supplanted by others. The fallacy of race ascendency proposes “that society ought to be reorganized on a bi-racial system and that a race group should duplicate the social organization within itself and keep to itself, maintaining its solidarity [with the rest of society] only [through the] merest sort of economic cooperation which seems necessary for the [functioning] of society.”122 This fallacy, which Locke referred to as the most practical of the fallacies of race, presents a case for social segregation—either legally enforced or self-segregation—as a type of capitulation to racism. Without stating why, Locke claimed that “the society that practices this bi-racial system pays a very dear price and is almost in the proverbial position of the man who ‘cuts off his nose to spite his face.’”123 I imagine that Locke was concerned  Ibid., 75.  Ibid. 121  Ibid., 76. 122  Ibid. 123  Ibid., 77–78. 119 120

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about two issues. First, Locke was concerned with the level at which races could engage with and learn from each other. For instance, segregation lessens cultural reciprocation between races. Lessening cultural ­reciprocation would lessen understandings of different races. And lessening understandings of different races would lead to less respect accorded to different races. And so social segregation would have unfavorable effects on the possibility of cultivating a cosmopolitan community. Second, Locke was concerned that races that are deemed inferior will be denied economic, political, and social opportunities in a bi-racial system. And so the practice of true democracy would be undermined. The fallacy of automatic adjustment predicates that, because race is in part deliberate, race distinctions and perhaps even racism is natural and permanent as they exist. Nothing can be done to reshape race or racism. Both are naturally occurring and permanent phenomena. Locke thought that races can change with shifts in culture-types, and that racism—though instinctual—is neither natural, permanent, nor uncontrollable. Now all of these fallacies were committed by the authors discussed in the last chapter. And much of anthropological history was rancid with them. Perhaps the authors’ commitments have much to do with the biased aim that motivated anthropological theories of race. Furthermore, these fallacies were rampant in both American thought and practice. They account for much of the white racism that was the deepest and most fundamental problem in America, and the white supremacy in which America’s deepest and most fundamental problem was grounded. And as such, they were major impediments to the practice of true democracy and the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community.

Conclusion Locke’s notion of race, being purely sociocultural, diverged from a long list of authors’ theories on race. Whether supporting or combatting white supremacy, theorists tended to support biological notions of race. Locke’s theory eschewed any appeal to biology as an acceptable base for racial divisions, though without denying that races exist. And as such, he completed the work of authors such as Du Bois, who wanted to preserve race, but in a way that deemphasized biology. As Locke was able to sever race from

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biology, he provided a powerful argument against much of the white supremacy that impeded both the practice of true democracy and the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. Races are sociocultural constructions that are owed to history. They are neither natural nor divinely created. And if so, then is difficult to support much of white supremacy’s ideology. Recall that white supremacy is committed to a set of beliefs. First is the belief that there are races, where races are understood on the basis of biological differences separating species or subspecies of humans. Second is the belief that differences separating human races necessarily produce particular cultures with different values. Third is the belief in a hierarchy of human values that allows racial groups to be rank-ordered. And fourth is the belief that white peoples occupy a position at the top of the hierarchy of races. Endorsing this set of belief leads to prescriptions that justify various forms of imposition, oppression, and at worst annihilation by whites. Locke’s theory of race shows that the first and second of the beliefs in the set are false. However, one can still commit to the third and fourth beliefs. A white supremacist can argue that there is a hierarchy of cultures because there is a hierarchy of values. Whether natural or historical, whites have a better culture than non-white races because whites have better values than non-whites. And it is on that basis that whites occupy a position at the top of the hierarchy of races. So, the white supremacist might exploit Locke’s arguments that culture-types precede and create races, and that races are values. Racial differences imply value-differences because culture-­ difference is perceived as value-difference. To claim that RaceA is better than RaceB just is to perceive RaceA’s culture as better than RaceB’s. There is no way to talk of race-equality when RaceB has a culture with values that are inferior to RaceA’s. And so to claim that whites are superior to non-­ whites, the white supremacist merely needs to talk about whites having developed superior values than non-whites. White supremacy need not be grounded in nature or God, and need not rely on invariance in terms of human races having produced particular cultures with particular values. This supremacist might argue that the kind of white supremacy promoted by authors in the last chapter is too thick. And so Locke’s aim to argue against white supremacy needs an argument against value-supremacy; he needs to engage value theory. In all, Locke forced us to rethink the connection between race and culture. He re-conceived race in such a way that severed any connection to biology and placed it squarely within history and sociology. However, this

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was not enough to combat white superiority. Locke’s sociocultural theory of race can still leave value-hierarchies intact, merely locating them in history as opposed to making them timeless by either nature or God. Thus, Locke needed to attack value-hierarchies implicated in white supremacy. And this motivated Locke’s theory of value, which will be the subject of the final chapter.

CHAPTER 6

A Theory of Value for Democracy and Cosmopolitanism

Enough has been said to show that the view generally held of the relation between race and culture may well be reversed. According to the prevailing view, man is many and civilization one, meaning by this that the races differ significantly in potential ability and that only one, the white race, could have and has achieved civilization. The reverse view, forced upon the ethnologist and the historian by a more critical and open-minded survey of the facts, reads thus: man is one, civilizations are many, meaning by this that the races do not differ significantly in psychological endowment, that the variety of possible civilizations is great and of actual ones, considerable, and that many civilizations other than ours have achieved things of genuine and unique worth. —Alexander Guldenweiser, Early Civilization: An Introduction to Anthropology To my thinking, the gravest problem of contemporary philosophy is how to ground some normative principle or criterion of objective validity for values without resort to dogmatism and absolutism on the intellectual plane, and without falling into their corollaries, on the plane of social behavior and action, of intolerance and mass coercion. —Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. L. Barnes, Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3_6

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Introduction Chief among Locke’s interests was the question of whether values were mind-independent or dependent solely on the individual valuer. This is the question of whether claims about moral principles, aesthetic objects, religious beliefs, ethnic loyalties, and so on were objectively or subjectively true. Locke thought that in the context of human relations, the former (value-objectivism) led to intolerance and mass coercion, while the latter (value-subjectivism) led to anarchism and nihilism. And this question was of such importance to him because it is the question out of which very important practical problems derive. As can be seen in the epigraph taken from “Values and Imperatives,” the answer to this problem had clear bearing on democracy, construed as an attitude and recognition of the basic equality and kinship of all humans that legitimizes autonomy under rational constraints. Locke’s concept of democracy implies pluralism, tolerance, reciprocity, and the right to difference, all of which are undergirded by equality, liberty, and fraternity. Because the question has bearing on Locke’s concept of democracy, it has bearing on his various conceptions of democracy. For example, recall that intellectual democracy is the respect for human dignity by the renunciation of dogmatic and absolute claims to truth and values. An answer to this question tells us whether intellectual democracy is possible and consistent with the nature of things. An answer to the question of values has bearing on practical problems regarding racism, which implies culture-hierarchies, and therefore value-­ hierarchies. White supremacy drew a necessary link between races and cultures, which imply differences in values between races. Now white supremacists claim that if values are both objective and diverge between cultures, then particular cultures are superior to others. And if different races produce different cultures, then there are superior races. And so Locke needed to engage the problem of values so as to fully address white supremacy, which is the ideology for America’s deepest and most foundational problem—namely, racism. And further recall that a part of Locke’s response to white supremacy was to argue that races are not natural products. Rather, races are sociocultural products. Race itself is a value. It unifies culture-traits by causing a robust sense of solidarity among those who understand themselves as a unified group with a specific culture-type. And so if the argument is that race is a value, then Locke owes an account of values so as to fully explain what race is. Locke’s aim in addressing the problem of value was to produce a sort of in-between position wherein we think of values as neither objective nor

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subjective. Though Locke denied that claims about values were mind-­ independently true or false, he also denied that their truth or falsity is merely a matter of individual valuations in the way that subjectivists tend to purport. Locke’s in-between position was that there is a kind of mind-­ independence in the immediacy of value-experience, which confers valuing a kind of objectivity. He seems to have thought that this position avoided the implications of either extreme. Further, he took this position to resolve two different, perhaps contentious commitments. On the one hand, Locke was committed to cultural constants and more permanent values such as toleration, reciprocity, and democracy, all of which are necessary for a cosmopolitan community. On the other hand, Locke was committed to the idea that there needs to be a constant process of reflective reconsideration of all values—a transvaluation of values. In describing Locke’s account of value, I first want to discuss what Locke considered appropriate start-points for investigations into value. For Locke, an abstract theory of value is useless. Locke thought that the appropriate starting-points for inquiry into value is the social and political world. After discussing Locke’s starting-points, I examine Locke’s rejection of both value-objectivism and value-subjectivism. Locke thought that if we took society and the political world as our starting-point for investigating the nature of value, then we would reject both objectivism and subjectivism. This leaves us with the question: “What option is available to value theory if we reject objectivism and subjectivism in value theory?” After engaging the appropriate starting-point for value theory that led Locke away from objectivism and subjectivism, I discuss Locke’s positive theory of value. For Locke, values are emotional forms of experience. What conditions a value’s legitimacy is whether it offers the best explanation for experiences, leads to progress, and coheres with other explanatory and progressive values, all in the society or culture within which it occurs. Finally, I relate his value theory to democracy and cosmopolitanism.

On the Appropriate Starting-Points for Value Theory Now recall that Locke took there to be appropriate starting-points for inquiry into race. And recall that Locke tended to begin his philosophical enquiry from two standpoints. First, Locke began philosophical investigations with a clear and careful understanding of where humans were situated at the particular moment of his philosophical inquiry. Second, Locke

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philosophized from what he took to be possible given anthropological considerations. The same governed Locke’s inquiry into value. Two ideas that were not mutually exclusive motivated Locke’s thought about an adequate value theory. First, an adequate value theory must explain our experiences. Second, an adequate value theory must begin with problems in society and the political world, and must be useful for solving those problems. Locke was concerned with the world wherein humans interacted. He understood value theory to be a discipline that must consider how its theories are able to affect the world, and not merely describe or intellectualize about it. In this way, Locke rejected logical positivism with its denials of both metaphysics and values, and in its “flight to description and analysis too analogous to science and too committed to scientific objectivism.”1 Locke denied that philosophy was or should become science. “Scientific knowledge, on the whole, rests on detailed and specific truths, and as it grows deploys in all directions in search of them.”2 There is a clear separation between it and philosophy. “Philosophy, on the other hand, even when using scientific knowledge as a base, is committed, like religion and art, to discovering some pattern or mosaic of meaning which can be comprehended not merely as a compartmentalized collection of truths but as a composite and illuminating picture of the truth.”3 Philosophy is much more expansive than science. It tracks the whole of life, which cannot be reduced to or merely explained by science. Philosophy, which is intimately connected to life, requires systematicity of the human experience. Systematicity takes meaning into account, where meaning is not merely linguistic or logical. Its “task is that of scanning the terrain and horizons of human experience from such exploratory heights of reason as alone, it seems, can yield a panoramic view of [woman and] man and [her and] his place in the universe.”4 This panoramic view considers what it means to be and live as a human, along with what is important in human life. Positivism, however, proposed what cannot be lived. Locke thought that: “Man [and

1  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 36. 2  Alain Locke, “Good Reading,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 104. 3  Ibid., 104–105. 4  Ibid., 104.

