African Security in the Anthropocene 3031251504, 9783031251504

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The Anthropocene: Politik–Economics–Society–Science

Hussein Solomon Jude Cocodia Editors

African Security in the Anthropocene Foreword by Robert Zuber, Director, Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict, New York, USA

The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics— Society—Science Volume 36

Series Editor Hans Günter Brauch, Peace Research and European Security Studies (AFES-PRESS), Mosbach, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS.htm http://afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_36.htm

Hussein Solomon · Jude Cocodia Editors

African Security in the Anthropocene

Editors Hussein Solomon Faculty The Humanities Centre for Gender and Africa Studies University of the Free State Bloemfontein, South Africa

Jude Cocodia Faculty The Humanities Political Studies and Governance University of the Free State Bloemfontein, South Africa

The cover photo was designed by Koffi R. Lawyer-Keme, who granted permission for it to be used here. The map of Africa on the internal page was taken from: https://etc.usf.edu/ maps/pages/000/32/32.htm; credit: Courtesy the private collection of Roy Winkelman; source: Mitchell’s School Atlas (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: E. H. Butler & Co., 1863). More on this book is at: http://afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_36.htm ISSN 2367-4024 ISSN 2367-4032 (electronic) The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics— Society—Science ISBN 978-3-031-25150-4 ISBN 978-3-031-25151-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Copy-editing: PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, AFES-PRESS e.V., Mosbach, Germany English Language Editor: Ingrid Kluyts, BA (Hons) Communication Science and BA (Hons) Language Practice, Member of South African Translators’ Institute. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to our children: Rookaya, Oyinmiedo, Adrian and Audrey. We pray they inherit a world where humanity lives with nature as opposed to against it

Foreword

Dr. Robert Zuber, Director, Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict, New York

In the policy spaces which we cover, many of which are at UN Headquarters in New York, we see fresh evidence, if not sufficient implementation, of what we here refer to as the “climate-conflict nexus,” or what the authors of “Contending Conceptions of African Security” refer to more explicitly and broadly as intersected “insecurity in the age of the Anthropocene.” Without minimizing any of the challenges facing African countries, the African authors of this compendium stress both internal issues of governance, terrorism and control of natural resources and of colonial legacies which have transformed but not abated, legacies which are perhaps more subtle but which nevertheless continue to keep an oversized foot securely planted on the neck of so many African aspirations. Movement within global policy often crawls when running is called for, including on addressing climate threats, and yet there are signs that major institutions and their powerful patrons are beginning to take at least some responsibility for crises which they have enabled more than abated, crises related to (in my own country at least) growing economic inequities, concentrations of consumption and attendant waste vii

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for which the term “conspicuous” barely suffices, and levels of military spending which drain global coffers of funds which could be used to build more caring and collaborative societies and fund all of our sustainable development commitments. The moniker inside the UN Security Council and beyond routinely stresses “African solutions to African problems.” But this can only happen as the voices of African scholars and policy advocates, of civil society leaders and others living and working on the front lines of conflict and our ever-widening climate emergency, are respected and, above all, heeded. Some of this is happening at the level of international policy. Some demands have taken shape, albeit unevenly, and are now eliciting some positive global responses. There is more talk of a permanent African seat on the UN Security Council. There are discussions about the importance of predictable funding for African peace operations. There are reflections, including by UN Human Rights mandate holders, of the human rights dimensions of climate challenges, including the racially charged implications of climate response which marginalizes those voices—including African voices—which suffer most from and contributed least to our climate emergency. There is even some remorse shed for failures both to ensure fair and adequate distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and to support Africa’s own vaccine production capacities more actively. But much more is needed to which this volume clearly and resolutely attests. More self-reflection, sovereign respect and urgent climate action (including climate finance) on the part of major economic and political powers. More efforts to eliminate corrupt practices and ensure that the abundance of natural resources across Africa yields greater blessings and fewer curses to African peoples. More on the part of the major arms merchants to end the scourge of widely available, trafficked weapons to groups which terrorize and humiliate, and which impede even African states’ best efforts to roll back climate risks, ensure higher levels of food security, preserve and expand livelihoods, and restore the trust of diverse communities. More efforts by African governments to ensure that a continent of active and often anxious young people can have confidence in state motives and plot a sustainable future which can be realized on African soil. As the authors note from their various contexts, if we are to effectively reverse what Gabon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to recently in the Security Council as our current, “slow death,” this will require more from each of us: including higher levels of people-centered solidarity, more effective, collaborative policy energies, and sustained attention to the essential needs and aspirations of our brothers and sisters across a vast, diverse, multiply challenged and equally abundant continent. The authors of this volume are showing us the dimensions of a more peaceful, sustainable path. We need to walk alongside them. October 2022

Dr. Robert Zuber New York, Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict

Foreword

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Dr. Robert Zuber is Director of UN-based Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict where he directs a team of researchers, advocates and interns monitoring all facets of the UN’s work on peace and security. He also serves as consultant, adviser or board member to non-profit and educational organizations including Green Map System, the Martin Luther King Jr. Center in Cameroon, Global Connections Television and Women in International Security. With degrees in philosophy, theology, psychology and education from Yale and Columbia Universities, he has written and spoken extensively and organized seminars and conferences in over 30 countries on topics from atrocity crime prevention and combating illicit small arms to the full participation of women in peace policies and processes.

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the support of a number of people. First, our gratitude to Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, this series editor, for his unfailing support, professionalism and efficiency—without which this book would not have been realized. We are also grateful to each and every author who worked tirelessly on their chapters and responded timeously to queries, often over weekends and late into the evenings. This project was greatly assisted by Ingrid Kluyts who superbly edited the manuscript. We are also extremely grateful to the support provided by the University of the Free State in the form of Dr. Nitha Ramnath and Lacea Loader. Finally, we would like to thank our wives Sanet and Kelechi for their constant support and understanding over this past year. November 2022

Hussein Solomon University of the Free State Bloemfontein, South Africa Jude Cocodia University of the Free State Bloemfontein, South Africa

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Contents

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Introduction: African Security in the Age of the Anthropocene . . . . Jude Cocodia and Hussein Solomon

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(Re)Thinking Security for the African Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bianca Naude

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Homer-Dixon’s Environmental Scarcity Theory and Potential for Conflict in the Nile River Basin (NRB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. K. Mahlakeng and Hussein Solomon

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Climate-Security and the Anthropocene: The Case of Mali . . . . . . . . Sanet Madonsela

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Exploring the Interface Between the African State, African Security, and the African Union in the Anthropocene Age . . . . . . . . . Hussein Solomon and Jude Cocodia

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Resource-Based Conflicts in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Omololu Fagbadebo, Mzikayise S. Binza, and Martin M. Kabange

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African Armed Forces and the Need for Security: Making Sense of Realities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dries Putter and Abel Esterhuyse

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Identity, Cohesion, and Nigeria’s Security Question Amid Anthropogenic Pressures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Jude Cocodia and Ibaba Samuel Ibaba

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The Role of Foreign Actors in African Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Dauda Abubakar

10 Insecurity and Regional Actors’ Role in Securing Africa: An Analysis of the Role of ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD in Countering Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Abdul-Jalilu Ateku and Isaac Owusu-Mensah

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11 Conclusion: The Future of African Security: Final Thoughts . . . . . . 165 Hussein Solomon and Jude Cocodia About the University of the Free State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 About the Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 About the Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Book Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Chapter 1

Introduction: African Security in the Age of the Anthropocene Jude Cocodia and Hussein Solomon

Abstract Much has been written on Africa’s myriad security challenges. Whilst these challenges may overlap in extant literature, they are often treated in isolation from each other. Adopting a different approach, this book views these challenges not as distinct entities but as outcomes of the evolving Anthropocene Age. In order to connect these different security challenges confronting this vast continent and its people, we adopt a broader approach to security than traditional concerns of conventional war. This wider human security framework views issues of climate change, poverty, and population growth with concerns equal to that of an enemy armed force invading one’s territory or the risk of terrorism. It is only by adopting this wider security lens that one can fully appreciate how humanity interacts with nature and how nature impacts on issues as diverse as governance, poverty or conflict. Keywords Anthropocene · Climate change · Cold War · Identity conflict · Famine · Poverty · Security architecture

1.1 Introduction Security has been at the forefront of discourses about Africa, because the continent’s development, in whatever context, and the welfare of its citizens are intertwined. Internal dynamics and external forces contribute to shaping security issues and outcomes on the continent. Many scholars treat these forces as independent and argue accordingly regarding their impact on the continent. As such, the literature research contains varied focuses on the security challenges of Africa, including neocolonialism, colonialism, international political economy, integration (social and J. Cocodia (B) Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] H. Solomon Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_1

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political), international/humanitarian aid, migration, governance, terrorism, peace, and much more. These challenges occasionally intersect in extant literature, but they are often discussed in isolation of each other. This book takes a different approach, as it examines these challenges not as separate entities but as outcomes of the evolving Anthropocene Age. The Anthropocene is argued to have begun with the development of the atomic bomb, new ideologies of universal liberty, centrality of crude oil in the global economy, and dominance of the United States—and global capitalism—in world affairs. These events have had both dire and benign, consequences for the African continent. Thus, this text examines the impact of the challenges that stem from the Anthropocene on security in Africa, as well as the responses on the continent. Issues of security in Africa have evolved over the years. The ideology of human liberty that grew at the start of the Anthropocene has fueled anticolonial resistance in Africa. Colonial powers sought to quell the dissent spreading through the continent with the clamor for Africans to take charge of African affairs. State security at the time consisted of suppressing these rebellions and Indigenous calls for freedom. Then came the Cold War and its attendant proxy wars on the continent, during which neighboring countries regarded each other with distrust if they had opposing political ideologies. This was a period when the continent was divided along the foreign ideological lines of capitalism and socialism, yet unsure of how these ideologies were to be applied for effective governance. The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement was a failed attempt at showing that Africa was ideologically neutral, as the body bore little to no relevance to the sources of African insecurity, which stemmed from the creation of artificial states that were led by venal leaders unable to deliver the public good to their people or establish inclusive polities. With the end of the Cold War came the era of new, brutal civil wars that were indicative of the failure of governance in countries across the continent. In its wake, at the turn of the century, Islamic fundamentalism gained ground in Africa’s numerous ungoverned spaces, from the Sahel to Somalia, and it gave rise to the War on Terror. As the saying goes, there is no vacuum in nature, so where governance failed to take root, and where sovereigns failed to exercise their authority, non-state actors—both local and foreign—were willing to fill the void in pursuit of either divine or mundane objectives. Through these experiences, national and regional security have been on trial, as several states find themselves increasingly struggling to manage violent opposition, both internally and externally. Consequently, there has been a call to update Africa’s regional security mechanisms to combat this threat. Unfortunately, much of the deficit that has greeted national armies in terms of professionalism and capacity have plagued regional security architectures as well. In the face of these anthropogenic challenges, the question arises: Does the solution to Africa’s increasing (in)security lie in collective security? When we consider that the Anthropocene connects humanity ever more intricately to nature, it becomes ironic that mankind is under threat as nature becomes more hostile in its response to human activity. But how has this affected security in Africa?

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Bianca Naude points out that scholars and non-scholars alike often take the concept of security for granted, focusing primarily on issues of war and violence (or their absence as an indication of peace) and military strategy. Within the African context, while this approach holds true, the concept of (in)security encompasses equally pressing issues such as resource scarcity, climate change, poverty, disease, and famine, which have become more salient on the continent and in the world, as demonstrated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Clearly, events such as deforestation, environmental pollution, and population explosion (due to improved health care), are all characteristics of the dawn of the Anthropocene and have resulted in an evermore complex relationship between humanity and nature. This constitutes a major aspect of human security, and it is tied to how the Anthropocene has manifested. Security studies in and on Africa should also encompass these issues in order to obtain a holistic picture of the security problem and its challenges. Following on Naude’s argument on the significance of the environment in human security, M.K. Mahlakeng and Hussein Solomon apply this concept to the issue of resource scarcity. They examine how this has affected relationships and rivalries among communities and states dependent on the waters of the Nile for survival. They contend that, in the age of the Anthropocene, environmental scarcity and its resultant conflict increasingly come to the fore. Owing to population growth, degradation, and uneven distribution and depletion of the Nile, the fierce competition over the diminishing resources increases the potential for an inter-riparian conflict in the Nile Basin. Nature’s dwindling resources definitely raise concerns about human (in)security, and the relevant states (Egypt and Ethiopia), which are embroiled in conflict over the utilization and distribution of the Nile, have shown no signs of reaching an agreement. A further example of the wider security issue as it relates to Africa can be found in Mali. Sanet Madonsela notes that Africa is not a major culprit in the factors that precipitate climate change; yet, its effects on Africa are massive and dire, including intense heat, reduction in rainfall, and the consequent increased propensity for conflict, as there is less arable land for farming and grazing. This situation has exceeded the state’s capacity to provide security, as there has been a marked increase in areas affected by intra-communal conflict. The instability in the north has spread to the central areas of the continent, as groups engage in violent conflict over nature’s dwindling resources. Even if these groups were able to collaborate on how to best utilize nature’s dwindling resources, there is no denying that their lives would still be under threat as the natural resources would diminish to a point where animal and plant life can no longer be sustained. It is the primary role of the state to ensure the security of its people, but this duty, as seen in Mali, has been susceptible to various pressures that make it difficult for African states to fulfill this role. At independence, states have a mandate to protect and provide for their citizens. This consists mainly of the state fulfilling its obligation in terms of welfare and security. Unfortunately, states in Africa have failed at this, as they often turn the instruments intended to safeguard peace into instruments of coercion. In doing so, they stoke the embers of rebellion within their borders as they lose the trust of the people. Consequently, they jeopardize peace and instigate violence as they embark on

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the suppression of dissent amid genuine public grievances. This trend substantiates Solomon and Jude Cocodia’s argument that, contrary to the conceptualization of institutionalism, states are not always the guardians of peace or fair arbiters of justice. Over time, they have shown strong tendencies to abuse their authority, and they stoke rebellion within their borders through the implementation of policies that foster horizontal inequality. The subsequent group/ethnic suspicion is a recipe for intense conflict. Leaders’ failure to distribute political power equitably among contending ethnic groups ultimately exacerbated tensions that culminated in the Nigerian Civil War. Therefore, Omololu Fagbadebo, Mzikayise Binza, and Martin Kabange examine the role of leadership in promoting or avoiding violent conflict. They contend that leadership is a key factor in Africa’s conflict equation. Thus, the resource curse theory that applies to most African conflicts—from the insurgency in the oil fields of Nigeria’s Niger Delta, to the Marikana massacre in South Africa, and the four decades of conflict over diamonds in the Central African Republic—could have been a non-issue if leadership had fulfilled its role of fair management and distribution of resources. Man’s prowess in exploiting nature’s resources gained momentum in the Anthropocene Age, connecting man to the environment more than ever before. While global leadership has ignored the damage done to the environment (until recently)—which has led to issues of climate change that Africa suffers from greatly—the leadership on the continent, who are occasionally in league with major powers and global corporations, exploit these resources to the detriment and chagrin of local host communities. The negligence, insensitivity, and unjustness of Africa’s political elite—which are indications of corruption—instigate violent responses from communities and groups that find themselves disenfranchised. Given the regularity of this phenomenon, it is therefore not surprising that the global view of the continent is one of conflict, violence, war, and deprivation. How equipped, then, is the African military to deal with conflict on the continent? African societies are generally malleable, owing largely to the extended family system, which ensures that society thrives more on individual and group negotiations than formal institutional rules. The military in Africa is no different from the society that bred it; thus, Dries Putter and Abel Esterhuyse contend that the continent is lacking in professional military capability. The African military capacity is a complex matter that is closely intertwined with the nature of the society it is meant to protect. It is often the relative absence of external threats and a focus on internal social and political dynamics that majorly define the nature of African armies. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the factors that shape the African armed forces and circumvent them to imbue them with professionalism and enable them to fulfill their roles of securing lives and effectively countering the growing internal threats within and across national borders. In the Sahel, climate change in the form of desertification, drought, and floods is driving conflict, which further undermines civil–military relations, as seen in the growing number of coups in Africa. As argued by Madonsela, the impact of climate change and the inability of states to weather the storm have led to increasing issues of human (in)security, as evident in Mali. Unfortunately, climate change is one of several ways in which the Anthropocene

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drives human in(security). Anthropogenic factors prompted the rapid independence of African states, which the political elite at the time were arguably unprepared for, given the explosion of ethnic tensions within their borders that they failed to address, either unintentionally or because they did not know how. The instability that followed the independence of many African states, which occasionally degenerated into war, was often due to the state’s exacerbation of ethnic tensions. Cocodia and Ibaba contend that this was the case with the Nigerian Civil War, which was the result of the state’s poor management of ethnic tensions and its role in promoting horizontal inequality, which broke the fragile bonds that held the contending groups together. The discovery of oil was instrumental in the major global powers taking sides in this conflict, which determined where the pendulum of victory swung. Moreover, anthropogenic pressures facilitated the events and outcomes of the Nigerian Civil War. Identity conflict remains a major exacerbating factor in the disintegration of social and political order in Africa (Kaplan 1994). The willingness of the political class to exploit rather than address ethnic differences has contributed in huge measure to the inability of African states to handle their security affairs, as well as the invitation for external interference, which is provided on the maxim that instability in the developing South would negatively affect the peace of the developed North. Hence, the concerted effort to support the institutional capacities of Africa by means of aid, humanitarian assistance, development programs, and the military has been viewed as the neoliberal securitization of Africa. Whoever remains unaligned with the interests of Africa’s major external ‘allies’ is deemed a threat to the neoliberal order that has been woven into the continent’s structure. Dauda Abubakar therefore notes that understanding Africa’s security requires interrogation of the role of the major external powers as well as the internal dynamics within its regions and states. While Cilliers (2006), Marc (2021), and Solomon and Cocodia (2021) contend that terrorism has been part of the African story, Glickman (2003) and Ewi (2021) view terrorism in Africa as being reinvented within the Western context of the War on Terror. This is the effect of the Anthropocene that has kept Africa bound to Eurocentrism and the ideals of the developed North (Nicholas 2015), or what has been termed the securitization of Africa. There have been calls within the African Union and beyond to infuse local approaches to issues of security and stability on the continent, hence the idea of African solutions to African problems. Aligning with Abubakar’s argument that Africa’s security requires interrogation of both the external influences and internal dynamics within its regions and states, Abdul-Jalilu Ateku and Isaac Owusu-Mensah approach the African security landscape from the latter perspective. They acknowledge Africa’s vulnerability to the ‘new’ security threats of terrorism, illicit trafficking, organized crime, and porous boundaries. To counter these threats, regional cooperation within and between Africa’s regional blocs is necessary. Facilitating this cooperation between member states—given the distrust that exists among opposing colonial lineages, the level of professionalism, and the capacity of African militaries—is a major challenge in Africa’s regional security project. The low level of inter-subregional security cooperation accounts for these subregional groups’ inability to effectively address the security issues in Africa.

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Regional blocs can only be effective when their member states are viable, and the starting point to achieving such viability is the cooperation of the public with the sovereign. Machiavelli expresses this much when he contends that the Prince is as strong as the loyalty he gets locally. States and regimes crumble from the disenchantment and non-cooperation of the public and this was exemplified in the Arab Spring. In Nigeria, the disenchantment of citizens in the north, led to the progrom against citizens from the east who lived among them, and which culminated in the country’s civil war. The disenchantment of the south in the past decade has once again taken the country to the precipice of intense conflict, a situation that is made worse by the increased terror attacks and banditry. The marginalization of the Tuaregs made northern Mali conflict prone since independence and this has spread to the central areas of the country. From Somalia to Liberia, and to Mozambique, the story is the same. Where citizens, whether majority or minority ethnic groups, suffer marginalization and deprivation, sovereigns lose support, which weakens the state and makes it more vulnerable to anthropogenic pressures. A collection of weak African states, transposes into an inefficient economic bloc, which implies greater demand for international intervention and assistance when challenges come. The discourses in this book therefore imply, tacitly and directly, that African sovereigns should be more responsive to the needs of their people, not a part of the population, but the whole. The use of the security apparatus of states should be employed first in the protection of the people, which is its primary duty, rather than in the subjugation of the citizenry. State apparatuses should be utilized first as forces of protection/preservation over being forces of coercion. This brings us to issue of the way forward. The spate of regime change on the continent, either by popular revolt as in the Arab Spring, or by military coups, questions the western style practices of governance in Africa that keep the continent tied to the neo-liberal apron strings of the west. These regime styles are questioned in this text, but in a much more subtle manner than was experienced with the emergence of coups in the 60s through to the 80s, irrespective of the different forms of civilian governments in place. The resurgence of these coups in the new democratic dispensation on the continent (which has arguably been tagged the third wave), brings the adopted styles of governance into question. As the saying goes, you cannot keep doing things the same way and expect different results. Most African countries, under this third democratic wave, are unstable and in need of a system that works for them. The continent’s current democratic dispensation has not paid off hence it is time for Africa to really begin looking inward to more indigenous modes of governance. To counter the impact of the Anthropocene, African countries need to be viable and strong and if 60 years of western styled governance has failed in this regard, then maybe the time has come to look inward to indigenous forms of governance to propel the continent to stability.

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References Cilliers, Jakkie, 2006: “Africa, Root Causes, and the ‘War on Terror,’” in: African Security Review, 15,3: 57–71. Ewi, Martin, 2021: “The 20-Year War: 9/11’s Enduring Legacy in Africa,” in: Institute for Security Studies, September 13, at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-20-year-war-911s-enduring-legacyin-africa. Glickman, Harvey, 2003: “Africa in the War on Terrorism,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 38,2–3: 162–174. Kaplan, Robert, 1994: “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of our Planet,” in: Atlantic Monthly (February): 44–76. Marc, Alexandre, 2021: “Order From Chaos: 20 Years After 9/11, Jihadi Terrorism Rises in Africa,” in Brookings, August 30, at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/30/20years-after-9-11-jihadi-terrorism-rises-in-africa/. Nicholas, Howard, 2015: “Underdevelopment in Africa—What is the Real Story?: The Role of Economic Policies and International Institutions in the ‘Underdevelopment’ of Africa. Organized by the Critical Collective and International Relations Committee,” at The Hague – International Institute of Social Studies, October 14, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SaqgQvLn5sQ. Solomon, Hussein; Cocodia, Jude, 2021: “Exploring the Confluence Between Terrorism and Identity in Africa,” in: Solomon, Hussein (Ed.): Directions in International Terrorism. (London: Palgrave Macmillan): 33–56.

Chapter 2

(Re)Thinking Security for the African Context Bianca Naude

Abstract Encompassing those elements that are essential to the survival of the state and its citizens, security has traditionally been viewed as the capacity to ensure protection from physical harm or death. As a result, security studies has prominently focused on issues of war, violence, and military strategy. This is not surprising, considering the violent historical context within which the modern state and society emerged. More critical approaches to the study of politics, however, have highlighted the fact that physical security is not the only type of security that human beings need to lead fulfilling lives, and an overemphasis on physical security has left the field of security studies short on dealing with a wide range of security concerns of the Global South and the African continent in particular. This chapter therefore aims to offer a balanced approach to understanding security as the human need for a sense of certainty about oneself, one’s environment, and one’s future, which extends well beyond simple ‘survival.’ This is especially relevant for scholarship on Africa, where concerns about climate chaos, access to quality education and health care, sustainable economic development, and social and political stability feature as prominently on the security agenda as more traditional concerns about war and violence. Keywords Anthropocene · Africa · Critical Security Studies · Human Security · Ontological Security · Self-Actualization · The State

2.1 Introduction One of the fundamental questions that the readers of this book will look to answer is, ‘What is security, and how do we deal with threats against it?’ The first part of the question is a matter of ontology: What is (in)security? What does (in)security do? And when or why do we feel (in)secure? The second aspect is epistemological: How do we come to define (in)security? Who decides what (in)security is? And how do we resolve threats to this security? This chapter deals primarily with the B. Naude (B) University of the Free State, Private Bag X13, Bloemfontein 9866, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_2

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first set of questions, aiming first to define what security is, and second, explain why and under which conditions actors feel insecure. Questions about ontology are deceptively simple, as their answers are exceptionally complex. Yet, it is important to define our subject accurately to effectively respond to the root causes of security concerns. After all, a doctor cannot hope to treat a medical condition if they do not know what it is or what is causing the symptoms. Although it would be fair to assume that all people likely view security as a fundamental human concern, there is little agreement among scholars and practitioners about what exactly security is and what its aim should be, and “while security may be a ‘universal’ need,” Bilgin (2020: 184) explains, “people experience and pursue it in different ways.” For example, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US security agenda has been dominated by the War on Terror and interventions aimed at securing US interests abroad, whereas African scholars and policymakers have argued that Africa and its people face more pressing issues of resource scarcity, climate change, poverty, disease, and famine. These issues are becoming increasingly salient across the world, as demonstrated by the Covid-19 pandemic. As human development, economic growth, and population booms continue to place pressure on the Earth’s limited resources, diseases are likely to increase, intensify, and evolve at a rate that we may not be able to respond to adequately. Famine may become more widespread as the burgeoning population needs more food, further exacerbating climate change through deforestation and farming. Security policymakers will need to balance the urgent need to mediate the effects of climate change, resource scarcity, and environmental depletion, with calls for social justice, increasing sensitivity to the human right to development and—as standards of living across the planet improve—individual desires for self-actualization and personal fulfillment. Even if individual perceptions of security are context-dependent, our solutions to (in)security must respond to the changing global landscape and the different realities that people across the planet face as a result of the evolving modern geopolitical context. The world has changed significantly since the emergence of security studies in the early 1900s. Conflict has assumed new dimensions, combatants wear new guises, and security agendas have been expanded to include new threats to states and their citizens. In the literature on international security, the conceptualization of the relationships between people, societies, and social institutions has also evolved, and we now have a better understanding not only of the material factors that influence world politics but also the relational and psychological dynamics that structure the social world. Our evolving understanding of security is embedded within a particular time in history—a geological epoch dubbed ‘the Anthropocene’—which is characterized by an increasingly complex relationship between humans and the environment in which the “unsustainable impact of humans on the biosphere” (Simangan 2020: 211) drives unprecedented environmental and ecological change. For Fagan (2017: 293), this relationship between humans and nature is not, as many have suggested, “a symbiotic and co-evolving planetary system” but rather a relation of conflict and instability between “the human and non-human.”

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Within this context, this chapter explores questions about the purpose of security and security-seeking actions in the social world, as found in the existing security literature. It is argued that security is a means through which to realize our vision for our collective future, and it should not be viewed as something that can be obtained or achieved but rather as something that humans constantly seek out on the path to becoming who they wish to be. As Barkawi (2011: 703) observes, “Security is an intermediate or derivative value that takes on meaning only in reference to a higher goal or purpose one is seeking to secure.” This orientation toward security has significant implications for the African continent, which is considered the guarantor of security for its citizens, as opposed to the principal beneficiary of security, as expounded in the final section. In this optic, this chapter echoes criticism leveled against ‘the status quo’ of security studies by critical security scholars who “call for an approach to security based on people, justice and change” (Williams 2007: 1022). While territorial threats remain throughout the world, as the ongoing Ukranian crisis demonstrates, Booth (1991: 318) underscores that threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations across the world derive primarily not from a neighbor’s army but from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease.

2.2 Defining Security in the African Context If pressed on their understanding of ‘security studies,’ many readers would agree with Walt’s (1991: 212) assertion that the “main focus of security studies […] is the phenomenon of war.” Indeed, in an older review of the state of the field, Nye, Jr. and Lynn-Jones (1988: 6) trace the evolution of security studies—of which they consider the core concerns to be “the causes of war and of alliances, as well as policyoriented research on military and other threats confronting particular countries,”—to revolutions in US foreign policy and military technology during the Cold War era. Rowley and Weldes (2012: 514) similarly observe that most contributions to the literature on security studies start with an “understanding of security as being about the threat, use and control of military—and especially nuclear—force in strategic studies during the Cold War.” This is, as Williams (2007: 1022) explains, because we tend to think of security in terms of survival—as safety from any outright threats to an actor’s1 physical existence. Common in these definitions is an understanding of security as a commodity, something that can be accumulated, which will make an actor secure once it is in their possession (Williams 2008: 5–6). (Neo)realists have long argued that actors, driven 1

‘Actor,’ here, refers to sovereign states. Given the strong realist roots of security studies, the field has focused predominantly on the security of sovereign states from external aggression. The primacy of state actors in security studies has been widely critiqued by critical scholars, as will be discussed later in the chapter. For the purposes of this section, however, I will retain the use of ‘actor’ in reference to states.

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by a ‘Hobbesian fear’ of uncertainty about others’ intentions (Collins 2004: 27–29), seek out military power in an attempt to obtain a sense of safety from some kind of threat (see, notably, Herz 1950; Jervis 1976, 1978; Glaser 1997; Booth and Wheeler 2008). The problem, as security theorists have pointed out, is that the accumulation of power and security by one actor may cause another one to feel unsafe, prompting them to start accumulating their own security resources, which results in an unending race to accumulate the most, and best, weapons (see, for example, Rathjens 1969; Gray 1971; Myrdal 1977). Yet, recent history has demonstrated that even the most powerful global actors with the largest and most advanced military arsenals rarely feel entirely safe from external threats, because, despite technological advances and more sophisticated military strategies, perceptions of others and their intentions are not transformed by force, and trust cannot be purchased. As Wendt (1992: 415) argues, “Cooperation for joint gain is extremely difficult in [a Hobbesian state of nature], since trust is lacking, time horizons are short, and relative power concerns are high.” Rooted in “militarized, masculinized, ‘top-down,’ methodologically positivist and philosophically realist” (Booth 2007: 28) Anglo-American thinking, traditional security studies has focused on the state, military power, and the preservation of an international order designed and perpetuated by states in the Global North. The Eurocentrism that dominates traditional security thinking is problematic for several reasons, but perhaps most prominently because it fails to consider the fact that insecurity, for most of the world’s states, simply does not have the same meaning as that ascribed to it by the Global North. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the majority of the African continent’s security concerns originate from within a particular state’s borders and cannot be solved by military means. Liberal institutionalists and constructivists have demonstrated that, although the anarchic international system creates conditions in which actors are engaged in a “continuing if not an unrelenting struggle for survival, advantage, and often dominance” (Jervis 1999: 45), it is possible for actors to cooperate to overcome mutual fear and suspicion in such a way that they not only avoid harm but also produce mutual gains. This can be achieved through the creation of institutions, such as the African Union, that distribute resources among member states, uphold shared values, promote dialogue, and craft a common vision of the future of international politics (see, on this point, Snidal 1991: 701; Wendt 1995: 71–74; Klotz 1995: 475–462; Keohane and Martin 1995: 45–46). The narrow definitions of security put forth by early security scholars have been further challenged by significant advances in psychology and the social sciences, which claim that humans are driven by more than mere survival. Although the two are related, security is not synonymous with survival, and it extends well beyond basic survival to include the protection of social values and the ability to exercise agency to live a meaningful life (Williams 2007: 1022–1023; see also Bilgin 2020: 183; Booth 2007: 101–102). This is not to say that physical security is redundant. On the contrary, safety from physical harm is fundamental to living a meaningful life. However, critical scholars have argued that we need to widen our understanding of security beyond concerns with military affairs. What is at stake in this widening of the security studies agenda is more than just the politics of language; it involves the

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detachment of the concept of ‘security’ from ‘war’ or ‘the use of force’ (see, on this point, Barkawi 2011: 702).2 As Barkawi (2011: 716) observes: If we think … of security, then of course a range of threats arising from the different sectors—environment, identity, economy—come into play. A threat of violence is only one type of threat to my security. By challenging the view of security as a commodity, critical approaches promote an understanding of security as a constant process of seeking out a sense of certainty about the world, which is underpinned in important ways by social relationships. Critical security studies, for example, views security as the search for, and a tool to achieve, ‘emancipation’—a condition of feeling confident about one’s actions and one’s capacity to shape one’s future in a meaningful way. Feminist scholarship has defined security similarly as a social phenomenon capable of “freeing individuals and groups from the social, physical, economic, and political constraints that prevent them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do” (Basch, cited in Svensson 2007: 4). Most people do not wish to simply ‘get through’ their lives; people have dreams and aspirations, and they feel content when they experience hope that they will be able to achieve their life goals. In fact, research has demonstrated that people are less likely to engage in violent conflict if they feel happy and fulfilled in their personal lives, while the search for happiness and self-actualization may actually fuel violent conflict (see, for example, Chingono 2017; Nieto-Valdivieso 2017). Indeed, the human need for self-actualization (feeling as though one can reach one’s potential), is written into the constitutions of many states, as well as international and supranational organizations. Consider, for example, the African Union’s description of its founding purpose: The OAU was the manifestation of the pan-African vision for an Africa that was united, free and in control of its own destiny and this was solemnized in the OAU Charter in which the founding fathers recognized that freedom, equality, justice and dignity were essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples. (African Union 2022; emphasis added) It is important to highlight from this citation the concepts of having control over one’s destiny and being able to realize one’s potential. Most, if not all, human activities are aimed at achieving these two objectives, as they add meaning to our lives and keep us from descending into a nihilist abyss. As Kinnvall and Mitzen (2020: 245) argue in their introduction to a recent symposium on the burgeoning literature in ontological security studies (OSS): [A]wareness of the fundamental contingency of human existence gives rise to the anxiety that life is ultimately meaningless. If humans are not headed anywhere in particular, and cannot 2

This, for Barkawi (2011: 703), is highly problematic and results in a field of study that is increasingly populated by “a generation of security studies specialists many of whom know little about weapons systems or military operations.” Security, Barkawi (2011: 716) argues, is a central concern of politics (broadly conceived), where politics and the use of force are, from a Weberian perspective, irrevocably entangled, where force enables politics through the provision of order, the establishment of hierarchies, and the drawing of boundaries around the types of politics that are possible in the world.

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Human well-being includes the aspects of belonging to a community and maintaining positive interpersonal relationships, feeling validated by one’s contribution to society, having a sense of purpose in life, and being able to derive a sense of permanence from the natural environment. This is because relationships with significant others make actors feel as though their actions matter and as though they can exert agency to meaningfully shape the course of their lives. Rooted in interpersonal relationships, everyday routines provide actors with a sense of existential certainty (or ontological security), serving as a “stabilizing anchor … a linear narrative through which they can answer questions about doing, acting, and being” (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020: 246). Routines, in other words, make actors feel as though they know what to expect from others, the environment, and specific situations, which provides them with a kind of blueprint for their (re)actions to events. More importantly, in the context of the foregoing discussion, relationships and social routines build trust, which ultimately enables cooperation. As Wendt (1992: 416) explains, trust and cooperation materialize over time through repeated reciprocal actions that reinforce perceptions of goodwill and eventually contribute to stable expectations that an actor is guaranteed some form of safety from others’ aggression: Cooperation is a gesture indicating ego’s willingness to cooperate; if alter defects, ego does likewise, signaling its unwillingness to be exploited; over time and through reciprocal play, each learns to form relatively stable expectations about the other’s behavior, and through these, habits of cooperation (or defection) form.

When routines are disrupted, ontological security theorists argue, actors become paralyzed with fear and anxiety about the uncertainty of the future, how they fit into this future, and how they are expected to behave to survive (and thrive). Importantly, the fear of annihilation and being forgotten—not being able to exert meaningful agency over one’s destiny—may drive actors to engage in violent and often personally harmful actions, while ruptured trust quickly turns cooperation into conflict (see Mitzen 2006: 342). This holds true for ruptures in the relationship of trust that actors maintain with the natural world: environmental changes, natural disasters, and diminishing resources pose real risks to an actor’s capacity to shape their future. So, how do the theories outlined here help us contemplate security in the African context? An essentialist definition of security, from the foregoing discussion, would be safety from harm or the threat of harm, extending beyond basic survival, to the protection of social values, and the ability to exercise agency to live a meaningful life. However, critical approaches to security challenge us to shift our thinking on the topic from what security is to what security does. Security, it is clear, allows actors to feel that they have purpose in life. Through their relationships with significant others, and their capacity to contribute to society, actors feel validated—as though their existence matters. In other words, security creates an environment in which actors can become who they feel they should be, allowing them to circumnavigate the deep-seated fear of annihilation (see, on this point, Berenskötter 2020). Implicit in the argument here is an important distinction between the individual and the collective(s) to which they

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belong. Thus far, this chapter has emphasized security as a human need and tool for achieving personal happiness, well-being, and actualization. These topics have, of course, received significant attention in the volumes of literature on human security produced since the concept first appeared on the security agenda in 1994.

2.3 Two Securities and the Human Subject Introduced to security discourse in the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report, the concept of ‘human security’ has steadily made its way into mainstream security scholarship over the past three decades (see, importantly, Axworthy 2001; King and Murray 2001–2002; Paris 2001; Kaldor 2007). The rise of the concept of human security, for Acharya (2001: 444–445), reflects broader changes occurring in post–Cold War global politics, including the “debate over the disarmamentdevelopment nexus … a growing recognition of non-military threats in global security debates [and] a new international climate marked by changing norms of state sovereignty with particular regard to human rights protection.” Human security, according to one of its earliest proponents, Lloyd Axworthy (2001: 20), “puts people first and recognizes that their safety is integral to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security.” While state security remains important, Axworthy explains that it is no longer sufficient to ensure the safety and well-being of people across the globe. In fact, the state is occasionally guilty of preying on its citizens through greedy political elites and government officials who become implicated in the abuse and exploitation of local populations—in direct violation of their oath of office. For Sen (2000: 2), the shift in emphasis from traditional military security to a more human-centered approach is attributable to the global recognition that “developing dangers and adversities” play an increasingly important part in the creation of insecurity throughout the world: The prospects of survival have been made less favorable in many parts of the world through problems in public health, including the emergence and spread of particular diseases, such as AIDS, new types of malaria, drug-resistant T.B., and so on. Similarly, in the growing persistence and sometimes accentuation of civil wars and associated killings. Human security, in other words, asks us to shift our focus from security as the protection of national interests and the preservation of the territorial integrity of the world’s states to thinking about security as the creation of conditions under which ordinary citizens can exist in dignity, free from any constraints in their pursuit of happiness and fulfillment. This view is perhaps best articulated by the former Prime Minister of Japan, Obuchi Keizo (quoted in Sen 2000: 1), in his address at the Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow held in Singapore on May 4, 1988: Human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired. [Human security] is the keyword to

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comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats.3 The debate, for Acharya (2001: 443), comes down to the distinction between ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want,’ with the core question being, ‘Who should be protected against which threats?’ The human security framework, on his view, emphasizes human freedom rather than state and regime security as its core pursuit (see also McCormack 2008: 117–120). Security, in the human security framework, is not limited to physical safety from death, disease, and starvation—economic crises and shocks can have as great an impact on the daily lives of the global population as war and violence, while the exclusion of the poor from political participation, along with further entrenchment of an already highly marginalized social position, are perhaps more damaging than the ravaging effects of loss of income or issues of liquidity (Sen 2000: 3–4). Among the vulnerable groups most affected by governance failures and social marginalization are women and children, whose security is directly and indirectly threatened through severe deprivation as a result of the persistent neglect of social and economic institutions, such as schools, hospitals, and so on. In addition, as remarked earlier in this chapter, happiness and its pursuit are important factors both in the occurrence and prevention of political violence. Indeed, a 2004 report of the United Nations’ High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change underscored the links between poverty, underdevelopment, and terrorism, highlighting that “poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation and war feed one another in a deadly cycle” (McCormack 2008: 119). With the emphasis on the security of individual people, the following question inevitably arises: What role does the state play in this reimagined security concept? This chapter aligns with the view that “states should … be [treated] as a means to provide security for their people, not as the ends of security policies” (Williams 2007: 1023; see also Booth 1991: 319; McCormack 2008: 122; Bilgin 2020: 184). It should be clear, however, that this view does not do away with the state in its entirety. To the extent that states are central to domestic development efforts— particularly the provision of basic services, such as education, health care, and social welfare as previously remarked—the state remains an important security actor. However, it plays a more fundamental role in the (in)security of individual people, as explored in this final section of the chapter.

2.4 Whither the African State? Acharya (2001: 451) considers development and the freedom from want to be central to the broadening of human freedoms. However, he views these divergent approaches 3

Former Prime Minister Keizo’s full address is accessible via the Japan Center for International Exchange at: https://www.jcie.org/analysis/books-reports/asian-crisis-and-human-security/. Date accessed: March 12, 2022.

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to human security as “complementary and evolving understandings of a complex and larger paradigm of human security in response to emerging challenges.” Importantly, in Acharya’s view, the state plays a central role in the provision of those basic services that allow people the freedom to pursue higher pleasures. In other words, the state is expected to create an environment in which people feel empowered to pursue what they imagine to be their destiny, free from any constraints resulting from material threats to their physical or psychological well-being. Security thinking should, in this context, include the strengthening of democratic processes and governance infrastructure, the establishment of functioning democracies with high levels of tolerance for political opposition, and the promotion of “a culture of open public discussion” (Sen 2000: 3). However, it also should extend beyond democratic consolidation, as McCormack (2008: 119) remarks, to address challenges relating to underdevelopment and poverty: For individuals living in situations of dire poverty and underdevelopment there is little chance of leading any kind of fulfilled life, even if formal political freedoms exist. It should be clear that states play a central role in the emancipation of citizens through the creation of an environment in which people are empowered to pursue their own vision of who they wish to be. States, in other words, maximize individual freedoms rather than limit them. However, this is only possible in a configuration where the state came into existence organically, as the expression of the collective will of a group of people who voluntarily accept the limitation of certain agencies in service of the greater good—in this case, the maximization of individual freedom. Security on the African continent is largely undermined by states themselves— both in terms of their institutional weaknesses and the tendency of some to prey on citizens. Even so, states remain essential to the provision of security for citizens, as Spears (2007: 15) remarks: Human security is jeopardized by the specific nature of many contemporary African states [yet] the state as an institution still holds many of the answers to advance a human security agenda … the state remains the fundamental purveyor of security [but] it often fails to fulfil its security obligations—and at times has even become a source of threat to its own people. A major problem with the state–citizen relationship in Africa, Spears (2007: 16) argues, is the lack of an organic social contract in which citizens willingly transfer certain rights and obligations to representatives who accept responsibility for, and accountability to, the citizenry they serve. It is widely accepted that African states were created by European powers as juridical entities rather than socially constructed institutions, and they served the interests of European powers rather than the citizens within their arbitrary borders (see Spears 2007: 16; also, Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 1–24). Even after decolonization, Spears argues, the African state’s only raison d’être was to oppose further colonial rule (Spears 2007: 17). No modern African state emerged as a result of the will of the people to create an institution that represents their collective interest or facilitates the achievement of their collective goals. Consequently, modern African states are viewed as commodities to be seized for personal gain rather than vehicles to

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achieve social goals. As Spears (2007: 18) remarks, “juridical sovereignty has meant that the state is … something that can be appropriated by political elites rather than made” (emphasis in original). Because the African state does not owe its existence to its people, African regimes rely less on effective service provision or mobilization of support from citizens to remain in control of society than “on a combination of patronage and force—either directly or through some proxy—to sustain their rule and suppress challenges or uprisings that emerge from a distant and marginalized quarter” (Spears 2007: 17). In other words, African states were founded on, and continue to exist through, the limitation or outright suppression of individual freedoms, rather than the maximization of freedom, which contradicts the ultimate goals of a human security approach as previously discussed. For McCormack (2008: 122), importantly, the ‘emancipation’ of people, as it is promoted in the human security framework, can only be achieved by “giving political power and control to the citizens and establishing clear lines of accountability and responsibility.” In the discussion on the role of the African state in the creation of an environment that promotes human freedom and encourages individuals to pursue higher pleasures, the relationship between the state and its citizens must urgently be transformed through the establishment of a true social contract. But there is something deeper at stake. While supporters of the human security framework tout emancipatory political outcomes, McCormack (2008: 123–124) argues that citizens of non-Western states who are usually at the receiving end of humanitarian interventions by great powers— justified through recourse to the principles of the human security framework and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)—are, in effect, disempowered by the transference of sovereignty to external actors and the simultaneous preclusion of any hope that citizens may gain power or change a political system that is not working in their favor. In other words, the principle of emancipation is undermined by the abdication of responsibility for the security of citizens of African states to international bodies and other, more powerful, state actors who are not directly accountable to citizens. While the emphasis of the approach to security in this chapter has been on individuals, this section underscores the fact that the state remains a central security actor, and democratic participation is the primary means for holding it accountable to its citizens. If, however, modern African states appear to be in a state of terminal decline rather than ascension, as Spears (2007: 19) remarks, the question can be asked why the state should continue to occupy a central role in the lives of citizens. Why not abolish the state in favor of a rule of the people by the people in the literal sense? The simple answer is that private citizens cannot assume the duties and responsibilities of the state, however much they may wish to. Even where resources can be pooled to meet collective needs or ensure an even distribution of wealth among the members of society, no private citizen or group of citizens can access or act causally in the international system (see, on this point, Naude 2022: 31). What affords citizens a voice in the international system is the state that speaks on their behalf (see, notably, Wendt 2015: 281), but states fulfill another, more fundamental, function in the lives of private citizens.

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The first section of this chapter reflected briefly on literature from the ontological security stream (OSS) of international relations scholarship, highlighting the importance of routinized relationships for feelings of existential certainty that ultimately allow people to act meaningfully in this world. While OSS focuses predominantly on the security that relational routines provide for actors, routines are performed in specific geographic locations, which Kinnvall (2004: 747) argues provide “site[s] of constancy in the social and material environment [within] which daily routines of human existence are performed.” Thus, considering their geographic and territorial characteristics, states fulfill the essential function of rooting private citizens in sites of constancy within and upon which to pursue, shape, and realize their destinies, enabling them to “answer questions about doing, acting and being” (Kinnvall 2004: 747), ultimately, allowing them to feel secure. This observation is particularly important in the age of the Anthropocene, where we are eroding our natural world through unbridled technological and economic growth. In this context, states have an important role to play in mediating the need for human and economic development, as well as the need to conserve the sites of constancy that allow humans to feel secure in the first place.

2.5 Conclusion Although our individual perceptions and experiences of security differ significantly, it remains a fundamental human concern. While security studies has traditionally focused on external threats to the sovereign state, by emphasizing survival as the central concern in security thinking, critical scholars have demonstrated the need to broaden our approach to security to include more diverse threats to human wellbeing. Security, in this framework, is about more than just surviving, it is about being free to pursue one’s goals and living a life of dignity. When (re)thinking security for the African context, these considerations should be foregrounded: there can be no talk of achieving peace, ending terrorism, protecting the environment, or investing in sustainable development without recognizing that the ultimate goal of all these activities is to allow African people to realize their potential in a world that they are able to shape meaningfully around their own hopes and aspirations. By engaging with existing security literature, and introducing newer insights from ontological security scholarship, this chapter has argued that security should not be considered a commodity—as something that can be attained—but rather a dynamic part of the process of crafting our destinies. Feeling secure allows us to act meaningfully in the world by giving us a sense of knowing how to (re)act to our environment in such a way that we are able to influence it. More importantly, our environment provides a site of constancy within which to perform the daily routines that facilitate the realization of personal and collective goals. The focus of security policies, therefore, should be on creating an environment in which Africans are free from both physical and psychological suffering, and eliminating obstacles in their path to leading creative and fulfilling lives.

