After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War 9780755622757, 9781848854178

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Earlier discussions amongst colleagues at the time of the 10th Anniversary of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (established in 1993) gave birth to the concept of a book that would bring together ideas and experiences that have emanated from the work of the Unit, its graduates and associates. After the Conflict is the product of this reflection as well as a wider debate involving many others besides those who have contributed chapters. In particular, Haleh Afshar, Charles Cockburn, Alistair Duncan, Mark Evans, Tim Jacoby, Roger Mac Ginty, John Warren and Gareth Wardell have been a source of continuous encouragement and inspiration. Several colleagues made crucial contributions to the practical realisation of this book: Margaret Chard for stepping in to keep the project going during my frequent absences; Andrew Jackson for his meticulous proofreading and indexing; Anna O’Connell for her consistent administration throughout; and Gavin Ward Design Associates for all their typesetting skills. I am especially grateful to David Stonestreet, Editor for IB Tauris, for his patience and practical advice, and of course to Iradj Baghezade of IB Tauris for taking up the book proposal in the first place. Above all I wish to thank all of the contributors for their ideas and collaboration. Sultan Barakat York, UK

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FOREWORD HRH Prince El-Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan

For some years, living as I do in a part of the world which seems all too often to be under permanent, violent reconstruction, I have held up the example of The University of York’s Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit as an institution urgently in need of imitators. As we know only too well in the ‘orphaned region’ of West Asia, the human race has developed far less expertise in holistic post-war reconstruction than in the technical process of repairing physical infrastructure. The two are intimately connected – personal and communal identity is bound up in the cultivation of the land or in styles, objects and institutions that house the definitive history and culture of a nation. War, natural disaster and economic instability bring physical, mental and even spiritual chaos to vulnerable networks of place and people. Official audits of attempts to regenerate societies after war may tend, naturally, to measure construction of what is visible – houses, schools and roads. Less easily measured, though just as necessary to the survival of a society, is the restoration of more obscure structures: the relationships between citizens and adherents of different faiths, the curriculum taught in the schools, and the demand for goods at the other end of the road. All social reconstruction needs external help but it should be of a kind that recognises and works with the internal values of a society in a relationship defined by cultural affinity and understanding of how human beings universally deal with suffering through this medium. Disease, famine and war are social products, and we can trace their origins, their spread, incidence and distribution directly to social organization … The first and most striking point, I believe, is the immense effort people make to preserve what they can of their culture and way of life.1 In helping to reorganise a social order, those who wish to contribute have to acknowledge that change in social order is inherently painful for the individual. Comprehending exactly how and why it is painful in any particular culture is possible when one shows genuine familiarity with the value-priorities of that

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x culture. This introduces a first point of commonality or sense of shared purpose for rebuilding. In his introduction, Dr Barakat makes the very important point that post-war reconstruction, for the insiders, actually begins before the end of conflict and itself contributes to the eventual cessation of violence. To think of reconstruction as an activity necessarily introduced from outside and separately from conflict resolution is, therefore, not only false but counterproductive. Outside efforts to end conflict succeed by working in parallel and harmony with people’s continual efforts to reconstruct and maintain a normal, secure life. This is the constant theme that runs through the contributions to this book as they examine different but interconnected aspects of reconstruction: the nature of peace, social and economic development, reconstruction of the built environment, developing the capacity for governance, reintegration of those affected by and involved in violence. Since conflict resolution is so much a matter of local communications, networks and structures of influence, and since public opinions are faster-moving and better interconnected than at any time previously, intervention in potential conflicts and also, as suggested by this volume, in post-conflict areas is more and more a case of knowing whom to call on the ground rather than whom to send in. From my own experience in relations between adherents of different religions, I would underline the role played by religious leaders and communities in peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction and development. Cooperation between faiths provides a powerful example of personal differences united for the common good, and taps into precisely the kind of strong local network and community feeling that can best survive in difficult conditions. At another level, successful reconstruction programmes are conceived within the parameters of a national policy framework. Joint or parallel work bringing together outside agencies and government helps to localise the plans and results, and gives them longer life. Invoking the same principle of cultural affinity is helpful in introducing, for example, poverty reduction strategies at a national level or certain political reforms. The central precept of all successful help has been to include and involve the people who would welcome outside help. Putting this principle into practice means finding a shared idea of a common good, and setting that common good as the communal goal. Democracy in its many forms has always at its heart the participation of the people in forming and maintaining the processes and laws by which they themselves are governed. Effective reconstruction and development, in invoking the widest possible common good, is always a democratising process and a form of conflict avoidance for the future. It is my sincere hope that this book, and others like it, can promote the concept of developing conversations between citizens towards deeper peaceful cooperation worldwide among generations to come.

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INTRODUCTION Sultan Barakat

Post-war reconstruction begins in the hearts and minds of those who suffer the horrors of war and want to change societies so that there is no return to mass violence. For them planning for reconstruction often begins during conflict and is an essential part of negotiating their way towards peace. For the outsiders, post-war reconstruction is always seen as a novel undertaking that only begins when violent conflict has come to an end. Today, post-war reconstruction is attracting attention from the media, academics, aid-practitioners and policymakers as never before. Consequently, this is an opportune moment to draw together the main arguments on the subject in a single, edited volume. Over the last decade there has been increased interest in the reconstruction of societies, outside western Europe, that have been devastated by conflict. Prior to this time, as a result of the Cold War, there was little interest in the rebuilding of societies beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance. I recall how at the time when the Berlin Wall came down I was attending a workshop on post-war reconstruction in Bulgaria and it seemed that the world was ready for change and that the end of the Cold War could provide the impetus that was needed in order to bring about that change. A change in focus away from a preoccupation of seeing the world in terms of east and west, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, had led to a growing awareness amongst the international community of other wartorn countries with long term needs. A son of a Palestinian refugee, I was born in the midst of conflict, war was a daily fact of life, and I always wondered what happened afterwards – but there was never an afterwards. Having studied architecture, I came to the UK as a postgraduate to study the reconstruction of Iraq in the aftermath of the 1980–1988 war with Iran, and look at this ‘afterwards’ that so intrigued me as a younger person. Initially, I was motivated by the built environment and in particular the devastating loss of human settlements, housing, heritage and social and physical infrastructure.1 Having overcome the initial shock of seeing the extent to which people in Europe exclusively associated the subject of post-war reconstruction with their own experience post the Second World War, I started, with the support of my then academic supervisor, Charles Cockburn, to offer a series of short workshops that

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explored the concept and focused attention on the many wars that were being waged in those days in the shadow of the cold war and Europe’s deterrent-based peace. Those were the very early beginnings. The discussions then were as confusing as the overall political landscape of those days, but it was that initial questioning that led to the creation of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) at the University of York in 1993. Since its establishment, the PRDU has accumulated considerable institutional knowledge, experience and expertise in this specialist area. Post-war Recovery Studies has been firmly established as a discipline in its own right with over 100 students having graduated from the MA course in Post-war Recovery Studies, 10 having completed PhDs in the subject, and a further 10 currently undertaking doctoral research. This book includes contributions from key individuals associated with the PRDU and collaborative chapters with former and current research students, who have influenced the debates on recovery and are set to take the subject forward in the coming years. Where possible, the chapters have been illustrated by reference to empirical research with which the PRDU has been directly associated. The opening chapter reflects on how the debate regarding aid, development and reconstruction has changed (as the nature of armed conflict itself has also changed) since the Second World War, as a result of the end of the Cold War and then the events of September 11 2001. These three watershed moments in the twentieth century have highlighted a significant shift in geopolitical power which has profoundly influenced perceptions of post-war reconstruction. Mac Ginty, writing in Chapter 2, shows how the post-Cold War period whilst having witnessed endemic ethnonational conflict has seen a significant number of peace processes and initiatives. The extent of this peacemaking activity now makes it possible to identify patterns, commonalities and differences and although it remains true that the complexities make generalisation difficult, certain themes are identifiable on the basis of which Mac Ginty provides us with an analytical overview. In the following Chapter 3, Özerdem and Rufini trace the background to the humanitarian principles which underpin development work and, discussing their meaning, assess how effective they can be in guiding humanitarian work in the current environment of war affected areas. They start by exploring the context in which contemporary humanitarian work is carried out, secondly they examine the core values of humanitarianism and thirdly they analyse the challenges of ‘new humanitarianism’ in the post-Cold War context before finally discussing the way ahead for the implementation of these principles in field work. Chapter 4 (Barakat, Connolly and Large ) uses a particular case study to examine the role of third party facilitation within the ‘mediation’ process in a low-intensity conflict, seeing it as an aspect of conflict resolution theory. Based on literature and

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field research it draws lessons from the process of joint dialogue in the Province of Aceh, Indonesia, as facilitated by the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) and focuses in particular on the effectiveness of using a ‘negotiated access for humanitarian aid’ strategy, in the form of the Humanitarian Pause, as a means of achieving sustainable solutions to conflict. The importance and difficulties of developing effective aid coordination structures are the subject of Chapter 5. Here Strand draws on research from a PhD research project to discuss in some detail the coordination arrangements that have existed, in Afghanistan, since 1986. An analysis of that case reveals how disparate the coordination structure may become as a result of a combination of structural and contextual issues. It suggests possible ways of ensuring a more effective coordination of humanitarian assistance, while also questioning how realistic current expectations are in terms of what is achievable in the field. The outcome is a more precise definition of what coordination is, based on a review of existing international coordination structures. Jones in Chapter 6 argues that to understand the role the economy plays during times of conflict and reconstruction, it is necessary to appreciate the relationship between pre war poverty and conflict, the economic effect of war on an economy and the approaches to economic reconstruction. He therefore examines three critical areas: the role of the pre war economy as a catalyst for the conflict; the impact of war on an economy at the micro and macro levels and associated flight of the displaced; the role of post war economic reconstruction which in the case of fragile less-developed countries has to be centred on poverty reduction. As in previous chapters the analysis emerges from the study of a particular case. The author focuses on Rwanda as the main example of the economics of war and approaches to post conflict poverty reduction. In Chapter 7 Deely presents an overview of the impact of war on health and health systems, and examines three major challenges faced by low-income, conflictaffected countries in attempting to restore public services. The first challenge is how to secure the large-scale international assistance that is needed for rebuilding and recovery. Following on from this the second challenge is how, in the short-term, to scale up services to meet the needs of under resourced populations. The final challenge is how to sustain these services in the long term. As a result of research carried out in Afghanistan Surkhe and Strand in Chapter 8 assert that there can be no single recipe for what are commonly called “peacebuilding strategies”. Rather, they suggest that there are at least three major types of situations which in turn utilise at least three different recipes for peacebuilding. In their analysis they develop the Afghan case as an example of one of these and as a contribution to typological analysis they view the Afghan case through a comparative lens. The purpose is to explain the progress and shortcomings of the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan, while discouraging

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comparisons with situations that are not comparable and offering the outlines of a category of peacebuilding situations “of the Afghan kind”. Zetter in Chapter 9 assesses the nature of the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction of the built environment, in three main sections. The first provides an overview and diagnosis of the limitations of current practice. Building on this review, the next section considers the guiding principles and strategies for the post conflict reconstruction of the built environment, whilst the last section examines operational practices. A key theme is that physical reconstruction is not just an end in itself, but is an integral part of the international community’s wider objective of post-conflict reconstruction of societies devastated by war. This recognises the complex relationships between the reconstruction of the built environment, the legal frameworks and institutional procedures which underpin this process and the wider political and economic objectives which guide post-war reconstruction programmes at the policy and international level. In Chapter 10, Barakat and Chard emphasise the central assertion of this volume, that post-war reconstruction is essentially a developmental process requiring longterm commitment and investment in building national capacity. The requirement to restore and build the capacity of people and institutions is, they stress, the number one priority in every post-conflict situation and this view has been adopted, at least rhetorically, by all the major international institutions. However, the reality is that the actual response on the ground is still dominated by a culture of ‘relief ’ and short-term perspectives. The authors, again by means of a case study, examine the institutional culture and practices that stand in the way of putting development ideas into practice in war-torn countries. Evans (Chapter 11) then examines the issue of reconstructing and developing the institutions of public administration in states emerging from conflict, starting from three key assumptions: that effective public administration is essential for recovery; that it is the indigenous civil service that must lead that process; that it must work in a framework of collaborative governance at local regional and national levels, with other national and international stakeholders. He then looks at major obstacles to reconstruction and the way that they have been tackled in particular cases, concluding with a set of hypotheses for good post-war practice in public administration. In the following Chapter 12, Barakat and Deely continue to make the case that what societies that have suffered war need, is long-term commitment. Taking the example of health service provision, they tackle the issue of the transition between short-term projects and rehabilitation assistance. Rehabilitation theory, they point out, suggests that during this transition humanitarian agencies should provide ongoing assistance to the affected population pending the restoration of appropriate services. However, the point is made that the provision of aid has to be carefully timed and matched to local needs so that it can be absorbed into the

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economy at a time when it can be of maximum benefit. Drawing on empirical research in Puntland, Somalia, the authors conclude that the key to bridging the gap between relief and rehabilitation lies in awareness of local needs and this involves aid agencies sharing the responsibility with local communities and allowing them to come up with solutions that suit their needs and match their collective resources. Creating a secure and stable environment in which reconstruction can take place is seen by Barakat and Özerdem in Chapter 13 as a necessary condition for the successful implementation of peacebuilding programmes. They also point out that the task of peacebuilding is a long-term process embracing various security related programmes including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, the restoration of internal security and the rule of law. They explore this in the context of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Kosovo by focusing on the relationship between reintegration and peacebuilding, examining demographic and employment data, looking at the reintegration process from a human resource development perspective and finally setting out the regional implications of this process. The final chapter asserts again the key conclusions that have emerged from a decade of academic and empirical research in the field of post-war reconstruction: the overriding importance of including local people in the equation; the inevitable failures that result from ‘short-termism’ and the we can ‘fix-it’ mentality. In order to illustrate the comprehensive approach evident throughout the book, which is also very much the hallmark of PRDU philosophy and practice, I have used the concept of seven foundational pillars for reconstruction, namely, ‘vision’; ‘participation’; ‘security’; ‘reconciliation and justice’; ‘equity’; ‘reconstruction and development’ and ‘capacity to reconstruct’, emphasising their synergy and the need for collaborative effort for the restoration of war-torn countries.

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1 POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT: COMING OF AGE Sultan Barakat

Post-war Reconstruction and Development – the emergence of a discipline Post-war (or the more euphemistic ‘post-conflict’) reconstruction has only recently been articulated as an important concept in international discourse, even though wars and the reconstruction after wars have been a constant of human history. The last decade, saw concepts of post-war recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction becoming increasingly the focus of international organisations, governments and NGOs, as well as becoming an important area for research and academic study. This new focus is not only at the level of political discourse but is rapidly being institutionalised as new administrative structures have sprung up in the international and governmental institutions of the world charged with addressing the particular problems perceived to be characteristic of the aftermath of conflict.1 Committing specific resources to the management of post-war recovery and development in this way suggests that it is part of a wider strategic agenda, beyond the familiar territories of humanitarianism and development. In fact, the reconstruction of nations post-conflict is now recognised as a key element in achieving global stability, security and the eradication of poverty in the 21st century. This dramatic turnaround in the profile and importance of post-war reconstruction can be attributed to a concatenation of events: First, there was the perception that the wars of the post-Cold War era, many of them ethno-national in character, were in someway new and deserving of specialist attention, interdiction and amelioration.2 The novelty of many of these conflicts is often overstated, but the perception of novelty persists. Certainly the problems prompted by these wars were complex, but the persistence of those problems, and their high visibility, due to access and media advances, was perhaps equally significant. Secondly, the sheer number of post-conflict situations has been dramatic; with nearly sixty separate conflict terminations in the 1989–2000 period alone (Mac Ginty, 2003). Although in reality many of those conflicts never achieved a complete closure.3 A third factor is the

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cumulative body of knowledge and lessons learned by international organisations, UN and bilateral agencies, national governments and non-governmental organisations following their involvement in a range of post-war scenarios from the 1990s onwards. For all actors and organisations, this has been a steep learning curve.4 Mistakes were made and glaring deficiencies and oversights identified. There has been a growing awareness that aid and relief interventions in the context of conflict have the potential to do great harm as well as good (Anderson, 1996). Finally, and probably most importantly, the events of 9-11 made the linkages between war, terrorism, poverty, culture and religion seem axiomatic to many commentators, with ‘reconstruction’ offering a way forward. Thus introducing the latest twist in post-war reconstruction discourse. Contrary to the expectation that the use of military force and therefore military expenditure would decrease after the end of the Cold War, both have increased (Darby and MacGinty, 2003) and a new United States (US) led doctrine of addressing security threats by pre-emptive military action has emerged. The perception that the international system was once more a state of nature characterized by profound insecurity increasingly dominated the mindsets of US policy-makers, commentators and citizens who began to advocate pre-emptive interventions in unstable environments which were seen to threaten the interests and security of western powers. In both, Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the US and its allies appear to have appropriated the concept of post-war reconstruction as the ‘humanitarian’ justification for war. Therefore, matching their pre-emptive military action policy with a pre-emptive approach to post-war reconstruction, initiated under the auspices of an occupying military force in the context of continuing conflict and resistance in an attempt to ‘deconstruct to reconstruct’. Their thinking seems to be that while unilateral military action may deliver short-term security to the US and certain western interests, it is likely to create long-term instability in the international system.5 The argument is then that, in contrast, an invasion accompanied by a reconstruction commitment, could lead to a more legitimate and sustainable peace through a humanitarian emphasis on improving livelihoods and the introduction of democracy. The reality however, has been that the enormous capacity to wage war was never matched by a similar will and capacity to reconstruct.6 The overall objective was often ‘regime change’ motivated by a pragmatic desire to get things fixed quickly. This points to a lack of understanding of what reconstruction requires, as more often the proposed plans to reconstruct tended not to be based on study and reflection of how societies work, how capacities can be improved and an appreciation of the time needed to bring about substantive change through the involvement of national actors despite the declared rhetoric: “Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We

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established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home. There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. The nation of Iraq with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.”7 The purpose of this chapter is to provide an illustration of some key milestones that reflect the changing nature of the debate surrounding post-war reconstruction as it has evolved from the aftermath of World War II to the present. It will also highlight the way post-war reconstruction related to changing characteristics of development aid. The absolute physical devastation of Europe during the Second World War provided an opportunity for the United States to emerge as a superpower. This marked a historic shift in geopolitical power, as the United States was able to play a central role in the reconstruction of Europe. The continued growth of the US economy, together with the collapse of the Soviet Empire symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, has increased her global dominance. Today, Afghanistan and Iraq’s future, like that of Europe in the 1940s, is closely entwined with America’s geopolitical agenda. Hence it is unsurprising that the last 60 years, which have marked America’s rise to superpower status in international affairs, is the focus of this chapter. The chapter begins by providing a working definition of post-war reconstruction and then considers our understanding of the origins and nature of armed conflict and approaches to aiding reconstruction. A review of the historical development of reconstruction as a distinct arena of activity and study follows highlighting three critical historical conjunctures during the twentieth century which have had an enormous influence on subsequent reconstruction efforts: the aftermath of World War II, the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11 2001. Each critical conjuncture marks a shift in geopolitical power, impacting profoundly on international as well as domestic relations and facilitating immense humanitarian challenges in what have constituted violent phases in human history. Defining Post-War Reconstruction Until recently, if you were to say that your field of interest was the study of postwar reconstruction, people would assume that you were a historian and your major intellectual concern was with the reconstruction of Europe at the end of World War II. It has only been in recent history with the media spotlight on the Iraq War, that post-war reconstruction has been associated with contemporary conflicts. But what of the many violent conflicts which have been fought since World War II? How did those nations recover from war? Why has the aftermath of theses conflicts not warranted the same amount of academic attention or analysis?8 The truth is that while conflict itself has been the focus of much academic

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study, the question of recovering from the destruction that accompanies war is an area that has been largely neglected by researchers.9 The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies is infinitely more difficult and complex than is generally recognised. The challenges of ‘normal’ development processes in countries emerging from conflict are amplified by the legacy of the conflict (including: physical destruction, lack of financial institutions, material and human resources, institutional fragility, political volatility, psycho-social trauma). These problems are often compounded by the simultaneous challenges of humanitarian relief and the absence of security. Societies emerging from war face a range of urgent, inter-connected problems on all fronts, not too dissimilar to situations of natural disasters. However, it is the destruction of relationships, including the loss of trust, dignity, confidence and faith in others that proves the most far reaching, potent and destructive problem and the most difficult to address. It has the potential to undermine possible solutions to a wide range of other issues: technical; economic; political; security; and, humanitarian challenges. There is a notable amount of imprecision when it comes to the terminology to describe the process of rebuilding war-torn societies. Post-war reconstruction, recovery, rehabilitation, peacebuilding, and development are often used interchangeably, and differentiating between these terms is very difficult. The World Bank defines Post-conflict reconstruction in terms of what it aims to achieve. Thus for the Bank – reconstruction has ‘… two overall objectives: to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social development’ (World Bank, 1998:4). And this, the World Bank suggests, can be achieved by ‘…investment in key productive sectors’; ‘good governance’; ‘repair[ing] physical infrastructure’; ‘rebuild[ing]… key social infrastructure’; and, ‘normaliz[ing] financial borrowing arrangements’ (World Bank, ibid:4–5). The UN’s description of peacebuilding activities is somehow different: …disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring of elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:11). The real variation between these two definitions is the World Bank’s emphasis on assisting economic recovery and normalisation, whereas the UN emphasises the importance of political reform. Often, the direct use of the term reconstruction is avoided, as some commentators have suggested that it implies the restoration of what existed in the pre-war society, when it is often the pre-war systems or lack thereof which contributed to the conflict in the first place (Kumar, 1997:2). Nevertheless, it has also been suggested that post-war reconstruction is something more often initiated by the war-affected community, whereas peacebuilding ‘is biased towards external interventions’ and ‘the development of a fragmented,

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“quick fix” and ad hoc approach to war-torn societies’. In short, there are as many different definitions as there are facets to this multi-disciplinary process: political theories of reconstruction tend to emphasise the importance of institutions for physical security and stability; economic theories with their belief in the importance of financial security take a more developmental approach; religious or humanitarian theories of reconstruction focus more on people and their capacity to survive, reconcile and forgive. An overarching definition has to incorporate all of these theories. As a starting point to this discussion, we have taken post-war reconstruction to mean a range of holistic activities in an integrated process designed not only to reactivate economic and social development but at the same time to create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence. In this sense, reconstruction can be distinguished for its corrective dimension in righting wrongs and addressing vulnerabilities, while maintaining the focus on the future. To achieve these objectives post-war reconstruction has to address the following issues. Firstly, it has to be grounded in supporting conflict affected communities to organise themselves and start to regain control over their own environment as soon as possible, by participating in the provision of aid, restoration of livelihoods and the improvement of services. Secondly, it has to be developed on the basis of a clear understanding of the underlying causes of conflict, which may be objective conditions, such as economic decline resulting from a collapse of commodity prices in world markets leading to poverty; or subjective causes, which are the result of internal human relations in the society, such as the distribution of resources between different social groups, which over time are transformed into perceptions of difference, so that the conflict is subjectively ‘reconstructed’ as an ethnic or religious conflict. These are the perceptions which belligerents may have about the conflict at a given point in time, which constitute the ‘medium’ through which the conflict is carried out, but rarely explain its origins. Nevertheless, a successful reconstruction strategy that aims to prevent a relapse into violence should be able to recognise the difference between causes and perceptions and address them accordingly. Furthermore, it is essential to recognise that the length and intensity of the violence may not only change the nature and course of the conflict, but could also affect the course of the reconstruction process in the aftermath of conflict.10 Thirdly, it is crucial to recognise that the creation of an effective reconstruction process involves the establishment of a shared vision that transcends the complex technical and administrative process of responding to urgent needs. Of course, for a reconstruction vision to be effective in mobilising people it has to be shared amongst all stakeholders and be locally rooted. However, for people to feel ownership, the vision has to start by addressing the root cause of the problem and what they see as their needs. In this respect, it is important to acknowledge that unresolved power struggles often remain in the aftermath of war, especially where a ceasefire or ‘peace’ solution was externally imposed on an unfinished civil war. In the absence of a mature democratic system or an organised civil society, elections rarely resolve such situations, or lead to sustainable power-sharing arrangements.

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The problems of fragile relationships between people and institutions are related to and compounded by unclear, or unstable divisions of power, transitory political institutions and poorly developed civil society and civic culture. Furthermore, the chaos of war often destroys or discredits traditional social structures and authorities, whilst new political structures may remain fragile, as often new authorities lack legitimacy and credibility or are tarnished by perceived links to partisan interests. Fourth, post-conflict brings with it unrealistically high expectations by the people, in direct contrast to the low capacity of the state to deliver and the likelihood is disillusionment with a corresponding diminution in the credibility of the state making the peace dividend hard to realise as far as the individual is concerned (Collier et al, 2003). Meanwhile, emerging social groups who due to war circumstance have become politically sensitised and aware, such as ex-combatants and their leaders, returning refugees, Diaspora returnees etc., tend to exercise a politicising impact on the local scene. As a result, the highly politicised context leaves few neutral or impartial spaces for political dialogue to take place and for sustainable, pluralistic post-war political systems to develop. Finally, it is critical to recognise that post-war reconstruction, is fundamentally a development challenge. However, it is not just about national ‘economic growth’ employing liberal market strategies, as the World Bank and other Financial Institutions have the tendency to advocate. Such an emphasis can often lead to extra pressure on emerging societies with privatisation and restructuring resulting in large job loses and wider grievances, at a time when reconstruction should be creating hope through delivering tangible benefits to individuals and their communities. Reconstruction as a developmental challenge is about addressing the micro level needs of communities (health, education, environment, employment and political participation) within a macro national strategy driven by the need to reinforce peace as much as by the need to induce growth. In other words, the concept of focusing reconstruction on achieving national economic growth, while assuming that NGOs and humanitarian assistance will provide a safety net, for the vulnerable, is fundamentally flawed. Having said that, one should recognise that there are many situations today (Somalia, Southern Sudan, Liberia) in which protracted conflict has existed for so long it has become normative, with little collective-memory of the pre-conflict phase. In such a context, reconstruction cannot simply replace humanitarian assistance, or take societies back to what existed before the war started. Continual adaptation and trade offs between reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to an ever-changing environment is necessary. The dislocations that usually occur during conflict may be so fundamental that an even greater adaptive capability is required. Based on the above understanding of the complexity involved in post-war reconstruction, the planning and implementation of reconstruction should take place at various levels according to the perception of the causes of destruction and violence. However, what really matters is not just what reconstruction is able to deliver but ‘how’ it is able to deliver and ‘when’, because ultimately, reconstruction is the achievement of a state of mind reached through a process of community empowerment.

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Aiding Reconstruction: from Berlin to Baghdad In order to better understand the concept of post-war reconstruction it is important to provide a historical perspective that traces continuities and discontinuities in post-war practice. Aid, in the form of financial or material assistance to afflicted peoples in other regions has occurred throughout history. However, it first became evident in modern times as a component of colonial expansion and consolidation in what could have been termed reconstruction, though it was never defined as such since there was no recognition at that time of the destructive effects of colonialism. On the contrary, colonialism was popularly regarded as bringing the benefits of civilization to more primitive peoples. Indeed, colonisation was often advocated to government as its philanthropic duty by the very middle class interests that were also taking advantage of the development of new markets and secure access to cheap raw materials and labour. Colonisation in Livingstone’s day was very much about advancing the ‘three Cs’: Commerce, Civilisation and Christianity, (Pakenham, 1990). It was firmly believed that the key to bringing non-Western peoples out of their perceived ‘backwardness’ was to start them on the road to ‘modern’ development through the application of economic and fiscal measures, which would ultimately lead to a society founded on the ‘Western’ model. It was this worldview that gave rise to a concept of development that was to dominate aid interventions in the next decades, (Todaro, 2000). This strict association of aid with long-term national self-interest explains why the victorious powers following the First World War, did not see the need to reconstruct the defeated enemy, Germany, in the interests of world stability, but rather demanded ‘reparations’ to enable their own recovery and as a form of ‘punishment’ for the ‘aggressor’.11 This philosophy of aid in support of strictly national and metropolitan interest was as Abbot (1971) confirmed exemplified in the United Kingdom’s Development Aid Act of 1929, which gave preferential treatment to Britain’s own colonial possessions while protecting its domestic market and military interests. It was only in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the industrialisation of warfare and the magnitude of continental destruction provided a reconstruction challenge on an unprecedented scale, that post-war reconstruction was first articulated as an academic concern.12 This reflected a crucial change of perspective in the development of reconstruction activities, which was led by the United States as it sought to consolidate its dominant post-war position and further its global aims by reconstructing the international system in a way that would ensure political stability while promoting a liberal economic world order (Chomsky 1999; Waters, 2001; Wallerstein, 2003). This was the doctrine to inform post-war reconstruction practice as it evolved through the critical juncture of rebuilding Europe post World War II; reconstructing the emerging nation states after the processes of decolonisation, as well as the numerous ad hoc responses to natural disasters. Let’s briefly consider each of these in turn. The Reconstruction of Western Europe It was now considered imperative, by the newly dominant capitalist power, the US,

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to rebuild not only the infrastructure and economy, but also the political structure of Germany. This was in addition to the reconstruction assisstance the US gave its European allies, and is seen as the reason why post-war reconstruction as a concept has most often been associated with the reconstruction of Western Europe, and in particular the role of the Unites States.13 Even before the war had ended, the US had set about reconstructing the international system, promoting consensus on a series of political, economic and social arrangements through which it could ensure a stable post-war international order and the pursuit of its own global aims (Chomsky, 1999; Waters, 2001; Wallerstein, 2003). The outcome was a new liberal economic world order, based on formal agreement between the victors over regional spheres of influence. A number of institutions were created to govern these key arrangements: 1.

The creation of a financial system of liberal internationalism to foster long term international investment, maintain exchange rate stability, and deal with balance-of-payment problems, represented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – later the World Bank.14

2.

In 1945, the United Nations was set up by 51 states seeking to create an international system that would provide a set of enforceable norms to resolve disputes between states and prevent further conflict. It replaced the League of Nations.

3.

The division of the world at The Yalta Conference of February 1945, into spheres of influence amongst the victors, with Eastern and Central Europe assigned to the Soviet union; Western Europe to Britain, France and the USA; the Middle East, Africa, South and South-East Asia to Britain and France; and the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America to the USA.

The first thing that strikes one as remarkable about the reconstruction of Western Europe, was its scale. The industrialisation of warfare allowed for the destruction of civilian infrastructure on a massive scale. The amount of money, which was allocated to the reconstruction of Europe was also enormous. By the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952, the countries participating in the European Recovery Progamme had been allotted US$12.4 billion, almost 1.2 per cent of America’s GNP for 1948–1952 (Wexler, 1983:249).15 With the US’s GNP today standing at around US$9.5 trillion this would amount to US$113.6 billion in present day terms. This figure did not include the billions in loans, which were granted to Europeans between 1945 and 1947. As European recovery was not viewed simply as a challenge of physical reconstruction, but as providing the foundation of a politically stable Europe, the task was economic as well as social. Before the war was over, discussions were already underway in the US over the future of Germany (Kennan, 1968; Acheson,

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1969). The establishment of a financially stable and integrated Europe, not dissimilar to the United States, which would check the spread of Communism was central to the recovery plan (Hogan, 1987; Kindleberger, 1987; Wexler, 1983). In 1949 Kindleberger wrote that: Recovery is, first, a requirement of the development of German democracy in turn needed for peace in Europe; second a weapon against the Soviet Union, whether in competing for the favour of the Germans or in inducing the Russians to agree to a German settlement; third a contribution to the recovery of Western Europe and to the political stability of the Atlantic Community; and finally, a means of reducing the burden of the American tax payer. Planning for reconstruction after World War II was participatory, in the sense that all sixteen European states, which would receive assistance were also involved in its planning and implementation.16 In contrast to aid disbursement today, the European nations were relatively free in the way it was managed, however spending was conditional as the US insisted on: a commitment to maximum cooperation in measures of self-help and mutual aid among the Europeans themselves. But in addition, several specific obligations would have to be honoured. Foremost among these would be the reactivation of the most efficient existing productive facilities, so as to achieve the quickest possible expansion of output. Second the recipient countries would have to undertake internal financial and monetary measures to stabilize their currencies, maintain proper exchange rates, and restore confidence in their monetary systems. Third, the countries involved would have to pursue measures designed to facilitate the exchange of goods and services among themselves and to foster multilateral intra-European trade. And, finally, they would have to bind themselves – through a multilateral agreement – to a joint organization that would review the progress made by each and all on a continuous basis (Wexler, 1983:19–20). In summary, there are a number of observations that can be made about the reconstruction of Western Europe that we cannot necessarily make of other reconstruction efforts. Firstly, it was a huge effort, and a great deal of money was committed to Europe’s reconstruction. Secondly it attempted to be corrective, establishing political and economic stability between the European states. Thirdly, although it was dominated by the US, it was participatory. Fourthly, it wasn’t just about providing hand-outs, there was an element of self-help. Finally, the psychological importance of recovery was not overlooked. The Marshall Plan specifically targeted aid at projects which would be seen to lift the spirits of a depressed Europe (Gaddis,1992:210).

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The Post-war Reconstruction of Eastern Europe While Western Europe was emerging from its darkest hour, for many in Eastern Europe the worst was still to come. The absorption of the region into the Soviet sphere meant that rebuilding took place in the context of Stalinist state-building (Kenez, 1999:160–183;). All processes of post-war reconstruction have a political element, but in this case the reconstruction effort coincided with concerted attempts to recast a series of states across the region. The reconstruction of public buildings and public spaces, for example, provided an opportunity for their renaming in honour of pro-Soviet or pro-communist party figures and ideals. The peculiar qualities of post-war communism in turn left their mark on post-war reconstruction in Eastern Europe. Reconstruction was state-driven, centrally planned and often standardised (Barakat, 1993). While participatory in the sense that reconstruction was carried out in the name of ‘the people’, post-war reconstruction in Eastern Europe was mediated through the party and statist apparatuses rather than through the individual. However, the emphasis was on reindustrialisation. Moscow compelled Soviet occupied Eastern Europe to supply machinery and raw materials whilst Germany and former Nazi satellites (including Finland) made reparations to the Soviet Union. The Soviet people bore much of the cost of rebuilding because the reconstruction programme emphasized heavy industry while neglecting agriculture and consumer goods. By the time of Stalin’s death in 1953, steel production was twice its 1940 level, but the production of many consumer goods and foodstuffs was lower than it had been in the late 1920s. (Qualls 2000). The co-option of reconstruction into the highly political project of statebuilding afforded reconstruction a crusading quality that meant that the reconstruction task continued, rhetorically and symbolically at least, well after the war ended. As in Western Europe, the emphasis was often on large-scale ‘top-down’ reconstruction projects that were very much the preserve of urban and economic planners and often viewed narrowly, as a technical exercise of rebuilding from which the individual was excluded for the collective good. To some extent this approach has amounted to a double reconstruction as the Cold War came to an end. This can be symbolised by the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1991. The Bank was established to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In considering these two models of reconstruction it is important to note that, although the Marshall Plan has for the most part been exulted as a success story, it has also been blamed as a factor in the break down in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and as such was a contributory factor in starting the Cold War (Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, 2005). Moreover as McAuley (2000) and Kennedy (1987) confirm, it is often identified as a key contributory factor to British economic decline.

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Reconstruction after Decolonisation and the ‘Wars of Liberation’ The end of World War II marked a turning point for the colonial powers who were crippled financially and struggling to sustain their colonial administrations, while the US ‘had reached a stage where the continued growth of its economy depended on foreign expansion, on overseas market outlets for manufactures, on access to raw materials resources, and on investment opportunities around the world’ (Hoogvelt, 2001:33). The pressure therefore for decolonisation came both internally from the colonies as well as from the US and the nation state became the universal model of government (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002:46). The speed with which European powers retreated from empire in the two decades following the end of World War II is one of the most startling, yet somewhat under-studied, aspects of twentieth century history.17 Decolonisation, wars of liberation and civil wars all contributed to an increase in the number and diversity of states world-wide, as well as their potential instability.18 Post-war reconstruction in these contexts was often integrated into the nation-building project and was underpinned by a national populism geared to the achievement of particular development goals and supported by Official Development Assistance (ODA). Most of the countries, which experienced turbulent periods of decolonisation and violent post-colonial struggles were ‘underdeveloped’ countries. This time the US used the Truman Doctrine as a policy instrument similar to that of the Marshall Plan to shore up its allies and to prevent the spread of communism: Between 1945 and 1970, the USA in fact intervened militarily in Greece, Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Grenada and of course Vietnam. It was further involved in the destabilization of regimes in Turkey, Iran, Guatemala, Cambodia, South Korea, Lebanon, Laos, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Chile, Ghana, Zaire and Mali (Hoogvelt, 2001:34). Beleaguered by losses in Vietnam, increasing economic competition from Europe and Japan, and the consequent de facto collapse of the Gold Standard in 1968, the US instituted a major change in foreign policy. The 1969 Nixon Doctrine sought to delegate some of the responsibility for global containment of communism to US regional allies (Brazil, South Africa, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia). The new strategy also embraced multi-polar negotiation, instigating an important thawing of relations with both the Soviet Union and China. But a second Cold War was already brewing. The Soviet Union, confident in its newly found oil and gas wealth, and suspicious of the US-Chinese rapprochement and the US strategy of regionalisation, also changed tack, seizing on the opportunities presented by uprisings in Central and Southern Africa, Latin America and Yemen. It is interesting to note here that this wave of revolution, which began in the late sixties came as a result of growing disillusionment among those who had been excluded from the benefits of the post-war dividends. It exposed major fault-lines in the International Order. (Wallerstein, 2003:50). Up to now, the Cold War had involved direct or indirect confrontation between

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the US and China or the Soviet Union over contested territories; the Berlin Blockade, the Korea War, Vietnam. The ‘Second Cold War’ would be played out in the jungles and villages of Third World countries who had been excluded from the post-war order (Reifer & Sudler, 1996:27–8). By the end of the seventies, the US and the Soviet Union were fighting proxy conflicts in a host of developing countries, including Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Israel and Palestine, Iran, Somalia. Development assistance came most commonly in the form of loans, targeted at developing infrastructure and the adjustment of the local economy for export. These ‘structural adjustment loans’ were based on the premise that ‘the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market-democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-orientated economy’ (Paris, 1997:56). A belief based on a particular perception of the post-war Marshall plan, that wealthy states simply by allocating a proportion of their GNP to development could bring about social change underpinned this approach.19 Moreover, it was also seen to be in the national interest of the donor to help ‘the free underdeveloped countries’ economically, creating ‘stable, effective and democratic societies’ as ‘the best promise of a favourable settlement of the Cold War’ (Millikan and Rostow cited in Ohlin, 1966:17). In the context of post-colonial development, however, it failed to include two essential elements of the Marshall Plan experience; participation and the promotion of self-reliance. Thus, while ostensibly recognising the former colonies as sovereign nation states, the discourse of overseas assistance remained essentially unchanged from the old colonial concept of tying notions of development to the donors’ strategic interests and bilateral aid was used as a lever to support the donor’s commercial or strategic interests, for example by procurement ties and mixed credit schemes used to stimulate donor export commodities. (ul-Haq, 1967). Not surprisingly less powerful and newly independent nations reacted defensively in the face of this exercise of power and the Cold War period saw the creation of regional associations with the aim of protecting their interests collectively. The formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, and the trans-continental Non-Aligned Movement in 1966 are two examples through which aid-recipient countries sought to protect their sovereignty and power of independent decision-making, while widening their economic options by enhancing mutual assistance and trade, (Adedeji 1999). However, this use of aid as a tool in the interventionist foreign policy of the Cold War cut both ways. On the one hand, it is true that the global contest between American and Soviet interests led to sustained involvement in recipient countries, which certainly compromised their sovereignty. Yet on the other hand, the ‘confrontation between the two systems provided space for developing countries to industrialise. It allowed, for example, the latter to play one side off against the other to obtain aid’ (Singh, 2002:298). As a result, where strategic interests were at stake, many such countries, were able to obtain more favourable lending terms than would have been the case if Western donors had acted from purely economic motives. In fact many would attribute the fact that the average economic growth within

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developing countries rose from 0.5 per cent (1900 to 1950) to 5.5 per cent (1950–1980), to the conditions of relative autonomy under which it was received and not just to the actual receipt of financial aid. . (Patel, 1992).20 So for developing states, this was very much the era of ‘master plans’, or centralised, state-wide plans. ‘Piecemeal’ reform was not in the vocabulary of development and the tendency to ‘think big’ had a long-lasting impact on those involved in post-war reconstruction.21 Since a number of states in the early decades of this era had considerable control over their own economies (for example, through the restriction of imports) this master planning was feasible and initially supported by aid partners. As time progressed, however, many donor countries began to be disappointed by the fact that this growth in macro-economic output did not result, as they had expected, in any noticeable reduction in world poverty. There was an inherent contradiction in basing aid policies on a combination of strategic interests and the recipient economy’s perceived capacity for absorption. By pursuing this strategy, donors instead of channelling resources to those states, or populations in most need had been supporting the growth of middle level economies and the wealthier social strata, thus exacerbating the disparities in wealth within the developing world and fuelling the belief that aid programming was simply a new imperialism. It was at this point that the contradiction of the wealthy nations of the North expecting the poor nations of the South to progress towards ‘modernity’ while maintaining the unequal trade relations began to be exposed. Writers such as Dos Santos (1970) suggested, that as long as the developing countries’ role was to export raw materials without adding value, they would always be at a disadvantage when competing with economies based on the manufacture of finished goods. Others began to predict not social development but growing social unrest, and the emergence of ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ administrations (Huntington, 1968; O’Donnell, 1973). After the initial wave of decolonisation several post-colonial states required processes of reconstruction following war. However, the process of reconstruction for these states tended to be initiated by the state itself rather than by the international community. Algeria, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Vietnam, all provide examples in which reconstruction processes were mostly conducted on a single state basis, with each model of reconstruction differing according to the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the state. Iraq’s reconstruction of Basrah and Fao following its 1980–1988 war with Iran, for example, was highly idiosyncratic with strict deadlines, competition encouraged between the ministries implementing the reconstruction and a high symbolic value attached to reconstruction activities (Barakat, 1993). While such reconstruction was often highly efficient in terms of visible results and in its corporatist mobilisation of state resources, again the needs of the individual were subjugated to those of the state. So, for example, reconstruction in states with ethnic fissures was also prone to ethnic bias. Many of these authoritarian and ethnically biased forms of state were to prove unstable. As Hagopian (2000:891) puts it, ‘Development was now generally seen to

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proceed unevenly ...to be subject to reversal, and to permit the apparently indefinite coexistence of plural forms of social identification and political organisation’. The realisation that many large scale development projects initiated by donors through governments (but without regard for cultural appropriateness) had failed because recipient countries had little commitment to their success, also led aid programmers to question this approach to development. As a result, in the 1970s aid programmes shifted from a macro-economic to a ‘grass-roots’ approach and a focus on the poorest countries and populations, for whom aid increased from 4 to 20 per cent of the worldwide disbursement (Tomasevski, 1993:32). In addition to the developments described above, a series of ‘natural’ disasters in the 1960s and 1970s also had a seminal influence on approaches to post-war reconstruction and the general field of humanitarian intervention. These disasters hit hardest in the developing world, and evoked an immediate humanitarian response from the richer nations, whose aid agencies and publics readily acknowledged a duty to help. This willing involvement facilitated a process of learning to improve practice in marked contrast to the very ambivalent and cautious response to the disasters resulting from war, though there was a growing recognition that the impact of even these ‘natural’ disasters was often socially constructed (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989; Corbett, 1988). The sheer scale of humanitarian need from many of the disasters required organised and integrated ameliorative efforts.22 Both international organisations, and the rapidly growing phenomenon of private sector Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), responded. The seeming recurrence and regularity of natural disasters (a perception aided by developments in the news media) led to greater organisation on behalf of intervening agencies and increased sharing of information.23 Although it is still noteworthy that the development of best practice and institutional memory did not really begin until the 1990s.24 The experiences in post-disaster interventions in this period were significant because they resulted in some lessons being internalised (in the policy-making circles of many governments and in the NGO sector) that were to become key tenets of post-war reconstruction: the importance of encouraging participation and self-sustainability of local populations based on their pre-existing capacities and the recognition of the limited attention spans of western publics and governments and therefore the need for timely intervention (Moeller, 1999).25 The development of this new approach was largely led by the increasingly sophisticated and heterogeneous NGO sector (originating mainly from the global north), which developed from the 1960s onwards and was willing to act on initiative, and in many cases assume advocacy roles. However, it has to be said that despite the recognition of the importance of local participation in recovery after disasters, this was rarely fully achieved. Instead, the dominant dynamic was that of external expertise and capability helping internal victims. Local participation rarely extended beyond the co-option of local people (commonly viewed stereotypically as passive victims) in the implementation of plans devised by strangers. Another concept that gained ground in this period was that of

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humanitarianism as a neutral process, independent of a political agenda – particularly when in response to natural disasters. For example, the United States was able to offer support after Iran’s earthquakes precisely because the disasters were unrelated to the political regime. This and the recognition, in principle at least, of the importance of local participation, was to contribute to a growing perception that it wasn’t necessary to channel humanitarian intervention through the state and this trend was matched and to a large extent encouraged by significant developments in the economic policies of aid. As the Cold War drew to a close, a new economic approach emerged to replace the notion of the developmental state with a growing emphasis on the individual, market institutions and decentralised decision-making. Taking rational actor models as their starting point, writers such as Hayek (1988) argued that states did not act in the national interest. The logical conclusion of this observation was therefore to increase the role of other actors by abandoning the strategy of long-term development planning directed by the state and allowing free reign to the price mechanism as a more efficient means of distribution. The practical strategies for bringing this about involved the deregulation of markets and the privatisation of the public sector; a process that was to be primed by the targeted use of aid. Compliance with this new economic order was thus achieved through conditions attached to financial assistance at the level of both macro-economic policy and individual projects. Although the collapse of the terms of trade for developing countries and the consequent debt crisis in the early 1980s was largely triggered by the shift to monetarist policies led by the United States and was thus beyond the control of governments in developing nations, it nevertheless reinforced the donor perception of poor economic management by recipient governments (Singh, 1993). As a result, although aid donations by the top donors were by and large maintained or increased during the early 1980s, balance of payments deficits in recipient countries were used to legitimate the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (OECD, 1995), which significantly curtailed the autonomy of recipient governments. As the 1980s progressed, in the context of weakening Soviet influence following the catastrophic invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, New Right ideology gained in global influence through the growing power of the Bretton Woods Institutions and a discourse of development that now focussed on ‘government failures’ and ‘globalisation’, reinforcing the idea of by-passing rather than strengthening the state in pursuit of a single global economy. Reconstruction After the End of the Cold War The initial euphoria felt after the end of the Cold War was short lived. The stability produced by the permanent tension between the two Superpowers during the Cold War gave way in the post-Cold War era to a pervasive uncertainty and a much less predictable pattern of international relations. The limitations of the nation state as the principle unit of political organisation in this ‘New World Order’ were brought sharply into focus. A wave of conflict and state collapse swept through the Third World even as the Second World was being besieged by nationalist separatism after the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Hobsbawm, 1994).

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In the 1990s, governments and civil society groups at all levels looked beyond the nation state for a new paradigm that would explain the status of influx and the growing transnational problems. The explanation that was increasingly extended was that these phenomena were manifestations of a process now commonly referred to as ‘globalisation’. The interstate politics of the superpowers had tended to overshadow what was probably a more pressing problem – the early 1980s witnessed the largest number of civil wars in history (SIPRI, 2004). There were also more conflict terminations during this period; 56 conflicts ended between 1989–2000, ‘pointing to a critical mass of post-war situations’ (Mac Ginty, 2003:602). Throughout the Cold War strategic interest had dictated ODA policy for the US and USSR. With the Cold War over, the US no longer needed to shore up its allies in the developing world and so ODA decreased throughout the 1990s. Sadly, however, this decrease in ODA coincided with an increased humanitarian need26 not least because the benefits of the new global economy were confined to a small number of developed countries, while poverty, violence and repression became the lot of the world’s majority (Chomsky 1999:8; Duffield, 2001:48). Another consequence has been that an ever-increasing proportion of the casualties of modern wars have been civilians. While in the 1960s, civilian deaths accounted for 52 per cent of the total fatalities, by the early 1990s this had reached 92 per cent (Sivard, 1993:20). In 1993 alone there were over thirty civil wars around the world, which, by 1995 were causing suffering to over 36 million people (DateBah, 1996:3). However, it was the ‘ethnic’ wars in the Balkans that were to focus Western attention. Throughout the Cold War hot fighting never took place on the door steps of power, the proxy wars were always remote to the US, Europe and the Soviets. Civil wars, by their very nature, exact a terrible toll on the civilian population. Massacre, ethnic cleansing, and the use of child soldiers was nothing new, nor was the targeting of the cultural heritage, but when it took place in Europe where Western Europeans regularly took their holidays, war was personalised.27 There was a fear that somehow these ethnic wars were ‘new’ and that they marked the beginning of a new era of global ethnic unrest (Kaldor, 1999). A significant factor in this new perception was that warfare in the 1990s was generally a great deal more visible than it had been during the Cold War. While this was particularly true within those parts of the world that had been under the Soviet sphere, increased visibility was also due to the development of digital and satellite technology, which allowed live transmission from some of the most inaccessible places in the world. Intervening in the Conflict-Affected Context The focus of media attention on the human cost of modern warfare combined with the rise in influence of the non-governmental sector, with considerable increases in private contributions since 1987, has been a significant factor over the last ten years in shifting debates over aid, development and sovereignty to a consideration of conflict-affected societies. In particular, the right to override sovereignty to

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intervene in the interest of security (seen to encompass strategic, economic and human rights interests) has been strongly asserted in a rhetoric that is reminiscent of the colonial ‘civilising mission’. Hill (1996) cites that reconstruction in the postcold war has followed one of three models: First, the Capitalist Model – encouraging investment: When peace arrives and reconstruction begins, the goals of the reconstruction process are in the simplest terms an economy, which is both stable and vital. Investment occurs only when there is stability and stability increases with investment. Stability is assured through a process by which a wide spectrum of entrepreneurial interests, including the less affluent, are allowed to participate in and influence the process. Most western aid agencies consider the capitalist model the only acceptable approach. Second, the Merchant State models: Scarcity in the war economy can enrich those who control access to resources. With the advent of peace, the control over movement and enforced scarcity diminishes. The agenda of the war commanders is to maintain their monopolisation on commercial activities. Third, Command-economy: A third model is the communist or socialist model – now much out of favour, but which still holds some credibility in societies where there remains a wide disparity in incomes and the party in power is tied ideologically to the concept of state control and reducing the income disparity. Three different but not always mutually exclusive approaches to tackling the issues raised by conflict can be discerned in this debate. The first, commonly adopted by major donors, the IMF and the World Bank, can be termed the traditionalist approach. Until recently, these organisations took the view that programmes of reconstruction and development could not be undertaken in areas affected by conflict although in states partially affected by organised violence, donor-led initiatives might continue in some regions and not others. This had the negative effect of increasing internal disparities, which were often contributory factors to the conflict in the first place. More than that, since such programmes tend to operate closely with state structures, they are often regarded as pro-government and therefore partial. Although the catastrophic crises of ‘failed states’ and the growing terrorism of the 1990s have prompted a shift from this policy amongst most of the major multilateral donors, the World Bank, (aside from its special Postconflict Fund mentioned above) still positions itself firmly outside the category of organisations working within the fields of relief, emergency aid, security enhancement and advocacy (The World Bank, 1998:20). The second humanitarian approach, which is the one most commonly adopted by UN agencies and medium-sized bilateral donors, has its roots in disaster response practice discussed above and has as its key objective the alleviation of suffering during and immediately after war or violent conflict and where possible to work through state agencies to initiate reconstruction programmes. This strategy is based on the concept of what has been called ‘the relief-to-development’ continuum (Macrae et al, 1997:225) which assumes a teleological progression from a crisis situation, through a process of rehabilitation to long-term social development. Reconstruction assistance is also typically offered to both protagonists as a means of conflict management (UNDP, 1995). However, the danger of this approach is that is that it tends to antagonise more hard-line elements of all sides involved in the conflict. (Ofstad, 2002;4)

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In fact this issue of neutrality, a cherished principle of humanitarian disaster relief, has proved a fundamental problem for both the traditionalist and humanitarian approaches to intervention in conflict. For the traditionalist the difficulty of maintaining impartiality in a conflict situation has been the justification for nonintervention. The archetypal exponent of the alternative humanitarian strategy, the ICRC, bound by the Geneva Conventions of 1864, also believes that intervention can only be justified in conditions of complete neutrality but advocates intervention ‘...during a conflict as long as they apply equal terms to all warring sides’ (Fox, 2001:277). This has resulted in situations such as that in Kosova, where in order to initiate reconstruction programmes for victims of Serbian expansionism the ICRC was obliged to decline to give evidence at the subsequent war crimes tribunal. Over the last ten years the notion of neutrality has become increasingly problematic. As NGOs were encouraged to assume greater responsibility for humanitarian action in the post-cold war era (Macrae & Leader, 2001) some, facing the horrific impact of violent conflict on civilian populations, questioned whether aid could in fact be neutral. Concerned with criticism that reconstruction efforts may have helped to perpetuate civil wars, agencies such as African Rights have suggested that such initiatives should be explicitly offered or withheld in order to bring a conflict to the speediest possible conclusion (de Waal, 1997). The Canadian organisation, CIDA, went further and shifted their support away from governmental institutions and towards organisations primarily concerned with the protection of human rights (Ofstad, 2002:4–5). This third approach to post-war reconstruction which can be termed new humanitarianism, is one which views ‘the search for a completely neutral humanitarian space [as] …ultimately futile’ (Omaar and De Waal, 1995) and constitutes the planning of interventions on an explicit human rights agenda, which challenges neutrality and conflicts with sovereignty by using the allocation of resources as ‘a tool to promote peace and justice’ (Fox, 2001:277). Such ‘principled’ aid, as the UK’s Overseas Development Institute calls it, has also been built into the conditionalities imposed by large-scale donors as part of a ‘coherent’ political strategy for reconstruction efforts during and following complex emergencies (Duffield, Curtis & Macrae, 2001:271). However, applying value-laden criteria in the allocation of aid is proving to be just as problematic as espousing neutrality, especially when reconstruction efforts are initiated from outside the conflict-affected situation without a comprehensive understanding of domestic issues (Barakat et al, 2002). For example, the way that the many effects of violent conflict such as forced migration or mobilisation, destruction of infrastructure, the breakdown in family and social relations, interruption of education and health services, weakening or breakdown in public institutions, collapse of all but informal unregulated commerce and employment, diversion of remaining resources to fund the war effort and so on, interact to affect the functioning of a society’s economy is rarely given much consideration in the design of post-war economic strategies, which are invariably the work of external agencies. In the same way, little attention is paid to the way that the impact of conflict on

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the economy in both private and public sectors produces different outcomes for different groups in the society. Women, for instance, are generally disproportionately afflicted, but remain under-emphasised in studies of conflictaffected societies (Date-Bah, 2001). This is partly due to the fact that women’s contribution to the economic dynamics of the conflict is frequently underestimated. In Guatemala, for instance, the use of statistics, which define women’s agricultural work as an extension of their ‘domestic’ duties has led to an incorrect assessment of the war’s economic impact on the rural community (Loughna & Vicente, 2000:23). This approach has also helped to reinforce the false generalisation that women are always passive victims of male aggression. For example in Afghanistan, not only do women play a key role in combatant morale and organisation, they are also often obliged to feed, house and move their families alone (Atmar, Barakat & Strand, 1998). Politicisation has further complicated the relationship between international organisations and local employees. As Barakat and Kapisazovic (2003) have shown, perceptions of neo-colonialism derived from the moral rhetoric of the international order, can reinforce a ‘them and us’ mentality on the part of domestically-recruited staff and this is often worsened by the in camera methods of donor decision-making. Finally, a lack of local knowledge can also lead to the very abuses that ‘principled’ aid seeks to avoid. It is becoming clear that hosting reconstruction assistance has become a key objective for armed groups seeking to perpetuate their role in a conflict (Le Billon et al, 2000) by claiming the role of development actors. Thus the presence of third party reconstruction programmes, can in effect exacerbate competition between belligerents and facilitate the diversion of local expenditure away from civil projects. The Maturing of Humanitarian Intervention As the real complexities of humanitarian intervention in conflict began to be appreciated, the 1990s was something of a ‘coming of age’ for humanitarian organisations. The use of humanitarian assistance as a weapon of war was perhaps the most demoralising realisation of this period. This was well documented in the Horn of Africa (Duffield, 1994; Prendergast, 1996). It was again observed after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Stockton, 1998). Relief and development agencies were urged to ‘do no harm’ and to ensure that their activities were not divisive (Anderson, 1996). There was increased uncertainty about what was the ‘right thing to do’ and an awareness of the dilemmas of aid provision and its unintended impact. Although there was a definite blurring between what was right, and wrong, the precepts of participation, empowerment, sustainability and capacity building found their way into the mission statements of many humanitarian organisations during the 1990s.28 There was a move towards increased accountability and best practice that led to a large number of humanitarian organisations signing up for codes of conduct.29 A further development during this time was recognition that development activities undertaken in conflict situations would only be successful if they were based on proper analysis of the dynamics of the conflict. (Goodhand &

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Hulme, 1999). There was also wider agreement that post-war situations deserved specialist attention and the development of case specific programming. For example, the World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and reconstruction Unit (1995), UNRISD’s War-Torn Societies Project (1994), the UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery 2001, and, the ILO’s Crisis Response and Reconstruction Unit. The 1990s also witnessed the increasing mainstreaming of the study of postwar reconstruction within the academic community and the development of a discourse on the subject. A number of academic programmes and research institutes dedicated to post-war planning and recovery have been established during the 1990s.30 Although much of the literature and commentary on the subject is casestudy based, generalisable lessons are emerging and a conscious process of identifying cross-context lessons is underway. Declining ODA and the Increased role of NGOs As ODA decreased and humanitarian need increased a major gap was created and this gap was filled by the ubiquitous NGO. The 1990s saw an explosion in the development and variety of NGO organisations (Smillie 1997). Many of these organisations had the advantages of flexibility and reflexivity lacking in international organisations and their agencies. This was in part due to the importance of the concept of sovereignty enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which prevents a member state from interfering in the affairs of another, whereas it is possible for a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) to ‘interfere’. While many NGOs displayed increasing levels of professionalism and adopted standard operating procedures based on accumulated experience from a variety of conflict zones, criticism has persisted of competition and rivalry between organisations, what has been described as the ‘subcontracting’ of NGOs and being partisan in their treatment of one group over another (Duffield, 1994:50). There was never an era in which aid was not political, but aid became particularly politicised during the 1990s as the motivations behind many Western government’s aid policies became clearer. In many instances it was primarily the donor state’s own security, which helps to explain, for instance, the massive differential in per capita aid to Iraq and Afghanistan.31 Following the security of the donor state, the protection of the donor economy was often a strong motivating factor, hence the linkage between aid and trade deals. Coming a poor third in terms of motivation was often humanitarianism and it is estimated that most donors ‘were channelling at least a quarter of their humanitarian assistance through NGOs’ (Development Initiatives, 2000 in Randel & German 2002:24). As a result, many NGOs became dependent on funds disbursed by states rather than privately raised funds and the strategies of a number of aid agencies became intimately linked with national aid policies, the most visible effect of this being the attention span devoted to particular crises. So for example, when the donor community’s funding priorities moved from Bosnia to Afghanistan the aid agencies followed, often regardless of actual need. Another function of the aid agencies’ acute financial dependency is the practice of reconstruction by project, in which reconstruction activities take the

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form of specific projects with strictly limited budgets and time periods. This development had advantages, not least the ability of projects to focus on the local level, but all too often the rigid adherence to the project cycle became the dominant factor in the reconstruction rather than the dictates of local need. A New Role for the United Nations Donors and the World Bank Having identified the importance of linking relief and development, in 1992 the UN published Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for Peace, which identified a more holistic approach to peace and security. Boutros-Ghali suggested that preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping should be supported by peacebuilding, which he defined as ‘actions to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (BoutrosGhali, 1992:11). The UNIDO conference of 1994 saw the UN agencies question their role in conflict. With increased humanitarian need created by the ending of some wars and the start of new wars the more relief orientated UN agencies, the UNHCR and UNICEF, saw their mandates expand as they took on more development orientated responsibilities in line with the dictum of linking relief and development. As Munro (2001:8) observes: Donors were pressed to think more expansively about their objectives: better ‘development’ can mitigate the need for emergency relief; better relief can contribute to development: better reconstruction can facilitate the transition between the two. In 1995 an International Colloquium on Post-conflict Reconstruction Strategies was held under the chairmanship of Dame Margaret Anstee. Peter Gudgeon, Senior Technical Adviser, Department for Development Support and Management Services in the UN Secretariat, Ben Hoffman, Director International Conflict Resolution, Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation and Sultan Barakat, PRDU were tasked with reporting and disseminating the findings, which were to prove influential. A number of UN agencies, already concerned to clarify their role in post-conflict, now recognised that post-war reconstruction required specialist attention and established units dedicated to post-war recovery. However, institutional jealousy led to intra-organisational competition rather than cooperation as each UN agency developed its own post-war competency. As a consequence the UN still lacks an integrated approach. The World Bank also reassessed its role in ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ in its annual meeting in 1995 and identified war as being the main obstacle to development at that time. It admitted that it had ‘addressed the special needs posed by civil conflicts on an ad hoc basis’ and that its operational policy drew on ‘(OP) 8.5, which was originally developed for reconstruction following natural disasters’ (World Bank 1998:x–xi). Meanwhile, the OECD also established a Task Force to focus on the linkages between conflict, peace and development co-operation, and the USAID ‘hosted a conference [in 1997] on post-conflict development’ (Munro, ibid:2). Thus, as the world approached the new millennium, its international

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institutions were still struggling to develop practical mechanisms to match their recognition of the complexities of post-war reconstruction. Reconstruction Post September 11 During the 1990s the US intervened in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo for humanitarian reasons. According to an opinion poll during the 1990s, Americans believed that ‘15–20 per cent of the budget goes to overseas assistance’ when the reality is closer to 0.25 per cent. Stoddard (2002:41) observes that, ‘Meanwhile, conservative interest groups and members of the government have encouraged the belief that American tax dollars are being sucked into a vortex of corrupt governments in the developing world’. President George W. Bush therefore pledged to reverse this perceived ‘trend’, by further cutting ODA, and focusing on more important domestic issues. The attack on the World Trade Centre, by suicide hijackers on 9-11-2001, forced him to totally reverse that policy. In retaliation for 9-11, Afghanistan became the centre of US attention. Having identified al-Qaida as the perpetrators of the attacks, the US demanded that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan hand over Osama bin Laden,32 al-Qaida’s leader, and close down al-Qaida’s training camps. A ‘war on terror’ was declared and the US and the UK began bombing Afghanistan. However, during the attacks on Afghanistan, British Prime Minster, Tony Blair, was already talking about the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan. At the Lord Mayor’s Banquet on November13 2001 he stated that: After the conflict, we must make good our promise to help bring in a broad-based Afghan government, representative of all peoples, including the Pushtoon and enable the reconstruction of that sorry land to take place. It is heartening that before the US and the UK had finished the Afghanistan offensive they were already thinking about the reconstruction effort, but the security imperative in this case was urgent. With an average life expectancy in 2001 of 43 and adult literacy at 36 per cent, Afghanistan’s insecurity made it a breeding ground for fundamentalism, and its porous borders allowed recruits easy access to the country. The disaster of 9-11 was the first time that America had been attacked at home since the bombing of Pearl Harbour in 1943, and Afghanistan was now seen as a direct threat to American security. But what of Afghanistan’s reconstruction effort thus far? The Centre on International Cooperation’s evaluation of Afghanistan’s reconstruction has highlighted several problems (Rubin et al., 2003:1). In the first 17 months of peace only US$191 million was spent on reconstruction out of the US$2.1 billion that had been pledged for the first 12 months and this disbursement was popularly perceived to be nowhere near enough to meet the needs of the Afghans. The evaluation highlighted a number of other typical reconstruction problems: a lack of security was seen as an impediment to reconstruction efforts; reconstruction should be conducted by indigenous staff and through indigenous mechanisms; donors and

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NGOs engaged in implementing recovery programmes need to make more effort to distribute resources fairly, and not only to the most accessible or visible; greater effort should be made to stay on track and monitor the progress of reconstruction. This critique of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan indicates that despite the lessons learned over the last 50 years, post-war reconstruction at its present level will be unexceptional in its failure to deliver peace and security to the Afghans. The latest stage in the development of the study and practice of post-war reconstruction came in the months leading to the March-April 2003 US-UK war on Iraq. Billed as a ‘pre-emptive war’, the United States in particular was keen to make the point that its war had a humanitarian motive and that the reconstruction of Iraq was an integral war aim. US military planners engaged in a ‘humanitarian mapping’ exercise in an attempt to minimise civilian casualties and damage to Iraq’s infrastructure (Abrams, 2003). A range of government departments and agencies were involved in extensive planning for humanitarian intervention in the envisioned post-Saddam Iraq. NGOs and private businesses, although not privy to military plans, were to take the lead role in Iraqi reconstruction. With stunning prescience, personnel were trained, supplies were pre-positioned and reconstruction contracts were awarded before the destruction began (Mac Ginty, 2003). The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq was significant in that it denoted that the US government had taken on-board the lessons of many other post-war situations. The extent of planning for the humanitarian and reconstruction situation in post-war Iraq suggested that key tenets of reconstruction had been internalised by the world’s remaining superpower. There was a recognition of the need to integrate reconstruction activities and the need to involve local people and allow them a sense of ownership of the reconstruction process. Policy-makers were at pains to stress that post-war reconstruction was to be regarded as a long-term endeavour (Fliescher, 2003). However, critics were quick to point out that pre-war reconstruction contravened the basic operating principles of humanitarian intervention in that it was based on presumed rather than assessed needs. Moreover, the very fact that such plans were drawn up in Washington risked ignoring local input. The primary role of the US military in reconstruction planning led to criticism of the further militarisation and securitisation of humanitarianism and thus the undermining of the ideas of neutrality and impartiality that many NGOs relied upon in the field. (Duffield, 2001). Critics suggested that the US pre-war emphasis on post-war reconstruction was a cynical attempt to deflect criticism of an aggressive war, using concern about reconstruction as a moral balm. While other critics depicted US prewar reconstruction as yet another step in efforts to sanitise warfare, and echoed previous criticisms of the wars in Iraq in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999 as presenting a wholly spurious picture of conflict as an anti-septic non-destructive activity ( Ignatieff, 2003). The post-war scenario has been somewhat different from the pre-war vision, which took no account of how the military intervention would interact with Iraqi society in all its aspects and different actors, beyond the military dictatorship. And so, despite having declared the Iraq War won, British and American armed forces

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continue to come under attack and by blurring the lines between humanitarianism and militarism, aid organisations have also come under attack. By fighting the ‘war on terror’ in Iraq, the US and British have not only successfully collapsed a state, they have also opened up a frontline where those who wish to fight for al-Qaida, for Jihad or simply against the interests of America and Britain, can now more easily attack what they see as legitimate, military targets. By basing reconstruction on the assumption that the intervener can see the needs of conflict-affected communities more clearly than local people, and so imposing reconstruction programmes devised in absentia they have ignored the complexities of the indigenous social order, the dynamics of the conflict itself, and the very local coping mechanisms and surviving institutional capacities, which might guarantee success in building a peaceful and prosperous society. Conclusions and lessons Learned Three critical junctures have informed our understanding of post war reconstruction: the rebuilding of Europe after WWII, the rebuilding of war-torn societies in the wake of the Cold War and the newly emerging doctrine of preemptive reconstruction emanating from 9-11. There are a number of initial lessons that can be drawn, which are relevant for developing a vision for recovery and form/constitute common themes throughout this book. It is evident that there needs to be a vision that underpins the recovery process, the Marshall Plan had a vision of a financially stable and integrated Europe that would check the spread of communism. A vision, such as this, and the reconstruction process must meet the specific needs brought about as a direct consequence of the war and not merely consider the perceived needs of those allocated the task of implementing the vision. In other words, care must be taken when assessing the direct relevance and focus of reconstruction, in that it must be directed in such a way that it caters for the actual needs of the post-war culture. An example of reconstruction missing the mark, or its ideal goal was when Vietnam mounted its large-scale effort to reconstruct the country’s economy and human settlements ‘along the lines of the Soviet Union’s experience of reconstruction...’ This approach was perceived to be too rigid to be applicable to the post-war needs evident at that time, because the necessity for centralised decision making and the allocation of productive forces was not reflective of national and regional realities. Critically the roots of the vision for such reconstruction must be developing a consensus for post-war reconstruction along certain lines in the minds of the population during the war, as occurred in Germany prior to 1945, and must inculcate in the civilian population a national appreciation and enthusiasm for recovery. The participation of all stakeholders, which includes the reintegration of former protagonists as in Lebanon and Kosovo; the participation of national business; local NGOs; and, civil society is crucial as their involvement ensures relevance and a sense of ownership. Furthermore, involvement of national stakeholders, in the reconstruction process, is also seen as ensuring a significant degree of cultural relevance, which is vital if reconstruction is to succeed, otherwise

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its success may be limited. It is, for instance, felt that the limited effect of the reconstruction of Vietnam was due to inappropriate cultural understanding. With this scenario in mind it is vital that successful post-war reconstruction should target the root causes of conflict, so as not to recreate the pre-war conditions, some of which may have been a contributory factor to the conflict. Another key lesson learned is concerned with the involvement of the national government. Recovery and longer-term development will not be sustainable if the national government is bypassed by international efforts to impose reconstruction. There are similarities of approach to recovery even from diverse countries. For instance a key aspect of reconstruction in West Germany, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, South Korea and the Balkans was the need to ensure that economic growth occurred to sustain the other recovery strategies. This has been seen as a critical factor in easing the transition from the immediate pre-war recovery to longer term development. This also highlights the importance of linking relief and development strategies within the rubric of post-war reconstruction. There is evidence from recent research carried out by contributors to this book, that indicates that without this tangible improvement in livelihoods people’s receptive capacity for other recovery initiatives such as reconciliation is diminished. Hence the importance of re-establishing acceptable levels of public services such as health, education and water supply. However, as discussed economic growth alone should not be viewed as a panacea for recovery. Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan today point to another necessity for postwar recovery – stability. Efforts to ensure stability such as creating a secure environment and re-establishing the rule of law must be part of the total recovery package. In conclusion, two different influences are apparent, which at times conflict and at other times come together. The first is the strong relationship between the concepts and practice of development and of post-war reconstruction. As our understanding of what constitutes development has changed, so too has our approach to post-war reconstruction. This is the path that led the authors of this book to a concept of post-war reconstruction as a process of reactivation of development, which at the same time addresses the root causes of conflict to establish an environment of peaceful interaction and a shared vision of the future. A second powerful influence over how we view reconstruction after conflict, has been the changing nature of international and intranational conflicts themselves and how they have been perceived, particularly over the last 60 years encompassing the Second World War, the Cold War and the recent pre-emptive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq post September 11, as well as the explosion in civil wars in post-colonial states and after the break-up of the Soviet Union. As we follow the history of the response to post-war reconstruction in the aftermath of these conflicts, we can see clearly that the determining factor in how post-war reconstruction is undertaken – strategic interest – has not changed. There is, however, a growing perception that this same strategic self-interest might dictate a different approach to achieving long-term security by reducing vulnerability to conflict through integrated post-war reconstruction as a corrective

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measure but it has yet to be effectively translated into practice. The following chapters have been written to analyse this dilemma from a range of disciplinary perspectives that reflect the many facets of the post-war environment.

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2 CONTEMPORARY PEACE PROCESSES Roger Mac Ginty

It is commonplace to write off the post-Cold War period as one beset by seemingly endemic ethnonational conflict. Ethnic cleansing, genocide and war-induced dislocation have indeed left a heavy stain on the decade and a half following the collapse of the bi-polar world. Yet, the period also witnessed a significant number of peace processes and initiatives. Wallensteen and Sollenberg record that 56 civil wars ended between 1989–2000.1 In other words, a critical mass of peacemaking activity offers an opportunity to identify patterns, commonalities and differences in contemporary peacemaking activities. The sheer variety of peacemaking processes and initiatives – often time, place and context specific – complicates the task of generalisation. Yet, certain patterns are identifiable and this chapter presents an analytical overview of peacemaking processes in the post-Cold War period. The problem of peace Before examining contemporary peace processes, it may be worth considering the ultimate projected aim of peace initiatives: peace. The term ‘peace’ is used liberally (peace processes, peacebuilding, peace summit, peace accord etc) but often without any precise understanding of what it means. Serious analysis of what peace might actually ‘look like’, and therefore what must be aimed for, is beset with a number of difficulties. First, is the perception that peace is invariably seen as part of a pacificconflictual dyad. In other words, peace is interpreted solely in the context of war and is not regarded as a phenomenon possessing intrinsic qualities. This ‘peace as the absence of war’ syndrome means that the starting off point for scholars and practitioners alike is violent conflict rather than the ideal phenomenon of peace. Related to this is a second problem: the fluidity of the peace concept. Temptations to attach universal values to peace must be tempered by a recognition of the importance of context. While we may wish for ‘… a higher expected utility from peace than war …’, this higher expected utility can have no absolute values.2 The movement of a situation of serious political violence to a situation of slightly less violence can be taken as a marginal advance for peace but would not equate to a condition of peace. Moreover, the fluidity of peace means that it can have no endpoint. Conflict resolution may promise ‘solutions’ to conflicts, but as the riposte

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that ‘only chemists have solutions’ reminds us, peace and conflict are socially constructed, culturally embedded and dependent on human agency. According to Adler, peace is a ‘practice’ rather than a commodity.3 Galtung’s original conceptualisation of peace as positive and negative, subsequently rendered more comprehensible by others, served as a useful conceptual vehicle to draw out the nuances of peace.4 In this scheme, negative peace equated to the cessation of violent hostilities or the regulation of a conflict relationship. While overt physical violence may have ended, other political, social, economic and cultural factors that adversely affected human opportunities and quality of life may have persisted. Thus, for example, a ceasefire may have stopped attacks on a village by armed groups. But while spared direct violence, the villagers may be prone to structural violence in the form of disease, discrimination or the threat of future violence. Positive peace, on the other hand, is regarded as a much more holistic concept that takes account of the wider environmental conditions beyond the mere staunching of direct violence. A problem for many scholars and practitioners is that positive peace stretches the concept of peace beyond the limits of its elasticity, going far beyond a reaction to the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. But the concept of positive peace serves a useful function in underlining the importance of economic and social development in the prevention, promotion and cessation of (violent) conflict. Thus peace conferences, accords and processes can only go so far. What are needed are mechanisms, principles and embedded codes of behaviour that address the structural and underlying causes of conflict. A third problem with peace is the perception that it is dull.5 But that is precisely the point. Peace is, and should be, dull. It should be embedded in the prosaic reality of everyday life. In the optimal case peace is the facilitation of an environment in which human opportunity can be fulfilled in the absence of violence or the threat of violence. As a result, the sheer normalcy of peace may mean that it is taken for granted. Changing international context It seems easy to overlook the role of the Cold War in fundamentally shaping peace and conflict in the post-World War II period. The structure of international trade, the fixed nature of international boundaries, the ideological bearing of liberation movements and their opponents, and the sponsorship of governments and armed groups all owe an immense heritage to the Cold War. With the collapse of the Cold War the international situation was transformed, and with it the context for war and peacemaking. Six points on the changing international context are worth making at this juncture. First, the end of the Cold War led to an upsurge of ethnonational conflict, particularly with more assertive secessionist movements challenging state sovereignty. Between 1989–2002, 116 armed conflicts were recorded in 79 locations.6 Importantly, this was not the pandemic of ethnic ‘anarchy’ envisaged by Robert Kaplan and others.7 Instead, ethnonational conflict broke out in different areas with different levels of intensity and duration. In some ethnically tense areas, violent conflict was limited by internal restraint and timely external intervention.

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Just as there was more conflict per se in the post-Cold War period, ethnonational conflicts were more visible, with their visibility facilitated by an electronic communications revolution, greater access to war-affected areas for the journalistic and aid communities, interventionist third parties and the fact that a shooting war broke out in Europe (the Balkans). Second, the ideological alternative offered by the Soviet sphere was gone and its western counterpart no longer had to make an intellectual case to justify itself. Ideological baggage that had offered a smokescreen for imperialist, nationalist and liberationist projects across the developing world now seemed irrelevant and was unable to encumber peace initiatives. The discourse that marked post-Cold War peace initiatives often had a realistic and functional quality in keeping with the ‘postideological’ age. Third, the patronage offered to states in the developing world by the Cold War superpowers was quickly withdrawn as the geo-strategic situation altered. The oneway North-South traffic of soft loans, security guarantees and military assistance came to an end. Thus a number of already weak states became further weakened and their leaderships lost the ability to mollify key supporters and suppress opponents. The apartheid regime in South Africa, for example, found that the spectre of a communist threat was no longer a bankable asset in the United States. State weakness has been an enduring feature in post-Cold War conflict and peacemaking. A fourth international factor that shaped the post-Cold War context for peace and conflict was that the United States was now the world’s lone superpower.8 Its 1990s vacillations between adventurism and isolationism had an enormous effect on peacemaking. The US was the interventionist power of last – and very often only – resort. European Union interventions in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s required American steel to ensure finality. Robert Kagan notes, in relation to NATO airstrikes on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999: The United States flew the majority of missions, almost all of the precision-guided munitions dropped in Serbia and Kosovo were made in America, and the unmatched superiority of American technical intelligence-gathering capabilities meant that 99 per cent of the proposed targets came from American intelligence sources …. For Europe the depressing fact remained that because the Kosovo war was fought with American equipment, it was fought largely according to American doctrine.9 With an unrivalled war fighting capability and the ability to project its power in virtually every corner of the world, the political will of the United States became a key factor in international interventions. Issues that the United States deemed to be important came to have an enormous influence over the character of peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. Thus, for example, nation-building, early-warning, preventive diplomacy, democratisation, human rights and human trafficking all had their ‘day in the sun’ according to whoever was in office and whatever policy agenda was being pursued.

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Also consequent of the dominance of the United States was the unchallenged orthodoxy of liberal free market capitalism. The ethos of economic liberalism was ever-present in transitions from authoritarianism and from violent ethnonational conflict. Just as the prevailing economic framework contributed to the conflict (for example, the demand for diamonds in west Africa), it also helped shape the peace. Many post-war societies have remained chronically poor regardless of the declaration of ceasefires or the signing of peace treaties. Instead, market conditions prevail, storing up potential public disaffection as economic aspirations remain unfulfilled. A fifth factor responsible for shaping conflict and peacemaking in the postCold War era was a renewed adventurism on behalf of the United Nations. Restrained during the Cold War, the institution was re-energised in the early 1990s as it sought to react to a dynamic international situation and a number of complex emergencies. The expansion of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has gained much attention and helped stabilise a number of conflict situations.10 The 1990s also saw the UN adopt a more militarily robust stance with the mandate of a number of missions stretching to peace enforcement (for example, Somalia). Yet as significant as peacekeeping and peace enforcement were, the ever broadening of mandates and responsibilities (perceived and assumed) fell across the full range of UN agencies. These activities, dealing with the displaced and impoverished in a wide variety of contexts, impacted on many more people than peacekeeping operations. Thus the United Nations was involved in a number of nation-building programmes, and was intimately involved in a number of peace processes through the provision of monitors for ceasefires, electoral assistance and support for disarmament and demobilisation programmes. A sixth international factor significant in the evolution of post-Cold War peace and conflict was the wider role assumed by the non-governmental sector. The sector’s near exponential growth in recent decades is instructive and it is important not to view it as a homogenous unit without varying capabilities, motivations and perspectives. Elements within it have become major international players, and states and international organisations have devolved and sub-contracted significant responsibility to private organisations. Perhaps the most significant contribution made by the NGO sector has been in the perceptual framing of peace and conflict. NGOs and civil society have played a crucial role in bearing witness to atrocity (when governments found it convenient to develop myopia) and advocating costly rights based intervention (when states were happy to differentiate between the rights of humans with different pigmentation and proximity to centres of power and commerce). To the extent that there is a ‘human rights agenda’ it is largely testament to NGOs. It is also worth noting that the increasingly prominent role played by NGOs in peacemaking initiatives has given contemporary peacemaking a distinctive character. A growing number of NGOs have a deliberate focus on conflict transformation and have been active as mediators and facilitators in peace processes. These Conflict Transformation Agencies (CTAs) have the capacity to act as connectors between the elite and local levels in conflict societies. Many CTAs

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have third party status, enabling them to operate on the various sides of a conflict and their focus on ‘bread and butter’ development issues has the capacity to extend the peace process beyond strictly constitutional, territorial and security issues. An example is provided by the role of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in Aceh in Indonesia, which was involved in both orthodox political facilitation between the conflicting parties but also facilitated a humanitarian dimension to the emerging peace process.11 In sum, what emerged from the Cold War was not an international political system characterised by unconstrained ethnonational conflict. While much was fluid, relatively fixed pillars remained in the form of the United States, a strong international attachment to state sovereignty and the prevalence of economic liberalism. Violent ethnonational conflict did not ‘just break out’. It was fostered by ethnic entrepreneurs, triggered by competition for scarce resources in the context of declining economies, and facilitated by porous borders and a freer flow of personnel, weapons, funding and information.12 In many cases contemporary factors melded with re-energised latent factors to create a complex conflict environment that defied quick-fix solutions. Instead, what was required was a peacemaking process able to deal with the complex nature of the conflict on multiple levels of society and over an extended time period. Separation or integration? The key aim in most peacemaking processes is to lower the costs of the conflict in a manner that satisfies the strategic goals and dignity requirements of those party to it.13 Conflicts are rarely ‘solved’; instead points of contention can be contained, managed and regularised using non-violent means. For a peace process to have any chance of success participants must share the same conflict management paradigm in the broadest sense. Peacemaking enterprises in ethnonational conflicts generally conform to two broad models: integrative or separatist.14 In the integrative model, the political unit will remain intact and the aim will be to manage an accommodation between different groups within a single political dispensation. The focus may be on reforming political space so as to make it more accessible to all sectors in society. In the separatist model, the aim will be to manage the division of territory and people.15 Northern Ireland provides an example of the integrative model, in which the state of Northern Ireland remains intact but is reformed to accommodate the diverse political aspirations of its citizens. Under this model, separation (through repartition or even ethnic cleansing) is deemed to have prohibitive costs. The ‘two-state solution’ for Israel and Palestine provides an example of the separatist model in which partition is managed. Participants in a peace process must at least agree on the macro-model of peacemaking, although details within that model often cause disagreement. Circumstances rarely allow the integrative or separatist models of conflict management to be pursued in their pure sense. For example, the realities of political geography mean that clean-cut separation may not be feasible. Minorities living in majority areas may necessitate those charged with peace negotiations to take note of elements of both the separatist and integrative models. In other words, negotiators may have to accept a degree of separation within an integrative model.