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woman] does not, cannot, live in a valueless world.”5 Positivism, with its emphasis on logic and scientific rigor alone, failed to see this. Locke thought that philosophical inquiry, especially one inquiring into the nature of value, should take this proposition seriously. And if it does, then philosophical inquiry into the nature of value will accept that society and the political world is the appropriate starting-point for a philosophical inquiry into value. A concern for society and the political world deeply affected Locke’s arguments in the debate about values. This concern led him to commit to a functional approach to value theory whereby there was no uncoupling “the theoretical from such practical aspects of the value problem, and [which] may eventually find its best leads and most satisfactory solutions coming by way of an insistence on such correlation.”6 Here, Locke was not merely concerned with answers to theoretical questions relating to human experience. To be clear, theoretical issues were genuine concerns. A sound philosophy explains experience. And so a sound philosophy answers theoretical questions even if it does not have significant bearing on pressing practical problems such as racism, democracy, and cosmopolitanism. However, Locke was concerned about the concrete practical issue of conflicts in values. These conflicts led to wars, imperialism, xenophobia, and racism that prevented the practice and spread of democracy, and thereby hindered the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, theoretical questions about value must include and be guided by the societal and political problems of different values lived and held dearly in our world. The concern with the social and political world separated him from many thinkers on value. It aligned him with those who took into account how theoretical inquiry about value must be applicable to the world, and are in fact justified by its engagement with people’s lives. Now recall that Locke was committed to fallibilism, whereby humans and human sciences are prone to error, even though humans can improve to make progress. In one of Locke’s most well-known essays—namely, “Values and Imperatives,” Locke began with the claim that all philosophies refer to specific times and locations. Philosophy does not capture mind-independent and timeless realities, even in being a systematic project  Ibid., 34.  Alain Locke, “A Functional Theory of Value Ultimates,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 82. 5 6

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that aims to capture humans’ place in the universe.7 Philosophical discourses are conditioned by the perspectives and needs of the communities within which they are developed. And they are judged to be sound insofar as they reflect both the experiences and needs of communities within which they are situated. At most, philosophy can capture something that is characteristic of an age. That philosophy cannot capture mind-independent and timeless realities because of its time-embeddedness and philosophers’ fallibility does not imply that Locke thought it not to aim at objectivity and truth. “For him, philosophy is a subjective activity with a view towards some objective reality.”8 The question is what truth is. Locke asserted that an overemphasis on logic and verification made “common cause with the current scientific attitude; making truth too exclusively a matter of the correct anticipation of experience, of the confirmation of fact. Yet truth may also sometimes be the sustaining of an attitude, the satisfaction of a way of feeling, the corroboration of a value.”9 Locke criticized philosophy for having begun to take truth to be singular, having one meaning, and found through one timeless method. Philosophers were failing to realize that: “To the poet, beauty is truth; to the religious devotee, God is truth; to the enthused moralist, what ought-to-be overtops factual reality.”10 If philosophers pay attention to society and the political world, then we will not lose sight of this. And if not, then the world will lose interest in us. Now it is not the case that Locke thought that philosophy should merely confirm what the world says or does. The world was thoroughly racist, and white supremacy was spread the world over. Locke repudiated these so-called “values.” However, he was philosophically committed to the idea that: “It is said to be ‘no use’ to postulate the impossible or to cherish utterly unrealizable ideals.”11 We saw this with Locke’s rejection of racial eliminativism. For Locke, philosophical theories that propose what is unrealizable are worthless. Paying attention to society and the political  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 34.  Segun Gbadegesin, “Values, Imperatives, and the Imperative of Democratic Values,” in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, Culture, Race, and Education, ed. Leonard Harris (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999) 277. 9  Ibid., 37. 10  Ibid. 11  Alain Locke, “Value,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 119. 7 8

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world keeps our theories in the realm of possibility, and thus keeps them of value to us, even when we challenge or reject aspects of the world. Philosophy, on Locke’s account, “works toward a system of interpretation, for some meaningful synthesis of knowledge and experience.”12 It synthesizes knowledge and experience in a useful way. For Locke, philosophy does not merely aim at truth. Like art and religion (perhaps surprisingly), he seems to have thought that philosophy does much to capture truth. However, if philosophy can capture truth, then the truth that it captures does not regard the world as it is independent of our minds. For Locke, truth does not require a correspondence between our ideas and the world, but a synthesis of our experience with the world—a sort of mediation between the world and ourselves—in a way that is useful to us. The world—as it is in a mind-independent sort of way—is not something to which our minds can get. Instead, the world is mediated or conveyed to us through our values. In some sense, the world must conform to us in order to be a world for us. And so Locke seems to have implicitly rejected both a correspondence theory of truth and philosophy’s ability to capture objective truths in claiming that “all philosophies refer to specific times and locations.” And as such, Locke rejected philosophy’s claim to capture or shed light on objective human values. Instead, he required that philosophical inquiry into the nature of value serve the practical needs of those about whom the inquiry was constructed. In addition to rejecting the correspondence theory of truth on purely phenomenological grounds, Locke rejected the correspondence theory of truth on practical grounds. Ernest Mason tells us that Locke’s “psychological approach to values was never intended to be an end in itself. Rather, he was interested in the psychological nature of valuating consciousness in an effort to better understand the nature of our agreements and conflicts over values.”13 His aim in understanding the nature of our agreements and conflicts over values was to solve practical problems. And so his value theory is not a mere abstract or intellectual endeavor. “This does not mean that axiology should have the task of formulating and expressing a specific ethical system, but that it should serve as a methodology for the investigation of ethical and moral phenomena in an effort  Ibid., 104.  Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value: An Introduction” (Unpublished Emory University Doctoral Thesis, 1975) 87. 12 13

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to offer us a more accurate approach to the problem of normative judgments.”14 Value theory, and philosophical inquiries more broadly, should not be constructed to support a system or world view. Recall that Locke rejected much theorizing in anthropology on the grounds that it had a biased starting-point—namely, that it aimed to justify racial hierarchies. Further, Locke rejected various theories of art—most notably W.E.B.  Du Bois’ theory of art—because of its propagandistic  aim. However, like philosophy more broadly, value theory must begin with the world, and have the aim of relating back to the world in its goal of progressing the world. And this idea allied Locke with pragmatist thinking. Though Locke embraced pragmatism in his concern about the world as a necessary starting-point for philosophy, he was not completely satisfied with it. “Locke’s philosophy can be described as radical pragmatism. It is radical in the sense that he believed pragmatism, as a philosophical movement, had become a conservative dogma by the late 1930s. In addition, for Locke, as a philosophy pragmatism failed to appreciate its own ethnocentrism because, under James, it privileged experimentalism and the scientific method.”15 Locke argued that “pragmatism has only transposed the question from the traditional one of how what ends should govern life to the more provocative one of how and why activity created them.”16 “His critique of pragmatism’s approach to values, particularly Dewey’s, centers on its approach to value absolutes.”17 For Locke, pragmatism merely aimed to replace dogmatic principles of value with an account of the genesis of values and why we rely on them. Pragmatism, then, did nothing to challenge dogmatism. It failed to have any impact on concrete societal and political problems, even if it offered explanations for human experiences. Further, for Locke, “pragmatism and instrumentalism has set up at the center of its philosophy a doctrine of truth as itself a functional value.”18 Pragmatism and instrumentalism have set up an ends–means relationship whereby means become justifiable because of the ends that are desired. For Locke, this led to value anarchism, while avoiding the problem of

 Ibid.  Leonard Harris, “Rendering the Text,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 17. 16  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 35. 17  Leonard Harris, “Rendering the Text,” 17. 18  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 35. 14 15

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absolutism that it was constructed to engage. And so, Locke might have labeled pragmatist investigations into the nature of value “useless.” Now beginning with society and the political world as a startingpoint for value theory led Locke to refute value-objectivism and -subjectivism. The former led to intolerance and coercion, and could license white supremacy. Licensing white supremacy would only further America’s deepest and most fundamental problem. However, the latter offered no solution, and therefore fared no better. It led to anarchism and nihilism, and afforded no resources for combatting white supremacy.