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Lastly, this chapter has argued that, although African states are often criticized for preying on their citizens, states are important security actors in that they are the only vehicles for collective action—and certainly the only means for private citizens to access the international system and act causally within it. In order to arrive at a place where African states are no longer viewed as impediments to their citizens’ pursuit of fulfillment, it is imperative that a true social contract be established, where the state itself is considered a common good rather than a commodity that brings personal wealth and power to those who come to ‘possess’ it. Indeed, until the African state accepts responsibility for the citizens it serves, African citizens will be forced to rely on external forces, who are neither responsible for nor accountable to them, for security. Contrary to conventional thinking, a truly pluralist state maximizes rather than limits individual agency and personal freedoms.

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Sen, Amartya, 2000: “Why human security?” in: Text of Presentation at the International Symposium on Human Security in Tokyo, July 28, at: https://www.ucipfg.com/Repositorio/MCSH/ MCSH-05/BLOQUE-ACADEMICO/Unidad-01/complementarias/3.pdf. Simangan, Dahlia, 2020: “Where is the Anthropocene? IR in a New Geological Epoch,” in: International Affairs, 96,1: 211–224, at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz248 (accessed May 17, 2022). Smith, Karen, 2016: “South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: From Champion to Sceptic,” in: International Relations, 30,3: 391–405, at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117816659596 (accessed February 22, 2022). Snidal, Duncan, 1991: “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” in: American Political Science Review, 85,3: 701–726, at: https://doi.org/10.2307/1963847 (accessed March 18, 2022). Spears, Ian S., 2007: “Human Security and the State in Africa,” in: African Security Studies 16,2: 14–25, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2007.9627413 (accessed March 10, 2022). Svensson, Katja, 2007: “Human Security as Inclusive Security–Gender, Epistemology and Equality,” in: African Security Studies, 16,2: 2–1, at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2007. 9627412. Walt, Stephen M. 1991: “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” in: International Studies Quarterly, 35,2: 211–239, at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471 (accessed February 28, 2022). Wendt, Aleexander, 1992: “Anarchy is What States Make of it,” in: International Organization 46,2: 391–425 at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764 (accessed February 28, 2022). Wendt, Alexander, 1995: “Constructing International Politics,” in International Security, 20,1: 71–81, at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265960638_Constructing_International_P olitics. Wendt, Alexander, 2015: Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology (London: Cambridge University Press). Williams, Paul D., 2007: “Thinking About Security in Africa,” in: International Affairs, 83,6: 1021–1038, at: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00671.x (accessed February 19, 2022). Williams, Paul D. (Ed.), 2008: Security Studies: An Introduction (London & New York: Routledge).

Chapter 3

Homer-Dixon’s Environmental Scarcity Theory and Potential for Conflict in the Nile River Basin (NRB) M. K. Mahlakeng and Hussein Solomon

Abstract By the end of the twentieth century, the realm of international relations was characterized by resource geopolitics (i.e., the potential for conflict as a result of the scarcity of vital resources across political boundaries). The idea presented by early scholars regarding the link between the environment and conflict was speculative and imprecise, hence the need for a theory that addresses this link. The hypothesis behind the environmental scarcity theory is that “resource scarcity, through the three causal forms of scarcity (i.e., demand-induced, supply-induced, and structuralinduced scarcity), has the potential to cause conflict.” In the age of the Anthropocene, environmental scarcity, and therefore conflict, is increasingly coming to the fore. This chapter argues that due to population growth and degradation and depletion of the Nile, along with its uneven distribution, fierce competition over the already finite water resource increases the potential for an inter-riparian conflict in the Nile Basin. Understanding the link between the two variables—environmental scarcity (independent variable) and violence (dependent variable)—requires an analysis of the effects and nature of environmental scarcity. Keywords Nile River · Environmental scarcity · Conflict · Africa

3.1 Introduction The Anthropocene Epoch is an unofficial unit of geologic time (National Geographic 2022). It refers to the fact that, in this period, human activity has started influencing M. K. Mahlakeng (B) Department of Political and Administrative Studies, National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho e-mail: [email protected] Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa H. Solomon Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_3

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the planet’s ecosystem and climate. By the end of the twentieth century, the realm of international relations was characterized by resource geopolitics (i.e., the potential for conflict as a result of the scarcity of vital resources across political boundaries) (Diehl 1991: 11). With the intensification of ethnic and ideological tensions that would witness inter-state conflicts, Klare (2001: 57) argues that the competition for access to vital resources has become a driver for conflict in internal relations. The emergence of these environmental conflicts is exacerbated in areas where resources are shared and were once plentiful (Homer-Dixon 1999: 48). In recent literature, scholars have focused on the role that water plays in international affairs and conflicts, and they have supported the notion that water will be the future cause of inter-state conflict (Yoffe and Wolf 1999). The scarcity of water—a vital natural resource—guarantees future social unrest, geopolitical friction, and war (Klare 2013). According to Ohlsson (1999: 211), the driving force for international conflict over water is the desire to increase supply and manage demand. Despite conflicting beliefs regarding the occurrence of water wars, current riverwater shortages, fierce competition over shared rivers, and the uneven distribution of internationally shared rivers breed water conflicts (Postel and Wolf 2001: 60). Shared water resources become a source of conflict if the river is shared “across” rather than “along” a border (Toset et al. 2000: 980–981). When the demand for water surpasses available supply in shared river basins, a nation can justify military action (whether offensive or defensive) in the name of economic preservation and national security. River water is likely to cause inter-state resource wars. Because rivers flow from one area to another, one country’s access can be affected by another one’s actions. The argument that the scarcity of renewable resources such as water will lead to violent conflict suggests that the decreasing supplies of resources that can be controlled physically (e.g., water) will provoke inter-state simple-scarcity conflicts as well (HomerDixon 1999: 228). Simple-scarcity conflicts are “conflicts over scarce renewable resources between states. They are particularly likely to break out over resources that are essential for human survival and can be physically seized or controlled like river water, fisheries and agricultural productive land” (Homer-Dixon 1991: 87). According to Homer-Dixon (1999: 228), the word “simple” is used to distinguish this type of conflict from others that include psychological and social processes. Conflicts that include psychological and social processes are those embedded within a context of long-standing religious, cultural, or worldview differences and inequalities, and which occur mostly within countries rather than between countries. Environmental scarcity causes simple-scarcity conflicts and increases society’s demands on the state, while simultaneously decreasing its ability to meet those demands (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998: 281). The simple-scarcity conflict argument posits that political disputes and violent conflicts between states occur when “states rationally calculate their interests in a situation where there is a fixed or shrinking pie of natural resources” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 137). Therefore, this forces states to seize or claim ownership over a shared renewable resource (Lipschutz 1989: 46). The article focuses on the environmental scarcity theory to argue for the possibility of a potential water conflict in the Nile River Basin.

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3.2 Environmental Scarcity Theory The outbreak of violent conflict is complex. Environmental scarcity emerges within a political, social, economic, and ecological context and interacts with many of these contextual factors to contribute to violence (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998: 279). Since the early 1990s, both academic and policy debates have argued that increasing environmental scarcity is a root cause of violent conflicts—and it is believed to be rapidly increasing. By definition, environmental scarcity refers to “the declining availability of renewable natural resources such as freshwater or soil” (Bingham 2001). This means that the supply of renewable resources such as water is not sufficient to meet the local demand (UNEP 2012: 29). Environmental scarcity is caused by the degradation and depletion of renewable resources, the increased demand for these resources, and/or their unequal distribution (Homer-Dixon 1999: 177). Scarcity-induced inter-state conflicts over water have become probable (HomerDixon 1999: 5). Supporting this is Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity theory, which argues that the scarcity of renewable resources, such as cropland, fish, forests, and—most importantly—water, could lead to the outbreak of violent conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1999: 8). The environmental scarcity theory illustrates how the scarcity of renewable resources can contribute to social breakdown and violence (Homer-Dixon 1999: 4) by drawing links between the environment and conflict. Homer-Dixon (1999: 4) claims that the idea presented by early scholars regarding the link between the environment and conflict was speculative and imprecise, hence the need for a theory that addresses this link more comprehensively. The hypothesis behind the environmental scarcity theory is that “resource scarcity, through the three causal forms of scarcity (i.e., demand-induced, supply-induced, and structural-induced scarcity) has the potential to cause conflict.” The concept of “environmental scarcity” encompasses all three of these sources. Unfortunately, most analysts study resource depletion and population growth in isolation from resource distribution. However, the environmental scarcity theory allows these three distinct sources of scarcity to be incorporated into one analysis. Thus, the theory argues that an analysis of the Nile disputes should not be conducted only on the basis of its uneven distribution but concurrently with water demand and supply (Homer-Dixon 1994: 8–11). Empirical evidence suggests that the first two sources are most dangerous when they interact with unequal resource distribution (Homer-Dixon 1994: 8; Urdal 2008: 593). The environmental scarcity theory stipulates that these types of scarcity (i.e., demand-induced, supply-induced, and structurally induced) are not mutually exclusive; they often occur simultaneously and interact with one another (Homer-Dixon 1994: 8-11); Uneven distribution never acts on its own, its impact is always a function of its interaction with resource demand and supply.

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3.2.1 Demand-Induced Scarcity Roudi-Fahimi et al. (2002: 4) assert that the most important factor in the demand for water is population growth, which directly increases the pressure on a nation’s available resources and production capabilities, leading to the scarcity of renewable natural resources, such as productive land, freshwater, and forests (Weiner and Russell 2001: 3). The demand-induced scarcity argument posits that population growth, or an increase in consumption levels, decreases the amount of limited natural resources available to each individual (Bingham 2001). If a resource base is constant, the availability of resources per person will diminish with the increasing number of people who have to share it. Such scarcity can also arise from an increase in demand per capita (Urdal 2008: 592–593). Homer-Dixon (1999: 48) indicates that an increase in demand assumes that the growth in population divides the pie into smaller slices for each individual, group, or state. Demand-induced scarcities arise only with resources that are rivalrous1 (e.g., fisheries, cropland, forests, and water). In recent years, the global pressure on limited freshwater resources has been mounting due to increasing population growth. In October 2011, the global population surpassed seven billion, and it is projected to rise to eight billion by 2025. This increase, coupled with rising rates of consumption, intensifies competition over water (UNEP 2012: 17–18). Population growth becomes a driver of scarcity as it boosts the demand for a specific resource (Homer-Dixon 1999: 15). According to Kennedy (2001), population growth engenders resource scarcity by creating a demand-induced scarcity, which forces states to adopt selfish measures in an equation where a resource is shared among more than one state. A comprehensive argument is that population growth will surpass the natural resources of the immediate environment, leading to deprivation, which will ultimately lead to conflict and instability, either directly through competition for scarce resources or indirectly through the generation of environmental refugees. Environmental threats have often been attributed to such rapid human population growth (UNEP 2006: 1). The continuation of the downward spiral of increasing population and declining environmental quality is inevitable (Urdal 2008: 418). According to Benjaminsen (2008: 819–821), African drylands are allegedly among the areas most severely affected by degradation, and water has been regarded as a finite and fixed resource in these regions. Toset et al. (2000: 274) argue that only 3% of the world’s water supply is classified as freshwater and available for human consumption. Klare (2001: 57) argues that the dangers associated with international competition for adequate water resources will inevitably increase. In basins, rivers, lakes, and aquifers shared by more than two countries, competition for limited supplies can lead to access to water becoming a matter of national interest. Water will therefore become increasingly salient in inter-state politics, in many cases even leading to violent conflict (Gleick 1993: 79–80). 1

A resource is deemed to be rivalrous when its use by one economic actor reduces its availability to others (Homer-Dixon 1999: 48; Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998: 280).

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3.2.2 Supply-Induced Scarcity Supply-induced scarcity results from the degradation or depletion of natural resources (Urdal 2008: 593). According to the supply-induced scarcity hypothesis, a drop in the supply of a key resource implies that the total resource shrinks, because there has been a reduction in both quantity and quality (Homer-Dixon 1999: 48). This scarcity refers to environmental degradation that decreases the overall available amount of a limited natural resource, therefore decreasing the amount available to each individual (Bingham 2001). With regard to environmental degradation, much of it pertains to “the negative human disturbance.” This refers to the human-made environmental changes that consequently have a negative impact on human society (Libiszewski 1992: 4). “Supply-induced scarcity results from rivers running dry, lowered water-tables and polluted groundwater and surface water courses” (Van der Molen and Hildering 2005: 135), and it simply becomes less of a resource as a result of non-sustainable use that does not allow the resource to regenerate. This occurs, for instance, through land degradation due to agriculture, industry, and domestic use that ultimately erodes the landscape.

3.2.3 Structural-Induced Scarcity Structural scarcity refers to the unequal access or distribution of natural resources (Bingham 2001). This is a form of scarcity that applies only to certain groups that, relative to other groups, are excluded from equal access to particular resources. Such unequal social distribution of a resource does not presuppose actual scarcity if the resource is distributed evenly (Urdal 2008: 593). Van der Molen and Hildering (2005: 135) argue that structural scarcities emerge when more powerful segments of water users confiscate a larger part of the scarce resource. This implies that some individuals, groups, or states receive disproportionately large slices of the pie, while other groups receive slices that are too small (Homer-Dixon 1999: 48), which, according to Homer-Dixon, may cause violent conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1999: 48; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998: 6). Homer-Dixon (1999: 48) asserts that structural scarcities arise from resources that are “excludable,” which means that property rights or other institutions can be used to prevent access to the resource by some actors. Renewable resources, such as river water, have characteristics that permit the assignment of clear property rights. Conflicts over natural resources arise when parties disagree about the ownership, allocation, and use thereof. An analysis of these agreements is necessary to illustrate structural-induced scarcity as argued by Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity theory. It also aims to provide a theoretical link between structural-induced scarcity and the potential for conflict in the Nile Basin. This link is made on the basis that property rights, or other institutions, are implemented to prevent other actors from

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accessing the water. Moreover, the scarcity and grievances that may result from this can reinforce existing stress factors, aggravate tensions, and incite disputes (HomerDixon 1999: 48; UNEP 2012: 14). Thus, the environmental scarcity theory denotes that the increasing scarcity of renewable resources, or grievances over their governance and/or transboundary nature, can reinforce existing stress factors and play a contributing role in the decision to resort to violence (UNEP 2012: 14).

3.3 Theoretical Application: Environmental Scarcity Theory in the Nile River Basin 3.3.1 Demand-Induced Scarcity: Population Growth in the Nile River Basin According to Baecher et al. (2000: 11), the Nile faces immense population growth, and the use of the Nile waters for a growing population can become a source of conflict. The Nile Basin Initiative pointed out that population growth in the Nile Basin is increasing at an unprecedented rate; and in 2010, the total population in the Basin countries was 424 million, of which 232 million people live in the Basin. According to the Nile Basin Water Resources Atlas (2022), the current total population of the Nile Basin countries is estimated at 487.3 million. Furthermore, 257 million people are estimated to be living within the Nile Basin (Nile Basin Water Resources Atlas 2022). The initiative further estimates that by 2025, there will be 600 million people living in the Basin countries and more than 300 million people living in the Basin. In addition, it is estimated that the total population in the Nile Basin will reach 647 million by 2030, which represents a 7.8% increase from the population in 2025 and a 52% increase of the population from 2010. It also estimates that just over half of these people will be living within the Basin boundaries (Nile Basin Water Resources Atlas 2022). This rapid population growth increases pressure on the natural resource base (UNEP 2006: 1). The population growth concentrated in the Nile Basin and the migration to the region have further exacerbated this population activity. The continued population growth will certainly add to the future water demands in the Basin (Baecher et al. 2000: 11), and it will place immense pressure on the Nile and its resources, leading to severe degradation, which will negatively affect and/or reduce outputs (Okascha 2012: 15). This increase in the demand for water resources generates numerous problems that many international rivers face. As the population in the Basin is expected to double in the coming years, pressing challenges are evident as societies living close to the river are confronted by social, environmental, and economic challenges (UNEP 2006: 1–5). The situation is worsening because the per capita water availability in the Nile Basin countries is expected to fall dramatically (Okbazaghi 2008: 5), which means that disputes over water supplies would become a serious source of conflict among these riparian countries. It is predicted that by 2025, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,

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and Burundi will experience water scarcity,2 while Uganda, Tanzania, and Eritrea will be under water stress3 (Karyabwite 2000: 6–7; UN 2021). A fall in per capita water availability, coupled with rapid population growth, leaves most of the riparian countries facing internal and inter-state conflicts, immense droughts, and famine. Despite being the source of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia has faced worsening drought conditions and famine between 1965 and 2006, making it highly dependent on international food aid (Okbazaghi 2008: 5). The agricultural activities that feed the growing population contribute to the decline in per capita water availability and increase non-point pollution, siltation, and erosion (Baecher et al. 2000: 11).

3.3.2 Supply-Induced Scarcity: Water Depletion and Degradation in the Nile River Basin The high dependence of all eleven riparian countries on the Nile River Basin has led to its depletion. Rapid population growth depletes the region’s already scarce water supplies as demands from agriculture, industry, and domestic use rise (Di Nunzio 2013: 2), as population size affects agricultural productivity. Agricultural activity is affected by resource degradation, which is, in turn, affected by the land-use decisions people make based on population size (Baecher et al. 2000: 11). Inappropriate landuse practices and farming techniques such as overgrazing by domestic livestock, agricultural practices in irrigated and large-scale farms in rainfed areas, and poor cultivation practices have the greatest impact on land degradation. These practices are the most common land-use practices in the Nile Basin. Environmental degradation and depletion pose an alarming threat for conflict in the region. For instance, high levels of water degradation led to Cairo—who has maintained dominance over utilization of the Nile for decades—consuming approximately 20% more water in 2020. This suggests that other riparian countries will be left with little, if any, water to consume for developmental purposes, and less consumption of water by other riparian countries means greater potential for disputes and conflict (Dakkak 2020).

2

Water scarcity is a condition in which the annual availability of internal renewable freshwater is 1,000 cubic meters or less per person (CBM/p.p.) (Xercavins 1999: 158). 3 Water stress is a condition in which the annual availability of internal renewable freshwater is less than 1,667 CBM/p.p. and greater than 1,000 CBM/p.p.; “Water scarcity is the point in which the aggregate impact of all users impinges on the supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional arrangements to the extent that the demand by all sectors, including the environment, cannot be fully satisfied. Water scarcity is a relative concept and can occur at any level of supply or demand” (UNDESA 2013; UNEP 2012: 18).

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3.3.3 Land Degradation Land degradation is inextricably linked to the quality, volume, and timing of water flow in the Basin (Baecher et al. 2000: 73). Land degradation has become a huge challenge within and among the Nile countries (Di Nunzio 2013: 6). For instance, the Rwandan genocide led to massive displacements, which left 60% of its forest damaged and 70% of its land severely degraded (Bigagaza et al. 2002: 51–52). Burundi, on the other hand, has lost 30% of its land to degradation (Kigomo 2003). In 2002, 30% of Kenya’s land faced severe degradation and, by 2008, one-third of its population was dependent on this degraded land. This is similar to the case in Sudan, where 76% of its population resides in degraded areas. The highlands of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania are also subject to degradation. Lastly, Egypt’s Northwestern Delta faces the most severe degradation due to contamination and increased salinity. This can, in many cases, be because Egypt lies downstream and receives water flow after it has been exposed to pollution upstream (Desta 2012: 10– 13). Practices such as poor cultivation, especially evident in parts of the Ethiopian highlands and the Egyptian Delta, are severe and have contributed largely to soil erosion. Moreover, the most common cause for land degradation is deforestation, and given the rising population growth vis-à-vis growing demands, forests are cleared and there is immense pressure on its resources (UK Essays 2018).

3.3.3.1

Agriculture

Agricultural practices, on the other hand, have the potential to contribute to nonpoint pollution due to the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides (Sombroek and Sene 1993; Baecher et al. 2000: 73). Agriculture is the largest consumer of water in Egypt, using about 85% of available water. Drainage water from agricultural fields contains pollutants such as pesticide residues, toxic organic and inorganic pollutants, salts, and treated and untreated domestic wastewater (Water Policy Program 2002: 6). There are over ninety agricultural drains that discharge into the Nile that contain industrial wastewater. This drainage has led to a high level of salinization (build-up of salts in the soil) and saline intrusion (when the ground is saturated with saltwater) in the Delta. This build-up of salts in the soil means that the soil cannot retain water, which prevents anything from growing. Such effects on the soil subsequently causes a decline in precipitation, which leads to soil erosion (Libiszewski 1992: 3). Half of Egypt consists of desert terrain, and only 6% of the country consists of arable and agricultural land. Egypt receives less than 80 mm of rainfall a year, which forces the country to depend on inefficient methods of irrigation, such as excessive watering and the use of wasteful irrigation (where gallons of water are pumped over crops). Agricultural runoffs, industrial effluents, and municipal sewage are recklessly dumped into the Nile River, leaving its water unfit for human consumption. Agricultural runoffs contain pollutants from pesticides and herbicides, which negatively

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affect the river and the people using it. Industrial effluents containing heavy metals are highly toxic (Dakkak 2020).

3.3.3.2

Industry

Although it is not widespread in the Basin, the mining industry has been another source of both erosion and runoff pollution. It has been noted that mines in Kilembe, Uganda release large quantities of copper and cobalt into streams and rivers in surrounding lakes (Kwetegyeka et al. 2014: 482). Moreover, there are thirty-six industries that discharge their pollutants directly into the Nile and irrigation canals. These include the chemical, electrical, engineering, fertilizer, food, metal, mining, oil and soap, pulp and paper, refractory, and textile and wood industries. Most of the residents in the region depend on irrigated agriculture for their livelihoods, and 29 BCM of drainage loaded with fertilizers, pesticides, and organic material is returned to the Nile annually from Cairo upstream (Ayad 2013).

3.3.3.3

Domestic Use

In villages where the only available water is from irrigation canals, women use the water for domestic purposes and dump the used water back into the drainages. Poverty has forced people to use unsustainable means to survive. Communities living along the concentrated Nile River Basin depend heavily on farming, but the ensuing drought, famine, population growth, and land degradation have influenced the water resources in the Basin. This is due to excessive burning of land for cultivation in many parts of the Nile, which has virtually eroded the oasis, making cultivation and water conservation extremely difficult (Rahman 2011). As argued by Kofi Annan, “Unsustainable practices are woven deeply into the fabric of modern life. Land degradation threatens food security. Forest destruction threatens biodiversity. Water pollution threatens public health and fierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future” (UN Press Release 2001).

3.3.3.4

Structurally Induced Scarcity: Uneven Water Distribution in the Nile River Basin

International river basins have become tense areas due to competitive exploitation, making disputes inevitable. The argument that water scarcity will lead to conflict in the Nile River Basin is contested by an opposing view that water scarcity is likely to force cooperation between riparian countries. This would be true if the underlying cause of water scarcity in the Nile River Basin was not the politics of distribution (Parkes 2013: 434). One of the most contentious issues regarding the Nile is the utilization of the available water resources (UNEP 2006: 2–4). The water scarcity problem in the Nile region is not only a result of the amount or scale of rainfall but

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also the agreements that govern the Nile River, which have led to unequal utilization of water between the upstream and downstream riparian countries. As an internationally shared river, the distribution of the Nile’s waters has been the subject of political, social, and economic tensions between upstream and downstream countries. The Nile River extends across political borders, which has led to misunderstandings and a lack of mutually beneficial agreements on the allocation of water (Conca et al. 2000: 1). The Nile therefore became subject to numerous agreements due to it being an international and transboundary river (Demeke 2013). Many treaties governing the Nile were bilateral in nature (McKenzie 2012: 579); they were concluded between Egypt (which was then under British control), Britain, and other foreign or European powers to regulate the utilization of the Nile and ensure that projects upstream would not disturb the flow of water to Egypt (Okoth-Owiro 2004: 1). These include five treaties between 1891 and 1925 (the 1891 Protocol between the United Kingdom and Italy for the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in eastern Africa; the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty for the delimitation of the frontier between Ethiopia and Sudan; the 1906 Treaty between the United Kingdom and the Congo Independent State to redefine their respective spheres of influence in East and Central Africa; the 1906 Tripartite Agreement and Set of Declarations between the United Kingdom, France, and Italy; and the 1925 Exchange of Notes between Italy and the United Kingdom) (Rubenson 1976; Degefu 2003; Okoth-Owiro 2004; Yihdego 2013). According to Knobelsdorf (2006: 5), these series of negotiations and agreements became what is known as the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement.

3.3.3.5

The 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreement

The 1929 agreement4 served as the basis for the principles of the Nile allocation to Egypt. It posed two requirements for the utilization of the Nile. First, it outlined quotas on the amount of water to be shared between Sudan and Egypt (McKenzie 2012: 580). With the Nile River’s average flow of 84 billion BCM/yr., these estimates suggested that Egypt would need 48 BCM/yr. and that Sudan’s irrigation would survive on the Blue Nile alone, which accounts for approximately 4 BCM/yr.: thus leaving 32 BCM/yr. unallocated (Wolf and Newton 2008). Due to the fluctuation of the river, it was agreed that during any change in the flow, gain or shortfall, the Nile waters will be divided evenly between Egypt and Sudan (McCaffrey 2003: 265; Okoth-Owiro 2004: 8; Lumumba 2007: 12–13). Second, Note no.1, paragraph 4 (b) and Note no. 2, paragraph 4 of the agreement gave Egypt veto rights on any upstream project that may alter the flow of the Nile on the basis of natural and historical rights (Knobelsdorf 2006: 6; McKenzie 2012: 580). Giving Egypt the right to extensively utilize the Nile, along with a property rule to protect this right, has structurally deterred upstream

4

Exchange of Notes between His Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian government on the use of Waters of the Nile for irrigation.

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riparian states from utilizing the Nile (Dunoff and Trachtman 1999: 24; Chesire 2010: 13). However, the 1929 agreement did not guarantee the full utilization or exploitation of the Nile waters, hence the need for a revised agreement. The 1929 agreement was subsequently revised on November 8, 1959 through the 1959 agreement5 for full utilization and control of the Nile waters (UN 1974: 65). The 1959 agreement was bilateral and entirely exclusive (Knobelsdorf 2006: 8; Demeke 2013), allocating the entire flow of the Nile waters at Aswan to Egypt and Sudan, thus effectively excluding other Nile riparian states. The two purposes mentioned in the introductory stipulations of the 1959 agreement specify both Egypt and Sudan’s intentions to claim full control over the Nile waters and make solid future claims to it. According to these introductory stipulations, the Nile River projects require for their execution and administration, full agreement and cooperation between the two Republics in order to regulate their benefits and utilize the Nile waters in a manner which secures the present and future requirements of the two countries; and, as the Nile waters Agreement concluded in 1929 provided only for the partial use of the Nile waters and did not extend to include a complete control of the River waters, the two Republics have agreed on the complete control of the River waters. The agreement was made after Sudan gained independence in 1953 and subsequently pushed its demands for a greater share of the Nile. The changes were to expand the amount of water allocated to Sudan, considering the changing economic and political landscape (McKenzie 2012: 581). According to the provisions of the agreement, the average flow of the river is considered to be 84 BCM/yr. The agreement had taken evaporation and seepage to account for 10 BCM/yr., which left a remainder of 74 BCM/yr. to be divided between Egypt and Sudan. The agreement argued that “acquired rights” for Egypt would amount to approximately 48 BCM, while Sudan would receive 4 BCM, and the remaining “benefits” of approximately 22 BCM are divided by a ratio of 7½ for Egypt and 14½ for Sudan. These calculations are based on “historical rights” plus “acquired rights.” Despite the difficulty of determining, monitoring, and quantifying the actual total annual flow of the Nile, as it varies by season and year, the “average annual BCM” used to argue for allocation in the agreement took into account expected seasonal fluctuations (Knobelsdorf 2006: 6–8). This meant that upstream countries could not use any water. However, Article 5, paragraph 1 and 2 of the agreement stipulates that: If it becomes necessary to hold any negotiations concerning the Nile, with any riparian state, outside the boundaries of the two Republics, the Governments of the Sudan Republic and the United Arab Republic shall agree on a unified view after the subject is studied by the said Technical Commission. The said unified view shall be the basis of any negotiations by the Commission with the said states; and, if the negotiations result in an agreement to construct any works on the river, outside 5

Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic for full utilization of the Nile waters.

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the boundaries of the two Republics, the joint Technical Commission shall after consulting the authorities in the Governments of the States concerned, draw all the technical execution details and the working and maintenance arrangements. And the Commission shall, after the sanction of the same by the Governments concerned, supervise the carrying out of the said technical agreements. Despite numerous attempts to reach agreement in the late 1950s and 1960s, with many upstream countries gaining independence, downstream countries have suggested that upstream countries have voiced imprecise and undefined claims to the Nile (Carroll 1999: 279; McKenzie 2012: 582). The current distribution of water in the area has serious global consequences and it is fundamental to the developmental processes of the respective countries. This uneven distribution also has many local political, economic, and social implications. The impact of resource distribution, specifically water, has many political implications in local, state, regional, and international spheres. In shared basins, the lower- or upper-riparian countries can control the quantity and quality of water flow by means of its military might and hydrological situation. Moreover, political actors may often use resources as objects of military and political action in an effort to extend their influence in such regions, thereby increasing the potential for conflict.6 From this, it can therefore be concluded that these agreements, respectively, systematically denied upstream riparian countries access to the Nile. Tvedt (2004: 480) argues that “these water sharing treaties have kept Nile Basin countries in conflict over the regions’ most precious resource.” This has led to an exchange of violent threats between upstream and downstream countries since the 1970s, and any means to develop and use the Nile has resulted in bitter disputes between Egypt and upstream riparian countries. For instance, Ethiopia has pushed its demands to develop water resources in an effort to address its challenges through irrigation schemes and the construction of dams, such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (Rahman 2011), which has become a source of major political disputes and military threats in the Nile region.

3.4 The GERD Dispute: A Recipe for Nascent Conflict The Nile problem, especially since GERD construction began in 2011, has been the subject of much debate, tension, and conflict. Moreover, the Nile discussions have since become political. Tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt have been rising over the GERD. Ali and Admasu (2021) assert that the GERD debate is an extension of the historical conflicts over the unequal utilization of Nile water resources, which, in turn, exacerbates the problem of the absence of reciprocity among riparian states (Ali and Admasu 2021). With the growing diplomatic rifts between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over the GERD, the prospect of war in the region has increasingly become a possibility. 6

Either verbal, political and/or violent.

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Disputes over Ethiopia’s GERD pertains to water-sharing rights between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. Ethiopia argues that the dam’s development is crucial for the country’s economic development and overcoming poverty and famine (Mahlakeng 2021c). Meanwhile, Egypt fears that the dam could disrupt downstream river flow and threaten its agricultural and hydropower sectors. Sudan, on the other hand, could stand to gain from increasing its water use through the dam’s development, although it has traditionally allied with Egypt against upstream development projects (Foong 2022). Egypt has made a shift beyond merely seeking political and financial strategic support to establishing and strengthening its diplomatic ties in Africa and abroad solely on the basis of military capacity—with an intention of putting an end to the anticipated completion of the GERD construction and its subsequent filling. The dam has been elevated to the status of a major domestic political issue in Egypt, and as it did in the past, Egypt still believes that a militaristic approach to Nile politics is a viable solution. As a result, the likelihood of a water war in the region is growing more real with each move that Egypt makes. For instance, Egypt has conducted joint military exercises (which included warplanes and special forces) with Sudan (as the GERD is built right on the headwaters of the Blue Nile on the Ethiopian-Sudan border), thus manifesting the rhetoric of intimidation or direct use of force to defend its rights over the Nile (Mahlakeng 2021b). The now-completed GERD, which is built right on the headwaters of the Blue Nile on the Ethiopian-Sudan border, is intensifying Egypt’s insecurities, which receives 59% of its water from the Blue Nile (Conniff 2017). The anticipation was, according to Conniff (2017), that filling the GERD could take between approximately four and seven years. And during this fill, Egypt could experience a cut of 25% of the Nile’s freshwater flow. Moreover, this is against the backdrop of an already serious nationwide freshwater shortage in Egypt (Conniff 2017). According to Al Jazeera (2022), the total capacity of the GERD reservoir is 74 BCM, and the process of filling this reservoir began in 2020. With the first and second phases of filling the GERD—completed on July 20, 2020 and July 19, 2021 respectively (Anna 2020; BBC News 2022)—the reality of any nascent threat to the Nile River Basin and its inhabitants’ peace, stability, and water security will soon be realized. The Nile will now have two of the world’s largest dams (i.e., the HAD and the GERD—located in Egypt and Ethiopia respectively), and there is currently no agreement on the management and operation thereof, despite the threat of severe water scarcity (Wheeler et al. 2020: 1). The first filling of the GERD retained 4.9 BCM (Basheer et al. 2020: 279), while the second filling retained 13.5 BCM, which approximates its current impoundment capacity to be 18.4 BCM (Wheeler et al. 2020: 7). The GERD project alone has strained relations between the Nile countries, and although analysts argue that water flows into Egypt could be reduced, depending on the initial storage of the HAD and the filling of the GERD (Al Jazeera 2013; Elsayed et al. 2020: 14), the dam’s precise impact on the downstream countries is unknown (Wheeler et al. 2016: 617). Wheeler et al. (2020: 3) further argue that the downstream consequences of filling the GERD are difficult to assess if the following six key aspects are not considered:

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(a) rainfall and flow in the Basin during filling; (b) how quickly Ethiopia fills the GERD reservoir; (c) how hydropower is generated at the GERD, which depends on developments in the regional power grid; (d) how filling of the GERD reservoir influences Sudan’s withdrawals; (e) the initial storage level of the HAD reservoir, given the fact that it was almost full at 178.4 m.a.s.l. (meters above sea level) on August 24, 2020; and (f) how the HAD is operated during the filling period. However, the risks of negative impacts can be minimized or eliminated through close and continuous coordination. Yet, several findings demonstrate the potential benefit of GERD for Egypt. For example, it would trap sediment upstream, thereby protecting major reservoirs in Egypt, which could profit from surplus electricity generated by the water held in the reservoir. Moreover, the topography of the GERD area is more suitable for storing the water than Egypt’s desert terrain, which has a higher rate of evaporation. Despite the positive externalities of the GERD, Egyptian officials present it as an existential threat and utter dire warnings of great calamity and chaos if their demands are not met (Ali and Admasu 2021). Ethiopia’s GERD does present a unilateral and unsustainable lose–lose scenario, which is tantamount to conflict. Far-reaching consequences of unilateral hydropower developments in shared watercourses include not only water availability but also social and environmental implications. In many cases, the social and environmental effects, as a result of unilateral decision-making, are far greater than the expected hydropower potential. These implications include, among other things, the destruction of arable land and the displacement of communities (i.e., environmental refugees). As a result, this warrants stronger regional Basin-wide cooperation and effective water governance. Moreover, it points to the need and urgency of an equitable Nile water-sharing solution in the form of a cooperative framework that will cater for the short-, medium-, and long-term needs of all riparian countries (Mahlakeng 2019). Unilateral developments in shared water resources, particularly the complex Nile River Basin, can lead to violent conflicts.

3.5 Recommendations An important factor in enhancing and addressing both the management and distribution of transboundary river basins is the implementation of institutional support structures. Therefore, given the developments in the Nile region that will likely lead to violent conflict, hydrodiplomacy is essential in averting the militarization of transboundary water resources and nascent water-related conflicts. Moreover, hydrodiplomacy advocates for the involvement of all stakeholders in water management (Comair 2021). This means moving beyond trilateral talks to the inclusion of other riparian countries—Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt—to ensure Basin-wide environmental, water, food, and energy security.

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Hydrodiplomacy is possible through the establishment and/or existence of capable regimes. Once there is a level of institutional capacity, or regimes and/or institutions are in place, they can mediate between a variety of stakeholders in a region to foster cooperation in collective security, among other things (Krasner 1982: 189–190). They can also alter the situation or setting in which the states interact so that cooperation is more likely (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 513). The African Union and the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) both represent valuable mechanisms for the sustainability, management, and utilization of the Nile waters, since for this to be possible, it requires either an international institutional structure or a negotiated multilateral treaty regime for bargaining between upstream and downstream countries (Okoth-Owiro 2004: 24). The African Union is recommended in this regard, because its environmental and central roles focus on resolving issues that are detrimental to peace and stability on the continent. Rahman (2011) argues that, in the past, Africa’s inter-state conflicts have been dominated by numerous ethnic and tribal issues, land disputes, and acquisitions, which the African Union could easily mediate. However, the Nile has become a recipe for conflict in the region due to the demand, degradation, and distribution of water resources. And, as a regional authority, the African Union can play a critical role in remedying the Nile disputes. The NBI will assist in the above, as it is an inter-riparian commission aimed at coordinating both upstream and downstream interests. According to Godana (1985: 264), Basin states can only benefit from the creation of a comprehensive commission serving as an institutional vehicle for cooperation. However, both the African Union and the NBI face respective deadlocks in addressing the challenges in the Nile Basin, which must be rectified if these mechanisms are to be effective. While it is important to highlight these deadlocks, I believe that these mechanisms are essential to ensuring cooperation in the Basin.

3.5.1 African Union The African Union has outlined crucial steps in the preservation of natural resources. This is evident through its Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. First, Article IV on Land and Soil, in Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this convention, state that it prevents land degradation by implementing land tenure policies to: establish land-use plans based on scientific investigations; implement agricultural practices and agrarian reforms; improve and introduce soil conservation; promote sustainable farming and forestry practices; and control pollution and erosion caused by agricultural activities, mining, and the disposal of waste (African Union 2003: 4). Second, Article V on Water, in Sections 2 and 3 of the same convention, proposes considerable provisions for preserving water and minimizing the possibility of waterrelated disputes in transboundary basins. Section 2 argues that “the parties shall establish and implement policies for the planning, conservation, management, utilization and development of underground and surface water, as well as the harvesting and use of rain water, and shall endeavor to guarantee for their populations a sufficient and

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continuous supply of suitable water.” And Section 3 posits that “where surface or underground water resources are shared by two or more of the contracting states, the latter shall act in consultation, and if the need arises, set up inter-state commissions to study and resolve problems arising from the joint use of these resources, and for the joint development and conservation thereof” (African Union, 2003: 5–6). If effectively applied, with the oversight of the African Union, these provisions can change the landscape of the Nile and the nature of associated disputes. However, according to Chesire (2010: V), the African Union has played little, if any, significant role in resolving water disputes between the Nile countries, which is mainly due to the constraints it faces.

3.5.2 Third-Party Involvement The African Union fails to support or address these issues due to the problem of financial dependence on foreign donors. The African Union’s ineffective role in the Nile largely stems from its reliance on foreign aid, which ultimately undermines its decision-making processes, thus further diminishing confidence in any African Union-led negotiation processes. In addition, the general fear and concern that “withholding aid jeopardizes the current African Union-sponsored talks between Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia to resolve the dispute over the dam” indicates an overreliance on foreign aid, which makes reaching agreements more difficult (Mahlakeng 2020b). For instance, the construction of the new African Union Headquarters was funded by China, and African countries contribute only about 40% of the African Union’s budget (Al Jazeera 2013). The involvement of third parties—such as the World Bank, the United States, and Canada—in environmental conflicts further complicates the issues of political, social, and economic interests, and it hinders regional cooperation. This is despite the fact that international financial organizations and funds are established to prevent environmental conflicts that may jeopardize civilizing and stabilizing cooperation (Tänzler et al. 2002: 63). Third parties become active players in environmental conflicts through the creation of insensible policies and programs. The role of third parties, such as the World Bank, continues to create a rupture between project developers and those individuals directly implicated by its construction or implementation. These are the same donors that obscure the cooperation framework in the Nile River Basin and therefore dictate the agenda of water cooperation in favor of technical rather than political interventions, such as preventive diplomacy. These technical interventions, for instance, include the World Bank’s intervention to stop Ethiopia from building the GERD or refuse funding for this project, which ultimately protects Egyptian hydrohegemony. Therefore, due to the involvement of third parties, the African Union will fail to achieve the difficult goals of conflict resolution and regional cooperation (Foulds 2002: 2).

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The involvement of external actors, possibly with varying external demands and biases, further complicates an already delicate situation. External actors play a significant role in the sustainability, management, and use of transboundary basins, as they can greatly influence the nature and politics thereof (Mahlakeng 2019).

3.5.3 Political Will Deficit The African Union continues to disregard the main Nile issue—the ‘ongoing inequitable utilization and distribution of the Nile’—which remains the only cause of tension and dispute in the Basin. Moreover, given that the Nile is a transboundary basin shared by eleven countries, the African Union overlooks an essential widebasin approach to solving a wide-basin issue. Nile negotiations must be based on the inclusion of all stakeholders, countries, and communities that are dependent on the Nile, thereby recognizing the importance of the river to all riparian countries. Thus, the African Union’s lack of mediation in the Nile disputes appears to indicate a deficient political will that contradicts its determination to produce the desired outcome of a ‘beneficial’ solution. In order to address a complex array of factors that are detrimental to the Nile region’s stability, balance interests related to each riparian country’s national sovereignty, and strengthen regional cooperation in the Nile, discussions with all eleven stakeholders are imperative (Mahlakeng 2021a). The nature and character of transboundary basins, which flow across territorial lines, brings the issue of ‘riparian rights’ into play. The notion of riparian rights among the Nile countries, which is the question of who owns the Nile based on territorial integrity, equitable and reasonable water use, and water rights (i.e., historic rights and natural rights), is a highly contentious issue—despite the fact that all eleven riparian countries of the Nile are entitled to riparian rights. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, emphasized that “each of the countries sharing the Nile waters has both rights and responsibilities, and the use and management of this natural resource requires the continued engagement of all nations involved, in good faith, with a view to reaching common ground” (UN 2021). The African Union’s lack of legal accountability and political will to deal with transboundary disputes will result in contentious water-related cases concerning equitable use between states being facilitated by, and/or submitted to, external actors such as the United States, European Union, World Bank, or International Court of Justice (ICJ) for mediation. The African Union’s inability to take responsibility for continental transboundary disputes emerging within its jurisdiction means that cases will be subject to foreign judgments and decisions rather than continental resolutions, thereby compromising the interests of African countries (Mahlakeng 2021a). Accountability (legal, political, and financial) is an essential tool in hydrodiplomacy, sustainable negotiation, and desired outcomes in disputes over shared resources. The political will in question is imperative and inextricably linked to institutional capacity, which is essential to prevent negotiations from collapsing.

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Political will is largely influenced by, and relies heavily on, the issue of financing, which is central to water issues, as it enables the construction of infrastructure as well as the establishment and maintenance of water agencies and commissions. However, such financing must come from internal stakeholders. Accountability ensures hydrodiplomacy; that is, sustainable water governance that adequately ensures equal access to the Nile (determined according to each riparian country’s needs). This ensures multilateralism, win–win situations, and stakeholder engagement (Mahlakeng 2020a). From a moral, political, and legal perspective, the African Union’s will to decisively act on shared water resources is obligatory and yet equally challenged. The responsibility for the use, preservation, and protection of water is an essential moral principle, as access to water is vital to humanity (Mahlakeng 2021a). As acknowledged by the African Union in its adopted Water Vision 2025, “Water can be a matter of life and death, that when too much or too little, it can bring destruction, misery and death” (African Union 2000). Politically, as a continental organization, the African Union has failed to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the upstream Nile countries (which are also its member states) in recognition of their right to access and use the Nile. Furthermore, it has failed to protect the independence of the upstream Nile countries by allowing them to be subject to colonial-era agreements that govern the Nile waters in lieu of a contemporary revised agreement. The African Union’s failure to act poses a great threat to its objectives of accelerating the political and socioeconomic integration of the continent, promoting and defending the issues of interest to its people and member states, and encouraging continent- and/or region-wide cooperation. The seemingly deficient political will and weak institutional capacity of the African Union inevitably entice external actors to become involved in the Nile dialogues and make them appear to be undeniably adequate and acceptable arbiters in matters that are visibly outside of their jurisdiction.

3.5.4 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) The changing geopolitical environment has also influenced the development of interstate mechanisms in dealing with potential conflict over water in volatile transnational water resources. The states in the Nile Basin established a ministerial cooperation mechanism known as the NBI, to manage a complex river system that is faced with conflictual Hydropolitics. The establishment of the NBI as an inter-state commission, which aims to ensure long-term development and improve land-use practices and management of the Nile water resources for the benefit of all without discrimination (World Bank 2008: 2), complements Article V (2) of the Convention of the African Union on shared water resources. According to Wolf and Newton (2008), from 1967 to 1992, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) supported a Hydromet project designed to collect hydrometeorological information within the Basin. Based on the findings of this

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project, the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) was formed in 1993 to facilitate informal dialogue between riparian nations. They further argue that the TECCONILE later resulted in the creation of the Nile River Basin Action Plan in 1995 (NRBAP) to ensure joint planning for the utilization and development of the Nile waters. In 1997, the World Bank allowed the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States (Nile-COM) to direct and coordinate donor activities within the Basin, which led the council to cooperate with organizations such as the UNDP, World Bank, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (Wolf and Newton 2008). A few years later, in February 1999, the NRBAP culminated in the creation of the NBI, which would oversee the substantial collective socioeconomic benefits and regional peace and security framework of the Nile River Basin (NBI 2014). The initiative was launched with the understanding that a collaborative effort in the development and management of Nile waters will yield the greatest level of mutual benefit in the region, and all of the riparian countries joined the organization. It signaled the recognition of shared interests among Nile Basin countries in an effort to foster cooperation. In May 2010, five of the eleven Nile Basin countries (Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Kenya) signed the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) to transform the NBI into a permanent Nile River Basin Commission (NBI 2014). The commission is based in Entebbe, Uganda and its chair rotates between the members (Lie 2010: 13). The intention of the NBI is to establish a comprehensive framework for the planning, management, and utilization of the natural resources of the Nile, principally the water (Oloo 2007: 95). Correspondingly, Garretson (1960: 144) has argued that a Nile River Basin authority or administration is essential in addressing the problems relating to the full development of the Nile Basin. According to Kukk and Deese (1996: 22), river basin organizations are essential to providing the means for all riparian countries to voice and resolve water issues without resorting to force. Without these organizations, political tensions and disputes along shared rivers tend to emerge (Kukk and Deese 1996: 22). This is evident in the case of the Nile River Basin. The emergence of political tensions and disputes in the Nile Basin are due to the absence or lack of capacity and capability of a river basin organization that mediates and ensures cooperation in the rational planning, conservation, and development of resources of the Basin as a whole (Godana 1985: 264). Okoth-Owiro (2004: 25) is of the opinion that establishing an international river basin organization, authority, or commission is the best solution for preventing and resolving water conflicts. He argues that a river basin organization is necessary to engage water-scarce and water-rich countries in negotiations. Benvenisti (1996: 400) asserts that this allows for a collective action, so that all riparian countries can enjoy access to the resources that cross political boundaries. Moreover, joint action is stipulated as the primary goal of the NBI. Nonetheless, it remains a challenge to achieve this goal, as the Nile River Basin is characterized by the conflict between water rights and historic rights.