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The core elements of a peace process There has been no exemplar peace process that has perfectly ‘resolved’ a conflict and acts as an exact template to participants in other conflicts. Instead, protagonists may be attracted by certain elements of other peace processes, so peacemaking enterprises often have a trial and error quality.16 It is worth noting that some peace initiatives have exacerbated conflict and heightened insecurity. The term ‘peace process’ captures the dynamic of a sustained peace initiative or series of initiatives in which the chief antagonists in a violent conflict attempt to reach an accommodation. Importantly, the aim is often merely to reduce the costs of the conflict. Damascene conversions are rare. Antagonists will often use the peace process as conflict by other means and manoeuvre to protect their advantages and wrong foot opponents. In some cases though, there was a widespread recognition among antagonists of the timeliness of peace initiatives. Changes in battlefield situations and leaderships, along with economic and international conditions, may have convinced antagonists of the ‘ripeness’ of the moment to explore an accommodation with opponents.17 In Sri Lanka, for example, a number of factors merged to make the prospects for a peace process propitious by early 2002. War weariness and economic underachievement, the international environment following 11th September 2001, the availability of a trusted mediator in the form of Norway, and a change of government in Sri Lanka all encouraged parties to the conflict to consider seriously a negotiated settlement.18 As the term suggests, a peace process is more than an isolated peace initiative, instead it suggests a sustained series of interactions between antagonists. In the best-case scenario, the interactions develop a robustness able to withstand dissent from within and provocation from without, even if the dissent and provocation adopted a violent form. Again, in the best case, the interactions will develop a mutual quality, with confidence-building measures in the form of ceasefires or security relaxations reinforcing a gradual development of trust between parties used to demonising the other. The interactions should also be serious in the sense that they focus on the core issues at the root of the conflict and are not merely diversionary tactics to tire and distract the opponent. If an ideal-type peace process were to be constructed, then it would develop through successive stages, with each stage seamlessly leading to the next and marking a milestone in the development of trust and confidence. The various stages in the ideal-type peace process model are set out in Table 2.1 opposite. Clearly peacemaking processes rarely have the linear quality represented here and the dynamic is not always forwards. Instead, processes often become stuck at one stage or another or make progress at one level and little at another. The peace process by stages model is useful nonetheless in helping to conceptualise contemporary peacemaking. To go through the stages briefly, violent conflict is rarely static.19 Different stages in the development of a violent conflict offer opportunities and constraints for antagonists to consider the viability of peace initiatives. William Zartman notes that antagonists are most likely to seek a compromise when they reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ or recognise that it is irrational unilaterally to increase the level of

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Peace process stage

Description

Violent conflict

Rarely static. Different stages in a conflict offer different opportunities for peacemaking.

Pre-negotiation

Rational for antagonists to assess the seriousness of their opponents with regard to peace initiatives. Key sticking points on agenda and scope of talks can be investigated.

Confidence-building measure

Can take many forms. Designed to foster trust.

Ceasefire

Temporary measure. Designed to create space for political negotiations.

Negotiation

Can take many forms: face-to-face or via proxies; intensive or broken into stages.

Agreement

Peace accords can be comprehensive or interim. May be put to popular vote through a referendum.

Post-Agreement peacebuilding and implementation

Peace accords require active implementation – often guaranteed by a third party.

Institutionalisation

In the best circumstances the accord develops a life of its own, increasingly free from the heritage of conflict and connected with economic and social development. Table 2.1 Stages in an ideal type peace process

violence.20 It may take many years until antagonists reach a mutually hurting stalemate and, somewhat perversely, it may be that the level of violence has to reach a critical (and hurting) mass in order to convince antagonists of the need to investigate less violent options. Given the costs of violence, it is irrational not to sound out opponents’ receptivity to initiatives that can help manage the conflict and lower its costs. The chief problem at the pre-negotiation stage though is that

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opponents have been so successfully vilified that to have contact with them carries high political risks.21 This vilification and objectification of the enemy is often an essential part of mobilising a state or community for a conflict, and thus prenegotiation contacts are often conducted at a subterranean and deniable level. The essential aim is to ascertain the seriousness of opponents to further initiatives. Thus, for example, initial British government contacts with pro-united Ireland militants in Northern Ireland in the late 1980s and early 1990s were conducted through a retired member of the British secret service. This was at a time when Margaret Thatcher’s government was publicly wedded to the mantra of ‘not talking to terrorists’.22 A key method of assuring opponents of the seriousness with which peace options are being considered is through confidence-building measures. Although these can occur at any stage during a peace process, they can be particularly effective at the early stages when issues of trust are at the fore. Confidence can be built through words and deeds, with, for example, protagonists using conciliatory language or making gestures such as the release of prisoners, withdrawal from territory or the relaxation of security restrictions. In order to help build trust in the nascent peace process in Sri Lanka, the Government of Sri Lanka lifted its ban on the Liberation Tigers of Tamel Eelam (LTTE) in September 2002. The concession was low-cost, yet of high symbolic value. Perhaps the most obvious confidence-building measure is a ceasefire. As the name suggests, it is a temporary measure, short of a permanent cessation and normally conditional on the outcome of a negotiation process. The immediacy of political violence often leaves little room for activity other than condemnation and responses (whether improved security measures or revenge). A ceasefire provides a respite, or space in which the antagonists can gain perspective and attempt to reevaluate their position in the conflict. Agreed third parties or nominated elements from within armed groups can monitor ceasefires. A key issue often becomes the length of the time between the declaration of a ceasefire and the onset of negotiations and a common suspicion is that antagonists use a ceasefire as an opportunity to regroup and rearm. Many tentative peace processes fail before reaching negotiations.23 At this stage, protagonists must ‘go public’ on their intentions, formulate negotiating positions and strategies, and rein in internal dissent. These issues often place immense strain on parties to negotiations and may prompt splits, and in some cases violent splinters. Even before substantive negotiations begin, a range of issues associated with the talks process must be investigated. These ‘talks about talks’ may consider the location of the negotiations (at home or abroad), the composition and legitimacy of negotiating teams, the identity and power of the chair, the inclusion and exclusion of certain items from the agenda, the usefulness of deadlines, whether the talks will be face-to-face or by proxy and access for the media and others. Sticking points abound, with ‘power-holders’ often seeking a minimalist agenda and remit for the negotiating process and ‘power-seekers’ often pursuing a maximalist approach. The key issue of legitimacy will pervade any negotiating process: to what extent are the parties to negotiations and any subsequent

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agreement true representatives of the constituency they claim to represent? While governments point to their incumbency (legitimate or otherwise) to justify their presence at the talks table, other groups may not have the benefit of an electoral process from which to draw legitimacy. In many instances, it is no coincidence that those who shouted the loudest and fought the hardest find themselves at the negotiating table. Other groups – women, minorities, the vulnerable – may find themselves under-represented. Talks processes may also be characterised by an asymmetry of participants, with governments able to mobilise greater technical and legal resources than smaller groups. Negotiating processes can adopt a number of mechanisms to help minimise problems arising from stalemate. For example, the proviso that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ prevents one side from wresting a concession from an opponent and then walking away from the negotiating table. The intention is to maximise the chance of a comprehensive agreement. Individual negotiators can be nominated as trouble-shooters who will attempt to find a resolution on contentious issues away from plenary sessions.24 Issues deemed to be so contentious that they could risk destabilising the entire talks process can be isolated and farmed out to the trouble-shooters or to a dedicated committee. In the ideal situation, a negotiation process will lead to a peace accord. Peace agreements reached in ethnonational conflicts since the end of the Cold War have varied enormously, ranging from brief memoranda of understanding that apply only to certain actors and certain regions within a state, to comprehensive agreements and associated constitutions that govern a power transition, transfer of territory, reorganisation of government, reform of the security sector and, fundamentally, a change in the public ethos governing a state or region to take account of diversity. Thirty-eight major peace accords were reached in relation to internal conflicts between 1988–1998. These ranged from the ‘velvet divorce’ between the Czech and Slovak Republics (1993) and largely ineffectual UN brokered agreements in Western Sahara (1991 and 1997) to internally agreed accords to Mali (1992) and New Caledonia (1998).25 These accords differed enormously in format; from a single document or a series of interim accords, to a new constitution. An electoral process may be required to confer popular legitimacy on a new accord or constitution, although the organisation of elections is often fraught with complication in a post-war situation. The rush to electoral politics, for example to select members of a new representative chamber in a post-accord political dispensation, has often preceded the establishment of deep-rooted democracy.26 It is also worth considering the limited extent to which institutional engineering can actually change behaviour in a deeply divided society. Finely calibrated consociational mechanisms designed to encourage consensual politics and centre-ground accommodation must compete with ethnonational and sociological factors that inform behaviour. Thus, for example, the 1989 Taif accord and subsequent state-building initiatives that helped conclude Lebanon’s civil war were replete with minority safeguards and measures to encourage consensus politics.27 Yet other factors, including war fatigue, embedded perceptions of the other community and the activities of external third parties, offer a more accurate explanation of contemporary Lebanese politics.

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A peace accord is only as strong as the will to implement it. The implementation and peacebuilding phase of a process will be crucial in making the peace work and enabling it to bring benefit to the populace.28 Much depends on the extent to which different sections in society accept and internalise key elements of any peace accord, for example the need to protect minorities or make state institutions accessible to all. A chief danger is that different sections of society interpret the peace accord to mean different things, and consequently cherry-pick it, upholding certain clauses while conveniently overlooking others. An external guarantor, whether an international organisation or third state, may help in the ‘policing’ of any accord. For example, it may play a crucial role in security sector reform or in capacity building for those institutions charged with post-war reconstruction. Crucial in this phase of a peacemaking process is bridging the gap between a peace accord agreed at the elite political level and the everyday experiences of citizens in the war-affected society. Peacebuilding programmes offer an opportunity to operationalise the peace accord and shepherd local level economic development in a post-war society. Peacebuilding can take many forms, from micro-credit schemes for female-headed households to large-scale truth recovery and reconciliation exercises. The essential aim is to ameliorate the effects of the conflict and prioritise bottom-up, local level development.29 In the most successful cases the peace process and accord will become institutionalised. The accord may provide for a reorganisation of major state institutions and legislate for a far-reaching transition. It may well take on a life of its own, increasingly removed from the transition from war to ‘peace’ and connected with the wider development of society. Challenges to peace processes It is worth re-stressing that the above typology represents an over-simplification. Few cases have adopted such a seamlessly linear progression. Even if the early stages of a potential peace process are put in place there are few guarantees that subsequent stages will develop. Instead, all such processes require human and political agency. Although the peacemaking processes of the post-Cold War period have operated in very different circumstances and have developed context-specific dynamics, many have faced common challenges and have displayed common deficiencies. Clearly the list of potential problems to beset a developing peace process could be a long one. Four problems will be discussed below: failure to deal with conflict causes; the failure to fulfil expectations; continuing violence; and the failure of an elite level peace process to connect with the everyday experiences of citizens. Perhaps the major deficiency facing contemporary peace processes, and one that is germane to the focus of the current volume on post-war reconstruction, is that many peace processes fail to deal with the actual causes of the conflict. Instead they may deal with the manifestations of the conflict. This is understandable since manifestations are often more apparent than a complex matrix of causes that may be deeply embedded in a conflict-affected society. Conflict manifestations are easier to legislate for, deal with, conceptualise, and convey in the media. Yet a peace

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process and consequent peace accord that fails to deal with the underlying causes of a conflict may store up trouble for the future. This is an easy criticism to make. Discerning conflict causes with any degree of clarity is a difficult task, particularly in relation to long-running conflicts in which the ethnonational fissures in society are bound up with issues of under-development and uneven development. In a number of cases, peace processes and accords have been hailed as seismic breakthroughs designed to bring an end to a conflict. Such processes may indeed contain initiatives designed to reduce the costs of the conflict and regularise interaction between different communities and their armed or elected representatives. They may also improve the quality of life of people in the conflict affected area. Yet a failure to deal with the underlying causes of the conflict may mean that the peace process merely acts as a veneer or balm over an entrenched conflict. For example, the central issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict revolve around the Israeli need for security and the Palestinian need for dignity and a sustainable political territory. It is possible though to conceive of a peace initiative that addresses a range of Israeli-Palestinian issues (economic cooperation, Palestinian autonomy, prisoner releases, travel restrictions etc). Such a peace process may have both benign intentions and benign effects, but unless the antagonists address the core conflict issues, they risk temporarily freezing the conflict rather than dealing with its causes. The events and discourses associated with a peace process can give an illusionary sense of real political change. Confidence-building measures, summit meetings, protracted negotiations, peace accords, fevered media commentary and peacebuilding schemes can all contribute to a public perception that significant political change is taking place. Political change may indeed be taking place, but it may not necessarily address the core conflict issues. To a certain extent, this may be displacement activity, diverting attention away from the real conflict causes to other issues related to the conflict. The ‘something must be done’ mentality displayed by many third parties in the 1990s in the Balkans provides a useful example of a failure to deal with core conflict causes. The violent conflict was staunched, massive political engineering was undertaken, and a range of reconstruction and post-war recovery initiatives were launched. Yet only limited efforts were made to deal with the conflicting nationalisms at the heart of the conflict. This is not to detract from the enormous and constructive efforts made by local and international actors towards the management of the conflict. Nor is it to underestimate the very real quality of life changes that many in the region benefited from. Instead it is to note that many conflict causes either were left unaddressed or were addressed insufficiently and, unless carefully managed, could flare up in the future.30 Related to the failure to deal with conflict causes is the failure to fulfil public expectations. A lack of trust in opponents and political processes means that many citizens may adopt an understandably circumspect view of the chances of any peace initiative taking root and delivering anything beyond transient benefits. Yet a number of factors may contribute to high public expectations of life in a postpeace accord era. Political elites may have to ‘sell’ an agreement to their sceptical supporters, and the temptation may be to over-sell. Election campaigns, possibly a

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referendum on the acceptance of a peace accord or new constitution, may also encourage political leaders to exaggerate the potential of the future. Additionally, the euphoria and hubris associated with a peace accord or transition from authoritarianism may lend itself to public optimism. Third parties, whether states, international organisations or NGOs, may promote the notion of a peace dividend, extolling the economic prize of peace. And, of course, conflict fatigue, may encourage some to believe that anything will be better than the foregoing conflict. At this point it is worth noting that the everyday experiences of people in conflict will condition their post-conflict expectations. For many people, the dayto-day experience of living in a conflict zone does not amount to constant violence, oppression and humiliation. The burden of a conflict usually falls unevenly across a population according to social class, age, gender, geographical location, and priorexisting vulnerability. Furthermore, the cycle of a violent conflict means that direct experience of violence may be compressed into concentrated periods, leaving other lengthy periods of tension and generalised structural violence. Given their everyday experience of conflict, many people living in a conflict area may envisage a postconflict scenario primarily in socio-economic rather than political terms. ‘Peace’ may mean better access to public goods and services and enhanced economic opportunities rather than a new political dispensation that is the product of constitutional engineering and consociational mechanisms. Thus public disappointment may arise from a failure of a peace process or accord to improve material living conditions rather than the political or security changes that it may herald.31 A recurring problem associated with many peace processes is continuing violence. The immediacy of political violence, and the – in many cases – almost automatic expectation of reaction and retaliation, means that the chances of political negotiations prospering against a backdrop of violence are slim. Ceasefires bring few guarantees of a permanent end to violence and may be prone to collapse in the face of relatively slight provocation. For militant organisations, calling a ceasefire is one thing, but having the organisational coherence to maintain and police it may be another matter. Peace initiatives will place militant actors under immense pressure. Darby distinguishes between ‘dealmakers’ and ‘zealots’.32 For the dealmakers (or opportunists), whether within the state security forces or a non-state force, the temptation will be to investigate alternatives to violence and lessen or cease military activity in order to create a space for peace explorations. For the zealots, on the other hand, the prospects for a negotiated settlement may seem unpropitious or else the option of not negotiating with the enemy may have become an inviolable principle. The strain that this places on militant groups can lead to splits. Splinter groups present two main problems that can seriously complicate the development of any peace process. First they can undermine the political authority of the militant group and the legitimacy of any claim it makes to represent a constituency. Second, splinter groups may engage in spoiler violence. Such groups, often called ‘spoilers’, will deliberately seek to derail peace initiatives, perhaps calculating that a better deal can be struck at a later date or that any deal would amount to a sell-out.33

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Spoilers often display a sophisticated psychology in which the peace process itself becomes the primary target of their violence. As a result spoiler violence may be deliberately calibrated to goad public opinion into pressing political representatives to walk away from peace initiatives. Hamas suicide bombings on Israeli civilians in the late 1990s were predicated on a cynical exploitation of a strong Israeli military response that would, in turn, exact a toll on Palestinian civilians and thus portray the Palestinian Authority as weak and incapable of securing any advantages from interaction with the Israeli government. Spoiler violence may continue, or even escalate, after a peace accord is reached. An accord, and the ending of large-scale violence, may actually pose a threat to groups and individuals who have a vested interest in the continuation of violence. Security sector reform, for example, may entail the downsizing of the military establishment, a loss of status for members of the security forces and even the threat of judicial proceedings in the event of a truth and reconciliation scheme. As a result, it becomes logical for some groups to attempt to continue the conflict as a means of protecting their livelihood or status. Dealing with spoiler groups can be especially problematic since an overreaction may be precisely the hoped-for response. Security sector reform and greater attention to human rights in the light of a new accord or constitution may hinder the freedom of the (reformed) security forces in countering the threat from spoilers. The critical factor in tempering the threat from spoilers lies in the support they are able to command from their core constituency. Ultimately this depends on public perceptions of any peace initiative, process or accord. If people feel threatened by a peace process or feel that it represents an advance for the enemy, then they may be tempted to support a spoiler agenda. Those best placed to neutralise the spoiler threat are the spoiler’s former colleagues but an over-zealous response may risk accusations of treachery. Apart from politically motivated spoilers that deliberately target a peace process, other potential sources of violence amid a peace process come from former combatants and their weapons. Protracted ethnonational conflicts often entail the mobilisation of large sections of society, and especially but not exclusively young males. For former fighters, demobilisation and disarmament programmes often equate to unemployment and poor economic prospects. Such is the extent of militarisation and securitisation in a conflict-affected region that many young males have become so acculturated to life in an armed group that they regard economic predation as the logical means to sustain a livelihood. During conflict this economic predation (banditry, robberies, revolutionary taxes, protection rackets) may be given a political gloss. Such a political spin may be harder to maintain in a post-conflict scenario and the violence may be purely criminal. The availability of military style weapons may give such violence an additional menace. The criminal gangs often remain peculiarly difficult to counter because of their close alignments with ethnic and kinship networks. A number of societies have suffered from a post-peace accord crime surge and the presence of cadres of armed groups with few economic prospects is often a key feature. In some instances, such as Guatemala, post-peace accord crime rates have reached such proportions that they overshadow the political

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violence that took place during the conflict. The situation is summed up by the title of a conference paper by Chuck Call: ‘Why the world’s most successful peace processes produce the world’s most violent countries’.34 To be truly effective, disarmament programmes need to be voluntary. Former combatants need to be assured that the peace accord is equitable and offers them a future. While some disarmament and demobilisation programmes have a development aspect, offering former combatants employment in a reformed military force or civil service, tools and seeds for agriculture, or places on retraining schemes, many do not.35 Former combatants may remain unconvinced of the merits of a proposed peace accord and may calculate that their weapons may be required in the future. Other combatants may retain their weapons for economic purposes, either to facilitate criminal activity or to sell or trade. Still other combatants may retain weapons because of their symbolic purpose, with gun ownership regarded as a status symbol for males. The end result is that many post-war societies are awash with small arms, adding greatly to insecurity and perceptions that the post-accord peace is a failure. In a sense, a culture of violence becomes so embedded into society that the mere declaration of a peace accord has little effect on the day-today existence of many citizens. At the heart of any account of continuing violence in a post-peace accord scenario is state weakness and a fundamental incapacity to control rivals to its claim to a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The police and criminal justice systems may be temporarily ineffective because of security sector reform ushered in by a peace accord. For example, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the successor to the reformed Royal Ulster Constabulary, had urgently to recruit forty experienced detectives from England and Wales because of an exodus from a discredited Special Branch.36 Politically delicate post-war situations may also necessitate state adoption of a lenient approach to criminal gangs or recalcitrant elements lest state heavy-handedness upset the political balance. Former combatants may also assume a central and venerated position in society, for example through veterans’ associations and a romanticised social narrative of their wartime activities. The excesses of war veterans in Zimbabwe provide a useful example and also prompt the question: when do former combatants cease to be former combatants? A fourth problem, common to many peace processes and accords, is the failure of the elite level political process to connect with people on the ground. This is very much connected with the previous point concerning the failure of peace processes and accords to fulfil public expectations. There are good reasons why many elements within a peace process must remain the preserve of a small group. The sheer manageability of a negotiations process demands relatively small delegations. Larger parties may claim to be the sole or legitimate representatives of a particular community and so jealously guard against the admittance of smaller parties to talks. In ideal conditions, political negotiations also need to provide a secure environment in which delegations can float ideas and assess the reception of these ideas among opponents. A confidential environment suits such a process, yet confidentiality may encourage suspicion and rumour among the home constituency. At some stage

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though negotiations must become public, whether through the publication of a peace accord or an interim agreement, a referendum on a peace accord or through media interviews and commentary. Lest the details of a proposed peace deal become an unwelcome shock, constituencies must be prepared. This may be no easy task given that conflicts are often sustained through the objectification and condemnation of ‘the other’. The perception that a peace process and accord is the preserve of a small coterie of elites is difficult to counter. Negotiations – often conducted behind closed doors and away from the locus of the conflict – may be personalised between leaders of governments, political parties and armed groups. Media reportage and commentary often concentrates on key individuals. International organisations and overseas governments may seem to have an undue role in the peace process and be oblivious to opinion on the ground. Armed groups (overwhelmingly, but not exclusively, male) may seem to be awarded a favoured position simply by virtue of the threat they pose, while those adopting more moderate stances may be easily ignored. The only role open to the vast bulk of the people may be to accept or reject a peace accord, not of their making, in a referendum, although in many cases the option of a referendum is not offered. In sum, the constituency of stakeholders in the peace process may be relatively narrow. A crime surge, the failure to fulfil public expectations and slow economic growth may further restrict the growth of the community of stakeholders in the postaccord years. Crucially, the benefits of a peace process and accord may be perceived to fall unevenly. For example, survey evidence on public perceptions of the benefits from the 1998 Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland revealed that by 2002 only 19% of Protestant respondents felt that the peace accord had benefited Catholics and Protestants equally. On the other hand, 55% of Catholics felt that both religious groups had benefited equally.37 A key to any peacebuilding activity is the rebuilding of fractured relationships in a post-war society. Yet peacebuilding activities often fail miserably. Usually inspired by western best practice, formal peacebuilding activities travel poorly and often possess an artificial quality that limits their reception by the vast bulk of citizens and former combatants. Peacebuilding often constitutes an incestuous circus of intra-civil society activities that are entirely dependent on external funding and leave a slight footprint among key constituencies when that funding dries up.38 Peace is best ‘built’ organically from the ground upwards, and is most effective when it is the by-product of other activities, primarily functional cooperation on issues of mutual concern. Thus cooperation on rebuilding damaged water infrastructure or the re-establishment of local services can act as a catalyst for a peace that has real roots in a society. The Sri Lanka peace process, formalised through a February 2002 ceasefire, adopted a novel approach in an attempt to build a constituency of stakeholders in the peace. Rather than concentrate on constitutional and security issues at the outset, negotiations focused on post-war reconstruction and development. The idea was to give peace a real meaning for citizens and incorporate a tangible ‘peace dividend’ into the peacemaking process. The rationale behind this approach was

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that parties who had been acculturated to a process of functional cooperation on reconstruction and development activities would then be able to deal with macropolitical issues on a basis of embedded trust. Sri Lanka has been fortunate though in that elements of the international community have been willing to invest in the experiment. As Susan Woodward notes, ‘No international or local action in support of peace can occur without a budget or a donor to tap.’39 Conclusion and discussion Given the focus of the current volume on post-war reconstruction and recovery, it may be worth considering the manner in which a peace process can contribute to the processes of post-war reconstruction and development. Many peacemaking initiatives have concentrated on security, territorial and constitutional issues to the exclusion of issues related to social and economic development. However, this pattern is changing and increasingly peace processes are assuming a broader remit that takes account of the integrated nature of peacemaking and post-war development. In a number of cases (Bougainville, New Caledonia and Sri Lanka) reconstruction and development issues have been awarded precedence over constitutional and territorial issues. The logic behind this approach is that the process of cooperation between the antagonists on functional issues such as economic development or social inclusion will dissipate some of the tension from constitutional, security and territorial issues. Thus far, the evidence is encouraging. The record of reconstruction after contemporary wars has been poor. In many cases, the security and political situation has not improved to the extent to allow significant reconstruction and recovery. In other cases, the participants in the peace process and their guardians in the international community regarded socioeconomic development as an afterthought – something to be addressed after the high politics of constitutional and security issues had been dealt with. By that stage, the focus of the international community and donors may have moved elsewhere. In still other cases, the macro-economic situation has prevented any meaningful reconstruction. It seems sensible therefore that the issue of post-war reconstruction and development is awarded a mainstream position within peace initiatives and peace processes. A corollary of this is the recognition that to be genuinely sustainable, reconstruction and recovery must have an organic quality involving the participation of local people. The combination of these two points (mainstreaming of reconstruction and a participatory approach) suggests the need for a move away from exclusively elite level peace processes that rely on an unproven ‘trickle-down’ effect. Instead explicit connections need to be made between public political peace processes and improvements in the people’s everyday experiences. NGOs can play an obvious role in this process as connectors between the different levels of a peacemaking process (although this may have consequences for any neutrality they proclaim). Yet becoming involved in a welter of peacebuilding activities, as many NGOs have done over the past decade, is no guarantee that they will actually foster a decline in conflict and an increase in accommodation and tolerance. The mere use of the suffix or prefix ‘peace’ (peacebuilding, building peace, peace enhancement,

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peace workshop, peace community etc) is not enough. Many peacebuilding programmes, despite good intentions, are investing in hope rather than in proven methods to enhance fractured relationships in deeply divided societies. The vast majority of people in a society emerging from violent conflict have little time for the sophistry (and even conceit) that underpins the projects and mission statements of many NGOs. Their real interest is in securing access to resources and opportunities; in simple terms: development. Peace processes that prioritise development and attempt to meet real aspirations and needs stand a greater chance of gaining public approval and achieving longevity. To recast Bill Clinton’s famous election slogan, ‘It’s development, stupid!’

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3 HUMANITARIANISM AND THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN A POST-COLD WAR CONTEXT Alpaslan Özerdem and Gianni Rufini

The life of Jean-Henri Dunant (1828–1910), the founder of the Red Cross, acts as a metaphor for humanitarianism: born into a well-off family, he ended his days in a hostel for the poor, drifting in a few years from fame to oblivion, from wealth to bankruptcy. Marginalised by Geneva’s high society whose protagonist he had been for many years, he died in loneliness. Humanitarianism had been the passion of his life and the Red Cross his monument. In the same way, contemporary humanitarianism has reached a low-point, despite – somewhat counter intuitively – gaining widespread popularity. The adjective “humanitarian” has never been so widely or so incorrectly used. The concept of humanitarian aid has an almost innate quality: assisting your brother or sister when their life is endangered is an instinctive expression of the survival of the species. The concept has also been internalised in international law through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the four Geneva Conventions (1949). The process whereby humanitarianism assumed a position within international law was not automatic. Instead, it required grim experience, reflective practice and juridical precedent over many decades to develop what is now termed ‘humanitarianism’: an ensemble of doctrine, solidarity, action and aspirations towards fairer justice for human beings. In its pure form humanitarianism adopted three fundamental deontological principles: the obligation to assist (the “humanitarian imperative”), impartiality and neutrality. The first stressed the independence of aid from any consideration of interest, opportunity or prodigality: humanitarian assistance was simply a duty. Impartiality reaffirmed that all humans were equal and that all civilians were innocent in a war and all had a right to equality of treatment. Neutrality meant a complete unrelatedness to the political and military aspects of conflict. The

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concept of neutrality aimed to ensure respect and immunity for third parties, and allow them to operate unmolested by the antagonists in a conflict. Given the above principles and its universal applicability, humanitarianism was apolitical. Yet it was born in a very political world and so was the product of an alchemic mixture of philanthropy and politics. In the nineteenth century an essentially charitable ethic characterised humanitarianism: that victims were deserving of help simply because of their status as victims. By the 1960s and 1970s this had developed to the extent that visions of humanitarianism were based on a strong political view of human rights and social justice. The context of this new, more politically aware humanitarianism is important: decolonisation processes, liberation struggles and the growth of the United Nations system all contributed to the new perspective. In the global North the humanitarianism of the 1960s and 1970s was accompanied by the multiplication of solidarity movements and NGOs dedicated to ‘removing the deep causes’ of war and poverty. Importantly, many of these organisations emphasised development aid and the protection of human rights (tools for the progress of peoples), rather than relief and humanitarian assistance that was often limited to relieving the symptoms of conflict or complex political emergencies. In parallel with the proliferation of intra-state armed conflicts and the subsequent operational challenges faced by the field of humanitarianism, increased attention has been paid to humanitarian principles since the early 1990s. The Providence Principles identified by Brown University, the Red Cross Movement’s Code of Conduct, and the Sphere Project are just some of the initiatives that have attempted to form a set of principles for humanitarian action. This chapter will investigate the context of these principles, discuss their meaning and consider how effective they can be in guiding humanitarian work in the current environment of war-affected areas. The primary purpose therefore, is not to show the necessity of having those principles as part of humanitarian action, but to consider the possible challenges that may be faced in their interpretation during the implementation process. In order to achieve this objective, the chapter will first outline contemporary characteristics of the operational environment for humanitarian work. Secondly, the context of the twin principles of ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ will be explored, and the chapter will examine other core values of humanitarianism by focussing on the above-mentioned attempts at the formation of principles for humanitarian action. Thirdly, the challenges of ‘new humanitarianism’ in the post-Cold War context will be investigated by focussing on the role of European agents. Finally, the discussions will elaborate the way forward for the implementation of these principles at the field level. Humanitarianism and Politics For much of its history, humanitarianism has managed to keep some distance from politics, interests and partisanship. There were exceptions, of course, with the Holocaust providing a salutary lesson in impotency and partisanship. A delegate at a Geneva conference some years ago colourfully summed up the fine line between

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politics and the principle that humanitarians had to tread: “Humanitarians have to swim into politics as in a sea of mud: floating but making sure not to swallow a drop”. Yet political winds constantly chilled the humanitarian world through the postWWII era. The birth and success of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the political alternative to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), was indicative of trends during this period. Soigner et témoigner (heal and witness), the MSF slogan, became the emblem of a new approach to humanitarian aid, still based on the three principles but conscious of the grey area between neutrality and inactivity. When MSF won the Nobel Prize in 1999, Bernard Kouchner, one of its founders, stressed this defining mark of the organisation: “MSF’s work was political from the start. I hope the prize marks the recognition of a type of humanitarian work which fights injustice and persecution.” (Rieff, 2002:309). The phenomenon of humanitarianism became tremendously popular following the 1984–85 famine in Ethiopia. Bob Geldof and the Band Aid initiative were in large part responsible for the development of a consensus on humanitarian assistance and governments, the UN and NGOs were mobilised. Thus far, NGOs had generally prioritised development projects, as emergency aid was considered as a mere short-term palliative. But the zeitgeist changed in the 1980s, with an increase in the priority given to crisis response, as independent humanitarian organisations recognised the need to adapt to a changing environment. Organisations now had to reckon with governments, international institutions and the mass-media. Essentially, they had to operate in a different way and pay attention to communication, the maintenance of good relations with the political establishment, organisational management and marketing. The entry of a large number of development NGOs contributed to this change, as they were more acquainted with the political environment and were concerned to underline their specific ‘developmentalist’ identity. Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict The literature in the humanitarian field tends to refer to ‘humanitarian principles’ and the ‘principles of humanitarian action’ interchangeably. However, as Leader (1998:14) reminds us, a distinction between them should be made as the former is about regulating and mitigating the effects of war, while the latter deals with guidelines such as impartiality and neutrality. Such a distinction is necessary because the current emphasis on the responsibilities of agencies in a way deflects attention from the humanitarian responsibilities of warring factions. For example, recognition of the special status of non-combatants is no less crucial for the humanitarian needs of war-affected populations than the issue of how agencies can best tailor their programmes according to the principles of humanitarian action. Nevertheless, the focus in this chapter will be on the latter. As far as the definition of humanitarian action/assistance is concerned, this chapter will adopt a similar understanding to that of Minear and Weiss (1993:9) which encompasses: “… activities covering a full spectrum, from the supplemental feeding of infants during famines to longer-term measures such as the strengthening of indigenous social and institutional coping mechanisms to avoid future crises”.

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Such an expansive definition of humanitarian action is considered contentious, because it is seen as blurring the boundaries between humanitarian and development work. Macrae (2001) defines this as the ‘new aid orthodoxy’ with a number of distinctive characteristics. Firstly, aid is perceived, within the international community, as addressing the root causes of conflict by dealing with poverty and inequality. However, Macrae (ibid:39) argues that such a view ignores the powerful role of political elites, as the “… comparative wealth of a group may render it more vulnerable to the threat of violence”. Secondly, most conflicts are seen as the result of misunderstanding between the different parties and the psychosocial aspect has become an important component of humanitarian assistance. It is thought that aid can be an incentive for institutional change. Finally, the blurring of boundaries between relief and development have resulted in a direct danger to the perception of traditional humanitarian assistance as ‘neutral’, causing a substantial shift in the political meaning of these interventions and the way they are perceived by warring sides and beneficiaries (ibid:43). In conjunction with the highly politicised environment of contemporary waraffected areas, humanitarianism also faces the danger of being involved in the dynamics of armed conflict. Boyce (2000:367) uses the analogy of water and fire in order to explain the possible negative implications: “Aid is not like water, which sprayed on the flames or embers of conflict invariably helps to extinguish them. Indeed, it can be more like oil. Appropriate aid can diminish the risks of conflict, but inappropriate aid can fuel it”. According to Bryans, et al, (1999:10), humanitarianism becomes “…at best another source of economic extraction, either directly through theft and hijacking, or indirectly through manipulation of distressed populations”. In addition, humanitarian practitioners are sometimes perceived as “…an obstacle to be overcome, increasingly through violence”. In other words, as Slim (1995:111) eloquently states, in the operational environment of today’s intra-state armed conflicts, relief workers can no longer enjoy the ‘camouflage’ of ‘saintliness’ as they are often considered to be part of the world of conflict. This is obviously all about the assumption that humanitarian action can actually be ‘neutral’, but as the discussions in the next section will suggest this might be only wishful thinking. Prendergast (1996) identifies three primary ways in which aid sustains conflicts. First, aid can be an instrument of war, for example through the manipulation of its access and population movements, and its diversion for the purposes of conflict. Secondly, aid can exacerbate conflict dynamics as it might increase the resources available to prosecute conflicts, and warring sides might sometimes hijack humanitarian infrastructure. Finally, aid can exacerbate the causes of war in a number of ways: by increasing competition between governments, rebel movements and neighbouring communities; by targeting certain communities instead of others, even though this may be done for the best humanitarian objectives, such as addressing the needs of vulnerable groups; and through the effects of humanitarian assistance on local authority structures and power balances. Elaborating on the impact of aid on conflict, Anderson (1996) explains that armed conflicts have profound effects on the local economy, imposing major shifts

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in employment, production and trade patterns. Ironically however, humanitarian responses may also reinforce economic systems of conflict. It is in this context that hiring guards from local militias in order to protect humanitarian assistance and relief agency staff can easily become a difficult dilemma, as this is likely to feed the war economy. In addition to hiring guards, another dilemma is the payments that aid agencies often have to make to those in control in their areas of operation. As a result of such payments, further resources are available for warring sides to buy more weapons. It is also argued that the more humanitarian agencies take over the responsibilities of local authorities in the provision of shelter, infrastructure, food and security, then the more resources are available for investing in the armed conflict itself. The issue of targeting for assistance those people perceived to be most vulnerable or needy, when judged according to set criteria can also turn into a source of conflict. For each targeted group receiving assistance, there is likely to be another war-affected group that may feel discriminated against because of their exclusion. This is likely to fuel tensions between different ethnic and religious groups and displaced and host communities. Even the presence of the international humanitarian community is likely to have profound implications on the local economy, as aid tends to create its own industry in recipient countries. For example, after humanitarian crises local prices for housing, office space and hotel rooms increase rapidly in parallel to the influx of expatriates. The aid system also has a dramatic impact on local wage and employment structures, as those able to speak a foreign language can easily earn three to four times more as translators than those highly qualified local people such as doctors, university lecturers and engineers (Anderson, 1996; Barakat and Kapisazovic, 2003). As preceding discussions show it would be naïve to assume humanitarian assistance can be provided in a vacuum of neutrality. Most of the above-mentioned impacts of aid on conflict are in fact, unavoidable. It is true that some can be mitigated through more effective coordination of relief agencies, a wider accountability of programmes and a greater level of professionalism in implementation. However, it is also a fact that relief agencies often find themselves in a position in which they have no choice but to make payments to facilitate their work and hire local militia as guards. The alternative is simply not to operate in such environments. Therefore, it is important to understand the challenges of the new aid orthodoxy and the constraints of such an operational environment on the principles of humanitarian action. The ensuing section will focus on the twin principles of neutrality and impartiality, before exploring other core values of humanitarianism. Principles of Humanitarian Action

The Twin Principles of Humanitarian Action: Neutrality and Impartiality The twin principles of impartiality and neutrality, which are enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols of 1977, have been central to most approaches to humanitarian action in war. According to The International

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Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which exemplifies this tradition, the principle of impartiality means that the organisation “... makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.” On the other hand, the principle of neutrality is defined as follows: “In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.” (Roberts,1996:51). In other words, impartiality is about providing humanitarian assistance on the basis of ‘need’ and need only, whilst neutrality is about not taking sides in any type of hostilities. Elaborating on the meaning of neutrality, Von Flue (1999:127) states that it is “... a way of facilitating impartial action, action devoid of discrimination”. However, he urges that when it comes to helping the victims of armed conflict and all those not (or no longer) taking part in the hostilities the ICRC is actually not ‘neutral’ as it “... actively defends their interests”. Furthermore, Von Flue (1999) alleges that although most humanitarian agencies claim to adhere to the principles of impartiality and neutrality, their actions face the risk of being politicised, which would make those principles totally defunct. It is stated that humanitarian assistance should dissociate itself “... from any effort to resolve a conflict” (ibid, 129), because as Macrae and Leader (2000) claim, without adhering to these twin principles, humanitarian action is only a façade. In other words, in the absence of these principles, partisan politics will dictate the nature and scale of external assistance, thus humanitarian action effectively becomes ‘political action’. De Waal and Rakiya (1994) specifically criticise the lack of appreciation for neutrality among relief agencies (excluding ICRC) operating in Africa arguing that neutrality for them is an aspiration rather than a fact. Another frequently voiced criticism is that for some aid agencies neutrality is used as a ‘fig leaf ’ to hide their lack of accountability, needs assessment and other formalised operational procedures. Elaborating further, Bradbury (1995) and Macrae (1996) assert that the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action are in fact in crisis due to a number of reasons. Firstly, in today’s armed conflicts there is great difficulty in distinguishing who is a combatant and who is a civilian, which acts as a constraint on the ideal of helping ‘innocent victims’. Secondly, as explained earlier, humanitarian assistance contributes to the political economy of armed conflicts in a number of ways. Thirdly, effective assistance can sometimes require ‘pragmatic’ solutions, such as making certain commitments to warring sides in order to assist war-affected populations. Finally, as it is often used by donor states as a substitute for political action, humanitarian assistance itself becomes ‘non-neutral’. Furthermore, the involvement of governments and their bilateral agencies in humanitarian action creates more obstacles to adherence to these principles, as NGOs often become “... the channel by which governments, international organisations and major foundations distribute their humanitarian aid” (Roberts, 1996:52). According to Prendergast (1996:40), another possible challenge to the principle

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of neutrality is “... the trap of allowing balanced objectives to take precedence over objective assessment”. It is possible that by attempting to be neutral, a humanitarian agency can easily find itself in a non-neutral position. If the assessment of needs, for example, is compromised in order to remain or be seen as neutral, such an attempt can lead to programmes which are effectively far from being neutral. It is also the case that humanitarian agencies often find themselves needing to explain to war-affected communities and warring sides that their action is actually ‘proportional’ to needs. This is a contentious issue, since a common misconception of impartiality is that it equates to ‘equal’ assistance to all sides. Obviously however, if needs are greater on one side than the other, then the provision of assistance should be proportional to this reality. Nevertheless, this is interpreted as partial assistance by different sides of the conflict. It should also be emphasized that neutrality should not be deployed as an excuse for ignoring local political dynamics as “... ignorance can be deadly” (ibid, 41). It is noted that there is in fact “... no panacea for the neutrality conundrum” and it is suggested that humanitarian policy “... should include the principles of independence and responding proportionately to need and should prioritise the gathering and analysing of information on socioeconomic dynamics so that these principles can be carried out astutely” (ibid, 42). On the other hand, according to El Bushra (1999:129), it would be “... fallacious to think that humanitarian agencies can, or should, remain neutral during conflict situations”. Considering their central position in controlling certain key resources and even sometimes, simply for their presence in the field, “... NGOs are inevitably and actively implicated in conflicts”. This view obviously represents one end of the adherence-to-the-twin-principles spectrum, and completely the opposite end of where the ICRC idealistically positions itself on that spectrum. In fact, El Bushra (ibid) believes that “... in certain situations they [NGOs] may deem it necessary to take sides” if they are “... convinced that the best way to serve the poor is to oppose the individuals or factions behind corruption and injustice”. With regard to the principle of impartiality, El Bushra states that it is “... scarcely of greater use than neutrality” (ibid). Trying to find a via media between the above-mentioned opposite perceptions of the twin principles, such terms as ‘independence’ or ‘detachment’ were suggested as more appropriate alternatives to ‘neutrality’ in order more accurately to reflect the activities of many agencies in the field of humanitarianism (Prendergast, 1996). For example, Minear and Weiss (1993:23) prefer ‘nonpartisanship’ over ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’, and define it as follows: “Humanitarian action responds to human suffering because people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or other extraneous agendas. It should not take sides in conflicts”. However, no matter what term is used in order to describe these principles, a more comprehensive understanding of these two opposite perceptions of the twin principles can only be effectively achieved by exploring the concepts of ‘deontological’ and ‘teleological’ approaches in humanitarianism. In ethical theories, a deontological approach may be represented as: “... what is moral is that which is imposed on us as obligatory”. In other words, it considers assistance as a duty “... in a list of rules and norms that are characterised by both

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restrictions (on freedom) and universality”. On the other hand, the teleological approach considers what is moral “... as that which we estimate to be good: ethics makes reference here to what comes to a satisfactory end (happiness, a fulfilled life), which is desired and must be achieved through actions that are considered good to the extent that they achieve that end”(Etxeberría, 2001:90). For example, according to the deontological approach, healing a combatant’s wounds is itself something good and therefore it is a duty to do this. However, the teleological view considers this as a limited perspective, since it is possible that the person being helped, could return to the armed conflict and kill children (Slim, 1996). Therefore, without considering possible consequences of humanitarian action, the teleological view believes that humanitarianism would always be far from achieving its primary objectives. It can clearly be seen that the approach taken by the ICRC can be described as ‘deontological’, while the approach advocated by El Bushra is more ‘teleological’. A wide range of humanitarian agencies represents different positions between the deontological and teleological approaches. Apart from the ICRC, it would be rather difficult for many agencies to define a clear position in this spectrum. Some agencies such as MSF would probably position themselves much closer to the teleological end of the spectrum. However, attempting to place humanitarian agencies on a spectrum like this does not aim to define one approach as better than the other, because both of them are in fact essential aspects of humanitarianism. Depending on the principles that shape the mandate of an agency, its action would be perceived at a particular position along this spectrum. For example, if saving lives were the only objective of an agency then a deontological focus would be more appropriate, while another agency that based its work on a wider range of principles such as political empowerment and the protection of human rights would need to adopt a more teleological focus in its action. So, whether it is a deontological or teleological approach, the decision making of different agencies in such an environment is likely to vary considerably (Etxeberría, 2001).

Other Principles of Humanitarian Action There have been numerous attempts over the last decade to establish a set of principles to guide humanitarian action. The Providence Principles by Brown University consist of the following eight principles: 1) Relieving life-threatening suffering; 2) Proportionality to need; 3) Nonpartisanship; 4) Independence; 5) Accountability; 6) Appropriateness; 7) Contextualization; 8) Subsidiarity of sovereignty (Minear and Weiss, 1993:19). The first four Providence Principles are in fact direct interpretations of the twin principles of impartiality and neutrality.1 Subsequently, their interpretation during the implementation of humanitarian programmes would face similar challenges to those faced by the principles of impartiality and neutrality. The fifth principle calls for a transparent humanitarianism, reporting fully on activities not only to donors but also to beneficiaries. The principle of ‘appropriateness’ advocates the need for humanitarian action to tailor itself to the local socio-economic, cultural and physical environment, and to aim to enhance, not supplant, locally available resources.

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The principle of ‘contextualization’ is probably the most contentious one, since it states, “Effective humanitarian action should encompass a comprehensive view of overall needs and of the impact of interventions. Encouraging respect for human rights and addressing the underlying causes of conflicts are essential elements.” (ibid, 35). It seems that this principle, in fact, contradicts the principle of ‘nonpartisanship’. As the discussions in the previous section indicated, to deal with root causes of conflicts would inevitably bring with it the need to deal with local political balances, empowerment of disfranchised communities and taking direct action against human rights abuses. However, this would also mean the politicisation of humanitarian assistance, thereby posing a direct challenge to the principle of neutrality. Therefore, the Providence Principles themselves present a contradictory approach in the guidance they offer to humanitarian organisations. On the other hand, ‘Subsidiarity of Sovereignty’ should be seen as an important breakthrough in humanitarianism. Considering that these principles were put together in 1994, a principle stating the need for sovereignty to defer to the relief of life-threatening suffering in situations where humanitarianism and sovereignty clash should be considered as an important step forward. This concept went on to become, for example, one of the underlying justifications for the development of guiding principles for the protection of internally displaced persons in the late 1990s. Another important initiative in assembling a set of principles for humanitarian action was the International Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGO Code of Conduct which established some measure of regulation of disaster assistance in 1994.2 As with the Providence Principles, so the twin principles of impartiality and neutrality resonate throughout this Code of Conduct.3 There are also contradictions within the Code of Conduct, for example, the ‘humanitarian imperative comes first’ and states that “When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such”. However, principle number eight urges that humanitarian assistance “… must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs”. Considering that most vulnerabilities are likely to have root causes in the sphere of power balances and access to resources, an attempt to reduce future vulnerabilities would effectively mean dealing with political structures and mechanisms. In other words, the use of relief aid to address vulnerabilities faces the risk of the politicisation of humanitarian assistance. It should be noted that the issue here is not whether relief aid should be utilised in the reduction of future vulnerabilities or not, as it is a crucial necessity for effective assistance particularly in protracted emergencies. However, what is required from humanitarian practitioners is to have a full awareness of the possible implications of such an undertaking in terms of the politicisation of humanitarian action. It should also be borne in mind that unless the practice of humanitarian assistance undergoes drastic institutional, financial and organisational changes, some of the principles in the Code of Conduct are likely to remain as little more than ‘ideals’. For example, the fourth principle claims that non-governmental humanitarian agencies (NGHAs) would “… not act as instruments of government foreign policy”. Although this principle states an important ideal for humanitarian

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work, it also seems to be completely unrealistic in a context in which most NGHAs rely heavily on government funding for their programmes. In other words, having such a principle in the Code of Conduct is obviously no guarantee of its realisation unless there is true financial independence of NGHAs from governments. The ninth principle, which urges NGHAs to be accountable to both donors and beneficiaries, also faces a similar challenge, as the likelihood of agencies actually holding themselves accountable to their beneficiaries, particularly in an emergency, is rather questionable. Unless there are drastic changes in funding policies, this principle is also likely to remain as little more than a piece of ‘politically correct’ rhetoric. The principle of respecting local culture and custom can also be contentious. Humanitarian agencies sometimes need to make difficult choices between their principles and what is considered to be acceptable within local culture. Such issues as the participation of women, women’s rights, female literacy, or humanitarian programmes specifically for women, may clash with restrictions imposed on women by conservative regimes or cultures. For example, this was one of the most contested issues faced by the humanitarian community in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime. It was in response to the restrictions imposed on women (particularly in relation to employment, education and access to health care) that some donor and implementing agencies decided to suspend their involvement in the country. However, according to Barakat and Wardell (2001), this policy ironically had particularly negative consequences for women themselves, as it left many female-headed households without assistance. Furthermore, those agencies with a more deontological approach, which chose to remain despite the restrictions, were nevertheless able to secure concessions from the regime, which resulted in modest improvements in the lives of Afghan women. Having accepted the importance of establishing such principles for humanitarian action, Prendergast (1996:46) identifies some of the dangers of codes of conduct. The first being their vulnerability to possible political manipulation, he states that such codes and resulting sanctions “... can be invoked for subjective reasons and can create dilemmas and interruptions in resource-scarce, volatile regions marked by divided authority and mixed front lines.” Therefore, as well as establishing codes of conduct the field of humanitarianism also needs transparent procedures for their utilisation in war-affected areas. Another potential danger stated by Prendergast (ibid) is the challenge of including rebel movements in ground-rule signing and dissemination. In other words, the implementation of codes of conduct in situations of disputed, divided, or unclear authority is likely to face huge obstacles. It is also noted that the introduction of such codes may ignore the existence of traditional legal principles inherent in a war-affected community. There may be situations in which international principles might not be relevant “... in the context of what are often richly developed indigenous principles of group interaction and justice” (ibid). Finally, Prendergast once again rightly points out that another difficulty with the implementation of codes of conduct concerns how best to ensure the coordination of all, or some, of those agencies involved in response to a humanitarian crisis.

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As a response to criticisms of the effectiveness of such Codes of Conduct, the next important step in the formalisation of principles of humanitarian action was the launching of the Sphere Project by a number of, mainly European, relief agencies in 1997. The project was initiated “… to improve the quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters, and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response” by proposing a set of Minimum Standards and a Humanitarian Charter. The Minimum Standards relate to the sectors of food, nutrition, water and sanitation, shelter and site planning, and health. As indicated by the Project itself, although the establishment of such Minimum Standards and accompanying indicators were not altogether new, they “… represent a remarkable consensus across a broad spectrum of agencies, and mark a new determination to ensure that humanitarian principles are realised in practice.” (www.sphereproject.org). Although the Sphere Project has faced criticism for creating a parallel set of guidelines, which conflict with those long-standing standards established by some specialised UN agencies such as the UN Fund for Children (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO) and World Food Programme (WFP), nevertheless, it was a crucial step forward for the realisation of principles of humanitarian action into practice. The earlier initiatives did not go any further than putting forward a set of principles at a conceptual level, however, the Sphere Project actually brought about a set of minimum standards and their accompanying indicators. Challenges of ‘New Humanitarianism’ in a Post-Cold War Context The early 1990s gave rise to hopes for a co-ordinated approach to crises, involving military, diplomatic, humanitarian and developmental instruments within an integrated political framework. There were a growing number of ‘success stories’, from Mozambique to Cambodia and Central America. In these cases the use of the military component essentially had been aimed at supporting and protecting relief operations while establishing a broader climate of security. The military had been subordinate to humanitarian activity. Such operations were based on a new approach to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief, with a pivotal role for the United Nations-United States-European Community partnership. The new context, with the attention put on appropriate reconstruction and development policies, gave the EC the opportunity to display its considerable capacity in this field and allowed space for the now heavyweight role of NGOs, whose spectrum of competencies was easily (though sometimes superficially) converted to the new challenge. Abruptly, the tragic experience of Somalia placed the new generation of operations on hold. After the initial shock, the international community became more reluctant in its willingness to get involved in new missions and assume new responsibilities. More and more often, the Security Council’s members – vis á vis major complex emergencies – were capable only of agreeing on the lowest common denominator of international politics: relief. The new philosophy could be summarised as dispatching humanitarian aid but disdaining any political engagement. The case of Rwanda was paradigmatic: an ethnocide was carried out in full view of the media and international community, yet the latter’s response was

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sluggish. However, over four hundred and fifty NGOs descended on the country, creating a major coordination problem. By 1994–95, many international NGOs, reinforced by academics and institutions, were acutely aware of the insufficiency of international political responses to crises, namely the tendency of institutions to agree on relief as the sole solution. In France, the expression piége humanitaire (humanitarian trap) reflected the increasing frustration of aid organisations facing endless engagement in complex emergencies. Pasquier (2001) underlines the challenge faced by humanitarian organisations by stating that they “… either find themselves alone in coping with situations of chaos and unbridled violence that go beyond their capacity for action and far exceed their mandates, or, at the other extreme, see themselves relegated to the sidelines of operations conducted by those same States in conflicts where the political interests of the latter happen to coincide with the concerns of the humanitarian community” (www.odi.org.uk/hpg/confpapers/pasquier.pdf).4 At this stage, institutions and NGOs, as well as academics, undertook a series of major critical reviews of contemporary humanitarianism. Recurring themes arising from these deliberations included: concerns for efficiency and effectiveness; the need for coordination; a lack of broader policy frameworks for operations; hazy relations between governmental, non-governmental and military actors; a growing awareness that third party assistance might extend conflicts; and increasing interference of the political sphere in neutral humanitarian space. The central role of UN agencies in operations had contributed to an increasing politicisation of aid, at the same time that the space for the UN-led peacekeeping actions was shrinking. While the UN role was discussed, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), now the largest donor in humanitarian aid, decided to develop its own ‘European way’. The situation changed again in 1995, after the NATO decision to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite a traditional awkwardness in relations with military actors, many humanitarian organisations welcomed the role of military intervention as the catalyst in ending five years of bloodshed. The working relationship forged in Bosnia and Herzegovina went some way towards eroding the traditional lack of trust between the military and humanitarian sectors and contributed towards the creation of the cultural and political conditions that made a new multidisciplinary approach possible.5 Europe became a major player in this new environment. ECHO and NGOs Established in 1992, ECHO has worked in 85 countries including Central and Eastern Europe, and Former Yugoslavia. It manages funds from the European Commission budget and the European Development Fund. In the period 1992–1995, 1176 million Ecu were allocated to former Yugoslavia, 48% of the total European humanitarian aid (Commission plus Member States), which totalled 2270 million Ecu.6 In order to strengthen its links with operational organisations, ECHO worked with a selected group of partners (UN, NGOs and the Red Cross) through a

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specific Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA). Its stated purpose was “… to define roles and responsibilities in the implementation of humanitarian operations financed by the European Community.”(www.europa.eu.int). Initially, NGOs were recipients of about one third of the ECHO budget, with this figure increasing to 67% by 1999. Crises in Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia served as catalysts in this process of devolution to NGOs. A growing sensitivity in European civil society, touched by its proximity to the theatre of war, encouraged responses with a ‘social’ quality, while the crisis of development policies pushed many NGDOs to look at humanitarian aid as a compatible alternative. As politics seemed to be increasingly concerned with peace, stability, democratisation and human rights, the concept of a multi-faceted international community working within the same framework began to appear more plausible. Intertwining political objectives such as development and democracy building with humanitarian ones appeared to be an inevitable (though delicate) step towards a new vision of security. This was a vision which included, on the one hand, sustainable development; on the other control of migration flows and economic stability. A vision mirrored, on the humanitarian side, by the new theoretical approach called New Humanitarianism. Focus on quality New Humanitarianism had the potential to simplify many of the challenges facing the humanitarian sector, particularly the obstacle that prevented governments from integrating humanitarian aid into their foreign policy toolboxes. A new activism pervaded humanitarianism: wider peacekeeping, droit d’ingérence, militaryhumanitarian standing forces, continuum and other concepts emerged, to offer a methodological framework for the new broader humanitarian community. The European Commission focused on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) – a single doctrinal framework encompassing all the components of crisis response. The new approach embraced all stages of a crisis: prevention, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, institution building, reconstruction and reconciliation, conflict resolution and crisis management. By the turn of the century, ‘new’ humanitarian aid had reached a critical phase (Macrae, 2001a): “First, the blurring of humanitarian and political objectives has meant that the motivation behind humanitarian decision-making has become much less clear. … Second, the integrationist approach assumed that not engaging on humanitarian issues with certain parties, because of their human rights, records are an ethical approach. ... The idea of the ‘bad victim’ becomes legitimised” (www.odi.org.uk/hpg/confpapers/macrae.pdf). The climax of this trend was the Kosovo war and the situation subsequently worsened with Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003): humanitarian principles are systematically invoked and violated to justify ‘humanitarian wars’ in the name of ‘human rights’; and NGOs bring relief through funding from the same governments which waged the war, working side by side with the soldiers who fought it. It is the end of independence and neutrality, perfectly symbolised by the simultaneous dropping of bombs and food rations from US Air Force planes in

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Afghanistan. Impartiality ceased to be a taboo since the programme ‘Energy for Democracy’ was carried out in Serbia in 1999–2000. Initiated by the Red Cross numerous organisations, along with voices from within the establishment, have asked politics to withdraw from the humanitarian arena. Europe is missing an opportunity For many NGOs and commentators the European institutions present themselves as the most likely political actor in the search for an acceptable overarching policy framework for humanitarianism. The process of drafting the European Convention presented an opportunity of reaffirming the principled nature of European aid but unfortunately it was a missed opportunity, preventing Europe from becoming the first sovereign entity whose fundamental charter is entirely based on international law. The Convention has just drafted the legal framework for the future of EU humanitarian interventions. A large group of humanitarian organisations (through the networks VOICE, Solidar and Eurostep) have expressed strong criticisms on the draft (VOICE, et al, 2003). Conclusions Humanitarian action in conflict affected countries takes place in a highly politicised environment in which political, operational and humanitarian decisions are made in an overlapping and interchangeable manner. They are often used as a substitute for each other as humanitarian assistance is increasingly used as a compensation for the lack of willingness to bring about a political resolution to armed conflicts. Furthermore, the boundaries between civilians and combatants are no longer clear. Those working as farmers during the day may be waging a war at night. The response to such crises comes from a wide range of governmental, nongovernmental, multilateral and local actors, as well as the international military, each with totally different mandates, thereby adding to the overall confusion and complexity of the situation. Some of the common features of today’s humanitarian response are, unfortunately, power wrangling ‘turf wars’ between different actors and competition for funding among NGOs. It is in such an environment that relief agencies are required to observe the above-mentioned principles of humanitarian action. Whether they are in the form of a list of commitments, ideals or minimum standards, the scope for obstacles to their realisation is clearly enormous. Consequently, humanitarian agencies often find themselves making difficult judgements on how best to help war-affected populations, whilst not exacerbating the conflict’s root causes and sustaining its dynamics. It was in response to this challenge that Anderson’s ‘Do No Harm’ concept attracted considerable breadth of interest in the field of humanitarianism. Organisations at the teleological end of the spectrum have been eager to adopt this concept, as they rightly emphasize that humanitarian assistance does not operate in a political vacuum. It is thought that through the provision of minimal amounts of material input humanitarian agencies might reduce the possibility of their assistance becoming a factor in sustaining the conflict. Such organisations were also eager to advocate the deployment of ‘developmental relief ’ in their programmes. In other words, they insist that

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addressing root causes should be considered as a more appropriate approach to the realities of today’s armed conflicts. It is also accepted that, although often well intentioned, some humanitarian assistance programmes might exacerbate crises by feeding war economies, thereby posing an obstacle to self-sufficiency and more sustainable solutions. Experience shows that humanitarianism can no longer hide behind the façade of ‘altruism’ and expect that all its actions will simply result in something good. Goodness as an outcome is not an inherited part of the intention and motivation of humanitarianism, but can only be achieved through a dedicated professionalism at both policy and field levels. In order to ensure this however, humanitarianism should base its actions on certain principles that are widely accepted and endorsed by a broad range of agencies. Nevertheless, this needs to be done by bearing in mind the fact those principles such as ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ in particular, may be impossible to adhere to in certain circumstances. Humanitarian agencies cannot simply be compelled to act when and where possible, regardless of the possible negative impact of their actions. As the teleological perspective advocates, the consequences of humanitarian action should be weighed carefully and, if necessary, the decision to reduce humanitarian assistance or to provide no assistance at all in some circumstances, should be one of the possible options open to agencies. A relief agency’s position on the humanitarian spectrum is defined collectively by its actions and stated mandate. For an agency like the ICRC, adherence to the principles of humanitarian action is of the utmost importance and it is this that makes ICRC particularly distinctive among other humanitarian agencies. However, for many other agencies, neither in terms of resources nor in the reality of their operational environment, could they ensure the same level of adherence to the principles of ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’. It should also be recognised that, because of the special status of the ICRC, its donors would know that they have little or no influence over its activities, giving the ICRC the advantage of being totally independent. However, this does not mean that agencies with a more teleological approach cannot have a similar independence. For example, MSF refuses funding from some donors in order to maintain its independence. Besides, even the ICRC has to accept that the belligerents of today’s conflicts have little recognition or understanding of the Red Cross emblems or principles. The recent proliferation of aid agencies also makes it hard for combatants to differentiate the one from the other (Barrow and Jennings, 2001:39). On the other hand, by acknowledging that humanitarian action might sometimes need to disregard the principles of impartiality and neutrality in order to be more careful about possible negative consequences, the new aid orthodoxy also runs the risk of blurring important boundaries between humanitarian work and political action. If this is deemed to be absolutely necessary on humanitarian grounds as well as the grounds of the agency’s mandate, then the most effective approach would be to identify mitigation strategies for the possible consequences of reducing activities or providing no assistance at all. In other words, the ‘Do No Harm’ concept should not be hijacked as a rationale for not taking any action, but instead should be used as guidance for the design of appropriate mitigation

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strategies. The important distinction to be made here is that while aid should be politically informed, as it increasingly is, it should not be politically driven. In order to address the root causes of conflict and provide political solutions, it should be accepted that political engagement is necessary. However, it is not the role of aid workers to serve this purpose, as political responsibility lies in the political not the humanitarian sphere. Ironically, the alternative to the principles of humanitarian action would be Slim’s (1997) contrasting list of ‘principles’ which he sees as central tenets of today’s humanitarianism: misunderstanding, isolationism, unilateralism, fluctuating and limited multilateralism, selectivity and containment.7 Although this is a disparaging view of the current humanitarian environment, it perhaps serves well to demonstrate how the role and importance of central tenets such as neutrality and impartiality have been seriously diminished in the eyes of many in the field of humanitarianism. Furthermore, policy trends, from 1999 on, have heightened the need to reestablish clear boundaries for humanitarian action, as well as an ad hoc political framework. If the future European constitution as discussed earlier, is not able to provide an appropriate framework for humanitarian decision-making processes, then the international community needs to look at other possibilities such as, for instance, the establishment of a mechanism, perhaps a technical-ethical committee – independent from Governments, the Security Council or the European Commission – aimed at ensuring that humanitarian aid is not dependent on or exploited by political agendas or vested interests. The credibility of any such mechanism should be above suspicion. The main task of such a body would be promptly to analyse a crisis, assess the needs and decide, or at least recommend, the volume and forms of assistance. This would have to be done as soon as possible after the outbreak of the crisis and then subjected to an ongoing review. The mechanism could also be entrusted with postfacto evaluation. Its tasks need not necessarily be limited to specific crises. The independent body could also address general recommendations on the conduct of humanitarian assistance and perhaps, at least informally, propose draft legislation. In short, it would have both monitoring powers and powers of political and normative initiative in the field of humanitarian assistance. The key element of the envisaged mechanism’s success would have to be its moral authority. Nonetheless, assigning some sort of semi-binding force to its recommendations is an option that should not be ruled out: for instance, further procedural requirements for decisionmaking could be added in case its recommendations are not followed. International practice provides examples of independent bodies, including numerous international fact-finding bodies and commissions of inquiry, although no model is likely to be suitable without adaptation. The composition and functioning of this independent monitoring body would have to be carefully considered in order to combine independence and credibility with the necessary technical expertise, effectiveness and capacity for rapid-response.

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4 CAN PROACTIVE HUMANITARIANISM CREATE SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS? CHALLENGES TO THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN ACEH Sultan Barakat, David Connolly and Judith Large

Conflict through its varied manifestations frequently challenges the international community to find suitable strategies for intervention. The complexities range from understanding root causes to managing the dynamics of peace processes. In selecting a recent and innovative example, this chapter examines the impact of third-party facilitation in the protracted low-intensity conflict in the Province of Aceh, Indonesia. Positioned within a theoretical framework of third-party intervention, are some of the main findings from field evaluations by the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) and from a separate independent review.1 From this analysis, the authors draw comparative lessons from the process of joint dialogue in Aceh as facilitated by the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC). Keeping in mind the tendency for peace processes to waver and freeze, the analysis is framed by the inception of HDC’s engagement with the Government of Indonesia (GoI) in late 1999 and closes with the launching of the major military offensive against the separatist rebels (GAM) in May 2003. After gaining approval and support from former President Wahid, the HDC began an exploratory process of conflict and risk analysis and consultations with the relevant stakeholders and actors in Aceh, Jakarta and abroad. After this first phase, the HDC was obliged to re-define its institutional profile from a political to a humanitarian image in order to increase confidence and support within the GoI. Accordingly, this change emphasised HDC’s institutional independence; its sole promotion of humanitarian dialogue; impartiality and respect for the laws and sovereignty of Indonesia; the rejection of mediation and the adoption of facilitation. Until April 2000, the HDC used talks in Geneva to determine future negotiation partners and to draft the first joint agreement, the Humanitarian Pause,

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between the two warring parties. Known originally as ‘The Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause in Aceh’, the three-month cease-fire agreement was signed by representatives from the GoI and GAM in May 2000. After some hesitancy between the two sides, the Humanitarian Pause (the Pause) was extended for another three months until January 2001. At this point, a significant development in the dialogue process occurred with the joint signing of a ‘Moratorium on Violence’. Although this mainly represented another short-term security agreement, it also encouraged the future possibility of resolving more substantive political issues within the conflict and made the provision for democratic consultations among the Acehnese. In March 2001 and under the new name, ‘Peace through Dialogue’, the process promoted additional changes; in particular, the attempt to create a demilitarised peace zone in north Aceh and a more organised effort to gain greater awareness of the process among the public. ‘Peace through Dialogue’ also aimed to increase the number of dialogue participants within the two sides and the frequency of the joint meetings between operational commanders. Nevertheless and as discussed in detail below, the main structures and approach of the Pause continued as the foundations of the intervention process. Despite the furtherance of joint agreements and their international support, security violations on the ground proceeded to undermine progress. Consequently, in April 2001, the GoI authorised an increase in police and military operations and troops in Aceh. Although the two sides continued to meet, the arrest of six GAM negotiators demonstrated the GoI’s overall impatience with the rebels and signified the government’s eagerness to reassert their authority and power. The July election of Megawati Sukarnoputri as President and the conferring of ‘special autonomy’ or limited self-government (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalem or NAD) to the province in August confirmed the GoI’s uncompromising approach to GAM’s demands for independence. A fresh round of talks in February 2002 allowed the GoI to restate officially their determination to pursue a military solution unless the rebels softened their political aims. Despite the stalemate, the intermittent input into the process of three internationally respected diplomats (International Advisory Group) revived the momentum for the two sides to progress. In May 2002, the GoI and GAM signed the ‘Joint Statement on the Cessation of Hostilities’, reaffirming previous commitments on security promises and the need to develop a more inclusive process of dialogue. Critically, for GAM, the agreement officially declared their acceptance of autonomy as a starting point for a political resolution to the conflict. In September, the GoI submitted their draft of a peace framework and gave the rebels until the end of the year to confirm their acceptance of autonomy as a prerequisite for dialogue. Evidently, this formed a formidable hurdle for the long-standing, though internally-divided separatists. In recognising the seriousness of this, perhaps final stalemate, the HDC introduced another dimension of incentives and support from the international community. In order to persuade GAM to reconsider their demands for independence, the introduction of an international monitoring team and a relaxation of the army’s offensive role were promised. Furthermore, both sides were encouraged to

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demilitarise simultaneously and gradually within specific peace zones. Joint agreement on these issues was reached on 10 December 2002, through the signing of the ‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’ (COHA). In appreciating this achievement, it is essential to recognise the role of the international community in keeping the two sides talking. Specifically, one month before COHA, 23 countries (including Japan, the United States and members of the European Union) agreed to deliver substantial financial aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh, once a more permanent cease-fire had been reached. Despite the above inducements for the GoI and GAM and the success of the initial peace zone during the first few months of 2003, basic promises on security could not be kept. Moreover, the more ambitious aims of demilitarising and disarming across the province proved impossible to implement. By mid-May 2003, the GoI decided to abandon the process of joint dialogue and instead launched a major military offensive in the province. Although the overall process of intervention achieved significant progress in getting the two warring sides to enter into dialogue at different levels of command, a comprehensive cessation of hostilities proved elusive. While all the joint agreements form important reference points, the authors argue that the foundational Humanitarian Pause holds the key to understanding the potentials and limitations of the intervention process. In particular and stemming from contextrelated factors that hindered the forging of an intervention process, the analysis identifies five main challenges and suggests alternative approaches for intervening agencies. The selection of a suitable intervention strategy for third-party actors in an armed conflict forms the first main challenge. While obvious in principle, the need to tailor strategy according to context can be easily underestimated in practice. This can occur when a rapid response is deemed critical for humanitarian reasons and/or the political opportunities for intervention are considered scarce. Based on the particular form of intervention in Aceh, that is, taking a proactive approach to humanitarianism starting with the Humanitarian Pause, the authors focus on the far-reaching limitations of using a ‘negotiated access for humanitarian aid’ strategy in creating sustainable solutions to conflict. The other four central challenges for the third-party include creating a level playing field among dialogue partners; keeping the intervention process clean of the conflict; implementing agreements; and balancing a two-fold institutional image of the third party. Internationally, the increasing number of active Conflict Transformation Agencies (CTAs) reflects variations in traditional forms of third-party intervention. Andrew Rigby defines CTAs as ‘national or international, non-profit, charitable organizations committed to working with or alongside local and international actors in analysing, understanding and responding to violent conflict in constructive and creative ways’.2 To give a basic idea of quantity and field presence, two key observers recently estimated there are between 400–480 ‘conflict resolution’ agencies operating world-wide.3 Despite the significant number of CTAs, the vast majority of these organisations operate as ‘third-parties’ in other people’s wars, with little or no

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examination of their role.4 Although there are some notable analytical reviews of new conflict resolution techniques,5 there is insufficient examination of the role of third-parties and inadequate case study research through which to gauge progress. For the intervening agencies, Rigby emphasises the need for a broader understanding of the main challenges faced in the field and their relevance to research students, analysts and decision-makers. Therefore, this chapter aspires to connect this particular breach between the theory and practice of conflict resolution, with reference to the Province of Aceh. Before examining the specifics of the case-study in question, it is necessary to locate where the process of third-party intervention in Aceh intersects conceptually within the relevant theory. Conflict resolution itself can be conceptualised as having many constituent parts including: analysis, advocacy, mediation, negotiation, political problem-solving, security, justice and accountability among others.6 Although these aspects strengthen our understanding of conflict resolution, thirdparty intervention has been subject to a conversely limited interpretation. Furthermore, Bruce Jones contests that the ‘literature on third-party intervention is agnostic as to the nature of the original parties to the conflict and as to the type of actor which can assume a third-party role’ [authors’ emphasis]. This assertion is grounded in the split between ‘international society literature’ and ‘conflict resolution literature’. For the former, states intervene to prevent other states violating the human rights of its citizens. The latter defines third-parties as ‘various actors’ who intervene, ‘between two or more actors who are engaged in conflict with each other’.7 As Jones points out, the third-party role in ‘intervention’ is conceptualised following the English-language meaning of the word as ‘to come between’, ‘to interpose’. Using this as a starting point, the author proposes four types of intervention: unarmed and pacific, which is mediation and facilitation by non-state actors and some conventional diplomatic processes; unarmed and coercive, including such actions as logistical or training support for a government or armed rebel force, trade sanctions, pressure and leverage through financial incentives (debt relief, huge aid packages); armed and pacific, as in peacekeeping operations with the consent of parties to the conflict; and armed and coercive, the use of force against one of the parties in favour of the other or in favour of part of the population. In Aceh, the HDC, a Swiss-based independent agency with no previous experience in Indonesia, promoted itself as a humanitarian actor (‘unarmed and pacific’). Above all, this role entailed facilitating dialogue between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the armed Aceh/Sumatra Liberation Front (ASNLF) or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM).8 As instructed by all of the contemporary discourse above, the term ‘humanitarian’ is frequently added to similar actors, implying the reduction of suffering and promotion of a designated common good according to stated universal principles. In the Aceh conflict, it was hoped primarily humanitarian concerns could be used to unite both the GoI and GAM in agreeing to a ‘pause’ in the conflict. That is, by bringing basic humanitarian principles to the fore, both sides were expected to agree on a short-term, temporary cease-fire to allow the unimpeded delivery of aid and assistance during a predetermined and specific period.

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Based on the humanitarian intent of the HDC and the need to avoid the charged connotations that a cease-fire may imply, the term ‘Humanitarian Pause’ was coined to reflect the first joint concern between the state and the rebels.9 From this position, humanitarianism was intended to be proactive, that is, to prevent the low-intensity conflict in Aceh from spiralling in the direction of a complex emergency. Ultimately, it was believed that the prevention of a humanitarian disaster could become an appropriate lever for conflict transformation by creating a space for joint dialogue. Preliminary field visits by the PRDU emphasised that the prevention of large-scale internal displacement was a particular concern. This chapter interprets the joint process, that is, the facilitation of dialogue or enabling warring parties to speak to each other, as a facet within mediation which represents a form of third-party intervention. Chester Crocker et al. (1999) divides mediation into two paradigms – the structuralist and the social-psychological. For the former, the causes of conflict are treated as ‘objective’, requiring leverage and influence since they directly affect the calculations of each party as to potential losses and gains. For the latter social-psychological school, mediation is grounded in problem-solving workshops, consultative meetings and ‘third-party-assisted dialogue, undertaken by both official and non-governmental structures’. Accordingly, the aim is to provide a forum to explore options, attitudes, and possible solutions.10 On reflection, the HDC is classified within this second paradigm. From a different though complementary standpoint, Marie Kleiboer provides a broader framework for the political process of mediation. As intervention, mediation is divided into the generic models of: Power Brokerage, Political Problem-Solving, ‘Domination’ (taking over rather than enabling) and the Restructuring Relationships model.11 If we locate the HDC somewhere on the continuum of political problem-solving/restructuring relationships, Kleiboer lists two indicators of mediation success. The first is process – the representation of all relevant parties and the degree to which parties voluntarily reach an agreement. The second is outcomes – which concerns the depth and strength of the agreement, the short- or long-term implications and the degree of support. The latter depends on whether there is maximum support versus strong protests from key players or the undermining of key players by maximum opposition. The nature of the conflict The Acehnese have nurtured a long history of rebellion, taking fierce pride in their fighting ability, cultural and linguistic distinctiveness and strong Islamic identity.12 The province emerged as a Sultanate or sovereign state in the 16th century and preserved its independence against the Portuguese, with the Dutch engaging in 35 years of conflict to complete the process of colonisation. Therefore, when Indonesia sought to resolve the conflict in 2000, it confronted perennial Acehnese resistance to external domination. Although Aceh is endowed with a variety of lucrative natural resources, which have the potential for economic development,13 struggles to control and exploit these resources have made economics a significant catalyst of the conflict in its historical and modern manifestations.

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In the late 1940s, Aceh became incorporated within the newly-born Indonesian Republic, after giving financial and material assistance to the central government and striking a political deal in good faith. However, within a decade of rule from Java and a resultant curbing of de facto autonomy, serious discontent emerged among the Acehnese. Local elites, in particular the influential Islamic scholars, fearful that the role of Islam would be undermined, supported an armed rebellion from 1953 until the early 1960s. President Sukarno responded by returning Aceh’s provincial status and its autonomy in religious and cultural matters, thereby settling the tensions between the province and Jakarta.14 When Suharto replaced Sukarno as president, the promise of full autonomy was once again broken and in 1976 GAM began to fight intermittently for secession. Since the 1980s, the growth of oil- and gas-based industries in the northeast of the province has increased the stakes among the warring parties, making the aims of the conflict more complex and fragmented. In terms of ‘hearts and minds’, patterns in the exploitation of minerals have created widely-held and long-standing grievances over governance, underdevelopment and revenue drain to Jakarta elites. The Indonesian armed forces, in their attempts to maintain national unity and control of natural resources, simultaneously launched a sustained counterinsurgency campaign. By early 2000, the conflict had inflicted significant losses for GAM, the military and in particular for the civilian population with more than 10,000 fatalities, several thousand presumed missing/disappeared and the habitual violation of human rights by both sides. The subsequent experience of indiscriminate military repression in the late 1970s and particularly in 1989 and the early 1990s, deepened alienation from the Indonesian State and accelerated popular support for independence.15 The International Crisis Group (ICG) cites an independent study of statistics on casualties between 1989 and 1998, which suggests between 1,000 and 3,000 people were killed with another 900–1,400 missing, believed dead. Death tolls are controversial and much disputed, and some estimates by Acehnese NGOs are much higher.16 Despite the implementation of the Humanitarian Pause, the 2001 death toll for the conflict was estimated at more than 1,700 or approximately twice that for the year 2000.17 After this period, prominent religious, academic and human rights leaders were targeted and assassinated with an increase in cases of abduction and torture by an anonymous third-force.18 This was of special significance for the Acehnese since the distinct pattern of violence was indicative of the decade of military repression. For GAM, its most symbolic loss occurred when the security forces killed the commander of its military wing19 in late January 2002, three days after the provincial governor of Aceh invited him to peace talks.20 Long before the intervention process in Aceh, there was a common and ingrained perception among the central government and the security forces of a threatened national sovereignty. This threat may be seen as having both external and internal dimensions. In addition to ‘internal’ campaigns for independence within several provinces, the ‘external’ dimension is seen in the attempt to link Acehnese separatism (and the suspected revival of similar claims in West Papua) with attempts by foreign powers to carve up Indonesia. Neither clear evidence, nor the identity of

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the foreign powers in question, is made obvious to the Indonesian public; nevertheless many government officials are suspicious of foreign NGO agendas. The linkage of separatism with foreign subversion is a long-standing element in official Indonesian discourse and has become even more common since August 1999. 21 When HDC entered in late 1999, the pre-existing degree of suspicion from the central government must have represented a formidable barrier and made the conflict in Aceh seem intractable. Although the opposition to external interference continued, the May 1998 resignation of President Suharto marked the possibility of new political opportunities for intervention. At the grassroots level in Aceh it prompted the rapid growth of a peaceful movement for self-determination among youth and students.22 The transfer of power to President Habibie and subsequent events bringing President Wahid to power led to new openness and heightened feelings of public expectancy.23 The Acehnese public mobilised peaceful proreferendum demonstrations and local organisations estimated the gathering of one million people at the main mosque in Banda Aceh during a rally in November 1999. Since this event came in the wake of East Timorese independence and some months before the Papuan People’s Conference in May 2000, the spectre of such popular expression was extremely threatening to Jakarta’s governing circles. Moreover, the end of the Suharto era and the welcoming of democratic principles allowed a re-thinking of the military approach to the conflict in Aceh. Factors that complicated the intervention process Before identifying some of the barriers to the process of facilitation, it is useful to consider the background of HDC and its connection to Aceh. Coinciding with the aspirations for a fresh political era in Indonesia, the latter half of 1998 also marked the founding of the Geneva-based centre. Given the challenges posed by the changing conditions in which humanitarian actors were operating in the 1990s, numerous specialists came together in 1997 to identify needs in the area of humanitarian assistance and the problems that a new centre might resolve.24 At the end of this review, the HDC was established with the following statutory aims: to develop and strengthen a universal, intercultural and multidisciplinary dialogue in which all players concerned by humanitarian issues can exchange their experiences; and to devise and promote sustainable solutions to humanitarian problems. The structures of the centre include a foundation council, an executive director and a programme committee.25 The statutory aims were reflected in the objectives of the Pause, which worked towards the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the provision of security to support this delivery and the reduction of tension and violence. The third objective was to promote confidence-building measures toward a peaceful solution. Implementation was conducted through a Joint Forum and two joint committees on security and humanitarian action, whose progress was monitored by two separate teams. The composition of these bodies was designed to draw a balance of representatives from the GoI and GAM, with some members from civil society.26 The HDC was charged with facilitating the work of the forum, committees and monitoring teams.