Locke’s Critique of Value-Objectivity and Value-Subjectivity For Locke, the most significant theoretical problem in value theory was the problem of the ontological status of values. Locke was concerned to have a value theory that can be confirmed by our experiences. Now unlike many philosophers of his day, Locke thought that engaging in value theory would lead to a solution to practical value-conflicts that get in the way of democracy and cosmopolitanism. And so, for Locke, value theory should address two sets of related problems. “One set of problems is on the theoretical level, and involves the formal definition of the generic character of the value ultimates: the other set of problems is on the practical level and concerns the active issues of value conflict in our culture and their bearing on the questions of value ultimacy.”19 Though concerned with value theory from a theoretical standpoint, “it appears that what Locke is really trying to solve is not so much the epistemological problem of subjectivism versus objectivism, but the very practical, political, and social problems of value absolutism and value dogmatism.”20 Locke’s arguments against value-objectivity and valuesubjectivity, along with his positive value theory, aimed ultimately at practical ends. In Locke’s view, the main theoretical problem with value-objectivity is that the position cannot explain phenomenological experiences in the  Alain Locke, “A Functional Theory of Value Ultimates,” 82.  Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value,” in Alain Locke: Reflections on a Modern Renaissance Man, ed. Russell J.  Linnemann (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982) 8. 19 20

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process of valuing. Locke saw that humans tend to merge and transfer value-­predicates in their assertions and judgements. Locke termed this value transposition.21 Value transposition occurs where a value-predicate (beautiful/ugly, holy/unholy, etc.) is attributed to an object or state of affairs that differs from its usual classificatory type. “We are aware of instances, for example, where a sequence of logical reasoning will take on an aesthetic character as a ‘beautiful proof ’ or a ‘pretty demonstration,’ or where a moral quality or disposition is appraised not as ‘good’ but as ‘noble,’ or again, where a religious ritual is a mystical ‘reality’ to the convinced believer but is only an aesthetic, symbolic show to the non-credal spectator.”22 This is principally why “truth” for the poet can be beauty. “Truth” is typically reserved for and attributed to claims regarding scientific states of affairs. However, it can be transferred to objects and states of affairs not classified as scientific. And so one might say, for instance, that: “Nas’ music is ‘the truth.’” Here, one need not be speaking hyperbolically. If values were mind-independent, and especially if things are such that they affect a passive mind and evoke a judgement thereafter, then those who spoke of a “pretty demonstration” and so on are either taking poetic license or merely speaking nonsense. In either case, they would be incorrect—as a matter of fact—in making the claim. Locke argued that: “Unless this type of value occurrence is illusory or mere metaphorical confusion in the language of value description, it presents an almost unexplainable character to the value realist. If he is consistent with his doctrine of the value type as intrinsic, he must dismiss such situations a mere analogies.”23 And so: “The logical [value-objective] way of explaining such instances assumes a change of the judgmental pre-suppositions mediating the values, or in other cases, puts forward the still weaker explanation of the transfer of value predicates through metaphor and analogy.”24 Locke took these positions to be mistaken. Rather, he thought that there is nothing incorrect—as a matter of fact—in claiming that some logical demonstration is pretty, particularly when thinking of the type of feeling that a logician might have when perceiving or thinking about some proof.

 Alain Locke, “A Functional Theory of Value Ultimates,” 85.  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 44. 23  Alain Locke, “A Functional Theory of Value Ultimates,” 85. 24  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 44. 21 22

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Locke conceded that there are tendencies that create usual classificatory types. “Formalizations of values, traditional in attitude association or orthodox in logical evaluation, do stereotype certain content with value references that become typical and characteristic…”25 Two factors ­contribute to the creation of a usual classificatory type, where value-predicates get attributed to objects and states of affairs. First is the tendency of a particular feeling being evoked in humans by some experience of an object or state of affairs. So, those who stand in an open field or atop a hill in the dark of night, and under a star-filled sky, have a tendency to experience a state of awe that inspires an association with a religious value-type. The feeling and association lead to the attribution of the value-predicate “holy” to nature or the sky above. Second, tendencies in conscious evaluations could lead to certain objects or states of affairs usually being associated with a value-predicate. One might add a third  factor—namely, learning in a particular culture. The immediacy of the value-predicate’s being associated with an object or state of affairs may be the result of having learned to make the association in a particular culture. Culture then may teach us to attribute certain value-predicates to objects or states of affairs immediately. For Locke, whatever the case may be, there are many exceptions in actual valuations. These exceptions present problems for value-objectivism.26 Locke thought that: “The same principles hold, moreover, in explaining the conflicts and incompatibilities of values as value-groups. Of course, there are other types of value conflicts, means-ends and value-series problems, but what concerns us at this point are those graver antinomies of values out of which our most fundamental value problems arise.”27 Locke thought that disagreement over the weight of values presents problems for theories that purport value-objectivity. Appeal to truth, beauty, and goodness confirms this. “How, even after lip service to the parity of Beauty, Truth and Good, we conspire for the priority of one pet favorite, which usually reflects merely our dominant value interest and our own temperamental value bias.”28 If values were objective, then we should not find such longstanding disagreement amongst competent judges of the three different values. And so, that there is such divergence in the weight of  Alain Locke, “A Functional Theory of Value Ultimates,” 85.  Ibid. 27  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 44–45. 28  Ibid., 45. 25 26

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values illustrates a problem with thinking values to be mind-independent in the way that value-objectivists tend to think. Now recall Locke’s preference for accounting for history when explaining race. Locke seems to have the same requirement for value theory. Locke seems to have thought that an attentive eye to history disconfirms value-objectivism. Excluding what ought to occur, he thought that value-­ objectivism suffers from a lack of an ability to explain the transvaluation that occurs with regularity for most values.29 Transvaluation occurs when societal development or problems therein require societies to rethink and adjust their values. Value-objectivity has difficulty explaining this, and has difficulty explaining how a treasured value from the past can become a disvalue in our present or future. Instead, Locke argued that “what is revealed or developed in experience as better becomes the new good, shifting the position of normative acceptance or agency formerly occupied by the older value content.”30 An object that we judge to be better than another, but not necessarily a good object, becomes a good object because of its being reevaluated in certain contexts.31 Objects’ goodness, then, is contextual. Their goodness depends on circumstances in which contexts become important, which can only be connected to our experiences. Context could not explain a thing’s becoming good/bad or better/worse if there were objective properties that make them qualitatively good or better than other objects. Changes in normative force result from the contextuality whereby objects become good; whether we ought to pursue an object shifts with contextual shifts in the goodness/badness of the object. However, these shifts are difficult to explain if objects’ value is mind-independent. “The process continuity of the normative character of values is demonstrated not merely by the substitution of new value content for the old, but even more clearly by the displacement and retroactive devaluing of the old, a procedure which transforms yesterday’s good into a relatively [sic] bad.”32  Alain Locke, “A Functional Theory of Value Ultimates,” 82–83.  Ibid., 84. 31  Thus, one may infer that a qualitatively “bad” object can become an unqualifiedly “good” object, which Locke claimed would be impossible if certain value-properties were implied by the existence of the object. 32  Alain Locke, “A Functional View of Value Ultimates,” 84. 29 30

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For Locke, our imperatives are derived from how we feel. We may then judge an object as either good or bad, or as either better or worse than another object. “When explicit judgement ensues, it is revamped in evaluative thought accordingly.”33 Moreover, Locke gave an implicit rejection of value-objectivism because he thought that all objects possess the capacity of being valued.34 Locke’s view that all objects are capable of being valued seems to be a rejection of a particular type of argument used to support value-objectivism. This argument asserts that there is a natural attraction toward or repulsion away from certain objects either because of certain real qualities of the objects or because human emotions, intuition, and/or our rational faculty picks out qualities in objects that make them worthy of a certain sort of esteem. Locke seems to have reasoned that if all objects possess the ability to be valued, then neither are true. For Locke, “value differs in kind from consciousness of fact. It is posterior to the latter, and represents a reaction upon fact…. [V]alues are something superadded upon the other qualities of objects by the mind, in order to express their relation to its purpose and acts, and do not inhere in objects per se.”35 Value, for Locke, is something added to the object by the psychological faculty of the valuing agent.36 And so Locke rejected value-objectivism on theoretical grounds. However, he conceded that values can take on a kind of objectivity within a community. They can appear objective without being ontologically objective. He conceded that values can come to appear ontologically real if by such is meant that they become very widely accepted or acknowledged within a community. Widespread acknowledgement explains why people tend to think of particular objects as containing an inner worth. He argued that “it is only if an object is constantly valued in a particular way that its value adheres to it and it comes to seem intrinsically valuable. For it then emancipates itself from the personal valuation and makes its valuation look like a mere recognition of an already  Ibid.  Alain Locke, “Value,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) 123. 35  Ibid., 126. 36  Here, we need not think that the separation between fact and value is too stark. Locke did not think that we perceive facts separately from or without value. In many cases, the fact becomes what it is because of the value. 33 34

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existing value. Value acquires objectivity in other ways also.”37 It is unclear whether Locke took this process to produce actual objectivity or merely the appearance of it. Statements that he made could license the inference that he took a communal accordance to produce actual objectivity in values. Locke wrote: Thus the personal reaction expressed in a value-judgment carries a formal claim to universality, since everyone initially regards himself as the measure of all things, until he is instructed by the dissent of others. This claim therefore maintains itself only while it is not disputed, and should not be taken as more than methodological. By the comparison of value-judgments it appears that different persons value very differently; hence many value-judgments being in dispute are regarded as ‘merely subjective.’ About others, many or all are found to agree, and these may thereby acquire every degree of ‘objectivity.’38

Wide disagreement about an object’s value leads to the appearance that the valuer determines the object’s value. Wide agreement either causes or confers objective value to the object. “Thus objects which have obtained social recognition as valuable come to rank as objective values. A value that has risen to be objective may then maintain itself without continuing to be valued, and even though, under the circumstances, its value may have been converted into the opposite.”39 I take Locke to have thought that widespread agreement confers the mere appearance of objectivity. What separates the appearance of objects as possessing mere subjective value from those that appear to have objective value is not internal to the object, or a kind of fittingness of the objects that can be discriminated by any valuer. Rather, their being valued in a certain sort of way in society, along with the longevity of their being valued in this way, accounts for the appearance of objectivity of values.40 Now Locke had several important practical critiques of value-­ objectivism. Recall from chapter one that Locke was concerned about 37  Alain Locke, “Value,” 123. (Locke never articulated how value acquires objectivity in ways other than the way stated. One is left to wonder whether there are manifold valuationprocesses, or whether there are manifold ways in which the one valuation-process can produce value-predicates.) 38  Ibid. 39  Ibid. 40  Still, one is left to wonder why there is such a variance in why people are more likely to value some things in a similar way and why others are valued so variedly.

