Agrarian History of the Cuban Revolution: Dilemmas of Peripheral Socialism (Studies in Critical Social Sciences / New Scholarship in Political Economy, 249/23) 9789004538290, 9789004515215, 9004538291

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Agrarian History of the Cuban Revolution

Studies in Critical Social Sciences Series Editor David Fasenfest (Wayne State University)

volume 249

New Scholarship in Political Economy Series Editors David Fasenfest (Wayne State University) Alfredo Saad-​Filho (King’s College London) Editorial Board Kevin B. Anderson (University of California, Santa Barbara) Tom Brass (formerly of sps, University of Cambridge) Raju Das (York University) Ben Fine ((emeritus) soas University of London) Jayati Ghosh (Jawaharlal Nehru University) Elizabeth Hill (University of Sydney) Dan Krier (Iowa State University) Lauren Langman (Loyola University Chicago) Valentine Moghadam (Northeastern University) David N. Smith (University of Kansas) Susanne Soederberg (Queen’s University) Aylin Topal (Middle East Technical University) Fiona Tregenna (University of Johannesburg) Matt Vidal (Loughborough University London) Michelle Williams (University of the Witwatersrand)

volume 23 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​nspe

Agrarian History of the Cuban Revolution Dilemmas of Peripheral Socialism By

Joana Salém Vasconcelos Translated from the Portuguese by

Bhuvi Libanio

LEIDEN | BOSTON

This book was firstly published in Portuguese in 2016, entitled História Agrária da Revolução Cubana. Dilemas do socialismo na periferia, by Alameda Publishing. Grant 2021/​04559-​9, São Paulo Research Foundation (fapesp) The Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data is available online at https://​cata​log​.loc​.gov lc record available at https://​lccn​.loc​.gov​/2023008116

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 2666-​2 205 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 3829-​0 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 1521-​5 (e-​book) Copyright 2023 by Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

To Suzana, my mother, and to Mingo, my father, who told me rebellion stories from their generation

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Menos mal que existen Los que no tienen nada que perder No siquiera la historia. Menos mal que existen Los que no dejan de buscarse a sí Ni siquiera en la muerte. silvio rodríguez

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Contents  Acknowledgments xi  Foreword—​English Edition  xii  Foreword—​Brazilian Edition xvii  List of Tables, Charts, and Maps xx  Cuban Provinces from 1940 to 1976 xxiii  Introduction Dilemmas of Peripheral Socialism 1 1  Modernization of Cuban Plantation (1902–​1958) 23 1  Latifundium-​Minifundium Land Tenure Structure 25 1.1 Between Latifundium and Minifundium  26 1.2 Origins of Structural Heterogeneity 30 1.3 Social Actors of Modern Plantation 34 2  Cropping Regimes: Sugarcane Fields in Wall Street 35 2.1 Military Order No.62 and Primitive Accumulation 39 2.2 Dance of the Millions 40 2.3 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 and the Jones-​Costigan Amendment 42 2.4 Ascension of Cuban Saccharocracy 44 3  Labor Regime: the Curse of the Crowds 45 3.1 Statistics Cover-​Up 46 3.2 A Portrait of Rural Misery 47 3.3  Structural Unemployment and tiempo muerto 49 4  The World Seen from Above 50 4.1 Batista and the Rockefeller-​Sullivan  51 4.2 A Portrait of Saccharocracy 66 5  Revolution against Underdevelopment 69 5.1 The Moncada Program 70 5.2 Revolutionary Democratic Nationalism 74 5.3 Sierra Maestra Law No.3 75 2  First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–​1963) 79 1  Transformation of the Land Tenure System 79 1.1 The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 81 1.2 Nationalization Laws 88

viii Contents 1.3 A Portrait of Structural Transformation 91 2  Cooperatives or State Farms? 96 2.1 The Proletarian Peasant and the Scale Preservation 97 2.2 Agricultural Cooperatives 98 2.3 Granjas del Pueblo (People’s Farm) 100 2.4 Converting Cooperatives into Granjas 104 3  Peasantry: Principle of Voluntarism and anap 120 3.1  a nap Foundation and Its Principles 121 3.2 Mistakes Made with the Peasantry 123 3.3  a nap’s “Administrativism” 126 3.4 Politics of Voluntary Collectivisation 127 4  Agricultural Diversification: Disruption of the Double Articulation 130 4.1 Neocolonial Insertion Crisis: the Search for National Sovereignty 130 4.2 Increase of Internal Demand: Searching for Social Equity 135 4.3 Diversification: Searching for Economic Development 137 4.4 Structural Problems of Diversification: Extensive, Disorganized, and Inefficient 142 4.5 Intensification of Class Struggle and General Economic Trends in 1963 149 3  Second Agrarian Reform and the Sugar Paradox (1963–​1967) 153 1  Transformation of the Land Tenure System 153 1.1 The Agrarian Reform Law of October 1963 154 1.2 Cyclone Flora 156 1.3 The Social Structure of the New Agriculture 159 1.4 A Combined Strategy: Sugar, Diversification and Technology 162 2  The Soviet Union and the Sugar Paradox 164 2.1 The 1964 Agreement 165 2.2 Back to Sugar 169 2.3 Inserted Revolution and the Paradox of the New Dependency 172 2.4 Third World: Arena for National Sovereignty  176 3  Agrarian Management: between Relative Autonomy and Centralization 179 3.1 Agrupamientos, Departamentos, Lotes (Grouping, Departments, Allotments) 181 3.2 Aspects of the Great Debate in Agriculture 183 4  Specialized Diversification and Technology-​Intensive Model 188 4.1 Crops Performance between 1964 and 1970 188 4.2 Combinados and Special Plans: Modes of Diversification 191

Contents

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4.3 Peasantry and Special Plans 194 5  Technological Dependency and Sugarcane Mechanization 196 5.1 Investment and Consumption 198 5.2 Tiempo Muerto in Reverse: Disguised Unemployment 200 5.3 Paths and Detours of Technological Choice 205 4  The 1970 Harvest and Development Strategy (1967–​1970) 214 1  Agrarian Structure and Development Strategy 214 1.1 Import Substituting Industrialization 217 1.2 Turnpike Strategy: the Return of “Comparative Advantages”? 225 1.3 Why Ten Million? 232 2  Revolutionary Offensive and Moral Economy 237 2.1 Moral Economy and Ideological Centralization 243 2.2 Collective Wage Agreement and Lack of Accounting Control 247 2.3 The Shrinking of the Peasantry 251 3  The 1970 Harvest: Plan and Reality 253 3.1 Simultaneous Battles 254 3.2 The Harvest in Numbers 256 3.3 Causes of Failure 258 3.4 Structural Distortions 263 4  Voluntary Work: between Consciousness and Coercion 269 4.1 Drop in Productivity and Elimination of the Foreman 271 4.2 Criticism of Volunteer Labor 274 4.3 The Militarization of Labor 278 4.4 Self-​criticism 279 5  Conclusion Dilemmas of Peripheral Socialism 286 1  Geopolitical Advantage: the Source of Surplus 286 1.1 The Transfer of Soviet Resource 287 1.2 Multilateral Payment Agreement 292 1.3 Cold War and Geopolitical Advantages 296 1.4 Joining the comecon 299 2  Peripheral Socialism and Rationality of the Possible 301 2.1 From Segregation to Egalitarianism 302 2.2 Development of the Productive Forces 307 2.3 Peripheral Socialism and Rationality of the Possible 309  Bibliography and Sources 317  Index 327

Acknowledgments Without the financial support from Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (fapesp), this research and this book wouldn’t exist in Brazil or anywhere (fapesp projects 21/​04559–​9 for the English edition; 15/​11414–​6 for the Brazilian edition; and 11/​3343–​0 for the research funding). I thank this valuable institution that allow young researchers to became professional scholars in Brazil. I also thank Alameda Publishing House for the first Brazilian edition of this book in the name of Haroldo Ceravolo; Brill Publishing House for the English edition in the name of David Fasenfest and Alfredo Saad Filho; as much as Bhuvi Libanio for the outstanding translation, and Andrew Smolski for the thoughtful English foreword. Thank you for the confidence. I thank my supervisor for this research, Plínio Sampaio Junior, an economist and former Professor of the Economic Institute at Unicamp, whose theoretical knowledge helped me to frame this work. I thank my comrades of the Florestan Fernandes Study Group at Unicamp, who helped me to be a historian among economists during this research period. I also thank Professors Luiz Bernardo Pericás, Jorge Grespan, Lincoln Secco, Eduardo Mariutti, Pedro Ramos, Waldir Rampinelli, and Janes Jorge, for the dialogues and evaluations about this work. I am also grateful to the professionals who had attentively answered my interviews in Havana, Mexico City, Santiago de Chile, and Saint Petersburg, between 2011 and 2013. Especially Jacques Chonchol, Juan Valdés Paz, David Barkin, Julio Travieso, Roberto Regalado, Lourdes Cervantes, Ester Lobaina, and Rolando Ávila. Also thank the pleasant workers from the Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana (ceec), the Centro de Estudios Che Guevara, the Oficina de Historia del Consejo de Estado, and the librarians from Universidad de La Habana. Personally, I am grateful to João, for our love and complicity during the past 14 years, for being my first-​hand reader and listener, and now also a great father. To Flora, our little lovely girl. To Suzana (my mother), Marcos (my brother), Mingo (my father), Isis, Kinha, and Lívia. To Jasmim and Caetano, my nephews. To my hundred-​years-​old grandmothers, Dulce and Martha, for sharing their memories of the last century and being such strong and inspiring women. To all my fellow activists, who teach me to practice more our criticism. To my best friends, who feed my life with energy.

Foreword—​English Edition

Cuba’s Present and a Specter Haunting the Spectators Often, we experience world events as spectators. Outside the immanence of participation, the spectator responds to events as an omniscient force operating under ideal conditions. From the vantage of the spectator, criticism comes from the perspective of an observer unencumbered by the actual state of play. In political debates, a similar situation occurs. When protests occurred in Cuba beginning on July 11th, 2021, socialists globally staked positions as spectators falling into well-​worn tropes. Some criticized the Cuban government, led by the Communist Party of Cuba (pcc), for failures to address economic scarcity and curtail political repression. Others noted the continued role of United States aggression toward Cuba and how the blockade conditioned economic scarcity. At times, both of these positions would be presented within the same article, as if there was a resurrection of the neither/​nor Cold War position taken by certain factions within the international socialist movement. I write now not to stake a position about what any actor in this saga should have or have not done during or prior to the protest. Rather, these words are meant as a call for analysis like that presented in this book, Agrarian History of the Cuban Revolution: Dilemmas of Peripheral Socialism. The ability to opine beyond doxa is based on a theoretically-​informed understanding of national and international political economy. This decenters the either/​or of causation, either pcc or US, toward a more complex and dynamic explanation of Cuba’s present difficulties. That is, the spectators should be haunted by the specter of Marx: “[Humans] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-​selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” Marx’s meaning was clear; humans, organizations, and nation-​states are embedded within structures that present opportunities and barriers to change. These structures are historical and material, and therefore people cannot act as if they do not exist, as if they are not real. Dr. Vasconcelos builds on important theoretical developments in Marxist theory to demonstrate how structural constraints impacted the transition from Cuba’s neocolonial economy centered on the plantation to the post-​revolution sovereign economy centered on the state farm. The uneven and combined development of capitalist social relations during the neocolonial period based

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on the underutilization of surplus extracted by international capital reproduced a technologically-​backward, labor-​dependent agriculture. When the Cuban revolutionaries began the process of re-​organizing agriculture, they confronted a reality in which the sugar monocrop had been entrenched, internally and externally. To extricate its deep, perennial roots was not a romantic task in which the ideal could be actualized the day after the triumph. The breaking of the plantation did not automatically entail the rise of cooperatives and peasant-​based agriculture, because this decision itself could have threatened the overall stability of sovereignty. Although, this was conceived of as an option. There was an attempt to move agriculture away from sugar beginning in 1959. As Dr. Vasconcelos notes, this was tied into the “small agrarian debate,” ultimately won by the modernizers emphasizing industrial methods of production, state farms, and the export of the sugar monocrop. To be fair, social and ecological conditions lifted a multitude of barriers for supporters of cooperatives and peasant-​based agriculture, ultimately dooming their argument by circumstance. Between 1959 and 1964, there were three hurricanes, a drought, and already exhausted soil fertility. Then, there was a burning through the agricultural surplus, like in beef cattle, a bonanza driven by optimism and hope. Add to this the need to stabilize the balance of payments, increase imports for (agro-​) industrialization, and meet Soviet demands for sugar in exchange for oil. So, when Cuban officials attempted to support diversification through policy, they quickly ran out of options to free themselves from sugar, based on the internal class structure that saw a loss of rural proletarians, the external export demands, and the ecological conditions they faced. Officials ideologically committed to agricultural modernization became dominant, leading to the strengthening of sugar once more. This structural analysis of development, based on a dialectical relation of forces between structure and the agency of historical actors, continues to be important for understanding Cuba today. In the 1990s, the Cuban economy confronted an extreme contraction following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The pain from the loss of Cuba’s main trading partner was compounded by the United States’ strengthening of the decades-​long blockade with the ongoing goal of toppling the pcc by starving the Cuban population. Because of this, the Cuban government pivoted toward a tourism-​dependent economy and withdrew land from the production of sugar. Importantly, changing conditions meant alterations in the agrarian structure away from state farms toward cooperatives and peasant-​based agriculture. This shift was drastic, with state land in cultivation reduced from more

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than 80 percent in the 1970s to less than a quarter by the 2000s (Smolski 2022). Cooperatives, like the Basic Unit of Cooperative Production (ubpc), the Credit and Services Cooperatives (ccs), and the Agricultural Production Cooperatives (cpa), along with smallholder, private farmers, came to represent almost 75 percent of land in production. These changes to agriculture were not only forced by external structural circumstances, but made possible by prior structural and institutional changes: the training and professional development of scientists and technicians, the de-​commodification of land, the construction of facilities to produce input substitutes, and the maintenance of a mass small farmer organization, the National Association of Small Farmers (anap). The rise of urban agriculture, the increased production of vegetables and fruits, and the application of agroecological and low input agrarian practices all were tied into leveraging this social base. Once more, the internal and external conditions of Cuba impacted its agrarian trajectory. Decisions that were made prior impacted what decisions could be made as conditions changed. Or, to rely on Dr. Vaconcelos’ conceptual apparatus, the instrumental (means) and substantive (ends) rationalities were brought together to motivate a re-​peasantification in order to meet the demand for food under crisis conditions. That was also tied into a resurgent tourism sector that re-​introduced the law of value into more parts of everyday life in Cuba. Now, we arrive at the present. What are the current conditions of Cuba’s agrarian political economy, internally and externally? The Trump Administration not only ended the diplomatic advances put in place by the Obama Administration, officials increased the blockade to intolerable levels. This has meant increasing fuel scarcity, rolling blackouts, lack of necessities for the public healthcare system, and more (Vasconcelos 2021). The covid-​ crisis exacerbated these economic problems by restricting tourism, along with the ever-​worsening economic conditions in Venezuela, Cuba’s main trading partner. Overall exports have again returned to levels near that of the Special Period in Times of Peace, with 1.966 billion usd in 2021. This means less foreign exchange to cover the cost of imports. Imports are at 8.431 billion usd, buoyed in part by a 19.618 billion usd debt that is increasingly short-​term. That debt, amounting to almost 20 percent of gdp in 2020 (World Bank 2022), and need for credit-​financed import purchases faces more perilous terrain as the cost of finance increases with the global rise in interest rates. Even more, the Biden Administration has largely eschewed reversals of Trump-​era policies, such as maintaining Cuba on the list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” As such, the pcc has little room for maneuver to address the mounting challenges.

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In terms of problems for the food system specifically, 1.955 billion usd of food products were imports, accounting for the majority of cereals, poultry, and rice consumed on the island. Long lines and arduous searches for a dignified meal have been an ongoing issue for the Cuban government and population, even during the Soviet period (Benjamin, Collins, and Scott 1984). Garth (2020) notes that it is this struggle to provide a culturally satisfactory meal that leads to increasing levels of frustration, often shouldered by Cuba women. Despite this drudgery, in 2019 Cubans on average were able to obtain 3,375 kcal/​capita/​day, with 82.59 g/​capita/​day of protein and 73.08 g/​capita/​ day of fat (fao 2022). There is then a discordance between often challenging conditions of everyday life and the government’s capacity to alleviate them, even if it succeeds in assuring the population does not face conditions of malnourishment or famine. I return to my premise, that it is much easier to be the spectator occupying a transcendental space above the fray. It is much more difficult to be on the field of immanence, to be within an existing situation and seek to shift the parameters in which people can act. Not impossible, but certainly distinct from having any and all options at your disposal. What should the pcc do within these external constraints? What should anap do? Or the population generally? Considering the legitimacy of demands that were the basis of the protests, a spectator cannot just say, “But, the US,” as if that resolves really existing problems people navigate. And, to be clear, I am not stating that the pcc is above criticism, as it certainly commits errors. Any person would rightly shake their head at the disastrous idea to achieve a 10,000,000 ton harvest in the 1970 giant zafra to understand how wrong leaders can be. And currently, more could be done to address internal food supply chain issues, such as increasing the production of feed for livestock to support yields of meats and dairy. Rather, criticism must match existing conditions, instead of arguments based on an ideal typical world. It may be cliche, but it is a truism, to know where we are going, we must know where we have been. In order to understand those conditions, we need the exemplary types of analyses represented in this book. Dr. Vasconcelos’ agrarian history, her careful attention to data, and her utilization of theoretically rich concepts for interpretation provide us tools to analyze for strategic utilization the course of development. By doing so, we can be informed spectators, and from that vantage work within our own everyday spaces to improve global conditions for more just, sustainable worlds.

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Andrew R. Smolski Postdoctoral Research Scholar Department of Agricultural and Human Sciences North Carolina State University (ncsu), USA References Benjamin, Medea, Josepha Collins, and Michael Scott. 1984. No Free Lunch: Food and Revolution in Cuba Today. Oakland, CA: Institute for Food and Development Policy. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2022. faostat Statistical Database. Rome: fao. Garth, Hannah. 2020. Food in Cuba: The Pursuit of a Decent Meal. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Marx, Karl. 1999[1852]. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” Accessed on August 28th, 2022. https://​www​.marxi​sts​.org​/arch​ive​/marx​/works​/1852​/18th​-bruma​ ire​/ch01​.htm​. Oficina Nacional de Estadistica e Informacion. 2022. Anuario Estadistico de Cuba 2021. Accessed on August 28th, 2022. http://​www​.onei​.gob​.cu​/node​/18491​. Smolski, Andrew R. 2022. “Interrogating Structural Conditions for Agricultural Production: A Comparative-​Historical Study of Cuban Incorporation, Delinking, and Exile.” Journal of World-​System Research 28(2): 359–​390. Vasconcelos, Joana Salém. 2021. “Cuba, Protests, and Paths of Revolution.” Journal of Latin American Geography 20(3): 195–​205. World Bank. 2022. World Bank Open Data. Accessed on August 28th, 2022 https://​data​ .worldb​ank​.org​/coun​try​/cuba​.

Foreword—​Brazilian Edition Cuba has undergone a gradual process of change since Raúl Castro assumed the presidency of the country in 2008. Only three years after this fact, pcc held a Congress to discuss paths that the island should follow to boost its economy. It is worth remembering that in the 1990s the Caribbean nation had gone through The Special Period, shortly after the end of real socialism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (let us not forget that 85% of imports and 80% of exports were linked to those countries). The reconfiguration of its international market and the enduring struggle against the United States embargo directly impacted the Gross Domestic Product of the island, which suffered a 35% decrease between 1989 and 1993—​year in which the fiscal deficit reached 33% of gdp—​when imports dropped 75%. In 1992, a series of measures were taken as attempts to solve the complicated financial situation, restructuring state bodies (with parallel recognition of mixed ownership); however, even so, it was not enough for the country to overcome its economic fragility. Legalizing possession and use of foreign currency, accessing remittance from abroad, opening to foreign investment, and creating tariffs for non-​essential goods and services as well as a new tax system were some of the elements that distinguish this moment. With the need to expand food production, many of the state farms were transformed into the so-​called ubpc (Unidad Básica de Producción Cooperativa or Basic Units of Cooperative Production). Positions in the state-​related sector declined and self-​employment emerged. Then the cuc (Peso Cubano Convertible or Cuban Convertible Peso) was launched, and a greater decentralization of companies then set the tone for the moment—​the Corporate Improvement System (Sistema de Perfeccionamento Empresarial), developed by the Armed Forces, for example, appeared at the end of that decade The fact is, until 2009 gdp increased 4.7%. In the first decade of the 21st century, bilateral diplomatic and economic agreements (such as those with Venezuela, for example) helped strengthen the domestic scenario (in 2006, gdp increased 12.2%). Several investment programs focused on energy production and consumption, modernization of transportation, an attempt to increase agricultural production while also aiming to reduce imports, and development of the housing sector (in spite of that, growth rate decreased to 7.3% in 2007 and to 4.1% in 2008). Although several mechanisms were tried, more needed to be done. Adjustments had to be implemented to avoid underutilization and poor management of the productive sector (only half of the arable land on the island was used and housing shortage was significant; in addition, 70% of the food

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consumed there came from abroad). The country needed to improve infrastructure and to accelerate the process of modernization and opening up to the rest of the world. The Proyecto de lineamientos de la política económica y social [Project for an Outline of Economic and Social Politics], in 2011, proposed the development of private business in 178 areas, expanding registration for self-​employed business owners and suggesting self-​employed income and small business income are categorized differently in Cuban pesos. The idea in “updating the socialist model” (criticized by some as a return to capitalism) was to streamline state bureaucracy, reduce centralization and paternalism, eliminate subsidies and excessive spending, tackle industrial and agricultural decapitalization issue, and offer higher education to technical professionals and professionals in productive branches of the economy. State investments would be directed to the most efficient producers. Raúl Castro himself said his intention was to build “a more prosperous and sustainable socialism.” An ambitious and comprehensive task. Therefore, economist José Luís Rodríguez regards the current economic transformations as “the most complex in all revolutionary history.” Cuba currently has trade relations with 75 nations (in 2013, trade between Brazil and Cuba added up to US$ 642.8 million, being Brazilian exports equivalent to US$ 528.2 million; Brazilian investments in Mariel Special Development Zone, on the other hand, is a clear example of mutual interest between the two governments). gdp in Cuba grew on average nearly 5% in the last five years. The island imports around US$ 6.5 billion of products per year; and foreign investment amounts to US$ 500 million (this number could potentially rise significantly in the next decade). Most food, however, is still imported, while internet, telecommunications and service infrastructure certainly needs improvement. Industrial productivity on the island, in turn, is 50% lower than in the 1980s. Decentralization in management, therefore, remains one of Cubans’ preferred initiatives in this new phase. And it conveys greater overall efficiency. That means, therefore, giving companies greater decision-​making autonomy, increasing their competitiveness, expanding the power of municipalities, establishing cooperatives and improving the environment for the cuentapropistas, who are currently nearly half a million individuals, 26% of the total amount in the country. In agriculture, the plan is for the state to be responsible for only 20% of the land, while the rest belongs to the private sector. A tax system that places greater emphasis on tax collection should also be gradually implemented. The United States’ recent rapprochement with Cuba marks a new moment, reestablishing diplomatic ties and bilateral negotiations in different areas. Americans are certainly eyeing this market.

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Therefore, interest in Cuba remains strong. Since the triumph of the revolution in Cuba, in January 1959, Brazilians have written about the routes of politics and economy on the island. From the first author in our country to discuss the revolution—​journalist Armando Jimenez—​to Frei Betto—​who held the classic interview published as Fidel e a religião [Fidel and Religion]—​journalists, political activists, and academic intellectuals dedicated themselves to the topic. One needs only to remember names such as Jamil Almansur Haddad, Almir Matos, Nery Machado, Hélio Dutra, Jorge Escosteguy, Ignácio de Loyola Brandão, Márcio Moreira Alves, Eric Nepomuceno, Fernando Morais, Vânia Bambirra, Florestan Fernandes, and Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira. Now, young researcher Joana Salém Vasconcelos joins the bibliography about the island. While the Cuban process has often been analyzed from a journalistic or theoretical political perspective, Vasconcelos carries out a study focused primarily on addressing the agrarian issue after the revolution, an essential topic to understand the history of Cuba and which significantly contributes to elucidating the paths of Cuban agriculture today. In this sense, she follows in the footsteps of scholars such as Sergio Aranda, David Barkin, Jacques Chonchol, René Dumont, Michel Gutelman, Oscar Zanetti Lecuona, Fernando Charadán López, and Juan Valdés Paz, among others. In this book (originally her master’s thesis at Unicamp), she depicts the agrarian structure in Cuba before and after the revolution and transformations taken place between 1958 and 1970, as well as possible contradictions in the development project of the revolution over the years. Property and labor regime, international economic order, technological and financial dependency, and development strategy are subjects discussed by the author, who skillfully reconstructs the trajectory of the relationship between the sugar and agricultural industries, along with the social situation in the countryside. According to Vasconcelos, “the sugar paradox lies precisely in the fact that Cuba sought to build a new society (with new purposes for the use of surplus) through means inherited from underdevelopment (basically sugar economy).” From the First Agrarian Reform to the mobilization of all productive forces to reach the production goal of ten million tonnes of sugar in 1970, the author details the vicissitudes and characteristics of the Cuban development model. This is, therefore, a fundamental book for understanding the trajectory of Cuban agrarian economy yesterday and today. Luiz Bernardo Pericás Professor of Contemporary History Universidade de São Paulo (usp), Brazil January 2016

Tables, Charts, and Maps Tables 1  Agricultural area by property size (1946) 26 2  Property distribution by extension and land concession regime (1946) (in hectares) 27 3  Fulgencio Batista’s patrimony by sector, 1958 54 4  Heritage of the ten main sugarcane companies in Cuba, 1958 60 5  Expropriated area two years after the agrarian reform (May/​1961) 91 6  Land tenure according to sworn declaration of owners affected by the first Agrarian Reform Law (1959) 93 7  Cuban agricultural area by sector (May/​1961) (in caballerías) 94 8  Area and workforce in cooperatives and people’s farm (May/​1961) 103 9  Problems faced by sugarcane cooperatives (September/​1962) 108 10  Area/​worker: people’s farms and sugarcane cooperatives (1961) 110 11  Area and properties of private agricultural sector (August/​1961) 121 12  Voluntary collectivization (1963/​1967) 128 13  Sugarcane cooperative area by crop 138 14  Annual production of ten crops in Cuban agriculture (1957–​1961) 140 15  Sugarcane and sugar yields (1961–​1967) (tonnes/​hectare) 143 16  Sugar production and exportation (1952–​1963) (millions of tonnes) 143 17  Land tenure system by sectors after the two agrarian reforms 156 18  Rural classes after the second agrarian reform 160 19  Agrarian property and crops after the second agrarian reform (December 1963) (in caballerías) 161 20  Area and properties of the private agricultural sector after the second agrarian reform (1963) 162 21  1964 agreement: plan of Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar (tonnes) 166 22  Sugar consumption per capita in eleven countries (kg/​year) 167 23  Agricultural yield (1963–​1964) (in millions of pesos) 180 24  Territorial reorganization after the second agrarian reform 182 25  Area with seven crops in the state sector (1965–​1970) (caballerías) 190 26  Unemployment rate (1943–​1981) 201 27  Change in employment profile (1958–​1971) 204 28  Mechanization of cane cutting and harvesting (1963–​1981) 210 29  Use and production of agricultural fertilizers (1963–​1968) 211 30  Targets and actual sugar production (1952–​1970) (in million tonnes) 212 31  Importation structure (%) 223

Tables, Charts, and Maps 32  Turnpike strategy and the creation of economic and technical means of development 230 33  Simultaneous battles (1968–​1975) 255 34  Key indicators of sugar production (1951–​1970) 257 35  The 1970 harvest: plan and reality 259 36  Sugar production and exportation: plan and reality (1965–​1970) (million tonnes) 260 37  Agricultural production (1962–​1978) (mil tonnes) 266 38  1970 harvest workers 270 39  Foreign trade (1958–​1970) (%) 290

Charts 1  Cuban exportations by country of destination (%) 133 2  Cuban importations by country of origin (%) 133 3  Agricultural production in proportion: food, sugarcane, and other industrial crops (1957–​1963) (index, 1957 =​100) 141 4  Sugar production (1951–​1970) (million tonnes) 169 5  Change in employment profile (1958–​1971) (in indices, 1958 =​100) 204 6  Sugar prices (1961–​1978) (US cents) 288 7  Enrollment by level of education (1958–​1977) 303 8  Enrollment by level of higher, technical, and special education (1958–​1977) 304

Maps 1  Cuban provinces from 1940 to 1976 xxiii 2  Patrício Lumumba Farm 113 3  Mártires de Placetas Farm 114

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The Third World now became the central pillar of the hope and faith of those who still put their faith in social revolution. It represented the great majority of human beings. It seemed to be a global volcano waiting to erupt, a seismic field whose tremors announced the major earthquakes to come. eric hobsbawm (1995, 436)

…

The Cuban delegation wishes to emphasize that, in its opinion, Latin America could not fulfill the requirements for internal transformation as articulated in the eclac document, and with which in general we agree, but through revolutionary transformation of such structures. Such a transformation should dislodge the oligarchies of national and foreign landowners, resulting in sudden redistribution of income and placing financial and real resources of Latin American economies in the hands of revolutionary states with strong popular support, willing to commit to a real policy of development. carlos rafael rodríguez (1983, 285)

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Cuban Provinces from 1940 to 1976

map 1  Cuban provinces from 1940 to 1976

Introduction

Dilemmas of Peripheral Socialism

Some themes in human history so fervently mobilize contemporary subjectivity that they can hardly be approached without electrical discharges of passion and hate, producing a kind of short-​circuit between past and present. And in that case, perspectives on the past might bring to light the most latent crises of the present, unveiling conflicts and paradigms concealed by the most diverse ideological tools. The Cuban revolution is absolutely one of these themes. Not only one or two facts are responsible for such a phenomenon. But a set of factors mixes up temporalities and puts them under permanent crossfire. First and foremost, Cuba persists as a kind of reminiscence of the Cold War misplaced in time, which, in the 21st century, challenges the “end of history” concept. Second, it prostrates itself hopelessly in the wake of the United States, embodying its small and uncomfortable antithesis. Third, it still gives rise to various feelings within the critical tradition and global Marxist thought, which can be as unconditional both in defense and in attack. Fourth, while conservatives cannot tolerate its achievements, revolutionaries do not exceed its limits. This book was initially planned as a contribution to a potential understanding of achievements, dilemmas, and limits of the revolution on the periphery of capitalism. Its central axis is the agrarian structure, basis of the Cuban economy, before and after the revolution. Throughout Latin America, the agrarian issue is a Gordian knot among social and economic problems, propagating uneven and combined modernization of our colonial heritage, spreading asymmetric waves of sumptuousness and penury. Thus, the Cuban effort to overcome these legacies, as well as to develop a sovereign and egalitarian society, found precisely in the agrarian structure a strategic zone for historical experimentation. Ultimately, this work is an investigation exercise on obstacles and contradictions in this fierce Cuban struggle against a modernized, reinvented and, above all, persistent colonial past.

© Joana Salém Vasconcelos, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004515215_002

2 Introduction 1

Cuba: Agrarian Reform and Revolution

It is an understanding that the Cuban revolution was, above all, a revolution against underdevelopment. Its main historical motivation, from the beginning, was to face the contradictions that dependent capitalism imposed upon the country: first, social segregation perpetuated by structural unemployment; second, high external vulnerability that made national sovereignty unfeasible. Those two essential features of underdevelopment engendered double articulation, reproduced by the unequal and combined modernization of the agrarian structure on the island, a process led by US capital and Cuban sacarocracy throughout the first half of the 20th century. To overcome these structural legacies, the revolution made use of a development project, which quickly transitioned from popular democratic nationalism to socialism. This transition occurred first because various fractions of the Cuban bourgeoisie showed themselves intolerant of any reform that minimally redistributed surplus within the framework of the capitalist system and altered its use, paving the way to strengthening anti-​capitalist political subjects. Second, of course, because of the Cold War—​anyone who was an enemy of the United States almost inevitably became an ally of the Soviet Union. The relentless geopolitical turn that took place between 1959 and 1961 openly influenced the socialist option. However, it should be noted that during the first decade of the revolution, Cuba preserved certain autonomy concerning the ideological premises of the Soviet system and became a laboratory of authentically new revolutionary experiences. This book sheds light on the transformations in the Cuban agrarian structure between 1958 and 1970, i.e., from the agrarian reform initiated during the guerrilla warfare to the catastrophic goal of producing 10 million tonnes of sugar, designed to leverage a paradoxical strategy of development. These transformations will herein be analyzed in three dimensions: land tenure system, cropping regime, and labor regime. As will be seen, each of these dimensions is linked to the dismantling of what we define as modern plantation, supported by three pillars: latifundium–​minifundium land tenure structure; monoculture organically connected to international financial speculation; and economic violence against agricultural laborers, made possible by structural unemployment—​in Cuba, specifically, tiempo muerto.1 The narrative developed here, however, is

1 Before the revolution, the sugarcane off-​season was termed tiempo muerto [dead season]. Eight months a year, usually from April to November, almost half a million laborers became unnecessary for the cane field, having to improvise livelihood.

Introduction

3

chronological, interweaving these three logical dimensions of the agrarian revolution in the course of time. It would not be possible to investigate that trajectory without first dedicating ourselves to studying the main historical determinations of the pre-​ revolutionary scenario, which explains particularities of the Cuban underdevelopment. Therefore, the long process of modernization of the colonial plantation was chosen as guideline, and it is thus summarily disclosed in the first chapter. And a panorama of agrarian changes between 1902 and 1958 is outlined, regarding land tenure, cropping regime, and labor regime, as well as the organic relations between the Cuban agrarian structure and US capital in an effort to weave a structural portrait of the starting point of this investigation. With modernization and dismantling of the plantation as the main axis of the research, Caio Prado Junior and Celso Furtado’s development theories and a theory of surplus are called upon to organize this narrative.2 It, in turn, identifies social subjects and structural obstacles which determined the agrarian issues, as well as new contradictions created within the revolution itself and the controversies which made history more dynamic. The approach is mainly theoretical, with intent to explain in both general and specific aspects underdevelopment as a historical, social, economic, and cultural process that defined Cuban reality in 1958. Underdevelopment was historically determined by the modernization of colonial inheritances, which potentialized the uplifting of productive structures alien to the needs of the community. In this sense, it is a reflection of the absence of “national formation,” i.e., the nonexistence of an economic system that resonates with demands and identities of the population, and the perpetuation of the social abyss, which irremediably fragments national collectivity. In other words, underdevelopment is the result of the incapacity of dependent capitalism to create an adequate economic basis to satisfy the country’s internal needs, guided by socially shared values.3 Since 2 At once, Caio Prado Junior criticized Rostow’s development economics and Stalinist stageism: “Orthodox development theory starts from a static situation, an abstract ‘traditional society,’ similar everywhere (or at least similar for the purposes of the theory), which at a given moment begins to change due to factors outside its own dynamics.” For Caio Prado, development is otherwise a “process that is especially historical and does not fit into models built at first on the basis of events that shape (in fact, only partially) the institutionalization of capitalist relations of production in pioneer countries. It is in the specificity of each country that one has to investigate the process by which it was informed, evolved, grew, and developed, or might develop, and how, in order to match the standards of the modern world” (Prado Junior, 2001, p. 30–​31). 3 About structural weaknesses of dependent capitalism and its conflict with nation-​building, see Plínio Sampaio Junior: “Dependent capitalism is completely divorced from national

4 Introduction peripheral societies are endowed with productive structures geared toward satisfying foreign wills, material and cultural conditions for nation sovereignty are not informed, and they remain vulnerable to the dictates of central capitalism (including its theories). Challenges in nation-​building limit how peripheral societies can control the path and rhythm of their development, predominantly determined by external conditions. In this sense, they cannot control their own historical time—​they have no control over where they are heading and how fast, being permanently subject to structural reversals determined from the outside to the inside. Being underdevelopment an essentially historical concept, it is not herein considered reducible to an exclusively economic phenomenon or capable of figuring in a unidimensional and unilinear analysis while understood as a “stage prior to development,” aiming at central capitalism as a model.4 Otherwise, as it will be explained, underdevelopment is understood as the specific framework of peripheral capitalism: a synthesis of the multiple determinations of the Latin American historical process, which express organic links between colonial past, primary-​exporter dependent economy, social segregation, acculturation of elites, particularly violent production relations, structural heterogeneity (more specifically, the complementary duality of modern and archaic sectors), precarious institutionality and authoritarian political culture, processes aggravated by the incomplete conquest of national sovereignty, which leads these asymmetries to paroxysm. Therefore, the concept of underdevelopment is a potential window to considering contradictions that move historical totality. 2

Theoretical and Methodological Notes

Two additional theoretical resources supported this work. First, Celso Furtado’s surplus theory, which aids a totalizing view of underdevelopment and indicates the engines of its expanded reproduction (see Furtado, 1974; 1977; 1981). Furtado defines the parameters of his theory of surplus as follows: society, becoming incompatible with the continuity of the civilizing process” (Sampaio Junior, 2000, p. 417). 4 From Florestan Fernandes’s foreword in História e Desenvolvimento [History and Development] by Caio Prado Junior: “[Caio Prado Junior] was convinced of the accuracy of his discoveries and of his depiction of the historical evolution of Brazil and of other peripheral and marginal societies (as he conceived them), which did not and could not repeat the self-​sustained economic development of industrial Europe and the United States. He freed himself from the illusions of those who represented our country as if he could reproduce past, present, and future of imperial centers and focused on what was fundamental: saying why this was historically impossible” (Fernandes, 2001, p. 7–​8).

Introduction

5

Identifying the surplus requires studying the destination given to the fruits of increasing labor productivity. Inequalities in the levels of consumption by members of a collectivity constitute the irrefutable indication of the existence of surplus. Therefore, the surplus theory is the economic perspective on social stratification. […]. In summary, the central theme of the surplus theory is the unequal forms of appropriation of the results in increasing labor productivity. 1977, p. 18–​19

This surplus theory represents a precise and flexible enough conceptual corpus to explain not only underdeveloped capitalism itself (the starting point for this work), but also the structural changes resulting from the revolution to overcome it (the socialist transition process), and the forms of economy and social relations envisioned for the society to be built in Cuba (the historical meaning of the revolution). In this narrative about dismantling modern plantation, we identify the tensions between the different agrarian economic forms that coexisted in the historical process of transition, in different combinations between land tenure, cropping regime, and labor regime. The category surplus, as conceived in Furtado’s theory, proved to be particularly suitable to study the transition processes in Latin America because it supports both underdeveloped productive structures that have not yet perished and the provisional economic forms that emerged from the heat of the revolutionary struggle, not to mention the new socialist structures and relationships under construction. As Furtado predicted, his surplus theory could be applied to the analysis of post-​capitalist societies: From ideas such as surplus and accumulation, it is possible to build a conceptual framework that is broad enough to encompass the study of all social formations […]. But not only the ‘pre-​capitalist’ forms of production organization can be encompassed in a theory of social change based on the concept of surplus. The same can be said of ‘post-​capitalist’ forms, the so-​called centrally planned economies, in which the relative dimension of the surplus and its destination explicitly emerge as a result of the direct action of the State. 1977, p. 27

Therefore, it was out of the awareness that the “socialist transition” was a topic widely discussed by the Marxist tradition that such reference was used in this book. However, it was also unavoidable to make use of a theory specifically capable of explaining the concrete situation of Cuba in 1958, which does

6 Introduction not apply to Soviet theories of the transition to socialism in the 1920s.5 On a theoretical level, the concept of underdevelopment chosen presents considerable connections with Marxist readings of the uneven and combined development of peripheral capitalism (see, for example, Amin, 1976), but it offers a more solid contribution to the analysis of the double articulation fought by the Cuban revolution. The similarities between Latin American structuralism and Marxism allow us to combine them, to the same extent that the Cuban

5 The Marxist tradition has gone through a century of controversies concerning the transition to socialism which, in general, were polarized from two “original” political positions supporting the Soviet economic debate in the 1920s, whose pioneering representatives were Preobrajhensky (1979) and Bukharin (1987). The former formulated the theory of primitive socialist accumulation, which diagnosed a new historical determination of class struggle during the transition, in which the state (proletarian) and the private sector (predominantly peasant) disputed the surplus. Identified with the socialist segment of production, the state sector would still be incapable of carrying out its own expanded reproduction, and it would have to resort to private (capitalist) surplus to feed an original accumulation, the same way capitalism fed on so many forms of production that were not wage earners before and after the industrial revolution, notably the slave colonies in America. Primitive socialist accumulation therefore implies the capture of private surplus by the State through extra-​economic mechanisms. Bukharin, on the other hand, defended that the enrichment of the private sector was a key part of the development of the productive forces, without which it would not be possible to achieve socialist objectives. Therefore, if the State were to strip the private sector of its surplus, productive forces would never reach levels historically necessary for the completion of the revolutionary process. Controversies regarding the adequate correlation between the state sector and the private sector in the appropriation of the surplus during the construction of socialism acquired the most diverse developments, including those of high theoretical abstraction regarding the incidence of the law of value in transition economies. Such Marxist tradition of debates on transition is not disregarded here. However, starting from a historical-​concrete analysis, the surplus theory that supports the concept of underdevelopment and the Latin American structuralist political economy, as formulated by Celso Furtado, is believed to be a better fit while explaining specific Latin American and, more specifically, Cuban issues. While the Marxist debate on transition can provide important contributions to the historical narrative of agrarian reforms in Cuba, it predominantly corresponds to other historical realities—​especially the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thus, mistakes caused by the displacement of this tradition from one reality to another without the proper mediations are avoided. In any case, there are countless points of contact between one and the other referential, which allows us to combine them, as long as the reality of the Cuban historical process itself has done so. Furthermore, the notion of surplus is broader than that of surplus value, since it can be used to investigate non-​capitalist forms of production, i.e., it allows us to go through different revolutionary transformations without abandoning conceptual precision, without getting lost in inadequate labeling and, ultimately, without the need for abstract theoretical reservations about the greater or lesser validity of the law of value in transition economies—​which would be far beyond the scope of this work. For these reasons, the surplus theory proved to be more adequate here.

Introduction

7

revolution itself did, through the historical intertwining of overcoming underdevelopment with the transition to socialism. Second, Marx’s philosophy of history grounds the diagnosis of active forces in the historical process, i.e., class struggle as defining criterion for the correlation of forces and the possibilities of breaking and overcoming underdevelopment (see Marx; Engels, 2011, 2012. The concept of the historical subject in Marx’s philosophy of history allows us to avoid a static approach to reality and to emphasize not only the structural obstacles placed in the way of Cuban development (which can be analyzed in the light of Furtado’s theory), but also the energetic revolutionary will (subjective force) that allowed a small island to challenge an empire. Political and ideological conflicts engendered by the Cuban revolution escalated according to national and international class struggle. In this sense, the development project of the revolution definitely did not depend on the supposed “political will” of nationalist public administrators and their highly technically competent teams, guided by their defense of economic development and social justice, as Latin American structuralism might put it. The bourgeois solution envisioned by eclac never found room on the island, and overcoming underdevelopment coincided with the working classes’ historical need for revolution, as put forth by the theory of uneven and combined development. The combination of those references is neither arbitrary nor casual. Several Cuban and foreign intellectuals with different roles and intensities acted in the development project of the revolution from the intersection between Latin American structuralism and Marxism. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, Ernesto Guevara, Raúl Castro, Regino Boti, Oscar Pino-​Santos, Juan Noyola, Juan Valdés Paz, Sergio Aranda, José Acosta, Jacques Chonchol, Carlos Romeo, David Barkin, Michel Gutelman, Charles Bettelheim, and René Dumont figure among many others, not to mention eclac itself, although with caution, except notably in publications on Cuba from 1964 and 1980. It is safe to say that Fidel Castro also stood on this double territory, following, on the one hand, José Martí as a theoretical and practical guide in the struggle for national emancipation and, on the other hand, Karl Marx as a political reference to justify the need for socialism and to explain social subjects that should build and lead it. Florestan Fernandes also articulated these references in his considerations about Cuba, prepared in 1979. He highlighted the “two orders of interdependent needs” of the Cuban revolutionary process: Chronic poverty and extreme underdevelopment faced through socialism […]. Such a contradiction, in its general and elementary aspects, is not unique to Cuba. What is specific to Cuba though is the type of

8 Introduction combination, the attempt to link the primitive socialist accumulation to two simultaneous functions: the overcoming of chronic poverty and extreme underdevelopment along with the implantation of a socialist society. 2007, p. 314–​315

Therefore, this theoretical-​methodological intersection zone has historically become a fruitful territory for controversies related to Latin American transformation strategies. Furthermore, these two references are combined with intent to avoid two errors. First, excessive emphasis on structural factors, which eliminates or demeans the role of subjects in historical decision-​making. Second, its inverted twin: excessive emphasis on subjective factors and on the will of historical subjects to determine development, which reduces the real difficulties imposed by structural obstacles. The combination of these references represents the search for a dialectical approach between structures and subjects, between possibilities and needs, between means and ends of the socialist project to overcome underdevelopment. 3

Historical Determinations of Underdevelopment

This work is grounded in the following concept of underdevelopment briefly summarized based on some theoretical assumptions. According to Celso Furtado, any theory of development should take into account a surplus theory.6 According to his theory, development is determined by choices regarding the use of surplus made from a variety of options. The connection between development project and surplus utilization is the essence of his theory. Furtado stated that: What matters in the concept of surplus is the final destination of resources, which is disconnected from satisfying constraining needs and opens up to a variety of options. It is because their use transcends the basic requirements related to the reproduction of the population, in a certain cultural context, that these resources can be considered surplus. Seen from another angle, the use of these resources translates the

6 The concept of surplus emerges as the cornerstone of the study of development,” wrote Furtado (1994, p. 37).

Introduction

9

collective life project, the sum of all options made by individuals and groups participating in one or another form of social domination. 1981, p. 49–​50

Therefore, a theory of development must encompass forms of generation, appropriation, and use of surplus. In social product, surplus is the portion not appropriated by the “cost of social reproduction” and, therefore, it may be used by activities directly related to livelihood (Furtado, 1981, p. 54).7 Surplus is generated from the relationship between social division of labor and labor productivity. And its efficiency growth is either synchronous (through specialization and scale increase) or diachronous (through technological innovation). Appropriation of the surplus is its asymmetric absorption by the social structure, which can be processed by different mechanisms of authoritarian and mercantile domination. The use of it, on the other hand, is essentially of two types: expansion of productive capacities or simple unproductive consumption. Choices of the use of the surplus, according to Furtado’s theory, reveal the “substantive rationality” of a society, i.e., cultural and moral values that hierarchize social practices. In other words, the purpose of certain historically determined social groups, which control the trajectory of the surplus. The predominance of one purpose over another in the use of surplus rests on the correlation of forces between social classes. Because the dominant purpose in a given society would correspond to the substantive rationality of the dominant social class, which in turn is defined by the ability to control the process of generation, appropriation, and use of the surplus. Nevertheless, to achieve their purpose, dominant classes need what Celso Furtado dubbed “instrumental rationality,” i.e., the technical and economic means that allow them to generate surplus. Substantive rationality (ends) and instrumental rationality (means) are two strategic dimensions of human creativity processes: they involve both the elaboration of techniques capable of expanding the variety of material and cultural options and the creative use of these new options according to the hierarchy of dominant purposes.8 In theory, development is control of historical changes promoted by the synthesis of these two

7 What Furtado means about social product is the sum of cost of social reproduction and surplus. About the concept of social product see Furtado, 1981, chapter iv. 8 Furtado stated: Science of development concerns two processes of creativity: technique—​ man’s effort to equip himself with instruments to increase his capacity of action—​and the ultimate use of the means created—​the value humans add to their existential patrimony (1994, p. 37).

10 Introduction processes of creativity, and would depend on the correlation between technological and economic means and cultural or moral ends, necessarily determined by social struggles over the control of the surplus. In this general theoretical framework, what distinguishes capitalism from all other modes of production would be the superposition of instrumental rationality and substantive rationality. Because “the penetration of mercantile criteria in the organization of production is nothing other than the expansion of the social space subjected to instrumental rationality” (Furtado, 1981, p. 4). It is only in capitalism that the ends are confused with the means in such a way that technique becomes a priority determination of the use of the surplus. Furtado characterizes capitalism in the following terms: It is certainly the first case of a society in which instrumental rationality itself constitutes a source of legitimacy for the system of power and in which inventiveness with regard to the operative aspects of social life prevails over all other forms of creativity. 1981, pp. 52–​3

However, the development of capitalism is uneven and combined. Therefore, while at the center of the system the purpose that guides the use of the surplus and the possibilities of profit arising from technical progress are jumbled up, in the peripheries, underdevelopment is specifically constituted by two other historical determinants: first, the imperative of the profitability of central economies; and second, the power to modernize the consumption patterns of local elites. The first historical determinant of underdevelopment was informed by foreign control of the means of production and the natural wealth of peripheral societies, made possible by the unbalanced alliance between national and international capital, which conveyed an enormous mass of productive resources toward central economy profitability. And the second was synthesized from the concept of “modernization,” i.e., permanent sophistication of consumption patterns of the elites in peripheral societies through the imitation of consumption patterns of the elites in the center, deepened by a historical process of asymmetric absorption of modern technological means also developed in central capitalism (Furtado, 1974). This unequal assimilation of foreign technology brought along the penetration of values and identities alien to the collectivity, incorporated only to satisfy consumption impulses of acculturated

Introduction

11

elites lacking nationalist sentiment. The inevitable face of technological heterogeneity resulting from “modernization” was structural unemployment.9 Both determinants, being essentially alien to national formation, provided an economic base as distorted as the structure of social stratification, as well as permanently incapable of satisfying the basic needs of the populations.10 Thus, underdevelopment is a historical synthesis of an inadequacy between means and ends. It is identified by structural insufficiency of the technological and economic base, to satisfy on the one hand the asymmetric determinants of accumulation, and on the other popular needs. This insufficiency was historically compensated by the resurgence of social segregation and authoritarian mechanisms of surplus extraction. According to Furtado: The so-​called underdevelopment is but a manifestation of disparity between the dynamics of demand and the low rate of accumulation of reproductive capital. The latter originates from the form of insertion in the international division of labor system and the former, in the penetration of consumption patterns in the center. Therefore, the basic characteristic of a peripheral economy is asymmetry between the productive system and society. This asymmetry manifests itself as social heterogeneity and ruptures and unevenness in consumption patterns. 1981, p. 89–​90

Thus, the historical determinants of underdevelopment engender a contradictory combination of violence (authoritarian forms of surplus extraction made possible by structural unemployment and underemployment) and waste (underutilization of productive capacity resulting from productivity gaps, lack of a national economic system, and force exerted by speculative capital in these structures). According to Furtado, the expanded reproduction of

9

10

According to Furtado, [h]‌istorical circumstances, object of other studies, led certain countries to early adopt a capital-​intensive technology (concerning the availability of resources for accumulation), which led them to conform their own economic structure in a way that would perpetuate technological heterogeneity that manifests itself on the social plane in the form of an important contingent of the “underemployed” population engaged in activities which ignore any increase in physical productivity” (1977, p. 24). Concerning Brazilian reality, Caio Prado stated: “That which should normally constitute the essence of an economy, which is to provide food for individuals engaged in it, this has always been not only underestimated, but often almost entirely unattended in Brazil” (Prado Junior, 2001, p. 64).

12 Introduction underdevelopment asymmetries depends on two main levers located precisely in the agrarian structure and in the international economic order.11 As a historical-​structural phenomenon, overcoming these obstacles would require shaking the foundations of dependent capitalism. These were precisely the targets of the Cuban revolution, which fought the two historical determinants of underdevelopment through a program grounded in a new substantive rationality based on egalitarianism and national sovereignty. These two new goals merged in the anti-​imperialist struggle and became a socialist development project, declared in April 1961. This project demanded, on the one hand, change in instrumental rationality, i.e., a new relationship between the structures of productivity and the needs of the population, and on the other hand, the rooting of these new purposes incorporated as common values of national collectivity. Since underdevelopment is an inadequacy between means and ends, making social control of direction and rhythm of historical change unfeasible, the Cuban attempt to overcome it faced structural challenges linked to these two processes of creativity. The Cuban trouble to find adequate means for new purposes of development and to convert the new purposes into such an engaging collective reason that it would reduce the coercive components of social relations of production—​in other words, self-​discipline workers through consciousness—​are addressed in this book. 4

Why the Agrarian Structure

We will briefly explain the choice from the point of view of the agrarian structure to carry out this study. Due to its historical characteristics, the agrarian structure is the nerve center of the expanded reproduction of underdevelopment. Furtado’s viewpoint was an outset of this book: Agrarian structures are the best observation point to study mechanisms of social domination on which the authoritarian extraction of surplus is

11

About the agrarian structure, Furtado says: “The living conditions of a population gathered in inferior lands or who migrated to agricultural frontiers define the basic salary paid in capitalist agriculture. Therefore, it is the agrarian structure that determines the surplus” (1981, p. 104). Regarding the international economic order, Furtado argues: “It is hardly questionable that the current international economic order feeds and exacerbates disparities, since its technological style, which is its substratum—​and originates from economies with high levels of accumulation—​favors diversification of consumption where the most elementary needs are not met” (1981, p. 146).

Introduction

13

based […]. The symbiosis between traditional and modern, which characterizes peripheral agriculture, is the best viewpoint to the intertwining external domination—​form of insertion in the international division of labor—​and internal domination: primacy of authoritarian criterion in surplus extraction. 1981, p. 96, 101

In an underdeveloped society which exported tropical products, plantation was the specific agrarian form of social segregation.12 The concept of plantation, created to explain the agrarian structure of cotton colonies in the South of the United States, found resonance in Latin American historical and economic literature, while the latifundium-​monoculture-​slavery triad determined the colonial structure of countries such as Brazil and Cuba, remarkably in sugarcane production.13 In Cuba, Manuel Moreno Fraginals and Ramiro Guerra were the greatest scholars on the subject.14 Plantation was a colonial historical fact that was rooted in the agrarian structure of post-​colonial societies. Until 1958, the process of generating, appropriating, and using Cuba’s economic surplus was determined by a “neocolonial triad”—​by modern plantation—​first, a latifundium-​minifundium land tenure structure that made asymmetric the absorption of technical progress in agriculture, generating underutilization of industrial productive capacities; second, a cropping regime that subordinated sugarcane monoculture to international financial capital, resulting in underutilization of agricultural productive capacities; and third, a labor regime marked by authoritarian extraction of surplus through social segregation and unemployment. First, modern plantation land tenure was characterized by concentration of land ownership and asymmetric absorption of technology. Land concentration

12

13 14

Furtado elaborated a Latin American underdevelopment typology according to productive specialization. He defined three exporting groups: agricultural products in temperate regions (Argentina and Uruguay), agricultural products in tropical regions (Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America, accounting for more than half of the Latin American population), and mineral products (Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela). Each group gave rise to a specifically segregated social structure, according to the predominant economic activity. As for tropical countries, plantation is one of the colonial original economic forms of colonial origin that reproduce the system (1969, p. 62–​4). On the organization of plantations in southern United States, see Gray, 1958. In Brazil, it was Caio Prado Junior who established studies on the role of plantations in colonial and post-​colonial societies. See Prado Junior, 1994 and 2004. See Fraginals, 1989; Guerra, 1970.

14 Introduction along with denationalization of land, was made possible by two cycles of intense “accumulation by spoliation”: the US military occupation from 1898 to 1902 and the financial crisis of the Dance of the Millions, in 1920—​topic of the first chapter in this book. Foreign spoliation of vast rural areas was marked by the dispossession of peasants, who were forcibly displaced to the worst lands available and, in many cases, became dependent on paid employment, living on leased minifundium. It is from this spoliation that the latifundium and minifundium structure emerge. The asymmetric absorption of foreign technical progress in the sugar production chain expanded the capacity of the industry in relation to that of agriculture, transferring power from sugar plantations to the ingenios centrales (central mills)—​as sugar mills are known in Cuba. This intensified productivity asymmetries within the chain, favoring small speculative circuits in the agrarian structure. Second, regarding cropping regimes, foreign investment in the agrarian structure subjected monoculture to the great modern circuits of financial speculation. In 1958, sugar accounted for 54% of the total value of agricultural production in monetary terms and 77% of the total value of the island’s exports. Concurrently, sugar plantations had 46% of their area idle and, usually, 20% of the plantation not harvested (Chonchol, 1961, p. 8, 11–​12). This underutilization of sugarcane productive capacities made up to allow room for speculation in the global market was the result of Cuba’s insertion in the economy as dependent on the United States. Dependency was sealed by Reciprocity Treaties and by the system of exportation quotas adopted throughout the first half of the twentieth century, which blocked the development of any other productive segment and condemned the island to monoculture. In addition to commercial ties that guaranteed the underutilization of agricultural and industrial productive capacities, there was extensive foreign control over the land: in 1958, 40% of Cuban sugar production was controlled by US owners (eclac, 1980, p. 14). All that made Cuba particularly susceptible to the pressures of international finance capital, subjecting its productive structures to the drift of the largest financial groups in the world.15 As will be discussed ahead, foreign control of the national economy was often made possible by the Cuban state and its ruling classes. Third, the modern plantation agricultural labor regime was based on authoritarian extraction of surplus, permanently guaranteed by structural 15

On the speculative nature of large estates in underdeveloped Latin America, Furtado wrote: “Land ownership is less a basis for organizing agricultural production than a means of extracting surplus from an economy with an extremely low level of productivity” (1969, p. 91).

Introduction

15

unemployment.16 Until 1958, structural unemployment acquired dramatic proportions during the tiempo muerto. Unemployment, underemployment, and unpaid work fluctuated according to sugar harvest and together they accounted for a third of the national workforce (Acosta, 1973, p. 69; Pino-​ Santos, 1983, p. 265; Lecuona, 2009, p. 128).17 Rural laborers, who represented almost 40% of the island’s total population, lived in extreme poverty (Pino-​ Santos, 1983, p. 270; eclac, 1964, p. 272). According to research carried out by Agrupación Católica Universitária, in 1956 revealed, 92.79% of Cuban rural families survived on less than 1,000 pesos a year, including production for self-​ consumption, which made them even more vulnerable to salary cuts.18 The three levers of “neocolonial triad,” of modern plantation, were the means of reproducing historical determinations of underdevelopment: first, they guaranteed the profitability of central economies and, second, the modernization of elite consumption patterns, feeding the privileges of a so-​called societas sceleris bourgeoisie.19 Modernization of the plantation was in itself the “development of underdevelopment” or the “anti-​development.”20 Thus, the agrarian reforms carried out by the Cuban revolution fought the levers of reproduction of dependent capitalism, attacking the modern plantation land tenure system, cropping regime, and labor regime. In that struggle, the development project embodied by the revolution proposed to change the trajectory of the surplus, expanding and diversifying its generation by activating underutilized productive capacities; democratizing their appropriation by breaking with social segregation; and guiding its use in the service of the new substantive rationality. Such transformations were triggered by the agrarian reforms of 1959 and 1963. 16

17 18 19

20

On authoritarian extraction of surplus in agriculture after slavery was abolished, Furtado argues: “The transition to modern agriculture was often followed by reduction in employment in modernizing areas or activities and increase in underemployment elsewhere, where the traditional form remained. Often, this dichotomy was produced within the same agricultural holding which, having a reserve army of labor, could impose low wages in the modernized sector” (1981, p. 101). According to data made available by the National Economic council of 1958. In the 1950s, there was parity between peso-​dollar exchange rates. The so-​called “societas sceleris type of bourgeoisie” is a definition adopted by eclac to describe the Cuban bourgeoisie in the 1980s, using a concept by Hélio Jaguaribe, who summarizes it in two characteristics. First, the subordination of national elites to foreign interests and, second, an “overt and self-​conscious exploratory opportunism of the societas sceleris elite,” i.e., one behaving as a criminal society (in: eclac, 1980, p. 15). On the concept of “development of underdevelopment” see Amin, 1976, chapter iv, p. 167. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez argues: “The period of sugar expansion was that in which the greatest economic structural deformation of our country took place, and in fact it is a period of ‘anti-​development’” (1983, p. 57).

16 Introduction When put into practice, the revolution development project prompted new contradictions, which in turn triggered polemics, criticism, and permanent corrections. Some of these dilemmas are reconstituted, in view of the debate on revolution and socialism on the periphery of capitalism. Since the agrarian structure is the best point of observation for the study of the mechanisms of social domination, it certainly constitutes an excellent point of observation of the processes of emancipation. 5

New Contradictions from the Revolutionary Process

This work addresses some of the new contradictions emerging from the development project of the Cuban revolution. Such contradictions manifest themselves in divergences of generation, appropriation, and use of the surplus in view of the new range of options opened up by the change in the substantive rationality of the system. Furtado described peripheral socialism as a specific attempt to overcome underdevelopment fraught with impasses. For him, there was trouble in three areas arising from the “collectivization of the means of production” in the context of underdevelopment: concerning a social organization responsible for defining priorities in allocating scarce resources; concerning an incentive system which reconciles the best performance of productive activities with the desired income distribution; concerning insertion in international economy ensuring access to technology and financial resources outside relationships of dependency. 1994, p. 39–​40

These three issues correspond precisely to the three concrete dimensions of the dismantling of modern plantation. The first issue corresponds to land tenure and to appropriation of surplus, i.e., controversies regarding management and scaling of new productive units in the agrarian structure. The most appropriate social organization responsible for defining surplus allocation priorities was widely and openly debated in Cuba between 1961 and 1964, from the “small agrarian debate” on cooperatives and state farms to the “great economic debate” on forms of ownership during the transition to socialism.21 The great

21

The idea that there was a “small agrarian debate” between 1961 and 1962 is original of the current study and there is no similar reference in the bibliography. The “Great Economic

Introduction

17

economic debate was polarized between two proposals: that in the Budgetary Finance System, absolute state control over generation and appropriation of surplus would predominate, so that the State would decide on its use with sovereignty; in the economic calculation system, the private sector would hold a portion of the surplus, being able to decide on its use in the private sphere. The essence of the economic debate between those two systems was divergence over what should be the specific role of the private sector in decisions about the use of surplus and what its general political role should be in the transition to socialism. Obviously, this book does not propose to rebuild the arguments of that major Cuban economic debate, although the knowledge of it is an indispensable condition for our objective. Between 1965 and 1966, the debate was replaced by the simultaneous experimentation of two rival models of the “Big debate” in the sectors headed by its most prominent formulators: the budgetary finance system was applied to industry and commanded by Ernesto Guevara, while economic calculation was applied in agriculture and led by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.22 However, the experience of the duality of

22

Debate” is otherwise established. It took place in 1963 and 1964 through articles published in magazines such as Cuba Socialista, Nuestra Industria, Comercio Exterior, among others. On one side Ernesto Guevara (Minister of Industries), Luis Alvarez Rom (Minister of Finance), Miguel Cossío, Alexis Condena, and Mario Rodríguez Escalona stood for maximum state centralized economy through the Budgetary Finance System. And along with them, stood Belgian economist Ernest Mandel. On the other side Alberto Mora (Minister of Foreign Trade), Marcelo Fernandez Font (President of the National Bank), Juan Infante, and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (President of National Institute for Agrarian Reform—​i nra) stood together with Frenchman Charles Bettelheim for cooperative forms of self-​management and self-​financing of production units. In addition to the most appropriate forms of management, there was a debate on the role of economic calculation and mercantile categories in the transition to socialism, the value of material and moral stimuli for increasing labor productivity, the role of the law of value in the transition economy, the administration of prices, and the cultural dimension of the economic rupture with capitalism. Articles on the great economic debate can be found in Guevara, 1982, 2006, and 2011 and in Rodríguez, 1963a, 1963b, and 1966. Historical reformulation of arguments and implications of the debate can be found in Pericás, 2004. The strategic nature of topics addressed at that time is corroborated by the fact that the controversies have unfolded until today. On the current economic debate, see articles by José Luiz Rodríguez García, Carmelo Mesa-​Lago and Julio Diaz Vasquez in Catalejo—​Economía y Política on Temas Magazine website. (Access: January 19, 2023: temas.cult.cu/​). Carlos Rafael Rodríguez is a Cuban economist who became the main leader of the Popular Socialist Party (psp), the communist party in Cuba before the revolution. He was president of National Institute for Agrarian Reform (inra), created in 1959, and played a leading role in the agrarian and economic debate during the years addressed in this book. For all these reasons, Rodríguez is one of the crucial protagonists in the story herein narrated.

18 Introduction models did not last long: from 1967 onwards, despite the noticeable absence of Guevara, principles governing the budgetary finance system became essential guides for the “Revolutionary Offensive,” which radically repudiated economic calculation and culminated in the 1970 harvest. Concerning land tenure, the different agrarian productive units of each specific moment of the revolution and their implications for the appropriation of the surplus are identified as follows: cooperatives, state farms, small peasant property, special plans, combined, etc. Each new agricultural production unit was put to the test, representing different configurations of surplus control and, consequently, of development strategy. Controversies about the new land tenure permeate all chapters in this book. The second issue pointed out by Furtado addresses tensions between labor productivity, democratization of surplus and social relations of production, i.e., it concerns the new labor regime. The profile of the reduction of unemployment in Cuba between 1959 and 1970 and the tiempo muerto in reverse—​the transition from structural unemployment to scarcity of laborers in the sugarcane fields—​will be further discussed. Concurrently, social guarantees offered by the State meant “collective pay” for work (or collectivization of income), which coexisted with a system of relatively low individual wages. More specifically, the case of volunteer work toward the 10 million harvest will be addressed. The analysis of voluntary work during the 1970 harvest summarizes the contradictions experienced between democratization of the surplus and the fall in labor productivity, which halted social relations of production. Under Cuban conditions, democratization of surplus loosened the coercive ties of work, generating negative results on productivity. The attempt to solve this problem through voluntary sugarcane cutting brigades gave rise to a paradoxical ideological tool, triggering consciousness and coercion to mitigate the drop in productivity. In other words, for some people, voluntary work was an action of revolutionary consciousness, while for others, it meant coercive imposition. Actions that were even more intense for mechanization of sugarcane cutting fell far short of what was planned for the big harvest. In 1970, only 1% of sugarcane cutting was mechanized, while the government’s expectation was to reach at least 30% (Edquist, 1985, p. 108). Subsequently, volunteer work was shown to have disastrous results in terms of productivity. The dilemma between democratization of surplus and the fall in labor productivity in an underdeveloped society transitioning to socialism—​which, supposedly, intended to reduce the coercive component of work and not recreate it—​was not resolved. Ultimately, this second order of problems primarily reflects the debate between the use of material and/​or moral stimuli to achieve increase in labor productivity while transitioning to socialism. While that topic will be

Introduction

19

briefly addressed so that the context of the 1967 “Revolutionary Offensive” is explained, the theoretical and economic complexity of this debate prevents a deeper approach in this book.23 The third issue Furtado points out brings forth the determining force of the international economic order and the technological and financial dependency for an underdeveloped country such as Cuba. That order of issues fall on the cropping regime of the agrarian structure and the tensions between monoculture and diversification. The Cuban revolution led to a radical agricultural diversification until 1963. Then it opted for prioritizing sugarcane combined with specialized diversification, until around 1967. As the 1970 harvest approached, sugarcane became even more incisive, producing structural distortions in almost all branches of the island’s economy, also making diversification unfeasible. Behind each crop policy, there was a specific development strategy. It is clear, however, that for the 1970 harvest, the consolidation of Cuba’s new insertion in the international economic order guaranteed by the agreements with the Soviet Union, was preponderant. The relationship between cropping regime, development strategy, and international economic insertion is a significant paradox in the history of the island. The new Cuban insertion meant that sugarcane specialization, one of the pillars of modern plantation, remained active, albeit less subordinated to speculative circuits. Despite that, the use of surplus generated by sugar production began to be guided by new purposes, and sugar came to be seen as a provisional lever for development—​in other words, a technological and economic platform enabling a “great leap.” Such contradiction crosses through this work and allows us to visualize how profound changes in the appropriation and use of surplus coexisted with permanence of the forms of surplus generation arising from an extremely persistent colonial heritage. 6

Cuban Agrarian Reform Periodization

The following is a general outline of this research and a proposal for periodization of different moments in the transformation of Cuban agrarian structure between 1958 and 1970, corresponding to each chapter and according to three analytical dimensions: land tenure system, cropping regime, and labor regime. The main features of the agrarian reform and structure change discussed in this book are summarized in the following outline. 23

Arguments on this dimension of the Cuban economic debate are analyzed in Pericás, 2004. See also Silverman, 1971 and 1978.

Latifundium-​ Minifundium Structure

24

Cooperatives (until sep.1962) and State Farms (40%)

First Agrarian Reform Law

Dual Model (self-​financing of farms)

Small Owners (40%)

State Farms and Combinados (60%)

Second Agrarian Reform Law

Stabilization

Moral Economy (budget system)

Economic Calculation (transition to soviet model)

Small Owners (15%)

State Farms, Combinados, and Special Plans (85%)

Revolutionary Offensive

Immediately after 1970

CHAPTER 5

By rural bourgeoisie we considered every landowner with 5 to 30 caballerías, plus the exceptions established by the first Agrarian Reform Law (from 30 to 50 caballerías). By small owner we considered all those with 2 to 5 caballerías. One caballería corresponds to 13.42 hectares (Chonchol, 1961, p. 28).

Intense and Improvised Centralization

Latifundium (57% Rural Bourgeoisie of the area with (30%) and small 2.8% of the owners). owners (30%) Minifundium (15% of the area with 78.5% of the owners)

Economic Debate -​-​ Production Unit Management

Private Agricultural Property24

State Agricultural Insignificant Property

Land Tenure System

Jan/​1959 to Oct/​1963 Oct/​1963 to Sep/​1966 Sep/​1966 to Jul/​1970

CHAPTER 4

1958

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 1

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20 Introduction

There is none (susceptible to international finance capital)

Development Strategy

Eliminate idle productive capacities

Investment in agro-​ industrial capital

Combined Strategy

The 1964 Agreement and New Insertion into the Soviet Bloc

Recovery of Sugarcane Area and Guidelines to Specialized Diversification

Attempts to Investment in agro-​ sugarcane crop industrial capital mechanization

Turnpike Failure of the Strategy (1970 “Great Leap” and harvest: “Great self-​criticism Leap” in exportation)

Consolidation Joining the of the comecon Insertion into the Soviet Bloc

The Ten-​ Sugar Specialization Million Goal and Reduction of Diversified Area (Structural Distortions)

Immediately after 1970

CHAPTER 5

Introduction

Technical and Idle productive Economic means capacities

US Blockade and Insertion Crisis

Dependency on United States

International Economic Insertion Emergency Policy

Radical Diversification and Reduction of Sugarcane Area

Cropping Regime Speculative Extensive Sugarcane Monoculture

Jan/​1959 to Oct/​1963 Oct/​1963 to Sep/​1966 Sep/​1966 to Jul/​1970

CHAPTER 4

1958

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 1

newgenrtpdf

21

0%

Sugarcane crop mechanization

25

14,3% (1943-​1958) 1% to 3%

6,4%

3% to 1%

2,8%

1% to 3%

3,6%

Self-​criticism about the excess of moral stimulus and productivity retraction

Hierarchization of revolutionary goals: egalitarianism as priority

Immediately after 1970

CHAPTER 5

The unemployment tax in the period 1943-​58 is subject to statistical manipulations related to the seasonality of the harvest, as we will see in Chapter 1.

0%

10,56%

Moral stimulus and voluntary work (productivity retraction)

Unemployment average25

Lack of sugarcane labor force and material stimulus

Tiempo muerto (violent surplus extraction)

Labor Regime

Better salaries and collectivization of labor beginning

US capital profitability Surplus democratization: egalitarianism, national and modernization sovereignty, and socialist project of the elite’s consumerism

Priority use of surplus

Jan/​1959 to Oct/​1963 Oct/​1963 to Sep/​1966 Sep/​1966 to Jul/​1970

CHAPTER 4

1958

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 1

newgenrtpdf

22 Introduction

­c hapter 1

Modernization of Cuban Plantation (1902–​1958) It is in the relationship between latifundia and minifundia that we must seek the fundamental traits of regional agrarian structure. celso furtado (1969, p. 91)

…

The well-​being of our dominating classes—​dominating inwardly, dominated from outside—​is the curse of our multitudes. eduardo galeano (2004, p. 14)

∵ When Fulgencio Batista fled to the Dominican Republic in the wee hours of January 1, 1959, and was received by dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo at the price of one million dollars a night, the US Embassy no longer supported him. It was the fourth time Cuba had gone through such an expressive popular uprising. The first time was between 1868 and 1878, during the Ten Years’ War against Spain; the second, during the War of Independence from 1895 to 1898; and the third uprising overthrew the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado in 1933, after a decade of rebellions. And now the Sierra Maestra guerrillas, in such an unlikely victory, had spread a new spark. Until then, in 1959, Cuban society could be considered neocolonial and underdeveloped.1 Neocolonial for its undeniable external vulnerability and either weakness or inexistence of decision-​making centers on the island. Underdeveloped for the inadequacy between its productive structure and the needs of the majority of the population. Absence of national sovereignty and inadequacy of the productive structure were historically aggravated by the modernization of originally colonial sugar plantation, which had reached paroxysm during the first half of the twentieth century, and was the organic nexus

1 About the concept of neocolonial society see Fernandes, 2007; Sampaio Junior, 1999; Acosta, 1973. About the concept of underdevelopment see Furtado, 1981.

© Joana Salém Vasconcelos, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004515215_003

24 

Chapter 1

between agrarian structure and the international economic order in determining the Cuban underdevelopment.2 Ultimately, the modernization of Cuban plantation was a composite of three processes: the worsening of structural heterogeneity,3 which widened asymmetries in land tenure; the broad US control of Cuban lands based on the conversion of monoculture into an essentially speculative activity, a defining feature of the cropping regime; and unemployment during tiempo muerto, which perpetuated social segregation, imposing violent conditions on the labor regime. This chapter will shed light on how the three operations of modernization of plantation were articulated. First, land tenure guaranteed a particularly violent labor regime. Land concentration and technological disparity between agriculture and industry in the sugar chain were the main factors giving rise to seasonal unemployment in Cuba, for while extensive agriculture absorbed huge contingents of laborers, industry was technology intensive. Agriculture required for just four months a year a contingent of labor in the sugarcane field capable of providing raw material for a disproportionately modernized industry. Such a large contingent was then unneeded during the off-​season, resulting in seasons of massive rural unemployment that affected half a million people (Aranda, 1968, p. 12; Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 265). The latifundium-​minifundium structure stems from this process. Second, the cropping regime reinforced a labor regime marked by absence of alternatives because there were no other crops capable of absorbing such a contingent during the off-​season. Thus, sugarcane monoculture perpetuated precarious wages. Simultaneously, this seasonal unemployment was a key part of the expanded reproduction of underdevelopment because it guaranteed the generation of a large surplus through a low cost of population reproduction. And third, land tenure and cropping regime were linked by the speculative nature of modern plantation, which guaranteed the underutilization of agricultural and industrial productive capacities. Two speculative dimensions provided such underutilization. The land tenure was internally tied by leasing and subleasing networks (typical of the latifundium-​minifundium structure), which made up small circuits of speculation, fed by land idleness. Concurrently, these small circuits were integrated into a large circuit of speculation, since the cropping regime was conditioned on fluctuations and negotiations on the world sugar market, determining the idleness of the industry. Ultimately, when this three-​blade gear was set in motion, it created both prosperity and devastation. 2 To learn more about the history of plantation in the nineteenth and twentieth century Cuba see Fraginals, 1989. About the concept of modernization, see Furtado, 1974. 3 To learn more about the concept of structural heterogeneity, see Pinto, 1979.

Modernization of Cuban Plantation (1902–​1 958)

25

The modernization of plantation made Cuba an emblematic case of underdevelopment in Latin America and of the uneven and combined development of capitalism. In the 1950s, it presented the most acute contradictions of peripheral formations: it was a nation split in its social structure and with no control over directions and rhythms of its development. While capital reached high degrees of concentration and centralization and the sugar industry absorbed technologies of high productivity, most of the population remained submerged in extreme rural poverty and agriculture remained as rustic as in the nineteenth century.4 This chapter briefly restores the historical process that culminated in the Cuban situation of 1958, covering the three dimensions of modernization of plantation. 1

Latifundium-​Minifundium Land Tenure Structure

Modernized plantation in Cuba generated a latifundium-​minifundium land tenure structure.5 The relationship between latifundium and minifundium was a territorial expression of social relations of production in the countryside. In other words, Cuban minifudia were the territorial form during tiempo muerto, for it was the only means of subsistence for most of the cane cutters laid off every year from April to November. The latifundium-​minifundium land tenure structure is represented in Table 1, with data from the 1946 Cuban National Agricultural Census.6 4 See Amin, 1976 for a concept on uneven and combined development. About concentration and centralization of capital see Marx, 2004, chapter xxiii. 5 The latifundium-​minifundium land tenure structure was conceptualized by Celso Furtado as follows: “Subsistence farming occurs when production is two-​thirds or more for self-​ consumption, even if those who work on it derive supplementary income from outside activities. Sometimes subsistence units live in symbiosis with commercial agriculture. This is the case concerning the bimodal latifundium-​minifundium typical of the agrarian structure of much of Latin America” (Furtado, 1981, p. 97). Juan Valdés Paz dubbed that same structure latifundia constellation: “the agrarian organization corresponding to this constellation was characterized both by the growing polarization between latifundium and minifundium, as well as by a slow evolution of its organizational forms” (2009, p. 11). For him, a minifundium can be defined as: “a family farm unable to provide the vital minimum income for its members” (1997, p. 21). Subsequently, the revolutionary government considered the “vital minimum income” two caballerías per family of five, that is, twenty-​seven hectares. 6 The 1946 agricultural census was the last official statistical map on agrarian property carried out by the Cuban government before the revolution. It was used by the revolutionary movement to determine land reform and land redistribution policies in 1958 and 1959. Also based on it agronomist Jacques Chonchol wrote his report to fao in 1961, when he was sent to Cuba in technical missions to assist the agrarian reform of the island (see Chonchol, 1961, 1963, in

26  table 1

Chapter 1 Agricultural area by property size (1946)

Size Até 2 caballerías De 2 a 5 caballerías De 5 a 30 caballerías Mais que 30 caballerías Total

Properties

%

125,619 16,766 13,150 4,423 159,958

78.5 10.5 8.2 2.8 100

Area (caballerías) % 101,530 61,292 128,781 384,787 676,390

15 9 19 57 100

source: chonchol, 1961, p. 5—​1 946 national agricultural census

In 1946, latifundia over thirty caballerías made up 2.8% of the number of properties and controlled 57% of the agricultural area, while minifundia smaller than two caballerías accounted for 78.5% of all properties and covered only 15% of agricultural area.7 While landowners often owned more than one property, according to Chonchol, less than 3,000 people owned 62% of the country’s total agricultural area before the revolution. A closer look at the agrarian structure shows that thirteen of the main US-​owned sugarcane plantations meant no less than 87,407 caballerías. According to the 1952 livestock census, only 3% of the properties raising cattle was responsible for 43% of the entire national cattle herd (Chonchol, 1961, p. 8–​10). This was the panoramic picture of land concentration. It was precisely the relationship between latifundia and minifundia that set the speculative essence of modern plantation land tenure. 1.1 Between Latifundium and Minifundium Between latifundium and minifundium there was a complex chain of leases and subleases, represented in Table 2. Subtenants, partners, and squatters accounted for approximately one-​ hundred thousand people in the 1950s (Pericás, 2004, p. 35). On top of them addition to our interview published in 2012.). Jacques Chonchol, an agronomist, was Minister of Agriculture under President Salvador Allende between 1970 and 1972. Before that, as a fao technician, he went to Cuba on a mission to help with the agrarian reform. 7 Caballería is a unit of land measurement used in Cuba, and it will be the reference agrarian unit in this book as it is predominant in the research sources. One caballería, which is equivalent to 13.42 hectares, is a large measure, which in itself reveals a crucial feature of Cuban agriculture before and after the revolution: gigantism (Chonchol, 1961, p. 28).

