African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs 3031545249, 9783031545245

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African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs Wilfred Lajul

African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

Wilfred Lajul

African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

Wilfred Lajul Gulu University Gulu, Uganda

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Preface

Odera Oruka (1991) defines philosophic sagacity as wisdom philosophy or philosophy of the wise men of Africa, who are independent, liberal, and non-conformist thinkers, and who often deviate from the accepted common norms of their societies. Parker English and Kibujjo Kalumba (1996) wondered if such independent thinkers are insulated from the rapid Westernization of Africa. I would ask whether these independent thinkers were also insulated from the influences Africans had on each other. To be uninfluenced, in my view, is not necessary, since distinctive reflective ideas can originate in a community regardless of influences. In some instances, in reaction to influences, different individuals and groups of people may develop ideas that are contrary to those being imported, especially if they are contradictory in value to those they cherish. Talking about philosophic sagacity in Africa, Kathanga (1992) believes that in traditional African societies, there were individual wise men and women gifted in offering rational explanations for any challenge directed to them. Besides, literacy was not a condition for philosophic thinking and that philosophy existed in traditional African societies. His emphasis, in line with his Master and supervisor Henry Odera Oruka, is still on wise men and women. He does not broaden the concept of philosophic sagacity beyond wise men and women to include wise sayings and proverbs. This is where, I think, this kind of thinking limits philosophic sagacity to individuals, which was to fulfil his Master’s and other Universalists’ belief that philosophy is not found in any communal system. Philosophy is the work of individuals, as contained in the use of rationality alone. This is v

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again another way of fulfilling his Master’s and other Universalists’ belief that philosophy is purely a rational activity. Other thinkers have already gone beyond rationality in identifying African philosophy in general and African philosophic sagacity in particular. For instance, Thèophile Obenga thinks that philosophy deals with human knowledge and the elevation of the mind (Obenga, 2004, p. 31). Obenga believes that philosophy that was practised during the Egyptian Pharaonic period was a synthesis of practice (learning, living morally) and reflection (pursuit of wisdom) (Obenga, 2004, p. 33). He was convinced that no philosophy could be originated except in relation to life, existence, and the universe. Philosophy in ancient Egypt was more than a reflective activity, since it included practical living. Meaning, through reflective thinking we dig deeper into the nature of things and acquire knowledge, but the practical side of philosophy helps to live morally and uprightly. Kathanga’s emphasis on reflective thinking alone in distinguishing what counts as philosophy from what is not is limiting, since philosophy has the practical part which requires practical living. African philosophy, from which their version of philosophic sagacity is derived, should then be understood as a way of life, informed by emotionally engaged reflective thinking for striving towards upright living. In this understanding of philosophy, we can then go beyond rationality to include emotional involvement (See also Ibuot, 2010). In the process of deriving reflective knowledge, humans are deeply involved. While intellectually humans can stand above their engaged experiences, they in general derive knowledge from both their rational reflection and intuitive feelings. The combination of the two helps to derive useful knowledge for practical living. John Mbiti confirms this when he defines African philosophy as “the understanding, attitude of mind, logic and perception behind the manner in which African peoples think, act or speak in different situations of life” (1969, p. 2). As regards communal experiences, Wiredu has already clarified that individuals are the originators of ideas that are often owned by different societies. Wiredu insists that “The philosophy of a people is always a tradition of organic relationships among (at least some of) its elements” (1991, p. 92). “On Defining African Philosophy”, Wiredu (1991, p. 96) clarifies the following points. First is the fact that in trying to understand the Orukian sage-­ philosophers, we must take into account the relationship between the individual, the sage-philosopher, and the communal outlook of the people concern. Secondly, the communal outlook of a given people, which some

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prefer to term communal philosophy, is a point of departure from which individuals and sage-philosophers begin to do philosophy. Thirdly, this communal philosophy provides the philosophical foundation for the sage-­ philosopher and determines his or her theoretical options. Fourthly, communal philosophy is the pooling together of the thought elements of individual sage-philosophers. Fifthly, due to lack of writing, these individual elements are swamped in the pool of communal memory. Lastly, communal philosophy for that matter should be considered philosophical. Referring to African philosophic sagacity as purely works of individual men and women alone may be misleading. I think, African philosophic sagacity should encompass wise men and women of Africa, African traditional wise sayings, and proverbs. It is true, as attested by Wiredu, that “There are irrational, superstitious elements in our traditional thought; but there are also rational ones. And there is a wealth of concepts, idioms, and other verbal turnings in our language that have a definite philosophical import” (Wiredu, 1991, p. 95). In this attestation, Wiredu is saying that not everything that is found in African traditions is philosophical, since both rational and irrational elements exist. But the key point here is to go beyond wise men and wise women as the hallmark of African philosophic sagacity. Even though we go beyond wise men and wise women, we should not take for granted whatever we consider sources of such philosophical thinking. In this case, even African wise sayings and proverbs contain elements that are rational and those that are not rational. However, in this book, we are interested only in those elements that are philosophically rational; well aware that these are emotionally engaged reflective ideas. On the other hand, though in general I agree with Wiredu that “There is recognition here that among the traditional folks of Africa uninfluenced by modern education there are genuine philosophers,” I think that such sage-philosophers need not be uninfluenced by outside ideas. When we consider African proverbs for that matter, as one of the sources of African philosophic sagacity, then we have to guard against two temptations. The first is to think these proverbs are not influenced by outside ideas. African peoples had great influences on one another before coming into contact with the West and their educational system. An example can be seen in the similarities between different African proverbs. Though the languages in which these proverbs are coined are often unintelligible to each other, a number of times, they have almost the same wording and especially ideas behind some of these proverbs. One wonders how this could be possible.

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My answer is simply one, the influence they had on each other. Some of these peoples have similar origins or originated from similar geographical locations, or they have migrated to similar geographical locations. In the process of migrations, Africans have greatly interacted and influenced one other, and they have learnt quite widely from each other. These ideas learnt are generally concretized in their languages, wisdom sayings, and proverbs. The second temptation is to think that proverbs are purely communal thoughts without any links to their individual originators. My view, in line with what Wiredu has already explained above, is that these proverbs are originated by individuals, whose words of wisdom were adopted and transmitted by the societies in which they have originated. I noticed this in the different versions of the same proverbs coming from the same African societies like that of the Acholi of northern Uganda. Okot p’Bitek (1985), for instance, would give a proverb whose version is different from the rendering of Angelo Banya (1994), who comes from the same Acholi culture. My take on this is that these proverbs had similar origins, but as they were used in different chiefdoms, individuals changed them to suit their unique situations. Such changes cannot be done communally, but individuals can do that, and the community only propagates such versions of the proverbs. Lajul (2014) defends the philosophic sagacity hypothesis on the basis that, “behind the wisdom embedded in traditional Africa, there are deep philosophical principles that could be unveiled. Such wisdom could be derived from elders and other people in Africa, as well as from African proverbs and wise sayings” (2014, p. 41). Though Oruka had the temptation to rely only on elders, who are unfortunately not insulated from Western and other influences, besides the fact that most of them are now dying, we shall maintain that Africa still has a lot of wisdom, though some of these wisdoms, as Odera rightly observed, are purely moralistic, while others are philosophic. This book is interested in the latter category of wisdom and hypothesizes that African philosophy is deeply entrenched in African wisdom sayings and proverbs. In this sense, this book is investigating African philosophy in some of the African languages and wisdom sayings, like the Acholi and Luganda languages and selected proverbs. Though culture is dynamic, like elsewhere in the world, African cultures still have deposits of their traditional wisdoms buried in their languages, wisdom sayings, and proverbs. We think that an African elder does not need to be insulated or uninfluenced by Western or any other cultures, but an African philosophic sage should be able to distinguish his or her

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own thoughts or the thought of his/her people from the foreign ones he or she has acquired. We shall then concentrate on the selected African languages, wise sayings, and proverbs to identify philosophic sagacity. Some of these wise sayings and wisdoms, a number of which have already been committed to writing, will create the theoretical basis to understand African societies and their way of life, modelling different philosophies of life and patterns of behaviour. Even what Oruka calls moralism should not dissuade us from identifying ethics, which is the critical reflection on those moral principles and practices in African way of life and patterns of behaviour. We shall use Acholi and Luganda languages and proverbs as a case, though we shall equally identify, for comparison reasons, some proverbs from other parts of Africa. Gulu, Uganda

Wilfred Lajul

References Banya, A. A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda Development Series, No. 2). Foundations for African Development. Ibuot, J. E. (2010). Traditional African ideology and the challenges of development in Nigeria. The Constitution, 10, 58–59. Kathanga, N. (1992). Philosophic sagacity in Africa. Dissertation submitted for a degree of Masters of Arts in Philosophy at the University of Nairobi. Lajul, W. (2014). African philosophy: Critical dimensions. Fountain Publishers. Mbiti, S. J. (1969). African religions and philosophy (2nd ed.). Heinemann. Obenga, T. (2004). Egypt: Ancient history of African philosophy. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 31–49). Blackwell Publishers. Odera Oruka, O. (1991). Sage philosophy (New ed.). Acts Press. p’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. Parker, E., & Kibujjo, M.  K. (1996). African philosophy: A classical approach. Prentice Hall. Wiredu, K. (1991). On defining African philosophy. In T. Serequerberhan (Ed.), African philosophy: The essential reading (pp. 87–110). Paragon House Press.

Acknowledgements

The successful completion of this book was the result of so many people including my students, fellow staff members, reviewers, and my publishers. Without their kind contribution I would not have succeeded in completing this work. Finally I acknowledge and appreciate the support I got from my family members and God, above all, for giving me the health I needed to do this work.

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Contents

1 Introduction  and Discussion of Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity  1 1.1 Introduction  1 1.2 Oruka and His Critics  6 1.2.1 Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity  6 1.2.2 Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity Critics  7 1.3 New-Philosophic Sagacity and Ethnophilosophy  8 1.3.1 New-Philosophic Sagacity  8 1.3.2 Philosophic Sagacity and Ethnophilosophy  9 1.4 The Context of African Languages and Proverbs 12 1.4.1 The Acholi People 12 1.4.2 The Ganda 15 1.4.3 The Acholi Language 16 1.4.4 The Proverbs 17 1.5 Methodology 18 1.6 Book Layout 19 1.7 Conclusion 23 References 24 2 Logic  in Selected African Languages and Proverbs 27 2.1 Introduction 27 2.2 Analysis of Chimakonam’s African Logic 33 2.3 Logic in Selected African Languages 35 2.4 Logic in Selected African Proverbs 36 2.4.1 Similarities and Differences 36 xiii

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2.4.2 Sequence in Events and Time 38 2.5 Discussing African Logic 41 2.5.1 Similarities and Differences 41 2.5.2 Sequence in Events and Time 41 2.6 Principles of Logic in Acholi Language 44 2.6.1 Principle of Negation (pe, ku, bong, bongo, peke) 44 2.6.2 Principle of Conjunction (ki) 45 2.6.3 Principle of Logical Contradiction 46 2.6.4 Principle of Disjunction: nyo, onyo (or) 47 2.6.5 Principle of Excluded Middle or Law of Excluded Middle 48 2.6.6 Principle of Implication: ka, ci (if, then) 50 2.6.7 Principle of Logical Equivalence 53 2.6.8 Principle of Identity or Law of Identity 54 2.6.9 Syllogistic Principle 55 2.7 Conclusion 56 References 57 3 Moral  Philosophy in Selected African Languages and Proverbs 59 3.1 Introduction 59 3.2 Moral Philosophy in African Proverbs 62 3.2.1 Ownership 62 3.2.2 Behaviour 65 3.2.3 Relations 68 3.2.4 Upbringing 71 3.3 Discussing African Moral Philosophy 73 3.3.1 Ownership 74 3.3.2 Behaviour 76 3.3.3 Relations 78 3.3.4 Upbringing 81 3.4 Conclusion 83 References 85

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4 Political  Philosophy in Selected African Languages and Proverbs 87 4.1 Introduction 87 4.2 Political Philosophy in Selected African Proverbs 91 4.2.1 Nature of Political Authority 91 4.2.2 Democracy 96 4.2.3 Political Legitimacy101 4.2.4 Role of Women in Politics104 4.3 Discussing African Political Philosophy106 4.3.1 Nature of Political Authority106 4.3.2 Democracy110 4.3.3 Political Legitimacy114 4.3.4 Role of Women in Politics116 4.4 Conclusion119 References121 5 Social  Philosophy in Selected African Languages and Proverbs123 5.1 Introduction123 5.2 Social Philosophy in Selected African Proverbs and Languages125 5.2.1 Nature of African Societies125 5.2.2 Social Bonds127 5.2.3 Social Welfare129 5.2.4 Social Justice132 5.2.5 Social Upbringing134 5.3 Discussing African Social Philosophy136 5.3.1 Nature of African Societies136 5.3.2 Social Bonds139 5.3.3 Social Welfare141 5.3.4 Social Justice143 5.3.5 Social Upbringing145 5.4 Conclusion147 References148

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6 Theory  of Knowledge in Selected African Languages and Proverbs151 6.1 Introduction151 6.2 Epistemology in Selected African Languages and Proverbs155 6.2.1 Knowledge in General155 6.2.2 Sense Knowledge157 6.2.3 Intellective Knowledge160 6.2.4 Mystical Knowledge163 6.2.5 Existential Knowledge167 6.3 Discussing African Epistemology170 6.3.1 Knowledge in General170 6.3.2 Sense Knowledge172 6.3.3 Intellective Knowledge174 6.3.4 Mystical Knowledge176 6.3.5 Existential Knowledge176 6.4 Conclusion177 References178 7 Metaphysics  in Selected African Languages and Proverbs181 7.1 Introduction181 7.2 Metaphysics in Selected African Proverbs183 7.2.1 Personhood183 7.2.2 Concept of Freedom186 7.2.3 Social Bond190 7.2.4 Causes and Effects193 7.3 Discussing African Metaphysics195 7.3.1 Personhood196 7.3.2 Concept of Freedom200 7.3.3 Social Bonds202 7.3.4 Causes and Effects204 7.4 Conclusion206 References207

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8 Philosophy  of Beauty in Selected African Languages and Proverbs211 8.1 Introduction211 8.2 Philosophy of Beauty in Selected African Proverbs213 8.2.1 Social Beauty213 8.2.2 Moral Beauty216 8.2.3 Physical Beauty219 8.3 Discussing African Philosophy of Beauty220 8.3.1 Social Beauty221 8.3.2 Moral Beauty227 8.3.3 Physical Beauty230 8.4 Conclusion232 References233 9 Conclusions and Recommendations235 9.1 Conclusions235 9.2 Recommendations238 Appendix: List of Proverbs Compiled by the Author of This Book241 Bibliography253 Index261

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2

Conditional Proposition Truth Table Validity Test Truth Table

31 43

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Discussion of Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity

1.1   Introduction This book examines African philosophic sagacity in selected African languages and proverbs. Among the selected African languages, we shall zero down on Acholi language and Luganda, both in Uganda. To authenticate this examination, we have to properly understand what philosophic sagacity is all about and the context in which it features in African philosophical discourse. Henry Odera Oruka, who lived from 1944 to 1995, was the first to coin the concept philosophic sagacity. Although Odera Oruka discussed other aspects of African philosophy in his publications, like metaphysics (1972), epistemology (1975), and ethics (1995, 1996), he is best known for his philosophic sagacity discourse. He defined philosophic sagacity as wisdom philosophy. However, by wisdom philosophy, he means second-­ order philosophy and not first-order philosophy. By first-order philosophy, Oruka means wisdom in the ordinary sense. These are common bodies of knowledge cherished by a given human society, which are used for the practical guidance of day-to-day life. Second-order philosophy, on the other hand, is philosophy in the strict sense, since it is a reflection on the first-order philosophy. He elaborated this philosophic sagacity concept in various publications beginning with “The four trends in current African philosophy” (1991a). This thesis was later substantiated by him in © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_1

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subsequent publications (1983, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1998). In a similar way, Oruka believes that philosophic sagacity as wisdom can only be produced by independent elders and thinkers uninfluenced by outsiders and who are often opposed to the ordinary wisdom of their peoples. Though Oruka is entitled to this line of thinking, it is necessary to correct certain misconceptions embedded in this concept and go beyond it. First, Oruka tends to value the view of thinkers other than moralists. For him, thinkers are second-order sages other than first-order sages, who are cultural diehard defenders of commonly accepted views of society. This book goes beyond the understanding of thinkers as elders of society, who are uninfluenced by outside ideas. The reason is that a critical elder and thinker does not need to be uninfluenced by outside ideas. Humans, today or yesterday, have always had influences from other sources, but a thinker is one who is critical in picking out and distilling what one has received and in adopting them for his or her own purpose. Besides, restricting philosophical sagacity to individual thinkers limits the scope of African philosophical sagacity as this book will shortly demonstrate. In this book, we argue that other sources of wisdom, both for first-­ order and second-order individuals, exists. One of these sources is the society and its culture. From the wisdom of society generated and accumulated over time, true wisdom begins, grows, and expands. From such bosoms of human societies, individual wisdom is fertilized and articulated by individual thinkers. Moreover, deposits of some of these wisdoms generated by the individual members of any society are preserved in the ethos, wise sayings, proverbs, and language of their people. These have been greatly ignored by Oruka in the articulation of the sagacity thesis. The amazing similarities among African proverbs, as if they were produced by a single mind, indicate that many African cultures did have influences on each other. So, if the cultures are influenced from within or without Africa, individuals cannot escape to learn from such ideas that have infiltrated their cultures. It is important to note that a sage may or may not be influenced by outside ideas, but that the sage must be diligent in picking what is philosophically acceptable for his or her consumption, and this is central in the view of this book, which Oruka does not take into consideration. Secondly, the proverbs and wise sayings of Africa have remained and still remain a big deposit of knowledge and wisdom, both taken as it is and critically reflected upon. To distinguish a philosophic proverb from a non-­ philosophic proverb or wise saying will not be possible at the level of their literal meanings, but deeper or philosophical meanings. Some of these

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meanings can never be apparent to all the members of the same society, since some may not be able to disinter their deeper meanings, but the wise men and women of African societies are able to go beyond the literal meanings of the proverbs or wise sayings. These deeper meanings, apparently, are the basis on which different African societies are built and organized. African philosophy has been defined in this book as the critical study of African rational history, while Western philosophy is the critical study of the rational history of Western thoughts. Mbiti defines African philosophy as the understanding, attitude of mind, logic, and perception behind the manner in which African peoples think, act, or speak in different situations of life (Mbiti, 1969). Wiredu, on the other hand, thinks African philosophy is not just the world outlook of traditional African societies. In fact, African philosophy is an attempt to derive a “synthesis of the philosophical insights of their ancestors with whatever they extract of philosophical worth from their intellectual resources of the modern world, and philosophical reflections on their languages and cultures in an effort to exploit their philosophical intimations” (Wiredu, 1991, p. 105). In this Wiredian understanding, there are three issues about African philosophy: that African philosophy is not just a traditional African outlook; it is a synthesis of the traditional outlook and modern African outlook; and lastly, it is a philosophical reflection on African languages and cultures. This differs a bit from the Mbitian definition, which takes African philosophy to be an understanding, an attitude, and the perceptions behind African way of thinking, living, and acting. In this book, it is not enough for African philosophy to identify the African understanding, attitudes, perceptions behind their ways of thinking, living, and acting; it is equally important that African philosophy tries to create a synthesis between their past ways of thinking, living, and acting with the way they do in the modern times. Besides, African philosophy also has to identify from their languages and cultures these very understandings, attitudes, and perceptions about life, thought, and actions. Emphasis here will be to identify African reflective wisdom, understandings, attitudes, and philosophical perceptions behind the African ways of thinking, language, living, and acting. Since we cannot do this for all African peoples, in this book, we shall limit ourselves to the selected African languages and proverbs, the case of Acholi and Luganda. Our efforts will equally be to identify the linkages between traditional and

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modern ways of thinking, living, and acting as demonstrated, specifically in Acholi and Luganda languages and selected proverbs. This approach has been recommended also by Wiredu, when he observes that: this is the time when there is maximum need to study African traditional philosophy. Because of the historical accident of colonialism, the main part of the philosophical training of contemporary African scholars has come to derive from foreign sources. […] Philosophical truth can indeed be disentangled from cultural contingencies. But for this purpose, nothing is more useful than the ability to compare different languages and cultures in relation to their philosophical presuppositions. (Wiredu, 1991, p. 98)

In the above text, Wiredu is emphasizing the importance of studying African traditional philosophy. The reasons he gives are, first, historical accident colonialism has made on Africans to dwell on the philosophical study of foreign languages and cultures. Secondly, it is possible to disentangle philosophical truth from different African cultural contingencies. Thirdly, doing this will be beneficial, not only to Africans, but also to non-Africans. So, to compare traditional and modern African philosophical principles and theories, it is important to understand these traditional African philosophical worldviews. No meaningful synthesis can be derived from two unknown entities. We may be aware, generally, about what is happening in the world today, though only a few Africans sincerely understand traditional African philosophical worldviews. This will make synthesis between the traditional African philosophical worldviews and the modern ones very difficult, if not impossible. Besides, a number of people want to talk about Africa, but a number of them speak from ignorance other than knowledge. It is only a study of this kind that can open the windows both for Africans to understand themselves and for foreigners to understand Africa. The study of African philosophic sagacity in selected African languages and proverbs certainly emphasizes and dwells on this approach. It is an investigation of Acholi and Luganda philosophical worldviews as derived from their languages and proverbs, so that we can understand the African traditional philosophy behind these proverbs. It is only then can we discuss and try to compare this traditional understanding, attitudes, and perceptions of the Africans on the basis of the different branches of philosophy

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that can help us to synthesize between them and the modern patterns of knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions. Besides these methodological differences, African contexts and philosophical worldviews are uniquely different. Obenga clarifies that to the Egyptians, “to philosophize was not just to speculate about life and reflect on nature, but also to be engaged with love, intense desire, and strong enthusiasm in the investigation of causes underlying reality in order to build up a system of values by which society may live” (Obenga, 2004, p. 33). So, in the West, philosophy is a critical reflection on reality, while in Africa, it is both a reflection and an engagement in the investigation of causes underlying reality in order to build a system of values by which different societies live. Obenga adds another dimension to the difference between Western and African philosophies in that, in the West the method of deriving philosophy is purely through the use of human reason, but he contends that in Africa, there is a neat harmonization between reason and emotion, which Western philosophy tends to keep apart as thesis and anti-thesis. To support this Obenga writes: Reason, emotion, spirit, mind, and body were not conceived as separate antithetical entities. Matter and spirit were not opposites in conflict. Thus, in their inquiries philosophers can draw on all the resources of their being, including reason and feeling. In this way they expect to achieve fulfilment. (Obenga, 2004, p. 35)

This is a very important observation which is contrary to Leopold S. Senghor’s controversial and mostly discredited stance that African epistemology is emotional and Western epistemology is rational. Obenga’s view is supported with the later stance of Emmanuel Ibout, who competently argues that man “cannot know without the involvement of his emotions, faith/belief, imagination, etc., that the only place you can find a knowledge that does not involve human emotions is artificial intelligence like computers and robots” (2004, pp. 58–59). This means, philosophical knowledge, in particular, and knowledge of any kind in general, is a result of the different faculties of the human person, not only of intellectual activity as the West thinks.

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1.2  Oruka and His Critics In this section we shall look at the view of Henry Odera Oruka and his critics. The main critics of Odera Oruka were the proponents of ethnophilosophy philosophers. 1.2.1   Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity To understand Oruka’s philosophic sagacity discourse fully, we need to contextualize that for Oruka, his attempt was to do two things. First to distinguish and distance an African philosophical position from ethnophilosophy that was at the time vehemently criticized, and secondly to place African philosophy at the level of professional philosophy, which at that time was considered to be the hallmark of philosophy. To achieve the first objective, he had to “formulate a position distinct from ethnophilosophy yet grounded in traditional wisdom of African sages” (Lajul, 2018, p. 117). Serequeberhan (1991) sees this as an ambivalent position caught between the claims of traditional African wisdom (sagacity) and the claim that philosophy is a culture-neutral universal discipline (see also Lajul, 2018). To substantiate, Oruka (1983, 1991b) believes that ethnophilosophy is only the second historical phase of the development of true African philosophy. He, therefore, places ethnophilosophy on the second phase preceded by pre-philosophy and climaxed by professional philosophy. At the stage of pre-history, Oruka thinks this is a stage in which the black man’s culture and even mind was extremely alien to reason, logic, and various habits of scientific inquiry (Lajul, 2018, p. 117). After pre-­ history, we have ethnophilosophy, which he terms customs-dictated philosophy phase (Lajul, 2018, p. 117). Hountondji (1983) calls it philosophy of communal consensus. Oruka, however, thinks this is not proper philosophy, since it is only philosophy in the debased sense. Philosophic sagacity falls under the third stage of professional philosophy. He, therefore, vests philosophical sagacity with all the claims of professional philosophy, like universality, individuality, rationality, and criticality. The only characteristic attributed to professional philosophy, with which Oruka disagrees, is writing or literacy. This is because he rightly notes that writing is not a method of doing philosophy, but only a way of preserving it. True philosophy is derived from thinking, which is universal to all humans.

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1.2.2   Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity Critics From the interview carried out by Kresse Kai with Oruka in 1995, there are four points on which Oruka was faulted. First, that sage philosophy, like ethnophilosophy, seems to be also “a mere temporal stage in the process of philosophising, a transitional stage that can find concrete expression in professional philosophy” (Lajul, 2014, p. 40). Secondly, that sage philosophy seems to be a mere “reaction to Europeans’ belief that Africans are incapable of philosophising” (Lajul, 2014, p. 40). Thirdly, that “sage philosophy” should be “broadened to include the youth, women, and other educated intellectuals who might not be elders” (Lajul, 2014, p.  40). Lastly, that philosophizing “must be made relevant to people’s lives and philosophy must respond to concrete, lived experiences in Africa” (Lajul, 2014, p. 41). Lajul (2014) thinks that philosophic sagacity cannot be reduced to mere temporal stage in the development of African philosophy, because it remains perennially valid. I would, in fact, add that sage philosophy as derived from the philosophical wisdom of Africans and embedded in their languages, wise sayings, and proverbs cannot be easily dismissed, unless we get rid of all indigenous African languages, wise sayings, and proverbs. The fact that some of these proverbs are being revised and used in the modern contexts with more relevant contents makes the fourth objection about relevance of sage philosophy obsolete. African languages are not dying easily to the onslaught of modernization and globalization, but they are evolving and adapting themselves to new needs of modern Africans. Precisely, because of this, they are still being continually used in local communications. Indeed, most indigenous African languages are still vibrant in most parts of Africa. As regards the second criticism that sage philosophy is only reactionary does not destroy the relevance and content of sage philosophy. Reaction, as claimed by Oruka’s critics, was proper at the beginning since Europeans were demeaning to think Africans are illogical and irrational. But what is problematic is not the reaction, but the content of this reaction. It is true that in reaction to Western criticisms, Oruka fully bought the views of professional philosophy without reservations or critical analysis. For instance, rationality is not the hallmark of philosophy, just as literacy is not a condition for doing philosophy, because humans are endowed with both rational and other abilities like emotions.

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Lastly, that sage philosophy should be broadened to include youth, women, and other educated intellectuals who are not elders. This, in my view, is diversionary, because what is important is to understand that these are just some of the sources of sage philosophy. As philosophy, whether critically or rationally based, as is believed by Oruka, can be demonstrated by a youth, a woman, or any other educated intellectual and this would not reduce or increase the validity of sage philosophy. Distinction should be made between the acts of philosophizing, which are demonstrations of philosophic wisdom, from the actor, who is the philosopher. The actor may or may not be literate, may be a man or a woman, a youth or an elder, but what distinguishes that person’s act of philosophizing is the quality of his or her thinking, which can generate philosophic knowledge.

1.3  New-Philosophic Sagacity and Ethnophilosophy It is important, at this point, to identify what is new from the book’s point of view, which is different from what Oruka has already articulated. It is equally important to identify the difference between philosophic sagacity in this new sense and ethnophilosophy, which this book seems to adopt in as far as it deals with specific African cultures, the Acholi and the Buganda of Uganda. 1.3.1   New-Philosophic Sagacity By new-philosophic sagacity, this book is referring to the broader understanding of philosophic sagacity, different and distinct from that of Odera Oruka. In the view of this book, philosophic sagacity is understood as the critical philosophical study of African traditional theories, principles, and value systems embedded in particular African languages, wise sayings, proverbs, and wise men and women of Africa. On the basis of these philosophical principles and theories or value systems, African communities are built. This wisdom philosophy is the basis on which the organizations of the African societies were made. They are works of individuals whose identities can no longer be traced because of lack of writing, but their views have been accepted, adopted, and, from time to time, refined within the ethos of the different societies as they continue to guide the societal value systems and philosophical worldviews.

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This is markedly different from philosophic sagacity as the uninfluenced views of those who reflect on the communal ethos of their societies and who at times disagree with them. Philosophical sagacity in this new sense considers that within that communal ethos, deeply entrenched philosophical principles adopted and refined over the years by individual thinkers are already present, though the identities of those individuals can no longer be traced because of orality. To disagree with some of the communal value’s systems of the Africans is a normal process that takes place all the time as demonstrated in the changes and introduction of new ideas and values systems within African societies. What is even more central in our view is to realize that the very languages Africans use, their wise sayings, and proverbs already contain those second-order philosophical thinking within the African societies. In most cases the philosophical depth and relevance of an African wisdom is seen in the spread of such an idea or principles within a wider geographical space that might even be linguistically different, and in the length of time such philosophical principle seems to sail through the years. The advantage of studying these traditional philosophical principles and theories rooted in the African past is that such philosophies can be validated against their recurrent use and reuse in modern African languages and wise sayings. 1.3.2   Philosophic Sagacity and Ethnophilosophy In regard to philosophic sagacity and ethnophilosophy, I can say, there are three meanings of ethnophilosophy as per the literature on this subject. The first takes ethnophilosophy as ethnology or a set of values, categories, and assumptions implicit in African cultures. The second takes as metaphysical categories that shape Africa’s views on reality, and the third as cultural philosophy. However, Lajul in 2014 has already observed that ethnophilosophy combines the three interpretations, because it is a philosophy of values (axiology), metaphysics, and cultural philosophy. Though for Ochieng ’Odhiambo, these categories are mutually exclusive, I think they are complementary. Oruka, on the other hand, thinks ethnophilosophy is not philosophy in the proper sense, but it is philosophy in the debased first-order sense. This makes Oruka’s view on ethnophilosophy different from philosophic sagacity. In the view of this book, however, ethnophilosophy is understood as the critical philosophical study of traditional theories, principles, and

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values systems embedded in particular African cultural communities as the basis for the organization of those societies. They are works of individuals whose identities can no longer be traced because of lack of writing, but their views have been accepted, adopted, and, from time to time, improved within the ethos of the different societies as they continue to guide the societal values systems and philosophical worldviews. This is also different from philosophic sagacity as deep philosophical principles embedded in African languages, wisdom sayings, proverbs, and the wisdom of African wise men and women. While philosophical principles and theories rooted in ethnophilosophy are proper to those African cultures, traditional philosophic wisdom cuts across cultural borders and are contained within the ambience of traditional African and modern African philosophical worldviews. However, ethnophilosophical philosophical principles and theories, as well as philosophic sagacity principles and theories, can easily be applicable anywhere in the world. It is interesting to note that there is a momentous movement, not only towards recognizing ethnophilosophy, but towards placing it at the centre of African philosophy. In the abstract of Ada Agada’s book chapter, “A Wellspring of African Philosophical Concepts? The What and Why Questions in the Context of Interculturality”, he argues in the following way: I defend the claim that ethnophilosophy is a major source of African philosophy, among other identifiable sources, and that, more than any other source, it is the most obvious candidate for the title of “wellspring of African philosophical concepts”. Ethnophilosophy boasts an advantage in contributing to the essential ingredient of culture-specified uniqueness that can distinguish African philosophy from non-African philosophies and enhance African philosophy’s intercultural competitiveness. This cultural defining essence lies in the primordiality of ethnophilosophy as the form of thought most deeply rooted in the African lifeworld or age-old tradition. (Agada, 2022, p. 17)

In this chapter, I appreciate this new insight because in 2014, I have clearly identified and defended that ethnophilosophy thesis is one of the dimensions of African philosophy. Among the different dimensions of African philosophy, we have ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, hermeneutic philosophy, and professional philosophy, to mention some of them (Odera Oruka, 1978). Yet, by no means am I saying now that

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ethnophilosophy is the same as philosophic sagacity, since ethnophilosophy, like philosophic sagacity, is only one of the dimensions of African philosophy. My view is that African philosophy can be discussed from various angles, and ethnophilosophy, which Agada now think is the wellspring of African philosophical concepts, is one of the dimensions from which one can study African philosophy. This does not nullify other dimensions of African philosophy, which can be studied in their own rights. Where Odera Oruka goes wrong is to think ethnophilosophy is the only philosophy in the debased first-order sense. On the other hand, to say ethnophilosophy is the essential ingredient of African philosophy is right, but this should not be interpreted as making it more important than all other sources of African philosophy. This is because, as I have demonstrated in this book, though language is part and parcel of any ethnic culture, the wisdom philosophy within any African cultural language is still identifiable. This wisdom philosophy can be traced from wise men and women of Africa, proverbs within that cultural language, and wise sayings. I would say ethnophilosophy concentrates on the content of African philosophy within a particular culture. This does not mean, because it is unique to a particular culture, it is not universalizable. African philosophy is better derived if all these sources are combined together; that is why Lajul in his book African Philosophy: Critical Dimensions (2014) takes a look at the different dimensions of African philosophy. It is good to note that authors like Aribiah David Attoe (2022) think that African philosophy must have a direction, and this direction must not be solely tied to ethnophilosophy. He maintains that if ethnophilosophy is neither the foundation/substructure nor the entire superstructure of African philosophy, then we must think of ways in which African philosophy can progress with and beyond ethnophilosophy (Attoe, 2022). In his own words, he reiterates: While scholars like Ada Agada find ethnophilosophy, laced with some critical reflection, as the foundation of African philosophy, I specifically locate the foundation of African philosophy in criticality […]. The foundation of African philosophy, thus, expresses itself fully in the coming together of okwu with criticality, where the latter interrogates the former. From this foundation, I lay down the implications for growth that this foundation has and how it transcends ethnophilosophy. (Attoe, 2022, p. 71)

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The problem I have with Attoe is the old Western thinking that philosophy must be an individual enterprise rooted in criticality or rationality. There is no problem in flogging this dead horse, but when we are speaking of ethnophilosophy, we must accept that it is still critically the work of individuals whose individuality can no longer be traced. Where I agree with Agada is that, he is bringing to light the long detested concept of ethnophilosophy, but I think he should equally recognize that this is only one of the dimensions of African philosophy.

1.4  The Context of African Languages and Proverbs To comprehend this book, it is good to contextualize our study by understanding this group of people—the Acholi and the Buganda—their languages, and the contexts in which they use their proverbs. This will help the reader fully appreciate these selected African languages, wise sayings, proverbs, and the philosophical wisdom rooted in their societies. 1.4.1   The Acholi People Whitmire (2013) believes that Acholi ethnic identity is a socio-political reality that evolved over the years. The social and political organizations of the Acholi people were responsible for the creation of their ethnic identity. The social organization informed the political organization and the political organization maintained their social organization. Whitmire (2013) first believes that the Acholi ethnic identity was created prior to the advent of colonialism. Secondly, colonialists’ claim that the Acholi ethnic identity was created only in the nineteenth century during colonization by importing chiefdom ideology into Acholiland is an assertion not well founded. Thirdly, that this claim does not take recognition of the social dimension of the Acholi ethnic identity but emphasizes only its political dimension. Lastly, that Acholi ethnic identity was created by their political ideology, chiefdom ideology, traditions, and adoption of a common language, and this took place during the pre-colonial period (Whitmire, 2013, p. 12). Atkinson (1994), on the other hand, believes that Acholi lacked a collective ethnic identity prior to the nineteenth century, a view Whitmire refutes as seen above. Whitmire believes that Acholi ethnic identity prior

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to the nineteenth century subsisted in political identities, traditions, and common language. I support Whitmire on this issue. The reason is that the theory that Acholi ethnic identity was created in the nineteenth century by the colonial administration by importing chiefdom ideology into Acholiland could not have succeeded if the Acholi did not have a solid basis of ethnic identity. The creation of Acholi chiefdom ideology was possible because of the political, social, and linguistic identities they had already acquired prior to the nineteenth century. Ethnic identity is a strong social attitude that can only evolve from within a society and cannot be imported from outside. Whitmire continues to argue that, “The chiefdom ideology functioned as the amalgamation of the social, political, religious, and traditions of the Acholi. This informed the creation of their collective identity during the pre-colonial period” (2013, pp. 12–13). Meaning, if the Acholi did not have the political, religious, and social identities and traditions, the colonialists would not have succeeded in creating the chiefdom identity they claim to have done. This also means, the Acholi people, prior to the coming of the colonialists, had their own ethnic identity, which is the basis from which we can derive their philosophies. I disagree, however, with Whitmire in her claim that in the seventeenth century, the Acholi learnt the chiefdom ideology from the Luos, who had migrated and settled in Bunyoro and who later, for different reasons, returned to Acholiland. I also disagree with Atkinson that the Acholi are not ethnically Luo people. That the Luo people were solely responsible for the social organization and adoption of the chiefdom ideology among the Acholi is not correct. Thirdly, Atkinson claims that it was because the Acholi adopted the Luo language, then anthropologists thought they were all descendants of the Luo. Lastly, that the basis of chiefdom building among the Acholi was the result of other non-Luo peoples’ influence (Whitmire, 2013, p. 19). However, deriving from Atkinson, Whitmire brings out the following very important analysis about the Acholi people. First, that some of the claims of Atkinson about the Acholi and their relationship to the Luos are not correct. The reasons she gives are that, firstly, the Luos were a very small portion of the population. Secondly, the Luo basically settled in the Luo triangle, the southwest Acholiland. Thirdly, the largest Luo presence near Acholiland was located in northern Bunyoro-Kitara, and the source of this information is Atkinson (1994, p. 71) himself.

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In this book, we think, there is a confusion authors make about the three interrelated terms used in reference to the Acholi people: Luo, Acholi, and Nilotic. The question is, are these terms referring to three different groups of people, and if so, how are they related? One does not get any clear explanations from the authors we have surveyed above. From Whitmire, the Luos are not the same as the Nilotics, since the Nilotics primarily settled in east and central Acholiland, while the Luos settled in the southwest and northern Bunyoro-Kitara. According to Atkinson, linguistically, the Acholi did not acquire their Luo language from the Luo group as Whitmire claims. On the contrary, the Acholi spoke a language similar to that of the Shilluk, a group from among whom they migrated. Secondly, it is wrong to say the name of this ethnic group, the Acholi, is the one that created their identity. This is wrong because, while a name is very important in the identity definition of a people, identity itself does not subsist in the name, because the identity precedes the name and the name only captures and expresses an identity. So, if the Acholi are ethnically and linguistically identified with the Shilluk people in the Sudan, then this must be taken as more basic than the ascription of such an identity to them. The relationship among the terms Acholi, Luo, and Nilotic has not yet been fully explained. The text we have seen earlier shows the link between the terms Acholi and Shilluk. As a people, the language the Acholi and the Shilluk spoke was basically the same or similar. If the Acholi language is Luo, then the language the Acholi people use is not derived from the southwestern Luo or the northern Bunyoro-Kitara Luo as Whitmire claims above. Besides, there is confusion among different authors about the term Luo and the Paluo. While Luo is a language spoken among the Shilluk, the Acholi, and other Luo-speaking peoples, the Paluo refers to a clan within this bigger group. The Paluo is wrongly associated with the Luo people as a group. The Paluo could have been a central group among the Luo people, but they are not identical with the Luo as a group. The term Luo is another way of describing the same group of people in terms of the language they speak. All the groups that speak that language, with varying dialects, are still called the Luo people. These include the Alur, the Jopadhola, and the Kenya Luo, who still speak Luo language up to now. Referring to the Acholi or the Luo-speaking group as the Nilotics is another way of describing this same group of people who lived mainly around River Nile, where they come right from Sudan into Uganda. The

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term Nilotic is even much broader than the term Acholi or the Luos. However, anthropologists have decided to distinguish three groups of people that dwell in the greater northern Uganda: the Nilotic, composing of the Acholi and the Alur; and the Nilohamites, composing of the Langi, the Karamojong, and the Iteso. Among these Nilohamites, it is only the Langi who adopted the Luo language, while the Iteso and the Karimojong maintained their Nilohamitic linguistic dialects. In fact, Ocaya (1988) calls the Acholi the Nilotics (the Nilotes or the lakeside people) and mentions the following groups of people as belonging to the same anthropological group: Other Nilotic peoples are found in southern Sudan, western Ethiopia, eastern Zaire, western Kenya and northern Tanzania. In Uganda besides the Acholi the other members of the Nilotes are the Alur, Jonam, Labwor, Palwo, […] and Padhola. The Shilluk, Annuak, Bari, Bor and some Lwo are in Sudan. A still larger number of the Lwo live in western Kenya. All these peoples regard themselves as the same people with the same origin and they speak a language similar to each other. (Ocaya, 1988, p. 11)

When speaking about the Acholi of northern Uganda, we shall understand the term to mean the group of people from Shilluk, from the central Bahr el Ghazal region of southern Sudan, who linguistically are Luo speaking, geographically live along the Nile River regions of Africa, and so are Nilotic. 1.4.2   The Ganda Ganda, also called Baganda, or Waganda, are people inhabiting the area north and northwest of Lake Victoria in south-central Uganda. They speak a Bantu language— called Ganda, or Luganda—of the Benue-­ Congo group (Britannica, 2019). Sometimes described as “The King’s Men” because of the importance of the king, or Kabaka, in their society (Countries and their Cultures, 2010), the Ganda are the largest ethnic community in Uganda. The Baganda speak a Bantu language called Luganda. It is a member of the Niger-Congo family of languages. In the Luganda language, the singular form of Baganda is Muganda. Like many other African languages, Luganda is tonal, meaning that some words are differentiated by pitch. Words that

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are spelled the same may carry different meanings according to their pitch. Luganda is rich in metaphor and in proverbs and folktales. 1.4.3   The Acholi Language The National African Language Resource Center (NALRC) describes Acholi language as a Luo language in the following words: “Acholi is a tonal Luo language belonging to the Nilotic branch of African languages. It is spoken in Acholiland in northern Uganda and some parts of Sudan”. The Acholi Language Manual, published in 2009, describes the Acholi language in quite similar way by saying, “Acholi belongs to the family of Luo languages. […] Acholi is a tonal language, though tones are not normally written. Hence two seemingly identical words can actually mean different things depending on the tone of their vowels. Tone is therefore important if such fluency is desired to reduce ambiguity to a minimum”. Victor Ocaya (2004) adds something about Acholi language. First, in general Acholi language has been preserved in its entirety, but they certainly incorporated in their own elements of the language spoken by the people found in the new regions where they migrated. This fact accounts for the different dialects and new terms found in the different dialects of the Acholi language. Secondly, the Acholi language developed towards simplicity (Crazzolara, 1938, p. xiv). Most words are made up of one or two syllables (Ocaya, 2004, p. 15). One hardly comes across words with more than three syllables (p.  15). Foreign names with more than three syllables are often shorted or abbreviated for ease of pronunciation. For instance, Crazzolara became Olari; Pellegrini became Opel, in the Acholi language.1 Thirdly, the Acholi alphabet consists of all the letters of English alphabet, except for h,q,s,x,z. This means, out of the 26 letters of the English alphabet, the Acholi language retains only 21 of them. However, they also have two extra letters, which are combinations of letters for ease of pronunciation. These are letter ny pronounced as nya and ng, pronounced as nga. This makes Acholi letters of the alphabet to be 23, which are (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, r, t, u, v, w, y, ng, ny).

1  Both Crazzolara and Pellegrini were Italian Missionaries belonging to the Congregation of the Comboni Missionaries, who are Catholic Missionaries that introduced Catholicism into Northern Uganda.

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Lastly, the vowels in Acholi language remain five as those in the English language, and they are pronounced as they are written. For Ocaya, this is in accordance with the rule called Italian value, where letters are pronounced the way they are written. What is important is that both Acholi and Luganda are tonal languages. In both languages there are widespread use of riddles, similes, and proverbs. For instance, in Luganda language, one would say, “I have a wife who looks where she is coming from and where she is going at the same time” (a bundle of firewood, since the two ends are similar). This is a riddle. An example of a simile in Acholi language is “Col calo dyewor” (as dark as the night). But we are more interested in the proverbs, which we shall illustrate in different chapters. 1.4.4   The Proverbs Since we cannot talk of all African languages, we shall narrow our contexts to the Acholi proverbs, which are typically similar to the Ganda proverbs. In the context of African philosophy, African proverbs originate from both the emotional and rational engagements of the philosophers with realities in their lives and environments. Some of these proverbs have been committed to writing by several authors both in Acholi and other African languages like Luganda and Kiswahili. The two outstanding Acholi elders who wrote on their proverbs are Okot p’Bitek, who wrote a book Acholi Proverbs (1985), and Angela Banya, who wrote another book on Acholi proverbs titled Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog -1994). I have equally collected over 250 African proverbs from West and East Africa, and particularly from Acholi cultural community (as listed in the Appendix). We shall also use selectively two other works on proverbs; one is by Ishiabwe Atemu (2019) titled A Collection of 100 Ganda/Kooki (Uganda) Proverbs and Wise Saying, and the second one is by Kalugila and Lodhi (1980), More Swahili Proverbs from East Africa. A number of proverbs from these sources will be used in this work, though those in the appendix have not been separately published. Comparing the different sources of proverbs in selected African languages, one would wonder whether they are related. The observation is that most of them are exactly the same, though their interpretations in some cases are different due to different cultural contexts. For instance, Ganda proverb No. 19 “Ears that do not listen to advice, accompany the head when it is chopped off” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6) is exactly the same as

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a West African proverb recorded in the Appendix No. 170, “A deaf ear follows the head to the grave”, and No. 172 “A fly that does not listen to advice, goes to the grave with the corpse”. One then wonders how such proverbs coming from diverse cultural contexts can have, actually, almost the same rendering. In my view, this is one of the ways of showing how related Africans are in their philosophical thinking. It is also a signal that over the years Africans have significantly influenced each other, despite differences in languages and cultural contexts. As can be shown from the above, these proverbs have the same moral lesson; refusal to listen to sound advices is always dangerous, since it leads to death. The contexts are different, since one speaks of a fly, the other two talk of an ear, one is deaf and the other does not listen. The deafness here is not a sickness, but a stubborn refusal to listen, and all leads to the same result. The philosophical meaning for all these proverbs seems to be, according to Ishiabwe, “advice from those who have wisdom and experience” (2019, p. 6), which is to be taken seriously. It does not generalize that all forms of advice are good. What is interesting is that none of these versions of proverbs are more correct than the other, since all were actually used in one African language setting or the other. Since all these proverbs are contextually placed, depending on the intention of the authors, words are usually coined to bring out some specific meanings, as intended by the user. In reading and interpreting these proverbs, a lot of care has been taken to avoid such misconceptions and confusions.

1.5   Methodology The methodology used in this book is basically analytical. The proverbs have been placed within their proper contexts, before exposing their literal, deeper, and philosophical meanings. Care has been taken to distinguish the general philosophical meanings from the specific branch of philosophy such proverbs fall under. The identification of specific branch of philosophy within which a particular proverb falls was purely the author’s own fantasy, since another author may place such proverb in a completely different branch of philosophy. Taking from an example from Okot p’Bitek’s proverb No. 118 (Jwi jwi ci Ongole ce, Chong pe neko?), where Banya renders the same proverb as J2, Jwi Ni Ongole, Buyu kono, and the Lajul’s version as Jwi jwi ci Ongole oneko, tin dong Jubi oneko Ongole (2018, p.  39), we can identify three

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different branches of philosophy. p’Bitek places it under epistemological proverb (knowledge is not a monopoly of one person); Banya places it under social philosophy (ability to persist in any undertaking without easily giving up); and Lajul places it under metaphysical proverb (destiny or luck is not predetermination, since it can change). Therefore, while the result of these analyses is philosophical, it should be understood as African philosophy in the eyes of the author, because it is the author that tries to interpret and identify the meanings behind these proverbs. This also means, as much as it is an African philosophy, it is equally the author’s personal understanding of African philosophy. If tomorrow somebody will come out with interpretations that will differ from those in this book, it should not be taken as a mistake, but as an expression of the richness of philosophical ideas in different African cultural settings, coined in their languages and proverbs.

1.6  Book Layout The book is divided into eight chapters. These include the general introduction that surveys issues like contexts and methods. The other chapters have discussed the different branches of Western philosophy like logic, ethics, political philosophy, social philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics. The effort here was to identify these different branches of philosophy in selected African languages and proverbs. You will notice here the attempts to identify elders that are uninfluenced by foreign ideas are dropped, not because it is irrelevant, but because Oruka has already done his best in that direction. However, since Oruka’s approach did not yield much fruit, we had to change approach in deriving the content of philosophic sagacity, by expanding the scope of the sources of this philosophy to include use of African languages, wise sayings, and proverbs. Chapter 2 discusses logic in selected African languages and proverbs. Though it is generally accepted that African philosophy exists, this is not true for certain branches of philosophy like logic. Airoboman and Odia (2019) and Nweke (2012), among others, deny the existence of African logic. The reason they give is the universal nature of logic. However, they also acknowledge that Africans have the capacity for logic because logic is a given to humans. The problem is to think logic is universal to humans, yet Africans have the capacity to do logic, but they have no logic. For, to have the capacity to do logic without actually doing logic is itself illogical. Ndubisi (2014), with whom I concur, accept that African logic exists and

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is essential, and that it is the criterion or yardstick for presenting knowledge. He emphasizes that logic is the only way in which both written and oral languages are intelligible. Without logic, no human language would be understandable. This chapter maintains that African logic, for that matter, does not need to be an anti-thesis of other people’s logic, regardless of variations with other’s logic. In conclusion, we realize that in Acholi logic, as a case: similarity is not proof of connectedness; time is linear; exclusive disjunctions exists but not inclusive disjunctions; the law of the excluded middle is not always true, since water can be neither hot nor cold; valid and sound arguments can easily be deduced by intuition and not always by reasoning. In Chap. 3, we have looked at moral philosophy in selected African languages and proverbs. We discovered that African moral philosophy may not be quite different from any other people’s moral philosophy. However, the central philosophical worldview of the Africans in general and the Acholi in particular that distinguishes their moral philosophy from others is derived from their philosophical worldviews. In this book, the philosophical worldview of the Acholi and many of other Africans has been the consideration that humans are individuals who are strongly related to one another and to their environment. In this worldview, the individual is equally important as the society within which they live. Because of this, moral judgements are made on the basis of these individual and corporate demands. In conclusion, this chapter underpins some of the moral principles in this philosophy like balance between private and communally owned properties; that crime affects both individual perpetrators and the community within which it is committed, plus the environment; enmity within the same human communities are only circumstantial, while enmity with outside members of one’s human community are considered to be substantial and more dangerous; individual interests are superior to communal interests, contrary to common belief that in Africa communal interests always supersedes individual interests; moral personalities are products of both individuals or personal and community’s aspirations and education. Chapter 4 distillates the political past values embedded in the selected languages, wisdom sayings, and proverbs of the Africans in general and of the Acholi people of Northern Uganda in particular. This chapter diverts from the usual trend of looking for what our first-generation African political leaders did or said. It does not even focus on the present-day African political problems. On the contrary, it believes that Africans have

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well-placed political theories and principles embedded in their past political values, as can be traced from their languages, wisdom sayings, and proverbs. The Acholi political society, from which we intend to derive some of these political theories and values, is decentralized. While centralized political system, like the Baganda of central Uganda, could still be of great value to African societies, but given the nature of present-day African societies, which is an aggregate of different African nations or ethnicities, a better leaf could be borrowed from the decentralized traditional African political systems, like that of the Acholi. This chapter concludes with the political principles like political authority is hierarchical; basis of political power is the popular support of the people; political power has limits; chief duty of political authority is to care of the welfare of the people; the rise and fall of political authority affects positively or negatively the entire political community; democracy is the regulation of power by power; political legitimacy is based on political support of the people; political duty in the interest of all does not abdicate pursuance of self-interest; and females are equally important in political dispensations. In Chap. 5, African social philosophy is discussed as reflections on the origin of African societies, their ways of life, and the expression of social relations and interests as manifested in their collective social structures and worldviews. The chapter identifies the nature of African social philosophy in general and the nature of social bonds, social welfare, and social justice in African social worldview. The chapter analyses what constitutes social upbringing and social responsibilities. Some of the findings are that society is constituted of predictable and unpredictable natures; the basis of social bondage is personal security and satisfaction of its members’ needs; society is a network of bonded relationships; social welfare is not the product of its leaders, but of the many insignificant members; social benefits should be distributed according to needs; personal needs should be balanced with social needs; and in the distribution of social benefits, leaders profit more than the majority of the members. In this chapter we also discovered that a good society is where justice, which takes what is truly right and wrong for what they truly are; unjust action affects all, culprits as well as the other members of the community; true justice protects current as well as future interests of society; to translate a temporal benefit into an entitlement is not just, to mention some of them. Theory of knowledge is discussed in Chap. 6, where knowledge is taken to mean the perception of the origin, nature, reliability, or unreliability of what constitutes a relationship between the knowing subject and the

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known object. A number of African societies had their own ways of understanding this relationship. African ontological existential perception makes their perspective unique. To explain how Africans understand this relationship in their language and selected proverbs, we found out that they commonly accept sensitive and intellective knowledge like in Western epistemology, besides mystical knowledge. The African and the Eastern philosophy acknowledge the importance of mystical knowledge, though the method of deriving them varies. Meditation is the best way of deriving mystical knowledge in the East, while divination is the best way of deriving mystical knowledge in Africa. In both cases, mystical knowledge is at times taken as a gift from divine beings. In distinguishing between sensitive and intellective knowledge, African perspective takes these theories of knowledge as supplementary to each other. However, hierarchically, these two forms of knowledge have differences. For more practical actions, the sensitive knowledge is always considered to be more important than intellective knowledge, but hierarchically, intellective knowledge is always considered to be higher. Though arguments for or against the existence of African metaphysics abounds, the view that it exists is endorsed in Chap. 7. The task is to show that if African metaphysics exists, then particular African cultural metaphysics also exists. In fact, what constitutes African metaphysics is derived from the different African cultural heritages on the salient issues that existentially affect different African societies forcing them to look for solutions. In these solutions, there are, the different African cultural metaphysics. In this chapter, African metaphysics is understood to mean the African perspectival understanding of the nature and science of essence. African metaphysics, as has been derived from their selected languages and proverbs, was identified on the basis of the nature of existence. Taking the proverbs, though limited in a way, is the most reliable means of doing this, since most of these proverbs have existed prior to the invective influence of other worldviews. To be genuinely African does not mean it can only be found in Africa. The following are some of the metaphysical principles found in the selected African languages and proverbs: the personal dimension of personhood is ontological, while the social dimension is circumstantial; freedom is the ability to act in spite of constraints; work is an ontological interaction between individuals or groups with their environment to meet their needs; social relations are ontologically built; and preservation of society is equally important as self-preservation.

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In Chap. 8, African beauty is conceived as works of arts, as natural qualities, but also as moral uprightness. Gyekye seems to summarize African conception of beauty as consisting in works of art, natural qualities expressed as figures, moral behaviour, and humanity itself. This chapter surveys African concept of beauty in selected African languages and proverbs. For instance, Okot p’Bitek identifies three basic concepts of beauty: social, moral, and physical beauties. While social beauty refers to the harmonious living and peace in society, moral beauty has to do with human behaviour, and physical beauty is the symmetrical harmony between different parts of a given entity. The basic principles of moral beauty as discussed in this chapter are: moral beauty is superior to physical beauty; character is the basis of moral beauty other than behaviour; and inner beauty is not an outcome of inheritance. Some of the basic principles of beauty are physical beauty is external, while inner beauty is interior; and physical beauty combined with moral beauty is the hallmark of true beauty.

1.7  Conclusion What are distinguishable about these different chapters are their introductions and subsequent contents. In the introductory sections of the different chapters, issues that could not be outlined and discussed in the general introduction were handled. Specifically, given the fact that the different chapters are built on the different branches of Western philosophy, there are issues with each of these philosophical branches. In general, authors are divided as to whether some of these branches of philosophy could be attributed to Africa or not. Their main argument is that philosophy is a universal science based on human rationality, so what is true of Africans must be true of any other people’s philosophy. So, they contend that the regionalization of the different branches of philosophy was not correct. Those who support the existence of the different branches of African philosophy argue that there is an apparent contradiction in the above line of thinking. By accepting that African philosophy exists, as is acknowledged by most authors both protagonists and antagonists, denying the existence of specific branches of philosophy to Africa sounds hilarious. Actually, the denial of the existence of the different branches of African philosophy is tantamount to denying the existence of African philosophy itself (Udefi, 2014). This would take us back to the drawing board in discussing whether African philosophy exists or not. Any serious thinker may have his or her views, but it would also be reasonable to acknowledge and

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respect the views of the many who have now accepted that African philosophy exists. On the basis of this analysis, I thing this book has gone ahead to discuss the different branches of African philosophy as they can be derived from selected African languages and proverbs. It is also important to understand that not all African proverbs are philosophical. The interest in this book is to make some careful selection of the proverbs considered to be philosophical. This came mainly on the basis of the deeper meanings or philosophy behind these proverbs. The deeper or philosophical meanings were derived on the basis of the author’s knowledge of philosophy and the selected African languages. One should not be surprised if some other African author would come out with slightly different philosophical meanings. This would depend on their level of knowledge of the selected African languages and philosophy. The advantage of the author is that he has sufficient knowledge of the Acholi language and philosophical trainings. His disadvantage is that because of his philosophical trainings, he might read too much into these meanings. Even though this may be the case, the author has tried to minimize what could be termed an over-reading of the philosophies behind some of these selected African proverbs.

References Acholi Language Manual. Peace Corps language archive. http://www.livelingua.com Agada, A. (2022). A wellspring of African philosophical concepts? The what and why questions in the context of interculturality. In A.  Agada (Ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the search for the wellspring of African philosophy (pp. 17–38). Springer. Airoboman, F. A., & Odia, S. I. (2019). Can there be an African logic? Journal of Philosophy and Culture, 7(2), 7–13. Atkinson, R. R. (1994). The roots of ethnicity: The origins of the Acholi of Uganda before 1800. University of Pennsylvania Press. Attoe, A. D. (2022). African philosophy: With and beyond ethnophilosophy. In A. Agada (Ed.), Ethnophilosophy and the search for the wellspring of African philosophy (pp. 71–86). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­78897-­1_5 Banya, A. A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda Development Series, No. 2). Foundations for African Development. Britannica, T. (Ed.). (2019). Ganda. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved September 27, 2023, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ganda-­people Crazzolara, J. P. (1938). A study of the Acooli language. Oxford University Press.