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Governments and international organisations enthusiastically endorsed the process, media coverage heralded it as a major breakthrough27 and promises of support came from the United States and European Union. International agencies channelled substantial funds towards programmes designed to build confidence in the Pause.28 The HDC was able to build on the international support and optimism and found sufficient goodwill and individual participation to convene meetings between the key parties. Although the Pause specified humanitarian intent to reduce or stop violence as a confidence-building measure, it was not intended to resolve political differences directly.29 While it lacked the permanence and promise of traditional cease-fires and truces, its design was simple in that it signified the first symbolic act toward constructive dialogue. Furthermore, the ‘pause did enable some changes in the confrontation, the most important being the creation of joint working groups on several issues’.30 Although progress in implementing the Pause was slow, during the first phase it appeared the conceptual strengths of proactive humanitarianism might be put into practice with notable benefits, in particular, the overall reduction in fatalities. For the local people in Banda Aceh, the temporary lull in violence and the arrival of a small international contingent created enormous expectations and re-ignited hopes for a referendum and independence. However, from the start one complicating and recurring factor was the enforcement of joint promises on security. For example, the joint committees succeeded in facilitating the return of some internally displaced persons (IDPs) but their safety could not be guaranteed. Numerous violations of the Pause were committed and the work of the monitoring teams was hampered by the fact that both sides continued to produce different explanations of incidents.31 There was a growing disparity between promises made in Geneva and the reality of what was happening on the ground. The Pause was not delivering because security, responsibility and accountability remained contested areas, in pragmatic terms, the people talking could not deliver. A further factor that stalled the intervention process was the degree of internal division and lack of consensus among the dialogue partners. Using the politically sensitive title of ‘facilitator’, thereby distancing itself from the pejorative overtones of ‘mediator’, the Swiss agency was able to initiate a presence in Aceh without affecting the principle of state sovereignty.32 Although the initial acceptance of the HDC was grounded in the direct support of President Wahid, it lacked uniform approval among the military and political conservatives, which proved later to be a significant constraint. After the inception of the Pause, political opposition eventually viewed the process of facilitation as a form of capitulation to the rebels in Aceh. At the macro-level, severe discord stemmed from rapid change, vested interests, threatened positions and reforms that were far from consolidated. Not all of the military (TNI) leadership respected the new President Wahid; military and business interests overlapped in state oil and gas companies. Once positioned in the field, the HDC opted to work directly with representatives of the GoI and the GAM leadership of Hassan di Tiro.33 However,

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GAM is a village-based group, fragmented across the villages of Aceh and divided by conflicting military and economic objectives. Evidence suggests that even in 1999 GAM was not unified, with semi-mafia configurations in certain areas that still prevail today. Competitive factions and mini-warlords functioned in a predatory fashion, with examples of small rural development projects being sabotaged to keep people from being independent: for example, pepper fields burned to remove local cash crops, and representative measures to keep locals under control. Based on the sole choice of di Tiro, it was clear that from the beginning the negotiating partners were also restricted. As considered further below, other key stakeholders included the splinter faction, MP GAM, and those committed to nonviolence, for example, the student movement and the Ulama. A third complicating factor was the emergence of new and competing agendas as an unintentional outcome of the intervention process. This factor had several knock-on effects, which led to the further entrenchment of the two warring sides. As the HDC went ‘operational’ in the field, GAM gained a breathing space and became more composed, held public meetings and took over public functions. Using organised and parallel systems of governance, GAM provided protection, collected illegal taxes and issued birth and marriage certificates. Partisans pointed to these as civilian administration tasks similar to those in a real state, while critics considered it racketeering and robbery. By August 2000, 200 government offices had been burned in several districts34 and it was also generally accepted that most of the villages in Aceh paid GAM 20 per cent of their development funds from the central government.35 In their attempts to restore the status quo ante, the Indonesian military responded with ‘sweeping operations’ to clear villages of GAM sympathisers. This sharp increase in violence represented the fourth destabilising factor. Between January and the beginning of August 2000 approximately 300 people were killed in Aceh. IDPs were attacked in the camps where they had sought shelter. Linked to this increase, a change in the nature of the violence occurred, exemplified by several high-profile attacks on human rights and development staff.36 It sent a clear signal that international agencies perceived as supporting ‘the enemy’ were not wanted in Aceh. In March 2001, the Banda Aceh-based Monitoring Team on Security Matters, accompanied by an HDC international staff member, was attacked in north Aceh by the Indonesian military (TNI) as they were investigating an incident. Equally, in a separate incident in the same month, the Head of the South Aceh Monitoring Team, his lawyer and his driver, ‘were killed on their way back home after answering a police summons. They were investigating rape cases allegedly involving Brimob (Police Mobile Brigade) personnel.’37 Not forgetting the tragic loss of life, the incidents demonstrated that the HDC Aceh process offered no more immunity to violence to its local staff than it did to local people generally. Despite the continuation of the intervention process through a series of shortterm, joint agreements, a large suffering population found themselves caught in what locals describe as a ‘sandwich’ position between two or more armed forces. The situation was further confounded by the ‘hidden hand’ or third-force factor which exemplified the difficulties for outsiders in understanding the complex nature

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of the conflict. For some time Acehnese and other Indonesian observers have believed that not all of the conflict originates from the struggle between GAM and the Indonesian military, arguing that a ‘third-force’ or ‘forces’ have vested interests in exacerbating the conflict and the disorder. For example, it was possible that dissident groups in GAM launched attacks in order to sabotage the joint agreements. It was also claimed by some that the military runs its own ‘third-force’ in order to discredit GAM and justify the eventual imposition of martial law. Similarly, it has been rumoured that military deserters and criminal configurations engaged in the marijuana trade or simple banditry have an interest in destabilisation. For the HDC, this often made it difficult to determine who was influencing the cycle of violence. One major instrumental factor in the deterioration of the security situation during March 2001 was the closure of the ExxonMobil plant. Due to a perceived increase in attacks on its staff and facilities, the US oil company closed three gas fields. As a consequence, it forced the liquefied natural gas (LNG) company PT Arun NGL Co, which relies on ExxonMobil for its natural gas supply as a raw fuel, to stop its LNG output and its LNG shipments to South Korea and Japan. The subsequent timing and the inclusion of the US company’s local site in one of the first peace zones of 2001, risked a hijacking of the intervention process. The oil and gas installations have always been central to the conflict in its modern form and this was demonstrated by their influence on the GoI’s security and military approach. By the end of March, there was a blatant relationship between ExxonMobil’s decision to stop production and the growing military presence on the ground.38 This became increasingly obvious, as Indonesian troops appeared poised to expand military operations with the arrival of three infantry battalions and an armoured cavalry troop in Lhokseumawe. In sum, the 2,000 military personnel represented the biggest security deployment in Indonesia ever to defend a vital installation.39 In considering the salience of the LNG industry and the prominence of those who stood to make a political and economic loss, it was a risk allowing the closure of ExxonMobil to become linked to the stammering dialogue process. Attempts brokered by the HDC to reach agreements for a designated ‘peace zone’ to ensure oil production and the cessation of immediate hostilities did not hold. In April a Presidential Decree (No. 4) was announced, declaring a new approach to the problem of armed separatists in Aceh, integrated in terms of, ‘political, economic, social, law and public order, security, information and communication’ concerns. However, this was mostly demonstrated by a major military offensive against GAM.40 Although this protracted and low-intensity conflict has its own specific features, it is possible to identify common problems for the third-party when intervening in conflict. Based primarily on the case study of Aceh and with reference to other contexts, alternative approaches to these central challenges are addressed.

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Five central challenges to third-party intervention

Selecting a suitable strategy of intervention As stated at the beginning, choosing an appropriate intervention strategy is of fundamental importance to the third-party. It is clear that the HDC’s approach to the GoI and GAM was catalytic, a classic third-party intervention offering to assist two opposing groups in face-to-face contact and dialogue. For the GoI, this was the first time an international, non-governmental facilitator had been accepted to undertake talks with an armed rebel group and was thus considered to be extremely positive.41 As a non-official third-party, skilled humanitarian professionals with impressive international experience staffed the Swiss agency, it could be reasonably assumed that years of experience negotiating access in war zones were a basis for the dialogue approach in Aceh, particularly in achieving a pause. Nevertheless, as an intervention strategy, humanitarian negotiation for access is qualitatively different from political intervention for resolution.42 In the humanitarian negotiation for access strategy, two or more warring groups are dealt with by an agency with its own objective of meeting needs and delivering resources. The mediating party thus has its own goal of bringing in aid, for example, a ton of rice. If warring groups decide that it is in their interest ‘to have the rice’, they are making an agreement with the agency as much as with each other, for a specific time, for a specific purpose. In political dialogue, the difference is the absence of ‘the ton of rice’. The third-party is not directly offering goods, but rather processes: enabling, linkage, facilitation, good offices, taking messages, relaying meanings, assisting communication. The onus to deliver on objectives lies with the parties, not with the intervening agency. In negotiating access, the armed combatants are addressed because of the immediacy of needing to put guns down to allow the delivery of aid. For broader political intervention in protracted social conflicts, the single focus on those who carry the guns runs the risk: (a) of legitimising violence as a means to the negotiating table, and (b) narrowing visions of the future to stated positions rather than broadly representative needs. Therefore: ... the extent to which parties to the conflict are willing to resort to violence if negotiations fail limits mediator leverage, and these third-parties will face an uphill struggle keeping the negotiations on course. Mediation efforts at this level should therefore be directed at …‘lengthening the shadow of the future’ by dramatising the long-term costs of violence to the parties if negotiations fail. Ideally they should also be directed at changing the attitudes of the parties by creating domestic constituencies that are supportive of negotiation and political as opposed to military options …43 HDC’s initial approach encompassed a wide variety of actor and entry points. For reasons of logistics, capacity and political calculation, the approach instead evolved to high level meetings in Switzerland and the Humanitarian Pause framework (the

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establishment of the Joint Council, Joint Monitoring Committees, and Commander-to-Commander meetings). In mid-2001, there were attempts to establish broader representation within the dialogue process through a series of ‘democratic consultations’ with NGOs and civil society leaders, but these were met with resistance due to severe socio-political polarisation. Consequently, emphasis for dialogue was on combatants, rather than a more inclusive approach such as the concerted development of multi-party talks in Northern Ireland. There is an irony here, given the high-profile ground swell of civil society actions in late 1999.44 For Aceh, humanitarian access tactics may be used for confidence-building or interim measures in a strategic process. However, conflict resolution strategy must ultimately encompass multiple interests and the need for fundamental changes in relationships and structures. Humanitarian access negotiations require agreement and action on very specific targets, times and routes, with obligations and understandings undertaken between intervening/outsider agency and conflicting parties. Third-party non-official political mediation relies on opening discussions, enabling processes, trust seeking and long-term transition in messages, positions, actions and structures. The term ‘humanitarian’ was non-offensive to the Indonesian Government and made dialogue acceptable. It also raised reasonable expectations (as well as unrealistic ones) about visible changes in the lives of the suffering – first for IDPs, then for the majority population. Alternatively, useful techniques include back channel approaches,45 the use of problem solving workshops, round table forums, cross-cutting interest groups, trust building, advising on precedents and policy and ‘multi-lateral mediation’. These are options for measured intervention in entrenched and bitter internal conflicts such as Aceh. They constitute a strong alternative to very visible talks and a rapidly established presence on the ground.

Creating a level playing field among dialogue partners Classic negotiation and resolution processes (for example, the communications model) are most effective in situations of relative parity. Such conditions are rare amid the power asymmetry characteristic of modern internalised wars, which involve specific identity groups clashing with central state power. Therefore, in many instances, ‘it is vital to provide the parties with equal status, even though there is an indisputable asymmetric power relationship (realising that) … final compromise is likely to be closer to the original position of the stronger, not the weaker, party’.46 The communications model of negotiation falls short when there are significant differences in power between the parties involved, when violence is institutionalised into relationships, and embedded socio-economic problems impede a realistic negotiated outcome. Mediators automatically face a dilemma in this type of dispute, but want to retain credibility with both sides. The HDC never claimed to be a power broker or the bearer of solutions to the Aceh conflict and although its enabling and facilitating role has always been made clear, it was consistently undermined by the failure or inability of dialogue partners to deliver. Therefore, the model was unsuitable without complementary approaches to structural inequality.

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Dialogue as a strategy assumes some degree of symmetry or rough equality between partners. Each ‘side’ needs comparable power and standing in order to move ‘to the middle’, or indeed to have the incentive for compromise. Without such incentives a third-party can unwittingly contribute to freezing a situation, or holding it in such a way that the stronger power can ‘offer little at the table’, while in fact doing great harm to the weaker adversary in the field.47 In Aceh, the central government was, ‘seen to talk’, in parallel with launching a targeted assassination campaign against GAM leaders. Both parties to the conflict evidently could not consolidate to come into the middle ground and the violence continued. The GoI partly justified their offensive in 2001 by pointing to GAM consolidation on the ground.48 Suffering acute losses in the field, GAM in turn began talking about a role for the ‘People’s Voice’, presumably because their losses were so acute that they stood to lose little by moving to democratic consultations, particularly if they convinced the people to voice demands for independence. In considering also the politicisation of civil society, the moderates were unable to voice alternative modes of leadership and representation. The tensions between the two armed parties reached a significant stage in July 2001, when police arrested six GAM representatives on the security and humanitarian committees, facilitated in Banda Aceh by the HDC.49 One report by an international organisation argues that the arrest of GAM representatives questioned future negotiations since trust in Jakarta had again been broken significantly. Furthermore, GAM wanted to internationalise the talks and the GoI took an antithetical position, arguing that future negotiations would only take place at the local government level. This strategy allowed the central government to distance itself from the joint talks while publicly accusing the HDC of operating beyond their original mandate.50 On reflection, it can be said that third-party intervention contributed to legitimising the Hassan di Tiro GAM leadership by bringing it to the table as the representative voice of the people, ahead of other groups who were also claiming some form of representation. GAM gained a new visibility but also rapidly gained a new vulnerability as well. GoI military operations had some success in targeting GAM leaders for elimination, and in waging a new ‘hearts and minds’ struggle for the loyalty of the people. Such an acute polarization might have been avoided either by limited back-channel mediation or by an approach of dealing with ‘sides’ in a more inclusive way from the beginning, with broader representation from Aceh and a problem-solving framework.

Implementing agreements Examining system levels and ‘re-entry’ illustrates the third challenge of implementing or transferring agreements. From initial meetings in Geneva to the first informal exploratory political discussions in early 2001, third-party facilitation steered carefully to explore the middle ground in a constructive fashion. ‘Tracking’ these discussions in detail would reveal insight into different ‘system’ levels: the immediate participants, representatives of GAM and the GoI (in conjunction with and hosted by HDC); their respective immediate constituencies (Stockholm,

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Jakarta) and the broader political base – the Acehnese population and indeed the overall situation in Indonesia itself. With regard to the establishment of the Pause and its ‘mechanisms’, the PRDU, as contracted by the HDC, used extensive field research to document the evolution of a joint humanitarian committee. Envisaged by the GoI representative as a confidence-building process established on the principles of humanitarian action with a liaison person in Jakarta, GAM insisted on Aceh as the sole location for the joint humanitarian committee. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the Security Modalities Committee would have representation from both sides and a period of three months’ preparation for the Pause was also agreed. The method and means of transferring this to relevant implementation on the ground in Aceh or indeed into the awareness of the Jakarta parliament or TNI leadership was much less clear.51 Overall, the environment in Aceh was fragmented, and interspersed with intimidation and vulnerability stemming from both violence and corruption. The ‘third-force’ element of undefined terror loomed in the experience of the Achenese population, against a background of human rights violations by both ‘sides’ and the legacy of state violence. At the inter-personal ‘system’ level, both parties were ready to meet; at ‘inter-group’ level they were prepared to work together in Banda Aceh. Regardless of this advancement, the wider systemic level was not ready. The majority of Acehnese interviewed in the field (including those on the joint committees) felt the HDC had severely underestimated the ‘character of Indonesian politics’. This comment referred to overestimating executive authority in Jakarta, the nature of military business interests and control in Aceh, and the overlap between local government in Aceh and a culture of corruption. Another aspect not addressed in Geneva was the gravity of human rights abuses in recent Acehnese experience, which resulted in the scarring (physical, psychological) or radicalisation of the population and the pervasive mistrust of ‘authority’ unless it is localised (village based), moral and traditional. That is, ‘authority’ which is visible to outsiders is likely to be the source of fear and mistrust for locals – genuine authority for them is less visible and needs to be demonstrable through transactions of faith, support, loyalty and shared suffering. In one of the reports from the field, Arne Strand observed: ‘the population has at the moment trust in only three groups, the students, NGOs and the Ulama, which they see as their spokespersons and guardians’. The vision of joint monitoring and humanitarian implementation was laudable and constituted a breakthrough in thinking. Translating it into practice beyond the initial relatively successful few weeks was not viable. Unlike precedents for ‘joint committees’, as for example under the United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia after the war in Yugoslavia,52 the Pause and subsequent agreements had neither a legal framework nor an implementing authority. The papers signed on the first joint agreement were never ratified by the GoI; the HDC continued ‘facilitating’ between chosen dialogue partners whose opposing positions remained utterly the same. Other international intervention precedents, such as joint committees in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), or in the power-sharing agreements in Northern Ireland, have carefully crafted institutional agreements with a longer

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‘lead-in’ time and shared accountability. Local precedents, such as the Somali community monitoring teams in Wajir, eastern Kenya, are ‘bottom-up’ from the grass roots with local populations taking collective responsibility for influencing their fighters and elders.53 The HDC made it clear that it was only helping in a process that belonged to the Acehnese and the GoI, but the framework of compliance or enforcement in place was not apparent. Small group work (as demonstrated by the Geneva talks and the formation of the committees in Banda Aceh) on understanding and the possible solutions to problems was intense, often counter-productive and a product of personal exchange. Transferring these ideas to reality from a (small, closed, enabled) system to the wider environment requires either voluntary compliance or authority linkage/guarantees for enforcement, or both.

Keeping the intervention process clean The fourth challenge concerns vested interests and control, in particular, the politicisation of humanitarian aid. ‘Humanitarian’ reasons for a pause in fighting, or ‘cease-fire’, traditionally have been for very specific task-based purposes, such as immunisation, exchange of prisoners and delivery of aid. While humanitarian assistance is seen as an imperative in its own right, it has also been suggested that humanitarian operations may be used to promote long-term peace and security where possible.54 This was clearly a hope in the early days of the 1989-brokered ‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’ (OLS).55 In fact, this aid delivery mechanism negotiated with both government and rebels has long since become an entrenched feature of the conflict.56 Operation Lifeline Sudan was formulated in response to acute emergency and famine conditions. Evidence documented in a study by Barakat and Connolly et al. indicates that while the Acehnese had suffered, ‘indiscriminate killing of civilians, intimidation, harassment, torture and displacement; the Pause was to be proactive with the aim of assisting in the prevention of further humanitarian consequences of violent conflict.’57 The same report cites the main humanitarian areas of need as water and sanitation, health care and shelter, for those displaced or made homeless by the conflict, the repair of infrastructure (including schools), provision of educational materials and compensation for loss of livelihood or disability. At the time of intervention, there were a promising number of humanitarian agencies, with an estimated 120 national and international Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), United Nations Childrens’ Fund (UNICEF) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), operating in the province. This introduces two points: first, while there was a need for humanitarian assistance, specific structures were already in place. Second, the Pause was an agreement based on face-saving for combatants finding their way to ‘dialogue’ as much or more than a genuine response to humanitarian need. Despite this inherent contradiction, the committees established in Banda Aceh were intended as umbrella or coordinating bodies. Rice, milk and medicines were distributed and assistance was given to IDPs. In May 2001, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) local staff estimated that 45 houses had been rebuilt, out of a destroyed 4000.58 For example,

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there were attempts to cultivate joint reconstruction in the village of Idi Rayak and approaches were made to relevant local authorities, to IDPs, and plans suggested for materials and co-operation. However, attempts were thwarted by violence, and deliberately blocked. The decision-making behind the targeting and delivery of aid will always be fraught with politics, as it is concerned with distribution and control of resources. To establish mechanisms comprised of representatives from each side, and effectively give them selection control over proposals submitted to the partner implementation body (much delayed in acting on project responses), meant potential vulnerability to corruption, blockage and manipulation on either side. For example, in one case in north Aceh (based on information/witnesses by victims) for every activity, two per cent of the project budget was given to the Pause's team for protection and security.59 One unanticipated outcome of the intervention process was the entrenched politics of the committees themselves, and this may have contributed to dividing the NGO activist, and civilian populations who felt pressure to be identified on one ‘side’ or another. The Pause did not ‘cause’ this divide, but rather contributed to the formalising of already growing polarisation, which dates back to the strong proreferendum movement and Acehnese demands for justice and attention to violations of human rights.60 The Indonesian constitutional framework failed to deliver. In practice both sides took a firm line of ‘if you are not for us, you are against us’. It was not uncommon by summer 2001 for individuals who took no political position to receive death threats from both sides.

Balancing a twofold institutional image The last challenge concerns visibility and the task of maintaining a ‘high’ or ‘low’ institutional profile for the third-party. With active opposition to their presence within government and opposition circles in Indonesia, the HDC accepted nonofficial standing and sought total discretion. This was difficult to achieve considering its direct link to President Wahid’s office and the sensitive nature of the conflict. Consequently, there was an inherent vulnerability and a fear of being too visible, thereby alienating or provoking opposition voices. At this early stage, it became clear that it would be difficult for the HDC to communicate directly with the more military-driven officials within the GoI, resulting in the absence of uniform acceptance. At the same time, however, in the wake of international response to East Timor, expectations in Aceh were very high following the announcement of the brokering of the Pause. The HDC’s Geneva-based talks received international news coverage, which rendered them high level, official and highly visible. HDC Banda Aceh, by contrast, maintained a low profile to the point of being deemed ‘invisible’ by many local Acehnese.61 This created dissonance between expectation and delivery potential. Hopes rose when people heard media reports about the talks, but on the ground the HDC could not enforce or implement agreements. Implementation and compliance depended crucially on the main parties involved.

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For immediate dialogue participants, the HDC offered a visible example of the possibility of talks, exploring middle ground and finding options. Trying to translate this to field level proved daunting (as noted in the ‘first challenge’). Each competing party may see the intervening third-party as a helpmate and friend – a ‘Janus’-like quality of showing very different faces.62 In this case, GAM saw the HDC as its doorway to independence. Conversely, the GoI saw the HDC as its pathway to maintaining territorial integrity. It appeared beneficial for the GoI to be in talks with rebels, in order to gain more international support for their armed forces, as evidenced by joint naval exercises with the USA. Conclusion The protracted low-intensity conflict in Aceh has its own specific features, unique history and actors. Equally, it represents a modern arena of violence and the experience of third-party intervention in this case points to possible generic learning, which must be continually tested and refined in context. For this reason, it is useful to review the five central challenges and their outcomes with particular relevance to the role of the third-party, the influence of the context and the impact of intervention. From this, it is possible to identify some conclusions on the use of proactive humanitarianism in creating sustainable solutions to conflict. First, it is essential to recall where the case-study intersects within the relevant theory. This chapter began by identifying a lacuna in the third-party intervention literature, pertaining to the specific nature of the actor or intervening agency. Based on Jones’ typology, the HDC can be defined as ‘unarmed and pacific’. Using Cocker et al., the approach in Aceh stems from the ‘social psychological school’, acting as a forum to explore options and attitudes before suggesting possible solutions. Within this typology, the case of intervention in Aceh primarily stresses that CTAs must ensure practice does not exceed organisational capacity. By locating the HDC on Kleiboer’s continuum somewhere around political problem-solving and restructuring of relationships, the indicators of success should include the level of representation and degree of voluntary participation in the ‘process’, and the depth of agreement and the level of support as the ‘outcomes’. Accordingly, the choice of parties to be included in any dialogue process is crucial. The consequences of inclusion or exclusion will affect conflict behaviour. If a broad representation is not possible, linkage with other platforms should be sought. Unless remedies are taken to address and alleviate the underlying reasons for the violence, the leap from humanitarian access to confidence sufficient for lasting agreement in ending violence is too great. Overall, the HDC took positive steps in constructing and facilitating dialogue between two opposing aspirations, the GoI and GAM. Symbolically, space was provided for both sides to voice and listen to each other’s demands. As an ‘international independent institute’, it attempted to promote its background to instil trust and promote experience and diversity. Using self-restraint during unfair media-coverage and providing international and local venues at least encouraged the forming of reliable working relationships among the dialogue partners. The latter enabled the GoI and GAM to meet in person and ‘live under the same roof ’,

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using intensive dialogue sessions to explore the possibility of ending political violence or at least minimise its effect on civilian populations.63 Regarding institutional image, the challenge of maintaining a high and low profile demonstrated an unintended contradiction regarding ‘visibility’. In the case of Aceh, high-level talks resulted in statements and intentions, which received media publicity early in the process. Instead, extended ‘pre-negotiation’ work and off-the-record meetings could have performed well with low visibility. HDC field operations based in Banda Aceh were instructed to keep a very low profile and visibility so as not to offend authorities. Conversely, monitoring and implementation activity must have a profile rendering it legitimate, viable and accessible to the population. Being non-official and being not recognised is not the same thing. It is understandable that an intermediary will strive for total discretion, to be a secret envoy or simply low-key in approach. However, once a joint framework has been agreed for implementation in the country concerned, it follows that this must have due recognition or there will be no hope in guaranteeing security on the ground. The Aceh experience indicates difficulties and options when working in asymmetric power relations for conflict transformation. Solidarity is one option in order to build support, capacity and advocacy for the weaker party (effectively taking sides). This approach contributed to the ending of apartheid and new elections in South Africa. Not taking sides, but extending principles of neutrality and dialogue across actors and society multilaterally is also possible, with goals of social and economic justice and development, as has been the practice in Northern Ireland third-party initiatives. Focusing on the influence of the context and the nature of the violence, it is essential to note that partially, ‘chains of command’ were inadequate, political will was lacking for an immediate settlement, and access to broader actors and embedded power structures in the conflict configuration was not possible. Divisions within the GoI itself meant fluctuating levels of support and credibility for the intervening agency. Thus, the challenge of ‘spoilers’ demands attention – that is, those who continually sabotaged attempts at establishing a peace process in Aceh following the negotiation of the Pause. This phenomenon is familiar to anyone living or working in a conflict zone. ‘Spoilers’ still plague the peace process in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, as was the case for a long time in Bosnia even with an occupying peacekeeping force. Vigilante groups, extremist factions, and predatory criminal formations often wield ‘veto’ power in inverse proportion to their actual social legitimacy. Thus, the case study highlights the need for reliable partners when working alongside elite power-brokers. The long-term project is to turn the tide in terms of legitimate authority, institutional resilience and motivating factors themselves. The main lesson from this chapter focuses on the far-reaching limitations of using ‘negotiated access for humanitarian aid’ strategy as a foundation for resolving substantive issues.64 This lesson is the key to understanding the impact of intervention on the context and stresses the primary need to understand the root

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causes and dynamics of conflict. In terms of a direct impact, after the first phase of the Pause the number of fatalities increased. Secondly, certain changes in the nature of the violence became more prominent; for example, the scorch-and-burn policy by the Indonesian military across the province and village raids, and the rise in attacks by anonymous perpetrators targeted at human rights and civil society representatives and at civilians. Some of these trends are also disturbingly reminiscent of the indiscriminate military repression in the late 1970s and early 1990s. Furthermore, despite the intentions of the Pause, the delivery of aid became more restricted and civilians increasingly became victims of the conflict. This was demonstrated by the resurgence of IDPs into North Sumatra and within the Province of Aceh.65 In light of organisational constraints and a limiting strategy, the Pause was based on weak foundations.66 Consequently, the level of local community autonomy was lessened and a degree of legitimacy was granted to GAM. As de facto representatives of the Acehnese at the talks, the Pause became a convenient time to consolidate and expand its military and political functions. In response, the GoI attempted to reclaim the dominant position they held before the Pause by launching attacks on GAM directly and on those who were perceived to be sympathisers and representatives of civil society. Over time, political and military groups used the Pause to further their own self-serving objectives. Within this context, the ‘middle ground’ was removed, positions were interpreted as partisan and the conflict became the common denominator.67 In this sense, the process actually accentuated the conflict by making military losses and gains more critical. With a destabilising process of joint dialogue, the challenge of delivering humanitarian aid and vested interests became linked. As proven in other contexts, the more embedded the conflicting parties and interests become in the distribution process over time, the greater the possibility of the manipulation and politicisation of aid. ‘Smart’ approaches with clear and targeted arrangements for specific purposes are an option to the entrenchment of vested interests. Aid should not be conditional on progress in dialogue, but representative of the co-operation sought through dialogue. It must also be recognised that in the light of events in 2001, ExxonMobil could have benefited from knock-on effects from the process. Since ExxonMobil has extracted oil and gas for nearly 30 years, increasing ‘security costs’ and ‘GAM taxes’ may have made future drilling unprofitable. Conversely, it is also important to consider the threat of closing ExxonMobil as an equally convenient excuse for the GoI to implement a more stringent security operation. After all, the context of an endangered international company abroad provides just the right amount of justification for military measures at the national and international level. Finally, the analysis has raised a number of concerns about the use of proactive humanitarianism as a basis for creating sustainable solutions to conflict. In particular, lessons from Aceh have reinforced the need to tailor theory and strategies according to context. Although processes of third-party intervention frequently prove to be resilient, shifting between deadlock and progress, conversely the third-party needs to retain at least a strong sense of confidence and direction.

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However, based on the case-study, it is still unclear if humanitarianism can be reinvented to such an extent that it can resolve conflict, transform fragile political futures, or even inspire a convincing strategy. Evidently, conflict and its varied manifestations are still creating challenging conditions for humanitarian actors through the need for appropriate responses. In considering this need and the diversity of third-party actors in conflicts, clearly the comprehensive challenge is to gauge progress accurately and reach a broader understanding of the varying complexities.

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5 AID COORDINATION: EASY TO AGREE ON, DIFFICULT TO ORGANISE. Arne Strand

A demand for improved coordination of humanitarian assistance is frequently heard from emergency scenes and countries undergoing rehabilitation and development processes. This is heard not least from locations with a high presence of humanitarian actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), United Nations humanitarian agencies, donors and, if functional, national ministries and departments. Aid coordination is here frequently suggested as a suitable remedy against duplication of aid projects, badly planned and implemented relief efforts, lacking information on actual needs and available resources and, in general, inefficiency within the wider aid sector. A larger degree of interaction and information sharing between humanitarian organisations and adherence to commonly agreed rules and norms, managed through a coordination body, is expected to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of international assistance. In this chapter it will be questioned why the coordination of humanitarian assistance has become such an important feature of relief and rehabilitation discourse. An attempt will be made to define more precisely what coordination, especially among NGOs, might entail and which are to be coordinated, before international coordination structures are reviewed and limitations for establishing more effective coordination arrangements are identified. Findings from a DPhil research project will be drawn on to discuss in more detail the coordination arrangements that have existed since 1986 in Afghanistan, a country where NGOs have played an instrumental role in service provision due to a weak or contested government.1 That case illustrates how fragmented the coordination structure might become as a result of a combination of structural and contextual issues, and identifies some obstacles that inhibited efforts to ensure a more effective coordination of humanitarian assistance. This eventually leads to a questioning of whether the success level for NGO coordination might be set too

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high and, finally, a presentation of what types of coordination activity are achievable in the field. Why is aid coordination important? Before providing a definition of aid coordination a discussion is warranted on why the coordination of humanitarian assistance is deemed so important. Over the last decade we have seen a mushrooming of the number of humanitarian actors, especially NGOs. This includes international consortiums and alliances (such as Save the Children International), NGOs based in developed countries (often referred to as ‘Northern NGOs’), NGOs established in developing countries (often referred to as ‘Southern’ or ‘national NGOs’) and, in some locations, a range of community based organisations (CBOs). Smillie (1997) estimated the number of NGOs based in the Northern countries and working in Southern countries at 4–5,000 in 1997, while Hulme and Edwards (1997:4), citing a range of sources, state that the number of governmentregistered NGOs in Nepal increased from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993 and in Tunisia from 1,886 in 1988 to 5,186 in 1991. These figures might, however, exclude a large number of smaller relief-oriented NGOs which at short notice are able to emerge on the scene of a disaster with a truck of relief supplies and a TV crew to document their activities and secure new funds. At the height of the crisis in Rwanda nearly 200 NGOs, mostly international, were operational and in Angola more than 100. UN officials described it as a ‘relief flood’ and Ahmed (2001:32) explains that ‘All at once the humanitarian system boomed’, and ‘Because of their flexibility, speed, disregard of state borders and sheer manpower, humanitarian NGOs profited most from this boom.’ This again leads Cohen and Deng (1998:192–193) to conclude that such uncoordinated action led to ‘inadequate geographical and sectoral coverage, duplication, competition, and ineffective use of resources.’ There is no doubt that the various donors, countries and institutions have taken a liking to NGOs. Cohen and Deng (1998:364) put the figure of financial transfers through NGOs from the industrialised to the developing world at US $8 billion in 1998, and further noted (ibid. 188) that NGOs have become the main implementing partner of UN agencies in emergency situations. NGOs portray themselves as able to raise funds for and provide assistance in a more expedient, efficient, less bureaucratic and more cost effective manner than government entities or UN organisations, what Hulme and Edwards (1997:5) summarise as ‘... their supposed cost-effectiveness in reaching the poorest.’ A further reason for the donors’ interest in channelling funds through the NGOs seems to relate to a wish to support civil society based organisations rather than national governments in developing countries, the latter often being regarded as bureaucratic and corrupt. Although bypassing state functions might not be the main objective, by channelling funds through NGOs donors are evidently in a position to keep a closer control on fund utilisation as they can select NGOs they know beforehand. Nor should one underestimate the increased possibility of adding a national flag or a donor logo onto NGO-implemented projects (and NGOs).

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Therefore, in any humanitarian crisis, one must expect to meet a high number of NGOs from a range of different countries competing for attention and funding among themselves and with UN agencies. Some NGOs are specialised in different fields, such as health or relief provision, while others attempt to cover a wider range of activities. This competitive anarchy for supporting people in need of assistance leads to situations where, as described by Barnes (1998:7), ‘The various stakeholders jockey to place their agency at the forefront of the process – positioning to enhance their own legitimacy and subsequent fundraising capacities.’ The remedy prescribed against such chaotic situations is then either a mechanism to regulate the NGO sector or, if that is not a feasible solution, the establishment of coordination arrangements or bodies for the humanitarian actors. While there are some examples of situations where a government, an international body or a United Nations agency holds authority to regulate NGO activities through legislation or control of funds,2 more often such regulatory structures are not in place. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, however, underlined the importance of aid coordination at the presentation he made at the UN Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) in 1997, stating: The most important challenge facing the humanitarian community remains the provision of coherent, effective, and timely assistance to those in need. Improved coordination among and between national bodies, the United Nations and the international community is essential to serve those in need. Reindorp and Wiles (2001:17) regard aid coordination as a tool that is able to ‘... add value to a humanitarian operation by providing better quality and more effective and efficient responses to help those in need than would be done in its absence.’ However, despite the importance placed upon coordination by practitioners and academics alike there are plenty of examples of failure in aid coordination and agencies refusing to be coordinated or to involve themselves in coordinated efforts. ‘Why should we involve ourselves’, one senior NGO representative argued in Peshawar in 1999 (personal communication), ‘there are no additional benefits in it for us and our staff only spend time on meetings that in the end only benefit other NGOs.’ It is therefore not so surprising that a senior UN staff member on their Afghanistan programme described attempts to coordinate NGOs as being as difficult as ‘herding cats’ (Islamabad, 1999, personal communication). Uvin (1999:19), taking a more nuanced view when synthesizing research from a number of complex political emergencies, developed a list of factors inhibiting the coordination of humanitarian assistance, here listing: ... the multitude of actors; the high cost in time and money that effective co-ordination entails; the need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests; competition for influence and visibility between donors; and the general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for manoeuvre by the discipline of co-ordination.

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Those to be coordinated From the very start, however, it must be acknowledged that an important factor that might prevent effective coordination is the diversity of the various humanitarian actors involved, holding very different organisational cultures and structures. Moreover, these actors, individually and as groups, might hold very different perceptions of what such coordinated efforts are to achieve and what extent of authority and influence a coordinating body should hold. Many might also be reluctant to share information about their planned or ongoing activities due to a massive competition for funding. Starting with the United Nations: this member organisation has to a certain degree a unitary structure and even a separate coordination entity for humanitarian assistance, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). There is still a large degree of overlapping of tasks among the various UN agencies and a high degree of competition for funding. Reindorp and Wiles (2001:1) in this regard argue that ‘The structure of the UN “system” of funds, agencies and programmes based on a political logic of UN member states’ interests is a fundamental obstacle to coordination.’ Governments might also oppose the UN taking on a coordination role if seen to bypass or compete with their own structures, as did the new Afghan Interim Authority by early 2002 when the UN did not acknowledge their newly established planning and budgeting procedures, but insisted on maintaining a parallel UN process (Strand, 2002:10). The NGOs, in contrast, are each independent entities, not only setting their own mandates but also, in theory, deciding in which countries and areas they are to work and to which beneficiary groups to provide assistance.3 Thus, the NGO sector has not established (or accepted) any overarching governance structure to guide or regulate them. Attempts by the UN to regulate NGOs are often ill received and rebuffed on the grounds of humanitarian impartiality and neutrality, as might regulatory attempts from a national or local government if regarded as infringing on their neutrality. Moreover, given that NGOs are an international phenomenon it is often argued that their different organisational cultures, languages and cultural and religious background are, at times, barriers for them to interact in general and to coordinate their efforts in particular. Although the NGO sector lacks a hierarchical superstructure for aid coordination they have established three international coordination bodies: the Geneva-based International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the US-based Interaction. The first organisation has some non-European NGOs as members, the second is a consortium of the eight largest NGO consortia, and the latter have only US-based agencies as members. There is thus a representative imbalance in the international coordination structure, in which the large number of ‘Southern NGOs’ do not hold much influence. One does, furthermore, find coordination structures that primarily represent a group of NGOs with a common donor, such as VOICE with the European Union, and certainly a large number of nationally based coordination arrangements with a varying degree of inclusion of the NGO community. Another important humanitarian agency is the International Committee of the

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Red Cross (ICRC), an intergovernmental organisation that derives its mandate from the Geneva Convention. The ICRC has therefore excluded itself from being coordinated by others, or as the organisation explains ‘The ICRC cooperates with many international organisations but insists on its own complete independence’ (ICRC, 2002). The same practice has larger international NGOs, such as Medicines Sans Frontiers, to a certain degree adapting, often arguing against being forced into coordination arrangements that might compromise their humanitarian impartiality. Donor countries and bodies, such as the Humanitarian Aid Office of the European Union (ECHO) and USAID, that provide funding and material assistance are in a unique position to decide independently what humanitarian projects or organisations they wish to fund. While the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1997) has developed recommendations and guidelines for the coordination of humanitarian assistance there is, in reality, no single entity that can exercise any authority over donors. Therefore, though to varying degrees, a range of humanitarian, national, political, military, financial and religious interests might be taken into consideration when each donor makes decisions on which types of project they wish to support and which aid channels they choose to select. The end result, however, is that the combination of a fragmented and independent NGO system and the large number of donors, only accountable to themselves, makes it virtually impossible to compile a worldwide or a national overview of assistance provision or to trace the different contributions from donors to beneficiaries. Thus, render impossible documentation of how much of the actual assistance reaches the intended beneficiaries or how much of it is spent on project implementation or in the different administrative layers the aid assistance is shifted through. Defining coordination What, then, does coordination entail? There are differing definitions of coordination. Robinson, Hewitt et al. (2000:7) define coordination as ‘a way to bring together disparate agencies to make their efforts more compatible (in the interest of equity, effectiveness and efficiency).’ They, at the same time, warn that ‘Without coordination, the danger is of lapsing into chaos and inefficiency.’ Hvinden (1994:5–6) sees coordination as ‘the process whereby two units are brought to operate together in a (more) harmonious way’. But he warns that this concept is only meaningful when these units ‘are presupposed to act in a coordinated manner’, and drawing on Katz and Kahn (1978:106) he argues that ‘one may create additional problems for an organisation by seeking coordination of all activities, for instance by causing delays in decisions to the point of no return.’ Hvinden distinguishes coordination from cooperation and collaboration as he argues that these two latter forms of integration primarily relate to achieving a particular goal through execution of a particular task (cooperation) or through working together on a joint task (collaboration), although he warns that such distinctions ‘may also become a semantic trap where denotative and connotative, normative and factual, formal and informal, elements are mixed.’

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Moving on to the humanitarian sector Minear, Chellia et al. (1992), quoted in Reindorp and Wiles (2001:6), explain when discussing UN coordination that Coordination is the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilising resources and ensuring accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership. The issue of forced or facilitated coordination is central to the coordination discourse, or what Minear (2002) describes as coordination by command or coordination by consensus. While UN agencies and, certainly, national governments express a wish to be able to direct and ‘coordinate’ other humanitarian actors by command, the NGOs are equally strong in their rejection of such practices. Jon Bennett (2000:171–172) argues that an NGO coordination arrangement ‘is a service provider, not a regulator. Its authority comes from the collective consensus within its membership; there is no hierarchical determination of authority.’ If so, in a country or an area where there is an absence of a national state to impose regulations on the NGO sector a forced coordination arrangement might only succeed if supported by the majority of the donors. If not, single NGOs seeking individual funding will be able to implement any project of their liking in any given location for any given group of beneficiaries without consulting with any other humanitarian actor. However, concerns about a lack of coordination, increasing worries about a proliferation of NGOs and an increasingly negative image of the NGO group led more professional IGOs and NGOs to enter into a discussion on self-regulation. The International Federation of the Red Cross and a number of NGOs thus first agreed upon a ‘Code of Conduct’ (IFRC, 1994) to guide their humanitarian intervention in emergencies, and later on established the Sphere project (Sphere Project, 2000) to define minimum standards for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Such principles and standards form the basis for voluntary selfregulation from each individual agency signing up; there is no authority vested in any body to punish those who might violate the rules. But while imposing coordination on humanitarian actors at the international level has proved difficult, there are a further number of reasons why aid coordination has been difficult to organise not only at the national level but also in the villages and towns where the intended beneficiaries reside. Coordination activities Despite the limitations outlined above, one frequently observes that two or more NGOs collaborate when they implement their projects in the same area or work within the same humanitarian field. It is when such forms of natural collaboration between humanitarian agencies reach a degree of formalisation that we might label

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it as coordination of humanitarian activities. Frequently, NGO coordinating bodies establish bylaws and elect a board to guide their activities. It is then expected that the members meet at regular intervals and share information amongst each other, while the coordination body is expected to represent them with other humanitarian actors, donors and authorities. The members might entrust an appointed administrator and/or the board with a degree of authority to act on their behalf, although this varies largely between the bodies. Some coordination bodies might have specific criteria for membership besides members’ acceptance of bylaws and paying of membership fees. These could be a requirement for a certain budget level, a demand for the provision of information to the coordination body, and regular meeting attendance. Coordination bodies might then have a geographical cover, as a nation, a province or a district, be rooted in a thematic issue, such as human rights, or represent a specific group of NGOs, such as the national ones. Combinations of the above categories might also be found, such as the Afghan NGOs’ Coordination Bureau (ANCB). ANCB only allows Afghan NGOs as members, but has a national coverage with local sub-offices and thematic groups on, for example, education and agriculture. Jon Bennett, who has worked extensively on coordination issues, has identified a range of terms used to describe NGO coordination arrangements, such as consortia, councils, federations, umbrella agencies, networks, unions, and coordination bodies (1995: 169). NGO coordination, when undertaken in a formalised manner, would, according to Bennett, require: ! Independence from government, though it may include government participation. ! The setting up of a secretariat, answerable to an elected executive committee, that takes responsibility for administering the day-to-day activities of a membership organisation. ! A national perspective, i.e., it will usually cover more than just one sector and will take on some kind of representational role. Derived from these requirements, Bennett has furthermore identified eight different groups of NGO coordination arrangements: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Umbrella organisations of NGOs. Umbrella organisations of NGOs for a single sector/issue. Groups of grassroots organisations. Consultative councils (government/NGO). Councils of social welfare or social services. International NGO consortia. Religious affiliation consortia. Sub-regional networks of NGOs (including groups listed from 1 to 5).

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He notes, moreover, that many of these umbrella groups might not accept a coordination role although ‘invariably they facilitate coordination through information exchange’ or ‘can move from one category to the other’ (Bennett 1995:170). Information sharing about humanitarian needs and activities and security matters appears to be what NGO coordination bodies most frequently engage in, and this is usually regarded as uncontroversial. Some coordinating bodies, such as the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), establish a database of NGO projects, divided by activity and project location (ACBAR, 1998) and compile directories of humanitarian agencies (ACBAR, 1999). Such registers might then be used to produce maps where overlaps and gaps in humanitarian activities might be spotted, if the reporting is accurate and planned and ongoing activities are included. It appears more difficult for NGOs to share more specific project information, especially when at the planning stage of a project, as many NGOs fear the competition for funding. Van Brabant (2001) has undertaken research on what functions coordinating bodies or forums undertake, and he has furthermore ranked these in accordance with the expected degree of controversy each function might provoke. He has grouped the functions into three categories, 1) member-oriented functions; 2) information-focused functions and 3) task- and target-oriented functions. Within the first group services such as NGO registration, taxation, labour law issues and the establishment of a documentation centre are regarded as uncontroversial, while a little more controversy arises regarding possible training activities. As for the second category, Van Brabant suggests that being a contact point for the aid community and providing situation updates is acceptable, though there is less acclaim for security related functions and attempts to undertake collective learning. The establishment of project databases, the setting of sectoral standards and attempts at collective planning are seen to be moderately controversial. As for the last category, there is limited controversy over the preparation and presentation of political analysis, a little more, however, for the establishment of common funding appeals or the establishment of a collective position and negotiation for consent. Most controversial within this function is what he defines as strategic management, which could include common programming, strategic monitoring, vetting of agencies, disciplining of renegades and fund control. This observation is supported by the author’s own research and can thereby add weight to the previously mentioned observation made by Bennett (2000) that NGO coordination is based on horizontal lines of communication and collaboration rather than vertical and ‘authoritarian’ ones. The consequence is that if the NGOs feel forced into a specific arrangement or are of the opinion that their interests are not catered for in the present coordination body, they might easily shift their membership to another body or forum, or establish a new one more accommodating to their needs and interests. This, in most cases, leads NGO coordination bodies to take on a minimalist role as an interest organisation for a specific NGO group. The only example found where NGOs accept a more forceful coordination arrangement is within the humanitarian de-mining sector. Reasons

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given for their willingness to be directed by a governmental or UN-established Mine Action Centre (MAC) are: the specific security regulations they have to abide by, the fact that funding is often channelled through or on the approval of the MAC, and the fact that most of the NGO personnel come from a military background and are thus more inclined to accept more vertical command lines. There are, however, large variations in how effective and facilitative the different coordination arrangements are. Persons and organisations committed to coordinating their efforts with others can make a major difference here, as they might take on a role as facilitators and thus encourage others to join in and speed up processes. It also often improves the effectiveness of the coordination arrangement if the coordination body or forum is based close to the field and the intended beneficiaries. Not only will decisions be based on more accurate and updated information, but many organisations and individuals will also feel a greater commitment to coordinating activities and put in an additional effort as they are so aware of the humanitarian problems they aim to meet. What activities and functions the coordinating bodies take on will differ according to the context the humanitarian agencies operate in, the composition of the humanitarian sector and the specific challenges the organisations confront. There is certainly no blueprint for a successful coordination arrangement, but there are some lessons to be learned from specific cases. The Afghan case: the five coordinating bodies When we take a closer look at the NGO coordinating bodies established for Afghanistan from 1986 onwards it is striking how the coordination structure reflects divisions within the NGO community. In this case it reflects the competition for funds and influence that existed between national and international NGOs, and differences in religious outlook and humanitarian priorities and practices between NGOs based in Western and those based in Islamic countries. The Islamic Coordination Council (ICC) was already established in 1986 in the ‘relief capital’ Peshawar in North-Eastern Pakistan by NGOs and Red Crescent organisations from Islamic countries. These wished to counter what they regarded as negative Western influences on Afghan refugees in Pakistan, on women in particular, and aimed to provide a more unified Islamic aid system that could improve the support of their Muslim brothers and sisters (ICC, personal communication, 1999). The Western-based NGOs did not react to this establishment, if they even knew about it. They only took the lead in establishing the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) in 1988 when they felt compelled to protect their interests as the UN opted to bring in a Geneva-based coordination entity (ICVA) to coordinate NGOs’ activities (Nicholds and Borton 1994:34). Through the establishment of ACBAR the Western NGOs gained greater influence in the wider aid community, not least as it enabled them to give a collective presentation towards donors and the UN of the knowledge and expertise they had gained from working in Afghanistan and with Afghans since the early 1980s. Feeling sidelined in this process, a number of Afghans started gradually to seek a larger degree of influence in decision making within Western NGOs and ACBAR, a

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process frequently referred to as ‘Afghanisation’. At the same time the UN grew increasingly worried about the hegemony and influence of the Western NGOs on the Afghan relief scene, and decided therefore in 1989 to provide financial support for Afghans establishing their own NGOs. This led to a rapid increase in the number of Afghan NGOs, from 12 in 1988 to 88 in 1992 (Strand, Lander et al., 1999:19), followed by the establishment of a separate coordination body for Afghan NGOs, the Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau (ANCB, 1999). In 1988 NGOs operating out of the north-western Pakistan town of Quetta already found it difficult to be part of a coordination body located in Peshawar, and thus they established the South West Afghanistan and Baluchistan Association for Coordination (SWABAC). Their main office was later shifted inside Afghanistan to Kandahar, and in 1995 another NGO coordination body was established in Herat as well: the NGOs’ Coordination Body (NCB). By doing so they challenged the national influence of ACBAR, ANCB and ICC and set a clearer division between coordinating bodies with a national coverage and those with a regional one. Consequently, the end result was a sharply divided NGO coordination community, split not only along ‘civilisation fault lines’ to make use of Huntington’s explanation model (Huntington, 1997), but also according to nationality and regional presence. Any attempts at contact and a closer collaboration between the coordinating bodies located in Peshawar were further hampered by their different administrative languages, and virtually no social interaction between employees of the different NGO groups. The end result was that international political and religious differences were cemented through the NGO structure and their respective coordinating bodies. However, by the end of the 1990s the worry about the increasing influence of the Taliban, on the one hand, and uncertainty within the United Nations on how to handle the provision of humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies, such as Afghanistan, on the other hand, led donors and the UN to establish two interconnected albeit separate coordination initiatives in 1997. Firstly, a number of ‘likeminded’ Western donor countries formed the Afghan Support Group with the aim of forging a larger unity on policy and funding strategies among the major donors to Afghanistan. Secondly, within the United Nations a Strategic Framework Process (UN OCHA, 1998) was initiated, aimed at improving intra-UN coordination in complex emergencies, with Afghanistan being selected as a test case. The Strategic Framework not only established an organisational coordination model, it also provided a policy direction for the UN, introducing a set of principles to guide the provision of assistance.4 However, such principles were of minor value if only adhered to by UN agencies, so in a collaboration between donors, UN agencies and international NGOs a further step was taken to ensure a more coherent approach. A process termed Principled Common Programming (PCP) (UN OCHA, 1998) was therefore introduced in 1998, with the stated objective to ‘... improve the collective impact of assistance on beneficiaries – the people of Afghanistan – in a timely, principled and resource efficient manner, and to contribute to broader efforts to achieve peace.’ Not only did this statement restate the overall intention of coordination of

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humanitarian assistance, it further added a vision of the humanitarian assistance being able to contribute to peacebuilding in Afghanistan through adopting a common humanitarian policy. The issue of linking humanitarian assistance to more political objectives led several NGOs to warn against a politicisation of humanitarian assistance, implying that donors attempted to use the coordination body to enforce a political agenda upon the humanitarian agencies (Atmar, 2001).5 However, and despite wide support of the PCP among most NGOs, the new coordination structure encountered some of the same problems that have been identified at the international coordination level: that of donors’ unwillingness to have others decide on their behalf and NGOs’ reluctance to be forcibly coordinated. While both the UN and NGOs limited their presence in the overall coordination body established through the PCP, the Afghan Programming Board (APB), no donors were willing to withdraw from the body, and many of these needed time to consult their home ministries before responding to any given proposals. This practice left the APB as an information sharing arrangement, coordinating through consensus, rather than a decision making body. The influence of the APB was further diminished by the fact that many donors continued channelling funds outside of the common funding mechanism, the Consolidated Appeal Process. Donors and NGOs had from the very start blocked the establishment of a common PCP fund, while NGOs were instrumental in blocking a detailed screening and prioritisation among project proposals, arguing that no interagency forum held formal authority to approve or reject the proposals of single agencies. It therefore came as less of a surprise when an evaluation report concluded that while the SF and PCP process had facilitated larger interaction among humanitarian actors, it had not been able to establish joint planning and prioritisation of tasks, nor undertaken joint needs assessments or capacity development, which were judged by many to be a prerequisite for establishing common goals and approaches (Duffield, Gossman et al., 2001). In the meantime an attempt to create one common NGO coordination body as a response to increased (and possibly forced) influence from the UN and the donors became stranded on formalities and fear within the respective administrations of minimised influence and loss of jobs (Strand, Lander et al., 1999). There was simply not enough trust among the NGOs to join in one coordinating body that could then be authorised and expected to represent the interests of this diverse group of members. It is therefore interesting to note that even when an internationally recognised government was established in Afghanistan by late 2001 it did not lead to any change in the NGO coordination structure. The only difference was that the national coordinating bodies shifted their offices to Kabul, and continued to argue over which of them should be the NGO counterpart to the UN and the Afghan Transitional Authority (personal communication, Kabul, 2002). Functional coordination We have seen that, despite a pronounced willingness to be part of a coordinated

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effort, it has proved difficult to bring every type of NGO and other humanitarian actors into the same coordination arrangement. Furthermore, that attempt at enforcing a coordination structure on NGOs has failed, except in one very specific case for Humanitarian Mine Action. While there are a number of structural limitations to effective aid coordination, rooted in differences in mandate and humanitarian approach, one might further argue that the Afghan case demonstrates that the conflict that has shaped the NGO environment generates barriers between the different groups of NGOs. This is certainly not unique to Afghanistan; the friction between Islamic and Western NGOs was found in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well, and is found between International and National NGOs in most conflict zones. Such deeply rooted differences between different NGO groups, despite claims to be sharing a common humanitarian platform, are likely to remain a limiting factor for any coordination initiative. The NGOs’ and donors’ quest for absolute independence is another limitation, leaving Minear (2002:197) to explain that what he terms a humanitarian enterprise apparatus ‘... is driven not by the needs of vulnerable civilian populations but by donor interests, heavily political in nature, and reinforced by the institutional dynamics of humanitarian organizations themselves.’ Thus, rather than continue the struggle to unite and enforce coordination on such a diverse group of humanitarian actors, which is doomed to fail unless the entire sector is reformed (starting with the UN), one should rather look at ways to improve the present coordination regime so that it is less threatening and thus more doable. Drawing together international and Afghan experience, there are a number of coordination activities that appear to be acceptable to most NGOs and thus also beneficial to the wider group of humanitarian agencies and their intended beneficiaries. These would be: ! Information sharing regarding the political, military and humanitarian situation in the concerned areas. ! Compilation and dissemination of information on NGO projects, at least those ongoing and possibly planned. ! Information campaigns highlighting specific humanitarian challenges and needs. ! Organising meetings for humanitarian actors on thematic or ad hoc issues. ! Introduction of common humanitarian codes and standards.6 ! Interaction and formalised contact with governments and civil society groups, and certainly with all other humanitarian actors. ! Capacity building of NGOs and NGO employees.

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Certainly, to enable such a degree of formalised coordination and establish a collective memory among NGOs that usually have a large turnover of staff, there is a need to establish a more formalised coordination arrangement with a board and a small secretariat. The latter, if the activity level is low, could, however, be handled by one member NGO to limit the cost. As previously emphasised, however, there is no blueprint for such a structure as it needs to adapt to each new situation. In order to keep the trust of the NGOs that choose to join it, it needs to focus on facilitation and process management rather than decision making and the establishment of unilateral agreements. Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that any such arrangement will largely rest on the will and commitment of individuals, or organisations when they see that such coordination arrangements add value to their work.

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6 THE ECONOMICS OF WAR AND POSTCONFLICT POVERTY REDUCTION Richard Jones

The economy of a country is a fundamental component of the country’s identity, status, and capability. The influence of the economy leading up to conflict, during conflict and in the post conflict reconstruction stage is one of the single most important factors when assessing the cause and dynamics of the conflict, and the strategies of post conflict economic development. Contemporary conflicts do not only occur as a result of tension, which is solely attributable to ethnic or political factors. Economic factors are also fundamental; their affects as conflict catalysts have the potential to negatively impinge on people’s livelihoods in more basic ways than any other reason for conflict. Existing political and ethnic tensions are often manipulated and exacerbated when people’s standard of living declines because of economic stagnation, thereby increasing the potential for conflict and displacement. Movements of the displaced created by the conflict can further upset a country’s fragile economy. Some economies cope better with conflict than others but in the main conflict in less developed countries, particularly in Africa, impoverishes the majority of the population. This chapter is written in the context of conflict in fragile economies who have weak states and experience high incidences of poverty and under development. To understand the role the economy plays during times of conflict and reconstruction it is necessary to appreciate the relationship between pre war poverty and conflict, the economic effect of war on an economy and the approaches to economic reconstruction. Therefore this chapter assesses three primary areas: 1) The role of the pre war economy as a catalyst for the conflict; 2) the impact of war on an economy at the micro and macro levels and associated flight of the displaced; and 3) the role of post war economic reconstruction which in the case of fragile less developed countries is centred on poverty reduction. There are many countries whose economies have been ravished by conflict and their populations impoverished and often displaced. However this chapter will use Rwanda as the main example of the economics of war and approaches to post conflict poverty reduction.

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The role of the pre war economy as a catalyst for the conflict In the pre war context the economic catalysts are identified by Collier (2000:2) who states that there is a profound gap between popular perceptions of the causes of conflict and the results from recent economic analysis: popular perceptions see rebellion as a protest motivated by genuine and extreme grievance. Rebels are public-spirited heroes fighting against injustice. Economic analysis sees rebellion as more like a form of organised crime. A study by Collier and Hoeffler (2000) quoted by Collier (2000) analysed the pattern of conflict on civil wars during the period 1965–1999.1 The report summarised that the role of poverty as the primary catalyst for civil war is far more fundamental than previously understood. The report’s economic findings, as identified by Collier (2000:6) were as follows: Countries that have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of primary commodities are more at risk of conflict. Conflict is concentrated in countries with little education, fast population growth and in economic decline with a diminishing growth rate of per capita income. Diasporas also have an effect: Collier (2000:14) cites that diasporas sometimes harbour rather romanticised attachments to their group of origin and may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging. They are often much richer than the people in their country of origin, have better contacts, equipment and general capabilities for fighting and so can afford to finance, equip and undertake aggression. When people live in poverty their capacities and capabilities are low and their vulnerability is high. As experience in places such as the Great Lakes Region of Africa shows, economic factors exacerbate more traditional causes of conflict such as ethnic, religious and political considerations. Keen (1998:12) confirms that increasingly wars that appear to have begun with political or ethnic aims have mutated into conflicts in which short term economic benefits are paramount. The economy before the war is often characterised by poor management and inappropriate macroeconomic policies, of which, to be fair, the ruling political party cannot always be held solely responsible. In these times of international economic assistance which is often based upon economies undertaking initiatives from bilateral and multilateral organisations, less developed economies which are run to entirely domestic agendas are rare. The wealth of many countries is linked to the sustainability of a single or few key commodity goods such as coffee and thus populations feel the decline in commodity prices acutely, resulting in falling incomes and relatively higher prices for basic goods. Continued demand-pull inflation and the removal of factor price distortions, (as often necessitated by the multilateral and bilateral actors), increases the gap between what people can afford and what they earn. The social safety net provision that could be employed to ensure a ‘minimum standard’ also reduces in response to debt serving and poor macroeconomic performance. However the ruling government can often be keen to divert attention away from its own poor economic management and lay the blame elsewhere by, as Keen (1998:39) states, encouraging ethnic or religious tensions. If there has been a history of polarisation of resources amongst different ethnic groups within society and tensions are exacerbated by history (colonialism), geography (high population to land ratios), ethnic tensions (ethnic domination), and

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an induced grievance from a previous war which has polarised society still further, conflict has a fertile base. Add to this explosive combination, floored western economic policies, e.g. the prior unrealistic pace of structural adjustment and inflexibility of programmes which have often worsened social conditions and exacerbated poverty, the country is ripe for conflict. High profile extremist movements that capitalise on the situation and exploit the realities to suit their own agenda make conflict inevitable. This is especially true when recent history highlights similar events. In Rwanda for example Ohlsson (2000:13–14) cites how environmental scarcities became acute in the 1980s as an effect of soil degradation, continuing high population pressures, diminishing returns of land, and inequitable land distribution. The resulting scarcity of arable land led to a high rate of rural unemployment, leading to dissatisfaction amongst the poor peasantry. The socioeconomic crisis converged with power rivalries that preceded the genocide. It was the scarcity of arable land in particular that often gave encouragement to the majority Hutu ethnic group to take part in genocidal acts against the minority Tutsi and moderate Hutus. In more general terms Keen (1998:45–48) states that the genocide offered opportunities not only for looting, but also for venting fury on those perceived as enjoying unfair economic advantages. People embrace violence for many reasons including: that they feel justified in using it as a tool because they fear for their own lives and therefore feel they have little choice; they are told to commit acts of violence by others whom they respect or fear and are obliged to obey; or some people deliberately embrace violence for short term gain particularly when there is deep social and economic exclusion and impunity for violent acts. In the most extreme example the pre war economy is the main reason for the conflict, or to a lesser extent the pre war economic conditions shape the conflict and influence all who are involved. Hence, as recognised by Collier (2000, 2003), Keen (1998), and Ohlsson (2000), in general terms the poorer people are before the conflict, the higher the degree of polarisation of economic benefits, the greater the impact of the negative socio-historical factors, the more likely the desire to improve one’s livelihood becomes the overriding reason for committing mass acts of violence. It is the economic consequences of such mass acts of violence that we now address. The impact of war on an economy War impacts negatively on economies in fragile countries with weak states and high incidences of general poverty. Not only does conflict negatively effect the country where there is fighting, often, particularly in Africa, war tends to spill over into neighbouring countries that suffer the same economic problems and are therefore especially vulnerable to conflict. What economic activity there was is almost certainly curtailed at best, or at worst halted altogether. In short, as Collier et al (2003:84) states, war reverses development. This is manifest by increasing levels of poverty that the majority of the population will feel despite possible short-term gains through the partaking of the spoils of conflict. In general terms war is associated with worsening economic

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indicators; the longer the war the more negative the effect on the economic indicators. As conflict is prolonged violent acts based on economic motivation become more commonplace as resources diminish. Haughton (1998:4)2 highlights several economic consequences of the impact of war: in all cases GDP per capita falls, the population moves, driven elsewhere by the fighting. Even with peace security may be fragile, the infrastructure is in poor shape, inflation is high and the exchange rate over valued. The financial and fiscal systems are weak, the industrial sector tends to be abnormally small and there are weak social indicators. Institutions such as property rights, trust and statistical services, tend to have been undermined and the peace dividend that might accompany lower military spending is usually illusory. Collier et al (2003:84) reaffirms that economic policy and institutions deteriorate significantly. Within this context it is now necessary to address the basic economic consequences of conflicts from the micro and macroeconomic perspective. The microeconomic perspective From a microeconomic perspective, the effect of conflict can create individual/group winners and losers. The vast majority of the population in impoverished countries suffer negatively as a result of conflict. From a human perspective people are forced to flee, fight, protect their property/assets or remain where they are in danger as conflict can often restrict mobility. Against this backdrop of increased tension such actions undermine the structure of production, which is so vital to sustaining micro level capabilities. Individuals and households are disrupted and their main form of activity – usually agriculture – is negatively affected. Crops and animals do not receive attention, equipment – primitive though it may be – is often stolen and crops are destroyed and livestock taken. Such occurrences have been especially true in conflicts in Africa when such endowments were perceived to be unfairly distributed. In Rwanda for example, Taylor (1999:135) cites that often the victims had their assets (livestock, money, equipment etc.) stolen before the Hutu militia killed them. They would also destroy crops and feast on the cows and other stolen fare to celebrate. For those who remain the absence of stability and the need to keep a low profile for personal safety mean that the task of gathering food or firewood could be potentially fatal. Whilst the structure of production is undermined for those who have the possibility of benefiting from such a structure, many people have no choice but to flee from the danger. Such action brings its own economic and social consequences as tensions can often increase between those who are fleeing violence and existing community members, as poverty levels are further exacerbated. There is also a gender dimension: in the recent genocide in Rwanda and continuing conflicts in Burundi and the DRC for example, men form the majority of victims and men also form the majority of perpetrators (Oxfam 2002). Therefore a consequence for the national household composition is that there has been an increase in female-headed households. In some cases there has also been an increase in child headed households when both parents have been killed or are in prison.

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Whilst the human consequences of conflict are perhaps more obvious, the impact of conflict at the microeconomic level is manifest by the stagnation or cessation of economic activity. This is associated with declining income and production, thus effecting aggregate supply and further aggravating shortages. Households meanwhile suffer from the loss of economic activity generation and their poverty increases. Therefore conflict undermines the smooth interaction between income earning activities and households to determine relative prices and the factors of production. Thus prices are liable to be unstable and subject to a greater number of variables than those determined by intrinsic supply and demand within the context of a stable environment. Due to this instability, the land, labour and capital that make up the country’s factors of production are not used in their most productive ways, e.g. the crops are deteriorating, the labour force is either fleeing, fighting or remaining hidden, people are unavailable for work and capital is not flowing from economic activity to economic activity, or ultimately from household to household. The ultimate effect is that the household has to sell/use their existing assets, further indebt themselves in order to survive, and look to others for assistance. Essentially these are negative coping mechanisms associated with declining health, education and nutrition levels which can only be sustained in the short term. Thus the undermining of the microeconomic environment worsens the standard of living which was already at critical levels. There are some instances when people can profit from the conflict. Pillaging, protection rackets, arms control, stealing, the exploitation of the vulnerable and general black market operations can be potentially profitable particularly if the individual/group is relatively influential and powerful. In countries that have areas of rich resource endowments like the DRC (coltan), Sierra Leone (diamonds and gold) and Columbia (heroin) groups of people can forcefully control the extraction and selling of such goods which can be very lucrative. Such control however requires cooperation between individuals and groups which can quickly break down, e.g. in the DRC.3 The spoils politics of war highlights how the economic gains of war can be distributed to those few favoured elites and the financial rewards often used to ‘buy’ power and influence corrupt groups. The microeconomics of war may be summarised according to Table 6.1 on the following page. Macroeconomic perspective Any analysis of recent contemporary conflicts shows that the countries affected are very often poor by any standard definition, suffering from severe indebtedness, low resource endowments and high poverty indicators.4 Usually conflict only serves to worsen an already bleak situation and its impact is felt more acutely as conflict seems to take place within those countries that can least afford a war. The geographic and economic fragmentation that occurs as the population is mobilised to fight, flee or remain confined to specific areas severely curtails the interaction of land, labour and capital. For example the GDP’s of Burundi and the DRC have decreased in value from 1980, the respective conflicts aggravating the total production of goods and services in both primary and secondary sectors and

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Overall Consequence for Household

! Human resources for production (economic growth) decrease.

! Price instability

! Produce deteriorates ! Decrease in supply of goods and trading

! Cease to be economically active as people either fight/flee/ remain in confined area/ protect property and assets ! Tension/displacement

! Inflation

! Scarcity of basic goods

! Non payment of wages

! Negative consumption patterns

! Sharp increase in prices

! Reduced investment in households

! Mobility problems/Population movement ! Restricted access to markets ! Reduced amount of land to be cultivated or used for grazing ! Minimal security ! Benefit from social provision decreases

! Increase indebtedness ! Limited coping power of households, reliance on support from others due to asset depletion ! Possible restricted mobility ! Decrease in purchasing power ! Household assets may have been confiscated ! Refugee/IDP integration ! Depletion of household assets ! Household health, education and nutrition worsens ! Increase in child/female headed households and number of orphans

Winners Dislocation of Structures of Production

Overall Consequence for Individual/Group Beneficiaries

! Exploitation of war (e.g. selling goods on black market, protection rackets, arms/people smuggling, control of key resources, etc)

! Control of spoils ! Income increases ! Power increases?

Table 6.1 The Microeconomics of War: Losers and Winners Source: Author

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further impoverishing the populations. (World Bank Development Indicators 2001). Government expenditure on fixed capital assets – land, intangible assets, government stocks and non-military non financial assets – contracts dramatically in times of conflict. Again in Burundi and the DRC between 1980 and 1997 government expenditure reduced by 67% and 75% respectively (World Bank Development Indicators 2001). The ‘savings’ made were used to finance military expenditures and war objectives. As the conflict limits production the amount that the country can export reduces, therefore limiting the income from precious hard currency. This is particularly relevant to the exporting of primary commodities as conflict negatively influences the production, the logistics and the infrastructure necessary to export. Due to inappropriate macro policies and the effects of the war economy, the import volume of goods and services often decreases because the purchasing power of the country has decreased as resources have been deployed elsewhere. Conflict also affects the prices of basic goods and services and hence as their availability becomes less, so their value increases. For example between 1990–1998 the consumer price index showed increases ranging from 20% in Rwanda to 2089% in the DRC! (World Bank Development Indicators 2001). The food price index also showed similar patterns of rapid increases. The rapid rise in the price of goods and services means that inflation spirals out of control. In an effort to mitigate against the effect of a highly unstable currency governments and their populations will try to convert their savings into a more stable currency, usually the US Dollar. As identified, the economics of war dictates that finance is taken away from one area (such as social service provision) and used to finance military expenditure and the war effort. As a consequence public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP can decrease, with the associated negative consequences on literacy rates. Spending on other public services such as health is reduced which increases the incidents of infant mortality, child malnutrition, worsens life expectancy and increases the percentage of the population without access to essential health services. Agricultural extension services stop during a conflict which further increases the burden on the population. This reduction on social service provision ultimately increases the task of post war reconstruction as the very people who will be needed to contribute to reinvigorating the production process will not be able to do so to the best of their ability. Infrastructure is a common target for destruction in a conflict – wells have been deliberately polluted, transport infrastructure destroyed and power supplies cut. This aggravates the ease with which precious goods and services can be moved around the country, particularly as fuel rationing can come into force. Poor infrastructure also limits the recovery. For many countries involved in conflict, especially countries in Africa, the deficit on the national balance of payments increases. The balance of payments account suffers particularly during a conflict because increasing levels of finance are used to pay for goods and services for the war, such as the purchase of military equipment through the current account. The investment, loans, and grants from

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foreign private firms that form the capital account diminish as the country’s capacity for being a sound investment decreases because of the conflict. Indebtedness is worsened as economic regulation is weak or non existent; thus tax revenues decline and effective policies for macroeconomic stabilisation such as restrictive fiscal and monetary policies aimed at reducing inflation, curbing budgetary deficits and improving the balance of payments, cannot be implemented. During the conflict armed forces personnel increases, as does the importing of weapons. The related problem of high levels of military expenditure is a decrease in the level of aid.5 In many conflicts there are frequent human rights abuses which also limit official development assistance. Aid in Burundi fell from $217m in 1993 to $77m by 1998 (World Bank Development Indicators 2001). This was in part due to the government’s excessive expenditure on military equipment and their poor record on human rights. As war reverses development, eventual economic recovery becomes ever more difficult to achieve. In addition to the economic factors there is little trust, corruption is often widespread, there is a regression of the work ethic and property rights have been eroded; this has the potential to further economic regression and limit development potential. It is also probable that there will not be any relevant data on which to base an immediate economic reconstruction package, as data collection will have stopped during the war. The macroeconomics of war may be summarised according to Table 6.2, opposite. Thus far, more attention has been given to the intrinsic economic consequences of war. Consideration is now given to the relationship between war and displacement, for displacement itself is a consequence of the macro and microeconomic impact of war. The Economics of War and Flight At the macro level, already HIPC status countries with an acute lack of finance need to redistribute resources for the war effort. Given the prevailing economic situation and the likely economic crisis, macroeconomic instability is already a feature of the economy. This worsens during times of conflict and ultimately increases the poverty and vulnerability of the population. At the micro level, already HIPC status countries suffer from a dislocation of the structure of production, thus undermining the interrelationship between income generation and households to determine relative prices and factors of production. This means that land, labour and capital are not used with economic growth and development as the primary focus; this, and the associated scarcity of basic goods and price instability, leads to heightened levels of vulnerability which increase levels of poverty (see Figure 6.1, page 106). Increasing levels of poverty then have the potential to become part of the conflict itself and as development levels decrease, people become more susceptible to rhetoric and grievances can become magnified, tension can rise and the conflict becomes sustained on an ever reinforcing basis of worsening poverty, as confirmed by Keen (1998) and Ohlsson (2000). This can sometimes be different to the original

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The Impact of War on the General Macroeconomic Situation ! Overall indebtedness increases ! Economic regulation collapses which weakens already weak institutions ! Declining tax revenues ! Hard currency income decreases ! Reduced spending on social provision ! Increase spending on military expenditure ! Decreasing exports especially commodity cash crops ! Imports of non-military goods usually decrease. On occasions however imports of non-military goods can increase through special credit arrangements. It is likely though that the produce will go to the powerful. ! Balance of payments deficit increases ! Dollarisation of economy ! Absence of effective stabilisation policies ! Falling GDP as domestic production decreases ! Prices of basic goods increase, (hyper) inflation increases and overvaluation of exchange rates ! General shortages of basic goods and services ! General reduction in levels of skills and education ! Geographic and economic fragmentation as population is mobilised to fight/flee or remain confined to specific areas ! Agricultural extension services and data gathering for statistical purposes stops ! Trust is minimal and corruption can be widespread, regression of work ethic; property rights eroded6 ! Decrease in international aid ! Poor infrastructure acts as a structural barrier to post war reconstruction as well as aggravating the war effort and domestic distribution of existing (although usually minimal) provisions ! Foreign Investment is discouraged due to the instability ! Increased effort required for post war reconstruction Table 6.2 The Macroeconomics of War Source: Author

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Macro Level

HIPC Status

Lack of finance for war effort

Poverty Sustains Conflict Redistribution of resources

Major Macroeconomic Consequences ! Rising budgetary deficits ! Inflation ! Increasing debt ! Collapse of economic regulation ! Shortages of basic goods/services

Conflict Refugees /IDPs

Micro Level

HIPC Status

Dislocation of structure of Production

Poverty Increases

Major Microeconomic Consequences ! Price instability ! Scarcity of basic goods ! Restricted access to markets ! Land, labour and capital not used efficiently for Undermines economic growth interrelationship ! Limited coping ability of between firms/ households income earning and households Poverty Sustains Conflict

Figure 6.1 The Economics of War and Flight Source: Author

basis for the conflict that could have commenced on a more ethnic or political platform. Thus poverty aggravates the conflict further, and often gives more zeal to the conflict’s players to achieve their objectives with the enhanced desire for resource/spoil acquisition, knowing that they have little to lose and much to gain. The continuation of the conflict worsens the economic situation and makes the task of post conflict reconstruction ever more difficult. As a result of the conflict people take flight and become displaced.

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Within the context of impoverished countries, when the displaced enter another country or area with minimal capabilities, and often minimal or nonexistent assistance from international or regional actors, they aggravate the already hard pressed coping capacities of the community. Black (2002) states that this is compounded by the refugees’ difficulty in integrating economically with their destination community. Therefore poverty increases as impoverished refugees return/resettle in impoverished communities. This often results in renewed tension leading to renewed displacement as demonstrated by the following continuum:

Poverty

Conflict

Resettlement/repatriation

Refugees/IDPs

Displacement

Figure 6.2 The Abridged Version of the Refugee Continuum Source: Author

In Rwanda, for example, many of the displaced went from one community/refugee camp to another as they went around the refugee continuum experiencing renewed poverty, tension and further displacement. Chossudovsky (1997:120) cited that in the few years after the genocide the Rwandan refugees in the camps had nothing to look forward to upon their return: agricultural markets had been destroyed, local level food production and the coffee economy had been shattered, and urban employment and social programmes had been erased, increasing poverty levels. This chapter has so far shown how prevailing economic conditions in fragile countries with weak states and a history of unrest are particularly vulnerable to conflict. The poor economic conditions can be used to justify aggression, whether from the government keen to deflect attention away from their own failings, or the general population keen to improve their own livelihoods through extreme measures. The link between the aggression committed by the government and members of its population is a conducive socio-political ideology usually based on manipulation of historical factors to suit. During the war such populations who already suffered from high levels of poverty experience even more extreme livelihood conditions. This is because the economic consequences of conflict all ultimately have mainly negative human consequences such as worsening poverty and continued displacement. It can be seen therefore that proactive development would actually decrease the possibility of renewed war. This follows on from the contention of Collier et al (2003) that to reduce poverty and to increase standards of living for all the population would

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remove the ‘economic justification’ for war. As Keen (1998) states, whole populations rarely commit acts of aggression for their own sake. It is therefore necessary to appraise the third element of analysis – the reconstruction of the economy through poverty reduction. Poverty and post-war poverty reduction This section is divided into two areas: firstly it is necessary to have an understanding of poverty and of general approaches to poverty reduction; secondly it is necessary to tailor such approaches in the post war context. People can suffer from poverty in the UK as they can suffer from poverty in Africa, for poverty, as Townsend (1993) states, is relative to the environment in which it is defined. People in Europe may associate poverty with having to live in areas of high crime and few employment opportunities; people in Africa may associate poverty with the more fundamental requirements of life such as lack of food and water. Both groups live in poverty and suffer from deprivation accordingly, making poverty a multidimensional concept. However, the type of poverty of prime concern here is the absolute poverty and under development which characterises the economies of many of the countries who have over the last few decades experienced conflict.7 For further discourse on poverty see Allen et al (2001) and Stitt (1994). Therefore it is necessary to outline the process by which people can move from living in poverty to living in relative betterment; this is achieved through increasing people’s levels of development based on poverty reduction. Thomas (2001) states that although there are many different ideas about what constitutes development, it is generally agreed that development is necessary to reduce poverty8 especially so as the multilateral and bilateral agencies that increasingly oversee poverty reduction strategies are committed to the ‘development’ ideal. This developmental imperative is confirmed by Cernea (2002) who cites that the fundamental objective of development is to reduce poverty and promote growth. Todaro (2000) provides a general definition of development as being concerned with improving the quality of human life through: 1.