2.007

159.958 48.792 9.342 46.048 6.987 33.064 13.718

3.025 387 33 462 75 272 1.551

48.778 15.048 2.063 15.726 2.647 9.752 3.206

1.002 336

59.475 15.366 1.766 13.199 2.271 18.603 7.258 218

23.901 8.541 1.409 8.296 1.28 2.916 1.241

Up to From 1 From 10 From 25 0,9 to 9,9 to 24,9 to 49,9

1.2 245

100 30.5 5.8 28.8 4.4 20.7 8.6

%

source: acosta, 1972a, p. 83—​d ata by 1946 national agricultural census

All Owner Administrator Tenant Subtenant Partner Squatter [precarista] Others

Number of properties

123

12.01 4.897 1.25 4.092 431 922 295 63

10.433 3.831 2.027 3.592 240 536 144

From 50 From 100 to 99,9 to 499,9

Property distribution by extension and land concession regime (1946) (in hectares)

Land concession regime

table 2

30

2.336 722 784 681 43 63 23

Over 500

%

72,134.20

0.8

9,077,086.30 100 2,958,694.50 32.4 2,320,444.70 25.6 2,713,929.70 30 215,215.20 2.4 552,078.90 6.1 244,588.80 2.7

Total area

newgenrtpdf

Modernization of Cuban Plantation (1902–​1 958)

27

28 

Chapter 1

speculation circuits that energized the modern plantation land tenure system were built, connecting latifundium and minifundium through rentier capitalism. There were three regulated regimes for rentier land concessions: lease, sublease, and partnership. Subtenants made up 4.4% of properties and had to pay rent in cash to intermediate or final tenants. Often, there were many intermediaries between the last subtenant and the owner, and they withdrew income without planting not even a single hectare. Partners, on the other hand, accounted for 20.7% of productive units, and they were required to pay for the use of the land in kind, which could reach half or a third of their total production. Partners established a contractual relationship with the lessor but without monetary mediation, and their crops were subject to the cyclical interests of the sugarcane harvest. And finally, there was still a regime without regulation: the squatters, who occupied 8.6% of all properties. They did not even have a contract and were completely unprotected from any labor legislation, usually in illegal possession of a small land for subsistence production. Precisely because of the absence of a contract, they were more susceptible to exploitation by the intermediary chain (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 13). In livestock activity, something similar went on in three types of productive units: breeding properties of small-​scale cattle producers; improvement ranches of average breeders; and fattening properties of landowners (cebadores). The latter, controlling the end of the livestock chain, had speculation power over the former ones, paying them cheap for a product they would sell expensive (Chonchol, 1961, p. 12). According to the 1946 Agricultural Census, at one end of the agrarian structure, one third of properties greater than 37 caballerías (500 hectares) were in either lease, sublease or partnership regime. Another third of these latifundia were managed by professional administrators and the last third were managed by their owners. At the other end, a constellation of minifundia surrounded the latifundia, as if the latter magnetically attracted the former, just as capital attracts labor when there is unemployment. Altogether, 63% of properties exploited directly by their owners corresponded to units smaller than 1.8 caballerías (25 hectares), 79% of which accounted for units smaller than 3.7 caballerías (50 hectares). The class of tenants showed the same pattern: 63% of them rented properties smaller than 1.8 caballerías and 81%, less than 3.7 caballerías. The more intermediaries there were between owner and effective occupant of the land, the greater the proportion of the minifundia. Among subtenants, 71% of the properties were less than 1.8 caballerías and 89.8% were less than 3.7 caballerías. Ultimately, among partners and squatters, 87% of the units were smaller than 1.8 caballerías and 96% were smaller than 3.7 caballerías. In all, 90% of the minifundia smaller than 1.8 caballerías were

Modernization of Cuban Plantation (1902–​1 958)

29

occupied by tenants, subtenants, partners, and squatters. Subtenants’, partners’, and squatters’ lands altogether did not reach more than 11.2% of agricultural land on the island. The life of subtenants, partners, and squatters in minifundia resonated with the rural proletariat, as they were all adrift in the seasonal waves of unemployment. This landless peasantry had historically suffered from expropriations resulting from the expansion of capitalism in the countryside, being moved to the worst lands of the agricultural frontier and subjected to these rentier concession regimes. It is not by chance that peasants who inhabited Sierra Maestra actively supported the guerrillas: both they and their ancestors reached those lands coerced by the Rural Guard, an armed corps created during the 1902 US occupation to serve the land concentration. This dispossessed fraction of the peasant class was gradually proletarianized, which was described by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez: As the process of capitalist penetration into agriculture developed, the number of semi-​proletarians increased because misery forced peasants more and more to employ themselves as agricultural laborers and, therefore, compete for the scarce work opportunities offered by Cuban agriculture. 1978, p. 39

Thus, on the minifundia there was a symbiosis between agricultural wage workers and peasants. Subtenants, partners, or squatters had dual social origin: on the one hand, they were dispossessed small peasants who had been moved to the worst land and were always looking for a salary and, on the other hand, they were occasional wage workers who, during the off-​season, searched for survival alternatives in the minifundia. From this symbiosis a particularly hybrid social class arose in the Cuban agrarian structure—​the proletarian-​ peasant, working for wages from December to March and surviving in minifundia between April and November. Consequently, speculative manipulation of land by large landowners and intermediaries oppressed the margins of subsistence of the proletarian-​ peasant and reproduced social segregation in agriculture at the same pace as seasonal cycles of unemployment. According to the official 1946 census, the difference in the monthly family income of a peasant with up to 10 hectares (0.75 caballerías) and a landowner with more than 1,000 hectares (74.5 caballerías) could reach up to ninety times (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 32). If there was this local speculative chain between latifundium and minifundium, the modern plantation was organically connected to the wide speculative channels of

30 

Chapter 1

the world financial market, a connection whose history dates back to the origins of structural heterogeneity. 1.2 Origins of Structural Heterogeneity Structural heterogeneity, defined by industrial productivity greater than agricultural productivity, was the result of Cuba’s peripheral insertion in the world economy. This was the assessment of Juan Noyola, an eclac economist assigned to go to Cuba on a technical mission in 1959.8 In his words: The natural result of establishing a relationship between a so-​called underdeveloped country and an industrial country is the division of the economy of the former into two sectors: a modern sector, in which even the most modern and efficient techniques known are used, and an archaic sector, whose development is hindered less by internal blockage than by, precisely, the existence of the modern sector controlled by imperialism. 1978, p. 115

It must be considered that heterogeneity persisted, despite the fact that the Cuban sugar industry (modern sector) was also technically lagging behind the international level in the 1950s. In his classic study on the matter, López warned: From an agricultural viewpoint, it was a total structural deformity. An extraordinarily behindhand agriculture that served as the basis for one of the world largest, if not the largest, industries of its kind. The second structural flaw was that it was also a behindhand industry, such that one could say it was living approximately the third decade of the century. Since the 1920s-​1930s, the Cuban sugar industry has not innovated […]. It can be said that the capitalist system abandoned investments in Cuba since 1925 and only carried out a maintenance campaign, which practically led the industry to crisis, in 1958. 1982, p. 115, 117

The history of the asymmetric absorption of technology in the Cuban sugar sector coincides with the history of the division of the ruling agrarian class into two fractions: the colono (owner or tenant of the sugarcane fields) and 8 The Mexican economist Juan Noyola resigned from his position at eclac, in 1960, by letter to Raúl Prebisch. He stated: “If at any time divergences or incompatibilities arise between the interpretation I give to my task and that given in other circles, I regret it, not for myself but

Modernization of Cuban Plantation (1902–​1 958)

31

the hacendado (owner of the sugar plant). The tension between both illustrates a typical pattern of speculative competition within the ruling class. That competition is unfolding into dependent modernization itself. The separation of industry from agriculture in Cuba was a process that began in the mid-​ nineteenth century and ended in the early twentieth century. It resulted from industrial centralization and technological modernization which made 1,170 ingenios centrales in 1881 into just 171 ingenios centrales in 1903 (Lecuona, 2009, p. 221). This modernization process was followed by a great leap in productivity. In 1877, 1,191 ingenios centrales produced 520,000 tonnes of sugar. In 1894, 450 ingenios centrales produced one million tonnes of sugar (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 213). From a more diachronic perspective, Juan Noyola defined the process of increasing productivity between mid-​nineteenth and mid-​twentieth centuries as “industrial sugar revolution.” Sugar production capacity increased from 1.5 million tonnes in 1902 to 5 million in 1920. In the mid-​twentieth century, 161 ingenios centrales had the capacity to produce 7 million tonnes of sugar (Noyola, 1978, p. 39, 49). On the other hand, agriculture remained rustic. While one might point out that failed attempts to mechanize the Cuban sugarcane harvest took place until 1929, after the world economic crisis landowners virtually abandoned initiatives of technological improvement in agriculture, calculating high costs of mechanization would correspond to residual and uncertain future gains. As long as the sugar surplus was more easily secured through unemployment, landowners would be indifferent to agricultural technical progress. In a sense, landowners became aware of the strategic role of seasonal unemployment in guaranteeing low production cost and, therefore, high income and international competitiveness. Furthermore, between 1930 and 1958, rare attempts at mechanization of the sugarcane harvest were hindered by workers themselves, through Luddite methods: setting fire and ravaging machines acquired by employers and destroying engines, which meant even more unemployment. Therefore, technological disparity between agriculture and industry in sugar production was perpetuated by the interest of two active actors in the agrarian structure: landowners, who calculated economic advantages of seasonal

because it reveals a misunderstanding about the Cuban Revolution. It also reveals that the interests moving against the revolution influence the United Nations secretariat. It has come to my attention that, by influence and pressure, the Secretary-​General of the United Nations has decided to terminate the eclac/​d oat mission. In such circumstances, I believe that I have no alternative but to irrevocably resign from my position at eclac, as of October 31 of this year” (Noyola, 1978, p. 11). After his resignation, Noyola became director of juceplan (Central Planning Board) and was awarded the Cuban citizenship title.

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unemployment, and laborers, who feared missing the only four months when they were paid a salary. In Charles Edquist’s words as a researcher of technological choice processes in Cuban: The main reason was the low salaries of agricultural laborers and the abundance of manual labor. Under these conditions, mechanization experiments were not perceived to be economically attractive even for large cane growers. From this time on, workers strongly opposed the introduction of mechanical harvest equipment […]. The sugar-​cane producing countries were—​and are—​generally underdeveloped countries with an abundance of cheap manual labor. In the most cases, the machine could not compete with manual laborers because of the high cost of purchasing harvesters and the operation and maintenance of them as well. 1985, p. 33

In that sense, technological delay was an important component of the speculative game, whose main rule was to minimize population reproduction costs and constant capital costs. The lack of interest in technical progress in agriculture and the absorption of modern technology by the industrial sector worsened productivity asymmetries. And thus, the idle capacity of the sugar industry emerged and strengthened the speculative potential of Cuban sugar on the world market. Productivity asymmetries between industry and agriculture increased social segregation, widening the gap between modern sugar industry owners and temporary rural laborers, who survived by adopting peasant ways of life on small subsistence farms.9 Competition between fractions of the proprietary class resulting from the asymmetric modernization explains the underutilization of the productive capacities in 1958 and the intense centralization of capital in the sugar chain. During the expansion that took place from the end of the 19th century until the First World War, colonos (growers) benefited from the competition between hacendados, for industrial capacity increased and raw material was relatively scarce. With the modernization of ingenios centrales and the exponential increase in industrial production capacity, colonos manipulated the speculative rise of the sugarcane price. Consequently, plant owners took on an 9

See Pino-​Santos for more on the history of the separation between industry and agriculture in sugar production resulting from modernization of plantation, 1983, p. 213, 278–​279, 426–​9, 434. About the consequences of this separation in the 1960s, see Valdés Paz, 2009, p. 21–​41.

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offensive policy of acquiring land on a large scale, where they could grow the so-​called administration cane fields, control the railroads for sugarcane transportation and thus avoid colono’s high speculative prices.10 With the spread of administration cane fields, colonos began to lose speculative power and became the weak link of the agrarian bourgeoisie, a pattern that continued until the 1950s.11 With the emergence of administration cane fields and the increase of colonos’ loss, central mill owners chose to lease their lands rather than to directly manage them, merging administration cane fields with the lease and sublease systems. Hence the hacendados not only had easier gains, but also avoided direct contact with laborers and their uncomfortable demands, which fell on tenant colonos. Land rent was a tool of domination among fractions of the ruling class, i.e., the tenant colono had losses due to monopoly control of sugar plants by an often foreign financial oligarchy. Therefore, the historical origin of administration cane reserves was the modern plantation and the intercapitalist battle between hacendados and colonos, from which the former emerged economically victorious. Administration cane fields, by either direct exploitation or lease, kept the plant owner protected from the world market fluctuations. Furthermore, the progressive concentration of ingenios centrales in the hands of financial oligarchies connected the narrow speculative channels of administration cane leasing to the wide speculative corridors of Wall Street financial groups, which in turn, explains the progressive expansion of the idle area and unemployment (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 213, 278–​279, 426–​9, 434). According to Oscar Zanetti Lecuona,12 in 1952, land concentration had enormously increased the economic and social distance between large and small colonos. While 730 large colonos, representing 0.01% of the total, 10

11

12

Administration cane fields were plantations owned by hacendados which did not go through the domestic market before industrial processing and, therefore, were not subject to speculative manipulation. Furthermore, to guarantee industrial performance, the cane must be ground no latter than 24 hours after being harvested. Therefore, control of rail transportation was crucial in the competition between hacendados and colonos (Lecuona, 2009, p. 77) On the role of the railroad monopoly in sugar expansion see Noyola, 1978, p. 43–​4, and Guerra, 1970. Colonos gained regulatory measures to favor their participation in the production chain, especially after the 1933 revolution. They conquered regulatory measures to favor their participation in the production chain, especially after the 1933 revolution. Among their achievements, Decree-​Law 522, for instance, established a minimum milling quota of 20% of colonos’ sugarcane in ingenios centrales (i.e., a maximum amount of 80% of administration cane), in addition to fixed minimum payments for every 100 arrobas of sugarcane delivered to ingenios centrales: 5.5 arrobas of sugar to tenant colonos, and 6 arrobas of sugar to landowners (Lecuona, 2009, p. 46–​9). Oscar Zanetti Lecuona is a Cuban historian specialized in sugar economy and a professor at Universidad de la Habana.

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cultivated 29% of the crushed sugarcane, a mass of 40,000 small colonos (61% of the total) ground only 8.6% of their production (Lecuona, 2009, p. 81). 1.3 Social Actors of Modern Plantation In summary, the social structure of Cuban agriculture before the revolution can be described in terms of five major social classes subdivided into fractions (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 25). The hacendados, predominantly rentiers, were in the highest class, being divided between those who leased their lands and those who managed them directly. These hacendados were organically linked to international capital and to the great speculative circuit, controlling powerful conglomerates of centrales azucareros. Next was the agrarian bourgeoisie, subdivided into landowners and tenants. The agrarian bourgeoisie was fractionated into big bourgeoisie—​with offensive attitude and financial participation in the international economic order—​and local bourgeoisie—​they took advantage of the speculative circuit of subleases. By and large, they were speculators. The agrarian bourgeoisie was also classified as the fraction of colonos who could be either “free” or “hired.”13 Below the most fragile colonos of the agrarian bourgeoisie stood a heterogeneous peasantry, subdivided into owners, tenants, subtenants, partners, and squatters. The peasantry had basically two profiles. Strong peasants were landowners who, despite not having workers on their properties, had access to a greater volume in surplus distribution. Small peasants, on the other hand, did not own land and were generally subject to either subtenant, partner or squatter condition. The rural proletariat was made up of permanent and occasional wage workers—​the latter had a peasant way of living according to the demand for labor in the off-​season. The hybridity of class fraction—​simultaneously proletarian and peasant, and a consequence of modern plantation itself—​was a reflection of the latifundium-​minifundium land tenure structure on the social structure: the same occasional wage worker on sugarcane fields was led to sublet or simply temporarily take ownership of a portion of land to provide for his family’s subsistence during the off-​season. Thus, a considerable number of rural working class people were proletarian peasants, a fact that will be politically and demographically discussed in the next chapter. Finally, the fifth class in the agrarian structure was composed by merchants who did not deal directly with land ownership but provided for 13 Free colonos had greater bargaining capacity depending on their access to public railroads, and they produced either on their own land or on leased land. Hired colonos produced on plantation owner’s lands, i.e., the administration cane fields. They were demanded by contract to sell their production to the respective central mill, with no chance of price negotiation (Lecuona, 2009, p. 49).

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circulation of agricultural goods. Speculation trading circuits were similarly heterogeneous. That was the social structure of modern plantation, a consequence of the latifundium-​minifundium land tenure structure. Subsequently, understand how the cropping regime has historically submitted to the forces of financial speculation. 2

Cropping Regimes: Sugarcane Fields in Wall Street

Speculation and underutilization of productive capacities boosted the latifundium-​minifundium structure.14 If the body of the latifundium-​ minifundium land tenure structure was the asymmetric absorption of technical progress in the sugar sector, speculation was the soul, and it occurred at two levels. At macro-​level, through general underutilization of productive capacities: idle land, idle capital, and unemployment. At micro-​level, as previously argued, through a complex system of leases and subleases, small vessels for the great speculative flow linked to the international economic order. The link between general underutilization of resources and small speculation was the “administration cane fields.” In 1958, 46% of the Cuban sugarcane latifundia were idle. Furthermore, usually 20% of the crop were not harvested (Chonchol, 1961, p. 8, 12). That means 66% of the area of sugarcane farms—​85 thousand caballerías of land—​remained underutilized.15 In addition, there were almost 16 thousand caballerías infested by a shrub named marabu.16 Chonchol argued: This situation was mainly a consequence of the traditional means of sugar production in Cuba. When the export market improved, more area was cultivated rather than cultivating more intensively the area planted. In addition, the so-​called companies lacked interest in using the available

14

15 16

In the Economic Thesis of the 26th of July Movement: “Another characteristic of our underdeveloped condition imposes on us the fact that Cuba has 40% of its population engaged in agriculture, which produces in this activity only 20% of the national income” (Castro, Boti, Pazos, 1959, p. 84). In Cuba, they call unharvested sugarcane caña quedada (in Brazil, cana bisada). Concerning that, Lecuona argued: “The availability of land allowed a systematic use of the caña quedada policy to obtain better revenue” (2009, p. 90). According to Chonchol, “marabu was, in Cuba, the symbol of an abandoned land not cultivated by the landowner entrepreneur” (1961, p. 25).

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land and labor resources for other productions—​their exclusive business was sugar for the foreign market. 1961, p. 8

The data Lecuona presents to us is even more alarming: according to him, almost half of the sugarcane fields remained caña quedada and not just 20% (2009, p. 90). Therefore, technical outdatedness, extensive production, plantation reserve, and idleness of the land were structural agricultural consequences of means the landed oligarchy found to expand its speculative profit margin. In reality, Cuban landowners’ main objective was not to produce sugar, but to manipulate prices and financial assets in order to guarantee large profitability. In addition to idle land, industrial capacity was underutilized. According to Celso Furtado, 25% of the Cuban sugar industry capacity before the revolution was stagnant, which represented something around 1.75 million tonnes of unproduced sugar per year (Furtado, 1969, p. 349). In 1953, during his trial for storming the Moncada Barracks, Fidel Castro stated in his self-​defense speech that there was a 1.5 billion-​dollar idle capital in Cuba held by the National Bank and banfaic, and that with the resources available the island could maintain a three times larger population under conditions of social equality (Castro, 2007, p. 46).17 According to Juan Noyola, the underutilization of productive factors—​labor force, capital, and land—​was undoubtedly the main nature of the Cuban economy structure (1978, p. 65). In 1961, Noyola argued: From the end of the twenties to the triumph of the Revolution, the Cuban economy was likely to be, among all the economies of the capitalist world (both developed and underdeveloped), the one that had the highest proportion of deoccupation, a poorer proportion of utilization of all resources. 1978, p. 115

Chonchol was one of the biggest critics of extensive agriculture in Cuba. He considered it one of the main obstacles that had to be overcome so that economic development was possible on the island after the revolution. Cuba, despite being the leading sugar producer in the world, when it came to yield 17

Fidel Castro’s statements should be seen more from a political and qualitative viewpoint, rather than demanding quantitative accuracy, especially considering the real conditions of isolation in which his self-​defense was prepared (Castro, 2007). banfaic was Cuba’s Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, created in 1950 during the administration of Carlos Prío Socarrás (Lecuona, 2009, p. 26).

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per area was one of the last with a 4.5-​tonne coefficient of sugar per hectare in 1958–​1959 (Chonchol, 1961, p. 11). The index was highly unsatisfactory when compared to Indonesia (11.7) or Hawaii (10.6). But, as already discussed before, landowners had no economic interest in the technological development of agriculture (Lecuona, 2009, p. 84–​5; Edquist, 1985, p. 33). Livestock farming was also extensive and rustic: there was almost no artificial pasture, there was only one animal per hectare in free-​range and one worker every 300 or 600 hectares (Chonchol, 1961, p. 12). Land and labor underutilization was organically linked to the monoculture and exportation nature of the Cuban economy. Modern plantation meant an increasingly irreversible technical and social specialization of the sugarcane monoculture. The more dependent on a single product’s price fluctuations in the world market, the more speculation became landowners’ subterfuge. The vicious circle of “anti-​development” was triggered by a speculative monoculture cropping regime.18 Through that same fao report, Chonchol realized that before the revolution food production was rudimentary, small, and almost exclusively for self-​ consumption. In 1958, Cuba was so dependent on sugar that this single product accounted for 54% of the total monetary value of agricultural production, 56% of the total cultivated area, 50% of the agricultural workforce, and 77% of the total value of exports (Chonchol, 1961, p. 11). Cuban production was so poorly diversified that its five main products (cane, cattle, coffee, tobacco, and rice) accounted for 80% of the total value of agricultural production in 1958 (Ibid., 1961, p. 13).19 Foreign trade followed the same hyperspecialized pattern: only 18

19

Regarding the damage caused by monoculture, Chonchol expressed: “Monoculture has been one of the most prominent activities in Cuban agriculture before Agrarian Reform […]. Crop rotations were almost unknown, not to mention the possibility of mixed crop-​ livestock farming. Although this super-​specialization sometimes contributed to the development of entrepreneurial and technical capacity far superior to that of large traditional farmers in Latin American countries, it was, at the same time, the cause of a very poor use of land and labor resources, and it prevented making good use of the great economic and social advantages of a more integrated agriculture” (1961, p. 14). In 1958, cattle represented 25.2% of the monetary value of agricultural production; tobacco employed around 180,000 laborers during high seasons, including around 70,000 in seasonal work, and accounted for only 6.4% of the total value of exports, occupying 4,470 planted caballerías; coffee, only 1.3% of Cuban exports, employed 50,000 permanent laborers and 150,000 seasonal laborers during sugarcane off-​season, occupying approximately 10,432 planted caballerías; rice was produced exclusively for the domestic market and had quadrupled between 1948 and 1958, in addition to being the most technically developed agricultural sector due to its high demand for irrigation (Chonchol, 1961, p.12–​15).

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sugar, tobacco, and coffee accounted for 84.7% of the country’s total exports (Ibid., 1961, p. 15). Of all Cuban sugar exported in 1958, 65% went to the United States and 35% were shared mainly between England and France (Lecuona, 2009, p. 156, 232). On the other hand, dependency on food imports was increasing. Between 1955 and 1958, the value of food imports grew by 30.4%, while imports of basic items such as rice and beans grew by 111% and 66% respectively (Chonchol, 1961, p. 15). In 1958, 70% of Cuba’s imports came from the United States (Lecuona, 2009, p. 232). This pattern of dependency coupled with the US economy had been viciously reproduced since 1898. As Juan Valdés Paz stated,20 there was an organic relationship between the underutilization of factors, monoculture, technological delay, and external dependency because: As a rule, these companies made the most of free resources—​soil fertility, public infrastructure, and environmental conditions—​and that is why either exports lacked or they kept technical factors to a minimum while a large portion of the area remained idle in order to keep occupancy and production levels below domestic market demand, as well as to make exports competitive and profitable. 2009, p. 3

The persistence of extensive monoculture and its conversion into a platform for financial speculation was, among other factors, a consequence of the US appropriation of Cuban lands and the consolidation of neocolonial dependency. Two waves of primitive accumulation of capital in which US businessmen appropriated Cuba’s abundant economic and natural resources created the conditions for monoculture to achieve such modernization.21 The first took place with the military occupation by the United States, between 1898 and 1902; and the second during the 1920 crisis. To understand how Cuba reached its structural situation in 1958, the two waves must be first understood. 20

21

Juan Valdés Paz is one of the leading experts in Cuban agriculture. Cuban sociologist and political scientist, he was a professor at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Havana and a researcher at the Center for American Studies and the Instituto de História de Cuba. For twenty years, he has dedicated himself to various positions in agriculture, including administrator, Delegado Regional da Administração Geral de Engenhos [Local Officer for General Mill Administration], and even Vice-​Minister. He currently continues his activities as an independent researcher. In 2014, he was awarded the Cuban National Prize for Social and Human Sciences. It was an honor to have interviewed him in July 2012, in Havana. His personal trajectory is detailed as anecdote in a footnote, later in Chapter 2. Read about primitive accumulation of capital in Marx, 2004, chapter xxiv.

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2.1 Military Order No.62 and Primitive Accumulation The US control over Cuban sugar production began during the military occupation, from 1898 to 1902. Military interventionist Leonard Wood took the first measures collecting weapons the Cuban Liberation Army held, creating a national police force commanded by the New York Chief of Police, and creating the Rural Guard to contain peasant rebellions. He then enacted a series of economic laws that favored the appropriation of Cuban productive resources by large corporations, such as Military Orders No. 34 and No. 62. The former expedited private appropriation of the country’s railroads, strategic to control the sugar production. But it was the latter that constituted the first and most blunt act of US primitive capital accumulation over Cuba. Military Order No. 62 determined that all alleged owners of peasant community properties (haciendas comunales) submitted to the court documents of proof. The major business groups in the United States easily overcame the humblest peasants, falsified documents, bought jurors, and thus took possession of tens of thousands of caballerías. In addition, only these large corporations had technical capacity for the agrarian measurement required by law as proof of property; therefore, they were able to select the most fertile lands for themselves. As their ultimate guarantee, companies had the Rural Guard on their side, favoring them over peasant inhabitants, who were then considered “invaders” of their own lands. Many American companies acquired wide areas through their preeminence of technology, bureaucracy, and military nature above the peasants. The United Fruit Company, for example, in 1904 acquired two ingenios centrales (Boston and Preston), in addition to 2,791 caballerías, through these means (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 525–​7). In 1905, US companies already owned 21% of the Cuban crop (Le Riverend, 1972, p. 207). Between 1898 and 1913, US capital had quadrupled its investments on the island (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 12). The end of the US military occupation of Cuba was negotiated in 1902 through the Platt Amendment, drafted by Elihu Root (Secretary of State under President McKinley) and presented to the United States Congress by Senator Orville H. Platt. It proposed, among other things that: a) Cuba would recognize the right of the United States to intervene in its internal affairs whenever they deemed necessary for “the preservation of Cuban independence”; b) Cuba would provide territories so that the United States established naval bases and coaling stations, and carry out the intervention on the island if necessary, paving the way for the emergence of Guatánamo Base; c) Cuba was barred from negotiate treaties that gave any other nation power and would not transfer lands to any foreigner on the island; d) Isla de Pinos would no longer be Cuban territory; e) the Platt Amendment should be approved as a Cuban constitutional amendment as a condition for the withdrawal of US troops from the

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island (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 291). In fact, after slight internal frictions within the Cuban ruling class, the Platt Amendment was approved as a constitutional amendment with effusive support from the Círculo de Hacendados (which later became the Asociación Nacional de Hacendados), the Unión de Fabricantes de Tobacco, the Centro de Comerciantes, of the Sociedades Económicas de Amigos del País, among other openly annexationist groups (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 291–​ 295). Manuel Sanguily denounced the violation of Cuban sovereignty contained in the Amendment and proposed the nationalization of the land; however, he was largely defeated. In exchange for the Platt Amendment, the United States withdrew American troops from Cuba on May 20, 1902 (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 292). On December 11, 1902, as established in the Platt Amendment, the Cuban–​ American Treaty of Relations was signed. It granted preference to the import of 530 US products into Cuba at a 20% to 40% reduction of tariff rates—​33% of these products had discounts greater than 40% (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 442). In exchange, preference was granted to few Cuban products exportable to the United States, especially sugar and tobacco. The Treaty also prevented Cuba from relating to other countries on a preferential basis, transforming it into a kind of US commercial protectorate, under permanent threat of a new military occupation.22 2.2 Dance of the Millions In 1913, the Cuban sugar industry reached its peak in the US market: 87% of the sugar produced on the island was exported (Lecuona, 2009, p. 222). Then, when World War affected beet sugar production in Europe there was a continuous modernization of the Cuban plantation without lowering prices, and that triggered a speculative euphoria (Le Riverend, 1972, p. 212). After the war, two facts came together to regain price stability. First, US sugar beet and sugarcane production expanded significantly, competing with Cuban production and reducing imports of sugar into the United States. Second, the European sugar industries resumed production (Le Riverend, 1972, p. 247). As a result, sugar prices began to drop. Nonetheless, an unprecedented speculative process called Dance of the Millions, between 1918 and 1919, postponed the decline of the price, and unleashed the second wave of US primitive capital 22

The US followed through on their threat in at least five occasions: between 1906 and 1909 at the request of Cuban annexationist President Estrada Palma himself; in 1912; between 1917 and 1920; and in 1933 and 1934, with the interventionist Welles, after the overthrow of the dictator Machado by a popular rebellion, generating strong political instability (Pino-​ Santos, 1983, p. 308–​10; Mao Junior, 2007, p. 154).

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accumulation over Cuba. It should be noted that, precisely in 1918 and 1919, 100% of the Cuban crop was sold to the United States (Lecuona, 2009, p 32). The Dance of the Millions determined a new relationship between Wall Street and Cuban sugar. Speculation was sparked by false information about an alleged wave of sugar shortages in the United States. In 1918, at the turn of the year, the American press warned about a sugar shortage crisis in the country. It was massively broadcast through all methods of communication that in a few days the country would run out of the product, generating an uncontrolled “urge for sugar” (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 373–​76). But the campaign had no real foundation, and as European production resumed shortly after the end of the war it showed just the opposite. However, the dissemination of the topic influenced the market to such an extent that sugar prices rose from 9 cents a pound in February 1919 to 23 cents in May. Between May and August, speculation continued and Cuban producers even projected prices above 50 cents a pound (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 375–​7). An euphoric “sugar betting game” began to boil in Cuba and large sums were negotiated, creating a great illusion of wealth. Havana was filled with state-​of-​the-​art vehicles, mansions were built, and the Cuban saccharocracy made a series of extravagant expenditures (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 376). But when the harvest was available, sugar flooded into the markets. None of that was real: prices began to drop. From May to December, in only six months, they plummeted from 23 to 3 cents a pound (Le Riverend, 1972, p. 222). The Cuban saccharocracy had already consumed the projected riches of the future, which suddenly vanished. Sugar elites created unpayable debts with foreign banks, and their goods were mortgaged. Thus, international creditors appropriated an immense mass of Cuban productive capacity in the blink of an eye. The Rockefellers’ The National City Bank was undoubtedly the biggest beneficiary: overnight, it took possession of ten centrales azucareros and created the General Sugar Company, which commanded four companies (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 396).23 In 1923, the Rockefeller offensive through The National City Bank had already gained direct and indirect control of 32 centrales, which corresponded to 25% of the country’s harvest (Pino-​ Santos, 1983, pp. 407, 412). Other large companies that benefited from the Depression of 1920 were Compañía Atlántica del Golfo, Cuban American Sugar Mills and, again, the United Fruit Company (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 255). In 1914, 38 centrales were controlled by the United States, corresponding to 40% of the harvest (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 382). In 1927, there were 75 ingenios centrales

23

Compañía Azucarera San Cristobal; Compañía Azucarera de Sagua; Compañía Azucarera Vertientes; Compañía Azucarera Camaguey.

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owned by the United States (out of 185 active centrales), which represented 62% of the harvest (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 254). Furthermore, in 1924, 60% of the Cuban banking system belonged to US companies (Lecuona, 2009, p. 243). Lecuona calculated a total of 48 centrales that became US owned between 1920 and 1925 (2009, p. 27). It is undeniable that the Dance of the Millions consolidated the presence of Cuban sugarcane plantations in Wall Street. According to Le Riverend: In the republican history of Cuba, there are no facts more representative of the weakness of our economic structure than those that characterize the crisis of 1920–​21 […]. The anti-​imperialist sentiment becomes precise, it defines itself from then on. We can even talk about the emergence of a new national consciousness, in 1923. 1972, p. 221

The origin of the idle capacity of the Cuban sugar industry is linked to the Dance of the Millions. The first effect of the strong influence of Wall Street on Cuban sugar production was the expansion of the speculative function of land and industry. In addition, Cuba was under pressure from the expansion of sugar beet production in southern USA, sugarcane from the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii (annexed or almost annexed, respectively, to the United States), and the resumption of European production in the post-​war period. From 1920, maintenance of the expansion of Cuba’s productive capacity that took place in the previous decade, from 2.6 to 4.1 million tonnes of sugar, was not possible without destabilizing prices (Fraginals, 1989, p. 359). Since then, the island’s growing productive capacity and the reduction of the US market space were imbalanced. Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 and the Jones-​Costigan Amendment Just when Cuba seemed to be recovering from the impact of the financial crisis in 1920, in 1929 another crisis struck the country. It was a second sharp jolt. Two crises of structural depth overlapped, causing the sugar economy to shrink, unemployment to increase, and wages to be reduced. Preferential tariffs with the United States made it impossible for the island to diversify its economy. Therefore, in the midst of the crises, Cuba was held hostage to a single commodity whose production expanded around the world. The expansion of sugar production worldwide, along with the 1929 crisis, generated a wave of regulation that guided the world market toward preferential blocks. To stabilize prices, in 1926, the Cuban government enacted the Verdeja 2.3

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Law, limiting sugar harvest by 10% (Lecuona, 2009, p. 227). The following year, the Sugar Conference in Paris limited Cuban crop sugar harvest by 4 million tonnes. Seeking to adapt to the situation, Cuba joined the Chadbourne Plan in 1931. The goal was to balance world production and consumption by regulating predetermined export and import quotas. The Cuban government established internal quotas for the use of ingenios centrales by colonos and a guarantee that the State would purchase surplus sugar (Ramos, 2007, p. 563; Lecuona, 2009, p. 140). The Brussels International Sugar Agreement of 1931 regulated production quotas for countries corresponding to 50% of the world market. (Lecuona, 2009, p. 43). And then, the fateful year of 1934, when the regulationist conjuncture impelled a new edition of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty of 1902, and the enactment of the Jones-​Costigan Amendment in the United States Congress. These two measures together deepened Cuba’s bond of dependency with its “partner.” As Noyola summarized: In 1934, when all Latin American countries were raising tariffs, Cuba, in exchange for a share of the US sugar market and having tariff discount, lowered its tariffs, thus cutting its own wings for industrial growth. That is, the future growth of the Cuban economy was connected again to sugar and no attempt was made to diversify, to transform the structure of the economy. 1978, p. 58

The new Reciprocity Treaty raised the tariff discount for US products in Cuba to 60% and increased the amount of products on which the lowest tariffs were applied.24 On the other hand, while the general sugar import rate was 1.87 dollar, the Cuban rate was 0.90 dollar (Lecuona, 2009, p. 192). The Jones-​Costigan Amendment was the last resource to reduce sugar production, policy practiced by the Wall Street saccharocracy—​the United States Congress established a 24.9% quota of the domestic market for Cuban sugar, which was equivalent to

24

In the Reciprocity Treaty of 1902, among 530 US products with preferential tariffs in Cuba, 48.3% had a 20% discount, and only 0.6% had a maximum 40% discount (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 442). In the Agreement of 1934, the proportion of products with greater discounts grew: more than 78% of the products would have discounts greater than 30%, of which 32% would have a discount of 40% (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 475). All in all, the Agreement of 1934 favored 550 US products in exchange for more than 20 Cuban products, including sugar, with 40% reduction; rum, with 37.5% reduction; and tobacco, with 21% reduction (Pericás, 2004, p. 28).

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the average consumption of 1.9 million tonnes of sugar per year between 1929 and 1933 (Pericás, 2004, p.28). The problem was that this period corresponded to the lowest consumption of the century. In the 1920s, Cuban sugar had on average 50% of the US market (Lecuona, 2009, p. 227; Le Riverend, 1972, p. 246–​ 7; Acosta, 1973, p. 70). While Cuban sugar had its share in the US market halved in the national income it was also reduced—​in 1921, the sugar market represented 60% of Cuban national income, and in 1939, only 27% (Acosta, 1973, p. 59). Thereafter, the reduced US quota was only provisionally abolished during World War ii (Lecuona, 2009, p. 44). Furthermore, in 1937 the US Congress defined that only 1% of the Cuban sugar that was purchased could be refined on the island, further expanding the idle capacity of the industry (Ibid., 2009, p. 157). It explains why the sugar industry and the financial sector made an effort to reduce production and then raise prices, also maintaining a huge idle capacity as a speculative margin. The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 and the Jones-​Costigan Amendment were a political move on the island’s class struggle as well. The popular nationalist rebellions that overthrew the Machado regime in 1933 fought the Platt Amendment. In fact, the Platt Amendment was abolished and Machado was overthrown all together. The renewal of the Treaty in 1934 showed that US control over sugar production no longer needed military effort. 2.4 Ascension of Cuban Saccharocracy In the 1940s, US investments in Cuba had a new shape, due to the decrease in the profitability of sugar production, resulting from the increase in world production and the pressure of competition on price expectations. Between 1929 and 1958, US investments in Cuban agriculture decreased by 46%, while investment in oil rose by 170%, in public services by 160%, and in trade corridors by 230% (Acosta, 1973, p. 60). In fact, in the 1940s, the unsatisfactory prospects of the sugar market promoted a turn in imperialist politics and US companies began to liquidate their sugar heritage. Therefore, while in 1939 the United States owned 66 ingenios centrales and 55% of the sugar production, and Cuba had 56 ingenios centrales and 22% of the production, in 1951 the Americans had 41 centrales and 42% of the production while Cuba expanded their sugar power to 113 centrales and 59% of the production (Acosta, 1973, p. 61). Changes to the US investments on the island continued, following the same trend until the revolution. In 1959 the US had only 36 ingenios centrales and several companies were in liquidation process. The Agreement of 1934 was replaced by the Exclusive Trade Agreement between Cuba and the United States when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) was signed in 1947. The Cuban

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45

quota, suspended during the war, was then reinstated at 28.6% of the US market (Lecuona, 2009, p. 184; Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 477).25 In 1958, US properties in Cuba accounted for no less than 40% of sugar production, 90% of electricity and telephone services, 50% of railroads, and 23% of the nonsugar industry (juceplan, in: eclac, 1980, p. 14). Consequently, Le Riverend defined Cuba, until 1958, as republica intervenida—​an intervened republic (1972). Florestan Fernandes defined the island as “a segmented and specialized annex of the United States” (2007, p. 73). The growing integration between Wall Street and sugarcane monoculture explains why Fidel Castro’s words resonated with the Cuban reality of 1953: Eighty-​five percent of small Cuban farmers are paying rent and living under the perennial threat of eviction from their lots. More than half of the best arable land is in foreign hands. In the East, the largest province, lands belonging to United Fruit Company and West Indies connect the north coast to the south coast. There are two hundred thousand families with no land to sow viandas for their hungry children and, at the same time, about three hundred thousand caballerías of productive land remain uncultivated in the hands of powerful interests. 2007, p. 41–​226

The Cuban revolutionary movement of the 1950s was precisely against the underutilization of resources. Fidel said: “What is inconceivable is that anyone should go to bed hungry while there is a single inch of unproductive land” (Castro, 2007, p. 49). Therefore, the third axis of modern plantation is social segregation reproduced by a labor regime inherited from slavery. 3

Labor Regime: the Curse of the Crowds

In 1956, the situation of Cuban rural poverty was described in a survey conducted by Agrupación Católica Universitaria (acu) and published in a

25 26

Moreover, clause 202-​E of the US Sugar Law threatened not to buy sugar from those who regulated the labor market by banning the importation of foreign labor, which had been the case of Cuba since 1933, as will be further discussed (Lecuona, 2009, p. 185). “Vianda” in Cuba, are white foods such as potatoes, cassava, bananas and their variations. We will use the term in Spanish in this work, due to the lack of an appropriate translation into Portuguese.

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pamphlet entitled “Why agrarian reform?.”27 The survey hinted on important aspects regarding the asymmetric effects of modern plantation, describing the lives of rural laborers from five dimensions: food regime, access to medical care, access to education, housing situation, and family income. This research, allowed discovering that statistics disguised the fact that although appearing to be a rich country, Cuba sustained itself at the expense of a profound social asymmetry. 3.1 Statistics Cover-​Up In the 1950s, economic analysts could superficially look at the island’s national wealth. Cuba had the 3rd largest gdp per capita in Latin America in 1952,28 it was the 2nd largest meat consumer per capita in the continent, had the 2nd largest paved road network by territory, the 2nd highest density of doctors per capita, in addition to offering the 3rd highest salary paid to sugar industry laborers in Latin America. ibrd itself confirmed, in 1951, that the Cuban standard of living was higher than that in other Latin American tropical countries (Pericás, 2004, p. 31). Other data enhanced this illusion: In Cuba there was one car for every thirty-​nine inhabitants, one radio device for every five people, and 57% of its population was urban. Cuban economists, such as Felipe Pazos, preferred to use the term “semi-​developed” to define Cuban society (Pericás, 2004, p.32). Against extolling modernization based on aggregated data, in 1956 Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, from the Popular Social Party (Cuba’s official communist party before the revolution), argued: Certain luxury consumptions while providing aspects of superior civilization conspire against national progress through false investment of savings and will, in the long run, bring about economic stagnation, leading us to subcivilization. 1983, p. 65

In fact, modernization of elite consumption patterns, the high rate of urbanization, and the technical progress of the sugar industry created an illusion of development in a country of extreme social segregation. The concentration

27

The reliability of the survey Agrupación Católica Universitaria conducted was confirmed by the fact that both eclac and fao used acu as a source in several official documents (e.g.: eclac/​fao, 1963). 28 Cuban gdp per capita in 1952 was 406 dollars, only behind Venezuela (450 dollars) and Argentina (428 dollars) (eclac, 1953, p. 32).

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47

of 25% of the population and 75% of Cuban industrial production in Havana helped consolidate such a false perception (Pericás, 2004, p. 34). In terms of social product, it meant that the cost of reproduction was close to survival, leaving large amounts of surplus for the usufruct of the privileged, the ruling class. 3.2 A Portrait of Rural Misery In 1957, Cuba had 6,356,000 inhabitants of which 41.2% lived in the countryside (eclac, 1963, p. 53; eclac, 1964, p. 272; Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 270). According to a report by Jacques Chonchol,29 of 2.8 million people who lived in the countryside, 860 thousand (31% of the rural population) made up the agricultural workforce (Chonchol, 1961, p. 4). According to eclac, in the 1950s, 44% of the island’s total workforce was agricultural (eclac, 1963, p. 50). Research conducted by Agrupación Católica Universitaria (acu) showed that only 4% of Cuban rural laborers ate beef, less than 1% of them ate fish, and only 2.12% ate eggs. The diet of rural laborers was basically reduced to rice (24% of the diet), beans (23%) and viandas (22%). Only 11.2% of them had milk and no more than 3.36% ate bread. Therefore, the exciting aggregate data on Cuba clashed with the fact that animal protein was part of a list of luxury goods. Access to medical care was also precarious: only 8% of those who were interviewed by acu had ever used free medical assistance from the State. In addition, 36% of the interviewees admitted having some type of intestinal parasites, 31% had malaria (Acosta, 1973, p. 81), 14% had already suffered from tuberculosis, and 13% from typhoid.30 Formal education also did not reach rural laborers: 44% of them had never attended school and 43% defined themselves as illiterate. The Cuban government’s official 1953 Population and Housing Census showed a total illiteracy rate of 23.6% of the population, which would amount to 1,032,849 people (Acosta, 1973, p. 79).31 However, in 1959, the revolutionary government faced the following situation: 50% of school-​age children 29

30 31

Jacques Chonchol is a Chilean agronomist who has played a leading role in the history of agrarian reform in Latin America. As a fao (Food andAgriculture Organization) technician he was sent to Cuba to advise on the island’s agrarian reform in 1959 and 1960. Ten years later, in 1970, he became minister of agriculture under President Salvador Allende. With the coup, he managed to flee his country with his family and lived for two decades in France. I had the opportunity to interview him in July 2011. Data referring to illnesses are often underestimated, due to the understandable embarrassment of interviewees in revealing this type of information. These data correspond to those published by eclac, indicating illiteracy rate of 41% of the rural population over 15 years of age, which meant between 20% and 25% of the total population in the same period (eclac, 1963, p. 45).

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could not enroll due to unavailability in schools. Comparing the enrollment deficit of the school-​age population of 1959 with the official 1953 census, José Acosta concluded that the official illiteracy rate of 23.6% released by the government was significantly underestimated (1973, p. 79). Furthermore, according to eclac data, in the 1950s, 69.2% of Cuban children up to 15 years old were subjected to agricultural work (eclac, 1963, p. 53). The precariousness of rural laborers’ housing was even more alarming. Their houses were most often built by the workers themselves, using material that was at hand: the so-​called bohíos.32 Among the people interviewed, 63.96% had neither a toilet nor a sink in their homes and 88.5% had access only to well water. Only 3.24% of them had running water in the house. The construction of houses was also troublesome: 60.53% of the houses were made of wood walls, guano roof, and adobe floors. Only 7.26% of rural laborers had access to electricity, and 89.84% of them lived in candlelight. In addition, 41.64% of the houses had only one bedroom to be shared by the whole family. These data are consistent with the official 1953 Population and Housing Census, according to which only 4.1% of rural houses had bathrooms, only 10.3% had running water, and only 10% had access to electricity. The 1953 census exposed the fact that the urban situation, although significantly better, was supported by large pockets of misery. For example, 45.8% of urban residents did not have a bathroom, 24.4% of those people did not have access to running water, and 13% had no access to electricity. The same 1953 census stated that 56% of the 1.2 million homes that took part in the census were in “highly uninhabitable” conditions, and in rural areas, housing conditions that were considered very bad increased to 79.6% of the population (eclac, 1980, p. 154; Acosta, 1973, p. 83–​5). The data collected by acu regarding family income is the ultimate detail in the picture of extreme poverty: 50.64% of rural laborers’ families lived with an annual income of less than 500 pesos, 42.15% of the families earned from 500 to 1000 pesos per year, and 7.21% of the families earned between 1,000 and 1,200 pesos per year.33 Therefore, the general picture shows that 92.79% of the families interviewed lived on less than 1,000 pesos per year, including production for self-​consumption. While the per capita income of rural laborers was equal to 91.25 pesos per year, the national per capita income in 1956 corresponded to 398 pesos per year, i.e., 4.3 times higher. In this context, rural household

32 33

Bohíos were indigenous huts in which most peasant families lived. The Departamento de Viviendas Campesinas at inra built 12,500 houses and 500 social buildings in one year (Chonchol, 1961, p. 27). In the 1950s, there was parity between peso and dollar (Lecuona, 2009, p. 192).

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expenditure was not surprising: 69.3% of incomes were directed to food and 14.06% to clothing.34 Misery was continually reproduced by unemployment. 3.3 Structural Unemployment and tiempo muerto Structural unemployment was a permanent feature of the Cuban economy. It was responsible for widening the gap between the mass of rural laborers and an enriched minority. In 1957, 16.4% of the Cuban workforce was totally unemployed (361,000 people), 10.1% were underemployed in temporary or part-​ time activities (233,000 people), and 7% worked for their relatives without a salary (154,000 people). This means that 33.5% of the Cuban workforce was unemployed, underemployed or active without a salary, which corresponded to 748,000 people out of a 2.2 million population (Acosta, 1973, p. 69; Pino-​ Santos, 1983, p. 265; Lecuona, 2009, p. 128).35 Cuban structural unemployment had a specific characteristic generated by monoculture: the tiempo muerto. Non-​mechanized sugarcane plantations dismissed cane cutters from April to November. The rainy season, from May to October, is also the growing season. Agricultural production from non-​sugarcane crops was unable to absorb the workforce during the tiempo muerto. This specific type of unemployment alone reached 457,000 people in the 1950s, i.e., approximately 20% of all Cuban workforce (Aranda, 1968, p. 12; Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 265). There was an overt effort to cover up statistics concerning structural unemployment in the 1953 Population Census, when the government collected data on the workforce during the sugarcane harvest and reported an 8% unemployment rate (Castro, Boti, Pazos, 1959, p. 93). The rate of permanent unemployment triggered a decline in wages, weakening the possibilities of negotiation for rural laborers. It is, therefore, obvious that the super-​exploitation of labor in Cuba was one of the main surplus generators. The overexploitation of work was aggravated for two reasons. First, the growth of the Cuban population was proportionately greater than the growth of the sugar sector, especially after its crisis in the 1920s and limitation in the 1930s due to imbalances in the world market and growth of sugar production in the United States and in Europe (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 374–​5, 463; Le Riverend, 1972, pp.230–​246; Lecuona, 2009, p. 227). Meanwhile, the Cuban State had a policy that increased structural unemployment through labor importation brought from the Antilles by the large sugar companies and successively encouraged by the governments. In 1912, President José M. Gómez

34 35

The complete acu survey is in Chonchol, 1961, p. 16–​18 and in Acosta, 1973, p. 78–​87. Data from the National Economic Council, in 1958.

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authorized the “importation” of 1,400 Haitians by the United Fruit Company, which inaugurated a 30-​year period of substantial flow of Antillean braceros to Cuba (Acosta, 1973, p. 54). Subsequently, President Mario García Menocal, between 1913 and 1921, allowed US sugar companies to bring 156,000 workers from the Antilles into Cuba (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 304). According to data by Ramiro Guerra, between 1912 and 1925, 140,000 Haitians and 100,000 Jamaicans were “imported” to sugarcane plantations in Cuba, increasing unemployment and dropping wages (Acosta, 1973, p. 54). Between 1928 and 1940, this policy remained active: 100,000 Jamaican and Haitian braceros were brought to Cuban plantations, which corresponded to almost a third of the total number of sugarcane cutters on the island (Edquist, 1985, p. 25). Cuban rural laborers were strongly opposed to the importation of Antillean labor. Then with the 1933 Revolution, three were the achievements: first, the eight-​hour workday in the industrial sector; second, the nationalization of 50% of sugarcane laborers for each production unit; and third, the relationship between rural laborer’s minimum wage and sugarcane harvest (50 cents of Pesos for every 100 arrobas of sugarcane), avoiding abrupt price fluctuations (Lecuona, 2009, p. 52–​3). But only after the 1940 Constitution the importation of foreign labor to widen structural unemployment was definitively prohibited (Edquist, 1985, p. 53). The policy to import workforce from the Antilles to Cuba—​a country of unemployed people—​showed that the project of the elites was to guarantee a labor regime with violent extraction of the surplus. Despite some temporary conflicts between the Cuban saccharocracy and the interests of Wall Street over sugar policy, the collaboration of the Cuban State with the worldwide hegemonic financial group of the Rockefellers reached its peak in the Batista administration. This collaboration revealed why the realization of the historic determinations of underdevelopment had blocked any nationalist initiative of the Cuban bourgeoisie. 4

The World Seen from Above

Eduardo Galeano (2004, p.14) wrote: “Our defeat was always implicit in the victory of others.” The other side of Cuban social segregation was its ruling class immersed in speculative activities and organically associated with great US monopolies.36 President Fulgencio Batista, for instance, was iconic. 36

A synthesis of the heritage of the Cuban and foreign bourgeoisie that controlled the sugar sector and other branches of the island’s economy is presented in two tables at the end of this section.

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He represented the full integration between state powers and national and international private economic powers. In 1958, Batista owned three ingenios centrales and several sugarcane colonies, with a total production capacity of 22,845,254 arrobas of sugar per day (which means 342,679 tonnes). Batista’s sugar heritage was organized into five companies. In addition, he owned ten communications and advertising agencies, eleven major tourist developments, seven air, sea, and road transportation companies, three major metropolitan service companies, seven financial investment companies, and two industries, including the 2nd largest pulp and paper factory. The Cuban president was also a shareholder of Compañía Azucarera Atlántica del Golfo s.a., Banco Hispano Cubano, Cuban Telephony Company, Banco Godoy-​Sayán de Ahorro y Capitalización, and the State owed him 500,000 dollars (Jimenez, 2000). Nevertheless, none of these ventures were not Batista’s priority businesses. He was a tycoon whose priority was real estate speculation, thus owning no less than twenty-​two construction and urbanization companies, including some shell companies and many businesses in the name of frontmen, as it came to light after his escape (see Table 3). 4.1 Batista and the Rockefeller-​Sullivan When Fulgencio Batista, in the wee hours of March 10, 1952, launched the coup that overthrew Carlos Prío Socarrás 80 days before elections, he had none other than the brothers John Foster Dulles (US Secretary of State under President Eisenhower) and Allen Welsh Dulles (head of the cia), important partners in the Sullivan & Cromwell Financial Services group (Castro, 1959, p. 92; Pino-​ Santos, 1983, p. 548). The Sullivan & Cromwell group was famously related to one of the branches of the Rockefeller family (from the Standart Oil Co.), which in turn had conquered financial hegemony in Cuban sugar production in 1920, as a result of the crisis following the speculative process known as Dance of the Millions (Pino-​Santos, 1983, pp.375–​7). The Rockefellers and Sullivans & Cromwell were financially integrated enough to be considered by historiography a single group. In 1952, properties belonging to the Rockefeller group and Sullivan & Cromwell together controlled eighteen Cuban ingenios centrales, organized into five large consortia operated mainly by The National City Bank, also owned by the Rockefeller group. As a result, the Rockefeller-​Sullivans directly and indirectly controlled 35,694 caballerías (an area equivalent to Trinidad y Tobago) and 79,460 laborers working in the centrales, not to mention the ones working in plantations. This means that behind Batista there was a real financial-​sugar power (see Table 4, item 1). In the 1950s, facing increased competition in the sugar market and the expectation of prices dropping, the Rockefeller-​Sullivans adopted the policy

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of selling their agrarian properties in Cuba, shifting investments to energy and mineral resources on the island. Therefore, in 1958, they became the second largest Cuban producer group, behind Cuban tycoon Julio Lobo, the “sugar emperor.” Lobo, on the other hand, initiated in 1940 an offensive policy of acquiring centrales; he purchased part of Compañía Azucarera Atlantica del Golfo on March 4, 1958.37 The Rockefeller-​Sullivans also controlled the American Telephone & Telegraph company, whose subsidiary, Compañía Cubana de Teléfonos, held monopoly on the telephone service on the island, in partnership with the Morgan group (Jimenez, 2000). Furthermore, through Freeport Sulfur Company and American Smeltin & Refining Company (as&r), in alliance with Casa Morgan, the Rockefeller-​Sullivans had already shown a strong interest in nickel mining in Cuban East mountains, (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 544), and were already exploring Cuban oil through Esso Standard Oil Co., which was then the second largest non-​financial consortium in the world (Jimenez, 2000). Sullivan & Cromwell were also in the transportation business, most notably from the merger of Cuba Railways (owned by the Tarafa family) with other railway companies operating on the island, with the intent of forming a monopoly Ferrocarriles Consolidados (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 519). In short, the Rockefeller-​Sullivan group had a lot to lose in Cuba. Therefore, from those broad economic interests, the group started a conflict with President Carlos Prío Socarrás, culminating in the 1952 coup precisely for two reasons: the exploitation of nickel and the sugar policy. Carlos Prío had granted, in the mid-​1950s, the exploitation of nickel to Billinton, a Dutch company of quite insignificant dimensions if compared to the giants Rockefeller. Billinton, the only competitor of American Smeltin & Refining Company (as&r) in the concession process, had accepted the new and unexpected clause established by the Prío administration—​a minimum of 20% of Cuban capital was required in the exploration of the mineral. as&r, a favored bidder, had refused to comply with such a clause, claiming that the consortium was already closed. But the Rockefellers were annoyed at losing ground in the nickel exploitation due to Carlos Prío’s improvised maneuver. Prío had an overt interest in personally participating in the “Cuban capital” required by the new clause. The relationship between the Rockefellers and the Prío administration was then more tense because of the sugar policy. Supported by the Cuban saccharocracy, the Prío administration implemented an expansionist and free-​trade policy in the sector, which contributed to the deterioration 37

As three of the four installments would expire after 1959, they were not paid (Jimenez, 2000, p. 97).

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of the price of sugar on the world market. However, the Rockefeller-​Sullivan group, considering their sugar bets on Wall Street, was interested in restricting the production of Cuban sugar as a means of guaranteeing price stabilization and control at high levels, worldwide. Prío’s expansionist policy represented an obstacle to rising sugar prices on the world market.38 Three factors were then coordinated toward the coup of March 10, 1952. First, the economic interests of the Rockefeller-​Sullivans were threatened by the Prío administration. Then, the Dulles brothers, partners at Sullivan & Cromwell, took high-​level positions under US President Eisenhower, in 1952, as Secretary of State and Head of cia. And ultimately, Fulgencio Batista matched the Rockefeller-​Sullivans’ interests—​he had suppressed the 1933 Revolution and since then had commanded the Cuban army; he had an ideal curriculum of repressive actions against popular unrest and of loyalty toward the financial oligarchy interests during his time as president, between 1940 and 1944 (Pino-​ Santos, 1983, p. 544). These three factors combined to put the Rockefeller-​ Sullivan interests at the forefront of the Cuban government between 1952 and 1958. After the coup, Batista immediately altered the sugar policy making it restrictive, benefiting the as&r by granting tax-​exempt for the exploitation of nickel, in addition to protecting the Rionda family in the acquisition and expansion of King Ranch in Camaguey.39 Batista also created brac (Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities), in direct connection with the cia through General Martín Díaz Tamayo—​as a letter from Allen Dulles addressed to Batista on July 15, 1955 shows (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 549–​50). It is likely that Batista took on the task of fulfilling the guidelines of the Truslow Mission, serving US monopolies.40 The strongest indication of this subordination is the radicalism while working on the two purposes of the regime. First, the profitability of international capital—​while between 1936 and 1953 US profits in Cuba grew by 90 million dollars, between 1953 and 1958, they grew by 250 million dollars (Acosta, 1973, p. 68). And second, the enrichment of Cuban elites, so that their consumption patterns would modernize (see Table 3 for Batista’s holdings).

38

39 40

In addition, the administrations of Grau San Martín (1944–​48) and Carlos Prío (1948–​52) from the Auténticos party had slightly increased tariffs on rice, some textiles, and footwear importation, timidly protecting these Cuban industries which would be one more reason for the discomfort of the United States (Acosta, 1973, p. 73). The Rionda family was part of the sugar-​financial complex that operated on Wall Street along with the Rockefeller-​Sullivans, the Schroeder Bank and in alliance with the Czarnikow group (Pino-​Santos, 1983, p. 546). bird economic mission in Cuba, 1949.

Colonies with capacity to produce 18,571,115 arrobas of sugar per day in Central Washington, in Las Villas. Colonies with capacity to produce 3.659.139 arrobas of sugar per day in Central Resulta, in Las Villas. Central Andorra—​nominal ownership of Batista’s wife, Martha Fernandez Miranda—​ with capacity to produce 185.000 arrobas of sugar per day; 3.000 workers; the 17th largest refinery in the country; the 9th largest distillery; and 338 caballerías in Pinar del Río. Central Constancia—​nominal ownership of Fernando de la Riva—​with capacity to produce 430,000 arrobas of sugar per day; 3,000 workers; and 392 caballerías in Las Villas.

Compañía Agrícola Punta Felipe s.a.

Compañía Agrícola Delta s.a.

Industrias Andorra s.a.

Rancho Veloz Sugar Company s.a.

Nominal owner Ramon Vasconcelos Maragliano (newspaper) Gaspar Pumarejo (television channel 12) Antonio Pérez Benitoa (radio station)

Alerta s.a.

Canal 12 s.a.

Circuito Nacional Cubano s.a.

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Company

Communication and advertisement (10)

Central Washington, with 2,835 workers; the 5th largest refinery in the country; the 18th largest distillery; and 10 caballerías in Las Villas.

Compañía Agrícola Defensa s.a.

Agricultural (5) Properties

Fulgencio Batista’s patrimony by sector, 1958

Company

table 3

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Fulgencio Batista Fulgencio Batista Fulgencio Batista Fulgencio Batista

rhc, Cadena Azul de Cuba s.a.

Revista Gente s.a.

Compañía Editorial Mediodía s.a.

Radio Siboney s.a.

Comprising the companies Centro Turistico Barlovento and Compañía de Fomento de Bauta s.a. it was chosen by the Batista government to build the Bauta aqueduct. Sold to bandes in 1957, it became Batista’s property through a fraud scheme.

Playas del Golfo s.a.

Kawama Beach Club

Gerona Beach Territorial s.a.

Compañía Territorial Playa Francés

Modernization of Cuban Plantation (1902–​1 958)

Hoteles Isla del Tesoro s.a.

Compañía de Fomento y Turismo de Trinidad s.a.

Compañía Motel El Oasis s.a.

No specific information found

25-​million-​dollar capital

Antillean Hotel Corporation

Compañía Hotelera Antillana

Information

Company

Tourism (11)

Fulgencio Batista

Cadena Oriental de Radio

Compañía Inversiones Radiales s.a. Fulgencio Batista

Manuel Perez Benitoa e Andre Domingos Morales del Castillo

Fulgencio Batista’s patrimony by sector, 1958 (cont.)

Radio Reporter s.a.

table 3

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Fulgencio Batista’s patrimony by sector, 1958 (cont.)

One of the four airlines in the country. In partnership with Julio Lobo Olavarría, he controlled three maritime routes and a boat terminal through the companies Línea de Navegación del Golfo-​Cuba s.a., Naviera Cubamar s.a., Naviera Vacuba s.a., Operadora Marítima Unión s.a., and Terminal de Muelle y Navegación Atarés s.a. No specific information found

Aerovías Q s.a.

Naviera Cubana del Atlántico s.a.

Cuba Aeropostal s.a. Cooperativas de Ómnibus Aliados Compañía Interamericana del Transporte s.a. Compañía de Ómnibus Metropolitanos s.a.

Park Meter Corporation

New York-​based parking meter producer associated with The Karpark Corporation from Ohio.

Compañía de Parquímeros Cubanos Importer of parking meters that were sold to Organización Nacional de Estacionamentos s.a. Públicos, created by the Batista government in 1957.

56 

Metropolitan services (3)

Nominal ownership of Compañía Inmobiliária Rocar s.a., and one of the four airlines in the country.

Transportation (7)

Compañía Cubana de Aviación

Varadero Realty Company Terramar s.a.

table 3

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Shell company, which would be used to transfer their assets to their family members unsuspectedly, a fact proven when one of their wills was found in vault nº 58 of The Trust Company of Cuba.

Second largest newsprint factory using sugarcane bagasse; with nominal ownership of Cristobal Díaz Gonzales it loaned 17 million pesos from bandes. Production of concrete blocks.

Compañía Técnica Cubana s.a.

Industrias Siporex s.a.

Industries (2)

Compañía de Fomento Almendares No specific information found s.a. Compañía de Inversiones Victoria s.a. Compañía de Inversiones y Desarrollo de Baracoa Compañía de Inversiones Dofinca s.a. Inversiones Dalmen

Compañía de Inversiones Bonti s.a. Nominal ownership of Cristobal Díaz Gonzales.

Compañía de Inversiones Balaspis s.a.

Investment (7)

With nominal ownership of Prudencio Fernandez del Rio, it supplied all metropolitan Havana and built gas pipelines, with loans from bandes.

Fulgencio Batista’s patrimony by sector, 1958 (cont.)

Servicios Metropolitanos de Gas s.a.

table 3

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Nominal ownership of Cristobal Díaz Gonzales.

Compañía de Inmuebles s.a.

Nominal ownership of Cristobal Díaz Gonzales. Nominal ownership of Cristobal Díaz Gonzales. Owner of Varadero Realty Company and Terramar s.a. Partnership with Cristóbal Díaz Gonzales.

Compañía Urbanizadora Crismery s.a.

Urbanizador Cruz s.a.

Compañía Urbanizadora Varadero s.a.

Propiedad Horizontal Miramar

Compañía Inmobiliária Marimuca s.a.

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Compañía Inmobiliária Adorsina

bandes creditor.

Construcciones Marítimas Baliza s.a.

Compañía de Fomento del Túnel de Tunnel that spent 10 million dollars of public money. La Habana s.a.

Compañía Ingeniería del Golfo s.a. Built the most expensive highway—​35 million dollars—​during the Batista administration.

Shell company with nominal ownership of Andrés Domingo Morales del Castillo, minister under Batista, and Manuel Pérez Benitoa, who owned shares in most of Batista’s other companies.

Civil construction (22)

Fulgencio Batista’s patrimony by sector, 1958 (cont.)

Compañía Inmobiliária Rocar s.a.

table 3

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source: own elaboration with data from jimenez, 2000

Inmobiliaria Miramar Compañía Territorial San Vicente s.a.

Urbanizadora Crysa s.a.

Compañía Urbanizadora Valvelano s.a.

Sociedad Marimelena Realty Company

Compañía Urbanización de Sur s.a.

Propietaria de Fincas Rústicas s.a.

Mercantil del Puerto de La Habana s.a.

No specific information found

Fulgencio Batista’s patrimony by sector, 1958 (cont.)

Compañía Constructora del Litoral s.a.

table 3

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Centrales Álava Conchita Mercedes Lugareño Morón Stewart Agramonte Estrella Vertientes Alto Cerdo Palma Santa Ana Baraguá Florida Macareño Chaparras Delícias Mercedita 18 centrales

Compañía Atlántica del Golfo

Compañía Azucarera Vertientes-​Camaguey de Cuba

Compañía Central Alta Gracia s.a.

Punta Alegre Sugar Company

The Cuban American Sugar Mills Company

total

35,694

79,460 workers

18,65

7,035

7,972

20,132

25,671

Oriente Oriente Pinar del Rio

Camaguey

Oriente

Camaguey

Camaguey

Matanzas

Province

60 

10,44

9,635

2,562

4,078

8,979

Area (Caballerías) Number of workers

(1) Rockefeller-​Sullivan

Heritage of the ten main sugarcane companies in Cuba, 1958

Company

table 4

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Tánamo Araújo Cape Cruz El Pilar Escambray Hershey La Francia Niquero Parque Alto Perseverancia 1,261 Rosario San Cristóbal Tinguaro Miranda 15 centrales

Compañía Azucarera Tánamo de Cuba

Central Araújo s.a.

Central Cabo Cruz s.a.

Central El Pilar s.a.

Central Escambray s.a.

Hershey Corporation (a)

Central La Francia s.a.

New Niquero Sugar Company

Parque s.a.

Central Perseverancia s.a.

Rosario Sugar Company

Central San Cristóbal s.a. (b)

Central Tinguaro s.a.

Miranda Sugar Estates (c)

total

12,106 caballerías

45,836 workers

5,906

2,4

2,5

1,75

3,5

1,65

5,6

750

6,45

2,13

3

1,65

2,78

3,16

2,61

Number of workers

Oriente

Matanzas

Pinar del Rio

Havana

Las Villas

Las Villas

Oriente

Pinar del Rio

Havana

Las Villas

Pinar del Río

Oriente

Matanzas

Oriente

Havana

Province

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1,525

558

4

582

46

33

1,088

2

1

329

137

326

3,833

383

San Antonio

Compañía Azucarera Gómez Mena s.a.

Area (Caballerías)

Centrales

(2) Julio Lobo

Heritage of the ten main sugarcane companies in Cuba, 1958 (cont.)

Company

table 4

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Patria Adelaida Andreita Manuelita San Germán Punta Alegre Violeta 7 centrales

Compañía Azucarera Central Patria

Compañía Azucarera Adelaida

Central Andreita Compañía Azucarera s.a.

Compañía Azucarera Central Manuelita s.a.

Compañía Azucarera Fidelidad s.a.

Compañía Azucarera Buena Vista s.a.

Central Violeta Sugar Company

total

5,221 caballerías

693

1,418

1,184

93

243

1,063

527

Area (Caballerías)

Centrales Céspedes Elia (d) Francisco Manatí La Vega Tuinicú 6 centrales

Company

Compañía Azucarera Céspede s.a.

The Francisco Sugar Company

Manatí Sugar Company

New Tuinicú Sugar Company

total

23,773 caballerías (8,541 +​15,192)

1 300

22,833 workers

270 3,5

9,963

800 5,2

3,1

Number of workers

26,283 workers

7,115

4,63

5,27

439

2,023

2,97

3,836

Number of workers

Las Villas Las Villas

Oriente

Camaguey Camaguey

Camaguey

Province

Camaguey

Camaguey

Oriente

Las Villas

Las Villas

Camaguey

Camaguey

Province

62 

4,288

503 2,489

960

Area (Caballerías)

(4) Braga-​Rionda

Centrales

(3) Sucesión Falla

Heritage of the ten main sugarcane companies in Cuba, 1958 (cont.)

Company

table 4

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Amistad (e) Mercedita (f) Gómez Mena (g) Resolución 4 centrales

Nueva Compañía Azucarera Gómez Mena s.a

total

Central Cunagua s.a. (i)

3,404 caballerías

Cunagua Jaronú (j)

6,438 caballerías

(7) American Sugar Refining Company

3 centrales

total

1,356 338 1,71

Cuba (h) Santo Domingo

Azucarera Central de Cuba s.a.

Area (Caballerías)

Compañía Ingenios Azucareros de Matanzas s.a. España

Centrales

Company

Las Villas

Havana Havana Havana

Province

15,968 workers

8,010 workers

1,675

4,335 2

Camaguey

Matanzas

Matanzas Matanzas

Number of Workers Province

15,250 workers

1,5

563 4,666 caballerías

2,5 6,25 5

Number of workers

315 1,403 2,385

Area (Caballerías)

(6) Família Tarafa

Centrales

(5) Gómez Mena

Heritage of the ten main sugarcane companies in Cuba, 1958 (cont.)

Company

table 4

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Báguanos Tacajó Algodones Purio 4 centrales

Antillas Sugar Estates

Compañía Azucarera Ingenio Algodones

Compañía Azucarera Delpurio

total

1,936 caballerías

263

512

951 210

Area (caballerías)

Boston Preston (k) 2 centrales

United Fruit Company

total

20,250 caballerías (8,154 +​12,096)

2,963 5,191

Area (caballerías)

Centrales Toledo Fajardo Providencia 3 centrales

Compañía Azucarera Central Toledo s.a.

Compañía Azucarera de Guines s.a. total

534 8,634 caballerías

8,1

Area (caballerías)

2,6 8,100 workers

5,5

Number of workers

20,000 workers

7,5 12,5

Number of workers

10,532 workers

1,5

3,06

3,992 1,98

Number of workers

Havana

Havana

Province

Oriente

Province

Las Villas

Camaguey

Matanzas Oriente

Province

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Company

(10) Manuel Aspuru San Pedro

Centrales

Company

(9) United Fruit Company

Centrales

(8) Salustiano García Díaz

Heritage of the ten main sugarcane companies in Cuba, 1958 (cont.)

Company

table 4

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Heritage of the ten main sugarcane companies in Cuba, 1958 (cont.)

Hershey Corporation owned the largest sugar refinery in the country, in addition to other properties such as the electrified railroad owned by Compañía del Ferrocarril Cubano de Hershey with 190 km of public service and 130 km of private roads, Aceites Vegetales s.a. industry, and an electricity plant generating and transmitting from sugar. (b) Central San Cristóbal s.a. owned the 2nd largest sugar refinery in the country. (c) Miranda Sugar Estates was a partnership between Julio Lobo and the West Indies Sugar Corporation. (d) Central Elia raised cattle, planted kenaf, produced yeast, and held control of the Guayabal port and terminal. Perhaps the most interesting information about Elia was that its administrator was Manuel Portuondo Regil, none other than the vice president of Cuba. (e) First electrified plant in the country. (f) Diversified: they grew pineapple, corn, and rice in large quantities. (g) Diversified: they produced rice and yeast. It was the first to have chemical laboratories and an experimental station. (h) One of the thirty centrales associated with cattle raising. (i) Raw sugar from both centrales exported to the United States supplied 10% of the total for Americarican Sugar Refining Company, the largest refinery in the world market. (j) Greater productive capacity in the country. (k) Preston is the first central by number of workers and the second by area. source: own elaboration with data from jimenez (2000)

(a)

table 4

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Batista’s economic policy followed principles of “governmental compensatory spending”: through a Keynesian subterfuge he created bandes in 1955 and issued 350 million pesos in bonds to finance public works. Batista injected public money into civil construction in an unprecedented flood defined as the “cement policy.”41 In addition to spending on civil construction works, Batista burned 408 million dollars from public reserves with the payment of debts to the United States (Acosta, 1973, p. 71). The organic link between Batista, the Rockefeller-​Sullivan group, and other members of the Cuban saccharocracy was an instrument on State hands to reproduce historical determinations of underdevelopment, without any national or popular mediation. 4.2 A Portrait of Saccharocracy In addition to the Rockefeller-​Sullivan group, the main resources of the sugar economy were concentrated in a few Cuban families (see Table 4), largely integrated by marriages and other degrees of kinship. The main Cuban hacendado was Julio Lobo Olavarría, who almost single-​handedly commanded the production of 15 ingenios centrales corresponding to 12,106 caballerías and 45,836 laborers, with production capacity of 65 million arrobas of sugar per day (975,000 tonnes), in addition to controlling the two largest refineries in the country (see Table 4, item 2). In addition, Julio Lobo owned the main trade corridors and sugar export companies in the world. One of his companies, Galbán Lobo Trading Company, was the main sugar seller in the world market, responsible for 35% to 60% of the Cuban and Puerto Rican sugar and 60% of the refining in the US market (Jimenez, 2000). Lobo also owned the National Bonded Warehouses Company, a gigantic sugar warehouse that stored the product of 21 centrales and owned a port. In addition, he owned Banco Financiero (holding 12 million dollars in deposits from the 21 centrales that stored their sugar in his warehouse), Corporación Aeronáutica Antillana s.a., a local airline with itinerary in his properties, one of the three airlines on the island exempted from taxation for carrying official mail; and the Corporación Inalámbrica Cubana s.a., a radio, telegraph, and telephony corporation (Jimenez, 2000). The second largest family in the sugar industry after Julio Lobo was Successión Falla Gutierrez, formed by the heirs of Laureano Falla Gutiérrez. As owners of The Trust Company of Cuba, the biggest bank in the country by deposits, they were the main national sugar-​financial group. Approximately

41

The economic theories of the mr 26–​7 criticized: “Batista leads the ‘compensatory public expenditure’ building ‘pyramids in the desert’ […]; he paved roads and built pharaonic and sterile buildings, the so-​called cement policy” (Castro, Boti, Pazos, 1959, p. 93).

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56% of deposits at The Trust belonged to just twenty-​six sugar companies. Sucesión Falla owned seven centrales, therefore being the 2nd largest group of Cuban landowners by number of centrales owned after Julio Lobo, and the 3rd largest by total production capacity (after Julio Lobo and Compañía Atlántica del Golfo, owned by Sullivan & Cromwell). The total production capacity of his centrales was 2,190,000 arrobas of sugar per day (32,850 tonnes). In addition, they commanded 26,283 laborers and owned 5,221 caballerías organized as seven companies (see Table 4, item 3). The family also owned shares in the powerful Compañía Azucarera Atlántica del Golfo since the company declared a “complete liquidation plan.” Competing with Julio Lobo, Fulgencio Batista, and Francisco Blanco, the Fallas were seeking majority control of the company. Ultimately, they were important shareholders in over ten companies in different fields (Jimenez, 2000).42 The third group in the Cuban saccharocracy was the Braga-​Rionda Family, owner of a sugar complex with six centrales, 23,773 caballerías, and 22,833 workers (see Table 4, item 4). The Braga-​Riondas were strongly integrated into international capital, acting in coordination with the Rockefellers, having speculative interests on Wall Street. In 1957, the Braga-​Riondas deposed Julio Lobo from his position of control in the Cuban sugar industry through the Cuban Trading Company, which stored sugar from 25 centrales together with Compañía General Cubana de Almacenes Públicos and Compañía Marítima Guayabal s.a. (debtor of bandes). The Braga-​Riondas also owned livestock business Compañía Ganadera Becerra s.a. (with 7,300 heads of selected cattle and 1,178 caballerías). They owned the first industry of wooden boards made of sugarcane bagasse in the world, Compañía de Productos de Fibras Manatí s.a., and the recently opened Compañía Cubana Primadera s.a., in the same branch, a shareholder of Cuban Bagasse Products. Finally, the Braga-​Rionda family had a prolific marriage with the Gómez Mena family. The fourth most important Cuban sugar group was the Gómez Mena family, related to the Braga-​Rionda family. The daughter of José Gómez Mena (the patriarch), Liliam Gómez Mena, had married Alfonso Fanjul Estrada who in turn was Higino Fanjul Rionda’s son, one of the successors of the Braga-​Rionda estate. In 1958, Alfonso Fanjul Estrada was director and shareholder at The Trust 42

Nauyú Destillering Company (2nd largest Cuban distillery), Banco de los Colonos, Petrolera Transcuba s.a., Compañía Cubana de Refrigeración Eléctrica, Papelera Nacional, Compañía Cubana de Pesca y Navegación s.a., Compañía Cubana de Fibra y Jarcia s.a., Compañía Agrícola Henequenera Estrella s.a., Compañía Inmobiliaria Payret s.a. (owner of Cinema and Theater Payret), and Corporación Intercontinental de Hoteles de Cuba s.a.

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Company of Cuba and held leadership positions in seven other large companies (Jimenez, 2000).43 The Gomez Mena family owned four ingenios centrales through the enterprise Nueva Compañía Azucarera Gómez Mena s.a., which added up to a capacity of 1,350,000 arrobas of sugar per day (20,250 tonnes), 15,250 laborers, and 4,666 caballerías—​it was the 4th largest Cuban sugar producer (see Table 4, items 4 and 5).44 Gómez Mena had a relevant political curriculum: he had been president of the Instituto Cubano de Estabilización del Azúcar (icea) and Minister of Agriculture in 1936. In addition, the group stood out for having been at the forefront of technological innovations in the sugar industry: they were the first to electrify a sugar mill, use irrigation on a large scale, reforest, and use alcohol as fuel. Gómez Mena was Banco de los Colonos main customer, and he owned shares in several ventures, including Batista’s Industrias Siporex s.a.45 Other groups of the saccharocracy controlled Cuban production with considerable monopolistic influence: Tarafa Family (owner of three centrales, with 3,404 caballerías, in charge of 8,010 laborers); American Sugar Refining Company (owner of the two most modern centrales with the highest production capacity on the island—​6,438 caballerías, in charge of 15,968 laborers and, responsible for 10% of the total raw sugar processed by the refinery located in the United States); Salustiano García Díaz (owner of four power stations, which totaled 1,936 cavalry and commanded 10,532 laborers); United Fruit Company (which held 20,250 caballerías and was in charge of 20,000 laborers); Manuel Aspuru San Pedro (owner of three centrales, owned 8,634 caballerías and was in charge of 8,100 laborers); among others (see Table 4, items 6 to 10; and Jimenez, 2000). This brief map of the concentration and centralization of capital in Cuba in the 1950s explains the high degree of instrumentalization of the State, reinforced by political intolerance in the segment against any timid redistribution 43

44 45

He was Vice President at Nueva Compañía Azucarera Gómez Mena s.a., Cuban Trading Company, The Francisco Sugar Company, Manatí Sugar Company, Construtora Airform de Cuba s.a., The New Tuinicú Sugar Company, and General Manager at Industrial Arrocera de Mayabeque s.a., besides being a shareholder in the following companies: Cuban Bagasse Products, Compañía Internacional de Envases s.a., Compañía Oriental Papelera s.a., and North Atlantic Kenaf Corporation (Jimenez, 2000). Note that in 1958, Compañía Azucarera Gómez Mena s.a., originally from this family branch, was owned by Julio Lobo, who had purchased it from Compañía Azucarera Atlántica del Golfo, in 1957 (Jimenez, 2000). The Gómez Mena family owned Indústria Arrocera de Mayabeque s.a. and shares in Cuban Bagasse Products, Compañía Internacional de Envases s.a., and Constructora Airform de Cuba (Jimenez, 2000).

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of the surplus. This contrast between the misery of the masses and the extravagant well-​being of the elite is a historical fact that helps explain why a state controlled by the saccharocracy would not be able to solve the so-​called “national problems.” It would then be up to another historical subject to put an end to this battle. 5

Revolution against Underdevelopment

The 26th of July Movement (mr 26–​7) proposed to change the historical determinations of Cuban underdevelopment. It meant blocking the use of the surplus earmarked for modernization of elite consumption and profitability of international financial capital. mr 26–​7 presented two new objectives for the use of surplus generated in Cuban society. The first one was egalitarianism, through which the stratified social structure of surplus appropriation would be dismantled and the unemployment reproduction scheme blocked. It was known that to achieve egalitarianism it was necessary not only to redistribute the surplus and use it for social purposes, but also to expand the generation capacity, i.e., to redirect the use of productive forces toward real needs of national collectivity.46 National sovereignty was the second new objective of using surplus, i.e., internalizing decision-​making centers and expanding Cuban society’s control over directions and rhythms of its own development. This necessarily meant breaking with the external dependency on the United States, whose main mechanism was the Cuban sugar quota established since 1934.47 Egalitarianism and national sovereignty merged in a project of popular sovereignty that encountered obstacles of an immediate and structural nature. The most immediate obstacle was the Batista administration, which expressed a symbiosis between the State, the ruling class, and international capital. The structural obstacle was the very modernization of plantation, i.e., its regimes of property, cropping, and work, which guaranteed the perpetuation of social suffering (violence) and the underutilization of productive capacities (waste). Therefore, the struggle for 46

47

The economic theories of the mr 26–​7 stated: “The democratic government of the 26th of July [Movement] will zealously ensure high wages for workers, high incomes for citizens. Along with this distributive policy of social justice, it will be an obligation to make the Cuban economy grow, develop, and provide the technique for new production” (Castro, Boti, Pazos, 1959, p. 79). The economic theories of mr 26–​7 argued: “If Cuba aspires to produce rice, this jeopardizes the quota. If Cuba is ready to industrialize; if Cuba must produce its food, all of this jeopardizes the quota […]. The income of six million Cubans cannot continue depending on whether or not our quota is cut” (Castro, Boti, Pazos, 1959, p. 84–​5).

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egalitarianism and national sovereignty involved breaking with this agrarian structure, the reproductive engine of underdevelopment. In that sense the mr 26–​7, by fighting the double articulation and standing up against modern plantation, put the system in check as a whole. The revolutionary movement tried to perpetuate the idea that underdevelopment was a project, not a natural fact, nor a historical fatality. The subjects of this underdevelopment project, once identified, should be held accountable.48 Consequently, mr 26–​7 advocated a development project guided not only by new purposes, but also by new subjects.49 5.1 The Moncada Program In his self-​defense, in 1953, Fidel Castro announced what was later named Moncada Program. There were five immediate laws, followed by ten measures, to be carried out by the new power that managed to overthrow the Batista regime. The first law in the Moncada Program was the implementation of the 1940 Constitution (Castro, 2007, p. 38). Since Batista’s coup, the 1940 Constitution has been replaced by Statutes written by government leaders. Fidel Castro condemned, in 1953, the Statute as illegal, not only because of the circumstances in which they were written, but also because it concentrated all powers of the Republic under the figure of a single individual, guaranteed by article 257. This article determined that the Statutes could be modified by the Council of Ministers with the approval of two-​thirds of its members, all of whom were appointed by the president.50 Facing this modern version of absolute power, the bodies of the Republic bowed: not only the Legislative power merged with the Executive, but also the Court of Constitutional Guarantees itself submitted to the new law, abolishing the Constitution and adhering to the coup. The 1940 48 49

50

Fidel Castro criticized, in 1953: “The unfortunate man who steals out of hunger is sent to jail, but none of the hundreds of thieves who have stolen millions from the state ever slept a night behind bars” (2007, p. 45). New subjects Fidel Castro identified during his self-​defense: “We understand by people, when we speak of struggle, the 600 thousand unemployed Cubans; the 500 thousand farm laborers who live in miserable bohíos, work during four months and the rest of the year starve […]; the 400 thousand industrial workers and braceros, whose pensions are being defrauded, from whose achievements are being snatched […]; the 100 thousand small farmers […] who must pay installments like feudal servants; the 30 thousand selfless, sacrificed and necessary teachers […]; the 20 thousand small merchants who are embarrassed by their debts […]; the 10 thousand young professionals” (2007, p. 36–​7). Fidel Castro criticized Batista in 1953: “A man declared himself, in some statutes, the absolute owner, not only of sovereignty, but also of every citizen’s life and death and of the very existence of the nation” (2007, p. 86).

