African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic: A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy [1st ed. 2021] 3030724441, 9783030724443

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African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy Jonathan O. Chimakonam L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic

Jonathan O. Chimakonam L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy

Jonathan O. Chimakonam Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria Pretoria, South Africa

L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya Department of Philosophy University of Pretoria Pretoria, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-72444-3    ISBN 978-3-030-72445-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of ­ illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and ­transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To the forerunners of conversational thinking: CS Momoh, for the vision he saw; P Iroegbu, for the big step he took; II Asouzu, for leading the frontlines.

Preface

This book is an exercise in decoloniality through the methodological medium of conversational thinking. The sense of decoloniality implied is that of an intellectual dismantling of coloniality using the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic. Two things are involved. On the one hand is a problem that transcends the borders of sub-­Saharan Africa and on the other hand is a remedy to the problem that is entirely homegrown, which shows that African philosophy as an aspect of epistemologies of the south has, indeed, come of age. In 2018, Boaventura de Sousa Santos published a book in which he claimed that epistemologies of the south have come of age and predicted an end to the Anglo-­American cognitive empire. The predicted end to the Western cognitive empire is metaphorical. It is not an end to the idea or the influence of the idea. Ideas are immortal! It is an end to the leviathan’s legislative and executive domination over where, what and who should count in the production, regulation and dissemination of knowledge—the so-­called coloniality of power, knowledge and being (Ndlovu-­Gatsheni 2015). But the end of Western epistemic hegemony would not be marked by a flurry of critical opinions rampant today in the African academia. Opinions have never orchestrated any intellectual revolution. There are all kinds of narratives out there—narrative of return, narrative of victimhood and so forth—none of which contained adequate imagination to engineer a new wave of thinking. The end of a cognitive empire such as the one built by the West can only be initiated with a logico-­methodological break—an inauguration of a new approach based on a new logic. A sample of this is already happening at two levels, namely, individual and collective. At the vii

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individual level, thinkers like II Asouzu who developed ibuanyidanda philosophy and its methodological ambience called complementary reflection, and JO Chimakonam who developed conversational philosophy with its methodological framework called conversational thinking, as well as its logical foundation called Ezumezu, are leading the way. At the collective level, the Conversational Society of Philosophy (CSP) is trail-­blazing a new intellectual resurgence in African scholarship. Today, camps are divided even among African philosophers on what should define the struggle to shrink the Western cognitive empire. Two ideas have been floated and are now being stressed in some quarters, namely, decolonization and Africanization. While decolonizers speak in different tongues, Africanizers appear more aggressive than learned. For example, in terms of curriculum, some believe that African philosophy should be subsumed or embedded in a generic curriculum of philosophy. But answers are yet to be given satisfactorily to whether the so-­called generic curriculum is actually generic. Others insist that what exists is a Western philosophy curriculum and advocate a radical break in which contents in African philosophy displace contents in Western philosophy. For the latter group, a new curriculum of philosophy that is autochthonous should be devised for universities in Africa. To some, the Africanization project in philosophy is a path to decoloniality. To others, decoloniality is a program for Africanization. There are probably more gray areas than clear vision in these conceptual gymnastics. But there is a sense in which decoloniality can be understood as an intellectual and mental quest for liberation from coloniality. Here, there is a direct link between coloniality and miseducation. In the context of philosophy, it creates the false intellectual impression that philosophy is necessarily Western philosophy. As a result, the radical core of the narrators of victimhood calls for the displacement of Western curriculum and its replacement with African curriculum. The call for the elimination of Western philosophy from the curriculum of philosophy in universities in Africa, and substituting it for African philosophy, or the development of a hybrid curriculum in which African philosophy is dominant,1 is very tempting, but it has some inherent challenges. Three of these challenges, among others, include the problem of lack of 1  JO Chimakonam and VC Nweke (2018) have made a call for what they call the P-­model. This is a model of decolonized curriculum in which African philosophy is dominant, but which features relevant sections from other philosophical traditions.

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funding for research in the field of African philosophy, the problem of an inadequate number of experts in the field of African philosophy and the problem of lack of classroom literature on African philosophy to be used in the teaching of African philosophy. While the first challenge will be very difficult to address even in several decades to come, the second can be addressed if the third is adequately taken care of. Perhaps, if well-­informed African philosophers of today task themselves to produce more classroom-­­ oriented texts that would form basic literature for African philosophy courses, in no distant time, we would have enough experts in this field of study. This book is a response to the challenge of producing decolonized classroom-­based literature in African philosophy for teaching, research and training of future African philosophers. It curates ideas in both African metaphysics and epistemology. It also puts forward theories formulated to stimulate fresh debates and extend the frontiers of learning in the field. With this in mind, we gave ourselves the tasks of systematically unravelling and discussing, in an accessible manner, two branches of African philosophy: African metaphysics and African epistemology. Our reason for the choice of African metaphysics and epistemology is that they are basic to other branches of African philosophy2 and have been the ones least discussed in the literature. One cannot engage in other branches of African philosophy, whether African ethics, African aesthetics, African political philosophy or African philosophy of science, without understanding reality and knowledge from an African perspective. But is African metaphysics or African epistemology culture-­bound? The answer is no! The prefixing of metaphysics and epistemology with ‘African’ does not imply that these theories of reality and knowledge are African culture–bound. On the contrary, the prefixing is a product of the politics of knowledge and philosophy. It is a way of emphasizing the fact that the knowledge produced from the African philosophical place is an African contribution to the knowledge enterprise in general. Also, the prefix ‘African’ enables us to highlight the falsehood in the earlier European-­ held and promoted, negative impression that philosophical insights cannot be gleaned from the African place. Hence, this book titled African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic: A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy is a project on  A breakdown of the branches of African philosophy can be found in some literature. For example, see C.B. Okolo (1993) and C.S. Momoh (2000). 2

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decoloniality, in which conversational thinking and Ezumezu logic drive the process. But if this book is a decolonial project, why do we retain the Western coinages metaphysics and epistemology? First, it is because decoloniality is not a war against idea. The concepts of metaphysics and epistemology used to designate two of the branches of philosophy are ideas. If the two branches had not been so named with etymological roots in the Greek language, they probably might have been named from a different language. Second, our understanding of African philosophy is one that is universalizable rather than culture-­exclusive. So, it does not matter so much which language gifted us with the etymology of the names of the branches of philosophy. What matters is the recognition that various cultures can contribute to the ideas of metaphysics or epistemology. It is in this way that African philosophy is a perspectival contribution to the universal discipline of philosophy. The coinages of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and so on as the name for some of the branches of philosophy are not problematic. What can be problematic are the internal structures of the corpus discussed in different places involving both the background logic and the methods formulated therefrom. For example, when philosophers in the West discuss their metaphysics or epistemology as though it were the metaphysics or the epistemology of the entire universe, they shut the door against the perspectives from other places. This is a discriminative form of cultural politics which must be abandoned. We should be able to discuss different branches of philosophy from various cultural perspectives. One way of designating such perspectival orientation to philosophy is by prefixing each tradition with geographical or cultural signifiers such as Western, African, Asian and so on to mark their origin and celebrate the intellectual history and culture that produced such ideas. This is a strategy for mere categorization. It is unfortunate that some go to the extent of escalating it to a level of cultural politics so as to undermine or residualize the epistemologies of otherness. Here, the strategy is always to impose a given background logic and methods grounded in such a logic on other cultures. This book is partly a rejection of such intellectual subjugation. Additionally, this book is not a project in comparative philosophy, since we are not concerned with comparing and contrasting the philosophical ideas produced from the African place with those produced from other places, neither is it geared toward making Africa/Africans the object of philosophy. Rather, it is aimed at highlighting and discussing

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philosophical insights that have been produced from the African place. We have done this through the instrumentality of conversational thinking. This is apparent in that we critically and creatively engaged the philosophical ideas and thoughts of some established and upcoming African philosophers in keeping with the canons and themes of conversational thinking. The central idea is that African philosophy has come of age and that the various branches of this philosophy need to be developed on the bases of a homegrown method and suitable background logic for us to achieve decoloniality. We recommend this book to all philosophers, students of philosophy, scholars in the fields of African studies and intellectual history. Decoloniality is incomplete without a logical and methodological break from the norm. The path to this break is what we have opened for African philosophy in this book. Pretoria, South Africa December 26, 2020

Jonathan O. Chimakonam L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

References Chimakonam, J.O. and, V.C.A. Nweke. 2018. Why the ‘Politics’ Against African Philosophy Should Be Discontinued. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 57 (2): 277–301. Momoh, S.C. 2000. Nature, Issues and Substance of African Philosophy. In The Substance of African Philosophy, ed. C.S.  Momoh, 1–22. Auchi: APP Publications. Ndlovu-­­Gatsheni, S. 2015. Decoloniality as the Future of Africa. History Compass 13 (10): 485–496. Okolo, C.B. 1993. What Is African Philosophy? A Short Introduction. Enugu: Cecta. Santos, B.S. 2018. The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South. Durham: Duke University Press.

Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the valuable research assistance which Dr. Aribiah Attoe of the University of Fort Hare and the Conversational School of Philosophy rendered to me in Chap. 6 of this book. I also acknowledge the assistance which Dr. Ada Agada of Forum Scientiarum, Eberhard-­­ Karls-­­Universität Tübingen, Germany, and the Conversational School of Philosophy rendered to me in Chap. 3 of this book. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the support which my wife Amara Chimakonam and our daughter Mànàrị Chimakonam rendered to me at the homefront in the course of this research. JO Chimakonam I appreciate Dr. Jonathan O. Chimakonam for his mentorship, as well as the critical and creative inputs he made in each of my chapters. I acknowledge Jerome Oko Alexander of the Conversational School of Philosophy and Reverend Israel Akpan Obot for proofreading each of my chapters. Furthermore, I wish to appreciate Victor C. A. Nweke and Chukwueloka S. Uduagwu of the Conversational School of Philosophy for their intellectual encouragement and support during the writing of my chapters. I also appreciate my mother Nne Ntukoghe Ejen Onongha and my elder brother Honorable Joseph Ejen Akwa for their support in the course of this research. My wife Hope Agbor Ogbonnaya and my children Obinna and Nneka Ogbonnaya are acknowledged for their love and sacrifice. LU Ogbonnaya

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Funding Acknowledgments This research is funded by the University of Pretoria’s Research Development Programme (RDP) for 2020 and the University of Pretoria’s Postdoctoral Fellowship Grant, both awarded to JO Chimakonam with LU Ogbonnaya as the postdoc fellow. The management of the University is respectfully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in the book are those of its authors and do not, in any way, represent the opinions of the University of Pretoria or its employees.

Contents

1 Introduction: Decoloniality Through Conversational Thinking—Basic Principles of the African Systems of Thought  1 Part I African Metaphysics  13 2 The Theory of Nmekọka Metaphysics 15 3 Metaphysical Themes in Consolation Philosophy 41 4 Ụwa Ontology 65 5 Ibuanyidanda Ontology 89 6 The Ontology of Personhood109 Part II African Epistemology 133 7 Curating Some Epistemological Ideas in African Philosophy135

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8 Toward an African Theory of Knowledge175 9 The Theory of Cogno-Normative Epistemology: Formulation II195 10 Conclusion219 Index221

About the Authors

Jonathan  O.  Chimakonam  Chimakonam holds a PhD and is a senior lecturer at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. He taught at the University of Calabar, Nigeria, for several years. He was a Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg (2017–2019). His teaching and research interests cover the areas of African Philosophy, Logic, Environmental Ethics and Postmodern/Postcolonial/Decolonial thought. He aims to break new grounds in African philosophy by formulating a system that unveils new concepts and opens new vistas for thought (conversational philosophy); a method that represents a new approach to philosophizing in African and intercultural philosophies (conversational thinking); and a system of logic that grounds both (Ezumezu). His articles have appeared in refereed and accredited international journals. He is the editor of some books including Atuolu Omalu: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy (Lanham: University Press of America, 2015); African Philosophy and Environmental Conservation (London: Routledge, 2017); African Philosophy and the Epistemic Marginalization of Women (London: Routledge, 2018, with Louise du Toit); Ka Osi So Onye: African Philosophy in the Post Modern Era (Delaware: Vernon Press, 2018, with Edwin Etieyibo); The Death Penalty from an African Perspective (Delaware: Vernon Press, 2017, with Fainos Mangena). He has also authored some books including Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies (Springer, 2019); New Conversations on the Problems of Identity, Consciousness and Mind (Springer, 2019, coauthored); and his latest book, Logic and African Philosophy: Seminal xvii

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Essays on African Systems of Thought (Wilmington, 2020). He has given several invited talks. He is the convener of the professional African philosophy society, The Conversational School of Philosophy (CSP), and the founding editor of Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions. He is a winner of Jens Jacobsen Research Award for Outstanding Research in Philosophy by the International Society for Universal Dialogue. He is African philosophy Area Editor in the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Chimakonam has mentored and continues to mentor many young African philosophers. He is working on a new manuscript in African philosophy. L.  Uchenna  Ogbonnaya  Ogbonnaya is a postdoc at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. He holds a PhD from the University of Calabar supervised by JO Chimakonam. His areas of specialization and research interest include African philosophy, logic, metaphysics and applied philosophy. He has some articles and chapters in international journals and edited collections. He has presented papers in some international conferences. He is also an editorial assistant for Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions. He is a member and secretary of the Conversational Society of Philosophy (CSP) and serves as the coordinator of their Monthly Seminar Gathering (MSG). He is currently working on a research project titled ‘Decoloniality through Conversational Thinking’ for his postdoc.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 4.1

Analytics of nmekọka ontology EBUB diagram

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Decoloniality Through Conversational Thinking—Basic Principles of the African Systems of Thought

Decoloniality is not a war of sides, a conflict of interests, or a duel between protagonists and antagonists. It is not a recovery of old legacy, salvaging of name or dented honor, or even a battle cry against the apparitions of colonialism, apartheid and similar systems. It is not a movement of the oppressed, whether nationalistic, ethnic or populist; it is not even an attack on an enemy on the other side. These are all part of the concerns, but decoloniality is not a street squabble. It is  an intellectual program aimed at rolling back the mechanisms of coloniality that highlighted borders, made it significant and weaponized it, such that physical borders translated to intellectual borders, dividing not only the north and the south as widely presumed, but the haves and the have-nots, and, indeed, all subjective dichotomies such as sex, religion, class, race, gender and so forth. In this way, coloniality affects all the downtrodden, the marginalized other, the outsider, the outlier and the exploited of this world irrespective of where they are, where they are from, the language they speak, or the color of their skin. As there are marginalized people everywhere, decoloniality is a program for dismantling coloniality spearheaded by those in the margins. And these margins refer more to epistemic status than to geography. This is not to write borders out of the equations of coloniality and decoloniality, but to emphasize the collective epistemic suppression suffered by the outliers. So, we are saying that the intellectual evils that the borders created are worse than the physical borders. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_1

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With borders come restrictions, impositions, suppression and repression. Borders are instruments of regimentation that constrain freedom. Intellectual borders are high walls that entrap reason, keep it under siege or imprison it. While colonialism was interested in physical borders, coloniality is interested in intellectual borders. In the north–south divide, coloniality is an intellectual system that came after colonialism which, bearing the standard of Enlightenment, seeks to universalize and impose the intellectual accumulation of the modern West on the rest of the world. The fragmented borders outside become the intellectual colonies of the West, which is on a mission to conquer and control knowledges. In this way, divisive artificial borders appear, which, seeming natural, draw a line between the superior and the inferior, the in-group and the out-group, the norm and the normalized, the self and the other, the best and the rest. There are many manifestations of ‘reason,’ but coloniality isolates that of the Enlightenment in the pretense that it is the manifestation and seeks to foist it on the rest of the world. Voices are silenced for a voice, transformed into the voice. Coloniality then wagers its advanced form of reason against nascent ones and presents nascence as impotence. It is a game of impression, a peacock’s dance. It is the intimidating gaze and gait of the leopard, which have nothing to do with reality. Coloniality is the bully costume of the Western modernity. It browbeats the rest and scares other manifestations of reason into the hole of the ethnos. But decoloniality is a program for halting the unguarded march of coloniality—the march that carves cultures into smaller units and tramples territories into submission. Decoloniality is not so much interested in dismantling the artificial borders. It wants to hoist their flags. It is interested in changing the narrative of borders from bordering to disbordering;1 that is, from deploying border as a weapon to deploying it as leverage. We can now see territories or cultural units as epistemic formations, as voices of difference authenticated by context and justified by a kind of fuzzy logic. Coloniality has intellectual strands in power, knowledge and being (Quijano 2000; Grosfoguel 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015; Seroto 2018). But it is in a material border that it finds and takes its force. Without physical borders, coloniality of power, knowledge and being would have 1  The concepts of bordering and disbordering were first introduced in an invited paper which JO Chimakonam presented at the 16th International Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology (CLMPST), Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences, Czech Technical University, Prague, August 5–10, 2019.

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much less effect. It is the borders that not only define the powerful and the powerless, the superior and the inferior, the insider and the outsider, but that also legitimize the oppression of one against the other. Our approach in this book is to curate extant ideas and propose new ones in African metaphysics and epistemology using ‘conversational thinking’ and ‘Ezumezu logic’ as a model decolonial method and logic, respectively. It would be a book that serves both the classroom purpose and the general readership, while at the same time addressing the pertinent concern about the Africanness of African philosophy. It is a firm conviction of the conversationalists that theories in different philosophical traditions are distinguished by their background logic and methodological dispositions. Conversational thinking is a decolonial strategy and an attempt to delegitimize intellectual and physical borders as instruments of constraints, marginalization and discrimination. You could not converse with an epistemic agent if you did not have respect for that agent. The procedure of conversational thinking is measured with a tool called the conversational curve. In it, variables or realities as units are conceived as interdependent or in a network of complementarity. For these realities to interact, they have to be in constant motion, either a conjunctive motion in which they complement or a disjunctive motion in which they cease to complement. When they are complementing, they are in a complementary mode. When they are not complementing, they are in a contextual mode. For the conversationalists, the complementary encounter between realities is called nmekọ or a relationship, which is of two types: notional solidarity and creative struggle. While the first is between two similar variables, the second is between two seemingly opposed variables. It is the latter type of relationship that yields new ideas. But this process of inference is insured by a system of three-valued logic in which the intermediate value is a truth-glut rather than a truth-gap. One model is Ezumezu logic (Chimakonam 2019). Others include Chris Ijiomah’s Harmonious monism (2006, 2014) and Innocent Asouzu’s Complementary logic (2004, 2013), that is said to be many-valued. In Ezumezu logic, for example, seemingly opposed variables are not read as contradictories but as subcontraries making it not only possible but necessary for variables to engage in a productive relationship. A major hindrance in African metaphysical and epistemological thinking is the widespread ignorance about where the difference between African and Western systems of thought lies. It is commonplace to find in the literature, the claim that African metaphysics and epistemology represent the African

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‘way’ of perceiving reality or reaching knowledge. While this narrow view is correct, it provides very little information about what makes that ‘way of perceiving or knowing’ African. The reference to ‘the way’ points solely to methodology. But methods do not hang in isolation. They are grounded in some logic. In any system, whether academic or not, three prominent features hold it together: logic, methods and doctrine. While logic lies at the foundation and represents the laws and general principles that guide thinking in that system, methods are diverse ways of applying the same laws of that logic, and doctrine represents the thematic deployment of those methods. Interestingly, whereas it is possible to have diverse methods in a system, there can only be one logic for any system  because it prescribes the laws governing correct thinking that yields understanding in such a system. African metaphysics or epistemology can be distinguished from the Western or Asian versions by pointing toward the logic and methods that undergird and drive their inquiries. While method purveys a way of perceiving or knowing reality, it falls to logic to define such ways. African metaphysical and epistemological thinkers have neglected this important part at the expense of the African philosophical tradition. It is not enough to say that African metaphysics and epistemology are different ways of perceiving reality or acquiring knowledge. Indeed, every metaphysical system or epistemological theory represents some ways of perceiving reality or acquiring knowledge. That ‘way’ must be given a logical definition to differentiate it from other ways in other philosophical traditions. Part of our goal in this book is to provide and explain that logical basis that characterizes and distinguishes African metaphysics and epistemology from the rest. This aligns with the program of decoloniality in academic disciplines which among others, seeks to recover, develop and deploy systems of formerly repressed knowledge ecologies. In this book, we lay down Ezumezu logic and conversational thinking as samples of decolonial logic and method for defining and deriving the assumptions of African metaphysics and epistemology. Conversational thinking then is decolonial for prescribing a method based on a logic that marshals ideas from the African perspective. It purveys a strategy for rolling backward the hegemony of Western intellectual tradition. Conversational thinking demonstrates the significance of other epistemic fronts and the viability of other manifestations of reason. It is a method of thought2 that rides on the crest of the principle of nmekọ or 2  As a method, research produced in line with conversational thinking complies with eight postulates: (1) it inaugurates a new idea which is (2) presented with great clarity while (3) acknowledging similar existing ideas and distinguishing the ‘new’ from the existing ones (4)

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relationship and is grounded in a truth-glut–compliant system of three-­ valued logic. Method and logic then are the main ingredients that mark any philosophical tradition out from others. The two basic principles of the African systems of thought are the notion of nmekọ that underlies methodology and the three-valued logic orientation  that justifies inferences in African philosophy and studies. Nmekọ translates to relationship or communion. This relationship is not a dialectical one but an ohakaristical one. This means that two seemingly opposed variables merely complement but do not lose their identities. In this way, the type of relationship that undergirds the African systems of thought does not yield a synthesis but a ‘creative struggle’ in which mutual engagement through conjunctive and disjunctive motions births new concepts and ideas as well as opens new vistas for thought. We show that any attempt that presents the relationship of seemingly opposed variables in the African systems of thought as a Hegelian-style dialectics that yields a synthesis is mistaken. The conjunctive motion that leads to the relationships of notional solidarity and creative struggle, is temporal and is interrupted now and then by ‘tension of incommensurables.’3 It ultimately terminates at ‘benoke point’4 that prevents a synthesis. From the preceding, we establish that the second basic principle that underlies the African systems of thought and shapes its methods is trivalence. This proceeds from a three-valued universalizable logic developed from the African worldview. This logic is three-valued like the Jan Lukasiewicz’ system, but unlike the Lukasiewicz’ system, the intermediate and there has to be a bold claim about the inadequacy of existing ideas in literature, which makes the new ideas being inaugurated relevant and desirable. The claim (5) has to be logically justified using a three-valued system that admits of truth-glut. Being representative of the liberal arts, the argument must (6) be presented with artistic flair, (7) and in a re-engaging style, that is, a critical engagement between epistemic agents that addresses a problematique which can be generational or transgenerational (8) and in which arguments presented must be context-sensitive. See JO Chimakonam, What, really, is this Thing called Conversational Thinking? Paper presented at the 3rd African Philosophy Conference, University of Dar es Salaam, October 28–30, 2019. 3  In conversational thinking, seemingly opposed variables are conceived as belonging to different ontological categories. This creates tension whenever they come into contact, and can lead to the collapse of a complementary relationship. See JO Chimakonam (2019). 4  The complementary relationship between two opposed variables has a limit beyond which the Hegelian type of synthesis can occur. But because conversational thinking abhors this type of harmonization in which interacting variables lose their identities, benoke point becomes that line at which all complementary efforts cease. For details see JO Chimakonam (2018) and Egbai and Chimakonam (2019); see also Chimakonam and Egbai (2016) and Egbai (2018) for more details on the nature of conversational thinking.

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is actually a value in itself and not an undetermined center. It is a modal convergence called the complementary point where two extreme values of true and false form a third value that is both true and false (truth-glut), rather than neither true nor false (truth-gap) or either true or false (determinism). The complementing variables assume strict values of true or false when they depart the complementary mode and return to what is called the contextual modes. For this, Ezumezu is a context-dependent system in which the relationship of two extreme values are ohakaristical rather than dialectical. In Ezumezu, propositions are evaluated following the thesis of complementarity, which states that ‘a statement can be necessary, impossible, or the complement of both.’ The preceding is different from the theses of ‘bivalence’ and ‘determinism’ that drive the Aristotelian logical system. While the former states that ‘a statement is either true or false,’ the latter states that ‘a statement is either necessary or impossible.’ In the Aristotelian system, there is no room for the intermediate. Godwin Sogolo (1993: 69) argues that the three traditional laws of thought, identity, contradiction and excluded-middle, by their formulations, imply absolute identity and absolute difference in which things are mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, the preceding does not only account for ‘precision in the expressive power’ of any system of logic that abides by the three traditional laws but for topical limitation of such a system as well. Aristotle, on the one hand, was troubled that his system could not deal with ‘future contingent propositions’ despite its great precision. What his logical formulation gained in precision, it lost in scope. Ezumezu, on the other hand, makes the best of precision and scope. By adding three supplementary laws, njikoka, nmekoka and onona-etiti, that imply absolute identity and difference in which things could be mutually complementary rather than inclusive, Ezumezu purveys a system of logic with massive expressive power. For example, the proposition ‘one needs to drink water to stay alive’ can be evaluated differently in both the Aristotelian and Ezumezu systems. In the former, the Boolean value of the proposition would undoubtedly be ‘1’, assuming bivalence and determinism. The preceding seems pretty hasty. In Ezumezu, however, there is more depth and breadth. The proposition would be evaluated at two levels, the complementary mode (cmi1) and contextual mode (cmi2); and at two contexts, T and F. Beginning with the latter, the proposition ‘one needs to drink water to stay alive’ would have the Boolean value ‘1’ if reduced to a specific context, say in the middle of the Sahara Desert where one is dehydrating

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under high temperatures. But if taken to a different specific context, say in the middle of the River Niger where one is drowning, the Boolean value would be ‘0’, because one has probably gulped too much water and more water can only kill the person. Going forward, if the proposition is moved from contextual mode to complementary mode, the Boolean value of the proposition ‘one needs to drink water to stay alive’ would be ‘1-0’, a truth-glut. In the complementary mode, there are no specific contexts. We know that the statement can be true, but it can also be false. Since it is not reduced to a specific context which can help us determine its specific Boolean value, we say that in such an intermediate mode, both values are present. In the absence of any specific context, it is futile to determine the specific value of a proposition, which is why the conversationalists insist by the principle of Context-­ dependence of Value that the specific values of statements are to be decided only in the contexts in which they are asserted. This is the logical outlook that shapes the African systems of thought. Put together, the notion of nmekọ, contextual analysis and a truth-glut three-valued logic constitute the foundation and guiding pillars of the African systems of thought from which methods can be formulated to drive theories. Here, we are concerned with African metaphysics and epistemology and will demonstrate with theories and extant ideas in the literature how these two basic principles inform the structure of African metaphysical and epistemological thinking. This will address the charge of transliteration and copycatism levelled against African philosophy by the likes of Jurgen Hengelbrock and Heinz Kimmerle (Ozumba 2015: 171–185). In African philosophy literature, especially in the last three or four decades, actors like Kwasi Wiredu (1983), Kwame Gyekye (1984), Segun Gbadegesin (2002), Chukwuemeka Nze (1989) and so forth have produced works in which they searched through the intellectual accumulation of their cultural worldviews. Most of them excavated cultural voices and did a bit of window dressing. As admirable as that may seem, such endeavors fall short of veritable system-building. Their methods are chiefly Western, and their arguments can only be justified with the Aristotelian logic. Not that the corpus produced during the period is completely useless, but it is difficult to see how it approximates the expression ‘metaphysics or epistemology from African perspective,’ which is what we call African philosophy. So, the affected scholars produced works in Western philosophy rather than in African philosophy. The discussion of topics framed in African languages is not sufficient to make such topics discourses from an African perspective. Method and logic are crucial for the preceding purpose.

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For the failure to sort out the method and logic of their endeavor, some of these African scholars carbon-printed Aristotle’s and Plato’s metaphysical and epistemological structures on the African cultural canvas.5 What they did cannot be called metaphysics or epistemology in African philosophical tradition. At best, they are metaphysics or epistemology from Africans, but even that is problematic because, on the one hand, their ideas lack deep creative originality besides reporting cultural voices and, on the other hand, they have an abundance of creative imitation of Western thinkers. As such, we have discussed their ideas in this book as contributions from African philosophers. When Aristotle talks about matter, they also talk about matter; when the medieval philosophers talk about the soul, they also talk about the soul; and when the German idealists talk about spirit, or the British empiricists talk about the senses, or the continental philosophers talk about the mind, they follow suit and search for the equivalences of such terms in the intellectual dungeons of various African worldviews. The edifice of Western philosophy, for example, was not built that way. And that is why the contributions of the Calabar School or the conversationalists to the system-building efforts in African philosophy cannot be overlooked. When we talk about the Calabar School, we are referring to thinkers at the neighboring institutions in the eastern part of Nigeria who shared ideas and regularly engaged in colloquia. Pantaleon Iroegbu, who was the major exponent of ụwa ontology, was of the Seat of Wisdom Seminary Owerri. Innocent Asouzu (ibuanyidanda ontology), Chris Ijiomah (harmonious monism), Godfrey Ozumba and Jonathan O. Chimakonam (integrative Humanism), Chimakonam (Ezumezu logic), Chimakonam, Victor Nweke and Uti Egbai, etc (conversational thinking) and Ada Agada (consolationism) are all from the University of Calabar axis. Agada originally was from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, before teaming up with the elements at the Conversational School of Philosophy in Calabar. The conversationalists have contributed in shifting the paradigm of thought in African philosophy from metaphilosophy to system-­building. These theorists are conversationalists because of the style of their philosophy. They generally start by tapping raw materials from the cultural and linguistic resources of one or the other of African culture. Then they escalate the inquiry by engaging with other thinkers who have said something 5  One of us has discussed this idea (see Chimakonam 2019: xi–xii) as the spell of Plato and Aristotle on African philosophers.

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similar or different in a critical conversation, before formulating new ideas and framing systems. In all, you would observe the difference of method and logic in their thoughts when compared to those of Western thinkers and even those of their less audacious African counterparts. The project of decoloniality through conversational thinking is, therefore, both a logical and a methodological one. We are looking at a logical and a methodological revolution in African philosophy, and, indeed, different areas of African studies. We cannot successfully decolonize the African intellectual space without effecting a change in logic and methodology. Any radical change in methodology demands and necessitates a change in the governing system of logic. In this book, we produce a blueprint for the study of metaphysics and epistemology from an African perspective using the method of conversational thinking that is grounded in a system of truth-glut logic developed in Africa but which is perfectly universalizable. The ingredients that highlight these methods and logic are presented from the conceptual lens of nmekọ or relationship and trivalence, respectively. There are many works out there that discuss different aspects of the African systems of thought from philosophy to science and cultural studies. Unfortunately, none to the best of our knowledge has rigorously taken up the methodological and logical challenges of unravelling the basic principles that define and identify a body of knowledge as a discourse in the African systems of thought. This leaves a beginner or a newcomer wondering where the difference between African and, say, Western systems of thought lies. This book fills this lacuna and promises to clarify the foggy areas in the structure of the African systems of thought, especially from the metaphysical and epistemological perspectives. It will impact the sundry fields of African studies and comparative studies which in the methodological respect experience shocks and confusions leading to the erroneous designation of African knowledge formations as imitations or transliterations of Western episteme. The book is conceived to put aspects of African philosophy into perspective, suitable as an introductory text, a beginners’ course and for classroom work. It reveals the originality of African gnoseology and proffers the framework for its creative resurgence. We have divided this book into two parts. In part one, the focus is on metaphysics. Here, we discuss metaphysical ideas proffered by some African philosophers. These scholars include Pantaleon Iroegbu, Innocent Asouzu and Emmanuel Edeh. The metaphysical themes and topics discussed are ụwa ontology, ibuanyidanda ontology, the ontology of

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personhood, themes in consolation philosophy and nmekoka metaphysics. In each part, the plan is to present ideas in the literature as well as offer a theoretic proposal for a new idea. We were concerned with ụwa ontology, ibuanyidanda ontology, the ontology of personhood, themes in consolation philosophy and, finally, we offered nmekoka metaphysics as a robust, fresh theory in African metaphysics. In discussing Iroegbu’s and Asouzu’s ontological theories, we observed in Chaps. 4 and 5 that those theories are communitarian and relational, respectively, as can be seen in their ideas of belongingness and missing link. In Chaps. 2, 3 and 6, we concerned ourselves with the ontology of personhood, themes in consolation philosophy and a new proposal called nmekoka metaphysics. In these three chapters, we showed that the metaphysical notions were built on the idea of relationship and complementarity, otherwise called nmekọ. We also submitted that this idea of nmekọ (complementary relationship) is inherent in the ontologies proposed by Iroegbu and Asouzu. Moreover, we argued that these ontological theories can be explained using Ezumezu logic. The idea that nmekọ that involves ‘context’, conversational method, and Ezumezu logic  that highlights ‘trivalence’ underlie or can be shown to underlie  the African metaphysical theories and themes discussed in part one is carried over into part two of this book, which is concerned with epistemology. Here, there are three chapters. In Chaps. 7 and 8, we curate some epistemological ideas in African philosophy and carve a path toward an African theory of knowledge  that is shown to align with the basic ­principles of the African thought. In Chap. 9, we provide a second instalment to Chimakonam’s theory of cogno-normative epistemology. The general idea we project in the chapters in this part is that there is no neutral theory of knowledge. For us, all theories of knowledge are contextdependent. We contend that for Africans, knowledge is both cognitive and normative, which is highlighted in the idea of duality, nmekọ, as well as Ezumezu logic. The most promoted idea in part two is that, for the African, knowledge is knowledge if and only if it is humanistic. We invite all those interested in Africa, and knowledge from an African perspective and philosophy to an intellectual feast. Let the conversation begin!

References Asouzu, I. 2004. The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. ———. 2013. Ibuanyidanda (Complementary Reflection) and Some Basic Philosophical Problems in Africa Today: Sense Experience, “ihe mkpuchi anya” and the Supermaxim. Zurich: Lit Verlag GmbH and Co. Kg Wien.

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Chimakonam, J.O. 2018. The ‘Demise’ of Philosophical Universalism and the Rise of Conversational Thinking in Contemporary African Philosophy. In Method, Substance, and the Future of African Philosophy, ed. Edwin Etieyibo, 135–159. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Egbai, U.O. 2018. Why African Philosophers Should Build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2. Egbai, U.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2019. Why Conversational Thinking Could Be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189. Gbadegesin, S. 2002. Eniyan: The Yoruba Concept of a Person. In The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H.  Coetzee and A.P.J.  Roux. Cape Town: Oxford University of South Africa. Grosfoguel, R. 2007. The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms. Cultural Studies 21 (2–3): 203–246. Gyekye, K. 1984. Akan Concept of a Person. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 3rd ed., 199–212. Lanham: University Press of America. Ijiomah, C. 2006. An Excavation of a Logic in African Worldview. African Journal of Religion, Culture and Society 1 (1): 29–35. ———. 2014. Harmonious Monism: A Philosophical Logic of Explanation for Ontological Issues in Supernaturalism in African Thought. Calabar: Jochrisam Publishers. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. 2015. Decoloniality as the Future of Africa. History Compass 13 (10): 485–496. Nze, C. 1989. Aspects of African Communalism. Onitsha: Veritas Publishers. Ozumba, G. 2015. The Transliteration Question in African Philosophy. In Atuolu Omalu: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 171–185. Lanham: University Press of America. Quijano, A. 2000. Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America. Nepantla: Views from the South 1 (3): 533–579. Seroto, J. 2018. Dynamics of Decoloniality in South Africa: A Critique of the History of Swiss Mission Education for Indigenous People. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 44 (3): 1–14. Sogolo, G. 1993. Foundations of African Philosophy: A Definitive Analysis of Conceptual Issues in African Thought. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Wiredu, K. 1983. The Akan Concept of Mind. Ibadan Journal of Humanistic Studies 3: 113–134.

PART I

African Metaphysics

CHAPTER 2

The Theory of Nmekọka Metaphysics

Introduction There are now in existence some theories in African ontology. In fact, in Chaps. 4, 5 and 6 of this book, we shall discuss three prominent ontological theories formulated in African philosophy: Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology, Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology and the ontology of personhood that can be credited to several contributors. But ontology, which is a theory of being, is only one component of metaphysics as a discipline. The other component is cosmology, a theory concerned with the nature of the world. There is yet to emerge in African philosophy, and to the best of our knowledge, a broad theory of metaphysics.1 Ontology and cosmology make up 1  We are not unaware of diverse metaphysical ideas which can be found in the works of scholars like JB Danquah’s The Akan Doctrine of God; Marcel Grauile’s Conversations with Ogotemmeli; John Mbiti’s African Religions and Philosophy, Ruch and Anyanwu’s African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa; Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “Physical and Metaphysical Understanding of Nature, Agency, and Causation in African Traditional Thought”; or even Placide Tempels’ controversial Bantu Philosophy. A host of critics (see, for example, Hountondji 1996; Asouzu 2007) have dismissed the metaphysical account in the Bantu Philosophy as descriptive and uninformed. At least one of the criticisms (being descriptive) has been marshaled against Emmanuel Edeh’s Towards an Igbo Metaphysics. There are also metaphysical ideas in the ongoing discussions on ubuntu, communalism, Afro-communitarianism and personhood which many African philosophers have

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_2

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the field of metaphysics, which studies reality as a whole. So, if one were to construct an African theory of reality, what structure would it take? In the literature, we have concepts and ideas that reflect the two components of metaphysics, but a prototype theory that accounts for reality as a whole from an African philosophical perspective is long overdue. By a theory of African metaphysics, we mean a structure that contains clear statements of an underlying logic and its principles, clear formulation of its method(s) according to those logical laws, and a clear articulation of ideas organised in line with specific methods. What then would such a theory of African metaphysics look like? For lack of a better word, we have decided to call the brand we wish to develop here a theory of nmekọka metaphysics. But before then, it might be helpful to observe that there are concepts, notions and even theories in the literature on African philosophy that pass for ideas in African metaphysics. For example, personhood as espoused by actors such as John Mbiti (1969), Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984, 2018), Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014), among others, is metaphysical insofar as it attempts to paint a picture of being from an African point of view. The same can be said of Pantaleon Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology (1995) and Innocent Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology, two theories discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5 of this book, respectively. Besides the aforementioned ontological theories, there have also been other metaphysical ideas developed or discussed in African philosophy by different scholars. For example, some concepts such as self, soul, mind, destiny, evil, life, afterlife, reincarnation, being, God, gods, deities, spirits, names and naming have been discussed by various African scholars. It is also important to mention that Ada Agada’s recent consolationism (2015) took a thematic discussion of various metaphysical ideas such as freedom, God, fatalism, being, determinism, maat, mood and evil. All of these concepts are metaphysical, but consolationism does not necessarily suffice as a theory of African metaphysics that attempts to give a broad picture of reality, as well as the logic and methodology that underlie such configuration of reality. Consolationism is a conceptual presentation of metaphysical issues in African philosophy. In the last four decades, various African philosophers have put forward ideas and theories in African ethics (including political philosophy), ontology and African logic. In fact, these three areas can be said to be the most occupied themselves with in recent times. Teffo and Roux’s “Metaphysical Thinking in Africa”, Lajul’s “African Metaphysics: Traditional and Modern Discussions” and Nicodemus Yongho’s Theory of African Metaphysics provide useful overviews of ideas in the literature.

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developed branches of African philosophy today. The very opposite could be said of African metaphysics and epistemology where very little has been done in terms of theoretic formulation. As the second decade in the twenty-first century winds up and a new one is beginning, it is time to pay serious attention to those two branches of African philosophy. What we are doing in this book as a whole is to show what progress has been made with regard to developing ideas in African metaphysics and epistemology. Specifically, for this chapter, we want to demonstrate what such a theory in African metaphysics might look like. In the first section, we will survey African metaphysical thinking and show why it is not comprehensive. In the second section, we will introduce and formulate a model theory in African metaphysics. We will construct this new theory on Ezumezu logic taking care to show the presence of nmekọ or relationship as the binding principle in African thought. We will demonstrate the presence of nmekọ by showing the linkage of ideas at the foundation of African thought. We will conclude by drawing attention to the significance of African metaphysics for African philosophy at the turn of the new millennium.

Curating Metaphysical Thinking in African Philosophy An appreciable number of African philosophers have attempted to curate metaphysical ideas from various cultural viewpoints in Africa. In this section, we will highlight some of these views. To be clear, these scholars attempted to engage with one metaphysical topic or another from the perspective of an identified culture. Topics such as time, person, causality, being, immortality, reincarnation, life and some others  have been discussed in the literature. Besides the metaphysical topics, there has also been an attempt to formulate a theory of metaphysics by at least two of such cultural thinkers, namely, Emmanuel Edeh and Placide Tempels. Edeh and Tempels gave us initial elementary metaphysical concepts for system-building. Here, we will discuss Edeh’s contribution to African metaphysics. Tempels’ controversial, and somewhat discredited contribution is well known and as such would not be discussed for lack of space. In Chap. 5 of his Towards an IgboMetaphysics, Edeh goes in search of elementary metaphysical concepts in an African language. He wants to show that not only do people in Africa have metaphysical ideas; it is better to reach these ideas through their linguistic lens. The preceding would preserve meaning and the distinction inherent in a system developed by

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Africans. In a way, Edeh’s project is meant to answer the incorrect assertions by some misinformed Western racists. In the early 1980s, the Great Debate in African philosophy was winding up. One of the most sensitive topics at the time was the position by some Western intellectuals like Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Georg Hegel and Lucien Levy-Bruhl,2 who denied rationality to the African and, consequently, the philosophical ability. In excavating and describing the metaphysical ideas of his people, the Igbo of West Africa, Edeh joins other African scholars3 of that time who disproved the Western assertion by curating philosophical genius in their cultures. One of the areas of attraction for Edeh was the sphere of ontology. Edeh paints a picture of the Igbo understanding of being grounded in the Igbo language (1999: 93). He observes that there is no specific Igbo word that translates to the English word ‘being’ but that this does not mean that the Igbo had no idea of being. To unfold the Igbo idea of being, he carries out a field study, serving questionnaires to people in selected Igbo communities. What emerged were two hypotheses: the onye hypothesis and the ife hypothesis (1999: 94–95). So, while most of his respondents identified onye as the Igbo word for being, a few identified ife. While onye is anthropocentric, ife is not. Ife covers the categories of being that are both animate and inanimate, physical and nonphysical. The broad range covered by the ife category is similar to that covered by the idea of ‘being’ in the English language. It is for this that Edeh favors the ife hypothesis. The accurate rendering of being in Igbo language, for him, is, therefore, ife. But he quickly observes that ife does not bring out the most important aspect of being, which is existence. To address this shortfall, Edeh looks for the Igbo version of the verb to be which is idi. He suffixes it to ife to obtain ife-di, that which is or thing that is (1999: 96–97). In contrast, Edeh identifies ife nki ̣tị translated as ‘thing ordinary,’ from which he derives the ontological category of nothing (1999: 95, 97). If we 2  These Western scholars questioned the intellectual ability of the African and some of them argued that the African has made no contribution to modern civilization. See Hegel (1975) and Levy-Bruhl (1947). For Hume and Kant, see Popkin (1977–1978). 3  It must be observed that the attempt at cultural excavation of philosophical ideas was inaugurated by Placide Tempels in his now imfamous book Bantu Philosophy (1959). This strategy soon caught attention, and there were more similar outputs like George James’ Stolen Legacy (1954), Alexis Kegame’s Bantu-Rwandise Philosophy (1956), Henry Olela’s “The African Foundations of Greek Philosophy” (1984), T.  Uzodinma Nwala’s Igbo Philosophy (1985), Innocent Onyewuenyi’s The African Origin’s of Greek Philosophy (1993) and Gyekye (1984). Edeh’s Towards an Igbo Metaphysics was in line with this programme to disprove the Western assertions that Africa has no philosophy and that her peoples are incapable of thinking.

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tighten the translation, we might be able to identify ife nkịti ̣ as nothingness. Ife nkịti ̣ then would contrast to ife-di just as nothingness might contrast to being. But Edeh did not clearly identify ife nki ̣ti ̣ as nothingness. He translated it as ‘thing ordinary’ or ordinary thing, which he subdivided into ife nwelu ndu (animate things) and ife enweghi ndu (inanimate things). But this translation of nkiti as ordinary is mistaken. Nkiti does not translate to ordinary; it accurately translates to ‘no thing’ or nothing, which in ontological terms could mean nothingness. Besides the minor error in translation, Edeh’s contribution to the conceptual development of African metaphysical thinking remains significant. He also discusses other metaphysical topics such as reincarnation, death, duality, soul–body unity and God from an Igbo cultural perspective. For lack of space, we will not discuss his submissions on these topics. But it is important to know that what Edeh aims at primarily is to show that these metaphysical ideas are present in African cultures as against the erroneous supposition by some Western scholars of the absence of philosophical thinking in the African worldview. There are other African scholars who have discussed different metaphysical topics. Time is one of the highly discussed topics in African metaphysics. John Mbiti, John Ayoade, John Parratt and many others have discussed time from various African cultural perspectives. Mbiti (1969: 17–18), for one, believes that understanding African metaphysical ideas requires a knowledge of what time means for the African. According to him, there are two categories of time: potential and actual. These two categories correspond to two shades of events: the ones which have the likelihood of occurring and those that have occurred in the past or occurring in the present. The idea of time as corresponding to present and past phenomena, for Mbiti, shows that the future lies outside the concept of time in Africa and is thus meaningless. This conclusion was controversial, thus necessitating several reviews and rejoinders to Mbiti’s work. One such is Ayoade, who contests Mbiti’s generalization of what could be a peculiarity of the Gikuyu and the Kikamba peoples. As Ayoade puts it, “[w]hile it is possible that this may be true of some people about whom John Mbiti might have first-hand knowledge, it is not remotely true of the Yorubas whose total perspective of time-future even extends beyond the end of this life to an afterlife” (1984: 95). Similarly, Francis Gillies criticizes Mbiti’s position concerning the absence of the concept of the future among the Bantu. In his words,

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if the Bantu peoples have virtually no concept of the future, how else could they have understood the Christian eschatological message except as futuristic? Indeed, if Mbiti’s conclusions are correct, then the conversion of the Bantu to Christianity would be an insuperable task, contradicting the theological motto that ‘grace perfects nature’, because, in this case, Christian eschatological grace would do violence to Bantu nature. Now, clearly, the conversion of the Bantu, together with the work carried out amongst them by Christian missionaries, seems to indicate a future perspective both on the part of the missionaries and of the Bantu. (1980: 19)

The preceding was a picture of the African idea of time as provided by Mbiti and two criticisms that center on his description of the African as having no idea of the future. But John Parratt (1977: 123) seems to agree with Mbiti. Of course, he admits that Mbiti may not be entirely correct, may have overstated his position and that certain pieces of evidence may stand opposed to his conclusion, but that there are other pieces of evidence that tend to corroborate Mbiti’s claim that the idea of a future sense of time virtually does not exist amongst Africans. As he puts it, Mbiti’s conclusion “commands a good deal of evidence, and to say that African societies are more orientated towards the past than towards the future is to reflect a view which has been frequently voiced by social anthropologists.” These anthropological pieces of evidence Parratt is referring to are the preeminence of folklores, proverbs, rites and rituals which, according to him, are all “backward-looking” in their measurement of the lifeworld. “The present is seen in terms of the past, the social system and its relationships are determined by the myths and ‘history’. The rites, whether as communal rituals or rites of passage, are also rooted in the past and conceived in terms of the re-enactment of the primal events” (1977: 123). But is Parratt correct in his counter-analysis? That is and will remain controversial. Our aim here is not to engage with this controversy but to show that there is a rich corpus on metaphysical thinking in Africa and by African scholars. There are other African thinkers who conceive of time in African worldview as cyclical.4 Under this conception, topics like immortality, reincarnation, afterlife, living-dead, ancestors and destiny are discussed. As a cyclical phenomenon, events move from the past to the present to the future, which could be temporal or lie beyond. The idea of events that spill beyond 4  See Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984), Innocent Onyewuenyi (1996), Mesembe Edet (2016), Earl Mackenzie (1973), Richard Onwuanibe (1984) and Udobata Onunwa (2011).

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the temporal evokes discussions on life, death, afterlife, ancestorship and reincarnation. So, life is actually a journey in a cyclical time of life, death, afterlife and reincarnation. For lack of space, we cannot discuss every topic treated in the literature on African metaphysics or every scholar who has researched in the field. It suffices to show that there is metaphysical thinking in African philosophy. What is perhaps lacking is a proliferation of metaphysical systems. In the chapters that follow, we have discussed the contributions of Pantaleon Iroegbu and Innocent Asouzu. We have in Chap. 6 discussed the metaphysical system of personhood or Afro-­ communitarianism. But all these are ontological contributions. What is lacking is a unified theory of metaphysics, where both ontology and cosmology are accounted for. In the next section, we will attempt to construct a sample of such a theory called nmekọka metaphysics.

Nmekọka: A Sample Theory of African Metaphysics In discussing the meaning and nature of African metaphysics, Lajul (2017: 19–25) explains that African metaphysics represents an African way of perceiving reality. He curates such views in Ozumba (2004), Menkiti (2004) and Obenga (2004), to name a few. For Teffo and Roux (1998), these ways of perceiving reality represent different cultural worlds, and while endorsing this superficial view, they problematize it. As they put it, [o]ur perceptions are influenced by our expectations, beliefs and emotions, but also by our conceptual schemes, our histories and social circumstances, and the language we talk. That is to say, the conception of the nature of reality varies from culture to culture, almost suggesting that different cultural communities live in different worlds. … If we are dealing with different conceptions of the world, is it possible for a person to know and to discuss other conceptions, or are we totally fenced in by our own conceptions? (1998: 192)

Perhaps it would be helpful to indicate that whereas a given system is grounded in a single logic, it is not impossible for people groomed in a different system to follow the reasoning in another system insofar as they have made an effort to learn the laws and linguistic or syntactic rules of the logic of the new system. Unlike Teffo and Roux, we see no problems with this. The problem for us is the penchant for carrying the logic of our system into a different system and attempting to employ it to assess the

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assumptions of the new system. It is such an unwieldy move that leads to the ignorant characterization of two different systems of thought as scientific and superstitious, consistent and contradictory, respectively. So, as we explained in the introduction, the view that African metaphysics represents a ‘way’ of perceiving reality is not sufficiently informative. A way of perceiving reality is not nearly enough to distinguish metaphysical theories in two different philosophical traditions. Such a way represents a method, and method is defined by logic. In delivering nmekọka metaphysics, Ezumezu logic and conversational method would be deployed. An adequate explanation has been provided in the introduction to demonstrate how both could characterize a theory as African metaphysics. In spinning this theory, we think it is fitting to begin with conceptual clarifications. Nmekọka is derived from two Igbo words: nmekọ and arụmarụka. Nmekọ elementarily means relationship and points to a situation where an array of variables adjudged to be complete for a given task are in a relationship of complementarity. When we think of a logical inference of the complementary type, where seemingly opposed variables can come into a functional relationship without losing their individual identities, the concept of nmekọ has emerged to adequately characterize such an inference. One of us has recently deployed it in characterizing a system of logic that can handle some of those inferential modes such as the future contingents, complementary inferences and modern physics, which are not covered in Aristotle’s syllogism. He dubbed that system of logic Ezumezu logic (Chimakonam 2019). In that project, he used ezumezu written with a small letter ‘e’ to represent the character of the third or intermediate value, Ezumezu written with a capital letter ‘E’ to designate the system itself and nmekọka to designate one of the supplementary laws that undergird the system. The law of nmekọka highlights the significance of context in affirming the truth-value of a variable. In this work, we employ nmekọka as a primary concept that depicts the valuations of a variable in different contexts that necessitates a complementary relationship. The second word from which nmekọka is derived is arụmarụka, which means discourse—the type that progresses from critical to creative encounters. Discourse which derives from the Latin discursus and translates to ‘running to and from,’ literally meaning ‘written or spoken authoritative conversation like debates,’ does not fully capture the meaning of arụmarụka. But it comes quite close. The additional layer is that such

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conversations involve a thorough examination, a critical assessment and a creative struggle. Arụmarụka in itself is derived from the root word okwu, which one of us has described elsewhere as the raw material from which nkpuru-okwu or word is formed (Chimakonam 2018a). He could have opted for logos instead of okwu as a preferred suffix by which the name of our theory would have been nmekọkology rather than nmekọka. But we find logos as a suffix not suitable to the project on African metaphysics we wish to pursue. As he argued (Chimakonam 2018a, 2019), logos is encased in ethnocentric commitments which makes it unfit for purposes that are supposed to be universal. Also, it carries a baggage of meanings, which makes it unstable and mercurial to serve the purpose of global intellectual centrism creditably. But we have not opted against logos in articulating the concept of nmekọka strictly for reasons of its weaknesses highlighted earlier. We have opted against it mainly because okwu is richer, ethnically uncommitted and serves the purpose better. For example, if we define nmekọkology as the study of, meaning a detailed examination of, we will define nmekọka as the discourse on, meaning a thorough examination of, a critical assessment and a creative struggle involving written, gestured and spoken exchanges on a topic of choice. In this context, we deploy it in formulating a theory of metaphysics from an African perspective. Nmekọka then is a collectivist metaphysics or discourse on realities in their logical dynamism and interrelatedness. It is a metaphysical system that gives an account of the motions and relationships of the network of seemingly opposed, interdependent and interconnected variables. There are two things involved in the previous definition: background logic, which structures realities and their motions, and the notion of nmekọ or relationship, which explains the interaction of realities. Suffice it to reaffirm that the ideas of Ezumezu logic, method and nmekọ are the foundational ideas that distinguish a discourse in African philosophy from those in, say, Western or Asian philosophies.5

5  Some African metaphysical thinkers like EA Ruch and KC Anyanwu (1981: 124) and CB Okolo (1998: 249) have pointed to the notion of nmekọ or relationship as cardinal to the African metaphysical thinking. Pantaleon Iroegbu (1995) also discusses this notion as belongingness. In it, realities are said to be in relationship with one another rather than isolated. It is in being together that each can realize their optimum best. In Igbo language, this is often described as the principle of igwebuike, unity is strength. It purveys the power of complementarity of opposites. The three supplementary laws of thought that characterize

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Our account of nmekọka will cover two components of metaphysics: cosmology and ontology. Under cosmology, we will address two questions: (1) How do we account for the nature of the universe as a network of existents? (2) How do we structure existents in the universe? Under ontology, we will address the following questions: (1) What is the nature of things? (2) Can there be something that is perceptible/detectable and something that is only imaginable at the same time? Cosmology is generally understood as the study of the origin and development of the universe. There are various theories from different religions, the most popular of which is creationism. Creationism holds that the universe was created by some powerful deity who in itself was uncreated. Ancient Greek philosophers from Thales to Anaximanes engaged this subject in a robust fashion, putting out various hypotheses of the ultimate stuff. In modern time, evolutionary scientists hold that the universe evolved and this is known as evolutionism, often seen to rival creationism. Other scientists came up with the Big Bang theory, according to which the universe exploded into existence some 14 billion years ago. All these theories claim to offer explanations on how the universe came about. However, this is not the approach we want to adopt in our theory of nmekọka. By cosmology from an African perspective, we are not specifically looking for the ultimate stuff or trying to explain how the universe emerged; we are concerned with how to understand the nature of the universe; is it an entity or a network of entities? Does the universe have a face value? And does another universe or other universes exist? If there are other universes, what are they like? Tapping into the resources in conversational thinking, we outline three approaches we can employ in studying the universe: nkwuwa, ntapi ̣a and arụmarụka.6 Nkwuwa can be used to address the first question, ntapịa can be employed to address the second question, while arụmarụka can be employed to address the last two questions.

the Ezumezu logical system—onona-etiti, nmekọka and njikoka (Chimakonam 2019)—variously capture the significance of relationship in African philosophical thinking. 6  See U Egbai and J Chimakonam (2019: 182–185) for an intercultural philosophy presentation of these three approaches as communication, hermeneutics and conversation. See also Chimakonam and Egbai (2016) and Egbai (2018) for more details on the nature of conversational thinking.

