Adenauer's Foreign Office: West German Diplomacy in the Shadow of the Third Reich 9781501756696

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ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE

FOREIGN OFFICE West German Diplomacy in the Shadow of the Third Reich

Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr.

NIU

PRESS

DeKalb, IL

© 2012 by Northern Illinois University Press

Published by the Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, Illinois 60115 All Rights Reserved Design by Shaun Allshouse The views or opinions expressed in this book, and the context in which the images are used, do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of, nor imply approval or endorsement by, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Maulucci, Thomas W. Adenauer's foreign office : West German diplomacy in the shadow of the Third Reich / Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-87580-463-7 (cloth) -

ISBN 978-1-60909-077-7

(electronic) 1. Germany (West)-Foreign relations. 2. Germany (West). Auswartiges Amt. 3. Adenauer, Konrad, 1876-1967. 4. GermanyHistory-1945-1955. I. Title. DD258.8.M38 2012 327.43009'045--dc23 2012030665

Contents

List of Charts and Figures Acknowledgments

v11

1x

List of Abbreviations and Foreign Words Used in the Text

Introduction

xiii

3

The Auswartiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-1945

12

2 The Foreign Affairs Question in Occupied Germany, 1945--49 3 The Return of the German Diplomats

64

4 Foreign Policy without a Foreign Office, 1949-51

92

S The Foreign Office's "Childhood Illnesses," 1949-55 6 Personnel Policy, 1949-55

119

145

7 The Leadership Structure in the Auswartiges Amt, 1951-55 8 The Career Diplomats and Adenauer's Foreign Policy Conclusion

244

Appendix: The Auswartiges Amt, 1951-June 1955 Notes

271

Bibliography Index

373

351

41

251

214

182

List of Charts and Figures

Chari 1-West German Foreign Service Personnel 1951-55 127 Chart 2-West German Missions Abroad 1949-June 1955 134 Chart 3-Percentage ofFormer NSDAP Members (Higher Service), 1950--54

169

Chart 4--Summary of Biographical Information on 100 Leading Officials in the West German Foreign Office, September 1949-June 1955

171

Chari 5--Percentage of WilhelmstraBe Veterans in the Higher Service, 1950--54 172 Fig. 1-The Auswartiges Amt in the WilhelmstraBe, Berlin, around 1935 27 Fig. 2-Hans von Herwarth and Konrad Adenauer, 1952 67 Fig. 3-The defendants at the Ministries Trial in Nuremberg, February 1948 81 Fig. 4--Adenauer leaving Allied High Commission headquarters on September 21, 1949, after receiving the text of the Occupation Statute 103

Fig. S-The new Foreign Office in the Koblenzer StraBe (today Adenauerallee) in Bonn, September 12, 1955 133

Fig. 6--Illustration from a 1951 anonymous pamphlet satirizing the return of the veteran diplomats 155

Fig. 7-Albert Hilger van Scherpenberg and Ernst Muhlenhaupt, December 1959 177 Fig. 8-------Adenauer, Walter Hallstein, and Herbert Blankenhorn, October 1954

187

Fig. 9-Political cartoon featuring Adenauer and Heinrich von Brentano, 1955

211

Fig. 10-Albrecht von Kessel

231

Acknowledgments

The idea for a study on the West German Foreign Office came to me while I was a graduate student searching for a dissertation topic at Yale University. I had long been interested in both Germany's foreign relations and the Adenauer era. It also struck me as intriguing that in the early 1950s, in a society that by and large was trying to put the Nazi past behind it, the return of veteran diplomats to the new ministry had produced public controversy. As I am writing this introduction, years after having begun work on this book, it does not surprise me that the history of the Foreign Office in the mid-twentieth century still provokes controversy in Germany. What I could not have expected, however, is that the issue of how to create new democratic governments in countries that had experienced dictatorship or authoritarian rule would take on new relevance in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, and perhaps soon also through broader sections of the Middle East and Africa. Through a combination of design, luck, and the influence of external factors, Germans in the Federal Republic managed to build a democratic system and society from the ruins of a dictatorship. This book presents a small but important part of this story. While at Yale I was fortunate to have good mentors and teachers. My advisor Paul M. Kennedy provided constant encouragement and excellent training in the fields of international history and security studies. I had the pleasure of participating in several seminars led by Sir Michael Howard. Jim Boyden, Paul Bushkovitch, John Merriman, Mark Steinberg, and the late Robin Winks also influenced my development as a historian. So too did the late Henry A. Turner-may he rest in peace. After graduating I worked several years as a research assistant to the late David F. Musto at the Yale School of Medicine. John Harley Warner, Sarah Tracy, and the late Larry Holmes exposed me to entirely new worlds of history, which I happily explored along with my office mate, the late Pam Korsmeyer. John Lewis Gaddis, who arrived at Yale just before I left New Haven, was kind enough to read my dissertation and also to invite me to the stimulating book discussions he holds at his home with other faculty and grad students. My fellow graduate students at Yale were a great source of support. Kennedy's assistant Will Hitchcock provided me with several opportunities to present

x Acknowledgments my work at International Security Studies. David Hermann convinced me that I could speak French in preparation for my first research trip to Europe, and Talbot Imlay helped guide me through the French Foreign Ministry archives. Mary Sarotte, Pertti Ahonen, Will Gray, John Lowry, and Jay Geller provided me with a fine group of German historians to bounce ideas off. Anne Louise Antonoff was a constant source of encouragement. Doug Selvage, Heather (Ruland) Staines, and George Williamson all read parts of my first draft and managed to survive the process. Jason Lavery and I are still good friends even though we started writing our dissertations in the same apartment. Thomas A. Schwartz of Vanderbilt University offered much useful advice during the early stages of my project and later served on my dissertation committee. Samuel Williamson read my finished dissertation and kindly provided detailed comments for revising it. In Germany I was fortunate to be taken under the wing of Hans-Peter Schwarz at the University of Bonn, who was my advisor during the research year provided by the German Educational Exchange Service in 1992-93. He gave me many valuable suggestions and also helped me to arrange interviews with German diplomats who had served during the early 1950s. His colleague Hanns Jurgen Ktisters took an interest in my project and provided helpful insights, as did Udo Wengst of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich. Wengst also allowed me to use the photocopied documents, especially of hard to find political newsletters, that he had collected for his own study of the creation of the West German government. I would also like to thank Alexander Boker, Sigismund Freiherr von Braun, Wilhelm Grewe, Hans von der Groben, Hans von Herwarth, Heinz Krekeler, and Rolf Pauls. All of these men from the first hours of West German diplomacy are now departed, but in the early 1990s they kindly invited me into their homes and provided interviews that helped me understand the atmosphere of the time. While in Bonn I formed part of a multinational crew of young researchers in the Foreign Office archives that included David Cameron, Maddalena Guiotto, Andreas Rodder, Katherine Sams, Christiane Scheidemann, and Dominique Trimbur. Between 1999 and 2002 I returned to Germany to work, first as a research associate at the University of Heidelberg and then as an assistant professor of history at UMUC Schwabisch Gmtind. At Heidelberg I had the great pleasure of working for Detlef Junker. He and his staff, especially Philipp Gassert, strongly encouraged me to continue work on my foreign office manuscript. So too did my colleagues at UMUC, including Beth Plummer, the late Gary Anderson, and John Gunkel. In March 2001 I was invited by Bernhard Brunner of

Acknowledgments

xi

the University of Freiburg to a weekend colloquium organized by his advisor Ulrich Herbert at St. Peter in the Black Forest on Nazi criminals in the Federal Republic. For me this was a very important experience, since it underlined the need when writing about the Auswartiges Amt to further break down the artificial barrier in German history represented by the year 1945 and also to take a sociological as well as a foreign policy perspective on my topic. Since returning to the States in 2002 I have had wonderful and supportive colleagues at SUNY Fredonia and at my current institution, American International College, where Julie Walsh, Robin Varnum, Gary Jones, and Vickie Hess have all taken an interest in my project. Due to my previous work on the Foreign Office, in 2007 Peter Hayes of Northwestern University asked me to contribute to the work of the Independent Historians' Commission commissioned by the Auswartiges Amt. The Commission's work was published as Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik [The Office and the Past: German Diplomats in the Third Reich and in the Federal Republic] (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010). Hayes's research team was responsible for the years 1945 to 1951, and I contributed sections on denazification and the diplomats' search for new careers. Peter was great to work with, and I am thankful to him and the other lead authors for this opportunity. It also was fun to be reunited with old friends like Will Gray and Astrid Eckert and to meet new ones like Katrin Paehler, Norm Goda, and Annette Weinke. I relied on Das Amt where necessary to update my research-its unprecedented access to German records makes it a valuable resource-and to address some issues that were not my primary focus. However, this study and its findings are my own, and it will be obvious to those familiar with Das Amt where my interpretations differ. I would like to express my thanks to all of the many archivists and librarians who have provided assistance in researching this book. Their kindnesses have ranged from helping to find documents to providing tea with honey for a deathly ill graduate student. Above all, I would like to thank Ludwig Biewer, director of the Politisches Archiv des Auswiirtigen Amts, and his staff, especially Martin Kroeger, Lucia van der Linde, Knud Piening, and Gunther Scheidemann. The interlibrary loan librarians at AIC, especially Amy Schack and Gilana Chelimsky, have been tireless in tracking down books and articles for me. It has been a great pleasure working with my editor, Amy Farrauto, and managing editor Susan Bean at Northern Illinois University Press. I also

xii Acknowledgments greatly appreciated the useful and detailed suggestions provided by the manuscript's two anonymous readers. Last but not least, I would like to thank my own family in the United States as well as my various German "host families" and friends in Stade, Hamburg, Dortmund, Saarbriicken, Bonn, Heidelberg, Schwabisch Gmiind, Berlin, and elsewhere who have shown me their kindness over the years. Lisa Edwards is not only an excellent wife but, as a fellow historian, not just tolerant but understanding of what it means to try to write a book.

List of Abbreviations and Key Foreign Terms Used in the Text

Auswiirtiges Amt-Foreign Office BMGF-Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs BP-Bavaria Party

BVN-Union of Victims of the Nazi Regime (DU-Christian Democratic Union CSU-Christian Social Union CTB-Allied Combined Travel Board DBFF--German Office for Peace Questions DDP--German Democratic Party (Weimar Republic) DfAA--Office for Foreign Affairs (Federal Chancellery, 1950-51) DNVP--German National People's Party (Weimar Republic) DP--German Party DVP--German People's Party (Weimar Republic) ECSC-European Coal and Steel Community EDC-European Defense Community ERP-European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)

Evangelisches Hilfswerk-Protestant Relief Agency FDP-Free Democratic Party FM-SS-Patron Member of the SS FRG---Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) GATT--General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDR-German Democratic Republic (East Germany) HICOG-(US, UK, French) US, UK, French Element, Allied High Commission

xiv

List of Abbreviations

HICOM-Allied High Commission in Germany JEIA-Allied Joint Export-Import Agency KPD-German Communist Party (West Germany) MdB-Member of Bundestag NSDAP-National Socialist German Workers' (Nazi) Party OEEC-Organization for European Economic Cooperation OMGUS-Office of US Military Government in Germany 1945--49 OSS-US Office of Strategic Services RHSA-Reich Main Security Office (Third Reich) SA-Sturmabteilung (NSDAP paramilitary group) SD-Sicherheitsdienst (SS intelligence agency, part ofRHSA)

SEO-Socialist Unity Party (East Germany) SPD-Social Democratic Party of Germany SS----Schutzstaffel ("Protection Squad" ofNSDAP)

UA-47-Bundestag Investigative Committee 47

Verbindungsstelle zur AHK-Liaison Office to the Allied High Commission VIW-Frankfurt Economics Administration

Westbindung-Policy of political adherence to the West in the Cold War Wilhelmstra8e-Nickname for German Foreign Office before 1945 I-Center Party

ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE

Introduction

0N MAR ( H 15, 1951, some eighteen months after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), a small ceremony took place at the Museum Koenig to mark the official establishment of a Foreign Office [Auswartiges Amt]. The Museum Koenig was a natural history museum that had been pressed into service by West German authorities to address the lack of office and meeting space in Bonn four years after the Second World War. In September 1948 it had hosted the opening session of the Parliamentary Council that drafted the West German constitution, or Basic Law. After the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the late summer of 1949 the museum would be used as temporary housing for various parts of the government, including the Chancellery and some of the offices that would be incorporated into the Auswartiges Amt. 1 Now, in a building filled with taxidermied animals, the diplomats assembled to meet their newly appointed foreign minister, Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer took his place at the head of a reception line, greeted his subordinates, and exchanged pleasantries with a few pre-selected officials. The French High Commissioner in Germany, Andre Frarn;ois-Poncet, reported that until then some of the higher functionaries present had enjoyed little or even no contact with their "inaccessible boss," even though they had been in government service for months already working on foreign policy issues. Adenauer then made a speech in which he stressed how significant it was that the Western Occupation Powers had finally allowed West Germany to set up a Foreign Office and conduct its own diplomacy. He emphasized that he could not remain foreign minister over the long term, but that he would do

4 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE his utmost to return Germany to the family of European nations on a basis of equality and mutual respect. Finally, he cautioned that the Federal Republic's representatives in foreign countries needed to exercise restraint if they were going to win trust abroad. The same afternoon, Adenauer spoke with the press. He said that despite the new Foreign Ministry, in the immediate future the Federal Republic would not become very active in foreign policy. Due to the distrust of Germany by much of the international community, it seemed more advisable for the time being to exercise a "refined sense of restraint" [vornehme Zuruckhaltung]. He then added that it was appropriate to maintain the structure of the pre-1945 Auswartiges Amt with some modifications since, he asserted, the old "WilhelmstraBe" had never been a Nazi institution, and it would be useful to retain some foreign policy traditions. Frarn;ois-Poncet noted that this comment must have pleased many of those present at the earlier ceremony, who themselves had joined the German diplomatic service before 1945, served during the Third Reich, and then, in ever-increasing numbers, found employment in the Federal Republic. However, Adenauer also said that it was wrong to select West Germany's new diplomatic representatives "only from the stocks of the old school." Despite the need for experience and tradition, a new start was also necessary. 2 This account of the opening ceremony for the new Foreign Office and the related press conference nicely illustrates the main themes of this study, which describes the creation and early history of that ministry through 1955, the period Adenauer served as foreign minister, and the related issue of how and why the Western Occupation Powers granted the Federal Republic the right to conduct an independent foreign policy. The creation of the Foreign Office tells us much about the possibilities and limits of professional diplomacy in the mid-twentieth century. It also clearly illustrates three of the central themes in the early history of the Federal Republic of Germany: the integration of the new state into the international community, the cooptation of "old" German elites and traditions by the political system, and the creation of that new system itself. This study argues that, despite an improvised start and a considerable continuity of practice and personnel with pre-1945 Germany, the changed international and domestic situation proved decisive in creating a ministry that could help to implement new directions in German foreign policy. It also seeks to explore the interactions between international, political, and social history as well as to contribute to an increasing literature that bridges the gap between the pre- and post-World War II eras that characterized previous writing on German history.

Introduction

S

The troubling question of personnel continuity in the German diplomatic service remains of considerable interest today, thanks to a great extent to the groundbreaking work of historian Hans-Jurgen Doscher. 3 But it has not remained a subject only for scholars, especially because of the Foreign Office's previous attempts to portray its past in the best possible light. A heated controversy developed within the ministry itself concerning Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's refusal in 2003 to continue to issue the standard official obituary containing the phrase ehrendes Andenken [honored memory] for diplomats with formal ties to the Nazi Party. In response, in 2005 the Auswartiges Amt convened an international Independent Historians' Commission to examine the role of its former employees in the Third Reich, personnel continuities with the Federal Republic's foreign service, and how the post-1951 ministry handled issues related to the Nazi past. The commission's study, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit [The Office and the Past], appeared in the fall of 2010 and received an enthusiastic response from the public. 4 However, it has also drawn sharp criticism from scholars. They have focused on the section about the years 1933-45, which they claim, among other things, exaggerates the Foreign Office's role in the Holocaust and ignores its activities in other areas. 5 In response to the "Obituary Affair," in January 2006 WDR Television in Germany also aired a 45-minute documentary titled "Hitler's Diplomats in Bonn."6 Personnel policy and the "politics of the past" are crucial subjects for any history of the Auswartiges Amt in the twentieth century. However, the current study seeks to broaden the focus to include the ministry's role in international and domestic politics and how it was shaped by these same politics. Moreover, the study concentrates on the formative years of the new Foreign Office between 1949 and 1955, years which, as will be argued below, are often treated in a cursory way by scholars of West Germany's foreign relations. As the ceremony in the Museum Koenig suggested, the ministry's early years saw considerable improvisation, and not just because a new government was being established in Bonn, a medium-sized city that had never served as Germany's capital before. An important reason was that the creation of a full-fledged Auswartiges Amt had to wait for some eighteen months after the establishment of the Federal Republic's government, at which time most of its other ministries and offices had started to function and had laid claim to the best available buildings. The delay was caused by Germany's defeat in 1945 and the subsequent policies of the victor powers from the Second World War. Initially the Four Powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) controlled relations between the outside world and occupied

6 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Germany. After the start of the Cold War, the Occupation Statute proclaimed on May 12, 1949, for the new West German state named foreign affairs as an area reserved for the three Western Occupation Powers. The Three Powers also returned the German diplomatic documents they had captured during the war only in a piecemeal fashion starting in the 1950s. 7 As a result, not only were proper facilities lacking (a situation not remedied until a new ministry building opened in 1954), but administrative practices and even the simplest forms and documents had to be remembered or re-created. The first generation of diplomats in the Federal Republic felt with some justification that "we built things up out of nothing," as head of protocol Hans Heinrich Herwarth von Bittenfeld (a.k.a. Hans von Herwarth) put it. 8 It would be several years before the ministry was functioning smoothly. Due to the late start, the new Foreign Office's role in the government also was no longer first among equals, as it had been before 1945 ( at least in the minds of its own officials), and other ministries would play a growing role in West Germany's international affairs. A related problem concerned the fact that Adenauer had decided to serve simultaneously as chancellor and foreign minister. At first glance, this strategy gave him significant political advantages. As early as 1954 Theodor Eschenburg called attention to the fact that like Gustav Stresemann and Heinrich Bruning during the Weimar Republic, not to mention the chancellors of the Second German Empire, Adenauer enjoyed an extraordinarily strong position within the German government because he held these dual offices at a time in which foreign policy successes were important for domestic politics. 9 After his tremendous electoral success in 1953 Adenauer was able to fully assert himself vis-a-vis his cabinet and his own parliamentary alliance, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), thus initiating the "Chancellor Democracy"-a parliamentary system that became characteristic for the Federal Republic in which the head of government played a dominant role in relation to the parties of the ruling coalition. 10 However, as he mentioned at the March 15, 1951, press conference, Adenauer could not hold both of these offices indefinitely. His critics, and even some of his closest coworkers and political allies, believed that he did not have enough time or energy to lead the government, conduct diplomatic relations, and oversee the construction of the new Foreign Office effectively all at the same time. The charge that the leadership of the ministry was too narrow, and thus overworked and overstretched, arose repeatedly during the early 1950s. Yet Adenauer was unwilling to abandon the Auswartiges Amt until West Germany attained sovereignty, arguing that he needed to personally direct the Federal Republic's foreign policy until

Introduction

7

that time. Only on June 7, 1955, did he tum over the ministry to his party colleague Heinrich von Brentano. If the aforementioned problems were related to a new start, the journalists at the press conference were keenly aware that considerable continuities remained between the old Wilhelmstra/3e and the new ministry in terms of both organizational structures and, more seriously, personnel. Herwarth was one of many officials present at the earlier ceremony who had begun their careers in the 1920s and 1930s. He was considered a "non-Aryan" and left the foreign service for the army in 1939, and he also played a small role in the German resistance against Hitler. 11 Other colleagues, however, had continued to work in the ministry loyally until Germany's defeat in 1945. Not just journalists but also West German politicians from all parties except those on the far right would question Adenauer's assertion that the Wilhelmstra/3e had not been a Nazi institution, and these concerns would culminate in 1951 and 1952 in a parliamentary investigation by the Bundestag's Investigative Committee 47 [Untersuchungsausschuj3 Nr. 47, or UA-47). The committee's report and the resulting Bundestag debate disappointed many observers. As could be expected, the diplomats' defenders felt that both were unnecessary and even outrageous. In reality, however, UA-47's investigations were limited and incomplete and did not result in lasting changes in the ministry's personnel policies, which ensured a high degree of continuity with the old Wilhelmstra/3e. The veteran diplomats were a prime example of the process by which German elites that had served under National Socialism, and that in some cases were responsible for its worst crimes, were able to reenter public life in large numbers after 1945. To explain this phenomenon, in 1983 philosopher Hermann Liibbe suggested that Germans in the immediate postwar decades did not repress the Nazi past and knew full well what they and their neighbors had done during the Third Reich. However, they were willing to overlook many individual histories as long as those concerned accepted the new democratic ground rules, which were widely viewed as a preferable alternative to a continuation of the Nazi system. Liibbe posited that this strategy of "communicative silence," along with time, was the only way to successfully transform a society that had been exposed to National Socialist ideology for so long. 12 West German diplomat Paul Frank expressed this idea somewhat differently when he described colleagues from the old Wilhelmstra/3e as "burned children [gebrannte Kinder]," scalded by Nazism, who now were happy to play by the new rules as long as no one questioned their continued employment. 13 As Norbert Frei pointed out in the mid-1990s, however, there is one major flaw

8 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE in such arguments: state and society in Western Germany were neither neutral nor autonomous instruments in this process. "Simply on the basis of their numbers alone those that were to be integrated were themselves able to determine to a great extent the conditions of their integration." 14 The diplomats were able to take advantage of the fact that until the l 960s West German society was far more interested in rehabilitating or forgetting about those who had collaborated with Nazism than in persecuting them. Adenauer himself did not fully trust the veteran diplomats and thought that they were too much of a "clique" that would represent its own interests and, perhaps, not his foreign policy priorities. This was the other aspect of the continuity question that hung over the opening ceremony and press conference that March 15-to what extent could the new West German state be trusted by the outside world to pursue a constructive and peaceful foreign policy just six years after the Second World War? This was the very issue that had caused an eighteen-month delay in creating a new ministry. Adenauer warned both his diplomats and the reporters that the goal of German diplomacy had to be to obtain equal treatment and respect from the outside world, and this would require a good deal of tact and hard work. These problems faced by the new ministry stood in stark contrast to the successful foreign policy through 1955 of the Adenauer government, whose policies helped to lift the Occupation Statute, lead to West German membership in NATO, contribute to the start of the European project, and in general place the Federal Republic in a position of some prominence internationally. At first glance, these successes happened in spite of the situation in the Auswartiges Amt, not because of it. This contradiction was, however, part of a broader international development. Since the late nineteenth century, professional diplomats in almost every country had experienced a decline in status and lost considerable influence on the policy-making process. 15 Modem communications and transportation revolutionized diplomatic practice. "Summit diplomacy" often reduced the role of the resident ambassadors "to that of reporters whose reports were often disregarded by the home office." 16 In almost every country there was also a proliferation of agencies and specialists with no diplomatic background to deal with specific aspects of international relations (e.g., economic affairs) and new forums to coordinate overall foreign policy. No longer did the Foreign Ministry retain its undisputed role in advising the head of state on relations with the outside world and managing the same. 17 Diplomats like George F. Kennan and Harold Nicolson pointed at mid-century to an additional recent development that had eroded professionalism in their

Introduction

9

field: the rising influence of public opinion on the policy-making process. Under leaders like Wilson and Lenin, diplomacy became openly ideological and addressed itself to peoples, not governments. 18 One veteran of the early years of the new Auswartiges Amt even titled his memoirs "Diplomats aren't good for anything [Diplomaten taugen nichts]." This was an actual comment that Helmut Schmidt made to Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow in 1974 in the presence of both of their foreign ministers, who politely laughed along with the joke. 19 A few scholars have devoted attention to the foreign policy-making process in the early Federal Republic. 20 But the available histories on the Auswartiges Amt concentrate heavily on its personnel policy or on its internal administration as opposed to its wider political role. 21 This ministry came into being shortly after the end of the Second World War, which arguably was the most important watershed for the trends described above. It needed to cope both with these challenges and with an ever-increasing number of fields, international forums (e.g., the United Nations system and European organizations), and due to decolonization, states where the Federal Republic's interests had to be represented. One could argue that its weight in the West German government grew over time due to the increased importance of international issues, despite a superficial formal loss of status as the main organization responsible for shaping the Federal Republic's foreign policy. 22 Yet the clear message of the early 1950s is that important foreign policy decisions did not require a full-fledged Foreign Office as long as there was an energetic foreign minister-in this case Chancellor Adenauer-with a competent albeit overworked circle of advisors. Adenauer's comments on that March day also pointed to other key aspects of West Germany's relationship not only with the Three Powers but with the outside world as a whole. As he noted, it was indeed significant that the Federal Republic could now conduct its own diplomacy directly with foreign countries, even if this had to be done with great caution due to resentments arising from the recent past. Nonetheless, scholars have often treated the years of the Occupation Statute 1949-55 merely as a prelude to West German foreign policy per se. "In its early years," writes Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "the Federal Republic had neither the power nor the legitimacy to conduct its own foreign policy."23 To be sure, the Federal Republic had to deal with both the Three Powers and the reunification question. But the former clearly made the new state more an object than a subject, while the latter, especially for Germans, represented a special aspect of domestic policy. Indeed, many scholars depict the central task of the Federal Republic's foreign policy as one of overcoming

10 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE or dealing with restraints-some of which arose from the international system, some of which were legacies of the Nazi past and World War II, and some of which were self-imposed. 24 Yet it is also clear that starting around 1952 the Adenauer government's successful policy of Western integration allowed the Federal Republic a great deal of de facto foreign policy sovereignty despite the formal continuation of the Occupation Statute. 25 Because its form closely followed Bonn's evolving foreign policy competencies, the early history of the new Auswartiges Amt allows us to examine how, starting in 1949, the Federal Republic actively tried to shape its relations with the entire outside world, not just Western countries, and its possibilities for doing so. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, already by 1951 the Three Powers had decided that formal controls over West German foreign policy would be ofno avail if they did not have a trusting relationship with the Federal Republic. Furthermore, despite a plethora of studies on German foreign policy in the twentieth century, we still do not know very much about the "learning processes" that the foreign policy elites went through that would help explain how Germany went from seeking a "place in the sun" to renouncing power politics and emphasizing international cooperation. 26 A dramatic change in the political operating environment, such as occurred in Germany around 1945, may totally invalidate people's previous behavior or goals, even long-standing ones, and cause them to look for new options. 27 But what exactly was the relationship between the new thinking and historical learning processes in terms of the diplomatic corps? This question is the key to explaining the support of both veteran diplomats and newcomers not just for the new state but also for its foreign policy. Due to the new Auswartiges Amt's strong political leadership and somewhat chaotic initial growth, the diplomatic corps would not have the opportunity to shape the overall lines of West German foreign policy. However, most diplomats became advocates of this policy due to their appreciation of the changed international and domestic environments in which they had to operate. These new circumstances are important to bear in mind because many aspects of the early history of the Foreign Office reflect a mentality that was very influential in the Federal Republic in the 1950s: the search for "normality" or "normalization." To quote Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, the 1950s was a "decade of normality" throughout Western Europe, marked by the reconstruction of personal lives, the economy, and the physical environment, that followed the "decade of violence" of the 1940s. For the average person in the Federal Republic this meant a return to "normal" conditions in the pri-

Introduction

11

vate sphere, associated with stable home lives and rising prosperity. As Mary Fulbrook emphasizes, wanting to be "normal" also involved a "desire to pick up the pieces as if nothing had happened" or, in other words, the urge to forget about and distance oneself from the barbarity of the Third Reich. 28 Likewise, the Federal Republic in the early 1950s wished a return to "normality" through the achievement of sovereignty (including the right to conduct "normal" diplomacy with all of its trappings), international equality [Gleichberechtigung] and at some point national reunification. The veteran diplomats sought the "normality" of renewed employment in their profession and a ministry organized according to what they perceived as the sound practices of the pre-Nazi time. They also wanted to disassociate themselves from their own role under National Socialism as well as from Allied denazification policies. The debate about a "restoration," a term popularized by Walter Dirks and Eugen Kogon in the journal Franlifurter Hefte, indicates that many contemporaries in the early Federal Republic were aware of social, economic, and political continuities in Germany and that visions of the "normal" were sometimes contentious. By the mid- l 950s, left-wing intellectuals often used the term "restoration" narrowly to discuss troubling personnel continuities with the Third Reich. 29 By this time it had so entered the public consciousness that a wide variety of observers, including Adenauer himself, would speak of a "restoration" when describing conditions in the new Foreign Office. In the end, however, enough had happened that there would be no simple return to the past for German diplomacy or its practitioners.

The Auswtirtiges Amt of the German Reich,

1871-1945

IN THE 1950s, the Federal Republic of Germany's Auswartiges Amt displayed significant personnel and organizational continuities with its predecessor in the German Reich. The Wilhelmstraf3e had implemented the foreign policies of Otto von Bismarck and Gustav Stresemann and, more ominously, of Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler. As a result, interpretations of the pre1945 history of both German diplomacy and the German diplomatic corps played an important role in postwar debates about the new ministry and who should serve in it. Veteran German diplomats attempted to promulgate a positive vision of this past, and ironically those who had experienced setbacks under or who had opposed National Socialism were often the most active. For example, Hans E. Riesser was a career diplomat whose clashes with his new mission chief in Paris starting in 1932 led to his recall. Forced to leave the service in 1934 as a "non-Aryan," he established himself as a businessman in France and then Switzerland. On Christmas Day 1941, the Nazi state revoked his German citizenship under new legislation targeting Jews living abroad, even though Riesser had also worked for German military intelligence in Switzerland since 1939. He restarted his diplomatic career in 1950 and served the Federal Republic as head of its Consulate General in New York and as its observer at the United Nations. 1 In 1959, after he retired, Riesser wrote a book titled Did Germany s Diplomats Fai/? 2 He concluded that, considering normal human weaknesses, the ministry's past record was good. As will be discussed later, starting in the late I 940s his colleagues Wilhelm Haas and Gustav

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Strohm, who like Riesser had personal difficulties with the National Socialists, pointed to the Weimar Republic's Foreign Office (1918/19-33) as a progressive ministry led for six years by a democratic foreign minister, Stresemann. Others, like State Secretary Ernst von Weizsacker in his 1950 memoirs, held Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and other "Nazi diplomats" brought into the ministry guilty for crimes committed during the Second World War and claimed that the career diplomats were only marginally involved in these affairs. They initiated what one scholar has called the "minimal guilt thesis" that has characterized the ministry's official self-depiction until very recently. 3 Yet these theses were immediately challenged, both in Germany and abroad. As historian Paul Seabury pointed out in 1951, "In the vast collection of memoirs and apologia produced by former diplomats of Nazi Germany, Ribbentrop serves the purpose of whipping boy for former German diplomatists now engaged in cleansing their own reputations before the bar ofhistory."4 Since perceptions of the past played an important role in the creation of the new Foreign Office, we will begin by considering the history of the German Auswartiges Amt from 1871 to 1945. The German diplomatic corps never numbered more than approximately five hundred individuals active at any given time before the Second World War. With a generally conservative worldview, its members felt strong ties of solidarity to their institution and to their colleagues. They shared a peculiar lifestyle and relationship to the government, which included regular rotating postings at home and abroad for themselves and their immediate families as well as the tradition of "nonpartisanship" common to German government officials before 1945. Weizsacker, who worked for the Second German Empire ( 1871-1918), Weimar Republic, and Third Reich (1933--45) as a naval officer and then as a diplomat, told the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in June 1948 that "as a civil servant, one doesn't serve a constitution, but the Fatherland. One serves whichever government and constitution is given to the country by the people."5 This was an exclusive professional group both conservative and cosmopolitan in outlook, which defined itself in terms of state service. 6 Despite their selectivity, however, the diplomats' outlook and conduct during the first half of the twentieth century shared much in common with other predominantly conservative elite groups in Germany. The diplomats were worried about maintaining their social and political positions during a period of intense upheaval marked by two world wars, two major economic crises (the hyperinflation of the early 1920s and the Great Depression), and two political revolutions (a democratic one in 1918-19 and a National Socialist one

14 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE in 1933). Furthermore, they wanted to uphold Germany's status as a great power. Whatever government seemed best able to ensure these ends would secure the career diplomats' support as a group. 7 Within these parameters there was considerable room in the Auswartiges Amt for flexibility in further professionalizing the ministry, for contrasting foreign policy strategies, and even for divergent views of both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Yet like other German elites, the German diplomats' enthusiasm for republican government clearly weakened as the 1920s progressed and then died as the Weimar Republic entered its crisis phase. With few exceptions they cautiously greeted the rise of National Socialism as the best means ofrestoring national stability and strength. 8 And despite increasing evidence that the new government was pursuing criminal policies, most continued to serve loyally and sometimes enthusiastically until it collapsed in 1945. In the past, some scholars have argued that the diplomats' university studies, privileged social backgrounds, and typically conservative political views made it highly unlikely that they would identify wholeheartedly with Nazi ideology, goals, or political methods. 9 However, these authors focus on foreign policy issues or on the German resistance and generally are not concerned with the sociology of elites or the internal functioning of the National Socialist system insofar as they do not directly relate to international affairs. Recent studies have demonstrated that many of the most dedicated servants of the Nazi state, for example those with leadership functions in the police system, were relatively young, well-educated members of the middle class who did not need the Party to help them advance their careers. 10 Likewise, the German nobility, despite its public image in West Germany starting in the 1950s, contained far more supporters of Hitler than resistance members. 11 Therefore there is no reason to assume that the diplomats were less likely to cooperate or empathize with the NSDAP [the National Socialist German Workers' Party, or "Nazi Party"] just because of their background. Although a resistance movement existed in the Auswartiges Amt by 1938, most diplomats did not become critical of Nazism until well into the Second World War, despite the fact that they resented incursions by "outsiders" into their ministry. By the end of the war, many had become deeply implicated in National Socialist crimes. 12

The Auswiirtiges Amt during the Kaiserreich The modem Auswartiges Amt arose out of the Prussian Foreign Office in 1870 as part of the process of German unification. During the Second German

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Empire the Foreign Office's stature as first among the civilian ministries derived in no small measure from the fact that it was directly subordinate to the chancellor, starting with Bismarck himself. There was no independent minister in charge of its operations but instead a bureaucrat, a state secretary [Staatssekretar]. In 1885 the Auswartiges Amt adopted a new internal configuration based around four divisions: the Political Division (IA), the Personnel and Administrative Division (IB), the Foreign Trade Division [Handelspolitische Abteilung] (II), and the Legal Division (III). The ministry also created a Colonial Division in 1890, which became an independent Reich Colonial Office in 1907, and a Press Division [Nachrichtenabteilung] in 1915, but otherwise it maintained its basic structure with few changes until the end of the Kaiserreich in 1918_13 Throughout this era there was a strict distinction between the diplomatic and consular career tracks. Moreover, Division IA held a predominant place within the ministry. It not only handled all political matters but also contained all of the diplomatic personnel. Most of its officials were aristocrats, although the balance between nobles and non-nobles working in the central office in Berlin was by no means unfavorable to the latter. 14 However, the nobility predominated in appointments to foreign posts, in part because of the importance of the European royal courts in international relations and assumptions about the nobility's international experience, language skills, and overall sophistication. In addition, the diplomatic track required men (and before 1918 only men) of independent wealth. Attaches did not receive a salary, although it might take as long as three years to pass all of the requisite examinations for becoming a diplomat. Moreover, expense accounts frequently did not come anywhere close to covering the costs incurred by mission chiefs for social functions. Around 1912 the Auswartiges Amt estimated that applicants for the diplomatic career track needed private incomes of 15,000 Reichsmark a year, a great burden even for most propertied men. 15 In the public mind, Division IA came to represent the entire Foreign Office: an aristocratic stronghold concerned mainly with questions of high politics. Its diplomats treated their mainly bourgeois colleagues from the other divisions, at best, as useful advisors on technical questions. 16 Before 1945 Germans both admired their Foreign Office for its glamour and criticized it for its traditionalism. Starting in the 1880s the German press, the business community, and the Reichstag alike began to question whether it was in step with the times. Parliamentary critics emphasized the need for liberalization of the ministry's recruitment policies in order to break the nobles' monopoly and to draw increased attention to trade matters. 17 Implicit in the

16 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE criticism after 1890 was also a frustration with Wilhelm II's erratic leadership style. Since the Kaiser could not be attacked openly, the Foreign Office became an obvious target for detractors of German foreign policy, as for example in the wake of the 1908 Daily Telegraph affair. 18 Even Wilhelm Freiherr von Schoen, state secretary in the Foreign Office from 1907 to 1910, publicly admitted that the Auswartiges Amt was behind the times in light of the increasing volume and complexity of its work. 19 Nonetheless, calls from parliament to combine the German diplomatic and consular services went unheeded by the Foreign Office before World War I, as did persistent requests to abolish income requirements for entering the foreign service and to modernize the examination process for potential attaches. Starting in 1917 a series of developments finally forced the ministry's hand. First, several diplomatic missteps by the Foreign Office provoked neutral countries and threatened to bring them into the war against Germany. For example, in anticipation of Germany's return to unrestricted submarine warfare, in January 1917 State Secretary Arthur Zimmermann proposed a military alliance with Mexico in the case of the United States' entry into the war. In return, Mexico would receive Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. British intelligence intercepted the "Zimmermann Telegram," which was published in American newspapers in March. Then in September, the United States made public telegrams intercepted several months earlier from Germany's minister in Buenos Aries, Karl Graf von Luxburg, in which Luxburg recommended sinking Argentine ships trading with the Allies and called the Argentine foreign minister an "anglophile ass." The Foreign Office managed to repair relations with neutral Argentina, but the "Luxburg Affair" outraged German trading interests. By the spring of 1918 overseas merchants were calling openly for sweeping reforms, forcefully supported by National Liberal delegate Stresemann in the Reichstag in July. However, change became imminent only during the second half of 1918. Frustrated international businessmen began to think that the Imperial Economics Office [Reichswirtschaftsamt] would be more responsive to their interests. In order to prevent the loss of its foreign trade competencies to another ministry, the Foreign Office was finally ready to undertake concrete reforms. 20