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Constitution, therefore, came to represent the rescue of the Republic of Cuba, “kidnapped” by an illegal coup. Nevertheless, defending the 1940 Constitution was not sheer formalism. It was the most democratic Constitution in the history of the Republic. Perhaps for that reason, it had never been effectively complied with since its articles were in conflict with the modern plantation. Concerning the land tenure system, for example, article 87 established the social role of private property (Heredia, 1978, p. 138). Then Article 90 presented an even more radical policy: Latifundia is prohibited and, for the purpose of its disappearance, the Law will indicate the maximum extent of property that each person or entity may own for each type of exploitation to which the land is dedicated, taking into account respective peculiarities. The Law will restrict the acquisition and possession of land by foreign people and companies and will adopt measures that tend to revert land to Cubans. cuba, 1940

In addition to prohibiting large estates and indicating the need for nationalization of agrarian property, the constitution introduced a policy of distributing state lands to families of rural laborers.51 This means that the 1940 Constitution proposed nothing less than an agrarian reform policy which was put into effect only in October 1958, through Sierra Maestra Law No. 3. The 1940 text also contained relatively advanced labor laws—​it granted an eight-​hour workday, minimum wage, and paid vacations; prohibited arbitrary dismissal; and established the right to work, protecting unemployed people (Lecuona, 2009, p. 118). Reestablishing the 1940 Constitution and giving back to the people their power to modify it meant not only recovering constitutional legality usurped by Batista, but also regaining labor protection, social rights, and a nationalist policy of agrarian reform against latifundia, giving a step toward the realization of the aims of the revolutionary movement. The second immediate law of the Moncada Program would break the speculative chain of subleases that subjected the proletarian peasant to waves of seasonal unemployment, the charge of high rents for using the land, and 51

Second Transitory of Title vi of the 1940 Constitution: “The State shall distribute equitably and proportionally land owned by it which is not needed for its own purposes, meeting the needs of a father or head of household and giving preference to those who has been tilling it under any title. In no case will the State be able to give a single family land with a value greater than two thousand pesos or an area greater than two caballerías” (Cuba, 1940).

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debts with land speculators, delivering up to two caballerías of the land to all tenants, subtenants, partners and squatters who worked on it, and allowing them to buy three more caballerías. The third law of the Moncada Program interfered directly with the distribution of economic surplus: it would be mandatory that all companies in the country handed over 30% of their income to workers (except exclusively agricultural companies already affected by the previous law on land distribution). The fourth law of the Moncada Program was intended to conquer the fraction of colonos for the development project of the revolution, fighting the speculative power of administration cane. The law would grant colonos the right to participate in at least 55% of the sugarcane financial performance, in addition to a minimum quota of 40 thousand arrobas per central for all colonos established for more than three years. The immediate fifth law of the Moncada Program represented a literal score settling with the Batista regime: it determined the confiscation of assets badly administered by government leaders. For example, the public patrimony acquired by Batista through his own “cement policy.” Half of these assets would go to a workers’ fund and the other half to social assistance policies (Castro, 2007, p. 39). All these measures undermined the traditional trajectory of the surplus, redistributing the social product. After these five immediate laws, ten more comprehensive measures were listed by Fidel Castro in his self-​defense (Ibid., 2007, p. 40–​9). First, an agrarian reform that would abolish land rent, prohibit large estates and foreign ownership, create state properties and peasant cooperatives, in addition to reforesting the area on the island. Second, an educational reform would be carried out guaranteeing free education to all citizens, increasing teachers’ salaries from 200 to 350 pesos, allowing teachers to use free public transportation, and providing them with a six-​month recess every five years for special pedagogy courses. Thirdly, strategic sectors controlled by foreign monopolies would be nationalized, specifically electricity and telephone trusts, owned by the Morgans and the Rockefeller-​Sullivans.52 Fourth, the State would be responsible for guaranteeing electricity to all, since the trouble in universalizing access 52

Compañía Cubana de Eletricidad was owned by Grupo Morgan, which held 88% of the shares. It was a subsidiary of Electric Bonds & Share. Only 4% of shareholders were Cubans. The company had 7,464 employees and provided electricity to 3 million users (approximately half of the country’s population). Considering the huge mass of Cubans without access to electricity, this data is enough to prove the service a monopoly. Electricity rates were also monopolistic: they were double or triple the price charged in the United States. Compañía Cubana de Teléfonos was a monopoly owned by Grupo Morgan in partnership with Grupo Rockefeller-​Sullivan. The head office was American Telephone & Telegraph (Jimenez, 2000).

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to it resulted from the electric trust not considering it profitable to extend power lines to certain regions, deliberately keeping them in the dark. Fifth, a tax reform with egalitarian ends would be carried out, starting from returning amounts levied on the most impoverished sectors of the population and considered excessive. Sixth, the State would be responsible for guaranteeing the right to adequate housing, based on a program of building houses, lowering rents by half and tripling the collection of taxes from urban landlords. Seventh, the State would be responsible for guaranteeing that all people had access to free health service. Eighth, the State would be responsible for guaranteeing adequate employment to all, mainly through the social work necessary for the egalitarian purpose of the revolution, such as the construction of hospitals and schools. Ninth, a policy for industrialization. On that, Castro argued, in 1953: Cuba continues to be a raw material factory. Cuba exports sugar to import sweets, exports leather to import shoes, exports iron to import ploughs … The whole world agrees that the need to industrialize the country is urgent. 2007, p. 42

With a critical stance regarding Cuba’s economic insertion in the international division of labor, the Moncada Program sought to requalify this insertion from an industrial policy.53 So far, industrialization had been made unfeasible by the subordinate and dependent character of the Cuban insertion in the international economic order, through which the United States blocked the island’s development potential with threats regarding the sugar market. On the need for industrialization, there was already a debate in Cuba between sectors of the revolutionary left and developmental reformist sectors linked to eclac.54 Industrialization would be made possible by the tenth measure of the Moncada Program: nationalize 1.5 billion pesos of inactive capital from the National Bank and banfaic and use it for Cuban economic development. 53

54

Despite its distinct ideological nature, the Popular Socialist Party had a very similar position. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez argued, in 1956: “The representatives of US financial capital were responsible for the structural deformation of Cuba, as they structurally imposed on us monoculture and monoexportation” (1983, p. 61). Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, from the psp, was polemicizing with the Cuban reformist sectors, claiming positions such as that of Raúl Prebisch. In 1956, he argued: “They elaborate a whole series of theories to deprive economic development of its real substance and convert it into simple agricultural diversification, with a certain increase in agrarian productivity through agricultural mechanization development. […] In that regard, we unreservedly agree with Prebisch’s words when expressing that development ‘is not

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5.2 Revolutionary Democratic Nationalism The Moncada Program did not simply refer to the 1940 Constitution in a more radicalized version of the eclac structural reforms. mr 26–​7 was the historical heir of a current Cuban political thought defined as “revolutionary democratic nationalism,” with a strong anti-​imperialist content (eclac, 1980, p. 16). Such was the tendency that grounded the defense of national sovereignty and the overcoming of the island’s economic dependency. Since the 19th century, nationalist leaders with a democratic bias, who raised the flag of sovereignty, forged a political culture in defense of true Cuban independence. This current has become stronger each generation. The struggle for national sovereignty was a social force that went through the decades in constant sophistication until 1959. Several generations accumulated forces to formulate the Moncada Program and the very existence of the mr 26–​7. The genetic code of Cuban revolutionary democratic nationalism came from many figures: from Ignácio Agramonte and Carlos Manuel Céspede, criollo vigilantes who freed their own slaves and launched the Ten Years’ War against Spain in 1868; from Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, poor peasants who created their people’s armies, radicalized the struggle for freedom, and were defeated for the first time in 1878; and even more strongly from José Martí, who after joining Gómez and Maceo, launched himself in the second war of independence and died in combat, in 1895. Martí’s nationalist formulation, summarized in his speech at the Monetary Conference of the Republics of America, in 1891, is the most significant historical legacy absorbed by the Cuban revolutionary nationalist current. Martí argued: One who says economic union, says political union. The people who buy, lead. The people who sell, serve. Trade must be balanced to ensure freedom. The people who want to die sell to only one people, and the people who want to be saved sell to more than one. The excessive influx of one country in the trade of another country becomes a political influx. […] The first thing that makes one people dominate another, is to separate mere increase of what exists today, but rather a process of intense structural changes’ and that ‘industrialization will be key to improve Latin American livelihood.’ […] Our first thesis: development for Cuba means undertaking industrialization beyond mere technification of agriculture […]. And beyond the reduced industrialization of agricultural raw material, such as bagasse or kenak, which are also essential. Quite the opposite, in a word, of what the pompous Truslow Mission recommended, following the very explicable imperialist canons, which managed to momentarily dazzle certain Cuban economists and a part of our own industrial bourgeoisie” (1983, p. 56–​7) The topic of Cuban industrialization will be addressed again in Chapter 4.

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that people from the others. People who want to be free, must be free in business. Distribute your business equally among strong countries. martí, 2005, p. 154–​155

Martí’s words were quoted by Ernesto Guevara on August 8, 1961, at the meeting of the Inter-​American Economic and Social Council, the same one that founded the Alliance for Progress in Punta del Este (Guevara, 2003, p. 3). There was also a “parliamentary version” of the revolutionary nationalism represented by Manuel Sanguily, who in the early years of the Republic fought the US military occupation in the Constituent Congress, was against annexationist positions and the Platt Amendment. The revolutionary nationalist sentiment also moved Julio Antonio Mella, Ruben Villena, Antonio Guiteras who, dedicated to overthrowing the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado, led workers’ strikes, student protests, and guerrillas in the East, between 1923 and 1933. All these historical subjects, in different contexts, social origins, and individual realities, had in common the non-​negotiable struggle for national sovereignty. The historical current acquired a mystical potential in the representation of popular courage, which was synthesized especially by the figure of Fidel Castro. Two young commanders of the mr 26–​7 joined the pantheon of Cuban nationalist martyrs: Abel Santamaría, fallen in the attack on the Moncada Barracks, in 1953, at the age of twenty-​five; and Frank País, killed in the urban combat against the Batista dictatorship, in 1957, at the age of twenty-​two. And it goes without saying, Ernesto Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos were notorious martyrs in the pantheon as well. Over the decades, the historic persistence of the struggle for national sovereignty in Cuba has given greater legitimacy to the organization of more radicalized and violent combats. This partially explains why Sierra Maestra guerrillas won hegemony in Cuban society between 1956 and 1959, despite the violence of the civil war. Because the engagement of the mr 26–​7 was not exactly a novelty, and it was in line with this historical current that had already solidified relations of solidarity in strategic segments of the Cuban people. 5.3 Sierra Maestra Law No.3 The first effective achievement of the Moncada Program, as expressed by Cuban guerrilla and intellectual Fernando Martínez Heredia, was Sierra Maestra Law No. 3, enacted by the Rebel Army in October 1958.55 The law was

55

Fernando Martínez Heredia was a mr 26–​7 guerrilla in the 1950s and, after the revolution, he approached Ernesto Guevara’s political positions expressed in the great economic

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written by Fidel Castro, Ernesto Guevara, and Humberto Sori Marín—​Marín later abandoned the revolution (Heredia, 1978, p. 136). Its basic principle was to ensure the articles of the 1940 Constitution were effective toward the agrarian issue. Its immediate action was to distribute state land in plots of not more than two caballerías to peasants who till it. This was followed by the elimination of latifundia and the nationalization of land, along with the promise to expand the policy on a national scale. Sierra Maestra Law No 3 consolidated the dual power in Cuba, since, as Heredia argues, it was already a government act put into action by the guerrillas: Our first act in government, before establishing the first school, was to dictate a revolutionary group establishing the Agrarian Reform, which regulated, among other things, that the owners of small lands would stop paying their rent until the Revolution decided so individually. In fact, we were advancing with Agrarian Reform as the spearhead of the Rebel Army. 1976, p. 137

Beyond popular, the agrarian reform was also “a vehicle to increase productivity and agricultural production within the framework of a development project based on national industry with an internal market that will be expanded by the rise of the agricultural level of individual farmers’ lives” (Heredia, 1978, p. 138). Therefore, the agrarian reform was the real engine in the revolutionary process. Wherever the Rebel Army was, the agrarian speculation scheme based on latifundium-​minifundium was dismantled grounded on the 1940 Constitution and through Law no. 3. The first ones in the list of priorities to be given by the State two caballerías were those who were laboring on other people’s lands: sub-​tenants, partners and squatters. Then the land would be distributed to peasants who served or helped the Rebel Army and to the families of victims of the Batista regime (Heredia, 1978, p. 140). Indemnification to landlord-​ tenants was organized according to their declaration of assets on October 20, debate. He was director of the magazine Pensamiento Crítico, which during its five years of existence (1967–​1972), linked to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Havana, became a center of attention for intellectuals, writers, and artists. After 1970, Heredia disagreed with the Cuban government and the magazine ceased to exist (Heredia, 2010, p. 9–​18). Regarding Sierra Maestra, he expressed: “Law 3 was the first of the revolutionary laws through which compliance with the Moncada Program was implemented. It was certainly our first agrarian reform law” (1976, p. 143).

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1958, in which there was widespread tax evasion, harming landowners (Ibid., 1978, p. 139). Other measures to encourage production and fight land speculation were proposed by Law No. 3: prohibition of selling or leasing properties distributed by the Rebel Army; indivisibility of land of two caballerías; tax exemption for former owners who invested their compensation in productive activities; nationalization of all lands not registered in the Land Title Registration, on October 20; offering of credit to new owners of minifundia at halved interest rates; prohibition of anyone acquiring more than 5 caballerías under the new law; the Rebel Army’s control of agricultural prices to fight speculation; among others (Ibid., 1978, p. 139–​141). Law No. 3 was combined with a Rebel Army policy to drive peasant self-​ organization. Peasant revolutionary committees were created on a local and regional scale, and the Peasant Congress in Arms and the Plenaria Azucarera (plenary sessions) were held in 1958, on September 21, and November 28 and December 6 respectively, among other events of political and military organization of rural laborers for the revolution. As the guerrillas took possession of new agrarian and industrial resources, they immediately placed them under the command of revolutionary purposes, conquering the peasant masses and the rural proletariat in the very execution of the new development project. The ultimate expression of rural popular organization of the Rebel Army was the National Conference of Sugar Workers, which brought together, between December 18 and 20, 1958, unionists from five provinces and more than 700 advocate workers and peasants against the Batista regime (Heredia, 1978, p. 142). A prominent role in the political organization of the peasantry and rural proletariat was played by Raúl Castro in the ii Frente Oriental, a countryside vanguard group for popular self-​organization. Rural organizations then created were the incarnation of popular sovereignty: peasant collective efforts joined the Rebel Army to build schools, hospitals, and roads, going beyond the mere execution of a new land tenure system. All that, in the midst of the civil war, was a demonstration of the historical capacity of the new subjects that emerged in a concrete dispute for egalitarianism and national sovereignty. A brief reflection on the nature of the Cuban revolution still fits this chapter, responding to the question: Why was the fight against Cuban underdevelopment revolutionary? Although there are several complementary answers to this question one aspect only the apparently decisive one is highlighted below. Any political project that sought to alter the historical determinations of Cuban underdevelopment could only be carried out if there were a historical subject capable of sustaining it. The development project proposed by mr 26–​7 was not initially socialist, but rather, guided by its two main goals—​ egalitarianism and national sovereignty. The fight against Cuban

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underdevelopment was revolutionary because between the Cuban reality and the purposes proposed by the mr 26–​7 no new historical mediations emerged, i.e., no individuals emerged capable of executing a program of structural reforms that came close to social equality and national sovereignty without fully breaking with the reproduction scheme of dependent capitalism. Thus structural reforms in Cuba necessarily depended on a revolution. For Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, that need was extended to the entire Latin American continent which was taken by the deformities of dependent capitalism: Whoever undertakes the evolutionary reform of income groups will encounter organized resistance from the privileged social sectors of Latin America and their military protectors. It should, moreover, inevitably affect US investors. Therefore, sooner or later, they will have to face this dilemma: either they decide to carry out transformations through revolutionary ways, or they will suffer the same defeat all reformist processes experienced in the last Latin American decades. 1983, p. 283

The historical lesson that stems from the Cuban case is that underdevelopment and its means of reproduction (the double articulation between social segregation and dependency) were the possible specific form of peripheral capitalism on the island. A new peripheral capitalism, in that specific historical situation, failed. Probably because under such structural conditions, even a moderate fight against the historical determinations of Cuban underdevelopment was impossible without social conflict. And a political subject with no penchant to conflict could not carry out even a minimal transformation, therefore remaining tied to the process of conservative modernization. In this sense, structural reforms could only be carried out in Cuba by the action of a historical subject tending to conflict: the mr 26–​7.56 “Without a revolution, there is no Agrarian Reform,” cried Fidel Castro, on July 14, 1959, at the end of the First National Forum on the subject. In Cuba, there would be no structural reform if there were no revolution.

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The economic theories of the mr 26–​7 expressed: “An effective plan of economic development will only be established if an energetic action of citizens eliminates the obstacle known as Batista and his regime. An effective economic development plan will only be carried out if its executors, once in power, obtain political support of the majority of citizens” (Castro, Boti, Pazos, 1959, p. 78).

­c hapter 2

First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–​1963) It is a unanimous criterion that the latifundia phenomenon revealed by the above data not only contradicts the modern concept of social justice, but also constitutes one of the factors that shape the underdeveloped and dependent structure of the Cuban economy. Agrarian Reform Law, May 17, 1959 (in padrino, 1960, p. 48)

…

Gentlemen, it is our most strict criterion that the only possible agrarian reform is that which liquidates once and for all native and foreign latifundia, recovers large unproductive land for the State and hands over to peasants the land they till. carlos rafael rodriguez, April 10, 1969 (1983, p. 284)

…

In a single word we could define how far agricultural development was going: diversification. Which means the Revolution in its agricultural policy represented the antithesis of what had existed during the years of dependency on imperialism and the exploitation of the landowning class. ernesto guevara, October 1964 (1982, p. 20)

∵ 1

Transformation of the Land Tenure System

Between the arrival of the Rebel Army in Havana on January 1st and the signing of the Agrarian Reform Law on May 17th, 1959, a growing tension developed between moderate and revolutionary sectors of post-​Batista Cuban society. The militarist attempt by General Eulogio Cantillo and the US embassy to swear

© Joana Salém Vasconcelos, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004515215_004

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in Colonel Ramón Barquín, who would carry on with the historic determinations of the neocolonial order was frustrated. Therefore, on January 3, Manuel Urrutia, representative of moderate sectors with whom the guerrillas formed a fleeting broad front known as the Provisional Government, took office. Urrutia headed his moderate office with Prime Minister José Miró Cardona. Fidel Castro reserved for himself the Commander in Chief position in the Rebel Army. Although guerrilla leaders have positioned themselves strategically as military commanders, they did not directly have ministerial function. Raúl Castro was appointed Military Commander of Santiago de Cuba and Ernesto Guevara became Military Commander of Havana. Anticipating new difficulties for the execution of the Moncada Program, the 26th of July Movement strengthened its alliance with the Popular Socialist Party (Cuba’s communist party), which until mid-​1958 had sharply criticized the guerrilla tactics.1 During the first weeks of 1959, the commanders of the 26th of July Movement articulated their alliances with the psp and the Revolutionary Directorate, and prepared for a new phase of political combat in which the execution or not of the program of structural transformations was at stake. The distance between Urrutia’s office—​with formal political power but no military power—​and the Rebel Army—​with effective military power but initially with little access to the government—​produced a “first governmental crisis” (Lobaina, 2012), overcome on February 16, 1959, when Fidel Castro was appointed Prime Minister. The class struggle quickly penetrated the government. When Fidel Castro led the Council of Ministers, the essence of the 1940 Constitution was restored, reducing President Urrutia’s role of signing laws. When the Rebel Army took over part of the political instruments of the government, it paved the path toward a change in the very nature of the State, starting from the definitive replacement of its military apparatus. Deep differences between Urrutia and the Rebel Army did not take long to emerge, and in the course of six months they became unavoidable. The ministers appointed by Urrutia organized behind the scenes a policy of slowing down the reforms, seeking to prevent the laws of the Moncada Program from being carried out. On the other hand, Fidel Castro pressured to quickly approve the revolutionary laws, which would immediately respond to social justice demands. As historian Rolando Ávila stated, “Fidel was moving in the opposite direction. Because it was time to keep the expectations of reactionary social classes, including imperialism, neutralized. And, on the other hand, the execution of the Program he promised in Moncada” (Ávila, 2012). The dispute 1 The main leaders of psp were Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, and Aníbal Escalante.

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between two development projects with different purposes was then in a new historical phase. The strength of the Moncada Program suggests that it not only proposed new goals for Cuban historical development, but was already executing them. The actions of the Rebel Army along with Sierra Maestra Law No. 3 were a concrete alternative for development, whose starting point was agrarian reform. Urrutia’s sector sought to circumvent structural transformations, creating mediations between the promised reforms and the old historical determinations of underdevelopment, in the name of pacifying the country. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez says that until May 1959, the Cuban bourgeoisie and the foreign companies controlling the island’s economic resources carried out maneuvers in an attempt to soften the agrarian reform. A group of ranchers offered the new government 10,000 pregnant cows in exchange for milder land reform. Meanwhile, Diário da Marinha advised that the distribution of land be carried out only in marshy lands, in the mountains, or in lands invaded by the marabú (Rodríguez, 1978, p. 121). However, Moncada’s agrarian reform had been underway since October 1958 and, as it expanded, it created the material bases of a new power, narrowing the paths of the moderate sectors. 1.1 The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959 On May 17, 1959, in Sierra Maestra, Fidel Castro finally signed the Agrarian Reform Law; it was a symbolic starting point for the structural transformations. The date was a tribute to Niceto Pérez, a worker murdered by the Rural Guard on May 17, 1946 (Acosta, 1972b, p. 93). In the law-​text, latifundia was identified as the main mechanism reproducing the dependent and underdeveloped nature of the Cuban economy; five elements distinguish it: Dependency on national income to structure it from production to exportation, considered the “strategic variant” in Cuban economy, which thus becomes highly vulnerable to the cyclical depressions of the world economy; high tendency to import, including goods which under other conditions could be produced in the country; consequent reduction in the multiplier effect of investments and exports; technical delay in the methods of cropping and livestock exploitation; in general, the low living standards of the Cuban population and, more specifically, the rural population, with consequent narrowness of the internal market, incapable, under such conditions, of encouraging the national development of the industry. padrino, 1960, p. 48, emphasis added2

2 All information and quotes from the Agrarian Reform Law of 05/​17/​1959 were taken directly from the text of the law, organized in a compilation of Revolutionary Agrarian Laws by Padrino, 1960, p. 47–​67.

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At first, as one might notice, the agrarian reform was just a structural reform. The economic guidelines that would make this rupture possible did not show much discrepancy compared to eclac structural reform program, as Carlos Rafael Rodríguez has verified countless times: replace imports by diversifying agriculture, increase exports by industrializing agriculture and creating an internal market through redistribution of national income, aiming at the future industrialization of the country.3 The non-​negotiable essence of the Moncada Program was egalitarianism and national sovereignty, with no mention of socialism in this period. Although the Cuban revolution quickly moved from a nationalist and democratic proposal to a socialist strategy, the two purposes of the Moncada Program remained the main guiding forces of the Cuban historical process until 1970, when those aims are ranked differently. On the one hand, without agrarian reform, there could be no national economic development, since modern plantation deepened the technical and social disparities of the productive structure and made foreign exchange waste possible through elite opulent consumption. On the other hand, an agrarian reform that would undo the economic and cultural obstacles of Cuban underdevelopment would affect the foundations and nature of peripheral capitalism, seriously threatening the way of life of the ruling classes and the profitability of US companies. Therefore, agrarian reform that would transform the structures of Cuban society could not take place within the established order. In other words, the determinants of underdevelopment were non-​negotiable for its beneficiaries in such a way that the Cuban bourgeoisie did not build up the capacity for national organization of its society, nor did it know how to manipulate democratic institutions to absorb the inherent tensions of social segregation. In Florestan Fernandes’ interpretation, the Cuban bourgeoisie would not have been able to create transition paths from dependent neocolonial order to competitive social order. He summarized: Neither the United States advanced providing the Cuban bourgeoisie with economic and political space to carry out a revolution within the order, through which the competitive social order could emerge

3 In 1969, during the 13th Session of eclac, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez expressed: “What happened in our country is all that eclac postulates are conditions for development, that is: Agrarian Reform, elimination of irritating inequalities of income, achievement of economic independence, and guarantee of human living standards for those who, until yesterday, lived in deplorable conditions; and, above all, establishment of the material and technical base […] which—​we are sure—​will serve as an example to Latin American fraternity of peoples” (Rodríguez, 1983, p. 290).

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from hibernation, nor did Cuban bourgeois classes have conditions and means to become revolutionary at a deep level spontaneously imposed, which required them to “risk everything” in exchange for something that seemed like utopia or “dream.” What is essential, therefore, is not how much the Cuban bourgeoisie was internally divided, but the fact that it preferred compromise as a technique for accumulating forces. fernandes, 2007, p. 104

Such a weakness of the Cuban bourgeoisie impelled the revolutionary nationalist movement “outside the ‘forces of order,’” so it would carry out structural reforms that would expand internal control over development (Fernandes, 2007, p. 102). Meanwhile, Urrutia’s office “tried to stop the revolution and adapt it to a development that would only serve to consolidate a competitive social order” (Ibid., 2007, p. 119). In general terms, the May 17 Law outlined two priority goals: to eradicate rural poverty and promote economic development, i.e., redistribute surplus and expand the bases of its generation. In the Agrarian Reform Law, egalitarianism and national sovereignty were merged into an economic development strategy, whose pressing tasks consisted of eliminating the underutilization of productive capacities, activating idle lands and unemployed workforce, to expand exports and increase import capacity; diversifying agriculture to supply raw material to the national industry, provide the population with food. and save foreign exchange spent on imports; and stimulate increased productivity with public incentives for the private sector. It was impossible to carry out these tasks without eliminating two obstacles: idleness of the land, which provided a material basis for speculative behavior, and specialization through monoculture which benefited the US economy. Thus, the law propagated two slogans: the elimination of latifundia and the right to ownership for farmers tilled the land. As promised in October 1958, article 1 of the May 17 law prohibited estates larger than 30 caballerías. Article 2 proposed three exceptions to that limit: properties larger than 30 caballerías with sugarcane and rice plantations yielding over 50% of the national average in the last harvest; cattle ranching properties that had a minimum number of cattle per hectare to be determined by the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (inra); and areas whose technical efficiency and economic performance would be seriously harmed by downsizing. In none of the exceptions the law allowed that properties exceeded 100 caballerías. Article 5 determined the order of expropriations: first, land cultivated by tenants, sub-​tenants, partners or squatters; subsequently, surplus lands from latifundia larger than 30 caballerías. State lands would also be redistributed. Like Sierra Maestra Law,

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May 17 Law declared that all land not registered up to October 20, 1958, would be considered state-​owned, therefore punishing landowners who had declared reduced properties to evade taxes (Article 8). Properties smaller than 30 caballerías and subject to leases, subleases, and partnerships would also be expropriated in the corresponding areas; their owners would keep the rest. In that sense, it was a particularly punitive law for “pure rentiers,” who did not keep any portion of their land for their own use and used the entire area for speculative purposes, as in this case they would be fully distributed in favor of whoever tilled them.4 Article 11 forbade the establishment of lease and partnership contracts of any kind, preventing the rentier system from being restored. Articles 33 and 34 abolished free land market, restricting the transfer of property to three legal situations: sale to the State, exchange authorized by the State, and heredity. That way, a legal blockade against economic forces toward the restoration of an agrarian rentier structure, and protection for small producers who benefited from redistribution were built. Such protection was consolidated in article 62, which prohibited eviction of all beneficiaries of the law. As a result, the two typical gears of land speculation were halted. Both internal circuits of speculation—​the complex webs of leasing and subleasing—​and external circuits that would bear fruit in Wall Street fed by gigantic areas of idle land and plantation reserves maintained by landowners were radically limited. The nationalist component of agrarian reform was concentrated in articles 12 to 15. It was determined that, one year after the enactment of the law, sugarcane exploitations by corporations that did not comply with three requirements would no longer be allowed: first, that all shares be nominative; second, that all holders were Cubans; third, that none of the holders owned any sugar factory (refineries or centrales). Companies that did not comply with the requirements would immediately lose their rights to quotas of mills in the centrales. Article 13 had a historical impact, as it altered the dynamics of concentration and centralization of the capital that was in Cuba since the 19th century. Owners of sugar plantations were prohibited from owning centrales and refineries, in other words, administration cane fields were eliminated

4 Later, in 1961, Resolution No. 266 was passed. It granted widows and the elderly who had no other means of livelihood than land rent, a monthly payment in cash from the State—​the amount was not less than what they received as income. Subsequently, this payment was converted into a lifetime pension because, as Antero Regalado analyzed: “in such a case, it is no longer a question of payment for an expropriated asset but of meeting a social, human issue” (Regalado, 1979, p. 171) Regalado was a peasant guerrilla in Ariguanabo, honored by anap after his death with the order “Antero Regalado for outstanding peasants.”

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through dismemberment, only in the agriculture and industry private sector. Owners with less than 30 caballerías should adjust to this law over the course of one year, getting rid of one or another part of their possessions. Those larger than 30 caballerías, subjected to article 1, would have their administration cane fields extinct. Article 14 prohibited every business corporation, preventing provisions of the law from being circumvented in financial anonymity. With the same purpose, it required that all transfers of property between relatives up to 4th degree carried out after January 1, 1959, be registered (Article 65). To complete the “Cubanization” of the agrarian structure, Article 15 determined that land ownership, from then on, could only be acquired by Cuban citizens, eliminating the right to inherit foreign property. According to the law-​text, all expropriated land would be distributed following two new ownership models: “vital minimum” and agricultural cooperatives. Immediately after law enforcement began, a third new type of property emerged: the state-​owned Granjas del Pueblo (People’s Farms). Along with the remaining private property, the new Cuban agriculture would consist of four types of property, two private, one state-​owned, and one mixed-​owned. The vital minimum was a lot of fertile land of two caballerías for each family of five individuals, whose ownership would be inalienable (Article 16). Its size could vary according to the fertility of the land, determined to guarantee a minimum annual income established by inra. The law declared the new distributed properties indivisible, preventing subsequent generations from breaking the minimum calculated when inheriting the land. The vital minimum would be distributed based on three criteria. First, all tenants, sub-​tenants, partners, and squatters who cultivate less than two caballerías (article 18), as well as owners with less than two caballerías (article 19), would receive free of charge from the State the remaining portion of land to reach the vital minimum, through private property titles issued by inra. Second, all tenants, sub-​tenants, partners, and squatters who tilled between two and five caballerías would receive free of charge two caballerías and could acquire three more through forced sale. Thirdly, regarding state land tenants, the three remaining caballerías would not be transferred by forced sale, but rather, free of charge. Peasants of the Rebel Army and relatives of those murdered by the Batista regime would have priority in the distribution of land, followed by inhabitants and neighbors of each expropriated area. Even so, all Cuban citizens without property could request the vital minimum from any part on the island (Articles 22 and 23). It was requested that landowners affected by the agrarian reform law presented themselves within the three-​month period for expropriation, otherwise they would lose the right to compensation (articles 25 and 26). As soon as the law was regulated, it was determined that landowners could choose their best

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land, leaving the worst for redistribution (Pino-​Santos, 07/​02/​1959; Rodríguez, 1978, p. 133). Compensation was the most explicit trigger for controversy between the two sectors of the Provisional Government. There were two mechanisms of agrarian redistribution in the 1940 Constitution: either expropriation with cash compensation or confiscation. The revolutionary sector of the Provisional Government defended the creation of Agrarian Reform Titles issued by the State to compensate affected landowners, a proposal which they did not accept (Acosta, 1972b, p. 94–​5). Another controversy arose when landowners challenged the use of the October 20, 1958 record to set land prices. The Law created the Agrarian Reform Titles with a 4.5% per year interest and a twenty-​year term for the State to return the amounts (Articles 29 and 31).5 Compensations for the land were 400 pesos per caballería (Chonchol, 1961, p. 28). Despite rural buildings and plantations already sown being compensated separately by the State (article 29), the law determined that 45% of property income was to be deducted from the compensation, as they correspond to values “produced without private capital effort and only because of State, Province, municipality, or autonomous action” (Article 30) (Padrino, 1960, p. 56). The law encouraged the productivity of the landowners’ remaining lands by exempting them from taxes for ten years when the compensation was invested in productive activities. All landowners who abandoned their land would be punished with the loss of their compensation (article 66). In Transitory Provisions of the Law, it was established that the entire land under private ownership should be productive and the parcels not put into activity within a year would also be expropriated. From an institutional point of view, the law ensured two strategic organizations for planning and activating the new agrarian structure: zda s (Agricultural Development Zones—​Chapter 4) and inra (Chapter 6). The Agricultural Development Zones were regional administrative units responsible for the direct implementation of the agrarian reform in all its dimensions: from expropriations to sociocultural development. The zda s organized the establishment of rural schools, maternity homes, emergency rooms, medical and dental care, creation of recreational spaces, libraries, gyms, and all means of production and cultural dissemination for the rural population. Twenty-​eight zda s were created, numbered by Province, and covering quite extensive territories, 5 According to French agronomist René Dumont, who was in Cuba to advise on the agrarian reform process during the same period Jacques Chonchol was there, Cuban agrarian reform had compensation interest rates higher than the Japanese capitalist land reform (Dumont, 1970, p. 28).

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especially considering the scope of the tasks assigned to them (Chonchol, 1961, p. 23). Each Zone would have a Regional Director subordinate to the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (inra).6 inra was created, technically, as the central agency for the implementation of agrarian reform. But in reality it was much more than that: it was the political apparatus housing the revolutionary sector of the Provisional Government. In the words of Cuban historian Rolando Ávila, inra was “the mechanism to take the Moncada Program into its first stage, and it was based on an organized and armed people” (Ávila, 2012). In a context in which it was not possible to count on the Provisional Government, it was necessary to create a power instrument to guarantee the effectiveness of the agrarian reform. Therefore, inra was created from the bases of the Rebel Army itself. Functions assigned to the institute affected all dimensions of rural life: design production plans and technological improvement, provide inputs and public credit to cooperatives and small farmers, build rural schools, hospitals, and recreation and cultural centers, in addition to tens of thousands of houses to replace the bohíos.7 In addition, inra was assigned the tasks of elaborating and proposing tariff and fiscal policies aiming at increasing production, directing and managing agrarian reform funds, writing a Regulatory Framework for Cooperatives and appointing their managers. Ultimately, all the autonomous agents intended for the regulation, stabilization, promotion, and defense of agricultural production were incorporated into inra, such as the Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute. Born from the heart of the Rebel Army, inra was initially a military organization which expanded its power through the distribution of weapons to beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, so that each one of them would protect it with their own hands. As Ávila explained: “Development Zones became Military Zones, because weapons were handed over to the people” (Ávila, 2012). In that sense, inra was a “State within a State” (Fernandes, 2007, p. 179), whose purpose was the armed defense of the execution of the Moncada Program. It was the agency that sealed the alliance between the 26th of July Movement, the psp, and the Rebel Army. inra organized the people with weapons and was militarily superior and autonomous compared to the moderate forces of the Provisional Government. Fidel Castro dispatched his Prime Minister directives from the inra office, of which he was President, and rarely attended Urrutia’s 6 There were five Agricultural Development Zones in Pinar del Río; three in Havana; four in Matanzas; five in Las Villas; three in Camaguey, and eight in Oriente (Chonchol, 1961, p. 23). 7 To finance all that, inra Credit Department was created, subordinating and later absorbing the former banfaic.

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office meetings (Mao Junior, 2007, p. 333). Furthermore, when carrying out the agrarian reform, inra “disaggregated the traditional basis of domination of the national and foreign bourgeoisie” (Fernandes, 2007, p. 180). The Agrarian Reform Law accelerated the revolutionary process and deteriorated the internal relations of the Provisional Government, in addition to being a watershed to the relationship between Cuba and the United States. Tensions escalated when Urrutia began, in his public speeches, to accuse Fidel Castro of “communism” and to use his power to postpone the signing of the Moncada Program laws. Fidel Castro insisted on answering clearly that he was not a communist. In fact, agrarian reform enabled capitalism and private property in the countryside. As Carlos Rafael Rodríguez expressed: “the limit of 30 caballerías established as the maximum for individual property clearly defined that the Cuban revolution, at this stage, considered acceptable the existence of capitalism in agriculture” (Rodríguez, 1978, p. 136). Strictly speaking, the first agrarian reform spread private land ownership to more than 200,000 families (Ibid., 1978, p. 35). The dispute between moderates and revolutionaries worsened in June, when Commander Pedro Díaz Lanz, Chief of the Revolutionary Air Forces, defected and showed up in the United States to denounce Cuban “communism.” The fact triggered a “second government crisis” (Lobaina, 2012). On July 17, 1959, Fidel Castro resigned as Prime Minister, not before explaining himself for two hours on television, accusing President Urrutia of blocking revolutionary changes. While Fidel was speaking, the outraged Cuban population took to the streets to demand the resignation of Urrutia, who signed his resignation even before the end of the speech (Mao Junior, 2007, p. 333). Since June, the Council of Ministers was transforming to the benefit of the Castro sector. Revolutionary vanguard people, such as Raúl Roa and Pedro Miret, were already in place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, respectively (Lobaina, 2012). That allowed the Council of Ministers to appoint, shortly after the fall of Urrutia, Osvaldo Dorticós as President, definitively consolidating the revolutionary leadership of the Cuban government. 1.2 Nationalization Laws In addition to the Agrarian Reform Law, other expropriation laws made up the forces to dismantle the modern plantation. One of the most important was the Recovery of Misappropriated Property Law (law no. 78) signed by the Provisional Government in February 13, 1959, recovering through Revolutionary Courts public wealth illicitly embezzled by previous governments (Chonchol, 1961, p. 78). To implement this law, the Ministry of Recovery of Misappropriated Property was created, and in April 1960 it declared to have already recovered

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US$ 400 million (Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 232)—​later they would reach 2.94 billion dollars (Rodríguez, 1978, p. 123). Expropriations of large US groups by the agrarian reform law started a conflict that expanded in an unavoidable way. In the early 1960s, Cuba put into practice Martí’s famous words: “union with the world and not with a part of it; not with a part of it, against another” (Martí, 2005, p. 155). The island had purchased 300,000 tonnes of oil from the Soviet Union, and US oil refineries Texaco, Esso, and Shell refused to process “socialist” raw material. The Cuban government was left with no option but to intervene in the refineries to keep them running. Subsequently, the United States responded with a law in Congress eliminating the quota on imports of Cuban sugar, taking the first steps toward the blockade (Rodríguez, 1969, p.14). Then, on June 6, 1960, Cuba reacted approving the Nationalization Law no. 851, providing for the nationalization of foreign owned properties on the island and created the “Funds for Payment of Exports of Goods and Companies of United States Nationals” to be fed by foreign exchange obtained from sugar trade with the United States itself, i.e., compensation conditioned on the end of the sugar blockade (Chonchol, 1961, p. 30). Through the Nationalization Law no. 851, thirty-​six sugar plants, all electricity and telephone companies on the island, and all oil refineries were nationalized, adding up to 700 million dollars corresponding to US investments in Cuba within a total of 1.1 billion (Rodriguez, 1978, p. 122; Dumont, 1970, p. 35). The Nationalization Law affected almost the entire banking system, which was predominantly controlled by foreigners (Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 233). The growing tension that accelerated the dismantling of modern plantation was recorded by the First Declaration of Havana, on September 2, 1960, through which the Cuban government decisively positioned itself for the emancipation of the world underdeveloped peoples, demonstrating that they would not give up newly won sovereignty, as well as explicitly thanking the Soviet Union for its military assistance. By making preferences clear, Cuba established conditions for a “hot war” on the fringes of the Cold War, declaring: The National General Assembly of the People of Cuba, energetically condemns the overt and criminal intervention exerted by North American imperialism for more than a century over all the nations of Latin America […]. Accepts and is grateful for the support of the Soviet Union’s rockets, should its territory be invaded by military forces of the United States […]. Ratifies its policy of friendship with all the peoples of the world […]. Condemns the latifundium, a source of poverty for the peasants and a backward and inhuman agricultural system […]. Condemns, both the

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exploitation of man by man and the exploitation of underdeveloped countries by imperialistic financial capital. in: bell et alli, 2007, p. 290

Shortly afterward, on October 13, 1960, the Cuban government approved the Nationalizations Law No. 890, completing a cycle of expropriations that would irreversibly change the agrarian structure of the island. Law No. 890 expanded the government’s expropriations to the Cuban bourgeoisie, nationalizing a gigantic mass of means of production: 105 centrales azucareros, 160 factories, 60 commercial establishments, 56 strategic service companies (transportation, power, telephone), and cultural establishments (press, movie theaters). From then on, the 161 centrales azucareros that made up the industrial means of the main product of the Cuban economy were either state or cooperative property.8 From the point of view of the agrarian structure, there were still three other mechanisms of land redistribution: donations, voluntary sales, and modification to article 24 of the Fundamental Law of the Republic, of December 22, 1959, which authorized the confiscation of land from people or companies that

8 Juan Valdés Paz, whose personal history is as interesting as the revolution itself, told me that in the early 1960s, at the age of 19, he became a volunteer teacher for literacy campaigns. He was quickly trained for the task. A few weeks later, he was informed that he would no longer be a volunteer teacher, but a diplomat. For that he would take an express course at the University. But the speed of the revolution was so overwhelming that the course didn’t happen either. Just in October 1960, on the occasion of passing the Nationalizations Law No. 890, the young volunteer teachers were gathered in a shed in Havana. Without knowing why they were gathered there, some even believed they would be prepared to carry out guerrilla warfare in Latin America. In the middle of the night, Fidel Castro himself appeared and declared: “Have you been told the reason you are here? Well, I come from the Council of Ministers. We nationalized all the industries in the country and you will be intervening. However, you are teachers. You will intervene now, but in a few months you will be replaced.” That’s how Juan Valdés Paz spent 20 years working as an administrator in the sugar sector. During the first People’s Harvest, he ran Central Constancia de Encrucijada, in Las Villas, without ever having entered a factory before in his entire life. He then took an administrator course, and for the Second Harvest his command was expanded to 12 centrales. As soon as he felt like an “expert,” young Valdés Paz was transferred to agricultural administration, a task much more complex due to the absence of the industrial component that disciplines work and to the lack of technology accumulated in the production process. After 20 years, he became professor of economics, sociology and history (Valdés Paz, 2012). Orlando Borrego, who worked alongside Che in the Ministry of Industries, reported that philosopher Jean Paul Sartre was present during the inauguration ceremony of the new sugar sector administrators, on October 14, 1960. At the time, Borrego asked him how he saw the new administrators. Sartre replied: “This is crazy, they are teenagers!” (in: Borrego, 2002, p. 21).

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had left the country or circumvented the revolutionary laws (Chonchol, 1961, p. 30–​31).9 1.3 A Portrait of Structural Transformation The result of expropriations carried out until May 1961 is shown in Table 5. Despite guaranteeing the permanence of private property up to 30 caballerías, which for many countries could be considered a large-​scale latifundium, the degree of land concentration was such that 85% of the agricultural lands in the country were part of some property that was at least partially affected by the Agrarian Reform Law. That is because at the beginning of 1959, three thousand people owned 62% of Cuba’s total agricultural area (Chonchol, 1963, p. 74). Until May 1961, approximately 374,071 caballerías were affected by expropriation mechanisms, i.e., 55.8% of Cuban agricultural land. The affected area was immediately redistributed. table 5

Expropriated area two years after the agrarian reform (May/​1961)

Law

Agrarian reform law Recovery of Misappropriated Property Law (a) Donation to inra Voluntary sales and article 24 Nationalization law (n° 851) Nationalization law (n° 890) Modification to article 24 of the Fundamental Law of the Republic (b) total

Area (hectares)

Area (caballerías)

%

1,199,184 163,214

89,358 12,162

23.9 3.3

322,590 581,757 1,261,587 910,547 581,157

24,038 43,350 94,008 67,850 43,305

6.4 11.6 25.1 18.1 11.6

5,020,036

374,071

100

(a)

“This figure is an underestimate. It is actually greater, but these are the only exact statistical backgrounds that the inra Legal Department has so far,” Chonchol wrote in his report (Chonchol, 1961, p. 28) (b) Acosta, 1972b, p. 107 source: own elaboration with data from chonchol| (1961, p. 28), except (b) 9 Carlos Rafael Rodríguez tells that, in the meantime, tens of thousands of large national and foreign landowners fled to Miami, “with the conviction, expressed upon arrival there, that a few weeks later, the defeat of the Revolution would give them back their factories fully functioning” (Rodríguez, 1978, p. 128).

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Jacques Chonchol reports that as of June 12, 1961 31,812 vital minimum titles had been granted by inra, totaling 30 thousand caballerías. Moreover, as of March, 1961 about 25 thousand small sugarcane colonos became owners of units between two and five caballerías, receiving a total of 80 thousand caballerías. Thus, approximately 110 thousand caballerías were distributed as small individual properties in just two years of agrarian reform (Chonchol, 1961, p.28). The acts of expropriation carried out by inra, in which Chonchol personally participated, were not as conflicting as might be supposed. Perhaps because the fervently counterrevolutionary segment of the Cuban bourgeoisie was already in Miami. Chonchol reported: The process of taking land came about in an environment of extraordinary tranquility and without any further violence […]. Intervention amounted to physically taking over ownership. By mutual agreement, the inra representative and the owner of the property determined the lot the latter would keep […]. There was a case in which, while taking possession of a latifundium over 600 caballerías, we drove the property owner’s car and had lunch at his house before the head of inra in that province proceeded to gather the peasants of the latifundium to announce that from that moment on, except for fifty caballerías that remained with the proprietor, the rest of the land would be subdivided in three cooperatives of about 200 caballerías each. 1961, p. 26

Expropriations of livestock properties occurred faster than the agricultural ones, as large landowners (cebadores) and medium landowners (melhoradores) reacted to the new measures by suddenly paralyzing the purchase of young cattle raised by small landowners. This jeopardized the dynamics of the sector and forced the government to act as purchasing agent for young cattle. Due to the specificities of the livestock sector, units were predominantly converted into state properties of direct administration (later Granjas del Pueblo). The sugarcane and rice plantations were only expropriated after the 1960 harvest and became predominantly cooperatives. (Chonchol, 1961, p. 26). Thus, land tenure was then composed of four structures: cooperatives, which were heirs of the administration cane fields and, therefore, of the best lands; Granjas del Pueblo (People’s Farms), which concentrated the best land for livestock; small individual properties of up to five caballerías, redistributed

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First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–1963) table 6

Land tenure according to sworn declaration of owners affected by the first Agrarian Reform Law (1959)

Area

Size

Up to 5 caballerías (67 hectares) From 5 to 30 caballerías (67 to 402 hectares) Over 30 caballerías (over 402 hectares) Total

Properties

Owners

Caballerías

% Number

46,741

7.4 28,735

68.3 20,229

66.1

122,040

19.3

9,752

23.2

7,485

24.5

464,844

73.3

3,602

8.5

2,873

9.4

633,625

100

42,089

% Number

100

30,587

%

100

source: chonchol, 1961, p. 7—​i nra legal department

by the government; and properties between five and one-​hundred caballerías, remnants of the previous agrarian structure. Two of them, Cooperativas and People’s Farms, could be considered completely new in the Cuban agrarian structure. The following tables show the Cuban agrarian structure in May 1959 and May 1961. Table 6 shows land tenure as declared by those affected by the agrarian reform in the three months that followed the approval of the law. According to these statements, 66.1% of landowners owned up to five caballerías and occupied only 7.4% of the agricultural area; at the other end, 9.4% of the owners owned more than thirty caballerías and controlled 73.3% of the area. The following Table 7 shows Cuban agrarian structure in May 1961, with most of the agrarian reform already carried out, but not yet completed. It is possible to look at the new structure from three perspectives: first, composition of four ownership modes; second, dimension of state and private sectors; and third, dimension of inra sector and the agrarian bourgeoisie.10 10

inra sector is considered by Jacques Chonchol (1961, p. 66) as the set of agricultural production means that will be coordinated and submitted to state production plans. Therefore, inra sector is made up of state sector plus small farmers (up to five caballerías), organized by anap (National Association of Small Farmers). The criterion for understanding inra sector is, above all, political: the productive base controlled by the allied segments of the revolution.

94  table 7

Chapter 2 Cuban agricultural area by sector (May/​1961) (in caballerías)

State sector

Private sector

Granjas Sugarcane Up to 5 From 5 to 100 del cooperatives caballerías (anap caballerías(b) Pueblo sector) Area (caballerías) % total area(a) Area % total area(a) Sector

181,330

60,317

24.2 241,647 32.2

8

180,055

24 508,583 67.8 inra Sector (Granjas +​Cooperatives +​anap) Area 421,702 % total area(a) 56.2 Total area(a) 750,230 Heads of cattle 1,022,737 131,691 —​ % Bovine 20 2.6 —​ cattle By sector 1,154,428 3.945.572(c) % Bovine 22.6 77.4 cattle Total Bovine 5,100,000 cattle

328,528 43.8 Agrarian bourgeoisie 328,528 43.8 —​ —​

Note: The author points out that data from the state sector are accurate, with statistics from inra, but data from the private sector are estimated, given the dynamism of the revolutionary process and the absence of precise statistics. The private sector is more precisely defined in Table 11 (a) Total area in properties, which corresponds to 89% of the island’s total area of 842,955 caballerías (b) The limit defined as 100 caballerías results from taking exceptions, which extend the 30 caballería limit in specific cases of high productivity (c) Chonchol points out that, despite the lack of exact data on bovine cattle distributed between small and large private landowners, it is clear that “the bulk of this figure must be in the hands of private farmers with more than 5 caballerías” (1961, p. 66) source: own elaboration with data from chonchol (1961, pp. 28, 44, 65–​6 6)

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Some observations are necessary for the interpretation of Table 7 First, cooperatives are considered part of the state sector, although hybrid, as they were regulated and directed by the State while they could simultaneously obtain private surpluses. In May 1961, they were on 8% of Cuban land as properties, notably the best lands of the old administration cane fields. The People’s Farms, heirs of large-​scale livestock farming (the cebadores), owned 24% of the land, also located among the best in the country. The state sector, due to its forms of ownership, can be considered completely new in the Cuban agrarian structure, accounting for 32.2% of the area in May 1961. Small farmers with up to five caballerías were represented, since May 17, 1961, by the National Association of Small Farmers (anap), which, being composed by direct beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, had a strong affinity with the revolution (Barrios, 1987, p. 20). At the time, the smallholder sector occupied 24% of Cuban’s lands. The remaining latifundia sector (between five and one-​hundred caballerías) held a significant 43.8% of the agricultural area in properties on the island while the private sector held 67.8%. The agrarian reform process was so dynamic and accelerated that, according to data by Juan Valdés Paz, at the end of 1962, with the expropriations concluded and the new agrarian structure stabilized, the state sector already held 41% of the country’s agricultural land (277,272 caballerías), while the private sector held 59% (399,031 caballerías) (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 93–​94). The expropriation process was decisively influenced by the declaration of the socialist nature of the revolution, proclaimed on April 16, 1961, following the US invasion of Playa Girón. The possibility of a hot warfare on the fringes of the Cold War reached its pinnacle with the Missile Crisis (October 1962). Declared socialist, the revolution raised its goals to a higher level: egalitarianism and national sovereignty became the essence of a project to destroy capitalist relations. As a result, new forms of agrarian property in Cuba were thrown into the whirlwind of the economic debate on the transition to socialism, integrated into controversies developed in the so-​called second world (Pericás, 2004). Cuba, from then on, was a link between the third and the second worlds, intertwining the search for overcoming underdevelopment with the task of building socialism. The new types of property that emerged from the agrarian reform (Granjas del Pueblo and Cooperatives) were the economic means created with intent to achieve egalitarianism and national sovereignty. From the declaration of the socialist nature of the revolution, they were submitted to new criteria of analysis. The new forms of agrarian property should not only overcome social segregation and external dependency, but also lend themselves to the creation

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of a socialist economy. In the impulse of this purpose, Cooperatives were converted into State Farms, which generated a debate that will be analyzed below. 2

Cooperatives or State Farms?

The specificity of the Cuban agrarian reform was the preservation of the scale of productive units. During its execution, the revolutionary government became aware that the sociological and psychological profile of Cuban peasants was strongly proletarianized. This meant that in Cuba the “hunger for land” was less intense than the “hunger for wages,” which allowed productive units not to be fragmented into small individual properties, preserving the advantages of the scale of modern plantation. But not only the profile of Cuban peasants played a role in preserving the scale. There was a conjunction of other factors, among them inherited technical requirements; egalitarian purpose of development; and declaration of the socialist nature of the revolution. Starting from the principle of preservation of the scale, agrarian reform created sugarcane cooperatives and state farms, two new forms of land ownership which, from April 1961, began to be guided by the search for a socialist economy. With the transformation of all sugarcane cooperatives into state farms in September 1962, differences arose regarding the advantages and disadvantages of each of these ways to achieve the purposes of the revolution. The controversy over cooperatives and state farms preceded what became known as el grand debate (the big debate about economy in Cuba) of 1963 and 1964. As a reference, the controversy is here defined as the “small agrarian debate” of 1961 and 1962. Although it did challenge some of its fundamental topics, it was substantially different while informing opinion sectors. The small agrarian debate clearly split Cuban leaders on one side and foreign experts (advocates of the revolution) on the other. We identified two fundamental axes of the small debate: management and the scale of production units. The difficulty in defining which should be the mechanisms of state control over the private use of surpluses that better coordinate socializing economic forms with the increase in the general productivity of labor stood in the background.11 11

The role of private surpluses in the transition to socialism constitutes the most important polemic in second world economic debates. This controversy was raised and replaced different times in the 20th century for societies that sought to build a socialist alternative to capitalism. The philosophical core of the question lies in the priority order of change, that is, if it would be necessary to develop productive forces by capitalist means as a condition for a new socialist culture to emerge. Or if, otherwise, it would not be possible to forge this

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2.1 The Proletarian Peasant and the Scale Preservation The proletarian nature of Cuban peasantry was a sociological characteristic identified by many specialists who addressed the agrarian reform on the island.12 It is possible to affirm that Cuba was an essentially agrarian country, but not a peasant one. As Acosta wrote, “Sugar production determined the emergence and development of an agricultural proletariat with a majority relative weight in the total rural population and linked to the basic economic activity of the agricultural sector” (1972a, p. 80–​1). Before the revolution, two-​thirds of Cuban agricultural land was worked by “non-​peasant methods” (Rodríguez, 1966, p. 25). According to the last census before the revolution, 63.6% of all agricultural workers were wage workers (Barkin, 1978, p. 23). Added to that was the historic insecurity of Cuban peasants in relation to individual land ownership. Over the course of a century, peasants were constantly displaced and moved to less fertile agricultural frontiers, losing their homes and plantations with no objective conditions of resistance. The agricultural expansion of landowners and foreign companies since the mid-​19th century was worsened with the emergence of the Rural Guard in 1898, which carried out spoliation with violence, contributing to the peasants’ insecurity of land. Therefore, this segment of the rural population began to identify wage earning as a much more stable and promising way of life. Undoubtedly, once Cuban peasants became wage workers their insertion in the new state economy of the revolution was accelerated. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez explained the phenomenon: Seeing around poor peasants who lived in conditions comparable to their own or inferior, the memory of the vicissitudes of a still recent time when they too were peasants and the experience of the possibility to improve their situation by struggling to raise wages and living conditions as proletarians, led agricultural workers, as a whole, not to project the objective of conquering the land in order to work on it as small farmers. This is not to say that they were indifferent to whether or not they owned some amount of land. 1978, p. 119

12

new socialist culture but from the development of productive forces leveraged by already socialized economic forms. During a conversation with Jacques Chonchol on the subject, he argued: “Most sugarcane workers did not have a farmer’s mentality, but rather a proletarian mentality. So, it was easy to go from a capitalist proletarian company to a socialist proletarian one” (Chonchol, 2012).

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The distribution of individual land ownership was one of the strong guidelines of the agrarian reform law. However, more than a self-​sufficient way of life growing food in the two caballerías of vital minimum was a complementary activity to wage earning. The basic livelihood of Cuban rural workers was wage, except in the western part of the island, where peasants were predominant in tobacco growing. Small individual properties certainly contributed with the family supply; however, the precarious technical conditions made rendered more uncertain and dependent on price fluctuations the private surplus of small peasants. The peasant tendency toward wage-​earning created the sociological and subjective conditions for the People’s Farm policy, through the simple conversion of private large estates into large state units, closer to the socialist economic model.13 Even before being declared socialist, the revolution identified this sociological specificity of the Cuban rural worker and found the possibility of avoiding the fragmentation of the agrarian unit, seeking to preserve the advantages of the scale. Therefore, the new properties created within the revolutionary process were, from the outset, collective forms of organization of production: cooperatives and state farms. 2.2 Agricultural Cooperatives The agricultural cooperatives created in the first agrarian reform in Cuba were heirs of the old administration cane fields and 45% of the country’s sugarcane plantations with the best lands were under their responsibility (inra, 05/​03/​ 1960, p. 43).14 Cooperatives were formed with intent to avoid dividing the land into individual lots, although in many cases several cooperatives were founded from a single latifundium. In the context of socialist debates, cooperatives were particularly controversial as a type of property because it represented the transition between individual private property and socialized property, in which private surplus 13

14

On that, Paul Sweezy and Leo Huberman expressed: “Bourgeois land reformers always aimed at the breaking up of large landed estates into small peasant holdings. More radical thought, at least from the time of Marx, has generally rejected this aim on the dual ground that small-​scale peasant cultivation of the soil is hopelessly inefficient and that a small peasantry is inevitably a reactionary, counter-​revolutionary force” (Huberman & Sweezy, p. 114). Cooperatives created in the first agrarian reform are different from Credit and Services Cooperatives and Agricultural Associations of anap peasants. The first ones were administration cane fields converted by laborers who were already wage workers and became, collectively, owners of parcels of the properties of their employers. The second were forged by different modalities of collectivization of individual private properties.

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still played a role as a driving force. Theoretically, cooperatives are collective private properties, which have similarities with typically capitalist business societies. However, Cuban cooperatives were born organically linked to the direction of inra and the centralized planning of the economy; therefore, they were more similar to socialized properties than to private properties. In the Sugarcane Cooperatives General Regulations, approved on May 3, 1960, it was agreed that, for five years, 80% of the profit of cooperatives should be spent on the construction of houses and other collective buildings (agricultural facilities, medical services, sports, social events). The other 20% would be distributed among members as private surplus (inra, 1960a, p. 41–​2). The regulation stated that resources for production would be distributed by inra’s General Administrator of Sugarcane Cooperatives. Furthermore, it was determined that 30% of the area belonging to cooperatives should be used for non-​cane crops, for food to the members and for the internal market. Each cooperative received from the State two-​hundred dairy cows, fifty sows, and one bull to start production (Chonchol, 1963, p. 111). That made the cooperatives extremely dependent on the central power and even if they were given decision-​making autonomy in private surplus, they were quite restricted. The purpose of cooperatives, as defined by the regulations, had the following guidelines: to promote and cultivate sugarcane plantations; to intensify sugarcane production, planting high-​yielding varieties; to diversify agriculture and achieve domestic food sovereignty; to increase cooperative members’ income; to guarantee the social well-​being and education of its members; to build houses and buildings; to collaborate with inra for economic development; to fulfill the objectives of agrarian reform. Members could voluntarily leave society, but were prohibited from selling their rights (inra, 1960a, p. 41–​2). In theory, cooperative administration combined local autonomy with centralization. The regulations created General Assemblies of cooperatives, a space for open discussions and internal decisions. During Assemblies, a Board of Directors and one coordinator were freely voted. The coordinator would be responsible for representing the cooperative before the State, inra, and all external bodies (inra, 1960a, p. 42). However, because cooperatives did not yet have administrative and technical capacity to successfully carry out their purposes, the regulations established that inra would appoint an administrator to manage production together with the coordinator. In that sense, as stated in the regulations, the cooperative “in its initial stage will be directed by the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, in order to ensure better development through technical assistance and guidance” (inra, 1960a, p. 43). In practice, however, the bodies of local power did not add much participation, and during two and a half years of existence the cooperatives functioned marked

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by subordination to the central power, as opposed to what is expected from self-​management. In only one year, 622 cooperatives were created, combined in forty-​six intermediary groups occupying a total amount of 60,316 caballerías. They had 122,448 members and 46,614 temporary workers hired either only for the harvest or for temporary services. These members became an important military pole for the defense of the revolution. In order to protect plantations from external and internal aggressions, 54% of the members participated in the National Revolutionary Militia (Chonchol, 1961, p. 57).15 This military involvement of cooperative members did not correspond to an expected administrative involvement in production units. 2.3 Granjas del Pueblo (People’s Farm) The Granjas del Pueblo (People’s Farm) were not included as a form of property provided for in the Agrarian Reform Law. They emerged in late 1959 as a particular solution for large estates in the livestock sector. People’s Farms were huge state farms with wage workers, which had greater functional similarity with capitalist companies, since they had a formally centralized pattern of economic decision. They were created from three arguments. First, from a technical point of view, the rustic and extensive nature of livestock activity did not allow for a sudden reduction in scale, as there was no installed technology that would enable the rapid conversion to the intensive model. The extensive model was based on a giant scale, which was preserved in the Granjas. Second, from an economic point of view, there was a need to control meat consumption. When the Rebel Army confiscated herds and distributed cows among small peasants who did not have the knowledge to raise them, there was a widespread sacrifice of animals for food, in a flagrant

15

In the early 1960s, centrales Adelaida and Punta Alegre, managed by agricultural cooperatives, were hit by bombs dropped from airplanes, causing a major fire. On Punta Alegre, 2,220,000 arrobas of cane were burned, and on Adelaida, 7,500,000. To save the cane, workers from all cooperatives in the region went there to cut it immediately. It was then decided that the sugar would be produced in the neighboring centrales: Morón, Violeta, Pátria, and Adelaida itself. This episode was just a small example of the growing tension between agricultural workers and the military aggressions that sought to defeat the revolution (inra, 1960b, p. 86–​7). inra Magazine published, in March 1960, a message sent by a rural worker to Fidel Castro, through journalist Waldo Medina: “Tell Fidel, as soon as you find him, that we send this money for airplanes that could defend Cuba. But if the outside fellows are not willing to sell airplanes, no need to buy them because the machetes of thirty-​odd thousand partners will be enough to liquidate those crooks” (in: Medina, 1960, p. 83).

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waste of dairy farming. Many peasants had never eaten beef before and the unprecedented change in food pattern generated euphoria. Between 1958 and 1960, the weight of slaughtered cattle grew by 22% and Chonchol warned of a possible livestock crisis, which represented “one of the most serious problems Cuban Agrarian Reform faces today” (Chonchol, 1961, p. 73–​4). René Dumont expressed the same concern, claiming that uncontrolled slaughter would have exceeded the reproductive speed of the animals, generating the later need for beef rationing (Dumont, 1970, p. 37). In 1961, in an attempt to reverse the loss of sacrificed animals, Operation Cow was created, through which 13,000 purebred cows were imported, at 400 million dollars (eclac, 1964, p. 288). Therefore, state control of livestock headed by People’s Farms was an economic need. The third argument was of a political and social nature, related to the egalitarian purpose of the revolution. Livestock properties had few workers, sometimes only one man for every fifty caballerías, and the government hesitated to apply the cooperative model, considering that privileged units would be created with few workers and a lot of surplus, generating disproportion in income compared to agricultural cooperatives (Chonchol, 1961, p. 37). Based on those three factors, the government decided to directly control livestock through the state farms, when they were named Granjas del Pueblo. Another fundamental factor was added to the circumstances described and gave the People’s Farms a strategic role. When the Cuban revolution declared itself socialist in April 1961, Marxist references began to influence the new economic organization. In Karl Marx’s view, the concentration of capital represented the historical development of scale as a technical and social level of productivity, agglomerating masses of capital and labor in large industrial facilities (Marx, 2004, chapter xxiii). With regard to the concentration of agrarian productive forces, Marx defended the superiority of large scale in an article published in The International Herald, on June 15, 1872, entitled “The Nationalization of the Land.” In it, Marx criticized small agrarian property: In France, it is true, the soil is accessible to all who can buy it, but this very facility has brought about a division into small plots cultivated by men with small means and mainly relying upon the land by exertions of themselves and their families. This form of landed property and the piecemeal cultivation it necessitates, while excluding all appliances of modern agricultural improvements, converts the tiller himself into the most decided enemy to social progress and, above all, the nationalization of land. […] He clings with fanatic fondness to his bit of land and

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his merely nominal proprietorship in the same. In this way the French peasant has been thrown into a most fatal antagonism to the industrial working class. marx, 1872

Likewise, when the classical Marxist tradition analyzed the determinants of the monopoly phase of capitalism, it identified the concentration of capital as a factor in increasing efficiency, profitability and power. Not unexpectedly monopoly capitalism, with technical superiority and state-​military vocation, replaced competitive capitalism (Lenin, 2020). Like Marx, Lenin was a critic of small-​scale competitive capitalism, considered the main enemy of the transition to socialism in Russia. In 1921, Lenin argued that, during the Soviet transition, state capitalism had considerable affinities with socialism.16 The key to this political struggle was the struggle between the centrally planned economy and the autonomous speculative economy. In the Cuban economic debate of 1963 and 1964, Guevara was strongly influenced by Lenin’s point of view and frequently quoted him (Pericás, 2004). In February 1964, when defending the proposal of the Budgetary Financing System, which rejected the use of economic calculation within the state sector, Guevara stated: As a technique, the predecessor of the budgetary finance system was the imperialist monopoly implanted in Cuba. […] When the monopolists left, they took with them their top management and some middle management. At the same time, our immature conception of the revolution has led us to destroy a number of established procedures merely because they are capitalist. Because of that our system has not yet reached the degree of efficiency that the criollas branches of the monopolies had, in relation to management and control over production. guevara, 1982, p. 188

16

In his famous pamphlet The Tax in Kind, in which he defended the New Economic Policy (nep) to replace “war communism,” Lenin proposed that state capitalism was adopted as a tactical retreat to reestablish the alliance between the revolution and the small Russian traditional peasant. On that occasion, he expressed: “It is not state capitalism that is at war with socialism, but the petty bourgeoisie plus private capitalism fighting together against state capitalism and socialism. The petty bourgeoisie oppose every kind of state interference, accounting and control, whether it be state-​capitalist or state-​socialist […] the continuation of the anarchy of small ownership is the greatest, the most serious danger, and it will certainly be our ruin (unless we overcome it)” (Lenin, 1965). About the economic debate of the Soviet transition of the 1920s, see Vasconcelos, 2013.

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Area and workforce in cooperatives and people’s farm (May/​1961)

Cooperatives People’s farms Number of Agrupaciones (grouping) Number of productive units Total area (caballerías) Caballería/​Unit (average) Cooperative members or permanent workers Temporary workers Permanent workers /​Productive units (average) Caballería/​Cooperative members or permanent workers (average)

46 622 60,317 96.9 122,448

—​ 266 181,330 682 27,321

46,614 197

69,177 103

0.49

6.64

source: own elaboration with data from chonchol (1961, pp. 41–​2 , 53)

When Cuba entered the debates on the transition to socialism, the People’s Farms already existed, but they were certainly strengthened by the Marxist defense of large state ownership as a superior kind of technical-​economic organization. In May 1961, 266 Granjas were organized, occupying 181,330 caballerías with 96,498 wage workers, 71% of which were temporary workers. The units were very large in scale: 682 caballerías on average (Chonchol, 1961, p. 41–​2). They had 1,245,000 heads of cattle and 4,160 tractors (Aranda, 1968, p. 285). Due to their livestock origin, 75% of the granjas were concentrated in the eastern provinces (Las Villas, Camaguey, and Oriente) (Chonchol, 1961, p. 41). In short, the People’s Farms arose from the concrete circumstances of the livestock sector and then adhered to the Marxist principles that overtly guided the Cuban economy from April 1961 onwards. The idea of non-​fragmentation of the land turned into the defense of maximum scale as an imperative of socialization.17 Then the People’s Land was defined as a superior type of ownership because, as Cubans put it, “it belongs to all the people, and not to part of the people” (Chonchol, 1961, p. 45). Table 8 is an X-​ray of cooperatives and People’s Farms that defined the new land tenure, in May 1961.

17

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez stated: “The land fragmentation into small plots represented a delay in the socialization of the agriculture” (Rodríguez, 1963a, p. 6–​7).

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2.4 Converting Cooperatives into Granjas Conversion of Cooperatives into State Farms was voted on in September 1962, by decision of workers in the National Congress of Cooperatives, with 1,381 delegates in favor and only three against. The proposal had been submitted to two months of debate in the Cooperative Councils and Assemblies (Fernandes, 2007, p. 186). Cuban leaders politically encouraged conversion by using Fidel Castro’s egalitarian argument: cooperatives generated social inequalities based on fertility natural differences between lands, which could not be tolerated in the new socialist society. In Fidel’s words: Cooperative is a good production system, but it also has its flaws, such as the one resulting from the diversity of lands, from the differences in each land’s fertility, of that community in a cooperative with a good land and will receive benefits superior to those of members in a bad land cooperative […]. However, that will not be the case in the People’s Farms. It does not matter that one farm has poor land and the other has rich land. Workers on all farms will receive the same benefits; children on all farms will receive equal benefits, regardless of the land being poor or rich. in: chonchol, 1961, p. 45

The conversion of Cooperatives into State Farms was heavily criticized by foreign analysts who supported the Cuban revolution—​Jacques Chonchol, René Dumont, and Michel Gutelman, among others.18 First, the Cuban arguments for state farms will be presented, then the criticisms of foreign experts. For the purposes of synthesis, Juan Valdés Paz outlined the problems and contradictions of Cuban agricultural cooperatives in six spheres of analysis: (1) economic, (2) territorial, (3) administrative, (4) work organization, (5) political and social, and (6) ideological. In the economic sphere, cooperatives presented three issues. The first was the immense trouble self-​financing, which blocked economic autonomy in relation to the State. This generated frustration, as the cooperative members did not achieve the necessary income so that the 20% of private surplus provided for “free” use were satisfactory. The second problem was the drop in the average annual income of cooperative members due to economic inefficiency. 18

Michel Gutelman was a French agronomist on the team of economist Charles Bettelheim, who was on the island to advise the revolutionary government throughout the 1960s. Bettelheim was very active in the economic debate on the transition to socialism and was directly opposed to Guevara’s proposal for the budgetary finance system. He participated in the Cuban debate submitting an article (see Bettelheim, 1982).

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The third problem was productivity: although the Regulations determined that cooperative members should receive wages equivalent to their working hours plus surpluses (inra, 1960a, p. 41), it did not occur in practice. Valdés Paz found that the distribution of internal surplus of the cooperative did not correspond to the efforts of each one, which resulted in slackening of working conditions.19 This aggravated the problem of profitability and generated unease among the cooperative members. In the territorial sphere, there was a problem inherent to the dynamics of agrarian reform. Many cooperatives had territorial discontinuities, as they were crossed by the property of the former landowner. As it was a transitional period, the previous agrarian structure and the new structure were still geographically interpenetrated. As cooperatives are still economically fragile units, this factor affected them more strongly. On the one hand, there were cooperatives of the same group that were very distant from each other, with few resources for transportation, rendering impossible an effective collective management. On the other hand, there was a disorganization of the crops themselves, as the economic blockade and government incentives for agricultural diversification led to the proliferation of small productions for self-​consumption. This generated dispersion of crops, small isolated plantations inside and outside the cooperatives, harming agricultural efficiency. In the administrative sphere, there was a problem of duplicity of powers between the coordinator and the administrator at the cooperative, and a tendency to replace the local power emanating from the Assembly through orders issued by the central power. In that sense, the combination between autonomy and centralization proposed by the Cooperatives General Regulations had not worked as expected and autonomy did not take effect.20 In addition, geographic dispersion rendered enormously difficult the work done by the 19

20

The lack of a relationship between hours of work and wages also resulted from the absence of the foreman as a coercive force in work organization. Valdés Paz analyzed it: “In capitalist agriculture there is a foreman. The foreman is an arbitrary, a person who imposes the norm he wants and pays whatever he wants, except when workers show resistance […]. When we replaced this exploitation scheme, we suppressed the foreman. By suppressing the foreman—​this function was even a symbolic representation of exploitation—​we broke the link that organizes work. Because in manual work in open fields, in the open air, such as agriculture and construction, the direct presence of a person who controls the workforce is decisive. Otherwise, nobody works, because agriculture is very hard and so is construction” (Valdés Paz, 2012). This topic is further discussed in Chapter 4. Valdés Paz expressed: “The participation of grassroots actors was to the minimum, or even none, both for preparing proposals and for making organizational decisions” (2009, p. 147).

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inra administrator, who could not count on a local administrative power and, therefore, had their tasks doubled. This generated loss of control over internal accounting, harming the participation of cooperatives in state plans. In the sphere of work organization, three other issues arose. First, as a result of geographic dispersion, several cooperative members lived outside their units, resulting in disaggregation between workers and the productive community. Such disaggregation induced a second issue: many of the cooperative members worked long hours for private producers or on their own plots, reducing the collective effort within the cooperative. The third issue was income inequality between temporary workers and cooperative members. If permanent members experienced a drop in income due to self-​financing trouble, the situation of occasional members was certainly even more insecure. When cooperatives were converted into farms, the need to reduce the proportion of temporary workers increased. In the political and social sphere, there were three types of issues. First of all, the fact that cooperative members were wage workers generated a “sociological infeasibility” of self-​government, due to a cultural and political unpreparedness inherited from the previous situation. It was impossible to convert, in such a short time, a wage worker who performed only one procedure in the production chain into a subject with responsibility for the entire economic process and its consequences. Valdés Paz summarized: It was not only about functional implications, but about the sociological infeasibility of a cooperative organization in agrarian companies developed under strong capitalist relations of production in which wage labor disconnected the producer from the interest in the land and from his participation in the final economic result; it limited his domain of the production process and prevented him from having any administrative experience. 2009, p. 20

Secondly, there was no political body to specifically and socially represent cooperatives (such as anap for small farmers, for instance). This made it difficult for this segment to inform a collective organization and self-​awareness, and it compromised its communication with the government about the problems faced. Third, cooperative members were even more dissatisfied because farm laborers had higher wages and stability, generating clear unequal conditions of social well-​being. All that was worsened by the absence of a “cooperative culture,” which eroded community ties and made it difficult to create the necessary political environment for the self-​government of production.

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In Carlos Rafael Rodríguez’s opinion, the sociological legacy of wage workers would have been the fundamental issue of cooperatives. He argued: Attempts made between 1960 and 1962 to convert former sugarcane agricultural laborers into collective owners through cooperative forms of tenure based on permanent usufruct of the land met with little interest of the laborers. 1978, p. 146–​7

As a result of this disorganization, disparities arose related to the degree of collectivization of the land belonging to each cooperative, according to the different degrees of members’ ideological perception. The difficulties caused some groups to limit the socialization of the land and find private solutions to the inefficiency of collective production. In such a context, it is not surprising that there has been a drop in unionization among cooperative workers, who have lost their ties to the wage struggle. These problems faced by cooperatives are summarized in Table 9. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was very optimistic about the conversion of cooperatives into state farms.21 For him, it was a requirement for the construction of socialism, which was anticipated due to the analyzed circumstances. He claimed: The faith of sugarcane agricultural laborers in the Revolution made it possible for that which could have given rise to a crisis to be solved—​ through a democratic decision in which all the members of cooperatives participated—​with the transformation of Cooperatives into Sugarcane Farms, thus precipitating, with a good result, a process that was scheduled for several years. 1963a, p. 8

21

Rodríguez’s positions reveal the different location of the “small” and the “big debate.” In the “small debate,” the controversy over cooperatives and farms reflects the struggle between collective private ownership and state ownership. In this case, Rodríguez defended nationalization as a superior form. In the “big debate,” on the other hand, the controversy was expressed within the state sector. In which case, Rodríguez defended economic calculation within the state sector as a lever for development, including self-​ management units with an emphasis on local power, i.e., decentralization of state power itself.

108  table 9

Realm

Chapter 2 Problems faced by sugarcane cooperatives (September/​1962)

Functional contradictions

Infeasibility of funding most cooperatives Lack of distributable income and decrease in average Economy annual income in terms of wages Egalitarianism in income distribution, regardless of hours worked Territorial discontinuity of properties integrating the Territorial cooperatives organization Dispersion of agricultural areas Proliferation of self-​consumption plots inside and outside the cooperative Duplicity of powers between coordinator and cooperative administrator Tendency to replace the former with the latter Management and Violation of Cooperative Regulations: non-​functioning administration of the Board of Directors and poor participation of cooperative members Dissolution of the permanent administrative apparatus and non-​replacement by another equivalent Loss of administrative control High proportion of cooperative members living outside the cooperative Work Cooperatives working for private producers or on their organization own plots Non-​cooperative workers with different rights, working conditions, and income “Sociological infeasibility” of converting wage workers into cooperative members Political and Lack of social and political representation of cooperative social members Living conditions inferior to State Farmer [State Farm wage worker] Lack of cooperative culture

First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–1963) table 9

109

Problems faced by sugarcane cooperatives (September/​1962) (cont.)

Realm

Functional contradictions

Ideological

Differences in the level of collectivization between cooperatives Some cooperative groups limited land socialization Cooperative members who invested in private property Drop in unionization

source: own elaboration with arguments from valdés paz (2009, p. 20)

For Valdés Paz, the coexistence of both forms brought to light issues involving cooperatives and accelerated the process of collectivization in the path of the Soviet solkhozes, although for voluntary motivation (Valdés Paz, 2009, p. 16). However, Valdés Paz himself did not fail to notice the new inconveniences created by the model of state farms.22 Despite all these setbacks experienced by cooperative properties, some foreign experts considered it the most adequate form of Cuban agrarian development. These specialists harshly criticized the Granjas del Pueblo, especially because of four aspects: gigantic scale, excessively centralized management, state equal pay harmful to productivity, and disorganized agricultural diversification. In this section, the arguments in defense of cooperatives and the criticism toward scale, management, and state equal pay typical of People’s Farms will be discussed. The issue of agricultural diversification will be discussed later. Cooperatives were praised especially by Jacques Chonchol and René Dumont, for two main reasons: its technically adequate scale and its political aptitude to absorb the direct will of workers in production decisions. In 1961, Chonchol claimed: The current size of each cooperative (between 1,000 and 1,500 hectares) and between 200 and 300 laborers (considering the occasional ones), is 22

Among them, too large scale for the existing technical-​administrative conditions; the homogeneity of the administrative apparatus of the farms, which is inadequate for the diversity of sizes and cultures of the productive units; and the loss of specialization resulting from excessive agricultural diversification stimulated by the government (Valdés Paz, 2009, p. 18).

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such that allows to combine, in the same agricultural company, advantages of diversification, crop rotation, mixed farming (growing of crops and raising of livestock) with economy of scale, division of labor, mechanization and efficient administrative controls […]. This organization, with its regional structure and active representation of workers in the process of managing companies, also has the advantage of facilitating their social and psychological ascension and of balancing the need for national programs (basic in a planned economy) with the concrete realities of companies. 1961, p. 57–​8

In short, cooperatives showed two main virtues. One of them, the virtue of scale: in addition to being technically more viable, the cooperative had a greater vocation to adapt to an intensive production model (an argument justified in Table 10). The ratio of caballerías to permanent workers, as can be seen, was almost fourteen times higher in People’s Farms, which had inherited the most extreme experience of an extensive model due to its livestock origin. In Chonchol’s assessment, this was one of the worst legacies of the previous agrarian structure, and the cooperative scale created the right conditions to overcome it. The other virtue of cooperatives was management: it was a way of relieving the tension between the centralized economic plan and democracy in the productive unit, a central theme of the great Cuban economic debate (Pericás, 2004). For him, cooperative assemblies served as a catalyst political practice toward the cultural development of workers, forging each cooperative member’s economic conscience and expanding the necessary community solidarity for self-​government. In addition, when workers’ administrative perception is sharpened, productivity should increase due to the direct material interest of each one in collective property. In Chonchol’s opinion, there would be an Table 10

Area/​worker: people’s farms and sugarcane cooperatives (1961)

People’s farms Cooperatives Caballería/​Permanent worker Caballería/​Temporary worker Caballería/​Total workers source: chonchol, 1961, p. 42

6.64 2.62 1.9

0.49 1.3 0.36

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inevitable correlation between material interest and increased labor productivity, which cooperatives could virtuously articulate through self-​management, without this meaning abandonment of social conscience. Chonchol critically considered three major arguments of the revolutionary leadership for the new orientation: egalitarianism, state control of food, and the idea of “higher form.” On egalitarianism, Chonchol stated that through fiscal policy it would be simple and possible to deal with social disparities generated by soil fertility differences.23 Regarding the state control of food production, he admitted that it could be an advantage in the path to food sovereignty, as the low profitability of many crops lacked extra-​economic guarantees provided by the State. However, he added that he considered it possible to reconcile state control with management autonomy, through dialectical coordination between the centralized plan and local interests. He assured: Budget planning must be carried out based on a production plan that starts from the local level, with general instructions that may come from the central level. Then, in administering resources there may be much more influence from the central level. However, we must not forget one thing: administrative efficiency. Whenever there is excessive centralization, there is administrative inefficiency somewhere. And that definitely affects the productive result. I am in favor of greater autonomy for the base, with fundamental relationships with the central power. But with enough autonomy to be efficient at the base […]. From the central level, there must be great guidelines, great basic guidelines. Defining a country’s development strategy is something that is done from the center. But while applying it, autonomy must be given and with dialogue between the center and the base. Without that, I believe exercising centralism leads to disaster. And excessive autonomy without general orientation leads to everyone doing what they want. There is a combination that is not easy to determine. chonchol, 2012

On the concept of maximum scale as a “higher form,” Chonchol identified two influences: on the one hand the Marxist economic tradition and, on the other

23

Chonchol expressed that: “From those who make much profit, surplus can beyou can take the surplus through taxes. And the size of the cooperatives was not big enough to produce big profits” (2012).

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hand, the US plantation tradition.24 In 1963, he stated that the perception of the large state enterprise as a superior form was a myth that would be contradicted by the concrete reality of the Cuban economy (1963, p. 126). Chonchol claimed that the People’s Farms were a disaster in terms of agricultural organization, for seven reasons. Number one, its gigantism hampered both administrative efficiency and technical quality of production, especially in a context of significant shortage of agrarian specialists, many of whom had left the island after the revolution (Chonchol, 1963, p. 118). Furthermore, large agricultural enterprises required proportionally much more technical staff than medium or small enterprises. Under those conditions, it would be almost impossible to satisfactorily manage farms with an average of 600 caballerías. One of the effects of the technical-​administrative precariousness was a “defective territorial distribution of investments” (Chonchol, 1961, p. 48). Number two, the gigantism of the farms would enormously increase transportation costs within each unit, leading to failure as a result from difficulties in locomotion administrators and agricultural technicians would find, which in turn resulted from geographic irrationality that brought serious losses (Ibid., 1961, p. 50). Transportation difficulties also generated delays in payments and inputs that missed the correct climatic moment and territorial imbalances in the use of fertilizers. Chonchol described the territorial chaos to which the farms were subjected: Established People’s Farms are not always one single territorial unit. In many cases, the same farm is made up of 2, 3, 4 or 5 plots of land isolated from each other by other units—​either private or sugarcane cooperatives—​and sometimes the distance between the extreme plots is quite considerable. All that is the product of the desire to establish large units and the territorial distribution of properties that were integrated as people’s farms. 1961, p. 41

24

“In Cuba,” Chonchol argued, “the influence of large-​scale traditional agriculture, North American-​style agricultural mechanization (despite the current political opposition), and the conception of the large socialist state enterprise were factors undoubtedly key—​ some of them perhaps unconsciously—​to the decision of establishing the Granjas del Pueblo” (1961, p. 46). Juan Valdés Paz expressed the same: “For the capitalist oligarchy the reference of large production would be sought, at first, in the large farm and in capitalist companies, and later, in the Soviet solkhoses” (2009, p. 14). On this subject René Dumont commented that the caballería is a unit two-​hundred times greater than the Chinese Mou. Given the proportions of each country, it is clear that “gigantism” would have been, above all, an American influence.