2.

3.

Greater access to health facilities, education, rising levels of food consumption and rising levels of income, achieved through relevant economic growth processes. Making conditions within the economy conducive so that the self-esteem of the citizens within the country increases, achieved through relevant political, economic, institutional and social systems that promote self-respect. Allowing for greater levels of freedom and choice, which encompasses democracy, choice of consumer goods, religious freedom, freedom to practice culture, language and freedom to travel.

Attempts to reduce poverty in developing countries are broadly based upon such principles. Robb (1999:47) gives several definitions of poverty reduction from various multilateral institutions which are reflective of the need to foster development,9 it is these strategies that we now address.

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Collier et al (2003:118) cites that reducing incidences of conflict can be achieved through stimulating development in slow growing, low income countries. Shaw (2002) expands that as conflict has real economic roots, so its containment and reversal involves reconstruction that tackles its root causes and not only the symptoms of war, thus making the case for post war poverty reduction to minimise the threat of renewed conflict. Cernea (2002) concludes that the orientation towards reducing existing poverty must go hand in hand with efforts for preventing the onset of new processes of impoverishment. The structural nature of the economy reinforces the high levels of poverty (see Stitt 1994).10 It is this structure that forms the root causes of the poverty and hence the conflict. Keen (1998) cites that the objective of post war economic reconstruction should not be merely to restore the pre war economy, as the conflict was aggravated or caused by the pre war economic conditions. Fundamental changes are often required which not only reflect poverty’s multidimensional nature but address the structural causes of poverty. Such approaches are usually undertaken through both multilateral and bilateral institutions working with the domestic government and other stakeholders such as NGOs. These approaches include:

Linking poverty reduction to sustainable growth This involves increasing the productive capacity of the economy overtime so as to bring about rising levels of income (Todaro 2000). Economic growth is central to poverty reduction as it ultimately underpins all other aspects of development. Adjepoju (1993) confirms that without economic growth the gap between the rich and the poor can only be closed through redistribution of existing wealth, mainly through fiscal initiatives, which would only work in the short term. Mullen (2002) cites that the poor have two assets: their labour and their creativity. There needs to be an environment that optimises the potential of labour and provides an environment for creativity. This requires that the returns on the poors assets must be increased, hence increasing the level of disposable income through economic growth and liberalisation. Mullen and Hulme (1996:11) state that as assets are limited this is achieved through either raising levels of productivity and output of these assets or increasing the sale price of their market transaction. A more diversified structure of production is required to reduce risk by ensuring that a population’s return from their labour and creativity are not from only one source. The studies of Collier et al (2003:84) show how diversification out of primary commodity dependence can reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict as incomes, policies and institutions are geared toward a border portfolio of economic activities. The reduction of adverse economic shocks and the promotion of economic growth will allow the restoration of fiscal regimes necessary to ensure that the benefits of development are felt by as much of the population as possible. This is especially relevant for the implementation of social safety nets to protect the vulnerable and the need to ensure that all people of differing ethnic groups mutually benefit. Taxes can be collected and spent on social priorities such as schools and hospitals. There is a correlation between inadequate access to

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education/health facilities and poverty.11 Research by the World Bank quoted by Mullen and Hulme (1996:15) suggests that primary education can make a substantial contribution to aggregate output. An increase in one year of education at the primary level could lead to an increase of up to 3 per cent in GDP or 8 per cent for a four year primary course. The general rehabilitation of economic regulation will also help to restore stabilisation policies geared towards curbing budgetary and trade deficits and reducing inflation as well as reducing corruption. Conversely an over emphasis on economic growth alone to achieve poverty reduction is also problematic (see Mullen and Jones 2002).12 Development as defined is more than just economic growth; social, political and institutional systems have to be energised to increase choice from life’s options; this brings about self-esteem. The poor’s access to productive resources can only be increased when the policy environment is optimised to be pro-poor. This means that poverty reduction also involves other initiatives besides intrinsic economic growth, including:

Good governance and stability Weak states recovering from war need to have their institutions strengthened to deliver poverty reduction. The restoration of a democratic process should be a central feature of the post war economy coupled with the promotion of human rights.13

Land reform and environmental conservation In many less developed countries, the pressure on arable land is acute as the populations are heavily reliant upon subsistence agriculture. Localised conflict over land can also be a precursor to national unrest. Fairer allocation of arable land resources is a necessary component of poverty reduction, as is the need to increase yields. This is achieved with extension services to improve the yields, regulatory provision for land ownership and long-term strategies to take people’s reliance off the land. Technology transfer can also improve the environment, enabling less developed countries to benefit from advances made in richer countries.14

Food Security Household food security is achieved by investing in regional and national early warning systems, climatic and crop forecasting, strategic grain reserves, crop storage facilities and logistics. Off farm employment activities mitigate against the risk associated from post harvest losses.15

Finally it must be remembered that poverty itself is global, heterogeneous, multi causal and geographically configured, and has macro, meso and micro level dimensions. Hence universal prescriptions aimed at reducing poverty have major fault lines. (Mullen 2002). Such strategies outlined are not entirely reliant upon improvements in the poverty level in the countries alone in which they are undertaken. Western attitudes and processes to global poverty reduction must be

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reviewed so that poorer countries can partake of the economic benefits available to the richer countries. This is particularly relevant in terms of trade and access to global markets; for improving such access to the benefits of globalisation is a sustainable approach to reducing poverty (and conflict). This chapter has so far established how declining economies can act as a catalyst for conflict, particularly in poorer countries. The analysis of the macro and microeconomic effects of conflict show how conflict aggravates the economies, the ultimate effect of which is to further poverty regression and increase the populations’ vulnerabilities. In many countries a consequence of the conflict are refugee flows which themselves become a factor towards increasing poverty when they return/resettle in communities with limited capacities. To promote stabilisation in a country after a war, consideration has to be given to the root causes of the conflict, particularly the economic factors, which involves understanding the manifestations of poverty and seeking to increase a country’s general development through various approaches to poverty reduction. The objective is not to recreate the pre war economy but to ensure that the economic conditions that exacerbated or led to a conflict are minimised To practically demonstrate post conflict reconstruction through poverty reduction the Rwandan experience will be detailed. The case of Rwanda amply demonstrates the three main areas that have been analysed: the negative influence of the economy contributing to the 1994 genocide; the war impact on the economy; and the post war economic reconstruction based on poverty reduction. Post Conflict Poverty Reduction: The Case of Rwanda Rwanda Facts Population

8.1m

Total area (000 km2)

26

People per km2 of arable land

874

GNP (1998) $

1.9bn

Total external debt (1998) $

1,226m

Households below the poverty line %

64

Incidence of food poverty %

68

Adult literacy rate %

58

Life expectancy (years) 1998

41

Annual population growth rate %

3

Table 6.3 Rwandan Facts Source: Rwandan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2001) and World Bank Development Indicators (2000)

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Rwanda is located in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa; bordered by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. There are three ethnic groups the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, who form 85, 14 and 1 per cent of the total population respectively. The Great Lakes Region and Rwanda in particular have been synonymous with conflict for many decades. However it was the genocide in April – July 1994 for which Rwanda is most associated when between 800,000 – 850,000 people were killed. For a detailed history of Rwanda, which describes in detail many of the economic, social and political factors outlined below, see Prunier (1998). For personal accounts of motivations for the genocide and the experience of people during the genocide, Omaar et al (1995) provides the definitive text. Pre conflict catalysts The main pre conflict catalysts leading up to the 1994 genocide can be summarised in terms of internal and external factors. The main internal factors were the power struggles16 that led to thousands of Tutsis leaving the country to live in exile in Uganda, the high arable land to population ratio17 – 874 people per km2 of arable land (World Bank 2000:40) and the high level of administration.18 These factors enabled the genocidal government to create a myth of overpopulation (at the expense of the minority Tutsi group), and ensure that all levels of administrative bureaucracy obeyed the government and kept records of ethnic group and often political affiliation of the population. The main external catalyst was the economic policy that Rwanda adopted on the behest of the IMF. Rwanda ranks 164th out of 174 in terms of the UN Human Development Index (1997) quoted by the UNDP (1997). Mullen, (1999:18) cites that during the 1960s and 1970s Rwanda’s economic performance was above average for Sub Saharan Africa. Rwanda benefited from high levels of aid and good economic management which allowed sustained economic growth and low indebtedness. However, like many African countries, the latter part of the 1980s brought about an economic downturn due to the falling price of their main cash crop, coffee, on the international market, and inappropriate macro policies. Coffee production underpinned the Rwandan economy and the country’s subsequent development; a negative change in the price of coffee (see figure 3), was bound to destabilise the economy. Chossudovsky (1997:111) confirms that the deterioration of the economic environment which immediately followed the collapse of the international coffee market and the imposition of sweeping macroeconomic reforms by the Breton Woods institutions exacerbated simmering ethnic tensions and accelerated the process of political collapse. The following graph illustrates the instability of coffee prices from 1960–1999. The RPF’s invasion in 1990, but more specifically in 1994, coincided with the structural reforms that the World Bank deemed necessary.19 These reforms led to rising prices, high levels of unemployment, rampant inflation and decreasing standards of living. The World Bank did not take into consideration the social effects of their structural adjustment programme. Declining wealth increased tensions in the north-western prefectures of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. These

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Price $

Coffee Prices 1960–1999 (Cents/kg) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

1997

1998

1999

Year Figure 6.3 Coffee Prices 1960–1999 Source: World Bank (2001)

prefectures have historically upset the stability of the country. Prunier (1998:123) cites that the struggles caused by the shrinking of the country’s wealth since the mid 1980s acted as catalysts for the northerners to start fighting amongst themselves, the Gisenyi Mafia against the Ruhengeri group. Not only did this inter Hutu conflict destabilise the region, it was here that the soldiers serving the government forces mutinied in protest at the ruling government, the MRND’s soft stance on Tutsis and in particular the RPF. The local authorities and civilian population supported their mutiny and Tutsis started leaving the region.20 The economic collapse and the associated worsening standards of living for the entire population, the political instability in the north west, the tensions created by the invasion of the RPF from Uganda, the overcrowding, coordinated administration and land degradation, were factors that quickly coalesced. All these factors were taking place within the historical frame of reference of perceived superiority/inequality amongst Tutsis/Hutus within Rwandan society that was exacerbated by the Belgian colonisers. Only one more dramatic incident was needed before the killing could begin with intensity. The Rwandan President was not hard line enough for many of his own people, particularly the MRND who resented the concessions made by the Arusha Accords to the RPF, and by association to the Tutsis. On the 6th of April 1994, as the President’s plane was returning from Arusha it was shot down just before landing in Kigali. All on board, including the Burundian President, were killed. Although not proven both Prunier (1998:213–224) and Omaar et al (1995:94–99) maintain that it was highly probable that the plane was shot down by the Hutu extremists (MRND). They could then blame the RPF (and by definition all Tutsis and moderate Hutus in opposition to the extremists) and therefore ‘justify’ their imminent deaths. The genocide in which 800,000 to 850,000 Rwandese people, mainly Tutsi and some Hutu in the opposition, could begin.21

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The ensuing anarchy led to over 2 million people leaving the country, the majority going to the DRC, and Tanzania, whilst over 300,000 people become internally displaced. The context of current poverty reduction in Rwanda By the end of July 1994 the RPF had taken control of Kigali and the majority of Rwanda and the newly installed government set about reconstructing the Rwandan economy. One of the first priorities was to ensure the peaceful reintegration of returning refugees, because returning refugees also aggravated the poverty. Not only do impoverished returning/resettling refugees often worsen already high levels of poverty, their presence can aggravate the inertia of painful memories (Haughton 1998), with both established locals and returning refugees viewing each other suspiciously for perceived respective roles in the genocide. Over 177,000 shelters were rehabilitated/constructed to house the returnees and displaced, as well as the rebuilding of basic infrastructure. Although the root problems of land allocation, reconciliation and continued poor standards of living were not entirely addressed in the immediate post war phase of reconstruction, stability of sorts was achieved. The challenge to reconstruct Rwanda and its economy was and remains daunting, although in the nine years from the end of the genocide the government has, against great odds, achieved relatively stability. However there are still many challenges that emanate from the structural poverty general to Rwanda and the region and the poverty resulting from the genocide. The Rwandan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), (2001:8) cites that poverty in Rwanda is due to two factors: firstly, the economic structure reflects a failure to achieve productivity increases in a context of a large and growing population. Secondly, the genocide of 1994 further impoverished the country, leaving a number of specific problems:

Microeconomic Structural Problems

! Low agricultural productivity means that farmers do not have the resources to risk investing in technological and methodological change ! Low human resource development, especially in literacy and skills development ! Limited employment opportunities, reflecting both demand and supply factors ! High transport costs, aggravated by the decapitalisation of the rural sector ! Environmental degradation ! The dislocation of the micro economy by returning refugees

Macroeconomic Problems The failure to address these microeconomic problems has had macroeconomic consequences: ! A very weak export base of US$ 16 per capita compared to an average of US$100 in sub-Saharan Africa ! Vulnerability to external price shocks. Earnings from coffee fell from $45m in 1997 to $26m in 1999 because the price more than halved, even though volume increased

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! A narrow revenue base, averaging 8.7% of GDP in the period 1995–1997 compared to an average of 17.7% of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa ! Measured private investment is only 8% of GDP in 1999. Net smallholder investment in animals, crops and terraces, was negative between the early and late 1990s. When assessing poverty it is often all too easy to become absorbed in economic statistics; however it is important that the human factors are appraised. In Rwanda any poverty reduction strategy must take account of the following: Out of a population of 8.1m ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

500,000 have missing limbs Over 100,000 females are coping with the trauma of rape 300,000 people have disabilities from wounds sustained during the genocide There are over 5000 street children in Kigali alone. Most born as a result of rape and have been rejected by their mothers/communities 2 million people have experience of being refugees living in chronic conditions in refugee camps, especially in Congo, and 300,000 have been displaced. 85,000 households are child headed as both parents were killed 45% of all households are female headed 13.5% of the population have AIDS There is a high fertility rate (3%). In 20 years time the population will double There is an acute population to arable land ratio (874 people per km2 of arable land) 90% of population are subsistence farmers and there is a diminishing amount of arable land due to lack of fertilisers and overuse 64% of the population lives below the $1 a day poverty line

Conclusion: approaches to post-war poverty reduction in Rwanda and their relevance to the theory This final section forms a conclusion to the chapter as the outline of the Rwandan approach to post war poverty reduction is detailed, and its relevance to the prior theory discussed. Post war poverty reduction in Rwanda is undertaken through the Government of Rwanda’s PRSP, which is formulated in conjunction with multilateral financial institutions with support from bilateral institutions and NGOs. The main focus is on gradual structural transformation, i.e. how over time national income will be derived from the secondary sector as opposed to the current primary agricultural sector; this will eventually decrease the pressure on the land. Thus national income will be derived from commercial, IT, agro processing, tourism, mining, exporting of skills and garment manufacture. This is achieved through the development and commercialisation of the agricultural sector so farmers can grow crops such as maize, bananas, potatoes and tea/coffee for the international/regional market. The increasing income from the crops will mean that farmers will be increasingly

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purchasing from the secondary sector, which in turn will increase aggregate demand for the goods/services and the need for ever more people to be employed in the secondary sector. This strategy requires significant government intervention in the form of infrastructure development, fertilisers, extension services, social capital support to vulnerable groups, and subsidies as well as commitment to reduce inflation, curb money supply, reduce budgetary deficits and improve the balance of payments. In recognition of the economic and social damage of disease, low educational attainment and cultural barriers to development, there are additional specific interventions to reduce incidences of malaria, HIV/AIDS, improve literacy and raise the status of females. Past inequalities are being overcome by attempting to mainstream the income distribution to all sectors of the economy and close the urban-rural gap.22 The PRSP advocates that the shortage of skilled personnel in all sectors can be overcome by encouraging people to update their skills and then be rewarded for doing so. The government now ‘own’ all the land; this in theory will limit the disputes over land ownership, particularly amongst returning/resettling refugees. The Rwandan PRSP advocates strategies that have relevance to post conflict poverty reduction discourse and development theory in general. The PRSP is widely regarded by academics and practitioners alike, and has by necessity to take an holistic approach to poverty reduction in the aftermath of the genocide. Since 1994 the short term focus on immediate re-housing, infrastructure provision, health service provision and domestic food sustainability has given way to a longer term focus of sustainable development which attempts to enable the 64 per cent of the population living on less that $1 a day to improve their livelihood. The main vehicle for this is the national PRSP. It is implemented in the context of the need to reduce poverty, as a way of reducing the possibility of renewed conflict. Thus the PRSP and the poverty reduction it advocates is the most vitally important strategic priority for promoting stabilisation and development within Rwanda and, by association, the Great Lakes Region. Rwanda is a resource-poor country with a strong link between poverty exacerbating conflict. Therefore as Collier et al (2003) cites, the stimulation of development can minimise the threat of conflict. Such is the structural nature of the poverty and the need to address the roots of the conflict, the structural transformation approach advocated is the only realistic option; this builds upon the contention of Stitt (1994) in that root causes of conflict are endemic in the structure of the economy. Therefore reducing a population’s dependence on the scarce land, and the facilitation of a process of monetising the agricultural economy, will enable people to benefit financially from their labour and creativity in a more enabling environment than existed before the genocide. For as Mullen (2000) reaffirms, poverty reduction must be undertaken in such a way that the returns on the assets of the poor (their labour and creativity) are increased. The main engine for economic growth is the commercialisation of the agricultural sector, which as Todaro (2000) states, will increase the productive capacity of the economy and bring about rising levels of national income. Economic growth will also contribute towards the sustainability of other policies

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necessary for development such as spending on social provision. The liberalisation and promotion of private sector initiatives is contentious amongst some commentators such as Chossudovsky (1997), whilst Simon (2002) argues that PRSPs are built on the rather tenuous assumption that neo-liberal macroeconomic reform will promote a reduction in poverty as a result of leaner, fitter and more efficient economic management and political governance. Others still, such as Dollar (2001), recognise the benefits of a twin approach of a gradual flexible liberalisation which allows macroeconomic targets to be calibrated accordingly, and specific interventions to protect the vulnerable, such as those for HIV/AIDS, malaria and promoting the status of females. Options for post conflict poverty reduction in Rwanda are extremely limited, thus in the circumstances the only way to decrease reliance upon the agricultural sector is through initial investment in the sector. This is a form of sectoral economic growth, which as Mullen (2000) states is necessary, as poverty reduction needs to take place where the poor are; in Rwanda the poor are the subsistence farmers. By advocating a poverty reduction strategy on the basis of many differing agricultural based activities such as the growth of maize, potatoes and coffee, risk is spread. This portfolio approach in theory minimises the effect of, for example, another crash in coffee prices and enhances stability, it confirms the contention of Collier et al (2003) that it is a necessary element of post war poverty reduction to remove the reliance on one prime commodity crop. The risk of the negative consequences of drought or harvest failure will decrease as more people become employed in non-agricultural based activities. The stable environment will also allow the institutions to be strengthened and the formation of a fiscal regime. In more general terms it can be seen that although the manifestations of poverty are relatively simple – i.e. people suffer from lack of food, shelter, inadequate access to water supply and sanitation, health and education facilities etc. – the causes are complex and derive essentially from the structure of the Rwandan economy, which has been exacerbated by the genocide. Thus there are post conflict poverty reduction strategies for land reform and environmental conservation, health/education, food security and good governance. By focusing on the basics in terms of bringing about improvements in the fundamental characteristics for survival – food consumption, rising incomes, education and health – the Rwandan PRSP is building upon the contention of Sen (1999) who advocates that poverty reduction in the context of very poor countries must be placed on under nourishment, premature death and illiteracy. As poverty, and hence poverty reduction, is recognised as being multi dimensional, polices must be mainstreamed in all sectors of the economy, not just the department of finance and planning. This is in line with the contention of Mullen (2000) who states that the type of structural poverty that Rwanda suffers requires an holistic approach which needs to have a cross sectoral support. Despite high levels of chronic poverty and the effect of the genocide, the Rwanda PRSP is not implemented in an environment which is devoid of any strengths and opportunities. This follows on from several commentators (Sen 1999, Mullen 1996–2002), that the poor themselves can be vehicles for their own

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development. In the case of Rwanda this involves building upon existing strengths and adding to cultural and physical capacities already in place. In Rwandan society there are cultural practices that have been harnessed to reduce poverty. The tradition of work on public projects (umuganda), the tradition of mutual assistance (ubudehe) and the tradition of the contribution to support for the needy or the achievement of a common goal (umusanzu) are all used to some extent to achieve poverty reduction objectives. Indeed the development of a methodology of grassroots action planning and problem solving builds directly on the ubudehe concept to the extent that the cultural practice is a central tenant of the Rwandan PRSP. Culturally sensitive ways of implementation are far more likely to succeed, as are strategies that build upon already established strengths and opportunities. Finally it can be seen how the Rwandan PRSP is underpinned by Townsends (1993:177) four components to poverty reduction: 1) the creation of income earning opportunities – through the commercialisation of the agricultural sector; 2) the improvement of expenditure patterns – pro poor expenditures such as specific interventions to increase social capital support to vulnerable groups; 3) the provision of basic needs – health, nutrition and education, and 4) institution building – improving the capacity of all sections of the administration to deliver by ensuring that poverty reduction is the overriding objective. To reduce poverty in Rwanda is to reduce the possibility of renewed conflict. The Rwandan experience highlights the issues that strategies for post conflict poverty reduction have to contend with to a greater or lesser extent worldwide. Although it must be remembered that no amount of development, no matter how tangible and welcome, can completely reduce the underlying traumatic memories that people may have. It is unrealistic to expect reconciliation and social reconstruction to happen quickly. As Haughton’s (1998) inertia of painful memories highlights, physical reconstruction is comparatively straightforward; emotional scars take longer to heal. However when people can enjoy a relatively decent standard of living, can eat more than once a day, have a shelter, employment opportunities and access to health and education facilities, the potential for their manipulation to commit acts of violence is substantially limited. Violence and conflict require environments that are conducive to such negative acts, they rarely happen in a void. Increasing a population’s level of development through post conflict poverty reduction that addresses the economic roots of the conflict, which in the past were endemic in the structure of the economy, removes the primary catalyst and ‘justification’ for violence. Such strategies put in place the most important mechanism for preventing renewed conflict – relative contentment.

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7 WAR, HEALTH AND RECOVERY Sean Deely

This chapter presents an overview of the impact of war on health and health systems, and examines three major challenges faced by low-income, conflictaffected countries to recover health services, before analyzing a number of recent developments which may improve prospects for sustainable recovery. The first challenge is how to secure the large-scale, international assistance that will be needed to rebuild and recover. Many conflict-affected states are struggling to restore stability, but the gap between their needs and their resources is too great to allow them to even begin planning for recovery, let alone address the structural conditions that lock them into a cycle of poverty, conflict, and underdevelopment. Without long-term, large-scale donor support, recovery will remain beyond them and their populations will continue to suffer severe deprivation, with the wider effects of conflict and disease posing increasing threats to regional stability. If they can secure some level of reconstruction assistance, the second challenge is how, in the short-term, to scale up services quickly to meet the needs of underserved populations and those without access? Typically starting from a point of extremely limited public finance and a weak health system, these countries face overwhelming needs at a time when conflict has wiped-out much of the health system infrastructure, destroyed the professional staff base and disrupted access to essential services. At the same time, an influx of NGOs implementing short term, project-based and vertical programmes, and a sharp increase in informal service provision, present real problems to align services within a national system. The third challenge is how to sustain these services in the long term. Emerging administrations need to reform health policies and institutions to increase their effectiveness and efficiency, and harness the local-level involvement that will be needed to ensure sustainability of services in the long run. But war will have contracted or destroyed the limited tax base of the economy and severely weakened national policy-making and planning capacity. Consequently, as experience shows, low-income, conflict-affected countries tend to suffer chronic failure of basic service provision (World Bank, 2002).

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The Impact of Conflict on Health and Health Systems The main targets in today’s violent conflicts are civilians, driven out of their homes and villages or maimed and killed, often with impunity. They constitute between 60 and 90 per cent of the victims of all conflicts today (ICRC, 1998). Their health and welfare are threatened not only by gunfire and bombardment, but also by lack of access to food, water, basic health services and disease control measures. Three main effects can be discerned: ! Increased health needs of the affected population; ! Reduced capacity of health services; and ! Distortion of the health system. Increased Health Needs of the Conflict-Affected Population During violent conflict and war, mortality, morbidity and disability can increase drastically as a result of fighting, displacement, hunger and disease. Battlefield injuries however, may represent only a small proportion of the health problems: war results in displacement, hunger, the erosion of coping capacities and the breakdown in community health systems. Major problems can arise from preventable infectious and parasitic diseases such as malaria, measles, tetanus, acute respiratory infections and diarrhea. The burden of these diseases falls disproportionately on children and women of reproductive age.

War Wounds, Disability and Mutilation At least two-and-a-half million people were killed by conflicts occurring in the nineties, while a further 31 million people were injured, displaced or otherwise affected (IFRC, 2001). Although war only takes third place behind epidemics and famines in causing deaths, it is the worst disaster for inflicting injuries (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995). War requires continuous, high level surgical capacity, often in the most adverse security conditions for medical staff. Injury through bombardment, landmines and unexploded ordnance such as cluster bombs frequently results in permanent disability. Over 30 million landmines were laid in Afghanistan in the 1980s: today four per cent of the population is disabled and in Cambodia, 36,000 people have lost at least one limb as a result of landmines (WHO, 2002a; WHO, 2002b). In some conflicts involving modern technologically-advanced weaponry, high levels of cancer have been reported – both among the local populations and among servicemen and women. Studies in Iraq report incidences of cancer in 40–48 per cent of the population in some areas (Sikora, 1999; Pilger, 2003). This has been attributed to the use of depleted uranium (DU) munitions: in the Gulf War more than 300 tons of DU munitions were fired, including tank shells containing up to 4.5 kg of uranium and hundreds of thousands of rounds of fighter aircraft ammunition made of solid uranium 238. These rounds disintegrate upon impact, with up to 30 per cent turning to dust. Inhalation or inadvertent consumption when this dust makes its way into the food-chain result in cancer, birth deformities, high levels of miscarriage and other health problems (Pilger, 2003; HRW, 2000).

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Mutilation has also been used deliberately as a weapon of war: in Mozambique people had their ears and lips cut off during the war; and in Sierra Leone, RUF fighters hacked off people’s limbs during attacks on civilian areas (HRW, 2001; Pavignani & Colombo, 2001).

Communicable and Non-communicable Diseases Secondary threats from waterborne, personal contact and vector-borne diseases increase as a result of overcrowding, damage to the infrastructure and inadequate clean water supply. For example, WHO estimates that there are 72,000 new cases of Tuberculosis and more than 15,000 deaths per year in Afghanistan, and over 15,400 new cases per year in Somalia (WHO, 2002b; WHO, 2001). Threats from communicable diseases are worsened by the decline in immunization coverage, discontinuation of public health campaigns, and disruption of routine disease monitoring, prevention and control programmes. Infant and child mortality increase as a result of vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles, tetanus and diphtheria. During the eighties, infant mortality in conflict-affected areas of Uganda rose to 600 per 1000 (WHO, 2002a) and in 1992 in Somalia, child mortality rates between 500 and 750 per 1000 have been reported (Green, 1994). Displacement, in particular, heightens exposure to health problems from communicable diseases, increasing the risks of measles, diarrhea and respiratory infections. During conflict and other disasters, refugees and displaced people experience ‘massively raised mortality rates – at their worst, up to 60 times the expected rates during the acute phase of displacement’ (WHO, 2002a). Lack of access to medical care also increases the incidence of mortality from non-communicable diseases such as heart-disease, and from other conditions like asthma and diabetes.

Women’s Health Women’s health suffers disproportionately during conflict: maternal mortality in Afghanistan and Somalia (1,700 and 1,600 respectively per 100,000) are among the highest in the world (WHO, 2002b; UNICEF 1999). In Afghanistan the lack of basic health services was compounded by the shortage of female health personnel, gender segregation and restrictions placed on women and girls (WHO, 2002b). In Somalia restricted access to health services is exacerbated by the widespread practice of Female Genital Mutilation (Deely, 2001). Women are also particularly vulnerable to HIV and sexually transmitted disease during periods of conflict.

HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases Risks from HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases increase significantly during conflict, through prostitution, rape and the suspension of traditional cultural mores. Fighters from both insurgent and government forces, who often have a high HIV prevalence rate, frequently engage in forced or commercial sexual activities. Infection rates continue to increase as a function of fighters’ mobility, including during the post-conflict period when they return home after demobilization (WHO, 2002a). Refugee women in particular are more vulnerable to infection from HIV

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because of the lack of security in camps and host communities and because they are more likely to be forced into prostitution when they have been deprived of normal sources of income (ibid).

Mental Health The psychological effects of conflict are widespread and profound. Frequent confrontation with death, proximity to bombardment, shelling and shooting, witnessing death or injury, loss of, or separation from family members, and the prolonged fear of invasion, capture, injury or abuse result in widespread posttraumatic-stress disorder (Maynard, 1997). Although many people manage to deal with the mental suffering and stress caused by exposure to violent conflict, it has been shown to produce increased rates of depression, substance abuse and suicide (WHO, 2002a). During the war Bosnia registered a high incidence of suicide among both young female victims of rape and sexual abuse, and elderly people who had given up hope as a result of the long siege of Sarajevo (Deely, 1998). In both Sri Lanka and El Salvador violent conflict is also credited with triggering sharp increases in suicide among the civilian population (WHO, 2002a).

Substance Abuse Substance abuse increases dramatically as a function of depression and stress, and the increased access to drugs as a result of the breakdown of law and order. The production and supply of heroin, cocaine and qat have fuelled war economies sustaining conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, Kosovo, Somalia, Tajikistan, Myanmar, Peru and West Africa in recent years (UNODCCP, 2002). Heroin addiction among conflict-affected civilians is a major cause of ill-health. According to UNODCCP there are more than six million opiate users in Asia, mainly in and around Afghanistan and Myanmar (UNODCCP, 2002). Aid workers and journalists have documented cases of parents and grandparents of Afghan refugees in Pakistani camps, taking opium and administering it to their children or grandchildren, to relieve stress and depression. In Somalia, qat addiction is a major social problem, directly affecting the health of hundreds of thousand of addicts throughout the country and indirectly affecting the health of family members by diverting scarce household income needed for food and health (Barakat & Deely, 2001).

Disrupted Access The increased level of injury, disease and disability is compounded by the effect of the conflict in disrupting access to health care. Isolation from health services through damaged infrastructure, reduced mobility, landmines, curfews, fear and insecurity, prevents people from seeking treatment for everyday or war-related conditions. For those who may be able to reach a nearby health facility, increased poverty at household level, due to loss of employment, decreased economic activity and high inflation, reduces access to increasingly privatized health care. Available treatment – if any – is further restricted by disrupted lines of access and referral within the health system as a result of fighting and territorial divisions (Macrae, 1995).

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Diminished Capacity of Health Services A number of factors combine to directly reduce the availability of health services: killings or displacement of health personnel, damage to facilities and equipment, and interrupted medical supplies. Indirectly, restrictions in local and central government budgets affect supervision, management and maintenance, while the lack of resources at national level weakens policy-making and planning.

Loss of Health Personnel Attacks on health staff are an all too common feature of modern conflict. In Mozambique, health workers were systematically targeted, kidnapped and killed by RENAMO fighters (Pavignani & Colombo, 2001). In Uganda, half of the doctors and 80 per cent of qualified pharmacists fled the country between 1972 and 1985 (WHO, 2002a); in Rwanda over 80 per cent of the health care staff were killed or fled as a result of the genocide (Kumar, 1997); in East Timor most of the professional health staff were driven out during a three week rampage of violence and destruction in 1999: only 25 doctors remained (Tulloch et al, 2003). In the Occupied Territories ambulance drivers have been singled out and killed by snipers and regular Israeli forces during the current Intifada (IFRC 2001a). Morale among surviving staff is further eroded by shortages of supplies, inability to deal effectively with patients’ needs, and the devaluation or non-payment of salaries. In disputed or insecure areas, fear of being associated with one side or another and consequent persecution keeps staff away from public health facilities. Often rural facilities are abandoned completely as staff move to safer urban centers.

Damage to Infrastructure and Equipment Clinics and hospitals are often systematically targeted during campaigns of violent conflict and war, as forces attempt to destroy the support base of their adversaries, displace perceived sympathetic populations, or terrify them into submission. Buildings are destroyed or seriously damaged, and vehicles, equipment and supplies are looted or stolen. For example, during the war in Somalia, 85 per cent of the health infrastructure was destroyed or damaged beyond repair (Barakat and Deely, 2001). Following the referendum in East Timor in August 1999, pro-Indonesian forces demolished the Timorese health system, completely destroying 35 per cent of the infrastructure and leaving only 23 buildings without major damage. Almost all medical supplies or equipment were looted or damaged beyond use and the central health administration was completely ruined (Tulloch et al, 2003).

Interruption of Supplies Shortages and infrequent supplies of medicine cause increases in medically preventable conditions. This often leads to avoidable deaths from asthma, diabetes and a range of infectious diseases and is compounded by interruptions in cold chains for vaccines and maintenance of medical equipment for diagnosis and treatment. The imposition of sanctions exacerbates and prolongs this problem. Before the 1991 Gulf War health services in Iraq reached 90 per cent of the population and children were routinely vaccinated against the major childhood

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diseases (WHO, 2002a). The sharp reduction in health system capacity as a result of damage and disruption during the war was compounded under the sanctions regime. Imports of cold-chain equipment, spare-parts and supplies needed to maintain medical equipment, including heart and lung machines, radiotherapy equipment, chemotherapy drugs and analgesics, were delayed or blocked completely by the Sanctions Committee (Sikora, 1999). As many as one million people are estimated to have died as a result of the combined affects of conflict and sanctions between 1990 and 1997 (UNICEF, 1998; Cortright and Lopez, 2001; Pilger, 2003).

Reduced Health Financing Conflict-affected governments generally experience a reduction or redirection of resources away from health spending that jeopardizes their ability to maintain even minimal levels of public health services and inform planning and policy. During war, the economy contracts as commercial activity declines and resources are diverted away from normal activities, leading to a shrinking of the government’s tax base and the impoverishment of ordinary people. Collier (2000) estimates an average decline of 2.2 per cent for each year the conflict continues. As conflict looms or escalates, public finances are diverted to military expenditures and central and local government health budgets are reduced. Typically inflation soars and the reduced health budgets are devalued further. This devaluation quickly translates into shortages of medical supplies, fuel for ambulances or other vehicles, spareparts, and a general failure to maintain facilities and equipment. Public sector salaries fall below subsistence in real terms and staff increasingly resort to private practice to supplement or maintain incomes. For example, by 1999, hyperinflation in Iraq had reduced the average doctor’s salary to the equivalent of £3 per month (Sikora, 1999). Over time, services deteriorate further as staff performance is affected by diminished supervision and training (WHO, 2002a; Macrae, 1995).

Weakened Policy-making, Planning and Management Capacity National capacity for policy-making, planning and management is dramatically reduced by the loss of senior health staff and the reduction in financial resources available for health. The exodus of senior health personnel often deprives postconflict countries of their most experienced and capable professionals who seek safety and a future for themselves and their families in neighbouring or third countries. Many of them never return (Macrae, 1995). Countries like Afghanistan, Somalia, Congo and Iraq which have been affected by conflict for years have been unable to participate fully in international debates about changes to health systems, for example to address the HIV/AIDS crisis, or the increased incidence of TB. In Somaliland, a WHO study revealed that only seven per cent of registered private practitioners knew the correct TB regimens and only 13 per cent apply direct observations (WHO, 2001). Because conflict-affected countries experience high levels of displacement and migration, they act like weak links in a chain, preventing the eradication of diseases like polio, and increasing the transmission of HIV/AIDS and TB. Inability to participate in international mechanisms for policy-

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making and planning also increases the risk that these countries – and as a corollary – their neighbours suffer major outbreaks. In Gulu, Uganda in 2000, an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever was linked to the return of troops who had been fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (WHO, 2002b). Distortion of the Health System As a result of the increased need and reduced public sector capacity, the structure, source and concentration of health services change dramatically during and after periods of conflict. The health system may undergo significant transformation or even fragmentation, and it is not uncommon for public services to be marginalized as a series of domestic and international actors take over the responsibility for the provision of services. Although they may provide a temporary solution, considerable problems are also associated with the proliferation of informal and unregulated services and the predominance of NGO relief health programmes.

Diversion As conflict escalates the focus of health services shifts away from primary to tertiary care. Increasingly resources are diverted to deal with war-related problems such as the treatment of battlefield injuries, malnutrition and disease. Preventive and promotive activities are reduced or suspended. Vector control and public health programmes are compromised. Community-based activities in general are reduced or suspended and outreach services are cut back dramatically or halted completely due to lack of resources or insecurity. Disease control and surveillance programmes are interrupted and health information systems are disrupted.

Privatization The structure of health service provision can change dramatically during and after conflict as public health workers who are forced to leave their normal place of employment due to fear, destruction or the lack of remuneration, turn increasingly to private practice to earn a living (Macrae, 1995). As cutbacks and inflation drive government salaries below subsistence levels, workers either supplement their incomes by ‘referring’ clients for private consultations at their residence or in a local pharmacy, or they leave their public sector jobs and focus solely on private practice. In some countries, public health sector employees were allowed to divide their time between public and private practices. This was the case, for example, in Somalia during the Barre era, and the practice continues today with many NGO health facility staff maintaining a private practice in a local pharmacy, or running a pharmacy themselves.

Informalization In some cases, the de facto suspension of the regulatory role of the national health authority due to lack of resources effectively removes the requirements for health service providers, and the services and drugs they provide, to meet minimum professional requirements. An ‘informal’ health sector emerges as a result of the sharp rise in need, the collapse of public health services and the increased

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availability of drugs and medical supplies from aid operations. An increasing number of traditional healers, pharmacies and drug peddlers appear. In the Puntland state of Somalia, UNICEF estimates that as much as 80 per cent of health service provision is provided by ‘informal’ or private providers. There are hundreds of unlicensed pharmacies in Bosasso, Galcaio and Garowe (Barakat & Deely, 2001). Far from improving the situation, this combination of ‘informalization’, deregulation and self-medication contributes to the worsening health status of the conflict-affected population. According to the WHO, in Somalia for example, ‘antiTB drugs have been prescribed in wrong regimens and are generally sold without prescriptions by the majority of pharmacies. This malpractice has taken place for many years and is contributing to the spreading of multi-drug resistance in the country’ (WHO, 2001).

Urbanization Uncertainty and fighting generally force large numbers of people into urban areas in search of security, food and shelter. Health facilities become overwhelmed by the influx of displaced persons seeking care. Displaced health professionals and former public sector health staff may offer informal services or establish private facilities such as clinics or pharmacies. Meanwhile, under pressure from media-driven public and political interest, NGOs compete to set up relief health projects in urban centres with large populations. As health workers flee rural areas and outlying facilities are cut off due to insecurity or damage, the disparity in the availability and quality of services between rural and urban populations often becomes dramatic. In Angola in 1996, 90 per cent of the health services in Huambo province were concentrated in Huambo city (Pavignani & Colombo, 2001). In Somalia only 15 per cent of the rural population has access to health services, compared with 50 per cent of the urban population (UNDP, 2001). In Afghanistan, Kabul currently has one physician for every 1,700 people, while in rural areas the ratio is one physician per 450,000 people. Half of the 8,333 hospital beds available in the country are located in facilities in Kabul, while the rest of the country has 0.34 beds per 1,000 people, compared with an average of three per 1000 in low-income countries (WHO, 2002b).

Internationalization Short-term, high profile relief health programmes by international NGOs often ignore government policy and guidelines, supposedly in the interest of time, or perceived neutrality, effectively sidelining the already weakened health administration. Usually operating outside the control of the Ministry of Health, many NGO activities are project driven with only token participation in coordination mechanisms. Bounded by project objectives, agency mandates and donor agendas instead of a national framework for health service delivery, relief aid further undermines national capacity for policy-making and planning. While they bring badly needed assistance, limited technical capacity and inflexible donor funding cycles can lock NGOs into a short-term relief mode long after more developmental approaches could be employed (Macrae, 1995; Jackson & Deely, 2001).

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Fragmentation NGO health activities often constitute parallel health and welfare networks which fragment the public health service and divert resources from the government. During the complex political emergencies of the 1990s, responsibility for health service provision in affected countries was divided up between hundreds of different aid organizations, with certain NGOs or even donor countries assuming responsibility for specific zones. It was not uncommon to find different systems and even standards of health care being provided by different NGOs in neighbouring provinces or districts. Designed with donor agendas and resources in mind, health services develop unevenly, even ad hoc, delaying rehabilitation and recovery of national health systems (Duffield, 1994; Stubbs, 1998). Aid agency initiatives also tend to favour vertical programmes focusing on a single disease such as malaria or TB, or aiming for a single intervention such as malaria, with less integration across services (WHO, 2002a).

Lack of Accountability Typically, NGOs are accountable to external donors for the effectiveness of their programmes and the services they provide. There is little or no ‘downward’ accountability to people in the community or health authorities at local or national level. This lack of accountability obviates the need for consultation with or participation of beneficiaries. Local people – whose resources could be drawn on to sustain the health service in the long-term – often complain that their perceptions about their own health needs are ignored and that they have little meaningful involvement in decisions about the services provided. Intentionally or not, this often creates a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ impression which alienates local people and reduces their prospective willingness to mobilize resources for the services when donor support is withdrawn. The Challenge of Health Service Recovery This gives some idea of the challenge facing post-conflict states as they set about the reconstruction of their health service. Post-conflict health service recovery requires a move away from relief-based programmes towards the development of long-term programmes aimed at improving the overall health status of the population and establishing an effective health system. It implies a shift in focus from short-term projects to large scale rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. Any reconstruction strategy must respond to three major challenges: ! Access large scale international support; ! Rapidly increase service delivery capacity; and ! Develop a strategy for sustaining services during the post-recovery period. Accessing International Support Given the lack of resources available to the post-conflict state, and the enormity of the task of rebuilding, significant sums of international assistance will be needed to meet the cost of recovery. It takes at least a decade for post-conflict governments

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to build the governance capacity, policies and institutions that will be required to provide the necessary support to the health service. Recent studies have demonstrated that, even when large scale reconstruction aid is provided by the international community, too much money is provided too early – during the first three years – when absorptive capacity is low, and resources are squandered. Then, just when absorptive capacity is increasing, the level of aid decreases (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The theory suggests that in the past donor support for reconstruction and development assistance has been conditional on (a) a formal end to the conflict; and (b) international recognition of any new government. This is because the international aid system is based on relations between states and large scale reconstruction support cannot be granted in the absence of an internationally recognized government (Macrae, 1995). Donors continue to bypass the de facto government and channel funding for health service rehabilitation projects through the NGO sector, even though experience has shown that when such projects are not implemented within a coherent national policy framework, resources are dissipated with little long term impact on recovery. Even with a recognized government in place, donors are reluctant to risk investing the levels of aid that would be required to deliver reconstruction and recovery without a formal end to the conflict, because renewed conflict remains possible or probable. The end of a conflict and formal recognition of the government, therefore, allow states to adopt positions on support to a post-conflict country, setting the wheels in motion for engagement by macro-level institutions like the World Bank to initiate the development of plans for reconstruction and development finance. In reality however, genuine post-conflict situations are few and far between and low intensity conflict can continue for years after a formal cease-fire. Many conflicts restart within a few years (King, 1997). Even when there is a recognized government in place, low income countries affected by conflict tend to have very poor governance, weak institutions, and high levels of corruption, and decades of development finance have failed to improve policies and institutions (World Bank, 2002). Consequently, donors are reluctant to risk investing the levels of aid that would be required because prior experience has demonstrated that aid doesn’t work. Regardless of legitimacy or post-conflict status, large scale assistance is unlikely to be forthcoming because donor strategies in these countries have not succeeded in producing recovery in the past Increasing Service Delivery Capacity In the past, health sector rehabilitation typically focused on high-visibility reconstruction of urban-based secondary and tertiary facilities and increased vertical programmes to tackle the main causes of disease. This type of approach centres mainly on NGO-led interventions at the micro-level and produces an expansion in services in the short term. Because they ignore long term considerations of capacity and sustainability they contribute relatively little to the overall process of reconstruction and recovery of the health system (Macrae, 1995). What is really needed is a twin strategy that can increase access to basic health care

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quickly and develop the capacities to maintain that access in the future. Emerging administrations must provide essential services quickly to improve health and ensure that recovery is not retarded or jeopardized. In the short-term, a scaling up of services is urgently needed to provide essential care and expand the health system to meet the needs of rural as well as urban residents and ensure services reach previously underserved or marginalized groups. For example, a survey carried out by WHO in Afghanistan in 2002, identified one basic health centre per 40,000 people in the central and eastern regions, and one per 200,000 people in the south. Nineteen districts had no health facilities whatsoever (Waldman & Hanif, 2002). In the long term, emerging authorities need to design and build a public health system that can identify, address and monitor the most common health problems, and guarantee the quality of both preventive and curative services. Long term recovery implies determining the character and content of the public health system and the channels through which the service will be delivered. Depending on the intensity and duration of the conflict, a range of activities may be required: rehabilitating and re-equipping damaged health infrastructure; developing a cadre of technically competent health staff; establishing an effective, practical health information system; developing and imposing a regulatory framework to guide the activities of a disparate collection of NGOs, private and informal service providers; and undertake a restructuring of services to provide an even distribution in rural and urban areas. In theory, post-conflict countries require increased short-term funding for existing government facilities, while simultaneously deploying long term funding for investment in rebuilding the capacity of the public health system. In reality however, experience has shown that government capacity for health service delivery is poor and unlikely to produce an increase in services without years of sustained investment. Consequently, conflict-affected countries tend to suffer chronic failure of basic service provision (World Bank, 2002). Sustainability Even if they can rebuild a health system with sufficient capacity to deliver essential services to their populations, conflict-affected countries can only hope to make small improvements in their health condition if they can sustain essential services over a long period of time. This raises two main problems: first, conflict-affected countries are generally very poor and simply lack the financial resources required to sustain a reasonable level of basic health services; second, private expenditure on health tends to be out-of-pocket spending at the time of illness, rather than prepaid, missing the opportunity to support community-based health delivery facilities. In 1997, the average amount spent on health in the 48 least developed countries was $11 per capita. No government in any of the 44 low income countries with a per capita income of $500 or less per year raised even $20 per person per year for public outlays on health and no country with per capita income of less than $600 per year spent four per cent of GNP in budgetary outlays for health (WHO, 2001). In Uganda, for example, the 1986 Ministry of Health budget was only 6.4 per cent of its pre-war, 1970 level (Macrae, 1995). The Somaliland Ministry of Health and

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Labour budget in 2002 was $500,000, or $0.17 per person. In the Puntland State of Somalia in 2000, total public revenue was $8.36 million, of which two per cent – $167,200 – was allocated to health. Even assuming the lowest population estimate of 850,000 persons, this amounts to $0.19 per person (Barakat & Deely, 2001). According to WHO, the minimum per capita outlay to provide a set of essential services in low income countries would be $30 to $45 per year (WHO, 2001). This would support a basic system capable of addressing the major communicable diseases and maternal and perinatal conditions that cause the majority of deaths in low income countries. This would represent between 10 and 15 per cent of GNP in the least developed countries, much more than any low income country can afford to allocate from domestic resources, and far in excess of what would be available to any country struggling to rebuild after war. The inability of the government to raise enough revenue to sustain a basic public health system is compounded by the inefficient use of private spending on health. Because of the poor state of public health service, private expenditure forms the main funding source for health care in low income countries, unlike established market economies, where public expenditure exceeds private spending by a ratio of 2.3 to one (Witter, 2002). The levels of private spending indicate that these out-of-pocket payments could make a significant contribution to sustaining community-based-health services if they were paid into a pre-payment scheme. Such schemes would also offer the benefit of risk-pooling, providing some form of insurance against future illness. Instead, households spend a significant proportion of their disposable income on out-of-pocket payments for services at the time of illness, often squandering the money on low quality or inappropriate treatment, or informal and traditional forms of health care with little – if any – positive impact on their health. Toward Recovery: Some Recent Developments These three challenges – expanding capacity, sustaining basic services, and securing access to international assistance – illustrate the complexity of the task of postconflict health service recovery. The following section reviews some recent developments and approaches that may help address some of the weaknesses in current thinking and herald a more positive future.

The World Bank’s Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Approach Last year the World Bank issued a report identifying the need for a new approach to a group of thirty very poor countries whose development has been retarded by weak policies, institutions and governance. Many of these countries – categorized as Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) – are affected by, or emerging from, conflict. The report notes that the underlying problems are similar in both conflict-affected and non-conflict LICUS. In addressing the specific challenges of post-conflict recovery, the approach builds on evidence from earlier studies that suggest that the pace of reform is considerably faster in post-conflict countries than elsewhere, and that early progress in social reform is more important than macroeconomic recovery (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).

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The LICUS approach recommends a twin strategy of promoting policy and institutional change and improving the delivery of basic social services. It advocates direct engagement with local stakeholders to identify two or three key proposals for initial support that would have a broad appeal and give a serious boost to recovery prospects, generating expectations within society for further change and recovery. The implications for health service recovery are important. Arguing that people in countries abandoned by the international community suffer severe deprivation, and that health breakdowns in one country inflict costs across the region, the report proposes to prioritize the delivery of health care and primary education. The challenge of essential service provision in LICUS is very similar to that encountered in countries emerging from conflict: government capacity is poor and increasing budget allocations is unlikely to produce a sustainable increase in health service provision in the short or even medium term. The LICUS approach proposes a transitional solution: a surrogate system using alternative channels – locally-owned and integrated and linked to relevant government ministries – to ensure that the provision of essential services does not have to wait until the national systems have been rehabilitated or built. Options range from coordinated piecemeal provision through agencies such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent and UNICEF, to integrated provision through an independent service authority (ISA). The ISA would sub-contract service provision to a combination of local government, NGOs and private providers. Initially autonomous and subject to strict provisions on transparency, accountability, quality and performance, it would gradually be incorporated into the government. In the short-term this strategy allows for the provision of essential services that would be beyond central government capacity. In the medium to longer term, the government takes over a system that is already functioning effectively at a time when the relevant ministry has built the structures and capacity to be able to sustain it. The LICUS strategy offers no solution to the political problems that lock these countries into a cycle of poverty, conflict and underdevelopment; in fact it barely acknowledges them, and it remains to be seen whether the strategy can help conflict-affected governments access the type and scale of finance needed to address these structural conditions. But it may constitute an important step on the path to re-engagement with the international community and provide at least a partial solution to the problems of access to assistance for health service recovery in post-conflict countries.

Increasing Service Delivery Capacity Countries facing the re-establishment and strengthening of their national health system must, as a matter of priority, determine and adopt a core package of services that would be responsive to the epidemiological priorities of the country, and address the conditions that constitute the main causes of ill-health and mortality. A standardized set of services is one of the hallmarks of the public health approach and the early development of an essential services package can provide a foundation for the public health system and guide the expansion of service delivery capacity.

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In post-conflict countries, an essential services package can address the main causes of avoidable mortality in a feasible, cost-effective way. It would also ensure a more effective distribution of resources, offering low cost basic services to all. Where necessary it can be introduced progressively with some essential components being introduced relatively quickly and other interventions phased in progressively, allowing time to train health staff and build capacity. In Afghanistan, the Ministry of Health (MoH) is currently introducing an essential clinic services package that establishes the main services to be delivered by facilities throughout the country. The Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) aims to provide a standardized set of services which forms the core of service delivery in all primary health care facilities, and promote a redistribution of services to provide equitable access.

The Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan Maternal and Newborn Health Antenatal care Delivery care Postpartum care Family Planning Care of the Newborn

Child Health and Immunization EPI services (routine and outreach) Integrated Management of Childhood Illness

Public Nutrition Micronutrient supplementation Treatment of clinical malnutrition

Communicable Diseases Control of Tuberculosis Control of Malaria

Mental Health Community management of mental problems Health facility based treatment of outpatients and inpatients

Disability Physiotherapy integrated into PHC services Orthopedic services expanded to hospital level

Table 7.1 The Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan

The MoH is using a system of Performance-based Partnership Agreements (PPAs) – contracts between the Ministry of Health, NGOs and private service providers – to quickly create a network of service providers who can deliver essential services, within the framework of a national health policy. A bidding process solicits tenders from NGOs to provide this package to populations in under-served areas. The contract stipulates NGOs will be paid on a per capita basis if the quality of services provided meets pre-determined indicators (Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan; 2002). The strategy is ambitious, but the government is committed; the level of funding and technical assistance is good and there is a core group of NGOs with an impressive record of service in Afghanistan. Reports on the experience with PPAs in post-conflict Cambodia has been very positive, contributing to a dramatic increase in access to facilities especially by vulnerable groups (Bhushan et al, 2002).

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While the preponderance of NGOs, private and informal service providers can be seen as a challenge to government efforts to set up a coherent, professional health system, it can also be seen as a potential resource; a source of capacity that can be tapped through regulation and supervision. Governed by a national health strategy setting out policy, standards, guidelines, goals and objectives and providing indicators for the achievement of pre-set targets within strict parameters, these NGO, private and informal actors can play a major role in the early recovery of the health system. The combined essential services package-PPA approach removes the burden of direct service provision from the Ministry of Health, allowing it to focus on rebuilding the infrastructure, systems and policies that will be needed to sustain the public health system in the post-recovery period.

Sustainability Long term sustainability of health services in conflict-affected, low income countries will require nothing less than a revolution in the way that finances for health are currently raised and spent. In a landmark report on health finance reform published in 2001, the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health made a series of recommendations to improve the sustainability of health services in low income countries. Forty-four of the 61 low-income countries included in the study are embroiled in or emerging from conflict.

Basic Strategy for Health Finance Reform in Low Income Countries 1)

Increased mobilization of general tax revenues for health, in the order of 1 per cent of GNP by 2007 and 2 per cent by 2015;

2)

Increased donor support to finance the provision of public goods and to ensure access for the poor to essential services;

3)

Conversion of current out-of-pocket expenditures into pre-payment schemes, including community financing programmes supported by public funding, where feasible;

4)

A deepening of the HIPC initiative, in country coverage and in the extent of debt relief (with support from the bilateral donor community);

5)

Efforts to address existing inefficiencies in the way in which government resources are presently allocated and used in the health sector; and

6)

Reallocating public outlays more generally from unproductive expenditures and subsidies to social-sector programmes focused on the poor.

Table 7.2 Health Finance Reform in Low Income Countries Source: WHO, 2001, pp59–60

Reforms will be required to change established government attitudes that allocate only two to three per cent of the national budget to health, and address allocative inefficiencies arising from the traditional preference for high cost, relatively ineffective tertiary facilities. The first decade after conflict, presents an opportunity

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to make significant progress in reforming policies and institutions before lapsing into the more inflexible environment that characterizes many low-income countries (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). The upheaval experienced during conflict tends to weaken systems and institutions, making societies highly amenable to reform in the early post-conflict phase. People expect change and old vested interests may have been swept away. New approaches will also be needed to harness private spending on health, and use this money to contribute to sustaining community facilities. The Commission proposed that such out-of-pocket expenditures be channelled into communityfinancing schemes to help cover the cost of community-based health delivery. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is currently piloting a variation of this type of scheme together with the Somali Red Crescent Society and the World Bank in northeast Somalia. The new model is based on the principle that local people would gain more control over their health condition if they were actively engaged in the planning, delivery and monitoring of services provided by their community health facility, and be more inclined to pool their resources and contribute to its upkeep. Initial results have proved encouraging and the Red Crescent is replicating the model in its other clinics in northeast and northwest Somalia (see Chapter 12). But the reality is that long term sustainability of health services in low income countries cannot be achieved without a major, sustained and long term injection of external funds. Despite major advances, including the creation of the Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, an independent, public-private partnership to increase global resources to combat these diseases, donor governments have come in for increasing criticism. Funding has been slow to materialize and only $1.7 of the $4.7 billion pledged had been paid by October 2003. One government, the US, has even been accused of trying to cut contributions after backtracking on another pledge to provide $15 billion for AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean (Kristof, 2003). Conclusion In its wake, violent conflict leaves a debilitated, traumatized and disease-burdened population, struggling to rebuild their lives in countries where the capacity of the health system to deal with their increased needs has been severely reduced. Destruction of health facilities, displacement and killings of staff, withdrawal of public funding, and poverty at household level reduce the availability of health care and restrict access to services. In low income countries, where a very limited health system existed before war broke out, people may find themselves with no access to professional care. Apart from the obvious effect this has in increasing the hardship and misery of an already suffering population, it serves to undermine and even jeopardize recovery: a poverty stricken and disease-burdened population contributes little toward social and economic regeneration. Yet emerging administrations tend to have neither the resources nor the capacity to scale up services to meet the overwhelming health needs and begin reconstruction of the sector.

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Access to international support is not easy to secure, depending on the nature of the transition from conflict, prospects for stability, and acceptance of the emerging administration’s legitimacy. Even if they do receive assistance, experience suggests that they are unlikely to succeed in building the capacity needed to extend services throughout the country, and in the long run low-income countries do not have the resource base to sustain them, anyway. Despite these overwhelming challenges, a more positive environment is emerging that may reverse the chronic failure of basic service provision in lowincome, conflict-affected countries. New engagement mechanisms and funding windows are being put in place and new approaches are being developed that may provide at least partial solutions and allow governments and international organizations to make some progress, in the reconstruction of sustainable health systems.

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8 THE LOGIC OF CONFLICTUAL PEACEBUILDING Astri Suhrke and Arne Strand

The ink on the Bonn agreement, setting out the Afghan peace procses, was barely dry before assessments of progress – or lack thereof – in the implementation process started to appear. A couple of years later, the number of reports from aid agencies, journalists and scholars had significantly accumulated. The starting point for analysis was mostly case-specific, which set Afghanistan up as a unique case; alternatively, a generalized model for post-conflict situations and related aid strategies was used.1 The intermediate possibility of situating a particular case in a typology of conflicts and related post-conflict situations has rarely been developed. A common tool in comparative studies, typological analysis is nevertheless implicit in much of the post-conflict literature, and in some cases has been explicitly developed.2 This chapter seeks to contribute to a typological analysis by viewing the Afghan case through a comparative lens. The underlying assumption is that there can be no single recipe for what is now commonly called “peacebuilding strategies”. The alternative is not to consider each case as totally unique and therefore reject all general propositions about strategies and outcomes. Rather, we propose at the outset at least three major types of situations, which entail at least three different recipes for peacebuilding. We shall here briefly sketch the three types, and develop the Afghan case as an example of one of them. By doing so, we hope to explain the progress and shortcomings of the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan in generic terms, discourage comparisons with situations that are not comparable, and offer the outlines of a category of peacebuilding situations “of the Afghan kind”. Three types of peacebuilding situations Let us consider three recent post-war situations that have been accompanied by comprehensive international aid response of the kind we now call “peacebuilding”: East Timor, Mozambique and Afghanistan. Peacebuilding can be defined minimally as non-resumption of the original conflict, more ambitiously as non-occurrence of new violence, and even more comprehensively as the establishment of political,

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economic and social structures that are conducive to peaceful political process.3 This composite definition focuses on security issues (non-violence) and constitutive rules (for establishment of core institutions) as foundational aspects of peacebuilding. We assume that a high degree of security and consensus on constitutive rules will greatly facilitate the rest of the peacebuilding agenda. Reconstruction, for instance, requires a minimal level of security as well as a political compact that can determine priorities and the distribution of benefits. More generally, the more comprehensive aims of peacebuilding – to develop political, social and economic structures that can sustain the peace – are anchored in the constitutive rules that define the nature and principles of interaction in a society, usually in the form of a constitution. The typology proposed here is therefore constructed around the foundational issues of peacebuilding relating to security and agreement on constitutive rules. How, then, do the three cases appear in this construct? East Timor The armed conflict between the Indonesian government and the Timorese independence movement (FRETILIN) came to an end in October 1999, but was not followed by a peace agreement. Nevertheless, the armed intervention of the international community, which the Indonesian government was compelled to 'invite', marked Jakarta’s official acceptance that East Timor would no longer be part of Indonesia. The army (TNI) and the Timorese militias it supported withdrew, taking with them a sizable number of civilians. In East Timor, the independence movement regrouped under the wings of the United Nations, which took military and administrative control of the territory in preparation for full independence. The strategic starting point for peacebuilding was thus full victory for one side, and acceptance of defeat by the other. Limited incursions by remnants of the militias and some uncertainty about the lingering aspirations of key TNI commanders did not fundamentally alter this picture. Given the colonial/secessionist nature of the conflict, issues of reintegrating the defeated party were not central. The principal defeated party, the Indonesian army and the Indonesian civil service, simply left the territory. Reintegration arose in relation to several groups of Timorese – the pro-Indonesian militias, the proIndonesian civilians, and the refugees who had been forcefully displaced to West Timor. Return and reintegration of these groups raised difficult issues of justice and social relations. Yet the political condition for return was clear: they had to return and reintegrate essentially on the terms of the winning side. Militarily, they were in no position to challenge the outcome. A small deployment of UN peacekeepers on the border to Indonesian West Timor further underlined the stability of the new situation. The first aim of peacebuilding – to prevent a recurrence of the original armed conflict – was thus secured by the way the war ended. While a short-lived civil war among Timorese had erupted some 25 years earlier, on the eve of the Indonesian occupation, the subsequent independence struggle had increased the unity of the subjugated people. The independence movement had developed a common

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political umbrella and a military wing, leaving an institutional legacy on the winning side of political and, especially, military unity. To transform the armed wing of the independence movement (FALINTIL) into a national defence force was politically easy. FALINTIL had a unitary structure and there were no competing politicalmilitary groupings. The conflict-inherited framework for preventing new violence was thus favorable as well. The constitutional process organized after the Indonesian withdrawal in 1999 took place against the backdrop of considerable consensus, shaped by religious homogeneity (Catholic), national identity forged through the independence struggle, and experience with only one kind of state structure (metropolitandirected and unitary). The most divisive issues related to language and associated positions of power (Portuguese, Indonesia and Tetum), and principles for sorting out property claims. In East Timor, therefore, the nature of the preceding conflict and its outcome had produced a satisfactory security situation early on in the peace process; the nature of Timorese society and the legacy of recent history had created considerable consensus on the constitutive rules of society. This made for a relatively easy and generally peaceful post-war reconstruction. Let us call it selfenforcing peacebuilding. Mozambique In Mozambique, securing the peace was not so easy, nor were the other aims of peacebuilding readily within reach. The peace settlement in 1992 was a compromise where neither side could claim clear victory. The two parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) had fought to a stalemated end, and – deprived of crucial external support – responded positively to external mediation. At one point, the Mozambican case seems to fit the general finding in the literature that civil wars which do not end in full victory/defeat are more likely to re-erupt.4 As they signed the peace agreement, both Mozambican parties retained their separate armies. Both had made great sacrifices and investment during a long and cruel war. The rebel movement had emerged with arms and had no experience as a political actor. The government party, by contrast, was used to monopolize politics in a one-party state. Ensuring that the conflict henceforth would be fought through non-violent means in the political arena was therefore a major challenge. It took great diplomatic and economic efforts by the international community to stabilize the situation. While they were supported by a UN peacekeeping force, UNAMOZ had a strictly limited mandate, leaving the main burden of implementing the peace agreement to others. As it turned out, demobilization and subsequent general elections proceeded largely on schedule. After this threshold had been crossed, two years after the peace agreement was signed, the risk of renewed violence along the original conflict lines was progressively reduced, although not entirely ruled out. Problems of reintegration remained on all levels – social, economic and political. Negotiating the terms of reintegration raised issues of political and economic power that had helped generate the war in the first place. Although fought after 1992 without arms, the continuing conflict between the parties was

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sharpened by regional divisions and a political system that operated in favor of the government party. Yet three factors helped to keep the conflict within the political arena and the agreed-upon constitutive rules. First, there was no question of developing entirely new constitutive rules as a basis for the post-war society. The peace agreement bound both parties to a recently adopted, liberal constitution. The peace agreement further specified the peacebuilding agenda in considerable detail, including provisions for demobilization and the new military structures, i.e. the process of demobilization and reconstitution of a national army, as well as the rules for conducting the political contest. While there was no guarantee that the parties would observe the peace agreement, there was at least the formal support of a document that committed the parties to operate within the existing constitutive rules and implement a set of peace-related objectives as specified. Moreover, the peace agreement framed a peacebuilding agenda for donors, and a yardstick against which to assess progress. Finally, the regional and international context continued to favor a common peace rather than competitive intervention to fuel war. In the Mozambican case, then, the structure of the conflict and its outcome made for a somewhat difficult peacebuilding task – difficult in the sense that armed force was fragmented, political transitions uncertain, and reintegration issues challenging on all levels. On the other hand, the parties to the conflict had fought to a stalemate and had no ready resources to continue the war. There was a formal agreement on major constitutive rules as well as the substantive issues of the peacebuilding agenda. In this situation, concerned and consistent international attention to implement key aspects of the agenda – especially demobilization and elections – decisively tipped the balance in favor of sustained peacebuilding. Given the importance of continued mediation, let us call the Mozambican type mediated peacebuilding. Afghanistan The Afghan case differs in important respects from both of the above. The peacebuilding agenda introduced after the fall of the Taliban was inserted in a situation of fragmented military force, continued armed conflict, and widespread disagreement on constitutive rules. The foundations of peacebuilding therefore had to be laid. Establishing the apparatus and legitimacy of a central state meant confronting vested regional and local interests that commanded military, economic and hence political power. There was only a provisional acceptance by some Afghan parties of a previous constitution (those invited to the Bonn conference called by the UN), and a timetable for writing a new one (as specified in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001). Reopening the constitutional question in a country with great ethnic/religious diversity and marked regional divisions raised a host of divisive issues relating to ethnicity, religion, the nature of justice (secular vs. Islamic) and the very nature of the state (unitary vs. federal). The only agreed-upon document from which to start was the Bonn Agreement, which was a brief and quite general agreement on power sharing concluded among the victors in the conflict. While setting out a timetable matched to goals, the Agreement did not specify the nature of the solutions (e.g. the process of demobilization and reconstitution of a new national army).

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The war against Taliban had seemed to crush the movement as an overt military and political force, and there was no attempt to incorporate its remnants or associated populations in the post-war order. Not until April 2003 did the USappointed President Hamid Karzai stretch out a hand to the “moderate” among the Taliban.5 The Bonn Agreement represented only the victors. That might not have been a problem if, as in East Timor, the principal defeated side was another state that accepted defeat. The one-sided nature of the agreement was much less suitable for a post-civil war situation where both sides had a distinct population and ethnic base. A Mozambican type of peace agreement would have been more suitable for reintegration purposes. As it turned out, the Taliban was not a spent force. Barely two years after Bonn the movement had revived the military struggle in the southeastern part of the country. Ethnic and historical connotations of the constellation of winners and losers made the Bonn Agreement even more fragile. The Taliban was associated with the Pashtun communities which had traditionally supplied the rulers of Afghanistan. The winning faction was at the time the Northern Alliance, composed of nonPashtuns and dominated by a core of the Tadjiks from the Pansjir-based Shyra-yi Nazar. Except for two short interludes Afghan rulers have not been Tadjiks. In early September 2001, the Northern alliance controlled only some 10 per cent of Afghan territory. Two months later they had won the war against Taliban thanks to US intervention. In this context it makes analytically more sense to regard the Bonn Agreement as only the first step in a peacebuilding process, equivalent perhaps to attempts to negotiate peace during a conflict. In this perspective, the fall of the Taliban does not signal the end of the war and the introduction of a peacebuilding agenda whose main items can reasonably be expected to be implemented within say, a four–five year period. What follows the fall of Taliban is rather the beginning of a process to determine foundations of peacebuilding. In East Timor and Mozambique, the principal foundational issues were settled during the last phase of the war, or by the war itself. In a comparative perspective the current phase of peacebuilding in Afghanistan therefore belongs, analytically, to a phase in a civil war where the parties position themselves to shape the critical aspects of the post-war order, that is the structure of the state, the nature of society, and the role of the military. For these reasons, we shall call it conflictual peacebuilding. This perspective has important policy implications as well. It helps identify a range of current problems as being typical, indeed “normal” for this kind of peacebuilding. This should help Afghans and concerned outside parties – particularly donors – to adjust objectives, strategies and expectations accordingly. For instance, much of the public relations efforts of the UN assistance mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is designed to counter negative publicity regarding security problems, slow reconstruction, warlordisms, deep fissures over constitutional issues.6 This is usually done by citing figures on improvement in health, education, agriculture, and the process of constitution-writing, etc. Typically lacking is recognition of the normality of such difficulties. Security problems reflect unfinished wars of various kinds, and have to be dealt with as such. Forging

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agreement on constitutive issues such as the structure of the state and the armed forces is extraordinarily difficult and in most countries part of a long and conflictual historical process. Reconstruction will necessarily be slow given security problems, low state capacity, and narrow state legitimacy. While many Afghans and outside observers deplore the slow disbursement of donor aid pledges, a conflictual peacebuilding model suggests that aid money should be more sensitive to the need for generating consensus than to speed of disbursement.. These issues will be discussed in more detail below. They are “lessons” derived from the kind of peacebuilding model that we can discern in Afghanistan. Peacebuilding issues Security By mid-2003, there were at least three types of conflicts in Afghanistan, with different security problems.7 Firstly, there was continuous infighting among regionally based warlords, particularly in the north. These conflicts were mostly ethnically related, focusing on control of territory and resources, and often fuelled by old enmity. Secondly, there was continuous conflict between the central state and the region over influence and control, not least over income from taxation. This conflict took the form of less armed fighting in 2003 than in the previous year. The third and most violent conflict was the continuous war between, on the one hand, the US-led Coalition forces and the Afghan Army, and, on the other, the “terrorists”, a term loosely defined to include groups from Taliban, Al-Quaida and supporters of former mujahedin leader and Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.8 The conflicts were typically interlocked with internal power struggles in the central government (the Afghan Transitional Administration, ATA), which in turn involved external actors in the region and the United States. Reports by NGOs suggested that the US and its allies in Enduring Freedom continued in late 2003 to feed the conflict by supporting warlords involved in the hunt for terrorist suspects.9 At the core of these problems is the fact that the Bonn Agreement gave ministerial position and influence to a very diverse group of parties and warlords, old enemies that were only brought together in a common fight against the Taliban. Being different kinds of problems, they have elicited different kinds of response. As for infighting among the warlords, UNAMA and the ATA have combined mediation and monitoring through a Security Commission, as well as attempted disarmament, but with little evident success. The Coalition forces basically refused to involve themselves in curtailing the commanders. In the ongoing conflict with the regions, the Karzai administration seemed to move towards the use of diplomacy and financial incentives rather than military confrontation, yet with no more result. In an important initiative in May 2003, his National Security Council summoned 10 of the country’s provincial governors and two regional commanders to Kabul to demand their compliance with a 13-point decision of the NSC. This included a ban on private military personnel, as well as enforcement of the collection of provincial revenues. Some of the most powerful governors did not show up at the meeting, however, and except for some attempts

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to reshuffle officials, nothing much had happened by the fall of that year to alter the power balance. With very slow progress in the establishment of the Afghan National Army, the government had little power of its own to back its authority. Calling on the Coalition forces might be counterproductive and at any rate seemed futile as the latter constantly reiterate the position that their mission did not include this kind of enforcement. The conflict with “the terrorists” is a very different kind of war, being fought by the US-led Coalition forces alongside soldiers from the Afghan Army as well as US-trained and armed militia. “Terrorist” attacks on army bases, convoys and humanitarian workers have increased steadily since spring 2003 and by the fall, of that year, the UN as well as the ATA cited serious security concerns. In the two months of August and September alone, some 300 persons were killed in the fighting or attacks on civilians.10 Afghan and foreign aid workers were among the latter. The Taliban has claimed control over parts of several provinces in the south and southeast of Afghanistan. UN officials estimated that only one-third of the entire south and southeast was safe enough to proceed with preparations for elections scheduled for June 2004. The attacks mostly took place close to the Pakistani border or along the main roads, making the ATA claim that the Taliban were operating from Pakistan and again recruiting new talibs (religious students) from the many madrasa’ located in these areas. A similar kind of ‘cross-border warfare’ took place during the Soviet occupation though at that time the challengers to Kabul had powerful outside state supporters. While the Taliban apparently has some external support, it is by comparison quite limited. The worsening security situation in 2003 revived discussions about the role of international military forces. UNAMA and the ATA had early on and consistently requested an expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), wanting the international peacekeeping contingent to be stationed in the major Afghan cities in addition to Kabul. The international community, particularly the US, had rejected the idea. In early 2003, the US military launched a new military strategy designed ‘to win hearts and minds’, by positioning military/civilian teams in different regions. To be protected by a small military contingent, the contingents were termed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). They would undertake reconstruction projects, assist in coordination of humanitarian assistance and, in effect, reinforce central government authority vis-à-vis local power holders. The PRTs appeared to be a substitute for expansion of regular ISAF units and raised several questions. The PRTs were strongly criticized by the NGO community for blurring the important line between humanitarian and military interventions, endangering aid workers and exposing local communities to danger rather than winning their hearts and minds by attracting attacks by militants. Secondly, the PRTs may make matters worse with respect to the first two kinds of conflicts cited above if they go in halfheartedly. To illustrate: the local commander in Kunduz was very unenthusiastic in his response to the announcement in August that German PRTs might arrive. If there were to be only a few – say 100 – that would be fine – but not if they numbered up to 250. Security in Kunduz was fine, he said.11 The Kunduz commander does not stand alone. He is closely affiliated with Defence Minister

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Fahim, who not only sees his power base threatened but might fear that a large deployment of international troops will pose a threat to the lucrative drug smuggling in the area. Thus, when the power network spreads as far as the top of the Afghan Army, the international troops either have to go in on the terms of the local commanders, which usually would mean accepting a curtailing of their influence, or the alternative would be to enter into conflict with them. As for the conflict with the “terrorists”, the presence of the foreign Coalition forces deep inside the Afghan countryside undoubtedly was an invitation to attack. “Terrorist” activity was concentrated in the areas where the forces were operating. Evidently rejecting both the option of expanding or sharply reducing the military pressure, the coalition forces opted for an in-between solution. As well as maintaining a limited military presence in certain regions they expanded their presence via deployment of PRTs. The teams are not large enough to pose a military threat to the warlords, but still represent a presence that may contain their military ambitions and secure a degree of intelligence gathering. As indicated above, however, the PRT strategy is fundamentally problematic. The militant forces opposed to the US presence regard the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy as essentially a military one, and use military means to prevent humanitarian assistance from “winning the hearts and minds” of the Afghans. For them it is equally threatening if assistance is delivered by military forces or by humanitarian agencies. As some military personnel dress in civilian clothes when operating in the countryside, the lines are further blurred. The British Army has to a certain degree responded to criticism by separating aid and military functions and by not directly involving military personnel in humanitarian projects. It is still often the case that more nations seemed prepared to deploy PRTs, possibly as part of – or in lieu of – an expanding NATO-led ISAF force moving beyond Kabul. By the fall of 2003, several states were deploying or preparing to deploy PRTs, including Great Britain, Germany and New Zealand. ISAF is generally regarded as a relative success in Kabul. The capital enjoys a degree of security, the ATA has been able to function, and the political process has proceeded somewhat unhindered. Nevertheless, as ordinary Afghans readily note, two ministers have been killed, there is still a large number of armed men within Kabul in defiance of the Bonn Agreement, and ISAF forces have been attacked. Kabulis recognize the important distinction between the role of ISAF as a peacekeeping force for the Afghans, and not only as a military unit out for hunting ‘terrorists’ that pose a threat to ‘the US and the West’. If this important point is emphasized, expansion of a neutral force might be welcomed outside Kabul which can only enhance existing security measures. Plans for re-establishing an Afghan national army, combined with demobilization of the militias and local armies, have been emphasized as a means to create security and permit a downscaling of international forces. The plans have proved difficult to implement. Early attempts to train new recruits ended up with trained and armed personnel returning to the payrolls of their warlords. Attrition rates subsequently seem to go down as UN officials estimated a reduction from 50 to 30 per cent in May 2003.12 The Minister of Defence strongly resisted all attempts

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to limit his own and his Tadjik power base by instituting reforms towards a more ethnically balanced ministry. By September 2003, major reforms had changed the mid-and upper-ranks of the Ministry, though leaving two out of three top positions in his hands. The International Crisis Group concluded that “the reforms are likely to be regarded skeptically” by many would-be candidates for demobilization.13 At stake is the position of the new Afghan Army – whether it will be a tool for common security or secure the influence of only one ethnic group. Unless a major policy shift occurs, the national army will likely be regarded as just another faction by the Afghans. In short, present security policies appear more focused on international rather than Afghan concerns. This has heightened the military conflict and reduced the legitimacy of the ATA. Security problems have further slowed reconstruction in Pashtun areas, where humanitarian relief and reconstruction aid is perceived as rewards for those who sided with the USA in ousting the Taliban. Constitutive issues At heart of the constitutive issues in Afghanistan is the relationship between the central state and the regions. Except for the reign of King Abdurrah Rahman and possibly in a period under the Taliban administration, Afghanistan has not had a strong and centralized Afghan state authority, and certainly, not one that has been respected by all ethnic and religious groups. The monarchy that as per tradition wields a degree of influence that has been weakened for several reasons. There is no obvious candidate to succeed the present aging King, many of the present politicians and warlords are old enemies of the King, and, not least, he is a Pashtun and therefore the Tadjiks currently at the helm will not allow him to regain power.14 Lacking central power, Kabul has traditionally ruled by managing alignments with local power holders. Unlike the phenomenon of “modernizing monarchs” in other countries, which was based on a tradition of absolutist monarchs, the system of “managing monarchs” in Afghanistan left little room for aggressive reforms. The operative principle was that if the regions would accept central rule they were rewarded with a degree of assistance and allowed to bring their cases to the national court for adjudication, if issues could not be resolved locally. The weakness of the system was that development assistance was unevenly distributed, that cities were favored, and power and access to foreign money was monopolized by a very small elite. At times, reforms were introduced in a patronizing way that alienated the rural population. But the managing monarch system also contained a ‘strongman’ tradition, represented by King Abdurrah Rahman, who used the army to crush opposition. Over the past two decades a different pattern has emerged as groups and commanders established more independent regional entities. During the 1980s it was the Afghan military/political parties that declared their opposition to the central government, and by doing so received external military aid. The mujahideen governments of the early 1990s were never sufficiently united to develop a common policy towards the regions, each ministry (that had any money) used to spend national funds to secure or buy loyalty to their specific group. At the same

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time, the Afghan Army had ceased to be the single most powerful military force that could be used to enforce the position of the central government. Given the present fragmentation of power and authority, where local/regional leaders can draw on a thriving illegal economy, supportive interest by individual foreign states, and links to Afghan strongmen at the national level, it is difficult to envisage developments that would allow for more than a “managing monarch” at the centre. Control of resources is critical here. A record harvest in 2003, a thriving illegal economy of drug production, arms smuggling and transit trade generated a potentially quite sizable tax base. Most of this was collected locally. By mid-July 2003 the Ministry of Finance had secured the transfer of only around 56 million US dollar from the regions, or only around 20 per cent of the total, according to some estimates.15 By comparison, the development budget for the financial year 2003/4 was 2.2 billion US dollars, which donors consequently were asked to finance. Reconstruction The planned reconstruction has gone much slower than what most Afghans had hoped for. The Afghan Transitional Administration has increasingly made a major issue out of what it considers inadequate, slow and unsuitable channeling of donor funding. The second post-Taliban Finance Minister (and first of the ATA), Ashraf Ghani, demanded already in mid-2002 that donor funding should be channeled through the ATA. His position was supported by the World Bank, and the Bankadministered Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund was held up as the preferred channel.16 This procedure, it was argued, would help build Afghan administrative capacity and strengthen the capability and legitimacy of the state. The World Bank had helped the ATA hire international accounting firms to ensure against charges of irregularity in the procurement and accounting process. The ATA has also complained of slow disbursement, and the Finance Minister has aggressively updated estimates of the financial needs for reconstruction. Instead of the initial assessment of five billion dollars for five years, prepared by the UNDP, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank for the first Tokyo pledging conference in January 2002, Ashraf Ghani asked donors in early 2003 for 15–20 billion dollars over a five-year period. In support of the claim he cited a revised UNDP-World Bank estimate that 16–19 billion dollars were needed over the next three years. If funds of this magnitude failed to materialize, Ghani told donors at a meeting in Brussels in March 2003, Afghanistan might well become a “narco-mafia state” that would threaten the security of all: criminals would run the mining, oil and gas industries, drug production and arms trade would expand, and terrorist militias would mushroom. Some donors agree that cash flow is a serious problem, arguing that the administration must have a larger and faster money flow to pay government salaries, build state capacity, deal with recalcitrant local authorities, and address reconstruction needs to show ordinary people that there is a piece divided to the people. UNAMA has generally taken this position as well (especially through the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General dealing with relief and

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reconstruction). In fact, for the first year of its existence the mission had a highlevel official whose principal task was to raise donor money for Afghanistan. NGOs with a major presence in Afghanistan have, not surprisingly, argued strongly for greater financial transfers as well.17 NGOs, the international banks and the ATA all have an institutional interest in managing large flows of aid money.18 A team of experts led by Barnett Rubin sought to assess the validity of the claims of slow and inadequate funding.19 The team correctly noted that the speed of disbursement is less important than whether relevant needs and objectives are being met. Citing shortcomings of disbursement against pledges “gives no information at all about the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but only about the behavior of donors.”20 Similarly, they noted that citations of accomplishments in some areas (especially health and education) are not meaningful unless they can be shown to be priority sectors in an appropriate sequence of peacebuilding tasks. In this respect, their report argues, the experiences in Afghanistan and other post-war reconstruction cases show that security sector reform, state capacity, and rapid growth of employment are priority areas. The report further dispels comparisons that sometimes are made with per capita aid money disbursed in other cases (East Timor, Rwanda and Kosovo); clearly this is meaningless insofar as there is obviously correct per capita figure across cases. Yet, while these are useful corrections, the Rubin study does not significantly clarify what they call “the fog of peacebuilding”. Most importantly, the report strongly supports the Ghani estimate of needed funds, without examining or clarifying the basis on which this need is estimated. “Needs” can only be assessed in relation to certain standards of what ought to be obtained. Is the basis in this case certain minimum standards, e.g. of water, education, etc for the population? What is the standard for restoration of infrastructure (e.g. pre-war level, as adjusted for technological development in the past 25 years at which Afghanistan has been at war?). Obviously, in a country as devastated by war, poverty and natural disasters as Afghanistan, it would not be difficult to come up with a needs assessment much higher than any of those used to date. In this kind of situation, assessment of needs is typically based on selective criteria that prominently include estimates of the likely availability of funding.21 In other words, needs assessment is an integral part of the aid bargaining process. If “need” is an ambiguous basis for determining the adequacy of aid flows. A recent major World Bank study concludes that donors should phase in funds slowly and peak the transfers in years four–seven after the “onset of peace”. But the reason for this policy recommendation is that this particular timing has statistically been shown to generate greatest economic growth effect of aid money.22 Whether economic growth by itself is a critical instrument of peacebuilding is unclear. The fact that most civil wars statistically have occurred in poor countries does not necessarily mean that a rapid growth process in itself will generate consensus and cohesion. Other studies conclude that the magnitude and timing of aid may well be less significant than how the funds are being used.23 In this connection, it has increasingly been recognized that aid by its very nature has some impact on patterns of conflict in the host country, and donors have taken this on board at least in

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principle.24 It follows that in a conflictual peacebuilding situation, as in post-Taliban Afghanistan, particular attention must be given to the likely conflictual or consensual effects of aid. A model of a conflictual peacebuilding suggests several dimensions that should be factored into decisions concerning reconstruction funding in Afghanistan:

How does aid affect the legitimacy of the state? Large aid flows channeled through the central governmental will necessarily strengthen the hold of the incumbents on the levers of power. Strengthening the central state clearly is fundamental to both peace and economic development in Afghanistan, as Cramer and Goodhand, among others, cogently argue.25 Yet increased aid money will not necessarily serve this purpose unless the incumbents have some degree of legitimacy. A most serious problem of the ATA is its narrow political base. The ATA is, after all, an appointed, transitional administration, although members regularly refer to themselves as the Government. Attempts to legitimizing the incumbents by calling an Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 were undermined by procedural irregularities and intimidation. Subsequent efforts supported by UNAMA and some donors to broaden the base by negotiating replacement of some government positions are moving slowly. Rapid transfers of funds to the central state in this phase thus risks letting reconstruction become an overtly partisan tool. The aid process in effect gets ahead of the political process, as some reports warned already in early 2002.26 The point also applies to donors who might have their own preferences. For instance, a major donor-financed training programme of judges in secular law (civil, criminal, comparative and human rights) proceeded apace in 2003,27 at a time when both the Judicial and Constitutional Commissions were seriously divided over the role of secular versus Islamic law.