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absolutism. Recall that it is the belief that the things (at least some of the things) that one values are ultimately justified (or justifiable) independently of social or historical conditions, and that the professed values apply equally to all human beings regardless of any actual social or historical differences. Locke’s concern was grounded in the imposition of values on those with differing values to which absolutism leads. Value-objectivism has been a great weapon for absolutism, both intellectually and in contacts between cultures. Further, Locke was concerned with uniformitarianism. Recall that uniformitarianism is the active desire to bring other peoples or culture into conformity with one’s own life-expressions or the life-expressions of one’s culture, nation, religion, and so on. Locke was deeply concerned about uniformitarian universalism, and with peace that is conditioned by uniformity in values. We might think of peace conditioned in this way as a uniformitarian conception of cosmopolitanism, or as uniformitarian universalism. Recall that he rejected uniformitarian universalism for four reasons. First, uniformitarian universalism is impossible, and thereby impractical. Second, uniformitarian universalism would have a very negative effect on culture because it would lead to cultural stagnation. Third, uniformitarian universalism undercuts certain rights that condition peace—namely, liberty. Fourth, uniformitarian universalism—given that it is undergirded by absolutism—is false. Value-objectivism promoted uniformitarian universalism. Still further, value-objectivism licenses arbitrary dogmatism. Recall that arbitrary dogmatism is a commitment to a value made in the absence of any justification for it over other viable options, where these commitments are immune to disputation. These block many of the conceptions of democracy that need to flourish in order to promote the practice of democracy. If values are mind-independent, then there is no need to discuss them in a critical way. They are beyond dispute. And those who disagree with them are either mistaken (in the case of intellectual values), uncultured (in the case of aesthetic values), wicked (in the case of religious values), or immoral (in the case of moral values). These people can very easily be denied dignity via moral equality accorded to all members of the human race, without which they could very easily be denied political rights, educational benefits, economic opportunities, and so on. Lastly, value-objectivism had a big role in the white supremacy that is the ideology for America’s deepest and most fundamental problem. Racism was predicated on seeing “white values” as objectively superior to

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any value-system taken to be non-white. Again, we see this with each of the theorists in Chap. 4. Bernier’s liberal racism was predicated on value-­ objectivism that entailed the denigration of values and culture-products perceived as non-European. It justified imposition and perhaps oppression that served non-European groups’ interests in order to bring them into the fold of European history. Kant’s scientized race and racism, in some sense, scientized values as they related to races. Blumenbach’s and Gobineau’s understanding of degeneration made whites’ values markers from which humanity devolved. Value-objectivism then, became a necessary tool in furthering the white supremacy that motivated and derived from each author’s view. Now one might think that the answer to value-objectivism’s theoretical and practical problems lies in value-subjectivism. “According to the subjectivist, the values I cherish are good for me and the ones you cherish are good for you. Value judgements are neither objectively true nor objectively false, but merely the expression of personal attitudes, needs, interests, and tastes masquerading as rational judgements.”41 Though sympathetic to certain of its theoretical and practical aims and effects, Locke argued against value-subjectivism. Value-subjectivism’s greatest theoretical problem is one of its gravest practical problems. Value-­ subjectivism is unlivable. Locke argued that we live by and cannot live without our imperatives. Values ground these imperatives. And so we live by and cannot live without values. Locke asserted that: “In de-throning our absolutes, we must take care not to exile our imperatives, for after all, we live by them. We must realize more fully that values create these imperatives as well as the more formally super-imposed absolutes, that norms govern our behavior as well as guide our reasoning.”42 Subjectivist positions that reduce values to arbitrary feeling-states of the individual run the risk of forcing us to lose sight of a more fundamental aspect of human experiences. Theoretically, arguing such a position is tantamount to arguing against the theory of noncontradiction. Any argument presupposes the principle of noncontradiction. Likewise, any argument against values—particularly as it regards normativity—presupposes truth as a value that ought to motivate a particular response. Further, since living a life that does not assume the principle of noncontradiction is impossible, theorizing about such a position is  Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value,” 7.  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 34.

41 42

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pointless. Locke thought the same thing about arguments for value-subjectivism. Why argue in favor of a position that cannot be lived. Locke argued that “by waiving the question of the validity of value ultimates as ‘absolutes,’ we do not escape the problem of their functional categorical character as imperatives of action and as norms of preference and choice.”43 Even if it were not pointless to argue for value-subjectivism from a theoretical point of view, the practical consequences of accepting it are disastrous. In fact, they are equally as disastrous as value-objectivism. Locke thought that value-subjectivism led to the abdication of or nihilism about values. The latter could end in thinking life pointless. And thinking life pointless does not progress society. One who thinks life pointless would not work or think it beneficial to work to solve many of our deep social and political problems, to further democracy, and work toward the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. In fact, thinking life pointless does not sustain society at all. Value-subjectivism does not solve the problem that austere imperatives derived from objective theories of value created. If all values are a matter of individual preference, and none are better than others, then what is wrong with racism? What is wrong with the denial of democracy? Imperialism? Colonialism? And further, democratic values are not better than racist values. Cosmopolitanism is not better than white supremacy. These are merely different value-sets that are true and worthy of respect or disrespect just in case individuals do or do not prefer them. For Locke, as a critical pragmatist, this view was misguided.

Locke’s Value-Pluralist Theory of Value Locke argued that an appropriate starting-point for value theory is the social and political world. It was attentiveness to that starting-point that led Locke to deny value-objectivity and value-subjectivity. Rather than these, Locke promoted value-pluralism. Without affirming mind-­ independent values and thus imperatives, he argued that there is something objective in the experience of valuing. He took this position to solve both the theoretical and practical problems of both objectivism and subjectivism. Locke’s value theory is often called relativistic. And there is good reason for thinking it to be so. On a few occasions, Locke referred to his

 Ibid., 35.

43

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position on values as a “cultural relativist” position.44 However, it would appear that Locke was not thinking about cultural relativism in the way that is often articulated in current debates. Locke did not accept a kind of cultural relativism whereby values are correct just in case they are the guiding principles of the culture or society in which they occur. For Locke, values’ legitimacy is not conditioned by culture or society. And we can infer this from the inconsistency of the view with Locke’s rejection of racism and white supremacy. Locke thought that racism and white supremacy were guiding sets of values in America, even if the guiding ideals laid down in America’s Constitution were different from or antithetical to them. Locke would have recognized cultural relativism, construed on these terms, as poor foundations for challenging racism and white supremacy. Further, Locke lauded racial and social progress. Lauding these is difficult—if at all possible—from a cultural relativist position. My intuition is that Locke would have been just as suspicious of this construal of cultural relativism as he was of subjectivism. Rather than values being true just in case they are the guiding ones of a culture or society, Locke used relativism to deny values mind-­ independence and to express the idea that a value or set of values is true in relation to other things—namely, our experiences and social needs. For Locke, what conditions a value’s legitimacy is whether it works best in the system and time in which it exists—that is, if it: (1) offers the best explanation for experiences; (2) leads to progress; and (3) coheres with other explanatory and progressive values, all in the society or culture within which it occurs.45 This conception allows for a number of different values and value-sets that may be “true,” but are able to be critiqued from within and without the society or culture in which the values exist. He endorsed this view in avoiding value-objectivity’s rigidity and value-subjectivism’s absurdity. Neither could best explain our experiences nor progress society. Thus, neither cohered with values that work best in society. For the purposes of clearly distinguishing Locke’s view from more contemporary construals of cultural relativism, I refer to his view as a value-pluralist position.

44  Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond, ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 45  Alain Locke, “A Functional View of Value Ultimates,” 87–92. My intuition derives from Locke’s claims about how values function in morality, science, and art.

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Locke argued that: “The traditional way of accounting for the various kinds of value, on the other hand, starting out as it does from the side of evaluation, leans too heavily upon logical definition.”46 In addition to the problems described above, Locke seemed to have thought that value-­ objectivism privileged logic and reason too highly, while value-­subjectivism overprivileged feeling and emotion. “The natural distinctions of values and their functional criteria surely lie somewhere in between the atomistic relativism of a pleasure-pain scale and the colorless, uniformitarian criterion of logic….”47 And so, in splitting the difference between objectivism and subjectivism, Locke wanted to ground valuation in emotion, while avoiding radical overemphases on individual feelings. Locke engaged value theory from a phenomenological and genetic point of view. “Phenomenologically, it attempts to explore and describe the psychological phenomena of valuational experiences; genetically, it traces the origin and development of these experiences in terms of the psychological processes involved.”48 From this engagement Locke’s position was that value is “an attitude assumed towards fact, a weighing of fact in relation to an agent, and his feelings, desires, interests, purposes, needs, and acts; and it expresses his appreciation (approbation) or reprobation (depreciation) of it in this relation.”49 So, for Locke, valuational experiences are emotional experiences. He provided a few criteria for valuational experiences. First, value is distinct from fact. The latter relates to what is, while the former relates to what ought to be.50 Yet, for Locke, neither can exist without the other. “Pure value exists as little as pure fact.”51 Second, values are both positive and negative. “As they express the attitude of a subject to an object, they indicate the acceptance or rejection, pursuit or avoidance, of the former, the attractiveness or repulsiveness of the latter. They occur therefore in couples of antithetical predicates, both admitting of degrees of intensity.”52 And third: “All values are disputable.”53 Persons’ “valuation need not be

 Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 41.  Ibid., 38. 48  Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value,” 4. 49  Alain Locke, “Value,” 111. 50  Ibid., 117. 51  Ibid., 119. 52  Ibid., 117. 53  Ibid. 46 47

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correct, and need not be accepted.”54 For Locke, no value is immune to question or timelessly true. Now though an emotional experience, the assignment of value-­ predicates in valuational experiences is not free-floating, singular, or purely subjective. As we will see, this is because the value-types are not free-­ floating, singular, or purely subjective once we consider societal influences on perception. “Taking feeling-modes as the basic factor of differentiation, the religious and ethical, moral, logical and aesthetic types of value differentiate very neatly on the basis of four fundamental feeling-modes of exaltation, tension, acceptance, and repose or equilibrium.”55 These later are values’ modal qualities (feeling-modes or emotions) for the former value-types. For Locke: “There are sub-divisions for each value-mode determined by the usual polarity of positive and negative values, and also for each mode a less recognized but most important sub-division related to the directional drive of the value-feeling.”56 Locke thought that modal qualities each have an introverted and extraverted type. In valuational experiences, the modal quality either relates specifically to the subject as something strictly internal, or it relates to a community as something external. And each modal quality has value-­ predicates and positive/negative polarities. As it relates to ethical (inner) or moral (outer) value-types, inner or internal tensions relate to conscience, while outer or external tensions relate to duty. “Every definition of the moral or ethical situation recognizes the characteristic element of conflict between alternatives and the correlated sense of tension.”57 If there is an inner tension, perhaps one caused by an internal standard that we can either live up to or fail, and we live up to the standard, then we will attribute the value-predicate “goodness” to our action. If not, then we will attribute the value-predicate “badness” to our action. Likewise, if there is an outer tension, perhaps one caused by a communal standard that we can either live up to or fail, and we live up to the standard, then we will attribute the value-predicate “right” to our action. If not, then we will attribute the value predicate “wrong” to our action.