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map 2  Patrício Lumumba Farm Note: Redesigned by the author based on Rodriguez’s map (1963b, p. 77)

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez demonstrated, in his article in Revista Cuba Socialista nº 27 (1963b, p. 77–​78), the dimension of the territorial disorganization taking place between 1959 and 1963, depicted in the maps of two People’s Farms: Patrício Lumumba and Mártires de Placetas. Sketch Maps 2 and 3 show how, despite the search for superiority of scale, from a practical point of view, it was not possible to take advantage of eventual gains due to the territorial fragmentation of the units. Chonchol’s criticism number three was that enormous farms had an increased distance between administrators and workers, reproducing the division between intellectual and manual labor, which theoretically was intended to be overcome. In his opinion, it would be necessary to have intermediary bodies between the administration and the workers of the farms, because the gigantism of the farm prevented conscious integration of local workers into the production process and, much less, into the national agricultural plan. Furthermore, the farm model would reinforce the wage-​earning capitalist mentality by inhibiting the participation of the base in the management of the company, fostering a lack of awareness of the production process in its entirety (Chonchol, 1961, p. 51).

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map 3  Mártires de Placetas Farm Note: Redesigned by the author based on Rodriguez’s map (1963b, p. 78)

Chonchol’s fourth criticism of the farms was that its gigantic nature was the result of transposing an industry principle to agriculture. While displacing considerations on the superiority of scale from industry to agriculture the natural limits of agriculture itself were disregarded. In practice, that relativized gains in scale. The idea that “maximum scale” would always be more profitable in the agricultural sector derived from a very theoretical and not very technical reasoning. Chonchol argued: There is a tendency to think that large, highly mechanized collective enterprises make it possible to obtain in agriculture the same advantages of specialization and mass production as in large industrial enterprises. […] Theoretically, the large agricultural company should have the same economic advantages as the large industrial company: maximum specialization of different groups of workers, chain operations, mass production, reduction of general administration expenses, economic profitability at a low unit cost of product obtained. However, in fact the agricultural production process is much more complex, variable, and insecure, especially due to a series of unpredictable natural factors and at the least difficult to control. 1961, p. 46, 48–​9

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Criticism number five of the gigantic nature of farms was that they induced the perpetuation of the extensive model (see Table 10). The sixth criticism was that farms were deficient by nature, since there was a lack of relationship between wages and labor productivity and that required the State to always bear the differences, diminishing the social impact of the lack of economic profitability. The deficit was an unavoidable condition in the search for food sovereignty, as Chonchol himself realized.25 Even so, he defended that there should be a relationship between wages and work to guarantee a minimum level of productivity. Finally, Chonchol’s criticism number seven was related to the attitude of the leaders of the revolution who, in an attempt to avoid excessive bureaucratization of agriculture, ended up downsizing the administrative teams in such a way it made them extremely inept. He exemplified the problem with the words of an inra Head of Province: “bureaucratism occurs when there are eight people where five are needed. However, if attempting to avoid bureaucracy there is one or two people where four are needed that is, otherwise, counterproductive, uneconomical, and ineffective” (in: Chonchol, 1961, p. 50).26 René Dumont, another agronomist who was in Cuba in the 1960s, was even more critical of the agrarian model adopted. As a staunch defender of self-​ management, he problematized both farms and cooperatives. For Dumont, there were two main problems that affected both forms of ownership: excessive centralized management and state equal pay. He argued that the Cuban revolution was technically ineffective and excessively generous with rural laborers, unlike the Soviet revolution. He wrote: “If the ussr exploits its peasants, Cuba spoils them too much” (1970, p. 36).27 25

26

27

In defense of food sovereignty, Chonchol argued: “I believe that it is fundamental for any type of country, whether socialist or capitalist, if it wants to have autonomy, to have in its internal market a high proportion of basic foodstuffs produced internally, even if more expensive” (2012). For Valdés Paz, excess of centralism and administrative inefficiency of agrarian management in the first years of the revolution were more a result of the scarcity of technical and political staff than of an ideological precaution, and it would be corrected in 1963 (2009, p. 14). The National Association of Small Farmers (anap) in its ii Conference, in 1963, carried out a self-​criticism of how Agricultural Societies function, a new form of agrarian property resulting from voluntary collectivization of peasants. The mistake was described as “premature communism” and summarized in two measures: one, equal fixed monthly pay for all, regardless of hours worked and not taking production into account; two, free and equal sharing of the Society’s own agricultural products for free self-​consumption by its members. Consciousness concerning those issues, as criticized by Dumont, was relatively built (Barrios, 1987, p. 54).

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As for the cooperatives, Dumont believed that, in reality, they were theoretically autonomous state properties because the mandatory use of 80% of the surplus toward construction of collective buildings stifled local initiatives. Furthermore, it was a feeble rule, as it did not specify the maximum cost of works, leaving room to waste imported resources. Despite the technically adequate scale of Cuban cooperatives, Dumont claimed that being excessively centralized in the way they functioned could hinder their evolution because both the private use of surplus and each worker’s feeling of ownership would be important stimuli for work. In August 1960, he personally expressed his opinion to Guevara and proposed the creation of a reward system for the most disciplined workers, through which they would be given “shares” in the cooperative enterprise, therefore having greater participation in the surplus. Dumont was definitely out of step with the egalitarian purpose of the revolution, but he justified himself with realistic economic arguments: in 1962, for example, of 622 cooperatives, only 3 had profitable balance sheets, a symptom of structural issues in production relations (Dumont, 1970, p. 51). Concerning the Granjas, his criticism was even more emphatic. He claimed that the scale was so wrong that technicians spent more time moving from one place to another busy dealing with bureaucratic paperwork than actually improving the technical conditions of production. Regarding the scale of granjas, Dumont ironically stated: “gigantism is not an article of Marxism faith, which merely condemns—​rightly—​the microfundism, which is an obstacle to modern technique” (1970, p. 55). In addition, he alerted to the fact that, in 1963, productivity of the anap Sector had been twice larger than the farms, so that in practice the idea of a “higher form” was not justified (1970, p. 73). In this regard, Dumont also argued that socialism was not synonymous with large scale and that it could certainly be made compatible with more flexible forms of management (1970, p. 180). But Dumont’s main criticism of the farms was about state equal pay, one of the “excesses of generosity” of Cuban leaders. State-​level equal pay was an inherent factor of indiscipline, negligence with production costs, waste of resources, and accounting incapacity.28 For him, the model was inevitably unfavorable, and there would not even be a development plan to cover such a deficit. However, Dumont’s great contribution to the Cuban revolution was not about polemics regarding management; it was, otherwise, his proposal for specialized agricultural diversification, which was 28

Dumont expressed that “the guaranteed daily wage which is high and is paid no matter how much work has been done, has relax work discipline, especially in view of the fact that there is a predominance feeling now that no one is ever fired, however little work he does” (1970, p. 120).

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fully accepted by the revolutionary leadership in 1963 (a topic that will be discussed later herein). Michel Gutelman, an agronomist who accompanied Charles Bettelheim on his visits to Cuba, disapproved of the excessive centralization of agricultural production units, which had been exacerbated by the conversion of cooperatives into farms. As for Gutelman, his criticisms were organically linked to the “big debate” and aligned with the defense of economic calculation.29 He argued: This desire to impose the rigid system of the plan on production processes that, by nature, cannot be developed in rigid frameworks, led to the denial of planning and triggered a series of vicious circles of economic disorganization. 1975, p. 140

Gutelman also stated that, paradoxically, a certain degree of economic disorganization had favored production because it loosened the ties of exaggerated centralism and allowed positive extra-​regulatory initiatives for the country’s development (1975, p. 114). For him, the combination of centralization with autonomy proposed in the Cooperatives General Regulations had never been put into practice, since “the production units were in a state of permanent inferiority” in relation to the central power (1975, p. 133). Valdés Paz directly commented on Gutelman’s opinion, arguing that when writing his critique Gutelman disregarded the broader historical conditions of the Cuban revolution which determined the centralization; among them, external and internal aggressions; the US economic blockade; shortage of technicians imposing an inadequate scale; the accelerated and radical transformation of land tenure, cropping regime, and labor regime in Cuban agriculture; the need to create new management standards and work norms. All in all, without disregarding the different nature of the missions of each of these international experts,30 Valdés Paz claimed that Gutelman’s, Chonchol’s, and 29 30

For his group, the “practical impossibility of exercising management from the center was evident, given the level reached in development of productive forces” (Gutelman, 1975, p. 148). Valdés Paz said in an interview: “Jacques Chonchol comes as fao advisor and remains for a short period. He makes a report on Cuban agriculture that I consider one of the best we have for that period. It is a technical report. […] Gutelman is different. He doesn’t come as an international official like Chonchol, but he comes as a technical advisor to Charles Bettelheim. He is an agrarian specialist and Charles Bettelheim brings him for this reason. He participates, with Bettelheim, in several reports to the government because he was an advisor to the Cuban government between 1961 and 1967” (Valdés Paz, 2012).

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Dumont’s criticisms erred in a common mistake: they failed to connect social and geopolitical forces in the Cuban revolutionary process. In his words: They were here when the invasion of Girón, the October crisis, Operation Mongoose, the fight against the bandits, and a military conflict that followed the revolution took place, and they did not take it all for granted—​ as if political decisions concerning agriculture were not also related to those. An agrarian policy was defended, as if it could be designed separately from the conflict scenario in which the entire Cuban revolution was during that period. valdés paz, 2012

While the “small agrarian debate” between farms and cooperatives swung quickly and absolutely in favor of farms, as it unified Cubans around the same vision, the solution to the great economic debate was more contradictory and complex, also affecting decisions on agricultural policy. Some of the arguments of international experts advocating for cooperative self-​management during the “small debate” were taken up by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in the “big debate”; however, it was then directed toward the interior of the state administration. The economic instruments Rodríguez proposed to leverage productivity expanded in two dimensions the margins of private surplus within the state sector. First, in the individual dimension, through a system of material incentives to increase laborer’s individual efficiency. Second, in the collective dimension, with self-​financing of farms—​a relative autonomy of state properties in the relationship with the State itself, which was only possible with the growth of the surplus retained in the productive unit. As a consequence, social differentiation between individuals and between farms was fostered within a nationalized economy. The budgetary financing system conceived by Guevara, on the other hand, converted any surplus into state budget, later redistributed in the form of egalitarian public services and productive investments. Thus, Guevara’s proposal denied the economic autonomy of productive units and avoided any form of social differentiation (Pericás, 2004; Vasconcelos, 2011). However, the big debate remained unconcluded, and its developments were hybrid. Facing the impasse between two models of socialist development, the revolutionary government chose to experiment with both.31 As long as Carlos 31

As Pericás observed: “for some time, both the economic calculation and the budgetary financing system coexisted in the country” (2004, p. 125). Valdés Paz speaks about the duality of models: “there is a moment when this controversy is resolved by Fidel Castro with the decision that a management model such as the budgetary finance system proposed by

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Rafael Rodríguez was in charge of inra, he would apply economic calculation in agriculture; and as long as Ernesto Guevara headed the Ministry of Industries, he would implement the budgetary finance system in the sector. Valdés Paz called this hybrid output the “dual model” (2009, p. 18–​9). For him, however, the dual model had an original mistake: There was a contradictory fact: while agriculture had production issues (there was a fall in the agrarian product) due to its level of deficiency and organizational trauma, rehearsing the economic calculation where there was a contraction of the product was, from the start, unfeasible because there would be no material incentive to give, there would be no surplus, it would have to be subsidized, etc. The calculation model was used in a sector that, by definition, did not have the conditions to do so. Vice versa: the industry sector that did have surplus, that could apply the economic calculation because it had something to reward, to share, started to test a financing system that denied material incentive, in which the surplus was in the hands of the State and mercantile relationships were not even recognized. valdés paz, 2012

As a result: The contradictions between both systems made it increasingly difficult to reconcile them into a single plan, as well as their control subsystems. On the other hand, the incongruity between each system and the economic reality of its respective sector—​infeasibility of funding the economic calculation and profitability sectors in the budget sectors—​made the search for advantages based on these experiences increasingly superfluous. valdés paz, 2009, p. 33

The original contradiction of the “dual model” will be further discussed accordingly to analyze agrarian transformations. It is essential to note, though, that the main arguments of foreign specialists to defend the collective private property (cooperatives) in the “small agrarian debate” were reclaimed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in defense of the state property self-​management (economic calculation) in the big debate. In general, between 1961 and 1964,

Che be tested in certain sectors of the economy, mainly in industry and foreign trade, and that the economic calculation system be tested in agriculture and domestic trade” (2012).

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Cuban society went through a context of international military pressure and, simultaneously, dealt with these internal controversies over the land tenure system. The search for economic solutions to the historical impasses of underdevelopment and the transition to socialism was influenced by this war situation and was permanently limited by the narrow margins of available surplus. From the dismantling of the modernized plantation, these new contradictions emerged. As society carried out experiences of production and administration guided by the purposes of egalitarianism and national sovereignty, it ran into obstacles related to productivity and made inflections in the agrarian land tenure system, cropping regime, and labor regime. In that sense, the role of private surplus in the socialist development process was a constant source of concern throughout the 1960s. While the new forms of socialist property were the object of such controversies, discussions took a specific direction in the Cuban agriculture private sector. 3

Peasantry: Principle of Voluntarism and anap

Despite Cuban peasants being wage workers, there was a sector of traditional smallholders for which a careful and specific policy was developed. In May 1961, 24% of the Cuban territory—​an estimated 180,055 caballerías—​belonged to about 150,000 families of small farmers with less than five caballerías. Many of the lands occupied by them were old leases, subleases, and partnerships, which were priority objects of the agrarian reform. Since before the revolution, this sector of small properties was significantly more productive than the large estates inherited by the state sector.32 And because of that, they had considerable economic relevance in the national agricultural production as a whole. In August 1961, according to data presented by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the private sector was composed as Table 11 shows.33 One will notice that 592 32

33

According to the 1946 Census, the yield of properties smaller than 10 hectares (0.7 caballería) varied between 102 and 200 pesos/​hectare. At the same time, large estates between 1,000 and 5,000 hectares (75 and 372 caballerías) had an average productivity of 23.8 pesos/​hectare, and the latifundia larger than 5,000 hectares (372 caballerías) had an average productivity of only 4.94 pesos/​hectare (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 29). Regarding the private sector, Jacques Chonchol’s estimates presented in table 7 show differences compared to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez’s data in table 11. The difference is not very expressive concerning the sector of landowners with less than 5 cavalry, but quite significant for the area occupied by the agrarian bourgeoisie. The possible explanation for this difference is that the calculations published by Rodríguez in 1963 were more accurate statistics regarding landowners who fled to Miami abandoning their lands and

First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–1963) table 11

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Area and properties of private agricultural sector (August/​1961)

Size Up to 5 cab. From 5 to 10 cab. From 10 to 20 cab. From 20 to 30 cab. Larger than 30 cab.

Number of properties

Area (caballerías)

154,703 6,062 3,105 1,456 592

174,971.35 45,270.00 45,477.76 37,819.95 28,125.97

source: rodríguez, 1963a, p. 10

landowners fit the exceptions of the law and maintained properties larger than thirty caballerías, occupying an area of 28,125 caballerías. There were 10,623 owners between five and thirty caballerías, and they would be expropriated from October 1963 by the second agrarian reform. By 1962, 200,000 smallholder families had already benefited from the agrarian reform, receiving the vital minimum (Rodríguez, 1978, p. 35). A significant portion of these small farmers worked as occasional state employees. In 1965, 40,000 families benefiting from the vital minimum did not have enough land to generate marketable surpluses, which probably corresponded to the size of the peasant sector that alternated farming for self-​consumption and occasional state employment. The other 160,000 families generated marketable surplus and had a more typically peasant way of life (Rodríguez, 1966, p. 41). This was the social base on which the National Association of Small Farmers was created, with the aim of integrating them economically and politically into the revolution. 3.1 anap Foundation and Its Principles When anap was founded on May 17, 1961, there were approximately 154,703 small farmers in Cuba on different levels of economic and political organization. The founding conference was attended by 3,800 delegates elected in assemblies held throughout the country.34 anap president José Ramírez Cruz

34

expropriations rapidly carried out between May and August 1961, showing a much smaller area occupied by the agrarian bourgeoisie than Chonchol estimated. The founding conference of anap was a result of the accumulation of forces at the National Sugarcane Plenary held on December 10, 1960. The Growers Association

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(also known as Pepe) was blunt while announcing the principle of voluntarism that distinguished the proposal of the Cuban revolution for small farmers. Voluntarism was a permanent clause of the revolutionary policy with the peasantry, overtly contradicting the violent campaign of forced collectivization led by Stalin from 1929 onward. Pepe Ramírez spoke in 1961: Peasants will not be forced to integrate cooperatives. No one is authorized to use coercive methods or threats to force peasants to organize themselves into cooperatives. Peasants will integrate a cooperative when, consciously and voluntarily, they agree to do so, that is, by an absolutely voluntary act. in: barrios, 1987, p. 25

anap’s line of action in a nutshell was originally to organize, unite, and guide small farmers in the application of the agrarian program of the revolution (Barrios, 1987, p. 22). The institution had inherited the guerrilla spirit of The Second Eastern Front “Frank País” commanded by Raúl Castro. It was the political and military vanguard of the integration of peasants into the Rebel Army. Originally, anap was created to be a political body for the masses, so as to represent small farmers before the Revolution, and to represent the Revolution before small farmers. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez described this two-​way political representation as the “dual personality of anap” (Barrios, 1987, p. 45; Rodríguez, 1966, p. 39). Two practical problems marked the history of the integration of Cuban peasants in the transition to socialism. First, the violation of voluntarism during two waves of violence against small farmers: one wave occurred between August 1961 and March 1962; the other, between 1968 and 1970 during the so-​ called “Revolutionary Offensive.” In both cases, as soon as the revolutionary leadership identified the violent attitude, they quickly opposed it. The second problem was excessive administrative attributions undertaken by anap between 1961 and 1963, which blocked its original political character. Its administrative role was reestablished from 1963 onward, when in the ii anap Congress the issue was critically assessed. These two issues are further discussed in the following sections, understanding them as components in the debate regarding the correlation between the socialist revolution, state control, and the private use of surplus. (Asociacion de Colonos) refused itself to participate in it, which definitively separated small and medium peasants who were for the revolution from large growers who were against it (Barrios, 1987, p. 18).

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3.2 Mistakes Made with the Peasantry The alliance between proletarian-​peasants and the Rebel Army is the genesis of the relationship between small farmers and anap. The integration of peasants into the Rebel Army tipped the balance in the guerrillas’ favor. Aware of that, the agrarian reform leaders prioritized the concession of land to those who tilled it, strengthening the economic bases of this class that supported them. Unlike what happened in the Russian revolution, the increasing number of small agricultural landowners further strengthened the alliance between Cuban revolutionaries and peasants.35 In this scenario, voluntarism was an economic organization strategy of peasants for the revolution. anap’s fundamental task was to politically convince small farmers of the advantages of voluntary collectivization. However, between August 1961 and March 1962, some agents of the revolution committed two types of errors that violated the principle of voluntarism: one, excessive repression against commercial speculation in agricultural products; and two, the execution of inappropriate expropriations of small peasants by modifying article 24 of the Basic Law, which punished counterrevolutionary behavior (Rodríguez, 1963a, p. 13–​14). The first mistake was made by the wave of peasant speculation on food prices between 1960 and 1962. This wave stemmed not from the fall in food production, but from the fact that it did not grow at the same galloping pace that demand increased.36 Added to that was the turmoil of the revolutionary process and the economic blockade from December 1960 onwards, contributing to the perception of relative scarcity and the feeling of food insecurity. Consequently, one of the coercive measures that violated the principle of voluntarism was prohibiting peasants from taking their agrarian products to their own family members who lived in the cities. That outraged them, generating dissatisfaction with the government (Barrios, 1987, p. 31). Against peasant commercial speculation the revolution proposed three policies. The first was price administration establishing pay levels for small producers. The proposal originated from the realization that for small farmers 35

36

The Russian Revolution had to face the dual nature of its land reform. While poor peasants passionately supported the October revolution there was a “rebound effect.” By distributing land into small individual plots, agrarian reform converted poor peasants into middle peasants, thus enlarging middle peasantry, its economic base, and its speculative impulses, going against the planned economy project of the revolution. This “rebound effect” required the tactical retreat of nep between 1921 and 1929, which was later replaced by Stalin’s forced collectivization (Bettelheim, 1976, p. 215; Vasconcelos, 2013). This is Carlos Rafael Rodríguez’s analysis: “Although production did not fall in 1959 and 1961 on state lands, it could not increase enough to match the rising demand” (1966, p. 38).

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price would play the same stimulating role as wage played for workers, and that it would be through decent price that peasants would have their speculative impulse diminished and the proportion of sold products to Tiendas del Pueblo increased.37 The second policy was differential pricing to encourage peasants to improve their productivity. Thus, the peasant who managed to produce more than 35 tonnes of cane/​hectare would sell his products to the State at better prices, and peasants who increased their productivity by at least 30% a year would be remunerated accordingly (Rodríguez, 1966, p. 41). The third measure was credit, technical assistance, and supply of inputs, fertilizers, and seeds for small farmers with the counterpart that they sell 75% of their production to the State (Rodríguez, 1963a, p. 16). Nonetheless, the leaders feared the emergence of a layer of individual producers who had privileges over other rural laborers and as a result of the revolution itself. This correlation between tactics (price stimuli) and strategy (voluntary collectivization) for the Cuban peasantry synthesized the pragmatic vision and perspective of the revolution on the tensions between state control and private use of surplus. It was clarified by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez: By setting fair prices for its products, the Cuban revolution is far from applying the Bukharinist formula “enrich yourselves!,” directed at rich peasants [kulak]. It is about prices profitable enough to encourage the most efficient forms of agrotechniques and never to promote excessive accumulation or unproductive idleness. 1966, p. 48

The second mistake while dealing with peasants was undue expropriation. As Carlos Rafael Rodríguez reported, many agents of the revolution did not distinguish the protagonists of the boycotts and sabotages from their supporting small peasants, who were often led to having certain attitudes due to fragility while facing pressure from their bosses. With the modification of article 24, agents of the revolution expropriated peasants “suspected” of counterrevolutionary actions without any previous attempt to convince them. This precipitation was criticized by Rodríguez:

37

Carlos Rafael Rodríguez argued for the policy of remunerative prices for peasants; he wrote: “it was assumed that, in the transition period, while constructing socialism, price plays the same role for small individual producers allied with the working class that wage plays for proletarians” (1966, p. 40).

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Some local organizations were not able to correctly distinguish between the rural bourgeois and former landowners who were head and main protagonists of those activities, and certain small peasants who, dragged by their propaganda and victims of fear and fearful of the future, collaborated with the enemy somehow decisively. An extremist policy led to striking through expropriations based on laws applicable to counter-​revolutionaries both true and permanent enemies and confused and occasional adversaries. The expropriation of small farmers—​in some cases correct from a strictly legal point of view—​resulted in enemies confusing dozens of small working peasants. 1966, p. 37

Once those mistakes were acknowledged, in March 1962 a meeting between heads of the zda and Fidel Castro was convened. It was then decided that all undue expropriations carried out by the revolution were to be immediately returned (Rodríguez, 1963a, p. 14). At the ii anap Congress, in May 1963, an assessment established that the errors had been mostly corrected. The correction revalued the sovereignty of anap grassroots bodies, removing authoritarian leaders. Barrios reported: “many leaders who used negative methods such as ‘mandonism’ and ‘caciquism’ were removed, making the base and management bodies in municipalities and provinces work by collective leadership” (1987, p. 47). From then on, a new operating principle for anap was established: collective management and individual responsibility (Barrios, 1987, p. 47). The rapid error correction had a strategic political reason that had been envisioned in the anap Congress in May 1963. By that time, the second agrarian reform was already being formulated and the government was about to expropriate all the private sector with properties greater than five caballerías. At that moment, the peasantry needed to be safe and confident in the revolution, otherwise this second round of expropriations could generate the fear that everyone would be affected. The agrarian bourgeoisie, which was already in an offensive campaign against the government, carried out production boycotts, killed animals unnecessarily, set fire to plantations, damaged machines, and spread rumors that the government had a plan to take possession of all peasant properties. Fidel Castro, on the occasion of the ii anap Congress, overtly disputed the peasant base with the agrarian bourgeoisie, and criticized his internal enemies’ strategy of counter-​information and cynicism: One must be careful with the bourgeois. They use all sorts of tricks to bribe and corrupt. Certain bourgeois had never even greeted the employee, the

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worker, and now they invite him to ride in their cars and take him out for drinks. What are they doing? They are trying to broaden their social base […]. If capitalism returned to our country, they would immediately hand out attacks against workers and employees who they have been currently inviting for drinks. in: barrios, 1987, p. 57

Fidel also announced that the revolution conceived national development on two bases—​the state sector and the peasant sector—​and that small farmers could be “absolutely sure” that they would not be harmed by any future expropriation. This paved the way so that the second agrarian reform would not build up insecurity, threatening the hegemony of the revolution in the true social segment of the scale (Barrios, 1987, p. 58–​9). In that sense, Fidel argued it was not the time to carry out the voluntary collectivization campaign and that they should stop persuading into cooperatives. Despite the acknowledgment and correction of errors toward the peasantry in 1962, the same mistakes were made again in 1968, during the “Revolutionary Offensive” period. This time, they were linked to the “special plans,” which were of the same nature: government officials “replaced the necessary collective and individual discussion by the bureaucratic method of ‘order and command’” (Barrios, 1987, p. 83). That situation was assessed in 1970, in coordination with the self-​criticism on the frustrated 10-​million-​tonne sugar harvest. 3.3 anap’s “Administrativism” Between 1961 and 1963, anap did not fulfill its original political purpose, and ended up taking on administrative tasks, as if it were a department of inra. One of its main roles was granting credit for peasants, a task that could not be postponed, for it was a pillar of agrarian reform. Before the revolution, banfaic had only 12 thousand customers, among which only 7 thousand had access to credit. In one year only, anap delivered 93 million pesos in credit to 180,000 peasant families, at interest rates ranging from 2.5% to 4% per year. In order to accelerate the integration of the peasant sector into the state agriculture sector, a “moral commitment” was established for peasants who received credit: they should sell all their production to the State, without any contractual obligation and in accordance with the principle of voluntarism (Barrios, 1987, pp. 36–​8).38 Credit was seen by the revolution as strategic, as it was the 38

The commercial freedom of small farmers was confirmed by eclac itself in 1963: “Small farmers—​except when stipulated in agreements made through anap—​retain their right to sell their products directly to consumers” (1964, p. 267).

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essential mechanism to prevent agrarian reform from suffering the same structural reversal that many transformations in Latin America had already suffered. Barrios explained: Cuban peasants could not suffer the bitterness and disappointments of peasants from other countries. Benefited by supposed agrarian reforms and not receiving the necessary amount of credit at low interest nor the guarantee of safe market and fair prices for their crops, in the course of a few years, they were victims of lenders, scammers, and intermediaries, finding themselves once again converted into partners, tenants, or simple employees, or a mixture of all those categories so common in the fellow Latin American countries. 1987, p. 38

Between 1961 and 1963, anap granted a total of 180,424,607 pesos in credits to peasants, recovering 85% of overdue titles (Barrios, 1987, p. 50–​51). Despite being a strategic task, the granting of credits transformed anap into a kind of inra for the peasants, and the technical and administrative roles strongly overlapped its political nature. Once this problem was acknowledged at the 1963 Congress, a rectification policy was written. inra’s Vice Ministry of Private Production and Cooperative was created to fulfill the technical-​administrative role performed by anap until then—​ preparation of private production plans; distribution of technical input and material; administration of Tiendas del Pueblo; and the granting of credit (Barrios, 1987, p. 62).39 From 1963 onward, anap began to fulfill its original political role. Even so, anap’s “administrativism” resulted in an unsatisfactory development of its grassroots bodies, which did not function with the same vitality that was expected, generating a distancing of the peasantry in relation to agricultural production plans. 3.4 Politics of Voluntary Collectivisation One of anap’s most important political and ideological roles was to convince people about the advantages of voluntary collectivization. Initially, there were three new strategies to carry out voluntary collectivization of peasant land ownership: Agricultural Societies, Credit and Service Cooperatives, and 39

inra’s Vice Ministry of Private Production and Cooperative was dissolved in 1965. General Directorate of Harvests then took on its roles. This change generated a significant lack of coordination between the peasantry and the agricultural production plan, which was confirmed at the iii anap Congress in 1967 (Barrios, 1987, p. 73).

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Mutual Aid Brigades. Agricultural Societies were the total collectivization of land use by individual producers who unified their plots and created a cooperative. Unlike agricultural cooperatives created by the agrarian reform law, these were in fact collective private properties, with more autonomy in relationship with the State. As they needed technical and financial assistance from the State, the Societies made the “moral commitment” of selling their production to Tiendas del Pueblo. Credit and Service Cooperatives, on the other hand, were a partial collectivization for some specific links in the production chain. For example, to acquire credit, to buy machines and share them, to buy fertilizers, to build agricultural buildings, warehouses, houses or gyms, to request technical assistance from the State, among others. Those cooperatives did not unify the land, but they did stimulate the peasant association at specific stages of production. In 1963, a new voluntary collectivization strategy emerged: the Mutual Aid Brigades, which was the partial collectivization of work. For example, small farmers either helped each other to harvest neighbors’ crops in a rotational process or integrated themselves into the harvest of the state sector, later being helped by state employees on their private properties. Table 12 shows the evolution of those voluntary collectivization units. It is clear that the Agricultural Societies were not successful, having decreased by half the number of units, members, and occupied areas between 1963 and 1967. anap defined the problem of Agricultural Societies as being the “premature communism,” which made them unfeasible, due to a proposal of table 12

Voluntary collectivization (1963/​1967)

1963 Forms Credit and Service Cooperatives Agricultural Societies Mutual Aid Brigades Total

1967

Units Members Caballerías Units Members Caballerías 527

46,133

32,213

1,301

79,067

57,347

328

3,844

2,764

126

1,511

1,453

0

0

0

1,652

—​

—​

855

49,977

34,977

3,079

80,578

58,800

source: own elaboration with data from valdés paz (2009, p. 36); and barrios (1987, p. 75)

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absolute egalitarianism: equal fixed monthly pay for everyone, regardless of hours worked and not taking production into account, and equal sharing of the Society’s own agricultural products for free self-​consumption by its members (Barrios, 1987, p. 54). Credit and Service Cooperatives had an otherwise ascending trajectory. The number of units grew by 2.5 times, the number of members by 70%, and by 80% the area occupied between 1963 and 1967. Having only appeared in 1963, the Mutual Aid Brigades reached in 1967 1,652 units (Barrios, 1987, p.75). The arguments for voluntary collectivization that guided the persuasion process involved the difficulties of individual agricultural mechanization; the lack of labor for private sector harvesting; retribution for the solidarity of state employees toward the harvest of small farmers; the tendency of wage workers to choose to work in the state sector, leading to manpower shortage in the private sector, among others.40 For example, the peasant retirement pension was created—​the State could buy an elderly peasant’s share and integrate it into the Granjas, paying them a lifetime pension. In addition, the increase in the state sector’s productivity and the relative expansion of its surplus made collectivization more attractive to the peasant, not to mention it alleviated the relative scarcity of food, mitigating speculation. Ultimately, it was proposed that anap was made strong as an organism of socialist awareness to ideologically persuade peasants into collectivization. These statements were more efficient when expressed by a generation of young peasants technically trained by the schools of the revolution to work on a large scale, and relatively detached from the agricultural property of their parents (Rodríguez, 1963a, p. 19; 1966, pp. 49–​51). In 1966, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez assessed the policy of the revolution for peasants so far carried out and argued: The presence of a large non-​cooperative peasant sector does not tend to weaken the proletarian-​peasant alliance, nor does it represent an obstacle to socialism. On the contrary, the Cuban revolution is certain that the method with which peasants’ problems were addressed constitutes the best guarantee of their full identification with socialism and the safest and most effective vehicle for their voluntary and growing incorporation into the socialist economy. 1966, p. 52

40

Rodríguez wrote: “The implantation of socialism renders agricultural workers increasingly resistant to selling their labor-​power to the private sector and choosing to feel they are members of the socialist community in the Granjas” (1966, p. 49).

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Small farmers, therefore, were a pillar of Cuban agricultural development after the agrarian reform. Between 1959 and 1963, they played an important role in food production and in the military defense of the revolution. So far we have discussed the change in land tenure considering the sectors, as well as characteristics, contradictions, and problems of the new types of properties emerging from the revolution. Another important aspect of the dismantling of modern plantation was the deterioration of monoculture, accelerated by the crisis of the insertion of Cuba into the international economic order. Such a crisis engendered a reactive process of agricultural diversification between 1959 and 1963 with important structural consequences. 4

Agricultural Diversification: Disruption of the Double Articulation

The structural transformation of Cuban agriculture was followed by a policy of diversification, directly proportional to the disruption of the double articulation that sustains capitalist underdevelopment. On the one hand, the crisis of external dependency was accelerated by the US economic blockade, which began in December 1960; on the other hand, the overcoming of social segregation generated a gigantic internal propensity to consume. Thus, the disintegration of the double articulation “external dependency-​social segregation” was a catalyst for the destabilization of sugarcane monoculture, insofar as it generated an immediate need for food production. In 1963, the land for diversified planting had expanded by 29,806 caballerías (eclac, 1964, p. 286). Hereafter, firstly the crisis of Cuba’s insertion in the international economy after the revolution will be discussed, followed by the identification of causes and dimension of the increase in internal demand, resulting from the fight against social segregation. Finally, the effects of those two factors on agricultural production between 1959 and 1963 will be summarized. 4.1 Neocolonial Insertion Crisis: the Search for National Sovereignty When the US economic blockade began in December 1960, in response to the nationalization of all US properties on the island, 3 million tonnes of Cuban sugar were instantly left without destination, which corresponded to 51% of that year’s harvest (Barkin, 1978, pp. 128–​9; Rodríguez, 1983, pp. 469). In the previous year, of the 5 million tonnes of Cuban sugar exported, 60% were destined for the United States (eclac, 1964, p. 274; Aranda, 1968, p. 65). That insertion corresponded to the historical pattern reproduced by the Preferential Treaties of 1902, 1934, and 1947. On the other hand, 69.6% of Cuban imports in 1958 were obtained from the United States. In 1960, this figure was 48.5%. Starting

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from the crisis of Cuba’s insertion in the international economy, Cubans found themselves impelled to find other import sources and create immediate conditions to produce the domestically indispensable (Barkin, 1976, p. 134–​5). The impact of the US blockade on the Cuban agrarian structure was felt—​in the years immediately prior to the revolution, food occupied almost 30% of Cuban imports,41 varying from 150 to 250 million pesos (eclac, 1964, p. 285; Rodríguez, 1978, p. 29). In addition, more than 50% of agricultural inputs were imported, including 80% of machinery and fertilizers (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 29). In February 1960, some months before the blockade, Cuba had signed its first trade agreement with the Soviet Union through which the Soviets committed to: (1) purchase 425,000 tonnes of Cuban sugar in 1960 plus 1 million tonnes annual rates between 1961 and 1965, at world market prices; (2) granting US$100 million in credits with maturity date in twelve years and 2.5% interest per year, which should be used to purchase equipment and technical assistance (Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 232). Furthermore, Soviet oil would be sold 30% cheaper than cartelized oil from the Capitalist bloc (Noyola, 1978, p. 124). As of December 1960, however, this agreement was not enough to protect the Cuban economy from the impact. Between 1960 and 1963, the blockade deepened and spread to other countries. Since September 4, 1961, through the Foreign Assistance Act, the United States has prohibited any private aid to Cuba from its territory. A few months later, on February 7, 1962, Kennedy declared that any American product was prohibited from entering Cuba and Cuban goods could not enter the United States either—​transportation carried out by international vessels. Cuban difficulties were greater when, on August 1, 1962, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act declared that the United States would not assist any country that aided Cuba. On October 10, 1962, US ports were closed to every ship that had already entered socialist ports. The following year, the crisis between Cuba and the United States reached its apex. On February 8, 1963, the United States prohibited US citizens from traveling to Cuba, as well as from conducting private business with the Cuban government. On May 14 of the same year, the US government began to inspect, with specific requirements, food products and medicines sent to Cuba, making it difficult for the Cuban population of the United States to be in contact with their relatives on the island. The economic offensive was completed when the United States began to condition the diplomatic behavior of other nations: in December 1963, another amendment to

41

More specifically 30.4% in 1955; 27.6% in 1956; 27.0% in 1957; and 27.5% in 1958 (Valdés Paz, 1997, p. 29).

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the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited US assistance to any country that did not break trade relations with Cuba (Pericás, 2004, p. 42). Due to the blockade, the insertion of neocolonialism was in crisis; however, while another insertion was not yet consolidated, an environment of sensitive commercial insecurity was created. This made the time between 1960 and 1963 correspond to a crisis in the transition between two insertions of Cuba in the international economic order. This insecurity was only remedied at the end of 1963, with a second agreement with the Soviet Union, announced by Fidel Castro in January 1964. The crisis of the insertion of neocolonialism in Cuba, however, already pointed to an escape route. In 1961, 72% of the exported sugar went to countries with a centrally planned economy: out of 6.4 million tonnes of sugar exported, 4.6 million were consumed by the Soviet bloc, being 3.3 million for the Soviet Union (51%) and 1 million for China (15%) (eclac, 1964, p. 274). In 1963, the new insertion was stronger: more than 80% of Cuban transactions abroad took place with countries with a planned economy, being 42% of exports directed to the ussr, from where 50% of imports were obtained. China and Czechoslovakia were second, respectively, in importance to Cuban transactions. The three together represented 66% of Cuban exports and 72% of imports in 1963 (Ibid., 1964, p. 276–​7). The crisis of the insertion of neocolonialism in Cuba and the turn toward its insertion into the Soviet bloc is portrayed in Charts 1 and 2.42 The reorientation of trade flows and the adaptation of the productive system were consequences of disrupting dependency and social segregation. The US capital had been incisively attacked by the nationalization laws. The way of life of the national bourgeoisie was harmed by the regulation of the content of these imports. Sumptuous consumption was limited and the modernization of the elites’ luxury was interrupted.43 Surplus used for sumptuous consumption 42

43

Own elaboration with data from Barkin (1973, p. 134–​5). The foreign trade data on the period from 1958 to 1963 coincide with the eclac report (1964, p. 280–​1), with only nuances differing them. Latin America was not included because it had a residual share of Cuban foreign trade. The blockade of Venezuelan oil alone reduced Cuban imports from Latin America by 75% between 1958 and 1962. Cuban exports to Spain grew between 1962 and 1963 because in 1963 Cuba signed agreements with that country to sell sugar, as well as with France and the United Kingdom (eclac, 1964, p. 277). Fidel Castro, in his famous speech to the Second National General Assembly of the People of Cuba, on February 4, 1962, in response to the expansion of the economic blockade approved by the Inter-​American Economic and Social Council (cies) meeting in Punta del Este, in August 1961, and to the Cuba’s suspension from the Organization of American States (oas), on January 31, 1962, cried: “It doesn’t matter that cars haven’t come here for many years; it doesn’t even matter that many luxury objects haven’t come to Cuba in many years. It doesn’t matter, if that’s the price of freedom! It doesn’t matter, if that’s the price of dignity! It doesn’t matter, if that’s the price they charge motherland!” (Castro, February 4, 1962).

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First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–1963) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1958

1960 USA

1962 USSR

1964 China

1966 Spain

1968

1970

Czechoslovakia

chart 1  Cuban exportations by country of destination (%)

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1958

1960 USA

1962 USSR

1964 China

1966 Spain

chart 2  Cuban importations by country of origin (%)

1968

1970

Czechoslovakia

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were then spent on the purchase of capital goods and consumer goods for the majority of the population. According to eclac’s assessment in 1963, the revolution brought about a change in the purpose of imports: In the course of 1959, restrictions were implemented on the importation of sumptuous articles, which were followed by the creation of a complementary tariff on the purchase of automobiles and the determination of ad valorem taxes that levied on most products, with the exception of basic foodstuffs. 1964, p. 284

On the one hand, the change in the content of imports reflected a conscious guideline of the revolutionary process, which aimed at saving foreign exchange and changing the purpose of its use. Since July 1959, the Tax Reform Law (No. 447) has surcharged luxury goods.44 Import substitution, a policy already widely defended in Latin America by eclac, involved saving wasted foreign exchange on superfluous goods for industrial investment. According to Pericás’s analysis, the general guidelines that made up the development project of communists at psp and eclac in the 1950s were quite similar: One might notice that the post-​revolution economic project was heavily influenced by eclac—​whose numerous ideas were being discussed in Cuba, in the 1950s—​and by a more “radical” line advocated by communists. In practice, the proposals were very similar; the main difference, at the beginning of the process, was in the emphasis on deepening the measures, not necessarily on their content. 2004, p. 59

On the other hand, it was an emergency policy of import substitution which, despite being an essential guideline to the revolution development project, became a matter of survival. In reality, the economic blockade triggered the substitution of food imports through an urgent and unplanned agricultural diversification with a strong tendency toward chaos. As Gutelman stated: “the revolutionary government, bewildered by the sudden loss of an international 44

The government levied 20% taxes on automobiles, 15% on beer, and 60% on incomes greater than US$500,000 a year. At the other end of social segregation, the law levied only 3% income tax on those earning less than US$4,000 a year. As an optional guideline, the law required workers to donate 4% of their wages to the Agrarian Reform Fund, a proposal that found significant support (Pericás, 2004, p. 55).

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market and still incapable of having a perfect idea about the integrity of the new market, did not worry about maintaining, let alone increasing, sugar production” (1975, p. 210). While the blockade itself generated food insecurity the increase in internal demand resulting from the strong redistribution of income contributed to an imbalance between supply and demand for food. 4.2 Increase of Internal Demand: Searching for Social Equity The Moncada Program sought to disrupt social segregation, radically redistributing the surplus. In addition to agrarian reform, tax reform, and the fight against speculation by controlling and subsidizing food prices through Tiendas del Pueblo, five other major immediate measures changed the distribution of surplus: urban reform; wage policy; reduction of strategic tariffs; expansion of basic public services; and employment policy. In March 1959, before the urban reform law was passed, a landlord-​tenant law had reduced by 50% charges on city properties. The urban reform law was passed in October 1960. It transformed the payment of rent into a monthly indemnity payment to rentier owners, so that all tenant families would have the chance to buy the property they have occupied. In addition, a joint effort to build houses for permanent private use was carried out by state officials. State housing was granted upon payment of an amount not higher than 10% of the family income. Between 1959 and 1960, no less than 15,123 new houses and 500 agricultural buildings with social roles were constructed (eclac, 1964, p. 272; Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 233). Urban housing expenditure of households was very much reduced. The wage policy of the revolution primarily affected non-​agricultural wage workers. According to data from Carteira de Saúde e Maternidade Operária, the number of non-​agricultural wage workers registered between January and April grew by 41% between 1957 and 1961 (Chonchol, 1961, p. 71).45 In 1959 alone, wages increased by 22%, an addition of 167 million pesos to the wage bill (Piñero, 1960, p. 85). The tariff reduction policy also contributed to the growth of domestic demand. Electricity rate was reduced by 30% in July 1959,46 year when electricity demand grew by 13% (Piñero, 1960, p. 86). The telephone rate was also reduced.

45 46

Growth took a leap in 1960: 252,399,600 wages were recorded in 1957; 259,584,300 in 1958; 273,439,900 in 1959; 381,231,100 in 1960; and 428,409,100 in 1961 (Chonchol,1961, p. 71). In August 1959, the American and Foreign Power Company (AFPCo), a subsidiary of Electric Bond and Share, parent company of Compañía Cubana de Electricidad, canceled a 15-​million-​dollar grant in response to the rate reduction (Pericás, 2004, p. 38).

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The policy of expanding state and free public services contributed to a radical improvement in the quality of life of poor people. Between 1958 and 1962, adult enrollment in elementary school grew by 16%. During that period, enrollment in all levels of education doubled, except in technological education, where enrollments increased 38 times (eclac, 1964, p. 273). Between 1958 and 1965, the number of people who finished elementary school grew from 22,000 to 74,000; completion of high school grew from 4,563 in 1959 to 20,819 in 1966; and the number of higher education graduates grew from 1,151 in 1959 to 1,830 in 1966 (Fernandes, 2007, p. 233–​235). During 1961, illiteracy in Cuba dropped from 23.6% to 3.9%, and at the beginning of the following year, Cuba declared itself a territory free of illiteracy (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 43; Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 236). As far as health development is concerned, between 1958 and 1962, the total number of hospitals on the island grew 2.6 times, from 55 to 144 establishments. In the same period, hospital beds increased from 22,080 to 38,199, i.e., 70% (eclac, 1964, p. 273). All this accelerated the overcoming of social segregation and directly or indirectly increased the population’s purchasing power. The use of idle capacity was one of the most important policies for economic and social development after the revolution, and regarding workforce it became an employment policy that sought to attract unemployed people to the state sector. The results were very fast: between 1957 and 1963, jobs increased by 25%, which absorbed more than 50% of the chronically unemployed workforce. According to eclac, 425,000 people entered the job market between 1957 and 1963. The unprecedented speed with which the most serious structural issues of Cuban underdevelopment was tackled was an important historical example for Latin American countries (1964, p. 272). Despite that, the increase in employment was followed by a reduction in labor productivity, as eclac verified: The problem of employment was only partially overcome, reflecting the part still unresolved not so much because of virtual unemployment but because of the fall in productivity levels per employed person. Today, this is one of the main problems faced by the Cuban economy, which affects both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 1964, p. 269

All these income redistribution policies, together with the established restriction on the importation of luxury goods, generated an enormous increase in liquidity, which could only be achieved by breaking the knots of peripheral capitalism. Between 1961 and 1963, total Cuban savings grew from 465 million

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to 797 million pesos; while monetary circulation grew from 630 to 709 million pesos (eclac, 1964, p. 294). The scale of the increase in demand, however, generated not negligible imbalances and inflationary pressures. Between 1958 and 1961, among wage workers consumption increased by 25%—​equivalent to 500 million dollars. In 1958 there was a relative balance between supply and demand of food, stabilized at 555 million pesos. Of those, 412 million were produced domestically and 143 million were imported. The problem was that in 1961 the total food supply dropped to 532 million pesos due to the US economic blockade, while demand grew to 727 million pesos. Overcoming this deficit and following the increase in domestic demand imposed a strict policy of national food production, capable of increasing supply by 50% in just three years (Gutelman, 1975, p. 213). The blockade, however, made vital imports, such as animal fat, unfeasible. Animal fat from Chicago was 90% of the total fat consumed in Cuba. Jacques Chonchol was responsible for a plan to grow oilseeds that would replace the import of animal fat from the United States with vegetable fat produced on the island from sunflower, peanut, soybean, and corn (Chonchol, 2012). It was an exceptional case, along with citrus, in which diversification was guided by a technically planned proposal. In most provinces, the process of agricultural diversification responded to a spontaneous and urgent dynamic, full of contradictions. 4.3 Diversification: Searching for Economic Development The agricultural diversification that took place between 1959 and 1963 was defended by the revolutionary leadership with three arguments linked to the new purposes of Cuban development. First, diversification was a policy of employing workers during the tiempo muerto. It would occupy the workforce during the months in which sugarcane did not need its contingent, responding to the egalitarian purpose of the revolution. Second, diversification was a food sovereignty imperative. Throughout Cuban history, the fluctuation of sugarcane prices on the world market was, if not the only, the most important element that built up the capacity to import food for workers. Feeding the population with internal autonomy was a key task in the pursuit of national sovereignty. Third, there would be a virtuous correlation between diversification and industrialization.47 Producing food was an inescapable task of industrial development, as Regino Boti highlighted:

47

The virtuous correlation between agrarian reform, food production, and industrialization will be further discussed in Chapter 4, on development strategies.

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table 13

Sugarcane cooperative area by crop

1960

1961

Area (caballerías) % Sugarcane Other crops Natural pasture Total

45,000 1,409 13,591 60,000

75 2 23 100

Area (caballerías) % 35,000 13,040 11,960 60,000

58 22 20 100

source: chonchol, 1961, p. 55

In order for there to be rapid industrial growth in any country, agriculture must produce for industrial workers more food without large price increase and for industry itself greater quantity of raw material. Concurrently, for the industry to grow it is necessary to increase peasants’ standard of living, so that they are able to buy manufactured products or goods, particularly machinery for agriculture. (11/​07/​1959)48 In the beginning, agricultural diversification was concentrated on the cooperatives that inherited the administration cane, which still kept 45% of the national sugarcane production. Sugarcane occupied 75% of the cooperatives’ agricultural area in 1960, and in 1961, 58%—​in only one year it dropped around 10,000 caballerías. Other cooperative crops, on the other hand, expanded to 11,631 caballerías, increasing their occupation from 2% to 22% of the agricultural area. Natural pasture on cooperative areas was also reduced by 1,631 caballerías. The rapid turn of cooperative agriculture from monoculture to diversification is represented in Table 13. It was not an anti-​sugar policy. Diversification was coordinated with the proposal to intensify sugarcane production, a measure to fight structural heterogeneity, seeking to bring together the technological levels of industry and agriculture separated by more than a century of uneven and combined

48

Regino Boti was one of the authors of the mr 26–​7 economic program. After the revolution, he became Minister of Economy under Urrutia, and in 1960, he was transferred to become head of Central Planning Board (juceplan), in which he served until 1964. His ideas were developmental, and he was at the foundation of eclac, in 1948.

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development. The intensification would allow for maintaining the level of sugarcane production, opening space for new crops, which in turn would save foreign exchange spent on imported food (between 150 and 250 million) then used toward the industrial development of the country. Agricultural diversification and intensification were the pillars of an overall economic development strategy. The Cooperatives Regulation explained it: Cooperative members will have to, as their fundamental objective, promote and cultivate their correspondent sugarcane area, intensifying production in order to use areas that allow them to diversify their production so that they achieve greater incomes. inra, 1960a, p. 41

However, while diversification and intensification were articulated in the Regulation, food insecurity resulting from the blockade in fact prevented the latter from keeping pace with the former. Chonchol’s data show that during the first three years of agrarian reform, it was possible to reconcile sugarcane growth with the upward curve of agricultural diversification. Between 1957 and 1961, sugar production grew by 19%, tobacco by 38.1%, rice by 46.3%, peanuts by 67.3%, coffee by 5%, and potatoes by 6.7%. Between 1959 and 1961, tomato production grew 45.9%, cotton increased 100 times, sisal grew 29.8%, and soybeans were planted on the island, expanding production by 55 times. According to eclac, between 1958 and 1960, corn production increased by 44%, and vianda by 88%. The bean production experienced a fivefold increase between 1958 and 1961 (eclac, 1964, p. 276).49 However, that increase in sugarcane production swelled due to the cutting of all the sugarcane plantations on the island, as ordered by the government, which harvested the 20% reserve of production traditionally not cut by speculators (Chonchol, 1961, p. 71). The growth in production of the main food products on the island is represented in Table 14. However, between 1961 and 1963, this temporary conciliation between sugarcane and agricultural diversification was disrupted, and sugarcane production showed significant decrease along with other industrial crops (coffee, cotton, tobacco). As it was not coordinated with sugarcane intensification, the agricultural diversification policy began to generate structural issues related to the balance of trade, hindering the attainment of foreign exchange from sugar 49

eclac data extracted from juceplan documents. In addition to crops, between 1960 and 1963, chicken production grew by 35% and eggs by 10%; and between 1957 and 1963, the volume of fishing increased by 33% (eclac, 1964, p. 289).

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table 14

Crops(a)

Annual production of ten crops in Cuban agriculture (1957–​1961)

National production (tonnes) 1957

1958

1959

1960

Sugar (raw) 5,616,914 5,727,641 5,906,280 5,804,958 Tobacco 41,712 50,649 35,569 45,252 Rice in the husk 256,796 225,943 282,062 304,239 Tomato —​ —​ 89,062 102,396 Clean cotton —​ —​ 53 776 Peanut 4,203 2,540 2,367 5,346 Soy —​ —​ —​ 277 Sisal (raw fiber) —​ 9,447 8,525 13,193 Coffee 36,687 43,737 29,512 55,161 Potato 94,931 79,263 71,613 97,613

1961 6,683,674 57,604 375,714(b) 129,962 5,530 7,030(b) 15,668(b) 11,069(b) 38,525(b) 101,382

(a) The ten products correspond to 87.3% of the total Cuban agricultural production in 1959–​60 (b) Estimated numbers source: chonchol, 1961, pp. 69–​7 0

trade. The growth of food crop between 1958 and 1963 is compared with the curve of industrial crops, in Chart 3. The structural change in the proportion between agricultural products from sugarcane and from other industrial crops (tobacco, coffee, cotton), as well as food crops (cereals, vegetables, meat, and vegetables) are demonstrated in the chart. From 1958 to 1961, the increase in food production occurred simultaneously with the growth of sugarcane production and other industrial crops. However, from 1961 to 1963, food production increased, while industrial crops declined—​especially sugarcane. Probably the curves were divergent because between 1958 and 1961 industrial crops grew (sugarcane included) because of the use of idle land of expropriated large estates. However, between 1961 and 1963 they fell as a result of the competition for land that started between them and food crops. The plan for 1962 alone, for example, was to expand the production of rice, corn, beans, peanuts, soybeans, meat, vegetables, and fruits by 33,512 caballerías (Chonchol, 1961, p. 44).50 In general, between 1959 and 1963 the volume of total agricultural 50

The same plan proposed the expansion of 25,114 caballerías for artificial pangola grass pastures; 2,273 caballerías for cotton; 693 caballerías for coffee and sisal; 156 caballerías for reforestation; and 134 caballerías for tobacco (Chonchol,1961, p. 44).

141

First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–1963) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

1957

1958 Food Crops

1959

1960

Sugarcane

1961

1962

1963

Coffee, Tobacco, Coon

chart 3  Agricultural production in proportion: food, sugarcane, and other industrial crops (1957–​1963) (index, 1957 =​100) Note: Own elaboration with data from eclac (1964, p. 286)

production excluding sugarcane grew by 45%, while sugarcane production declined by an average of 15% per year. The total drop in sugar production between 1957 and 1963 was 30% (eclac, 1964, p. 269, 285). This contradiction between sugarcane and food production resulted from the perpetuation of the extensive model and the impact of the US blockade on the Cuban agricultural structure. In that period, urgency ruled the agrarian policy more than any conscious and planned development strategy. Despite agricultural diversification being part of the program of structural transformations, and even though food production had actually grown, none of this has been enough to open the expected avenues of substituted imports, especially considering the unprecedented increase in domestic demand. In fact, Cuban agricultural diversification was a process directly proportional to the crisis of its insertion. It was an emergency and technically disorganized response to the third order of problems pointed out by Furtado in this book’s introduction: “insertion in the international economy ensuring access to technology and financial resources outside relationships of dependency” (Furtado, 1994, p. 40). That generated at least three new structural issues, to be addressed below.

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Structural Problems of Diversification: Extensive, Disorganized, and Inefficient First, an extensive diversification was carried out—​ not followed by due intensification of agricultural production. This process reinforced structural heterogeneity, rather than attenuating it. Second, because it was reactive, diversification was territorially disorganized, eliminating the possibility of planning cropping areas, compromising the much-​defended scale advantages of the Granjas do Povo. Third, diversification was insufficient. Despite the significant increase in food production, it did not keep up with the growth in demand, generating critical macroeconomic imbalances. The first problem, extensive diversification, was observed by Chonchol in his report to fao: “the only possibility of increasing agricultural production in the country is intensification to obtain more plant and animal products per land unit” (1961, p. 77). Because of the extensive model, the tensions between food diversification, sugarcane and livestock farming became unbearable. Instead of generating mutual benefits, extensive diversification created competition for land on account of one crop only growing as another one declines. The intensification of sugarcane production in the 1960s varied as represented in Table 15. It is clear that between 1961 and 1963, as a result of radical diversification and the economic blockade, the intensity of sugar production dropped by 24.7%. The result was that in 1963 sugar exports reached the lowest value of the decade, as demonstrated in Table 16.51 Sugar, which in 1961 was 25.1% of the industrial sector, came to represent 15.8% (eclac, 1964, p. 291). The drop in sugar exports generated a drop in import capacity, reflected in the increase in the Cuban trade deficit in 1962 and 1963. The Cuban trade deficit in 1960 reached 19.6 million pesos. In 1961, it increased to 76.6 million pesos, and in 1962, it jumped to 238.7 million pesos. In 1963, it dropped to 116.9 million pesos (eclac, 1964, p. 285). Given that, eclac suggested a “sugar production crisis in 1962 and 1963” (Ibid., 1964, p. 270). The main reason eclac pointed out for this crisis was the reduction in area of sugarcane plantations from 9,687 to 14,903 caballerías, which corresponded to almost 15% of the sugarcane area recorded in 1959 (eclac, 1964, p. 287; Chonchol,1961, p. 4). But that was not the only reason for the sugar crisis. Three other reasons aggravated the situation. First, as expected, diversification absorbed labor for other crops and the new land tenure system increased the number of hours 4.4

51

In 1964, sugar production recovered up to 4.47 million tonnes, and from then on, it was always higher than in 1963 (Barkin, 1978, p. 128–​9).

First Agrarian Reform, Impulses and Impasses (1959–1963) table 15

143

Sugarcane and sugar yields (1961–​ 1967) (tonnes/​hectare)

Year

Sugarcane

Sugar

1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

40.88 31.13 30.78 39.3 48.54 48.41 52.44

4.87 3.95 3.59 4.65 5.66 5.95 6.33

source: gutelman, 1975, p. 258. data by minaz table 16

Sugar production and exportation (1952–​1963) (millions of tonnes)

Year

Production

Exportation

1952 1956 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

7.2 4.5 4.7 5.7 5.8 6 5.9 6.8 4.8 3.9

5 4.6 5.4 5.3 5.6 5 5.6 6.4 5 3.3

source: eclac, 1964, p. 282

worked for self-​consumption. That it would result in manpower shortage in the sugarcane sector with worse pay and heavier work was not expected. The mechanization of sugarcane cutting was still absolutely insufficient to supply the branches that migrated from the sector. The second reason was the unprecedented drought in 1961 and 1962, whose duration and severity affected all crops. The third reason was cyclone Flora at the end of 1963. juceplan assessed the loss: 10% of the sugarcane area; 60% of rice, fruit, and grain

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production; 70% of cotton and coffee crops; 80% of corn and tubers; 40% of bovine cattle and pigs; and 70% of poultry farming (eclac, 1964, p. 285). Despite the sugar production crisis, sugar prices on the world market behaved in such a way it avoided a major disaster in the generation of Cuban surplus. Between 1959 and 1961, sugar market prices indicated a downward trend due to the decrease by 9% in volume imported by the United States and by 19% in the world market, combined with a general increase in production.52 However, in 1962, the bad weather conditions in Cuba and Europe added to the geographic reorientation of purchases from the United States and the financial speculation typical of the sector caused prices to rise to almost 4 cents a pound in 1962 and 12 cents a pound in 1963. In this context, Cuba managed to negotiate a 4 to 6 cents a pound increase in the price of sugar sold to socialist countries and, despite the production crisis, the island obtained more income than in previous crops—​it did not prevent the imminent trade deficit, though; but it did significantly reduce trade deficit compared to 1962 (eclac, 1964, p. 277–​ 8; p. 281; Gutelman, 1975, p. 231–​2). On that occasion, eclac observed that import substitution required an initial lever to increase importation; therefore, the only way for Cuba to expand import capability would be sugar itself: Considering the panorama of Cuban exports as a whole, it seems evident that the growth of the capacity to import in the coming years will fundamentally depend on the possibilities of expanding sugar production and exports. 1964, p. 283

In that sense, while the first structural issue—​extensive diversification—​ reduced production and sugarcane yields, it generated a crisis in the only sector capable of expanding the import capacity required for industrialization, which figured as the axis of the development strategy. Industrialization was programmatically associated with agrarian reform and diversification.53 However, it was not feasible to do all that at the same time—​a fact observed 52 53

In 1959, for example, 1.2 million tonnes were stored on the world market. In 1961 alone, world sugar production grew by 21 million tonnes, which reinforced the downward trend in prices to 2.91 cents a pound (eclac, 1964, p. 278). As Carlos Rafael Rodríguez summarized: “The Revolution set out, from the very beginning, to eliminate dependency on a single crop and turn toward diversification, allowing, on the one hand, to reduce food imports to a minimum, which were abhorrent considering a land as fertile as ours, and, on the other hand, to provide basic raw material for national industry, being the result, in both cases, an increase in agricultural and industrial export surplus” (Rodríguez, 1963a, pp. 21–​22).

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throughout 1963, through the structural issues, consequences of the reduction of sugarcane, especially the growth of the trade deficit that it was otherwise intended to remedy. The second structural issue was the loss of scale, resulting from the fact that diversification was not only extensive but also territorially disorganized. Gutelman explained that “two years after taking power, administrators’ excitement to individually apply the general directive of diversification transformed the Cuban countryside into a veritable mosaic of diverse cultures” (1975, p. 223). If the gigantism of the Granjas del Pueblo was justified by the technical and economic advantages of large-​scale production for increasing productivity, the disorganized and spontaneous nature of diversification had nullified this advantage, disseminating dispersed small-​scale cropping that cut across each of the large productive units into small fragments. Dumont attested that in some cases there were twenty-​five to thirty-​five crops in a single farm, while it would be recommended that there be two to four crops per unit (Dumont, 1970, p. 141). There would be a total of about sixty crops in all People’s Farms tilled on a small scale, and this meant that each Farm made an effort to produce more than half of all the existing crops on the island within the same productive unit (Gutelman, 1975, p. 223). With the territorial disorganization that marked the agricultural diversification of the state sector, the productivity of small private anap producers was greater than the productivity of the “higher form” of state farms. On that occasion, Chonchol stated: “it is not that diversification is incorrect, but claiming that it is possible to efficiently manage a company this size and with this degree of diversification” (Chonchol,1961, p. 49). Like Chonchol, Gutelman expressed that “the policy of agricultural diversification indisputably corresponded to a correct development strategy, but, conceived as a tactic, it faced immense difficulties” (1975, p. 215). Gutelman proposed that diversification should be a long-​term goal because at the speed it occurred it jeopardized the general balance of the economy, including the social achievements of the revolution. More than a strategy focused on immediately reversing the cropping regime of export-​oriented monoculture, disorganized diversification responded to the pressures of the international market. The potential absence of sugar buyers pushed Cuba to make this sudden turn to avoid food shortage. Diversification lasted while there was uncertainty about the longevity of the agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union, as there were no medium-​ term guarantees about the new economic insertion. The contradiction between the search for a large scale and the radical fragmentation of crops demonstrates the technical confusion that prevailed on the Farms. Experience has shown that diversification could not be a political

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guideline in itself, and that it should be technically planned supported by agronomic criteria and specialized cultivation methods. The Farms deepened the extensive model and left all crops under the command of a single administrator. Each crop required a different type of machinery, fertilizer, soil preparation, and harvesting procedure; however, farm technicians were not prepared to deal with so many peculiarities. That was also how eclac perceived it, in 1963: The principle of diversification was often applied without previously determining zones or areas in which new crops should be sown, and this led to each agricultural enterprise trying to produce a large number of articles, sometimes subdividing and overspecializing available land. Concurrently, new crops were introduced at a rate and magnitude that did not fully correspond to the knowledge and experience of the agricultural workforce. Apparently, sugarcane cultivation was the most affected by this process. eclac, 1964, p. 287

In that case, the Cuban government followed René Dumont’s guidelines. Dumont designed an agricultural diversification program for Cuba through which each production unit should specialize in no more than four crops. The program was guided by two principles. The first was specialized diversification, which had to obey a rational geographical arrangement. A horticultural ring for perishable products would be created surrounding Havana and other large cities.54 Sugarcane and cattle, on the contrary, should be kept away from urban centers. Each industrial crop (cane, cattle, coffee, tobacco, cotton, sisal, fruit) should occupy one area close to the respective industry and each one should be concentrated in a single region of the country, guaranteeing regional specialization and vertical convergence between agriculture and industry. Each production unit should contain a horticultural sector and produce milk on a small scale, in order to guarantee internal food sovereignty. In addition, all production units should combine livestock with crops in a rotation system, as this would increase the productivity of both. Thus, national diversification planning with regional specialization would replace reactive diversification on a random local scale (Dumont, 1970, p. 40–​44).

54

Dumont attributed the authorship of the horticultural rings model to agronomist Von Thunen (Dumont, 1970, p. 142).

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The second principle in Dumont’s program was technical education for specialized diversification. It proposed the dissemination of instruction manuals for thirty crops, including animal fodder, fifteen to twenty basic fruits and vegetables, and at least twelve agricultural techniques. The manual should be differentiated into different levels, corresponding to the division of labor—​the administrator had to master the entire process. For the illiterate, drawn manuals could be made. According to Dumont, such a simple measure could save millions of pesos in technical production errors (Dumont, 1970, p. 45).55 Finally, the third structural problem did not result from diversification, but it should have been solved by it and was not—​it was the imbalance between supply and demand for food. About that it is necessary to first emphasize Juan Noyola’s words: “it was the first agrarian reform in the history of the world that did not bring in its wake an initial decrease in production” (1978, p. 119). In fact, food production for the domestic market grew at an average rate of 5.8% per year between 1957 and 1963.56 At that time, it was verified that the food sector for the domestic market was the “most dynamic segment of agriculture” (eclac, 1964, p. 288). However, the growth in food production was not sufficient to satisfy the increased demand. Such an imbalance generated inflationary pressure difficult to control, and it forced the government to create food rationing measures, which for decades was a characteristic of the Cuban revolution.57 Even so, the strict rationing did not prevent eclac itself from observing that, in the case of basic foodstuffs and textile products, consumption of the Cuban population had significantly improved after the revolution: Despite the fact that domestic supply was not sufficient to cover such an expansion [of demand] and the appreciable drop that was registered in some products in 1961, consumption per inhabitant tended to grow

55

56 57

There was a third principle in Dumont’s program and its political content is contemplated in the debate on cooperatives and People’s Farms. He was for self-​management, self-​financing, and legal autonomy of agricultural units and argued that, when receiving all supplies from the State, the units were not able to measure the real production cost, generating systematic waste and a drop in labor productivity. Within this principle he proposed that wage was necessarily related to hours worked, a measure that was only generalized in Cuba, after the failure of the 10 million tonne harvest, in 1970 (Dumont, 1970, p. 46). Corrected for a demographic growth of 1.9% per year, this meant an increase in the domestic food market of 3.8% per year per inhabitant (eclac, 1964, p. 288). At that time, eclac analyzed it: “The result was an internal deficit of such a magnitude that it had to be stopped through strict rationing of most consumer goods and price increases” (eclac, 1964, p. 270).

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compared to figures prevailing in 1957, in the main agricultural articles: rice, wheat flour, tubers, and vegetables. Otherwise, the consumption of fat and livestock products—​on which little quantitative information is available—​does not seem to have recovered to previous levels, despite improvement in pork, poultry, and fish production, among other products. The production of shoes and cotton textile, in turn, allowed for the increase in domestic consumption, especially in the most numerous strata of the population. eclac, 1964, p. 274

Seeking to attenuate the imbalance between food supply and demand, in 1961, the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba (The Workers Central Union of Cuba) during its ix Congress assessed the need for salary freeze until the entire wage system in the country was restructured (Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 236).58 The rationing system mainly involved food, clothing, and footwear.59 Its purpose was to guarantee, in a context of increasing domestic demand, both a basic standard of living for all—​without large disparities in consumption resulting from the still present income inequality—​and economic rebalancing. As Sergio Aranda argued in 1968: The rationing system imposed in Cuba serves the purpose of guaranteeing each citizen, regardless of their income level, social class or administrative responsibility, the right to purchase certain quantities of each of the rationed food, thus preventing lower income groups from being marginalized from this consumption […]. Rationing in Cuba is motivated by an essentially transitory phenomenon of maladjustment. 1968, p. 39–​40

58 59

The new wage system was approved in September 1962 and experimentally implemented in thirty-​six agricultural units and twenty-​seven non-​agricultural units throughout 1963 (Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 238–​9). The rationing consisted of, basically, 1.48 kilos of boneless beef per person per month; 1.38 kilos of rice per person per month; 1 liter of milk per day for children under seven years old and adults over sixty-​five years old; and 6 cans of condensed milk per month for other ages. There was no specific restriction on the consumption of bread, eggs, sugar, and vegetables (Aranda, 1968, p. 39–​40). In 1969, the rice portion doubled to 2.7 kilograms per person per month (Barkin, 1976, p. 139). It is worth remembering that rural laborer’s diet before the revolution was much poorer, and that products such as meat and milk, now guaranteed to all, were considered luxurious. Furthermore, in addition to the regular supply in the Libreta de Abastecimiento (Supply Booklet), the majority of the working population had one or two free meals in the work centers.

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The macroeconomic imbalances generated by these three structural problems did not fail to influence decisions made toward agrarian policy in October 1963. Intensification of Class Struggle and General Economic Trends in 1963 In short, this first stage of Cuban agrarian reform—​between 1959 and 1963—​ was characterized by an enormous release of underutilized productive forces, especially land and labor, as well as a very strong shift in agricultural production resulting from the accelerated transformation of the properties, disorganized diversification, and the US economic blockade. The modern plantation was fully dismantled. The increase in food demand and the increase in the proportion of self-​consumption cropping are immediate consequences of putting agrarian reform into effect. In 1969, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez assessed the general situation of Cuban agriculture between 1959 and 1963. Due to its capacity for synthesis it is worth quoting: 4.5

In agriculture, organizational issues were more noticeable due to the very nature of the sector. On the other hand, the watchword diversification, which emerged as the antithesis of our previous history of monoculture and dependency on imperialism and which in the circumstances of the moment sought a response to external uncertainty, faced errors and difficulties in its application. First, diversification was carried out in absolute rather than relative terms. That led to the dismantling of around 200,000 hectares of sugarcane in order to dedicate that area to other crops. Such a measure, followed by an extreme drought that lasted from the end of 1961 to 1962 and organizational and workforce issues, caused severe reduction in the 1962 and 1963 crops. Regarding workforce issues, one may say they originate from the new agricultural programs that determined a stable offer of employment and an increase in purchasing power, the country’s defense needs, as well as the new conception of labor relationships that led us to the eradication of subhuman exploitation. Secondly, the beginning of a large number of agricultural and livestock lines while technologies had not been mastered, meant great tensions for an agricultural organization that was still underdeveloped and subject to the natural readjustments derived from the process of political and social transformations. rodríguez, 1969, p. 16–​17, emphasis added

That is an important assessment so that by starting from it one may point out the main determinants that triggered the second agrarian reform, which

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started on October 10, 1963. Hereafter, four of them are identified. The first determinant is about the growing tension of the international context. From the 1960 blockade onward, the US government adopted an aggressive attitude to militarily defeat the Cuban revolution. They were dissatisfied both with their material losses—​with the loss of control over the Cuban economy—​and with the moral failure of having been expelled from a country where until recently they overthrew and installed presidents. The invasion of Playa Girón on April 16, 1961 and the missile crisis of October 1962 were conflicts prompted by the aggressive strategy of the United States in the context of the Cold War, and which ended up raising the affinity between Cuba and the Soviet Union, paving the way for the radicalization of the revolution with the second agrarian reform. The second determinant was about the intensification of class struggle, resulting from the growing sabotage of the agrarian bourgeoisie that remained on the island, which was also becoming increasingly aggressive, following the US government’s attitude. Among the most serious actions were fires and murders: they burned sugarcane fields, poultry farms, state food stores, destroyed rural schools, and workers’ and peasants’ homes. Some murders of civil and military leaders of the revolution were mentioned by Antero Regalado.60 Others followed the example set by Hubert Matos and Manuel Artíme, who joined peasant organizations with the purpose of provoking intrigue, aversion, and confusion from within (Regalado, 1979, p. 168). The second agrarian reform was the measure that eliminated the economic base of this actively counterrevolutionary segment, ending the incomplete defeat of the former Cuban elites. The third determinant was about the need to eliminate the territorial chaos generated from the first agrarian reform. As Maps 1 and 2 demonstrate, state farms were dispersed territories interspersed with remaining private latifundia, which amplified structural issues resulting from economic disorganization. State control over the areas that separated fragments of the same farm was fundamental for the reorganization of agriculture, now on socialized

60

Regalado recalls: “The even murdered volunteer teachers such as Conrado Benítez; the young student and popular literacy teacher Manuel Ascunce; the peasant fighter and member of the Rebel Army in the Sierra Maestra Pancho Tamayo; the honest and revolutionary peasants of Escambray Pedro Lantigua and Carlos Cancio; the peasant leaders of Las Villas Juan González and Romelio Cornelio; the militia and revolutionary peasant from Ceiba del Agua Vicente Pérez Noa; the peasant children of Bolodrón Fermín and Yolanda Rodríguez; the agricultural leader of Gunes Humberto Hernandez; and the sugar worker at the Osvaldo Sánchez plant Profirio Acosta” (1979, p. 178).

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bases. The construction of a centrally planned economy required that the set of productive forces participate in the plan, otherwise external factors could undermine it. The second agrarian reform incorporated almost the entire Cuban area into the national economic plan. Ultimately, the fourth determinant of the second agrarian reform was a consequence of the macroeconomic context. Despite the growth of 9% per year in gross products between 1961 and 1963, the average growth of savings at 30% per year and the average growth in currency in circulation at 6% represented a strong imbalance. Many of the investments needed to structurally rebalance the Cuban economy were postponed due to lack of spare parts, and even so, a total growth of 19% in material product was achieved between 1959 and 1963 (eclac, 1964, p. 269, 273, 294).61 According to eclac, in addition to spare parts, in 1963, energy shortages had become a bottleneck for Cuban growth. Furthermore, a fiscal crisis had arisen as a result of the growth in public spending, which increased sixfold between 1959 and 1964, leaping from 389.6 million to 2.4 billion pesos (eclac, 1964, p. 294). Imbalance was also manifested in the balance of trade: between 1959 and 1963, a trade deficit of 550 million dollars was recorded as a result of a larger than 33% decrease in the value of Cuban exports between 1957 and 1962.62 Between 1962 and 1963 alone, the exports fell by 100 million dollars, from 520 to 420 million (eclac, 1964, p. 270, 285). To rebalance the accounts, 700 million dollars were acquired in foreign loans, 300 of which were conditioned on the purchase of capital goods (eclac, 1963, p. 270). Despite the regulation of purchase of luxury goods, which contributed to the 44% drop in imports between 1957 and 1963, the 10% increase in spending on raw material, fuel, and capital goods did not allow for the expected foreign exchange saving (eclac, 1964, p. 270). Furtado analyzed the problem: The Cuban revolution had started by redistributing income with intent to raise the level of consumption of the great mass of the population, which meant that not only would the investment rate not rise, but also the 61

62

About the concept of material product, eclac explains: “The concept of material product refers to the total value added in the production of goods and in the provision of services directly over the course of a year and expressed in market prices […]. It differs from the concept of gross domestic product at market prices, which does not include services such as drinking water, finance, housing, personal and professional, public administration and defense, and other similar services classified as non-​productive” (eclac, 1964, p. 275). About exportation: 40% of the drop was in the volume exported and 60% was due to price deterioration (eclac, 1964, p. 270).

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capacity to import freed by the reduction in consumption of the wealthy classes was absorbed by the importation of consumer goods for general use, or of intermediate products and raw material to produce those goods in the country. 1969, p. 345

All of that generated pressure on the balance of payments which ended up restricting importation. Finally, although the employment policy has shown rapid results in terms of absorption of unemployment, alleviation of the brutal exploitation of work, and end of relationship between hours of work and wages, generated a significant drop in productivity, as observed by eclac: From 1961 to 1963, economic policy faced a decline in productivity levels. An impulse was given to training and qualification programs for the industrial workforce, and campaigns were carried out to encourage an increase in production per employed man. eclac, 1964, p. 270

Facing intensification of the class struggle, disorganization in agriculture, and macroeconomic imbalances, the revolutionary leadership, now avowedly socialist, defined its path: to expand the bases of state economy, to strengthen control over the economy, and to fully incorporate into the new Cuban development project the agricultural area still commanded by the agrarian bourgeoisie.

­c hapter 3

Second Agrarian Reform and the Sugar Paradox (1963–​1967) It was to be expected that the external sector in a short time would be transformed into the nerve point, where the future of the Cuban revolution would be decided. celso furtado (1969, p. 342)

…

Is building on sugar better than building on sand? jean-​paul sartre (in galeano, 2004, p. 86)

∵ 1

Transformation of the Land Tenure System

Signed on October 3, 1963, the second agrarian reform was the final blow to the private landowner sector remaining in Cuba. The law claimed that the agrarian bourgeoisie was obstructing the production of food for the population, speculating on agriculture and using its high incomes for “anti-​social and counter-​revolutionary” purposes. Therefore, its existence would be incompatible with socialism. They also maintained that the rural bourgeoisie was serving as a political base for the sabotage actions of U.S. imperialism, in a decisive move for the development of Cuban agriculture.1 In addition, the incoordination between the National Agricultural plan and the private landowner sector obstructed ongoing development projects and aggravated economic disorganization. The main objective of the law, therefore, was to eliminate this rural bourgeoisie, composed of approximately 10,000 proprietors who owned, since the end of 1962, 138,822 caballerías, including 1,000 arrobas of cane grown in

1 The information regarding the second agrarian reform law was extracted from its original text organized in Bell et al., 2011, p. 283–​6.

© Joana Salém Vasconcelos, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004515215_005

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22 thousand caballerías (Rodríguez, 1963a, p.10; 1963b, p. 74; Gutelman, 1975, p. 88). 1.1 The Agrarian Reform Law of October 1963 The first article of the law declared the nationalization of all private properties greater than 5 caballerías (A “Cavalry” is equivalent to 67 hectares), with the exception of two cases: properties jointly operated by family members, provided that the individual portions of each member were not greater than five caballerías (Article 2); and the high-​productivity properties, which had already shown a spirit of cooperation with state plans, perpetuating the exception of the first agrarian reform (Article 3). Absenteeism was considered by law an act of sabotage to the agricultural development of the country and was subject to punishment. It was emphasized that only productive properties would be entitled to financial compensation. The portions of land subject to leases and sales, which were illegal since June 3, 1959, would not be compensated either. The productive owners and in legal situations would receive compensation of 15 pesos monthly, for 10 years per expropriated caballería (Articles 4 and 6). This figure represented no more than 3.8% of the compensation of the first agrarian reform (of 400 pesos per caballería), reflecting a completely distinct correlation between social and political forces (Chonchol, 1961, p. 28). There would not be any compensation inferior to 100 pesos per month, nor superior to 250 pesos per month.2 If the affected lands were being managed by a third party, the administrator would have the right to compensation, and not the owner. Unlike in 1959, this compensation would also apply to plants, livestock, machinery and agricultural buildings on expropriated properties (Article 6). Owners affected by the law who lived in their rural houses and did not have another residence could continue to live on their farms if they so wished, that is, they would have to live with the neighboring state farm (Article 5). In addition, if the affected properties were registered as mortgage guarantees, the commitments would be immediately voided, along with any debt or obligation binding that land (Article 7). Another decisive measure was state intervention in all bank accounts belonging to the expropriated, with three purposes: the late payment of its workers; the payment of debts with the state; and the settlement of all bank credits that were due within 30 days following the signing of the law. With this measure, Cuba’s last millionaires were liquidated and prevented from running away with their fortunes without paying

2 Which means that an owner who had a maximum of 25 expropriated caballerías, would receive the same compensation as an owner who lost 16 caballerías.

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their debts. Social segregation has been dealt a definitive blow. Finally, the law determined that expropriations would be executed within 24 hours of their signature. After this deadline, if the owners of more than five caballerías had not received the visit from the inra, they would be obliged to report the fact to the Provincial delegation during the following 72 hours. Failure to comply with this communication, as well as any attempt to prevent or prevent the application of the law, would be punished with loss of all compensatory Rights (Article 9). The second agrarian reform became part of the Basic Law of the Republic of Cuba. At the end of the first agrarian reform, at the end of 1962, the state sector had 44% of the country’s land, including forests and hills, which corresponded to 290,834 caballerías, in addition to 27% of the total bovine mass. The owners of over 5 caballerías controlled 20% of the total area of the island, and the other 36% were distributed among small farmers (Gutelman, 1975, p. 88; eclac, 1964, p.271). Strictly speaking, the private sector was still larger than the state sector, and even though many small farmers were organically linked to the anap and national plans, a huge mass of agricultural productive resources still did not partake in the social-​economic development strategy. After the second agrarian reform, 60.1% of the country’s lands submitted to state control, that is, 410,856 caballerías. For the first time, the largest portion of agricultural productive resources was in the hands of the state and control over the use of the surplus would be largely centralized. According to the data provided by Gutelman, smallholder farmers owned 39.3% of the land, which accounted for 265,499 caballerías (Gutelman, 1975, p. 88). The structural transformation of land ownership resulting from the second agrarian reform can be observed in Table 17. From a monetary point of view, at the beginning of 1963, the state owned 46.3% of the agricultural sector, and came to control 57% of this in 1964 (Aranda, 1968, p.36). Forms of Agrarian property have since undergone a growing trend of stabilization. After the second reform, only two forms of property became the basis of new agriculture: the State Farm and small private property. Between one and the other, agricultural societies and credit and service cooperatives reflected attempts at voluntary collectivization of small private property. This new structure reflected the new economic and political subjects who directed the purposes of national development: the state of socialist ideology and a politically organized peasantry in the anap and/​or economically organized in the process of collectivization.

156  table 17

Chapter 3 Land tenure system by sectors after the two agrarian reforms

First law (Dec /​1962) Sectors State Sector Private Sector Private property smaller than 5 caballerías Private property largest than 5 caballerías

Second law (Dec/​1963)

Area

%

Area

%

290,834 385,529 248,211

44 56 36

410,856 265,506 265,499

60.1 39.3 39.3

138,822

20

0.0

0.0

source: gutelman, 1975, p. 88

1.2 Cyclone Flora On the eve of the signing of the second agrarian reform, the rural bourgeoisie intensified its counter-​information activities and tried to spread fear among the peasants about a supposed complete expropriation of the private sector (Barrios, 1987, p.65). In May 1963, Fidel Castro had already directed anap to stop the campaigns of voluntary collectivization, fearing that this would provide ammunition to internal enemies. In the midst of the ideological war between the government and the rural bourgeoisie for the conquest of the confidence of the peasants regarding the second Agrarian Reform, a natural catastrophe diverted all the country’s attention. One day after the signing of the law, on October 4, 1963, cyclone Flora entered the island from the south of the Eastern Province with unprecedented power.3 The results of the disaster were 1,500 dead and missing, 175,000 people evacuated from their homes and an economic loss of more than 100 million

3 The cyclone was blocked by the Sierra Maestra, where it remained for many hours, continuously enlarging the volume of River Springs and generating thunderstorms, that extended for hundreds of kilometers. It then veered into the Gulf of Guacanayabo to the south and turned erratically to the North, penetrating the province of Camaguey. After 6 days of storms and catastrophic flooding, the cyclone left the island north of Camaguey, crossing a region near Gibara on October 9. The erratic trajectory of the cyclone was also unknown to the Cubans (Bell et al., 2011, p.311).