•

The Auswiirtiges Amt during the Weimar Republic, 1918-33 First, however, came the unexpected and sudden collapse of the German Empire in November 1918 and the subsequent creation of the Weimar Repub-

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lie. According to one view, the Revolution of 1918-19 "stopped before the gates of the Auswartiges Amt" and left the ministry's leadership firmly in the hands of the career officials who had made policy during the Kaiserreich. 21 Yet these events led to a tremendous turnover in the ministry's leadership personnel. Between July 1, 1918, and April 10, 1919, alone, thirty-nine diplomats left the office, including both deputy state secretaries and seven division leaders [Direktoren] or deputy leaders [Dirigenten]. Many of these changes came about because the individuals in question were monarchists who could not support a republic or its probable new foreign policies. Further resignations would come to protest the signing of the Versailles Treaty in August 1919, although these were often merely temporary. 22 Over the next decade the ministry would experiment with modernizing its structures, professionalizing its personnel, and trying to adapt the best traditions in German foreign policy to the changed international scenario. For some time its officials also were willing to cooperate with, or at least tolerate, the new republic. Nonetheless, it is also undeniable that by the late 1920s the diplomatic corps's patience with the Weimar Republic and with the progress made in revising the Versailles peace settlement-with its limitations on the German armed forces, territorial losses above all in the East, and reparations-was wearing dangerously thin. During the Weimar Republic the vast majority of diplomats continued to cling to a tradition of nonpartisanship insofar as they declined to join a party and, at least in public, refrained from commenting on government policy. 23 Many of them disliked the Republic, yet anti-republican sentiment remained muted. Some who, like Weizsacker, decried the "party system mess" [Parteischweinerei], nonetheless "obediently" [brav] voted for Stresemann 's German People's Party (DVP) in the 1924 elections. 24 Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath was, in the words of his biographer, "one of a large number of conservatives who found no place within the Weimar political system, but gave passive and unenthusiastic loyalty to the new state."25 Monarchists like Neurath and Weizsacker knew that it was impossible and indeed undesirable to turn the clock back to 1918, and a well-functioning German republic was tolerable given the lack of other alternatives. 26 Weizsacker also noted that you could conduct a "normal foreign policy" with some Weimar governments.27 Moreover, loyalty toward the republican system depended to a great extent on the government's respect for the principle that "an actual parliamentarisation of the foreign service was not possible," as Foreign Minister Ulrich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau told the cabinet on April 1, 1919. The foreign minister might take suggestions

18 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE from the parties, but in the end he alone would determine the ministry's personnel policy. 28 Yet the nonpartisan tradition had also begun to break down. Many Weimarera civil servants decided that they had to become active in republican politics for the very reason that their traditional rights and privileges were coming under attack. German diplomats, like other Higher Service [Hoherer Dienst] officials throughout the country (an elite comprising only 2% of all civil servants), showed a proclivity to support the conservative German National People's Party (DNVP), whose view of the Republic fluctuated from ambivalent to openly hostile and which also made preservation of the career civil service one of its priorities. 29 The limited material available on the diplomats' political affiliations suggests an initial phase of enthusiasm for left-liberal and even socialist politics around the time of the November Revolution in 1918, especially among younger officials. 30 As with other members of the middle and upper classes, the diplomats' support for democracy fell after the early 1920s as general dissatisfaction with the Republic grew. This is evidenced in the rightward trend in political affiliations of attaches who entered the Foreign Office in the 1920s over the course of the decade. 31 But the Stresemann years proved that the Foreign Office could support a "republican" foreign policy and come to admire a republican foreign minister, as many of the younger diplomats who came into the ministry in the late 1920s attested. 32 On the whole, German diplomats actively defended the Republic's foreign policy against attacks from the political right through 1933. 33 The Auswartiges Amt also tried to adapt its administrative structures to the times. As mentioned above, even before the November Revolution public pressure forced the ministry to commit itself to internal reforms. Then the Weimar Constitution of August 1919 formally created a foreign minister responsible to parliament (Brockdorff-Rantzau had been appointed interim foreign minister in February). Both houses of parliament enjoyed the right to ratify treaties and their own foreign relations committees. Moreover, the lower house or Reichstag received much greater budgetary authority than its predecessor had enjoyed in the Kaiserreich. The parliament, and especially the Reichstag, now had unprecedented powers to supervise not only foreign policy but also, by means of appropriations, the internal workings of the Foreign Office. 34 The ministry's main response to calls for a new approach from parliament and the public came in the form of the Schiller Reforms, named after Edmund Schiller, superintendent (and later head) of the Personnel and Administrative Department. They combined the diplomatic and consular career tracks and

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opened the foreign service, especially in its top positions, to candidates from the business world, politics, and academia. 35 A number of "outsiders," or officials who had not come up through the foreign service ranks, were appointed to prominent diplomatic posts abroad. This new personnel strategy also reflected the fact that the ministry needed experts in economics, culture, and other fields that were becoming increasingly important for its work. 36 The reforms introduced a regional system based on six geographical divisions (Western Europe, Southeast Europe, Northeast Europe, Great Britain and the British Empire, the Americas, and East Asia). The Personnel and Administrative Division (Division I) and a sharply reduced Legal Division (Division VIII) survived as "functional" departments from the old system and were joined by a new Division IX, which dealt with cultural affairs and "Deutschtum" abroad (i.e., German communities outside the Reich's borders, mainly in Eastern Europe). Finally, a Foreign Trade Office [AujJenhandelsstelle], Division X, coordinated demands from the private sector of the economy with state policy. 37 Schiller resigned in December 1920 after his reforms came under heavy criticism from his colleagues. Thereafter the Foreign Office displayed considerable reluctance to appoint outsiders to important positions, a trend that continued until Joachim von Ribbentrop became foreign minister in 193 8 (and that would resume after 1949). By the end of 1921 the Auswartiges Amt also had reduced Schiiler's six geographic divisions to three and closed the AuBenhandelsstelle. Then in 1936 it scrapped the regional system entirely in favor of a return to five functional divisions: the Personnel and Budget Division (1), the Political Division (11), the Division of Commercial Politics (III), the Legal Division (IV), and the Cultural Division (V). 38 The Schuler Reforms' limited impact has often been attributed to the allpervasive conservatism and traditionalism of the diplomatic corps, for example its reluctance to employ outsiders and its emphasis on the "primacy of politics" as opposed to economics. 39 However, the Foreign Office's practical difficulties between 1918 and 1923 played a significant role, too. 40 These included a series of weak foreign ministers who set no clear political line, internal divisions over the proper course for Germany in the wake of its military defeat, and the ever-increasing trend toward participation of the political parties and outside specialists in planning foreign policy. In this atmosphere Schiiler's reforms, and in particular the plethora of new divisions he established, further detracted from effective work. Once streamlined, however, the geographic system would survive for another fifteen years, and it is not at all clear that conservative opposition played the main role in its final demise. For

20 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE example, after the start of the world economic crisis in 1929-30, various countries increased tariffs and other trade barriers. In response, support within the ministry grew for taking trade relations out of the various geographic divisions and putting them into an independent division once again. 41 Peter Kruger has even suggested that after 1933 the ministry's leadership wanted to concentrate all of the career diplomatic corps in one large political division so as to mitigate the effects of growing Nazi interference in the ministry's personnel policy. 42 The Schuler Reforms also brought lasting change to the Auswartiges Amt in at least one important area: the diplomatic and consular services remain unified to this day. 43 The Auswartiges Amt's personnel policy also slowly changed during the interwar period. The new training program for attaches, developed by Neurath in 1921, embodied the prevailing mix of traditionalism and reform within the Auswartiges Amt during the Weimar era. On the one hand, the examination topics required that candidates have more or less the same educational background as their predecessors in the Kaiserreich. On the other, the ministry decided to pay attaches for the first time, thus effectively opening the service to persons without large personal incomes. 44 The foreign service continued to consist, as it had before 1918, overwhelmingly of upper-class Protestant males who had completed legal studies and who, as the German political parties on the center and left noted with some concern, frequently were brothers in the same conservative student fratemities. 45 Among the Higher Service, the highest of the four classes of civil servants within the office and the one that included the diplomats, Catholics represented only 20 percent of the personnel (despite constituting approximately 36% of the pre-1914 population), and Jews and women remained insignificant minorities. 46 Significantly, however, fewer diplomats came from the aristocracy. Between 1871 and 1914, seven often attaches had been nobles. During the Weimar Republic this ratio fell below three of ten. 47 Although approximately 39 percent, 62 of the 161 diplomats serving as mission chiefs or at leading posts in the central office between 1921 and 1933, still had noble titles, especially during Gustav Stresemann's tenure as foreign minister (1923-29) officials in the most important leadership positions tended to be both relatively young and bourgeois. 48 Kruger has described this phenomenon as the transformation of the diplomatic corps from a "status elite to a functional elite."49 Professional skills increasingly counted for more than social status. Likewise, German foreign policy in the Weimar years attempted to combine tradition and innovation. Due to demobilization after the Armistice and

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especially the Versailles Treaty, the major problems facing national foreign policy had changed dramatically. No longer did diplomacy have maintaining or expanding Germany's great power status as its main goal. Instead, simply reattaining that status by dismantling the Versailles settlement became the overriding objective. However, if the end was not so much in question, there were significant differences within the diplomatic corps about the means by which it could be achieved. Here the geographic orientation of Germany's foreign policy-e.g. pro-Western, pro-Soviet, or neutral-was far less important than the general principles it should follow.so Some diplomats continued to prefer a foreign policy with clear roots in the Wilhelminian tradition. They emphasized that the armed forces were the main basis of national power, making the restoration of Germany's military strength a priority. They preferred unilateral solutions to Germany's problems wherever possible, which was sometimes described as a policy of the "free hand." For the same reason, they were skeptical about opening Germany entirely to the international economy. Finally, although they posited a close connection between foreign and domestic conditions, they believed the former were decisive for the latter. During the 1920s Bernhard von Billow, Neurath, and Weizsiicker were prominent representatives of this "conservative" foreign policy, and they would have a chance to implement it directly after 1930. Typical of this thinking were Weizsiicker's retrospective criticisms of German participation in the League of Nations from 1926 to 1933. He believed that this organization, which was supposed to preserve international peace, actually was a cynical device that the victor powers from World War I used to preserve a status quo favorable to them. Moreover, because the League had been unwilling to grant Germany significant concessions, e.g. on disarmament, or truly equal treatment, Weizsiicker thought it had dealt the Weimar Republic a fatal blow and prepared the way for Hitler.s 1 The other position also had its roots in the German Empire but is most closely associated with Stresemann. Its adherents identified economic rather than military strength as the main determinant of national power and valued close integration into the world economy, multilateralism, and international cooperation. Stresemann himself was not a proponent of supranational European integration, but he was willing to think beyond the nation state by emphasizing Germany's role in an interdependent international system centered on Europe that also included the United States as a major actor. The Versailles peace settlement could be revised in Germany's favor only by peaceful means in cooperation with the other major powers, as epitomized by the Dawes Plan

22 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE on reparations of 1924 and the Locarno Treaties of 1925. Good relations with France were also a central part of his agenda. Although the conservatives as a group wanted the return of all Germany's pre-1918 territories as well as new colonies, Stresemann had more limited territorial goals, which focused primarily on regaining Danzig and creating a special solution to the Polish Corridor. The most recent scholarship on Stresemann's foreign policy also has emphasized that these precepts were not simply a means to the end of renewed power politics after successful revision of the Versailles Treaty. He believed that the old style of international relations had to be replaced by a new type that involved closely integrating Germany into a peaceful European state system based on interstate cooperation. When the Republic took an authoritarian turn during the era of presidential cabinets (1930-33), however, so too did the Foreign Office. A new conservative leadership consisting of two career diplomats, State Secretary Billow (1930-36) and Foreign Minister Neurath (1932-38), advocated more assertive policies in the interest of more rapid progress toward full international equality and a final revision of the Versailles Treaty. In particular, Stresemann's emphasis on multilateral relations was jettisoned. Most disturbingly, both Neurath and Billow desired to pursue a foreign policy of the "free hand," which also was unburdened by domestic considerations. 52 They believed that the end of parliamentary government in the Reich would increase the Auswartiges Amt's institutional influence on policy-making, too. 53 In this the conservatives would be greatly mistaken. The chancellor's role in Germany's foreign relations after 1930 and outside interference in the ministry's internal workings after 1933 both increased dramatically. Moreover, the practical and moral deficits of this variety of political nonpartisanship, based as it was upon the strongest possible reassertion of a "primacy of foreign policy," became glaringly obvious starting in 1933 as the ministry became an accomplice in Hitler's aggressive plans.

The German Diplomats and the Rise of the Nazi State Career diplomats had reason to be cautious about Adolf Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933. Long before then the National Socialists had targeted the Auswartiges Amt as a bastion of "reactionary" officials harboring "internationalist" (that is, non-German) views. Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and Joachim von Ribbentrop thought that the diplomats were illsuited to conduct the NSDAP's "revolutionary" foreign policy and therefore intended to restructure the Foreign Office as quickly as possible. 54 An array

The Auswfirtiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-194 5 23 of new organizations for international affairs soon confronted the Foreign Office. Some of them were quite serious competitors; for example, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop [Ribbentrop Bureau], the Party's foreign policy office under Ribbentrop, and the NSDAP's Auslandsorganisation, which coordinated all Party members and groups outside the Reich's borders. 55 Soon after 1933 the Foreign Office came under increased scrutiny by party organizations and was monitored by electronic surveillance. 56 However, hopeful expectations about the nature of a National Socialist government led most diplomats to remain in service. Only a handful of Foreign Office officials-thirty-three from all ranks, according to one estimate--quit in the wake of January 30, 1933. 57 As we have seen, a roughly similar number of officials from the Higher Service alone had resigned between mid-1918 and mid-1919. In contrast, in early 1933 Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, a member of the left-liberal German Democratic Party (DDP) and ambassador to the United States, was the only prominent German diplomat to leave. Prittwitz later said he tried to get other colleagues to follow him, but none of them did because they believed they could exercise a moderating influence on Hitler's foreign policy and were reassured by Neurath's continued presence as foreign minister. Moreover, those who feared they would lose their jobs calmed down as it became apparent that the Nazis initially preferred to leave the diplomatic corps essentially unchanged. 58 Despite the distrust they faced from the NSDAP, leading diplomats clearly welcomed the new government's emphasis on reestablishing national strength and unity. Not only had these elements been lacking during the last years of the Republic, but they also seemed necessary if Germany was to once again pursue an active foreign policy. Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen wrote that neither a Communist nor a National Socialist dictatorship seemed particularly attractive to him and his colleagues in 1933. "Nevertheless, the impression prevailed that enormous energies had been released by [the Nazi] movement, that an enthusiasm had been set in motion which justified the hope that this new state of mind might develop into a new and creative period following fifteen years of unrest, uncertainty, and growing economic and social chaos."59 Like Dirksen, Neurath at first assumed that the Nazi movement would become increasingly moderate in its politics after entering the government, much as the Italian fascists had. In the meantime, it would restore order in Germany and remove the communist threat. 60 Some of the younger generation of diplomats who would later serve the Federal Republic shared these beliefs. Hans Kroll, who worked in the ministry's Foreign Trade Division in the early 1930s and later served as West

24 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE German ambassador to Yugoslavia, Japan, and the USSR, wrote in his memoirs that he and his closest friends and colleagues in the Foreign Office, like other "nationally minded" Germans, initially trusted the new government to revive the economy, lessen class tensions, and combat communism. 61 The Legal Division's Werner von Bargen, who ended his career as the Federal Republic's ambassador to Iraq, wrote after the war about the widespread feeling in the government ministries that Hitler needed to be given a chance since "something had to happen." Ifhe failed, he and his movement would quickly disappear. 62 Bargen displayed more enthusiasm at the time than his comments suggest, since he joined the NSDAP in May 1933. 63 Their rhetoric indicates that some leading diplomats openly embraced the new government. Ambassador Ernst Arthur Voretzsch gave a speech at the reception at the embassy for the German colony in Japan on May 1, 1933, the Day of National Labor (a Nazi holiday that substituted for the Marxistassociated May Day), titled "Hitler, God's Emissary [Hitler, der Gottgesandte]."64 Neurath himself, on June 28, 1933, instructed Germany's foreign missions that all personnel were free to join the Nazi Party if they wished. He declared that the official working abroad "had to avow himself to the new Germany and must cooperate in the construction of the new state," and even used the Nazi term "nationale Erhebung [national uprising]" to describe the change in government. 65 Neurath's and Billow's goal of increasing the ministry's influence on policy making quickly proved to be an illusion. Even before Hitler turned to open conquest, it was obvious that the initiative for many of the key decisions in German foreign policy-like the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland in 1934, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936--had come from the Chancellery, not the Foreign Office. 66 Nonetheless, German diplomats worked closely to implement Hitler's revisionist program, which until the late 1930s seemed to coincide well enough with their own agenda from the previous decade. Hitler's initial successful and peaceful pursuit of traditional revisionist goals, capped by the Anschluj3 with Austria in March 1938, served an important domestic purpose: it helped stabilize the alliance between the NSDAP and conservative elites in the government and military. Moreover, this apparent foreign policy consensus helped mask his intentions from the outside world until he was ready to proceed with his true program starting late in 193 7. 67 Hitler's announcement to leading government officials and army officers on November 5, 1937, of his intention to absorb Austria and Czechoslovakia

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into the Reich as the first stage of an attempt to win Lebensraum marked the end of the career diplomats' influence on the overall direction of German policy. Neurath and the military leadership objected to these plans, it should be stressed, for reasons that had little to do with principled opposition to territorial expansion. Although they could not have fully anticipated Hitler's later policies, in the mid-l 930s many leading diplomats, including Weizsacker and the German ambassador to the USSR, Rudolf Nadolny, advocated the extension of Germany's eastern boundaries. 68 This sentiment reached far into the ranks of later active opponents of Nazism as well. For example, although it could not have helped their cause of strengthening foreign opposition to Hitler's plans for war, after 1938 members of the diplomatic resistance told their British contacts that they wanted Germany to retain the gains made through the AnschluB with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland and to revise the western borders of Poland. 69 While in exile in 1935 former chancellor Heinrich Bruning wrote that "the goal must remain as [it has] for a decade: re-winning better borders and greater space [Lebensraum] in the East. How this goal is to be pursued tactically in each case is a question of constantly changing decisions. Only no abrupt tum from the present policy."70 Hitler's new strategy, however, represented just such a break, risking war with the United Kingdom, France, and other major powers. Neurath and the generals objected, only to be replaced. In the following months considerable personnel and organizational change ensued in the Economics, War, and Foreign Ministries as dependable National Socialists replaced old conservative elites. In February 1938 Ribbentrop became foreign minister, and a number of prominent German ambassadors were recalled. 71 It was only at this point that serious opposition to the NSDAP's foreign policy program developed among some career diplomats, who feared that a general European war was now imminent, especially in response to the events that led to the Munich Conference and the subsequent dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in late 1938 and early 1939. Career diplomats found other areas of ideological affinity with National Socialism besides agreement on the need to revise the Versailles Treaty and restore Germany's great power status. Besides Prittwitz, few German diplomats seemed to have mourned the end of the Weimar Republic. The ministry's leadership displayed little concern about the abolition of democracy at home. 72 The same was true even for diplomats who resisted Nazism like Ulrich von Hassel, who rejected the "Weimar System" and therefore greeted the new government

26 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE in 1933. After his recall as ambassador to Italy in 1938, he became part of the conservative resistance and was arrested in connection with the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt against Hitler. In September 1944, he told the People's Court [ Volksgerichtshoj] that would sentence him to death that he objected to the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939 in violation of the Munich Accords, the abolition of the Rechtsstaat (a state that based its rule on law), the abridgement of personal freedoms, and the treatment of the Jews and the Christian churches. Political, as opposed to individual, rights did not appear in Hassel 's list. 73 As Donald McKale wrote, "yet another reason that Hitler retained the established diplomats involved their support-or lack of criticism-of what the Nazis considered most important in 1933 and 1934: the campaign inside Germany against the Jews, Communists, and other alleged enemies of the government." 74 In particular, the Foreign Office displayed no hesitation about cooperating with official anti-Semitic policies. "Polite" anti-Semitism had been widespread among the diplomats since the days of the Kaiserreich and helps explain the relatively low number of Jews in the Auswartiges Amt through the 1930s. 75 Officially, the ministry considered Jewish affairs to be a domestic matter and rarely took an active interest in them. During the politically unstable last years of the Republic it started actively "covering" for domestic events that might damage Germany's reputation abroad by emphasizing to foreigners the continuity in national foreign policy. 76 But the Auswartiges Amt's instructions for its missions abroad on how to explain German-Jewish relations to the outside world after 1933 went far beyond what might be considered a justifiable continuation of this "covering" policy. Already in April 1933, the Foreign Office leadership had, in the words of Christopher Browning, "approved the official dissemination throughout the world of the crudest type of antiSemitic propaganda in order to preserve Germany's honor and reputation" in the form of a circular letter to all German missions on current Jewish policy. 77 Furthermore, prior to 1938 it insisted in response to complaints from other governments that foreign Jews residing in Germany were subject to German Jewish legislation (and therefore no international agreements had been violated). 78 Those diplomats who did strongly disapprove of official anti-Semitic policies, like Hassel and Hans-Bernd von Haeften, eventually gravitated toward the resistance, especially after Kristallnacht on November 9, 1938. 79

The Auswartiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-1945 27

1. The Auswartiges Amt in the WilhelmstraBe, Berlin, around 1935, bedecked with swastika flags for a special occasion (Bundesarchiv, Bild l 46-1983-028-08).

Personnel Policy and NSDAP Membership Despite increasing difficulties during his last two years in office, Neurath had success in limiting outside interference in the ministry's personnel policy. 80 Even before Ribbentrop replaced him as foreign minister in 1938, however, career diplomats had started joining the Nazi Party in great numbers. By October 15, 1937, approximately 200 of the some 500 Higher Service officials belonged to the NSDAP or one of its organizations, with at least 50 members in the SS or SD [Sicherheitsdienst, the intelligence agency in Heinrich Himmler's Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA]. Overall, approximately one- third of the ministry's 2,600 employees were now party members. Many more had applied but been rejected. These figures belie the thesis propagated by former diplomats after 1945 that the Auswartiges Amt had been an anti-Nazi bastion until Ribbentrop began to determine personnel policy in 1938. 81 Nonetheless, these data do not tell us why diplomats actually joined. The fact remains that although only a handful of officials voiced their objections

28 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE by resigning after January 30, 1933, only around 10 members of the Higher Service and 64 employees overall had joined the NSDAP before that date. This indicates that the overwhelming majority initially adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the new government. In 1934 the gauleiter of the Auslandsorganisation, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, helped reopen the membership lists of the NSDAP to German diplomats, this time with the expectation that they would join. Nonetheless, the Auslandsorganisation was still complaining to Rudolf Hess as late as March 193 7 about the "relative lack of National Socialist officials in the Foreign Service."82 That same year a "mass flight" of diplomats into the SS 's honorary structures ensued. 83 The timing was no coincidence. In 1936 and 1937 party incursions into the ministry's business reached an unprecedented level. These culminated with the appointment of Bohle as state secretary in the Foreign Office on January 30, 193 7. Although he recognized the primacy of German mission chiefs, Bohle insisted that the Auslandsorganisation's "party leaders" have second rank at all public functions abroad. Moreover, he expected the closest cooperation between the ministry and his organization, not only to help indoctrinate Germans living abroad with National Socialist ideology but also to demonstrate the unity of party and state. 84 Most importantly, the Auslandsorganisation now asserted the right to approve the ministry's requests for personnel appointments or promotions. Bohle's postwar comments that many diplomats asked him for help in joining the NSDAP or the SS therefore come as no surprise. 85 Neurath became increasingly desperate to keep party officials out of ministerial business and therefore became more willing to make dubious compromises on important appointments. 86 A 1951 analysis of the captured Foreign Office personnel files by the US High Commission confirmed the importance of 1936-37 for the diplomats' formal relationship with National Socialism while adding an important new insight. Starting around 1936 the Auswartiges Amt learned to have candidates for promotion join the NSDAP first, in response to the increasingly tough scrutiny of its personnel policy by the Nazi Party Chancellery in Munich. Several diplomats later testified that they had been told to join after 193 8 for exactly this reason. 87 Walther Hess, forced out of the foreign service in 193 8 due to his Jewish wife, also noted that in the 1930s diplomats without independent wealth often found it difficult to quit their jobs for financial reasons. 88 Careerism therefore played an important role in the decision to join the party, especially for younger officials. It even influenced the behavior of the diplomats of Referat D III of the Abteilung Deutsch/and [literally, the "Germany" or

The Auswiirtiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-1945

29

Domestic Affairs Division], which coordinated the Foreign Office's policy on the "Final Solution."89 Taken alone, nominal membership in the NSDAP was a poor sign of one's true political convictions. On the other hand, it is important to remember that such membership was never compulsory. As Neurath wrote in his June 1933 instructions to Germany's foreign missions, "this step by its very nature is naturally purely personal."90 Even direct invitations to join the SS could be declined without serious consequences. 91 After the war several junior diplomats as well as former Chancellor Bruning claimed that the Foreign Office leadership, and Bulow in particular, had privately urged younger officials to stay at their posts and to join the NSDAP in order to prevent dedicated Nazis from taking their place. 92 Others who had been stationed abroad in the 1930s added that their mission chiefs urged them to join because they would otherwise be of limited use in dealing with a proNazi German colony or local fascist officials (e.g., in Italy), thereby surrendering the field to the NSDAP's representatives. 93 Btilow's sentiment, spoken on his deathbed in 1936, that "you don't abandon your country just because it has a bad government [Man liij3t sein Land nicht im Stich, weil es eine schlechte Regierung hat]" undoubtedly remained widespread in the tradition-minded diplomatic corps. 94 However, most of the evidence for this type of nonpartisan patriotism comes from postwar testimony and memoirs, and such claims could be and were used as a retrospective defense for staying in office, regardless of the grounds. And even if some diplomats believed they had to follow this strategy to exercise a moderating influence on Hitler's policies, in the end they only deceived themselves. After Ribbentrop became minister, the total number of employees in the Auswartiges Amt increased from 2,665 to 6,458 by 1943.95 This vast increase occurred in Ribbentrop's own office and personal staff, in the new Culture and Radio and Information and Press Divisions, and most dramatically, in the Abteilung Deutschland and its successors after 1943, Referat Inland I and II, which were responsible for relations with the NSDAP and Jewish policy. The SS's influence in these new organs was particularly strong, with SS-Ftihrer [officers] who had followed Ribbentrop into the Auswartiges Amt in all the key positions. As these units grew during the course of the Second World War, the importance of the Auswartiges Amt's traditional structures and personnel decreased significantly. 96 Due to Ribbentrop's appointment, pressure on remaining members of the pre-1938 diplomatic corps to join the NSDAP or its organizations undoubtedly increased even as Bohle's personal influence

30 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE diminished. 97 During the war the vast majority of Higher Service officials were either party members or candidates (around 75% in 1941), including approximately 73 SS-Ftihrer by 1944. These very high membership levels in the NSDAP and its organizations were reached mainly due to new officials brought into the ministry by Ribbentrop, but they also indicate the NSDAP's growing influence on the Foreign Office's traditional personnel. 98 Throughout the Third Reich career officials in the Personnel Division consistently registered objections, usually in vain, to outside appointments who did not fulfill the foreign service's formal requirements. Career diplomats also looked with some disdain on members of Ribbentrop's personal staff and office, many of whom had been given credit for service in the Foreign Office based on time spent in the Dienststelle Ribbentrop. Members of the US High Commission concluded that the ministry's personnel files evidenced a "strong, if undercover, disagreement" between the "unreconstructed" core of careerists and newcomers brought in from NSDAP organizations. 99 In response to a request from colleagues in 1949, Carl Dienstmann, who had served as deputy director of the Personnel Division in the mid-1930s, and his former subordinate Hans-Werner Rohde prepared answers to a list of questions about the fate of the German diplomats under National Socialism. They claimed that "hundreds" of Higher Service officials could not be promoted due to objections from the Party. Although we must treat this information with extreme caution, since it was based on memory and likely served an apologetic purpose, it confirms the idea that the Personnel Division faced a constant struggle with Party offices in getting officials appointed or promoted. 100 In a clear expression of the diplomatic corps' solidarity, Neurath and others apparently tried to shield colleagues who were Jewish, who were married to Jews, or who for some other reason were considered undesirable by the NSDAP. This became an issue as early as April 7, 1933, due to the passage of the Law to Restore a Professional Civil Service [Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums] and intensified with further "Jewish legislation" over the next few years. All told, these laws affected 30,000 civil servants during the 1930s, or about 2 percent of all government civil servants-a disappointingly low figure to many Nazi activists. According to Dienstmann and Rohde, 22 out of roughly 500 Higher Service officials had to leave due to "racial" reasons in the 1930s. Another l Oleft due to "ideological differences," presumably because they were Freemasons or devout Christians, to whom the NSDAP objected. The Foreign Office leadership protected such individuals for as long as possible (for prominent Jewish officials, until the promulgation of the

The Auswartiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-194 5 31 Nuremberg Laws in September 1935). Thereafter it arranged either pensions or suitable jobs with private industry. 101 Yet the corps of career diplomats and the men brought into the ministry by the National Socialists clearly were not irreconcilable rivals. A senior career diplomat like Andor Hencke (head of the Political Division from 1943 until 1945) noted that despite the resentments of the career officials, one cannot say that a really changed spirit came into the office through the incorporation of the many new civil servants who should be seen as party representatives [Exponenten]. On the whole, the ministry's fundamentally "conservative character" did not change significantly. Ultimately the Auswartiges Amt "reared" [auftiehen] many of the newcomers. That means that they adopted its customs and traditional way of thinking and in part developed into very useful officials. In many respects the foreign service Praxis looked different from what they previously had thought and had been told. The Party and its organizations-and, by the way, Hitler himself-frequently came to see them as "lost sheep" and inwardly wrote them off.

For example, Hencke credited State Secretary Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, Weizsacker's successor who had come into the ministry from the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, with doing his best to shield the Auswartiges Amt and its personnel from increasing interference from Party circles in the last years of the war. 102 Through the early 1940s many career officials developed a genuine enthusiasm for Hitler's policies, which certainly helps explain their desire to join the NSDAP or its organizations. Several prominent diplomats freely admitted as much to members of the US State Department's Special Interrogation Mission to Germany in 1945 and 1946. Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, Germany's ambassador to the United States from 1937 to 1938 and also Ribbentrop's brother-in-law (although with a cool attitude toward the latter), cited Hitler's successes in curbing unemployment and rearming Germany and even said that a solution to the "problems" of Austria, the Sudetenland, and the Polish Corridor had to be attempted in some way. 103 Ambassador-at-large Karl Ritter, an economics expert and also Ribbentrop's liaison with the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) from 1940 to 1944, "greeted Hitler's coming" in 1933. "He was certain that Hitler was the man of the hour, the only one capable ofleading Germany out of its great difficulties. Hitler's achievements, from the German point of view, at least up to 1936-37, were outstanding in Ritter's opinion,

32 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE despite such nonsense as the treatment accorded the Jews." 104 Ambassador Curt Priifer wrote in the unedited version of his wartime diary on July 19, 1943, "the Fuhrer is a great, a very great man, who made our nation-at that time facing ruin-into the most powerful country on earth; and this in an incredibly brief and victorious period of time between 1933 and 1941." As a "nationalistic and social-minded" German, he admitted that he had been "sincerely converted to some of the beautiful ideas of National Socialism." 105 Only around 1938, according to Ritter, did Hitler begin to lose the German people's confidence due to his aggressive foreign policy. There is little reason to believe Ritter's claim, however. While it is true that a few German diplomats, officers, and other government elites saw this development as a grave danger and began to form oppositional circles, the initial Nazi military successes in the period 1939--42 apparently created an air of "political giddiness" throughout the Foreign Office. 106 In an interview conducted with the US State Department in September 1945, translator Paul Otto Schmidt also said that the critics in the ministry were on the defensive during the first years of the war because of the "entire country going overboard for National Socialism." 107 Schmidt claimed that only the defeat at Stalingrad led to a more sober attitude among his associates. Other evidence supports his contention. Both the original and the postwar edited versions of Priifer's diary, covering the months between August 1942 and September 1943, convey the author's increasing sense of pessimism about any successful outcome to the war (as well as his eventually successful attempt to retire and move with his family to Switzerland). 108 Rudolf Holzhausen, forced to leave the foreign service due to "racial grounds" in 193 7, differentiated between several groups within the Foreign Office. Before 1938, a small group of "party enthusiasts," including some career officials, exercised an ever-increasing influence on decision making due to Neurath's lukewarm [fiau] stance toward them. A larger group of"sensible" officials [Besonnene] had gathered around Biilow and then Weizsacker. After the war started, a deep division arose between Ribbentrop's staff, which after 1943 was with him at Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia, and the Auswartiges Amt's traditional units. Solidarity within the Auswartiges Amt continued to deteriorate. As Germany's situation became more and more hopeless, another group critical of the NSDAP also coalesced, which Holzhausen described as "those who could see again [Wieder Sehend Gewordenen]." 109 These attitudes resembled those of German elites in general. 110 The SD, in charge of monitoring public opinion and potential enemies of the Nazi regime,

The Auswiirtiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-194 5 33 noted in February 1943 that almost everyone saw the defeat at Stalingrad as a turning point in the war but that government officials in Berlin had reacted particularly pessimistically. "From various parts of the Reich come reports that national comrades who had visited Berlin on business in the last days had noted a markedly head-hanging mood in the agencies and offices there." 111 Hans-Bernd von Haeften, a diplomat executed by the Nazis after the failed July 20, 1944, assassination attempt on Hitler, would claim before the People's Court in late 1944 that 60 percent of the ministry thought as he did about the NSDAP. 112 But how many Germans did not think for one reason or another that Nazism had gone very wrong by that time?