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Hountondji, P. J. (1983). African philosophy: Myth and reality (H. Evans & J. Rée, Trans.). Hutchinson. Ishiabwe, A. (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) Proverbs and Wise sayings, African Proverbs Working group: Nairobi – Kenya. Kalugila, L., & Lodhi, A.  Y. (1980). More Swahili proverbs from East Africa. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Lajul, W. (2014). African philosophy: Critical dimensions. Fountain Publishers. Lajul, W. (2018). Contemporary African philosophers: A critical appraisal. Makerere University Press. Mbiti, S. J. (1969). African religions and philosophy. Heinemann. NALRC. Language and culture. Michigan State University. http://www.nalrc. indiana.edu Ndubisi, J. O. E. (2014). Nature and function of logic in African epistemology. JOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19(11), 32–36. Nweke, C. A. V. (2012). African logic: A contemporary reflection on the condition for its existence and non-existence. Flash: Journal of Philosophy and Religion, 6(1), 49–71. Obenga, T. (2004). Egypt: Ancient history of African philosophy. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 31–49). Blackwell Publishers. Ocaya, V. (1988). Ultimate reality and meaning according to the Acholi of Uganda. Ultimate Reality and Meaning, II, 1(March), 11–22. Ocaya, V. (2004). Logic in the Acholi language. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 283–295). Blackwell. Odera Oruka, H. (1978). Four trends in current African philosophy. In A. Diemer (Ed.), Philosophy in the present situation of Africa. Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH. Odera Oruka, H. (1983). Sagacity in African philosophy. International Philosophical Quarterly, 23(4), 383–393. Reprinted in African philosophy: The essential readings, (ed) TsenaySerequerberhan, St. Paul MN: Paragon House, 1991, pp. 47–62. Odera Oruka, H. (1990). Sage philosophy: The basic questions and methodology. In H.  Odera Oruka (Ed.), Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy. E.J. Brill. Odera Oruka, H. (1991a). African philosophy: The current debate. In H. Odera Oruka (Ed.), Sage philosophy: Indigenous thinkers and modern debate on African philosophy. ACTS Press. Odera Oruka, H. (1991b). Sagacity in African philosophy. In African philosophy: The essential readings (pp. 47–62). Paragon House. Odera Oruka, H. (1998). Sage philosophy. In P.  H. Coetzee & A.  P. J.  Roux (Eds.), The African philosophical reader (pp. 99–108). Routledge. p’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. Serequeberhan, T. (1991). African philosophy, The essential readings. Paragon House.

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The National African Language Resource Center (NALRC). Language and culture. http://www.nalrc.indiana.edu Udefi, A. (2014). The rationale for an African epistemology: A critical examination of the Igbo views on knowledge, belief, and justification. Canadian Social Science, 10(3), 108–117. Whitmire, L. (2013). The creation and evolution of the Acholi ethnic identity. A master of arts degree Thesis presented to the Graduate School of Clemson University, Tiger Prints. Wiredu, K. (1991). On defining African philosophy. In T. Serequerberhan (Ed.), African philosophy: The essential reading (pp. 87–110). Paragon House Press.

CHAPTER 2

Logic in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

2.1   Introduction To ask whether there is African philosophy or not is now an obsolete question, but the question whether certain branches of philosophy like logic can have culture-specific dimensions is still current. In trying to answer the question, “can there be an African logic?” Airoboman and Odia (2019) opine that the answer is no. To substantiate this, they give three related points. The first is an enquiry into whether logic can be bound or contextualizable as specifically cultural or peculiarly African. Secondly, they acknowledge that some authors argue for the existence of culturally or contextually bound logic, so they can talk of African logic in general or African cultural logic specifically. Thirdly, they conclude that their study deny the existence of any logic that can be general to Africans or specific to some African cultures. The reason they give is the universal nature of logic. However, they also acknowledge that Africans have the capacity for logic because logic is a given to humans. Before we critically look at this conclusion, it is good to note that the existence of African logic does mean it is completely different from any other logic. To have African logic is to say that there are logically consistent ways of reasoning deeply embedded in the different African languages. Because of these systematic consistencies, African languages are © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_2

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understandable. However, there are different contextual circumstances and different worldviews within which African languages are used; there are also variations with what we now know as the mainstream Western or formal logic. An example I can give is from the Acholi language, where their counting system is centred on base five. This is different from the Western base-ten counting system. Acholi, on the other hand, uses basefive counting system. These two ways of counting are not the same, yet both are logical. So, is it too much to say, though there are great similarities between African logic and Western formal logic, there are also variations, as we shall later demonstrate by the use of selected African languages and proverbs. The conclusion of Airoboman and Odia that deny the existence of any African logic becomes then questionable, since it renders the efforts in this chapter useless and a waste of time. But before giving up, we should look critically at what Airoboman and Odia are saying. Airoboman and Odia, after denying the existence of African logic or specifically cultural logic, direct their readers’ attention to the new questions on African philosophical discourse. They affirm that, today, the question is not about the existence of African philosophy but about the branches and contents of Africa philosophy. As regards the branches of African philosophy, the question runs; since African philosophy exists, does it also mean the different branches of African philosophy exist? The second discourse is about the contents of African philosophy which asks that if the different branches of African philosophy exist as given in Western philosophy, then what their contents are. We can put the questions in their own words: The first set which concerns change in degree raises such questions as: whether given the existence of Africa philosophy can there also be African Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and so on? The second set of questions which concerns change in kind is involved in such questions as: What is African Epistemology, Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and so on? (Airoboman & Odia, 2019, pp. 7–8)

They claim that their main problem with this discourses is such questions take for granted that African philosophy exists. Secondly that because African philosophy exists so the different branches prevalent in Western philosophy must also exist. They directly accuse authors like “Anselm

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Jimoh (1999, pp. 18–37, 2004, pp. 66–81); Etuk (2002, pp. 98–116), among others have philosophized in this way” (Airoboman & Odia, 2019, p. 8). They conclude by saying that the main mistake of a number of African philosophers they have mentioned above is that they have proceeded to discuss the contents of the different branches of African philosophy beginning from wrong assumptions that African philosophy exists and, as well, the different branches of African philosophy exist. This line of thinking is supported by a number of other African authors like Uduma (2009) and Nweke (2012). In this regard, Nweke (2012, p.  49) maintains that “a peculiar African Logic, just like a peculiar European, Asian nay American Logic that is different from universal thought processes is non-existent. Human thought processes are universally the same”. In this text, Nweke is saying the same thing like Airoboman and Odia that logic exists in all cultures, but this does not mean peculiar African logic is present in all African cultures. In my view in this chapter, the pretentious admittance of Airoboman and Odia that “It is also evident that Africa has philosophy” (2019, p. 7) and of Nweke that “Human thought processes are universally the same” (2012, p.  49) becomes quite ambiguous. Let me begin with Nweke, who accepts that human thought processes are universally the same. This is quite disturbing. To find that thought processes of two human beings who have similar rational abilities to think logically result in the same logic is a lie of the highest order. Indirectly, this statement is a direct denial of individuality in philosophical thinking. Nweke is saying, because two individuals have the same thought processes, so automatically, they can only produce one logic that must conform to such a thought process. This, by implication, is also what he alludes to different social groupings in Africa, because they live in a community, they own similar communal philosophical contents, so they have the same thought processes going in their societies. This way of reasoning is equally wrong. Wiredu (1980) has already alluded earlier that thoughts are products of individuals, and I add, two individuals may never come to the same thought results even when they are endowed with the same rational abilities or thought systems, leave alone two different societies to produce just one logic because they subscribe to the same human thought process. Returning to Airoboman and Odia, what do they mean by saying Africa also has philosophy? Is having philosophy the same as saying there is African philosophy? In my view, these two terms seem not to mean the

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same thing in the view of Airoboman and Odia. Seems, they are saying, there is philosophy in Africa, because Africa has philosophy, but there is no African philosophy. They even confirm this in the conclusion of their work when they write: While the writers agreed on the universal nature of logic both in time and space and on African capacity for this order of logic because the energy, that is, the ability, capability, capacity of logic is a given to all humans irrespective of race or colour, they refused to accede to the claim that logic is context or culture bound and therefore that there is any logic that is peculiarly African. (Airoboman & Odia, 2019, p. 13)

In the above text, again they are saying the following: logic is universal both in time and space; Africans, like other humans on earth, have the capacity to do logic, but Africans among the different races in time have no logic, generally as Africans and specifically as African cultures. This argument has grave logical errors. First, what is the meaning of saying logic is universal in time and space? Are they saying that that the statement excludes Africans both in time and space? Secondly, where is that space where logic germinated and grew to fruition? Thirdly, what do they mean by the ability or capacity to do logic without actually doing logic? I cannot agree with the argument that an individual can be an agriculturalist without having done any form of farming. So, according to Airoboman and Odia, Africans are this exceptional group of people who have the capacity to do logic, like any other humans on earth, and whose worldviews do not contain any form of logic. Does it mean, Airoboman and Odia think it is possible to have the capacity to do logic and not be able to apply that logic in any form like in the people’s way of life or language? These same questions will continue to be asked about each and every branch of philosophy being discussed in regard to Africa. And as far as Airoboman and Odia are concerned, the answer will always be no; eventually, we are to square zero. There is no African philosophy. The logical rule of inference states that if the antecedent of a conditional proposition is true, then its consequent must also be true, if such a proposition is true. In fact the rule says, any conditional proposition is only false under one condition where the antecedent is true, while the consequent is false; otherwise always true. I can illustrate this using the very statement made by Airoboman and Odia (Table  2.1). Rephrasing their argument, I would say:

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Table 2.1  Conditional Proposition Truth Table P

Q

(P

->

Q),

T T F F

T F T F

T T F F

T F T T

T F T F

If Africans have capacities to do logic, then they must have some form of logic (P -> Q) This means, this proposition, If Africans have capacities to do logic, then they must have some form of logic (P -> Q), is false only under one condition. That is when it is true that Africans have the capacity to do logic, and they do not have any form of logic. This is the kind of affirmation Airoboman and Odia want us to believe. It is false and unacceptable that Africans have the same capacity to do logic, but they do not have any form of logic. What I do appreciate about Airoboman and Odia is that they are bold enough to say it, though they do not have sufficient logical arguments to support what they say. In this chapter, I am going to demonstrate that, definitely, Africans have not only the capacities to do logic, they actually have logic in both their proverbs or wise sayings and their language. Since I have no capacity to talk about all African cultures, I will speak with confidence about the cultures I am familiar with: the Acholi of northern Uganda and Luganda of southern Uganda. These are the cultures with which I am proud to be associated. Ndubisi supports the existence of African logic when he tries to identify its nature and function in African epistemology. He writes: Logic, on its part, distinguishes correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning. It borders on the criteria or the yardstick for our acclaimed knowledge. […]. Logic provides the necessary ‘instruments’ for proper presentation of what we claim to know. […] logic is very essential to the study of African Epistemology. […] the function of logic in African epistemology is to provide the African epistemologist with good, coherent and systematic approach to objective knowledge acquisition. (Ndubisi, 2014, p. 32)

In the above text, Ndubisi is not only accepting that African logic exists and is essential, but also that it is the criterion or yardstick for presenting

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knowledge. I would add that logic is the basis of language, which is a tool for presenting knowledge, since it informs the coherent or incoherent use and application of concepts in any language. This is the only way in which both written and oral languages are intelligible. Without logic, no human language would be understandable. So can Africans have intelligible languages and no logic, yet these languages are not the same in form and order like those to be derived from the so-called universal human thought processes. In fact Ndubisi concludes by saying, “One important point to note is that the function of logic in African epistemology has to be viewed through the focal lens of the African person as a being in the African world” (2014, p. 36). Meaning, the African world may not be identical with other people’s worlds, so how can their logic be exactly the same like other people’s logic? Logic is then defined as the study of principles and methods of distinguishing right from wrong reasoning. Walter Brugger defines logic as thinking “but looked at from the point of view of the relationships existing between ideas themselves which can be attributed in the same sense to many individuals” (1972a, p. 227). He adds that, “Formal logic or logic in the stricter sense looks at the correctness or logical consistency of thinking (laws of thinking)” (Brugger, 1972a, p. 228). He distinguishes logic from epistemology and methodology by saying that “Theory of knowledge considers correspondence with reality or truth; and methodology concentrates on the ways of finding the truth” (1972a, p. 228). So, logic concentrates on the correctness or consistency of reasoning, epistemology insists on correspondence with reality, while methodology considers the ways of finding out the truth. Methodologically, however, there is a relationship between these three disciplines in Western philosophy because all use human reason. To discover the truth (epistemology), humans employ human reason; to discover the best ways of arriving at the truth (methodology), humans use human reason; and to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning (logic), humans use human reason. It is this insistence on the use of human reason alone that distinguishes African philosophy from Western philosophy. This is because to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning, humans do not only employ human reason, since they equally use their senses of intuition. Similarly, to arrive at the truth or identify the best ways of arriving at the truth, humans in African philosophy employ both rational and intuitive senses.

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Besides, the context and philosophical worldview of a people determine how they distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning. Implying, though the principles determining what is right from wrong reasoning could be the same in different societies, differences may still be determined by the particular worldview of a given people. The Acholi and the Buganda too, like many other African societies, had their own philosophical worldviews, which helped them to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning, good from bad reasoning. We shall then use these selected African languages and proverbs to showcase.

2.2   Analysis of Chimakonam’s African Logic Jonathan O. Chimakonam (2019) has made one strong affirmation about African logic, with which this book agrees, that “Logic is not a property of one race” (pp. xii–xiii). He adds that “It is almost impossible to create a new idea if one has no logic” (2019, pp. xii–xiii). Conclusively, he recommends that it is time “for Africa to rise up and systematize its own logic in order to manifest its own natural creative originality” (2019, pp. xii–xiii). Chimakonam (2019, p. xxi) divides and summarizes his book into 11 chapters, but for the purpose of this book, we are interested in analysing the logic-based foundation of African philosophy. Chapter 1 replicates the Western paradigm insisting on reason as the only basis of any philosophy including logic, which this book thinks undermines other equally important methods of deriving knowledge. We shall not delve into analysing some problematics in African logic, which distinguishes African logic or African philosophy from ethnophilosophy. We shall not discuss schools of thought in African logic constituting the apologists, polemicists, and system builders, showing that true African logic subsists in the system builders’ school of thought. The question of method Ezumezu as a method or as formal system will not be the focus of this analysis, since by method Chimakonam dwells so much on criticality as the Western basis for doing logic, versus the unique African method, which antagonizes African philosophy with Western philosophy. We shall not dwell on the clarifications or justifications of Ezumezu logic or applications of this logic. This is because it diverts our attention from looking at African logic. In Chap. 2, while Chimakonam still spends a lot of energy flogging a dead horse by dwelling on questions whose answers gave rise to the rejection of African philosophy, unfortunately, he still thinks they are very important. These questions are “what makes a discourse, philosophy? And

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what makes a philosophy, African?” (2019, p. 21). In the preface of his book, he had already disposed of this question by saying the answers that persisted up to then were the Platonic and Aristotelian paradigms, which he rightly observed stifle any other humans to think outside the box. The only point he raises, which seems to be of interest to us, in as far as African logic is concerned, is what he wrote: “I contend that all traditions might be universal but they were first particulars rooted in different systems of logic. The universal in this sense, is a collection of particulars with distinct methodical and logical nuances” (2019, p. 21). To support this view, he cites Aime Cesaire, who in a letter to Maurice Thorez in 1956 opined that: “I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. But neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated universalism. There are two ways to lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in the “universal”” (Césaire, 2010, p.  152; Chimakonam, 2019, p. 21). I have some problem with this way of thinking as I will explain shortly. On the issue of universalism claimed by Chimakonam, there is some problem when he writes: Any discourse that treats African or non-African issues […], but is capable of universal application can qualify as African philosophy insofar as it is produced with African culture-inspired methods grounded in the logic of African ontology or the instrument of logic tradition in Africa which is arumaristic in structure. (2019, p. 35)

I have a problem with the concept of universalism constituted as a rule of philosophy. Meaning, if an idea is not universalizable, then it is not philosophy, and only when it is universalizable then it becomes philosophy. I do not agree with this way of thinking, because some ideas are universalizable, but they may never be universalized due to differences in contexts and philosophical worldviews of the different peoples. In drawing a conclusion on Chap. 2, Chimakonam brings in an important point but at the same time shoots himself in the foot. He rightly concludes that, “Ezumezu system is therefore called African logic because it is developed within the African philosophical tradition and with generous African ontological paraphernalia, to shape and undergird philosophical inquiries in Africa” (2019, p. 36). But he goes on to say, this logic is “not as polemicists suppose that it points to a unique African way of thinking. Again, this latter attribute of driving philosophical inquiries in Africa

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does not in any way vitiate its universal applicability” (2019, p. 36). The reason he gives is for the fear “that the evocation of ‘African’ reawakens the idea of ethnophilosophy or any sort of unique, pure, culture-bound excavations” (2019, p. 36). The problem here is the way Chimakonam distinguishes African logic or any other philosophy that is genuinely philosophical from ethnophilosophy. He thinks ethnophilosophy is a unique, pure, culture-bound excavation of Africans. This is wrong in my view because ethnophilosophy is a systematic African tradition imbued with individual thoughts that are rooted in the thinking system, rationally justifiable worldviews of its people as it has evolved over the years, improved, and transmitted through the communally accepted African ethos. This is where the particulars, Chimakonam is taking about, are seated. There are aspects of ethnophilosophy that are universalizable, while others are unique because of the unique socio-philosophical contexts and worldviews of the different societies. Within this deeply rooted ethos of the different African peoples, one can find logic buried in their languages, their metaphysics, their theory of knowledge, and their wisdom philosophy, to mention some of them.

2.3  Logic in Selected African Languages The first to demonstrate the existence of logic in an African language is found in Acholi counting system. In the Acholi counting system, they use base-five counting system. This means, their numbering runs up to five and from five they begin by adding one number to five, two numbers to five, three numbers to five, four numbers to five, and so on. After ten, they use then the existing numbers and add them to ten. This has already been discussed by Lajul (2014, p. 76). This way of counting is not uniform to all African languages, and in fact a language like Luganda follows a base-ten counting system. Because the counting system of the Acholi was not derived after the arrival of the colonialists, we have all the reason to attribute it to the traditional logic and wisdom embedded in their language. This is a case of a particular systematic logic that is not universalizable. This kind of wisdom is equally embedded in the Luganda language, whereby names of individuals, apart from those belonging to the royals, proverbial names, and those that run across the different clans of Buganda, there is a way in which one can tell, from the name of an individual, the clan to which that individual belongs. Female names like Nankya,

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Namubiru, and Nansubuga automatically belong to the Buganda Mamba clan (Lung Fish clan), while names like Nabossa, Nakiguli, and Namakula belong to Buganda Ndiga clan (Sheep clan). One could argue, since there are lots of irregularities in the way such names are arranged besides the fact that some of the names are shared among different clans, there is no logic in such an arrangement of names. However, even though we can accept that such irregularities exist, it does not explain away the fact that there is a very deep thinking behind such arrangement of names. What is even more striking is the fact that the central purpose of this naming system is for easy identification of relatives wherever they meet. From a name of a man or a woman, one can tell the clan he/she comes from, and if the two are from the same clan, then it means they have some relations which can prevent marriage union, since close relatives do not marry each other. Though such purpose may be moral, essentially it is more logically ontological. This is because in the ontological arrangement of Africans, blood relatives are all considered to be tightly related to each other, so they are sources of support for each other. To strengthen these ontological bonds, then ethically it becomes a taboo to marry one’s own sister or brother. So, logically, names are arranged in such a way as to prevent this bond to be broken.

2.4  Logic in Selected African Proverbs In some of the selected African proverbs, we can identify at least two themes in respect of logical arguments. These are similarity and differences, and sequence in events and in time. 2.4.1   Similarities and Differences In respect of the first themes, similarity can be a natural or a temporal quality in the African thought system. Natural similarities are embedded in the essential qualities of objects considered to be similar. In such similarities, there are properties that make such similar object essentially different from each other. While temporal similarities are likeness of different objects at a given time, the following proverb points to natural similarities with their essential differences as well. Bedo i nget bye oweko kum pura kwar [Acholi Proverb]- (Banya, Proverb No. B9; Appendix, No. 19)

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According to Banya, the literal meaning of the above proverb is that “Staying round the anthill all the time made the body of hartebeest antelope changed to reddish” (Banya, 1994, p.  137). In the appendix, the proverb is translated as “An antelope is brown because of its acquaintance with the anthill” (Appendix, No. 19). Contextually, this proverb can be placed in the animal world. In the animal world, antelopes like grazing around anthills, where they can easily see incoming predators. Since anthills are brown by nature, an association is made between the brownness of anthills and the brownness of antelopes, creating the impression that the antelopes derived their brownness from the anthills around which they graze. The deeper meaning is that familiarity breeds contempt. Implying, familiarity creates impressive linkages between objects that are by nature not similar or related. Temporally, it is normal to create causal link between things that are similar, but logically it is wrong to think, because such objects are similar to each other, then they are essentially related—meaning one quality in object is essentially the same as the other quality in another object. This way of reasoning makes humans to commit fallacies in reasoning by assuming linkages that do not exist in nature. The second deeper meaning in this proverb is that even though two or more objects are not related by nature, temporal association between them creates sense impression of oneness; the two objects begin to look similar because of familiarity, though logically there is no actual connection. Banya interprets this in terms of human behaviour that associating with bad or good people makes one imitate their way of behaviour (1994, p. 137). It is often believed that individuals take their way of behaviour from society, but logically, this is not true because humans have the ability, as individuals, to choose between the good and bad values of society and to adopt themselves to the preferred social values they have identified. You can tell a ripe corn by its fruit. A chick that will grow into a cock can be spotted the very same day it hatches [West African Proverbs]  – (Pinheiro, 2014, p. 564) The prototypical meaning in the former proverb refers to a food which is ready to be eaten. It is ripe, and you can say so just by looking at it. The prototypical meaning in the latter proverb makes a distinction between a chick (standing for a baby boy) and a cock (which embodies an adult male). The context of the second proverb is that of human character that begins to manifest itself right from childhood. As Pinheiro affirms, “I can trust you. I know it as I look at you. As our fathers said, you can tell a ripe corn by its look” (2014, p. 564). This proverb was taken from the book

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of Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart. Thus, Okonkwo was the ‘ripe corn’, and Nwakibie rightly said, “I know it as I look at you. As our fathers said, a chick that will grow into a cock can be spotted the very day it hatches” (Pinheiro, 2014, p.  564). The deeper meaning is that signs of a good character in adult life can already be deduced from the time a child is still young. Philosophically, we are saying there is similarity between human adult life and their childhood. The logical implication is that there is something in the adult life of a human being that began its manifestation in the early life of that person. So, logically, this proverb is saying, it is wrong to say an adult life is totally different from childhood life. This can also mean what is has a great resemblance with what was; conversely, what was continues to manifest itself in what is. This is similar to another African proverb, “If you want to know the end, look at the beginning” (Liles, 2023). Don’t think there are no crocodiles just because the water is calm [African Proverb] - (Liles, 2023). The meaning of this proverb is that quietness is not a sign of peace and absence of troubles. The context is that of the natural world, where crocodiles that live most of the time under water trap their prey at water bodies. For them to succeed to catch their prey, they have to remain calm and not to stir the water bodies, since it would signal to the animals of their presence. So, an animal coming to drink water and finds the water quite calm has to be careful since their hidden enemies could be nearby in the calm water. The deeper meaning is that there is no correlation (similarity) between calmness of a situation with the absence of trouble. The philosophy is that peace is not absence of war; calmness is not an indicator of the absence of trouble. Logically, peace does not correspond to the absence of trouble. The two are not logically related. This is because where there is apparent absence of trouble, there could be other forms of trouble that make human life difficult. 2.4.2   Sequence in Events and Time In day-to-day life, humans see events following one another; equally, there are rhythms between moments. The question that is frequently asked is whether events that follow one another have any relationships and are the rhythms in moments repetitive or linear. From the following proverbs, we shall see that for Africans, a number of errors are often committed in trying to link events that follow one another. Equally they find it difficult to

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see prospects of repetition in the rhythms between moments. We shall then examine some of the proverbs. Kakot dag cwer, pe gileng iwi yamo [Acholi Proverb]  - (Appendix, No. 46). The literal meaning of this proverb is that “if it does not rain, it should not be blamed on the winds” (Appendix, No. 46). The context is that of rain that at times appears as if it is going to downpour cats and dogs, then all of a sudden the clouds dissipate. The tendency is to blame the winds that rain was going to be much, but now look at the winds that have blown away the clouds. The deeper meaning is that what is not going to happen will not happen; blame should not be shifted to circumstances. The philosophy behind this proverb is that whatever happens has its cause, and circumstantial events or happenings should not be confused with causes. The logic is events that follow one another are often illogically connected as if they have causal relations. Like the blowing of the winds when it is threatening to rain, and dissipation of the clouds, as if the winds that come before are the cause of the failure to rain. This is similar to the Western logical fallacy of non causa pro causa—what comes before an event is not necessarily its cause. Okom oreto langwec [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 117). This second proverb literally means, “A runner stumbled just because of a rotten wood” (Appendix, No. 117). Okom is a rotten piece of wood or stem of a fallen tree that has been eaten up by termites and because they still protrude above the grounds, they can no longer cause much damage even if someone stumbles by them. Yet, when a running person stumbles by them, the excuse they give is that it was because of that okom that they did not win or succeed, which is an incorrect reasoning. The deeper meaning is that an excuse is often given for an already defeated or lost case. Philosophically, the proverb is refuting attribution of a wrong cause to an effect. Logically we can say, what precedes an event is not always its cause—logical fallacy of non causa pro causa. Pii pe mol dok tere [Acholi Proverb]  - (p’Bitek, Proverb No. 147; Appendix, No. 135) The third proverb is about time as rhythms of moments. According to p’Bitek, the proverb literally means, “Water does not flow upwards to the source of the river” (1985, p. 36). The context is that of the natural world. In the natural world, waters from the rivers keep flowing in the same direction and never backwards. The waters that have flown down the rivers cannot flow in the opposite direction. The deeper meaning for p’Bitek is

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that “The march of time cannot be arrested. Old age must come and with it general decline” (1985, p. 36). This also means time is progressive, and we can never grow younger. The philosophy behind this proverb is that time is linear. Logically, time is the rhythm between moments and always progressive and never retrogressive. Enkima bwelemerelwa okutuukirira elyenvu, nti ago tegengedde [Ganda Proverb] – (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 12). The literal meaning is that “When a monkey can’t reach the ripe bananas with his hands, he says they are not ripe” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 13). The deeper meaning is that “People give excuses and reasons for failing to do something when it is not easy to do” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 13). The philosophy is that “We should learn to be persistent and focused on what we want to achieve. Continue your efforts and in the end there will be success” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 13). Logically, it is right to give the true reasons for the success or failure of an event. Diversionary reasons are in themselves illogical. This is because when people fail to achieve a goal, like the monkey in the proverb, they tend to divert to reasons that are not connected or consistent with the reality on the ground. Thus, illogical; like in the proverb, failure to pick the ripe banana was not because the banana was not ripe, but because the monkey was incapable to reach it. Babadde bawoza ogwe embwa ng’endiga erinnye enjoy [Ganda Proverb] – (Nabiryo, 2020, p. 22). The literal meaning is that “The sheep to climb a roof symbolizes bad omen” (Nabiryo, 2020, p. 22). The context is that of the animal world, where goats are known to be stubborn and can easily climb a roof of a house. But this is not known of the sheep because they are known to be very calm and less active animals. So, it is an abnormality to see a sheep climbing the roof of a house, and when this happens, it is believed to be a bad omen. “It shows something bad is going to happen” (Nabiryo, 2020, p. 22). The deeper meaning is that when a sheep climbs a roof, it is “a sign of warning to others about something bad that may happen if they proceed with what they are doing” (Nabiryo, 2020, p. 22). The philosophy is that extraordinary happenings are often signs of incoming dangers. The logic is that events have relations to their roots causes, where bad consequences are foreseeable in preceding events. The meaning is that bad consequences are often preceded by bad causative indicators. This helps people to always be careful with what they do in life.

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2.5  Discussing African Logic In discussing African logic in the proverbs, we have to take into considerations the two themes we have highlighted, namely, similarities and difference, and sequence in events and time. 2.5.1   Similarities and Differences Under this theme, we can derive the following logical principles in African logic. The first logical principle is that logically, it is wrong to think, because objects are similar to each other, so they are essentially related to each other. Empirically, acquaintance or familiarity may create causal link between things that are similar, but logically, this is not a correct reasoning. Failure to respect this logical principle makes humans see linkages that do not exist in reality. The second logical principle is that common association among objects creates false sense impression of relatedness of the realities just because of their similarities or familiarity; however, these are temporal impressions that do not correspond to the natural connectedness they seem to represent. These two logical principles can help in discouraging bad reasoning in society. The third logical principle states that what is has a resemblance with what was; conversely, what was continues to manifest itself in what is. This is because logically, it is wrong to say an adult life is totally different from childhood life. This is captured in the proverb that says, “If you want to know the end, look at the beginning” (Liles, 2023). The fourth logical principle states that peace does not correspond to absence of trouble. This is because where there is apparent absence of trouble, there could be other forms of trouble that make human life difficult. Conversely, where some trouble is, it does not mean there is totally no peace. Peace in this sense is defined as positive presence of justice, better means of livelihood, and greater opportunities that make human life better. Logically, the negative understanding of peace as the absence of trouble or war is not sufficient to understand the dynamics of human living. 2.5.2   Sequence in Events and Time The first principle on sequence and events says what comes before an event is not necessarily the cause of the event that comes after. This is exactly the

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same as the Western logical fallacy called non causa, pro causa. There are a number of proverbs that support this principle. It is a fallacy to think because two events follow one another, then the first event is the cause of the second event. “If it does not rain, it should not be blamed on the winds” (Kot ka dag cwer pe gileng i wi yamo), implying failure to rain is not necessarily caused by the preceding winds, because other factors could have been responsible. This can also be analysed from another angle. The argument behind this fallacy is that: If the winds blow away the clouds, then it will not rain It has not rained So, the winds blew away the clouds

The formal fallacy committed here is that of “affirming the consequent”. This fallacy states that it is true that in any conditional statement, so long as the antecedent is affirmed, then one can validly affirm the consequent.1 But in the above argument, given a conditional statement, If the winds blow away the clouds, then it will not rain, and the affirmation of the consequent (It has not rained), so it is fallacious to affirm the antecedent, which says, the winds blew the clouds. We can also prove that this argument is fallacious by using a truth table method for testing the validity of an argument. This method tells us that whenever the premises of an argument are true, then its conclusion must also be true; otherwise it is automatically invalid, which is the case in the above argument. W -> -R, -R, :.W, where W stands for “The wind blows away the clouds”; -R stands for “It will not rain”. W -> -R, -R, :.W The truth table above shows that the argument is invalid because for a valid argument, there is no possibility for its promises to be true, while its conclusion is false (Table 2.2). In line 4 in the above table, the first premise is true; the second premise is also true, while their conclusion is false. So, where all premises are true, but the conclusion is false, it is definitely sure that such an argument is invalid. The second proverb says, “By stumbling on the okom, it has pushed forward the runner” (Okom oyoko langwec), implying what is considered to 1  This assertion does not mean, if it is African, then it must not match with the Western logic. This way of reasoning makes any form of African philosophical thinking or logic an anti-thesis of the Western philosophy. This way of reasoning is wrong because we have said already above that there are a lot African logic shares with Western logic, but there are also variations. This is only one of the similarities; we have not yet analysed everything.

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Table 2.2  Validity Test Truth Table W

R

(W

->

-R),

-R,

:.W

T T F F

T F T F

T T F F

F T T T

F T F T

F T F T

T T F F

be a hindrance, instead, has become a facilitator. Logically it means, an impediment hinders the progress of an activity, but in reality, this may not be always true. Instead, an impediment can become an aid to an ongoing progress. The second meaning is that what comes before is not always the cause of what comes after. In the first case, it is not the wind that is the problem, but the failure to rain, which is not necessarily caused by the wind. In the second case, the rotten wood that normally should be a hindrance to the ongoing progress, but instead it is the facilitator of the ongoing progress. In both cases, events that preceded the later events are attributed to be causes of the later events, which are logically fallacious. The third logical principle we shall consider is that which says, “Time is Linear” (Pii pe mol dok cen). While other African thinkers, like John Mbiti (1969), think that, for Africans, time is circular, for the Acholi instead, time is linear because what comes does not repeat itself. This is also supported by other proverbs which say, “Opportunity knocks, but once” (Olam ma mit pe cek giryo). If opportunities come your way, one should take advantage of it, but not to wait because another one is still coming. It may never come again. This is similar to two other proverbs: one says, “Ground Hornbill sleeps hungry in spite of a swarm of locusts” (Arum obutu kec i wii bonyo), and “A bird in the hand is better than two in the bush” (mak tunu aye pok). All these proverbs point to the fact that what you have now is yours; what you still do not have is not sure if it will be given to you. Time actually is linear; it is not circullar, so what you fail to get now, you may not be sure you can still get when another opportunity offers itself. Time does not turn around because it is always progressive. In a crude way, another proverb says, “a male child sleeps with the mother once, and never again” (Latin lacoo butu ki mine gicel keken). When a male child is getting out of the mother’s womb is the only moment he passes through the mother’s vagina, and never again in life. If it happens again, it becomes an abomination par excellence.

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This may be contrary to the West African proverb which says, “What goes around comes around” (Appendix, No. 235). Though this may be said of time, what this West African proverb is saying is that what you do to others will also one day be done to you. This is not in contrast to the fact that time is considered to be linear. Two other principles come from Luganda proverbs. The first one says it is logical to give the true reasons for the success or failure of an event; any diversionary reason is illogical. This is because when people fail to achieve a goal, they tend to divert to reasons that are not connected or consistent with the reality on the ground, so their reasoning becomes illogical. This is illustrated in the proverb that “when a Monkey fails to pick a ripe banana, then he says, after-all the banana what not ripe”. The last principle is that events have relations to their roots causes, where consequences are foreseeable in preceding events. Implying, consequences are often preceded by causes, and bad consequences are also preceded by bad causative indicators, while good consequences are preceded by good causative indicators. What is new in the African logic is that not only effects are affected by their causes, but also bad and good effects have bad and good causative indicators, respectively. This helps people to always be careful with what they do in life.

2.6   Principles of Logic in Acholi Language There are several principles in Acholi logic; some are exactly understood in the same way as in Western logic, while there are also variations. The interesting part is to discover these variations created by linguistic and cultural differences and worldviews. It is in the philosophy behind these different worldviews where such differences subsist. In my view, this is healthy, and it is a confirmation that there are indeed different world philosophies; some are unique to particular cultural societies, while others are spread over a much wider cultural spaces, which normally cut across different geographical spaces. 2.6.1   Principle of Negation (pe, ku, bong, bongo, peke) According to Ocaya (2004), in Acholi logic, negation is always rendered by the words pe, ku, bong, or bongo, and I would add peke. Like in the proverb, Mon rwotgi peke, meaning “Women have no chiefs” (Proverb No. 43, p’Bitek, 1985, p.  10), and Pyem tutwal oweko lak gweno peke,

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meaning, “Too much argument made chickens have no teeth” (Proverb, No. 54, p’Bitek, 1985, p. 13). To illustrate this we can use two of p’Bitek’s proverbs. The first one says, Agoro pe camo kato kulu, meaning, “Agoro termites do not cross a stream to feed on the other side” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 1, Proverb No. 1). Here we are using the proverb to demonstrate Acholi use of “Negation” in their language. Here the word “pe” is used to illustrate that these termites called Agoro, however destructive they are, they “do not” feed on the other side of the stream. The second example is a proverb which says: Aweno pe gilaro ki won tol, meaning, “No one disputes the ownership of a guinea fowl with the owner of the snare in which it has been caught” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 2; Proverb No. 7). In the same way, here the word “pe” - no illustrates that guinea fowl is “not” disputed with the owner of the snare in which it has been caught. So, respect and honour is given to those that deserve it, and it is not disputed. 2.6.2   Principle of Conjunction (ki) Ochaya rightly gives the principle of conjunction in Acholi language, though he gives a wrong example to illustrate it. First of all he says: Conjunction denotes the conjoint truth of the propositions combined by the conjunctive connective (and), and the proposition is true only when all the conjuncts are true. The Acholi language uses ki (and) to construct a conjunction as in Opio ki Ocen beco  - Opio and Ocen are good. (Ocaya, 2004, p. 288)

In logic, a conjunction is a compound sentence composed of two propositions. However, when Ocaya (2004) gives the example of a conjunction in Acholi as “Opio ki Ocen beco (Opio and Ocen are good)”, he does not observe the rule of logic that each of the parts of a conjunction must be sentences that have the capacity of being true of false, so must be propositions. In this case, to say “Opio ki Ocen beco” does not reflect this principle. This is because the word Opio by itself has no capacity of being true or false, and even Ocen by itself has no capacity of being true or false. For this example to be correct, the compound sentence should read: Opio ber ki Ocen ber, Opio is good “and” Ocen is good. The two parts of this compound sentence have now the capacity of being true or false.

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2.6.3   Principle of Logical Contradiction I have discovered that, Acholi language does not have logical contradictions, as Ocaya has rightly observed. For him: there is a logical contradiction when a quality is attributed to, and denied of, a thing at one and the same time and under the same circumstances. In propositional logic a contradiction is a logical conjunction in which one of the conjuncts is the negation of the other. Such a proposition is always false. It is self-contradictory, and its negation is a tautology known in logic as the law of non-contradiction. The Acholi language prefers atomic propositions to molecular ones. So a compound proposition which clearly expresses a logical contradiction is hard to come by. But, implicitly, there is a constant use of the principle of non-contradiction in the language. (2004, p. 288)

This means, Acholi language, which usually prefers to use atomic propositions instead of molecular propositions, in the language of Ocaya, has logical contradictions. Ocaya gives the following examples to illustrate this: Maa mito agulu (Mother wants a pot) and Maa gire pe mito agulu (Mother does not want a pot) (Ocaya, 2004, p. 288). He explains that what the second conjunct means is that the mother wants instead a gourd and not a pot. Second example, Kitgum ber, ci pe ber (Kitgum is good and not good) (Ocaya, 2004, p.  288). For Ocaya, what this implies is that “under certain circumstances Kitgum is good; but from other points of view the town is not good” (Ocaya, 2004, p. 288). The third example he gives is that: “Kongo ni mit marac (This beer is very good. Literally: This beer is good bad) (Ocaya, 2004, p. 288). My observation is that these examples do not give the best examples of logical contradictions for the following reasons. From the first two examples, the circumstances are not the same, and so two propositions cannot be contradictory under different circumstances. Literally, the first conjunction is contradictory to the second one because one cannot want a pot and at the same time not want a pot. The second conjunct is not contrary to the first conjunct because it is not stated fully. When fully stated, this proposition would read Maa gire pe mito agulu ento opoko (Mother does not want a pot, but a gourd). In that sense, the deeper meaning of the two propositions is not contradictory because they do not contradict each other. Taken literally, they appear to be contradictory to each other, but taken in the proper context, they are not contradictory to each other, so they are not logically contradictory.

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In the second example, it is the problem of circumstance; Kitgum is good under one circumstance, but bad under another circumstance. This is not a logical contradiction because the circumstances are not the same. In the last example, Kongo ni mit marac (This beer is good bad) is only a logical contradiction when it is taken in its literal sense. However, when the actual meaning of the sentence is taken, “Kongo ni mit marac”, which means, (This beer is very good) (Ocaya, 2004, p. 288), then it is not a contradiction. The reason why it looks like a logical contradiction is because, in Acholi language, the use of the word “too” much of something is replaced by the use of negation. Instead of saying, “This beer is too good to be missed”, The Acholi would say, “Kongo ni mit marac”. This is similar to other expressions like: Myel man opong marac or myel man opong ma pe wace (This dance is full beyond description); Nyanni leng ma pe inen (The girl is beautiful beyond any seen beauty); Kongo man mit ma pe wace (This beer is nice beyond description); Nyan ni leng la pore pe (The girl is beautiful beyond comparison). So, expressions like marac, pe wace, pe inen, la pore pe, to mention some of them, do not reflect negation, but instead affirmation of a given quality to a much higher degree than the ordinary. The ordinary are expressed in simpler terms like: Kongo man mit (This beer is good); Myel man opong (The dance was full); Nyanni leng (The girl is beautiful). When emphasis is given to a given quality, then such emphasis will carry negation as we have seen above. Such emphasis does not demonstrate existence of logical contradictions in Acholi language. In conclusion I can say, though Ocaya also acknowledges that in Acholi language logical contradiction is hard to come by, I would say that they do not exist. This is because all the examples given by Ocaya are actually not logical contradictions as explained above. Emphasis in Acholi language tends to use the negative in the sense that they have “no comparison” (la pore pe), “beyond human words” (pe wace), “not seen before” (pe inen), and “too good to …” (marac). 2.6.4   Principle of Disjunction: nyo, onyo (or) A disjunction, according to Acholi logic, is a compound sentence with two mutually exclusive disjuncts, as Ocaya explains below: The inclusive disjunction, usually symbolized “v,” is a compound proposition which is true if and only if at least one disjunct is true. And an exclusive

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disjunction “/” is true if and only if one principal disjunct is true and the other is false. Disjunctive connectives in Acholi are nyo, onyo (or). The Acholi language recognizes only the exclusive disjunction. For example, Okello ka pe paco, ci tye i poto (Okello is either at home or in the fields). […]. So, from an exclusive disjunction and any of its disjuncts as premises, the Acholi validly conclude the negation of the other disjunct. (Ocaya, 2004, p. 289)

In Acholi language, one can also use terms like “either” ka, “or” ci. For instance, “Ka” Okello pe paco, “ci” tye i poto (Either Okello is at home, or he is in the fields). I agree with Ocaya, who observes that in Acholi disjunctive logic, the two disjuncts cannot both be true, because if one is true, then the other must be false. For example, one cannot say “Akello tye dako, nyo en tye mego” (Either Akello is a woman or she is a mother). This does not make sense in Acholi language because it is not only possible, it is true that if Akello is a woman, then she can also be a mother. While it is perfectly right to say, “Akello tye dako, nyo en pe dako” (Either Akello is woman or she is not a woman), in this case both cannot be true. In Western disjunctive logic, there are three possible scenarios: either both disjuncts are true; or one disjunct is true and the other disjunct is false; or both disjuncts are false. In Acholi disjunctive logic, a disjunction is true only when one of the disjuncts is true and the other is false, but it is possible to have both disjuncts true, yet the disjunction itself is false. For instance, one can say, “Okello tye i paco, nyo en tye i poto” (Okello is either at home or he is in the fields). In this case, it is possible that Okello may not be at home and not even in the fields. In such case, then the disjuncts are both true, yet the disjunction false. While in Western logic a disjunction is true when either both disjuncts are true or one of them is true, it is false only when both disjuncts are false. 2.6.5   Principle of Excluded Middle or Law of Excluded Middle Ocaya makes a very interesting observation that, while Western logic clearly believes in the law of excluded middle, Acholi logic defies this logic by providing a possibility of the middle position. Though authors like Russell (1923) and Black (1937) think that natural language is totally vague and should be eliminated from formal logic, Zadek (1972), Gaines (1976), Haack (1978), and Sainsbury (1986) argue that the existence of

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vagueness in ordinary discourse should be taken seriously because it can as well be a blessing in disguise. To support this view Ochaya wrote: This principle [Law of excluded middle] says that between a statement and its negation there is no other alternative. The Acholi language, however, has a peculiar way of repeating an adjective in a manner that seems to suggest a third possible alternative between a statement and its negation. For example: 1. Piny lyet: It is hot. (P); 2. Piny pe lyet: It is not hot. (-P); 3. Piny lyet-­ lyet: It is rather hot. (?) In (3) the English “rather” does not capture the Acholi idea of lyet-lyet, which is somewhere between (1) and (2). Piny lyet-lyet quite unambiguously asserts that it is neither “hot” nor “not hot” and the law of excluded middle rules out just this possibility. This is evidence against the law of excluded middle, from an Acholi standpoint. (Ocaya, 2004, p. 289)

This is an interesting observation on the side of Ocaya, who does not take for granted the Western principles of logic, given his deep knowledge of Acholi language and many years of teaching Western Logic at institutions of higher learning. To support him, I disagree with Russell and Black, who want to dismiss natural language as unfit for formal logic because of their vagueness. This is because even the so-called Western language like English has its vagueness in many respects. Take, for example, in English, one would say, “I am going to the market”, but this statement is vague because it does not tell us how one will reach the market. German language instead would be more precise to tell you that one is either walking (gehen) to the market, or driving (fharen) to the market, or flying (fliegen) to the market. Secondly, to have a middle position does not render a given language vague. Instead it is a blessing in disguise, since what we have for long taken for granted may not be correct. Other examples from Acholi language could be used to support this observation of Ocaya. For instance, when one says, (1) Kongo ni lim (The beer is sweet), (2) Kongo ni pe lim (The beer is not sweet), and (3) Kongo ni lim lim (The beer is rather sweet), this indicates that a statement is not always true or false. It is possible to have the middle position. Like in the example given above, it can be true that the drink may be sweet or not sweet. But it is also possible for the drink to be neither sweet nor not sweet. To maintain this does not make the language vague, but instead it

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challenges the fact that it is not always the case that a statement can either be true or be false and there is no middle ground. Another example can be cited from the Bible, where in the book of revelation Jesus said, “So, because you are lukewarm, and neither hot nor cold, will I spit you out of my mouth” (Rev. 3:16). Meaning, it is better for one to be a devout Christian or not a devout Christian, but to be neither devout nor not devout is to be a lukewarm Christian, and Jesus will dissociate himself from them. So, it is preferable that a statement should also be true or not true, but that there exists also statements that are neither true nor false. Such statements are not vague or illogical. 2.6.6   Principle of Implication: ka, ci (if, then) Implication is always stated in the form of conditional propositions. According to Ocaya (2004), Acholi logic obeys all the rules of logical implications; however, this is possible when the human sense of intuition tells one that such an argument is valid and sound. Ocaya wrote: Anderson and Belnap (1975) argue that logical concepts such as that of validity, deducibility, or entailment must always take relevance into account. According to them, there is, for instance, deducibility only if a person’s unspoiled sense intuitively tells him that an inference is valid. The Acholi concur with this view. (2004, p. 291)

For Ocaya (2004), implication is expressed in the form of a conditional proposition, which can be false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent false. When it comes to the use of sense intuition, Ochaya gives telling examples which show that an argument may be valid according to formal language, but when it comes to natural language it may not actually feel valid or sound. In the following examples we can see what he means: 1. Ka mani obino, ci mi-ne lagony (If your mother comes, then give her the key). 2. Ka icamo kic i dwar ma nongo ceng lyet, ci oryo neki matek (If you eat honey during a hunt when the sun is hot, then you get very thirsty). 3. Ka in lacan, ci pe inyomo (If you are poor, then you cannot marry). 4. Ka Gulu petye i Acholi, ci maa pe onywala (If Gulu is not in Acholiland, then my mother did not beget me) (Ocaya, 2004, p. 290).

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In the examples given above, all these conditional propositions show some links between the antecedents and their consequences. For the conditional statements given above, in numbers 1 and 3 there are links, though these links are not causal. This is because the arrival of one’s mother has no causal relationship with the act of giving her the key. Equally, being poor is not causally related to one’s inability to marry. In numbers 2 and 4, there are causal links between the antecedents and the consequences. While for number 2 the link is natural, for number 4 the link is purely logical. The act of eating honey when the weather is hot is naturally related to the experience of getting thirsty. On the contrary, there is no natural causal relationship between Gulu being in Acholiland and one’s being born by one’s mother. However, the link between Gulu being in Acholiland and one not being born by one’s mother is purely logical. Taking each of these conditional statements one by one, we can also see that they could all be turned into arguments or syllogisms. But since they are not complete syllogisms, then they are enthymemes: 1. The argument in the first conditional sentence runs: If your mother comes, then give her the keys. Your mother comes. So, she is given the keys (Modus Ponens). Or, if your mother comes, then give her the keys. Your mother is not given the keys. So, your mother did not come (Modus Tollens). This argument is valid, but not sound, because the link between the antecedent and the consequent is not causal; it is purely logical since the coming of the mother is not the compelling reason for the keys to be given to her. The coming of the mother is not casually linked to giving to her the keys. 2. If you eat honey during a hunt when the sun is hot, then you will get very thirsty. He has eaten some honey during the hunt when the sun is hot. So, he is very thirsty (Modus Ponens). Or, if you eat honey during a hunt when the sun is hot, then you will get very thirsty. You are not very thirsty. So, you did not eat honey during the hunt when the sun is hot (Modus Tollens). This argument is valid and sound. This is because there is a natural causal link between the antecedent and its consequent. 3. If you are poor, then you cannot get married. You are poor. So, you cannot get married (Modus Ponens). Or, if you are poor, then you cannot get married. You are married. So, you are not poor (Modus Tollens). In this argument, though it is valid, but it is not sound, because there is no relevant links between its antecedent and

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c­ onsequence. There is no link between poverty and ability to get married. If one is married, it is not necessarily true that you are not poor. Similarly, because one is not married, it does not mean one is poor; there could be other reasons for not getting married. 4. If Gulu is not in Acholiland, then my mother did not beget me. Gulu is not in Acholiland. So, my mother did not beget me (Modus Ponens). Or, if Gulu is not in Acholiland, then my mother did not beget me. My mother begot me. So, Gulu is in Acholiland (Modus Tollens). These two arguments are valid, but not sound, since for an argument to be sound, it must first be valid and all the statements used must be true. From these examples and the analysis I made from the examples given by Ochaya, I have come to realize that what Ochaya calls sense of intuition is actually where one is able to detect and differentiate arguments that are only valid from those that are valid and sound. Meaning, in sound arguments, the arguments themselves are valid and all the propositions used are necessarily true. While for the others, the arguments are valid, but some of the propositions used are not necessarily true. Sense of intuition adds to natural language the ease to identify sound from non-sound arguments. This concept of logic is unique to Africans in general and to the Acholi logic in particular. In the West, to distinguish sound from unsound arguments only rationally prescribed logical proofs can be used, but in Acholi language, sense of intuition can as well be used to make the distinctions. A proverb that can be used to illustrate this is that which says: Kot ka dag cwer, pe gileng i wi yamo (If it does not rain, let it not be blamed on the wind). This is another enthymeme whose full hypothetical syllogism runs as follows: . If the wind blows, then it will not rain. 1 2. The winds have blown. 3. So, it has not rained. This Modus Ponens syllogism is valid but not necessarily sound. Blowing wind is not necessarily linked to the failure to rain. It may not rain for various reasons. In other instances, the winds themselves facilitate rain, and that is why we have rainstorms, which means rain that comes with a lot of winds.

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2.6.7   Principle of Logical Equivalence Two propositions are logically equivalent when one is true, then the other must be true, and if one side is false, then the other side must also be false. Ocaya puts it differently: Two propositions are equivalent if they entail each other, and to be the case both must either hold or not hold. The notion of logical equivalence is easily seen by the Acholi in the context of certain kinds of riddle. […]. A riddle of the kind in question is made up of an indirect description of an object (the problem). The object, when named, is the solution of the problem. In Acholi traditions it is generally acknowledged that the problem as set is equivalent to the correct answer given. For example, Akuri aryo ongolo nam (Two doves crossed the river) is equivalent to wang (the eyes). Here again riddles may help to see that the concepts of logical equivalence […] exist in the Acholi language. (Ocaya, 2004, p. 291)

Though Ochaya gives Opia ka pe paco, ci tye i te kongo (If Opia is not at home, then he is at the beer party) as an example of logical equivalent, I think that example is wrong or very weak. This is because even though he says this example should read (–P Q), meaning “if and only if Opia is not at home, then he is at a beer party”. Implying, if Opia is not at home then he is at a beer party, and if Opia is at a beer party, then he is not at home”. The example is weak because in natural language, the argument is valid but not sound. I would suggest another example, which says, Ka Alum pe meni, ci dong ango ma meni? (If Alum is not your mother, then who else is your mother?) This statement means, if and only if Alum is not your mother, then someone else is your mother. Implying, if Alum is not your mother, then someone else is your mother; and if someone else is your mother, then Alum is not your mother. This statement is a biconditional. Put as an argument, it would read: If and only if Alum is not your mother, then someone else is your mother. Alum is not your mother. So, someone else is your mother. Or If and only if Alum is not your mother, then someone else is your mother.

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Someone else is not your mother. So, Alum is your mother.

In this case, the argument is both valid and all the statements used can be true, so the argument is also sound. This shows that logical equivalence is also present in Acholi logic, as it is demonstrated above. The intuition is clear because the arguments are valid and all statements used are true. 2.6.8   Principle of Identity or Law of Identity The law of identity states that any given thing is identical with itself. This law is quite similar to the English language usage, which states that, “If it is a tree, then it is a tree”. The Acholi would say, “Ka ber, ci ber” (If it is good, then it is good), expressed symbolically as P -> P (Read as: If P, then P). Ocaya adds that: The law of identity states that any given thing is itself. In traditional logic, this law is given as A is A.  This formulation is ambiguous in the English language because the copula has various possible meanings like formal implication, identity, and formal equivalence. This problem does not arise in the Acholi language. Identity is expressed by juxtaposition of nouns: dano dano (man is man). This law is perhaps best identified with the mathematical theorem a = a. In this respect, too, the Acholi expression of the law of identity is precise. (Ocaya, 2004, p. 292)

Acholi gives a proverb which says: “Ka rac, ci rac” (If it is bad, then it is bad). The literal meaning of this proverb is that, “if bad, then bad”. Contextually, the proverb is used when men go for war, to hunt, or carry out a difficult and dangerous task. If it is going to mean death, let it be death. The deeper meaning is that, “Come what may”, let what is going to happen, happen. The philosophical meaning is that when something is going to happen, it will happen; one can do little or nothing about it. It is not blind predestination but a reasonable acceptance of what will follow a decision made. The logic is that, “what will happen is equivalent to that which will happen”. In another proverbial expressions, the Acholi would say; “Kun coo, kun coo” (Here we are men, and there you are men). It also means, we shall tussle it out, physically. If you are to win (or die), you will win (or die); if I am to win (or die), I will win (or die); there is no going back.

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2.6.9   Syllogistic Principle Acholi logic obeys all the syllogistic rules found in traditional logic. However, it does not have one of the qualities of standard form propositions, which is the copula. Secondly, it does not obey the rule that the standard form categorical propositions must always begin with the quantifiers. Ochaya adds that: The central assumption of syllogistic logic is that every statement has a subject of which something is predicated. According to that logic, there can be only four kinds of statement: (1) universal affirmative (A), e.g. Dano ducu to (All men are mortal); (2) universal negative (E), e.g. Dano ducu pe to (No man is mortal); (3) particular affirmative (I), e.g. Dano mukene to (Some men are mortal); (4) particular negative (O), e.g. Dano mukene pe to (Some men are not mortal). (Ocaya, 2004, p. 292)

In the above text, Ochaya confirms that in Acholi logic about syllogisms, two things are not in accordance with traditional logic: the absence of a copula and the arrangement of the terms in standard form propositions. In saying Dano ducu to (All men are mortal), there is the subject term “Dano” (Men), quantifier “ducu” (all), and the predicate term “to” (mortal), but there is no copula “are”. Similarly, the subject “Dano” is placed before the quantifier “ducu”. Ochaya also notices the presence of quality and quantities in the Acholi syllogistic logic. The quality is described in term of a negation, “pe” (not), while the quantities are described in terms of qualifiers, as explained above. To confirm this he writes: The symbols of quality (pe (not) and quantity (ducu (all); mukene (some) are readily discernible. Absent, of course, is the copula. The job of the copula is to indicate the presence of subject predicate relationships. This service does not, however, require the existence of another word. (Ocaya, 2004, p. 292)

As explained above, in Acholi logic, the standard form categorical propositions do not need to begin with quantifiers, like “ducu” (all) and “mukene” (some). The negation is indicated by the word “pe” (not), and the copula is conspicuously absent.

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2.7  Conclusion In conclusion we can say, though most of the basic logical principles are the same in Acholi logic as well as in traditional Western logic, there are, however, some dissimilarities. From the proverbs, we can derive two of such dissimilarities. The first one is on the question of sense knowledge. From sense knowledge we can derive a logical principle that similarities are not proofs of connectedness. Western empiricism tends to believe, true knowledge is only found in empirical experiences. But here the Acholi say empirical experiences can be deceptive. Empirical knowledge gives the wrong impression that things that are similar seem to be connected. For example, “staying near an anthill has made an antelope brown” - bedo i nget bye oweko kum pura kwar. Logically, this is incorrect reasoning. The Acholi also acknowledge that familiarity indeed breeds contempt, just as it is said in the West. However, such created wrong impression is logically false. The second variance is that time is linear. Western philosophy surely believes that time is linear, but Mbiti believes African concept of time is circular. But this is not true for all Africans since according to the Acholi, time is linear. I can also say that Acholi language contains most of the properties of Western traditional logic; however, there are variations in some aspects beside those observed above. The first clear variance is in logical contradiction. Though authors like Ocaya accept that logical contradiction is difficult to come by in Acholi language, I think it does not exist as it was discussed in this chapter. Secondly, when it comes to disjunctive logic, I have discovered, as it is strongly supported by Ocaya, that in Acholi logic they have exclusive disjunctions and not inclusive disjunctions. Inclusive disjunction implies the existence of two disjuncts in a disjunctive propositions that are both true. While exclusive disjunctions are disjunctive propositions, whereby if one is true then the other must be false; both of them cannot be true, though both of them can be false. Acholi logic subscribes to the existence of exclusive disjunctions and not inclusive disjunctions. Thirdly, while traditional Western logic believes in the logical law of excluded middle, the Acholi logic maintains the existence of middle positions. They believe that an event under the same circumstance may neither be true nor be false, but it may be both true and false to varying degrees. Under the same circumstance, an event may be true or may be false, but it

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may also be neither true nor false. For instance, water may be cold or hot, but it may also be neither cold nor hot, so lukewarm. Lastly, implications are present in Acholi logic. However, like in most natural languages, the difference between valid and sound arguments can easily be sensed by intuition. Such sense intuition on the rightness or wrongness of the arguments involving conditional statements means such arguments are not only valid but also sound. As for logical equivalence and law of identity, Acholi logic has the same properties as in traditional Western logic. In discussing African logic with varying degrees of agreements and disagreements, I have demonstrated that Africans do not only have the capacity to do logic, but that they have logic. African logic in general does not need to become an anti-thesis of other people’s logic. We have shown Africans have a lot in common with Western logic, but also variations. These variations arise because of the differences in philosophical worldviews, linguistic structures which are not the same all over the world.

References Airoboman, F. A., & Odia, S. I. (2019). Can there be an African logic? Journal of Philosophy and Culture, 7(2), 7–13. Anderson, A. R., & Belnap, N. D. (1975). Entailment: The logic of relevance and necessity (Vol. 1). Princeton University Press. Banya, A. A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda Development Series, No. 2). Foundations for African Development. Black, M. (1937). Vagueness. Philosophy of Science, 4, 427–455. Brugger, W. (1972a). Logic. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 227–228). Gonzaga University Press. Césaire, A. (2010). Letter to Mourice Thorez. Social Text 103, 28(2), 145–152. Translated by Chike Jeffers. https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-­2009-­071 Chimakonam, O. J. (2019). Ezumezu: A system of Logic for African philosophy studies. Springer. Etuk, U. (2002). The possibility of African Logic. In O. Oladipo (Ed.), The third way in African philosophy (Essays in Honour of Wiredu, K.) (pp.  102–110). Hope Publications. Gaines, B. (1976). Foundations of fuzzy reasoning. International Journal of Man-­ Machine Studies, 8, 623–668. Haack, S. (1978). Philosophy of logics. Cambridge University Press. Ishiabwe, A. (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) proverbs and wise sayings. African Proverbs Working Group.

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Jimoh, A. (1999). Context-dependency of human knowledge: Justification of an African epistemology. West African Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2(1), 18–39. Jimoh, A. (2004). Knowledge and truth in African epistemology. Ekpoma Review, 1, 66–81. Lajul, W. (2014). African philosophy: Critical dimensions. Fountain Publishers. Liles, M. (2023). 150 of the best African proverbs about life, love and family that are full of poetic wisdom. https://parade.com/1100530/marynliles/ african-­proverbs/ Mbiti, S. J. (1969). African religions and philosophy. Heinemann. Nabiryo, C. (2020). A study of symbolism in Ganda proverbs. Research report for Bachelor of Education of Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda. Ndubisi, J. O. E. (2014). Nature and function of logic in African epistemology. JOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19(11), 32–36. Nweke, C. A. V. (2012). African logic: A contemporary reflection on the condition for its existence and non-existence. Flash: Journal of Philosophy and Religion, 6(1), 49–71. Ocaya, V. (2004). Logic in the Acholi language. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 283–295). Blackwell. p’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. Pinheiro, F.  A. C. (2014). Africa viewed through its proverbs and literature. European Scientific Journal, SPECIAL/edition, pp.  557–565. ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 557. Russell, B. (1923). Vagueness. Australian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 84–92. Sainsbury, R.  M. (1986). Degrees of belief and degrees of truth (pp.  97–106). Philosophical Papers. Uduma, O. U. (2009). Can there be an African logic. In From footmarks to landmarks on African philosophy (pp. 289–311). Obaroh and Ogbinaka. Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and an African culture. Cambridge University Press. Zadek, L. A. (1972). Fuzzy languages and their relation to human intelligence. In Proceedings of the international conference: Man and computer (S. Karger).