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1. Nkwuwa/Expression: The universe is not some object or entity out there. It is not simply a space–time continuum. It is a network of existents trapped in space–time. In order words, the universe cannot be discussed in isolation of different existents that make it up. None of the disparate existents in the network can be fully understood outside their connection with others. But here is the big question; how do we know that the universe exists? How do we account for its nature? Notice that we are not asking how the universe emerged, we are assuming for the sake of argument that the religions, the ancient Greek philosophers and the modern scientists have done justice to that question. Here, we are interested in how to account for the nature of the universe. It is easy for anyone to imagine another universe or even a multiverse, but they would be mere figments of imagination. How do we know that the universe we have assumed to exist is not a figment of imagination? This inquiry is as important as that of the origin of the universe itself. We must understand, as some African thinkers have argued, that the place of the human knower is central in African knowledge formation.7 In the African metaphysical vision, it is not possible for anything at all to exist, if humans do not know it. When we use the concept of knowledge or episteme, we do so in an anthropocentric fashion. We assume that it is only humans who can pursue, acquire, review, revise, regulate and disseminate knowledge in this way. Whether this assumption is correct or incorrect, it still lies beyond the confines of science to tell us. When we say that something exists, we are saying that it is empirical, whether perceptible or detectable. If something like the universe or any of its component existents is said to exist, it means we can talk about it, describe it or simply express it. This is what is meant by the Igbo ­concept nkwuwa meaning ‘saying it out’ or ‘speaking it out.’ For lack of a better English synonym, we have translated nkwuwa as expression. The philosophical value of this concept lies in its presentation of the power of language in an entirely new light. Nkwuwa arrogates to language the power to justify the existence of something. If something is perceived or observed through technological detection, it remains as data in the computers. It is a language that can give it an objective existence in the form of ‘saying it out’ or ‘speaking it out.’

7  For detailed discussion of this subject, see Zahan (1970), Ikenga-Metuh (1981), Anizoba (1986), Onunwa (1991, 1994, 2011) and Ijiomah (2004).

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Nkwuwa or expression is done with language, whether written, spoken or gestured. So, we can see that language is a critical tool in metaphysics. It could be in the form of natural, artificial or sign; it does not matter. What matters is that without it we may not be able to communicate our perception or technological detection. Where natural languages fail, sign language steps in. The important thing is that humans are always able to communicate. Anything that exists can be expressed, at least, as an idea. Anything that cannot be expressed does not exist. Anything we can perceive or detect, we can express with the tool of language. If we say, for example, that the universe exists, we must be able to explain what it is like as an object of our perception or technological detection. Where we cannot offer this expression, the entity itself must be a figment of the imagination. There is something the universe is like, but that thing is not outside the universe itself. It is the universe. The universe is like itself. This is not a puzzle. We are simply echoing what is in extant literature in African metaphysical thinking.8 The universe, as an entity is a network of many realities. It is this network that is called the universe. We can describe the individual entities in the network or even the network itself. Such would be what the universe is like. . Ntapi ̣a/Interpretation: In a bid to understand the nature of the uni2 verse, we necessarily have to perceive or observe it. Having perceived or observed the universe, we necessarily have to express it. This expression involves a linguistic description of what is perceived or observed. But the preceding is not where it ends. Language has a further role in nmekọka as metaphysical thinking. That role is played out in the ­concept of ntapịa, which roughly translates to ‘interpretation.’ The metaphysician of the mould of nmekọka offers their interpretation of what is described or expressed. The need for ntapịa is hinged on two reasons: because the senses and the observation instruments can mislead or malfunction, and because when subjected to varied interpretations, new vistas could be opened which would lead to a better understanding of the universe or individual existents. Ntapịa is not merely interpretation in its simplistic sense. It is more than that. In a way, it means decoding of the relationship between entities. 8  Some scholars in African philosophy have discussed the interconnectedness of reality and their complementarity as strong features of the African perspective to knowledge. See Innocent Asouzu (2004, 2007), Sophie Oluwole (2014) and Jonathan Chimakonam (2015, 2017a, 2018b).

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Nmekọka conceives the universe and, indeed, every individual existent as a coded entity. Reality in whatever shape is encrypted. It is the job of the metaphysician to decode or decrypt any reality they study. Often, what is perceived or detected is not the full picture. The universe does not have a face value. The metaphysician has to scratch beyond the surface and dig deep to unveil the underlying nature of each reality. This attempt at unknotting and uncovering of reality which is relational  is what ntapịa is about in our metaphysical system. The universe is not what can be perceived or detected; there are underlying mechanisms. Philosophers and scientists have been studying these for centuries from different standpoints such as cause and effect, life and death, beginning and ending, up and down, and space and time. They have formulated principles and laws to explain the workings of the universe. When we toss an udara up in Abagana, it falls; but when we toss the same udara up in another part of the universe, say in space, it floats, why? It is because, for every aspect of the universe, there exists the  ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, that make the universe an encrypted reality. It is the job of the metaphysician to decrypt it, layer by layer. But the metaphysician is not equipped with the laboratory as the physicist is, because they are not studying empirical reality alone, and for what it is. The nmekọka metaphysician is interested in understanding reality as a whole, whether perceptible/detectable, imaginable or not. They look at the myriad of realities in their similarities and variances, floating in a network of divergences and interdependence, and directed in an intricate intersection of conjunctive and disjunctive motions, wherein they engage in complicated relationships of notional solidarity and creative struggle. According to this position, existents in the universe are varied. While some share more in common, others have a lot that separate them. All of them are in constant motion searching for complementarity pairing. Where they succeed, they enter into a conjunctive motion with identified pairs and construct either a relationship of notional solidarity if they share more in common, or a relationship of creative struggle if they share less in common.9 When the relationships fail, they reenter a 9  In conversational thinking, there are different types of relationships. The first is ‘relationship of notional solidarity,’ which occurs when two identical variables sharing similar properties relate. Such relationships do not produce much by way of original ideas; they do more in stabilising the discourse by endorsing and confirming ideas produced in different places and contexts. This type of relationship is a given, it is always there, it does not have to be invented. The other type of relationship which necessarily has to be invented is ‘relationship of creative

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disjunctive motion drifting from each other in search of new complementary pairing. So, to understand each reality, one has to understand not only its nature but its motion or trajectory in the universe and its relationship with other realities. To understand the universe, one has to understand how its composite existents move and relate from context to context. This process of uncovering is what the nmekọka metaphysician calls ntapịa. . Arụmarụka/engagement: Cosmological inquiries in nmekọka meta3 physics are not exhausted in one expressing their ideas on the nature of the universe or whether the universe has a face value. It also involves inquiries on whether another universe or other universes exist, and what they are like. Arụmarụka is an Igbo word for critical engagement. Here, the individual reflections of metaphysicians on whether another universe exists and what it might be like are subjected to critical scrutiny by peers. As opponents contest the new ideas put forward, proponents of such ideas respond. This encounter is a form of creative struggle which not only fine-tunes new ideas but unveils new concepts and extends the frontiers of our knowledge of the universe. On whether other universes exist, a nmekọka metaphysician would say they do, but they can only be like the existing universe. No one has visited another universe. Science has not advanced well enough to search them out with special telescopes. But we can imagine they exist somewhere beyond our realm. The problem, however, is that our imagination is limited and determined by the knowledge of our present universe. So, here is the dilemma: we can imagine other universes, but they must resemble our present universe. Put differently, the existence of other universes depends on our knowledge of the universe we inhabit. The kind of credibility this inference gives to our claim about the existence of other universes is suspect. The Aristotelian logician might argue, as a result, that either other universes exist or they do not. If they do, they necessarily have to be different from the present universe. But if they exist and are different from the present universe, can we imagine such universes? The answer is no! Since whatever ideas we picture in our minds would be a product of struggle.’ This is the type of relationship that gives birth to new ideas. It exists between dissimilar or seemingly opposed variables. It is a struggle because it involves critical rigor or clash of ideas and it is creative because it produces something new or opens new vistas for thought. There are others which are beyond our scope here.

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association. Associating our ideas of the present universe with a possible universe can only give us a picture similar to the universe we know. We can conclude for the sake of argument that other universes do not exist because no one has seen or visited those universes. Or, we can conclude that they exist because the present universe exists and we can imagine that other universes might as well exist. But what do these two arguments tell us? It is not strictly about a dilemma, though that is part of it; it is about a possibility. The possibility that there can be something that is perceptible/detectable and something that is only imaginable at the same time. This type of inference is validated by a system of logic like Ezumezu. Ezumezu is a three-valued logic in which contradiction can, in some contexts be diluted to complementarity, bivalence extended to trivalence to obtain truth-glut instead of truth-gap.10 It is the logic that directs the motion and relationships of variables or existents. To make sense of this, it is important to engage with the following question: how do we structure reality in nmekọka metaphysics? There are two theses: logical and ontological. The logical thesis, on the one hand, stipulates that there are two modes of inference, the complementary and the contextual. In the complementary mode, any interpretation of reality is possible. The existence of other universes is possible. Something that is perceptible/detectable and something that is imaginable can both hold. But in the contextual mode, where inferences are reduced to specifics, possibility is displaced by necessity. In the contextual mode, propositions are necessarily true or false. This present universe exists, it is not the case that it does not, and it cannot be the case that it is possible. Ontological thesis, on the other hand, stipulates that realities exist as individual units but which necessarily interact with one another. It is this interaction that activates each reality, defines its unique attributes and those it shares in common with other realities. The process of interaction among diverse realities is directed by motion and nmekọ. In this understanding, realities are conceived in nmekọka metaphysics as being constantly in motion within which they construct intersecting relationships as already described earlier. The previous discussion on ontological thesis brings us to the second component of metaphysics, namely, ontology. As stated earlier, we will address two questions: (1) What is the nature of things? (2) Can there be something that is perceptible/detectable and something that is only  See JO Chimakonam (2017b, 2018c, 2019).

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imaginable at the same time? Ontology is a subfield of metaphysics that studies the nature of being. Here, we want to present the nmekọka ontological category. These are from the Igbo language and translate to ‘being,’ ‘nothingness’ and ‘being-in.’ There are also three categories of existence in nmekọka: ife di ̣, ife nki ̣tị11 and ife izugbe. There are also four classes of being in nmekọka metaphysics: ife nmụọ, ife ụwa, ife enu and ife ezi. Nmekọka can be analyzed using the diamond analytic tool or what can be called the Analytics of Nmekọka Ontology as captured in Fig. 2.1. Ife di ̣: This is an Igbo concept that means what exists. Ife dị, which translates to ‘thing that is,’ is being in nmekọka metaphysics. It has two aspects: ife nmụọ, which translates to ‘thing that is in the mind,’ meaning imagined reality; and ife ụwa,12 which translates to ‘thing that is in the universe,’ meaning perceptible/detectable reality or those realities that are out there in the universe. While ife nmụọ are those realities that are present in human imagination which cannot be perceived or detected, ife ụwa Ife nkịtị

(Ife nmụọ) (Ife enu) Ife dị

Ife izugbe (Ife ụwa)

(Ife ezi)

Fig. 2.1  Analytics of nmekọka ontology 11  The concept of ife di ̣ and ife nki ̣ti ̣ were first articulated by Emmanuel Edeh (1999) in his ife hypothesis. Whereas we preserved his rendering of ife dị as being, there is a slight twist to our conceptualization of ife nkịtị. Whereas Edeh translates ife nkịti ̣ as ‘nothing’ or ‘thing ordinary,’ which inspired him to define it as a class of inanimate things, we translate it as ‘thing that is nothing,’ which yields ‘nothingness.’ Edeh made a mistake in his translation of ife nki ̣ti.̣ While ife literally means ‘thing,’ nkịti ̣ does not translate to ‘ordinary’ but to ‘nothing.’ 12  The concept of ụwa was first articulated by Pantaleon Iroegbu (1995) in his metaphysical theory called ụwa ontology. See Chap. 4. In his book he rendered ụwa as world or globe; here we render it as universe.

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are those realities around us in the universe. An example of ife nmụọ would be ajo nmụọ or evil spirit. It exists in our imagination. We cannot say that the idea is generated from anything we can perceive in the universe. The existence of ife nmụọ is proof of the power of human imagination to create realities which do not exist in the universe in the structure of ife ụwa. Ife ụwa are perceptible or technologically detectable. Ife ụwa is further divided into two: ife enu, which translates to ‘thing that is up there,’ meaning abstract reality; and ife ezi, which translates to ‘thing that is out there,’ meaning concrete reality. Ife enu are ideas abstracted from ife ezi. They exist as generics of their concrete versions. For example, we can talk of nwa nmadu or an individual human being as ife ezi, but we can have the abstract idea of nmadu or human being which is generic or possessing the abstract universal idea which umu nmadu or human beings share in common. The power of ife hypothesis in articulating being has not been fully acknowledged since Edeh put it forward in his 1985 book Towards an Igbo Metaphysics. In it, all classes of being are prefixed with ife, which translates as ‘thing.’ This allows the African metaphysician to conceive both perceptible and imperceptible realities. Ife becomes a powerful qualifier that classifies being. So, we do not just talk about being in a binary of abstract and concrete; we can further subdivide the abstract and the concrete into different subclasses. Ife, therefore, allows us to present a more comprehensive picture of reality, whether in the universe, in other possible universes or in the human mind. Ife nki ̣tị: This derives from Igbo language and translates to ‘thing that is nothing’ or ‘thing that does not exist.’ Here, we render ife nki ̣ti ̣ as nothingness. But nothingness in nmekọka metaphysics is a category of being made manifest by the qualifier ife. But just what type of being is ife nkịti ̣ is bound to generate controversy. If we render ife nkịti ̣ as nothingness, how is nothingness being? Perhaps, we have to start by clarifying that by nothingness we do not mean lack of being or absence of being as Plotinus conceived it.13 Ife nkịti ̣ is a being of a category different to the substantial being. The substantial being belongs to the subcategory of ife ụwa. Ife nki ̣tị is a category that is better described not by highlighting its lack of substance but by highlighting its categorical difference. The reason is that if ife nkịtị is not substantial, the use of substantial linguistic characteristics or their negation to describe it would be mistaken.  See Plotinus, The Enneads (1966–1968).

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Similarly, the practise of describing the spiritual or immaterial realities, which is common in extant metaphysical literature in African philosophy, is mistaken.14 Most African scholars simply draw up the category of the spiritual and move on with their discussion as if the subject is that simple. Some even relapse to aggregating deities, gods, ancestors and all kinds of spirits as members of the set of spiritual or immaterial realities. In these mistaken exercises, some African scholars have blurred the line between pneumatology and ontology. While pneumatology is the study of spirits and spiritual beings, ontology is the study of the nature of being. There is a common practice of presenting the former as the latter or conflating both in learned scientific papers by some African scholars. This is an appalling case of widespread creative surrender. The so-called spiritual or immaterial realities that one comes across in the literature on African studies is a bad rendering of the metaphysical category of ife nkịti ̣—nothingness. Ife nki ̣ti is a category of being that cannot exist in this universe. Because it is not substantial or space–time-bound, it cannot even be said to exist. But is it not the case that anything that is being necessarily should exist? Yes, but that is also why ife nkịti ̣ is described as nothingness, except that it is nothingness concerning the space–time-bound universe. Let us for the sake of argument imagine that there are other universes governed by different or nonphysical laws other than space–time continuum, such universes would seem like a perfect abode for nothingness. Ife nkịti ̣ is a being that lacks substance but has other properties we cannot perceive. How do we know that nothingness is something? How can we understand its nature? Ife gives us a clue that nothingness is something, but that is all we know. It is a thought in the mind which makes it share some affinity with ife nmụọ. We have no way of deciphering the actual nature of nothingness. Any attempt would lead us to modeling nothingness after substantial being. So, we would end up like Plotinus who thought of it as a lack or absence of being, but this is mistaken. It is mistaken because we are allowing our idiosyncrasies to shape our vision of nothingness. We can imagine ife nkịtị or the idea of nothingness, but not any specific reality that can be described as nothingness. Can we create the idea of nothingness in our imagination that is not abstracted from any perceptible reality? We have demonstrated that the human mind can do this with the idea of ajo nmụọ or evil spirit. There is no perceptible reality out there that can be described as evil or spirit from which we generated the idea of an  See, for example, the analysis in Onunwa (2011) and Ijiomah (2005).

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evil spirit. Can we not also do this with nothingness? We can. If we can construct a belief trope and associate that with any known reality in ife ụwa, from which we can abstract the image of nothingness. In creating the idea of ajo nmụọ, it seems that what the human mind did was to construct a belief trope that spirits exist in a certain universe called the spiritual realm. Then, it associated the nature of these spirits with perceptible realities like humans and animals. It is from the physical structure of humans and animals that the mind abstracted the grotesque and uncanny ideas of spirits. These images have to be uncanny and grotesque in order to become spirits. If we imagine them clearly, we would find that we were imagining humans or animals—things we are familiar with in ife ụwa. However one looks at it, it seems impossible to know what nothingness is like. But the forceful fact that nkiti is qualified with ife in nmekọka metaphysics makes ife nkịti ̣ a category of being that is too difficult to ignore. Ntapịa is required to decode or decrypt ife nki ̣tị, but first, we need to have a picture that is clear enough for ntapịa to take over. We do not have it. Ife nki ̣tị is something that is elusive not only for the senses to perceive or the technologies to detect but for the mind to imagine. All that we have is that isolated yet very strong idea of nothingness unsupported by any other idea. But for the simple fact that this idea exists somewhere in the mind, we cannot give it up or dismiss it. Ife nki ̣ti ̣, then, is a problem of metaphysics and it is up to the metaphysicians to decipher the nature of nothingness as a category of being. Ife izugbe: This comes from the Igbo language and translates to ‘thing in a complementary or universal state.’ The emphasis here is not on the being under this category, but on the state in which that being lies. To understand this idea of ‘state of being’ or ‘beingness,’ one must understand the truth-glut in a three-valued system of logic. In Ezumezu logic, for example, there are two extreme values, and there is an intermediate value that lies between the two. Think of the two polar values truth and false as contextual modes of interpretation and the intermediate value as the complementary mode of interpretation.15 Inferences to the former are about specific realities while those to the latter are about abstractions. We can talk of enyi or elephant and nnunu or bird as specific realities that are ife ezi. But we can also talk about enyi-nnunu or elephant-bird except that it would not be as ife ezi. It would be as ife izugbe. This is a state of 15  These two inferential modes are discussed as the symbolic formulae cmi1 and cmi2 in Chimakonam (2019: 99).

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possibility. The being in this state is a possible being—one that could exist, if not now, at some point in the future; if not in this universe, in some other universe. This being is not an indeterminate being—one whose existence is neither true nor false. In other variants of three-valued logic such as those of Jan Lukasiewicz (1970) and Stephen Kleene (1952), the being in the intermediate value would be an indeterminate being. This is because, whether in a realist or epistemic reading of the intermediate value, the two polar values that bestride it are interpreted as contradictories, which means that the intermediate value is a truth-gap. In the Ezumezu system, the polar values are read as subcontraries, meaning that in the intermediate platform, if one holds, the other could still hold. So, understanding the logic that undergirds nmekọka metaphysics is key to understanding ife izugbe as a state of beingness. This beingness is a being of possibility—a continuously unfolding reality, one which we cannot be hard and fast about in determining its nature. Somehow, the other two categories of being, ife di ̣ and ife nkịtị, along with the four classes of being converge at ife izugbe. Through ife di ̣, ife nmụọ and ife ụwa converge at ife izugbe. Through ife nmụọ, we can add the category of ife nki ̣ti ̣ to the list, and through ife ụwa, we can add the classes of ife enu and ife ezi to the list as well. At ife izugbe, they complement each other without losing their individual identities. It is specifically because they retain their individual identities that it makes it difficult to determine the actual nature of ife izugbe. At one end, we are talking of a distinct being, and at the other end, we are talking of two distinct beings. How to account for the nature of ife izugbe appears problematic. But once we realize that ife izugbe is about a state where beings with different ontological categories converge, then the emphasis shifts from those converging beings to the state where they converge. A good example of ife izugbe as already stated would be enyi-nnunu. Here, we have enyi or elephant and nnunu or bird, both of which are ife ezi belonging to the category of ife ụwa. But enyi-nnunu or elephant-bird belongs to the category of ife nmụọ. While enyi and nnunu are perceptible concrete realities, enyi-nnunu is not. It is an imagined reality, the ideas of which were abstracted from their concrete versions and associated together to create the being enyi-nnunu. This being exists because we can apply the tools of nkwuwa and ntapi ̣a to study it. But it exists in the mind as a possible being whose nature could be ife nmụọ and ife ụwa simultaneously.

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Conclusion Metaphysics studies reality as a whole, in both ontological and cosmological dimensions. But why should we talk about African and Western metaphysics instead of just metaphysics, or even metaphysics in a place? The answer, awkwardly, is cultural politics. The philosopher in the West can afford to say metaphysics because the Western philosophical tradition is dominant. But the philosopher in Africa cannot afford to be so carefree and nonchalant toward the underlying politics in academia. The African philosophical tradition is at the periphery and is faced with constant struggle to assert itself. Predicating any of its accomplishments with ‘African’ is one way of asserting itself. Otherwise, there is a grim reality that what little accomplishment it makes can easily dissolve and disappear into the ocean of Western philosophical accumulation. So the use of the predicate ‘African’ to qualify the metaphysical, epistemological or even logical contributions from Africa is not by choice; it is necessitated by circumstance. It is a form of cultural politics,16 a necessary one. It is a shame when some uninformed commentators and critics latch onto the seemingly controversial label to criticize the philosophical exercises in the African tradition; or when some misinformed cultural jingoists interpret the predication as defining a form of regional knowledge economy—something peculiar or that defines uniqueness of some sort. We do acknowledge that there can be perspectives to metaphysics, epistemology and logic which could be traced to different cultural places where the questions of philosophy arise. However, these perspectives do not bode difference in an exclusive sense. They do so in terms of cultural contributions to a common epistemic project. And these different shades of contributions are methodological. When we talk about African, Western or Asian philosophical traditions, we are talking about different methods or approaches to the same philosophical enquiry. It is in this sense that some people talk of letting a thousand flowers bloom. It is like acknowledging that there can be different routes to Mecca. We must think of the philosophical traditions as different routes to knowledge. It may be possible to say that one route is shorter and another is smoother, and yet another is safer, but we should never engage in the sort of animadversions that discount one’s route and absolutize ours. That sort of inclination, to say the least, is the death of freedom of thought.  Richard Rorty (2007) discussed this idea.

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What we have done in this chapter is partly to study the metaphysical contributions from Africa. African philosophy is a tradition under which the categories of knowledge developed in the African place are arranged. As a tradition, it represents the contribution of the African place and not, as some erroneously suppose, categories that are African culture–bound.

References Agada, A. 2015. Existence and Consolation: Reinventing Ontology, Gnosis and Values in African Philosophy, ed. Jonathan Chimakonam. Minnesota: Paragon House. Anizoba, O.E. 1986. The Dignity of Man in Igbo Traditional Belief. Unpub. PhD Thesis, University of Nigeria. Asouzu, I.I. 2004. The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar. ———. 2007. Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology, Beyond World-­ Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Imposition, 2007. London: Transaction. Ayoade, J.A. 1984. Time in Yoruba Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 3rd ed., 93–112. Lanham: University Press of America. Chimakonam, J.O. 2015. Conversational Philosophy as a New School of Thought in African Philosophy: A Conversation with Bruce Janz on the Concept of “Philosophical Space”. Confluence: Journal of World Philosophies 3: 9–40. ———. 2017a. Conversationalism as an Emerging Method of Thinking in and Beyond African Philosophy. Acta Academica 47 (2): 11–33. ———. 2017b. The Question of African Logic: Beyond Apologia and Polemics. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy, ed. Adeshina Afolayan and Toyin Falola, 106–128. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2018a. The Journey of Reason in African Philosophy. In Ka-Osi-SỌ -Onye: African Philosophy in the Postmodern Era, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam and Edwin Etieyibo, 1–20. Delaware: Vernon Press. ———. 2018b. The ‘Demise’ of Philosophical Universalism and the Rise of Conversational Thinking in Contemporary African Philosophy. In Method, Substance, and the Future of African Philosophy, ed. Edwin Etieyibo, 135–159. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2018c. The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm. In Philosophical Perceptions on Logic and Order, ed. Jeremy Horne, 96–121. Hershey: IGI Global. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer.

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Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Danquah, J.B. 1968. The Akan Doctrine of God. 2nd ed. New  York: Humanities Press. Edeh, E. 1999. Towards an Igbo Metaphysics (First Published, 1985 by Loyola University Press). Enugu: Our Saviour Press. Edet, M. 2016. Innocent Onyewuenyi’s Philosophical Re-appraisal of the African Belief in Re-incarnation: A Conversational Study. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 5 (1): 76–99. Egbai, U.O. 2018. Why African Philosophers Should Build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2. Egbai, U.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2019. Why Conversational Thinking Could Be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189. Gillies, F. 1980. The Bantu Concept of Time. Religion 10 (1): 16–30. https:// doi.org/10.1016/0048-­721X(80)90025-­1. Grauile, M. 1965. Conversations with Ogotemmeli. London: Oxford University Press. Gyekye, K. 1984. Akan Concept of a Person. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 3rd ed., 199–212. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 1992. Person and Community in African Thought. In Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, 1, ed. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, 101–122. Washington, DC: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. Hegel, G.W.F. 1975. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hountondji, P. 1996. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. 2nd rev ed. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Ijiomah, C. 2004. References to the Ultimate Reality and Meaning in an African Language: Further Contribution to the URAM Igbo Studies (URAM 5: 188–209; 7: 84–101; 13: 134–44). URAM 27 (1): 70–81. ———. 2005. Some Epistemological Tools with which Africans Relate to Their Realites. Ultimate Reality and Meaning 28 (1): 75–87. Ikenga-Metuh, E.E. 1981. God and Man in Africa. London: Geoffrey Chapman. Iroegbu, P. 1995. Metaphysics the Kpim of Philosophy. Owerri: International Universities Press. James, G. 1954. Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library.

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Kagame, A. 1956. La philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de l’ Etre. Bruxelles: Acedémie Royale des Sciences Coloniales. Kleene, C.S. 1952. Introduction to Metamathematics. Amsterdam: North Holland. Lajul, W. 2017. African Metaphysics: Traditional and Modern Discussions. In Themes, Issues and Problems in African Philosophy, ed. I.E. Ukpokolo, 19–48. New York: Palgrave. Levy-Brhul, L. 1947. Primitive Mentality. Paris: University of France Press. Łukasiewicz, J. 1970. On Three-Valued Logic. In Selected Works by Jan Łukasiewicz, ed. L.  Borkowski, 87–88. (First Published, 1920). Amsterdam: North–Holland. Matolino, B. 2014. Personhood in African Philosophy. Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Mbiti, J. 1969. African Religions and Philosophy. London/Ibadan: Heinemann. Mckenzie, E. 1973. Time in European and African Philosophy: A Comparison. Caribbean Quarterly 19 (3): 77–85. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 3rd ed., 41–55. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 2004. Physical and Metaphysical Understanding Nature, Agency, and Causation in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives, ed. Lee M. Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2018. Person and Community—A Retrospective Statement. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (2): 162–167. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i2.10. Nwala, U. 1985. Igbo Philosophy. London: Lantern Books. Obenga, T. 2004. Egypt: Ancient History of African Philosophy. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu. Oxford: Blackwell. Okolo, C.B. 1998. Self as a Problem in African Philosophy. In African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H.  Coetzee and A.P.J.  Roux, 248–258. London/New York: Routledge. Olela, H. 1984. The African Foundations of Greek Philosophy. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard A. Wright, 3rd ed. Lanham: University Press of America. Oluwole, S.B. 2014. Socrates and Orunmila: Two Patron Saints of Classical Philosophy. Lagos: Ark Publishers. Onunwa, U. 1991. Humanism: The Bedrock of African Traditional Religion and Culture. Religious Humanism XXV (2): 66–71. ———. 1994. The Individual and Community in African Traditional Religion and Society. The Mankind Quarterly XXXIV (3): 249–260. ———. 2011. Humanistic Basis for African Traditional Religious Theology and Ethics: A Challenge to the Church in Nigeria. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religion 1 (1): 39–61.

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Onwuanibe, R. 1984. The Human Person and Immortality in Ibo Metaphysics. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 3rd ed., 183–198. Lanham: University Press of America. Onyewuenyi, I. 1993. African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism. Enugu: SNAAP Press. ———. 1996. The African Belief in Re-incarnation: A Philosophical Reappraisal. Enugu: Snaap Press. Ozumba, G.O. 2004. African Traditional Metaphysics. Quodlibet Journal 6(3). http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/ozumba-­africa.shtml (retrieved 7th January, 2015). Parratt, J. 1977. Time in traditional African Thought. Religion 7 (2): 117–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-­721X(77)90019-­7. Plotinus. The Enneads. Trans. A.H. Armstrong, Including the Greek, in 7 Volumes (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard-London: 1966–1968). Popkin, R. 1977–1978. Hume’s Racism. The Philosophical Forum 9 (2–3): 213–218. Rorty, R. 2007. Philosophy as Cultural Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ruch, E.A., and K.C. Anyanwu. 1981. African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa. Rome: Catholic Book Agency. Teffo, L.J., and A.P.J.  Roux. 1998. Metaphysical Thinking in Africa. In The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H.  Coetzee and A.P.J.  Roux, 134–148. London/New York: Routledge. Tempels, P. 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Yongho, N.N. 2013. Theory of African Metaphysics. Columbia: Createspace. Zahan, D. 1970. The Religion, Spirituality and Thought of Traditional Africa. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

CHAPTER 3

Metaphysical Themes in Consolation Philosophy

Introduction Ada Agada is the main exponent of the system of consolationism. He is a member of the Conversational School of Philosophy convened at the University of Calabar, which endorses the method of conversational thinking. Consolationism, like other systems by advocates of the conversational school, bases its logic on context-dependence of variables, propositions and inferences, and on the notion of nmekọ or relationship which is exemplified in the principle of complementarity of seemingly opposed variables. The system of consolationism contains metaphysical themes that can be  presented through the methodological framework of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic.  In this chapter, we will attempt among others, to demonstrate that the assumptions of consolationism can be derived with the conversational method and grounded in a truth-glut three-valued logic. Agada’s system is a tightly knitted network of metaphysical themes which condense the universe and its manifestations in the doctrine of mood. This doctrine is necessitated by the inexplicable conspiracy of events in the universe, in which purpose is scuttled at the cusp of its realization. A universe that gives every sign of perfection in the ontological progression of a human being suddenly comes short of delivering this promise with the scythe of death. Purpose becomes not just unattainable but © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_3

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impossible. Agada is then compelled to ask: “is the universe pointless?” and is human life futile? (2015a: 126). Realizing the purpose of life, which is perfection might be impossible, but life itself is not meaningless. Humans find meaning in the consolation which they achieve through daily negotiations in the moods of joy and sadness. It is not perfection, and it falls short of the desired purpose in life, but it is something to fall back on. Life, pestered and petered by the exigencies of fate, freedom and determinism, becomes the fabled LongJohn’s bicycle which carries you for a few kilometers and breaks down so that you can carry it for the next few kilometers. It is not the best or even the desired end, but it is a consolation. This consolation is achieved by the functional complementarity of the moods of joy and sadness. Conversational thinking is the method that defines the type of scenario in which two seemingly opposed variables come together to interact (Chimakonam and Egbai 2016; Egbai 2018; Chimakonam 2017a). The central notion here is nmekọ characterized as a relationship that can manifest in what Agada calls the “melancholy being” (2015a: 8). Agada says that the melancholy being is “man and woman—in the world, for whom anxiety signposts the fundamental emotionality that roots all rationality.” In this being, there is a struggle between reason and emotion, joy and sadness, optimism and pessimism, and so on. Yet, it is the possibility of a coming together and a working together of seemingly opposed variables that highlight conversational thinking as a veritable method of philosophizing in Africa and the world at large (Chimakonam 2018a; Egbai and Chimakonam 2019). From method to logic, we see a grounding of consolationism in Ezumezu1—a model three-valued system developed to undergird the method of conversational thinking. Ezumezu purveys the logical framework for the justification of inferences of the complementary type, where opposing variables are read as subcontraries rather than as contradictories. Ezumezu provides for two modes of inferences: the contextual and the complementary. The identity of variables are preserved in contexts, so also is the valuation of propositions, but it is in the complementary mode that the interconnectedness and the interdependence of variables are demonstrated to home in on the fact that realities in African metaphysical thinking exist in a network. As many more concepts continue to be unveiled in African philosophy, conversational method and Ezumezu logic remain crucial in explicating and justifying these developments. Consolationism, which comprises of an 1  See JO Chimakonam (2017b, 2018b, 2019) for a detailed formulation of this system of logic.

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intricate network of metaphysical themes, has as its main objective the exploration of the meaningfulness of human existence in a universe where an ultimate purpose is elusive. The pursuit of meaning for human existence provides a soft landing where the quest for an ultimate purpose becomes futile. In this chapter, we will discuss the key metaphysical themes of consolationism.

Preface to Consolationism Perhaps, one of the ways to highlight the giant step that consolationist metaphysics represents is to draw attention to a paradigm shift. Before Agada, several African philosophers have undertaken excursions into the field of metaphysics. Interestingly, most of such attempts were cultural excavations. Agada scaled beyond these voices of the tribe to post a robust individual reflective agenda. For lack of space, we will identify and discuss three of such prominent programs with ethnocentric commitments. The three efforts that would be considered include Placide Tempel’s Bantu philosophy, Alexis Kagame’s Bantu-Rwandese philosophy and Mogobe Ramose’s ubuntu philosophy. Interestingly, all three are about the Bantu cultures from the Congo, Rwanda and Southern Africa. The first is Placide Tempels’ notorious Bantu philosophy. Initially well received and then literally despised for the role Tempels cast for himself. Tempels was the shepherd of the Bantu. The Bantu had lush vegetation which they could not see. He alone could see it; and who else, but he, has the responsibility to guide the flock to the green field for grazing. Tempels is widely believed to be the first scholar to present the Bantu-African notion of being, which he sees as central to Bantu-African philosophy. His argument is that, for the Bantu, being is force or at least inseparable from force. This force, for him, is not transcendental but an attribute of being. This is buttressed by him in the following words: We conceive the transcendental notion of “being” by separating it from its attribute, “force”, but the Bantu cannot. “Force” in his thought is necessary element in “being”, and the concept “force” is inseparable from the definition of “being”. There is no idea among Bantu of “being” divorced from the idea of “force”- Without the element “force”, being cannot be ­conceived. … What has been said above should be accepted as the basis of Bantu ontology; in particular, the concept “force” is bound to the concept “being” even in the most abstract thinking upon notion of being. (1969: 50–51)

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The idea that Tempels projects here is that there is no way that the Bantu-­ African can talk about being without the idea of force. This is because force is the animating property of being. This idea of force—vital force— denies being, in the Bantu-African context, its abstract dimension. For Tempels, there is a rough dynamism between the abstract and the concrete. “We (the West) hold a static conception of ‘being’, they (Africans), a dynamic” (Tempels 1969: 50–51). But Innocent Asouzu quips that “although he (Tempels) tells us that the Bantu notion of being is dynamic, he goes on to reduce this notion to something that is fixed” (2007a: 183). By making force a necessary part of being or the animator of being, he unifies both the abstract and the concrete. Yet, in a way, force appears similar to Aristotle’s substance. If it is the most important of the two components, the very essence of his ontology, then Tempels has replicated the Aristotelian Western notion of being that is static instead of dynamic. Tempels says that what he did was to give an account of the Bantu conception of being. It was not his own account, even though what he produced ended up being colored by his Western philosophical orientation. So, the major problem with his attempt is that critics have found a way to show that his account of the Bantu conception of being was inaccurate. And with the initial excitement it generated, many were misled by his proposal—something Asouzu (2007b: 74–75) describes as the “Tempelsian Damage.” The second is Alexis Kagame’s Bantu-Rwandese philosophy (1956), modelled after Tempels’ project. Kagame was one of those victims of the ‘Tempelsian Damage’ who adopted the model of Tempels. One may ask, after Bantu philosophy, was there a need for Bantu-Rwandese philosophy? He was a chronicler of community thought, an archiver of ethnic legacy or an excavator of local ideas. He dedicated his time to give an account of Rwanda-Bantu ontology. What one cannot deny is the influence of the thought of Tempels on him. This is to say that he started with the thought of Tempels but went beyond him. He notes that there are categories of being in the following hierarchical order: Muntu (human beings [the living human and the human dead] endowed with intelligence), Kintu or Ikintu (beings that are dependent on intelligent beings, and they include animals, plants, minerals and inanimate objects), Hantu or Ahuntu (categories of place and time) and Kuntu or Ukuntu (categories of mode) (Jahn 1961; Masolo 1994: 87; see also  Uduma 2003; Unah 2009). According to Kagame, the common denominator among these categories of beings is ntu. Ntu is that which binds all of these categories of being

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together. It is that which enhances relationship and interaction among beings in the cosmos. In this light, it is related to Tempels’ force (vital force), which connects all realities in the cosmos. Like Tempels, Kagame observes that what underlies these four categories of being is force. What they have in common is force. And this force is what is identified as Ntu. Ntu is what acts as a relationship existing among these four categories of being. Ntu is found in Mu, Ki, Ha and Ku. What this implies is that no category of being exists without ntu. This makes ntu the force that does not exist alone, but with other particular or individual realities. Janheinz Jahn captures this point thus: Ntu is the universal force … which however, never occurs apart from its manifestations: muntu, kintu, hantu and kuntu. Ntu is being itself and cosmic universal force. Ntu is that force in which being and being coalesce. … Ntu expresses not the effect of these forces, but their being. But the forces act continually, and are constantly effective. (1961: 99ff)

The idea is that ntu is inseparable from other categories of existence. If ntu is separated from those categories, they will cease to exist. This makes it the life-giving force in being. Again, like Tempels before him, Kagame has merely given an account of the Bantu ideas of being. The Bantu-Rwandese project was a cultural excavation—a type of exercise in dusting up the archives and putting things into perspective. Kagame was the voice of his culture area. The third is Mogobe Ramose’s account of ubuntu philosophy. Ramose’s poise in his book is like that of a village custodian who knows everything about the village. He has, very much like Samkange and Samkange before him, earned the title of the steward of the Bantu who knows all the norms and keeps the chest containing the legacies of the true Bantu philosophy under his wooden, bamboo, time-smoked bed. But one major observation which a Ramose reader readily makes is where the Bantu worldview ended and where Ramose’s original ideas began. Most of the concepts which Ramose has used to articulate his own account are also present in the accounts supplied by the likes of A Kagame (1956), J Jahn (1961), S Samkange and T Samkange (1980) and M Bhengu (1996), all of whom came earlier than Ramose’s account. Interestingly, their interpretations of those concepts are strikingly similar except for some nuances. This makes it difficult to ascertain the originality of the entire corpus produced by ubuntu scholars. So, perhaps, the best we can talk about might just be the

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originality of the different accounts, in the sense that, while working with the same cultural materials, various scholars were able to add their own twists and turns. For example, when Samkange and Samkange (1980) articulate ubuntu as a humanism, Ramose (2002) articulates it as a humanness, but the basis of their discourse remains the same—extant cultural narratives. So, while one could grant that there were touches of personal insight in Ramose’s account of ubuntu philosophy like Tempels and Kagame before him, as he unveiled the Bantu statuette, he was ultimately feasting on an existing archive. Like those before him, Ramose anchors his notion of being on the Shona-Bantu, Southern African word ubuntu (Ramose 2002). Although he sees ubuntu as wholeness and not fragmentary, he observes that ubuntu consists of two words ubu and ntu. As he put it, Ubuntu is actually two words in one. It consists of the prefix ubu- and the stem ntu. Ubu evokes the idea of being in general. It is enfolded being before it manifests itself in the concrete form or mode of existence of a particular entity. Ubu as enfolded being is always oriented towards unfoldment, that is, incessant continual concrete manifestation through particular forms and modes of being. In this sense ubu is always oriented towards ntu. At the ontological level, there is no strict and literal separation and division between ubu and ntu. Ubu- and -ntu are not two radical separate and irreconcilably opposed realities. (1998: 41)

This implies that in ubuntu ubu and ntu exist as inseparable aspects of oneness or wholeness with ontological and epistemological connotations. The preceding is similar to Tempels’ and Kagame’s accounts of the inseparability of being and force, Mu, Ki, Ha, Ku and ntu as the case may be. Ubu is ontological while ntu is epistemological since ubu manifests itself through ntu. Given that this is the case, ubu carries the same ontological connotation as Aristotle’s substance. However, for Ramose, ubu cannot exist without ntu, but for Aristotle, substance can exist without accident. Again, we see the influence of his Western training in his account of his people’s idea of being. Ubuntu ontology is not Ramose’s ontology; it is the ontology of his cultural place. We might be tempted to believe that Ramose projects a generic notion of being in his presentation of ubuntu ontology. This would not be correct. He was after a specific being, and that is umuntu—the human being. The preceding, for him, is a concrete being through which other beings

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can be known. According to him, “Umuntu is the specific entity which continues to conduct an inquiry into be-ing, experience, knowledge and truth” (2002: 41). Umuntu is homo-loquens (homo-sapiens), with the ability to communicate through speech. As such, it is being that can inquire into the nature of other beings. Given that this being umuntu is central in Ramose’s account of ubuntu ontology, it makes it similar to Heidegger’s dasein. Yet again, we see the influence of the West in his account. All three archivists highlighted gave accounts of the Bantu conception of being. The ubuntu they described is largely a worldview version peppered with various personal nuances. Thus, the raw material is not their own reflective original idea. The categories and metaphysical themes they discussed were either excavated from their local cultural worldviews or modelled after what already exists in Western literature. Also, they were all influenced by Western intellectual tradition: Tempels, because he was a Westerner, and Kagame and Ramose because they were educated in the West. Granted that each embellished his account with patches of personal insight, none could transcend the entrapments of cultural voices of the Bantu. This draws a line between these three and Agada, whose attempt at streamlining some metaphysical themes displayed creative originality and individual insight. What Agada put forward can be credited to him, his ideas. He exited the bounds of ethnophilosophy by creating original ideas even though his inspiration came from the African worldview. This is the way to advance the frontiers of African philosophy. While not discounting the intellectual value of the archivist program, especially in setting up debates on traditional African philosophies, their actual philosophical worth in system-building is low. The preceding is the reason scholars like Bernard Matolino and Wenceslaus Kwindingwi (2013) and Matolino (2015), for example, dismiss the cultural corpus-ubuntu as moribund, outmoded, dead and uninspiring in modern times. But some (Metz 2014; Chimakonam 2016; Koenane and Olatunji 2017), have rejected Matolino’s hasty house-clearing exercise. The problem with ubuntu is not that it cannot supply fodder for new systems; those working on the fodder should aim for higher methodological and theoretic revisions so as to add significant value to the excavated resources. Until the raw materials of ubuntu community thought are deployed in a reflective exercise aimed at birthing new ideas and systems, ubuntu as a community thought would appear as surplus to philosophical requirement in the modern age. The sort of thing Agada is doing with some metaphysical themes, which is the

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focus of this chapter, has been lacking in the exercises on ubuntu and related thoughts in African philosophy. It must be noted that while quite a number of scholars have sought to conceptualize and interpret ubuntu, apply it on different topics or discuss it in diverse ways that are not short of scholarly excitement,2 the problem that remains to be addressed is the methodological extensions of ubuntu beyond the worldview archive. Some philosophers believe that they are doing just that3; that they are in the business of revising, systematizing, modernizing, theorizing, retheorizing and even reconceptualizing ubuntu as a veritable program of African humanism. But the question is how exactly are they doing those things and for what purpose? The philosopher Leonhard Praeg (2014), for example, has attempted a robust anthropological, sociological, political and, of course, philosophical analysis of the concept of ubuntu, both as a humanism and as a communitarianism, but one can see the heavy leaning on the Western intellectual parameters of logic, method and the guiding principles of his presentation. Praeg’s book, A Report on Ubuntu, for all of its depth and critical insight, appears like a Western perspectival discourse on ubuntu. And this is the major shortcoming of various scholarly output on ubuntu. Most of the authors on ubuntu, and it does not matter what group one belongs, or even the cultural background, were trained in either the analytic or continental sub-­ traditions of Western philosophy, and they bring all that baggage to bear in their constructive and reconstructive exercises on ubuntu as an African humanism. While a Western perspectival study of a theme in African intellectual history should interest any scholar, it is no substitute for an approach that stems from the perspective of African episteme. It is the output of the latter approach that we can correctly call ‘African humanism,’ ‘African communitarianism’ or any other thing for that matter. This is not a suggestion that some persons are incapable or unqualified to do African scholarship for not being culturally Africans, as some have alarmingly argued. No, not at all! After all, there are folks who are not culturally Westerners yet are able to do Western philosophy. It is a question of training; we must admit this, first and foremost. And then, it is a 2  See, for example, the work of M Bhengu (1996), T Metz (2007), I Keevy (2009), F M Murove (2010), C Gade (2011) and L Praeg and S Magadla (eds 2014). 3  See, for example, S Samkange and T Samkange (1980), A Shutte (2001), M Ramose (2002), J Bewaji and M Ramose (2003), T Metz (2007), V Niekerk (2007), C Gade (2012) and L Praeg (2008, 2014).

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question of interest. But above all, it is ultimately a question of recognition and respect. One who has no regard for Africa and its cultural and intellectual history is unlikely to accept that an approach to philosophizing, which can be called ‘African,’ and which is logically and methodologically different, exists. While it is difficult to know what motivates different actors on the ubuntu scholarship—lack of expertise, lack of interest or lack of respect—we can, at least, humbly make an effort to abandon, sometimes, our compelled philosophical pretensions. In this chapter, we are going to show how Agada, despite his training in the Western continental tradition, was able to make a veritable attempt through his consolationism, for an African perspectival contribution to metaphysics.

The Idea of a ‘Consolation’ Philosophy The intriguing term ‘consolation’ immediately gives one the idea of an affective formulation of an existentialist kind. While, indeed, consolationism engages the question of human emotion, it goes beyond the emotional to articulate the notion of ‘consolation’ in an abstract way. According to Agada, the term consolation is a universal category that best captures the condition of a reality that is expressed tragically and the conditioned beings that constitute this reality. Reality is expressed tragically because it is incomplete in the sense that evil—both physical and moral—adheres intimately to this reality even as the human mind cannot clearly identify the reason for the emergence of the universe and the purpose of human beings in this universe. The evidence for physical, or natural, evil can be seen in the facts of natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes, which impose a huge cost on human beings. The evidence for moral evil abounds in the destructive and even mind-boggling actions of human beings (Agada 2015a: 205–210). Physical nature manifests incompleteness in its destructive effects on living nature or things and in its being subject to degeneration just like conscious nature. The coexistence of evil (sometimes identified with the term terror in Agada’s thought) with good (sometimes identified with the term beauty) promotes the idea of progress in an otherwise tragic universe. The fact of evil makes the pursuit of good desirable. In the consolationist system, in the pursuit of good lies the promise of progress, which, however, never reaches its goal before striving entities degenerate and fade away. In this incomplete universe, something paradoxical is at work. While it is fated to remain incomplete, and therefore tragic, this same universe manifests

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characteristics of a yearning totality. According Agada, this yearning comes out clearly in the internal purpose that one sees everywhere. For example, the human sex gametes unite to form a zygote, and the zygote develops into a fetus, which eventually completes its gestation period, and a baby is born. In a sign of progress, the baby becomes an adolescent, then a teen, then an adult before degeneration sets in, thereby putting the very concept of progress in question just when one is almost convinced that a grand purpose is at work in the process of human evolution. The pessimistic dimension of reality comes into play as the entity that started so well, giving credence to the idea of progress, reaches old age and leaves the world-stage without arriving at any satisfactory knowledge of the purpose of their existence. Similar phenomena are observable in the physical sphere. A star is born and lives for millions or billions of years before fading out of existence. The same rainfall that nurtures plant life causes destructive flooding. Agada theorizes that the illusion of progress is the impression humans have as a result of the fact that yearning is the fundamental mode of existence. Yet, an entity and even the universe when taken as a totality can only be defined by yearning if there is a fundamental element or intimate state of all beings which directs conscious and unconscious behavioral patterns in living and nonliving things. Agada identifies this fundamental element as mood (see Agada 2013a, b, 2015b). The philosophy of consolation, therefore, becomes the doctrine of mood. We will provide a detailed discussion of the pivotal concept of mood in the next section. Thus, it is easy to see that for Agada, something which exists as mood and yearns for an unrealizable perfection persists under the category of consolation. Perfection, according to Agada, is what obtains when a state of completion—which yearning always indicates as worth attaining— comes into existence. An existent thing comes into being to fulfill the requirement of progress even though by its very nature, it cannot reach the goal of progress. The entity is enveloped by a tragic existential condition but persists in the search for perfection. In the course of this search, the entity, for example, the conscious human being, can realize moments of meaning in terms of achieving self-­ created goals that bring happiness. Not only are these moments of meaning instances of consolation but the very existence of this being itself is an instance of consolation since having become, it was never possible for this being to choose not to have been, and while it exists it strives toward fulfillment. Circumstances beyond this being bring it into existence, and this

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being has no option but to persist as long as it can while yearning for the higher state it seems constituted to attain even in the face of the truth of the impossibility of achieving this state. The existence of the human being is, therefore, consolatory. The human being is consoled by its state of being, however tragic, and in this state, it seeks the maximization of the emotion of joy while seeking to diminish the emotion of sadness. The existence of the universe is also consolatory because it comes into being seemingly without any grand purpose and yet manifests the yearning character that indicates perfection as its goal. This universe again is consolatory because in it coexist elements of beauty and terror, the good and the bad in a seemingly compensatory pattern. Herein lies Agada’s choice of the term consolation. About this term, he says specifically: Consolationism avers that a universe such as ours whose ultimate purpose the human mind can discern as completion/perfection but which never seems to reach this goal is a tragic universe. Yearning then seems to be in vain. In a universe where perfection is indicated and is yet not possible but in which striving is an eternal process that yields some level of satisfaction, such a universe is consolatory. The consolatory universe balances beauty and terror although death ultimately terminates the hope of the human consciousness that dares to dream of a final purpose which will see the realization of perfect existence for sentient beings and the completion of physical nature. (Agada 2019a: 5)

Human beings yearn, like nonhuman living things and non-sentient nature, but this yearning is in vain because the perfection of existence cannot happen. The moments of meaning in human life, when joy is increased, cannot last as sadness will sooner arrive to remind the human being of the futility of their striving. What is true for the human being is true for physical nature. The chief difference is that physical nature does not yearn consciously as the human being does. Agada (2019a: 5) writes further about what he means by the term consolation: Consolation defines the condition or state of being in a universe characterized by yearning and in which the goal of yearning, which is perfection, is unattainable. The standard of a yearning existent is very high indeed. If a thing yearns at all, its final purpose is the bringing into existence of a perfect state of affairs that endures and not merely achieving goods that cannot endure; and if this ideal state is impossible, doomed ultimately by the cessation of active consciousness in death, for instance, then the universe that is

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defined as a totality of striving is a tragic universe. Given the impossibility of the ideal, which the mind indicates, what subsists is what must be endured, and this is a consolation. The agreeable aspect (the beautiful) of universal existence, which counteracts the disagreeable aspect (terror), is consolation.

It must be noted that Agada’s consolationist system is a monistic system similar to the system espoused by Innocent Asouzu (2004) and Mogobe B.  Ramose (2002). Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda proposes the concept of entities as missing links of the totality of reality, where each link in itself is incomplete and cooperates with other incomplete links to advance progress in the universe. Ramose’s ubuntu ontology holds up a monistic universe in which being manifests itself as an event rather than the discrete, fragmentary dimensions that human language makes of things. The two African philosophers, whose positions can be labelled Afro-communitarian in view of the monistic conception of the universe as a community, provided Agada with the idea that everything in the universe can be unified. The preceding highlights the presence and influence of nmekọ, our notion for relationship directed by the logical principle of complementarity. Accordingly, consolationism sets out to reconcile mind and matter, emotion and reason, beauty and terror, good and bad, intellect and feeling, optimism and pessimism, joy and sadness,  and so on. The objective is not to blur dividing lines per se but to identify a unifying principle that makes it possible for us to think and rethink the phenomena of the world such as being, mind, matter, God, reason, emotion, freedom, determinism and fatalism. In the idea of mood, the Nigerian philosopher thinks he has found the unifying concept.

The Doctrine of Mood The doctrine of mood is articulated at two levels, that of ontology and philosophical psychology. At the level of ontology, mood is the essence of all things in the universe. It is a proto-mind from which advanced consciousness (mind) and matter arise. It is a proto-mind in the sense of being “primordial intelligence ubiquitous in the universe and characterized by yearning” (Agada 2019a: 4). In his earliest articulation of the concept of mood, Agada regards it as the primitive form of the universe which can best be understood by the exploration of human emotionality and the subsequent projection of feelings and yearnings into the observable nature.