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pesos (Bell et al., 2011, p. 313, 320). The greatest loss was related to infrastructure and the damage in terms of crops amounted to 11 million pesos (Barrios, 1987, p.65–​6). The calculations made at the time diagnosed that 80% of the smaller crops had been destroyed by the waters, being 30% to 50% of the coffee crop and 100% of the banana plantations (Bell et al., 2011, p. 321). The cyclone was so devastating that the rainfall that fell over the province of Oriente in just six days was higher than the rainfall that covered the entire national territory throughout the year 1961, equivalent to 1,244 mm (Ibid., 2011, p. 339). When he spoke on national radio a few days after the disaster, Fidel Castro expressed that it would be possible to water 10,000 caballerías of crops for one year with that amount of water (Ibid., 2011, p. 341). It was therefore necessary to learn to master the forces of nature, in order to harness them in favor of society. The territory affected by cyclone Flora corresponded to more than half of the national territory: 62,948 km2 inhabited by 2,974,000 people. More than 11 thousand homes were completely destroyed, more than 21 thousand homes were seriously damaged, and more than 100,000 families lost absolutely everything (Ibid., 2011, p.319–​22). The floods reached places that had never been hit by this type of storm before, because they were far from the rivers and thus did not have any preparation to deal with the floods. Entire families climbed the roofs of their homes and were rescued by helicopters of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Many anonymous people made a commitment to help their neighbors, and a new spirit of “national solidarity” was awakened by the tragedy. Fidel Castro himself put himself at the head of the rescue work, penetrating the danger zones inside an amphibious car (Ibid., 2011, p.311). While the rural bourgeoisie bet on the fragility of the new government to cope with the catastrophe and the exiles of Miami were sure that the incompetence of the revolutionaries would shake popular confidence, the government adopted emergency measures so forceful in defense of the affected, that the consequence was exactly inverse. In this sense, cyclone Flora was decisively important in order to consolidate the confidence of the Cuban peasantry in relation to the government and the second agrarian reform. The peasantry of the East had already suffered from many hurricanes, but cyclone Flora was undoubtedly one of the most devastating in the island’s history. For them, especially, it was palpable that the immediate actions taken by the revolutionary government differed from all previous governments. Facing the tragedy, the revolution carried out an impressive demonstration of responsibility for the human rights of those affected. When Cubans saw Fidel Castro venturing into danger zones and the Revolutionary Armed Forces helicopters flying through the storm, confidence deepened. After the emergency rescue work, with the end of the storm, the government put itself at the

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service of reconstruction and social protection to the homeless. A census of the affected population was drawn and free food was guaranteed to everyone. On radio, Fidel Castro claimed that, before the revolution, the dead in climate tragedies were added to the starving dead, because the affected population did not receive adequate assistance and had to rely on their own luck, which would not happen that time. He also stated that in disasters such as this, the rural Guard and landowners took advantage to evict many peasants from their lands (Ibid., 2011, p.355). The government provided money to all Cubans who lost their homes, so that they could rebuild them. It offered free clothes, shoes and furniture. Not only were all the debts of the peasants who lost their crops lost, they also received more state credits to restart the plantation. The State handed over pregnant cows, sows and chickens to the peasants and the destroyed farms and bought the cattle from the small farmers, who would sell them to the newly expropriated bourgeois. The Ministry of Health has set up health care clinics, with moving vaccination stations for the homeless. In regards to infrastructure, the Ministry of Public Works has committed almost all its budget to the reconstruction of bridges, roads and communication lines of the East, some of which had been completely destroyed. The Ministry of transportation was responsible for the reconstruction of the railways. inra made an inventory of all the lost farm equipment and has drawn up a plan for the recovery of the plantations. A plan for reforestation was also outlined in order to avoid the landslides of entire mountains witnessed in the passage of the cyclone.4 In addition, the government adopted two immediate economic measures. The first was to raise the prices of four items (cigarettes, beer, beef, chicken meat) to finance the reconstruction. This measure was sanctioned by law 1,127 on October 31, 1963.5 The second measure set the voluntary reduction in

4 Reforestation plans had already been in place since 1959, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture headed by Pedro Miret. With the revolution, the Ministry of Agriculture became a kind of “Ministry of Reforestation,” this being the only relevant task it carried out before its complete dissolution at the end of 1960. All its traditional assignments were passed to inra. According to Chonchol, and the role of the Ministry of Agriculture has been limited because of the “lack of trust of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government in relation to the bodies of the traditional Cuban Public Administration, and even when a man in the full confidence of the Revolutionary Government was appointed Minister of Agriculture, Commander Pedro Miret (July, 1959), his appointment had been made with a view to enabling the dissolution of the body.” Miret’s Ministry had, in 1960, planted 36 million trees in 1,192 caballerías (Chonchol, 1961, p. 61). 5 By law 1,127, the price of cigarettes and beer were raised by 5 cents; the price of beef by 55 cents and the price of chicken by 65 cents (Bell et al., 2011, p. 343, 367).

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sugar consumption to 26.9 kilograms per person per year, which would mean a reduction of more than 50% of habitual consumption.6 The aim was to expand foreign exchange by selling sugar on the world market. But between 1963 and 1964, the average annual sugar consumption in Cuba fell only from 63.3 kilograms per person to 54.7 kilograms. The drop of only 13.5% in domestic sugar consumption makes us assume that the government appeal has not reached the levels expected, even though it has had some effect. In 1965, the average increased again to 65.8 kilos per year of sugar consumption per person (Aranda, 1968, p.58). The two economic measures were still insufficient for full recovery. Foreign aid was fundamental. The Soviet bloc sent food, supplies, clothing, and other supplies free of charge. But when the Red Cross of the United States offered help, the Cuban government refused, triggering another exchange of accusations. Castro justified the refusal, claiming that Cuba had allowed U.S. Hurricane fighter jets to fly over the island to provide weather information about cyclone Flora, but that the U.S. government had ignored the permission and then slandered Cuba for allegedly blocking airspace for technical missions. In addition, Fidel claimed that the United States Red Cross still owed 10 million pesos to the island’s government as compensation to Cubans arrested during the invasion of Playa Girón. For the Cuban government, any aid from the United States should be conditional on the end of the economic blockade and the payment of the 10 million pesos of compensation (Bell et al., 2011, p. 350).7 As Barrios noted: “the Flora cyclone served to make clear, before all our people and especially before the peasants, the deeply humanistic and supportive character of our Revolution” (1987, p.65). In this sense, the government’s rapid response to the cyclone and the guarantee of protection to the affected population were decisive for the peaceful application of the second agrarian reform law. 1.3 The Social Structure of the New Agriculture The second round of expropriations completed the dismantling of the land tenure system of modern plantation and virtually eliminated the land speculation that gave dynamism to the Cuban capitalist system, in addition to having supplanted social segregation once and for all. Corresponding to this new 6 To register the voluntary nature of the measure, Fidel stated: “We do not want to establish this by decree; I believe that our people are conscious […]. This must arise from the feeling of solidarity of the people themselves” (In Bell et al., 2011, p. 344). 7 “Twenty times worse than Hurricane Flora for Cuba,” Fidel said, “is Yankee imperialism!” (in Bell et al., 2011, p. 351).

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agrarian structure, a new social structure emerged, which took the place of traditional segregation. From the historical point of view, the elimination of the rural bourgeoisie was the most important consequence of the second agrarian reform. Along with it, the consumerist impulses of the elites and the waste of national currencies on luxury goods—​which blocked the paths of the island’s economic development—​would disappear. For this reason, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez maintained that: “with the second and definitive agrarian reform, until the end of 1963, the transit of Cuba from the semi-​colonial to the socialist structures was completed in practice” (Rodríguez, 1978, p.154). The remaining private sector relied on the revolution, and important peasant segments were already ideological allies. From October 1963, the classes and fractions of classes active in agricultural production were arranged as shown in Table 18. The peasantry has established itself as a fundamental part for the production of food and other agricultural goods for the internal market. In 1965, for example, the peasantry was responsible for the production of 69% of vegetables, 68% of fruits, 32% of rice, 58% of tubers and 40% of the country’s milk (Furtado, 1969, p.351). The division of labor inherited from the previous agrarian structure held large state property responsible for exporting crops and small peasant estates food. Now, however, this division of labor was oriented towards new purposes. The State took on new priorities in the use of the surplus, and the small peasantry, historically focused on the arduous individual subsistence, had incorporated the economic task of collective subsistence. In December 1963, the state commanded 69.9% of sugarcane production, while the private sector commanded 54.2% of other national crops. After the second

table 18

Rural classes after the second agrarian reform

Class

Fractions of classes

Socio-​legal group

Peasant

Small or medium

Agricultural Proletarian

Temporary workers (crops) Agro-​industrial worker Direct workers Indirect workers Craftsmen

Individual producer (anap) Cooperative Producer Jornalero

Other landless groups

source: valdés paz, 1997, p. 132

Employee Administrative and services Managers and technicians Self-​employment

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Second Agrarian Reform and the Sugar Paradox (1963–1967) table 19

Agrarian property and crops after the second agrarian reform (December 1963) (in caballerías)

Sectors

Sugarcane

State Private Total

%

76.800 69.9 26.300 30.4 103,100 100

Other crops

%

249,600 210,500 460,100

54.2 45.8 100

Cultivated area(a) 326,400 236,800 563,200

% 58.0 42.0 100

(a) only the area actually cultivated source: nuñez jimenez, 1966, p. 21

agrarian reform, the division of crops between the state and private sectors was organized as shown in Table 19. The responsibilities of the private sector, however, could not expand beyond the technical limit allowed by its small scale. The production units of the private sector, after the second agrarian reform, were predominantly properties smaller than the living minimum of 2 caballerías. Although the productivity of the anap sector was twice as high as that of the state sector in 1962 and 1963,8 small farmers found more potential obstacles to absorbing technology and intensifying production due to the small size of their properties and resources (Dumont, 1970, p.73). In addition, these peasants depended on the state sector to boost their activities: 30% of peasant revenues came from sales to Tiendas del Pueblo and without voluntary work organized by the state they could hardly sustain their individual crops (Rodríguez, 1978, p.150). Voluntary collectivization was then driven by the possibilities of intensifying private agriculture in search of relative food sovereignty. In Table 20, we show the composition of the private sector after the second agrarian reform by the size of its properties. From 1964 the state sector found more favorable conditions for an economic development policy, by incorporating the huge mass of agricultural resources. The conditions were set for overcoming some structural problems that had been diagnosed since 1961, such as the territorial fragmentation of farms and the impossibility of involving all national forces in economic plans. The misconceptions committed by the state sector would be very useful for the future;

8 For example, in 1962 the production of yams in the private sector was 7 tonnes per hectare, while in farms it was 2.4 tonnes per hectare (Dumont, 1970, p.73).

162  table 20

Chapter 3 Area and properties of the private agricultural sector after the second agrarian reform (1963)

Size

Units

Less than 2 caballerías Less than 1 caballería Less than 0.45 caballería

120 thousand 60 thousand 25 thousand

% of total peasantry 78 39 16

source: valdés paz, 2009, p. 36

among them, the disorganized aspect of diversification, the excessive centralization of Agricultural Management, and the perpetuation of the extensive character of production. The awareness of these misconceptions and the change in the international scene, which signaled a more permanent insertion into the Soviet bloc, caused the revolutionary leadership to reformulate the national development strategy. 1.4 A Combined Strategy: Sugar, Diversification and Technology When the new agrarian structure was stabilized, it was seen that the distance between the economic plans and the reality of agricultural production could decrease. A new proposal for the economic organization of Agriculture was formulated, based on a new development strategy. Faced with the negative impact of the reduced sugar harvest of 1963 on the formation of the National surplus, the revolutionary leaders changed their vision regarding the cultivation of sugarcane. Had it not been for a sudden spike in sugar prices in the world market that year, the bottleneck in the balance of payments could have been even more suffocating. This is how, in 1963, the Cuban leaders became more deeply aware of the power of historical structures. Sugar was a legacy of underdevelopment that was difficult to overcome. It was therefore about profiting from it and turning it into an advantage.9 They would not have deduced this, of course, if there had not been a change in the international scene. The new economic insertion was in the process of consolidating itself: the Soviet 9 Regarding the choice of sugar, Rodríguez commented in 1972: “It was foolish that with the available equipment of our sugar industry, with the agricultural and industrial facilities for the production of sugarcane, with the experience both agricultural and industrial, which was the only one that we really had, we should not take advantage of all these conditions” (1983, p.469).

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bloc became an ideologically suitable escape route to overcome the crisis generated by the American blockade. In late 1963, the Cuban government signed a new agreement with the Soviet Union and shifted its investments back to sugar. But the return to Sugar did not mean, at least at first, the end of diversification.10 The Cuban development strategy began to combine specialized diversification with sugar prioritization. This combined strategy depended, functionally, on the capacity of absorption and technological innovation in sugarcane agriculture.11 Thus an idea punctuated in the regulation of sugarcane cooperatives in 1960 was resumed: correlate diversification and intensification. Intensifying sugarcane production was an imperative of diversification and vice versa. The conflict between the different crops over the extensive occupation of the area should be substituted by the combined strategy. Technology was the link that could resolve the contradictions between sugarcane and other crops and everyone should be aware of its essential character. As part of the new agricultural strategy, three tasks were outlined. First, new administrative bodies of the state sector were created in favor of greater decentralization of the agricultural plan: groupings, territorial departments and plots. Secondly, a new territorial organization of crops was developed, replacing fragmented diversification with specialized diversification, as Dumont had suggested.12 Third, the priority of State Investments was shifted to the purchase of capital goods and technological absorption.13 The combined strategy and the three tasks were based on some optimism about the structural capabilities of Cuban agriculture. It was synthesized by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in the following words:

10

11 12 13

Guevara argued, in 1964, that the new strategy sought to readjust the proposals of resources and not to abandon diversification: “Cane has priority, in terms of allocation of resources and factors that helped the more efficient use of them. The rest of the agricultural productions and their development, which involved diversification, were not abandoned, but the appropriate proportions were sought to prevent a dispersion of resources that makes it difficult to optimize yields” (Guevara, 1982, p.21). On the “technological abandonment” of cane, Rodríguez declared in 1964: “cane threatened to become a kind of natural pasture, because so little attention was given to it as to natural pastures” (1964, p.15). Valdés Paz maintained: “diversification will not develop to the detriment of historical productions, but rather as the development of new areas and new projects” (2009, p.39). These tasks coincide with the first and third order of problems listed by Celso Furtado in the introduction of this study (Furtado, 1994, p.40). These two problem orders are the theoretical background of the narrative that proceeds here. The combined strategy and the three tasks organize the next topics of this chapter.

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What experience has taught us is that Cuba’s agricultural diversification does not have to develop forcibly, at the expense of cane production, for which our land is especially endowed for reasons of soil climate and geographical position. The mistake made in Cuban agriculture during the years 1960 and 1961 consisted, on the one hand, of relegating cane as if it were indispensable to diversify agriculture; and, on the other hand, bringing diversification to the local level, that is, converting each farm into a mosaic of crops. […] The direction we have taken since 1962 is another. Diversification must exist in a national sense, that is, that of the 250 thousand or 300 thousand caballerías available for cultivation, cane can have 125 thousand caballerías and the rest should be devoted to the crops most applicable to our soil and climate conditions. 1963b, p.85

In order to better understand the combined strategy that accompanied the second agrarian reform, we will then discuss its international context (the new Cuban insertion), and the three tasks of reorganization mentioned above: (1) administrative-​territorial change; (2) Specialized diversification; (3) technological absorption. 2

The Soviet Union and the Sugar Paradox

In April 1963, Fidel Castro went to the Soviet Union for the first time (Rodríguez García, 1987, p.40). Guevara had previously represented the Cuban revolutionary government in various parts of the world and, between October and December 1960, had visited countries such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea and China (Pericás, 2004, p.65; Massari, 2007, p. 162–​3).14 In the trip, he had won the trust of the countries of the bloc, which have granted in credits a total of 142 million pesos and 100 million dollars.15 14

15

Before visiting the Second World, Guevara led, in June 1960, a diplomatic mission to the Third World: India, Egypt, Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, also passing through Japan and Yugoslavia (Pericás, 2004, p.65). The so-​called “Third-​World vocation” of the Cuban revolution has since determined the diplomatic priorities established in the first months of government (Cervantes, 2015). These were 100 million pesos from the Soviet Union at interest of 2.5%; 10 million pesos from East Germany; 15 million pesos from Romania; 5 million from Bulgaria; 12 million from Poland; 60 million dollars from China without interest; 40 million dollars from Czechoslovakia at interest of 2.5% (Pericás, 2004, p.41, 65, 86; Noyola, 1978, p. 125).

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Since 1962, after the missile crisis, the alliance between Cuba and the Soviet Union had become irreversibly close, becoming an unstable point of equilibrium of the Cold War. On October 31 of that year, the United States and the Soviet Union circumvented the imminent nuclear conflict with the withdrawal agreement of the Soviet missiles installed in Cuba and the U.S. missiles from Turkey. The Cuban leaders, excluded from the negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev, still intended to bargain for the closure of the Guantánamo base, the end of the economic blockade, and the complete prohibition of the recurrent US invasions of the island’s airspace (Mao Junior, 2007, p.370). Despite the considerable malaise caused by Cuba’s exclusion from the agreements that led to the resolution of the crisis, the island had officially become a strategic piece of geopolitical chess, well positioned to check at any time. Thus, the missile crisis shaped the geopolitical determinations of the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, the developments of which will be analyzed in Chapter 5 of this work. Meanwhile, the U.S. economic blockade against Cuba spread its effects to other countries. And the greater the austerity of the United States, the stronger the ties between the island and the Soviet Union became. 2.1 The 1964 Agreement As the United States’ economic sanctions against Cuba advanced, the island’s new international insertion into the Soviet bloc was consolidated, reflecting another pattern of trade relations. Or, as Hobsbawm remarked: “Everything was moving the Fidelist movement in the direction of communism” (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 439). In the same month that the blockade reached its full form, in December 1963, the second agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union was signed. Announced by Fidel Castro in January 1964, the agreement consolidated the new agrarian strategy of prioritizing sugar, giving it increasing flow (Rodríguez García, 1987, p.240). Through it, the Soviet Union had committed itself to purchase, between 1965 and 1970, 24.1 million tonnes of sugar at 6.11 cents a pound, staggered progressively each year, as shown in Table 21. In addition, China had committed to buy 1 million tonnes of Cuban sugar in 1970 at 6 cents a pound, gradually expanding its share each year until the agreement was reached (Dumont, 1970, p.218).16 This agreement carried on with what was established in 1960, according to which 20% of the exchanges would be made in convertible currencies and the other 80%, mainly in Soviet goods, especially oil (Pericás, 2004, p.40). 16

In 1964, the price of sugar on the world free market ranged from 5.77 to 5.82 cents a pound. Then there was a plunge, reaching 1.80 in 1966 and 1.90 in 1968, while the Soviet price remained (Ramos, 2007, p.577).

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table 21

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Total

1964 agreement: plan of Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar (tonnes)

2.1 3.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 24.1

source: own elaboration with data from gutelman (1975, p. 233)

Along with the agreement, in January 1964, the goal of production of 10 million tonnes of sugar for 1970 (despite the fact that the Institute of Physical Planning of the Ministry of Public Works had produced studies indicating a maximum production capacity of 8.4 million tonnes, as will be discussed below). The sugar strategy was based on two external economic data. First, the possibility of growth of sugar consumption in the countries of the Soviet bloc. Second, the prospect of a shortage of the world sugar market, formulated in the 1960s by international economic bodies, which triggered a speculative process from which Cuba was not exempt.17 In 1963, the Soviet Union had more than 200 million inhabitants and an average sugar consumption of 30.5 kilograms per year per capita, which corresponded to half of Cuban domestic consumption (Aranda, 1968, p.58). Thus, despite being the largest producer of beet sugar in the world, with 6 million tonnes per year, the elasticity of Soviet demand was enormous (Pericás, 2004, p.39). Not for nothing, Soviet sugar consumption grew by 37% between 1963 and 1965. The elasticity of Chinese demand was even greater: with 700 million inhabitants, its average sugar content was only 2.6 kilograms per capita per year in 1963, having grown by 23% until 1965. The elasticity of Chinese and 17

As Ramos analyzed: “In the early 1960s […] there was a pessimism as for future supply, that was clear in the analyses made by international organizations (for example, fao), with widespread scarcity expected and therefore a long period of high prices in the world free market” (Ramos, 2007, p.575) The relationship between speculation on the world sugar market and the 1970 harvest will be discussed in the next chapter.

Second Agrarian Reform and the Sugar Paradox (1963–1967) table 22

167

Sugar consumption per capita in eleven countries (kg/​year)

Cuba United States ussr Mexico France Brazil West Germany India China Pakistan Indonesia

1963

1964

1965

Population in 1966 (million inhabitants)

63.3 47.9 30.5 34.2 34.1 35.8 33.0 5.8 2.6 2.9 5.4

54.7 46.1 39.6 35.9 34.3 33.6 32.8 5.3 2.8 3.0 5.4

65.8 47.3 41.8 36.1 34.7 36.3 33.8 5.7 3.2 3.2 5.5

7.8 196.8 233.2 44.1 48.9 84.7 57.5 483.8 700.0 105.0 104.5

source: aranda, 1968, p. 58

Soviet demands can be seen in Table 22, compared to the pattern of sugar consumption in Cuba, developed and underdeveloped capitalist countries.18 Despite this apparent economic rationality, the new Cuban strategy deviated from the classic path of import substitution proposed by the Latin American structuralists. In 1962, the attempt of a rapid industrialization through import substitution did not meet expectations and instead of solving the problems of external imbalance, it aggravated them (Perias, 2004, p.83). But why, after all, prioritize sugar, if the Cuban monoculture was a historical remnant of colonial domination, main sustenance of the modernized plantation? First of all, it should be noted that the agrarian strategy adopted in 1964, linked to the new international insertion, presented important structural differences in relation to the neocolonial monoculture. We list four essential differences. First, the Cuban sugarcane plantation was no longer umbilically subjected to Wall Street financial speculation, the inevitable consequence of which was the underutilization of the island’s productive capacities (idle land, uncultivated plantations, structural unemployment). The speculative drift that deformed 18

At the time, in addition to the United States, only England and Canada, among the developed capitalist countries, had consumption per capita over 40 kilos per year (Pericás, 2004, p. 40).

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the productive structure of the island was broken in two stages: first, with the agrarian reform and expropriation of foreign-​controlled lands in 1960; second, with the price stability offered by the Soviet Union in 1964. This does not mean that Cuba was not subject to the moods of the world sugar market, but rather that its productive structure would be aimed at the maximum use of available resources, reversing the sense of neocolonial monoculture. Secondly, sugar production should be subject to a national economic plan that was supposed to be aligned with the planned economies of the purchasing countries, which depended on well-​coordinated adjustments and prognostications between all parties. Planning determined a new historical subject at the helm of production and created conscious possibilities for long-​term structural transformation, which definitely did not exist in the modernized plantation. It would be possible, since then, to carry out a planning of technological improvements, without which the strategic goals of Agriculture would not be achieved. The Cuban surplus would be used, through planning, to improve the technical and economic means suitable for the purposes of the revolution. Thirdly, the possibility of reconciling the sugar priority with diversification projects through agricultural intensification was envisaged. The “new monoculture” had in mind its own overcoming and would seek to combine its activities with the diversified special plans of intensive technology, which was far from existing in the neocolonial period. Fourthly, the allocation of surpluses produced by sugar was defined by new historical subjects. This meant that despite the process of generation of the surplus remaining hyperspecialized, the distribution and use were guided by the new goals of development: equality, national sovereignty and the construction of a socialist society. Despite these essential differences, the return to sugar had a stalled character, because it postponed an essential step in the process of national development: the internalization of technical and economic means appropriate to the new purposes of Cuban society. This time, although governed by other determinations, Cuban structural dependency on external economies was perpetuated. This “new-​type of dependency” was combined with a high dose of national sovereignty and the relative internalization of decision-​making centers. It was, as it were, a “planned dependency” that, by its stability, broadened the margins of choice of the Cuban government in relation to all its previous history. Cuba was no longer hostage to the speculative fluctuations of the world market, but was dependent on the very existence of the Soviet bloc. Therefore, even without the appropriate technical and economic means, the revolutionary government launched itself to the immediate execution of the new purposes of development, from the existing concrete conditions. The

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169

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

chart 4  Sugar production (1951–​1970) (million tonnes)

inadequacy between means and ends, defining underdevelopment, acquired new social, technical and historical contents. 2.2 Back to Sugar The sugar sector’s response to the new international insertion was rapid: in 1964, the crop grew by 15.2% compared to the previous year, despite the destruction caused by Cyclone Flora. In 1965, annual growth was 37.6%. The trajectory of Cuban sugar production between 1951 and 1970 is shown in Chart 4.19 The stage of emergency diversification was closed by the stability of the new international insertion of the island. In addition to being insufficient to supply the growth of domestic demand for food, this diversification resulted in an uneconomical path, having generated structural imbalances that could not be ignored by the revolutionary direction. The reduction of the sugar crop, the growth of domestic food demand, and the insufficient substitution of food imports put pressure on the importation capacity, bringing to light the ghost 19

Own elaboration with data from juceplan (1970, p.136).

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of currency scarcity. The growth in demand was an inevitable consequence of the end of social segregation and the government understood that it needed to be contained. Hence, as seen, in 1962 adopted the libreta, the monthly supply card that controlled consumption levels and at the same time, gave the right to a free amount of food to families.20 The rapid recovery of sugar was a consequence of the expansion of 17,417 caballerías from the sugarcane area, between 1962 and 1964. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in 1963, described the expansion quite optimistically: The errors of approach made since 1961 were rectified already at the beginning of 1962. In the 1964 harvest, the effects of this fundamental rectification on sugarcane policy were felt […]. Together, these three years of work have returned a total of 17,417 caballerías to cane cultivation, which will be sufficient, together with the appropriate use of inputs, irrigation and the right varieties, for a 1965 harvest of 7 million tonnes if the weather conditions are normal. 1963a, p.21

Even in the heat of the great economic debate waged within the Cuban revolutionary leadership between 1963 and 1964, the return of sugar as a strategic priority was a consensus point. Perhaps because there was no other way in sight to solve the problem of currency scarcity, as new food crops failed to acquire the proper efficiency to replace imports. In 1963, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was very clear in justifying the new strategy from the observation of the economic advantages of sugar production in relation to other crops: inra has carried out some incomplete studies that already allow us to consider the desirability of extending the cultivation of cane up to 125 thousand caballerías instead of delivering these 25 thousand new caballerías to less profitable cultures nationally and internationally. When it is known that cane irrigated with the water used to irrigate rice

20

In Barkin’s view, rationing was a necessary measure of the development strategy itself, without which investment could not be expanded: “it was necessary to restrict individual consumption for the nation to continue to use most of the credit and foreign exchange for the necessary importation of capital goods and raw material for industrial production […]. Without an adequate mechanism to restrict domestic demand for domestic agricultural products and the importation of other consumer goods, it would be impossible to undertake the long-​term development program begun in the middle of the seventh decade” (Barkin, 1978, p. 219–​220).

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produces more—​in terms of comparative value—​than a caballería of rice and that the sale of sugar produced by this caballería of cane represents much more in foreign exchange than the savings that would be obtained from rice production in this same space, one understands why, as long as we can produce cane for the international market, this operation is profitable for us. Even more so when it comes to beans and corn. 1963b, p.86

Grounded in this reasoning, from then on, the production of a series of “forced” crops was reduced as defined by Carlos Romeo21 (1965, p. 8), whose economic rationality led to the defense of the advantages of importation. Edquist argued that an advantage of the socialist economy over the capitalist one was the fact that the state, as a “subject of technological choice” (social carrier of technique), could withstand more time of unprofitable investments and this time was more suited to the structural process of developing endogenous technological capabilities, necessarily long-​term (Edquist, 1985, p. 142) However, this advantage could only be glimpsed if there was a long-​term development strategy under way, which, between 1959 and 1963, did not exist, so that the unprofitable agricultural diversification of the first years of the revolution was not justified by any future gain in terms of technological structure. The emergency policy for agriculture sooner or later should be replaced by a long-​term one. Currency shortages, however, were an immediate structural problem. The revolutionary leadership walked exactly halfway between the long-​term strategy and the immediate setbacks. Guevara had stated in a television program on January 6, 1961, that “Cuba has to rely on sugar to develop and to carry out its foreign trade. It either sells its sugar, or suffers very high losses in External Trade” (1982, p.103). Reinforcing the same idea, in an interview with journalist Jean Daniel, Guevara stated a few years later that “our difficulties come from our own mistakes. The greatest of them, the one that has caused us the most problems, as you know, is the underexploitation of sugarcane” (in Pericás, 2004, p.82–​3). It is noteworthy that the polarizing exponents of the great economic debate, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and Che Guevara, agreed on the policy of prioritizing sugar. But what would the structural consequences of this policy be, in the context of a new international integration? Guevara believed that trade relations between socialist countries were qualitatively distinct from capitalist international relations

21

Carlos Romeo is a Chilean economist who has been an advisor to the Ministry of industries in Cuba since March 1959, initially sent on a technical mission to eclac.

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and considered that the new Cuban insertion could create the foundations of industrialization, which he sustained in 1964: It is necessary to find trade formulas that allow the financing of industrial investments in developing countries, even if this violates the existing price systems in the capitalist world market, which will allow the uniform advancement of the entire socialist camp […]. The recent agreement between Cuba and the ussr is a demonstration of the steps that can be taken in this direction. 1982, p.195

In this hopeful reasoning of Guevara, we find the heart of the sugar paradox.22 It was thought, then, that the typical hyper specialization of the neocolonial agrarian structure could be a means for forming the foundations of a new economy that was diversified and aimed at the needs of the population. Unfortunately, this bet was frustrated from 1970, causing sugar to remain the key factor in generating surplus for much longer than desirable. However, the timing of synchrony is affected by all sorts of optimisms. And economic insertion into the Soviet bloc had become an imperative for survival. 2.3 Inserted Revolution and the Paradox of the New Dependency In the late 1960s, Celso Furtado analyzed the importance of the external sector in an underdeveloped economy like Cuba, and came to conclusions not dissimilar to the revolutionary leaders. He claimed: In an economy with little differentiated structure such as the Cuban, any attempt to increase the pace of growth would immediately entail serious pressure on the balance of payments. In this way, it was to be expected that the external sector in a short time would become the focal point where the future of the Cuban Revolution would be decided. 1969, p.342

It would be impossible to understand the determinations of the trade agreements between Cuba and the Soviet Union without considering the correlation between economic security (credits, liquidity and foreign exchange) and military security (armaments and protection). The Cuban geopolitical specificity 22

Hope poetically synthesized by Eduardo Galeano in the early 1970s: “The Revolution then discovered that it had confused the dagger with the killer. Sugar, which had been the factor of underdevelopment, became an instrument of development” (2004, p.87).

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of the period from 1960 to 1990 was defined by Salvadoran-​Palestinian Shafick Handal with the concept of “inserted revolution.”23 According to this interpretation, the military coups that had occurred in Latin America after 1959 formed a tremendously hostile regional environment for the island, which threatened the survival of the revolution. The repressive escalation was deepened from 1964 in Brazil and spread throughout the Southern Cone, producing, according to Regalado, a third generation of Latin American dictatorships, the “military dictatorships of National Security,” whose primary objective was the ideological elimination of revolutionary forces, whether national-​liberating or communist.24 This “continental counter-​revolution” profoundly altered the course and possibilities for the development of the Cuban revolution, all the more so when the American economic blockade spread in the region. Inserted in the hostile surroundings, Cuba would have no alternative but to resort to foreign aid (economic and military). The interpretation of the inserted revolution, therefore, defends the thesis that there was no concrete possibility of survival of the Cuban revolutionary project, without resorting to Soviet protection. Therefore, any criticism against Cuba’s specialized inclusion in the Soviet bloc should weigh the very existence of the revolution in. An interpretation of the Cuban impossibility to refuse foreign aid was exposed by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in an interview for the Colombian magazine Indo-​American Development on November 1963: Even if imperialism has the military capacity to attack us, it does not have the concrete historical possibility of bringing this aggression into practice. The political cost would be too great. The Soviet Union played a central role in Cuba’s economic development. We believe that in the development of backward countries, international collaboration has an important role. We emphasize that people who do not count on their own forces and depend exclusively on foreign aid will not be able to 23

24

Although this concept has not been formalized in any academic work, it has high interpretative validity. Often, political leaders of essentially practical character fail to formalize their theories following conventional academic procedures, but this does not diminish their acute capacity to interpret reality. The one who presented this concept was Roberto Regalado, historian, sociologist, leader and theorist of contemporary Cuba, geopolitics specialist, editor of the magazine Latin American Context and yes Ocean Sur, whom we talked to in July 2012 in Havana. The diachronic perspective of the concept of inserted revolution enriches the understanding of the problems analyzed here. For Regalado, the first generation of dictatorships would have occurred shortly after the Spanish-​American wars of independence and the second generation emerged in the 1920s in the Caribbean Basin (Regalado, 2012).

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develop. But under present conditions, countries that have been largely exploited by imperialism and are qualitatively distant from the development of the more advanced countries will not be able, by themselves in the short term, to overcome this underdevelopment. 1983, p.501

Thus, the idea of inserted revolution “justified” the paradox of sugar and new dependency. In the short term, the Soviet aid would solve two vital problems: foreign exchange and defense. However, the water that quenched the Cuban revolution’s thirst—​and without which it could not survive—​generated the constant risk of drowning. While it was essential, it had negative structural consequences in the long term. Over time, Soviet protection deepened the island’s external dependency, rather than creating the conditions for its mitigation. In quantitative terms, trade dependency on the Soviet bloc was proportional to the previous dependency on the United States, as we saw in Charts 1 and 2 (Chapter 2). In qualitative terms, however, the new dependency was of a distinct nature, since it gave rise to a flow of transfer of resources from outside to inside the island, in the opposite direction of capitalist insertion. There were three transfer mechanisms: prices, credits and productive investments. Such a flow was only possible because the inserted Revolution presented a paradoxically positive side, generated by the same context of the Cold War that armed the hostile environment: a “geopolitical advantage” of Cuba in its relations with the Soviet bloc.25 As will be discussed in ­chapter 5, all the mechanisms for transferring Soviet resources to the island were based on this geopolitical advantage, the existence of which depended on very specific international tensions. In the context of high military pressure, few Cuban leaders have glimpsed the historically provisional character of the Cold War. Therefore, the Soviet aid triggered by the inserted revolution was interpreted as a “new paradigm” of international relations between countries with unequal levels of development of productive forces. Even Juan Noyola, one of the greatest advocates for the diversification of trade relations praised in September 1960, the distinct character of “socialist credits” in relation to imperialist credits:

25

The prices set by the agreements were political: always stable and superior in relation to the world capitalist market. The Soviet credits were renewed and the payments of the debts extended with cancellation of interest, not conditioned to the profitability of the investments. The transfer of Soviet technology took place at low cost and included the sending of.

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The idea of long-​term state credit, the low interest rate, without imposing political conditions, for purposes that the country itself defines and in fields where it is necessary to have foreign equipment, with complementary capital resources, in which it is a question of developing new industries that require great technical experience and large production units, such loans are acceptable, and they are even recommended as a complementary form of development. In the case of Cuba, there are two magnificent examples: the credits granted by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. 1978, p.109

Rodríguez went further on the positive characterization of Cuban insertion in the Second World. He stated that international relations with the Soviet bloc constituted an overcoming of the exploitative paradigm of imperialist relations, because for the first time the international division of Labor would be organized in fair conditions of “interdependency” (Rodríguez, 1963b, p.86). Obviously, in the face of an imminent military conflict, in general the interpretations on the new Cuban insertion were more sensitive to the immediate needs than to the cold analysis of the historical-​structural provisionality on which such insertion was based. Thus, in the 1960s, the praise of the new dependency was predominant.26 In addition to the transfer of resources, there was another fundamental aspect that contributed to the positive vision of insertion into the Soviet bloc: the unprecedented coexistence between external dependency and national sovereignty. Valdés Paz commented: Objectively, the Cuban revolution is only viable if one train engages with another. Because it is not possible for a country like Cuba to have a life of its own. Now this engagement can be done in a way that is more appropriate to our interests (not only economic, but general, security, political, cultural), or we can behave like a pawn, like a satellite. But the result was the opposite: we imposed specialized technical teams to the ussr commitments and situations that they would not have wanted in any way if we had not forced them. I refer to their commitments in Africa, Central America, etc. valdés paz, 2012, emphasis added

26

The negative consequences of Cuba’s dependency on the Soviet bloc have become irreversible in the long run. Their diachronic determinations will be discussed in Chapter 5.

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In fact, the main arena for the Cuban national sovereignty to act was its foreign policy, which was anti-​imperialist and “third-​worldist.”27 In this respect, the struggle to overcome underdevelopment, which has driven the project of the Cuban revolution since its inception, has become institutionalized as the highest guideline of foreign policy. In other words, the anti-​imperialist battle became an international purpose of Cuban foreign policy, which linked the island organically to the Third World. 2.4 Third World: Arena for National Sovereignty The Cuban involvement in the Tricontinental conference, in the founding of the Organization for solidarity with the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (os—​paaal) and in the movement of Non-​ Aligned Countries indicated that, during the 1960s, the Cuban economic dependency did not mechanically generate political dependency.28 The sovereignty of the Cuban foreign policy, reinforced by these experiences, is a very relevant historical data for understanding the nature of relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union in the 1960s.29 The margin of national sovereignty earned by the island allowed it to fight for the emancipation of peoples on an international level, through the creation of political tools to combat underdevelopment and the colonial domination in other continents. After World War ii, the Third World went through an intense wave of revolutionary movements for national emancipation, involving metropolises, 27

28 29

“‘Third Worldism,’ the belief that the world would be emancipated by means of liberation of its impoverished and agrarian ‘periphery,’ exploited and pressed into ‘dependency’ by the ‘core countries’ of what a growing literature called ‘the world system’, captured much of theorists of the First World Left. If, as the ‘world system’ implied, the roots of the world’s troubles lay not in the rise of modern industrial capitalism, but in the conquest of the reversal of this historical process in the twentieth century offered the powerless revolutionaries of the First World a way out of their impotence” (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 439). This explains the attraction that the Cuban revolution exerted on the European and American leftists. Cuba was the only Latin American representative in the Non-​Aligned Movement, in an isolated demonstration of national sovereignty on the continent (Hobsbawm, 1995, p.337). However, in the 1970s, this “new dependency” acquired different determinations. After the failure of the harvest of 10 million tonnes of sugar, Cuba joined The came with less international negotiating power and adopted the manuals and the Soviet economic planning models. From then on, dependency just deepened. In Valdés Paz’s assessment: “the greatest effort for autonomy was in the 1960s. In the 1970s, we almost fell into the Soviet model and only in the middle of the 1980s we began to come out with the policy of rectification of errors. […] I believe that the Cuban leadership thought: Cuban foreign policy is our space of independence” (Valdés Paz, 2012).

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colonies and neo colonies in a zone of permanent conflict. As Hobsbawm had diagnosed, the third world was the scene of the hot wars that developed as an extension of the Cold War, articulating two components: local-​based resistance to foreign domination and the ideological polarization between market freedom and social equality. For Hobsbawm: This persistent social and political instability of the Third World provided its common denominator. This instability was equally evident to the USA, protector of the global status quo, which identified it with Soviet communism, or at least regarded it as a permanent and potential asset for the other side in the great global struggle for supremacy. Almost from the start of the Cold War, the USA set out to combat this danger by all means, from economic aid and ideological propaganda through official and unofficial military subversion to major war […]. This is what kept the Third World a zone of war. hobsbawm, 1995, p. 434

Facing the revolutionary potential of the peripheries, Cuba was a key player in the connection between the Second and Third Worlds, ideologically influencing national liberation movements, organizing military aid and political defense of independence struggles, especially in Africa. The “revolution against underdevelopment” amplified its systemic sense when Cuba presented itself as the vanguard of the emancipation of the peoples of the South. This role was consolidated when, in January 1966, at the height of the Vietnam War, a group of 82 underdeveloped countries, represented by 327 political organizations, met in Havana for the Tricontinental conference, idealized by the Moroccan Mehdi Ben Barka.30 After all, the Tricontinental bothered the leaders of the metropolises of contemporary capitalism, perhaps because it unmasked the speeches in defense of human rights that were sometimes uttered from the North.31 Che Guevara, who was in Tanzania at the time, shortly after leaving 30

31

A nationalist political leader, Ben Barka had founded the National Union of Popular Forces of Morocco in 1959 and was a prominent leader in the struggle for the decolonization of Africa. Three months before the conference, involved in the chairmanship of the Tricontinental Organizing Committee, Ben Barka had been murdered in Paris by order of the French secret police, where he had been exiled since 1963, after having been the victim of an obscure kidnapping with signs of cia participation (Cervantes, 2015). The fear of the United States regarding the Self-​Organization of the Third World was also related to the fact that the economic project of sustainable development could seem to them much more effective and adequate. As Hobsbawm justifies: “A Soviet-​based communism therefore became primarily a programme for transforming backwards countries

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the Congo, sent the famous message to Tricontinental, in which he proposed to “create two, three, many Vietnam,” foci of guerrilla resistance against the Armed Forces of the United States in all parts of the world, at a time when the defense of the self-​determination of peoples had gained international prominence (Guevara, 2011, p.421). In that context, through Tricontinental, a counterpoint was conceived that articulated all these demands for independence and sovereignty. Thus, ospaaal (Organization of solidarity to the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which exists to this day) was conceived. It would be a tool of solidarity among the peoples of the underdeveloped and colonized countries, which had been exploited in different ways by the imperialist powers during the last centuries, in order to finance and organize the struggle for national sovereignty in a hemispheric dimension. The absolute priority of ospaaal in 1966, according to Lourdes Cervantes,32 was to complete the process of decolonization of the peripheries, especially of Africa and Asia, which were still controlled by foreign powers. To this political and military challenge were added the struggle for national sovereignty of countries that, despite their formal independence, they did not have national States with real power of government; the preservation of national and cultural identities of the original peoples; South-​South Solidarity; the struggle to overcome underdevelopment and economic backwardness; social justice; among others. The representativeness of the third world at that founding meeting became even more threatening for the capitalist bloc because both China and the Soviet Union were welcomed in Havana as observers. Cuba’s anti-​imperialist action would have displaced Soviet and Chinese positions through its foreign policy by the self-​determination of peoples. Cervantes commented: The meeting is a historic milestone because despite the prevailing sino-​ Soviet schism of the time, both the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the then Soviet Union attended the Tricontinental conference as observers and pledged to support politically and concretely the national liberation movement of the South. It is probably, at a time of

32

into advances ones […]. The Soviet recipe for economic development—​centralized state economic planning aimed at the ultra-​rapid construction of the basic industries and infrastructure essential to a modern industrial society—​seemed designed for them […]. It also seemed a more suitable model, especially for countries lacking both in private capital and a large body of private and profit-​oriented industry” (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 376). Lourdes Cervantes is the current political head of ospaaal, with whom we spoke in July 2012.

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such harsh disagreements, the only time when both forces coincide with the need to give a boost to this organizational process. 2015

It is far beyond our objectives to analyze the general determinations of Cuban foreign policy. What matters, for now, are the three bases of historical interpretation. First, the idea that the Cuban revolution could not survive without external help, due both to the structural (technical-​economic) mismatches of an underdeveloped society, and to the military context of the inserted revolution. Second, that the sugar paradox had become a paradox of international integration, that is, in economic terms, the Cuban-​Soviet relationship was as essential and beneficial in the short term as it was problematic in the long term. And third, that Cuba had integrated itself into a “new kink of dependency” relationship, whose four essential structural differences in relation to neocolonial dependency were pointed out earlier, to which we add its particular coexistence with national sovereignty.33 After having set out these general determinations of the international scenario behind the combined strategy, we have to understand the three tasks that accompany it: the relative administrative decentralization of agricultural production; the forms of specialized diversification; and the search for technological absorption that would enable the intensification of production. 3

Agrarian Management: between Relative Autonomy and Centralization

The most elementary structural problem solved by the second agrarian reform was territorial chaos. From October 1963, the farms that were bypassed by other properties were reorganized geographically. This leveraged the state’s 33

Florestan Fernandes agreed with this: “if it still remains dependent on the world sugar market, it is obvious that this dependency does not prevent either the autonomy of its revolutionary economic policy, nor a growing rationalization of the control of alternative applications of scarce material and human resources” (2007, p.191) The same interpretation was officially presented by eclac: “without the preservation of a large trade deficit and various forms of aid, Cuba could neither supply its domestic consumption, still at very severe levels, nor finance their investments, including Defense. These ties of the 1960s did not, however, prevent innovation in Cuba’s domestic and foreign policy. The leaders persisted in their determination to explore original paths to socialism and admitted that, in their search for shortcuts, they did not pay enough attention to the experiences of countries that had long been engaged in this endeavor” (eclac, 1980, p.28–​9).

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table 23

Agricultural yield (1963–​1964) (in millions of pesos)

1963 State Private Total

360.8 410.0 770.8

46.3% 53,7% 100%

1964 467.0 349.7 816.7

57.7% 42,3% 100%

source: aranda, 1968, p. 36

productive capacity and allowed the expansion of agricultural incomes in the sector by 29.4%, as shown in Table 23. As part of the territorial reorganization, new administrative bodies of agricultural production were created, which reflected some aspects of the criticism of international experts regarding management and scale. On the one hand, a new territorial subdivision of the farm (the departments and lots) was created, reducing the sphere of action of agricultural technicians and responding to criticism about the gigantism of the scale. On the other hand, a new decision-​making body between the farms and the provinces (the groupings) would act as an intermediary in the planning, decentralizing some administrative and financial assignments outside Havana and absorbing some aspects of the criticism about management.34 In addition, in 1964 the Institute for Physical Planning was created, which would have the strategic task of developing geoeconomic units throughout the country, in the medium and long term (eclac, 1980, p.165). We can therefore consider that, although not accepted, the comments by Chonchol, Dumont and Gutelman during the “small agrarian debate” did not fall into the void. The Cuban agricultural territory has acquired a new organization, less contingent and less subject to the tensions and improvisations of the revolutionary struggle. The realization of the need for territorial reorganization, the scale and management of state agricultural units was communicated by Rodríguez in 1963:

34

Chonchol, for example, criticized excessive centralism: “I criticized the farms of the people […] for something that is very typical of socialist regimes, that everything relied too much on Havana. Then, each administrator had to get along with Havana and had no real autonomy to make a series of decisions. They needed to consult [the state]” (2012). Gutelman and Dumont presented the same criticism, as shown in the previous chapter.

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The plantations, except in exceptional cases such as rice and cane, and in the most recent period, cotton, were not distributed according to the characteristics of the soil and climate, which caused loss of crops or low yields. All this led us to the conclusion that it was necessary to undertake immediately a territorial, physical reorganization of the farms, which should take into account two principles: 1) a determination of the optimal size of the units and reduction of the existing ones according to this dimension; 2) the redistribution of the areas between farms, displacing the fragmented units to the farms to which they should belong definitively, from the geographical and economic point of view. 1963b, p.81

The overcoming of territorial chaos occurred at the height of the great economic debate. Therefore, the administrative changes generated by the creation of the new agricultural bodies after the second agrarian reform were a direct reflection of an option within the debate. At the time, as we have seen, dual financing systems were adopted (Valdés Paz, 2009, p.33). The model chosen for agriculture was the economic calculation. And the decentralization promoted by groupings, subdivisions and lots reflected this choice. Agrupamientos, Departamentos, Lotes (Grouping, Departments, Allotments) The 600 state farms were divided into territorial departments of 100 caballerías, that is, a scale similar to the sugarcane cooperatives that had been abolished in September 1962. The departments corresponded to the farm units within the larger production unit constituted by the farm. After that, each department was fragmented into batches of no more than 35 caballerías (Nuñez Jimenez, 1966, p. 22). The lots were operational subunits, specialized in a single crop. They were, therefore, units of agrotechnical profile. The division into departments and lots allowed to soften the gigantism of farms and created the scale of tests of specialized diversification. Each lot of 35 caballerías would be operated by an agronomy specialist. At the same time, all farms were grouped into 66 groups, an instance between the productive unit and the provincial administration, which united about 10 farms under the same responsibility.35 This new territorial organization aimed to create the basis for specialized diversification, for the best use of the advantages of scale, in addition to 3.1

35

In 1965, the groups were arranged in the Cuban territory as follows: 6 groups in Pinar del Río, 4 in Havana, 6 in Matanzas, 10 in Las Villas, 14 in Camaguey, 18 in Oriente and 8 groups directly subordinated to the national government (Valdés Paz, 2009, p.39).

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table 24

Territorial reorganization after the second agrarian reform

Level

Unit

Structure

Municipality Region

Technique Exploitation Production Economic

Province Nation

Provincial delegation National Delegation

Lot Department State Farm State agropecuary grouping (agrupáción) inra delegation Central body of inra

source: valdés paz, 2009, p. 38

generating geographical coherence. The groupings were “regional companies” that organized the movement of labor between the different farms for which they were responsible for, according to the cycles of each crop. Each farm specialized in no more than four crops, the cycles were interspersed and the labor was fully used, as it circulated through the farms seasonally. The assignments of each instance in the new territorial organization are in Table 24.36 The territorial reorganization was enhanced by administrative reforms that solved two methodological problems of agricultural economic planning. Gutelman had criticized two elements of Cuban agricultural planning that, by excessive centralism, would increase inefficiency. First, the descent and ascent methodology elaboration of the national economic plan: starting from the statistical data worked by the center, Havana elaborated all the smallest details of production of each unit, aggregated as a puzzle. Each unit received the plan from above, and proposed modifications discussed at the worker assemblies. From the base modifications, each unit would return its modified specific plan to the center, and the puzzle could not be balanced again when the

36

In addition to the agricultural reorganization, in 1963 a reform of the Cuban political-​ administrative division was elaborated, reducing the number of municipalities with the following justification: “Although numerous municipalities in our country have results of the historical crystallization of economic, political and social processes, in many of the cases, the municipalities arose as a consequence of the political activities of small local caciques (leaders), who promoted the administrative division with the aim of enlarging local feelings and thus obtaining political support for their personal ambitions” (Rodríguez, 1963b, p.80).

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new plans were aggregated, generating an incongruity of difficult solution. In the context of a stockless economy, the multiple changes in the plans made it impossible to consistently meet the goals of each sector. Thus, there was a tendency of high abstraction of concrete production conditions, statistically forcing productive coordinates that were unworkable in practice. The second methodological problem pointed out by Gutelman was the transverse division of the state economy: the Ministry of Internal Trade, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Industries, inra, Acopio (procurement and distribution agency), each was responsible for a stage of the same production chain. In sugar production, the refineries and power plants were in charge of the Ministry of industries, but the plantations belonged to the inra, while the Acopio carried out procurement and distribution, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade carried out exportation procedures and importation of inputs. This transversal division of tasks in the same production chain has created, in Gutelman’s opinion, another inefficiency factor. Those two methodological problems of farm general management were corrected from 1963. First because the plan started to be initiated at the unit and then sent to the central planning bodies. Secondly, by eliminating administrative cross-​cutting and creating vertical trusts that brought together plantations, processing industry, harvesting and distribution, and exportation and purchase of inputs under the same administrative coordination, in the “combined model.”37 According to Valdés Paz, the logic of agricultural planning began to be guided by the “principle of double subordination, through which it was a matter of reconciling the vertical character of certain organizational structures with the regional character of others” (2009, p.35). By enabling the administrative decentralization of Agriculture, the groups, departments and lots did not fail to constitute a response to the great economic debate, since the new instances would be the material basis of the new management autonomies. In 1964, when it was decided on the duality of models, the new administrative bodies created in the second agrarian reform became vehicles of the paradigm of economic calculation. 3.2 Aspects of the Great Debate in Agriculture The relationship between the new administrative bodies and the application of economic calculation in agriculture were announced by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in 1963:

37

The “combined” type of companies will be further explained below.

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The decentralization and regionalization of Agriculture also allow us to move to the use of economic calculation and self-​financing as a method of economic and financial direction in the conduction of productive units. As is known, this method requires Cuban socialist enterprises to cover their expenses with their own resources and ensure profitability in production. The state provides the financing of centralized inversions which, when producing profits, parts of these will be destined to the realization of decentralized investments proposed by the companies and approved by the planning bodies. 1963b, p.88

Rodríguez also stated that self-​management would be applied in the groupings, because the accounting deficiencies of the farms prevented self-​financing in the unit. On the other hand, the lot would be the unit of the new incentive system, according to the labor norms of socialist emulation that had been approved in September 1962 (and lasted until 1968), according to which there would be direct correspondence between wages and hours worked (Rodríguez, 1963b, p. 89; García Rodríguez, 1987, p. 244). Another resolution that sought to eliminate the bureaucracy resulting from excessive centralization was that the administrative expenses of each group should not exceed by 0.8% the total value of its production and could not exceed the value of 80,000 pesos (Rodríguez, 1963b, p.92). Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was the most important defender of the economic calculus against Guevara’s proposal. He wrote two articles in the magazine Cuba Socialista (1963a, 1963b), in which he criticized the budgetary system of financing and justified why, in his opinion, the excessive centralization generated by the budgetary system would lead agriculture to failure. Interestingly, Rodríguez’s criticism of the centralism of the state agricultural administration were very similar to the opinions of international experts made public between 1961 and 1962, in the “small agrarian debate.” But Rodriguez, having absorbed aspects of those opinions, advocated an intermediate path, which reconciled state economy with self-​financing. Here we reproduce the most significant excerpt of his opinion, wherein he draws a significant set of criticism of the centralism that took place between 1959 and 1963: Centralization engenders serious vices and dangers. The bureaucratic centralism is the worst of them. The method of drawing general guidelines without taking into account the specific peculiarities of each locality leads agriculture to serious errors. If this is added to the centralist strictness, which requires that each local decision of the administrators

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be consulted with the National Center, not allowing all administrators to have a sphere of competence within which they can act for their own responsibility, it tends to the systematic formation of a ‘bottleneck,’ the stagnation of problems and to desperation of base workers, administrative puppets are created, lacking resolutive capacities, unable to seriously address the problems before them and devoid of any movement that is not generated by the administrative strings that connect them to the central apparatus. If in every corner of production these vices of centralism are nefarious, in agriculture they become mortal. The industry carries within itself a certain degree of productive mechanization; agriculture requires changing solutions, from month to month, from day to day, and sometimes from hour to hour. No regulation can replace the conscious and technical initiative derived from local analysis and experiments. For this reason, too, this year of study of the conditions of development of our agriculture led the leaders of the inra to the conclusion that it was imperative to eliminate the General administrations that ran the farms from Havana, be they People’s farms or cane farms, to replace them with a decentralization, in which the farms are grouped by a regional base. 1963b, p.81–​82, emphasis added

The five most relevant points of criticism by Rodriguez that justified the economical calculation in agriculture and, therefore, groups, departments, and lot to lot, as an instance of decentralization of the decisions are as follows: (1) excessive bureaucracy due to centralism; and (2) the strictness of the economic system, and the resulting stagnation of the problems in operational bottlenecks; and (3) the lack of political education and experience by the agricultural leadership, who lose the local initiative and the ability to solve problems due to the habit of forwarding them on to the center; and (4) the specific nature of agriculture, which requires dynamic solutions that can be adapted to the weather and the ground, making all the centralist solutions (which would occasionally work for the industry) not equally functional in the field; (5), and lastly, due to the need for the decentralization of decisions and legal requirements, the scale of the political, industrial, economic, administrative scales of the production should be re-​defined.38 38

Among these five criticisms, at least the first four coincide exactly with the analysis presented by Chonchol regarding farms. As for the fifth criticism, the farms perpetuated the scale considered by Chonchol as “gigantic” (Chonchol,1961, 2011). As demonstrated previously, some claims made by international interlocutors who were active in the “small agrarian debate” were taken up by Rodríguez to define the internal functioning of the

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The autonomy of the groups would be even lower than the one Dumont advocated for, because in addition to operating within the state sector, it was still organized by a guaranteed salary scheme.39 Dumont commented that the administrative changes generated by the second agrarian reform would still be insufficient steps of decentralization, due to the fact that self-​financing would be restricted to the groupings instance (approximately 10 farms that amounted to almost 6.000 caballerías), units that were still gigantic when compared to the ideal of self-​financing of cooperative units of 100 caballerías (Chonchol,1961, p. 41–​2, 53).40 This state-​controlled agricultural decentralization, mediated with the central guidelines of economic policy, was the hallmark of the period 1963 to 1967. According to Valdés Paz, that decentralization was responsible for expanding the overall efficiency of the economy.41

39

40

41

state sector. At the time of the “small debate,” Rodríguez agreed with the Cuban leaders regarding the need for centralization, based on the following claims: (1) the lack of administrative frameworks and local planning experience; (2) the “anarchic” tendencies of the zones of Agrarian Development (zda); (3) the need to establish economic rhythm and discipline in its own direction; (4) the political and strategic need of a vision of the totality of productive resources available; (5) the importance of a centralized supply of technical and material resources for production in a period of social conflict; (6) the importance of centralizing agricultural collection to create a relationship between all farmers and the state (Rodríguez, 1963b, p.81). Dumont advocated self-​management in private cooperatives, because the inherent wage guarantee of the state sector would be an inevitable factor of inefficiency: “The sugarcane cooperatives failed as did the granjas because of the guaranteed wages paid on them” (Dumont, 1970, p. 181). Like Chonchol, Dumont advocated for a combination of autonomous cooperatives with centralized general political guidelines: “It is quite possible to combine day-​to-​day self-​management with the general orientation of the economy according to a plan, by the granting of conditional, specifically allocated public credits” (Dumont, 1970, p. 125). Although they were politically closer to the economic calculation system than to the budgetary financing system, it is relevant to differentiate between Dumont’s and Rodríguez’s proposals. Regarding the administrative changes of 1963, Dumont maintained: “It was not until the end of 1963 that the Cuban leaders recognized ‘the practical impossibility of managing units from the center.’ After this reassembling of parcels of land on the granjas, a practice which the second agrarian reform encouraged, it was decided to regroup these state farms in sixty or so local groups, the agrupaciones, which were the only groups to direct the state farms and the only one to receive financial autonomy” (1970, p. 228, emphasis added). Valdés Paz praised the effects of state-​mediated decentralization resulting from the territorial reorganization of 1963: “the grouping achieved greater autonomy from these bodies, albeit maintaining centralization over the subordinate State Farm. The creation of a regional agricultural enterprise provided a comprehensive plan for agricultural activities and an instance of coordination with all political and state organizations in the territory” (2009, p.39).

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Walking the razor’s edge between centralization and decentralization, Rodríguez did not seem to ignore the risks of excessive decentralization, which could open the doors to capitalism, both economically and culturally. Later, in 1980, in a context where the revolution already pointed to a second stage of self-​criticism, Rodríguez listed these risks of decentralization: Seeking to escape the undesirable effects of excessive centralization, some economies moved to a degree of self-​managed decentralization in which the market once again played the decisive role. The new ‘decentralized’ system reproduces—​very quickly—​the disadvantages of capitalism without achieving its efficiency […]. We postulate, therefore, a decentralization that does not break the assumptions of inevitable centralization, but rather that is compatible with it […]. It is not a question of introducing through the window the market that we ourselves expelled through the door. What we want is to preserve the guarantee of coherence and internal harmony that is achieved with centralization and to put the company, in turn, in a position to make the necessary operational decisions, influence the investment process and choose between various productive options. 1983, p.432–​3

Rodríguez, in this 1980 declaration, sought to differentiate the1964 agricultural Cuban decentralization of that practiced in socialist countries that had already yielded to the pressures of restoration of capitalism.42 The solutions pointed out by the inra management after the perception of the mistakes made by themselves were dialectical: it was a matter of creating a system that would sew the local initiative together with centralized planning, the self-​awareness of the workers with the national strategic project.43 The national strategic project, as we summarized, required two other fundamental tasks: specialized diversification and technological absorption.

42

43

The first self-​criticism that deviated the Cuban economic course occurred in 1970 as we will present below (Castro, 1980). The second self-​criticism that changed the assumptions of the economic organization of the island occurred in 1986, on the verge of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It is probable that Rodriguez was already pointing out the essence of the second self-​criticism when he laid out his position in 1980. Everything indicates, however, that this dialectical balance is possible only in the easy territory of theory. Because Cuban decentralization was again “corrected” from 1967 by the “revolutionary offensive” (Barrios, 1987, p.83–​4; Valdés Paz, 2009, p. 47).

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Specialized Diversification and Technology-​Intensive Model

The second task of the combined strategy was agricultural diversification. The government had already adhered to Dumont’s project for specialized diversification in order to overcome the mosaic of crops, to widen the substitution of food imports and the production of export crops (coffee, tobacco and citrus). But it would be difficult for the sugar offensive to be reconciled with the specialized diversification immediately, since the technological absorption necessary to make it possible could only occur in the long term. 4.1 Crops Performance between 1964 and 1970 On August 31, 1964, the enlarged board of directors met to analyze agricultural production since the modifications of the second agrarian reform. In this meeting, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez took a hard stock at the failure to meet the goals of diversified crops. Reducing the goals of the crops favoring the sugarcane area, the leader said, could not be synonymous with not meeting them. Dissatisfied, he addressed the Board: “life has repeatedly shown that every time we reduce to improve, we do not improve” (1964, p. 14). The partial balance sheet 10 months after the second agrarian reform reveals that the production of tubers and roots fell by 9.1%,44 banana and cassava plantations were completely ruined by Cyclone Flora and meat, in general, showed an alarming setback. With regard to cereals, especially rice and corn, there had been a worrying fall of 22.6%. Beans, allocated in the specialized zone of the East, and potatoes had also suffered significant setbacks. However, export crops showed a reverse trend: tobacco and livestock performed very well. According to the report, Pinar del Río had achieved the best tobacco harvest of the decade. Livestock had shown the most significant advances in the national economy between 1963 and 1964, with a growth of 18%.45 What had prevented an even better development of the livestock sector was the economic blockade of the importation of wire to encircle pastures. There are therefore almost 300 caballerías of extensive pastures that, by the goal, should have already been surrounded.

44 45

Despite the 15% growth of the state sector, the loss of the private sector surpassed it (Rodríguez, 1964, p.13). In addition, there was an increase by 16% in total beef mass, 55% in pork distribution, 9% in milk production, 22% in poultry mass and 13% in eggs. The general guidelines of the livestock policy for the coming years consisted of: intensive pastures of pangola grass, artificial insemination, genetic breeding and dairy domestication (Rodríguez, 1964, p.31–​ 33, 38).

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Finally, there were also improvements in fruit production (Rodríguez, 1964, p. 13–​14, 18, 20, 21, 29). However, in general, Rodríguez adopted a critical stance on the occasion, expressing the inevitable tension between sugarcane and diversification: “we are advancing in sugarcane production, but as we will see later, we are retreating in many other things” (1964, p.17). The president of inra also repressed the leaders who blamed Cyclone Flora as subterfuge to hide human organizational errors, which, according to him, still accounted for 60% of the problems. The direction to provincial leaders in 1964 was to expand food production: “we have to make 1965 a year of increase in food production […]. The increase in productivity and yields per area must compensate, to some extent, the reduction of plantations” (Rodríguez, 1964, p.25, 30). The decrease in food product, which motivated Rodríguez’s criticism, was not homogeneous. Although some of the food crops had shrunk significantly since 1965, others had expanded. According to juceplan data, the area devoted to rice grew 4.7 times between 1965 and 1970.46 The tomato area shrank by 29% between 1965 and 1968, and then grew again. However, beans had 60.9% of their area reduced between 1965 and 1970; the area dedicated to viandas decreased by 51%, and fruit by 15% in the same period.47 The pangola grass area, in turn, decreased by 75.9% only between 1966 and 1968, but recovered its previous level in 1970. This group of crops is sufficiently representative of the Cuban diet (rice, beans, viandas fruits, meat), and their surfaces are represented in Table 25. Regarding crop exportation, citrus expanded between 1965 and 1970 by 2.2 times. According to the data by David Barkin,48 46

In 1967, the disagreement between the Cuban government and the Chinese government had led to the suspension of the planned large imports of Chinese rice. Since rice is the fundamental basis of Cuban food, the government has provided intensive expansion of its cultivation, with a view to self-​sufficiency. Celso Furtado commented on the Chinese-​ Cuban issue: “the difficulties that occurred in 1967 in the exchange with China, from where Cuba hoped to obtain a large part of the rice it consumes, once again highlighted the risks of excessive specialization in the agricultural sector” (1969, p.350). By 1976, the rice harvest was already almost fully mechanized and the self-​sufficiency of this food was a very close possibility (Barkin, 1976, p.30). 47 About viandas, Rodríguez claimed at the August 1964 meeting: “Vianda is essential because it affects the overall development of national food […]. Vianda solves the problem that the whole diet has not yet solved” (Rodríguez, 1964, p.30). 48 David Barkin is an economist who lived in Cuba throughout the 1970s and was a visiting professor at the Institute of Economics at the University of Havana, when he investigated the island’s socialist development policy. He currently lives in Mexico and teaches at the Metropolitan Autonomous University-​Xochimilco. He was interviewed for this research. We had the opportunity to interview him in November 2011 in Mexico City.

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table 25

Area with seven crops in the state sector (1965–​1970) (caballerías)

Cultivation Rice Beans Viandas (a) Tomatoes Citrus fruits Fruit (b) Pangola grass

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

2,429 2,462 9,816 539 92 342 —​

2,352 2,572 9,380 507 373 256 6,765

3,306 3,505 7,979 457 300 435 7,068

5,358 2,804 6,811 382 444 326 1,627

9,560 943 3,619 423 1,056 356 2,974

13,927 822 3,755 506 292 288 6,800

(a) Potato, sweet potato, yam, taro (malanga), cassava, pumpkin and banana-​vianda source: juceplan, 1972, pp. 59–​6 0

other export crops, notably tobacco and coffee, showed greater stability and the production of both varied only 0.03% between 1965 and 1970 (Barkin, 1976, p.128–​9). At the time, eclac analyzed: “this new policy reflects a concept of diversification as a medium-​term problem, not short” (eclac, 1964, p.270). Since food sovereignty is an essential pillar of national sovereignty, the tension between sugarcane expansion and food crops, triggered by the subsequent agrarian reform, was yet another paradoxical component of Cuba’s strategy. After all, how to reconcile, in such a short time, the sugarcane increment with the food increment? Would the still idle lands be enough to supply the expanded domestic demand? The tension between sugarcane and food crops led to the hypothesis, among international observers and analysts, that Cuba would have opted for a definitive return to monoculture. Despite the sugar goal of 1970, Rodríguez insisted in 1968, in an interview for the Italian Sabelli, that this hypothesis was incorrect. The word monoculture, for him, no longer applied to the Cuban agricultural situation: Many European friends wonder if all this does not mean a return to monoculture and monoproduction. It is a relevant question, but we have to say it does not mean that. In the strategy chosen for our development, sugar has become a decisive but not exclusive element. In 1970, in the plan of exporting agricultural products and our entire economy, sugar will still have a predominant role. But it is necessary to say that this role will

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become static and will be almost static in the perspective of our development, while, at the same time, exports of other agricultural products, coffee, citrus fruits, fruits, dairy products and, subsequently, developed products of our nickel industry and mining in general, will have an accelerated course. rodríguez, 1983, p.459, emphasis added

As discussed in the next chapter, the harvest of 10 million tonnes predicted for 1970 prevented the export diversification plan from being fully pursued. In order to understand the dynamics of agricultural diversification after the second agrarian reform, in addition to verifying the performance of non-​sugarcane crops, we investigated their economic forms. In an attempt to apply Dumont’s guideline, “national diversification and local specialization” (Rodríguez, 1963b, p.84), two new forms of property were created: the “combined” type enterprises in 1965 and the special plans in 1967. 4.2 Combinados and Special Plans: Modes of Diversification As already discussed, in 1963, one of the problems of the Agricultural Organization was the transverse division of Labor. The poultry sector was an example of inefficiency: subordinated to eight different departments, the inra and two other ministries, it was under the simultaneous responsibility of several distinct administrative bodies. But the case of the poultry sector was not the only one. Each agricultural production chain crossed many different organisms, which amplified the general economic disorganization. Sometimes a small administrative problem in one chain link was transmitted to all other bodies, so that control over accounting was lost and errors of “unknown” origin accumulated. In the agricultural dimension of this administrative problem, there was another possible setback. Gutelman identified a strategic contradiction between agricultural diversification and the industrialization of agriculture, that is, horizontal convergence and vertical convergence of agro-​industrial production. On the one hand, crops that were horizontally associated with the sugar chain would benefit from their inputs and the labor force potentially available in the off-​season (the overcome tiempo muerto). On the other hand, however, the vertical agro-​industrial integration of cane was fundamental to the success of the 1970 harvest. Gutelman pointed out that these two convergences (horizontal and vertical) could not occur at the same time, because they required geographical and administrative integration. The impasse seen by Gutelman reflected the contradictory essence of the combined strategy, which sought to reconcile the prioritization of sugar with diversification. It

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reflected the paradox of sugar and new economic dependency: after all, would the sugar agro-​industry aim outward and integrate into the Soviet bloc, or inward, integrating into the internal food market? When the Ministry of sugar industry was founded in 1964, Gutelman interpreted it as a “victory of vertical integration” (external sector) and a relative defeat of diversification (internal sector) (1975, p.186–​191). But following the model of specialized diversification, other export crops sought vertical integration (which did not occur with the internal production of food, predominantly controlled by the peasantry). In the wake of the second agrarian reform and territorial reorganization, in 1964, the agricultural administrative structure was changed: the transversal division of the economic plan was eliminated, with the creation of new state-​owned enterprises called the “combined” Model. The combined model was similar to the consolidated enterprises of the financing budget system, but these functioned within the paradigm of economic calculation.49 The combined companies were state-​owned companies that coordinated, under the same administrative unit, planting, industrial processing, technical and material services, marketing and the disposal of all workers at each stage of production of a single agro-​industrial item. They were governmental trusts. Valdés Paz, who had worked as an agricultural administrator at the time, commented: “The integration of all these activities in a single branch organization of the second degree […] allowed an unprecedented enhancement of productive activity and investments” (2009, p.42). By adopting the economic calculation system, combined-​type enterprises were self-​financed and relatively autonomous.50 With combined enterprises, economic reorganization and specialized diversification were converted into the same process. Examples of these companies were FrutiCuba, CubaTabaco, the Combinación Avícola Nacional, and the Combinado Porcino. Among these, only FrutiCuba did not survive economically, but the others were consolidated (Valdés Paz, 2009, p.41). Perhaps because, as Valdés Paz argued: “the organizational form of the “combined” would be more effective in livestock activities, which are highly industrial, with a relative autonomy of resources and less deficit of labor force” (2009, p.41–​42). In Valdés Paz’s opinion, as we have seen, the industrial sectors had a greater vocation for economic calculation, while the agricultural sectors would be better suited to the budgetary system of financing, previously 49

50

A consolidated company, as conceived by Guevara, would be “a conglomerate of factories or units that have a similar technological base, a common design for their production or, in some cases, a delimited geographical location” (Guevara, 1982, p.188). On the role of consolidated companies in the financing budget system see Guevara, 1982, p.183–​201. Relatively, as they are state-​owned, they should coordinate with national plans.

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the opposite of what had been put in place after the great economic debate. Therefore, with the combined model, the economic calculation met with the industry; following the reasoning of Valdés Paz, this was possibly one of the reasons for the higher efficiency. In terms of the paradigm of economic functioning, the so-​called “special plans” were the inverted mirror of the combined Model. Created in 1967, the special plans were part of the “revolutionary offensive” and followed the paradigm of the financing budget system. They were experimental units for the application of the technology-​intensive model, which took place in pilot projects in specific locations on the island, with a view to future expansion.51 In reality, the term “special plans” was used for all the experiences of application of the technology-​intensive model directly commanded by Fidel Castro, outside the institutional structure of inra. As Valdés Paz explains: The expression “special plans” refers to many different things […]. It was an expression invented by Fidel. While the inra had [responsibility over] the whole of Agriculture, Fidel was sponsoring certain experiences that aimed at the introduction of a technology-​intensive model. 2012, emphasis added

While inra was responsible for the “usual” agricultural techniques and input, the special plans should function as poles of non-​sugarcane technological innovation. Like every innovation sector, they were extremely costly and occasionally displaced peasant Estates and state farms from their territories. According to Valdés Paz, the authority of the special plans to displace other estates was one of the reasons why they should be led by Fidel.52 In other words, the special plans were “extra-​institutional,” hence the difficulty in finding information about their surfaces and functioning, since juceplan was not 51 52

According to Valdés Paz, that occurred in the following decades: “in the end, the idea was that all agriculture would adopt the intensive model, which will occur in the next 20 years” (2012). “Fidel was conducting the experiments separately. He did not want them to be done by inra, which was committed to the everyday economy,” reported Valdés Paz (2012). In addition, he explained Fidel’s role in that process: “suppose a special plan broke the boundaries of two farms that already existed. And besides, affected two peasants who were there. Or also hit a production of cane or cattle. This projection of the special plan broke with pre-​existing agrarian organization and affected land use. The plan modified everything and for this it was necessary to have power: only Fidel Castro could say ‘make these two farms disappear.’ One should recall that from 1965, Fidel formally becomes president of inra and Carlos Rafael leaves” (2012).

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responsible for the records. Its resources were collected “from the outside” of the National Economic Planning, as Valdés Paz pointed out: The special plans were new production units, which had necessarily arisen since 1967, as a result of large investments in traditional production areas or new productions in selected areas […]. In reality, it was a growing number of territorial projects of the most diverse productions that were affecting the normalized structures of the socialized sector. Their purpose was to introduce forms of intensive production “underneath” such structures or “outside” their directing instances […]. The special plans seemed to be the direct designation of resources outside the planning process. valdés paz, 2009, p.40

In agrotechnical terms, the experience of the special plans was constituted in five moments: first, the study of the soils of the entire national territory, carried out by the Institute of soil and fertilizer studies, to find the most appropriate places for experimentation of each crop; second, the unmarking of the scale, in terms of territorial area, technological intensity and investments; third, the construction of irrigation systems in the selected areas; fourth, the mechanization of all productive steps; fifth, genetic, agricultural or animal improvement. The special plans, compared to the current agriculture, were extraordinary technology-​intensive laboratories. 4.3 Peasantry and Special Plans From the implementation of the special plans, a new wave of “mistakes” emerged with the peasantry, especially with regard to forced expropriations. The implementation of a special plan often involved compulsory displacements of other properties, which at times generated social tensions: This specialization and this technology-​intensive model had the effect, first, of a decrease in peasant lands. Because when the territorial design affected groups of peasant producers, these units were integrated under a state enterprise in some fashion: either nationalizing the lands, or remunerating the peasants’ production with the state enterprise. The fact is that special plans and specialization of the soil brought along a decrease in the peasant sector. 2012

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At the conclusion of the second agrarian reform, according to Gutelman’s data, the state sector owned 60.1% of the land (Gutelman, 1975, p.88). According to Valdés Paz, by the end of the 1960s, the state sector had already expanded to approximately 85% of the island’s surface (Valdés Paz, 2012). It was discussed here earlier how the process of partial or temporary voluntary collectivization (with credit and service cooperatives and mutual aid brigades) had progressed between 1963 and 1967. However, the most collectivized form of peasant production, agricultural societies, did not prosper. Although there may have been many voluntary sales of peasant land to the state in the period, especially in cases of rural retirement, the transfer of this volume of land did not occur exclusively on the principle of voluntariness. The second wave of coercion to the peasantry triggered by the so-​called revolutionary offensive and the special plans in 1967 was observed in 1970, as part of the negative balance of the 10 million crops (Barrios, 1987, p.83). Regarding diversification, it was found that the peasantry incurred the same error as the state sector did: fragmentation. In 1967, at the 3rd anap Congress, it was diagnosed that the correction of the error through the specialized diversification of the state sector was not being accompanied by the peasants, who followed with excessively diversified small estates. To address this discrepancy, the watchword was “technology.” The revolutionary leadership interpreted that the main shortcomings of peasant production were caused by excessive diversification and low application of the technique. The Congress decided that anap would encourage soil irrigation, greater specialization of properties and the expansion of mutual aid brigades for cane-​cutting. Fidel spoke: It is necessary that peasants everywhere are not producers of everything. Let’s explain. One of the most terrible things when crossing the fields is a kind of lack of specialization of the peasants. E peasants should specialize in one or two or three products, but mostly in one product […]. What we expect from this Congress […] is that we leave with the purpose that the peasants apply the technique, that they mechanize agriculture. in barrios, 1987, p.79–​80, emphasis added

“Technology” was the watchword. In the short term, the proposal to combine the prioritization of sugar with specialized diversification could not occur without strong tensions, but they intended to find harmony in the medium term, through the technology-​intensive model. The technological discrepancy of that moment still did not allow it. And then we come to the third task of the combined strategy, and perhaps the most crucial of all: technological absorption.

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Chapter 3

Technological Dependency and Sugarcane Mechanization

Cuba’s technological dependency constituted one of the greatest obstacles to overcoming underdevelopment and, more precisely, to the Constitution of the technical-​economic means suitable for the realization of the ends of the revolution.53 The difficulty of internalizing the productive forces convenient to the pursuit of the socialist purpose was the essence of the strategic dilemmas that now affected Cuban agriculture: how to combine the prioritization of sugar with the specialized diversification in a manual agriculture with a deficit of labor and low incomes? There was only one answer: technology, mechanization, intensification. At first, with the economic blockade, the Cuban machinery industry located in the USA suffered a dramatic shortage of spare parts (Noyola, 1978, p.128–​9). In a second moment, the sugar prioritization strategy required an increase in productivity that could only be obtained through advances in the mechanization of cane cutting and the use of fertilizers. Faced with these difficulties, several attempts of technological autonomy arose, either in the chemical industry or in the design of machines by Cuban technicians. The first initiatives in search of technological autonomy were carried out in the spare parts sector. In 1960, the Cuban government created an emulation system consisting of a number of Spare Parts Committees. The Spare Parts committees were present in each industrial unit, and its objective was the creative solution of all kinds of technical adversities generated by the scarcity of spare parts. At the national level, a higher spare parts Committee was founded, which was contacted only to assist in solving the most difficult problems. In the same year, the government launched a campaign called “build your own machine,” for teams of workers to engage in the design and adapted reproduction of various types of imported machines operating on the island. The Confederation of Cuban workers (ctc) was very active in the construction of the campaign and in the incentives to the workers, so that each one would become a kind of experimental mechanic (Pericás, 2004, p.82–​3). Despite playing an emergency role in the repair of some machines and a political role in 53

For a theoretical approach to the origins of technological dependency on Latin America, see Furtado, 1981, 1994. One of its formulations concerns the social and cultural content of technological uptake: “If we take into account that this technology is not independent from the social relations prevailing in countries of advanced income in countries with low levels of accumulation and often create inconsistency between rationality at the level of private enterprise and the social objectives of development policy […]. To speak of diffusion or transmission of technology is therefore an understatement, because what is spreading in this case is a way of living, which implies the dis-​articulation of the system of pre-​existing values in the society receiving the new techniques” (1981, p. 40, 46).

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the creative engagement of workers, the measure was obviously so precarious and amateur that it could never account for the enormous technological challenges of Cuban development. Mainly because the needs of foreign technology were expanding far beyond the replacement of parts, as the internal demand expanded and new productive goals were adopted in the agricultural sector. The most emblematic example was the production target of 10 million tonnes of sugar in 1970, whose strategic weight was superior to all other sectors of the island’s economy. The 1970 harvest began to require much more substantial technological advances in sugarcane productivity than the simple replacement of parts. Even because, with the exception of the use of some tractors, sugarcane plantations were, until then, based on the absolute predominance of manual labor. As we have seen, before the revolution there was no interest in the mechanization of cane cutting on the part of any of the social actors involved: while the landowners benefited from the low cost of reproduction of the population, the workers feared the growth of unemployment. (Edquist, 1985, p.33). Added to these structural conditions of the Cuban economy, there was another fundamental explanation for the non-​mechanization of the sugarcane plantation. There was, in any part of the world, no machine suitable for the climatic and topographic conditions of the Cuban cane fields (Edquist, 1985, p.82–​3).54 This is because the development of sugarcane technology appropriate to each plantation depends on specifically designed mechanical components that take into account a number of local agricultural factors. The creation of this specific technology, without which there is not enough yield to justify its use, necessarily stems from trial-​and-​error experience. No producer of sugarcane harvesters in the world had conceived and designed a machine based on the concrete conditions of Cuban agriculture. There was no other way to create this specific technology but through the experience of use, finding problems, developing improvements, and others, on the very land of the island. In other words, the most successful cane cutters in the world have always been created with “custom design,” designed directly by the country that would make use of them. This fact made the Cuban technological dependency even more serious, since the absence of the appropriate technology could not be supplied merely by the absorption of foreign capital goods. The only way to acquire certain technologies was through the development of the capacity to

54

Or at least there was no fully developed machine known. Case of Massey-​Ferguson’s Australian Harvester model. It already existed in the 1960s, but was only discovered and tested in Cuba from 1971 and then was widely adopted (Edquist, 1985, p.49).