CHAPTER 3

Moral Philosophy in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

3.1   Introduction Molefe (2016) believes that “One of the central debates in moral philosophy is the question whether morality is definable either in terms of partiality or impartiality” (Molefe, 2016, p.  1; see also: Cottingham, 1986; Singer, 1979; Wolf, 1992). Molefe defines partiality as “the view that we have immediate or stronger moral obligations to our own personal ties or special relationships, like friends and family, than we have to strangers” (Molefe, 2016, p. 1; See also Cottingham, 1986, p. 357; Metz, 2011). He defines impartiality as “the claim that we owe equal moral consideration to all moral patients without any consideration to the so-called special relationships; a moral agent is expected, on this view, to dispense moral goods from an indifferent, impersonal, or what is sometimes called an ‘ideal point of view’ ” (Molefe, 2016, p. 2). McNaughton and Rawling describe partiality as agent-relativity (1992, p.  526), while impartiality is agent-­ neutrality (1992, p. 526). Molefe, while rejecting what he calls the impartial morality, instead supports the consideration that partiality is the right way to understand African morality. He argues that, “impartiality, as represented by Wiredu, fails to cohere with moral intuitions characteristic of African moral thought, namely: the high prize usually accorded to the family, veneration of ancestors and the notion of personhood” (Molefe, 2016, p.  1). To © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_3

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reject impartiality, he said, “I used Wiredu’s ethical theory, sympathetic impartiality, as a foil to discuss African ethics in general. I argued that this moral principle fails to cohere with centrally defining features of African thought in general: the high price attached to the family and ancestor veneration” (Molefe, 2016, p. 16). I find problem with the “either” “or” type of arguments forcing readers to take the view that African ethics employs either partiality or impartiality models. In this way of thinking, there is no way in between. Molefe concludes that what Wiredu describes as “sympathetic impartiality” is equivalent, in real terms, to impartiality. The view in this chapter is that true African concept of morality is neither purely partial nor purely impartial. African concept of morality is derived from both the partial and impartial moral standards. This can be explained in the following ways. First, Molefe’s theory of partiality runs into trouble because he employs a very highly contested understanding of the human personhood to support his position. The normative view of the human person as presented by Menkiti (2004) and Metz (2007, 2012) is itself problematic. In the normative concept of the human person, a mature human person is considered not to be born, but made. Nwoye terms it “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”—a person is a person through other persons (2017, p. 42). This understanding of the human person is really problematic even in terms of morality. If an individual is just a by-product of social upbringing, then personal moral responsibilities would cease to exist in African societies. This is because an individual, and all that he or she does, is a result of his or her moral characterization which is produced by the society. In this sense, it is even difficult to talk of partiality, since everything is dependent on the communal identity and social values personified in an individual. Indirectly, everything is impartial from the individual point of view, since these are not only the standards of society but also products of the same society. On the other hand, it is wrong to say everything that is done in self-­ interest is partial and everything done in common interest is impartial. Rand Ayn (1964) is very vocal in demeaning common interest and glorifying self-interest. She is actually saying the rational order is to follow rational self-interest. An argument against Rand is that she tends to glorify rational self-interest while undermining rational common interest. In my view, morality is not the question about partiality or impartiality, but centrally about rationalization of what is for the good of the individual

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(rational self-interest) and what is rationally good for everybody (rational common interest). A standard of morality is not even about agent-relativity or agent-­ neutrality. This is because what might appear to be an agent-neutral standard may actually not be for the good of all; and what is agent-relative moral standard may not be for the good of the agent him-/herself alone when critically evaluated. At this point, I would like to go back to the original distinction between morality and ethics. Morality is always the accepted standards of right or wrong by an individual or a group of individuals, while ethics is the rational justification of these different moral standards. In subjecting what Molefe calls partiality or impartiality in moral examination to objective moral standards, we should give justification of those impartial or partial standards. In this chapter, instead, we shall understand human personhood as metaphysical, social, and personal. A human person is none of these independently because as Kaphagawani (2004) states, “personhood is metaphysical, because a human person is an ontological being, constituted of body, soul, and spirit [which some African authors prefer to call heart]” (Kaphagawani, 2004, pp. 332–342). A human person is also a social being in that a number of its attributes are socially acquired. However, more importantly, a human person is also an individual, whose personal choices and self-determinations make him or her to become what he or she is. To understand African ethics, then we should try to understand the foundation of African ethics, which is the symbiotic relationship between the individual and the material and non-material realities, the individual and society, and the individual and self. Anything that hurts the harmony within this symbiotic ontological relationship is morally wrong and an act that harmonizes this symbiotic ontological relationship is morally good. The Acholi and a number of African moral philosophy are derived from this stand that any act of an individual that enhances the harmony within an individual, harmony between an individual and society, and between an individual and nature is ethically right, otherwise wrong. The difference is that what an African considers to be a member of society has two dimensions: those that belong to the immediate society with whom an individual is connected by blood or has very closed ties with, and those that do not belong to this closed ties. An African will prefer the first type of bond to the second type of bond (See, Lajul, 2011). Where I agree with Molefe is his understanding of African ethics, as exemplified in the phrase “African ethics” defined in terms of two facets.

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Firstly, it is defined by invoking commonly shared moral beliefs and presuppositions by people below the Sahara. Secondly, it refers to the intellectual reflections and deliberations on these moral intuitions” (Molefe, 2016, p. 3). In this understanding, the concept African moral philosophy is not cast in stone, but it simply refers to the invocation of commonly shared moral beliefs and presuppositions by African people south of the Sahara. Secondly, it is the reflections and deliberations on these moral beliefs and presuppositions. So, African moral philosophy will be understood as the rational justifications of the moral standards of individuals and different African social groups south of the Sahara. It is second-order morality, since first-order morality is the standards of right and wrong of particular societies. First-order morality according to Oruka (1991) is practical morality, because it is that which guides humans in their day-to-­ day practical decisions. Moral philosophy, on the other hand, is the critical reflection on that first-order morality, since it is not guided by the way of looking at things, but by the rightness or wrongness of things according to human reason. In this chapter, we shall discuss African moral philosophy from their selected languages and proverbs. We shall try to discover in these wise sayings or proverbs the literal meanings, the contexts, the deeper meanings, the philosophy, and the particular moral philosophical orientation in those proverbs.

3.2   Moral Philosophy in African Proverbs In trying to understand African moral philosophy from their selected languages and proverbs, a lot of care has been taken. In this section, to get the right meanings behind these proverbs, one has to be adept with the language used and the context of such a proverb. In doing this, we shall concentrate on four aspects of African moral philosophy: ownership, behaviour, relations, and upbringing. 3.2.1  Ownership By ownership we mean being entitled to a property, having a right to possess an item, or having the ability to identify one with and accept responsibility over an issue. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (4th Edition) defines ownership as “the state of being entitled to or having the right of possession over an item” (Cowie, 1989, p. 886). In this section, we shall

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then investigate the African concept of ownership as exemplified by the Acholi and Ganda societies. We shall make use of the following selected proverbs. Abalo pa nga [Acholi Proverb]  - (Banya, Proverb No. A1; Appendix, No. 1) Literally, this proverb means, “Whose property have I spoilt” (Banya, 1994, p. 117). The context is agriculture: when millet from the garden is not yet fully ripe, but to save the family from starvation, the owner of the millet can harvest some of it to save the family from famine. One can then confidently say, “Whose millet have I spoilt” since they are mine. The deeper meaning is that using what is one’s own to save one’s life or the life of one’s family members does not constitute a crime. The philosophy behind this proverb is that to use what is one’s own to solve one’s problem is right. It is then both morally and ethically right to use what is one’s own property to solve one’s personal problems, since doing so does not offend anyone else. Aweno pe gilaro ki won tol [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek, No. 7; Banya, No. A22; Appendix, No. 16) The literal meaning is, “No one disputes the ownership of a Guinea Fowl with the owner of the snare in which it has been caught” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 2). The context is that of hunting, where the owner of the snare has the right over the Guinea Fowl with respect to whoever might have found the trapped Guinea Fowl. The duty of the founder of the trapped Guinea Fowl is to report to the owner of the snare and hand the Guinea Fowl over to him. The deeper meaning is that “respect and honour to those who deserve it” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 2). Banya instead thinks that, the deeper meaning is that we should be “content with our own belongings and leave others to have theirs in peace” (Banya, 1994, p. 130). The philosophy behind the proverb is that there is a difference between ownership and simply being in possession of a particular property, since ownership takes priority over mere possession of property. The moral philosophy is that it is ethically wrong to claim ownership over properties that we only possess and do not belong to us. While morally it is acceptable to use any property in our possessions to solve one’s problems, ethically, this is wrong because ownership takes priority over mere possession of an item. Abil abil otyeko kodi [Acholi Proverb] – (p’Bitek’s Proverb No.61). p’Bitek gives the literal meaning as “Dripping, dripping finished the corn sack […] Drop by drop, water wears away the stone” (1985, p. 15). The context is that of being in charge of what belongs to the community.

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The deeper meaning is that what is usually taken in bits leads to depletion of the property in question. p’Bitek confirms the context and deeper meaning when he says, “the proverb is usually directed against women who use foods set aside as seeds; or anyone in charge of property belonging to others, when he uses small bits of it” (1985, p. 15). This means, we should be careful when using properties that belong to the community. Philosophically, the proverb is saying, when we are in charge of communal property, we are morally bound to take caution, since such property is not ours individually and its misuse affects others as well. The moral philosophy is that it is ethically wrong to use what belongs to society as if they were personal properties. This is because its use or misuse affects other members of the society as well. Ekyengela amangu, kivunda mangu [Ganda Proverb]; Kinacho iva haraka, huoza haraka [Swahili Proverb] Literally it means, “What ripens quickly rots quickly” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The context is that of wealth accumulation, where overnight someone may accumulate wealth that s/he has not worked for. The deeper meaning is “a warning about gaining property or wealth quickly” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The philosophy is that “Easily acquired wealth gets depleted quickly. Come easy, go easy” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The moral philosophy is that “We should learn to gradually acquire what we wish and also ensure [their] sustainability for the future” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). Amazzi amasabe tegamala nyonta [Ganda Proverb]; Maji ya kuomba hayamalizi kiu [Swahili Proverb] Literal meaning is that “Water that has been begged for does not quench the thirst” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  6). The context is that of social relations, where there is more dignity in receiving a gift than to beg for it. The deeper meaning is that “Relying on other people’s properties to support ourselves is not acceptable and is discouraged. Borrowed items do not provide for all the needs of a person. Self-reliance is the best principle and helps a person to support themselves and others in the family or community, without fear of losing [dignity] stability” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6). The philosophy is that true human dignity lies in the ability of self-reliance as a basis to support others other than to be supported. The moral philosophy is that it is morally right to be supported by other members of society, but it is ethically more dignified to be self-supporting. Akako akatono kakila mbegelaako [Ganda Proverb]; Heri chako kidogo kuliko kuomba [Swahili Proverb]

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The literal meaning is that “It is better yours which is little than borrowing” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The context is that of social living, where people borrow from each other, at times for survival. The deeper meaning is that “what is not yours can be taken away from you. We should be self-­ reliant because it gives us confidence, and we are able to support ourselves and others” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The philosophy is that self-reliance is better than a life of dependence on others. Morally, it is right that people support one another at times of need, but ethically, it is better to rely on what we own other than what we do not own. Abakadde bali mu gandaalo mu kisikiziz kyomuti [Ganda Proverb]; Wazee huketi kwenye kivuli kwa sababu walipanda mti miaka mingi iliyopita [Swahili Proverb]. Literally, it means, “Old men sit in the shade because they planted a tree many years before” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  1). The context is that of planning for our own future and the future of our families and societies. The deeper meaning is that “What we establish now creates the stability for our future. We should save resources which will provide for our needs in the future” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 1). The philosophy is that foresight and planning is the essence of a secure future. Morally, people tend to use what they have to meet the needs of the day, but ethically, it is better to own also the future by planning for its needs. 3.2.2  Behaviour Cowie defines behaviour as a way of treating others, manners, and way of acting or functioning (1989, p. 96). In contradistinction, while behaviour is the manifestation of character, character, on the other hand, is the recurrent underlying pattern of human behaviour. Character is then manifested in the way an individual behaves and treats others, acts, or functions in society. In this section we are investigating the underlying moral patterns of a human person’s behaviour as manifested through his or her actions. We shall try to derive this from the following selected African proverbs and languages, so as to find out their ethical implications. Ali myero ki okwata/kwateng [Acholi Proverb]  - (p’Bitek, No. 4; Banya, No. A9; Appendix, No. 8). Banya translates the above proverb as, “Discord or hostility fits the kite” (1994, p. 121). For p’Bitek, this proverb literally means, “Causing trouble should be left to kites” (1985, p. 2). In the Appendix (No.8) this proverb is translated as, “Discord is proper for the kites that can fly away”

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(No.8). The context is that of the animal world, as when kites rob humans of their chicks, they can get away with it, since they can fly away and no one can bring them to account for what they have done. However, this is not possible for humans, since whatever humans do, they still live in human societies, where they will be asked to account for their actions. Banya gives the deeper meaning that we should “respect our neighbour’s property” (1994, p.  122), while p’Bitek thinks that “If human being causes trouble he is often discovered and held responsible. But kites fly away” (1985, p. 2). I think the deeper meaning is that crime is proper for non-moral agents like kites, but not for human beings who are moral agents. The philosophy behind this proverb is that humans are moral beings, while kites are not. The moral philosophy is that it is ethically wrong for humans, who are moral beings to act like non-moral beings since they have moral responsibilities to account for all their actions. Humans, therefore, should behave in accordance with morally acceptable principles. Beru onegu dolo [Alur Proverb] - (Appendix No. 23). Literally it means, “Calabash monkey is a victim of its beauty” (Appendix, No. 23). The context is that of wild animals. Calabash monkey is one of the most beautiful monkeys, with two long white strips of hairs running on its back from neck to tail. Their skins are the most favoured for dancing costumes among the Africans. So, they are often hunted by humans, specifically for their beautiful skins. The deeper meaning is that being good or beautiful is not always an advantage for the owners. The philosophy is that natural advantage in one context can be a terrible disadvantage in another context. The moral philosophy is that good behaviour is not always advantageous, since it can lead to the ruin of those who are morally good. This proverb is similar to two others, one presented by p’Bitek and the other is recorded in the Appendix of this book. p’Bitek presents the proverb as Laber wange ryeny—“The eye of the beautiful one […] cannot see well” (1985, p. 30). p’Bitek explains that “When a girl got it into the head that she is beautiful, she may become lost, going from one young man to another, and in the end she may fail to marry the most eligible young man” (1985, p.  30). This means, her being beautiful has not been of advantage to her; instead it has landed her into trouble. The second proverb is from the Appendix, No. 85, saying Layom cwing gigeru ki nyac— meaning, “It is the goodhearted that are often infected with gonorrhoea”. Being goodhearted, in this sense, has not been of advantage to such a

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person, because it has landed him or her into another trouble. The moral philosophy in all these cases is that, goodness is not always advantageous to the beholders, so humans have to accept their natural gifts but at the same time handle them with care. Bwoba oli mulungi, nelwolifa entaanayo elyagalwa [Ganda Proverb]; Kama wewe ni mtu mzuri hata baada ya kifo kaburi lako litapendwa [Swahili Proverb] Literally, the proverb means, “If you’re a good person even after death your grave is loved” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). The context is that of good behaviours in society, where one is remembered for the good things s/he has done when alive. The deeper meaning is that we should “be of good character and do good deeds so that people will remember them even after they are dead” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). The philosophy is that “A person is remembered for the good things they do in life” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). The moral philosophy is that good behaviour is remembered even after our death. Gwok pe donyo i ot labongo yibe [Acholi Proverb](Appendix No. 41). A leopard never changes its colours [West African Proverb] - (Appendix No. 173). A pig will always remain a pig [West African Proverb]  (Appendix, No. 178). Does the snail leave its shell? [West African Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 191). The first proverb literally means, “a dog does not enter into the house without the tail” (Appendix, No. 41). Contextually, African dogs, in unfamiliar environments, tend to show shyness when entering into a stranger’s house. They tend to fold their tails in between their legs. But as soon as they get familiar with the environment, they let their tails to unfold as it usually dangles. The deeper meaning is that true moral character cannot be hidden for long. The philosophy is that human character, whether acquired through nature or nurture, is part and parcel of human way of life; they cannot be veiled for long. The moral philosophy is that human character is the recurrent underlying pattern of human behaviour, it does not easily change (like leopard’s colour), it is like our second nature (a pig is always a pig), and it does not leave us (like the shell of a snail). It is our duty to discover the deeper basis of our human behaviour, which manifests our human character as a springboard of human actions. Such deeper basis determines the way we behave in society. Icwako gweno kwe idok ka cwako ogwang [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 42; Banya, No. C11).

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Literally, this proverb means, “Defending chickens against the wild cats is not enough, at times it is the chicken to blame for travelling to the abode of the wild cats” (Appendix, No. 42). The context is that of the animal world, where chickens are known to be delicacies of wild cats. Often, wild cats come to look for chickens around home states, since chickens are domestic animals. In such cases, the wild cats are blamed for hunting chickens. But at times, it is the chickens that move far into the bush where the wild cats live. There, it is difficult to blame the wild cats since the victims have made themselves available for victimization. The deeper meaning is that it easy to blame trouble causers, but at times it is the victims that look for trouble. Philosophically, we can say blame the culprits but do not forget to task the victims. For, it is wrong to believe that victims are always innocent. The moral philosophy is that it is always wrong to blame trouble causers, since at times victims too may invite their own troubles. According to common moral standards, it is right to blame trouble causers like wild cats who feed on chickens, but deeper ethical reflections show that victims too have to stop inviting troubles onto themselves. 3.2.3  Relations Johannes B. Lotz (1972) defines relation as “the habitude or reference of one thing to another” (1972, p. 343). He opines that “A relation presupposes a subject, a term, and a foundation; in the relation of fatherhood, the father is the subject, the son is the term and the act of generation is the foundation” (Lotz, 1972, p. 344). He further explains that a relation can be unilateral or mutual; in the case of the former the foundation depends on the subject alone (God-man relation), while for the latter, the foundation depends on both the subject and the term (friendship). However, besides distinguishing between transcendental or essential relations and categorical or accidental relations, Lotz (1972) also distinguishes between real relations and logical relations. While real relation has to do with reference between material or spiritual beings, logical relation is reference between things that can only be grasped by our minds. In African philosophy, relations are understood as a bond between one entity and another. This bond could be material, spiritual, or just formal. Formal relations are those that can be derived from language, especially in logic. Other bonds could be ontological, social, or personal. Ontological relationship is between creatures and their creator. While social

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relationship is the bond that binds the members of society, personal relation is a bond between individual members of society to their own ideals. African moral philosophy is derived from the ontological relations between humans and God, relations among humans, and relations between humans and other creatures.1 Whatever harmonizes the symbiotic relationship between humans and God, relations among humans, and relations between humans and other creatures is always considered morally good, otherwise bad. We shall survey the implications of these relations in the following African languages and proverbs. Ywayo Moro ki lakalakidi [Acholi Proverb]- (Banya’s Proverb No. Y4). Banya gives the literal meaning as “Pulling brown blind ants with fibrous rope woven with grass and bringing home” (1994, p. 218). The context is that of domestic work, where mostly women go in the woods to collect firewood. To tie the firewood together, they often weave some rope out of spear grass (lum obiya) and use them. A lady might find some rope already woven lying by themselves, meaning someone has thrown them. Such ropes often are infested with brown blind ants. She may use them to bundle her firewood, but this time, together with those brown blind ants (moro). These brown blind ants are known for biting and causing humans painful small wounds on the skin. Banya gives the deeper meaning by saying, “Here brown blind ants are, problems, bad luck, enmity, misfortune, bad omen, hatred and any other bad things or happenings you can think of. Bringing home means, causing them to happen thus, involving everyone” (1994, p. 218). The philosophy is that what we do may have bad effects on the community where we belong. The moral philosophy is that human actions have communal effects. Moral actions affect the individuals as well as the community within which such individual live. Okwateng oloko ngeye ki polo [Acholi Proverb]  – (p’Bitek’s Proverb No.81. Literally, this proverb means, “A kite turns its back to the sky (its home)” (p’Bitek, 1985, p.  20). The context is that of charitable acts extended to an individual, either by society or by another individual member of society. According to p’Bitek, the deeper meaning is about “ungrateful person who turns his back on those who were kind to him. E.g. an orphan deserting a foster father in need” (p’Bitek, 1985, p.  20). It is 1  This is similar to what Thomas Aquinas says that man is the link between the material world and the spiritual world, because he is both material (body) and spiritual (soul).

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turning our back against the members of society who helped us to become what we are. The philosophy is that being a beneficiary of societal generosity is an obligation to exercise generosity in return. The moral philosophy is that it is ethically wrong to receive acts of charity, generosity, and kindness from others and society, and fail to acknowledge, appreciate, and reciprocate. To be ungrateful is to fail to acknowledge the social goods we have received, and this disharmonizes society. Kulu pong ki jange [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 56) Literally, this proverb means, it is the tributaries that make a river swell with water. The context is that of natural formation of water bodies, like rivers, where different tributaries join a particular river at different points, making the entire river get bigger, wider, and more powerful as it approaches the bigger water body that it joins. The deeper meaning is that it is the collaborative work that makes a society strong or prosperous. The philosophy is that what appears to be an independent entity is often a result of many little contributions from different stakeholders. The moral philosophy is that an entity is what it is because of support system that sustains it. Mon nywal ki nyek gi [Acholi Proverb] – (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 80). Literally, this proverb means, women give birth with the assistance of co-wives. The context is that of husband sharing. Co-wives are known to be jealous of each other. p’Bitek explains, the etymology of the word co-­ wife “nyek”, which comes from the word “nyeko”, meaning jealousy. Okot p’Bitek then explains, “Co-wives are always jealous of one another” (1985, p. 20). The deeper meaning is that at the time of need there is no enmity, as the so-called enemies still have to help each other to safely deliver their babies. Philosophy behind this proverb is that need does not know enmity. The moral philosophy is that it is wrong to deny giving assistance to one’s enemy at the time of grave need like time of child bearing. In this case, the enemy is usually a member of the same community. Implying, such a person is only a circumstantial enemy, as it is the jealousy created by the circumstance of husband sharing that has made the two women apparent enemies. Bwoba onywanye no mukulu, oba otuliidde muguwa [Ganda Proverb]; Ukiwa rafiki wa mkuu kumbuka huwa amekalia kamba [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “When you befriend a chief remember that he sits on a rope” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 9). The context is that of relations between relatives and their family members that are in authority, political,

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or otherwise. The deeper meaning is that we should “tolerate one another at all times. We can have a friendship, or blood ties with people who are in authority, are powerful politically or economically. Sometimes they may not be there for us and the bond may break” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 9). The philosophy is that “high social status has its demands on those who hold them. So, we should understand them and their status, and accommodate them as they are” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 9). The moral philosophy is that social status places double responsibility on those who hold them. This is what Molefe (2016) calls agent-partiality and agent-neutrality. Those in authority should balance between agent-partiality and agent-neutrality. It is not a question of either or, but good ethical behaviour is a delicate balancing between partiality and neutrality. 3.2.4  Upbringing Cowie defines upbringing as a “treatment and education during childhood” (1989, p. 1404). Most people in the world believe that an individual’s upbringing is responsible for the way different people behave in life. For example, Cowie gives an example that “The twins had different upbringings. Her country upbringing explains her love of nature” (1989, p. 1404), implying that someone’s upbringing accounts for one’s ways of behaviour. We shall then understand upbringing as the education a person receives in life, which are partly responsible for what they do and how they behave in life. A number of Africans believe that human upbringing is important for their moral conducts. A distinction has to be made between moral upbringing that build human character and human personhood. The former is acquired during social living, while the latter has to do with basis underlying ontological constitution of a human person. Though some African philosophers think human personhood is the by-product of human society, others think individuals are responsible for the development of their personhood. In this book, we shall understand moral upbringing as only partially responsible for human conduct, since individuals too have personal choices to make in life, besides their ontological and environmental influences. The following proverbs will help us to understand these moral issues. Sotta abudongo nga bukyaali bubisi [Ganda Proverb]; Ufinyange udongo ungali na maji [Swahili Proverb]

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Literally, it means “Work the clay when it is still wet” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 25). The context is that of pottery, where it is known that clay from which pots and other earth wares are moulded can be done only when the clay is wet. The deeper meaning is that “We should correct those who make mistakes, at the earliest opportunity so that the problem does not persist or be repeated” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  25). The philosophy is that “Correction of unacceptable behaviour changes a person for the better, making them more responsible persons” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  25). The moral philosophy is that late interventions to make corrections can lead to irreversible consequences. “Children for instance, should be corrected and made to understand their mistakes, so that they become responsible persons” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 25). Ngat muyee nyac pa lakware wang ma omado [Acholi Proverb]  (Appendix, No. 104). The literal meaning is that “If you support the sexual promiscuity of your grandchild, then you should be ready to provide treatment for the transmissible diseases (nyac) he or she will get” Appendix, No. 104). The context is that of child rearing: when parents try to discipline their children, the grand parents tend to intervene in support of their grandchildren, making them to get spoilt. One of such indiscipline is sexual promiscuity, which often results in contracting communicable diseases like gonorrhoea. At such moments, the grandparents should be prepared to treat such avoidable diseases, because if the child was disciplined properly, he or she would have avoided contracting such diseases. The deeper meaning is that we should be prepared to face the consequences of our actions. The philosophy behind this proverb says that human actions have consequences. The moral philosophy is that individual actions have consequences, not only on the individual offenders, but also on the members of society who have failed to inculcate proper moral responsibilities in the young members of their societies. Owingkwe cito ki cet i ot pa maro [Acholi Proverb]  - (Appendix, No. 127). Literally, this proverb means, “A person who does not listen [nicknamed Owinykwe], will go with dung on his body at his mother in-law’s home” (Appendix, No.127). The context is that of social relations, where we have to listen to the wise counsel given to us by our elders, neighbours, or relatives. Oftentimes, those who have the habit of despising such advices or moral upbringing commit mistakes that bring them to shame. One of such shames is the smell of dung on a man who is wooing a suitor. The

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deeper meaning is that refusal to take wise counsel bears negative consequences. The philosophy behind this proverb is that the ability to take wise counsel is the yardstick for good moral education. The moral philosophy is that it is wrong to reject wise counsel of elders, neighbours, and other members of our society. Iru duny lubu agulu [Acholi Proverb] - (Banya’s Proverb No. I3). The literal meaning, according to Banya, is that “Smoke rise up vertically following the shape of the pot which is on fire” (Banya, 1994, p. 159). The context is that, “When fire burns under the pot, the smoke from the fire rises up vertically following the shape of that very pot and not of any other which is not on the fire” (Banya, 1994, p. 159). The deeper meaning, according to Banya, is that “The crime you commit is entirely your own responsibility and nobody else’s” (Banya, 1994, p. 160). But this could also mean that those around us behave in accordance with our teachings. The philosophy behind this proverb is that there is individual responsibility for what we do as individuals. Alternatively, the deeper meaning is that we behave following the footsteps of our predecessors or mentors. The moral philosophy is that, primarily, an individual bears the full responsibility for his or her actions. Or, basically, our behaviours are partially the products of our social upbringing.

3.3  Discussing African Moral Philosophy The basis of African moral philosophy, as we have seen earlier, is the establishment of harmonious symbiotic relations between an individual and self, an individual and society, and an individual and the material and spiritual worlds, including God. In African moral philosophy, when an individual enhances these harmonious symbiotic relations, then his or her actions are considered to be ethically right, otherwise bad. This differs from Western philosophy that bases moral philosophical judgement on human reason. It also differs from Western religious ethics, which judges the relationship between an individual on the basis of the laws established by God. In this relationship, it is the faithfulness to the commands of God that makes an action ethically right or wrong. Western philosophy distinguishes between philosophy and religion, so according to philosophical ethics, society should be regulated by rationally justified norms, while for religious ethics, it is the rationally justified laws of God. African moral philosophy takes both to be the case. It makes its moral judgements not only in terms of right reason concerning norms that

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govern society but also with rationally justified laws that govern human relationship with God and the material world. The weakness of African moral philosophy is in fusing social and religious moral norms, yet the former is derived from society, while the latter is derived from divine laws. The weakness of Western philosophy is in unnecessarily separating religion from philosophy, yet both are concerned with human behaviour, making them complementary to each other. The African proverbs we have analysed above will now be discussed in line with these basic theories of ethics. We shall try to look at the different principles or theories of African moral philosophy in the proverbs by contextualizing them, in either the present or past social settings. Some of these principles and theories are centred on the concepts of ownership, behaviour, relations, and upbringing. 3.3.1  Ownership By ownership, we refer to possession of properties and accepting our mistakes and crimes. While mistakes are evils committed on the basis of ignorance, crimes are committed with full knowledge of the wrong in question. Properties in African philosophical sagacity are the results of human efforts. By interacting with the physical and spiritual worlds, humans derive properties, which are the goods humans need in life. Through the interactive engagement with the spiritual and physical worlds around them, the Africans produce property, which were owned both individually and communally. Communal properties were things like land, forests, rivers, water sources, and pathways. Some properties which were individually owned were things like houses, granaries, spears, tools for work, food crops, and the gardens. However, there were properties that were generated socially either through inheritance or through communal activities; such properties were placed at the custody of some responsible members of society in the trust that they are properly administered. All the members of that society were expected to benefit from such property. It is in this trust that elders would choose heirs to their properties, believing that they would justly administer the properties entrusted to them for the good of all in that society. Such people, who were only custodians of communal properties, were expected to treat such properties not as exclusively owned by them. The following are some of the ethical principles used to guide the members of society in administering individual or communal properties.

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The first ethical principle states that it is both morally and ethically right to use what is one’s own to solve one’s personal problems. Such principle has been derived from a proverb which says Abalo pa nga? (Whose have I ruined?). The answer to this question is always no one else’s except what is my own. So long as a particular property belongs to an individual, that individual has both moral and ethical rights to use them to meet one’s needs. This may not be the case when that property is communally owned. Some Africans like the Acholi had the second ethical principle saying, it is ethically wrong to use property that belongs to the community, as if it was a personal belonging. The main reason is that its use or misuse affects others too. This ethical principle is derived from the proverb abil abil otyeko kodi (Dripping, dripping finished the corn sack). This reflects relations with communal property. The second one which reflects personal property says, Aweno pe gilaro ki won tol (There is no dispute over the ownership of a Guinea Fowl with the owner of the trap). Unfortunately, today people hired to manage public resources have quite often turned those resources into their own properties depleting public wealth. This indicates the existence of two categories of property ownership in our societies: personal properties and public properties. While the ethical principle relevant in the administration of personal properties remains the same, that which regulates public properties has experienced grave setbacks. Public properties are today kept under the custody of public servants, who administer them on behalf of the public. However, the way public properties are administered in Africa today is riddled with a lot of glitches. Through corrupt practices, public servants constantly transfer public properties into their own names leaving the public to languish in poverty. The third ethical principle we get from some of the Ganda proverbs states that come easy, go easy. This is because when we acquire property overnight, without much effort, it means such wealth has come easy on our way. The likelihood is that such wealth also disappears easily. Actually one famous Nigerian social media commentator says, “Humans do not have the wisdom to keep the wealth they have not personally acquired through hard work”. That is why this Ganda proverb says, “What ripens quickly rots quickly”. The fourth ethical principle says, true human dignity lies in the ability of self-reliance as a basis to support others, other than to be supported. Surely, to be supported by others is good, but to be able to support oneself and

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others is more dignified. That is why the Ganda proverb says, “Water that has been begged for does not quench the thirst”. This principle is also supported by another Ganda proverb which says, “It is better yours which is little than borrowing”. The fifth ethical principle says that foresight and planning is the essence of a secure future. The implication is that, ethically, it is not right to dwell only on the needs of the present, but to equally focus on the security and sustainability for the future. This is because people tend to use what they have to meet the needs of the present and forget about the needs of the future. Surely, as the Ganda proverb underlines, “Old men sit in the shade because they planted a tree many years before” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 1). The biggest problem in most parts of Africa is that they seek to fulfil not only the present days’ needs but also to fulfil the artificially created consumerist needs of the modern society, and they totally forget of tomorrow. Some live as if there is no tomorrow. In this way, ethically right principles are sacrificed on the table of the present and its delights. 3.3.2  Behaviour A distinction should be made between moral behaviour and other ordinary human actions that may also have moral implications. Moral behaviour is the manifestation of human character with direct propensity for rightness or wrongness. Like an act of stealing or killing another human person is a moral behaviour. On the other hand, human action may not necessarily be connected to rightness or wrongness, like eating or sweating, which are natural human activities without direct moral implications. Actions that have moral implications are conscious, deliberate, and are capable of being right or wrong. To determine the rightness or wrongness of any moral behaviour depends on the ethical principle at play. In the African moral philosophy surrounding behaviour, there are several guiding ethical principles as can be derived from the proverbs analysed earlier. Some of these ethical principles are discussed below. The first principle is that, ethically, it is wrong for moral beings, like humans, to behave amorally. The reason is that humans are accountable to the members of society to which they belong. That is why the Acholi say, discord is proper for kites, but not humans. Kites in this case are, by nature, amoral beings that do not account for their actions. They commit crime and fly away. However, humans are moral beings that have to account for their actions among fellow humans.

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In a number of African traditional societies, this ethical principle was adhered to closely because society would not let any criminal action go un-punished. On the contrary, today in many African societies, humans want their actions to be amoral just like that of amoral beings. In Western philosophy, Machiavelli proposed it in the areas of politics, claiming that making any political action moral would weaken the political leader’s power of control over society. Today, this attitude has permeated almost all areas of human actions. In economics, the same claim is being made, saying economic activities should obey its own laws, which they baptize self-regulating “free and competitive market economy”. It does not need any external regulation. This economic law or self-regulation has propelled the world to a state of great economic disparity, where 90 per cent of the total world wealth is owned by only 10 per cent of the world’s richest individuals. The second moral principle is that goodness is not always advantageous to the beholders. The Alur of North Western Uganda say beauty has killed a calabash monkey. In this context, African moral philosophy teaches us that humans have to accept their natural gifts or humanly cultivated virtues (beauty, goodness, talents, etc.), but at the same time they should handle them with care, lest they may lead to their downfall. The African ethical system warns its members that they should do good to one another not because it always bestows on them personal benefits; on the contrary, this may cause them displeasure. This differs a bit from Kantian, “duty for duties shake”, because for the Africans, humans are encouraged to do good for the sake of the many vulnerable members of society who need their help. For Kant, duty should be performed for duties’ sake. Such behaviours, for an African, do not necessarily benefit the beholders, but at least the society. This is supported by another Ganda proverb which says, “If you’re a good person even after death your grave is loved”. Implying, a person is remembered for the good things they do in life, so good behaviour is remembered even after our death. To be remembered after death is not a reward for the goods you have done, but for being morally an upright person. A number of people might have benefited from your goodness, but not necessarily you at personal level. This should not discourage us from doing good, but in upstanding the fact that goodness is a duty, not just for duty’s shake, but for the good of society. The third ethical principle is that basis of human behaviour is human character. Reason is that the springboard of human individual actions is

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human character. This is derived from a proverb, Gwok pe dongo i ot labongo yibe (A dog does not enter a house without the tail). Human behaviour, according to the Acholi and a number of African societies, is flexible, since they can change from situation to situation. However, human character is the natural or cultivated trend of human behaviour derived from nature and nurture. This is a better basis of human action if human action is to be morally right. The difficulty today is to concentrate on human behaviour other than human character, in terms of both training and regulations. Moral education provides a lot of dos and don’ts targeting human behaviour but places very little attention on the formation of human character on the basis of imparting values upon which human character is formed. Most laws in Africa are copied from the West with very little African rationally justified moral value contents. African ethical values system emphasizes the importance of character as a basis of human behaviour. This is supported by a number of West African proverbs like A leopard never changes its colours; A pig will always remain a pig; and a Socratic type of proverb question, Does the snail leave its shell? All these confirm that emphasis, in regulation and moral training, should be placed on the question of human character as a basis of human behaviour. The fourth moral principle states that while trouble causers are blame worthy, but victims of trouble may not be blameless. This is because it is ethically right to blame trouble causers, but it is equally important to blame those who look for trouble. Just like wild cats are blamed for causing problem, chickens too are blameable when they go to the habitation of wild cats. Most justice systems in the world today target problem causers, and yet they do little to address the issues surrounding those who provoke problems. 3.3.3  Relations In this section, we shall refer to the ontological relations between humans and God, relations among humans, and relations between humans and other creatures. In this discussion, focus will be placed on the relations between the moral agent who is the individual and the community within which he or she lives. Later we shall also look at how this individual relates to those considered to be their enemies, real or circumstantial. In all these, our attention is on whatever harmonizes the symbiotic relationship between humans and God, relations among humans, and relations between

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humans and other creatures is always considered to be morally good, otherwise bad. Below are some of the key ethical principles embedded in the selected African proverbs. The first ethical principle states that human actions have personal and communal effects. Africans generally think moral actions affect the individuals as well as their communities. This is captured by the proverb ywayo moro ki lakalakidi as explained earlier. In Western philosophy, individual responsibility is the central principle that regulates human behaviour, and where such behaviours are at variance with the laws, it is then the individual to receive the punishments as prescribed by the laws of society. In African traditional ethics, any behaviour of an individual definitely affects, not only the individual, but also the society within which an individual lives. This principle is equally captured by other Acholi proverbs, like banya cwir poto ki banya oro (Wet season debt is settled by dry season debt) and ogwal acel obalo wang pii (A single frog is enough to render the well unusable). Centrally these proverbs are emphasizing the same ethical principle that the effects of individual wrongs go beyond the individuals, since they too affect society. In the modern world, this ethical principle is completely being ignored because of the Western philosophical emphasis on individuals as free, autonomous, self-propelling, and determinants of their actions and what they want to become in life. African moral philosophy reminds us that though individuals are free, autonomous, self-propelling, and determinants of what they become in life, this cannot take place outside the ambience of societies within which individuals are born, grow, and learn the values that are important to be pursued to succeed in life. In as much as the actions of the society affects, shapes, and provides the worldview within which individuals prosper, the actions of these individuals too affect the very society within which they live. The second ethical principle states that receiving is good, but appreciation by giving is better. This is because it is a duty to acknowledge, appreciate, and reciprocate acts of charity, generosity, and kindness extended to us when we are in need. Implying, it is wrong to turn our backs against the society and the individuals within that society that have supported us in life. Okwateng oloko ngeye ki polo—a kite turns its back to the skies from which it comes is the proverb capturing this principle. In the modern world, a number of people take the support they receive from society for granted. On the contrary, in traditional African society, members were strongly advised not to do that, since it destroys the basis of social capital

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and discourages social support system without which society would fail to prosper. The third ethical principle declares that communal wealth, values and common good are products of individual efforts. This is because the many and sometimes insignificant members of society are the sources of the communal values in society. Indeed, kulu pong ki jange—they are the tributaries that contribute to the greatness of the rivers. Often, African philosophy in general, and ethnophilosophy in particular, has been misunderstood because of the wrong attribution of the African values to a totality of the society, forgetting that such totality is the result of individual contributions of the members of those societies. Humans have the weakness to acknowledge the cumulative contributions of the many that are not recorded. Failure to acknowledge these manifold contributions does not go well with the formation of social capital. This social capital was a valuable resource for meeting the needs of society, especially of their vulnerable members, like the old, the young, and the disabled. In modern society, for instance, the tax payers that contribute to the consolidated funds of society are often ignored. The final custodians of these funds, the state, is the one glorified for the successful development of society, yet without the contribution of these many insignificant tax payers, the leaders of society would have nothing to depend on. The fourth ethical principle affirms that human need is superior to circumstantial enmity. This is because, at the time of need, every human being deserves to be assisted, regardless of whether such an individual is an enemy or not. Indeed, it is wrong to deny giving assistance to one’s enemy at the time of need. This principle is clearly about circumstantial enemies, who are members of the same societies that due to different circumstances are placed in conflict with one another. For instance, two women sharing a single man have no reasons to be enemies, but jealousy that springs from such a circumstance makes them feel as if they were enemies. So, it is ethically wrong to deny such persons help when they need it, need to preserve their lives especially at the time of child-bearing. Indeed, co-wives give birth with the help of one another. In a number of African social settings, enemies can come from within the society or from without the society. In this case, the proverb is referring to enemies within the same society in which an individual lives. Society is always tolerant to such circumstantial enemies, and they are to be treated with humanity, since their lives are also important for the survival of the same society. This may not be the case with enemies from

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outside the society within which an individual lives, where such sympathy may not be advised, according to a number of African ethical systems (see Lajul, 2011). In the modern context, however, such distinctions are not easily made. An enemy is an enemy whether they came from the same society in which we live or not. It becomes even worse in case of states. States that are considered enemies are treated very unkindly both in war and in trade. Inter-­ state enmity today is not treated as permanent enemies, since an enemy is determined by their cooperation or interference with state interests. So long as particular states have stopped interfering with another state’s interests, then they cease to become enemies to each other. This was not the case in traditional societies, where inter-clan enmities were more enduring. Such enmity excluded any other relationships to prevail, like trade, inter-marriages, to mention some of them. Lastly is the ethical principle which states that social status places double responsibility on those who hold them. This is because of the responsibility of those in authority is to home communities like; the family, the tribe of even the race, but it is also duty to the national community where they are leaders. This principle requires that we try to understand them, because as the Ganda proverb describes, “they sit on a rope”. They have binding tie with what Molefe (2016) calls agent-partiality and at the same time agent-­ neutrality. To be partial to your dear ones and at the same time to be neutral to the public you are governing. It is not an “either” “or” situation since both are equally important. This requires a delicate balance between agent-partiality and agent-neutrality. Because it is difficult to create this balance, a number of Africans in leadership position often fall completely on one side of the rope. Ayn (1964) advises that the side they should fall on should be that of partiality, which she describes as preference for self-­ interests. Other authors think they should fall on the side of neutrality, thus forgetting self-interest. I still maintain that one has to keep by adhering to both rationally justifiable self-interest and rationally justifiable social interest. 3.3.4  Upbringing Upbringing is here understood as the education a person receives in life, which are partly responsible for what they do and how they behave in life. This type of education contributes towards the moral behaviour. African moral philosophy gives a number of moral principles that guide their

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members on the way to morally educate their young ones. Some of these principles are the following. The first ethical principle is that earlier character moulding is the yardstick for good moral education. This is because correction of those who make mistakes, at the earliest opportunity, helps to create acceptable behaviour and responsible persons. On the contrary, late interventions to make corrections can lead to irreversible consequences. That is captured by the Ganda proverb advising that we should “Work the clay when it is still wet” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  25). The Acholi would say, Yat ka dong ogom, pe tire—A tree that is already bent cannot be straightened. The second ethical principle states that moral education is a communal activity. This is based on the fact it is the duty of the parents and the members of the extended family to guide the youth to know what is right and what is wrong. Failure to do that makes the community partly responsible for the failures of the young ones. This is illustrated in the Acholi proverb Ka iyee nyac pa lakwaro, wang ma imado (If you condone the sexual promiscuity of your grandchild, then you should be ready to treat it). In a number of African cultures, responsibility for moral guilt is apportioned between the individual criminals and the society that have failed to appropriately mould such an individual. The aspect of communal responsibility is missing in Western ethics, where blame is attributed only to the individual criminals. The societies that condone such behaviour are distanced from blame. In African moral philosophy, when an individual commits a crime, the entire clan or society is blamed. This is seen in a number of ethnic cleansing among the different warring tribes in Africa. The third ethical principle affirms that rejection of wise counsel is ethically harmful. The reason is that in real life, when young people take counsels given to them lightly, they end up into bigger troubles. Indeed, owinykwe cito ki cet i ot pa maru—one who does not follow wise counsels goes to their mother-in-laws with faeces on their body. In the modern world, a number of the youth learn from peers and the unregulated social media deprived of moral value contents. Both families and schools are no longer centres for moral education but centres for financial supports (by the families) and academic education (by schools). In the schools, what matters are the academic contents the youth learn other than moral education. Questions of moral upbringing are left to the conflicting doctrines of the religious sects, setting the youth in the sea of moral turmoil. The fourth ethical principle mentions that moral behaviours are partially products of social upbringing. This is illustrated by the proverb that

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Iru duny lubo agulu (Smoke follows the shape of the pot). From this proverb, we get to learn that smoke symbolizing human behaviour adopts itself in accordance with the shape it has been given, which is symbolized by a pot, representing social upbringing. This does not mean all human behaviour is the result of social upbringing, but that social upbringing substantially shapes members’ way of behaviour. The individual too is responsible for the behaviour one adopts depending on one’s personal natural capacities, efforts, and ability to listen, accept or reject what the society imparts.

3.4  Conclusion In this chapter, we have looked at the selected African proverbs underpinning African moral philosophy. We have tried to interpret them by first giving their literal meanings, deeper meanings, philosophy behind these proverbs, and specially looked at the moral philosophy behind these proverbs. In discussing African moral philosophy in selected African proverbs, we discovered that these proverbs cover several themes in moral philosophy. Themes like ownership, behaviour, relations, and upbringing, to mention a few of them. Some of these themes could be discussed in any field of philosophy, but here, they were appraised from the ethical point of view. We also discovered that African moral philosophy may not be quite different from any other people’s moral philosophy. However, what was unique to African moral philosophy was the way they interpret or understand those issues. The guiding principle, all along, has been the African philosophical worldviews, which in a number of instances are not the same. For instance, those of the Western world are different from the African philosophical worldviews. Even among Africans, their philosophy would not be quite different except where the specific African people’s philosophical worldview was found to be different. The central philosophical worldview used in this book has been the consideration that humans are individuals who are strongly related to one another and to their environment. In this worldview, the individual is equally important as the society within which they live. Because of this, moral judgements are made on the basis of these individual and corporate demands. As regards ownership, the African moral philosophy emphasizes that we should create a balance between private property and communally owned properties. In relations to crime, they believe that we should be aware of

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the effects of our individual actions on other members of the society and the effects of the crime of the members of the society on the individuals. On human behaviour, the African moral philosophy emphasizes the centrality of human behaviour derived from their fountain of emotions and psychic actions, the heart. They distinguish enemies that are found within the close communities as circumstantial, since more substantially, they cannot be true enemies. Indeed, bitterness may prevail among members of the same African community, but they still have the common interests that bind them together, like sources of water, moments of childbirth, and time of security threats, where such enmity must be dropped in favour of common interests. Where African societies differ is that the same good will is rarely extended to what they define as outsiders. These are enemies in the true sense of the word, since there is little they share in common with them. In the same way, the African moral philosophy would deal with such enemies with less sympathy, even though they are members of the same human society. This has been the root cause of many inter-tribal wars and conflicts in Africa before colonialism and soon after independence. If Africa is to overcome this malady, then they have to broaden their concept of brotherhood to include all the members of the human race. The distinction between insiders and outsiders should be dissolved, if African fragmented nation-states are to become harmoniously united national states. The third area of concern is human relations within the community. While the relationship with the other members of the community is vital for social and personal survival, the relation with the environment and nature in general including God was found to be very vital. As regards the community, success of the community will depend on the level at which individual needs are met. Strictly speaking, individual’s interests in this regard are superior to the common interests, since common interest is the aggregate satisfaction of the individual members. This is contrary to other Africans’ view. For instance, John Mbiti who believes that social interests are superior to individual interests: I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am (Mbiti, 1969, p. 106). On this ground, a number of African authors would be divided since some would say the common interests are superior to the individual interests (the extreme communalists), while others would say the individual interest is equally important as the common interest (moderate communalists). In this chapter, my view is that individual interest is equally important as the common interest in the African philosophical worldview. This

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may not be the case in the Western sense, where individual interests are superior to common interests on the basis of their individualistic worldview. The African philosophical worldview maintains that the common interest is paramount only if the individual interests are presumed met. It is not an “either” “or” situation. It is both, and one leads to the other. Individual interests lead to common interests unlike in the West, where individual interest is not directly related to common interest. The two are not directly related. Lastly, as regards moral upbringing, African moral philosophy maintains that both society and individuals are directly responsible for the moral upbringing of their members. The individuals alone would not succeed in producing an all-round human personality. The individuals need the society, but on the other hand, the community alone cannot succeed without the personal efforts and involvement of the individuals. The two supplement each other in producing an all-round moral personality.

References Ayn, R. (1964). The virtue of selfishness: A new concept of egoism. Penguin Books. Banya, A. A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda Development Series, No. 2). Foundations for African Development. Cottingham, J. (1986). Partiality, favouritism and morality. Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 357–373. Cowie, A. P. (Ed.). (1989). Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. Ishiabwe, A. (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) proverbs and wise sayings. African Proverbs Working Group. Kaphagawani, D. N. (2004). African conceptions of a person: A critical survey. In W. Kwasi (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 332–342). Blackwell Publishing. Lajul, W. (2011). Impact of African traditional ethics on behaviour in Uganda. MAWAZO: The Journal of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Makerere University, 10(3), 125–139. Lotz, B. J. (1972). Relation. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 343–344). Gonzaga University Press. Mbiti, S. J. (1969). African religions and philosophy. Heinemann. McNaughton, D., & Rawling, P. (1992). Honouring and promoting values. Ethics, 102, 535–543. Menkiti, I. A. (2004). On the normative conception of a person. In K. Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 324–331). Blackwell Publishing.

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Metz, T. (2007). Toward an African moral theory. Journal of Political Philosophy, 15, 32–341. Metz, T. (2011). Confucianism and Ubuntu: Reflections on a dialogue between Chinese and African traditions. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 38, 78–95. Metz, T. (2012). An African theory of moral status: A relational alternative to individualism and holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: An International Forum, 14, 387–402. Molefe, M. (2016). African ethics and partiality. Phronimon, 17(1), 104–122. www.phronimon.co.za Nwoye, A. (2017). Africentric theory of human person. PINS, 54, 42–66. Oruka, O. (1991). Sagacity in African philosophy. In S.  B. Oluwole (Ed.), Readings in African philosophy. Mass-tech Publishers. p’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. Singer, P. (1979). Practical ethics. Cambridge University Press. Wolf, S. (1992). Morality and impartiality. Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 243–259.

CHAPTER 4

Political Philosophy in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

4.1   Introduction In his book African Political Philosophy, 1860–1995, Pieter Boele (1998) observes that the history of African political ideas is a neglected field of study. While investigations in African history, anthropology, and politics flourish, the study of African intellectuals discussing critical theories of thought belonging to individual Africans is rare. If the field of African political philosophy is neglected, discussions on critical intellectual theories of African individuals are rare, and to talk about Africans political thinkers is an anomaly, then it would become a taboo to talk about African political philosophy in the selected African languages and proverbs. Given the antipathy of Western and a number of African intellectuals on ethnophilosophy, my effort in this chapter seems to become an upheal one and almost an impossible task to achieve. This problem becomes worse when Pieter Boele continues to say: Everywhere in the world collective world-views are studied as distinct from the philosophical reflections of individual thinkers (often going against the established worldview). Why then, in the case of Africa, should world-views be the prime source for the study of ideas, and should anthropologists act as amateur philosophers and philosophers act as amateur anthropologists? (1998, p. 7)

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Boele would even drop this book without taking a second look when he sees that it is another attempt at promoting collectivist worldviews, an attempt to turn anthropologists into amateur philosophers and philosophers into amateur anthropologists. In these sentiments, Boele is saying two things: philosophy can only be done by individuals and never by any form of collectivity. Secondly, collectivist worldviews are merely anthropology and can never be equated with philosophy. To accept the contrary is to turn anthropology into philosophy and philosophers into anthropologists. My problem with Boele is in denying that behind the apparent collectivist’s African worldviews, there are individuals who cannot be identified by name. Authors like Kwame Gyekye (1995) and especially Kwasi Wiredu (1991) have tried to make this clear. Wiredu says, communal philosophy is a by-product of individual thinkers. No idea can be generated collectively. Ideas are products of individual thoughts, and communities only accept, adopt, and transmit these individual ideas as communal values. Thabede (2008) defines worldviews as the basis of cultural beliefs, ideas, values, and conceptions that are culturally learnt. Wolters (1983) thinks worldviews are perceptions of the world, things in the world, and the place the members occupy in that world. These worldviews are the basis of personal and group beliefs, ideas, and values they have learnt. This is to say, if Boele wants to see African intellectuals develop their individual critiques, then they must base their critiques on these groups’ beliefs, ideas, and values. Vidal (2008) however says that African worldviews are philosophical because they are the results of specific African existential experiences. His argument is that worldviews are philosophical in the broadest sense. In his view, philosophy in its broadest sense refers to a worldview, and worldview is the highest manifestation of philosophy. Boele wants individual African intellectuals to critically expose African political philosophy, but from where will they extract the content of this African political philosophy? Just by critically reflecting, on what? Unless Africans generate sufficient materials, from both traditional and modern political experiences, they will have nothing to reflect on. Otherwise, they will continue to reflect on the political ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, Jefferson, Dewey, or Marx as Boele has earlier criticized (Boele, 1998, p. 7). Besides, the political ideas of the giants, Boele mentioned above, were not created in vacuums, but from concrete political and cultural contexts of their own societies and at times coloured by the worldviews of their peoples at that time, though they went beyond them. African political

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philosophers too need to identify these basic philosophical worldviews of the African peoples, and from within these worldviews, they can then critically agree or disagree with them and create new political ideas. The efforts, I and many other African authors are making, are to dig out these political ideas buried in some of the African’s written or unwritten traditions. Without understanding these so-called cultural worldviews and the values deeply embedded in them, African political thinkers will have air to reflect on. They will have nothing to call meaningfully African. After criticizing the two common trends in African political philosophy as divided between the theories of African leaders like Nkrumah (1909–1972), Senghor (1906–2001), and Nyerere (1922–1999) and reducing African political philosophy to the vicissitudes and hazards of African politics, Kasanda (2015) clarifies that African political philosophy should be concerned with three things. First that it is an everyday experience of alliances and collective actions of the Africans. Secondly, it is a communal effort by Africans themselves rooted in their past and present-­ day experiences. Thirdly, African political philosophy is then the space of communal experiences where the people reveal themselves to each other as equals and where they manifest their desires to build a humanizing society. This implies that it is not enough to repeatedly concentrate on identifying the political theories propounded by our first generation of African political leaders after independence and concentrating on the political problems that bedevil African societies. It is important, instead, for African political philosophers to concentrate on discovering political powers and potentials entrenched in African political togetherness as equals, so as to identify from their collective past and present experiences, humanizing values on which African present-day societies can be build. This chapter distillates in identifying these political past values rooted in the wisdom of some of these African societies, like the Acholi of northern Uganda and the Buganda of central Uganda that can be used to build present-day African political societies. This approach diverts from the usual trend of looking for what our first-generation African political leaders did or said. It does not even focus on the present-day political problems African societies are facing. On the contrary, it believes that it is because Africans have ignored to borrow from their past political values that they are facing the present-day political problems. The model of African political society as exemplified in the selected African languages and proverbs helps to derive some of these political

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theories and values. While some African societies like that of Buganda are centralized, others like that of the Acholi are decentralized political systems. The centralized traditional African societies where kingdoms were well established and had slightly different political philosophical principles, though communalities also exist with decentralized systems. While centralized political system could still be of great values to African societies, but given the nature of present-day African societies, which is an aggregate of different African nations or ethnicities, a better leaf could be borrowed from the decentralized traditional African political systems. This model will be important in trying to understand African traditional political societies exemplified in the Acholi and Ganda languages and wisdom sayings. Political philosophy, in this book, will be understood as the study of the theories and principles of political governance. Political governance will be understood as the management of political societies and public affairs. In other words, political governance is the management of people’s power of self-rule. In traditional African societies, such people’s power was managed in a way that was consonant with their traditional social and political philosophies and value systems. Traditional African political philosophy is the study of the power of the people and how this power was managed. This is because, “behind the political organizations of traditional Africa exist political principles that regulated political organizations and societies” (Lajul, 2014, p. 89). In African languages and wisdom sayings, we can identify several of these political theories and principles buried in their languages and some of their proverbs. Among the multitude of African proverbs, of which Acholi and Ganda proverbs are only a sample, written and unwritten, we shall survey some of them to trace these political principles of governance. Given that a number of these proverbs are still in their oral forms, I will limit myself to the proverbs written down. We shall, besides other sources, depend more on the proverbs written down by Okot p’Bitek (1985), Angelo Banya (1994), and Ishiabwe Atemu (2019), plus those I have personally collected and documented in this book as appendix.

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4.2   Political Philosophy in Selected African Proverbs In this section, we shall divide the different political themes and try to identify relevant proverbs that fall under each of them. These different themes will be nature of political authority, democracy, political legitimacy, and role of females in politics. 4.2.1   Nature of Political Authority Joseph Schröteler and Kenneth Baker (1972) define authority as “the sum total of physical or moral persons (and in a broader sense of traditions and customs) which can and do motivate personal consent to the directions of the one who possesses authority” (1972, p. 27). By authority, here I think they mean public authority. They continue to say, “Assent of the intellect based upon authority [personal authority] is called faith; consent of the will and execution is called obedience” (1972, p. 27). They went ahead to distinguish between personal authority and public authority. Personal authority is where people are motivated to assent to a particular authority because of personal superiority of the one in question (because of his experience, knowledge, ability, and character). Instead, public authority is where the motive for assenting to a particular public authority is derived from legitimate juridical power which is essentially independent of the personal talents of the one possessing it. According to them, public authority, in the sense described above, commands precepts, prohibitions, and binds in conscience under the pain of sin or punishment. Otherwise, personal authority does not bind in conscience—it remains on the level of counsel (Schröteler & Baker, 1972). In this sense, public authority can be equated with political authority. Schröteler and Baker trace the ultimate foundation of all authority to one’s “basic philosophy of life; thus authority has an essentially different meaning in individualistic, materialistic, scientific and theistic outlook of human existence” (1972, p. 27). They continue to argue that Christian philosophy (which is theist in nature) believes that all authority comes from God because it is founded on human finiteness. On the basis of human finiteness, humans need the authority of God to complement their limitations. Secondly, human authority is derived from this divine authority; since humans are finite, apart from God’s authority, humans submit to the authorities of fellow human beings. This means that human authority

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is not the result of human impulse or human egoism; it is the way God indirectly exercises his authority in the world through these human representatives. This is done in three ways: through direct divine commission (as in the establishment of the authority of the church), cultural organizations (as seen in the organization of different societies), and contract agreements (in which individuals enter freely and place themselves under particular human authorities). Besides, Schröteler and Baker acknowledge that authority could be based on a given people’s philosophy in which they identify four types of philosophies: individualistic philosophy as is the case of Western philosophy; materialistic philosophy as is the case with Marxist materialism; scientific philosophy that believes in the authority of science alone; and theistic philosophy, as that proclaimed by Christian philosophy. In this way, Schröteler and Baker totally ignored the African philosophical perspectives. Though they acknowledged that different peoples of the world have their philosophies based on their cultural organizations, they did not think that was applicable to Africa. In this chapter, we shall understand the nature of African political authority, as the management of the people’s political power. Taking the cases of the Acholi and Ganda societies in Uganda, they had both decentralized and centralized political organizations, respectively. In the decentralized political system, they did not have well-established kingdoms since their public authority depended more on personal authority of the Acholi political leaders other than juridical powers derived from their legal system. While for the Buganda, who had well-established centralized political system, it was the institutional power of the kingdom that empowered the political leaders of the kingdom. In this way, it could be equated with what is called public authority in the sense described by Schröteler and Baker above. In the decentralized political system, it was truly the personal skills, knowledge, abilities, political talents, and the character of the political leaders that gave them the political authority to keep the people as one political unit other than making appeal to divine authority or the juridical authority derived from their well-established laws. Though the personal skills, knowledge, abilities, political talents, and the character of the political leaders were not absent in the centralized political system, emphasis was placed more on the institutional powers with which the kings were vested.