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Mood is “thought shadowed by the primitive emotion of existence and of human life” (Agada 2013a: 256). What it means for a thing to be ‘moody’ is that it is defined as a yearning entity (Agada 2013b). The ‘moody’ thing is in a state of actuation or striving, be it a human being or a stone. When Agada says that mood is a kind of thought shadowed in the primitive emotion of existence he is trying to convey the idea of a fundamentally dynamic universe in which activity is conditioned by yearning. He is trying to say that this yearning, this primordial emotion that actuates things, is in itself the rationality of the universe since out of it emerges the thought we are familiar with as conscious beings. And since the universe has been posited as a tragedy in its very emergence, the basic condition of mood is one best described by the term melancholy. Melancholy is inseparable from mood. Wherever there is mood, there is also melancholy. For Agada, what we call nonliving things, which are potentially alive, do not escape the reach of melancholy. These supposedly nonliving things are only ignorant of their tragic condition. The moment they become aware of this condition, they become fully melancholy beings (Agada 2015a: 96–97, 245–269; 2019b). To distinguish his concept of melancholy from the term melancholia, Agada notes that melancholy is not synonymous with depression. Melancholy is constituted by the emotion of joy and sadness, which can be clearly studied through careful observation of human life. Joy and sadness are given important status in the consolationist system because of mood having been identified as the fundamental reality. Depression, on the other hand, is not sadness. Depression is a grave devaluation of sadness and is not desirable since it panders to nihilism and the pessimistic perspective of existence without paying attention to the optimistic perspective. Depression is pathological and a fit topic for psychology, while sadness is an orientation of conscious beings in a tragic universe. To experience melancholy, therefore, is to feel the emotions of joy and sadness. Both emotions reinforce and refine each other. The one is most keenly appreciated when the other has been experienced. An entity cannot be a melancholy being if it is incapable of experiencing joy and sadness, either actually or potentially. But can a stone experience melancholy? Agada’s answer is that a stone is a potential experiencer. He claims that just as it is plausible that life evolved from seemingly nonlife, the organic from the inorganic, so is it plausible that a stone will at some point reach a level of actuation that goes far beyond the fatalistic threshold and become sentient, evolving from the inorganic to the organic in its ill-fated moody

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journey of striving. The fatalistic threshold is the point at which the mood-­ essence of an entity causes it to become real enough for this entity to come into being (Agada 2015a: 237). Whatever actually exists has attained the fatalistic threshold. Whatever crosses the fatalistic threshold becomes actively conscious and able to respond to environmental stimuli. Plants, animals and humans have crossed the fatalistic threshold, but a stone is still in the vicinity of the fatalistic threshold. Just as there is a plant mood, an animal mood, a human mood, so is there an Eternal Mood. God is the Eternal Mood, not in the sense of lying outside the sphere of mood, which is a fundamental reality, but in the sense of Him as the highest embodiment of mood, as the entity in whom mood is most active in the service of the possessor of mood. In other words, God as the Eternal Mood means that it is God who, above all beings, has mastered mood and put it in His service. Instead of proving the existence of God, Agada attempts what he calls the ‘justification’ of the existence of God. With the Kantian critique of the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments for God’s existence showing clearly the difficulties accompanying the theoretical procedure of proving God’s existence, Agada assumes that it is more rewarding justifying God’s existence than proving it. A proof assumes that the criterion of certainty will be met while justification seeks to use the metaphysical arguments to strengthen an already existing faith in God’s existence and also shed light on the question of existence (Agada 2019c: 102). In justifying God’s existence, Agada discards the categories of omnipotence and omniscience because they are incompatible with the tragic and emotive universe he is describing. The categories of power and glory replace the old categories. The classical metaphysical proofs are basically the same because they implicate each other in the race to prove the existence of a perfect and self-created being, which the problem of causal regression frustrates. Agada (2015a: 109–110) argues: Underlying the famous triadic arguments is the problematic issue of causality, the effect-cause regression that seems unstoppable once the cause of any effect in the world has been identified. The three arguments are in fact versions of one main argument struggling to deal with one main problem, that is, the problem of infinite regress. Who made the world? God. Who made God? Blank. Faced with this problem, unbelieving thinkers comfort ­themselves with the cunning assertion that if God must necessarily exist, then the world could just as well have existed necessarily.

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Agada’s arguments for God’s existence which he directs primarily at the believer and secondarily at the individual interested in speculative metaphysics may be described as the arguments from abiogenesis and biogenesis. It goes like this: In a universe characterized by yearning, in which even advanced thinking is a form of yearning, human beings are emotional beings who derive meaning from the states of joy and sadness. Their knowledge and perspectives about the world are either optimistic or pessimistic in relation to the states of joy and sadness. The yearning that is expressed in great intensity in humans exists at a less intense level in nonhuman living things, diminishing further as the forms of life descend until the level of seemingly lifeless things are reached. But even seemingly lifeless matter obeys natural laws or acts in a regular manner that indicates the continuing operation of yearning. The preceding argues for a common origin of all things. A common origin means abiogenesis is plausible as a theory of the origin of life given that things appear to evolve upwardly, from lower forms to higher forms. Agada’s contention is that chance, and a purely mechanical process, cannot account for the transition from nonlife to life in all its complexity. As he puts it: The complexity of the universe is reflected in its finetuning; the complexity of the simplest cell and the human mind indicates clearly that natural causality cannot account for the eternity of the universe and the evolution of mind and matter. If we grant that physical evolution and biological evolution follow purely mechanical directionality we import teleology through the back door. If we are to fall back on chance the word ‘nature’ becomes pseudonymous for chance and must be treated as a thing, a creative unconscious will. By granting unconscious powers of creation to chance we personify it as a living principle and imbue it with mind. In which case, chance is no longer accidental but purposeful. Chance becomes what we call God, an intelligent designer. (Agada 2015a: 111–112)

But the consolationist universe is a living, dynamic universe where everything is either alive or potentially alive. It is not enough to say that God transforms what is nonlife to life. The argument from abiogenesis has to be supplemented or supported by the argument from biogenesis, the theory that life is basic and life produces life. The argument from biogenesis is significant and should be quoted at some length. According to Agada:

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Let us suppose that mechanical processes produced life and that these processes are eternal and do not require a master engineer and strategist. The problem of panpsychism rears its ugly head and gibbers at us. How can non-­life produce life if the germ of life is not already present in non-life? The point I want to make is that not only does abiogenesis lead to a belief in the eternity of matter but also, more spectacularly, in the eternity of mind or intelligence. It does not seem to us adequate that non-living matter should transform itself into living matter under certain physico-chemical conditions if the non-living matter did not already carry within itself the germ of life, not potentially but actually. That is to say, for a blind evolution to be valid or correct the idea of non-living matter in the world must be discarded and replaced by the idea that all matter is actually alive. Then the evolution of the universe is simply the development of life in many forms and in varying degrees of intensity and sophistication. And yet the evolution of life from life nullifies the radical formulation of abiogenesis. Non-life is no longer posited and we arrive at idealism. Life is related to mind. Mind is either the principle of life and therefore, prior to life or mind and life are one and the same thing or mind follows life as a consequence of life. If mind comes before life as its principle, we can argue for a God who is precisely this principle. If life and mind are contemporaneous and therefore one we can argue for a God who is co-existent with the eternally existing universe. If mind follows life, we can still argue for a God who evolved as a consequence of life and therefore younger than the universe. I call this primordial mind the Eternal Mood. (Agada 2015a: 112)

This quotation shows that the biogenetic argument points to the existence of God even if this God is ultimately limited in power and knowledge. Agada’s conception of mood has continued to evolve. In his earliest writings, he traces the concept of mood to the Idoma-African notion of owo and otu. The Idoma of Central Nigeria believe that every human being has an otu, mind, and an owo, guardian spirit. God is Owoicho, the greatest owo (see Agada 2015a: 35–39; 2018). Every entity in the universe also has owo, whether living or nonliving. The notion of owo is tied to the notion of otu, for otu emerges out of owo, ultimately, since owo is not merely a guardian spirit but a primitive mind. Owo is Agada’s source of the concept of mood. Consequently, Agada professes panpsychism. Since the traditional African conception of reality has no place for absolute idealism and radical panpsychism, his most recent writing shows a tendency to move away from idealism and radical panpsychism. He has recently indicated his

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interest in grounding the concept of mood in the African concept of vital force, which, we think, has always been an inspiration behind his conceptualization of mood (see Agada 2019a). Since the vital force is conceived as having both material and spiritual qualities, it is safe to say that Agada’s pivotal doctrine of mood will undergo further tweaking in the future. What is obvious from his writings so far is that he regards the human being as a melancholic being (homo melancholicus), God as the Eternal Mood who accounts who is powerful and glorious by virtue of his ability to manipulate mood and create things based on this manipulation but who cannot be appropriately described as omnipotent and omniscient. The epistemological framework he uses to support his universe where the dialectic of mood sustains change is panpsychism, the view that mentality is fundamental in the universe.

Freedom, Determinism and Fatalism It is expected that the understanding of reality as composed of yearning and entities that yearn will favor determinism. The system of consolationism is a deterministic one to the extent that everything is conditioned by mood. Nevertheless, Agada does not use the terms freedom (or free will) and determinism in the conventional sense. In much of Western philosophical literature, freedom is conceived as the capacity to choose a course out of a set of courses. A person is seen to have exhibited free will if he or she could have acted differently in a given scenario. Determinism is the view that by natural necessity, when a cause is given, an effect follows. For Agada, the two concepts are inadequate in describing a yearning universe that exists for a reason no one is certain of and which manifests characteristics of striving rather than rigid conditioning. An entity or state A seeks another entity or state B, but it is not known what caused A, or if the proximate cause or causes of A is/are known, the ultimate cause of the cause or causes of A. The only thing that is abundantly clear is that A is a yearning entity. Consequently, Agada introduces the term fatalism into his metaphysical system. The introduction is an attempt to reconcile freedom and determinism as interchangeable concepts that mirror the dialect of mood, the process of change, transformation and evolution made possible by the moody nature of things. As noted earlier, in traditional usage freedom and determinism are inadequate terms, according to Agada, because they apply rigidly to spheres which are supposedly isolated but which,

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actually, interact dialectically. The preceding reference to dialectics points to the type of logic that undergirds Agada’s system. It is a three-valued logic of which Ezumezu is a model. In such a system, states and entities cannot be rigidly determined prior to their coming to be, even as the notion of freedom is an illusion, as we will soon discover. Freedom in the consolationist system is the capacity to will a perfect state of affairs that excludes struggle in the field of agency while determinism becomes the condition of freedom. For a thing to be determined means that the thing is conditioned to will or act perfectly, to bring about a state of affairs that always favors the willing entity. The preceding means that there is no room for alternatives since projecting alternatives will mean that dice are being thrown and chance is being appealed to. The free act, as the determined act, is one that follows a linear path from the beginning to the end. One will say that it is unreasonable to expect humans to will perfectly. Anticipating this charge, Agada refers the reader to his system which paints something of a tragic picture of the universe. The impossibility of willing perfectly merely underlines what he has been saying all the time, that reality is a tragedy. The inability to will perfectly is the greatest indication of this tragedy. Fatalism becomes the most appropriate concept to use when talking about the actions of yearning beings. Fatalistic events are not rigidly conditioned before they happen, but once they happen, they become rigidly conditioned in the sense of their irreversibility. In a particular passage, Agada (2019a: 5) argues that: The standard of a yearning existent is very high indeed. If a thing yearns at all, its final purpose is the bringing into existence of a perfect state of affairs that endures and not merely achieving goods that cannot endure; and if this ideal state is impossible, doomed ultimately by the cessation of active consciousness in death, for instance, then the universe that is defined as a totality of striving is a tragic universe. Given the impossibility of the ideal, which the mind indicates, what subsists is what must be endured, and this is a consolation.

He does not accept the idea that freedom can be possible in a consolatory universe, although the human mind necessarily desires it as a value because of the perfection it implies. What we call freedom is only the power of choice, a grossly limited power. The choices we make are never permanently beneficial. Even if a choice can prove beneficial all our lives, the

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eventuality of death destroys the potency of this choice in a way that makes clear the general impotence of the human entity. Thus freedom is an illusion. Freedom cannot be achieved, but the human mind continues to be lured by the concept because of the promise of a perfect universe that it brings. A thing, according to Agada, is an illusion if it is neither false nor true for the very reason that it is desired but unachievable. An illusion thus has no real existence even though it opens up the mind to great possibilities. In the consolationist system, fatalism is the condition of beings. It is the view that things happen because they must happen as directed by their moodiness (according to the inner logic of yearning) and once they happen, they are irreversible. Fatalism is a concept which “yields a notion of sufficiency that entails the necessity of the inevitable and therefore, the compulsory existence of the universe” (Agada 2015a, b, 63). The law of necessity sets in when an event occurs. Before the event occurs no such law is operational since what is required is a sufficient condition. Necessity is a secondary phenomenon. Sufficiency requires that a thing reaches a fatalistic threshold to become actual, such as yearning. In sum, fatalism is the inevitability of things and events, their occurrence on account of their yearning for something which, unfortunately, the human mind cannot grasp but which Agada speculates as perfection of human beings and perfection of nature; in other words, freedom. But given the impossibility of this speculative goal, what humans as the observers of the universe find is consolation. Consolation, then, is the meaning of human existence and universal existence, although the goal of human life and the universe is perfection or freedom. The tragedy is found in the separation of meaning from purpose, the former attainable and the latter impossible.

Conclusion Agada’s metaphysical contribution is made up of a collection of themes closely knitted to respond to two related questions: is the universe pointless? and is human life futile? Applying conversational thinking unveils the role which nmekọ or relationship plays in delivering the promises of the themes or concepts in consolationism. For example, understood as mood, the universe has two aspects, joy and sadness, which are the positive and the negative moods, respectively. These seemingly contrasting moods necessarily complement each other to create the sort of balance that characterizes human life. It is in their complementary relationship, which is often

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marked by creative struggle,4 that meaning in life is generated. We cannot talk about a meaningful life if there are no presentments of trial and triumph. Endless problems and vicissitudes of life tend to present life as futile or purposeless. Why, for example, should I continue to struggle against the odds which life throws at me if there is no hope or possibility of overcoming some of the problems? If all I do to change the course of events in the world which are unfavorable to me amount to nought, why should I continue to have hope or belief in life? Or, why should I even continue to live? These are not trivial questions. Consolationism teaches us that there may be a lot of pain or sadness in the universe, but there are also some joys. It is us, the humans who create this joy by weathering the storms of sadness life throws at us. Every ounce of joy we create represents an ounce of meaningfulness which gives us the hope that human life might not be futile after all. To create joy is to score a victory. It does not matter how small. And it certainly does not matter how big the space of sadness in our lives is. The relationship of creative struggle which is required to create joy is a productive and busy one. It is understood that the ideal is perfection, a state of bliss, an obliteration of sadness. A conquering of pain by pleasure, a ceaselessly flowing sense of optimism, a joyous continuum and a confident universe! But can we reach this state? In a universe of power and glory, it is impossible. We must then aim for what Gottfried Leibniz describes as the best possible world: a universe where sadness is a stubborn reality that must be respected and tolerated, chiefly because it cannot be wished away. Such a second option is consolation. But consolation, Agada reminds us, is not entirely empty, especially of meaning. It might be devoid of an eternal purpose, but certainly not of meaning. A conspiracy of fate and determinism, and the interjection of the agentive acts of freedom and choice, mediated by contexts and circumstances, increase sadness or joy. This process of interaction between seemingly opposed variables is a relationship of creative struggle. This relationship endorses hope, which sustains yearning. As long as there is 4  See JO Chimakonam (2019). He utilizes what is called the conversational curve to demonstrate the centrality of nmekọ or relationship in the African philosophical tradition. This relationship has two types: the relationship of notional solidarity and the relationship of creative struggle. While the first occurs between mutually endorsing variables, the latter occurs between two opposing realities. It is the relationship of creative struggle that creates new ideas.

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yearning, the universe is not entirely pointless, and human life is not completely futile. In fact, we need not arrive at eternity to realize ‘meaning.’ What Agada has not said perhaps, as forcefully as he should have, is that striving to fulfill yearning can in itself constitute a purpose. The melancholy being can still evolve. We do not know how, but we know it is possible. And a flicker of possibility is all that is required to sustain hope.

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Masolo, D.A. 1994. African Philosophy in Search of Identity. Bloomington: Indiana University. Matolino, B. 2015. A Response to Metz’s Reply on the End of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2): 197–205. Matolino, B., and W.  Kwindingwi. 2013. The End of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (2): 214–225. Metz, T. 2007. Toward an African Moral Theory. Journal of Political Philosophy 15: 321–341. ———. 2014. Just the Beginning for Ubuntu: Reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (1): 65–72. Murove, M.  F. 2010. De-linking Ubuntu: Towards a Unique South African Jurisprudence. Obiter 31 (1): 134–145. Praeg, L. 2008. An Answer to the Question: What Is [Ubuntu]? South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 367–385. ———. 2014. A Report on Ubuntu. Pietermaritzburg: UKZN Press. Praeg, L., and S.  Magadla, eds. 2014. Ubuntu: Curating the Archive. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. Ramose, M.B. 2002. African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mont Books. Samkange, S., and T.M. Samkange. 1980. Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indigenous Political Philosophy. Salisbury: Graham Publishing. Shutte, A. 2001. Ubuntu: An Ethic for the New South Africa. Cape Town: Cluster Publications. Tempels, P. 1969. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence African. Uduma, U.O. 2003. Contemporary Trends in Philosophy. Enugu: PAN-Afric. Unah, J. 2009. Ontologico – Epistemological Background to Authentic African Socio-economic and Political Institutions. In From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy, ed. Andrew F. Uduigwomen, 264–278. Lagos: O. O. P. Van Niekerk, J. 2007. In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4): 364–368.

CHAPTER 4

Ụwa Ontology

Introduction The concepts of Ụwa ontology are inspired by Igbo language and culture, but the theory itself is universal. It is a theory of being put forward by Pantaleon Osondu Iroegbu, who was a Roman Catholic Priest and a teacher of philosophy at the Seat of Wisdom Seminary, Owerri. To arrive at the ụwa ontology proposal, Iroegbu engaged with proposals by other philosophers, both Western and African. Ụwa ontology was articulated to reflect two main principles of the African system of thought: the notion of nmekọ or relationship and the logic that transcends binary contradiction and accommodates  binary complementarity. What this leads to is that Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology is not the same as other theories of being that employ a system of logic that is not trivalent. We can understand this difference better through the prism of Quine’s notion of ontological relativity. The thesis of Quine’s ontological relativity is that ontology (i.e., what is) is relative. This thesis rests on his idea of the indeterminacy of translation. Quine’s idea of ontological relativity is found in his Word and Object (1960) and elaborated in his “Ontological Relativity” (1968). He holds that perception of reality is dependent on the individual’s observable behavior and her/his speaking environment. He elaborates this point by alluding to a translation scenario, wherein an individual is confronted with text in a foreign language which has never been translated. This scenario © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_4

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comes with difficulty in translation. According to him, the available evidence ought not to lead only to accurate translation but could also lead to perverse translation. Quine made use of the notions of extensionally equivalent (sameness of the spatiotemporal world) and the principle of individuation (diverse ways of slicing and sorting what is in the world). He does not believe that by figuring out the principle of individuation employed by a speaker, that we can provide a determinate translation of the speaker’s idea of an object. Quine asserts that slicing and sorting that comes with the principle of individuation (which has to do with analytical hypothesis), leads to the problem of rendering it as practical instead of conceptual and deep. He contends that the notion of the analytical hypothesis is subject to the indeterminacy of translation (1968: 190). What he is saying is that if the native language we try to translate asks ‘is this world or thing the same as that,’ we could also be asking ‘if the world or thing belongs with that.’ We can deduce that Quine’s thought is that the indeterminacy of translation applies not only to alien language in radical translation but that it ‘starts at home.’ The point is that every speech about a thing is indeterminate about the thing since there is nothing in one’s speech behavior or speaking environment that leads to one analytical hypothesis and one determinate translation above another that is well supported. There is a smooth and seamless transition from this indeterminacy of translation to ontological relativity. Quine sees the difference between a thing and its constituent parts or the moment of the thing. It is in this light that he argues that “there is a difference on any terms, interlinguistic or intralinguistic, objective and subjective” (1968: 200), referring to a thing, its constituent parts and its moments. If we think otherwise, “reference would seem now to become nonsense not just in radical translation but at home” (Quine 1968: 200). But Quine also notes that it all depends on an individual’s frame of reference to determine the position of an object in relation to the other. When two persons talk about the relationship between two objects A and B, one can say that A is on the left of B while the other can say A is on the right side of B. Their assertions are dependent on their frame of reference. This is, likewise, the point that Quine makes in his principle of individuation, where he talks about a thing, its constituent parts and its moments. Thus, for Quine, there is no point in talking about what the objects of a theory are. On the contrary, we should focus on how a particular talk about objects is interpretable in terms of another talk about objects (1960:

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201). The strength of this view lies in “the equivalent—mutually interpretable—ways of speaking about the world, not one of those ways, in particular, as no one of those ways is privileged in any meaningful sense” (Kaufman 2016). The point that Quine is making is that reality is interpreted and reinterpreted based on the evidence and that every theory is formulated to explain an object distinct from another object independent of the other theory of the other object. That is to say that there is relativity in conceptions of reality and rendition of ideas or thought in languages. This is because there is no essentially shared, common or universal trait between two different languages which employ two distinct words (or phrases) to express the same meaning (Hallen 2004: 117). It  does not imply that Quine’s thought can be “invoked to discredit the attempts by African philosophers writing in English to elucidate philosophical thesis using their vernacular” (Bello 2004: 266). According to Barry Hallen, Quine argues that every human language is “a unique creation, with its ingenious meanings and conceptual network that are compelling evidence of genius” (Hallen 2004: 117). This idea of Quine aids intercultural interpretation between two languages, given that their unique elements must be downplayed and sacrificed (2004: 117). That is to say that propositional attitudes, for Quine, are relative (Hallen and Sodipo 1997: 84; Hallen 2004: 117). This implies that there is cognitive/epistemological relativity across cultures. With this, African philosophers, as those in other traditions, can philosophize from their cultural contexts by employing their linguistic worldview but make an interpretation in a universally spoken language which they employ in their philosophizing. This is apparent in Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology, which employs the Igbo linguistic worldview to articulate a theory of being in African philosophy that can be grounded in an African culture–inspired system of trivalent logic called Ezumezu. Although unstated by Iroegbu, we could see the inherent logic of his theory. It is one that accommodates truth-glut and trivalence rather than truth-gap and bivalence. Later in this chapter, we will show that Iroegbu’s ontological theory can be grounded in an African logic like the system of Ezumezu three-valued logic as its organon. The Ezumezu logic system promotes the ideas of relationship and context-sensitivity inherent in African thought system and African philosophy. We will employ conversational thinking (conversationalism) (Chimakonam 2018; Chimakonam and Egbai 2016; Egbai and Chimakonam 2019; Egbai 2018), as a method to engage Iroegbu’s thought critically and creatively in order to present

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his views and show the inherent lapses in his notion of being. Also, in the spirit of conversational thinking, as we put Iroegbu in the seat of nwa nsa and take the seat of nwa njụ, we shall ask and attempt to answer questions on Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology. In this chapter, we will discuss ụwa ontology, starting with Iroegbu’s criticisms of the thoughts of some ontologists before him. The preceding will come under the topic ‘Background to Iroegbu’s Ontology.’ After that, we will look at the nature of Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology. We will also look at the connotations and zones of ụwa. These subtopics are foundational to the main issue, which is Iroegbu’s argument that ‘being is belongingness.’ Then, we will present some principles that are inherent in Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology. After that, we will critically and creatively engage Iroegbu’s thought.

Background to Iroegbu’s Ontology Pantaleon Iroegbu is regarded by the conversationalists, a movement that grew from the Calabar school of philosophy, as one of their forerunners. This is not surprising because he lived and philosophized in the eastern part of Nigeria, and along the axis where the Calabar school was convened at the University of Calabar. His approach was very conversational in that he critically and creatively engaged other thinkers. He also employed the linguistic resources from an African worldview in the formulation of his concepts. He made bold claims which he justified through a logic that accommodates truth-glut. These are some of the trademark features of the conversational style. He started his journey to articulating his own ontology by first engaging the ontological theories articulated by some Western philosophers, in particular thinkers such as Heraclitus and Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, AJ. Ayer, Alfred Whitehead, Jean-Paul Sartre and J. Van der Veken. We will not go into an in-depth review of the views of those Western philosophers since Iroegbu’s ontology is the main focus of this work. Be that as it may, we will pay brief attention to the views of J. Van der Veken, who has done a general critic of other Western ontologists before him. Another reason for picking his view is that his theory of being, to a certain degree, connects with African ontology in that it accommodates the idea of relationship or complementarity.

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Van der Veken observes that the ontological theories by other Western philosophers polarize being; hence, their notions of being are one-sided. Commenting on his idea, Iroegbu notes that “reality is not just one way or the other, one part or the other, one aspect or the other. There are two complementary poles” (1995: 288). In place of these one-sided ontologies, Van der Veken proposes a ‘dipolar’ metaphysics or ontology. His argument is that there is only dipolar reality. Accordingly, he states: “A di-polar metaphysics conceives reality in terms of two contrasting poles or aspects (not two parts) neither of which can exist without the other” (1991: 26). This ontology tells the two-sided story, instead of the one-­ sided story, of being which is common to other Western ontologies. What Van der Veken argues for is that reality consists of the abstract and the concrete poles which share an interdependent relationship. Elaborating on this point, he notes that the abstract, essential, eternal, absolute, transcendental is the cause of the concrete, relative, temporal and the immanent. This is an integrated view of reality which in African thought can be explained using a truth-glut system of three-valued logic. Van der Veken’s proposal, for an African critic, should be a plausible ontological theory since it transcends the noncomplementary conception of reality that is predominant in Western philosophy. But, Iroegbu criticizes Van der Veken’s ontology by saying that it is minimal as it restricts reality to dipolarity (1995: 259). For Iroegbu, reality is not only dipolar or two-sided; it is also multifaceted (1995: 259). This implies that dipolarity is not the only way of viewing reality; there are other ways. Another criticism which an African critic can raise against this ontology is that it does not clearly present being as relational. This is because being is not just dipolar; it is also relational. The way beings relate between poles ought to influence the manner in which they relate with each other. If beings are seen in this light, then it can be said that they are not only dipolar, but also relational in nature. It is this point that is lacking in the ontology of Van der Veken and other Western ontologists, which is something some African ontologists are striving to address in their theorizing on being. Iroegbu also engages the ontological theories of some African philosophers like Placide Tempels, Henri Maurier, Kwame Gyekye, Mourad Wahba and Emmanuel Edeh. Since the ontological theory that Iroegbu proposes is African, we will dedicate some paragraphs of this chapter to pointing out his view on the ontologies of these African philosophers. Iroegbu starts with the ontology of Tempels, a Western- (European-) born African ontologist, who argues that being, for the Bantu-African is

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force and in particular vital force. Tempels sees this force as that which connects beings together in hierarchy and community; and that it is through it that beings influence each other (1959). Iroegbu argues that this ontology is non-African because it is not the Bantu who postulated this theory of being and that the approach employed by Tempels is non-­ African. Iroegbu did not, of course, dwell on the methodological distinction, but it is clear from his argument that he sees Tempels’ presentation as Western in style. For Iroegbu, Bantu philosophy is Tempels’ hypothesis for the Bantu people (1995: 290). What Iroegbu is saying is that Tempels’ approach in articulating the vital force ontology is alien to the Bantu people and cannot pass as an African ontology. The next scholar whose ontology Iroegbu engages is Maurier. Maurier’s argument is that vital force is not what defines African ontology; neither is it nyama (life energy). For him, it is a relation (Je Avec) derived from religion (religare). Maurier goes on to assert that all realities are somehow related to each other in a community. One of Iroegbu’s criticisms against Maurier’s thought is that although Maurier holds that realities are connected in the form of relationship, he does not state if things exist first before relating with one another (1995: 292). The second criticism that Iroegbu raises against Maurier’s ontology is that he employs a foreign category, Je Avec to explain the notion of being in Africa (1995: 298). This does not meet the criterion of sourcing conceptual materials from the African cultural and linguistic repertoire. Another African philosopher Iroegbu engages with is Gyekye. Gyekye developed an ontology from his Akan culture. According to him, beings exist in vertical order (God, Spirits [gods and goddesses], ancestors, humans and other cosmic beings) rather than in a pyramidal manner (1987). Iroegbu’s main criticism against Gyekye’s Akan ontology is that it is a collectivist cultural voice which lacks an “essential, individual, critic-­ analytic and systematic touch” (1995: 303). Iroegbu also engages the work of John Ayoade (1984), who presents a Yoruba ontology. Ayoade argues that in Yoruba ontology there is Olorun (the Supreme Being), the smaller gods who act as intermediaries between Olorun and other creatures. Next to them are the ancestors who also play vital roles in the Yoruba worldview. Then, there are humans and other entities. This ontology leans heavily on a spiritistic conception of the universe. “Almost every existent item has a spirit or spirits inhabiting it” (Iroegbu 1995: 304). Even natural entities are said to have spirits within them, leading to the accusation that Africans are animists, who are involved

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in animism. In spite of this, Ayoade notes that Yoruba ontology is anthropocentric, for humans are at its center. He also sees this ontology as that which influences the Yoruba conception of time. He argues, contrary to Mbiti’s position that the Yoruba have a notion of time that is connected to the past and present without a future. For him, even though time is measured with events that have occurred, the African has a conception of time that is also future-oriented as they plan for the future with events that will occur in it. He further states that the Yoruba measure time from the human (egocentric and communocentric) and environmental (celestial/ cosmic and terrestrial/ecological) perspectives. In all, he sees time as a practical daily experience. The challenge with this ontology, according to Iroegbu, is that it is the thoughts of the Yoruba people that lack the input of Ayoade (1995: 307). The implication is that the ontology so developed cannot be credited to Ayoade since it does not bear any stamp of individual ownership and is not a product of his ingenious thought but a cultural narrative. However, Iroegbu does not stop at doing a critical and rigorous reflection on the ontological theories articulated in Africa, south of the Sahara. He extends his searchlight to North Africa. He handpicks the work of Wahba, whom he presents as a thinker from the Islamic background. According to Iroegbu, Wahba discusses an “Afro-Islamic metaphysics (ontology)” (1995: 307). Alluding to Ben Nabi’s thought, Wahba argues for a cosmological ontology wherein the world is held to be tripartite in nature. These include the world of ideas, the world of persons and the world of things (1985: 23). What Iroegbu observes that must be highlighted is that this ontology is not derived from a traditional African worldview; it is a product of a foreign worldview—an Arabic worldview. Inasmuch as this is the case, the ontology that Wahba presents cannot truly be called Afro-Islamic ontology. It is purely an Islamic ontology. Thus, we see no reason for Iroegbu to have included it among other African theories of being. The general criticism that Iroegbu raises against these African scholars is that the theories they presented lack “the personal, critical exploration of the meaning of reality both as a whole and in its particularities” (1995: 311). Additionally, their discussions reflect community thought; hence, what Ogbonnaya calls ethno-ontology.1 The 1  Ethno-ontology is derived from ethnophilosophy—community-owned thought or philosophy. He describes community-owned theory of being as ‘ethno-ontology’ (Ogbonnaya 2017).

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challenge is that none of the above African ontologists has been bold enough to articulate their personal, critical, creative and innovative ideas from the African worldview and culture. Besides the scholars discussed here, Iroegbu seems to see in the thought of Emmanuel Edeh a bold step toward original thinking. He believes that Edeh has developed and defended a theory that has sparks of personal insight, even though Edeh calls it Igbo ontology. Edeh arrives at this ontology by going to the field to interview and, afterward, analyze the data he gathered from the field. This is an approached that was first deployed by Henri Maurier in his conversations with Ogotommeli, and then much later, in a refined form by Odera Oruka in his Sage Philosophy project. Edeh prefaces his theory with a discussion on what he believes was the worldview that colors ontological thinking in Africa. This, for him, is the ‘theory of duality’—that is to say, reality is dual in nature. For instance, the world consists of the spiritual and the physical realms, this world and the other world, Eligwe na Ụwa (heavens and earth); while the human person consists of body (material) and soul (immaterial) (Edeh 1985: 76–78). It is clear that Edeh had been influenced by his Judeo-Christian background as a Catholic priest. But he was also influenced by his Igbo-­ African cultural background. Edeh makes reference to his Igbo language to find the most appropriate Igbo word for being. He narrows his search down to two words, namely onye and ife; hence, the onye and ife hypotheses. From his presentation, he notes that most of his respondents held that the Igbo word for being is onye, but he found the onye hypothesis to be unsuitable. One major objection was that ‘onye’ is anthropocentric and rules out nonhumans from the class of beings. Contrarily, the ife hypothesis appears to be encompassing and nondiscriminatory, so he adopted it as a suitable category for being. Although ife refers to a thing, Edeh gives it an ontological dimension by suffixing it with idi, making it ife-di. It is with this concept that he articulates an Igbo theory of being. But it is safe to say that the ontology which Edeh proposes is not strictly an Igbo ontology since it contains a lot of the author’s personal insight. Iroegbu suggests that it can be described as a theory by an Igbo ontologist (Iroegbu 1995: 322–323; Ogbonnaya 2014: 117, 2017). Edeh himself denies that his work is not metaphysics (ontology) done by an Igbo scholar but Igbo metaphysics (ontology) (Edeh 1985: 114). The fact is that even most of his respondents do not subscribe to the conclusion he arrived at. So, the ideas are his.

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Iroegbu, however, observes that in spite of the fact that Edeh’s theory of being represents an individual’s rational and systematic reflection on the Igbo conception of being, it has not reached the expected level of personal, critical and systematic interpretation of reality (1995: 324–325). The dearth of original thinking in African metaphysics, for Iroegbu, persists. It is, therefore, to investigate and overcome the challenge of original individual thinking that made Iroegbu to come up with his ụwa ontology, which is the main focus of this chapter.

The Nature of Iroegbu’s Ụwa Ontology After criticizing the earlier ontologies, Iroegbu goes on to articulate what he believes is an all-encompassing and all-inclusive idea of being. He does this by linking being to the concept of ‘ụwa’. He argues that ụwa is the Igbo word for the ‘globe,’ ‘cosmos’ or the ‘world’—the dwelling place for all entities or realities. It is the place where existence takes place and is made possible. It is this concept ụwa that Iroegbu equates with being. He sees it as the most appropriate word that perfectly defines and gives being its meaning or existence. It is in this light that Iroegbu raises certain fundamental questions: Our question here then is: what is it that makes being, being? To be; what is it? Ụwa is reality or being. What is it then that Ụwa fundamentally is? Why Ụwa? For what is Ụwa? To be part of Ụwa is to be what? To share in Ụwa is to share in what, to give what, to have what identity? (Iroegbu 1995: 374)

These are some of the questions that undergird Iroegbu’s exploration of the notion of being. From the preceding quotation, Iroegbu makes an assertion that needs to be given  a close attention. The assertion is that “Ụwa is reality or being.” What does this imply? Does it imply that being is reality? This question calls for critical reflection. Some scholars are of the view that being and reality are distinct entities. A case in point is Jonathan O. Chimakonam, who argues in an earlier writing that being is reality, but reality is not being (2013: 74). By this, reality from his African conception transcends and encompasses being. It is the sum of all existents, both known and unknown, real and imaginary. In fact, that reality and being are not exactly the same remains controversial. Contrary to Chimakonam’s

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position, Iroegbu posits that being and reality are not distinct from each other. They are, for him, the same entity. This can be represented thus: Ụwa is reality Ụwa is being Therefore, reality is being The syllogism above shows that being is reality and reality is being. Iroegbu, from this argument, equates reality to being through a common connector (ụwa). Hence, ontology, for Iroegbu, is the science of ụwa. Scholars may ask how ontology can be the science of the cosmos or the globe, or whether cosmology depicts ontology. These questions appear difficult to resolve. But the truth is that Iroegbu does not in any way attempt to equate cosmology to ontology. In fact, his idea of ụwa appeals more to the notion of globe than cosmos. On the contrary, he derives his ontology from his cosmology. This is in line with Chimakonam’s position that cosmology is definitive of ontology (2012: 23–24). That is to say, ontology stems from cosmology. It is in this way that Iroegbu develops a ‘cosmologized ontology.’ This ‘cosmologized ontology’ is inherently enshrined in the questions Iroegbu raises. All these questions are interconnected and lead to the idea that ụwa is being. It is in answering these questions that Iroegbu brings to bear his ‘cosmologized ontology.’ Iroegbu captures this as he argues that the entirety of existence, from God the highest being to inanimate beings of our cosmos can be summarized in the englobing concept of the Igbo term Ụwa. Ụwa is all-inclusive. It mirrors being, existence, entity, all reality. It englobes all that is: animate and inanimate, visible and invisible. It is comprehensive, universal and global. It has transcendent and immanent scope as well as explicative and progressive elasticity. (1994: 144)

By this, being is, insofar as it is in ụwa. It is this notion that we will investigate in detail in the next section as we consider Iroegbu’s connotations, zones and beingness of ụwa.

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The Connotations of Ụwa Ụwa literally connotes the world, but Iroegbu holds that it is an elastic concept that could connote more than the world. In his opinion, it has 15 connotations, that include life, cosmos, field of action, time (and space), destiny, fate, condition, tragedy, age limit, nature, persons, nation, land, earth and totality (Iroegbu 1995: 339–341). We highlight these 15 connotations as follows: i. Life: In this context, Iroegbu explains that ụwa connotes existence, an individual life or existence. This is what is implied in the Igbo expression ụwa m—meaning ‘my world,’ ‘my life’ or my existence. It can also be seen in the Igbo expression ụwa gi meaning ‘your world,’ ‘your life’ or ‘your existence.’ Everyone’s ụwa is different from everyone else’s ụwa. Everyone has her/his ụwa, which can never be the same as those of others. ii. Cosmos: This is an English rendition of the Igbo word ụwa. This is the concrete reality of our experience. This is the ‘surface of the earth’ (elu ụwa) and the ‘inside of the world’ (ime ụwa). It is the inner side or interior as well as the concrete aspect or part of the world. iii. Field of action: This is a symbolic understanding of ụwa. It is the symbolic understanding of what the world or life is as expressed in one’s action or activity. For instance, the world of musicians (ụwa ndi egwu). Thus, the world is defined by one’s (or a group of peoples’) action or activity. iv. Time (and space): It is the world defined in terms of time—time of (human) existence. It is in the world as time that we act or fail to act. This has to do with human use of time or the world to determine their destiny, future and opportunity. It has to do with the past and the present. This, according to Iroegbu is apparent in the Igbo expression “ụwa mbụ ka mma” (the old or ancient world is better than ours now). v. Destiny: It is the world of good luck. This has to do with a favorable, good and successful world or life. Here, ụwa is seen as ụwa oma (good world or good destination). A person of destiny is one of good luck here and in the hereafter. Its opposite, for Iroegbu, is fate.

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vi. Fate: It is a world of bad life or bad world (ụwa ọjọọ). A person who is trapped by fate is one who experiences bad luck such as the bitter, hard and negative side of life. It is ill-life which the world permits humans to experience. It is negative destiny. vii. Condition: This has to do with the world as a difficult world or life. It is a difficult life determined by a person’s false steps. This, for Iroegbu, finds full expression in the Igbo phrase “ụwa alịghịlị” (a world of difficulties). viii. Tragedy: For Iroegbu, this is the world seen as tragic life (ụwa ike). It is a catastrophic life which leads to a bad end—the end of one’s individual physical life in this physical realm of human existence. This is the world of disaster that brings about the end of the world and, in turn, the end of an individual world. ix. Age limit: According to Iroegbu, this is the world as defined by age range. Here, life in the world is not static but dynamic. It involves the gradations of individuals from one age status to another. This follows the order: childhood—adolescence—adulthood—old age. There is also a separation of individuals in the world based on social status, functions and role expectations. x. Nature: This is the world of nature and natural realities or things such as rivers, trees and stars. It is this natural world that humans are connected to in order to appreciate its inherent beauty. It is a beautiful world of nature and things. xi. Persons: This is the world as populated by people. It is the world of people on the planet. It is the human populations as found in the world. This world could either be positive or negative. It could be found in expressions such as ụwa nye aka (let the world help— positive) and ụwa ka njo (the world is worse—negative). The world in this context is the people who are either good or bad. xii. Nation: For Iroegbu, this is the world and in particular the people with whom we relate and have dealings with, in our day to day life. It is the political organization of people based on their desire to achieve a common goal and good. xiii. Land: It is the world defined as a peoples’ land. It is people as defined by their land. For instance, the Igbo are defined by their land; hence, we talk about ala Igbo (the Igbo people). Thus, we talk about ụwa Igbo, ala Igbo (the world of the Igbo is the land of the Igbo). In this light, the Igbo people are the people of their

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world. It is the people’s world; our world. Here, we talk about ala anyi—it is our world or my world as defined by where I come from. xiv. Earth: This, for Iroegbu, is the entirety of the globe (ụwa niile— the whole earth). It includes the known and yet to be known world. It is our physical dwelling abode, place or world. xv. Totality: This is the abstract, unqualified, all-englobing concept. It includes everything, whatever is, insofar as it is. This is the notion of ụwa which Iroegbu deploys in his ontology. With these connotations of ụwa highlighted, it becomes pertinent to also consider the zones of ụwa which are related to them.

The Zones of Ụwa Iroegbu (1995: 341) states that there are six zones of ụwa which include ụwa anyi, the divine world, the Godian world, the good-spirit world, the bad-spirit world and the ancestral world. Each of these zones of the world are highlighted as follows: i. Ụwa anyi: This is where human beings live and die. It is the human world. It is the cosmos. ii. Divine world: This is the world of the Supreme Being; the abode of the High God—CHUKWU. iii. Godian world: This is the abode or world of powerful spirits such as Ala, Anyanwu and Amadioha. These spirits are the governors of the world on behalf of CHUKWU. iv. Good-spirit world: This world is the dwelling place of those who have departed from this human world ụwa anyi. It is a spirit-world where departed good people dwell. It is the abode of those who have been forgotten by the living in the human world. It is the world of the forgotten dead. v. Bad-spirit world: This is the world of evil people who have departed from this human world. The spirit of such an evil person cannot reincarnate simply because they led an evil life while in the human world. Consequently, they continue to perpetuate evil in the human world and in conjunction with human agents from this world. The spirits that inhabit this world are ajọ nmụọ and chi ọjọọ (evil spirits). Humans fight against these evil spirits through alienating rites, exorcising sacrifices, incantations and prayers.

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vi. Ancestral world: This is the home of the living dead, otherwise called Ndichie (ancestors). It is from this world that they care for and protect their family members and loved ones in the human world. Every Igbo person longs to go to this world when she dies since she has the opportunity to reincarnate in the human world. There exists a strong relationship among these six zones of ụwa. According to Iroegbu, their center of convergence is the cosmos ụwa anyi (the human world). The spirits in the Divine world govern and regulate life in the human world through the natural order as they punish those who commit abomination (nmerụala) or go contrary to the natural laws that are set in place. The human world is also a place of the interplay between good and bad spirits, who continue to perpetuate good and evil in this world. While the good spirits are appreciated via sacrifices and offerings for their goodness and good deeds, the bad spirits are expelled from the human world through prayers and other rituals. The ancestors also continue to make their presence felt in this human world through their care for, and protection of, family members and loved ones as well as through reincarnation. There are no clear-cut boundaries among these worlds because they are interconnected. These zones interpenetrate one another such that they cannot be talked of without others in the Igbo cultural worldview. This relationship that exists among these zones is dynamic and always manifests itself in such a way that it cannot be said to have a starting or end point. What this leads to is that all realities in these zones cooperate and interrelate with each other in a ceaseless manner. The zones also interconnect and interpenetrate with the connotations of the ụwa earlier highlighted. All of the connotations of ụwa are expressed in the six zones of ụwa. The realities of the connotations of ụwa are expressed and found in the zones of ụwa. These diverse zones and numerous connotations imply that there is a plurality of ụwa but one ụwa. The connotations and zones are the numerous manifestations of one ụwa. All of the manifestations of ụwa as zones are dual—physical and spiritual— which are in “a dynamic mutual relationship” (1995: 342). This makes ụwa the one and only existing reality. The oneness of ụwa as discussed here is based on the notion of nmekọ (relationship of complementarity), which features prominently in African philosophical thinking. The idea of nmekọ that is inherent here is that all connotations and zones of the world and the realities within them are interconnected, interrelated and

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interdependent on each other such that it can only be described as a complementary relationship (nmekọ) grounded in a prototype truth-glut, three-valued logic system.

Being as Belonging: A Hermeneutics of Iroegbu’s Ụwa Ontology Iroegbu’s key argument is that there is no being outside of, or without, ụwa. His notion of being is linked to his concept of belongingness. This concept is linked to ụwa (1994), which makes being possible. It is this concept of ‘belongingness’ that shows how indispensable ụwa is in the scheme of things. Iroegbu comes to the conclusion that ‘being is because it belongs.’ The question then is, belongs to what or to where? Iroegbu’s assertion is: ‘to be, is to belong’ to ụwa and ‘to belong is to be’ in ụwa (1995: 374). Explaining this ‘belongingness’ as belonging to ụwa, he argues: Belongingness as used to define being here however has a deeper meaning. Generally, it is the reality of whatever is in so far as it is, being a part of, therefore belonging to reality ụwa. In this sense, Belongingness is an abstract term, an ontological one that specifies that a thing is, because it belongs. (1995: 374)

Iroegbu does not stop at saying that ụwa connotes ‘belongingness’; he goes on to make it categorical that ụwa as ‘belongingness’ has some hermeneutical insights. These insights are be-(1)-on (be on), be-(l)-ongoing, be-long and be-longing. Be-(1)-on (be-on) involves transforming abstract being into concrete being. This being brings an entity from the region of abstract to the realm of the concrete. It should be noted that this region of nonexistence is what Iroegbu calls “to be off” or “adi ̣ghị-adi ̣ (nothingness)” (1995: 375). He is saying that if something is not on/into the world (ụwa) such a thing is out of existence. Thus, to be is to be-on. Here, the being makes ụwa its own (ụwa m) by being-on ụwa. Thus, to be is to be-on ụwa. Going by this, one can say that a thing or an entity is being when it be-on ụwa. This makes ụwa the source of being as well as the plane on which an entity marks its being. Hence, being is ‘ihedi na ụwa’ (what exists in the world). This is because outside of the world is nothing. Ụwa, therefore, is being that defines being as being. This affirms the assertion that ‘an entity cannot be unless it be-on ụwa.’ The idea of ụwa as belongingness dovetails into the second interpretation of ụwa as ‘be-(l)-on-going.’

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It is not enough for an entity to take upon itself being by only claiming to be-on ụwa. It also has to be-ongoing in ụwa. The first interpretation connotes that an entity becomes being when it takes upon itself its ụwaness, by coming in ụwa. But such an entity cannot just continue to remain being if it, at any point, ceases to be in ụwa. In other words, for an entity to remain being, it has to continue to be in ụwa. This is the idea of belongingness as be-ongoing. To be-ongoing is to continue to exist in ụwa. This leads to the idea that the being of an entity or a thing is possible through its ụwaness. Hence, anytime an entity loses its ụwaness by not belonging in ụwa, it ceases to be being and goes into oblivion or a state of nothingness and becomes nothing. Thus, the being of an entity needs to be maintained and sustained. It can only be sustained through its on-goingness in ụwa. Iroegbu substantiates: “The ongoingness of being means that somebody who belongs today cannot be, all things being equal, regarded as not belonging tomorrow, unless at the prize of annihilation” (1995: 375). Iroegbu also notes that even death does not destroy the beingness of an entity. For instance, the human being cannot be thrown out of being; neither can the beingness of the human being be destroyed through death. Death can only transform the human being from one mode or state to another. In his words: Not even death can break the ongoing Belongingness. For, firstly, the dead do not disappear from being. They change their mode of being. They are the living dead: dead, but still living (in the spirit-world). Secondly, the dead still belong to both the family here on earth and now to the ancestral world. (1995: 375)

This assertion has two connotations. Firstly, it connotes that the beingness of a thing is constant inasmuch as it is on-going in ụwa. That is to say that beingness is a process that must be sustained in ụwa. Secondly, it connotes that an entity can change from one mode of being or existence into another mode of existence in ụwa. This is in line with the view that “ụwa dị abụọ” (the world has two dimensions [physical and nonphysical]). So, an entity can move from the physical mode of being to the nonphysical mode of being. In the same vein, the entity can move from the nonphysical mode of being to the physical mode of being. This, to an extent, resolves the problem of change and permanence in metaphysics. An entity is the same but only experiences and undergoes changes in states of existence in ụwa. This is what Iroegbu meant by “in going on, it (being) is

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both itself (identity) and something else (change).” “Ụwa na eme ntụghari ̣ (being turns around, changes), yet ụwa bụ otu (being is the same, it does not change)” (Iroegbu 1995: 375). It should be noted that change is a state of a thing in ụwa, but it does not imply a change in the beingness of such a thing. Hence, an entity is being when it be-on and is ongoing in ụwa. It is on this note that Iroegbu remarks that “on-goingness is an existential constituent of being-in-be-ongoingness. The ontological consequence is that being is being in so far as it is ongoing” (1995: 375). The ongoingness of belongingness situates being as that which must continue to be within ụwa. This is a pointer to the fact that the continuous affirming of the being of an entity in ụwa is not for a while; it is forever. This brings another dimension to the conception of ụwa as belongingness. This is what Iroegbu’s third hermeneutical insight (of being) brings to play in the concept of be-long. For Iroegbu, for an entity to be, it has ‘to be-long.’ An entity that has being belongs within time. But this time is not ephemeral time; it is a time that carries the notion of everlastingness (ebighiebi). So, an unending existence is the property of any entity that possesses being, or that is in ụwa. It has to do with the longevity of life for humans within the African place. This is the most cherished value of African people (1995: 376). This continuous unending existence is long life and prosperity. It is to belong in existence, and share in the prosperity, goodness and communion with other existing entities. No wonder Iroegbu argues that “[w]hile on-going may be open-ended, being-long stretches it still further unto everlastingness” (1995: 376). Is it enough to stop at saying that belongingness stretches to everlasting? Or, does it only connote an on-going art or to be-on ụwa? The truth is that belongingness connotes all these and more. It also involves ‘belonging.’ Here, every entity brings or yields to perpetuate its being in ụwa. This is expressed in their longing for life, being and ụwa. Iroegbu captures this point as follows: To belong is to be in the desire for life. It is the will to march along in life. It is founded on the awareness that nothing is higher a value than life. Nduka (life is greater). Ndubuisi (life is the principal thing). To long for life is to want to be, not only in the abstract ụwa but in the concreteness of what ụwa offers. The belongingness, being-in-longing, or the longing for ­continued existence explains the natural inclination for self-preservation in all creatures. (1995: 376)

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From this assertion, it can be deduced that beings do not just come into being, but they seek to preserve their being in ụwa regardless of the situation they encounter or find themselves in. This is summed up in the following words by Iroegbu: “it is in the nature of being to be, to remain in being, to live forever! Nothing wants to end. The world has no desire to end. Its internal wish is to be forever” (1995: 377). A superficial look at the discussion on Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology as belongingness might lead to the understanding that belongingness depicts existence. The truth is that belongingness transcends existence or to be in ụwa. Iroegbu explains that to exist means to stand out of hiddenness. But he cautions that this is not what he meant by belongingness (1995: 377). In his words: “Being is not something that stands-out, of. Being rather stands-into reality to become reality. Being is being because of something, abstract being, enters into, forms parts of, and therefore belongs to real realities in the totality of ụwa” (1995: 377). This does not imply to exist. It rather has the connotation of in-xisting—taking abode in ụwa. Being in-xists in that it moves from the nothingness of not yet into the reality of ụwa where its beingness is affirmed and made meaningful. Hence “rather than exists being in-xists” (1995: 377). Iroegbu seeks to establish that to in-xist is to be in ụwa (ịnọ na ime ụwa). It, therefore, follows that if being does not in-xist in ụwa, it does not have being. It is to buttress this idea of in-xisting in ụwa as belongingness that Iroegbu makes reference to the Igbo aphorism ‘Egbe bere, Ugo bere’ (EBUB). This aphorism carries the insight of ‘live and let live.’ Thus, to in-xist is to live with others in ụwa. Hence, from the Egbe n’Ugo conundrum we can infer that the idea of to in-xist connotes ‘perching’ and in particular perching in ụwa. This can be represented in a linear graphic as follows: To perch → to belong → to be (to in-xist) Iroegbu represents this relationship in a triangular diagram in Fig. 4.1. A critical consideration of the Egbe n’ Ugo conundrum points to the fact that individualism is a vice that must be eschewed, while communion or mutual relationship (nmekọ) is a virtue that all should pursue with all tenacity. This is what is implied in the saying ‘Let the kite perch and let the eagle perch.’ What this means is that ụwa is common ground for all beings to in-xist on without any discrimination. This argument is substantiated by Iroegbu in the following manner:

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Fig. 4.1  EBUB diagram

To perch

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To belong

To be When Egbe perches and Ugo perches, they come face to face with each other. They are with each other. They are present to each other. They relate to each other deeply and directly as well as trace relationship with other inhabitants of ụwa. To relate is to share something: to give and take. They have common projects, needs and desires. Together they struggle to overcome their difficulties. Together they share their joys. The common existential sharing of their ụwa-realities is the essence of their perching together. (1995: 279–380)

Iroegbu’s ụwa proposal is an ontology of belongingness which places all existent realities in ụwa. This leads to solidarity of beings as they see themselves as subcontraries that can coexist and contribute meaningfully toward the self-actualization of the being of each other in ụwa. The point is that self-actualization and self-realization are totally impossible outside ụwa. In this case, there is nothing like alienation of being. Alienation is the worst thing that can happen to any being; for it amounts to total oblivion and nonbeing. All beings are affirmed in the ụwa community, wherein mutuality arises from the we-consciousness. This can be better understood in the light of some principles.