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produce them internally, which, in an underdeveloped country, meant prioritizing some branches of investment over others. Edquist stated: Not all technologies can be acquired in the international market. Much custom design is carried out. That is, many industries require close contact with the producers of capital goods, in order to specify and develop the appropriate production system or machine […]. Such custom design is particularly important in agriculture, where specific conditions in terms of topography, climate, soils, varieties grown, etc., demand local design or adaptation of machines. 1985, p.122, emphasis added

For all that, when the task of mechanizing the cane harvest in Cuba became an imperative of the combined strategy, it meant an even greater challenge than one might initially assume. After all, buying a machine is an immensely simpler operation than producing one. Cuba needed take the following steps to accomplish this task: firstly, move the investments for the purchase of capital goods, which would enable the creation of a local production experience; and second, to find technological matrices in other countries, which would serve as the basis for the creation of the machine; and third, to begin a process of trial-​and-​error experimentation with the technologies that are available in each season; fourth, to obtain external credit at low interest rates in order to perform all of these highly expensive operations; fifth, to build the capacity of technology and/​or the design and production of their own machine internally. All this meant displacing social investments and importation capacity for the purchase of capital goods. 5.1 Investment and Consumption According to David Barkin, the proportion of investment in capital goods in Cuba’s gdp grew from 18% in 1961 to 24% in 1966 and the planned increase for 1968 was to reach 31%. Between 1959 and 1964, the value of fixed capital imports grew by 37.6%. At the same time, the percentage of investment in social welfare fell by 45% from 1961 to 1964, while industrial and agricultural investments doubled in proportion to the global economy investment fund. From 1964 onwards, agriculture and industry absorbed 60% of the country’s investments. In the same period, the economic effort of the 1970 harvest meant that more than half of the industrial investment and one third of the agricultural investment were directed to the sugar sector (Barkin, 1978, p.124–​5; Barkin, 1976, p. 136; Aranda, 1968, p. 76). Barkin described the change

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in the Cuban investment profile, from the inflection of the predominance of Emergency Social Policies to the predominance of a planned strategy of economic development: As development programs matured, an increasing proportion of all investment was devoted to them, rather than devoted to social services, which during the initial years of the review received almost half of the budget for further inversions. barkin, 1976, p.125

The change in the investment profile made Celso Furtado differentiate two phases of the Cuban Revolution: the distributist and the reconstruction of the external sector. In the first phase, the ability to import released by the reduction in the sumptuous consumption of the elites was absorbed by the exponential growth of popular consumption demand, that is, by the importation of consumer goods and, sometimes, raw material necessary for their domestic production. When the import substitution process proved insufficient to meet this demand, the national deficit worsened. Almost at the same time, the creation of Cuban integration was solved and the external sector was again prioritized within the combined strategy, which was based precisely on its reconstruction: sugar production would be aimed at expanding the margin of importation capacity which, in turn, created the technological absorption capacity for the required increase in productivity. The combined strategy sought to chart a path for the revolution to also radically alter the hyperspecialized mechanism of surplus generation, expanding the physical productivity of Labor and creating the foundations for the diversification of the economy.55 This change reflects the 49.7% growth in state investment between 1962 and 1966 (juceplan, 1971, p.30). Tension between importation of capital goods or consumer goods running in a scenario of exponentially growing domestic demand was analyzed by Edquist, who stated that it is necessary to choose between technological development or expansion of the domestic market:

55

On the reconstruction stage of the external sector, Furtado said: “The experience of Cuba in this period made evident that, for the transformation of the economic structure of a developing country it is not enough to have a power structure able to extract resources for the collectivity in order to increase market capitalization; it is not less necessary to have a certain amount of capacity to import, without which is the assimilation of the technological process is insufficient” (1969, p. 345).

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In economic terms, a precondition for investment in mechanization was lower consumption. The interest in mechanization shared by all social groups meant that people implicitly accepted this in order to escape manual cane-​cutting. Although most Cubans were also fed up with low consumption levels prevailing around 1970, mechanization and increased consumption could not both be achieved at the same time. 1985, p. 105, emphasis added

The same equation between investment and consumption was diagnosed by Barkin, in terms of political and social struggle: “those interested in maximizing growth rates by maintaining high investment rates would have to challenge those wishing to increase existing levels of consumption” (1978, p.108). At the time when the revolutionary government opted for the combined strategy, it was necessary to invest in technology capable of intensifying the production of cane and freeing up area for other crops, eventually at the expense of popular consumption. But this was not the only reason that led Cuba to change its investment profile and prioritize capital goods. There was also a worrying situation that had settled since 1961 in the cane fields, related to the shortage of Labor to cut the crops. The waste of land and labor, typical of the modernized plantation had been fully overcome in the course of the first years of the revolution to become its inverse. As David Barkin noted: “The reserves of Labor and land were rapidly depleted, future growth had to be based on the reorganization and mechanization of the entire economy” (1978, p.218). Overcoming the levels of unemployment that existed before the revolution was combined with the creation of new life opportunities for cane cutters in jobs in cities, in educational institutions, in the construction of infrastructure, in public services and in national defense. So, when they envisioned better ways of life, the cane cutters who were affected by the Tiempo Muerto moved from the sugarcane sector to other sectors. Thus, two radical changes characterized the labor market in Cuba in the 1960s and directly influenced the mechanization of cane cutting. First, unemployment rates have fallen in order to overcome their structural character. Second, the structure of employment has changed, cane cutters had migrated to other sectors, and the former Tiempo Muerto turned into a shortage of manpower (Barkin, 1976, p. 29). 5.2 Tiempo Muerto in Reverse: Disguised Unemployment Tiempo Muerto was the typical Cuban manifestation of structural unemployment and social segregation. The transformations of the land tenure system and the cropping regime directly hit the working regime of the modernized

Second Agrarian Reform and the Sugar Paradox (1963–1967) table 26

201

Unemployment rate (1943–​1981)

Year

Rate

Year

Rate

1943ª 1953b 1956ª 1957b 1956–​7c 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966

21.1 8.4 20.7 9.1 16.4 12.4 11.8 13.6 11.8 10.3 9 8.1 7.5 6.5 6.2

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

5.3 4.3 2.9 1.3 2.1 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.4 4.1 3.4

(a) During tiempo muerto (b) During harvest (c) Data for 1956–​7 and all subsequent years refer to annual averages source: edquist, 1985, p. 24

plantation. Between 1959 and 1963, the life possibilities of those who suffered from lack of occupation and work in the off-​season changed, starting from the vital minimum and the state policy of incentives to the peasantry to increase productivity, through credits, inputs and favorable prices. Cuban structural unemployment was exceeded, as shown in Table 26. The average Cuban unemployment in 1956–​7 calculated by the censuses and samples of the Baptist administration was 16.4%. The average represented the change between Tiempo Muerto and the harvest, which depicted the extremes respectively between 21.1% and 8.4% of unemployment.56 Even 56

As seen in Chapter 1, the measure of unemployment is quite controversial, since the official data of the pre-​revolutionary period did not consider “unemployment” a series of precarious and temporary situations, such as unpaid family work, underemployment and partial or temporary employment. According to Acosta’s interpretation of the 1958

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if we took these conservative calculations as a starting point, the fall in the unemployment rate between 1959 and 1970 would have been 90%, reaching a minimum of 1.3% unemployment this year. It should be remembered that along with the significant fall in unemployment, there was a 64.7% increase in the average wage in the state agricultural sector between 1962 and 1966 (juceplan, 1971, p.36). In sectoral terms, this fall in unemployment was accompanied by a shift of the labor force from cane plantations to other productive activities. Faced with the new employment and, above all, study opportunities created by the revolution, many cane cutters migrated from the sector, opting for less heavy and better paid jobs, with many of these entering school for the first time. The number of workers in public education grew from 23,648 in 1958 to 127,526 in 1969. In the public health sector, the number of 8,209 employees in 1958 expanded to 87,646 in 1969, that is, it grew by more than 10 times. Women were also incorporated into the national workforce: from 194,000 active women in 1956 to 600,000 in 1970, with a still enormous growth potential, since this contingent represented less than 25% of women between the ages of 20 and 54. Pensions for men over 60 and women over 55 increased from 200,000 in 1958 to 550,000, removing a contingent of this age group from directly productive activities. Moreover, when international tension reached its peak in 1962, 300,000 men had been absorbed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces, especially the young. The number of workers who abandoned any directly productive activities also increased, taking advantage of the stable social conditions offered by the new economy (eclac, 1980, p.31–​32).57 This is how many cane cutters moved to other activities or found the opportunity for retirement, and were not replaced by young people willing to do such an exhausting job, in the face of so many educational opportunities and the huge demand for more skilled workers. This situation gave rise to voluntary labor policies, as will be seen in the next chapter. Due to this displacement of the labor force, the 1960s in Cuba was marked by the contradictory combination of disguised unemployment, shown in to the fall in labor productivity, and shortage of labor in the cane crop. Edquist defines that while open unemployment has fallen, disguised unemployment

57

National Economic Council data, Cuban unemployment added to underemployment and unpaid agricultural work should reach a third of the economically active population, that is, 748 thousand people (Acosta, 1973, p.69). In 1971, 100,000 men were incorporated into the labor force as a result of the law against “loitering,” which corresponded to almost two-​thirds of voluntary work (eclac, 1980, p.32, 179).

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has grown with the simultaneous plunge in productivity. The Cuban disguised unemployment, in Edquist’s opinion, was harmful in economic terms, but preferable in social terms, since it resulted from the general improvement of the living conditions of the workers.58 As Bertram Silverman put it: “The poor in the countryside were either moving to higher income centers or devoting part of their higher income and economic security to recreation” (Silverman, 1978, p.172).59 Since 1961 there had been a shortage of labor in the cane plantations, in parallel with urban unemployment. This scarcity persisted throughout the 1960s and was one of the biggest obstacles created by the revolution itself for the 1970 harvest. (Edquist, 1985, p.34–​5). The structural change in the employment profile has given rise to a Tiempo Muerto in reverse: the available workers were not enough for the harvest and the fall in productivity revealed disguised unemployment. This phenomenon is shown in Table 27. Considering the same values in indices, the change in the proportion of workers by sector can be visualized in Chart 5.60 The change in the employment profile on the island has made the problem of “appropriate technology,” that is, labor-​intensive technological choice in underdeveloped countries with the aim of combating structural unemployment, not seem to be a dilemma for the Cuban government. In 1961, the Ministry of industries created the Commission for the mechanization of the cane harvest (Edquist, 1985, p.34) to solve the labor shortage in the cane fields. Mechanization began to be defended with two arguments: first, it was a means of solving the problem of labor shortages in plantations; second, it was also a way of eliminating an excessively heavy and brutal type of manual labor, that is, organizing the Cuban labor force according to the egalitarian and humanistic purpose of the revolution (Ibid., 1985, p.84). Since mechanization is a long-​ term task, in the short term the attempt to solve the shortage of labor force 58

59

60

Edquist supported this idea with the following words: “To some extent overt unemployment had been replaced by disguised unemployment—​which was negative in terms of productivity, but preferable in terms of social status and security for those previously unemployed. In this way the negative social and psychological effects of unemployment were mitigated, but the negative impact of disguised unemployment (low productivity) for economic growth and efficiency remained” (1985, p.34, emphasis added). Bertram Silverman associates the growth of the island’s disguised unemployment with the growth of the service sector, which represented a quarter of the total workforce before the revolution and came to represent a third (Silverman, 1978, p.172). Bertram Silverman is a labor economist and professor at Hofstra University in New York. He is a scholar about the Cuban moral incentive system. He was in Cuba in the late 1960s. Own elaboration with data from Edquist (1985, p. 35, 99).

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table 27

Change in employment profile (1958–​1971)

Number of professional cane cutters between 1958 and 1971

Employment growth between 1959 and 1970 by sector (%)

1958 1963 1964

370,000 210,000 160,000

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

143,368 105,598 88,300 79,752 72,986

Industry Civil construction Transportation /​ Communication Services

50 90 100 23

Note: voluntary workers are not included source: own elaboration with data from edquist (1985, p. 35, 53, 99)

250 Professional Cane Nuers

200

Industrial workers

150

Civil construc on

100

Transport / Communica on Services

50

0

1958

1963

1964

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

chart 5  Change in employment profile (1958–​1971) (in indices, 1958 =​100)

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materialized in two measures: on the one hand, non-​professional voluntary work and, on the other, the militarization of the cane cutting, topics that will be discussed in the next chapter (Ibid., 1985, p.35, 42).61 According to Edquist, the employment situation influences technological choices in a decisive way.62 Thus, the change in the employment profile in Cuba would have been a determining factor in decisions on sugarcane mechanization, in the context of a technologically dependent country. The different moments of this choice will be discussed below. 5.3 Paths and Detours of Technological Choice “Technological choice” is a key concept of Edquist’s research on the mechanization of cane cutting in Cuba, in a comparative study with the same process in Jamaica. Edquist combines a structuralist approach to technological change with an approach that focuses on the subjects responsible for decision-​making. Therefore, technological choice depends on the existence of a “subject of technological choice” whose margins of action are limited by structural constraints. There are especially the six structural factors that were analyzed by the author in order to understand the Cuban choice of technology choice process: (1) the interests, goals, and the subject of the subject of the technological change; (2) the level of the organization; (3) its power of decision-​making; (4) the availability of information about the technologies already in place; (5) the ability to effectively access the selected technologies; and (6) the technical know-​how for the use and reproduction of the technology you have chosen, that is to say, the “technology” in order to operate, maintain, repair, design and manufacture of capital goods at home (Edquist, 1985, p. 77, 121). The task of technological absorption required by the combined strategy was at least twofold. First, it was necessary to mechanize the cutting of sugarcane, which would not only solve the scarcity of labor in the sugarcane fields, but also increase the physical productivity of Labor and therefore sugar yield.63 Secondly, it was necessary to intensify production so as to free area on the island for diversification, for example, with fertilizers.

61 62 63

In Edquist’s opinion, a third measure could have been positive: a greater wage increase for professional cane cutters, as attractive to reverse temporarily the displacement of the workforce to other sectors (Edquist, 1985, p.147). “The employment situation is a very important determinant of choice of technique, since it partly determines the interests of at least some of the actors” (1985, p. 14), argued Edquist (1985, p.14). Incomes that, as said, were among the lowest in the world (Chonchol,1961, p.11).

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The sugarcane production process involved six steps equally crucial to the end result of the product: (1) preparation of the Land; (2) sowing; (3) cultivation of the sugarcane and the control of the weeds; (4) application of fertilizers; (5) cutting, cleaning, and harvesting of the sugarcane; and (6) transportation to the mills. The technological choice for the mechanization of the Cuban sugarcane harvest focuses only on the fifth stage, whose three tasks (cutting, cleaning, harvesting) can be performed separately by simple machines or simultaneously by a single machine called a combined harvester. The process of mechanization of this fifth stage can vary in various compositions of manual work with mechanized work. In the 1960s, a simple harvester, which would cut the cane and leave it on the ground without cleaning, could replace about 10 manual workers. A combined harvester of the same time, which cut, cleaned and harvested the cane, could replace thirty to fifty workers (Edquist, 1985, p.16, 17). Facing the absence of a harvester suitable for the climatic and topographic conditions of Cuba in the world market, the country launched itself in search of relative technological autonomy. If, on the one hand, the Cubans did not have the capital goods industry to produce the machines they needed, on the other, they could not escape the need to create a new and original machine. In this sense, between 1962 and 1964, three cane harvesting machines were assembled and tested in Cuba from imported dies and parts. Although they are based on imported capital goods, these machines are considered Cuban because they were designed, assembled and adapted by engineers on the island. The first of these, the Ecea mc-​1, was a combination of two models (the South African Inca and Thornton Model F) and was assembled and tested in Cuba in 1963. It was a simple machine: it just cut the cane and left it on the ground without cleaning. This required that the workers cleaned and collected the cane from the ground. Because of this, revenues did not increase enough to justify the costs of importation and assembly and the model was abandoned in the same year. Edquist attributed the failure of Ecea mc-​1 to the understandable inexperience of Cuban engineers with the subject (Edquist, 1985, p.36, 124). Cuba then invested in the production of “elevators” for harvesting, which were coupled to the Italian cutting machine Utos. The elevators were used to lift (harvest) the cane cut from the ground. They were called criollas and their experimental use represented 1.5% of the 1963 crop (Ibid., 1985, p. 37). In 1964, the criollas were replaced by the Soviet pg 0.5, which featured more economic advantages and was widely adopted throughout the 1960s (Ibid., 1985, p.124). Finally, the third machine designed in Cuba was an adaptation of the Soviet ktc, which was named liberator by Fidel Castro, because it would be the machine that would free human beings from that brutal work. The Liberator

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was a combined harvester, which cut, cleaned and harvested the cane. However, its complexity prevented it from being produced on the island (Ibid., 1985, p.41). Therefore, in 1965, the Cuban government made an agreement with Claas Maschinen-​fabrik, a West German company, to produce the Liberator. The machine was tested in 1967, was successful and was widely adopted in the following years. The Liberator produced in West Germany (which came to be called Claas-​Liberator) was an example of the importance of custom design. At the same time, it revealed a huge gap between the capacity of Cuban technological design and its productive forces. Cuba was definitely unable to produce the Liberator it had designed, because this would require an extremely developed mechanical industry, still far from the island’s potential. Not for nothing, the machine has become one of the best-​selling in the world for its quality and efficiency. In 1969, the Claas-​Liberator achieved twice the yield of the Soviet that had inspired it (the kt-​1). It was the highest productivity machine ever used in Cuba and reached the mark of 130 tonnes per hectare. However, in 1970, Cuba made the decision to sell the Claas-​Liberator patent to the German company that produced it. In Edquist’s assessment, Cuba did not obtain the economic advantages adequate to its technological design capacity, since in exchange for the patent it received discounts on the importation of the machine throughout the 1970s and nothing else (Edquist, 1985, pp. 129–​131).64 Other experiments, with machines designed outside Cuba, were tested in the 1960s. In July 1963, the Soviets visited the island to study its morphological conditions with a view to producing a more suitable machine. In January 1964, as a result of these studies, adaptations were made to the ktc-​1 and kt-​1 machines, combined harvesters designed and produced in the Soviet Union. After their good experimental results, they began to be imported from the 1965 harvest. The two main problems related to the ktc and kt were, first, the lack of Cuban technological capacity to operate the machine and, second, the inadequacy of the machines for the type of cane and the topography of the island. In the 1965 harvest these problems were felt and only 10% of the machines purchased went into operation. This proportion was decreasing until 1970.

64

Edquist considers that the sale of the patent was a bad deal for Cuba, which ended up handing over its technological design capability for less than its real value. For him, there were better production alternatives of the Liberator. For example: a provisional concession agreement; producing it in the Soviet bloc; or requesting technical assistance from Claas itself to produce it internally on the island. By 1978, Claas Maschinenfabrik had already exported The Liberator to more than 30 countries and Cuba had lost its patent (Edquist, 1985, p. 131).

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This is because the Cuban reeds were quite inclined and the soil was uneven, while the Soviet machine was suitable for cane with a maximum inclination of 30º and for flat soil. This technical inadequacy caused its productivity to fall too fast, its parts to break without adequate replacement, and there was not enough Cuban technical knowledge to operate it. For all this, the ktc-​1 and kt-​1 were not operational to the sugarcane plantations of the island. In 1968 they stopped being imported and in 1972 there was no longer any in activity (Edquist, 1985, p.39–​41).65 A more than sufficient reason to understand the enormous failures and inefficiencies of these harvesters was the absence of sugarcane plantations in the Soviet Union, which made it impossible to produce the custom design through trial-​and-​error experience and the permanent adaptations of the machines to the concrete agricultural conditions. Soviet machines cost about 30 thousand dollars each, which was approximately the price of the world market (Ibid., 1985, p.126, 159). In Edquist’s opinion, one of the main reasons for the general failure of the mechanization of cane cutting in the 1960s was the choice of Soviet cutters as a priority investment focus.66 Unlike the harvest machines, the importation of the Soviet pg 0.5 elevators, which replaced the criollas in the raising of cut cane from 1964, would have been responsible for the enormous advance in the mechanization of this specific task of the Cuban harvest, which reached up to 5% of the 1970 harvest. After all, the elevators did not depend on the soil characteristics to determine their performance. A pg 0.5 raised 11 tonnes of cane per hour (Ibid., 1985, p.37–​8, 53). Finally, from 1967, in addition to Claas-​Liberator, three other families of machines were tested in Cuba: the Henderson, abandoned in 1972; the ktp-​1, whose use had expanded in the 1970s; and the Massey-​Ferguson, which was also widely used.67 The Henderson harvester was the first 100% national model: it was designed in Cuba and, due to its simplicity, could also be produced internally. Its main defect was not cleaning the cane, so that 30% of the uplifted and transported product was made up of waste. This is because Henderson was designed to work in coordination with the cane cleaning stations also

65 66 67

In this period, other Soviet models were tested: ckt-​1, kcc-​1, kcc-​1A, ktc-​1A, kts-​1A (Edquist, 1985, p.42). In his own words: “The almost complete failure to mechanize Cuban cane-​cutting in the 1960s can be explained partly by the choice of Soviet harvester” (Edquist, 1985, p. 127). In the paths and paths of Cuban technology choice, Libertadora, ktp-​1 and Massey-​ Ferguson had consolidated themselves as successful technological paradigms on the island, for different reasons.

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invented nationally.68 The Henderson was adapted to an Italian Fiat tractor, but was eventually abandoned in 1972, as other experiments proved more efficient (Ibid., 1985, p.48). The second machine tested after 1967 was a Cuban-​Soviet invention, the ktp-​1, created in the early 1970s and widely used from 1973.69 Edquist stated: “the ktp-​1 Harvester should be considered a frank success of the joint venture between Cuba and the ussr, although this machine is certainly not among the most productive in the world” (1985, p.134). Finally, the third family of foreign machines was the Australian Massey-​Ferguson, which led the leverage of mechanization of cutting, collecting and cleaning in the 1970s (Edquist, 1985, p.51). According to Edquist, if Massey-​Ferguson had been tested in the 1960s, it would possibly have accelerated the mechanization of cane cutting on the island, anticipating it by 5 to 8 years. The Massey-​Ferguson was best suited to the island’s topography and climate, as Australia’s agricultural conditions were very similar (Ibid., 1985, p.126–​7). In addition, Cuba quickly became Massey-​Ferguson’s main consumer market (larger until Australia itself), so that they could have acquired relative bargaining power in relation to their prices (Ibid., 1985, p.132). The trajectory of cane mechanization in Cuba is demonstrated in Table 28. We can observe that by 1970 the combined harvesters had failed: only 1% of Cuban cane was mechanically cut in the fateful harvest. However, the task of mechanizing the lifting of manually cut cane had been achieved in 82% to 85% of the crop. To assess the importance of this advance, it should be remembered that sugarcane lifting alone corresponded to 40% of manual workers in 68

69

In 1964, the first dry Cane reception and benefit Center was created: dry cane cleaning stations (using air), developed by the Cuban engineer Roberto Henderson, who named the corresponding harvester. It was an original solution, with custom design, suitable to cope with the water scarcity that predominated in the country’s agriculture. Its goal was to eliminate manual cleaning and centralize the reeds of the region to facilitate the collection of the harvesting company. With the stations, it was intended to increase labor productivity from 80% to 150%. In 1965, 4 stations were built, and in 1967 there were already 67, which cleaned up to 70 tonnes of cane per hour. In 1980, “technological gap” of the cleaning the process in Cuba in relation to other parts of the world was almost zero and technological dependency was negligible on this specific link in the production chain (Edquist, 1985, p. 42–​3, 53, 127, 144, 158). In 1977, a large ktp-​1 plant was established in Holguín, which became the largest producer and exporter of cane cutting machines in the world, with a production capacity of 600 units per year. Its low productivity and simplicity were the necessary condition for it to be produced in Cuba. In 1979, the Soviet Union no longer produced ktp-​1: Cuba had completed this technological absorption, alleviating the problems with the balance of payments experienced by the country (Edquist, 1985, p.52, 133, 136).

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a crop (Edquist, 1985, p.36). Still, the technological dependency on the island was perpetuated, since the pg 0.5 elevator was 100% Soviet. As Edquist maintained: “regardless of how successful this transfer of technology was, it also led to an extension of Cuban dependency on the importation of cane elevators from the Soviet Union” (1985, p.124). Despite the advances made in the mechanization of the harvest, the problem of labor shortage in the cane fields had not yet been solved, since the 10-​ million-​tonne target for 1970 required an unrelenting national effort. Due to the lack of mechanization, the Cuban government made use of volunteer work days. From this process of trial and error, it is concluded that, even though full interest and power to carry out the mechanization of cane was demonstrated, the subjects of the technological choice of the island faced structural obstacles table 28

Year

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

Mechanization of cane cutting and harvesting (1963–​1981)

% of cane cut and harvested % of cane cut manually and uplifted by combined harvester mechanically —​ —​ 1–​2 2–​3 2–​3 3 2 1 3 7 11 18 25 32 36 38 42 45 50

source: edquist, 1985, p. 38

1 20 26–​32 44–​46 53–​57 61–​68 65–​74 82–​85 87 89–​96 93–​94 96 96 97 97 98 98 98 98

Second Agrarian Reform and the Sugar Paradox (1963–1967) table 29

Use and production of agricultural fertilizers (1963–​1968)

Use (tommes) (a) 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

211

444,100 650,200 500,600 581,500 908,600 1,487,800

Use in cane fields (%) (b)

Production (Tonnes) (c)

40.2 48.9 63.7 57.8 55.9 41.1

439,000 430,000 473,000 514,000 788,000 860,000

source: own elaboration with data from:(a) rodríguez, 1969, p. 25; (b) aranda, 1968, p. 72; (c) eclac, 1980, p. 72

of four orders: first, the lack of information about the technological options available in the market, which is the case of the lack of knowledge about the Australian Massey-​Ferguson in the 1960s; second, the lack of access to capital goods; third, the economic disengagement to deploy the chosen and imported technology, generating waste of currency; and fourth, the inability to operate, repair, maintain and reproduce the technology internally (Edquist, 1985, p.99). The other dimension of the task of technological absorption was the development and application of fertilizers. According to the data presented by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, there was significant progress in the production and consumption of fertilizers during the 1960s. According to his report to eclac in 1969, Cuban fertilizer production had grown by 2.4 times between 1958 and 1968, going from 252,900 tonnes to 860,000 tonnes (Rodríguez, 1969, p.33). In the 1960s, Cuba had obtained 50 million dollars in credit to install a fertilizer plant with the aid of the English Simon and Carvers (Ibid., 1969, p. 102). This allowed the use of fertilizers to expand in the proportion shown in Table 29. Between 1963 and 1967, there was a significant increase in the proportion of fertilizer use in cane fields, in relation to other crops. Moreover, between 1966 and 1970 the production of pesticides on the island grew by 7.6 times, and only between 1966 and 1968, spending on the purchase of the product grew by 80% (Rodríguez, 1969, p.25).70 As a result of this investment, in 1967, Cuba would 70

Production grew from 255 tonnes in 1966 to 2,203 tonnes in 1970 (eclac, 1980, p.72). Even so, spending on the purchase of pesticides grew from 4.32 million pesos in 1966 to 7.80 million in 1968 (Rodríguez, 1969, p.25).

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table 30

Year

Targets and actual sugar production (1952–​1970) (in million tonnes)

Actual production

1952/​1956 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1970

5 5.96 5.86 6.76 4.88 3.88 4.47 6.15 4.43 6.23 5.16 8.53

Targets —​ —​ —​ —​ 6.14 —​ 6.5 7 6.5 7.5 8 10

source: barkin, 1978, pp. 128–​9

have reached the cane yields of Puerto Rico: they grew by 28.2% compared to 1961 and by 70.4% compared to the worst cane harvest (1963) (Gutelman, 1975, p.258). This effort was part of the option for the technology-​intensive model, which a posteriori was criticized by Valdes Paz.71 None of that was enough, however, for the country to reach its sugar production targets in the 1960s, as Table 30 above shows. Cuba’s inability to achieve its own production targets set in the context of the combined strategy is a revealing fact of the structural limitations of the island’s economic development. The problems of agricultural disorganization continued to harm and compromise Cuban production. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez criticized the elaboration of

71

In our conversation, Valdés Paz criticized the Cuban option for the technology-​intensive model for its harmful impact on the environment and for its vulnerable aspect: “the main elements of this technology-​intensive model were imported. Where from? From the Soviet Union, from the European socialist camp, something from China, etc. Which made it a very vulnerable model […]. The consequences of this technology-​intensive model are of an ecological character. It has produced a soil depletion, serious problems of imbalance of biological control of pests and diseases […]. A specialization of 90% was required. Over time, it became clear that this requirement for specialization was totally counterproductive in ecological and economic terms” (2012).

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unattainable goals created by the government’s own bodies in August 1964, before the national economic direction: If we cannot reconcile sugarcane production with the goals that we have to meet in agriculture, giving rise to all these agrotechnical disasters that we are systematically fighting, it is necessary to discuss in the National direction of the country the reduction of one or another goal […]. Because we gain nothing by planting products that we then lose without being able to cultivate and we must be realistic: in short, what we achieve afterwards without cultivation is less quantity of product than what we would have obtained if we planted less and cultivated more. And this appears as a bad work attributed to agriculture, when in reality it is a bad work of organization of economic activity as a whole and only a part of this deficiency is attributable to agriculture. 1964, p.16–​17

This criticism of Rodríguez reveals the state of economic disorganization still existing in Cuba after the second agrarian reform. What would be the capacity to equate sugar targets and specialized diversification in the same strategy, bypassing disorganization and technological dependency? This whole Cuban situation highlighted a complex historical challenge that, by its structural nature, aroused as a strategic question for the whole of Latin America: what concrete possibilities for the development of adequate technical and economic means for achieving egalitarian and sovereign ends in the periphery of capitalism? In other words, by what narrow way would they overcome the mismatch between means and ends that perpetuated underdevelopment? When the production target of 10 million tonnes of sugar was adopted, Cuba forced the limits of the combined strategy, because the sugarcane prioritization gained so much power that it hindered any compatibility with the proposal of agricultural diversification. Thus, the three fundamental tasks essential for the success of the combined strategy (relative decentralization; specialized diversification; technological absorption) were definitely overshadowed by the 1970 harvest target.

­c hapter 4

The 1970 Harvest and Development Strategy (1967–​1970) In a relatively short time, the development of a consciousness does more for the development of production than the material stimulus. ernesto guevara, February 1964 (1982, p. 190)

…

We can be terrible competitors and we fear absolutely no one when it comes to sugar. We will see how those who developed their industry at the expense of Cuba will be arranged. […] Well, they will have a sugar indigestion! fidel castro, 7 June 19651

…

Between 1971 and 1975, a Soviet expert who visited the island said that, in theoretical terms, Cuba had lived through a very similar stage to the ussr war communism. julio diaz vázquez, July 29, 2010 (in valdes paz, juan et al., 2012, p. 72)

∵ 1

Agrarian Structure and Development Strategy

When Cuba embarked on the historic task of overcoming underdevelopment, eclac’s theories of development were acclaimed by economists of different perspectives and could not help but influence the revolutionary government. The founding thesis of the new Latin American political economy, mentioned 1 Castro, 7 jul. 1965. Some excerpts are cited in Gutelman, 1975, p.237–​8.

© Joana Salém Vasconcelos, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004515215_006

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in Prebisch’s famous Manifesto of 1949, was based on the fight against the theory of comparative advantages of David Ricardo and his affiliates, exposing the structure and dynamics of the imbalances generated by the international division of labor. In the Manifesto—​which became the original eclac charter of principles—​Prebisch stated: It is true that the reasoning about the economic advantages of the international division of labor is of unobjectionable theoretical validity. But one could forget that it is based on a premise contradicted by the facts […]. The flaw in this premise is to attribute general character to what is very circumscribed in it […]. The prodigious advantages of productivity development have not reached the periphery to a degree comparable to that enjoyed by the population of these large countries […]. There is, therefore, a manifest imbalance, and whatever its explanation or way of justifying it, it is a certain fact which destroys the basic premise of the scheme of the international division of labor. 1986, p.479

As a theoretical alternative to comparative advantages, Prebisch formulated the thesis of the deterioration of the terms of trade. Faced with a common adversary, his diagnosis presented relative affinities with the Marxist theory of unequal exchange, even if they were based on distinct economic and philosophical premises.2 Both contested the propositions of Ricardo’s thesis, questioning the supposed tendency to balance the international economic order. In 2 On the deterioration of the terms of trade: “from the 1870s until the Second World War, the price ratio constantly moved against primary production […]. The price ratio has therefore moved adversely to the periphery […]. The countries of Latin America, with a strong foreign trade coefficient, are extremely sensitive to these economic repercussions” (Prebisch, 1986, p.481, 485). Samir Amin synthesizes the theory of unequal exchange: “Equilibrium in the balance of payments, which, at best, exists only as a tendency, is dependent on a permanent adjustment of the international structures. Now these are, so far as relations between the developed and the underdeveloped parts of the world are concerned. structures of asymmetrical domination by the center of the world system over the periphery. External equilibrium—​· international order—​is possible only because the structures of the periphery are shaped so as to meet the needs of accumulation at the center, that is, provided that the development of the center engenders and maintains the underdevelopment of the periphery (…). Whereas, however, in the sphere of internal exchange the law of value implies equivalence of the exchange-​values of two commodities containing the same quantity of labor, in the sphere of external exchange the commodities exchanged contain unequa1 quantities of labor, reflecting uneven levels of productivity” (Amin, 1976, p. 104, 133). For more on the theory of unequal exchange, see Emmanuel, 1976.

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contrast, historical and structural approaches to peripheral social formations were elaborated in order to identify obstacles to the development of productive forces of countries with a colonial past.3 Based on Prebisch’s new theory, eclac founded a capitalist development program in Latin America, whose implementation involved three structural measures that should be adapted to the particular conditions of each country. First, a change on the profile of imports that would save currency for capital accumulation at the expense of sumptuous consumption. Secondly, an employment policy that would create a robust internal market, that is, an effective demand sustained by the needs of the majority of the population. And third, import substituting industrialization, considered essential to achieve a minimum level of social well-​being, corresponding to a new price pattern no longer subject to deterioration. This process would be conditioned, in each country, by the availability of natural resources and raw material, by the possible margins for changing the importation profile, as well as by the ability to obtain external financing. The internal market, in turn, could only be formed through a relative income redistribution which, in societies based on social segregation, resulted in a confrontational policy.4 Changing the profile of imports was a gradual way to break with dependent economic insertion. At the same time, creating an internal market would remove the foundations of the segregationist model that was typical of underdevelopment. In this sense, the transformative potential of eclac’s political economy partially coincided with the Cuban struggle for the elimination of double articulation (dependency and social segregation). Thus, the program of import substituting industrialization seemed appropriate in the eyes of the forces of the “Revolutionary Democratic nationalism” that ruled the country from 1959.

3 However, the theory of deterioration of terms of trade was essentially a theory of the relationship between productivity, diffusion of technical progress and world market prices, while unequal exchange was based on labor value theory and, therefore, privileged the problem of social relations of production. Therefore, despite the similar conclusion regarding the structural imbalance of the international vision of labor, the strategic programs for the development of the peripheries that branch out from the two theories are significantly different with regard to the capitalist relations of production. 4 Prebisch defined: “Therefore, there is a need to modify the composition of imports and, relatively, the structure and volume of domestic production, to meet the current needs of the population, sustaining a maximum of employment. While imports essential to the current needs of the population will follow the relatively slow pace of the country’s organic growth, those of deferred articles will be subject to export fluctuation” (Prebisch, 1986, p.499).

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1.1 Import Substituting Industrialization The industrialist conception of development was the result of the same feeling that had stimulated the maximum diversification of Agriculture: the achievement of economic self-​sufficiency as a radical expression of national sovereignty. The Cuban leaders, at first, chose to apply the program of import substituting industrialization on the island, identifying in it the necessary leverage for the creation of new technical means suitable for the Revolutionary finals. The notion that “development” was an immediate synonym for “industrialization” was widespread among the government’s most influential economists, among them Regino Boti, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and Juan Noyola. In 1956, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez declared: No technical or dialectical argument can undo what Colin Clark called “Petty’s Law,” with its three hundred years in force, according to which the highest income and the greatest progress relate to the employment of the largest proportion of the population in industrial activities versus agricultural activities. History confirms this trend. Developed countries are those with the highest real income per capita because they have a determined economic structure based on a certain degree, greater or lesser, of industrialization. 1983, p.57

Juan Noyola, eclac economist on an aid mission to Cuba and later leader of the Central Planning Board (juceplan), presented courses and lectures to workers and administrative officials on the island, disseminating the import substitution vision. Between September and December 1959, Noyola taught a training course on economic development problems, where he focused on differentiating two foreign exchange saving strategies: import substitution and export expansion. Although they were not exclusionary or incompatible, Noyola expressed his preference for the substitutive strategy, claiming that the external sector expansion would not be able to absorb the underutilized contingent of labor force, without expanding other inward productive sectors.5 He 5 In defense of import substitution, Noyola argued: “it is, therefore, the high elasticity-​income of the demand for imported products that makes the adoption of an import substitution policy indispensable as one of the needs of economic development. We can always think that they are equivalent alternatives to import substitution, which means using less foreign exchange to obtain the same amount of resources, or the expansion of exports, which means obtaining the foreign exchange to acquire these resources abroad. In theory, both are equivalent. Now, in practice, and even if the development of new exportation lines is fundamental, it is even more important to replace imports. If a growth in the importation capital derived

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completed his reasoning by saying: “In reality, not only import substitution, but also, in general, economic development, means industrialization” (1978, p.82). Cuban import substitution, according to Noyola, would encompass four strategic objectives. First, transform the sugar sector into a multiple industry, through the use of its byproducts: its bagasse would be the raw material for the paper industry; the sugar plant, a pole of energy production; and other cane derivatives would serve the chemical industry; this unfolding was named by Guevara the “sucrochemical industry” (Noyola, 1978, p.132). The second objective should be, for Noyola, the energy sector, which would probably be the main structural bottleneck of Cuban development, once the full use of underutilized capacities has been reached. The third objective should be the steel and mechanical industry, based on the eastern laterite reserves, still conditioned by overcoming serious obstacles such as technical difficulties in mineral extraction, the need for large scale to ensure minimum profitability, the narrowness of the market and the high fuel consumption—​considering an economy wherein oil already occupied 10.7% of the importation tariff (eclac, 1964, p.284). Finally, the fourth objective would be to absorb population growth and eliminate unemployment (Noyola, 1978, p.93–​94). Noyola’s 1959 prognosis predicted that, when a replacement strategy was adopted, it would be possible to double agricultural production, triple industrial production and quadruple energy production by 1970 (1978, p.95). The replacement currency savings would come from the elimination of sumptuous consumption.6 Aware that all these objectives should be hierarchized according to the existing conditions on the island, Noyola proposed that the sugar chemical sector be the spearhead of industrialization, through the Constitution of a chemical complex of international standard, followed by the food industry and, subsequently, by mining, according to the advantages and limitations peculiar to the island (Noyola, 1978, p.275).

from traditional exportation activities were to be achieved that was sufficient to absorb the existing unemployment and the vegetative growth of the labor force, then the expansion of exports would be the solution. However, if adequate growth in these sectors cannot be expected, import substitution is preferable” (1978, p.82). 6 Noyola argued in 1959: “it was an economy that could afford to import, for example, 30 million dollars of animal fat, which could afford to import many tens of millions of dollars of sumptuous articles; a country that, being the world’s leading sugar producer, imported industrialized sweets (torrones from Spain), which, being a major producer of tropical fruits, imported, for example, one million dollars of pear juice […]. We could stay 10 years without importing cars and absolutely nothing would happen. This is because about 100 million dollars from all kinds of motor vehicles were imported” (1978, p.122–​23).

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In addition, Noyola advocated, during his short period of collaboration with Cuba until his tragic death in a plane crash on November 26, 1962, for a model of Caribbean trade integration that could reconcile the two methods of obtaining foreign exchange for development (the replacement of imports and the expansion of exports). In this case, goods destined for the United States and Europe should be moved to the Caribbean market.7 Noyola also predicted Cuban integration with the Soviet bloc (the only one that had actually been consolidated) and with the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa (which only integrated politically, as Lourdes Cervantes, at ospa-​a al, expressed). In Martí’s wake, Noyola was one of the firmest proponents of “geographical diversification of foreign trade” as a strategy of economic independence (Noyola, 1961, p. 411). At The Forum of Agrarian Reform, held in Havana in July 1959, Raúl Castro stated that it would be possible to save 150 million dollars a year through the substitution strategy (Castro, 29 jun.1959). Regino Boti was also involved in the substitution strategy. According to Boti, 120 million pesos were spent annually on food imports and Cuba met the appropriate conditions to replace them. More than that, the substitution of food imports would be strategic to sustain the other substitutions and the very reproduction of society, as he explained at The Agrarian Reform Forum.8 The Cuban government, in an official report delivered to eclac in 1966, synthesized the substitution policy of the first years of the revolution: Thus, “industrialization” became a national slogan, at the same time patriotic and technical […]. Industrializing efforts were immediately guided by domestic growth through import substitution and the projection of accelerated industrial development on the basis of the classical scheme. Very quickly, however, the policy followed by the United States Government for the Cuban Revolution forced a reconsideration of Cuba’s sugar position. cuba, 1966, p.19–​20

7 In defense of the integration of Cuba into the Caribbean as a pillar of the substitution strategy, Noyola said: “In this case, replacing imports and expanding exports become synonymous, because they replace imports from the United States and Western Europe not only for Cuban domestic consumption, but also to export to the Caribbean area […]. A fertilizer industry, an insecticide factory, a tire factory, can be an integration industry for the five Central American markets” (1978, p.88, 91). 8 Boti spoke on July 4, 1959: “the progress of the growth of the industry stops and evaporates in an inflation and, at best, continues as long as the country can import food. But the day its currencies run out, the industry’s growth process stops instantly” (Boti, 04/​07/​1959).

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As seen, the economic imbalances resulting from the state blockade and the sudden uncertainty in relation to the sugar markets quickly made a conventional substitutive policy unfeasible.9 Consolidated the blockade and amid the strong military tension, the substitution policy became an emergency and disorganized impulse, whose effects on the agrarian structure have already been analyzed. The blockade prevented the obtaining of intermediate goods, capital goods and spare parts that would leverage the initial accumulation of the replacement process. In addition, other structural factors made the conventional substitution policy unfeasible and led Cuba to change its development strategy. The first and decisive factor was insurmountable: the absence of a natural resource base that would provide the right raw material for the development of substitute industries. The scarcity of energy resources hindered or even obstructed the substitutive process, and the organic specificities of the island’s soils prevented some plantations from being successful for natural reasons.10 The second factor was the scarcity of foreign exchange and weak importation capacity, a historical and structural consequence of the deterioration of the terms of trade. Replacing imports meant acquiring modern and expensive capital goods, on a scale far beyond the island’s financial possibilities, especially at a time of falling sugar exports. Thirdly, there was the problem of a shortage of qualified human resources (technicians, engineers, scientists) and of a modern apparatus of industrial innovation and maintenance, required by the substitution process. As Pericás explained: “By the end of 1964 only 50% of the total capacity of imported machinery was working, due to lack of maintenance, repairs and organization” (2004, p.85). The Ministry of Industries did not have more than 473 engineers under the Guevara management, between February 1961 and the end of 1964 (Pericás, 2004, p.87). For all this, despite the 9

10

As Rodríguez noted in 1968: “the first attempts to develop large industrial complexes (precisely, I am referring to the steel industry and other metalworking processes) showed us that the years of maturation of these investments were long and that the importation resources indispensable for inversions were vast and seriously compromised the national economy. Moreover, they did not bring income in the immediate future. This meant, in the economic situation of the country, facing the risks of a serious strain for the future rise in consumption levels” (1983, p.448). “Cuba is not Brazil, it is not even a mainland territory like Czechoslovakia,” Rodríguez stated in 1956 (1983, p.66). eclac specified the problem in its analysis: “Cuba is not a country particularly endowed with natural resources. Its lands are excellent for one cultivation—​especially cane and tobacco—​and less suitable for another—​coffee, some basic grains and, finally, it has the important possibility of vast resources of the sea. However, it has few energy resources and, with the exception of nickel, no other mineral riches of importance were detected” (eclac, 1980, p.64).

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850 million dollars invested between 1960 and 1963 for industrialization representing an amount greater than the United States investment in the island in the previous 50 years, the replacement strategy failed. The structural limitations of the substitution strategy were synthesized by eclac in 1964: In the first plans of manufacturing development, an investment of unused magnitude and structure was foreseen, which covered a very wide range of activities. Thus, the process of industrial development was affected by a phenomenon of extending the period of maturation of inversions and—​what is more important from the point of view of short—​term production rhythms—​by a relative deterioration of the maintenance and modernization of existing industries. Although these deficiencies have tended to be remedied, still in 1963 the implementation of the industrial plan was adversely affected by the limitations or changes in supplies and reserves of raw material, especially the food, chemical, textile, petroleum and sugar industries. It should also be noted that the availability of skilled labor of middle and upper levels constituted another bottleneck. 1964, p.289

In addition to these, another structural obstacle that prostrated itself against the substitution policy was listed by Boti to explain the failure, and is related to the radical process of income redistribution analyzed earlier. Despite the considerable increase in substitute production in several Cuban economic segments during the first years of the revolution, the much higher increase in demand would have absorbed the saved currencies, preventing imports from being effectively replaced.11 In the case of food, in physical terms, the importation of rice grew 14% between 1957 and 1960; the importation of corn grew more than 200 times between 1957 and 1963; of potatoes 59% between 1957 and 1962; of beef 118% between 1957 and 1963 (eclac, 1964, p.279). Moreover, the industrial growth observed between 1958 and 1963 reflected, in part, the underutilization of productive capacity, which, according to eclac, reached

11

The aggregate growth of the agricultural sector was 5.8% per year between 1959 and 1963. The industry expanded 7.1% per year between 1961 and 1963, being: 9.9% the oil sector, 6.7% mining, 16.3% chemical, 11% textile, 5.7% electricity, 4.5% metallurgy and mechanics. The cumulative growth of the footwear sector between 1961 and 1963 was 247%, of fabrics was 48%, of cement was 33.8% between 1957 and 1961. The proportion of heavy industry (mining, metallurgy, chemical, and construction material) went from 22.2% to 28.8% of the total industrial sector (eclac, 1964, p.269, 288, 290–​292).

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40% before the revolution, but quickly ran out (eclac, 1964, p.291). In 1963, Boti sustained: Despite the growth in the share of domestic production, import substitution does not occur. This is due to the fact that the level of productive consumption of agricultural products that one wants to achieve in 1963 grows as much as, and in some cases more, than production. 2011, p.265

Finally, the lack of profitability of agriculture and the general fall in productivity contributed to the definitive failure of the substitution policy.12 The change in the island’s overall import profile in the early years of the review reflected the substitution effort. The fall in the importation of consumer goods and growth in the importation of capital goods are visible trends in Table 31. In his theory, Furtado differentiated two driving axes of economic processes: (a) the development of productive forces (technical dimension); (b) Accumulation outside the productive system (cultural dimension). His theory of development predicts that “to accelerate (B) in the future, it may be necessary to slow down its pace in the present to the benefit of (a)” (1981, p.55). Thus, the fall from 36.4% to 24.2% of the share of consumer goods in the Cuban importation tariff between 1958 and 1962, with a sharp emphasis on durable consumer goods, was the result of the new social structure that was intended to be built through the replacement of sumptuous consumption by capital goods, which increased its proportion from 22.6% to 34.2% in the period. Industrialization by substitution of sumptuary consumption, however, took place through a colossal effort focused on many simultaneous sectors, from capital goods to common goods (from chemical industries, steel smelting, brooms, padlocks, soap, antibiotics, shovels and picks, clothes, shoes, yogurts, among other 107 new factories of the most diverse products). The scale of the industrialization attempt led to its failure because as Gutelman explained, “in the absence of a solid industrial base, the rate of import substitution by the premature installation of manufacturing industries was very low” (1975, p.209). This meant that the investment effort of 25% of gdp would only have an expected return on industrial growth of 5% (Ibid., 1975, p.208). The 12

Romeo stated: “At the end of 1962, the substantial reduction in labor productivity and the general lack of profitability of agropecuary production, as a consequence of the change in the traditional productive structure of the agricultural sector, was clearly appreciable” (Romeo, 1965, p.5).

24.0 1.9 15.0 2.9 4.2 850.1

21.0 1.6 12.1 2.3 5.0 713.9

Million pesos 1955 cif January-​September source: eclac, 1964, p. 284

38.6 28.5 10.1 10.1 26.7

40.5 29.9 10.6 8.6 29.5

Consumer goods Non-​Durable Durable Fuels Raw material and intermediate products Fixed capital assets For agriculture For industry For transportation Construction material Total (a)

1957

1956

Importation structure (%)

Product

table 31

22.6 1.8 14.2 2.7 3.9 854.8

36.4 26.8 9.6 10.5 25.2

1958

26.6 2.4 13.9 4.4 5.9 742.2

33.3 24.9 8.4 9.2 29.8

1959

23.6 3.7 9.1 4.2 6.6 637.8

31.4 28.9 2.5 13.5 30.6

1960

33.6 4.6 8.4 10.1 10.5 702.5

26.0 21.9 4.1 7.5 32.6

1961

34.2 2.4 15.2 9.9 6.7 759.3

24.2 21.5 2.7 10.8 30.8

1962

27.7 —​ —​ —​ —​ 453.8

25.1 23.9 1.2 12.3 34.9

1963b

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same observation was made by Carlos Romeo in 1965,13 and by the Cuban government itself, in the document delivered to eclac in 1966.14 To this, Romeo added that the factories imported from the Soviet bloc, as noted below, were technically obsolete in relation to the advanced capitalist countries and, in some cases, even in relation to those existing in Cuba (Romeo, 1965, p.6). When explaining the failure of import substitution Sergio Aranda added: Industrialization did not solve the growing deficits of foreign trade, did not generate currency and, on the contrary, required an initial increase of imports—​not offset by the same volume of exports (Aranda, 1968, p.25). Therefore, the same structural imbalances that determined the return to sugar, including the limitations of the importation capacity above all, defeated the first substitution policies. Carlos Romeo synthesized: Production levels remained below installed capacities, since the ability to import, limited mainly by the fall in sugar exports and very poorly exploited by organizational limitations (explainable in an environment of social transformation aimed at the creation of a “socialist economy”), was not sufficient to sustain the pace of imports necessary for national participation and, at the same time, to increase current production, despite the generous annual credits that the partner countries granted to balance their balance payments. 1965, p.6

In 1963, the adoption of the combined strategy for agriculture (prioritization of sugar, specialized diversification and incorporation of technology) meant a movement to abandon the conventional substitution strategy, to bet exactly on the reverse path. The expansion of specialized exports would be the strong line of the new strategy, relegating import substitution to the background, contrary 13

14

Carlos Romeo analyzed: “the first indication of the difficulties was expressed through the inability of the technical devices of projection, construction and assembly to match the pace of hiring complete factories in socialist countries. Secondly, the process of construction and assembly of the new factories clashed with a limit far below contemplated and the technical and financial resources available both in national currency and in foreign currency” (Romeo, 1965, p.5–​6). The Cuban government argued: “under the current conditions, the very character of the existing industry, with its weak technological concatenations and structural bottlenecks in the production capacities of intermediate goods, is not in a position to produce an effective volume of import substitution that allows them to considerably increase their activity without affecting the balance of payments in freely convertible currency” (Cuba, 1966, p.18).

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to what Noyola had recommended in 1959. Without denying the future need for substitution, the prioritization of sugar contextualized in a new international economic insertion indefinitely postponed Cuban industrialization. The new development strategy focused on the target of 10 million tonnes of sugar from the 1970 harvest and was associated by David Barkin with the so-​called “turnpike strategy.” 1.2 Turnpike Strategy: the Return of “Comparative Advantages”? As a consequence of the narrow range of maneuver of the revolution in the control of the rhythms of the incorporation of technical progress, the replacement strategy was abandoned. In 1968, Rodríguez analyzed the failure of the substitution policy with the following words: If Industrial Development was obstructed for Cuba in a short period because our country had neither the technical means, nor the possibility of rapid investment, nor the base for raw material that would need to be established, and, on the other hand, agricultural development offered such possibilities for expansion, it was not uncommon that the attention of the leading circuits of our country and, in particular, of the First Secretary of our party and Prime Minister, comrade Fidel, focused on studying this whole situation, this natural possibility given by our economy, this historical possibility given by the installed capacity of the sugar industry, the development of cane cultivation and the production of sugar […]. The industrialization process was not eliminated from our economic conception, but rather postponed to a relatively short time in historical terms, during which we took agricultural production as the basis of development. 1983, p.449, 472

The turnpike strategy took agriculture as the basis of development, reversing the traditional tendencies of the development theories that circulated throughout Latin America in the 1950s.15 The Cuban option corresponded, in the literature evoked by Barkin, to an “unbalanced model of growth,” that is, that it concentrated resources in a specialized sector to, through it, support the entire economy.16 Literally, turnpikes are the long roadways built around modern large cities that allow high-​speed traffic. Barkin explained: 15 16

Turnpike it was translated as “revolving” strategy in Barkin, 1976. About the turnpike strategy as an unbalanced model of growth: “the ‘revolving’ theory of growth (turnpike theory growth) constitutes an extreme form of the imbalance method

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The strategy known as turnpike (for its similarity to the high-​speed ring roads built around many cities) follows the logic that the most direct path between two points is not always the fastest. The greater the distance that separates them, the faster it would be to make a contour within the high-​ speed track. […]. Cubans modified the theoretical model called turnpike to include population growth and the inability to produce a wide range of machinery and consumer goods. They chose to concentrate on the production of agricultural goods and develop trade relations with other nations so that the capital goods mentioned could be purchased with the proceeds of the sale of agricultural products. 1978, p.102, 104

From a theoretical point of view, betting on the sugar agro-​industrial sector as a growing source of foreign exchange, that is, from the expansion of importation capacity necessary to the subsequent industrialization, meant abandoning the theories that attested to the imbalance between the center and the periphery. It was a question of adopting a reasoning similar to that of comparative advantages, that is, the possibility of net gains through the exportation of products of primary origin. As Barkin stated: “The policies that result from the turnpike theory are similar to those that would result from the combination of a dynamic theory of comparative advantages and the theories that emphasize the importance of obtaining higher investment coefficients” (1978, p. 102). It would be easy to say that the Cuban option represented a simple return to the theories of the equilibrium of the international economic system, contrary to the advances of critical theories. Such reasoning would represent a mechanistic look at the relations between economic theories and historical processes.17

17

which attaches particular importance to the efficiency criteria. This theory suggests that a given development objective can be achieved more quickly through the initial concentration of the means of production with greater capacity for intervention and not through the immediate transformation of the economy that would allow the desired production structure […]. The greater the distance between the starting point and the goal, the more interest there is in using the ‘revolving’ theory” (Barkin, 1976, p.11–​12). The imbalance method would be opposite to the socialist theories of development which, adhering to Marx’s model of reproduction, preach the need for a proportional evolution of departments i and ii. Regarding this model, Romeo recalled: “traditionally, this dynamic scheme presents itself in terms of a ‘closed’ economy, assigning foreign trade a totally secondary role” (Romeo, 1965, p.11). Furtado described the Cuban strategy from 1964: “the fundamental point of the new economic policy is, as we have seen, the recovery and expansion of sugar production, with a view to providing the country with a base of capacity to implement that provides it with leeway to transform its economic structures” (Furtado, 1969, p.348).

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By breaking with the double articulation, the Cuban revolution shuffled theoretical frameworks and projected a definitively new fact into the economic reality of the continent. After the signing of the 1964 agreement with the Soviet Union, the Cuban government effectively came to believe in the equitable nature of the International Relations of the Soviet bloc—​a topic that will be addressed later. Given the circumstances, the leaders of the revolution subverted their own theoretical tradition, which associated development with substitutive industrialization in an indistinguishable way, and began to make their conceptions more flexible, seeing a wide sugar route on the horizon. The island’s government did not ignore the strangeness of searching for the weapons to leverage its overcoming, in what seemed to be the engines of underdevelopment. In 1966, the “novelty” in such a strategy was recognized: The concept of development, both in the capitalist and socialist economic theory, was linked, for different reasons, to the theory of accelerated industrial growth as the only way to ensure the process of self-​sustained growth of income. The Cuban case presents, for the first time, an experience capable of changing these principles considered, until now, as sine qua non in the process of development […]. Given the alternative advantages that offer the possibilities of development of the agricultural sector in relation to import substitution, it was decided to base the development of the next period on an accelerated expansion of that sector. cuba, 1966, p.14, 17

The importance of Cuban originality was highlighted by Carlos Romeo, who mentioned the autonomy of strategies in relation to theories and the prominence of concrete reality as a criterion for finding ways out to underdevelopment. In 1965, Romeo praised Cuban creativity, which would have forged an authentic path, avoiding the copying of foreign models and dribbling political errors arising from adherence to certain dogmatism and staging.18 In the Revolutionary context, the turnpike strategy embodied a properly Cuban model of development. Three medium-​or long-​term steps were envisaged. The first era of the external sector expansion or, in other countries, 18

Romeo said: “There is no doubt that Cuba’s economic development policy deviates substantially from the practice of the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries, as well as from the traditional theory of socialist development […]. In the field of economics, the consequences of the thoughtless copy, as well as the lack of a scientifically founded creative attitude, have led and leads peoples to unnecessary sacrifices that do not constitute any ‘inevitable’ stage of the construction of socialism” (1965, p.10, 23).

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agricultural industrialization with immediate priority for sugar and then for other exports (milk, beef, tobacco, citrus fruits, coffee) (Barkin, 1976, p.23). The source of surplus generation of this step would still be sugar. The export agricultural industrialization had four dimensions of investments. The first was the mechanization of the sugarcane harvest, with a view to increasing productivity and eliminating human labor in the most arduous tasks, in addition to filling the shortage of labor (see Chapter 3). The second was the industrialization of sugarcane by-​products, or sucrochemical sector, taking advantage of the energy potential of sugarcane processing and developing chemical industries of fertilizers, synthetic fertilizers, paper and alcohol. The third was the food exporting sector (especially citrus and milk) which ended up falling under the special plans (see Chapter 3). And the fourth was focused on in-​house production of intermediate goods for the external sector, especially the mechanical industry (tractors, milking machines, harvesting machines and cement) and genetic technology (artificial insemination). Also included in this stage was the task of mechanizing the agricultural sector of internal supply, both food, in search of self-​sufficiency of meat vegetables, tubers, rice and fisheries; as for non-​food (cotton, sisal), with a view to expanding a base of raw material for future non-​durable consumer goods industries (e.g., textiles). Because of the multiplicity of tasks of agricultural industrialization in Cuba, this first stage was called a “simultaneous battle.”19 All these concomitant tasks should be financed in two ways: first, through the sugar expansion and second, through the indispensable external aid. Thus, the production target of 10 million tonnes of sugar in 1970 became the primary lever of agricultural industrialization and the “great leap” that would drive the Cuban economy to the next stages. The second phase of the turnpike strategy would be a diversification of agro-​ industrial exports. The leap needed to reach this stage was the unprecedented break with sugar specialization. On the one hand, it was envisaged that the technical improvements in the sugarcane sector, when stabilized at the level of 10 million tonnes of sugar from 1970, would make it possible to reduce the consumption of productive resources, freeing up investments for other sectors. On the other hand, it was hoped that the industrialization of the citrus, coffee, dairy, and bovine segments, leveraged in the first stage with the sucrochemical sector, would be ripe to occupy strategic space in the export agenda. Thus, 19

Fidel Castro defined: “Simultaneous battle meant achieving this incredible effort, which, as we have already explained on another occasion, was not for sporting reasons, but for the imperative needs of our economy, for our development, to overcome our poverty” (1980, p.21).

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despite continuing to be a priority, sugar would no longer represent the only sustaining pillar of the generation of excess. Through the currencies obtained by the diversified agribusiness, the priority of investment of this stage would be the mining of laterite, which implied spending on technology and human resources training without immediate profitability. The development of mining would provide the raw material needed for heavy industrialization. The extraction of nickel, iron, chromium, cobalt and alumina would be financed by agribusiness, which would sustain a second “great leap,” in the 1980s. And then the third phase of the turnpike strategy is reached: the gradual importation of capital goods for heavy industrialization (metallomechanical, surgical, as well as durable and non-​durable consumer goods), supported by agroindustrial export currencies and the availability of raw material (laterite and non-​food agricultural goods). The importation of capital goods was the last great challenge to be overcome and would finalize the creation of the technical means necessary for the realization of revolutionary purposes. Expectations around the stages of the turnpike strategy are summarized in Table 32.20 Turnpike strategy represented, in the history of development policies and theories, a sui generis proposal. Rodríguez, in 1968, stated that the Cuban option meant a “new and untried way in the history of economic development, not only socialist, but we could also say, capitalist” (1983, p.445). For these reasons, Valdés Paz maintained that the period between 1959 and 1971 would have been a kind of practice of “socialism with national traits.” He argued: The fact that there was already a critical mass at the international level to the Soviet movement in Eastern Europe, that this knowledge, access and contact with these societies of real socialism also revealed to us Cubans 20

The process of appropriation of the surplus was determined by the correlation between the state sector and the private sector in the agrarian structure and guided by the progressive enlargement of the former in relation to the latter. Table 33 deals with the creation of technical-​economic means and therefore does not consider the use to meet revolutionary purposes (social investment, for example). A synthesis of expectations was made in the document of the Cuban government delivered to eclac in 1966: “the type of development to which Cuba has proposed is precisely associated with the accelerated development of exports of products that, even having their origin in the primary sector, must be processed by the industrial sector, that is, that agricultural development itself conditions the development of certain industrial branches. It should also be borne in mind that agricultural growth itself will generate a number of external economies that will facilitate the development of traditional branches or the emergence of new industries, as occurs in the case of sugar and cane derivatives (alcohol and other fermentation industries, paper pulp, etc). Within this context we must examine the relations of Agriculture and industry in the coming period” (1966, p.17).

First stage

Industrialization of domestic Industrialization of non-​ consumer agriculture and non-​durable durable consumer goods consumer goods

Secondary use

—​

Intermediate goods, consumer durables and capital goods industry

Until 1990 Nickel industry and export agribusiness

Third stage

(a) It was expected that Soviet external funding would remain as long as necessary source: own elaboration based on arguments from barkin (1978, p. 104); and rodríguez (1983, p. 450–​5 5)

Industrialization of export agriculture Laterite mining and “sucrochemical”

Priority use

Until 1980 Diversified agro-​industrial exportation

Second stage

Turnpike strategy and the creation of economic and technical means of development

Expectation Until 1970 Internal generation Sugar: crop of 10 million of surplus (a)

table 32

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the limitations and shortcomings of these models, creates within the Cuban leadership an intention that remained strong until 1971, to build a socialism with strong national features, with its own characteristics. And in this eagerness to build a national socialism we were also willing to discover tibia water, that is, we wanted to invent everything! And there was no need to invent everything, because there were a lot of rational experiments for any socialist formula. It is in this intention of a national socialism, autonomous, original, presented as a background and in which Fidel fundamentally participates, where Che’s proposal would be inserted. 201221

There were at least two structural problems of the turnpike strategy which were identified by Barkin. First, its paradoxical character: there was a risk of making the economy more dependent on sugar in order to achieve further diversification.22 Second, that between each of the stages of the turnpike strategy there would be a “great leap” and a reorientation of the investment priority, always assuming that the sectors developed in the previous stage achieved endogenous profitability and rare stability in the export market. These leaps could be blocked by interest groups in the Cuban economy itself, which would benefit from the investment priorities of the earlier stages—​not to mention the international political and economic fluctuations. On this issue, Barkin stated: The “revolving” strategy poses numerous difficulties; among others it is worth pointing out the danger that some interest groups created during the development process pose by resisting the necessary changes to achieve the ultimate goal […]. If when the partial abandonment of the accumulation of production goods is imminent, the pressure to maintain the focus on the accumulation of productive capacity increases, the (new) planners may give in and continue to insist on the production of capital goods and intermediate goods. In this way, the desire to achieve high growth rates could lead to a further decline in manufacturing industries, which, according to the plan, would serve to foster growth in the production of consumer goods […]. Those interested in maximizing the

21 22

The “Che proposal” refers to the notion of moral economy, which will be discussed below. Barkin argued that: “the current strategy, which makes the economy largely dependent on sugar and other agricultural products, seems to be the only one capable of leading to a more diversified economic structure, in which agricultural products and ores will play a less important role” (1976, p.35).

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growth rate while maintaining high levels of investment should oppose those who wish to improve existing levels of consumption. 1976, p.15–​17

When asked in an interview about which interest groups could have fulfilled this role in Cuba, Barkin replied: “the workers of the sugar industry themselves, who are afraid that with the diversification of the economy, they themselves would lose control, they would not have the same economic importance, nor access to so many resources” (2011). When asked about the existence of empirical documents that corroborate this hypothesis, Barkin said it was only an interpretation. Thus, the success of the turnpike strategy depended fundamentally on three variables: the Cuban insertion in the international economic order, the leverage of the productive forces and the behavior of the subjects of development. The 1970 harvest was just the first “great leap” of a long climb. 1.3 Why Ten Million? On July 29, 2010, Cuban intellectuals who had participated in the 1970 harvest gathered in the activity Jueves de Temas (Theme Thursday, organized by Revista Temas located in icaic) to revisit a memorable period of its history. One of the speakers was Selma Díaz, head of the Physical Planning Institute of the Ministry of Public Works in the 1960s, who had participated in the first calculations to assess what the sugar target would be for 1970. She reported: The first investigative work we did pointed out that, by solving small bottlenecks in industrial capacity, the country could produce about 8.4 million tonnes of cane in the surrounding lands of sugar plants. Reaching 10 million implied a process of investments in the machines: changing complete tandems, increasing boilers, etc., which could not mature in the time that was left. valdés paz et al., 2012, p. 71

According to Selma Díaz, therefore, the goal of 10 million was not created within the Institute of Physical Planning, which had calculated the limits of national productivity. She was the leader responsible for the guarantee of the harvest in the East, the most important region of the country in terms of sugar. The plan stipulated that the eastern province alone would produce 3.2 million tonnes, of which 2.35 million were achieved (Roca, 1976, p.16). In the 2010 debate, Selma highlighted a section of a 1964 letter from her to Bettelheim, in

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which she warned him of the impossibility of the 10 million crops. In the letter, she lamented: As always, it was thought that if we were able to produce nine million tonnes in 1970, why not ten in 1968? And now the commission is trying to rectify the plan, adjust it to the new goals with the conviction that they will not be able to do so. inra also tries to fulfill his plans with the conviction that they could not be fulfilled and so to infinity. And then, we try to demonstrate that we cannot continue working in this way. valdés paz et al., 2012, p. 70

Technically qualified to occupy a position of strategic framework in the world and with relative decision-​making power regarding the goals, since 1964 Selma already had the conviction that the 10 million would not be reached. She indicated that the procedure of setting unattainable goals was not restricted to the sugar sector and would be spreading across simultaneous battles. In this sense, the whole scheme of expectations of the turnpike strategy crumbled at the first step. Julio Travieso, Cuban economist present at the 2010 debate asked the panel: My question is: why 10 million? If we had said, “Let’s have the greatest harvest in our history,” there would have been no political failure, because that was the case. So why 10? Why not 11 or 9.5? What is the explanation and where did this number that ultimately led to political failure come from? valdés paz et al., 2012, p. 74

To which Selma responded: The f­igure 10 million was a personal decision of Comrade Fidel Castro. We discussed with him the work we had completed in agriculture, the assessment of each of the 154 existing plants, and that, according to the results, we could reach approximately 8.2 or 8.3 million tonnes. We proposed 8.5 million. At the first meeting he told us: 9 million. And in 1964, from 9 to 10 million and even this goal was impossible. valdés paz et al., 2012, p. 75

Valdés Paz mediated the 2010 debate. His insight into the origins of the 10 million figure confirmed Selma’s account. In an interview in 2012, he expressed:

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There’s an untold story there. The 10 million figure was not supported by anything at all. The field studies nothing more than assured cane to 8.75 million, maybe 9 million. Perhaps. Hardly. And from the economic point of view, all the economists who commented on the topic, including Bettelheim who was in Cuba, said that the capacity made a projection between 8 and 8.5 rational, but that seeking 8.5 took additional inversions that were not justified. They would no longer be marginally justifiable. There were no marginal advantages. It would affect industrial investments, excessively affect livestock, etc. It would create side effects, the experts said. In the beginning, in the corridors, there was talk of 9 million. And then, from one day to another, in a speech 10 was mentioned. And then the country’s strength, morale, revolutionary morale was committed to 10. Everything was a bet that certainly had some political logic behind it, but that had lost all economic logic and the sense of feasibility, as demonstrated. 2012

It is not news that Fidel Castro was a centralizing figure, who took strategic decisions in defiance of what the experts who supported him told him. This, it seems, was one of the most relevant decisions taken without technical and economic support, which earned him tremendous self-​criticism. The number 10 corresponded, first of all, to political and subjective criteria, which expressed the herculean will of the Cuban government for the realization of the first “great leap” of the turnpike strategy. On the other hand, we cannot ignore that the world sugar market was undergoing a speculative process supported by institutions such as the fao, whose official diagnosis alarmed the scarcity of the product in the following decade (Ramos, 2007). In fact, in the 1960s, world sugar production grew by 36% (from 52,299 to 71,142 million tonnes) while world consumption grew by 43% (from 49,218 to 70,48 million tonnes). However, speculative forces interfered in the evaluation of supposedly exempt international institutions, which ended up orienting the expectations of the sugar market for overproduction—​even reaching Brazil, which also adopted a record target for 1970 (Ramos, 2007, p.576). Cuba was obviously not immune to the speculative game of the sugar market, even if it now acted with greater sovereignty. At the same time, Fidel Castro revealed his desire to crowd the capitalist free market with cheap sugar, in order to break Latin American competitors who had bet on the island’s bankruptcy as an inevitable consequence of the elimination of the quota of Cuban sugar in the US market and were preparing

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to take its place. On 7 June 1965, in a speech to workers at the Antonio Guiteras plant in Las Tunas, Fidel praised his trade war tactics: Many bourgeois, sugar producers in different parts of the world, are ruining themselves; many who had a program of development of sugar production thinking that Cuba was going to fall realized it and paralyzed all plans. The result: yes, we can have a year, two, three with low prices-​ we can handle it!—​for a portion of the sugar we export. Does that mean we’re going to suffer restrictions? But look, although all this has to be discussed and analyzed at every opportunity, in every way we lean towards the criterion that we will not enter into any more restrictive agreements […] that had served in the past for new areas to emerge, to the detriment of our country’s economy. That the price be low? For those who do not have natural conditions to produce sugar, let them not produce it. Let them buy it and produce something else. castro, 7 jun.1965

In short, at least four motivations led Fidel Castro to transform, on his own responsibility, the goal of 8.4 million set by the Institute of Physical Planning into 10 million. First, a moral motivation, that is, a policy of public demonstration of Cuban economic potential, both for the Soviet bloc and for the capitalist market. Perhaps expecting greater respectability and greater bargaining power in his new worldwide insertion. The second motivation had more political than economic content and was manifested in 1965 through Fidel’s desire to wage a trade war against the Latin American sugar bourgeoisie and make its expansion unfeasible by crowding free markets with cheap sugar. The third motivation came from the real expectation of a shortage in the world sugar market in the 1960s and, therefore, had an economic character, that is, there was a rational bet on the growth of the Cuban share of the free market. Subsequently, however, this diagnosis revealed its speculative origin. And the fourth motivation, supposedly, came from an intuitive interpretation of an objective economic data: if 8.5 million involved investments that were not justified, the solution would be to produce more to justify them (Valdés Paz, 2012). Given this picture, a no less relevant question arises: being the 1970 harvest the immediate realization of the turnpike strategy, the main problem in its execution would consist in the amount 10 million or the bet on the sugar sector as a development lever? When we addressed this question to Valdés Paz, we heard the following opinion:

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It is necessary to separate the strategy from the ­figure 10 million […]. A sugar strategy, a sugar expansion, were entirely rational possibilities, and for sugar to be the locomotive that would drag the rest of the economy and finance the other development sectors […]. In this, it seemed to me that the government was right […]. However, there were objective barriers to the greatest possible will. Reconsidering the past, those who were actually right were those who warned that that [the figure] was not rational. 2012

Not only Cuban but also foreign experts warned the government about the impossibility of 10 million.23 Among them, Celso Furtado had criticized in 1969 the possible impacts of the Cuban crop on the world sugar market. For him, the free market would not carry the 2.5 million tonnes predicted by Cuba for 1970 and such a “flood” would force prices down, slimming the flow of foreign exchange to the “great leap.” Furtado remarked that only with a maximum production of 8.5 million in 1970, Cuba would not affect sugar prices in the Soviet bloc (1969, p.348–​9). Ultimately, there was no lack of advance warnings about the figure. At the same time, experts who warned the government about the risks of an unfeasible goal, made clear their positive view on the agro-​exportation strategy. For Gutelman: Sugar monoproduction was not, from a purely economic point of view, detestable in itself, only within the framework of Economic Relations blocked and imposed by an imperialist power. In the perspective of economic relations between socialist countries, sugar specialization became the lever that would allow the start-​up of the Cuban economy in good conditions. 1975, p.235

23

Barkin argued: “failure to meet production targets became evident in all sectors of the economy long before the most widespread failures and analyzed by the Prime Minister in his famous speech of July 26, 1970” (1978, p.132). The alerts were directly transmitted to the government. René Dumont suggested to Fidel in 1967 that the target of 10 million be postponed to 1975 (Dumont, 1970, p.143). Gutelman advised, in 1968, that it be transferred to 1972, stating that: “the needs of the rapid growth of the sugar sector are in danger of creating distortions in all branches of the economy. These distortions are the product of the breadth of needs and technical requirements of the priority sugar sector. The experience of other socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, shows that these distortions, once established, are difficult to correct due to the lack of malleability of the investments made” (1975, p.274).

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We will see at the conclusion of the work why this point of view was mistaken. After all, the long-​term extension of sugar specialization has led to disastrous consequences for the island, a fact consummated by the Soviet collapse. It would be appropriate to infer, finally, if the f­igure 10 million was not raised by Fidel Castro based on his new stance in the great economic debate. From September 1966, Fidel became convinced that the ideological and moral engines of the economy were the real key to the construction of socialism, emphatically approaching Guevara’s economic proposal. We will see below how the harvest of 1970 was intensely intertwined with the period of the “revolutionary offensive,” when the Cuban government bet on the minimization of individual monetary rewards for work. 2

Revolutionary Offensive and Moral Economy

When Fidel Castro first took a clear stand in favor of the budgetary system of financing and moral incentives in September 1966, the process of the “revolutionary offensive” began. The incentive system was one of the most important dimensions of the Cuban economic debate. The use of moral and/​or material incentives in countries seeking to simultaneously increase productivity and deepen social equality represented one of the great dilemmas of the so-​called Second World, which divided it into disparate opinions and practices. This polemic issue corresponded to the second order of problems of the construction of socialism in an underdeveloped society listed by Furtado and claimed in the introduction of this work: “That of the system of incentives that reconciles the best performance of productive activities with the desired distribution of income” (Furtado, 1994, p.40). Essentially, it was about finding out what was the relationship between consciousness and productivity, between ideology and economy, in the transition to socialism. On the one hand, it was questioned to what extent the workforce mobilized by the revolutionary consciousness would be able to increase productivity or, on the contrary, would be harmful to the economy. On the other hand, it was questioned whether the use of individual material benefit to increase productivity would not be a setback, because it fosters a typically capitalist cultural trait within the society that was intended to be socialist.24

24

Mesa-​Lago synthesized the divergence in four historical examples. First, post-​1948 Yugoslavia, which applied the Liberman model of easing private initiative and

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Fidel Castro, until then, had adopted an intermediate and distant stance from controversy, having proposed the experience of the duality of models in 1964, respecting the space of power of Rodríguez and Guevara in their ministries.25 On July 24, 1965, in front of 5,000 workers who would earn diplomas as a moral reward for their high individual incomes in cutting cane, Fidel revealed his intermediate position: We have to go on studying and analyzing a lot in order to always choose the best methods to propel man forward. Neither idealistic methods, which conceive men totally and disciplined guided by the concepts of duty, because in the reality of today’s life we cannot think like that […], nor those paths that seek, above all, to awaken egoism in man, which, without seeking precisely this, leads to this, so that man wants to act well thinking that this amounts to a reward for him and not a deep moral duty. castro, 24 jun.1965

25

generalizing individual material incentives. Second, the Soviet Union, which although it had wavered in relation to the role of the private initiative, adopted predominantly material incentives: in the Stalin era through a centralizing model, and after his death in 1953 through a flexible model that strengthened the private sector, also through the influence of Liberman. Third, China which, after oscillations, adopted a predominantly moral model, the maximum expression of which would have been the “Great Leap Forward” of 1958–​1961 and the cultural Revolution of 1966, but abandoned the system in 1968. Fourthly, there is the Cuban case: between debates and vacillations, the two incentives were adopted simultaneously and in a disorganized way. But from 1967, the Cuban government placed emphasis on moral incentives through volunteer work for the 1970 harvest. To this political tendency in defense of moral incentives, Mesa-​Lago granted the title of “sinoguevarist” (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.71–​91). For a panoramic analysis of the theme see Pericás, 2004. According to Mesa-​Lago, this allowed greater scope for negotiation with the Soviet Union: “until mid-​1966, Castro’s position in the controversy was not clear, leaning at times to material encouragement and at others in favor of monetary stimulus […]. With this studied balance, Castro managed to control the two extreme tendencies within Cuba and at the same time can negotiate with the ussr, skillfully playing the card of the sinoguevarist tendency” (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.83). Carmelo Mesa-​Lago is a Cuban intellectual who is very critical of the revolutionary government, but who has not ceased to be a respected interlocutor for the politics on the island to this day. He graduated in law before the revolution and in the 1960s went to live in the United States. He specialized in labor relations and social Security and was a special adviser to eclac on the subject. He wrote several books and articles on Cuban economy. He is currently a professor at the University of Pittsburgh and publishes articles critical of the Cuban government in the Catalejo section of the Magazine Temas.

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In the same speech of 1965, however, Fidel showed that Rodríguez’s group had its share of reason when it intended to apply material stimuli for sugarcane production as well: It would be absurd to try that the great mass of men who earn their bread by cutting cane were, each of them, to make their maximum effort by saying that they need to do it for a duty, regardless of whether they earn more or earn less. It would be idealistic to do this. 196526

In the proposal of the duality of models, between 1964 and 1965, a system of socialist emulation with material incentives, elaborated by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, was experimentally applied to sugarcane crops. Such incentives consisted of national and international travel, homes, automobiles, motorcycles, refrigerators, among other benefits to workers (or groups of workers) who obtained higher productivity and/​or met their goals. It is true that only 20% of the workers on the island participated in the program and, of these, only 1% to 1.7% benefited. That is, the effect of material incentives on labor productivity was still residual (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.77). In August 1966, at the xii Congress of the Confederation of Cuban workers (ctc), there was an exchange of political direction: Miguel Martín, the new union president, was very close to Fidel, and replaced Lazaro Peña, of the former psp. At the time, in his inaugural address, Martín emphasized the importance of revolutionary consciousness, of the construction of the “new man” through moral incentives for productivity, criticizing the program of material incentives that was being experimented by Rodríguez.27 At the end of the same event, Fidel Castro exposed: It may well be that a country believes that it is building communism and is actually building capitalism. We want to build socialism and we want to build communism. Since there is no manual, no clue, no guide, as no

26 27

Fidel Castro, speech on July 24, 1965. As it is known, the formulation about the “new man” was original to Guevara, with relative influence of some tendencies of Chinese communism. Guevara stated, in his letter to the Uruguayan Carlos Quijano, later published as “Socialism and the Man in Cuba”: “pursuing the chimera of realizing socialism with the help of the dirty weapons that capitalism has bequeathed to us (the commodity as an economic cell, profitability, individual material benefit as a lever, etc.), you can reach a dead end […]. To build communism simultaneously with its material base, the new man must emerge” (Guevara, 2011, p.229).

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one has yet walked this path, we have the right to try it with our means, with our procedures, with our methods. castro, 29 Aug.1966

Fidel thus demarcated Cuba’s national sovereignty and subtly outlined a criticism of the libermanist model, which was then adopted in Yugoslavia, Czech Republic and the Soviet Union.28 At the time, moreover, the original proposal for the simultaneous construction of socialism with communism was launched for the first time, which presupposed the combination of the two principles defined by Marx from the Criticism of the Gotha Program.29 With this, it was sought to reconcile material incentives proportional to work and moral incentives that link the revolutionary consciousness to the engines of the economy. On August 29, 1966, Fidel gave more concreteness to his intermediate position, proposing a defining criterion of which incentive would be best suited to each type of work. The incentive should correspond to the level of physical sacrifice of the worker and, accordingly, to the degree of technological modernization of the activity. The more sacrificial the work, the more important the material incentive would be as compensation. On the contrary, a policy of moral incentives should correspond to a high productivity and minimal physical effort. So, Fidel defined it: I believe that the axis of the problems is neither in the material incentives nor in the moral ones, the axis is in the technique […]. At work, while more rigorous is physically, while more artisanal and rawer, the greater importance has the correlation between salary and effort. However, when man is in front of an electrical equipment pressing a button, and if he does not press the button he is bored, then from this man you can 28

29

Economist Yevsei Liberman in 1962 had published a prestigious article in the Pravda called “The Plan, the Profit and the Prizes,” wherein he advocated for a reformation in the socialist economic system guided by the resumption of competition. It would be, according to the author, a way to relieve the administrative apparatus of the state and directly interest each worker for their own goals, through a system of individual material incentives (awards) and the incentive to increase profitability per productive unit. The flexibilization was so intense that it was interpreted by its opponents as a return to capitalism. Liberman’s influence was decisive in guiding the economic reforms of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1960s and the term “libermanism” came to be used to represent this model (Pericás, 2004, p.92–​95). In the Cuban transition, the relations of production that corresponded to socialism, “to each according to his work,” still permeated by the necessity of material encouragement, and to communism “to each according to their needs,” would coexist, already moved by moral encouragement. See Marx, 2005.

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demand that he Press that button, for which he makes no effort, and does not have to be creating another kind of stimulus, because society will not train technicians, relieving men’s work, raising productivity, so that they are guided by the same criteria as capitalist man […]. Some companions have other ideas, I respect your ideas, we will discuss them. […]. Ideas must prevail according to their strength. 196630

Only a month later, however, Fidel’s thinking on the issue of incentives changed substantially. Before the Assembly of the committees for the defense of the Revolution (cdr), on September 28, 1966, Fidel praised moral standards and, for the first time, announced a war on material incentives. He stated that, even with good intentions, the proponents of such individualist measures were reactionary, would be working conspiratorially against revolution, and would be properly countered. In the speech to the cor, Fidel unmistakably took a position in the economic debate, with a more radical take in combating the material incentives of what Guevara himself had demonstrated in his articles.31 He cried: We have spoken in the name of socialism, we have spoken in the name of communism, and we will never make a socialist conscience, let alone 30

31

From the same speech of August 29, 1966. Valdés Paz praised Fidel’s intermediate proposal of incentives linked to the level of physical effort of the work, and regretted that it had been abandoned soon after: “Fidel introduced a more realistic element, because he related the problem with the development of productive forces and technical working conditions. A skilled worker who is operating sophisticated equipment has a more open conscience to moral incentives than a worker who does a rough job and is in very harsh conditions, who is more poorly paid. What would they give them moral incentives for? Will you forgo an incentive or award? Fidel introduced an element of realism, although later this was also lost in the late 1960s. Everything returned to ‘the moral, the moral, the moral’” (2012). In his letter to Quijano on the “new man,” Guevara pondered: “hence it is so important to correctly choose the instrument of mobilization of the masses. This instrument must be of a moral nature, fundamentally, without forgetting a correct use of material incentives, especially of a social nature” (2011, p.229). In 1972, Rodríguez signaled a misconception made by the international left about Guevara’s position on the subject of incentives, as if Che were contrary to any form of material incentive: “they interpreted the so-​called ‘guevarism’ as an elimination of all material incentives, to replace it only for moral reasons. There is not a single statement from Che that supports this. On the contrary, everything Che said about these problems carried as a constant the phrase: ‘an adequate combination of moral incentives and material incentives.’ He emphasized moral incentives more, but always spoke of a suitable combination” (1983, p.539).