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The decentralized political system may be important for most African modern societies that do not have well-established and binding juridical laws that unite the members of their societies in conscience. The modern African political societies may need to appeal more to the personal skills, knowledge, abilities, and the talents of the African political leaders to bind the members of the different African countries into a nation as one coherent political unit. As things are, most African countries are agglomerations of different nationalities bundled together, with very poor binding juridical systems that appeal to them in conscience. Let us now look at the proverbs that express this political theory. Rwot loya ki ngo? [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 18) Or Rwot loyo ki bul - (Appendix – No. 140) The literal meaning is a question: “With what is the chief better than me?” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 4). The answer is (Rwot loyi ki bul) a chief has the royal drum which you, a commoner, do not have. The context is that each of the Acholi chiefs has the royal drum as a symbol of their authorities. The deeper meaning of the proverb is that “Although all men are equal in some respects, in others they are not” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 4). The philosophy behind this proverb is that humanly speaking we are all equal, but politically some people are hierarchically higher than others. Royalty distinguishes a political leader from the rest of the members of human society. The political philosophy is that political authority places an individual at a higher hierarchy of social order. Empungu telya bire [Ganda Proverb]; Hata tai mkubwa zaidi hushuka juu ya mti kupumzika [Swahili Proverb] Literal meaning is that “Even the mightiest eagle comes down to the tree tops to rest” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The context is that of the animal world, where birds cannot be flying in the air forever. Time comes they have to rest, and it is still the same tree which is on the ground. The deeper meaning reminds “people that however important or wealthy we are, we sometimes experience difficulties which lowers our ego” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  11). The philosophy is that “Life has its ups and downs” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The political philosophy is that political leadership places humans high up among humans, but it does not dispel them from their responsible ties with those they lead on the ground. Eyettikka obuvunanyizibwa, era afuna okunenye zebwa [Ganda Proverb]; Mtu anaye beba majukumu pia hupata lawama [Swahili Proverb]

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Literally saying, “A person who carries responsibility also receives blame” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 15). The context is that of social living, where responsibilities are usually accompanied by blames for not living in accordance with the responsibilities apportioned. The deeper meaning is that “every leader will give an account to God for those who followed them in their lifetime” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 15). In my view, I think this proverb means, every leader is answerable to the people s/he leads. The philosophy is that true leadership is a responsibility accompanied with rewards and sanctions. The political philosophy is that political leaders must act and behave for the good of the community they lead, so that people will stay on the right track. This is because people blame leaders when things go wrong. They praise the leaders who do their work to their best of their abilities. Atya enjuba taliba wa gombolola [Ganda Proverb]; Anaye liogopa jua hawezi kuwa mkuu [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “He who fears the sun will not become chief” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 7). The context is that of political leadership since it is not practised on a silver platter. Deeper meaning is that “A person who fears challenges cannot be a leader” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 7). The philosophy is that leadership is an office to “handle all matters whether they are difficult or easy, because they are expected to provide solutions to counter challenges, be firm and be responsible for the members of the family or community” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 7). The political philosophy is that political leadership is a responsibility and not a privilege. Bwoba onywanye no mukulu, oba otuliidde muguwa [Ganda Proverb]; Ukiwa rafiki wa mkuu kumbuka huwa amekalia kamba [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “When you befriend a chief remember that he sits on a rope” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 9). The context is that of friendship or ties with political leaders. The deeper meaning is that we can have a friendship or blood ties with people who are in authority, but it is not a guarantee that it should become our privilege to benefit, since their position is for all in society. Philosophy is that political leadership is for the good of all in society, relatives and non-relatives, allies and enemies. The political philosophy is that political leaders are for both close blood ties and those without any connection to them; personal benefits and public benefits are equally the same. Enjovu ebbiri wezilwanira, essubi lisesetera [Ganda Proverb]; Wakati ndovu wawili wanapo pigana nyasi ndio hupondwa [Swahili Proverb]

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Literally saying, “When two elephants fight the grass gets trampled” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 12). The context is that of the animal world, where grass on which elephants fight are damaged. The deeper meaning is that “When the authority disagree or wrangle about issues, the subjects are the ones who suffer” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 12). The philosophy is that the side effect of failed authority affects the stability of the lower-level members in an organization. The political philosophy is that political authority should be mindful of the effects of their decisions and activities, since the immediate victims are their subjects. Arwot ki oda [Acholi Proverb]– (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 6). Literally, it means, “I am chief in my own house” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 2). The context is that of interference with the mandates given to others. p’Bitek gives the deeper meaning as “However poor one might be, he is till chief in his own house” (1985, p. 2). The deeper meaning is that one has jurisdiction over one’s own household. The philosophy is that every authority has the limits of its own jurisdiction. The political philosophy is that in political democracy, the principle of “non-interference” is necessary for peaceful coexistence. Ayita ringo mot, geno ode [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek’s proverb No. 23) The literal meaning is that “The ground squirrel runs slowly because it trusts its hole which is nearby” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 6). The context is “said of children who behave rudely because their parents are nearby, to whom they can always escape when attacked” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 6). The deeper meaning is behaving in a provocative way because one’s protection is assured. The philosophy behind this proverb is that individual’s or group’s actions is based on their level of security. For instance, countries with nuclear weapons behave recklessly in the international arena because they trust when provoked into war, they have what it takes to defend themselves. So, the political philosophy is that political authority is derived from the level of security and political power an individual or group of individuals have or rely on. Gwok ringo ka ma gibolle iye kwon [Acholi Proverb]- (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 11). The literal meaning is that “A dog goes (literally runs) where it is given bread” (p’Bitek, 1985, p.  3). The context is the animal world, where domestic animals like dogs literally go where it is given food. The deeper meaning is that “A person in need goes where he expects assistance. Thus a generous chief has many followers” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 3). The philosophy behind this proverb is that the fulfilment of human need is the ground

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for human gratitude and obedience. The political philosophy is that political authority is primarily to cater for the welfare of its citizens, which is the basis of their gratitude and political obedience. Bedo akera oroma [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 63) Literally, this proverb means that “I am tired of/vexed by dependent life or leading a life of pleasing the power-that-be” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 15). The context is that of social life, where one lives a life that is dependent on others, making one to do things to please others and never oneself. The deeper meaning is that when one is dependent, no proper attention is paid to their real needs. The philosophy behind this proverb is that “It is an expression of desire for freedom and equality” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 16). The political philosophy is that to live a life that is totally dependent on the political authority that one serves diligently, complying with everything they tell them to do is subservient and politically incorrect. This is because it is a life of dissatisfaction, hopelessness, and unfreedom. It implies political authority that proffers satisfactory life to its subjects by offering citizens opportunities for self-reliance, independence in thoughts and deeds, and a life of equality is the essence of political authority. 4.2.2  Democracy Walter Kerber defines democracy as “the philosophical political idea of the sovereignty of the people; this means that all political power is traced back to the people themselves as the primordial subject of this authority” (1972, p. 89). While authors like Olusola (2020) talk of democracy and consensus in traditional Africa, Matolino (2018) and Eegunlusi (2018) talk about consensus and majoritarian or liberal democracy in Africa, respectively. The first argument is that consensus is not a form of democracy according to Olusola, but Matolino and Eegunlusi think, consensus is a form of democracy. Wamala (2004) outrightly supports the view that consensus is a traditional form of democracy in his article titled “Government by Consensus: An Analysis of a Traditional Form of democracy”. In this book, we are aware that there are different forms of democracy (social, liberal, majoritarian, etc.), but we shall try to identify African form of democracy from selected African languages and proverbs. Among others, the two we can identify from selected African languages and proverbs are democracy as regulated power and democracy as consensus. This also means, in traditional African society, true democracy requires regulation

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but at the same time cooperation. Regulating political power takes different forms including competition and consensus building in order to reach common political grounds. This is also important because, as Wamala (2004) insists, consensus has always been criticized on grounds that it posits unanimity forgetting that consensus presupposes dissensus, that is, the ability to disagree, and talking until people agreed to the existence of opposed views which needed to be reconciled. There was also political opposition amidst consensus. So, as Wamala explains, consensus democracy does not mean absence of disagreements. Some of these disagreements may never be resolved peacefully, and that is why once in a while wars erupt even in traditional African political societies and at times schisms of the same political societies take place. However, we speak of government by consensus, where the practice of seeking harmony amidst disagreements and divisions succeeds to bring peace in a political dispensation. In such political situations, a lot of disagreements are talked over until solutions that keep societies together are found. In this section we shall understand democracy as regulated political power. This is because without some regulation of political power, we cannot talk of democracy. Political power, however, is regulated differently in different cultural settings. In traditional Africa, political powers were regulated and managed differently among the centralized and decentralized African political societies. Our interest in this section will be to look keenly on how political authority was regulated, either by arriving at consensus or by power regulating another power. The following proverbs will help us to divulge this political power and how it was regulated. Twongwen lworo labuce [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 36) The literal meaning of this proverb is that “A cock fears the other cock that defeats it” (Appendix, No. 36). The context is that of cocks fight, where there is often a total defeat. It is only when total defeat is achieved by one of the cocks, then such fights would end. Once total victory is achieved the defeated cock relegates and submits completely to the winner. The deeper meaning is that political authority only fears those other political authorities that have the capacity to defeat them. The philosophy behind this proverb is that power regulates power. The implication is that political authorities are respectful only of those others that can politically or militarily challenge or defeat them. For example, in modern political settings, political parties in power fear only those other political parties

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that can make them lose an election or make them lose popular support of the people; otherwise, they stop at nothing in doing what they want. Omuntu bwabeera obwoomu, yefuula kabaka [Ganda Proverb]; Mtu akiwa peke yake hujifanya kama mfalme [Swahili Proverb] Meaning, “If one is on his own, he behaves like a king” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). The context is that of unregulated life, where individuals or those in authority do anything they want. The deeper meaning is that “One who is alone controls himself and does what he wants” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). The philosophy is that humans have tendencies to do whatever they want if not regulated by self-discipline or some external forces. The political philosophy is that regulated life is demonstrated by taking responsibility for oneself and other people. So, democracy is the regulation of political authority by external forces. Democracy helps political leaders to embrace other people, create good association with the community, and become accepted by others. Kyenkola banange sagala bakinkole [Ganda Proverb]; Anaye dhulumu akidhulumiwa husema amekandamizwa [Swahili Proverb] It means, “The one who offends others, when offended says he/she is being oppressed” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 16). The context is that of social living, where members of society often offend each other. The deeper meaning is that “we should show consideration for others so that we also receive the same consideration from others” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 16). The philosophy is that we should “Treat others with respect and they will also respect us” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 16). The political philosophy is that true democracy is respect for each other within the political society and respect of the subject by the political leaders and of political leaders by the subjects. Tokungula kyotasimba [Ganda Proverb]; Usikidunishe kile ambacho haukukilima [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is “Do not belittle what you did not cultivate” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 26). The context is that of agriculture, where a lot of effort is made to cultivate, but someone comes to belittle the effort made. The deeper meaning is that “We should respect other people’s efforts and achievements” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  26). The philosophy is that respect should be given where it is due. The political philosophy is that democracy is respect of each other’s efforts and differences. Olubuto lwo bwoluwa emmere embi lujja kukubira engoma ozine [Ganda Proverb]; Ukipatia tumbo chakula kibaya, itakupigia ngoma ucheze [Swahili Proverb]

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Literally meaning, “If you give bad food to your stomach, it will drum for you to dance” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 21). The context is that of feeding, where eating bad food creates stomach upset, to which an individual often suffer. The deeper meaning is a warning that, “If you get yourself into trouble, then get ready to accept the consequences” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  21). The philosophy is that “We should avoid getting into trouble” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 21). The political philosophy is that democracy is a skilful negotiation of power dynamics based on right choices. Nonuzinyi ennyo alekulira ekidaala [Ganda Proverb]; Hata anayejua kucheza densi zaidi ya wote, siku moja atajiuzulu [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “Even the best dancer one day must retire” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  18). The context is that of performing arts, where artists show their skills in the entertainment industry. Such skills cannot persist endlessly; time comes when it deteriorates and must end. The deeper meaning is that “Everything we do is for a time. Nothing lasts forever in this life” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 18). The philosophy is that thriving skills also come to an end, so one should be prepared to retire at some point in life. The political philosophy is that in a democratic society, leaders come, leaders go. Omumpi wakoma wakwaata [Ganda Proverb]; Mtu mfupi huweka mfuko wake pale mkono wake utafikia [Swahili Proverb] Literally it means, “A short person hangs his bag where his hand can reach” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). The context is that of domestic life, where humans place their bags on walls of the house where they live. The deeper meaning is that we should “desire to undertake what endeavours we can manage” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). The philosophy is that human efforts should be commensurate with human capacity. “Trying to do too many things at a time leads to failure” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  23). The political philosophy is that democracy is the ability to manage society. Where such capacity is lacking, one should not try to occupy it. So, we should “take responsibilities which we can manage successfully” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). Cwan ma lac kweyo nyuka - (Banya’s Proverb No. C12). Literally, this proverb means, “A large plate cools porridge” (Banya, 1994, p.  147). Banya gives the context, saying, “Here porridge means problems. A large plate means united body of persons” (Banya, 1994, p. 147). When human problems coalesce on individuals, they overwhelm them, like porridge in a narrow cup which remains hot; yet when shared it is spread like porridge in a large plate, which cools faster. The deeper meaning is that problems shared are easier to solve. Banya thinks the

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deeper is that “When we have difficult problems which we can’t solve alone, we should employ the collective efforts of many” (1994, p. 147). Philosophically, the proverb means, unity is strength. The political philosophy is that political problems are best solved as a united political body in a democratically consensual manner. So, political problems are more difficult when leaders and isolated individuals try to solve them alone; yet when members of society unite to solve them, they become easier to deal with. One of the ways to get society involved is through dialogue or consultations and eventual agreements on the way forward. Otigu manok tyeko kwon - (Banya’s Proverb No. O26). For Banya, the literal meaning is that “A little dish of Bamia vegetables finishes huge heap of kwon [millet bread]” (Banya, 1994, p. 199). The context is that “Bamia is a very slippery vegetable - when you collect it on a piece of kwon [millet] bread, before reaching your mouth most of it slips and remains in the container which is Atabo. At the end you find that the kwon is finished but the Bamia is still there” (Banya, 1994, p. 199). The deeper meaning is that “[…] even if they are few in a group but strongly united, they can succeed by using their skills effectively” (Banya, 1994, p. 199). Philosophically, the proverb means, success is not an outcome of numbers, but unity and effective use of available resources including the knowledge, the views, and the skills of those around us. The political philosophy is that a political unit is strong on the dedication of the few united members, but not so much because of the size of its population. Magezi muliro, bwegukuggwako, ogunnona wa munno (Wamala, 2004, p. 436) Literally, the proverb means, “Knowledge is like firewood in the hearth, if you have none you fetch it from your neighbour” (Wamala, 2004, p. 436). The context is that of an extended family, where what is lacking in one family is obtained from another family. The deeper meaning is that sharing knowledge is the basis of support we render to each other, socially and politically. Wamala himself explains the philosophy behind this proverb by saying, “The dedication to consensus seems to have been rooted in the firm epistemological belief that knowledge is ultimately dialogical or social, and in the collective responsibility of all for the welfare of the community” (2004, p. 437).

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4.2.3   Political Legitimacy Political legitimacy is the acceptability of a political authority by the public, and often it is the basis for the political support given to the political authority in question. Legitimacy is then popular acceptability of the authority in question by the population as genuine. A political authority may be lawfully established, but the perception of their legitimacy depends on the degree to which the population accepts such an authority. On the other hand, we can have in place a legal authority, yet legitimately, the population ascribes true authority to the one that might not be a legal authority. The following are some of the proverbs that help to highlight this political theory. Kakulu ta kulilwa [Ganda Proverb]; Huwezi kuwa juu ya mkubwa [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “You cannot be above the leader” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 16). The context is that there is hierarchy in society, and political authority is at a higher hierarchy than the rest of the members. The deeper meaning is that “There is always an authority to lead and give instructions to others” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  16). The philosophy is that we should respect authority and be submissive to their leadership. The political philosophy is that since we cannot all be leaders in society, others must be ready to be led. In this subsists recognition and acceptance of political authority. Rwot ineka ki nyero [Acholi Proverb] – (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 17). The literal meaning is that “Chief you kill me with laughter” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 4). The context of this proverb is about individuals who frequent the chief’s palace, not so much for their interest in the chiefdom affairs but for selfish reasons. Such individuals are termed hypocrites (rwot ineka), who sly at anything the chief says, whether it is right or not just because they want to show they are in the king’s good books. The deeper meaning is that hypocrisy is often at play in dealing with political leaders. p’Bitek adds that, “It is a proverb of spite, for a man should be independent and self-reliant” (1985, p. 4). The philosophy is that political leaders should beware of hypocritical political allies, who pretend to hold particular political interests at heart, but who fail to advise the political leaders to do the right things or take paths that may enhance and not destroy the political interests they are supposed to protect. The political philosophy is that political interests are protected and fostered, not so much by unreliable political allies but by genuine political critics. Political authorities that

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respect genuine political criticisms tend to be admired and are easily accepted as good political leaders. Omukulu watali, ebikere bibunduka [Ganda Proverb]; Mkubwa akiwa hayuko, chura huruka ndani [Swahili Proverb] Literally it means, “When the master is away, the frogs hop in” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 22). The context is that of the animal world, where frogs flock to feed where there is no danger. The deeper meaning is that “we should not take advantage of the absence of authority” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  22). The philosophy is that “Self-motivation leads us to work without supervision because we are aware of our responsibilities” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 22). The political philosophy is that subjects of political authority who are self-motivated to work without supervision are a sign of full acceptance of a political authority in place. Otherwise, the rule of the game will become the use of force, and in the absence of such force, the citizens rejoice. Adong calo Ngwen labongo bwoma [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 4) The literal meaning is that “I became vulnerable like a white ant without wings” (Appendix, No. 4). The context of this proverb is that of white ants, whose main safety is their wings that make them fly away from the ground where predators are commonly found. But the moment their wings fall off, they become as vulnerable as ever, since they have to move on the ground infested with predators. The deeper meaning is that when one is stripped off the protective gears, mechanisms, and system of support and safety, then dangers become numberless. Philosophically, when leaders are stripped off the popular support of their people, then they become vulnerable and are exposed to numerous dangers from their political enemies or rivals. The political philosophy is that political support, which legitimizes political authority, is like the protective mechanism a political leader has, and short of it, they are as vulnerable as any other commoner. Labwor ma kok pe mako lee [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 63) The literal meaning is that “A roaring lion does not catch any animal” (Appendix, No. 63). The context is that of the animal world, where a hunting lion avoids roaring, since it scares off nearby animals making it difficult to catch them. The deeper meaning is that success is achieved by intelligent planning and not necessarily by demonstrating physical strength. The philosophy behind this proverb is that intelligent planning is superior to the use of physical force in the execution of plans. The political philosophy is that in executing political authority, the use of careful

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planning, persuasion, and making intelligent and calculated moves are the basis of political success, support, and legitimacy, but not the use of force. Latin pe tuku ki cak ma ii lawote [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix No. 81); Latin gwok pe tuku ki cak ma ii lawote [Acholi Proverb]– (Banya, Proverb No. L24). Chicks do not run after the cock, but after the mother hen [West African Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 187). The literal meaning is that “A child does not play with the milk inside another child” (Appendix, No. 81). Banya renders it as “A puppy does not play with the milk which is inside its fellow puppy” (1994, p. 176). The context is that of kids’ play. When kids play with one another, there is chance that each has what it takes to be happy and play joyfully. But in scenarios where some kids have all it takes to make them happy while others are hungry and starving, there is likelihood that peaceful play cannot take place. The deeper meaning is that atmosphere to act peacefully in dealing with others demands that all participants have the necessary condition for peaceful coexistence. The philosophy behind this proverb is that personal satisfaction is a precondition for acceptance and harmonious living with others. The political philosophy is that citizens relate with other citizens freely and peacefully only when the conditions of living in their own countries are conducive and favourable, just like the mother chick that provides favourable environment for the chicks makes the chicks to run after them, and not after the cocks [West African proverb]. Lyec neko won poto i kum poto ne [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 15). Literally, this proverb means, “The elephant kills the owner of the field it is raiding” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 4). The context is that of chasing away herds of elephants that raid human habitations destroying their crops. In attempting to save crops from destruction, elephants often attack the owners of the fields killing them. The deeper meaning is that “Might is sometimes right. A strong man who is in the wrong may still harm a weak person in the right” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 4). The philosophy is that might often, regrettably, obliterate fairness and justice. The political philosophy is that often people acquire political positions, not because they earned it but because they have the might to subdue their rivals and subjects. In these cases, such political authorities remain largely illegitimate. Lyec turu yen me talle [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek, proverb No. 132). p’Bitek gives the literal meaning of this proverb as “The elephant breaks down the tree for smoking its own flesh” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 32). The context of this proverb is that when an elephant is still breaking down

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innocent trees, it does not know that the very trees broken down are potential firewood for smoking its flesh. p’Bitek gives an example to explain the context of this proverb: “A thief carries a piece of rope to use in climbing into a house; when he is caught, the rope is used for binding him” (1985, p.  32). The deeper meaning is that human actions can become their own downfall. The philosophy behind this proverb is that human actions have multiple effects: good and bad ones. At first sight the immediate ends might look good, but in the long run, the negative effects are worse. The political philosophy is that what might look like a political victory may in the end become a political loss. 4.2.4   Role of Women in Politics It is commonly believed that African women are best described as the dregs of society and the beasts of burden. To a great extend this may be true, but it is not true of all African societies. Among some of the African societies like the Acholi of Northern Uganda, there are clearly demarcated roles of the members of society: men have their burdens too, as much as the female population. In this section, we are not going to discuss the general role of women in society but their role in politics. Gwok ma dako bene mako lee [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 37) The literal meaning is that “Even female dogs do hunt” (Appendix, No. 37). The context of this proverb is that of hunting, where female dogs at times do better than male dogs in successful hunting expeditions. This is directed against sceptics who tend to underrate females in general, but just as the female dogs can hunt, so can any other females be very successful. The deeper meaning is that females are potentially as capable as their male counterparts. The philosophy behind this proverb is that males do not have the prerogative of success since their female counterparts are equally and potentially capable of success. The political philosophy is that females are equally as capable as their male counterparts in executing political duties. This is contrary to the negative attitudes towards females who are often relegated to the secondary levels in political affairs. Implying, males should be aware that, given an opportunity, females are equally as capable as their male counterparts. Cip aye otera i tim [Acholi Proverb]– (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 8). Literally, this proverb means, “It is the apron skirt that took me away” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 3). The context is that of social practice, where women are treated as if they do not belong to their father’s home or society.

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p’Bitek explains that this proverb is used “when there is tendency to treat girls or women as less important than boys and men in the family or clan” (p’Bitek, 1985, p.  3). The deeper meaning is that the rule of exogamy places a woman outside her own homestead, and not natural law. Philosophically, natural laws are superior to social laws, notwithstanding the fact that it is this very social law that places a woman outside her own homestead. The political philosophy is that the rule of exogamy is no excuse for treating females as socially and politically outsiders of human society. The Acholi society did not consider the female flock to be completely out of order in running society. The female flock are equal stakeholders of society as men are according to natural law; however, the only difference is that, due to rules of exogamy, which is purely the creation of society, daughters are married outside the lineage. But being married outside one’s lineage is no excuse for treating the female flock as outsiders of the very flock from which they come or societies into which they are incorporated. Mon rwotgi peke [Acholi Proverb]– (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 43). The literal meaning is that “Women have no chiefs, or chiefs are not chiefs to women” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 10). The first meaning is that “Women cannot allow other women to be a superior. In another sense, a chief is not a chief to his own wife or wives, or even to other women” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 10). My view is that, the second interpretation given by p’Bitek seems to be more authentic. Otherwise, in Acholi culture, women also had leaders among themselves. The deeper meaning is that women are wives to their political leaders and not their subjects. Philosophically, this means political authority is for running society and not for administering a family because in a family the rule of engagement is different. One cannot use the political power one has to administer his wife, because at home a wife is a wife and not a subject to the political leader. The political philosophy is that political authority is discretionary. Implying, in the application of political power in different circumstances, like managing political community and managing a family or a wife, discretion is required. Mon aye guti ot [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 97). Literally, this proverb says, “Women are the foundation of household” (Appendix, No. 97). The context is that of traditional Acholi house. Every house has its pillar supporting the roof poles that rest on the walls. These walls are made of guti (short poles) joined together on which mud is smeared to constitute the wall of the house. However strong the central pillar and roof poles are, the strength of the house rests on these short

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poles that make up the wall of the house. Deeper meaning is that women are the main support of the household. The philosophy is that women are the main support group of human society. The political philosophy is that women are the support basis of political society; any political society and its organization will remain weak without women’s support. Dyang cito kulu ku [Acholi Proverb]  - (Banya, No. D5; Appendix, No. 29). The literal meaning of this proverb is that “Cows do not fetch water from the wells” (Appendix, No. 29). The context of the proverb is that however much wealth one has in terms of cattle that are usually reared by men and used for paying bride wealth, these animals cannot carry out the duty apportioned to women, like fetching water from the wells and taking care of other domestic needs. The deeper meaning is that wealth cannot substitute humans. The philosophy behind this proverb is that for certain duties to be fulfilled in society, humans need humans. The political philosophy is that a society may be rich and powerful, but without women who provide the basic needs of humans in that society, such a society is worthless. This is similar to the Ganda proverb which says, Amaka omutali muchaara galinga ekisibo omutali nte—“A home without a woman is like a barn without cattle” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 5). Other Ganda proverbs confirm that Eka egwana mukazi na bba (A home suits man and wife); Awagumba ennume n’enduusi (The male’s abode is the female’s too) (Ssetuba, 2005, p. 42); and Bakidambya kye kizaala eddenzi (The unloved woman may bring forth a boy child) (Ssetuba, 2005, p. 45).

4.3  Discussing African Political Philosophy The discussion on African political philosophy will be guided by four themes in political philosophy as outlined in the preceding section. These are themes on the nature of political authority, democracy, political legitimacy, and the role of women in politics. 4.3.1   Nature of Political Authority In the African political philosophy, political authority is hierarchical. When the Acholi say, “A chief is better than me because of the royal drum that he has, and which I do not have” (rwot loya ki bul), they mean that though all have their own dignity and authority in the areas of their influences, this does not mean citizens are all equal politically. In politics, some people are

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hierarchically higher than others. Like the case of chiefs that are hierarchically higher than the commoners. This means, the first principle of political philosophy is that political authority places individuals at higher social hierarchy than other members of society. In this sense, political authority could be understood as a privilege. However, though a number of Africans respect this political hierarchy, they also think this must be a responsible privilege. That is why the Buganda say, “Even the mightiest eagle comes down to the tree tops to rest”. Meaning, even though political authority places a political leader high up like an eagle, the people are their resting place. The Baganda continue to say, political authority may be a privilege, but it is a blameable privilege because “A person who carries responsibility also receives blame”. Surely, people praise leaders for the good they do, but they also blame them for any wrong that happens in society. Indeed, political authority is more of a responsibility than a privilege, since “He who fears the Sun, cannot become a chief”. This also means the difficulties embedded in political authority require those who are ready for the difficult task, other than those seeking privileges. The second principle is that political authority is both for personal and public benefits. This means, political authority is for the benefit of both close friends and relatives and also the public they lead. That is why the Baganda say, “When you befriend a chief remember that he sits on a rope”. The political leader has to balance this delicate responsibility, to please both close friends and relatives without forgetting to please the public for whom they are leaders. In this principle, the Baganda appeal to the close friends and relatives of the political leaders to understand the double and delicate responsibility their relatives have as political leaders. This is an area where modern African political societies often fail, simply because they do not know how to balance this delicate double responsibility over those close to them and the public they lead. More often than not, public resources are unjustly apportioned in favour of friends and close relatives at the expense of the public. This has given the picture that African leaders unnecessarily act in favour of their ethnic communities instead of caring about the majority public interests. The third principle states that political authority should be mindful of the effects of their actions on the populace. The Baganda say, “When two elephants fight the grass gets trampled”. This a very common saying in most parts of Africa. The emphasis is that when political leaders fight among themselves, they should be aware that the effect of their actions is more

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injurious to their followers other than themselves. Without responsible leadership, a number of times, political leaders make decisions and do things that make the life of their people hard. This is not a good mark of political authority. The fourth principle is that of non-interference. Meaning every political authority has limits; and so long as it is exercised within its domain, there will be peace and harmony in society, but when one political authority goes overboard, then there is going to be conflict. The Acholi then say, A rwot ki oda. In my house, I am chief. Meaning, in my domain, I am the one in charge, and in your domain, you are in charge; there should be no unnecessary interference into domains that are not given to an authority. A number of Africans detest interference in their own domains of powers, where they too have their own powers to manage. Political leaders were generally respected in as much as they too, on their part, respected the lower ranks of authority. St Augustine opines that hierarchical order places everything within the universal order, where at the apex of this hierarchy is God, followed by humans, and the lower creatures like plants and other animals. For him, in each instance, the higher uses the lower and lower obeys the higher. The Acholi political philosophy does not go that far. It places a political leader to be directly higher to his subjects in hierarchy. These subjects are lower in hierarchy than the leaders, but not usable by the higher authorities. On the contrary, for peace and harmony to prevail in society, these higher authorities are to work for the good of the lower authorities, to respect the different layers of authorities established within the African society. This is similar to Rousseau’s contract theory, where the populace are obedient to the higher authorities on one condition that the “common will” is respected and promoted. In the Acholi political theory, such contractual relationship exists, though it is not explicitly described in the Rousseaun sense. This is an important observation because while the Acholi believe that their leaders are directly responsible for the social order, and the people are duty bound to obey them, so long the leaders stand to protect the people, this mandate is derived from an implicitly unwritten contract. Since this contract is implicitly implied, it should be distinguished from the Rousseaun explicit social contract between the leaders and their populace. The fifth principle of political philosophy is about the purpose of political authority. The principle is that political authority is for the provision of security and welfare to the people. This is because the stability and security

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of political authority is determined by the strength of the powers they wield in relation to other states on the basis of their own strengths and the support they receive from their people and allies. The Acholi say, “The ground squirrel runs slowly because it trusts in its hole which is nearby” (Ayita ringo mot geno ode). To run slowly means one has great confidence while it’s near its hole refers to its security where it takes refuge in time of danger. So, the ways political leaders behave indicate the kind of confidence they have in their own capacity to repel any threat or in support they can get from their people or allies. Their own strength is derived from their assured legitimacy and possible assistance they can get from their neighbours on the basis of their good and friendly relationships. Today in Africa, a number of political leaders build their own political powers based on personal armies, and not necessarily national armies, who stand solidly behind them. In such political entities, leaders feel they do not need the support of their citizens because they have sufficient military support either from their own resources or from their own allies. The tendency is to have dictatorial political systems that do not care for the views and the support of its people. This is the modern rendering of this theory, because in the African traditional societies, the military powers of the chiefs were formed by the people’s army that was constituted of able persons in the society. Apparently, every able person in Acholi traditional society was military personnel. Without the military support of these men and women, political leaders have no military powers of their own. The sixth principle is that political authority is primarily relevant only when it caters for the welfare of it citizens. Caring for the citizen’s welfare is the basis of their political obedience and support. Unfortunately, most political leaders value their citizens for the support they give them to come to power or to stay in power, but never for the good of the citizens. It should be the other way round; citizens should support their political leaders because of the care and diligence they pay to their needs and welfare. Surely, “a dog goes where it is given food” (gwok ringo ka ma gibolle iye kwon). The last principle states that overdependence is politically undignified. This is because authentic political life is that which offers opportunities for self-reliance, independence in thoughts and deeds, and equality; but not a life of dissatisfaction, hopelessness, and unfreedom, pushing humans to be overdependent on the political authority. The implication is that the nature of political authority is that it should lead to a life of satisfaction. Unfortunately, in real political life, some people will have to live a life that

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is totally dependent on the political authority that they serve diligently, complying with everything they tell them to do. Such a life is undignified, a life of dissatisfaction, unfreedom, and hopelessness. Indeed this proverb decries, “I am tired of dependent life or leading a life of pleasing the power-that-be” (Bedo akera oroma). 4.3.2  Democracy The first principle of African political philosophy is that power regulates power. This principle of political philosophy underpins the fact that political institutions are respectful only of those that can defeat them politically or militarily. For example, in modern political settings, political parties in power fear only those other political parties that can make them lose an election or make them lose popular support of the people; otherwise they stop at nothing in doing what they want. In fact, for the Acholi political philosophy, this happens because it is only power that regulates power. Indeed, “a cock only fears the other cock that can defeat it”—Twongweno lworo labuce. Similarly, for the Buganda, democracy is regulation of power by external forces. That is why they say, “If one is on one’s own, he behaves like a king”. The difference between modern democracy and the traditional African concept of political democracy is that power regulates power through competitive elections in Western political systems, while in African political philosophy, the regulation of power was by the forces outside a particular political system. For instance, several chiefdoms can gang against the central authority, in centralized democracy, or other chiefdoms ally against a particular bad political authority in decentralized political authority. In modern democracy, they are the political parties that constitute these forces within a political dispensation. The fact is that when despotic chiefs impose their dictatorial regimes on the people, the leaders of dissident groups seek support of other more powerful chiefdoms to tame such despotic chiefs. When such chiefs see such alliance against them with more powerful chiefdoms, they bow down to the will of the people. In all cases, democracy is possible where political powers are regulated by other political forces, whether through the power of the masses, their alliance with other powerful chiefdoms, or forces of the opposing political parties. The second principle is that democracy is the regulation of power by consensus. As mentioned earlier, consensus democracy is not about absence of disagreements in human society, but about the methods used to address

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disagreements. To resolve those disagreements, it is not competition, but dialogue that is used to find some common grounds on which consensus can be reached. Interpreting Wamala’s concept of consensus democracy, Matolino (2018) observes, Wamala argues that the dialogical nature of knowledge and consensus is founded on the belief that nobody has a monopoly on knowledge. Matolino goes to say: He [Wamala) emphasises that the dialogical conception of knowledge would not have been possible without the idea of collective social responsibility. All members of society were supposed to contribute and work alongside each other. He identifies this recognition and arrangement as social capital. (Matolino, 2018, p. 19)

Matolino concludes by saying, “Wamala thinks that the type of social capital that would make consensus work is the traditional kinship system in which everyone is related to everyone else, either by blood or betrothal” (Matolino, 2018, p. 20). But what Matolino did not get right is the fact that Wamala places consensus democracy mainly within the relationship between the Kabaka (Ssabataka) and the clan leaders (Bataka). This relationship was not always smooth, as Matolino himself analysing Wamala’s work wrote: “However, there was a tense relationship between the Ssabataka and the Bataka as the former sought to increase his powers at the expense of the latter” (Matolino, 2018, p.  18). Without dialogical efforts for agreement, there cannot be any harmonious relationship. It is this effort for agreement that creates consensus democracy, in that what is discussed and agreed upon for the benefit of both the King and the subjects represented by the clan leaders regulated the excesses of each group. The power of the different clans and their leaders was a sufficient power to regulate the power invested in the Kabaka (Ssabataka). In Wamala’s own words, “What emerges, consequently, is a very strong sense of the ‘social’ as opposed to the ‘individual’ or the ‘personal’ or even the ‘private.’ Such a frame of mind was doubtless conducive to a consensual approach to governance” (2004, p. 438). The proverbs given by Wamala in support of this theory are ‘Ndi mugezi’, nga muburille—“I am wise, only if others have informed me” (Wamala, 2004, p. 436); Magezi goma, galesa Magambo ku kubo—“Belief in one’s intellectual self-sufficiency resulted in Magambo’s failure to reach home” (Wamala, 2004, p. 436); and Ekyalo ddiba lya mbogo; terizingibwa

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bwamu—“A village is like a buffalo skin; one cannot roll it up by himself” (Wamala, 2004, p. 437). This is also supported by another Acholi proverb Tongweno oloyo Menya—“Menya failed to get an egg” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 21). In this Acholi proverb, which is exactly the same in meaning like the one about Magambo’s failure to reach home since he was blind and thought he could make it home all by himself, so is Menya who was very selfish and relied on his own wealth, but when he needed a simple thing like an egg, which he could not get from his neighbours, he fail to get it, and this led to the death of his son (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 21). The third principle of political democracy is that true democracy is respect for each other. This means respect of the populace by the political authority and that of political authority by the people. The Baganda capture this principle in their proverb which says, “The one who offends others, when offended says he/she is being oppressed”. Political leaders that disrespect the people easily complain that they are not respected by the people who have given them the power to rule. This is also captured by another Ganda political philosophy that democracy is respect of each other’s efforts and differences. In a democratic political system, the Baganda say, “Do not belittle what you did not cultivate”. Differences in opinion do abound in any political dispensation, but it is only respect of these differences that makes political society move as a unit, otherwise chaos is bound to explode. In Acholi political philosophy, besides the fact that democracy is realized when power regulates power, it is also important that political power respects its limits. Political authority that interferes in every minute detail of citizens’ lives cannot be considered democratic. This is demonstrated by a proverb which says, “each Ocok1 has its own ant hill” (Ocok man ki byene), and “A cock does not crow at the neighbours home” (twongweno pe kok loka pa yaa), or oyo man ki wino ma i doge (each rat has its own whiskers). All these mean, political power has its own limits and jurisdiction, and good democratic practice is to respect such limitations in dominion. The fourth principle is that democracy is skilful negotiation of power dynamics. In the process of negotiating power, in a democracy, the political leaders are to keep in mind that the way they treat the people is the same way the people will treat them. Where the people are treated with 1  Ocok is a kind of plant that grows only on anthills and has yellowish bitter fruits when they are ripe.

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dignity and respect, so will the people treat the political leaders with dignity and respect. That is why the Baganda say, “If you give bad food to your stomach, it will drum for you to dance”. Among the skills a political leaders is expected to have is to know the political capacity they have. For instance, you cannot offer yourself to be a provincial governor when you are well known only within your locality or village. The Baganda would say, “A short person hangs his bag where his hands can reach”. These skills include the ability to know that one has no new ideas to offer, so one should quit political arena. This is supported by another Ganda proverb which says, “Even the best dancer one day must retire”. There are two political points that were central to the Baganda of Central Uganda: one was principles of democracy as identified by Wamala (2004), and the second was that identified by Lajul (2018). Wamala identified the principles of subsidiarity, non-interference, legitimacy, and dependence, as key in the democratic practice of Buganda. Lajul, on the other hand, posits that the principle of participation among the Buganda was unique and central in the Ganda political system. The central view brought out by Lajul is that: Since the Ssabataka [King of Buganda] is the head of all the different clan leaders (Bataka), the Buganda developed a political system where all the different clans would participate in ruling Buganda. This is based on the fact that only the Kabaka was matrilineal while the other Baganda are patrilineal. A Kabaka was then encouraged to marry wives from the different clans of Buganda. Since the sons of the Kabaka take on the clans of their mothers, there is a possibility of rotational leadership in Buganda. If a Kabaka was a member of his mother’s clan, the next one would come from another clan since the wives are from the different clans. In this system, all the clans of Buganda participate in ruling Buganda. (Lajul, 2018, p. 103)

In conclusion, while in the West it is the people’s power that regulates political authority, for a number of African traditional societies, besides the guidance of the democratic principles outlined above, appeal was also made to the invisible power of God to whose authority even the most powerful kings were subject. This was a common paradigm in the centralized African societies. For the decentralized African societies like that of the Acholi of northern Uganda, the people themselves, through their alliances with neighbouring chiefdoms, would regulate the unregulated

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political powers of despotic chiefs. In all these cases, power regulates power in any form of democracy. The difference comes in how such political powers were regulated. 4.3.3   Political Legitimacy The first principle about political legitimacy is that not all can be leaders in society, so, others must be led. It is in this willingness to be led that true recognition and acceptance of political authority subsist. That is why the Buganda say, “You cannot be above the leaders”. If we are not above the leaders, then we must accept and be willing to submit to their authority. This is a very common political sentiment among centralized political systems like that of the Buganda. The more decentralized political system of Africa, like that of the Acholi, emphasizes worthy leadership: one who deserves to be leader and who also deserve to be submitted to. That is why they emphasize proverb like Rwot ineka ki nyero (chief, you have killed me with laughter). This proverb as already explained means that political legitimacy is grounded more on genuine critics and not on puppets, who are hypocrites [rwot ineka]. In this subsist recognition and acceptance of political legitimacy. The second principle of political legitimacy says, true political legitimacy is where subjects are self-motivated and not forced to obey the political authority. This is because when subjects begin to take advantage of authority in its absence, it is a sign that they are not free or self-motivated. Self-­ motivation leads to work without supervision, a sign that the subjects are aware of their responsibilities; otherwise, “When the master is away, the frogs hop in”, as the Buganda say. Indeed, the rule of the game will become the use of force, and in the absence of such force, the citizens rejoice. The third principle says, political authority is legitimate when it enjoys popular support and acceptability. Political support is the first security and protective mechanism of a political authority and the basis of political legitimacy. A political leader without political support is as vulnerable as a white ant without wings (ngwen labongo bwome). The problem in political practice today is based more on the manoeuvring skills of the politicians other than rallying on the popular support of the subjects. This has been prominent in Africa, and it has led to a lot of undemocratic practices in African political space as may be elsewhere in the world.

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The fourth principle is that political support is derived from intelligent, wise, and careful persuasion, other than force. This is because the use of force does not always derive popular support, apart from scaring the enemies; it alerts them for self-defence, using various defensive mechanisms like fleeing before they are attached or setting other strategies for self-­ defence. For political authorities to be legitimate, political leaders will need to make use of calculated moves, careful planning, and persuasion first before force is applied. Otherwise, as the Acholi proverb says, “a roaring lion does not catch any prey” (labwor ma kok pe mako lee). Niccolo Machiavelli thinks it is the use of political virtue in which a political leader knows when to apply force and when to apply other persuasive skills. So, a prince must know when to be a lion and when to be a fox, since a lion can scare the enemies, while a fox can detect the traps set by the enemies. The Acholi would say, it is not in scaring the enemies where legitimacy rests, but it is in careful moves, wise planning, and persuasion that political support is garnered. The fifth principle says that it is the beneficial socio-economic living that provides a solid basis for political legitimacy. Meeting the social and economic needs of the subjects provides a conducive condition of living that pulls the members of society together. This becomes the primary duty of political authorities to ensure that their citizens have favourable conditions of life, less they become non supportive to the political authority, hostile to one another and especially to foreigners. Surely, “a child does not play with the milk inside another child”—(Latin pe tuku ki cak ma ii lawote). In Africa today, most political leaders’ primary concern is consolidation and perpetuation of their political powers in political offices other than addressing the welfare questions of the citizens. They think keeping oneself in office is prior to the duty of meeting the needs of the members of society. Yet, it is the other way round. It is only when political leaders struggle to meet the needs of society can they guarantee the support from the people, and their own consolidation and perpetuation in political offices are legitimized and made possible. The sixth principle is that use of force illegitimizes political authority. This is because it is wrong to think that might is right. Often people acquire political positions, not because they earn it justly and fairly, but because they have might to impose themselves on the people by use of force. The Acholi noticed that while this practice is rampant, it can never result in legitimate support of the mighty political leaders. This is captured in the proverb which says, “The elephant kills the owner of the field it is

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raiding” (Lyec neko won poto i kum potone). Yet, the field is useful to the elephant only for a while, just at the time the elephant is feeding on the crops growing in it. In a similar way, a politician’s forceful occupation of a political territory cannot result in popular support from the people. The result of force is temporal, yet the duty to win the heart of people required for acceptability gets tougher. To counter this unacceptable practice, the Acholi derive another political principle that might is not always a political victory, but a basis of non-­ acceptability. This is because what might look like a political victory may in the end become a political loss. This is derived from the philosophical fact that human actions have multiple effects, good and bad ones. At first sight the immediate ends of a political action might look good because it is successful, but in the long run, the negative effects of such actions might become destructive. Indeed, as the Acholi say, Lyec turu yen ma latalle— meaning, “An elephant break trees that in the end is used for roasting its own meat”. Just like the innocent trees broken are the very ones used for smoking the elephant’s flesh, the West Africans would say, “Those you meet on your way up are those you will meet on your way down (Appendix, No. 229). So, though most political actors are aware that political support and legitimacy are necessary for smooth political administration and democracy, very few take it seriously. The result is that we have a lot of political leaders in Africa that are illegitimate because they do not enjoy popular support. Instead, they impose themselves and their political authorities on the people. Such leaders wrongly use the principle that “might is right”. In the context of African dictatorial regimes, this principle is used more often than not. Dictators and military coup leaders impose themselves on the people regardless of the people’s protests, views, or opinions. Often, such leaders retrospectively try to legalize their authorities through creation of legal frameworks to support their actions. Such regimes eventually become legal, but never legitimate, since legitimacy is the willing acceptance of the citizens to the political authorities. In this case, such legitimacy is absent. 4.3.4   Role of Women in Politics The first principle of political philosophy talks about the role of women in politics saying, in politics, women are equally important as their counterparts, the men. Reason being that females are often relegated to the

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secondary levels in political affairs; given opportunities, they may perform better. In fact, females are potentially capable as males in the execution of political duties. Plato had already observed that there is nothing in the native capacities of women that make them inferior to men. So, keeping women in the kitchen denies a nation 50 per cent of its national capacity. The difference between Plato and African political philosophy is that for Plato, these capacities need education to be useful, while Africans believe that this is not necessary. Women can contribute to society whether their capacities are trained or not. Just like “A female dog can also hunt” (Gwok ma dako mako lee), so a female’s role in political society is very important. Secondly, Plato insists that education must be the same for both men and women, but a number of Africans think that education must be segregated. The African traditional education was segregated in terms of males and females. Where Africans go wrong is by predetermining the role of females and males in their educational system. This is an aspect that may need to be carefully studied, whether giving uniform education to both males and females is at all the best way to prepare females for their roles in society. Or, it is better that in areas females are better than males, they should be given special attention that would make them perform even better. Uniform education may not necessarily lead to equality in education; instead segregated education with similar contents would do better in ensuring equality in education. However, the pre-selected roles between males and females, as it was practised in African societies and on which basis education was segregated, may not be necessary today, since in most cases, it favours one sex of humanity over the other. The second principle is that exogamy is no excuse for treating females as political outcasts. By exogamy, we mean the practice that females are married outside their lineage. Exogamy should not be an excuse for treating the female flock as outsiders. A number of African societies did not consider the female flock to be completely out of order in running society. The female flock are equal stakeholders of society as men are according to natural law; however, the only difference is that, due to human law of exogamy, daughters are married outside the lineage according to the rule of society. The political principle given above implies that the rule of exogamy is no excuse for treating females as socially and politically outcasts. Natural law does not dictate whether, in marriage, a woman should leave her family and join another family or not. But humans or customary laws, which are generally accepted among different human societies,

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dictate that women should be married outside the families from which they originate. This however, does not mean it nullifies their roles in the political dispensation of their societies. That is why the Acholi proverb says that “it is the apron skirt that took me away” (Cip aye otera i Tim). Meaning, it is not natural law but the customary law that places females outside the societies from which they are born. This customary law, which has overturned natural law of belonging to a family to which one is born, should not become the grounds for treating females as outsiders. So, getting married outside a female’s lineage should not deprive females from their right to participate in the political affairs of society. Unfortunately, contrary to these facts, females continue to be treated as outsiders of the very societies from which they originate or even of societies into which they are incorporated. The third principle of political philosophy surrounding women states that political authority is for running society, and not the family. This means, there should be discretion in applying political power in any political system. This principle highlights that in different circumstances, discretion should be used in managing political community. For instance, managing a family or a wife is different from managing a political society. The prudent use of such discretion is a bond of success in political practice. This means, in a family a woman is a wife and not a subject of a political leader, even though that leader is a king. To a political leader, his wife is not a subject where he can use his political authority to manage. Indeed, “women have no chiefs” (Mon rwotgi pe). To a wife, the king is a husband, a marriage partner; to a king, the wife is a partner, and not a subject. The fourth principle states that women are the cornerstone of any political society. A cornerstone is the basis of the strength of an organized political society. Meaning, without the support of the female members of society, any political society and its organization will ever remain weak and vulnerable. This is because women are the main support of the household. Without the vital support of women, the entire household collapses, with the consequential collapse of the social structure. Implying, women are the main support group for any society. The strength of any society is seen in the stability of the household that only boom with the support of the female flock. Indeed, women are the foundation of the house—Mon aye guti ot, as the Acholi say. In support of the above principle, the Acholi continue to say Dyang cito kulu ko (Cows do not fetch water from the wells). This is because, for certain duties to be performed in society, we need humans and nothing

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else. In the Acholi political philosophy, such duties are directly associated with the role of women that provide these basic human needs in society. Indeed, a society may be rich and powerful, but without women who provide the basic human needs in that society, such a society is worthless. This is because, wealth cannot substitute humans. The Buganda add, “A home without a woman is like a barn without cattle”. Besides, “A home suits man and wife”, and again, “The male’s abode is the female’s too”. All these show the importance of women in African society.

4.4  Conclusion In conclusion, I would like to accentuate some basic principles in African political philosophy. The first regards the nature of political authority. In this, Africans believe that political authority is hierarchical. However, true political power is based on the popular support of the people. Besides, political power has limits, since there is time to come to power and time to leave power. Centrally though, political leadership is relevant in as much as it cares for the welfare of its people, because it should lead to a life of satisfaction for all, by making the people self-reliant, independent in thoughts and actions and to live a life of equality. This is because, the rise and fall of political authority, as it were, affects positively or negatively the entire political community. The second conclusion is about democracy. Democracy in African political system is based on the theory that “power regulates power”. Political power of different political institutions in decentralized African traditional societies was regulated by the coalition of chiefdoms. Bad political leaders fear more the possible coalition that will be organized against them other than competitive individuals or political groups, as is the case in the West. The dissident subjects often seek alliance with more powerful neighbouring chiefdoms to tame despotic political leaders. Such despotic leaders are often replaced by their own more democratic sons or brothers, so that the people’s line of rule is not completely disrupted. This is different from modern political overthrows that replace everything and everybody in the old dispensation. In more centralized African traditional political systems, emphasis was placed on the coalition of the different clans against the central political administration or by appealing to the gods of their ancestors. This also means, though African traditional chiefdoms resemble atomic autonomous political units, they were united much more strongly in purpose to ensure their people are protected. For that

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matter, attacking one of the chiefdoms by non-Acholi chiefdom was taken as an aggression against all. However, political leadership requires harmony with members of the societies and other chiefdoms, living honestly and committed to the people’s interests. This is common in both centralized and decentralized political systems. Thirdly, political support by the people was the essence of political legitimacy. To amass political support, political leaders ensured they remain useful by providing material and social needs of the people. They should ensure they provide security and protection, material and social benefits other than demonstration of cruel power. Genuine criticism, other than hypocrisy, was important to demonstrate legitimacy, and the use of discretion and persuasion was recommended instead of force. Respecting these leads to self-motivated and committed subjects that are ready to work for and with their political authorities. Lastly, females are equally important political stakeholders in any political dispensation. Exclusion of females from political leadership was derived from the exogenous social practice, which was a customary law, as opposed to the natural law which binds every individual males or females to the societies from which they are born. Females are legitimate participants in the societies from which they come and should never be relegated to the periphery, as it was the case in a number of African societies. Besides, the female flock are the main support force for any social existence, including being the main supporters of the basic needs of society. This is also because political societies are relevant only in as far as they cater for human welfare, and females are the main custodians of human welfare. From these we can see that, African political philosophy is not quite different from the other human societies in the world. However, emphasis varies in accordance with the philosophical worldviews of the people. Because the Acholi did not have highly centralized political societies, they were more democratic in their attitude and practice. In more centralized societies, where their kings tended to be politically more powerful, alternative means were used to regulate the political powers of their leaders including appeal to the gods and coalition of different sub-groups in those societies. But when it comes to the general welfare of the subjects, both centralized and decentralized African societies were much more united. For daily needs and basic security, most African societies took care of their affairs, but when it comes to the general security of the people, they relied more on the political structures and political arrangements in place.

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References Banya, A. A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda Development Series, No. 2). Foundations for African Development. Boele, P. H. (1998). African political philosophy, 1860–1995: An inquiry into families of discourses. Praeger Publishers. Eegunlusi, T. R. E. (2018). Critical reflections on Wiredu’s consensual democracy. Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK), New Series, 8(2), 1–27. Gyekye, K. (1995). African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Temple University. Ishiabwe, A. (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) proverbs and wise sayings. African Proverbs Working Group. Kasanda, A. (2015). Analyzing African social and political philosophy: Trends and challenges. Journal of East-West Thought, 5(1), 30–50. Kerber, W. (1972). Democracy. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 89–90). Gonzaga University Press. Lajul, W. (2014). African philosophy: Critical dimensions. Fountain Publishers. Lajul, W. (2018). Contemporary African philosophers: Critical appraisal. Makerere University Press. Matolino, B. (2018). Consensus as democracy in Africa. AHP Publications. Olusola, V. O. (2020). Democracy and consensus in traditional Africa: A critique of Kwasi Wiredu. Inkanysa: Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 12(1), 1–10. p’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. Schröteler, J., & Baker, K. (1972). Authority. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 27–28). Gonzaga University Press. Ssetuba, I. (2005). The hold of patriarchy: An appraisal of the Ganda proverbs in modern relations. In Gender, literature and religion (pp. 37–47). CODESRIA. Thabede, D. (2008). The African worldview as the basis of practice in helping professions. Social Works/Maatskaplike, 44(3), 233–245. Vidal, C. (2008). Wat is een wereldbeeld? (What is a worldview?). In H. Van Belle & J. Van der Veken (Eds.), Nieuwheid denken. De wetenschappen en het creatieve aspect van de werkelijkheid. Acco. Wamala, E. (2004). Government by consensus: An analysis of a traditional form of democracy. In K.  Wiredu (Ed.), A companion to African philosophy (pp. 435–442). Blackwell Publishers. Wiredu, K. (1991). On defining African philosophy. In T. Serequerberhan (Ed.), African philosophy: The essential reading (pp. 87–110). Paragon House Press. Wolters, M. A. (1983). On the idea of worldview and its relation to philosophy. In P. A. Marshall, S. Griffioen, & R. J. Mouw (Eds.), Stained glass (pp. 14–25). University Press of America.

CHAPTER 5

Social Philosophy in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

5.1   Introduction Some authors prefer to combine African social philosophy with African political philosophy calling it social and political philosophy. One of such authors is Kasanda (2015) in his article, “Analyzing African Social and Political Philosophy: Trends and Challenges”. In this article, Kasanda states categorically that the first section of his article looks at the object and nature of African social and political philosophy, but in the actual text his emphasis remains purely the object and nature of African political philosophy. Even when he surveys the relationship between African social and political philosophy and ontology, again his emphasis is purely on the relationship between African political philosophy and ontology. What Kasanda outlines as objectives of social and political philosophy, which are; well-­ being, power, and social and political organization, his actual explanations shows that these are proper objectives of African political philosophy other than both African social and political philosophy (Cfr. Kasanda, 2015, p. 29). The first three subheadings of Kasanda’s article, Analyzing African social and political philosophy: Trends and challenges (2015), are as follows: section 1-1- reads, “What is African Political Philosophy about?”; section 1-2 reads, “African political philosophy and ontology” (Kasanda, 2015, p.  30); and section 1-3 reads, “Neglected sources of African political © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_5

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philosophy” (Kasanda, 2015, p. 31). In this section, he totally forgot that his initial aim was about African social and political philosophy. In my view, it may not be necessary to force concepts that are similar to mean the same. In this chapter I believe that it would be more profitable to study African social philosophy separately from African political philosophy. Rollin Chambliss defines social thought as that which is “concerned with human beings in their relations with their fellows. Man’s thoughts about his relations to others whether expressed, in folk literature or in the compositions of individual writers” (1954, p. 4). Instead, Harry Barnes (1948, p. vii) saw the field in terms of “what social philosophers and sociologists have said about the origin of human society, the ways of group life, the development and expression of social interests”. Assimeng regrets, as Barnes indicates above that, “Social thought is often studied solely with respect to the philosophical systems of great writers. But Africa produced no writers until recent times. Yet it seems obvious that before great writers emerged, Africa thought about society, and this thought was embedded in the collective phenomena of social structure” (1977, p. 176). From the quotes given above, social philosophy is then conceived as human thoughts about human relations with one another, the origin of human society, the ways of group life, and the development and expression of social interests. African social philosophy, instead, would be reflections on the origin of African societies, their ways of life, and the expression of social relations and interests as manifested in their folk literature (written or unwritten) and collective social structures and worldviews. George F.  McLean, in the Preface to Social Reconstruction in Africa (1999), a publication of a team of researchers from the Department of Philosophy, Makerere University, affirms that for a proper and organized social reconstruction to take place in Africa, whether by smaller or larger societies, ethics must be central to this transformation. More centrally, McLean (1999) emphasizes that African social philosophy is a reflection of a given African human community based on deliberate choice, freedom, and responsibility to shape their values and develop corresponding virtues constitutive of their cultures as ways of cultivating their own lives. So, the people’s reflective efforts to shape their values and corresponding virtues pertaining to their unique culture are what constitute social philosophy. African social philosophy, for that matter, is the reflection of the African people about their social relations, origin, way of life, and expression of their social interests and values to identify, regulate, and safeguard their

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cultural virtues and derivative values for the harmonious life in their societies. Social philosophy as a branch of philosophy deals with social problems, especially those issues pertaining to social values. Social philosophy is also understood as the philosophy of the human society. As society is in constant growth, innovation in thinking and living, new perspectives are to be envisaged to build up a harmonious world vision to cope with the demands and new value understandings of society. In this chapter, we shall try to identify the African social philosophy exemplified by the Acholi people from their wisdom saying or proverbs. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines proverb as “short well-­ known saying that states a general truth or gives advice” (Cowie, 1989, p. 1004). Besides the Acholi proverbs, we shall also look at some of the proverbs in selected African languages, like Luganda and Kiswahili. These general truths, in most instances, have deeper meanings which often are not apparent to all, though not obnoxious to any deep thinker.