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Benvenisti (1996: 400) argues that it has become difficult for common action to institutionalize, because Egypt has made the Nile waters a private good. As such, the Nile waters have been classified as an excludable and rival good (Homer-Dixon 1999: 48). Thus, in order to ensure the transition from rivalry to collaboration, an established commission or organization must help riparian countries realize their shared interest in the water resource, thereby guaranteeing a win–win situation and addressing the natural rights and historic rights of both upstream and downstream countries (Okoth-Owiro 2004: 28). The NBI aimed to include all members through participatory dialogues (Wiebe 2001: 751; World Bank 2008: 2). It also constituted a departure from the past trend of unilateral water use and management, particularly in emphasizing the issues of fair water allocation, joint management, and resource development. This signals a fundamental shift in the status quo of upstream–downstream relations, particularly in the relationship between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Lie 2010: 11).

3.5.5 Third-Party Involvement According to the remarks made by the Executive Director, engineer Teferra Beyene, to the Chinese delegation on a ‘China–Africa transboundary waters study tour’ on May 7, 2014, the biggest challenge the NBI faces now, is lack of finance to implement the investment projects it has prepared and ensuring its institutional sustainability to continue providing the excellent services it has been providing for its member states. I believe the partnership that NBI has recently started with the Republic of China will help in filling some of these gaps as China is a key partner in Africa’s bid.

This statement signifies a deeper entrenchment into foreign-aid dependence. In analyzing the NBI, it has become evident that foreign donors have been closely involved in its funding its establishment (Wolf and Newton 2008).

3.5.6 Political Deadlocks in the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) The NBI also battles with establishing a legal framework that involves all stakeholders within the context of its shared vision (Foulds 2002). Another important challenge the Nile Basin countries are facing is related to establishing a permanent legal and institutional set-up to anchor their cooperation on a solid footing. The complexity of the Nile situation manifests itself in the failure, thus far, of the Nile riparians to reach an agreement on an inclusive CFA, more than ten years after the start of the facilitative efforts under the NBI.

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The CFA aims to provide a legal agreement that will determine a reasonable and equitable solution for sharing Nile waters among the Basin states and simultaneously guarantee the water security of the Nile riparian countries (Lie 2010: 11; Salman 2013: 21). However, this framework faces conflicting positions on the rights and provisions of the utilization of the Nile, particularly in terms of Article 4 and 14(a) (Waslekar 2013: 7). According to Article 4, Nile Basin States shall in their respective territories utilize the water resources of the Nile River system and the Nile River Basin in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, those water resources shall be used and developed by Nile Basin States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits there from, taking into account the interests of the Basin States concerned, consistent with adequate protection of those water resources. Each Basin State is entitled to an equitable and reasonable share in the beneficial uses of the water resources of the Nile River system and the Nile River Basin. (International Water Law Project 2014)

Egypt and Sudan want Article 14 amended to reflect their historic rights. On the basis of Article 14, they argue that “Nile basin states agree, in a spirit of cooperation, not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile basin states” (Sudan Tribune 2008; Salman 2013: 21). Hence, the current stalemate in the NBI cooperative framework. In addition, the upstream–downstream position on the CFA is conflicted by the opposing claims of historical and natural rights to the utilization of the Nile (Kendie 1999: 145). On the one hand, upstream countries have insisted that this framework must disregard all previous agreements that they were not party to. On the other hand, downstream countries are seeking a new framework that incorporates such earlier agreements. This has caused further disparity within the region (Oloo 2007: 101) and, evidently, the future and success of the NBI are contingent on the CFA’s success (Lie 2010: 11).

3.6 Conclusion The Nile River Basin faces considerable challenges—all of which have resulted in water scarcity. The issue of water scarcity already affects every continent on Earth, and the demand for water is increasing at more than twice the rate of population growth, making the Nile region chronically deprived of water (Baecher et al. 2000: 39). However, some critics have denied that water is a source of conflict. For instance, Lowi (1996: 5) argues that some scholars believe that the political differences among nations are likely the causes of disputes. Although Homer-Dixon also believes that the issues of resource scarcity and conflict may not be widely visible until the coming centuries, it is clear that the disputes and tensions in the Nile River Basin and other shared water resources play a key role in scarcity. Shared resources not only require equal access and distribution among all stakeholders, but equal responsibilities for the sustainability and management of these resources as well. Given the current reality of climate change, poverty, and growing

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degradation upstream, the sustainability of the Nile can only be ensured through a cooperative approach. This will ultimately ensure adequate water quality and quantity, especially for Egypt. It is within this understanding that zero-sum outcomes and war are tantamount to all Nile resources facing continued degradation and depletion. Foulds (2002) asserts that there is a need for a new international water agreement for the Nile Basin—one that is initiated by an African organization or commission. There has to be a resolution to the question of balance between who has the historic right to the Nile’s water, and issues of sovereign water rights especially with regards to where the river ought to be controlled, whether that be upstream or downstream. This entails the need for both the African Union and the NBI to rectify the status quo of the 1929 and 1959 agreements, which would subsequently enable them to develop a common position on the equitable exploitation and utilization of the Nile Basin’s resources. To this end, they should consider the region’s already complex political environment. Regimes have a responsibility to ensure the overall well-being of their natural environments. Given that the natural environment is the source of many conflicts, regimes must take an active role where such resources correlate to conflict. Some regimes are successful in addressing environmental conflicts by intervening directly at the level of the threat. In other words, if water scarcity is identified as a key driver of conflict, regimes may employ several strategies to address this threat—for instance, by developing an agreement solely based on addressing water scarcity in a given region. Thus, it is possible for cooperation around shared water resources to be a focus for river basins. Together, formal and informal institutions influence operational water management and performance of the water sector. In fact, the main factor in the performance of the water sector is institutional performance. Therefore, institutional settings or regimes are an important aspect of transboundary river basin management (Raadgever 2005: 1−4). Egypt’s continued defiance of beneficial multilateral cooperative agreements visà-vis developments intensifies the likelihood of nascent militarized conflict and war. Although no riparian country can afford (nor benefit from) inter-state conflict, issues such as delays in reaching an agreement, rapid population growth, climate change, and unequal water distribution exacerbate existing tensions and frustrations—and it would be foolish to disregard and/or underestimate these tensions (Mahlakeng 2020a).

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Chapter 4

Climate-Security and the Anthropocene: The Case of Mali Sanet Madonsela

Abstract Noteworthy climate change summits are often attended by well-clad delegates who are focused on discussing the long-term implications of the phenomenon and negotiating carbon emissions policies and renewable energy subsidies. While this is fascinating to people who are interested in green politics, those affected by the phenomenon are often excluded, even though they experience the dire consequences of climate change. Despite having one of the lowest carbon emissions in the world, Mali is a perfect example of a country that frequently experiences climate-related shocks. The country has been experiencing intense heat, drastic reductions in rainfall, and increased intensity in armed conflict, which has been detrimental to its development and food security. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and continued political instability in the country has further exacerbated its existing human security crisis, heightening interest in the role that climate-induced scarcity plays in Mali’s communal conflict. With this in mind, this chapter seeks to examine the role that climate change has played in Mali’s deadly intra-communal conflict. Keywords Climate change · Intra-communal conflict · Climate-induced migration · Climate-security nexus · Mali

4.1 Introduction We have to face the reality of climate change. It is arguably the biggest threat we face today. —William Hague, former UK Foreign Secretary and leader of the House of Commons

On April 17, 2007, the United Nations Security Council held an unprecedented debate on climate change, energy supplies, and security. While some regarded the platform as completely inappropriate, most of the states present agreed that climate change constituted a global security crisis that threatened international water and food supplies, allocation of resources, safety of coastal populations, and forced climateinduced migration that could trigger conflict and increase tensions in areas receiving S. Madonsela (B) Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_4

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migrants. These states acknowledged the phenomenon’s ability to cause permanent human displacement, particularly in underdeveloped countries, given their low capacity for adaptability due to widespread poverty and low technological advancement. While some were taken aback, most expected the matter to take precedence, given the rhetoric of the time. In 2003, the United States had already labeled the phenomenon “the mother of all security challenges,” while the United Kingdom’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Sir David King, alluded to its ability to affect global security even more than international terrorism. These concerns were aggravated when a group of US admirals and generals shared similar sentiments. They implied that climate change could act as a force multiplier, increasing water scarcity and food insecurity. Years later, these sentiments are echoed around the globe as the world bears witness to the tensions surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River, which is currently threatening war between Ethiopia and Egypt, as the latter faces the downstream implications of a much-reduced Nile. Water scarcity and desertification lie at the heart of the communal conflict between the herders and pastoralists across the Sahel (Brown et al. 2007: 1141–1143; Kusangaya et al. 2013: 1; McDonald 2018: 1). It is worth emphasizing that the notion of climate change is hardly new, and literature on the phenomenon dates as far back as the twentieth century, when scholars first observed changes in the global temperature. In the 1950s, they noted an increase of 0.1% in the global temperature, a decline of 10% in the winter snow cover, and a 40% decline in northern ice thickness. Despite these observations, the phenomenon remained an environmental issue of peripheral concern throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, this changed with the sophistication of climate-change modeling technology. By the 1990s, policymakers begun observing changes in regional climate conditions and eventually accepted that greenhouse gas emission had to be reduced as it increased the frequency of climate-related hazards, loss of life, social disruption, economic hardship, and climate-induced migration. Over the years, climate change would become a mainstream challenge as concerns mount over the growing climatesecurity threat. This nexus would become of particular interest to Africa, as it is one of the continent’s most vulnerable to climate change and climate vulnerability. It is expected to experience increased water-related challenges, such as a shift in rainfall patterns, intensification of hydrological cyclones, flooding, and even reduced rainfall, which would negatively affect regions that are highly dependent on rainfed agriculture. While some African populations have demonstrated an immense ability to adapt to climate vulnerabilities, others have not, resulting in their falling victim to the climate-security nexus (Brown et al. 2007: 1141, 1146; Mueller et al. 2020: 1; Reuveny 2007: 657). With this in mind, this chapter seeks to unpack the role that climate change has played in Mali’s deadly intra-communal conflict.

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4.2 The Anthropocene In 2000, Nobel Prize-winning chemist, Paul J. Crutzen, and Eugene F. Stoermer introduced the concept of the Anthropocene to the scientific community, which resulted in its informal introduction to geological literature (Smith and Zeder 2020: 1; Trischler 2016: 310). The term has since gained traction in both academia and practice (Zalasiewicz and Waters 2015: 1). It denotes the contemporary global environment and is an umbrella term used to highlight an epoch in which human activity has a significant effect on the planet (Smith and Zeder 2020: 4; Chakrabarty 2018: 5–6). It seeks to capture the quantitative shift in the relationship between human beings and the environment. It suggests that the Earth is moving out of its current geological epoch, the Holocene, and into an era where human beings have become a global geological force (Steffen et al. 2011: 843). This is often referred to as the postHolocene period (ibid. 2011: 843). Climate change and its impact, the effects of waste (particularly plastic), the impact of pollution on marine and terrestrial processes, the loss and extinction of biodiversity, and changes in the chemical composition of the soil, oceans, and atmospheres are key identifiers of the Anthropocene (Chua and Fair 2020). The advent of this period is placed around the 1800s, at the start of the Industrial Revolution. During this time, human activity is expected to have a significant effect on the environment, and thus the planet, which would be observable in geological stratigraphic records such as rock, glacier ice, and marine sediments for millions of years. It will also affect other species, resulting in their extinction between 100 and 1000 times faster than previous rates. The advancement of technology and medicine would result in the increased exploitation of the Earth’s resources. The exponential increase of the human population and industrial outputs over the past three centuries would continue to place added pressure on the environment, resulting in humans consuming half of all accessible freshwater (Crutzen 2006: 14). These populations would rapidly consume—and exhaust—fossil fuels created over several million years and increase air pollution (Lewis and Maslin 2015: 172; Steffan et al. 2011: 842). Consequently, this would alter the biochemical or element cycles of nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur, which are essential to life on Earth, while altering terrestrial water cycles by intercepting river flows toward the ocean. Ultimately, these activities may affect the functioning of the Earth’s systems (ibid. 2011: 842; Zalasiewicz et al. 2010: 2228). It should, however, be noted that the prevailing notion of humans waking up to the negative impact of their actions conceals long-standing environmental consciousness and grassroots political campaigns against ecological degradation, particularly between the Global North and the Global South. The use of the term ‘Anthropos’ in Anthropocene creates the impression of unity among humans, which fails to take the unequal effects of climate change and the impact of the Anthropocene into account, thus suggesting a linear trajectory (Chua and Fair 2020). However, this may be easier, as acknowledging the inequalities may eliminate the humanist innocence of the phenomenon. Despite elements of denial, the evaluation of the carbon footprints and consumption of different countries reveals the existing power imbalances and the

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inequality between those with higher carbon footprints and consumption and those who are most vulnerable to climate change and climate vulnerabilities. In 2015, Oxfam found that the world’s wealthiest 1% of countries had a carbon footprint that was 175 times higher than 10% of the world’s poorest countries, thus strengthening concerns that the Anthropocene may be characterized by the plundering of natural resources, excessive disposal of waste in the environment, and, ultimately, the destruction of the environment (Crutzen 2006: 17; Saldanha 2020: 13).

4.3 Climate-Security Nexus The idea that climate change contributes to violent conflict has gained significant traction in academia, particularly due to the growing interest in the implications of environmental degradation (Skah and Lymmouri 2020: 8). Over the years, it has been widely acknowledged that climate change has exacerbated existing socioeconomic and political tensions, such as weak governance, poverty, injustice, social insecurity, and violence. Its security effects have been described and documented at both the macro- and microlevels of various disciplines, including political science (Froese and Schilling 2019: 24; Sweijs et al. 2022: 1; McDonald 2018: 1). The relationship between the two has been explored in various studies. The climate-security nexus is a framework used to analyze the complex cause– effect relationship between the following four elements: climate change, natural resources, human security, and social stability (Huq et al. 2021). It argues that environmental scarcity contributes to large-scale migration, poverty, and violence. Similarly, it was found that deforestation, soil degradation, and a lack of access to freshwater contribute to political violence—all of which can be observed in Mali. Contrary to this, environmental degradation can also provide opportunities for cooperation (Skah and Lymmouri 2020: 8, 9). Zimbabwe is an example of a state that is vulnerable to climate change but has a low risk of armed conflict (Mbiyozo and Maungandze 2021). While this may be the case, it remains of the utmost importance that these linkages continue to be studied, as a failure to do so may undermine attempts to engage in conflict prevention and establish and sustain peace in affected areas. This would, in turn, perpetuate the vicious cycle of climate disasters and conflict in vulnerable countries (Sweijs et al. 2022: 1; McDonald 2018: 1).

4.4 Contextualizing Mali As previously mentioned, high-level climate change summits are often focused on discussing the long-term implications of climate change and negotiating emissions policies and renewable energy subsidies; however, those experiencing the dire consequences of climate change are often excluded from the conversation. Despite having

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one of the lowest carbon emissions in the world, Mali is a perfect example of a country experiencing climate-related hunger and violence. Mali is a landlocked, low-income country located in the Sahel region of western Africa. It is home to 19.7 million people from a wide array of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups. Two-thirds of its territory consists of desert terrain. The country is highly vulnerable to climate change, and it experiences extensive dry seasons. This is problematic because the agricultural sector is responsible for much of the country’s job creation, and over 60% of its population is located in rural areas. Since the 1960s, it has experienced an increase in its annual temperature, and its annual rainfall began declining in the 1990s, resulting in extreme droughts over the past few years. The country’s northern region has been subject to most of its desertification and migration, while other parts have experienced heatwaves, sandstorms, flash floods, wildfires, and locust invasions. Its economy is reliant on agriculture and agropastoralism, which involves tracking grazing and water across a given landscape. In total, 35% of its gross domestic product (GDP) is reliant on agriculture, with cotton accounting for 80% of its agricultural exports. Mali has been characterized by high levels of poverty and marginalization, limited opportunities, weak governance, and political instability, despite it being one of Africa’s largest gold exporters (Tarif and Grand 2021: USAID 2019: 1; African Development Bank 2015: 21; International Climate Centre 2021: 1). Political power and economic development are largely concentrated in the southern parts of the country, while the northern parts remain marginalized. This has resulted in the Tuareg people based in the north viewing themselves as culturally and historically distinct from the population in the south, which drove the rebellions in the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s (Hegazi et al. 2021: 4). Mali has faced multiple challenges since the start of 2012 when it experienced armed conflict in its northern region that threatened its territorial integrity, while its political and institutional instability in the south resulted in a coup on March 22, 2012. Amid all of this, the country is also experiencing food insecurity caused by droughts (African Development Bank 2015: 20). This weak governance, political instability, and food and livelihood insecurity have created the perfect breeding ground for extremist groups and rebel militias to boost their recruitment and support (Tarif and Grand 2021), which has, unfortunately, resulted in the country being gripped in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 300,000 people in the past decade (International Committee of the Red Cross 2021; RefliefWeb 2021).

4.5 The Origin of Mali’s Contemporary Conflict There are numerous reasons for the recent emergence of conflict in Mali. Some cite the country’s discriminatory political institutions and its national ideologies, inter-group politics, climate change, and a mutual distrust and lack of understanding between central and northern Mali as contributing factors. They believe that the government’s unwillingness to foster economic development and political representation for northern aspirations has ignited violent contestation and separatist action,

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which has resulted in a group of Tuareg separatists called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) mobilizing for a separate and independent northern Mali, which is often referred to as Azawad. This popular support is arguably indicative of the inequalities collectively experienced by the people in the north. The government’s withdrawal, ethnic divisions, lawlessness, illegal trafficking, and the integration of militant groups into local communities have strengthened the MNLA, consequently allowing the group—backed by a network of Islamist militant groups— to launch a violent insurrection in January 2012 in the northern parts of the country and consolidate its control over the area almost immediately (Clingendael 2015; El-Abd 2021: UN 2021; Centre for Preventive Action 2022; France 24 2012). The military’s inability to contain the conflict in the north resulted in a group of officers staging a coup that overthrew the president at the time, Amadou Toumani Touré. They cited his response to the rebellion as the main reason for the coup. The officers’ infighting and lack of focus left a power vacuum in Bamako, which the MNLA and its affiliates filled. By April 2012, the area was fully under their control. While this was no small feat, the MNLA’s alliance with its supporting Islamist counterparts was short-lived due to their secular beliefs. While they sought an independent north, their counterparts sought the implementation of their version of Sharia law, resulting in their split and the ousting of MNLA fighters from key areas. The Islamist groups soon took control of Timbuktu and Goa, destroying shrines, imposing their version of Islamic rule, and attempting to gain control over the central parts of the country. This prompted the United Nations Security Council to authorize the deployment of peacekeepers from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the area. In January 2013, the French government intervened to provide aid to Mali (Centre for Preventive Action 2022; Hegazi et al. 2021: 6). However, despite the foreign intervention, the conflict continued, as did the deterioration of security and governance. This has unfortunately increased the tensions between transitional governments and external actors, resulting in France withdrawing its forces. The French withdrawal has increased the focus on the peacekeeping progress in the country, as some regard it as the most dangerous peacekeeping mission to date, given the number of casualties (Wilén and Williams 2022; United Nations 2022). This conflict has resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the displacement of millions in the region (Al Jazeera 2022). In the first quarter of 2022, there were 543 deaths, which includes members of jihadist, militia, and selfdefense groups as well as security forces. Additionally, 320 human rights abuses were recorded during the same period (France 24, 2022).

4.6 Mali’s Climate Violence Prior to colonialism, resource governance in Mali was regulated by the Dina empire, which sought to regulate the effective use of resources for all socioeconomic groups, with the Fulani taking priority. The Fulani were herdsmen, while the Bozo were fishermen, and the Dagon were agriculturalists. However, this system was disrupted

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by both colonialism and postcolonialism, as European governance took priority over customary rules. This created issues of legitimacy that changed the power dynamics and upset traditional power relations between the different groups. The modernization project sought to intensify agricultural production at great cost to traditional customary structures. The decentralization reforms of the 1990s aggravated the changing power dynamics of these groups and increased the agricultural encroachment of key pasture areas and livestock corridors. The resource management reforms resulted in traditionally lower-ranking members in Fulani societies earning more than the former powerful members engaged in pastoralism. Almost instantly, climate change, herd expansion, and population growth affected others’ livelihoods. These resource grievances were subsequently instrumentalized by armed non-state groups and thus gave rise to banditry, self-defense militias, and extremism. By 2015, communal violence between the pastoralists and farmers in the central parts of the country started escalating, and the limited state presence and authority in the country gave rise to violent extremism. Very soon, multiple extremists and militant groups were active, wreaking havoc in the country (Hegazi et al. 2021: 7–8). In February 2017, France and the Group of Five (G5) for the Sahel region announced the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which was tasked with defusing the violence in the region. Despite their presence, the violence continued, intensifying fears, increasing displacements, and threatening regional stability. Many are concerned that this may result in Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State establishing new havens and completely destabilizing the region. Mali’s brittle economy and lack of job creation have facilitated the increased smuggling of migrants and drugs as a source of income in both this region and the country as a whole (Centre for Preventive Action 2022; Hegazi et al. 2021: 6). The political volatility and military coups have further exacerbated the decline of security in the country. The 2021 military coup resulted in the African Union and ECOWAS suspending Mali’s membership of their continental and regional bodies. Additionally, they threatened sanctions if the military did not allow a civilian-led transitional government to rule (Centre for Preventive Action 2022). What began as a climate conflict has since spiraled across the entire region to include a wide array of ethnic groups. Thus, it can be argued that climate change has exacerbated the country’s existing social, political, and economic challenges (Tarif and Grant 2021).

4.7 Conclusion The Anthropocene is a period in which human activity plays a significant geological role. In this epoch, human activity has contributed to a change in the biochemical cycles of the elements needed for survival on Earth. While human civilizations has made great strides in development, it has also plundered the Earth’s natural resources and played a major role in the destruction of the environment—which inevitably contributes to climate change and climate vulnerability. It should, however,

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be noted that resource consumption has been unequal during this period, as those most vulnerable to climate change and climate vulnerability often have the smallest carbon footprints. Despite this, climate change acts as a force multiplier in those very regions. It exacerbates existing socioeconomic and political tensions, poverty, injustice, and insecurity. By acknowledging the existence of this nexus, practitioners and scholars can actively participate in developing sustainable conflict prevention and peacekeeping strategies and policies. There are various policies on climate change that emphasize the reduction of greenhouse gases, strategies to increase different societies’ capacities to survive climate change, improvement of human knowledge and understanding of climate change in order to facilitate the development of risk-management strategies, and, ultimately, manipulation of the Earth’s systems to counteract the effects of climate change. Stabilizing the greenhouse gas levels will allow ecosystems to adapt without threatening food production and economic development. Ordinary citizens around the world can invest in renewal energy solutions by recycling, utilizing more sustainable transportation and environmentally friendly appliances, and reducing their consumption—particularly of fast fashion and plastic. The clothing sector, for example, accounts for almost 3% of the world’s CO2 emissions. Regardless of an increase in knowledge on the phenomenon, global emissions continue to increase, which has a negative impact on countries such as Mali that are highly climate-sensitive and subject to the climate-security nexus. Historically, resources in Mali were governed by traditional/customary rules that established boundaries for farming and grazing, regulated access to pastures, and managed migration. However, this changed during colonialism and postcolonialism, and the intensification of agricultural production and resource management reforms has altered traditional dynamics and resulted in farmer–herder violence. This intercommunal violence threatens unity in the country. To address this issue, the government must use customary mechanisms to facilitate communal dialogue that can ease tensions and defuse the conflict. It must establish more consensual land tenure policies to address the challenge of scarce resources and avoid stigmatizing other communities. In addition, its development policies should be more inclusive as well. There is an urgent need to address the widespread poverty in northern and central Mali. The government should focus on improving human security, creating sustainable economic development, and addressing the country’s existing social and economic grievances. An increased focus on improved governance and service delivery would weaken the recruitment systems of militant non-state groups that exploit existing cleavages. The Malian government must reestablish its presence in ungoverned spaces and address its state fragility as well as the continued threat of coups that undermine its internal stability and foreign relations. Furthermore, it must investigate allegations of human rights violations and abuses by its soldiers to improve its credibility and regain citizens’ confidence. This will bring an end to the vicious cycle of violence in the country. The Malian government will not be able to reestablish stability in the country without addressing the underlying causes of tension and conflict. Military solutions

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may yield short-term success, but there is an urgent need to address the country’s communal divisions, unequal development, and pressing resource challenges.

References African Development Bank, 2015: Renewable Energy in Africa: Mali Country Profile (Cote d’Ivoire: The African Development Bank). Al Jazeera, 2022: “Two UN Peacekeepers Dead, 5 Others Wounded in Mali Attack,” at: https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/5/two-u-n-peacekeepers-killed-5-wounded-in-northern-maliattack-u-n. Brown, Oli; Hammill, Anne; McLeman, Robert., 2007: “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat: Implications for Africa,” in International Affairs, 83,6: 1147–1154. Centre for Prevention Action, 2022: “Instability in Mali,” at: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflicttracker/conflict/destabilization-mali. Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 2018: “Anthropocene Time: The Seventh History and Theory Lecture,” in: History and Theory, 57,1: 5–32. Chua, Liana; Fair, Hannah, 2020: “The Anthropocene: Anthropological Approaches,” in: Institute for Interdisciplinary Research into the Anthropocene, July 9, 2022. Clingendael Institute, 2015: “Rebellion and Fragmentation in Northern Mali,” at: https://www. clingendael.org/pub/2015/the_roots_of_malis_conflict/2_rebellion_and_fragmentation_in_nort hern_mali/ (accessed April 30, 2022). Crutzen, Paul Jozef, 2006: “The ‘Anthropocene,’” in: Earth System Science in the Anthropocene (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer): 13–18. El-Abd, Sarah, 2021: “From Environmental Scarcity to ‘Rage of the Rich’—Causes of Conflict in Mali,” at: https://www.e-ir.info/2021/12/21/from-environmental-scarcity-to-rage-of-the-richcauses-of-conflict-in-mali/ (accessed June 27, 2022). France 24, 2012: “Who are the Tuareg Rebels Conquering Northern Mali?” at: https://www. france24.com/en/20120402-tuareg-rebels-conquered-northern-mali-mnla-azawad-toure-aqimqaeda-ansar-dine-mujao (accessed May 5, 2022). France 24, 2022: “UN Report Links Malian Army to ‘Exponential Rise’ in Abuses,” at: https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220531-un-report-links-malian-army-to-exponentialrise-in-abuses (accessed June 11, 2022). Froese, Rebecca; Schilling, Janpeter, 2019: “The Nexus of Climate Change, Land Use, and Conflicts,” in: Climate Change and Conflicts, 5: 24–35. Hegazi, Farah; Krampe, Florian; Smith, Elizabeth Seymour, 2021: “Climate-Related Security Risks and Peacebuilding in Mali,” in: SIPRI Policy Paper, 60 (April) 2021, at: https://www.sipri.org/ sites/default/files/2021-04/sipripp60.pdf. Huq, Saleemul; Warner, Koko; Rhyner, Jakob, 2021: “The Climate-Security Nexus: From Conflicts to Synergies,” (November 30) at: https://www.cliccs.uni-hamburg.de/about-cliccs/news/2021news/2021-11-30-climate-security-workshop.html. International Climate Centre, 2021: “Mali, Country-Level Climate Fact Sheet,” at: https://www.cli matecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/RCCC-ICRC-Country-profiles-Mali.pdf (accessed April 27, 2022). International Committee of the Red Cross, 2021: “Mali’s Invisible Front Line: Climate Change in a Conflict Zone,” at: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/mali-invisible-front-line-climate-changeconflict-zone (accessed July 9, 2022). Kusangaya, Samuel; Warburton, Michele L.; Archer Van Garderen, Emma; Jewitt, Graham P., 2013: “Impacts of Climate Change on Water Resources in Southern Africa: A Review,” in: Pergamon, 67: 1–17.

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Lewis, Simon; Maslin, Mark, A., 2015: “Defining the Anthropocene,” in: Research Perspectives, 159: 171–180. Mbiyozo, Aimée-Noël; Maunganidze, Ottilia A., 2021: “Climate Change and Violence in Africa: No Time to Lose,” at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/climate-change-and-violence-in-africa-notime-to-lose (accessed May 10, 2022). McDonald, Matt, 2018: “The Climate Change-Security Nexus: A Critical Security Studies Perspective,” in: Toda Peace Institute, Policy Brief No. 19, at: https://toda.org/policy-briefs-andresources/policy-briefs/climate-change-in-pacific-island-countries-a-review.html (accessed May 28, 2022). Mueller, Valerie; Sheriff, Glenn; Dou, Xiaoya; Gray, Clark, 2020: “Temporary Migration and Climate Variation in Eastern Africa,” in: World Development, 126, C: 1– 16, at: https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeewdevel/v_3a126_3ay_3a2020_3ai_3ac_3as030 5750x19303523.htm (accessed April 27, 2022). Reliefweb, 2021: “Climate Change and Violent Conflict in Mali,” at: https://reliefweb.int/report/ mali/climate-change-and-violent-conflict-mali. Reuveny, Rafael, 2007: “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” Political Geography, 26: 656–673. Saldanha, Arun, 2020: “A Date with Destiny: Racial Capitalism and the Beginning of the Anthropocene,” in: Society and Space, 38,1: 12–34. Skah, Maha; Lyammouri, Rida, 2020: The Climate Change-Security Nexus: Case Study of the Lake Chad Basin (Morocco: Policy Centre for the New South). Smith, Bruce D.; Zeder, Melinda, 2013: “The Onset of the Anthropocene,” at: https://www.resear chgate.net/publication/259173100_The_onset_of_the_Anthropocene (accessed April 25, 2022) Steffen, Will; Grinevald, Jacques; Crutzen, Paul; McNeil, John, 2011: “The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives,” in: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 369: 842–867. Sweijs, Tim; De Haan, Marleen; Van Manen, Hugo, 2022: Unpacking the Climate Security Nexus: Seven Pathologies Linking Climate Change to Violent Conflict (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies), at: https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Unpacking-the-ClimateSecurity-Nexus-HCSS-2022-1.pdf (accessed April 27, 2022). Tarif, Kheira; Grant, Anab Ovidie, 2021: “Climate Change and Violent Conflict in Mali,” at: https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/climate-change-and-violent-conflict-in-mali/ (accessed June 9, 2022). Trischler, Helmuth, 2016: “The Anthropocene,” in: NTM Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin, 24,3: 309–335. United Nations, 2021: “Mali Violence Threatens Country’s Survival, Warns UN Human Rights Expert,” at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/08/1097272 (accessed July 11, 2022). United Nations, 2022: “Mali: UN Condemns Second ‘Cowardly’ Attack in Three Days Against Peacekeepers,” at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1119722 (accessed June 13, 2022). USAID, 2019: “Mali Country Profile,” at: https://www.usaid.gov/mali/fact-sheet/mali-country-pro file. Wilén, Nina; Williams, Paul D., 2022: “What are the International Military Options for the Sahel?” at: https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/what-are-international-military-options-sahel (accessed May 26, 2022). Zalasiewicz, Jan; Waters, Colin, 2015: “The Anthropocene,” at: https://nora.nerc.ac.uk/id/eprint/ 513436/1/The%20Anthropocene_for%20NORA.pdf (accessed May 30, 2022). Zalasiewicz, Jan; Williams, Mark; Steffen, Will; Crutzen, Paul, 2010: “The New World and the Anthropocene,” in: Environmental Science and Technology Viewpoint, 44: 2228–2231.

Chapter 5

Exploring the Interface Between the African State, African Security, and the African Union in the Anthropocene Age Hussein Solomon

and Jude Cocodia

Abstract As any first-year political science student would attest, a state may be defined as a community residing in a particular geographical space with institutions that regulate its affairs and the necessary coercive means to protect its independence against other states, while judiciously utilizing such coercive means as a deterrent to wayward members of its own community. This independence is often described as the sovereignty of states, which is both negative and positive. While negative sovereignty is merely de jure in that it is a formal legal condition, providing for some recognition in international relations as well as nominal non-interference in one’s domestic affairs, positive sovereignty is not merely de jure but de facto where states actively fulfill their citizens’ needs and aspirations. African states are often weak, due in part to anthropogenic pressures, and so operate merely at the level of negative sovereignty. In the Anthropocene Age, where the human impact on the world has led to rising insecurity across the globe, postindependent African political elites have failed to create inclusive communities in their polities and have, instead, directed the coercive apparatus of states toward citizens in an effort to bolster regime security. Meanwhile, the continental African security architecture represented by the African Union reinforces regime security at the expense of the human security of ordinary citizens. This chapter argues that, given the fact that the state is often at the heart of insecurity, the African Union needs to adopt a less state-centric security architecture if positive security and sovereignty are to be realized. Keywords Sovereignty · African Union · Weak states · Human security · Regime security

H. Solomon (B) Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] J. Cocodia Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Amassoma, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_5

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5.1 Introduction The Anthropocene Age started at the end of World War II, when, from a strategiccum-conflict perspective, mankind possessed the ability to exterminate itself as a species through the development of the nuclear bomb. Geologically, it marked humanity’s ability to profoundly affect the Earth’s systems and future, which became a central driver of planetary change (as it radically altered the Earth’s biosphere), leading to rising insecurity. Internationalism and realism allude to the above points but also contend that the Anthropocene marked the onset of the US-orchestrated new world order and its multilateral global leadership role (Whitehead 2014: 1; Angus 2016: 152; Davies 2016: 58; Brauch 2021: 295, 298; UNDP 2022: iii). The latter has been a double-edged sword for politics and development in Africa, with the African Union often serving as proxy. While the United States and its allies have been at the center of aid, security, and development in certain areas, they have also been the source of underdevelopment and strife in others (see Moyo 2009; Nicholas 2015), and there is little the African Union can do about it when they are co-opted into such schemes (Cocodia 2021).1 The latter of the Anthropocene’s hallmarks mentioned above—the new US global order—propelled the rush for independence at the start of the Anthropocene, with great excitement and high expectations for a prosperous and stable African continent—for Africans, led by Africans—of which the camaraderie among nations and the rich resources available would witness rapid development and usher in an era of peaceful coexistence. Scholars, the literate, and the unschooled of the colonized world shared this vision (see Rodney 1981). However, it did not take long for this dream to vanish, for even before the euphoria of the drums of independence faded, intra- and inter-state wars, coups and countercoups, and drought and poverty became common themes across the newly independent countries of Africa. Congo-Kinshasa became embroiled in a civil war whose antecedence began barely a week after independence in 1960. Six decades down the line, the country still suffers from the aftershocks of this war, such that 5.8 million lives have been lost from the region’s instability between August 1998 and November 2008—a period during which it is approximated that 1000 lives were lost each month (Bavier 2008; Relief Web 2008). And although the violence has slowed recently, there remains cause for concern, as 4600 lives were lost between January 2019 and June 2020 (Akamo 2021: 9). Sudan experienced its first civil war from 1955 to 1972 between the northern and southern regions, just before independence was granted in 1956, and the deaths are estimated to be no fewer than 500,000 (Momodu 2022). This was also the first recorded war in Africa where child soldiers were recruited (Momodu 1 Jude Cocodia (2021) argues that the African Union was used was co-opted by the United States and Ethiopia in order to legitimize the usurpation of power in Somalia from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had brought peace to a troubled south-central Somalia. In its stead, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), loyal to Ethiopia, was installed. This invasion was carried out as a peace enforcement operation under the aegis of the African Union—the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is difficult to imagine that the African Union was not aware of the stability the ICU had brought to Somalia before the invasion.

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2022). Seven years after independence, Nigeria experienced the same (from 1967 to 1970). The situation was fueled by fear of ethnic domination and control over oil, and more than one million deaths were recorded (Uche 2008; Klieman 2012; Raji and Abejide 2013; Nwaubani 2020). Tanzania and Uganda, who gained independence in 1961 and 1962 respectively, were involved in an inter-state war from 1978 to 1979, in which approximately 1500 civilians had been shot and killed. The 1994 Rwandan Civil War, which lasted about six months (April–October) was estimated to have killed about 800,000 civilians and 75% of the Tutsi population (Verpoorten 2005; BBC 2011). The above statistics indicate that independence is not the panacea that most believe it to be in terms of ushering in peace and utopia. The sovereignty associated with independence comes with responsibilities, and most countries in Africa are either failing or have failed at this. While negative sovereignty has been achieved, exercising their responsibilities and achieving positive sovereignty—even the protection of life, which is the most basic of all—has been overwhelming for African states for several reasons, including the catastrophic effect of climate change. Most states in Africa are confronting a violent return to identity politics espoused in issues such as ethnic rivalry, ethnonationalism, and horizontal inequality. While these issues often lead to high-intensity conflicts (including terrorism), it has evolved in the twenty-first century from occasional acts of violence intended to draw attention to a grievance to ruthless wars that are waged to acquire territory. However, Solomon and Cocodia (2021) argue that terrorism is part of African history. Whatever the case, this chapter examines who or what fuels the formation of violent groups and whether the African state has been a facilitator of peace or active in fomenting strife. Considering that the role of Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) is to enable states to manage challenges that they cannot overcome on their own and facilitate inter-state collaboration (Okafor 2005), the question arises: Has the African Union, beyond being instrumental in Africa’s independence struggle, enabled African states to meet the challenges they face by providing security for its citizens?

5.1.1 State Security, Human Security, and Inter-State Collaboration: Africa’s Regional Conundrum Earlier security discourses were state-centric: from Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes to the more recent writings of Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Carl von Clausewitz. This institutional-cum-state-centric approach to security was challenged by the rise of critical studies, which sought to shift the emphasis to the individual, thus resulting in the conflict between state and human security. At its most basic level, this ideological conflict can be expressed as preserving the rights of each individual while ensuring that their security does not compromise the security of the state. Implementing safeguards to ensure the stability and security of the state would likely infringe on the rights of the individual.

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The implementation of curfews to stem riots and other forms of instability infringes on the right of citizens to move freely, just as prohibiting hate speech to reduce ethnic tensions restricts the right to self-expression. Some scholars have devoted their studies to a workability of both concepts—a balancing act of finding midpoints between both poles. Sahito and Slany (2012: 38) contend that it is important to adopt broad security measures in high-risk situations in order to protect critical infrastructure and thus reduce the threat level—including terrorism—while preserving the rights of citizens. Pace (2012: 68) holds that lowering the threat level while preserving the rights of citizens clearly defines what the limits and responsibilities of states and organizations are. Unfortunately, in reality, especially in developing countries, it is either one or the other, which is evident in the arguments of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and the moral hazard theory, where this ideological dichotomy is at its most fundamental. Proponents of the R2P contend that human security takes precedence over sovereignty and, by extension, state security. Sovereignty, they argue, comes with responsibilities, such that, in a state’s inability to meet its responsibilities and keep its citizens secure, the international community reserves the right to intervene (Bellamy 2008; Glanville 2011; Richmond 2013; Hultman 2013). Thus, the R2P derives its strength from the position of human security taking precedence over state security and the fact that it aligns with a US world order (that promotes individual freedoms), which marks the Anthropocene Age. Conversely, while contending that the R2P challenges the Westphalian tradition, proponents of the moral hazard hold that the R2P instigates rather than prevents genocide and mass atrocities (Kuperman 2009; Hehir 2010). They argue that rebellion is the most common trigger for genocidal violence, yet some militants may rebel, despite the risk of provoking state retaliation, because they expect any resulting atrocities to attract intervention, which facilitates their rebellion. Thus, proponents of the moral hazard theory contend that the R2P ultimately prolongs suffering by encouraging repressed groups to continue armed resistance and reject reasonable negotiated settlements. They suggest that this is a major reason for the onset and prolongation of the conflict in Darfur (Kuperman 2009: 285–292; Robiliard 2011: 23) and the prolongation of the Nigerian Civil War. Another critique these scholars level against the R2P is that it makes local parties in conflict too reliant on international rescue, such that civil society is forced to neglect the decisive roles they could play in defusing conflict. Given the level of insecurity and instability on the continent, what roles do states, citizens, and the African Union have to play? One basic argument is that if states fulfill their responsibility to protect their populations, violent insurgencies would cease or dwindle to the bare minimum (Bellamy and Williams 2012; Vircoulon and Lesueur 2014). Botswana, for example, has an exemplary record of recognizing the rights of its citizens, which has made providing security much easier (see US Department of State 2019; US Embassy in Botswana 2022). Consequently, civil strife is seldom heard of compared to states such as Nigeria, where citizens’ rights are hardly respected and frustrations run high, which culminates in regular costly civil strife, brutal banditry, and fatal terrorist attacks. This contrast indicates that states ought to be the major providers of security for

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Table 5.1 Disparity in Income between the political class and skilled and unskilled public servants Class

Profession

Monthly salary

Annual salary

Upper class

Federal Legislator

₦13,580,000 ($32,723)

₦162,960,000 ($392,675)

Middle class

Lower class

Professor

₦450,000 ($1084)

₦5,4000,000 ($13,012)

Judges (Supreme Court)

₦751,000 ($1809)

₦9,012,000 ($21,715)

Labourer (Gardner/Cleaner etc.)

₦30,000 ($72) (minimum

₦360,000 ($868)

wage)

Source Oxfam (2017), Cole (2020)

citizens, as they provide security, no matter how basic, which individual citizens and civil society do not have access to. Unfortunately, as Solomon and Cocodia (2021) observe, states, especially in Africa—from Mali to Mozambique—have been the catalyst for insecurity within, and occasionally across, their borders. A major avenue through which African states have exacerbated insecurity on the continent is the growing divide between the political (ruling class) and the poor, whose numbers are rapidly increasing. This phenomenon is captured in Table 5.1, which illustrates the disparity between the political class and public servants in Nigeria. Nigeria’s Gini coefficient for 2018 stood at 35.1%, while South Africa’s was 63.1%—the highest in the world (World Bank 2022). South Africa’s score is partly due to the legacy of apartheid and corruption. The Gini coefficient measures a country’s income inequality: the higher the percentage score, the greater the inequality (Stoltz 2022). A country with complete parity would achieve a score of 0%. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the crime rate in South Africa is high, given the link between income inequality and instability, or high crime rates, in a country (Forde et al. 2021). Unfortunately, these disparities have not been given due attention in research but has, instead, been left for the attention of motivational speakers and the press. One such motivational speaker, Patrick Lumumba, states that “if you want to get wealth without working for it at all, join African politics. That is the truth everywhere in Africa, except for a few places” (in Chooma 2017). In most of his discourses, Lumumba stresses that it is a contradiction to see African politicians, who come from some of the poorest countries in the world, being among the world’s best paid, while camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), which were meant to be temporary bases, have now become permanent abodes across the continent. This, he points out, illustrates the lack of empathy among leaders, which incenses the poor (Chooma 2017; Jannamike 2022) and breeds resentment that ultimately leads to insurgency (Solomon and Cocodia (2021). The income inequality that exists in most parts of Africa has been a major contributory factor in conflict on the continent—including terrorism. Group income inequality arising from unfair allocation of resources by the state leads to social friction, riots, and higher crime levels, as citizens and (ethnic) groups

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respond aggressively to the institutionalized deprivation to which the state has exposed them (Hansen and Musa 2013; Pettinger 2019). Often, economic marginalization that is based on ethnic affiliation fuels identity politics. The poverty and misery this evokes within the group precipitates the rise of terrorists and self-styled reformative groups. The justification peddled by the ethnic groups for resorting to violence is often tied to the state’s mismanagement of resources, corruption, and insensitivity to the poor (Hansel and Musa 2013; Cocodia 2020a, 2020b; Adelaja and George 2020). Climate change, especially desertification in the Sahel, has further added to these conflict dynamics. The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, and most other terror groups followed this trend. Oxfam (2017) and the Equality Trust (2019) observed that high income inequality, especially between groups, promotes financial crises, erodes democratic governance, diminishes social cohesion, and obliterates equal opportunities for all. In direct terms, income inequality occasioned by the lopsided distribution of resources by the state propels violent crime as well as the incubation and growth of terrorist groups (Bourguignon 2000; Kelly 2000; Anser et al. 2020). The state of leadership and the role of governments in Africa’s (in)security crisis compelled Lumumba (in Olokor 2022) to accuse Africa’s leaders of contributing to insecurity, noting that they had failed the people and imbued their lethargic and incompetent attitudes into the functions of the African Union. The African Union, after all, hardly represents 1.2 billion Africans; it is more representative of the fifty-four heads of state—reflecting this political elite’s interests and serving to reinforce regime security rather than popular sovereignty. Similar to most other IGOs, the role of the African Union is to collaborate with and assist states in improving the lives of their citizens, which includes the provision of security. Based on the continent’s colonial experience, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) opted to maintain the dictates of the moral hazard theory and thus avoided interfering in the internal affairs of its member states. As the core of its functions was tied to the emancipation of all African countries from colonization, the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990, which were the last countries to gain independence on the continent, meant that the organization desperately needed relevance in Africa’s political evolution (see Kalu 2020; James 2022). In addition to the pressures of the Anthropocene Age—which include the end of colonialism on the continent, the end of the Cold War in 1989, and the triumph of democracy over communism—there was a global shift toward people power and, with it, growing popularity of R2P in global politics. With these changes and the inertia of the OAU during the Rwandan genocide, and to stay relevant, the OAU had to change its approach to issues on the continent, and it donned a liberal garb as denoted by Article 4h of its Constitutive Act, which states that citizens’ welfare takes precedence over state sovereignty. This is notable because its successor, the African Union, allowed intervention in the affairs of member states. These anthropogenic events, over and above Muammar Ghaddafi’s push for a ‘United States of Africa,’ necessitated this radical change for a continent traumatized by proxy wars, coups, and countercoups (Ibrahim et al. 2017; Cocodia 2018; Akiyama 2019; James 2022).