The Foreign Office's Role during the Second World War As of this writing, we still lack an up-to-date overview based on primary sources of the Auswartiges Amt's role in German diplomacy and occupation policy during the Second World War. 113 Most historians agree that after the war started, the Foreign Office's traditional spheres of activity became increasingly marginal in importance. 114 Only twenty-two countries still maintained diplomatic relations with Germany by 1942. 115 In occupied Europe additional opportunities to influence government policy now existed, but the Auswartiges Amt faced considerable competition from other German administrations as well as the armed forces. Its influence was most limited in Poland, the western Soviet Union, and Norway, and most significant in France and Denmark, where Foreign Office officials were officially recognized as "Reich Plenipotentiaries" with the right to deal directly with local authorities. Other occupied territories (Serbia, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands) as well as the German puppet states (Slovakia, Croatia) fell into an intermediate category. With Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria (all German allies), the Foreign Office could conduct more or less normal diplomatic relations, although in the last three states it did face interference from other agencies, especially in the area of Jewish policy. 116 Many ambassadors recalled from abroad now served on what became no less than eleven "country committees" (for example, on the United States or Soviet Union) that did little else but plan propaganda. 117 However, in other ways the Auswartiges Amt's competencies increased. It insisted on being consulted in any matters that affected foreign policy. The Foreign Office participated in inter-ministerial conferences on slave labor, the economic exploitation of Germany's conquests, staging propaganda trials, and

34 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE implementing the Final Solution. It helped the German armed forces with the technical planning and diplomatic preparations for its campaigns, assigned teams of diplomats to all the major operational theaters to assist commanders, and advised the military on relevant aspects of international law. It also continued to produce propaganda (or to support other organizations engaged in it) and on Ribbentrop's order even organized a special detachment to seize fine art objects and important archives and libraries from occupied territories for use by the ministry. Heinrich Himmler's RSHAregularly sought the ministry's opinion on its own activities in occupied Europe, including the deportation of political prisoners to Germany, the execution of hostages and prisoners of war, and recruitment for the Waffen-SS. The Auswartiges Amt also helped maintain the SD in foreign countries. 118 Officials brought into the ministry by the NSDAP bore the main weight of responsibility for initiating the ministry's participation in Germany's territorial expansion after 1938, the Holocaust, and a plethora of other crimes. 119 For example, the Abteilung Deutschland, led by Deputy State Secretary Martin Luther's "Jewish experts" under Franz Rademacher in section D III, coordinated the Auswartiges Amt's policies concerning the Jews. Luther, a diplomatic outsider from the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, led the Abteilung Deutschland from 1940 until his removal in 1943 after a botched attempt to remove his patron Ribbentrop as foreign minister. Rademacher, who joined the ministry in December 193 7, had been centrally involved in developing the "Madagascar Plan" in 1940, which called for the deportation of Jews living in Germanoccupied Europe to that French colony. After Luther's fall, two other outsiders from the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Horst Wagner and Eberhard von Thadden, directed Jewish Policy from the newly created desk Inland II. With the assistance of local ambassadors who were party functionaries (normally with high ranks in the SA or SS), Wagner and Thadden pressured Germany's allies in southeastern Europe to deport their Jewish populations during the last years of the war. 120 Michael Mayer has stressed that the vast majority of the 21 leading officials in these "special units" after 1940 had ties to the NSDAP that dated before 1933 and had joined the SA or SS by 1938; 16 had worked for party organizations before entering the Foreign Office; and only two possessed the normal qualifications for the diplomatic service. As a group these outsiders had a more radical view of the "Jewish question" than the career diplomats in other parts of the ministry, who continued to think in traditional terms-admittedly also in terms of traditional anti-Semitism-about the Foreign Office's responsibility for the foreign policy and legal implications of anti-Jewish policies. 121

The Auswiirtiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-1945

35

Nonetheless, members of the old core of career officials regularly cooperated with these policies, and the rest of the ministry and its foreign missions helped coordinate the Final Solution throughout Europe. In Greece, German diplomats began informing the SS about the size and nature of the Jewish community as early as 1938, three years before either the occupation of that country or the first systematic mass executions of Jews in Eastern Europe. 122 Several career diplomats who would later be reemployed in the Federal Republic's Foreign Office after 1949 played a key role in deportations. Bargen, the ministry's representative in Brussels from 1940 to 1943, reported to the ministry on deportations of Jews from Belgium. 123 Werner von Grundherr zu Altenthann und Weiherhaus, head of the Scandinavian Desk in the Political Division, cooperated with the Foreign Office's General Plenipotentiary and SS-Obergruppenfohrer Werner Best on Jewish policy. 124 After the war both Bargen and Grundherr argued that they had attempted to limit the impact of the deportation orders by noting the negative impression that deportations would make on the local population, or the technical problems involved (e.g., lack of sufficient police forces in Belgium). At no time, however, did their reports raise fundamental objections to the policy. Their colleagues Herbert Nohring and Franz Quiring have been implicated in the deportation of Jews from Greece (Salonika) and France, respectively. 125 Kurt Heinburg headed the desk for southeastern Europe in Division II from 1936 to 1943. He prepared position papers on deportations from the countries from this region and forwarded them for a decision to the leader of the Political Division, Ernst Woermann, another career diplomat, or his deputy. Heinburg had detailed knowledge of both deportations in southeastern Europe and local mass shootings or gassings. 126 Meanwhile Hermann Muller (after 1945 Mtiller-Roschach), who entered the ministry in 1938 as an attache, worked from November 1941 to March 1942 at the desk in the Abteilung Deutschland that approved applications from German Jews to emigrate. He denied most of the requests, often with fatal consequences for the applicants. 127 Knowledge of Nazi crimes against humanity must have been widespread among the diplomats. For example, in 1941 the Foreign Office organized several two-week tours of the Eastern Front for its cultural and press attaches stationed in foreign missions. Herbert Blankenhorn, later to play a leading role in the Federal Republic's diplomatic service, participated in September while serving in Berne, Switzerland, and visited both Belorussia and Poland. Years later he remembered being horrified by his group's tour of the Warsaw Ghetto and the related briefing on policies toward Jews and Poles. 128 In

36 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE October 1941 the Auswartiges Amt sent Rademacher to Yugoslavia to coordinate German policies toward Serbian Jews. He later wrote on his expense report, for every accountant in the ministry to read, that the purpose of his trip was the "liquidation of Jews in Belgrade." 129 By January 1942 at the very latest, the entire leadership as well as the diplomats in the interested desks in Berlin were well informed about the activities of the Einsatzgruppen in murdering Jews in the Soviet Union on the basis of Gestapo reports circulated through the Abteilung Deutschland. 130 Detailed information about the next stage of the Holocaust starting in 1942-with its mass deportations, death camps in Eastern Europe, and more systematic methods of killing-remained more limited. The first reference to the gas chambers in official Foreign Office documentation appears only in May 1943. 131 However, the German diplomats knew enough by late 1942 to draw the conclusion that deportation probably meant death for the individuals involved, including from their own observation of deportations and from the foreign press and radio (to which they had privileged access as diplomats). Peter Longerich writes that the Final Solution was an "open secret" in Germany by 1942 due to the regime's own rhetoric threatening the elimination of the Jews. 132 Yet most did not draw the necessary conclusions or, if they did, did not protest. As David Bankier argues, even "those [Germans] who acquired such knowledge, either through their work in the bureaucracy or because as members of an underground they directly sought it for themselves, had to make an effort to imagine what it meant. Because what they had to imagine was unprecedented, they were not always able to conceive of the monstrous dimensions of the crime." 133 However, lack of "committed opposition" to the persecution of Jews and other groups and "traditional anti-Semitism" meant that "their level of resistance to genocidal means was very low," even if they did not openly advocate murder. Moreover, many tried to remain deliberately ignorant for as long as possible in order to salve their conscience and avoid any personal responsibility for what had happened. 134 Accordingly, after the war Weizsacker, who raised no objection from the Foreign Office to deportations from France, claimed that he had no knowledge of the death camps while they were operating, and Bargen stated that he firmly believed at the time that the thousands of Jews deported from Belgium, including women and children, had been sent to Poland on work detail [Arbeitseinsatz ].1 35 As Sebastian Weitkamp has pointed out, after 1945 such assertions also became part of a conscious and indeed very effective legal strategy for both career and "Nazi" diplomats brought before Allied and later West German courts. For example, prosecutors in the Federal

The Auswiirtiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-1945 37 Republic needed to prove that defendants knew at the time that they had sent people to their deaths to convict them of murder [either Mord or Beihilfe zum Mord]. Otherwise, they might be found guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter [Totschlag], but the statute oflimitations for manslaughter cases that occurred during the war years expired in the mid- I 960s. 136

The Diplomatic Resistance Only the threat of another European war that Germany most likely would lose prompted a strong reaction within the ministry against the NSDAP, starting in 1938. Andre Fran9ois-Poncet, a very critical observer of the German foreign service as France's ambassador in Berlin from 1931 to 1938 and then as the French High Commissioner in Bonn from 1949 to 1955, believed that the diplomatic corps, like the German general staff, was at first blinded by fervent nationalism. Once the diplomats recognized that Hitler's policies were leading to disaster, many became sincere members of the resistance and were willing to take the risks involved. 137 The Auswartiges Amt was undoubtedly one of the major centers of resistance activity during the Third Reich. 138 But the number of diplomats who actually participated was very small. 139 During the 1961 trial against Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, the Auswartiges Amt prepared lists of its employees from all ranks executed after July 20, 1944, and incarcerated at any time during the Third Reich. The compilers came up with a grand total of 11 Foreign Office members executed and 11 arrested. 140 According to the information compiled by Dienstmann and Rohde in the fall of 1949, 4 diplomats quit due to disagreement with the NSDAP's foreign policy. A further 12 were arrested and 9 of those executed. At least 3 other officials were forced into military service during the war. As previously noted, Dienstmann and Rohde claimed 32 higher service officials had to leave the service-or in a few cases quit---0ue to "racial" or "ideological reasons." Their answers, as well as Gustav Strohm's January 1949 memo on the Foreign Ministry during the Weimar Republic, confirm the impression that only a very small minority of the approximately 500 pre-1938 Higher Service officials, perhaps IO percent, were either persecuted by the Nazis or suffered the consequences of oppositional activities.141 Moreover, most of the tiny group that did actively resist had left the diplomatic service already or had been brought into the ministry as outsiders. 142 On the other hand, Dienstmann and Rohde also claimed-with few concrete examples-that over a hundred officials had to leave service after 1943

38

ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE

due to their marriages to foreign wives, 143 that "hundreds" were not promoted along normal patterns because the NSDAP thought them unreliable, and that the Foreign Office protected "numerous" diplomats whom the Nazis considered "suspicious or disreputable." These were dubious anti-Nazi credentials; at best, their validity rested on supporting evidence provided by former colleagues as well as favorably disposed Allied authorities, denazification courts, and employers. The number of demonstrably anti-Nazi officials was very small, but the number who would claim after the war to have been anti-Nazi, with the help of former associates, was much larger. Erich Kordt was certainly correct in pointing out, in his 1950 memoir, that because of the need for secrecy, the picture of the opposition in a totalitarian state has to look contradictory and disunified to the outsider. The full story of the Foreign Office's resistance cannot be taken "from the official documents."144 This also means, however, that it remains very difficult to know with any certainty how far oppositional attitudes truly extended within the ministry and that outsiders might come to very different conclusions based on the same evidence. Compared to the activities of other resistance groups, there were legitimate doubts about whether the "diplomatic resistance" had done anything more than act as spectators while others took the risks. For example, in February 1952 Bundestag delegate Hermann L. Brill (SPD), a member of UA-47 and a former concentration camp inmate, acidly told Wilhelm Melchers that the latter's retrospective written depiction of the events of July 20, 1944, in the Auswartiges Amt did not impress him as a testament of resistance activity: "This account ... seems to indicate to me, Dr. Melchers, that on this day, among the people you name, no activity at all predominated, but instead a purely passive waiting-around, a hesitancy to act in any way, and the feeling that something sinister was approaching that you had surrendered yourselves to almost voluntarily. That is my impression." 145 Comments by Fabian von Schlabrendorff, a German lieutenant who tried to kill Hitler by placing a bomb in his airplane in March 1943, are also interesting in this regard. He asserted at Nuremberg in June 1948 that the "young resistance group" in the Foreign Office, which included Adam von Trott zu Solz, Hans-Bernd von Haeften, Eduard Briickelmeier, Erich and Theo Kordt, Hasso von Etzdorf, Albrecht von Kessel, and Gottfried von Nostitz, "was important-and I might say decisive-for us." They would have to gauge and secure the foreign support vital for any successful change in regime in Germany. However, under cross-examination Schlabrendorff admitted that he had no firsthand knowledge of the activities of these men or their supposed patron,

The Auswiirtiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-1945

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Weizsacker. 146 Indeed, Weizsacker's status as a "resistance member" remains a matter of considerable dispute. While he unquestionably sought to prevent a general European war in 1938 and 1939, it is debatable to what extent this can be equated with active opposition to Hitler or N azism. 147 A few Higher Service officials had at least recognized the dangers of Nazism, albeit belatedly, and had tried to use foreign contacts to frustrate Germany's expansionist foreign policy before the outbreak of war in 1939. Later, they would establish contacts with the German resistance trying to overthrow and replace Hitler. Since the 1950s several additional foreign service employees have been recognized as resisters, including Rudolf von Scheliha, a diplomat murdered by the NSDAP in 1942, and Fritz Kolbe, a member of the ministry's Intermediate Service [Mittlerer Dienst], which was responsible for clerical tasks. Official prejudices about the former's ties to communist resistance groups and the latter's status as an informant ("George Wood") for the OSS in Switzerland explained the delay. Two others, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz (who entered the ministry in 1939 as an expert for maritime affairs) and Gerhard Feine, helped save numerous Jews in Denmark and Hungary, respectively. Both men were reemployed in the West German diplomatic service after 1949. Especially after the assassination attempt against Hitler on July 30, 1944, the National Socialists attempted to remove "undesirable elements" from the Foreign Office through arrests and dismissals. Regardless of their status in the party, most diplomats who had decided to break with it demonstratively due to its wartime policies paid with time in jail or with their lives. But they were the exception to the rule among the career diplomats. 148 Those who were initially enthusiastic about National Socialist policies and who felt obliged to serve until 1945, like Dieckhoff, later expressed bitterness toward the regime. When interviewing him after the war, however, members of the US State Department had the distinct impression that Dieckhoff's "main quarrel with Hitler was not so much the aims of the latter but the stupidity of many of his methods. It was mostly his intelligence which had been outraged rather than his sense of moral values, although he said at the end that had he known then what he knew now of much that went on inside Germany he might have found it impossible to continue serving." 149 As Sylvia Taschka concludes, Dieckhoff's motives for continued service were complicated, and he had raised objections about Nazi policies; "however, reason [Verstand] is by its very nature neutral: it does not represent moral greatness." 150 In his postwar memoirs Hans Kroll excused himself in an arguably more honest manner. Although he openly objected to Nazi interference

40 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE in his ministry's business, he had felt obligated as a "German patriot" to work for victory "until the last day." 151 After the war, the Social Democrat Walter Zechlin, head of the Foreign Office's Press Division for most of the Weimar Republic, asserted that charges that the old Auswartiges Amt was conservative, or even reactionary, were exaggerated. It had tried to change with the times, especially in the 1920s. Yet Zechlin clearly was wrong in believing that its main flaw lay in the fact that the career officials saw their role as that of experts who simply obeyed the regime in power, something like a good headwaiter or hotel manager. 152 The diplomats were "normal" German elites with all of their virtues, weaknesses, and flaws. In particular, many had demonstrated considerable enthusiasm for National Socialism until things began to go wrong during the war, while only a very small group had taken a principled stand against it. After 1945, however, all would spend a considerable amount of time trying to rationalize and justify their ministry's history.

The Foreign Affairs Question in Occupied Germany, 19 45-4 9

WHEN THE TH IR D RE IC H collapsed in May 1945, the victorious Allied Powers shut down its central government, including the Auswartiges Amt, and prepared to rule Germany themselves. The consequences for German foreign relations were both obvious and dramatic. Allied Control Council Declaration No. 2 of September 20, 1945, summed them up by announcing that "the diplomatic, consular, commercial, and other relations of the German State with other States have ceased to exist."' Total defeat plus Allied occupation created a "vacuum" in Germany's international relations. 2 Yet just as nature abhors a vacuum, it quickly became clear that Germany could not be kept isolated from the rest of the world. Almost immediately, the Four Powers (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States) found it necessary to take joint steps to monitor Germans living abroad as well as to promote international trade. The onset of the Cold War in 1947 put an end to these quadripartite efforts but also raised the prospect of two new German states, East and West, that would have at least some effective control over their own foreign relations. Developments in the Western occupation zones are of central interest to our story. Especially following the US announcement of the Marshall Plan to aid Europe's postwar economic reconstruction on June 5, 1947, the Western Allies carefully began to delegate responsibility for foreign affairs to German offices. In the process they also noted what John Gimbel described as the "German momentum"-not just the increasing participation of German actors in the Western zones in the

42 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE reconstruction of their country but also their rising hopes and expectations of exercising as much influence as possible on future developments. 3 German elites, including former diplomats, advocated the gradual acquisition of equal rights within the international community. By 1948, there even were open discussions about whether a new West German state would possess a foreign ministry. When the Federal Republic of Germany was constituted in the late summer of 1949, there were no definitive answers about when the new state would receive the right to manage its own international relations or about what type of administrative apparatus the Western Powers would allow. But in this uncertain situation lay the origins of the future West German Auswartiges Amt, as well as many of the problems it would experience in its initial years.

Unsuccessful Four Power Attempts to Regulate Germany's Foreign Affairs,

1945-47

In 1945 the victorious Allied Powers decided to divide Germany into four military occupation zones to be administered by France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States respectively. That summer the Four Powers also formally agreed at the Potsdam Conference to reunify Germany under its own government in the future. To work toward that goal, they would create central administrations in a variety of policy areas, including foreign trade, that would operate across zonal boundaries. 4 However, they would make little progress. Disputes over reparations and the treatment of Germany as one economic unit brought inter-Allied tensions to a head in 1946 and 1947. Not only did the USSR insist on taking reparations out of current German production, it also took early steps toward an independent political administration in its own occupation zone. The forced merger in the Soviet Zone of the SPD with the German Communist Party in April 1946 reflected the Soviet desire to make Communists the leading political force there. 5 Moreover, France, which had not been a party to the Potsdam Accord, objected to central administrations in principle. They might lead to a revived, unified German state that could threaten its neighbors and provide a conduit for the extension of Soviet influence. The French "veto" played a significant role through mid-1946, when the other three powers seemed to be cooperating well enough to keep hopes of an agreement on central administrations alive, even though French obstructionism also permitted the British and Soviets to disguise their own dislike of such administrations. 6

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Concerns about the costs of a continued occupation and about French and, increasingly, Soviet policy led the British and Americans to openly abandon the Potsdam formula for governing Germany as a single entity. As early as 1945 the Attlee government in Britain envisioned this possibility, and in April 1946 it decided not to relinquish control over the Ruhr and its heavy industry or to allow Soviet participation in administering it. That September, US secretary of state James F. Byrnes followed the British lead and proposed the economic fusion of the American and British zones, which occurred on January 1, 1947. Four Power planning for central administrations came to a hopeless standstill. 7 Only after the inconclusive Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in the spring of 1947, however, did the United States abandon all hope of treating Germany as an economic whole. Thereafter it committed itself fully to the British position of making an effective political and economic unit out of "Bizonia. " 8 Before their relationship collapsed due to the Cold War, however, the Four Powers had made two attempts to regulate Germany's relations with the outside world cooperatively. The first concerned the central administration to regulate foreign trade explicitly mentioned in the Potsdam Accords. By the winter of 1946-47, reviving trade seemed essential to prevent impending economic disaster in Germany. 9 Nonetheless, in April 1946 the Soviet desire for a high degree of economic autonomy for their zone combined with French objections to centralized administrations effectively killed plans for an all-German Import-Export Office, a preliminary stage on the way to a foreign trade administration. Great Britain tacitly supported the French since it did not want the competence of its zonal commander limited in foreign trade matters. This failure exemplified the fact that the Four Powers' real priorities for economic reconstruction in Germany diverged substantially from those outlined at Potsdam, with the three Western Powers finding that theirs shared much in common. 10 Interzonal trade within Germany soon resembled foreign trade, since it had to be based on negotiated agreements. The second attempt to regulate Germany's foreign affairs came about as the result of Four Power efforts to recall former German diplomatic representatives from neutral states and to secure access to German diplomatic property there. The Allies wanted to destroy any remaining Nazi intelligence networks abroad. As J. M. Troutbeck of the British Foreign Office related to a State Department official, there was the danger that German officials would become dispersed. "Furthermore the continued freedom of German officials in neutral countries is in the opinion of our Missions, and I gather of their United States

44 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE colleagues as well, detrimental to our local prestige." 11 Control Council Declaration No. 2 of September 20, 1945, announced the recall of all German diplomatic, consular, and other personnel from overseas and Allied supervision of the disposal of the buildings, property, and archives of all German diplomatic and other agencies abroad. However, neutral states did not want to prejudice their relations with a future German government. 12 They often hesitated to repatriate German diplomats who had stayed in their territory after the war. The last important holdout was the Republic of Ireland, which sheltered the former German ambassador, Eduard Hempel, and his deputy, Henning Thomsen (who had joined the SS in 1933), until the early 1950s. The Irish government appreciated the attempts of Hempel and Thomsen to respect Eire's neutrality during the Second World War, but both men were also accused of spying and of membership in the SD, the SS's intelligence agency.13 Neutrals also were reluctant to turn over German state property. 14 Some offered conditions for doing so, and several Latin American nations in particular tried to procrastinate. 15 In June 1945, in response to Allied pressure to surrender German state property and archives in Switzerland, the Swiss government threatened to abandon its responsibility as the protecting power representing German interests abroad. The British government anticipated similar difficulties elsewhere, including Spain and Portugal. The dilemma for the Occupation Powers was that there was no alternative to these governments providing services formerly performed by German missions. Moreover, if neutrals succeeded in renouncing responsibility for local Germans, it might be difficult to secure the repatriation of individuals that the Control Council wished recalled. 16 In July 1945 the State Department proposed the creation of an Interim Office for German Affairs in each of the United Nations countries and, in a corresponding program, all of the neutral states as well. 17 This would in effect be an ersatz German consular service. Beyond helping to deal with the neutrals, there was an urgent need for Interim Offices. In the words of a State Department official writing in 1946, Germany's collapse leaves millions of Germans abroad with no diplomatic and consular services and provides no governmental machinery to tie these Germans and their numerous interests in with their native country. In the year and a half since the German collapse this situation has developed to the point of chaos in that the real needs of Germans abroad and the needs of nationals of other governments for services which used to be performed by German officials abroad have been met or at-

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tempted to be met in innumerable irregular fashions, the variety of which is limited only by the ingenuity of man. 18 Negotiations on the Interim Offices continued throughout the rest of 1945 in Berlin, seat of the Allied Control Council. 19 On December 13, the Control Council's Political Directorate approved the wording of an invitation to all United Nations states to join the Control Powers in opening offices to perform "quasi-consular tasks" for Germans living abroad. The offices' main goal would be to encourage Germans to return home. Therefore, they would furnish documents for travel only to Germany and would not provide financial aid or other protection for Germans experiencing difficulties abroad. Simultaneously,the Control Council would ask all neutrals to transfer any existing offices responsible for their German colonies to Four Power control. The proposal also foresaw using trustworthy former German diplomatic personnel under close supervision. 20 Nonetheless, the plan remained on the agenda in Berlin for more than a year. Two factors caused the delay. First, the various Interim Offices around the world needed a central office in Germany to coordinate them. When the British element in the Control Council's Coordinating Committee proposed creating one on January 28, 1946, the prospect immediately raised French fears. The French Foreign Ministry and French military government in Germany wanted to make sure that their support for the project was not misconstrued as a precedent for re-creating either a German consular service or foreign policy-making institutions. French representatives in Berlin stated that they would agree to a central coordination office only if it were an inter-Allied body subsidiary to the Political Directorate. Moreover, they insisted that German personnel be used only in subordinate roles without any leadership function. The Political Directorate accepted the British text with the modifications proposed by the French on February 7, 1946, and the Coordinating Committee instructed the Directorate to work out the details on February 16. 21 The French military government also dragged its feet in identifying former German diplomats living in its zone to serve in the Berlin Office, much to the annoyance of the British and American elements in the Control Council. 22 The second sticking point involved finances. In February 1946, British representatives in the Political Directorate argued in favor of allowing participating governments to use preexisting local arrangements in the new system. A variety of agencies in Britain already took care of "quasi-consular" affairs for Germans, and the British government refused to finance a new office in

46 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE London. The Political Directorate adopted the proposed change in June and submitted the plan to the Finance Directorate. 23 The latter completed its deliberations on how to fund the project only in November 1946. The Coordinating Committee approved the directorates' plans on December 3, 1946, and referred them to the Political Directorate for implementation. 24 The subcommittee established for this purpose within the Political Directorate actually made considerable progress between January and March 1947. 25 In January the US representative proposed a scheme for a coordination office in Berlin. The subcommittee also created a list of countries to invite to participate. As far as neutral states were concerned, the Control Powers would try to convince Portugal and Spain to accept control offices run solely by them. The subcommittee also decided not to ask Switzerland to open an Interim Office at first, since that country did not recognize Control Power authority in Germany. By late February the list of desired participant states was complete. So too was a list of former German diplomats. The personnel for the central office would consist entirely of Germans up to the level of Abteilungsdirigent [assistant division director]. Even the French, after repeating their objections to employing diplomats in leadership posts, began to do background checks on a few potential candidates from their zone. 26 The entire system would provide identification papers; register births, marriages, and deaths; register and conserve wills, passports, and other documents; and help clients return to Germany. How to finance the offices was left up to each participating state, either through service fees or a "consular tax" imposed on the local German colony. 27 The Interim Offices might have become a reality had it not been for the complete breakdown in relations between the Control Powers at the 194 7 Moscow Conference. Since the Allies were unable to reach an agreement in principle on centralized administrations, the Soviet representative in the Political Directorate in Berlin stated on May 21 that further deliberations must be postponed. The US and British members protested in vain not only that the Soviet action reversed a Coordinating Committee decision but also that the Interim Offices were not a centralized German administration foreseen at Potsdam and were meant only to meet a pressing Allied need. Since the prevailing decision-making procedures in the Control Council were based on consensus, the Soviets had effectively vetoed the entire plan. 28 On June 6, 1947, in the Coordinating Committee, the Soviet delegate repeated his government's position on the Interim Offices and thereby formally brought planning to a standstill. The Interim Offices did not rank with the major centralized German administrations named at Potsdam in terms of importance, and French tolerance

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for central administrations increased as prospects for Four Power administration of Germany-and therefore the chances for a reunified Reich-grew less and less. Nonetheless, Ambassador Jacques Tarbe de Saint-Hardouin, political counselor of the French military government, remarked that the plan was the sole case in which France agreed to central German administrations at the Control Council, and its failure demonstrated that the USSR also did not desire such administrations. 29 The plan for Interim Offices was interesting for another reason as well. It indicated how far the Allied attitude on former German diplomatic personnel had changed since the end of the war, when the overriding goal had been to intern members of the Wilhelmstra/3e ( as will be discussed in Chapter Three). The Interim Offices would not have represented a restoration of the old foreign ministry since only a small number of diplomats would be utilized under Allied supervision. But the Four Powers had recognized that the most practical and cost-effective methods for managing these offices required their participation. With the onset of the Cold War in 1947, Three Power tolerance for former diplomats as well as for other German elites participating in foreign policy planning would increase.

The Start of West German Foreign Policy, 1947-49 If the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of March-April 1947 marked the Four Powers' ultimate failure to agree on central administration for Germany, the US announcement of a European Recovery Program (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan, on June 5, 1947, signaled the fullfledged onset of the Cold War. Within months the Soviet Union began using rhetoric not heard since before 1941 about a conflict between "two camps" in the world, and the division of Europe and Germany become firm. 30 In response, the Three Western Powers intensified their efforts to stabilize their occupation zones politically and economically and to integrate them into the international community. By mid-1948 West German statehood itself was in sight. And as Konrad Adenauer told the press on August 23, 1949, it was obvious that German offices were going to play an ever-increasing role in foreign policy even though the new Allied High Commission would represent the Federal Republic internationally. 31 Even before 1947, the Three Powers had taken some joint steps to regulate relations between their occupation zones and other countries. For example, they exchanged consular offices with each other in each of the Western zones

48 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE and Berlin and, starting in 1946, allowed other United Nations states to establish missions as well. 32 The Western Powers also cooperated to control the movement of all persons traveling to or from Germany, something the Four Powers had been unable to do. The Tripartite Exit Agreement of January 1947 established what eventually became known as the Combined Travel Board (CTB). By 1951, the CTB, located in Herford, North Rhine-Westphalia, had 14 branch offices in West Germany and also operated abroad through 20 permit offices and 110 US, British, and French consulates. 33 With varying results, the Western powers and other friendly states also attempted to provide for their respective German colonies. For example, the State Department set up the Interim Office for German Affairs (IOGA) in Washington on August 10, 1948, which provided consular services to the more than three hundred thousand German nationals residing in the United States. 34 On the other end of the spectrum, Germans living in Italy, which made virtually no arrangements for them, found it almost impossible either to secure the necessary travel documents to leave the country or to settle estates, and German schools and cultural institutes also suffered greatly. 35 The Italian case was paralleled elsewhere, including in the Far East. 36 The Three Powers' most important task involved rebuilding the German economy. Starting in August 1946, a series of agreements initiated the economic fusion of the US and British zones. The Bizonal Fusion Agreement of December 2, 1946, formally created the Vereinigtes Wirtschaflsgebiet [United Economic Area], or Bizonia, and with it a number of German-staffed agencies in various fields of economic policy. However, neither the US nor British government nor their zonal military governors initially contemplated establishing German-staffed offices abroad to help promote trade, even along the highly supervised lines foreseen for the Interim Offices. This was true even though certain Allied agencies in Bizonia thought that this would be a sensible policy. In February 1947, the Allied Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA) requested that the Foreign Trade Division of the Bizonal Administrative Agency for Economics in Minden (North Rhine-Westphalia) work out a proposal for "semi-official" German trade agencies in several neutral countries as well as the United Kingdom and United States. 37 The agency presented the Allied Bipartite Economic Control Group in Minden with a detailed proposal on June 4. 38 However, the JEIA had not coordinated this initiative with its superiors. On June 2, 1947, German radio reported that the British Foreign Office had denied that the Administrative Agency for Economics would open missions in foreign capitals in the near future. 39 In all likelihood, the Two Powers feared

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that these economic missions could easily acquire a political function or be misconstrued as possessing such functions. As US military governor Lucius D. Clay reminded the minister presidents from the American zone around the same time, the United States and Great Britain had agreed only to the economic union of their zones. A political union might harm chances for reunification. 40 Then on June 5 came the announcement of the Marshall Plan, which quickly changed the rules of the game. The British and Americans initiated two further reorganizations in June 1947 and early 1948, which produced a more workable bizonal administration based in Frankfurt with an executive council led by Hermann Ptinder of the CDU and its own legislature consisting of delegates elected by the bizonal Lander [states]. 41 Not only did German elites in the Western zones, with the exception of the Communists, greet the Marshall Plan, they quickly linked active participation in the ERP with progress toward sovereign statehood. 42 Moreover, they had long thought that the Western zones' economic potential could be used as a tool to acquire greater international rights for Germany due to its importance for European and world economic reconstruction, and the ERP seemed a golden opportunity to do just this. 43 As American diplomats also realized, writes Klaus Schwabe, the ERP's full possibilities "would remain incomplete as long as Germany was unable to speak for itself to other nations and in this respect remained dependent on the military governments. For this reason, discussion of the political consequences of Marshall Aid inevitably led to the call for West German self-determination in foreign policy."44 Starting around October 1947 German officials began to plead for the right to participate in the formulation of international trade principles as well as in the negotiation of bilateral trade and payments negotiations. Ludwig Erhard of the Frankfurt Economics Administration [Verwaltungfar Wirtschaft, or VfW] and others asked for the dismantling of Allied restrictions on German trade. 45 Some of their proposals included plans for trade missions. 46 Vollrath von Maltzan, the former diplomat in charge of the VfW's Foreign Trade Division, saw such missions as a cautious first step toward considerably wider foreign-policy rights for Western Germany. Assuming that both the economy and political relations with the Three Powers improved, he thought the right to conduct diplomatic activity would inevitably follow if the Germans only remained patient. 47 Then, in the first half of 1948, the deputy foreign ministers of the Three Powers and the Benelux states met for talks in London that raised the prospect of a West German state. Their final communique of June 7 restated the goal of ensuring German participation in Western Europe's economic recovery and

50 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE foresaw "the establishment of a basis for the participation of a democratic Germany in the community of free peoples."48 The French zone would be fused with Bizonia into Trizonia (a process completed in April 1949). On July 1, 1948, the Allied military governors handed three documents to the West German minister presidents summarizing the decisions made at London. The third listed general guidelines for an Occupation Statute, which would go into effect after the creation of a West German state and be administered by Allied High Commissioners, who would replace the military governors. The Three Powers would continue to reserve the powers necessary to "conduct or direct for the time being Germany's foreign relations." They would also "exercise the minimum control over German foreign trade, and over internal policies and measures which could adversely affect foreign trade," in order to ensure that the new state would honor obligations entered into by the Occupation Powers and also use foreign aid in the proper manner. Finally, an International Ruhr Authority would be created, with German participation. 49 On July 20, the minister presidents formally replied to each of the "London Documents" and made suggestions. While they did not question Allied controls over foreign affairs and trade in principle, they asked that Germany be allowed to create offices abroad with the legal status of consulates to protect economic and trade interests. Clay, speaking for the other military governors, responded positively to the German suggestions. 50 The London Decisions quickly led to the closer coordination of the Western zone's trade policies, culminating with the fusion of the JEIA with the French zone's Office du Commerce Exterieur on October 18, 1948. The Three Powers also moved to create binding trade treaties for Trizonia with foreign powers and eventually made the VfW's Foreign Trade Division responsible for negotiating them. By October 1949, when the JEIA ceased to exist and the West German government assumed control of its trade policy under close Allied supervision, trade and payment agreements existed with twenty-nine countries. 51 German representatives from the Frankfurt Administrations also began participating in the institutions associated with the ERP. 52 With the establishment of the Federal Republic's government in September 1949, ERP affairs were concentrated in a special ministry. 53 It had the distinction of running the Federal Republic's first two missions to the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in Paris, both of which reported on political developments within the host countries. 54 Well before the Federal Republic was created, therefore, Allied policy had directly involved West German offices in economic diplomacy,

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albeit in a highly supervised fashion that allowed them only an advisory role. As the British Foreign Office put it in March 1948 regarding the ERP, "Our intention would be rather to infiltrate German advisors gradually to the extent that this can be done without giving rise to objections from other countries."55 In general, the London Decisions had further raised West German expectations about forthcoming foreign policy rights. In the summer of 1948 the British government noted that a growing number of individuals and groups in Germany had become interested in foreign policy. In particular, it saw a danger that the German Office for Peace Questions [Deutsches Buro far Friedensfragen, or DBFF] would coordinate their efforts. The German states in the American zone had established the DBFF in April 1947 in suburban Stuttgart.56 Bavaria, Hesse, Wilrttemberg-Baden, and Bremen financed the DBFF, and each sent a representative to the administrative committee that oversaw its work. 57 The committee member from Wilrttemberg-Baden, Fritz Eberhard of the SPD, managed the office's daily affairs. His coworker and party colleague, the career diplomat Gustav Strohm, who had joined the NSDAP in 1938 and in 1944 "volunteered" to work in the armaments industry (presumably because he had uttered "defeatist sentiments"), encouraged Eberhard to use other former diplomats in an advisory capacity when useful. 58 The DBFF's main task was to gather material useful for a future German peace treaty as part of preparations for the all-German Munich Conference of Minister Presidents in July 1947. However, the conference achieved no progress toward German unity, and when the American zone's minister presidents could or would not supply the Peace Office with enough additional assignments, its significance and very survival became less and less certain. In response, its staff either turned its attention to getting work from other sources or, increasingly, devoted itself to topics of special interest. Most notably, in 1948 and 1949 the DBFF played a role at the deliberations of the Council of Minister Presidents and the Parliamentary Council on a future West German state (Eberhard himself was a member of the Parliamentary Council). Its ever-widening activities made outsiders, including the British and French occupation authorities, very suspicious. 59 In addition, in late July 1948 British authorities believed that Franz Blucher, of the Free Democratic Party, had entrusted the former diplomat Gunther Diehl with making plans for a "shadow" foreign office in coordination with the DBFF and other offices. Diehl had been stationed in Vichy during the war and also was a liaison to Flemish nationalist groups. The British Intelligence Office in Hamburg wrote that Diehl "gives the impression of being unrepentantly and somewhat arrogantly nationalistic in outlook." For example,

52 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Diehl told his British conversation partners that "the Germans as a whole are NOT convinced of their moral guilt" and that no reputable German diplomats would serve in a new foreign ministry until after the Western Powers surrendered their right to control Germany's foreign policies. Grace Roll es ton, of the British Foreign Office's German Political Department, noted that Diehl would not have a chance to implement his "somewhat sinister plans" for a while due to remaining controls by the Occupation Powers. But in the likelihood that Germany would be able to send out representation in the foreseeable future, Diehl's activities raised the question of how to prevent the reestablishment of a German foreign service that considered itself a "superior caste of beings," which was out of touch with everyday domestic affairs. 60 The German Political Department agreed that German representation abroad "must begin on the right lines with the approval and support of the Allies." 61 Both the British political advisor in Germany, C. E. "Kit" Steele, and deputy undersecretary of state and future High Commissioner Ivone Kirkpatrick agreed that it was necessary to take action soon, but with a reservation: since the Germans were starting from scratch, it made sense for reasons of efficiency, as Kirkpatrick put it, to employ members of the "old gang" in leadership positions as long as "notorious 'bad hats' are kept out."62 Due to its concerns about these increasing German activities, the British government initiated an inter-Allied discussion about what West Germany's foreign policy rights should look like in the future. In early November the Political Division of the British element of the Allied Control Council in Berlin reported to London that its US and, somewhat less enthusiastically, French counterparts had agreed that West Germany needed to be represented abroad in the near future on a limited basis. Moreover, "since the Germans will sooner or later begin to plan a full scale Foreign Service, if indeed they are not already doing so, it is better for us to approve and influence this planning rather than to attempt to suppress it." There was also agreement on setting up a planning committee consisting of reliable German experts, for example Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron and the Kordt brothers, and that the DBFF should be abolished or reformed. The Three Powers could decide later when this limited foreign representation should be expanded. The French Political Division wanted to consult the Quai d'Orsay before giving its final approval to these ideas, however, and the reply came back negative. The French Foreign Ministry did not believe that it was yet necessary for Germany to have missions abroad and rejected not just a coordinating office led by Germans but any German foreign affairs planning at

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all. It insisted on waiting to renew the discussion until after an Occupation Statute had been drafted. 63 On April 8, 1949, the Three Powers finally issued the text of the Statute. As French foreign minister Robert Schuman told US secretary of state Dean Acheson, the Three Powers should give the Germans "maximum responsibility" where possible, while maintaining the right to intervene in security affairs, denazification, and other sensitive matters. 64 Foreign affairs and trade figured prominently among the areas they reserved for their own jurisdiction, although they intended to exert active control over the latter only as far as necessary to compel the West Germans to honor international agreements the Allies had made on their behalf. The reserve clauses also expressly mentioned a number of foreign affairs commitments that the Federal Republic would be expected to honor, including the International Ruhr Authority, reparations, nondiscrimination in trade matters, and "international agreements made by or on behalf of Germany."65 The Allied High Commission in Germany later estimated that the Three Powers had concluded 180 international agreements in various fields on behalf of either Western Germany or the individual zones between 1946 and September 1950, not counting Allied representation of the Western Zones in the ERP and the OEEC. 66 On April 14, the military governors met with representatives from the Parliamentary Council in Frankfurt to clarify certain aspects of the Statute. US Military Governor Clay said that the Allies intended to let German authorities have commercial representation abroad and, after a time, possibly certain consular functions as well. The West Germans could participate in international conferences, provided that at least one of the Three Powers attended. After the German government formally joined the OEEC, the only restrictions on German foreign trade would be those common to other ERP agreements and those associated with Allied (i.e., US) economic assistance to Germany. Clay warned that the new German government would have to set up the necessary agencies rapidly, especially since the Occupation Statute could be revised in a year's time. 67 However, he also pointed out that only the High Commissioners, who had not yet been appointed to replace the trizonal military governors, could make binding declarations on issues relating to the Statute. 68 Clay was correct to advise caution, because an important pattern from the years of military occupation would continue under the new High Commissioners. The British government would continue to advocate generosity in granting the West Germans foreign policy rights and usually-but not alwaysfound support from the United States. On the other hand, the French Foreign

S4 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Ministry and some French officials in Germany argued against moving too quickly. These inter-Allied differences would play a vital role in the eighteenmonth delay between the creation of the Federal Republic and the establishment of a West German Foreign Office with the right to conduct diplomacy.