5.2   Social Philosophy in Selected African Proverbs and Languages We shall divide the different proverbs falling under social philosophy into six. These will be proverbs articulating the nature of African societies, social bonds, social welfare, social justice, social upbringing, and social responsibilities. 5.2.1   Nature of African Societies Cowie defines nature as “the typical qualities and characteristics of a person or an animal; qualities of a material or non-material thing” (1989, p. 825). In reference to African societies then, we are trying to identify the typical qualities and characteristics of African societies as presented in selected African languages and proverbs. Behind these linguistic and proverbial expressions, we intend to identify the deeper meanings and social philosophy proper to the Africans after presenting their literal, deeper meanings, and proper contexts. The following are some of the proverbs as expressed in these selected African languages and proverbs. Got aye pe girwate [Acholi Proverb] – Appendix No. 34

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Literally, it means only mountains do not meet. The context is that of the natural world, where mountains remain stagnant, but humans are mobile. The deeper meaning is that when we meet strangers, we should not treat them badly. The philosophy is that the way we treat others should be the same way we should expect to be treated. The social philosophy is that we should treat humans as social beings that may need each other’s help any other time in life. The Buganda say, “A thin man, you show him contempt when he is across the river” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3), might be the one that will sail you across the river. The deeper meaning is that “we should not judge others until we have enough knowledge of their character and abilities. We can misjudge a person because of their appearance, only to realize otherwise. The social philosophy is that we should “Appreciate all people as they are” ” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). Engalo ensazigwa niranyini zo [Ganda Proverb] No. 47 – (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 13). Literally it means, “Empty hands only please their owner” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  13). The context is that of human society, where community benefits from the contributions of the individual members. Ishiabwe specifies, “In the African tradition, a person with nothing is not valued by others; and is viewed as a burden, even when they do not realize it” (2019, p.  13). Deeper meaning is that “Every person is expected to work and achieve something which can help themselves and others, so they are viewed as responsible and reliable. They may have property, skills or wisdom to offer others. Without these, how do we give any input to support the community?” (2019, p. 13). The social philosophy is that “We all need to have a way of helping to build others” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 13). Indeed, the nature of African traditional society is that all contributes to society’s and individuals’ welfare. Tukozesa njuba emu naye si naka gonna [Ganda Proverb]; Tunatumia jua moja lakini sio boma zetu [Swahili Proverb]—(Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 27) Literally it means, “We share the same sun but not our homes” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 27). The context is that of social living, where there are things to share, but there are also things we cannot share. The deeper meaning is that “our loyalty is stronger to our family than other people” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 27). The philosophy behind this proverb is that, “We can be friends and associates but family bonds are forever more important. Our family ties are unique and an outsider may not fit in well” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 27). The social philosophy is that family ties are stronger than extended community ties. So, the nature of African society is that it is

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centred around the family (home), though extended to include others as well. Gwok ngeyo lapite [Acholi Proverb]– (Appendix, No. 39) The literal meaning is that “A dog only knows the person that feeds it” (Appendix, No. 39). The context is that of domestic animals which shows how a dog relates to the owner, particularly because he or she feeds it, thus its loyalty to the owner. The deeper meaning is that where one feeds is where one’s loyalty is placed. The philosophy behind this proverb is that society is relevant only in as far it is the source of individual’s welfare and security. The social philosophy is that the basis of social organization is the satisfaction of personal needs and security of the members. This is another typical quality and characteristic of African social philosophy, which is the provision of social welfare and security for its members. 5.2.2   Social Bonds After explaining the nature of African societies, we now proceed to explain what constitutes the social bonds in African societies. Cowie defines a bond as things that unite people or groups, a state of being joined, and a status where two things are securely joined together (1989, p. 124). In this sense then, social bond refers to things that join members of society together, state of being socially connected, and what makes members of society securely united. We shall try to trace these social bonds in selected African languages and proverbs. Doti iweki [Acholi Proverb] – (Appendix, No. 28) The literal meaning is that “Shared the same breast” (Appendix, No. 28). The context of this proverb is that of family ties. This refers to people who are siblings. These could be two blood sisters or blood brothers from the same mother. The deeper meaning is that of blood relations. The philosophy behind this is that though humans are connected to each other by the fact of being humans, blood relations have a deeper and stronger connecting bond. The social philosophy is that society is a network of bonded relationships; some are weakly connected to each other, while others are more strongly connected to each other. This also means, despite the fact that humans are ontologically related to each other, there are also hierarchies in this bond of networks; blood relations seems to be stronger in this networks than connections through marriages, pacts, assimilation, and absorption. So, in answering what is that which binds members of African society together, the answer is blood relations.

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Ababi okulya, abalungi emilimo [Ganda Proverb]; Umati ni mbaya kwa kula, lakini mzuri kwa kazi [Swahili Proverb] Literally, this proverb means, “A crowd is bad for eating, but good for work” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 1). The context is that of human labour, where Africans tend to work together. In Acholi language, they call it “tic alwak” (communal work), which derives also some benefits. The problem seems to be in the distribution of the benefits derived other than in working together. The deeper meaning is that “Many people working or living together requires support of each other to accomplish [their] … goals. Sometimes selfishness arises when there are benefits expected at the end of an endeavour” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 1). The philosophy is that togetherness (social bond) is easier at the level of work and contribution to society, but not at the level of sharing the benefits of work. Sometimes people want to acquire everything for themselves without considering others at the end of laborious effort by society. The social philosophy is that genuine togetherness is demonstrated at the level of sharing the benefits of work and not only at the level of sharing the burden of work. This shows us that sharing is a value and the essence of social bonds we should develop for all situations and for the benefits of all people. Tol wat pe cot [Acholi Proverb] – (Appendix, No. 147) The literal meaning is that “String that binds relatives together does not break” (Appendix, No. 147). The context is that strings are often known to be breakable whatever they are made of, but in the context of blood relations, such strings that tie them together are known not to break easily. This is said in contrast to friendships or any other social relations that are considered to be fragile. The deeper meaning is that blood ties that bind relatives are supposed to be stronger, unlike other ties that bind in other social relations. This is similar to the English saying that “Blood is thicker than water”. The philosophy behind this is that blood ties more closely than any other social bond or arrangements. The social philosophy is that society is created by a web of relations; however, among these relations, blood relations bind much more strongly than any other social relations. Again, that which keeps social bonds in Africa is basically blood relations besides other socially constructed relations. Akanyonyi kakozesa byo oya birara okuzimba ekisu kyaako [Ganda Proverb No. 10] – (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3) The literal meaning is that “When a bird builds its nest it uses the feathers of other birds” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The context is that of the animal world, where birds use the available resources in their environment

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including feathers of other birds to build their own nests. The deeper meaning is about “the benefits of unity and teamwork” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The philosophy is that “A person cannot sustain themselves fully. Support from other people helps us to succeed in [our] … endeavours” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The social philosophy is that “The family, friends and community build us to live full lives” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). Oyo kirubu giporo [Acholi Proverb] – (Banya, No. O29) The literal meaning, according to Banya, is that “Rats are arranged on sticks for smoking according to sizes” (1994, p. 200). The context is that of hunting, particularly in communities where certain types of rats are edible. When many of them have been trapped, they are fixed on some sticks and smoked according to the sizes of the sticks. One should not put different sizes of rats on the same stick, since smaller ones tend to get ready faster than the bigger ones, making the small ones get burnt. The deeper meaning is that when we eat, we should as well think of those who have not yet eaten. The philosophy behind this proverb is that personal satisfaction must be balanced with society’s satisfaction. The social philosophy is that when members of society take care of their personal needs, they should not forget the needs of the other members of society as well. Social bonds are strengthened when members of society mind about each other’s needs. 5.2.3   Social Welfare Cowie (1989, p.  1449) defines welfare as good health, happiness, and prosperity of a person or group of persons; safety of a particular group; citizens’ well-being in terms of ensuring social services like  – pensions, family allowances, and free medical care. Social welfare then refers to that which constitutes the good health, happiness, prosperity, safety, and well-­ being of society. To cater for these social needs, there are thought systems or patterns which constitute the social philosophical worldview of a given people, and this is their social philosophy. We shall survey selected African languages and proverbs to identify their social philosophy on human welfare. Diang majalongo cakge pe [Alur Proverb]- (Appendix, No. 25 -Alur); Labwor makok, pe mako lee [Acholi Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 63; Banya, Proverb No. L4; p’Bitek, No. 122) The literal meaning of the first proverb is that “A cow with the biggest udder has no milk” (Appendix, No. 25). P’Bitek translates the second

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proverb literally as, “A roaring lion does not catch any animal” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 30), while Banya translates it as “A roaring lion does not catch any prey” (1994, p. 170). The context of the first proverb is that of animal farming, where cows with apparently bigger sizes of udders are the ones that are expected to produce bigger quantities of milk, but on the contrary, they produce very small amounts of milk. Those with smaller sizes of udders, on the other hand, tend to produce more milk. So, it is not the size of the udder that determines which cow is more useful. The context of the second proverb, which is the Acholi version of the Alur proverb, is that of the animal world, where lions that roar a lot often scare off the other animals and in the end fail to catch any animal. These two proverbs are similar to the English proverb, a barking dog does not bite. The deeper meaning is that quality does not reside in size. Banya gives the deeper meaning of the Acholi version that we should “stop singing or broadcasting our plans of action” (1994, p. 170), while p’Bitek thinks, the deeper meaning is that “A man of words and not of deeds is useless” (1985, p. 30). The philosophy behind the Alur version is that quality social welfare is more about the contribution of insignificant actors than of prominent actors. While for the Acholi version, the philosophy behind it is that action speaks louder than words. The social philosophy is that production of social welfare is not necessarily the achievement of its prominent leaders, but little contributions of the many less significant members of society. Or social welfare is the product of the many silent actors than the few who lauds or boasts of their contributions. Kwon caka pe moko odeyo [Acholi Proverb] – (Appendix, No. 60); Gin caka pe moko odeyo [Acholi Proverb] – (Banya, Proverb, No. G2) Literally, this proverb means “Borrowing food cannot create food security” (Appendix, No. 60). “Hawkered or goods exchanged do not last long” (Banya, 1994, p. 153). The context of this proverb is that of domestic feeding. When a household lacks their own garden of millet, then when others are harvesting their millet, they go from farm to farm working for other families, and they are given a token of appreciation, a basketful of such millet. This practice was called caka, in Acholi. When millet bread is mingled, what remains stuck at the bottom of the cooking pot is called odeyo. It is only when this cooking pot is used regularly can this odeyo (which is a delicacy) be formed and extracted. To mingle millet bread regularly means that the source is secure. This source is actually one’s own millet garden. The practice of caka, as the Acholi observed, does not bring food security in the home, since that small amount of millet collected will

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soon get finished, while the food’s need of the family continues to prevail. The deeper meaning is that food security is a result of ownership of the food products. The philosophy behind this proverb is that security of property is only guaranteed by owning property than borrowing property. The social philosophy is that the family welfare is achieved by ownership of property and not dependence on the good will and generosity of the other members of society. The Buganda confirm this by saying, “Water that has been begged for does not quench the thirst” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6). Akako akatono kakilambe gelaako [Ganda Proverb]; Heri chakoki dogo kulikokuomba [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “It is better yours which is little than borrowing” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The context is that of property ownership, where one owns something in contrast to those who borrow property in order to own something. The deeper meaning is that “what is not yours can be taken away from you” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The philosophy is that “We should be self-reliant because [it] gives us confidence, and we are able to support ourselves and others” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 3). The social philosophy is that human welfare is met on the basis of personal ownership of property than social support from others. Janyap lake pa ryedi [Alur Proverb] - (Appendix, No. 44 - Alur) The literal meaning is that “The lazy ones have sharp teeth” (Appendix, No. 44). The context of this proverb is that of domestic work. Those that are lazy are described as having sharp teeth for consumption. They do not want to participate and contribute to the family welfare, yet are often the ones with higher needs and greater demands. The deeper meaning is that lazy ones are good at consuming. It also means laziness does not reduce our needs and demands; on the contrary, lazy people need socially acquired wealth. The philosophy behind this proverb is that laziness does not deserve any social sympathy; yet it does not exonerate them from demanding social support. The social philosophy is that those that do not contribute to social welfare have even greater needs for social benefits and welfare. Amaka amalungi gakola ekibanja ekiningi [Ganda Proverb, No. 18]; Nyumba nzuri hutengeneza shamba nzuri [Swahili Proverb]  – (Ishiabwe, 2019, pp. 5–6) The literal meaning is that “A good home makes a good farm” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  6). The context is that of social living, where in a home people work hard to support each other. The deeper meaning “stresses the benefits of being sustainable [supportive of each other]

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socially and economically” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6). The philosophy is that “People living in harmony as a team, they achieve much more. They can provide for themselves and others” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  6). The social philosophy is that human welfare is best met where people work as a team, similar to that in a home that fruitfully produce, share, and contribute to each other’s welfare and needs. 5.2.4   Social Justice Oswald von Nell-Breuning (1972) describes justice as the preservation or production of social order established by rights and law to promote the common good. He puts it in the following words: “If rights and law establish the order of the community, the task of justice is to preserve that order or produce it when the existing circumstances do not form a true and meaningful social order which promotes the common good” (1972, p. 211). He describes social justice as the ability of “constantly creating anew the true order of society and thereby continually protecting and furthering the common good” (Nell-Breuning, 1972, p. 211). In this section, our interest is to identify social justice as derived from social values around which the common good and welfare of society can be protected, preserved, and promoted. We are trying to identify the values surrounding social justice from selected African languages and proverbs. Goro camo apil [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 113). The literal meaning is that, “Weakness wins a case” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 28). P’Bitek describes the context as “Cripples and other weak persons such as women have acid tongues, but if you allow yourself to be provoked into a fight with them, and the matter is taken to court, you will always lose the case. Their weakness wins sympathy from the chief” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 28). The deeper meaning is that “It is worthless and unmanly to fight someone who is not your match” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 28). The philosophy behind this proverb is that justice is a power match; otherwise it will be sympathy to prevail over justice. The social philosophy is that in human society, just competition should be applied where there is matching competitive abilities; otherwise, it will be the law of sympathy other than justice that will be used to judge the case. Cwako cwak ot kongo [Acholi Proverb] - (Banya’s Proverb No. C10) The literal meaning is that “Intercede in favour of the house in which there is beer” (Banya, 1994, p. 147). The context is that of traditional court system, where elders are the ones to pass judgements to settle

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disputes. Often, self-interested elders pass judgements, not on the basis of right and wrong (that is justice), but on the basis of how they would benefit after the judgement. House that brew beers were often favoured because if they get annoyed with the judges, then they would not supply the beer they later need. Such elders would judge in favour of those families, even if they know very well they are on the wrong. The deeper meaning is that “Intercession in favour of a friend or a relative though he or she is wrong because you know he or she will reward you or you do not want to spoil your relationship with them is unjust” (Banya, 1994, p. 147). The philosophy behind this proverb is that justice is the ability to dispense right judgement regardless of favours. The social philosophy is that society where justice is meted on the basis of right and wrongs are respected, while societies that bend justice in favour of friends, relatives, or acquaintances are regarded as unjust societies. So justice is the ability to stand for what is right regardless of whatever circumstances. Lworo dongo wang ogwal [Acholi Proverb]  - (Banya’s Proverb No. L44). The literal meaning is “Fearing the large eyes of a frog” (Banya, 1994, p. 181). The context is that of the animal world, where a frog has very big eye balls which frighten people. In this saying the frog’s eyes means the superior or an elder. When an inferior deals with a superior, one encounters difficulties. However, when one is equal to the superior, then that superior gives in easily. The deeper meaning is that to obtain something out of a superior or a difficult person, you better make use of that person’s equal (that can be one’s superior or an elder). The philosophy behind this proverb is that seniority is power. The social philosophy is that in society, it is the respect for elders and those superior to a person that can exact true justice. Where there is no respect for authority, there can be no justice, since authority is the custodian of justice. Okol cok tee [Acholi Proverb] - (Banya’s Proverb No. O13). Literally, this proverb means “A log that gathers all from behind” (Banya, 1994, p. 196). The context is that “Hunters trap animals with chain or rope - they tie a log at the end of the chain or rope - when the animal caught runs, this log spares nothing which is behind the victim; grass, trees, even other animals nearby are hit and collected by it” (Banya, 1994, p. 196). The deeper meaning is that “Anything whose result or consequence befalls all in a community though committed by an individual is referred to as a log” (Banya, 1994, p. 196). The philosophy behind this proverb is that human action has some communal effects. The social

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philosophy is that actions of individuals affect not only the actors but as well the community in which such actors live. So, true justice takes into consideration both the victims and others who are affected by an act of injustice. Usiwekama upanga ukatao kuwili [Swahili Proverb]  – (Kalugila & Lodhi, 1980, p. 23). Literally, this proverb means “Never be like a sword that cuts with both sides” (p. 23). The context is that of household tool like a knife that might be double edged or single edged. The deeper meaning is that cutting with both sides is a sign of double standards that are considered to be problematic. In the practice of justice, taking two conflicting parties to be both right, is not true justice. The philosophy behind this proverb is that justice that is based on double standards is wrong. The social philosophy is that in practising justice, right must mean right and wrong must mean wrong, without bias or favour. 5.2.5   Social Upbringing While upbringing is “the treatment and education during childhood” (Cowie, 1989, p. 1404), social upbringing is the education and inculcation of values with which the young members of society are introduced and integrated into a given society. Some of these social values can be identified from the language and the proverbs of the people. In this case, we shall use the selected African languages and proverbs. Sotta abudongo ngabukya alibubisi [Ganda Proverb]; Ufinya ngeudongo ungali namaji [Swahili Proverb] Literally, it means “Work the clay when it is still wet” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 25). The context is that of human upbringing, where children are morally moulded when they are still young. The deeper meaning is that “We should correct those who make mistakes, at the earliest opportunity so that the problem does not persist or be repeated. Correction of unacceptable behaviour changes a person for the better, making them more responsible persons. Waiting to make the correction can lead to irreversible consequences” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 25). The philosophy is that “Children […] should be corrected and made to understand their mistakes, so that they become responsible [adult] persons” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 25). The social philosophy is that moral upbringing is best done at a tender age. The Acholi say, Yat ka dong ogom pe tire [Meaning, a tree that is already

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bent, cannot be straightened]. The implication is the same; proper upbringing is only possible when done early in the life of children, since when they become old it is impossible to correct them. Gwok loyo ki yibe [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 10) Literally, this proverb means, “A dog is better than so-and-so by its tail” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 3). The context is that of gratefulness, because when favour is done to a dog it waves its tail as a sign of gratitude. Even on the arrival of its owner, a dog welcomes the owner by wagging its tail. This cannot be said of a person who is ungrateful. The deeper meaning is that a dog is better than some ungrateful humans because dogs can at least show signs of gratitude, while some humans are heartlessly ungrateful. The philosophy behind this proverb is that gratitude should be a mark of humanity because humans have reason. However, this sometimes eludes humans; yet the irrational animals like dogs can show better signs of gratitude. The social philosophy is that in society, humans who are supposed to demonstrate higher levels of humanity through appreciation are often defeated by mere animals that despite their lack of rationality show signs of gratitude. Proper social upbringing inculcates attitudes of gratitude, which is a cardinal virtue in the education of younger generations. Aporabot oneko Apwoyo [Acholi Proverb] - (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 98). The literal meaning is that “Blind copying killed hare” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 24). The context is that of a fairy tale about a hare and a bee. When a bee invited a hare for a visit, he prepared porridge and in addition added honey, which was its natural by-product. In copying bee, hare too invited bee for a visit, and hare tried to add his natural by-product into the porridge made, only urine could come out, which made the porridge unpalatable. The cost was loss of friendship with bee. The deeper meaning is that, “Copying others blindly is dangerous” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 24). The philosophy behind this proverb is that blind copying of others is not only dangerous, but they are counterproductive. The social philosophy is that a lot humans learn from one another, but blind copying is not a value to learn, but a vice to avoid. An attempt to do what others do without understanding them is a vice to be avoided. Ibinongo pa larok [Acholi Proverb] - (Banya’s Proverb No. I1) The literal meaning of this proverb is that “You will find it in a stranger’s home” (Banya, 1994, p. 159). The context is that of children’s upbringing, where especially girl children are reminded that, “the kind of life they live in their parent’s home is what they will get in a stranger’s home. In this case, stranger means those who will marry them” (Banya,

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1994, p. 159). The deeper meaning is that children “should not expect that life in their future homes will be a bed of roses. They should abide by their parent’s teaching” (Banya, 1994, p. 159). The philosophy behind this proverb is that the training and lessons you get as a child determine how you will live as an adult. The social philosophy is that the future is the unfolding of your childhood. The lessons and problems you go through as a child are the preparation for the life and problems you will meet as adults. This is similar to the Yoruba proverb (West Africa) which says, “Where you will sit when you are old shows where you stood in youth” (Appendix, No. 254). Amatu agatawulira kubu lirirwaga gende rawamuno mutwe [Ganda Proverb]; Masikio yasi yosikia wasia, huandama nanaki chwakina pokatwa [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “Ears that do not listen to advice, accompany the head when it is chopped off” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6). The deeper meaning is that “there are consequences when we do not take advice from those who have wisdom and experience. Those associated with us also suffer the consequences” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6). The philosophy is that “We should […] appreciate advice and correction” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6). The social philosophy is that proper upbringing is demonstrated in proper behaviour grounded in listening to wise counsel of others.

5.3  Discussing African Social Philosophy In discussing African social philosophy in selected African languages and proverbs, we shall divide it into five sub-topics like the nature of African society, social bonds, social welfare, social justice, and social upbringing. 5.3.1   Nature of African Societies In trying to understand the nature of African societies, the first principle of African social philosophy says that, natural objects are predictable, while human societies are unpredictable. Society of humans can change, progress, or regress, while natural objects like mountains are fixed and do not change places. So, unlike other natural beings, humans should know that the way they treat each other determines harmony or disharmony in society. Those with disadvantaged social positions today might have a different social position tomorrow; those with low social status today might have higher social status tomorrow. Indeed, it is only mountains that do

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not meet (Got aye pe rwatte). The Nigerians say, those we meet on our way up are those you will meet on your way down (Appendix, No. 230). The Buganda say, “If you climb up a tree, you must climb down the same tree” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 6). They also say, “A thin man, you show him contempt when he is across the river, might become your saviour”. So, humans socially need each other and as such constitute a meaningful human society. Some modern thinkers say, today is for the more organized and tomorrow is for the better organized. Such concepts of social organizations, however, go beyond the individuals and their capacities for self-realization. It requires a concerted effort of many. The difference is that traditional African societies believed in the concerted efforts of all the members of society, while modern societies believe in the concerted efforts of the connected few, the privileged individuals or groups in the societies. The second principle of social philosophy regarding the nature of human society states that, we all need to have a way of building ourselves and others. Societies and their needs are not sustainable without the contribution of each and every individual. That is why the Africans insist that an empty hand is only good for the owner, since it has nothing to contribute towards the well-being of others. The Buganda of central Uganda still insist that though humans contribute to social welfare, when it comes to the sharing of the social welfare, humans tend to become selfish and greedy. That is why they say, a crowd is bad for eating, but good for work. Togetherness encourages social work and contribution, but the same crowd is not good when it comes to sharing the fruits of communal work and contributions. In the modern world, these vices are getting to the extremes when African modern state leaders extort and misappropriate public goods and properties for their own interests and benefits. This explains why a number of Africans still languish in poverty amidst plenitude of resources endowed on them by nature or those accumulated through human labour. The third principle says, human society is centred around the family [home], though by extension it embraces others as well. In terms of tightly bonded units, African society is centred on the family, without neglecting others. In this sense, the first society Africans talk about is the family or the home, and only by extension, others are also embraced. This bond of social unity tends to get weaker, the further it moves away from the family fulcrum. This is why we have sayings like, we share the sun, but not the home

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(Ganda proverb). The Acholi would say, tol wat pe cot, meaning strings that bond blood relations do not break, while others may break. They even add obeno wat, meaning blood relation, which is different from wat nyom, meaning marriage relations. A number of Africans consider enmity among blood relations as only circumstantial (brothers are like gourds that knock each other, but do not break each other). On the other hand, other forms of human relations as substantial. That is why the Acholi say, larem kwoko remo, friendship may cause death; so, we must not rely on a friend as we do on a blood brother or sister. The last principle of African social philosophy regarding the nature of African society states that, the basis of social bondage is personal security and satisfaction of the members. Even though externally it appears that in Africa, the social interest is superior to personal interest, on a closer look, this African social philosophical principle illustrates the contrary. The fact is that, both social interests and personal interests are equally important. From the proverb “A dog only knows the person that feeds it” (gwok ngeyo lapite), we can see that the Acholi are saying, where one feeds is where one’s loyalty is placed. Meaning, society is relevant only in as far as it is the source of personal security. This also means, it is because society provides the personal security to individuals that make social ties very strong. Because society provides security for personal interests and promotes personal interests, society becomes indispensable. In a number of African countries, society does not provide sufficient security and help to personal needs, and that is why a number of people are becoming anti-social and hostile to the social interests. The second problem with modern society is that personal interests are blown far beyond social interests without creating any meaningful balance. Yet in traditional African social philosophy, both personal and social interests are taken to be equally important. In the modern setting, while human needs continue to prevail, the means to accommodate them keep dwindling every day. The ability to accommodate coming needs of society was embedded in communal efforts in traditional societies, yet today, this communal support is dwindling, so personal predicaments keep getting precarious. The burden to accommodate human needs today falls squarely on the individuals and their immediate family members. In Africa, where the national governments have not yet taken over the responsibility to cater for social interests as it used to be in traditional African societies, individuals have become more desperate. The result is more diverse levels of poverty, annihilations, desperations, and in some instances death. To cope with some of these burdens, Africans

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have become more aggressive in wealth acquisitions and not necessarily wealth creations through whatever means, including the fraudulent ones. In the process, those in charge of societies, both religious and civil, rob their communities of their social welfares by accumulating wealth for themselves and their immediate confidants in the names of religion or tax dues. This also means that to establish a human society is a difficult task, involving risks and taking chances, that at times leads to failure to safeguard the securities, care, and welfare of the offspring they beget. To mitigate this difficulty, a number of African traditional societies use to solicit the support of the members of human society. Today, unfortunately, such support is dwindling. Individuals battle on their own with very minimum support of their immediate family members. Often such support is not sufficient, and many a time they are not well coordinated, leading to misguidance and misdirection in the lives of the members of society. 5.3.2   Social Bonds The first principle of social bonds according to African social philosophy is that society is hierarchical and an ontologically bonded network. Some of these bonds are weak, while others are strong. This also means, despite the fact that humans are ontologically related to each other, there are also hierarchies in this bond of networks; blood networks seem to be stronger to other social bonds created by marriage, pacts, assimilation, and absorption, to mention some of them. In this bonded relationships, blood relation (doti iweki) is superior. In modern African societies, the bonds and networks created by blood relations are beginning to diminish in importance in comparison to other bonds and new social networks in which Africans find themselves. For example, marriage bonds creating nuclear families are becoming superior to the socially extended family bonds, just as new social relations like religious and political affiliations are creating new bonds that are becoming superior to the networks based on blood relations. Nuclear families appear to be steadily gaining superiority over extended family ties because it is a combination of both blood relations and social arrangements. A man and a woman come together as wife and husband based on social arrangements and not on the basis of blood relations. However, children born of these social arrangements are bonded to the nuclear family by blood.

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The reasons behind these shifts in social relations are, among others, work networks that make humans stay longer hours, days, and years in such relations than in the traditionally set family relations based on blood ties. At funerals, most mourners are now composed of such new relations derived from one’s religious, political affiliations, and workplace acquaintances, other than from the traditionally dominant relations based on blood ties. This means, the traditional Acholi proverb (doti iweki) based on having suckled the same mother’s breast is steadily losing ground. What were hierarchically superior bonds of relations are becoming inferior to the newly created bonds of human relations in modern Africa. The second principle of African social philosophy about society states that sharing is a value and the essence of social bonds. This is because however hard humans work together, true social bonds are created at the level of sharing the benefits of work. Without just sharing of the benefits of human labour and togetherness, we cannot talk of true social bonding among the people. That is why the Buganda say, “A crowd is bad for eating, but good for work”. In modern African societies, however, sharing has been weakened by the philosophy of personal property and the money economy. When wealth was determined in terms of material goods, it was easy to streamline greed and selfishness, but with money economy, wealth can be easily transferred from communally established sources to private bags. Selfishness has crept in making wealth sharing more difficult in modern African societies because of personal property practice. Though the concept and practice of personal property existed in traditional Africa, it was balanced with the concept and practice of communal property. On the contrary, today, the principle of sharing, which was the hallmark of social bonding, is getting completely shattered by greed and selfishness. The third principle of African social philosophy states that the family, friends and community build us up to live full lives. Indeed, what makes us what we are comes from the resources we get from others, especially the family. Our own resources are limited, and they do not fully support our existence. Full life is realized when it is lived in communion with others, beginning with the immediate family members and goes to the extended family and others. Unfortunately, today, life is based more on individual efforts and very little from the group support. Where the group support is obtained it is other social relations, like the state, the religious communities, and the workplaces that provide, thus greatly undermining the traditional basis of social bondage, derived from the family.

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Another African principle is that social bonds are strengthened when members of society care about each other’s needs. This is because personal satisfaction must be balanced with society’s satisfaction; or personal interests must be balanced with the interest of society. It is this care about one another that builds and bonds society. But this principle is getting lost in a number of African communities, since personal interests are being exaggerated far beyond social interests. 5.3.3   Social Welfare The first principle of African social philosophy with regards to social welfare states that social welfare is the product of the many less significant members of society other than its prominent leaders. The proverb capturing this says, “Kulu pong ki jange” [Acholi Proverb]—a river swells by its tributaries. Though leaders of society are always lauded as prominent contributors of human welfare, they are not the producers of the required social welfare. Instead, social welfare is the result of the contributions of the many less significant members of society. The above is supported by another principle which states that success of society or of individuals within society is the result of little contributions of many. The production of social welfare is the duty of all in society and often comes through their little contributions. Indeed, “it is the grass by the roadside that takes the big bull home” (Lum ma inget yoo otero twon paco [Acholi Proverb]), since as they move home, they continually pick the grass by the roadside. The grass by the roadside refers to the little contributions of many, and the bull is the society and its needs, while home is the destiny or success of society. The difference between these two principles is that, the former compares little contributions of the many with the larger contributions of the few, while the latter refers to the little, but continuous contributions of all in society towards social welfare. In today’s African societies, the rich and the leaders of society tend to be accredited and praised beyond their worthwhile contributions to society. On the other hand, the members of society who continuously contribute to social welfare, through taxes and their daily hard works, are ignored and taken for granted. This means, the powerful and more prominent members of society, though they are also important, are not the main change agents in society. That is why it is right to say, a roaring lion does not catch prey “Labwor makok, pe mako lee”

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[Acholi Proverb], or as the Alur would say, it is not the size of the udder that produces more milk, “Dyang majalongo cakge pe”. The second social principle related to social welfare states that, a prominent security feature of a home is the production, availability, and sufficiency of one’s own food supply. Dependence on the generosity of neighbours or society is a liability. Owning a millet garden was a sign of such food security. From the proverb, “what is borrowed has no permanence” (Kwon caka pe moko odeyo), the Acholi society believed that sustainability of family welfare depended more on personal properties and efforts than on the generosity of others or of society. This principle is confirmed by another proverb from Buganda, which says, “It is better yours than borrowing”. A number of African countries and individuals within them have for long been beneficiaries of foreign aids, but this is not the way things have been in the traditional African societies. In the African traditional societies, individuals were encouraged to work hard so as to sustain their own lives and their livelihoods (Nyerere, 1967). Dependence on societies should only come in extreme cases. But in contemporary Africa, what was exceptional has become almost the norm. Beginning with political dependence of Africa on their colonizers for almost everything, security, education, health, and social welfare, and compounded by the religious donations from the countries from where missionaries came, many Africans have acquired the habit of depending on foreign aid. The third principle in relation to social welfare is that contribution to social welfare is as important as benefitting from it at the time of need. In fact, those who do not sufficiently participate and contribute to social welfare often have greater needs to benefit from social welfare. The categories of such people can be identified as the old, children, the disabled, and the lazy ones. While society has a duty towards the vulnerable members of their societies, they have no binding duties towards the lazy members of society. However, in many African societies, however, in as much as everybody was to contribute according to their abilities, distribution is done on the basis of human needs. Indeed, “the lazy ones have greater needs” (Janyap lake pa ryedi [Alur Proverb]) and are not left out. But this philosophy encourages everybody to contribute to social welfare according to one’s ability, so that even those who do not sufficiently contribute to social welfare can also benefit. The fourth social principle in regard to social welfare is that human welfare is best met where people work as a team, similar to that in a home that fruitfully produces, shares and contributes to each other’s needs. The Buganda

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do not see any better example apart from that of a home, which is the community of those who work together and share the fruits of their labour as a team. Unfortunately, both in Buganda and in many other African societies there is a general breakdown of families due to different forces. Some of these forces are demands of work, attraction of new religions, political affiliations, and distance from personal families. In this way, what was the seedbed or a good farm (the family) is turning into a jungle with funny characters getting born out of African families. 5.3.4   Social Justice The first principle of African social philosophy concerning social justice states that just competition applies where there is matching competitive abilities; otherwise it is not justice, but sympathy. To say, “Weakness wins a case” (Goro camo apil) implies that the principle of justice used is different from the normal one, since it is sympathy that is used to favour a weaker party, other than fairness, which is based on equal competitive abilities of the contenders. In traditional and modern African societies, humans often employ sympathy or empathy other than fairness in the application of social justice. It also implies that humans should contend with those whose capacity matches their own if they are to claim justice and fairness. Contending with weaker parties, like children, the vulnerable, the sick, and the disable, jeopardizes one’s fair claim of victory, because social justice will judge in their favour because of their disadvantaged situations, which the weak and the vulnerable of society deserve to get. The second principle of social justice is that unjust societies do bend justice in favour of friends, relatives, and acquaintances. Societies where justice is meted on the basis of right and wrong are respected, while societies that bend justice in favour of friends, relatives, or acquaintances were regarded as unjust. This is demonstrated in the Acholi proverb that “Interceding in favour of the house in which there is beer” (cwako cwak ot kongo) is wrong. True justice is seen where what is wrong is taken for what is wrong and what is right is taken for what is right. Though the practice of interceding in favour of a friend or a relative existed in African traditional societies, this practice is on the increase in the modern times. Today, due to corruption and financial influences or nepotism, tribalism, and racism, justice is twisted upside down. More often

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than not, the innocent is convicted in the courts of law, while the culprits, because of their social status, are left scot-free. Today it is not enough to be right, but might, in terms of social influence, social status, and connections, makes right. The third principle of social justice is that justice prevails when it is under the custody of a respectable authority. In the Acholi traditional society, it is the respect for authority in terms of elders and those superiors that true justice prevails. If there is no respectable authority in charge, often no true justice is practised. That is why the proverb says, “Fearing the large eyes of a frog” (lworo dongo wang ogwal). Meaning, because there is an authority to contend with, so humans will behave justly; otherwise they will not. Authority in this sense means the power that can sanction injustice. The problem with this philosophy is that respect of authority depending on the fear of admonition, punishment, or reproach is a weak basis of justice. True justice cannot be sustained on the basis of fear. It requires acquisition of some basic values that society wants to uphold. Modern African societies are not different from African traditional societies, where law is obeyed and justice is practised only on the basis of fear of punishment. In the absence of a formidable authority that enforces law and justice, society slips into the state of injustice. The fourth principle of African social justice is that actions of individuals do not only affect the actors, but as well the community in which they live. This also means, in African traditional societies as exemplified by the Acholi, justice is not purely the settling of disputes between the offended and the offender, but it has to include the community within which the offence is committed. This is because injustice affects not only the individual persons concerned, but also the community within which it is committed. When the Acholi say, this is “Okol cok tee”, they mean an act [log - okol] whose consequence affects all in the community though committed by an individual alone. Western concept of justice is that it is a punitive act to put right a wrong that was committed by an individual against the offender, which totally excludes the community within which it is committed. The African concept of justice is that it is a remedy to an injustice muted against an individual and the community within which an individual lives. It may therefore be punitive, reconciliatory, remedial, and corrective in the context of individuals who live within communities that are equally affected as that individual.

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The last principle of social justice we want to present is that justice should not be based on double standards. What is right should be taken to be right on the basis of rightness. Equally, what is wrong is taken on the basis of its wrongness. A double standard wavers between rightness and wrongness, thus compromising true justice. 5.3.5   Social Upbringing The first principle about social upbringing is that good upbringing is best done at a tender age. Efforts to correct bad human behaviour late in life often fails. That is why the Buganda and Swahili proverbs say, “Work the clay when it is still wet”. The Acholi puts it negatively that do not try to straighten a tree that is already bent, lest it breaks. The implication is that human upbringing is a difficult responsibility on the part of human societies, but if it is to be done, it must be done to children when they are still young. Secondly, the Buganda say, upbringing is the task of the whole community, because it is like rolling the skin of an elephant, which needs the whole village. Unfortunately, today in Africa, social upbringing is being left to nuclear families and the schools or religious communities who are more often than not partisan and divisive. They do not help to mould the entire character and behaviour of an African child, and hence the numerous problems Africa is facing. The second principle of social philosophy concerning social upbringing states that gratitude is the footprint of social upbringing. On the other hand, the spirit of gratitude is the hallmark of humanity. Unfortunately, humans who are supposed to demonstrate higher levels of appreciation are at times defeated by mere animals that despite their lack of humanity and rationality show signs of gratitude. This is normally the result of poor social upbringing. When an individual is properly brought up, he or she knows how to show appreciation for whatever good they receive. When this is lacking, it is not enough to blame the individual but the kind of social upbringing the individual has received. Blame should go to the social background from which such an individual comes, showing the society has not done well their duty to groom a socially sound person. This does not exculpate the individuals for being blame-worthy. They then say, “A dog is better than some humans because they can show gratitude, while some humans are heartlessly ungrateful” (Gwok loyo ki yibe). In traditional African society, it suffices to know an individual from his or her background. When individuals search for marriage partners, their

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effort is put on getting to know the kind of social background from which such an individual comes. Individuals are therefore judged on the basis of their backgrounds. If the parents of such a potential marriage partner are known to be thieves, to have killed, are social menace, they would automatically reject such marriage partner, believing the parents have groomed a person with bad behaviour patterns. Two things can be deduced from this social principle: one is positive and the other is negative. The positive one rightly acknowledges the influence of social upbringing of the younger members of society, saying if society wants socially sound members of their society, then social upbringing must be sound, while the negative one generalizes the situation of human background by incriminating or patronizing individuals on the basis of their background trainings. Such automatic identification of individuals with their backgrounds can be very misleading and can lead to the wrong condemnation of innocent individuals whose backgrounds are not quite sound. Equally, it might lead to the wrong patronization of bad individuals whose backgrounds are sound. The third principle of social philosophy regarding upbringing says, socially, people can learn from one another, but blind imitation of one another is wrong. This is because a lot of humans learn from one another, but blind imitation, in an attempt to do what others do without understanding them, is wrong. In fact, this social principle is saying knowledge is the basis of sound social learning and possible imitation, implying one should understand well what one is trying to copy, instead of copying what one does not fully understand. Both in traditional and modern African societies, there is great weakness in humans that blindly copy one another. Often the thinking behind this behaviour is the belief that what works for others works also for them; what is good for others is also good for them. This generic attitude of mind is not useful for personal growth, and it kills human initiatives and ability to adopt things to fit individuals’ unique situations. That is why the Acholi say, “Blind copying killed hare” (Aporabot oneko Apwoyo). The fourth principle of social upbringing is that the training and lessons you get as a child determine how you will live as an adult. Put differently, this social philosophy states that the future is the unfolding of your childhood. The lessons and problems you meet as a child prepare one for future life. Similarly, the Yoruba Proverb from West Africa says, “Where you will sit when you are old shows where you stood in youth”.

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While this social philosophy is true in many instances, it is incorrect to think that the future is just an unfolding of one’s past childhood. This is because there are breakthrough stories in the world, where people move from poverty to wealth, and vice versa. However, to a great extend this African social philosophy should be understood from the moral point of view. This is because in as far as human upbringing is concerned, it has to do with moral behaviour of an individual. So, a well-brought-up individual is the one who is morally upright, so failure to train a child morally leads to moral difficulties in later life. This is still captured by this Ganda proverb that “ears that do not listen, accompany the head when it is chopped off”. In West Africa, they say, “flies that do not listen follow the corpse to the grave”.

5.4  Conclusion In conclusion, we can say, as regards the nature of African social philosophy in general, we found out that, all is derived from their philosophical worldview, which states that society is constituted of predictable and unpredictable natures. Among other things, humanity or being human is predictable, because it is proper to all human beings, while personal status of any individual is unpredictable, because it can change with varying circumstances. So, in the African social philosophy, it is only our humanity that is predictable but not our personal status that constitutes the nature of our social living. The basis of social bondage is personal security and satisfaction of its members. However, both social and personal interests are paramount for the survival of social bonds. The root of social bondage is the family demonstrated in the ability of self-perpetuation through marriage. Specifically, society is a network of bonded relationships. These bonds are hierarchical, since blood ties are superior to any other social bonds, like friendship. Social alienation is the greatest danger to social bonds, since working as a team without leaving anyone behind is the trademark of social link. Social welfare is not the product of its leaders, but of the contribution of the many insignificant members. Security of a home is in self-­ sustainability and not dependent on social welfare. The social philosophy here is that humans must contribute according to their abilities, and social welfare should be distributed according to needs. Taking care of personal needs should be balanced with the needs of others.

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As regards social justice, Africans believe that a just society is where justice is practised; right is taken for what is truly right and wrong for what is truly wrong in accordance with their socio-philosophical worldview. They acknowledge the importance of authority in the realization of true justice. True justice prevails under respectable authority. Unjust action affects all, culprits as well as the other members of the community. True justice protects current as well as future interests of society. Just competitions require matching competing abilities. To train or educate a responsible social individual requires the effort of the entire society. On the part of the individuals, they are reminded that it is not enough to attend instructions, but to learn from an instruction is more important. In social learning, two things are important: blind imitation is discouraged, while cultivating a spirit of gratitude is encouraged. Though human actions affect both individuals and members of society, a number of Africans acknowledge that at times individuals are directly answerable for their own actions. They also note that generosity is not often recognized and appreciated by society, so individuals must act out of convictions other than desires to please others. Generosity, they notice, has limits, which is to guard against personal peril.

References Assimeng, M. (1977). African social and political thought: Introductory analysis for students. Unpublished. http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/ Banya, A. A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda Development Series, No. 2). Foundations for African Development. Barnes, H.  E. (1948). An introduction to the history of sociology. Chicago University Press. Chambliss, R. (1954). Social thought: From Hammurabi to Comte. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Cowie, A. P. (Ed.). (1989). Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. Ishiabwe, A. (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) proverbs and wise sayings. African Proverbs Working Group. Kalugila, L., & Lodhi, A.  Y. (1980). More Swahili proverbs from East Africa. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Kasanda, A. (2015). Analyzing African social and political philosophy: Trends and challenges. Journal of East-West Thought, 5(1), 30–50.

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McLean, F. G. (1999). Preface. In Social reconstruction in Africa: Ugandan philosophical studies, II. The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Nell-Breuning, O. (1972). Justice. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (p. 211). Gonzaga University Press. Nyerere, J. K. (1967). Education for self-reliance. The Government Printer. p’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited.

CHAPTER 6

Theory of Knowledge in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

6.1   Introduction Debate about the existence of African epistemology remains another open battle ground in that there are two hotly contested views on the existence or non-existence of African epistemology. In the introduction of this chapter, we shall show who the main contenders of these two diversely opposed views are. Just to begin with one of the antagonists of the existence of African epistemology is Airoboman and Asekhauno (2012). Airoboman and Asekhauno (2012, p. 13) opine that their work critically examined and established that there is actually no African epistemology. This is because the premises on which African epistemology rests are wrong. According to them, the wrong assumptions behind these premises are (a) some knowledge is peculiar to Africans, (b) such knowledge is context dependent and socially bound, and (c) such knowledge is superior to other epistemologies. Secondly, epistemology can only be culturally provoked, generated, and reflected upon. Thirdly, epistemology is a universal discipline as a theory of knowledge. Lastly, to provoke, generate, and reflect on such knowledge, Africans need to set themselves free from the cocoon of peculiarism. Before I give my own view on this approach, it would be good to hear what protagonists say about African epistemology. The view presented by the protagonists is captured by Nwosimiri (2017) and other authors. One © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_6

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of the points of contention brought out by Nwosimiri is that justification of knowledge can be properly done only by internalists and externalists. The weakness of the protagonists of African epistemology, according to Nwosimiri, is that they depend only on the externalist justifications and ignore the internalist justification of knowledge. To defend the existence of African epistemology, Nwosimiri (2017, p. 1) brings out the following points. The first is that each race is endowed with a distinctive nature and embodies in its civilization of a particular spirit. Secondly, Africans like other people share certain values, perceptions, and interaction with the rest of the world. Thirdly, that African mode of knowing is social, monist, and situated notion of knowledge. For Nwosimiri, the above shared values prompted Africans to modernize their societies. What is difficult to see in Nwosimiri’s argument is whether there is anything unique in this African epistemology. He equally insists that African epistemologists focus on externalists, ignoring that both externalist and internalist notions are necessary for knowledge justification.1 Externalist point of view is comparative, because it contrasts African epistemology with other knowledge systems as if African knowledge system must be an anti-thesis of other knowledge systems. Internalists look at Africa from its survival point of view, which cannot take place without a system of knowledge coherent with its needs and unique situations. There is no group of people in the world that can survive without their unique knowledge that makes them dominate their environment and harvest the fruits of the world and make them live like human beings. Africa has survived and continues to survive because of its unique knowledge system. In Chap. 2, I observed that misgivings about African philosophy can be applied to any branch of philosophy, which in the final analysis will dismiss all branches of African philosophy. Ironically, Airoboman and Asekhauno claim that there is African philosophy. At the same time they are saying, there is no African epistemology. In the same argument, Airoboman and Asekhauno contend that there can be no culture-specific African logic, epistemology, and I am sure they may soon publish on the other branches of African philosophy. 1  Externalists are those looking at African knowledge system from outside, and their main aim is to see if African knowledge system agrees or not with the Western or other knowledge systems, while internalists are those deriving the African knowledge system from within Africa and their aim is to determine internal factors of agreements or disagreements within African knowledge system whether their views agree among themselves.

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My problem with Airoboman and his colleague is not only about their obsession with philosophical method but also their understanding of universality. For them, what is universal has no specific bends in specific cultural contexts, and what is cultural can never be universalized. For them, specificity of certain philosophical theories or views as found in specific cultures are negations of universality. They seem to think what is specific must be anti-universal. This way of thinking is not correct. Universality is not cast in stones. What is universally true can also be particularly true. The law of logic tells us, from the universally true, we can deduce the specifically true, and not the other way round. Surely, there are some philosophical theories and views that are specifically true in the African context, but not necessarily universally true. Airoboman and Asekhauno criticize the basic African epistemological assumptions. I do not see any inconsistencies in saying that some African epistemological concepts are peculiar to Africans and that such knowledge is context dependent. I wonder who has claimed that African epistemology is superior to other epistemologies. This would be unrealistic because we are not talking about inferiority or superiority of knowledge but only of some differences. I find difficulty in understanding how epistemology can only be culturally provoked, generated, and reflected upon. What would be the possible result of reflecting on epistemology from specific cultural perspectives, if not some possible new knowledge? For epistemology to be universal, in my view, it means it must be arrived at through justifiable reason. To use justifiable reason as the criterion for knowledge does not mean that the content derived must be the same because the method used is the same. There is even no unison view about this method, since a number of African authors think to derive knowledge in any discipline; we need as well to involve our intuitive abilities besides our rational abilities (see Ibuot, 2010). What does Airoboman mean by saying that Africans must set themselves free from the cocoon of peculiarism? We are peculiar, not by choice, but by nature and other factors. What can set humans free from their peculiarity is human ability to reflect, think, and rationalize the context and content of their peculiarity, which is exactly what African philosophy is trying to do. This effort does not nullify peculiarity but sophisticates it and makes it more intelligible, universally. As regards Nwosimiri (2017), I could agree with him if African epistemology only focuses on external justifications of knowledge. But this seems not to be true in my view. I will later show how the Acholi of Northern Uganda justify the validity of their knowledge, including

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through observations, experiments, and internal consistencies. I do not agree with him that African concept of knowledge is social, monist, and situated. The social nature of knowledge is derived from the point of view of its use, which is cultural acceptability, while the situatedness is based on where such knowledge is derived from. But that African concept of knowledge is monist, a single-angled type of knowledge, is not true. I have several examples from selected African proverbs to showcase. In general, the following are some of the antagonists who do not believe that African epistemology exists: Hountondji, Appiah, Bodunrin, Oruka, and Wiredu. On the other hand, some of the protagonists are Senghor, Anyanwu (1983), Onyewuenyi (1976), Amaechi (2015), and Jimoh and Thomas (2015). Some authors do not only believe that African traditional knowledge exists, but they also have African traditional scientific knowledge. Such authors are Millar et al. (2006), Kende, Apusigah, Haverkort, and Tabuti (2006). In criticizing authors like Hountondji, Amaechi (2015, p. 2) states that while he shares Hountondj’s vision of adoption of an attitude of critical, scientific, and sceptical orientation in African societies, he rejects the views of Hountondji and other scholars who deny African intellectual and cognitive systems and argues that their position rests on one-sided conception or dimension of epistemology. Amaechi believes that epistemology, just like other philosophical practices, is as old as the history of mankind in Africa, rejecting Hountondj’s view that philosophy, as an academic discipline, started in African universities only in the 1960s and 1970s. Theory of knowledge is the perception about the origin, nature, reliability, or unreliability of what constitutes a relationship between the knowing subject and the known object. Bishop Alexander Willwoll defines knowledge as “that life process that is known to man directly from his own consciousness; in this event (the subject) possesses the known (object) in himself in such an active way that he at the same time sets it over against himself in the active unity” (1972, p. 212). The general problem in the theory of knowledge has been about what constitutes this relationship between the knower and the known. Many African societies had their own ways of understanding this relationship on the basis of their philosophical worldview. While there is no doubt that they had both the rationalists’ and empiricists’ explanations of this relationship, what marks their perspective unique has been their ontological existential perception. In a world where an individual is not just an autonomous being, that is self-propelling and self-determining, but one

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who is also social and closely related to self, others, nature, and God, the understanding of this relationship between the known and the knower definitely matters. To explain how they understood this relationship, it is good to survey some selected African languages and proverbs.

6.2   Epistemology in Selected African Languages and Proverbs From some of the African proverbs, we can understand knowledge as sensitive, intellective, both sensitive and intellective, and knowledge also as mystical. We can analyse some of these proverbs one by one. 6.2.1   Knowledge in General By knowledge in general, we want to underline the concept of knowledge in itself detached from the different branches or kinds of knowledge one may be referring to. In this sense we would be referring to basic characteristics of knowledge as it is understood by the Africans. Later we shall discuss these different characteristics, trying to identify those that are proper to the African people and those Africans share with the Western or other people’s epistemologies. Kicika iye pe [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix No. 51). The literal meaning of the proverb is that “He or she has no inner partition” (Appendix, No. 51). The context of this proverb is that of the structure of a traditional African house. A traditional African house should have some inner partition, separating living room from the bedroom. They would compare someone who does not have secrets with a house without an inner partition and describing him or her as an open space (kicika iye pe). Kicika is part of the inner wall separating the living room from the bedroom or any other rooms. It is in the inner room where personal belongings and valuables are kept. The deeper meaning is that he or she has no secrets. The philosophy behind this proverb is that having personal knowledge or secret is a bond of security. Epistemologically, knowledge or information is wealth or value an individual must have and keep in the store of life. Such knowledge may be known to oneself alone, used by an individual at the right moment when he or she needs it for successful living. To have such reservoir of knowledge or information is a sign of true humanity and a sign of wisdom. So, one of the characteristics of

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knowledge is that they are valuable and useful. Those who possess them have valuable information for their own security, needs, and successful living. True knowledge is the possession of valuable information and skills that are useful and a resource. Obolo opuk i pii [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.137) Literally means, “He has thrown the tortoise into the water” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 34). The context of this proverb, according to p’Bitek, is a folktale. “In a folk tale, hare lifted up tortoise meaning to kill him and said; ‘How do you want to be killed? Shall I dash you against the rock or do you prefer to be drowned?’ Tortoise answered: ‘What a fool you are to think that you can kill me by smashing me on the rock! Do you not know my shell is unbreakable?’ Whereupon the foolish hare threw tortoise into the water” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 34). The deeper meaning is that a misfortune becomes a blessing in disguise (p’Bitek, 1985). The philosophy behind this proverb is that what foolish humans see as misfortunes, wise men see as blessings in disguise. Epistemologically, this proverb means to lack simple knowledge of the natural world is a sign of foolishness. True knowledge is the possession of simple information about the world, like the knowledge that tortoise shells can crack when smashed against the rock, and tortoise does not drown in water. Being foolish is the inability to know that tortoise is an animal that lives both in water and on land, so throwing a tortoise into water is just a blessing in disguise. Hare is often known for its stupidity (lack of knowledge) and foolishness (lack of wisdom), which is the inability to see the difference between truth that smashing a tortoise against the rock can actually kill it and the lie that a tortoise can ever be drowned in water. One of the characteristics of knowledge is then the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood. Kedi ibut ki maru i te pii, twal bingene [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No. 49): Butu ki maro i te pii (Banya, Proverb, No. B18) The literal meaning is that “Even if you have sex with your mother in law under water, one day it will be known” (Appendix, No. 49). Banya literally translates this proverb to mean, “Sleeping with mother in law under water” (1994, p. 141). The context of the proverb is that of family life, where mother-in-laws are “regarded by the son-in-law as a sacred person. She is so important that the kind of respect given to her is above the rest” (Banya, 1994, p. 141). While sex with someone else’s wife is bad enough, but having sex with one’s mother-in-law is considered an abomination, in the Acholi culture. Having sex under water, here, means in the

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most secretive place. Though Banya thinks, the deeper meaning is that we should “respect secrets just as we respect our mother-in-laws” (1994, p. 141); I think the deeper meaning is that with time, even the top most human secrets will be known. There is no secret under the Sun, as the Bible say. The philosophy behind this proverb is that truth cannot be hidden forever. The theory of knowledge is that lies are attempts to hide the truth, but the truth itself cannot be concealed forever. So, another characteristic of true knowledge is that it is self-evident. Ryeko pe pa ngat acel [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.84) The literal meaning is that “Wisdom, cunningness, skill or knowledge is not for one person only” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 20). The context is that of court cases, where different people give their verdicts on the case. However, the tendency that one’s opinion must be adopted by all is strongly protested in this proverb. The counsel is that one should always listen to the opinion of others, since wisdom is not a prerogative of one person. P’Bitek has the following to say about the deeper meaning, “Even if one is knowledgeable or powerful, one should always listen to the opinions of others since wisdom and skills, like knowledge, is not a monopoly of one person” (1985, p. 20). The philosophy behind this proverb is that true wisdom is embedded in human judgement, demonstrated by different people. The theory of knowledge is that true knowledge is derived from right judgements; and right judgement is a sign of wisdom, which humans share. Therefore, in general, we can say knowledge is the possession of valuable information and skills that are useful and a resource. It is the possession of simple information about the world and the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood. True knowledge is self-evident, since it cannot be hidden forever and it is a result of right judgement. 6.2.2   Sense Knowledge Alexander Willwoll defines sense knowledge as “the impressions received into the sense organs from the surrounding world, […]; they are received by the sense power in a biologically favourable simplification and brought to consciousness in an active way. In this consciousness certain definite aspects stand out which are in a definite correlation of the objective realities of the surrounding world” (1972, p. 212). Implying, sense knowledge is the definite aspect of the objective world, brought to human consciousness through the sense organs. Later, Willwoll contends that these definite aspects of the objective world are then processed at intellectual level to

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become intellective knowledge. We shall try to trace these definite aspects of the objective world as identifiable in selected African languages and proverbs. Wang loyo Ajwaka [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.154) The literal meaning is that “The eyes are more dependable than the oracles of diviners” (Appendix, No.154). The context is that of human sickness, where the Acholi often search for the cause of human illnesses. Often they rely on the arts of divination of diviners, who through their oracles tell their clients what the causes of their problems are and the right course of action to be followed. Oftentimes, however, such derived mystical knowledge proves futile, since they do not solve the problems predicted. Others, using their natural abilities to see things based on observations and reflections, tend to predict the right causes of such illnesses, which more often than not prove to be correct. The deeper meaning is that observations and reasoning are more reliable than mystical attempts to derive knowledge. The philosophy behind this proverb is that between mystical knowledge and sense knowledge, sense knowledge is more reliable. The theory of knowledge is that sense knowledge is superior to mystical knowledge; so humans are urged to rely more on their sensual experiences to derive knowledge other than relying purely on mystical knowledge. Atalimba takula [Ganda Proverb]; Asiye ongea uongo hatakua [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “He who tells no lies, will not grow up” (Ishiabwe, 2019, pp.  6–7). The context is that of experiencing the bad consequences of telling lies, from which a person suffers pain. The deeper meaning is that “Telling lies is a vice which brings many problems between people. This usually has unpleasant consequences which make people to learn lessons to guide them in the future” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  7). The philosophy is that “We should learn from mistakes we make so that we do not repeat them” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 7). The theory of knowledge is that experience is the best teacher. This proverb is similar to other Luganda proverbs like Atambula ekilo (One who travels to a familiar place does not worry about arriving in the dark); Atanatambula yatenda nyina okufumba (He who has not travelled thinks that his mother is the best cook in the world); and Eyali alumidwa omusota, bwalaba omunya agudduka (He who is bitten by a snake fears a lizard). Mak tunu aye pok [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya, Proverb, No.M3)

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The literal meaning is that “A thing given to be held for a moment is a permanent gift” (Banya, 1994, p. 183). The English would say, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush” (Cowie, 1989, p. 109). This proverb is normally given in the context of eating beef. In the process of eating, elders, who give pieces of meat to young ones in their hands, usually say “get this for the time being” (mak man pi tutunu). In the end, what was given for the time being (pi tutunu) becomes the actual lot you will get (pok) (Lajul, 2014, pp. 133–135). The deeper meaning is that what one has at hand is better than what one has been promised. The philosophy behind this proverb is that what is perceivable by our senses are more dependable than what is perceivable by our minds. The theory of knowledge is that sense knowledge is more dependable than intellective knowledge in practical living. So, sense knowledge is also genuine knowledge. Arum buto kec kom Bonyo [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek, Proverb, No.99; Banya, No.A18) The literal meaning according to p’Bitek is that “Brown hornbill sleeps hungry in spite of a swarm of locusts” (1985, p. 25). The context is that of locusts’ invasion in an area. P’Bitek writes: “The bird has the habit of taking a locust and throwing it up, and then opening its beak so that the prey may fall right into its throat: but each time the insect flies away. It is said that when a locust flies away, the hornbill says, “Go! There are plenty more” (1985, p. 25). Though locusts are delicacies for the Arum bird, but time normally comes when locusts evacuate an area after having destroyed everything. In such a situation, Arum will have nothing to feed on and starve. For the deeper meaning, p’Bitek thinks this is “said of a lost opportunity” (1985, p.  25). I can add the deeper meaning is that when an opportunity knocks, we better take advantage of it, because we might lose it once and for all. Equivalent to English, “Procrastination is a thief of time”. The philosophy behind this proverb is that what one can see, touch, feel, or taste is more dependable than what one can only perceive with the mind. The theory of knowledge is that experience is real knowledge with relevance and importance for solving our human problems. Nyenye limo nyuka ki tunge [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya’s Proverb No. N9) For Banya, this proverb literally means, “A cockroach uses its feelers to find out the temperature of gruel [porridge]” (1994, p. 190). Contextually, “Before it begins to lick gruel, a cockroach finds out the temperature of the gruel to ensure that it does not burn it” (Banya, 1994, p. 190). The deeper meaning is that we should look before we leap as rendered in the

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English language. The philosophy is that feelings or experience are genuine sources of knowledge. Epistemologically, experience is the dependable source of knowledge for human survival. 6.2.3   Intellective Knowledge Alexander Willwoll describes intellective knowledge as the ability of the subject to return to himself and possess himself along with the total experience of the world in its relationship to existence (1972, p.  213). To return to himself, the subject does this through human thinking, applying the ability of human reason. Intellective knowledge is then the abstraction of general or deeper elements of particular perceptions derived through sense knowledge. It is the ability of human mind to generalize and to identify commonalities and differences among particular perceptions. In this process, the mind derives knowledge that go beyond the commonly observable facts or phenomena of particular existences. Willwoll believes that human knowledge “includes both sense and intellectual knowledge as its two necessary aspects” (1972, p. 213). In our case, we are trying to understand the type of knowledge that goes beyond our sense perceptions. A type of knowledge we can arrive at by the use our human reason. Such knowledge will be analysed from selected African languages and proverbs. Entalowooza yamala amazzi mulwendo [Ganda Proverb]; Yule mtu hafikirii ni kama chungu inayokataa kukaa vizuri maji yakamwagika yote [Swahili Proverb] Literally it means, “The one who does not think is like a gourd which fails to sit well and all the water pours” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 14). The context is the African houseware utensils like gourds used to collect water. Only wise ones used pads to stand a gourd of water, and fools sit them on bear ground; they usually pour out if put on bear grounds. The deeper meaning is that “A person who takes things for granted, or takes things lightly retains no knowledge of things in his mind” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 14). The philosophy is that it is important to reflect on what we do so that we avoid wastage. The theory of knowledge is that intellective knowledge, which is a result of human reflective thinking, helps us to become wise and avoid making silly mistakes in life. Yiko oywelo i ngom [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.164) The literal meaning is that of “Burying oywelo fruit in the ground” (Appendix, No.164). The context is that of fruit gathering. A good fruit

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gatherer, when collecting Oywelo fruits (that are normally green when they are unripe and black when they become ripe), would bury the unripe fruits and come later to recover them from the ground when they are ripe. Saving for the future is the deeper meaning behind this proverb. The philosophy behind this proverb is that the future is as important as the present; so a wise person not only gathers for the immediate needs but also saves for the future. The theory of knowledge is that using our senses, we can clearly see what we need for the present; but our ability to reflect on the present tells us to think of the future as well and prepare for it accordingly. Thus, intellective knowledge, which is the ability to reflect on our sense experiences, is necessary and important for the present and the future. Um pe ngweyo cet [Acholi Proverb]—(P’Bitek, Proverb, No.156; Banya, Proverb, No.U1) The literal meaning is “The nose does not smell excreta” (p’Bitek’s, 1985, p. 38), before it comes out of the stomach. Contextually, this proverb asserts that, though humans are aware of the strong, unpleasant smell that usually comes from excreta, humans do not have the ability to detect such bad smell before the excreta comes out of the stomach, either as waste matter or as gas. The deeper meaning is that humans do not have the foresight to predict and foretell the future. P’Bitek gives the deeper meaning as saying, “We are often ignorant of the coming misfortune” (1985, p. 38). The philosophy behind this proverb is that foresight is the ability to see possible forthcoming fortune or misfortune, but lack of it makes humans to face undesirable ordeals they least expect. The theory of knowledge is that the ability to foresee is the capacity of the intellect that reflects on human experience to derive intellective knowledge. When humans fail to do this, they are likely to face bad consequences. Oweko ngwen i kom tuk—(p’Bitek, Proverb, No.145); Weko ngwen kom tuk—(Banya, Proverb No.W5), [Acholi Proverbs] According to p’Bitek, the literal meaning is “He has left the white ants on the tuk”—small anthill (1985, p.  36). While for Banya, the proverb literally means “Leaving white ants in a mould” (1994, p. 214). The context is that of edible ants that inhabit small ant’s hills. But by the mere look at the anthill, one cannot tell whether it contains edible ants or not. Wise people often go beyond this first impression and venture into finding out whether the anthill inhabits edible ants or not. The deeper meaning, according to p’Bitek, is that “external qualities: size, beauty, white teeth, smiles, etc., can be misleading” (1985, p.  36). For Banya, the deeper meaning is that “regrets for failures due to ignoring advice and teachings”

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(1994, pp.  211, 214). For me, the deeper meaning is that inability to reflect, think, or reason makes humans miss golden opportunities. This happens because humans mainly rely on external qualities as p’Bitek has mentioned or fail to learn from the deeper knowledge and wisdom contained in the advice given by those who have better knowledge of the fact, as Banya contends. The philosophy behind this proverb is that reflective thinking is the ability to discover what sense experience cannot give humans. The theory of knowledge is that, hierarchically, intellective knowledge is higher than sense knowledge, because it can help us to discover what the senses alone cannot provide. Te okono obur bong luputu—(p’Bitek, Proverb, No.150); Tee okono pe luputu—(Banya, proverb, No. T2) The literal meaning is that “Pumpkin growing wild in the old homestead site is not uprooted” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 37). Instead, Banya translates this proverb as “The stamp of a pumpkin plant should not be uprooted” (1994, p. 207). Contextually, when people migrate from one homestead to another, they tend to think what they have left in the old homestead are no longer useful. For that matter, the pumpkin growing by the courtyards, many think, are no longer useful and are tempted to uproot them. But what they cannot see at that time is the possibility that where they are migrating to, things might not be that rosy, since food crops take time before they are harvested. What often happens is that such pumpkins left in the old homesteads become the last resort to salvage the family from famine. The deeper meaning, according to p’Bitek, is that “Old customs which are harmless and may even be useful should not be uprooted” (1985, p. 37). P’Bitek argues that this is the main theme of his book, Song of Lawino (1985, p.  37). For Banya, the deeper meaning is similar to saying we should not defecate in the tent—his proverb, No. P1 (1994, p. 207). The philosophy behind this proverb is that our excitement about our sense perception should not blur our perception of what lies ahead. The theory of knowledge is that we should not rely only on what we can see and touch; we should equally think of what we cannot see with our eyes, yet we can perceive with our minds. Thus, intellective knowledge is as important as our sense knowledge. This proverb is similar in meaning to other Acholi proverbs like Omoko ci ocodo (Trapped and escaped); Amingaming ongolo nge gweno (It is soon after the chickens have gone to sleep that Amingaming (a type of white ants—chicken’s delicacies) comes out); and Angee dong cen (I wish I had known comes too late).