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Since its inception, the African Union has sought to fulfill this responsibility of improving life on the continent, especially in terms of security. While some have rated its efforts positively (Okeke 2016; Bamidele 2017; Tieku 2022), others are skeptical that it has anything different to offer, and they advocate that radical change is necessary if it is to make any impact (Hodge 2002; Belay 2019), or contend that the organization is part of the problem (Ayittey 2016; Ayittey and Dixon 2019; Cocodia 2021). In the early years of its transformation, the African Union seemed eager to fulfill its role of providing security, and it became involved in peace operations between 2003 and 2013, recording a few early successes, such as those in the small nations of Burundi (2003–2004), Comoros (2003–2008), and Sudan (2004–2020). While the Central African Republic (CAR) (2013–2014) was deemed an outright failure, situations in Somalia (since 2007) and Mali (since 2013) remain tense as the peace operation continues. Apart from the organization’s early forays into the provision of security through peace operations—with success in the small countries of Burundi and the Comoros between 2003 and 2004, and the United Nations–African Union hybrid peace operation in Darfur after thirteen years (2007–2020)—the others have been either outright failures (Central African Republic) or enveloped in uncertainty (Mali and Somalia). Since 2014, the African Union has not embarked on any new peace operations, despite several conflicts on the continent and the increasing presence of terrorist groups, and the shocks, displacement, and misery that accompany it. Given the amount of time and resources spent on the planning of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is appalling that it was never called into action to secure the Cabo Delgado region in Mozambique, even before the horrific March 2021 attack by ISIS-affiliated Islamist extremists in Palma. If the attack had been sudden (without calling into question the Continental Early Warning System [CEWS] of the African Union), ending the attack and securing the town when the Mozambican government sought help should have been the prerogative of the ASF. Instead, for an Islamic insurgency that had continued since 2017, foreign mercenaries were the first responders, followed by troops from Rwanda and a few other southern African countries (Mckenzie 2021; BBC 2022). The African Union’s invisibility and cold feet in shouldering the responsibility of security ensured that over 200 lives were lost in the Palma attack, which is part of a larger conflict that has resulted in over 2500 deaths and displacement of over 700,000 people (Herrmannsen and Byaruhanga 2021; UNHCR 2022). Of those who fled Palma, an Al Jazeera (2021) report noted: “The civilians fleeing Palma are heading to areas where they will receive no support. They have hundreds of miles to go either by land or by sea to find an organization that can provide them the kind of food, medicine and psychological support they surely need.” As a survivor of the attack added: “This is not over. It seems like nobody cares. If you are in Africa, nobody cares” (BBC 2022). The disappointment at the inertia of the African Union and its ASF mechanism stemmed from the fact that while the ASF—whose planning was conceived in 2001— was certified ready by the African Union and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2016 (Ani 2018; Cocodia 2020a, 2020b), it was not called into action when the Mozambican government sought help to salvage the situation. Prior to the terrorist

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attack in Palma, various suggestions had been made as to why the ASF might not function if called upon. Cocodia (2020a, 2020b) argues that the certification of the ASF as ready was premature on the grounds that the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC), which was the major factor for contriving the ASF, was missing/non-existent. The ASF was formed based on the need for rapid deployment, such that peace operations personnel could be assembled and deployed within three months of the mission’s approval. This was to counter and improve on the slow deployment faced by ad hoc arrangements that could continue for six or more months. Given this scenario, Cocodia (2020a, 2020b: 140–141) contends that the ASF’s premature operationalization was a strategy by the AU to propitiate its donors in view of the fourteen years and over US$1 billion invested in it…. The United States lavished money on what was described as the African Peace and Security Architecture providing $500 million to train up to 50,000 African troops. British involvement was also substantial, with more than £110 million a year being invested via the African Conflict Prevention Pool for nearly a decade. “As at December 2013” the figure stands at £51.5 million. The Pool is a joint initiative run by the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and DFID. These donations are outside funds provided by other major partners – the EU, Germany and France. Given that such massive investments had to be justified declaring the ASF fully operational was likely due to political pressures rather than field demands. In lacking its RDC, the major reason for its existence, the time and resources put into the ASF were not worth it.

In addition to this, each of the African Union’s five regions is expected to have a five-thousand-strong battalion. This number—in war, peace, or stabilization operations—is inadequate for the ‘force projection’ needed to intimidate spoilers or stabilize a conflict region (De Souza 2019: 107; Cocodia 2020a, 2020b: 138). In view of these defects, it is argued that the flexible ad hoc system that allows Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) from any part of the continent—though slow to move into action and certainly not perfect as its mixed record shows—is a much better approach than the (phantom) ASF for dealing with intense conflict (Cocodia 2020a, 2020b). The ad hoc mechanism suits the heterogeneous dynamics of the African Union better as it gives it much more control over delicate issues, such as the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The latter half of the Anthropocene has witnessed a change in conflict dynamics on the continent, from cross border wars to civil wars, a rise in Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) with no commitment to rules of engagement, huge civilian casualties, the use of child soldiers, and the use of rape as a weapon of war (see Kaldor 2012). This owes to the end of the Cold War and the rise of the US hegemonic world order. Ani (2018) notes that aspects of the original concept of the ASF date back to 2003 and have become outdated in terms of growing security threats, such as terrorism, violent extremism, transnational crimes, and humanitarian crises. The ASF’s ability to manage this new asymmetrical warfare is limited in respect to training, organization, equipment, doctrine, intelligence capabilities, and organization (De Souza 2019). As such, the problem must be reevaluated, and assessments should be based on these changes, which would influence the contexts in which ASF interventions would be required and deployed. Irrespective of how well this reevaluation and CONOPS pan out, it all comes to naught if the political will of African states and their regional organizations are unwilling to commit resources (Ani 2018; De Souza 2019).

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In line with the tenets of the US world order, which is a product of the Anthropocene, Article 4h of the Constitutive Act of the African Union authorizes the organization to go into an erring state to protect citizens from extreme forms of victimization from sovereigns. Contrarily, however, the African Union has shielded sovereigns wanted for war crimes. For instance, Al-Bashir was wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2009 for atrocities committed against civilians in Darfur that resulted in over 300,000 deaths. However, until he was deposed by a popular revolt of his own people, he flouted this order (which relied on the cooperation of all states), traveled throughout Africa, and attended meetings of the African Union. In fact, in the same year the warrant was issued, the African Union declared its support for Al-Bashir, and in the following year (2010), it issued a declaration that it would not cooperate with the ICC to arrest Al-Bashir (Du Plessis 2010). The African Union’s displeasure regarding the deposition of Al-Bashir was evident in its lackluster response to the crisis that emanated from his removal; that is, the long stand-off between civilians and the military (who gained control). On this, Kato (2019) writes: As Sudan’s revolution faces the real threat of failure, it is the response and (in)action of the African Union that’s most interesting. The body has been vague, inconsistent, reactive and utterly inept at responding to developments in Sudan that when it finally did, it had lost all leverage and could not keep up with a very fluid situation that needed huge resources; diplomatic and otherwise to stay on top…. This sloppy show is also an important indicator that the AU is in no rush to reform and certainly won’t pressurize membership countries to embrace change.

The African Union’s lethargic response to crisis has been a disservice to its ability to act, even in matters relating to sovereigns. It is unable to act when states disagree on a course of action to be taken (Akiyama 2019), which led to the absence of the African Union during the Libyan crisis of 2011 (which lasted from March to October) that deposed Gaddafi and left approximately 21,490 people dead, 19,700 injured, and 435,000 displaced (Daw et al. 2015: 103). The division among African Union member states, and the resultant indecision, paralyzed the African Union from taking quick steps to solve the Libyan crisis—either diplomatically or militarily (Akiyama 2019: 11–12). The international system that evolved at the onset of the Anthropocene—and at the turn of the century under US hegemony—wanted Al-Bashir and Gaddafi out of power due to their human rights records, whether real or phantom (see Davidson 2017; Walsh 2019; Brown 2021; Pothier 2022). Given this powerful external pressure, it was unlikely that the African Union could have stopped either event from happening. The result, coupled with the removal of Saddam Hussein, has been a very unstable Sahel that the African Union must deal with. Hence, it is fair to assert that anthropogenic pressures have been a double-edged sword for Africa, especially in terms of human security. Unfortunately, while most states on the continent have exhibited a high level of insensitivity toward their own populations—breeding public resentment, rebellion, and terrorism—these same sovereigns have transposed this onto the continental stage through the African Union. Akiyama (2019: 2) contends that AU member states will continue to act in their own self-interest, even if it undermines the African Union.

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This explains why, despite the R2P posture of the African Union, insecurity and terrorism have spread slowly yet surely within and across national borders.

5.1.2 Can the African Union be Less State-Centric? Africa continues to be the most blighted continent in the world. Long-suffering Africans have had to endure violence and poverty, all the while being treated with apathy, if not disdain, by their own leaders. This situation has witnessed regime security being at the forefront of the African Union’s agenda. Regime security (read elite security) undermines human security and contradicts democratic principles. After all, the people are sovereign in a democracy and the state acts as the agent of that popular sovereignty. Despite great global strides in the R2P, which was championed by intellectual giants such as the Sudanese Francis Deng, the reality is that the African Union has continued to place regime security above human security—despite the fact that the dismissal of popular sovereignty, as well as the inability to practice inclusive and responsive governance, lie at the heart of Africa’s security challenges. One major area in which the African Union has differed from its moribund predecessor is that Article 4h of its Constitutive Act allows for intervention in the affairs of member states. The African Union has been slow to act, despite numerous egregious violations of human rights within member states. Such states, of course, have been reluctant to empower the African Union Commission (AUC).

5.1.3 How Do We Break This Impasse? First, we need to acknowledge that, as in the continental project of an African Continental Free Trade Area, economic integration is a necessity if Africans want to escape impoverishment, given the small-scale nature of disparate African national economies. Similarly, given the political fragmentation of African states, there must be a continental project that emphasizes greater integration and subscription to certain norms, such as democracy. Far from taking its cue from individual states, it should take its cue from the African Union. For this to occur, the African Union—and the AUC specifically—must be strengthened. This requires their financial independence from member states. To a certain extent, they have achieved some degree of independence from member states by receiving donor funding from external partners such as the European Union. However, this carries the danger of pursuing a donor-driven agenda. The creation of an AU Peace Fund has been a step in the right direction, as it has given the African Union a presence in hostile areas, so that can engage in preventive diplomacy before hostilities are even initiated. It also provides the African Union with some independence. One reform initiative of the African Union is to institute a 0.2% tax on all imports (Louw-Vaudran 2019). This would help it to become financially independent and allow it to act in the interest of all Africans, not

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just the political elite. In turn, this would prevent inaction—being held hostage by the very member states whose territories require intervention. Second, the African Union must work closely with African civil society. For too long, African states have been on the wrong side of history, while Africa’s people have been on the right side. In the case of the ICC indictment of Al-Bashir, while member states and the African Union baulked at one of their own standing trial, 800 African NGOs supported the ICC’s stance that Al-Bashir had to account for the deaths of 300,000 fellow Africans in Darfur (Coalition for the ICC 2020). The African Union can create a database of legitimate NGOs with traction among their people and provide them with representation in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Pan-African Parliament, and every organ of the African Union. In this way, the voices of ordinary Africans can be heard at every level of the continental body. True African security will only be achieved if the voices of the 1.2 billion Africans can be heard and not just the cacophony of venal political elites engaged in protecting their incumbency. The African Union needs to be brave and support human security and endorse popular sovereignty if ordinary Africans are to have a better tomorrow.

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Chapter 6

Resource-Based Conflicts in Africa Omololu Fagbadebo, Mzikayise S. Binza, and Martin M. Kabange

Abstract Africa is rich in natural resources. Yet, the resource-curse syndrome often diminishes the prospects of the resource blessing that ought to have characterized African societies. Corruption, environmental degradation, intermittent violent conflicts, and wars, among other things, have become the vices associated with the abundant presence of natural wealth on the African continent. The Liberian War, the Niger Delta insurgencies, the Marikana massacre in South Africa, the Adaka Boro episode in Nigeria, the land crises in most African societies, the imbroglio over the Nile River, and a series of other intra- and inter-African conflicts over natural resources have drawn the attention of scholars. This chapter argues that the management of the politics associated with Africa’s natural resources has continued to drive the resource-curse syndrome, with attendant consequences on security and stability. While corruption characterizes and engenders the domestic management of these resources, the neocolonial mentality and geopolitical construction of the African states drive the international dimension of these conflicts. Mismanagement of the proceeds of natural minerals in most African societies has led to the proliferation of armed conflicts and other criminal activities, while the political, military, and bureaucratic elites have remained the beneficiaries of the resources. With connections to foreign countries and multinational conglomerates (who are the recipients of the supplies of raw natural resources), the African elites often provoke conflicts to facilitate resource mismanagement. Proceeds from the illegal mining of resources, popularly known as ‘blood diamonds’ or ‘blood money,’ in collaboration with external O. Fagbadebo (B) · M. M. Kabange Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, D Block, Office D-305, Riverside Campus, 19 Aberfeldy Road, Scottsville, 3209 Pietermaritzburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] M. M. Kabange e-mail: [email protected] M. S. Binza Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Academic Affairs and Research (AAR), Walter Sisulu University, Mthatha, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_6

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forces, have been used to fund a series of wars and conflicts in Africa. This chapter asserts that resource-based conflicts in Africa would cease only when African leaders assume the role of statesmen who are committed to societal development and peace rather than pecuniary gains for personal enrichment. Keywords Civil war · Anthropocene · Berlin conference · Ethnic hostility · Colonialism · Environment · Natural wealth · Corruption · Poverty · Leadership

6.1 Introduction Conflict is endemic in Africa. It occurs in different spheres and contexts, and different actors have different reasons for their activities. From civil wars to militant activities across the continent, foreign powers and multinational corporations involved in the sale of arms and ammunition found a lucrative market in Africa (Craft and Smaldone 2002; Sanchez and Morgan 2019). The height of this commercial interest in war and conflicts, especially in Africa, was the opportunities offered by access to natural resources. State and non-state actors with vested interests in such conflicts have explored the opportunity to supply arms in exchange for the extraction of such natural resources, thereby leading to the prolongation of wars and proliferation of arms (Fyanka 2013; UNSC 2021). Thus, corruption, environmental degradation, intermittent violent conflicts, and wars, among other things, have become the vices associated with the abundant presence of natural wealth on the African continent. The Liberian war, the Niger Delta insurgencies in Nigeria, the Marikana massacre in South Africa, the Adaka Boro episode in Nigeria, the land crises that characterized most African societies, the imbroglio over the Nile River and a series of other intra- and inter-African conflicts over natural resources have drawn the attention of scholars and researchers (Mbaku 2020). Africa is rich in natural resources, and while this natural source of wealth is a blessing, the nature of human activities has made it a curse. For instance, while the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) would boost electricity generation in Ethiopia, it would impede agricultural activities in Egypt and parts of Sudan on the Nile River, thus presenting both benefits and challenges: If it works as planned, GERD will usher in a new era and help brighten the mostly dark landscape that appears in night-time images of Ethiopia. However, by changing the river’s hydrology, the dam may have an impact on millions of people who live and farm downstream in Egypt and parts of Sudan and use the Nile’s water. (NASA Earth Observatory, April 19, 2022)

In addition, “95 percent of Egypt’s farmland is found within a narrow zone near the riverbanks,” hence the likelihood of food shortages. This reality gave rise to Egypt’s opposition to the construction of the dam (Mbaku 2020), which has generated conflicts among the three principal countries: Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.

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The dispute over the GERD is part of a long-standing feud between Egypt and Sudan—the downstream states—on the one hand, and Ethiopia and the upstream riparians on the other over access to the Nile’s waters, which are considered a lifeline for millions of people living in Egypt and Sudan. (Mbaku 2020)

Other forms of conflict associated with natural resources abound in Africa. Scholars have argued that the presence of a wealth of resources is a driver of war and conflict (Craft and Smaldone 2002; Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 205; Ross 2004; Basedau and Wegenast 2009; Berman et al. 2017). Natural resources such as land, water, oil, gas, copper, diamonds, and gold—among other lucrative commodities that are of high economic value—serve as incentives for conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) note that these resources often spur armed rebellions due to greed. Thus, “wealth in primary commodities increases the likelihood of civil war onset by providing opportunity and the related motive of ‘greed’ for armed rebel activity, rather than by spurring conflict-promoting grievance” (Basedau and Wegenast 2009: 38). Arica is the epicenter of this phenomenon.

6.2 Conflicts in Africa Postindependent Africa has been embroiled in a series of conflicts (Ighobor 2019; Allison 2020). The intra-societal imbroglio of different spheres has led to civil wars in Nigeria, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Sierra Leone, among others (Meres 2017; Rustad and Bakken 2019). These conflicts have led to grave humanitarian crises and widespread devastation. Since the advent of colonialism in Africa, the hitherto inter-tribal conflicts for empire expansion have taken a dramatic turn. Colonial policies encouraged intra-societal conflicts orchestrated by the colonial administrators as a weapon to entrench foreign domination. Thus, after independence, the conflict phenomenon became part of the political culture from the early 1960s to 1990s (Rustad and Bakken 2019), and the number has continued to grow (Table 6.1). Different factors were responsible for these conflicts; nevertheless, the driver of most conflict in Africa is competition for natural resources.

6.3 Natural Wealth and Society: The Anthropocene Perspective Human activities in nature have brought about profound changes across the globe. The Industrial Revolution in Europe sparked the need for raw materials for industry, and the discovery of rich natural resources in Africa changed the landscape. Subsequently, Europe scrambled for the partition of the continent at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference. For Africans, it was an era of development and growth through exposure

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Table 6.1 List of some civil wars in postcolonial Africa Country

Years

Drivers

The Sahel Crisis (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger Republic)

Since 2012

Religious and local militias

South Sudan

Since 2013 (tenure of the transition government has been extended to February 2023)

Power struggles between national political leaders

Central African Republic (CAR)

Since 2012

Ethnoreligious hostility

Morocco

Since 1970

Separatist movement

Mozambique

1977–1992; since 2021

Ideological rivalry; the domestic crisis of governance, disputes over access to land and rich natural gas reserves; collaboration with foreign oil companies

DRC

Since 1996

Genocide in Rwanda; massive refugee crisis; revenues from illegal extractive activities

Burundi

1993–2005

Ethnic hostility

Nigeria

1967–1970

Military coup

Rwanda

1990–1994

Ethnic hostility

Sudan

1955–1972; 1983–2005 Since 1987: Insurgency by the Lord’s Resistance Army Since 2003: War in Darfur

Separation

Cameron

Since 2016

Separatist agitation

Libya

Since 2011

Oil resources; foreign intervention

Chad

1965–1979; 1979–1982; 2005–2010

Authoritarian leadership; religious differences

Congo Brazzaville

1993–1994; 1997–1999

General political unrest fueled by Imperialism and foreign oil companies’ interest in the rich oil fields

Djibouti

1991–1994

The uneven power dynamic between the Issas and Afars

Ethiopia

1974–1991; since 2018

Ethnic hostility; foreign intervention

Somali

Since 1991

Competition for power and resources

Angola

1975–2002

General domestic political instability and foreign intervention (continued)

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Table 6.1 (continued) Country

Years

Drivers

Cote d’Ivoire

2002–2007; 2010–2011

Political victimization; internal political dynamics

Guinea Bissau

1997–1999

Attempted coup against the president

Liberia

1989–1996; 1999–2003

Ethnic divisions; predatory leadership; corruption; economic disparities

Mali

1962–1964; 2007–2009; 2012 Ethnoreligious differences (the Tuareg Rebellion); since April 2002: Maghreb Insurgency

Sierra Leone

1991–2002

Collapsed economy; armed conflicts against the government over mineral resources

Source Compiled by authors

to Western culture; for Europe, it was an answer to a looming industrial calamity and the continent’s gateway to control over land endowed with rich natural resources. On the one hand, it was a blessing for human activity and exploration, but on the other, these human activities come with adverse effects that impinge on both nature and humanity. Environmental pollution and deforestation are detrimental to the ecosystem and contribute to climate change; and the conflict, insecurity, and disaster, among other things, that accompany the exploration of natural resources continue to threaten human existence. In other words, human activities on Earth have mixed outcomes: Human activity is now global and is the dominant cause of most contemporary environmental change. The impacts of human activity will probably be observable in the geological stratigraphic record for millions of years into the future, which suggests that a new epoch has begun. (Lewis and Maslin 2015: 171) The world has entered the Anthropocene Epoch. This concept was developed and popularized by Paul Crutzen when he “disagreed with a colleague who referred to the Holocene when discussing recent factors in global change dominated by human actions” (Brauch 2021: 292). The contention is that human activities in nature have altered the geological composition of the Earth in such a way that it has resulted in climate shifts (Carey 2016; Folke et al. 2021): Humans are the dominant force of change on the planet, giving rise to a new epoch referred to as the Anthropocene. This new epoch has profound meaning for humanity and one that we are only beginning to fully comprehend. We now know that society needs to be viewed as part of the biosphere, not separate from it. (Folke et al. 2021: 834)

Right from the age of the Industrial Revolution through to globalization (with the invention of machines and breakthroughs in technology), the Earth has witnessed tremendous changes and shifts (Parvanova 2017; Benyera 2021). The rediscovery of

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Africa as a continent rich in natural resources needed to bolster the Industrial Revolution in Europe had increased the pace of exploration and the growth of industrial technologies (Frankema et al. 2015; Jegourel and Chalmin 2017; Reisch 2022). The divide-and-rule tactics associated with the European invasion of Africa marked the beginning of the devastating consequences of human activities on nature in Africa. The inter-tribal wars and conflict over territorial, human, and natural resources altered the interactions among citizens and their relationship to the environment. With colonization and control of the different societies in Africa, Europe introduced the continent to different activities that engendered conflicts over natural resources, which have characterized the postindependence environment. The abundant natural wealth in Africa has promoted insecurity in different spheres.

6.4 Resource-Based Conflicts in African Society Natural resources are a given in Africa, and each country has unique reserves. The continent boasts fertile land for agriculture, mountains with rich deposits of gold and other resources, swamp forests and wetlands suitable for plantation farms, tree crops, rich crude oil deposits, rivers with a wealth of fish, and other resources that are buried beneath the Earth. Africa is rich in gold deposits, diamonds, iron, uranium, lithium, cobalt, copper, bauxite, silver, petroleum, and vast forests for plantation, such as cocoa beans, tropical timber, and fruit, among other things (Table 6.2). In addition, Africa is rich in agricultural minerals such as cotton, tobacco, maize, sorghum, groundnuts, coffee, tea, cassava, bananas, olives, dates, citrus, wheat, cocoa, yams, as well as fish and livestock, among many others. The allure of these resources is sufficient to create wealth on the continent. They should attract external actors—depending on the management of their extraction and usage—however, historically, they have mainly attracted violence and war. Empires and kingdoms throughout history are known to have risen or fallen because of their victories or defeats in wars that were heavily laden with natural resource considerations. History is also replete with examples of friendships and alliances forged by empires and kingdoms to defend access to, and control of, essential natural resources, while efforts have always been made to appease those who might block access to sources of vital natural resources. (Alao 2007:1)

This summarizes the two extreme consequences of natural resources. Poor leadership, coupled with the politics of managing natural resources on the continent, has created a resource curse. Evidence from the literature suggests that the nature of conflicts in Africa could be explicitly or implicitly drawn from human or natural resources (Adesola 2015; Kipkemoi et al. 2017; Akubo 2019; Price 2020). From the perspective of human resources, Ibrahim et al. (2014) considered the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism, and the concurrent neocolonialism as crucial driving forces in the development of the economies of many European countries, which have indirectly fueled resourcedbased conflicts in Africa. For instance, the transatlantic slave trade in West Africa

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Table 6.2 List of some natural resources in Africa by Country Country

Resources

Niger Republic

Uranium; coal; cement; lead; gold; iron ore

Namibia

Uranium; diamonds; zinc; lead; sulfur; salt; tantalite; copper; gold

Zambia

Copper; emerald; cobalt

South Africa

Diamonds; coal; gold; uranium; chromium

Mozambique

Aluminum; coal; titanium

Guinea

Bauxite; iron ore; uranium

Tanzania

Tanzanite; gold; diamonds; silver; tin; phosphates; iron ore,

Ghana

Gold; bauxite; diamonds; manganese; crude oil; silver; salt,

Botswana

Diamonds; copper; coal; soda ash; nickel

Nigeria

Natural gas; crude oil; gold; copper; iron ore; limestone; magnesium; silver; tin; columbite,

Libya

Crude oil natural gas; gypsum

Algeria

Crude oil; natural gas

Senegal

Crude oil; natural gas

Mozambique

Crude oil; natural gas

Egypt

Natural gas; crude oil; iron ore; phosphates

Tanzania

Natural gas

DRC

Natural gas; copper; diamonds; cobalt; gold, zinc, petroleum

Equatorial Guinea

Natural gas; crude oil

Cameroon

Natural gas; petroleum; aluminum

Angola

Crude oil; diamonds

Zimbabwe

Coal; chromium ore; asbestos

Zambia

Copper; cobalt; zinc; lead

Western Sahara

Phosphates; iron ore

Uganda

Copper; cobalt

Tunisia

Petroleum; phosphates; iron ore

Togo

Phosphates; limestone

Swaziland

Asbestos; coal; clay

Sudan

Petroleum; iron ore; copper, Natural gas

Somalia

Uranium

Sierra Leone

Diamonds; bauxite; iron ore

Senegal

Phosphates; iron ore

Rwanda

Gold; tin ore

Morocco

Phosphates; iron ore; manganese

Mauritania

Iron ore; gypsum; copper

Mali

Gold; phosphates (continued)

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Table 6.2 (continued) Country

Resources

Malawi

Limestone

Madagascar

Graphite; chromite; coal; bauxite

Liberia

Iron ore; diamonds

Kenya

Limestone; soda ash; rubies

Guinea-Bissau

Bauxite; phosphates

Gabon

Petroleum; manganese

Eritrea

Gold; potash; zinc

Ethiopia

Gold; copper

Cote D’Ivoire

Petroleum; diamonds; manganese

Congo-Brazzaville

Copper; diamonds; cobalt; gold, zinc

Chad

Uranium

CAR

Diamonds

Burundi

Gold

Burkina Faso

Manganese; limestone

Benin Republic

Petroleum

Source Compiled by authors

between the sixteenth and nineteenth century, witnessed African leaders hunting their fellow Africans and selling them as slave merchandise to Europeans in exchange for goods such as firearms (Akuamoa 2011). It is estimated that about fifty million slaves were moved from Africa to North and South America and Caribbean plantations (Rodney 2005); and these enslaved Africans became an essential human resource that helped Europe create the necessary investment capital for its Industrial Revolution. As far as colonialism and neocolonialism are concerned, numerous scholars recognize that the desire of leaders to conquer and dominate can narrow or close possibilities for any fair allocation and distribution of resources (Adesola 2015; Muboko 2017). Furthermore, the domination of one group of people over another is always condemnable, as no socioeconomic formation supports or endorses any form of repression, oppression, or willful dehumanization (Adesola 2015). Hence, the marginalized group may become infuriated and revolt against the dominant group, which could yield violent bloodshed. This is the case in many African countries— from East, West, and Central Africa to most southern African countries—that fought for independence from the colonial system from the 1950s to the 1990s, and yet continue to experience various issues such as racial or ethnic conflict, segregation, and deprivation of human rights due to the dominant systems of neocolonialism and dictatorship. For instance, scholars highlight the case of Uganda during Idi Admin’s reign, Mobutu Seso Seko in DRC and Charles Taylor in Liberia (to mention a few), who attempted to control all aspects of the state, which prompted protest and rebellion (Alao and Olonisakin 2000; McCandless and Christie 2006; Adesola 2015).

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From the natural resource perspective, the African continent, initially regarded as the Dark Continent by European explorers, is vast and naturally endowed with scarce resources, including petroleum, gas, gold, diamonds, cotton, and coffee as well as fertile land for agricultural and animal production. These natural resources, however, have attracted numerous predators who only seek to satisfy their own interests. Scholars and researchers further recognize that some of the natural resources in Africa are ‘cursed,’ as they do not contribute to the continent’s economic growth nor translate such growth into the economic development of the local communities. As such, there is a need to change the resource curse narrative by optimizing the use of the continent’s natural and human resources to enhance its industrial capacity. The literature also highlights other conflicts involving land acquisition and ownership that have occurred between White colonialists and Indigenous people in places such as DRC, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and other parts of southern Africa (Maphosa 2012; Ibrahim et al. 2014; Adesola 2015). Africans have also been fighting among themselves over land ownership, resource control, water scarcity, and forests, and Africa’s economic development is hampered by disputes over borders, oil, and other resources. Kum (1990: 445) attributed inter-state conflicts in Africa to “undemarcated borders, irredenta, resource distribution and refugee questions, liberation wars, or conflict as a diversion from domestic political and/or economic crises.” Nevertheless, leadership factors played crucial roles in the outcomes of the conflicts. Aremu (2010) identified factors such as arbitrary colonial boundaries, ethnicity, inept leadership, corruption, and poverty, as the drivers of conflicts in Africa. As Oduntan (2017) has noted, “Most African states and boundaries were carelessly carved out as compromises between European colonial powers rather than reflections of the realities of African ethnography or politics.” This is the bedrock of the incessant territorial conflicts that have engulfed Africa since its independence (Table 6.3). Table 6.3 Some inter-state conflicts over natural resources in Africa Countries

Year

Causes

Nigeria–Cameroon

1970s–2002

Bakassi Peninsular

Angola–Morocco

1964–1978

Atlas Mountains area

Eritrea–Ethiopian

1998–2000

Territorial dispute over Badme

Somalia-Ethiopia

1980–1982

Ugandan Desert region

Tanzania–Uganda

1978–1979

Uganda’s annexation of all territory north of the Kagera River

Kenya–Somalia

1963–1967

Territorial claim

Libya–Chad

1978–1987

Occupation of the Aouzou Strip

Ethiopia–Sudan

1989–90

Disputes over Damazin and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River

Somaliland–Somalia

Since 1998

Territorial dispute

Source Compiled by authors

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The factors that prolonged most of Africa’s civil wars are rooted in the presence of mineral resources. In countries where rebel movements and antigovernment groups took control of the communities with mineral resources, they engaged in extraction activities, as was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Libya, among others. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the presence of mineral resources prolonged the civil war (Assadi 2013). Sierra Leone depended on diamonds and other valuable mineral resources; thus the “presence of easily extractable natural resources…led to a prolonged civil war because they provided the rebel movement…with easily lootable assets and convenient sources of funding for sustaining the conflict” (Assadi 2013): The availability of certain commodities that are either highly valued or geographically concentrated, such as diamonds in the case of Sierra Leone, creates opportunities for predation by rebels. Rebels are able to use force to loot and tax such commodities, thereby enabling rebel movements to acquire a source of sustainable financing that can be used to perpetuate conflict. (Assadi 2013)

As long as the rebel movements have access to funds, they will not be in a hurry to end the war. Moreover, the control of areas and communities where these mineral resources are located is a major target of both the government and rebel forces. This helped the Sierra Leone rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), with the support of Liberia’s rebel leader, Charles Taylor, to control substantial areas that harbored diamonds and other resources: The Eastern and Southern regions of Sierra Leone are abundant in these diamonds, which are accessible to anyone with a shovel and sieve. The Revolutionary United Front was thus able to fund its military action through illicit trade in conflict diamonds. Specifically, the Revolutionary United Front used funds from alluvial diamond mines to purchase weapons and ammunition from neighboring countries such as Guinea and Liberia. (Assadi 2013)

Similarly, in the DRC, the presence of various natural resources, especially diamonds, was noted as a driver of civil wars and other violence (Luca et al. 2013). The DRC is rich in coltan, diamonds, gold, and cassiterite; agriculture, forests, and wildlife, including timber, coffee, and ivory; and copper, cobalt, livestock, gorillas, okapis, tobacco, tea, palm oil, and recently, crude oil (UNSC 2001, 2003). In 2016, DRC was the fifty-eighth largest oil-producing nation in the world, with a proven reservation of 180 million barrels. The warring parties either used the resources listed above as sources of funds to finance war expenses and sustain themselves, or they were the objectives of the warfare. In its reports on the wars in DRC, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discovered “individuals and companies that were involved in natural resource exploitation in a way which could be linked directly with funding the conflict” in the country (UNSC 2003). For instance, the increase in the price of tantalum in the international market in 1999 and 2000 increased its demand, and the rebel group intensified its hold on the host communities where tantalum was extracted in the DRC: Part of that new production involved rebel groups and unscrupulous business people forcing farmers and their families to leave their agricultural land, or chasing people off land where coltan was found and forcing them to work in artisanal mines. As a result, the widespread

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destruction of agriculture and devastating social effects occurred, which in a number of instances were akin to slavery. (UNSC 2003)

Within the context of resources, the international dimension of these wars was the market outlets for the minerals extracted by the rebels. In the case of DRC, forces from “Rwanda and Uganda, in conjunction with their respective rebel counterparts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” were discovered as being involved in the physical exploitation of natural resources (UNSC 2001): The illegal exploitation of resources by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda took different forms, including confiscation, extraction, forced monopoly and price-fixing. Of these, the first two reached proportions that made the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a very lucrative business. (UNSC 2001)

Aside from these conflicts, there are other territorial disputes that stem from the arbitrary colonial boundaries that altered the geopolitical composition of most African states (Mengisteab 2004). The Benin Republic had border disputes with Togo, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso; while Congo-Brazzaville and DRC have their share of border disputes; Sudan has a dispute with Egypt, Ethiopia, Chad, and the CAR; while Libya had a similar dispute with the Niger Republic and Chad. Furthermore, Equatorial Guinea has border disputes with Gabon, Nigeria, and Cameroon, while Botswana has border disputes with Namibia, and Swaziland with South Africa. Nigeria’s border disputes with Cameroon and Chad have led to intermittent skirmishes along the border, while Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are disputing the ownership of Corisco Bay. Tanzania and Malawi remain at loggerheads over a lake boundary (Oduntan 2017); Lake Nyasa, as it is known in Tanzania (or Lake Malawi), is a source of livelihood for both countries: The dispute is no small matter for Malawi as the lake’s geographical space represents about a third of its entire territory. Malawi argues that its economic life, culture, folklore, and sentiment as a nation are inextricably linked to the lake. Tanzania derives considerable value from the lake too. It supports a large number of artisanal fishermen and there are shoreline communities that have ancestral burial places that now lie under the lake. (Oduntan 2017)

As with many territorial disputes in Africa, the origin of this conflict is traceable to arbitrary colonial boundaries. Natural resources have aggravated most armed conflicts in African countries. The diamonds in Angola influenced the prolongation of the Angolan Civil War (Harsch 2007), while oil was the driver of the protracted armed conflicts in Nigeria’s Niger Delta (Fagbadebo and Akinola 2010). Both the militants and security agents deployed by the government engaged in oil bunkering and the establishment of illegal refineries. The former governor of Bayelsa State, Seriake Dickson, disclosed that the militants had access to funds through such illegal activities: Let me tell you that all the violence, brigandage and criminality that we experience in the Niger Delta states, particularly Bayelsa where I know more, have their roots in the activities in the creeks. It is from there they have easy funds to recruit followers; it is from these activities of crude oil theft and illegal refining that people are able to sustain such large numbers of youths and put them into various cult groups. What is going on has a direct effect on the proliferation of small and light weapons because they need an army of youths to protect

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Oil bunkering and vandalism of oil pipelines characterized the militants’ activities. There have been reports of the proliferation of illegal refineries in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, allegedly facilitated by the involvement of security forces deployed to the area (Baiyewu 2022). The Governor of Rivers State, Nyesom Wike, has addressed this allegation of the complicity of the security forces: Most of the problems we have with illegal oil bunkering is that security agencies are fully involved in this illegal oil bunkering. That’s the truth. Civil Defence is involved. The army is involved. Police are involved. The Navy is involved. Let us tell ourselves the simple truth. (cf. Naku 2022)

Indeed, some influential individuals have allegedly been involved in such activities, possibly facilitating the complicity of the security personnel. Some of the operators of illegal refineries have disclosed to the media that they had the support of the security personnel because they had their share of the proceeds (Umeh 2021). The media report also indicated that security personnel “who know the locations of the illegal refineries usually receive gratifications not to close down crude oil theft rings and maintain an overview of the illegal operations” (Umeh 2021). They [security personnel] only destroy the refining sites when they have a misunderstanding about payments or when a new officer assumes office and wants to impress his superiors, but after a while, he joins the business, Before now, we used to have a cordial relationship with the Navy and other security agencies, they urge us to embark on illegal refineries and we paying them at the end of production. Sometimes we pay them weekly and at other times, we pay them daily. (cf. Umeh 2021)

This practice compromised national security and stifled revenues accruable to the coffer of the government. While the government provided funds and materials to fight insurgencies and militants’ vandalism of oil pipes and other facilities, governmentfunded security personnel were complicit in the perpetration of these illegal activities. Thus, the resources that militants usually obtain from oil bunkering often motivate them to perpetuate the conflict in the region. Corruption is a major driver of these illegal activities, and it occurs with the active support of members of the community (Harsch 2007; Rus 2010): The consequence of illegal exploitation has been twofold: (a) massive availability of financial resources for the Rwandan Patriotic Army, and the individual enrichment of top Ugandan military commanders and civilians; (b) the emergence of illegal networks headed either by top military officers or businessmen. These two elements form the basis of the link between the exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict. Other contributing factors however exist—the roles played by some entities and institutions, and the opportunistic behavior of some private companies and influential individuals, including some decision-makers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. Some leaders in the region bear direct responsibility. The Panel concludes that tough measures must be taken to bring to an end the cycle of exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (UNSC 2001)

This analysis highlights the impact of human activities on nature. In Africa, natural resources are accompanied by a mixed sense of being both blessed and cursed.

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6.5 Corruption and Resource-Based Conflicts in Africa The bedrock of most resource-based conflicts in Africa is the mismanagement of the benefits accrued from these resources. Many resource-rich countries, especially those in Africa, are battling the challenge of corruption that characterize their extractive industries: It now seems beyond contention that the politics surrounding the management of natural resource politics has brought out some of the extremes in Africa’s security complexities. Among the issues that have been thrown up are violent ethnonationalism, acrimonious intergroup relations, youth revolts, small arms and light weapons proliferation, corruption, money laundering, warlordism, cross-border looting, mercenarism, and alleged links with global terrorism. (Alao 2007: ix)

Nature did not anticipate this as the aftermath of the endowed resource, and human activities in the extractive industry has had a multitude of devastating repercussions. The abundant resources have become the motivation for corruption because of the pervasive culture of deviance and impunity in public sector leadership as well as the management of natural resources in the extractive industry. The global efforts to address the lack of accountability in the extractive industry appear to be ineffective in Africa. In 2003, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was established as a global mechanism to ensure good governance practices in the management of natural resources. With the motto “seeing results from natural resources” and the mission “to promote open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources,” EITI sought to address issues relating to the governance of the extractive sector (EITI 2022: 12). In the EITI Progress Report (2022), the Chairperson, Helen Clark, noted the nexus between natural resources, conflicts, and the geopolitical landscape in resource-rich countries—especially where crises had erupted—and the need for transparency in the management of the extractive industries: These events highlight how closely the resource sector is tied to the geopolitical landscape. They also remind us of the important role that transparency can play in helping to stem revenue flows that can fuel conflict and corruption, by bringing them into public view. (EITI 2022: 4)

EITI noted in the report that the consequences of weak state capacity gave rise to systemic weaknesses that created “potential openings for corrupt activity” (EITI 2022: 13). In DRC, EITI discovered irregularities in the involvement of Chinese investors in the extractive industries and the management of the country’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The investors had made a $3 billion infrastructure deal with the DRC government on the Sicomines project “to build roads and hospitals in exchange for a 68% stake in a mining joint venture with DRC’s major state-owned company” (EITI 2022:13): Few of the urgent infrastructure projects had been realised as per the initial agreement, and an undisclosed amendment to the contract, made in 2017, rerouted the project profits to

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Financial transfers from the SOEs to the government are characterized by “deviations between policy and practice” (EITI 2022: 13). Weak and ambiguous regulatory frameworks have created loopholes that encouraged low productivity and dwindled the profitability potential of the SOEs. This infraction has weakened their competitive potential as a key stakeholder in the growth of the national economy. In its 2016 report, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted the different forms of corruption that characterize the extractive industries: Corruption in the value chain of extractives is a major impediment to development. The OECD…one in five cases of transnational bribery occur in the extractive sector. Corruption works as a tax on international investors, increasing the costs of doing business. It further deprives host countries of much-needed revenues and significantly alters the efficient allocation and distribution of resources to achieve development objectives. (OECD 2016: 10)

In sub-Saharan Africa, poor management of the extractive industries has created governance challenges, with different methods used by government officials and SOEs to indulge in corrupt practices (OECD 2016). For instance, the ambiguity associated with revenue collection in the extractive sector promotes the circumvention of tax regulations that gave rise to systemic under-taxation and tax concessions (OECD 2016). Many other practices have made the extractive industries susceptible to abuse and mismanagement of resources by public officials who exploit their privileged positions of power to advance their pecuniary interests at the expense of the state. Knutsen et al. (2017) have noted that the measures associated with the extractive industries in Africa breed corruption. The political elite has easy control and monopoly over revenues accrued from mineral resources, which has consequently reduced the incentives for accountability and transparency in the extractive industry. Available funds meant for service delivery become means for political patronage through unofficial transactions. Hence, distortions in the national economy degenerate into crisis, thus precipitating conflicts in different spheres. In Nigeria, for instance, the allocation of crude oil blocks is at the discretion of the president, who usually exploits it to advance political patronage and ethnic interests (Fagbadebo and Akinola 2010). Nigeria has a delicate geopolitical structure in a federal system in which power skews toward the northern part of the country. From 1960, the northern political and military elite held sway in the control of national power. Consequently, ownership of oil blocks in Nigeria has skewed toward the northern elites, as the discretionary allocation of oil blocks was used as a weapon to establish northern interests as the country’s main revenue source (Premium Times, 06/03/2013; Amaza 2019). Nigerian oil wells are located in the south, but their ownership and controls are in the hands of the north. Years of marginalizing oilproducing communities and depriving basic social and infrastructural facilities have given rise to the relentless armed conflicts that have occurred since 1966 (Fagbadebo and Akinola 2010).

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In Africa, the discovery of natural resources in commercial quantities is an incentive for corruption, because it introduces “high rent activities to the economy, thereby increasing the bribes that economic actors can pay while still reaping profits, thereby incentivizing bureaucrats to request bribes” (Knutsen et al. 2017: 322). Consequently, in resource-dependent economies, governments have less incentive to invest in costly monitoring and control institutions to detect and punish corruption. Indeed, leading government actors themselves may benefit from bribes for control over resource production and exports.

6.6 Conclusion Resource-curse syndrome is a reality in Africa. And the fear of the permutation of the Anthropocene is a manifest phenomenon where humanity’s engagement with nature has altered the context, scope, and nature of interactions in Africa. Conflicts in Africa have claimed many lives, infrastructural damage caused by war has weakened or reduced the facilities designed to serve the interests of citizens, and the relics of war and violent conflict dot the continent. However, Africa has remained attractive to foreign powers, who continue to throng the continent in the guise of peace and conflict resolution to further their interests in, and exploration of, its abundant natural resources. While citizens suffer the impact of the various violent activities, the political elites and their foreign collaborators profiteer from natural resources—both legally and illegally. In some instances, violence in Africa is induced by foreign powers to provide opportunities for the sales of arms and ammunition, while in others, violence-induced violence has facilitated access to resources in societies characterized by immunity and deviance. Thus, corruption has continued to drive most conflict in Africa, with an impact on governance and public service delivery. Human security in Africa is in peril, as institutional compromise has opened public sector management to predators who benefit more from violence than peace. A series of conflict situations in Africa has promoted the illicit acquisition of wealth at the expense of human security and welfare, which is antithetical to nature.

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Oduntan Gbenga, 2017: “Why Malawi and Tanzania Should Stick to Mediation to Settle Lake Boundary Dispute,” in: The Conversation, July 3, at: https://theconversation.com/why-malawiand-tanzania-should-stick-to-mediation-to-settle-lake-boundary-dispute-79948 (accessed March 25, 2022). OECD, 2016: “Corruption in the Extractive Value Chain: Typology of Risks, Mitigation Measures and Incentives,” in: OECD Development Policy Tools (Paris: OECD Publishing), at: https://doi. org/10.1787/9789264256569-en (accessed March 25, 2022). Parvanova, D., 2017: “The Industrial Revolution was the Force Behind the New Imperialism,” in: ESSAI: 15,30, at: https://dc.cod.edu/essai/vol15/iss1/30. Premium Times, 6/03/2013: “83% of Nigeria Oil Blocs Owned by Northerners—Senate Committee Chair,” in: Premium Times, March 6, 2013, at: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/12339883-of-nigeria-oil-blocs-owned-by-northerners-senate-committee-chair.html (accessed March 16, 2020). Premium Times, 06/07/2013: “Niger Delta Militants Steal Crude Oil to Buy Arms, Recruit Members, Bayelsa Governor Says,” in: Premium Times, July 6, 2013, at: https://www.premiumti mesng.com/news/140350-niger-delta-militants-steal-crude-oil-to-buy-arms-recruit-membersbayelsa-governor-says.html (accessed August 27, 2021). Price, Roz A., 2020: “Lessons Learned in Promoting Accountability and Resolution of Natural Resource-Based Conflicts in Africa,” in: K4D Helpdesk Report 921 (Brighton, UK: IDS). Reisch, Viktoria, 2022: “The Race for Raw Materials: Contributions to the Debate on the EU’s Raw Materials Policy Following the Publication of the Fourth Critical Raw Materials List and the 2020 Action Plan,” in: SWP Journal Review 1, at: https://doi.org/10.18449/2022JR01. Rodney, Walter, 2005: How Europe underdevelopment Africa (Abuja, Panaf Publishing Inc). Ross, Michael L., 2004: “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” in: International Organization 58,1: 35–67. Rus, Horatiu A., 2010: “Corruption, Conflict and the Management of Natural Resources,” in: Economics of Governance 15,1005, at: DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-014-0148-3. Rustad, Siri Aas; Bakken, Ingrid Vic, 2019: “Conflict Trends in Africa, 1989–2018,” in: Conflict Trend, 6. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), at: https://www.prio.org/projects/1631 (accessed October 12, 2021). Sanchez, Wilder Alejanro; Morgan, Scott, 2019: “Arms Sales in Africa: A Buyer’s Market,” in: Geopolitical Monitor, December 16, at: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/arms-sales-in-afr ica-a-buyers-market/ (accessed March 24, 2022). Umeh, Kanayo 2021. “How Navy Personnel, Others Aid Crude Oil Theft, Illegal Refineries in N’Delta,” in: The Guardian, February 15, at: https://guardian.ng/news/how-navy-personnel-oth ers-aid-crude-oil-theft-illegal-refineries-in-ndelta/ (accessed July 12, 2022). United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2001: Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo, at: https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/report-panel-experts-illegal-exploitat ion-natural-resources-and (accessed May 12, 2022). United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2003: Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DR Congo (S/2003/ 1027), at: https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/final-report-panel-exp erts-illegal-exploitation-natural-resources (accessed May 12, 2022). United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2021: Rapid Spread of Small Arms, Light Weapons Still Threatening World Peace, Exacerbating Plight of Civilians in Conflict Zones, Disarmament Chief Tells Security Council. 8874th Meeting SC/14656, 6 October 2021, at: https://press.un.org/ en/2021/sc14656.doc.htm (accessed January 24, 2022).