 Ibid.  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 41. 56  Ibid. in “Value,” Locke provided the following value-types: hedonic; aesthetic; utility; ethical; religious; and logical. 57  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 41. 54 55

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As it relates to the religious value-type, introverted awe or worship is felt as an inner ecstasy. One might say that: “I get joy, joy, joy when I think about the Lord.” Or: “Contemplation of the ‘Holy’ is an awe-inspiring and rapturous experience.” Extroverted awe or worship is felt as religious zeal. In community, this joy might be expressed in a “praise-break” or “holy ghost dance.” Such experiences are felt as religious experiences, and their subjects receive value-predicates “holy” and “good.” Locke argued that “the mode of the religious values, we have the mechanisms of introverted exaltation determining positively the ecstasy and sense of union of the religious mystic and negatively his sense of sin and separation, with the outward or extroverted form of the religious value expressing itself in the convictions of “conversion” and salvation (active union with God) and the salvationist crusade against evil (the fear and hate of Satan).”58 For Locke, classificatory schemas relating to valuational experiences refer to two different processes. The first, which he explicitly stated, regards the way in which socially classified objects affect the emotions of valuers. The second, which I think he needs in order to make his value theory work, regards the way in which objects are classed in community. These two modes are the basic ways of valuational experiences that are attached to the perception of objects in accordance with language and use. For Locke, when objects are subsumed under classifications that are in accord with communal constraints of language and use, they affect the feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes of valuers in a way that makes placement under a value-type immediate; under normal social constraints in valuational experiences, we attribute values to objects immediately. Locke argued that “value modes have a way of setting up automatically or dispositionally their end-values prior to evaluative judgment.”59 For Locke, this meant that the manner in which objects affect us is not arbitrary. And thus Locke took there to be a kind of objectivity for values and imperatives, though not the static mind-independence purported by value-objectivists. For Locke, there is a psychological schema that is particular to humanity. Objects that are classified in a certain way fit into a definite number of value-types, which refers to “the qualitative character of a particular way of experiencing as mediated by a given emotion or attitude which Locke

 Ibid.  Ibid., 36.

58 59

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terms the feeling-quality [modal quality].”60 In this way, “values are immediately recognized through an apprehension of their emotional quality; value-predicates are determined by the affective volitional influence of the feeling-quality; and the imperatives of a given value are given immediately once the primary feeling-quality has been established.”61 The first classificatory schema regards a psychological schema whereby perceived objects are immediately placed under value-types. Yet, one might wonder how this position differs from value-­subjectivism, even in promoting objectivity in the psychological schema of valuational experiences. Certainly a value-subjectivist can affirm the claim that there is a psychological schema in valuational experiences and still claim that the values they cherish are good for them and the ones you cherish are good for you. And so one might say that Locke’s value-pluralism amounts to the same thing as value-subjectivism if it only affirms a psychological schema in valuational experiences. I think that a part of the answer to the question in the preceding paragraph lies in how community teaches us to perceive objects. In my view, Locke must have thought that there is a more fundamental classificatory schema relating to valuational experiences—that is, besides the psychological schema that places objects directly under value-types. This schema is prior to the emotional effects that objects have on us when classified as objects in accordance with language and usage. In order for Locke to have held a position in between value-objectivity and value-subjectivity, Locke needed to think that perceived objects accord to similarities in language and use such that they tend to affect value-types in similar ways. Locke needed to think there to be a classificatory schema that relates to perceived objects. Locke argued that even though value is relative to our personalities: “This relativity, however, is not to be regarded as importing any objectionable subjectivity into values, just because it proves to be the source also of their objectivity. For it turns out that all objects are pervaded by values and constituted for man [and woman] by valuations, and hence their avowed values may just as rightfully belong to them as the values latent in their other qualities.”62 If all objects do not possess the same 60  Jacoby Carter, “Alain LeRoy Locke,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University, 2012) 8. 61  Ibid. 62  Alain Locke, “Value,” 119.

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c­ riteria for valuations, then they would arbitrarily affect valuers’ feelings, emotions, and attitudes. Objects must be perceived as particular objects, possessing a general kind of usableness, and under certain linguistic constraints as kinds of classifiable objects. They must be classified this way in order to affect particular emotions that evoke an immediate categorization under a value-type. This is why value-types are not necessarily free-­floating, singular, or purely subjective once we consider societal influences on perception.63 Locke thought that perceiving an object with a particular value need not “occur in the history of the individual, but it can be traced in that of the race, whose achievements the individual inherits. An object may, for example, be apprehended as pleasant, beautiful, or right, without a judgement or process of valuation; but the immediacy of its value-claim is no bar to any inquiry into why it is valued, how it has come to be so, and whether it ought to be so, and really is as beautiful, right, or pleasant as it seems to be.”64 Objects’ coming to have a certain value does not depend on individual valuers’ experiences in valuing certain objects. For Locke, the individual valuer inherits a world of valued objects—a world in which objects have obtained a certain sort of value due to a valuation-process. Communities have set up a value-system that it “teaches” (cultures) individuals to perceive when they perceive objects. Now Locke’s value theory concerns the relationship between value and facts. A fact is said to be separable from value. “Reflexion at present commonly starts from the antithesis of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ and the difference between the standpoints of ‘description’ and ‘appreciation.’ It is widely held that consciousness of value differs in kind from consciousness of fact. It is posterior to the latter, and represents a reaction upon fact.”65 Locke 63  Now one might read this type of classification to be contrary to Locke’s own words. Values, on Locke’s account, have no invariable content. And Locke did not seem to limit this to comparisons across communities. The value of a certain Objectx can be inconstant within communities because of divergences in the perception of the object that accords to the language or use of the object. One might argue that Locke promoted the idea that the valuepredicates are inconstant irrespective of the community of valuers, such that two valuers within the same community can value some Objectx in very different ways, even given stability in the perception of the object. And so one might think that the perception of the object as a particular kind of object subsumed underneath the same classificatory schema tells us nothing of the value that will be perceived in the object. On this reading, perception of objects in accordance with language and use means nothing to the value attributed to the object. 64  Alain Locke, “Value,” 124. 65  Ibid., 111.

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rejected such a stark distinction as it relates to our consciousness of the two. We do not become conscious of a fact prior to and apart from value. Locke followed the Gestalt tradition in his agreement with those who thought that “the fact/value dichotomy is weaker than it might appear at first sight. From the phenomenological analysis of experience, in fact, it seems to emerge that values originally derive from the world of facts, where the two domains apparently coexist and, in a way, interpenetrate.”66 For Locke, the relationship between fact and value is one of reciprocal dependency. Facts cannot exist without value, and value requires facts. Further, existing objects, which is to say objects that exist for us, all require value. Recall that Locke thought that value is something added to the object by the psychological faculty of the valuing agent. Locke thought that value was implied by our recognition of both the existence of and facts about objects. “Facts, being the objects of truth, must all imply values, and it must be in vain to search for any existence which is wholly free from valuations.”67 Locke was making an epistemological claim with these words. It is not that the existence of objects outside of human cognition implies value. Rather, our perceptions of some object as a particular this or that, along with judgements about the object, imply valuations. An object’s becoming an object for us implies value. Locke argued that “we think of reality as a central fact and a white light broken up by the prism of human nature into a spectrum of values.”68 We affirm it in recognizing it as a particular object. And we affirm or disaffirm particular statements relating to it by recognizing facts about it. Both imply valuations. In everyday meaningful human experience, perception of some object is perception of it as a particular kind of object. This process implies classification. In this way, everyday meaningful human experience implies classification. And to classify objects implies value attributed to them because of their existence as particular kinds of objects. Now it is one thing for Locke to say that facts imply value, and quite another for him to demonstrate it. Locke argued for the assertion that facts imply values in four ways. First, Locke conceded that the search for 66  Fiorenza Toccafondi, “Facts, Values, Emotions, and Perception,” in Values and Ontology: Problems and Perspectives, ed. Arkadiusz Churdzimski and Wolfgang Huemer (New Brunswick: Ontos Verlag, 2009) 137. 67  Alain Locke, “Value,” 118. 68  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 47.

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truth uninfluenced by the mind has been unproductive.69 Philosophy’s inability to reach or settle on a method of arriving at abstracted reality shows that reality, or at least our knowledge of it—which is to say, reality for us—requires the human mind’s additions. The particular additions to which Locke referred were valuations. “Reality in its fullness contains and exhibits values, and they are ejected from it only by an effort of abstraction, which is relative to certain restricted purposes, and is never quite successful. Values therefore are not to be regarded as gratuitous additions to reality, made out of the superfluity of human perversity, but as its highest qualities and the culminating points of its significance for us.”70 Second, Locke recognized that our desire for truth proves that it is impossible to completely separate fact from value. Locke thought that humans value the possession of truth over falsity. One need only affirm Aristotle’s declaration at the beginning of Metaphysics that all human beings by nature desire to be in a state of knowledge, to see Locke’s point.71 Locke argued that: “For the importance attributed to the discovery of fact, and the eulogistic sense in which ‘reality’ is opposed to ‘appearance’ or ‘illusion’ are, in fact, values.”72 Recall that there are logical and scientific value-types with particular value-predicates—namely correct/ incorrect and true/false. Our language demonstrates the value that we place on the discovery and possession of facts. And this shows that valuations guide us toward facts. That humans place value on facts motivates our pursuing them. So, Locke reasoned that if a fact is valuable because it is a fact, and this motivates us to seek it out, then there can be no knowledge of facts without our attribution of value. In fact, Locke argued that “just as the existence of fact must be conditioned for us by our knowledge, so our knowledge must in turn be conditioned by our interests and the prospective value of the objects of our cognitive endeavors.”73 Now if value is not ontologically objective, then our knowledge of facts and the existence of objects (as objects for us) are not ontologically objective. Third, Locke argued that: “It is not psychologically possible to reach any ‘fact’ except by a process permeated throughout by values, viz, a purposive endeavor to attain an end (‘good’) by choice of the ‘right’ means,  Alain Locke, “Value,” 118.  Ibid., 126. 71  Aristotle, Metaphysics, in Aristotle:Complete Works, vol. 2, trans. W.D. Ross, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 3. 72  Alain Locke, “Value,” 119. 73  Ibid., 113. 69 70