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Bwoba tosobota kutunula mumaaso, olibeera mabega [Ganda Proverb]; Kama hauwezi kutazama mbele, utaendelea kubaki nyuma [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “If you cannot look ahead, you will always remain behind” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). The context is human movement, which demands that the traveller constantly looks ahead to see any incoming obstacle so that it may be avoided. Otherwise, such obstacles will constantly disrupt the forward movement of the traveller. The deeper meaning is that “Hope and determination is important for a person to be able to develop economically and intellectually” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). Though I think the deeper meaning is that looking ahead means planning carefully in order to succeed. The philosophy is that “We all must focus on moving ahead with our endeavours, regardless of any challenges we might encounter” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). The theory of knowledge is that reflective and critical thinking is necessary in order to succeed in life. 6.2.4   Mystical Knowledge In general, mysticism is defined as “spiritual discipline used to make contact with the divine” (Kundi, 2013, p. 141). For Kundi (2013), mystical experience is the transient (temporal, brief, momentary), extraordinary (unusual, unexpected) experience of being in unity, in harmony, in relationship, not only with the divine, but with everything in existence, accompanied with ecstatic feelings, loss of individuality or personality functioning, modifications of time and space, and loss of control over events. In mystical experiences, we are not fully in control of the events taking place. But what is very important for our purpose is the observation of Deikman (2000) that throughout the years and in different cultures of the world, a strong link is made between mystical experiences and mystical knowledge. Mystical experience, apparently, helps in obtaining access to mystical knowledge. Rupa Goswami divides mysticism into two: Vaidhi (sanctioned) and Raganuga (spontaneous) mystical consciousness. Acquired through meditation reared up by spiritual discipline and preparation, whereas the latter is the gift of God (Sircar, 1977). In my view, African philosophy subscribes to both forms of mystical experiences; however, the first type (sanctioned or reared mystical consciousness) is done through divination in Africa, while in the East, this training is acquired through meditation. In both the

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East and in Africa, including Western Christianity, spontaneous mystical experience is the gift of God. Divination as a means of obtaining mystical knowledge as it is done in Africa is greatly doubted by Western philosophy because of their apprehensive methodology strenuous to human reason. Western philosophy may find less difficulty in accepting meditation as a means of obtaining mystical knowledge as it is prominent in the East, but they would relegate spontaneous mystical experience to the field of theology. In Western philosophy, there are four terms that are usually associated with mystical knowledge: intuitionism, irrationalism, occultism, and mysticism. Our questions now is which of these Western terms are the same or similar to the African concepts of mystical knowledge? Besides, whether beyond sense and intellective knowledge there is another form of knowledge? It may not be the competence of this chapter to probe into the details of this discussion, but I have to take a position, whether I believe in the existence of mystical knowledge or not, which in my view is affirmative. Underhill (1911) sees closer affinity between philosophy and mysticism, since several great philosophers speak of a “mystical philosophy” or a “philosophy of mysticism”, as adumbrated by great philosophico-­ mystical thinkers such as Heraclitus, Socrates, Plato, Plotinus, Eckhart, Spinoza, Kant, Berkley, Hegel, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Bergson, in the West and Sankaracharya, Avicenna, Al-Farabi, Al-Kindi, Ibn’al-Arabi, Al-Chazali in the East, which provides ample proof of the close affinity between philosophy and mysticism. Now, going back to the question we have posed above, which of these terms can be equated with African mystical knowledge? In my view, it would be none of these terms in themselves, though there are some relations to some of these terms as I want to explain. To say African mystical knowledge is about intuitionism would not be saying anything new, since Western philosophy itself, despite variance in views, believes in intuitionism. African mystical knowledge is closely related with what Josef Vries calls normal or special intuitionism. This is because it is about how especially talented people intuit knowledge using their natural abilities or even about direct vision of God. However, it is not true that African mystical knowledge can be equated with irrationalism, psychological or epistemological. This is because African understanding of mystical knowledge is that this knowledge, though it is mystical, is also intelligible, and not something irrational. Thirdly, the concept of occultism is the battle grounds between Western and African philosophy.

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What Frank (1972) calls occultism is where the real problem is. Some of the happenings and methods of obtaining mystical knowledge may involve what Frank has termed abnormal or unusual, extraordinary or preternatural occultism. As a key representative of the Western philosophical worldview, Frank has the right to call these happenings occultism. But equally, from the African philosophical worldviews, what is mysterious does not need to be occult. He defines that what is occult is everything that is known in an abnormal but profane way (Josef, 1972, p. 285). The question is abnormal to whom? This is abnormal or unusual to Western philosophy, but not to African philosophy, because in African philosophy, humans have a symbiotic relationship with the visible and the invisible world. So, in this relationship, humans communicate with God and other natural realities and derive knowledge. The type of knowledge derived from this relationship cannot be defined in the Western rationalized sense. It may be unusual to human reason, but not necessarily unusual to humans as such, since humans are more than rational beings. Humans, in the African philosophy, are both rational and emotional beings. So, any distinction cast in stone to separate human rationality from human sensitivity would be wrong. Some of these interactive relationships that generate knowledge may be preternatural, but all are conceptualizable by the human mind, so they are not abnormal. Therefore, intuitive mystic, as confirmed by Underhill, does not merely conceive but also realizes, in sentiment and action, the unity of life. This is the distinction between philosophy and mysticism, as seen above (Underhill. 1911). To describe African mystical knowledge as spiritism, which according to Frank is the same as preternatural occultism, is also wrong. This is because, for knowledge to be knowledge, it is not important who initiates its derivation. If it is God, through revelation, or special human talent through intuition, all is still knowledge meant for the good of human beings. So, our effort here is to try to identify this form of knowledge in selected African languages and proverbs. Bura oyweyo kome [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.24) The literal meaning is that “A cat has brushed the body” (Appendix, No.24). The context of this proverb is that of witchcraft, where the Acholi believe that it is orchestrated by witches, who manipulate and mandate cats to touch their victims, by which such victims instantly become bewitched. The behaviour of such victims automatically changes; they begin to behave in funny and uncoordinated ways, a sign that they are

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under spell or they are bewitched. The deeper meaning is that he or she has been bewitched. Implying, witches are capable of manipulating nature (cats) or natural events (sometimes lightening) to injure or harm the health of other human beings. The philosophy behind this proverb is that there is mystical power that can be known and manipulated. Such mystical knowledge, by which bad human beings in the persons of witches are capable of manipulating evil forces to the detriment of other human beings, is hereby implicated. The theory of knowledge is that knowledge is also mystical, since there are certain happenings in human life that cannot be explained empirically or rationally, yet their effects on humans are clearly seen. Putu lwit i dye cing [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya, Proverb, No.P4) The literal meaning is “To pluck amulet from the inside of the palm/ hand” (Banya, 1994, p. 204). The context is that of superstition, believing that someone possessing an amulet can be successful in many things, like hunting, food production, wealth acquisition, to mention some of them. The deeper meaning, according to Banya, is that “unless a miracle takes place, the plan will not be accomplished” (1994, p. 204). The philosophy behind this proverb is that certain happenings in human life are results of extraordinary or mystical causes other than ordinary powers or abilities. The theory of knowledge is that there are certain happenings in human life which are dependent only on mystical powers as they are known by humans. Dok iwar pa Oget [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.105) Though this proverb literally means, “To return to Oget’s sandals” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 26), as mentioned earlier under social welfare, it is also an indication of the existence of divination as a mode through which the Acholi would obtain mystical knowledge. Contextually, “Oget was an Acholi diviner who used sandals but was not highly thought of as a diviner. However, after scorning him, people would return to him having failed elsewhere” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 26). In this context, the deeper meaning is re-appreciating Oget’s act of divination, though at first despised. The philosophy behind this proverb is not only re-appreciating the past but also re-appreciating mystical knowledge derived through divination. The theory of knowledge is that, mystical knowledge is still real and accessible.

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6.2.5   Existential Knowledge According to Baker (1972), the term existential means “that which determines man’s self-understanding independently of his own free choice” (1972, p. 130). On the other hand, the German term existentiell means “that which affects my concrete human existence here and now and it is usually thought of as the result of my free choice” (1972, p. 130). For Kierkegaard, existential is that which leads the individual person to the fullness of his own human existence (dasien) (Lotz, 1972, p. 131). For Heidegger, existential in the metaphysical sense is that through which an individual strives for human existence and ultimately to absolute existence (Lotz, 1972, p. 132). This implies, for Heidegger, existential moves from the ontic to the ontological, from the factuality of existent to the existence that supports it. For Sarte, “man’s existence precedes his essence” (Lotz, 1972, p. 133). Lotz then concludes that for existentialism, what is central is the idea that human “will and freedom […] occupy the central position; personal involvement and existential seriousness are demanded” (Lotz, 1972, p. 134). Webber (2015), in the introduction of his book, Rethinking Existentialism, believes that the best description of existentialism is to say “that for human beings existence precedes essence” (2015, p. 13). It is philosophical shift from emphasis on essence as the core of all beings to the existence as the core and centre of all beings. Malik and Akhter (2013) emphasize that “The early 19th century philosopher Soren Kierkegaard is regarded as the father of existentialism” (Marino, 2004, p. ix). He maintained that the individual is solely responsible for giving his or her own life meaning and for living that life passionately and sincerely (Lowrie, 1968), in spite of many existential obstacles and distractions including despair, angst, absurdity, alienation, and boredom (Corrigan, 2008). “According to existentialism, the individuality of man is supreme and this individuality is greater and more important than the existence of man, nation and the world. This philosophy recognizes the existence of individuality, opposing the notion of intelligence and nature” (Malik & Akhter, 2013, p. 87). Existentialism as a theory of knowledge then states that experience is knowledge only when an individual is personally and passionately involved. This personal involvement and existential seriousness distinguishes existentialism from empiricism, which takes experience on face value as truth. For existentialism, experience is knowledge only when one is personally and passionately involved. It is also different from pragmatism which

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thinks experience is not knowledge, but only the raw material for knowledge, unless it is reflected up on. Existentialism maintains that experience is not just raw material of knowledge, but the very essence of knowledge; only that it must be the experience of the knower him/herself, where they are intimately and passionately involved. In existentialism, the subject and the object of knowledge become intimately one. Experiences that touch or shake our very existence can generate knowledge worth its name. Existential experiences cannot be easily forgotten, nor easily shared. They remain deeply impactful on our lives and on our memories. Existential experiences lead to “knowledge of” other realities and not just “knowledge about” them. This is the type of knowledge we are trying to trace in selected African languages and proverbs. Ekiri muttu kimanywa nyini kyo [Luganda Proverb]; Kilicho ndani ya mfuko hujulikana tu na mwenyewe [Swahili Proverb] Literally, the proverb means “What is inside a package is known only to its owner” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The context is that of gifts humans share with one another. Whatever is wrapped in a package to be given to another person is only known to the one who has packed it. Any other person can only guess what might be inside such a pack, unless the owner of the package decides to reveal it. The deeper meaning is that “Our secrets and plans are only known to ourselves and can only be known by someone else unless we disclose” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The philosophy is that “We should not assume we know about other people, their plans and intentions. Only God knows our inner thoughts and plans” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  11). The theory of knowledge is that existential knowledge is only proper to the one who experiences it, unless the owner decides to share it with others. This is because the person packing a gift is personally involved and has the inner knowledge of what such a package contains. Geno gen pa lalur [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.33) The literal meaning is “Trust of a hyena that it will get some leftover carcass” (Appendix, No.33). The context is that of the animal world, where hyenas wait in nearby bushes to partake of the lions’ leftovers. Often this hope is in vain, since the lions that often hunt in groups also have capacity to finish their catch. Having a deceptive trust is the deeper meaning of this proverb. That it is deceptive to rely or depend on the experience and knowledge of others. The philosophy behind this proverb is that personal knowledge and efforts are often the basis of true success, other than the knowledge, experience, and effort of others. The theory of knowledge is that existential knowledge (i.e. knowledge in which we are personally

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and passionately involved) is the best and most reliable form of knowledge. To derive person knowledge, we must get personally involved and not depend on other people’s knowledge. Labul tong gweno ngeyo ka pene [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya, Proverb No.L3; Appendix, No.62) The literal meaning is that “A person, who roasts an egg, knows where the yoke is” (Appendix, No.62). Banya translates this proverb as literally meaning, “A person who roasts an egg knows where the umbilical cord is” (1994, p. 169). The context is that of cooking, where experienced cocks know exactly what to do much better than those who hear about cooking from others. According to Banya, the deeper meaning is that “there are certain hidden secrets which are only known by some individuals. As such it is only they who should be left to sort out such hidden facts. It is also used to tell people not to interfere with what an expert knows how to do of which we are totally ignorant” (1994, pp.  169–170). I would add expert knowledge belongs to the experts. The philosophy behind this proverb is that expert or attested knowledge is always superior to an adventure into experience. The theory of knowledge is that expert or attested knowledge is generated by personal experiences and involvement, which is existential knowledge. This type of knowledge is always superior to that knowledge we hear of or learn from others. Ngat man boko kot mupwode—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.134); Boko kot ma opwodo—(Banya, Proverb No.B13)—[Acholi Proverbs] The literal meaning is that “Each person tells the rain that drenched him” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 33). “Relating a story of how one was beaten by rain” (Banya, 1994, p. 139). The context is that of storytelling. “During a conversation in which ‘A’ relates a story of how someone (whose name he does not mention) was caught stealing and was punished, the proverb is quoted back at him; the implication being that since he knows the story so well, it must be him who was caught and beaten. This draws out the name of the real culprit” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 33). The deeper meaning is that people best tell stories that have happened to them. Banya adds that in telling a story, people usually relates their “own personal practical experiences on a specific topic” (1994, p. 139). According to p’Bitek, in the modern setting, people “write about things that happen to them personally” (1985, p. 33). The philosophy behind this proverb is that personal experiences and involvement are the basis of best stories narrated or shared. The theory of knowledge is that what people share about the world from personal existential experiences are superior to those stories

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they share from hearsay or secondary sources. More often than not, personal experiences are more dependable than what is told on the basis of hearsay. Aboka lam—(Banya, Proverb, No.A2) The literal meaning is that “Narration is contemptible” (Banya, 1994, p. 118). The context of this proverb is that of dance and partying. After parties, participants’ attempts to tell their colleagues, who have not actually attended the party, fail to explain exactly what happened. The joys of dancing to the tunes of the drum, the beauty of togetherness, the new dates made, etc., are simply too deep to be verbally narrated. The deeper meaning is that what one experiences by participation and involvement is too deep to be shared with other people. The philosophy behind this proverb is that personal experiences and involvement generate better knowledge than hearsay. The theory of knowledge is that existential knowledge is far deeper and more difficult to share and forget than knowledge we derive from other person’s experiences. This also makes us contrast African existentialism with empiricism. In Western existentialism, true knowledge is believed to come only from personal experiences and involvements. The African concept of knowledge is that we can also learn from what others have experienced, but when existential knowledge is compared with empirical knowledge, the former is better. So, while humans can learn from existential experiences and also from others’ experiences, existential experiences derive better knowledge than knowledge from hearsay.

6.3  Discussing African Epistemology From the selected African proverbs surveyed, we can identify sense knowledge, mystical, knowledge, and existential knowledge. We can now discuss the details of these findings. 6.3.1   Knowledge in General In African epistemology, knowledge is understood as a reservoir of information known to all or is a reserve of some individuals. While public knowledge is very important for day-to-day living, reserved private information is a reservoir of knowledge important for individual security and successful living. An adult is expected to have both public or common knowledge, and personal or private knowledge as a bond of their security

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and maturity. From the proverbs reviewed, we can see an epistemological principle underpinning this understanding of knowledge. It says, reserved personal knowledge is the basis of individual success and security. This is because having no secrets makes a person vulnerable, and such a person is described as one who is hollow. Reserved knowledge is a store of information known to oneself alone used by that individual at the right moment when needed. It also means that an adult as a knowledgeable person does not need to expose carelessly whatever he or she knows. To have such reserved information or knowledge is a mark of maturity and a true sign of adulthood. For, an adult person without reserved information has no backbone. Today, such reserved knowledge is placed under intellectual property rights, which cannot be used without the permission of the owner. In African traditional society, it was the basis of expertise that was often admired and sometimes hired by the other members of society. These experts included potters (locwec), blacksmiths (lotet), artists (lower or lomyel), builders (logedo), and hunters (lodwar), to mention some of them. In the modern world however, a mark of true knowledge is its ability to be verified by an independent party. Verifiability, in the modern world, is the mark of true knowledge. While in traditional Africa to have reserved knowledge did not mean such knowledge was not verifiable, it means such knowledge was critical for the survival of that individual and of the members of his or her society. This is distinguished from public knowledge, which was supposed to be assessable to all members of human society. Emphasis in African traditional knowledge was on the usefulness of the knowledge derived for human survival and not on their verifiability, as is the case in the modern world. Secondly, true knowledge is derived from sound judgements. A person with sound judgement does not hurry to draw conclusions, nor wait when it is too late to make judgements. A knowledgeable person is one whose perspectives and experiences are wide, judgements are sound, deeply thought out, and critically analysed. Epistemologically, knowledge is the ability to make sound judgements. For such knowledgeable persons, they do not hurry to judge the end result of a bad or good situation, because he or she does not know what might come out of such a bad or good situation. Often, blessings or opportunities may come out of a bad situation, and pains and sorrows may as well come out of good situations. To be knowledgeable was synonymous with being wise in African traditional society.

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The third theory of knowledge is that awareness of public knowledge or information is the beginning of wisdom. Those who are not aware of public knowledge are described as foolish persons. Foolishness is lack of wisdom, inability to detect, predict, or judge rightly situations of predicaments. Often, such a lack of wisdom is grounded in ignorance, which is a lack of knowledge, both public and private. In the proverb, “throwing a tortoise in water” (bolo opuk i pii), the foolish hare was not even aware of public knowledge that tortoise is an animal that lives both in water and on land, so throwing it into water would just be a blessing in disguise. Hare, in some African worldview, like that of the Acholi, is often associated with foolishness (lack of wisdom), which is the inability to see the difference between truth and non-truth; that smashing a tortoise against the rock can actually kill the tortoise and the falsehood that a tortoise can ever be drowned in water. Another characteristic of true knowledge is that it is self-evident. The theory of knowledge is that lies are attempts to hide the truth, but the truth itself cannot be concealed forever. Therefore, in general, we can say knowledge in traditional African society was considered to be valuable information that is useful and a resource. It is also the ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood; it is self-evident and a result of right judgement. 6.3.2   Sense Knowledge Just like in many other worldviews in the world, the Africans too believed that sense knowledge was real and genuine. Though Western philosophy distinguishes between sense knowledge from existential knowledge, Africans do not make such a great difference between these two theories of knowledge, though they are definitely aware of the difference between the two. Existential knowledge is far deeper and more difficult to forget than sense knowledge received from another person, like a hearsay. This also makes us contrast existentialism with empiricism. While Western existentialists think true knowledge is that in which we are personally involved, African concept of knowledge is that, we can also learn from what others have experienced. However, when you compare the existential with hearsay knowledge, the former is deeper. While humans can learn from existential experiences and also from other people’s experiences, existential knowledge derived from personal involvement is always deeper and better than the knowledge we get from hearsay. That is why in the above proverb, the Acholi say, “narration is contemptible” (aboka lam). However

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much someone narrates to you a story, your knowledge of what happened cannot be the same like the knowledge of the one who was involved in the story itself. In a similar way, the Buganda say: He who tells no lies, will not grow up; He who has not travelled thinks that his mother is the best cook in the world: He who is bitten by a snake fears a lizard. All these mean experience is the best teacher. Western existentialism, however, refutes this concept that experience is the best teacher. For them, experience teaches no one unless we reflect on it. In that way experience reflected upon is a true teacher. This is because they think experience is only a raw material to be reflected upon to become useful. This observation is good, but it does not negate the fact that true experience teaches us and it is the basis on which higher forms of knowledge are derived. These higher forms of knowledge are also not possible without the raw material (experience) from which higher form of knowledge is derived. In some of the African philosophical worldviews like that of the Acholi, “Sense and rational knowledge are considered superior to mystical knowledge”. For that matter, humans are urged to rely more on their reflections on sense experience to derive knowledge other than relying on mystical knowledge. Mystical knowledge was mainly derived from the oracles of divination through the medium of diviners. Often, many people in different African cultures rely on the mystical source of knowledge to solve social and health problems, to know their causes and supposedly prescribed remedies. While a number of people in African still use this source of knowledge, their concept of knowledge tells them not to rely on them so much. Often, these divine oracles turn out to be false, including the remedies prescribed by the diviners. For that matter, Acholi epistemology urges their members to rely more on their sense knowledge and the rational reflections on these sense experiences. To say, “The eyes are more dependable than the oracles of divination” (wang loyo ajwaka), they mean to say, instead of relying on the divination as a means of deriving knowledge, they should make use of what they can see with their own eyes and the subsequent reflections on those experiences. Thirdly, African epistemology distinguishes between intellective knowledge and sense knowledge. While sense knowledge is the information derived through sense perceptions, intellective knowledge is the information derived through human reflections on sense perceptions. These two are both sources of knowledge. However, when it comes to practical living, sense knowledge is more dependable than intellective knowledge.

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This is because what one can perceive with the senses is real and genuine, while a reflection on that sense perception depends on the intellectual abilities of individuals. Not everybody may have the same quality and capacity of such reflections, so it cannot be a universally reliable source of knowledge for everybody. From this they derive another epistemological principle which says, “Sense knowledge is more dependable than intellective knowledge in practical living”. This is because, as seen in the proverb, “what one is given for the time being is true justice” (mak tunu aye pok). Meaning, what you have received as for now is what you have since you can see and touch it. What might be added you still do not have it since you cannot see or touch it, and it might never be added. So, sense knowledge is genuine knowledge. This principle is confirmed by other proverbs like, “ground hornbill slept hungry despite plenitude of locusts”(Arum obuto kec ikum bonyo), or “cockroach feels the heat of porridge with their feelers (Nyenye limo Nyuka ki tunge). So, both Western pragmatism and existentialism tell us that experience that is not reflected upon teach us nothing, but a number of Africans, as can be seen from the reviewed proverbs, say experience, whether reflected upon or not, is useful for humans to know what are useful or not useful for life. Experience, indeed, teaches us something for practical living, though not all humans do learn from experience. 6.3.3   Intellective Knowledge The African epistemology equally accepts that intellective knowledge is genuine, besides sense knowledge. The Baganda say, “The one who does not think is like a gourd which fails to sit well and all the water pours”. One who does not think will always be shaky. The theory is that intellective knowledge, which is a result of human reflective thinking, helps us to become wise and avoid making silly mistakes in life. In a similar way, the Acholi say, human life depends not only on the now and what is present, which is what empirical knowledge gives us, but also on the deeper meanings of the present and their implications for the future. This second dimension of human life requires the intervention of intellective knowledge. This is implied in the proverb that, in as much as one can look for and gather ripped oywelo fruits that are usually black in colour, they should not ignore to collect the green oywelo fruits too, which are not yet ripe. However, they should first bury them in the ground for

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future consumption. So, “burying oywelo fruit” (yiko oywelo i ngom) is an intellective attempt to make use of the present to prepare for the future. To emphasize the importance of intellective knowledge to foresee the future so as to adjust the present actions and meet the future needs, some Africans like the Acholi give the following epistemological principle: “Ability to foresee is the capacity of intellective knowledge, and when this capacity lacks, humans fail to know what they are likely to face, good or bad”. The difference between sense knowledge and intellective knowledge in this sense is that though they are supplementary to each other, sense knowledge concentrates on the present, while intellective knowledge reflects on the present with the aim to understand more deeply the present to prepare an individual for the possible future ups and downs. Indeed, to say, “The nose does not smell excreta” (um pe ngweyo cet) before it comes out of the stomach implies that sense knowledge is limited in as far as the future is concerned. This limitation is reduced by the ability of intellective knowledge to reflect on the present and understand it better and at the same time understand its implication for the future. Without sense knowledge, intellective knowledge will lack the material with which to work, and without intellective knowledge, the sense knowledge remains limited and non-predictive. The above principle is supported by another one which says, “Intellective knowledge is higher in hierarchy than sense knowledge, because it can help us to discover what the senses cannot help us to know”. In the proverb “he has left white ant on the anthill” (oweko ngwen i kom tuk), some of the Africans like the Acholi imply that, through sense knowledge, we cannot see what is contained in an ordinary anthill. With intellective knowledge, even if the anthill looks very ordinary, an individual can discover what that anthill contains. So, without the ability to reflect on our ordinary experiences, we may never know the deeper meanings of realities we see. In this sense, though both sense knowledge and intellective knowledge are important, intellective knowledge is higher in hierarchy in as far as deeper meanings and predictive knowledge are concerned. This is also confirmed by another proverb which says, “You do not uproot pumpkin from the old homestead” (Te okono obur, bong luputu). Meaning, experience tells us that in migrating to another homestead, the family need not destroy all in the old homestead. Reflecting on these facts, which is the capacity of reflective thinking, tells us that one does not fully understand the reality or the future without the use of reflective thinking, which produces intellective knowledge. Without this ability, humans will

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continually make mistakes that could be avoided. This is similar to the Ganda proverb which says, “If you cannot look ahead, you will always remain behind”. Meaning, reflective and critical thinking is necessary in order to succeed in like. 6.3.4   Mystical Knowledge In the African philosophical worldview, knowledge was considered not only to be sensitive and intellective, but also to be mystical. While sensitive knowledge focuses on the present experiences, intellective knowledge delves into the deeper implications of the present and predictive information for the future. Now, the mystical dimensions focus on realities that go beyond the empirical and intellectual perceptions, though they are not irrational since they are thinkable, but not scientifically provable. This is based on the epistemological principle that happenings in human life are not all explainable empirically and rationally. This is because such knowledge has mystical origins. A number of Africans believe in the ability of certain individuals, like witches or diviners, to possess dynamic forces derived from nature and natural events to injure or heal, bewitch, or restore the health of other human beings. Though this cannot be proven scientifically or rationally, humans continue to benefit or suffer from their effects. The effects of such dynamic forces on humans are real, but causes of these effects are not known by the natural, sensitive, and rational human faculties. This is the basis of a belief in the existence of mystical knowledge. Some of the proverbs given above illustrate such belief. 6.3.5   Existential Knowledge Apart from sensitive, intellective, and mystical knowledge, the Africans also believe in existential knowledge. The difference between existential and empirical knowledge is that, existential knowledge is that in which an individual is personally and emotionally involved, while empirical knowledge is that which is derived by self or others through the use of the five external senses. What differentiates African existential knowledge from Western existentialism is that for the Africans existential experience is only one of the ways of deriving knowledge, while Western existentialists think this is the only way of deriving true knowledge. However, the Africans believe that in terms of depth and quality of knowledge, personal experience or existential experience is superior to knowledge received from the

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experience of others. This is exemplified by the Buganda who say, “What is inside a package is only known by the owner”. Meaning, existential knowledge is only proper to the one who experiences it just like a person packing a gift is personally involved and has the inner knowledge of what such a package contains. The Acholi people put it negatively: depending on the experience and success of others is often not reliable, just like the deceptive trust of the hyena, which has not killed the game and yet trusts he will benefit from it (geno gen pa lalur). The epistemological principle that can be derived from this proverb is that knowledge that can yield reliable success is that in which we are personally involved, while what we derive from others may be deceptive. Just like explained above, existential knowledge is expressed in another proverb which says, “A person that roasts an egg knows where the yoke is” (labul tong gweno ngeyo ka pene). Or, “A hunter understands better what carrying a gourd of water means” (ladwar neno opoko pii ki wange). Meaning, only by getting involved in a hunting expedition an individual understands what true hunting experience entails. So, undergoing an existential experience is the best way to learn. Another proverb confirms, “Each person tells the rain that drenched him” (ngat man boko kot mupwode), meaning, when people are very passionate about the story they tell, it implies the person is narrating an existential experience. This is because what people share about the world from hearsay is only secondary to what they share from existential experiences. It also means that, more often than not, personal experiences are more dependable than what is told on the basis of hearsay (aboka lam).

6.4  Conclusion From these analyses and discussions, we can see that the African theory of knowledge may not be an anti-thesis of other epistemologies, but it also has some of its unique interpretations and insight as we have seen above. It is also important to conclude that though it is commonly accepted that there is sensitive and intellective knowledge, Western epistemology has a great distrust of mystical knowledge. Often they refer to it as intuitionism, irrationalism, occultism, or spiritism. None of these terms reflect the exact meaning of mystical knowledge as held by most African societies. On the other hand, though both the African and the Eastern philosophy acknowledge the importance of mystical knowledge, the method of deriving them varies. In the East, meditation is the best way of deriving mystical

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knowledge, though this does not exclude the possibility of the donation of such knowledge as a gift. In Africa, the most common way of deriving mystical knowledge is through divination. This also does not exclude the possibility of deriving mystical knowledge as a gift from the divine beings themselves. We have also discovered that the exclusive treatment of the different theories of knowledge in the West has been more inclusively treated in African epistemology. Distinctions are clear between sensitive and intellective knowledge in African epistemology, but in most instances, these theories of knowledge are considered to be more supplementary to each other than separate. However, hierarchically, these different forms of knowledge have differences. For more practical actions, the sensitive knowledge is always considered to be more important than intellective knowledge, but hierarchically, intellective knowledge is always considered to be higher. Just like most worldviews distinguish between knowledge and truth, so do Africans. For them, truth, like in other philosophical worldviews, has to do with the relationship between facts, events, and happenings with what is stated about such facts, events, and happenings. Knowledge, instead, is the content of the conscious relations between the subject and the objects of knowledge. They equally distinguish between moral truth and epistemological truth. Moral truth (pe goba) is the coherence between human actions and the concept of right and wrong maintained by an individual or group of individuals within society. Epistemological truth (ada) is the correspondence between reality and what is stated about the concerned realties. From the theoretical point of view, moral truth uses coherence theory of knowledge, while epistemological truth uses the correspondence theory of knowledge.

References Airoboman, F. A., & Asekhauno, A. A. (2012). Is there an ‘African’ epistemology? Journal of Research in National Development (JORIND), 10(3), 13–17. ISSN 1596–8308. www.transcampus.org/journals,www.ajol.info/journls/jorind Amaechi, U. (2015). Dimensions of epistemology and the case for African indigenous ways of knowing. Tattva-journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 1–16. Anyanwu, K. C. (1983). The African experience in the American market place a scaring indictment of western scholars and their distortion of African culture. Exposition Press. Baker, K. (1972). Existential. In I. W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (p. 130). Gonzaga University Press.

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Banya, A. A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda Development Series, No.2). Foundations for African Development. Corrigan, J. (2008). Oxford hand book of religion and emotion (pp.  387–388). Oxford University Press. Cowie, A. P. (Ed.). (1989). Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary (4th ed.). Oxford University Press. Deikman, A. J. (2000). Controversies in science and the humanities, Journal of Consciousness Studies. Special Issue: Cognitive Models and Spiritual Maps, 7, 11–12. Frank, K. (1972). Occultism. In W. Brugger & K. Baker, Philosophical Dictionary (pp. 285–286). Washington: Gonzaga University Press. Ibuot, J. E. (2010). Traditional African ideology and the challenges of development in Nigeria. The Constitution, 10, 58–59. Ishiabwe, A, (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) proverbs and wise sayings, African Proverbs Working group: Nairobi—Kenya. Jimoh, A. K., & Thomas, J. (2015). An African epistemological approach to epistemic certitude and scepticism. Research on Humanity and Social Sciences, 5(11), 54–61. Josef, V. (1972). Intuitionism. In W.  Brugger & K.  Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 206–207). Gonzaga University Press. Kundi, S. (2013). Characteristics of mystical experience and impact of meditation. ND: International Journal of Social Science, 2(2), 141–146. Lajul, W. (2014). African philosophy: Critical dimensions. Fountain Publishers. Lotz, B.  J. (1972). Existential philosophy. In W.  Brugger & K.  Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 131–134). Gonzaga University Press. Lowrie, W. (1968). Kierkegaard’s attack upon Christendom. Princeton University Press. Malik, G. M., & Akhter, R. (2013). Existentialism and classroom practice. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJSR-JHSS), 8(6), 87–91. Marino, G. (Ed.). (2004). Basic writings of existentialism. Modern Library. Millar, D. Kendie, S. B. Apusigah A. A. & Haverkort B. (Eds.). (2006). African knowledges and sciences: Understanding and supporting the ways of knowing in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 97–104). COMPAS/UDS/UCC: Barneveld. Nwosimiri, O.  K. (2017). Epistemology in African philosophy: A critique of African concept of knowledge. World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 11(2) https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/18802 Onyewuenyi, I. (1976). Is there an African philosophy? Journal of African Studies, 3(4), 513–528. P’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. Sircar, M. N (1977). Mysticism in the Bhagavad-Gita. Classical Publications: New Delhi.

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Tabuti, R.  S. J. (2006). Traditional knowledge in Bulamogi County—Uganda: Importance to sustainable livelihoods. In D. Millar, S. B. Kendie, A. A. Apusigah, & B.  Haverkort (Eds.), African knowledges and sciences: Understanding and supporting the ways of knowing in Sub-Saharan Africa (pp.  97–104). COMPAS/UDS/UCC. Underhill, E. (1911). Mysticism: A study in the nature and development of man’s spiritual consciousness (4th edn). E.P. Dutton. www.shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in › bitstream Webber, J. (2015). Rethinking existentialism. Oxford Universoity Press. Willwoll, A. (1972). Knowledge. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 212–213). Gonzaga University Press.

CHAPTER 7

Metaphysics in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

7.1   Introduction Aristotle talks about “the first philosophy” to refer to Metaphysics (Tahko, 2013, p. 49). To say metaphysics is the first philosophy, Aristotle means “an account of what is, or what it means to be, fundamental. Things that are the most fundamental are not grounded in anything more fundamental, they are ontologically independent” (Tahko, 2013, p. 49). Tahko thinks this fundamental reality is in terms of the notion of essence rather than fundamentality, grounding, or ontological independence. Metaphysics, as it turns out, is the science of essence (Tahko, 2013, p. 50). Kim and Sosa instead define metaphysics as “a branch of philosophy that deals with fundamental question about the nature of reality. The etymological definition of metaphysics holds that the term metaphysics is derived from the Greek words meta-ta-physika” (Kim & Sosa, 1995). Tapfumaneyi and Rupande add that these Greek words mean “after physics or transcending the physical” (2013, p. 587). Implying, metaphysics is the science of the essence of realities beyond the physical. While this understanding is generally accepted by most authors, the corresponding understanding of African metaphysics is not well acknowledged. A number of authors still think, to speak about African metaphysics is to say too much, since metaphysics cannot be culturally bound. Francis Etim (2013) takes the task to study this problem and questions if African © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_7

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metaphysics exists or not. In conclusion, Etim believes that African metaphysics exists. However, it requires painstaking task to derive it from the oral nature of many African cultures. Besides, African metaphysics is the identifiable logical reasoning, reflective of African capacity for philosophical enterprise and thinking patterns on the nature of reality. Etim recognizes the polemical argumentations raised against the existence of African metaphysics, especially by universalist philosophers who say metaphysical issues should not be regionalized so that it can make universal appeal to all. On the other hand, Etim positively mentioned that African metaphysics reflects the African universe of experience and African existential realities. The acceptance of the existence of African philosophy presupposes the existence of African metaphysics. Secondly, he states that African metaphysics is distinctly and peculiarly African. Etim quotes Karl Marx (1885) and Innocent Onyewuenyi (1985) as supporters of the existence of regional or culturally derived metaphysics. On the basis of these views, Etim avers that, “men do not at certain epoch merely philosophize in general; for, there is a definite philosophy, with definite character, which arises among a people and permeates their spirit. This philosophy is contemporaneous with and a reflection of the people’s constitution forms of government, morality, social life, capabilities, customs and enjoyments” (2013, p. 11). He continues to say, “The themes dealt with in philosophy are universal, yet the treatment of these themes is relative to a people and coloured by their conceptions of life in which everything around them becomes meaningful”. Etim concludes that “as the Africans daily struggle to survive the hazardous nature of the world and being faced with the fundamental issues of the purpose and meaning of existence, the natural tendency is to ask some salient and basic questions in these regards” (2013, p. 12). The questions raised by Africans and the solutions they offer to these existential issues constitute African metaphysics. Other authors that support this view are Lebisa J. Teffo and Abraham P.J. Roux, who maintain that “Metaphysical discourse in Africa must be based on the African perception of reality as determined by a history, geographical circumstances, and such cultural phenomena as religion, thought systems and linguistic conventions entrenched in the African worldview” (2003, p. 195). The implication is that most metaphysical discourses on the African continent have certain common features. I fully endorse these sentiments and argumentations. My task is to go further and say, if African metaphysics exists, then particular African

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cultural metaphysics also exists. In my view, what constitutes African metaphysics is derived from the different African cultural heritages on the salient issues that are existentially bugging different African societies to which the different African societies give basic solutions. It is in these solutions that subsist the different African cultural metaphysics like that of the Acholi of northern Uganda. In this chapter, we shall use the term African metaphysics to mean the African perspectival understanding of the nature and science of essence. African metaphysics, as will be derived from selected African languages and proverbs, will attempt to identify these perspectival views on the nature of existence. Taking the proverbs is only a limited way of understanding the view of a given people on the essence of existence, but it is the most reliable, since most of these proverbs existed prior to the invective influence of the Western world on Africa. The little we shall derive from the proverbs will be genuinely African, even though it may not be uniquely African. This is because to be genuinely African does not mean it can only be found in Africa or in the selected African languages and proverbs.

7.2   Metaphysics in Selected African Proverbs In the proverbs, one can identify different aspects of African metaphysics. Some of these aspects are concepts of freedom, the concept of the human person, cosmology, and ontology. We shall identify each of these aspects when looking at particular African proverbs, which will help us place them in their proper metaphysical contexts and schools of thought. 7.2.1  Personhood Johannes B. Lotz (1972a) defines a person as an “individual in the spiritual order. Therefore, the person is an individual being, endowed with a spiritual nature that is also incommunicable” (1972a, p. 302). Lotz continues to affirm that “Only the capacity for spiritual self-consciousness and the corresponding self-determination belongs essentially to the notion of the person” (1972a, p. 302). Implying, human personhood is the spiritual nature of the incommunicable, self-conscious, and self-determination of an individual. This also means, in Western philosophy, human personhood has four key characteristics: individuality or incommunicability, self-­ consciousness, spirituality, and self-determination.

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In African philosophy, the concept of human personhood is hotly contested by different African philosophers. Their views fluctuate between absolute communitarianism and absolute individuality. However, in between these extremes exist what we call the moderates. The extreme communitarians insist that a person is a person through other persons. This view is supported by authors like Menkiti (1984), Agulanna (2010), Imafidon (2012), Obioha (2014), and Nwoye (2017), to mention some of them. On the other hand, the extreme individualists are those that support the Western concept of the human person as an isolated, atomic, free, and self-determined being. While the moderates think that the traditional African concept of the human person balances between communitarianism and individuality. They say, though humans are individuals who are autonomous, free, and have the ability of self-determinations, and they are also ontologically and socially connected. This is the view to which this chapter subscribes. Kuckertz sees a human person as relational by saying that “ ‘I’ belongs to the I-You-correspondence” (1996, p. 62). He, however, still maintains that personhood is relational, but this cannot reduce a human person to mere “products of any collective or community” (1996, p. 62). Teffo and Roux add that “Even though they are members of the same family or community and are raised in more or less the same way, “individuals differ and they may differ radically” (2003, p. 205). So, some of the supporters of this moderate communitarianism are authors like Gyekye (1996), Kuckertz (1996), and Teffo and Roux (2003), to mention some of them. Another recurrent trend in African philosophy is to conceive of the human person as dualistic, just like in the West, thinking a human person is constituted of material and spiritual aspects. The difference with the Western thinking, like that of Descartes, who thinks that the spiritual and material aspects are radically different, for African philosophy, instead, there is no radical or categorical difference between the spiritual and the material. Authors like More (1996) interpret the relationship between the material and spiritual aspects of the human person in terms of behaviours other than metaphysical, as maintained in the West (See. Teffo & Roux, 2003, p. 205). This view is also supported by Wiredu (1987, p. 318) and More (1996, p. 153). Other African authors instead think the human person is triadic. In this view, the human person is thought of as intrinsically made of body, soul, and heart (See, Segun, 1998; Kaphagawani, 2004; Gyekye, 1987; and others). The Acholi concept of the human person in my view is triadic,

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where the human person is made of the body (kom), soul (tipu), and heart (cwiny). However, to understand the African concept of the human person better, we need to probe into selected African languages and proverbs. The following are some of them. Motho ke motho ka batho [seSotho Proverb]; Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu [isiZulu Proverb] This proverb literally means a person is a person because of other people. The context is that of social living, where an individual is supported by the upbringing and contributions of the community. The deeper meaning is that “I am, because you are”, which is the basis of South Africa’s society rooted in the community. The philosophy is that we are a product of each other’s actions and decisions. Metaphysically, personhood is derived from society. Akwaagala, Akwaagula no bujama bwo [Ganda Proverb]; Anayekupenda, hukupenda na uchafu wako [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “He who loves, loves you with your dirt” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 5). The context is that of human relations in society. The deeper meaning is about “genuine love and acceptance of all characteristics of a person” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 5). The philosophy is that “We should not accept people because of what they have but because of who they are. Whatever weaknesses and inabilities [people have], we should love them unconditionally” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  5). The metaphysics is that ontologically what makes a person a human person is not his or her properties and qualities, but basically what one is with all one’s weaknesses, inabilities, and fragilities. Lacan bene dano [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.64) This proverb literally means, “A poor person is also a human being” (Appendix, No.64). The context is that of poverty, where those who are considered poor in society are despised and held in low esteem. The result is that sometimes even the poor people themselves loose self-esteem and self-confidence and begin to believe that their lot is unalterable. The deeper meaning is that a poor person has the ability to get out of poverty, so long as he or she remains a human being. The philosophy is that circumstantial situations are alterable, unlike natural situations. To be human is a natural situation, which cannot be altered, but to be poor is circumstantial since it can be altered. The metaphysics is that poverty is a social phenomenon that can be altered, while being human is a metaphysical or ontological state which cannot be altered. This does not mean human

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personhood is a static concept, but it is still a dynamic concept as other proverbs will substantiate. Twon gwok pe ringo mwaka aryo—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.155). Same as “Pii pe mol dok cen” (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 147); and “Tiyo obalo akeyo” [Acholi Proverbs] (p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 152) P’Bitek believes that the literal meanings of these three proverbs are “The bull dog does not run for two years” (1985, p. 38), “Water does not flow upwards to the source of the river” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 36), “Old age ruins akeyo” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 37), respectively. The context of the first proverb is that “There is some form of competition among bull dogs over bitches which are on heat, in which one bull dog emerges as the strongest. But this success is never repeated. The peak is soon passed and decline follows” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 38). The context of the other two proverbs is that of nature, which are made in such a way that they are both progressive, in the case of the second proverb because they grow to maturity, and regressive, in the case of the third proverb, because they decline in boom. The deeper meaning is that, “The march of time cannot be arrested. Old age must come and with it general decline” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 36). Or “Beauty, youthfulness, etc., does not last forever” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 37). The philosophy is that there is time for everything. As the Bible says, time to be strong and time to decline, time to begin and time to end, time to be young and time to grow old. The metaphysics is that humans, like any other beings in the material world, are temporal. Humans are bound within the segments of time, which are progressive and at the same time regressive. Metaphysically, human personhood is progressive and with time regressive. This is what human individuality goes through within the context of collective living. 7.2.2   Concept of Freedom Walter Brugger defines freedom in the general sense as “the state of not being forced or determined by something external, insofar as it is joined to a definite internal faculty of self-determination” (1972b, p.  146). Meaning, freedom in the general sense is the absence of internal and external constraints inhibiting self-determination. He distinguishes three types of freedom: physical, moral, and psychological. “Physical freedom [which is proper to humans, animals and to lesser extent plants], is the striving of beings to the extent that external, material obstacles do not impede them” (Brugger, 1972b, p. 147). Moral freedom has two connotations: (a) “in

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the broad sense consists in the ability to determine oneself to something without being hindered by external causes” (1972b, p. 147), and (b) “In the narrow sense consists in the ability to determine oneself to something without running up against an opposing obligation” (1972b, p.  147). Psychological freedom “consists in the ability to determine oneself to something without any psychic pressures, preceding the act of decision, which would clearly force the will in one determined direction” (1972b, p. 147). For Immanuel Kant, freedom has two connotations, negative and positive. Negative freedom is freedom from constraints, internal or external, while positive freedom is the capacity of self-determination and commitment to self-chosen goals (Lajul, 1994, pp. 118–120). In this section, we shall understand freedom to mean both negative detachments from constraints and positive commitment to self-chosen goals. The following are some of the proverbs considered to show the African understanding of freedom. The interpretation of these proverbs may vary from one thinker to another; however, clear linkage has to be identified between the proverbs themselves and meanings they carry. Lewic weko i camo awola [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya, Proverb, No. L39; p’Bitek, Proverb, No.128) P’Bitek thinks the literal meaning is “If you are shy, you eat poison” (1985, p. 32). The context is that of domestic life. When one is a visitor, the Acholi culture recommends that he or she be served some food or drink as a sign of hospitality. But at times, one is offered food or drink by an enemy, and apparently the visitor is aware that this food is not given in good faith, but with the intention to poison. Because it looks bad to reject an offer of hospitality, this visitor goes ahead to eat such food out of shyness. In the end, the visitor suffers death. The deeper meaning, according to Banya, is that “when we see a wrong thing, we should not be timid to accept it just like a grave which accepts anybody thrown in it, wealthy or poor” (1994, p.  180). It actually means lack of courage and self-­ assertiveness to say no to what we know is not right. The philosophy behind this proverb is that human problems are compounded by lack of courage, inability to self-determination, other than ignorance about the right things to do. The metaphysics behind this proverb is that true freedom lies in the human ability to self-determination, self-assertiveness, and courage to act for the right cause despite hindrances from social customs like politeness, hospitality, intimidation, fear, and lack of courage. Actually, we fail to be free more due to lack of courage other than lack of knowledge of what to do.

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Embwa elina eggumba mu kamwa teluma [Luganda Proverb]; Mbwa aliye na mfupa mdomoni hawezi kukuuma [Swahili Proverb] Literally, the proverb means, “A dog with a bone in his mouth cannot bite you” (Asiimwe, 2020, p. 11). The context is that of the animal world, where dogs get engaged in licking the bones they are given and fail to bark or guard the home. The deeper meaning is that “We cannot serve two masters at the same time” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The philosophy is that “When our attention is divided, we are bound to fail” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 11). The African metaphysics is that positive freedom as commitment to self-chosen goals requires an undivided attention. Lacan ma kwo pe gero mine [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.32) The literal meaning is that “A poor man so long as he lives does not sleep with his mother” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 8). The context is that of family life. Marriage in traditional African society was an uphill task. When one is poor, it was next to impossible to get married or get a woman for a wife. But however hard the situation is, a poor man cannot take his mother for a wife. The deeper meaning is that even the most powerful instincts in humans, like that of procreation, does not inhibit human beings exercising restraint and self-control. The philosophy is that freedom is the rational ability to restrain instinctive drive for self-satisfaction. Metaphysically, human persons have both rational and instinctive capacities, but the rational capacities can always prevail over the instinctive drives regardless of actual needs. In this rational capacity subsists human freedom. So, human freedom is the rational ability to prevail over the instinctive drives in man however powerful such instinctive drives may be. Lewic oneko Balaturu—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No. 129); Lewic omako balaturu—(Banya, Proverb, No.40)—[Acholi Proverbs] The literal meaning is that “Shyness kills Balaturu” (p’Bitek, 1985, p.  32). Banya thinks the literal meaning is “The Cape-monitor felt ashamed” (1994, p.  180). The context is that of the animal world. Balaturu is a very shy animal that when it comes in contact with humans or any other animal that poses a threat to its life, it freezes and stands still. In the process, it is often killed by its predators. The deeper meaning is that shyness or excessive fear of the aggressor kills. P’Bitek adds that “When surprised, the little animal does not make any attempt to escape, but sits there quietly, […] and it is killed” (1985, p. 32). The philosophy behind this proverb is that excessive fear that paralyses is detrimental to

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life. Excessive and paralysing fear is often responsible for the demise of those overtaken by it. The metaphysics is that true freedom lies in the ability to overcome excessive and paralysing fear. Kant has noticed that one of the enemies of human freedom is tutelage to fear, which can be fear of self or fear of others. In this case, it is not fear of self, but fear of the aggressor. Agulu pii odiyo otac [Acholi Proverb]- (p’Bitek, Proverb No. 2) Literally, the proverb means, “The water pot presses upon the otac” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 1). The context is that of domestic work. “Otac is the small circular pad used as a stand and also for carrying water pots on the head. Unless the pot is lifted, the pad cannot be removed” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 1). A pot represents pressure, weight, and force exerted upon acting individuals, while pad is the pressed individual or group of individuals on whom such pressure is exerted. The deeper meaning refers to “an individual who is forced by authority or public opinion to do or refrain from doing certain acts against their will” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 1). The philosophy behind this proverb is that clash between individual will and public will or authority is often a source of un-freedom. The pressure exerted on the individual, however, does not delete the nature of the pad, since the pad’s identity still remains. Metaphysically, true freedom is not acting in the absence of public pressure or public opinion; rather it is acting despite these influences. Freedom is a conscious and deliberate choice made by an individual or group of individuals to act in conformity with or against an existing authority or public opinion. Latin aweno pe dongo ikin gweno [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.37) Literally, the proverb means, “A Guinea Fowl chick cannot be reared among chicken chicks” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 9). The context is that of bird rearing, where attempts are sometimes made by humans to make Guinea Fowl eggs to hatch among chicken eggs. Often after hatching, the wild bird runs away into the bush. P’Bitek adds that, “Even though hatched by a hen, the wild bird runs away into the bush” (1985, p. 9). The deeper meaning according to p’Bitek is that “Strangers will always remain strangers. Said of orphans or slave boys who behave or show ungratefulness” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 9). The philosophy is that conscription does not obliterate freedom. For instance, a Guinea Fowl cannot be conscripted by human design to become a domestic bird. Equally, a slave can never be conscripted to another society, where they naturally do not belong, however well they are treated. The metaphysics is that freedom cannot be

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drafted or permanently lost by human design. In fact, true freedom is the persistent struggle to set oneself free from self or socially imposed delimitations. It is obedience to one’s inner drives in search for liberty or resistance against restrictions to self-determination. 7.2.3   Social Bond In African philosophy, social bonds are the metaphysical relations binding humans to one another, to nature, and to God. Harmony in these ontological relations brings about peace and progress, while the contrary brings about pains and sufferings. That is why an action of an individual affects all the other members of society including the natural environment within which living things survive. Even the actions of the members of society affect the individual members of society. This is contrary to the Western philosophy, where individuals are responsible for their own actions, and groups of individuals as well work in their own interests or peril, independent of other individuals. The following are some of the proverbs that support this philosophy. Omego obedo calo opoko, giyoke ento pe gitoo [Acholi Proverb]— (Appendix, No.121) The literal meaning is that brothers are like calabashes or gourds tied together on a tree; they keep knocking each other, but they can never break each other. The context is that of seed preservations. The Acholi usually preserve their seeds for planting in the next raining seasons in gourds tied to some branches of trees on the compound or to some of the poles on the inside roofs of grass-thatched houses. When winds blow such gourds swing around, knocking each another, but they do not crack. The deeper meaning is that blood relatives, like brothers, often quarrel among themselves, but their quarrels do not turn into homicides, which may not be the case when the quarrels are between strangers. The philosophy is that blood binds more strongly than other social arrangements. Metaphysically, bonds based on blood relations bind more strongly than bonds derived from other social relations. Omuntu bwabeera obwoomu, yefuula kabaka [Ganda Proverb]; Mtu akiwa peke yake hujifanya kama mfalme [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “If one is on his own, he behaves like a king” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). The context is that of social living, where society places demands on its members, and this makes an individual at times feel uneasy. The deeper meaning is that “One who is alone controls himself

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and does what he wants” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). The philosophy is that “It is important to take responsibility for oneself and other people. Self-­ importance leads to trouble” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 23). The metaphysics is that if we embrace other people in society, then we too will have good association with the community and have a sense of belonging and be accepted by others. Romo pe koko latin pa dyel [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek’s Proverb No.56); Min ngati kadi ber rom mene pe kato meni [Acholi Proverb]— (p’Bitek’s Proverb, No.42); Nyek meni pe meni [Acholi Proverb]— (p’Bitek’s Proverb No.45) According to p’Bitek, the literal meaning of the first proverb is that “A sheep does not lament the death of a goat’s kid” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 14). The second proverb literally means, “Somebody else’s mother, however good she may be to you, she can never be better than your own mother” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 10), while the third proverb literally means, “Your step-­ mother is not your mother” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 11). The context of these three proverbs is that of family life, whether that of animals or of humans. In that of animals, species of sheep is not the same as the species of goats. They have nothing in common, except that they all belong to the group of domestic animals. So, the pains the sheep species feel cannot be the same like those the goat species feel. For humans, it is the concept of motherhood. No woman can be such a good mother as it is to her own children, neither can a woman fully accept full motherhood of a co-wife’s child. The deeper meaning is that blood relationships ontologically bind offspring to their parents and to their species. The philosophy is that blood is an ontological binding force among humans and other living species. Metaphysically, blood is an ontological bond that binds humans and other species into a knot that is difficult to break. This, however, is not the case for any other classical togetherness and social arrangements. Oyo “Aculube” too kum lotinone—(Appendix, No.129); Opilo too kumlotinone—(Banya, Proverb, No. O20) The literal meaning is that Aculube or Opilo rat will die for its young ones. The context is that of the animal world. From experience it is known that this type of rat [Oculube] has special love for its young ones. When one tries to chase them away from their young ones, instead of running away for their lives, they keep coming back to where their young ones are, to the extent that before you injure their young ones, you must first kill them. The deeper meaning is that rather die for the sake of one’s children than salvage one’s own skin. Philosophy behind this proverb is that the

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duty to save one’s posterity prevails over the duty to protect one’s own life. The metaphysics is that humans have a duty to safeguard the future of their society that is ontologically contained in their younger generation as well as a duty to save their own lives. However, the duty to preserve the ontological posterity is superior to the duty to preserve one’s personal life. So, ontologically, humans or living things are tightly bonded to their posterity in their offspring. Okono wang kum pii—(Banya’s Proverb No. O14). According to Banya, the literal meaning of this proverb is that “Pumpkin gets burnt in spite of water put in the pot for cooking it as if water has not been put in” (1994, p. 196). The context is that, “When pumpkin is being cooked, enough water is provided to let it be properly cooked—but at the time you take it out thinking it is cooked already, you find it is burnt as if water was not provided” (Banya, 1994, p.  196). According to Banya, “This means, you may have a lot of property, children, resources, etc., but they are all useless to you. You remain poor as if these were unavailable” (1994, p. 196). The philosophy is that true wealth is not the amount of property one owns, but the qualitative relationships one has with those around you, and the relevant material properties only add meaning to human life. The metaphysics is that it is not the material possession a person owns that provides meaning in human life, but one’s qualitative ontological bonds of relationships to things and other human beings that give humans true meanings in life. There are several other African proverbs on social bonds. Below are some of them. It takes a village to raise a child [Ganda Proverb]; A village united in fraternity is prosperous [Akan Proverb]; When the web of the spider join, they can trap a lion [Amhara Proverb]; The cleverness of one alone is a shallow well that soon dries up [Berber Proverb]; A spoon full of relish gets tasty if it goes around from one to another [Chewa Proverb]; One by one makes a bundle [Ganda proverb]; You don’t give someone a goat for a gift and still hold the rope [African Proverb]; and the one who visits you is better than the one who send you greetings [Swahili Proverb] (Asiimwe, 2020). These proverbs stress the importance of social bonds that keep Africans united, socially and ontologically. This is a metaphysical reality.