The 11 German Momentum" and Planning for a Foreign Office, 1948-49 In the meantime it was becoming even clearer that the West Germans would use any opportunity to shape foreign policy in the Western zones in a manner that coincided with their own, and not necessarily Allied, interests and also seek opportunities to further widen their prerogatives. In November 1948 Bizonia's Long-Term Program for the period through 1952-53, designed by German officials from the Frankfurt Administrations, came up for discussion at the OEEC in Paris. It caused a sensation since it aimed for Western Germany's active return to the world market, including a large increase in German exports. 69 Still other German offices, including the DBFF, began to contemplate how the Western zones might be able to attain sovereignty more quickly within the parameters of the European movement. 70 In early 1949, Adenauer, president of the Parliamentary Council (the body of West German parliamentarians entrusted with drafting what became the Federal Republic's Basic Law, or constitution) would even publicly link a German contribution to a European army and German political equality for the first time. 71 This assertiveness also extended to German planning for a constitution. The Minister Presidents' Constitutional Convention of experts at Herrenchiemsee in Bavaria in August 1948 accepted the principle that a constitution should be planned as if there were no Occupation Powers. 72 Theo Kordt, the former diplomat serving as delegate from North Rhine-Westphalia, proposed the immediate creation of a foreign ministry. 73 The convention's final report clearly placed foreign affairs in the area of competence of the central government and foresaw a ministry to administer them. 74 The Parliamentary Council began its own deliberations in Bonn on September I, 1948. 75 It quickly demonstrated its impatience with Allied slowness in drafting an Occupation Statute. 76 On December I 0, the plenary passed a resolution, supported by all the parties except the Communists, stating that the Occupation Powers should lift all restrictions on German trade, allow a consular service, reapply existing international agreements made by the Reich or the Allies in Germany's favor, and permit German representation at international conferences. 77 In response

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a British diplomat remarked that, in the time since July 1948, "the Germans have stepped up their demands considerably ... particularly in the field of international affairs, jurisdiction and occupation costs."78 By 1949 perhaps the best sign of continuing "German momentum" in foreign affairs was an open debate over the pros and cons of establishing a foreign ministry. It was especially startling because the participants had to presuppose what foreign policy powers the new government would enjoy. As noted, even after the proclamation of the Occupation Statute in April, the Occupation Powers had not gone much further than promising a more unrestricted trade policy and commercial missions at some point in the future, and they had said nothing official about what type of German central administrative structures or personnel they would permit. Three main schools of thought existed among the West Germans. Hermann Piinder and his coworkers in the Directorate of the Frankfurt Administrations favored establishing a full foreign ministry. The DBFF, the SPD, and the body that developed the most detailed plans, the minister presidents' Organization Committee, advocated an independent state secretariat for foreign and occupation affairs under the chancellor. Finally, the CDU's Konrad Adenauer wanted to direct foreign affairs directly out of the Chancellery using a small staff. His position would win out, because his CDU/ CSU won the August 1949 elections and because it was the plan that all three Occupation Powers were most willing to accept at first. Piinder from the very start favored creating an independent ministry that would coordinate all of the areas in which the Western zones of Germany already exercised foreign affairs powers, largely in the areas of trade and Marshall Plan affairs. He and his coworkers recognized that the West German economy would be a key factor in foreign relations in the future, and they probably also had personal ambitions to hold leading posts in the new ministry. 79 Supporters and critics alike spoke of a "foreign trade ministry," a term Piinder himself helped establish. Critics in the DBFF and the political parties charged that his proposal would unjustifiably reorient German foreign affairs almost totally around economics and would lead to serious competency conflicts with a future Economics Ministry. Certain elements of Piinder's plan nonetheless made good sense. The new ministry would build on rights that the Allies had already granted and could be set up immediately using elements of the Frankfurt Administrations. Piinder and his supporters also believed that the other proposals to manage foreign affairs were inadequate because they envisioned institutions that were too small and also would overburden the chancellor with direct ministerial responsibilities. Encouraged by US and British

S6 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE officials, in February 1949 the VfW created an Organization Staff for Creating Trade Missions Abroad, under former diplomat RudolfHolzhausen, which foresaw twenty trade missions coordinated by a central office. 80 However, Ptinder would wait until June to make his full proposals public in response to his opponents in this debate. These included several groups that thought it best to start with less than a full ministry. Already in 1947 the DBFF had begun working on projects that would be of use to a future Auswartiges Amt. 81 However, it first turned its attention to this question seriously after the Herrenchiemsee Conference in August 1948. 82 On the basis of a preliminary memo by his DBFF colleague the ex-diplomat Ernst-Gunther Mohr and a discussion with the VfW's Maltzan, on November 25 of that year Dirk Foster outlined his thoughts about the problem for leading officials in the Peace Office. Although the Occupation Powers had already involved German offices in international relations to some extent and could be expected to tolerate additional activities, their final position on foreign affairs was still unknown, and it was uncertain whether they would allow a full ministry at first. By December 10, Foster, himself a former diplomat, had worked out a proposal for a three-division Section for a Peace Settlement and International Relations based in the Federal Chancellery. 83 In May 1949, a month after the Allies had promulgated the Occupation Statute, the former diplomats Hasso von Etzdorf and Gustav Strohm prepared another memo titled "Regulating Foreign Affairs in the Future Federal Government." It called for a separate agency to conduct foreign affairs, either an independent ministry or an office in the Federal Chance11ery, and preferred the latter scheme because it could be kept small and therefore economical. Unlike Foster, Etzdorf and Strohm proposed putting relations with the High Commission into the office, since they thought it wrong to view the totality of relations with the Three Powers solely through the lens of the occupation regime. 84 Fritz Eberhard summed up the DBFF's position at a meeting of its leading officials on June 10, 1949: the Federal Chancellery needed one office for foreign affairs and one for occupation affairs, and it would be best if the latter were subordinate to the former. However, the DBFF also would accept the notion of two separate offices of equal status. 85 The DBFF tried to involve as many groups in its planning as possible, including both the CDU/CSU and the SPD, which reflected its general interest in establishing nonpartisanship as a principle for the new West German state's foreign policy. Armed with Foster's memos, in December 1948 Eberhard received an encouraging yet reserved response from Herbert Blankenhorn, the

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former diplomat who was general secretary of the CDU in the British Zone and also Adenauer's confidant. On the other hand, attempts to reach out to the Frankfurt Administrations failed miserably. Despite this setback, the DBFF planned a meeting with all interested groups on January 14 in Dtisseldorf, including representatives of the political parties. But just before it took place, the SPD leadership forbade the delegates affiliated with it from attending, much to the surprise of the other participants. 86 The SPD had sabotaged the meeting, not wanting its hands tied by either the other parties or the DBFF. Nonetheless, by mid-1949 its own ideas did not differ substantially from those of the Peace Office. At its January 1949 meeting in Iserlohn, the party's Executive Committee [Parteivorstand] initially adopted the position that the new federal government needed both a Ministry for Occupation Affairs, which would make plans for a future foreign ministry, and a Central Office for Foreign Trade. Moreover, the Chancellery should have its own information office until a foreign ministry was created. 87 Thanks especially to the efforts of former diplomat Gerhard Ltitkens, who led the SPD Executive Committee's Foreign Policy Desk [Referat far Auj3enpolitik], by June the Executive Committee had concluded instead that a single Office for Occupation Questions and International Relations subordinate to the chancellor was preferable. It also anticipated that German consulates or trade offices would soon take on political functions. US and British occupation officials expressed their basic agreement with the plan. 88 The minister presidents' Organization Committee undertook the most systematic effort to plan for a foreign policy apparatus. The committee originated as part of a compromise between the minister presidents and the Parliamentary Council to extend the life of the latter beyond the approval of the Basic Law and also to allow the minister presidents to influence the creation of the new government. 89 The former diplomat Wilhelm Haas, who later served as first head of the new West German Foreign Office's Personnel and Organization Division, represented Bremen on the committee and played a key role in drafting its proposal for a foreign affairs office. He also brought the DBFF's perspective to the meetings due to his position on the Peace Office's Administrative Council. During the committee's meetings on June 17 and 18 the chairman, Minister President Christian Stock of Hessen, pointed out that it was difficult to set up a full-fledged foreign ministry when West Germany was not a recognized state and while there was no peace treaty. With one exception, the participants favored concentrating foreign affairs and relations with the Allied High

58 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Commission under the chancellor instead of creating a ministry. However, they disliked the idea of setting up a foreign affairs division within the Chancellery itself and advocated an administratively separate state secretariat instead. 90 On June 18 Haas volunteered to prepare a formal report on the question. 91 By June 25, after consulting with members of the DBFF, Haas submitted to the committee a Proposal for the Treatment of Foreign Affairs in the Federal Government, which outlined a basic organizational structure for either a full ministry or a state secretariat-in either case with five divisions and twenty-five desks, and loosely based on the structure of the 1936 Auswartiges Amt. 92 The memo immediately met with disagreement. "Dr. Haas's plan is complete but too grandiose," said Clemens von Brentano, the former diplomat who represented Baden, who instead proposed a state secretariat under the chancellor with just twelve Higher Service officials. On the other hand, Haas's friend from Hamburg, Kurt Sieveking, while not endorsing a ministry for "optical reasons," warned against setting up too small a foreign policy apparatus, since this would impede quality work. The committee asked Haas and Brentano to work out a compromise. 93 They had not yet reached one when the committee discussed foreign affairs again on June 30. Brentano presented his own plan, which differed from Haas's mainly in that it envisioned a much smaller office, with five desks instead of five divisions, led by low-ranking officials. 94 By the end of the meeting, the committee reached substantial agreement on the desirability of a foreign and occupation affairs office led by a state secretary directly subordinate to the chancellor and then merely needed to decide on its scale. 95 The upcoming inaugural session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on August 10 briefly revitalized the discussion on the desirability of a foreign minister. 96 Only full members could send their foreign ministers to the organization's Council of Ministers, and the implication was that possessing a foreign minister symbolized a state's full equality in international forums. Haas told the Organization Committee on July 11 that "in a personal conversation gentlemen [from the DBFF] actually had pressed him hard not to create a state secretary but a minister" for this very reason. 97 But to no avail, since that same day Haas presented the final proposal he had worked out in conjunction with Brentano and other committee members. 98 The version that appeared in the Organization Committee's recommendations to the minister presidents on July 30 called for a federal office for foreign affairs consisting of four divisions. It also recognized that the final decision on the apparatus would lie with the German political authorities after the new state was constituted. 99

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Last but not least, Konrad Adenauer, leader of the CDU, and his personal assistant Herbert Blankenhorn favored conducting foreign and occupation affairs directly from the Federal Chancellery as opposed to a separate administrative unit. They thought this would assuage any Allied fears about independent German activity in foreign affairs and also be the most economical solution. During his meeting with Eberhard on December 17, 1948, Blankenhorn agreed that a joint CDU-SPD effort was desirable, as was a bipartisan foreign policy in general. However, he feared that the Occupation Powers would see a "secret Auswartiges Amt" in the DBFF's plans. Blankenhorn also doubted whether the Occupation Powers would allow an expressly named advisor for international affairs. On the other hand, they certainly would give their blessing to a "division for occupation affairs" in the Chancellery, which could handle foreign affairs and planning for a peace treaty as well. Blankenhorn thought this union logical, because one could not separate domestic and foreign affairs in an occupied country. At first, the Federal Chancellery would have to be kept small, but as he noted, a larger organization could be created later. 100 Early in 1949 Adenauer, in his capacity as president of the Parliamentary Council, asked the Hamburg Audit Office [Rechnungsho.fJ of the United Economic Area to prepare a study "on basic questions on constructing the Federal administration." The initial study, dated March I, argued that the new ministries should remain as small as possible and that foreign affairs should be coordinated by the federal president's office. Under the Basic Law, the president would sign treaties as head of state anyway. 101 Adenauer strongly disapproved of this idea, telling journalists in April 1949 that he believed that a foreign affairs office was necessary but that it must be directly subordinate to the federal chancellor. On April 13, Adenauer asked the president of the Audit Office for additional suggestions, and a new study dated May 3 not surprisingly put foreign affairs directly within the Chancellery. 102

Adenauer Asserts His Position The West German political parties had already made clear that they would not be bound by any preexisting plans for setting up the federal government, including those from the Organization Committee. Their position reflected the inevitable logic of political developments in Western Germany since mid1948, which had seen the steady erosion of the minister presidents' rights and competencies in favor of the political parties. 103 The rather one-sided debate

60 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE in the summer of 1949 between Adenauer and his party colleague Hermann Ptinder, the director of the Frankfurt Administrations, over how to administer West German foreign relations was part of this larger picture. Not only was Adenauer unwilling to be bound by suggestions from the Frankfurt Administrations, whose lifespan clearly had become limited once planning for the Federal Republic began, but by the end of the summer Adenauer was chancellor and would have the opportunity to decide this question himself. On June 3, 1949, after months of speculation, Ptinder came forward for the first time with a concrete proposal for a "foreign trade ministry" in reaction to the Audit Office's proposals. Not only did he think the number of ministries proposed by the Audit Office too small, Ptinder wrote to Adenauer, but he also argued that such matters as Marshall Plan affairs, foreign trade treaties, and the complex of questions arising from the Occupation Statute should be consolidated in a "Ministry for Interstate Relations" (in the letter Ptinder also used the phrase "Foreign Economics Ministry"). The commercial missions planned by RudolfHolzhausen's Organization Staff would form an important element of the ministry. 104 Ptinder soon reached a much wider audience when he addressed the minister presidents' Organization Committee on June 17. As during the Weimar Republic, the Chancellery had to be kept small. Ptinder thought it would be wrong to make the chancellor responsible for ministerial work of any type since it would divert his energies and attention from shaping the government's overall policy. In response to a question, he stated that the "foreign trade ministry" would more resemble a division within a ministry rather than a full ministry and that a future foreign office would organically absorb it. 105 Then on June 20, Ptinder held a widely publicized press conference in Frankfurt in which he once again critiqued the Audit Office's proposals and elaborated on a "Ministry for Interstate Relations." 106 He and his coworkers also were very skeptical about the Organization Committee's recommendations. Sometime in late July his office drew up a proposal for a foreign ministry with six divisions. Ptinder himself was thought to harbor hopes of receiving the foreign affairs portfolio. 107 He received encouragement on August 16 from the newly appointed US and British High Commissioners, John J. McCloy and General Brian Robertson. Ptinder claimed that both High Commissioners agreed with his arguments about the desirability of setting up a ministry from the very start and told him that Andre Frarn;:ois-Poncet, the French High Commissioner, held the same view. 108 However, Adenauer intended to run foreign affairs from the Chancellery. During the summer he made known his objections to Ptinder's ideas for a

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"Ministry for Interstate Relations" to a number of party colleagues. Like Ludwig Erhard, he thought it wrong to take international economic affairs out of the future economics ministry. 109 Adenauer also apparently disliked the idea that Piinder---or, more correctly, Holzhausen's Organization Staff-was making personnel preparations for a new foreign service. 110 Despite Piinder's persistent lobbying, Adenauer preferred postponing any discussion of the issue until after the elections. 111 Although he had sponsored Piinder, his party colleague, as a candidate to lead the Frankfurt Administrations, his misgivings about Piinder's political abilities, widely shared with other contemporaries, now came to the fore. 112 By early August, criticism of the Frankfurt Administrations' foreign policy activities had reached such an extent that Piinder reportedly was reluctant even to approach Allied Offices for further clarification of the foreign policy rights West Germany would enjoy. 113 In the federal elections on August 14, 1949, the CDU/CSU received 31 percent of the vote and formed a center-right coalition government with the FOP and the German Party (DP). Adenauer now broke his silence on August 20, when he told Bavarian minister president Hans Ehard that he wanted to concentrate foreign affairs in the Chancellery under a state secretary rather than in a separate office. Piinder's name came up once again as a candidate for state secretary during Adenauer's meeting with Ehard, although it is unclear who made the suggestion. 114 At the RhondorfConference of prominent CDU/CSU politicians on August 21, Piinder was the first to break the ice and endorse Adenauer's candidacy as chancellor. 115 However, if he intended to secure his appointment as foreign minister from Adenauer in return, he failed. On August 23, Piinder told the press service dpd that he supported creating a federal ministry for interstate relations and that the Occupation Powers had already expressed their approval. Moreover, a plan already existed for the ministry. 116 But in a press conference in Bonn on the same day, Adenauer denied that any discussion had taken place in Rhondorf about naming a state secretary for foreign affairs. He also mentioned that, while the minister presidents' Organization Committee had done good work, "we have to be fully clear with ourselves that their findings are nothing other than recommendations." 117 Given the outcome of the election, Adenauer would be able to manage foreign affairs as he saw fit. Piinder later made a last-ditch attempt to create a ministry from the start. On September 2, ERP Office deputy director Herbert Martini prepared a detailed evaluation of the Organization Committee's report that supported this effort. Although it misconstrued Piinder's plan for a "Federal Ministry for Interstate

62 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE Relations" as primarily motivated by economic considerations, Martini wrote that the Organization Committee's report had usefully focused attention on the primacy of political considerations. Nonetheless, he thought this was another reason to create a full-fledged ministry. He anticipated that the political situation was going to develop so quickly that the Federal Republic would become involved in foreign affairs to an extent unforeseen by the Organization Committee. The chancellor must not be burdened with ministerial questions, nor must a state secretary for foreign affairs be overwhelmed with work. The Organization Committee was doubtlessly right that personnel decisions would be very difficult, but this was no reason to keep the initial office so small that it was understaffed and underfunded. Ptinder forwarded Martini's memo to Adenauer in early September and pleaded again with the chancellor and several other members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group to set up an independent ministry, or at least a separate office under the chancellor. 118 As expected, however, Adenauer announced in his initial government declaration on September 20 that a state secretariat within the Chancellery would conduct foreign affairs. 119 Along with the uncertainty about the Three Powers' intentions, this decision was another important legacy for the future Foreign Office. For Adenauer, initially running foreign affairs out of the Chancellery proved to be politically expedient for several reasons. As we will see, the French High Commission initially rejected any structure that resembled a future foreign ministry. It also helped him further consolidate his own personal position. As chairman of the Parliamentary Council, Adenauer had participated very little in drafting the Basic Law but used his position to become the most important conversation partner with the Western military governors as the liaison between them and the Parliamentary Council. 120 Blankenhorn, at first assisted only by the young former Wehrmacht officer Rolf Pauls, served as Adenauer's chief assistant in dealing with the Allies. 121 These contacts became very important after Adenauer became chancellor. Not only did he and Blankenhorn have a working relationship with Allied offices, but Blankenhorn and his staff became the nucleus of the Verbindungsstelle zur AHK [Liaison Office to the Allied High Commission], the most crucial element of the new Foreign Office. Moreover, his importance as the main contact with the Three Powers made it easy for Adenauer to justify taking the foreign minister's portfolio himself when it was created in March 1951. On the other hand, Ptinder and Martini were absolutely correct in warning about the difficulties that would arise if the foreign policy apparatus were too small and understaffed once the Three Powers began to grant the

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Federal Republic more rights. While it is admittedly difficult to conceive of the Three Powers' approving an embryonic foreign office before September 1949, it is also true that Adenauer showed little tolerance for plans made by the Frankfurt Administrations or the minister presidents. In any case the new Auswartiges Amt, unlike other ministries that arose out of the Frankfurt Administrations, would not be able to rely on significant institutional predecessors created during the years of military occupation. But there would be yet another important legacy of these years. As we have seen, former diplomats were centrally involved in the "German momentum" in foreign affairs in the Western zones, and after 1949 they would appear in increasing numbers in the offices that eventually became the new Foreign Office. Explaining how this happened requires an examination of how the WilhelmstraBe veterans were able to reestablish themselves in German society after 1945.

The Return of the German Diplomats

0NE EVE NI NG I N LA TE SUM ME R 1945 Hans von Herwarth sat in an American officer's mess in Wiesbaden with US Army captain Peter Hamden and discussed whether his family should resettle in the United States. "My thoughts had been occupied with this idea for a long time already, because I feared that the division of Germany into four zones could be permanent." Herwarth also could not imagine that there would ever be a German foreign service again. At that moment, news arrived that Anton Pfeiffer, brother of Herwarth's former Moscow Embassy colleague Peter and an old acquaintance of Hamden, wanted Herwarth to work for him in the office of the Bavarian minister president. Herwarth moved with his family to Munich and reentered government service in the fall of 1945. 1 Four years later, he was managing protocol functions for the West German government. Herwarth's story sheds light on the experience of many mid- and lowerrank German diplomats between 1945 and the early 1950s. From a family with a long tradition of state service, he entered the Auswartiges Amt as an attache in 1929. He had a complicated relationship with the Nazi state. His paternal grandmother was Jewish, and Herwarth believed that only his patrons at the embassy and in the WilhelmstraBe's personnel office protected him from dismissal after 1933. While in Moscow, where he served from 1931 to 1939, Herwarth participated in two attempts to mobilize the Western powers against Nazi Germany. In the fall of 1938 he informed colleagues at the British and French embassies about Hitler's aggressive intentions toward Czechoslovakia.

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The next year, he provided British, French, and American diplomats with details of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. In August 1939 he joined the army and, despite being highly critical of German occupation policy in Eastern Europe and having contact with the military resistance against Hitler, served loyally until the end of the war. After the attack on the Soviet Union he helped to interrogate prisoners from the Red Army. For most of the war Herwarth served as an officer on the staff of General Ernst Kostring, who organized military units out of Soviet volunteers to fight for Germany. These "Eastern Legions" included members of collaborationist militias that had committed atrocities in Eastern Europe. In 1944 Kostring and Herwarth accompanied General Helmuth von Pannwitz's Cossacks on anti-partisan campaigns in Croatia, which were marked by the execution of thousands of civilians and the burning and looting ofvillages. 2 Despite his presence in Croatia, however, Herwarth later asserted that as Kostring's adjutant and advisor he personally had no opportunity to commit "bloody crimes in the occupied territories." 3 After the German capitulation, US diplomat Charles Thayer, a friend from his Moscow years, discovered Herwarth in captivity in Austria and immediately helped him get demobilized. Although he knew about Herwarth's activities in Yugoslavia, Thayer believed he had been opposed to National Socialism and accepted his claim that he had played an important role in the assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944. Most importantly, he thought Herwarth could provide valuable information about the war in the East and especially about German attempts to conduct "political warfare" against the Soviet Union. Herwarth joined a research group at the US Political Advisor's Office in Wiesbaden consisting of other German diplomats with experience with the Soviet Union as well as Harnden. 4 Herwarth's fate in the immediate postwar years shares certain common patterns with that of other WilhelmstraJ3e veterans. When the war ended he did not see much of a future for himself and even contemplated emigration, yet by the early 1950s he had attained a prominent position in government service in the very ministry he once thought an impossibility. His rapid climb was aided by his background as a diplomat and administrator and his foreign language skills (including English, French, and Russian), all of which were in high demand with German offices that had to deal with the occupation authorities. His expertise on the Soviet Union proved of special interest to the Americans. Herwarth had an exceptional network of contacts, including foreign diplomats such as Thayer and former colleagues such as Peter Pfeiffer. He also could demonstrate active ties to the German resistance against Hitler. However,

66 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE Herwarth's is also a cautionary tale. While his prewar contacts with the Western powers and his rejection of Germany's wartime policies toward ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe are beyond dispute, he embellished his ties with the July 20 movement in order to impress Thayer and others after the war. They also did not inquire critically into his wartime record. 5 "Johnny" Herwarth, as friends called him, was undoubtedly a critic of Nazism and open to a new political start in Germany after 1945, but his continued service for the National Socialist state-albeit not only in the Foreign Office-made it impossible for him to escape association with its crimes. Other career diplomats would have considerably more difficulty than Herwarth in reestablishing themselves after the war due to Allied policies. But they possessed the same types of skills, experiences, and contacts that Herwarth did, and their educated, professional backgrounds made them appear unlikely sympathizers with National Socialism. Diplomats with considerably weaker resistance credentials than Herwarth, or even none at all, could depict moments of noncompliance or aid for comrades in need as fundamental opposition to Nazi policies. Probably most importantly, after 1947 they benefited as a group from an increasingly critical public opinion in the Western zones plus the onset of the Cold War, both trends that led to the end of Allied policies aimed at an active political purge of former Nazis and nationalists. As a result, even former officials closely associated with Ribbentrop or those involved in serious crimes could find work in the private sector. Members of the younger generation of diplomats like Herwarth frequently made the transition into government service or politics as well, although their activities in the area of foreign policy raised the suspicions of both the Occupation Powers and the West German political parties.

Automatic Arrest, Internment, Denazification The return oflarge numbers of diplomats to public life is especially surprising considering Allied policies toward them in 1945. Initially the Four Powers saw the diplomatic corps as a key group that had collaborated with National Socialism, and they intended to deal with it severely. As soon as Allied military government began in parts of Germany in late 1944, the Control Powers placed most German diplomats under "automatic arrest" along with other compromised persons who had held important positions in the NSDAP, the military, and all levels of government. Automatic arrest affected about 200,000

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2. Foreign Office Protocol Chief Baron Hans von Herwarth watches as Konrad Adenauer signs the text of the General Treaty in Bonn, May 26, 1952 (AP).

68 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE Germans, with 100,000 in US camps alone by the end of 1945. 6 The exact number of interned diplomats is unknown, but many spent time in Allied captivity, some as long as two years. Allied Control Council Directive 24 of January 12, 1946, also ordered the removal from responsible positions within Germany of diplomats who had served above the rank of desk official (Referent) in Berlin and those stationed abroad with the rank of attache or above. 7 Even before the end of hostilities a number of officials closely associated with the NSDAP, such as Ribbentrop's deputy Walther Hewel and the German ministers to Romania and Hungary at the end of the war, Manfred von Killinger and Dietrich von Jagow, chose to commit suicide rather than be taken by the Soviets. 8 Soviet authorities displayed particular zeal in arresting diplomats in their zone as well as from the German missions in Eastern Europe and Manchuria and then proved reluctant to release them. Adenauer demanded the release of the remaining captives on a visit to Moscow in September 1955. 9 Prominent diplomats were called before Allied and international courts to account for their activities during the war. Members of the Auswartiges Amt's political leadership were sentenced at Nuremberg. At the International Military Tribunal in 1946 Ribbentrop received the death penalty and Neurath was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Between 1946 and 1949 US occupation authorities initiated 12 "Subsequent Nuremberg Trials," including Case XI against leading bureaucrats in the central government. As the case name, "The United States against Ernst von Weizsacker et al.," suggested, surviving senior officials from the Auswartiges Amt's political leadership and Ribbentrop's circle were the star defendants. 10 In addition, former ambassadors and Reich commissars in Nazi-occupied Europe were tried in the countries where they had committed their crimes. This was the fate of Otto Abetz in France, Otto Bene in the Netherlands, and Werner Best in Denmark, all of whom were arrested by local authorities, while the United States extradited Siegfried Kasche and Hanns Ludin to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, respectively, where they were convicted and executed in 1947 .11 Regardless of whether they had been interned or also sentenced by courts for specific crimes, diplomats who sought positions in public service or in sensitive branches of private industry still needed to be vetted politically through a process known as "denazification." 12 Initially there was no appreciable difference between denazification and automatic arrest, but the Occupation Powers quickly developed ways to systematically evaluate former Nazis and collaborators. Already by late 1945 these included the use of a questionnaire, or Fragebogen, in which individuals had to give detailed answers about their personal

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backgrounds, political and religious affiliations, and career and income during the Third Reich. However, the Occupation Powers grossly underestimated the extent to which German elites had been co-opted by National Socialism, and large backlogs of cases soon developed. In response, in 1946 they moved to create unified guidelines for categorizing and punishing offenders that utilized local denazification boards staffed by politically uncompromised Germans. For former German officials, these guidelines were quite severe. Under Allied Control Council Directive 38 of October 12, 1946, they faced initial categorization in one of five groups based solely on their previous position and rank and not, for example, on their ties to the NSDAP. All ministers, state secretaries, ambassadors, and officials down to the rank of Ministerialdirektor (division director) in government offices that existed before January 30, 1933, or down to the rank of Ministerialrat ("principal" or desk director; in the Auswartiges Amt, legation counselor) in offices created thereafter were to be placed in group I (major offender). Major offenders could be imprisoned for up to 10 years simply for their service to the government; if convicted of specific war crimes, they could be executed or imprisoned for up to 15. They also faced the loss of their property, could not hold public office or vote, and for a decade could engage only in "ordinary labor." Moreover, "all officials of the Foreign Office (Embassies, Legations, General Consulates, Consulates and Missions) in the rank of a Ministerialrat or in the position of an attache" were to be placed in group II (offender) and faced virtually identical sanctions. Even a "follower" (the American zone term for group IV) could not move without the permission of the authorities, would be forced to retire or be reassigned from positions in the civil service and certain professions, and might be required to pay into reparations funds and report periodically to the police. 13 As was the case for other German elites, the diplomats found denazification to be a humiliating process in which they themselves had to demonstrate that they were politically acceptable. 14 The goal of those with ties to the NSDAP was to achieve the favorable rating of "exonerated" (group V), which applied to "anyone who, in spite of his formal membership or candidacy or any other outward indication, not only showed a passive attitude but also actively resisted the National Socialistic tyranny to the extent of his powers and thereby suffered disadvantages." 15 Those with no formal party ties could hope to be classified as "not affected" (34.5% of all cases in Western Germany were simply dismissed, largely for this reason). 16 While some benefited from youth amnesties, and others with no formal

70 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE ties to the NSDAP (including known dissidents and the persecuted) might avoid the process altogether, most diplomats needed to apply for a denazification status if they wanted to work again. Their questionnaires emphasized what they thought the boards wanted to hear, for example their continued church membership (a supposed sign of anti-Nazi sentiment) or career setbacks (e.g., being skipped for normal promotion). Sometimes they would also leave out details about their past relationship with organizations like the SS or SD. 17 Most importantly, they asked acquaintances for testimonials of their anti-Nazi sentiment. These letters, quickly nicknamed "Persil certificates" after a popular laundry detergent, were even more effective if written by prominent persons, recognized opponents of Nazism, or foreigners. Diplomats who already had been denazified favorably, especially those with jobs in the German state governments, universities, or Bizonal Administrations, frequently wrote for former colleagues who were still caught up in the process. Especially notable were letters from the Auswartiges Amt's last personnel chief, Hans Schroeder. Schroeder joined the Foreign Office in the 1920s as a consular official, not a Higher Service diplomat, but saw his career rapidly advance after he was stationed in Egypt in 1928 and began a friendship with Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess. Many career diplomats credited Schroeder with protecting them from arrest or dismissal during the Third Reich, and he continued to help his colleagues after the war by writing large numbers of Persil certificates based solely on his own memory (an effective tactic, considering that the Foreign Ministry's personnel files remained in Allied custody until the early 1950s ). After the war, he told another diplomat, "You know, it is actually funny. Earlier they always wanted me to confirm that they were for the Party; today I am supposed to attest to everyone that they were always against it! I refused no one." 18 If diplomats could prove that they were resisters, their cases for exoneration became much stronger. For example, Herbert Blankenhorn entered the Foreign Office as an attache in 1929 and was stationed to various posts abroad before being assigned to the Protocol Division in Berlin in 1943. He joined the NSDAP in 1938. Both US and Swiss authorities became suspicious about his activities while he was stationed in Washington ( 1935-39), for a time as the head of the political desk, and in Berne (1940--43), where his responsibilities included being in charge of propaganda. To his credit, during the war Blankenhorn demonstrated a critical attitude toward Nazism and established contacts with the resistance. However, his active opposition was much less certain, so much so that it was not a subject he dwelt on later in

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life. Despite this, in his denazification questionnaire of May 12, 1946, Blankenhom stressed his membership in the Trott-Haeften group and his "participation in the subversive work against the Hitler regime." 19 This strategy was successful, and he was placed into group V in Hamburg on January 8, 1947. 20 Blankenhom's case was quite mild compared to that of former state secretary Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, who had been convicted in 1949 at the "ministries trial" at Nuremberg for his role in the murder of the Hungarian Jews (he would be pardoned the following year). Armed with good Persil certificates and a story about forging a telegram to save the lives of Jews slated for deportation, Steengracht managed to be exonerated at not one but two denazification hearings in 1951. The Special Representative [Sonderbeauftragte] for Denazification in North Rhine-Westphalia protested but only managed to have him reclassified in group IV. 21 Despite these strategies, through 1947 Allied authorities sometimes intervened with local denazification boards when they thought German diplomats had been categorized too leniently. 22 Yet the German diplomats who had served during the Third Reich had a relatively easy time compared to other elite groups. They demonstrated a strong sense of solidarity with each other, as their willingness to write Persil certificates proved. In many cases they could make use of prewar professional ties with Allied diplomats to rehabilitate themselves and their colleagues. They provided the Occupation Powers with useful information about German foreign policy during the Third Reich and, for the Western Powers, the Soviet Union. Most importantly, they benefited from the onset of the Cold War and the growing German dissatisfaction with denazification and war crime trials starting in 1947. Soon after the war, networks of private contacts began to grow again, reflecting the tremendous solidarity that officials of the Reich Foreign Office felt for each other. Such "Seilschaften" and "Cliquen" [networks and cliques], for better or worse, represented the norm in post-1945 German governmental and university administrations. 23 German diplomats assisted their less fortunate colleagues and their families in securing a livelihood after the war. 24 As was the case with denazification and Persil certificates, the key criteria used for judging individuals in need of aid was not their political views or official activities during the Third Reich but whether they had behaved in a "decent [anstiindig]" manner toward other members of the Foreign Office, especially when the latter had experienced difficulties with the NSDAP and its organizations. 25 An early opportunity to help former colleagues arose due to the fact that the Western Occupation Powers wanted to secure as much information as possible

72 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE about the Third Reich's policies and technologies. The Ministerial Collecting Center at Hessisch-Lichtenau near Kassel, established in June 1945, formed part of the Special Sections Subdivision created by Allied supreme headquarters in Europe to secure political, economic, scientific, and technological intelligence in Germany. By the end of the summer the Collecting Center held 1,420 tons of captured documents, 42 tons of microfilm, and 1,300 German officials under automatic arrest, including diplomats from the Auswiirtiges Amt. 26 Andor Hencke, the last head of the ministry's Political Division, initiated and supervised the work of 58 of his former colleagues who described the ministry's organization and personnel as of March 15, 1945, to help with preparations for the upcoming Nuremberg trials. Heinz Triitzschler von Falkenstein, recognized by his colleagues for his excellent writing style and a contributor to various "White Books" justifying the Third Reich's foreign policies, helped Hencke with the sections on the Political Division and also translated the entire study into English. 27 Hans-Jurgen Doscher has illustrated how these diplomats, especially Horst Wagner, former leader of Referat Inland II, deliberately drew up misleading organization plans for some of the ministry's units in order to obscure their role in anti-Jewish policies and their ties to Heinrich Himmler's RHSA. 28 Another group of diplomats that the Western Allies found especially useful were those with expert knowledge of the Soviet Union, including Otto Brautigam, Herbert von Dirksen, Hencke, Herwarth, and Gustav Hilger. 29 Such cooperation helped legitimate these diplomats in the eyes of the Occupation Powers. In turn, it enabled them to help their former colleagues. While in British internment in the summer of 1945 Werner Gregor, a prewar consul in Glasgow, provided detailed information on a list of his former colleagues through the letter "K" as well as on Ribbentrop, Neurath, and Martin Luther (an illness prevented him from continuing beyond noting which officials had been "Nazi diplomats" appointed after 1933). Gregor described the German diplomats as reserved toward National Socialism, with only those who were young and ambitious or without good prospects for promotion attracted to it. 30 In October, Herwarth gave his American superiors two lists of diplomats who possessed outstanding "character, knowledge and political attitude." The first list, headed by Weizsiicker, contained the names of those who had occupied important positions. The second contained thirty-two other officials whom Herwarth considered important due to their various qualities. 31 In contrast, in April 1945 Fritz Kolbe held no less than 133 of the 241 officials he described in a memo for his OSS contacts in Switzerland unfit for future service. 32 How-

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ever, Kolbe's critical view was rare among German diplomats consulted by the Occupation Powers about their former colleagues and may have been because he himself was not a member of the Higher Service. In 1948, diplomats associated with the Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirchen in Deutsch/and [Protestant Relief Agency, also known as the Evangelisches Hilfswerk] office in Hamburg even set up a "circle offriends [Freundeskreis]" to help those in immediate financial need, especially due to the recent currency reform. Fritz von Twardowski, Herbert Richter, and Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick organized the project, which sent regular circular letters to possible contributors. In addition, a net of eight "confidants" existed for Western Germany and Berlin, which included Blankenhorn, Herbert Dittmann, and Wilhelm Melchers. Individual diplomats named worthy cases, including the families of colleagues executed by the Nazis, and often initiated the fundraising process themselves. The Freundeskreis distributed over 39,000 DM to 129 individuals in the spring of 1951 alone. 33 Around 1947 German society also became much more tolerant of the diplomats and other "functional elites" who had served the National Socialist state, and this would be reflected in its attitude toward denazification and war crimes trials. 34 No consensus about denazification could be reached beyond punishing prominent Nazis and removing relentless careerists, agitators, and informers from their posts. 35 By 1947--48 discontent with Allied procedures as well as rejection of the supposed Allied thesis of German "collective guilt" were clearly on the rise. After German-staffed denazification boards were established, they were often unable to resist pressures for lenient treatment. Many Germans also rejected denazification in principle, with opposition the strongest among the better educated and those with a higher socioeconomic status. Moreover, by 1948 each of the Occupation Powers had decided to conclude their zonal denazification programs as quickly as possible due to the impending creation of two German states and turned them over completely to German authorities. Between 1949 and 1952 the German Lander in the West as well as the Bundestag passed legislation to bring the entire process to a close. 36 The German public's shift on war crimes trials was arguably even more dramatic. In 1946 an overwhelming majority of Germans living in the American occupation zone found the sentences handed out by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg against the Major War Criminals either fair (55%) or too lenient (21 %). 37 However, after US authorities in the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials targeted medical professionals, military officers, industrialists, government bureaucrats, and others who had served the Third Reich,

74 AD ENAU ER' S FORE I GN OFFI CE representatives of these groups and their allies in the German churches, press, and political parties organized amnesty campaigns. By the early 1950s their pressure had contributed to numerous Allied pardons. In May 1952, during the last phase ofnegotiations on the contractual agreements with the three Western Occupation Powers, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer also asked for "acts of mercy on a large scale [Gnadenakte im groj3eren Urrifang]" immediately after the agreements were signed to signal the dawning of a new era for the German people. He was hoping in particular for a pardon for German war criminals still in Allied captivity, especially the "tragic case" ofNeurath. 38 In September 1952, 52 percent of West Germans thought it unjust that the five remaining major war criminals sentenced in Nuremberg in 1946 were still in prison (only 14% thought it fair). Neurath returned home due to his failing health in November 1954. 39 Allied opinion on the former German diplomats had also become much more favorable by the early 1950s. For example, in the spring of 1945 the US State Department, recalling his time in Washington, described Blankenhorn as an "ardent and convinced Nazi" and a member of the SS (the first claim was subjective, the second clearly incorrect). By March 1952, however, John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner in Germany, could write to the New York-based Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League that Blankenhorn had joined the NSDAP because "he thought it was the way to get along. This is not a very noble approach, to be sure, but I would not suspect him now of desiring openly or secretly the return of the Nazis to power." 40 The former diplomats took advantage of this changed atmosphere in several ways. Although under the initial Allied guidelines they were supposed to be classified automatically as major offenders or offenders, the available evidence indicates that diplomats with formal ties to the NSDAP were exonerated (group V) at a much higher rate than the general population in the Western zones. 41 Steengracht's denazification, discussed above, indicated that the longer they waited, the better the chance diplomats had of receiving lenient treatment from denazification boards. As Hans Kroll noted in his memoirs, he ended up in group V mainly due to the fact that by 1948 the British had decided to transfer responsibility for denazification to German offices, which found nothing objectionable in his previous service in the Auswartiges Amt (Kroll never joined the NSDAP). 42 Diplomats with more troubling resumes also profited from delayed denazification. During the war, Soviet expert Otto Brautigam held high-ranking positions in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, where he helped shape the occupation of Belorussia and