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which implies selective attention, preferences for what seems valuable, and the influence of concomitant value-feelings and a variety of prejudices and forms of bias.”74 The affirmation/disaffirmation-process is rooted in an end that is thought to be valuable, and one that is rooted in human preferences. Preferences signal psychological modes and orientations not related to the subject of the fact. It would be absurd to say otherwise. No one who affirms or disaffirms aims at being incorrect, and people do not aim at being incorrect because people consider being incorrect to be undesirable; people devalue being incorrect. So, the affirmation/disaffirmation-­ process is undergirded by value insofar as the end for which it has been employed is value-laden. And further, it is not merely that reaching the end for which the process has been undertaken is valuable. The process itself seems to imply a discriminative nature that is value-laden. In the process, we focus our attention on a more valuable set of solutions to problems, evidence, and so on that we take to lead to facts. Finally, Locke argued that all facts contain latent values. In judging facts, we implicitly judge that it is better to know than to be ignorant. Just as we are inclined toward what is correct and disinclined away from what is incorrect, we are inclined toward knowing a thing and disinclined away from ignorance of it. “Hence, the value-relation and attitude can never be eradicated from even the merest and most stubborn ‘fact.’”75 We cannot be aware of any fact without value. He took this to disprove objectivity in facts. And if there is no mind-independence regarding facts, then there is no mind-independence in our knowledge of existing things. However, again, Locke wanted to deny subjectivity as well. We cannot simply “make up” facts, endorsing whatever we wish to endorse and denying what displeases us. Now for Locke, there is a reciprocal relationship between facts and values. So, while it is appropriate to say that one cannot be aware of a fact without value, it is equally appropriate to say that “[p]ure value exists as little as pure fact. It would be pure fancy or sheer postulation, and neither fancies nor postulations are elaborated without regards to facts. They are made to be realized, and when they are recognized as impossible their value is destroyed or impaired.”76 For Locke, it would appear that value

 Ibid.  Ibid. 76  Ibid. 74 75

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requires facts because value is intentional and not an arbitrary wish.77 To value is to direct one’s attention and motivation toward something, which requires both the perceived existence of the thing and belief in factual claims about it. Locke’s statements on fact and value seem to have implications for the relationship between emotion and reason. If: (1) value is emotionally-­ laden; (2) our knowledge requires value; and (3) gaining knowledge requires reasoning, then we are left to wonder about the relationship between reasoning and emotion. Locke argued that “norms control our behavior and guide our reasoning.”78 Norms are undergirded by values, and values are undergirded by emotions. And so if norms guide our reasoning, then it seems that emotions guide reasoning such that reasoning requires emotions. Locke could have followed David Hume in thinking that reason is a slave to the passions. And Locke did not say anything to license the inference that he took emotion to require reasoning. In other words it is not clear whether he took the relationship between reason and emotion to be reciprocal or unidirectional. Writing about Locke’s thought on the relationship between reason and emotion, Mason wrote that: Men, says Locke, are indeed rational, but they are first of all emotional. Hence to point out the dependence of logical or rational thought on feelings is the basic intent of Locke’s distinction between the original value sensing and the evaluation of that affective sensing. One of the most important consequences of the failure to recognize this complex psychological process is a mistaken notion of facts––the notion that they are simple, pure, neutral things, easily defined and explained.79

This shows a kind of unidirectional, dependency relationship between emotion and reason. However, given Locke’s proclivity for reciprocal relationships, I think that Locke would have  considered the connection between emotion and reason to be a bit more intimate and complex. Both Hume and Mason’s Locke separated reason and emotion in a very classical way. There are two separate processes that, while connected in a unidirectional, dependency relationship, are distinct. I think that Locke would 77  Locke seems to have argued that valuing is intentional because discriminatory dispositional emotions, which allow valuations to occur, are intentional. 78  Alain Locke, “Values and Imperatives,” 34. 79  Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value,” 6–7.

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have seen emotion as a fundamental part of our reasoning, such that emotions such as inquisitiveness are both necessary for and intertwined throughout logical reasoning and scientific investigation. I think that he would have seen emotions as requiring reason, perhaps in something of a process.80 And so given Locke’s proclivity for reciprocal relationships, I think he would have thought of reasoning and emotions as more closely intertwined than is commonly thought. Now one may wonder how Locke’s position avoids the pitfalls of both value-objectivism and value-subjectivism. Certainly Locke’s view denied values mind-independence in the way that value-objectivists purport. However, Locke’s account seems more like the radical subjectivist position. And so, one might wonder how it supports cosmopolitanism and democracy, and how it disallows and combats white supremacy and racism. Theorists writing about Locke’s value theory have argued that he failed to reject radical subjectivism, and thus that his view failed to challenge regressive values.81 In the final section, I address Locke’s value theory in light of his cosmopolitan and democratic values.

Locke’s Value Theory, Democracy, and Cosmopolitanism Locke’s value theory is perhaps something of an enigma when thinking about other of his practical concerns. One might expect for him to have had a much thicker value theory as a foundation for his commitment to cosmopolitan and democratic values. Values and imperatives cannot be of a “live and let live” variety if they are to challenge America’s deepest and most fundamental problem. However, I think that Locke was on to something in his attempt to situate himself in-between objectivism and subjectivism. Locke was aware that value-objectivism helped to sustain and further liberal, aesthetic, and scientific racisms, colonialism, and general cultural impositions. It led to jingoism and disallowed any respectful comparison of cultures. It could support either uniformitarianism with its forced unity through sameness or bigotry that kept different groups from sharing the same space. It could neither support a healthy democracy, condition peace,  See: Jennifer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 57–99. 81  Segun Gbadegesin, “Values, Imperatives, and the Imperative of Democratic Values,” & Ernest Mason, “Alain Locke’s Philosophy of Value: An Introduction.” 80

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nor explain human experiences. And so objectivism—especially during his lifetime—was not a very promising way to ground values. Subjectivism was not a very promising way to ground values either. Subjectivism, though it promoted more tolerance—even if not reciprocity—was unlivable. And furthermore, it could do nothing to challenge any of the problems deriving from value-objectivism. Instead, it must allow for regressive absolutes that derive from value-objectivism just as much as it allows for progressive democratic and cosmopolitan values. If no values are better than others, then democracy is no better than racism. Locke’s pluralism that aimed at some objectivity—namely, experiential and functional objectivity, but denied values mind-independence, seems to have been the best available weapon to solve these practical problems. Recall that for Locke what conditions a value’s or value-set’s legitimacy is whether it works best in the system and time in which it exists. It must: (1) offer the best explanation for experiences; (2) lead to progress; and (3) cohere with other explanatory and progressive values, all in the society or culture within which it occurs. Locke took his pluralist theory to satisfy each. And he took the other two broad theories to fail in one way or another. Locke’s value-pluralism explains experiences that value-objectivism cannot explain. Consider value transposition. Recall that it occurs when a value-predicate is attributed to an object or state of affairs that differs from its usual classificatory type. For Locke, there need not be a singular, mind-­ independent value that either makes an impression on the mind or is discovered via logical evaluations. Valuations are grounded in emotional experiences. Values are apprehended immediately in valuational experiences. “Once a different form-feeling is evoked, the situation and the value type are, ipso facto, changed. Change the attitude, and, irrespective of content, you change the value-type; the appropriate new predicates automatically follow.”82 And so two valuers might experience some object or phenomenon in different ways that leads to different value-predicates from different value-types being immediately attributed. Locke also took his value-pluralism to be the best explanation for the historical occurrence of transvaluation. Recall that transvaluation occurs when societal development or problems require societies to rethink and adjust values. If values have no mind-independence, and if they cohere with the experiences and needs of valuers, then they are apt to change with  Alain Locke, Values and Imperatives,” 44.

82

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societal development and when problems require societies to rethink and adjust them. And further, Locke thought that his position best explained disagreement over the weight of values. Valuations, being grounded in emotional experiences, convey no mind-independent truth about values. And so persons can legitimately disagree about the appropriate weight accorded to values like goodness, truth, and beauty. One person can legitimately value truth over goodness and beauty, while another values goodness over beauty and truth. When persons understand that there are no mind-­ independent truths about values, then though persons hold and live by them, there will be a lesser likelihood of conflict over them. In fact, Locke thought that his theory best explained why values become absolutes, and why conflict is the result of values becoming absolutes. Locke wrote that: “An affective theory of valuation throws these internal dilemmas into an interesting and illuminating perspective. In each of these cases, the modal value-feeling is, of course, held in common and the same ideological loyalties shared, but these sub-groups are still divided by the basic difference in their orientation toward their common values.”83 Locke thought that loyalties to value-feelings become rationalized in a way that makes values absolutes, and thereafter divides humanity in more problematic ways because of conflicts deriving therefrom. Locke argued that “as each of these attitude-sets becomes dispositional and rationalized, we have the scientific clue to that pattern of value loyalties which divides humanity into psychological sub-species, each laying down rationalizations of ways of life that, empirically traced, are merely the projections of their predominant value tendencies and attitudes.”84 We rationalize our feelings such that we increase our commitment to values. As such, “our varied absolutes are revealed as largely the rationalization of our preferred values and their imperatives.”85 And so “the fundamental opposition of value modes and the attitudes based upon them has been one of the deepest sources of human division and conflict.”86 Our rationalization ends with our firm beliefs that we are mind-independently right, moral, or good when we make certain value-judgments. All other valuations are wrong, immoral,

 Ibid., 45.  Ibid., 46. 85  Ibid. 86  Ibid. 83 84

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or bad. And so our projections of our feelings and rational investment in our projections are the sources of much human division and conflict. Locke seems to have thought that we could lessen conflict over differences in values by understanding valuational experiences as emotional. His commitment to critical pragmatism led him to think that a proper solution to social and political problems begins in-part by understanding those problems. Understanding the root cause of our conflicts over values is an important first step toward solving them. And so he took his theory to be theoretically necessary as a first step to solving a basic practical problem— namely, how to best resolve conflict over values. The ability to reduce or solve conflicts over differences in the values lived by individuals and groups was the greatest practical value that Locke took his theory to possess. He wrote that: The effective antidote to value absolutism lies in a systematic and realistic demonstration that values are rooted in attitudes, not in reality, and pertain to ourselves, not to the world. Consistent value pluralism might eventually make possible a value loyalty not necessarily founded on value bigotry, and impose a truce of imperatives, not by denying the categorical factors in valuation, which, as we have seen, are functional, but by insisting upon the reciprocity of these norms.87

In this way, he took his theory to lead to social and political progress. For Locke, understanding the source of our loyalties to values can lessen the drive to fight with others who differ from us. He thought that it can lead us to listen to others whose values we do not share, and perhaps even to reciprocate with them. Certainly value-pluralism could lessen the drive to impose values onto different groups. For Locke, “value pluralism of this type proposes its two most important corollaries,—the principles of reciprocity and tolerance.”88 And in this way, rather than negating, disallowing, or failing to support basic cosmopolitan and democratic values, Locke took his value-pluralism to promote them. Recall from Chap. 2 the centrality of reciprocity and tolerance. For Locke, tolerance and reciprocity—the willingness to allow and share with others’ values—are necessary for healthy social and political relations. And they are integral components of both moral and cultural cosmopolitanisms.  Alain Locke, “Unity Through Diversity: A Bahá’í Principle,” 135.  Alain Locke, Values and Imperatives,” 47.