The Principles Underlying Iroegbu’s Ontology Chimakonam and Ogbonnaya (Unpublished) have teased out some principles from Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology. We believe that these are some of the principles that guide Iroegbu’s theory. It is these principles that we shall discuss in this section: i. The Principle of Mutual Existence: This principle holds that all beings have equal opportunity and right to exist in ụwa, which is their common abode. They have the same right to it and that none

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has a greater right than others. Each of them has the same right to come on in ụwa as an ontic being. This principle emphasizes the ‘mutual existence of beings.’ ii. The Principle of Belongingness: This principle holds that to be is to belong to ụwa; all beings are because they belong to a common home, which is ụwa since it is on and from it that they derive their existence. The reason is that this ụwa is the only realm of existence, and if one does not belong to it, one cannot be said to exist. So, if any being does not have the right to belong to ụwa, such a being cannot be said to exist. If one’s right to ụwa is negated, it implies that it is put out of existence. This principle is likewise known as the principle of ‘mutual belongingness of beings, since it posits that to be is to mutually belong to ụwa—the owner and source of being. iii. The Principle of Coexistence: Given that every being belongs to ụwa, it implies that all beings coexist in it. This principle of coexistence finds its full expression in the Igbo aphorism Egbe bere Ugo bere (let all beings perch) in ụwa. This principle also supports the principles of mutual existence and belongingness since it is a byproduct of the principles of existence and belongingness. The reason for this is that for being to coexist in ụwa, they must first and foremost exist and belong to ụwa. In all, this principle asserts that to be is to coexist with others in ụwa. And for any reality not to coexist it means that it cannot be said to be being. This can also be called the principle of ‘mutual co-existence of beings.’ iv. The Principle of Participation: This principle holds that if beings exist, belong and coexist, they have to also participate. The participation of beings is in two forms. The first is that they must participate in ụwa—their common abode, while the second is that they must participate in each other’s existence. This is why it is also termed the principle of ‘mutual participation of beings.’ This brings about interconnectedness, interrelatedness and interaction of beings in ụwa. It is in this sense that we can say that beings in-xist in ụwa. These principles point to the fact that being is ‘that which is with others.’ It is that which is with other beings. This makes being that which exist in community or communion with each other. They are those entities that find their existence only within this community known as ụwa. So, being is a community—a collection and conglomeration of other beings that it exists, belongs, coexists and participates with, and, in ụwa. This is a

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communitarian  or collectivist understanding of being. The idea is that with the community of beings there is solidarity and oneness; a oneness that flows from ụwa—their common home. This is what is implied in some Igbo aphorisms such as nnọkọta bu ndu (togetherness is life). It implies that without ụwa, existence will be impossible. This connotes that nnọkọta is possible in ụwa and to be is to be together (to in-xist). It makes ụwa the basis for existence. Therefore, ụwa is a being that grounds beings, gives beings and sustains beings. One strong criticism that can be raised against Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology is that it makes ụwa an absolute reality. This is to say that, for Iroegbu, ụwa is the only reality that is and is at the very foundation of all realities. This is like making ụwa the same as Aristotle’s substance. It is an act of absolutizing of ụwa just as Aristotle absolutized substance (Asouzu 2007; Ogbonnaya 2014). The difference between them is that, while Aristotle absolutized substance by saying that it is that which is inherent in all realities, Iroegbu absolutized ụwa by asserting that it is that which encompasses and houses all realities within it. However, it is true that ụwa is at the base of every existent reality since all other realities are found within it; but it is not an absolute entity like Aristotelian substance. One argument that can be made is that ụwa is one reality among other realities, and that all of these realities are complementary to ụwa. Thus, ụwa cannot exist without them, just as they cannot exist without ụwa. Ụwa needs them to continue to exist, just as they need ụwa to exist. In methodological terms, we can stake a claim that the logic that can be used to explain Iroegbu’s theory of being is an African logic such as the Ezumezu system. Ezumezu logic is three-valued and accommodates truth-glut. This means that opposed variables are read as subcontraries rather than contradictories. And instead of the laws of contradiction and excluded-middle, Ezumezu prioritizes the laws of nmekọka and ọnọna-­ etiti, respectively. These latter laws supplant contradiction for complementarity, and bivalence for trivalence. The logic is built on, and promotes, the principle of inclusivity, and is a logic of inclusivity or an inclusivist logic. This is apparent in Chimakonam’s supplementary laws of thought that include the laws of integrativity (njikọka), complementarity (nmekọka) and included-middle (ọnọna-etiti) (Chimakonam 2019). Ezumezu logic and its three laws of thought emphasize contexts in all inferences, and explain communal living that Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology also promotes through his ideas of mutual existence, belongingness, coexistence and participation. All these have their roots in the principles of integrativity (to

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integrate is better than to be alone), complementarity (to work together is better than to work alone) and included-middle (there is always a middle point between opposing realities). They point to the fact that being together is the highest manifestation of being. This is what communal living entails. It entails allowing all realities a chance to exist within the community of beings since they find their identity, strength and solidarity in the group as well as promote the well-being of all in the community of beings. This is possible through the ontological idea of nmekọ (complementarity). All realities enter into a communal relationship because they desire to complement one another in order to make each and the community better. The preceding is what being as belongingness connotes. Iroegbu’s notion of belongingness leads to, and stems from, nmekọ, which is better captured in the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu three-valued logic.

Conclusion This chapter has discussed Iroegbu’s ụwa ontology as an ontology of belongingness. It has shown that nothing is unless it belongs to ụwa. It does not argue that ụwa is the only being that is. Rather, it posits that ụwa is a fair, common ground for all beings to in-xist and actualize as well as realize their being. Thus, the implication ụwa ontology carries with it is the idea that being is when it in-xists in ụwa through meaningfully coexisting as well as contributing to the well-being of other realities in ụwa. In this situation, no being is to be alienated from ụwa for any reason. On the contrary, all beings must be seen as a member of the ụwa community, since to be is to belong, and to belong is to perch. All this takes place in ụwa, the habitation of all beings. It is germane to note that although Iroegbu did not state it, his ontological theory is a product, as well as an exercise in conversational thinking. This is apparent in the way he placed other ontologists on the seat of nwa nsa (proponent), while himself took the seat of nwa njụ (opponent).2 He did not stop at deconstructing their theories of being; he went on to reconstruct them in his ụwa ontology. This is well captured and implied in his notion of belongingness, which is the core of the African philosophical idea of nmekọ. 2  For a detailed explication of these conversationalist concepts, see Chimakonam (2015: 463, 469–470).

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References Asouzu, I.I. 2007. Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology, Beyond World-­ Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Imposition. London: Transaction. Ayoade, J. 1984. Time in Yoruba Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. R.A. Wright, 93–112. Lanham: University Press of America. Bello, A.G.A. 2004. Some Methodological Controversies in African Philosophy. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 263–273. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Chimakonam, J.O. 2012. Introducing African Science: Systematic and Philosophical Approach. Bloomington: Authorhouse. ———. 2013. Integrative Humanism: Extension and Clarifications. Journal of Integrative Humanism – Ghana 3 (1): 74–84. ———. 2015. Transforming the African Philosophical Place Through Conversations: An Inquiry into the Global Expansion of Thought (GET). South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 462–479. ———. 2018. The “Demise” of Philosophical Universalism and the Rise of Conversational Thinking in Contemporary African Philosophy. In Method Substance and the Future of African Philosophy, ed. E.  Etieyibo, 135–160. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Chimakonam, J.O., and L.U.  Ogbonnaya. Unpublished. Iroegbu’s ‘Ụwa’ Ontology as a Framework for an Ecocentric Philosophy. Unpublished. Edeh, E. 1985. Towards an Igbo Metaphysics. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Egbai, U.O. 2018. Why African Philosophers Should Build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions. 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2. Egbai, U.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2019. Why Conversational Thinking Could be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189. Gyekye, K. 1987. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Cambridge: CUP. Hallen, B. 2004. Contemporary Anglophone African Philosophy: A Survey. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 99–148. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Hallen, B., and G.  Sodipo. 1997. Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Iroegbu, P. 1994. Enwisdomization and African Philosophy. Owerri: International Universities Press. ———. 1995. Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy. Owerri: International Universities Press. Kaufman, D. 2016. Course Notes  – W.  V. O.  Quine, ‘Ontological Relativity’. https://theelectricagora.com/2016/05/25/course-­notes-­4/. Accessed on 20 Oct 2020. Ogbonnaya, L.U. 2014. The Question of Being in African Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religion 3 (1): 108–108. ———. 2017. Questioning the Idea of ‘African Ontology’: A constructive Case for Ezi n’ulo Model. A Paper Presented during the “Contemporary Language, Logic and Metaphysics: African and Western Approaches Conference”. Held at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, August 14–16. Quine, W.V.O. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 1968. Ontological Relativity. The Journal of Philosophy 65 (7): 185–212. Van der Veken, J. 1991. The Philosophy of Being. Louvain: Unpublished Course Dispensae. Wahba, M. 1985. Contemporary Moslem Philosophers in North Africa. In African Philosophy: Trends and Perspectives, ed. P.  Bodunrin, 15–26. Ile-Ife: The University Press of Ife.

CHAPTER 5

Ibuanyidanda Ontology

Introduction The central question that this chapter seeks to answer is: has Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology been able to address and overcome the challenge inherent in the notions of being articulated by philosophers (Western and African) before him, who, according to him, misconstrued being? His take is that the concept of being has been misconceived and misrepresented in various ways. This begins with Plato, who polarized reality and the world into the physical world and the world of forms. He goes on to absolutize an aspect of reality, which is the world of forms. For him, the world of forms is one that is superior to the world of matter. This idea is replicated in the philosophical reflection of Aristotle, a student of Plato. Although he initially set out to overcome and correct this in his theory of hylomorphism (reality being made up of form and matter), he failed to accomplish this task. He continued in the misarticulation of being as he also bifurcated being into substance and accident, and elevated substance to the status of being even without accident. This lopsided way of conceptualizing reality continued down the history of Western philosophy and even African philosophy. It was no surprise at all that a philosopher like Alfred North Whitehead (1978: 39) adjudged that Western philosophy was a series of footnotes to Plato and, one could add, Aristotle. But it was the latter’s metaphysical posturing that Asouzu finds most lopsided. In fact, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_5

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Asouzu took a departure from Aristotle’s metaphysics, which he criticized as polarized and lopsided (2011: 17–18). Further evidence for the reality of the bifurcation and polarization of being can be seen in one of the books that set up the argument for the existence of African philosophy. This is found in Placide Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy. In this book, Tempels replicated the bifurcation of being in Western philosophy in African philosophy. This is apparent in his argument that vital force is being. Accordingly, he quips that ‘being is force’ and ‘force is being’ (1959). This vital force is Tempels’ African version of Aristotle’s substance. This bifurcating ontology has permeated African philosophizing, as can be seen in the work of Emmanuel Edeh (1985), Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984), Mogobe Ramose (2002) and others. It is to reconceptualize the idea of being in African philosophy and philosophy in general that Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology is birthed. Asouzu’s aim was to articulate a notion of being that is beyond the challenge of bifurcation of reality. This is what he somehow achieved via the instrumentality of his Igbo aphorism—ibu anyi danda, which he translates as ‘complementarity.’ It is this idea of complementarity that informed and shaped his ontological theory. The fact is that Asouzu came up with an ontological theory that does not bifurcate, polarize and elevate an aspect of reality to an absolute instance, like other philosophers have done. However, his theory is not without some inherent challenges. We shall discuss some of those challenges later. Worthy of note is the fact that Asouzu was very conversational in his approach. He employed conversational thinking in his works. This is evident in the manner in which he critically and creatively engages other ontologists before him, taps linguistic resources from an African worldview, transforms those resources into fresh ideas and personal insights, unfolds new concepts and makes bold claims which he justifies through a logic that accommodates truth-glut. What this suggests is that conversational thinking grounded in a model system of three-valued logic is a viable method that best delivers theses in African philosophy and cross-cultural philosophy (Chimakonam 2017, 2018; Chimakonam and Egbai 2016; Egbai and Chimakonam 2019; Egbai 2018). Also, it is this conversational trend in philosophical thinking that is employed here as we critically and creatively engage his ontological thought on the question of being. In this chapter, we will consider the background to ibuanyidanda ontology, and the methods and principles that undergird this ontology.

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Thereafter, we will make a critique of ibuanyidanda ontology and show objections by other scholars.

Background to Ibuanyidanda Ontology Innocent Asouzu is one of the pillars of the Calabar school convened at the University of Calabar in eastern Nigeria. As Chimakonam puts it, ibuanyidanda ontology “is a theory of being from an African perspective, formulated by the Nigerian Philosopher, Innocent Asouzu, a teacher of philosophy for many years at the University of Calabar” (Chimakonam 2016: 3). The inspiration for this ontology stems from the African conception of reality and in particular from the Igbo worldview. Asouzu explains that the word ibuanyidanda depicts ‘complementarity,’ and ‘complementarity’ has been conceived, developed and employed in various ways in the daily life of Africans in pristine African societies such as Egypt (Kamalu 1990: 7), Fanti (Oguah 1984: 220) and Igbo (Basden 1921: 35; Achebe 1998: 68; Nnoruka 1998: 245–246). This idea is captured as the interconnectedness, integration and collectivity of beings and realities. The value of the complementarity of realities can be found in the idea that no one is ego solus since they mutually reinforce each other (Kaboha 1992: 69–70; Oladipo 2002: 159; Iwe 1985: 69; Ejizu 1985: 104; Nasseem 1992: 24; Iroegbu 1995: 60). This finds its climax in the African ‘we-­ consciousness’ popularized by John Mbiti which reads: “I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti 1969: 108). The foregoing suggests communion, solidarity, mutual coexistence, interdependence and complementarity among all beings, and it is what characterizes reality from the African viewpoint (Nwoga 1984: 22, 41, 54, 57). From this, it can be said that Asouzu’s argument is that ibuanyidanda in traditional African society and in particular traditional Igbo society is due to human feelings of insufficiency, relativity and fragmentary perception as well as manifestation of reality, and the world in particular. He also notes that this is the basis for the practice of ibuanyidanda ideas such as solidarity, coexistence, togetherness, co-responsibility and co-­ authentication (2004: 105), to mention only a few. Thus, no human can exist in isolation; they always exist with each other in a mutual complementary sense in order to attain ‘authentic existence.’ In other words, ibuanyidanda helps humans to live above the “finitude and insufficiency, in the face of the many incomprehensible and threatening forces both natural and supernatural” (2004: 105).

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Asouzu heavily draws from this to develop his complementary philosophy that is making waves today in African and intercultural (as well as comparative) philosophies. He relies on his Igbo cultural background as he argues that within the Igbo cultural matrix there are diverse expressions that depict complementarity, which is necessary due to human finitude and insufficiency. Some of these Igbo expressions include onye ka ozuru (who is perfect) and ụwa ezuoke (the world is incomplete). The realization of this insufficiency, according to Asouzu, makes the anonymous traditional Igbo thinkers and philosophers to assert that “all units are important aspects of missing links of reality” (2004: 107). This gives birth to the Igbo complementary concepts such as azụ bụ ike, igwe bụ ike, ụmụnna bụ ike (multitude is strength), njikọ (togetherness), njikọ ka (togetherness is better) and ụmụnna (kindred) (2004: 109). All these Igbo concepts or expressions, for Asouzu, connote mutuality, but he still does not see them as implying complementarity; rather, he sees them as foundational to authentic human relationship, which is complementary in itself. It is on this note that Asouzu states that “complementarity is thus the unifying force of all community-centered reasoning” (2004: 109). In search of a more appropriate Igbo concept that depicts complementarity, Asouzu avers that he stumbled upon the 1991 Ahiajoku Lecture entitled ‘IBU ANYI DANDA’ delivered by Romanus Ohuche, who argues that ibu anyi danda carries with it the principle of complementarity. In the lecture, Ohuche uses ibu anyi danda and complementarity interchangeably (2013b: 2) This (ibu anyi danda or complementarity), for Ohuche, helps the Igbo community to work hand in hand with the missionaries who brought education. In this complementary relationship, the missionaries come with education by recruiting teachers while the community provides land for schools (2004: 32). Asouzu picks up this concept and develops it further. He does this by making reference to the etymological meaning of the concept ibu anyi danda. The word ibuanyidanda literally is made up of three Igbo words, ibu (load), anyi (insurmountable) and danda (a species of ants that work together). When put together, it becomes the aphorism ‘no load is insurmountable for danda the ant,’ which translates to complementarity. This aphorism is employed by the Igbo as a work song: “Bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda, Bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda, Bunu bunu oo ibu anyi danda” (Asouzu 2004: 108). With this song, the Igbo are saying that complementarity is the best path to life. It holds that no individual can exist in isolation and that more can be achieved when people work together. It is this

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descriptive idea that is derived from observation of danda the ant that Asouzu systematizes at a categorical level to explain the notion of being. He does this by transforming this descriptive (observational) statement into a synthetic, analytic statement. It is in this way that he avoids the error of transposition and picture-type fallacy (2004: 119–132, 2013a: 15, 2013b:13), which simply implies that “human communities, just like danda, have the capacity to surmount difficult challenges by complementing their efforts” (2013a: 10). For Asouzu, this is not the case. As he stated, “definitely, what is valid for ants is not valid for human beings in all ramifications if the analogy must uphold its usefulness” (2013a: 15). Asouzu does a deep, critical analysis of the descriptive and observational statement ibu anyi danda and makes it a concept that is meaningful to the entire reality in existence. Thus, this synthetic-analytic statement is a derivative from the descriptive (observational) statement (ibu anyi danda) through abstraction (2007a: 11, 2011: 40). It is in line with the above that Asouzu employed ibuanyidanda as an equivalent of the English word complementarity. It should be noted that Asouzu does not claim that the idea of complementarity is restricted to the Igbo aphorism ibu anyi danda or that it is a concept that is found and developed only in pristine African societies. He argues that this notion is universal as it is found in other societies outside Africa as well as other disciplines such as quantum mechanics (physics) (2004: 95–118). It is Asouzu that we owe the gratitude for developing the philosophical dimension of this idea of complementarity in his ibuanyidanda ontology.

The Method of Ibuanyidanda Ontology The method which Asouzu formulated for his ibuanyidanda ontology is complementarism or complementary reflection. Complementarism, according to Asouzu, is a ‘disposition’ with which one approaches and understands in a holistic manner, without any form of bifurcation and polarization. This mindset is known as the ibuanyidanda mindset (obioha—comprehensive totalizing mind), that leads to comprehensive, holistic objective truth (2007b: 149). In the foregoing discussion, four basic claims can be deduced. First is that truth (objective truth) is the goal of philosophy. The second is that this truth can be arrived at through an appropriate method (ibuanyidanda method). The third is that the method is a disposition towards comprehensiveness. The fourth is that it is the right disposition that informs the

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appropriate way of attaining objective truth. It is this mindset that we seek to articulate in light of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda method. This mindset is also known as obioha (ibuanyidanda or complementary mindset). It is otherwise called the global mindset (Asouzu, 2007a: 22, 54). This mindset seeks to go beyond all forms of fragmentary and lopsided conception of reality that lead to no truth or partial truth. Its concern is objective truth, which is holistic and derived from a holistic comprehension of reality. This is in line with the fact that reality is multifaceted and that no particular approach can lead to a holistic truth about it. It is with this that different approaches are complementarily employed in studying reality in order to arrive at truth (authentic, objective truth)—one that is not bifurcating or polarizing. The ibuanyidanda mindset is a comprehensive, complementary, totalizing mindset. For Asouzu, this mindset does not bifurcate, polarize or elevate an aspect of reality to an absolute instance. On the contrary, it harmonizes and unifies reality. It sees realities as missing links. According to Asouzu, missing links are “all imaginable modes of relations as can be abstracted and related to each other in a complementary mutually related way in service” (2013a: 50). Hence, they are fragments of reality which are incomplete on their own but are made complete through complementarity within other fragments. It is in this way that Asouzu argues that there are entities and the entities of entities, ideas and ideas of ideas, units and the units of units, both spirit and matter, animate and inanimate and so on (2011: 50, 2013a: 59). The Ibuanyidanda method seeks to harmonize them in such a way that they find their completeness within the whole where they complement themselves. Therefore, the ibuanyidanda mindset sees differences in realities as the reason for harmonious coexistence of the parts in the whole (Asouzu 2007a: 402). Discussing this point further, Asouzu argues that, as a disposition, the global mindset helps actors grapple with differences and similarities positively. It does this effectively beyond the artificial boundaries imposed by the mind and such that substance and accident are readily seen as belonging to diverse regions of being. Where this type of mindset is operational, differences and similarities strictly speaking remain more or less a mere artificial arrangement, which does not in any way prevent the mind from understanding that all units are mutually related (Asouzu 2007a: 412). Individuals who do not have the global mindset required for seeing reality holistically suffer from what Asouzu calls “ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment)” (2007a: 57, 235, 358, 2004: 61–69).

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Elsewhere, he adds human ambivalent situations to the phenomenon of concealment (ihe mkpuchi anya) (2011: 80). Accordingly, he argues that these human ambivalent situations and ihe mkpuchi anya act as the mechanisms that prevent individuals from seeing reality from a holistic perspective. These mechanisms also impose fragments and aspects of reality as reality. They affect the way philosophy and knowledge enterprise are exhibited and carried out. This influence is negative since knowledge that should naturally lead to truth is restrictive in a sense. The question that confronts one at this point is how one can achieve this obioha (global mindset) that “has learnt how to view units as complements within a comprehensive universal setting” (Asouzu 2007a: 83). The point is that it is not easy to renounce and get over non-­conciliatory, conceited, polarizing and discriminating types of mindset acquired through several years of education, socialization and indoctrination (2007a: 24–70, 2011: 48). Asouzu traces the challenge to the fact that it is a mindset problem. It is on this premise that he calls for the need to address this human condition and restore the mind to obioha (global mindset). Thus, he posits that this can be made possible through “noetic propaedeutic or the pedagogy of the mind” (2011: 48). Writing on the meaning of noetic propaedeutic, Asouzu quips that [b]y noetic propaedeutic, I mean, a pre-education of the mind, and human reason with a view to overcoming the broken unity in human consciousness caused by the challenges of the tension laden human ambivalent existential situations and ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment). (2011: 49)

Noetic propaedeutic is a pedagogical and psychotherapeutic measure through which the mind is pre-educated before it approaches and studies reality. This process can also be seen as the reeducating of the mind. It is reeducating of the mind because the mind has initially been miseducated to view reality in a disjunctive, bifurcating and polarizing manner. Thus, obioha is the right disposition with which reality should be approached and studied. As a result, noetic propaedeutic is the path to obioha. Noetic propaedeutic enables the mind to seek to overcome the subject/object divide that comes with the bifurcating mindset inherent in human consciousness. In this way, noetic propaedeutic provides the enabling environment for humans to see things or realities the way they are, without any form of distortion of thought or vision. The reason is that it takes away the veil of concealment that blinded the mind to the truth. Noetic propaedeutic

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brings the human mind to the state of obioha, which is associated with obi/ mmuo eziokwu (disposition to the  truth). This is obtainable when the mind begins to see fragments and units as missing links of reality. At this stage, the mind operates with “akara obi/akara mmuo or the transcendent categories of consciousness” (2011: 50). It is germane to state that the ibuanyidanda mindset can be attained through noetic propaedeutic aided by ‘existential conversion.’ It is through existential conversion that the mind “learns to convert the transcendent categories of unity of consciousness of ibuanyidanda philosophy into practical action” (2013a: 59). Asouzu states that transcendent categories of unity of consciousness (akara obi/akara mmuo) include “‘absoluteness’, ‘comprehensiveness’, ‘fragmentation’, ‘future reference’, ‘historicity’, ‘relativity’, ‘totality’, ‘unity’, ‘universality’ and ‘world-immanent predetermination’” (2013a: 59). Also, existential conversion brings to obioha another dimension of thinking. This dimension of thinking is ima onwe onye (being-in-control). In the view of Asouzu, ima onwe onye is an act of existential conversion in which “an acting and a thinking subject is entrapped such that [it] finds expression in the experience of transcendent complementary categories of consciousness with missing links” (2011: 54). Ima onwe onye is not only a thinking pattern, it is also “an important attribute of an authentic being (a true philosopher)” (Chimakonam 2016: 5). A true philosopher is one who is in control of herself/himself and her/his faculty of reasoning when she/he confronts realities. Such a philosopher remains unbiased in examining such realities. It is at this point that a philosopher or inquirer is able to harmonize these missing links within the whole. It is also in this whole that their limitations and insufficiencies are complemented and their being actualized. This is where obioha comes into play and realizes objective truth—truth as it is. Hence, obioha is the disposition needed for the mind to think and act in an ibuanyidanda mode. As a result, Asouzu argues that [o]bioha operates under the assumption that all forms of human achievements are conceivable based on mutual complementarity of all available resources and in consideration of all actors and factors that enter into their genesis. Hence, its strength subsists in upholding a harmonized focus while treading the path of multi-dimensionality; it sees as major weakness all tendencies towards one dimensionality, exclusiveness, polarization and division. (2007a: 43)

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This can be the case when the mind is open to seeing that the coexistence of realities is the path to better knowledge and relationship with reality. This is possible when the mind is at a level where it is christened obioha and has come to the point of self-authentication through complementary transcendent existential conversion. It is this mindset that Asouzu sees as what should shape ibuanyidanda ontology; hence he formulates four principles, as imperatives and the criteria to guide the articulation of his ontology in line with obioha. These principles will be considered in the next section.

Basic Principles of Ibuanyidanda Ontology Ibuanyidanda or complementary mindset (global mindset or obioha) is, for Asouzu, what can lead to a proper conception of being. This is possible through some principles articulated by Asouzu. The complementary character of ibuanyidanda ontology discussed earlier is guided by the principles discussed here. The principles include the principles of integration or harmonious complementation and progressive transformation. The principle of integration or harmonious complementation states that “anything that exists serves a missing link of reality” (2011: 44). Some useful deductions can be made from this principle. First, individual entities exist. Second, they do not exist in isolation. Third, they exist in relation to one another. Fourth, their relationship is in mutual service to each other. Fifth, they affirm the existence of each other. This principle is the metaphysical variant of the practical principle of ibuanyidanda known as the principle of progressive transformation. The principle of progressive transformation states that “all human actions are geared towards the joy of being” (2011: 44). There are some implications that can be drawn from this principle. First, humans are active entities; they are not inactive or passive. Second, humans are goal-oriented entities. Third, humans’ goals are manifested in their actions. Fourth, human actions are not aimless; they are driven by purpose. Fifth, human actions are aimed at making life count or meaningful. Thus, sixth, all actions that are meaningful and right are the ones that lead to the joy of all who are affected by the actions. The two principles above are guided by two other principles known as ibuanyidanda imperative and the truth and authenticity criterion. The ibuanyidanda imperative states that one must “allow the limitations of being to be the cause of your joy” (2011: 44). Some inferences can be

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made from this imperative. First, beings have their limitations or no being is self-sufficient. Second, humans have reasons to be joyful. Third, human joy is tied to the notion of being. Fourth, humans derive joy from understanding and appreciating the limitations of being. Fifth, the awareness of our self-insufficiency should remind us of our mutual dependence and should lead us to seek complementation. The truth and authenticity criterion states that one must “never elevate any world immanent missing link to an absolute instance” (2004: 69, 270, 317–47). The deductions that can be made from this criterion include, first, that it is possible to absolutize an entity or missing link; second, that it is necessary to avoid this tendency; and third, that it is better to place all missing links on the same plane. It is indeed these principles, imperative and criterion that take the concept of ibuanyidanda to its synthetic-­ analytic state from its descriptive state, which is elementary and might be misleading. They are the very defining rules for ibuanyidanda as complementarity. With these principles, imperative and criterion discussed, we turn to ibuanyidanda ontology, which Asouzu articulates using the highlighted principles.

The Nature of Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda Ontology Asouzu’s theory of being is known as ibuanyidanda or complementary ontology. This ontology unravels “being from African perspective.” It is articulated as an anti-Aristotelian ontology believed to be bifurcating, polarizing and exclusivist in nature as it pertains to being. For Aristotle, being consists of substance and accident, but it is substance that truly underlies being even with accident (1947). According to Asouzu, this is not only a bifurcating, polarizing and exclusivist notion of being; it is a static conception of being. He, moreover, asserts that it is this conception of being that has colored the ontological theories in Western philosophy. Furthermore, Asouzu notes that even Tempels’ assertion of the Bantu-­ African conception of being aligns with the Aristotelian tradition as it gives a static idea of being instead of a dynamic one. Asouzu deduced this from the passage where Tempels equated force with being (Tempels 1959). Asouzu then suggests that Tempels’ proposal can be reduced to substance (Asouzu 2007a; Ogbonnaya 2014: 110). In this way, Tempels infuses a static attribute into what he claims to be dynamic. Asouzu claims that it is like Aristotle’s substance. This is what we term ‘Tempels’ dilemma.’ The question is how can what is dynamic be static? Asouzu also argues that this

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understanding of ontology has influenced some other African ontological theories. It is against this backdrop that he seeks to reconstruct the notion of being. This is the practical application of conversational thinking by Asouzu. What is done, as shown in this paragraph, is to critically engage Aristotle and Tempels. In the paragraphs that follow, we will demonstrate logically how he has creatively reconstructed aspects of their thoughts in his own ontological system. On his part, Asouzu holds that being is not equal to substance without accident, as Aristotle claims. He opines that being is that which consists of substance and accident, that are in a mutual complementary relationship. What he says is that no aspect of being exists in isolation or can be equated to being. In other words, being has a dual nature. It is in this light that he argues metaphorically that ihedi, nwere isi na ọdụ (what is, has head and tail end), where the head (isi) is the substance and the tail end (ọdụ) is the accident. These aspects (head and tail end) of being are missing links to each other in line with the principle of integration or harmonious complementation. Thus, they are needed to coexist for being to be being. If these two aspects of being make up being, being cannot be defined outside the vortex of their complementary presence. That is to say, being is defined within the context of the relationship (nmekọ) that exists between substance and accident. What this comes to is that being consists of substance and accident that are in a mutual complementary relationship. Also, these two aspects of being are not only missing links; they cannot exist in isolation of each other. They always exist together (ka sọmụ adịna). If they always exist together, then none can be elevated to an absolute instance (following ‘the truth and authenticity criterion’). The reason for this is that they are insufficient on their own. It is this incompleteness in each aspect of being that compels them to coexist with each other. Also, it is this tendency that keeps them glued to each other and gives being its dual nature, in line with the African principle of duality (Edeh 1985: 74) or ‘harmonious duality.’ Asouzu, furthermore, takes this explication of being to another level as he observes that realities exist in a mutual complementary relationship. This is derived from his view that each aspect of being is incomplete in itself, outside the opposite other. In the same light, realities are insufficient on their own unless they enter into a complementary relationship with others. This relationship is in a mutual sense such that each benefits from it. It should be noted that in each of the relationships that being enters, it manifests itself differently. This is what Asouzu meant by ‘future

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referentiality’ (2007a: 56, 63, 65, 99) of being. The idea is that being continues to manifest itself in relation to other beings that it encounters. Thus, to understand a being, one has to take into consideration all the possible and would-be relationships that such a being would enter into. In this light, each reality serves as a missing link to others since it is deficient in itself and therefore needs to be in a relationship in order to realize its existence fully. The foregoing is in line with the ibuanyidanda imperative, which urges one to allow the limitation of being to be the cause of one’s joy. If one does not see being as that which is limited in isolation, the individual will not understand why beings need to enter into a mutual complementary relationship. It is, therefore, due to this limitation in being that a reality goes into different relationships with other realities in order to find its completeness and be meaningful in its existence. This implies that being is the missing link (Edet 2011: 28). As the missing link, being is that which complements, and is itself complemented by others.

A Critique of Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda Ontology A careful consideration of the numerous research dissertations, theses, projects, articles and book chapters on Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology gives the impression that this ontology is a perfect system. No! ibuanyidanda ontology is not a perfect system. It is not a flawless philosophical system. For to think so will lead to the conclusion that it is a perfect system that prescribes perfectionism for all humans and other philosophical systems too. In this section, we will raise some objections to ibuanyidanda ontology. An aspect of ibuanyidanda ontology that has come under strong scrutiny is the idea of the missing link. This idea constitutes a great problematic to ibuanyidanda ontology since it leaves room for diverse interpretations and applications. The idea of the missing link is so vital in Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology enterprise because it is not only used in the definition of being but is found in the principles of integration and the truth and authenticity criterion. The general deduction that can be made from this idea of the missing link is that ‘all existent realities are missing links.’ Chimakonam has raised a serious criticism against ibuanyidanda ontology based on this insight. According to him, it can  lead to a false conclusion that all missing links count (Chimakonam 2014: 54). This is a credible objection, but it can be explained that every missing link counts within a context. It is not in all contexts that every missing link counts.

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There are contexts where a particular missing link might not fit in perfectly. In such a situation, such a missing link may not count. Also, there may be others where it fits in perfectly. In such contexts, it counts. Thus, all missing links count in the context they rightly belong to. That is to say that the concept of missing link is context-dependent. This understanding of missing link is strongly affirmed by Chimakonam in another of his works where he posits that “[b]y missing links Asouzu means the diverse units that make up an entity within the framework of the whole and as they are complementarily related” (2014: 7). With this, it is not correct to say that the idea of missing link is too vague and that it should be replaced with the ‘necessary link’ as Chimakonam prescribes (2014: 55). This can be substantiated by the fact that within a universe of discourse, all of its variables cannot be said to be necessary links but missing links. The reason is that they are in a mutual complementary relationship. The conclusion reached leads naturally to another problematic in ibuanyidanda ontology. This problem is that ‘it confuses complementarity, mutuality and equality’ (Chimakonam 2014: 55–64). For Chimakonam, Asouzu sees complementarity, mutuality and equality as one and the same concept in terms of meaning and usage. He substantiates his claim thus: “yes, he [Asouzu] may not have openly declared that all men in mutual complementary relationship are equal, but the sense of his philosophy suggests they must be” (2014: 59). Chimakonam even goes ahead to make allusion to the ‘truth and authenticity criterion’—“never elevate any world immanent missing link to an absolute instance”—to validate his claim. For him, this criterion implies equality of all beings that are in a mutual complementary relationship. We will address these criticisms of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology on two fronts. First, Asouzu believes and proclaims that there is a hierarchy among beings or realities. This is apparent in his argument about the relationship between substance and accident that are in mutual complementary relationship within the whole called being. He argues that substance is ihe kachasi mkpa (what is most important) while accident is ihe di mkpa (what is important) (Asouzu 2007a: 254). It shows that there is gradation of beings or realities even when they are in a mutual complementary relationship in the same way as substance and accident. This leads to the second front, which Asouzu did not talk about. He did not talk about equality in his ontology, but reciprocity. We can see this in his remark that reads: “Reciprocity is the disposition through which distinct quantities can be brought in relationship to each other, such that each, more or less,

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recognizes the necessity of the mutual dependence that is fundamental for the ordered execution of their functions” (Asouzu 2003: 80). What this implies is that “[r]eciprocity derives from the natural complementary and systematic relationship existing among things. … [Also] all partners in a reciprocal relationship are necessarily bound complementarily” (Asouzu 2003: 80). Hence, in ibuanyidanda ontology, “mutual complementary relationship … does not aspire to ‘equality in complementarity’, rather it is characterized by ‘give and take’, that is, ‘reciprocity in complementarity’” (Edet 2014: 104). Thus, beings, for Asouzu, regardless of their ontological status can enter into a mutual complementary relationship with each other. This does not imply equality, but offers an equitable ontological plane for complementarity with each other. The idea of complementarity that is relevant to this chapter is not that of up-down or down-up relationship wherein an aspect of being or any being is considered to be greater than another (Chimakonam 2011). In this chapter, complementarity is seen in terms of mutuality wherein all beings or realities have equal standing in their relationship with one another. What this means is that none has a more important place than the other. This argument does not dismiss the hierarchy of beings but holds that none is more than the other in relevance within a whole in spite of their hierarchical placement. Another area where Asouzu’s ontological thinking could be critically and creatively engaged with has to do with the logic that underbellies ontology. According to Chimakonam, the logic of ibuanyidanda ontology appears to be monistic since everything is always true (2014). We do not agree with this. Even Asouzu himself does not see the logic that axiomatizes his ontology as monistic. Asouzu holds that the logic of his ontology is complementary logic. Asouzu substantiates this by making reference first to his principle of integration. In his application of the method and principles of ibuanyidanda to logic, he argues that ‘anything that exists serves a missing link of reality’ and that missing links are both positive and negative. According to him, “this fact can be seen in the way our conjunctive and disjunctive faculties relate to each other” (2013a: 92). For him, this leads to tension in human consciousness and affects the way humans think, judge, act and relate to reality and the world around them. The conjunctive enables humans to relate well with each other and the world, while the disjunctive works in the opposite. It leads to self-­ centeredness and disharmony. This, in turn, leads to seeing reality and the world in a disjointed mode, with one or two alternatives.

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This type of logic negates harmonization and complementation as well as sees opposites as contradictories that can never be harmonized. It is these disjunctive judgments that have led to what Asouzu calls “the logic of geographical categorization” (2013a: 93). This logic is based on geographical differences. It is exclusivist and ethnocentric in character. It poses some difficulties in logic. It leads to a plurality of logics such as “Western Logic, Eastern Logic, Northern Logic, Southern Logic, Arabic Logic, Chinese Logic, African Logic, Zulu Logic, Bantu Logic, Yoruba Logic, etc.” (2013a: 93–94). It also leads to division along ethnic, tribal and geographical boundaries, as well as strained interpersonal relations. Asouzu highlights some of the problems posed by the logic of geographical categorization: Recourse to geographical categorizations presents special difficulties in logic. Where we always focus on geographical differences to grasp at the specific, we would always be faced with the dilemma of how we can apply the same categorization to all general constituting an entity within given localities bearing in mind their specific differences. … [It] makes us always vulnerable to the fallacy of over-generalization, to reductio ad absurdum and to argumentum ad infinitum. … [It] is one that fuel[s] all sorts of ethnocentric reduction; and one that can easily lead to fallacy that because all share in the same geographical location, they are likely to possess the same qualities and attributes in the same measure. … (It) has the capacity to undermine creativity. (2013a: 94–95)

After pointing out the danger of the logic of geographical categorization, Asouzu avers that ibuanyidanda logic does not follow after this logic, but that it is rather based on conjunctive faculty of the human consciousness, which seeks harmonization and complementation and is geared toward creativity, as it strives to grasps missing links beyond geographical considerations. Asouzu goes on to state that ibuanyidanda logic follows the ibuanyidanda methodic pluralism and transcends all forms of methodic monism that regionalizes logic. Hence, this logic in its “mode of operation is neither single-valued, doubled-valued, triple-valued, quadruple-­ valued, etc. It is something that is constitutive in complementary comprehensive future-related mode” (2013a: 97). This is to say that ibuanyidanda logic is not a one- (single-) valued logic as Chimakonam suspected (2014: 44). Rather, it is somehow related to what Christopher Udofia describes as “Complementary Harmonism,” which holds that “the

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bivalent logic of subsumptive monism … is to be complemented with the rise of multivalent valued logic” (2011: 42). Ibuanyidanda logic, for Asouzu, goes beyond even Udofia’s “Complementary Harmonism” since it is wider in scope and holds that single-valued logic, double-valued logic, triple-valued logic and quadruple-valued logic are used together in the explanation of any given reality or system and its future referential dimension. It sees all logic systems, including those yet to be propounded, as mutually complementary in the explanation of reality. Hence, it is a complementary/integrative logic that seeks to harmonize and unite differences. Asouzu, in discussing his ibuanyidanda logic applies his truth and authenticity criterion. By this criterion, Asouzu says that no logic should be considered to be more important than others at any instance. He argues that both the logic of human interest (with inherent tendency to defend our interest even at the cost of the interest of others) and the ontological logic (legitimizing logic) are needed for effective functioning of the society. One can say that fundamentally the logic of human interest and the ontological logic complement themselves since they are needed for the execution of any action that is truly human. Hence, without the logic of human interest that is freely constituted, the legitimizing role of the ontological logic would become ineffective. … In other words, the ontological logic builds on the free operation of the logic of human interest as it legitimizes and directs it. (2013a: 106–107)

These two logics must, therefore, be employed complementarily for human beings to act correctly in any given situation of life and understand reality better. This kind of logical thinking will lead to complementarity of diverse logic systems, where all of these systems are seen as contraries or opposites within a complementary whole. It is the failure to see them in this light that leads to what Asouzu calls the ontological boomerang effect of ibuanyidanda logic. Although Asouzu holds that the logic that underbellies his ontology is ibuanyidanda logic, one can say that Ezumezu logic could be used to explain some aspects of his ontology. For instance, we can use Ezumezu logic to explain his reconceptualization of being as that which consists of substance and accident. Both aspects then are in a mutual complementary relationship to form being. Here, we can see that there are three entities or realities, namely, substance, accident and being (substance and

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accident). These three entities correspond to the three Boolean values of Ezumezu logic: true (T), false (F) and true and false (C). “Another instance has to do with defining being in terms of ihedi, nwere isi na ọdụ (what is [being]) has head and tail end)”. The head (isi), tail end (ọdụ) and what is being (ihedi) correspond to the three Boolean values of Ezumezu logic. What cannot be doubted from the preceding paragraphs is that the logic of ibuanyidanda ontology is related to Ezumezu logic, just as complementarity is synonymous to nmekọ. Ibuanyidanda ontology, ibuanyidanda logic, conversational thinking and Ezumezu logic bring out and emphasize the idea of nmekọ or relationship. All types of logic, for Asouzu, are related to each other in that they can be used to explain any given reality. This is why Ezumezu logic operates in the light of the principle of complementarity (nmekọka), which is also the core of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology, and gives room for all possible logic systems to bud and be used in the explanation of reality. This is what nmekọ entails—the working together of all possible systems and theories.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have examined Asouzu’s notion of being starting from what led to his philosophy. We also observed that, for Asouzu, method is a disposition and that the method of his ontology is complementary disposition, otherwise known as complementarism. Afterwards, we noted that his ibuanyidanda ontology has its root in his four basic principles: the principle of integration, progressive transformation, ibuanyidanda imperative as well as the truth and authenticity criterion. Our concluding remark is that Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology holds that being is that which consists of both substance and accident. These two aspects are in a mutual complementary relationship to form being. Being is a whole. Each reality is not just relevant but important, constituting the missing link in the network of other realities. We are looking forward to a large-scale engagement with Asouzu’s theories by the African philosophical community, and beyond. Ibuanyidanda ontology is a veritable African perspectival contribution to the field of metaphysics. It is original and purveys a methodological strategy for addressing some of the issues perturbing Africa and the world today. Such issues as ethnic, racial, religious and sectarian tensions, which are some of the problems that carve a line between the ‘self’

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and the ‘other’ among humanity today, can be addressed through the complementary principles of ibuanyidanda philosophy.

References Achebe, C. 1998. Chi in Igbo Cosmology. In African Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. E. Chukwudi. Malden: Blackwell. Aristotle. 1947. Metaphysics, Trans. W.D.  Ross. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon. Asouzu, I.I. 2003. Effective Leadership and the Ambivalence of Human Interest: The Nigerian Paradox in a Complementary Perspective. Calabar: University of Calabar. ———. 2004. The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar. ———. 2007a. Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology, Beyond World-­ Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Imposition. London: Transaction. ———. 2007b. Method as Disposition. Challenges of Philosophy in a World of Relativity. In Ikwa Ogwe: Essential Readings in Complementary Reflection (A Systematic Methodological Approach), 140–158. Calabar: Saesprint. ———. 2011. Ibuanyidanda and the Philosophy of Essence (Philosophy, the Science of Missing Links of Reality). 50th Inaugural Lecture, Calabar: University Calabar. ———. 2013a. Ibuanyidanda (Complementary Reflection) and Some Basic Problems in Africa. Zurich: Lit Verlag GmbH and Co. KG Wien. ———. 2013b. Ibuanyidanda (Special Edition): Excerpt from Online Dictionary of Intercultural Philosophy. (ODP). Calabar: Uninversity of Calabar. Basden, G.T. 1921. Among the Ibos of Nigeria. London: Frank Cass. Chimakonam, J.O. 2011. Dissecting the Character of Danda the Ant and Neutralizing the Philosophy of Missing Links: An Egbe N’Ugo Conundrum. Journal of Complementary Reflections: Studies in Asouzu 1 (1): 41–52. ———. 2014. Dissecting the Character of Danda the Ant and Neutraizing the Philosophy of Missing Links: An Egbe N’Ugo Conundrum. In Argument and Clarification: A Philosophical Encounter Between J.  O. Chimakonam and M.  I. Edet on the Ibunayidandaness of Complementary Ontology, 53–81. 1. Calabar: 3rd Logic Option. ———. 2016. Globalization Versus Ibuanyidanda Ontology: Confronting the Tension Between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. ISAPs Conference Special Edition 2: 1–18. ———. 2017. What Is Conversational Philosophy? A Prescription of a New Doctrine and Method of Philosophy, in and Beyond African Philosophy. UNISA 18: 114–130. ———. 2018. The Demise of Philosophical Universalism and the Rise of Conversational Thinking in Contemporary African Philosophy. In Method

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Substance and the Future of African Philosophy, ed. E.  Etieyibo, 135–160. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Edeh, E. 1985. Towards an Igbo Metaphysics. Chicago: Loyola University Press. Edet, M. 2011. Being as Missing Links. Journal of Complementary Reflections: Studies in Asouzu 1 (1): 28–32. ———. 2014. Ibuanyidanda as ‘Ezi Okwu’ and the Resolution of Chimakonam’s Egbe N’Ugo Conundrum: A Philosophical Response to Chimakonam’s ‘Dissecting the Character of Danda the Ant and Neutraizing the Philosophy of Missing Links’. In Argument and Clarification: A Philosophical Encounter Between J.  O. Chimakonam and M.  I. Edet on the Ibunayidandaness of Complementary Ontology, 83–131. 1. Calabar: 3rd Logic Option. Egbai, U.O. 2018. Why African Philosophers should build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions. 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2. Egbai, U.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2019. Why Conversational Thinking Could be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189. Ejizu, C. 1985. Continuity and Discontinuity in Igbo Traditional Religion. In The God’s in Retreat: Continuity and Change in African Religions. Enugu: Fourth Dimension. Iroegbu, P. 1995. Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy. Owerri: International Universities. Iwe, N.S.S. 1985. Christianity, Culture and Colonialism in Africa. Port Harcourt: Department of Religious Studies College of Education. Kaboha, P. 1992. African Metaphysical Heritage and Contemporary Life. African Contributions to Contemporary Life: The Foundation of African Social Life. Uganda Philosophical Studies. I. II. 2. Kamalu, C. 1990. Foundations of African Thought. A Worldview Grounded in the African Heritage of Religion, Philosophy, Science and Art. London: Karnak House. Mbiti, J.S. 1969. African Religion and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 3rd ed., 41–55. Lanham: University Press of America. Nasseem, Z.B. 1992. African Heritage and Contemporary Life: An Experience of Epistemological Change. The Foundation for Social Life. Uganda Philosophical Studies. 1. II. 2.

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Nnoruka, S. 1998. Education and African Development. In Africa, Philosophy and Public Affair: Proceedings of an International Conference held at Bigard Memorial Seminary, Enugu from April 29-May 3, 1997, ed. J.O. Oguejiofor. Delta. Nwoga, I.D. 1984. Nka na Nzere: The Focus of Igbo Worldview. Ahiajoku Lecture. Owerri: Culture Division, Minisitry of Information, Culture, Youth and Sports and Printed by the Government Printer. Ogbonnaya, L.U. 2014. The Question of Being in African Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religion 3 (1): 108–126. Oguah, E.B. 1984. African and Western Philosophy a Comparative Study. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. R.  Wright, 213–226. Lanham: University Press American. Oladipo, O. 2002. Rethinking Yoruba World-view and Idea of Life. In The Third Way in African Philosophy: Essay in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu, ed. O. Oladipo, 155–167. Ibadan: Hope. Ramose, M. 2002. African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books. Tempels, P. 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Udofia, C.A. 2011. Worldview Dependence of Metaphysics, Truth and Logic: A Proposal for Complementary Harmonism as a Framework for Cultural Dialogue. Integrative Humanism Journal 1 (2): 42–48. Whitehead, A.N. 1978. Process and Reality. New York: Free Press.

CHAPTER 6

The Ontology of Personhood

Introduction Personhood and its aspects have been discussed in philosophy for a long time. From ancient Egypt to China, Japan, India and Greece, rubrics such as b¦ (personality), tianren heyi (unity of humanity and nature), shinjin (bodymind), dravya (substance), res cogitans and res extensa (mind and body), akara aka, ori (destiny) and so on have been, and are still being, discussed. One of the questions that cut across these topics and contexts is about the composition of the human person or the self. Is the self extended, intangible or both? Various answers can be found in different philosophical traditions. Our focus in this chapter is not to survey these many perspectives but to focus on the contribution from the African philosophical tradition. John Mbiti, the Kenyan philosopher, produced a robust account of the constitution of the person. In his thought, there is the extended body and the spirit, both of which make up the individual. At death, the body perishes but the spirit sojourns to the great beyond in the afterlife, where it readies itself to be recycled into existence in another body. This is mainly the blueprint of African understanding of mind–body dynamics. The difference which can be found in other accounts such as Alexis Kagame’s account of the Rwandan bantu, Ifeanyi Menkiti’s and Richard Onwuanibe’s accounts of the Igbo, Kwasi Wiredu’s and Kwame Gyekye’s accounts of the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_6

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Akan, Segun Gbadegesin’s account of the Yoruba, and discussions on kindred topics such as ubuntu, communalism, Afro-communitarianism and so forth is minimal, and in some of them, insubstantial. There is a combination of the material, immaterial, abstract forces in some cases, and a cocktail of all in some others. The ontology of personhood spells out both material and immaterial, mental and extended components of the person. Here, we will survey most of what has been said in the literature on African philosophy, with a specific focus on personhood. There is the ethics of personhood1 which among others centers around the determinations of right and wrong conducts, the extent of individual endowments and communal values and so on, on the bases of norms and other moral precepts. But there is the ontology of personhood which covers the metaphysical labyrinth of what it means to be a person, an individual, an entity that exists, a physical, a non-physical or both. In any case, the person who is the subject of the ethics of personhood can also be subjected to metaphysical analysis. So, it is easy to see how the ethics of personhood connects with the ontology of personhood. At one end, we are concerned with precepts that guide or determine an entity’s conducts, and at another end, the biological and metaphysical constitution of that entity are subjects of investigation. We will highlight the two main conceptions of personhood: the metaphysical and the normative. We will survey the major discourses on the normative conception of personhood such as Mbiti, Menkiti, Gyekye, Matolino and Ikuenobe. The list is not exhausted in these scholars’ contributions, but they probably represent the major positions and turning points in the debate. Where necessary, we will highlight some objections, even though this is not the aim of the section. In the course of this survey, we will draw attention to some of the important commentators, promoters and critics of the major proponents. We will also highlight some of the proponents on the side of the metaphysical conception, and show the significance of their work in the overall project of African metaphysical thinking. In the end, we will attempt, howbeit small, to collapse the ethics of personhood on the ontology of personhood in order to show that both 1  One of the most active exponents of the ethics of personhood in the African philosophical tradition is Thaddeus Metz (2007). He describes his theory as relational ethics. A host of others like Polycarp Ikuenobe and Motsamai Molefe are among those working in the area of ethics of personhood. Ubuntu is also a typical portrayal of personhood as a moral precept. It has been, and continues to be, deployed in practical terms in addressing the problems in society. South Africa in the postapartheid era is a typical context where ubuntu is applied to cases involving human rights, justice, equity, distribution of resources and so on. See Shutte (2001), Metz (2011), Egbai (2017, 2018) and Egbai and Chimakonam (2019a, b).

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can, and should, be discussed in connection to the other. What we shall not do is a robust discussion of the ethics of personhood that will engage with various contributors. Such a project is clearly outside the scope of the present book focused on metaphysics and epistemology. The aim of this chapter would be to show what contributions have been made in the topic of personhood to the project of African metaphysics. A robust metaphysical theory may not have been formulated on the topic, but a litany of metaphysical themes have been investigated, and a host of concepts have been produced, and that, if nothing else, takes the growth of metaphysics in African philosophy a step closer to full development. An parallel objective in this chapter would be to demonstrate how the method of conversational thinking and its logic of Ezumezu can ground the ontology of personhood.

Discourses on Personhood The question of personhood continues to be an enduring question in philosophy, generally speaking. To ask the question of personhood is to ask the question what, if anything, defines the quality, essence and/or the ontological constitution of the human person, such that one can identify a certain being as a human person and not some other type of beast. In Western philosophy, a number of answers have been given to this particular question, from Plato and his tripartite notion of the soul to Aristotle and his rationality, to Descartes and his thinking thing, even down to naturalists like Hume in the past and the neurophilosophers of today, who identify personhood in consciousness, and self-awareness, which in turn is identified with brain function. In the contemporary time, a host of Western philosophers such as Charles Taylor, Alasdair Maclntyre and Amitai Etzioni have floated various theories in communitarianism within which strands of personhood have been discussed. What is interesting about the Western view is that its underlying thinking suggests that personhood lies within the individual and nothing more; that it is derived from the individual herself/himself and involves the expression of some innate capacity or quality. Our immediate concern, here, is not with the Western view, but we nod toward it here as a way of acknowledging important contributions to the topic and as a way of putting into perspective the nature of the African view which we consolidate in this chapter by teasing out the ontological rendering of personhood. In African philosophy, a lot too has been said about the idea of personhood, from John Mbiti to Bernard Matolino and beyond. A number of African scholars have sought to present their views on the matter in a way that reflects and/or interrogates traditional African views of personhood.

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Under the rubric of ubuntu thought, scholars like Placide Tempels (1959), Alexis Kagame (1956), Janheinz Jahn (1961), Samkange and Samkange (1980) and Mogobe Ramose (2002) have floated and discussed personhood as muntu.2 Overall, it is interesting to see how personhood is understood within the African perspective. There are probably three trajectories for this topic: as an ontological discourse, it focuses on the nature of the person in the ontology of personhood, whether physical or nonphysical; as a cosmological discourse, it focuses on the world community; and as metaphysics, it combines the structure of personhood and community, with special consideration of the nature of their relationship. What then is the ontological nature of the person? Most African thinkers hold that the person consists of the physical body and the nonphysical vital force,  spirit or mind or soul as some would have it.  The combination of these ontologically different entities makes up the person. To analyze these, Didier Kaphagawani (2004) outlines three theses. The first is the ‘force thesis,’ which conceives the essence of humans and indeed all realities in Bantu ontology in terms of force or vital force. The force thesis is credited to Placide Tempels, who attempted to produce the outline of Bantu thought in his now controversial book Bantu Philosophy (1959). The second thesis, credited to Alexis Kagame (1989), is ‘shadow thesis.’ In this thesis, Kagame conceives the human being as an entity composed of shadow, which is the principle of animality, and an immortal principle which is the animating principle of intelligence. The third thesis is the ‘communalism thesis,’ which Kaphagawani credited to John Mbiti (1970). Here, the individual is conceived as a social or communal being whose existence and thriving depends on her/his association with the community (Agada and Egbai 2018). Polycarp Ikuenobe (2006) also provides his own two categorizations, which are descriptive metaphysical and normative conceptions: There are two philosophical conceptions of personhood in African thought: the descriptive metaphysical and the normative. A metaphysical account of personhood may seek to analyze the essential ontological make-up of a person, examining, for instance, whether he or she is essentially material or immaterial, or whether he or she has one or two essential natures. Analyses of the nature of the mind and body, and the relationship between them, are efforts to give metaphysical accounts of personhood. However, it is the normative and not the metaphysical idea of personhood that is germane to 2  The views of these actors have been given considerable attention in Chap. 2 of this work, and there is no need to revisit such views without running the risk of reiteration.