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had firsthand knowledge ofNazi crimes against humanity. After the war, Brautigam argued that he had tried to limit the impact of these policies and also had been expelled from the NSDAP in 1940 for "defeatist" and "Jew-friendly" statements. On August 13, 1949, a denazification board in Bocholt placed him in group V, and the following year a court in Nuremburg-Ftirth suspended criminal proceedings against him for lack of sufficient evidence. By this time he was providing his expertise to the US government. 43 In April 1948 a denazification board in Altena in Westphalia categorized Gustav Adolf Sonnenhol in group IV even though he had joined the NSDAP in 1931, belonged to both the SA and SS, and served several months in 1944 as head of the Foreign Office's Inland II B (in charge of relations with the SS). In August 1949 Sonnenhol successfully appealed for reclassification as exonerated (group V) in anticipation of work in the new Marshall Plan Ministry in Bonn. Persil certificates from former colleagues Werner Otto von Hentig and Peter Pfeiffer portrayed him as a resister and emphasized his attempts to help Theodor Auer, another diplomat arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 (an act of "decency" toward a colleague but hardly a sign of fundamental opposition). 44 Both Brautigam and Sonnenhol would later enter the Auswartiges Amt, the former in 1953 as an "Eastern expert," and the latter as ambassador to South Africa beginning in 1968. In April 1953 Peter Pfeiffer, head of the new Foreign Office's Division One (Personnel and Administration), also drew a connection between the end of the occupation and the political vetting of candidates for the foreign service. According to his subordinate Wolfgang Freiherr von Welck, Pfeiffer had repeatedly expressed that for the evaluation of political attitudes and pasts he did not find the term "politically uncompromised [unbelastet]" or rather "fully uncompromised," "less compromised," etc., appropriate because it originated in the terminology of the Allied prosecuting authorities. In place of the term "fully uncompromised," etc., should for example be stated" ... was not a member of the NSDAP."45

Not only was denazification itself tainted, in Pfeiffer's mind, because of its association with the Allied occupation, but his comments underline the fact that by the early 1950s in West Germany denazification often was viewed merely on the level of formal criteria such as party membership and had lost all significance as an instrument for a political purge. There was one silver lining, however. By the time most diplomats had gone through internment and denazification, a new political system and political

76 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE culture had been established in the Western zones, backed by Allied occupation forces. If they wanted to attain new social prominence, they and other elites who had actively collaborated with Nazism had either to respect the new democratic rules or to seek employment outside of politics or government service. Those who could not, or who had been too closely associated with the NSDAP, needed to move into the private sector. For those who had actively placed their hopes in National Socialism, old political positions needed to be abandoned or at least expressed only in private. In retrospect, the flawed and ultimately too lenient denazification process probably was a price that had to be paid in exchange for compliance with the new democratic system, especially considering that German society as a whole was not yet ready to confront the recent past. 46

New Careers In 1945 WilhelmstraBe veterans needed to start new lives. Over the next several years diplomats who had fled Nazi Germany due to political or racial reasons began slowly to return on their own, while those who had served in foreign missions until the end of the war were generally repatriated under Allied pressure. A handful of others who feared prosecution for their wartime activities made their way abroad to South America, Italy, Syria, and other destinations. Older officials simply retired, especially if they still had money and property (many lost everything due to the war and, if they had estates in the east, Soviet occupation), and some began to write their memoirs. Younger colleagues normally needed to earn money and followed a variety of strategies. Some worked as journalists or translators, took jobs as university faculty, went back to school themselves, or practiced law (most diplomats had completed legal studies). 47 Even highly compromised diplomats and those with strong ties to the NSDAP could enjoy a second career in the private sector for about a decade until the West German justice system turned its attention to them, as several examples suggest. 48 Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, who received a five-year sentence at Nuremberg at the Ministries Trial in April 1949, later worked as a businessman in Hamburg. 49 Wilhelm Keppler, Ribbentrop's state secretary for special assignments from 1938 to 1945, received ten years at the Ministries Trial. Pardoned by the US High Commission in 1951, he took a position with the motor producer Felix Wankel in Lindau on Lake Constance. 5° From 1943 to 1945

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Eberhard von Thadden served as leader of the ministry's Jewish Desk and helped coordinate deportations from throughout occupied Europe. In 1956 the Cologne public prosecutor suspended proceedings against him due to insufficient evidence. By this time Thadden had established himself in private business. The firm Schlingelmann and Co. KG in Bracke, Westphalia, would lose its "esteemed boss" due to an automobile accident on November 11, 1964, just as the district court in Essen was initiating a new case against him. 51 Rudolf Rahn led the German military government's propaganda operations in occupied France and then served as the Third Reich's envoy to fascist Italy from 1943 to 1945. After the war Coca Cola appointed him to manage its operations in Germany. 52 Younger diplomats who had not occupied leading positions in the WilhelmstraBe could also enter politics or public service. No less than six would sit in the first Bundestag in September 1949. 53 Blankenhorn served as deputy secretary general of the Zonal Advisory Council [Zonenbeirat] in the British zone from March 1946 to April 1948, and thereafter as secretary general of the CDU in the British zone and personal secretary of the president of the Parliamentary Council, Adenauer. Others held leading civil service positions in state government; for example, Wilhelm Haas, head of the Presidial Division of the Bremen Senate 1947-49. 54 Except in Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and WilrttembergHohenzollern, all the West German minister presidents also employed former members of the Auswiirtiges Amt as foreign policy advisors (for example, Theo Kordt in North Rhine-Westphalia). 55 Numerous other diplomats, such as Herbert Dittmann, justice in the Court of Appeals [Oberlandesgericht] in Hamm, Westphalia, served in local governmental administrations or the court system. 56 Still others found work in the Bi- and later Trizonal Administrations. Especially important was Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan, who led the Frankfurt Economic Administration's Foreign Trade Division. 57 Two organizations that served as collection points for small numbers of former diplomats between 1945 and 1949 deserve special mention. With its headquarters in Stuttgart, the Evangelisches Hilfswerk, led by CDU politician Eugen Gerstenmaier, coordinated charitable activities and, where necessary, reconstruction work for all of the Protestant and Orthodox churches in Germany. A number of Protestant diplomats, including Twardowski, Weick, and Melchers, found positions with the Evangelisches Hilfswerk after the war. The size of its budget, which according to its 1947 annual report contained 100 million RM in voluntary contributions from domestic sources alone, reflected its significance in the eyes of Germans. One critic noted that

78 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE the former diplomats working for the Evangelisches Hilfswerk "certainly have discovered their interest in charity and the church only after the war" and that they were not required in order for the Hilfswerk to function properly. 58 The organization also possessed a measure of political importance in the early postwar years. As of late 1947 it had encountered little difficulty in operating throughout Eastern Germany. The Evangelisches Hilfswerk's members believed that their organization alone was in a position to maintain ties to Germans in the Soviet zone should the Iron Curtain become permanent. For that reason they feared any political break with the Soviets, a position that raised the eyebrows of some US officials. 59 The other organization heavily influenced by former diplomats was the German Office for Peace Questions, or DBFF. As time went on, more and more diplomats came to work there. 60 Among them were Erich Kordt, who worked on international law questions; Hasso von Etzdorf, who became the DBFF's deputy leader; and Peter Pfeiffer, who succeeded Fritz Eberhard as leader in December 1949. The organization was quite small, but most of its leading personalities were former diplomats who stayed in private and professional contact with a still-wider circle of diplomats outside of their office. 61 The DBFF also identified and assembled some of the outsiders who later worked in the new Foreign Office. For example, its legal committee recruited Erich Kaufmann, Wilhelm Grewe, and Gustav von Schmoller in 1948 as advisors on questions relating to an Allied occupation statute. 62 It was only natural that the former diplomats would hope to resume their careers one day. The Evangelisches Hilfswerk drew attention as the possible nucleus of a "future German Foreign Office," with Gerstenmaier rumored as a candidate for foreign minister. "Responsible people" said that its members talked openly of these possibilities. 63 The DBFF certainly understood itself as a-if not the-precursor of an office for foreign affairs in a future West German government, although its members became more pessimistic as the process of setting up the Federal Republic dragged on into 1949.64 It is also instructive to get a sense of where the diplomats chose to live after the Second World War. An analysis of the postal codes from a March 1950 address list for 504 former Higher Service officials living in Germany compiled by the Freundeskreis indicates that the largest concentrations were living in Bavaria (89), the Rhineland (81), Hessen (66), Schleswig-Holstein and the area around Hamburg (53), Wilrttemberg (49), and West Berlin (48). The Bavarian figures are probably best explained by the fact that this state attracted many refugees after the war, but the large numbers in the Rhineland and Hes-

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sen reflect the success that younger officials already had by early 1950 in finding work with the federal government and its precursors in Bonn and Frankfurt. 65 By this point the rehabilitation of the diplomats was largely complete.

The Story of the Two Foreign Offices Like other groups of German professionals after 1945 (for example, industrialists, military officers, and police), the diplomats also used another strategy to reestablish themselves, namely, creating a plausible collective history that sought to exonerate as many of them as possible from responsibility for collaborating with National Socialism. 66 Soon after the end of the war they began to develop, both privately and publicly, what became the standard account of the Auswartiges Amt's history during the Third Reich: the officials responsible for criminal activities under National Socialism were brought into the ministry by Ribbentrop, while the core of career diplomats not only had little to do with policy making after 1938 but also opposed National Socialism. As with the other groups, the diplomats tended to ostracize any former colleagues who openly disputed this version of history. Those with legitimate contacts with the German resistance, or who had suffered persecution and career setbacks under Nazism, initially propagated the story of the two foreign offices most avidly. Arguably, these were "good Germans" who, in trying to protect the reputation of their ministry and colleagues, propounded a highly simplified version of the past. Already in 1945 this myth-building was relatively advanced. That year the US State Department sent a "Special Interrogation Mission" to interview German diplomats in Allied custody in order to learn as much as possible about the conduct of the Third Reich's foreign policy. Again and again the mission heard that the German career diplomatic corps had diminishing influence over Nazi foreign policy as the Third Reich progressed and virtually none after Ribbentrop took over in 1938.67 During his interview in October 1945, Paul Otto Schmidt went even further and claimed that two groups existed within the ministry. The career diplomats, including his own friends like Erich Kordt as well as Weizsacker, "stood for moderation, compromise, and traditional diplomatic methods." On the other side were the outsiders, "Hitler-Ribbentrop extremists" brought in by the NSDAP. As an example, he mentioned the German dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, which the outsiders celebrated but which left the career diplomats "stunned and disgusted."68 Schmidt

80 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE and the others interviewed did not invent these tensions, but they contrasted the corps of career diplomats and those brought into office by the NSDAP in simplistic black or white terms. Although this history initially remained within the ranks of the diplomatic corps, preparations for the US-organized Ministries Trial against Ernst von Weizsacker and other leading bureaucrats at Nuremberg from December 20, 1947, to April 14, 1949, led the diplomats to take their case public. Friedrich Gaus, head of the Foreign Office's Legal Division from 1923 to 1943, cooperated with the US prosecutors. Gaus, who entered the Auswartiges Amt in 1907, had proven himself just as adaptable as Weizsacker to changing German governmental systems and even more willing to cooperate with them. Not only had Gaus been one of the chief architects of the 1925 Locarno Treaties, a cornerstone of Gustav Stresemann's diplomacy, but along with Karl Ritter, he had been Joachim von Ribbentrop's chief advisor from among the ranks of the career diplomats-and therefore suspect to many of them. Yet in Nuremberg on March 12, 1947, he made a remarkable confession about his activities during the Third Reich to Robert M. W. Kempner, the German American prosecutor who soon became the bete noire of the WilhelmstraBe veterans. Gaus said that the Reich's former officials had a moral obligation to tell the truth about all of Nazism 's crimes, even if they compromised themselves in the process. Furthermore, he spoke in the name of all of his former colleagues: "We now have, however, in all of our misfortune, the one incomparable gain of finally being able to tell the truth after the long years of our silence, our lack of courage to resist and our untruthfulness." 69 The Neue Zeitung (an American publication) featured Gaus's statement on March 17, 1947, along with an editorial positing the collective guilt of all German civil servants (followed by a similar editorial on March 28). Immediately, a number of his ex-colleagues responded who objected to his claim to speak in the name of the entire diplomatic corps. 70 In a letter to the paper, Gottfried von Nostitz strongly defended the memory of the Foreign Office resistance. However, he also freely admitted that many German officials failed to meet the challenge presented by Nazism. Some had collaborated with the Nazis out of opportunism, while a much larger group thought it sufficient to remain decent personally while continuing to serve. 71 In the rush to take the counteroffensive against Gaus and Kempner, other diplomats started to portray the role of the career diplomats in much more simplistic terms. 72 The main responsibility lay with Wilhelm Melchers. Melchers was a Middle Eastern specialist who led the WilhelmstraBe's Orient Desk dur-

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3. The defendants at the Ministries Trial in Nuremberg, February 1948. Front row left to right: Ernst von Weizsacker, Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, Wilhelm Keppler, and Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, all from the Auswartiges Amt. Back row left to right: Otto Dietrich, Gottlob Berger, Walter Schellenberg, and Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk (United States Holocaust Memorial and Museum, courtesy of Robert Kempner).

ing the war and who helped coordinate Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda directed toward the Arab world. Despite this, he successfully intervened in his official capacity to save Palestinian and Turkish Jews living in Nazi-occupied Europe. As noted previously, he also had contacts with the Trott-Haeften resistance group involved in the events of July 20, 1944, although he would exaggerate his own role later in order to find work with the Evangelisches Hilfswerk and for his denazification. As early as 1946 Melchers also propagated the idea of two foreign offices. 73 In April 1947 he heard that Weizsacker 's initials had been found on a document originating from the Foreign Office's Judenrefer-

82 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE ent, Franz Rademacher. Melchers believed this would lead to the conclusion that the Auswartiges Amt had cooperated in the Final Solution and even speculated that the Nuremberg prosecutors had forged the initials. He wrote Theo Kordt asking if it was not time to underline the division between the old Foreign Office and Ribbentrop's office. Kordt agreed. 74 Melchers then proceeded to do so in the strongest terms in a letter to Gaus dated May 27. 75 He circulated his rebuttal among his former colleagues, who were quite pleased with it. 76 In May 1948, Gaus would repeat his message while testifying at the Ministries Trial. When asked why he had made himself available as a witness for the prosecution, he replied that his experiences in internment camps with other German inmates had strengthened him in his decision. In particular, he complained that many of his former colleagues refused to fully cooperate with Allied investigations due to "an ill-chosen patriotism, or a misguided esprit de corps."77 In response, Melchers continued to insist on the idea of the two Foreign Offices during the Third Reich, writing in a short account in October 1948 that "camouflaged opposition work required fictitious cooperation." If it could not stop the worst, at least the Foreign Office opposition managed to prevent many smaller evils. 78 This line would be repeated in many diplomatic memoirs as well as in the ministry's own depictions of its past. The Auswartiges Amt's official history, published in 1970, agreed that only rarely had career diplomats "incurred personal guilt out of human weakness or in order to hold their position."79 In reality, Weizsacker and other career diplomats had countersigned various documents relating to the deportation of Jews. The Abteilung Deutschland and later the Referat Inland I and II regularly informed the Foreign Office's traditional units of such activities. 80 The Ministries Trial exposed many of these contacts. While the court exonerated him of "membership in a criminal organization" (from 1938 he had held the honorary rank of SS-Flihrer), in April 1949 it found Weizsacker guilty of planning aggressive war and crimes against humanity and sentenced him to seven years in prison. Later that same year, the first charge was dropped on appeal and the sentence reduced to five years. 81 The trial provided ample ammunition for attacks upon some of Weizsacker's younger colleagues well into the 1950s. Kempner provided encouragement for further exposes. 82 Many diplomats participated in the attempt to organize a defense for Weizsacker, who in their view personified the tragic situation of those officials who had stayed at their posts to prevent the worst. 83 In particular, the Kordt brothers tried to bring Weizsacker's case to the public in a series of

The Return of the Germon Diplomats 83 postwar publications and through their testimony at Nuremberg by providing details on his attempts to stop the outbreak of war in 1938 and 1939. 84 The Kordts themselves had taken specific actions to prevent war. Erich Kordt, along with Hasso von Etzdorf, planned an abortive assassination attempt on Hitler in November 1939. 85 In 1938 and 1939 Theo Kordt attempted to inform British authorities in London about the German resistance's plans, an activity he continued briefly after the outbreak of the war when Weizsacker restationed him to Berne, Switzerland. 86 By October 1950 the Kordts and their former colleagues, massively aided by a public campaign staged in the German press and by churches and prominent politicians, had persuaded the US High Commission in Germany to pardon Weizsacker. 87 Yet Weizsacker and the Kordts clearly had not given British officials the same advice about how to deal with Hitler, with the brothers pressing for a public ultimatum. In 1949 the historian Hans Rothfels first speculated that they actually had not cooperated with each other at all. 88 Neither the German nor the international public ever completely accepted the idea of an active "resistance circle" around Weizsacker, and some questioned the Kordts' motives. For example, in September 1948 British Foreign Office official Robert Lord Vansittart, one of Theo Kordt's main contacts in London in the 1930s, told the New York German emigre paper Aujbau/Reconstruction that he did not think the Kordts were bad people or Nazis but that they were undependable and opportunist. Vansittart never had the sense they actually planned to do anything against Hitler, and their opposition to the British guarantee for Poland had left him with a bad impression. 89 The article also stated that Theo Kordt had used his position at the Berne consulate during the war to "spy" by obtaining material on the location of British factories, airports, and other strategic targets and forwarding them to Berlin (the Swiss missions were among the few remaining that could transmit such information collected abroad to Germany). When Michael Mansfeld's September 1951 article series in the Franifurter Rundschau reopened the attack on diplomats representing the Federal Republic, Kordt (who unlike his brother Erich had reentered the diplomatic service) told his colleague Robert Ulrich, head of the West German mission in Belgrade, that it was no use publicly responding since the charges against him were so old. 90 The diplomats' version of history resonated with outsiders only to a limited degree, despite the notable success of their campaign to secure Weizsacker's pardon. More typical was an editorial in the Stuttgarter Zeitung on May 3, 1949, which stated that "the WilhelmstraBe trial showed that the old-style dip-

84 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE lomats, despite many good human qualities in individual cases, nonetheless as a whole were weak and unprincipled [haltlos]-marionettes. But who is supposed to replace them?"91

Postwar Attacks on WilhelmstraBe Veterans As noted in the previous chapter, members of the old Auswartiges Amt played an important role in the deliberations about how to manage a new West German state's relations with the outside world. Contemporaries certainly noticed as well, and their attitudes toward these activities ranged from ambivalence to outright rejection. Frequently, these apprehensions were coupled with the suspicion that the diplomats were plotting to rebuild the Auswartiges Amt in a manner similar to the "Black Reichswehr" (anti-democratic paramilitary groups organized to get around the military restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty) of the Weimar period. Some diplomats later went out of their way to deny rumors that they had talked openly about their chances to be reemployed in a new diplomatic service while in Nuremberg at the Weizsacker trial. 92 Even as late as 1949 former diplomats complained that the new West German political and administrative elites, encouraged by the Occupation Powers, were predisposed against them. 93 The Communist and Communist-influenced press was quick to condemn the diplomats' activities. The press in both the USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) pointed to the Peace Office as evidence that the oldstyle German diplomacy was becoming active again in foreign affairs. In June 1947, the East German Socialist Unity Party (SEO) paper Neues Deutsch/and drew attention not only to the DBFF but also to the presence of various former diplomats as advisors at the 1947 Munich Conference of Minister Presidents. 94 The DBFF received reports a few months later that SEO circles in Berlin believed that the Peace Office was a type of skeletal general staff helping to create an anti-Soviet West German state and that Eberhard should be hanged if the opportunity presented itself. 95 On April 1, 1948, Pravda reported that Clay was responsible for creating the office, which was headed by "arch-reactionaries" and harbored many "Nazi-diplomats." It charged that the Peace Office was helping to prepare a separate peace with the Western zones and a revision of Germany's eastern borders. 96 Der Morgen, the paper of the Soviet zone's Liberal Democratic Party, summed it up by calling these WilhelmstraBe veterans "diplomats without legitimation." They had failed the test during the Third

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Reich and now were conducting "secret diplomacy." 97 East German attacks, frequently based on solid evidence, continued after many former diplomats found their way into the Federal Republic's Auswartiges Amt. They reached a high point in 1961, the year of the Israeli trial against Adolf Eichmann. 98 The West German political parties also paid attention to the former diplomats' activities. In general, the farther to the right a party stood, the more likely it was to tolerate them. However, only the parties furthest to the right, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the much smaller German Party (DP), displayed an inclination to actively rehabilitate the diplomats. Among the other small parties that expressed an interest in this question, the German Communist Party (KPD) took a line similar to that of the Communist press, and the Catholic Center Party (Z) also was highly critical. These positions became most apparent after the creation of the Federal Republic. On the other hand, the views of the two largest parties, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), along with its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (CSU), were already clear by 1949. The CDU/CSU's attitude was usually ambivalent. This ambivalence would also characterize the Adenauer government's position on these questions in the early 1950s. Despite Anton Pfeiffer's (CSU) presence on the DBFF's board of directors, the CDU/CSU displayed relatively little interest in the organization. It seems that Konrad Adenauer wanted to keep the DBFF at a distance. He resisted overtures from ex-diplomat Hans Kroll, a member of the CDU's Foreign Policy Committee and Theo Kordt's predecessor as foreign policy advisor to the government of North Rhine-Westphalia, to have the CDU participate in the Peace Office's work. 99 Nonetheless, the CDU/CSU was also interested in securing its influence over the composition of any new German foreign service. According to British information in September 1948, the party intended that all "chiefs of missions will be leading CDU personalities or press personalities" and not former diplomats (who might however serve in subordinate positions ). 100 Blankenhorn wrote to Friedrich Holzapfel, chair of the CDU's Foreign Policy Committee, on January 26, 1949, that "it would be especially important to us" to get the full list of SPD candidates for the diplomatic service. 101 Holzapfel himself had been trying to do just this for some time, in addition to preparing a catalogue of names for his own party. 102 The SPD, on the other hand, harbored grave misgivings about the ex-diplomats who, in Kurt Schumacher's view, stood for a political restoration in Germany. 103 Like other German elite groups, they had lost their right to political leadership in postwar Germany through their support of Nazism. Social

86 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Democracy, however, had condemned Nazism from the beginning and therefore deserved to lead. 104 The SPD showed great reluctance to participate in schemes initiated by former diplomats for a Peace Office in 1946. Its Executive Committee created a foreign policy committee at its Munich meeting in January 1947 in part because of concerns about the "attempts of clubs of exdiplomats [verfiossene Diplomatenklubs ]" to influence political decisions. 105 The DBFF's personnel policy drew substantial attention from the SPD's leadership, which feared not only that many former diplomats had come into the office but also that the CDU/CSU was responsible for the personnel decisions.106 Not only would a CDU-dominated Peace Office be politically disadvantageous, but the SPD had branded the CDU a party that harbored ex-Nazis and conservatives. 107 This no doubt was one consideration behind the SPD 's briefly renewed interest in plans for a bizonal peace office during 1948. 108 The tensions between the DBFF and the SPD's headquarters in Hannover were especially ironic since the men most responsible for the DBFF's personnel policy, Eberhard and Strohm, were SPD members. In late 1948 the SPD unleashed a press campaign against the reactionary "clique" of diplomats that threatened to return to federal service through backdoor connections without proper examination of their credentials. 109 They were the first major shots in the battle between the ex-diplomats and their critics, which reached its high point in 1951 and 1952. 110 The Neuer Vorwiirts carried an especially sharp condemnation on Christmas Day 1948, titled "The Question of the Future Foreign Missions: Warning against the Old Diplomats!" Probably written by SPD Executive Committee member Herbert Kriedemann, the article commented on the Parliamentary Council's December 10 resolution on what should be included in the Occupation Statute, including the right to economic and consular representation abroad. In Germany "too often the appeal to expertise has created access through the back door to important state positions for undemocratic and reactionary elements." The Foreign Office managed to get through the Weimar Republic without changing its conservative, even reactionary, nature and, like the German officer corps, demonstrated little opposition to the NSDAP. With the Frankfurt Administrations' support, WilhelmstraBe veterans already were returning to influential positions without proper scrutiny of their political credentials and threatened to enter the future West German government as well. The article concluded that "it would be a dangerous mistake to act here inconsistently and with false generosity." 111 On February 25, 1949, the SPD's press service carried an article titled "The Bourbons of Frankfurt," by former diplomat Gerhard Liltkens. 112 He called

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attention to plans by Ptinder and the Frankfurt Economics Administration to conduct foreign affairs that might tie the hands of the new West German government. Not only would the SPD not allow an economics ministry to conduct foreign relations, but it objected to the "reactionary, big-industry corps of officials," including former diplomats, being entrusted with important tasks. In particular, Ltitkens raised charges against Ernst Eisenlohr. Ever since late 1948 Eisenlohr, the mayor of Badenweiler, had traveled to Frankfurt about once a week to advise Ptinder on questions relating to the Marshall Plan. Although never a member of the NSDAP, Eisenlohr had been German minister in Prague from 1936 to September 16, 1938. Among other things, he was accused of doing nothing to prevent German pressure on the Czech government to deport the SPD leadership from Prague. 113 Ltitkens also mentioned the clique of former diplomats who were trying to enter and influence the "FrankfurtStuttgart-Munich plan-smithy [Plane-Schmiederei]," thereby linking both the DBFF and the Bavarian State Chancellery to Ptinder's efforts. While qualified former Reich officials could come back into state service if they had the proper personal qualities, the SPD could not permit "a clique marked [verfolgt] by conservative-grand bourgeois sentiment" to dominate a new foreign office. In SPD circles Ltitkens had previously defended many diplomats as acceptable candidates for a new foreign service, so his article came as a shock to the DBFF's staff. 114 Perhaps he felt compelled to write such a sharp and widereaching attack to defend himself against opponents in the SPD's leadership who felt he was too soft on his former colleagues. His friend Strohm expressed understanding for his difficult position within the SPD and understood that he had intended primarily to counter the Frankfurt Economics Administration's plans, a goal the DBFF shared. 115 Whatever his motivation, Ltitkens soon would regret the stir that "The Bourbons of Frankfurt" created. The German and international press, much to his surprise, quickly seized upon the article and began repeating its main arguments. The press devoted renewed attention to the DBFF in this context. 116 In the budget debate on March 25 in the Frankfurt Economic Council, the SPD's Erwin Schoettle repeated the points raised by Ltitkens in a general attack against those groups who were trying to play a role in conducting foreign affairs without democratic legitimacy (or, more accurately, approval from the political parties). 117 The SPD Executive Committee then put out an illustrated pamphlet version of the "Bourbons" article in April. 118 The pamphlet moved members of the DBFF who belonged to the SPD to write the Executive Committee in protest, pointing out that it was not in the party's best interest to

88 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE portray the DBFF as "reactionary" when three of four members of the DBFF's administrative committee (Eberhard, Hermann Brill, and Haas, who, while not a member, represented SPD-governed Bremen) and five of twelve division leaders all belonged to the SPD. 119 Liitkens was apologetic in subsequent meetings with former colleagues. He admitted he had been put under pressure by the party leadership, although he stuck to his charges, which were based on evidence from the Nuremberg trials. 120 The diplomats defended themselves against attacks from the SPD by emphasizing the progressive character of the Foreign Office during the Weimar Republic. To them, Weimar demonstrated that the Auswiirtiges Amt had served a German republic loyally with a peaceful and constructive foreign policy. This argument also usefully supplemented their contention that there had been two foreign offices and only the NSDAP (and not the career diplomats) had been responsible for Nazi foreign policy. Moreover, there was no better way to stake a claim to reemployment in the West German Foreign Office than by stressing the need to return to Weimar's professional standards. Gustav Strohm's January 1949 memo "The Auswiirtiges Amt of the Weimar Republic," which he wrote with the aid of Fritz Eberhard, responded to Kriedemann 's article. 121 Strohm claimed that the Weimar foreign service had a liberal or centrist political orientation and that after 1933 the Foreign Office merely implemented a foreign policy conceived by Hitler and Ribbentrop. Stresemann was the best proof that the Weimar Auswiirtiges Amt was not reactionary. Strohm also emphasized that before 1933 the Auswartiges Amt made foreign policy, not the foreign ministers. 122 In effect, he portrayed the Weimar era as a positive period in the Foreign Office's history and at the same time reasserted the professional diplomats' claims to direct German foreign policy. Strohm distributed his memo widely through the first half of 1949, first among former colleagues and then to Germans in influential positions, in an attempt to create a more positive image for the old Foreign Office. 123 As he told Harold Graf von Posadowsky-Wehner, the DBFF's observer in Frankfurt, the memo was not to be given to former diplomats, who were likely to file it away, "but on the contrary to our 'enemies."' 124 The diplomats later responsible for building up the Federal Republic's new Foreign Office also believed that Weimar was a useful orientation point. According to Wilhelm Haas, the first head of the Personnel and Administration Division, the new service needed a "healthy tradition" in order to maintain its internal cohesion. "The Foreign Service of the Weimar period could serve as an example for us insofar as its basic orientation was liberal, contemporary

The Return of the German Diplomats 89 [gegenwartsnah] and open to reform [reformfreudig]." Haas thought that the WilhelmstraBe's critics often forgot the extent to which the German diplomatic and consular officials came to share these values during that period, "which probably can be considered the most successful in the history of the old Auswartiges Amt since Bismarck. During it [the Auswartiges Amt] succeeded in bringing Germany back into the ranks of the Great Powers by peaceful means after a lost war." Moreover, because of their constant contacts with the outside world, their sense for the necessity of peaceful compromise in international relations, and their basic tolerance (all "special qualities of the service"), the majority of diplomats were mistrustful of Hitler from early on and their "inner resistance" was "truly instinctive." 125 Speaking at the first annual International Seminar for Diplomats in KleBheim, Austria, in 1957, Herwarth stressed Stresemann's impact on both German diplomacy and the German diplomatic corps and claimed that the Foreign Office "shared his ideas and followed him willingly." The problem was that the majority of the German people did not support Stresemann's policies, partly due to the "reactionary-nationalistic position [Grundhaltung] of large circles" but also due to the "tragic failure" of politicians and diplomats to win its trust. 126 Few of the diplomats' critics, including those in the SPD, denied that there was a need to employ a certain number of veteran diplomats for professionalism's sake. Nonetheless, the SPD's argument that the "clique" should not be readmitted to their former posts en masse had considerable resonance. So too did arguments that businessmen, journalists, or trade unionists with considerable international experience would do just as good a job as ex-diplomats. Germany's reputation abroad and the need to create a good first impression after it became possible to set up missions strongly influenced these arguments. 127 The Franlifurter Neue Presse argued in August 1949 that it was unthinkable for a bankrupt business to reemploy the same old people as its representatives after getting back on its feet, and that this same principle should apply to the new West German government. 128 Even the few ardent advocates of professionalism in the press thought that only a small number of veteran diplomats needed to be reemployed as a core for the new service, perhaps as few as thirty or forty_ 129 Those diplomats who were least cautious about calling attention to themselves during the immediate postwar years faced overt hostility. Around January 1947, RudolfNadolny, Germany's former ambassador in Moscow, and his colleague Karl Du Mont proposed a plan for a provisional Auswartiges Amt with 142 officials to restart direct trade and consular relations (along with a list

90 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE of suitable German diplomats). 130 The plan clearly aimed at circumventing Allied reserved rights over German foreign policy. Nadolny claimed that US officials had asked him to draft it. 131 In reality, they had wanted help identifying German candidates to occupy the Berlin headquarters of the Interim Offices for German Affairs, and his proposals certainly exceeded their expectations. 132 Nadolny later created a furor by co-organizing meetings in Bad Godesberg in March and August 1949 for a Society for German Reunification. He himself was a main target for criticism due to his previous good relations with Soviet authorities as well as his long-standing thesis that the USSR wanted an independent, capitalist Germany. 133 Other ex-diplomats tried to assert their rights, as former Reich employees, to back wages, pensions, and as soon as it became possible, employment in a new diplomatic or consular service. Eugen Budde's writings on preparing for a peace treaty in 1946 and 1947 emphasized the need for German foreign affairs and international law experts, which undoubtedly meant former Wilhelmstraf3e officials. 134 By 1948 he had turned his attention to establishing criteria for appointments to a new consular service. He proposed employing the German Consular Law ofNovember 8, 1867, as well as the former Foreign Office's examination procedure. The Consular Law stipulated that anyone appointed to the office of consul had to study law, serve at least three years in Germany's internal government administration, and have two years practical experience in the consular service. Budde considered all applicants with experience only in business or journalism unqualified. 135 On June 27, 1949, Budde revealed one of his major considerations when he requested that Hermann Piinder keep him and 30 other ex-diplomats in mind when the new foreign service was established. Piinder rejected Budde 's ideas. 136 The same month Friedrich Holzapfel, head of the CDU Foreign Policy Committee, declined to entertain other proposals from his fellow committee member Budde for the future foreign service. 137 By this time Budde had become a target of public ire as well. His critics pointed out that there were plenty of German industrialists and journalists with language skills and knowledge of conditions abroad, and that it was unlikely that the Allies would allow former representatives of the Third Reich to serve in a new consular service. 138 By this time many former diplomats had grave doubts about whether they could be reemployed in their old profession. In December 1948, Maltzan was skeptical about whether the Allies would allow any former diplomats to serve in a future consular service, regardless of their records. If they did, he thought that no diplomats with ties to the NSDAP should be sent abroad so as not to provoke foreign opinion. 139 Hasso von Etzdorf wrote to his friend Nostitz on

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May 17, 1949, "For the time being they will not allow us old Nazis, to whom I would like to allow myself to include you by my side, an official capacity relating to foreign countries." 140 By that time, the DBFF's leadership did not think there was any chance that the new West German government would take over their office and began considering other alternatives. 141 Until mid-1950, when it broke up due to lack of funding, the DBFF's leaders hoped to transform their office into a foreign policy institute like Chatham House in London or the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. 142 Such fears proved highly exaggerated. Thanks to Herbert Blankenhorn, a handful of diplomats would be present in the Chancellery already when the Federal Republic's government was constituted. Also in the summer of 1949 Hans von Herwarth of the Bavarian State Chancellery received the assignment of making protocol arrangements in Bonn for the new federal government. Assisted by his colleagues from Munich, the former diplomats Hans Schwarzmann and Erica Pappritz, and with additional help from the DBFF and related circles, he set up a "protocol staff." 143 At 11 :00 a.m. on September 13, 1949, in the Redoute in Bad Godesberg, the newly elected West German President Theodor Heuss received the Allied High Commissioners, the foreign diplomatic corps attached to the High Commission, and prominent representatives from German political and religious life. "Our friends from the A[ uswartiges] A[ mt] Herwarth, Herz, Mohr, Schwarzmann, Gardemann, Etzdorf, and Frau Pappritz make up the protocol staff," wrote Blankenhorn in his diary. "Reception is very dignified. " 144 Four days later, Blankenhorn, Herwarth, and Theo Kordt sat down together to generate ideas for the foreign policy section of Adenauer's inaugural government declaration, which the chancellor delivered before the Bundestag on September 20. 145 In the declaration Adenauer stressed that, although the Federal Republic would not have a Foreign Office at first, it nonetheless would be active in at least some areas of foreign policy. In fact, due to Allied occupation, the Marshall Plan, and other international agreements, Western Germany was more closely bound to the outside world than ever before. "The paradox of our situation is that although the Allied High Commission administers Germany's foreign affairs, every activity of the Federal Government or the Federal Parliament, even in Germany's internal affairs, somehow involves [in sich schliefit] a contact with the outside world." 146 The next eighteen months would demonstrate this paradoxical connection as Adenauer's government faced having to deal with foreign affairs without a foreign office.

4

Foreign Policy without a Foreign Office,

1949-51

ONE DAY LATE IN 1949 Rolf Pauls, Herbert Blankenhom's personal assistant, accompanied Konrad Adenauer from the Museum Koenig to the Palais Schaumburg, the neoclassical palace where Adenauer now had his office. They walked by the Villa Hammerschmidt, still being used by the Belgian occupation forces. As usual, two soldiers stood guard outside. Adenauer pointed in their direction, and Pauls overheard him say, "We want to have that, too." 1 This aside by the chancellor was spontaneous but hardly absent-minded. One of the major goals of the Federal Republic's foreign policy through 1955 was dismantling the Occupation Statute and achieving sovereignty and formal equality with other states. As the guard in front of the Villa Hammerschmidt symbolized, in 1949 West Germany did not have the same right as even its tiny neighbor, Belgium, to represent itself in foreign countries, let alone to have its own military. Except in a few well-defined areas, all of West Germany's formal contacts with the outside world initially ran through the Allied High Commission (HICOM), whose headquarters on the Petersberg also symbolically looked down upon Bonn from across the Rhine. Adenauer realized that the Federal Republic could not move too quickly or aggressively lest it raise Allied fears, but by the spring of 1950 he was clearly frustrated by the limited progress made toward international equality. Conversely, by that time both the Three Powers and many West

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Germans had themselves become frustrated by the chancellor's attempts to run foreign policy without a foreign office. The dilemma for the Three Powers was that the Federal Republic did need some freedom to conduct its own foreign policy. Their goal in Europe after the start of the Cold War was what Wolfram Hanrieder called the "containment of the Soviet Union at an arm's length, and of West Germany with an embrace." Although Hanrieder was describing US policy specifically, his concept of "double containment" applied in varying degrees to the British and French in this period too. 2 The Federal Republic needed to become a partner and take its place in Western institutions, and this required giving it foreign policy rights. But how far was it safe to go, and how fast? The previous two years had demonstrated that the West Germans would seek to use any foreign affairs powers they could as broadly as possible. "In one sense this power is [the] core of [the] whole potential revision," thought the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson. No hasty decision, even provisional, sh[oul]d be made, because when foreign affairs are relinquished, even in part, [the] occupation is well on [the] road to liquidation. It will prove virtually impossible to exercise other reserved powers for long since Ger[man]s are acting like [an] equal, independent nation in foreign affairs .... In other words, foreign affairs power, and termination of [the] state of war, are two of the biggest cards we have, and we must be sure we get [a] generally satisfactory complex of settlements in return for them. 3

The Three Powers would need to secure this "complex of settlements" from the West Germans on issues such as recognition of the Reich's international debts. They also had to prevent the West German government from reneging on agreements entered into by the Allies on its behalf---or even worse, from turning toward the Soviet Union. Over the next eighteen months these questions would be favorably resolved. In March 1951 the Federal Republic received the right to conduct its own diplomacy and establish a foreign ministry. In addition, it had already become involved as an equal partner in negotiations for what became the European Coal and Steel Community and, eventually, its own armed forces. Developments in international politics and especially the global Cold War helped produce this change, as did an increasing realization on the part of the Three Powers that controls could be relaxed since the Adenauer government was proving a reliable partner.