87 88

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Locke thought that value-pluralism would help us “to discover unity and spiritual equivalence underneath the differences which at present disunite and sunder us, and how to establish some basic spiritual reciprocity on the principle of unity in diversity.”89 Further, Locke thought that these provided “a sturdier intellectual base for democracy.”90 Like his cosmopolitanisms and democratic theory suggested, Locke thought that we can maintain our loyalties to values while respecting others’ values. And so we should not think of Locke’s value theory as being antithetical to values, or antithetical to the position that there are “correct” values. Locke’s value-pluralism opposes subjectivism, which is unable to offer any support to democratic and cosmopolitan values, and cannot support antiracism. I am in agreement with Kenneth Stikkers’ view that Locke’s value pluralism is “a more authentic universalism––that is, a provisional generalization, always open to revision, that is derived inductively from a fair sampling of the rich variety of perspectives cultivated by the numerous cultural traditions inhabiting our globe, and never a universalism arrived at a priori as some particular perspective universally imposed.”91 Locke’s value-pluralism allows a plurality of legitimate, differing values. However, it does not allow all values, or on equal footing. This view, by implication, rejects ontologically objective values that lead to dogmatism and bigotry. It promotes the integration of “values and value systems that might otherwise never react to one another, or, if they did, would do so only in opposition, rivalry, and conflict.”92 As Locke himself put it, “the pluralistic approach to values opens the way to a universality and objectivity for them quite beyond the reach of the a priori assertions and dogmatic demands which characterize their rational and orthodox promulgations.”93 In a word, Locke’s pluralism promotes value-exchanges that imply retraining the way in which communities perceive objects. Unlike subjectivism, however, Locke’s value theory has conditions for legitimacy beyond individual-preferences. It requires a kind of benefit to society in a certain sort of way. It must both progress society and cohere  Ibid.  Alain Locke, “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 57. 91  Kenneth W. Stikkers, “Instrumental Relativism and Cultural Pluralism: Alain Locke and Philosophy’s Quest for a Common World,” in The Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke: A Reader on Value Theory, Aesthetics, Community, Culture, Race, and Education (New York: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999) 212–213. 92  Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” 70. 93  Alain Locke, Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” 57. 89 90

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with other explanatory and progressive values. Locke argued the possibility of what he termed “culture constants” or “culture cognates,” discoverable through an earnest value-pluralism. For Locke: The principle of cultural equivalence, under which we would more wisely press the search for functional similarities in our analyses and comparisons of human cultures; thus offsetting our traditional and excessive emphasis upon cultural difference. Such functional equivalences, which we might term “culture-cognates” or “culture-correlates,” discovered underneath deceptive but superficial institutional divergence, would provide objective but soundly neutral common denominators for intercultural understanding and cooperation.94

He thought that there are similar/exact items, objects, or beings that the different expressions function to represent and/or appreciate. These lie underneath diverging cultural expressions. And so values that relate to items, objects, or beings are similar/exact. In other work, I argued that Locke took there to be more fundamental values that pervade all political conceptions of good lives. I argued that Locke took there to be certain values that are necessary for communities to exist. “Locke’s assertion that there are functional values ultimately relies on an idea that all communities’ cultures are built upon certain values, and that all reasonable persons within these communities embrace these values. Thus, if there is common ground between groups insofar as functional values are concerned, then there must be undergirding value-commitments that allow this commonality.”95 Of course, these are not mind-independent values. However, they would ground Locke’s conception of progress that is required by legitimate values and value-sets. And they would in-part ground his conception of the manner in which values must cohere with other progressive values. As indicated in Chap. 2, these fundamental values were equality, liberty, and fraternity as basic values of free-associations. Locke’s value-pluralism, while allowing for a plethora of diverging and legitimate values and value-sets, requires that they progress society and (at a minimum) cohere with fundamental values that are necessary for a community’s existence. Racists and white  Alain Locke, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” 73.  Corey L.  Barnes, “Imperatives of Peace: A Lockean Justification for Cosmopolitan Principles,” in The Acorn: Philosophical Studies in Pacifism and Nonviolence Vol. 17, No 1 (2017) 24. 94 95

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supremacist values do not cohere with these, and thereby are not legitimate. Instead, they impede democratic and cosmopolitan values that are the best expressions of fundamental values. Recall from Chap. 2 that Locke required a “functional rightness.” And recall that functional rightness has two entailments. First, it entails selecting those values that serve some pragmatic function such as solving particular practical problems. Solving practical problems implies a preference for and selection of values for non-arbitrary reasons. And so second, but prior to preference and selection, functional rightness entails an interrogation of our values to see what pragmatic functions they serve. Our preferences for certain values become justified by their pragmatic function, though without being uniformitarian universalist or dogmatic. Locke took his value-pluralism to both explain and support this idea. From the first, Locke was committed to cultural constants and more fundamental values such as toleration, reciprocity, and certain democratic values—namely, equality, liberty, and fraternity. The latter are implied by free acts of association, and all are necessary for social progress and the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. The second committed him to the idea that there need be a constant process of reflective reconsideration of all values—a transvaluation of values.

Conclusion Locke’s value-pluralism, along with his sociocultural theory of race, were theoretical weapons the he constructed against the white supremacy that is the ideology for America’s deepest and most fundamental problem— namely, racism. He was able to deny problematic parts of both race and value, while preserving each (race and value) in a way that served democracy and cosmopolitanism. Locke thought that there was nothing natural about race, and he thought that there was nothing mind-independent about value. Still, he argued that we should neither deny race’s nor value’s existence and importance in our lives. Such a denial in either case would be quixotic, fail to offer explanations of experiences, and ultimately fail to combat white supremacy. Furthermore, both race and value—construed in a particular way, with an attentive eye to history and the social and political world in which we live—seem necessary to support the practice of democracy and cultivate a cosmopolitan community.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Now there are many who swear it’s true. That brothers all we are. Yet it seems there are very few. Who will answer a brother’s call. —Abbey Lincoln, “Brother, Where Are You?” [D]emocracy, looked at nationally or internationally, is seriously beset with internal inconsistencies, political, social, and cultural. It is weakened by these all the more as it tries to pull itself together as a corporate body of United Nations fighting a world defense of democracy. The net prescription is mandatory advice to correct these shortcomings at the earliest possible moment and in the most immediately practical ways, both for health and strength in the arduous war effort and for vision and moral authority in the making of a just and successful peace. —Alain Locke (“Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy”)

Let us return to the second epigraph above. We have seen Locke’s commitment to cosmopolitanism. And we have seen Locke’s argument for why democracy needs to be spread the world over. However, racism— with its ideology termed white supremacy—is a major impediment to the practice and spread of democracy. By implication, racism and white supremacy are major impediments to the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. We have seen Locke’s theoretical solutions to the practical © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. L. Barnes, Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3_7

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problem of racism and white supremacy. On the theoretical level, Locke attempted to rebut them by showing races to be products of history, having no biological backing. And he attempted to show that values are not mind-independent. Instead, valuational experiences are emotional experiences wherein we contribute to facts’ existence. And therefore, on the theoretical level, racial hierarchies have no legitimate grounding. I would like to end this systematization of the first part of Locke’s philosophy with two brief remarks about possible limitations of Locke’s thought. First, Locke failed to mention a problem that is perhaps not reducible to or solved by addressing  the problem of white supremacy. Locke never mentioned the problem of sexism—particularly sexism against Black women. One might expect Locke to have said something about the position that women occupy in society, given the rise of feminism, his relationships with women during the Harlem Renaissance, and his relationship with his own mother.1 It is perhaps even more surprising that he never said anything about homophobia—particularly against gay Black men, given that he was gay. And though one can perhaps discuss problems related to intersectionality, gender oppression, and sexuality given Locke’s framework, it is both rather shocking and embarrassing that Locke was silent on these issues. Second, there is the question of motivation. Terrence MacMullan raised a potential issue with Locke’s value-pluralism that leads to questions about how to change white supremacists’ values. For MacMullan, Locke’s pluralism cannot dissolve the problem of absolutism because it does not give the absolutist a reason to engage the project. The absolutist will ask: “Why should I engage in an attempt to articulate values that are meaningful to all people when my values are the ones that all people should be following?”2 White supremacists may ask a similar question. And one might deny that Locke’s pluralism can answer a question of this kind. It seems that if people are committed to white supremacy, and embrace values that support it, then there is perhaps no way to motivate them to give up their 1  Leonard Harris and Charles Molesworth, Alain L.  Locke: Biography of a Philosopher (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 2  Terrance MacMullan, “Global Citizenship through Reciprocity: Alain Locke and Barack Obama’s Pragmatist Politics,” in Philosophic Values and World Citizenship: Locke to Obama and Beyond, ed. Jacoby Adeshei Carter and Leonard Harris (New York: Lexington Books, 2010).

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commitments. In other words, what Locke needs is a separate argument for how to motivate others to give up racism and white supremacist ­values. And this might be difficult, given the psychological and monetary benefits conferred by racism and white supremacy.3 Addressing this challenge requires a separate, more practical theory that goes beyond the theoretical theories of race and value that, if adopted, will lead to the practice and spread of democracy and thus to the cultivation of a cosmopolitan community. In short, what is required—in addition to a philosophy of race and a value theory that combats the tenants of white supremacy and racism at the theoretical level—is a theory showing us how to motivate people to commit to democratic and cosmopolitan values. My argument is that Locke provided practical solutions to racism and white supremacy with his philosophies of education, art, and religion. In his philosophical thought regarding these, we see how we might change people’s perceptions in a way that moves them toward a democratic mindset. Attention to Locke’s philosophies of education, art, and religion is the second aim in my attempt to systematize Locke’s philosophy under a commitment to cosmopolitanism.