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a communist conscience with a winemaker mentality! We will not make a socialist conscience and a communal conscience with a sign of pesos (Cuban currency) in the minds and hearts of men and women of the people […]. We have to stimulate in the people these factors of consciousness, we have to stimulate the moral factors in the people, in addition to the effort to satisfy their material needs […]. It must be said that those who want to solve the problem by appealing to individual egoism, by appealing to the individual effort to solve their problems, have forgotten about the society; whoever does this will be acting in a reactionary way, will be conspiring—​even if he does it with the best intentions in the world—​against the possibility of creating in the people a real socialist consciousness, truly communist […] Those who intend to consider themselves revolutionaries will never cease to fight these individualistic tendencies and incessantly call for the generosity and solidarity of the men and women of the people. castro, 28 Sep.1966

We could think that Fidel had waited for the result of the experience to finally choose the most appropriate path to the Cuban socialist transition, were it not for the fact that both models had, symmetrically, achieved a precarious performance in relation to expectations.32 Understanding why Fidel was convinced that the budget model was more suitable, precisely when Guevara was already absent, remains an open question. What are the consequences of this change in the agrarian structure on the island? Fidel’s new position determined that the first “great leap” of the turnpike strategy, the 1970 harvest, was moved by a moral lever. Valdés Paz confirmed: “In the last years of the period, the economic calculation was supplanted by a new system of budgetary financing and the various mechanisms of economic control, suppressed or supplanted by political controls” (2009, p.34). It was the beginning of a “revolutionary offensive,” which would mobilize crowds of volunteer workers to carry out their social duty: to produce 10 million tonnes of sugar. 32

In Valdés Paz’s assessment, no model met the expectations of his defenders because industrial profitability was more suitable for economic calculation, while the lack of profitability of the agricultural sector made it tremendously difficult to self-​finance and would better accept the Budget Model. In this sense, the experience would have been inverse to the recommendations of economic rationality (2009, p. 34). Valdés Paz argued to us: “contrary to the theory, neither Che can apply a system free of material stimuli in industry, nor can agriculture stop applying moral incentives, because it did not have sufficient resources to base the work on a system purely of material incentives. Elements of one and the other have always been present” (2012).

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2.1 Moral Economy and Ideological Centralization A reconfiguration of the forces inside the government began at the end of the great debate. In July 1964, Alberto Mora was dismissed from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The following month, Regino Boti was also removed from the Ministry of the economy, and five months later Martínez Sanchez left the Ministry of Labor. In the same year, Rodríguez was replaced by Fidel himself in the presidency of inra.33 And since March 1965, Guevara has no longer been influential in the government. A year before Fidel’s public demonstration against material incentives, in October 1965, Cuban newspapers published the list of new members of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. According to Mesa-​Lago, Fidel would have worked to reduce the power of the former psp (favorable to material incentives), whose members would have been removed from the most influential core of the government and scattered into secondary posts. Still according to Mesa-​Lago, only Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez would have remained in the center of power, however in minority in relation to Fidel’s group. Simultaneously, the old psp newspaper Hoy was merged with the mr 26–​7 newspaper Revolución in the new publication: Granma, the Communist Party of Cuba official newspaper. On the other hand, Guevara had also been excluded from the list of the political party. Weeks after the change of the Central Committee, in October 1965, the letter in which Guevara resigned all his positions within Cuba and communicated his departure for the guerrilla war in the Congo came to light.34 In February 1967 the magazine Cuba Socialista, which belonged to the former psp, was closed down by the government. Shortly after, all the magazines that participated in the great debate also had their publications closed, among them the Nuestra Industria and a Comercio Exterior.(Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p. 87) On February 4, 1968, the weekly review in Granma criticized a group of leaders organized in a circle that was called “microfactionism,” considered to be reactionary, which would be propagandizing the failure of the system of moral incentives adopted by the government. The formation of this microfaction

33 34

When asked why Carlos Rafael Rodríguez had left the presidency of the inra, Valdés Paz replied: “since Fidel returned to agriculture because he was going to secure the 10 million plan and the special plans, I imagine that this hindered Carlos Rafael’s authority” (2012). Mesa-​Lago suggests that the letter was false: “the name and Guevara was not included [in the new Central Committee list]. As justification a letter was published attributed to Che, in which he renounced all his positions within Cuba” (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p. 85, our emphasis). Massari highlighted the fact that the fateful letter appeared to the public in October, but it was dated April 1, 1965 (Massari, 2007, p.164).

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coincided with some members of the former psp, who publicly defended material incentives. Accused of belonging to the microfaction, forty state officials were sentenced to prison terms between two and fifteen years (Mesa-​ Lago, 1971, p.88). That is, the process of creating what Sergio Roca35 called “moral economy” (Roca, 1976, p.6) coincided with an expressive centralization of power and a more aggressive stance of the revolution in relation to political disagreements within the party itself.36 From September 1966, Fidel led a progressive withdrawal from material incentives, which was completed when, in 1967, the sugar crop was produced without such incentives. By 1967, the government had eliminated all kinds of self-​financed units from the island’s economy, and all investments and incomes in the country had become budgetary in nature (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.87). In December 1967, Fidel reportedly told journalist Herbert Matthews: “We do not believe in the materialistic concepts of capitalism and certain types of consumerism, in which money is the incentive” (in Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.87). Among the immediate measures of the revolutionary offensive on the organization of work were the elimination of the system of material awards to workers or factories with high productivity, the end of overtime payment, the reduction of the working day from 44 to 40 hours and the normalization of voluntary free work. By abolishing the incentive system drawn up by Rodríguez, the differential wage scale corresponding to these incentives was also extinguished and the wage ranges were sharply approximated between all workers. The ultimate goal of reducing the pay gap was to ensure an economy of identical wages, in which social classes would be abolished and communism finally achieved. Therefore, from a strategic point of view, the economic measures of the revolutionary offensive were guided by the principle of gratuitousness of state goods and services, and the maximum demonetarization of the economy. In addition to education, health, sports and Culture provided free of charge by the State (at levels of quality considerably higher than other underdeveloped countries), with the revolutionary offensive, telephone, electricity and water services also became free. But not only: food, clothing, footwear and other 35 36

Sergio Roca is an economist, professor at Adelphi University in New York, a study of socialist economic systems. Roca criticized the ideological interference of economic decisions: “The impact came about through personal purges conducted in 1965 and 1966 in planning agencies, in production centers, and in secondary schools and universities. In many instances, technically qualified experts were removed from responsible positions and promising students were prevented from pursuing careers simply because they lack and sufficient revolutionary ardor. The criterion of technical competence was superseded, or sometimes altogether replaced, it by the test of ideological compatibility” (in Roca, 1976, p. 60).

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basic necessities should be fully free of charge through the libreta. Those who still paid rent were completely exempt from payment. Transportation tariffs were reduced and only did not become free because fuels still represented a noticeable obstacle to the development of the island. Along with the proposal to abolish the market, since 1967, the new system of moral incentives emerged that rewarded the most productive workers with diplomas, streamers, the flag of Moncada, medals, or titles of honor such as “Vanguard Worker,” “Millonario” (referring to the 10 million tonnes) and “National Labor Hero.” Another moral stimulus was given to the poorest workers, whose names were assigned to prominent places, giving them a prestige never before imagined (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.82; Barkin, 1978, p. 215; Silverman, 1978, p. 165). Through these moral incentives, it was proposed that work be seen as a social duty and no longer as a vehicle for increasing individual well-​ being. Silverman held that: “The ‘moralization of work’ replaced material incentives as a means of modernization” (1978, p.164). That is, the revolutionary consciousness was to be the main engine of the 1970 harvest, and therefore of the economic modernization upon which the development strategy would unfold. But the choice for moral economy did not respond only to the political conviction of Fidel Castro awakened in September 1966. There would also be a material agreement of the system of moral incentives. With the end of social segregation, the trend of structural imbalance between the supply and demand of consumer goods followed an irremediable aggravation. Between 1959 and 1970, the island’s savings accounts and monetary circulation reached a record sum of 3 billion pesos, reaching the same value as the salary fund (eclac, 1980, p. 175). These wages, therefore, have lost the ability to represent an individual material incentive to productivity, both because of the scarcity of basic goods and because of the accumulation of savings. The shortage of consumer goods in Cuban society was the result of two facts: first, the American blockade; second, the turnpike strategy that prioritized imports of capital goods. This scarcity greatly hindered the organization of a system of material incentives, whose scope and effectiveness would likely be limited by the lack of resources. A commercially deficit state that prioritized economic development could not offer plenty in consumer goods to inject massively into the system of incentives. And a system of incentives that did not reach broad sectors of workers would not generate the proposed effects on productivity and would not overcome its experimental character. Or at least so one sector of the Cuban government may have thought. In short, the offensive was a general movement of abolition of the market and reduction of the wage bill, with a view to the progressive shrinking of the

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function of the money in society (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p. 90). Therefore, since there are no consumption goods available, why maintain high wages? On March 24, 1968, Fidel stated on national radio: “Are we going to stimulate people by giving them money notes with which nothing can be bought?” (in Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p. 97) Cuba had joined the path of the abolition of the consumer society. In the perception of eclac, during the revolutionary offensive a real possibility of eliminating money as a distribution mechanism opened up (eclac, 1980, p.22). Hence the interesting statement of the Soviet who traveled to the island in the early years of the 1970s and noticed that Cuba seemed to have just gone through war communism.37 The idea that there was a structural imbalance that economically justified the adoption of the system of moral incentives was considered by Carme Mesa-​ Lago,38 by David Barkin,39 by Bertram Silverman40 and eclac.41 On the one hand, the lack of the possibility of spending on consumer goods discourages 37 38

39

40

41

Report by Julio Díaz Vásquez, in the epigraph of this chapter. On the period of war in the Soviet Union, see Bettelheim, 1976 and Dobb, 1972. Mesa-​Lago analyzed the opinions of “sinoguevarist economists” who, in 1964, would have said: “it is impossible to use material interests to improve the result of labor, unless more money automatically means more consumer goods. The rationing system negates most of the advantages of material incentives” (in Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.97). Barkin held that: “the scarcity of material goods and the inability to award substantial wage differentials was a contributing factor in realizing the shift to moral incentives” (1978, p.113). And he added: “the rationing program made the adoption of non-​material incentives almost a necessity, for the goods available to reward workers were not attractive enough to encourage the personal efforts that the new government sought to motivate” (1978, p.220). In the context of “a policy aimed at blocking, or even reducing, individual consumption, in order to be able to channel a greater volume of resources for investments,” the generalization of individual material incentives was then blocked (Barkin, 1976, p.41). Silverman argued that moral incentives were a necessity of the development strategy adopted, since it required austerity in consumption for the importation of capital goods: “gnp had fallen by more than 4% in 1966. The radicalization of the Cuban economic organization was closely linked to the decision to intensify the rate of economic development” (1978, p.171). eclac analyzed: “basic products were distributed through an egalitarian rationing and not through purchasing power. Non-​essential consumer goods have practically disappeared and the possibilities of enjoying higher incomes have become very restricted. Growing support for moral incentives for socially necessary work and the refusal to value superfluous personal consumption as a stimulus to the greatest efforts of work accompanied the deliberate equality in the distribution of basic products and the inevitable austerity in consumption” (1980, p.22). On the irremediable imbalance between supply and demand for consumer goods, eclac stated: “this has blocked the effectiveness of measures and tools to promote productivity, in addition to a certain disorganization of production in the face of the weakening of economic controls” (1980, p.175).

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work. On the other hand, a system of material incentives would be costly for an economy that put all its effort into the 1970 harvest. Silverman also assessed that there would be another material conditioning to justify the option of moral economy: the fight against smuggling, in which the consumer society was still very involved, attracting savings funds and aggravating the inefficiencies of the state sector.42 Smuggling was the materialization of the position identified as “selfish” by the revolutionary offensive, which dribbled the forces of collectivization in search of individual benefit. Silverman sustained: In severe circumstances of scarcity, the private sector provided an illegal source of consumer goods and competed for success in obtaining scarce workers and resources. Thus, the prototype of the “consumer goods society” operated at the heart of the Cuban system and took advantage of the contradictions and inefficiencies inherent in the socialized sector. 1978, p.167

The counterpart of the demonetarization of the economy was the creation of an egalitarian system of distribution of the surplus through free state goods and services. Strictly speaking, then, there was a specific type of material incentives in place, since the social security system was undeniably a “collective material benefit,” or of a “social nature,” as Guevara defined it (2011, p.229). With the purpose of eliminating the consumer society, the revolutionary offensive reduced individual material benefits and monetary relations, but offered something in exchange. From this policy emerged what we can call “principle of collective wage agreement,” whose counterpart was the lack of accounting control of the state economy. 2.2 Collective Wage Agreement and Lack of Accounting Control The idea that reducing consumption levels in the name of increasing investment levels was a necessary strategic option for Cuba was also accepted by supporters of material incentives.43 But in the context of the moral economy,

42

43

On the attraction exerted by smuggling in the context of imbalance, Barkin stated: “No one who has the opportunity will stop buying a single article that has the opportunity to buy, regardless of whether he does or does not need it. The government is making a great effort to absorb surplus purchasing power and reduce the distorting effects it creates on the distribution of consumer goods” (1978, p.212). Carlos Rafael Rodríguez mentioned: “the option between accumulation and consumption is a political option […]. Development means the sacrifice of relative consumption in function of the needs of accumulation” (Rodríguez, 1983, p.422, 456).

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reduction in consumption levels was reinforced by ideological factors. The principle of collective wage agreement was already in force before the revolutionary offensive, since it was an impetus to the construction of a society of social and popular rights, in contrast to the consumer society. Barkin pointed out: Even before the explicit decision to adopt moral incentives was made, the increasing amount of public services available to the population and the limited amount of consumer goods that could be added through the rationing program had altered the role of monetary income in determining living standards. 1976, p.216

By the principle of collective wage agreement, the way to balance the supply of consumer goods and the money in the hands of the population was no longer marketable and became almost exclusively political.44 But the revolutionary offensive was a real egalitarian avalanche. The policy of gratuitousness of State goods and services came into direct confrontation with the remaining markets. The problem was that, by radically moralizing the economy and decoupling worker productivity from labor incomes (both individual wages and collective state surpluses), the calculation of real development costs was disregarded, compromising economic controls and social accounts. In 1965, the Ministry of Finance was closed and was not replaced. This meant that in 1967, accounts no longer existed, so that there could also be no coherent policy of reducing productive costs and minimum profitability per Economic Unit (eclac, 1980, p.187). Bertram Silverman explained how the new economic system despised accounts: The introduction of the new system of economic administration in 1967 radically expanded Che’s central budget system. The new system of economic administration eliminated transactions between units within the socialized sector, according to the general norms established by the annual plan. The companies had direct contractual relations, but there were neither monetary nor credit relations. Records of receipt and dispatch of articles were circulated, but no payments were required. 1978, p.158

44

Fidel Castro stated on July 26, 1970: “the devaluation or change in the value of the currency, as was done in the early years, is correct when it applies to the bourgeois; but it would be repugnant if it refers to the workers” (Castro, 1980, p.15).

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It is worth noting that the uncontrolled social-​definitional accounting was not part of the original plans of the budget system conceived by Guevara.45 The economic unrest resulting from the revolutionary offensive occurred in at least five dimensions. First, there was the uncontrollability of the account registers of the state sector in a national dimension due to the demonetarization of relations between the state enterprises, which exchanged spare parts, fuel, inputs and even workers, without there being the ability to quantify the displacements in the disposition of the factors of production by means of a general equivalent. The lack of accounting to record these displacements complicated the economic planning, given the uncertain knowledge of the administrators in relation to the territorial disposition of the productive factors. Awareness of the control and quantitative registration of production goods was also gradually lost. The second dimension was the uncontrolled decision-​ making in the productive units. The farms collected resources and inputs from the state without the knowledge of their real costs. By ignoring the costs of spare parts, inputs, raw material, and the accounting dimension of each of the factors, managers made mistakes and often wasted these resources, amplifying the drop in labor productivity in national terms. The waste was incorporated into the administration, as Silverman explained: “The fragile planning was also weakened by the excess of resources that are often the product of revolutionary enthusiasm and the uncertainty of foreign supplies” (1978, p.177). The third dimension was the control of production costs on the part of the workers themselves, who no longer cared about the optimal use of the resources available to them, since their salary and social well-​being did not depend on any economic rationality directly linked to their productivity. Demonetarization, in this case, was allied with a contempt for economic control, contrary to what Silverman advocated, for whom the pursuit of cost reduction should be the basis of social consciousness. Finally, the social duty of work should include the effort to increase productivity. Not knowing the costs made it impossible to reduce them and the task of the worker became a chain of subjective determinations that generated objective losses. Silverman maintained: “There is a relationship between social consciousness and economic control and responsibility, a factor that has not been fully appreciated in the development of the Cuban economic organization” (1978, p.162–​3). A fourth dimension was the 45

On this topic, Luis Alvarez Rom, Guevara’s partner in defense of the budgetary system, clarified: “the principle of commercial income within the state sphere is strictly formed and dominated by the plan, only for the purposes of economic calculation, accounting, financial control, etc., but it will never come to be predominant in a fetishistic way over the social content of production” (in Guevara, 1982, p. 222).

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loss of the real relationship between values and prices, which in the case of imported goods (consumer or capital) meant the impossibility of seeing the amount of currencies invested to acquire them. The fifth dimension, finally, was the loss of the link between wages and production and the consequent loss of monetary instruments of labor discipline, which were replaced, on the one hand, by moral incentives and, on the other, by the ideological action of the revolutionary offensive on labor. All this meant that, despite the use of historically underutilized productive capacities, many crops were sacrificed, poorly prepared or delayed in relation to their optimal harvest, leading to the loss of resources that were not even accounted for.46 The immediate result of the loss of economic controls was the fall in productivity, just in the first decisive step of the Cuban development strategy: the 1970 harvest. The more disconnected from work, the more the salary became irrelevant in determining the worker’s posture facing their obligations, generating indiscipline and absenteeism. In the moral economy, this disengagement should have been compensated if not by revolutionary consciousness, at least by the mechanization of the cutting of the cane, which was not successful either. How eclac synthesized: During the last years of the Sixties, the hopes of quickly reaching the goal of a communist society—​a “from each according to their ability, to each according to their need”—​taking on the stage of the socialist governed by the rule of ‘from each according to their ability, to each according to their work,’ brought this trend to the point where they have had an adverse effect on productivity, and on the moderate use of scarce resources such as water and electricity. Apparently, the leaders of the Cuban revolution overestimated the capacity of popular participation and enthusiasm to supply economic resources and this led to the suppression of the rules of socialist distribution and material incentives. 1980, p.22–​23

The accounting imbalance prevailing between 1967 and 1969 significantly decreased the quantitative sources available that described the agrarian structure of the period, an absence that, in itself, is still a relevant data for 46

Silverman defined “ideology has often served to rationalize the practice and goals of economic policy. Although ideology has played an important role in mobilizing the masses to accept social and economic goals, it has also had the effect of clouding the view of the real underlying forces” (1978, p.145). For a complete analysis of the loss of economic controls and records resulting from the revolutionary offensive, see Silverman, 1978.

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the understanding of the tensions that permeated the Cuban development strategy.47 Despite the rarefied quantitative information, it is known that, as expected, the relationship between the revolutionary offensive and the peasantry was not exactly harmonious. 2.3 The Shrinking of the Peasantry In 1964, the state sector owned 60.1% of the land (Gutelman, 1975, p.88) and by 1970 it had expanded to approximately 85% of the island’s surface (Valdés Paz, 2009, p. 51). With the pressure of the 1970s harvest, a policy of incorporation of peasants into national production plans intensified. The principle of voluntariness, theoretically, had not been abandoned, but the revolutionary offensive contributed to the creation of an accusatory climate against the peasantry, generating forced expropriations.48 In January 1967, state farm workers who owned small family properties were expropriated in the name of the 1970 harvest, to ensure that they worked only for the socialized sector, as well as adding small portions of land to the simultaneous battles (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.87). In 1967, the anap Assembly, confident in the government policy, agreed to the complete abolition of the free market and the full sale of rural production to the state. In the same year, the government forbade peasants from hiring workers, abolishing any wage relationship in private agriculture and making the sale of peasant lands to the state the only option (Silverman, 1978, p.169). Soon, on 14 January 1968, Fidel Castro announced that 90% of the peasants of the Havana belt (the perishable food ring proposed by Dumont) had voluntarily withdrawn from Mercantile production. Between 1967 and 1969, 12 thousand peasant properties were sold to the state (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.88). Around the same time, a latent tension between a minority segment of the peasantry, a minority sector of the youth, and the government began to erupt. The tension stemmed from two problems: on the one hand, the scarcity of consumer goods and productive supplies for small farmers; on the other, the violence with which some local leaders had expelled 47

48

eclac noted: “official sources point out that macroeconomic statistics began to reorganize systematically in 1962, that from 1967 to 1969 estimates were hampered by the deterioration of records, and that from 1970 to 1976 methodological changes were adopted” (1980, p.61). Antero Regalado mentioned: “similarly improperly was the intervention and nationalization of dozens of plots of small peasants carried out, and such a measure was not nationally oriented, aiming that, if necessary, also could also achieve by arguing about such a need with all servants, companions who would certainly understand the question as demonstrated in thousands of cases, since the masses are able to understand the things that have logic, without the need for administrative action” (1979, p.192).

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peasants, without trying to convince them of the economic necessity of that change. As Antero Regalado reported, about the revolutionary offensive: These local leaders went to the peasants with orders that demonstrate a total ignorance of life in the countryside. They made no effort to explain, in a fraternal way, the need for peasant incorporation into the new forms of work and economy. They imagined that, in a simple way, from today to tomorrow, such a complex historical change in social life could be achieved. It took the energetic call of attention by the Direction of the Revolution and the adoption of measures aimed at eradicating administrative methods and re-​establishing the policy of persuasion and voluntariness in all work with the peasants. 1979, p.206

From April to September 1968, a wave of sabotage and looting of the state economy spread across the island: fertilizer factories, sugar warehouses, coffee, coffee shops, tobacco, wood, clothes, shoes, Tiendas del Pueblo schools, boats and hotels were looted adding up to more than 80 cases, according to Fidel himself. In response, at the end of 1968, the death penalty was announced for all those who attempted against the 1970 harvest, which meant damaging any branch of the Cuban economy (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.110). On July 26, 1969, the government announced a future direction of the complete extinction of private property as part of the revolutionary offensive, which would have been relativized after the self-​criticism of the government in the face of the failure of the harvest (Ibid., 1971, p.89). Peasants who did not voluntarily or compulsorily sell their land were fully incorporated into the national agricultural production plans in 1968, and converted to indirect state officials, losing their autonomy in relation to the crops and quantities planted on their properties. In practice, therefore, peasant private property was already abolished. This advance of state lands over peasant lands was defined by Dumont as the “third agrarian reform.” The French agronomist argued: Until 1967, for statistical purposes a leader of the Associação Nacional Agricultores Pequeños asked farmers their prognosis about cereals. That year, the leader suggested desirable modifications according to his sowing plan. In 1968, they gave them orders, which were established according to the regional cultivation plan, which became mandatory. This year begins a campaign to deliver, exclusively to the state trade (Acopio), all available production. It was initially presented as a voluntary gesture,

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soon after it is indicated that it is mandatory, and the publication of the exemplary sanctions applied to offenders incites others to do so. in silverman, 1978, p.169

Unfortunately, there is no detailed information about the agrarian structure and peasant property between 1967 and 1970, due to economic unrest and loss of accounting records. An important piece of data was brought by Barrios, an anap historian. He reported that at the 1970 Congress of the Association It was officially recognized that the state had acted with authoritarian methods against the peasantry and a critical assessment of the revolutionary offensive was made (Barrios, 1987, p.83). It was under the pressure of the revolutionary offensive and the advent of moral economy that the 1970 harvest was sought. 3

The 1970 Harvest: Plan and Reality

The 1970 harvest was much more than a strategic development goal: they became the embodiment of National Honor. It was a test of resistance of the ideological and moral magnitude of the Cuban people, in adverse economic conditions (Roca, 1976, p.7). The failure of 1970 meant not only unfulfilled goals, but mostly a moral defeat of the philosophy that underpinned the pursuit of the goal. “After all,” Roca said, “foreign economic credit may be negotiated, but national pride and confidence, once depleted, are difficult to renew” (1976, p. 11). Barkin’s opinion was more pragmatic. Despite the moral defeat, he claimed: It is not about whether these goals are achievable or not, but about the negative consequences for the rest of the economy when trying to achieve them. Thus, the undisputed priority agreed for sugar production in recent years has meant the abandonment of many other sectors of the economy. Had the target of 10 million tonnes been achieved, the sacrifice in the other sectors would have been exactly the same. 1978, p.138

It was not just the 10 million tonnes of sugar that were at stake between 1965 and 1970: other sectors were also committed to equally challenging goals. The sugar crop was the flagship of a myriad of goals of the most different segments: they were the “simultaneous battles.”

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3.1 Simultaneous Battles Simultaneous battles were broader than the “combined strategy” (see Chapter 3) because they did not cover only three tasks. The combined strategy was composed of the triad “cane-​diversification-​technology.” The simultaneous battles involved several other sectors of the economy, such as the cement industry, transportation infrastructure (ports, roads and railways), the production of tires, batteries, metal bars, clothing, cigars, soaps, trousers, and a number of scarce consumer goods. In 1969, Fidel even stated that not only the sugar goal should be achieved, but also all the goals of simultaneous agricultural and industrial battles—​otherwise they could consider themselves defeated. Fidel propagated this economic demand to the Cuban people during the revolutionary offensive: The grandiosity of the 10-​million-​tonne harvest is all the other economic plans that are being undertaken simultaneously … I repeat that the most important thing is that we do not sacrifice another plan to achieve the sugar goal. That would be our real victory. If we have to stop everything else, there will be no victory. in roca, 1976, p.1249

This stance contributed with an even greater impact of frustration when, in May 1970, Fidel announced that even the 10 million tonnes would not be reached. Selma Díaz reported in 2010 that the priority sectors of the simultaneous battles were rice, beef, dairy, coffee and citrus (Valdés Paz et al., 2012, p. 73). Some goals are shown in Table 33. Sergio Aranda wrote in 1967, that in order for the goal of 10 million to be reached, it would be necessary to enlarge the sugarcane area by 25,000 caballerías, increase sugar yields by 40%, mechanize the cutting of sugarcane, improve irrigation networks by 5,000 caballerías, build 800 new irrigation equipment caballerías, build or improve drainage channels by 16,000 caballerías, increase the use of fertilizers by 700,000 metric tonnes per year, introduce new varieties of cane by no less than 53,000 caballerías and cultivate them using mechanized methods for at least three years (Aranda, 1968, p. 60, 69). “This set of tasks,” claimed Julio Díaz Vásquez, “introduced a tension in the country” (Valdés Paz et alli, 2012, p. 70).

49

Published in Bohemia magazine on February 21, 1969.

The 1970 Harvest and Development Strategy (1967–1970) table 33

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Simultaneous battles (1968–​1975)

Sector

Amount

Year

Investment /​ gdp (e) Sugar Coffee (a) Fish (c) Cattle

31% 10 million tonnes 83 thousand tonnes 151,5 thousand tonnes 9 million heads (a) 12.5 million heads (e) 1 million tonnes 750 thousand tonnes Self-​sufficiency Self-​sufficiency Self-​sufficiency

1968 1970 1970 1970 1970 1975 1973 1975 1975 1975 1975

Fertilizer (c) Citrus fruits (b) Rice (e) Beef (e) Milk (e)

Note: To the planned self-​sufficiency for beef and milk in 1975, 10 to 15 million dollars of exports would be added in the expectation of surplus generation soure: own elaboration with data from: (a) gutelman (1975, p. 243, 262), (b) dumont (1970, p. 225), (c) fao, (1966, p. 32), (d) aranda (1968, p.28), (e) barkin (1973, p. 124, 127, 130)

The sacrifice undertaken by Cuban workers in the pursuit of all these goals can be exemplified by the story reported by Selma Díaz, who directed the 1970 harvest in the province of Oriente. Selma mentioned: In Oriente, if night centers were closed, you could not buy a bottle of rum anywhere. When we were in full harvest, we had to ask permission from Commander Guillermo García, who was driving the province, to give a few bottles of rum to those who were cutting cane under the rain. valdés paz et alli, 2012, p. 73

The cane cutting works did not stop. To this account of Selma Díaz, Gladys Marel García, from the audience, added: “In Yaguajay, the peasants had to sow the land at night, with car lights, to satisfy their food needs” (Valdés Paz et alli, 2012, p. 74). The simultaneous battles added up in a herculean work. Driven by trust in Fidel Castro, by the Revolutionary conscience, or by the fear of persecution, the masses of workers (professional and volunteer) cut cane from July 14, 1969 until July 26, 1970, stopping only for the maintenance of the machines.

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3.2 The Harvest in Numbers The 1970 harvest lasted 217 days, more than double the 102-​day average of the 1951 to 1969 harvests. Harvest days include only cane cutting days, excluding machine maintenance time, raw material shortages, and other factors that momentarily paralyze production. The ratio of harvest days to calendar days corresponds to the efficiency coefficient, which reached an average of 80% between 1953–​1958 and was between 46 and 56% in the 1960s (Roca, 1976, p.12, 33). The years 1969 and 1970 showed the worst results in the ratio of tonnes of cane milled per harvest days and beat the lowest industrial yield (tonnes of sugar per tonnes of cane) in a 20-​year series. This disappointing performance of the yields of the 1969 and 1970 harvests can be identified in Table 34. The harvest plan provided that, in order for the 10 million tonnes to be produced, it would be necessary to count on 115, 000 caballerías planted, 81.4 million tonnes of cane cut, at an agricultural yield of 53 tonnes of cane per hectare and at an industrial yield of 0.123 tonnes of sugar per tonnes of cane.50 The agricultural sector has come closer to the set goals. At first glance, the real “culprit” of the crop failure would have been the industrial sector, whose yields were 12.9% below expectations, with a use of industrial capacity 25.5% lower than imagined. The exact distance between the plan and the reality of the 1970 harvest is shown in Table 35. In addition, comparing the years 1965 and 1970, the only time sugar production targets were met was in 1965. The history of missed goals turned into a five-​year disillusionment in 1970. It should be noted, for example, that the performance of 1969 was the worst since the adoption of the turnpike strategy, a year in which only half of the goal was achieved. The cumulative deficit of unfulfilled targets since 1966 amounted to 11.9 million tonnes of sugar not produced, with 11.5 million tonnes not exported to the Soviet Union at an average agricultural yield of 46 tonnes per hectare and an industrial yield of 11.6. Considering the purchase price of sugar by the Soviet Union of the 1964 agreement, this lag meant a loss of more than 1.4 billion dollars in Soviet products. The contrast between sugar plans and crop realities between 1965 and 1970 is represented in Table 36. The harvest of 1970 was planned in stages, so that on the 23rd of December of 1969 the first million was to be completed, and so on by 15 July 1970.51 Despite all the sacrificial effort, the average production of the 1960s reached 50 51

The industrial yield is multiplied by 100 to facilitate comparative viewing. Julio Díaz Vásquez recalled, in the debate of Jueves de Temas in 2010, that the plans for each month of the harvest corresponded to the following values: December 23, 1969: 1 million; January 18, 1970: 2 million; February 9: 3 million; March 17: 4 million; April 3: 5 million;

44,939.70 59,537.90 40,811.50 39,295.40 34,818.60 37,039.10 44,714.30 45,715.90 48,050.60 47,492.20 54,325.20 36,686.00 31,143.40 37,196.40 50,686.50 36,839.80 50,879.80 42,368.10 40,476.20 79,677.60

5,821.30 7,298.00 5,223.90 4,959.10 4,597.70 4,807.30 5,741.50 5,862.60 6,038.60 5,942.90 6,875.50 4,882.10 3,882.50 4,474.50 6,156.20 4,537.40 6,236.10 5,264.50 4,459.40 8,537.60

Milled cane (thousands Raw sugar base 96º of tonnes) (thousands of tonnes)

Key indicators of sugar production (1951–​1970)

12.95 12.26 12.8 12.62 13.2 12.98 12.84 12.82 12.57 12.51 12.66 13.31 12.36 12.03 12.15 12.32 12.26 12.19 11.02 10.71

Basic industrial yield 96º (%) 108 136 94 88 76 80 98 98 103 103 133 104 94 118 130 102 133 113 135 217

415,567 441,894 438,881 446,722 460,802 460,331 454,757 466,183 467,629 466,289 408,731 354,144 333,110 316,065 388,449 359,453 382,985 375,582 299,077 367,442

Number of days Milled cane by days of harvest (t)

The 1970 Harvest and Development Strategy (1967–1970)

source: juceplan, 1971, p. 136

1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

Harvest

table 34

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only 300,000 tonnes more than the sugar average of the 1950s.52 The main factors of the failure of the 1970 harvest will be discussed below. 3.3 Causes of Failure The different analyses of the 1970 harvest show a consensus that the main cause of its failure was industrial. Sergio Roca attributed 80% of the operational problems to the industrial sector and transportation failures (which would correspond to 1.2 million tonnes of the lag in relation to the target), and the other 20% to the agricultural sector (i.e., 300,000 tonnes) (Roca, 1976, p.20).53 Barkin thought the same: “One of the fundamental bottleneck factors was the maladjustment of the industry, unable to effectively treat all usable sugarcane” (1978, p.44). Julio Díaz Vasquéz also mentioned: What didn’t happen was the power plants. The goal was to increase the grinding capacity of up to sixty million arrobas per day, for which the reconstruction and expansion of many of these were necessary. The industry could not assimilate the development program. valdés paz et alli, 2012, p. 71

Fidel Castro, in his speech of May 19, 1970, confirmed: We found the problem of the yield. It was the most serious difficulty we encountered, derived from industrial investments in the first place, and also from operational problems in the plants. […] We are cutting, and we will cut, more cane than what was scheduled for 10 million. But in one province—​where we have had more serious industrial problems—​which is the province of Oriente, we will have a deficit of 700 000 tonnes of sugar. This province had to produce no less than 3.2 million tonnes of sugar. castro, May 19.1970

52 53

April 20: 7 million; May 7: 8 million; July 7: 9 million; July 15: 10 million (Valdés Paz et al., 2012, p. 72). The average Cuban sugar production in the 1950s was 5.3 million tonnes, while in the following decade it was 5.6 million (Barkin, 1976, p.44). In the words of Roca: “The weather was nearly optimal; an adequate amount of sugarcane was planted and harvested; agricultural welds were satisfactory; abundant manpower was provided at harvest time; and transportation did not develop into a major bottleneck until after the February crisis precipitated by complications in the two critical areas. These critical areas involved industrial investments and industrial yields; it is to them that the failure to reach 10 million tonnes must be attributed” (Roca, 1976, p. 14).

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The 1970 Harvest and Development Strategy (1967–1970) table 35

The 1970 harvest: plan and reality

Cane area (caballerías) Tonnes of sugar (million) Tonnes of cane harvested (million) Agricultural yield (tonnes of cane /​hectare) Industrial performance (tonnes sugar /​tonnes cane *100) Industrial capacity use (%)

Plan

Reality

115,000 10 81.4 53 12.3

114,351 8.35 80.9 52.5 10.71

90

67

source: own elaboration with data from roca (1976, p. 15, 31)

Roca listed the causes of the failure in order to visualize all the related errors, both prognostic and operational. Among the critical factors, it was predominantly shown the industry crisis that had begun in December 1969 and became unavoidable in February 1970. In December 1969, many sugar plants were forced to stop due to technical problems, related to the lack of spare parts and/​or the need for maintenance of machinery, forcing the cane to travel to even more distant plants (Roca, 1976, p.21). This problem expanded and turned into the “February crisis,” when 23 plants (out of a total of 154) simply stopped working, among which were 45% of the most productive industrial units on the island.54 For some weeks, 30% of the island’s total industrial capacity was completely paralyzed (Ibid., 1976, p.28). This triggered a structural imbalance in the sugar chain, due to the excess of cane in relation to the capacity of transformation, so that at least 4 million tonnes of cut cane had their paths altered towards much more distant industries (Ibid., 1976, p.22). One of the main reasons for the stoppage of industries was the lack of investment. Despite the ambitious production plan, the Cuban sugar industry was scrapped, which was recognized by Fidel Castro in 1970. Historically, the technical precariousness of the sugar chain was concentrated in the cane fields, and thus the industry ended up being neglected (Roca, 1976, p.23). Firstly, between 1965 and 1970, the sugar industry investment had fulfilled only 33% of the planned amount (Ibid., 1976, p.30). To this, a second factor is 54

The six most productive plants that stopped their activities were: Urbano Noris, Guiteras, Brasil, Argelia Libre, Uruguay and Jesús Menendez (Roca, 1976, p.28).

6.2 4.5 6.2 5.2 4.5 8.5 35.1

+​0.2 -​2.0 -​1.3 -​2.8 -​4.5 -​1.5 -​11.9

Balance 2.1 3.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 24.1

2.3 1.8 2.5 1.7 1.3 3.0 12.6

Exportation Exportation commitments carried out +​ 0.2 -​1.2 -​1.5 -​3.3 -​3.7 -​2.0 -​11.5

Balance

Agreement with ussr

(a) Average production of the period source: own elaboration with data from roca (1976, p. 9, 15)

1965 6.0 1966 6.5 1967 7.5 1968 8.0 1969 9.0 1970 10.0 Total 47.0

Reality

Production

Sugar production and exportation: plan and reality (1965–​1970) (million tonnes)

Goal

table 36

48 38 49 42 44 52 46(a)

11.94 12.09 12.05 11.97 10.84 10.71 11.60(a)

Agricultural (tonnes Industrial (tonne of of cane /​hectare) sugar /​tonne of cane)

Income

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added: maintenance was inefficient, and it took too long to solve solvable problems. Many breaks for repairs extended the delay from the processing of the stem of the cut cane, reducing its sugar potential. In addition, poorly repaired machines extracted even less juice from the cane than their expected capacity (Ibid., 1976, p.27). A third factor that triggered the February crisis was the misconceptions in planning the use of industrial capacities. The 1970 harvest plan provided for the use of 90% of the installed capacity throughout the harvest period, admitting that there was a margin of only 10% for maintenance breaks. But the use of installed capacities in previous years had averaged 76% in 1966 and 80% in 1967, disproportionate to the expectation created by the 1970 plan. The fourth cause of the February crisis was delays in imported spare parts. Orlando Borrego (head of the Ministry of sugar industry—​m inaz) said that in December 1970 the country was still waiting for imported parts that would be tested for the first time in the country and whose increments were included in the crop plans (Ibid., 1976, p.31). As Valdés Paz warned, the industrial parts of sugar factories need a period of at least three years of experiments and adjustments to start their optimal productive capacity.55 The period of adjustments was even greater in the context of a shortage of skilled labor to execute them. This was the fifth problem that engendered the February crisis. The training of new technicians did not grow in proportion to industrial investment in new machines. minaz estimated a deficit of six to seven thousand average technicians and skilled workers for the sugar industry in the 1970 harvest. In addition, 2 thousand active technicians had just graduated, and were still inexperienced, some of them devoting themselves to their first harvest. This set of problems concentrated in the provinces of Oriente, Camaguey and Las Villas. The East was expected to produce more than its actual productive capacity, which, in the end, operated at half the expectation. In the East, industrial investment was reduced to 40% of the planned. Las Villas, in turn, since January 1970, operated at 68% of its capacity. And Camaguey, since January, operated at 63% of its capacity, and carried out 32% of the necessary investment (Roca, 1976, p.24, 29). On May 19, 1970, Fidel Castro confirmed that Matanzas and Havana would surpass the goal by 150,000 tonnes of sugar, but the deficit of the East would be 700,000 tonnes and Camaguey 400,000. For all this, industry was the key factor in the failure. 55

Valdés Paz explained to us in an interview: “in capitalism, when a plant made an investment of a certain magnitude, which meant an important modification in some of its productive sections (say, the milling phase, clarification, sugar processing, centrifugation), it was calculated that this investment would not be in full exploitation in a period of less than three years. Because every major investment takes adjustment” (2012).

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The upheaval of the industrial crisis triggered in February quickly spread to the transportation sector, which was already operating at maximum capacity. From December 1969, the two structural problems fed back, because the longer the cut cane took to be processed, the lower its sugar potential. Ideally, the cane should be ground in less than 24 hours. Reaching three days late, the cane planted in Cuba lost 10.5% of its yield. Seven days later, this loss reached 25.4%. From December 1969 until the end of the harvest, the national average time between harvesting the cut cane and the industry was three days. With the February crisis, this average had even increased. Apparently, to achieve the industrial profitability of 12.3, the planners counted on a zero delay, that is, that the cane was cut and processed on the same day, which from the start was already impossible (Roca, 1976, p.22). As Fidel Castro confirmed in his self-​criticism of July 26, 1970, more than half of the island’s transportation infrastructure took responsibility for the crop, so that all industrial branches were hit by the crisis: raw material did not arrive, stocks did not empty, and the reflection of the paralysis of the sugar industry spread in a dramatic domino effect. On the seventeenth anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks, Fidel admitted: “With all the goodwill in the world concentration on transportation has been done, and it proved excessive” (1980, p. 36). But agriculture has not failed to bear responsibility for the frustrations with the crop. As we saw in Chapter 3, the mechanization of cane cutting was a crucial task that was not fulfilled in time. Although the target of agricultural yields had been almost reached, some mistakes made in the cane cutting procedure may have been harmful to industrial yield. Among the factors that may have decreased the quality of the sugarcane sent to the industries were, first of all, poor soil preparation, neglecting the weeds that harmed the growth of the sugarcane (Roca, 1976, p.15). Secondly, there was a serious problem in the planning of sugarcane plantations. Considering that the cane that is less than 18 months yields very little, and that 35.170 caballerías had been sown between July 1968 and June 1969, it is concluded that 20% of the crop was composed of prematurely cut cane, which undoubtedly compromised the industrial yield (Ibid., 1976, p.17). Thirdly, the cane cutters, many of them inexperienced volunteers, decreased the yield of the cane. The fact is that most of the problems observed in the 1970s had already manifested themselves throughout the 1960s and the planners and leaders were already aware of them (Ibid., 1976, p.30). As Fidel analyzed, in a speech published in the Granma on 21 May 1970:

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The Battle of the 10 million tonnes was not lost in one or two years; we lost it in the last four years, and we lost it where we least expected … It was ignorance about industrial problems … It was trying to accomplish in eighteen months what we could not do in five or six years. in roca, 1976, p.30

As disastrous as the moral defeat suffered by Cuba in 1970, were the structural consequences of the effort undertaken. The unbalanced growth model adopted by the turnpike strategy, along with the loss of accounting controls due to the radicalization of the moral economy led to a picture of structural distortions manufactured by the revolution itself, in its attempt to overcome underdevelopment. 3.4 Structural Distortions The distortions reproduced productivity imbalances in the Cuban economy and, triggered by the February crisis, affected both agricultural and industrial activities. In the agricultural sector, few crops resisted the sugarcane avalanche. According to data compiled by eclac and obtained from official documents of juceplan, between 1966 and 1970, the production of roots and tubers fell by 68.7%, not including state or private self-​consumption. In the same period, vegetables decreased by 42%; fruits by 16%; coffee production decreased by 3.9% and tobacco by 38.5%. In the livestock sector, between 1966 and 1970, poultry meat decreased by 20% and fresh milk production fell by 35.2%. Therefore, the importation of powdered milk had to be increased by 12 million dollars. Pork found its worst rate in 1969, 69.2% lower than in 1966, but recovered in 1970 (eclac, 1980, p.68; Castro, 1980. p. 25). Beef problems were not exactly productive. Between 1966 and 1970, beef production grew by 3%. However, according to Fidel Castro, the supply of the provinces of Oriente, Matanzas and Havana were precarious, due to the scarcity of fattened cattle for slaughter, as well as transportation delays (Castro, 1980, p.24). According to eclac, the material decline in the production of pickled meat between 1963 and 1970 was 21.7% (eclac, 1980, p.70). The vegetable fats and beans sector presented problems with deliveries and transportation (Castro, 1980, p.32). Between 1963 and 1970, the canned fruit and vegetable industry decreased its production by 20.5% (eclac, 1980, p.70). In the food sector, the only good news between 1965 and 1970 was rice production, which expanded by 4.8 times, and egg production, which grew by 52.5% (eclac, 1980, p.68). The fishing sector did not collapse: the 1970 fish catch was completed with 105,996 tonnes, or 70% of the target (eclac, 1980, p.74). Nevertheless, the industrial sector that used fish as raw material

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decreased by 94.6% between 1964 and 1970 (eclac, 1980, p.70). Regarding the collection of food by the harvesting company, there was a decline of 16% of potatoes, 52% of sweet potatoes, 41% of cassava, 65% of taro (malanga), 56% of plantains and 14% of milk (Roca, 1976, p.41). A complete picture of the Cuban agricultural production between 1962 and 1978 can be seen in Table 37. Several branches of the industrial sector were harmed, and the segments of non-​durable consumer goods was one of the most affected. Production of nylon fabrics fell by 90.9% between 1963 and 1970 (eclac, 1980, p.71). According to Fidel, the nylon sector was affected by the lack of manpower, which had been mobilized for the cane cutting (Castro, 1980, p.27). Cotton fabrics decreased by 15.5% between 1963 and 1970 (eclac, 1980, p.71), with a deficit of 16.3 million square meters (Castro, 1980, p. 30). This meant a 13% drop in garment production between 1969 and 1970 (Roca, 1976, p.44). The leather footwear segment also suffered from a lack of manpower, both due to absenteeism and cane mobilization. Only 6% of the 1970 plan had been carried out in July (Castro, 1980, p.29). The main problem of shoe production, according to Fidel, was the decrease in quality: the shoes worn by the cane cutters began to lose their soles after a week or less of use, and there was no point in meeting the goal in quantitative terms, if the shoes became unusable so quickly (Castro, 1980, p.39). The production of bottles and bottles was also compromised by labor and transportation problems, depleting the soft drinks and beer sector, and expanding imports of medicine bottles by 2 million dollars in 1970, with worse prospects for 1971 (Castro, 1980, p.28, 32). Between 1963 and 1970, the domestic production of lamps had declined by 45.2% and of industrial lamps by 88.4% (eclac, 1980, p.73). In 1970, the toothpaste sector showed an 11% lower performance than the plan, and the soaps and detergents segment faced a gap of 32%, due to lack of raw material (Castro, 1980, p.31). Another very compromised industry was the paper industry, mainly due to huge delays in the delivery of raw material (sugarcane bagasse), due to the general disorganization in transportation. In July 1970, 30 thousand tonnes of bagasse were stored, lacking transportation to the factory, generating a deficit of 50% in comparison to what was expected in the plan (Castro, 1970, p.28). Bread production suffered a similar problem, as Fidel reported in July 1970: “The flour factory […] had ceased to produce 6,000 tonnes […] because the flour produced was not withdrawn and the factory had to stop, while, on the other hand, it could happen that the population ran out of bread due to lack of flour” (Castro, 1980, p.36). The cigar and cigarette segment shrank by 15% between 1969 and 1970 (Roca, 1976, p.44). Furthermore, between 1963 and 1970, the wooden furniture sector decreased by 20%, corresponding to the decrease in the availability of raw

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material: charcoal production decreased by 75% and forest plantations by 40% between 1960 and 1970 (eclac, 1980, p.69). The cement sector also paid a price for the 10-​million goal. Between 1967 and 1969, production fell by 22.8% (eclac, 1980, p.72). In 1970 he presented a slight recovery, but still left much to be desired. The factories suffered from the transportation crisis triggered by the harvest and stopped producing 50 thousand tonnes of cement because the deposits were crowded and there were no means of displacement available (Castro, 1980, p.36). This fall impacted the civil construction industry, which between 1964 and 1970 erected 43,935 houses, only half of the construction carried out between 1959 and 1963, and also half of the performance achieved between 1971 and 1975 (eclac, 1980, p.157). The same delay in the transportation of raw material strongly impacted the production of fertilizers, which was 42.2% below plan, reaching 578 thousand tonnes (eclac, 1980, p.72). By July 1970, only 8% of the agricultural machinery Assembly plan was complete. At the same time, the production of steel bars showed a drop of 38% compared to 1968, mainly due to transportation issues, considering that 60% of the production was in stock, causing the factories to stop (Castro, 1980, p.26). In this disastrous general picture, according to Fidel Castro, the plans for nickel and oil even went well. Nickel accounted for 96% of the plan. Electricity production in 1970 was 11% higher than in 1969, but the demand for growth had been 17%, generating shortages and interruptions.56 Many failures to comply with industrial plans were related to foreign trade, due to delays in hiring, shortage of cargo ships, insufficient port infrastructure, generating delays in importation of raw material, foodstuffs, and equipment from the capitalist world (Castro, 1980, p.32). The growth of imports due to the poor performance of several Cuban industrial segments caused that, between January and April 1970, importation charges were 20% higher than the same period in 1969 (Castro, 1980, p.39). The biggest villain of the structural distortions was transportation, which spread the February crisis for the entire economy. From the stoppage of the sugar industry, with the need to transport the cut cane to very distant locations, the railway and road sectors gave absolute preference to the transportation of cane and spare parts of the sector, creating a chain of imbalance for the other sectors. During the harvest, 27% of the existing trains in the country (60 locomotives) were dedicated exclusively to the transportation of cane (Castro, 56

Fidel Castro assessed, on July 26, 1970: “the existing deficit in relation to maximum demand translates into interruptions in the supply of energy that will tend to worsen, due to the limitations of the manpower necessary for its maintenance, and to its delays in the installation of new generating units” (1980, p.27).

175 219 25 196 —​

191 217 35 222 12

320 204 —​ 437 35 48

340 207 —​ —​ 52 51

297 226 40 269 16

175 123 267 371 32 44

289

920 231 34 307 18

82 50 274 393 24 35

281

1020 330 25 328 13

111 68 271 393 33 52

434

1178 324 24 316 11

133 94 328 377 34 45

290

1205 302 26 361 10

138 95 244 460 29 46

309

1289 251 20 343 4

312 291 157 330 20 32

136

1403 214 20 341 12

Livestock

203 77 141 391 32 36

218

Agricultural

1968 1969 1970

268 239 181 490 25 39

235 261 236 288 545 21 43

238 337 309 393 563 29 45

273 362 338 449 577 17 41

332

1472 1509 1586 1684 1749 228 344 379 421 454 24 30 36 45 56 325 315 270 228 219 16 17 21 30 38

319 285 210 342 26 25

156

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

1698 528 62 262 46

353 335 423 645 19 51

363

1976

1679 562 63 269 52

349 —​ 3111 585 16 —​

349

1977

1735 596 —​ —​ 42e

—​ 458 312 592 —​ —​

436

1978a

266 

(a) Preliminary (b) Includes rice, corn and beans (c) Includes tomato, cucumber, pumpkin, onion, garlic, pepper, melon, eggplant (d) Millions of units (e) Until October source: eclac, 1980, p. 68. excludes state and private self-​c onsumption

Eggs(d) Fresh Milk Poultry Cattle Porcine Cattle

312

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

240

1962

Agricultural production (1962–​1978) (mil tonnes)

Roots and tubers Grains(b) Rice Vegetables(c) Fruit Coffee Tobacco

table 37

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1980, p. 33). Fidel noted that there were failures in the transportation of raw material to soap factories, cement, bottles, steel bars, bagasse paper, nails, fertilizers, among others, all of which also suffered from the accumulation of products stored in warehouses. Passenger transportation fell by 36%, both due to the mobilization of cane and the lack of spare parts in the railway system (Castro, 1980, p.34). In the road system, there were problemswith bus maintenance, due to the poor performance of the tire industry (50% below the plan) and batteries (33% below the plan), requiring large imports (Roca, 1976, p.37; Castro, 1980 p. 29). In Santiago, for example, of the 103 buses belonging to the municipality, only 35 were in circulation, in a city of 200 thousand inhabitants (Castro, 1980, p.38). The planned investment in roads and dams has also been hampered. Public education was one of the sectors least impacted by the 1970 harvest, but it was not exempt from it either. Despite the extraordinary levels of growth in investment and enrolment, the rate of student evasion increased, between 1960 and 1970, from 16.4% to 21.2%, probably as a result of voluntary work mobilizations among youth (eclac, 1980, p.91).57 To describe this critical period, eclac presented the following summary: At the conclusion of the previous decade, the main goal was definitely the 10 million tonnes of sugar, but by the determination to reach it, other important activities were neglected, which led to a widespread disorganization that negatively influenced some investments. Human, financial and administrative resources had been essentially devoted to the “giant” goal of the harvest. The fixed quantity was not reached, although a production mark (8,500,000 tonnes) was established, which was never reached again. 1980, p.67

Facing the large scale of distortions generated by the crop in the Cuban economy, we remember Selma Díaz, the planner of the East, who claimed since 1964 to know that it was impossible. When asked about the real consciousness of the revolutionary leaders regarding the objective limitations of the goal, Valdés Paz answered: 57

eclac commended the Cuban government’s stance on education: “it should be noted that during the last years of the past decade, when there was a deterioration in the productive sectors and the economy in general, there were the largest increases in scholarship, thus proving the high priority given in Cuba to education and confirming the hypothesis that the budget of this sector was not sacrificed in the face of contingencies in the availability of resources” (eclac, 1980, p.90).

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We didn’t know. No, actually, one or the other. But we were all committed, we wanted to do it. There was an official speech, a mystique, the commitment, the honor of the nation. Che dies in 1967. And everything could be done, the will of man … That was the problem: not seeing objective limits and believing that subjectivity can do everything. There was a question of background design. If what can define a war are subjective values, it can also define economics. 2012

Facing the ten-​million-​harvest traumas it was at least observed that the Cuban economy could definitely not operate at such a level, and for the following years it would be necessary to equate the goals according to a less ambitious sugar strategy (Barkin, 1976, p.44). One of the biggest glue effects of the 10-​ million target associated with the turnpike strategy was manifested in the worsening of Cuban dependency on sugar.58 Due to the harvest, there had been an increase in the share of sugar in the generation of surplus, simulating the maintenance of food imports at 20% of the total imports of the island since 1958 (Barkin, 1976, p.136). The fact is that the sugar paradox was put to the test, and instead of leading to diversification, it generated the deepening of sugar dependency, an analysis also presented by eclac. In the first half of the 1970s, the marked increase in the Cuban growth rate occurred due to the rise in sugar prices on the world market, accompanied by the Soviet Union. By 1974, the share of sugar in the Cuban surplus generation had grown from 80% to 90%, while the growth in total production was 8% and in labor productivity 6% (eclac, 1980, p.40). The Cuban strategy to overcome underdevelopment deepened one of the characteristics that had structured it. A specifically important structural distortion of the 1970 vintage remains to be analyzed: workforce. How, after all, could the island reach the goal of 10 million, in a situation of shortage of professional labor force and with only 1% of sugarcane mechanization? (Edquist, 1985, p. 38) The Cuban government’s response to this challenge was the combination of voluntary work and the militarization of agricultural production.

58

In the words of Barkin: “internal pressure on resources and planning decisions has limited any other productions available for exportation, while increasing the need to import certain products […]. The Cuban example shows well how the historical dependency due to imports of food products destined for domestic consumption is not easily overcome” (1976, p.48–​9).

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Voluntary Work: between Consciousness and Coercion

Although the industrial sector was considered more problematic than the agricultural sector in the balance of the 1970 harvest, the low industrial yields were certainly aggravated by the lack of skill of most cane cutters. The reflection of the low productivity of voluntary work in production would not be noticeable in terms of tonnes of cane per hectare, but in terms of tonnes of sugar per tonne of cane. Julio Travieso,59 professor at the University of Havana, told us about his experience in volunteer work in the sugarcane fields: We were going to cut cane and, of course, we didn’t have the dexterity to do that, which is very difficult. The cane should be cut well below because the sucrose is below. If you cut the plant in the middle, it makes very little sugar. First, you have to cut the leaves. […] It seems easy, but doing this for eight hours or ten hours or more—​for moral imperatives—​and no dexterity at all. We were young, but the older teachers would go too. 2012

Volunteer work had been a political mobilization strategy since the beginning of the revolution, which institutionalized itself during the revolutionary offensive due to the strengthening of the use of moral levers of the economy. In the 1970s, the frustrations of the mechanization of cane cutting and the shortage of professional cutters turned volunteer work into a material necessity, which added to its ideological and moral dimension. According to Sergio Roca, between 60% and 65% of the workforce of the 1970 harvest was of voluntary workers (which corresponded to about 200,000 volunteers working simultaneously). Only 20–​25% of the cutters were professionals (precisely 79,752 people) and another 20% were members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. At the most intense point of the harvest, 350,000 workers were simultaneously armed with machetes. On average over the entire period, 250,000 workers/​ year launched themselves to the sugarcane effort. In total, 1.2 million people cut cane voluntarily between July 1969 and July 1970, coming from the most diverse provinces, professions and economic sectors. The profile of the workforce that participated in the 1970 harvest can be seen in Table 38.

59

Julio Travieso studied law at the University of Havana and received his doctorate in Economics in Moscow, having lived for a decade in the Soviet Union. He is a teacher and writer, with novels published in several countries, among them Llueve sobre La Habana and Cuando la Noche Muera.

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table 38

1970 harvest workers

Type

Persons (order of magnitude)

Professional Volunteer Military Total at peak harvest Average worker/​year Total volunteers Total professionals in cane sector Average worker/​year enough to reach the goal, if all were professionals

79,000 200,000 71,000 350,000 250,000 1,200,000 500,000

% 20–​25 60–​65 15–​20 100

70,000

source: own elaboration with data from roca (1976, p. 18–​1 9, 46)

Considering that the Cuban workforce in the 1960s was made up of approximately 2.2 million civilians, the total number of volunteers for the 1970 harvest corresponded to 54.5% of the total workforce on the island (Roca, 1976, p.18). In addition, it was calculated that if only professional cutters worked in the 1970 harvest, it would take no more than 70,000 workers/​year to reach the production target of 81.4 million tonnes of cane, that is, only 28% of the average workers/​Year who were active in reality. It is not possible to quantify the responsibility of voluntary work for the fall in industrial incomes. However, considering the dimensions of the national effort, the hypothesis that voluntary work paradoxically made the goal of agricultural income feasible and made the goal of industrial income impossible seems quite convincing.60 If the Cuban economy was already going through a process of general decline in productivity, the use of volunteer work as a major mobilization force for the primary task of the turnpike strategy deepened this problem.

60

According to Roca: “Since the majority of the cutters were largely inexperienced volunteers (some had previous experience, but most had none), part of the cane (it is impossible to determine how much) may have been improperly cut or cleaned, or both” (Roca, 1976, p. 18).

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4.1 Drop in Productivity and Elimination of the Foreman Not by chance 1971 was labeled “the year of productivity” in Cuba (Silverman, 1978, p.143). Although the use of the productive capacities previously underutilized on the island had enabled a considerable initial economic boost to the revolutionary project, at least seven structural changes in Cuban society triggered the process of falling labor productivity. First, there would be a specific profile of population growth in Cuba that reduced the proportion of economically active people in relation to the total population, a ratio that in 1970 reached only 32%, which meant that two-​thirds of the population (and economic development) depended on the work of only one-​third (Castro, 1980, p.10). Secondly, since 1959 there had been an exodus of skilled workers who culturally identified with the elites and repudiated the revolutionary process, representing a vacuum of technical capacity that led to the shutdown of some factories.61 Despite the great effort of the revolutionary government in the training of new professionals, there was no way to compensate for the shortage instantly, and even if in the 1970 harvest there were already three times more graduates than in 1959, it was still insufficient for the challenge of simultaneous battles (Fernandes, 2007, p.235). Thirdly, the US blockade triggered the shortage of spare parts and a progressive scrapping of the productive forces. Fourthly, the structural imbalance between wages and available consumer goods and the combined reserves of 3 billion pesos between savings funds and the circulating currency, by itself, discouraged workers from earning more, since there was no market capable of absorbing the new purchasing power (eclac, 1980, p.175). In this sense, even if there was a system of differentiated wage incentives to leverage productivity, neither could it achieve great results in a society lacking consumer goods. Fifthly, on the part of analysts who defend material incentives, the moral economy would be one of the main causes of the fall in productivity, because the disengagement from wages and work reduced labor discipline and generated absentee behavior, which was noted by Fidel Castro himself a posteriori (Barkin, 1978, p. 117; Castro, 1980, p.29). Castro spoke on July 26, 1973: It will be our duty to maximize the efficiency in the use of our economic and human resources in the coming years. Accounting in detail for expenses and costs. And the errors of idealism that we have committed 61

Barkin defined: “the great exodus of skilled workers and professionals from all branches that took place, as the revolution progressed, contributed to the decrease in productivity and exacerbated the need to invest large proportions of all resources in educating the population” (1978, p.111).

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in the management of the economy, we should know how to rectify them valiantly. castro, 26 jul.1973

Mesa-​Lago mentioned a survey done in 1963 on state farms, which revealed that workers devoted only four or five hours a day to the crops and earned wages for an eight-​hour journey (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.96). But labor indiscipline was not only a consequence of the lack of individual material incentives to work. It was also the result of the sixth factor that led to the fall in productivity in Cuba: the elimination of the foreman. One of the biggest challenges of the transition to socialism in an underdeveloped country, as Cuba demonstrated, was to discipline the hard work. Underdeveloped countries have a predominance of labor-​intensive productive sectors. This means, for the most part, working in conditions of extreme physical effort and little reward, especially in the agricultural sector. The counterpart of the transformation of the Cuban agrarian structure and the guarantee of social well-​being to the rural population was the difficulty of disciplining the worker, without resorting to coercive methods (capitalist or post-​capitalist). Fidel Castro recognized, in his speech of self-​criticism of July 26, 1970, that the heroism of the Cuban people lay in the fact that the motivations of work were no longer despair and extreme poverty, which once frightened the life of the rural wage earner, but rather “conscience and honor.”62 History had shown that, although heroic, the new subjective motivations of the effort made in the 1970 harvest would still be insufficient for 10 million. This is because the foreman was an efficient disciplining agent of the work, whose coercive weapons were directly proportional to the structural unemployment arising from the modernized plantation.63 When the foreman and unemployment are eliminated, no other work organizer could be so efficient. Valdés Paz explained: This link went from exploiter to nothing, when it had to be passed from exploiter to someone who somehow covered such a function. Therefore, 62

63

Fidel stated: “the people were heroes not only in the execution of this work. Even more so when the last cane was delivered, despite knowing that the 10 million would not be reached […] The reasons why workers make extraordinary efforts are not those of the past, which were hunger and death, but honor” (1980, p.19–​20). Fidel Castro reflected on May 1, 1971: “what was the law of capitalism to force people to work? Unemployment, the labor reserve, hunger; the pistol in the chest of every worker, of every peasant. The peasant had no doctor, he had no education, he had no medicine, he had no income, he could not pay rents” (Castro, May 1.1971).

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all schemes in agriculture never worked. Neither material, nor moral, nor any of the schemes of labor organization. Industry has also been highly affected, but in the industry the machine imposes a work pace that can be easily measured. In agriculture, as in construction, setting labor standards is difficult because conditions are very variable. 2012

The new relations of agricultural production have engendered a new contradiction between efficiency and egalitarianism. The administrator of the sugarcane plantation should, through persuasion, fulfill the role of disciplining the work previously performed by the foreman through violence. But this Cuban agricultural administrator did not identify with the figure of the exploiter, and had no interest in entering into conflict with the workers. Therefore, it did not strive to control the technical standards of work and avoided denouncing ill-​ done work. Instead of taking a charging stance that pushed for increased productivity, the administrator established average work standards that everyone could meet, and did not rigorously check the results. Moreover, with the average wages guaranteed by the state, neither did the administrator hold effective instruments of power to pressure the workers to carry out heavy tasks in the open. Valdés Paz was agricultural administrator for 20 years (from 1962 to 1982) and explained to us how, in the absence of adequate instruments to discipline the work, the new organizing agent of the production ended up becoming an accomplice to the fall in productivity. He narrated a very common situation in the cane fields: Three norms rule the cane field: one norm is for sparse weeds (few and small herbs), another is for medium herbs and another for heavy (a lot of grass). The work organizer, who is not willing to fight with 20 workers and does not have any coercive instruments in his hands for such a fight, has two problems: before and after. The first problem is: you are hardworking and the field is scarce in weeds. I tell you, “Look, your norm is for a little weed.” And you tell me, “if it’s for a little then I’m leaving. Because I will earn more in the dense field. If the norm here is so low, I won’t do it.” But you lack manpower, you need the worker to stay. And you say, “Then I’m going to register you as median so that you earn a little more.” This is how the organizer himself violates the norm and this is the problem of before. Now comes the problem of after: already finished the field, it is clean. But in capitalism, you don’t get paid until the mayor goes to see if it’s really clean. He goes with his horse through the middle of the field, strolls, looks … Because if he gives one extra peso from his boss, they fire him!

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There is a hard control of the result of work. “How much did you clear?” “I cleared half an acre.” The spoken work is reported. You won’t go there to see it, because if it’s bad, you’d have to fight the worker. And we return to the principle: their function is not to quarrel with all workers, none of whom wants to work. Or they want to work less and earn more. This is the contradiction. 2012

The elimination of the foreman, egalitarianism and moral economy, in solving the main social injustices and economic coercions of capitalism, eventually loosened the screws of the Cuban productive system.64 Thus, even the professional cane cutter contributed to the general fall in productivity, working well below their capabilities (Roca, 1976, p.49). The new production relations were not adequate to the efforts required by the development of the technical and economic means necessary for the international reproduction of the new purposes of the national project. Creating the technical and economic means that would allow the generation of surplus in Cuba to cease to depend predominantly on the external context required, at the very least, disciplined work. In an attempt to solve this obstacle, the Cuban Revolution opened two opposite paths: conscience and coercion. Voluntary work and compulsory work were the two sides of the same process. However, adopted in an attempt to alleviate the shortage of sugarcane labor in the 1970 harvest, its effects on production were contrary to what had been intended. Volunteer work was the seventh factor in the fall in productivity. 4.2 Criticism of Volunteer Labor Since 1965, in Camaguey the harvest had been carried out with 63% of agricultural work. According to Sergio Roca, the maximum productivity of a voluntary worker was 200 arrobas per day, that is, half the standard productivity of a professional (400 arrobas/​day). The productivity of urban volunteers, such as students and workers of the ctc, was very low: 117 and 130 arrobas per day respectively (Roca, 1976, p.46–​47). The national productivity of the 1970 harvest was compromised by this factor. As Roca maintained: “It is quite possible 64

Mesa-​Lago synthesized: “The main reason for absenteeism lies in the fact that socialist society has not completely developed its own methods for substituting the incentives and brakes of the market system, which were previously those that motivated production: wages and fear of unemployment . There is more money in circulation than articles to spend on. Every worker knows that they can live on what they are paid to work 15 or 20 days a month” (1971, p.104).

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that the general productivity level for the entire harvest did not exceed 200 arrobas per man/​day” (Roca, 1976, p. 47). Two orders of criticism were elaborated in relation to voluntary work in Cuba: the first, on its economic irrationality (due to the harmful consequences of inexperience on incomes); and the second for its coercive side. Valdés Paz focused his criticism on the problem that is directly economic. He sustained: Volunteer work has two ways of being measured. By the workers who go from the city to the countryside, it is a political response, an ideological mobilization, has a moral character, and reveals a revolutionary commitment. All this, on the political side. On the side of the agrarian economy, it is a disaster. The work it produces does not cover the costs of transporting them, housing them, feeding them and providing them with resources to work. Their productivity is very low. It does not matter that there is one who can eat a raw lion. Next to him is another that does nothing—​I’m talking in statistical terms. Second, because of their inexperience, they produce a productive damage that is not quantified, but must be taken into account. 2012

In the context of a moral economy, subjective factors also made that voluntary work aggravated the drop in productivity. The lack of financial control of the production generated the mistaken perception that voluntary work was free of costs, as if it represented nothing more than collective gains from the revolutionary consciousness. Due to this perception, voluntary work contributed to the increased waste of productive resources. Silverman summarized it: Certainly, moral incentives often encourage irrational uses of manpower and capital, as directors or managers do not feel obliged to complete tasks that could be completed during the normal working day. Nor do they feel obliged to address the causes of the lack of efficiency. Managers often felt that overtime or voluntary work did not represent costs and were often perplexed when asked if there had been no waste of awareness to meet their goals. 1978, p.178

Julio Travieso added another approach to criticism: the loss of his educational capacity over time and its coercive dimension. Volunteer work was a practice that lasted no less than 30 years in Cuba, having been greatly diminished in 1989. Therefore, it ceased to be a patriotic mobilization in the face of exceptional

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situations, as it was in 1970, to become a mandatory fixed institution, which in addition to being economically harmful, would no longer be able to fulfill its ideological mission, having become a routine emptied of meaning. By generalizing and institutionalizing, it would have deformed its original principle.65 When asked about what were the consequences suffered by Cubans who did not attend the volunteer work, Travieso replied: We would go voluntarily, because we were convinced that it was necessary, we were aware that it was necessary. I would go because I wanted to. The revolution was the revolution and I had to go. But what if we hadn’t gone? We would have stopped being teachers, stopped being students. We would be expelled as teachers or as students, and they would call us counter-​revolutionaries. Obviously, you could once say that you were sick. But refusing to go to volunteer work entailed serious moral and material sanctions. 2012

This is because voluntary work, in reality, when it became a “social duty,” also responded by the logic of coercion. While professional work faced discipline-​ related obstacles, voluntary work was simultaneously an educational mobilization and a compulsory activity. In Guevara’s own perception, voluntary work was a means of building a new man, but being a social duty, it was not exempt from coercion. The coercive dimension was inversely proportional to the development of revolutionary science. In his letter to Quijano, Guevara wrote: We do everything we can to give work this new category of social duty and unite it with the development of technique, on the one hand, which will give conditions for greater freedom, and to voluntary work on the other, based on the Marxist appreciation that man really achieves his full human condition when he produces without the compulsion of the physical need to sell himself as a commodity. Of course, there are still coercive aspects to work, even when it is voluntary; man has not transformed all the coercion that surrounds him into a conditioned reflection

65

In the analysis of Travieso: “there was an antecedent: Lenin’s volunteer Saturdays, which were half-​Saturdays. Once a year, I don’t know. Here in Cuba, once a month, another 45 days a year. […] And in the end productivity was very low. It was not always for cutting cane, there were totally absurd activities, which had no sense, it was deforming itself” (2012).

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of a social nature and still produces, in many cases, under the pressure of the environment. fidel calls it moral compulsion). (2011, p.232)

The moral Economy found non-​monetary methods of coercion to maintain worker discipline, in cases where conscience did not serve as the engine of labor discipline.66 One of the routine ways created to embarrass the unproductive worker morally was to write his name on a public panel in the production unit, in order to officially hold him responsible for the eventual non-​ fulfillment of the goals (Mesa-​Lago, 1971, p.82). Mass organizations such as the Union of Young Communists (ujc), the ctc and the Federation of women of Cuba (fmc) carried out strong pressure to recruit volunteer workers and, as Travieso explained to us, denying this recruitment could mean a deterioration of the emotional and professional ties of individuals with society, in a process of demoralization and isolation. In the face of this type of threat, voluntary work began to be practiced as compulsory free labor. As Silverman analyzes: If moral incentives fail, then there will be an execrable need for coercion. Although the Cuban population’s commitment to the revolution has reduced the need to resort to force, conscience is also a scarce resource and one of Cuba’s functional problems may be to use it efficiently. 1978, p.175

Facing excessive optimism of the revolutionary government toward the harvest, in a context in which social accounting was already out of control, there would also have been, in some cases, the breakdown of trust between workers and work organizations with regard to the achievement of the goals. In the moral economy, when the worker does not believe in the feasibility of implementing the goals set by the authorities, the negative impact on production is more intense, since consciousness is based on this relationship of trust between the worker and the revolutionary direction. After all, if it is the fulfillment of the goals that regulated the incentive or moral punishment of each worker, knowing beforehand that the plans were unrealizable created an understandable discomfort among the workers, who would be punished for

66

In Silverman’s words: “as economic penalties and rewards have been rejected, only social pressures and, ultimately, coercion remain as a method of dealing with these problems […]. A system of incentives that makes use of directives emanating from above simply becomes another form of pressure” (1978, p.183–​4).

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mistakes they did not make. A minimal breakdown of honesty in the relations of production, the small gestures of deception of the system facilitated by the uncontrolled accounting, and the moral pressure without material rewards, in Silverman’s assessment, would have generated a “cynical distrust that weakens the identification of the worker with the system, essential ingredient of the model” (1978, p.176). The need to create instruments of discipline at work generated, after the harvest, in 1971, the law against loitering, through which all men able to work, between 17 and 60 years old, who were absent from their posts, would have to work under the supervision of another worker or mass organizations, and in extreme cases, they would have to work in “rehabilitation centers” for a maximum of one year (Silverman, 1978, p.180). These were forced labor centers. As Alberto Mora, defender of material incentives, defined, moral economy meant: “substitution of profit motivation for power” (in Silverman, 1978, p. 184). Therefore, the twin face of volunteer work was the militarization of the crop and the compulsory work of “rehabilitations.” 4.3 The Militarization of Labor The Armed Forces took an intense role in the 1970 harvest, both performing the cutting of cane and controlling the work of the rehabilitation centers, where the “undisciplined” and the “counterrevolutionaries” went during the offensive. One of the main consequences of the 1970 harvest on the agrarian structure was the end of the relative administrative decentralization adopted in 1963 through the empowerment of groups, departments and lots. The attempt to find a fair measure between centralized planning and democracy in the unit of agricultural production was supplanted by the objective requirements of the crop and by the ideological centralization that characterized the experience of moral economy. There could be no room for autonomous local initiatives, as all productive resources on the island needed to focus on the 10 million, as a guarantee that the “great leap” of the turnpike strategy would be fulfilled. The militarization of labor centralized agriculture as a war operation. In the absence of monetary tools, revolutionary awareness had proved insufficient to discipline work, increase productivity and leverage economic development. Therefore, the process of decentralization was interrupted. From 1965, a special detachment of party leaders was created to oversee the 1970 harvest, the Harvest Sector. As the revolutionary offensive progressed, agricultural decisions became increasingly centralized in this team, until, in 1968, the Harvest Sector was replaced by the Command posts, army headquarters that supervised agricultural work (Silverman, 1978, p. 178–​9; Valdés Paz, 2009, p.41).

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In some places, then, the army began to occupy the function of labor discipline agent, a link that was weakened after the elimination of the capitalist foreman. It monitored not only manual work, but also administrative work, considering the inevitable complicity of the administrator with the fall in productivity. “The consequence of this model,” as Valdés Paz defined in 2010, “would be a restriction on democracy, because decisions are made and there is no discussion” (Valdés Paz et al., 2012, p. 76). The duration of the Posto de mando was short, but expressive of this new contradiction of the social relations of production with development, put to the test of a sacrificial strategy. At the end of this unnerving process of persecution of the impossible, the Cuban leaders produced their self-​criticism. 4.4 Self-​criticism If Fidel Castro was largely responsible for the effort of the 10 million, having set an economically impracticable goal even after being warned by Cuban leaders and foreign experts, “skeptical” or “pessimistic,” that the harvest would not reach, it was also he who publicly assumed responsibility for the losses of this effort. On May 19, 1970, two months before the end of the harvest, Fidel officially declared that it would not be possible to achieve the goal. At the same time, he settled his scores with the Cuban people and highlighted the leadership’s transparence on the subject: If you want me to tell you the situation clearly, it’s that we simply won’t make 10 million. Simply. I’m not going to go round and say it. I think that for me, the same for any Cuban organization to a high degree, it really means something very hard. It means something very hard, perhaps harder than any other experience in the revolutionary struggle […]. Now, the people were never deceived, nor will they be now, when there is still a lot of cane to be cut and a lot of sugar to be produced; I have always said: “the day and the hour when, according to the situation, we have all the calculations, let us know that we will not reach—​for whatever reasons—​ the 10 million. We will not keep an illusion until the last minute. We won’t keep it because it wouldn’t be honest. It is not by these means that we have to mobilize the people to carry out the effort and we will never do it! castro, May 19, 1970

In his self-​criticism Fidel analyzed that despite the structural distortions and losses, the 1970 harvest produced a record: the largest production in the history of the island and a growth of 90% compared to 1969, that is, 4 million tonnes more. With this, the highest average of production was reached every

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six years in history (1964–​1970) (Roca, 1976, p.13). For this reason, the 8.5 million represented, in Fidel’s words, simultaneously a subjective/​moral defeat and an objective/​economic victory.67 Some errors were explicitly addressed in the process of self-​criticism. Facing a “subjective defeat,” the first error pointed out was the subjectivity of the prognostics of the revolutionary direction. Fidel Castro recognized him before the people on July 26, 1970: Man plays a primordial role here. Fundamentally, the men who have a position of leadership. First of all, we will point out in all these problems the responsibility of all of us and mine in particular. In no way do I intend to distribute responsibilities that I think do not also belong to me and the entire direction of the Revolution. […] I believe that we, the leaders of this revolution, were a little too expensive with our learning process. And unfortunately, our problem […] is, first of all, the inheritance of our own ignorance. 1980, p. 35

The administration recognized the mistake of underestimating difficulties, minimizing challenges and propagating optimism without material basis (Castro, 1980, p.41). The subjective approach to the 10-​million target had been one of the most critical misconceptions by international experts. On the one hand, there would be an excessive optimism of the leaders regarding productive capacity on the island (Barkin, 1978, p.133). On the other hand, there would also be an excessive confidence in human infallibility, as if the “new man” could already be built from the political will, disregarding the historical need for a profound transformation of culture (Barkin, 1978, p.137). On this, Fidel admitted in September 1970 that it was a noxious idealism to believe that social consciousness could be a priority lever for the “great leap.” On September 20, 1970, he wrote in Granma:

67

Fidel spoke on May 19, 1970: “morally, not reaching 10 million would be a defeat. There is not the slightest doubt. Subjectively, for us, it would mean that we were below the possibilities, it would mean that we were not able to achieve this goal. Objectively not. We do not have the slightest doubt that what the country is achieving today means a record in the increase in production that has never been achieved in the economic history of any country, including a record that we will never reach again. And a good proof of this is that two months before [the end of the harvest] we have already left behind the maximum of the production of the capitalists, from when in this country there were half a million unemployed, half a million men anxiously waiting for the harvest to begin.”

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Some people without morals and without awareness of their social duty take the freedom to disdain work, to remain idle, to leave the weight of productive effort on the shoulders of others, to cheat, among a million other things … Perhaps our greatest idealism was to believe that a society that has barely begun to live, a world that for thousands of years has been under the law of retaliation, the law of survival of the fittest, of selfishness and fraud, the law of exploitation, could, overnight, become a society in which everyone behaves ethically and morally. in roca, 1976, p.62–​3

A second mistake assumed by Fidel was the excessive use of volunteer work, which displaced tens of thousands of students delaying the training of higher technicians. As the students of technical education (higher or middle school) devoted three to four months a year to cutting the cane in the collective volunteer effort, their training was delayed, perpetuating the shortage of skilled labor, which after all constituted one of the most pressing difficulties in the country (Castro, 1980, p.18). “When we talked about the ten million, the problem was arms. I would say that at this moment we have a problem of brains, a problem of intelligence,” Fidel declared on July 26, 1970 (1980, p.56). A third error was admitted by Fidel in the management’s report to the first Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in 1976. It was a self-​criticism of the moral economy. The decoupling of wages and productivity was pointed out as one of the main causes of absenteeism and labor indiscipline. It was thus recognized that although moral incentives were the ideological oxygen necessary for the revolutionary process, abandoning material incentives altogether would have been a mistaken option. In the 1976 report, Fidel analyzed: The policy of gratuitousness, improper in some issues, was increasing from 1967 and reached its peak in the years 1968–​1969. The 1967 salary breaks away from the norm in 1968. Awareness schedules and the waiver of overtime pay are stimulated … When not taking into account the redistribution according to the work, the excess of circulating money increased noticeably in the face of a shortage of supply of goods and services, which created favorable conditions and the broth for absenteeism and labor indiscipline. in eclac, 1980, p.22

The president of the Republic, Osvaldo Dorticós, in 1972, elaborated a critique on a fourth problem, also related to the radicalization of the moral economy: the deterioration of economic records and the harmful effects of a lack of

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accounting control. For him, the near economic collapse of 1970 found one of his main adversities in uncontrolled accounts. Dorticós elaborated: In 1968, the year in which a lamentable process of deterioration of economic controls, fluidity and statistical discipline matures, the possibility of constructing macroindicators disappears. It was the eve of 1970, the great effort of the giant crop, which generated as a negative repercussion some fundamental deteriorations in our economic discipline, in our financial discipline, in our economic and statistical controls. From 1968, and mainly in 1970, with the exception, I repeat, of the sugar industry, we find that the rest of the nation’s fundamental economic activities suffered a lamentable depression. in eclac, 1980, p.6768

As we have seen, the lack of accounting control had several dimensions, notably two: the decoupling of production costs with the economic resources obtained by a productive unit served as a counter-​incentive to the exact accounting of such costs; and demoralization resulting from the non-​fulfillment of centrally planned goals, stimulated the creation of statistics forged by administrators, in order to avoid collective or individual constraints. A fifth element of self-​criticism was presented by Rodríguez, in an interview to Marta Harnecker in 1972, published in the newspaper Chile Hoy. It relates to the unsuccessful attempt to mechanize the cutting of cane. The enormous difficulties of the mechanization process (see Chapter 3) required a process of trial and error in the medium term, until the technological choice was adequate. These difficulties, when underestimated by the revolutionary leadership, caused the crop to be cut off by 1.2 million inexperienced and very low-​productivity volunteer workers, narrowing the margins for the generation of surpluses and making the 10 million not viable. In discussing this topic, Rodríguez took the opportunity to expose his discomfort with some international experts who criticized the crop, and commented: Most of the criticism of the target of 10,000,000 tonnes was not based on a correct criterion. […] One of the paradoxes in relation to the approach to Cuban agriculture is that some critics such as Dumont or Gutelman, who have referred with hostility to the process of Cuban agriculture, are

68 Extracted from Dorticós , O. “Economic Control and standardization: key tasks” In: Economy and development n. 11, March-​July 1972.