How does aid affect centre-regional relations? The issue of state legitimacy is closely linked to centre-regional relations. A critical strategy of past rulers in Kabul has been to assert their authority over regionally based leaders through monetary transfers.28 In the present context, the equivalence would be to support projects that could generate cooperation from local leaders as well as on the grass-root level. Both anecdotal and historical evidence suggests, however, that such transactions are the equivalent of spot contracts. Support and cooperation are rendered only as long as the transfers keep coming. If this is correct, large aid transfers at present may in themselves serve to maintain – perhaps even strengthen – the present structure of a weak centre and strong warlords. Recognizing this point, UNAMA and some major donors have chosen to calibrate some kinds of transfers with demands for reform rather than hasten to finance programmes for restructuring the army and the police. As noted above, plans to demobilize existing militias (including those controlled by the Minister of Defence) and building up a new Afghan National Army (ANA) were linked to reforms of the Ministry of Defence. A similar perspective has shaped plans to reform the police, which is under the Ministry of Interior. President Karzai

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announced in April 2003 that police reform would take place within a five-year framework for restructuring the command and control hierarchy that would assert Kabul’s control down to the district level. Despite the five-year timeline, Ministry of Finance officials immediately protested that donors had only pledged half of the amount envisaged for the Law and order Trust Fund established to finance the reform.29

How does aid affect the accountability of the government? The pattern of Afghan central governments functioning as a rentier state is being repeated. Previous central governments were heavily dependent upon foreign subventions and aid transfers; the ATA was by mid-2003 almost entirely financed by donor money, from cabinet ministers down to teachers and the police. In addition to covering most of the recurrent costs of the state, foreign aid actors were asked to finance the development budget for 2003–04 as well. As Barnett Rubin has demonstrated, this structure of financing has historically generated an orientation whereby the government recognizes accountability primarily in relation to foreign donors, and secondarily to its own people.30 The dependence on foreign funding makes the ATA able to pin their internal problems on the failure of external actors to pay up, while the recurring talk of insufficient resources gives the ATA an excuse in the eyes of their own population for having accomplished so little.

How does aid affect equity issues? The ATA was by mid-2003 not only narrowly based, but internally fragmented, as single ministries nurtured their relationship with individual donors. Equity issues have traditionally been paramount in Afghanistan political life, and are seen as integral to successful conflict prevention more generally.31 In post-Taliban Afghanistan, many observers have noted a deep sense in Pasthun areas of being excluded from both power and the stream of benefits associated with it. In this situation, monitoring the patterns of reconstruction and attention to equity issues are particularly important. Managing reconstruction raised other difficult issues as well. Corruption had become a major problem, both in the form of direct flow of money to officials for services rendered and appropriation of national property. In a blatant example, Ministry of Defence officials authorized the bulldozing of houses and subsequent appropriation of a choice area of Kabul where people until then had been allowed to squat. The incident also revealed the inconsistency in the UN’s approach towards the corruption problem. While the UN Special Rapporteur on Housing strongly condemned the action, and even named the officials benefiting from the ‘landgrab’, the head of UNAMA, the SRSG, Lakhdar Brahimi, toned down the problem in a letter to the ATA so as to avoid any direct confrontation over the issue.32 The early phase of reconstruction focused inter alia on rebuilding state capacity in the form of administrative structures and procedures. Yet the inherently slow process of institution building conflicted with the demands for rapid results in some areas, particularly major infrastructure projects that could generate significant employment and be a highly visible “peace dividend”. At times, however, claims of

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‘inadequate absorptive capacity’ may conceal other concerns, as the repair of the Kabul-Kandahar highway illustrates. Restoring the main arteries was considered critical to an economy heavily dependent on transit traffic, and repairing the KabulKandahar road was among the main items on the agenda of both Afghans and the donors. Initial disagreement on the Afghan side about whether to seek loans from the international banks or try to get grant money financing delayed a decision. The US subsequently agreed to provide the finance, and chose a large US-based engineering company, the Louis Berger Group, to implement the project. This alienated elements within the ATA who noted that Afghan companies were bypassed even though they had tendered lower bids in the competition. It made matters worse when the American company subsequently brought in Indian subcontractors. The end result was not only a capital-intensive repair project, but an administrative structure that symbolized foreign interference. Scattered attacks on the road crews suggested that both the workers and, subsequently, the road itself might become a target for militant groups, as was the practice in mujahideen targeted areas in the1980s. Conclusions This review has offered some perspectives for assessing likely future developments and related aid policies in Afghanistan and the lesson that may be drawn from this is that a conflictual peacebuilding model is inherently difficult to implement. The choices are mainly between more or less satisfactory approaches, uncertain outcomes and modest objectives. The main reasons lie in the nature of the preceding conflict. The US intervention that removed the Taliban set the stage for an extraordinarily difficult succession. By militarily removing a regime that held a power of sorts in a fragile nation-state, with no successor able to claim broad legitimacy, and a Pandora’s box of tensions ready to open up, the regime change set the stage for continued conflict of all kinds. Even if the intervening state were fully committed to a comprehensive peacebuilding programme as defined above – i.e. to support political, economic and social institutions that could sustain a national peace – it would be an extraordinarily difficult task. The resulting conflictual peacebuilding appears to have no easy outcomes, nor are they always or necessarily peaceful. The most basic lesson, therefore, is not to intervene to create a situation like this in the first place.

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9 LAND, HOUSING AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT 1 Roger Zetter

Widespread destruction and damage to the built environment – roads, bridges, urban infrastructure, public buildings and above all housing – are simultaneously an instrument and a by-product of war and conflict. Nowhere are these devastating outcomes more evident than in the complex and violent humanitarian crises of the last 15 years: the deliberate destruction, in 1993, of the gracious 16th century Ottoman Stavi Most bridge in Mostar, remains an iconic image of how war destroys both the physical and the social fabric of local communities. In conjunction with the forced expulsion of civilian populations – likewise a process which is both a direct instrument for promoting conflict and a by-product of physical destruction – war-devastated built environments provide dramatic and immediate evidence of the impact and violence of conflicts. Typically, most countries convulsed by violent conflict are at critical stages of economic development in which the built environment is often a leading macro-economic sector – capital formation, infrastructure investment and housing construction. Destruction of the built environment decimates these already fragile economies. These characteristics of recent violent conflicts in former Yugoslavia, some of the CIS republics, further afield in sub-Saharan Africa – the Great Lakes region and Mozambique – and in Afghanistan and east Timor, have created a profound change in the orientation of the international humanitarian regime and the models of intervention (see eg Macrae, 2001; Minnear and Weiss, 1995; Slim, 1997; Weiner, 1998; Weiss and Collins, 1996; Pirotte et al., 1999; Zetter, 1999). Rebuilding and rehabilitating built environments damaged by war now constitute a major operational focus of donors and NGOs operating in this post-conflict environment. But physical reconstruction is not just a sectoral and programmatic end in itself: it is both a metaphor and an integral component of the international community’s wider objective of post-conflict reconstruction of societies disintegrated by war. Involving both communities who have remained in situ in the

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war, and often incorporating large-scale repatriation and return of war-displaced minorities, reconstruction and reintegration – whether spontaneous, voluntary or as part of a wider political framework of peace and reconstruction in ethnically divided communities – pose major policy and operational challenges to the agencies charged with designing and implementing these programmes and projects. These challenges, and the interplay of operational and political objectives are well summarised in the OECD’s guidelines ‘Helping to Prevent Conflict’ (especially Part II) (OECD, 2001), the UNHCR’s Operational Framework (UNHCR, 1998) and the EC’s Communications on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in 1996 and 2001 (EC 1996, 2001). In this context, complex emergencies impose their own complexity on the processes and modalities of recovery. Thus a key theme of the chapter recognises the complex relationships between the reconstruction of the built environment, the legal frameworks and institutional procedures which underpin this process at a programme and implementation level, and the wider political and economic objectives which guide post-war reconstruction programmes at the policy and national level. This chapter assesses the nature of the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction of the built environment. It is divided into three main sections. The first provides an overview and diagnosis of the limitations of current practice. Building on this review, the next section considers the guiding principles and strategies for the post conflict reconstruction of the built environment, whilst the last section examines operational practices. The chapter is predicated on two important suppositions. First, within the built environment sector as a whole, the multiple dimensions and role of housing and landed property as a fundamental component of post-conflict recovery are dominant concerns. Consequently these form the focus, though not exclusively so, of this chapter. Housing: ! is subject to widespread destruction – for example over 60% of the housing stock was partially damaged and 18% totally destroyed in the Bosnian conflict whilst over 50% was damaged in the Kosovan conflict (ICMP, 1996). ! is a basic physical need for survival, personal safety and protection which are major drivers for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of war-damaged property; ! plays a significant macro-economic role in developing and transitional economies and is a leading economic sector in post-war, post-disaster reconstruction; ! constitutes social capital and an important social and cultural commodity which reflects the rights of people to live where they choose; this ! connects to the wider objectives of peacebuilding and community reconstruction after conflict, and the restoration of local economic livelihoods;

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! reconstruction and reoccupation of property provide important indicators of how previously war-torn communities, and especially returnees, perceive their security and permanency; housing is both an instrument and a metaphor for post-conflict reconstruction and trust.2 Because housing and landed property offer multiple opportunities to rebuild livelihoods and peace, reconstruction in this field can best be conceived in terms of an assets-based approach (Sanderson, 2002) – rebuilding material and capital assets, as well as social and political assets. This conceptualisation underpins the argument of this chapter. Second, this review recognises that conditions in post-conflict countries vary greatly in the scale, tasks, capacities, institutional structures, timescales and modalities of reconstruction and recovery. Therefore, ‘best practices’ and ‘guiding principles’ must be adapted and adaptable to the variety of prevailing conditions. This chapter therefore focuses less on specific tools and instruments but more on a framework of principles, processes and approaches which, shared with stakeholders, can help to shape and direct programmes and projects for postconflict reconstruction of the built environment. Overview and diagnosis Against the background of ‘peace after violent conflict’ in the last decade or so, and the consequentially steep rise in donor-funding for a wide range of physical reconstruction programmes and projects, there have been substantial improvements in techniques and capacity-building – eg project specification, construction standards, tendering and contracting procedures. Intergovernmental agencies such as the World Bank, OECD, UNHCR, ECHO, for example, and implementing partners such as IRC, Caritas, Care, Oxfam and a host of smaller NGOs are now operational in many post-war reconstruction programmes. Agencies have developed new approaches to intervention after conflict. The UNHCR’s Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), low-cost micro projects frequently used to rehabilitate and reconstruct infrastructure such as roads, bridges and bore holes, are perhaps the most celebrated example of new tools for post conflict recovery designed to encourage return and reintegration (UNHCR, 1995). The need for multi-sectoral and participatory approaches is widely perceived, although more in principle than practice. Informed by a code of conduct based on the principles and rights embodied in the Humanitarian Charter, minimum standards for shelter and settlement provision in post-conflict situations, alongside natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies, are embodied in the Sphere ‘2’ guidelines (Sphere, 2003). Yet, practice has been largely piecemeal and project driven: many reconstruction programmes have met with limited success to date. Implementation constraints include technical, logistical and strategic difficulties; housing completion rates and output are below target whilst cost overruns are common; minority return levels are often much lower than anticipated. These are notably features of the Bosnia-Herzogovina experience. Beneficiary participation is often very limited in physical reconstruction as well as other sectors, and this inhibits engagement with

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the wider objectives of rebuilding social capital after conflict. Coordination with other sectoral interventions and linkage to wider programmes of peace-building are generally pragmatic. This was a feature of reconstruction in Kosovo, with the large number of agencies operational there, and also currently in Afghanistan. As a result, programme sustainability, which is the major prerequisite of an enduring postconflict reconstruction strategy, remains compromised. Political, security and governance considerations of course play a large part in the poor programme performance, most evident in Bosnia-Herzogovina for example (Amnesty International, 2000). In any case, reconciliation is a protracted and often intractable process. Moreover, evidence from reconstruction programmes in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, amongst other locations, confirms that post-conflict reconstruction programmes tend to replicate the model of refugee assistance programmes. They demonstrate the familiar shortcomings of project-driven approaches, short-term time and budget horizons directed to easily measurable indicators and outputs. These limitations are attributable to donor demands and the policies of the international community based on the belief that sustained pressure ‘to reconstruct’ is the best way to restore peace. Such thinking precludes a more systematic and coherent approach. Moreover, this model is unsustainable. It creates dependency by disempowering beneficiaries from the process of rebuilding their own livelihoods and social contexts. And by concentrating on short-term projects, it impedes the mobilisation and co-ordination of longer-term strategies for development-led recovery and reconstruction. Conversely, in some circumstances rapid and spontaneous post-conflict reconstruction takes place. In Kosovo, housing reconstruction and a building materials industry relying on imported commodities from neighbouring countries quickly developed at the end of the NATO military intervention in 1999. As part of the wider informal economy, this process was well underway before the international reconstruction programme was in place (see eg Telford, 2001), and overran the carefully designed plans and programmes of international donors and NGOs. In Kabul (though not elsewhere in Afghanistan), there is comparable evidence of a post-war environment stimulating a surge in physical development (Wiley, 2003). For different reasons, similar outcomes are reported in Mozambique. Here, unique conditions for reintegrating 1.7 million refugees (ie the fact that the conflict was not fought on ethnic lines), combined with poverty-induced selfreliance, to foster local, autonomous responses (UNHCR, 1996). The apparent contradiction that war or, more precisely in the present context, post-war circumstances provide the trigger for development opportunities, and the wider link between humanitarian relief and development, are themes which are discussed below.3 Equally, these examples offer important lessons about the resilience of seemingly vulnerable and war-impacted local communities, and their latent capacities to rebuild their social capital and livelihoods. This widespread experience confirms that locally crafted responses hold the key to successful and, ultimately, more sustainable responses. The concern here lies with the critical need to rebuild,

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develop and, in many cases, reform the institutional capacity and resources of wartorn states, thereby enabling individuals and communities to engage the task of physical reconstruction. This, as much as physical reconstruction itself, is a prime objective. From this perspective, a critical corollary here is that the interests of the international humanitarian regime of donors and NGOs, and the wider political interests of the international community, must resonate with local responses and structures. Too often in the field of physical reconstruction, external donor assistance comes with preconceived practices and assumptions about housing standards, construction methods, contracting procedures and land tenure systems which override local conventions and capacities. Operationally, external interventions often lack the necessary practical adaptability and flexibility to deal with the dynamics and high levels of uncertainty found in post-conflict environments. Their approaches frequently constrain implementation and inhibit widespread local adoption. More broadly, project and programme interventions in this, as in other sectors, are determined by wider international political agendas in which post-conflict reconstruction is tethered to the development of new instruments of governance, structures of civil society and the transparency of legal and bureaucratic procedures: for example the regulation of property ownership, transfer and legislation. Often, it is the failure of these instruments which is perceived to precipitate conflicts in the first place (OECD, 2001; Arcand and Pons-Vignon, 2003). Indeed, as in the aftermath of natural disasters, so too after war and conflict, the imperative is to seize opportunities to transform previously restrictive or socially divisive practices and bureaucratic structures – examples in the field of the built environment are: discriminatory planning policies and public development projects; inequity in public project tendering and contracting procedures; restrictive land ownership and registration practices. Herein lies the need to link wellconceived physical recovery programmes to the wider and complex context which shaped the particular humanitarian crisis in the first place – hence, again, the need to link complex recovery to complex emergencies. Critical though this objective is, it has to be remembered that externally imposed responses may be both alienating and of limited success unless they acknowledge local practices and legislative frameworks. Thus, perhaps more than in any other sector of post-conflict peace and reconstruction, ‘solutions’ in the built environment sector highlight the profound tensions between re-imposing the status quo ante and developing new approaches and practices. Symptomatic of the tension is the fact that many of the processes in this sector begin with the ‘re’ prefix – repatriation, rebuilding, rehabilitation and reconstruction, (Keen, 1998:10), restoration and redevelopment (see eg Anderson, 1996; Eade 1998; Kumar, 1997). This chapter is concerned with these ‘re’ processes. But the point is more than semantic. It lies at the core of the challenge to develop locally viable, strategically sustainable projects and programmes for post-war reconstruction of the physical environment and peacebuilding. In short, the impediments to durable and sustainable reconstruction

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programmes for the physical environment are a major barrier to the wider objectives of post-war recovery, reintegration of minority returnees and the development of strategies for sustainable peace. Moreover, dissemination of lessons learned and experience between agencies is limited. A more systematic understanding of the concepts and processes of physical reconstruction is needed, one which links to wider objectives of post-conflict rebuilding; this will help to alleviate project failure, enhance institutional capacity and ultimately lead to more sustainable reconstruction. Guiding Principles and Strategic Intervention Reconstructing the physical environment and housing projects in particular, usually supports multiple objectives. They are: an important component of economic recovery; an instrument for achieving broader political priorities of peacebuilding as well as narrower practical requirements for shelter; and the means of rebuilding the social fabric and household livelihoods. Physical projects and technocratic deliverables are thus the means not the ends of interventions which operate at multiple levels. Crucially, therefore, post-conflict reconstruction programmes for the built environment must be conceived within a strategic framework of interventions for rebuilding peace and livelihoods. However, experience to date suggests that these wider objectives are unfulfilled because key strategic parameters are usually neglected in the ‘implementation push’ and project-driven approach which the international humanitarian community adopts to put peace in place. By focussing on lower order deliverables and measurable outputs – eg contract completions, costs per housing unit, buildings restored – physical reconstruction projects have frequently failed to address or measure progress towards the ‘higher order’ objectives which they serve such as reintegration, social and civil society development, economic needs and strategies for peace. Four parameters constitute the essential preconditions of sustainable and durable physical reconstruction programmes: building a strategic framework; linking relief and rehabilitation to recovery and development; rebuilding institutional capacity; enabling and empowering people as key resources in these processes. Although they cannot easily be integrated into programme design and delivery, these guiding principles or strategic imperatives define both a normative set of policy requirements and an appropriate methodology for a more effective delivery of physical reconstruction programmes. Bridging the Strategic Gap and Building a Strategic Framework The first challenge, and a significant shortcoming in much current practice, lies in developing a systematic framework which integrates the operational characteristics of physical programmes and projects with the wider strategic objectives of postconflict peacebuilding. Precisely because physical reconstruction is so self-evidently project driven, the need to recognise the interconnectedness between project implementation, programme design and with the wider framework of strategic policy, is essential.

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How might a more systematic understanding of, and a framework for, interventions for physical reconstruction be conceptualised? First principles suggest that the strategic context of recovery and development, and thus the scope for reconstructing the built environment, is conventionally defined in terms of three programmatic arenas: ! Rebuilding governance and polity – political capital: democratic processes, institution building, civil society, peace, reconciliation and security; ! Rebuilding social structures – social capital: social networks, support and trust within and between different groups and constituencies; ! Rebuilding livelihoods – economic and physical capital: recovery and development of economic activity, physical infrastructure and housing, environmental sustainability. Rebuilding the physical environment (and of course in other sectors), takes place in each strategic arena – most evidently in the third arena for the built environment. At the same time, these programmatic arenas are operationalised by different modalities of intervention; typically most post-conflict programmes are defined in terms of three complementary levels which are: ! Reconstruction Concepts – guiding principles underpinning programme design and delivery such as: sustainability; enablement and empowerment of communities and beneficiaries; and housing as a leading sector for economic and social recovery; recovery to development. ! Reconstruction Strategies – policy making and programme design: typically long term and indirect impacts; ! Field Level Action/Implementation – project delivery: typically short term and direct impacts. Again, post-conflict physical reconstruction takes place in each operational level, evidently at the third level which is highly developed for this sector in contrast to the first level. The diagrammatic (Figure 9.1) illustrates the conjuncture of programmatic arenas and operational levels, how interaction between them occurs at different levels, and why strategic co-ordination between them is essential. Because physical reconstruction takes place at different governmental levels (from national to local); with different processes (eg civil society initiatives to mobilise property commissions or local capacity building for self help construction), through different agencies (government, NGOs etc), and with different outputs (eg housing, physical infrastructure, social development), coordination is often the major barrier to mobilising recovery and development in this sector. The framework helps to indicate the ways in which the diverse activities of agencies, donors and government institutions can be better co-ordinated and why the linkage and integration between the variables is essential to effective programme design and delivery.

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Strategic Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction Operational Levels

Reconstruction Reconstruction Field Level Concepts Strategies Implementation

Programme Arenas

(Indirect Impacts: MediumLong- Term)

(Direct Impacts: Short Term)

Governance and Polity (political capital)

Accountability Peacebuilding Civil Society Sustainability

Strengthening government institutions Developing NGOs

Training Social infrastructure

Social Structures (social capital)

Community building/ reconstruction Empowerment

Participation strategies Settlement strategies

Community development Physical development and Infrastructure

Livelihoods (economic/ physical capital)

Recovery to development

Spatial development strategies Local capacity building

Infrastructure Housing

Figure 9.1 Strategic Framework for Post-conflict Reconstruction Shaded row indicates focus of physical reconstruction

Linking Relief and Rehabilitation to Recovery and Development The concept of a relief-to-development continuum (eg Demusz, 1999; Gorman, 1993 Macrae, 1997, 2001; UNHCR, 1995:143–186; 1997; Zetter, 1995) is now a central tenet of post-conflict reconstruction. It is a process which bridges humanitarian and developmental objectives and lies at the crux of built environment programmes and projects. Difficult though it is to conceive that massive, negative economic and physical disequilibria caused by human violence, displacement and extensive destruction, stimulate development, humanitarian disasters potentially generate and release enormous economic and human energy for reconstruction. But too often in post-conflict recovery programmes, ‘disaster as a development opportunity’ (Zetter, 1992) is, as we have seen above, sacrificed to short term priorities. Yet it is the longer term developmental outcomes and priorities which are much more likely to secure lasting peace and reconciliation. As Macrae argues (2001:158–161; see also Middleton and O’Keefe, 1998), embedding a sustainable continuum from relief and rehabilitation to peace and development is essentially a political rather than a technocratic challenge, in which personal security, human rights protection and advocacy, strategies for return and

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reintegration are amongst the most critical yet intractable constraints. These characteristics do not negate the concept: they merely indicate the barriers to be overcome at different levels (national and local) and through different processes (negotiation and local enablement and capacity building), if a continuum is to be developed. Within this context, a number of pre-conditions must be satisfied if physical reconstruction is to play an effective role in linking relief to development. First, priorities for humanitarian recovery should be integrated into, and complemented by, the broader national developmental framework to rebuild assets, livelihoods and income strategies. But, as we have seen, lack of co-ordination, piecemeal implementation and project-driven, short-term priorities are endemic features of the sector. As an example of how this tendency should be reversed, housing projects, for example, must be developed in parallel with policies and projects to reconstruct and/or develop new economic activities and infrastructure, micro-credit facilities, employment and income generating projects to enable both returnees and those who remained behind to restore their livelihoods. Perhaps more significant, national policy frameworks, particularly in the housing sector, are critical vehicles for safeguarding the rights of communities. Second, the built environment plays an extensive and instrumental role both in post-conflict reconstruction and as a leading sector in macro-economic recovery and development. Physical infrastructure, and the housing sector in particular, are important economic goods, typically accounting for 20% of GDP; they generate significant up-stream and down-stream multipliers – regenerating building materials and components industries, re-establishing construction labour markets, utilising transport networks, inter-household income transfers. For these potentialities to be achieved, programmes for reconstructing the physical infrastructure need to be integrated into national and regional level economic policy frameworks and investment programmes. From this perspective, the potential links between macroeconomic development opportunities and post-conflict reconstruction should be much more widely recognised and exploited. Conceptually it offers a vital means of focusing war-torn countries on future needs and priorities. Third, reconstructing the built environment to support developmental and sustainable peace is a partnership. One of the many problematics is that projects in this sector are rarely conceived and operationalised beyond the immediate physical tasks and outputs where donors and their implementing partners hand over to beneficiaries. Partnership has to be developed between donors, implementing partners and beneficiaries, so that the role of built environment projects within the larger frame of peace and reconstruction strategies is effectively conceived. Rebuilding institutional infrastructure and capacity In the built environment sector, the potential contribution which post-conflict reconstruction can make to developmental objectives, is contingent on both effective articulation within national policy frameworks (discussed above) but also on the (re-) building of governmental institutional capacity. For, not only are buildings and infrastructure destroyed by conflict and violence. The fabric of

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government and governance is destroyed as well. This wider legacy of institutional destruction, or at least severely depleted capacity, produces a post-conflict vacuum which constitutes a major barrier to implementing reconstruction projects in this sector. Recovering and rebuilding these capacities enables national and local authorities to regain the impetus for policy and programme management. This requires a range of strategies tackling administrative resources, legislative machinery, institution building and professional and skills development. Typically, amongst the most significant institutional and legislative capacitybuilding aspects for the built environment sector are the following: machinery for regulating land ownership, titling and real property restitution claims, including multiple occupation of property; protection and security of property rights; reconstituting and, where appropriate, revising the planning instruments and building codes and standards; promoting professional and skills training; producing strategic development plans (for example for housing) and regional and local spatial plans. Beyond these immediate tasks, securing transparent procedures and decision making, and enhancing the development of good governance are not just byproducts of post-conflict institutional development. As with rebuilding national policy frameworks, these objectives are critical inputs to the long term task of postwar peacebuilding. In this respect they are potentially more valuable than the project construction level itself, although the latter dominates the sector. Enablement and Participation The focal point of successful post-conflict reconstruction strategies for the built environment sector should be the initiatives of people themselves – those who remained and returnees. People are not passive and dependent victims but active survivors and stakeholders whose coping capacities in reconstructing their lives are frequently underestimated. Much of the available evidence confirms that in the shelter sector above all, but also in resuscitating the local economy for example, enabling and enhancing the local population’s own capacities, skills, expertise and self reliance are the most effective strategies – in Anderson’s phrase, the ‘local capacities for peace’ (Anderson, 1996). These processes reveal rather more clearly than a top-down donor perspective, the post-conflict priorities of local populations. Moreover, empowering local populations avoids dependency on institutionalised provision, and in this way the physical tasks of recovery and development are more likely to lead to wider social and cultural benefits of communities building a more sustainable peace together. Thus the peacebuilding objectives of good governance, accountability and democratic decision making, can be given tangible meaning through programmes such as housing which are developed, designed and implemented in ways which empower communities and participants. Unfortunately the project-driven model of reconstructing the built environment, with its focus on macro-level externally-funded interventions and physical outputs, obscures the fact that, at the local level, people may cope remarkably effectively with their own resources. As a SIDA paper points out,

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rejection of self-help in favour of contractor built housing in Bosnia-Herzogovina, by the international community in 1997, came about not because of problems with the concept, but the methods being deployed at that time (SIDA, 2001). Many of the assumptions which the international community used to justify contractor over self-help housing construction in Bosnia-Herzogovina – speed, employment generation, project monitoring – were disproved by the empirical evidence: perhaps most telling, costs were found to be 40% less in self-help projects (SIDA, 2001). The evidence on self-help housing reconstruction in Kosovo is particularly significant – but appears to be the case in widely different situations such as East Timor and Afghanistan – where despite the constraints, returnees had mobilised both the economy and shelter reconstruction before external assistance was mobilised and continued rather more effectively alongside it. Here, self-help processes, often utilising informal sector mechanisms, made efficient and economical use of resources, which external agencies and contractors could never replicate, as noted above. This also makes practical sense since, as the evidence shows, NGOs can never deliver sufficiently large shelter or income recovery programmes. For example, although the international community (IC) has assisted in reconstructing 100,000 units in Bosnia-Herzogovina, 300,000 war damaged houses remain. As SIDA suggests (2001), it seems infeasible that the IC could continue to finance projects for this volume of restoration, especially when beneficiary motivation to manage reconstruction is high. Self-help is an integral part of an integrated strategy not only to save money for other community projects but also as part of the wider peace and community reconstruction objective. There are of course constraints and barriers to local enablement within postconflict communities: these require external interventions. What local people and communities cannot always supply are the larger-scale resources and support structures which donors and NGOs have also often been less willing or skilled at providing – major infrastructure connections, limited availability of building materials, credit and finance agencies, regional development, land registration systems, effective security, simplified building regulatory frameworks, capacity building in public institutions like planning and building control agencies. These are the priorities for external interventions, providing the framework for, rather than duplicating what local populations can do best. They are essentially strategic and operational constraints which should not be confused with the basic conceptual premise of enablement and empowerment. Operational Requirements and Field Level Practices Project and programme design and implementation involve a complex range of operational variables. Data and information needs Post-conflict reconstruction is predicated on a minimum range of data and information – for example property cadasters, population and demography, infrastructure maps. This is an often-neglected pre-requisite. Inevitably the postconflict data deficit is enormous. Data and records have been destroyed; where data

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are available they record social, demographic and economic structures which have been violently changed or destroyed; survey capacity to collect new data is limited; the data are likely to be contested by different interest groups. These conditions have implications for both short-term project design and implementation, and medium term programme development. In the short-term, the need for minimal data, is often sacrificed by the imperative of ‘project delivery’. Yet durable structures are built which have significant implications for public and private investment decisions and service and infrastructure provision. Medium-term data needs – for example projected populations, housing needs, economic and employment forecasts – which are essential for settlement planning, are also a deficit in post-conflict situations. The minimum data requirements will vary considerably according to location, type and scale of project and programme, and phasing in the post-conflict reconstruction cycle. However, it is helpful to conceive of two categories: base-line data and operational and management requirements. As regards base-line data this might include: ! Target population (including ‘hosts’ and returnees) of projects and programmes – current and projected demography, social characteristics; ! Profile of economic activity and livelihood capacities – current and projected structure of local economy, economic livelihoods and activities, levels of economic well-being, needs assessment and availability of production inputs (eg capital plant, machinery, building materials, farming tools and seeds), future development strategies and projects, scope and capacity to absorb returnee and local population; ! Social infrastructure – current and projected availability and condition; needs assessment and proposed reconstruction and development programmes; ! Physical infrastructure – current and projected availability and condition; proposed reconstruction and development. Minimum operational and management information would include: ! Building codes and regulations, planning policies and strategies, standards, regulations and procedures for planning permits etc.; ! Capacity of local housing finance, savings and lending institutions – available capital, probity, lending criteria, equity for different ethnic groups; ! Availability of building materials – procurement, logistics – and contracting capacity and impact of projects and programmes on these capacities; ! Stakeholder analysis – participatory processes and mechanisms in the built environment sector. Clearly, it is unrealistic and counter productive to hold up reconstruction until all these data requirements are satisfied. Rather, what the data check list and audit provides is a systematic framework of normative data needs for improved project planning, whilst indicating, more precisely than in much present practice, where information shortfalls are likely to put project and programme outputs and deliverables at risk.

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Land policy, property and occupancy issues Tackling the immediate problems of destruction, the restitution of property and land claims, disputed property rights and ‘double’ occupancy are endemic features of post-conflict reconstruction programmes and projects (see eg Fitzpatrick, 2002; Wiley, 2003). These requirements bridge the operational and strategic levels of intervention. These constraints are frequently cited reasons for project failure in evaluations, and although the impact appears greatest in the urban setting (for example impacting repair of war-damaged housing and new-build projects), the significance in rural areas should not be underestimated (Wiley, 2003). The issues are complex and sensitive. Because cadasters are either destroyed, or complex bureaucratic barriers to their access are deliberately erected to prevent return and/or reoccupation, it is exceedingly difficult to establish property rights or sort out possession where there is double occupancy of property. Underlying these procedural difficulties is the sensitivity of property rights. They represent capital assets and provide symbolic meaning to people’s entitlements to live in particular locations – rights which war and violence have deliberately destroyed (CHRE, 2001). In this context, restoring the full and just exercise of property rights, which operate with transparency, is fundamental to the restoration of social rights and the rule of law. And the machinery of land policy ‘plays a critical role in the long term stability and development of a country after war helping to ensure that further conflict does not follow’ (Fitzpatrick, 2002:3). Where minority return is also an objective of post-conflict reconstruction, property restitution is especially instrumental. To mediate these ends, claims adjudication bodies, usually in the form of independent Property Commissions, are often created. They can be vital ‘first phase’ institutions through which disputes in post-conflict societies can be transparently resolved and validated, information is shared, and opposing stakeholders encouraged to negotiate: this contributes to the wider task of peacebuilding, legal and institutional reconstruction, reconciliation and governance, as well as the practical task of rehabilitating the built environment (Theotocatos and Zetter, 2003). Bosnia and Kosovo provide useful examples. In Afghanistan, attention has been drawn to the need for such an approach, whilst a centrepiece of the UN Secretary General’s Peace Accord to resolve the long running partition of Cyprus is a sophisticated Property Commission to adjudicate claims and award compensation (United Nations 2003, paras 107–111 and Republic of Cyprus, 2003). Significantly Fitzpatrick argues, in the case of East Timor, that the consequences of the decision within the UN Transitional Administration not to establish a commission have proved problematic (Fitzpatrick, 2002:5), notwithstanding the complexities of both post-colonial and post-conflict circumstances. Once established, sustainability of these commissions is vital. Thus in both Bosnia and Kosovo, donor-funding to complete the task, by setting up national institutions to continue the work, has not been sustained and this appears to be undermining the credibility of the institutions and introducing public scepticism. From an operational perspective, amongst the key modalities in clarifying property rights4 and rehabilitating war-damaged property are the following:

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! Local municipalities should agree the pre-war occupants of properties and putative project beneficiaries; ! These lists and the legal rights and claims to properties should be independently corroborated by Property Commissions; ! Tripartite agreements between the municipality, the beneficiary and the project agency concerning the return/occupation by the proposed beneficiary can help to eliminate disputes about the return and restitution of property rights; ! Fixed (reasonable) periods for reclaiming property, or occupying rehabilitated or new built property should be agreed with the project agency; ! Clear agreement on the nature and the duration of temporary reassignment of tenure rights is critical; ! Where double occupancy occurs repair/reconstruction should not be executed until due procedures (usually through the Commission) have been completed; ! Compensation levels and the mechanisms to provide it must be transparent, agreed in advance and clearly regulated. Of course there has to be room for manoeuvre. Return and restitution of property rights depend on the goodwill of local authorities and majority populations; this is rarely forthcoming on a voluntary basis. Thus the strength of purpose, sanctions and leverage which international agencies can invoke to ensure adherence to basic rules of law, in this case with regard to property rights, are also critical. Mediation between the practical task of securing individual property rights and the strategic objective of reinforcing the principles of rights is a crucial process in this context. Rebuilding the capacity of the building materials industry Post-war reconstruction is frequently hampered by the destruction of the building materials industry or supply shortages of materials due to heavy demand in postconflict reconstruction. Although informal sector supply chains are usually reestablished quickly, these are rarely sufficient to support the scale of projects and programmes needed to rebuild war-torn countries. Thus a critical part of a reconstruction strategy is to develop programmes for rehabilitating this sector. This includes: making detailed assessment of building material demand; projects and programmes to invest and resuscitate the industry; re-establishing procurement and supply chains including transport infrastructure; secondary distribution to contractors, communities and households/project beneficiaries engaged in reconstruction. Infrastructure Rebuilding war-damaged physical infrastructure (water and electricity supply systems, sewage disposal, transport infrastructure) and social infrastructure (schools, community centres and clinics), constitutes a major challenge in postconflict reconstruction. The challenge is usually compounded by pre-existing shortcomings – underfunding, poor management and maintenance – as well as by the sudden surges in demand at the end of conflict, for example, from returning populations.

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Physical infrastructure is usually tackled first because it provides the platform on which many other elements of post-war reconstruction, population return, economic revitalisation and peacebuilding depend. Issues of prioritisation, linked to the often formidable scale of rehabilitation works, are salient and unique aspects in infrastructure reconstruction. Thus, whilst progress can be achieved on building projects, for example, housing, public buildings and factories, they are not free standing. Frequently it is the lack of utility ‘connections’, service delivery failures, unrepaired transport links which prevent the completion of what might otherwise be successful projects. Close co-ordination is needed in terms of programming, time scales and physical planning, as well as project agencies and local authorities, to ensure that individual projects are compatible with infrastructure reconstruction. In general it is helpful to distinguish the differential impacts of medium and large scale, as opposed to local infrastructure needs. In the latter case local capacity can be mobilised and augmented by agency interventions where the scale may require the resources of larger contractors. Community-based, locally generated projects play a wider role in rebuilding peace and trust and, once in place, infrastructure becomes a critical instrument in unlocking individual commitment and capacity to rebuild housing. Also at the local level it may be possible to overcome some shortfalls by temporary solutions, for example in water supply and pumping systems, electricity generation. On the other hand the large-scale rehabilitation of major infrastructure, such as restoring bridges and railways in order to transport building materials or resuscitate export markets, usually require major external project funding. Finance and Credit Funding the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the built environment, as we have seen, is vital to kick starting the economy after conflict. Infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, water supply and sewage disposal systems usually require large scale and external funding and they are predicated on rebuilding indigenous institutional capacity, also discussed in the guiding principles section. But at the householder level as well, access to funding is critical in order to rebuild property and livelihoods which, in turn, generate important up-stream and down-stream economic multipliers. Funding and credit shortfalls frequently constitute a barrier to effective post-conflict housing projects, whether in self-help situations or where cost recovery is required from project beneficiaries. Various mechanisms have been used to bring funding on-stream in postconflict reconstruction and return programmes. Whilst these mirror approaches used in orthodox development situations, political and logistical factors tend to produce barriers in the post-war context. Typically these tend to be: weak savings and credit institutions, characteristics pre-dating the war but often accentuated by it; high interest rates reflecting high levels of post-conflict risk; limited access to credit and finance because of inadequate creditworthiness or collateral; bureaucratic procedures and/or corrupt practices and/or deliberate barriers to access which inhibit the effective flow of finance into household purchasing capacity and productive investment.

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The key objectives are to adopt financing methods which are a) appropriate to the needs and means of the target beneficiaries, including the poor and vulnerable sectors, and b) safeguard agencies from improper use of funds. Amongst the options for the provision of credit to facilitate reconstruction are: establishing revolving credit schemes; developing projects which partner donor-funded agencies and with local credit and lending agencies in order to (re-)establish credit and savings for key sectors such as housing; streamlining borrowing procedures; establishing co-operative finance agencies and associations for housing; microcredit or credit association/co-operative schemes for investment in livelihoods. Issues to be considered are: dispensing methods (eg cash or vouchers or credit notes); repayment requirements and staging; sanctions on defaults; levels of subsidy and interest rates. Appropriate‘ inputs’ – technologies and materials A major objective in post-conflict reconstruction of the built environment must be to incorporate the resources and skills which hosts and returnees possess, by using familiar materials and construction techniques, including self-help practices. Approaches familiar to local people and contractors enable a more rapid engagement with the reconstruction process. Indigenous technologies may not reflect internationally accepted standards familiar to donors and implementing agencies, and this tension may accentuate the inherent dilemma between using old practices and developing new technologies, as a means of breaking with the past to build the peace. Experience suggests that the key determinants of project success or failure lie in tackling supply side shortfalls and logistical blockages in the construction and building materials industries – even though the shortfalls are sometimes anticipated rather than actual. Agencies often respond by importing technologies and materials because this simplifies project delivery. Invariably, though, this raises project costs and excludes beneficiaries from participatory strategies which are vital if war-torn communities are to feel a sense of ownership in the tasks of reconstruction. Equally, the multiplier effect of domestic/local procurement can be a critical stimulant to rebuilding the local economy, potential which is lost with imported technologies and components. Even so, the deployment of indigenous approaches will not always be the automatic choice. Opportunities will be limited, for example, in cases where international intervention aims to support specific communities and social groups who lack productive capacity – such as the elderly – or those who lack access to housing – for example where returnee communities may be particularly vulnerable to exploitation or exclusion. Given that it is ‘supply side’ rather than ‘demand side’ constraints which constitute the main barriers to post-conflict reconstruction in the built environment sector, particular attention needs to be directed to removing system blockages and restoring capacity. Thus programme and project delivery should address: ! Availability of inputs – It is particularly important to anticipate and overcome specific commodity shortfalls (eg cement, bricks, steel rods), since these will

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induce system-wide blockages, delays and cost escalation. Current and projected demands need to be assured. ! Supply chain capacity and logistics – These need to be assessed to ensure sufficient logistical capacity and that distribution and marketing channels are operating effectively to provide on-going delivery of building materials. This can be critical given that post-conflict transport demand is extremely high in all sectors and transport infrastructure will have been targeted in war – are roads and railways functioning effectively and what is the volume and condition of the transport fleet? ! Commodity pricing – Given that post-conflict scarcity and demand for building materials and labour are likely to be endemic, and constraints on transport infrastructure exceptionally high, these factors can make their procurement very vulnerable to cost inflation, price fixing, pricing cartels and the creation of artificial shortages. Monitoring building commodity prices, wage rates and transport costs will assist cost reduction/cost stabilisation strategies in project design and in assessing tender pricing. Varied interventions to regulate or support pricing structures may be needed to overcome supply shortfalls and thus reduce and stabilise project costs. ! Storage of materials – This is also problematic after conflicts – security and space – and this will effect supply and distribution chains and thus impact on project delivery as well. Standards, Contracting and Project Management In many post-war reconstruction programmes, the extensive number of project agencies, with their varied tendering and contracting procedures produce substantial problems of programme co-ordination, friction between stakeholders, lack of consistency in design, varied building standards and procedures, and confusion for local administrations, contractors and potential beneficiaries. These outcomes militate against effective project and programme delivery and produce substantial delay. Of course different types and scales of projects and the different capacities of contractors (size, experience) must be accommodated; but the challenge is to balance flexibility with consistency. There have been attempts to standardise practices for construction and contracting (ECHO/IMG, 1999). To introduce some consistency, what is needed are guidelines for: ! Project inception which concisely specify project objectives and measurable indicators; ! Forms of tendering and procedures which are appropriate to the project, capacity of local contractors, and the involvement of beneficiaries; ! Forms of contract, again appropriate to circumstances; ! Quality, cost control, and contract supervision procedures. At the same time it is important that the standards are fair, allow competition, ensure that minority groups are not excluded from involvement in contracting and

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construction, prevent corrupt practices and safeguard the project agencies from unaccounted losses. Personal safety Personal security matters are a particular feature of rebuilding the built environment after conflict, although the implications extend well beyond this immediate sector. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) (notably in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Kampuchea) and landmines (in Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone for example) affect over 90 countries although the majority are not at war (Burion, 2003; Land Mine Action, 2002)). These ordnance together with war-damaged structures, and unsafe utility systems constitute significant hazards for local populations after war, as well as for personnel engaged in the task of physical reconstruction. The incidents of these violent hazards vary significantly between urban and rural settings. Beyond these obvious physical dangers, agency field staff as a whole are particularly vulnerable, in post-conflict reconstruction situations, both in terms of the direct physical hazards and because they are often working in the ‘interstices’ of previously warring communities. A key feature here is the work of specialist agencies involved in de-mining and clearing the horrific detritus of war. Often these are locally recruited and trained (UNDP, 2001). In many locations this is the pre-requisite to the main task of rebuilding the physical environment. Thus close co-ordination is needed, particularly at project inception stage, between project and contracting agencies, mine and UXO clearance agencies and also those responsible for building condition survey information. Conclusions Funding regimes and donor and agency policies do not generally support programmes and projects for reconstructing the built environment which are effectively developmental, durable and responsive to local conditions; the emphasis is on short-term horizons and external expertise. Institutionalised assistance and recovery frequently pre-empts the capabilities and resources which war-impacted populations possess. Post-conflict recovery and reconstruction in the physical environment sector require long term and systematic developmental frameworks. This chapter has indicated some of the parameters of such a model. Deploying local communities and households as the key resource to be mobilised, developing strategic tools, and removing the blockages to that process constitute a major challenge but offer a sustainable way forward in rebuilding the built environment – especially the housing sector – and contributing to peace-building. Placing physical reconstruction programmes within a long term development framework, which links macroeconomic strategies with micro-level projects and interventions again constitutes a challenging but viable way forward. Without this, the task of recovery and reconstruction will induce protracted dependency on outside agencies and little prospect of sustainable development, economically, socially or environmentally. The potential for the built environment sector to contribute to the more profound task of peacebuilding will be similarly impaired.

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10 BUILDING POST-WAR CAPACITY: WHERE TO START? Sultan Barakat and Margaret Chard

Despite the general recognition by the UN and other international institutions that post-war reconstruction is essentially a development process requiring long-term commitment and investment in building national capacity, the actual response on the ground is still dominated by a culture of ‘relief ’ and short-term perspectives. Building the capacity of national institutions of government and civil society is a declared aim but prevailing practice contradicts it. The UN and in particular its development agency, UNDP, which might be expected to take the lead in promoting the development approach, seems unsure of its role in post-conflict contexts where state institutions are no longer fully functional and civil society lacks organisational structure and experience. It has long been acknowledged in the international community and in particular in the UN, that ‘(t)he challenge of rebuilding after war is essentially a development challenge in the special circumstances of a war-torn society’ (Stiefel, 1999:15) and it is generally agreed that development is about developing people and their institutions. The ‘special circumstances’ of war-torn societies are not the emergency needs created by the destruction (floods and earthquakes cause similar damage) but the unravelling of the fabric of society, the weakening or complete breakdown of those institutions and relationships that would normally enable the society to respond to its own needs or to negotiate assistance as sovereign peoples. In these circumstances the need to restore and build the capacity of people and institutions is the number one priority, not the logistic exercise of restoring the physical environment. Why is it that despite this understanding, in every post-conflict situation, the international intervention is led by the relief not the development principle? This contradiction between knowledge and practice has been noted by many and examined in a previous article by the authors (Barakat and Chard, 2002b). The most limiting factor is the absence of political will, to make the case for a different approach, to make a long-term commitment in a volatile and uncertain environment in the face of security and logistic difficulties. Lastly there is the undeniable fact, that the international institutions appear to lack the capacity to adapt their operations to this kind of approach, they are held back by their own internal resistance to the logic of change that they themselves have identified.

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The United Nations is once again asserting its mandate to take a leading role in the rebuilding of a nation devastated by war, Iraq. However, as in Afghanistan, its effort so far has been concentrated on short-term humanitarian relief and emergency repair of infrastructure. The unilateral stance of the US-led occupation has been partly responsible for this situation but now that the UN is actively engaged in supporting the political process and has been able to conduct a Joint Needs Assessment with the World Bank, the way is open to make a clear commitment to long-term peacebuilding and development. It is not as contractors delivering supplies and carrying out emergency repairs that the UN will assume a leadership role: ‘(T)he UN was not founded as some giant alleviation machine...It was founded first and foremost as a peace and security institution, designed as the charter put it, to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”’(Rieff, 2003:3). The leadership that the UN can and should bring to the situation is through the longer perspective of development for peace, but in Iraq we see even the UN’s own development agency (UNDP) concentrating much of its effort in relief and repair work. Only now is it ‘finalizing a multi-level project to enhance the capacities of the Ministry of Planning’ and its plans for ‘Promotion of an open and democratic society through interventions in...civil society organisations, media, Gender and human rights’ are so far unspecified (www.iq.undp.org 26/11/2004). It seems that faced with this and many other ‘post-conflict’ situations around the world, where governments have collapsed and it is necessary to work more directly with non-state actors, UNDP wavers in its resolve, unsure of how to apply its mandate when working with nascent civil society and without its traditional government partners. As the following account of its struggle to build NGO partnerships in war-torn African countries illustrates, under the pressures of working in conflict it is all too easy to forget the cardinal rule that development is about building the capacities of people and institutions, relegating local partners to the role of sub-contractors in short-term relief operations. Development in a war-torn society The point has already been made by the authors (Barakat and Chard, 2002b) that if rebuilding after war is essentially a development process, when considering how to assist post-war recovery, we must first review what we know from the many decades of practice and theoretical analysis of development experience around the world. We can perhaps start by briefly reminding ourselves of the essential differences between relief and development interventions. The primary aim of relief is the saving of lives, while development is concerned with how people live their lives: restoring and improving livelihoods, mending and strengthening social organisations and relationships, reviving their cultural and intellectual life. It is this difference in aims that in turn dictates the very different approaches of relief and development. Relief, is a rapid short-term, mainly logistic exercise, which delivers essential resources in a moment of crisis to avert humanitarian disaster. In the interests of speed and efficiency its interventions are standardised, largely externally planned, centralised and top-down. Recipients have no involvement in planning the operations and little or no choice as to what is offered. Local government or non-

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government organisations also have no input at the strategic level and usually fulfil only a limited role in delivery of resources, which are mainly for immediate consumption. Work on infrastructure is limited to essential repairs or emergency installations designed to secure access and basic supplies. It is a crisis response. Development, on the other hand, working with a long-term perspective, is an investment exercise and is therefore concerned with medium and long-term planning of all aspects of the economic, social and political life of peoples. It has to work through the active participation of those affected, which means decentralised, bottom-up strategies adapted to local needs and aspirations and this requires empowering and building their organisations and systems of governance. Development interventions are a response to endemic, deep-seated deficits that undermine people’s lives, both physically and psychologically. Wars do create humanitarian crises, similar to natural disaster, but such life-threatening episodes are less common in post-conflict environments. What commonly exists in those contexts is a damaged and fragmented physical and social environment, but it is one in which people are surviving and gradually recovering. Their primary concern is to live in a secure and organised society that allows them to restore their livelihoods. This is why though it may initially involve episodes that require a relief response, rebuilding after war is essentially a development exercise concerned with enhancing the capacity of individuals, communities, and nations to function effectively through their institutions, to manage the conditions in which they live. However, for this realisation to have any practical meaning for rebuilding wartorn societies, it is also necessary to have a clear idea of what constitutes an institution1 and what is understood by the word capacity.2 First of all it has to be recognised that ‘not all organisations are institutions’. For example, an emergency food distribution project set up by a foreign NGO generally lacks permanence and legitimacy and is only of value to the affected population for the duration of the food crisis. It is a temporary organisation, not a permanent institution in the lives of the people. It serves a relief purpose but contributes nothing to development. Importantly, it is also true that ‘not all institutions are organisations’ (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 1992:371–374). This is a crucial point to recognise when seeking to assist populations affected by prolonged civil conflict in which organisational forms of state and civil institutions may have broken down or lost legitimacy but a strong ‘rule based’ institutional culture, in the form of informal authority and customary practices, is likely to persist and constitute a resource (or capacity) for community survival and recovery. It is also important to recognise that capacity building, involves both individuals and their institutions. Human beings live in society and their individual capacities are enhanced or inhibited by the social, administrative, economic and political frameworks in which they live. Thus the definition of capacity in development terms includes both aspects of governance and individual competence. The capacity of both institutions and individuals to manage their affairs is first of all conditional on having the power to make decisions (in the case of nations this is called sovereignty). Only in that context can developing a clear vision and defining objectives become a reality. That, in turn, requires practical planning ability to devise

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strategies that will lead to achieving the agreed objectives. Institutions also need appropriate forms of organisation involving at least communication networks and agreed working procedures and, sooner or later, more formal structures, if they are to be able to implement their plans successfully. Individuals in order to make an effective contribution within their institutions must also acquire or enhance their personal abilities. Technical and professional competence is the favourite territory of much “technical assistance” and “skills training” but these frequently do not address fundamental issues of personal development. Perhaps more crucial for those who have just emerged from a prolonged period of war and its inherent social disruption and isolation, is the need to first fill gaps in general education, culture and knowledge of the world in order to understand what skills may be useful. More important still, for both learning and performance, is motivation, which starts with commitment to clearly perceived objectives but is sustained by the existence of an enabling working environment. If policies devised by others are perceived to be irrelevant and aspects of governance are restrictive or discriminating, while strategies are poorly targeted and disorganised, the capacity and motivation of individuals to shape events is diminished whatever training they may have received. This brings us to the final indispensable component of individual and institutional capacity: financial, material, information and human resources. That is, the necessary means to carry out work designed to achieve individual and collective goals. Without resources, even the most able appear incompetent or uncommitted. However, development experience has shown that the problem is rarely absolute lack of resources, but rather an issue of access and control, which is why the question of empowerment is always cited (as above) as the first step in capacity building. For example, in the aftermath of war, while most societies have valuable material resources (often a motive for war in the first place) they have no easy access to finance to exploit them or to employ and train the people they need. They are forced to negotiate with much more powerful international institutions to obtain finance and in the process concede a significant part of their power of decision. Further, after prolonged conflict and isolation from normal communication and information exchange, many societies are also further disadvantaged by lack of knowledge and experience in these negotiations as well as in their own decision making. The fact that collective violence produces a wide range of consequences for the ways in which people make a living for instance, is also frequently ignored. Factors in the society, such as internal displacement, gender roles, disrupted education programmes, damaged infrastructure, increased unemployment, demobilisation, the break up of labour organisations and the weakening of state institutions all have a profound effect on the functioning of the economy. While it is commonly true that elements within the protagonists’ constituency may prosper, the vast majority of those directly or indirectly affected by a conflict suffer considerable material deprivation. Productivity is generally reduced as crops are not cultivated or destroyed, security for the transportation of goods diminishes, inflation – often as

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a result of government borrowing to finance the war effort – grows, the private sector, if not actually bankrupt, becomes reluctant to invest and skills development is impaired as labour is diverted into military activities (International Labour Organisation, 1998:10) In assisting conflict-affected societies to deal with these problems, reconstruction models must abandon the approach of simply injecting monetary resources into a war economy in order to stabilise its balance of payments and produce a healthier looking GDP, while continuing to sustain much of the population on emergency relief. Instead the aim should be the reintegration of conflict-affected groups by means of a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities for economic activity. Fundamental to this approach is the recognition that the problems of the unemployed, the displaced, the disabled, of female-headed households and young people without education are inseparable from issues of conflict management and post-war reconstruction. The relief and development agencies cannot simply adopt a ‘business as usual’ approach to confronting the enormity of these problems. Helping conflict-affected societies to achieve economic and social stability, requires innovative modes of action and policies at different levels and an ‘in-depth intimate knowledge and understanding of local and national actors, forces and dynamics’ is vital (Stiefel, 1999:30). Indeed, herein lies the fundamental difference between the conflict-affected context and broader issues of aid, intervention and development. It is the social impact of collective violence which differentiates it from disasters and the chronic effects of poverty. Societies damaged by warfare are marked by acute fragility and an extensive fragmentation of familial, local and national institutions. It is for this reason that their reconstruction cannot simply be reduced to an issue of financial assistance, nor can collective violence be regarded as a temporary aberration on an aid-to-peace continuum. Consequently, the thinking behind ‘most donor-funded interventions is particularly unsuited to these circumstances, since it allows no space for solutions to evolve as people recover their confidence, understand their changed circumstances, identify possible courses of action, and thus become able to make choices’ (Barakat and Chard, 2002b:826). In such cases, the assumption that the intervener can see the needs of the conflict-affected communities more clearly than local people themselves, ignores not only the complexities of the indigenous social order, but also the dynamics of the conflict itself. Indeed, in devising reconstruction programmes in absentia and imposing them via the geopolitical conditionality regime, donors discount the coping mechanisms that conflictaffected societies tend to develop, thereby overlooking their remaining capacities and the fact that ‘successful peacebuilding evolves from indigenous societal resources’ (Cockell, 2000:23). Building the capacities of individuals, communities and their institutions has long been acknowledged to be a ‘learning process’ in which ‘successful programs … built from and enhanced community capabilities, while opening new options’, rather than the ‘blueprint’ fixed short-term project approach, still adopted in so many post-war interventions. (Korten, 1980, 496–499). Importantly it is one in which not just the visibly disadvantaged but all stakeholders must learn and change.

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‘Local institutional development involves not just local people learning … but … with each gain in local institutional development, there should be some changes in the way in which work is planned and carried out at virtually all levels, from the individual up to international institutions’. A crucial aspect of that learning process for the international agencies is to ensure that their contributions to capacity building are ‘additive rather than substitutive’. The latter, by suppressing emerging capacity can end up being ‘subtractive’, diminishing capacity as described above (Uphoff,1986: 195–234). For example, in contrast to the neo-liberalism of prevailing ‘wisdom’, a labourintensive approach to reconstruction should initially be adopted in order to stimulate economic development and help former combatants, returning refugees and others regain a place in civilian life. This can promote a peaceful transition to conflict resolution without the use of political conditionalities which may further weaken state capacities (World Bank, 1998: 10–11). Evidently the international financial institutions, as also the UN agencies, donor agencies and INGOs have gradually taken the messages of Korten and Uphoff on board and made efforts to reform their practice accordingly, but the most tenacious obstacle to progress is proving to be their own organisational culture, which frequently leads to an apparently hypocritical contradiction between such rhetoric and actual practice. In the difficult circumstances of war-torn contexts these problems are thrown into relief, when powerful external organisations assume the role of assisting peoples whose institutions have been weakened and fragmented to the point that they appear completely dysfunctional or not to exist at all. An often quoted example in this regard is that of Mozambique in the final years of the civil war and the immediate post-war period when the role of the state was perceived as marginal. ‘Relief agencies...have become the chief provider of public welfare and important sources of employment’ (Donini quoted by Smillie 2001:15). However, that was not the whole picture, important work to support the capacity of public institutions in Mozambique by the UN and bi-lateral donors during and after the war, has facilitated a significant recovery of the institutional capacity to set policy agendas and direct public service delivery, even while still largely dependent on external funding.3 An important example was the role of UNDP during the most difficult years of the war in strengthening the government relief agency’s capacity to coordinate powerful, and in some cases unwilling, relief agencies in a single strategy (Barnes, 1998). The government’s ability to mobilize and manage international relief in an emergency, evidenced during the 1999 flood disaster, owed a lot to that experience during the war. UNDP and post-conflict development This last example prompts us to look more closely at how the international agencies are facing up to the task of assisting war-torn countries, by examining how they seek to relate to societies, whose institutional life has been severely damaged by war or prolonged internal strife, through the experience of UNDP as it faces the challenge of finding institutional solutions to the contradiction between what it knows from decades of experience to be the principles for promoting successful development and the role in which it finds itself in what are now termed ‘postconflict contexts’.

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A Strong and Trusted Partner The 2000–2003 Business Plan called for UNDP to grow into an organisation that leverages its strengths through partnerships, actively searching for innovative ways to work with other key institutions on devising and sharing solutions. In 2002, the international community, through both the International Conference on Financing for Development and the Works Summit for Sustainable Development, affirmed this approach, stressing that the problems of the world are too large for any one organization or even category of institutions to go it alone. The circle of partners has grown beyond governments and international institutions and must continue to spiral outward, encompassing the dynamism of civil society, the resources and technology of the private sector, and the knowledge and expertise of foundations and universities. UNDP Reform: Equipped to Meet Challenges with Results www.undp.org/annualreports/2003/ 15/09/03 As the UN’s development agency, UNDP has long been involved in capacity building exercises with government and, latterly, civil institutions around the world and not infrequently, as in the case of Mozambique, during prolonged internal wars. In this traditional work with governments and civil society organisations (CSOs) it has striven, often with notable success as described above, to play the ‘additive’ role and the organisational mechanism for this has been through ‘National Execution’, which delivers funds for execution to the host government as a means of channelling resources (financial, technical etc.) to national institutions implementing development programmes. However, in war-torn contexts it now more frequently finds itself in a ‘substituting’ role, assuming ‘power of decision’ through ‘Direct Execution’ in which implementation of programmes developed through an interagency ‘steering committee’ is sub-contracted mainly to large INGOs, who may or may not involve local organisations or leadership in the process. (UNDP/BCPR 2002:3) The failures inherent in this approach have been clearly identified in the midterm review of UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) Transition Recovery Programme in Eritrea. (Mengistu, Pardeshi, Saltmarshe and de Vita, 2002) where UNDP was working by Direct Execution in which the major part of funding for the recovery programme was contributed by donors, rather than the national budget and most of the activities were subcontracted to NGOs as well as the line ministries and local government. In fact in this case, INGOs were by far the largest group of implementation partners followed by local government. While it was found that the multi-institutional Programme Steering Committee consisting of representatives of key government ministries, UNDP, the principal donor and other coordinating bodies, was a highly successful forum for determining policy and strategy issues and that UNDP established close partnerships with government, other UN Agencies and donors, partnership with its principal implementation partners, the NGOs, was less successful. In particular, when involved in meetings and workshops, the NGOs revealed that they were unclear, both about the

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programme’s overall goal and its strategy. This ‘communication gap’ may well have arisen because the NGOs, who were not directly involved in the steering committee (where the funding agencies represented external assistance) were also not involved in any equivalent general forum for implementation partners. A second ‘gap’ in the integration of NGOs could also be attributed to lack of horizontal coordination mechanisms at the implementation level. It was noted that the INGOs were not involved nor directed in any way to ensure the development of local government capacity to take over and sustain public services in the long term after the Transition Recovery Programme. The third major gap, is one that has already been mentioned as inherent in all post-conflict contexts, the lack of formally constituted and operational civil society institutions. Only one national NGO was involved in implementation of the programme. The question of how to recognise and work with nascent and nonformal civil organisations was still unresolved at this mid-term stage of the programme. ‘Knowing whom to work with...is as important as knowing how to work with them. Sometimes the wrong capacities of the wrong people may be strengthened’ (Smillie, 2001:7). Institutional weakness for example, is often not due to incapacity but to unchecked corruption (Smillie, 2001: 184). In this respect, it is important to recognise the many forms of social organisation and representation that can exist in post-conflict society rather than looking for only operational NGOs. K. Maynard’s ‘Taxonomy of Positive NonState Actors’ (2002) provides a useful check-list as a starting point for this analysis, first of all by making the point that not all non-state actors are positive, though they may exercise considerable local authority, (war-lords, for example) secondly by making the distinction between communal and non-government authorities (of a traditional, religious or ad hoc nature) vested in individual or collective leadership, and fully developed civil society organisations with clearly defined structure and aims. It is the former category that is most apparent in post-conflict society and it is through them that those implementing recovery programmes can involve affected populations in their own recovery. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that while this kind of institution has been a vital coping strategy in a war situation, a broader representation and a more transparent structure will be needed if community organisations are to play a constructive role in developing a sustainable peace in dialogue with restored state institutions. It is therefore important to be clear about the reasons for engaging with civil society. There is the immediate practical incentive of gaining access to needy populations, and there is a longer term perspective, that of the development of the civil society ‘for its own sake because of the more social and political roles it might play in helping to return a country to normal, or preventing a return to conflict.’ (Smillie, 2001: 182). It is also essential to have a clear idea of what constitutes civil society. Kasfir (1998:1–11) reminds us that we must look to ‘the social formations that have emerged through the history’ of a particular society, rather than trying to ‘urge’ peoples ‘to adopt a Western version of civil society’. NGOs constituted on a Western model in order to access donor funding run the risk of being unsustainable and often amount to no more than fiefdoms of private individuals (Chabal and Daloz,1999:22–23).

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Kasfir also warns that seeing civil society as an alternative to the state in a ‘confrontational relationship’ with it is unhelpful to an emerging democracy. Civil society must have ‘the possibility...to play a role in the consolidation of democracy’ by ‘working constructively with the state as well as opposing it’. In this regard, the legitimacy and value attached to an existing institution, is enormously important especially if it has the capacity to adapt its organisation to the new circumstances. For example, in Burundi the revival and restructuring of the Bashingantahe/Sages, traditional bodies for the settling of local disputes, for advise and reconciliation and for protection of people, property and the environment, was demanded by the public, and supported by a national NGO partner of UNDP to work for the prevention of conflict (Centre de Recherches pour L’inculturation et de Development CRID, 2002). Identifying positive partners in the civil population also requires understanding of how to build their participation and capacity and this was another area in which the Eritrea evaluators identified a gap in performance. PRA assessments were being carried out by the implementing organisations to facilitate project implementation, rather than as a genuine, learning process to understand and address the root causes of the people’s impoverishment. The question was raised “Are the people a ‘target group’ or are they partners in development?” This recognition led to their final observation, that there was very little sharing of knowledge and skills within the aid community. There is a need for more systematic gathering, analysis and sharing of information from the field by a wide range of actors, including academics as well as field staff, as a basis of understanding for developing ‘context specific, cooperative mechanisms’ for working with Non-State Actors (Stanley Foundation: 2002). UNDP’s willingness to analyse and focus on key operational problems cannot be faulted, nor their intention to find solutions, but like most other large international agencies, their institutional response to newly identified problems has been to create new organisational sub-units with special responsibility to tackle them (such as the BCPR), rather than facing the daunting task of altering their general codes of practice to accommodate new challenges. The result is the alphabet soup of acronyms that bewilder fellow agency operatives, the staff of local partner institutions and the general public in the devastated regions they seek to assist. Worse still, since the problems of disadvantaged groups they are mandated to deal with, do not conform tidily to such compartmentalisation, these many agencies and sub-agencies frequently find themselves competing to cover the same ground. Once created, they take on a separate identity and life of their own, diligently researching and circulating ‘concept papers’ and devising ‘guidelines’ and convening discussion forums and ‘steering committees’ and it takes some effort to share these activities horizontally within the parent organisation. Also as the Eritrea case illustrates, most of this activity does not percolate down to the level of actual operations, even less to the recipient populations. To exemplify these problems further, we draw on an episode in UNDP’s learning process with its NGO partners in war-torn countries in Africa, in which we, as workshop facilitators, played the role of participant observers as one of our

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major international institutions confronted relationship problems that are affecting all international development organisations whether UN, donor government, nongovernment or financial institutions, all of which are engaged to a greater or lesser extent in the same process. The workshop in Nairobi was the first experience in an initiative to review BCPR/UNDP practice in its partnerships with national NGOs in war-torn contexts. It brought together representatives of national NGOs and UNDP field staff from fourteen war-affected countries in Africa.4 (Further stages in the process would entail a similar workshop for Asia and a general workshop to synthesise the results of the regional discussions.) BCPR was set up within UNDP’s Emergency Response Division to respond to the specific conditions of post-conflict recovery and building a peaceful civil society capable of working in partnership with government is one of its key objectives. However, as already discussed, the conditions prevailing in post conflict societies impose particular limitations: because government frameworks are weak or non-existent and there is a lack of formally constituted CSOs, UNDP finds itself taking up a substituting or supplementing role with government and (in Africa at least) works mainly through INGOs to reach the affected populations through their often informal and fragmented civil society organisations (UNDP/BCPR 2002). While BCPR grappled with this complex set of relationships, looking for the best way for UNDP to coordinate and develop response in post conflict conditions, another unit, the Civil Society Division (CSD) established in the Bureau for Resources and Strategic Planning (BRSP) was tackling the general question “How will UNDP need to change to become a responsive partner to Civil Society?” (UNDP/CSD,1999) in a series of discussion papers and debates which culminated in a UNDP ‘policy note’ (2001) and at the time of setting up the BCPR initiative to examine UNDP’s partnership with NGOs in post conflict environments, a CSO Advisory Committee, within BRSP, was continuing to work on the issue for general development contexts, but now included conflict prevention as one of the potential outcomes of developing CSO partnerships (UNDP/BRSP 2002:2). Logically, since, as we have already asserted, post conflict recovery is a development process, the two units within UNDP were by now in fact addressing the same issue, and on the basis of a shared development philosophy, based on UNDP’s accumulated development wisdom. However, institutionally, because of organisational separation between the parent divisions, ‘Emergency Response’ and ‘Resources and Strategic Partnerships’, it was clearly perceived by those involved as a ‘conflict of interests’. Coming from their different starting points, each perceived not only that they had to be involved in the issue but that they needed to defend a territorial claim to it. Hence the eventual uneasy coalition reflected in the title of the workshop and the last minute (but justifiable) plea from BRSP to include reference to its key policy papers in the workshop concept paper. However, the organisational imperatives did not stop there, by the time the workshop (designed, if we remember, to consult the national NGO and UNDP field staff) took place, high level staff from two other UNDP units in New York also felt driven, not only to attend as resource persons, but to take a ‘front seat’ as multiple moderators. This behaviour should not be seen

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as mere careerism, but rather as the result of an organisational environment, which is diminishing the capacity of talented individuals and the institution they serve by setting them up to compete for space and resources, rather than maximise effectiveness through information and resource sharing. In the event, these institutional conflicts did not divert the workshop from achieving its purpose. It did produce valuable insights into the working relationship between UNDP and its NGO partners and how its response to war-affected populations could be improved, pinpointing key issues for change and development that are relevant beyond the specific organisational context of UNDP and reinforce many of the views expressed in the literature reviewed above. As we have said, UNDP is a representative, not a unique, case. The participants in the workshop, in distilling their common experiences, gave some clear priorities for building the capacity of local institutions in war-torn contexts. They saw UNDP/NGO partnerships as having the potential to greatly

Partners say they value UNDP

Advantages of a UNDP/NGO Partnership

A survey across 118 countries found high approval rates.

A UNDP partnership with NGOs can make more focussed and flexible responses.

All respondents

87%

Governments

92%

UN Agencies

82%

International Financial Institutions

78%

Bilaterals

74%

Civil Society

86%

Private Sector

90%

Other

90%

Unknown

95%

Source: UNDP External Partnerships Survey 2002

Local resources can also be mobilised through the partnership with national NGOs. Partnership provides an opportunity to strengthen the capacity of national NGOs. UNDP programmes can have better access to affected populations. Partnership can ensure a greater exchange of information and knowledge. Partnership can create space for dialogue and advocacy. Working in partnership can promote more transparency and openness, build mutual confidence through greater knowledge of NGO priorities and understanding of the comparative advantages of each (UNDP/NGO) so that both can benefit from complimentarity and shared responsibility. Source: Africa NGO Workshop 2002: working group results.

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increase capacity to support recovery and development in war-torn societies but only if that benefit was perceived as mutual and dependent on an equal and sustained partnership relationship, which did not relegate them to the role of occasional sub-contractors. They needed to learn management skills from UNDP, but UNDP could learn from their knowledge and experience of the local society. They defined empowerment within UNDP and within their own society as an essential precondition for an ‘enabling working environment’ for NGOs to work effectively in post conflict. That empowerment had to be both guaranteed by institutional frameworks (partnership agreements with UNDP, legal recognition through government legislation) and by cultural changes that would transform their working relations with both UNDP and government, therefore making it possible for CSOs to be fully involved in taking decisions within the partnership with UNDP (or other agencies). Overcoming the organisational problems required not just new mechanisms and structures but a complete change in organisational culture on the part of both UNDP and its NGO partners with greater transparency, two-way exchange of information and greater trust. UNDP should be more prepared to take risks in developing the capabilities of NGOs. Practical suggestions for achieving this were that UNDP should have a greater presence on the ground in conflict situations, allowing itself to be better known and in turn to know and understand the weaknesses and potential of CSO partners as the basis for investing in their development. It could also make its responses and procedures more flexible and adaptable to the difficult working conditions in these contexts, promoting horizontal lines of communication and cooperation that

Organisational and Institutional Relationships National NGOs felt that they were discriminated against in favour of INGOs; They, with other stakeholders, were excluded from consultation; The UNDP organisation is heavily centralized and appears top-down in its approach; There is a lack of transparency on both sides. This ... results in lack of trust and confidence; UNDP seems unwilling to devolve responsibility for certain aspects of operations to NGOs or to give them access to UNDP resources and facilities; Key contributory factors were seen as: The absence of coordination mechanisms and full involvement of NGOs in the whole project cycle; General confusion on both sides about roles and responsibilities; NGOs were treated as mere contractors rather than genuine partners; There is inadequate knowledge of NGO work by UNDP and of UNDP by NGOs; There was often a lack of sensitivity to diversity and neutrality. These knowledge gaps are due, at least in part, to little investment in capacity building activities such as back-stopping, skills, management and personnel development (of NGO and UNDP field staff). Source: Africa NGO Workshop 2002: working group results

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would allow regional and cross-border responses to conflicts that spill over the country limits set by UNDP’s traditional mandates. They also needed, with UNDP support, to negotiate a role, with government, in the development of policy within their own society. At the same time they recognised that part of the reason for the present exclusion of CSOs from policy forums, was their own lack of transparency, competence and experience and their inadequate organisational development. To participate fully and effectively, they must address these gaps through a variety of capacity building strategies, actively supported by their international partners. The third crucial component in their capacity to respond to the needs of waraffected populations is the ability to access and control resources. Indeed, the primary motive in seeking partnership with UNDP or other donors is to gain access to the financial and logistic resources they lack. However, without skilled personnel, the local CSOs will not be able, nor be trusted, to take on the responsibility of managing and accounting for donated resources, or succeed in substituting them in the long term with sustainable use of local resources. Human resource development, which, in the early stages of post conflict recovery, involves providing the means to recruit and retain as well as to develop the skills of local staff, is a crucial resource input that is often neglected by international partners intent on delivering services. Finally, looking beyond the immediate issue of improving the capacity of UNDP and its civil partners to work together, to that of improving the general capacity to respond to conflict, the Nairobi workshop participants constantly stressed the importance of gathering and sharing information and knowledge more widely with others engaged in conflict prevention and resolution and the rebuilding of war-torn societies. They advocated the development and dissemination of local and regional expertise and the commissioning of research as another crucial capacity building strategy that could be facilitated by the international agencies, to their own benefit as well as that of the post conflict societies they serve.