Chapter 7

African Armed Forces and the Need for Security: Making Sense of Realities Dries Putter and Abel Esterhuyse

Abstract Africa is often considered to be a place of conflict, violence, and war; yet, it is surprisingly lacking in professional military capability. How could this deficiency in professional armed forces in Africa be explained? African military capacity is a complex phenomenon that is closely intertwined with the nature of the society it is supposed to protect and the maturity of the economic and political system within which it is embedded. Moreover, it is often the relative absence of external threats along with a focus on internal social and political dynamics that predominantly shapes the nature of African armies. Much can be learned about the institutional nature, operational capabilities, and national focus of African armed forces by examining their developmental pathways and roots in the process of decolonization, as well as understanding the shared purpose or national identity within African countries. As such, the chapter aims to provide an outline of the key drivers that shape the nature and professionalism of contemporary African armed forces. Keywords Armies · Defence · Capability · Military · Institution

7.1 Introduction Africa is often regarded as a place of conflict, violence, and war (Williams 2017); a potentially dangerous continent that is prone to cataclysmic brutality and substantial security and good-governance voids. Rebel movements and governments are occasionally equal in their terror, threat, and danger to the population at large. Moreover, it is a continent that often suffers both natural and man-made disasters. As a result, especially from a security perspective, Africa is often seen as a continent that lacks

D. Putter (B) · A. Esterhuyse Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] A. Esterhuyse e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_7

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the political, security, and military capacity to manage its own challenges and thus needs help. There is no reason to believe that African armies should be in any way different in their institutional nature and operational capacity—ceteris paribus. With some exceptions, African armies seem to struggle both in their institutional nature (how they are constituted from an organizational perspective) and in their operational capacity (their ability to conduct sustainable operations). This chapter aims to explore the historical development and institutional and operational complexities of African armies in order to provide some understanding of the nature of African armed forces. The cultural, technological, and institutional composition of armed forces in general are shaped by two key realities and a tension that defines the debate on African militaries. First, frequent war and the demand for conventional military capabilities provide the template for the culture and institutional nature of armed forces; and, second, international and humanitarian law constitutes the moral framework for the operational employment of armies (Farrell 2005). However, in Africa, military threats are defined predominantly by their irregular nature; and irregular, non-statutory armed forces do not necessarily conform to the demands of international and humanitarian law.

7.2 A Word on Military Capabilities While the nature and content of security are defined by the powerful and elite, military capacity is a complex phenomenon that is closely intertwined with the nature of the society it is supposed to protect, and the maturity of the economic and political system within which it is embedded. John Ferris defines military power as the dynamic interplay between three key variables—the material factors of the state, its bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and its political structure. The interface between the material, bureaucratic, and political structure ought to translate into the allocation of an appropriate part of the national budget for defense, access to the appropriate national and international industrial and technological resources for the purposes of defense, and access to the correct quality and quantity of human capital for defense (Millett et al. 1988). Insecurity and corruption tend to be the by-product of imbalances between matériel access and allocation, bureaucratic inaptitude, and political clumsiness. These imbalances are exploited at both the national and international levels, with a significant impact on the ability of African militaries to develop and function according to the standards of the paradigm militaries of the world. The operational effectiveness of armies is a much-debated topic, and it is dependent on the skill, quality, and integration of a defense force that is deemed agile and responsive (Brooks 2007). Steven Biddle describes the operational effectiveness of contemporary militaries in systemic terms. For Biddle (2004: 3), the modern military system of force employment is “a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level of war.” Contextually, and more recently, these issues have been accurately

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demonstrated by the Ukrainian military and society at large with the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (Francis et al. 2022). However, from a systems perspective, the underlying argument is clear. Military technology and resources alone are no indication of robust military capability. A state’s military capacity is rooted in how it exploits the full spectrum of its available resources, from matériel and people to knowledge and skills. The diversity of these systemic realities, Tuck (2016) argues, explains the variation in the application of the modern military method of force employment, even though there is a strong element of emulation of the world’s so-called paradigm militaries. Thus, matériel and technological knowledge ought to be aligned with institutional considerations, such as training, discipline, and cohesion; the ability to critically reflect, analyze, and adjust; and the development of a military doctrine that aligns its technological and institutional qualities with the strategic tasks at hand (Parker 2005). Once such an alignment between matériel and the tangible and intangible aspects of human capital is achieved, an effective military capability tends to emerge. Doctrine, conceptualized as the alignment of the technological and institutional realities for strategic effect (Spencer 2018), therefore, requires careful consideration of military institutional traits and culture. These institutional qualities are often rooted in the political and socioeconomic frameworks of the polity. Moreover, what is of critical importance—especially in the African security domain—is the training, organization, and force structure for the development of a culture of professionalism and urgency within the military. A culture of urgency is decisively dependent on the judgment and independent timeous decision-making capacity of junior officers and senior non-commission officers—mostly associated with the construct of mission command (US Army Doctrine 2019). The capacity for autonomous and decentralized decision-making and action is something with which many political systems are uncomfortable, especially in ethnically and racially divided societies. The trust, both up and down the chain of command, needed for decentralized decision-making, is a defining characteristic of effective modern world-class militaries. These factors are essential to successful and decisive military intervention in complex conflict situations. Modern military capabilities and operational systems-of-systems are undoubtedly complex. The need to manage this complexity places a high demand on the ethos, skills, and knowledge of those serving at all levels within the military. The need for ethical behavior, knowledge, and skills drives the requirement for a complicated system of education, training, and development. In parallel, there is a need to extend the retention rate of military professionals to serve as a cultural bedrock, maintain expertise, and extend institutional memory. But the characteristics of modern military systems—matériel and technological expertise, professionalism, independent decision-making, ethical behavior, knowledge, and skills—are often at odds with the needs and political realities of many African societies. This predicament frequently translates into civil interference in establishing military capabilities. Such interventions, Biddle (2004: 50) argues, often include frequent rotation of commanders and purges of the officer corps; suppression of horizontal communications within the military; divided lines of command; isolation

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from foreign sources of expertise or training; exploitation of ethnic divisions in officer selection or unit organization; surveillance of military personnel; promotion based on political loyalty rather than military ability; or execution of suspected dissident officers. This is often accompanied by a self-inflated status in those in command, a void between subordinates and seniors, and a lack of technical competence in those in command; in short, an institutional distance and disconnect between the leaders and those being led. These realities raise several questions regarding the nature of the African security domain and African militaries, as well as their operational capacity. Allen (2019: 264–265) notes that it is the “relative absence of external threats and a focus on internal social control that predominates African armies.” Yet, Africa is no stranger to conflict and war. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) clearly indicates that between the end of the Cold War and 2015, an estimated 630 state-based and non-state armed conflicts occurred in and among African nations (Williams 2017). There has, however, been a shift toward increased levels of socalled state-based armed conflicts, violence against civilian populations, protests and rioting, religious extremism, the use of improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombings (Allen 2019). Within this deteriorating security environment, Paul Collier summarizes the African threat agenda as two pivotal points: (a) the prominence and expansion of radicalized Islam; and (b) natural resource exploitation (Williams 2017). This is perhaps an oversimplification of African security realities. However, the point is that these threats fall outside the traditional and generally accepted raison d’être for militaries, making them ill-equipped and ill-prepared for these kinds of threats. African militaries, thus, often face the disconnect between their institutional makeup, based predominantly on the example of the paradigm militaries in the West, and the harsh realities of the African threat agenda. In short, African militaries are incapable of dealing with “the movement of populations, proliferation of violent, nonstate actors, expansion of criminal networks, and continued weakness of governance indicators all present serious challenges in the short, medium, and long term” (Matfess 2016: 297).

7.3 African Militaries, Historic Realities, and National Identity Much can be learned about the institutional nature, operational capabilities, and national focus of African armed forces by considering their developmental pathways and roots in the process of decolonization, and understanding the shared purpose or national identity within African countries. More specifically, the way in which specific African countries eliminated colonial rule had a profound impact on the nature of its postindependence military. In some instances, the process was peaceful and relatively unproblematic, especially in francophone countries with a small European population. However, in countries with a relatively large European, often Creole,

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population, the number of variables that influenced the process of independence made it invariably more complex—and often much more violent. This unfolded in two ways. In some instances, wars for independence were prolonged by colonial powers that had a vision of maintaining the umbilical cord by integrating the colonies with their own national territory. In many of these cases, European migration to the colonies was encouraged. As such, long colonial wars unfolded in Algeria (1954–62), Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau (1960–1974). In other cases, European settlers in the colonies revolted against the colonial powers themselves, only to become embroiled in a protracted conflict against the Indigenous population. The process of independence in South Africa (1961–1994), Zimbabwe (1965–80), and the last part of the war in Algeria are typical in this regard. In some instances, the process of independence was accompanied by low-level violence, as was the case in Kenya. Moreover, the struggle for independence, in some instances, developed into a prolonged civil war, as was the case in Angola after the withdrawal of the Portuguese in 1974. This led to different foreign governments providing military and ideological support to different factions (Chuter and Gaub 2016). The conflict, violence, and war accompanying the process of independence in Africa often set the scene for the development of postindependent African armed forces—with unfettered access to a globalized international community and military–industrial complex. The violent processes of decolonization in Africa also unfolded within the context of the Cold War. Foreign involvement in African militaries became a constant feature in postcolonial African states—often in the form of a lingering ex-colonial military presence, international equipment, and ideological support from non-colonial powers, as well as different iterations of training and capacity-building initiatives by the international community. The military presence of non-African states meant that African militaries often modeled themselves on these non-African militaries. The emulation of these militaries by African armed forces were reflected in their institutional culture, practices, equipment, doctrine, and organization. As such, the security agenda and strategic needs of the newly formed states were often not the primary drivers in the formation of African militaries, which translates into a disconnect between strategic needs and the nature of the militaries in Africa from the outset (Bubna 2010). The presence of foreign militaries also affected the sense of urgency within African armed forces. A strong national identity is a fundamental building block for effective military organizations (Collier 2015). A weak national identity coupled with ethnic diversity, factionalism, and tribalism is quite common on the African continent, making it difficult for African militaries to develop, organize, and deploy to advance national interests—especially if those interests do not serve an identifiable national identity. Furthermore, African militaries must recruit from their population. If the population does not share a national identity, the enormous burden of internalizing a military identity, values, and standards to offset a lack of national identity becomes the military’s responsibility. This does not appear to be significantly problematic from an organizational perspective, but such efforts are in the hands of a command cadre that likely suffer from the same level of factionalism or tribalism as those that need to be united under one identity. The difficulty of internalizing a national identity is also

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complicated by the fact that the language of command is often that of the departed colonial power (World Population Review 2022). In countries such as Rwanda and Ethiopia, the ability to build a national identity on ideology, instead of focusing on the dominance of key ethnicities, is perceived as a key success factor for its military (Collier 2015). Similar to the effect that ethnicity and language might have on the formation and development of the efficacy of African militaries, religion can be very disruptive to national identity. For militaries, the supply-chain issues alone caused by different religions—such as prayer times, specific dress, and dietary requirements—complicate command, control, and logistics. When considering the threat posed by Islamic extremism in Africa, it also complicates trust building and esprit de corps within military units where both Islam and Christianity are present. The situation will become more complex in the mid- to long-term when mainstream Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, imported by the activities of China and India in Africa, become more dominant.

7.4 African Militaries and the Democratic Project Africa is not always associated with the concept of democracy. Anton du Plessis and Anja Kaspersen label this a ‘democratic deficit’ (Du Plessis and Kaspersen 2016). Yet, while African states often suffer from public-sector weakness due to corruption, identity issues, and conflict, there are countertrend examples as well. Several states in southern Africa have become symbols of success within fewer than 100 years, celebrating decolonialization and democratization that produced a strong public and private sector. This process of maturation is clearly visible in the military of states such as Botswana. However, democracy is an infinite process, and debate about the development of an appropriate defense capability based on robust offensive and defensive capabilities—with a proven doctrine, matériel, technology, and defense sector—is an essential element of the democratic process. In countries such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, effective defense capabilities are rooted in low levels of corruption. Moreover, comparatively speaking, defense developments have contributed to rapid, broad-based economic growth (Collier 2015). Yet, neither Ethiopia nor Rwanda has liberal democratic systems of government. The ruling parties and leadership cadres of these countries are the product of liberation struggles and sacrifices that were demanded as part of the process of liberation. African states that are still embroiled in internal struggles will find it hard to draw unifying leadership from the various belligerent groups to form the foundation for future military leadership, which is crucial in the establishment of an effective national military capability. The creation of a national military from the cadres of these various liberation and rebel movements is a daunting task that is critically dependent on the willingness of the various movements to make concessions and collaborate in the name of national unity.

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African governance, Howe (2001) argues, continues to be driven by personalities rather than institutions. This has a direct effect on the professionalism of African armed forces. Howe argues that “national political structures and values help determine a force’s character and that Africa’s prevailing system of personal, rather than institutional, rule has proven incompatible with military professionalism.” The idea of personal rule aligns with the prominence of ethnicity and race in many African societies. Thus, Allen explains, “A key difference between African military regimes and those elsewhere in the world is the predominance of ethnic stacking” (Allen 2019: 264). The current wave of personal rule and coups in Africa does not only reflect the reality of civil–military relations and professionalism in Africa, but it is also an indication of military unprofessionalism and political, ethnic, and racial divisions in society. African leaders make use of two strategies to build coethnic armed forces. The first is restructuring the officer corps of an existing army along coethnic lines, followed by the construction of coethnic parallel military institutions, such as presidential guards and militias (Allen 2019). Allen refers to these strategies as ethnic stacking. The outcome of these two processes, Allen concludes, unfolds in three possible scenarios of how ethic stacking is practiced within the African military. The first scenario projects that ethnic stacking and coethnic strategies within African militaries is a key variable that prevents African states from transitioning into democracies or growing into mature democracies. Africa’s military regimes are often ethnically stacked. As such, theses states’ transitions to democracy are often short-lived (Allen 2019). Moreover, in the case of ethnic stacking within African militaries, the process of democratic transition is often delayed or stalled. Thus, transitioning toward a stable democratic society and rule will materialize only within the context where militaries are not ethnically based and where the process of democratization is not led by militaries (Allen 2019). Ideology, in contrast, appears to be a more suitable tool for unifying and creating identity than ethnicity—which is not only true for the African democratic project and associated military support. Yet, African militaries tend to place great emphasis on ethnicity in recruitment and promotion, which continuous to undermine their role in the process of democratization. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), for example— known for its apolitical nature and emphasis on operational efficiency—were gradually undermined through ethnic stacking by at least two presidents: Daniel Arap Moi, an ethnic Kalenjin, and his successor, Mwai Kibaki, an ethnic Kikuyu (Wrong 2014). These two presidents deliberately ensured that leadership positions were filled along tribal lines. South Africa has been a constitutional democracy since 1994. Through institutional processes, the South African military deliberately emphasizes the need for representation along ethnic, racial, and gender strata. However, within the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the issue of race and ethnicity are deliberately minimized and disregarded. As such, the transformation of the SANDF over a period of more than two decades has placed considerable emphasis on restructuring the officer corps of an existing army along “co-ethnic lines” (Allen 2019: 250). This was perhaps facilitated (in contrast with other examples on the African continent)

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by the fact that democratic transition occurred before the integration of the various armed groups into a single statutory armed force. The process of integration, given South Africa’s history of ethnic and racial segregation, thus allows for the transformation of the military to reflect the demographic composition of the South African nation. Although it is not without its challenges, it remains an example of democratic transition on the African continent—and the military’s role in the process.

7.5 Africa’s Military Professionalism In Africa, and elsewhere in the world, military professionalism matters considerably—a failure of which leads to catastrophe, such as that currently experienced by the Russian military in Ukraine. Military professionalism is not only imperative in the effectiveness and efficiency of a particular military, it also largely defines its relationship with its government and civilian population. Samuel Huntington (1957) was likely not wrong in his outline of military professionalism as a cornerstone in civil–military relations. Whether in training in the barracks or on domestic deployment, carrying the flag of military professionalism defines the relationship and mutual respect between the military and civil society. When the military is deployed outside the borders of the state, military professionalism reflects national pride and identity. Thus, military professionalism is directly associated with the flag of the country it serves, whether those in the military wear the blue UN beret or not. Unfortunately, African militaries are often viewed as unprofessional and in need of technical expertise for combat and political responsibility to the state (Howe 2001). Decalo (1990) characterizes most African militaries as technologically limited, each with, as described by Howe (2001: 14–15), “a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal differences.” This eloquently links with arguments regarding the military and national identity. It simply means that the values and interests of the state and, by implication, the values underpinning the military as an institution, precede that of any lobbying or interest group or leaders in society. In a way, this resembles the distinction by Max Weber between the rational–legal and charismatic authority. The primacy and inclusiveness of the civic must also supersede ethnic and subnational identities— both in the military professional and professional military. Yet, quite often, civic values and interests appear to be the last priority in African militaries. This was, once again, reflected in the recent rise in successful and attempted coups over the past decade in Africa (Powell et al. 2021): “African armies are perceived as underfunded, underequipped, and ineffective. There is a long history of coups and human rights violations. Twenty sub-Saharan militaries were involved in armed conflicts in 2020” (Mwakideu 2022). The conduct of armed forces is an expression and reflection of the extent to which professionalism has been internalized by a specific military and, by implication, each individual member. In September 2013, the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab executed an attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, leaving sixty-seven people

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dead and several wounded (Baya and Graham 2014). In responding to the crisis, the factionalism between the KDF and the counterintelligence specialists and the ensuing looting of the shopping mall by the KDF reflected this reality (Wrong 2014). Thus, Wrong (2014) is of the view that Africa’s relationship with its military should be viewed as one of long-standing, uneasy intimacy. Wrong notes how first-time visitors to Africa are struck by the volume of camouflage on display and the kneejerk response to men in uniform by African citizens in general. The irony is that those in uniform are often not seen as reassuring symbols of law and order but as potential predators. The trade-off between loyalty and honesty is a reality that (military) staff officers around the world face. Loyalty is often traded for truth and honesty in African armed forces. In Africa, remaining loyal to the liberation movement and its military was ingrained in the struggle for liberation. Of course, loyalty is vital to and inherent in democratic and non-democratic political practices—not only in Africa. For example, Howe (2001: 11) notes that “countries with personal rule rarely have both loyal and competent forces.” There could thus be an inverse correlation between loyalty and competence in African armed forces. The problem of personal loyalty is compounded by the violation of civil–military relations, leading to the proliferation of unprofessionalism and erosion of military capability (Howe 2001). Thus, Peter Mwai estimates that, since the 1950s, Africa has seen 200 attempted coups: an average of four per year from 1960 to 2000 (Mwai: 2022). Thus, ironically, rebellions that aim to dispose of long-serving dictators set the scene for a return of coups, and “while popular uprisings are legitimate and people-led, its outcome is often determined by the military” (Mwai 2022). With a growing trend toward authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa (Fröhlich 2022), African militaries will face increasingly greater demands to remain loyal to the (seasonal) ruling elite, and they will be systematically weakened to not pose a threat to personal political agendas—thereby eroding any attempt at professionalism into a barren plane.

7.6 Operational Complexities of African Militaries The complex nature of African security and the pervasive nature of African conflict places a significant demand on African militaries, whether through peace missions, counterinsurgency, or major military operations. Preparing armed forces for such a wide spectrum of operational missions require matériel and doctrine—resources that are in short supply in African societies. African armed forces also tend to be strongly army-oriented, with expensive air and naval technologies in short supply (Nigeria and South Africa the obvious exceptions). The nature of African armed forces, and their operational capabilities in particular, is complicated by the demand for involvement in domestic security and stability and, as such, they are “part and parcel of domestic politics and resource allocation.” (Wrong 2014). Knox Chitiyo (in Wrong 2014) notes that the changing nature of today’s security challenges are catching off guard what, at heart, are old-fashioned former colonial armies, set up and

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trained on traditional lines. Hence Chitiyo (in Wrong, 2014) contends that: “These armies are good at handling either conventional warfare or counterinsurgency, […] But now, you have a new dynamic, a nexus of domestic terrorism—rural and urban— coming together with counterinsurgency, and they are not equipped to deal with that new type of warfare.” The significant demand for peace missions in Africa presents a unique complexity. Impartiality by African militaries in peace missions is challenged by the oversupply of variables not amenable to peace (Williams 2017) as well as the presence of complex issues such as ethnicity, race, culture, and religion. African armed forces are often employed on assignments traditionally categorized as police assignments. The predicament here is that they are not necessarily well-trained and equipped for these missions. Combating transnational organized crime that is distinctly linked to natural resource exploitation and the proliferation of small arms and ammunition is a typical mission in this regard (Williams 2017). The complex networks of corruption, crime, and violence, which generally evolve into a parallel economy, are often above the skill level of the average African soldier. Resource allocation to African militaries often appears to be both formal and informal, and unregulated and regulated. Corruption is therefore often endemic with African militaries known to be invested in organized crime typically associated with the natural resource industrial sectors. Examples of this can be found in Liberia (1990s), where the Nigerian military “became firmly associated with diamond smuggling and drug trafficking.” The Zimbabwean military leadership fell into the same ills during its intervention on behalf of Kabila (1998) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—obtaining diamond and gold mining concessions (Wrong 2014). The KDF has exhibited similar trends and has been accused by the United Nations Monitoring Group of “becoming invested in charcoal trading in Somalia—a business which, ironically, benefits the very Al-Shabaab militants the KDF is fighting” (Wrong 2014). Ugandan military leaders have long used the Lord’s Resistance Army as the primary threat in order to the extend its military action to “pocket ghost salaries, run hotels, and engage in the timber trade” (Wrong 2014). The regular state-based funding of statutory armed forces in Africa is often highly contentious, which is rooted in numerous variables that translate into budgetary neglect of the armed forces. These variables include, among other things, deliberate neglect of the defense sector by the government; an often highly over-bureaucratized, process of budgeting; mismanagement of the budget by defense officials; and a generally adversarial relationship between military bureaucracies and Treasury. These processes have been clearly visible in the resource allocation to the South African military since the early 2000s. The result is a military that is in various stages of decline, described in a recent report to the president as being ‘hollowed out.’ Ironically, the South African government is increasingly relying on the military as a stopgap in critical issues of governance.

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7.7 Conclusion Africa is often regarded as a place of conflict, violence, and war, and there is no reason to believe that African militaries should be in any way different in their institutional nature and operational capacity. And yet, within the context of the complexity of African security and the pervasiveness of African conflict, significant demands are placed on African militaries to conduct peace missions, counterinsurgency, or major military operations. To accomplish this, any military must be embedded in a capability that is effective, efficient, and professional. The complexities of the African political, economic, and security environments make such an endeavor (almost) a bridge too far. The bridge could be closer for some nations if organizational identities could be strengthened without attachments to politics, ethnicity, and loyalty. Democracies are strengthened by professional militaries, and for nations on the road to democracy, professional militaries should not be an impediment. Professional African militaries will emerge once their true potential as part of the democratic project is recognized by politicians and society at large. Their road to professionalism—and becoming a formidable national capability that can be a force for both sovereignty and international peace—could gain significant momentum if they are assisted by professional international militaries that operate on the principles of international peace, development, and cooperation instead of exploitation and expansion. This chapter has explored many of these contentious issues with the aim of understanding some of the complexities involved in creating effective, efficient, and professional African militaries.

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Du Plessis, Anton; Anja, Kaspersen, 2016: “Seven Trends Shaping the Future of Peace and Security in Africa,” ISS Africa,” June 28, at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/seven-trends-shaping-the-fut ure-of-peace-and-security-in-africa. Farrell, Theo, 2005: “World Culture and Military Power,” in: Security Studies, 14, 3: 448–488. Fofack, Hippolyte, 2022: “Africa and the New Cold War: Africa’s Development Depends on Regional Ownership of Its Security,” in: Brookings, May 19, at: https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/africa-in-focus/2022/05/19/africa-and-the-new-cold-war-africas-development-depends-onregional-ownership-of-its-security/ Francis, Ellen; Pannett, Rachel; Cheng, Amy; Hassan, Jennifer; Ilyushina, Mary, 2022: “RussiaUkraine War Live Updates: Moscow Says Black Sea Ports to Open; Zelensky Warns against Appeasing Putin,” The Washington Post, May 26, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 2022/05/26/russia-ukraine-war-news-live-updates/ (accessed May 26, 2022). Fröhlich, Silja, 2022: “Dictators in Africa Using Social Media to Cling to Power,” in: Deutsche Welle, January 9 at: https://www.dw.com/en/dictators-in-africa-using-social-media-to-cling-topower/a-60360543 (accessed May 31, 2022). Harkness, Kristen A., 2016: “The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60,4: 587–616. Howe, Herbert M., 2001: Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Lynne Rienner Publishers). Jenkins, Brian M., 2022: “The Will to Fight, Lessons from Ukraine,” RAND Corporation, March 29, at: https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/the-will-to-fight-lessons-from-ukraine.html (accessed July 12, 2022) Matfess, Hilary, 2016: “Africa,” in: Richard, D. Hooker (Ed.), Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration (Government Printing Office): 297–315. Mwakideu, Chrispin, 2022: “Examining the Poor Reputation of Africa’s Armies.” DW, January 19, at: https://www.dw.com/en/examining-the-poor-reputation-of-africas-armies/a-604 81228 228 (accessed July 16, 2022). Millett, Allen R.; Murray, Williamson; Watman, Kenneth H., 1988: “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” in: Millett, A.R.; Murray, W. (Eds.): Military Effectiveness: Volume 1—The First World War (Boston: Unwin Hyman): 4–6. Mwai, Peter, 2022: “Are Military Takeovers on the Rise in Africa?”, in: BBC News, February 2, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600 (accessed May 31, 2022). Tuck, Christopher, 2016: “Future Land Warfare,” in: Jordan, David; Kiras, James D.; Lonsdale, David J.; Speller, Ian; Tuck, Christopher C.; Walton, Dale: Understanding Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 137–149. Parker, Geoffrey, 2005: The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 1–11. PCS Report, 2021: “African Conflicts to Watch in 2022.” ISS Africa, December 17, at: https://iss africa.org/pscreport/psc-insights/african-conflicts-to-watch-in-2022 (accessed May 31, 2022). Powell, Jonathan; Reynolds, Abigail; Chacha, Mwita, 2022: “A New Coup Era for Africa?” in: Conflict Trends, 2021/4. March 15, at: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/a-new-coupera-for-africa/ (accessed May 27, 2022) Spencer, John, 2018: “What Is Army Doctrine?” Modern War Institute, March 30, at: https: //mwi.usma.edu/what-is-army-doctrine/ (accessed July 12, 2022) United States Government (US Army), 2019: Army Doctrine Publication 6-0: Mission Command (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform). Army Publishing Directorate, at: https://arm ypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34403-ADP_6-0-000-WEB-3.pdf. Williams, Paul D., 2017: “Continuity and Change in War and Conflict in Africa,” in: Prism, 6,4: 32–45. World Population Review. “DR Congo Population 2022 (Live),” at: https://worldpopulationreview. com/countries/dr-congo-population (accessed May 27, 2022).

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Chapter 8

Identity, Cohesion, and Nigeria’s Security Question Amid Anthropogenic Pressures Jude Cocodia and Ibaba Samuel Ibaba

Abstract Group identity plays a major role in issues of security, from force integrity that fosters military cohesion and efficiency to genocide and racism that divide communities and states. Identity is a powerful force for peace, but it can also be a deadly tool for destruction. So how can states harness this force for good? And have anthropogenic pressures contributed to shaping identities, intensifying animosities, or building bridges across groups? In Nigeria, security issues have often been identity-driven, culminating in its civil war from 1967 to 1970. Although this is attributed to clandestine maneuvers for control of the nation’s oil wealth, the quest for identity domination was at the heart of the war. Half a century later, the same identity domination crisis brings the country to the brink of fragmentation. This paper links the events that led to the civil war to current events, and it advocates that leaders should learn from history the painful lesson that a state will remain unstable—even after a war is comprehensively won—if state-sponsored horizontal inequality dominates the political space. This chapter concludes that the country has everything to gain from forging horizontal equality. Historical research design and social analysis served as the methodological foundation of this paper. Keywords Biafra · Nigeria · Horizontal Inequality · Group Identity · Group Cohesion · Civil War It is hard to judge the rights and wrongs of other people’s ethnic fears and hatreds… (Michael Leapman 1998)

J. Cocodia (B) University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa J. Cocodia · I. S. Ibaba Niger Delta University, Amassoma, Nigeria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_8

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8.1 Introduction Security, most scholars agree, is quite a broad concept, because it relates to the lived experience of humans which is extremely varied. For this reason, Botterill (2016: 125) notes that it is an expansive, fluid, and uncertain concept. Thus, what constitutes self-defense for one could be conceived as a threat to another; and in order for each actor to gain the advantage in this contest, the need for group support arises along with the formation of group identity. Group identity plays a major role in issues of security, from force integrity that fosters military cohesion and efficiency to genocide and racism that divide and destroy communities and states. So how can states harness the force of identity for good? Have anthropogenic pressures contributed to shaping identity, thereby intensifying animosities between groups in Nigeria? And, lastly, what role does the state play in this? The period of decolonization in Africa and Asia began with the onset of the US world order at the start of the Anthropocene Age. This period prompted the emergence of new states but not new ethnic groups—which were incorporated into the legal and political framework of states (Buendia 2005). Throughout the 1960s, many of these new states were embroiled in sporadic communal violence prompted by the desire for power or control of resources (Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] and Nigeria), or the struggle for survival/recognition (Nigeria). Many of these events were connected to anthropogenic pressures. Along with the rise of a new world order, the Anthropocene is depicted as the era in which humans’ interaction with the Earth has had profound global environmental effects and the thirst for coal and oil has become a full-blown addiction (Carrington 2016; Voosen 2016). This addiction has had farreaching effects on the framing of international and national politics, influencing relationships within and across boundaries (Oyefusi 2007; Davis 2017), of which Nigeria has had its fair share. For, as noted by Oyefusi (2007: 2), “Of all natural resources, oil has been found to have the highest risk of civil conflict because of the large rents it offers, … 23 of the states dependent on oil exports have experienced civil war in any five year period.” Peša (2022) admits that the Anthropocene and its effects are differentiated by locality, while Kathryn Yusoff (in Peša 2022) asserts that there are a “billion Black Anthropocenes,” each demanding specific attention and analysis. This chapter does so in view of the Nigerian Civil War, the horizontal inequalities that propelled the clash of ethnic identities, the current political environment that is reminiscent of pre–civil war tensions, and the role of Anthropogenic pressures in all of this. The existence of group inequalities within political and cultural/ethnic realms is known as horizontal inequality, because, irrespective of size, all groups should be on a par, with equal access to resources and exercising of freedoms. Horizontal or group inequality is experienced in several ways, including class, religion, and ethnicity. Of the factors that facilitate it (see Stewart and Langer 2007; Canelas and Gisselquist 2018), group cohesion and state policies are major culprits. Of these, state-sponsored horizontal inequality is more divisive and catastrophic.

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In Nigeria, security issues have often been identity-based, which culminated in its civil war from 1967 to 1970. Though this is attributed to clandestine maneuvers for control of the nation’s oil wealth, the quest for identity domination was at the heart of the war, which was eventually fueled by state-sponsored horizontal inequality. Half a century later, this same identity domination crisis brings the country closer than ever before to the brink of fragmentation. This chapter advocates that leaders should learn from history the painful lesson that situations of this nature seldom improve—even after a war is won, and it concludes that the country has everything to gain from forging horizontal equality. Historical research design and social analysis served as this chapter’s methodological foundation.

8.2 Nigeria’s Dark Past Extant literature of interactions between the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani prior to the colonial era is scanty (see Dike 1956; Ajayi and Alagoa 1980; Onimode 1982). Most of what has been captured about the interactions between these groups began with Nigeria’s amalgamation in 1914 (see Heerten and Moses 2014). Therefore, much of their interaction falls largely within the Anthropocene Age. This chapter is not a treatise on Igbo relations with the Yoruba or the Hausa-Fulani precolonial era but an analysis of the inequalities that precipitated the civil war and the anthropogenic forces that made it devastating. It draws on lessons that should have been learned in view of current events that appear to be a reenactment of what transpired over five decades ago. The Igbo embraced Western education as quickly as the Yoruba did, which was much faster than the Hausa-Fulani; as such, they dominated the colonial civil service across the length and breadth of Nigeria. This carried into the army, where its upper echelons, at independence, largely consisted of Igbo and Yoruba. It was for this reason that the north had insisted on independence being delayed in 1958; and even in 1960, it was obvious that the north would have preferred it to be deferred still (see Ekwe-kwe 2015). It was at this point that the rapprochement between the Igbo and the Hausa-Fulani gained prominence in Nigeria’s history.

8.3 The Onset of the Civil War, Local Forces, Identity Politics, and the Failure of State At independence, Nigeria had three regions, each dominated by the three major groups—the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the southwest, and the Igbo in the southeast. Being one country, movement across the regions was unhindered, but integration of visitors into the mainstream cultures, especially in the north, was often difficult, either by default or due to the disposition of the visitor. This friction

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was most evident in the Igbo settlers/migrants in the north, and it had its roots in erstwhile colonial policies and the diametrically opposed social values of both groups. On British colonial policies, Albert (2001: 1–2) notes: The Igbo in Kano, like the other immigrants in the city, were settled in the Sabon Gari—a settlement established around 1911 for immigrant Africans from the Middle Belt (Nigeria), Southern Nigerian provinces, and other British West African colonies. The intention of the British colonial government was to use segregated settlement patterns to prevent Christian and highly Westernized immigrants from interacting with the Muslim Kanawa in a manner that would endanger the colonial administration in Kano. The Sabon Gari system has consistently made it difficult for the settlers to assimilate into their host community. The system also prevented the Kanawa from understanding the socio-cultural orientation of the Sabon Gari settler. The relationship between the two groups has been frequently characterized by violence.

While the high population density and lack of arable land for farming—due to high acidity and leaching—had prompted the emigration of Igbo from their homelands in the east, the effective occupation of the area by the British in 1906 stimulated interregional trade between the Igbo and other Nigerian peoples. Albert (2001: 1) contends that the relationship between immigrants and host populations depends on the degree of competing claims between the groups. When migrants are easily assimilated into the mainstream culture, peaceful coexistence follows. But when their values clash, the host–immigrant relationship is often characterized by animosity and conflict. The latter was the case between the independent-oriented Christian Igbo and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who held on tenaciously to a feudal system in which survival depended on the wealth of patrons. As noted by Nnoli (1978: 132), “Igbo society looked down on people who accepted superiors, depended on them, or relied on them for their progress. Subservience and unquestioning obedience signified weakness and lack of masculinity.” Nnoli’s view explains the relationship between the Igbo and their Hausa-Fulani hosts, who treated them with disdain and suspicion, such that in conflicts involving other ethnic groups, reprisals were often meted out on the Igbo (see Albert 2001: 13). The early education of the Igbo ensured that, despite efforts to streamline appointments in the northern civil service for indigenes only, many Igbo retained their jobs, and as new industries opened in Kano and across northern Nigeria between 1962 and 1965, so did the influence of the Igbo, who already had the requisite skill and were absorbed into these industries, much to the chagrin of their less-skilled northern hosts (Albert 2001: 14). Until this period, capitalism—as trumped up by the new world order—had worked in the favor of the Igbo. But civil wars are seldom instigated by the self-made successes of individuals and groups. So how did the situation deteriorate to the point where the Igbo sought secession and a civil war broke out? The 1965 elections plunged the country into a political crisis and the military stepped in to prevent degeneration. As noted earlier, much of Nigeria’s top military brass at the time were from the eastern region, so it was not surprising that the January 1966 coup that overthrew Tafawa Balewa, a northerner, was engineered by an easterner, Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu. Considering that the west and the east, due to their educational head start, dominated the civil service and military (even

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in the northern region), and the Igbo of the east already controlled the (formal and informal) economic sector, to deny the north political power in such fashion—the only vestige it could hold on to—was asking for trouble. As Albert (2001: 14) notes, the January 15, 1966 coup led by an Igbo major allowed the indigenous Hausa-Fulani in the north to halt the ascendancy of the Igbo. On the causes and aftermath of the coup, Obasanjo (2014: 168) writes: It was the mishandling of the elections in the Western region and the subsequent total breakdown of law and order which resulted in complete insecurity of life and property …. A rescue operation was thought to be desirable and necessary … but the coup was heavily tribally biased in its execution in the South and that nailed its coffin…. The pattern of casualties was seen on reflection by well-meaning Nigerians as not only uneven, but also a sudden change in the political equation.

Most of the influential politicians and top military officers from the northern and western regions—including Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria’s prime minister; Sir Ahmadu Bello, the northern premier; and Samuel Ladoke Akintola, the premier of the western region—were casualties of the coup. Conversely, top politicians and military officers from the eastern region, especially those of Igbo origin, were spared. Among them were Nnamdi Azikiwe, the president at the time, and Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, the chief of army staff—the highest-ranking military officer and, later, the first head of state, which made him a direct beneficiary of the bloody yet failed coup (Albert 2001: 14; Obasanjo 2014: 187; Obasanjo 2015: 8; Maiangwa 2016). Although these events strained the fragile peace between the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo, there was still relief at the onset of the coup, which doused the tensions that had trailed the general elections of 1964 and the western regional elections of 1965, during which citizens constantly feared for their lives (Uche 2008: 117–118: Undiyaundeye 2018). The straw broke the camel’s back when Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, now the head of state, surrounded himself with Igbo advisors—a move that influenced his perception of events in the country. In hindsight, Aguiyi-Ironsi made Nigeria a unitary state, an action that heightened the Hausa-Fulani trepidation of greater Igbo domination, as many northern civil servants could be replaced by their better-qualified Igbo counterparts (Warren 1979: 68; Uche 2008: 119). Furthermore, when he refused to prosecute the coup ringleaders, opting instead to remand them in prison, other ethnic groups viewed this as a brazen display of ethnocentrism. To the Ijaws, a minority group in the eastern region, it was clear that Aguiyi-Ironsi, who had sentenced the secessionist Adaka Boro—one of their own—to death for treason, could not apply the same punishment for ringleaders who were his kinsmen. And to the Hausa-Fulani, it was a gross injustice and an insult not to punish those who had killed their own leaders. This not only fueled the loathing of the Igbo but also the bloody countercoup (hinged on vengeance) of July 29, 1966. Additionally, it paved the way for the pogrom that followed in the north in September of the same year (Obasanjo 2014; Maiangwa 2016). It should be noted that the fragile relationships between the Hausa-Fulani indigenes and the Igbo migrants had been managed in the north up to this point, despite the horizontal inequality that existed because of the Igbo ascendancy in commerce. This peace could no longer hold when state-sponsored horizontal inequality arose. The

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outcome of the collapse of this delicate peace was a three-year civil war. Obasanjo (2015: 8–9) notes: The sky-high praises of the coup and the apparent relief given by it in the South came to a sudden end when the succeeding government of Maj.-Gen. J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi unfolded its plans. If Ironsi had displayed greater sensitivity to northern thinking, he could have capitalized on the relief that immediately followed the coup. But in addition to his failure to take advantage of the initial favorable reaction to the coup, he did not know what to do with the ring leaders of the coup who had been arrested…. In the North, the suppressed relief and muted favorable reaction in certain quarters turned to studied silence and a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude. This gradually changed to resentment culminating in the May 1966 riots throughout the north … ‘and’ the counter coup of 29 July.

With the outbreak of conflict, the country’s petroleum industry quickly became a strategic component, which had huge ramifications as it attracted many international interests (Warren 1979: 67–68).

8.4 Oil as an Anthropogenic Pressure and the Nigerian Civil War Immediately after World War II, when bombs fell and the world’s thirst for coal and oil became a full-blown addiction, the Earth entered the Anthropocene Age (Voosen 2016). Nigeria had both of these resources in abundance in its eastern region—that had previously attempted to secede from Britain—which made it difficult for Britain to hand the country off at the outbreak of war in 1967, despite having granted Nigeria independence in 1960. The world’s addiction to oil ensured that Britain, and much of the international community, could not resist interfering, which prolonged the conflict that led to the death of over three million people, making it the worst humanitarian crisis of the 1960s, bordering on issues of genocide (Ekwe-kwe 2015; Curtis 2020). This section thus explores how dependence on oil, a significant development of the Anthropocene Age, influenced the participation of Britain and other superpowers (and led to local manipulations) in the civil war. Warren (1979: 77) and Leapman (1998: 1) assert that Britain could not escape involvement in the war, because its sole aim was to bring the Nigerian economy back to the condition where its substantial trade investments, especially in the oil sector, could be developed. Britain (British Petroleum) had a 50–50 percent partnership deal with Royal Dutch Shell (hence the name Shell-BP) in substantial oil investments, which by June 1967, had gulped £150 million in establishing production, which had increased to approximately £204 million by late 1967. In terms of earnings, output increased from 84,000 barrels per day in January 1964 to 301,352 barrels per day in August 1965, with an attendant increase in oil revenues from £20 million to £60 million—thus transforming Nigeria from a marginal oil producer to the world’s thirteenth largest—and 83 percent of Nigeria’s oil was produced by Shell-BP (Klieman 2012: 157).

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At the start of the war, Nigeria’s oil export to Britain was only £47 million, which was 10.3 percent of the latter’s oil import. This trade had become increasingly vital to Britain. Uche (2008: 113) writes: The June 1967 Middle East Six Day War, which resulted in the blockade of the Suez Canal, extensively disrupted the supply of Middle East oil to Europe. With the inaccessibility of the Suez Canal route, oil tankers from the Middle East were forced to travel a longer route by going round the Cape. This negatively impacted on both the delivery time and cost of Middle East oil supplies to Western Europe. The ban on oil sales to the United Kingdom by several Arab countries also did not help matters. For the British government therefore, the continued production of Nigerian oil was important in order to mitigate the precarious oil supply position in the United Kingdom at the time. Supporting Nigeria was considered its safest bet in order to achieve its objective.

Aware that a protracted conflict would hurt its financial interests, Britain pressed for a cease-fire and formal peace negotiations in late 1967 (Warren 1979: 76). When this failed, the Britain opted for a swift end to the war and consequently increased it military supplies to the Nigerian government. Warren (1979: 76) notes: “The most obvious manifestation of Britain’s support for Lagos was the substantial flow of military materials. Though British supplies accounted for less than two-fifths of Nigeria’s arms imports in 1966, by 1968 (the first full year of the war) almost fourfifths of Nigeria’s weapons came from Great Britain…. It was maintained that by promoting a speedy end to the war they would protect British investments.” By the time the war ended on January 15, 1970, Shell-BP’s output had reduced by 90 percent (Kileman 2012: 163). However, its investments—much of which were shut down during the war to avoid attack—resumed business at the end of the war. While it was disregarded at the time, the British inadvertently aided Nigeria’s blockade of food supplies to the eastern region by using ‘starvation as a weapon of war’ in supplying weapons and crafts to the Nigerian military (see Ekwe-kwe 2015), which resulted in the famine that contributed significantly to the more than three million deaths suffered by Biafra, leading to claims of genocide. Concurring with Warren (1979: 67), Uche (2008: 112) contends that oil had influenced Britain’s decision to work with the Nigerian government. In order to better defend its actions during the war, the words ‘famine’ and ‘hunger’ never appeared in the hundreds of the official British documents devoted to the conflict (Leapman 1998). Yet, so obvious was the use of starvation as a ‘strategy of war’ that Venter (2015: 88) avers that Biafra was starved into submission. Regarding Britain’s indifference to this claim, Forsyth (2015: i) states, “I had seen such misery, so much starvation and death, so much cruelty inflicted on small children; and I knew that behind it all were vain and cynical men, not a few in high office in London, who had closed their eyes, hearts and minds to the agony of those children.” These accounts reveal that when it suited Britain to remain aloof to criticisms and the humanitarian ethos of the Anthropocene to achieve its economic goals, it did. Britain’s arms export had significantly influenced the outcome of the war and given credence to the view of Gonzalez (2010: 60) that oil has an intensifying effect on war and conflict; hence, the desire to control Nigeria’s crude oil resource fueled international interference in the war and propelled local manipulations. The British,

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of course, were not the only ones interested in Nigeria due to its projected oil reserves and economic boom. The role of the United States and France in this regard has been the subject of debate (see Warren 1979; Klieman 2012) but much of it borders on speculations and allegations. However, France’s assistance, which was argued to be on humanitarian grounds—a trend that has gained prominence in the Anthropocene— has been blamed for the protraction of the war and its prolonged suffering (Warren: 1979: 77–78). The discovery of oil in Nigeria and the oil boom that began in 1964 also influenced the local manipulations that precipitated the war. By 1964, Nigeria had become a major exporter of crude oil, and it had some of the finest quality available in its Bonny Light (Klieman 2012). By 1965, proceeds from oil had surpassed that of groundnuts (from the north) and cocoa (from the west) put together, and prospects remained much greater (Undiyaundeye 2018: 7). Therefore, it was understandable that whoever controlled the oil had the greater resources by far and stood a better chance of winning the war. One side’s gain would be the other side’s loss—a zero-sum game. This winner-takes-all scenario prompted a series of strategies and counterstrategies from both sides that ended in the creation of twelve states. This move ensured that the minority areas of Port Harcourt, the marshlands, and the creeks of the Niger Delta—which together accounted for about 85 percent of oil reserves in the eastern region—were separated from the Igbo-dominated areas. This explains why the early objectives of the war on both sides were to gain control of the oil-rich city of Port Harcourt and the oil-terminal town of Bonny.