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African communal traditions, as personhood is a status earned by meeting certain community standards, including the ability to take on prescribed responsibilities that are believed to define personhood. (2006: 117)

Although these two categories are often associated with Ikuenobe, he admitted that they were commonplace conceptions. He identified Kwasi Wiredu (1996) and Segun Gbadegesin (1998) as examples of scholars who had earlier discussed the two conceptions. Of the two, Ikuenobe identifies the normative conception as characterizing the African ontological and worldview discourses on personhood. Here, we are interested not only in describing some pristine worldview conception but also in discussing how some African philosophers conceive the ontology of personhood. Within the African worldview, personhood usually involves more than merely existing and possessing a certain expressed innate quality—one can be a human being without being a human person. For most African thinkers, personhood is something that is recognized, accorded, earned, processual. What this immediately shows here—as we shall show in our explanation of extant views on the matter—is that beyond some innate characteristic or capacity, personhood is something that is, at the very least, socially recognized. A quick detour to African metaphysics shows why this is the case. Within a framework that views reality in terms of interconnectedness and harmony—a view which, somehow, gets down to social, ethical and even political considerations—it is easy to see why the dominant African views on personhood adopt a social posture and require a recognition of an individual’s value to communal harmony and interconnectedness. So, in this section, what we present is not so much our understanding of personhood as we see it, but rather a review of some of the prominent African views on personhood in the literature. In the sections below, we will present what is largely an ethical dimension of personhood as espoused by major theorists. However, we will do so by highlighting various concepts employed by those thinkers that are eminently metaphysical. Our analysis will come in the conclusion.

John Mbiti John Mbiti’s views on personhood are hinged on an African metaphysics that is duly communal in which the individual is ontologically constituted by both physical and nonphysical aspects. The community also stretches from the physical to the spiritual realms. Since this communal metaphysics trickles down to the social sphere, it is not surprising that Mbiti, who is a communalist, also hinges the idea of personhood on this communal

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foundation. Mbiti is quite blunt in his explanations. He boldly states that “[t]he community must therefore make, or produce the individual; for the individual depends on the corporate group. Physical birth is not enough: the child must go through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the entire society” (Mbiti 1970: 141). What Mbiti is implying here, if it is not obvious enough, is that an individual, at birth, is not, and cannot be, a person. In this sense, merely existing as an individual is not enough for personhood. To be a person, the individual must go beyond merely existing and be incorporated in the society to imbibe cultural norms, engage in communal rites and integrate with others. Integration would then involve harmoniously living with others, since disconnecting from others does not presuppose integration. When the individual imbibes and incorporates communal norms, lives harmoniously with others and engages in certain communal rites, the individual is made aware of his duties and responsibilities, which when pursued and honored grant personhood to the individual. Notice that all that has been said is thought of only in reference to how the individual (must) relate(s) to the community. Thus, in Mbiti’s view, it is the community that is paramount in understanding personhood. Mbiti goes further to state that “[w]hatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say ‘I am because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.’ This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man” (Mbiti 1970: 141). Thus, it is the community that recognizes and confers personhood, and it does so when the individual engages positively with the community. Indeed, it is this communal recognition that ensures that an individual remains a person, even when that individual becomes a person. In Mbiti’s radical view, it is the community that decides an individual person’s fate to the extent that once the individual is forgotten by her community, she/he loses his/her personhood. In summary, it is Mbiti’s view that what makes a person a person is the performance of those acts that positively engage with others in the society (one’s community), as well as one’s cultural norms and the recognition of those acts by the community to which the individual belongs—even after death.

Ifeanyi Menkiti Ifeanyi Menkiti’s notion of personhood (1984, 2004) is arguably the most debatable notion of personhood on offer, perhaps because of its notoriety as one of the most radical views of personhood, based on African

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communalism, that is out there today. But such arguments are not necessarily the main crux of this exposition. We intend to present here, Menkiti’s ontology of person through his normative conception of personhood. Like Mbiti, Menkiti provides a conception of the individual that is both physical and spiritual corresponding to the physical and nonphysical dimensions of the community. There is the human community, but there is also the spiritual community where the dead reside. Since the occupants of the spiritual community were once the living members of the physical community, it follows that the individual, whether fully a person or not, is constituted by both the physical and the spiritual ontological elements. One can consider Menkiti and his views on personhood as deeply influenced by those of John Mbiti discussed earlier, in that what he describes as the “ontological progression” is reminiscent of Mbiti’s views about the various stages of individual ontological progression from physical to spiritual existence. He begins by making, what is for him, an important distinction—that is the distinction between an individual and an individual person. From merely looking at these terminologies, one can safely say that the latter possesses a bit more ontological weight than the former, and this is precisely what Menkiti says: In looking at the African conceptualization of the person, one acknowledges, of course, that it is a given fact that every individual has a body apart from the body of every other individual within his or her own community. That sort of given fact is a brute biological fact. But it need not be read as conveying a message that each stands alone. Normative standing is one thing, and superficial biological considerations quite another. … Up to this point, I have used the terms ‘individual’ and ‘individual person’ as if they were fully interchangeable. But in the context of an investigation of African understandings of the person, a clarification might be in order, so as to avoid confusion later on. … For considered as an individuated source of consumption, a bundle, as it were, of primary appetites, the individual could still count as an agent in the world. But to go beyond the raw appetitive level to the special level marked by the dignity of the person, something more would seem to be needed. In this regard, ‘individual’ and ‘individual person’ may carry somewhat different weight and it is the context of discussion that spells out whether they converge or diverge. (Menkiti 2004: 324–325)

By ‘individual,’ Menkiti is pointing at the human being, as she/he exists in the world. He is talking about the biological entity, identified as human, along with all its innate characteristics and paraphernalia, who is seen and understood as an agent in the world. However, when the term ‘individual person’ is used, we are talking about an extended notion of the self, one

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that includes individual dignity and a normative progression. A number of contemporary Menkitians such as Polycarp Ikuenobe (2006), Motsamai Molefe (2017) and Edwin Etieyibo (2018) have given detailed discussions on Menkiti’s position, especially on the function of the ‘it.’ To understand how Menkiti’s notion of personhood works, we must understand his ideas about ontological progression. Menkiti begins by telling us that every human being is born without any degree of personhood attached to the individual. He bases this strong claim on the fact that in our normal usage of the word ‘it,’ we do not refer t00o mature human beings, but rather use the term when referring to babies and little children. He further bases this assertion on the fact that in traditional Africa, one does not mourn the death of a baby in the same way that one mourns the death of a mature human being. In like manner, one does not hold elaborate funerals to bury a baby or a little child. This suggests, for Menkiti, that children do not possess personhood. However, Kwame Gyekye is quick to disagree with Menkiti on this point because, for him, the usage of the word ‘it’ is not specific to children, and neither does it preclude a lack of personhood. He also states that “no distinction as to personhood can be made on the basis of the nature and extent of ritualized grief over the death of a child or of an older person. A human person is a person whatever his age or social status” (Gyekye 1992: 108). While we do not make judgments about who is correct, we find it expedient to bring up these objections. So how then does an it gain personhood? Because personhood involves an ontological progression, Menkiti believes that acquiring or earning personhood is a matter of time. In other words, personhood develops with time. But this development does not happen in a vacuum and the mere passage of time does not preclude the automatic conferral of personhood. Personhood also involves normativity and moral experience. Since moral experience is gained as one grows older and engages in various social relationships, the experience itself is necessary, and the more time one has in gaining this experience, the more normatively mature one is. Thus, one can read books and become geniuses at mathematics or other such subjects at 12, but one cannot be a moral genius at that same age as this requires a large repository of moral experiences. The reason for this is that morality and the maturation of the human person are so intimately bound up that a still evolving specimen of the person, lacking a full record in the area of lived experience, would be hard-pressed to

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present the sort of personal history needed for an elevation into the status of a moral exemplar. (Menkiti 2004: 325–326)

It is not enough to gain moral experience; it is also important that the individual uses that moral experience to aim toward being the finest version of herself/himself. It is important that that moral experience also involves the individual actually engaging positively with others. Menkiti (2004: 326) further suggests that the community plays an important role in reinforcing moral behaviors and serving as the moral compass for the individual who is progressing in their normative journey. He states this quite clearly: “In the stated journey of the individual toward personhood, let it therefore be noted that the community plays a vital role both as catalyst and as prescriber of norms” (Menkiti 2004: 326). As a child, the individual possesses no culture, moral experience or even identity. These things are imparted to the individual by the community, and the more the individual engages with the community, the more the individual attains moral experience—and, by extension, personhood. What this strictly implies is that without the community, personhood is impossible. Perhaps it is this suggestion that allows us to think of Menkiti’s view as a radical form of communitarianism (Gyekye 1992). Conversely, since personhood is conferred on an individual who has lived or is living an appropriately positive life (by the community), it is also the case that refusing to live by set-down communal laws diminishes or repeals whatever gains one may have had in the journey toward personhood. This is why Menkiti precisely states that personhood is the sort of thing which has to be achieved, the sort of thing at which individuals could fail. …The project of being or becoming persons, it is believed, is a truly serious project that stretches beyond the raw capacities of the isolated individual, and it is a project which is laden with the possibility of triumph, but also of failure. (Menkiti 2004: 326)

A final noteworthy point that Menkiti makes is his idea that personhood, understood in the sense described earlier, carries on, even after the (supposed) transition that is death, to the point when the individual becomes an ancestor. Having previously arrived at personhood and having carried on with it as an ancestor, the individual then begins to lose her/his personhood as memories of the individual begin to fade, and the individual eventually becomes a nameless dead—another it. The radical view of personhood

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that Menkiti expresses is, therefore, summarized as follows: the individual is born with certain attributes which identify her/him as a human being but is also born as a moral and cultural tabula rasa—an it. The individual must then strive to acquire and gain personhood, which is, in turn, conferred and midwived by communal norms and the community respectively. Acquiring personhood is something that one can fail at and this personhood, once arrived at, carries on even after one becomes an ancestor and this personhood is slowly lost as the individual person becomes a nameless dead. So, in Menkiti’s view, similar to Mbiti, a person, ontologically, is constituted by physical and spiritual elements with varying moral weights.

Kwame Gyekye Kwame Gyekye responds to Menkiti (Gyekye 1992: 107–108).3 We begin our discussion of Gyekye’s views on personhood by presenting his views of the internal workings of the human being and, after that, how the communal framework that accords that individual with the moniker person. For Gyekye (1978), expressing the views of his Akan community in Ghana, the person is made up of three distinct components. The first component (in no particular order of importance) is the nipadua or human body. This, obviously, characterizes all the physical, visible and biological constituents of the human person. Whereas this is the most obvious constituent of the human person, it cannot be only what makes the individual a person. One can easily imagine a recently deceased individual or Chalmers’ zombie with all these biological components present, yet it would be odd to point at such a thing and say that there lies a fully constituted and functioning human person. The second component of the human person is the sunsum. For Akan scholars, like Gyekye, the sunsum delineates that aspect of the individual which resonates with all that personally identifies him or her. Now, there are some like Wiredu (1987) who think that the sunsum dies off with the nipadua. It is not hard to imagine why, because as the body decomposes and memories begin to fade, the deceased individual’s personal identity also begins to fade away. After centuries of decay, we cannot, for one, positively identify the remains of, say, Napoleon Bonaparte; neither can we 3  Another scholar that offered a robust critical reaction to the radical communitarian view is Chukwudum Okolo (2002). He problematized the conception of the self which is subsumed to the community and claimed that “[s]uch a philosophy of self is bound to generate all sorts of problems with regard to the status of self as an individual, as an independent subject.”

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attach all those characteristics, virtues, mannerisms, charisma, terror and so on that captured his personality, if we had no vision of him, nor encountered him, nor remembered tales of such virtues or mannerisms. This is because his death has also led to the death of his sunsum. Fundamentally, Gyekye disagrees with all of these claims. For him, the sunsum “cannot be a physical thing, for qualities [which constitutes a person’s identity like courage, jealousy, gentleness, forcefulness, and dignity] are psychological, not sensible or physical” (1995: 90). Gyekye’s main assumption here is that because these attributes that constitute personality identity, or more appropriately sunsum, are nonphysical, they cannot, therefore, die or cease to exist. We shall not argue the obvious point that nonphysicality may not necessarily imply immortality and/or spirituality, but this appears to be what Gyekye thinks (1995: 90–91). The third and final component of the human person, within the Akan framework, is what is called the okra. According to Gyekye, the okra can be “described as divine and as having an ante-mundane existence with the Supreme Being” (1995: 85). One can draw similarities between Gyekye’s view and that of Placide Tempels (Tempels 1959) and Segun Gbadagesin (2020), in that in those elements—the vital force, ori, and the okra—there is a primary source for their existence and/or being, and that source is God. Gyekye further claims (again others like Wiredu disagree) that the okra can be viewed as the Akan “equivalent of the concept of the soul in other metaphysical systems. Hence, it is correct to translate okra into English as soul” (1995: 85). It is not a physical or material substance and neither is it quasimaterial; it is spiritual, and like the sunsum it outlives the dead body. In fact, Gyekye further claims that any other interpretation “runs counter to the belief of most Akan people in disembodied survival or life after death. For a crucial aspect of Akan metaphysics is the world of spirits [asamando], a world inhabited by the departed souls of ancestors” (1995: 86). Besides Gyekye, a host of others have produced separate accounts of the self from the Akan/ Ashanti perspective. Some examples include RS Rattray (1923), JB Danquah (1944), SK Akesson (1965), Meyerowitz (1951), K Wiredu (1987) and AK Appiah (2004). We would not be able to discuss all for lack of space. It is important to note, at this juncture, that we presented Gyekye’s description of what components are present in a human person first before diving into his moderate communitarian view because, as his criticism of Menkiti shows, Gyekye firmly believes that individuals, at the very least, possess some baseline level of personhood, which is then accentuated by communitarian relationships. He alludes to this when he says that

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a person is by nature a social (communal) being, yes; but he is by nature other things as well (i.e. he possesses other essential attributes). Failure to recognize this may result in pushing the significance and implications of a person’s communal nature beyond their limits, an act that would in turn result in investing the community with an all-engulfing moral authority to determine all things about the life of the individual person. (Gyekye 1992: 106)

Nevertheless, the community still plays an important role in augmenting that personhood and guiding it to full maturation. Gyekye’s communitarian conception of personhood is based on six implications: The Communitarian Conception of the person has some implications: it implies, (i) that the human person does not voluntarily choose to enter into human community, that is, that community life is not optional for any ­individual person; (ii) that the human person is at once a cultural being; (iii) that the human person cannot – perhaps must not – live in isolation from other persons; (iv) that the human person is naturally oriented toward other persons and must have relationships with them; (v) that social relationships are not contingent but necessary; and that (vi) following from (iv) and (v), the person is constituted, but only partly … by social relationships in which he necessarily finds himself. (Gyekye 1992: 104)

What this view entails can be summarized as follows. There exists a human person, who is born with certain components and characteristics—whether in actuality or potentiality. Indeed, beyond the components discussed at the beginning of our examination of this view, the human person is inherently good or moral (Gyekye 1992: 108–109). Thus, it is no surprise that in most African communities, especially human communities, the immediate expectation is that a human being would behave morally such that behaving badly or immorally would raise serious concerns. But beyond this, that individual, along with this baseline personhood, is necessarily a cultural being and also, by nature, a communal being. By letting one’s inherent goodness express itself and by engaging with one’s culture via its norms and rituals, the individual augments and maintains his/her personhood. Also, for an individual whose personhood is naturally communal, if that individual continues to exhibit the sort of social relationships that prioritize social relatedness, interconnectedness and communal harmony, then it follows that the person is being a human person. By the same logic, if a human person who is by nature communal or communitarian and who is by nature inherently good only and always

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seeks to perpetrate acts that ensure discord, fragmentation, exclusivity, immorality and so on, then that individual is, at the very best, a broken or incomplete person. This is a nod to the fact that unlike in Menkiti’s view where the individual will cease to be a person, Gyekye’s view acknowledges innate personhood: “A human person is a person whatever his age or social status. Personhood may reach its full realization in the community, but it is not acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes along in society” (Gyekye 1992: 108). In summary, for Gyekye, like for other African philosophers examined before him, beyond the unity of an individual’s components—external properties like culture and community play a role in defining the person— there is more to being human ontologically than meets the eye.

Bernard Matolino Moving away from the views of the older philosophers, we encounter the views of the contemporary African philosopher, Bernard Matolino. In his book Personhood in African Philosophy, Matolino begins by analyzing the views of other philosophers who have spoken about the notion of personhood from an African perspective. In doing this, Matolino (2014) divides the African conception of personhood into two main categories: the metaphysical understanding of personhood and the communitarian view of personhood. While the metaphysical category views personhood in terms of those constituent parts or capacities of the individual, whether immaterial or otherwise, which makes up the human person, the communitarian category encapsulates all those African views of personhood that tie personhood to the community. So, we see once again, the combination of the physical and the nonphysical in the ontological constitution of person. It is important for Matolino that this distinction is made because, having made this categorization, Matolino (2014) goes on to express his displeasure with the communitarian views on personhood. He invokes Gilbert Ryle’s categorical mistake and accuses the communitarians of reifying community to the status of an actual metaphysical reality. As a direct foil from this criticism, Matolino also claims that in order to appeal to a certain “pre-colonial traditionalistic understanding of community”—since it is this appeal that most African philosophers, especially ethnophilosophers, (erroneously) require to authenticate a view as appropriately African—African scholars are eager to present communitarian views of personhood (2014: 120).

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Matolino (2014) goes on to suggest that the ideas of personhood need not take on a communitarian stance since African philosophy is not essentially communitarian and consequently finds metaphysical views on personhood sufficiently attractive to capture personhood. Thus, one of Matolino’s strong points is his belief that the individual is often relegated to the background in favor of an overexaggeration of communal influence when explaining personhood (2014: 161–165)—it is a prima facie oddity that this is the case since what is being talked about is individual personhood. These explanations and criticisms pave the way for Matolino’s own ideas of personhood that are based on what he, quite strangely (given his critique of communitarianism), calls “limited communitarianism.” In a critical review of Matolino’s book, Mesembe Edet sarcastically commented that “the only statement that is completely true about Limited Communitarianism is that it is limited (lopsided) as its name suggests” (2015: 105). Quite predictably, Matolino suggests that within this framework, views about the person that are (and should be) metaphysical in nature must be kept separate from communitarianism, since both ideas belong to different categories (2014: 166). By excluding communitarianism from his view of personhood, the neglect of the individual and the passionate reification of the community are avoided. For him the community is only “a set of conventions deliberately created by individuals to serve the social needs of those individuals” and is, therefore, “temporal and not fixed” (2014: 184). In this way, Matolino tones down the importance of the community, even more so than Gyekye did, in defining who a person is. Thereafter, Matolino makes an interesting move. Rather than go further to explain what ontological features or characteristics are precisely important in any talk of African notions of personhood, Matolino only suggests that the gap be filled by whatever features any community decides are a constituent of personhood—insofar as it is a metaphysical constituent and not a communitarian one. So, for the Bantu, such a feature would be the vital force and, for the Akan, such a feature would be the unity of the nipadua, okra and sunsum and so on. But in turning the table against the community and placing the individual on top  of the metaphysical order, some scholars believe that Matolino has made very little progress in literature, if any. The point of it all is not only about rescuing individual endowment, but also about preserving the communal values. Moreover, it is about eliminating the orientation of domination of one by the other. As Edet (2015: 104) captures it,

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[l]imited communitarianism claims to be different from the moderate version on the ground that it rejects the autocracy of the community. But this involves a tu quoque because Matolino’s Limited Communitarianism merely reverses the trend; instead of the community preceding the individual, he suggests that it is the individual that precedes the community. He has not touched the kernel of discourse which is the existence of a tyrant or an autocrat that dictates the relationship between the community and the individual. If the individual ‘dictates’ for the community and not the other way round, then Limited Communitarianism commits tu quoque. Matolino’s over-commitment to the metaphysics of inviolable individual rights leads him to this fallacy.

It is fascinating what Edet did in his criticism of Matolino. One thing was to draw attention to the need for eliminating the tendency for the community and the individual to dominate each other, which creates a lopsidedness of some sort. To remedy this, Edet proposes a program he calls “autonomy-in-community,” which among others, seeks to balance the power relations between the individual and the community. According to Edet, “(1) [autonomy-in-community] [r]ecognizes the influence but not the tyranny of the community or the individual in shaping personhood; (2) biological features establish individual identity and confer autonomy on it, but sociability establishes the influence of the community in shaping the autonomy and personhood of a person hence, a person is a person in the community” (2015: 104). But it is not clear where lies the difference between autonomy-in-­ community and Micheal Eze’s Contemporaneity program. Eze (2008) put forward this proposal, which for him defines the relationship between the individual and the community as that of a mutual and codependent one. He made no further effort to develop the theory. Recently, Chimakonam (2018a) investigated the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community taking into account themes such as rights and autonomy and arrived at a subtle defense of the complementarity of the two. Further, in a coauthored article (Chimakonam and Awugosi 2020), the authors took the inquiry farther using the theme of freedom and again establishing the complementarity of individual and community. In a forthcoming work, Chimakonam (2021) explains that the reason for the tension between the individual and the community in a normative conception is due to the seeming priority given to the community norms. To overcome this, he formulated a conversational alternative in which a person is a being

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in conversation. A being in conversation is one that has developed the capacity to indulge in critical and creative examinations of moral precepts and conducts. He argues that when such a being is in conversation with the moral law within itself, it is called introspection, and when it is in conversation with the positive laws out there in its community, it is called extropection. So, for the conversational conception of personhood, one is a person if they have attained the biological maturation to engage in these two-way conversations, whether they use it or not and whether they use it well or not. However, by conversation, he does not mean expressions and communications. He means a kind of interaction that involves logic and morality. It is hard to see these discussions ending anytime soon, but the debate has never been about a single point. It has always been about two unconnected issues: the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community and the prioritization of either the individual endowments or the community values. Some of us think it should focus on the relationship because it is hard to think of a lopsided option that is plausible. In focusing on their relationship, we would come to realize the importance of balance, tolerance, compromise and complementarity, at which point prioritization of one over the other would become trivial.

Polycarp Ikuenobe Polycarp Ikuenobe is another contemporary African philosopher, a vocal Menkitian, who has also weighed in on the personhood debate. His views on personhood are a derivative from his analysis of Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart (2009), which is in turn captured in the article “The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart.” Like Matolino, Ikuenobe categorizes philosophical discussions of African notions of personhood into two types: the descriptive metaphysical notions and the normative notions. We have given a brief presentation of his definition of the two conceptions earlier and so will not rehash it here. Reading Ikuenobe’s account of the two conceptions, it is obvious to us that he would disagree with Matolino’s earlier assertion that communalism or communitarianism is key to any ontological understanding of personhood from the traditional African perspective. This point is important as what follows is a communal account of personhood that is illustrated by Ikuenobe’s analysis of Achebe’s seminal book. Like Menkiti, Ikuenobe posits that attaining personhood usually takes time and also that even though this is the case, old age is not a guarantee

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that one is a person. He places some emphasis, in his article, on the place of ‘achievements’ in the African understanding of personhood. Achievement here is understood as certain social financial, cultural and even personal milestones that distinguish an individual among her/his peers. This point is reinforced by Ikuenobe’s view that “[a]n elder is not simply someone who is chronologically advanced in age. Age is respected, certainly, but age alone does not bring the recognition associated with personhood; personhood or elderhood comes from achievements and excellence” (Ikuenobe 2006: 117). Thus, ‘growing old’ is significantly different from ‘growing up,’ as exemplified in the life of the father of the protagonist in Achebe’s book, Unoka, who lived old but had no achievement. As Ikuenobe puts it, “[l]aziness, weakness, and failure to meet one’s obligations, as we saw in Unoka, are considered unacceptable because they prevent one from contributing to the community and acquiring personhood” (Ikuenobe 2006: 123). Because achievement plays this important role, it was possible for young individuals to attain personhood even at a young age, as exemplified in the life of the main protagonist in Achebe’s book Okonkwo. Ikuenobe further suggests that it is the community that recognizes these achievements and, by extension, confers the status of ‘person.’ While this is all true, Ikuenobe concludes his account by making the very important point that although achievements and the communal recognition of those achievements were important, achievements were not enough in conferring personhood on their own. One also needs to be “‘psychologically wholesome,’ emotionally and rationally stable, communally well adjusted, and must consistently show excellent judgment” (Ikuenobe 2006: 117). Again, this is a typical rendering of Mbiti and Menkiti to which the criticisms marshalled against the latter can also apply. It is too radical and confers enormous power on the community, one which is used to dominate the individual’s endowments. But, perhaps, one important thing to note is that like Mbiti and Menkiti before him, Ikuenobe subscribes to the existence of two metaphysical components in an individual. Ontologically, the individual, whether a person or not, is made up of both the physical and the nonphysical components. These components complement to give us the nature of an individual. This idea of complementarity that runs through the views surveyed in this chapter demonstrates the presence of and reflects the attribute of nmekọ as a central feature of the African thought. Similarly, the complementation of the various metaphysical components of the

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individual as espoused by Mbiti, Menkiti, Gyekye and Wiredu is something that a trivalent logic such as Ezumezu can explain. All this goes to further distinguish the structure of metaphysical thinking in the African tradition from the one in other traditions.

Conclusion Personhood is a hotly debated topic in African philosophy. Mostly, it has been about the ethics associated with it, but saliently, it is also about the ontology of it. We cannot discuss personhood or the self outside metaphysics. Even though the radical communitarians open the toolkit of norms to account for how we come to become persons, and the moderate communitarians appear to be too focused on defending individual endowments like rights, freedom and autonomy, it is the constitution of the individual person that we are talking about in this context. This constitution is a metaphysical concern. So, the discourse on personhood is also an ontological exercise. The questions that guide such a discourse are: What are the ontological components of the person? What makes an individual a person? Is a human being a person from birth or at some stage in life? Are the basic features of ontological personhood physical or nonphysical, or both? Can we truly separate the metaphysical and the ethical discussions on personhood? To the last question, Wiredu (1996), Gbadegesin (2002) and Ikuenobe (2006), to name but a few, distinguish the metaphysical from the normative and prioritize the latter over the former. Personhood, for them, is about the ethical dimension. But this is hardly satisfactory. In fact, it is lopsided. The normative analysis of personhood cannot be done in a vacuum. When we discuss  the features of persons as ethical beings, we are predicating such features on metaphysical realities. Let us say for the sake of argument that persons are different from individuals, where the former are individuals possessing certain attributes and the latter are just extended entities; are those attributes not part of the extended entities who can be described as persons? So, a person is an individual with certain attributes. Without the individual, it does not seem like we can have a person. Thus, the individual’s metaphysical features are important materials that form the basis for the making of persons. If this is the case, then personhood is as ontological as it is ethical. If we take the two issues at stake in personhood—the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community and the prioritization of either the individual endowments or the community values (Agada and Egbai 2018)—we would quickly observe that the discourse is more

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about ontology than about ethics. To understand the relationship between the two entities, we must understand their nature. Questions about individual endowments and community values cannot be answered without recourse to the ontologies of the two entities. That both the radical and the moderate communitarians have chosen to trivialize the metaphysical issues involved in personhood does not make their approach correct. If anything, it makes it lopsided, because the normative aspect of personhood cannot be divorced from its metaphysical aspect. Ikuenobe says that Western philosophers are interested in the metaphysical while the African philosophers are interested in the ethical—this is unacceptable. Unfortunately, both sides are looking at the issue from the prism of Aristotelian two-valued logic, which is bivalent and deterministic. Such a logic presents reality in a lopsided fashion in which a superior is privileged over an inferior; metaphysical over normative; individual over community and vice versa; and so on. We are of the view that any interpretation of personhood, whether metaphysical or normative, radical or moderate communitarianism and so on, which prioritizes one perspective over another is hinged on a strait-jacketted system of logic. The logic that drives the system of African thought, from various theoretic proposals by African thinkers does not appear like two-valued but three-valued where the intermediate is a zone of complementarity between two polar values. There are a few proposals already in the literature, but in this book, we are deploying Ezumezu logic (Chimakonam 2017a, 2018b, 2019) as a model decolonial logic and conversational thinking (Chimakonam 2017b; Chimakonam and Egbai 2016; Egbai and Chimakonam 2019; Egbai 2018) as frameworks that can explain the structure of personhood from an African perspective. Balancing the narrative in Afro-communitarianism was the concern of the work entitled “Can individual autonomy and rights be defended in Afro-communitarianism?” (Chimakonam 2018a), which was further addressed in a coauthored essay (Chimakonam and Awugosi 2020). The summary of both works is that the relationship between the individual and the community is that of mutual complementarity. The hiatus between the radicals and the moderates exists because both sides have chosen to focus on the values of the community and on individual endowments respectively, while at the same time trivializing the nature of the entities involved. This is a metaphysical concern which alone can provide a clear understanding of the stakes. The community needs the individual as much as the individual needs the community; the struggle to prioritize one’s interest over the other which is highlighted by the inherent bivalent logic can only jeopardize the well-being of both. So, the trivial

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concern in personhood is actually which of the ethical features come first in the power relations, the community values or the individual endowments? The triviality of the preceding question can only be made manifest when attention shifts to the ontology of personhood. From the theories discussed in this chapter, it is obvious that most, if not all, agree that the person in African ontology of personhood has a dual component: physical and non-physical. For Mbiti, Tempels, Menkiti, Gyekye, Wiredu and Ikuenobe, the combination of the physical and nonphysical components makes up a person. A number of African philosophers have attempted to investigate the ontological concern; unfortunately, their endeavors have been less discussed compared to those of their more illustrious counterparts in the normative concern. Abimbola (1971), Nze (1989), Gbadegesin (2002), Wiredu (1995), Okolo (2002) and even Gyekye (1978) are some examples of literature on the ontological composition of self. Generally, these scholars ask about the substances that make up the person or the self and which is dominant or superior. Ideas discussed accommodate concepts such as soul, mind, body, spirit, destiny and so forth. As with every discourse in philosophy, there is no agreement among these views. Personhood is a state and circumstances of being a person. It is a metaphysical state. Its ontology consists of the individuals who are in such a state. These individuals bear the metaphysical  features that characterize persons. They are extended entities, and according to extant literature may possess some or all of the ontological aspects such as body, mind/soul, spirit, destiny as the case may be. What is important is that these persons interact among themselves, and also interact with their communities. The meaning in the lives of persons is to be found in their relationships with one another, and with their community. There is complementation directed by mutual and inevitable interconnection and interdependence of realities in the universe, and of the metaphysical composition of the person grounded in a logic that allows for the complementation of opposites.

References Abimbola, W. 1971. The Yoruba Concept of Human Personality. In La notion de personne en Afrique noire, 73–89. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Achebe, C. 2009. Things Fall Apart. New York: W. W. Norton. Agada, A., and U.O.  Egbai. 2018. Language, Thought and Interpersonal Communication: A Cross-Cultural Conversation on the Question of Individual

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and Community. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Religions and Culture 7 (2): 141–161. Akesson, S. K. (1965). The Akan Concept of Soul. African Affairs: The Journal of the Royal African Society 64 (257): 280–291. Appiah, K. A. (2004). Akan and Euro-American Concepts of the Person. In African Philosophy: New and Traditional Perspectives. ed. Brown, L. M., 21–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chimakonam, J.O. 2017a. The Question of African Logic: Beyond Apologia and Polemics. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy, ed. Adeshina Afolayan and Toyin Falola, 106–128. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2017b. Conversationalism as an Emerging Method of Thinking in and Beyond African Philosophy. Acta Academica 49 (2): 11–33. ———. 2018a. Can Individual Autonomy and Rights be Defended in Afro-­ Communitarianism? Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (2): 34–49. ———. 2018b. The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm. In Philosophical Perceptions on Logic and Order, ed. Jeremy Horne, 96–121. Hershey: IGI Global. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. ———. 2021. Why the Normative Conception of Personhood is Problematic: A Proposal for a Conversational Alternative. In Some Contemporary Issues in African Philosophy, ed. J. Chimakonam, E. Etieyibo, and I. Odimegwu. Cham: Springer, forthcoming. Chimakonam, J.O., and C.I.  Awugosi. 2020. Afro-Communitarianism and the Question of Individual Freedom. Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy 21 (1): 1–16. Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Danquah, J. B. (1944). The Akan Doctrine of God. London: Cass. Edet, M.I. 2015. The Limitations of Bernard Matolino’s “Limited Communitarianism”: Continuing the Conversations on Personhood in African Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 4 (2): 99–112. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v4i2.8. Egbai, U.O. 2017. Questioning the Group-Based Approach to Social Equality in the Post-Apartheid South Africa. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 6 (2): 59–84. https://doi.org/10.4314/ ft.v6i2.4. ———. 2018. Why African Philosophers Should Build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2.

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Egbai, U.O., and J.O.  Chimakonam. 2019a. Protecting the Rights of Victims in Transitional Justice: An Interrogation of Amnesty. African Human Rights Law Journal 19: 608–623. https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-­2096/ 2019/v19n2a3. ———. 2019b. Why Conversational Thinking Could be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189. Etieyibo, E. 2018. Moral Force and the “It-It” in Menkiti’s Normative Conception of Personhood. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (2): 47–60. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i2.4. Eze, M. 2008. What Is African Communitarianism? Against Consensus as a Regulative Ideal. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (4): 386–399. Gbadegesin, S. 1998. Eniyan: The Yoruba Concept of a Person. In The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H.  Coetzee and A.P.J.  Roux. Cape Town: Oxford University Press of South Africa. Gyekye, K. 1978. The Akan Concept of Person. International Philosophical Quarterly 18 (3): 277–287. ———. 1992. Person and Community in Akan Thought. In Person and Community, ed. K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye, 101–122. Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. ———. 1995. An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Ikuenobe, P. 2006. The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart. Philosophia Africana 9 (2): 117–131. Jahn, J. 1961. Muntu: An Outline of Neo-African Culture. New York: Grove Press. Kagame, A. 1956. La philosophie bantu-rwandaise de l’être. Bruxelles: Acedémie Royale des Sciences Coloniales. _______. 1989. The Problem of ‘Man’ in Bantu Philosophy. Journal of African Religion and Philosophy 1: 35-40. Kaphagawani, D. 2004. African Conceptions of a Person: A Critical Survey. In A Companion to African Philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu ed. 332–342. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Matolino, B. 2014. Personhood in African Philosophy. Piertermaritzburg: Cluster Publications. Mbiti, J. 1970. African Religions and Philosophy. New York: Doubleday. Menkiti, I. 1984. Person and Community in African Traditional Thought. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard Wright, 3rd ed., 41–55. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 2004. On the Normative Conception of a Person. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, 324–331. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Metz, T. 2007. Toward an African Moral Theory. Journal of Political Philosophy 15: 321–341.

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———. 2011. Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa. African Human Rights Law Journal 11: 532–559. Meyerowitz, E. L. R. (1951). Concepts of the Soul among the Akan of the Gold Coast. Journal of the International African Institute 21 (1): 24–31. Molefe, M. 2017. Critical Comments on Afro-Communitarianism: The Community Versus Individual. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 6 (1): 1–22. Nze, C. 1989. Aspects of African Communalism. Onitsha: Veritas Publishers. Okolo, C.B. 2002. Self as a Problem in African Philosophy. In The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 247–258. Cape Town: Oxford University Press of South Africa. Ramose, M.B. 2002. African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mont Books. Rattray, R. S. (1923). Ashanti. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Samkange, S., and T.M. Samkange. 1980. Hunhuism or Ubuntuism: A Zimbabwe Indigenous Political Philosophy. Salisbury: Graham Publishing. Shutte, A. 2001. Ubuntu: An Ethic for the New South Africa. Cape Town: ClusterPublications. Tempels, P. 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africaine. Wiredu, K. 1995. Metaphysics in Africa. In A Companion to Metaphysics, ed. J. Kim and E. Sosa, 312–315. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ______. 1987. ‘The Concept of Mind with Particular Reference to the Language and Thought of the Akans. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. Vol. 5: African Philosophy, ed. G. Floistad, 153–179. Dordrecht: Nijhoff.

PART II

African Epistemology

CHAPTER 7

Curating Some Epistemological Ideas in African Philosophy

Introduction The exciting thing at this stage of African philosophy is that African epistemology, one of its branches, has come of age. This seems to be the established position of African philosophers and in particular African epistemologists after the debate between the African epistemological pessimists (Afro-epistemological pessimists, who deny the existence of any African theory of knowledge) and the African epistemological optimists (Afro-epistemological optimists, who hold that there is an African perspective or theory of knowledge (Jimoh 2017; Ikhane 2017). Although Afroepistemological pessimists argue that there is no distinct African epistemology other than epistemology as a generic theory of knowledge, in this chapter, we pitch tent with the Afro-epistemological optimists to argue that African epistemology or theory of knowledge or epistemic perspective that is  methodologically distinct from Western epistemology, exists. Our position is that an African culture–inspired perspective to knowledge that is not African culture–bound exists. By this, African epistemology is not a restrictive epistemology or a collection of restrictive epistemological systems and theories. So the theory/theories of knowledge developed from the Afric African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic an philosophical

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place could be transcultural and multicultural in its applicability, though African culture–inspired in origin. Granted these, we are of the view that African epistemology and its systems and theories are gradually taking their rightful places within global philosophy, as part of the overall decolonial program to dismantle the cognitive empire of the West. This is evident in the robust epistemological ideas, concepts, systems and theories that have been produced in African philosophy. Unfortunately, little or no effort has been made toward curating some of the well-articulated and developed concepts, ideas and theories of knowledge in African philosophy. Our position is that there is the need to do proper documentation and put into perspective some of the epistemological concepts and ideas that have been articulated in African philosophy. We shall adopt the conversational approach (Chimakonam and Egbai 2016; Egbai and Chimakonam 2019; Egbai 2018), which is grounded in a model decolonial logic called Ezumezu for this exercise. Where appropriate, we shall demonstrate the presence of nmekọ as a guiding relational principle in African philosophy.

Some Epistemological Ideas in African Philosophy This section focuses on discussing and elaborating on some key epistemological theories in African philosophy. Some of the theories that will be discussed here are Senghor’s negritude, Wiredu’s notion of truth, Ijiomah’s humanizing/humanistic epistemology, Chimakonam’s cogno-­normative epistemology and Tavernaro-Haidarian’s deliberative epistemology  and others. We will not discuss Innocent Asouzu’s theory of ‘complementary epistemological reflection’ here to avoid repetitions because we have done justice to the metaphysical aspect of the theory in Chap. 5, which provides direction for the epistemological aspect. We shall begin with negritude. Leopold Senghor’s Negritude Negritude is a concept in African philosophy and in particular African epistemology that was coined and used, by some African students studying in Paris, France early in the twentieth century. Some of them include Léon Damas, Aime Cesaire and Leopold Sedar Senghor. These scholars initiated the Negritude movement when they were students in Paris in the 1930s. In 1932, to be precise, the word Negritude was first coined and used specifically by Aime Cesaire (Abanuka 2011: 82).

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Negritude was first unveiled as an African political emancipatory ideology and theory aimed at liberating Africans from denigration and discrimination. This was due to the racist orientation at that time. Many Europeans, some of whom were scholars, saw Africans as nonhumans and incapable of contributing anything meaningful to human civilization. The French political class of the time felt that the only beneficial thing to be done for Africans was to assimilate them into already existing and established European civilization (colonizing cultures). The students of African descent, who came from different places perceived the racism and the proposed program of assimilation as offensive and destructive to African identity and cultures. To affirm the integrity of African identity, they formulated the ideology of negritude which is the totality of the cultural values of Africans south of the Sahara, including those in the diasporas. As Senghor puts it, “Negritude is simply the recognition of being Negro and the acceptance of the fact that: of our destiny as Negroes, of our history and our culture” (Senghor 1971: 6). The modern European perception of Africa is a continent enshrouded in darkness. Some Europeans at the time believed that Africans have created nothing, invented nothing, written nothing but only participate in dance and lovemaking. This poor conception of Africa prompted some African students in France to affirm their humanity through identity reconstruction and color valorization that crystallized in the ideology of ‘Negritude.’ According to Bartholomew Abanuka, “Negritude was merely something they could fall back on, a type of springboard for action; it was not an accomplishment, but a sort of instrument which would yield efficacious results when employed for the upliftment of the black race” (Abanuka 2011: 92). It was in this concept that they found and anchored African renaissance. There are two meanings of Negritude: (i) the objective meaning, which presents Negritude as a culture, consisting of economic, political, intellectual, moral, artistic and social values; and (ii) the subjective meaning, which is the acceptance of this fact of the African civilization. This is why Ruch and Anyanwu declared that “Negritude is the whole of the values of civilization, cultural, economic, social, political which characterize the black people, more exactly the Negro-African world” (1984: 206). This civilization and its cultural values are expressed in the African state of mind—feeling. This implies that the starting point of Negritude is ‘Negro-­ African psychology,’ which is an aspect of African philosophy. Although Negro-African psychology is what defines negritude, negritude in itself is a philosophy—Negro-African philosophy. In this light, Negritude is not only a theory of Negro-African psychology, but it also

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includes and involves Negro-African culture, Negro-African ontology, Negro-African personality, Negro-African sociopolitical philosophy and Negro-African epistemology. Our focus in the paragraphs that follow shall be on the epistemological dimension of Negritude—Negro-African epistemology. Senghor’s epistemology of Negritude is one that is emotional. His argument is that the African perspective to knowledge stems from emotionality. This is typified in his postulation that “emotion is Negro and reason is Greek” (Cited in Abanuka 2011: 84). The idea is that the preferred mode of knowing for the African is emotion. This does not mean that Africans are not reflective; they are, but features such as empathy, and other emotional attributes, are richly part of their rational disposition toward the world. For him, while Westerners know strictly through reason, Africans mediate reason with emotion. He links this emotion to feeling and rhythm. In his words, “I feel, I dance the other, I am” (Senghor 1961: 96, 1962: 6). This implies that an African comes to affirm her/his being through affirming or feeling the other. Without feeling the other, an African cannot see herself/himself as existing. This idea of affirming one’s being through feeling the other is the fulcrum of how Africans come to know what is known. This is what the Bantu of Southern Africa echo in a song ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,’ which translates to “a person is a person through other persons” (see Mangena Web Np). In knowing the other, the African feels and dances the other. Feeling and dancing are metaphors for empathetic reasoning. Senghor captures and explains this manner of knowing in detail as he notes that “to dance is to discover and to recreate, especially when it is a dance of love. Just as knowledge is at once recreation and recreation after the model of God” (Senghor 1961: 96). The point is that emotion is a category of knowledge. The African can access the object of her/his knowledge through her/his emotion— the power of her/his emotion. Here, she/he feels the object even before seeing it. The implication of this is that knowledge, in the African context, goes beyond the physical and perceptible. Feeling, which involves intuition (intuitive reasoning), transcends the physical in order to grasp the reality beneath its signs. This is why it is suggested by the Negritude scholars that the Negro knows the innermost nature of things. Before one comes to the knowledge of an object, the person has to first and foremost feel the object. But one cannot feel an object without first assimilating it. This is done in love. Hence, to feel is to know. This

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knowledge involves intuitive discovery and synthesis. By this, the African knows the physical and inner nature of things. This makes the African perspective to knowledge an ontologized knowledge. Explaining this, Abanuka writes: “Intuitive reasoning … grasps the innermost nature of things and easily determines the proper use of things; because on this level of knowledge, things are just perceived in their concreteness, but also in their relation to one another” (Abanuka 2011: 85). In this context also, African epistemology connects with African ontology and ethics. It is ethical because the Africans’ perspective to knowledge is rooted in the consciousness that they share life with other beings, and that knowledge is subject to moral evaluation, a point we will revisit when we discuss Chris Ijiomah’s contribution. This idea of knowledge as Negritude has its base on the ontological and ethical view that holds that things in the cosmos can be unified or can exist in a type of network. In this unified, unitary vision, humans are in a network of relationship with animals, plants, inanimate objects and even the environment. With this, there is no subject/ object dichotomy in the knowing process in African cosmology. This is because the knower knows by participating and communing with the known. This makes the Negritude approach to knowing one of “participation and communion” (Senghor 1961: 98). In this way, what an African knower claims to know remains in her/his memory since she/he assimilates and absorbs the object into her/his being through feeling. This African epistemological theory called Negritude leaves us wondering if there is a distinction between Africans and Europeans? Or, can Africans only know through emotion without reasoning? If the answer to the second question is yes, then it follows that Africans in their act of knowing cannot know through discursive, analytical, critical, conversational and reflective processes. This suggestion which is inherent in Senghor’s proposal, has attracted criticisms from various African scholars who felt that Senghor unwittingly played into the hands of some racist Europeans who deny Africans of rationality. But Senghor himself claims he was misunderstood as we shall show soon. What Senghor’s proposal seeks to demonstrate is the cultural and methodological distinction between the African and the European approaches to epistemology, systems or modes of thought. In emphasizing emotion, Senghor does not divorce the African from reason. He is only saying that for the African, reason is mediated by empathy and other humane emotions. As Senghor puts it,

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[t]he White is cognitive unlike the Black who is sensualist. Epistemologically, the latter has a reason which is more synthetic, intuitive, sympathetic, sensitive, mystic, interiorizing, essentialist and surrealistic. As for the White, objectifying, existentialistic, realistic and utilitarian. (Osuagwu 1999: 146)

That is to say that Negritude is an African epistemological procedure distinct from the European epistemological procedure. While the European approach is strict, the African approach is not. Following the above argument, the main challenge with Senghor’s Negritude is that it emphasizes an aspect of knowledge and knowing over the other aspect of knowledge and knowing. This is apparent in Senghor’s ‘emotion is black.’ This challenge is raised by Barry Hallen thus: The more troubling consequence of the assessment, of the dominance or predominance of emotional needs and feelings over abstract thinking in Africa, was how to relate or to reconcile with an academic philosophy that was overwhelmingly rationalistic in orientation. Senghor’s Negritude … proved to be, in the end, a less than successful attempt to do this because it more or less confirmed and reinforced the reason/emotion dichotomy between the West and Africa. Many African intellectuals protested that critical reasoning also had to play an essential role in African systems of thought and that, in any case, dividing the person up (purposefully on scientific basis) between a rational self and an emotional self was an hypothesis of Western cultural orientation. (Hallen 2004: 296)

However, the answer to the second question raised earlier on is an emphatic NO! Africans do not just know through feelings; they also utilize the category of reason. Senghor has addressed this issue: Young people have criticized me for reducing Negro-African knowledge to pure emotion, for denying that there is an African reason or “African technique.” This is the hub of the problem. … Thus I explain myself. However paradoxical it may seem, the vital force of the Negro-African, his surrender to the object, is animated by reason. Let us understand each other clearly; it is not the reasoning eye of Europe, it is the reason of touch, better still, the reason of the embrace, the sympathetic reason, more closely related to the Greek logos Latin ratio. For logos, before meant at once reason and speech. (Senghor 1961: 96–97)

So, Senghor’s allusion to ‘black emotionality’ does not imply that Africans do not employ reason or reasoning in their acts of knowing, but

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that Africans mediate reason with emotion or feeling in the course of knowing. The position that is emphasized and held in this chapter is that knowledge is the product of feeling (emotion) and reason. This means that both emotion and reason are complementary paths to knowledge in line with the laws of complementarism and integrativism of Ezumezu logic as well as the idea of nmekọ that drive the relational structure of the African system of thought. The idea is that if feeling and reason do not work hand in hand, in terms of being complementary and integrated, a knower cannot claim to have a complete view or perspective to knowledge. This is what nmekọ depicts. Thus, knowledge is possible when there is a complementarity of feeling and reason in the knowing process. We can see then that Senghor’s epistemological theory can be grounded by the Ezumezu truth-glut system of three-valued logic. K.C. Anyanwu’s Epistemological Relativity Anyanwu’s theory of knowledge is a relative one, and it is termed epistemological relativity. This theory of knowledge holds that knowledge is predicated on culture. Culture means “a human response to experience as well as the beliefs and ideas which enable human beings to live meaningful lives” (Anyanwu 1984: 82). People of different cultures may experience and approach reality differently. As a given people experience reality, they employ their thoughts in understanding it. This makes reality an object of experience and thought. The variance of experience and thought about reality results in divergence of philosophy. For Anyanwu, culture is relative. He contends that just as culture is relative, so is philosophy, which is derived from it. Given that a human is the product of culture, and that culture varies from place to place, and from epoch to epoch, the resultant theories of knowledge would vary too. This theory of cultural relativity is substantiated by Anyanwu thus: Due to the plurality of cultures and different interpretations of experience, it is impossible to look for the one Truth about meaning of life and the world in any culture. What the history of culture shows is that experience can be understood in different ways in terms of different principles or standard of interpretation. (1983: 104)

The above argument can lead to the understanding that every culture has its own philosophy. This accounts for the existence of Western philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Chinese philosophy and even African philosophy. The

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idea here is that from the understanding of African philosophy, we can talk about African epistemology or epistemology from an African perspective. This epistemology is not the same as other epistemologies from other philosophical traditions. There are logical and methodological nuances. Whereas the Aristotelian logic grounds theories in Western philosophy, it is the model three-valued system which accommodates the truth-glut that can ground epistemological theories in African philosophy. Methodologically, the approaches of the analytic and continental philosophers also differ from, say, the approach of the conversationalists as a result of the different background logics that marshal the methods. Probably, Anyanwu argues for the existence of a theory of knowledge from an African perspective. However, he observes that the kind of epistemology we have today in Africa is a product of confusion caused by the subjugation of “African cultural facts to the assumptions, concepts, theories and world view suggested by the Western culture and developed by the Western thinkers” (1984: 77). This confusion involves employing the Western conceptual scheme in presenting African epistemology. As a result of the preceding, “the knowledge arrived at with the Western principles of understanding is not the knowledge of the African cultural reality but enlightened rationalism of knowledge emancipated from the African world” (Anyanwu 1984: 77). The  point made in the preceding is somehow an imposition of Western epistemic concepts and categories on Africa as they are used to explain and interpret African reality. An epistemology so derived is alienated from the African cultural worldview. In the opinion of Anyanwu, African epistemology ought to be the explanation and interpretation of reality using African concepts, conceptual scheme and epistemic categories in order to arrive at knowledge from an African perspective. African epistemology then is a theory of knowledge through an African culture-adapted method, which one can utilize in order to arrive at a trustworthy knowledge of reality. Conversational thinking as a method that accommodates the complementary inference, contextual and relational analyses grounded in a three-valued logic is a good example of a method that can drive Anyanwu’s theory. Such epistemology so achieved would be a product of, and reflects, the worldview from which the experience is derived. To understand Anyanwu’s relative conception of knowledge, we have to attempt some questions such as what is knowledge? How can knowledge be achieved or derived? Anyanwu answers the second question by referring to Leopold Senghor, a forerunner of epistemological relativity. What we are saying is that Anyanwu’s theory has a connection with

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Senghor’s Negritude. This is apparent as he quoted Senghor extensively. He agrees with Senghor that there are nuances in African and Western approaches to knowledge. For him, while the West favors analytic and critical approaches, Africa favors the intuitive approach. Anyanwu subscribes to the intuitive form of knowledge due to the fact that it furnishes immediacy and has the inherent tendency toward concreteness, which is lacking in analytic knowledge (that drifts in cognitive and epistemic emptiness) (Anyanwu 1983: 103). Intuitive knowledge gives the knower a direct contact, and the actual feeling of the known since the knower participates in its being as it participates in the being of the knower. This brings about a better understanding of the external world and life in general. It also guides the knowers and prevents them from dominating and misusing nature. This type of approach to knowledge motivates humans to seek ways of coexisting with nature rather than dominating it. The act of knowing through feeling is like saying that human knowledge stems from an experience similar to the approach of the empiricists. According to Anyanwu, knowledge is a product of the human experience of reality. “Reality refers to objects of experience and thought” (Anyanwu 1984: 82). It is reality as it manifests in the African place that one experiences in the knowing process. When different experiences are tinkered with different methods, the outcome is likely going to be a different perspective on knowledge. The idea here is that experience is not knowledge but a basic element in the knowledge acquisition process. For experience to transform into knowledge, it must be acted upon by reason. It is in this light that Anyanwu avers that “[i]f the African people have beliefs and knowledge about reality, these must be the products of human experience. The theories of such beliefs and knowledge must be the product of logical reflection” (1984: 83). This brings us to the view that for Anyanwu, knowledge involves experience and reason in the same manner that it involves feeling and reason for Senghor. The central idea in Anyanwu’s argument is that experience and intuition are essential for knowledge acquisition. Furthermore, Anyanwu argues that there are two types of experience— personal and impersonal. He sees the impersonal experiences as that which is derived from scientific experience and is objective. This experience leads to objective truth that “arises from the artificial situation of science with its arbitrary hypotheses” (Anyanwu 1984: 84). Such a knowledge is detached from a personal human experience. The preceding is not a direct metaphysical experience of reality; neither does it improve human knowledge of such reality. Anyanwu afterward makes a case for personal