NGOs’ lack of capacity NGOs have gaps in their knowledge and experience of all aspects of basic project planning, management and evaluation;. NGOs’ internal governance and organisational structures may not be adequate for the tasks they are given; NGOs usually have insufficient logistic and financial capacity to execute projects; They may lack the capacity/knowledge to access resources from other sources besides UNDP; Capacity in human resources cannot be assumed. as well as individual skills and knowledge gaps, retaining competent staff is a problem. NGOs lack of empowerment in post-conflict contexts (lack of legal status and difficult relations with government) reduces their capacity for action. In general, NGOs in post-conflict lack experience and skills in lobbying and advocacy. Source: Africa NGO Workshop 2002: working group results

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The UNDP institutional response UNDP’s long-term response to the findings of this workshop and the review process, which it initiated, will of course be a considered and negotiated outcome. BCPR was clearly already looking for change and embarked on the review process with that end in mind. Their dialogue with the NGOs is still evolving and it is too soon to predict how the initiative will eventually impact on building the capacity of the UNDP/NGO partnerships in post-conflict contexts, nor was it our purpose as onlookers to suggest how that particular process might proceed. The point of examining this particular event in detail, has been to describe and understand in general terms the kinds of interactions that take place in a process of institutional learning in response to the challenge of working in new and difficult contexts such as that of assisting development in war-torn societies. There was a range of different responses to the findings of the grassroots participants by the senior representatives of UNDP at its headquarters level, which we can assume were dictated, not just by personal opinion but by the institutional concerns of their respective organisational units within the organisation. BCPR staff, while they did not necessarily agree with all the outcomes, nevertheless accepted the workgroups’ results as an input to the dialogue they had initiated and took practical steps, such as setting up an email network to circulate consultation documents and facilitate the continuation of the process. Their instinct was to allow the free debate with the NGOs to continue but at the same time, they clearly felt under pressure from their peers from the other top level divisions of UNDP and felt that they must appease them if they wanted to retain the space to proceed with their project. The senior policy specialist from BoM (Bureau of Management at the New York headquarters) had come fully expecting the groups’ findings about procedural problems and ready to set up a practical consultation process to review the manuals and guidelines after the workshop. As he frankly admitted, the strongly presented case for a change in organisational culture came as a surprise to him but he undertook to take it on board. He clearly realised that it could not be ignored and that there would have to be an institutional response to this challenge. He also, in the workshop at least, bowed to the majority decision to discuss the organisational issues in mixed groups of NGO and UNDP field staff, although his preference was for separate workgroup discussions. This response could be seen as tactical and realistic. As a management specialist, he was fully aware that institutions can only function with the consent of all stakeholders, which has to be won through dialogue. The BRSP representative was clearly shaken to discover that the bureau’s policy documents, developed over several years of consultation, had not reached the field operations and felt threatened by the challenge to UNDP’s ‘top-down’ culture. A separate BRSP report was circulated after the workshop, which detailed ‘Some Lessons to take to Jakarta’, the next in the series of workshops (Pero, 2002:7–8). The main concern evident in these ‘lessons’ was to ‘disseminate CSO policy … to all participants electronically beforehand’ and to ‘meet with (the) facilitator prior to the workshop so he understands the CSO Division’s work’ and to clarify ‘the nature

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of the partnership between BCPR and BRSP and why we are doing this together’. This response was clearly more concerned with defending the turf of BRSP than addressing the concerns raised by the grassroots. The other concern revealed by these ‘lessons’ was that of managing the next workshop in such a way as to avoid the kinds of challenge that came out of the Nairobi workshop. First of all, by briefing the facilitator and the participants to take CSO policy as the starting point for the discussion. Secondly by ‘focus on nuts and bolts of operating in postconflict recovery’ and limiting discussion to ‘operational issues that we want to tackle’. To that end, realising that the key conclusions of the workshop were forged in the working groups, BRSP proposed ‘split working groups, i.e. NGOs and UNDP officers separately, especially when discussing operations’ and conceded ‘NGOs and UNDP to co-chair the workshop’ as a gesture towards the NGO demands for more equal partnership, that could be more easily managed. Clearly, BRSP was not ready to take on board the need for a change in UNDP’s organisational culture, but was intent on damage limitation by seeking to manipulate the outcome of the next stage of the consultation process. The response of the representative of the other major division in UNDP’s New York headquarters (Regional Bureau for Africa, RBA) was similar to that of BRSP. The purpose in attending the workshop seems to have been primarily to defend and extend institutional territory by encouraging the NGOs and UNDP country staff to be aware of and engage with RBA programmes. The representative was so far from recognising the need to rethink top-down management as to be outraged at the challenge to the hierarchy from the grassroots, and extremely angry at BCPR and the facilitators for allowing it to happen. Conclusions The Nairobi workshop participants’ vision of a sustained and mutually reinforcing partnership relationship between national CSOs and international agencies reaffirms that even in the most desperate circumstances (there were delegates present from countries with ongoing wars) agency staff should not be merely relief orientated, they must develop ‘the capacity to build capacity’ and not ‘cloak their desire for service delivery partners in the broader jargon of building civil society’ (Smillie, 2001: 182), while in practice treating local CSO’s as untrustworthy subordinates on fixed-term contracts. This can only produce ‘NGOs’ like those that appeared in Mozambique to take advantage of donor funding and disappeared when it ended (Smillie 2001:190), that is temporary organisations, not civil society institutions. The national NGO’s belief that they had vital local knowledge, understanding and access that could ensure greater effectiveness for aid programmes in conflict situations if combined with resources and skills provided by the agency partner, also reinforces the need to build the human resources of local organisations by assisting them to recruit and retain competent local staff, filling any gaps in their professional skills on the job. In fact as Turray and Parakrama mention, there are very often national professionals available who are as well qualified as the expatriates and who have the added advantage of understanding the language and

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culture of the society (Smillie 2001:183). In many cases as refugees, victims of violence, as conscripted combatants or redundant employees of bankrupt enterprises, they are not practicing their professional skills. Not recovering this human resource goes beyond substitution to what Uphoff calls ‘subtractive’ development. (1986:234) The insistence of the national NGOs on the importance of building relations with government, however difficult and frustrating that may be, illustrates the point, that while for many external operators all that is required is a short term solution to a ‘crisis’, nationals, even during a war are looking for a permanent development process. It can be set back, put on hold, but in the end will be resumed and can only be carried forward sustainably by developing the government’s capacity to provide an enabling political, legal and economic framework in which society can function. Civil Society on its own cannot sustain coherent national development, neither can government, so long as it fails to include civil society and private business in policy development and implementation. The workshop participants strongly believed that building the capacity (of international agencies national CSOs and governments) to respond to the needs of war-torn peoples has to be based on transparent mutual knowledge as a basis for trust and on a wide exchange of professional experience and knowledge, first between those working in the same national context and in the same region but also benefiting from international experience if appropriate. This reflects the situation that many professionals in war-torn countries as they face the challenge of trying to restore the lives and livelihoods of their society. They have been in virtual isolation from professional contact and access to information or advice to update their general knowledge and working skills. On the other hand they have the depth of experience and local understanding that their aid partners lack. The tendency when these two groups meet however is to conceal not to reveal these gaps or to share information. The result is the mutual distrust described by the workshop. An important lesson learned from observing UNDP’s role in the workshop is that, while procedural and even structural change in the face of new circumstances is comparatively easy for a large institution like UNDP to contemplate, the more fundamental but essential task of transforming its underlying institutional culture is not so easily taken on board. As Smillie comments (2001:7) ‘The reality of what happens in emergency assistance programmes flies in the face of stated donor policy.’ The UN looking to the new millennium sees a new consensus on the nature of governance that ‘places civil society at the heart of the development policy debate’ and sees ‘a strong social and institutional infrastructure is crucial to growth and development’ and ‘shared ownership of the development agenda’, involving ‘partnerships and alliances’ between public, private and civic actors is the key to its sustainability. It also recognises that ‘international institutions require stronger public and political constituencies to support them’ if they are to retain their legitimacy (Edwards, 2000:206). Nevertheless, as the experience of the Nairobi workshop has illustrated, this is easier said than done. In our previous paper on the same topic, of the contradiction between international rhetoric and the reality of practice (Barakat and Chard, 2002b), we

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Necessary capacity building measures to ensure the UNDP-NGO partnership works Develop a shared concept of the partnership; Establish mechanisms to ensure a two-way learning process; Develop NGO competence through a range of capacity building activities: Workshops; Short-term training; Exchanges and roaming secondments of UNDP and NGO personnel; Roaming facilitators/resource persons; Mentoring of new by established NGO partners; Creation of full-time focal points for NGO contact and consultation in country offices; Increase in UNDP monitoring in the field; Promote the organisational development/restructuring of NGOs; (Develop) greater flexibility and trust in the transfer of resources directly to NGOs; Mediate space for negotiation with governments; Develop knowledge sharing and networking, through local and regional forums; Develop local and regional expertise in conflict analysis, mediation, prevention and resolution of conflict ... understanding issues of integration of youth in peace processes, gender and HIV/AIDS, human rights in the local context. Source: Africa NGO Workshop 2002: working group results

discussed how powerful customs and practices or ‘rule based’ institutions can persist within completely new political structures, intended to transform governance. The example we used in that case was that of traditional patronage systems of governance continuing to exercise power within newly created ‘democratic institutions’. What we can see from the Nairobi workshop experience is that this phenomenon is not confined to governments, but that the personnel in all institutions are driven by powerful collective assumptions or ‘rules’ of working behaviour and relationships. Indeed such agreed ways of doing things evolve because they are necessary, if we are to be free to get on with practical day-to-day business. Patronage institutions in traditional society, after all, also evolved legitimately to meet the social welfare needs of the population; it is only when they fail to respond to new conditions and the changing needs of their stakeholders, that they become instruments of oppression and eventually of instability. Institutional capacity implies, therefore, not only strength but the will and ability to adapt and change. The larger and more well established the institution is, the longer the time lag is likely to be between acknowledging the need for change and actually achieving it in working practice. What we can also see from the workshop is that new stakeholders, joining an institution in challenging conditions at its grassroots level, can provide a lever for changing the working culture of such an institution if it has the courage to give them that opportunity. By taking the lessons of the Nairobi workshop on board and accepting its more practical suggestions for changing the institutional culture of partnership relations,

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NGOS

The ‘New Style’ Partnership

! The organisational and institutional capacities of NGOs have not lived up to the ever increasing expectations of the donors, particularly in post-conflict situations. ! Increasingly the tendency has been to shift to INGOs, who in turn end up sub-contracting National NGOs with little requirement to invest in capacity development. ! These INGOs are becoming increasingly donor dependent. ! There has been insufficient investment in building long term capacities of NGOs (in particular National NGOs), due to a prevailing ‘Old Style’ partnership culture defined by project approach to funding.

Authentic Partnership means that two parties, with similar values and vision, are working towards a common goal. It grows out of:

Source: NGO Africa Workshop. S. Barakat Introductory Presentation

! Compatible values, purposes and strategies; ! A belief in reciprocity; ! Mutual respect for each other’s identity, integrity and autonomy; ! Mutual trust, transparency and accountability; ! Sharing governance power; ! Sharing resources for joint action; ! Two-way exchange of information, ideas and experience; ! Constructive use of each others networks; ! Sensitivity to the political, economic cultural and institutional contexts; ! Commitment to a long-term relationship. Source: NGO Africa Workshop. S. Barakat Introductory Presentation

UNDP would not only increase the effectiveness and sustainability of its interventions but return to its true roots as an agency for the development of the long-term capacity of peoples to meet their own needs and aspirations, instead of trying, as it now does, to accommodate itself to the prevailing organisational culture of the relief agencies. What is true for UNDP is as true for its parent institution. The UN aspires to lead reconstruction in Iraq, but finds itself in crisis with three possible ways forward: ‘to continue as it is, with all the obvious risks of a slide into irrelevancy’, ‘to become the de facto servant of US foreign policy’ or to undertake realistic reform’ (Rieff, 2003:6). The key to that reform will not lie in restructuring the security council and other organs of the institution (though this may be one of the outcomes), but in a change of culture: the rediscovery of its moral authority to work for peace, by taking the long, rather than the politically expedient view and by reasserting that development strategies starting from the bottom up and empowering war-affected populations and their institutions are the key to national reconstruction and long-term peace and stability.

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11 POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Mark Evans

For forms of government let fools contest: What’er is best administered is best Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle 111, lines 303–4.

Sighting Shots Alexander Pope’s cautionary words have particular resonance for this study of the role of public administration in post-war reconstruction, for it proceeds from three main assumptions that it argues should underpin national reconstruction planning, programming and implementation. First, the development of effective public administration is a prerequisite for successful post-war recovery and the establishment of a sustainable peace. Secondly, the indigenous civil service should, in most instances, be the prime mover in post-war reconstruction. Hence, successful post-war reconstruction requires the establishment of a strong, efficient and effective central administrative system. Thirdly, successful post-war reconstruction needs the development of an effective, legitimate system of collaborative multi-level governance involving the participation of central, regional and local governmental organisations, donors, international non-governmental organisations, and, local non-governmental organisations. The aim of this chapter is to review the key challenges to transitory public administration in post-war states derived from studies of international experience. It largely draws on the findings of fieldwork that was conducted by myself and Sultan Barakat during training and consultancy projects in Sri Lanka (Barakat et al, 2001) and Afghanistan (Barakat et al, 2003) that drew on ideas from earlier work conducted by Barakat and the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York in England. The former was a project commissioned by the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies in Sri Lanka to advise the Government of

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Sri Lanka (GOSLA), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs) on issues relating to governance and post-war reconstruction. The latter was a project commissioned by the European Union that involved the provision of training to senior civil servants in the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) on challenges to post-war public administration. These two cases have been selected for this chapter because they involve the experiences of reconstruction in a state still at war (Sri Lanka), as well as a country that has signed a peace treaty (Afghanistan). This is in keeping with a core argument that is developed throughout this book; that reconstruction should not wait for the signing of a peace treaty but should be viewed as a key instrument of peacebuilding in itself. In both instances workshops were organised with key protagonists to discuss the key challenges confronting public administrators in war-torn societies and a narrative approach was adopted as the key method for data collection. This approach relies heavily on qualitative interviews with key informants, group discussions, participatory observation and the drawing of lessons from other cases that are similar or comparable. It does not require the establishment of given truths, but argues that there are often several ways of interpreting an issue, and that interpretation requires a balanced approach based on building a preponderance of evidence in support of a particular narrative. This approach allows us to identify the causal links between obstacles to reconstruction, appropriate strategies for reconstruction and successful post-war recovery and development. Such causal links are deduced by a combination of information from key informants and from my own ontology (or sense of how the world works). As the study of transitory public administration in post-war reconstruction involves a broad ranging and amorphous combination of theory and practice, I must begin by attempting to limit my field of enquiry. The discussion, which follows, is organized into four parts. Part one explores the central principles underpinning public administration that in theory should inform practice in states emerging from conflict. This will provide us with some operational concepts, which will be deployed in the remainder of the study. In part two, the major obstacles to post-war reconstruction confronting public administrators in post-conflict situations will be identified drawing on narratives of international experience. The chapter then moves on to evaluate how these obstacles can best be removed, once again drawing on a range of positive and negative lessons from international experience. In conclusion, a set of hypotheses for guiding good reconstruction and development practice in public administration is presented. Principles and practice in transitory post-war public administration Public administration in the general sense of the term refers to the administration of a cooperative human effort in a political setting directed towards the achievement of agreed policy objectives. It is thus a political activity that can occur in a wide variety of institutional frameworks and is concerned with the formulation, implementation and termination of public policy. Public administration in the context of societies emerging from conflict may be defined in roughly the same

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terms. It remains the administration of a cooperative human effort in a political setting directed towards the achievement of national reconstruction and development goals. It differs, however, in three significant ways. First, public administration in such a form should be temporary and its institutional structure and policy goals should wither away as the newly constructed or reconstructed state moves towards a more normal state of development. Secondly, it also differs in the sense that reconstruction and development goals are often shaped and implemented by external international actors such as the Washington Nexus, and other international donors or INGOs. Thirdly, transitory public administration often requires greater autonomy from traditional checks and balances than normal in order to allow it the freedom to move quickly to relieve suffering or to take advantage of external loans or grants. The principles informing practice in the conduct of post-war reconstruction administration are also similar. Although the fundamental role of public administration is to formulate, plan, implement and terminate public law when necessary, it should also have a higher social purpose. Public administration should exercise moral leadership in the society it serves as the guardian of a good society and its freedoms established and regulated under the rule of law. In theory it performs this role through the equitable allocation of public goods and services to the people it serves and to whom it is accountable. Several principles can be identified in these two sentences – the rule of law, equity of service provision, accountability, and, citizen responsiveness – that in combination make up what in modern parlance is referred to as Good Governance. Good Governance is commonly exhorted as an essential component of post-war reconstruction and development. This is different from the World Bank’s (1992) version of Good Governance that involves a very particular understanding of governance as an instrument of market reform. What is considered Good Governance in one society may not necessarily be for another. Nonetheless, although the concepts associated with this understanding of governance borrow much from the liberal democratic model and reveal a western cultural bias, similar principles do underpin most models of administration deployed in developing countries. This is partly the legacy of colonialism, and, partly a product of processes of democratization. However, as Heady (1984:150–151) notes, many ancient civilizations from the Egyptians through to the Greeks and Romans developed public organizations for administering public affairs. Moreover, the administrative traditions that emerged under Confucius in 478BC continue to influence administrative developments in South-east Asia (Common, 2001). The distinguishing features of public administration under normal conditions remain the case under exceptional conditions. Consequently, in most developing countries, its activities should be constrained by two linked if rather nebulous concepts, the public interest and public accountability. Accountability may be defined as the obligation to answer for a responsibility conferred. Transparency refers to a government’s obligation to ensure that the operations of government are open to public scrutiny. Why are transparency and accountability in public administration considered virtues? At least four reasons may be proffered here: to

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guarantee the legitimacy of government; to build public faith and confidence in the system of government; to establish clear spheres of responsibility in the system of government and thus avoid replication of functions; and to ensure popular control and political equality. But what does transparency and accountability in government involve? At the very least it must involve the existence of clear accountability routes in government. In liberal democracies this would be achieved through the existence of constitutional rules, checks and balances such as the separation of powers (e.g. executive, legislature, judiciary), conventions (e.g. ministerial responsibility, collective responsibility), regular financial audit, and frequent elections. It may also involve open government (public access to information about decision-making) and freedom of information (public access to personal information held by public organizations). While it is crucial that government is allowed to govern, there must be certain checks on its behaviour to ensure that it acts legitimately and responsibly. The practical implementation of the concepts of accountability and transparency serve to try and ensure that government acts in the national interest. These principles provide the mechanisms for achieving the fundamental aim of societies emerging from conflict – to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of people. A clear lesson can be drawn here from studies of international development in practice. The most successful developmental states are those that have reflexive, ‘learning’ public organisations and embark on programmes of public sector reform geared towards efficient and effective planning and delivery of national development goals. An evaluation of how far these principles of public administration should inform reconstruction practices will be conducted in part three of this chapter. We will now move on to identify the key obstacles to successful post-war reconstruction and development drawing on the view of senior civil servants and ministers from the GOSL and the AIA. Obstacles to post-war reconstruction and development The first task of a government emerging from conflict is to ascertain the degree of physical, political, economic and social reconstruction required in order to steer the country back to the road of development. This will clearly differ depending on the nature and geography of the conflict, the degree of destruction and the state of development prior to conflict. For example, after twenty-five years of conflict much of the public infrastructure of Afghanistan, and particularly its capital Kabul, has been destroyed and requires comprehensive reconstruction. In Sri Lanka, despite a similar longevity of conflict, the physical impact of the war has affected certain areas far more than others. For example, the war affected areas of Jaffna, Amparai, Trincomalee, Vavuniya, and, Batticaloa have all experienced significant destruction. Sri Lanka’s capital, Colombo, however, has largely been insulated from developments in the north with the exception of the occasional suicide bombing. This had helped to perpetuate a ‘Magic Kingdom’ mentality that has proved a key obstacle to the development of an enduring peace. As a senior officer in a LNGO observes:

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The Sri Lankan people’s perception of the war depends on where they reside geographically. In 1995 things were far better; there was hope mainly because of rising GDP, which has now been sucked into sustaining the war effort. Indeed it has taken five years for the war to reach Colombo. People have been acting as if nothing is happening but now they are really starting to feel the impact (Senior Officer, LNGO). The second task of government must therefore be to identify the potential obstacles to reconstruction and development that may impede or even undermine the recovery process. As Figure 1 illustrates, these obstacles can be divided into three broad sets of variables: ‘cognitive’ obstacles, ‘environmental’ obstacles and international and public opinion. These variables do not exist in a vacuum; they interact in complex and often unexpected ways and inform the reconstruction and development context. Hence, they must be clearly understood in order to develop the appropriate reconstruction and development strategy. (Barakat et al 2001b) Cognitive Obstacles Cognitive obstacles refer to the process by which reconstruction problems are recognized and defined, the timing of the inception of reconstruction and development activities, and the legitimacy of the actors involved in the intervention. The most significant cognitive barrier for reconstruction and development to overcome is the entrenched culture of relief that continues into the post-conflict era. The assumed urgency of emergencies is often used to justify quick fixes. The same way of thinking persists in the aftermath of conflict, undermining reconstruction and development initiatives and straining relationships between donors and recipients – particularly emerging public authorities. Institutional arrangements, financial mechanisms and operational tools of assistance that are put into place under emergency programmes are often ill-suited to reconstruction and longer term development. The following narratives reveal the degree to which this culture of relief has become embedded in governmental and non-governmental organisations: Everybody is focused on getting through the day and meeting short-term goals. Thinking about development is impossible as long as this mentality persists (Senior Officer, INGO, Afghanistan). A psychology of short-termism is all pervasive. Bureaucrats live from day to day. There is no sense of collective responsibility (Minister, GOSL). An institutional pathology is thus created based upon short-termism and damage limitations that undermines reconstruction and development, encourages a relief attitude and leads to institutional sclerosis. This emergency mindset continues to be top-down, paying only lip service to concepts of participation and empowerment (Berlage and Stokke, 1992). Although the nature and geography of the conflict will largely determine the character of post-war reconstruction, it is evident that

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AFTER THE CONFLICT Cognitive Obstacles ! Defining ‘post conflict’, ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘recovery’ ! Timing ! Legitimacy Public and International Opinion ! International – Washington Nexus, UN, key donors ! Elites – political, bureaucratic, economic, religious ! Mass – ethnic groups

Environmental Obstacles ! Political – poor security, need for state-building, constitutional reform & Collaborative Governance ! Institutional – Weak state institutions, limited human resources, poor working conditions ! Economic – inequitable growth, need to revitalise the informal sector ! Social – little faith in the system, unrealistic expectations Reconstruction Planning and Programming

* this is an interactive model in the sense that these sets of variables do not exist in a vacuum; they interact in complex and often unexpected ways. Figure 11.1 Mapping Potential Obstacles to Reconstruction and Development

reconstruction and development activities should not, and in fact do not, wait for the signing of a peace agreement, for although international assistance is needed for large-scale reconstruction, local level recovery led by INGOs or public organisations in collaboration with INGOs will go on regardless of policies, interventions, or the support of international organisations (Mitchell, 1997). But why is this activity so important? Reconstruction and development, no matter how limited, provides opportunities for the restoration of livelihoods, thus reducing dependency on costly relief in contexts where emergency has become the norm rather than the exception. For example, the cost of relief in Ethiopia amounts to 36 per cent of government revenue or 94 per cent of capital expenditure. Relief activities, on the other hand, are largely supply-driven reflecting bureaucratic, rather than community priorities and provide little opportunity for governments to win ‘the hearts and minds’ of its own citizens when they are imprisoned in the conflict zone (Barakat et al., 2001b).

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Environmental Obstacles As Fig. 11.2 illustrates, environmental obstacles to reconstruction and development refer to the range of political, institutional, economic and social factors that can constrain or facilitate the process of reconstruction and development.

Political Obstacles Several political problems need to be resolved in order to ensure a sustainable reconstruction and development plan. These include the need to: eradicate the rule of the gun and secure the rule of law to ensure a fully functioning state; establish strong central authority in order to plan and implement national reconstruction planning and programming; ensure the sovereignty of indigenous state actors over external actors in such a process; and, introduce constitutional reform to safeguard multi-cultural rights and freedoms (where appropriate) and establish regional/local government that is representative of all the people. The failure to secure these conditions will undermine the legitimacy of the state and destabilize state-building and may well result in further conflict. a) Security The importance of a secure environment in establishing legitimate and functioning government is emphasised in the following narratives: Political ! The need to eradicate the rule of the gun and establish the rule of law ! Lack of strong central authority as an instrument of state-building ! The problem of foreign intervention and the need for Collaborative Governance ! The need for constitutional reform to safeguard multi-cultural rights and freedoms and establish regional/local government that is representative of all the people

Institutional ! Ineffective Organisational Structure ! Limited human resources ! Poor Working Conditions

Economic ! Lack of control over national resources ! Tackling inflation ! Socio-economic development ! Attracting inward investment ! Developing international trade ! Industrial reconstruction ! Brain drain overseas

Social ! The need to eradicate Warlordism ! Lack of Trust in government and INGOs ! Welfare ! Education at the central and local levels ! Toleration of individual rights ! Restitution of women’s rights

Figure 11.2 Social, Economic, Institutional and Political Obstacles to Post-war Reconstruction Source: Senior Civil Servant and Ministers, Government of Sri Lanka and the Afghan Interim Authority

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AFTER THE CONFLICT The rule of law needs to replace the rule of violence: until it does we cannot function as a government because we can’t do simple things like collect taxes (AIA). Demilitarisation is a prerequisite for recovery (Senior Civil Servant, GOSL).

Reconstruction and development projects not only risk being destroyed by renewed offensives but the threat to the security of personnel also remains one of the main obstacles to programming. As the case of Afghanistan illustrates, the lack of security in the regions due to warlordism has prevented the collection of taxes to support state activity. This has led to a dependency on the international community for the provision of basic resources, such as salaries for AIA administrative personnel. Nonetheless, security constraints should not detract from the need to invest in opportunities to make a transition. Initiating longer term reconstruction and development programmes builds local people’s confidence in their region and may even help to improve security. b) State-building The greatest challenge confronting a government emerging from conflict is the need to establish a legitimate and functioning state. As we observed in part one, international experience stresses the importance of the establishment of strong, but legitimate, central state authority as a key instrument for successful statebuilding and, ultimately, development. This normally involves the restoration of law and order, human and property rights, and international and domestic recognition. In the short-term, the realization of such an agenda requires strong central authority. However, as the following narratives reveal, it must be combined with a ‘bottom-up’ approach to national reconstruction and development planning and programming: The key problem here (Afghanistan) is the distance between government and the people, especially outside Kabul. There is no government outside Kabul (Junior Minister, AIA). There exists a stark urban/rural divide in relation to perceptions of the war. This is reflected in rural fatigue and war weariness. Their needs are more simplistic and when they are denied the suffering is often more acute (Minister, GOSL). c) Collaborative Governance States emerging from conflict then, are typically weak, due to this lack of engagement with the whole society and in terms of their technical capacity to engage in reconstruction planning and programming, which is often a problem at every level of government. It is therefore unsurprising that they should become so dependent on technical assistance from the INGO and donor community. As a senior official in a prominent INGO puts it:

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Effective reconstruction is about effective partnership building. Few postconflict states can go it alone in the short to medium term. They are reliant on us for delivering basic services and mobilizing the resources they need for reconstruction. Humanitarian agencies, with this perception, can then be reluctant at the institutional level to transfer real responsibility and control over resources to emerging local governmental organizations and communities. Yet, where possible, communities (and governmental institutions where they exist) should be recognised as the main partners in service rehabilitation projects as their participation ensures more effective management and more relevant service provision. The failure to develop effective joint working arrangements through the establishment of collaborative governance involving governmental organizations, LNGOS and INGOs at all levels of government, can provide a significant obstacle to recovery. While the international community has legitimate concerns about the administrations they are called upon to support, and allegations of corruption in INGOs and LNGOs are in some cases well-founded, this is not a reason to procrastinate. Short-termism will in the long run only undermine the very processes it is striving to establish. There is an urgent need to develop a coherent, long-term strategy that will provide consistent support to regional and local efforts to provide social services and to establish democratic forms of governance. As a senior civil servant in a central government department in Sri Lanka observes: ‘INGOs often act as if we don’t exist. One of the reasons why relations are so poor is that they don’t trust us and we don’t trust them’. Hence the development of an effective collaborative system of governance based on clear operating rules, mutual respect and trust is a prerequisite for effective post-war reconstruction. d) Constitutional Reform This brings us to the final political ‘obstacle’, constitutional reform. A constitution refers to the whole system of government of a country, and the collection of rules, written and unwritten, which regulate the government. Most constitutions have four key features. First, they constitute the system of government, and its form and functions; hence they are prior to the system of government – rules cannot be derived from that system. Secondly, they involve an authority outside and above the order it establishes – the notion of ‘constituent power’ – this power in a liberal democracy should be attributed to the people who legitimize the constitution and hence the governmental system. Thirdly, this form of law supersedes other laws because it originates in a higher authority than the legislature. And, fourthly, it is entrenched because its purpose is to limit the powers of government (Evans, 2003:16–18). However, in a post-conflict situation, the emphasis of the role of constitutions in limiting the power of the state is clearly at odds with the need (discussed above) to establish strong central state authority as the key instrument for successful statebuilding. Moreover, while in theory the central role of a constitution is to provide an anatomy of legitimate public power, the following narratives demonstrate that the constitution itself is often the root cause of conflict (Barakat et al., 2001b):

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AFTER THE CONFLICT The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a manifestation of a crisis of the state which has its roots in British imperialism. The British left behind a majoritarian constitution that privileged one ethnic group over all others and ensured its dominance in politics, economy and society. Until we have a constitution that reflects the multi-ethnic character of Sri Lankan society and protects the rights of minorities, the conflict will continue (Minister, GOSL).

Hence, constitutional reform is a crucial element of post-war reconstruction in most states emerging from conflict. It is, however, a process that requires an inclusive bottom-up approach involving extensive deliberation between the state and civil society.

Institutional Obstacles From our survey of narratives on obstacles to reconstruction extracted from members of the GOSL and the AIA, it is evident that ineffective organisational structures, limited human resources and poor working conditions in public administration are viewed as the key institutional obstacles to reconstruction. a) Weak State Institutions Reconstruction is impossible without good governance, transparency, participation, accountability and the rule of law (World Bank Advisor to the AIA). It has become common to hear sentiments such as these expressed by World Bank officials. However, Good Governance remains an aspiration to be struggled for, a benchmark against which development can be gauged. There are often more pressing concerns for public administration in the short-term as the following narratives reveal: I’ve been a civil servant under the Soviets, the Mujahideen, the Taliban and now under the AIA and I’ve never been able to do my job properly because we’ve never had the right organizational structures, resources or power (Senior Civil Servant, AIA). The bureaucracy is monoethnic and has acted in emergency mode due to the existence of a state of emergency for 28 years of its existence. Exceptional conditions have become the norm. Bureaucratic norms and values have been shaped around an emergency mentality. This explains both the size of the bureaucracy, which is the result of patterns of patronage, together with other forms of corruption (Senior Civil Servant, GOSL).

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The most common concerns expressed by public administrators in interim authorities tend to focus on the size and hierarchical nature of the bureaucracy. There is a general recognition that there are too many departments and civil servants, replicating functions and generating unnecessary bureaucracy. Meanwhile at the regional and local level there is an absence of effective administrative tiers for the delivery of services so that when it does occur, it is top-down and poorly programmed and fails to meet the needs of local communities. Thus, poor coordination between levels of government and the absence of codes of administrative conduct often lead to excessive secrecy and accountability and corruption problems, matched by the lack of consultative mechanisms and other forms of public participation. Restructuring public administration through administrative reform thus becomes a fundamental component of post-war reconstruction. b) Limited Human Resources The most common concerns in terms of human resource issues expressed by senior managers of public organisations in interim authorities tend to focus on the lack of effective expertise in the following areas: leadership/management of change; general planning skills, particularly in relation to budgetary planning; auditing; project management; programming and implementation; and human resource management. The following narrative reveals the scale of the problem: After 23 years of war we no longer possess the expertise to do our jobs properly (Senior Civil Servant, AIA). It is therefore often the case that post-war administrations do not have the capacity to deliver national reconstruction goals and thus become overly dependent on Diaspora or foreign experts. As the following narratives reveal, this can cause a range of further obstacles to effective reconstruction planning and programming: The use of Diaspora has caused a great deal of resentment within the administrative cadres. We stayed on, we struggled and we suffered. Yet it is those who left that are benefiting most from peace. That can’t be right (Senior Civil Servant, AIA). Even if many return, there is likely to be a major skills gap especially in key aspects of public administration such as policy formulation, planning, priority setting, budgeting and monitoring, which will require a comprehensive programme of recruitment, reorientation and training (Minister, AIA). We have become too reliant on foreigners as we lack knowledge about reconstruction programming. We are also very vulnerable to the World Bank and the IMF, as we don’t have the ability to argue with them on their own terms (Minister, AIA).

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It is interesting to note that prior to the Taliban, 43 per cent of government employees in Afghanistan were women, most of whom were sacked. This suggests that there is often a reserve army of skilled workers available in a post-conflict state should their skills be called upon. There is also often a distinct lack of appropriate hands-on professional training on reconstruction and development issues: At first I attended this training course because you provide a free lunch but now I am very angry. Why haven’t we been given this opportunity before? How are we supposed to rebuild without this type of practical support (Senior Civil Servant, AIA). While many government departments have considerable experience in responding to emergencies, this is not necessarily complemented by equivalent expertise in reconstruction and development programming. For example, community participation – the key to sustainable reconstruction and development – is widely advocated, but not necessarily well implemented. In addition, the lack of reliable statistics about health, social, demographic, economic and commercial conditions, particularly outside the few major urban centres, presents significant obstacles to planning medium and long-term reconstruction and development programmes. As a senior civil servant in the GOSL notes, ‘We simply don’t have the capacity to collect accurate base-line data’. Institutional capacity building has thus become a crucial element of reconstruction planning. c) Poor Working Conditions Perhaps unsurprisingly, senior managers of public organisations in the AIA were most concerned with their poor working conditions: I haven’t even got a desk never mind a computer. It is extremely difficult to do any long-term thinking in this environment (Senior Civil Servant, AIA). It is difficult to get enthusiastic about reconstruction when you’re not getting paid and your family is starving. You have to remember that under the Taliban we were not paid a wage, we were fed (Senior Civil Servant, AIA). In addition, concerns were expressed over the absence of housing, education, pension and health entitlements, the lack of crèche facilities, and nepotistic practices in the workplace. As one senior manager put it: ‘It isn’t surprising that corruption occurs when our working conditions are so poor and we have such an inhumane working environment’. However, the following narratives from senior civil servants in central government departments in Sri Lanka demonstrate some key differences in the nature of these two conflicts in terms of working conditions: In my opinion, one of the main reasons why this conflict has gone on for so long is that conditions in the civil service are pretty good and have not been badly affected by the war. There is therefore a reluctance amongst senior civil servants to do anything positive (Senior Civil Servant, GOSL).

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In the Sri Lankan context, good working conditions in the civil service have created an obstacle to reconstruction in the sense that there is a reluctance to be proactive in pursuit of peace as it could ultimately impact on conditions of service. In Afghanistan the opposite problem exists; the absence of good working conditions has led to corruption and maladministration, which have undermined reconstruction efforts.

Economic Obstacles Although many of the problems facing post-conflict societies existed prior to the outbreak of conflict, the consequences of conflict can radically alter the political, demographic and economic structure of a country. For example, in 1994 in Rwanda the elimination of 800,000 Tutsi and many moderate Hutus proved to be a huge drain on skilled public sector personnel. In addition, more households became headed by women, certain intellectual and entrepreneurial sections of society migrated and populations were prevented from returning home, creating new ethnically polarized communities. In these circumstances, trading relations and markets are easily lost, either through conflict or sanctions, and industry and infrastructure may have become physically damaged or obsolete. Thus reconstruction often requires the creation of a new economic structure and there are three main economic obstacles to successful reconstruction that need to be considered: the problem of inequitable growth; the role of the informal sector; and the need to balance macro and micro economic objectives (Barakat, 1992). a) Inequitable Growth Inequalities of power, wealth, and access to resources, including services such as health and education, are often the root causes of conflict. In many post-conflict societies the persistence of such inequitable growth constitutes an inherent vulnerability to recurrent violence and major reform programmes may be a prerequisite to sustainable recovery. Without systems of representative governance, accountable politicians and judiciaries, land reform, and access to education and basic health services, recovery will be retarded and stability jeopardized. b) The Role of the Informal Sector Meanwhile, the first sign of post-war economic recovery is most commonly the emergence of a varied and dynamic informal sector. When seeking to support a broad-based economic recovery, reconstruction and development programmes should therefore recognize the opportunities presented both by the informal sector and the expertise and investment resources which the returning Diaspora offers. However, ongoing support for such spontaneous reconstruction and development efforts should be based on an accurate assessment of the genuine need for assistance to the most vulnerable in society. The informal sector is often totally unregulated and can be hazardous (providing poor quality of service, or linked to criminal activity). In the longer term there is a need for policy, standards and regulation to protect the interests of those who can afford these services, and donors also need to be convinced that there is a case for humanitarian assistance.

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Post-conflict governments therefore face an inevitable conflict between micro and macro economic policy objectives as they try to balance the need to stabilize the economy by cutting expenditure to meet the demands of lending institutions, and at the same time come under pressure to spend to meet the demands of reconstruction. However, with the infrastructure devastated, local authorities weakened, and local capacities eroded, there will be few options but to bring in expertise from outside the war-torn areas (nationally or from the Diaspora). This was a feature of Palestine in the aftermath of the 1993 Oslo agreement. With the almost total erosion of local capacities after 25 years of Israeli occupation, the newly established Palestinian authorities had no choice but to depend on outside expertise for the process of reconstruction and to bring back Palestinians from abroad. This, of course, upset those Palestinians who perceived themselves as having suffered most under the occupation and benefited least from reconstruction opportunities. The situation became even worse when mistakes were made in the implementation process and policy objectives and hence expectations were not met. (Barakat et al., 2001b) As noted above, the scale of the challenge of rebuilding war-torn communities requires the development of state-led collaborative structures of governance with the participation of actors from the INGO, public and private sectors. The absence of any of these actors can result in programme failure, long delays in responding to urgent needs, the waste of scarce resources and, most significantly, renewed conflict. This means that the input of various actors has to be balanced, in particular governmental organisations, and LNGOs should not be sidelined. It cannot be assumed either that external resources will remain consistent throughout the period needed for the reconstruction and development of the war-torn areas. International experience has shown that donor interest reaches its peak in the aftermath of establishing peace, and declines sharply thereafter. This is, of course, in direct contrast to the needs of the war-affected areas. There are five main reasons for this. First, the international community is focused on ‘signing a peace agreement’ and is less interested in implementing it. Secondly, other priorities for funding may arise elsewhere. Thirdly, cuts in central budgets may occur. Fourthly, poor performance in terms of reconstruction on the ground and the inability of local authorities to manage the initial influx of funding can create implementation gaps in reconstruction planning and programming. Finally, violence may re-emerge. The current conditions experienced by the Palestinian, Afghan and Iraqi authorities, are a good illustration of this point (Barakat et al 2001b).

Social Obstacles There is no faith in government or in INGOs. They are both viewed as vultures serving their own interests (Junior Minister, GOSL). The key obstacle is fatalism; there is simply no confidence in the future (Minister, AIA). As these narratives on the key social obstacles to reconstruction observe, the

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absence of public faith in the ability of government to redress public problems remains a key obstacle to sustainable recovery. Moreover, the public often has unrealistic expectations that can’t be met. Indeed the work of the international community may raise expectations by delivering welfare services at unprecedented standards within target communities. It is therefore crucial that social institutions and other community-based organizations are treated as key partners in the collaborative system of governance that emerges to deliver on national reconstruction and development goals. This is a crucial mechanism for building social solidarity.

International and National Opinion Most post-conflict states engaging in national reconstruction and development are heavily dependent on the support of the international community, particularly the Washington Nexus, the UN, and key donors such as Japan, Germany, Holland, Norway and the UK. The capacity of post-war governments to maintain international attention is thus crucial in order to raise sufficient funding for the reconstruction effort. As one Minister in the AIA puts it: ‘The international community will soon forget us. It always does. It is my job to ensure that it doesn’t (Minister, AIA)’. It is equally important to build a societal consensus across elites and masses on national reconstruction imperatives in order to maintain social harmony and stability. In sum, the interaction between these ‘cognitive’ and ‘environmental’ obstacles and the forces of international and public opinion inform the reconstruction and development context in states emerging from conflict. Post-war reconstruction and development administration – from ‘government’ to collaborative ‘governance’ In the previous section the main obstacles to successful post-war reconstruction were identified and evaluated. This section argues that these obstacles can be removed through effective state-building, national reconstruction and development planning, administrative reform and the effective mobilisation of human and material resources in support of the reconstruction effort. This involves a fundamental shift from ‘government’ to ‘collaborative governance’ as the key instrument of reconstruction. State Building through Collaborative Governance Between us (INGOs and government) we have the resources and the skills; all we need to do is learn how to work with each other (Senior Civil Servant, GOSL). In the long-term government departments will have to acquire the skills to do most of this. But in the meantime we need their (INGOs) help. We need to become experts overnight. The longer it takes us to learn new skills, the longer it will be before we can govern ourselves (Senior Civil Servant, AIA).

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As we observed above, a relief mentality often underpins and shapes the activities of state institutions and actors at the central, regional and local levels. The longer the conflict, the more embedded this mentality becomes, and an emphasis on the short-term dominates and the medium or long-term benefits of reconstruction are not considered. The outcome is ‘institutional sclerosis’ which has to be tackled through a process of state-building, for the existing ensemble of institutional structures governing the state and the constitution that gives it legitimacy is often the root cause of the conflict itself. While drawing rational lessons from international experience can be both creative and progressive, states need to find their own way through the problem of state-building. In other words they should not be afraid of engaging in innovation in order to meet the challenges they face. Liberal democracy may not provide all the answers to their institutional problems. The only guiding rule that must be observed is that reconstruction and development requires ‘governance’ and not ‘government’. This is not merely a semantic point. What we mean by this is that government must be viewed as a key player in a range of collaborative, representative structures of governance that include a broad range of stakeholders, from domestic sectional interests to international donors and INGOs. The transition from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ at all levels is a condition of successful reconstruction and development, which should aim to allow communities to own, manage and support public services. A parallel aim should be to build the capacity of the emerging local and central administration to supervise and regulate services and provide the necessary support to sustain them and, as the state institutions are consolidated and new civil institutions emerge, so the external stakeholders should progressively withdraw. National Planning and the Management of Reconstruction and Development Activities Effective national reconstruction planning refers to a deliberate attempt to coordinate the activities of the state and the international community around achieving nationally inclusive reconstruction objectives. In states emerging from conflict such a planning framework needs to be coordinated from the centre and given strong state direction. This may be in stark contrast with ‘normal’ national development planning in which the state often plays a more minimal role (Barakat, 1998). Collaborative governance provides the institutional framework in which a national plan for reconstruction and development can flourish. National reconstruction plans present the policy objectives of the government and normally place a significant emphasis on governance and economic management. The first step in the development of such a plan must be to ensure that it is as inclusive and representative of the interests of civil society as possible. Failure to consult widely and to incorporate public perceptions directly into reconstruction planning and programming can lead to the emergence of implementation gaps and may even facilitate the outbreak of further conflict. The second step in a national reconstruction strategy is to identify the institutional architecture to underpin the planning and implementation of reconstruction programming. Barakat (1998) has

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identified four alternative institutional architectures that have been deployed in post-conflict states.

a) The establishment of an independent body with an executive role This option is widely accepted following disasters in general and wars in particular. It very much reflects the centralised decision-making character of the pre-war or pre-disaster government. The independent body could take the form of a Ministry (e.g. in Croatia), Supreme Council (e.g. in Yemen) or even just an Executive Office. The French Ministry of Reconstruction established following World War II was an outstanding example of where a ministry had the responsibility for not only preparing reconstruction plans but also financing them and supervising their implementation. One of the most recent examples of the deployment of this model was the reestablishment of the Croatian Ministry of Reconstruction in 1997. Another example of the deployment of this model is the Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) which was created in 1977, with the task of supervising all reconstruction and rehabilitation work.

b) The establishment of an independent authority with only a coordinating role In Japan up until 1945, the Ministry of the Interior controlled city planning, but for post-war reconstruction planning an independent organisation called the War Damage Reconstruction Agency was established. The agency gave directives to war damaged cities to develop and institute their own plans, under the guidance of the Agency. Similarly, following the Nigerian civil war in 1970, the Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction was established with the task of coordinating the allocation of resources. The various government ministries were allocated implementation responsibilities. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for agricultural projects including tree crops, food crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry. Such a role is often assumed on an ad hoc basis by leading humanitarian organisations. The role of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlement (UNCHS - Habitat) in Kabul, Afghanistan, during the period 1992–96, provides an excellent example of an agency assuming the lead coordinating role in the absence of strong central government.

c) The establishment of reconstruction cells within each appropriate ministry This approach has the advantage of keeping responsibilities where they belong but it suffers from coordination problems and establishing demarcation lines between the ministries who often compete for resources and roles in the reconstruction process. Iraq’s experience of reconstruction in the 1990s is very similar to this model. In addition to the creation of reconstruction cells in the ministries, a Supreme Council for Reconstruction was established and entrusted with the task of coordination between the different ministries and the removal of bottlenecks, particularly in relation to issues to do with security and defence. However, when it came to implementation great confusion took place due to the overlapping of responsibilities. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that this model increased the efficiency of the reconstruction process and provides a quicker return to normality.

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d) The establishment of a Reconstruction Planning Office at Presidential or Cabinet level This approach was adopted by the Government of Jamaica where each relevant ministry provided personnel on a seconded basis to form an integrated planning team under the Prime Minister’s or President’s authority. The involvement of the Prime Minister or the President can reduce the problems of competition or failures of co-ordination between ministries. However, for this model to work, it has to concentrate on its planning and coordination roles and divorce itself entirely from implementation. This is a difficult choice to make especially when considering the temptation of the considerable reconstruction resources that suddenly become available.

e) The establishment of an ‘inclusive’ institutional architecture for national reconstruction planning and management The problem with all of these models is that they represent an extremely centralised ‘top-down’ view of reconstruction. They lack the possibility of coordination at regional and local levels and they do not allow enough space for local communities to participate in the process of decision-making. The task of reconstruction is an enormously costly one that will stretch the human and financial resources of the public sector to its limits. This means that the allocation of roles to a wide range of governmental and non-governmental bodies is crucial. In sum, this requires the establishment of an ‘inclusive’ institutional architecture for national reconstruction planning and management based upon collaborative governance. This will provide for the following: ! the central co-ordination of all efforts of reconstruction at the national level carried out by central government and its agencies in partnership with INGOS and NNGOs; ! regional co-ordination, carried out by a number of administrative units in all war damaged areas, that can be coordinated by a central regional authority in partnership with appropriate non-state actors and citizens; and ! communal/local structures of governance that would look after the immediate concerns of the people living in war-affected areas. Indeed some of these reconstruction needs are best addressed by local bodies, such as: housing, relocation/resettlement, local infrastructure and health. Comparative experience has shown that whatever the model of reconstruction administration and the number of groups participating, there are five basic requirements that have to be present in each of the participating agencies or authorities in order for them to act effectively: 'the authority to act; the competence to act; the resources to act; the knowledge to act; and community acceptance of the various indigenous and non-indigenous stakeholders.' (Barakat, 1998:138). Hence, whatever institutional architecture a state adopts for national reconstruction planning and management it should be able to work vertically and horizontally (Barakat et al., 2001a and 2001b).

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Administrative Reform One of the major problems confronting programming is poor coordination of service delivery. There is too much duplication going on. You never know who is responsible for what. The result is waste (Senior UN officer, Sri Lanka). Our infrastructure is non-existent. We’re starting from scratch and we need as much help as we can get (Junior Minister, AIA). As Turner and Hulme (1997:1) observe, ‘It seems that all are agreed on the proposition that the nature and performance of public sector organizations are critical elements in determining developmental success’. Indeed, countries that have experienced the most rapid and sustained development such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, all have highly effective public sector organizations, strong centres, entrepreneurial elites, relatively autonomous states, effective economic planning ministries, certain aspects of Good Governance, and have engaged in civil service reform (see Leftwich, 2001). Administrative reform in the context of war-torn societies refers to the process by which new administrative instruments are developed to deliver on the state’s national reconstruction and development goals. This will normally involve an urgent process of planned organizational change geared towards improving efficiency and effectiveness. It is often targeted at particular institutions and particular cadre. It is therefore a wholly political process. External intervention from the Washington Nexus creates a pathology for a particular agenda of civil service reforms. Indeed the World Bank has identified the key components of reform as: ! installing in civil services personnel information and management systems more tightly linked to payrolls, and including clear and appropriate career development schemes; ! staff audits to determine what personnel is on hand; ! improving training systems; ! revision, usually meaning simplification, of the legal framework governing the civil service; and ! getting the right people into the administration, partly by stronger incentives to attract and retain them, partly by changing objectives and procedures in an effort to make the work situation more challenging and rewarding. However, this refers only to human resource issues. Administrative reform is also likely to involve a significant degree of restructuring, normally involving downsizing, centralization in terms of policy-making, decentralization in terms of delivery systems, and improving organizational responsiveness through: ! constituting effective public administration frameworks (e.g. executive machinery, departments, planning and coordinating mechanisms);

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! the development of codes of ethical practice (e.g. codes of conduct, transparency, accountability, effective audit, monitoring and evaluation); ! establishing operating procedures for Collaborative Governance; and ! creating certain aspects of Good Governance. The achievement of accountability and transparency in public administration is a key ambition for most states emerging from conflict. This is largely, but not always, due to the terms governing World Bank programming and tends to focus on the adherence of public servants to formal rules and regulations, performance accountability and the issue of to whom the public servant is accountable. A variety of policy instruments have emerged in recent times in an attempt to make public servants accountable and responsive to the citizenry such as the use of clear accountability routes in government through the application of constitutional rules, regular financial audit, codes of conduct for elected and non-elected public officials and the use of Open Government practices. In addition, a range of initiatives have been geared towards enhancing public participation such as participatory community action projects, citizen panels for key public services (e.g. health, education), focus groups, user group forums/participatory evaluations in service areas, and deliberative opinion polls. Where possible, however, indigenous institutions should be strengthened and the establishment of inappropriate structures and institutions should be avoided. The Mobilisation of Resources for Reconstruction and Development International experience shows that resource mobilisation for reconstruction is a decisive element in formulating a reconstruction strategy. Poor mobilisation and utilisation of human, physical, financial, and public resources following war has often led to delays in reconstruction. All of these resources have to be assessed in terms of their immediate and long-term potential. Moreover, indigenous resources must be distinguished from external ones; and the latter evaluated in terms of their potential for causing dependency, unwanted external control, or uneven development. The effective mobilisation of resources depends on central and local government action, but is augmented through the utilisation of grass root organisations such as self-help projects, women's groups, co-operatives for training people and the provision of materials for rebuilding. This is why the development of a shared ‘bottom-up’ national vision for the reconstruction and development of the war-torn areas is so critical (Barakat, 1994). Parting shots – hypothesizing good practice in transitory post-war public administration Ten main hypotheses for guiding good practice in transitory post-war public administration can be derived from the preceding analysis. Hypothesis 1: Successful post-war reconstruction requires the eradication of the rule of the gun and the establishment of the rule of law.

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Hypothesis 2: Collaborative governance provides the institutional framework in which a national plan for reconstruction and development can flourish. It should be based on clear operating rules, mutual respect and trust. Hypothesis 3: The greatest challenge confronting a government emerging from conflict is the need to establish a legitimate and functioning state. The establishment of strong, but legitimate, central state authority is a key instrument for successful state-building and, ultimately, development. Hypothesis 4: The establishment of a ‘national’ reconstruction and development plan is a crucial mechanism for ensuring the legitimacy of the state and should be as inclusive as possible. Successful post-war reconstruction requires effective ‘bottomup’ participation by civil society organisations in processes of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and, reconciliation. Hypothesis 5: National reconstruction and development plans should not only focus on the reconstruction of public infrastructure and economic management but also on developing the human resources, appropriate institutions of governance and forms of public management to deliver on reconstruction and development goals. Hypothesis 6: The indigenous civil service should, in most instances, be the prime mover in post-war reconstruction. Consequently, successful post-war reconstruction requires the establishment of a strong, efficient and effective central administrative system. This will normally involve restructuring through administrative reform aimed at improving efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness. A national civil service college should be established to ensure the long-term sustainability of this aim. Hypothesis 7: Successful reconstruction requires engaging in progressive lesson learning from international experience. However, local solutions must be found to local problems. Public administrators must engage in rational policy transfer and draw on the best overseas expertise. Hypothesis 8: The establishment of a constitution that is representative of the people, safeguards the rights of the individual, minority groups and private associations and provides an anatomy of legitimate public power is essential in order for the state to be viewed as legitimate. Hypothesis 9: The establishment of a bottom-up political culture is essential in order for the state to be viewed as legitimate. This should involve the development of effective local political institutions and inexpensive forms of public participation such as citizens’ juries, participatory community action projects, citizen panels for key public services (e.g. health, education), focus groups, user group forums/participatory evaluations in service areas, and deliberative opinion polls.

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Hypothesis 10: The final hypothesis is the general hypothesis taken as the starting point for this book, that post-war reconstruction is essentially a development challenge (Stiefel, 1999). For this reason activities which build and shape emerging state institutions should be initiated as soon as possible, even before the formal establishment of peace, in order to offset the relief mentality that often underpins and shapes the activities of state institutions and actors at the central, regional and local levels. While significant evidence has been presented in this chapter to validate these hypotheses, further research is required in a broader range of post-conflict states in order to give them greater prescriptive weight. Nonetheless, given the stark absence of research in this area, this set of hypotheses does provide a valuable starting point for the establishment of a reflexive research programme on transitory post-war public administration. This should be a pressing concern for academicians of postwar reconstruction and development.

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12 COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT: SUSTAINING LOCAL HEALTH SERVICES DURING THE TRANSITION TO RECOVERY

Sultan Barakat and Sean Deely

The Challenge of Sustaining Health Services Since the early 1990s, international aid organizations have been drawn progressively into the provision of health and other essential social services in conflict-affected countries. As time passes short-term projects give way to rehabilitation assistance whose primary aim is to help restore local services and pave the way for recovery. Rehabilitation theory suggests that during this transition, humanitarian agencies should provide ongoing assistance to the affected population pending the restoration of appropriate services by the responsible authorities. In reality however, it takes at least a decade for most post-conflict governments to build the governance capacity, policies and institutions needed to provide an effective public health system. Even when large-scale reconstruction aid is provided by the international community, too much money is provided too early – during the first three years – when absorptive capacity is low, and resources are squandered. Then, just when absorptive capacity is increasing, the level of aid decreases (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Consequently, low-income, conflict-affected countries tend to suffer chronic failure of essential services and agencies end up replacing formal services rather than helping to bridge the transition between relief and reconstruction (World Bank, 2002). Once the international community’s attention has moved on, however, funding tapers off and agencies’ concern over future donor support causes a ‘commitment trap’ whereby a general reluctance to invest in local capacities to take over services locks the agency into a continuous cycle of relief provision. As agencies adjust to declining donor interest and under-funded annual appeals, a downward spiral of reduced support, budget cuts, fewer benefits, lower staff salaries, and less frequent monitoring and supervision, inevitably affect the quality and range of services. Local people increasingly revert to informal practitioners and self-medication, often with expired or otherwise inappropriate drugs procured from unqualified drug

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peddlers, with seriously detrimental affects on their health (WHO, 2001). In developing countries between 30 and 50 per cent of all health-related spending is for pharmaceutical drugs, compared with 15 per cent in developed countries (Whitehead et al, 2001; UNDP 2003). Sustaining health service provision is not a conflict-related problem. In 1978 the Alma Ata declaration adopted a new primary health care strategy to extend essential services to millions of people by the end of the 20th Century. Ironically, the 1980’s economic crisis and subsequent imposition of structural adjustment programmes led to the erosion, and in some cases de facto collapse, of public health systems in many developing countries (Diskett and Nickson, 1997). The ‘Agenda for Reform’ outlined by the World Bank in 1987 proposed a shift in responsibility for health service to the private sector provision, a theme echoed in the Bamako Initiative in 1988, introducing user fees to finance recurrent costs in primary health services (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2000). In 1993, the World Development Report (‘Investing In Health’) called on governments in developing countries to double or triple spending on basic public health programmes and essential clinical services, and proposed a minimum package of essential services to be made available to all (World Bank, 1993). More recently, the Millennium Development Goals adopted at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000 aim to produce a dramatic reduction in poverty and marked improvements in the health of the world’s poor by 2015. The 2001 report of the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health called for the benefits of globalization to be extended by scaling up the access of world’s poor to essential health services, declaring that the linkages between health, poverty and economic growth have been greatly underestimated, and outlining a basic strategy for health-finance reform in low income countries (WHO, 2001). There are no quick fixes for sustainability of health services in low-income countries, and even less-so if they are also affected by conflict, even though the level of suffering and deprivation is considerably worse. In conflict-affected countries, the lack of health services needs to be seen in the broader context of state failure to provide for the basic needs of the population. The same factors that cause chronic failure of health services also produce poverty, economic decline and conflict. Agencies contend that people and governments in these countries lack the financial means to provide essential services and that the solution is through vastly increased financial assistance in the form of grants to help existing or emerging health administrations build the systems and services needed (WHO, 2001). Donors, on the other hand, argue that aid has consistently failed to produce improvements in service provision – it may even have worsened matters by increasing corruption and accumulating indebtedness – and new injections of cash will only work in the context of improved policies and institutions (World Bank, 2002). Yet these improvements take years to achieve – at least a decade in conflictaffected countries. Some sort of transitional solution is needed in the meantime and aid agencies are increasingly being used to provide it.

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The Puntland State of Somalia The health situation in Puntland is among the worst in the world, reflecting the consequences of underdevelopment, conflict, years of neglect and the international community’s continuing policy vacuum regarding Somalia. Since its independence in 1960, Somalia has been subjected to an almost uninterrupted series of natural and conflict-related disasters. The civil war that broke out in 1988 culminated in the collapse of the state in 1991, amid anarchic clan-based violence, famine, large scale internal and external migration, and the near complete destruction of the physical and economic infrastructure. In 1998, the northeastern area of Puntland declared itself an autonomous state within a future federal Somalia. It considers itself to encompass the regions of Mudug, Nugal, Bari as well as Sool and the eastern part of Sanaag, two regions also claimed by Somaliland, which declared its independence in 1991. The three-month constitutional conference of community elders and political leaders which led to the formation of Puntland also produced a three-year provisional charter and elected a political leadership, i.e., a president and an executive council. President Abdullahi Yousef Ahmed, a former Somali army colonel, was elected from a list of four candidates to serve as President for a period of three years. Efforts to establish a government were making progress in 2001, when his request for a two-year extension was rejected and a conference of elders elected Jama Ali Jama to replace him as president. Violent conflict broke out between supporters of the two contenders and ended in the expulsion of Ali Jama a year later. A fragile peace has been restored and stability is slowly being restored under the re-constituted government of Abdullahi Yousef. Before the war only two per cent of government expenditure was allocated to health. The national service was highly centralised and concentrated on hospitals in urban areas with 80 per cent of all doctors and nurses working in Mogadishu (Barakat and Deely, 2001). Today, a highly nomadic and dispersed population served by a sparse, poorly developed infrastructure is plagued by major health problems from infectious diseases like acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, measles and tuberculosis. Maternal mortality is estimated at 1,600 per 100,000 births and infant mortality at 132 per 1,000 live births. Under-five mortality is an estimated 224 per 1,000 live births indicating that a quarter of all children never reach the age of five (UNICEF, 1999). New cases of polio were registered recently and the incidence of tuberculosis is growing at an alarming rate (Barakat and Deely, 2001; WHO 2001). Immunization campaigns are carried out regularly but coverage is very low, often below five per cent for the six childhood killer diseases. Somalia has a high Sexually Transmitted Disease rate (almost 25%) and this, together with the very high rate of TB, point to high risks of an HIV/AIDS epidemic in the near future. A number of other factors specifically promote the spread of the disease including: lack of awareness and education; inadequate blood banking and transfusion facilities; the widespread practice of Female Genital Mutilation; scarification and episiotomy; poverty and its impact on health behavior; and migration – by traders, nomads and returning refugees. Three-quarters of the population (estimated at 850,000 by the UN and over two million by the government of Puntland) is either nomadic or rural, and access

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to professional services is one of the main reasons why health conditions are so poor. According to the Directorate of Health there are 63 qualified doctors, five functioning hospitals, three health centres, 25 Mother-and-Child/Outpatient clinics and 62 health posts (many of them not functioning). Most of these services are located in urban areas: only 15 per cent of the rural population has access to health services UNDP, 2001). Since the collapse of the public health system in 1991, health needs have been filled by a combination of traditional healers, NGOs, private providers and a huge number of pharmacies, many of them little more than stalls run by unqualified people. A survey, carried out by UNICEF in 1997, suggested that three out of four sick children were treated privately, mainly at socalled ‘pharmacies’ (UNICEF, 1997). In recent years, this over-reliance on ‘pharmacies’ or drug-peddlers led some aid organizations to believe that people had the means to pay for health services, prompting attempts to introduce cost recovery systems to transfer the burden of financing health services from the international donor to the local community. The apparent success of cost-recovery systems in extracting fees for hospital services in Bosasso and Las Anod also encouraged the extension of user-fee schemes to primary health care facilities. The rationale advanced was that the income that could be generated by the introduction of user fees would part-fund the facility overheads or drugs. It was argued that exemption systems would ensure the poor enjoyed continued access. User-fee schemes have even less chance of success in conflictaffected Somalia than they did in the developmental contexts they were intended for and where these schemes have generally failed to raise even five per cent of running costs while preventing many vulnerable people from accessing services. Experience has taught repeatedly that user fees often end up excluding the poor from essential health services while at the same time only recovering a fraction of cost. (WHO, 2001) Apart from generating inter-group tension over entitlement to waivers, and fuelling corruption, user-fee systems in sub-Saharan Africa appear to have compounded poverty and spread debt throughout communities, effectively worsening the overall health status of the population and retarding recovery (Witter, 2002; Simms et al, 2001; Whitehead et al, 2001). In conflict-affected countries like Somalia, vulnerable people suffer most from the introduction of these schemes because exemption systems do not function in the context of widespread poverty, nomadic or transient populations and consequent inability to distinguish poor people from non-poor. Yet both aid agencies and emerging health authorities, faced with chronic donor fatigue and no immediate prospects of large-scale reconstruction assistance from the international community, continue to introduce cost recovery schemes in the vain hope that thy will produce sustainability. Community Management: Sharing More than the Cost The Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) has been supporting a network of Mother and Child Health clinics throughout Somalia since the conflict there in 1991,

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providing essential health services in mainly remote, rural areas. For almost a million Somalis living in the communities served by the Red Crescent health programme, these facilities are the only professional services available. Twelve of the clinics are located in Puntland, making SRCS one of the main health service providers in the emerging state. Years of funding support and a succession of unsuccessful peace conferences have all but exhausted donor interest and sustaining the 49 clinics has become increasingly difficult. In April 2000, the International Federation and the SRCS joined forces with the World Bank’s Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Team to find ways to convert the network into a more sustainable service that could form part of the future health sector in Somalia. The Health Service Recovery Project is drawing on the approaches and experiences of different actors in health service provision in transitional and conflict-affected states over the years, in an effort to develop a system that draws on community resources and abilities and not only on external inputs, and is therefore more selfreliant. Self-reliance is a key component of the Community Involvement in Health approach to health development. CIH has been increasingly used to promote primary health care and encourage people’s participation in and responsibility for the provision of services to promote health. Community involvement in health development is a process by which partnership is established between the government and local communities in the planning, implementation and utilization of health activities in order to benefit from increased local self-reliance and social control over the infrastructure of primary health care. (Rifkin, 1990, quoted in Kahssay & Oakley, 1999) Community financing is another promising approach which can be adapted to local needs and resources. While many different approaches to health service financing have been attempted and much written on the merits and disadvantages of cost recovery, cost sharing and cost reduction, a consensus is emerging on the usefulness of community financing schemes that channel out-of-pocket health expenditures on drugs, traditional healers and commercial provision into prepayment schemes to help cover the cost of community-based health delivery (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2000; Barakat & Deely, 2001; UNDP, 2003; WB, 2003). Building on these two approaches, and the experience of the Red Crescent in Somalia for more than a decade, the project has developed a ‘community management’ approach combining a strategy of collective community contributions within a broader initiative to build the systems and capacities to produce a major increase in community involvement in health. ‘Community management’ is based on the principle that people would make better use of their local health service, and be more inclined to contribute resources to ensure its sustainability, if they were given the opportunity to participate meaningfully in decisions about its organization and development. People who have some sense of ownership over their local health facility would be more inclined to contribute to its

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upkeep. Furthermore, if the service responded to their perceptions of their health needs and priorities, they would have less need to use alternative providers and might be persuaded to redirect out-of-pocket expenditures into some form of community fund for the facility. Moreover, if influential community members were actively engaged – at some level – in the planning, delivery and monitoring of services provided by their health facility, they might feel a responsibility towards the facility that would encourage them to mobilize community resources to support such a community health fund. The Methodology There are three main steps in the community management approach: a) Establishing baseline data to create a general profile of communities’ socioeconomic conditions and health behavior to inform a general strategy for increased community involvement in the service; b) Undertaking in-depth studies on individual communities’ specific circumstances to provide information for the development of a community health plan setting out how the service can be adapted to better suit local people’s needs and resources, and assigning specific roles and responsibilities to the main actors involved in health service provision, including local health authorities, aid agencies, health facility staff, and community organizations; c) Implementation of the community health plan, including: a. establishment of local structures, systems and capacities to participate effectively in the co-management of the facility, b. implementation of the planned activities including improved and expanded services, revenue generation and local health campaigns, c. evaluation, and following adjustment based on the outcome of the evaluation, d. replication. Any attempt to increase community involvement in the delivery and sustainability of services must be based on an appreciation of the particular circumstances of the community or communities in question. Where more than one community is involved, baseline data will be needed on a range of community characteristics including: communities’ health concerns and priorities; the perceived value of the service; the capacities and resources available individually and collectively within the community and how they are currently used to affect health outcomes; and existing patterns of participation and resource mobilization. This information can then be generalized across communities to ascertain broad trends of people’s willingness and ability to increase their use of the service and their involvement in efforts to sustain it. Because no two communities are the same, a detailed assessment of each community’s circumstances will also need to be carried out so that the model can be adapted to the particular health needs and socio-economic characteristics of individual communities, and thus build a sustainability system for the service around local people’s willingness and ability to participate in it. None of this is particularly new, and any attempt to design a community-level

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programme will begin with some type of assessment of local capacities and vulnerabilities. Although many cost recovery and user fee systems have been implemented without adequate prior knowledge of communities’ circumstances, baseline data about a wide range of community characteristics are gathered on a regular basis by aid organizations. All too often however, these assessment and planning activities take place in and around communities without any real involvement of local people, with the end result that the community feels the service has been imposed on them. If communities have not been adequately consulted about their health concerns, priorities and perceived needs, or involved in the planning and running of the service, there is little room for local people to develop any sense of ownership for the facility, and consequently little interest in contributing to its upkeep. The key issue, then, is not whether agencies should gather baseline data or conduct in-depth assessment of communities to design programmes, but how can traditional programming practices be adapted to produce a genuinely participatory process that can help create an environment and appropriate systems to enable local people to play a meaningful role in the delivery and sustainability of services that are appropriate to their circumstances and needs. Baseline Data: The Household Survey Baseline data is needed on a range of community characteristics including: its health concerns and priorities; the perceived value of the service; the capacities and resources available individually and collectively within the community and how they are currently used to affect health outcomes; and existing patterns of participation and resource mobilization. This type of data is usually best gathered through a household survey. The use of standard questionnaire surveys in conflict-affected or developmental contexts without adaptation or alteration has been criticized as particularly disempowering because of their tendency to exclude local people from key aspects of the design and analysis process (Barakat et al, 2002; Chambers, 1999). Ordinary people can also be intimidated by the rigid application of the structured or semi-structured questionnaire or may simply be unable to construct a cohesive response to questions that have little meaning for them in the aftermath of conflict or loss (Barakat, 1992). In his seminal work ‘Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last’, Robert Chambers rejects standard surveys as long-winded, tedious, a headache to administer, a nightmare to process and write up, inaccurate and unreliable in data obtained, and leading to reports, if any, which were long, late, boring, misleading, difficult to use, and ignored. (Chambers, 1999; pp. 111) Surveying by professional researchers, according to Chambers, had become ‘robustly sustainable as a rural and urban industry’ – an industry with little value other than as an exercise in employment for professional consultants, involving the

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participation of local people only tangentially, if at all (Chambers, 1999; pp. 122). Chambers justifies such trenchant criticism of questionnaire surveys by explaining that they are part of an established systemic process which is riddled with antipoverty biases and ignores local people’s knowledge. This status quo is consolidated by the use of questionnaire surveys to ‘distort peripheral realities and fit them into centrallypre-set frameworks’. This occurs when constructing the questionnaire; interviewing respondents; and analyzing the data (Chambers, 1999, pp. 93–7). In the context of health service delivery or aid programming, the surveying process is rarely initiated by an entirely neutral, non-biased party. As a rule the objective is to provide baseline data for an organization with – at a very minimum – a particular mandate, and often with preconceived notions about what would constitute a solution to the problem. Questionnaires may only serve to reconfirm the limited knowledge that the external researcher had in the first place. This is because of their often highly structured design, which requires an action-reaction type response. They require precise responses to closed questions, producing multiple-choice simplifications of often-complex phenomena, and usually excluding even simple combinations or permutations of circumstances such as multiple sources of income. Data collected is strictly limited to what was asked and does not extend beyond the limited perspective of the external researcher who prepared the questionnaire. It cannot, therefore, challenge their preconceived notions about the problem and, or its solutions. ‘What is not asked about is not found out about and cannot be part of the analysis’. The greater the volumes of data, the more the analysts are forced to select, to choose what to present, what to focus on. This according to Chambers ‘necessarily reflects their priorities and predispositions, which are then reinforced’. Missing valuable opportunities to learn from people who might be able to provide a much richer, informative, detailed, broader picture of complex local circumstances, they are unlikely to correct misconceptions, introduce new ideas, or construct new hypotheses to replace wrong ones. Hence, to paraphrase Chambers, they do not inform, they only reconfirm, and they often reconfirm partial or incorrect solutions. Can these weaknesses in the survey as a research method be overcome? And if so how?

Weaknesses of traditional surveying methods In the Health Service Recovery Project, the objective of the proposed survey was to establish baseline data on a range of characteristics and practices in 12 communities across Puntland served by the Red Crescent clinics. The number of inhabitants in the these 12 communities is estimated at 144,000 people, ranging in lifestyle from nomadic livestock trading to farming, fishing and trading, widely dispersed over an area the size of Portugal, varied in their health needs and uses of the Red Crescent clinics and as complex as they are different in their attitudes, customs and values. The questionnaire survey offers a method which, when properly used, provides data that is representative of a larger population and produces results that can be generalized with a degree of confidence to that population. The challenge is how it can be done without the weaknesses and biases

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elaborated by Chambers. His thesis is that such distortions arise as a result of the exclusion of local people from the processes of constructing the questionnaire, interviewing, and analyzing the data. It is clear that the active participation of local people in the surveying process can significantly enhance the validity, relevance and usefulness of the information gathering exercise (Long, 2001; Kahssay & Oakley, 1999; Chambers, 1999). If anything, the process of engagement which takes place when ordinary people become convinced that they can influence and control the services provided should be recognized as an outcome in its own right (Kahssay & Oakley, 1999). The question therefore is: how can the surveying process be adapted to include – to the fullest extent possible – local people in: ! the preparation of the survey questionnaire ! the interviewing of other local people as respondents; and ! the analysis of the data to produce survey results.

Participatory Surveying The strategy used the Puntland participatory survey combined participatory methods with traditional surveying methods to enable local people and health workers to undertake an enquiry into the health and socio-economic conditions of their own communities. The process of enablement took place through the active participation of local people representing their communities, and clinic staff in six major activities: ! Consultation about the need for baseline data to help improve the running and resourcing of the clinics and how this data should be collected; ! Training on a variety of data collection methods including surveying, mapping, ranking, and listing, to enable community representatives and clinic staff participate in the planning and conduct of the household survey; ! Preparation of the survey questionnaire; ! Undertaking the survey; ! Analysis of survey data to identify and validate trends, patterns and conclusions emerging from the survey; and ! Decision-making about how the results should be used to improve clinic services and increase prospects for sustaining the service The survey training and organization workshop was the key to this process. Initially, significant objections had to be overcome from several quarters – including senior Somali managers – who contended that community representatives would not be able to grasp concepts such as sampling, ranking or linear thinking, Somalis, after all, having a verbal culture, based on seasons, and so forth. These arguments were overcome however and the workshop took place over a ten-day period in July 2000. For the first time since the Red Crescent Integrated Health Care programme began in 1993, clinic staff and local representatives from the 12 communities came together with Red Crescent senior management and branch staff to discuss the programme, community health behavior and clinic services.

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The methodology used in the survey training and preparation workshop involved the progressive development of participant’s ability to prepare and conduct a small-scale household survey on the one hand, and facilitators’ ability to understand the complex local, cultural and social context and its implications for the design of the survey, the composition of the questionnaire and the wording of individual questions. A participatory learning approach was used, combining classroom-style facilitator-participant interaction with both formal facilitators and community elders facilitating sessions. A range of participatory learning and working techniques was used to progressively engage community representatives and solicit their participation in the development of detailed profiles of their respective communities sharing knowledge and experience among community representatives, clinic staff and health administration officials. Techniques included participatory mapping of communities, their catchment areas, populations, subgroups and services; well-being and wealth ranking; the production of seasonal calendars describing variations in climate, population, health service utilization, water resources, labor patterns and migration; listing; role-playing; observation; simulation and real-life practice. Beginning with introductory sessions to explain the purpose of the workshop and the survey and develop a common understanding of the project’s objectives, the basic concepts of research, surveying and data gathering were gradually introduced. Over ten days the workshop increased in complexity and practicality to engage participants in the design of representative samples from their respective communities, and eventually the design and preparation of the questionnaire to be used in the survey. The workshop concluded successfully, erasing the doubts expressed prior to its organization, and a month later, thirty-six community representatives and clinics staff, working with staff from the Red Crescent offices in Garowe and Galcaio, undertook a household survey targeting 6,500 people in the 12 communities. The responses generated a range of baseline data on households’ profiles, assets, livelihood and incomes, their traditions of participation and use of community health facilities, and the likely impact of cost recovery on health service utilization. This data was presented to the community representatives and clinic staff in a validation and feedback workshop. During presentations, group work and discussion they reviewed the preliminary results and confirmed their accuracy and representativeness, and in some cases highlighted inaccurate or misleading results and were able to explain the origin of the mistakes. Their analysis of the data was then used as a basis to explore the conditions that would need to be fulfilled in order for the community to assume more responsibility for the running and resourcing of the clinics. This produced a consensus among community representatives, clinic and programming staff for increased community involvement in the running and resourcing of the clinics, on the basis that local people would be willing and able to contribute towards a community health fund to support the running of the clinic, if the range and level of services provided were increased to better meet their needs and concerns. The type of service improvements, as well as the nature of the resources to be contributed, and the manner in which they would be mobilized would vary from community to community, and would require a more in-depth study of communities health concerns and resources.

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Action Research: In depth community studies and planning An action research approach was used to conduct this in-depth study in Qarhis village, one of the Puntland communities selected to test the agreement reached with the community representatives. Action research is defined as a process through which people can collectively clarify their problems and formulate new ways of envisioning their situations. In doing so, each participant’s taken-for-granted cultural viewpoint is challenged and modified so that new systems of meaning emerge that can be incorporated in the texts – rules, regulations, practices, procedures and policies – that govern our professional and community experience. We come closer to the reality of other people’s experience and, in the process, increase the potential for creating truly effective services and programmes that will enhance the lives of people we serve. (Stringer, 1996) Local people are not treated as subjects: they become active participants, empowered by the process to make changes based on their own perspectives and interests. It is a highly participatory and consensual approach towards investigating problems and taking action to deal with them. In the context of community health service provision, the central focus of this variant of action research is to promote change and improvement through the enablement of users to identify, analyze, reflect upon, and take action to resolve problems with the service. Speed is essential in order to maintain participants’ interest and confidence in the process and build momentum towards a solution-outcome. A multidisciplinary team was selected with professional expertise in medicine, public health, education, economics and planning. To ensure commitment from the main stakeholders in health service provision, the team included staff from the Red Crescent offices in Galcaio and Garowe, the Puntland Directorate of Health and the Federation Somalia Delegation. Training on research methods was given and the team developed observation checklists, semi-structured interview questionnaires for clinic exit interviews, structured questionnaires for a mini-household survey, maps for transect walks and key probes to guide the data collection process. Community representatives and clinic staff facilitated the identification of a cross section of community members including clinic users, local traditional leaders, and community elders, clinic staff, private health service providers such as pharmacists and traditional healers.

Key Questions The overall aim was to engage these participants in a research and planning exercise about the community’s willingness and ability to support their health facility, in order to facilitate the identification by participants of proposals for improvements to the service and solicit an agreement on the type and level of resources local people would be willing to contribute in order to make it more sustainable. Specific areas of study were identified based on the information provided by the household survey and seven main questions were developed:

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i) What are the main demographic features of Qarhis community? ii) What governance systems operate in Qarhis, how do people participate in them and what suitable mechanisms exist to support health? iii) What are the community’s main health problems and the facilities they use to address them, and why? iv) How are other communal needs such as water, education and communication met? v) How does the Red Crescent clinic function and to what extent does it really meet the needs of the community? vi) Do people in the community really have sufficient resources such as assets and income to be able to contribute financially or materially to the cost of the clinic? vii) Are people really willing to participate actively in the running and resourcing of the Red Crescent clinic? Multiple research methods were used to gather the information and data. By using qualitative methods, which are accessible to all participants, local people were able to experience a sense of ownership in the process through participation at every level: participant observation, focus group discussions, unstructured and depth interviews. Additionally, some surveying was carried out using semi-structured questionnaires to probe households on their health needs and concerns and their willingness and ability to contribute to the service. Exit interviews were also carried out with clinic users to get a better sense of current and past health problems and levels of satisfaction with the services provided by the clinic. Document analysis was also used to provide in-depth information on the community’s health profiles and specific characteristics such as disease burdens, frequency and nature of health facility usage, and so forth.

Findings The findings were presented to a meeting of all the stakeholders including the village council, staff from the clinic, the Garowe Red Crescent health office, the Directorate of Health and the International Federation Somalia delegation. The study concluded that, taken collectively, the community has the assets, the ability and the willingness to participate in the resourcing and running of local health services. ! Qarhis has a sound socio-economic base, centered on livestock production, lobster fishing and the sale of water to nomads. This diversification income provides a safety net, at the community level, against the consequences of drought. ! The livestock ban is a source of economic hardship and instability, but seasonal employment in coastal fishing firms is a major source of income and as many as half of the households in Qarhis benefit from this. ! Sub-clan coping mechanisms and traditions of participation in burden-sharing respond well to requests for assistance and support for vulnerable people. ! A significant proportion of the community pays for health consultations –

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! !

!

!

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from the clinic head nurse at his private practice in one of the pharmacies and from traditional healers. People also pay for medicine at the two local pharmacies, and for tests and consultations in Garowe Community Hospital. There is a general level of satisfaction with the Red Crescent clinic service, mainly as a result of free medication, trained staff, and good recovery levels. Clinic users – although in principle willing to participate more actively in the running and resourcing of the clinic – clearly expressed their desire to see an improvement in the quality and range of services provided. The study revealed that staff practice was not always satisfactory, highlighting the need for training and supervision to improve the quality of clinic services. However it was also noted that the capacities of the Red Crescent office in Garowe to provide supervision to Qarhis and six other rural clinics were limited and given the distances to be traveled, the absence of asphalt roads and the shortage of vehicles, there is an important role for the community in monitoring standards of performance and services at the clinic and supporting community health programming through increased participation at every level. The community health committee acts as a conductor for community participation in some areas of support to the clinic and the service, but it was clear that these are ad hoc and almost always in response to arising needs and not as part of a systematic or regular participation. It also provides a limited degree of governance support but again this seemed limited to at most three of the nine members of the committee and was neither formalized nor structured. The low immunization coverage due to the absence of a cold-chain in the clinic was a major cause for concern shared by all participants. Given the poor state of the ‘road’ from Garowe to Qarhis, the lack of transport and staff capacity at the Red Crescent office in Garowe and the irregularity of attendance at the clinic, particularly by nomadic users, the only solution would be to establish a cold chain in Qarhis clinic with a fridge and freezer and other equipment. The standardized approach to clinic drug supply produced frequent shortages of drugs which resulted in patients having to go without, or pay to procure them at the pharmacy, or request them from a pharmacy in Garowe. Irregularities with clinic opening hours were also a cause of some dissatisfaction. The clinic’s lack of basic laboratory facilities were a source of dissatisfaction to many users and upgrading the service with a primary health care laboratory would provide the clinic with an additional means to improve the community’s health status.

A Basis for Shared Responsibility The participants were asked to provide general feedback as they saw fit and specific feedback on a number of key questions: ! Is sustaining the clinic a priority for the community of Qarhis, the clinic staff, the Red Crescent, the Directorate of Health and the International Federation? ! If it is, on what basis would they be willing to participate more actively in the running and resourcing of the clinic?

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There was general agreement that sustaining the Red Crescent clinic was a top priority. Community elders and health committee members expressed clearly their willingness to participate actively in the maintenance of the clinic. They agreed that the first priority was the need to sustain the services offered by the clinic. It was made clear that the community is in a position to contribute and support such an essential service. The participants were then asked to retire and consult internally on the following specific questions: ! What specific changes to clinic services would be required by the community, in order for the clinic to respond better to their perceived health needs? ! What changes would the Red Crescent and the Federation be willing and able to make? ! On what basis should the running costs of the clinic be shared between the Directorate of Health, the Red Crescent/Federation and the community collectively? ! How much would the community be willing to contribute in cash? ! Would the community be willing to increase its participation in the governance of the clinic through the Community Health Committee? ! Would this be acceptable to the Red Crescent and the clinic staff ? Over the next two days, village elders in Qarhis consulted extensively with the heads of the seventeen sub-clans, the village health committee and community members in an effort to work out the extent and nature of their participation and the service upgrades they would request for the clinic. Two days later, an open village meeting was held at the primary school. It was convoked by the head of the Village Council and attended by the heads of all seventeen sub-clans, the Community Health Committee, representatives of the Qarhis Women’s Association and the local Youth Association, the director general of the Puntland Directorate of Health, the District Officer for the region, the UNICEF representative for Puntland, the members of the project team, and a broad section of the population who stood around the classroom, in the hallway and listened and watched through the open windows. In response to the questions posed during the previous meeting community elders responded that the only condition for them to participate more actively would be for the Red Crescent to upgrade the services offered at the clinic so that they can meet the actual needs of the community. ! They specifically requested better drug management, regular vaccine supply and the establishment of a primary health care laboratory at the clinic. ! They also stated their willingness to pay a charge for the laboratory services (they already do for tests in Garowe). ! Health Committee members would be willing to increase their activity to provide governance and monitoring for the clinic and ensure more active community participation, but they would need a formal mandate, guidelines and training.