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7.2.4   Causes and Effects Aristotle and a number of scholastic philosophers describe a cause as the “principle of existence upon which the existence of a contingent existent really depends” (Naumann, 1972a, p. 55). Causality, on the other hand has been defined by Naumann, (1972b) as, “the influx of a cause on its effect and the relation that comes into existence as the result of this activity” (p. 52). In the case of cause, the contingent existent is the effect of such a cause. Naumann distinguishes between cause and the necessary condition required for coming into existence of the existent, saying a cause cannot operate without a necessary condition. But a necessary condition does not itself exercise any influence on the caused reality (e.g., light is a necessary condition for but not the cause of writing) (1972a, p. 55). Naumann also distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic causes. He says, when “a cause enters into the construction of a caused reality” (1972a, p. 55), then it is an intrinsic cause; and when this does not enter into the construction of a caused reality, then it is an extrinsic cause. He adds that “the intrinsic causes of all bodies are matter and form which constitute the whole reality of a body by each communicating itself to the other; matter, because it receives within itself and carries the form, and form, because it determines the matter and so gives to the whole its own specific stamp” (1972a, p. 55). Naumann identifies the extrinsic cause with efficient cause which “produces an existent reality as the result of its activity; the product of such activity is called an effect” (1972a, pp.  55–56). He talks of the final cause as one of the principles of finality because “every activity is ultimately determined by an end or purpose […] the value of this end attracts the efficient cause” (1972a, p. 56). He concludes that “the end or purpose, as that for the sake of which the existent exists, is the extrinsic cause of the existent itself” (1972a, p. 56). This means, the scholastic philosophers made four distinctions with regard to causes: the extrinsic cause, the intrinsic cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause. However, in the end, they identify extrinsic cause with both the efficient and final causes. At ontological and dynamic levels, African metaphysics does not separate causes in terms of intrinsic or extrinsic, efficient or final, though conceptually such distinctions can also be made. They note that beings influence one another because being is vital force (Tempels, 1968); and beings are relational (Ogbonnaya, 2014; Asouzu, 1998). Emphasis in African metaphysics is on the existence of beings that are ontologically related to one another. Though they are aware that causes and effects are

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related, they do not go to distinguish how effects are realized from their causes in the world. Likewise, in several African proverbs, the concept of cause and effect are distinguishable, but in terms of clarity and precision, it falls short of what Western metaphysics exposes. The following proverbs from selected African languages are used to present the concept of cause and effect. Yiru pe duny nono [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.165); Bwoyo kya enju, oyinza okusazamu omukka? [Ganda Proverb]—“If you burn a house, can you conceal the smoke? Literally, this proverb means, “There is no smoke without fire” (Appendix, No.165). The context is that of fire burning; when one sees smoke coming out of some quarters, one rightly concludes that the smoke is produced by some fire, which is not directly seen. The deeper meaning is that there is reason or explanation for every happening. Philosophically, the proverb says, every effect has a cause. This is because, when one encounters an effect, one has all the reason to conclude there is something that has caused it. Metaphysically, it means, there is a correlation between effects and their causes, implying where there is an effect, there must be an underlying cause. In other words, whenever one encounters results of human activities, they should know behind it there are some agents or forces that have caused them. The Buganda confirms this with a question, “If you burn a house, can you conceal the smoke?” The answer is always no; when a house is burning, its smoke cannot be concealed. Bwosekerera ekibya osekerera mubumbii—[Ganda Proverb]; Ukiichekelea bakuli, unamchekelea mtunzi [Swahili Proverb] Literally, this proverb means, “If you laugh at the bowl, you laugh at the potter” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 10). The deeper meaning is that we should “respect and honour those who facilitated our wellbeing regardless of their age and status. [So, we should] appreciate those who supported us in our daily walk with life” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 10). The philosophy is that there is causal relation between the cause and the effect. Inadequacies in the effect are related to the inadequacies in the cause; and by implications, perfections in the effect are reflections of perfections in the cause. The metaphysics is that cause and effects are causally related. Kot mubino mager bene cok [Acholi proverb]—(Appendix, No.55) Literally, this proverb means “Even stormy rain has its end” (Appendix, No.55). The context is that of rain; when rainstorms strike, often humans become anxious as to whether or when it would ever come to a stop. The deeper meaning is that however bad a situation is, it will eventually come to an end. Philosophically, the proverb is saying, whatever has a beginning

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has an end. Metaphysically, everything that has casual beginnings equally has terminal ends. In other words, there is nothing in the human world that does not have a beginning and an end. Obwol ma otwi dong pe dok i bye [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.110) Literally, the proverb means, “Mushroom that comes out of the anthill can no longer go back into the anthill” (Appendix, No.110). The context is the natural world where it is known that mushrooms grow mainly on anthills. Once they come out, there is no going back. The deeper meaning is that once born, the natural process of life takes its course. Philosophically, the proverb means, nature has a finality towards which it progressively moves. Metaphysically, the proverb is saying, the intrinsic cause and the final cause or end of nature are ontologically buried within itself. Meaning, embedded in its nature, the human world has its beginning and end (intrinsic and final causes). Odo ma bor goyo two ku—(p’Bitek, Proverb, No.140); Odo ma bor pe goyo twol—(Banya, Proverb, No.O8)—[Acholi Proverbs] The literal meaning, according to p’Bitek, is “A stick which is far away cannot kill a snake” (1985, p. 35). Banya renders the literal meaning as “A stick which is not in hand cannot beat a snake” (1994, p. 195). The context is that of help that we may need from our relatives or from one another. The most effective help usually comes from those nearby but not those who are far away. By the time those who are far away come to our rescue, it is always too late, since the situation would have worsen; similarly, a stick that is far away cannot be used to kill a snake that is nearby. The deeper meaning is that the most effective help comes from those who are nearby. The philosophy is that proximate solutions are more effective than distant solutions in dealing with problems. Metaphysically, the proverb says, in causal relations, the more proximate the cause is to the effect, the stronger is the impact of the cause on the effects. So, the impact causes have on effects is commensurate with the proximity of the two to each other.

7.3  Discussing African Metaphysics African metaphysics can still be discussed from different angles, like by looking at the African concept of personhood, concept of freedom, social bondage, and causes and effects, to mention some of them.

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7.3.1  Personhood As modern scholars are stiffly divided on the concept of personhood in the African metaphysics, the texts we have reviewed equally divide this concept into two. The view which insists that human personhood is derived from the community is supported by modern authors like Menkiti (1984), Agulanna (2010), Imafidon (2012), Obioha (2014), and Nwoye (2017). On the other hand, the view that human personhood is an ontological reality based on human individuality lived within the social context is supported by modern authors like Gyekye (1996), Kuckertz (1996), and Teffo and Roux (2003). In the selected African languages and proverbs, I discovered that centralized African societies that had well-established political systems like kingdoms tended to emphasize first conception of human personhood, while the decentralized societies tended to emphasize the second view. In the first instance, among the Sotho people in South Africa, they would say, Motho ke motho ka batho, while for the Zulu, they say Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. These mean, I am a person through other persons. Metaphysically, these proverbs mean, personhood is derived from society. It is the basis of ubuntu philosophy in African philosophy. My finding is that not all African societies subscribe to this stringent understanding of the human personhood. This should help us to appreciate views of authors like Menkiti (1984) and his colleagues. Apparently, such strict understanding of human personhood comes from more centralized African societies. This does not mean all who subscribe to it do come from such social setting in Africa. Traditionally, in centralized African political system, unity was the hallmark of survival. If authors like John Mbiti (1969) hint on this philosophy in his famous phrase, I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am (Mbiti, 1969, p. 106), it should be understood on this basis. My problem is to think because it is derived from the bosom of Africa, in this case from a traditional African proverb, then it must apply to the whole of Africa. The second understanding, which, in my view, is much more widespread in decentralized African societies, where the demand of communality was not so strict, and there was then a lot of room left for individuality in Africa. But I want to correct straight away that even in these decentralized societies, an individual could not survive alone, and he or she equally needs the society. This is where African metaphysics in general depart from Western metaphysics, where individuality was the stamp of human

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personhood. For instance, the Acholi proverbs we have reviewed, like Lacan bene dano (A poor person is also a human being), Twon gwok pe ringo mwaka aryo (The bull dog does not run for two years), Pii pe mol dok cen (Water does not flow upwards to the source of the river), and Tiyo obalo akeyo (Old age ruins akeyo) as explained above, place emphasis on individuality. This is because, metaphysically, these proverbs say, human personhood is progressive and with time regressive. This is what human individuality goes through within the context of collective living. The constitutive dimension of human personhood, in the view of this chapter, is that though an individual human person is both social and ontological, this social dimension is circumstantial, while the ontological dimension is metaphysical,1 temporal, and purposive. The ontological dimension of human personhood is metaphysical, because it goes beyond the physical being and is dynamic. On the other hand, the social dimension is not metaphysical, because it is circumstantial. This is illustrated in the proverb which says, “Lacan bene dano”—a poor man or woman is also a person. Meaning, personhood subsists in the concept of being a person, “dano”, while poverty, “can”, is a situation in which an individual can finds himself or herself. A situation of poverty or wealth, for that matter, does not define a person, because it can be altered, that is, it can be acquired or lost. The metaphysics is that personhood is a metaphysical or ontological state of being which cannot be altered, while status of a human person like poverty is circumstantial; it is a social phenomenon that can be altered. Though poverty is mentioned here, it only serves as a classical example, because the Africans today are beginning to define human personhood in terms of what they have and not what they are. The poor people are today often treated as if they were second-class people and not deserving of the dignity proper to human personhood. In this proverb, a decentralized society like that of the Acholi of northern Uganda protests that attitude and understanding. Instead they say poverty, like other circumstantial situations in which humans find themselves, should not be considered as definitive of human personhood. Implicitly, they are saying, though those 1  By ontological we mean the existent being, while metaphysical is beyond the physical. So, the ontological dimension of human personhood is that existent being that is dynamic and more than that which is physical, while the social dimension of human person is generally produced through the efforts of an individual and society within which he or she lives, so it is not metaphysical (See Lotz, 1972b, p. 292, 1972c, p. 247).

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circumstantial factors are important, they are derived from the society in which humans live other than from the limitation embedded in human personhood. This also means society can only contribute to the circumstantial situations in which human persons live. Such circumstantial factors are real, important, and affect the way human persons live, prosper, or survive, but they do not define human personhood. That is why the Buganda say, he who loves, loves you with all your dirt. Dirt in this sense means with all your limitations and circumstantial conditions, some of which individual humans are responsible for, while others are the products of society. Unfortunately, today in a number of African societies, these circumstantial social situations are becoming definitive of human personhoods, ignoring the metaphysical reality of being human, which is the same in all human beings. Secondly, from the ontological point of view, the African metaphysics maintains that human persons are temporal. As part of existent beings, humans progress and regress with time. Truly, “Twon gwok pe ringo mwaka aryo”—The bull dog does not run for two years (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 38). Similarly, “Pii pe mol dok cen”—Water does not flow upwards to the source of the river (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 36), and “Tiyo obalo akeyo” Old age ruins akeyo (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 37). The metaphysics in these proverbs is that humans, like any other beings in the material world, are temporal. Humans are bound within the segments of time, which are progressive and at the same time regressive. Metaphysically, human personhood is progressive and with time they become regressive in their ontological dynamism. Thirdly, the ontological concept of personhood in African metaphysics is that human beings are purposive. They live for a purpose of life. The realization of this purpose or vocation is the duty of both an individual and the society within which such an individual lives. Personal human efforts, with the support of the other members of society including the gods, are responsible for the realization of this purpose. Human struggles are to fulfil and fit in such a purpose or finality. It is only when an individual falls within the proper finality can the Africans talk of “Wang Ceng odok i ode”—The Sun returns to its house (Banya, 1994, p. 213). The metaphysics is that humans live for a purpose, a vocation to fulfil in life, and this purpose is proper to each and every individual; this vocation is that which one is best suited to become, his or her finality. Other attempts may never give meaning to such a person. It is only when one

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finds or returns to their proper or legitimate places life offers them can they live true human life. Fourthly, the ontological concept of personhood in African metaphysics emphasizes that while individuality is unique, personhood is an endowment of both individuality and community. This is because individuals have capacities to communicate with one another, with nature and with God. In the process of this ontological communication, individuality is not lost, but enriched. This also means, a human person that is not in communication with other humans, nature, and the spiritual world is a poor person. That is why a number of Africans say, human beings are social individuals. The danger with some African philosophers is to think that, because humans are ontologically related, then their individuality is lost, placing the communality over and above individuality. At least for the Acholi, they say no. Surely, “cun pe tudde”—You cannot tie two penises in a knot. Though this language is strongly masculine, in real sense, it is not about males, but about humans, both males and females, whose individualities cannot be dissolved into some communal entities. The metaphysics is that personhood is rooted in individuality that is ontologically and harmoniously united with other beings. Relations in human society are derived from individual personalities collaborating or cooperating with one another, but not in dissolving differences in individuality and fusing individuality in this ontological union. They become one on account of cooperation, common interests, and well-being, each time respecting the differences in personalities and individuality. As regards the constitutive dimension of personhood, I did not identify any specific proverb in the African language expressing it. However, in some African languages, this concept is clear. As mentioned in the introduction of this concept above, the Acholi divide the human person into three: body (kom), soul (tipu), and heart (cwiny). This is similar to other Ugandan terms dividing the human body into three: body, soul, and heart. Specifically, the concept of heart is referred to as “cwing (Acholi), cuny (Langi), omutima (Luganda) and ingeso (Bafumbira), all of which refer to the metaphysical reality responsible for character, emotions” (Lajul, 2017, p. 33). The Yoruba, according to Segun, calls it okán, “the source of emotional and psychic reactions or the spiritual source of emotion” (Segun, 1998, p. 150). This is contrary to other African society’s dualistic differentiation as mentioned above. But overall, one can see that for the Africans, human persons are social individuals, and personhood is ontological, temporal, purposive, and is an endowment of both individuality and community.

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7.3.2   Concept of Freedom Western philosophy tend to distinguish between physical, moral, and psychological freedoms (Brugger, 1972b), while a number of Africans do not make such distinctions. Secondly, while Kant thinks freedom has two dimensions—negative, by which humans set themselves free from constraints, and positive, where human commit themselves to self-chosen goals—a number of Africans do not make such distinctions. They believe that to be free, one does not need first to be set free in order to make self-­ determination by making self-chosen goals. For a number of Africans, freedom is essentially the ability to self-­ determination, self-assertiveness, and courage to act for the right cause despite hindrances. This is illustrated in different situations like those caused by lack of courage, human instincts, excessive fear, public opinion, and both self- and socially imposed delimitations. To explain lack of courage, the Acholi would say, “Lewic weko i camo awola”—“If you are shy, you eat poison” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 32; Banya, 1994, p. 180). The problem here is not ignorance but lack of courage. In such cases, a person is aware and knows there is danger coming, yet lacks the courage to assert oneself over and against it. The metaphysics behind this proverb is that true human freedom lies in the ability of self-determination, self-assertiveness, and courage to act for the right cause despite hindrances from social customs like politeness, hospitality, intimidation, fear, and lack of courage. Actually humans fail to be free more due to a lack of courage than the lack of knowledge of what to do. Another important African concept of freedom is that positive freedom as commitment to self-chosen goals requires an undivided attention. That is why the Buganda say, Embwa elina eggumba mu kamwa teluma (A dog with a bone in his mouth cannot bite you). From the deeper meaning that we cannot serve two masters at the same time, we can derive the essential metaphysical principle that true freedom lies in the level of attention we pay to our desired cause. By implication, it also means, with divided attention we cannot achieve our freedom. The Buganda say, “The hunter who is following an elephant does not stop to throw stones at birds” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 24). Human instinct, on the other hand, is the irrational drive in man towards its perceived goal. Humans do have both rational and instinctive abilities and drives. In most cases there are no discrepancies between the two drives, yet in some instances, the instinctive drives are clearly contrary

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to the rationally perceived drives based on right rational judgement. In such cases, rational abilities must prevail over instinctive drives. Thus, the Acholi say, “Lacan ma kwo pe gero mine”—“A poor man so long as he lives does not sleep with his mother” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 8). While the natural instinct may not differentiate between sexual objects, human reason does make clear who is a legitimate sexual object or not. True freedom is realized only when reason prevails over instincts in such cases. Fear is a normal psychological human attitude where danger is involved, but excessive fear normally interferes with good rational judgements. In such a situation, fear takes control of the human power of volition, paralysing human ability to act. So the Acholi say, “Lewic oneko Balaturu”— “Shyness kills Balaturu” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 32). As explained in the text above, the real problem is that fear overwhelms and at times paralyses the ability to run and escape from danger, exposing the victim to danger. The problem here is the inability to overcome this excessive fear. True freedom does not need to remove the possibility of having fear, but rather the courage to prevail over it. True freedom, in other words, lies in the ability to overcome excessive and paralysing fear. Kant has noticed that one of the enemies of human freedom is tutelage to fear, which can be fear of self or fear of others. In this case, it is not fear of self, but fear of the aggressor. Kant thinks, one should first be set free from such fear in order to get the courage to escape from danger, but the Acholi say, no, one does not need first to be set free, since this may not be possible. But humans, unlike this animal (Balaturu), have the ability to act in spite of such fears. Public opinion according to a number of African societies in general, and in the Acholi society in particular, is described as a pot (Agulu), which exerts pressure, weight, and force upon acting individuals, while pad (Otac) is the pressed individual or group of individuals on whom such pressure is exerted. To say “Agulu pii odiyo otac”—“The water pot presses upon the otac” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 1) implies that pressed individuals or group of individuals do not feel free to act as they want. The Acholi insists that such a pressed individual or group of individuals will not wait until public opinion stops prevailing. But where they are convinced about what they are supposed to do, they should go ahead to do what is right despite the existence of such public opinion. Again, freedom is not the absence of internal or external constraints, but acting despite such constraints. Metaphysically, freedom is a conscious and deliberate choice made by an

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individual or group of individuals to act in conformity with or against an existing authority or public opinion. The last concept we have analysed is that of self or socially imposed delimitations. Humans sometimes find themselves in situations where they have to conform to socially imposed customs or practices they do not believe in. In such cases, individuals can choose to submit to such delimitation, imposing on themselves the burden of obedience—self-­ delimitation—or they can choose to act contrary to those social delimitations. In such cases, humans would be determining their self-will despite the social delimitations. Surely, the Acholi say, “Latin aweno pe dongo ikin gweno”—“A Guinea Fowl chick cannot be reared among chicken chicks” (p’Bitek, 1985, p.  9). By nature, Guinea Fowls are not domestic animals. By design, however, humans may intend to turn Guinea Fowls into domestic birds. So long as they remain within the domestic confines, such Guinea Fowls suffer social delimitation. As soon as they prevail over humanly-imposed conditions by escaping, they are acting contrary to such delimitations. It is only in the latter that true freedom subsists. The metaphysics is that freedom cannot be conscripted by human design. In fact, true freedom is the persistent struggle against self or socially imposed delimitations. It is obedience to one’s inner drives in search for liberty or resistance against restrictions to self or social determinations. This is still contrary to the view of Kant that there must first be absence of constraint for freedom to prevail. Africans think, freedom is self-determination in spite of constraints. 7.3.3   Social Bonds In African philosophy, social bonds are the metaphysical relations binding humans to one another, to nature, and to God. Harmony in these ontological relations brings about peace and harmony, while the contrary brings about pains and sufferings. That is why an action of an individual affects all the other members of society including the natural environment within which humans live. Even the members of society’s actions affect the individual members of society. This is contrary to the Western philosophy, where individuals are responsible for their own actions, and groups of individuals can as well work in their own interests or peril, independent of other individuals.

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In the African social philosophy, society is defined by the kind of relationship that exists between its individual members and the society itself. In Western philosophy emphasis is placed on a dualistic relationship between the individual and society, in which both are independent of each other and the society is practically a means for the realization of the individual interests. In African social philosophy, the social relationship is ontological, since it encompasses the individual and the society, individual and nature, and individual and the spiritual world. In the African metaphysics, though social bonds are very important, they consider blood bonds to be superior. They acknowledge that at times of conflicts, social bonds often give way and crumble, but conflicts, even among blood relatives, do not destroy blood bonds. In that way they say, blood brothers are like calabashes or gourds tied together on a tree; they keep knocking each other, but they can never break each other. The same meaning is found among the Buganda of Southern Uganda who say, “You should not give an opinion when two relatives are quarrelling” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 2). The meaning is that conflicts, disagreements, rivalries do exist even among blood relations; however, because of the strength of the bonds binding them, such conflicts do not shatter the blood bonds. African metaphysics compare blood bonds with other relations, as we have earlier seen in the case of friendship. In one of their proverbs, the Acholi say, Larem kwoko remo—that friendship may cause death. The Buganda add, “A close friend can become a close enemy” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  23). Besides, the Acholi describe a married woman as dako— which etymologically comes from two words, daa (woman) and koo (chest), meaning a person of the chest. It is a sexual bond that ties them together, and not necessarily blood. Metaphysically, this proverb is saying, bonds based on blood relations bind more strongly than bonds derived from other social relations like friendships, marriage, blood pacts, and social covenants, to mention some of them. This does not mean other bonds are not important; on the contrary, they believe these other relations are important, but they cannot supersede blood relations. In the African social philosophy, posterity was embedded in the offspring, while life was embedded in the individual. Life was very important in the African traditional society. Important as it may be, life of an individual was nevertheless inferior to the life embedded in the young ones, since in them subsists the posterity of their society. For that matter, an individual who was unable to transmit life to its young ones was considered to be miserable. To capture the importance of this ontological reality,

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the Acholi would say, “Oyo Aculube too kum lotinone” (Aculube rat will die for its young ones). In African social metaphysics, the relationship to wealth or material possession versus qualitative relationship one enjoys with other human beings, nature, and the spiritual world was very important. To say, “Okono wang kum pii” (Pumpkin gets burnt in spite of water), the Acholi mean, in spite of abundance of wealth one can still have a miserable life, because it lacks full meaning. Full meaning in life is determined by the quality relationship one enjoys with those around him or her. These relationships are provided for by other human beings, nature, and the spiritual world. It is the ontological relations with others and nature that provide full meaning in human life, but not necessarily material possession. The metaphysics is that it is not the material possession a person owns that provides meaning in human life, but one’s qualitative ontological relationships to things and other human beings that give humans true meanings in life. This also means, humans need both qualitative ontological relations with other beings and sufficient material possession, but when the two are compared, ontological qualitative relations are superior to the material possessions. 7.3.4   Causes and Effects In the African metaphysics, strong emphasis is placed on intrinsic causes, extrinsic causes, and not so much on final and efficient causes. To understand this, we shall identify from the metaphysical contents of the proverbs surveyed three categories of metaphysical principles in regard to causes and effects. These are ontological principles, principles of causality, and principles of action. By ontological principles we refer to that from which existent being takes its origin. This is because principle itself means the order of existence or becoming or of knowledge from which something takes its origin (Brugger, 1972a). So, by ontology, we mean the theory about existent being (Lotz, 1972b). Ontological principles are statements about existent beings and, in these cases, statements about causes and effects among existent beings. Though distinctions are always very clear between the different principles regulating existent beings in Western metaphysics, the African metaphysics does not go that far, yet such differences can be distinguished. For them, causes and effects are real, but how one cause relates to the other

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was not their priority. Nevertheless, in the selected African languages and proverbs, such distinctions can be identified. The first ontological principle says everything that has casual beginnings equally has terminal ends. This principle is derived from their proverb saying, Kot mubino mager bene cok, as explained above. Meaning, every effect that has intrinsic causes equally has terminal ends. So, causal beginnings and terminal ends are ontologically related. The second ontological principle states that the intrinsic cause and final end of nature are ontologically buried within nature itself, derived from a proverb which says Obwol ma otwi dong pe dok i bye, meaning, intrinsic cause and final cause are ontologically related. On the other hand, causality is the inflow of cause and effect and the relation that comes into existence as the result of this activity (Naumann, 1972b). In this case, we are talking about the order of existence, becoming, or knowledge, explaining the relation that comes into existence as the result of causal activities. We have identified three principles explaining the relation that comes into existence as a result of causal activities. These, as I have mentioned above, are principles that can be conceptually distinguished, yet in practical life of a number of African people, nobody bothers about them, since they all belong to the one ontological dynamic world of beings. The first principle states that where there is an effect, there must be a cause. Indeed, this is captured in their proverb saying, “Yiru pe duny nono”. Surely, prior to the existent effect, there must be an intrinsic cause. This does not mean, where there is a cause, there must be an effect. This may become logically problematic, since causes may be latent and only become active to produce their effects later. Existence of a cause does not indicate the presence of an effect, but the presence of an effect definitely implies the existence of a cause. The second principle is that cause and effects are intrinsically related. The perfections or imperfections found in the effect are often reflective of the perfections or imperfections in the cause itself. That is why the Buganda say, “If you laugh at the bowl, you laugh at the potter”. The third principle is that causes have at times far reaching effects beyond the confines of temporality. That is why a number of African societies have the proverb which says, “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”. In the theory of causes and effects, the main determining activity is called action. These actions are directed at different aspects of the process.

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In dealing with different human situations and human problems, actions are directed differently, as some of these principles indicate. The first principle of action states that the more proximate the cause is to the effect, the stronger is its impact on the effect. The proverb from which this principle is derived is “Odo ma bor pe goyo twol”—A stick that is far away [not at hand] cannot kill a snake that is nearby. We can call this the principle of proximity. Implying, in performing human actions, the closer the causes are to the effects, the more impactful are their results on the effects. The second principle of actions states that effective results are obtained through available means. The Acholi would say, “Banya pe gitongo ki keny”—one cannot pay bride price on the basis of bride wealth that is still to be borrowed, since one cannot tell whether the lender will surely give that wealth to the borrower. This means, available means are the efficient causes, which are more effective to produce results than unavailable resources. Actions based on available resources, which are the available efficient causes, are realizable.

7.4  Conclusion This chapter has surveyed four metaphysical concepts in African philosophy, namely, concept of personhood, freedom, concept of social bonds, and cause and effects. In general, the African metaphysical concept comes from their social philosophy and, particularly, their decentralized and centralized social arrangements. Because of these, divergent opinion prevails in the African metaphysical concepts. As regards the concept of personhood, we found out that African societies subscribe to the two dimensions of human personhood: the personal and the social. While the centralized African societies tend to exaggerate African communalism at the expense of personal dimensions of personhood, on the other hand, decentralized African societies tend to emphasize personal dimension without ignoring the communal dimensions. With regard to the concept of freedom, one central point underlined in the African metaphysics is that freedom is not the absence of constraints as it is demonstrated in the West. On the contrary, freedom is the ability to act despite constraints. That constraints can come from self, others, and the material and immaterial worlds is understandable, but that human freedom can exist despite  these prevailing circumstances, is the central issue about freedom.

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In the metaphysics of social metaphysics, the Africans believe that social relations are ontologically built. The blood relations are ontologically superior to other social relations. Preservation of society is a higher duty than self-preservation in African metaphysics, while material possession is inferior to the harmonious ontological relationships that exist between an individual and the members of society, nature, and the spiritual world. With regard to causes and effects, just like in other metaphysics, the Africans believe in the ontological principles, principles of causality, and principle of action. For instance, whatever has casual beginnings has terminal ends, and buried with the agent of action is its intrinsic cause and final cause. These are ontological principles. One central principle of causality I would like to mention is that wherever there is an effect, there is a cause. And one principle of action is that problems are best solved at their root causes. Secondly, the principle of proximity says causes are more impactful when they are near their effects.

References Agulanna, C. (2010). Community and human well-being in an African culture. TRAMES, 14(64/59), 282–298. Asiimwe, J. (2020). African proverbs on giving and generosity. CivSource Africa. Asouzu, I. Innocent. (1998). Science and African Metaphysics: A Search for Direction. The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, 23, 1–7. Banya, A.  A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda development Series, No.2). Foundations for African Development. Brugger, W. (1972a). Principle. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 227–228). Gonzaga University Press. Brugger, W. (1972b). Freedom. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 146–148). Gonzaga University Press. Etim, F. (2013). African metaphysics. Journal of Asian Scientific Research, 3(1), 11–17. Gyekye, K. (1987). An essay on African philosophical thought: The Akan conceptual scheme. Temple University Press. Gyekye, K. (1996). African cultural values: An introduction. Sanfola Publishing Co. Imafidon, E. (2012). The concept of person in an African culture and its implication for social order. Lumina: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 23(2), 78–96. Ishiabwe, A. (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) Proverbs and Wise sayings, African Proverbs Working group: Nairobi—Kenya. Kaphagawani, D. N. (2004). African conceptions of a person: A critical survey. In W. Kwasi (Ed.), A Companion to African philosophy (pp. 332–342). Blackwell Publishing.

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Kim, J., & Sosa, E. (Eds.). (1995). A companion to metaphysics. Blackwell Publishers. Kuckertz, H. (1996). Selfhood and its reason to be. In J.  G. Malherbe (Ed.), Decolonizing the mind. Proceedings from the second colloquium on African philosophy (pp. 57–66). Department of Philosophy, Unisa. Lajul, W. (1994). The role of man in the dynamics of history: Reflections on Kant. Urban University Press. Lajul, W. (2017). African metaphysics: Traditional and modern discussions. In U. E. Isaac (Ed.), Themes, issues and problems in African philosophy (pp. 19–48). Palgrave Macmillan. Lotz, B. J. (1972a). Person. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 302–303). Gonzaga University Press. Lotz, B. J. (1972b). Ontology. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 291–292). Gonzaga University Press. Lotz, B. J. (1972c). Metaphysics. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 247–249). Gonzaga University Press. Marx, Karl. (1885). Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Oekonomie; herausgegeben von Friedrich Engels. Vol. 2: Der Zirkulationsprozess des Kapitals (1 ed.). Hamburg: Verlag von Otto Meissner. https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-25620. Mbiti, S. J. (1969). African religions and philosophy. Heinemann. Menkiti, A. I. (1984). Person and community in African traditional thought. In R.  A. Wright (Ed.), African philosophy: An introduction (pp.  171–181). University Press of America. More, M. P. (1996). Review of A. Shutte, ‘Philosophy in Africa’. South African Journal of Philosophy, 15(4). Naumann, V. (1972a). Cause. In W.  Brugger & K.  Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 55–57). Gonzaga University Press. Naumann, V. (1972b). Causality. In W. Brugger & K. Baker (Eds.), Philosophical dictionary (pp. 52–53). Gonzaga University Press. Nwoye, A. (2017). Africentric theory of human person. PINS, 54, 42–66. Obioha, U. P. (2014). A Communitarian understanding of the human person as a philosophical basis for human development. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 6(8), 247–267. Ogbonnaya, U. L. (2014). The question of “being” in African philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions, 3(1), 108–126. Onyewuenyi, I. (1985). A philosophical re-appraisal of African belief on re-­ incarnation. Fordham University. P’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. Segun, G. (1998). Éníyán: The Yoruba Concept of a Person. In P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (Eds.), The African philosophy reader (pp. 149–168). Routledge.

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Tahko, E.  T. (2013). Metaphysics as the First Philosophy. In E.  Feser (Ed.), Aristotle on method and metaphysics (pp. 49–67). Palgrave Macmillan. Tapfumaneyi, D. K. K., & Rupande, G. (2013). African Metaphysics: The African legal quagmire. International Journal of Advanced Research, 1(5), 587–595. Teffo, J. L., & Roux, P. J. A. (2003). Metaphysical thinking in Africa. In P. H. Coetzee & A.  P. J.  Roux (Eds.), African philosophy reader (2nd ed., pp.  193–258). Routledge. Tempels, P. (1968). Bantu philosophy. Présence Africaine. Wiredu, K. (1987). The concept of mind with particular reference to language as thought of the Akans. In G. Floistad (Ed.), African philosophy- Contemporary philosophy: A new survey (Vol. 5). Kluwer Academic Publications.

CHAPTER 8

Philosophy of Beauty in Selected African Languages and Proverbs

8.1   Introduction Matthew Izibili contends that “Beauty among Africans is not conceived only in works of art but also in physical characteristics or qualities of the human person. African aesthetics considers the beautiful to consist more in the life of a person than in events, scenes and works of arts” (2017, p.  210; see also Gyekye, 1992, p.  131). Okafor wonders why in many African languages the term “beautiful” also encompasses the morally good (Quoted by Izibili, 2017, p. 2010). For Gyekye (1992), the African conception of beauty is seen not only in works of art and in the human figure but also in moral behaviour and indeed in humanity itself. This means that among Africans, beauty is conceived as works of arts, as natural qualities, but also as moral uprightness. Implying beauty is not only a human creation but also a natural quality. Secondly, African concept of beauty consists in being, that is life of a person other than in acts of being, which is human creation. Thirdly, African conception of beauty is more than acts of being, but also includes quality of human behaviour, that is, moral goodness. Gyekye seems to summarize African conception of beauty as consisting in works of art, natural qualities expressed as figures, moral behaviour, and humanity itself. Soul Shava (2015) believes that the essence of African aesthetics is its representation as a construct of African people on the continent and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_8

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people of African descent in the diaspora. Shava continues to opine that African aesthetics is the articulation of African culture, identity, and spirituality. It is the African standard of perceiving, appreciating, appraising, or applying aesthetic values or knowledge of things African. Thirdly, that African aesthetics reveals the cultural bond between Africans in the continent and abroad (Shava, 2015, p. 3). What is central about the view of Shava is the cultural identity and spirituality as central to African aesthetics. In the concept of beauty, Africans see more than the physical or external aspects of reality described as beautiful, because they see the inner reality too, which Shava calls spirituality, which identifies them as cultural units bonded together as a people. P’Bitek describes this inner reality as moral and socially expressed in a life of harmony with self and others. P’Bitek identifies the Acholi concept of beauty with the term ber— good, whose opposite is rac—bad. His view is that the term ber has three different meanings: the social, the moral, and the physical. That means we can talk of social beauty, moral beauty, and physical beauty (p’Bitek, 1986). From what we have seen above, beauty seems to have four different connotations: human work of arts, natural qualities, moral quality, and universal quality. Analysing these, we can see that physical beauty may be a work of arts or a natural quality in a physical object. On the other hand, moral quality is specifically a human behavioural relation with self and other beings, while universal beauty can also be the natural harmony in creation itself or those harmony created by humans among all humankind. This then implies that, we could still talk of three different types of beauties: physical, moral, and social. In this chapter, we shall survey a number of African proverbs in line with the philosophy of beauty. The Acholi, like many other African societies, have differing concepts of this philosophy. But what is central to the Acholi, in line with Okot p’Bitek, is that the Acholi have three basic concepts of beauty: social, moral, and physical beauties. While social beauty refers to the harmonious living and peace in society, moral beauty has to do with human behaviour. Moral beauty in this context is the harmony between personal behaviours, actions, and choices, and the values of society. Some of those values are purely moral, since they only portray the attitude of the people towards a given concept, but others are ethical, since they are based on the rational justifications of these actions and behaviours in terms of rightness and wrongness. While physical beauty is the symmetrical harmony between the different parts of a given reality,

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between these different concepts, however, moral beauty is considered to be superior to the other two. This is followed by social beauty, since social progress is only possible when there is some relative peace, order, and harmony in society. Last on the list, we have the physical beauty. However, there is no physical feature that is considered ugly, so long as it is combined with some aspects of moral beauty.

8.2   Philosophy of Beauty in Selected African Proverbs In trying to give the interpretation of the different proverbs, we shall first give the literal meanings of the proverbs. Secondly, we shall trace their context, since these are important in understanding the meanings of these proverbs. As far as the meanings are concerned, deeper meanings may not be the same as the philosophical meanings, though in some instances these two may be exactly the same. There is also a particular philosophical meaning, which is the application of the general philosophical meanings to the unique branch of philosophy to which such proverb belongs. 8.2.1   Social Beauty It has already been explained above that social beauty is the harmonious living and peace in society. It is the harmony that exists among the different members of a particular society, which in African philosophy includes harmony with nature and the spiritual world. It comprises what Shava (2015) describes as the articulation of African culture, identity, and spirituality. Social beauty, as a harmonious social living, is articulated in cultural harmony, identity, and spirituality. In a culture that lives in harmony, all the members of the society identify themselves and find their identity as a people. Because for true cultural harmony to exist there must also be harmony with nature and the spiritual world, such a beauty can be described as spiritual. Our attempt here is to identify proverbs that can help us to understand better the concept of social beauty in selected African languages and proverbs. The following are some of them. Gipoko pyer ngwen [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek, Proverb No.67); Ekilabo ekitono koowa munno [Luganda Proverb] The literal meaning is that “The two friends share the white ant” (p’Bitek, 1985, p.  17). The Ganda versions means, “A small gift

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strengthens a friendship” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  10). The context is that “Very close friends share the smallest things as a sign of their friendship” (1985, p.  17). The term pyer ngwen, in the Acholi proverb, means the abdomen of a white ant, which is considered to be the most delicious part of the white ant, so sharing it is a sign of great friendship. The deeper meaning is that sharing is the epitome of great friendship. The Ganda version’s deeper meaning is that “small deeds we do for one another help to strengthen bonds [of friendship]” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 10). The philosophy behind this proverb is that sharing is a social beauty. The philosophy of beauty is that sharing, harmony, friendship, and peace are the essence of social beauty, since they seal social relationships. Giribo pii ma i kulu [Acholi Proverb]—(p’Bitek Proverb No.68) Literally, this proverb means, “They share only water from the well” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 17). The context is that of social living, where social beauty is absent, but what unites humans is only sources of livelihoods, like water from the village well. In all other things, they share nothing in common. P’Bitek adds that, “Because they are so hostile to one another, the only thing they have in common is the village well” (1985, p. 17). The deeper meaning is that “although they are so hostile, they still belong to one home, in that they share the same well” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 17). That “there are times when they must unite to face an external aggressor” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 17). So, even where social beauty is lacking, humans cannot fail to share the sources of their livelihoods, like water from the village well, or unite to face external aggression that is potentially more dangerous than the enmity or hostility that prevail among the members of the same society. The philosophy is that however bad humans are to each other, they still have ties that pull them together. The philosophy of beauty is that hostility does not obliterate social beauty, but weakens its effectiveness in creating social harmony and peace. This is because where hostility prevails, humans still have bonds that tie them together, like sources of livelihoods: water sources, firewood from the same forests as a source of fuel, they live on the same land, and together they face common external enemies. Enyana tesekerera nkunku [Ganda Proverb]; Ndama hamchekelei ng’ombe asiye kuwa na pembe [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “A calf doesn’t laugh at a hornless cow” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 14). The context is that of social living: deficiencies of one member should not disrupt social harmony. The deeper meaning is that “we are quick to see other people’s weaknesses and forget that we

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may also have the same or worse, now or in future” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 14). The philosophy is that “We should appreciate one another regardless of our challenges and inabilities” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 14). The philosophy of beauty is that social harmony is based on our nature as social beings and not on accidental differences, physical or moral. Karakak nywalo karakak [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.48) The literal meaning is that “wild cats only beget wild cats” (Appendix, No.48). The context is that of social living, where humans behave in accordance with the way they are taught by their societies. When humans come from peaceful societies, they also live in peace with others; when instead they come from hostile societies, they too will become hostile in their social relations with others. Just like wild cats that cannot produce domestic cats, though they are all from the same cat’s family. The deeper meaning is that good society breeds good members. The philosophy is that humans are moral products of their societies. The philosophy of beauty is that social beauty is a product of society. Apidi nyaa wol [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya’s Proverb No. A15) Literally, this proverb means, “Discord the daughter of Wol” (Banya, 1994, p. 126). The context is that of Acholi traditional society. Wol is an Acholi clan in Kalongo, Agago District. “Once upon a time a girl born in the clan was named Apidi (Discord). When she grew up, she became so vivacious and of a bitter tongue that she one day caused a big fight between Wol and another clan. In this fight, the people of Wol suffered very many casualties. This was caused by their daughter Apidi” (Banya, 1994, p. 126). The deeper meaning is about a person who causes conflicts in society. The philosophy is that there are people with the propensity to cause discord among humans. The philosophy of beauty is that those with the propensity to cause disharmony in society and disrupt social beauty are considered to be socially ugly. This proverb is similar to “Latunge ki remo”—“A person whose horn have been smeared with blood” (Banya, 1994, p. 126). Towakananga na musiru [Ganda Proverb]; Usipuuze nguvu za watu wajinga wakiwa wengi[Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning says, “Never underestimate the power of stupid people in large numbers” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 26). The context is that of social life. The deeper meaning reminds us of “the power of many people having a common mind and when people work as a team, it doesn’t matter what their inabilities and weaknesses are, they succeed” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  26). The philosophy is that “We all have something to offer the

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community” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  26). The philosophy of beauty is that social harmony is a power for success regardless of inadequacies and weaknesses. 8.2.2   Moral Beauty As we have seen in the introduction to this chapter, moral beauty is the quality of the human behavioural relation with self and other beings. It is the harmony between personal behaviours, actions, choices, and the values of society. Some of these values are purely moral, while others are ethical. A value is purely moral when they only portray the attitude of the people towards a given concept, while a value is ethical when they are rationally justifiable in terms of rightness and wrongness. We shall attempt then to identify proverbs that would highlight the concept of moral beauty in African aesthetics. Laber ume ngwe [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya, Proverb, No. L1; p’Bitek, Proverb, No.121) The literal meaning, according to p’Bitek, is that “The nose of the beautiful one smells” (1985, p. 30). Banya instead literally translates the proverb as, “A beautiful/handsome person’s nose is stinky” (1994, p. 169). The Maragoli of Kenya instead say, “The beautiful one smells in the mouth” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 30). The context is that the external appearance may not correspond to internal realities. For instance, physical beauty can be externally seen, but the stinking smell of the nose or the mouth cannot be seen externally. The deeper meaning is that character cannot be seen by looking at a person. While the physical beauty that can be seen by our eyes can be attractive, but character, which cannot be seen externally, may be unpalatable. The philosophy behind this proverb is that physical beauty is not the hallmark of human beauty. The philosophy of beauty is that true beauty subsists in human behaviour. This is because beauty can be moral or physical, but moral beauty is superior to physical beauty. Ber ber pa lalaa [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No. 20); (Banya, Proverb, No. B11) The literal meaning is “Like the beauty of lalaa plant” (Appendix, No.20), though Banya renders it as “He/she has the external beauty or handsomeness/appearance of Lalaa vegetable” (1994, p.  138). In his book, The Artist the ruler, p’Bitek explains the context as follows: “Lalaa plant has lovely leaves and flowers; but it is bitter in taste” (p’Bitek, 1986, p. 30). What can be seen externally is the physical beauty of this lalaa

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plant, with shining and beautiful green leaves, but what cannot be seen externally is its bitterness, since when this edible vegetable is cooked, it is always bitter. The deeper meaning, according to Banya, is that “someone who appears good but has a bad character” (1994, p. 138). The English would say, do not judge a book by its cover. So, external beauty can be deceptive. The philosophy is that inner beauty is embedded in human character. The philosophy of beauty is that good moral character is the epitome of inner beauty, which is true beauty. La yomcwiny lugero ki nyac—(p’Bitek, 1986, p. 26); Layomcwiny kigero ki nyac—(Banya, Proverb, No, L36)—[Acholi Proverbs] The literal meaning according to p’Bitek in The Artist the Ruler is “The generous one gets gonorrhoea” (p’Bitek, 1986, p. 26). Banya renders it as “A generous person is mated with framboesia or syphilis” (1994, p. 179). The context is that of prostitution, where women that are generous in exposing their bodies for sex are often the victims of sexually transmitted diseases. The deeper meaning is that there is limit to generosity, because it must be practised with caution, prudence, and care. Okot adds, “is not specifically or only addressed, as a warning, to women who, by being generous with their bodies, might actually catch [gonorrhoea] the thing; it is a mild rebuke to any person who betrays the weakness of being generous, which is taken to be a kind of showing off, of boasting” (1986, p. 26). Banya adds that “if you are too generous, the consequence is your loss or suffering” (1994, p.  179). The philosophy behind this proverb is that generosity is not a limitless virtue; it must be practised with caution. The philosophy of beauty is that moral beauty is demonstrated through generosity, which should be practised with caution; otherwise it leads to human undoing. Gwok pe donyo iot labongo yibe [Acholi Proverb]—(Appendix, No.41) Literally, this proverb means, “A dog does enter a house leaving its tail behind” (Lajul, 2014, p. 129). The context is that of domestic animals. An African dog, in an unfamiliar environment, behaves very politely by folding its tail in between the legs when entering into a stranger’s house. However, it will not take long when it gets familiar with the environment, and then it lets its tail to stand the way it is supposed to. The deeper meaning is that humans may adopt their behaviour according to a particular prevailing circumstance, but what they cannot change is their characters, because sooner or later such character will clearly come out. The philosophy behind this proverb is that human character and human behaviour are not always symmetrical; they do not always correspond. The philosophy of

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beauty is that true beauty lies in human character and not in human behaviour. This is because, human character is the persistent, reliable, and dependable way of acting and doing things, while human behaviour is a way of acting adaptable to suit different circumstances. Mac nywalo buru—(Banya, No.M1); Mac onywalo buru—(p’Bitek, No.40)—[Acholi Proverbs]; Bazaala mubiri tebazaala mpisa [Ganda Proverb] Literally, the proverb means, “Fire gives birth to ashes” (Banya, 1994, p. 183). Instead, p’Bitek translates it as “Fire has begotten ashes” (1985, p. 10). The Ganda version says, “Parents give birth to the body of their children, but not always to their characters” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). The context of this proverb is that of family life, where fire is made both for cooking and for warming (wangoo) in the evenings. The product of fire made by lighting woods produces ashes in the end. Similarly, the context of the Ganda version is still the family, where children derive a lot from their parents, but not everything. The deeper meaning is that vibrant characters or personalities of parents can produce less vibrant characters or personalities in their offspring. The Buganda gives the deeper meaning as “We may bring up children and try to shape their character, and yet they may not turn out to be as we expected” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 8). The philosophy is that characters are unique to individuals, since biological parents can produce those with completely different characteristic traits. The Buganda do add: “Sometimes they [children] adapt behaviour which we cannot change; and which may differ from our expectations” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p.  8). The philosophy of beauty is that inner beauty, which is embedded in human character, is not the product of human inheritance, since one trait of parents’ character can produce completely the oppose character traits in their offspring. Omwaana owegonjebwa, aweesa nyina ekitiibwa [Ganda Proverb]; Mtoto wa tabia nzuri hufanya mamake aheshimiwe [Swahili Proverb] Literal meaning is that “The child with good behaviours makes the mother to be respected” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 22). The context is still that of moral behaviour. The deeper meaning is that “All people appreciate persons of good behaviour and positive attitude. Those who associate with them benefit from the association and are respected too” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 22). The philosophy is that the benefit of good behaviour is shared by those associated with such behaviour. The philosophy of beauty is that morally good behaviour is appreciated by the community.

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8.2.3   Physical Beauty Physical beauty is the symmetrical harmony between different parts of a given physical entity. It can be the work of human arts or a natural endowment. It is the most attractive aspect of any given reality, but not necessarily it’s a most important dimension in African aesthetics. Acholi aesthetics, as one of the African philosophies of beauty, believes that it is one of the least in hierarchical order, following social beauty and topped by moral beauty. Our intention here is to identify the concept of physical beauty in selected African languages and proverbs. Ber kwac pa Nyaga [Acholi Proverb]—(Banya’s Proverb No. B12) Literally, the proverb means, “As good as the Leopard of Nyaga” (Banya, 1994, p. 138). The context is that of domesticating wild animals. Nyaga, a onetime Chief of Alero clan, in West Acholi, demanded that a young leopard be brought to his palace and tamed as a domestic animal. At first, the leopard “pretended to be very good and humble when it was brought home from the jungle for taming. [Physically, it was an amazingly beautiful animal]. After a short while, people detected its cruelty which disqualified it from being an animal worthy of being tamed” (Banya, 1994, p. 138). The deeper meaning is that one is physically beautiful, but the character is bad. “Your behaviour is full of pretence of goodness, but the truth about you is nothing but evil. A hypocrite” (Banya, 1994, p. 138). The philosophy behind this proverb is that physical beauty is not sufficient to qualify one to belong to human society. In this case, the physical beauty of the leopard does not qualify it to become a domestic animal. Inner beauty, which may not be apparent at first sight, is superior to the physical beauty which is seen on sight. The philosophy of beauty is that physical beauty can be admirable, yet it not sufficient to qualify a morally beautiful person. On the other hand, it can also mean, physical beauty is inferior to inner or moral beauty embedded in human character. Mulungi emabega, mumaaso mubi [Ganda Proverb]; Kizuri kutoka nyuma, kibaya mbele [Swahili Proverb] Literal meaning is “Beautiful from behind, ugly in front” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 17). The context is that of physical perspectives of the same reality: one indirect (behind) and the other direct (in front). The deeper meaning is that “We can judge people or situations incorrectly. Whatever may seem appealing may turn out to be the opposite” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 17). The philosophy is that “We should take time to have some experience before deciding on anything” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 17). The aesthetics

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is that physical beauty is only an indirect way of perceiving the true beauty of a person. This is because physical beauty is external and can easily be appreciated, but physical beauty covers what can only be properly perceived from a closer look. This closer look is like perceiving an object from the front; by experience, then one may discover that physically such a person is beautiful, but morally ugly. Ne ssanja lyaaliko olulagala [Ganda Proverb]; Tawi la ndizi lililo zeeka, hapo awali lilikuwa change na la rangi ya kijani kibichi [Swahili Proverb] The literal meaning is that “An old banana leaf was once young and green” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 18). The context is that of the natural world, where natural objects deteriorate in beauty over time. The deeper meaning is that “Everyone was once young and matures along the years. Young people should learn that one changes status, age and gains wisdom as years pass by. They will also grow old one day” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 18). The philosophy is that “We should prepare for changes in our lives” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 18). The philosophy of beauty is that with time physical beauty deteriorates, but by implication, as physical beauty deteriorates, moral beauty [should] blossom. Omwana omubi takaddiwa ewaka [Ganda Proverb]; Msichana asiye mrembo hazeekei kwao [Swahili Proverb] Literally, this proverb states that “An ugly girl does not become old at home” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 19). The context is that of African marriages, where in general men look for those women who are physically beautiful to marry, but many discover that even those women who are not quite beautiful physically have good behaviour, so they get married to them. The deeper meaning is that “All women are expected to get married in the African tradition. [… but] Above physical beauty is the ability to sire children, nurture a family and serve the community” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 19). The philosophy is that there is no physical condition that inhibit a woman to perform her duty as a mother and caregiver in a family, leave alone lack of physical beauty. The philosophy of beauty is that physical condition is not a hindrance to the performance of social duties, like marriage duties.

8.3  Discussing African Philosophy of Beauty The previous analysis basically looked at the basis of African concept of beauty in selected African languages and proverbs. The languages used are Acholi, Ganda, and Swahili. These chosen languages are spoken over very

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wide areas of Africa. Luganda, which is a Bantu language, has similarity with all the Bantu languages stretching from West Africa, to East, and southern Africa. Swahili, on the other hand, is spoken all over East Africa, including eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Acholi, as a Luo language, is spoken in northern Uganda, eastern Kenya, northern Tanzania, southern Sudan, eastern DRC, and part of Ethiopia. The central issue discovered is the difference between morality and character. While morality and its values are social products, human characters are neither social products nor a result of natural inheritance. Each individual has their own characters, which are unique to them regardless of family or social backgrounds. 8.3.1   Social Beauty In discussing the African concept of social beauty, which is the harmonious living in society, we discovered that they emphasize harmony with others in society, nature, and the spiritual world. However, the proverbs did not cover all these different dimensions of social harmony, since they dwelt mainly with the existence of harmony and disharmony among humans. The proverbs tended to explain what creates harmony in society and what disturbs harmony in society. It is noticed that, for one to live in harmony, four things are required: harmony with self, harmony with others, harmony with nature, and harmony with the spiritual world. In some of the African languages, like Acholi, one can identify expressions like ber bedo aye kit pa kwariwa—meaning, social beauty, which is described as “ber bedo”, is the way of life of our ancestors. When one digs deeper into this way of life of the ancestors, then one can see respect for self, which they express as dano ma wore kene—(a person who has self-respect); closeness to nature, since the natural environment was the womb of their existence; closeness to their ancestors (lubo kit pa kwariwa), who were the custodians of their cultural heritage; and closeness to the gods (woro jok), who sanctioned their day-to-day activities. Going back to the proverbs we have surveyed, we shall divide them into two: those that constitute social harmony, and those that disrupt social harmony. With regard to what creates social harmony in society, the African philosophy of beauty identifies four things: friendship, blood ties, women, and society itself. In regard to friendship, the Acholi would describe close friends as “Gipoko pyer ngwen”—“The two friends share the white ant” (p’Bitek,

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1985, p. 17). Meaning, true friends never deny each other what is precious, since the abdomen of the white ant was considered a delicacy in the Acholi culture. Similarly, the Buganda say, “A small gift strengthens friendship”. Friendship encourages sharing, which is the trademark of good social relations and living. Here, the philosophy of beauty is that sharing, harmony, friendship, and peace are the essence of social beauty, since they seal social relationships. Regarding blood ties, the Acholi think they bind humans more tightly than any other social arrangements. For that matter, they would describe blood relatives as, “Tol wat pe cot”—“The cord that ties relatives together cannot be broken” (Appendix, No.147). For sure, we know that today, such may not be a reality any longer, since blood relatives can sacrifice or even kill each other for the sake of wealth. However, this was unthinkable in the Acholi traditional society. Wealth itself was considered a means for the sustenance of life, but not an end in itself, as it is being taken today. In this case, the philosophy of beauty is that blood relatives will always remain reliable basis of concord, regardless of differences that tend to keep them apart. The Buganda would add, “A calf doesn’t laugh at a hornless cow” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 14). The philosophy is that, even among blood relatives, those sharing some natural origins, like a calf and a cow, should appreciate one another regardless of the numerous challenges and inabilities. The philosophy of beauty is that social harmony based on our nature (like blood ties) as social beings, and not on accidental differences, tends to keep social relations and harmony strong. When accidental differences, created by wealth, politics, or religion, are taken as superior to natural links, then social harmony and cohesion are put at risks. Africans acknowledge that there were a number of issues that could keep blood relations apart from each other, but because of the strong concept of social beauty, all were considered secondary, since the primary duty was to keep social harmony, which is social beauty. Concerning women as the epitome of social beauty, the Acholi would say, “Gang ber ki mon”—“Women are the beauty of the home” (Appendix, No. 31). The Buganda say, “A home without a woman is like a barn without cattle” (Ishiabwe, 2019, p. 5). Aware that in the traditional African societies, women bring life into the world; they take care of children, the sick, the disabled, and the elderly; they administer the general welfare of the home, this makes them indispensable parts of the meaning and quality of life in any given home. Here, the philosophy of beauty is that, women are the indispensable key agents of social beauty. This is because they

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create the atmosphere that makes a home a better place for humans to live in. Negatively, in the name of social beauty, women were kept working all the time, making them to be overexploited by the dominant men of the African society. The proverb concerning society says, “Karakak nywalo karakak”— “Wild cats only begets wild cats” (Appendix, No.48). Meaning, humans behave in accordance with the way they are brought up by their societies. So, a good society breeds good members. Implying, human behaviours are partly modelled and produced by societies. The philosophy of beauty is that social beauty is a product of society. When one comes from a peaceful, loving, and harmonious family or society, such a person in real life tends to be peace loving and appreciates living in harmony with others. On the contrary, when one comes from a hostile, quarrelsome, abusive, and disharmonious family or society, most likely, such a person tends to behave in a wild and quarrelsome way. The support of the above concept, the Acholi say, Obong dyang mapiny, lubo mamalo—The lower hoof of a cow is identical to the upper one (1994, p. 193). In the animal world, similarity between animal species is by nature. In case of humans, children are physically similar to their parents by nature, but behaviourally similarity to parents is only by nurture. Implying, physical beauty can be inherited from our parents by nature, but social beauty can only be learnt from parents or society from which we come through nurture. The philosophy of beauty is that the way society teaches its young ones is the way those young ones will behave even in later life. This is similar to the Yoruba proverb which says, “Where you will sit when you are old shows where you stood in youth” (Appendix, No.253). Similarly, the Acholi still say, “Oneno ki i wang obeno”—“Has learned it right from the time he or she was still being carried on the back with obeno1” (Appendix, No.123). Meaning, children learn from what they see their parent or other members of society do, right from childhood. This social learning, hardly leave them, even when they grow up. The philosophy of beauty is that social beauty is derived from social upbringing. This is because as children grow up, they learn to behave in ways that are consonant with the values they have received from their parents or societies within which they are brought up. 1  Obeno was a traditional wear made of animal skin (in traditional time, and other clothes in the modern times) prepared for tying babies at the back of their mothers.

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Along similar lines, we can also discuss the African understanding of that which brings discord in social harmony in human societies. Social disharmony, which is the absence of social beauty, is created basically by two factors: hostility and propensity to provoke hostility. As regards hostility, the Acholi say, “Giribo pii ma i kulu”—“They share only water from the well” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 17). This illustrates that existence of hostility hinders social harmony and, consequently, social beauty. Such people are only forced out of necessity to share the natural resources, like land, water sources, and the man-made calamities, like war caused by the external aggressors. Otherwise, under normal circumstances, they are living in disharmony. This is regrettable in the African philosophy of beauty, but they acknowledge that such scenarios existed in African traditional societies. In this case, the philosophy of beauty is that hostility does not obliterate social beauty but weakens its effectiveness in creating social harmony and peace. This is because where hostility prevails, humans still have bonds that tie them together, like sources of livelihoods: water sources, firewood from the same forests as a source of fuel, they live on the same land, and together they face common external enemies. Concerning propensity to provoke hostility, the Acholi would say, “Apidi nyaa wol”—“Discord the daughter of Wol” (Banya, 1994, p. 126). In traditional African societies, those who provoke hostility are considered to be sources of big problems. While social problems were part and parcel of social living, provoking them was something else. Conflicts that were usually provoked caused much damage to the properties of society including loss of lives. The philosophy of beauty here is that those with the propensity to cause disharmony in society and disrupt social beauty are considered to be socially ugly. This proverb is similar to another Acholi proverb, which says, “Latunge ki remo”—“A person whose horns have been smeared with blood” (Banya, 1994, p. 126). The trouble makers of society are socially ugly. The second example of those with the propensity to provoke conflicts or hostilities is given in the Acholi proverb which says, “Nyeto Anyara ma twon”—“Milking a male Ichneumon [Anyara]” (Banya, 1994, p. 190). Humans are provoked to hostility when they are exacted beyond their limited abilities, like trying to milk a male Anyara, extracting from it milk which is beyond its natural ability to give. Such provocation ignites hostility in society. Here, the philosophy of beauty is that some humans in society are good at provoking problems that disrupt social harmony and

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beauty. Problems should be confronted when they cannot be avoided, but initiating them does not create harmonious social living. We conclude this discussion on social harmony and disharmony with the Ganda proverb that says, “Never underestimate the power of stupid people in large numbers”. Social harmony is power, regardless of the inabilities and weaknesses in the social group. This is because, when many people having a common mind work as a team, they are bound to succeed. The philosophy is that we all have something to offer to our communities, and this is the basis of social beauty and harmony, which is a power for success.  asic Principles of African Social Beauty B The first principle of African aesthetics states that Sharing, harmony, friendship, and peace are the essence of social beauty. The beauty of living in society is seen where there is harmony and peace. This happens when humans are friendly to each other. Violence and war, for that matter, disrupt such social harmony. So, when the Acholi say, “Very close friends share the smallest valuables as a sign of their friendship” and the Buganda say, “Gift strengthens friendship”, they imply that, such sharing is the hallmark of social harmony. Members of society are then encouraged to be caring, mindful of one another, since this is socially beautiful and it creates social harmony, trust, and peace in society. The second principle of African aesthetics says, Hostility weakens, though does not obliterate social beauty. This is because where hostility prevails, humans still have bonds that tie them together, like sharing the available sources of livelihoods. The context of describing two people as those who “share only water from the same well” (Giribo ma i kulu) implies two things: that though they are hostile to one another, there are certain social bonds that still tie them together. Secondly, hostility makes them share nothing in common, except the sources of livelihood. In both cases, sources of livelihood and common good still draws enemies together. Hostility undermines or weakens social beauty, but does not destroy it. The third principle of African aesthetics states that, Blood relations are strong bonds of social relations, regardless of differences that sometimes keep them apart. While other knots that tie humans together are easy to break, knots that tie blood relations are difficult to break. For the traditional Acholi social philosophy, they believe these knots that tie blood relations together actually cannot break, that is why they say, “The cord that ties relatives together cannot be broken” (Tol wat pe cot). To say a relationship

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is like a rope that cannot be broken means that they are usually stressed to great limits, though such stress does not result in total separation. On the contrary, in a number of African societies, this cord has at one time or another been broken. However, the forces that keep the cords of social relations are more numerous than those that can break them. Notwithstanding, it is easier to break social relations other than blood relations. The fourth principle of African aesthetics states that, Social beauty is a product of society. Rousseau had earlier stated that humans are born free, but society keep them everywhere in chains. This is similar to this African social philosophy, because they are actually saying, society makes us what we are, either socially good or socially bad. Social beauty in this sense is the product of society. What differentiates Rousseau’s social philosophy from the African one is that, for Rousseau, humans are therefore the product of society, while for the Africans, social beauty is the product of society, but a human being is more than a social being. He is also an individual, who must have characters of one’s own, creating what Africans call moral beauty. Fifth principle of African aesthetics say, social beauty is destroyed by provoking avoidable conflicts. Humans living in society will continue to confront problems that cannot be avoided, but provoking such social problems is not necessary for harmonious social living. With such provocations, social beauty can never be attained, since conflicts will ensue and social harmony will be disrupted. This principle is also saying, social beauty does not prevent conflicts to take place in society, because some of those conflicts are unavoidable. However, conflicts should not be intentionally provoked, since they disrupt social harmony and peace. The sixth principle of African aesthetics states that, women are the indispensable agents of social beauty. This is because they create the atmosphere that makes a home a better place to live in. A good home is constituted by the quality of life within it, and this is provided basically by the women. Lastly, social harmony is power. This is because when many people having a common mind work as a team, they cause progress and change. This is regardless of the limitations or weaknesses within the social group, because as a body that is united, they are a source of power, which is the basis of success.