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experience, which is direct and immediate. It is the basis for subjective truth and knowledge, which is metaphysical. It grants the individual or subject direct and immediate experience of reality. Anyanwu’s view is that knowledge, the type that philosophers pursue, is personal and subjective. Knowledge is a subjective enterprise since it involves a subject and the object of a person’s knowledge. In knowing, from the intuitive perspective, the knower’s judgment is influenced by her/his personality, interest, commitment and sensitivity. These arguments point to the fact that knowledge in the African place is not communal knowledge as many may claim; it is a subjective enterprise. The idea is that even the collective experience starts with the individual’s subjective experience. This is the point that Anyanwu makes when he argues that experience “is a procedure by which human beings become immediately and directly acquainted with the object of knowledge” (1984: 84). This implies that “in every experience, there are the individuals who experience and something that is experienced” (Azenabor 2010: 93). The one who has the experience is the ego (the subject) and what is experienced is the world (the object). By this, knowledge involves the duality of subject and object. Without either of these two, there can be no knowledge in the African context. Also, Anyanwu argues that there is ‘concept by postulation’ (this is Western) and ‘concept by intuition’ (this is African) (Anyanwu 1984: 88–96; Azenabor 2010: 96). These refer to the methodological nuances earlier discussed. More so, Anyanwu contends that there is no epistemic schism in African epistemology as can be found in Western epistemology between rationalism and empiricism. In African epistemology, knowledge is not viewed as that which is derived solely from the rationalist perspective (which holds that knowledge can be obtained only through reason independent of sense experience) or solely from the empiricist perspective (which holds that knowledge can be reached via sense experience independent of reason). Anyanwu argues that human knowledge is obtained through both the rationalist and empiricist approaches. Within the African worldview, knowledge is possible through the combination and complementarity of sense experience (empiricism) and reason (rationalism). This conception of knowledge reflects the African worldview, which some advocates of African philosophy call the ‘philosophy of integration’ (Anyanwu 1984: 78; Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014). The philosophy of integration reflects the conception of reality from an African viewpoint. This is apparent in the duality between the knower (subject) and the known (object), objective

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and subjective realities, experience and reason, rationalism and empiricism, as the case may be. Nmekọ—the principle of complementary relationship that characterizes the African system of thought—is what underlies this type of approach in the epistemological inquiry. The idea highlighted in nmekọ is that without the complementary relationship stated earlier, knowledge will be lopsided. We must also observe that in this conception, the primary emphasis does not lie on certainty but on comprehensiveness. It is from the comprehensive that target can be set for the certain. The main objection to this epistemic perspective is on its universal applicability. Interestingly, epistemology from an African perspective is relative to the African culture that produces it but is, without doubt, universally applicable.  Complementary inference can be made in any culture or epistemic location insofar as one is abreast with a truth-glut logic that drives it. Kwasi Wiredu’s Theory of Knowledge: The Notion of Truth Kwasi Wiredu discusses his idea of truth from the Akan cultural linguistic worldview. He notes that for an Akan person, who is good at the English language, the Akan equivalent for truth is nokware. He also notes that the word nokware has nkontompo as its opposite in the Akan language. According to him, nkontompo means lies and that the opposite of truth is falsity and not lies (Wiredu 1996: 105). He goes on to assert that the implication of this is that, in Akan language, truth is given a moral connotation and status instead of solely a cognitive connotation. Wiredu deduced three reasons for this argument: “First the main preoccupation with truth in traditional Akan society is moral. Second, the moral concept of truth presupposes the cognitive concept of truth; and third, the English word for ‘truth’ itself is ambiguous” (Wiredu 1996: 105). Wiredu is saying that truth, for the Akan, is expressed as truthfulness, which is a moral notion. This moral conception of truth as truthfulness does not imply a denial or negation of the cognitive conception of truth among the Akan. On the contrary, it holds that truth as truthfulness is both cognitive and moral. But that the moral conception of truth takes precedence over the cognitive conception of truth since the cognitive conception of truth is inherent in the moral conception of truth. By this, truth is not simply ‘what is the case,’ but more of ‘what ought to be the case.’ The suggestion is that ‘anything that is moral’ could be ‘what is the case.’ In this way, there is no clear-cut distinction between a moral conception of truth as nokware and a cognitive conception of truth. This vagueness is apparent in

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Wiredu’s statement that “to say that an asem (statement) is nokware implies that it is true cognitively” (Wiredu 1996: 106). But when asem is true in a moral sense is hardly clear. What can be gleaned from the preceding paragraph is that in the Akan language, there are two types of truth—cognitive truth and moral truth— and they are interconnected. This interconnection can be explained using the principle of nmekọ, which, among others, stipulates the complementary relationship of seemingly opposing variables. In discussing the cognitive notion of truth, Wiredu starts by saying that there is no particular word for truth in the Akan language. What they have are conceptions of truth. He argues in the affirmative that there is a cognitive conception of truth in the Akan language. He finds this cognitive conception of truth in the idea “to say that something is, is to say that it is so,” or that “truth is what is so.” This is explained by the Akan phrase “nea ete or asem a ete saa” meaning “a proposition which is so” (Wiredu 1996: 106). Herein, nea means ‘that which is,’ ete means ‘to be’ or ‘is’ and saa means ‘so,’ while asem means ‘proposition’ or ‘statement’. Given that ‘to be true’ means ‘to be so,’ the Akan word saa which depicts ‘so’ also implies ‘true.’ Thus, if we say that ‘a proposition or thing is so (saa),’ we are saying that ‘that proposition or thing is true.’ Consequently, for a proposition to be true, it means it corresponds with fact. This implies that the Akan cognitive conception of truth is somehow related to the correspondence theory of truth. However, this does not mean that correspondence theory provides an analysis of truth as that which is so. Wiredu substantiated this relationship between the Akan cognitive notion of truth and the correspondence theory of truth as follows: [These] linguistic contrasts have some very interesting consequences for the theory of truth. Consider the correspondence theory of truth. This is supposed, in one form, to assert something like this: “‘P’ is true” means “‘P’ corresponds to a fact.” What does this come to in Akan? Simply that “‘P’ te saa” means “‘P’ corresponds to ‘nea ete saa,’ which in truth is nothing more than saying that “‘P’ te sea” means “‘P’ te saa.” In other words, the correspondence definition amounts to tautology in Akan. In a certain sense, this might be taken as a verification of the correspondence theory, for it might be said that being a tautology is a specially splendid way of being true. Be that as it may, one thing which cannot be pretended in Akan is that the correspondence theory offers any enlightenment about the notion of being so. (Wiredu 1996: 107)

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Our focus is not to delve into details of this relationship. The point we seek to make is that ‘what is true’ is ‘what is’ and ‘what is so.’ Thus, for the Akan, cognitive truth is what corresponds to fact,’ ‘what is,’ ‘what is the case’ or ‘what is so.’ A thing is said to be so because it is known to be so. This is in line with Wiredu’s assertion that ‘to be is to be known’ (1980). The preceding assertion suggests that if a thing is not known, it cannot be the case. It should be noted that this cognitive conception of truth as that which is so does not carry the idea of communal agreement or agreement among members of the community (the Akan community). This misconception that truth in a cognitive sense involves communal agreement might arise from misapplication of the translation of the Akan word nokware, which means ‘being in one mouth,’ where, its constituent words are ano meaning ‘mouth’ and karo meaning ‘one.’ However, less literary, it means “being of one voice” (Wiredu 1996: 105). This does not mean oneness of communal voice or communal agreement. Wiredu goes on to argue that [o]f course, truth has something to do with agreement, which is evident in the fact that to say of something someone has said that it is true implies agreeing with him. This is an agreement between two points of view which does not necessarily involve the whole community. But community-wide or not, agreement primarily cannot be the essence of truth in the primary sense, for when there is an agreement in cognition it is about something being so, i.e. the case. (Wiredu 1996: 106)

For him, truth is not a community agreement. This is far from the point that Wiredu sought to make. His point was that this cognitive conception of truth in the Akan mind belongs more to the wise individual than to the populace (Wiredu 1996: 106). If we say that ‘truth is that which is so,’ we are saying that the individual’s word is one with his thought. Accordingly, Wiredu observes that “truthfulness has to do with the relationship between what a person thinks and what he says. To be truthful is to let your speech reflect your thoughts” (1996: 106). If this is the case, then ‘truth is opinion’ (Wiredu 1980: 111, 175). Truth is subjective, and it is the individual who asserts what she/he experiences as true. Hence, truth is what an individual says it is. This is what nokware somehow depicts. “It is important to note that nokware (truthfulness) involves the concept of truth. To say that somebody is speaking truthfully is to say that s/he genuinely believes what s/he is saying is true. Moreover, it implies that it is, in fact, true” (Wiredu 1996: 106). The preceding is a moral conception of truth. Also, to say that what we assert is not nokware is to make a moral comment. In all, the Akan conception of truth is moral but with cognitive

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insight. Some criticisms and the answers to such have been addressed in the next chapter. It is germane to note that Wiredu’s notion of truth aligns with the idea of nmekọ, which is apparent in the complementary relationship between speech and thought. A speech is truthful if it is complemented by the thought of the individual who expresses it. In other words, it is not correspondence, but a complementarity. Chris Ijiomah’s Humanizing/Humanistic Epistemology Humanizing epistemology (Ijiomah 1996), which is also rendered as humanistic epistemology (Ijiomah 2011), is a program by Chris Okezie Ijiomah of the Calabar School of Philosophy aimed at “bringing to focus the missing base in our today study of epistemology.” The central idea in this program is that true knowledge should be humane; thus, knowledge ought to be moral or humane. According to him, there are two reasons people seek knowledge: first is, they seek knowledge for knowledge sake or for curiosity; second, they seek knowledge for practical purpose, that is, to meet human needs. N.S.S.  Iwe, in his Foreword to the monograph Humanizing Epistemology, makes this point apparent when he states that “[h]e (Ijiomah) argues that though the primary attraction to knowledge may be to satisfy our curiosity, he adds that the ultimate aim of knowledge is to understand and organise reality in order to minister to the existential needs of man and his well-being” (Iwe 1996: iv). Following John Pollock (1987), Ijiomah attempts to define and distinguish between what is knowledge and what is non-knowledge. This is why he argues that epistemology is the theory of knowledge and non-­ knowledge against the popular idea that epistemology is merely a theory of knowledge. In his opinion, epistemology as a theory of knowledge answers the question ‘how does one know?’ However, epistemology as a theory of knowledge and non-knowledge concerns itself, in addition to knowing, with not knowing or the limits of knowledge (Ijiomah 1996: 13–14). Ijiomah insists that his aim was not to construct a new theory of knowledge but to address one of the lacunae in the existing theories of knowledge. That lacuna, for him, was about the limitations of knowledge. In his words, “epistemology is not limited to theories of knowledge: instead, it includes theories of non-knowledge. For example, the knowledge of ‘x’ involves not only the content of ‘x’ but also the limits of ‘x’. But to discuss the limits of ‘x’ is to find out what is ‘x’ and what is not ‘x’” (Ijiomah 2011: 63).

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Besides the limits of knowledge, Ijiomah also talks about the practical dimension of knowledge, that is, the moral dimension of knowledge. The moral dimension to knowledge is arrived at through a discussion on the nature of knowledge. This implies that epistemology has a metaphysical foundation in addition to a methodological foundation. What we are saying is that epistemology does not only answer the ‘how’ question but also the ‘what’ question of knowledge. The content of knowledge cannot be equated with the process of knowledge. For Ijiomah, to equate ‘the process of knowledge’ with ‘knowledge proper’ is to misconstrue knowledge. His view is that what qualifies as knowledge is ‘the product of the process’ and ‘not the process itself’ (Ijiomah 1996: 19). Thus, “it is only when the product of operation, the worldview or the unquestioned belief is submitted to questions of values that justification, evaluation and methodology come in as matters of epistemology” (Ijiomah 1996: 19). This discussion is on the metaphysical basis of epistemology. The preceding point is made apparent in Ijiomah’s insightful discussion on the nature of knowledge as he sought to answer the question of ‘what is knowledge.’ Ijiomah goes about his task by referring to what the conversationalists termed “Conceptual Articulation” (Ogbonnaya n.d.). He does this by employing some words from the Igbo linguistic worldview, which he transforms into concepts. It is through these concepts that he captures and addresses the question of the nature of knowledge. Some of those concepts include Ako, Ama-mi-he, Uche (Echiche), Aghugho, Mme-­ kpa-­ahu and Ako-na-uche (the discussion on some of these ideas is presented in the next chapter, but we shall do brief expository exercises in the next few paragraphs). According to Ijiomah, Ako means ‘wisdom’ or ‘moral knowledge,’ Ama-mi-ihe means ‘dispositional knowledge’ or ‘intelligence,’ Uche or Echiche means ‘thought’ or ‘thinking,’ Aghugho means ‘treachery,’ mmekpa-ahu means ‘cultural problem’ and ako-na-uche means ‘knowledge.’ Ijiomah begins the discourse on the nature of knowledge by noting that uche or echiche is the receptacle in which ama-mi-ihe (dispositional knowledge or intelligence) is found or situated. This disposition or intelligence has to do with an insight into the relationships among the components of any reality (Ijiomah 1996: 19). He explains that although intelligence is an essential aspect of knowledge, it is not knowledge in itself. He argues that the content of uche, that is, ama-mi-he, can only become active when uche (thought) is agitated by the presence of mme-­kpa-­ahu (problems). What uche does, in this situation, is that it engages itself in examining the

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problem that agitates it. This, in turn, leads to ‘knowledge of the problem’ (ama-mi-he [intelligence]). This is only dispositional knowledge but not knowledge proper. The reason is that intelligence is ambivalent. It can be used for evil or good purposes. When it is used for evil or selfish purpose, to dehumanize human beings by causing confusion and trouble, it becomes aghugho (treachery). However, when it is used for the good of all or to achieve good ends as well as to address human social problems, it becomes ako (wisdom). Ijiomah takes the discussion further as he concerns himself with the concept of ako (wisdom). He argues that ako is the moral aspect of knowledge. According to him, the main goal of ako is to moralize knowledge. Knowledge is moralized (made ako [wisdom]) when ama-mi-he (intelligence), the product of uche (thought) is humanized, that is, used to foster human well-being by solving the existential problems that confront human beings. By this, the full circuit of knowledge is completed when intelligence, which is a product of thought, is used to moralize knowledge. In the words of Ijiomah, “knowledge becomes the application of the contents of Uche to particular problems by Ako” (Ijiomah 1996: 21). Ijiomah identifies knowledge proper as ako-na-uche. The knowledge which is known as ako-na-uche is not static but dynamic. This is due to the fact that human problems, which this knowledge seeks to solve, are themselves not static, but dynamic. The preceding makes knowledge a self-reconstructing phenomenon. The general idea from the preceding paragraphs is that knowledge is not just dispositional but practical. What this entails is that Ijiomah’s program for ‘Humanizing Epistemology’ emphasizes the moral aspect of knowledge without neglecting the dispositional aspect of it. Another idea is that knowledge is a by-product of a problem. This is to say that without a problem there can hardly be a process that yields knowledge. Thus, it is when humans seek to address or solve their existential problems that they generate knowledge. Furthermore, it can be deduced that every knowledge is contextual since it addresses and seeks to solve problems that generated it. The resultant epistemology then is contextual and complementary akin to the method driven by the notion of nmekọ and the trivalent system of logic that grounds it. It is in this light that one can argue that humanistic epistemology is African epistemology or a theory of knowledge in African philosophy. The reason for this is not because it is an epistemological theory propounded by a philosopher of African origin but because of the methodological and logical foundations of the program itself.

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More so, it can be claimed that knowledge, as Ijiomah sees it, is not egocentric, but sociocentric (1996: 27). What he is saying is that knowledge is not meant to address and solve individual but human problems on a larger scale, that is, human problems at the societal level. It is in this light that Ijiomah argues that if one claims to know, such a person becomes responsible not only for himself but also for others and for the entire society. Thus, knowledge, within the context of humanistic epistemology, makes an individual competent to function and serve in the society. Every political leader is expected to be morally responsible to the society where she/he is called to serve (Ijiomah 1996: 23–33). Knowledge is for service. It can also be stated that any knowledge that is meant for service must first and foremost be a moralized knowledge. Our discussion of Ijiomah’s ideas on the nature of knowledge so far shows that knowledge is a moral enterprise that is aimed at promoting human welfare since it first moralizes the individual that possesses it and then humanizes the society. Paulin Hountondji’s Endogenous Knowledge The idea of endogenous knowledge is articulated by Paulin Hountondji. His argument is that Africa needs knowledge that can bring about her development. He makes this point very glaring in his paper titled “Knowledge as a Development Issue.” He starts by making a critique of an orientation in African philosophy known as ethnophilosophy. He argues that ethnophilosophy flourishes on three key propositions: (1) all Africans share a common worldview; (2) these worldviews may be called philosophies; and (3) all Africans (African philosophers) have to do is to rediscover these philosophies (Hountondji 2004: 529). Hence, the ethnophilosophy project gives a picture that the only way to do African philosophy is to philosophize about Africa. Hountondji vehemently criticizes ethnophilosophy on three fronts: (a) ethnophilosophy is an aspect of ethnology confused as philosophy; (b) ethnophilosophy is a collective voice, unanimism; and (c) ethnophilosophy involves extroversion. With respect to ethnophilosophy as an aspect of ethnology confused as philosophy, he argues that it denies African philosophy the liberty to engage with issues of universal concern. He equates ethnophilosophy with other aspects of ethnology such as anthropology and ethnography. On unanimism, he argues that philosophy is not about everyone agreeing with everyone (Hountondji 2004: 530). Everyone must not hold the same view. Philosophy, for Hountondji, is not a

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collective enterprise but an individual venture. On extroversion, he avers that ethnophilosophy is externally oriented since it seeks to address and answer the question raised by the West. Here, Africa and Africans are not the audience of the research; they are only the object of the research. To this end, ethnophilosophy is an intellectual research about/on Africa for the West, who asked the pertinent questions that are being answered by ethnophilosophers. The knowledge so gathered is not meant for and cannot be used by Africans. It is meant for the West and, in particular, to foster economic extroversion. In this way, Africa and Africans are decentered from the subject of knowledge and knowledge production. Even the offshoot of ethnophilosophy, which is ethnoscience, does not really serve the purpose of enhancing indigenous or local knowledge. What it does is that it only studies local knowledge “for its own sake, from an aesthetic point of view, as if they were just products of fancy” (2004: 535). Here, local or traditional knowledge in Africa is not studied in order to validate what ought to be validated and open it up for further investigation and application by contemporary science. What we can deduce from Hountondji’s argument is that ethnophilosophy and inter alia ethnoscience do not really project and enhance indigenous or local knowledge. On the contrary, they help to marginalize it. Buttressing this point, Hountondji argues, “what I meant was that in Africa today what is often called traditional knowledge is still marginalized” (Hountondji 2004: 534). This is simply because Africa’s indigenous types of knowledge are not harnessed for Africa’s good. Rather, our traditional knowledge is integrated and subordinated to the world system of knowledge (Hountondji 1995: 2), which is Western. Likewise, our economy is integrated and subordinated to their economic system. This implies that both African indigenous or traditional knowledge and economy are extroverted or externally oriented. Even our scientific and technological activities are extroverted and are harnessed and used by the West, while Africa remains in poverty, not knowing what to do with what it has. The ignorance of how to harness and use our knowledge and technical know-how accounts for Africa’s economic backwardness and underdevelopment. Since our knowledge is not at the core but at the periphery of global knowledge, we have no choice but to scrabble for knowledge (scientific and technological knowledge) produced in the West to address Africa’s challenges. This reliance on Western episteme also accounts for Africa’s continuous dependence on the West. Hountondji goes on to claim that there is no actual or thoroughgoing scientific research

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going on in Africa that can help break Africa free from the West. It is in the West that scientific and technological knowledge is produced and imported into Africa, the main consumer. The implication of this is that Africa is economically backward because it is scientifically and technologically backward. In other words, insofar as Africa continues to depend on the West scientifically and technologically, it can never become economically independent and viable. Consequently, for Africa to become economically viable and develop, it must be involved in the production of scientific and technological knowledge. This must begin from its epistemology if any achievement must be made. The first is that Africa needs to break free from the shackles of ethnoscience and get involved in endogenous knowledge. According to Hountondji, endogenous knowledge is simply indigenous or local knowledge properly harnessed through rigorous methodologies  (Hountondji 2004: 534). Hountondji contends that the way to emancipate this indigenous knowledge produced in Africa is to study it not for its own sake or for aesthetic purposes, but rather for practical relevance. Hountondji elaborates on how endogenous knowledge in Africa can be demarginalized against ethnoscience that marginalizes it. As he puts it, [w]e are not studying the “indigenous knowledge,” “local knowledge,” or “folk-science” for its own sake, from an aesthetic point of view, as if they were just products of fancy. We are asking how true they are, how valid they are. We are looking for ways and means to test them in order to validate whatever in them can be validated, and make contemporary science take them into account in a reciprocal process of updating. That makes a huge difference. Ethnoscience does not ask any question about the truth of local knowledge systems. It just describes them and leaves them as they are. (2004: 535)

What Hountondji meant is that endogenous knowledge ought to be first validated by African philosophers, who excavate and open it up for further investigation by contemporary researchers and scientists. The contemporary researchers and scientists would then seek further ways that this indigenous knowledge can be made practically applicable and relevant to Africa. The African philosopher must also be there to see to the progress of this endogenous knowledge. For this, Hountondji challenges African philosophers:

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We should pay attention to what is going well. We should acknowledge achievements and work in progress and seek how to cope with present difficulties and develop new strategies for overcoming dependence. We should promote scientific and technological innovation and self-reliance as means to meet, first and foremost, Africa’s own needs. (1995: 2)

Hountondji’s main point is that Africa needs to develop. Such development can be possible through epistemic strategies that encourage self-­ reliance. So, “an important step forward would be to integrate it into the mainstream of ongoing research for the benefit of Africa” (Hountondji 2004: 534). When this is done, we will come to realize that our indigenous knowledge can become the very foundation for our scientific, technological and economic development. This type of positive effort can help recenter Africa in knowledge production, and the knowledge produced in Africa would be given global recognition as part of the core rather than as peripheral knowledge. It is important to indicate that Hountondji’s proposal does not imply that Africa must close her borders to foreign ideas, and scientific and technological inventions from outside. On the contrary, Hountondji calls for an integration of both. Before being applied, and in order to be better applied, “traditional” knowledge should be tested again and again by the people themselves, reappropriated in a way that makes it possible to make the indispensable linkage with ongoing scientific and technological research. What is needed in Africa today is not just to apply traditional know-how in agriculture while continuing at the same time to import from the West, whether in agriculture or in other fields, technologies which are poorly understood by local users. What is needed, instead, is to help the people and their elites to master and capitalize on the existing knowledge. This is necessary whether the knowledge is indigenous or not. The rationale is to enable the people to develop new knowledge in a continual process of uninterrupted creativity, while applying the findings in a systematic and responsible way to improve their own quality of life. (2004: 535)

Earlier, Hountondji had explained that [i]n short, we are faced today in the field of knowledge with a twofold task. First we have to appropriate, assimilate and make entirely ours, with lucidity and critical mind, all the international heritage now available including the

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very process of scientific and technological innovation. Secondly, after critically assessing, testing and updating, reappropriate our own ancestral heritage and the creativity, adaptability and ability to innovate that made our ancestors what they were. (1995: 9)

The point is that both externally and internally generated knowledge must be seen as complementarily integral and necessary for Africa’s development. Hence, Hountondji’s idea of endogenous knowledge still has a place for nonindigenous knowledge in Africa. This implies that our knowledge would be complementary, all-encompassing and holistic. The notion of nmekọ is what explains this trajectory in African philosophical tradition. Embedded in the method of conversational thinking, nmekọ organizes variables into mutually complementary units. This is the strategy that explains the practical ways of combining Western and African knowledge resources irrespective of cultural differences, for the growth and development of the continent. Godfrey Ozumba’s and Jonathan Chimakonam’s Integrative Epistemology Integrative epistemology, which is propounded by Ozumba and Chimakonam, two members of the Calabar School, is aimed at demonstrating that the approach to epistemology in African philosophy could differ from those of other philosophical traditions, say, Western philosophy. They argue that this difference is due to method and background logic. For instance, against the idea that knowledge is ‘justified-true-belief’ which has been criticized by Edmund Gettier, they assert that knowledge is ‘Integratively Justified True Belief’ (IJTB) (Ibrahim 2011; Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 47) or “integratively justified and contextualized true belief” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 130). This makes integrative epistemology a mega-theory which houses other sub-theories such as defeasibility theory, the causal theory and the reliability theory. Also, contrary to the epistemological enterprise in Western philosophy where it is either this epistemological theory or the other that is employed in explaining and arriving at knowledge of reality, integrative epistemology holds that all theories of knowledge are necessary links and can be integrated in order to explain and arrive at knowledge of reality. It is in this light that they contend that epistemological theories such as externalism, evidentialism, evolutionary epistemology, genetic epistemology, internalism,

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integrative humanism, mentalism and virtue epistemology can be integrated to obtain a more holistic knowledge. By integration, they mean a complementary relationship of a sort that can be  driven by the law of njikọka or integrativity found in Ezumezu logic and characterized by the principle of nmekọ. While the epistemology of ‘either this or that’ theory is predicated on Aristotelian two-valued (bivalent) logic, integrative epistemology is predicated on the Ezumezu system of three-valued (trivalent) logic. With the bivalent and deterministic logic, Western epistemology draws a line between realities to separate knowledge from non-knowledge, fact from fiction, and truth from falsehood. Integrative epistemology, on its part, seeks to reach a comprehensive knowledge through the functional relationships between knowledge and ignorance, fact and fiction, truth and falsehood because, without one aspect, the other cannot in a strict sense be defined. Integrative epistemologists seek to see to it that an aspect of reality does not become the focus of epistemology to the exclusion of others. To this end, the system provides a platform wherein all the aspects of reality are taken into cognizance in the knowing process. This is made possible by the integrated platform wherein all theories function to bring about a holistic insight into the knowledge of reality. This is captured by Ozumba and Chimakonam as follows: Integrative humanism suggests that there are different shapes of human experiences and all should be brought in when studying man and realities in his world. Hence, integrative method of philosophy called integrativism discountenances the traditional divide between rationalism and empiricism, physical and transcendental, etc. For us, the one is simply the continuation of the other. The logic of integrativism is not bifurcating and polarizing like the Western classical two-valued logic. (2014: 46)

The logic that undergirds integrative epistemology is one that is trivalent in nature and is called njikoka logic. This logic is not different from Ezumezu logic, which underlies conversational thinking. In fact, Ezumezu is the finest expression of this logic to date. With this point made, it is germane to turn to integrative epistemology proper. Ozumba’s and Chimakonam’s theory of knowledge known as integrative epistemology has its root in the ideas, methods, principles and philosophical tenet called Integrative Humanism or Njikoka Amaka (Ozumba 2010; Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014). Integrative humanism is a

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philosophical system which holds that human knowledge ought to be holistic and not lopsided. This is derived from the integrativist view that reality is multifaceted, “having both physical and spiritual dimensions; past and present; as well as harmonized future framework in which seemingly opposed variables unite without contradiction to achieve progress and epistemic wholeness” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 5–6). The method it follows is known as integrativism, which is “a ratio-empirico-­ spirito-centric approach to doing philosophy where realities are contraries instead of contradictories” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 6). The idea is that there are more than one way of approaching reality. Therefore, to comprehend reality, all the available and would-be invented approaches or methods need to be considered as necessary links. As necessary links, all these methods might not be useful in explaining reality in all contexts. Whenever any method is not useful or relevant, it is not discarded, rather it is kept and employed in another context where it is needed (Ozumba 2010). This implies that both methodology and idea are contextual. And to have a holistic perspective of knowledge about reality all the available approaches to, and perception of knowledge must be taken into cognizance. Ozumba and Chimakonam articulate their integrative epistemology by seeking to answer the questions “what does it mean to know?” and “how does the African come to know?” (2014: 33). The second question focuses on the method of knowledge acquisition. For the integrative epistemologists, knowledge acquisition processes include perception and reflection. Perception has to do with acquiring knowledge through aru (the human body and senses), while reflection has to do with obtaining knowledge via the instrumentality of akụrọ (the human mind) and mmụụ (human spirit) (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 34). The organs of knowledge acquisition in integrative epistemology include aru (body [senses]), akụrọ (mind) and mmụọ (spirit). The idea here is that knowledge can be physical, mental and spiritual. Physical knowledge is derived through the senses; mental knowledge through the mind; and spiritual knowledge through revelation from Nke-Mbu (the Supreme Being) and it is occasional. This makes knowledge perceptive, reflective and revelatory. While physical knowledge takes care of the physical well-being of humans, mental and spiritual knowledge take care of human mental and spiritual well-being, respectively. The implication is that integrative epistemology is a tripartite epistemology. By implication, human knowledge is empirical, rational and spiritual. In the same vein, there are contextual, cultural, empirical, mythical, pragmatic, rational, revelatory, relative, situational and soulish truths (Ozumba and

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Chimakonam 2014: 43, 44). All these truths are connected to the tripartite conception of knowledge. Therefore, for one to arrive at knowledge (holistic knowledge), all these shades of truths must be taken into account. The integrative epistemologists make it clear that although knowledge is three-dimensional, it is also a duality. This is because there are two basic human faculties: the perceptive and the reflective. One comes to know when the perceptive faculty perceives data in/from the external world and the reflective faculty interprets and understands these sense data. Concerning duality, they argue that knowledge has physical and nonphysical dimensions as well as cognitive and normative dimensions. For them, each of these pairs is complementarily inseparable. Since humans have physical and nonphysical parts, there is corresponding physical and nonphysical knowledge to maintain balance in the human person. Also, integrative epistemologists hold that knowledge is cogno-normative in that cognitive is necessarily normative. This is what they called “cogno-­ normative epistemology” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014; Chimakonam 2015b). The central point here is that human knowledge must be moralized before it can pass as knowledge. This is possible when human knowledge passes through normative evaluation in terms of its humanizing effect on the human person and the society. The last point in the preceding paragraph leads to the view that human cognitive knowledge must be for the moral good of individuals and of society. The norms that define the morality of knowledge are given by the society that the knower belongs to or finds herself/himself in. This implies that individual knowledge is also community-regulated knowledge. The reason is that the individual knower derives the moral aspect from the community norms and uses it to humanize knowledge. With this, it becomes easy to understand Ozumba’s and Chimakonam’s argument that “knowledge cannot be divorced from ethics and vice versa” (2014: 37). This goes a long way to emphasize the cogno-normative character of epistemology in African philosophy (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 37). The integrative epistemologists draw from the African worldview, which grounds a strong connection between epistemology and ethics (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 37). Two points have been made in this paragraph. One is that knowledge in African philosophy as seen through the lens of integrative humanism is cognitive and normative. The other is that an individual’s knowledge is something that the community shares both in production and use. This is because the community provides the normative framework that gives moral justification to the knowledge which the

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individual claims to have. The preceding affirms the idea that knowledge belongs to the community since individuals who produce this knowledge belong to the community that gives moral stamp to it (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 36). Ozumba and Chimakonam also argue that knowledge is context-­ dependent. That is, knowledge and truth claims are relative to context. This makes “all human-based knowledge dynamic, tentative and contextual. The objectivity and absolutism of knowledge are only realizable within contexts and by those who share the same insights in[to] the truth conditions explicit in a given ‘form of life’” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 45). By this, no knowledge is absolute; knowledge and truth claims are relative. This is to say, epistemic certainty in knowledge is relative, and every knowledge acquired is relative within contexts. In the words of Ozumba and Chimakonam, “what is certain in one context could be uncertain in another context and vice versa” (2014: 34). Relativity in knowledge is dependent on the kind of knowledge we seek. The integrative epistemologists address all forms of knowledge and their inherent differences as depending on the following: 1. Specifying the kind of knowledge we are seeking to attain (conscious of the content) 2. The ‘form of life’ within which we are seeking this form of knowledge (context proper) 3. The means we are relying on in seeking this form of knowledge (method) 4. What is the basis for truth in that “form of life” (logic) 5. Identify the criteria of knowledge we are adopting to provide us the certification of knowledge (medium of knowledge acquisition). (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 42) Ozumba and Chimakonam take integrative epistemology to another level when they contend that there is another side to it; and that is eliminative epistemology. According to them, “Eliminative Epistemology E.E is a term coined to describe an epistemological scenario where actors in the knowledge acquisition process are unduly reshuffled and assigned unconventional roles” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 48). In the act of reshuffling, actors are reassigned new roles outside their traditional roles. The actors see their new roles as oddly unfit and therefore see themselves as being eliminated from the epistemic process. Ozumba and Chimakonam

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posit that this reshuffling is due to the logical shift in the knowledge acquisition process. It is a shift from the Aristotelian two-valued logic, which is bivalent and restricts knowledge to the physical. Herein, knowledge is gotten only through the senses and reason. Outside of these, there is no knowledge. By this, certainty in knowledge and truth is restricted to the physical world and that knowledge in the nonphysical world is completely impossible. They also argue that today just as “the scientists see more reason to explore the outer universe, the philosophers see more compelling need to investigate the hitherto metaphysical, transcendental or humbly put, unknown world” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 48). The idea is that knowledge is not restricted to the physical world; it can also be obtained from the nonphysical, metaphysical world. Ozumba and Chimakonam also assert that the logic that is behind this eliminative epistemology is trivalent or three-valued logic. This logic takes away certainty and truth from the philosopher (experience and reason) and places it on the event or what would happen. This is “a process-­ dependent algorithm where history determines the internal dynamics” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 48) of knowledge. Here, the epistemologist is an unattached epistemic inquirer who does not get involved in the knowledge process even through analysis. They connect their argument to “the alethic notions of contingency, necessity and possibility in modal logic” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 49). Worthy of note is that Ozumba and Chimakonam recognized the existence of the physical and nonphysical world, which the contingent, necessary and possible worlds of modal logic are somehow related to. The contingent world is the world that could be, while the necessary world is the world that is; and the possible world is the world that might have been (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 52). While the necessary world is the physical world, the contingent and possible worlds are not. The integrativists argue that “what the possible world means to the modal logician is what the non-physical world means to the integrativists, but the integrativist would hesitate to justify the truth of the possible world” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 50). In spite of this, Ozumba and Chimakonam assert that “[i]ntegrativism cannot justify the truth of the possible world of modal logic because the possible world is not the same as the nonphysical world i.e. the world that might have been is not the same as the world that could be or that is” (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 50). They go on to connect the contingent world with the metaphysical, transcendental or spiritual world insisting that it is part of the epistemic universe. They

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justify the existence of this world using African ontology and the njikọka inferential principle, which is subsumable in Ezumezu logic. The general idea here is that the necessary world is the physical, which can be justified; the possible world is nonphysical and cannot be justified; and the contingent world is the metaphysical, transcendental or spiritual world, which can be justified. The implication is that while there can be certainty of knowledge and truth in the physical and metaphysical worlds, it is not possible in the nonphysical world. The reason why knowledge is possible in the contingent world is that it is tangible like the physical world. Its tangibility is made possible from the hermeneutics of African ontology (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 51). The central thrust in integrative and eliminative epistemologies is that epistemic certainty is contextual or context-dependent. Ozumba and Chimakonam, using the time/space continuum, illustrate that although there is epistemic certainty in the contingent and necessary worlds, this certainty in knowledge is contextually different. For them, in the necessary world, time ticks from being to becoming; but in the contingent world, time ticks from becoming to being. This, in their opinion, accounts for the lack of conclusive conjectures from the integrative epistemologists as they probe into epistemic certainty in knowledge in the contingent world. Ozumba and Chimakonam substantiate this as follows: However, integrative epistemology by entering the contingent world also stops short of a conclusive investigation because the epistemic time inevitably changes its format from anti-clockwise where beings occur before they are studied to clockwise format where beings are to be studied from their process of becoming or emergence. The challenge is that becoming occupies a non-existential and non-spatial position while the integrative epistemologist occupies an existential position; hence, the contingent world becomes a world too close for entry for the integrative epistemologist. (Ozumba and Chimakonam 2014: 53)

From this view the integrative epistemologist in her/his quest for knowledge in the contingent world takes a new epistemic place—that of waiting to know as a witness, instead of her/his traditional active role as the one knowing. Here, the epistemologist is eliminated from her/his position (the active knower) to take on another position (the passive waiting knower). By this, it is the events that unfold and manifest knowledge

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without the active participation of the knower. This is how knowledge is attained in eliminative epistemology. What the entire discussion on integrative and eliminative epistemologies leads to is that a knower is assigned different roles depending on the context. For instance, in integrative epistemology which takes place in the necessary world, the knower is an active knower. However, in eliminative epistemology which occurs in the contingent world, the knower is assigned the role of a passive-waiting-knower. The idea of context-dependence of the knower has its roots in conversational thinking and its background logic, Ezumezu logic, emphasized by the principle of context-dependence of value (CdV). This principle states that “credible value judgements are the ones based on contexts” (Chimakonam 2019: 119). Jonathan O. Chimakonam’s Cogno-Normative Epistemology This is a theory of knowledge developed by Jonathan O. Chimakonam, another element of the Calabar school. He observes that there is a considerable gap between Western and African epistemic formations. For him, this gap is due to circumstances such as geography, environment, cultural diffusion and so forth. According to him, the necessity to combat environmental challenges and scarcity of natural resources were inspirational for the development of Western episteme (2015b: 68). These challenges made the creative and innovative thinking become the hallmark of their philosophy in general, and epistemology in particular. In contrast, precolonial Africa had a comfortable and conducive environment, blessed with lots of natural resources. For this, the people had no circumstantial reason to engage in the type of creative and innovative thinking that bring about new ideas for problem-solving. Chimakonam argues that if the Europeans had such an environment, they might not have been involved in creative and innovative thinking. Also, Chimakonam contends that another reason there was little development of the African episteme was that individual contributions to the African epistemological enterprise were not readily acknowledged. Pristine Africa had a communal ideology that celebrated the collective ego and downplayed the individual ego. Individuals who were creative and innovative were not celebrated. This is what Chimakonam calls “the phenomenon of oha-ama-dike or ‘the no hero phenomenon’” (2015b: 68). In this scenario, every individual epistemic endeavor or achievement is attributed to the community instead of the individual. This is depicted in the popular cliché “our people say

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syndrome.” The glory or credit to knowledge, in this light, goes to the community instead of the individual. The individual who is the originator of an idea or insightful thought is never known since the ideas and the thoughts always come out with the ‘our people say’ cliché, instead of this or that person says. The issue of intolerance and nonrecognition of heroes, according to Chimakonam, should be done away with if African epistemology must progress like Western epistemology. While Chimakonam sees nonrecognition of heroes as a communitarian ghost of the African past that must be done away with, he encouraged the celebration of individual strides, which involves creative and innovative thinking in African epistemic enterprises. In this case, African epistemologists would be encouraged to develop their individual thoughts, and others would be encouraged to criticize such thoughts in order to improve them and birth new ideas. Thus, Chimakonam questions the relevance of aspects of the African past. For him, just as not all aspects of modernity can be relevant in the construction of Africa’s new episteme, some portions of Africa’s past are also not relevant. He, however, indicated that what Bogumil Jewsiewicki (1989: 3–5) and Janheinz Jahn (1961: 165) call the ‘usable past’ and ‘valuable past’ respectively might still be relevant. The message which Chimakonam wants to convey is that African epistemology must not be community-driven; the individual has to be the focal point. Accordingly, Chimakonam states: My conviction rests on the assumptions that (1) individual African philosophers can freely produce original thoughts without inclinations to Africa’s past; that critical conversations among individuals can be developed (2) that the “community” which often lies at the background of the emerging African episteme is not and should not be the only framework. (Chimakonam 2015b: 72)

It is with this remark that he goes into making a case for, and elaboration of, the theory of cogno-normative epistemology. The major thrust of the cogno-normative epistemology is the division of knowledge into the cognitive and the normative. So, for Chimakonam (2015b: 73–79), knowledge is not only cognitive; it is also normative. Epistemology should not only ask about the nature of knowledge; it should also ask about its value. The cognitive component of knowledge seeks to reach certainty or greater understanding, while the normative component seeks to weigh the moral value of the cognitive component.

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We must be able to say, above all else, that we have good or bad knowledge, not just certain or uncertain knowledge. The preceding is the basis of the cogno-normative epistemology. Part of the project of cogno-normative epistemology is making a distinction between knowledge that ought to be pursued and knowledge that need not be pursued. Africa does not need knowledge with low moral value, or that can devalue human beings. Rather, Africa needs knowledge that enhances and promotes the flourishing of the human person. This is to say that, following cogno-normative epistemology, scientific knowledge that produces weapons of mass destruction must be abhorred and eschewed by Africans. Africans must pursue, welcome and embrace scientific knowledge that enhances human well-being. The knowledge that should be pursued is the one that addresses human existential challenges such as political (bad governance and leadership), economic (poverty, inequality) and social (hunger and starvation, racism, conflict, wars, backwardness). Thus, to the question what should it mean to know, for modern Africa?, cogno-normative epistemologists hold that one who knows, possesses scientific knowledge which does not dehumanize the human person or destroy the environment or reality as a whole. This knowledge is the type of knowledge that can develop Africa. It is not enough to state what it should mean ‘to know’ for modern Africa; it is germane to talk about how this knowledge should be pursued. According to Chimakonam, the knowledge that Africa needs is also a knowledge that is devoid of spiritism. It has to be acquired via the instrumentality of reason and the senses. As he explains, [c]ogno-normative epistemology seeks to prescribe both sensual and rational tools divorced from spiritism as veritable sources of knowledge for the modern African philosopher. The complementarity of the two, call it “ratio-­ empiricism” is also prescribed. Above all, the principle of value analysis is to provide checks and balances on what is to be pursued and on what must be avoided. It is, additionally to be regarded as the ultimate criterion for what is knowledge for the modern African. (Chimakonam 2015b: 79)

This makes cogno-normative epistemology an approach to knowledge that prioritizes human interest. One implication of this is that, for cogno-­ normative epistemologists, knowledge is for the service of human interest and nothing else. This entails that there is a connection between epistemology and humanity (Chimakonam 2015b: 79–80). By this,

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cogno-­normative epistemology is not only rationalistic and empiricist, it is also humanistic and humanocentric. In cogno-normative epistemology, there is no divorcing of cognitive (knowledge) from the normative (knowledge). Neither is there a separation between the empirical and the rational. Knowledge from this African perspective is a complementarity of both the cognitive and the normative as well as the empirical and the rational. This makes cogno-normative epistemology an epistemological theory that is complementary in nature. For this, it is called ‘complementary epistemology’ since it aligns with the principle of complementary relationship (nmekọ). This idea of complementary epistemology is discussed in detail in another chapter of this book. Sophie Oluwole’s Yoruba Conception of Knowledge Our focus in this section is on Sophie B. Oluwole’s groundbreaking book Socrates and Orunmila: Two Patron Saints of Classical Philosophy. In this work, she paid no attention to the question of whether there exists epistemology in Yoruba culture. She takes it for granted that the Yoruba and Africans, in general, have the idea of knowledge in their worldview. Her concern is with the nature of this knowledge. In a way, she equates it with truth and wisdom. All through her work, she employed knowledge, wisdom and truth interchangeably. She makes her epistemic claims as Orunmila’s mouthpiece, a Yoruba ancient philosopher, who is believed to have articulated some philosophical thoughts in the past. Her discussion on Yoruba conception of knowledge is done in comparison to the Western conception of knowledge. For Western philosophy, she presents Socrates as its Patron saint. According to her, in Yoruba cosmology, there are two types of knowledge: absolute knowledge and relative knowledge. For her, no human possesses absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge belongs to Olodumare, the Supreme Being in Yoruba cosmology. She also argues that this knowledge, wisdom or truth is unchanging. This is apparent in the passage which she credited to Orunmila: “Truth that is absolute and unchanging belongs to Olodumare” (Oluwole 2017: 143). Given that humans cannot have absolute knowledge, Oluwole then declares that humans have relative knowledge, which is also tentative, even though reliable. This knowledge, she contends, is obtained through the senses or sense experience. Substantiating this claim, she quips that, according to Orunmila, “knowledge derived from experience is always

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relative, tentative, reliable but never absolute- it varies from person to person, from time to time, and from place to place and hence cannot be eternal and unchanging” (2017: 143). The implication is that human knowledge is relative. She explains this as “wisdom this year is madness (folly) next time” (Oluwode 2017: 143). This means that sense knowledge is transitory, relative and changes with time. It is also contextual. For example, Oluwole explains that “the norm in one place is an abomination elsewhere” (2017: 143). In other words, what is seen as knowledge in a place might be seen as folly in another place. Sensual knowledge then is context-dependent. Oluwole summarizes the idea of relativity of knowledge in Yoruba cosmology thus: Wisdom is like a road that goes in different directions. Therefore, nobody can be its only and absolute custodian. For just as children are wise, so also are adults. This was the basic principle of organizing and managing the state of affairs in Yoruba Pristine society. (2017: 143)

Put in another way, “[t]ruth is multifaceted and uncountable” (Oluwole 2017: 143). This means that there are ‘many-many truths’ and not just one truth among humankind. The one absolute Truth is and belongs to Olodumare. With the idea of relativity of knowledge comes the idea that no one knows in totality. This is apparent in the expression “a person who knows this may not know that” (Oluwole 2017: 143). That is to say that humans only know in part; they cannot have complete or holistic knowledge. It is only Olodumare who knows all and is all-knowing. Oluwole also argues that Olodumare is the source of all human knowledge, which it makes known to humans through revelation. Although some human knowledge could be revealed by Olodumare, it is imperfect. It is only Olodumare’s knowledge that is perfect. Oluwole, more so, argues that within the human sphere, there is revealed and natural knowledge. While the revealed knowledge comes from Olodumare, natural knowledge is derived from experience and reason (reflection). This knowledge derived through experience and reason is inferior when placed side by side with that of Olodumare. Oluwole claims that “Orunmila explicitly states that the knowledge and wisdom human beings seek and can arrive at through the combination of reason and experience are inferior to those possessed by Olodumare which is beyond the reach of humans” (Oluwole 2017: 147). The implication is that there are certain categories of knowledge which humans cannot have

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because they belong only to Olodumare. Thus, human knowledge, even when it is revealed by Olodumare is limited in content and scope. The point that Oluwole makes is that the Yoruba and the Africans have their own epistemic category as well as their conception of knowledge, which are somehow related to the Western conception of knowledge. She anchors her argument on the logical distinction between Yoruba and Western conceptions of knowledge. She observes that while the Western conception of knowledge is built on the either/or logic in the exclusive sense (the logic of binary opposition), Yoruba (African) conception of knowledge is built on the either/or logic in the inclusive sense (otherwise known as the logic of binary complementarity). It is also germane to note that this logic and its resultant epistemology is a product of and reflects African ontology, which she terms ‘complementary dualism’ (Oluwole 2017: 181). This ontology holds that “reality has one basic axiom with two inseparable elements” (2017: 81). What Oluwole describes as the logic of binary complementarity is now better formulated into a proper system of logic called Ezumezu. In all, she cautions that although Yoruba-African epistemology is distinct from that of the West, it is not the same as the Negritude of Senghor. Hence, she argues that Yoruba-African epistemology and thought system are not solely emotional and based on feeling, as many have argued. For her, they are also critical, rational and scientific. Leyla Tavernaro-Haidarian’s Deliberative Epistemology This theory is articulated by Leyla Tavernaro-Haidarian. The aim is to develop an epistemological theory from the African place. It is an African culture–inspired epistemology. It is Africa-inspired because it draws from an African concept as well as two African culture–inspired philosophical theories. The African concept which underlies this epistemology is ubuntu, while the philosophical theories which are the frameworks upon which it is built are complementary reflection and conversational philosophy. Before we go on to elaborate how ubuntu inspired the epistemic approach, and how complementary reflection and conversational philosophy act as frameworks for deliberative epistemology, it is pertinent to consider some issues that warranted this epistemological proposal. Deliberative epistemology, it should be noted, has its root in the debate on what constitutes African epistemology. This finds expression in what can be referred to as some orientations and schools of thought in African

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epistemology. From the writing of Tavernaro-Haidarian, we discover that there are, for her, three orientations in African epistemology. These are ‘theological orientation,’ ‘Western orientation’ and ‘pure African orientation’ (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 231). The theological orientation is pursued by theologians and religionists, who hold that African epistemology is predicated on African ontology and that Africans had the idea of God before the advent of the colonial masters (Tempels 1959; Idowu 1962; Abraham 1966; Danquah 1968; Mbiti 1969). The Western orientation advocated by some philosophers and scholars gives the idea that African epistemology involves the use of Western epistemic concepts and categories to understudy, interpret and comprehend African realities (Horton 1967; Wiredu 1985; Roy 1986). Pure African orientation is held by some African philosophers and scholars, who opine that one can arrive at African epistemology when African realities are studied, analyzed and interpreted using African concepts and categories (Bedu-Addo 1985; Hallen and Sodipo 1997). These three orientations, for Tavernaro-Haidarian (2018: 231), can be regrouped into two schools of thought in African epistemology. The schools of thought include ‘particularist African epistemology’ (African epistemological particularism [AEP]) and ‘universalist African epistemology’ (African epistemological universalism [AEU]). The theological and African orientations fall under the AEP, which holds that the African knowing process is distinct from the Western knowing process. Likewise, the Western orientation comes under AEU, which holds that the human knowing process is universal and the same everywhere. Tavernaro-­ Haidarian goes on to note that there is a third school of thought in African epistemology, which can be found in the work of Udefi. The position is that “there are both elements of particularity and universality in epistemological conceptualization” (Udefi 2014: 113; Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 231). Here, we christen this school of thought in African epistemology ‘African epistemological eclecticism.’1 It is eclectic in that the theory sees knowledge as obtainable through the combinations of some elements of the African epistemological particularist’s and African epistemological universalist’s approaches to knowledge. Tavernaro-Haidarian is of the view that her deliberative epistemology falls under this school of thought. However, it should be noted (as we shall later show) that 1  This idea can be found in Andrew Friday Uduigwomen (2009) and Ikechukwu Anthony Kanu (2012, 2016), who promote eclecticism as a school of thought in African philosophy.

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Tavernaro-­Haidarian’s deliberative epistemology is not African epistemological eclecticism as she claims. Contrary to this, we shall argue that it is rather conversational and hence conversational epistemology. Given that Tavernaro-Haidarian’s deliberative epistemology belongs to the conversational tradition, it can be said that there is an orientation in African epistemology called the conversational approach. This orientation is African culture–inspired, but not restricted to Africa. Deliberative epistemology is African culture–inspired because it is rooted in an African concept known as ubuntu and African philosophical methodologies such as complementary reflection and conversational philosophy. In the course of elaborating on deliberative epistemology, it will be clearly stated why it is not African epistemological eclecticism but conversational epistemology. Deliberative epistemology, it should be noted, has as its goal the desire to go beyond the discursive tension in epistemology between rationalism (reason as a source of knowledge) and empiricism (experience or the senses as the source of knowledge), objectivism and subjectivism, vertical and horizontal approaches to knowledge and so on. These dichotomies and tensions are “‘normative adversaries’ in paradigm” (Karlberg 2004; Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 232). It is based on this idea of tension that Tavernaro-Haidarian talks about two types of epistemologies, namely, vertical and horizontal. Vertical epistemology follows the vertical approach to knowledge, which holds that knowledge can be achieved when the right method(s) is/are employed to study reality as well as truth. Here, knowledge is said to have a direct link or correspond to reality or truth. Also, horizontal epistemology holds that “all human knowledge is socially constructed within diverse interpretative frameworks, meaning that it has no direct connection with, or correspondence to, foundational reality or truth” (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 232). With certain points made regarding the background/foundation to deliberative epistemology, it is now germane to discuss this epistemology proper. Before we do this, it is pertinent to understand the ideas that foreground this epistemology. These ideas include ubuntu, conversational philosophy and complementary reflection. We shall begin with ubuntu. The message of ‘ubuntu’ is often expressed as “a person is a person through other persons” (Tutu 1999: 35; Dandala 2009: 360). The idea here is that nobody is a person in isolation or on her/his own. She/he needs to live in relation to others. That is, every individual becomes a person by relating with other persons, who are an indispensable part of her/ his becoming human. This is to say that, there is an ontological

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interconnectedness of persons to persons since they are inextricably bound to one another (Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005: 69). The preceding leads to an individual not speaking of the self in terms of the ‘I’ but in terms of the ‘we.’ This is because every individual belongs and “to belong is to participate” (Mkhize 2008: 40). The participation is in solidarity and symbiosis. In the participatory and symbiotic relationship, each individual shares a lot in common with others. Here, there is a give-and-take relationship among members of the community. There is a sharing of epistemic ideas among the epistemic agents within a knowledge-seeking community. What this entails is that knowledge is not a one-sided or lopsided enterprise. It is a multifaceted enterprise. In this ubuntu-inspired epistemology, knowledge is “experiential or [a] function of the experiences of a community” (Tutu 1999; Battle 2009; Seehawer 2018). Hence, knowledge is arrived at through communal discourse, wherein a knower asserts that I know because we know. Or, there is a collective epistemic resource. The norms, for example, serve as a knowledge repository guiding and regulating actions of individuals. Here, “knowledge is thought to not be ‘generated and validated by individuals or through conventional scientific processes, but through communal discourse’” (Seehawer 2018; Tavernaro-­ Haidarian 2018: 233). Deliberative epistemology is also influenced by complementary philosophy (Asouzu 2004) and conversational philosophy (Chimakonam 2015a, 2017). Regarding complementary reflection, one can see that her idea of epistemic inclusivity, complementarity and interdependence in the knowing process and among the epistemic agents reflects Innocent Asouzu’s principle of integration. This principle states that “anything that exists serves as missing links of reality” (Asouzu 2011: 44). However, with regard to the influence of conversational philosophy on deliberative epistemology, we can see critical and creative engagement between proponent and opponent, which leads to contestation and protestation on any epistemic standpoint or issue. Thus, the hallmark of conversationalism, which is the method of conversational thinking, is that it  shapes deliberative epistemology leading to the notion that “a contest of ideas and the harnessing of competitive energies is the best way to generate knowledge” (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 232). The influence of complementary reflection and conversational philosophy leads to epistemic openness and tolerance among epistemic agents as they converse on any issue. Here, they do not see themselves as rivals but as complementary agents in the knowledge project. Knowledge then is obtained through listening to others tell the story of their experiences. In the traditional society, it involves listening to an elder(s) tell the story of

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their experiences, while in today’s realm of African philosophy, one arrives at knowledge by listening to other African philosophers share their epistemic experiences. This makes deliberative epistemology “profoundly other-centred” (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 233). It also makes deliberative epistemology an inclusive, complementary as well as a discursive epistemology since everyone shares their ideas with others. The implication of this is that knowledge and truth are somehow relative. According to Tavernaro-Haidarian, “[d]ifferent knowledge or truths are thought to emerge from the same discourse because each person adds to it their contextual positions” (Seehawer 2018: 6; Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 234). This idea is substantiated further: It is distinctive yet not opposed to, but rather bound up with other ways of thinking and seeing. In this way its knowledge base enriches other knowledge bases while also learning from them. This open mindedness allows for “fusion of horizons” and a “pooling of knowledge drawn from all.” … Ubuntu epistemology recognises and works “with” rather than against other ways of knowing and creates space for self-disclosure and cross-­cultural validation. (Tavernaro-Haidarian 2018: 233)

Ubuntu is also associated with the notion of truth. Ubuntu-inspired epistemology is against the lopsided representation of truth. Here, an aspect of truth is affirmed by, and also affirms, other truths. Thus, truth is collective and not isolated truth or a contextual or contextualized truth that is absolutized as the truth. The idea of knowledge and truth being collective, discursive and deliberative reflects complementarity (nmekọ), which the method of conversational thinking projects.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have dedicated space and time to discuss some of the very salient epistemological concepts and theories in African philosophy. This chapter is indeed an eye-opener to anyone who is yet to understand that African epistemology has come of age and that it should be taken seriously by any researcher. This chronicling of African epistemological concepts and theories is aimed at giving readers a quick and digestive insight into African epistemology. The exercise carried out here is by no means exhaustive, but it provides a panoramic view of how discourses on epistemology have developed and evolved over the years since the birth of African philosophy.