8.5 State-Sponsored Horizontal Inequality, Ethnic Tensions, and Instability in Nigeria Thus far, this chapter has argued that state-sponsored horizontal inequality was a major catalyst for the Nigerian Civil War, along with anthropogenic pressures associated with the global thirst for oil, which encouraged international interference that prolonged the war (and increased its devastation) and made it difficult to reach a peaceful agreement. This section contends that, half a century later, the same ethnic rivalry and state-sponsored horizontal inequality have placed Nigeria on the precipice of extreme instability. Scholars believe that inequalities between groups defined by religion, ethnicity, or regional identity are linked to a significantly higher risk of conflict (Klasnja and Novta 2016; Canelas and Gisselquist 2018). The Nigerian case illustrates that when this inequality is sponsored by the state, it leads to catastrophic consequences such as civil war. The 1967 Nigerian Civil War, the 1984 secessionist conflict in Punjab, and the 1991 crisis that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia were all fueled by ethnonationalist perceptions of injustice. Based on these and other compelling examples, Forsberg (2008) and Deiwiks et al. (2012) contend that, in cases where regions with distinct

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ethnic identities perceive ethnic discrimination through economic and political disadvantages, there is often an upheaval that triggers ethnonationalist grievances and increases the risk of secessionist conflict. This was certainly the case with Siad Barre and the instability in Somalia, as well as the Tuaregs of Mali. Studies have shown that ethnic grievances that stem from economic or political marginalization serve as motivation for the onset of civil war (see Wimmer et al. 2009; Gubler and Selway 2012). When a region feels significantly marginalized, it pushes for secession, which is currently spreading throughout southern Nigeria. The ethnicization of state resources in Nigeria, which is partly evident in the manner in which political appointments are made, is as old as the country itself. Resource allocation has always been skewed against minority groups who do not possess power. Since independence, the appointments of key security positions in ministries, departments, and agencies have often been skewed. Muhammadu Buhari’s regime has continued this trend in the distribution of political power—but more brazenly (Alechenu 2016; Amaechi 2021; Daily Post 2021; Omolaoye 2021). It is on record that between 2016 and 2021, of the twenty-eight appointments made across the fourteen major security parastatals in the country (including the army, air force, navy, police and state security service) southerners were appointed only six times, while northern indigenes were appointed twenty-two times. Six of these appointees were Christian while twenty-two were Muslim. Only one of these appointees, the chief of naval staff in 2016, was from the south-south, while none were from the southeast. Explaining this as coincidental falls short when taking into account the compulsory retirement of Nigeria’s top military personnel in 2016, of which 90 percent were nonMuslims from the south, with the southeast being the worst hit—all within one year of the current regime taking office (see Adebowale 2016). This skewed distribution of sensitive appointments (among other things) has increased suspicion among the country’s ethnic groups of an agenda of Fulani domination: Fulanization. This has added to the ethnic tensions, suspicion, and calls for secession that have kept Nigeria on the brink. While poverty and economic disparity fuel instability, the addition of nepotism and state-sponsored horizontal inequality creates a recipe for mutual national distrust and increases the drive for secession, worsens instability, and propels disintegration. In what might be termed a classic case of conflict contagion (see Forsberg 2008: 284), the external environment characterized by the collapse of Libya and militia/rebel wars in other parts of Africa has ensured that instability in Nigeria is at its worst. Various NGOs have called for the promotion of unity in the country by diversifying appointments in key institutions. They contend that regimes should unite the nation by basing official appointments on merit and competence (across religions, tribes, and geographical regions) rather than on kinship and religion (Akhaine 2019; Olaniyi 2021). Gubler and Selway (2012) emphasize the benefits of this approach and state that civil war is twelve times less likely to occur in societies where ethnicity is crosscut by socioeconomic class and access to political participation, power, and economic resources. The spread of political power and resources fosters stability within states.

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This illustrates the impact of horizontal equality (and why a state and its ruling elite should strive to avoid horizontal inequality). Horizontal equality can only be achieved when governmental ethnic bias and nepotism take a back seat in policy formulation, access to political power, and distribution of resources in the country’s national and subnational governments. This is what Nigeria’s political elites at all levels of government should strive for—among other things.

8.6 Ethnic Politics and the Resource Curse: Imprints of the Anthropocene The ethnic character of the nationalist movement in Nigeria, as driven by political elites of the major ethnic groups in the three regions of the country, created ethnicitybased political domination in postindependent Nigeria. National resources have thus been distributed largely based on ethnic considerations as opposed to economic and national development interests. Resource allocation has thus been skewed in favor of ethnic groups in power, and the resultant horizontal inequality has led to intense contestations for political power by major ethnic groups (and similar responses by minority groups) in a manner that has ignited intense identity politics and insecurity in the country. The discovery of oil in Nigeria and the subsequent revision of the revenue distribution formula demonstrates this. At independence in 1960, revenue allocation in Nigeria was mainly governed by derivation, which reserved a percentage of revenue derived from a region for use by the government of that region toward its development. Subsequently, revenue allocation by derivation was 50 percent in 1960, which persisted until 1970 when several revisions brought it to a low 1.5 percent. The first revision reduced it from 50 percent to 45 percent in 1970, and it was later reduced to 20 percent in 1975; 2 percent in 1980; 1.5 percent in 1984; 3 percent in 1992; and 13 percent in 2000 (Usman 2008; Jega 2007; Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1998; Ibaba 2017;2020). In the immediate postcolonial era, particularly from 1960 to 1969, agricultural produce such as cocoa, groundnut, and palm oil were the dominant source of national revenue and foreign exchange. During this period, the derivation share of national revenues was 50 percent, and the political elites of the major groups had political control. However, in 1970, when the derivation share of revenues was reduced to 45 percent, oil had overtaken agricultural produce as the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. The percentage of non-oil exports had reduced from 97.3 percent in 1960 to 42.4 percent in 1970, while oil exports had increased from 2.7 percent in 1960 to 57.6 percent in 1970. The coincidence of the reduction in derivation from 50 percent to 45 percent in 1970, with the displacement of agriculture as the mainstay of the national economy, fueled speculations that the major ethnic groups who controlled power at the center had skewed revenue allocation to favor themselves, while simultaneously denying the minority areas that produce oil their equitable share of national revenues. This was substantiated when derivation as criteria for revenue allocation was further

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reduced to 20 percent in 1975; 2 percent in 1980; and 1.5 percent in 1984. The component of oil exports had risen to 93.6 percent in 1975; to 96.1 percent in 1980; and to 97.3 percent in 1985 (Ibaba 2017;2020). Similarly, state legislation governing the oil industry only paid cursory attention to the Niger Delta, thus creating a scenario where multinational oil companies neglected environmental safety, adequate compensatory payments for damages incurred by oil production, and corporate social responsibility. The congruent effect of the Niger Delta not receiving a fair share of oil revenue from the national government, the damaging effects of oil production on the local economies of oil-producing communities, and the neglect by multinational oil companies resulted in resentments and grievances that became the rallying point of mobilization against the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies. This began as community protests against multinational oil companies but later degenerated into insurgency and terrorism driven by armed militia groups. These protests resulted in the increase of the derivation share of revenue to 3 percent in 1992 and later to 13 percent in 2000, in addition to other interventions. At different times, the government has attempted to develop the area with ministerial and extra-ministerial committees/agencies as well as peacebuilding mechanisms; examples include the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB); Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC); Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC); Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA); and the Amnesty Program (AP). The multinational oil companies have intervened in the conflict with community development approaches that seek to address development gaps in rural oil-producing communities. However, these interventions have been criticized for lacking inclusivity at different levels. The noted forms include: (a) overlooking or neglecting Niger Delta residents’ policy preference for rescuing the region from poor development and instability—as was the case with the Willink Commission, which recommended the establishment of a special development board against the people’s demand for state creation; (b) excluding the people from determining the type of social infrastructure or community development projects as practiced by multinational oil companies and extra-ministerial agencies, such as OMPADEC, NDDC and MNDA; (c) not representing non-elite groups on committees and platforms for the determination of peacebuilding policies and programs, as was the case with the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC); and (d) the outright imposition of policies and programs, as exemplified by the choice, content, and execution of the AP. This exclusion has sustained the conflict and created widespread insecurity in the country, and the engagement tactics of the protesting communities and militia groups have created fertile ground for violence. For example, the acquisition of arms for the insurgency has led to arms proliferation and a gun-carrying culture, as evidenced by the increase in armed gangs, cult groups, kidnapping syndicates, and vandalism of oil infrastructure for artisanal refining, or the outright illegal sale of crude oil and the deepening of oil-related environmental devastations. It is imperative to reiterate that the declaration of the Niger Delta Republic in 1966 by the late Major Jasper Adaka Boro of the defunct Niger Delta Service (NDVS) was a response

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to the state-sponsored horizontal inequality perpetrated by the then government of the southeastern region, which treated the Ijaws in the Niger Delta as second-class citizens, despite the enormous wealth exploited from the area (Tebekaemi 1982). The Boro Declaration lasted twelve days before it was crushed by the Nigerian federal troops, but it aroused a consciousness among the people, such that the current agitations seek to achieve what is generally considered to be the unfinished Adaka Boro Revolution. Significantly, the current policies and actions of government are not addressing the conflict environment, and given that the spread of militancy and kidnapping in the country—violent acts reminiscent of the Niger Delta in the 1980s and 1990s—have become serious threats to the country’s security and corporate existence, serious actions are required to attend to it (Opera News 2020).

8.7 Conclusion The recognition of individual liberties and the drive for self-determination gained prominence in the Anthropocene Age with the independence explosion in Africa, and independent Nigeria was one of many Anthropocenes. The country has historically had its fair share of anthropogenic influences, which include the discovery (and struggle for control) of crude oil. The oil factor arguably ranks next to identity/group rivalry in terms of the causes of the Nigerian Civil War, as well as most of the conflict in the country today. With the discovery of oil, and the subsequent struggles for control thereof, the Anthropocene has left its mark on Nigeria. Nigeria’s history of ethnic coexistence and rivalry illustrates that, while the citizens may have a high threshold for forbearance, its political elites have managed the country’s ethnic differences poorly. Instead of forging strength in diversity, the maxim for most regimes, even at a subnational level, is the projection of an affiliated ethnic kinship at the expense of other groups. Horizontal inequality—even when it occurs naturally—generates envy, suspicion, and fear of subjugation in rival and smaller ethnic groups, which scholars agree is a recipe for conflict. For this reason, the relationship between Nigeria’s ethnic groups, especially the major three, has been delicate and tense. As much as equality is encouraged, groups can seldom be equal, and horizontal inequality is inevitable, as some groups—such as the Igbo—are more ingenious at trade than others and thus might parade more wealth. However, when this horizontal inequality is sponsored by the government, the risk of intense conflict, and even civil war, is much higher. This was Nigeria’s story in 1967 and the events that led to its civil war, as the state under Aguiyi-Ironsi, either in hindsight or by omission, pressed an Igbo agenda of domination, which led to an uprising that culminated in war. It is disheartening to see that, half a century later, the lessons of state-sponsored horizontal inequality have still not been learned. Under the dispensation of President Buhari, state paraphernalia have been brazenly employed to afford the Hausa-Fulani an overwhelming edge in government. Their control of the Nigerian State’s security apparatus (among other things) unsettles other groups, and suspicion is rife. Unfortunately, instead of working together

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to defuse the tension, the country’s political elites have opted to stoke the flames. Each government policy or appointment is now weighted for ethnic advantage and not merit. The disunity that has been forged within the polity has certainly weakened the Nigerian State further, which is evident in the spread of terrorism, banditry, and violence in various forms. For Nigeria to build security and achieve stability, emphasis ought to be placed on horizontal equality for all groups at both the national and state levels. It does not solve all of the country’s problems, but it undoubtedly sets it on the path to stability.

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Chapter 9

The Role of Foreign Actors in African Security Dauda Abubakar

Abstract Although Robert Kaplan’s framing of the African sociopolitical landscape is one in which instability and violent conflict appear to be the norm, this chapter contends that such Eurocentric paradigms and avatars of ‘state failure’ do not rigorously interrogate the historicity of Africa’s encounter with Europe through colonial rule, the transatlantic slave trade, or persistent neoliberal interventions through diverse security assemblages. Drawing on the varied instances of major power interventions in the Sahara-Sahel, particularly Mali, the chapter argues that such illiberal interventions under the rubrics of the ‘War on Terror,’ often have unintended consequences, including human displacement, youth radicalization, and structural violence that undermine the nation-building project and state cohesion. The chapter concludes with the argument that decolonization of the African political space requires equal decolonization of the economic field to ensure development and human security. Keywords Mali · Security assemblages · Sahara-Sahel · Securitization · Eurocentrism

9.1 Introduction In a widely circulated article titled “The Coming Anarchy,” Robert Kaplan (1994) describes how issues of resource and environmental scarcity, demographic changes, crime, identity conflicts, and weak institutions in West Africa—and other regions of the Global South—exacerbate the disintegration of social and political order, with serious implications not only for those regions but also the advanced industrial countries of the world. Kaplan’s neo-Malthusian description of societies would later metamorphose into the discourses of ‘state failure’ and ‘ungovernable spaces’ as security threats to advanced liberal democracies (Zartman 1995; Osland and Erstad 2020; Boas 2018, 2021; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Menkhaus 2007; Wai 2012; Howell D. Abubakar (B) Political Science and African Studies, University of Michigan, Flint, MI, United States e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_9

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and Richter-Montpetit 2020). Thus, the ‘state failure’ paradigm started gaining traction in political science and international relations literature, as well as foreign policy strategies and speeches. For example, in a speech at the European Research Institute in Birmingham, United Kingdom titled “Failed and Failing States,” the British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, asserted the following regarding the devastating events of 9/11: “We need to remind ourselves that turning a blind eye to the breakdown of order in any part of the world, however distant, invites direct threats to our national security and well-being” (Straw 2002). After describing the challenges and threats in the Balkans and Africa, Straw’s prescription was clear: State failure can no longer be regarded as a localized or regional issue; instead, “We have to develop a more coherent and effective international response which utilizes all of the tools at our disposal, ranging from aid and humanitarian assistance to support for institution building.” He concluded with a state-centric strategy: The European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) should take the “lead in dealing with problems around the margins of Europe [and]…Africa…” while Canada and the United States should cover the Americas under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). Furthermore, the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States asserts that “failed states” are “breeding grounds of international instability, violence and misery” (NIS 2005:1–2). The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) affirmed the same logic that “internal conflicts can produce a failing or failed state with expanses of territory or populations devoid of effective governmental control. In such instances those territories can become sanctuaries for transnational terrorists like Al Qaeda” (NIC 2004: 14). With this new strategy anchored on neoliberal securitization and the framing of political instability as an existential threat (Abrahamsen 2013; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Hehir 2007; Duffield 2001; Frowd and Sandor 2018; Charbonneau 2017; Charbonneau and Sears 2014; Keenan 2004), the foreign policy of Western powers uniting to resolve African crises, particularly in the Sahara-Sahel, became focused on nebulous frames such as the ‘War on Terror,’ ‘counterinsurgency,’ ‘capacity-building,’ ‘security sector reforms,’ and ‘stabilization’ (Karlsrud 2019; Boas 2015; Dieng 2019; Venturi and Toure 2020; Dowd and Raleigh 2013). Following the Tuareg rebellion of 2012 that overthrew the Ahmed Toumani Touré regime, Mali in particular has become an experiment to test the strategy of neoliberal securitization of development (Abrahamsen 2001; Griffin 2016; Marsh and Rolandsen 2021; Boas and Strazzari 2020; Moe 2021; Charbonneau 2017; Charbonneau and Sears 2014). As I argue in this chapter, the discourses of state failure and its avatars (Wallerstein 1997; Sabaratnam 2013) often conceptualize African states from a Weberian and Eurocentric prism based primarily on the notions of state capacity, centralization of power, and instruments of violence, territoriality, and adherence to the normativities of Westphalian sovereignty (Grovogui 2002). However, it is important to note, as Mamdani (2020) reminds us, that the African postcolonial state is a product of European modernity (or direct colonial rule) couched as a “civilizing mission” (emphasis added) to ensure ‘political order’ and subjection of natives in the colony. Any challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the postcolonial state by the citizenry is perceived as a threat that must be crushed to secure social order. Thus, some autocratic African

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regimes exploit the notion of the War on Terror to clamp down on any form of dissent and extract resources from major powers in order to sustain their reign (Bergamaschi 2014; Dowd 2015; Branch 2009). Although Kaplan’s framing of the state crisis within the state failure paradigm may provide some conceptual insight into the challenges of conflict and security in postcolonial Africa, I contend that such Eurocentric paradigms are reductionist (Grovogui 2001), because they fail to incorporate the historical legacies of Africa’s violent encounter with Europe. This includes the transatlantic slave trade, colonial rule, exploitation of Africa’s human and material resources (Mamdani 2020, 2009, 1996; Amin 1974; Rodney 1974; Mbembe 2001; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015), unequal trade, the impact of the Anthropocene / climate change on citizens’ livelihoods (Benner et al. 2021), and—more recently—the deployment of security assemblages (Abrahamsen 2009; Lacher 2008), especially in the Sahara-Sahel, which exacerbate violence and displace thousands of civilians in countries such as Mali (Benjaminsen and Ba 2021; Boisvert 2015), Burkina Faso, and Niger (Boas et al. 2020). Thus, understanding Africa’s complex security challenges requires a closer interrogation of the internal dynamics of regimes and elite predatory rule, and, even more importantly, granular analyses of the role of external actors, including major powers, transnational organizations, military institutions, development agencies, mercenaries, and corporate entities that are deployed under diverse rubrics ranging from counterterrorism initiatives, security sector reform (SSR), capacity-building, and state stabilization. As Abrahamsen (2013: 139) alerts us, aggressive liberal universalism “always contains the possibilities of illiberal interventions in the lives of those who do not conform to the accepted standards of civility or possess the attributes required to join the liberal community.” Over the centuries, Eurocentrism and its avatars have often formulated hierarchies of racialized humanity, with Africa and its peoples relegated to the bottom. Colonialism derived its logic from this imagery of African “backwardness,” lack, “barbarism” (Baaz and Verweijen 2018; Grovogui 2001, 2002), and the alleged incompleteness of its people’s sensibilities, reason, and modes of sociopolitical organization. In Cooper’s blunt rendition: In a post-9/11 world, “the efficient and well governed [Europe] export stability and liberty to welcoming poor and failed states” of the Global South, including Africa (Cooper 2002). However, I argue in this chapter that, while neoliberal interventions and representations of Africa are rooted in the logic of ‘civilizing’ the Other into the international community of liberal states, the reality on the ground in Sahara-Sahel and other regions in Africa is far from Cooper’s claims of “exporting stability” and liberal values to Africa. I contend that neoliberal intervention through security assemblages in postcolonial Africa is Janus-faced: making gestures toward social order through state capacity-building and regime stabilization on one hand, while the unintended consequences of the policy exacerbate human displacement, communal violence, human rights violations—deepening the radicalization of unemployed youth into Islamist terror groups—on the other (Lacher 2008; Thurstan 2018; Mustapha and Meagher 2020). Simply put, the intervention of foreign actors in African conflicts has unintended consequences (Venturi and Toure 2020; Gutelius 2007; Boas 2015; Autesserre 2012, 2010; Moe 2021; Baldaro and

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Diall 2020). The chapter is divided into three sections. First, I develop a theoretical framework drawing on the notion of security assemblages (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Frowd and Sandor 2018; Demmers and Gould 2018) to illuminate how external actors, including European states, transnational organizations, security and surveillance institutions, non-governmental organizations, regional economic development and military aid agencies, mercenaries, and peacekeeping entities are deployed in Africa to restore political order and ‘stability’ in the so-called failed states of the Sahara-Sahel. The intervention is animated by the perception of threat by European states and the United States that the Sahara-Sahel is becoming an increasingly ‘lawless’ space where illicit tobacco trade, arms smuggling, and human and narcotic trafficking across the Sahara to North Africa and Europe constitute existential dangers (Raineri and Strazzari 2022; Baldaro 2021). The next section specifically examines the legacy and implication of foreign intervention in Mali as well as the impact of the Anthropocene / climate change on the livelihoods of its diverse ethnic communities (Benner et al. 2021; Benjaminsen and Ba 2021; Boas 2021). I also describe the rise of various Islamist groups and how local grievances over land and pasture, competition for the control of lucrative trade routes, and elite predatory rule and bad governance have exacerbated rebellion against the state, leading into protracted insurgency and terrorism (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019; Osland and Erstad 2020; Karlsrud 2019; Raleigh et al. 2020; Villalon 2021; Ibrahim 2021; Gutelius 2007; Baldaro and Diall 2020). For example, the Tuareg rebellion of 2012 in Mali by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was driven not only by their perception of decades of marginalization by the regimes in Bamako but also the violent abuse of civilians by Malian armed forces stationed in northern cities, such as Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal (Villalon 2021). Furthermore, corruption by security agencies and state-appointed judges further fuel resentment against the state. In the conclusion of the chapter, I provide some solutions for ensuring peaceful resolution of the complex crises in the Sahara-Sahel.

9.2 Security Assemblages and Intervention in the Sahara-Sahel According to Demmers and Gould (2018: 367), the concept of assemblages refers to an agential entity “that is created out of disparate elements, each of which has meanings or purposes that might be quite unrelated to the other elements. Together, they are brought into a new relationship…to create a [structured] arrangement that has its distinctive meaning, [logic], and purpose…” in pursuit of specific objectives. Inspired by the social theory of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), assemblages have been conceptualized as emerging “from the interactions of the often conflicting elements and external connections that constitute them” within the ensemble (Demmers and Gould 2018: 367). Furthermore, Demmers and Gould argue that military or security assemblages are characterized by five essential features: First, forging alignments

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through a shared perception of existential threat that leads to a shared definition of the problem; second, rendering the problem into a technical description to overcome internal tensions and ensure coherence; third, specifying and authorizing expert knowledge that is utilized toward addressing the security threat; fourth, reassembling the process, including the grafting of new elements, discourses, practices, doctrines, and legal instruments; and fifth, managing unanticipated failures, challenges, and contradictions by devising strategies of compromise. Drawing conceptual insights from neoliberal globalization, Abrahamsen and Williams (2011: 90–93) define global security assemblages as “transnational structures and networks in which a different range of actors and normativities interact, cooperate and compete to produce new institutions, practices and forms of deterritorialized security governance. These assemblages are reflections and components of important transformations in social and political power.” Thus, because of the enormous political and economic power at their disposal in the era of neoliberal governmentality, security assemblages have the capacity to deploy beyond the state into the global arena. Second, as entities operating through the deployment of discourses of order, stabilization, and securing of the population, security assemblages derive some measure of legitimation that enhances their acceptability in regions of limited statehood. In the context of the Sahara-Sahel, the outbreak of the Tuareg rebellion against the Malian State in 2012; the rise of radical Islamist insurgency supported by the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); illicit migration and human trafficking; networks of narcotics smuggling linked to state elites; and identity-driven conflicts between local communities over resources and livelihoods created an environment conducive to violent conflicts, which attracted external intervention. The security assemblages involved in the complex Sahara-Sahel conflict range from nation-states including the United States and France, transnational actors such as the European Union and the United Nations, mercenaries such as the Wagner Group (New York Times, 2022), and regional actors, including the Group of Five (G5) countries. Since most of the countries in the Sahara-Sahel are former French colonies, France has been a major intervenor in the regional conflict through its 2013 Operation Serval, which was later transformed into Operation Barkhane. Another conceptual framework in the literature that scholars have deployed in analyzing the Sahara-Sahel crisis (Lacher 2008) is securitization, originally articulated by the Copenhagen School (Buzan and Weaver 1998, 2003, 2009). Securitization, according to the Copenhagen School refers to “the speech act of the state [or its leaders/regime] that identifies a specific issue as a security problem” that requires emergency procedures, beyond the realm of normal politics (Lacher 2008: 387; Williams 2008). The initiation of the speech act not only defines an issue, including the behavior of other state actors, leaders, alliances, or non-state actors as an existential threat, but it also summons power—economic, military, diplomatic, and political—to address the perceived threat. As Lacher (2008: 386) states, “Securitization…denotes the process by which, in the quest of security, a governable entity is constituted” and by deploying the apparatuses and techniques of power/knowledge, it transforms the field of intervention. Through this merger of security and development aid, securitization depoliticizes intervention by claiming that its objective is to secure

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the population from threat and annihilation. However, securitization theory has been criticized not only for its Eurocentric assumptions about the post-Westphalian state as an ontologically distinctive standard of civilization (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2020), but also for its methodological foundations that are rooted in the Hobbesian social contract theory in which democracy, social order, and accountability are the norm in the West, while the Kaplanesque social disorder, state failure, and anarchy are the preserve of the non-West. Furthermore, Paul Williams (2008: 5) observes that securitization theory does not specify “where an act of severe politicization ends and an act of early securitization begins; it is also unclear why securitization should necessarily always involve agreement on addressing a threat through emergency measures and actions that are outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” As I will discuss later, the European Union’s policy of border management and control of illegal migration through Sahara-Sahel countries such as Niger and Mali has been informed by discourses of securitization where the “fragility dilemma” (Reineri 2018; Boas and Strazzari 2020; Osland and Erstad 2020; Boas 2015, 2021; Raineri and Strazzari 2022) limits states’ capacity to curtail a perceived threat to Europe. As Boas rightly observes, although the European Union remains the largest provider of development and humanitarian assistance to the Sahara-Sahel countries, such policy is primarily driven by Europe’s security agenda (Boas 2021). Thus, state capacitybuilding in the Sahara-Sahel not only aims to ensure border control and surveillance but also to entrench “Fortress Europe” (Boas 2021: 54) in the region of “insecurity”— in other words, to secure European and Western civilization. For example, the violent terror attacks at the office of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, and the Bataclan in France in 2015—in which approximately 158 people were killed and several injured—increased the perception of migration and immigration into Europe as a security threat. Thus, the deployment of security assemblages in the Sahara-Sahel by the United States, France, and the European Union was a strategic response to contain a perceived threat. In the following section, I focus on Mali as the epicenter of the Sahara-Sahel crisis and illustrate how the deployment of security assemblages in the region to counter perceived threats—including state fragility, Islamist insurgents and terrorists, Tuareg irredentism, illicit narcotics and human trafficking through porous borders, irregular migration, and climate change—has exacerbated violence across the region. From a historical perspective, it is important to note that in the precolonial Sahara-Sahel, where nation-state boundaries were non-existent, the centuriesold trans-Saharan caravan trade routes (Raineri and Strazzari 2022; Villalon 2021) connected the social formations of the region to North Africa, the Mediterranean region (including southern Europe), and the Middle East. Colonialism and nationalism entrenched hard borders (replacing the fluidity of precolonial boundaries) in the Sahara-Sahel with serious implications for the stability, security, and economic development of the region. In the words of Walther and Retaille (2021: 19), the “spatial structure in which trans-Saharan [trade] routes were associated with marketplaces remained remarkably stable until the dawn of the colonial period, despite the temporal and spatial succession of empires.” In the contemporary epoch, foreign intervention through the discourse of securitization may not lead to effective and long-term resolution of the complex social and political challenges of the Sahara-Sahel mosaic. As

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Raineri and Strazzari (2022: 235) state, “Foreign pressures to eradicate trafficking and intensify the fight against non-state armed protectors, albeit well-intentioned, could lead to destabilizing outcomes.” I now turn to Mali where the entwinement of foreign intervention through security assemblages, the War on Terror, and resourcedriven conflicts over livelihoods that arise from the Anthropocene, elite predatory rule, secessionist movements, and the rise of Islamist insurgency groups (Dieng 2019; Benjaminsen and Ba 2019, 2021; Baldaro 2021; Boisvert 2015; Boas et al. 2020; Raleigh et al. 2020) exacerbate the crisis of statehood in the Sahara-Sahel.

9.3 Mali and the Sahara-Sahel: The Legacies of Foreign Intervention in the Age of the Anthropocene The Sahara-Sahel is a vast geographic, social, and cultural mosaic that stretches from Mauritania and Senegal on the Atlantic coast, straddling the southern edges of the Sahara Desert across the West African subregion, into Sudan and the borders of the Horn of Africa. To the north, it covers most of the southern regions of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and the southwest corner of Egypt. In the precolonial era, the successive rise of the medieval empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhay centered around the inner Niger Delta wetlands; and the Kanem-Bornu Empire to the east around the Lake Chad Basin provided diverse peoples—including sedentary farmers, pastoralists, nomads, traders, itinerant Islamic scholars, and the swathe of peasantry—to engage in various economic activities that enhanced the growth of wealth in the region. The trans-Saharan trade in salt, date palm, textiles, gold, grains, kola nuts, and slaves provided the economic foundations upon which the empires flourished. As Walther and Retaille (2021: 18) state, “The accumulation of commercial wealth …permitted [dynasties] to establish political power,” and the control of trading routes through alliances and networks was an important component in ensuring control, influence, and some measure of stability. However, nineteenth-century French colonial rule altered the delicate socioeconomic, political, and livelihood balance among the peoples of the Sahara-Sahel. Colonial cartography—which identified population settlements for the purposes of paying taxes, surveillance, and control—introduced a politicized distinction between sedentary communities and nomads, thereby precipitating “an ethnicization of livelihoods and of spatial practices” in the Sahel (Walther and Retallie 2021: 23). A civilizational fault line was inadvertently drawn in which sedentary communities were regarded as “more receptive to the French ‘civilizing mission’”; hence, development models that centered around agriculture and mineral resource extraction were emphasized. However, transhumant nomadic communities were defined in terms of administrative regions where they would pay taxes and access immunization for their herds (and themselves) within the emerging colonial state (Mamdani 2012, 2020; Villalon 2021).

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A system of Ardo and Jauros (leaders within the nomadic Fulani communities who acted as the point of contact for the government) was incorporated into regional administration to ensure control of the nomadic communities. The implication of this is that, in the postcolonial era, political power remained centralized in the capital city with limited or no influence in the periphery, except in the realm of taxation and other forms of extraction. Mali and several other Sahara-Sahel countries—including Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad—all reflect the erstwhile colonial model of centralized power that is refracted into the periphery through patron–client relationships and networks of symbiotic pillage. Foreign intervenors, including humanitarian agencies, have adopted this conception of centralized postcolonial power and continue to operate their development agendas along these lines. The unintended consequences of this is that, for a majority of the African citizenry, the postcolonial state is perceived as being irrelevant to their daily livelihoods; hence, they resort to challenging its legitimacy either through outright rebellion—as the Tuaregs of Mali and Niger have been doing since the early 1960s, or secession— such as the attempted Igbo/Biafra secession in Nigeria (1967–1970), the Katanga rebellion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 1960s, and the Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebellion in the mid-2000s in Cote d’Ivoire that led to French and UN intervention (Charbonneau 2017). Thus, the intervention of foreign actors in Africa’s security realm can be traced, among other factors, to the postcolonial nature of centralized power, which exacerbates the marginalization of certain communities instead of creating an inclusive political community. Although the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s in the Sahara-Sahel brought the region to the attention of the international community, the terror events of 9/11 and subsequent Western invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan have exacerbated the perception among Muslim-majority countries that their religion is under attack. The botched elections in Algeria in 1992, in which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised for an outright victory, led to a vicious civil war and rise of radical Islamist groups, including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and its faction, the GSPC, which would metamorphose into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—a leading actor in the 2012 rebellion against the Malian regime. The 2012 rebellion in northern Mali was first spearheaded by the MNLA (led by Ag Bahanga). As a community that predominantly consists of pastoralists and traders who control cigarette trafficking, illicit migration routes, arms proliferation—and general trade along the trans-Saharan routes—the Tuareg’s main grievance against the Malian State is that, since independence, they have been marginalized by the southern Mande elites; and, second, even when international donor agencies provide financial resources for the development of northern Mali, most of it is misappropriated by the Bamako elites (Villalon 2021; Boas 2021; Dieng 2019; Bergamaschi 2014; Dowd 2015; Baldaro and Diall 2020; Benjaminsen and Ba 2019). However, the MNLA’s rebellion could not significantly alter the Malian balance of power, because its foot soldiers began to attack and brutalize civilians in the northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, thereby increasing local disenchantment with the Tuareg rebellion. AQIM immediately saw this as a window of opportunity in northern Mali and intervened in the (fluid) situation. Other Islamist groups such as Ansar Dine, led

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by Iyad ag Ghali, and the Movement for Justice and Oneness of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) also joined the fight against Mali’s military in the north. AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO soon displaced the MNLA, and Mali’s troops abandoned their posts in the northern cities. This event would trigger a coup in Bamako by Captain Amadou Sanogo, who overthrew the regime of Amadou Toumani Touré— who had hitherto been praised by donor agencies as a symbol of democracy in subSaharan Africa. As Islamist groups marched south toward Bamako, they encountered no significant resistance. Despite US support for Mali’s military through the PanSahelian Initiative (PSI) that was established in 2002 to enhance “capacity-building” to counter terrorism (Keenan 2004: 477; Boas 2021; Baldaro 2021; Gutelius 2007; Griffin 2016; Charbonneau 2017), Mali’s troops could not mount any serious resistance against the Islamist groups. The PSI consisted of approximately 1,000 special forces, marines, and contractors that were deployed to countries in the Sahara-Sahel, including Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. Western leaders, particularly French President Hollande, calculated that failure to contain the Islamist march toward the capital, Bamako, would result in a major catastrophe in Mali. As Mali’s crisis unfolded, Western policymakers framed the conflict through the lens of securitization, and significant security assemblages and resources were deployed to the theater of the conflict. However, Tuareg grievances of political exclusion against Mali and the ruling elites in Bamako are not the only cause of the crisis. Farmer–herder disputes in the inner Niger Delta wetlands over access to arable land, pasture, and water has been identified by scholars as another driver of the conflict (Banjaminsen and Ba 2019; Boas 2021; Villalon 2021, Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999). Furthermore, climate change arising from the Anthropocene, it is argued, not only leads to rising sea levels in low-lying areas of the world (with devastating consequences) but also desertification, intermittent rainfall, droughts, resource scarcity, dislocation of livelihoods, and communal conflict (Brenner et al. 2021). Critiques of the Anthropocene as it pertains to violent conflict are quick to indicate that while climate change impacts the trajectories of socioeconomic changes in vulnerable regions of the world, such as the Sahara-Sahel, it would be reductionist to assert that factors related to the Anthropocene are causally related to incidences of violent conflict. In a study focused on the Mopti region around the inner Niger Delta wetlands of central Mali, Benjaminsen, et al. (2012: 97) concluded that “factors other than those directly related to environmental [change] and resource scarcity dominate plausible explanations of the violent conflict.” Furthermore, they found three structural factors to be the main drivers of the conflict in central Mali and the Sahara-Sahel, including “agricultural encroachment that obstructed the mobility of herders and livestock; opportunistic behavior of rural actors as a consequence of an increasing political vacuum; and corruption and rent seeking among government officials” (ibid.). While the impact of the Anthropocene on livelihoods and conflicts remains a major debate among scholars and policymakers, it is clear is that human activities arising from industrialization and the burning of fuel gases that emit dangerous chemical compounds into the atmosphere is damaging the ozone layer and exacerbating global warning—with catastrophic consequences. One major response from the international community to the complex

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crisis in the Sahara-Sahel has been the deployment of military forces, peacekeeping entities, and development and border management agencies for capacity training and surveillance. France has been at the forefront of the deployment of security forces in the SaharaSahel to protect its corporate investments in the region, including the gold and cotton sectors in Mali, uranium extraction in Niger, and the cocoa and financial sectors in Cote d’Ivoire, to mention a few. Following the 2011 overthrow of the Gaddafi regime (after NATO’s intervention alongside the Benghazi rebels), about 1,400 well-armed Tuareg insurgents moved south into Mali and Niger, providing additional firepower to insurgent groups fighting incumbent regimes in the region. Alarmed by the threat of an impending 2012 rebel takeover of Bamako, President Hollande declared the deployment of the French Operation Serval early in 2013, stating that “the very existence of this friendly nation is at stake. Military operations will last for as long as required….Terrorists must know that France will always be there when it’s a matter not of its fundamental interests but the right of a population…to live in freedom and democracy” (Charbonneau 2014: 199). The primary goals of Operation Serval include thwarting the Tuareg and jihadist attacks on northern Mali and restoring order and territorial integrity in the country. In 2014, Operation Serval was transformed into Operation Barkhane, with an emphasis on counterterrorism operations and stabilization in all G5 Sahel countries, namely, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Chad, and Niger. Additionally, in April 2013, the United Nations authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Mali called the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with the mandate to work with the French and African Union Stabilization Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and restore peace, security, and stability by “all necessary means” (Charbonneau 2017: 415; Marsh and Rolandsen 2021; Osland and Erstad 2020). According to Karlsrud (2019: 12), by “the end of February 2018, a total of 13,532 uniformed personnel were deployed in MINUSMA, [and] 66% hailed from West and Central Africa,” which arose from the rehatting of AFISMA. Additionally, in 2017, the United Nations Security Council supported the deployment of a five-thousand-strong Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) with counterterrorism as its primary mandate. The G5 Sahel Joint Force attracted significant donor attention and support, because it mainly consisted of troops from countries within the region. At a fundraising event on February 23, 2018 in Paris, France donors pledged the sum of $509 million for the G5 Sahel Joint Force as part of “global ‘burden-sharing’ of security challenges between the US and its allies” (Karlsrud 2019: 9). In addition to the above-mentioned institutional security assemblages that are deployed to the Sahara-Sahel for counterterrorism, stabilization, and peacekeeping missions, another form of external Western intervention is security force assistance (SFA), which has three components: first, long-term assistance involving bilateral defense missions; second, the provision of ‘operational’ training and equipment on counterinsurgency provided to armies of Sahara-Sahel countries through Operation Barkhane; and third, the provision of logistical support and training on internal security provided to Malian gendarmerie, police, and customs services by the French Ministry of Interior (Marsh and Rolandsen 2021). The European Union also provides

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several forms of capacity-building and border management resources to SaharaSahel security agencies through initiatives such as the European Police and Rule of Law Mission (EUCAP) and the European Union Military Training Mission in Mali (EUTM). It is estimated that “EUCAP Sahel alone will spend over 130 million Euros in Mali and Niger between 2018 and 2021” (Boas 2021: 56). Following the outbreak of the 2012 conflict in Mali and the continuing Boko Haram attacks in southern Niger and the Lake Chad Basin, irregular migration across the Sahara-Sahel spiked from 40,000 in 2013 to 154,000 in 2015 and peaked at over 181,000 in 2016 (Boas 2021: 57). This development led to the expansion of EUCAP’s Sahel/Niger mandate in 2016 to specifically include support for Niger “to better manage and control irregular migration flows and to fight smugglers and traffickers taking advantage of people in despair…as these threats endanger both local populations and European citizens” (Boas 2021: 60). Thus, the securitization of irregular migration further increased grievances, especially among Tuareg communities, whose livelihoods have for over a millennium been tied to the caravan routes of the trans-Saharan trade. US intervention in the Sahara-Sahel is not limited to supporting the European Union, United Nations, NATO, and French initiatives, but includes the 2007 Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), which entailed deploying personnel and resources through the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) that replaced the PSI (Osland and Erstad 2020). According to Karlsrud, “The number of US special forces deployed in Africa has risen from 1% in 2006 to 17% in 2016 (1700 special forces troops in 2016). Including other forces [such as the CTF-HOA in Djibouti], the US has 6000 troops in Africa, with, for example, 800 deployed in Niger, and special operations forces carrying out raids in countries such as Chad, Cameroun, Libya, Mali and Somalia, with logistical support from private subcontractors to limit risk exposure” (Karlsrud 2019: 6). The US also operates a $110 million drone base in Agadez, Niger (where some 800–1,000 special forces are stationed) and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso—both of which are major trading and transit routes into Libya (Osland and Erstad 2020). It is from the Agadez drone base that the Obama administration intensified its drone strike campaigns across a vast swathe of land mass stretching from Mali to Niger, Somalia, and Yemen. It is also likely that the drone base in Agadez may have been utilized to provide NATO forces with intelligence on Gaddafi’s troop movements during the Libyan War, which culminated in the destruction of the country’s military forces and infrastructure. According to Marsh and Rolandsen (2021: 622), the “total budgeted US spending on Mali was worth $13 million during the years 2010–2019.” Moreover, through the G5 Sahel Joint Force, it is estimated that, as of May 2018, pledged support for Mali security forces amounted to e414 million (Marsh and Rolandsen 2021: 622). The Africa Command (AFRICOM) with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, is the primary operational arm of the US military on the African continent; however, most African countries remain skeptical of offering up their territory to host AFRICOM. Another element of the European Union’s security force assistance to Africa is the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa, which was established in November 2015 at the Valletta Summit on Migration. The objectives of EUTF are “to foster stability by addressing the root causes of conflict, forced displacement, and irregular migration, thereby

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to contribute to better migration management.” Approximately 90% of the EUTF’s e4.5 billion net worth is contributed by the European Union, and the funds are allocated to three regions across the African continent, “the Horn of Africa, with 14061.1 million Euro; North Africa, with 659.2 million Euro; and the Sahel/Lake Chad, with 1953.2 million Euro” (Boas 2021: 58). Unlike EUCAP and EUTM, the EUTF operates as “part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)” (Boas 2021: 58). Table 9.1 provides further insight into the diverse security assemblages and initiatives deployed by Western powers in the Sahara-Sahel for the purposes of ‘capacity-building,’ ‘stabilization,’ ‘restoring order and state territorial integrity,’ ‘counterterrorism,’ and security personnel training. The dilemma, however, is that despite the massive financial, military, and human resources deployed to the SaharaSahel countries, the region remains embroiled in insecurity, communal conflicts, narcotics trafficking, and illegal migration. As Boas (2021: 60) states, “The EU pledge of support for the Sahel is … in fact a pledge of support for European political stability, and not necessarily for sustainable investment in a peace, reconciliation and development agenda for the Sahel.” Drawing from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), Raleigh et al. (2020) contend that between 2012 and 2019, the outbreak of violent extremism and communal conflicts in the three states of the Sahara-Sahel, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, led to the displacement of over 1,263 civilians, 1,463 armed clashes, and 4,723 civilian deaths. Similarly, in the Lake Chad Basin, the outbreak of Boko Haram terrorism in 2002 and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have led to the displacement of over 2.8 million civilians; approximately 28,000 deaths and another six million people directly affected in the crisis in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (Mustapha 2014; Perouse de Montclos 2015; International Crisis Group 2016). It is also reported that approximately 50% of the 20 million people living in these three states are facing food insecurity due to the Boko Haram violence—which threatens farmers’ access to their farmlands during the rainy season—as well as the impact of climate change (International Crisis Group 2016). In order to address the Boko Haram attacks, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries—Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon— supported by the United States and France, established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a counterterrorism strategy. In 2015, the United States allocated $133 million to the MNJTF, $105 million in 2016, and $125 million in 2017, which amounts to $363 million (Dieng 2019: 489). When four US soldiers were killed in Niger in 2017, the United States “allocated $60 million in bilateral assistance to the G2 Sahel countries” to facilitate operations against Islamic jihadist groups in the Sahara-Sahel (ibid.). Table 9.1 and the data on US support to the MNJTF indicates that, over the past two decades, the West has deployed enormous financial and military resources to the Sahara-Sahel and Lake Chad Basin to bolster state capacity in the War on Terror and containment of irregular migration into Europe. Whether this strategy of deploying global security assemblages into Africa’s conflict zones have accomplished its goals remains debatable, but one thing that is clear from our analyses is that the securitization of the complex crises in the Sahara-Sahel may have had three major unintended consequences. First, by focusing on resuscitating the Weberian

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Table 9.1 Major regional security initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel Operation/Initiative

Personnel Start date

Mandate

Main tasks

Countries/Actor

MINUSMA

15,610

2013- UN(Ch.V11) Stabilization/transition UN

G5 Sahel

5,000

2017- UN/AU

Coordinate security response

Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Chad, France

2014

Counterinsurgency Operation

France

5,100 Operation Barkhane/Operation Serval

UN

EUTM-Mali

745

2013

EU

Military training

EU

EUCAP-Mali

140

2015

EU

Military capacity-building

EU

EUCAP-Niger

200

2012

EU

Civilian capacity-building

EU

Alliance for Sahel

500

2017

EU

Coordination: Dev. Assistance

Germany, EU, France, ADB, World Bank, UNDP

PSI*

1,000

2004

–

Counterterrorism

US, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad

TSCTI*

1,325

2005

–

Counterterrorism

US

Military training

Mali, Chad, Niger

Joint military exercises

Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Nigeria

Counterterrorism

US

Military training

Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti

CJTF-HOA*

6,000

2002

–

Source Osland, K.M. and Henriette U. Erstad, 2020. * Compiled by author

state model by strengthening the military, police, and security agencies of African countries in the beleaguered regions, Western powers may have inadvertently exacerbated the violence and abuses against innocent civilians. Second, the policy of securitizing certain local grievances against the postcolonial state and elite corruption, as the Tuareg/MNLA rebellion in Mali indicates, tends to depoliticize the democratic process where opposition against government policies is criminalized as terrorism. The failure of the West to distinguish between the initial Tuareg’s decades of struggle

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for some autonomy and participation in the governance of Mali and the agendas of AQIM in the Sahara-Sahel may have fueled the violence in the region. Third, the European Union’s policy of capacity-building for customs and border management personnel, especially in Niger and Mali, may have been informed by the self-serving objective of curtailing migration to Europe. The enactment of Niger’s Law 036, with encouragement from the European Union, which criminalizes any form of migrant smuggling and imposes severe penalties “including imprisonment, confiscation of property and removal from public office” (Boas 2021: 62), disrupted the livelihoods of hundreds of people in Niger and the Sahara-Sahel in general. As one critic put it: “Law 036 has weakened the region’s [Agadez] economy. Before, 6000 migrants left each week. There were formalities they did with the police, accommodation in ‘ghettos,’ catering; we talked of 60 billion CFA a year. Now all that has dried up, the whole chain suffers: sellers of cans, wood, landlords…” as well as the caravan traders (Boas 2021: 63). By disassembling the states of the Sahara-Sahel through the neoliberal discourses of securitization, structural adjustment reforms (Bergamaschi 2014), and deployment of financial, military, and surveillance assets, including drones, Western intervenors may have, unfortunately, exacerbated the violence that continues to undermine the democratization process and economic development in the region.

9.4 Conclusion This chapter examined the role of foreign powers/actors—including the United States, United Nations, European Union, and France—and the numerous security assemblages deployed in the Sahara-Sahel and Lake Chad Basin to contain political instability, terrorism, irregular migration, and violence that threaten to undermine state cohesion. While climate change and the Anthropocene undoubtedly affect the region through droughts, desertification, loss of livestock, and human displacement, the onset of communal violence and terrorism is driven by local grievances (including elite predatory rule), exclusion, and marginalization of minority communities from state power and access to resources, including land, jobs, and other sources of income. For many African citizens, the postcolonial social contract and transition to liberal democracy has not delivered any meaningful change in their daily penury and existence; hence, they feel abandoned (Bleck and Michelitch 2015). The postcolonial African state is increasingly perceived by its citizens as irrelevant, and following Mali’s return to democratic rule in the 1990s, it has been deemed a “donor darling” by development agencies (Bergamaschi 2014: 347). President Touré was hailed in the donor community as a “soldier of democracy,” who promoted “consensual politics,” while the World Bank’s assessment ranked Mali tenth out of thirty-eight sub-Saharan countries as a friendly place for “doing business” (Bergamaschi ibid.). President Touré became a close partner to the United States in the War on Terror in West Africa, and between 2006 and 2012, Mali secured about “$460 million compact investment as part of the Millennium Challenge Account” (Bergamaschi 2014: 361).