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The Allied High Commission and German Foreign Affairs, 1949-50 The Three Powers in 1949 took different views on the issue of the Federal Republic's foreign affairs. In a continuation of trends from the period of military occupation, France emphasized maintaining the powers reserved to the Allies. At the other extreme, the British wanted to prohibit only those West German activities that might lead to "political entanglements" (e.g., with the Soviet Union or its allies in various international organizations). The United States also wanted to rehabilitate West Germany internationally as quickly as possible but had reason for caution. 4 Control of German foreign relations lay at the heart of the Occupation Statute, which along with Marshall Aid gave the United States tremendous influence throughout Europe. 5 American leaders were also reluctant to extend foreign policy freedoms to the Federal Republic when there were no new European organizations in which to enmesh it. Without these structures, Germany might regain its former international position from before the war, which would be unacceptable. 6 The British government pressed hard to extend greater foreign policy latitude to the West German government even before the Adenauer government had been formally constituted. Its program was based on two premises: West Germany had to be incorporated into the Western system in the interests of peace and stability, and as an American diplomat in London put it, "Germany cannot remain static." To achieve these ends, the Three Powers had to implement a policy of gradual concessions. These would help increase the Adenauer government's international prestige and domestic popular support. In particular, the British government thought the Three Powers should admit Germany to various international organizations to which the USSR did not belong. The Foreign Office had a list offifteen that the Federal Republic might join; it even envisioned German membership in NATO in the distant future. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin presented this program at his Washington meetings with his US and French counterparts Acheson and Robert Schuman on September 15. 7 On the other hand, the United States did not think it necessary to adopt a common policy on foreign affairs. Unless serious problems arose, Secretary of State Acheson preferred to allow for a period of "practical experimentation" between the High Commissioners and the Adenauer government. 8 US High Commissioner in Germany John J. McCloy agreed but anticipated problems with the French in HICOM's Political Affairs Committee on German participation in international conferences and German consular representation abroad. He hoped Acheson could influence Schuman in this regard. 9

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In the meantime, the Adenauer government had initiated preparations for a state secretariat for foreign affairs. Already on September 9 Blankenhorn proposed his former colleague Vollrath von Maltzan to Adenauer as a suitable state secretary. 10 We can only speculate that the chancellor's distrust of former diplomats and Maltzan's ties to the VfW led him to reject the suggestion. Blankenhorn then began to champion Anton Pfeiffer (CSU), state secretary in the Bavarian State Chancellery and a member of the DBFF's advisory council. 11 On September 24 Adenauer commissioned Pfeiffer to draft a plan for a state secretariat, which he did with help from the DBFF and related circles. The final product closely resembled the 1936 Auswartiges Amt. 12 Yet his candidacy also came to naught, largely because Adenauer's CDU believed that the CSU had already received enough important posts in the government. 13 The difficulties with the French High Commission that McCloy had anticipated erupted when Adenauer turned to his next candidate, Hermann Josef Abs, vice president of the board of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation [Kreditenanstaltfor Wiederaujbau]. As a board member of financial institutions like Deutsche Bank as well as I. G. Farben, Abs had been involved in increasing German business and financial holdings in occupied Europe. He was one of the economics experts whom Adenauer called in to help negotiate with the High Commission on the crisis caused by the planned devaluation of the German DM in September 1949. 14 Now French Deputy High Commissioner Armand Berard intervened with Blankenhorn on October 22 to torpedo Abs's candidacy, claiming that the French had a large dossier on Abs's wartime activities. 15 Berard's message had not been coordinated with the British and Americans, and important differences between the Three Powers became clear at a meeting of HICOM's political advisors on October 26. French political advisor Louis de Guiringaud emphasized that "in the matter of Germany's foreign policy ... the High Commission has the main initiative and responsibility." The Adenauer government had to notify HI COM of its intentions in this area and submit its actions for approval. Adenauer should have an office to coordinate relations with HICOM and whatever international organizations Germany joined, to oversee trade representatives, and for protocol duties. However, this should not be a real ministry led by a politician, and the High Commission could make its approval contingent on West German concessions in other areas. Finally, the High Commission had "the power to alter decisions already taken and to modify the functions of the Office or to demand a change in its head." Both C. E. "Kit" Steele and James Riddleberger, the UK and US politi-

96 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE cal advisors, countered by arguing that West Germany already had the right to set up trade missions and consulates, and setting up an office to manage them was only normal. As Steele put it, "The Occupation Statute did not contemplate a static settlement," and it was necessary to move forward and to build the Adenauer government's prestige. He added that if the High Commission intervened too much in the creation of German missions (for example, in personnel questions), "we shall not build up a friendly service but a hostile one which will evade us." Steele also noted that Guiringaud had admitted that his government was motivated by public opinion in France. The meeting ended with agreement on the creation of a foreign missions working party, but both the Americans and the British feared further French obstructionism. 16 Their fears proved well-founded. On November 1 Berard recommended to Blankenhorn that Adenauer not establish anything resembling an Auswartiges Amt at present and work merely with a small staff. 17 French warnings appear to have made Adenauer cautious about setting up a foreign policy apparatus. 18 He could honestly tell the Bundestag's Committee for the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs on November 4, 1949, that HI COM was divided on the question of a German state secretariat for foreign affairs. One would soon be necessary due to the expected workload, but Adenauer wanted to wait until relations with the High Commission "became somewhat warm." It was very important not to create the impression that the Federal Republic was trying to conduct its own foreign policy. 19 According to press reports, Adenauer also said he could not find anyone to appoint as state secretary. "Diplomats of the old school" would not be well received abroad, so he was trying to find a suitable younger candidate. 20 The Foreign Affairs Committee was not pleased that so little progress had been made. 21 The chair, Carlo Schmid (SPD), argued that an office to coordinate foreign affairs activities could be set up immediately, since this was an internal German matter. Committee members became further displeased when Adenauer revealed that Blankenhom was in charge of a Liaison Office (Division III of the Chancellery) to the Allied High Commission, although he made no independent policy decisions. They stressed that it was urgent to appoint an independent state secretary as soon as possible, and Adenauer could only ask for more time. 22 His decision to direct foreign affairs himself was greeted with little enthusiasm in West Germany. It seemed to be another sign of his unwillingness to delegate authority. 23 On the other hand, the Three Powers welcomed the creation of the Liaison Office under Blankenhom and emphasized that it did not conflict with the provisions of the Occupation Statute. 24

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As Hans Globke, the head bureaucrat in Adenauer's Chancellery, wrote to Blankenhorn and his deputy Herbert Dittmann on November 7, the creation of a state secretariat for foreign affairs had been postponed for the time being. 25 Until mid-1950 Adenauer was content to establish a growing number of administrative units for foreign affairs in response to increasing competencies. Only on June 7, 1950, did he consolidate these into an Office for Foreign Affairs [Dienststelle for Auswiirtige Angelegenheiten, or DfAA] under Blankenhorn. And he did not seek to name a state secretary to manage foreign affairs until August 1950, and then only as "State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery." As Steele predicted, however, the French would have to make further concessions on German foreign affairs in order to resolve the dismantling question, a legacy of the military occupation. 26 The US government feared that continued dismantling of the German industrial plant would have long-term negative consequences for Allied-West German relations. By late October, Foreign Secretary Bevin accepted the US position out of concern for growing protests in West Germany, and he and Acheson convinced Schuman to participate in new talks. Acheson told Schuman that instead of a restrictive policy, it was necessary to awaken German enthusiasm for democracy by ending overt Allied intervention in the economy and giving the Federal Republic a greater international role. 27 At the Three Power foreign ministers' meetings in Paris during the week of November 7, Acheson could report to Truman that they had achieved "very satisfactory results" on all the German issues on the agenda, including foreign affairs. However, the foreign ministers agreed that West Germany should be discouraged at present from setting up anything like a foreign office. 28 On November 15, 1949, UK High Commissioner Brian Robertson officially informed Adenauer of the Paris Conference's results. He said that the foreign ministers had developed an entire program for reordering Allied policy in Germany. Its overall goal was to incorporate Germany into the European family of nations, but immediately it sought to establish normal conditions in Germany and between Germany and its neighbors. Its most important provisions involved the end of dismantling and restrictions on German shipbuilding, but many elements dealt with foreign policy. West Germany could enter the Council of Europe as an associated member, as well as certain other international organizations; the Allies would take steps to end the state of war with Germany; the Allied governments and the Federal Republic would take a unified stance on the new German Democratic Republic, founded in October 1949; and finally,

98 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE the Federal Republic would be allowed to establish consular and commercial missions in friendly states with a central coordinating office. 29 The program's most notable feature was its lack of detail, which reflected the complexity of the questions involved (e.g., ending the state of war), and the desire to allow the High Commissioners a maximum of flexibility. These new conditions found formal expression in the Petersberg Agreement of November 22, 1949.30 The Peters berg Agreement led to renewed planning for German consulates. HICOM agreed that the first West German consulates would enjoy all normal consular and commercial competencies, with two exceptions. They would not be able to issue visas or passports until the Combined Travel Board's role wound down in early 1951, and they should not interfere in matters pertaining to the remaining German assets from World War II. 31 The High Commission had no objections to informal contacts between German consular officials and the foreign diplomatic corps, at international organizations where the Federal Republic had member or observer status, for example. 32 In September 1949, the High Commission already had invited the old military missions from the UN countries in Berlin to appoint civilian missions accredited to HICOM. 33 This meant that such contacts were already a well-established practice in Bonn. The Italian consul Francesco Babuscio Rizzo, to cite one example, was a frequent conversation partner ofBlankenhom on bilateral issues and European integration.34 Nonetheless, the High Commission remained the sole intermediary for all official diplomatic contacts, and the German consulates were prohibited from political or diplomatic activity. 35 Despite these areas of agreement, the French once again had a much different notion from their American and British partners about how to interpret the words "gradual reestablishment of [German] consular and commercial relations" in the Petersberg Agreement. Shortly after its terms were announced, the French Foreign Ministry's Subdivision for Central Europe outlined a stepby-step process. At first, only the Occupation Powers and the Benelux states would receive German representatives; in due time, Italy and the Scandinavian states would follow. Latin American states and Spain would have to wait due to their sympathetic stance toward Germany during the war; Austria and Switzerland were also delicate cases. The FRG could eventually establish consulates in other countries, but France, the Subdivision concluded, was not interested in rushing this "evolution," especially in the Near and Far East. 36 Moreover, as early as September 1949 the French Foreign Ministry had expressed doubts about whether it was wise to let the West Germans open missions in Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal when German assets in those countries were still

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being liquidated. 37 On the other hand, both the UK and US High Commissions believed that only the USSR and its satellites, along with Spain and possibly Argentina, should be on the list of prohibited countries. On December 13, 1949, HICOM's Political Affairs Committee's foreign missions working party reported that it had not reached a consensus. 38 At the Political Affairs Committee meeting on January 23, Blankenhorn and Wilhelm Haas, newly appointed by Adenauer to oversee the establishment of a consular service, formally presented their plans, which contemplated the rapid creation of a consular network in Western and neutral states. For the first phase, they proposed opening offices in 42 locations: 18 in ERP countries, including 2 each in France, Italy, and Switzerland; 10 in countries that had trade agreements with the Federal Republic; and an additional 14 in other important countries, including 5 in the United States and 2 in Brazil. The first 3 missions would be opened in Britain, France, and the United States, possibly by April. The West Germans emphasized that in order to avoid negative reactions abroad they would avoid sending former Nazi party members except in exceptional cases. The Political Affairs Committee approved the plans while stressing that the German missions were supposed to avoid all political activities and any actions concerning German assets abroad that were still vested for reparations purposes. As a first step, one mission should be established in the most important commercial city in each of the Three Powers (London, New York, and Paris). Thereafter, the federal government was to approach HICOM each time it wanted to set up missions in other foreign countries and to present personnel lists for the missions in question. 39 The next round of expansion would prove contentious due to French insistence that West Germany resume relations with foreign states gradually. On May 12, 1950, Adenauer requested approval to open consulates general in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, and Turkey. 40 In the Political Affairs Committee, the French representative argued that it was necessary for the Germans to set up consulates first in Allied countries and have them functioning smoothly before moving on to states that had displayed sympathy for Hitler's Germany. He objected to Brazil, Chile, Sweden, and Switzerland, states that harbored former Nazis and important vested German assets from the war. The American and British representatives, on the other hand, wanted to give a positive response as soon as possible. Most German assets abroad had been confiscated, and the West German Chancellery already had received express instructions that German consuls had no

100 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE competency to deal with those that remained. Moreover, German colonies abroad needed responsible examples in order to counteract Nazi tendencies and the longing for the past or revenge. French High Commissioner Andre Frarn;ois-Poncet admitted "the Anglo-American argumentation seems pertinent to me in many respects."41 Nonetheless, the French Foreign Ministry remained preoccupied with the Latin countries and feared that allowing consulates in Brazil and Chile would make it impossible to resist a subsequent West German demand to open them in Argentina and Spain.42 Over the next twelve months the French High Commission tried to delay the creation of West German missions in Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula for as long as possible. On June 1, 1950, Frarn;ois-Poncet reported that the High Commission Council had agreed to postpone a decision on Brazil and Chile. 43 By October, however, the Commission had approved missions in those states, which the Adenauer government considered vital for West German trading interests. 44 In January 1951, Adenauer requested missions in Uruguay, Argentina, Portugal, and Spain.45 The French High Commission once again tried to delay a decision on the Iberian states, although Fran~ois-Poncet recognized how weak France's position on assets was, and also that it was illogical to block a consulate in Portugal, a NATO member. Unwilling to wait any longer, the US and British elements of the High Commission in March 1951 brought the Spanish question before the HICOM Council.46 Realizing that permission could no longer be denied, the French High Commission received assurances from the new West German Foreign Office that it would not open missions in Portugal and Spain before the fall of 1951, which would allow the new French ambassador to Lisbon to be accredited first and also prepare public opinion in France. 47 Although the High Commission granted the Adenauer government permission for Portugal on April 4, 1951, and for Spain on June 19, it was November 1952 before the German missions in Lisbon and Madrid opened. 48 The French Foreign Ministry and High Commission had helped to impose a certain "progressive" development on the creation of the West German mission net in Latin America and especially the Iberian Peninsula. They were also successful in delaying the Federal Republic's entry into some of the international organizations foreseen by the Petersberg Agreement, as US diplomats complained in April 1950. Interestingly, McCloy differentiated between low-level officials in the French High Commission, who were not very accommodating, and Fran~ois-Poncet, whom the US High Commissioner thought might be asked to make an appeal at the Quai d'Orsay if the situation did not improve. 49

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The Difficult Beginnings of West German Foreign Policy In the meantime, it had become painfully obvious that the Federal Republic's relations with the Occupation Powers had started off on the wrong foot. This is sometimes forgotten in light of Konrad Adenauer's subsequent foreign policy successes. Adenauer's foreign policy priorities upon coming into office as chancellor in 1949 were permanent incorporation of the FRG into the West [Westbindung], particularly on an institutional basis; attainment of national sovereignty; maintenance of a pro-American political orientation; and European unity centered on Franco-German reconciliation.so He was well aware that these goals could be attained only through the cooperation of the Western Powers. Above all, an atmosphere of trust was necessary. Adenauer's two greatest fears were Schaukelpolitik, or political vacillation by the Federal Republic between East and West (which could lead to the alienation of the Western Powers), and a Four Power agreement on Germany at the expense of Westbindung and sovereignty_s, In Adenauer's political calculations, reunification should come about as part of a long-term process in which a politically unified and militarily strong Western alliance eventually forced the weaker Soviet Bloc to abandon confrontation for cooperation. This "policy of strength," which was inherent to Adenauer's conception of Westbindung, became the substitute for an active West German eastern policy for most of the 1950s.s2 During his first months in office, however, it seemed at times as if he were headed on a confrontation course with the Occupation Powers. Adenauer faced a series of foreign policy crises that included the devaluation of the British pound and its effect on West German trade and the DM in September-October 1949; dismantling; and extended difficulties over the Saar, which culminated in March 1950 with the French government's announcement that they were going to lease the Saar mines for fifty years. Franco-German relations in particular were at a low point. Behind the Saar crisis lay French fears that both the Adenauer government and even its own British and American allies were contemplating how to involve the Federal Republic in Western defense. In response, French officials thought it vital to drive home to the Adenauer government its own second-class status.s 3 One historian wrote that the only thing that spared the world from a FrancoGerman diplomatic confrontation along traditional lines was the fact that it did not fit US plans.s 4 Neither the Schuman Plan nor prospects for German rearmament existed yet, both of which would raise the Federal Republic's prestige and (especially in the case of the latter) give it a real bargaining chip to use toward dismantling the Occupation Statute. Although the Statute was

102 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE supposed to be revised some twelve to fifteen months after its official declaration on September 21, 1949, this was still a long way off. The Three Powers were in no hurry to dismantle it either. The meager concessions contained in the Petersberg Agreement in November 1949 were granted by Allied fiat and hardly constituted diplomatic victories for the Adenauer government. 55 Both dismantling and the crisis with France also engendered an impatient nationalistic response in West Germany, including from members of the coalition government itself. Adenauer was "in a protracted low [im Dauertie.fJ" politically in 1949 and 1950. 56 In addition, his personal relations with the individual High Commissioners were especially poor through the first half of 1950, and he felt isolated as a result. It is no wonder that Adenauer proved both ill-tempered and prone to adventurous methods during this period, or that commentators began calling him the chancellor of"lonely decisions." 57 Adenauer attempted to use personal connections, speeches, and interviews to overcome the prohibitions on an independent West German diplomacy. While emphasizing his commitment to European integration and Western defense, he also pointed out inadequacies of Allied policy, especially those of a discriminatory nature such as dismantling, the Saar, and the Council of Europe (although the Petersberg Agreement allowed the Federal Republic to join the Council, Adenauer's government initially refused since France wanted the Saar represented as well). Adenauer told a journalist that he had to rely on these unusual techniques to announce West German aims to foreign governments and world opinion because "I have no other recourse." 58 For example, he turned to political acquaintances in Belgium and the Netherlands for advice about setting up German missions in their countries. 59 Alexander Boker from the Liaison Office was sent to the United States in November 1949 for a six-week stay, ostensibly to wrap up his personal affairs in Washington but actually to report on the US government's intentions toward Germany. Boker later claimed that his disclosure that the National Security Council favored German rearmament within a European framework prompted Adenauer to immediately tell the Cleveland Plain Dealer (a paper Harry S. Truman read) in an interview on December 3 that West Germany was willing to participate in a European army. 60 In July 1950, Albrecht von Kessel also practiced personal diplomacy by visiting the Vatican, where he had been stationed during the war, and talking with high-ranking German clergy about a variety of issues, including the restoration of diplomatic relations. 61 In August 1950, this time with Allied approval, Adenauer sent one of his former political rivals from North Rhine-Westphalia, Carl Spiecker (until 1948 a member of the Center

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4. Adenauer, followed by Herbert Blankenhom, leaving the headquarters of the Allied High Commission at the Hotel Petersberg on September 21, 1949, after receiving the text of the Occupation Statute. They are flanked by an Allied honor guard (AP).

Party, then CDU), on a tour of Latin America to sound out the prospects for resuming political and economic relations there. Although cut short because Spiecker became ill, the trip was another example of how personal contacts could compensate to some extent for the inability to conduct diplomacy with other states. 62 Between September l, 1949, and March 15, 1951, Adenauer gave more than twice as many exclusive interviews to the foreign press as he did to German papers, with journalists from the three Occupation Powers and Italy at the top of the list. 63 The most controversial took place in November and December 1949, when Adenauer announced that West Germany was ready to participate in a European army. A sharp reaction from the High Commission forced Adenauer to issue a retraction, and the Bundestag also was quite upset, since it had not been informed in advance. 64 The CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation clearly disapproved of Adenauer's interview tactics and moved immediately

104 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE to coordinate with the SPD in order to prevent a potentially explosive plenary debate. 65 In a February 1950 interview with American journalist Joseph Kingsbury-Smith, Adenauer tried to improve Franco-German relations by proposing a political union. This gesture, negatively received in France, proved to be another blunder. 66 In one sense, however, Adenauer's tactics were very successful. Both McCloy and the US ambassador in London, Lewis W. Douglas, who would chair the International Study Group on the revision of the Occupation Statute in the summer of 1950, agreed that Adenauer and other West German politicians were able to reach a world audience whenever they made speeches on foreign policy. If one of the original purposes of Allied reserved rights had been to prevent West German diplomatic activity, they had failed in this respect. Douglas asked if it would not be better if the Germans could conduct their diplomatic relations in a more normal way. 67 However, Adenauer's methods proved frustrating for his political friends and foes alike. Initially both the Bundestag and that organ's Committee for the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs found that the government provided them with far less information than they desired about foreign affairs. For example, in October 1949 Adenauer left his own party colleagues in the dark about his policy on the creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). 68 During the stormy Bundestag debate on the Petersberg Agreement on November 15, Kurt Schumacher said that the SPD did not object to Adenauer handling foreign affairs in a normal executive manner but then delivered a sharp attack on his failure to consult with the parties or the Committee for Foreign Affairs before agreeing. He branded Adenauer's methods a "policy of secrecy [Geheimpolitik]." Later during the same proceedings, Adenauer accused Carlo Schmid, who had admonished the chancellor about entering agreements that the Federal Republic could and would not keep (signing them with a "dolus eventualis"), of trying to tum the Foreign Affairs Committee into a substitute foreign office. He also compared Schumacher's remarks with Gregor Strasser's and others' attacks on the Weimar Republic's foreign policy and even accused Schumacher of stabbing him in the back [in den Rueken fallen] while in negotiations with foreign powers. US High Commission observers reported that Adenauer's comments created a great disturbance among the SPD delegates.69 On November 23 Blankenhom told Schmid that, in the interest of political unity on foreign policy, Adenauer would talk with the SPD the next day. 70 Unfortunately, two days later, in an especially raucous Bundestag session on the Petersberg Agreement, Schumacher accused Adenauer of being

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"Chancellor of the Allies." Upset members of the Allied High Commission talked to Blankenhorn about their dissatisfaction with the "crisis" in the Federal Republic's political system. Berard in particular criticized Adenauer's failure to inform parliament properly about foreign policy. Blankenhorn's diary entry for November 26 noted that he had had a "somewhat testy [gereizt] conversation with the chancellor about the Federal Government's technical deficits," a complaint echoed by the coalition's FDP and the opposition SPD. 71 On January 27, 1950, the Bundestag Committee for the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs decided to ask Adenauer to report on foreign policy events since the Petersberg Agreement and on preparations for the German missions and central foreign affairs office. 72 The request seems to have produced the desired increase in the information flow from the Chancellery. Blankenhorn and other Chancellery officials spoke to the Bundestag's Finance Committee about the foreign affairs budget on February 1 and 2 and attended the Foreign Affairs Committee for the first time on February 8. 73 The protocols of the Foreign Affairs Committee's meetings indicate that representatives from the Chancellery's foreign policy working groups began to attend regularly starting that month. Despite these changes the government parties continued to complain about being left in the dark by Adenauer on foreign policy. 74 The FDP cabinet members even received instructions on March 26 to tell Adenauer that if a central office for foreign affairs were not set up, the FDP could not continue to support the coalition's foreign policy indefinitely. 75 The discontent culminated on April 1, 1950, when the Bundestag passed a resolution, initially submitted by the SPD, requesting that the chancellor set up a State Secretariat for Foreign and Occupation Affairs with a political division and also appoint a state secretary by May 1. During the preceding debate, on March 29-30, Adenauer had explained that he planned to appoint two state secretaries in the Chancellery, one for domestic and one for foreign affairs. However, the state secretary for foreign affairs had not yet been named, because foreign policy was an Allied reserved right, and all steps in this area had to be approached with extreme caution. He also defended his interview policy as necessary for reaching the public in foreign countries. He ended on a conciliatory note by inviting the SPD to discuss these issues with him. Nonetheless, the resolution passed supported by a large majority from all parties. Adenauer did establish the DfAA in the Chancellery, but in June, well after the May 1 deadline had passed. 76 However, complaints persisted that Adenauer did not coordinate his foreign policy with the Bundestag or even his own cabinet. The most important instance was

106 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE the resignation of Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann in protest of the chancellor's pro-rearmament policy. Heinemann stressed that he and other cabinet members were not informed about the contents of the "Security Memorandum" sent by Adenauer to the High Commissioners in August 1950. 77 Greatly complicating matters was the fact that Adenauer initially did not delegate enough authority or have enough coworkers in order to conduct foreign affairs or, for that matter, most other government business properly. He was 73 years old when he became chancellor, and he felt overburdened by his tasks, which included not just running but also establishing the new government. 78 Perhaps he had not anticipated the workload; in January 1950, he complained about all the papers he was presented and asked ifhe had to read them all. 79 In March 1950 and then again in February 1951 Adenauer made Blankenhorn take long vacations out of concern for his health. 80 When the chancellor himself became ill in June 1950 and tried to work from bed in Rhondorf, the US High Commission reported "the fact that much top-priority government business has come to a standstill is a spectacular demonstration of the extent to which Adenauer has succeeded in converting Bonn into a one-man show." 81 Adenauer also felt alienated from the High Commission. In April 1950 he complained that Fran9ois-Poncet was no longer speaking with him, Robertson was uninterested and preoccupied with going back to England (lvone Kirkpatrick would replace him in May), and McCloy had not kept him informed about Allied intentions. 82 As his relations with the High Commission deteriorated, Adenauer delivered a series of sharp attacks on occupation policy in which foreign affairs figured prominently. On April 3 he complained in Munich that, despite great Allied pressure to accept an invitation to join the Council of Europe, West Germany could not do so as a full member because France insisted that the Saar also be represented. Moreover, the Federal Republic had been left isolated: It seems, to be sure, that [the Occupation Powers] want to keep Germany as far away as possible from any foreign policy. The High Commissioners have to represent us in foreign policy. We don't hear anything reliable about what is going on in the outside world. We are dependent on news reports and articles in the press [au/ die Berichte und au/ Zeitungsnachrichten]. We don't know anything authentic about what is being negotiated. We are left totally to our own resources. But in the long run it is impossible for them to exclude from foreign policy 50,000,000 people situated in the middle of Europe and directly on the battleline. When I say this, it is no veiled nationalism. 83

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Nonetheless, McCloy accused Adenauer of making a nationalistic speech. 84 Berard thought it obvious Adenauer did not want to appear as "Chancellor of the Allies," but it also was unacceptable for him to openly fight them. Blankenhorn, who had just returned from vacation, accepted this and said that Adenauer's relations with just about everyone had deteriorated during his absence. Adenauer was increasingly isolated and did not seek advice. He told Berard"[Adenauer] was a stubborn old man without experience let loose [/ache] into international politics."85 However, Blankenhorn also believed that the High Commission had neglected to keep the Chancellery abreast of world developments in the preceding weeks-especially concerning the European Council, the NATO Summit at the Hague, and Soviet-American relations-and contributed to Adenauer's sense of isolation. Steele and Cam O'Neill from the British High Commission conceded Blankenhorn's point over lunch the same day. 86 Two weeks later Adenauer spoke at the Titania Palace in Berlin and created a sensation when he closed his remarks by asking the audience to sing the third verse of the Deutschlandlied. Overlooked because of the controversy about the song, he repeated his litany of complaints about restrictions on German foreign policy to his audience: "The Federal Republic of Germany has no diplomatic missions. It is no better informed about what is being negotiated than any one of you. It depends on reports in the domestic and foreign press and on what foreign radio sends over to us. Naturally, a complete and exact picture cannot be derived from these [sources]." He also expressed his hope that the Occupation Statute would be modified as quickly as possible, preferably before the originally planned date in the fall of 1950. Adenauer recognized that other European countries retained an understandable fear of Germany and also that controls and limitations on German power were necessary as a way of maintaining peace. However, using McCloy's own words, he insisted that these controls must be reasonable, clear, and simple and added they also should not give the impression they were intended to hold West Germany down economically. 87 The High Commission found Adenauer's methods dubious. On May 7, McCloy reported to Washington: We had been urging the Chancellor to get his consular service organized and into the field so that the FEDREP could receive its own reports on the feeling toward Germany in other countries. The Chancellor, we find, is frequently impressed with the reports of third rate agents who pretend to have intimate

108 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE contacts with this or that leading political personality abroad and whose judgment and reliability are frequently open to question to say the least. I fully concur with the [State] Department's estimate that the present political situation in Germany reflects a lack of understanding of the realities of foreign affairs in general and the East-West situation in particular. 88 As we will see, the High Commission agreed that the Federal Republic had not taken full advantage of the possibilities open to it, which was one argument against extending any more foreign policy freedoms for the foreseeable future. What applied to the narrow area of foreign policy was also true for the larger scope of the Federal Republic's political activities during the first half of 1950. The High Commission thought Adenauer was concentrating too much on dabbling in foreign affairs while domestic policy, especially the construction of the central government, had suffered badly. As late as April 1950, both McCloy and Robertson believed it was premature to review the Occupation Statute with a view toward loosening Allied controls. 89

The Small Revision of the Occupation Statute Nonetheless, a new round of inter-Allied talks on the Statute began in May. In response to both the situation in Germany and overall developments in the Cold War, all three Occupation Powers began to rethink their German policy independently. The most portentous changes took place in Washington. Sir Oliver Franks, the British ambassador in Washington, wrote Bevin on March 8 that "the Americans seem to me to be groping desperately for ideas on foreign policy."90 The West seemed to be losing ground in the Cold War. In 1949 the "fall" of China, the creation of the GDR, and the Soviet detonation of an atomic device had given the USSR the initiative in the Cold War and focused domestic attention in the United States on foreign policy. As John Lamberton Harper has noted, "the fear was that the perception of a loss of US strategic superiority and resolve would translate into an erosion of European confidence in the United States." US embassies throughout Western Europe reported anxiety about the international situation and a growth of neutralist tendencies. McCloy believed that the Soviets were winning the propaganda war in Germany and that the people there were particularly nervous. These dilemmas would eventually lead to the drafting of National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) in April 1950, which emphasized the growing threat presented by the Soviet

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Union. In conjunction with the outbreak of the Korean War the following June, a major US military buildup followed. 91 By early May the State Department had concluded, in Paul Nitze's words, that the situation in Germany was "unstable, we must move one way or another. It w[ou]ld be disastrous ifGer[many was] not affiliated with [the] West and more inclined [to] bargain East against West. It is necessary gradually to relax controls and develop Ger[man] responsibility." Beyond political affiliation with the West, "responsibility" meant West Germany would contribute economically to Western defense and commit itself not to conspire with the Eastern Bloc or to increase Communist military potential through trade. The unsettled questions involved how the West should relax controls and interest the Germans in collaborating. Among the top State Department officials "it was consensus that time [was] running out on controls, occupation statute must be reviewed this fall, McCloy felt 18 months outside limit and ECA [i.e. the Marshall Plan-T.M.] w[ou]ld end 1952."92 The American sense of urgency was new. The British Embassy in Washington reported on April 29 that "it is evident that much hard thinking has taken place in the State Department during the last three weeks, and on the whole the German problem now looms larger among the subjects for the [upcoming London] Ministers' Conference than before. Even three weeks ago, some State Department officials were saying that Germany was not of course the main dish on the menu."93 This new US interest in the German problem suited the British. During the spring of 1950 the Labour Government desired to settle differences over Cold War strategy with its allies. On March 20, Bevin announced to the House of Commons that a NATO summit would convene in London in early May. 94 With it came the opportunity to discuss Germany with the Americans and the French. The British government had come to believe that inter-Allied differences on issues like the deconcentration of industry, demilitarization, the Saar, and the income tax law had unnecessarily aggravated the situation in West Germany. 95 On May 8 the cabinet agreed that the French had to take a more reasonable view on the Federal Republic's integration into Europe (ironically, the Schuman Plan was announced the next day). 96 In July, Steele reviewed his experiences within HI COM and accused his French and sometimes American colleagues of pursuing petty and at times nationalistic policies. 97 One way to end the deadlock on Germany was to extend greater political freedoms to the Federal Republic. Bevin's remarks during the House of Commons debate on European policy on March 28 displayed his irritation about Adenauer's tactics on the Council of Europe. He noted that, if the Federal

110 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Republic did become a member, the Allies would not only accept them but move to the next stage and give them the right to conduct their own foreign policy, allowing the Germans to act as full members on the Council. 98 Handing foreign affairs back to the FRG did not meet with Allied approval at first. 99 Through summer both US and French diplomats also noted that the United Kingdom wanted to deal directly with the Adenauer government and, as Acheson put it, make "end runs" around the High Commission.100 In late April, Berard complained that his British colleagues in Bonn characteristically wanted to concede all points to the West Germans and even seemed ready to abandon the Occupation Statute and dismantle the High Commission. 101 Around the same time the Foreign Office invited Blankenhorn and Peter Pfeiffer to London to study the organization of the British foreign service. 102 While there Blankenhorn talked with Bevin's parliamentary undersecretary for Germany, William Henderson; the newly appointed British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick; and the leader of the parliamentary opposition, Winston Churchill, who gave him a personal letter for Adenauer. Such direct West German contacts with one of the Three Powers outside the High Commission were highly unusual and flirted with provoking both the Americans and the French. Blankenhorn indeed provoked Berard by saying that he had been received in a spirit of trust in London that was lacking at HICOM's headquarters on the Petersberg. 103 US diplomats suspected that the United Kingdom favored full foreign policy rights for West Germany as a way of achieving bilateral economic goals, such as binding the Federal Republic to the Sterling Bloc. For that very reason, in the spring and summer of 1950 the United States would protest and intervene in the Anglo-German trade treaty talks in London. 104 British maneuvering may have represented less a desire to make "end runs" around the High Commission than an attempt to produce diplomatic movement, prompted by growing frustration with the Americans over economic policy and with the French on German policy. Since Bevin was in the hospital from April 11 to May 4, his subordinates also had an opportunity to maneuver independently. Kirkpatrick shocked his Allied counterparts at the preparatory talks in London for the Foreign Ministers Conference on May 4 by arguing for a wide-sweeping and immediate lifting of restrictions on West Germany, including in the security area, despite Bevin's firm opposition to German rearmament.105 During the coming summer the British government would take a very liberal position on returning political-but not economic-freedoms to West Germany.