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References Abanuka, B. 2011. A History of African Philosophy. Enugu: Snaap Press Ltd. Abraham, W.E. 1966. The Mind of Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Anyanwu, K.C. 1983. African Experience in American Market Place. New York: Exposition Press. ———. 1984. The African Worldview and Theory of Knowledge. In African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa, ed. E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu, 77–100. Rome: Catholic Book Agency. Asouzu, I.I. 2004. The Method and Principles of Complementary Reflection in and Beyond African Philosophy. Calabar: University of Calabar. ———. 2011. Ibuanyidanda and the Philosophy of Essence (Philosophy, the Science of Missing Links of Reality), 50th Inaugural Lecture. Calabar: University Calabar. Azenabor, G. 2010. Modern Theories in African Philosophy. Lagos: Byolah. Battle, M. 2009. Ubuntu: I In You and You in Me. New York: Seasbury Publishing. Bedu-Addo, J.T. 1985. On the Concept of Truth in Akan. In African Philosophy: Trends and Perspectives, ed. Peter Bodunrin, 68–90. Ile-Ife: The University Press of Ife. Chimakonam, J. O. 2015a. Conversational Philosophy as a New School of Thought in African Philosophy: A Conversation with Bruce Janz on the Concept of Philosophical Space. Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies. 9–40. Chimakonam, J.O. 2015b. The Knowledge Question in African Philosophy: A Case for Cogno-Normative Epistemology. In Atuolu Omotiu: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy, ed. J.O. Chimakonam, 671–682. Maryland: University Press of America. ———. 2017. What Is Conversational Philosophy? A Prescription of a New Doctrine and Method of Philosophy, in and Beyond African Philosophy. UNISA 18: 114–130. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Dandala, M. 2009. Cows Never Die: Embracing African Cosmology in the Process of Economic Growth. Repri. African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics, ed. M. Mirove, 359–277. Pietermaritzburg: KwaZulu Natal Press. Danquah, J.B. 1968. The Akan Doctrine of God. New York: Humanities Press. Egbai, U.O. 2018. Why African Philosophers Should Build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2. Egbai, U.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2019. Why Conversational Thinking Could Be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189.

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Hallen, B. 2004. Yoruba Moral Epistemology. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 296–303. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Hallen, B., and G. Sogolo. 1997. Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: An Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Horton, R. 1967. African Traditional Thought and Western Science. Africa 37 (2): 155–187. Hountondji, P. 1995. Producing Knowledge in Africa Today the Second Bashorun M. K. O. Abiola Distinguish Lecture. African Studies Association 38 (3): 1–10. ———. 2004. Knowledge as Development Issue. In A Companion to African Philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 529–537. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Limited. Ibrahim, A.A. 2011. Inquiry into the Defining Condition of Knowledge Claim: An Exercise from the Perspective of Integrative Epistemology. Filosofia Theoretica: An African Journal of Invention and Ideas 1 (1): 132–150. Idowu, B. 1962. Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief. London: Longmans. Ijiomah, C.O. 1996. Humanizing Epistemology. Owerri: A. P. ———. 2011. Humanistic Epistemology. Filosofia Theoretica An African Journal of Invention and Ideas 1 (1): 62–77. Ikhane, P.A. 2017. Epistemic Insight from an African Way of Knowing. In Themes, Issues and Problems of African Philosophy, ed. I.E. Ukpokolo, 136–144. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Iwe, N. N. S. 1996. “Foreword”. Humanizing Epistemology. Owerri: A. P. Jahn, J. 1961. Muntu: An Outline of Neo-African Culture. New York: Grove Press. Jewsiewicki, B. 1989. African Historical Studies: Academic Knowledge as ‘Usable Past’ and Radical Scholarship. The African Studies Review 32 (3): 1–76. Jimoh, A.K. 2017. An African Theory of Knowledge. In Themes, Issues and Problems of African Philosophy, ed. I.E. Ukpokolo, 121–135. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Kanu, I. A. 2012. The Africanity and Philosophicality of African Philosophy. Internet Afrrev: An International Online Multi-Disciplinary Journal 1 (2): 52–55. Kanu, I.A. 2016. Igwebuike as a Trend in African Philosophy. Igwebuike: An African Journal of Arts and Humanities 2 (1): 108–113. Karlber, M. 2004. Beyond a Culture of Context. Oxford: George Ronald. Mangena, F. n.d. Hunhu/Ubuntu in the Traditional Thought of Southern Africa. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/hunhu/. Accessed 16 Dec 2019. Mbiti, J.S. 1969. African Religion and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. Mkize, N. 2008. Ubuntu and Harmony: An African Approach to Morality and Ethics. In Person and Community: African Ethics in Global Culture, ed. R. Nicolson, 35–44. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwazulu Natal Press. Mnyaka, M., and M. Motlhabi. 2005. Ubuntu and Its Socio-Moral Significance. In African Ethics: An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics, ed. M.F. Muvore, 63–84. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwazulu Natal Press. Ogbonnaya, L.U. n.d. How Conversational Philosophy Profits from the Particularist and the Universalist Agenda. This Paper Was Presented as ‘African

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Philosophy as Dance Between Two Poles’ During the African Philosophy Conference Held at the University of Calabar, Calabar in Calabar in 2017. Oluwole, S.B. 2017. Socrates and Orunmila: Two Paton Saints of Classical Philosophy. 3rd ed. Lagos: Arks Publishers. Osuagwu, I.M. 1999. African Historical Reconsideration: A Methodological Option for African Studies, the North African Case of the Ancient History of Philosophy; Amamihe Lecture 1. Owerri: Amamihe. Ozumba, G. 2010. Philosophy and Method of Integrative Humanism. Calabar: Jochrisam. Ozumba, G.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2014. Njikoka Amaka: Further Discussion on the Philosophy of Integrative Humanism (A Contribution to African and Intercultural Philosophies). Calabar: 3rd Logic Option. Pollock, J.L. 1987. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. London: Century Hutchinson Ltd. Roy, P.K. 1986. African Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology). The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1 and 2): 1–10. Ruch, E.A., and K.C.  Anyanwu. 1984. African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa. Rome: Catholic Book Agency. Seehawer, M.K. 2018. Decolonizing Research in a Sub-Saharan African Context: Exploring Ubuntu as Foundation for Research Methodology, Ethics and Agenda. International Journal of Social Research Methodology 21 (3): 1–14. Senghor, L.S. 1961. Nationhood and the African Road to Socialism. Paris: Presence Africaine. ———. 1962. Negrohood: Psychology of the African Negro. Diogenes 37: 1–15. ———. 1971. The Foundations of Africanity or Negritude or Arabity. Paris: Presence Africaine. Tavernaro-Haidarian, L. 2018. Deliberative Epistemology: Towards an Ubuntu-­ Based Epistemology that Accounts for a Prior Knowledge and Objective Truth. South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (2): 229–242. Tempels, P. 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africane. Tutu, D. 1999. No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday. Udefi, A. 2014. Rationale for an African Epistemology: A Critical Examination of the Igbo Views on Knowledge, Belief, and Justification. Canadian Social Science 10 (3): 108–117. Uduigwomen, F.A. 1995/2009. Philosophy and the Place of African Philosophy. In From Footmarks to Landmarks on African Philosophy, ed. A.F. Uduigwomen, 2nd ed. Lagos: O. O. P. Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University. ———. 1985. The Concept of Truth in the Akan Language. In Philosophy in Africa, Tends and Perfectives, ed. P.O. Bodunrin, 43–54. Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press. ———. 1996. Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

CHAPTER 8

Toward an African Theory of Knowledge

Introduction The following pertinent questions readily come to mind as we talk about a decolonial approach to epistemology: Is epistemology a unified system without cultural nuances? Must the existence of African philosophy necessitate the existence of African epistemology? Is African epistemology really different in its background logic and methodology from other epistemologies? What is the logical and methodological distinction between African epistemology and, say, Western epistemology? Does the difference between African and Western epistemologies imply epistemological relativism? These and many more are the questions we shall attempt to address in this chapter. We will engage the thoughts of scholars in African philosophy and in particular African epistemology. In this conversation, we will mediate between those who hold a universalist position and question the idea of African epistemology and those who hold a relativist position and promote it. Using conversational thinking as our methodological framework, we critically and creatively engage with the idea of African epistemology. We will aim to deconstruct and reconstruct it in such a way that one will come to understand that African epistemology is African culture–inspired but not African culture–bound. We will seek to establish the originality of African epistemology by grounding it in Ezumezu logic, a three-valued © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_8

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system in which trivalence topples bivalence (see Chimakonam 2017a, 2018, 2019). We will also demonstrate its methodological difference by tapping into the ontological notion known as nmekọ, which characterizes a model decolonial method known as conversational thinking (see Chimakonam and Egbai 2016; Chimakonam 2017b; Egbai 2018; Egbai and Chimakonam 2019). Ezumezu and nmekọ, the latter of which drives home-grown methods such as conversational thinking and complementary reflection, are the African philosophical background elements that influence and shape African epistemology.

The Question of African Epistemology Although the existence of African philosophy is no longer an issue of debate, there are questions about its branches. If African philosophy exists, should there also exist its branches such as African metaphysics, African logic, African axiology (African aesthetics and African ethics) and African epistemology? On this issue, camps are divided. To some scholars, the existence of African philosophy does not necessitate the existence of its branches. For them, all the branches of philosophy are the branches of African philosophy, without the prefix ‘African.’ This is the universalists’ disposition to African philosophy. The philosophical universalists (PU) are of the view that there is no distinct field of study called African philosophy given that philosophy is philosophy anywhere and everywhere (Bodunrin 1984, 1991; Hountondji 1996, etc.). And even if African philosophy exists, it is a matter of nomenclature and not content. What they are saying is that what is done in African philosophy is nothing different from what is done in philosophy. So, the branches of philosophy are the branches of African philosophy. The epistemological offshoot of this school of thought in African philosophy is epistemological universalism’ (EU). The epistemological universalists’ (EUs’) argument is that even if African philosophy exists, there cannot be African epistemology, for epistemology is epistemology and not a cultural phenomenon. With the belief that epistemology is universal, the universalists appear to equate the Western theorizing on knowledge as universal epistemology. They view such theories as global without any cultural coloration. For this, they assert that the so-called African epistemology should be aligned with the universalized Western-­produced option. One of the EUs, Benjamin Oguah, avers that Western ideas of experience and reason should be accepted by African epistemologists as the sources of knowledge when inquiring about reality

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in the African place (1984). By this, there would be no need of seeking out other sources of knowledge or the African manner of theorizing about knowledge of reality in the African place. This school of thought in African epistemology is faced with three challenges. The first is that it misses the point concerning the difference between African and, say, Western epistemology. The difference is not about nature and content but about logic and method. By logic and method, we are talking about means of justification and different approaches to the same endeavor. In this light, African epistemology would then be understood simply as an epistemology from an African perspective. The second is that it makes African epistemology an aspect of Western epistemology. The third is that it makes African epistemology a copycat that mirrors  or transliterates Western epistemology. The latter suggestion, in turn, deprives African epistemology of originality. Hence, it cannot serve as an appropriate approach to African epistemology. Contrary to EU, there is epistemological particularism (EP). Epistemological particularists (EPs) (Tempels 1959; Senghor 1956, 1962, 1964; Anyanwu 1984; Innocent Onyewuenyi 1991; Jimoh 2017; Ikhane 2017), hold that there is African epistemology distinct from those of other philosophical traditions such as Western philosophy and Oriental philosophy. EP has its root in the school of thought in African philosophy known as philosophical particularism (PP). The argument of EPs is that just as there is a philosophical tradition known as African philosophy, there is also a branch of it known as African epistemology. What they are saying is that African epistemology is an epistemology that is culturally and socially conditioned, and then methodologically nuanced. This is why African epistemology is described as a form of social epistemology.1 It implies that African epistemology has environmental influences from the African place. The preceding argument entails that the way reality is studied in the African place may be different from how it is studied in other places. It is a question of method rather than topic or content. What they are saying is that although experience and reason are the crests upon which epistemology rides, their manifestation in different philosophical places might not be the same. African epistemology is an Africa-inspired theory of knowledge and nonknowledge. Its sources include but are not limited to African proverbs, 1  Social epistemology, according to Didier N. Kaphagawani and Jeanette G. Malherbe, is an epistemology “deliberately situated in a particular cultural context” (2003: 262). This can mean an epistemology or theory of knowledge that is culturally and socially contextualized and defined.

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fables, folktales, folk songs, myths (orality or oral literature), religion and other social institutions (Ogot 1968: 35; Nasseem 2003: 312). Besides the cultural sources, there is a modern society and an individual thinker. The primary emphasis is on the combination of different sources. Anything can inspire knowledge from one context to another. This is a relativist outlook2 to the epistemological enterprise. The relativist outlook is not in the sense of Senghor, who notes that African epistemology is absolutely distinct from Western epistemology as found in his popular dictum “emotion is Negro and reason is Greek” (Cited in Abanuka 2011: 84). Our argument in the preceding chapter is that both emotion and reason are integral parts of the African epistemic structure (we shall return to this later on). With this established, what then is African epistemology? To have a good grasp of African epistemology, it is necessary to understand what epistemology as a theory of knowledge is. Epistemology is that branch of philosophy concerned with the meaning, nature, method, scope, sources, theories and veracity of knowledge. Chris Ijiomah, following John Pollock (1987), explains that it is a theory of knowledge and non-­knowledge (1996:13, 14). Of course, epistemology is not only concerned with describing what is knowledge, and prescribing how to reach it; it is also concerned with what is not knowledge. So, epistemology draws the line between knowledge and non-knowledge. It is also pertinent to note that in African epistemology, one is not just concerned with knowledge but with  nonknowledge or even ignorance. Peter Ikhane makes this point apparent when he argues that in the African context, “knowledge is awareness of that which is known and can be known. It is also an awareness of that which cannot be known and [is] unknowable” (2017: 142). What we cannot know or what is unknowable is that which we are ignorant of. The reality of ignorance in African epistemology entails that human knowledge is limited and that humans cannot know the whole of reality or the truth about our world. This, for Ikhane, leads to “epistemological humility” (2017: 143) since no 2  The fact is that EP sees approaches to knowledge or studying reality as things that are relative to philosophical places. This is, however, not the type of relativism that makes knowledge culture-bound. Chimakonam (2019) distinguishes relativism from relativity. The latter for him allows for knowledge generated from a particular philosophical place to be universalizable (in terms of being applicable outside where it is generated). EP can be read in terms of relativity rather than relativism. It should be noted that relativism absolutizes and restricts knowledge in/to a particular place and this is not good for the epistemological enterprise, whereas relativity gives room for knowledge to be progressive and transcultural. On the basis of relativity, African epistemology is cultural in origin but transcultural in terms of application.

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matter what we know about the world, our “knowledge will always be dwarfed by what we do not, should not, and cannot ever know” (Vitek and Jackson 2008, cited in Ikhane 2017: 139). From the foregoing, African epistemology could be defined as a branch of African philosophy that concerns itself with a different approach or method to the study of the meaning, nature, scope, sources, theories, limitations and veracity of knowledge  and non-knowledge. The  preceding could lead to the view that African epistemology is an African contribution to epistemology or knowledge enterprise. Such a conception of knowledge, though universal in outlook, is restrictive. It is universal in that it can apply everywhere as the African contribution to the universal enterprise called epistemology. It is restrictive in that any epistemological work produced without the methodological nuances such as conversational thinking or complementary reflection cannot pass as African epistemology. Thus, it is through background logic and method that the originality of African epistemology can be established. African epistemology is an area of specialism in African philosophy that focuses on the method for studying knowledge that can be said to be African culture–inspired. In other words, it is the articulation and formulation of knowledge from/in an African philosophical place using home-­ grown methods. This understanding of African epistemology makes it both universal and particular. It is universal in that it does not restrict epistemology/knowledge to Africa/Africans and it is particular in that it is grounded in Africa-developed methods such that talk about African epistemology becomes talk about an African perspective to knowledge. Thus, African epistemology is an African culture–inspired theorizing on what is and what is not knowledge. The question now is what is this Africa inspiration?3 Different African philosophers/scholars have wrestled with this issue. But to Jonathan O. Chimakonam (2015b), it is a background logic that has the sort of expressive power for explaining certain types of inferences. We shall probe in this direction further in the course of this work.

The Nature of African Epistemology The ontology that informs African epistemology is “the philosophy of integration” (Anyanwu 1984: 309). This ontology is unitary and communal as it sees beings or realities as interconnected and interrelated. As a 3

 This has been well articulated by Chimakonam (2015a, b, 2019).

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result of this unitary ontology, “traditional epistemology does not approach the problem of knowledge by dividing its domain into the rational, empirical and mythical … (they) constitute a single mode of knowing” (Nasseem 2003: 308). This implies that human knowledge is not restricted to the physical world; it is also knowledge about/of the nonphysical world. It involves knowledge of divinities and God the Supreme being who is the source of all knowledge. This makes revelation an epistemic medium (Nasseem 2003: 311). The idea of revelation has led to the accusation that African epistemology is based on divine revelation owing to the fact that God is taken to be the source of knowledge. On this note, some argue that African epistemology lacks methodological and mathematical formula (Nasseem 2003: 209). That is to say that its approaches are supernatural. But this is not the case. Granted that many sources, some of which are religious, are accommodated in the African epistemic quest, it does not detract from its empirical and rational pedigree. It is not so much about the sources of knowledge as it is about the method deployed in tinkering with the materials generated from those sources. African epistemology deploys methods such as conversational thinking and complementary reflection which prescribe the systematic alignment of sensual and rational approaches. But raw materials of knowledge can be obtained from many a source, including those that appear to fall within the domain of the nonphysical. The idea of complementarity that drives discourses in African philosophy highlights not only the possibility but the importance of synergy, of pulling resources from different places. When we talk about sources of knowledge in African epistemology, the idea is that discrimination or segregation of all kinds should be eschewed. The goal of knowledge should not just be certainty or justification but includes comprehensiveness. Actors in African epistemology are not deluded that a comprehensive knowledge is possible, but they are not discouraged that an approximation is desirable. The preceding dispels the suspicion that traditional African epistemology is not rigorous, critical and reflective. The stroll into those sources that are not amenable to the senses constitutes a challenge to the tools of knowledge acquisition. If we can talk about the sensual and the rational, we can also talk about the supernatural. Perhaps this would be a problem if one is deploying methods favored by the analytic or continental philosophers grounded in deterministic and bivalent logical orientation. Things would be different when a

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method like conversational thinking grounded in a nondeterministic, complementary and trivalent system of logic is deployed. As will be seen later on, it is not all sources of knowledge in African philosophy that lie outside the realm of the empirical. There are those that are empirical and rational. In African epistemology, knowledge is holistic in that it integrates both the physical and the nonphysical dimensions. An issue that has to be addressed is how does the African epistemologist come to know? For Senghor, while Western epistemology is defined by analytic reason, African epistemology is shaped by emotion or intuitive reason. This is both sensual and rational. In intuitive reason, experience leads, and is foundational and fundamental, to knowledge. However, the type of experience which Senghor suggests is not just an external phenomenon; it is also a mental activity. This is to say that it is mental and sensual. The two objects of human experience then are sense and mental objects. In the opinion of P. K. Roy, “the real object (in the world [sense world]) is objective whereas a mental object or image is subjective” (1986: 2). This suggests that there is objective and subjective knowledge, where an objective knowledge is derived from the experience of a sensual object, while a subjective knowledge can be derived from direct intuition. Sense experience and reason or intuitive reason, for Senghor, make up the two main approaches to knowledge. This is assuming that approaches that lie outside the realm of senses and reason are not taken into consideration. In African epistemology, both approaches have to be deployed before a comprehensive view of knowledge can be reached. This can be represented as follows: I experience, therefore, I know – (incomplete knowledge) I reason, therefore, I know – (incomplete knowledge) I experience and reason, therefore, I know – (complete knowledge)

In this way, Mogobe Ramose writes that “African philosophy (epistemology) would not subscribe to the radical opposition between reason and emotion. … Understanding thought as a system means recognizing it as whole-ness, which include[s] not only the indivisibility but also the mutual dependence of the ‘rational’ and the ‘emotional’” (Ramose 2003: 276). Experience, for example, involves what is experienced (what is being experienced or the perceived) and the one experiencing it (the perceiver). What is experienced is the object of knowledge (the known) while the one experiencing it is the subject of knowledge (the knower). One cannot say

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that there is an experience and thereafter knowledge when the experience has not been acted upon by reason. If either of these components is absent, knowledge cannot be created. What this leads to is that there can be no knowledge without the object and the subject of knowledge. Hence, in African epistemology, there is knowledge only when there is an inseparable complementary unity between the object and the subject of knowledge. This relationship between the known and the knower is not static but dynamic, and it is regulated by nmekọ. Writing on this, Subairi’B Nasseem observes that in traditional African epistemology, the urge for continuous assessment and re-assessment of the known  – or that to be known – called for the participation of the subject. The subject was hardly in contradistinction to the object. In fact, there was no veil between the two. It is a feature of contemporary people rigidly to delineate the cognitive process in the subject as distinct from the object known. (Nasseem 2003: 310)

In this vein, a knower experiences the known first and then employs her/ his faculty of feeling, imagination, intuition, reasoning and thinking to feel, imagine, intuit, reason and think to arrive at knowledge. Thus, knowledge could be reached through feelings, imagination, intuition, reasoning and thinking (Nasseem 2003: 312). In African epistemology, there is no epistemological split between “rationalism and empiricism, subjectivism and objectivism” (Nasseem 2003: 310). Rather, these constituent epistemological concepts complement each other to make knowledge holistic. The discourse so far reminds us of the influence of a trivalent system of logic like the Ezumezu and the notion of nmekọ in African epistemology. The argument has been that the knowledge process in African epistemology is not a one-way mechanism; it is a complementarity of multifaceted indices. This is apparent in the argument that knowledge is reached through a plurality of means such as experience, feeling, imagination, intuition and reason (thinking). To weld these diverse sources together requires nmekọ. In Ezumezu logic, certain principles and laws define the way nmekọ operates to bring seemingly opposed variables into a functional unity. The laws of integrativism, complementarism as well as included-­ middle embedded in Ezumezu logic provide the framework for explaining the relationship among different epistemic variables.

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For different epistemic variables to work together or be brought together, in an effort to create knowledge, the strengths and weaknesses of each of these paths to knowledge have to be integrated and complemented. That such is desirable is not up for questioning. What is to be argued out is whether such a dynamic approach is possible given the law of noncontradiction embedded in bivalent logical systems. Nmekọ then insures methodologies like conversational thinking that have the capacity to negotiate opposing divides by presenting variables as subcontraries rather than contradictories. So, the seeming opposition between sense and reason, the knower and the known, the perceiver and the perceived, the one who experiences and the experienced, subjectivism and objectivism, revelation and speculation (revelatory and speculative knowledge), physical and nonphysical worlds (knowledge), and feeling (emotion) and reason can be dissolved through the mechanism of nmekọ.

Forms of Knowledge in African Epistemology With the point made in the previous section, it is germane to look at the forms of knowledge in African epistemology. These forms of knowledge have been discussed by scholars such as Joseph Ekarika and Rosemary Edet (1984), Andrew Uduigwomen (2009), Elijah John (2009) and Ejikemeuwa Ndubuisi (2014) to include perceptual knowledge, intuitive knowledge, common-sense knowledge, old age knowledge, inferential knowledge, mystical knowledge, oral knowledge, premonitive knowledge and holistic knowledge. All these are discussed as means of acquiring knowledge in the African place leading to African epistemology. Let us give a brief discussion of each of them: (i) Perceptual knowledge: This is an empirical form of knowledge gained through sense experience. It is knowledge which the knower cannot doubt because she/he experienced it firsthand and can attest to it. Since it is knowledge acquired through the senses, it is also called observational knowledge as well as experiential knowledge. Furthermore, it is personal or immediate knowledge. (ii) Intuitive knowledge: This is the kind of knowledge arrived at through instinct or feeling. It does not involve the use of rational processes. This knowledge by intuition occurs naturally. It is not

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prompted by anything outside intuition or feeling. This makes it an instinctive knowledge. (iii) Common-sense knowledge: This is not a knowledge acquired using human rational or empirical effort. It is a knowledge that everyone is born with. It is called innate knowledge. It is that knowledge which enables one to distinguish between what is morally right and wrong, and logically correct and incorrect. It also aids one to act at the right time and take the correct decision whenever one is faced with a sudden situation. This knowledge, in the traditional African setting, is regarded as superior to other forms of knowledge. (iv) Old age knowledge: Marcel Griaule (1965) in his conversation with Ogotommeli, and Odera Oruka (1991) in his sage philosophy popularized this type of knowledge in African philosophy. This is the form of knowledge that is attached to old age. On a general note, Africans believe that knowledge comes with age. It is believed that the older one becomes, the more experienced and knowledgeable one becomes. Also, the older one becomes, the wiser one becomes as one gets closer to the divine, the source of wisdom. It explains why in traditional Africa, the aged are regarded as sages—men and women of wisdom and deep knowledge. This is also known as hierarchical knowledge since it is knowledge based on one’s hierarchical position in the African community set-up. (v) Inferential knowledge: This is a form of knowledge reached from drawing a conclusion from an event that is repeated. For instance, because there is always night after day or there is always day after night, one can say one knows that day precedes night or that night precedes day. It is knowledge that enables Africans to predict the future based on the occurrence of past events. (vi) Mystical knowledge: This form of knowledge is also known as extrasensory knowledge or divination. It is a knowledge that is superior to common-sense knowledge since it is associated with the supernatural and extrasensory realm as its source. Although this knowledge is not acquired through sensory means, it can be used to manipulate things and events in the sensory and extrasensory realms of existence. It is the knowledge associated with diviners, mediums, native doctors, priests, rainmakers and so on. This kind of knowledge can be used to get information from the

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past, the dead and even to foretell or predict the future. As a form of knowledge, it could also be used to better the lots of humans or to bring harm and destruction. Hence possessors of this form of knowledge are highly revered or dreaded in traditional Africa. Two good examples are the afa and the ifa divination systems of the Igbo and Yoruba, respectively. (vii) Oral knowledge: This is a form of knowledge gotten through oral tradition—words of mouth passed down from generation to generation. It is a type of knowledge that  is embedded in African proverbs, folktales, legends, myths, songs, stories and so on. (viii) Premonitive knowledge: This is knowledge based on signs. These signs have either good or bad connotations or omen. It either implies good luck or harm  that is lying ahead of an individual. Such signs are of various forms: kicking one’s toe against a stone or sneezing repeatedly are good examples. (ix) Holistic knowledge: This is knowledge acquired when a knower is not detached from the known, and when different approaches are combined. Here, the knower assimilates everything about the known and is herself/himself absorbed into the known. Also, she/he employs all of her/his faculty, both empirical and rational means, to arrive at knowledge directed with nmekọ and the laws of integrativism and complementarism of a system like Ezumezu logic.

The Humanistic (Moral) Dimension of African Epistemology (Knowledge, Belief, Truth and Morality) In African epistemology, the interrelated epistemological concepts of belief, knowledge and truth are given special place. These have been discussed and elaborated by some African philosophers and scholars using some words embedded in indigenous African languages. Some of these words shall be highlighted here in Yoruba, Igbo and Akan languages. Within the Yoruba-African cultural milieu, scholars such as Barry Hallen and J. O. Sodipo (1986) and Hallen (1998a, b, 2005) have made prominent contributions. According to Hallen, knowledge is related to imo (knowledge), igbagbo (belief) and otito or ooto (truth). Within the Yoruba

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worldview, imo is arrived at through firsthand information, direct observation and sense experience, which are open to confirmation, verification or falsification by others. Hallen also makes it clear that although imo has to do with experience, it is not only sense experience but also rational cognitive experience in the mind (eriokon) which includes consciousness, comprehension, judgment and understanding. Both sensual and mental experiences are regarded as knowledge because they are true or are said to be the truth. Imo as true knowledge is both subjective and objective. It is subjective in that it is known by an individual, but objective inasmuch as it can be confirmed or verified by others, who can also have direct observation of it (this is what is meant by ‘to know’—mo). On the contrary, igbagbo is belief since it is derived from secondhand information. This cannot be knowledge owing to the fact that it is yet to be verified to be true or false. A belief can become knowledge only if it is confirmed or verified to be true (ooto) by one or others with good moral character and integrity (iwa), rather than one or others with questionable character. What we are saying is that not all knowledge is a product of direct observation (imo). Some knowledge may be derived from belief—secondhand information (igbagbo). The transformation of belief into knowledge is possible through person(s) of good moral character and integrity providing evidence or explanation (alaye). By this, knowledge is moral-evidence-­ based-proven belief. Amaechi Udefi (2014) explains the relationship between knowledge, belief and truth that is similar to the Yoruba conception of these epistemological concepts. The similar conception of their relationship shows that Africans have common conceptions of knowledge. According to Udefi, the Igbo word for knowledge is amamife or amamihe, while that of belief is nchekwube. For him, actual knowledge in the Igbo worldview is Amamife. This is because it is firsthand information which is verifiable using sense perception or direct observation. Sense perception is the evidence which becomes the basis for which amamife qualifies as knowledge. This can also be perceived or experienced by others who desire to know; hence amamihe is subjective and objective knowledge. Udefi also observes that nchekwube, which he translates as belief, is no knowledge for the Igbo. His reason is that it is based on secondhand information, which makes it unreliable. Accordingly, he avers, “[n]chekwube (belief) … is used by the Igbo to express those things which they accept on trust and confidence for which there is no reliability and certainty” (Udefi 2014: 114). This is to say that every secondhand information cannot be regarded as true since it is not reliable and therefore cannot qualify as knowledge. However, there are some exceptions to this. Udefi explains that secondhand information

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from personalities such as elders (ndichie), titled men (ndi ozo) and native doctors (ndi afa) are taken to be reliable, certain and true and can pass as knowledge as a result of their status in the society. Besides what seems like an incorrect translation of belief as nchekwube (which closely translates to hope, to have hope or hoping), rather than nkwenye (belief, to believe or believing), Udefi fails to observe that such unquestioned acceptance of the testimony of elders, titled men and native doctors lacks critical rigor and can be seen as a weakness rather than a strength for the traditional epistemology. No one dares to challenge an elder, titled man or the feared native doctor in cultures that deify and fear such people. Also, the above contradictory interpretations constitute a challenge in African epistemology which Kwasi Wiredu calls “epistemological authoritarianism” (1980: 4; see also Nasseem 2003: 307). The preceding has its root in African ontological placement of beings, otherwise called the hierarchy of beings in African cosmology. In such a hierarchy, God is at the apex, followed by the divinities, ancestors, elders, titled men, native doctors and others. Thus, the elders, titled men and native doctors are taken to be more knowledgeable and their knowledge and words as superior on any issue. They are believed to be more knowledgeable than the younger and other members of society because they are more experienced. This is no longer the case today as there are young people and those who are not titled or are not doctors who are more experienced and therefore more knowledgeable than the elders, titled men and doctors. In contemporary Africa, we have gone past the era of epistemological authoritarianism since elders, titled men and doctors are no longer regarded as custodians of knowledge on certain topics. Thus, their knowledge claims are no more seen as beyond reproach such that they must be accepted as true without question. This type of reverence is not accorded to secondhand information from others. For any secondhand information (belief) to become true and hence knowledge, it must be backed up with evidence from a reliable person who should have witnessed it also. It is this reliable person that the Igbo call onye eziokwu (a truthful person or morally sound person). This entails that an unreliable person (onye asi—a liar) cannot bear testimony to qualify any secondhand information as knowledge. What the above suggests is that there is a correlation between knowledge and truth in the Igbo African worldview. Consequently, a person of knowledge is one who is truthful and reliable and not a liar (Udefi 2014: 115). If from the foregoing discussion truth is central to transforming belief or secondhand information into knowledge, one is faced with the challenge of bringing out the ‘African philosophy of truth.’

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Some African philosophers such as Wiredu (1985) and T. J. Bedu-Addo (1985) have addressed the philosophical challenge above in a manner that compels attention. Wiredu is probably  the first African philosopher to have delved into an African philosophy of truth. He does so using the Akan language as a linguistic reference. According to him, the Akan word for truth is nokware, and its opposite is nkontompo, which directly connotes lie rather than falsehood or falsity. So, for Wiredu, what is not true is lie instead of false. Bedu-Addo does not agree with Wiredu that in Akan language nkontompo (lie) is the direct opposite of nokware (truth). His argument is that nkontompo (lie) is just a subset of propositions that could be said to be ‘not true.’ What Bedu-Addo is saying is that nkontompo (lie) is not the only word that can serve as the opposite of truth. Following Wiredu’s argument that truth is that which is so or the case, Bedu-Addo notes that the opposite of nokware (truth) is enye nokware (it is not true) and that can also translate as eye nkon tompo (it is a lie [a subset of enye nokware]). Bedu-Addo also exclaims that Wiredu’s argument that the moral connotation and communal agreement embedded in truth is an epistemological aberration in Akan language is unfounded. What is apparent about the notion of truth in Akan-African thought is that truth is that which corresponds to fact or reality. This implies that the African conception of truth is in line with the corresponding theory of truth. But for anything to be said to be true, it must have been communally declared to be the case and morally right. This could be the reason the Igbo call truth eziokwu—a proposition or what is morally right. Any proposition or act that is not morally right is immoral and cannot qualify as truth. The implication of this argument is that truth in African epistemology is more of a moral concept than just a cognitive concept. It can be argued that the idea of truth in African epistemology is one that is both perceived and practiced. Ramose states that “truth may be defined as the contemporaneous convergence of perception and action. Human beings are not made by the truth. They are the makers of Truth” (Ramose 2003: 277). He also notes that “[e]ven perception is not wholly neutral. In this sense, it is more appropriate for humans to live the truth rather than living in and by the truth. The former captures the basic tenet of African philosophy (epistemology)” (Ramose 2003: 277). What is implied here is that any truth that is not lived out cannot be the truth. This is why the Igbo call one who speaks and lives out the truth onye eziokwu (a truthful person). By this, a truthful person is one who translates her/his knowledge of truth to right action.

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These discussions entail that morality has a place in transforming belief into knowledge as well as defining truth. Hence, African epistemology has a connection with morality (African ethics) since “morality … (is) an inextricable component of knowledge” (Iwe 1996: iv). Chris Ijiomah’s conceptualization of knowledge from the Igbo-African worldview becomes relevant here. According to Ijiomah, knowledge consists of three elements ako (moral knowledge or wisdom), ama-mi-he (dispositional knowledge or intelligence) and uche (thinking or thought) and that their antithesis is aghugho (treachery). Ijiomah goes on to note that ama-mi-he, which is dispositional knowledge or intelligence, is found in uche or echiche. Uche is activated to produce ama-mi-he whenever an individual encounters a problem. If this intelligence is used morally in the sense of addressing or solving human existential problems, it results in ako (wisdom or moral knowledge). Explaining this, Ijiomah observes that [i]t is wisdom or moral dimension of knowledge because its function is to humanize and moralize man by using the product Uche to solve human problems. It is at this point of moralizing of human beings that a full circuit of knowledge is completed. At this stage what … (it) represents is what the Igbo call Ako-na-Uche otherwise known as knowledge. This becomes the application of the content of Uche to particular problems by Ako. Because mme-kpa-ahu (human problem) is not static. The whole knowledge is self-­ reconstructing. (Ijiomah 1996: 27)

The above implies that there are two dimensions of knowledge: positive and negative. Positive knowledge is ako (wisdom)—ama-mi-he (intelligence) employed in addressing human existential and social problems. Negative knowledge is aghugho (treachery)—ama-mi-he (intelligence) used for selfish purposes or to perpetrate evil. Hence, within the Igbo lifeworld, Aghugho is not knowledge since it is intelligence used immorally; rather, it is ako that is knowledge since it has positive implication as it humanizes the individual and society. Therefore, whoever claims to have knowledge but does not use it to better the lots of humans and the human society cannot be said to have knowledge. It is only when one puts one’s knowledge to use that such an individual is said to have knowledge. The previous paragraphs point to the fact that the idea of justification of knowledge in African epistemology is largely  a ‘homo-cultural theory,’ which involves human and environmental factors in the knowledge process (Jimoh 2017: 131). Such a theory of justification of knowledge implies that “(i) linguistic-conceptual schemes, (ii) human nature, (iii) socio-cultural

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values and interests, and customs and habits” (Jimoh 2017: 132) are employed in justifying what passes as knowledge. The climax of this justification of knowledge is that knowledge must be used for human and social good. Consequently, in African epistemology, dispositional knowledge is no knowledge until it is translated into practical knowledge by humanizing the individual and society. Ijiomah captures this thus: “every knowledge produces action and at the same time makes the owner of the action responsible for what he does” (1996: 26). The preceding makes everyone who has knowledge a moral agent since she/he treats knowledge as a tool to moralize and humanize herself/himself and the society as a whole. A major implication of such is that “knowledge is both egocentric and sociocentric” (Ijiomah 1996: 27) as it starts from the community, proceeds to the individual and then comes back to the community. This is apparent in the case that it is the desire of the individual philosopher or epistemologist to address human problems that result in epistemology. However, these products become knowledge if the knowledge arrived at is used to address the human societal challenges.

Conclusion The natural inclination that comes with the topic ‘African epistemology’ is the idea that such epistemology is one that lies in the African past. If this is the case, then contemporary African epistemology is either a theory of how Africans come to know (in their pristine society) or, it is a theory of how Africans come to know using the Western epistemological categories. Our view is neither of these positions. We have argued that African epistemology is a theory of knowledge and how one comes to know as inspired by the African place. Here, African epistemology is in touch with the way epistemology is done today but also have the contextual coloration, which is the ontology that is communitarianism and relational and the logic that grounds its propositions and methods is Ezumezu logic. It is this kind of epistemology that Leyla Tavernaro-Haidarian argues for using the concept of ubuntu, which depicts and promotes relationships among variables. In such epistemology, people reach knowledge by entering into a conversational relationship that involves critical and creative engagement.4 Tavernaro-Haidarian calls such a program “deliberative epistemology” (2018). 4   This thought that Tavernaro-Haidarian pushes forward is grounded in Jonathan O. Chimakonam’s method of conversational thinking (2015c, d, 2017a, b).

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Following the deliberative epistemology proposal, we can say that any criticism against African epistemology as community thought or theory of knowledge does not hold. If we are to concede to such criticism, then we would be condemning African epistemology as ethno-epistemology.5 The fact is, nowhere in Africa have people congregated to develop a theory of knowledge. It has always been individuals who put forward their ideas of knowledge but drawing inspiration from their African cultural background. By this, epistemology is not a community enterprise but an individual venture. If we accept the charge of ethno-epistemology, we might end up denying the relational dimension of deliberative epistemology, which is a brand of African epistemology that is relational and conversational. A careful and critical look at our arguments so far reveals that a progressive African epistemology is possible through critical and creative engagement as exemplified in the thoughts of Wiredu and Bedu-Addo on the Akan notion of truth. It is also apparent in the conversational technique that encourages interaction with other African philosophers and epistemologists.

References Abanuka, B. 2011. A History of African Philosophy. Enugu: Spiritan. Anyanwu, K.C. 1984. The African Worldview and Theory of Knowledge. In African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa, ed. E.A.  Ruch and K.C.  Anyanwu, 77–99. Rome: Catholic Book Agency. Bedu-Addo, J.T. 1985. On the Concept of Truth in Akan. In African Philosophy: Trends and Perspectives, ed. Peter Bodunrin, 68–90. Ile-Ife: The University Press of Ife. Bodunrin, P. 1984. The Question of African Philosophy. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. R.A. Wright, 1–24. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 1991. The Question of African Philosophy. In African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, ed. T. Serequeberhan, 63–86. New York: Paragon. Chimakonam, J.O. 2015a. Addressing Uduma’s Africanness of a Philosophy Question and Shifting the Paradigm from Metaphilosophy to Conversational Philosophy. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 4 (1): 33–50. ———. 2015b. The Criteria Question in Africa Philosophy: Escape from the Horns of Jingoism and Afrocentrism. In Atuolu Omotiu: Some Unanswered 5  Ethno-epistemology is a community-owned theory of knowledge or community thought on knowledge. This is an offshoot of ethnophilosophy.

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Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy, ed. J.O. Chimakonam, 101–124. Maryland: University Press of America. ———. 2015c. Conversational Philosophy as a New School of Thought in African Philosophy: A Conversation with Bruce Janz on the Concept of Philosophical Space. Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies. 9–40. ———. 2015d. Transforming the African Philosophical Place Through Conversations: An Inquiry into the Global Expansion of Thought (GET). South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (4): 462–479. ———. 2017a. The Question of African Logic: Beyond Apologia and Polemics. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy, ed. Adeshina Afolayan and Toyin Falola, 106–128. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2017b. Conversationalism as an Emerging Method of Thinking in and Beyond African Philosophy. Acta Academica 47 (2): 11–33. ———. 2018. The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm. In Philosophical Perceptions on Logic and Order, ed. Jeremy Horne, 96–121. Hershey: IGI Global. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer. Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Egbai, U.O. 2018. Why African Philosophers Should Build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2. Egbai, U.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2019. Why Conversational Thinking Could Be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189. Ekarika, J.B., and Rosemary N.  Edet. 1984. From Nature to Divine: An Introduction to the Study of Religions. Roma: Citta Nouva Della Pamom. Hallen, B. 1998a. Moral Epistemology When Propositions Comes Out of Mouths: Reply to Oke. International Philosophical Quarterly XXXVIII: 2. ———. 1998b. Yoruba Epistemology. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 9. ———. 2005. Yoruba Moral Epistemology. In A Companion to African of Philosophy, ed. K. Wiredu, 296–303. Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Hallen, B., and J.O.  Sodipo. 1986. Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft Analytic Experiments in African Philosophy. London: Ethnographica Ltd. Hountondji, P. 1996. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. Bloomington: Indiana University. Ijiomah, C.O. 1996. Humanizing Epistemology. Owerri: A. P. Publications. Ikhane, P.A. 2017. Epistemic Insight from an African Way of Knowing. In Themes, Issues and Problems of African Philosophy, ed. I.E. Ukpokolo, 136–144. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Iwe, N.S.S. 1996. Foreword to Chris O.  Ijiomah’s Humanizing Epistemology, iv–vi. Owerri: A. P. Publications. Jimoh, A.K. 2017. An African Theory of Knowledge. In Themes, Issues and Problems of African Philosophy, ed. I.E. Ukpokolo, 121–135. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. John, E.O. 2009. African Epistemology. In From Footmarks to Landmarks in African Philosophy, ed. A.F. Uduigwomen, 160–168. Lagos: O. O. P. Kaphagawani, D.N., and J.G. Malherbe. 2003. Epistemology and the Tradition in Africa – Introduction: African Epistemology. In The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux, 259–270. London: Routledge. Marcel, Griaule. 1965. Conversations with Ogotemmeli. London: Oxford University Press fir the International African Institute. Nasseem, Subairi’B. 2003. African Heritage and Contemporary Life. In The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H.  Coetzee and A.P.J.  Roux, 304–317. London: Routledge. Ndubuisi, E.J.O. 2014. The Nature and Function of Logic in African Epistemology. JOSR: Journal of Humanities and Social Science 19 (11): 32–36. Ogot, Grace. 1968. The African Writer. East Africa Journal. 5. Oguah, B. 1984. African and Western Philosophy: A Comparative Study. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. R.A.  Wright, 195–214. Lanham: University Press of America. Onyewuenyi, I. C. 1991. Is There an African Philosophy? In African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, ed. Tsenay Serequeberhan, 29–46. New York: Paragon. Oruka, H.O. 1991. Sage Philosophy: Indigenous African Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy. Nairobi: ACTS. Pollock, J.L. 1987. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. London: Century Hutchinson Ltd. Ramose, M. 2003. The Philosophy of Ubuntu and Ubuntu as a Philosophy. In The African Philosophy Reader, ed. P.H.  Coetzee and A.P.J.  Roux, 270–280. London: Routledge. Roy, P.K. 1986. African Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology). The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1 and 2): 1–10. Senghor, L.S. 1956. African-Negro Asthetics. Diogenes 16: 23–38. ———. 1962. Negrohood: Psychology of the African Negro. Diogenes 37: 1–15. ———. 1964. African Socialism. London: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers. Tavernaro-Haidarian, L. 2018. Deliberative Epistemology: Towards an Ubuntu-­ Based Epistemology that Accounts for a Prior Knowledge and Objective Truth. South African Journal of Philosophy. 37 (2): 229–242. Tempels, P. 1959. Bantu Philosophy. Paris: Presence Africane. Udefi, A. 2014. Rationale for an African Epistemology: A Critical Examination of the Igbo Views on Knowledge, Belief, and Justification. Canadian Social Science. 10 (3): 108–117.

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Uduigwomen, A.F. 2009. The Place of Oral Tradition in African Epistemology. In From Footmarks to Landmarks in African Philosophy, ed. A.F.  Uduigwomen, 169–176. Lagos: O. O. P. Vitek, B., and W.  Jackson. 2008. Taking Ignorance Seriously. In The Virtues of Ignorance, ed. B. Vitek and W. Jackson, 9. The University Press of Kentucky: Lexington. Wiredu, K. 1980. Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1985. The Concept in the Akan Language. In African Philosophy: Trends and Perspectives, ed. P. Bodunrin, 43–55. Ile-Ife: The University Press of Ife.

CHAPTER 9

The Theory of Cogno-Normative Epistemology: Formulation II

Introduction A lot has been said in the literature about the necessity or otherwise of African philosophy. Those are all distractions. But there is still a huge misunderstanding in some quarters about the purported Africanization of philosophy. There is a lot of fuss about the use of the predicate ‘African’ in philosophy. Some Western scholars and many Western-minded scholars in Africa find it opprobrious. But not one among those scholars has risen to condemn Bertrand Russell who titled his volume A History of Western Philosophy, or the many entries on the Encyclopedia Britannica under the rubric of Western philosophy, or the many other articles and books on Western philosophy, Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Eastern philosophy and so forth. Why is the case different for African philosophy? How come it is only when African philosophy is promoted as a tradition that the animadversionists remember that the predicate ‘African’ regionalizes or makes philosophy unique, exclusive and border-sensitive? There can be two answers to this question. The first is ignorance, and the second is intellectual hegemony. Even in philosophy, there are ignoramuses! Common folk in the world of philosophy have a faint idea of what philosophy really is. For such people, philosophy is philosophy everywhere, it is universal, and its logic is topic-neutral. This simplistic line is always sufficient for their proof. But who debates with them on those points? No one! This © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_9

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is because philosophy is actually philosophy everywhere, it is universal, and its logic is topic-neutral. So, who are they arguing with? The point of those who define philosophy as a discipline with different traditions is not to repudiate its universality or downgrade its rigor, but to highlight the different perspectives of the philosophical quest. Philosophers are those on an intellectual quest driven by reason to explore the contours of life and the universe. And they do this from different points of the compass. These are perspectives, often colored by local cultures and lifeworlds, to give curious and interesting nuances to each. Philosophical diversity is created from the many orientations of the quest. Those who cannot step back and have a broad view of these dynamics are often the folk caught in the web of needless, if not useless animadversions. We can politely say they are ignorant. We turn to intellectual hegemony—a strategy for stratifying minds according to regions, granting to those in the West all excellencies denied to those from other regions of the world. Unfortunately, there are still some folk in the West who in the twenty-first century cling to the old idea of the superiority and inferiority of humans, and the lies about the authorship of civilization as a whole. Regarding the first, they accept without question, the fallacious claim in modern Western literature that places the Europeans on top of human hierarchy. Regarding the second, they buy into the lies of Western historians who wanted to create the impression that human civilization began in Ancient Greece thereby downgrading earlier contributions and civilizations from Egypt, China, Mesopotamia, west Africa and so forth. Some scholars like George James (1954), Henry Olela (1984), Martin Benal (1987), Innocent Onyewuenyi (1993) and so forth have sufficiently demonstrated the debt of Greece to earlier civilizations. So, there is no need to flog the issue here again. But it is with the mindset of a falsified history that some Western scholars cling on to the feverish nostalgia of a superior and hegemonic West, to which the rest of the world must continue to bow in appreciation. When they carry this mindset to philosophy, they theorize about what is and what is not philosophy; who qualifies and who does not qualify as a philosopher; and so forth. Philosophy and, indeed, all gamuts of knowledge can only be defined through the prism of Western understanding. The Western perspective to knowledge then becomes the vision. In a way, a falsified history has become the history. An incorrect narrative has become the model. What has made this development dangerous is that few people in the West remember what truth or correct history looks like, and they are often the outsiders. Their corrigenda are easily normalized into an abstruse, uninformed empathy for the restness.

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However, the truth is, when we predicate philosophy or any of its branches with ‘African’ just as they do in the West or the East when they use the predicates ‘Western,’ ‘European,’ ‘Eastern,’ ‘Asian,’ ‘Indian,’ ‘Chinese,’ ‘Japanese’ and so forth, we are highlighting the perspective from that region of the world. Period! Any other thing is politics. Perhaps, what should be explained further is that ‘perspective’ in this context is about methodology and the logic that shapes it. The logic and method of the African system of thought have both been identified in the introduction of this book as what characterize and differentiate African metaphysics or epistemology from, say, their Western or Asian versions. In this book, we have undertaken to pursue a program of African metaphysics and epistemology through the prisms of a prototype method known as conversational thinking and a logical system called Ezumezu (see Chimakonam and Nweke 2018; Chimakonam and Egbai 2016; Egbai and Chimakonam 2019; Egbai 2018; Chimakonam 2017, 2018). In this chapter, we will discuss and expand my theory of cogno-normative epistemology, a prototype epistemological contribution from the African perspective. In the first instalment where one of the authors inaugurated this epistemological theory titled “The ‘Knowledge’ Question in African Philosophy: A Case for Cogno-Normative (Complementary) Epistemology” (Chimakonam 2015),1 he went out in search of the African episteme, discussed the influence of the environment in formulating an episteme, the benefits and power of knowledge, the value of scientific knowledge, why it is important to humanize epistemology and so forth. Here, we will discuss the nature of knowledge, including the type of power which knowledge has in the universe, the moral implications of knowledge and the substance or the ontology of knowledge proper. We will also discuss the components of epistemology, showing their various categories. In all of this, we will show that the structure of epistemology takes both the epistemic and the moral into account, and recognizes orientations and movements not strictly as rivals but as opposites that can meaningfully complement each other. 1  VCA Nweke (2016: 109–117) has provided a critical review of this essay which we are unable to engage with here in detail due to the trajectory of the present installment, but suffice it to say that in his critical conversation, Nweke asks whether the assumptions of the theory of cogno-normative (complementary) epistemology are valid, veracious and viable. He picked those assumptions one by one and subjected each to rigorous consideration following the canons of conversational philosophy. Besides other critical findings, Nweke’s conclusion was in the positive.

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On the Nature of Knowledge The Power of Knowledge Is knowledge a substance? At first glance, one would be tempted to wave away this question or trivialize it. But, if knowledge is something and not nothing; if it is something we can acquire, store and retrieve; if we can enrich it or improve on it; if we can share it and utilize it; then we cannot rule out the possibility of knowledge being extended. These lines of enquiry can fairly be placed within the domain of the ontology of knowledge. Currently, philosophers talk of knowledge of ontology but not so much about the ontology of knowledge. We know how much influence knowledge has on life, but we know very little about the structure of knowledge itself. Would it not be foolhardy to go on with life oblivious of the structure of the entity that controls it? It seems like getting to understand the nature of knowledge is the correct thing to do if we are ever going to control knowledge someday. At face value, it may look as if we control knowledge, but in reality we don’t! Take, for example, a team of scientists who set out to build a space rocket. Each of them possesses expertise in different areas. Working together, they succeed in building a rocket. They dispatch it unmanned to space and pilot it successfully from a station on earth until it completes its mission. Then, they drink champagne and toast to their success. When viewed from a naïve perspective, it would appear as if they were in control of an enormously complex knowledge system, but that would be delusional. A more accurate picture would be that with the aid of significant knowledge, they were able to control machines. But the knowledge that aids the scientists in controlling the machines actually controls the scientists. To be able to use knowledge to control any aspect of life or anything in the universe, one must first let knowledge control them. Just like the program that runs computers, knowledge runs humans. If you have no knowledge of rocket technology, how can you spend years attempting to build a rocket? Even if you want to go in search of the knowledge first, how can you begin such a journey if you had no interest or idea of what rocket science is about? So, every little knowledge controls us as much as the extensive knowledge would. The Sentineli, an isolated tribe in the Island of the Bay of Bengal in India, have continued to resist contact with the rest of the world. What they were fighting against was exposure to more knowledge. They seem to

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understand that with more knowledge come more troubles. We do not control knowledge; it controls us. There may be people who would think that surrendering to knowledge is worthwhile because there are a lot of things it can aid us to control. A demigod is a god after all, even if not the supreme one. For these people, it would be cowardice to refrain from knowledge as the Sentineli do, simply because we do not want it to have enormous control over us. It makes sense to hold this view, especially when we understand that the smallest knowledge controls humans as much as the biggest one. There is very little that is known about the Sentineli, but their stubborn resistance to the outside world which drives them to kill anyone that ventures into their Island is a shocking example of how much influence the little knowledge they have about us controls them. The evidence that the knowledge we possess controls us is everywhere. The High School kid in California who went to school with a semiautomatic gun and opened fire on his classmates was being controlled by the knowledge that guns can kill if operated in a specific way. If he did not have this knowledge, his classmates would not have been shot by him. Someone might ask what about the other 3000 kids in the school who probably have the knowledge of the gun and its use? Would it not be correct to say that they controlled that knowledge when they refrained from shooting their fellow students? The answer, unfortunately, is no! Refraining from using the knowledge one has does not amount to controlling that knowledge. How can one control something it refrains from? For every piece of knowledge, there is another version opposed to it. It is only a matter of which one controls you at a given time and context. The kid that shot some of his classmates also possessed the knowledge of preserving or respecting life. Like the rest of his classmates, he was for a long time controlled by the latter knowledge until one morning the former got the better of him. Choosing and Gliding We must understand that in life we are pawns at the cusp of knowledge. This may sound deterministic, leaving no room for choice, but let us face it, how much of choice do we really have? There is only one true choice, and that is suicide. This is the ultimate choice. When we are faced with the grim reality of life and realize that there is no escape from the terrifying whim of knowledge, we can, on our own, decide to end it all. But most people refrain from making the one true choice that is in their power because, as humans, we psychologically yearn to be controlled.