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! They were concerned about the most vulnerable community members, who may not be in a position to pay a charge for health service and rejected earlier ideas about imposing using fees or service charges. Instead they proposed the possibility of creating some form of community health fund which would be used to raise money for their participation in the running costs of the clinic. ! However, they had not been able to reach an agreement on the amount of the community’s contribution to this fund. The President of the Red Crescent informed the meeting that consultations had been held with clinic staff, UNICEF and WHO to mobilize additional support and resources to improve the quality of range of services at the clinic, and that he was in a position to agree to the following upgrade of the services: ! Improved clinic service monitoring by the Garowe Red Crescent health office; ! Improved staff performance through training and supervision; ! Provision of a cold chain facility at the clinic; ! Establishment of a primary health care laboratory for Qarhis clinic. This was confirmed by the UNICEF representative who pledged increased support to the clinic in the form of additional staff training and the provision of a fridge and freezer and regular vaccine supply. After a lengthy consultation with the heads of the seventeen sub-clans, the Head of the Village Council announced that the community would therefore be willing to contribute fifteen per cent of the running costs of the clinic. The Director General of Health endorsed the process and declared that although the Puntland administration has very little financial resources, it would participate in the running costs of the clinic, contributing five per cent of the running costs for the first year of the project, to be increased to ten per cent after one year if the community was successful in supporting the clinic, and could increase further in subsequent years. In an important gesture symbolizing government cooperation with the plan, the director general pinned a one-dollar bill to a picture of a collection box drawn on the blackboard at the front of the room, to represent the Directorate of Health’s commitment to cover five per cent of the budget. Other people then came forward to pin various sums of money to the picture of the Community Health Fund as a sign of their commitment to the agreement. Altogether six contributions were made representing the central government, local government, UNICEF, the Red Crescent and the community. Key components of the community health plan were worked out among the stakeholders and presented at a final meeting with the community the following day. Over the past 18 months the community has contributed 15 per cent of the total cost of running the clinic, and contributions are pooled in a community health fund which is used to undertake perceptible improvements in the health service, based on community priorities. Following the introduction of community management systems and tools and the provision of appropriate and relevant training, the Qarhis community health committee has assumed shared responsibility for the monitoring and upkeep of the clinic, and the range and quality of most

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services has improved significantly. The Red Crescent is currently reviewing its capacities and functions in the provision of services in the light of the expanding role of the community and the need for increased facilitation, local capacity building, communication and co-ordination. Conclusion The challenge for agencies involved in post-conflict health service provision is to develop the institutional ability to empower communities by helping them build workable partnerships with health authorities and partner agencies, and developing their capacities to create and implement solutions to improve and sustain their own services. Empowering local people – including service users, health workers and community elders – to participate actively in the planning, implementation and monitoring of services in their own communities has the potential to improve the sustainability of health services, through an active mobilization of community members to resolve a problem that they know more about, understand better, are no longer intimidated by, and feel mandated to confront. Community members have a better understanding of the local context and coping and participation mechanisms, and can gain access to and influence people and social groups to identify and implement solutions. Participatory approaches to the design and implementation of services require significantly more organization, and assume the availability of a local partner to assist with preparation and planning. They may be limited by community members’ reluctance to participate, and by lack of prior knowledge of their abilities. They also require a shift in agencies’ functions from delivering services, to facilitating and supporting communities’ increased role in their delivery. They take longer and require facilitation and training expertise. They may revive or provoke conflict between clinic staff and community members or representatives over control or responsibility for the management of health activities including the community health facility, and inevitably people’s expectations have to be raised in order for them to become engaged. But they empower local people by demystifying the issues around community health behavior and build confidence to confront health needs and associated problems. By sharing knowledge: about health needs, problems and treatments, living conditions, available resources, and a host of other individual, household and community characteristics – between community members, clinic staff, district health officials, local authorities, agencies’ staff, they build consensus on priority problems and generate ideas for solutions to tackle them. This helps to change the mentality built up through years of relief health that services are planned and delivered by an external party – usually an aid agency, with little or no involvement or responsibility on the part of ordinary community members. Community members and clinic staff engaged in the process also develop their capacities, individually and collectively, to communicate, plan, design, enquire, report, and manage, extending their abilities to deal with other problems they encounter in their daily lives.

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13 REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS: WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO KOSOVO Sultan Barakat and Alpaslan Özerdem

Lack of security is one of the main challenges of post-war recovery. A stable and secure environment is imperative for the successful implementation of peacebuilding programmes and, due to the symbiotic relationship between these two processes, a secure environment cannot be achieved without the successful implementation of various peacebuilding programmes (Özerdem, 2002). In other words, it is essential that security is considered an integral part of the overall recovery process, as Smith (2000) proposes in his ‘four sided box’ concept of postwar recovery, which consists of: economic reconstruction, a political framework that provides for democracy, reconciliation and security. In this conceptualisation, each side is as important as the others, and failure in one area jeopardises the realisation of others. Overall, the task of peacebuilding is a long-term process wide in scope, to which a number of security related programmes such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, the restoration of internal security and the rule of law, and humanitarian mine action each can contribute positively. Starting in July 1999, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), at the request of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR), has undertaken the implementation of the Information Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS), which aimed to provide support mechanisms for demobilised Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants in their return to post-conflict society.1 The overall objective included the following activities: facilitation of access to timely, accurate and unbiased information on reintegration opportunities; assisting in the establishment of small business enterprises; training and referral to employment opportunities. The ICRS was composed of the Reintegration Fund (RF) and Service Referral (SR) arms, while the training of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was the other major aspect of the reintegration strategy. The two principal components of the Fund were

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‘Employment through Vocational Training and On-the-Job Training’ and ‘Employment through Livelihood and Enterprise Development’. In the latter part of 2000, ICRS also started to include the ‘Psycho-social Therapy’ category. The total funding for the ICRS programme was more than US$14 million, and the direct assistance to former combatants ceased in August 2002, three years on and on budget. In order to explore the reintegration experience in Kosovo, this chapter will first focus on the relationship between reintegration and peacebuilding. Secondly, it will present the demographic and employment data on the caseload of former combatants in Kosovo. Thirdly, the chapter will explore the Kosovo reintegration experience from a human resource development perspective. Finally, the chapter will elaborate on the regional implication of this process. Reintegration of Former Combatants and Peacebuilding Having identified the three primary areas for the reintegration of former combatants as social, political and economic, Kingma (2000) defines social reintegration as the process through which former combatants and their families feel part of, and are accepted by, the community. Political reintegration meanwhile, refers to the process through which former combatants and their families become a full part of decision-making processes. Finally, economic reintegration describes the process whereby former combatants and their families build up their livelihoods through production and other types of gainful employment. According to this conceptualisation, the reintegration of former combatants would have certain implications for almost all aspects of the peacebuilding process. Increased security and stability through the reintegration of former combatants leads to progress in human development, which is a prerequisite for sustainable peacebuilding (Kingma, 2002).2 It is argued that following a ‘comprehensive political settlement’ DDR programmes are often implemented in the context of unfinished civil wars (Berdal, 1996:21). Therefore the possible implications of any DDR programme would have decisive impacts on the overall political context. It is stated that “...poorly planned, ill co-ordinated and inadequately funded programmes can exacerbate the political tensions that inevitably characterise any post-conflict situation”. Berdal (1996:73) explains this inter-relationship further: There is, in other words, an interplay, a subtle interaction, between the dynamics of a peace process and the manner in which the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration provisions associated with that process are organised, funded and implemented. Supporting this view, Colletta et al. (1996:18) highlight the relationship between the reintegration of former combatants and the sustainability of the peace process: Long-term reintegration ultimately is the yardstick by which the success of a DDR programme is measured. Successful long-term reintegration can

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make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and to the restoration of social capital. Conversely, failure to achieve reintegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun. Based on their experience in the Horn of Africa, Kingma and Grebrewold (1998:12) identify a number of situations in which the reintegration of displaced populations and former combatants may have an impact on the recurrence or development of conflicts. Some of these are the absence of a functioning state and legal system, lack of economic opportunities and competition for natural resources, political marginalisation and the absence of appropriate conflict management systems and availability of light weapons. Collier’s (1994) micro- and macroinsecurity framework for possible threats presented by combatants asserts that if demobilised combatants are not placed into employment or provided with the opportunities of skills training, the lack of an income source increases their propensity to commit crimes. Kingma (1999) cites the examples of Mozambique and South Africa where some demobilised combatants turned to banditry. Similarly, in countries such as El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique and Nicaragua significant numbers of former combatants turned to banditry following demobilisation (Weiss-Fagen, 1995). This is a particular issue when DDR processes fail, e.g. the reports of increased levels of crime in Angola in the late 1990s linked to the failure of the DDR programme, to either remove weapons from society or reintegrate former combatants in a manner whereby they could establish income activities (UNIDIR, 1999). In conjunction with the macro-insecurity framework, if the grievances and frustrations of demobilised combatants are not addressed through a reintegration strategy, former combatants can easily be remobilised, as happened in 1998 following the border clashes between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The possible implications of a demobilisation process would also be felt in the maintenance of regional stability and security. Poorly conceived and executed DDR programmes can themselves become a factor in the creation of future conflicts. The incomplete disarmament in Mozambique contributed to the proliferation of weapons throughout the country, and in neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Malawi. By 1998, Mozambique constituted the single largest source of small arms to the South African domestic market (UNIDIR, 1999). In reintegration programmes, which can vary from the provision of access to land and information counselling services to vocational training and the provision of access to credit, one of the main dilemmas faced is whether to target former combatants as a specific beneficiary group or to address their needs as part of a wider community. Last (1999) identifies a number of justifications for targeting combatants with specific programmes to help reintegration: ! If former combatants cannot see a role for themselves in the post-war order, individuals and small groups may turn to banditry or their leaders may defect in large numbers;

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! Targeted programmes can effectively discourage ‘self-mobilisation’ with weapons because combatants have to give up benefits to leave; ! Former combatants may be seen as a vulnerable group because they are ill equipped to deal with post-war economy and society; ! Former combatants should not be perceived as having returned to their communities empty-handed; ! Targeted programmes may also be seen as political payback for leaders who have risked a great deal to bring their constituents into the peace process; ! Those former combatants who are not reintegrated can pose a risk to security and stability; ! Targeted programmes should be seen more as an investment in the productive potential of former combatants rather than a bribe to keep them out of trouble. As noted earlier, former combatants tend to have limited information about their society and the opportunities available to them when they arrive back home. Consequently, information, counselling and referral services should be established in order to provide the vital link between former combatants and the services planned for them. For the reintegration of former combatants in rural areas, access to land is probably the most important consideration. The legal status of other returnees, such as refugees and internally displaced persons as well as former combatants, and their land rights may lead to a resurgence of community tension. In Nicaragua the core reintegration support for former combatants was land, although the distribution of promised land was often delayed or never took place. In addition to this obstacle, the resettlement of former combatants in rural settings in Nicaragua was also problematic due to landmines, over 100,000 of which were planted during the civil war (Spencer, 1997). The land issue was also contentious in El Salvador where US$250 million was needed for the purchase of land, agricultural credit, housing and credit for small enterprises. The process faced long delays, thereby undermining the successful implementation of the peace process (Berdal, 1996). Apart from land issues, the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as water supplies, sanitation, electricity, and health and education services also plays a significant role in the successful reintegration of former combatants (Somerwill, 1998). According to Kingma (2000), there is an emerging pattern, evident in a number of cross-cultural experiences, of more successful reintegration in rural than in urban areas. This is explained by the likelihood of having stronger supporting societal networks in rural than urban areas. For example, in the rural areas of Ethiopia, a key factor for successful social reintegration was the acceptance and support by the community as well as their extended families (Ayalew and Dercon, 2000). Activities in urban areas also need to be more diverse and of longer duration. For the Ethiopian reintegration experience it was explained that “...the urban target group was more complex and difficult than that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and economic backgrounds of the ex-combatants, the tightness of the urban labour market and different measures required to assist this

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group” (Colletta et al. 1996:58). Bearing in mind the complexity of urban labour markets and the likelihood of high unemployment rates, the utilisation of large public works programmes in the short term is recommended. In Ethiopia the majority of former combatants were referred to short-term public works programmes such as agricultural and construction activities for the Ministry of Agriculture. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) emphasizes the relevance of Employment Intensive Works Programmes (EIWP): In the post-conflict period, however, the restoration and reconstruction of the infrastructure can provide a much needed boost to the small and micro enterprise sector through the injection of extra income which generates the demand for a wide range of products and services and stimulates local trade. (ILO, 1997:14) In addition to EIWPs, the ILO recommends skills training and enterprise development as key employment-creating components in reintegration programmes, noting: “A healthy civilian identity can be encouraged through vocational training and constructive work that contributes to individual and community well-being”. This is particularly important as, unfortunately, the demobilisation and reintegration process also means that former combatants reenter an economy that is unstable and dependent on international assistance. Subsequently it is likely that former combatants would join in the ‘army of unemployed’. In the Bosniac-majority areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, “...about one third of the registered unemployed were demobilized soldiers” (WB-Bosnia, 1997). In such circumstances, as Berdal (1996:46) points out, failure to satisfy the high expectations of former combatants can quickly degenerate into social and political unrest. Small enterprise development schemes, which can be utilised to deal with the challenge of high unemployment, are often affected by a number of macroeconomic factors such as structural adjustment and economic reform, economic stagnation, a narrow industrial base, high inflation and high military expenditure. In order to overcome these factors, micro enterprise development programmes for former combatants should be supported as well as other programmes and facilities such as information on business opportunities, training, credit schemes and business development advice services (ILO, 1997). The following are a number of lessons learned from the reintegration of former combatants in various DDR experiences in Africa and Central America, presented by Berdal (1996): ! The assistance provided was often a combination of cash payments and other forms of reintegration support such as vocational training, credit for small enterprises, allocating land, etc. Although there have been great variations in cash allowances or lump-sum payments (US$50–3000) from country to country, the experience shows that there was “...no clear correlation between the size of the sum issued and the subsequent employment rate”. It is noted that cash allowances should be “...more closely tied to complementary

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AFTER THE CONFLICT educational programmes, investment in income-generating projects, training and developing small businesses” (ibid:47).

! The process should appreciate the needs of different categories of personnel and war-affected groups. This is particularly important in circumstances that involve large numbers of senior officers who are likely to have higher expectations than soldiers. The requirements of vulnerable groups such as disabled veterans, female former combatants and child soldiers would require special treatment (ibid). For example, women, both as fighters and war-affected civilians, acquire new roles during the war. However, they are often expected to return to their traditional roles after the war. Kingma (2002) makes linkages with this attitude and the high divorce rate in Eritrea where about one third of Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) were women. Tegegn (1992) argues that special efforts should be made to enable female former combatants to participate fully and equally in social, economic and political life. The analysis of socio-economic and demographic data on former combatants in GuineaBissau and Eritrea has shown that female former combatants were more vulnerable than male former combatants (de Watteville, 2002). Secondly, the trauma of war can have profound psychological impacts on the population, particularly on children, both as soldiers and civilians, affecting their social and emotional development. The World Bank (2002) argues that the reintegration of child-soldiers should place particular emphasis on three components: family reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity. In Sierra Leone, where the whole DDR process was seriously disrupted by the outbreak of renewed fighting in April 2000, involving many child soldiers whose distinctive needs had been neglected. ! Those vocational training programmes which were administered by former combatants themselves, have shown “...the greatest promise of success, both in terms of cost effectiveness and by reducing the potential for political tensions”. The reason for the relative success of such programmes is explained as follows: “...they are more sensitive to local needs and, ...appear not only to offer more flexibility, but also to be better geared towards integrating excombatants and their dependants into society” (Berdal, 1996:49). Apart from the individual requirements and specifications of each phase of a DDR programme, there are also a number of over-riding issues such as the establishment of an organisational framework, the acquisition of financing, coherence of activities in the post-war recovery context and the long-term sustainability of the process. For DDR programmes to be effective and efficient, the process requires a legitimate and competent coordinating body. According to Kingma (1997), a clear and credible central authority and implementing agency is needed. The most common institutional framework for DDR has been multi-functional UN missions and national arrangements. The ICRC and regional organisations have also provided a framework for DDR missions in some cases. Coherence of planning

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and implementation of post-war recovery programmes and their linkages with specific DDR activities is another crucial concern. In a typical post-war environment, in which a number of multilateral, bilateral funding agencies, international and local non governmental organisations, and national and local authorities work with different agendas, ensuring the coherence of activities becomes an imperative for long-term sustainability. It is also important for long-term sustainability, to ensure DDR programmes are not considered as short-term interventions. In fact DDR processes need to be seen in the context of development. In other words, a DDR programme means investment in the capacity building of human resources and revitalisation of livelihoods (Somerwill, 1998). Hence, the time-line for such programmes should be envisaged as much longer than a couple of years. Accordingly, the costing of the process and the acquisition of the necessary finances should bear in mind such prerequisites. For example, in Nicaragua the government’s ambitious reintegration plan would be “...nearly impossible to comply with, due to limited funds, coordination and infrastructure”. It was stated that “...the limited reintegration support from the international community, including the slow response of donors and lack of coordination, severely hindered the ability of the government to handle the crisis and the ex-combatants to reintegrate”(Spencer, 1997:22). In short, the efficient implementation of the DDR programme can serve to reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities. DDR programmes are often the most visible element of the peace agreements since they represent to the civilian population, the commitment of the belligerent parties to the peace process. An efficient, well-planned and flexible DDR programme can promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally. Reinforcing confidence in the peace settlement can be one of the most valuable bi-products of the DDR programme. Demographic and Employment Data on Former KLA Combatants The data on demographic and employment characteristics was compiled by the ICRS during the registration of 25,723 former combatants in the 49 officially designated KLA Assembly Areas and later in the seven IOM Sub-Offices. On the basis of the demographic and socio-economic data, it is possible to establish an overall profile of a ‘typical’ former combatant in Kosovo as follows: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

male (only 3.33 per cent of registered combatants were female); Albanian in ethnicity; 20–40 years old; 50 per cent chance of being married, and if s/he is single then 70 per cent chance of being younger than 25 years old; 80 per cent chance of having children; 50 per cent chance of having six to 15 dependants; 75 per cent chance of living in their own or family homes; 60 per cent chance of having a heavily damaged or destroyed house; relatively well educated with only 25 per cent chance of not having a high school education;

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However, only when these characteristics have been considered within the socioeconomic realities of Kosovo, will the real picture of possible challenges for reintegration start to emerge. Kosovo is a low-income province with a number of economic and industrial production disproportions and ineffective financial mechanisms inherited from the pre-war era, in addition to high levels of unemployment. The socio-economic development of the majority of the population was negated by the discriminatory laws and regulations which were imposed by the Serbian regime for a decade (RIINVEST, 1998, 2001). The physical infrastructure is damaged or severely neglected; 120,000 houses were destroyed. The province has substantial environmental problems such as landmines and UXOs, misused land and polluted water resources. More than half of the population were either internally displaced or became refugees during the war. The ethnic tensions between Albanian Kosovars and the minority groups, particularly Serbs, are still very tense. It is a province where most governmental functions are carried out by an interim UN administration, as the state system in the province has completely collapsed. There are problems with law and order as the judiciary, police and corrections services are being structured from scratch. Black market and regional mafia networks are widespread and strong. The ethnic problems between Albanian and Slav Macedonians in neighbouring Macedonia resulted in the outbreak of an armed conflict. More importantly, the UN resolution that gave the mandate of governance to the current UN administration is vague concerning the political future of the province. Serbia and Montenegro, which according to Resolution 1244 includes Kosovo, is likely to experience further structural problems in its state system. The Reintegration Strategy Implemented by IOM The total ICRS/RF expenditure per project from July 1999 to March 2001 averaged out at US$8,813 per project, or in other words, US$1,130 per direct beneficiary. The average RF project per capita cost and beneficiary per capita cost have shown a decreasing trend from the beginning of the RF project throughout its implementation. The primary reason behind this problem was the size of the former combatant caseload, which turned out to be much bigger than originally expected. During the first six to nine months of the ICRS/RF programme, the main method of providing assistance to former combatants was through the ‘Livelihood and Enterprise’ category, which was dominated by single-beneficiary agriculture projects (ICRS, 2000, 2000a). The challenge of the domination of single-beneficiary agricultural projects was also coupled with the variations of implementation pace, resulting in a slower increase in the number of assisted former combatants than the ICRS desired.

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Another important challenge was the approximately seven to eight weeks timeframe required for grant approval. Consequently it was deemed imperative to find ways of increasing the number of beneficiaries with fewer projects per capita cost. Employment through vocational and on-the-job training was considered by the ICRS as a mechanism to accelerate the response pace and to address these challenges. Starting in the third quarter, employment through training has formed the principal component of the ICRS strategy. Hence, despite their late initiation, their share in terms of numbers of assisted former combatants in the overall programme at the end of March 2001 was as high as 58 per cent (ICRS, 2001). In contrast to the training needs indicated by former combatants, most of the 32 vocational training centres in Kosovo were destroyed and looted during the war. Therefore, in order to initiate vocational courses, the ICRS programme had first to renovate 11 VTCs and then equip them. At these 11 locations, 18 course subjects were offered which represented a capacity of 79 classes across Kosovo. The length of time for all training courses was set as three months. Following attendance at a vocational training course, during which former combatants were provided with working overalls and stipends of DM150 (US$85) per month, the next step was to participate in a ‘Business Planning’ or ‘Career Development’ workshop depending on whether the former combatant sought self or private/public company employment. Taking a one-week ‘Business Planning’ Workshop was a prerequisite entitlement for an ICRS/RF grants application for the establishment of selfemployment initiatives. A two-day ‘Career Development’ Workshop aimed to improve former combatants’ referral chances by providing them with interview and presentation skills and CV preparation methods. The participants of these courses were also provided with stipends (ICRS, 2000b). The On-the-Job Training (OJT) route lasted between three to six months during which former combatants were given training in already established enterprises. The role of ICRS in this process can be summarized as the identification and registration of service providers and preparation of a tailor-made OJT with the potential employers, which would suit the needs of the company and also took into account the need to develop the skills and capacities of the former combatants. During the OJT period, former combatants were paid stipends, as well as some assistance offered to the employing entity. In the case of securing full-time employment with an enterprise that acted as a service provider, each former combatant was also provided by the ICRS with an individual comprehensive tool kit to be owned entirely by the former combatant and intended to be used in the place of employment (ICRS, 2001). In addition to technical vocational training courses and the OJT option for former combatants securing employment, the ICRS programme also initiated pilot projects in Agricultural Vocational Training (AVT). Three municipalities were selected for the AVT pilot projects, which included the basic rehabilitation and reequipping of the agricultural departments, the installation and/or rehabilitation of bore wells, as well as the reconstruction of greenhouses and the re-establishment of seed banks. The training format of AVT was similar to the one for technical vocational training courses. It was set as a three-month full-time course during

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which the participating former combatants were paid a stipend of DM150 per month. The courses for 450 vacancies (150 at each location) per term focused on various aspects of improved agricultural production and management (ICRS, 2001). The KPC Training (KPCT) was designed to train the 5,052 selected members of the KPC, 3,052 of whom are active full-time members, and 2000 are reservists. 500 of the positions, 298 active and 202 reservist positions respectively, are allocated for civilians and minorities. The KPC’s organisational structure has a centralized command, in which decisions are made at headquarters level and implementation instructions are passed down to the Regional Training Group (RTG) Commanders for execution. In parallel to the structure and responsibilities envisaged for the KPC by the international community, the KPCT aimed for the transformation of former KLA combatants into a civilian, uniformed, multi-ethnic corps through a training programme with the following objectives: first, to assist in rebuilding the infrastructure and community of Kosovo; second, to respond to any human or natural disaster affecting the population and territory of Kosovo; third, to conduct search and rescue operations; fourth, to provide assistance to UNMIK and KFOR when required (IOM, 2002). The training programme focused on short courses on priority topics such as basic firefighting, medical first aid, search and rescue, and emergency operations, in addition to other courses such as human rights and language classes. On-the-job coaching and the implementation of humanitarian projects were also part of the training programme. In addition to providing skills sustainment training for over 80 per cent of the KPC, a primary aim of the training was to prepare the KPC management for their public service duties through broad international contact. Subsequently, the courses focussing on pertinent civil protection and managerial and language skills not only took place in Kosovo, but also in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary and the United States (KPCT, 2000, 2001). Identification and Taxonomy of Skills Taking a broad view of the skills and human competencies in the process of assessing former combatants’ skills is imperative for the effective and targeted planning of reintegration. During the registration process in Kosovo between 23rd July and 30th November 1999, former KLA combatants were asked to complete a questionnaire which included general questions on their personal and employment characteristics. However, further skill assessments aimed at providing a better baseline for various micro-enterprise and training programmes implemented within ICRS and KPCT initiatives, have not been carried out. After the registration survey in Kosovo each individual initiative, such as vocational training courses, Reintegration Fund projects and the training of KPC members, should have made greater use of skills assessment. The decision-making process for designing such reintegration projects did not have the opportunity to utilise any information on former combatants’ capabilities at the cognitive, affective and psychomotor levels (Nubler, 1997). The questionnaire survey’s results provided some cognitive information as it enquired on former combatants’ formal

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knowledge and skills but idiosyncratic experience could not have been assessed by this methodology. On the other hand, the way that micro-enterprise development projects were planned, in close collaboration between IOM field staff and former combatants, meant that such idiosyncratic experiences may have been assessed by allowing for the design of tailor-made projects. More importantly, the assessment of such capabilities should have been an integral part of vocational and KPC training courses. As well as the testing of learned formal knowledge, these training courses should have had mechanisms for assessing idiosyncratic knowledge and improved capabilities at the affective and psychomotor levels. Considering human resource formation comprises emotions, attitudes, values and norms at the affective level, these training courses could have deliberately targeted improvement of the former combatants’ punctuality, respect for authority, self-reliance, attitude towards work and the ability to make decisions (Nubler, 1997). There is no doubt that some of the former combatants may have acquired such skills as part of their training courses. The lack of practice and handson experience opportunities at the training courses was a major obstacle for the development of manual skills as part of the psychomotor area. The reintegration strategy has not provided a clear taxonomy of skills according to different labour markets and occupations. It was important that the skills and competencies of former KLA combatants were classified as vocational, managerial and entrepreneurial. First of all, this would have avoided the ad hoc organisation of vocational training courses. For example, there was no particular logical argument for organising all vocational courses for three months. For those former combatants who had already acquired skills in the subject area of their courses, a three-month training may have been adequate, but that was not the case for those at beginners’ level. More importantly, the logic for organising all types of vocational training courses, from plumbing and electrical installations to computing, to be of the same duration is particularly questionable. The importance of treating all former combatants equally has been cited as a rationale here, given that the practice of paying stipends has been a feature of these vocational training courses. However, it is also probable that such reasoning may have resulted in a big sacrifice in the overall quality of learning. Accusations of unequal treatment could have been avoided through the development of appropriate response mechanisms. The programmes implemented by IOM have indeed provided appropriate fora for the effective allocation of various competencies. For example, the microenterprise development aspect was an ideal mechanism for the utilisation of entrepreneurial and management skills. The establishment of vocational training courses accross a wide spectrum of subjects has also provided opportunities for former combatants to develop new or existing vocational competencies. It is therefore praiseworthy that the IOM’s strategy has managed to adopt a great level of flexibility in responding to the changing and varying needs of former combatants. Apart from catering to different types of competencies and skills with its different ICRS programmes, it was clear that the IOM has managed to renew its approach, according to the information accumulated, with the development of the reintegration strategy. This ethos of flexibility in the IOM’s strategy has in turn

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produced the requisite degree of agility to tailor programmes to the needs of former combatants; a strategy that attempted to regenerate itself on the basis of an increasing understanding of the context throughout the implementation. On the other hand, the lack of an overall assessment of the economic context, particularly of any analysis of the labour market in Kosovo, has resulted in negative implications for the planning, implementation and evaluation of employment programmes for former combatants. It was also clear that the reintegration strategy in Kosovo could have benefited greatly from information on existing markets, potential future markets, the needs of people to be reintegrated and employed and the possibilities for education, vocational and business training. Application of Skills and Utilisation of Human Resources The reintegration strategy implemented by IOM clearly has experienced major difficulties in meeting the needs of a larger caseload than initially expected within the limits of its programme budget. The figures on Reintegration Fund projects, the average project per capita cost and beneficiary per capita cost, have shown that the strategy had a decreasing trend in its spending throughout its implementation. For example, while the total RF expenditure per project in the first quarter (July to October 1999) averaged US$13,227 per project, it was only $8,813 in the seventh quarter (January to March 2001) (ICRS, 2000, 2001). In addition to such financial challenges, the reintegration strategy seems to have experienced some coordination problems. The involvement of different agencies in the same task naturally brings different agendas, mandates and modes of operation. Although the reintegration strategy was designed and implemented by the IOM at the request of UNMIK and KFOR, some coordination problems still occurred despite the carefully designated working relationships framework. For example, the six monthly staff changes at KFOR caused some difficulties in programme continuity. In KFOR’s view a careful hand-over process helps mitigate the possible negative impact of staff turnover. However, according to UNMIK and IOM, working with a new officer every six months necessitates re-establishing their working relationships from scratch each time. Considering the decisive role that human relationships play in whether programmes are successful or not, the likelihood is that KFOR staff changes will have only exacerbated such problems. It is also crucial to consider the underlying reasons for the structure of the reintegration strategy. Closer inspection of the way some training programmes were planned and implemented would suggest that the over-arching aim of keeping former combatants busy was a determining factor in programme design. It is clear that various ICRS projects and the KPCT were under pressure to keep former combatants busy in order to reduce the possibility of them becoming a security risk in Kosovo or becoming involved in regional conflicts such as the one in Macedonia. Therefore it seems plausible to assume that the IOM as the main implementing agency was probably under pressure to ensure former combatants were provided with various training and enterprise development programmes. This may have been one of the reasons why some training courses, such as firefighting, were persistently made part of the overall KPC training structure, even though it was clear there

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would not be a major need for large numbers of firefighters in the corps. It was perhaps this similar perception that also formed the underlying reasoning for various VTCs. In other words, the economic recovery of Kosovo probably was not the only, or even the principal motivation for training so many former combatants in different sectors of the reintegration strategy. Rather, the aim of keeping former combatants busy was as important as economic considerations. For the importance of maintaining local and regional stability, this may have been considered as a welljustified objective. However, when it starts to overcome the objectives related to economic recovery, then the reintegration strategy also starts to lose its principal vision. The objective of keeping former combatants busy should be appreciated, but the apparent indifference to the way in which this is done should certainly be reconsidered. It should be noted that if security concerns start to overcome the reintegration strategy’s economic objectives, then it is likely to result in ad hoc initiatives with unsustainable consequences. After all, the dissatisfaction that may result from the economic outcomes of a reintegration programme can also turn into security risks. Policies for Effective Utilisation of Human Resources after Demobilisation The effective utilisation of human resources requires supportive policies and complementary measures for both the supply and demand side of the labour market and the provision of employment and livelihood development programmes as part of the reintegration strategy should be an integral part of the overall reconstruction process. However, the strategy in Kosovo did not utilise any type of labour market assessment, therefore it is difficult to claim that any targeted planning was carried out towards this aim. On the other hand, the economic reintegration of former combatants can be analysed in terms of their involvement in the reconstruction process. It is clear that those former combatants who have been assisted through enterprise development projects have been given a valuable opportunity to develop a sustainable livelihood, although one still dependant on a number of overall economic market factors. For many former combatants, most of whom were breadwinners not only for their immediate family, but also for their extended families, these enterprise projects were a lifetime opportunity. These projects have meant employment for other former combatants and civilians too and their positive implications on the regeneration of the economy can easily be estimated. The provision of employment in certain sectors would also have a trickle-down effect in other related areas. Thus RF projects have proved to be an appropriate way of responding to the needs of the economic environment in Kosovo and it can be claimed that small enterprises, created or supported through the ICRS’s RF programme, will certainly play a significant role in the rehabilitation of the economy in Kosovo. Meanwhile, technical VTCs provided as part of the ICRS programme, can also be considered an important step in creating a pool of trained people who are now much more likely to secure employment or establish their enterprise than before.

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On the other hand, no matter how carefully these VTCs have been planned and implemented, unless there is a fast rate of employment creation in Kosovo, most of these trained people are unlikely to find gainful employment. It is true that after these vocational courses the former combatants have a better chance to develop their own enterprises, but in certain sectors they will find themselves facing tough competition and also in need of further financial assistance for starting their businesses. The ICRS’s on-the-job training seems to be a more targeted approach for the needs of the labour market in Kosovo. The existing medium-size manufacturers in Kosovo should be encouraged, as they will form the main source of employment in the medium term. As part of the on-the-job training initiative the service providers had to be supported, and this should be considered an innovative and targeted approach. It not only responds to the demand side of the labour market but also the supply side. As regards involvement in the reconstruction of Kosovo, most of the respondents from KPC did not feel they were actively involved in the reconstruction process. Although there were various environmental cleaning, shelter and school rehabilitation, and infrastructure reconstruction projects, the real capacities of KPC do not appear to have been utilised effectively. It was pointed out that they would need training, machinery, equipment and financial resources for further involvement in the reconstruction process. More importantly, it seems the way that the international community perceives KPC is in drastic need of change. Most of the respondents felt that the international community did not take them seriously. This may be a matter of misconception of reality, but it requires immediate attention. If this is not the case, then the international community should find a better way of communicating its approach towards KPC. At the same time, the KPC should question the causes of the current tense relationships. The international community needs to appreciate that the KPC depends on them for the strengthening of their organisation, continuation of their employment and realisation of their long-term aspirations for their corps and for Kosovo. This dependence inevitably creates an environment in which KPC tries to find a balance between its ‘pride’ and its needs. It seems that a more positive approach towards KPC, which placed emphasis on its human resources and on utilising them in the reconstruction process as widely as possible, would certainly result in more positive relationships. The KPC Trust Fund initiative should be considered as a very positive step towards this aim. Implications of the Reintegration Process at Regional Level It is clear that the former combatants’ aspirations for the future of Kosovo include full independence. Not surprisingly perhaps, the KPC is inevitably considered as the future army of Kosovo. However, in order to make some projections about the future impact of the reintegration process on the post-war recovery of the province and the Balkans in general, it is important to have a clear understanding of whether an independent Kosovo realistically can be envisaged. This controversial subject often demands speculative projections, but it is outside the scope of this chapter to engage in such debates. However, it is accepted that sooner or later the issue of

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independence will need to be dealt with by the international community. Resolution 1244 may have managed to postpone this question for the time being, but the interviews with former combatants indicate that it features prominently in their desires and future aspirations. Consequently, the international community should at least accept responsibility for guiding the process and establishing an overall strategy, since an unwillingness to solve it will not result in the Kosovars forgetting it, however much they might wish it would. It is observed that the reintegration strategy has been a strong incentive for the majority of former KLA combatants, preventing large numbers of them from posing a security risk. Although the KPC is far from being a satisfactory structure for former combatants, it seems that they have accepted its principal characteristic of being a civilian protection corps for the time being. Nevertheless, the possibility of becoming an army in the near future seems to be the key motivating factor for many KPC members. In contrast to other former combatants, it should be accepted that KPC members were selected not only because they passed the KPC Recruitment Battery Test, but because of their relatively long-term loyalty to the KLA. For example, in terms of their length of time with the KLA, only 11 out of 41 respondents who were assisted by the ICRS programme had an involvement of over 12 months, while out of 34 KPC members interviewed, 29 of them said that they had spent more than 12 months with KLA. Considering that in addition to 4,500 KPC members, around 2,000 former combatants were employed by the KPS, it would not be too unrealistic to claim that these referrals had perhaps aimed to provide gainful employment for those former combatants who had formed the ‘hard core’ of the KLA. Therefore it was crucial for the international community that this ‘hard core’ be occupied and thus prevented from becoming a security risk in Kosovo. It was also essential that they would not desert their forces in order to join the fighting in southern Serbia or northern Macedonia. Some KPC members did leave the corps in order to support the armed conflicts of Albanians in neighbouring countries; however it seems that their numbers were limited. The interviews with former combatants have shown that the conflict in Macedonia was not considered as a ‘motherland’ duty for the majority of them. They certainly sympathised with the Albanians in Macedonia over the causes of their fighting, but this did not seem to be a strong enough reason to trigger large-scale desertions from the KPC. On the other hand, no matter how comprehensive and responsive the reintegration strategy had been in Kosovo, it would not have been able to prevent all former KLA combatants from joining in these regional conflicts. There may be various reasons for this. Some may feel that their loyalty or obligation to other Albanians in the region is stronger than any economic incentives that could be provided for them. Some may consider fighting to be the only way of resolving differences, whilst for some fighting may be the activity they feel best qualified to engage in. It is completely unrealistic to hypothesize that if the reintegration strategy in Kosovo had been successful, then none of the former KLA combatants should or would have joined in the regional armed conflicts. Considering that the registration process of former KLA combatants is itself open to speculation, then it is difficult

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to determine whether those who joined in the regional conflicts are really former KLA combatants or not. The aim here is not to justify or deny the involvement of some former KLA combatants in the regional conflicts, but the authors strongly believe that the success of the reintegration strategy in Kosovo should not be judged according to the above-mentioned hypothesis. The recent peace agreements in southern Serbia and Macedonia are likely to have positive impacts on the relationship between KPC and the international community. During the fighting in Macedonia there was certainly heavy pressure on both sides, as there were many reports claiming the involvement of former KLA combatants in the armed conflict in Macedonia. It was crucial for the international community to keep the internal dynamics in Kosovo correctly balanced, so there would not be a shift among former KLA combatants towards support for the armed conflict in Macedonia. After the recent demilitarisation of Albanian fighters in Macedonia, the region has once again entered a period of stability. Assuming that there will be no further ethnic conflicts involving people of Albanian ethnic origin in other regional countries in the near future, it is possible to claim that the peacebuilding process in Kosovo will enjoy a period of relative stability and security. Meanwhile, after the general elections in November 2002, Kosovo entered a new phase in institutional building. This new period is bound to bring new opportunities as well as challenges for the establishment of peace and democracy in the province. It is during this period that the issue of independence increasingly will become more prominent in the public debate, and the role of former combatants is likely to have a decisive impact on this process. The critical question relates to Kosovan independence, and if this does not happen, what the reaction of former combatants and Albanian Kosovars in general would be? For the future of Kosovo, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000:259) presents four essential elements to be borne in mind. These are the relationship of the province to Serbia and Montenegro; the relationship of Kosovar institutions of self-government to any continuing UN administrative presence and to the KFOR security presence; the nature of Kosovo’s borders and its relationship to neighbouring states; and the definition of Kosovo as an entity within the international community. The Commission’s report presents five possible options for Kosovo’s future, one of which is full independence. It states that after the province-wide elections an eventual demand for an independence referendum by elected Kosovar officials would be legitimate, and it should be “...granted as expeditiously as is prudent”. In the context of deciding what precise form of independence, the Commission recommends ‘conditional independence’ as the best possible option for Kosovo. A conditional independence is considered as a necessity, because as it is claimed that Kosovo lacks “...the means to defend itself against external attack” and “...the ability to guarantee internal order, domestic safety and inter-ethnic-peace”. It was the concept of ‘conditional independence’ that General Agim Ceku (12 July 2001) considered as a suitable path for Kosovo, explaining that the international community could set conditions in terms of human rights, democracy and multi-ethnicity for the Kosovars. According to him these conditions would be

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seen as challenges to be overcome for Kosovo’s long-awaited independence, integration with Europe, establishing good relationships with its neighbours (including Serbia and Montenegro) and working in collaboration with the international defence forces in Kosovo. This is the vision of Kosovo given by the Commander of KPC, which was referred to by many other former KLA combatants during the interviews. In short, a vision of independence, conditional or not, is considered as the most important desire of former KLA combatants, and probably by a very large percentage of the population. As long as this vision is provided with clear conditions to be met, Kosovars would be willing to cooperate with the international community and take the necessary steps to become an independent state. However, if the international community makes an indefinite deferral of Kosovo’s political future as an independent country, then the UN administration and KFOR will find working in the province increasingly difficult. Considering the views of former combatants interviewed on the reconstruction of Kosovo, which were also echoed by General Ceku, there is a strong perception that the international community has largely failed in the reconstruction process. Although there is an overall appreciation for the presence of the international community, particularly its military presence, their efforts at reconstruction have not met the expectations of former combatants. Obviously, this view can be challenged, but it is clear that the way in which the role of KPC in the reconstruction process has been kept within very limited margins also means that they rightly consider the reconstruction of Kosovo to be the responsibility of the international community. The opinion ‘if Kosovo has made any progress in its reconstruction process it has been due to the efforts of Kosovars, not the international community’ is quite common among former combatants, but the reconstruction of Kosovo is still seen as the responsibility of the international community. This process should be adjusted to give further responsibility to KPC although there would be three prerequisites in order to expect any substantial and effective involvement from it. These are: first, the provision of training to improve the human resources of KPC in the areas of construction and programme management; second, the provision of the necessary equipment and machinery to take an active and efficient role in the reconstruction; and finally, the improvement of coordination and trust between KPC and the international community. It seems that there is a strong desire for active involvement in the reconstruction process. The pride and patriotism of former KLA combatants can easily be harnessed for building schools, roads, houses and hospitals. They should be considered as a source of powerful, creative and well-informed human resources that can work towards the recovery of the ‘motherland’, instead of giving the impression that they are considered a security risk to be occupied with various displacement activities, without much consideration as to how. Conclusions Overall, the international community’s strategy for the reintegration of former KLA combatants in Kosovo, is innovative, flexible and ambitious in character, providing gainful employment and a livelihood framework for the majority of

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assisted former combatants. However, it seems that the international community needs to address a set of important issues as part of these reintegration initiatives, in order to ensure that the process contributes towards post-war recovery in a sustainable manner: ! Targeting former combatants as a specific beneficiary group is important and necessary for both security and human resource development considerations. ! The biggest mistake to make in the design and implementation of reintegration strategies is to consider former combatants from a purely security risk perspective and so adopt the approach of keeping them ‘busy’ as an overarching aim. ! The budgeting for DDR processes, particularly for the reintegration phase, should bear in mind that leaving some former combatants unassisted, due to financial limitations, can itself pose the highest security risk to the peace process. ! To ensure effective allocation of human resources to vocational, management and entrepreneurial areas, an overall assessment of the economic context, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of the labour market, should be carried out before completing the framework of the reintegration strategy. ! Vocational training courses should not be seen as a cheaper alternative to micro-enterprise development programmes. Vocational training is only effective in its true meaning if there are adequate employment opportunities in the local labour market for the graduates of such courses. ! Training programmes should consider the importance of improving effective and manual skills as part of their implementation programme for the provision of technical knowledge. From punctuality and self-reliance to the ability to make decisions such skills should be considered as important as teaching the repair of broken pipes, the installation of electricity systems or the painting of a car. ! The reintegration strategy should also contain complementary measures for the supply side of the labour market. The provision of incentives to employers through on-the-job-training schemes is a good example of such a measure to be incorporated into the supportive policies for the demand side. ! Enterprise development programmes should acknowledge that those former combatants who embark on a new occupation are likely to be much more vulnerable to market forces since, by contrast with former combatants who were involved in the same occupation before joining the armed forces, they will not have an established client base.

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! The provision of enterprise development schemes should bear in mind the possibility of over-saturation of the local market, therefore the type of projects supported should be decided according to the market thresholds for the need of that particular product or service. ! Micro-enterprise schemes are likely to have substantial knock-on impacts on the local economy through the provision of not only a regular income, but also employment opportunities to former combatants’ extended families. ! The KPC members’ pride in being a member of their organisation should be recognised as an important factor in the way the international community conducts its relationship with KPC. It is not possible to ignore the fact that only a couple of years ago they were ‘allies’ with the international community and fought together against the Serbian regime; clearly they still need time to adapt to their civilian identity. ! It should be borne in mind that although the KLA did not have a proper military structure and necessary resources, after their ‘transformation’ to the KPC they acquired a hierarchical organisational structure with a large pool of trained members of staff. In other words, KPC is much nearer to an army in character and resources than the KLA ever was before its demobilisation. ! If the international community wants to establish constructive relationships with KPC, it is crucial that KPC members start to feel like ‘partners’, and not simply ‘a source of cheap labour’. ! The further involvement of KPC members in the reconstruction process has the potential to become an excellent vehicle for building up strong relationships between them and the international community. ! In order to ensure the effective involvement of KPC in the reconstruction of Kosovo, the corps’ need for training, machinery, equipment and finance should be satisfied by the international community. ! If KPC members are not to feel totally dependant on the international community, there needs to be an effective involvement in the reconstruction process that enables them to share in the rebuilding of their ‘motherland’. ! It seems that a ‘conditional independence’ option, as designated by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, provides the most appropriate framework in which the positive contribution of former combatants in the post-war recovery process can be ensured.

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14 SEVEN PILLARS FOR POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION Sultan Barakat

On reviewing the history of post-war reconstruction it is difficult to identify successful cases of reconstruction. This is not to deny the enormous efforts in post-war reconstruction in past decades and the increasing development of best practice. The fact remains though that post-war reconstruction repeatedly makes the same mistakes. The vital constituency of local people are often written out of the equation. A technical reductionism means that reconstruction issues are often merely regarded as a rebuilding task rather than a wider issue deserving of integration with economic and societal development. The same ‘we can fix-it’ attitude also reinforces a prevailing short-termism in which only limited attention is devoted to each post-war area. However, as the introduction has described, there is a consensus on the key tenets of post-war reconstruction, that it is essentially a development challenge and as such includes both economic challenges of growth, inclusiveness, stability and sustainability, and political-development challenges related to relationships between people and between people and their local and national institutions. It is then understood that in the case of war-torn countries, each of these challenges will be magnified and compounded by the legacies of conflict and the continuing problems associated with an unstable security environment. In the light of the recurring problems in applying this knowledge successfully to post-war construction, this chapter aims to review the various factors that have been identified in the intervening chapters as influencing post-war reconstruction and which have to be simultaneously and holistically addressed in any approach to supporting that recovery. Vision Perhaps the greatest lesson from the few cases of successful post-war reconstruction1 is the importance of a clear vision for post-war recovery which encompasses all aspects of the process in a national policy framework. This in turn begs a number of questions. Whose vision are we talking about? Is it the vision of

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those seeking to intervene to help recovery or is it the vision of those struggling to recover from war? Can all the actors share the same vision? How is such a vision arrived at in a country still negotiating its post-war governance? If, as has been said, reconstruction is by definition a long-term, developmentally driven process, to be effective and sustainable, it first of all requires long-term political commitment to the process from both international and national actors. (Barakat and Chard 2002) If we look first at the international players, while they have been quick to draw up ‘road-maps’ (as for example in the cases of Aceh and Afghanistan examined in Chapters 4 and 8) they have been short on long-term commitment. Unfortunately, the experience of the last decade, and particularly the recent cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, suggests that little real thought is given to either the future regional and international role or the internal relationships and direction of development of countries emerging from conflict by the international community, concerned as it has been with the demands for western security and access to strategic resources, rather than any coherent vision for reintegrating the affected countries into the world community of nations. Instead, a disproportionate amount of aid is being absorbed by relief initiatives and repair of infrastructure for rapid delivery of services in the short term, without any strategic view of how they are to be sustained and by whom. Deely in Chapter 7 has discussed the dilemma of low-income, conflict affected countries dependent on large-scale international assistance to restore basic services, but also needing a long-term strategy for developing permanent provision. There is a clear reluctance on the part of western governments in making long-term commitments to ensuring sustainable development in war-affected countries and the UN and international development banks are failing to apply their accumulated development experience to the situation. It cannot even be assumed that initial levels of international political support and commitment will be sustained for long enough to assure the necessary internal political developments. Evidence from war-affected countries around the world and most recently from Afghanistan2, suggest that once the media spotlight moves on to the next ‘crisis’ and policies and political administrations change, funding pledges made at the height of a perceived emergency are quietly forgotten. Nevertheless, without actually contributing the level of finance initially pledged, the international community does exert considerable influence, through the conditionality of its donations, to promote one particular vision of reconstruction, that of the market economy/liberal democracy model for development. This model is not pursued, as a long-term goal (as was the case in post-war Germany discussed in Chapter 1) but as an instant solution regardless of the cultural traditions and social and economic history of particular nations. A totally free market in a chronically weak economy removes all protection from the most vulnerable before they have time to re-establish viable livelihoods, while increasing the opportunities for those who already benefited from the war to enrich themselves further. It also makes it difficult to target development resources to redress uneven development perpetuating and exacerbating differences that may have contributed to the conflict in the first place. Jones’ analysis (Chapter 6) of the

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case of Rwanda and the importance of poverty alleviation as a post-war economic strategy is important to this understanding. Wholesale privatisation, another feature of the market economy vision, in these conditions, where such a small self-seeking elite are the only economic actors, soon results in key assets of the national economy being sold out to foreign interests.3 Meanwhile, externally devised models of ‘democracy’ often mask the continuation of domination by existing power elites. (Barakat and Chard 2002: 829–830) While member states and agencies of the international community may have legitimate concerns about the administrations they are called on to support, their short-termism is only serving to undermine progress towards more stable and legitimate institutions of government and in the mean time, struggling communities, development agencies and NGOs are left with the daunting task of reconciling and reconstructing war-torn countries without a comprehensive framework of political and economic support. This is why it is essential (although by no means easy) to achieve a shared national vision of the reconstruction and development objectives and strategies as a starting point for enlisting international assistance. However, whilst it is vital that the national actors take the lead in the decision-making processes concerning their reconstruction, it cannot be assumed that the cessation of violent conflict, or even a peace agreement, means that there exists a national consensus concerning the vision for the nation’s future reconstruction and development priorities. Mac Ginty in Chapter 2 has clearly demonstrated the many strands of peacemaking that need to come together to achieve consent for civil governance. Achieving the national vision is itself a longterm development process that requires ‘a neutral space for debate to enable such a vision to emerge.’ (Barakat, 2002: 811) As Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand (2002) observed in the case of Afghanistan and the Bonn Agreement, there is a danger that the ‘quick fix’ agreement brokered by the international powers that marks the end of so many present day conflicts, may have helped to encourage the perception that such a vision does exist, and can be implemented by a coherent administrative system. The reality is rather different. Afghanistan (or Iraq) today is ‘a huge, shifting kaleidoscope of differing expectations and regional aspirations’ (Barakat, 2002:811) shaped by war and oppression. So where to begin? Actually, many actors begin to rebuild their lives even while the war is in progress, they already have a vision of the future they would like to build out of the ruins, though they may not be able to share it with many others. It is also important to remember, that even in the most violent of conflicts, apparently engulfing whole countries, at any one time the majority of the population continues with its normal peaceful activities, even if it is to the sound of distant combat and subject to restrictions of movement and availability of resources. For example, those whose houses are destroyed do not wait for the end of the war to build homes, with available local resources and in locations they judge to be relatively secure. Those driven into exile, as is well known, do not simply wait for the day when they can return, they are marked by a drive to succeed in their country of asylum by intensive efforts to earn money and acquire education and qualifications,

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especially for their children. Diefendorf (1990) notes that planners, architects and private citizens in Europe during the second world war, with no architectural training were involved in composing essays, making sketches and engaging in debate concerning what their future reconstructed cities should look like. It was noticeable that during the mid-1990s, even in the midst of a devastating civil war, city planners in the Kabul municipality were working on plans for the reconstruction of the city. In fact, there is a general consensus that the best time to plan for reconstruction is while the war is on-going, in order that the nation is well-placed for a more rapid reconstruction process, once the conflict is over. (Hewitt, 1965:9). The post-war task is to bring these visions into the open, engaging the participation of other previously excluded groups (such as former combatants, returning refugees, women) to reach an early consensus on some essential medium term goals that do not pre-empt decisions that the society is not ready to make. A more comprehensive vision of the country’s direction can then evolve hand in hand with the reconstruction process. Participation Clearly early participation of all the national stakeholders, not just those that had a say in the agreement to end the fighting, is a prerequisite for developing the national vision of recovery, starting with some basic agreements on governance. ‘One of the main tasks facing the Afghan people remains that of negotiating peace with all parties and achieving consensus as to how they wish to be governed.’ (Barakat, 2002: 808). Outsiders can facilitate this process but they cannot be part of it. They cannot, for example, ‘sit down and write a constitution for Iraq or any other wartorn society’ (RGS, 2003:8) and yet the establishment of such a framework is essential for effective reconstruction: power-sharing and negotiation between all the interested parties is essential if the cycle of violence and counter violence is to be broken. Participation is also, as development practice tells us, just as essential at the very local level of recovering family and livelihood. However, the enduring dynamic in most cases of contemporary post-war reconstruction has been of external funds and expertise taking the lead in the reconstruction effort at this as well as the national level. The tendency is to overlook the capacity of local communities to use their own resources. In recent years greater attention has been paid to the issue of participation, but this has often taken the form of the co-option of local people (often local elites) into schemes that were inspired, funded and led by external interveners. Instead what is required is ‘reverse participation’ or the involvement of external expertise, funding and personnel in locally inspired and managed reconstruction schemes. the pitfalls in trying to achieve this end have been examined in Chapter 10. If reconstruction programmes are to succeed it is of great psychological importance that the reconstruction process is used as a means to enhance exalted human values, harnessing the impressive survival capacities of the people that have brought them through war and seeing them as agents of development not simply passive recipients of aid. The people need to be involved in the development of

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social policies that address basic needs in such areas as health, education, housing and recreation (Amirahmadi, 1991). Debate has often focused on the timing of reconstruction with some commentators stressing the importance of speed (for example, to prevent the development of illegal or inappropriate settlements which cannot be removed later, or to take advantage of the short-lived donor interest in the situation). Having accepted the justification for speed, it then logically becomes expedient that implementation is in the hands of external agents who are already organised and equipped to do it. Others, with a development perspective, have emphasized that a more gradual approach allows time for greater public participation and, more importantly, the development of local skills and materials thereby reducing the dependence on external resources and assuring sustainability. In fact, each new experience in the reconstruction of post-war society reinforces the importance of local solutions to this increasingly global issue. Rather than local people being portrayed simply as victims and passive recipients of international largesse, the reality is that it is their creativity, pragmatism and resilience that are of critical importance in the process of rebuilding after conflict. Local solutions and responses to the challenges and dilemmas of reconstruction frequently are cheaper, more effective and more sustainable than externally imported solutions because they harness local knowledge and skills and use local resources. They also simultaneously carry the benefit of restoring dignity and confidence in the institutional and economic life of the society, enabling people to plan collectively for the future. Unfortunately however, both national governments and international actors often fail to build on the capacities of local people, local dynamics and local initiatives – either because of ignorance or because they don’t fit with externally conceived and designed programmes and projects. Consequently, too often local people are regarded as a liability to be neutralised rather than an asset to be utilised. It is also true that those who have wielded power through violence in the war, will be the first to come forward to stake a claim to power and influence post-war. Civilian leadership will take time to gain confidence and a voice and yet they are the ones who must ‘be centre stage in the decision-making’ about reconstruction ‘and the international community has an obligation to be seen to reward peace, not war.’ (Barakat 2002: 815) This is another reason for taking the long-view by creating the conditions in which initiatives for peaceful development can thrive. Security The first requirement if the civil population is to participate in planning development, work to restore their livelihoods and attract financial investment from the international community is a secure environment. For example the UN concluded that ‘The most fundamental need in Afghanistan today is for stability: people need confidence in their leaders and in the future’. (UN ITAP, 2002: 2). However, reconstruction activities cannot but be affected by the conflict that preceded it and a feature of the long-running, low-intensity intra-state conflicts of the post-cold war world is that even after war has officially ended, low-level conflict

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may continue for many years, posing a threat to reconstruction plans and longer term stability. This is proving to be the case in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Crucial in this regard will be the manner in which the conflict ended. In cases of ethnonational conflict, it is common for major violent conflict between organised groups to cease but for tension and occasional low-level violence to persist, including, frequently a rise in violent crime.4 This can have an immense influence on the post-war reconstruction environment and can contribute to the politicisation of the reconstruction. Reconstruction in an atmosphere of insecurity is unlikely to adopt the more holistic and integrated qualities that are required for it to become self-sustaining. This underlines the importance of analysing and understanding the conflict and its underlying causes as discussed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless it is also important not to forget the observation made above that even in a country at war, or in a state of post-war turmoil, the majority of the population for most of the time continues one way or another to pursue their normal peacetime activities and it is here that recovery and peacebuilding activities can be supported at a local level as a first step towards civil governance. One of the early priorities therefore, and an issue that must be planned for in advance of any cease fire or demobilisation, is to secure effective policing, to ensure personal safety for civilians, by a force that has the trust of the civil population and is accepted by former combatants. This may require a reconstruction of the military (as a means of reducing future risk of conflict) such as the creation of a single national army recruited from former combatants from both sides. It will certainly require the overhaul or total recreation of a civil police force. In the meantime it may be necessary to deploy an international peacekeeping force. In this case the role of the force has to be clearly understood by them and their hosts. Their presence and behaviour need to be generally acceptable to the civilian population and effective lines of communication need to be established to quickly resolve any differences that arise. We are currently witnessing in Iraq what can happen when the issue of civil security in the aftermath of war is not taken sufficiently seriously. Warnings in the pre-war phase, concerning the risks involved in simply dismantling the military and Ba’ath Party infrastructure were ignored, resulting in a deteriorating post-war security environment. (RGS 2003:8). As in many earlier conflicts, concerns about security, seem all too often to focus on protecting foreign aid personnel behind defensive barriers, rather than restoring conditions of general security that would allow them to work effectively with the indigenous population and their professionals. That kind of general security, achieved in some areas before others, cannot be achieved by policing alone. It is not a substitute for tackling the fault lines in the society, which gave rise to violent conflict and may, if not addressed, do so again. Long-term security depends on an agreed framework for the governance of the country (vision discussed above) whose legitimacy and therefore authority, is accepted by all parties. The end of armed combat does not spell an end to conflict. Conflict is inherent in every society and if peacefully managed can be a force for positive change. However, just as there is little neutral space for dialogue during violent conflict, the aftermath of conflict is likely to be a heavily politicised arena.

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In ethnonational conflict in particular, antagonists are hypersensitive to perceived slights. Many conflicts concern access to resources; these resources include political power, economic goods and opportunities, cultural legitimacy or public goods in the form of education or state employment. Post-war reconstruction is another resource and a potential site of conflict. War raises expectations concerning the post-war period, leading to disagreements over reconstruction strategies. There is reluctance on the part of governments to take difficult decisions that may undermine the dominance of the military, even when such decisions are crucial for effective reconstruction. In these circumstances, navel-gazing and soul-searching over neutrality is likely to be time wasted. Instead, those involved in post-war reconstruction must recognise the reality of the political nature of their activities and the risk that perceptions of their work may differ according to ethnic fissures. It is of critical importance to move beyond a ‘no peace-no war’ scenario, which results in the continuing diversion of scarce resources into the defence sector. The only way out of this situation is through solidly planned and equitable reconstruction and development, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali observed: “...we will not be able to have real peace without development.” (UNA, May/June 1992). Reconciliation and Justice Post-war reconstruction has therefore to be guided in its practice by a ‘conflict transformation’ perspective, the threefold goal of hope, healing and reconciliation, (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995). This means that the way each practical and organisational task is carried out is directed by the requirements of peacebuilding, the building of mutual confidence and trust, through common endeavours or negotiated division of resources.5 Nevertheless ‘The healing of bitter memories and the restoration of trust is a delicate, highly complex process that cannot be rushed and which may take generations to achieve.’ (RGS 2003: 5–6). If those on both sides of the conflict are willing to take part in reconstruction activities, this is a positive first step, though it is often taken for purely pragmatic reasons, and should not be taken simplistically as a sign that people are reconciled and no longer harbour ‘deep-seated resentments’. So too, the re-establishment of a legal or justice system cannot by itself, bring about healing, although it can help to create the environment in which responsibility for crimes is attributed and the perpetrators of indiscriminate violence are punished so that the rest of society can move first to mutual respect and later to acceptance. As outsiders we may think that reconciliation requires more than that, the capacity on both sides to forgive and to repent, but we have to recognise that for some the past cannot be revisited in this way, the best they can do is to go forward on a new footing. How a particular society handles this will depend on the history of their conflict and the cultural and religious practices that have helped them cope in the past with the victims and perpetrators of violence. There is no off-the-peg solution, such as a commission for truth and justice that can fit all situations. As Mac Ginty discussed in Chapter 2, peacebuilding in practice is context specific and even defining the peace to be aimed for is a complex process.

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What we can assert is that ‘Building peace requires sound foundations based on a commitment to righting wrongs and achieving an acceptable level of social justice and accountability. From this perspective, reconstruction too, should have a corrective dimension that promotes socio-economic change and not just the restoration of the status quo, if it is to secure not only the successful implementation of initial reconstruction activities, but more importantly, to sustain that investment into the future.’ (Barakat 2002:810) Equity The origin of many conflicts lies in the perception of certain groups that they do not have the treatment in society that they are entitled to. When they claim to be heard and are met with repression or silence, they resort to violence to achieve their aims, because in many societies, those who shout loudest get the most. In societies shaped by violent conflict, those who ‘shout loudest’ tend to be armed and male. Their success however, often leads to further inequalities for other groups. For example, former combatants tend to be the focus of many post-war reconstruction initiatives. There is good reason for this, not least the potential of former combatants to destabilise the peace. But the emphasis on former combatants, whether through business incubation schemes or tailored re-training programmes, risks prioritising this group to the exclusion of other groups, particularly women. Some post-war societies are characterised by a preponderance of single-female headed households and this sector requires specialist attention. Wars also create much larger groups in society of disabled adults and unaccompanied children and certain economic groups (peasant farmers, industrial workers) who suffer disproportionately from the economic collapse. In any country there are also inequalities between different geographical areas in terms of wealth, access to public services and social status, as well as those existing between different classes and interest groups. Very often it has been the existence of extreme inequalities of this type, including ethnic discrimination that has led to and fuelled the violent conflict. The violence not only begins but is often most intense and destructive in those already deprived regions, and it is from these regions that mass migrations occur. For example, since governing elites find it easiest to defend towns and cities it is often the rural populations, already underprivileged in development terms and depending on the land for their subsistence that are disproportionately affected. When the war is formally ended, it is here that life continues to be so precarious from continuing low-level violence, impassable roads, lack of public services and food insecurity, that external investors are reluctant to commit resources other than basic relief supplies to them, while local investment capital no longer exists. A quick survey of NGO and donor involvement in any post-war society will find their activities concentrated around the major cities and main trade routes that were the focus of development pre-war, where of course there is also plenty for them to do. However it is a dangerous assumption that recovering the most accessible areas first will inevitably lead on to general improvements in other areas of the country and for underprivileged groups. There is a real danger that these

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areas and socio-economic groups will eventually fall behind in terms of human capital in an irreversible way both in the public and the private sectors. Such capacities will be badly missed when peace has been concluded and the state has embarked on full-scale reconstruction and the same inequalities that led to violent conflict in the first place can do so again. These kinds of inequalities amount to a structural weakness or vulnerability in the society, dangerous fault lines that will sooner or later be reopened. The commonest form, that of an elite minority’s control over power, business, land and education at the expense of the majority – is at the heart of violent opposition and conflict. The result of such a conflict may be to remove such an elite, but this does not guarantee a structural change in the society. The original elite may be simply replaced by another with different external backing or a new class of entrepreneurs who have used the war to establish themselves and are well poised to benefit from the peace. As discussed in Chapter 11, major reform programmes may be required to address the structures of inequality that produce and reproduce vulnerability as a prerequisite to sustainable recovery, because without a basic framework of representative and accountable governance that affords equal access to resources, services and information, both progress to recovery and social stability are at risk. It is particularly important to be aware of the impact that economic policy can have on the equity of post-war society. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, there is strong pressure from the international financial institutions and the prevailing market economy ‘vision’, discussed above, to produce quick results in economic growth, through the privatisation of state assets, the reduction of public spending and the removal of subsidies. This can result in a widening gap between an elite group of well-connected individuals and the majority who have no access to any means of trade or production. Reconstruction and development programming that provides alternative sources of support for marginalized groups can threaten the ‘markets’ these elites have cultivated by depriving them of an impoverished and dependent workforce or customer base. Such elites will often undermine long-term reconstruction and development assistance, or at a minimum seek to secure some financial gain to compensate for any loss to their own affairs. The growth of large-scale corruption is therefore a common consequence of allowing such an economic power base to develop. The conflict between micro and macro economic policy objectives is inevitable and post-conflict governments will have to wrestle with the competing demands of economic stabilisation (often dictated by lending institutions) and reconstruction requirements. While the former requires drastic cuts in government expenditure, the latter implies increased public spending to cope with the pressing requirements of reconstruction. (Evans, Chapter 11). Contradictions can also arise from supporting production at the micro level while failing to provide markets at the macro level. As the discussion of participation above made clear, the input of various actors also has to be balanced. It too is an issue of equity, often very keenly felt by nationals who see jobs they are qualified and experienced enough to do, going to expatriate organisations and foreign aid workers with little local knowledge. It is a

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common misconception to over estimate the role of the external actors (e.g. United Nations Agencies, INGOs), while underestimating the role of local and internal actors (e.g. communities, local NGOs, Local and Central Government). This often occurs from ignorance or simply laziness. Recruiting from a familiar community of colleagues who share the same cultural and professional background is easier than trying to understand what skilled personnel exist locally amongst the unemployed, returned refugees and ex-combatants, with the added perception that they will have to be inducted in what are believed to be ‘proper’ working practices. The concern for speed is another factor, recruiting local staff or building partnerships with local organisations, takes longer, requires more care. Little wonder then that a common perception amongst the professionals of war-torn countries is that the main purpose of much technical assistance is ‘to provide employment’ for expatriates. Whatever motivates this imbalance, the results are poor performance in terms of reconstruction on the ground because funding inputs are not effectively matched to need or the capacity of local authorities and communities to absorb and manage them equitably. An enormous amount of waste occurs as many interventions are over funded while implementation gaps are created in other areas. Such inequalities of provision in a volatile society quick to suspect unfair treatment and discrimination can only serve to fuel the re-emergence of violence. The current conditions experienced by the Palestinian authorities, are a good illustration of this point. Present day Afghanistan is another, where for example, a number of equity issues are seen as potentially threatening to the peace process: the unequal distribution of the benefits of reconstruction ‘between the poor rural majority and the competing claims of the more vocal, visible and accessible urban minority’ (Barakat 2002: 814 ); the relations between the centre and the regions, that is between Kabul and the regional warlords; the distribution of power between ethnic groups of Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras, with ‘the current unusual dominance of a small group of Tajiks who were among the victors’; the unresolved question of the balance of Islamic versus secular influence, which was at the heart of the past decades of civil war. (RGS 2003:4) Reconstruction and Development In assessing the relative merits of different post-war reconstruction strategies, some commentators highlight the importance of political democracy, womens’ rights, land and tax reforms and social security as prerequisites for reconstruction, while in many countries ‘military reconstruction’ and re-armament are accorded the first post-conflict priority, with massive levels of investment directed towards purchasing weapons and training soldiers, on the premise that force is necessary for security, which is in turn a requirement for long-term investment in reconstruction. However, putting the pieces together one after the other is not an option, because while it is clear that post-war reconstruction and development on the one hand, depends on the creation of a favourable environment, though the pursuit of, vision, participation, justice and security, that is peacebuilding, at the same time it is a vital factor in that peace process, with the potential to enhance or detract from it by the way that its programmes are carried out.

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And so, rather than entering into debate as to whether post-war reconstruction differs significantly from development, or when it is deemed propitious to move from reconstruction to development, it is more helpful if it is viewed as the essential first step in the total development process after war. Reconstruction should be distinguished from other forms of normal building or development only by the complexity inherent in the process: the emotional energy, righting wrongs, rebuilding lives, solving differences in the pursuit of national goals that we have already discussed. Violent conflict plays a key role in devastating economies and immiserating populations (as Jones has explored in the case of Rwanda). However, many postwar societies were chronically poor even before the violent conflict erupted. Conflict simply adds another layer onto the latent problems of under-development and uneven development that already exist. Merely fixing war damage, or dealing with the apparent effects of war, will not address the underlying lack of development. In fact, reconstruction can often compound under-development by promoting economic models of consumption rather than production or accelerating dependency on outside technology and services. As a result, it is imperative that reconstruction takes note of wider development challenges. It has repeatedly been argued that the role of development is not to develop things but to develop people, aiming at the advancement of the whole human being: spiritually, morally and materially. Given this breadth of definition, and the fact that wars not only destroy existing human and material assets, but also preclude new investments and the development of a society’s skills, capacities and resources, it is apparent that there exists a strong relationship between reconstruction and development. Consequently, as Zetter has clearly illustrated (Chapter 9) developmental reconstruction is not simply about the repair of damaged buildings and infrastructure, but about deficits that remain even after destroyed structures have been rebuilt. For example, a hospital building only functions as a hospital if the population it is to serve feels confident to use it and can get to it, if qualified medical personnel are recruited, provided with necessary supplies and equipment to work and guaranteed a salary to support their families. The existence of functioning schools in the area or the means to communicate with their families if they leave them behind, may influence their decision to accept the job in the first place. In other words, reconstruction for development is about restoring the whole fabric of a society, by reconnecting as well as rebuilding what has been broken down. This realisation also alerts us to the fact that reconstruction cannot and should not be a faithful “reproduction” of what existed before. A society emerges from war irreversibly changed. People naturally wish to salvage what they can from the past but often the skills that earned them a living or position of respect in their community are no longer required and they find that even their fundamental values and worldview have had to change to accommodate the enormity of what has happened to them. Reconstruction, as the first step in a long-term recovery process, entails economic, social and psychological readjustment, that is, the full range of integrated activities and processes that have to be initiated in order to reactivate the development process that has been disrupted by the conflict.

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Once some form of administrative body exists that has the authority to carry through programmes of reconstruction and an assessment has been made of the extent of damage and needs, as well as identifying what resources are available, the logical next step is the establishment of realistic, achievable goals and objectives, the collective vision discussed above. However, since no society or state can afford to accomplish all its reconstruction objectives at once it is also necessary to work strategically, establishing a sequence of tasks to be implemented over a given period based on an agreed set of priorities. They may include reconstruction of the military (as a means of reducing future risk of conflict), repair or demolition of dangerous structures, reopening of roads and communications, re-establishing key services and vital administrative functions, (education and health, water supplies, drainage or irrigations systems etc.) the resumption of trade and production, the restoration of culturally significant or symbolic buildings or the resumption of religious or cultural activities etc. Each nation and community, depending on the vision it has of its future, and the nature of the devastation it has experienced, will have a different way of ordering their priorities. What is beyond doubt is that a standardised “relief ” response from the international community is at best inappropriate and at worst harmful to this process. As an illustration of this diversity we can look at two historical examples of relatively developed nations after major inter-state conflicts. The reconstruction priorities in Finland (1945–1975) were: 1) Reconstruction of destroyed public buildings and communications; 2) Construction of housing for the Karelian refugees who comprised 15% of the population; 3) construction of new industries to supply goods for repayment of war debts. A more recent example is that of the Iranian government’s post-war priorities in May 1989: 1) Oil and energy – reconstruction and development of oil refineries, petro-chemical complexes and power-stations; 2) Agricultural rehabilitation; 3) Reconstruction of factories producing building materials; 4) Housing, restoration and repair and rehousing of those in employment; 5) Reconstruction of industries maximising employment but requiring minimum foreign currency input. (Barakat, 1993) As an example of an underdeveloped nation recovering from an intra-state war, we could look at the case of Mozambique, where public demand pushed government policy towards spending the “peace dividend” not just to restore but to expand and improve education and health provision and where restoration and further development of transport links (road and rail) are seen not only as vital to the recovery of the economy by enabling the marketing of agricultural produce and stimulating the building industry, but also to building the unity of the country.6 These and many other examples are especially illustrative of the importance of economic reconstruction after war. Physical reconstruction, although a priority, is usually of secondary importance to economic regeneration. A buoyant economy will produce wealth, which in turn generates further recovery initiatives by individuals, communities and national institutions. However, the issue of reconstructing and improving infrastructure is important precisely because of its economic and psychological impact on the daily lives of people living amongst the devastation that modern warfare can cause.

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Well-designed infrastructural policies are necessary for successful reconstruction therefore, but their costly nature mean that there is a need for effective prioritisation, designed to remove bottlenecks at key stages in the reconstruction process. The relationship between economic recovery and the building industry is clear from the cases cited above. Frequently, however, the immediate option appears to be to import building materials and this is often funded as emergency assistance by donors for a short period after the end of hostilities. The result is rapidly constructed social infrastructure, which not infrequently proves to be poorly matched to needs and public service staffing capacities, while offering no long-term employment prospects to the building industry. The more developmental approach which recognises a need to strengthen the local building industry and for applied research on appropriate location, suitable local building materials and the role of local contractors, builders and craftspersons, in order to meet promises relating to housing supply and reconstruction after war, takes longer and has more difficulty in attracting investors, but produces more solid results. Given that this is so, it is the understanding of best practice in development that must underpin responses to the plight of war-torn countries. ‘War is not a single catastrophic event but a devastating way of life closely associated with chronic poverty and social injustice.’ Moving from that way of life into one of peaceful problem solving and development is ‘not a quick-fix but a development process’. (Barakat and Chard 2002:818). As already suggested, it is a process that does not in fact wait for cease-fires, the signing of peace agreements, the holding of elections or international approval. At the local level recovery goes on regardless of macro-level deliberations or interventions. Whenever and wherever the conditions exist, people start rebuilding their lives but it is a painful and slow process with frequent set-backs. And so a further step in understanding and furthering the reconstruction and development process is the recognition that a key dimension of protracted conflicts is that while there will always be areas where levels of conflict are too high to engage in any developmental activity, in others the seeds of recovery are being sown and can be nurtured by local authorities and aid agencies. As the peace process gains momentum, the experience of developing recovery strategies in these contexts can be applied to others and enable the transition from emergency to reconstruction and development programming. Post-war reconstruction is clearly no simple matter. There is no specific moment when it begins or ends. It is not simply relief ‘scaled up’, because that does not rebuild a society or stimulate an economy. Neither is it confined to physical reconstruction. Nor can different aspects of reconstruction be tackled in isolation. Diverse and interconnected strategies are required: at the local level supporting livelihoods, reintegration of groups that the war has affected in different ways (demobilised soldiers, women, people with disabilities) and the growth of local governance; at the national level supporting strategic planning and implementation of economic, and social programmes by a government that may lack experience or authority or both. While an overarching vision is essential and must emerge from

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the war-torn society itself, a high degree of flexibility and ability to seize opportunities for achieving agreed objectives is also necessary. Capacity The requirements for reconstruction and development discussed so far may seem over demanding and idealistic. Which individuals or organisations have the capacity to grasp such a process? Every aspect of the process carries with it the need to develop new capacities, indeed, it seems that in essence the post-war reconstruction task is about restoring and developing the capacity of a nation to function and manage all aspects of its collective life. As discussed in Chapter 10, there is more to capacity than technical competence. In fact lack of professional skills and scarcity of resources can often be overcome by other factors such as motivation and broadly based participation. There is no requirement for any one actor to be omniscient and every new post-war context brings with it the need for a learning process and pooling of knowledge by all concerned: local, national and international actors. Failures and mistakes are inevitable, but their worst effects can be avoided if a process rather than a fixed project plan approach is adopted. The starting point for assessing the capacity for recovery of any war-torn society is the recognition of the resilience and impressive survival abilities of those who have come through the trauma and hardship of violent conflict. It is important to discover and understand the various coping mechanisms (social, economic and political) that have enabled them to survive, because these, often informal and undervalued, collaborative structures can be the basis for the development of local institutions which are vital to the rebuilding of governance and civil society. In assessing the capacity of any organisation to respond to the challenge of working for reconstruction it is necessary to review the aspects of capacity that will enable it to work in a civil environment: authority to act, which is based on legitimacy, both legal recognition and acceptance by its community; control and access to resources; sufficient competence and knowledge for the tasks undertaken. These criteria need to be applied, not just to local or national organisations but to international organisations (NGOs, bilateral and international agencies) proposing to work in a particular post-war context. In every case, an honest assessment will reveal gaps and weaknesses, which need to be addressed, but also some, often unacknowledged, strengths which need to be exploited. As in the UNDP case discussed in Chapter 10, recognition of complimentary strengths and weaknesses in organisations working together is an effective means of capacity building if combined with a commitment to continuous development of local and international personnel, through formal training, mentoring or information exchange. Nevertheless, it is important not to loose sight of the fact (discussed in Chapter 10) that sustainable recovery is dependent on the development of the local institutions so that investing in building their capacity and overcoming perceived inefficiency must be the priority. Post-conflict local institutions can only be as good as the investment made in them whether this relates to finance, information, participation, attitude or development training. However, it is important to bear in mind, while developing bi-lateral

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partnerships, that the existence of too many implementing organisations and delivery systems can lead to delivery problems and the destabilisation of national policy goals. (The issue of coordination of humanitarian assistance discussed by Strand in Chapter 5 is important in this regard.) An essential aspect of strengthening the state is that non-state implementing agencies should work within overarching national policy and strategic frameworks and strengthening the state’s institutions is as vitally important as building civil society organisations.(Barakat and Deely, Chapter 12). The tendency in recent years amongst neo-liberal economists and grassroots approaches to development is to concentrate on ‘civil society’ development while minimising the role of the state which is often characterised as necessarily bureaucratic, bloated, corrupt, and inefficient. This view fails to recognise the vital role that the state can and must play in the process of rebuilding after conflict. As in any other nation, post-war governments have to take responsibility for assuring certain key aspects of governance: security and the rule of law; regulatory functions; setting priorities and defining rebuilding strategies as these emerge from participatory and consensual processes. The role of civil society is as a partner and monitor of government. The role of government is to attend even-handedly to the diverse needs and aspirations expressed through the civil society organisations. As in all partnerships, if both partners are strong, the relationship can be positive and productive. As regards strengthening the state, the location and extent of sovereignty in the post-war entity is also crucial, because that is what will largely determine its capacity to initiate and manage post-war reconstruction. Sovereignty in this case extends beyond the de jure locus of political power to encompass the ability of a state or region to control its own borders, territory or economy. The way reconstruction activities are initiated can also be crucial for the strengthening of ‘civil society’. In a politically charged environment, practical reconstruction work can provide ‘politically neutral’ spaces for civil society to mature and develop collaborative actions which in turn contribute positively to any on-going peace negotiations or processes. So local communities too must develop a sense of ownership and responsibility and the power to decide in relation to projects that affect them, as the only way of ensuring true sustainability through capacity for self-reliance. A simple way of fostering this in the initial stages is by the community contributing to the project in terms of material resources, labour, cash, etc. (Barakat and Hoffman, 1995). That is by exploiting their existing capacities. The issue of regaining control over lives and livelihoods at the community level and over national affairs at the state level is fundamental to post-war recovery, because this capacity is seriously eroded and undermined by violent conflict and has to be consciously reclaimed. This is particularly true in the case of the general population in protracted conflicts, where the lack of a means of making a living or defending themselves reduces people to a state of powerlessness, with no choice but to become dependent on relief or join in the cycle of violence or, quite often, both. Reconstruction through development, even on a limited scale, starts to provide opportunities for the restoration of livelihoods, which by reducing the need to

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depend on relief or violence for survival, restores the dignity of self-determination and the capacity to plan ahead. Initial assistance to affected communities, should do everything possible to enable self-determination rather than perpetuating dependence. However, as has often been observed, agencies can be reluctant at the institutional level to transfer real responsibility and control over resources and activities to local employees, communities and officials. Communities should be recognised as the main players in reconstruction and development projects and allowed to own and manage reconstruction schemes, since it is they who will have to sustain them when the external helpers have left, but they are more often than not held in a kind of tutelage relationship by aid organisations. The capacity of local and central public administration is weakened in the same way by the combination of the effects of the violent conflict itself and the dependence on relief as a consequence. State institutions too develop a ‘relief mentality’ that inhibits their capacity to respond to post-war challenges. Bureaucrats and politicians too can become prisoners of conflict and crisis management and loose the capacity for medium and long-term planning. This ‘institutional sclerosis’ (see Chapter 11) is often used as a pretext by external agencies for restricting the level of the emergent state’s responsibility for reconstruction planning and implementation strategies. However, as with the local communities, it is only by being required to take that responsibility (requesting assistance if necessary) that state institutions can grow to meet the needs of their people. While useful lessons can be drawn from international experience, systems of governance such as liberal democracy cannot be transplanted. Each nation has to find its own road to statebuilding and will need to feel free to be innovative in order to overcome the complex legacy of violent conflict. Just as externally provided relief programmes run the risk of substituting state authority and responsibility for allocating resources to social welfare, the same can apply to rebel groups who, while assuming the role of fighting on behalf of the people, do not feel the obligation to take responsibility for their welfare. For example, in Somalia, where regional administrations such as the Puntland State of Somalia have emerged after many years of violence and international relief efforts, they fully expect that health and education services will continue to be donor funded, while they concentrate their efforts and resources on security and defence. Of course, the reality is that in many developing countries affected by conflict, institutions of public administration are too weak (or simply non-existent) to immediately assume the full burden of their responsibilities. There may have to be a process of building the capacity of such newly emerging local administrations by ‘developing what may turn out to be a temporary system of collaborative local governance’. The term ‘collaborative governance’ describes ‘systems of governance in which public goods are delivered by a combination of governmental and nongovernmental actors through collaborative structures’ as distinct from hierarchical governmental organisation with sole responsibility for the delivery of services. (Barakat et al, 2000:76). As Evans suggests, this means that government must then be seen as a key

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player among a broad range of stakeholders from domestic sectional interests to international donors and INGOs that work together collaboratively to build representative structures of governance for the post-war society. It is this transition from ‘government for’ to ‘governance with’ at all levels that is a condition of successful reconstruction and development, but to complete the capacity building process, it is essential that once the system of government matures and new institutions and interests from civil society enter the system of governance, ‘external’ stakeholders withdraw from any involvement with internal governance and deal with national and local institutions on a strictly partnership basis. As discussed elsewhere (Barakat and Chard 2002) making this transition is no easy matter for powerful international players (the temptation to use economic and political clout is very strong) but experience has shown that empowerment is a key aspect of capacity. The other decisive capacity building issue in the formulation of reconstruction strategies is that of the mobilisation and use of resources, which involves a threestage process of identification, allocation and utilisation. The resources themselves fall into three categories: human resources; material and physical resources; financial resources (including credit) and services. In addition, it is necessary to distinguish between indigenous resources, and external resources, including any particular conditions pertaining to their purchase, transfer or adaptation for use. (Amirahmadi, 1991). The use of external resources, which may be more readily identifiable in the short term, has to be weighed in terms of their potential to cause dependency, unwanted external control, or uneven development, while taking time to identify local resources is likely to have a long-term capacity building impact. The mobilisation of identified resources and the planning of their allocation depends on government action to be nationally inclusive, though implementation and use will be locally focused and involve grass root organisations such as self-help projects, women’s groups, co-operatives, village councils etc. This pattern is of particular importance where, as is frequently the case, it is necessary to re-integrate war-damaged areas into the wider nation. As discussed above, it is essential that these often historically underprivileged regions do not slip further back into underdevelopment, but at the same time they should not be treated as a special case to the exclusion of less affected areas. Area focused reconstruction plans are likely to lead to further fragmentation and the reinforcement of social antagonisms if they are not conceived within a national framework negotiated between the institutions of state and civil society in both the directly war-affected and nonaffected areas. One example of how this sense of national purpose can be achieved is through the twinning of provinces, towns and cities, in which those not directly affected help in rebuilding the damaged areas through the mobilisation of their own resources. It played a significant role in the reconstruction of the war-affected areas in Iran following its 8 years war with Iraq and was used previously in the USSR following World War II. Such an approach as well as being a practical way to mobilise resources can have a national reconciliation dimension in cases of internal war.