3

 Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

Index1

A Absolutes, 27n26, 28, 30–33, 31n40, 99, 126, 127, 130, 159, 176, 178, 238, 244, 252, 253, 265, 266 Absolutism, 27, 28, 30, 132, 245, 251, 267, 272 Ahistoricity, 201 Anarchism, 14, 238, 244, 245 Arbitrary dogmatism, 27, 28, 36, 251 Aristotle, 77, 77n157, 168, 261 Autonomy, 10, 68, 69, 93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 104–106, 114, 115, 118, 230, 238 Axiology, 186, 243

Basic ideals of human association, 93 Bernier, François, 11, 137, 139–151, 156, 159, 165, 171, 180, 186, 199, 229, 252 Bigotry, 27, 58, 65, 87, 99, 264, 267, 268 Biobehavioral, 153, 170, 171 Black Nationalism, 46 Blues, 217 Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 11, 12, 137, 145, 146, 161–171, 174, 180, 186, 199, 200, 209, 252 Boas, Franz, 40, 41 Buffon’s rule, 147, 149

B Bahá’í, 44, 123 Baker, Houston, 217 Baraka, Amiri, 217

C Celtic, 51 Characterological, 141, 153, 159, 160 Chauvinism, 79, 83, 84, 86, 108, 122

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. L. Barnes, Alain Locke on the Theoretical Foundations for a Just and Successful Peace, African American Philosophy and the African Diaspora, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15004-3

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INDEX

Civilization, 67, 79, 81, 82, 146, 172, 175–181, 191, 192, 199, 224, 225, 227–229, 231 primitive, 224 Communitarianism, 105 Composite culture, 79, 86, 218, 221 race, 207 Confraternity, 25–30, 32, 169, 190, 191, 193, 195, 214, 223n91 Cosmopolitan Club, 45 Cosmopolitanism cultural, 7–9, 17–23, 23n16, 73–86, 101, 111, 112, 119, 130, 131, 219, 267 economic, 9, 17–22, 50, 59–73, 78, 101, 106, 130, 131 moral, 7, 8, 16–52, 54, 80, 85n185, 101, 107, 121, 130, 179 political, 7, 8, 17–22, 49, 52–59, 101, 102, 111, 130 thick and thin (strict and moderate), 7, 19 Cultural equivalence, 85, 87, 269 Culture -group, 13, 85, 86, 213 -traits, 13, 210–218, 220, 221, 226, 238 -type, 13, 85, 187, 211–216, 218, 220, 223, 225–227, 232–234 Culture constants/culture cognates, 269 D Dawson, Michael C., 105 Degeneration, 12, 137, 150n48, 161–182, 252 Democracy concept, 10, 91–100, 114, 129, 130, 238

conceptions; cultural, 10, 98, 119; economic/social, 10, 98, 124; intellectual, 10, 99; local, 10, 95; moral, 10, 98, 99, 179; political, 10, 90, 93, 98, 101, 104, 179; spiritual, 10, 99; world, 10, 24, 100 deliberative, 10, 101, 103, 104, 112, 119, 120, 126 liberal, 101, 103, 104, 109, 111, 117 participatory, 101, 112–116, 119 representative vs. direct, 101 Dephlogistize, 153 Diversity, 18, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 74, 123, 139n14, 151, 205, 209, 225, 268 Dogma, 244 Du Bois, W.E.B., 2, 13, 51, 82n172, 83, 188n4, 219, 220, 222, 223, 223n91, 233, 244 E Ellison, Ralph, 217 Ethnicity, 13, 17, 53, 98, 213, 214 Ethnocentrism, 244 Exploitation, 57–60, 62–64, 69, 70, 72, 79, 116, 183, 207, 208 F Fallacies of race the biological fallacy, 208, 211, 230, 231 and the fallacy of automatic adjustment, 230, 233 the fallacy of race ascendancy, 230 the fallacy of the masses, 230, 231 the fallacy of the permanency of race types, 230, 232 the superiority fallacy, 230, 231

 INDEX 

Fallibilism, 33, 65, 241 Fraternity, 30, 34, 83, 93–95, 93n14, 238, 269, 270 Freedom, 4, 24, 38, 48, 49, 55, 61, 69–71, 94–98, 104, 105, 108, 111, 117, 131, 132, 160 G Gobineau, Arthur de, 11, 12, 137, 145, 146, 169–182, 186, 199, 200, 207, 209, 225, 252 H Hardimon, Michael, 91, 142, 148 Harlem Renaissance, 1, 22, 23, 214, 272 Harris, Leonard, 2, 51, 92, 110 Hume, David, 156, 263 I Imitationist, 74 Imperialism ancient, 229 modern, 229 Incrementalism, 64, 66, 67, 126, 226 Individuality, 109–112, 195 J Jingoism, 86, 110, 264 K Kant, Immanuel, 11, 12, 137, 141, 146–167, 170, 171, 180, 181, 186, 199, 200, 209, 252 Kinship feeling, 139, 190, 210 type, 223

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L Lafont, Christina, 126 Lewontin, Richard, 205 Liberalism Black, 105, 109 modern, 109 Liberty, 28, 30, 34, 69–71, 70n137, 93–98, 93n14, 100, 105, 238, 251, 269, 270 Limited cultural convertibility, 85–87 Logical positivism, 240 López, Ian Haney, 206 M Mason, Ernest, 243, 263 Militant egalitarians, 105, 106 Missionarism, 229 Mogul Empire, 142 Monogenesis, 146–148, 162, 163, 170 N National Association for the Advancement of Colored People(NAACP), 47, 124 National Association from the Advancement of World Democracy(NAAWD), 47 National Association of the Advancement of American Democracy(NAAAD), 47, 125 Natural predispositions, 151 Nihilism, 14, 238, 245, 253 O Othering, 190, 195

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INDEX

P Pan-Slavic, 51 Patriotism, 40–43, 47, 49, 54, 80, 80n167, 82–84, 86, 112, 116, 118, 128, 129, 133 Performative theory, 13, 215, 218 Phyletic, 149, 150n48, 152n57, 162 Phylum, 148, 149, 152 Pluralism, 8, 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 34–37, 54, 58, 99, 103, 111, 123, 126, 131, 132, 176, 184, 187n2, 191, 238, 265, 267, 268, 272 Polygenesis, 140, 147, 162, 170 Pragmatism, 39, 81, 104, 117, 244, 267 R Race, 2, 3, 6–8, 11–14, 17, 23, 39n61, 43, 47, 53, 58, 64, 72, 73, 81–83, 95, 98, 100, 103, 107, 108, 117, 124, 125, 136–171, 164n102, 174–184, 175n138, 238, 239, 248, 251, 252, 259, 270, 272, 273 Race feelings, 193, 194, 226 Race sense, 139, 190, 191, 214, 215, 222, 225–229 Race-talk, 12, 13, 188, 189, 219, 220 Racial category constructionism, 215 Racial conservationism thick, 13, 219, 221, 222 thin, 219 Racial constructivism, 13, 218, 222 Racial eliminativism epistemic, 194 moral, 188 Racial hierarchy, 3, 155, 158, 167, 180, 191, 200, 244, 272 Racialized market, 61, 63, 66, 69, 72, 73, 131

Racial naturalism, 13 Racial realism, 83 Racial reconstructionism, 13, 218–219 Racial skepticism, 7, 13, 194, 218 Racial uplift, 105, 127, 128n133 Racism aesthetic, 137, 140–146, 159, 165, 166 antipathy, 227, 228, 230 doxastic vs. volitional, 227 liberal, 11, 12, 67, 142, 143, 145, 156, 167, 229, 252 race-animus, 84, 138 race-prejudice, 208 scientized/scientific, 12, 137, 142, 146–162, 168, 169, 252, 264 Reciprocity, 8, 9, 26, 35, 36, 38, 55, 74, 79, 80, 85–87, 99, 100, 116, 117, 123, 127, 131, 132, 191, 198, 222, 238, 239, 265, 267, 268, 270 S Santayana, George, 30 Scholz, Sally, 110 Sociability, 109, 110, 112 Social assimilation, 82, 191 Social Darwinism, 169 Sorts, 4, 13, 14, 16, 21, 22, 42, 67, 76, 77, 136, 149, 150, 153, 159, 183, 187, 207, 212, 213, 216, 223, 231, 232, 238, 243, 249, 250, 259, 268 Sovereignty, 8, 9, 18, 21, 52–58, 87, 102 Stereotypes, 67, 82–84, 86, 121, 160, 210 Still, William Grant, 78 Strains, 149, 150, 212, 218 Systematicity, 240

 INDEX 

T Talented Tenth, 23, 51, 105, 127, 128n133, 192 Temperament choleric, 154 melancholy, 154 phlegmatic, 155 sanguine, 154 Transvaluation, 239, 248, 265, 270 Truth, 14, 28, 34, 95, 99, 127, 178, 179, 196, 238–240, 242–244, 246, 247, 252, 260, 261, 266 Typological, 161, 208, 231 U Uniformitarianism, 8, 26n22, 27, 29, 38, 87, 99, 118, 132, 195, 251, 264 V Valuational experience, 255–258, 265, 267, 272 Value functional approach to, 241 mind-independent, 31, 130, 265

279

objectivism, 238, 239, 245, 247–253, 255, 264, 265 predicates, 246, 247, 256–258, 259n63, 261, 265 relativism, 87, 254, 255 subjectivism, 238, 239, 252, 253, 255, 258, 264 transposition, 246, 265 type, 246, 247, 256–259, 261, 265 Varieties, 18, 19, 65, 149, 150, 164–166, 164n102, 168, 262, 264, 268 W Weithman, Paul J., 119–121, 122n115, 123–125, 123n116 White supremacy, 3, 4, 11–14, 119, 136–138, 142, 146, 160, 161, 168, 169, 172, 182–184, 186, 200, 201, 207, 230, 233–235, 238, 242, 245, 251–254, 264, 270–273 X Xenophobia, 122, 133, 241