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It is also important to note that Captain Amadou Sanogo, who organized the coup that overthrew President Touré’s regime, was trained by US forces as part of the PSI military capacity-building initiative. Despite the numerous resources invested in Mali by its Western patrons, the country remains at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI); and it appears to be either incapable or unwilling to secure its territorial sovereignty. The lesson from Mali’s experience is that Western deployment of security assemblages in the Sahara-Sahel has the unintended consequence of fueling internal grievances (Dowd 2015), not only against the state and ruling elites but also against US and EU allies. In order to resolve the complex political violence in the Sahara-Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, it is essential for African leaders and foreign intervenors to take seriously the grievances of the diverse communities and implement institutional mechanisms for addressing them through greater attention to the sociopolitical and cultural context of such conflicts (Raineri and Strazzari 2022; Soares 2005; Autesserre 2010). This will involve what Mamdani (2020: 34) aptly calls “decolonizing the political” field, which entails “reimagination and redefinition of the political community.” Thus, addressing the question of belonging and citizenship rights in the political community is an important first step in decolonizing the political by redefining identities as historical rather than static primordial markers. In the case of Mali and Niger, for example, this will require taking seriously Tuareg, Fulani, and other groups’ grievances and incorporating them into the nation-building project through an open, just, and democratic deliberative process. The issue of religion in state and public affairs will also need to be addressed by Malians. For example, the controversial “Family Code” of 2001—which raised the age for girls to marry, made husband and wife equal in marriage, and affirmed the equality of men and women in inheritance—received backlash from Mali’s Islamic Clerics and Muslim community (Soares 2005). Similar to Nigeria, Malians will need to agree, through a democratic process, on the identity of the state, especially the role of religion and Sharia Islamic jurisprudence in governance. Another important factor in resolving Africa’s complex political violence is to acknowledge contentious politics as part of the democratic process and painstakingly identify the causes and drivers of such communal violence rather than criminalize it as individual or group pathology. While Western development aid and humanitarian intervention may have a role to play in addressing Africa’s security challenges, such approaches should recognize the collective agency of Africans in discussing and formulating the policy to avoid unintended consequences. Finally, with its abundant natural resources (e.g., gold, diamonds, coltan, uranium, copper, oil, gas, and— most importantly—human capital), African leaders should start focusing on strategic utilization thereof for internal social and economic development, rather than looking toward foreign aid and security assistance that reinforce neocolonial dependency and exploitation. Decolonizing the economic field is, therefore, as imperative as decolonizing the political.

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Chapter 10

Insecurity and Regional Actors’ Role in Securing Africa: An Analysis of the Role of ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD in Countering Terrorism Abdul-Jalilu Ateku and Isaac Owusu-Mensah Abstract Africa’s vulnerability to new security threats from terrorism, illicit trafficking, and organized crime calls into question the effectiveness of its regional security policies and cooperation. Regional cooperation has been identified in the extant literature as being essential to ensuring the collective security of states. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) are primarily and explicitly important security organizations, despite their generalpurpose mandates. But how they cooperate to confront security threats, the respective roles they play in the implementation of security policies, and the challenges they face are important factors in explaining Africa’s vulnerability to insecurity and how the continent is confronting emerging security challenges. Despite the increasing importance of the role of regional security actors, there has been surprisingly little theoretical and empirical comparative analysis of the role of regional security actors and their cooperative efforts in confronting insecurity in the region. This chapter addresses the gap in the literature by providing a theoretical and empirical understanding of the role, cooperation, and challenges of ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC in countering terrorism in Africa within the context of the Anthropocene. The chapter observes that aside from the push and pull drivers that negatively affect counterterrorism in the region, the low level of inter-subregional security cooperation worsens the region’s inability to contain the spillover of terrorists. Keywords Insecurity · Terrorism · Anthropocene · Regional Security Cooperation · ECOWAS · SADC · IGAD · Africa

A.-J. Ateku (B) · I. Owusu-Mensah Department of Political Science, Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, UK I. Owusu-Mensah Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_10

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10.1 Introduction This chapter analyzes insecurity caused by non-state actors within the Anthropocene—a term that describes the period in which humans have become the key drivers of planetary change. The prevalence of new security threats and violence from extremists and other transnational organized crime groups in recent years are good reasons for people to feel insecure. Indeed, the world—and Africa in particular—has become an increasingly insecure and precarious place to live, due to the disruptions caused by human beings, such as terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, illicit drug trafficking, and illegal small arms and light weapons trades, among other things. While efforts are being made to reverse the alarming rate of insecurity in Africa through international security interventions, young people are being conscripted into terrorist and other transnational organized crime groups to keep the flame of violent crimes burning. This chapter examines inter-regional security cooperation in confronting non-state security threats and violence in the age of Anthropocene in eastern, western, and southern Africa. Over the past few decades, particularly following the Libyan crisis in 2011, violent extremism and terrorism have increased in Africa. The return and influx of foreign fighters, mercenaries, and private military companies, and the expansion of armed and other transnational organized crime groups continue to negatively impact the peace, security, and sovereignty of African states. The rising levels of insecurity in Africa and the devastating impact of violent extremist and terrorist attacks, along with other forms of violence, necessitated the adoption of more stringent security measures aimed at confronting various forms of insecurity in countries that are in the grips of insurgent and/or organized banditry groups (Khera 2017). A key strategy to fighting transnational and transregional criminal groups is cooperation between states. This includes alliances between states with established relationships as well as new alliances. Through cooperation, African states have devised numerous strategies to counter the rising levels of insecurity—preventing vulnerabilities and targeted assassinations, enhancing border controls, and gathering and sharing intelligence. It is important to emphasize that these strategies, which are built on the UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy adopted by the UN General Assembly (Van Ginkel 2012; Williams et al. 2018), and those of the African Union, have not been able to halt the growing menace of violence in Africa. Eastern Africa is a historically volatile region. The insecurity in eastern Africa—resulting from exclusion, poverty, unemployment, injustice, civil wars, violent conflicts, and sparsely populated terrain—has created safe havens for terrorist organizations, such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, to spread beyond the region. The threat of violent extremism from Al-Shabaab has caused vulnerability in Somalia, which is eastern Africa’s epicenter of terrorism—with Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia being the “spillover” states, and Tanzania, Sudan, and South Sudan the “at-risk states” (IGAD 2018: 2; see also Solomon 2015). The West African story is similar. Since the mid-2000s, Nigeria has been in the grip of Boko Haram jihadists, who have caused the deaths and loss of livelihoods of thousands of people.

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The Sahel countries in West Africa have suffered exceedingly from jihadist groups, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslim (JNIM)—the umbrella group that formed in 2017 after the merger of the Sahara branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF). Violent extremism and terrorism in the Sahel have escalated and extended to the littoral states in West Africa, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Southern Africa is one of Africa’s more stable regions, but it remains extremely vulnerable to violent extremism because of widespread socioeconomic inequalities and exclusion, governance deficits, low political participation, and despondency of the youth, which entices them to engage in violent extremism, radicalization, and organized crime. In the face of the growing insecurity and its impact on communities, how do regional security interlocutors address the issues of non-state threats and violence in their respective regions, and how do subregional organizations cooperate to manage the emerging threats and violence? This chapter not only examines how the security policies of ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD confront non-state security threats, but also how they cooperate to fight new forms of security threats and violence.

10.2 Conceptualizing Regional Security Cooperation Studies on regionalism in the 1990s have primarily focused on the international political economy, which reflects the idea that, by nature, regional institutions are not only economic but also undergirded and/or driven by economic factors (Bailes and Cottey 1992: 198). However, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a framework for regional security cooperation (that analyses global security governance) was developed. Historically, regional security cooperation has either focused on cooperation that is driven by and directed against (perceived) external enemies, or on efforts to contain the risks of confrontation that were hinged on arms control agreements and military and security-building measures. Cooperation through alliances, collective security, and security regimes and communities continue to define current regional security cooperation. The oldest form of international cooperation—alliances—was designed as a military tactic to defend and attack a common enemy (Snyder 1990); however, as an international security approach, alliances are constrained in many respects. There is often tension among alliance members, which may divide them, and when alliances target perceived enemies within national, religious, or ethnic groups, it could lead to some members soliciting external support. However, despite the challenges they pose, alliances present opportunities as well. When productive— through confidence-building, mediation, and effective conflict resolution—they can reduce the likelihood of war between members. The twentieth-century concept of collective security emerged to prevent or contain war by mitigating any acts of aggression or threats to the peace and security of alliance members. It is anchored on a system that involves all states in a region or the world, and it focuses on the security of members within its jurisdiction. At the global

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level, the United Nations, and other large regional institutions—such as the African Union, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)—have either implicitly or explicitly aimed to ensure collective security. Despite the intended goals of safeguarding public security, it is important to emphasize that these global and regional security interlocutors face various interlocking challenges, including the difficulty of reaching consensus among the large membership. It has been established that the collective security approach works well when there is consensus between the major stakeholders of the cooperating institution, but it is likely to fail when there is continued disagreement or infighting. Security regimes—a third type of regional security cooperation—is underpinned by a common phenomenon in the non-security sphere of international relations; that is, although member states’ behavior is regulated, they may rely on the use force, respect for sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of international borders (Jervis 1998; Hendricks and Keïta 2017). More importantly, the geographical contiguity of membership does not limit regimes’ functional security objectives, which means that members can respect the constructs that undergird their membership, irrespective of their geographical location. The concept of a security community was developed in the 1950s by Karl Deutsch, with the intention to address the risk of conflict within a group. The underlying principles were that members of the community may not fight one another and were to resolve disputes amicably without any physical confrontation (Deutsch 1957; Adler 1998; Acharya 2001; Flemes 2005). Despite the envisaged goals, the empirical evidence from the EU experiment illustrates that the community could eliminate conflict between but not within member states. Thus, the security community is weak in terms of addressing internal issues; therefore, it might not be the most suitable approach to dealing with new security challenges such as ‘transnational’ threats, which are largely non-state threats (e.g., terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking). While these four models help to explain the nature, prospects, and limits of the different forms of regional security cooperation, they are inadequate in providing a comprehensive understanding of new security threats—especially from organized crime groups (e.g., terrorism, human trafficking, and drug trafficking), who, in most cases, operate largely from the vast stretches of ungoverned terrain. Aside from the African Union (which has over fifty member states and is the primary security interlocutor for the African continent), several other security organizations such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC exist at the subregional level, playing parallel roles in security matters. This illustrates that states prefer to address various aspects of security in a variety of procedural ways. Thus, understanding the security cooperation between states in terms of the functions that regional security institutions perform allows for the development of a comprehensive approach to the insecurity caused by non-state security actors in Africa. This chapter examines how subregional security organizations address insecurity in their respective regions, and the extent to which they cooperate to ensure the security of their communities.

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10.3 African Union Security Framework in Fighting Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Africa As far back as the 1990s, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—now the African Union (AU)—developed a counterterrorism framework within which violent extremism and terrorism would be fought by member states (Solomon 2015: 105– 107). In 1992, the OAU Counter-Terrorism Framework was passed in Dakar. The resolution requires member states to strengthen their cooperation and coordination of security policies in order to be effective in preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. Two years after the resolution was accepted, the OAU denounced violent extremism and terrorism in a declaration at its Thirtieth Ordinary Session in Tunis, Tunisia. The Ouagadougou Declaration in June 1998 reaffirmed the ideals and values of the OAU Charter—solidarity, unity, freedom, justice, peace, security, stability, and development. And the continental body took further steps to ensure the safety and security of its states by passing additional protocols and conventions following the bombing of US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. At the Thirty-Fifth Assembly of Heads of States and Government in Algiers in 1999, the prevention and combating of terrorism featured prominently, and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was subsequently passed. The convention came into force in December 2002 when the decision was ratified by thirty states. As part of measures to ensure that the convention was effectively adopted by member states, the AU established the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC) in Durban, South Africa in July 2002 to oversee its implementation. To give effect to Article 3(d) of the protocol, the AUPSC was to “coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects.” The adoption of the AUPSC was followed by the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in September 2002 in Algiers. The principle that an “attack on one country is an attack on the whole continent” was a key part of the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) adopted by the Second Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Sirte, Libya in 2004. While the African Union has adopted numerous measures to counteract violent extremism and terrorism in Africa, terrorist activities continue to spread throughout the continent. Countless terrorist activities have occurred from the mid-2000s, and in an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Addis Ababa in 2013, the Union expressed its solidarity with the Republic of Kenya after the AlShabaab/Al-Qaeda attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi. It is important to note that the earlier preventive and counterterrorism strategies adopted were largely kinetic (i.e., a combined military, security, and intelligence approach). However, the AU Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism required member states to prevent and counter terrorism by means of both military and non-military approaches. Because the severe poverty, inequality, and deprivation experienced by most African populations provide fertile breeding ground for violent extremism, the

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AU Plan of Action required member states to improve their populations’ socioeconomic opportunities. It recognized that only a few African states have the resources to combat the menace of terrorism on their own; as a result, member states were urged to pool their resources together to ensure the effective implementation of their adopted measures. As no state was free of violent extremism and terrorist vulnerability, the AU Plan of Action encouraged collaborative efforts and interaction among stakeholders. It was encouraged that greater interaction between legislative institutions, security and intelligence services, judicial bodies, financial institutions, law enforcement, and border surveillance and controls should be at the core of their counterterrorism strategies. The AU Plan of Action recognizes the intrinsic relationship that exists between terrorism and organized crime—including the illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking, money laundering, and corruption— and member states were to counter this menace as well. But how have the subregional security organizations contributed to keeping their people safe by preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism? The regional security bodies have become increasingly involved in coordinating AU member states’ security interests. In this chapter, we claim that, although the regional security organizations in Africa have developed several strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism, intersubregional cooperation remains weak, which contributes to the continent’s inability to deal with spillover terrorism. The next section examines violent extremism and terrorism in terms of three regional security organizations—ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC.

10.4 Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Western, Eastern, and Southern Africa Violent extremism and terrorism remain a major security challenge throughout Africa. Western, eastern, and southern Africa have all recorded gruesome murders by violent extremists and terrorists over the past two decades. Thus far, the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin states have been the hardest hit in West Africa, while the impact of Al-Shabaab’s terror acts in Somalia, Kenya, and neighboring countries remain indelible (Solomon 2015). Since Muammar Gaddafi was ousted, several militant groups have emerged in Africa, with many of them pledging bay’ah (allegiance) to the Islamic State (central). Today, the official provinces (Wilayat) of the Islamic State can be found not only in Algeria, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula), and Libya but also in West Africa in regions such as the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, Mozambique, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In West Africa, where the Islamic State jihadist group has two extensions—one in the Sahel (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara [ISGS]) and the other in the Lake Chad Basin (ISWAP Lake Chad)—at least six provinces and eight branches are on record (Warner et al. 2020). Aside from the recognized provinces and branches, it has supporters around the continent who, although they are not part of recognized

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Islamic State provinces, have executed attacks in its name—from Tunisia to Morocco, Kenya, and South Africa. It is estimated that 41% of the global deaths caused by the Islamic State militants in 2019 occurred in Africa, making the continent the terrorist organization’s center of jihadism. In the first four months of 2022, half of the Islamic State’s operations were conducted in Africa, and they claimed more operations in Nigeria than Iraq. While various terrorist organizations in Africa have established relationships with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), with varying goals, their dissatisfaction with their socioeconomic status and governance challenges such as corruption and human rights abuse, among other things, have largely been responsible for the episodes of terror experienced in the affected countries. The statistics are damning. The recent data suggest that Africa has surpassed the Middle East and South Asia as the hotbed of terrorist activities. The exponential growth in the violent terrorism in Africa points to one thing—Africa now is the world’s epicenter of jihadism. From the foregoing discussions, the reasons for the increase in jihadist activities in Africa are not obscure. The rise of Islamic State partners, perseverance of Al-Qaeda affiliates, continuous deterioration of domestic African social and economic conditions, and ineffective counterterrorism efforts have been largely responsible for the exponential increase in extremist and terrorist attacks in Africa. States cooperate to counter terrorist threats and violence against citizens, as do terrorists. They cooperate in orchestrating attacks on communities and facilitate opportunities for their affiliates to successfully unleash violence on societies. The African affiliates of the Islamic State have received support from the group, which has contributed to the rise of violence in Africa. The Libyan province of the Islamic State received fighters from Iraq to shore up its local fighters (Reuters 2016). They provided support in the form of funds, advice on tactics and strategy, and blueprints for governance. The overarching Islamic State has helped to fund the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP Lake Chad) (Ingram and Vidino 2021) and offered guidance on strategy and tactics (ISWAP Lake Chad), as well as reconciling with rivals (ISWAP Lake Chad) or standing up to them (ISGS) (see Nsaibia and Weiss 2020; Rolbiecki et al. 2018). In western Africa, the high prevalence of poverty and economic misery—resulting from poor macroeconomic policy, corruption, and a lack of external investment, among other factors—have been responsible for terrorism in the region (World Bank 2019). Terrorist groups have exploited the lack of economic opportunities in these countries by providing services to civilian populations that governments and rival jihadist groups are not able to—which is welcomed by the local population. ISWAP Lake Chad has played a prominent role in this in order to maintain its grip on its territory. More than one-third of Nigeria’s population lives in poverty and the poorest northern and northeastern areas have been taken over by ISWAP, which provides unparalleled services in a superior manner than its now significantly weakened rival, Boko Haram (World Bank 2020). More importantly, ISWAP is outperforming the Nigerian State in some ways. While the Nigerian government extorts citizens, seizes cargos, and cracks down on trade (Thurston 2021), the civilian population willingly accepts ISWAP’s levies on goods. Indeed, many communities in the Lake Chad

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area credit ISWAP for creating a better business environment, as they are now able to engage in trade. Furthermore, the modus operandi of their rival Boko Haram’s funds mobilization remains largely surreptitious and exploitative (Thurston 2021). ISWAP’s collection of zakat—a religious levy on the wealthy in society that is distributed to the poor—are systematically collected. This makes ISWAP appealing to most of the local Muslim population, who view the group as justice-minded people (ibid.). In the Sahara-Sahel, inter-ethnic violence and resurgence of unconstitutional rule in countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso have created more opportunities for terrorism to flourish. The inter-ethnic violence and political instability inflame tensions and undermine security. Over the past two decades, the Islamic State and AlQaeda-affiliated groups have exploited such security challenges. The ISGS exploited perennial conflicts between the Fulani and Tuaregs in the border region between Mali and Niger, primarily targeting Tuaregs in several attacks on civilians in 2017 and 2018 (Le Roux 2019). The Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) group has also taken advantage of the long-standing conflicts between Fulani herders and Dogon farmers in central Mali, by acting as the local arbitrators (Thompson 2021). The state’s absence in some parts of the country has resulted in the jihadists bridging the gap, as they are able to mobilize people across ethnic and racial cleavages (Demuynck and Coleman 2020). A typical example is Iyad Ag Ghali, the JNIM leader, who was a prominent leader of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 and called on all Muslims in northern Mali, irrespective of their ethnic extraction—whether Tuareg, Songhai, Fulani, Arab, or Bambara—to fight against “Western imperialists” and their local allies (France 24, 2019). Through their strong bonds with the local population in the Sahel, the ISGS and JNIM are able to recruit and retain members to fight against government forces and rival groups (Demuynck and Coleman 2020). The cases of eastern and southern Africa are no exception. Here, the jihadists have also exploited the states’ inability to provide essential services to their citizens. In addition, the epicenter of terrorism in eastern Africa—Somalia—has vast stretches of ungoverned land, which has allowed terrorism to flourish. Decades of international support to eliminate terrorist activities by empowering the central government—so that it becomes viable and can provide essential services to citizens—has not materialized, and the country remains in dire straits. Al-Shabaab has filled the governmental void by addressing the needs of these communities. The group has a shadow government whose presence is felt in most parts in southern Somalia, where it is performing better than the government in helping to address the economic and social challenges the people face. Instead of continuing the prosecution of the war against the terrorist group and taking responsibility for providing essential services to citizens, the Somali Federal Government was engaged in fighting the forces of the federal states instead (Bacon 2017). One scholar offered a poignant description of the state of affairs: “Insecurity under al-Shabaab is far better than security under the federal government” (Ingiriis 2018). It is abundantly clear that the unresponsive state structures, coupled with the looting of state resources by government officials, has created a vacuum for terrorists to gain a stranglehold on communities; and once they are successful in carving

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fiefdoms for themselves, it becomes extremely difficult for states to regain control of such territories. When Gaddafi’s regime crumbled in Libya, the young Tuareg revolutionaries (who had returned from Libya) joined the MNLA and laid the foundations for the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali in 2012 (Ibrahim 2020). In the next section, we examine the role of regional security cooperation in addressing the menace of terrorism.

10.5 Subregional Security Strategy in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Eastern, Western and Southern Africa The important role of multinational security cooperation in countering violent extremism and terrorism cannot be underestimated. States that do not collaborate with others would face serious challenges in securing their communities. The risks of violent extremism and terrorism encountered today transcend national and subregional borders. The situation has rendered both multinational and multiregional cooperation in the security domain inevitable. Joint military and security operations has an important requirement of multipartner and multinational intelligence and information sharing. However, this has been very difficult to achieve in Africa. In light of this, the question is: How have the national security interlocutors in the three selected regions cooperated to fight emerging forms of insecurity in Africa? The following section examines how violent extremism and terrorism are being countered by the three regional security interlocutors: (a) ECOWAS in West Africa; (b) IGAD in East Africa; and (c) SADC in southern Africa.

10.5.1 Countering Violent Extremism in West Africa The subregional security interlocutor in West Africa is ECOWAS, which comprises fifteen independent and sovereign states—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. As previously discussed, several of these countries have experienced terrorist attacks that have resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, destruction to both private and public properties, and the desolation of communities. While Mali, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso have been at the center of these attacks, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, and Togo have been occasional victims in recent times. ECOWAS has established various legal mechanisms and normative frameworks to counteract West Africa’s emerging security challenges and prevent deadly terrorist attacks. On terrorism, Article 3 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999) makes the fight against violent extremism and terrorism a critical objective

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(ECOWAS 1999). The symbiotic relationship that exists between terrorism and organized crime, such as the illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons as well as kidnappings, led to ECOWAS’s creation of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA). GIABA’s mandate involves the strengthening of member states’ capacity to prevent and control money laundering and terrorist financing in the region. Another important initiative is the establishment of the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) and the Committee of Chiefs of Security Services (CCSS), which are empowered to fulfill important functions. Although these institutions were created to help combat violent extremism and terrorism, they have not been able to do so. Therefore, to improve the chances of success, ECOWAS adopted more stringent measures. At the Forty-Second Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government in 2013, a Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism was made. The ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Implementation Plan followed the declaration. The ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government reaffirmed its commitment to combat terrorism at its Forty-Second Extraordinary Session held on May 30, 2014. Both the Declaration and Strategy aim to provide a common operational framework for member states in order to prevent and eliminate terrorism and other criminal acts from West Africa. They required member states to adopt policies to protect human security, create an enabling environment for sound economic development, and ensure the overall well-being of all citizens of West Africa (ECOWAS 2013). Moreover, the ECOWAS counterterrorism strategy seeks to give effect to international and regional counterterrorism instruments, such as the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, the OAU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, as well as other measures adopted by the African Union, such as the Comprehensive African Anti-Terrorism Model Law (ECOWAS 2013). ECOWAS’s counterterrorism strategy consisted of a three-pronged approach: prevent, pursue, and reconstruct. It requires member states to prioritize the prevention of violent extremism and terrorism, and if the preventive approach fails, states are to aggressively pursue and bring to justice perpetrators of terrorist acts and rebuild the damage caused to individuals and communities (ECOWAS 2013: 25). Member states are expected to undertake a number of activities to ensure positive outcomes. Under the first pillar—prevention—a wide range of activities, such as enhancing the socioeconomic, political, and cultural activities necessary to eliminate conditions conducive to terrorism, are to be undertaken. The second pillar seeks to enable member states to take swift and effective action to counter terrorism when it occurs. In this regard, violent extremists and terrorist are to be pursued by both military and non-military means. And the third pillar, reconstruction, aims to rebuild societies affected by terrorism, taking the necessary measures to reassert state authority where needed and undertake social healing in the aftermath of terrorist and counterterrorist activities (Ewi 2013; ECOWAS 2013). A key part of the strategy to achieve these objectives is the specific recommendations at all levels of the implementation

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plan. Crucial structures—including the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit, which has essential features such as the ECOWAS Arrest Warrant and Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks—were established. An ECOWAS CounterTerrorism Training Manual as well as training center for counterterrorism capacitybuilding were to be adopted. The success of the strategy requires periodic assessment to identify what works well and what needs to be reexamined (ECOWAS 2013: 40). While ECOWAS’s collective security approach is commendable, it has faced some interlocking challenges, which have contributed significantly to the mentioned regions becoming the hubs of terrorism in Africa. ECOWAS and its member states have not been able to comprehensively implement the Declaration or Strategy. The implementation of the established ECOWAS framework was fraught with significant challenges—including inadequate financial and technical resources, poor coordination, lack of political will, and overreliance on external funding—which impeded the realization of these goals. The West African region has undoubtedly become a safe haven for terrorists and a fertile breeding ground for terrorist networks, owing to the high prevalence of transnational organized crime, illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, money laundering, illegal financial and natural resource transfer, human trafficking, fraud, armed robbery, and piracy, among other things. The large degree of governance deficits, such as the high incidence of corruption in public service, human rights abuses, lack of socioeconomic opportunities—including youth unemployment and despondency, marginalization, and injustice, among other things—fuel the current proliferation of organized crime groups, which undermine security in the region (Idowu 2013; Bala and Tar 2021). The alienation and frustration of the youth, and the stunted economic growth in many countries in the region, have been exploited by terrorist groups in their recruitment, retention, and use of the youth in committing terrorist acts. Member states have been slow to ratify and implement global instruments that aim to combat terrorism. While some have created national structures such as counterterrorism units and other centralized structures to coordinate counterterrorism measures, many others are lagging behind, making the disruption of illicit funding to terrorists and their networks extremely difficult. In addition, ineffective border control systems have made it easy for the movement of foreign terrorist fighters in the region. Consequently, the current devastation caused by terrorists in Burkina and Mali— as well as the vulnerability and insecurity faced by the littoral states that led to the formation of the Accra Initiative by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo in 2017 to combat terrorism—can partly be blamed on the ineffective implementation of the ECOWAS counterterr

10.5.2 Countering Violent Extremism in Southern Africa SADC is a regional economic community composed of sixteen member states— Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho,

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Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Terrorism, as argued in many quarters, knows no bounds; thus, southern Africa is not immune to violent extremism and terrorism. While SADC has not experienced such widespread terrorism as the West Africa region, in countries such as Nigeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso, several factors increase the region’s vulnerability to terrorism. First, weak border controls make these countries vulnerable, as terrorists can travel with ease, which is not a new phenomenon in the region. Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, who would later be identified as a terrorist, crossed into Mozambique from his native Tanzania on August 8, 1998. This occurred two days after two massive explosions had destroyed the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which caused over 200 deaths. It was later established that he had helped orchestrate the Dar es Salam attack. Almost a week later, he crossed into South Africa with a visitor’s visa he had acquired in Dar es Salaam the day before the bombing. Before his arrest in October 1999, Mohamed had lived and worked in Cape Town for more than a year, and he was in the process of applying for asylum under a pseudonym (Banda et al. 2005). Second, the region’s vulnerability further stems from the violent attacks in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. The distressing situation in Cabo Delgado requires effective counterterrorism measures to keep the region safe and ensure that it does not descend into the abyss experienced in Nigeria and the Sahelian countries. Lastly, the potential danger that terrorism poses to the region owes to the increasing networks of terrorist groups. The ISIS-affiliated Islamic State in the Central African Province (ISCAP) has firmly established its presence in the region. It is estimated that ISCAP membership has increased to about 2,000 local recruits and foreign fighters from Kenya, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, DRC, Somalia, South Africa, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. While southern Africa is not new to terrorism, it is late to the development of counterterrorism strategies among the three subregional security interlocutors concerned. At the Thirty-Fifth SADC Summit held in Gaborone, Botswana in August 2015, SADC developed its Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Plan of Action—a comprehensive, integrated, and operational framework with the aim of preventing and countering terrorist activities in the region. However, it has taken almost seven years for the region to establish the SADC Regional Counter Terrorism Centre (RCTC). In fact, the RCTC was launched on February 28, 2022 in Dar es Salam, Tanzania, where it is headquartered. The RCTC’s main mandate is advisory in nature. It advises SADC on countering and preventing violent extremist policies, programs, and deployments within the SADC region. Moreover, it aims to coordinate the implementation of the SADC Regional Counter Terrorism Strategy and lead the review process of strategies. The RCTC—whose creation aligned with the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of 2001, as well as the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003—was tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that the region was peaceful and stable, so that SADC can achieve its ultimate objective of a united, integrated, and prosperous community. For member states’ national counterterrorism policies to be effective, the RCTC was tasked with undertaking research and assessing, analyzing, and timeously disseminating information to national agencies, so that they could act to preempt or pursue violent extremists and terrorists. But how has SADC been

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responding to violent extremism and terrorism in the region? The events in Mozambique provide important insight into the effectiveness of SADC’s strategy. SADC member states stand to be disastrously affected if violent extremism takes further root in Mozambique. The region’s security will be undermined, because Mozambique will be the springboard of terrorism and likely the supplier of extremism and terrorism to other member states. Presently, Cabo Delgado has been recognized as a major conduit for organized crime, including smuggling of contraband goods and drugs. Several young people from South Africa, Tanzania, DRC, and Malawi have been identified as members of the terrorist group Al Sunnah Wa Jama’ah (ASWJ). This suggests that the region is already in the grips of radical organizations and recruitment networks, which poses a grave security risk. One member of SADC, South Africa, has already been warned by ISIS not to get involved in the terrorism in Mozambique, because it would retaliate (Fabricius 2020). However, SADC has not paid serious attention to the violent extremism in Mozambique, which is concerning. Its decision-making regarding violent extremism in Mozambique has not been proactive. Several meetings convened to address the issues had lacked the urgency required for the organization to decisively deal with the matter. In November 2020, SADC convened an extraordinary Organ Troika Summit to address the terrorist activities in the region, particularly in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. Before this meeting, others were held by senior officials—including heads of state—on the same subject, but no clear decisions or actions were taken. In April 2021, SADC convened a Double Troika Summit in Maputo, which was attended by six presidents, to discuss measures to address the terrorism in Mozambique. A factfinding mission was to be deployed to Mozambique before another SADC Summit scheduled to take place in April 2021. Sadly, this meeting was postponed due to the unavailability of two presidents. Experience from the failures of subregional security organizations such as the G5 in West and Central Africa illustrates that SADC’s slow response will most likely enable the ASWJ to expand in size and gain control of the territory (Obaji, Jr. 2021). After months of deliberations, an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the SADC held in Maputo on June 23, 2021 culminated in the decision of the regional security actor to intervene militarily in Mozambique to prevent the conflict from spreading (Bolani 2021). There were other delays but the military was subsequently deployed. SADC approved a budget of $12 million, which hardly seems adequate. SADC leaders also agreed to respond with military force without taking the full scope of the UN’s Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) into account. After some delays, the standby force began arriving in Mozambique in late July and was formally deployed in August 2021. The operation in Cabo Delgado exposed the weaknesses in SADC’s regional security architecture. At the national level, the crisis in Cabo Delgado requires a coordinated multisectoral, multileveled, and multidisciplinary approach, but this was lacking. At the time of the SADC troops’ deployment, Mozambique lacked a national center for the prevention and countering of violent extremism, national research data on violent extremism and terrorism, and a strategy or action plan to prevent violent extremism.

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At the regional level, the size and preparedness of the defense and security sectors of SADC member states are uneven. For example, both Angola and South Africa maintain large defense forces and budgets. While the DRC has a sizeable defense force on paper, it is unable to ensure domestic law and order. Unlike Angola and South Africa, other member states such as Comoros, Lesotho, Eswatini, and Seychelles, have very small security forces and budgets. At the time of the operation in Cabo Delgado, evidence abounded that SADC lacked the capacity to respond to widespread violence from war or violent extremist attacks (Van Nieuwkerk 2021).

10.5.3 Countering Violent Extremism in Eastern Africa The IGAD, previously known as the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) is one of Africa’s youngest subregional organizations. It was founded in 1996 with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda as its members. IGAD has a broader mandate and ambitious objectives that embrace cooperation in almost all socioeconomic, political, and environmental fields (IGAD 1996). Similar to the two other regional economic communities (RECs) examined (ECOWAS and SADC), IGAD was initially established to address the economic challenges of the continent; however, due to the new security challenges such as those stemming from violent extremists and terrorists, IGAD’s mandate was expanded to deal with non-state security threats such as terrorism. Since 9/11, preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism have received much attention in the region, and IGAD has undertaken measures to this end. The IGAD region is important in examining the role of subregional security organizations for two main reasons. First, it is one of the most volatile and conflict-affected states of the world (Kinfe 2006). The region has been the epicenter of Africa’s instability and humanitarian disaster. The IGAD member states have experienced authoritarian regimes that witnessed the dastardly massacre of thousands of people and other conflicts such as ethnic, resource, and boundary disputes (Medhane 2004). Second, the region’s history of malaise economic and social opportunities is essential to the examination of terrorism. The 1998 terrorist attack on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam had caused some alertness in IGAD’s international obligation to combat terrorism. The most prominent terrorist organization in the region is Al-Shabaab. The group, similar to many others in Africa, declared itself an Al-Qaeda affiliate, and its primary goal is to establish an Islamic republic in Somalia (Menkhaus 2005). Following the erosion of the power of factional leaders in Somalia, which stemmed from the absence of an effective regional or inter-regional political force, Al-Shabaab dominated the political dynamics in Somalia and controlled most parts of the capital, Mogadishu. By invitation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, Al-Shabaab was virtually annihilated by Ethiopia, whose primary goal was to stop the spread of political Islam in the region. However, the withdrawal of the Ethiopian military from Somalia in 2008 created fertile ground for Al-Shabaab to resuscitate and regain its

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strength in the south-central part of Somalia, including Mogadishu. African security, under the aegis of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), successfully drove Al-Shabaab jihadists from most of the areas they had previously controlled, but they remain a great security threat, not only to Somalia but the entire IGAD region. The two interventions that effectively eliminated Al-Shabaab, first by Ethiopia and subsequently by AMISOM, illustrate that security cooperation can be effective if the necessary tactics are deployed. So how is IGAD responding to the emerging security threats of violent extremism and terrorism in East Africa? IGAD’s first major step to combat terrorism was its Draft Implementation Plan, which was adopted by member states in 2003 in Kampala, Uganda. The Plan requires member states to work within a common legal framework, develop treaties responsible for extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA), and encourage member states to ratify the relevant continental and international instruments. The plan also urges member states to increase information sharing, coordinate training, and cooperate in their quests to counter violent extremism and terrorism. In 2009, IGAD’s Council of Ministers were tasked to oversee the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the region, and two new conventions were adopted. The first pertained to extradition and the second to MLA. Moreover, in combating terrorism, IGAD adopted the Security Strategy in 2010, which restructured its Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) into the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS). The transformation was due to changes in the security situation in the region, which required a convergence to address the various transnational crimes. The IPSS is hinged on four pillars: Counterterrorism (CT); Transnational Organized Crime (TOC); Maritime Security (MS); and Security Institutions Capacity Building (SICB). In addition to its own strategies, the member states of IGAD have ratified international conventions on combating terrorism (African Union 2004; Solomon 2015; Ford 2011). Fighting terrorism in eastern Africa requires IGAD to take terrorist activities seriously in its security programs, because not only has Somalia been the epicenter of terrorism in the region, it has also functioned as a springboard for international terrorism. Somalia has found itself in this quandary because it has not been able to manage its internal security or implement stringent border security policies, which is essential to protecting its territory from becoming a safe haven for violent extremists and terrorists. IGAD has contributed to several activities to secure Somalia through the training of Somali security forces. It is estimated that by the close of 2013, between 14,700 and 15,000 troops had been trained by member states of IGAD. However, IGAD’s involvement in Somalia has been criticized as being insufficient due to a lack of capacity and competitive national interest of member states, as well as weak collaboration with civil society organizations.

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10.6 Conclusion: Weaknesses in Subregional and Inter-Subregional Security Cooperation in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism From the foregoing discussions, it is evident that opportunities to eliminate terrorism in the necessary regions through regional and subregional security cooperation exist, but they have proven difficult for several reasons. It is important to emphasize that, while the respective counterterrorism strategies of the three subregional security organizations have been developed according to the particular security challenges of each region, as argued earlier, terrorism knows no bounds, and the activities of terrorists are fluid, which requires inter-subregional cooperation. In some situations, states’ implementation of counterterrorism strategies without knowledge of the situations in neighboring states have pushed terrorists across borders—especially into areas with no government presence. Burkina Faso was a buffer against the spread of violent extremism to littoral states when it launched Operation Otapuano to eliminate terrorists in the southeastern part of Burkina Faso. However, this operation pushed the terrorists into the borders of the coastal states— Benin, Ghana, and Togo. Today, Burkina Faso is no longer a buffer zone, and Benin and Togo have recently recorded cases of terrorism, leaving only Ghana with no record of any violent attack, although the country remains extremely vulnerable to terrorism. The fight against terrorism can be won when states collaborate at both a bilateral and multilateral level. A typical example is the Accra Initiative, which is a cooperative and collaborative security mechanism created by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. The mechanism is built on three pillars: information and intelligence sharing; training of security and intelligence personnel; and joint cross-border military operations to sustain border security. This cooperative security mechanism helped to prevent the spillover of terrorists from the Sahel region. Terrorist activities in the member states would have been different if such cooperation was non-existent. It allows meetings of intelligence and security heads, and defense and security ministers, to meet quarterly to review their cooperative and collaborative efforts. The Accra Initiative led to the joint operations known as Operation Koudanlgou, with Operation Koudanlgou I conducted by Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Togo, and Operation Koudanlgou II conducted by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana in November 2018. Cooperation such as this must occur at the level of subregional bodies, where organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD can cooperate and harmonize their efforts in combating terrorism. The Group of Five (G5) and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Sahel as well as the support from France, the European Union, and other international actors face significant challenges in eliminating terrorism, because terrorist groups such as ISGS and JNIM successfully expanded their influence while the relevant countries were finding their feet in managing threats to their individual nations. Furthermore, the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force in West Africa (Mali, Burkino Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Chad) has not been able to militarily defeat

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the violent extremists in the region, because terrorism, organized crime, and quality of governance are linked. In both eastern and southern Africa—especially Somalia and Mozambique—as well as western Africa, unsuccessful peacebuilding strategies anchored on socioeconomic opportunities should be collaboratively addressed. Military strategies for countering terrorism, such as AMISOM, are failing because they are not designed to address issues of poverty and unemployment, absence of essential social services, and poor health and education, among other things, but these have profound implications for the sustainability of violent extremist and terrorist groups. Poor postconflict reconstruction means that many of the underlying social issues that fuel the insurgency remain unresolved. Any strategy to comprehensively confront terrorism should be designed around both military and non-military tactics—they are interdependent; neither one is superior to the other.

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Cilliers, Jakkie, 2015: Violent Islamist Extremism and Terror in Africa (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies), October, at: https://issafrica.org/research/papers/violent-islamistextremism-and-terror-in-africa (accessed May 13, 2022). Clifford, Bennet; Weiss, Caleb, 2020: “Breaking the Walls’ Goes Global: The Evolving Threat of Jihadi Prison Assaults and Riots,” CTC Sentinel 13, 2; at: https://ctc.westpointedu/breakingwalls-goes-global-evolving-threat-jihadi-prison-assaults-riots/. Demuynck Meryl; Coleman, Julie, 2020: “The Shifting Sands of the Sahel’s Terrorism landscape,” International centre for counter-terrorism—The Hague, March 12, at: https://icct.nl/publication/ the-shifting-sands-of-the-sahels-terrorism-landscape/. Deutsch Karl W., 1957: Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definitions and Measurement (New York: Doubleday & Company). ECOWAS, 1999: Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, Abuja: ECOWAS, December 10, at: https://amaniafricaet.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Protocol-Relating-to-the-Mechanism-for-Conflict-Preven tion-Management-Resolution-Peace-Keeping-and-Security-1999.pdf. ECOWAS, 2013: ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position Against Terrorism, Yamoussoukro (Abuja: ECOWAS, 28 February). Ewi, Martin; Aning, Kwesi, 2006: “Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa,” in: African Security Review 15, 3. Fabricius, Peter, 2020: “How Serious is the Islamic State Threat to Attack South Africa?”, in: ISS Today, at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-serious-is-the-islamic-state-threat-to-attack-southafrica. Flemes Daniel, 2005: “Creating a Regional Security Community in Southern Latin America: The Institutionalisation of the Regional Defence and Security Policies.” Paper Presented at the Conference of the World International Studies Committee (WISC) at Bilgi University, Istanbul, August 24–27, at: https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/182556. Ford, Jolyon, 2011: “African Counter-Terrorism Legal Frameworks: A Decade After 2001,” Institute for Security Studies [ISS]. Monograph, No. 177. France 24, 2019: “The Somali Government’s Attention is not Focused on Defeating al Shabaab,” December 29, at: https://www.france24.com/en/20191229-the-somali-government-s-attentionis-not-focused-on-defeating-al-shabaab. Hendricks, C.; Keïta, N., 2017: “Introduction: Security Regimes in Africa”, in: Africa Developmentt, 42, 3; 1–12, at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/90018131. Ibrahim, Azeem, 2020: Rise and Fall? The Rise and Fall of ISIS in Libya (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press). Ibrahim, Yahaya I., 2017: “The Wave of Jihadist Insurgency in West Africa: Global Ideology, Local Context, Individual Motivations,” West African Papers, no.7, Paris: OECD Publishing, at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/eb95c0a9-en.pdf?expires=1662277481&id=id&acc name=guest&checksum=CEBA7A3BA720A8F6BE70F421FF4DC298 (accessed May 27, 2022). Idowu, Amos A., 2013: “Security Laws and Challenges in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Insurgency”, in: Journal of Applied Security Research, 8,1: 118–134. Ingram, Haroro J.; Vidino, Lorenzo, 2021: “The Islamic State is in Congo. What now?”, in: Lawfare, May 16, at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/islamic-state-congo-what-now. Ingiriis, Mohammed H., 2018: “Building Peace from the Margins in Somalia: The Case for Political Settlement with Al-Shabaab,” in: Contemporary Security Policy, 39, 4: 512–536. Jervis, Robert, 1982: “Security Regimes,” in: International Organization, 36, 2: 357–78. Khera, Kishore K., 2017: “International Military Exercises: An Indian Perspective”, in: Journal of Defence Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 11: 17–40. Kinfe, Abraham, 2006: The Horn of Africa: Conflicts and Conflict Mediation in the Greater Horn of Africa (Addis Ababa: EIIPD and HADAD).

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Kwarkye, Sampson; Abatan, Ella; Matongba, Michael, 2019: Can the Accra Initiative Prevent Terrorism in West African Coastal States? ISS, at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-the-accrainitiative-prevent-terrorism-in-west-african-coastal-states. Laessing, Ulf, 2016: “Boko Haram May be Sending Fighters to Islamic State in Libya, U.S. officials,” in: Reuters, May 13, at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-usa-idUSKC N0Y41QH. Le Roux, Pauline, 2019: “Exploiting Borders in the Sahel: The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara,” in: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, June 10, at: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/exploitingborders-sahel-islamic-state-in-the-greater-sahara-isgs/. Maruf, Harun, 2016: “Intelligence Official: Islamic State Growing in Somalia,” in: VOA News, May 5, at: https://www.voanews.com/a/intelligence-official-islamic-state-growing-in-somalia/ 3316326.html. Maruf, Harun, 2016: “Somali Officials Vow to Retake Puntland Town,” in: VOA News, October 28, at: https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-officials-vow-to-retake-puntland-town/3570974https:// www.html#:~:text=Somali%20regional%20authorities%20in%20Puntland,when%20they%20t ook%20over%20Qandala. Medhane, Tadese, 2004: Turning Conflict to Co-operation: Towards Energy-led integration in the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa, Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung, at: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ aethiopien/02246.pdf. Menkhaus, Ken J., 2005: “Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse”, in: Totberg, Robert I. (Ed.), in: Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Washington: Brookings Institution Press). Milton, Daniel, 2016: Communication Breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic State’s Media Efforts (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center). Mosa’ab Elshamy, 2021: “U.S. General: ‘Wildfire of Terrorism’ on March in Africa,” VOA, Associated Press, June, at: https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_us-general-wildfire-terrorismmarch-africa/6207204.html#:~:text=A%20senior%20U.S.%20general%20warnedAmerican% 2C%20African%20and%20European%20troops. Nsaibia, Heni; Weiss, Caleb, 2020: “The End of the Sahelian Anomaly: How the Global Conflict Between the Islamic State and al-Qaida Finally Came to West Africa,” CTC Sentinel 13 :7, at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-end-of-the-sahelian-anomaly-how-the-global-conflict-betweenthe-islamic-state-and-al-qaida-finally-came-to-west-africa/. Obaji Jr., Philip, 2021: “Growing Insurgency in Mozambique Poses Danger to Southern Africa.” IPI Global Observatory, March 26, at: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/03/growing-insurg ency-mozambique-poses-danger-southern-africa/. Reuters, 2016: “Factbox: Key facts about Islamic State in Libya,” December 9, at: https://www.reu ters.com/article/libya-security-islamic-state-idINKBN13Y11J. Rolbiecki, Tomasz; Van Ostaeyen, Pieter; Winter, Charlie, 2018: “The Islamic State’s Strategic Trajectory in Africa: Key Takeaways From its Attack Claims,” in: CTC Sentinel, 13, 8; at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-states-strategic-trajectory-in-africa-key-takeawaysfrom-its-attack-claims/ (accessed May 15, 2022). Solomon, Hussein, 2015: “Responding to Terror: An Assessment of African Union CounterTerrorism Strategies.” In: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa. New Security Challenges Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan). Steinberg, Guido; Weber, Annette, 2015: Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), at: https://www.swpberlin. org/publications/products/research_papers/2015_RP05_sbg_web.pdf. Snyder, Glenn H., 1990: “Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut”, in: Journal of International Affairs, 44, 1, 103–123, at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357226. Thompson, Jared, 2021: “Examining Extremism: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin,” CSIS, July 15, at: https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-jamaat-nasr-alislam-wal-muslimin (accessed May 16, 2022).