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Turning now to the three kinds of resources mentioned above, we can start by considering human resources. The discussion of capacity building in Chapter 10 examined the different factors that contribute to the capacity of individuals, that is their ability to work productively for common and individual goals. The context in which they find themselves is critical. Post-war contexts can be enabling, if peace settlements are translated into greater security and freedom of movement, this immediately allows people to rebuild homes and livelihoods. The resulting greater optimism leads to motivation and commitment to community or national goals. Anything in the post-war environment such as reconciliation, economic investment, restoration of transport and communications, education and health care, enhances human resources by releasing existing capacities. Anything that detracts from these conditions, such as unequal access to reconstruction resources and services, unchecked corruption and criminality, continuing antagonisms, diminishes human resources. However, although people can be mobilised in this way to make considerable advances, it is also true that prolonged conflict leaves societies with huge human resource deficits in terms of general education, professional skills and experience. In developing countries many of these problems may have existed prior to the outbreak of conflict, but the conflict itself creates many more deficits, as children and young people have no formal schooling, young professionals, peasant farmers or artisans are conscripted, (and often die) as soldiers, or flee the country. Conflict can in fact radically alter the political, demographic and economic structure of a country. For example, in Rwanda the elimination in 1994 of 800,000 Tutsi and many moderate Hutus proved to be a huge drain on skilled public sector personnel. In addition, many more households become headed by lone women and lacking the contribution of male labour drop into absolute poverty which in turn inhibits the growth and development of another generation of children. Very often certain intellectual and entrepreneurial sections of society have migrated and other populations were prevented from returning home creating new ethnically polarized zones. It is essential for those assisting post-war development to think of all of these groups (women, young people and children, returning migrants and ex-combatants, refugees and the displaced, entrepreneurs and professionals in the Diaspora, faith or ethnic communities etc.) as vital resources to be recovered and put to work not as so many categories of problems to be dealt with. In this way of thinking, creating opportunities for each of these groups to contribute to reconstruction is an essential investment in resource development and capacity building. It will entail creating opportunities for education and professional learning for most, but also creating conditions that enable existing qualified and talented professionals to work where they can have most impact. For example, the Diaspora community represents a significant resource for most countries recovering from war. In contrast to those who remained, they have usually been able to complete higher levels of education and professional training and by exposure to new ideas and experiences have escaped the intellectual isolation that war so often creates. Some minimum conditions of security, housing and health and education services for their families

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are necessary for them to make the decision to return, but at the same time any perception that they are receiving privileged treatment or given undue powers of decision making can cause resentment amongst those that endured the full horrors of the war in the country. Social equity is therefore also an important aspect of building human resource capacity. It is not enough to simply ensure that hospitals and public works departments are staffed by technically qualified staff. Religious and ethnic differences have often been exploited by ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ during the conflict and education and training may have been reserved for some to the exclusion of others. It may be necessary for the sake of reconciliation not just to upgrade those already qualified, but to make the effort to take underprivileged groups through basic general education before including them too in professional training and access to professional jobs. As with human resources, a considerable capacity in material resources can be liberated simply by the fact of peace and the freedom of individuals to set about rebuilding their lives, despite the fact that the pre-war economy and infrastructure may be in ruins. National, regional and international trading relations and markets are commonly lost, either through conflict or sanctions and industry and infrastructure may have become physically damaged or obsolete. Consequently reconstruction may require the creation of a completely new economic structure, which will take some time to develop and even longer to produce general benefits. However, the early recovery phase is often marked by the emergence of a plethora of informal, commercial actors who represent the most dynamic force in the drive towards reconstruction and economic recovery. Reconstruction and development programmes can enhance the development of material resources by recognising the opportunities presented by this informal sector and supporting initiatives to create livelihoods from the transformation of local raw materials and the sale of goods and services. It is also important to ensure at an early stage that any available strategic resources are transparently exploited at national level to resource the reconstruction internally or earn from exports to reduce financial dependency. The majority of countries that have been subjected to prolonged or repeated episodes of conflict have such resources and they have often been key aspect of the conflict (diamonds, minerals and oil for example in the West African countries).As regards Iraq, it is its oil and its oil revenues that are of critical importance, both materially and politically. The resumption of the internal supply of oil and the revenue from exports will directly determine the pace and scale of reconstruction and the recovery of the general economy. Who controls the oil, and who therefore decides how the oil revenues are to be used for reconstruction is a crucial political issue. Failure adequately to clarify and resolve it to the satisfaction of the Iraqi stakeholders ‘will continue to generate resentment and to inflame the situation.’ (RGS 2003:8) Mobilizing financial resources – particularly in developing countries, is even more challenging. Mofid (1989) suggests three ways in which governments can mobilize financial resources towards removing funding constraints: self-help (including government reconstruction bonds, and facilitating self-finance by the

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people), regional help and international help. In countries, such as Iraq, that had a relatively developed economy before the war, self-help to release financial resources could produce significant resources, especially if as is usually the case, there has been an outward migration of some of the most talented, educated, and affluent members of society. This Diaspora, during as well as after the conflict, is usually providing a much-needed source of remittance for family members and may also be prepared to invest capital in the reconstruction even if they cannot be persuaded to return as a much needed human resource as discussed above. However, very poor countries, or particularly rural communities, with very low levels of educated citizens, tend to be reduced by prolonged conflict to an almost moneyless economy and attempts to introduce cost recovery in the public services, for example, prove futile in the early stages of reconstruction, though other kinds of self-help in material resources discussed above are possible. Mobilising regional investment is important not only as another source of financial resources but as part of a strategy to restore mutually beneficial crossborder trading relations and partnerships. Neighbouring countries will often be eager to do this, because their economies have also been adversely affected by the conflict. However, it is also often the case that these regional powers have been part of the conflict themselves and may seize the opportunity for economic hegemony over weakened neighbours. More often, it is simply the promotion of liberal market economy conditions (at the behest of the international financial institutions) that makes it almost impossible to defend struggling national entrepreneurs and therefore livelihoods in the face of competition from aggressive entrepreneurs from the stronger neighbouring economies (as is happening in the case of Mozambique and its neighbour South Africa and of German entrepreneurs in the Balkans). The post-war government needs a great deal of skill and greater economic autonomy than it is likely to have in order to be able to handle this source of finance successfully. In practice, the main sources of finance for a war-devastated economy are international: aid from bi-lateral donors, investment capital from multi-national companies and loans from the international banks. The management of these sources of finance is the most difficult of all since it involves a high degree of dependence and very limited scope for independent strategic planning. Post-war governments are more or less in a position of having to accept what they are offered, when it is offered. International attention is notoriously fickle: it is at its most intense during the violent phase of a conflict or at the moment a peace accord is reached. Yet the capacity of a post-war society to usefully manage international funds is often at its lowest in the immediate aftermath of conflict. The assessment of needs and establishment of systems of governance and administration is time-consuming and is often completed after the spotlight of international attention has moved away from the post-war area to another conflict area. Many post-war societies have faced a two-fold ‘reconstruction gap’: first when the level of international funding and intention outstrips the ability of the post-war society to absorb it usefully (it is therefore often absorbed by illicit private gain) and second, when the national

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capacity for the administration and organisation of reconstruction is in place but the international funding and attention has moved elsewhere and investment is bought at the price of increased indebtedness, as discussed by Barakat and Deely in Chapter 12. In short international donors are disposed to contribute most in the immediate aftermath of war, which is precisely the time when the recipient nation lacks the capacity to absorb this high level of funding usefully. Later, as capacity grows and development priorities are established it will require large sums for investment, but by then it is less available. Financial capacity then, is not just a matter of amount. Resources need to be available in the right amount at the right time and only constitute a real capacity if the recipient society has the power to decide when and how to use them as part of a coherent development strategy, which also takes into account the availability of human and material resources. Some concluding thoughts It has been the purpose of this book to bring together a wide range of experiences of conflict and recovery, subjecting them to a variety of analytical approaches, in order to understand the dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding and of recovery from war and so define the meaning of post-war reconstruction from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. It will be apparent from the account of the different components of reconstruction in this chapter and those that preceded it, that it has been impossible to discuss one without reference to the others. This is because, as was said at the outset, a holistic approach is required, in which each of these aspects is addressed simultaneously. While the emphasis given to each will vary at different stages of the process and in response to local circumstances, none of the pillars can be neglected without risking the collapse of the whole enterprise. The reconstruction of postconflict society is a challenging project that requires clear thinking, collaborative planning and long-term commitment. It is not the purely technical matter that it is often assumed to be, that can be isolated from other conditions and processes in society, but is part of the larger enterprise of peacebuilding through development. Without simultaneously securing the seven pillars of reconstruction, the huge sums of money expended on aid in the immediate aftermath of war, will continue to flow into the coffers of war lords and corrupt entrepreneurs, or simply be wasted in rebuilding infrastructure in the wrong place or at the wrong time, on expensive expatriate salaries when qualified local staff are available or in maintaining vulnerable people in a perpetual state of dependence and ultimately this lack of strategic thinking can only lead back into conflict. Of course this is not what the international community sets out to do, its intentions are in general, honourable. However, good intentions and fine rhetoric are not sufficient; we need to start from the outset with an absolutely clear vision of what post-war reconstruction is about. It has been argued throughout this book that it is a development process and that means that it is about helping people to recover: economically, socially, politically and psychologically. It is not a purely technical matter of reconstructing the physical environment or achieving simple economic growth, though these are

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part of it. When considering physical and economic recovery, priorities have to be established in relation to an overall vision of how a particular society wants to develop. How those goals are pursued has to be determined with a view to first of all facilitating peace, or at the very least mitigating violence, and that requires an understanding of the root causes of the conflict in order to promote reconciliation, justice and hope for all parties. The key implications of looking at post-war reconstruction in this way, is that building the capacity of individuals and institutions in all sectors of the society is a first priority and that the reconstruction process has to be the vehicle for building that capacity, with the necessary corollary that the pace of reconstruction is tied to the capacity, not of the international community but of the war-affected nation. This is why it is essential to harness the motivation, skills and resources of the indigenous population from the start, allowing their emerging institutions to develop by taking charge of the process. Outsiders looking in on a society riven by conflict often misinterpret the physical destruction and apparent lack of formal organisation as a chaotic slate to be wiped clean in order to start afresh with new ideas. The question to ask is “Is it us who are reconstructing them or are they in fact already reconstructing themselves?” We need to find out, what actually exists in that superficially chaotic scene in terms of ideas and skills and of surviving social and organisational structures that can be supported and given space to grow. The temptation for those with the means (the outsiders) is to impose too much reform too soon, to embark on too much physical reconstruction and to inject more capital than can be usefully absorbed in the early stages. We should not forget that reconstruction is as political as the war itself and can be even more corrupting: huge sums of poorly targeted finance and ill-conceived social and political engineering can turn warlords into reconstruction lords and contribute little or nothing to general employment or social stability. It is essential to hold fast to the concept of a learning and healing process, that can be supported but cannot be ordered. The war-wounded have to learn to walk again by walking.

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NOTES

Notes to Foreword

1

J. Davis, ‘The Anthropology of Suffering’ (Text of the Fourth Elizabeth Colson Lecture, Oxford 1992), Journal of Refugee Studies 5 (1992), pp. 149–61 at p. 155

1

Of course there was no postgraduate course that specialized in the study of post-war reconstruction. The University of York’s Institute of Advanced Architectural Studies offered a unique MA course by research led by Charles Cockburn, who was known for his exceptional ability of nurturing young talent. Many of the subjects he initiated have developed into research fields.

1

Such as UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR); the World Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit or the PCRU (Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit) recently inaugurated by the British Government. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (2004), the number of major armed conflicts between 1989 and 2001 (postcold war) has averaged 27 in any given year, with 1990 and 1991 seeing the highest increase. According to a World Bank report in 44 per cent of ‘war termination’ situations, conflict resumes in the first five years after the violence has stopped; with 50 per cent reverting back to war in the first decade of peace (Collier et al. 2003,7). Mention should be made here of the important contribution of UNRISD, which initiated the War Torn Societies Project in 1994, see the work of (Stiefel, 1999) The legality of both wars as an action of self defence has been questioned. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were both controversial. In both cases the US argued that it had the right to defend itself pre-emptively. This despite the fact that weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq, Saddam's links with Al Qaeda were non existent and the links between the State of Afghanistan and Al Qaeda were not proven. Many analysts have suggested that in Afghanistan and Iraq the basis for war was in fact illegal in terms of international law For example by 2005 the US has spent $155bn on the war in Iraq and it has funded reconstruction to a cost of $18.4bn. (Brookings Institute 2005) Speech by President George W Bush to the American Enterprise Institute on the 26th of February 2003, just days before the invasion of Iraq. Of the 81 reference books held at this time at The British Library on post-war reconstruction only 11 books were not about post WWII reconstruction and the majority of them were published around the time of WWII. Kant, Clauswitz, Marx, Engles and Tolstoy all wrote on war, they were not however so concerned with the aftermath of war and the necessary reconstruction (Gaille, 1978). According to the British International Studies Association (BISA) there are 48 universities in the UK which run International Relations programmes. There are only

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AFTER THE CONFLICT two which deal with the aftermath of war: Oxford University’s Refugee Studies Centre and the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York. These observations on conflict analysis are based on ideas contributed by William Lume a long-standing associate of the PRDU and regular visiting Lecturer on the MA course. Reconstruction assistance occurred between allies. For example, British troops assisting in the clearance and restoration of the battlefields of Northern France. This is not to overstate the novel nature of WWII. The American Civil War, World War I and the Spanish Civil War were all wars of the industrial era and involved large-scale mechanised destruction of infrastructure. See for example David W. Ellwood (1992) Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction (London: Longman) and Jeffry M. Diefendorf (ed.), Rebuilding Europe’s Bombed Cities (Basingstoke : MacMillan, 1990). The Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944 . The Marshall Plan was the nickname given to the European Recovery Program after it was announced in a speech in 1947 at Harvard University by US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall. In total, sixteen countries were involved in the drafting of a scheme for the recovery of Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey (Hogan, 1987: 60). Between 1945 and 1949 India, Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia, and Borneo and Jordan all gained their independence from the British Empire. Between 1953–58 Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, British Guiana and British Honduras all elected their own governments. Britain ceded independence to most of her African colonies during the 1960s (Chamberlain, 1998). Of the 90 post-colonial states, 53 of them had experienced civil war between 1946 and 1992 (Henderson & Singer 2000). Elements of this view continue to be held today. Kurt Waldheim demanded a Marshall Plan for African in 1974 and for Eastern Europe in 1989. More recently, the economist Jan Pronk, recently wrote that aid should “be used primarily as a catalyst, sometimes to help generate other resources or gain access to them, sometimes to help create domestic capacity” (2001: 627) That is not to say, of course, that such performance was in any way uniform, but even Sub-Saharan Africa which, by and large, started from very poor conditions following independence, achieved average yearly increases of GDP per capita around 2.5 per cent (Singh, 2002:297) See for example Nigeria’s Second National Development Plan (1970–74) which followed the end of the Biafran civil war. 1971 saw the establishment of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) in response to chronic natural disasters for the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance. 1977 saw the first publication of the journal Disasters by the Overseas Development Institute, which aims “to provide a forum for academics, policy-makers and practitioners for high-quality research and practice related to natural disasters and complex political emergencies around the world.” This concept was institutionalised in the 1991 UN General Assembly Resolution, which suggested that there should be a ‘Continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development’. It stated that ‘Emergency assistance must be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, 1991, (para. 40). One of the strongest critiques of aid and development activities was that they relied too heavily on so called experts, who were usually outsiders, commonly complete foreigners. It came to some as a revelation that local people had a ‘surprisingly’ sophisticated understanding of their own circumstances which could inform policy and produce more effective programming (Chambers, 1983).

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26 ‘Despite the five-fold increase in humanitarian needs across the globe in the last decade, the percentage of GNP allotted by the US government to foreign humanitarian assistance has stood at or below 0.1per cent – lower than at any time in the past fifty years’ (Stoddard, 2002:39). In 2001 the US was in arrears to the sum of US$1.5 billion for its obligatory contribution to the UN. It was however, swift to make the payment following the events of September 11 and the impending ‘war on terror’. 27 The deliberate bombing by the Croats of the famous bridge in Mostar is a good case in point. It was a very symbolic target, and one that was recognisable to many Europeans. 28 See for example the mission statements of CARE International, Oxfam, UNHCR. 29 In 1994 the ICRC drew up its Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. 261 NGOs are recorded as having signed the ICRC Code of Conduct (see ICRC website http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_disasters.pl?codeconduct_signatories.pdf consulted October 2003). In 1997 the SPHERE Project was launched to develop a ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response’. Its members include CARE US, Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK, and The International Rescue Committee. 30 In 2002 an issue of Third World Quarterly was devoted to ‘Reconstructing War-Torn Societies’ and the term ‘reconstruction’ was mentioned twice on the front cover of the January 2003 issue of International Affairs. Marsden, (2003) and Baskin, (2003) 31 http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world 32 Osama bin Laden was also held accountable for the US embassy bombings in Nairobi Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. 1

Notes to Chapter 2

M. Sollenberg & P. Wallenstein, ‘Armed Conflict 1989–2000’, Journal of Peace Research 38/5 (November 2001), pp. 629–44. 2 Quotation from E. Adler, ‘Conditions(s) of peace’, Review of International Studies 24 (December 1998), pp. 165–191. 3 Ibid., p. 168. 4 For Galtung’s original ideas see: J. Galtung, Peace by peaceful means: peace and conflict, development and civilisation (London: Sage, 1996). For interpretations and further development of Galtung’s ideas see: D. Barash & C. Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002); H. Miall, O. Ramsbotham & T. Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 43–4, 186–7; P. Lawler, A question of values: Johan Galtung’s peace research (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995). 5 K. Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978). 6 M. Erikkson, P. Wallenstein & M. Sollenberg, ‘Armed Conflict, 1989–2002’, Journal of Peace Research 40/3 (2003), pp. 593–607 at p. 593. 7 R. Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, Elmwood Quarterly (1994), pp. 11–24. 8 Useful overviews of US foreign policy can be found in M. Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a mission? (London: Pinter/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995); M. Cox, ‘American power before and after 11 September: dizzy with success?’ International Affairs 78/2 (2002), pp. 261–76; and, J. Nye, ‘Limits of American Power’, Political Science Quarterly 117/4 (2002–03), pp. 545–559. 9 R. Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), pp. 46–48. 10 See, for example, R. Thakur & A. Schnabel eds., United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001). 11 S. Barakat, D. Connolly & J. Large, ‘Winning and Losing in Aceh: Five key dilemmas in third-party intervention’, Civil Wars 5/4 (Winter 2002), pp. 1–29. 12 For explanations of the causes of contemporary ethnonational conflicts see: M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); S.

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AFTER THE CONFLICT Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The symbolic politics of ethnic war (Ithaca: Conrnell University Press, 2001); P. Rogers, Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-first Century (London: Pluto, 2000). For conceptual overviews of contemporary peace processes see: J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty eds., The Management of Peace Processes (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000) and J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty eds., Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, violence and peace processes (Houndmills: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003). These are explained in greater detail in R. Mac Ginty, ‘The role of symbols in peacemaking’ in J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty (2003) eds., ibid, pp. 235–244. The separation model is explained with particular clarity in C. Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security 20/4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136–175 and J. McGarry, ‘“Demographic Engineering”: the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 21/4 (July 1998), pp. 613–638. J. Darby, ‘Borrowing and Lending in Peace Processes’, in J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty (2003) eds., op. cit., pp. 245–255. The concept of ‘ripeness’ is associated with I. William Zartman, see his ‘The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments’, in J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty (2003) eds., op. cit., pp. 19–29. A critique is provide by JP Lederach, ‘Cultivating Peace: A practitioner’s view of deadly conflict and negotiation’, in J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty (2003) eds., op. cit., pp. 30–37. K. Höglund & I. Svensson, ‘The peace process in Sri Lanka’, Civil Wars 5/4 (Winter 2003), pp. 103–118. See, JP Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2002), pp. 63–66. Zartman, op. cit. G. Duffy & N. Lindstrom, ‘Conflicting Identities: Solidary incentives in the SerboCroatian war’, Journal of Peace Research 39/1 (2002), pp. 69–90. For details, see, E. Moloney, A secret history of the IRA (London: Penguin, 2003). See A. Guelke, ‘Negotiations and Peace Processes’, in J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty (2003) eds., op. cit., pp. 53–64. Pierre du Toit describes a number of these ‘breakout mechanisms’ during negotiations in South Africa’s Brittle Peace: The problem of post-settlement violence (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 53–67. J. Darby, The effects of violence on peace processes (Washington DC: USIP Press, 2001), p. 10. The issue of premature elections is discussed in B. Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral engineering for conflict management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). M.J. Zahar, ‘Peace by unconventional means: Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement’ in S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild & E.M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The implementation of peace agreements (Boulder C.O.: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 567–597. C. Hoddie & C. Hartzell underline the importance of the full implementation of peace accords (particularly the security aspects) in ‘Civil war settlements and the implementation of military power-sharing arrangements’ Journal of Peace Research 40, 3 (2003), pp. 303–320. There is a vast literature on peacebuilding. A good discussion of definitions can be found in H. Miall, O. Ramsbotham & T. Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 186–188. The issue of dysfunctional peace processes is discussed further in J. Darby & R. Mac Ginty, ‘What Peace? What Process?’ in Darby & Mac Ginty (2003) eds., op. cit., pp. 1–6. The fate of Israeli-Palestinian peace initiatives suggest the importance of regular public briefings to allow constituencies to develop realistic expectations of peace processes. See J. Shamir & K. Shikaki, ‘Determinants of reconciliation and compromise among Israelis and Palestinians’, Journal of Peace Research 39/2 (2002), pp. 185–202.

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32 Darby (2001), op. cit., p. 47. 33 SJ Stedman, ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, International Security 22/2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5–53. 34 C.T. Call, ‘Why the world’s most successful peace processes produce the world’s most violent countries’, paper delivered to the International Studies Association Conference, Chicago (March 1999). 35 V. Gamba, ‘Managing violence: Disarmament and demobilisation’ in Darby & Mac Ginty (2003) eds., op. cit., pp. 125–136. Disarmament and related programmes in the Mali peace process are outlined in RE Poulton & I ag Youssouf, A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1998), pp. 85–132. 36 ‘Policy move to recruit detectives’, BBC Northern Ireland News Online, (3 July 2003). 37 Survey results can be found at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/. 38 R. Belloni, ‘Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Journal of Peace Research 38/2 (2001), pp. 163–180. 39 S.L. Woodward, ‘Economic priorities for successful peace implementation’, in Stedman, Rothchild & Cousens eds., op. cit., pp. 183–214 at p. 183. 1

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Notes to Chapter 3

Relieving Life-Threatening Suffering: “Humanitarian action should be directed toward the relief of immediate life-threatening suffering.” Proportionality to Need: “Humanitarian action should correspond to the degree of suffering, wherever it occurs. It should affirm the view that life is as precious in one part of the globe as another.” Nonpartisanship: “Humanitarian action responds to human suffering because people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or other extraneous agendas. It should not take sides in conflict.” Independence: “In order to fulfil their mission, humanitarian organizations should be free of interference from home or host political authorities. Humanitarian space is essential for effective action.” As well as ICRC and IFRC, the following NGOs participated in the preparation of the Code of Conduct: Caritas International, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam and the World Council of Churches. The Red Cross Movement’s Code of Conduct: 1. The humanitarian imperative comes first. 2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. 3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. 4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. 5. We shall respect culture and custom. 6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. 7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief. 8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. 9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources. 10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects. André Pasquier, Political Adviser, International Committee of the Red Cross In 1999, a few months before the Kosovo crisis, Commissioner Emma Bonino (in charge of humanitarian aid for the EC) proposed the systematic use of military logistics for humanitarian purposes. In an article published by a British journal, she suggested an agreement between ECHO and the Western European Union (WEU) aimed at ensuring military logistics for the transport of food aid and further possible developments. The WEU welcomed the proposal, assuming that ECHO was ready to pay the cost of such operations. After being checked against the budgets, the proposal was dismissed. Court of Auditor, Special Report 2/97 of Court of Auditors concerning Humanitarian Action from the European Union between 1992–1995; C4-219/97. OJ CE n. 143/1, 12.5.1997.

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7

Misunderstanding: An increasingly ignorant international community with less diplomatic representation in ‘marginal’ parts of the world will continue to shape policy without the real depth of understanding that it seeks to achieve in its priority areas of the globe. Isolationism: Powerful members of the international community will, on occasion, sometimes become isolationist in the belief that many parts of the world are not their concern. Unilateralism: In many instances particular major international or regional powers will act unilaterally (but often with UN blessing) in areas they consider to be ‘their own backyard’ or in situations where they see an important national strategic interest. Fluctuating and Limited Multilateralism: The difference of interest which makes up the international community will continue to produce a variable and often limited multilateral action through the UN with a particular civil war seldom able to galvanise universal and concerted political and humanitarian action simultaneously and sustainably. Selectivity: The result of these tendencies will be a continuing selectivity and inconsistency of international response to the humanitarian tragedies caused by civil war around the world. Containment: International action towards many civil wars may continue to be primarily driven by a policy of containment rather than robust and conclusive engagement.

1

Both studies were initiated and commissioned by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) to provide independent evaluations. Although this demonstrates good practice, it also points to the necessity of learning from innovations in traditional third-party intervention techniques. The first review was undertaken by a team from the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), University of York, UK, involving Dr. Sultan Barakat (team leader), David Connolly (principal researcher), Arne Strand and Dr. Rob Aitken (field researchers). The research involved numerous field visits to Aceh and an analysis of the relevant literature and media reports during 2000–2001 with the key findings presented in the internal report, ‘What role can an Independent Humanitarian Organisation Play in Defusing a Conflict?’ (York: PRDU 2001). The second review, using both field and desk research, was completed by Judith Large with the key findings presented in the internal report, ‘Review of the Aceh Project’ (July 2001). Andrew Rigby, ‘Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management: the View from the Non-Governmental Sector’, International Affairs 4/77 (2001), pp.957–66. Dr. Kevin Clements (Secretary-General of International Alert), from an address at the International Peace Research Association Conference, Tampere (Aug. 2000) and Andrew Rigby (note 2) pp.957–66. International Alert subjected itself to thorough scrutiny (and accountability) through an evaluation conducted by an external team in 1997. See Gunnar Serbe, Joanna Macrae, and Lennart Wohlgemuth, NGOs in Conflict–an Evaluation of International Alert, (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1997). See, e.g. Voutira and Brown’s, Conflict Resolution: A Review of Some Non-Governmental Practices; A Cautionary Tale, a report for the Economic and Social Committee on Overseas Research of the Overseas Development Administration (1995). Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed Books 2001). Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall (eds.), Herding cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999) and the ACCORD Series may be found on the Conciliation Resources website http://www.c-r.org. Excellent previous contributions to this field include C.R. Mitchell and K. Webb (eds.), New Approaches to International Mediation (London: Greenwood Press, 1988) and D. J. D. Sandole and H. van der Merwe (eds.), Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). For example, development strategies to redress imbalances. See Raimo Vayrynen (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1991). Judith Large,

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‘Conflict Resolution: contested concept’ in Large, The War Next Door: A study of second track intervention during the war in ex-Yugoslavia (Stroud: Hawthorn Press, 1997). Also, Duffield, Global Governance (note 5). Bruce D Jones, ‘Intervention without Borders: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990–94’ in Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24/2 (1995), pp.235–236. There are at least three main political factions within GAM not including the central military wing, the AGAM or ‘armed GAM’. In Bahasa Indonesian, all of the factions use the same name, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, which they shorten to GAM but different names are used in English. Barakat and Connolly et al. (note 1) pp.233–6. In considering Aceh’s volatile political climate, the Pause was designed to create an opportunity whereby political violence could be prevented for a defined period of time based on an agreed recognition of the need for humanitarian assistance. After this agreement, there was the possibility of, or the foundation for, establishing further conflict prevention initiatives. Ultimately, the prevention of a humanitarian disaster could become an appropriate lever for durable conflict transformation or resolution. In their basic forms, these three variations (a pause, cease-fire and truce) in the cessation of violence can be differentiated by their purpose. That is, the Pause was predetermined and temporally defined although open to further negotiation as demonstrated. Alternatively, the purpose of a cease-fire or truce was perceived as more of a definite end to the call of arms. Secondly, facilitation was used because the GoI refused to accept traditional notions of third-party intervention. Crocker (note 5) p.22. Page 24 of the same suggests that, ‘[i]n these kinds of activities, third parties are supposed to play a neutral and essentially facilitating role, enabling and encouraging a mutual learning process rather than guiding or still less influencing and directing the parties to mutually acceptable approaches to problem solving’. Marieke Kleiboer, The Multiple Realities of International Mediation, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988). The predominant religion is Islam (97.6 per cent) followed by Chrisianity (1.76 per cent), Buddism (0.55 per cent) and Hinduism (0.08 per cent). The Acehnese pride themselves in this rich ethnic mix, saying A-C-E-H stands for Arabic, Chinese, European and Hindu. B. Dalton, Indonesia Handbook (Chico, CA: Moon Publications, 1995), p.821. The inhabitants of Aceh are divided into earlier pre-Malayan hill peoples, the Gayo and the Atlas, and the lowland coastal people who are the product of centuries of intermarriage between the Batak, Dravidians, North Indians, Javanese, Arabs, Chinese and Minangkabau. The administrative capital city is Banda Aceh with 2,389,000 inhabitants. The province has eight regencies (Aceh Selatan, Aceh Tenggara, Aceh Timur, Aceh Tengah, Aceh Barat, Aceh Utara, Aceh Besar and Pidie) and two municipalities (Banda Aceh and Sabang), as well as two Administrative Cities (Lhokseumawe and Langsa), 142 districts and 5,596 villages. Badan Pusat Statistic (BPS), ‘Aceh Dalam Angka, Aceh in Figures, 1998’. BPS-Statistic of Daerah Istimewa Aceh Province collaboration with BAPPEDA. The province is located at the northwest corner of Sumatra Island in Indonesia, covering an area of approximately 57 000 sq. km, bordering on the Malacca Strait (north and east), the Indian Ocean (west) and North Sumatra Province (south) and has a population of approximately four million. These range from fertile agricultural land, forests, fisheries and water, as well as oil and liquid natural gas, in addition to many types of minerals. Forests occupy 75 per cent of the land and only 2.47 per cent is cultivated by small holders. The economy is based on agriculture and mining. Estate Agricultural Services of D. I. Aceh, 1998 cited in Barakat and Connolly et al. (note 1) p.14. International Crisis Group, ‘Why Military Force won’t bring Lasting Peace to Aceh’, (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG Asia Report No. 17, 12 June 2001) pp.1–5. This occurred in 1959, when Aceh acquired the status of a Special Autonomous Territory or Daerah Istimewa.

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15 Similar to other peripheral regions, a military operation zone (DOM) was imposed in Aceh between 1989–1998 when mass human rights violations were committed indiscriminately during an anti-insurgency campaign. 16 International Crisis Group, ‘Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?’ (Jakarta/Brussels: ICG Asia Briefing Paper No. 18, 27 June 2001). For comparable statistics see Pyryambudi Sulistiyanto, ‘Whither Aceh?’, Third World Quarterly 22/3 (2001). 17 See John Aglionby, ‘Indonesia’s latest ‘Peace Plan’ Causes Death Toll to Double’, The Observer, (21 Oct. 2001). The same figures are cited in Tapol Bulletin No. 164/165: (Dec. 2001/Feb. 2002) p.5. 18 Field research in Aceh confirmed the common perception that there was an increase in the phenomenon of mysterious kidnappings and ritualised murders with the persistent anonymity of those responsible. That is, the attackers have only been identified as OTK or ‘unknown’. As one respondent added: ‘Society knows who they are but they are too afraid to say’. Barakat and Connolly et al. (note 1) p.135. 19 Teungku Abdullah Syafi’ie. 20 International Crisis Group, ‘Aceh: A Slim Chance for Peace’, (Jakarta/Brussels: Asia Briefing Paper: 30 Jan. 2002) p.2. 21 There remain strongly-held opinions in Indonesia that the nation/government need not have ‘lost’ East Timor, that the UN and external interference (Australia, UK etc) were instrumental in wrenching it away. Judith Large attended an event in Jakarta in March 2002 at which a high-ranking minister claimed that foreign interference was at work in both Aceh and Maluku, referring to international NGOs perceived as partisan. 22 By May 1997 Indonesia found itself in an economic crisis: the rupiah had, over a very short period of time, declined in value by 80 per cent; inflation was rising; output was down by 13 per cent per annum and poverty levels too, were on the increase. According to the World Bank (1999) poverty had increased from about ten per cent to 14 per cent (engulfing around 30 million people). Dependent on an export-based economy, Indonesia found demand for its principle exports of oil and liquid gas low in value terms, prices having declined in the face of an international supply glut. In an attempt to address its balance of payment difficulties, the Indonesian Government applied economic liberalisation through external regulation and supervision of its fiscal and monetary policies in accordance with advice received from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In addition, Indonesia’s banking system was saddled with non-performing loans which raised the need for new capital injections, mainly from foreign capital flows. The combination of the above factors significantly destabilised the national economy and contributed to the hasty resignation of President Suharto, ending an era that had lasted since 1966. Mr. Yusuf Habibie, then Vice-president of Indonesia was sworn in as president. Barakat, Lume and Salvetti, ‘Political Transformation in Indonesia, Humanitarian Needs in Aceh’, Internal Report to the Henry Dunant Centre, (University of York: PRDU, January 2000), pp.1–2. 23 Prior to this, in an attempt to solve the many and varied political, social and economic problems that faced the Province of Aceh and other peripheral rich regions seeking autonomy, legislation Articles 22 and 5 were enacted for administrative and fiscal decentralisation by President Habibie’s Government. Under these articles the issues of regional autonomy and distribution of revenue accrued from local natural resources are addressed. Furthermore, Wahid repeated the promises made earlier by his predecessor to curb the administrative powers of the army and to institute inquiries into human rights violations committed during the 1989–98 period Military Operation Zone (DOM), as well as to give greater political autonomy to the province. Barakat, Lume and Salvetti (note 22) p.2. 24 The HDC began its work in January 1999 with the aim of strengthening intercultural and multidisciplinary dialogue with a view to promoting sustainable solutions to humanitarian problems. Before this, the former Henry Dunant Institute existed as a training centre for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC).

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25 International Review of the Red Cross, ‘The HDC begins its work’, No. 833 (27 Jan. 1999) p.70. 26 See Barakat, Connolly and Large, ‘Winning and Losing in Aceh: Five Key Dilemmas in Third-Party Intervention’, Civil Wars, 5/4 (Winter 2002), p.8. 27 ‘Annan hails Indonesia-Aceh cease-fire’, Reuters, (12 May 2000). 28 USAID (The US Agency for International Development) as well as the Norwegian Government provided substantial funding for the operation of the implementation committees, including money for offices, vehicles and other basic infrastructure. ‘AS Bantu Rakyat Aceh Rp 24, 6 Milyar’, Serambi Indonesia, 7 June 2001; ‘AS Bantu Rp 2, 4 M untuk HAM Aceh’, Serambi Indonesia, (28 June 2001). 29 At this time, the Pause signified a number of breathing spaces for both sides. The central government would be praised by the international community for pursuing a peaceful resolution to the conflict. For GAM, the joint agreement also meant greater international awareness of its cause and for some, perhaps, an opportunity to shift from rebel group to legitimate political movement or party. As this chapter argues, the Pause also unintentionally created the space for GAM to gain an upper hand in the conflict. 30 International Crisis Group, ‘Aceh: Escalating Tension’, (Banda Aceh, Jakarta, Brussels: ICG Briefing Paper 7 Dec. 2000). 31 As not all members of the monitoring team were present on each trip, their reports reflected versions of events, which were rejected by the other side. 32 The HDC’s mission in Indonesia was initiated in response to the escalating political crisis in Aceh. It resulted from a series of meetings and discussions with the people of Aceh, as well as government leaders in Jakarta. Prior to this, President Wahid had requested HDC for support in developing appropriate strategies toward a peaceful outcome of the conflict in order to avoid a humanitarian crisis. The highly charged atmosphere in Aceh and the possibility that an early referendum there would encourage separatist demands from other parts of the country, contributed to the perception that territorial unity was threatened. The HDC was uniquely positioned to facilitate constructive dialogue and address the conflict-related factors, in partnership with all the relevant representatives. This was grounded in the fact that HDC is based in Geneva where it is registered under Swiss law as an international independent institute for promoting humanitarian dialogue. Agreeing to respect the laws and sovereignty of host countries and the aim of facilitating humanitarian dialogue formed two important principles. Finally, impartiality and maintaining contact with all stakeholders signified that HDC has no position on or particular interest in the political future of Aceh. Barakat, Lume and Salvetti (note 22) pp.6–7. 33 A former, prospective oil businessman, who claims a direct hereditary line from Acehnese sultans and heads a government in exile. He campaigns for total independence, and holds a position of non-recognition regarding authorities in Jakarta. 34 35 per cent of them were in then regencies (districts) of Aceh Utara and over ten per cent in Aceh Selatan and Aceh Barat. In September a significant number of government offices were burned or bombed as well. 35 Anthony Reid, ‘Which Way Aceh?’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 March 2000. 36 In early August the visiting head of the US-based International Forum for Aceh, Jafa Siddiq Hamzah, disappeared in Medan. His body was later discovered outside the city. Later in the same month Oxfam local staff were tortured and held by security forces in south Aceh. 37 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Indonesia Consolidated Situation Report’ No. 17, (22–30 March 2001) p.2. 38 See Jane’s Defence Weekly, (28 March 2001). 39 The GoI derives 40 per cent of its oil and gas reserves from Aceh, with LNG representing 20 per cent of the nation’s export revenue and five per cent of its annual budget. Indonesia is the world’s highest LNG exporter and South East Asia’s only member of OPEC. Mobil first found gas in Aceh in 1971 and at one point it supplied

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AFTER THE CONFLICT more than one quarter of Mobil’s worldwide revenue. Mobil merged with Exxon in 1999 and will not disclose how much it has earned from the field in recent years except that it now represents less than five per cent of the company’s oil and gas output. It operates a number of onshore gas fields in South Lhoksukon, Pase and Arun. New York Times, 24 March 2001. Presidential Decree No 4 (or IMPRES 4 as it is known in Indonesia) stipulated considerations including: • ‘the Government’s effort in solving the problem in Aceh through a persuasive approach and dialogue with the armed separatist movement either in Indonesia or in foreign countries has not shown any successful signals…’ • ‘the security disturbance and public disorder in Special Province of Aceh have caused wide public unrest in the community and hinder the government and its development system.’ • ‘security disturbance committed by armed separatist rebels is increasing where special efforts in handling issues are needed.’ (April 11, 2001). The GoI has had precedents of its own ministers assisting in Mindanao negotiations in the Philippines, and in Spratly Island, the South China Sea. This is not to say that the one may not be a part of, or followed by, the other: ‘Humanitarians have long pinned their hopes on impacting peace processes through their humanitarian efforts by bringing a minimum of trust and a sense of common humanity to the most inhuman circumstances. Humanitarian cease-fires are seen as turning points for building the trust upon which peace can be built at both local and national levels. Some observers claim that humanitarian interventions prolong wars, and create opportunities for armed forces to abuse the naïve good will of others. It is possible to view the professed willingness of an army leader to participate in the fight against polio as either a step towards a peace process, or as a tactic to gain time and military advantage. Perhaps it is both. Clearly closer examination and a more nuanced understanding are necessary.’ Jon M. Ebersole, ‘Health, Peace and Humanitarian Ceasefires’ in Health in Emergencies (Geneva: WHO, Dec. 2000) pp.1–7. Crocker (note 5) p.30. In one instance, Mohammed Nazar, coordinator of SIRA, the Acehnese Referendum Information Centre, was quoted in a UK publication in November 1999 saying: ‘...the movement for a referendum is the genuine desire of student activists as well as community workers. Aceh Merdeka is not us and our concept is different. They think they’re fighting an ethnic war, but we’re just working for democratisation…. Our action is for democracy and human rights – not for this war.’ ‘Terrorising the Truth’, New Internationalist, (November 1999), pp.14–17. The ‘back channel’ was vital in Northern Ireland, where secret mediation went on for years, and where George Mitchell was known first as an economic advisor, only later taking on a mediator’s role. Jan Egeland states that, ‘[i]n the ten conflict resolution efforts in which I have been involved, all the leaders at all times claimed their goal was ‘to end the suffering of our peoples.’ In reality, there were always influential political, military or economic warlords who had their interests tied to continuing the conflict’, in Crocker (note 5) p.544. Actors must be sought out who have long term interest in restoring peace, and who can be representative and influential for the population as well. Jan Egeland, ‘The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel’, in Crocker (note 5) p.544. See also Alan Tidwell, Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution, (London: Pinter, 1998), p.168. Tidwell states that, ‘[e]ffective conflict resolution can be derailed by the exercise of power, yet power by itself is rarely enough to resolve conflict. It is a mistake, in discussing conflict resolution processes, to ignore power. Yet it is equally a mistake to believe that just because the state has a monopoly of power, the leadership will never engage in a resolution process.’ John Groom, and Keith Webb, ‘Injustice, Empowerment and Facilitation in Conflict’, International Interactions 13(3) (1987) pp.263–280.

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48 Using time given by the Humanitarian Pause to launch information campaigns, raise visibility, take over more local jurisdictions and formal functions: weddings, registrations etc. 49 The police accused them of abusing their status as negotiators, releasing one individual after 24 hours and four more at the end of August, on condition that they report regularly to the police. The charges were not dropped, and the sixth was put on trial in Jakarta for falsifying documents. 50 International Crisis Group, ‘Aceh: A Slim Chance for Peace’, (Brussels: ICG Asia Report, 27 March 2002) p.9. 51 A PRDU team consultant to HDC highlights the practical difficulties on the ground at the early stages of the Pause: ‘…we have another group of certainly several thousand villagers that at the moment is refused access to humanitarian assistance as the GAM tries to prevent the Government from supplying and the villagers from accepting. This is in reality a much larger problem and in addition is hurting the most vulnerable in the society as well as blocking general development projects at the villages that could have met some of their social needs…Furthermore, villagers are starting to protest against these actions by GAM. Some are coming directly to the Social Department offices to ask for assistance and others are starting to question if it is wise to support GAM if that implies increased human suffering...This all points to the obvious and what we have seen in many conflicts, that the control of aid, or the ability to reject aid, is a very powerful political tool.’ Memo from Arne Strand, ‘Thoughts on the HP’ (Field notes, Spring 2000), cited with his permission. Barakat and Connolly et al. point out that in many previous examples of intervention in conflicts, mediators wielded a degree of power or have at least been respected because they are seen to possess a degree of power; in particular, the recognised ability to implement sanctions or rewards to rival factions/sides. ‘From this pivotal position, a mediator can uniquely instigate compromises as a way to bring irreconcilable sides together, create joint agreements and further a process of peace. Although a facilitator can equally introduce such peacemaking steps, the key difference is the lack of power to reward and sanction. Therefore, this leaves a facilitator with the limited tools of persuasion, guidance and assistance.’ Barakat and Connolly et al. (note 1) p.8. 52 Judith Large, ‘Kafka meets Machiavelli: Post-war, Post-transition Eastern Slavonia’, Development in Practice 9/5 (November 1999). 53 See The Wajir Story, video documentary available from Responding to Conflict, Birmingham. http://www.respond.org/ 54 See Martin Griffiths, Iain Levine and Mark Weller, ‘Sovereignty and Suffering’, in John Harris (ed.), The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Pinter 1995). 55 Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community (Oxford: Westview Press 1995). 56 OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan), A Review, (Nairobi: UNICEF/OLS 1996). 57 Barakat and Connolly et al. (note 1) p.20. 58 Field Interviews in Banda Aceh with Judith Large, (May 2001). 59 E-mail correspondence from an Acehnese NGO to Judith Large, (29 May 2001). 60 During the New Order period, local NGOs were divided by the security forces into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, development-based and human rights respectively. See Barakat and Connolly et al. (note 1) pp.123–130. 61 The HDC was limited on the number of international staff they could have in Aceh. Consequently, their role and presence was mainly restricted to Banda Aceh and the intensive negotiations between the GoI and GAM. 62 The Roman god Janus is described as having two ‘faces’: one looking to the future, the other to the past. Symbolically, Janus was also the Temple of Peace in Rome which had its doors thrown open in times of war and closed in times of peace. Brewer Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth 1993) p.675. 63 Barakat and Connolly et al. (note 1) p.179.

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64 Fundamentally, the reason for the HDC’s original strategy stemmed from the need to avoid the negative connotations implied by the label ‘mediators’. This was actually demonstrated by numerous criticisms by ‘hawks’ within the Indonesian Cabinet that the HDC had assumed too much of a role in internal affairs of the state. Apart from the implications of the label, it was also evident that GAM were pushing for the HDC to have a more significant role in the dialogue process; therefore, this position was automatically opposed by the GoI. 65 Antara, 17 May 2001 and AFP, 22 May 2001. 66 Despite the expectations brought by the initiation of joint dialogue and the subsequent joint recognition of common concerns, the Pause and subsequent joint agreements could not be implemented on the ground. From this arose the uncomfortable disjunction between expectation and delivery potential. 67 Primarily, the reclusion of civil society from the beginning had severe implications. One probable explanation for this reclusion was the intimidation of prominent members of civil society by the security forces. This is apparent from attacks on local NGOs who, as the second strand of civil society, had become its protectors. During 2001, local NGOs and human rights activists were targeted, becoming unfortunate victims of the conflict. Many believed their neutrality had been compromised after the various joint negotiations and were subsequently treated as sympathisers of the rebels. As noted, during the New Order period, local NGOs were divided by the security forces into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, development-based and human rights advocates respectively. As of August 2000, this had moved to the branding of all NGOs as pro-independence activists. 1 2 3

4

5 6

Notes to Chapter 5

The DPhil research in ‘Post-war Recovery’ was undertaken at the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), University of York, funded by the Norwegian Research Council. Mentioned here could be the UN administration in East Timor, UNHCR as lead agency in Kosovo, and the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina There are academics who question the actual independence of the NGO sector, pointing to the fact that many NGOs are totally financially dependent on their donors, which then might exercise control over their priorities; see Hulme and Edwards (1997) NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?, London, Macmillan Press These principles were 1) Life-sustaining humanitarian assistance shall be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, universality, and neutrality; 2) Assistance shall be provided as part of an overall effort to achieve peace; 3) International assistance will be provided on the basis of need; it cannot be subjected to any form of discrimination, including of gender; 4) Rehabilitation and development assistance shall be provided only where it can be reasonably determined that no direct political or military advantages will accrue to the warring parties in Afghanistan; 5) Institution and capacity-building activities must advance human rights and will not seek to provide support to any presumptive state authority which does not fully subscribe to the principles contained in the founding instruments of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and International Humanitarian Law; 6) Assistance activities must be designed to ensure increased indigenous ownership at the village, community and national level and to build the country as a whole; 7) Assistance activities must attain high standards of transparency and accountability, and must be appraised, monitored, measured and evaluated against clear policy and programming objectives. For details of this aid practice see Baitenmann, H. (1990). “NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid.” Third World Quarterly vol.12(no.1): 62–85. This would include the ‘Code of Conduct’ and the Sphere Standards, but possibly locally devised standards for different types of humanitarian activity or salary levels.

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Collier (2000) analysed the pattern of conflict on civil wars during the period 1965–1999. For statistical reasons the sampling frame comprised of 47 civil wars. Their study excludes geographical, historical and ethnic considerations. Haughton (1998) wrote the technical paper – The Reconstruction of War Torn Economies which advocates key policy measures that speed the reconstruction of war torn economies. Crucially he also recognises that the inertia of painful memories can be very difficult to overcome no matter how tangible the benefits of poverty reduction strategies. The Eastern DRC has been severely destabilised by the Rwandan genocide. The main consequences of which were the numerous killings especially in North and South Kivu and the overthrow of the Congolese Prime minister. The former allies Rwanda and Uganda who are operating in the DRC to protect their own borders from Interhamwe have since clashed with each other several times. The control of the lucrative mineral wealth is factor contributing to the breakdown in the relationship. As such there are two main groups fighting each other and trying to gain control over the resources. Rassamblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD-Goma), backed by the Rwandan faction and RCD – Mouvement de Liberation (Ugandan backed faction). For a detailed account of recent events in the DRC see Amnesty International (2000). Killing Human Decency. London All countries in the context of this chapter are poor by any standard definition or through a range of poverty indicators including for example populations experiencing: High incidences of food poverty, high infant mortality rates, high levels of malnutrition, poor human poverty index and human development index readings. Haughton (1998) highlights the occurrence of decreasing aid due to governments spending on military items. Typically under Official Development Assistance guidelines aid is dependent upon the recipient government not spending more than 4–6% of GDP on military items. See Le Billon (2000) The Political Economy of War: What relief agencies need to know. ODI Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) Working Paper 33. London. Todaro (2000:768) defines this state of underdevelopment as an economic situation in which there are persistent low levels of living in conjunction with low income per capita, low rates of economic growth, low consumption levels, poor health services, high death rates, high birth rates, dependence on foreign economies and limited freedom to choose among activities that satisfy human wants. Sen (1999:38) continues that such poverty exists when relative human needs cannot be achieved, these needs are ‘freedoms’ which contribute to a persons ability to live more freely and be more physically and emotionally secure in themselves. Thomas (2001:10) states that despite the huge differences surrounding the idea of development, what exactly it means and how it is to be achieved, there is general agreement that it must include tackling poverty. Robb (1999:47) gives several definitions from various agencies. Stitt (1994) identifies different types of poverty ranging from seasonal and cultural/sub cultural to structural. It is the latter type of poverty that is most relevant to this chapter. A population’s health is central to economic prosperity (Mullen and Hulme 1996:15;) and labour productivity could be enhanced by a progressive health policy (Rwandan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2001: 63). Poverty cannot be reduced by economic growth alone, Mullen and Jones (2002) provide an interesting study of the reliance various multilateral and bilateral donors place on economic growth. Decisions need to be taken at the grassroots level and should be underpinned by policies of reconciliation and conflict resolution, which prioritise the needs of female headed households, economic resources should be withheld from rebel groups (Collier, 2000: 126) and property rights need to be enshrined in law.

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14 The allocation of land and poor land management creates tension which leads to conflict. In very poor countries the use of technology transfer and the incorporation of traditional knowledge are seen as key factors in tackling poverty through developing effective land management policies which can increase food production. 15 The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (1995) cite that increases in food productivity are only possible if agricultural research systems are mobilised to develop improved technology, if extension services are strengthened to ensure passing on the improved technology to farmers and if farmers own capacities for innovation and creation are recognised and bolstered. 16 A primary internal factor was the power struggles between Hutu and Tutsi post independence. These occurred as a result of the polarisation of resources and power in Rwanda, which was a feature of the post 1962 governments. See Prunier (1998: 54–60). 17 Centuries of over farming have caused land degradation, with associated poor soil fertility. Rwanda’s high arable land:population density ratio is one of the highest in the world, which exacerbated the poor environmental conditions. 18 A consequence of the dense population and over crowding has been the formation of tightly controlled administrations throughout the country with strict hierarchical structures. This has led to a culture of obedience to authority from above, so people follow orders unquestioningly, a concept observed by Omaar et al (1995:117–120), and Ohlsson (2000:14). 19 In conjunction with Bretton Woods Institutions the Rwandan government undertook a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1987 to stabilise the economy and promote sustained growth. However, the SAP failed to achieve economic recovery, and growth declined still further. Mullen (1999:19) states that over the 1991–1992 period, on an average basis per capita GDP declined by 5.5 per cent, private per capital consumption by 4 per cent, the volume of exports declined by 6 per cent and GDP contracted by 3 per cent. 20 Ommar et al (1995:542) cite that the North West is the heart of CDR-Land, the blessed region of the late President Habyarimana, where due to the ingrained social-historical radicalisation of the Hutu people and their subsequent hard line approach to any form of authority (other than their own radical choice), their ability to kill and spread hatred of the Tutsi (and moderate Hutu) was so effective that by April 1994 many of the Tutsis were already dead. 21 Prunier (1998:265) states that between April and July 1994, between 800,000 to 850,000 Rwandese people, mainly Tutsi and some Hutu in the opposition, were killed by the genocidal regime. The deaths included 300,000 children; the total number of people killed represented 11 per cent of the population. Those groups involved in the massacres include the MRND-CDR militia (Interahamwe), Rwandan Government Forces, the police, the presidential guard, local officials and ordinary members of the Hutu population. The use of the hate radio station, Radio Television Libre de Mille Collines and list distribution, helped to increase the efficiency of the genocide. 22 The Rwandan PRSP (2001) cites how the level of inequality has risen since the mid 1980s, the gini coefficient increasing from 0.27 to 0.455, mainly because of the widening urban-rural gap. 1 2

Notes to Chapter 8

As an example of the first, see most of the articles in the special issue on Afghanistan of Third World Quarterly, vol. 23, no.5 (2002), except for the article by Jonathan Goodhand, which illustrates the second type. Typological analysis is implicit in several studies on the implementation of peace agreements (e.g. Fen O.Hampson, Nurturing Peace. Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1996, and Stephen J. Stedman et.al. (eds.), Ending Civil Wars, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2002tedman), and the work on macro-models of peacebuilding by Roland Paris, At War’s End. Cambridge UP 2004 (forthcoming). on more formalized on certain aspects

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of peacebuilding (e.g. Howard Adelman on typologies of return of refugees, Steven Steadman on types of spoilers that can wreck peace agreements). See the definitional discussion in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, Peacebuilding as Politics, Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, 2001. R. Licklieder, “The consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945–1993,” American Political Science Review, vol.89, no 3:681–690 (1995). Karzai made a distinction between “the ordinary Taliban who are real and honest sons of this country” and those “who still use the Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country.” Speech, 30 April, 2003. See e.g. briefing by Nigel Fisher, Deputy SRSG, 10 July 2003. Relief web. His departing briefing to the press set out to dispell what he called continuous negative questioning about developments on the reconstruction front. The problems were readily recognised in the UN see e.g. report of the SecretaryGeneral to the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan, 23 July 2003, A/57/850–S/2003/754. The party led by Hekmatiar, Hezbi-e-Islami, was the main receiver of US and Saudi military assistance during the 1980s. See Human Rights Watch, Press release, 23 September 2003, www.hrw.org/press/2003/09/afghanistan092303.htm. New York Times, 2 October 2003. “German deployment to quiet Afghan north, paves way for greater security,” Reliefweb, 28 August 2003. Cited in Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, Brussels/Kabul, ICG 30 September 2003, p. 5. Ibid., p.1. To aid the mobilization against the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, Ahmed Shah Masood deliberately used references to the defeat of a shortlived Tadjik ruler in the late 1920, as well as and alleged humiliations of Tadjiks and rape of Tadjik women. Frequent display of his pictures, and attempts to establish ‘Masood Cultural Centres’ in Pashtun areas, are a constant reminder of who lost and who won the latest war. See report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan, 23 July 2003, A/57/850–S/2003/754. see King’s College Study, A, case study (full reference to follow). Care International “Rebuilding Afghanistan: A little less talk, a lot more action,” Policy Brief, October 1,2002, www:care.ca/info The World Bank by mid-2003 had a surprisingly small portfolio in Afghanistan, only 100 million dollars. The Second Transitional Support Strategy, presented in March 2003, only laid out priorities and sectors of future lending, with no financial estimates. One reason could be that the ATA expected to obtain grant money, which it preferred rather than even soft-term loans from the international banks. www.worldbank.org/afghanistan Barnett R. Rubin et.al., Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, New York, CIC, June 2003. Ibid., p. 8. See e.g. Assessing Needs and Vulnerability. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, August 2001. Breaking the Conflict Trap, Washington, DC; World Bank 2003, chp. 5. See e.g. Susan L. Woodward “Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation,” in Stedman et.al., op.cit., pp. 183–214. OECD/DAC Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, www.oecd.org/dac/htm/pubsfoc.htm#Conflict. Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand, “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Challenge in Afghanistan, Development and Change, 33 (5) 885–909, 2002. Peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan, part. I Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, January 2002.

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27 A/57/850–S/2003/754., op.cit. para. 20. 28 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. 29 ICG, op.cit., p.5. 30 Rubin, 1995, op.cit. 31 Robert Muscat, Investing in Peace, How Develoment Aid can Prevent or Promote Conflict. M.E. Sharpe, 2002. 32 (Reference the actual report and the statement by Abdullah where he referred to the Brahimi letter.) 1

2

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4

Notes to Chapter 9

This chapter develops the author’s work from a paper first presented at the conference on Recovery and Development after Conflict organised by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway, April 2000 (Zetter, 2000) and a consultancy directed for the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation entitled From Roofs to Reintegration (Zetter et al., 2001). In making these contentions I recognise that because housing is also a private undertaking it may not always contribute as much to ‘peacebuilding’ and social cohesion as communal built environment projects for mutual benefit such as infrastructure for example. I am grateful to Hans Skotte at NTNU, Trondheim for making this point. See Keen (1998) and Collier (eg 2000) who examine the economic imperatives and consequences of contemporary violent conflicts. Based on OHR Code of Practice (1998) for Bosnia and Herzegovina and other sources.

Notes to Chapter 10

Dictionary definitions of an institution refer to both ‘ law, custom, practice...in the political and social life of a people ‘ and to an ‘organisation or association instituted for the promotion of some object, especially one of public utility’. (Onions, 1965:1018). Both these definitions indicate that an institution is part of the public interface between the individual and society Similarly, social science recognises two types of institution. One that is a ‘role or organisation’ This could be a either a governmental organisation, or a civil organisation, but in both cases it has some formal structure and constitution. The other type of institution is a ‘rule or convention’ a way of doing things that is ‘diffused among a multitude of people’. The key characteristics of both types of organisation are ‘legitimacy’ for a particular people, ‘stability and persistence’ and ‘value beyond the technical requirements of a task’. (Goldsmith, 1992: 582–583). Dictionary definitions of capacity also indicate two meanings: the original sense of ‘the ability to hold...a containing space, area or volume’ and the later metaphorical sense of ‘Mental receiving power...Active power of mind; talent’. These come together in a rather vague general meaning: ‘The power, ability or facility for anything in particular’. This dichotomy has led to confusion in development circles over exactly what is intended by capacity building interventions, but working definitions evolved through practice recognise that the capacity of organisations and individuals to manage their lives is conditioned by both human talents and the holding of material resources. (Barakat and Chard 2002: 819–820). For example, the internal development of the Education Sector Strategy Plan was supported in its initial stages, at the end of the war, by UNICEF (MINED/UNICEF 1992) and in 1998 the Mozambican Government was able to obtain general donor support for its implementation. (MINED, 1998) Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somaliland.

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Notes to Chapter 13

All data and information used in this practical note were provided by the IOM Kosovo, which gave the research team direct access to a wealth of information collected by the ICRS since the beginning of the reintegration strategy. This one-year research project was funded by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), with Sultan Barakat as grant holder. Disarmament can be defined as the collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons, and the development of responsible arms management programmes, while demobilization is the process by which the armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband. On the other hand, reintegration is the process whereby former combatants and their families and other displaced persons assimilate into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities. These three phenomena are interrelated, rather than sequential, but they can be thought of as part of a sequence of things that have to happen for a society to recover from conflict.

Notes to Chapter 14

Countries such as Lebanon, Iran and Mozambique have been broadly successful in achieving positive results in terms of stability, economic growth and inclusion, democratisation. In each of these cases the recovery was promoted through a national strategic framework, although with different levels of external assistance/investment. Members of the new Afghan Transitional Administration were soon to find that pledges made at the Tokyo conference on Afghanistan’s reconstruction failed to materialise and that UN programmes in support of returning refugees have had to be curtailed. As in the case of German penetration of the Balkan economies or the foreign take over of the banking sector in Mozambique. In many countries emerging from war, overt armed conflict may come to an end whilst low-level violence continues for many years, involving former factions, de-mobilised combatants, bandits or militias. In Afghanistan, US, Afghan and other coalition forces continue to fight remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaida, in what some commentators increasingly refer to as a guerrilla war, with no indication of an early end to the campaign. See Damian Gramaticus, BBC Online News, 17 July 2002 The Afghan Development Association have become particularly adept at alleviating tensions in conflict areas. For instance, the remote area of Khas Uruzgen is divided along the lines of the Pashtun and Hazara ethnic groups...through a sensitive and meticulous approach ADA has succeeded in calming tensions and even getting the communities to work alongside each other on development projects such as education and micro-hydro power stations (Fairfax 2003:51 quoting Goodhand & Hulme, 1999) Minister of Transport Tomaz Salomao quoted AIM 258, 28th July and Minister of Public Works and Housing quoted AIM 259, 15th August, 2003) available at http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news

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– (1998) Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects. Washington DC: World Bank. – (1993) ‘Investing In Health’, World Development Report 1993. New York: OUP. Zahar, M.J., (2003) ‘Peace by unconventional means: Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement’, in S.J. Stedman, D. Rothchild, and E.M. Cousens, (eds), Ending Civil Wars: The implementation of peace agreements (pp. 567–597). Boulder Co.: Lynne Rienner. Zartman, I.W., (2003) ‘The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments’, in J. Darby, and R. Mac Ginty, (eds), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, violence and peace processes (pp. 19–29). Houndmills: Palgrave-Macmillan. Zetter, R., (2000) From Complex Emergencies to Complex Recovery: Mobilising Relevant Resources for Recovery and Development, paper given at the conference Recovery and Development after Conflict organised by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway, April 2000, published in conference proceedings, NUST. – (1999) ‘International perspectives on Refugee Assistance’, in A. Ager (ed.), Refugees – Perspectives on the Experience of Forced Migration. London: Cassell. – (1995) ‘Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees’, Studies on Emergency and Disaster Relief, No. 2, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet and SIDA, Sweden, Uppsala. – (1992) ‘Refugees and Forced Migrants as Development Resources: the Greek-Cypriot Refugees from 1974’, Cyprus Review 4/1 pp.7–39. – Hamdi, N., and Ferretti, S., (2001) From Roofs to Reintegration – a study to enhance the competencies in housing and resettlement programmes for returnees. Berne: Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation, unpublished.

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21/04 Contributors

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Sultan Barakat is a Professor of Politics at The University of York, UK. He is the founding Director of the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU). He has published extensively on the social and economic rebuilding of war-torn societies.

Margaret Chard is a Research Fellow at the PRDU, The University of York. Her research focuses on the impact of capacity building and institutional development in war-torn countries.

David Connelly is a PhD student at the PRDU, The University of York. His research focuses on improving humanitarian responses to internally displaced communities, with special reference to Indonesia.

Sean Deely is a PRDU graduate, and now an Associate. He worked with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for 10 years as a Senior Officer before joining the United Nations.

Mark Evans is a Professor of Politics and Head of the Department of Politics at The University of York. He specialises in researching comparative public policy, institution-building, policy analysis and post-war reconstruction and development.

Richard Jones is a Research Fellow at the PRDU, The University of York. His research focuses on the economic impact of conflict and strategies for economic development and poverty reduction.

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AFTER THE CONFLICT

Judith Large is Acting Head of the Democracy Building and Conflict Management Programme at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm.

Roger Mac Ginty is a Lecturer at the PRDU, The University of York. His principle research interests include peace processes; political violence; public attitudes to devolution and constitutional change.

Alp Özerdem is a Lecturer at the PRDU, The University of York. His areas of expertise include the reintegration of former combatants, earthquake mitigation strategies and humanitarian principles.

Gianni Rufini is an Associate and Visiting Lecturer at the PRDU, The University of York. He is an expert in international aid and humanitarian assistance. He is the former director of VOICE (Network of European NGOs working in Emergency and Humanitarian Aid, 1997–2001).

Astri Suhrke is a Senior Research Fellow at the Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. A political scientist, she has written extensively on the politics of humanitarian policies.

Arne Strand is a graduate of the PRDU, The University of York, and is now a Senior Research Fellow at the Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. His key research areas are the coordination of humanitarian assistance, complex political emergences and forced migration.

Roger Zetter is Professor and Deputy Head of the Department of Planning, in the School of the Built Environment, Oxford Brookes University, UK. He has published extensively on urbanisation processes in the developing world, and on forced migration.

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INDEX

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INDEX

Accountability, 25 aid agencies’ neutrality, 57 conflict resolution and, 70 coordination, 92, 201 ethical practice, 210 governance, 162, 164, 193–194 government, 153 Humanitarian Pause, 74 mediation, 81 NGOs, 132, 135, 190 of programmes, 55 peacebuilding, 164, 256 Providence Principles, 59 reconstruction, 200 Sphere Project, 61 Aceh, 3 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), 37, 67 democratic consultation, 68 GAM, 68 Government of Indonesia, 68 Hassan di Tiro, 74, 79 Humanitarian Pause, 68 peace through dialogue, 68 third party facilitation, 67 Afghan Interim Authority coordination, 90 European Union, 192 Afghanistan ACBAR, 95 Afghan National Army, 147–152 Bonn Agreement, 251 Civil Service, 203 coordination, 96 donors, 26 Government, 199 infrastructure, 194 international players, 250 media, 251 9-11, 28 Northern Alliance, 145 reconstruction, 28–29, 192

Reconstruction Trust Fund, 150 refugees security, 26, 31, 198, 253–254 Soviet Union, 20 Taliban, 202 United Nations Centre for Human Settlement, 207 United States, 9 women, 25, 202 Aid Afghanistan, 146–149 agencies, 5, 65, 261, 264, 269 allocation, 269 Burundi, 108 capacity, 213–214 capitalist model, 23 ceasefire, 70, 81 Cold War, 18, 21 colonialism, 13–14 coordination, 87–89, 188 Development Aid Act (1929), 13 donor fatigue, 217 emergency, 54 European, 64 financial 69, 70 humanitarian 3, 21, 52–53, 58, 61–63, 70, 81, 85 Humanitarian Pause, 85 Human Rights, 52 Marshall Plan, 18 Mozambique, 187 negotiation, 77, 81–85 neutrality, 24, 54–57 non-aligned Movement, 18 Organization of African Unity, 18 orthodoxy, 54–55, 65 peacebuilding, 146 personnel, 257 political, 26, 66, 81, 85, 151–174 potential, 8 principled, 24–25 recipients, 252

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INDEX

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310

AFTER THE CONFLICT

Aid, continued reconstruction, 132, 12 relief, 59 Rwanda, 116 short-term, 250 strategies, 141 United States, 149 USAID, 27 Western governments, 27 World Bank, 23 Al-Qaida Afghanistan, 28 Iraq, 30 9-11, 28 training camps, 28 Anderson, M., 64 Angola DDR, 232 health services, 130 landmines, 172 NGOs, 88 Arusha Accords, 117 Asian Development Bank, 150 Balkans, 31, 35, 243, 269 conflict causes, 44 ethnic wars, 22 Band Aid, 53 Basque Region, 85 Bonn Agreement, 141, 144–146 Bottom-up, 42, 81, 175, 198, 200, 211 Bretton Woods, 21 British Army, 149 economic decline, 17 Imperialism, 200 Secret Service, 40 United States, 29–30 Burundi, 104, 105, 107, 108, 116, 117, 181 Capacity, 4, 8, 11, 12, 19, 31, 111, 175, 177, 181,183, 205–206, 252–253, 262–269 building, 25, 42, 98 conflict transformation agencies, 36–37, 83 economic, 113, 120 European Union, 61 health, 124, 128, 131–133, 136, 137,138 humanitarian organisations, 62 infrastructure, 163–166 investment, 108 NGOs, 185, 189 Ceasefire, 11, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 44, 47–48

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), 3, 37, 67–84 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), 69 Civil conflict, 175, 27 governance, 251–254 Service, 4, 46, 142, 190–206, 209, 211 society, 11–12, 22, 30, 36, 47, 63, 73, 78, 81, 85–88,160–162, 173–174, 179–188, 207, 211, 262–265 war, 11, 17, 22, 24, 30, 34, 41, 102, 142–145, 151, 178, 207, 215, 230, 252, 262 Civilians, 13–14, 22, 24, 29, 30, 45, 51, 56, 64, 72, 75, 81–88, 98, 117, 124–126, 142, 147–, 155, 178, 232–247, 254 Cold War, 1–2, 7–9, 16–18, 21–24, 30–31, 33–43, 51– 65, 253 Colombia, 126 Combatants, 77–80, 188 former, 5, 12, 45–46, 64–65, 178, 229–247, 254–266 Conflict, x, 1–5, 7–32, 33–49, 52– 66, 67–86, 98–100, 124–139, 141–154, 185–211, 213–220, 231, 236, 240, 243–244, 250–270 pacific-conflictual dyad, 33 post, x, 3–5, 7, 12, 22, 27, 35, 44, 102–122, 131–137, 141, 155–212, 213, 228, 230, 233, 257, 258, 262, 270 resolution, x, 178 separatist and integrative models, 37 Constitution, 8, 37, 41, 44, 47, 48, 66, 82, 142–147, 152, 194–211, 215, 252 Coordination, 3, 55, 60–63, 87–99, 130, 147, 158, 160, 180, 184, 201, 207, 208–209, 235–240, 245, 263 Croatia, 158, 207 Cyprus, 167 Czech and Slovak Republics, 41 Democracy, x, 8, 9, 15, 18, 41, 63, 64, 112, 181, 199, 206, 229, 244, 250, 251, 258, 264 Development, ix–x, 2, 4, 5, 7–32, 42–49, 52– 54, 63–78, 81, 84, 87, 91, 97, 101, 103, 107–122, 123, 130–132, 134–135, 149–154, 155–172, 173–240, 246, 247, 249–269 Diaspora, 266–268 Disarmament, 5, 36, 45–46, 146, 229–231 Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR), 229–247

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INDEX Do No Harm, 64–66 DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), 104–105, 107, 116, 118 Drugs, 126–130, 213–217, 225 Dunant, Jean–Henri, 51 East Timor, 73, 83, 127, 141–143, 145, 151, 155, 165, 167 ECHO, 62–63, 91,157, 171 Economic Growth, 12, 18, 30, 31, 47, 106, 109–121, 151, 214, 258, 269 Economic liberalism, 36, 37 Economics of War and Flight, 108, 110 El Salvador, 17, 18, 126, 231, 232 Employment, 5, 12, 24, 45–46, 55, 60, 103, 111–122, 127, 129,151, 153, 163–166, 176, 178, 219, 224, 229–247, 255–261 Empowerment, 12,,25, 161, 162, 165, 176, 184, 185, 195, 265 Eritrea, 179, 181, 182, 231, 234 Ethiopia, 53, 196, 231, 232, 233 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 16 Commission, 66 budget, 62 Community, 63 Convention, 64 Development Fund, 62 humanitarian aid, 62 Union, 35, 69, 74, 90–91, 192 Exxon Mobil, 76, 85 Finland, 260, 16 GAM, 67–85 Geneva, 3, 51, 52, 67, 73, 74, 79, 81, 82, 90, 95 Conventions, 54, 24, 91 Germany, 9, 13, 14, 16, 30, 31, 148, 205, 239, 250 Governance, x, 4, 11, 72, 75, 90, 114, 121, 132, 134, 158–168, 175–176, 185, 187–190, 191– 211, 224–226, 250–257, 261–268 good governance, 164,193, 198, 200 GoI, Government of Indonesia, 67–86 Guatemala, 17, 25, 45 Gulf War, 125, 128 Hamas, 45 HIV/AIDS, 120, 121, 125, 128, 189, 215 Holocaust, 52 Horn of Africa, 25, 231

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Housing, 1, 55, 120, 153, 155–172, 232, 253, 260, 261, 266 Human Rights, 10, 23, 24, 35, 36, 45, 51, 52, 57, 59, 63, 70, 72, 75, 80, 82, 85, 93, 108, 114, 152, 162, 174, 189, 238, 244 Humanitarianism, 2, 7, 21–30, 51–66, 69–86 new, 61–64 Humanitarian Mine Action, 95, 98, 172, 229 Humanitarian Pause, 3, 67–69, 71, 72, 77 Humanitarian Principles, 2, 52, 54, 61, 63, 70 ICRC, 24, 53, 56–58, 65, 81, 91, 124, 234 IDPs, 74, 75, 78, 81–82, 85, 110–111 Imperialism, 19, 200 Indonesia, 3, 37, 67, 70–85, 143 Infrastructure, ix, 1, 10, 14, 18, 24, 29, 47, 54, 55, 81, 104, 107, 109, 118, 120, 123, 125–127, 133, 137, 151, 153, 155, 157, 161–175, 203, 204, 208, 209, 211, 215,217, 232– 236, 238, 242, 250, 254, 259–261, 267–268 Iran, 1, 17, 18, 260 Iraq, 1, 26, 29–30, 63,124, 127, 128, 174, 190, 204, 207, 250, 252, 254, 265 Israel, 37, 43, 45, 127, 204 Jamaica, 208 Japan, 9, 17, 69, 77, 205, 207 Kenya, 81 Kosovo, 5, 28, 29, 30, 35, 63, 126, 151, 158,165, 167, 172, 228–247 Lebanon, 17, 30, 32, 41 Liberal Democracies, 194 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, 40 Macedonia, 236, 241, 243–244 Macroeconomics, health, 137, 214 war, 108–109 Malawi, 233 Mediation, 2, 67, 70–71, 78–80, 143–146, 168, 189 Mental Health, 126, 136 Microeconomics, war, 105–106 Mostar, 156 Mozambique, 60, 125, 127, 141, 143–145, 155, 158, 172, 178–179, 187, 231, 260, 268

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MSF, 53, 58, 65 Nairobi, 182–189 NATO, 35, 63, 148, 158 Neutrality, 24, 25, 29, 48, 51–59, 63, 65–66, 84, 90, 130, 184, 255 New Caledonia, 42, 48 New Zealand, 148 NGOs, 7, 12, 24, 26, 29–30, 36, 44, 48–49, 52–53, 57, 61–64, 78–81, 87– 99, 113, 119, 124, 130–131, 136–137, 146, 151, 157–165, 178, 180–190, 192–205, 251, 258, 262, 265 Nigeria, 19, 207 9-11, 8, 28,30 Nobel Prize, 53 Northern Ireland, 37,40, 46, 47, 78, 80, 84 Norway, 38, 205 OECD, 27, 91, 156, 157 OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan), 81 Oslo Agreement, 204 Palestine, 18. 37, 204 Peace, x, 1–3, 8, 10–30, 68, 72, 73, 76, 81, 104, 204, 212, 215. 217, 233, 244, 246, 252, 253, 266, 267, 270 Accord, 268 building, 4–5, 10, 97, 141–154, 158–164, 167, 169, 229–231, 244, 254–258, 269 Dividend, 260 keeping, 61–63, 68, 96 process(es), 33–49, 67, 81, 96, 231–232, 235, 261–263 through dialogue, 69 Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), 2, 5, 27, 67, 71, 80 Poverty, 3, 7, 8, 11, 19, 22, 52, 54, 101–139, 151, 158, 177, 194, 214–216, 220, 251, 261, 266 Providence Principles, 52, 58–59 Puntland (Somalia), 5, 131, 134, 215–216, 220,221, 223, 226, 227, 264 Reconstruction, ix, x, 5, 7–32, 35, 42, 43, 47–48, 61, 63, 65, 69, 82, 101, 107–172, 173, 177, 179, 190–212, 213–217, 229, 233, 237, 241–270 Red Cross/Red Crescent, 51–64, 81, 91, 92, 95, 135, 138, 142, 217, 221–228 Refugees, 10, 12, 178, 188, 215, 252, 258, 265–266

Afghan, 95 opium, 126 economics, 110–111 health, 125 Karelian, 260 Mozambique, 158 Rwanda, 118 Timor, 142 Reintegration, x, 5, 18, 30, 118,142–145, 156–157, 160, 163, 177, 229–247 Religion, x, 5, 8, 144 Resolution 1244, 236, 243 Rwanda, 5, 25, 31, 61, 63, 88, 101–122, 127, 203, 251, 259, 266 Serbia and Montenegro, 24, 35, 64, 236, 243–247 Sierra Leone, 105, 125, 172, 234 Solidar, 64 Somalia, 61, 125–130, 134, 138, 215, 264 South Africa, 17, 35, 84, 231, 268 Sovereignty, 18–25, 34, 37, 58–59, 72–74, 175, 197, 263 Sphere Project, 52, 61, 92 Sphere 2 Guidelines, 157 Sri Lanka, 38–40, 47–48, 125, 191–203, 209 Sustainability, 20, 25, 113, 211–219, 228, 230, 234–235, 249, 253, 263 Tanzania, 116, 118 TB, 128, 130–131, 215 Teleological, 23, 57–58, 64–65 Terrorists, 40, 146–148 Thatcher, Margaret, 40 Training, 10, 28, 46, 70, 94, 128, 152, 162, 164, 176, 189, 191–192, 195, 201–202, 221–247, 258, 262, 266–267 Transition Recovery Programme, 179–180 Transparency, 135, 159, 167, 183–185, 190, 193–194, 200, 210 Uganda, 31, 116, 121,124, 127, 129, 133 UNDP, 81 UNICEF, 27, 61, 81, 128, 130, 135, 215, 216, 226–227 United Nations, 14, 26, 27, 36, 52, 61, 80, 87, 89–90, 96, 142, 167, 174, 207, 214, 229, 258 United States, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 21, 29, 35–37, 61, 69, 74, 146, 238 USAID, 26, 91 USSR, 22, 265

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INDEX Violence, x, 1, 11–12, 22, 23, 33–34, 39–46, 54, 62, 68, 72–85, 103–105, 122, 127, 141–144, 155, 162–163, 167, 176–177, 188, 198, 203–204, 215, 252–258, 263–264, 270 West Africa, 36, 126, 267 WHO, 61, 125–137, 214–216, 227 Women, 25, 41, 60, 95, 124, 197, 202, 203, 210, 226, 234, 252, 256–257, 261, 265, 266 health, 125–126 Woodward, Susan, 48 World Bank, 10, 12, 14, 23, 26–27, 107–108, 114, 116, 123, 132–134, 138, 150–151, 157, 174, 178, 193, 200–202, 209–210, 213–214, 217, 234 World War II, 1, 2, 8–9, 13, 15, 17, 33, 35, 207, 252, 265 Yemen, 17, 207 York, University of (UK), ix, 2, 191 Yugoslavia, 21, 35, 62–63, 80, 155 Zimbabwe, 46

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