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only correct in what they copy from our own criticisms. So, we were not oblivious to the difficulties of the crop of 10,000,000, from the point of view of agriculture. However, that is clearly not where the plan failed. One major flaw was our confidence in the possible mechanization of the harvest between 1963 and 1970. But mechanization had difficulties, some of them caused by our own shortcomings. 1983, p.470–​1

As a component of self-​criticism, then, the delay of mechanization was observed in the sugarcane harvest. Rodríguez denied, in the same 1972 interview, that the Cuban development strategy meant a return to monoculture. He concluded that agricultural diversification was fully reconciled with the sugar priority and the efforts of 1970, guided, however, by the principle of local specialization.69 From such statements of Rodríguez it is possible to infer that, despite the distortions generated by the 1970 harvest and the paradoxical increase in sugar dependency triggered by the turnpike strategy, the initial intention of the combined strategy (see Chapter 3) would still be in place. A sixth topic of self-​criticism related to anap. Barrios analyzed that both crop sector leaders and local administrators underestimated anap as a governing body and despised peasant production. The harvest would not only have generated situations of violence against the peasantry along the revolutionary offensive, but also hampered the production of this segment of the agrarian structure: The negative impact that other important branches of the national economy caused the concentration of material and human resources as a function of the crop, was also reflected in the peasant sector, practically in all lines of non-​sugarcane agriculture: meat, vegetables, grains and in 69

Rodríguez argued that diversification was not abandoned, despite the differences of the 1970 harvest : “there is some confusion among some scholars of the Cuban economy, when they consider that we have abandoned the process of diversification of agriculture. If we examine the Cuban economy today, directly or through the plans, we will see that we continue the process of diversification, but more scientifically. In 1960, as we emerged from long years of neocolonialism and sugarcane being the economic element that generated our economic dependency on US imperialism, there was an emotional and sometimes theoretical attitude that led us to diversification. On other occasions, I characterized this attempt as diversification of local character […]. In 1963, with a more accurate knowledge of the economy and especially of agriculture, plans were initiated in order to specialize at the local level and diversify at the national level. This is what we have today” (1983, p.468–​9).

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tobacco production […]. All these causes together with the underestimation of the role of anap that had been perceived by many managers and administrative officials, the above-​mentioned decline in non-​sugarcane production in the peasant sector resulted as a consequence. 1987, p.85

A seventh component of self-​criticism, correlated to this, was also listed by Rodríguez: the excessive administrativism of the party in the 1970 harvest period. By striving to reach the 10 million, the Communist Party of Cuba would have, in their opinion, temporarily abandoned their political tasks of compiling, clarifying and representing the population, to assume bureaucratic and technical functions that did not correspond to them (Rodríguez, 1983, p.478). Finally, an eighth component of self-​criticism would be the aforementioned recognition that the crop had generated disastrous structural distortions for the Cuban economy as a whole.70 The 1970 harvest taught the Cuban revolutionary leadership that enthusiasm, political will, individual effort and conscience could not replace the development of productive forces (Silverman, 1978, p.183). The “great leap” of development thwarted itself, imposing the need for corrections. The Cuban model of “socialism with national traits” (Valdés Paz, 2012) was made fragile, which gave rise to a process of incorporation of Soviet experiences and Constitution of increasingly striking external references. In this sense, 1970 represents a very important inflection of Cuban economic history.71 In short, the revolutionary break that unleashed the double articulation that is characteristic of the history of underdevelopment has unevenly affected the trajectory of the Cuban economy’s surplus. There is a radical reorientation of the purposes of development, marked by new priorities in the use of surplus (equality and social welfare, national sovereignty and the construction of new technical-​economic means that supported the historical project of the revolution). There is a radical change in the land tenure system that has engendered new forms of surplus appropriation. But despite that, generation of surplus on

70 71

Fidel admitted: “the heroic effort to increase production, to increase our purchasing power, has resulted in imbalances in the economy, in reductions in production in other sectors, in short, in an increase in our difficulties” (1980, p.23). On this, Valdés Paz reflected: “in the historical perspective, Cuban socialism repeats once again what all socialist experiences have done: the intention to make a great leap. The leap failed, we learned with it and a new development course was started, with new strategies. We can take the historical experience of the 10 million as a failed attempt at a great leap that allowed us to rectify our transition strategies” (Valdés Paz et al., 2010, p. 75).

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the island remained predominantly based on sugar and dependent on a circuit of external exchanges. The possibility of breaking with this pattern of surplus generation was put on the “Great Leap,” which definitely did not occur in 1970. The nature of this circuit of external exchanges no longer corresponded to any of the theories about imbalance or balance of economic relations. The economic relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, in the context of the Cold War, had two fundamental pillars of support: ideology and geopolitics. These two pillars allowed Cuban attempts at economic development to continue to be financed by the Soviets and that the island’s gigantic social protection system (ends) remained disproportionate to its economic base (means). The new inadequacies between means and ends were continuously reproduced, which gave rise to a sui generis peripheral social formation in Latin America: with a strong socialist orientation, visible in the almost complete “statization” of the means of production and in the adoption of radical egalitarianism as an angular part of the system; however, still deeply limited by the historical legacies of underdevelopment, such as low productivity, technological dependency, scarcity of foreign exchange, export monoculture and the permanence of a coercive component in production relations.

­c hapter 5

Conclusion

Dilemmas of Peripheral Socialism

It is easier to win twenty wars than to win the battle for development. fidel castro, July 26, 1970 (1980, p.59)

…

The 1970 harvest was a political experimentum crucis, demonstrating how a narrow economic base—​even under a courageous economic policy with the earnest support of the majority of the population—​is a vulnerability factor while building the passage to socialism […] The future is not at hand! A people cannot free itself, in little more than a decade, from the burden of a heavy legacy left by five centuries of colonialism and neocolonialism! florestan fernandes (2007, p. 197)

∵ 1

Geopolitical Advantage: the Source of Surplus

In Cuba, neither the conventional substitution of imports nor the strategy of expansion of the external sector taken to the limit in 1970 nor any other way for the development of the productive forces could be successful without external financing. As the revolution built up its goals, internal and external imbalances worsened, although relatively attenuated by the growing exportation of sugar, a historical driver of the generation of surplus. Productive forces on the island, as Florestan Fernandes expressed, were not autonomous and powerful enough to finance the ambitious revolutionary development project. As Roberto Regalado explained in an interview, Cuban imbalances were recurrently covered up by the Soviet Union—​credits were renegotiated and extended at the end of each term. “For political reasons there was constant renegotiation,” affirmed Regalado. In 1972, when credits granted in 1960 expired, the Soviet administration extended the due date for payment of Cuban debts by

© Joana Salém Vasconcelos, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004515215_007

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twenty-​five years and eliminated interest charges (Rodríguez, 1983, p. 499). But this was not the only way of transferring Soviet resources to the island. Besides that, agreements were signed postponing the Cuban deficit until 1975, with Soviet technical collaboration, direct exchange of goods, and the regulation of import and export price indexes (eclac, 1980, p. 183). Despite the difficulty or impossibility of quantifying the economic relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union, everything indicates that there was a massive flow of resources in the island’s favor—​in the opposite direction of the deterioration of the terms of trade diagnosed between countries in the center and periphery of capitalism. A brief interpretation of what determined such a flow, defining it as the geopolitical counterpart that leveraged, from the outside to the inside, the generation of the Cuban surplus is presented ahead. 1.1 The Transfer of Soviet Resource The Soviet Union created at least three economic aid strategies toward Cuba: one, through sugar prices—​stable and above the world price; two, through productive investments; and three, through cheap and permanently renegotiable credit. Through these three mechanisms, the development strategy expanding the external sector not only increased Cuba’s dependency on sugar—​which in fact was intended to be overcome—​but also the island’s dependency on the Soviet Union. Each mechanism will be briefly discussed. The transfer of Soviet resources to Cuba through sugar prices is demonstrated in Chart 6. Chart 6 allows a panoramic view of three specific moments of the “Cuban-​ Soviet preferential trade agreements.” One goes from 1961 to 1971 with Soviet prices stable compared to the capitalist market prices—​fixed at 6.11 cents per pound of sugar since 1963. The latter showed a significant drop in the free market (International Sugar Agreement) with the minimum being 1.81 cents in 1966 and remaining below Soviet standard in the csa—​British preferred market—​since 1963, with the maximum being 5.76 cents in 1963–​64 and the minimum 4.66 cents in 1969 (Ramos, 2007, p. 577). In the second moment, from 1972 to 1974, the monitoring of Soviet prices related to the speculative high of capitalist prices stands out in a clear attempt to guarantee relative superiority for Cuba. Finally, from 1975 to 1978, it is notable the Soviet choice to not return to previous patterns, deepening the upward trend while capitalist prices are in sharp decline. When the Cuban-​Soviet agreement was renewed in 1972, the price of sugar was fixed at 11 cents a pound, almost double the 1964 agreement. In 1973, this price rose to 12 cents. In 1974, the capitalist market had prices higher than Soviet prices, initiating a speculative process against planned economies, not very

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45 40 Cuba-USSR

35 30

Internaonal Sugar Agreement

25 20

C.S.A. (Brish preferable market)

15 10 5

1978

1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

1970

1969

1968

1967

1966

1965

1964

1963

1962

1961

0

chart 6  Sugar prices (1961–​1978) (US cents) Note: In the 1960s, the prices of the International Sugar Agreement guided both the London Daily Price (free market) and the New York free market quotation. Own elaboration with data from eclac (1980, p. 75); and Ramos (2007, p. 577)

apt to sudden changes. In this ephemeral speculative peak, capitalists reached 29.66 cents (a 200% increase over the previous year), while Soviet prices rose to 19.64 cents. However, by 1975 the speculative tendency of the capitalist market was abruptly reversed, as usual, and prices fell to 20.37 cents, while Soviet prices rose to 30.4 cents. The Soviets continued increasing Cuban sugar prices, reaching over 40 cents a pound in 1978, while the capitalist speculative process plummeted in free fall, reaching in that same year 7.8 cents, representing only 19.5% of Soviet prices (Rodríguez García, 1987, p. 246; eclac, 1980, p. 75). These data allow a clear visualization of Soviet economic aid through prices, which provided a double advantage to the island: stability and price superior to the capitalist markets. The failure of the “great leap” in 1970 perpetuated sugar as an engine of surplus generation in Cuba. Therefore, the price of sugar remained the key factor in generating surplus. Thus, Soviet prices were an indispensable guarantee for financing all other branches of the island’s economy. Here is what Lecuona explained: “Special trade relations with the Soviet Union, which entailed prices four or five times higher than at cost prices and cheaper inputs, made it possible to circumvent the threats of lack of profitability” (2009, p. 237).

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The second Soviet economic aid strategy, productive investment, was a combination of granting credit, training Cuban technicians, and financing technological innovation. Paradoxically, in the 10-​million-​tonne-​target case, the incomparable readiness of the Soviet aid concerning other technological options delayed more than a decade the mechanization of the sugarcane harvest, expected to reach at least 30% of the harvest in 1970, when it reached only 1%. The Soviet technical assistance as an alternative for the mechanization of the harvest was a mistake from the beginning. The requirement for a custom designed sugarcane technology made it impossible for the Soviet Union to know how to produce the appropriate machine for Cuba, considering the need to adapt by trial and error to the climatic and topographical conditions of the island, not to mention the inexistence of sugarcane plantations in Soviet territory. As discussed in Chapter 4, the lack of mechanization was a crucial factor contributing to the failure of the sugarcane crop, for it required the work of 1.2 million voluntary workers, mostly inexperienced, aggravating the drop in productivity and harming industrial yields that year. Ten years later, in 1980, only half of the harvest was mechanized (Edquist, 1985, p. 86, 127; Roca, 1976, p. 18; Rodríguez, 1983, p. 471). The easy access to productive investments and to Soviet technical assistance, therefore, despite being irrefutable, was not able to attenuate the structural heterogeneity inherited from underdeveloped modernization. The third economic aid strategy was direct injection of credit into the Cuban economy with a view to covering imbalances. Throughout the 1960s, the island’s trade deficit was multiplied, despite the stability and relative superiority of sugar prices paid by the Soviets. Between 1958 and 1962 alone, the deficit increased 4.5 times (from 43.5 to 237 million pesos). Between 1962 and 1966, the deficit increased by 38.2%, and between 1966 and 1968, it grew by another 33.8%. The panoramic dimension of this expansion can be understood if we compare the annual average of the Cuban trade deficit from 1955 to 1958—​it reached 62.4 million pesos—​with the annual average from 1962 to 1970—​when it reached 312 million pesos, an average growth of 5.4 times (Barkin, 1978, p. 134–​5; eclac, 1964, p. 285). The growth of the Cuban trade deficit and the proportions of exports and imports by country in the 1960s are organized in Table 39. These deficits were predominantly covered by the Soviet Union, with residual aid from Eastern Europe as well. Despite their different economic models, aggravated by the Revolutionary Offensive, the transfer of Soviet resources to Cuba remained active. On the other hand, in 1967 there was conflict with Czechoslovakia, which was moving toward economic and political flexibility, in the opposite direction to the moral economy, which made the government of Czechoslovakia block

99.7 69.6 1.7 0.6 0.9 0.3 —​ —​ 0.3 —​ 777

28.4

75.4 52.3 1.5 2.5 1.4 24.6 17.1 5.2 0.2 0.1 608.3

imp exp 81.3 48.5 2.1 1.6 1.9 18.7 13.8 1.7 1.2 0.7 579.3

imp

1960

-​237

18.2 0.8 1.7 4.9 0.2 81.8 42.5 17.1 7 4.9 522.3

exp 17.1 0.1 0.2 1.4 0.2 82.9 54.1 11.8 4.9 3.6 759.3

imp

1962

-​304.4

40.9 0 9.5 7 0.4 59.1 38.6 11.4 2.1 2.2 714.3

exp 32 4.1 3.8 4 1.8 68 40.4 11.1 6.3 3.7 1,018.80

imp

1964

-​327.7

19.3 0 5.5 2.5 1.7 80.7 45.7 14.6 7.7 5.1 597.8

exp 20.3 0 8.1 0.5 1.4 79.7 56.4 9.4 3.9 3.9 925.5

19.8 0 1.8 0.3 6.2 80.2 61.2 —​ 3.6 3.5 1,089.20

imp

1968

-​438.6

25 0 6.4 3.5 2.4 75 44.5 —​ 6.3 5.5 650.6

imp exp

1966

-​257.1

26.3 0 3.9 10.2 1.3 73.7 50.8 —​ 4.7 4.7 1,043.40

exp

30.6 0 2.8 2.4 4.5 69.4 52.8 —​ 2.3 3.8 1,300.50

imp

1970

290 

source: barkin, 1976, pp. 134–​5 , in: cuba, compendio estadístico, 1970. except (a): eclac, 1964, p. 280

-​43.5

81.1 67.1 2.4 6.4 1.1 2,5 (a) 1,9 (a) 0,5 (a) —​ -​—​ 733.5

exp

1958

Foreign trade (1958–​1970) (%)

Capitalist Zone USA Spain Japan France Socialist Zone ussr China Czechoslovakia adr Total (in million pesos) Balance of Trade (in million pesos)

table 39

newgenrtpdf

Chapter 5

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productive investments that had been promised to the island. Although investments of that country in Cuba were residual, if compared to the volume of Soviet resource transfer, the example helps to understand different principles of international relations at work within the Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union financed the Cuban moral economy experiment although the Kremlin was already officially following Libermanism. Such a “tolerance” helps to gauge Cuba’s strategic importance in the Soviet geopolitical calculus. In 1966, aware of the problem due to the trade deficit the Cuban government attributed the responsibility for this problem to two causes: the deformations of underdevelopment, inherited from the pre-​revolutionary period; and Cuba’s trade relationship with the capitalist world, which were still necessary and should be eliminated as soon as possible. In a report submitted to eclac in 1966, the Cuban government sustained: It is necessary to add that, even though the relationship with the socialist field has reduced the need for goods from the capitalist zone to a minimum, there is a small, but appreciable percentage that still exists in an imperative way, since it is a question of imports which are decisive for the functioning of the industry. To fully eliminate them is one of the tasks for the next period. This will somehow guarantee stability to the functioning of Cuban industry, and it will make it possible to dedicate resources in capitalist currency to the acquisition of technology the country deems useful in the analysis of comparative efficiency. In short, it can be inferred that the current issues regarding the imbalance of foreign trade still constitute the most serious structural problem of the Cuban economy, and its most typical bottleneck. Nonetheless, it is a consequence of the entire deformed structure of the production process that inherited the revolutionary Cuba. 1966, p. 13, emphasis added

However, despite the declared intentions of the Cuban government, as eclac itself realized fourteen years later, eliminating the relationship with the capitalist world was not an easy task, nor necessarily a desirable one. The Cuban need for technology available on the capitalist market was a historical-​structural phenomenon, such as the choice of Massey-​Ferguson’s Australian sugarcane harvester in 1971. The same can be said of the Cuban government’s agreements with West Germany’s Claas Maschinenfabrik in 1967 (Edquist, 1985, pp. 48–​49, 132). In other words, the Cuban government’s 1966 statement about the future elimination of economic relations with the capitalist world did not go beyond the terrain of political discourse. In any case, there was an internal logic in

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the declaration, based on the argument that the international relations of the socialist field, unlike capitalism, adopted the development of peripheral countries as a priority objective. 1.2 Multilateral Payment Agreement The financial and military protection that the Soviet Union offered Cuba led some Cuban and foreign economists to have strong opinions about the socially just nature of the International Socialist Division of Labor (an expectation that has been relatively frustrated after the cut of Czechoslovakian investment on the island in 1967). This viewpoint was supported by at least three arguments. First, while facing the US offensive, the only way to safeguard the Cuban revolution would be with international military and financial support. Second, the Cuban economy profile would never adapt to an autarkic model, for its lack of natural resources would make it inexorably dependent on foreign trade. And third, trade between socialist countries is of an opposite nature to capitalist trade, i.e., repair and not deepening of imbalances. In that sense, economic dependency on Soviet aid had a purpose opposite to capitalist dependency—​ it was not an instrument of threat and violation of national sovereignty but an aid with true interest in the economic development of the island and in its self-​determination. The first argument was analyzed according to the concept of an inserted revolution, explained by Roberto Regalado (see Chapter 3). The second argument was based on the structural insufficiency of the import substitution policy for the island’s self-​sustained development and was explained by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in 1968 as follows: Breaking this structure is not a five-​year, or even a decade-​long thing, but it requires a lot of long effort. And in a country like Cuba, with an area of 114,000 square kilometers, it will be very difficult to completely eliminate this dependency on foreign trade, even if there is a growing process of import substitution. 1983, p. 455

Ten years later that argument was still valid. In 1978, while expressing the Cuban incapacity to completely internalize its surplus generation process, Rodríguez claimed it was not a worrying fact, for the trade relationships within the Soviet bloc were based on a positive economic dependency—​or yet, even necessary for the realization of national sovereignty. In a press conference with the Washington Post, the Times Magazine, and The New York Times on June 20, 1978, journalist John Nordheimer asked Rodríguez when, after all, Cuba

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would be “economically independent and not depend on the Soviet Union.” Rodriguez replied: I believe that in the economic realm there is no country, except for the United States and the Soviet Union—​due to specific conditions such as size and wealth—​that is entirely independent in the sense which we are talking about. If exporting 28% of production and importing more or less the same means dependency, then such a dependency affects most countries. The economic dependency we criticize is that which converts a country into a satellite nation, into a subject of another country, through threatening to suspend trade, suspend financing; this is the essence of imperialism. We believe socialism is quite the opposite […]. We are not in favor of becoming independent but rather, on the contrary, of increasing our mutual dependency, increasing the specific weight that socialist economies, first of all the Soviet Union, have in relation to Cuba’s foreign trade. Why? Because this dependency is the only condition on which we can maintain our independence. 1983, p. 535

Therefore it was a belief that even though the relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union was unstable it would not eliminate the possibility of a supposedly positive “interdependence” for the development of the island, providing resources without nullifying national sovereignty. This possibility was also expressed by Guevara himself seventeen years earlier, when the then President of the National Bank returned from his first trip to socialist countries, on January 6, 1961, and was interviewed on the topic: The multilateral payment agreement that was signed allows Cuba to use some of its capacity to sell sugar and buy all kinds of industrial import materials in European-​country areas, and these countries balance quantity. Everything is resolved with this multilateral agreement. guevara, 1982, p. 104

This “multilateral agreement” was then exemplified by Guevara: Cuba could have surplus relations with the Soviet Union and deficit relations with Hungary, while the Soviet Union had a surplus with Hungary in the same proportion. Thus, when establishing balanced trade relationships (of equivalent exchanges), the “multilateral payment agreement” was based on a plan to offset each country’s trade deficit and surplus and on agreed prices for each product. The idea that centralized socialist planning represented an economic

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rationality superior to any other system led Cuban leaders to be strongly optimistic regarding their overcoming of external imbalances through multilateral planning. To a large extent, the turnpike strategy, which considered sugar specialization a platform for the “great leap” toward diversification and industrialization, was based on this possibility of external balance, which, over time, became more complex and remote. In 1965, Carlos Romeo reviewed the nature of the international division of labor in the Soviet bloc to reinforce the validity of the Cuban development strategy. He wrote: It was possible to argue that the essence of mercantile relationships between socialist countries should be the opposite of the essence of capitalist mercantile relationships: the principle of exploitation of man by man and of poor nations by rich nations was replaced by the principle of non-​exploitation and of proletarian internationalism, to whose essence the action of the law of value in the socialist realm would be subordinated […]. To the extent that the law of value operates in socialist international trade within a different framework—​i.e., a framework governed by the principle of non-​exploitation and proletarian internationalism—​ exchange based on prices that reflect prices of capitalist production was no longer inevitable. Thus, in strict justice, unequal exchange becomes equivalent exchange. 1965, p. 14

Along with Romeo, Marxist economists in the 1960s also bet on the possibility of external balance, on the economic “complementarity” and “interdependency” of the Soviet bloc, claiming a historical overcoming of unequal capitalist exchange. In general, this vocabulary was then used in Cuba to express Marxist conceptions of trade relationships in the Soviet bloc: “theory of equivalent exchange” and “reciprocal advantage conditions” (Romeo, 1965, p. 8). This would be possible because, as Romeo argues, “the great problems in open economies—​market and prices—​were solved in Cuba” (1965, p. 15). It is not difficult to see from a contemporary viewpoint how rash a statement like that was, especially considering the date it was published, when the Cuban revolution was still taking its first steps. Furthermore, according to Cuban leaders, the new balance of socialist international trade would occur without political subordination. Then, in 1966, this understanding was officially and publicly adopted by the Cuban government:

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It cannot be said that specialization itself is either good or bad, it depends on the concrete conditions of each case. If an underdeveloped country, while in a favorable period, specializes its economy without being able to accumulate the resulting surplus, when the terms of trade change, it will find itself not developed and with a highly vulnerable economy. On the other hand, if the terms of trade are guaranteed and its social structure allows it to use the surplus correctly, specialization can serve as an engine for development. These two situations illustrate Cuba’s scenario then and now […]. Specialization and monoculture were mixed up in the context of world capitalism, which placed the countries exporting primary products in a situation of inequality, with a general disadvantage of specialization itself, unaware of how the experience gained in the sugar production and Cuba’s comparative advantages in that regard could be used toward making the sugar industry critical in a new type of economic development within an international division of labor linked to the world socialism. cuba, 1966, p. 7, 21, emphasis added

In addition, the Cuban government argued in the same document that from the existence of a “world socialist realm” it would be possible to establish relationships which, if contextualized in the capitalist world, would only reproduce inequalities and exploitation by uneven exchange. However, in the socialist realm, specialization and the international division of labor would “work” for the first time. In other words, it would be possible to combine the optimal use of resources with equivalent exchange, due to the definitive eradication of market pressures that victimized underdeveloped countries in the capitalist system. This equivalent exchange was based on a supposed “absence of antagonistic interests” (Cuba, 1966, p. 16, 29). From a strictly commercial point of view, it is a fact that Cuban sugar specialization produced immediate and conjunctural mutual advantages: the sugar-​buying countries produced it internally at much higher costs compared to Cuban sugar prices—​or yet, they did not produce it at all—​while Cuba received oil, interest-​free credits, machinery, equipment, parts, assistance, and technical training from the Soviet bloc, a set of benefits that were difficult to quantify. However, from a structural point of view, excessive Cuban specialization reproduced the vulnerability of pre-​revolutionary times and placed the island adrift in foreign political conjunctures. In fact, what explained the flow of resources poured into Cuba by the Soviet Union was, before any other factor, the international geopolitical order and the ideological substrate of the Cold War. These were the real guides for Soviet economic decisions, which makes

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the attempt to quantify the conjunctural advantages of such exchanges an unimportant task. And that goes because given the evident Cuban economic advantages obtained in its relationship with the Soviet Union, it is worth questioning what the Soviet advantages would be in its expensive relationship with Cuba, in addition to purchasing sugar at prices lower than its production costs. In other words, the Soviet Union’s little economic advantage while purchasing Cuban sugar did not seem to be enough to justify the voluminous coverage of the growing trade deficits of a small island, which was accumulating economic losses in the name of a “big leap” that didn’t happen. Furthermore, if this economic relationship were a Soviet bloc pattern, the Soviet Union would have behaved equally with all its political allies, and we should find a myriad of other examples of “Soviet altruism” toward underdeveloped countries within the bloc. And that did not happen. In a market driven by geopolitical determination, the commercial advantages and disadvantages went far beyond the dollar cents. In an interview in 2011, Chonchol argued: “There is no question that the prices set for products that came from Cuba were political and not economic prices” (2012). Like the prices, other forms of economic assistance offered by the Soviet Union were also essentially political and much less responsible for production costs and calculations of future profitability than for the logic of the Cold War. 1.3 Cold War and Geopolitical Advantages The understanding that the Soviet Union offered “geopolitical advantage” with its resources invested in Cuba was summarized by David Barkin in November 2011. At the time, Barkin argued: I understand that the decision to divide the relationship between the ussr and Cuba into two areas (better sugar prices and debt) is a political decision, a negotiation. And Cuba was dependent, but it offered the Soviet Union a very important geopolitical advantage. 2011

Then, when asked whether the Soviet Union’s geopolitical advantage in its relationship with Cuba was an “unnecessary” element in the international correlation of forces, considering the powerful Soviet military dimension and its role as hegemonic leadership of an important world trade bloc, and the economic costs of sustaining this advantage, Barkin responded:

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Regarding the Cold War, no. It would be unnecessary if the Americans decided to lift the blockade. But as long as Cuba was held captive by the US blockade, it was essential for the ussr to continue supporting it, under the terms of the Cold War. I believe that this is a very important element. How much does it cost? How much is it worth? Debts are paper […]. The relationship contributed to the Soviet economic power. 2011

With those words, Barkin presented an understanding for the problem of generating Cuban surplus. The surplus generation circuit that sustained Cuba for so long not only went outside the island, but it was also driven by geopolitical, extra-​economic, and ultimately ideological determinations. The Soviet Union was interested in transforming Cuba into a small “socialist paradise,” creating development conditions in contrast with the surrounding underdeveloped capitalist environment, which suffered from social segregation, external constraints, and many other structural deformations. The symbolic impact of this Caribbean socialism on the social movements and leftist parties around the world threatened the US control of Latin American regimes which, not by mere coincidence, was militarily resurged after the Cuban revolution. The way Cuba was appealing to the youth in the 1960s, as Hobsbawm describes it, helps us understand how its international strength came from its symbolic political significance, which made possible the dream of self-​determination, national sovereignty, popular power, and social justice. Such an enticement of the Cuban revolution certainly influenced the Soviet government in its costly investment to destabilize the enemy through showcasing the benefits of socialism in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Soviet policy toward Cuba was not different from the US economic and military aid policy for its anti-​Soviet allies after World War ii, especially Japan and Germany. As Hobsbawm has observed, the Marshall Plan “mostly took the form of grants rather than loans” (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 240). After all: For the Americans an effectively restored Europe, part of the anti-​Soviet military alliance which was the logical complement of the Marshall Plan—​the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) of 1949—​had realistically to rest on a German economic strength reinforced by a German rearmament. hobsbawm, 1995, p. 240, 241

The Marshall Plan was put together in 1947, which means that less than one year after dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki the United

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States offered Japan dollars toward the country’s total reconstruction. There was nothing “new” about US economic aid for erstwhile enemies. The Soviet Union’s aid for Cuba emanated different ideological principles; however, it did not stand too far from pragmatism, stimulated by the Cold War. Cuba was a strategic piece of the geopolitical game, fortunately located to destabilize US influence in Latin America, which gave it negotiation sovereignty far above its military or economic capacity. In that context, the understanding of a new sympathetic nature of the international division of labor in the Soviet bloc seems to have weakened. Therefore, Cuba would have reaped both the losses and the benefits of its status as an “inserted revolution”: on the one hand, it found no other way out than to join a great power that offered it military protection; on the other hand, it continually received a volume of resource disproportionate to its productive capacity, in return for its geopolitical location right next door to the first world giant in the midst of the Cold War. Or, as Florestan Fernandes defined it: “They converted the political element into something instrumental for the economic element” (2007, p. 209). If the Cuban-​Soviet relationship was based on this new paradigm of equivalent exchanges and mutual advantages, how can one explain that external productive convergence with the ussr did not generate either internalization of productive forces or a “great leap”? Nevertheless, the ambiguity of Cuban dependency can only be properly analyzed a posteriori, i.e., considering its profound negative impacts triggered by the Soviet collapse. Regalado defined such an ambiguity as follows: There was a permanent interaction in which they became aware of asymmetries: they paid a price for sugar that was more expensive than the world market, and the relationship was very constructive […]. But later analyses revealed that this relationship had very negative elements. Because if you definitely receive, receive, receive, and you don’t have to pay, your awareness of the need for things changes. You say: “we’re running out of oil,” they send you more […]. And when the Soviet Union fell, how much was left unpaid? What did we have? We had a relationship with Canada, with some European countries, some Latin American countries, but for those 15% of what we lacked. And that’s why the blow was so hard—​85% of our foreign trade collapsed. The Cuban State takes responsibility for the coup, faz um colchão e não o deixa chegar ao cidadão tão brutal como foi. 2012

In that sense, it is necessary to have a contemporary point of view to understand the paradox of the Cuban-​Soviet relationship. While it allowed the

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construction of a new level of social, educational, health, sports, and cultural development through a surplus generation circuit leveraged from the outside due to the specific geopolitical tensions of the Cold War, it also reduced the Cuban realization of its own inadequacies as it clouded the challenges of creating new technical and economic means to sustain such ends. The negative consequences of this paradox were only realized when foreign trade, a link in Cuban development, collapsed along with the Soviet Union. In 1987, 85% of Cuban exports were directed to the Soviet Union and 75% of exports were made up of sugar (Lecuona, 2009, p. 215). Lecuona defined the new Cuban dependency grounded on some of its disadvantages: Joining the system of so-​called real socialism, however, entailed prices that were not only advantageous but also alien to the reality of the market. It also involved the assimilation of relatively backward technology, the adoption of slow and costly investment schemes, a noticeable dependency on the external financing—​and accumulation of an expensive debt—​as well as the demand for multiple imported inputs for the little integrated national industry, whose products did not correspond in general with the global parameters of competitiveness. 2009, p. 238

Between 1989 and 1994, Cuban foreign exchange dropped from 13.5 billion pesos to 3 billion, reducing the gdp by 35% (Lecuona, 2009, p. 238). These were the long-​term consequences of Cuban strategists’ understanding of the Cold War: a stable historical conjuncture even considering what had been imagined at the time. When the geopolitical conditions created by the Cold War dismantled, the generation scheme of Cuban surplus was destroyed. Hypothetically, this perception of Cold War stability was consolidated after the failure of the 1970 harvest. 1.4 Joining the comecon The consequences of the failure of the 1970 harvest were not limited to the postponement of the turnpike strategy by a few years or even decades. Because it deepened so many structural distortions, the search for 10 million could not be repeated in the future and could not even appear as the first step in the escalation toward the development of productive forces. While facing the failure of the first “great leap” and the realization of its economic infeasibility, the entire strategy underwent adaptations resulting in the deepening of Cuban external dependency, especially after joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—​c omecon—​and following the Soviet economic model. While

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financing Cuba’s revolutionary offensive, the Soviet Union supported the model of moral economy that it officially fought against. With the failure of the 1970 harvest the space for constructing a “Cuban socialism with national traits” was suppressed and the island’s newly acquired sovereignty was weakened. In that sense, joining the comecon was followed by the defeat of the moral economy. After Cuba joined the comecon, a new agreement with the Soviet Union was signed considering four topics: one, the prices of Cuban sugar and nickel would always remain higher than in the world market; two, the Soviet Union would immediately grant 300 million rubles toward sugarcane mechanization on the island; three, the debt Cuba issued from 1960 to 1972 could be repaid from 1986 to 2011; four, the Soviets would fully cover Cuban trade deficits from 1973 to 1975, which added up to one billion rubles (Fernandes, 2007, p. 203–​ 204). In 1979, Florestan Fernandes predicted: “the political element must compensate for the economic element for a while, both in the configuration of centralized social planning and in the acceleration of economic development” (2007, p. 206). Regarding the same process, Lecuona highlighted that “after the failure of the so-​called 10 million harvest, economic policy would progressively adjust to the formulas established by the experience of European socialist countries, especially the ussr” (2009, p. 235). As a consequence, the Soviet model was gradually adopted on the island between 1972 and 1975, being fully consolidated after the first party congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in 1976, when the Economic Planning and Management System (sdpe)—​imported from the Soviet Union—​was approved. The sdpe reestablished monetary and mercantile relationships within the state sector, recovered the economic calculation in all branches, decentralized administration through self-​ financing, and introduced a program of incentives and rewards with an emphasis on individual material stimuli. In addition, Cuba imported manuals about political economy and administration, intending to train the new generations in the Soviet model. Private peasant cooperatives became legally regarded as “socialist properties,” and the collectivization policy which had marked the revolutionary offensive was abandoned. In fact, from 1970 to 1976, the Cuban economic model took a 180-​degree turn (Valdés Paz, 2009, p. 59–​60). The weakening of Cuban national sovereignty regarding economic, administrative, and ideological decisions as an outcome of the failure of the 1970 harvest was discussed by Valdés Paz: The 10 million harvest was the epilogue of a policy of national socialism. In 1971 and 1972, we had no choice but to join comecon in order

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to sustain the deficit that the country had entered in all areas. The country joined comecon in 1971 and from then on our economic plans were subject to harmonization mechanisms of the other comecon countries. […] What the 10 million harvest disclosed was that had we produced 10 million, the problem would be the same: we had to integrate. The point is we did not integrate as winners, which the administration of the country wanted so as to better negotiate its integration. Or perhaps only a partial and not total integration was considered due to some technologies being unavailable in Eastern Europe but available in the West […]. This integration was necessary. What I believe is that the failure made us reach this integration with a minimum negotiation capacity. 2012

For all those reasons, the failure of the 1970 harvest was a crucial inflection point, without which the Cuban trajectory could not be understood. It made Cuba join comecon with less autonomy and fragile negotiating power, in an economically and ideologically subordinate position. Had it achieved a strategic goal, whatever its absolute value, the island could have proved to the Soviet bloc that its planning system, its moral economy, and its “Cuban model” had credibility. The consequences of such a failure were felt at least until 1986—​ known as the year of the “Rectification of Errors,” when on the brink of the Soviet collapse Cubans self-​criticized the island, mentioning the excessive echoing of foreign standards. However, while the first “great leap” of the turnpike strategy has never been accomplished, this ambiguous dependency on the Soviet Union, with its negative long-​term effects, undeniably made it possible to achieve the goals of the Cuban revolution without internalizing the corresponding economic bases. In other words, Cuban society has become a sui generis example of mixing strong components of socialism with expressive underdevelopment traits, marked by the search for economic rationality within the narrow historical limits of the possibilities. 2

Peripheral Socialism and Rationality of the Possible

By breaking with the double articulation that determined underdevelopment (external dependency on the world capitalist system and social segregation guaranteed by authoritarian forms of surplus extraction) the Cuban revolution sought historical alternatives to guide its development grounded on popular needs. A tough fight against the legacy of its colonial past was set

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in two fronts: one, establishing new purposes in the historical context based on the identification of concrete needs of national collectivity; and the other, attempting to reconcile the island’s productive structure with such needs. Egalitarianism and national sovereignty were then representative of the priorities in changes. The impossibility of reconciling them with dependent capitalism pushed the island toward the anti-​capitalist alternative, which merged these principles in another civilizational framework: socialism. While on the one hand Cuba was able to rescue its self-​determination by tracing the directions and intentions of its own development, on the other hand, reconciling its economic base with national needs was not a simple or unexceptional task. The “development of underdevelopment” irrational spiral was blocked by new priorities for using the surplus. However, the new directions of development were still conditioned to the rhythms of the past, which required permanent adaptations, corrections, and adjustments in the revolutionary project. In that sense, this book reconstructed part of the path of permanent readjustment between means and ends: from emergency diversification to specialized diversification; from abandoning sugar to reestablishing sugar as priority; from cooperatives to state farms; from the principle of voluntary collectivization to “errors toward peasantry;” from the substitutive policy to the turnpike strategy, going through the intention of the combined strategy; from technological dependency to the tortuous path for creating our own machines; from economic calculation to moral economy and the subsequent return to economic calculation. Despite the narrow options made available by the Cuban economic foundation, which made permanent adaptations of the revolutionary strategy needed, the self-​determination of the direction of national development effectively redirected the use of the surplus and made achievements—​historically unprecedented in our continent—​possible for the collectivity. 2.1 From Segregation to Egalitarianism With commitment and social mobilization, Cuba eradicated illiteracy at an unthinkable speed for Latin America—​in less than one year, the illiteracy rate dropped on the island from 23.8% to 3.9%, and in 1962 it reached zero (eclac, 1980, p. 90). Concurrently, the educational system was universalized with unprecedented speed in the Latin-​American continent, not to mention with pedagogical and cultural attributes hitherto inaccessible to the population, as eclac explained, “until in the 1970s it became a consolidated system that might have seemed ambitious for a developing country but nonetheless demonstrates viability” (1980, p. 83). To highlight the feasibility of building an educational system comparable to the most developed countries in

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Conclusion 4000000 3500000

Total

3000000 2500000

Elementary School

2000000

Middle and High School

1500000 1000000

Adults Educaon

500000 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

0

chart 7  Enrollment by level of education (1958–​1977)

the world in a society considered underdeveloped was a kind of response to Latin-​American leaders who for centuries protected themselves from criticism on the account of technical and managerial infeasibility to carry out human rights. The universal right to free education came close to an effective system of “equal opportunities,” also extraordinary to Latin American standards. In 1959, only 2% of student teachers were children of workers and in 1962, 35%. In 1968, 8,000 workers and peasants enrolled in higher education, whereas in previous years none did (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 44). Such transformations were motivated by active popular sympathy toward the national development project. To some extent, the Cuban community took on the responsibility for the revolutionary politics, an attitude that was decisive in reading their achievements. In 1959, for example, teachers in the rural area agreed to earn half their salary so that it would be possible to double the number of student vacancies. When 1,000 secondary students were called upon to be volunteer teachers in the 1960 literacy campaign, 3,000 volunteered, and the following year, 2,000 more (eclac, 1980, p. 88–​90). Charts 7 and 8 show the evolution of the number of enrollments by level of education.1

1 Own elaboration with data from cepal (1980, p. 89). The beginning of the school year is August/​September.

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160000 140000 University

120000 100000

Special Educaon

80000

Technical Educaon

60000 40000

Teacher Training

20000

1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

0

chart 8  Enrollment by level of higher, technical, and special education (1958–​1977)

The effort toward the 1970 harvest is noticeable in the reduction of enrollments between 1968 and 1970, for young people and adults in school joined the voluntary work. Later, however, the upward trend was visibly recovered. In the panoramic view, between 1958 and 1977, primary school enrollments more than doubled; secondary education enrollments multiplied by 7.9; and adult enrollments increased 8.6 times. Regarding higher education, enrollments grew vertiginously fiftyfold compared to 1958. As there was no special education before the revolution, enrollments in this segment reached the mark of 13,500 in 1977. Technical education rose by 8.3 times, and enrollments for teacher training multiplied by 33. In general, enrollment in the Cuban education system went upward by 3.4 times (eclac, 1980, p. 89). Between 1958 and 1968 alone, the number of schools doubled from 7,567 to 14,568; and the number of active teachers grew by 63%, from 17,355 to 46,910 (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 44). Furthermore, in 1968, high-​school agrotechnical education, which did not exist before the revolution, had 37,000 students and fishing schools trained 3,000 young people and adults (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 23). The new preventive philosophy that became the basis of the Cuban health system also showed exemplary results in building an egalitarian and developed society. After the revolution, “healthy” was no longer a synonym for “not sick.” It became an understanding of the totality of the physical and mental conditions

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of human beings in all social spaces. Along with the literacy process of the Cuban population, a health education campaign was made possible, resulting in the drop of infectious diseases mortality rates (eclac, 1980, p. 125). The Cuban infant mortality rate in 1958 was 33.4 babies from 0 to 1 year old per one thousand inhabitants. In 1962, the Cuban maternal mortality rate was 117.9 per 100 thousand childbirths. However, in 1970, infant and maternal mortality rates in Cuba had halved. Regarding mortality of children from 1 to 4 years old per thousand inhabitants, the Cuban rate in 1970 was 10 times lower than the Latin American average (1.2 and 12.6, respectively). Not only did Cuba have the lowest infant mortality rate on the continent, it was also relatively distant from the countries in second place, Chile and Argentina, whose infant mortality rates were twice as high as Cuba’s that year (eclac, 1980, p. 123, 146). After all, while in 1958 state spending on public health on the island amounted to 16 million pesos, in 1961 it reached 60 million, and in 1968 it leaped to 180 million pesos, an increase by over 11 times in 10 years. Public health care for rural inhabitants was insignificant before the revolution—​there was only one rural hospital with 10 beds in 1958. In 1968, there were 47 hospitals in the rural area, 1,350 beds—​still not enough, but an extremely positive number, considering the previous precariousness (eclac, 1980, p. 122; Rodríguez, 1969, p. 41–​42). In addition, during the 10 to 15 years of the revolution, the death rate due to problems considered typical of underdeveloped countries—​diarrheal diseases, childbirth, tuberculosis, and tetanus—​which were among the main causes of death on the island before 1959, decreased by 87%, 53%, 85%, and 79%, respectively. Between 1958 and 1968, polio cases dropped by an exceptional 99.7%—​from 200 to 0.5 per year (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 41–​42; eclac, 1980, p. 141). Enteritis and other diarrheal diseases, childhood illnesses, homicide, tuberculosis, and nephritis/​nephrosis were among the top five causes of death in Cuba in 1958. In 1976, the causes of death in Cuba showed the same patterns as in the so-​called developed countries in the following order: heart diseases, tumors, cardiovascular diseases, influenza/​pneumonia, and accidents (eclac, 1980, p. 142). Physician, dentist, and health technician training multiplied over 3 times between 1961 and 1969, reaching a ratio of three nurses to every doctor, equal to that of countries considered developed (eclac, 1980, p. 127, 134). Between 1959 and 1968, twenty public health laboratories and forty state dental clinics were built—​both were previously non-​existent (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 41–​42). In the same 10-​year period, the number of hospitals nearly quadrupled (from 57 to over 200); the number of hospital beds doubled (from 21,780 to over 40,000); more than 260 preventive health polyclinics were created (previously non-​existent). The revolution was opposed to the concentration of hospitals, beds, and doctors in the capital, as an example of a policy against

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structural heterogeneity; therefore, in the 1960s, those showed more noticeable growth in areas of greater risk. Between 1958 and 1976, the number of hospital beds grew by 65.3% nationwide. However, on a regional basis, the search for equalizing disparities was visible: in Pinar del Río the number increased by 161%, in Matanzas 159%, in Las Villas 87.9%, in Camaguey 189%, and in Oriente 179 %. In Havana, however, where 63.3% of the doctors and 61.7% of hospital beds in the country were concentrated in 1958, the growth in that same 10-​year period was only 10% (eclac, 1980, p. 123, 139). Despite the number of hospitals still being insufficient until at least 1968, the population’s health, in general, improved due to a combination of social welfare policies, such as the proliferation of vaccination campaigns; health education campaigns and the eradication of illiteracy; increase in the number of doctors and health professionals; early and preventive care for all families without distinction; improvement of nutritional levels; domestic production of medicines, which increased from 7 million pesos in 1957 to 57 million pesos in 1965; preventive and curative polyclinics spread all over the country; access to potable water; sport and leisure policies, among others. All this made Cuba the country with the highest life expectancy at birth in Latin America, having grown from 69.7 years old in 1960 to 71.2 years old in 1972 (eclac, 1980, p. 142–​3). Regarding social security, the data are equally emphatic. In 1957, more than half of Cuban workers were outside the social security system. This meant that when they changed jobs—​which occurred very frequently, especially in rural areas—​workers lost the pension from their previous occupation. When they were sick, they received no more than three days’ pay a month and, in more serious cases, a maximum of nine days a year. On March 27, 1963, the Cuban government enacted a social security law with the intent to universalize its coverage. Therefore, the 154 thousand beneficiaries in 1959 went up to 363 thousand in 1970, and 554 thousand in 1975, representing a total increase by 2.5 times (eclac, 1980, p. 148–​152). Furthermore, as seen, the dismissal of state employees was eliminated, leaving other forms of embarrassment in the case of absenteeism. In the housing area Cuba has also made great leaps. According to the Population and Housing Census 1953, the latent deficit (that is, the number of houses in precarious habitability, acknowledged by the Batista regime itself) reached 56% of the houses participating in the census, a total of 1.2 million. There were, nonetheless, 44 thousand unoccupied houses belonging to rich families who owned more than one property on the island. According to eclac, from 1953 to 1958, the latent housing deficit grew by 28,000 houses a year, reaching 812,000 houses in 1959. With the revolution, civil construction

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was intensively creating jobs, and in 15 years, 210,476 houses were built, many of which were built by the microbrigades—​in 1971, 205 units and 4,500 workers. Houses with piped water—​55.6% of the total number of houses in the 1953 census—​reached 66.7% in 1970. In rural areas, in 1953, only 45% of the houses had bathrooms, a figure that rose to 61% in 1970. Also according to the 1953 census, 56% of the houses had electric light, while in the countryside only 8.7%. In 1970, 67% of Cuban homes had electric light, and in the rural area it rose to 14% (eclac, 1980, p. 154–​155, 162). Investment in civil construction tripled from 1958 to 1968, without any flow of resources for real estate speculation, such as that which filled Batista’s coffers through the so-​called cement policy (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 36). All those structural transformations, responsible for the elimination of social segregation, laid the foundations for a society with a pattern of egalitarianism which is averse to the social segregation nature of underdevelopment. 2.2 Development of the Productive Forces Despite the failure of the “great leap” of 1970, it would be a mistake to ignore the infrastructure advances promoted in the country between 1958 and 1968, insufficient in relative terms, but remarkable in absolute terms. In 10 years, 5,000 kilometers of non-​sugarcane highways were built in the country, reaching a total of 15,000 kilometers—​a 50% increase. The sugar railways—​9 thousand kilometers in 1958—​reached 12 thousand kilometers in 1968—​a 33% expansion. Passenger capacity of railroads expanded by 49% from 1964 to 1968. The Cuban merchant fleet grew from 14 to 49 ships from 1958 to 1968, which represented an increase in capacity from 50 thousand to 262 thousand tonnes—​an increase by 5.24 times. The Cuban air fleet also grew significantly, from 14 planes in 1960 to 27 in 1967, representing an increase in capacity by 3.6 times, from 140,000 to 500,000 passengers. All this was followed by a change in the import profile, giving priority to public transport: from 1952 to 1957, 71% of the motor vehicles imported by the island were individual, 19% buses, and 10% trucks. From 1960 to 1968, this profile changed to only 8% of the imported fleet of individual cars, 54% trucks, and 38% buses (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 36, 39–​40). Similarly, even though they fell short of the goals stipulated by the simultaneous battles and had suffered the serious distortions of the 1970 harvest, other activities of the Cuban economy showed significant growth, according to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez’s report to the 1969 eclac meeting. Nickel production, for example, doubled from 18 to 37 thousand tonnes from 1958 to 1968; consumption of steel bars and plates produced within the island for maintenance and repair also doubled from 1956 to 1968. In the same period, the cement sector expanded by 42%, reaching a production capacity of 1.366 million

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tonnes; paper production doubled; glass production grew by 80%; electricity consumption expanded by 85% and energy production increased by 58% (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 32–​33, 41). This trend of productive expansion suffered a sudden impact in the 1970s, but one should not fail to consider it significant to the comparative analysis of the economic development of the 1950s and 1960s. After the traumatic cyclone Flora, in October 1963, and Fidel Castro’s speech on the need to use nature’s violence to develop the country, such a guideline was followed, and the volume of dammed water increased extraordinarily by 97% from 1958 to 1968, reaching a total amount of one billion cubic meters in storage. In addition to the drought of 1962, Cuba went through the 1965 and the 1967 droughts, whose impact could be reduced because of the expansion of the national hydraulic system. Investments in hydraulic constructions, which reached 8.7 million pesos in 1963, reached 180 million pesos in 1968—​a twentyfold increase. Concerning agricultural development, Rodríguez reported to eclac that the amount of agricultural machinery and inputs would quintuple on the island in 1970, compared to 1960, a goal that was probably not reached due to the previously reported importation issues in the 1970 harvest. Once again, however, the goal was so daring that even if it was not met it provided a remarkable absolute growth compared to the 1950s. The construction of fifty airstrips for agricultural aircrafts that would fertilize 75,000 caballerías was also planned. Artificial insemination of cattle also evolved during the 1960s. In 1964, there were 114,000 pregnant females—​a daily capacity of 2 liters of milk. As early as 1968, Cuba had 2 million pregnant females—​a daily capacity of 10 liters of milk. The island’s fishing capacity also increased in absolute terms: from 1964 to 1968, 400 new fishing units were built, so that in 1967 the island fished almost sixty-​three thousand tonnes, a threefold growth compared to 1958 (Rodríguez, 1969, pp. 23, 26–​27, 38). The use of Cuban agricultural land has also evolved significantly, once the land was no longer used for speculative purposes. As Rodríguez reported to eclac, while in 1961 there were still 75,000 idle caballerías on the island, in 1969 only 7,500 caballerías remained unused—​notably, those were the most inefficient (Rodríguez, 1969, p. 26). The distance between absolute economic growth (positive) and development related to goals (negative) can be measured by using some data on the Cuban economy in the 1980s (Lecuona, 2009, pp.235–​6, 244)—​75% of the items in the sugar industry were produced in Cuba; the sugar industry had 15% more capacity than in 1958; two-​thirds of sugarcane cutting was mechanized; a record yield of 64.1 tonnes of cane/​hectare was achieved; there was 20 times more fertilizer and 20 times more irrigation than in 1958; the use

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of sugar byproducts was made possible (rum, bagasse paper, animal food, chemical derivatives, etc.). All these data were considerably short of what the leaders of the revolution had planned; however, they were still an important increase compared to pre-​revolutionary statistics. The great disparity, as one might notice, occurred between the economic base and the egalitarian social development. The latter being financed by external aid mechanisms and by the rationing policy. Despite technical and economic inadequacies and the perpetuation of excessive sugar specialization, at the end of the 1970s, eclac produced a report highlighting the transformation of the Cuban agrarian structure toward the strategic overcoming of the plantation. They synthesized: Despite the permanence of these structural traits, how the economy functioned varied significantly, as a consequence of the changes in property patterns and in the economic organization, which led to overcoming the model typical of a classic plantation economy. Indeed, although the sugar industry continued to be the key sector, the foundations were laid for it to operate with new organizational techniques and methods. Thus, the sugarcane production changed its profile; the activity underwent increasing mechanization and both lines of higher productivity and varieties with different maturation periods—​early, medium or late—​were introduced, allowing to mitigate the effects of a prolonged harvest by means of geographical and temporal organization of the harvest. 1980, p. 173

However, Cuba’s economic augmentation was not enough to, for example, change the workforce profile—​in 1969 it was still 50% agricultural (Silverman, 1978, p. 174). While correlating the demands posed by the goals of the revolution and its technical and economic foundations, a historical disparity can be noticed. The relationship between means and ends of the Cuban revolutionary process is the object of the final considerations. 2.3 Peripheral Socialism and Rationality of the Possible By dismantling the vicious circle of double articulation and establishing goals that are properly national for development, Cuba took on the challenge to break with the irrational processes of accumulation that determine underdevelopment, the only way that it could possibly create a democratic and social sense to its economic base. Building structures suited to the needs of the population required that new purposes were defined to guide the development and national integration around them. This integration should take place in

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two dimensions: on the one hand, the constitution of cultural bases and moral nexus that could organize the political will of the national collectivity, which means to disseminate the purposes of the revolution as shared values; on the other hand, the creation of an adequate national economic system to support such ends. These tasks would not be fully possible without the building of internal centers effectively capable of making decisions about the directions and rhythms of national development. Florestan Fernandes expressed that the construction of a socialist society depends simultaneously on two irreplaceable factors. One of them, the development of the “new man,” the cultural, moral, and psychological revolution guided by the new aims of egalitarianism and national sovereignty. And the other one, the productive forces, the technical and economic revolution, the means capable of achieving those ends (Fernandes, 2007, p. 219). Due to the complexity of both, Florestan warned that “revolutionary socialism does not generate miracles: underdevelopment can only be overcome gradually” (2007, p. 36). Fidel Castro was aware of the need to coordinate these two processes of creativity: the technical and economic, and the cultural one. And at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, in 1976, when the planned economic system of the Soviet Union was imported and the economic calculation was approved, he recalled the importance of moral stimuli. He argued that capitalism, due to its intrinsic perversity tending to a paroxysm on the periphery of the system, would always be more efficient than socialism in applying “economic pressures.” It was an explicit caveat against radical libermanist models of business competition and the pursuit of profit, which abandoned the moral component of socialist construction in exchange for the recomposition of the market. Fidel spoke: Convincing them for a second that we can do without ideological work on the masses or that we can do without moral stimuli would be a big mistake. It is absolutely impossible that the mechanisms and economic stimuli in socialism are as efficient as they are in capitalism because in capitalism the only thing that works is the stimulus and the economic pressure in absolute fullness: hunger, unemployment, etc. Here, some very restricted economic stimuli work, which are used as mechanisms to improve the efficiency of the economy, to precisely reward those workers and workers collectives contributing the most to society with their work […] Moral stimuli must be expanded because in reality we have talked a lot about moral stimulation and we have given few moral stimuli. in: eclac, 1980 p. 28

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In Cuba, the two processes of creativity—​ cultural and technological—​ intertwined in the socialist project were conditioned by the narrow economic bases available, the outcome of centuries of colonial exploitation and underdevelopment, and still not enough to completely break with the past. The advances and limits of this breach are fully visible in the revolutionary transformations of the agrarian structure. The agrarian structure of the plantation was modified in three essential dimensions: in the land tenure system, the cropping regime, and the labor regime. Since October 10, 1958, revolutionary changes in the land tenure system were organically guided by the construction of egalitarianism and national sovereignty. The breach with the modernized plantation land tenure went through a class warfare process. When the interests of large national and foreign latifundia were formally defeated on May 17, 1959, and the socialist nature of the revolution was declared on April 16, 1961, the Cuban land tenure system joined a new level of restructuring, which soon triggered controversies concerning the agrarian economic forms of transition. On October 10, 1963, a new battle was won against dependent capitalism and private land ownership was reduced to peasantry, largely allied with the revolutionary government. In the meantime, many controversies guided the new land tenure system—​the small agrarian debate (between cooperatives and state farms); the great debate (between economic calculation and the budget system), and the debate about the peasantry (the principle of voluntariness)—​until its completion and stabilization in 1970, when approximately 85% of the island’s surface was occupied by state properties and 15% by peasant properties. There was a complete breach of the latifundium-​minifundium structure, one of the pillars of the plantation. The cropping regime, on the other hand, was more directly influenced by international economic insertion. Due to how narrow the specialized economic base was and to the limited options to utilize the surplus, the cropping regime of the revolution did not manage to completely break with the modern plantation. That occurred because the trajectory of transformations in the cropping regime responded directly to the different moments of Cuban international insertion. While facing the US blockade, the direction was toward territorially disorganized diversification as an emergency guarantee of food sovereignty. And while facing the 1964 agreement with the Soviet Union, the direction was toward recovering the sugarcane fields. Specialized diversification, a project that resonated with an authentic national need, was secondary to the export strategy. It was the most rational course among all the possibilities analyzed by the leaders of the revolution—​it was the rationality of the possible. In short, the cropping regime did not manage to break with foreign

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market determinations because there was a narrow range of alternatives under pressure by international conjunctures. Sugarcane specialization, another pillar of modernized plantation, was not overcome. As Florestan Fernandes argued: “Cuba was a victim, first, of its ‘relative backwardness’ and then of its uneven progress” (2007, p. 61). On the other hand, the speculative character of monoculture was profoundly minimized or even eliminated because the prohibition of idle land and the end of leasing and subleasing relationships were measures incorporated by the national collectivity, as part of a new universe of values among which was the fight against speculative attitudes. Finally, the typical work regime of the modernized plantation was profoundly altered. In the first place, as seen above, there was a sudden change in the employment profile on the island, which contributed to overcoming structural unemployment and the emergence of a “tiempo muerto in reverse”—​in other words, the scarcity of workers to harvest sugarcane—​as workers were attracted by new professional and educational opportunities that arose in the midst of so many changes. Of the 500,000 workers historically laid off in the off-​ season, approximately 75% were taken on by other sectors between 1959 and 1970 (see Chapter 3). The end of unemployment, along with the absence of the daily repression of the capitalist foreman, the disconnection between wages and the agricultural norm, the general improvement in social welfare, and the scarcity of consumer goods available on the market were co-​responsible factors toward the remarkable fall in labor productivity recorded in the 1960s. Overcoming the violent extraction of surplus in agriculture, the plantation’s own labor regime, meant loosening capitalist constraints on production relations. Along with the insufficiency in the incorporation of technology and the arguments in defense of the moral economy, this process led to generalizing the policy of voluntary work, which merged contradictory components of political consciousness and moral coercion. As a matter of fact, new deep contradictions were created and the new labor regime remained as the subject of many controversies. From 1959 to 1970, the trajectory of the surplus reflected these contradictions. First, the purposes of the revolution that guided the use of the surplus were determined according to the needs of the population, an essential initial step for overcoming underdevelopment. Second, the models of socialist transition and national integration that organized the mechanisms of appropriation of the surplus were designed with sovereignty by the revolutionary government, dealing with controversies, adaptations, and corrections that directly affected the agrarian land tenure system. Third, the cropping regime remained specialized, a structural decision concerning surplus generation and

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determined by the Cuban insertion in the Soviet bloc specifically strained by the Cold War. For all those reasons, the failure of the 1970 harvest represented the frustration of the first leap of a development strategy aimed at overcoming the vulnerability of the cropping regime and expanding the island’s economic bases in order to reduce the influence of the insertion international level in its productive structures. While this vulnerability was not overcome, the external determination of the Cuban agrarian structure was strengthened, indefinitely extending the need for specialization. In this process, regarding economy and culture the “Cuban model” of transition to socialism and national integration stumbled. For that matter, the organizing mechanisms of surplus appropriation had to be adapted to such a failure: the moral economy gave place to the Soviet planning model. The economic foundations did not broaden as expected. On the contrary, its distortions have worsened as never before. And Cuba had to join comecon being aware of how narrow the range of options was. The adaptation of the Cuban model to the Economic Planning and Management System of the Soviet Union from 1972 to 1976 indicates there was an expansion of external determinations not only on the surplus generation process but also on surplus appropriation mechanisms. That was because when the attempt to broaden the island’s economic bases in a “great leap” was frustrated, some structural distortions were augmented, and external financing had tight margins for negotiation it was necessary to rank the very purposes of the revolution. Between egalitarianism and national sovereignty, the revolutionary government chose to guarantee the former in exchange for trust and acceptance of the foreign models of transition to socialism, a flank on which the originality and authenticity of national experiences had been sustained until then. If in the 1960s external economic dependency coexisted with a relatively broad horizon of national sovereignty, the same did not happen from the 1970s onward. In 1969, Furtado summarized the historical impasse experienced by the Cuban revolution as follows: The Cuban revolution is still in the search for a model of economic organization. This search tended to be extended due to the philosophical conflict—​which is at the root of socialist revolutions—​between those who suppose that the priority task of reconstructing man is only compatible with the maximization of formal rationality in an advanced stage of the production system and those who claim that no victory on the human level will last if the material base of society is not substantially expanded from the beginning. It seems that ten years after the Revolution there is no question that the moment of expansion of the material base of society

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can no longer be postponed. And this objective can only be achieved if the country is endowed with a really effective economic system. 1969, p. 352

Delaying the broadening of the economic base had its price. But on the narrow path from underdevelopment to socialism, would it be possible to achieve this enlargement immediately? As Florestan Fernandes mentioned, socialism did not work miracles. It is essential to note that the Cuban choice while deepening economic dependency and the flow of surplus resulting from geopolitical advantage supported egalitarianism and the social, cultural, and material achievements of the revolution in a non-​negotiable way. Therefore, despite absorbing foreign models of economic organization, the relative reduction of national sovereignty, the permanence of specialization, and the agro-​export pattern, Cuba reached a level of egalitarian development that was unprecedented in Latin America, remained focused on the needs of the population, and was known for its civilization paradigm markedly superior to dependent capitalism. Finally, the insistence of underdevelopment features on the island found yet another determination, related to the prominence of the geopolitical advantage in the surplus generation scheme, which was identified by Regalado: Social policy is made in such a way it is not sustained on its own economic basis. A country like Cuba, in the conditions it found itself from 1959 to 1963, could not simultaneously do everything it did, such as free education for all, free healthcare for all, good hospitals for everyone, housing, raising wages, lowering rents. What supported Cuba? Two things. One was foreign aid, which allowed the country to build schools, hospitals, etc. The other one was the very problem we are experiencing today regarding very low wages. With no need to finance itself, a policy of lowering wages has been consciously adopted on the island. Because the State definitely offers education, health, home concession, and one does not have to pay for any of that from one’s salary. What is the salary for? Well, for food and clothing, which are even in the Libreta de Abastecimiento—​in other words, it is restricted. What happens then? It takes too long. If one is going to live under a state of exception, that goes for five or ten years. Not every five years. So when the Soviet Union fell, one of the pillars that allowed offering social services for free fell. 2012

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Effectively, the external impulse of surplus generation led to losing the objective perception of the national economic base. In other words, over the years, Cuban society found itself relatively numb when it came to the immediate economic pressures resulting from the easiness which was a consequence of geopolitical advantages. On the one hand, that enabled maintaining its agricultural export position, and on the other hand, it intensified the impact of the fall resulting from the Soviet collapse. Ultimately, the adequate correlation between the two processes of creativity to overcome underdevelopment—​building a nationally integrated economic foundation, organically determined by the needs of the population and broad enough to guarantee some sovereignty—​reached some structural obstacles that were difficult to overcome. The purpose of the revolutionary project, established according to these needs, created an important level of national control over the directions of development. However, the insufficiency of technical and economic means demanded permanent adaptation, adjustment, and correction of the rhythm of this development, fundamentally determined from the outside in by the international conjunctures. In addition, the limited extent of the economic base and the obstacles to its expansion, against which the country collided in 1970, demanded that relative adaptations of the purposes be produced through its hierarchy. Thus, egalitarianism became the non-​ negotiable rudder of the revolutionary project, while sovereignty was relatively adjusted to the demands of the international context, directly reflecting on the permanence of the island’s agricultural export specialization. According to the tortuous paths of technological choice, Cuba has always circumvented obstacles a little more slowly than its own expectations, encountering more obstacles than could be expected by the optimism of the will. Even in difficult times, it remained in control of the direction of its development, whose rhythm, strictly speaking, depended on external conditions. It remained, above all, an example of the concrete possibility of another civilizational paradigm, defying those who insist on predicting how the story ends.

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Revista Inra

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Revista Cuba Socialista

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Revista Fundamentos

Aguirre, S. (1960). “La aplicación de la Ley de la reforma agraria en la industria azucarera.” In: Fundamentos n.164, p. 72–​76, La Habana, 1960. Aguirre, S. (1959). “Sobre las cooperativas agrícolas.” In: Fundamentos n.?, p. 77–​87, La Habana, 1959.



Revista Temas

Valdés Paz, J.; Díaz Vásquez, J. A.; Díaz, S. (2012). “La Zafra de los diez millones: una mirada retrospectiva.” In: Revista Temas, n.72, La Habana, Oct-​Dec/​2012.



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eclac (cepal) and fao

eclac (1953). Estudio económico y social de América Latina y el Caribe. Santiago de Chile: eclac, 1953. eclac (1960). Economic survey in Latin America, 1959. eclac: Santiago de Chile, June 1960. eclac (1962). Acontecimientos y tendencias recientes en el intercambio de America Latina con la Comunidad Europea. Document prepared by the Executive Secretariat. Santiago de Chile, 1962. eclac (1963a). El desarrollo social de América Latina en la postguerra. Decimo Periodo de Sesiones. Mar del Plata: eclac, 1963. eclac (1963b). Los recursos naturales en América Latina, su conocimiento actual e investigaciones necesarias en este campo. ii. El agua. Mar del Plata: Decimo Periodo de Sesiones, 1963b. eclac (1963c). El desarrollo social de América Latina en la postguerra. Mar del Plata: Decimo Periodo de Sesiones, 1963c. eclac (1963d). Los recursos naturales en América Latina, su conocimiento actual e investigaciones necesarias en este campo. Mar del Plata: Decimo Periodo de Sesiones, 1963d. eclac (1963e). Situación económica de América Latina. Mar del Plata: Decimo Periodo de Sesiones, 1963e. eclac (1964). “La economía cubana en el periodo 1959–​1963.” In: Estudio Económico y Social de América Latina y el Caribe. Santiago de Chile: eclac, 1964. eclac (1980). Cuba: estilo de desarrollo y políticas sociales. Ciudad de Mexico, d.f.: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980. eclac/​fao (1963). Problemas y perspectivas de la agricultura Latinoamericana. Document prepared by Joint Agriculture Divison eclac/​fao. Mar del Plata: Decimo Periodo de Sesiones, 1963.

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Ávila, Rolando. Rolando Ávila: entrevista [July 20, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012. Barkin, David. David Barkin: entrevista [November 12, 2011]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Cidade do México d.f., 2011. Brivers, Ivars. Ivars Brivers: entrevista [May 19, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. São Petersburgo, 2012. Cervantes, Lourdes. Lourdes Cervantes: entrevista [July 19, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012. Cervantes, Lourdes; Vasconcelos, Joana Salém. “Quando o terceiro mundo encontrou-​ se com o segundo.” Roraima: examãpaku—​Revista Eletrônica de Ciências Sociais, História e Relações Internacionais, v.8, n.2, 2015. Chonchol, Jacques. Jacques Chonchol: entrevista [July 18, 2011]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Santiago do Chile, 2011. Chonchol, Jacques; Vasconcelos, Joana Salém. “Jacques Chonchol em Cuba: reforma agrária e revolução em 1961.” São Paulo: Revista Mouro n.7, 2012. Díaz Vázquez, Julio. Julio Diáz Vázquez: entrevista [July 17, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012. Jimenez, Reynaldo. Reynaldo Jimenez: entrevista [July 10, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012. Lobaina, Esther. Esther Lobaina: entrevista [July 9, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012. Regalado, Roberto. Roberto Regalado: entrevista [July 13, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012. Sotelo Valencia, Adrián. Adrián Sotelo Valencia: entrevista [November 7, 2011]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Cidade do México d.f., 2011. Sotomayor, Octavio. Octavio Sotomayor: entrevista [August 19, 2011]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Santiago de Chile, 2011. Travieso, Julio. Julio Travieso: entrevista [July 17, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012. Valdés Paz, Juan. Juan Valdés Paz: entrevista [July 16, 2012]. Interviewer: Joana Salém Vasconcelos. Digital recording. Havana, 2012.

Index 1940 Constitution 50, 70, 71, 71n51, 74, 76, 80, 86 1970 harvest 18, 19, 166n17, 191, 197, 198, 203, 208, 213, 225, 232, 235, 238n24, 242, 245, 247, 250, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 258, 261, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 278, 279, 283, 283n69, 284, 286, 299, 300, 301, 304, 307, 308, 313 ten million xix, 281 26th of July Movement 35n14, 66n41, 69, 69n46, 69n47, 70, 74, 75, 75n55, 77, 78, 78n56, 80, 87, 138n48, 243 Agrarian Reform Law 76n55, 79, 81, 81n2, 83, 85, 88, 89, 91, 98, 100, 128, 153n1, 154, 159 anap xiv, xv, 84n4, 93n10, 95, 98n14, 106, 115n27, 116, 120, 121, 121n34, 122, 123, 125, 126, 126n38, 127, 127n39, 128, 129, 145, 155, 156, 161, 195, 251, 253, 283, 284 Blockade xii, xiii, xiv, 84, 89, 105, 117, 123, 130, 131, 132, 132n42, 132n43, 134, 137, 139, 141, 142, 149, 150, 159, 163, 165, 173, 188, 196, 220, 245, 271, 297, 311 Carlos Prío 36n17, 51, 52, 53, 53n38 Carlos Rafael Rodríguez xxii, 7, 15n20, 17, 17n21, 17n22, 29, 46, 73n53, 73n54, 78, 80n1, 81, 82, 82n3, 88, 91n9, 97, 103n17, 107, 113, 118, 119, 120, 120n33, 122, 123n36, 124, 124n37, 129, 144n53, 149, 160, 163, 170, 171, 173, 183, 184, 188, 211, 212, 217, 239, 243, 243n33, 247n43, 292, 307 Charles Bettelheim 7, 17n21, 104n18, 117, 117n30, 123n35, 232, 234, 246n37 cia 51, 53, 177n30 comecon 299, 300, 301, 313 Communist Party of Cuba xii, 243, 281, 284, 300, 310 Confederation of Cuban workers (CTC) 196, 239, 274, 277 Cooperative xiii, xvii, xviii, 16, 17n21, 72, 85, 87, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98, 98n14, 99, 100, 100n15, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 107n21, 109, 110, 111n23, 112, 115, 116, 117,

118, 119, 122, 126, 127, 127n39, 129, 138, 139, 147n55, 155, 163, 181, 186, 186n39, 195, 300, 302, 311 Cropping regime 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 15, 19, 24, 35, 37, 117, 120, 145, 200, 311, 312, 313 Diversification xiii, 12n11, 19, 73n54, 79, 105, 109, 109n22, 110, 116, 130, 134, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 144, 144n53, 145, 146, 147, 149, 162, 163, 163n10, 163n12, 164, 168, 169, 171, 174, 179, 181, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 196, 199, 205, 213, 217, 219, 224, 228, 231, 232, 254, 268, 283, 283n69, 294, 302, 311 Dwight D. Eisenhower 51, 53 England 38, 167n18 Ernesto Guevara xi, 7, 17, 17n21, 75, 75n55, 76, 79, 80, 102, 104n18, 116, 118, 119, 163n10, 164, 164n14, 171, 172, 177, 184, 192n49, 214, 218, 220, 237, 238, 239n27, 241, 241n31, 242, 243, 243n34, 247, 249, 249n45, 276, 293 Fernando Martínez Heredia 71, 75, 75n55, 76, 77 Fertilizers 146, 194, 211, 219n7, 252, 308 Fidel Castro xix, 7, 36, 36n17, 45, 51, 69n47, 70, 70n48, 70n49, 70n50, 72, 75, 76, 78, 78n56, 80, 81, 87, 88, 90n8, 100n15, 104, 118n31, 125, 126, 132, 132n43, 156, 157, 159, 159n6, 159n7, 164, 165, 187n42, 193, 193n52, 195, 206, 214, 214n1, 219, 225, 228n19, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236n23, 237, 238, 238n25, 239, 239n26, 240, 241, 241n30, 242, 243, 243n33, 244, 245, 246, 248n44, 251, 252, 254, 255, 258, 259, 262, 263, 264, 265, 265n56, 267, 271, 272, 272n62, 272n63, 277, 279, 280, 280n67, 281, 284n70, 286, 308, 310 Foreign Trade 37, 119n31, 132n42, 171, 215n2, 219, 224, 226n16, 265, 291, 292, 293, 298, 299 exportation 14, 37, 81, 151n62, 183, 189, 217n5, 226, 236, 268n58, 286

328 Index Foreign Trade (cont.) importation 45n25, 49, 53n38, 134, 136, 144, 152, 169, 170n20, 171, 183, 188, 198, 199, 206, 207, 208, 210, 216, 217n5, 218, 220, 220n9, 221, 222, 224, 226, 229, 246n40, 263, 265, 308 France 38, 47n29, 101, 132n42 Fulgencio Batista 23, 50, 51, 53, 66n41, 67, 68, 69, 70, 70n50, 71, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78n56, 79, 85, 306 Granjas del Pueblo /​People’s Farm 85, 92, 95, 100, 101, 109, 112n24, 145 inra 17n21, 17n22, 48n32, 83, 85, 86, 87, 87n7, 92, 93, 93n10, 98, 99, 106, 115, 119, 126, 127, 127n39, 155, 158, 158n4, 170, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 193n52, 233, 243, 243n33 Jacques Chonchol xi, xix, 7, 14, 25n6, 26, 26n7, 28, 35, 35n16, 36, 37, 37n18, 37n19, 47, 47n29, 48n32, 49n34, 86, 86n5, 87, 87n6, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93n10, 97n12, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 110, 111, 111n23, 112, 112n24, 113, 114, 115, 115n25, 117, 117n30, 120n33, 135, 135n45, 137, 139, 140, 140n50, 142, 145, 154, 158n4, 180, 180n34, 185n38, 186, 186n39, 205n63, 296 John F. Kennedy 131, 165 José Martí 7, 74, 75, 89, 219 Juan Noyola 7, 30, 30n8, 31, 33n10, 36, 43, 131, 147, 164n15, 174, 196, 217, 217n5, 218, 218n6, 219, 219n7, 225 Juan Valdés Paz xi, xix, 7, 25n5, 38, 38n20, 90n8, 95, 104, 105, 105n19, 105n20, 106, 109, 112n24, 115n26, 117, 117n30, 118, 118n31, 119, 163n12, 175, 176n29, 183, 186, 186n41, 192, 193, 193n51, 193n52, 194, 195, 212n71, 229, 232, 233, 235, 241n30, 242, 242n32, 243n33, 254, 255, 258, 258n51, 261, 261n55, 267, 272, 273, 275, 279, 284n71, 300 Julio Lobo 52, 66, 67, 68n44 Labor xiii, xix, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 15n16, 17n21, 18, 19, 24, 28, 32, 34, 36, 37, 37n18, 45, 45n25, 49, 50, 71, 73, 96, 101, 106, 110,

111, 113, 115, 117, 120, 129, 129n40, 136, 142, 147, 147n55, 149, 160, 175, 182, 184, 191, 192, 196, 197, 199, 200, 202, 202n57, 203, 203n59, 205, 209n68, 210, 215, 215n2, 216n3, 217, 218n5, 221, 222n12, 228, 238n25, 239, 243, 245, 246n38, 248, 249, 261, 264, 268, 271, 272, 272n63, 273, 274, 277, 278, 279, 281, 292, 294, 295, 298, 311, 312 employment xvii, 14, 15n16, 73, 121, 135, 136, 149, 152, 200, 201n56, 202, 203, 205, 205n62, 216, 216n4, 217, 312 exploitation 28, 33, 49, 52, 53, 71, 79, 81, 90, 105n19, 149, 152, 261n55, 281, 294, 295, 311 foreman 105n19, 272, 273, 274, 279, 312 peasantry 29, 34, 77, 97, 98n13, 122, 123n35, 124, 125, 126, 127, 127n39, 155, 157, 160, 192, 194, 195, 201, 251, 253, 283, 302, 311 tiempo muerto 2, 2n1, 15, 18, 24, 25, 49, 137, 191, 312 unemployment 2, 11, 13, 15, 18, 24, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 42, 49, 69, 71, 136, 152, 167, 197, 200, 201, 201n56, 202, 203, 203n58, 203n59, 218, 218n5, 272, 274n64, 310, 312 volunteer work 18, 210, 238n24, 242, 269, 270, 276, 277, 278, 281, 282 Land tenure system 2, 3, 5, 13, 15, 16, 19, 24, 25, 25n5, 26, 28, 34, 35, 71, 77, 92, 93, 103, 117, 120, 130, 142, 159, 200, 284, 311, 312 Latifundium 2, 13, 14, 24, 25, 25n5, 26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 76, 89, 91, 92, 98, 311 Latin America xxii, 1, 4, 5, 6, 6n5, 7, 8, 13, 13n12, 14n15, 25, 25n5, 37n18, 43, 46, 47n29, 74n54, 78, 82n3, 89, 90n8, 127, 132n42, 134, 136, 167, 173, 173n23, 176, 176n28, 178, 196n53, 213, 214, 215n2, 216, 225, 234, 235, 285, 297, 298, 302, 305, 306, 314 Marx xii, 7, 25n4, 38n21, 98n13, 101, 102, 226n16, 240, 240n29 marxism 6, 7, 116 marxist xii, 1, 5, 6n5, 101, 102, 103, 111, 215, 276, 294 Michel Gutelman xix, 7, 104, 104n18, 117, 117n29, 117n30, 134, 137, 144, 145, 154, 155,

Index Michel Gutelman (cont.) 180, 180n34, 182, 191, 195, 212, 214n1, 222, 236, 236n23, 251, 282 Minifundium 2, 13, 14, 24, 25, 25n5, 26, 28, 29, 34, 35, 76, 311 Moncada 36, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76n55, 80, 81, 82, 87, 88, 135, 245, 262 Monoculture 2, 13, 14, 19, 24, 37, 37n18, 38, 45, 49, 73n53, 83, 130, 138, 145, 149, 167, 190, 283, 285, 295, 312 Moral economy 231n21, 244, 245, 247, 250, 253, 263, 271, 274, 275, 277, 278, 281, 289, 300, 301, 302, 312, 313 material incentives 118, 237, 238n24, 239, 240, 240n28, 241, 241n31, 242n32, 243, 244, 245, 246n38, 246n39, 247, 250, 271, 272, 278, 281 moral incentives 237, 238n24, 239, 240, 241n30, 241n31, 242n32, 243, 245, 246, 246n39, 246n40, 246n41, 248, 250, 275, 277, 281 socialist emulation 184, 239 Morgan group 52, 72n52 Nationalization 40, 50, 71, 76, 77, 88, 89, 101, 107n21, 130, 132, 154, 251n48 Osvaldo Dorticós 88, 281, 282n68 Peasantry 29, 34, 77, 97, 98n13, 122, 123, 123n35, 124, 125, 126, 127, 127n39, 155, 157, 160, 192, 194, 195, 201, 251, 253, 283, 302, 311 peasants 14, 29, 34, 39, 74, 76, 77, 79, 84n4, 85, 89, 92, 96, 97, 98, 98n14, 100, 115, 115n27, 120, 122, 122n34, 123, 123n35, 124, 124n37, 125, 126, 127, 129, 138, 150, 150n60, 156, 158, 159, 161, 193n52, 194, 195, 251, 251n48, 252, 255, 303 small farmers 70n49, 87, 93n10, 97, 106, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 126n38, 128, 129, 155, 158, 161, 251 Periphery 1, 16, 176n27, 213, 215, 215n2, 226, 287, 310 peripheral 4, 4n4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 16, 25, 30, 78, 82, 136, 216, 285, 292 Peripheral xii, 309

329 Private property 71, 85, 88, 91, 98, 119, 155, 252 Productivity xviii, 5, 9, 11, 11n9, 12, 14, 14n15, 17n21, 18, 25, 30, 31, 32, 73n54, 76, 83, 86, 96, 101, 105, 109, 110, 115, 116, 118, 120, 120n32, 124, 129, 136, 145, 146, 147n55, 152, 154, 161, 189, 196, 197, 199, 201, 202, 203, 203n58, 205, 207, 208, 209n68, 209n69, 215, 215n2, 216n3, 222, 222n12, 228, 232, 237, 239, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246n41, 248, 249, 250, 263, 268, 269, 270, 271, 271n61, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276n65, 278, 279, 281, 282, 285, 289, 309, 312 Proletariat 6n5, 29, 34, 71, 77, 97, 97n12, 123, 129, 294 agricultural workforce 37, 47, 146 Raúl Castro xvii, xviii, 7, 77, 80, 122, 219 Raúl Prebisch 30n8, 73n54, 215, 215n2, 216, 216n4 Rebel Army 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 85, 87, 100, 122, 123, 150n60 Regino Boti 7, 69n47, 78n56, 137, 138n48, 217, 219, 219n8, 221, 243 René Dumont xix, 7, 86n5, 89, 101, 104, 109, 112n24, 115, 115n27, 116, 116n28, 118, 145, 146, 146n54, 147, 147n55, 161, 161n8, 163, 165, 180, 180n34, 186, 186n39, 186n40, 188, 191, 236n23, 251, 252, 282 Revolutionary Armed Forces 157, 202, 269 Revolutionary Offensive 18, 19, 122, 126, 289 Rockefeller 41, 50, 51, 52, 53, 53n39, 66, 67, 72, 72n52 Saccharocracy 41, 43, 44, 50, 52, 66, 67, 68, 69 Shortage xvii, 41, 112, 117, 129, 143, 145, 166, 196, 200, 202, 203, 210, 220, 228, 235, 245, 261, 265, 268, 269, 271, 274, 281 Socialist transition 5, 242, 312 economic debate 17n21, 96 Sovereignty xiii, 2, 4, 12, 17, 23, 40, 69, 70n50, 74, 75, 77, 82, 83, 89, 95, 99, 111, 115, 115n25, 120, 125, 130, 137, 146, 161, 168, 175, 176, 176n28, 178, 179, 190, 217, 234, 240, 284, 292, 293, 297, 298, 300, 302, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315

330 Index Spain 23, 74, 132n42, 218n6 Sugar prices 40, 41, 53, 144, 162, 236, 268, 287, 288, 289, 295, 296 Sugarcane mechanization 18, 31, 32, 73n54, 110, 112n24, 129, 143, 185, 194, 196, 197, 200, 203, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 228, 250, 262, 268, 269, 282, 283, 289, 300, 309 Sullivan 51, 52, 53, 66, 67, 72n52 Third World xxii, 164n14, 176, 176n27, 177, 177n31 Turnpike strategy 225, 225n15, 225n16, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 242, 245, 256, 263, 268, 270, 278, 283, 294, 299, 301, 302 Underdevelopment xix, 2, 3, 4, 6, 6n5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13n12, 15, 15n20, 16, 23n1, 24, 25, 50, 66, 69, 70, 77, 78, 81, 82, 95, 120, 130, 136, 162, 169, 172n22, 174, 176, 177, 178, 196, 213, 214, 215n2, 216, 227, 263, 268,

284, 285, 291, 301, 302, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 315 United Fruit Company 39, 41, 45, 50, 68 United States of America xii, xiii, xvii, xviii, 1, 2, 4n4, 13, 13n13, 14, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 53n38, 66, 68, 69, 72n52, 73, 82, 88, 89, 130, 131, 137, 144, 150, 159, 165, 167n18, 174, 177, 177n31, 178, 196, 219, 219n7, 221, 238n25, 293, 298 ussr xiii, xv, xvii, 2, 6, 6n5, 19, 89, 102, 102n16, 109, 112n24, 115, 131, 132, 145, 150, 159, 162, 163, 164, 164n15, 165, 165n16, 166, 168, 172, 173, 174, 174n25, 175, 175n26, 176, 176n29, 177, 177n31, 178, 179, 187n42, 192, 206, 207, 207n64, 208, 208n65, 208n66, 209, 209n69, 210, 212n71, 214, 219, 224, 227, 227n18, 229, 235, 236, 236n23, 237, 238n24, 238n25, 240, 240n28, 246, 246n37, 256, 268, 269n59, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315