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Thurston, Alex, 2021: “Why Jihadists are collecting ‘Zakat’ in the Sahel,” in: Political Violence at a Glance, July 12, at: https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2021/07/12/why-jihadists-are-collec ting-zakat-in-the-sahel/ (May 7, 2022). Trew, Bel. 2017: “ISIS Vows to Increase Attacks on Egypt’s Christians in New Video,” The Sunday Times, February 20, at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-vows-to-increase-attacks-on-egy pts-christians-in-new-video-qq6xts8tp (accessed May 16, 2022). UNDP, 2021: “Analysing Long-Term Socio-Economic Impacts of COVID-19 Across Diverse African Contexts,” United Nations Development Programme, at: https://www.undp.org/sites/g/ files/zskgke326/files/migration/africa/f5a32ba0e2fb380796e3596e0857ab63f2acb1300c5bb17a ad9847e13f941c43.pdf. UNSC, 2020: “Twenty-fifth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2368 (2017) Concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities,” United Nations Security Council, January 20, para. 43, at: https:// documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N19/439/92/PDF/N1943992.pdf?OpenElement. Van Ginkel, Bibi, 2012: “Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.” Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies, 3, 8: 1–14. https://doi.org/10.19165/2012.1.08 Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni, 2021: “Building Anticipatory Governance in SADC: Post-Covid-19 Conflict and Defence Outlook”, at: https://saiia.org.za/research/building-anticipatory-govern ance-in-sadc-post-covid-19-conflict-and-defence-outlook/ (accessed April 28, 2022). Warner, Jason; Weiss, Caleb, 2017: “A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry Between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia,” in: CTC Sentinel, 10,10, at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-legitimate-challenger-assessing-the-rivalry-between-al-shabaaband-the-islamic-state-in-somalia/ (accessed May 13, 2022). Warner, Jason; O’Farrell, Ryan; Nsaibia, Heni; Cummings, Ryan, 2020: “Outlasting the Caliphate: The Evolution of the Islamic State Threat in Africa,” in: CTC Sentinel ,13, 11, at: https://ctc.wes tpoint.edu/outlasting-the-caliphate-the-evolution-of-the-islamic-state-threat-in-africa/ (accessed May 17, 2022). Warner, Jason; O’Farrell, Ryan; Nsaibia, Heni; Cummings, Ryan, 2021: The Islamic State in Africa: Emergence, Evolution, and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefront (London: Hurst). Williams, Dodeye; Okon, Enoch; Onibasa, Tony, 2018: “The Utility of Military Force and the Global War on Terror (GWOT): Strategic or Tactical?”, in: Journal of Humanities and Social Policy, 4, 2: 1–11. Wolseley-Prah, Paa K.; Chanimbe, Timothy, 2021: “Ghana’s Readiness to Combat Terrorism: Strategies of Security Institutions”, in: The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, 23, 3; 367–399. https://doi.org/10.1080/23800992.2021.1968582. World Bank, 2019: “Macroeconomic Management Weakens While Social Inclusion Policies Improve Slightly in Africa’s Poorest Countries,” July 13; at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/ news/press-release/2019/07/31/macroeconomic-management-weakens-while-social-inclusionpolicies-improve-slightly-in-africas-poorest-countries (accessed May 13, 2022a). World Bank, 2020: “Nigeria Releases New Report on Poverty and Inequality in Country,” May 28, at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/lsms/brief/nigeria-releases-new-report-on-povertyand-inequality-in-country (accessed June 18, 2022b). Zelin, Aaron, 2018: “The Others: Foreign Fighters in Libya,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January, at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/others-foreign-fighterslibya. Zenn, Jacob, 2016: “Suicide Bombing in Congo Indicates Growing Influence of Islamic State Affiliate,” in: Terrorism Monitor, 19,14, at: https://jamestown.org/program/briefs-354/.

Chapter 11

Conclusion: The Future of African Security: Final Thoughts Hussein Solomon and Jude Cocodia

Abstract Africa’s numerous security challenges, from weak governance to poor civil–military relations and economic backwardness and war, have demonstrated that the continent’s obsession with traditional conceptions of sovereignty and maintaining its own rendition of the Westphalian system is woefully inadequate for the task of securing 1.2 billion Africans. These security challenges are exacerbated by climate change. Issues of desertification know no respect for the integrity of states. What is required is more inclusive and holistic concepts of security and greater powers surrendered to the African Union on the part of nation-states. Keywords African Union, · Regional Economic Communities, · Sovereignty, · Westphalian, · Desertification The postcolonial African state has lurched from one crisis to another: civil war, violent secessionism, genocide, and coups have all been the bane of the political landscape of the continent since independence. Their inherent weaknesses, as outlined by Solomon and Cocodia, have fueled newly independent African states to embrace traditional concepts of security and sovereignty. Ironically, Africa’s obsession with state security and traditional concepts of sovereignty and its corollary (non-interference) occurred at a time when much of the world was moving on to more inclusive concepts as it integrates evermore and, as threats such as the Covid-19 pandemic and desertification demonstrate, transcends territorial boundaries. African political elites have embraced traditional Western notions of security that emanate from classic notions of the Weberian state and the resultant Westphalian system, but this has proven to be a poor fit for the realities in the Global South, and Africa in particular, as Bianca Naude notes in her illuminating chapter. She argues for H. Solomon (B) Faculty The Humanities Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa J. Cocodia Faculty The Humanities Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1_11

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a more holistic notion of security—moving from state security with its emphasis on power and survival to human security, where access to quality health care, education, and sustainable economic development are as important as physical security. Our notion of security, Naude further argues, must be informed by the current geological epoch, the Anthropocene, which is characterized by the unsustainable impact of humans on the biosphere. This, in turn, further undermines African security in both traditional state-centric terms as well as security writ large, whether stemming from climate change or economic marginalization. As Dauda Abubaker notes in his chapter in this volume, 50% of the 20 million people living in the three Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa are confronted with food insecurity. This threat of famine is as real as an armed bandit, a militant Islamist grouping, or a soldier invading from a neighboring state. Why then should these threats not be prioritized? Concepts of human security and ontological security are ostensibly a better fit for Africa’s complex security landscape. The interface between humans and the environment is most evident in the realm of the possibility of water wars erupting on the continent, as outlined in the chapter by M.K. Mahlakeng and Hussein Solomon. Between 2010 and 2030, the total population residing in the Nile Basin would have increased by 52%, reaching a staggering 647 million people. This has increased demands on the life-giving waters of the Nile, with implications for food security for states and their populations. Moreover, this is occurring at a time when pollution in the river has escalated and rising temperatures have increased evaporation rates. In this context, Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was seen by the authorities in Egypt as an existential threat, and Cairo has repeatedly threatened the use of force to maintain the colonial status quo guaranteeing them the lion’s share of the Nile’s water. Ethiopia, meanwhile, has refused to alter course since the waters of the Nile has its origins in Ethiopian territory. In this context, state-centric notions of security undermine any notion of collective security that transcends territorial borders, which is sorely needed in the age of the Anthropocene. Sanet Madonsela examined the growing nexus between climate change and security in Mali, which has been at the center of insecurity in the entire Sahel region. Mali’s economy, she points out, is heavily reliant on agriculture and agropastoralism, but increasing annual temperatures since the 1960s, along with declining annual rainfall since the 1990s, have increased desertification. This, in turn, has weakened socioeconomic and political tensions and undermined already weak governance. It has also contributed to increased violence since independence, as seen in the Tuareg rebellions of the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s, as well as the escalation in conflict over scarce water resources between Fulani herdsmen, Bozo fishermen, and Dogon agriculturalists. This has fed into other forms of sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians. What is of importance here is that the various interventions that have aimed to stabilize Mali have all singularly failed. In large part, this is because the interventions placed greater emphasis on the symptoms—Islamist militant groups or communal violence—as opposed to the root causes, of which the environment takes center stage among the lot.

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Another facet of this overarching security challenge of the Anthropocene in Africa was also highlighted by Omololu Fagbadebo, Mzikayise S. Binza, and Martin Kabange in their discussion on the various resource-based conflicts plaguing the continent. Far from being a blessing, Africa’s abundant natural resources have morphed into a curse, as endemic corruption, environmental degradation, and violent conflicts have all become part of the extractive industries, especially mining. Extractive industries, especially illicit ones, have had a deleterious impact on the environment, eviscerating food security and undermining the living conditions of those affected. This, in turn, has served to increase competition for natural resources, which has fueled conflict. The insurgency in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the Marikana massacre in South Africa, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) around tantalum, and the blood diamonds of the Sierra Leone conflict all have their roots in this contestation over exploitation of natural resources. The weak levels of governance and the poor management of the extractive industries have made such conflict inevitable. The resource-curse syndrome is real in Africa, and it is the bedrock of the resource-based conflicts in the continent. It is hoped that this book would encourage continuous research, especially on specific country cases, to unravel the factors that have plagued African countries in falling consistently into the development trap. The chapter by Fagbadebo, Biza and Kabange opened up multiple directions of knowledge sharing that would enable researchers approach the issue of conflicts from other perspectives. Another facet of extractive industries was highlighted by Jude Cocodia and Ibaba Ibaba. Oil, they stress, has the highest risk of igniting civil conflict. In their contribution, they argue that the failure of the postcolonial state to address horizontal inequality by providing equal access to the largesse of natural resources, risks further conflict. In their case study of Nigeria, they point out how oil played a crucial role in igniting the civil war, and that several decades later, Nigeria’s state-sponsored horizontal inequality has placed the country back on the precipice of instability. Because resource allocation is skewed in favor of the ethnic group in power, contestations for political power have been fierce and often brutal. This contestation for power is seen both within and between states, often pivoting on the issue of access to natural resources and thus economic largesse. The Great Lakes region, which witnessed the intervention of neighboring states into the terrain of the mineral-rich DRC, is emblematic of this phenomenon. Indeed, as Dries Putter and Abel Esterhuyse note, no fewer than 630 armed conflicts have taken place between the end of the Cold War and 2015 on African soil. The extent of these conflicts has placed an extraordinary burden on the soldiers in national armies. They simply cannot cope with the plethora of challenges; their military doctrine and training does not speak to the threats they have to confront. This problem is exacerbated by a weak national identity, virulent ethnocentric nationalism, weak governance, corruption, the dearth of military professionalism, and the lack of resources. Frustrated by their civilian masters who often lack legitimacy or hail from another tribal faction, African militaries have often staged coups in frustration at the lack of leadership and the fact that their restive populations desire change, which is impossible to secure because of rigged ballots and monopolies of natural resources.

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However, access to natural resources is not merely the purview of domestic players. International actors have often had a hand in Africa’s myriad conflicts, as Cocodia and Ibaba demonstrate in their analysis of Nigeria’s civil war, where the British played a key role in ensuring their access to resources by supporting the Nigerian State against the secessionist Biafra. Dauda Abubakar also examined the role of foreign actors in African security in the form of major powers’ interventions, military institutions, development agencies, mercenaries, and corporate entities. He notes that these interventions have exacerbated human displacement, stoked communal violence, heightened human rights violations, and deepened the radicalization of unemployed youth. It is the intention of the authors of this book to bring to the notice of leaders on the continent (and beyond) the damage they do to their systems when they foster horizontal inequality. If policies are fair and groups that make up the commonwealth get their due, resources would stop being curses on the continent, and violent conflicts would be almost extinct on the continent All this, in turn, raises the pressing question of what is to be done? What is clear from the chapters in this volume is that the existing continental security architecture is simply not fit for this purpose, and it has proven to be entirely inadequate for the challenges confronting security in the age of the Anthropocene. Mahlakeng and Solomon note that, in the stand-off between Egypt and Ethiopia over the waters of the Nile, the African Union has been notably absent. In their chapter, Isaac Owusu-Mensah and Abdul-Jalilu Ateku note the ineffectiveness and low subregional security cooperation within the regional economic communities (RECS) of ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD. These RECs are the pillars of the African Union’s continental security architecture and must serve as first responders in times of crisis. What accounts for this failure? At face value, the African Union was a marked improvement on its predecessor, the OAU. As Solomon and Cocodia argue, Article 4h of the African Union’s Constitutive Act allows for intervention in the affairs of member states. Moreover, following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, a former Sudanese foreign minister, Francis Deng, played a key role in the emergence of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which reinforced the interventionist principle in order to protect lives—even if territorial borders and notions of sovereignty were to be violated. Yet, neither the African Union nor its constituent parts (the RECs) have distinguished themselves in any ongoing conflict. Whether it be Islamist terrorists in the Horn of Africa, creeping desertification in the Sahel, or coups, the silence from these august bodies has been deafening. How can this situation be turned around? How can responses to these threats be improved upon? From a military perspective, Putter and Esterhuyse note that one of the most critical challenges, and definitely one of the most underresearched themes in the body of knowledge on African security, is the nature and role of African armed forces. As Prof Esterhuyse recently highlighted in a lecture to the Staff College of the Dutch Armed forces in The Hague, the lack of African military professionalism is rooted, in part, in a misplaced argument from those, often with good intentions, that, to bring about peace and stability in Africa, African states ought to cut their defence budgets to make more money available for development. Thus, Africa confronts the harsh reality of the prevalence of conflict, violence, and war; yet, and at the same time,

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it is also perhaps the most under-militarised piece of real estate in the world. As such, there is very little understanding in Africa, in general, about the nature and role that African armed forces in the construction of African security. And very little research is being done in this regard. A comprehensive approach is need for the construction of a body of knowledge on African armed forces. The best approach would be to initiate a book project in this regard that ought to be historic, geographical and state based, and thematic in nature. In terms of a research agenda to be pursued, Putter and Esterhuyse contend that more research is required on the nature and role of African armed forces in the construction of African security. Stated differently, the collective knowledge of African armed forces rests upon weak foundations and African armed forces is one of the most underresearched themes in the scholarly debate on African security. How is this to influence the research agenda? As Colin S. Gray used to say, hope should never be the basis governing your plans. Yet, one “hopes” that funds will be available in future and that there are sufficient interests in the role of African armed forces for a comprehensive research project on African armed forces. There are numerous challenges on the continent that defy military solutions, how can these be mitigated? Some have pointed to the lack of financial resources or the dearth of technical expertise within the African Union. However, the European Union and other international actors have been most generous to the continental body, providing both financial resources and technical expertise. Others have pointed to a lack of political will, which, of course, begs the question as to why political will is lacking. Here, we return to Naude’s chapter on security. Security will need to be more inclusive and holistic—placing people, justice, and positive structural change at the center. Currently, security in its traditional form, with the emphasis on classic notions of sovereignty and the Westphalian state, actually speaks to regime security. The African Union, as a state-based organization, is far from a nascent super-state and far more representative of 54 heads of state than the 1.2 billion Africans residing on this continent. This cannot be allowed to continue. Sovereignty must also be pooled and more power transferred to the RECS as well as the African Union itself. The international community, meanwhile, needs to exercise its leverage over African states, RECs, and the African Union itself to ensure that sovereignty speaks to the collective security that Ateku and Owusu-Mensah point out is so lacking on the continent. Such collective security would not be possible without more democratic polities and more professional militaries, which are alive to all threats confronted by their citizens. This raises the question as to why the international community should behave in this manner? The answer is simply this: We live in an era where globalization is a reality, where the very inter-connectedness of the world suggests that insecurity anywhere threatens security everywhere. In this age of the Anthropocene, in this symbiotic planetary system, we need to be our brother’s keeper.

About the University of the Free State

The University of the Free State (UFS) has a proud history as one of the oldest, most respected institutions of higher education in South Africa. It opened its doors in Bloemfontein in 1904 as the Grey University College, with six students in the Humanities. Today it is a multi-campus institution, with two diverse campuses in Bloemfontein and one in Qwaqwa in the scenic Eastern Free State, accommodating more than 40,000 students in its seven faculties, with an increasing number of international students and associates, and an ever-widening scope of active involvement in and contribution to its surrounding communities. For the past 118 years, the UFS has been delivering quality graduates who have made their mark in various sectors. What sets the institution apart is its holistic student support initiatives, enabling it to achieve some of the highest success rates in the country. Delivering students who are in high demand in the global job market, remains a top priority. An established network of industry partners and close collaboration with the public and private sectors, as well as a continuous process of transformation and curriculum renewal, dovetail to produce highly employable graduates. UFS research efforts are driven by dedicated scholars, some of whom are international leaders in their fields, with industry and social impact and real-world application. Through the principle of engaged scholarship, the UFS responds to societal needs, using its scholarly and professional expertise with an intentional public purpose and benefit. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1

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About the University of the Free State

It is an institution that goes all out to provide its students and staff with an outstanding university experience. Anchored in a value bedrock of social justice, respect, and caring, the institution has managed to remain steadfastly relevant in a challenging and ever-changing national higher education landscape. Website at: www.ufs.ac.za.

About the Editors

Hussein Solomon is Senior Professor in the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State South Africa. His research interests includes exploring the interface between human security and the environment, religious fundamentalism and African democratization. His most recent books include Directions in International Terrorism: Theories, Trends and Trajectories (Palgrave, 2021); Terrorism in Africa: New Trends and Frontiers (with Glen Segell and Sergey Kostelyanets, Institute for African Studies, Moscow, 2021); Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis (with Arno Tausch, Springer 2021); Exporting Global Jihad (with Tom Smith, IB Tauris/Bloomsbury 2020); Islamism, Crisis and Democratization: Implications of the World Values Survey for the Muslim World (with Arno Tausch, Springer, 2020), African Security in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges and Opportunities (with Stephen Emerson, Manchester University Press, 2018), Understanding Boko Haram and Insurgency in Africa (with Jim Hentz, Routledge, 2017), Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and Jihad: A South African Perspective (Sun Media, 2013).

Address: Prof. Dr. Hussein Solomon, Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State, P.O. Box 392, Bloemfontein, 9300, South Africa Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.ufs.ac.za/research/unlisted-pages/our-leaders-in-research/ prof-hussein-solomon-104.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1

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About the Editors

Jude Cocodia is an Associate Professor and a Research Fellow at the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa. He is a Fellow of the International Peace Research Association; Associate Fellow of the Higher Edu-cation Academy, United Kingdom. He is a lecturer at the Depart-ment of Political Science, Niger Delta University where he has served as Head, Department and Post Graduate Coordinator. He is Editor of the Faculty Journal (Wilberforce Journal of the Social Sciences); Associate Editor of the Journal of the Institute for Niger Delta Studies (Niger Delta Research Digest); Reviewer for Insight on Africa (SAGE journal); and Assistant Secretary, Nigerian Political Science Association. His areas of expertise are Peace, Conflict, Security, and Democracy in Africa. His publications include: Peacekeeping in the African Union: Building Negative Peace (Routledge, 2018); “Rejecting African Solutions to African Problems: The African Union and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia”, in: African Security (2021); “Local Women and Building the Peace: Narratives from Africa”, in: Insight on Africa (2022); (with Hussein Solomon): “Exploring the Confluence Between Terrorism and Identity in Africa” (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); “What works? The African Union’s ad hoc Approach, the African Standby Force or the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflict?”, in: African Journal of Conflict Resolution (Durban: ACCORD, South Africa, 2020); “Achieving Stability in African Conflicts: The Role of Contingent Size and Force Integrity”, in: African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review (2016).

Address: Prof. Dr. Jude Cocodia, P.O.Box, 1378, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cocodia-Jude.

About the Contributors

Abubakar, Dauda is Professor of Political Science and African Studies at the University of Michigan-Flint. He received his PhD from the University of WisconsinMadison, and has taught at the University of Maiduguri, Nigeria, where he was also the Chair of the Department of Political Science and coordinator of Graduate Programs. His current research agenda is at the intersection of identity politics, citizenship, democratization, humanitarian interventions and the rising tide of violence in the Global South, especially post-colonial Africa. Professor Abubakar has published numerous articles and book chapters in peer-reviewed outlets in the field of African Studies and Political Science. His publications include: Violent NonState Actors in Africa: Terrorists, Rebels and Warlords (Palgrave Macmillaan, 2017); “Responsibility to Protect: The Paradox of International Intervention in Africa,” in: Abu Bakarr Bah (Ed): International Security and Peacebuilding: Africa, the Middle East and Europe (Indiana University Press, 2017); “Libya: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention and the Dilemmas of Counterinsurgency in Africa,” in: Usman A. Tar (Ed.): Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Africa (Routledge, 2021). Address: Prof Dauda Abubakar, 5528 Chatham Lane, Grand Blanc, Michigan, MI 48439, USA. Email: [email protected] Website: https://ii.umich.edu/ii/people/all/d/dauda.html. Ateku,Abdul-Jalilu is a Lecturer at the Institute of Policing, Staffordshire University. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham in the UK. His major research interests are in international relations theories, international security interventions in war-affected/post-war states, terrorism, organized violence and African security. His publications include: “Regional Intervention in the Promotion of Democracy in West Africa: An Analysis of the Political Crisis in the Gambia and ECOWAS’ Coercive Diplomacy,” in: Conflict, Security & Development, 20,6: 677–696, 2020. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1

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About the Contributors

Address: Dr. Abdul-Jalilu Ateku, Institute of Policing, Staffordshire University, Ashley 2 Buding, Room LW 116, Stoke-on-Trent, ST4 2DE, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected] Binza, Mzikayise S. is the Deputy Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Research at Walter Sisulu University (WSU) in South Africa. He has more than 20 years’ experience in higher education and training and has worked for various universities in South Africa where he held positions of Dean, Director, Professor and Programme Leader and Head of Department. He was NRF rated from 2011–2016. He has served as Policy Advisor to Ministers, Premiers and Executive Mayors of the democratic government in South Africa. He is also a media commentator on service delivery, African peer review mechanism, political economic transformation, governance, local government, diplomacy and democracy. His publications include: “The Role of Traditional Leadership in Promoting Governance and Development in Rural South Africa: A Case Study of the Mgwalana Traditional Authority”, in: Journal of Public Administration (2011); “A Longitudinal Study on Teaching Case Studies in Public Administration at an Open Distance Learning University”, in: Coetzee, M.; Botha, J.; Eccles, N.; Nienaber, H,; and Holtzhausen, N. (Eds.), Developing Student Graduateness and Employability: Issues, Provocations, Theory and Practical Guidelines (Randburg: Knowres Publishing, 2012); “Media Framing of Natural Disasters in KwaZulu-Natal Province: Impact of Contingency Plans”, in: Journal of Governance and Regulation (2015). Address: Office of the Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academic Affairs and Research (AAR), Walter Sisulu University, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.linkedin.com/in/professor-mzikayise-shakespeare-binzab253a449/?trk=public_profile_browsemap&originalSubdomain=za. Cocodia, Jude is an Associate Professor. He is a Research Fellow of the Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa. He is a lecturer at the Political Science Department, Niger Delta University, Nigeria, a Fellow of the International Peace Research Association, and an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, UK. He is an Official Reviewer for the Sage Journal—Insight on Africa, and an analyst for Wikistrat. His major areas of expertise are Peace, Conflict, Security, and Democracy in Africa. His publications include: “Peacekeeping in the African Union: Building Negative Peace” (Routledge, 2018); “Rejecting African Solutions to African Problems: The African Union and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia,” in African Security (14(2), 2021); He is currently working on a book “Complex Solutions to Local Problems: The Dilemma of the African Union in Somalia”. Address: Dr. Jude Cocodia, P.O.Box 1378, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Cocodia-Jude.

About the Contributors

177

Esterhuyse, Abel is Head, Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University at the South African Military Academy. He holds a PhD from University of Stellenbosch, and is a graduate of The Senior Leadership Programme of the African Center for Strategic Studies in Washington DC and the Programme on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS) of Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies in New York. Before joining the academia, he served as a Lieutenant Colonel in the South African Army. Prof Esterhuyse is a rated scientist of the South African National Research Foundation. His publications include: “The domestic deployment of the military in a democratic South Africa: Time for a debate”, in: African Security Review, 28,1; “Human Security and the Conceptualization of South African Defence: Time for a Reappraisal”, in: Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 38,1. Address: Abel Esterhuyse, Department of Military Strategy, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, Private Bag X2, Saldanha, 7395, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Abel-Esterhuyse. Fagbadebo, Omololu is a Research Associate and lecturer in the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics at the Durban University of Technology. He is a recipient of the Study of the United States Institute (SUSI) on American Politics and Political Thought Fellowship at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the Coordinator of African Impact Initiatives for Scholars and a member of the Editorial Board of SN Social Sciences. His areas of specialization include comparative politics, legislative studies, public governance, public institution, leadership, development studies, and African government politics. His publications include: Democracy and Political Governance in South Africa: The African Peer Review Mechanism (Springer Nature, 2023); State-owned enterprises in Africa and the economics of public service delivery (AOSIS Publishing, Cape Town, 2022); “South Africa in BRICS: A Review of Asymmetric Power Relations in an Intercontinental Group”, in: Journal of African Foreign Affairs (2022). Address: Department of Public Management, Law and Economics, Durban University of Technology, D Block, Office D-305, Riverside Campus, 19 Aberfeldy Road, Scottsville, 3209 Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.linkedin.com/in/omololu-fagbadebo-14b28518/?originalS ubdomain=za. Ibaba, S. Ibaba is a Professor at the Niger Delta University, Nigeria. His research interests focus on peace, conflict, security, politics, governance, sustainable development national integration, and poverty question in Nigeria. He has published widely and also edited 24 volumes of different journals including serving as guest editor to African Security, Journal of African Development and African Conflict Profile. He served as founding editor, Wilberforce Journal of the Social Sciences (Journal of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Niger Delta University, Nigeria) and founding Editorin-Chief, South-South Journal of Political Science (Journal of the Nigerian Political

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About the Contributors

Science Association, South-South, Nigeria). His publications include: “Perspectives on Nigeria: Internal Conflict, Oil Politics, Transnational Security Risks, and Opportunities for Peace in the Niger Delta”, in: African security, (2011); “The Roots of Terrorism in Nigeria: Exploring the Poverty Connection” Africana (2013); “Mopping the Wet Floor Beneath a Leaking Roof: Fighting Terror While Overlooking Radicalization: Understanding Boko Haram” (Routledge, 2017). Address: Prof Ibaba, P.O.Box 1529, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Email: [email protected] Website: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=DfHyQDsAAAAJ&hl=en; https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ibaba-Ibaba. Kabange, Martin M. is a lecturer and research chair in the Department of Public Management, Law and Economics at the Durban University of Technology (DUT), Riverside Campus. He holds a BA (Hons), a Master of Commerce and a PhD in Economics from the University of KwaZulu Natal. Dr Kabange’s main areas of research include Development Economics, SMMEs and financial inclusion, as well as Public Administration. He has published various articles in the area of Entrepreneurship and Economics. His publications include: “Non-payment Culture and the Financial Performance of Urban Electricity Utilities in South Africa”, in: Development Southern Africa (2022); “Examining the Relationship Between Economic Freedom, Income and Entrepreneurship in South Africa: A VECM Approach”, in: Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, (2022); “The Role of Gender and Personal Traits in Determining Business Performance of Ghana’s Informal Slum Businesses”, in: IJEBD International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Business Development, (2021). Address: Dr Martin Mulunda Kabange, 23 Dalry Road Pelham, 3201, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Madonsela, Sanet is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, and a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of History and Political Studies, Nelson Mandela University. She is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the IAPSS Scientific Blog A Different View, Deputy President of IAPSS Africa and Chair of the South African Association of Political Studies’ Emerging Scholars Research Committee. Sanet is a, double cum laude graduate, and member of the International Golden Key Honour Society. She serves as a Reviewer for the Taylor and Francis Politikon Journal. Her research focuses on Africa and the Middle East. Her publications include: “Critical Reflections on State Capture in South Africa”; “Towards a Political Economy for South African Rackets” (co-authored with Prof Mark Swilling). Address: Sanet Madonsela, c/o Prof Hussein Solomon, 17 Queenspark, 101 Kellner Street, Westdene, Bloemfontein, 9301, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.linkedin.com/in/sanet-madonsela-solomon-89830711b/? originalSubdomain=za.

About the Contributors

179

Mahlakeng, M.K., lectures at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, National University of Lesotho. He is also a Research Fellow in the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State. His publications include: Water Scarcity and Conflict in African River Basins: The hydropolitical landscape. 1st edition (Routledge); “A theoretical analysis of hydropolitics: Homer-Dixon’s environmental scarcity theory and the regime theory (World Affairs, 23,4, October-December, 2019); “Tensions on the Nile.” Research on Islam and Muslim in Africa (RIMA) Occasional paper, 7,15 (October), 2020. Address: Dr. Mahlakeng, P.O Box 11951, Phomolong, Qoaling Maseru 100, Lesotho. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.nul.ls/social/faulty-staff/. Naude, Bianca is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of the Free State, South Africa. She has contributed articles and chapters on ontological security theory as a novel approach to terrorism studies, foreign policy and regionalization as tools of resistance against Western hegemony, South Africa’s search for ontological security in its foreign relations, and the role of emotions in South African foreign policy. Her research, “Revisiting State Personhood and World Politics: Identity, Personality and the IR Subject” (Routledge, 2022) draws on Kohut’s theory of narcissism as self-esteem to explore how narcissistic defences protect the state’s ego from criticism and self-judgments. Naude’s publications include; Revisiting state personhood and world politics: Identity, personality and the IR subject (Routledge, 2022); “Beyond disciplinary dogma: An ontological security approach to terrorism and its study”, in: Hussein Solomon (Ed.): Directions in International Terrorism: Theories, trends and trajectories (The Gateway: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Address: Dr. Bianca Naude, 1027 Marinus Avenue, Eldoraigne X1, Centurion, 0157 South Africa. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.ufs.ac.za/humanities/departments-and-divisions/politicalstudies-and-governance-home/general/staff?pid=3MygsS8pqaE%3d. Owusu-Mensah, Isaac is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. He obtained his PhD in Political Science from the University of Ghana. His research interests are in international relations, African security, democratization and politics in Africa. His publications include: “The Poor Paying for the Rich: The Politics of Inequality in Water Pricing-Structure in Ghana, 2003–2013”, in: Africa Today, 64,2: 49–66 (January), 2018; “The Judiciary and Democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic”, in: Journal of African Elections, 17,3 (October), 2018. Address: Dr. Isaac Owusu-Mensah, Department of Politival Science, University of Ghana, P.O. Box LG 64, Legon, Accra, Ghana. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.ug.edu.gh/pscience/staff/dr-isaac-owusu-mensah-leave.

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About the Contributors

Putter, Dries is Senior Lecturer at the Defence Intelligence Studies, Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University. He has functional experience in land- and sea warfare, intelligence, and defence acquisition and related matters such as defence intellectual property, arms control and defence cooperation. His PhD focussed on Defence Knowledge Management. He has Master’s degrees in Security (MMS), Defence (MMil) and Business Leadership (MBL). He is a Captain (SA Navy), an Associate Researcher at the National Security Hub, University of Canberra and researcher for the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA). His research interests are hybrid warfare, counterintelligence, covert action, intelligence, defence and security. His publications include: “Social media intelligence: The national security–privacy nexus”, in: Scientia Militaria-South African Journal of Military Studies (2022); “Scoping the Future Counterintelligence Focus”, in: International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (2022): 1–28. Address: 3 Cyphia Close, Myburgpark, Langebaan, 7357, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Website: https://sun.academia.edu/DriesPutter. Solomon, Hussein is Academic Head of the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa. He is Visiting Professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Japan and Senior Research Associate of Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa. He occupied the Nelson Mandela Chair of African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, was Senior Visiting Fellow in the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London and also Visiting Professor in the Department of History and Political Science, Nelson Mandela University, South Africa. His research interests include African security, Islamist extremism and terrorism. Publications include: Directions in International Terrorism: Theories, Trends and Trajectories (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); Terrorism in Africa: New Trends and Frontiers (with Glen Segell and Sergey Kostelyanets, Institute for African Studies, Moscow, 2021); Arab MENA Countries: Vulnerabilities and Constraints Against Democracy on the Eve of the Global COVID-19 Crisis (with Arno Tausch, Springer 2021). Address: Prof. Dr. Hussein Solomon, Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State, P.O. Box 392, Bloemfontein, 9300, South Africa. Email: [email protected] Website: https://www.ufs.ac.za/research/unlisted-pages/our-leaders-in-research/ prof-hussein-solomon-104.

Book Endorsements

This volume edited by two distinguished scholars, joined by another ten experts who are authors of chapters, illuminates the once dark continent of Africa from the evolving Anthropocene age angle; with case studies that have never been published in any other work—and they exceed in their data gathering and analysis. Prof Glen Segell, University of Cambridge, England Authors of the manuscript make an appropriate review of Africa’s environmental and other anthropogenic challenges, and one cannot but agree with a conclusion that the relationship between humanity and nature, which is a major aspect of human security, has been put under great strain in the African context. The book also makes a sophisticated overview of such threats to Africa’s security that have emerged in the Anthropocene as terrorism, domestic corruption, foreign interventionism, and overall crisis of leadership. Prof Sergey V. Kostelyanets, Head of the Center for Sociological and Political Sciences Studies of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences The link between human agency and security, and the implications of this relationship for conflict generation and conflict resolution in Africa, is the central subject matter of African Security in the Anthropocene. The book brings together African scholars in ten chapters that conceptualise and analyse the relationship between the environment and security in the ‘human era’, focusing on carefully selected security issues, including: resource scarcity; climate change; the role of political structures like states, regional organisations, and the African Union (AU); African leadership and the resources curse; the nature and the role of Africa’s armed forces; group identity; foreign actors; and, security cooperation through Africa’s regional organisations. The book concludes with a contemplation of the future of African security. Whereas African Security in the Anthropocene brings into sharp focus the continued

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1

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Book Endorsements

failure of the African state (including its security apparatus) to be a source of security for its citizens, as well as the continued deficiencies in security cooperation through the AU and within and between Africa’s regional organisations, the book concludes with a positive outlook by, among other things, advocating for greater security cooperation. As Hussein Solomon and Jude Cocodia conclude in the final chapter of the book, “the very interconnectedness of the world suggests that insecurity anywhere threatens security everywhere. In this era of the Anthropocene, in this symbiotic planetary system, we need to be our brother’s keeper”. Lieutenant-Colonel/Dr Benjamin Mokoena Department of Political Science, Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, South Africa As the authors of this volume note from their various contexts, if we are to effectively reverse what Gabon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to recently in the Security Council as our current, “slow death,” this will require more from each of us: including higher levels of people-centered solidarity, more effective, collaborative policy energies, and sustained attention to the essential needs and aspirations of our brothers and sisters across a vast, diverse, multiply challenged and equally abundant continent. The authors of this volume are showing us the dimensions of a more peaceful, sustainable path. We need to walk alongside them. Dr Robert Zuber, Director: Global Action to Prevent War, New York Globally, anthropogenic disasters have now become the order of the day. There is a full-scale catastrophic change of our planet due to the activities of humans. The realisation is that humans have moved the planet outside its natural limits. In so many ways, the world has suffered from pandemics, statism, corporatism, the growing climate crisis, and the inability of stakeholders to genuinely and timely intervene. There is such a fundamental change in the way the earth is behaving, and there is an urgency to communicate that as powerful as it is possible. In all, the truth is that humans are not just participants but are a dominant feature in the changes in our world. In its broad summation, ‘African Security in the Anthropocene’ highlights these and the continuous role of humans in promoting these instabilities. The security challenges of the African continent are enormous, complex, and to a considerable extent very complicated. Across Africa, there has been a wide range of conflicts manifested in political, socio-economic, territorial, resource, and communal feuds. The overall challenge is that these have grossly affected human security and made contemporary analytical discourses very cumbersome. Times have changed and we now live in a world where it is difficult to get total normality back. The authors have made considerable effort to bringing analytical rigour to bear on the core issues of security that account for the incessant conflicts in the African continent. This is an excellent attempt in arousing critical security rethinking. Dr. Akpo Onduku, University of Bradford, England This book provides intellectual appreciation of dominant narratives of Western universalism surrounding the concept of security by invoking different academic

Book Endorsements

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voices from the global South, in particular the African continent. This scholarly contribution to the field of security studies is timeous; owing to the insecurities in African states. The book has a solid theoretical foundation, outlines and exhaustive literature, appreciates complexities, uses an accessible language and is well structured Dr Ntsikelelo Breakfast, Chair of the Department of History and Political Studies, Nelson Mandela University

Index

A Accra Initiative, 155, 160 Addis Ababa, 149 Africa Command (AFRICOM), 135 African Union (AU), 5, 12, 13, 37–40, 44, 57, 62–64, 66–71, 146, 148–150, 154, 159, 168, 169, 195 African Union Stabilization Mission in Mali (AFISMA), 134 Agropastoralism, 55, 166 Al-Bashir, 69, 71 Algeria, 83, 99, 131, 132, 150 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 66, 132, 133, 138, 147 Al-Shabaab, 102, 146, 149, 150, 152, 158, 159 Al Sunnah Wa Jama’ah (ASWJ), 157 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, 32 Angola, 80, 83, 85, 87, 99, 155, 158 Ansar Dine, 132, 133 Arab, 6, 115, 152 Arable land, 3, 36, 112, 133 Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 132 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 149, 154 Azawad, 56

B Bambara, 152 Banditry, 6, 57, 64, 121, 146 Berlin Conference, 79 Biafra, 115, 132, 168 Biosphere, 62, 81, 166 Blood diamonds, 167 Boko Haram, 66, 135, 136, 146, 151, 152

Boro, Adaka, 78, 113, 119 Bozo, 56, 166 Buhari, Muhammadu, 117, 120

C Cabo Delgado, 67, 156–158 Capitalism, 2, 112 Carbon emissions, 55 Carbon footprints, 53, 54, 58 Civil–military relations, 4, 101–103 Clausewitz, Carl von, 63 Climate change, 3, 4, 10, 43, 44, 51–55, 57, 58, 63, 66, 81, 127, 128, 130, 133, 136, 138, 166, 195 Cohesion, 66, 97, 110, 138 Cold War, 2, 11, 66, 68, 98, 99, 167 Collective security, 2, 37, 147, 148, 155, 166, 169 Colonialism, 1, 56–58, 66, 79, 82, 84, 127 Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), 149 Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), 41, 43 Coups, 4, 6, 55–58, 62, 66, 80, 81, 101–103, 112, 113, 133, 139, 165, 167, 168 Covid-19, 3, 10, 165 Creole, 98 Criminal networks, 155 Critical security studies, 13 Culture, 79, 81, 89, 96, 97, 99, 104, 111, 112, 119 Cyclone, 52

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Solomon and J. Cocodia (eds.), African Security in the Anthropocene, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25151-1

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186 D Dagon, 56 Darfur, 64, 67, 69, 71, 80 Decolonization, 17, 98, 99, 110 Deforestation, 3, 10, 30, 54, 81 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 79, 80, 83–89, 104, 110, 132, 150, 156–158, 167 Djibouti, 80, 146, 158 Doctrine, 68, 97, 99, 100, 103, 129, 167

E Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 56, 57, 147, 148, 150, 153–155, 158, 160, 168 Egypt, 3, 28, 30, 32–36, 42–44, 52, 78, 83, 87, 131, 150, 166, 168 Environmental scarcity, 3, 24, 25, 27, 28, 54, 125 Ethiopia, 3, 28–30, 32, 34–36, 38, 41, 42, 52, 78–80, 84, 87, 100, 146, 156, 158, 159, 166, 168 Ethnic, 4–6, 24, 37, 55–57, 63–66, 80, 81, 84, 90, 98, 99, 101, 102, 110, 112, 113, 116–118, 120, 121, 128, 147, 152, 158, 167 Eurocentric, 126, 127, 130 European Police and Rule of Law Mission (EUCAP), 135, 136 European Union (EU), 39, 70, 126, 129, 130, 134–136, 138, 139, 148, 160, 169 European Union Military Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), 135, 136 European Union Trust Fund (EUTF), 135, 136 Evaporation, 33, 36, 166 Exchange of notes, 32 Extremism, 57, 68, 98, 100, 136, 146, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 156–160

F Famine, 3, 10, 29, 31, 35, 115, 166 Forces Nouvelles (FN), 132 Fulani, 56, 57, 117, 132, 139, 152, 166

G G5 Sahel Joint Force, 57, 134, 135 Gaddafi, 69, 134, 135, 153 Gao, 128, 132 Global North, 12, 53

Index Global South, 53, 125, 127, 165, 189 Good governance, 89 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), 34–36, 38, 52, 78, 85, 166 Greenhouse gas, 52, 58 Group identity, 110 Guinea-Bissau, 84, 99, 153 H Hausa-Fulani, 111–113, 120 Heatwaves, 55 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 Homer-Dixon, Thomas, 24–28, 42, 43, 133 Horizontal inequality, 4, 5, 63, 110, 111, 113, 116–118, 120, 167, 168 Human security, 3, 15–18, 54, 58, 63, 64, 69–71, 91, 154, 166 Hydropolitics, 40 I Identity conflict, 5, 125 Igbo, 111–113, 120, 132 Ijaws, 113, 120 Illicit trafficking, 5 Instrumentalism, 5, 57, 63 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 146–148, 150, 153, 158–160, 168 Intra-communal conflict, 3, 52 Ironsi, Aguiyi, 113, 120 Irrigation, 30–32, 34 Islamic fundamentalism, 2 Islamic State (ISIS), 57, 67, 147, 150–152, 156, 157 Islamist, 56, 67, 127–133, 166, 168 J Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslim (JNIM), 147, 152, 160 K Katanga, 132 Kenya, 28, 30, 36, 41, 84, 99, 102, 146, 149–151, 156, 158 Kidal, 128, 132 Kinship, 117, 120 L Lake Chad Basin, 131, 135, 136, 138, 139, 150

Index Leadership, 4, 62, 66, 80–82, 85, 89, 100, 101, 104, 167 Liberian war, 78 Liberty, 2 Libya, 80, 83, 86, 87, 117, 131, 135, 149, 150, 153

M Machiavelli, Niccolò, 6, 63 Mali, 3, 4, 6, 52, 54–58, 65–67, 81, 83, 117, 126–128, 130–139, 152, 153, 155, 156, 160, 166 Marikana, 4, 78, 167 Migration, 2, 28, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 99, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136, 138 Military, 3–6, 11, 12, 15, 24, 34, 35, 56–58, 69, 80, 86, 88, 90, 96–105, 110, 112, 113, 115, 117, 127–129, 133–139, 146, 147, 149, 153, 154, 157, 158, 160, 161, 167–169 Militias, 55–57, 80, 101, 117, 119 Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), 119 Movement for Justice and Oneness of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), 133 Mozambique, 6, 65, 67, 80, 83, 85, 99, 150, 156, 157, 161 Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), 136, 160

N Natural resources, 3, 24, 26–28, 37, 39, 41, 54, 57, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85–89, 91, 98, 104, 139, 155, 167, 168 Neoliberal interventions, 127 Neo-Malthusian, 125 Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB), 119 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 119 Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC), 119 Nigeria, 6, 63–66, 78–80, 83, 87, 90, 103, 110–118, 120, 121, 132, 136, 139, 146, 151, 153, 156, 167, 168 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), 28, 30, 31, 37, 40–44 Nile River Basin (NRB), 24, 29, 31, 35, 36, 38, 41, 43 Non-Aligned Movement, 2 Non-state actors, 2, 78, 129, 146

187 O OAU Charter, 13, 149 OAU Constitutive Act, 66, 69, 70 Oil, 2, 4, 5, 31, 63, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85–88, 90, 110, 111, 114–116, 118–120, 139, 167 Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), 119 Ontological security, 14, 19, 166 Operation Barkhane, 129, 134 Organized crime, 5, 104, 146–148, 150, 154, 155, 157, 161 Ouagadougou Declaration, 149

P Pan-Sahelian Initiative (PSI), 133, 135, 139 Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC), 149, 154 Pollution, 3, 29–31, 37, 53, 81, 166 Population growth, 3, 25, 26, 28–31, 43, 44, 57 Poverty, 3, 10, 16, 17, 31, 35, 43, 52, 54, 55, 58, 62, 66, 70, 85, 117, 146, 149, 151, 161 Professionalism, 2, 4, 5, 97, 101–103, 105, 167, 168 Proxy wars, 2, 66

R Rebellions, 2–4, 55, 56, 64, 69, 79, 84, 103, 126, 128, 129, 132, 137, 152, 153, 166 Rebel movements, 86, 95, 100 Regime security, 16, 66, 70, 169 Regional security actors, 157 Regional security architectures, 2, 157 Renewable energy, 54 Resource curse, 4, 82, 85 Resource geopolitics, 24 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 18, 64, 66, 70, 168 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 86 Riparian conflict, 3 Rivers State, 88 Royal Dutch Shell, 114 Rwanda, 28, 36, 41, 67, 79, 80, 83, 87, 100, 156

S SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 156

188 SADC Regional Counter Terrorism Centre (RCTC), 156 Sahara-Sahel, 126–139, 152 Sahel, 2, 4, 52, 55, 57, 66, 69, 131, 134, 135, 147, 150, 152, 160, 166, 168 Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), 129, 132 Sandstorms, 55 Securitization, 5, 126, 129, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138 Security assemblages, 127–131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139 Security cooperation, 5, 146–148, 153, 156, 159, 160, 168 Security force assistance (SFA), 134, 135 Security regimes, 147, 148 Self-actualization, 10, 13 Sicomines, 89 Socialism, 2 Somalia, 2, 6, 62, 67, 79, 83, 117, 135, 146, 150, 152, 156, 158, 159, 161 Songhai, 152 South Africa, 4, 65, 78, 83, 85, 87, 99, 101–103, 149, 151, 156–158, 167, 185 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 147, 148, 150, 153, 155–158, 160, 168 South Sudan, 36, 79, 80, 146, 158 Sovereignty, 15, 18, 39, 40, 63, 64, 66, 70, 71, 105, 126, 139, 148, 165, 168, 169 Starvation, 16, 115 State failure, 125–127, 130 Sudan, 30, 32–36, 38, 42, 43, 62, 67, 78–80, 83, 87, 131, 146, 158 T Tantalum, 86, 167 Tanzania, 29, 30, 36, 41, 63, 83, 87, 146, 156, 157 Taylor, Charles, 84, 86, 192 Terrorism, 2, 5, 16, 19, 52, 63–65, 68–70, 104, 119, 121, 128, 133, 136–138, 146–161

Index Timbuktu, 56, 128, 132 Touré, Amadou Toumani, 56, 133 Transboundary, 28, 32, 36, 37, 39, 42, 44 Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), 135 Treaties, 32, 34, 159 Tripartite Agreement and Set of Declarations, 32 Tuareg, 6, 55, 56, 117, 126, 128–130, 132–135, 137, 139, 152, 153, 166 Tunis, 149

U Uganda, 29–31, 36, 41, 63, 83–85, 87, 146, 156, 158, 159 United Nations (UN), 15, 16, 56, 67, 104, 129, 134, 135, 138, 148 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 40, 41, 62 United Nations General Assembly, 146 United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 146, 159 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 134 United States, 2, 38, 39, 52, 62, 116, 126, 128–130, 136, 138

V Valletta Summit on Migration, 135

W War on Terror, 2, 5, 10, 126, 127, 131, 136, 138 Waste, 37, 53, 54 Weak states, 89 Weberian, 13, 126, 136, 165 Weber, Max, 102 Westgate Shopping Mall, 149 Westphalia, 64, 126, 165, 169 World War II, 62, 114