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8.3.2   Moral Beauty Moral beauty has already been defined as the quality of human behaviour in relation to self and other beings. We have also seen that moral beauty is the harmony between personal behaviours, actions, choices, and the values of society. Though some of these social values are purely the attitudes and perceptions of the African people towards a given object or concept, others are rationally justifiable in terms of rightness and wrongness. The proverbs we have surveyed incline more towards the attitudes of society than rational justifications as their basis. This does not mean the issues they highlight were not rationally justifiable, but only that they were not the main focus of those who coined and applied the proverbs in day-to-­ day life. From the proverbs we have surveyed, we can divide them into three: those that show what true moral beauty is, those that show what true moral beauty is not, and those that show the effects of moral beauty. From the proverbs, we can identify three proverbs that try to explain what true moral beauty is and how it could be identified. This hinges on character, inner quality, and generosity. Regarding character, the Acholi say, true moral beauty subsists in human character. This is captured in the proverb which says, “Laber ume ngwe”—“The nose of the beautiful one smells” (p’Bitek, 1985, p. 30). Meaning, we cannot identify true moral beauty in the external beauty of a person; one has to go beyond the external appearance and probe into the character of the person, which usually is not seen at first sight. The philosophy of beauty is that true beauty subsists in human character. It is not empirically evident but rationally perceivable. This is because, beauty can be moral or physical, but physical beauty is externally seen, while moral beauty, which is superior to physical beauty, is not externally visible. Regarding moral beauty as an inner quality, the Acholi would say, “Ber ber pa lalaa”—“Like the beauty of lalaa plant” (Appendix, No.20). Meaning, lalaa plant is physically beautiful, yet internally ugly (bitter). Inner beauty cannot be found in lalaa plant, since it is only physically beautiful. The philosophy of beauty is that good moral character is the epitome of inner beauty, which is an inner reality other than an external one. Regarding generosity as an expression of moral beauty, the Acholi would say, “La yomcwiny lugero ki nyac”—“The generous one gets gonorrhoea” (p’Bitek, 1986, p. 26). Meaning, generosity is an expression of a good moral character, though it has to be practised with caution. When acts of generosity become overdemonstrated, it is similar to pride, which

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can lead to one’s own ruin. The philosophy of beauty is that moral beauty is demonstrated through generosity, but generosity has to be practised with caution; otherwise it leads to human downfall. To demonstrate what moral beauty is not, the Acholi would say moral behaviour cannot be inherited. For they say, “Gwok pe donyo iot labongo yibe”—“A dog does enter a house leaving its tail behind” (Lajul, 2014, p. 129). Meaning, yib (tail) symbolizes character and the act of folding the tail in between its tail symbolizes the behaviour of the dog. In this sense then, behaviour can change depending on circumstance, while character cannot change, because it is like a tail to the dog. The philosophy of beauty is that true beauty lies in human character and not in human behaviour. This is because, human character is the persistent, reliable, and dependable way of acting and doing things, while human behaviour is a way of acting in tune with the prevailing circumstances. So, moral beauty is not found in human behaviour, since it changes according to situations, but is found in human character, which is a consistent behavioural pattern. Regarding moral beauty as that which cannot be inherited, the Acholi would say, “Mac nywalo buru”—“Fire gives birth to ashes” (Banya, 1994, p. 183). Fire symbolizes heat, while ashes symbolize coldness. People who have warm, strong, and active character can produce siblings with cold, weak, and inactive characters. So, moral beauty, which subsists in human character, is not the product of human inheritance. This is more directly confirmed by the Buganda when they say, “Parents give birth to the body of their children, but not always to their characters”. The philosophy of beauty is that inner beauty, which is embedded in human character, is not the product of human inheritance, since one trait of parents’ character can produce completely the oppose trait of parents’ character in their offspring. Lastly, the effects of moral beauty are demonstrated in the last three proverbs. The presence or absence of moral beauty affects others positively or negatively. To demonstrate the positive effects of moral beauty, the Buganda say, “The child with good behaviours makes the mother to be respected”, while to demonstrate the negative effects of absence of moral beauty, the Buganda say, “The one who offends others, when offended says he/she is being oppressed”. This means bad moral beauty affects the individuals themselves when they accuse others as being oppressive. Also, the Buganda say, “The grass torch that burns a bad house also burns a good one”. Meaning absence of good moral beauty affects good as well as bad people alike.

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 asic Principles of African Moral Beauty B The first principle of African moral beauty says, moral beauty is superior to physical beauty. When the Acholi talk of the beautiful one (laber), they actually refer to physical beauty. And when they go on to say, such a person can have a smelly nose (laber ume ngwe), they are referring to the inner beauty that is absent. Such inner beauty is always seen in the character of the person being referred to. Character, for the Acholi and many other African societies, is the bedrock for moral beauty. In other words, however physically beautiful an individual may be, so long as such an individual lacks the moral beauty, or as other African societies call inner beauty, such beauty is held in contempt. That is why we can say, for the Africans, between physical and moral beauty, moral beauty is considered to be superior. The second principle of African aesthetics says that, true moral beauty lies in human character. This is because human character is the persistent, reliable, and dependable traits or qualities behind human behaviour. Behaviour is a way of acting and doing things, which are adoptable to suit circumstances. Character is the basis for human behaviour, and behaviour is the expressions of human character; they are adjustable to suit different circumstances, without necessarily changing the character themselves. The third principle of African aesthetics states that self-preservation is prior to generosity in demonstrating moral beauty. This principle is captured by the proverb which says, “A generous person can easily be infected with gonorrhoea” (La yomcwiny lugero ki nyac). Implying, generosity as an expression of moral beauty is not superior to self-preservation. This is because, one will need to be alive and healthy to continue being generous. It is not the other way round; being generous does not guarantee one’s continued life and health. The fourth principle of African moral beauty states that, inner beauty is not the product of human inheritance. This is because a particular trait of parents’ character can produce completely oppose character traits in their offspring. Surely, “Fire gives birth to ashes” (Mac nywalo buru). While humans may be exact copies of the physical traits of their parents, this is not the case with character traits. Morally good parents can give birth to children of tainted moral characters; equally, parents of tainted characters can give birth to children with very good characters. That is the why the Buganda say, “parents give birth to the body of their children, but not always to their characters”.

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Lastly, the fifth principle says, presence or absence of moral beauty affects others. That is why the Buganda say, a child with good behaviour makes the mother be respected. Besides, the grass torch that burns a bad house also burns a good one. 8.3.3   Physical Beauty Physical beauty has been defined as the symmetrical harmony between the different parts of a given entity. Physical beauty can be ascribed to works of human arts or endowments of nature. In African aesthetics, physical beauty is not the most important dimension of beauty, though it’s the most attractive aspect. In the African aesthetics, beauty can be hierarchically graded, with moral beauty on top, followed by social beauty, and lastly physical beauty. This does not mean physical beauty is not important, but only that compared with the other concepts of beauty, it has its limitations. We shall see physical beauty as neither sufficient nor a hindrance to beauty. To underscore the fact that physical beauty is insufficient to qualify one to be morally beautiful, the Acholi would describe an individual as one who has the beauty of a leopard. To say, “Ber kwac pa Nyaga”—“As good as the Leopard of Nyaga” (Banya, 1994, p. 138) is to mean being a wolf in sheep’s clothing. In this case, the physical beauty of the leopard does not qualify it to become a domestic animal. The inner evil, which is covered by the external beauty, deceives humans to think they are fit for human company. The philosophy of beauty is that physical beauty can be admirable, yet it is not sufficient to qualify one for real beauty, which is moral. Physical beauty in African aesthetics is an indirect way and, at times, a hindrance to perceiving the true beauty of a person. This is because physical beauty is external and can easily be appreciated, but true beauty as an inner quality can only be seen at a closer look. That is why the Buganda say, “Beautiful from behind, but ugly in front”. Today in Africa, a number of people care less about these inner beauties, and a lot of fuss is made about physical beauty. It is important to note that in African philosophy of beauty, as physical beauty deteriorates with time, the moral beauty may blossom. This is because, at old age physical beauty may be less, but other moral values like wisdom may be more prominent. West Africans say, what elders see when seated children cannot see when standing on top of a tall tree. In a similar

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way, the Buganda think, any defect in physical beauty is not a hindrance to other forms of beauty. That is why they say, “An ugly girl does not become old at home”.  asic Principles of Physical Beauty B The first principle of African philosophy of physical beauty states that, beauty can be physical (outer) or moral (inner). The distinction made between physical and moral beauty is described in the proverb which says that, “One can have the beauty of a leopard” (Ber kwac pa Nyaga). Implying, physically, a leopard is one of the most beautiful animals, and that was why the chief called Nyaga tried to tame one of them as his pet. Least did the chief know that behind the physical beauty was the absence of the moral beauty; because one day, the leopard showed what its true character was by devouring somebody in Nyaga’s palace. This still shows that Africans acknowledged the existence of physical beauty; however, they recognized that moral beauty was superior to it. The second principle of African philosophy of physical beauty says that, old age is not a hindrance to physical beauty”. Old age may limit physical beauty, but it does not destroy it. By saying “Old but still handsome, beautiful or strong and qualifies for normal use” (Pud angakane romo abanga), the Acholi are admitting the existence of physical beauty that it can defy old age. One may be old in age and still physically beautiful and attractive. The Buganda put it differently, “An old banana leaf was once young and green”. This can also apply to physical beauty in contrast to moral beauty of a girl. As the Buganda say, “An ugly girl does not get old at home”. Meaning, even for a physically ugly girl, there is another form of beauty that makes people still appreciate her. The third principle of African philosophy of physical beauty says, physical beauty combined with moral beauty is the mark of true beauty. Implying, often it is difficult to find the different types of beauties combined in one individual. At times those with greater physical beauty often lack moral beauty and vice versa. Those with greater moral beauty may lack physical beauty. However, the admiration of beauty is greater where physical beauty is combined with moral beauty. In this sense, they find this physical beauty in a bird called the Crested Crane (Owalu) that combines in itself both physical beauty and moral beauty because of its innocence. It does not have the beauty of leopards that are physically beautiful, yet morally ugly. Instead, Crested Crane is both physically and morally beautiful. That is

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why the Acholi say, that such a person has “the beauty of the Crested Crane” (Ber ber pa Owalu). This is accompanied by several expressions which compare animals, especially birds that are innocent and at the same time beautiful to humans possessing these qualities. For instance, they would describe a beautiful girl “as beautiful as the river bird” (leng calo winyo kulu), “as brown as an antelope” (obok calo til), “as brown as sheanut” (obok calo moo yaa), to mention some of them.

8.4  Conclusion In conclusion, we can say, in African aesthetics, beauty as a concept is not limited to the physical, since it includes the moral and the social. Under social beauty, we did identify five basic principles in African aesthetics. These are principle of sharing, avoidance of hostility, blood ties, social beauty, and avoidance to provoke conflict. If these principles are followed, it helps society to live in social harmony and peace. Unfortunately, today a number of these principles of social beauty are absent, since people deal with each other on the basis of mutual benefits. Little is regarded outside personal gains. Because of these, social conflicts are common. This does not mean in traditional African societies conflicts were absent; on the contrary, the parameters of social conflicts in the traditional African societies were not derived from individual selfishness and desire for personal gains as much as it was the desire to preserve society from external aggressions. Even the so-called enemies within African traditional societies would put aside their differences for the defence of their patrimony. From the perspective of moral beauty, we derive four basic principles: superiority of moral beauty to physical beauty; character as a basis for moral beauty; self-preservation as prior to generosity; and inner beauty as not an outcome of inheritance. Well aware that, today, a number of these principles are either not respected or turned upside down. For instance, today no one cares about moral beauty. Instead, physical beauty is all that counts; judgements are made more on human behaviour than human character; and care to cultivate a stable and good character trait is no longer important; all that is important are success and wealth. The importance of the third principle is now blown out of proportion to the extent of forgetting about generosity altogether. Many are confused as to how to cultivate inner beauty, since it cannot be inherited from parents but learnt

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from society. But society itself has become a source of confusion other than guidance in acquiring moral beauty. With regard to physical beauty, we derived three basic principles: one that distinguishes physical from moral beauty; the principle that with age moral beauty grows, while with old age physical beauty diminishes; and true beauty is a combination of moral and physical beauty. Unfortunately, a number of Africans disagree with some of these principles. Today, old age is not a guarantee of the growth of moral beauty, and at the same time, old age is not a guarantee of diminishing physical beauty. The principle that physical beauty when combined with moral beauty can become a hallmark of true beauty has become an out-of-age principle. Today no one cares about the difference between inner beauty and outer beauty. For them, beauty is beauty, meaning, it is equivalent to outer beauty. As regards the principle of old age, it is slowly losing meaning. Associating old age with wisdom and good moral character continues to be greatly questioned in modern African society. What brings dignity is no longer old age, but wealth. In the modern times, it is believed that it is better if one gets old when he or she is still rich, in that regard, they continue to remain beautiful. Otherwise, when you are young and poor, you are no longer attractive. Combining moral beauty and physical beauty as an epitome of beauty is no longer a serious business. As mentioned earlier, what determines human beauty is human usefulness, and this it determined by the level of an individual’s economic wealth.

References Banya, A.  A. (1994). Adoko Gwok (I have become a dog) (Uganda development Series, No.2). Foundations for African Development. Gyekye, K. (1992). African cultural values. Sankofa Publication Company. Ishiabwe, A. (2019). A collection of 100 ganda/Kooki (Uganda) Proverbs and Wise sayings, African Proverbs Working group: Nairobi—Kenya. Izibili, A. M. (2017). The nature of African aesthetics. In I. E. Upokolo (Ed.), Themes, issues and problems in African philosophy (pp.  205–216). Palgrave Macmillan. Lajul, W. (2014). African philosophy: Critical dimensions. Fountain Publishers. P’Bitek, O. (1985). Acholi proverbs. Heinemann Kenya Limited. P’Bitek, O. (1986). Artist the ruler: Essays on art, culture and values. East African Educational Limited. Shava, S. (2015). The African aesthetic, In Shujaa, M. J. and Shujaa, K. L. (Eds.). The SAGE encyclopedia of African cultural heritage in North America. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, Inc.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusions and Recommendations

9.1   Conclusions The purpose of this book publication was to derive philosophical sagacity from selected African languages and proverbs. Philosophical sagacity, as we have explained at the beginning, is the branch of African philosophy that thinks African philosophy is deeply embedded in the African wise sayings, like proverbs, folktales, and the thoughts of wise men and women of African societies. Since these elderly wise men and wise women are reducing in number because of natural causes, Africans are beginning to be left with the deposit of this wisdom as they are recorded in their proverbs. Luckily, a number of these proverbs are getting documented, though it is an overstatement to say they have been documented, since only a fraction of these proverbs have been documented, not only in the Acholi language, but also in many other African languages. Our biggest worry is that the smaller African ethnic communities are losing their languages much faster than the numerically bigger ones. From experience we know that the few writings that have taken place in the African languages and proverbs are majorly from African larger ethnic communities. On the other hand, majority of the other smaller indigenous languages are not yet documented. This is also compounded by the fact that only some of these major languages are being taught in our schools, especially at university levels. The other numerous languages have very © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5_9

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little chance to get documented, since academically they have been ignored, and none of their members see great benefit, either in studying or writing them down. In conclusion, we can say, in this book we have tried to identify the sources of information used in this book. In that area, documented sources have been taken from Acholi and Luganda languages. While Luanda is a Bantu language spoken over a very wide area of Africa, ranging from South Africa to East and West Africa, Acholi as a Luo language is also spoken in a large area of Africa, ranging from Sudan, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. These two logistic groups do well represent a good part of Africa. Even though there are dialects in the different versions of the Bantu and Luo languages spoken in Africa, similarities in these different dialects in terms of proverbs are amazingly great. In some of these languages, the wordings of a number of these proverbs were found to be different, but amazingly similar in meanings. In regard to the Acholi proverbs, I have used the publications of Angelo Banya and Okot p’Bitek. When I compare the wordings of these two authors with the compilation made in the Appendix of this book, I found out that there were great similarities among them, though there are also differences. The differences among the different African proverbs could be explained by the different geographical and cultural contexts, which are sometimes manifested within the same cultural communities. In these proverbs, we were interested in the basic meanings of these proverbs, which were apparently the same. Different wording could reflect different contexts, but it did not take away the basic meanings, which were conspicuously similar. As regards the philosophical meanings, it was only the author of this book that made this attempt. This does not mean the other authors who published African proverbs were incapable of philosophical interpretation, no, but it was because their interest in compiling the proverbs was not to derive philosophical meanings out of them. However, despite all these, the basic meanings derived remained substantially the same. Since proverbs were condensed value statements or knowledge idioms of different cultural communities in Africa, they may not cover all topics that might be of interests for some readers. However, the fact that some of these themes were not covered was more due to the limitation in selecting the proverbs other than the absence of such themes in the proverbs. One difficult issue confronted was to deal with the categorization of these proverbs. Thematically, one proverb could contain more than one theme, so to categorize such proverb by any one particular theme

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somehow limits the free interpretation of such proverbs. This was however overcome by supplementing these proverbs with others that gave similar meanings to support such themes. When these collections of proverbs are put together, it was found out that they gave stronger evidence of the existence and understanding of such a theme in a particular philosophical subdivision. But on the whole, these proverbs were found to be grounded on the people’s history of thoughts and experiences. Though we could not ascertain that the deeper meanings of the proverbs were understood by all in African societies, we are instead sure that majority of African elders and those better versed in these selected African languages understand them. For sure, more experienced people and those who reflect more on deeper social issues could be quite acquainted with such deeply philosophical meanings. Some of the deeper meanings were my own interpretations enlightened by my training as a philosopher, my experiences and acquaintance with some of these African languages and cultures. To appreciate some of the philosophical insights and meanings would require some bit of reflection and interest in going beyond the obvious so that one really captures the deeper and philosophical meanings behind the proverbs. The identification of particular branch of philosophy in these proverbs too needed more reflections and, perhaps, more philosophical trainings. These could be areas of the author’s personal contribution to the understanding, interpretation, and explication of African philosophic sagacity. Another conclusion we can draw is that there has not been much work done specifically on the philosophical meanings of the African proverbs. Most of the works encountered were compilations and interpretations of some of these proverbs in the selected African languages. But as regards the philosophical meanings, this may not be common for everybody. However, this does not mean such authors cannot comprehend the philosophical meanings of the proverbs, but when one logically sees the relationship of the deeper meanings, they can appreciate the linkage between them and the different African philosophies attributed to these proverbs. In regards the philosophical contents of these proverbs reflecting African philosophic sagacity, so much similarities with Western philosophy has been discovered. First, this is a very strong disapproval of the thesis that Africa did not have any philosophy. These philosophical contents attest to the existence of very strong and sound philosophical principles as we have tried to expose from the different branches of philosophy using selected African languages and proverbs. But as regards their uniqueness from other philosophies, especially Western philosophy, there were very

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clear instances where the African philosophy, like other African philosophical theories, differed from Western philosophy. Some of these differences are seen in the concept of the human person, concept of being, freedom, social philosophy, and aesthetics, to mention some of them. One should not expect everything discovered in this study to be different from Western philosophy because African philosophy is not an anti-thesis of Western philosophy. When we talk about African philosophy, we are not saying all their philosophical views are different from Western or any other people’s philosophy. Lastly, we can note that philosophical sagacity is only a dimension, a way of approaching the same African philosophy. Even when Odera Oruka was proposing that interviews should be made with African elders who have original individual ideas not influenced by foreign ideas, he was still saying the same thing that through these elders African philosophy would be derived. Such philosophy could be in the area of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, moral philosophy, etc. Our hope is that those who are looking for a unique type of philosophy they want to call philosophic sagacity will be disappointed by this discovery. This is because philosophical sagacity is wisdom philosophy, meaning an African philosophy as derived from African wise men or women or wise sayings. The approach to identify African philosophy in the wise sayings and proverbs of the African people is noble and, for that matter, one of the most reliable ways of deriving Africans traditional philosophy. Modern African thinkers can only criticize, refute, or update the deeper meanings embedded in those proverbs in order to tease out what would be their own views or what they may think to be more relevant for modern Africa. This will be the basis from which to start because there should be something to criticize or update.

9.2   Recommendations From this study, we can make the following recommendations. First of all, it has been discovered that there is still a lot of African philosophy in the different African proverbs; however, these proverbs will first need to be documented. Secondly, the bigger task for trained philosophers is to derive philosophical meanings from these proverbs. A better approach would be to compare some of these proverbs in the different African languages to establish similarities and differences. From the little that has been attempted in this book, it has been realized that there is hardly any proverb that would not have similarity in the other African languages. Yet to do that there must be some deliberate attempts made.

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Secondly, we recommend that besides documenting the African proverbs, effort should be made to get their backgrounds or contexts. From this study, it has been realized that the contexts were very important, since they place the reader at the centre of the discussion. It was found out that some of these proverbs are actually moral lessons or conclusions to very long fairy tale or story well known in the culture from which such proverbs originate. My worry is that those who understand these contexts are getting fewer and those that can document these proverbs plus their contexts should be well versed in the language in which the proverbs are originally framed. Through more research of such proverbs that have already been documented, it will be the duty of trained philosophers to unearth their philosophical meanings. Without prior knowledge of philosophy, or philosophical trainings, most people will stagnate at the deeper meanings, which is good enough but not sufficient to understand the proverbs. Besides, when these philosophical meanings are derived and documented, these could be used for culture education, which are greatly lacking in most of our schools. Our educational system are heavily loaded with foreign philosophical worldviews, which we have inherited from our colonial masters and religious leaders, but our educational systems could be enriched by adding some of these pertinent African philosophical perspectives. For instance, we are taught about freedom, purely from the Western perspective, forgetting we do have even deeper understanding, if not better understanding, of freedom in our own philosophical theories. Lastly, it can be recommended that good knowledge of the languages in which the proverbs are written is important for a good study of African proverbs. This is noticed because some of these proverbs are almost impossible to transliterate into English, because they are much richer and deeper than their English equivalents. That is one of the reasons why, in this book, the proverbs have been left in the original language, and by giving one or two literal meanings, we wanted to show none of them may be sufficient in themselves. For instance, it was noticed that p’Bitek was better at translating the Acholi proverbs into English, but the translations of Angelo Banya, who was not a trained linguist were deeper, though they are rendered in poorer English. Indeed, it was difficult Banya was trying to make so that he would not lose the meanings as they are rendered in Acholi language. This is similar in many other African languages. Those who document the proverbs attempt to translate them into English, yet we know all of them fail to a great extent to represent what the proverbs actually stand for.

Appendix: List of Proverbs Compiled by the Author of This Book

East African Proverbs 1. Abalo pa nga (Whose property have I spoilt?) 2. Aboka lam (Narration is contemptible) 3. Adidadiada otucu min bul (Persistence has broken the mother drum) 4. Adong calo ngwen labongo bwoma (I became vulnerable like a white ant without wings) 5. Agoro pe camo kato kulo (Agoro termites do not eat across the stream) 6. Agwata matek mac mapuku (It is fire that can help split a hard calabash) 7. Akuri ma kare bor camo neno ceng (A dove lives far, eats, and keeps check of time) 8. Alii ber ki kwateng (Discord is proper for the kites that can fly away) 9. Alunya loyo lakwong (Revenge that comes later is more painful than those preceded) 10. Amingaming ongolo nge gweno (It is soon after the chickens have gone to sleep that Amingaming (chickens’ delicacies) comes out) 11. Ange tyene lit (If I had known (ange) or Ange (a name) has sick legs, so comes only later) © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5

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12. Anywagi cek ni ngati ma lake pe (maize gets ripe for a toothless person)(Alur) 13. Aporabot oneko apwoyo (Imitation has killed Hare) 14. Arum obuto kec ikum bonyo (Arum bird went hungry despite plenitude of locusts) 15. Atuya otuku tele (Atuya (Small species of giant rat) has provoked Tele (a bigger species of giant rats) 16. Aweno pe gilaro ki won tol (You do not rival over the ownership of a Guinea fowl with the owner of the trap) 17. Ayom mudong cen nyero yib lawote (The last monkey trailing each other laughs at the long tail of the colleagues in front—forgetting it has equally long tail) 18. Bat apwoyo camo bad dyang (The thigh of a cow is being exchanged for the thigh of a rabbit) 19. Bedo i nget bye oweko kum pura kwar (An antelope is brown because of its acquaintance with the anthill) (Acholi) 20. Ber ber pa lalaa (Like the beauty of “lalaa” plant) 21. Ber kit loyo lonyo (Goodness is better than riches) 22. Ber kit pe wille - (Goodness cannot be bought from a shop; it can only be cultivated) 23. Beru onegu dolo (Calabash monkey is a victim of its beauty) (Alur) 24. Bura oyweyo kome (A cat has brushed the body—he has been bewitched) 25. Diang majalongo cakge pe (A barking dog does not bite) (Alur) 26. Didididi otuco min bul (The mother drum is broken because of impatience) (Acholi) 27. Diro opoto i pii (Ingenuity has fallen into water—ingenuity has failed) 28. Doti iweki (Shared the same breast) 29. Dyang cito I kulu ku (Cows do not fetch water from the wells) 30. Dyel ma lapele tur i bad dero (A hyperactive goat get fracture at the granary) 31. Gang ber ki mon (Women are the beauty of the home) 32. Gang kolo pe pong (A quarrelsome home is often empty) 33. Geno gen pa lalur (Trust of a hyena that it is sure to getting the meat) 34. Got aye pe girwate (Only mountains do not meet) 35. Goyo labul ki I kor polo (Drum is not beaten when the one is still in the sky)

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36. Gweno lworo labuce (A cock fears the other cock that defeats it) 37. Gwok ma dako bene mako lee (Even a female dog do hunt) (Acholi) 38. Gwok muvutu i vuru kud icob ngunye (Let a sleeping dog lie) (Alur) 39. Gwok ngeyo lapite (A dog only knows the person that feeds it) 40. Gwok omako yamo (A dog has sensed where the catch is) 41. Gwok pedonyo i ot labongo yibe (A dog does not enter into the house without the tail) 42. Icwako gweno kwe idok ka cwako ogwang (Defending chickens against the wild cats is not enough; at times it is the chicken to blame for travelling to the abode of the wild cats) 43. Akaggo akakuba muka balo: w’akalaba akakasuka (If you find a stick used to beat your co-wife, throw it away, for it might be used against you) (Kiganda) 44. Janyap lake pa ryedi (Lazy ones are good at consuming) (Alur) 45. Ka imako atum pa rwot, mak imed ki megi (When holding the weapon of the king, add also yours) 46. Ka kot dag cwer, pe gileng iwi yamo (If it does not want to rain, it should not be blamed on the winds) 47. Kalwok pe doko katwo (Where one bathes should not be where one dries oneself) 48. Karakak, nywalo karakak (Wild cats only begets wild cats) 49. Kedi ibut ki maru i te pii, twal bingene (Even you have without your mother in law under water, it will one day be known) 50. Kicaa pa lodito iye col (Inside elder’s bag is always dark, because you do not know what they contain) 51. Kicika iye pe (Has no inner partition) 52. Kokoliro wi twon gweno kwar, ento pe cwinyo mac (The crown of the cock is red like fire, but it does not set fire ablaze) 53. Kono gweno otyeko moo I adomo (The use of feathers has depleted the precious oil from its container) 54. Kot bino ma Ayom dene (The rainstorm is so fierce that the monkeys begin to commit suicide) 55. Kot mubino mager bene cok (Even stormy rain has its end) 56. Kulu pong ki jange (It is the tributaries that make a river swell with water) 57. Kurukuro oweko gicweyo kum ogwal girac) (A frog body is rough because of lack of patience) (Acholi) 58. Kwac omato iye (Literally Leopard has drunk the womb—she is barren)

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59. Kwateng oloko ngeye ki polo (A kite has turned its back to the sky from which is comes—its home) 60. Kwon caka pe moko odeyo (Borrowed food cannot create food security) 61. Laber ume ngwe (The most beautiful girl might as well have a smelly nose) (Acholi) MP 62. Labul tong gweno ngeyo ka pene (An egg boiler knows where the yoke is) 63. Labwor ma kok pe mako lee (A roaring lion does not succeed in trapping animals) (Acholi) 64. Lacan bene dano (A poor person is also a human being) 65. Lacan ka onongo cii wode, dong pe itwero (A poor woman becomes so proud on getting a daughter in law, whom she thought she would never get) 66. Lacan makwo pe ginyero (Do not despite a poor person who still lives) 67. Ladwar neno opoko pii ki wange (It is only a hunter that knows the pain of hunting) (Acholi) 68. Lak lyec pe loyo rwede (An elephant tusk is not too heavy for its owner) 69. Lak tar weko ginyero i lobo (Because the teeth is white, we can afford a smile on human face) 70. Lalongolongo rwate ki lagucugucu (An incoming threat gets its befitting counter solution) 71. Lalur camo cogo kun geno ngwinye (A leopard that eats hard bones trusts the strength of the muscles of its anus) 72. Langala ramo boo ki toyo (A proud person ends up eating what he or she despises so much) 73. Lapidi nango cinge (A baby sitter has the right to lick the hands after feeding the baby) 74. Larem kwoko remo (Friendship can beget death) 75. Latek camo wi ogwang mutwo (A mean person eats the smoked skull of the monkey) 76. Latek camo wii ogwang mutwo (A child that is not easy to send normally ends up with the worse) (Acholi) 77. Latic ber ki bakacic (A labourer deserves his or her wages) 78. Latin kic winyo pwony ki i bad dero (An orphan learns from the hiding place near the granary, not from the wangoo)

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79. Latin lacoo pe tongo opobo ma i nget ot (A young man does not cut the best opobo (building material) from near the house; he goes and cut those from a further distance from the home. ­Meaning you do not marry your own sister, but marry from another family far away from your family members) 80. Latin lacoo, okutu lango (A male child is like the thorn from lango plant) 81. Latin pe tuku ki cak ma ii lawote (A child does not play with the milk inside another child) 82. Latong pa latek ladit aye gamo (It is only an elder that can borrow an axe from a mean person) 83. Latunge ki remo (He/she has blood on the horns. An instigator of discord among men) 84. Lawot dyewoo nyono man otyeno (A night adventurer steps on the testicles of Mr Evening—Otyeno) 85. Layom cwing gigeru ki nyac (It is the goodhearted that are often infected with venereal diseases) (Acholi) 86. Lewic weko i camo awola (Shyness makes one to eat poisoned food) 87. Lok pa jo aryo wek obed pa jo adek (A matter between two people is not a matter between three persons) 88. Loko calo got gengo ngeye (Speaks as if the mountain is his/her protector) 89. Luduku iye col (Inside a gun is dark, so one cannot tell if it has bullets or not) 90. Lum ma inget yoo tero twon paco (Grass by the side of the road is the one that takes a bull back home). 91. Lum ot acel ka opoto pe miyo ot cwer (Single grass that has fallen from the roof does not make the house leak). 92. Mac nywalo buro (Fire produces ashes) 93. Mak tuno aye pok (For the time being is the only justice). 94. Mego lonyo (Mothers are wealth) 95. Meni pe imako ki coo (You do not surprise your mother even if you know she is cheating on your father). 96. Min cwir pe giyeto (Don’t insult the mother of the rainy seasons, because you might get what you have never expected) 97. Mon aye guti ot (Women are the foundation of household) 98. Mot oceru muno poto (Slow but sure) (Acholi) 99. Mudong cen camo cogo (Late comers eat bones) (Acholi)

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00. Mudongcen mato pii marac (Late comers eat bones) 1 101. Ngat ma otwoni ki ngwen nongo okonyi ki cado (He/she who denies you white ant has saved you from possible diarrhoea) (Acholi) 102. Ngat makwo ki karakak en bene karakak (Living with a wild cat makes you also a wild cat). 103. Ngat muweko gweno okwanyo ma i cinge dong camo pige (If you permit that chicken takes away the meat given into your hands, then be prepared to eat only the soup). 104. Ngat muyee nyac pa lakware wang ma omado (If you support the bad behaviour of your grandchild, then you should be ready to handle the consequences). 105. Ngec pe giyango wa i yibe, mukene dong me yubo bila (An alligator is not skinned up to the tail, because the tail is used for covering horns). 106. Ngwen ka oye mac aka, wang ma mac owango (White ants go for what is known to be dangerous like fire; it should be prepared to get burnt by it) 107. Nyero yer ma ikom longo (Laughing at the scattered hairs on the scrotum). 108. Nyig yat poto iwi lapito (A fruit hits the head of the one that planted it) 109. Obong dyang mapiny lubo ma malo (The lower hoof of a cow follows the upper one—like mother, like daughter) 110. Obwol ma otwi dong pe dok i bye (A mushroom that has come out of the anthill can no longer go back into the anthill) 111. Obwol top ka tere (A mushroom gets rotten where it has comes out of the ground) 112. Ocek pa lawok (It is ripe for the toothless) 113. Odo ma ogoyo nyeki diki bigoyi (A stick used to beat your co-­ wife will be used tomorrow to beat you) 114. Odo mabor pe goyo twol (A long stick does not kill a snake) 115. Ogwal acel obalo wang pii (One frog has made the entire well dirty) 116. Okolok wii twongweno kwar, ento pe wango piny (The crown of the cock is red, but it does not have fire) 117. Okom oreto langwec (A runner stumbled just because of a rotten wood)

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118. Okwero pwony cito ki cet i ot pa maro (Refusal to listen leads to bad consequences) (Alur) 119. Olam ma mit pe cek giryo (Opportunity never knocks twice) 120. Oloko ngeye ki polo (Has turned the back to the heavens, its home). 121. Omego obedo calo opoko, giyoke ento pe gitoo (Brothers are like calabashes tied together on a tree; they will knock each other, but they will never destroy each other) (Acholi) 122. Omoko ci ocodo (Ensnared, but has escaped) 123. Oneno ki i wang obeno – (Has learned it right from the time he or she was still being carried on the back with obeno) 124. Opuk ma lacoo gineno i mac (It is only furnace fire that can help to identify a male from a female tortoise) (Acholi) 125. Ore keto latin i ic (Joke has put a child in the stomach). 126. Otwong lokke (Goodness begets goodness). 127. Owingkwe cito ki cet i ot pa maro (A man who does not listen will go with dung on his body at his mother in-law’s house) (Acholi) 128. Owok pa lawok (Good chance for those who do not have teeth) (Acholi) 129. Oyo aculube too kum lotinone (Aculube rat will die for its young ones). 130. Oyo girubu giporo (Sticks for smoking rats are measured according to their sizes). 131. Oyo man ki wino ma i doge (Each rat has its own whiskers) 132. Oyo ringo ci pe gicamo (Even inedible rats run for their lives). 133. Oywayo moro ki lakalakidi (Intending to pull just the rope, ones pulls the rope together with the brown ants that got stuck onto them). 134. Pe inyer odo ma ogoyo nyeki (Never laugh at a stick used for beating your co-wife, for it might be used against you) (Acholi) 135. Pii pe mol dok cen (River water does not flow backwards). 136. Ribbe aye teko (Unity is strength) 137. Romo lwenyo geno cogo wiye (A male sheep fights trusting the strength of its skull). 138. Romo too neno lamak wiye (A sacrificial lamb dies while looking at the one holding its head) 139. Ruko war i kom okuto (Wearing shoe after thorns have already pricked)

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140. Rwot loyo ki bul (A chief is only greater than him because of the royal drum he has) 141. Ryeko loyo tek kom (Wisdom is better than physical strength) 142. Te okono pe giputo (Do not uproot the pumpkin in the old homestead) 143. Tek calo kolo man gwok (As difficult as castrating a male dog) 144. Tek wang pe kwoo (Shrewdness is not theft—A woman that knows how to lure the husband into sex should not be accused of stealing her own husband from the co-wife) 145. Tingo wic ki leb (Taking the head as well as the tongue) 146. Tipu oleyo ceng (Shadow follows the sunshine) 147. Tol wat pe cot (String that binds relatives together do not break) 148. Tong gweno ooro pe toko ducu (Dry season eggs do not all hatch) 149. Tong oromo lyec (An elephant succumbs to the many spears assaulted at it) 150. Tunge dong olot (The horns have now grown) 151. Twon pa omeru pr meggi (Your brother’s bull is not yours) 152. Twongweno pa ladiro odoko kiler (The cock of a mean person has become inconsumable because of old age) (Acholi) 153. Twongweno pe kok pala yer (A cock does not crow at its neighbours where there is another rival cock) 154. Wang loyo Ajwaka (The eyes are more dependable than the oracles of diviners) 155. Wang kwo pa lapaco giculu ki dek ngor malyet (It is hot dek ngor [peas’ source] that is used to revenge the crime of an insider) 156. Wek reyo remo i doga (Stop smearing blood in my mouth) 157. Wele pa mon pe (Women are not visitors because wherever they go, they work as if it is their own home) 158. Wii odur pe pong (Rubbish pit never gets filled) 159. Winyo matuk lamal bene poto piny (Even a bird that flies high, one day will fall down—when it is dead) 160. Wor acel pe kwoko dek (One night does not make food go bad). 161. Wor kano dyang macol (Night hides black cows). 162. Yamo bikodo, ci dul gweno benen – (When the wind blows, then the anus of the chicken will be exposed) 163. Yat pe giito ki jange (That we do not start climbing trees from the branches) 164. Yer ma ikom longo pe ginyero (Do not laugh at the scattered hairs on the scrotum).

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165. Yiko oywelo i ngom (Burying oywelo fruit in the ground—saving for the future) 166. Yiru pe duny nono (There is no smoke without fire) 167. Yoo aryo oroco lalur (Two similar paths have confused the hyena) West African Proverbs 168. The beauty of a spider’s web is a trap for many, and it is only the foolish fly that is trapped by it. 169. A blind man does not throw away the apple he already has. 170. A deaf ear follows the head to the grave. 171. A dog that goes back to its own vomit is not worthy of the owner’s name 172. A fly that does not listen to advice goes to the grave with the corpse. 173. A leopard never changes its colours. 174. A lizard is not afraid of falling back. 175. A man cannot wash his hands with the legs, but can use his hands to wash the legs. 176. A man who is tired of learning is tired of living. 177. A parrot does not eat its eggs in hiding. 178. A pig will always remain a pig. 179. A river is not so deep that it does not have a source. 180. A sheep that wants to grow horns must first develop a strong head. 181. A tree that chooses to stand alone cannot become a forest 182. A young chameleon follows the steps of the forefathers’ walking stick. 183. After the storm comes the calm. 184. An elder does not sit at home while the goats delivers in the ban. 185. An intelligent enemy is better than a stupid friend.— Senegalese proverb 186. Can a man be so angry so as to cut off his own head? 187. Chicks do not run after the cock, but after the mother hand. 188. Do not become a radio without internet. 189. Do not mention the private part of an old woman, for they are the reason for human continuity. 190. Does the lizard forget its heritage? 191. Does the snail leave its shell?

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92. Even if the night refuses to go, all the same the daytime must come. 1 193. Exuberant is the prerogative of the youth, while wisdom is the prerogative of the elders. 194. Fairy tales are for babies; adults do not need them. 195. He who tampers with the bone given to a child must first contend with its tears. 196. How much a chameleon camouflage like grass, but never become the grass. 197. How much you cook your rice in hot spring, that rice will never get cooked. 198. However hot the seat of the throne is, somebody must sit on it. 199. Hyenas that gather for the carcass of the unfortunate fallen antelopes might find the meat too hard to chew. 200. If a bird decides to fly without landing, then the hunter will have to shoot without aiming. 201. If a child has not developed enough vulgar after his father’s death, it might cost him his life. 202. If a hunter has learnt to shoot without aiming, then the birds will also learn to fly without landing. 203. If your only tool is a hammer, you will see every problem as a nail.—Gambian proverb 204. In darkness the hand of the monkey looks like the hand of a man. 205. Is a flame still a flame when its fire is dead? 206. Is there a king without a kingdom? 207. Is this the calm before the tiger pounces? 208. It is not a shame for the blind man to ask for direction. 209. It is only the earth worn that knows what is contained there. 210. It is only when a gourd is broken you can know what is inside. 211. Let’s stop tossing a cow around, but tie a rope around its neck. 212. Never invite a rat for a dance with a cat, since the consequences are already known. 213. Never start what you cannot finish. 214. No one fish can swim the waters alone. 215. One man cannot marry a woman. 216. The ability of a monkey to move from branch to branch does not make it a baboon. 217. The buttocks are couples that can’t be separated at any given time. 218. The cooking pot of a chameleon is the same like that of a lizard. 219. The dog does not eat the dung, and the goat develops rotten teeth.

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220. The dog that does not eat the meat from the fire at least can get the warmth from the fire. 221. The downfall of a man is not the end of his life. 222. The grey hair does not stand in the middle of a fight between two cocks. 223. The head might be on top, but it carries the burden of the whole body. 224. The sea is not the same as the river, but the river flows into the sea. 225. The stubborn fly follows the corpse to the grave. 226. The ugly side of the foul has been exposed. 227. The vulture has just taken a bath in order to look beautiful. 228. The wood that people have is the wood they use for cooking their food. 229. Those who move with you when you were going up are those who will come down with you. 230. Those you meet on your way up are those you will meet on your way down. 231. Tie a rope on a goat or the goat tied itself on the rope is the same thing. 232. We went to the bush to defecate; instead we gathered our legs together. 233. What a young child sees when standing is not like what an elder sees while seated. 234. What brings tears to the eyes affect the nose as well. 235. What goes around comes around. 236. What the termites know the ants knows as well. 237. When a child is crying and pointing to a place is either its father or mother is dead. 238. When a cripple dances at a village square, then the face of the abled is covered with shame. 239. When a man bathes in the waters of the gods, he can pass through the land of the spirits unhurt. 240. When a man dances badly, the kinsmen scrap the eyebrows. 241. When a millipede lives in school, you wonder whether it will become a snake or remain a millipede. 242. When a termite decides to become a bird, that is when it gets into trouble. 243. When an egg is going to hatch into a cock, it can be seen right from the egg.

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44. When banana dies, it is replaced by its saplings. 2 245. When something greater than a cricket enters its hole, then it will have to fight until it wins or loses. 246. When the bush is set on fire, the rat has no time to remove its bed. 247. When the hawk attacks the baby chicks, the mother chicken fights back. 248. When the only goat left in the village is accused of eating the yams, what else can it say to defend itself? 249. When the roots of a tree begin to decay, it spreads death to the branches.—Nigerian proverb 250. When the unspeakable happens, the unspeakable is imagined. 251. When you chase two lizards at the same time, there is chance that you lose both of them. 252. When you eat a frog, you better eat a fat one. 253. When you start running like a dog caught with a stolen bone, then you create suspicion. 254. Where you will sit when you are old shows where you stood in youth.—Yoruba proverb 255. You bite the figure that fed you. 256. You kill a snake and skin it, yet you ask for its legs?

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Index1

A Acholi, viii, ix, 1, 28, 44–55, 61, 89, 125, 153, 159, 160, 166, 168, 169, 172–175, 177, 183, 212, 235, 236, 239 Aesthetics, 19, 211, 212, 216, 219, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232, 238 Africa, v, vii–ix, 2, 4, 5, 7, 20, 22, 23, 28–30, 33, 34, 75, 76, 78, 82, 84, 90, 92, 96, 97, 107, 109, 114–116, 124, 138, 140, 142, 145, 152, 152n1, 154, 163, 164, 171, 178, 183, 185, 196, 221, 230, 236–238 African, v–ix, 1–24, 27–57, 59–85, 87–120, 123–148, 151–178, 181–207, 211–233, 235–239 Antagonists, 23, 151, 154 Attitude, vi, 3–5, 13, 77, 104, 120, 135, 146, 154, 197, 201, 212, 216, 218, 227

Authority, 21, 70, 71, 81, 91–98, 101–103, 105–110, 112–116, 118–120, 133, 144, 148, 189, 202 B Bantu, 15, 221, 236 Banya, A. A., viii, 18, 19, 36, 37, 63, 65–67, 69, 73, 90, 99, 100, 103, 106, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 156–159, 161, 162, 166, 169, 170, 187, 188, 191, 192, 195, 198, 200, 215–219, 224, 228, 230, 239 Beauty, 23, 47, 66, 77, 161, 170, 186, 211–233, 242, 249 Behaviour, ix, 23, 37, 62, 65–68, 71–74, 76–79, 81–84, 134, 136, 145–147, 165, 184, 211, 212, 216–220, 223, 227–230, 232, 246

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 W. Lajul, African Philosophic Sagacity in Selected African Languages and Proverbs, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54524-5

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INDEX

Belief, v, vi, 5, 7, 20, 62, 88, 100, 111, 146, 176 Bonds, 21, 36, 61, 68, 69, 71, 118, 125–129, 136–141, 147, 155, 170, 190–192, 202–204, 206, 212, 214, 224, 225 Buganda, 8, 12, 33, 35, 89, 90, 92, 107, 110, 113, 114, 119, 126, 131, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 173, 177, 194, 198, 200, 203, 205, 218, 222, 225, 228–231 C Causes, 5, 39–44, 66, 77, 84, 138, 158, 166, 173, 176, 187, 193–195, 200, 203–207, 215, 224, 226, 235 Centralized, 21, 90, 92, 97, 110, 113, 114, 119, 120, 196, 206 Chiefdom, viii, 12, 13, 101, 110, 113, 119, 120 Communal, v–viii, 6, 9, 20, 29, 60, 64, 69, 74, 75, 79, 80, 82, 88, 89, 128, 133, 137, 138, 140, 199, 206 Communitarian, 184 Community, v, viii, 8, 10, 15, 17, 20, 21, 29, 63, 64, 69, 70, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 85, 88, 94, 98, 100, 105, 107, 118, 119, 124, 126, 129, 132–134, 139–141, 143–145, 148, 184, 185, 191, 196, 199, 216, 218, 220, 225, 235, 236 Conjunction, 45, 46 Context, 1, 5, 7, 10, 12–19, 30, 33–35, 37–40, 46, 53, 62–70, 72, 73, 77, 81, 88, 93–106, 116, 125–135, 144, 151, 153, 155–161, 163, 165, 166, 168–170, 183, 185–192, 194–196, 212–220, 225, 236, 239

Contradiction, 23, 46–47, 56 Critics, 101, 114 Culture, viii, 2–4, 6, 8–11, 27, 29–31, 82, 105, 124, 153, 156, 163, 173, 182, 187, 212, 213, 222, 237, 239 D Decentralized, 21, 90, 92, 93, 97, 110, 113, 114, 119, 120, 196, 197, 206 Democracy, 21, 91, 95–100, 106, 110–114, 116, 119 Difference, 5, 8, 18, 22, 33, 34, 36–38, 41, 44, 57, 61, 63, 98, 105, 110, 112, 114, 117, 137, 141, 153, 156, 160, 172, 175, 176, 178, 184, 199, 204, 215, 221, 222, 225, 232, 233, 236, 238 Disjunction, 20, 47–48, 56 E Education, vii, 20, 71, 73, 78, 81, 82, 117, 134, 135, 142, 239 Effect, 39, 44, 69, 79, 84, 95, 104, 107, 116, 133, 166, 176, 193–195, 204–207, 227, 228 Egypt, vi Elders, viii, 2, 7, 8, 17, 19, 72–74, 132, 133, 144, 159, 230, 237, 238, 243, 245, 249–251 Emotion, 5, 7, 84, 199 Emotional, vi, 5, 17, 165, 199 Epistemology, 1, 5, 19, 22, 31, 32, 151–170, 173, 174, 177, 178, 238 Ethnophilosophy, 6–12, 33, 35, 80, 87 Ethos, 2, 8–10, 35 Europeans, 7

 INDEX 

Events, 36, 38–44, 56, 154, 163, 166, 176, 178, 211 Excluded, 20, 48–50, 56, 81 F Freedom, 22, 96, 124, 167, 183, 186–190, 195, 200–202, 206, 238, 239 G Ganda, 15–17, 40, 63–65, 67, 70, 71, 75–77, 81, 82, 90, 92–94, 98, 99, 101, 102, 106, 112, 113, 126, 128, 131, 134, 136, 138, 147, 158, 160, 163, 176, 185, 190, 192, 194, 213–215, 218–220, 225 H Human, vi, 1, 2, 5–7, 19, 20, 23, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34, 37, 38, 41, 50, 60–62, 64–67, 69, 71–80, 83–85, 91–93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 103–106, 108–110, 116–120, 124–129, 131–148, 152, 153, 156–168, 170–176, 178, 183–192, 194–202, 197n1, 204, 206, 211, 212, 214–219, 221–230, 232, 233, 238, 244, 249 I Ideas, v–viii, 2, 9, 19, 32–35, 49, 87–89, 96, 111, 113, 167, 238 Identity, 8–10, 12–14, 54, 57, 60, 189, 212, 213 Individual, v–viii, 2, 8–10, 12, 20, 22, 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 60–62, 65, 69, 71–75, 77–85, 87, 88, 92,

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93, 95, 98–101, 107, 111, 119, 120, 124, 126, 127, 133, 134, 137–142, 144–148, 154, 155, 167, 169–171, 174–178, 183–185, 189, 190, 196–199, 197n1, 201–203, 207, 218, 221, 226, 228–233, 238 Intellective, 22, 155, 158–164, 173–178 J Justice, 21, 41, 78, 103, 125, 132–134, 136, 143–145, 148, 174, 245 K Kingdom, 90, 92, 196, 250 Knowledge, vi, 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 19–22, 24, 31–33, 35, 49, 56, 74, 91–93, 100, 111, 126, 146, 151–178, 187, 200, 204, 205, 212, 236, 239 L Languages, vii–ix, 1–4, 7–24, 27–57, 59–85, 87–120, 123–148, 151–178, 181–207, 211–233, 235–239 Legitimacy, 21, 91, 101–104, 106, 109, 113–116, 120 Logic, vi, 3, 6, 19, 20, 27–57, 68, 152, 153, 238 Luo, 13–16, 221, 236 M Mbiti, S. J., vi, 3, 43, 56, 84, 196 Meaning, vi, 2, 3, 9, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 30, 32, 34, 37–40,

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43–47, 50, 52–54, 62–73, 83, 91, 93–108, 112, 116, 118, 125–136, 138, 144, 155–163, 165–170, 174–177, 182, 185–192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 203–205, 212–223, 227, 228, 231, 233, 236–239, 245 Metaphysics, 1, 9, 19, 22, 28, 35, 181–207, 238 Method, 5, 6, 19, 22, 32–34, 42, 110, 153, 165, 177 Modern, vii, 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 76, 79–82, 88, 93, 97, 107, 109, 110, 119, 137–140, 143, 146, 169, 171, 196, 223n1, 233 Moral, ix, 18, 20, 23, 36, 59–85, 91, 134, 147, 178, 186, 200, 211–213, 215–220, 226–233, 238, 239 Morality, 59–62, 182, 221 Mystical, 22, 155, 158, 163–166, 170, 173, 176–178 N Nature, vi, 5, 19, 21, 22, 27, 30, 31, 37, 61, 67, 71, 76, 78, 84, 90–96, 106–111, 119, 123, 125–127, 136–139, 147, 152–155, 166, 167, 176, 181–183, 186, 189, 190, 195, 199, 202–205, 207, 213, 215, 221–223, 230 Negation, 44–49, 55, 153 O Odera Oruka, H., v, viii, ix, 1–24, 154, 238 Odera Oruka, O., v, 6, 62 Organic, vi Outlook, vi, 3, 91 Ownership, 45, 62–65, 74–76, 83, 131, 242

P P’Bitek, O., viii, 17–19, 23, 39, 44, 45, 63–66, 69, 70, 90, 93, 95, 96, 101, 103–105, 112, 129, 130, 132, 135, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 166, 169, 186–189, 191, 195, 198, 200–202, 212–214, 216–218, 222, 224, 227, 236, 239 Person, 5, 8, 19, 32, 38, 39, 50, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 69–72, 76, 77, 80–82, 91, 94, 95, 99, 103, 107, 109, 113, 125–127, 129, 132–135, 138, 144–146, 156–158, 160, 161, 163, 166–172, 177, 183–185, 188, 192, 196–200, 197n1, 203, 204, 211, 215–221, 223, 224, 227, 229, 230, 232, 238, 242–245, 248 Personhood, 22, 59–61, 71, 183–186, 195–199, 206 Philosophical, vii, viii, 1–12, 18–20, 23, 24, 28, 29, 33–35, 42n1, 54, 57, 62, 73, 74, 79, 83–85, 87–90, 92, 96, 116, 120, 124, 129, 138, 147, 153, 154, 165, 167, 173, 176, 178, 182, 213, 235–239 Philosophy, v–ix, 1, 3–12, 17–24, 27–30, 32–35, 38–40, 42n1, 44, 56, 59–85, 87–120, 123–148, 152–170, 172, 177, 181–192, 194–196, 200, 202, 203, 206, 211–233, 235, 237–239 Physical, 23, 74, 91, 102, 181, 186, 197, 197n1, 200, 211–213, 215, 216, 219–220, 223, 227, 229–233, 248 Political, 12, 13, 19–21, 28, 70, 77, 87–120, 123, 124, 139, 140, 142, 143, 196 Politics, 77, 87, 89, 91, 104–106, 116–119, 222

 INDEX 

Principle, viii, ix, 4, 8–10, 20–23, 32, 33, 41–56, 60, 64, 66, 74–83, 90, 95, 107–110, 112–119, 136–146, 171, 174–177, 193, 200, 204–207, 225–226, 229–233, 237 Protagonists, 23, 151, 152, 154 Proverbs, v, vii–ix, 1–4, 7–10, 12–24, 27–57, 59–85, 87–120, 123–148, 151–178, 181–207, 211–233, 235–239, 241–252 R Rational, v–vii, 3, 5, 7, 17, 29, 32, 60–62, 153, 165, 173, 176, 188, 200, 201, 212, 227 Rationality, v, vi, 6, 7, 12, 23, 135, 145, 165 Reflective, v–vii, 3, 124, 160, 162, 163, 174–176, 182, 205 Relations, vi, 4, 21, 22, 36, 39, 40, 44, 62, 64, 68–75, 78–81, 83, 84, 109, 124, 127, 128, 138–140, 142, 178, 185, 190, 194, 195, 199, 202–205, 207, 212, 215, 216, 222, 225–227 S Sagacity, v–ix, 1–24, 74, 235, 237, 238 Sage, vi–viii, 2, 6–8 Sequence, 36, 38–44 Similarity, vii, 2, 20, 28, 36–38, 41, 42n1, 56, 221, 223, 236–238 Social, 12, 29, 60, 90, 123–148, 152, 182, 190–192, 202–204, 212–216, 221–226, 237, 238 Superstition, 166 Swahili, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 93, 94, 98, 99, 101, 102, 126, 128, 131,

265

134, 136, 145, 158, 160, 163, 168, 185, 188, 190, 192, 194, 214, 215, 218–221 Syllogistic, 55 T Time, vii, 2–4, 6, 8–10, 17, 20, 22, 28, 30, 33, 34, 36–44, 46, 56, 65, 67–71, 77, 80, 81, 84, 88, 93, 97, 99, 104, 108, 109, 116, 119, 124, 126, 139, 142, 143, 145, 148, 152, 154, 157, 159, 162, 163, 174, 175, 186–188, 190, 192, 195, 197–201, 203, 205, 214, 215, 219, 220, 223, 223n1, 226, 230–233, 241, 243, 245, 247, 250, 252 Tradition, vi, vii, 10, 12, 13, 34, 35, 53, 89, 91, 126, 220 Traditional, v, vii, viii, 3, 4, 6, 8–10, 21, 35, 54–57, 77, 79, 81, 88, 90, 96, 97, 105, 109–111, 113, 117, 119, 126, 132, 137–140, 142–146, 154, 155, 171, 172, 184, 188, 196, 203, 215, 222, 223n1, 224, 225, 232, 238 U Uganda, viii, 1, 8, 14–16, 21, 31, 89, 92, 113, 137, 183, 197, 221, 236 Upbringing, 21, 60, 62, 71–74, 81–83, 85, 125, 134–136, 145–147, 185, 223 W Welfare, 21, 96, 100, 108, 109, 115, 119, 120, 125–127, 129–132, 136, 137, 139, 141–143, 147, 166, 222

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INDEX

Western, viii, 3, 5, 7, 12, 15, 19, 22, 23, 28, 32, 33, 39, 42, 42n1, 44, 48, 49, 56, 57, 73, 74, 77, 79, 82, 83, 85, 87, 92, 110, 144, 152n1, 155, 164, 165, 170, 172–174, 176, 177, 183, 184, 190, 194, 196, 200, 202–204, 237–239 Wiredu, K., vi–viii, 3, 4, 29, 59, 60, 88, 154, 184 Wisdom, v, vi, viii, ix, 1–3, 6–12, 18, 20, 21, 35, 75, 89, 90, 125, 126, 136, 155–157, 162, 172, 220, 230, 233, 235, 238, 248, 250

Wise says, 2, 3, 7–9, 11, 12, 19, 31, 62 Women, v, vii, 3, 7, 8, 10, 36, 44, 48, 64, 69, 70, 80, 104–106, 109, 116–119, 132, 139, 188, 191, 197, 203, 217, 220–223, 226, 235, 238, 242, 244, 245, 248–250 Worldview, 4, 5, 8, 10, 20–22, 28, 30, 33–35, 44, 57, 79, 83–85, 87–89, 120, 124, 129, 147, 148, 154, 165, 172, 173, 176, 178, 182, 239