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French policy makers faced the largest challenge, because the entire German policy Robert Schuman had pursued since 1948 seemed to have reached an impasse. Schuman had made a substantial break with previous French obstructionist practice to join with the other Occupation Powers in extending freedoms to the Federal Republic in hopes of tying it to a new Europe. By the spring of 1950 he had little to show for his efforts. European structures to enmesh the Federal Republic had not yet materialized, in large part due to British disinterest. Franco-German relations also were in a crisis. Jean Monnet, among others, feared a revival of German heavy industry along purely national lines. The Federal Republic was the one part of Western Europe where the steel industry showed great dynamism, and by 1950 West German steel production already exceeded the original Allied limits. Still worse, German economic potential assumed an ever-larger role in Allied thinking about European rearmament, and thoughts of using German human potential seemed just around the corner. 106 Just before the NATO Summit in London in May the French Foreign Office suspected the British and the Americans were ready to grant Germany wide-sweeping sovereign rights. 107 The solution proposed by Fran9ois Seydoux, head of the French Foreign Ministry's Direction d'Europe, involved closely associating France and Germany on a long-term basis within European structures. A positive French initiative would correspond to US wishes, and since its scope would be clearly defined, there was no possibility of surrendering to "excessive" West German demands. The Federal Republic's liberties, especially in the international arena, could not be allowed to exceed the limits already defined by the Occupation Statute and the Petersberg Agreement. The problem was that the Foreign Office had not worked out an exact proposal. It was at this point that Jean Monnet saved the situation with his proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community, which Schuman made public on the eve of the London Conferences on May 9 after informing the Adenauer government the previous day. 108 The Schuman Plan, as it became known, provided a substantial impetus for breaking the deadlock on Germany. At one stroke it improved Franco-German relations, provided the new step toward European integration the Americans hoped for, and increased the Adenauer government's prestige. It also allowed the Federal Republic for the first time to be treated as an equal in an important international forum. Adenauer immediately greeted the proposal. It conformed to his long-held ideas for European cooperation and, in his opinion, would also completely and positively transform West Germany's relations with its neighbors. Ironically, he received the news from Schuman later on the same day he

112 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE had decided it was necessary to yield to Allied pressure to join the Council of Europe despite the presence of the Saar in that organization. The Federal Republic joined in July as an associate member and became a full member the following year, although it would bitterly resist membership for the Saar in the European Coal and Steel Community (the issue resolved itself in 1956, when the Saar's population voted to join West Germany). The Schuman Plan also had implications for the management of the Federal Republic's foreign affairs. On June 15 Adenauer chose Walter Hallstein as leader of the West German delegation to the Schuman Plan talks. Despite his successful career as a law professor before 1945, Hallstein had a reputation among his colleagues as a critic of the Nazi regime and managed to stay clear of formal membership in the NSDAP and its organizations. The forced emigration of his academic advisors, Ernst Rabel and Martin Wolff, to the United States and Britain respectively during the 1930s may have played a role in his distance from the political system. As an American prisoner of war, Hallstein had been allowed to set up a camp university for his fellow prisoners, and he later enjoyed good relations with US officials. Quality jurists with an uncompromised past were a rarity in Germany in 1945. With experience in both international civil law and German law, Hallstein saw his career advance rapidly, highlighted by appointments as Rektor [director] of the University of Frankfurt am Main and then as president of the West German UNESCO commission. He also was a guest lecturer at Georgetown University during the I 948--49 academic year. 109 Having proved himself in the initial tests at the Schuman Plan talks, on August 6, 1950, Hallstein agreed to become state secretary in the Chancellery.110 He was responsible for both internal and external affairs and the immediate superior of both Hans Globke and Blankenhorn, although the latter told the US High Commission that Hallstein would concentrate more on domestic matters. The US liaison in Bonn also forwarded reports from "reliable sources" that Adenauer had adopted new working methods that delegated more responsibilities. Hallstein's appointment would help reduce the large backlog in work that had accumulated in the meantime, but unfortunately not for several months. 111 Not only would the appointment as state secretary upgrade Hallstein's position at the Schuman Plan talks in Paris, but the outbreak of the Korean War in June provided an opportunity for a decided German push toward full sovereignty. However events developed exactly, Adenauer knew that the next months and years would be full of negotiations on the Federal Republic's international status. Hallstein's intelligence and legal

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background made him a useful person to keep around for talks with the Occupation Powers. 112 There still was no state secretary for foreign affairs, but Hallstein's appointment was a step in the right direction. While clearly innovative, the Schuman Plan still followed the old formula of involving the West Germans in foreign affairs on a strictly defined basis only. Even before the plan was announced, however, the Three Powers decided to review the Occupation Statute. During the preparatory talks for the Foreign Ministers Conference in London (May 11-13), the Allied subcommittee agreed that the Occupation Powers needed to move quickly in reshaping their relations with the Federal Republic as soon as West Germany joined the Council of Europe (which was imminent). "The next stage," summarized Kirkpatrick, "should be the elimination of certain obstacles to German association with the West," including restrictions on German industry, a more liberal interpretation of the Occupation Statute by the High Commission, and "the circumstance that Germany cannot be a full member of many Western organizations so long as she has no direct access to governments, and her foreign affairs are solely controlled by the High Commission." 113 The Three Powers established an Intergovernmental Study Group to decide on the level of future intervention into West German political and security affairs. 114 At its meetings in July, there was agreement that the West Germans needed to have considerable freedoms in foreign affairs but that the Three Powers needed the power to prevent any initiatives contrary to the interests of the occupation regime or which might lead to a pro-Soviet orientation. However, the British delegation created considerable alarm by stating that it tended to favor removing all formal controls. Even though British diplomats told the US delegation that they had taken this radical position chiefly to draw French fire, their tactics reawakened the State Department's fears about a British "end run" around the High Commission. At the other extreme, the French delegation insisted that foreign affairs had to remain a reserved area. By implication, the High Commission would continue to delegate the areas in which the West Germans might act, as it had with the Schuman Plan. Delegation leader Rene Massigli asserted that "all power over Germany would rapidly vanish" if the Allies gave up foreign affairs. Moreover, he argued, there was no need to move quickly to grant more rights (e.g., to a foreign ministry), because the Federal Republic had not fully used the freedoms already extended. He referred directly to the slow progress the new German missions were making. 115 The Americans stood between the British and the French, wanting to be generous while maintaining formal securities against possible German misbehavior. The US

114 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE delegation leader Douglas, as well as McCloy, argued for the need to be liberal if concessions were going to be made. On the other hand, the State Department urged against premature discussion and agreed with the French that foreign affairs power and termination of the state of war with Germany were the two biggest cards the Allies had. The Americans had to be sure they reached a positive overall settlement with the West Germans first before playing them. 116 Despite the differences, on July 21 Massigli reported that the interested parties had reached a consensus on foreign affairs. 117 The Study Group issued its final report on September 4, which recommended giving the Federal Republic the right to set up an independent foreign ministry and conduct diplomacy. 118 The Study Group could not resolve two points of dispute. The United States and France wanted to preserve the High Commission's reserved rights over foreign policy, while the United Kingdom sought the "definitive transfer" of those rights to the Federal Republic except with regard to relations with the Communist Bloc and the final peace treaty. The United Kingdom was also prepared to accept West German diplomats, while the United States and France wanted only representatives without diplomatic rank. Later that month in New York, the foreign ministers decided to accept the Franco-American position on both issues until the next phase of statute revision. On the related issue of foreign trade, the US position of granting broad concessions won out, although many controls would remain in areas like German Eastern trade and the value of the DM. 119 By this time, German rearmament had been a burning issue for several months due to the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Acheson would shock his colleagues Bevin and Schuman at these same September New York meetings by announcing a "package deal" of increased US participation in European defense in exchange for Allied agreement to a German defense contribution. This would prompt French defense minister Rene Pleven to propose, the following month, a "European Defense Community" (EDC), a supranational army designed to ensure that the Federal Republic would not establish an independent military. As Adenauer fully recognized, the Federal Republic's cooperation in this project would necessarily mean the end of the Occupation Statute. 120 On September 23, the High Commissioners met with Adenauer to give him an overview of the New York Decisions and also informed him that joint German-HICOM committees would be set up to implement them. 121 Four days later Frarn;:ois-Poncet, HICOM's acting chair, sent Adenauer a clarification about the broad principles approved in New York concerning foreign rela-

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tions. 122 The Federal Republic would be able to set up a foreign ministry and conduct relations with foreign states "to the broadest extent possible." German representatives abroad could now have diplomatic rank, and foreign missions in West Germany would now be accredited directly to the Federal Government in all but a few cases. The Three Powers would also support West German entry into as many international organizations as possible. While the Three Powers did not intend to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Federal Republic, each High Commissioner would in effect act as a type of "ambassador" and negotiate directly on issues concerning the Federal Republic and his own state. Finally, the Three Powers would initiate steps to end the state of war between Germany and UN countries. Nonetheless, the new freedoms remained subject to various restrictions: 1-The Allies retained the right of disapproval over the establishment of foreign relations and the conclusion of international agreements between the FRG and foreign powers. Therefore, the Federal Republic had to keep HICOM informed about all of its diplomatic activity;

2-HICOM would not intervene in the FRG's relations with other states nor disapprove of its agreements, except when these affected Allied reserved rights, the purposes of the Occupation regime, measures enacted by the Three Powers on the basis of the Occupation Statute, international agreements negotiated on Germany's behalf, or any measure that "could prejudice a peace settlement with Germany [die Regelung des Friedens mil Deutsch/and Abbruch tun konnen ]";

3-Finally, whenever necessary HICOM would conduct relations, conclude agreements, and act in international organizations for the FRG when it could not do so itself. HICOM would also take measures to preserve international agreements on Germany and to ensure that the FRG honored its own agreements with other states. Most importantly, "relations with the USSR or with states in the Soviet sphere of influence [Machtbereich] will either be conducted directly by the High Commission or be subject to a very strict supervision and control"; the same applied to relations with Soviet and East German authorities in the GDR.

In October and November a number of German-HICOM committees met to implement the terms of the "Small Revision." 123 Besides clarifying certain points related to Frarn;;ois-Poncet's September 27 letter, Allied diplomats informed the Germans that the Federal Republic would have sole responsibility for the organization of the new ministry and the selection of its diplomatic

116 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE and consular personnel. 124 In exchange for the Small Revision, the Adenauer government had to agree to recognize the German Reich's international debts. Ultimately the Small Revision did not take effect until the spring of 1951, due to technical problems relating to the Federal Republic's recognition of Germany's pre- and postwar debts. The Bundestag agreed to recognize the debts on March 6, and the next day HICOM made the revision public. 125 The HICOM newsletter Diplomatische Korrespondenz stressed that a foreign office would raise the Federal Republic's international status "in a form appropriate to its importance." It also pointed out that the West Germans had already assumed a position unforeseen in the original Occupation Statute through participation as equals in the Schuman Plan negotiations and in talks on rearmament, which recently had opened on the Petersberg and in Paris. 126 For the Federal Republic these concessions were substantial, although many West German politicians were dissatisfied that there had not been a more radical revision of the Occupation Statute. 127 After more than eighteen months of waiting, the new Auswartiges Amt opened on March 15, 1951, with Adenauer as foreign minister. 128

Containment or Self-Containment? In January 1951 the Three Powers entered into yet another round of discussions on revising occupation controls. The Brussels Decisions from the previous December had vaguely promised "substantial freedom" to the Federal Republic ifit participated in Western defense, and it was now necessary to determine what this meant. 129 German democracy still seemed quite young and weak to Allied observers like McCloy, and Adenauer would not be on the scene indefinitely. 130 At the same time, they expected that the West Germans would continue to pursue an assertive policy in the forums open to them. In late December 1950 Kirkpatrick correctly predicted that Adenauer would try to link West German participation in Western defense to the total dismantling of the Occupation Statute if possible. "In short, we have a long row to hoe," he wrote. 131 Even so, by August 1951 the Three Powers had agreed that they needed to retain "supreme authority" only in certain specific areas, particularly those relating to German reunification, the status of Berlin, and the right to station troops and intervene in the Federal Republic in case of an emergency.132 Foreign affairs, especially restrictions on relations with the Soviet Bloc, were conspicuously absent from this list, much to the surprise

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of the West Germans. 133 HICOM believed that West German relations with Communist states and membership in international organizations in which Communist states were represented seemed unlikely, since the Soviet Bloc refused to recognize the FRG. Nevertheless, it is not possible, at least in theory, to exclude completely the assumption that broader or more official relations could be established between the Federal Republic and one or more countries of Eastern Europe; on that assumption the Three Powers might have to ensure that their interests in Germany would not be endangered by such relations. It is apparent, however, that if relations between the Federal Republic and Eastern Europe were to create a threat to Allied interests in Germany, they would be evidence of an orientation of Western Germany in a direction completely different from that which now enables the Allies to contemplate the conclusion of contractual agreements. In this case, legal safeguarding clauses would run the risk of being ineffective.

In exchange for agreeing to abide by the principles of the UN Charter and the Statute of the Council of Europe, the Federal Republic would be allowed to freely conduct relations with Eastern European countries with the exception of existing controls on trade and perhaps certain other areas (e.g., movement of persons ). 134 This paper was based on a French draft. Each of the Three Powers had independently reached the conclusion, to use the words of the State Department's Bureau of German Affairs, that "if the Germans seriously wish to cooperate with us, a formal promise would be unnecessary, and if they seriously wish not to cooperate, a formal promise would be unavailing." 135 Not only did the Federal Republic "seriously wish to cooperate," but in the fall of 1951 the Adenauer government went out of its way to secure legal assurances that the Three Powers would not negotiate behind its back with the Soviet Union. This was most obvious in the famous Bindungsklausel [binding clause], or Article 7(3) of the contractual agreements, which guaranteed that the Three Powers would extend to a reunified Germany all the rights enjoyed by the Federal Republic ifit also assumed all of the latter's treaty obligations. The original clause proved very contentious in the Federal Republic because it seemed to preclude any chance for reunification. Many in Adenauer's own coalition believed that the Soviets, who still possessed a veto, would never agree to a united Germany in a Western military alliance. Eventually, the language was modified to leave these commitments subject to "further negotiation." But in either form Adenauer intended that the Bindungsklausel would prevent the

118 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE reimposition of Allied control mechanisms on a unified Germany. 136 Moreover, Adenauer wanted the Three Powers to promise to consult with the Federal Republic on any matters concerning German interests. He clearly wanted to be associated with the development of a common Western foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Bloc. 137 Adenauer did not secure this last goal. The Three Powers did agree, however, to consult with the FRG about their negotiations with states with which the FRG had no relations, should the discussions involve German interests (Article 3 [3]); on the other hand, the Bindungsklausel would be dropped totally in 1954 in the new contractual agreements that followed the collapse of the EDC. 138 The Three Powers' treatment of the foreign affairs question is especially interesting because it does not fit the model of "containment with an embrace" cleanly. Certainly, their concessions came at a price for the Federal Republic, which had to assume the Reich's debts and agree to rearm. Also, the Powers would retain control over West Germany's relations with the Communist Bloc until the final lifting of the Occupation Statute in May 1955. Yet the concessions were made in principle before structures such as the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community actually stood in place to "contain" the Federal Republic. In 1951 the Powers feared that the Federal Republic might press for political equality before fully committing itself to Western defense, thereby compromising major Allied goals in Germany, the defense contribution, or both. 139 Even though they forced the West Germans to fulfill various conditions, the Three Powers hardly could have reneged on their foreign policy promises without seriously compromising the entire Occupation regime. One important explanation for this generosity certainly lies in the fact that the Adenauer government in the early 1950s practiced "self-containment," or in other words chose to cooperate with the Allied goal of Western integration, and even made some remarkable concessions of its own, as evidenced by the Bindungsklausel. 140 The question of foreign affairs power also demonstrates again that in the late 1940s and early 1950s the Occupation Powers had a general objective of ensuring the Federal Republic's membership in the Western camp. However, they had not worked out the details for achieving it and did so in reaction to events in the Federal Republic and the wider Cold War. 141 This reactive policy also had serious implications for the establishment of the new West German Auswartiges Amt, the major Three Power concession of March 1951, which experienced an inauspicious start. The ministry's form necessarily followed from the functions that the Three Powers allowed the Federal Republic to exercise in the field of foreign affairs.

5

The Foreign Office's "Childhood Illnesses,"

1949-55

DES PITE VAR IOU S AN NOUNCE ME NT S that the Auswartiges Amt had completed its initial organization, the ministry during the early 1950s was clearly a work in progress. 1 The first generation of West German diplomats vividly remembered the difficult circumstances they faced. According to the Federal Republic's first mission chief in New York and Washington, Heinz L. Krekeler, "In the beginning the most primitive material prerequisites were lacking .... In short, it was a beginning from the ground up as it could not be more radically conceived."2 Josef Lons, leader of Division I (Personnel and Administration) from 1953 to 1958, compared the early 1950s Foreign Office to a giant travel bureau. Officials came for orientation and almost immediately went off again to their postings in an ever-growing chain of foreign missions, while offices in Bonn were regularly occupied until nine or ten in the evening because of the massive workload and insufficient staff. 3 Until a new office building opened for business in 1955, the ministry lay scattered across the city of Bonn, and several of its important divisions had only recently been established. In August 1953 Konrad Adenauer admitted to the German press that "the complaints about the condition of the Foreign Ministry are justified to a great extent."4 As the West German daily Die Welt put it, the Auswartiges Amt during the early 1950s suffered from various "childhood illnesses."5 The term was apt. The Foreign Office would take a number of years to acquire the necessary personnel, facilities, and experience to effectively represent the Federal

120 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Republic's interests abroad at a time when foreign ministries all over the world found their tasks increasing dramatically. Due to its late creation, some eighteen months after the rest of the central government, it also found itself involved in serious competency conflicts with other federal ministries, which demonstrated that the Federal Republic's foreign policy would be inter-ministerial in the truest sense of the word. However, the term "childhood illnesses" was also appropriate because the Foreign Office would grow into a stable adolescence by the middle of the decade after many of its organizational shortcomings had been addressed.

The Working Groups in the Chancellery, 1949-S 1 One important cause of the Auswartiges Amt's early problems was the fact that it arose from several predecessors in the Federal Chancellery that themselves had come together in a piecemeal fashion in response to changes in Allied policy. Herbert Blankenhorn played a central role in creating this initial apparatus. Beginning in September 1949 he started to set up a small staff in Bonn to deal with foreign affairs. 6 It consisted of a protocol staff under Hans von Herwarth (which also served the Federal President's Office), a translation service, and advisors for "special tasks" like Peter Pfeiffer, Herbert Dittmann, Wilhelm Haas, the Kordt brothers, Hasso von Etzdorf, and Gustav Strohm. 7 By early October, both Erich Kaufmann from the University of Munich and Gustav von Schmoller from the Institut fur Besatzungsprobleme [Institute for Occupation Problems] in Tubingen had been called in to help with legal questions concerning the Occupation Statute. 8 Blankenhorn used these informal circles for expert advice on various foreign policy problems. 9 There can be little doubt that he intended to have Adenauer formally engage these men, most of whom were his former foreign service colleagues, as soon as possible. By the next spring, Adenauer had indeed appointed Kaufmann as the Chancellery's advisor for international law questions. 10 Adenauer moved to expand this apparatus over the last months of 1949. On November 4 he appointed Blankenhorn to head the new Liaison Office to the Allied High Commission (Division III of the Chancellery). This office served as the chief conduit between the federal government and HI COM, and its tasks swiftly ballooned to include a whole range of activities that had little to do with the main issues in German-Allied relations. By the fall of 1950 it had no less than ten desks on questions including occupation costs, food, agriculture

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and forestry, prisoners of war, foreign cultural relations, and passports. 11 The Liaison Office dominated the foreign policy apparatus in the Chancellery until the creation of the Foreign Office in March 1951 and, rechristened as Division II, remained the focal point for all important political questions thereafter. On November 14, 1949, Adenauer also instructed Blankenhorn to effect the transfer of the DBFF to Bonn. 12 The DBFF already intended to transform itself into a foreign policy research institute close to the new federal government, and moving to Bonn meant securing future employment for its staff. For Blankenhorn, having the office in Bonn served yet another purpose, as he noted in his diary on November 17: "I therefore will accommodate there all the men who are necessary and who for the time being cannot be transferred yet into a proper office-at the head Peter Pfeiffer and Theo Kordt." 13 He and his circle of advisors saw the DBFF as a formal element of a future office for foreign affairs. 14 The DBFF remained attached to the Chancellery only until June 1950, however. Although the federal government took over its funding from the German states in the American zone, both the Bundestag and the Finance Ministry were reluctant to continue to pay for it. On February 2, 1950, the Bundestag's Budget Committee declared that the DBFF could not continue in its existing form beyond March, even though it did ask the Chancellery to find another method for funding it. On February 14, Blankenhorn informed Finance Minister Fritz Schaffer (CSU) that Adenauer had approved plans for turning it into a research institute. 15 This would allow former diplomats who were useful as experts but easy targets for public attacks to remain in loose association with the new Foreign Office. 16 By early March, there were formal plans for dividing the DBFF's personnel between the Chancellery and a research institute. 17 However, on June 16 the Finance Ministry announced it would discontinue funding at the end of the month. Blankenhorn informed the DBFF that its personnel would be absorbed by the Chancellery, although he could promise nothing about their salary level or term of employment. 18 One immediate consequence of the organization's demise was that people who would have been attached to the research institute-most notably, Peter Pfeiffer and Hasso von Etzdorf-now assumed formal positions in the nascent Foreign Office. Pfeiffer, head of the attache school in Speyer, and Etzdorf, deputy leader of the Geographic Division (III), later figured prominently in criticism of the Foreign Office's personnel policy. The Allied decision in mid-November 1949 to allow German consulates created a need for a more formal apparatus besides the Liaison Office. From the very beginning Blankenhorn had Wilhelm Haas and Theo Kordt in mind

122 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE to lead the Administrative and Political Divisions, respectively, of the future State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. 19 Haas was particularly suited for the first job because of his work on the Organization Committee of the German Minister Presidents the previous summer. Admittedly, Blankenhorn was interested in him not so much for this reason as for his irreproachable credentials vis-avis Nazism and because he led the Chancellery of minister president Wilhelm Kaisen (SPD) in Bremen. Although Haas was not a member of the SPD, he enjoyed very good relations with it, which would help to limit criticism of personnel policy. 20 Blankenhorn knew Kordt well from their service together in Athens and Berne during the Third Reich. Adenauer's doubts about employing career diplomats interfered with these plans. On November 17, 1949, Adenauer told Blankenhorn, who was trying once again to secure Haas's appointment, that "you [people] from the old A[uswartiges] A[mt] stick together too closely for me. You know that I would like to set up a new office that has as little as possible to do with the old people." 21 Haas's first meeting with Adenauer on November 18 proved inconclusive, but the next day Blankenhorn persuaded the chancellor to employ him (a loudspeaker summoned Haas from his homebound train when it stopped in nearby Cologne). 22 Throughout the winter and spring Adenauer's distrust of Haas remained intense. 23 Coworkers later commented on the clash of personalities between the Catholic, conservative chancellor from the Rhineland and the reserved, Protestant, liberal North German. 24 More to the point, however, was the fact that Haas proved to be an independent-minded personnel chief. Haas picked Wilhelm Melchers as his deputy for personnel matters, and the ex-diplomat Werner Schwarz soon took charge of financial and organizational matters within what became known as the Organization Office for the Consular/Commercial Service. In December Rudolf Holzhausen from the Economics Ministry in Frankfurt was appointed to select candidates to become economics attaches; all other applications would be handled in Bonn. 25 By January l 0, the Organization Office had over three thousand unprocessed applications. Holzhausen, the European Recovery Program Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and other government organs held an additional four thousand. In light of the large number of applications, on January 14 Blankenhorn approved bringing in several other career diplomats to help with personnel affairs in Bonn and Frankfurt (two of them, Werner von Grundherr and Kurt Heinburg, would figure prominently in the personnel controversy of 1951-52 due to their activities in the Third Reich). 26 Haas had his first substantial meeting with Adenauer on December 19, 1949, and received approval for the Organization Office's plans for consul-

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ates. Despite Allied reservations, Adenauer said that missions would also have to perform political tasks and that further planning should be conducted as if they had the right to issue passports and send coded messages. Haas believed that the first consulates in London, Paris, and New York could be opened in April 1950. Adenauer approved plans for a central office initially consisting of a Personnel and Administration Division, a Foreign Trade Division, and a Legal Division; Haas recommended the addition of a Cultural Division. Adenauer also said that a division to handle political tasks could be established without being officially designated as such. Although Haas's timetable proved very optimistic (the first missions were sent out in June, and Foreign Trade and Legal Divisions had to wait until 1951 ), in principle he had outlined the structure for the future foreign office along the lines described in Anton Pfeiffer 's memo from the previous October. 27 In Adenauer's presence on February 22, 1950, Haas explained essentially the same plans to the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee. 28 On May 6 Adenauer commissioned Blankenhom with consolidating all of the foreign policy working groups. 29 This happened despite rumors that he would name Theo Kordt for this task with all the functions of a state secretary except the actual title. 30 On May 4, the Swiss paper TAT had greeted Kordt's assignment positively, calling him politically irreproachable. 31 Presumably his suspicions against career diplomats and people he did not know (and possibly Kordt's work for a political rival in the CDU, Minister President Karl Arnold of North Rhine-Westphalia) led Adenauer to decide in favor of Blankenhom. Kordt became head of the consular or Geographic Division (later Division III) with Hasso von Etzdorf as his deputy. As previously mentioned, on June 7, 1950, the creation of the DfAA under Blankenhom was announced, followed by Hallstein's appointment as state secretary in the Federal Chancellery in August. When it was formally created on March 15, 1951, the Auswartiges Amt consisted of the following units: I. Personnel and Administration (with translation service) II. Political Division III. Geographic Division Protocol Office for Attache Training and School at Speyer 8 foreign missions (as of December 31, 1950)

124 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Three new administrative divisions and the bulk of the missions remained to be set up. A late start plus the Finance Ministry's efforts to impose economies at all costs helped complicate the Foreign Office's initial financial situation and slow the creation of the first consulates. The Foreign Office did not have a regular budget until the Bundestag approved the Chancellery's 1950 budget plan request in July 1951. Before then the DfAA had to request special appropriations for all of its work, for example in June 1950 for the first three consulates general in New York, London, and Paris. When Haas submitted his first formal budget during the winter of 1950-51, the Finance Ministry failed to see the need for a full third of the requested personnel. An acceptable compromise was reached in March 1951, just as Adenauer was about to intervene himself. In December 1951 the Foreign Office, once again caught in the middle of the regular budget cycle (this time by the Small Revision of the Occupation Statute), asked for and received permission from the Bundestag Finance Committee to create a total of 107 missions immediately. 32 Admittedly, the pace of West Germany's reintegration into the international system and the resulting need for personnel had outstripped everyone's initial expectations. The Audit Office's report of May 3, 1949, asserted that the entire Federal Chancellery would require 120 employees, including the division for foreign affairs. 33 The Organization Committee's final report from the summer of 1949, coauthored by Haas, argued that a state secretariat for foreign affairs would need 180 officials (with 46 from the Higher Service) for the initial period and then 280 (74). 34 In reality, the DfAA alone would have 137 Higher Service officials on October I, 1950. By the end of 1951, the new Auswartiges Amt had 1,447 employees of all categories and 397 Higher Service officials. 35 In the spring of 195 l the French High Commission reported on the problems facing the new Foreign Office. Its organization was proceeding slowly, in part because of a narrow leadership. Adenauer tended to rely on the same small circle of advisors from the Liaison Office, led by Blankenhom and Herbert Dittmann. State Secretary Hallstein was preoccupied with negotiations on the Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, talks with HICOM on a German defense contribution, and the Occupation Statute. The ministry's units lay dispersed in multiple buildings throughout Bonn, and one of its most important elements, the Foreign Trade Division, was still attached to the Economics Ministry in Frankfurt. 36 According to Fran9ois-Poncet, the current structure was very much provisional and did not even have its own budget yet. In addition, a "diplomatic corps" in the true sense of the word did not exist, and Hall-

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125

stein and Haas were finding it difficult to recruit sufficient personnel. Frarn;:oisPoncet called their measures to staff the central office "makeshift solutions [solutions de fortune]." He predicted correctly that it would take some time to implement a needed reorganization. 37

The Maltzan Report Another year would pass before the Foreign Office's leadership could devote its full attention to organizational problems. Only the signing of the Treaties of Bonn and Paris in May 1952, which promised to lift the Occupation Statute in return for West German participation in the European Defense Community, combined with public attacks on the Auswartiges Amt's personnel policy (see Chapter Six), gave Hallstein both an opportunity and a motivation to address the ministry's internal organization. Until then both he and Blankenhorn had been heavily involved in negotiations on the treaties, and both felt they could put off administrative problems to some extent until the talks were over. 38 On June 26, 1952, with Adenauer's approval, Hallstein asked the Economic Ministry's Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan, a former diplomat, to prepare a comprehensive statement "on the individual problems that urgently require a solution."39 The next month Maltzan presented his report. 40 The CDU's parliamentary leader Heinrich von Brentano, while not agreeing with all of the specific points, wrote Adenauer that the memo provided an excellent foundation upon which to structure reforms. 41 It also coincided thematically with another report by Division 111. 42 Maltzan's report provides a useful overview of the ministry's problems, which fell into four main areas: technical prerequisites, relations with other government ministries, personnel policy, and leadership structures. Maltzan 's July 16, 1952, memo, titled 'The Further Construction and Organization of the Foreign Office," began by arguing that the tasks of the foreign service had changed greatly since the years after World War I. This was especially true due to the new accent on international political, economic, cultural, and military cooperation. "As far as the Federal Republic is concerned, the scope and pace of [its] involvement [Einschaltung] in world politics and the world economy have far exceeded the original forecast." 43 The phenomenon Maltzan observed was not unique to the Federal Republic but was taking place around the world as part of a process Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne have described as "diplomatic inflation." "The emancipation of the Third World, the spawning of international organizations and regimes, and the

126 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE broadening of the agenda of diplomacy, have been matched by a corresponding and seemingly inevitable expansion of the foreign services of the superpowers and their European allies" they write. 44 Maltzan believed that the Foreign Office as currently conceived was too small and understaffed to handle its numerous responsibilities. As a result, many tasks like the creation of foreign missions could not be completed with the requisite speed, while other policy areas that traditionally belonged to the German Foreign Office-for example, foreign trade-were being directed by other ministries. Foreign cultural policy and intelligence required greater efforts "in order to rediscover the lost connection to developments abroad." Maltzan thought it especially important to prepare to meet the demands associated with the Schuman Plan and with the European Defense Community and other European organizations, which soon would fall upon federal ministries in growing intensity. His report emphasized the need to increase the central office's personnel at all levels. 45 Between January 1 and November 1, 1952, the number of people employed in Bonn increased from 646 to 813, but the amount of paperwork doubled, and it would continue to expand during 1953 until at times it became overwhelming. 46 Lack of secretaries played a considerable role in the problem, and Maltzan recommended almost doubling their number in the central office (from 127 to 202). 47 In late 1952 West German mission chiefs in Europe and the United States also stressed the urgent need for more staff. 48 The solution, as chart l indicates, involved a massive increase in the Auswartiges Amt's personnel. Its budget increased steadily through the 1950s, despite the Finance Ministry's warning for fiscal year 1954 that tightening federal finances made sacrifices and the rationalization of work necessary. 49 In particular, the Foreign Office made a conscious effort between 1954 and 1957 to increase the percentages of the Elevated Service [Gehobener Dienst] and Intermediate Service [Mittlerer Dienst] among its total employees. In establishing the ministry it had been logical to staff the Higher Service [Hdherer Dienst] or diplomatic positions first and worry about support personnel later. Both the Elevated and the Intermediate Services increased dramatically over the course of the decade, in particular the latter, from which the clerical staff came. 50 On the other hand, the percentage of Higher Service members among the total Foreign Office personnel fell from 34 percent in 1951 to 26.5 percent in 1953 and to 20. 7 percent by 1957, approximately the level it had been during the 1938--40 period. In part, this also resulted from the expansion of the mission net and the end of certain special conditions that prevailed in the early 1950s-for example, the initial need for many Higher Service economic attaches to collect basic information about business conditions abroad (positions

The Foreign Office's "Childhood Illnesses," 1949-55

127

CHART ONE-West German Foreign Service Personnel, 1951-55 5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0

-

Home ■ Ab roa d

■ lioa t I

-

4566

3745 3411

3242

-

2610

1985

-

-

1447

-

,_

1184

~

-

I

- J

__J

I

I

I

1951 a 1951 b 1952a 1952b 1953a 1953b

I

I

1954

I

1955

Note: There were no uniform Federal statistics for government personnel before 1954. Figures for 1954 and 1955 are as of October 2. Source: Claus Miiller, Relaunching German Diplomacy, 273

that were later reclassified into the lower services). The Auswartiges Amt also created a special training program for the Elevated Service in 1955 and for the Intermediate Service in 1957. 51 In addition to an overall increase in personnel, Maltzan's report noted that the ministry still had to establish many administrative units. Particularly controversial were the size and scope of Division II, the former Liaison Office to the AHC, which handled the most important political tasks, such as European integration and relations with the Three Powers, and initially a grab bag of other issues as well. It completely overshadowed the more traditionally conceived Political Division from Haas's planning, Division III, which was organized on geographic lines. Haas told the Budget Subcommittee of the Bundestag Committee on the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs during its hearings in January and February 1951 that

128 ADENALI ER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Division II is an emergency construct [Notgebilde] that arose from Bonn's historical development. ... From [the] Liaison Office developed everything that today is Division II, which we ourselves perceive as a ministry within a ministry, a special apparatus at the disposal of the Federal Chancellor for his policy. Whereby-I may go ahead and say this here as my personal view, there are other views on it, too-the other divisions' work is handicapped. Until now the Political Division [Division III-T.M.] for practical purposes has been active in the background only [ist bis her praktisch in drifter Reihe in Aktion getreten]. There is scarcely a direct connection with the actual foreign policy. 52

Division II would slowly decrease in size as the government achieved its goal of replacing the High Commission and the Occupation Statute with treaty agreements with the Western powers. Starting in 1951 various tasks and desks would be transferred to other parts of the Foreign Office. 53 The Bundestag's Budget Committee recommended on May 31, 1951, that the two separate "political divisions" should be kept, but that Division II needed to be divided into two subdivisions, one for peace treaty questions and the other for international organizations. In the same debate former diplomat Carl von Campe of the German Party (DP) warned there was a danger that a new type of "European bureaucracy" would develop in Division II. Its methods and way of thinking might clash with "the old diplomats" in Division III, said Campe. Only stronger leadership structures could avert this danger. 54 Between 1951 and 1953 the Foreign Office created no less than four additional major administrative units. The Legal Division (V) became necessary with the opening of the first consulates. Previously, both Blankenhorn's Liaison Office and the Legal Desk [Rechtsreferat] in Haas's Organization Office as well as parts of the Justice Ministry and other federal agencies had taken care of legal matters. 55 For most of 1950 and 1951 the Foreign Office consolidated legal questions in a subdivision of Division III. As reflected in planning from the fall of 1950, Haas apparently saw this as a permanent solution that would leave the Foreign Office with five divisions plus Protocol. 56 On September 19, 1951, however (two months after Haas's reassignment), Hallstein gave the order to create an independent Division V under law professor Hermann Mosler. 57 Mosler's subsequent attempts to expand his division went hand in hand with the effort to regain competencies from other ministries. 58 In January 1955 Division V still did not have enough personnel to meet all of the demands placed upon it, especially on the leadership level. In particular, a new official with ambassadorial status

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was required to prevent the Foreign Office from being outranked at international conferences on legal issues by both foreign delegations and, in many cases, representatives from other West German ministries. 59 In 1951 cultural affairs were taken out of Division II and transferred to an independent Cultural Division (VI) under Rudolf Salat. 60 Although Division VI technically was the first of the new divisions, it took the longest to set up because its needs always came last in budget negotiations with the Finance Ministry. 61 Moreover, Salat, a non-career diplomat, was only the division's acting leader, and consequently he hesitated in making permanent organizational decisions. In his budget request for 1954 Salat reminded Division I that the Cultural Division's tasks were growing constantly as cultural contacts with foreign countries resumed, and that it desperately needed relief. 62 To use Theodor Heuss's expression, the Foreign Office possessed only a "so-called" Cultural Division until the latter started to receive more attention mid-decade. 63 In January 1955, the Foreign Office decided to write a Deputy Leader for Division VI into its next budget. Moreover, at Adenauer's express wish, the budget request would more than double the funds for international cultural work and for German schools overseas. 64 Later that summer, the new head of Division VI, Heinz Triitzschler, outlined to Hallstein his ideas for cultural work over the coming years. He wanted to involve private and semi-private organizations increasingly with the technical implementation of cultural programs and concentrate the Foreign Office's work on a few specific areas only. These included promoting the German language overseas, providing scholarships for foreign students, and sending German professors abroad. Triitzschler believed that southern Europe and the Middle East were especially fertile ground for such efforts, with South America as an area of second priority. In Europe as a whole it was important to present the image of a "new" German culture. 65 Finally, two important administrative divisions of the ministry did not even exist until 1953. Maltzan 's report called for those parts of Division III dealing with the USSR, Eastern Europe, and the "German East" to be built up as quickly as possible. Initially only a single desk (the Ostreferat) under Oskar Kossmann, a geographer by trade and a veteran of the DBFF, dealt with the entire Communist world as well as reunification. 66 Due to the primitive or nonexistent state of West German research institutes on Eastern Europe, he began consulting academic Eastern experts he knew from the pre-1945 period, including the circle around Sovietologist professor Werner Markert and the Balkan expert Professor Fritz Valjacev. Kossmann also helped build up

130 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE the Herderinstitut in Marburg, which specialized in Polish, Czech, and Baltic questions, and continued work on two projects started by the DBFF, the Osthandbuch and the Ostatlas. The Ostreferat quickly became a respectable research institute itself and brought out a series of publications for internal use. 67 Although his area of responsibility seemed dauntingly large, Kossmann's work initially consisted mainly of helping prepare for Adenauer's and Minister for All-German Affairs Jakob Kaiser's speeches on Eastern and German questions, or alternately for Blankenhorn's briefings with Adenauer. 68 Lack of personnel familiar with Eastern European affairs and languages as well as space shortages frustrated the creation of a subdivision for Eastern Affairs in Division 111. 69 If the Foreign Office thought at all about expanding its contacts with Communist states, it did so with an extreme sense of caution. For example, when a representative of a Berlin interzonal trading company wrote to Adenauer on November 17, 1950, and proposed opening West German trade missions in the USSR and its satellites, Alois Tichy of the Liaison Office believed it best not to answer the letter at all, given HICOM's general position on East-West trade. He wrote that "even after the establishment of a foreign office, the Federal Government is supposed to have the right to open missions only in friendly states, which according to the Allies does not include the USSR and its satellite states (Rapallo )."70 "Rapallo" referred specifically to the 1922 GermanSoviet treaty establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries but more broadly to German-Soviet cooperation in the 1920s, which Tichy clearly thought the Three Powers did not want to see repeated. 71 The initial pressure to open diplomatic missions in Communist countries came not from within the Auswartiges Amt but from parliament. Already on July 19, 1950, the SPD's Ltitkens asked Haas and Dittmann what provisions were being made for consular missions in Eastern Europe during a meeting of the Bundestag Committee for the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs. 72 In the same committee on October 12, 1951, Hans-Joachim von Merkatz of the German Party said that the committee should discuss the activation of German Eastern policy as soon as possible, and Ltitkens's motions for government reports on this and related topics found widespread support. 73 At its next meeting on November 7, Carlo Schmid proposed asking the government for a report on present and future possibilities for a German Eastern policy as well as on what the government or parliament could do in this respect. 74 Schmid's motion passed, although it is unclear whether the committee received its report. What is certain is that the Bundestag's dissatisfaction with the state of German East-

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em policy continued. The FDP on October 22, 1952, demanded the creation of a separate division for Eastern Europe in the Foreign Office. 75 The parliament clearly thought it normal and appropriate for the Auswartiges Amt to have the capacity to pursue an active policy toward Eastern Europe. After much delay, the veteran diplomat and Eastern expert Otto Brautigam was brought into the Foreign Office to lead the Eastern Division early in 1953; Gustav Hilger would follow in July as Advisor for Eastern Questions. In March, Brautigam submitted his ideas for what would become Division III-Geographic Division-Subdivision 35-Eastem Bloc and Eastern Questions. 76 In July 1953 Josef Lons, head of the Administrative Section in Division I, approved plans for Division Ill's 1954 budget, which included its expansion to include a Subdivision for Eastern Affairs with five desks. 77 By mid-December 1953, four desks already existed. 78 In January 1956, Subdivision 35 was finally complete, although the desk for reunification questions had been moved to Division Il. 79 Around the same time, Hilger began informing job applicants that all future appointments to the subdivision would be made from the ranks of those who had completed the normal training as foreign service attaches. 80 The Auswartiges Amt also possessed only a skeletal Foreign Trade Division (Division IV) until January 1953, the month in which Maltzan and many of his coworkers came over permanently from the Economics Ministry. This move had been planned from the very beginning, and on June 7, 1950, Adenauer ordered their transfer to the DfAA. 81 On January 27, 195 l, the Foreign Office also reached agreement with representatives from the Economics Ministry on the inter-ministerial division of labor relating to trade issues. The Auswartiges Amt would coordinate foreign contacts and negotiations, while the Economics Ministry would deal with West German business interests as well as the technical issues related to promoting external trade. 82 However, another two years passed before the transfer took place. It was widely believed that the delay was due to the Economics Ministry's second thoughts about surrendering both so much experienced personnel and its leading role in determining trade policy. 83 Lack of office space in Bonn clearly played a role, however. Walther Becker, acting leader of the truncated Division IV set up in 1951, wrote Hallstein on October 29, 1951, that the final transfer ofMaltzan's division would take place as soon as a new ministry building was constructed. 84 The impact of the Second World War put office space in Bonn, not to mention housing, at a premium in the early 1950s. 85 Due to the piecemeal way in which the Auswartiges Amt came together, other ministries claimed many