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Sadomasochism is a sexual manifestation of this condition. Sadomasochistic men yield to their women to tie them up, torture, humiliate and control them, not because such women are physically so powerful as to overpower them, but because it satisfies their psychological well-being to pretend to be overpowered by women. When the pull by the knowledge of the pleasures of sadomasochism or psychopathy or sociopathy is strong, and the person does not want to make the ultimate choice, there is another type of choice which, for lack of a better description, we would call ‘gliding.’ Think of a kite in the sky. It is not flapping its wings and flying. But it has its wings spread out and is gliding. On the one hand, it is using the wind or the rising warm air called thermals to control its flight, and on the other, the thermals are controlling its flight. Perhaps, the appropriate description would be to say that both the kite and the thermals meet each other halfway. The thermals might be moving the kite, but the kite is allowing the thermals to move it. This is a form of choice that can be called gliding. In life, humans have the ultimate choice and the gliding, and because of these choices, there is responsibility. It is easy for someone to say that the ultimate choice is too difficult and cannot be canonized, but the Japanese Yakuza constantly and seamlessly practice it. Anyone who violates the rule is expected to take responsibility, which might be in the form of suicide, bodily mutilation or self-mortification. The Samurai warriors in the East practiced suicide to avoid dishonor. Suicide by disembowelment is also practiced to preserve one’s honor among the Yakuza. Even among the Inuit, senicide was an honorable practice to save the young from starvation. So, suicide as a viable moral choice might not be as unthinkable as it sounds. Albert Camus writes that “[t]here is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide” (1975: 11). We think differently. There is clearly one moral choice which an individual has an exclusive power to make, and that is suicide. Suicide is the ultimate choice. Every other moral choice which an individual lacks the exclusive power to make arises as a result of their failure to make the ultimate choice. Deciding to end one’s life whether to prevent one from doing a heinous evil or to terminate a life that has become a burden or simply to have the fulfillment of deciding how and when one dies, is the only truly free choice. The knowledge of how to end one’s life is innate. Such knowledge is not acquired, that is why self-preservation is also innate. Suicide is thus that one moral choice which an individual can make exclusively.

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The Substance of Knowledge If, therefore, every other choice is influenced (to different extents) by acquired knowledge, knowledge then must be something of great power in the universe. At least, we know it is something and not nothing. But what kind of thing is it? It is one thing to study what knowledge means, how we acquire and justify it, and whether certain knowledge is possible; but it is something entirely different to inquire about the substance knowledge is made of. If we rule out the so-called spiritual substances, we would be left with ideas and material substances. Philosophers conceive idea as thought. It has neither mass nor weight, but it represents a section of things called knowledge. But there are other sections of knowledge which appear to be extended things. Could those sections of knowledge then be material? Physicists define matter elementarily as anything that has weight and occupies space. Does knowledge fit into this equation? Philosophically, it is difficult to say. We do not deal with pieces of equipment that can measure the mass and weight of knowledge in, say, Menkiti’s theory of personhood. However, advances in technology may have a way. Venturing outside the realm of philosophy, we stumble onto the developments in computing. The discovery of data and various data storage and reading devices can supply a new insight into the ontology of knowledge. Is data knowledge? Data are usually seen as a collection of facts and statistics. Data may not represent everything that is knowledge, but they represent a section of knowledge—those aspects of knowledge studied and utilized in the quantitative disciplines. We can now come to terms with the fact that knowledge has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. While the former has mass and weight, the latter does not. But both are interconnected and interdependent insofar as they are needed and utilized in different spheres. Knowledge then may be defined as a complementary network of qualitative and quantitative information that orders and determines the movement of the universe. The game hunter did not just walk into the bush and shoot an antelope unconsciously. It was knowledge, both qualitative (idea) and quantitative (data), that guided the hunter to the bush, and also guided the antelope to the spot of its death. It may be disputed that data have mass and weight. But interestingly, when a flash drive is plugged into a computer, the monitor displays the quantity of data and free space in the drive. There is usually a green or red

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bar that measures the mass of the data in the devise, just as the weight of the data content is measured in bytes. Now, these are what the monitor displays, but how real are they? Do data have mass and weight? In the 1950s, the maiden Hard Disk Drive (HDD), IBM 305 RAMAC, was developed. It had disc space of 3.75 megabytes, was 5 ft high by 6 ft wide and weighed over one ton. This monster HDD would have made sense of the suggestion that data have mass, but that idea appears squashed when we take a look at a PNY 256 gigabyte flash drive lying on our table. A friend in North America had sent it to us filled to the brim. Yet, when we pick it up, it weighs less than a nextorch laser pointer of almost the same physical size lying next to it. There is nothing that indicates to us that the drive weighs more than what is expected of it, given its physical size. This observation surely makes nonsense not of the possibility of data having weight, but of having mass as well. How can 256 gigabyte of data be stored in such a small object where only 70 years ago a drive of that physical size, smaller and shorter than the thumb, would contain 255.996.25 gigabytes less. It appears that newer technologies have found a way to compress data mass and weight. How do you even make sense of that? One would say technological sophistication made that possible. But even such a tech advancement ordinarily should only be able to give us better and faster devices, not smaller data mass or weight. So, from this discrepancy, one could conclude that data have neither mass nor weight in physical terms. Yet, the information in the computing technology proves otherwise. David Nield writing for the Science Alert Magazine explains that data actually have weight, even if not as heavy as their measurement sounds. As he put is, [a]ccording to Weber’s Law, humans can tell if two objects weigh different amounts if the discrepancy is more than 5 per cent. With the most recent iPhone 6s weighing in at 143 grams, that means we need something in the region of 7 grams of data for it to be noticeable. … When all the calculations are worked out, the final figure is 5.7 quintillion terabytes of data would equal 7 grams. If that doesn’t mean much to you, it’s about four quadrillion times the estimated size of the human memory (1.25 terabytes), or enough data to fill roughly 40 quadrillion large (128 GB) iPhone 6s handsets.2 2  See “How much Data does it take to make your IPhone Heavier?” Science Alert. April 2, 2016. https://www.sciencealert.com/how-much-data-does-it-take-to-make-your-iphoneheavier Retrieved, November 18, 2019.

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From this information, we learn how much data an iphone6 would have to contain before you would notice a change in its weight. That amount of data is many times higher than the content of the internet, which is a paltry 5 trillion terabytes. As discouraging as this might be, it is actually a victory for the philosophers. Knowledge can and does have weight in physical terms, no matter how small. If it has any weight at all, then it does have mass in physical terms, again, no matter how small. As was the case some 70 years ago when we did not have the technology to store large amounts of data, we find ourselves in the same situation today where the technology for easy and efficient measurement of the mass and weight of data is still in its infancy. Scientists may not have thought it of importance or of any value to develop such a scale some years ago. But that may soon change. In this section, we have shown the powerful influence of knowledge in the universe and the possibility of it being extended. As philosophers, we now have a reason to investigate the ontology of knowledge; if that would aid us not only in understanding knowledge better but in mitigating the range of control it has over humans, we would then have scored a little victory over such a powerful phenomenon.

The Components of Epistemology In traditional Western philosophy, epistemology focuses on the study of nature of knowledge, by which they inquire about what it means to know, sources and kinds of knowledge; and the extent of knowledge, by which they enquire about justification and certainty of our knowledge claims and so forth. In African philosophy, we go an extra mile, first backward, to investigate the components of epistemology and the ontology of knowledge; and then forward, to investigate the interrelatedness of knowledge, moral and logical dimensions and so forth. The Chinese philosophical tradition shares aspects in common with the African tradition. For example, there are aspects of relationality and the moral dimension of knowledge. Both are also traditions directed by logical systems that accommodate truth-glut, which also means that the methodologies for deriving these are similar. But this type of comparative studies is not the aim of the present work. What are the components of epistemology? They are two, namely: knowledge and ignorance. Often, we tend to dismiss ignorance as something that is not part of epistemic category. But this is not the case. For example, the relational property of being and knowledge that we espouse in this book indicates that we could talk about knowledge if there was nothing like ignorance. Also, ignorance is a phenomenon with moral and logical

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imports, both of which factor into our idea of knowing. Some philosophers in the West like Thomas Aquinas (2001), James Ferrier (2001), Jenny Keefe (2007), Nicholas Rescher (2009) and so forth have investigated the topic of ignorance, albeit not as a component of epistemology as we are doing in this work. There are also some researchers in Russia whom we believe are doing the same but from the perspective of Aquinas who drew a distinction between ignorance, nescience and error. Sometime in 2016 and 2017, one of us received two separate emails from these scholars whose focus was on nescience (see Philimonova and Mender 2016, 2017). The study of ignorance dates further back to ancient times. In the golden era of Greek philosophy, Socrates was famously quoted by Plato to have said “All I know is that I know nothing.” Farther still in Mesopotamia, Hammurabi, a king of Babylon once promulgated a set of laws in which ignorance which led to error was severely punished. The execution of Socrates by the Tyrants can be described figuratively as a crime against knowledge by ignorance. Socrates himself taught that no one does evil knowingly. The implication of the preceding assertion is that ignorance is the phenomenon that causes evil. There again, we must recognize that from Socrates’ perspective, ignorance plays a powerful role in the process of knowledge acquisition. We cannot ignore all this influence which ignorance appears to wield and focus squarely on knowledge as some epistemologists tend to do. To do good, one needs knowledge and to do evil, all that one needs is to be ignorant à la Socrates or, alternatively, to possess bad knowledge. In terms of good and bad, we are evaluating the morality of knowledge. Chris Ijiomah (2011) has described the infusion of morality in knowledge in his humanizing epistemology project. According to him, for knowledge to be worth its name, it has to have a human face, that is, it has to be functional, usable and morally assessable. In African philosophy, Ijiomah (2011) insisted that epistemology is concerned with not just knowledge but non-­knowledge. Epistemology, for him, asks not only about how we know but also about not knowing. There are some philosophers in the West who have shared this position as well. John Pollock (1987) is one of them. Epistemology, for Pollock, should have a broader outlook that accommodates both knowing and not knowing. Not knowing can be interpreted as ignorance. It is in this connection that we describe knowledge and ignorance as two components of epistemology. Under knowledge, we will discuss two categories and four classifications: cognitive and normative, and empirical and rational. For ignorance, we will also discuss four classifications broken down into two categories: moral and immoral; logical and illogical.

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Knowledge Knowledge is both cognitive and normative. It is also both empirical and rational. Some of these ingredients can be found in traditional epistemology but not in the present organization. The cognitive aspect of knowledge is well presented in different forms in Western thought. There is, however, a dearth of normative conception of knowledge in Western thought. The normative is usually the domain of ethics. But in African thought, questions such as how do we know, what can we know, to what extent can we know, how do we know that we know and so forth are intertwined with questions about the good and bad application of the knowledge we have. The knowledge that is applied in a good way is good, while the one that is applied in a bad way is evil. And like Socrates states, we agree that it is ignorance that leads to the bad application of knowledge. No one who knows that the outcome of a knowledge application would be evil goes ahead to apply it in that fashion. Such a person must have envisioned the outcome to be beneficial and the process justifiable in some way. If they thought an evil application of knowledge was beneficial in any way at all, it was because they were unable to understand the full ramifications of the course of action they had chosen. Ignorance is the only thing that can prevent someone from seeing the implications of their decisions. So, they have a narrow vision. And it is this narrow vision that directs their cognition as they process the epistemic variables available to them. A woman, for example, murders her husband so that she can claim a huge life insurance payout. If her motivation is to fund the university education of their two children, get a better apartment and afford a decent living for her and their children, then she is looking at the benefits which the outcome of her action would bring. Her vision is clouded by these benefits that she loses sight of the evil of her planned action. It is difficult to establish that she realizes the full ramifications of her planned action. For example, the presence of her husband in their children’s life outweighs the financial upgrade she envisions. If she realizes the preceding, she will not plot to murder her husband. The plot to murder her husband seems a good course of action to her. Ignorance of other ramifications of such an action leads her to commit murder. Murder, at such a point, becomes a necessary commitment to realizing the noble goals of sponsoring the university education of her two kids, moving into a better apartment and improving the overall financial condition of the family. The perception of these outcomes as benefits to the family beclouds the judgment of the

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woman and prevents her from seeing the bigger picture. Insofar as she cannot see the bigger picture, she is acting out of ignorance. To kill her husband in these circumstances, though murder, is indistinguishable from killing an aggressor in self-defense. In her cognition, her husband is an aggressor whose continuous living stands in the way of building a safe and secured future for their kids. She is not a murderer; she is a responsible parent who is honoring her duty and obligation to her kids. Unlike her irresponsible husband, who has failed to provide for the family and secure the future of their kids, she is not going to fail. Killing her husband, who by the way is useless as a parent, is a moral choice to make. Tough, but morally right nonetheless! The normative conception of knowledge stipulates that we must hold our epistemic visions to account. We must put them through moral scrutiny. The how and the extent of knowledge are not enough; the quality of the action that expresses or demonstrates the knowledge must be assessed as well. Granted that it may be difficult to say that knowledge in itself, or as a phenomenon, can be good or bad, or morally evaluated. When we talk about the quality of knowledge in African philosophy, we are talking about actions that express knowledge. It is not so easy to say that a certain knowledge is good or bad if it has not been expressed through action. It seems that knowledge as a phenomenon is value-neutral. For example, if a known serial killer who specializes in infanticide takes a bunch of school kids hostage, and a police sniper is able to get a shot from a distance, one would celebrate the killing of the serial killer as a good action. Yet, the same cannot be said of a police sniper who takes a shot at a man who is in a fight with his wife. Husbands and wives fight all the time; it is normal. You cannot justify killing a man because he fought or is in a fight with his wife and vice versa. What is at issue here is the inseparability of knowledge and action. There is a relationship. There is always one, even though the variables may seem opposed, like knowledge and action. In cogno-normative epistemology, actions are viewed as expressions of knowledge. So, evaluating an action amounts to evaluating the piece of knowledge that generates it. The knowledge of how to carry out murder cannot be separated from the actual murder. Without knowledge, there cannot be action, where action is construed as a calculated expression of knowledge. Knowledge is impotent without action. The proof of knowledge is action. Our actions are norm-governed. But these norms vary from place to place. Adultery, under certain conditions of hospitality, might be justifiable among the people of X, but it is not among the Igbo. So, context is central to the

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moral evaluation of knowledge in cogno-normative epistemology. This idea of context is best expressed with the principle of nmekọ undergirded by a truth-glut type of logic such as Ezumezu. We come now to rationalism and empiricism. The former stipulates that a meaningful knowledge of any kind necessarily has to proceed from rational approaches. It has to be derived through reason or a priori means. For the latter, the senses purvey the means through which we can reach dependable knowledge. There are some senses in which these two doctrines are tenable. The challenge, however, is that each discounts the other. While rationalism regards empirical means as unreliable, empiricism treats rationalism as capable of misleading the inquirer. How often are we deceived by the senses? Rene Descartes set out in search of knowledge that cannot be disputed or falsified. After a thorough and exhaustive search, he reached the cogito through his methodic doubt yielded by reason. Everything borne of the senses is deceptive and can be doubted, but we cannot doubt that we are thinking, he says. The empiricists who emerged from the Anglo-American world challenge the claim that empirical realities are ephemeral and illusory. In their ranks are actors like the logical positivists and David Hume who took their cause to its logical limit. Perception for them is central to knowledge acquisition. Whatever exists can be perceived, and this is not only practical, it is substantive. Here, we are not speculating about realities we can neither see nor touch; we are dealing with objects of our senses. Nothing can be as real or more real than the udara (a special tropical apple) in my garden. George Berkeley would argue that the udara exists insofar as there is someone perceiving it. To doubt the objects of our senses is to doubt our existence. And that alone is proof that the object exists. The aim of the present discussion is not to legislate on which position is tenable and which is not. For the conversationalists of the African philosophical tradition, both rationalism and empiricism are tenable, subject to context. What is important, and what has been lacking is a program that allows for the complementarity of the two doctrines. In cogno-normative epistemology, we theorize the complementarity of the two doctrines rather than their individual superiority. Ignorance In the epistemological theory we are formulating, ignorance is its second component. This component has four categories: moral and immoral, and logical and illogical.

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Moral Ignorance  This is when an agent knows that they do not know what they should know. For example, HIV/AIDS and cancer are ravaging Africa and the world. Scientists know that they do not have the cures for these diseases. So they eat the humble pie and declare their inability to develop cures so far. This is a moral type of ignorance. An agent knows that they do not know what they should know, and they are truthful to declare it. Epistemic agents are not saying that such and such are beyond us; or that we are incapable of knowing this and that. We can find cures to HIV/ AIDS and cancer; it is not beyond our epistemic limit. We have the intellectual capacity to figure these diseases out. We just have not been able to do that yet. Perhaps we have not pressed hard enough. So we are ignorant because we have not done all that is within our power to find the cures. We are, therefore, culpable for not utilizing the full range of our epistemic capacities. What is the benefit of having the capacity to do something good and then failing to do so? If we have the intellectual capacity to reach the type of knowledge that can save millions of people from suffering and death, we should go for it. We are morally bound to reach such knowledge and save all those people. If we fail to do this, it should make us morally culpable—bad people! One of the essences of the capacity for knowledge is to utilize it. The essence of knowledge itself is to put it to use. If an agent possesses a piece of knowledge which they do not put to use, they do not really possess such knowledge. Knowledge is not a phenomenon to be bottled up. So ignorance does not only involve a lack of knowledge; it also involves knowledge that is not put to use. But ignorance becomes a moral issue when what one knows is that they do not know what they should know. This is different from the Socratic dictum usually couched in the famous statement attributed to Socrates: “All I know is that I know nothing.” At one end, this statement appears to aim at highlighting the broad geography of knowledge out of which we have conquered just a small space. It is urging us to look at what lies ahead, the uncharted territories that represent our sea of ignorance. At another end, it appears to draw our attention to the fatal reality that no matter how much we try, what we do not know would continue to be greater than what we know. Our ignorance would always outweigh our knowledge, and there is very little we can do about that. However you look at it, there is a yielding of a sort. The first interpretation exudes a yielding to the reality of an overwhelming landscape of ignorance. We can continue our striving to shrink it, but its extension is almost

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infinite. The second interpretation points to a presentment of forlornness. We are simply limited. Our intellectual capacity is just not good enough to aid us in conquering the sprawling landscape of our ignorance. This is a fate we must accept as we strive to increase our knowledge. We can never go beyond our limit and, as a result, what we do not know will always outweigh what we know. On the contrary, moral ignorance is not focused on the limit or otherwise of our intellectual capacity. It is simply condemning us for failing to know what we should know. No matter how vast the territory of our ignorance is, it is our duty to shrink it insofar as we have the capacity to do so. Our failure to shrink it is not due to our lack of capacity but our lack of diligence. Moral ignorance takes it for granted that we have the intellectual capacity to reach any knowledge we set our eyes on. If we fail to reach a certain knowledge, it is because we have not pressed hard enough and we must admit it. Moral ignorance has benefits, one of which is that it challenges us to pursue knowledge. Ad destinatum persequor, the University of Pretoria motto describes it better. It means ‘I goal hunt’ or I hunt for/pursue a goal. In the knowledge enterprise, we are hunters after knowledge. We have the tools required, and our challenge is to secure the game. If the game eludes us, we must press harder and continue to do so until we have it. Immoral Ignorance This type of ignorance called immoral ignorance occurs when an agent chooses not to know what they should know. Perhaps, due to indolence, or an aversion towards helping/serving humanity, or, selfish economic or political interest. Let us take research into HIV/AIDS cure as an example once again. We can speculate that with the technological and research advancements recorded, the West has the capacity to find the cure for this disease if they press hard enough. The questions are do they have this technological capacity, and are they pressing hard enough? If they do have the research and technological capacity but are not pressing hard enough, why is that? These diseases ravage the continent of Africa, millions are infected with the HIV virus and the challenges faced by victims are enormous. Is such a plight not enough to compel action? Is the HIV/AIDS a case of immoral ignorance where the West chooses not to know what they should know? This is a controversy that has been going on with a lot of conspiracy theories. There are conspiracy theories which suggest that the West intentionally does not want to

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increase research on finding the cure for HIV/AIDS because the disease is predominant in Africa, and not too many Westerners are affected. Others suggest there are economic and political motivations for allowing the disease to decimate the human population in Africa. All these are conspiracy theories which ordinarily should be waved aside, but if we have the capacity and the tools to find a cure for HIV/AIDS disease, why have we failed so far? Or, why is research proceeding at snail’s pace? These are some of the questions that beg for answers. Immoral ignorance does not have any apparent benefits, at least to humans. If one indulges in immoral ignorance for economic and political gains, it may satisfy skewed selfish interest but will leave high cost on humanity as a whole. Immoral ignorance is, therefore, condemnable. Logical Ignorance This type of ignorance occurs when what is to be known is beyond the capacity of the agent. Nicholas Rescher (2009: preface, iv–v) in his book Ignorance states that “ignorance exists because man is a being of limited intelligence and power. We, humans, are finite beings – small potatoes in nature’s grand scheme of things. And as beings of limited capacity, we cannot manage to wrap our minds adequately around the world’s vast manifold complex and complexly interrelated realities.” Here, the idea is that no matter how hard an agent presses, they can never reach a specific knowledge due to lack of the intellectual capacity for such. For example, the knowledge of the being of God is believed to be unreachable. No one can say any meaningful thing about how God looked like in thousands of years of religious experience. Whether it is a man, woman, transgender, heterosexual, homosexual or something else, we cannot describe it beyond the knowledge of anyone. Besides the casual theories by some religious sects about the dwellings of God, which by the way are as nonsensical as they sound, the only curious thing that has been said about God’s ontology was popularized by the German atheist Friedrich Nietzsche (1909). In his Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche declared that God was dead and that it was humans who murdered him.3 But even this statement leads to nowhere as it appears to be full of innuendoes and ironies more than facts. Nietzsche was actually using the expression to show 3  The expression about God’s death had actually been in the literature long before Nietzsche popularized it. At least, Philipp Mainlander (1876) and George Hegel (2019) had discussed the subject much earlier.

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how the Enlightenment Age has dealt a heavy blow on the idea of God’s existence. The expression was never used in a literal sense, even though some scholars nowadays feel comfortable to interpret it as such. No matter the interpretation, the existence of God is not a knowledge we are capable of reaching. The word existence portends extentionality. It is the physical state of having objective reality. For God to exist as an extended body, it would have to be an extended reality like a human. If that happens, then it is no longer divine enough to be called God. A god that exists is no God at all. The question of the existence of God is either badly framed or implausible. We must consider the reverse: Can God exist? It is more about God cannot exist than about God does not exist? About the latter, we can have no knowledge of it. But for the former, we can creditably talk about God as an expression that cannot exist. If God cannot exist, how else can we talk about it? The answer is simple; we can only talk about God as an expression which we cannot talk about. God is an expression, period! Much as we may loathe this expression, it is actually the best and the only sensible thing we can say about God. The expression God is gay can attract strong criticisms from bigots, but it means nothing if there is no entity to which we can apply it. This is a disarming and humbling ignorance for humankind. That there is an idea which we can only express in limited diction but have no knowledge of its existence is painful. Such ideas that demonstrate the limit of human knowledge abound. They make nonsense of David Hilbert’s bold claim that with the tool of reason, humankind can solve any problem whatsoever, given adequate time and resources. In his 1901 lecture, Hilbert eulogized the power of reason to solve any problem as “possibly a general law inherent in the nature of the mind, that all questions which, it asks must be answerable” (1902: 437). Now, we know better. There is at least one problem we know for certain we cannot solve due to our intellectual limitations. And there are many more we are not sure of. In the past, there were many things humanity was not sure it could fathom which they eventually did. Many of them are in the realm of science and technology. Following this pattern, a careless person could jump to the conclusion that whatever we did not know now could be resolved in the future once we continue to press hard. But this would be a great mistake because there were many other things we were ignorant of decades, centuries and even millennia ago which we remain ignorant of today. For example, there were times when people assiduously worked at

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projects aimed at using the Alchemy’s stone to turn any substance into gold. That project has not only failed, it has been abandoned as either implausible or impossible. Implausible and impossible are convenient words to explain away our ignorance. Logical ignorance highlights our intellectual limitations in the face of knowledge. This is the epistemic challenge. It is  not about what we can possibly know. It is about the extent we can possibly reach in our epistemic quest. Victory in this challenge is defined by how far we can possibly go, not if we can reach the zenith. This is because we are designed with the capability to reach an incredible amount of knowledge, but unfortunately, not all possible knowledge. Ignorance conquers the mind. For all its depth and breadth, ignorance always overwhelms the mind. Illogical Ignorance  This type occurs when what an agent knows is incorrect, and the agent does not know that what they know is incorrect. We are familiar with what it means to know something with certainty; the opposite, of course, is not to know something with certainty. It is knowing something with certainty which is certainly incorrect, and we certainly do not know that what we thought was certainly correct was actually incorrect, that often eludes us. This is illogical ignorance. The model for this type of ignorance is usually the big fool. When not corrected or shut down, the big fool can weaponize ignorance and cause a lot of damage. If a piece of knowledge can beam a light, a piece of ignorance can cast a thousand dark shadows. For example, as recently as October 2018 and March 2019, Lion Air Flight 610 and the Ethiopian Air Flight 302 crashed, killing all passengers on board. Crash investigations reveal that The Maneuvering Control Augmentation System, otherwise known as MCAS, which Boeing had installed in the 737 Max, was the cause on both occasions. The MCAS was absent in the manuals and the pilots were neither trained nor made aware of the existence of the MCAS. Yet, this was a software computer system designed to have full authority to nose-dive the plane which the pilot cannot overrule. Think of the pilots of the two unfortunate planes and, indeed, all 737 Max as big fools as at that time. They thought they knew for certain every operating system of their planes, and they thought what they knew about 737 Max maneuvering characteristics were correct. It turned out they were wrong. But the cost of this illogical ignorance was high.

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How often are we in a similar position as the pilots of the ill-fated flights? It is not a case of not knowing, or that of not knowing enough, but a case of not knowing that what one knows is incorrect. This is the most dangerous form of ignorance.

Knowledge as Complementary What is called cogno-normative or complementary epistemology is a theory of knowledge from the African perspective in which complementarity of opposed variables rather than dichotomies characterizes the study of the sources and nature of knowledge. In conversational thinking, there are many contexts,  three  of which are: time, place and medium. In cogno-­ normative epistemology, empiricism and rationalism are contexts of the medium. Contexts of time and place are about topics that can be discussed with specific sensitivity to place and time. What racism means in Ghana is not what it means in Germany. The discussion on gays in Apartheid South Africa is not the same in post-Apartheid South Africa. Context is a very important aspect of cogno-normative epistemology. Every epistemic idea has a context. First, its questions arise in a place. Second, its structure is shaped by the pervading circumstances. Third, responses and interpretations follow one medium or the other. These three steps characterize the procedure of cogno-normative epistemology. They even make more sense of the epistemological development in the West. It is unfortunate that an unhealthy division exists between those who identify as continental philosophers and their rivals who identify as analytic philosophers. The first group promotes rationalism not as one medium toward knowledge acquisition but as the medium. The second group, in a similar fashion, hoists the flag of empiricism, again not as one possible medium but as the medium. Each discounts the epistemic perspective which the other has discovered and developed. The biggest shortcoming of epistemology in the West is not the failure to reach the rock-bottom knowledge, but the wedge which the rivalry between continental and analytic philosophies drives between the doctrines of rationalism and empiricism. It is this wedge that prevents the two doctrines from achieving the crucible of complementarity. Cogno-normative epistemology takes a step toward bridging the gap between the two doctrines. The continental and analytic schools represent two perspectives to knowledge. These perspectives may be different, but they can complement each other. The possibility of their complementation

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can be demonstrated in the conversational curve4 using the tools of conjunctive and disjunctive motions, complementary turn, the tension of incommensurables and benoke point. The conversational curve is part of the paraphernalia of Ezumezu logic, a prototype system of three-valued logic that is adaptable to the inferences of the complementary type. It is called African because it was developed in the African philosophical tradition and simply for the fulfillment of cultural politic. Otherwise, it is a system of logic that is perfectly universalizable. One of its highpoints is that it accommodates truth-glut as against the truth-gap which similar three-valued systems like that of the Polish thinker Jan Lukasiewicz (1970) accommodate. It is this logic that makes room for the recognition of context as an important part of thinking on any subject at all. There are two basic inferential modes in Ezumezu logic: the complementary and the contextual. Two seemingly opposed variables called nwa-nsa and nwa-nju are said to be in different contexts. But because variables are constantly in motion, there are chances that at some point, opposed variables would hit the complementary turn and enter into a conjunctive motion. The conjunctive motion leads from the contextual modes to a complementary mode. But the complementary mode is not a place of dilution of identities. It is a transitory state called nwa-izugbe where two opposed variables can achieve functional rather than ontological unity. The complementary mode is not a permanent mode. It is not perpetual; it is transitory. The idea of no condition is permanent appropriately captures the state of the complementary mode. If the fact that no two variables are completely divergent without points of similitude (a phenomenon which the conversationalists describe as ontological similarity) makes their eventual complementation necessary, the fact that no two variables which share certain features in common are completely identical (a phenomenon called ontological variance) makes their disintegration possible. The collapse of a complementary unity of two variables occurs when the features that differentiate them are highlighted. At such a point, what is called tension of incommensurables would set in and tilt the conjunctive motion into a disjunctive one. But the disjunctive motion does not linger forever. There are always features which opposed variables share in common, and when they are highlighted, a disjunctive motion is tilted back to 4  See JO Chimakonam (2019: 142) for the diagram and detailed description of the conversational curve.

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a conjunctive motion. The more their common interest, the closer their relationship could become. But these variables can never lose their identities and can never harmonize into a synthesis because of what is described as benoke point. Synthesis is a point beyond which the identities of complementing variables would be lost and a new thesis created. This is the muse of the Hegelians. The conversationalists do not subscribe to this type of inference for two reasons: it is against the order of things in the universe, and while identity is an important feature in the universe, difference is a defining feature of our world. Difference is a marker of identity. Every identity is different in some senses. These are permanent features of the universe. And so, it is not the case that complementing variables, say, husband and wife, can dissolve into one entity. Synthesis is not how the world works in terms of the relationship between seemingly opposed variables. It is a complementation.

Conclusion Two important aspects of cogno-normative epistemology described in this chapter are that knowledge is relational, and that truth is mutually endorsing. In conversational thinking, we highlight the strategic position of the concept of nmekọ or relationship and the system of African logic with its principle of context-dependence of value (CdV). As has been explained, “[t]he ‘principle of Context-Dependence of Value’ (CdV) that states that ‘credible value judgements are the ones based on contexts’ is formulated to justify the claim of the ‘logical thesis’ that ‘what we call truth may not always be dependent on the collection of facts which a proposition asserts but rather, on the context in which that proposition is asserted’” (Chimakonam 2019: 119). It has also been explained that nmekọ occupied a central place in discourses in African philosophy and studies and discussed some prominent examples in the literature.5 To demonstrate this central position, one of us put forward three axioms of nmekọ: truth, solidarity and regeneration. Axiom 1 explains that every variable or proposition or fact has a context no matter how universal it is. Axiom 2 follows from axiom 1 to state the fact that each variable or reality stands a better chance of fulfilling its inherent abilities when it combines with other realities. And finally, axiom 3 estab5

 See Chimakonam (2019, Ezumezu, pp. 123–124) for details.

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lishes the fact that new ideas are created from the creative encounter between old ones. Thus, because of the self-evident nature of these axioms, nmeko becomes a necessity that makes systems in African philosophy and studies viable. (Chimakonam 2019: 123–124)

These three axioms emphasize the importance of relationality of variables and contexts of interpretation. These features are basic in understanding our theory of knowledge, where context and relationality shape the structure of truth and knowledge. It is also the combination of these two factors that makes our epistemic quest a moral one, since the logical and the moral necessarily complement; hence cogno-normative or complementary epistemology. A piece of knowledge can be evaluated. The claim that knowledge can be evaluated is the radical dimension of this theory. The idea of value-neutrality is, therefore, put to great challenge by the theory of cogno-normative epistemology. We are convinced that in philosophy, there should be no value-neutral and independent propositions; if there are, we must learn to put them in context and in relation to others. Any proposition that cannot be put in context or related to another should probably not have been stated in the first place.

References Aquinas, T. 2001. The De Malo of Thomas Aquinas. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Brian Davies. New York: Oxford University Press. Bernal, M. 1987. Black Athena: Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785–1985. Vol. 1. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Camus, A. 1975. The Myth of Sisyphus. Trans. Justin O’Brien. London: Penguin. Chimakonam, J.O. 2015. The Knowledge Question in African Philosophy: A Case for Cogno-Normative Epistemology. In Atuolu Omotiu: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy, ed. Jonathan O. Chimakonam, 671–682. Lanham: University Press of America. ———. 2017. The Question of African Logic: Beyond Apologia and Polemics. In The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy, ed. Adeshina Afolayan and Toyin Falola, 106–128. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2018. The Philosophy of African Logic: A Consideration of Ezumezu Paradigm. In Philosophical Perceptions on Logic and Order, ed. Jeremy Horne, 96–121. Hershey: IGI Global. ———. 2019. Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Cham: Springer.

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Chimakonam, J.O., and U.O. Egbai. 2016. The Value of Conversational Thinking in Building a Decent World: The Perspective of Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Dialogue and Universalism XXVI (4): 105–117. Chimakonam, J.O., and V.C.A. Nweke. 2018. Why the ‘Politics’ Against African Philosophy Should Be Discontinued. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 57 (2): 277–301. Egbai, U.O. 2018. Why African Philosophers Should Build Systems: An Exercise in Conversational Thinking. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions. 7 (1): 34–52. https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v7i1.2. Egbai, U.O., and J.O. Chimakonam. 2019. Why Conversational Thinking Could Be an Alternative Method for Intercultural Philosophy. Journal of Intercultural Studies 40 (2): 172–189. Ferrier, J.F. 2001. Philosophical Works of James Frederick Ferrier (3 Vols.). Vol. 1, Institutes of Metaphysic. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Hegel, G.W.F. 2019. The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Cambridge Hegel Translations, Trans. T Pinkard and M Baur. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hilbert, D. 1902. Mathematical Problems. Bulletin (New Series) of the American Mathematical Society 37: 407–436. Reprinted from Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 8 (1902): 437–470. Ijiomah, C.O. 2011. Humanistic Epistemology. Filosofia Theoretica 1 (1): 62–77. James, G. 1954. Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy Is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy. New York: Philosophical Library. Keefe, J. 2007. James Ferrier and the Theory of Ignorance. The Monist 90 (2): 297–309. Łukasiewicz, J. 1970. On Three-Valued Logic. In Selected Works by Jan Łukasiewicz, ed. L. Borkowski, 87–88. Amsterdam: North–Holland. Nield, D. 2016. How Much Data Does It Take to Make Your IPhone Heavier? Science Alert. April 2. https://www.sciencealert.com/how-­much-­data-­does-­it-­ take-­to-­make-­your-­iphone-­heavier. Retrieved, Nov 18, 2019. Nietzsche, F. 1909. Thuzs Spake Zarathustra. Trans. Thomas Common. Edinburgh/London: T.N. Foulis. Nweke, V.C.A. 2016. Questioning the Validity, Veracity and Viability of the Case for “Cogno-Normative (Complementary) Epistemology”: A Conversation with Chimakonam. Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 5 (1): 109–117. Olela, H. 1984. The African Foundations of Greek Philosophy. In African Philosophy: An Introduction, ed. Richard A. Wright, 3rd ed. Lanham: University Press of America. Onyewuenyi, I. 1993. African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism. Enugu: SNAAP Press.

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Philimonova, Z., and TKI Mender. 2016. Nescience Cognition Knowledge. Email Received November 11, 2016. ———. 2017. Nescience Cognition Knowledge. Email Received March 20, 2017. Philipp, M. 1876. Die Philosophie der Erlösung. Berlin: Erster Band. Pollock, J.L. 1987. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. London: Century Hutchinson. Rescher, N. 2009. Ignorance: On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion

The focus of this book is on a decolonial approach to philosophy, specifically as it concerns African philosophy as a discipline. In writing this work, we have avoided the temptation of comparing and contrasting the philosophical ideas, insights and thoughts gleaned from the African philosophical place with those from other philosophical places. We have concerned ourselves with discussing African metaphysics and epistemology through the framework of the conversational method grounded in Ezumezu logic and teased out of the principle of nmekọ. In the two parts of the book, which deal with metaphysics and epistemology, we did not focus on the polemic of whether African metaphysics and epistemology exist or not. Where we tried to address that in any of the chapters, we did not dwell on them. We passively highlighted some of the salient points to keep records straight. We were primarily concerned with discussing the nature of African metaphysics and epistemology as captured in the treatises of some African philosophers in addition to throwing in our own proposals. Each part contains chapters that discussed ideas in the literature and a chapter that made a theoretic proposal as a way of extending the frontiers of knowledge in African metaphysics and epistemology. Specifically, the work proposed nmekọka as a robust metaphysical theory and a theory of knowledge called cogno-­normative epistemology. In writing this book, we complied with the eight postulates of conversational thinking. That is, we presented the ideas in the literature with clarity

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0_10

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while acknowledging similar existing ideas and distinguishing the ‘new’ from the existing ones. We made bold claims about the inadequacy of existing ideas in the literature and attempted to inaugurate new ideas. We tried to provide logical justification based on the Ezumezu system. We presented our arguments with artistic flair to compel reading and addressed problematics in the mode of nwa-­nsa and nwa-­nju engagement. Overall, we paid attention to context as an important index for thought in African episteme. We did this in three phases. First, we presented the metaphysical and epistemological thoughts as conceptualized by some African philosophers. Second, we engaged these thoughts critically by deconstructing those ideas where necessary. Third, we engaged and creatively reconstructed those thoughts with new proposals. The preceding makes this book a project in conversational thinking. Through this critical and creative engagement, we demonstrated that African philosophers have contributed immensely to the subject of metaphysics and epistemology from the African place. We also showed that African scholars have been on the right path for decolonizing knowledge, especially in the area of philosophy. This is apparent in that their metaphysical and epistemological thoughts promote African intellectual heritage. More so, we observed that their thoughts are African culture–inspired but not African culture–bound. We were able to demonstrate this by highlighting the fact that their metaphysical and epistemological thoughts depict the idea of ‘relationship’ as exemplified in the concept of nmekọ, which is considered as complementarity (complementary relationship). Likewise, we contended that the metaphysical and epistemological ideas and theories discussed could be explained using a logic known as Ezumezu logic. However, we cautioned that these thoughts, even though they are African culture–inspired, have universal applicability and relevance. The point we seek to make in this book is that African philosophers have contributed and are still contributing their quota to the development of knowledge in general. Decoloniality challenges contemporary African philosophers to get involved in promoting African intellectual heritage through homegrown methods such as conversational thinking. Although we have done this in the subfields of African metaphysics and epistemology, there is still much to be done in other areas. Therefore, African philosophers and scholars should also join hands in the decoloniality project in philosophy and other disciplines. The preceding, for us, is the path to total intellectual rediscovery and mental liberation from all forms of coloniality of being, knowledge and power.

Index1

A Abanuka, Bartholomew, 136–139, 178 Abiogenesis, 55, 56 Achebe, Chinua, 91, 124, 125 African ethics, ix, 16, 176, 189 African logic, 16, 67, 85, 103, 176, 215 African metaphysics, ix, 3, 4, 7, 10, 16, 17, 19, 21–34, 73, 111, 113, 176, 197, 219, 220 African philosophy, vii–xi, viiin1, ixn2, 3, 5, 7–10, 15–21, 23, 26n8, 32, 36, 42, 47, 48, 67, 89, 90, 110, 111, 122, 126, 135–171, 175–177, 179–181, 184, 187, 188, 195, 203, 204, 206, 215, 216, 219 Afro-communitarianism, 15n1, 21, 110, 127 Agada, Ada, 8, 16, 41–43, 47, 49–61, 112, 126

Akan, 70, 110, 118, 119, 122, 145–147, 185, 188, 191 Amamife, 186 Anyanwu, K.C., 23n5, 137, 141–144, 177, 179 Aristotle, 6, 8, 8n5, 22, 44, 46, 68, 85, 89, 90, 98, 99, 111 Arụmarụka, 22–24, 28 Asouzu, Innocent, viii, 3, 8–10, 15, 16, 21, 44, 52, 85, 89–105, 170 Ayoade, John, 19, 70, 71 B Bantu Philosophy, 15n1, 18n3, 90, 112 Being, vii, 2, 15, 41, 65, 79–83, 89, 109, 137, 179, 198, 220 Belief, 21, 33, 56, 60, 119, 122, 141, 143, 149, 155, 176, 185–190 Belongingness, 10, 23n5, 68, 79–86 Benoke point, 5, 5n4, 214, 215

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. O. Chimakonam, L. U. Ogbonnaya, African Metaphysics, Epistemology, and a New Logic, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72445-0

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INDEX

Bhengu, M., 45 Biogenesis, 55 Bodunrin, Peter, 176 C Causality, 17, 54, 55 Chimakonam, Jonathan O., viii, viiin1, xi, 3, 8, 8n5, 10, 22, 23, 24n5, 33n15, 42, 47, 67, 73, 74, 83, 85, 90, 91, 96, 100–103, 123, 127, 136, 144, 155–165, 170, 176, 178n2, 179, 179n3, 190n4, 197, 215, 216 Cogno-normative epistemology, 10, 136, 158, 162–165, 195–216, 219 Common sense knowledge, 183, 184 Community, 18, 21, 44, 47, 52, 70, 71, 83–86, 92, 93, 105, 112–115, 117, 118, 120–128, 147, 158, 159, 162, 163, 170, 184, 190, 191, 191n5 Complementarism, 93, 105, 141, 182, 185 Complementarity, 3, 6, 10, 22, 23n5, 26n8, 27, 29, 41, 42, 52, 65, 68, 78, 85, 86, 90–94, 96, 98, 101, 102, 104, 105, 123–125, 127, 141, 144, 148, 164, 165, 167, 170, 171, 180, 182, 207, 213, 220 Connotations of ụwa, 74–78, 82 Consolationism, 8, 16, 41–49, 51, 52, 57, 59, 60 Context-dependence, 41, 162 Conversationalism, 67, 170 Conversational School of Philosophy, 8, 41 Conversational thinking, vii, viii, x, xi, 1–10, 24, 27n9, 41, 42, 59, 67, 68, 86, 90, 99, 105, 127, 155,

156, 162, 170, 171, 175, 176, 179–181, 183, 190n4, 197, 213, 215, 219, 220 Cosmology, 15, 21, 24, 74, 139, 165, 166, 187 D Decoloniality, vii, viii, x, xi, 1–10, 220 Decolonial logic, 4, 127, 136 Decolonial method, 3, 176 Deities, 16, 24, 32 Deliberative epistemology, 136, 167–171, 190, 191 Depression, 53 Descartes, Rene, 68, 111, 207 Determinism, 6, 16, 42, 52, 57–60 Dialectic of mood, 57 E Edeh, Emmanuel, 9, 15n1, 17–19, 18n3, 30n11, 31, 69, 72, 73, 90, 99 Edet, Mesembe, 100, 102, 122, 123 Egbai, Uti, 8, 42, 67, 90, 112, 126, 127, 136, 176, 197 Emotion, 21, 42, 49, 51–53, 138–141, 178, 181, 183 Emotionality, 42, 52, 138, 140 Endogenous knowledge, 151–155 Epistemological authoritarianism, 187 Epistemological particularism (EP), 177, 178n2 Epistemological universalism (EU), 176, 177 Etzioni, Amitai, 111 Existential conversion, 96, 97 Ezumezu logic, vii, x, 3, 4, 8, 10, 17, 22, 23, 33, 41, 42, 67, 85, 104, 105, 127, 141, 156, 161, 162, 175, 182, 185, 190, 214, 219, 220

 INDEX 

F Fatalism, 16, 52, 57–59 Freedom, 2, 16, 35, 42, 52, 57–60, 123, 126 G Gbadegesin, Segun, 7, 110, 113, 126, 128 Ghana, 118, 213 God, 16, 19, 32, 52, 54–57, 70, 74, 119, 138, 168, 180, 187, 199, 210, 210n3, 211 Great Debate, 18 Griaule, Marcel, 184 Gyekye, Kwame, 7, 16, 69, 70, 109, 110, 116–122, 126, 128 H Hallen, Barry, 67, 140, 168, 185, 186 Hantu, 44, 45 Hegel, Georg, 18, 68, 210n3 Holistic knowledge, 156–158, 166, 181–183, 185 Hountondji, Paulin, 15n1, 151–155, 176 Humanistic epistemology, 136, 148–151, 185–190 Humanizing epistemology, 136, 148–151, 204 Hume, David, 18, 68, 111, 207 I Ibuanyidanda, viii, 52, 91–94, 96–98, 102–104, 106 Ibuanyidanda imperative, 97, 98, 100, 105 Ibuanyidanda ontology, 8–10, 15, 16, 89–106 Ife, 18, 30n11, 31–33, 72

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Ife di ̣, 18, 19, 30, 30n11, 34, 72 Ife ezi, 30, 31, 33, 34 Ife izugbe, 30, 33, 34 Ife nki ̣tị, 18, 19, 30–34, 30n11 Ife nmụọ, 30–32, 34 Ife ụwa, 30, 31, 33, 34 Igbo, 18, 19, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 65, 67, 72–76, 78, 82, 84, 85, 90–93, 109, 149, 185–189, 206 Igbo language, 18, 23n5, 30, 31, 33, 65, 72 Ignorance, 3, 152, 156, 178, 195, 203–209 Ijiomah, Chris, 3, 8, 136, 148–151, 178, 189, 190, 204 Ikhane, P. A, 135, 177–179 Ikuenobe, Polycarp, 110, 110n1, 112, 113, 116, 124–127 Illogical ignorance, 212–213 Immoral ignorance, 209–210 Inferential knowledge, 183, 184 Integrative epistemology, 155–162 Intuitive knowledge, 143, 183 Iroegbu, Pantaleon, 8–10, 15, 16, 21, 23n5, 30n12, 65, 67–86, 91 J Jahn, Jahnheinz, 44, 45, 112, 163 K Kagame, Alexis, 43–47, 109, 112 Kant, Immanuel, 18, 68 Kaphagawani, Didier, 112, 177n1 Kintu, 44, 45 Kleene, Stephen, 34 Knowledge, vii, 2, 15, 47, 95, 135, 165–167, 175–191, 196, 198–203, 205–207, 213–215, 219 Kwindingwi, Wenceslaus, 47

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INDEX

L Levy-Bruhl, Lucien, 18 Limited communitarianism, 122, 123 Logic, vii, x, xi, 2–10, 16, 17, 21–23, 29, 33–35, 41, 42, 48, 58, 59, 65, 67–69, 79, 85, 86, 90, 102–105, 120, 124, 126, 127, 136, 141, 142, 150, 155, 156, 159–162, 167, 175–177, 179, 181, 182, 185, 190, 195–197, 207, 214, 215, 219, 220 Logical ignorance, 210–212 Lukasiewicz, Jan, 5, 34 M Maclntyre, Alasdair, 111 Mangena, Fainos, 138 Matolino, Bernard, 16, 47, 110, 111, 121–124 Maurier, Henri, 69, 70, 72 Mbiti, John, 15n1, 16, 19, 20, 71, 91, 109–115, 118, 125, 126, 168 Meaning, 17, 21–23, 25, 30, 31, 34, 42, 43, 50, 51, 55, 59–61, 67, 71, 73, 75, 79, 92, 95, 101, 128, 137, 141, 146, 147, 169, 178, 179 Melancholy being, 42, 53, 61 Menkiti, Ifeanyi, 15n1, 16, 21, 90, 109, 110, 114–119, 121, 124–126, 201 Metaphysics, ix, x, 3, 4, 7–10, 15–36, 43, 49, 55, 69, 72, 73, 80, 90, 105, 111–113, 119, 123, 126, 176, 197, 219, 220 Method, vii, x, xi, 3–5, 4n2, 7–10, 22, 23, 35, 41, 42, 48, 67, 86, 90, 93–97, 102, 105, 142, 143, 150, 155–157, 159, 169–171, 176–181, 190, 197, 219, 220 Methodology, 4, 5, 9, 16, 149, 157, 169, 175, 183, 197, 203

Mind, ix, 8, 28, 30–34, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 93–97, 103, 109, 112, 128, 137, 147, 154, 157, 175, 186, 196, 210–212 Moderate communitarianism, 127 Mood, 16, 41, 42, 50, 52–57, 59 Moral ignorance, 208–209 Muntu, 44, 45, 112 Mystical knowledge, 183, 184 N Nasseem, Subairi’B, 91, 178, 180, 182 Nchekwube, 186 Negritude, 136–141, 143, 167 Nihilism, 53 Nipadua, 118, 122 Nkontompo, 145, 188 Nkwuwa, 24–26, 34 Nmekọ, 3–5, 7, 9, 10, 17, 22, 23, 23n5, 29, 41, 42, 52, 59, 65, 78, 79, 82, 86, 99, 105, 125, 136, 141, 145, 146, 148, 150, 155, 156, 165, 176, 182, 183, 185, 207, 215, 216, 219, 220 Nmekọka, 6, 10, 15–36, 85, 105, 219 Nmekọkology, 23 Noetic propaedeutic, 95, 96 Nokware, 145–147, 188 Nothingness, 19, 30–33, 30n11, 79, 80, 82 Ntapiạ , 24, 26–28, 33, 34 Ntu, 44–46 Nwa-Njụ, 68, 86, 214, 220 O Obioha, 93–97 Ogbonnaya, L.U., 71, 71n1, 72, 83, 85, 98, 149 Okra, 119, 122 Old age knowledge, 183, 184

 INDEX 

Olodumare, 165–167 Oluwole, Sophie, 165–167 Ontological relativity, 65, 66 Ontology, 8–10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 24, 29, 30, 32, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 65–86, 89–106, 110, 112, 113, 115, 126–128, 138, 139, 161, 167, 168, 179, 180, 190, 197, 198, 201, 203, 210 Onye, 18, 72 Onyewuenyi, Innocent, 18n3, 177, 196 Oral knowledge, 149, 183, 185, 189 Oruka, Odera, 72, 184 Orunmila, 165, 166 Owo, 56 Ozumba, Godfrey, 7, 8, 21, 144, 155–162 P Panpsychism, 56, 57 Parratt, John, 19, 20 Perceptual knowledge, 183 Person, 17, 21, 48, 57, 66, 71, 72, 75–78, 109–126, 128, 138, 140, 145, 147, 151, 158, 163, 164, 166, 169–171, 186–188, 200, 205, 211 Personhood, 10, 15, 15n1, 16, 21, 109–128, 201 Philosophical particularism (PP), 177 Plato, 8, 8n5, 68, 89, 111, 204 Pollock, John, 148, 178, 204 Praeg, Leonhard, 48 Premonitive knowledge, 183, 185 Principle of Belongingness, 84 Principle of co-existence, 84 Principle of Context-Dependence of Values (Cdv), 162, 215 Principle of integration, 97, 99, 102, 105, 170

225

Principle of mutual existence, 83 Principle of participation, 84 Principle of progressive transformation, 97 Purpose, 3, 7, 23, 41–43, 48–51, 58–61, 97, 148, 150, 152, 153, 189 Q Quine, WVO, 65–67 R Radical communitarianism, 117, 127 Ramose, Mogobe, 43, 45–47, 52, 112, 181, 188 Rationality, 18, 42, 53, 111, 139 Reason, ix, 2, 4, 23, 26, 31, 42, 47, 49, 52, 57, 59, 68, 71, 84, 86, 94, 95, 98, 99, 101, 116, 123, 138–141, 143–145, 148, 150, 158, 160–162, 164, 166, 169, 176–178, 181–183, 186, 188, 196, 203, 207, 211, 215 Re-incarnation, 16, 17, 19–21 Relationship, 3, 5, 5n4, 6, 9, 10, 17, 20, 22, 23, 23–24n5, 27–29, 27–28n9, 41, 42, 45, 52, 59, 60, 65–70, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 92, 97, 99–102, 104, 105, 112, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124, 126–128, 139, 145–149, 156, 165, 170, 182, 186, 190, 206, 215, 220 S Samkange, S., 45, 46, 112 Samkange, T., 45, 46, 112 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 68 Senghor, Leopold, 136–143, 167, 177, 178, 181

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INDEX

Social epistemology, 177, 177n1 Sodipo, J. O., 67, 168, 185 Sunsum, 118, 119, 122 T Tavernaro-Haidarian, Leyla, 136, 167–171, 190, 190n4 Taylor, Charles, 111 Tempels, Placide, 15n1, 17, 18n3, 43–47, 69, 70, 90, 98, 99, 112, 119, 168, 177 Tempelsian Damage, 44 Tension of incommensurables, 5, 214 Time, ix, 3, 16n1, 17–21, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 44, 47, 58, 71, 75, 81, 109, 111, 116, 124, 127, 137, 154, 161, 166, 171, 184, 190, 199, 202–204, 206, 211–213 Truth and authenticity criterion, 97–101, 104, 105 U Ubu, 46

Ubuntu, 15n1, 43, 45–49, 52, 110, 110n1, 112, 167, 169, 171, 190 Udefi, Amaechi, 168, 186, 187 University of Calabar, 8, 41, 68, 91 Ụwa ontology, 8–10, 15, 16, 65–86 V Van Der Veken, J., 68, 69 Vital force, 44, 45, 57, 70, 90, 112, 119, 122, 140 W Whitehead, Alfred, 68, 89 Wiredu, Kwasi, 7, 109, 113, 119, 126, 128, 136, 145–148, 168, 187, 188, 191 Y Yoruba, 19, 70, 71, 110, 165–167, 185, 186 Z Zones of ụwa, 68, 77–79