132 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE of the choice buildings first. In December 1952, the Foreign Office's units were scattered across the city in thirteen different buildings. 86 Maltzan's report argued that this situation had proven detrimental for the ministry's work and also raised security issues. Adenauer, who had grappled intermittently with the problem since at least November 1951, needed to approve plans for a central office building right away. 87 On July 26, 1952, shortly after Maltzan submitted his report, Adenauer and Hallstein reviewed the blueprints. 88 Adenauer was not pleased with the new building as it neared completion in 1954. He thought it would be easy to break into, as many of the windows were on ground level, and that "the structure was even more ugly" than he had previously believed; it also ruined the view of Bonn from the eastern bank of the Rhine. 89 Despite the foreign minister's critique, his diplomats moved into their new home in January 1955, although the ministerial wing remained unfinished until September. 90 By this time the central office clearly had left its "childhood illnesses" behind and could work on fine-tuning. The same can be said about the net of German missions abroad, which also experienced serious problems at first. In February 1951, Hallstein had already compiled an extensive list of possible mission chiefs for posts all around the world. 91 Nonetheless, Maltzan wrote that as of July 12, 1952, only 45 of the 107 budgeted missions were actually open. Fifteen could not be opened due to political reasons, but 47 more could not because leadership personnel could not be found or, in some cases, agreed upon. His report emphasized the need to strengthen German presence abroad substantially. In some parts of the world West German interests urgently required greater attention. German industry and its trade delegations complained that the lack of missions and insufficient staffing in Bonn cost them many business opportunities, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These areas were crucial in part because of the loss of traditional German markets in Eastern Europe due to the Cold War. 92 Postwar political issues affected trade potential elsewhere. Arab states were upset with the March 1952 Restitution Agreement with Israel, in which the Federal Republic symbolically recognized Germany's responsibility for the Holocaust and-more importantly from the Arab perspective-provided Israel and the Jewish Claims Conference with financial support for settling Jewish refugees from Europe. This agreement might hurt the rapidly expanding German trade in the Middle East. 93 In Spain and Portugal not only had trade suffered due to the lack of missions, but diplomatic representatives might try to tackle the problem of confiscated German property in both countries, despite Allied wishes to the contrary. Maltzan's

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5. The new Foreign Office in the Koblenzer StraBe (today Adenauerallee) in Bonn, September 12, 1955 (Bundesregierung, B 145 [Presse- und Jnformationsamt der Bundesregieumg, Bildbestand], Bild-00012608/RolfUnterberg).

report also stressed the need to strengthen the economic service at West German m1ss1ons. Due to the pro-Western emphasis of the Federal Republic's foreign policy, fully 56 of the 93 missions established in Western countries through June 1955 had opened their doors by the end of 1952. Inspections in 1954-55 indicated that many of the missions in Western Europe and North America were functioning properly. 94 Glaring exceptions were the diplomatic missions in London and Paris, which received low marks for inefficient internal organization and poor work climates. 95 Nonetheless, the US High Commission could endorse an article in the Suddeutsche Zeitung of December 31, 1952, on the FRG's relations with important Western countries, which "not without justification extols the success of its fledg[l]ing but nonetheless already efficient Foreign Service."96 On the other hand, it took until mid-decade to establish an effective West German presence outside of Western Europe and the Americas. Only 8 out of 20 missions in Asia, 4 out of 15 in Africa, and 1 out of 5 in Oceania had opened before December 1952, along with I of the 2 missions eventually established in Yugoslavia. 97 Planning for missions in East Asia and Africa began full-scale only in mid-1951, largely at the urging of the Foreign Trade Division. 98 More-

134 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE

CHART TWO-West German Missions Abroad, 1949-June 1955 160 139

140 129 120 100 80

60 40

30

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

Source: Auswartiges Amt, ed., 40 Jahre Auj3enpolitik, 733-751.

over, despite the exhortation by the FDP's Karl Georg Pfleiderer, a former diplomat, in the Bundestag on April 7, 1954, to open missions from "Warsaw ... through to Beijing in the Far East," the Occupation Powers represented the Federal Republic in its official relations with the Communist world (except Yugoslavia). 99 Allied Permit Offices, set up through the Allied High Commission, existed in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and occupied Austria to take care of German consular interests in these areas, and there were special arrangements made with Allied missions in Moscow, Beijing, Bucharest, and Sofia to issue travel documents for German citizens in the name of HICOM. 100 The Federal Republic also limited its membership in international organizations to those it could safely join without fear of a Communist veto of its application,

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and to observer status in all others, with West German "experts" attached to delegations of the Western Occupation Powers whenever necessary. In particular, this hampered direct West German participation in the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations. 101 Complementing the lone mission in Belgrade were a number of listening posts on the outskirts of Communist countries from which developments could be monitored. The most important of these were the Consulate General in Hong Kong and the Office [Dienststelle] in Berlin, both of which became operational in mid-1953. 102 The Hong Kong Consulate reported on affairs concerning Communist China, including Sino-Soviet affairs. 103 Initially the Berlin Office was responsible for reporting on all significant political, social, and cultural events in both parts of Berlin and East Germany. As East Germany became more incorporated into the Soviet Bloc after 1953, the Berlin Office extended its reporting to East German-Soviet relations, the former German territories occupied by the USSR and Poland, and events in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Its sources of information on the Eastern Bloc are representative of the information available to the West German government as a whole before 1956: contacts with Allied and Berlin government offices; reports from approximately 36 news services dealing with Eastern Europe (as of November 1955); some use of informants and refugees; and finally the monitoring of Communist governments, NGOs, and media. 104 Another problem was that many of the missions that opened in 1953 and 1954 were only fully staffed during the course of 1955. 105 After a goodwill mission to Asian nations in February and March 1956 by a delegation from the Federal League of German Industry [Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie], the league's president, Fritz Berg, complained that the economics sections of West German missions from Japan to Pakistan were understaffed and overworked. 106 However, the jury was divided on the missions in the Third World. After a 1956 tour of the African missions, the Federal Audit Office concluded that staffing was adequate. Problems arose largely because of the long home leaves enjoyed by diplomats in "tropical" areas. Representatives of the Audit Office also thought that strengthening the economic sections of such missions was unjustified, since "our production situation does not allow [West Germany] to increase exports at will" without creating late deliveries and other embarrassments. On the other hand, the Auswartiges Amt's brand-new foreign service inspector, Peter Pfeiffer, was touring Asia and Australia at the time, and he thought missions there were indeed understaffed. 107

136 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Regardless of where they were stationed, German diplomatic officials serving abroad initially suffered from insufficient overseas pay and expense accounts. Haas and his coworkers tried from the very start to estimate the cost of living but with only limited success. Many German mission chiefs reported that they did not have the necessary funds to entertain official guests properly or even to attend important functions. For example, Consul General Wilhelm Hausenstein complained in January 1951 that he had to tum down an invitation to a ball at the Paris Consular Club because his wife could not afford to buy appropriate evening wear. One of his coworkers also had to decline because the cost of a tuxedo for himself and a dress for his wife would have exceeded his monthly salary. Hausenstein wrote Haas that this was only the latest example of his financial inability to take care of his social obligations. Haas's deputy in charge of finances, Werner Schwarz, blamed the Finance Ministry for issuing such strict guidelines that he could not forward Hausenstein the necessary money. 108 More seriously, many workers at West German missions had trouble making ends meet, especially in major cities like Paris and London.109 Haas summed up the problem as early as August 1950: "The question of establishing an appropriate level of overseas pay continues to create great worries for us. We are endeavoring by every means to convince the Federal Finance Ministry of the necessity of raising compensation for overseas service [Auslandsbezilge ]." 110 By the time of Maltzan's report, which recommended increasing expense accounts for officials with representational functions, the government had already introduced significant improvements. On April 1, 1952, a subcommittee of the Bundestag's Committee on the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs concluded that a new system for determining overseas pay developed by the Finance Ministry put the West Germans on a comparable basis with the employees of other foreign services, but it needed to be introduced universally as soon as possible. In terms of expense accounts, however, German mission leaders were indeed less well off than their foreign colleagues. The Finance Ministry had agreed to only half the sum suggested by the Foreign Office. 111 On February 23, 1953, Finance Minister Fritz Schaffer wrote Federal President Theodor Reuss that his ministry and the Foreign Office finally had determined appropriate pay and expense accounts for diplomats stationed abroad, thereby alleviating the problem. 112 Another constant grievance during the ministry's early years involved poor coordination between the foreign missions and the central office. During a talk with Blankenhom on November 3, 1951, Adenauer himself complained vehe-

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mently that there was too little contact with the missions. 113 To a great extent the blame lay with insufficient personnel in Bonn. Otto Lenz, state secretary in the Chancellery from 1951 to 1953 and a vocal critic of the Auswartiges Amt, told Adenauer in August 1952 that during his travels abroad many West German missions had complained that they received answers to their questions or acknowledgement of reports only very irregularly. Important desks in Bonn (in particular he mentioned the Saar desk in Division 11) were insufficiently staffed and therefore basically inactive. 114 The German ambassador in Brazil, the FDP's Fritz Oellers, complained to party colleagues in November 1951 that he had to wonder when he saw from the latest organization plan that there was only one desk in Division III for all of North and South America. 115 The missions themselves were not totally blameless, however. At the Foreign Office's consular conference in Bonn in November 1951, Hallstein apparently took the mission chiefs in London (Hans Schlange-Schoningen), Paris (Wilhelm Hausenstein), and New York (Heinz Krekeler) to task for not providing timely information about important political events in their respective countries. 116 One part of the solution involved regular conferences between missions in a given geographic region. Krekeler instituted these in the United States as early as 1951, and by 1954 conferences had been held for the Latin American as well as the South and South-East Asian mission chiefs. 117 During the next three years the Auswartiges Amt also went to great lengths to improve the flow of information to the missions. 118 As suggested in Maltzan's report, in 1953 Division II set up a Deutschland-Referat [Germany Desk] to inform the missions about developments in Germany. How useful these efforts were remained a matter of opinion. For example, in the spring of 1954 the press division of the diplomatic mission in London reported that most of the information it received from the central office was either available in the local newspapers or arrived too late. The Federal Press and Information Office also sent great quantities of material, but much of it was in German and therefore oflittle use for public relations. 119 By the mid- l 950s the West German missions also had left many of their growing pains behind them. Not surprisingly, the mission net's development closely reflected the priorities of Adenauer's foreign policy, with a priority on Western Europe and the Americas and little emphasis on Eastern Europe. If many missions felt they were not well integrated into the Federal Republic's foreign policy thereafter, this had more to do with the peculiarities of the Foreign Office's decision-making style than any technical deficits of the missions themselves.

138 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE

Relations with Other Ministries Maltzan's report argued that the principle of the "Primacy of Foreign Policy" in government decision making was becoming increasingly important. So too, therefore, was the Foreign Office's main task, which was to coordinate the views of the various government ministries and create a coherent foreign policy. However, this task was rendered very difficult by the fact that the Auswiirtiges Amt was the last federal ministry to be created, "as the inheritance, so to speak, was already disposed of." It found itself in a situation where it needed to reclaim its traditional competencies in international relations that had been taken over by other ministries. Doing so would require more personnel and technical support. Maltzan wrote that inter-ministerial meetings on international questions frequently took place without Foreign Office representatives, who were too overworked to go. 120 One of the first major tasks facing the Federal Government during its first legislative period (1949-53) involved determining and delimiting the areas of competency of the ministries. 121 After lengthy discussions, the Federal Government published the Federal Ministries Standing Orders [Gemeinsame Geschaftsordnung der Bundesregierung] on May 11, 1951. 122 Paragraph 11 of the Standing Orders, which were based on regulations from the Weimar Republic, granted the Foreign Office its traditional preeminence in foreign policy: "Members and representatives of foreign governments as well as representatives of international organizations should be received only after previous agreement with the Auswiirtiges Amt. Negotiations with foreign states or in foreign states may be conducted only with the Auswiirtiges Amt's permission, and at its request only with its participation." 123 However, asserting this right in practice would prove difficult. Moreover, the increased importance of new issues with an international component, especially European integration, made it all but impossible to prevent the "technical" ministries from playing an evergreater role in the Federal Republic's diplomacy. For the Auswiirtiges Amt, ensuring the right to be informed about and to coordinate policy in international forums demanded several strategies. Over and above the Standing Orders, the Foreign Office tried repeatedly to issue guidelines to the other ministries as well as state and local offices on contacts with foreign states and their representatives in West Germany. 124 The ministries finally came to an informal agreement in May 1955 that all contacts with German missions, German nationals living abroad, and foreign governments had to proceed through the Foreign Office, certain purely consular matters ex-

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cepted. Even so, the Auswartiges Amt had to agree to no fewer than 11 special arrangements with various federal ministries and other organizations. 125 The Foreign Office also attempted to subordinate the standing delegations sent out by other ministries to its own missions. By February 1955 it had absorbed the Washington mission to the Foreign Operations Administration of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation (formerly the European Recovery Program Ministry). 126 On July 23, 1953, Hallstein appointed the West German consul general in Geneva, Gerhart Feine, the permanent delegate to the UN organizations to which the Federal Republic belonged and the permanent observer at those to which it did not. 127 One reason was certainly to keep close watch over the activities of other West German ministries that had business with international organizations in Geneva. The Foreign Office also successfully defended its right to lead the West German delegations at international negotiations such as those on the European Defense Community and the European Agrarian Community. Members of other ministries might head these delegations (e.g., at the EDC, Theodor Blank of the Dienststelle Blank, the predecessor of the Defense Ministry, which was only established in 1955). However, they stood directly under the orders of the chancellor and the Foreign Office, which also could determine the delegation's personnel. 128 The Auswartiges Amt also was in charge of the new West German NATO Embassy in Paris in 1955, despite the Finance Ministry's determined attempt that summer to call this ruling into question and also to have its own experts report directly to it and not through the Foreign Office (in March 1953 Adenauer had given Finance Minister Schaffer the right to participate in all foreign policy matters that would have financial consequences for the government). 129 Delegations to international negotiations on topics that interested multiple ministries produced additional headaches for the Auswartiges Amt. At the meeting of the Foreign Office's directors on July 4 and then again on July 15, 1953, Hallstein proposed that Adenauer send a letter to all government ministries on the question of West German conference delegations_l3° Reports from Divisions II, IV, and V confirmed that they often had too many members. Representatives from other ministries frequently came unprepared for negotiations or had not coordinated their positions with the rest of the delegation, and they often displayed a lack of negotiating experience and an inability to see issues in a political context. Members of the Auswartiges Amt repeatedly found themselves outranked in civil service terms within their own delegation. Finally, in some cases the other ministries tried to go around the Foreign Office and deal directly with the West German missions. 131

140 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Adenauer sent a letter out on November 11 reminding the ministries to keep delegations small. The Foreign Office would lead all negotiations unless it expressly surrendered this right, and it would not allow superfluous representatives to participate. The letter also stressed that according to the Federal Ministries Standing Orders, negotiations with foreign countries at any level required the Auswartiges Amt's advance permission. An inter-ministerial meeting to work out a common government position was also desirable before entering talks. Moreover, all ministers were to seek approval for official foreign trips from Adenauer first and to inform the Foreign Office in advance so that its missions could make the necessary preparations. 132 The letter confirmed the Auswartiges Amt's right to be the main conduit for West German contacts with the outside world but left open the possibility for special arrangements with other ministries in their areas of expertise. One precedent came in February 1953, when the Foreign Office concluded an agreement with the Labor Ministry that allowed the latter to lead negotiations on international labor law. 133 The Foreign Office was perfectly willing to allow ministries like the Labor Ministry to conduct negotiations on technical issues that had only a limited political content. On the other hand, its attempts to recover or assume the chief responsibility [Federfiihrung] for areas that did possess political importance proved more difficult. The year the ministry started to come out of its initial organizational difficulties-1953-also marked the start of a concerted effort to win back competencies in many areas. Several conflicts, including those with the Interior Ministry, with the Ministry for All-German Affairs, and with the Economics Ministry, were of a protracted nature. Starting in 1949 the Interior Ministry had taken responsibility for various types of international cultural exchange and for the provision of legal counsel to German citizens in foreign custody. On November 20, 1953, Hallstein wrote the new interior minister, Gerhard Schroder (CDU), in an attempt to reach a new division of labor on cultural questions in which the Auswartiges Amt took responsibility "for all those tasks in which the care of the Federal Republic's relations with foreign states plays the main role." The Foreign Office wanted responsibility for all German scholarly institutes abroad, especially the Archaeological Institutes in Rome, Athens, Madrid, and Istanbul, the Historical Institute in Rome, and the Institute for Art History in Florence. It also wanted the right to supervise all international scholarly conferences, foreign scholars traveling to West Germany, student exchange programs, and German participation in the European Organization for Atomic Physics. Schroder asked for time to study the matter. 134 Four years later, the Organization Desk (Referat

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110) in Division I reported that the division of competencies between the two ministries remained unsettled, with the German cultural institutes and educational exchanges as the main points of controversy. 135 The Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs [Bundesministeriumfiir Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, or BMGF], led by Adenauer's rival Jakob Kaiser (CDU) from 1949 to 1957, was responsible for gathering information on East Germany (which was not considered a foreign country), planning for reunification (including the Saar and other Western territories), and producing materials for public information and propaganda in both Western and Eastern Germany. 136 The Foreign Office did not always think that the BMGF's activities were compatible with sensible diplomacy. Blankenhorn's attitude is reflected in his diary entry about preparations for a June 1952 declaration by Adenauer on Berlin: "A draft from Jakob Kaiser flies in the wastepaper basket-as usual." 137 In March 1953 the Foreign Office suggested creating a "Working Committee on German Reunification [Arbeitsausschu/3 Wiedervereinigung Deutsch/ands]" to coordinate its work with the BMGF and other concerned ministries. This body met six times during the summer of 1953. Blankenhorn believed that the committee made it possible for the West German government to considerably influence the Western Powers' German policy, especially at the Berlin Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference in February 1954. Upon the Foreign Office's suggestion, the committee was revived on a permanent basis in July 1954. 138 Until he was transferred from Bonn in 1955, Oskar Kossmann also organized informal meetings of members of various government agencies, Bundestag delegates, and representatives of refugee groups of Germans expelled from the "Eastern territories," which met every few weeks to discuss Eastern European affairs. Kossmann believed these meetings helped create a collegial atmosphere that allowed for conflict-free inter-ministerial cooperation.139 This assertion is rather generous. The Foreign Office's Eastern experts most likely took the position expressed in Gustav Hilger's handwritten notes on a conversation with his boss Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick on December 17, 1954: "Reunification and planning should be worked on here .... We should make foreign policy suggestions. We have the desired [angestrebte] competence." 140 The Foreign Office was successful in suppressing the BMGF's activities concerning the Saar. Both in November 1952 and in January 1953 Adenauer warned Kaiser that his ministry should not undertake any independent initiatives.141 In November 1953, Adenauer used the pretext of his upcoming talks on the Saar with French foreign minister Georges Bidault to insist upon an end to the BMGF's competency not only for the Saar but also for all

142 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE questions relating to remaining border disputes with Belgium and the Netherlands.142 Nonetheless, the BMGF retained primary responsibility for the reunification question. The most serious inter-ministerial disputes involved the Economics Ministry on the issues of European integration and foreign trade. In part because he wanted to keep the final decision in his own hands, and also because coalition politics required him to provide a cabinet post for the FDP's Franz Blucher as head of the European Recovery Program Ministry (renamed the Ministry for Economic Cooperation in 1952), Adenauer remained reluctant to regulate competencies regarding foreign economics. As a result, other ministries regularly attempted to expand their influence in this area. Especially concerning European integration it was sometimes difficult to say which issues concerned foreign policy and which concerned domestic affairs, which meant the Foreign Office faced constant challenges. Of crucial importance was the fact that the Economics Ministry and the Auswiirtiges Amt had very different perspectives on integration. Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard's goal was to create a liberal world economic order, and he remained very skeptical about plans for sectoral integration, which he believed inhibited the free movement of goods. Instead, he preferred a system of functional integration-based, for example, on multilateral trade treaties like the OEEC and GATT-that possessed only those institutions absolutely necessary to keep it working. On the other hand, Hallstein, Carl Friedrich Ophi.ils, and other Foreign Office officials responsible for Europe were firm believers in constitutional integration. Extending structural integration as embodied in the Schuman Plan to as many branches of European industry as possible was the first step on the way to a federal European state. 143 By 1955 the ministries came to an uneasy compromise on competency for trade and European policy. With the full establishment of Division IV in January 1953, the Foreign Office received the competency for coordinating trade policy. An informal agreement reached in 1954 further clarified that the Economics Ministry was responsible for direct ties to German companies and industrial organizations, while the Foreign Office was in charge of the economics sections of West German missions. The Economics Ministry had the right to make personnel suggestions for trade attaches and the right to conduct direct correspondence with them. The head of the Foreign Office's Division IV became chair of the inter-ministerial Commercial Policy Committee [Handelspolitischer Ausschufi] with the head of the Economics Ministry's Division Vas his deputy. On the other hand, after the Bundestag ratified

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the Schuman Plan Treaty on January 11, 1952, Erhard convinced Adenauer to grant the Economics Ministry responsibility for relations with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It would coordinate policy with ECSC institutions, as well as being responsible for the preparation of all legislative, administrative, and economic measures related to the community. The Foreign Office retained responsibility only for questions that were clearly of a foreign policy nature, as well as organizational affairs related to the Assembly and Court of Justice. Neither ministry was particularly pleased about these arrangements and harbored aspirations of taking over full control of both trade and European policy. 144 After the Paris Treaties came into effect on May 5, 1955, granting the Federal Republic full freedom of movement in foreign policy (except in questions affecting Four Power rights on Germany), a series of public disputes featuring Erhard and new Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano broke out between these ministries on the best way to forward European unification and, during the summer of 1955, over whether trade was part of economic or foreign policy. Only in 1958, after the creation of the European Economic and Atomic Communities, the 1957 Bundestag elections, and Hallstein 's departure to Brussels as European Economic Community president, was the main competency for coordinating EEC affairs given to the Economics Ministry, although, as Bernhard Loffler points out, both the Auswartiges Amt and Adenauer would continue to play the decisive role in determining the content of European policy. 145 The Foreign Office responded to these competency conflicts as most other foreign ministries did. It accepted the principle of an inter-ministerial division of labor but insisted on its sole responsibility for the overall foreign policy, especially when concerning foreign policy in the narrower sense. The Auswartiges Amt created or expanded its own units for all relevant policy areas to keep abreast of what other ministries were doing. It also insisted upon the right to be informed about and help plan all activities abroad that clearly fell outside its own area of competence (normally not a problem, since other ministries' activities outside of the Federal Republic generally depended on West Germany's foreign missions). The days of the Auswartiges Amt's monopoly over foreign policy were long gone by 1949, although there may have been a silver lining. As Hans-Peter Schwarz wrote, "It is unmistakable that foreign policy tasks have grown enormously as a whole with a corresponding increase in weight of the A[ uswartiges] A[ mt]'s views for the entire political decisionmaking process." 146

144 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE The Auswartiges Amt's "childhood illnesses" were not limited to organizational problems and to inter-ministerial conflicts. In July 1952 Maltzan 's report noted that "currently in the divisions, willingness to work and initiative suffer from an element of great uncertainty resulting from an inadequately fixed internal hierarchy [irifolge magelnder innerer Verankerung in der Hierarchie] and a feeling of defenselessness against frequent public attacks of a personal and professional nature." While many observers thought that inadequate leadership structures lay at the heart of the Foreign Office's difficulties, its personnel policy proved to be its most public and its most persistent problem.

Personnel Policy,

1949-55

THE MOST DRAMATIC PROBLEM faced by the new Auswartiges Amt arose in September 1951, when the West German daily Franifurter Rundschau ran a five-part series by a young Wehrmacht veteran named Michael Heinze-Mansfeld on the ministry's personnel policy. The series took its title, "/hr naht Euch wieder [Here You Come Again]," from the first two lines of the dedication to Goethe's Faust, Part One, and of course referred to the Wilhelmstraf3e veterans who had reentered the Foreign Office. 1 The resulting controversy led the Bundestag to establish an investigative committee, Untersuchungsausschuf3 Nr. 47 [UA-47], which represented the culmination of the suspicions that had been building about Wilhelmstraf3e veterans since the war. The investigations put the Foreign Office into a state of unrest for many months. In the end UA-47's report, issued on June 18, 1952, did not lead to serious censure, despite a lively debate in the Bundestag on October 22, 1952. 2 As the SPD's Gerhard Ltitkens put it to Wilhelm Haas, "all calm-thinking people will have understood the debate as a failure for the investigation committee's report." 3 An important reason was the Bundestag seemed most concerned with outward appearances. UA-47's chairman, Max Becker (FDP), said that "the Auswartiges Amt in all of its parts must and should be the Federal Republic of Germany's calling card vis-a-vis the outside world, and there should not be the smallest stain or speck [kein Fleckchen und kein Stiiubchen] on this calling card." The committee considered the charges against the diplomats only from

146 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE the perspective of whether officials had been involved in any "past entanglement that makes it seem intolerable to let them appear in public as a foreign policy representative."4 The committee had nothing against letting the suspect diplomats work in some other branch of the federal government, and it made no effort to systematically study the Auswartiges Amt's personnel policy. The Foreign Office personnel did not compare unfavorably with those of other West German ministries, especially in the key category of their past formal relationship with National Socialism. However, due to the ministry's emphasis on professional standards, a disproportionately large number of WilhelmstraBe veterans assumed high-ranking positions, much as if their careers had not been interrupted by Nazism, war, and defeat. To further ensure standards, the Foreign Office also moved quickly to ensure it could meet its personnel needs internally instead of relying indefinitely on outsiders. The emphasis on professional qualifications and training represented the ministry's most important direct continuity with the WilhelmstraBe but also its most serious blind spot.

Personnel Policy under Wilhelm Haas Along with his deputy, Werner Schwarz, and the official in charge of selecting the High Service, Wilhelm Melchers, Wilhelm Haas directed the Foreign Office's personnel policy in the Organization Office and then in Division I from late 1949 until mid-1951. While it would be useful to revive some traditions from the Weimar era, Haas thought, the new Auswartiges Amt had to reflect modem conditions in Germany. However, in order to function on the same level as the highly developed diplomatic services of other states, it also needed experienced staff. 5 Haas was an appropriate choice to lead the Organization Office due to his being forced out of the Foreign Office in 193 7, his good relations with the SPD, and the work he had done overseeing the DBFF and for the West German minister presidents' Organization Committee. He, Schwarz, and RudolfHolzhausen, in charge of the selection of economic attaches, all had to leave the ministry in the 1930s due to their Jewish wives. At first glance, these three men promised to provide a strong guarantee against a wholesale return either of veteran diplomats or of former National Socialists. 6 Haas was particularly well acquainted with his fellow Bremen native Melchers and had no doubt that his friend had been a "genuine democrat" during the Weimar Republic and there-

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after, despite the fact that Melchers had remained in the diplomatic service until 1945. 7 Melchers, unlike the other leading officials in the Organization Office, knew firsthand what had gone on in the ministry during the Third Reich and had contacts with the diplomatic resistance. Yet despite their intention not to preside over a "restoration,"8 Haas and his colleagues contributed to one, due to both the urgent need for experienced personnel and their own blindness toward or tolerance of the activities of former colleagues. Their initial plans to recruit personnel reflected their good intentions but also inherent dangers. The most important criteria for employment were technical qualifications, including suitable fluency in English and French. In addition, all candidates had to possess "political dependability in the sense of the democratic ideal [demokratischer Staatsgedanke]," share a feeling of social responsibility, and be of sound character. These criteria applied even to candidates who had been victims or opponents of the Nazi regime. Former diplomats had no legal claim to reemployment, although they might have a "moral claim" if they fulfilled all other requirements. In determining the political reliability of applicants, Haas and his colleagues believed that membership in the NSDAP was only one factor to be considered. They recognized that many civil servants had tried to join the party but had been rejected, in many cases "for reasons that by no means speak in their favor." Preferential treatment would be extended to three groups of outsiders: first to persecutees, then to those whose careers suffered setbacks for political reasons, and finally to other non-Party members without extenuating circumstances. Ranked third along with this last group were Party members who had been active opponents ofNazism. 9 The new foreign service, Haas made clear, should not take any Higher Service official appointed after Ribbentrop became foreign minister in 1938. 10 At their meeting on December 19, 1949, Adenauer and Haas concurred on the criteria for selecting personnel for the new consulates and, by implication, for the entire foreign service. Adenauer fully agreed with the need for high professional standards, but he also stressed discretion because, in his opinion, many diplomats had been denazified too lightly. Haas later told UA-47 that Adenauer had agreed to three criteria for sending personnel abroad: "A) Members of the Auswiirtiges Amt, so far as necessary and justifiable ... B) From other careers. C) No former PGs [Parteigenossen, or NSDAP members] as higher civil servants abroad (additional personnel according to local requirements)."11 The Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee discussed these plans with Adenauer and Haas on February 22, 1950, and Haas stated that no former

148 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE NSDAP members would be sent abroad "for the coming time" with the exception of a few special cases. 12 Herbert Blankenhom's role in bringing together the working groups' initial personnel has already been noted. Although never officially Haas's superior, he was also the main conduit for presenting Haas's suggestions to Adenauer. 13 While it had served as the collection point for all new applications to the foreign service from the start, only on April 12, 1950, did the Organization Office inform the other working groups that it would assume responsibility for all personnel matters. 14 Blankenhom set a deadline of June 12 for the other units to deliver their personnel files to Haas. 15 Haas faced major difficulties in finding sufficient Higher Service personnel. He believed initially that of the roughly 600 Higher Service officials in the WilhelmstraBe in 1933, far fewer than 100 (he told French Deputy High Commissioner Berard only 60 to 80) could be reemployed. The others were either too old or too compromised to return. That meant that over 500 officials needed to be found for the new Higher Service. 16 By November 1950 the DfAA had doubled its previous estimate, stating that 67 WilhelmstraBe veterans had already been reemployed in the DfAA, and some 140 more came into question "according to the documentation at hand" to fill the 440 Higher Service positions currently planned. This still left a need for around 300 civil servants and employees. 17 Avoiding attacks on West Germany's new consular representatives was a priority. In December 1949 Holzhausen wrote that this was the prerequisite for efficient work by the new missions in their host countries. Potentially troublesome groups included left-wing parties, the German colony, "and the resident Jewry, which plays a great role everywhere in economic life abroad [!]." Former Nazis, he believed, should not be sent abroad at first, adding, without any trace of irony, that "failings" that were excusable in German eyes might not be so abroad. This general principle might be broken under certain circumstances in a few countries (he named Turkey, Spain, and perhaps France). Moreover, personnel from the lower service ranks could be excepted as long as they had not served previously in the host country while an NSDAP member. No one should be sent abroad who had occupied a prominent position during the Third Reich. Nonetheless, the lack of suitable, uncompromised candidates, Holzhausen predicted, would make it difficult to enforce these principles. 18 In keeping with these criteria, the Organization Office initially intended not to send any former members of the NSDAP abroad, as Haas told repre-

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sentatives from HICOM in January 1950. 19 However, the DfAA found it increasingly difficult to hold to this principle and maintain its own standards of professionalism. By April 1950, the West German press already reported that it would be impossible to comply with the strict "Allied" standards for personnel policy if a consular net were set up. 20 After the establishment of the consulates general in London, Paris, and Washington, Haas approached the US High Commission to ask if the time had come to include politically reliable former Nazis on the personnel lists for future consulates. In September, the Americans agreed that each case should be judged "on its own merits."21

The Politics of Personnel Policy, 1949-51 Adenauer, the West German political parties, and HICOM monitored the Organization Office's activities intensely from the very start. Their concerns ranged from a possible "restoration" of the old Foreign Office to the employment of too many compromised individuals to a continued confessional imbalance in favor of Protestants over Catholics. Adenauer and the CDU/CSU in particular worried that Haas's own policies did not take their political needs into account. By the start of 1951, Haas's days as head of Division I were clearly numbered. On November 20, 1949, Hans Globke, head of the Federal Chancellery, informed HI COM that Adenauer had given him the right to approve all personnel appointments, including in the various foreign policy offices. Globke, after 1953 a state secretary, was a valued confidant of Adenauer's due to the administrative skill and experience he obtained while an official in the Prussian and later Reich Interior Ministry between 1929 and 1945. However, his work on National Socialist legislation, especially a 1935 commentary he coauthored on the Nuremberg Laws, made him a controversial figure in the Federal Republic. 22 Troubling from the perspective of the Organization Office, on the other hand, was that he might interfere in its work, and also that he maintained contact with an old colleague from the Prussian Interior Ministry, Robert Kempner, the US prosecutor from the Nuremberg Ministries Trial. The two men corresponded in the winter of 1949-50 about the new foreign service and the difficulty in finding appropriate candidates. Kempner later wrote that Globke viewed the old diplomat corps with suspicion. 23 By December 3, however, the Liaison Office had convinced Globke simply to receive notice of all appointments concerning foreign policy staff. 24

I so ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE In the spring of 1950 Adenauer once again instructed Globke to oversee all personnel appointments to the foreign service in order to prevent a "restoration" of the old Wilhelmstra/3e. 25 In all probability this was in response to an article published on February 27, 1950, in the Neue Zeitung, an American paper, about the large number of former NSDAP members responsible for foreign policy in the Chancellery. In response, both the French and the US High Commissions had investigated and concluded that the influence of so many "Nazis" on West German foreign policy was troubling, as was the potential for further press attacks. The Chancellery seemed unconcerned and met the Americans with the argument that there were not enough experienced personnel who had not belonged to the party. 26 However, the CDU/ CSU Bundestag delegation also had become alarmed. On March 1, at Adenauer's request, it named three of its members, Hermann Piinder, Hugo Scharnberg, and Rudolf Vogel, to a committee to investigate the matter. 27 Globke's second assignment once again lasted only a number of weeks, but it upset Haas. 28 He feared that Globke would try to have him assigned abroad because they had disagreed in the past. He also told members of the US High Commission in April that he had a bad conscience about working with Globke due to the latter's commentary on the Nuremberg Laws. 29 On March 23, 1950, Haas nonetheless submitted five lists of personnel consisting of 708 suitable candidates for the Higher Service, including 179 former diplomats. Globke sent the lists to Piinder for comment. 30 Piinder believed that there was a relatively high percentage of former NSDAP members on the lists and advised caution. He suggested several additional candidates for the Higher Service, who were eventually appointed. Piinder also warned Globke that another group had given him a list of the personnel in the Foreign Policy Working Groups in the Chancellery that had disturbed him. "It seems fully intolerable to me that former members of the NSDAP-regardless of how uncompromised they were-reappear in such an overwhelming majority [mit einem solch ungeheuerlichen Ubergewicht] in, of all places, the central office of the future foreign service." By his count there were 22 civil servants employed in the Liaison Office, the Organization Office, the DBFF, and Maltzan's Foreign Trade Division in the Federal Economics Ministry. No fewer than 16 of them had been Nazi Party members and as many as 18 had belonged to conservative student fraternities, known for their extreme nationalism. "[I] have no doubt," Piinder wrote, "that these or similar lists also find themselves in other hands that are not as unbiased [die nicht ebenso rein sachlich eingestellt sind]." 31

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Ptinder's prophecy was soon fulfilled. The Neue Zeitung reported on April 19 that members of the CDU Bundestag delegation had approached Adenauer to complain about the "massing" of former Nazis in the government offices responsible for foreign affairs, which would make a very bad impression on outside observers. The parliamentarians cited exactly the same figures that Ptinder had. 32 The Chancellery moved quickly to control the damage. On April 20, Haas held a widely publicized press conference in which he explained the Organization Office's personnel policy. 33 The next day Adenauer told his cabinet that he had first heard of these problems from the Neue Zeitung and denied that he had set up a committee to investigate the matter. 34 On April 24 he promised to talk with the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation about the Organization Office's policies, although he first wanted to know who had spoken to the press. 35 Finally, on April 25, the Chancellery presented its own figures on the personnel in the Foreign Policy Working Groups. Of the 31 officials serving "in leadership positions" and as "desk officers," 14 had belonged to the NSDAP, and all but one of these had been denazified in group V---exonerated. Only five still belonged to the "alumni associations [Altherrenverbiinde ]" of conservative student fraternities. Like Haas's press conference, the press release insisted that a certain percentage of experienced diplomats was necessary in order to reestablish Germany's foreign relations. 36 Although the High Commission was alarmed by developments in the West German foreign service, it did not make a concerted effort to correct any negative tendencies in Haas's personnel policy. It is true that HICOM had to approve all personnel sent abroad up to the time of the Small Revision in March 1951, but it did not insist upon a right of approval for appointments to the central office. Moreover, British and French indifference prevented the implementation of two formal High Commission agreements in 1949-50 to screen German diplomatic officials. In keeping with its desire to rehabilitate Germany internationally as quickly as possible, the British High Commission thought from the very start that West German diplomatic personnel should be treated on an equal basis with diplomats from other countries. It saw little sense in a formal screening procedure because the initial German personnel sent overseas were going to be very "clean" anyway, and the British Commission foresaw abandoning the High Commission's veto right as soon as the Occupation Statute was revised (as actually happened in March 1951 ). The French government considered the question of German consular appointments mainly from the perspective of domestic public opinion. It would not receive any diplomats who had served in France during the German occupation. However, rather

152 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE than openly veto German personnel submitted to HI COM, the French Foreign Ministry had its consulates issue a "devious veto" by denying visas to all German officials who had served in France. On August 27, 1950, the US High Commission received orders from the State Department to act unilaterally in providing security clearances since Anglo-French indifference had caused the formal AHC arrangements to break down. It was instructed to follow a liberal line as long as the Organization Office was making an honest effort to "avoid politically unfortunate selections" and the West German candidates had done nothing to conceal their past. In cooperation with the DfAA, US officials scrutinized approximately 2,600 names from September 1, 1950, to March 7, 1951. The Americans made use of records from US Army intelligence, the Berlin Document Center, the US High Commission's Office of Political Affairs, and the Combined Travel Board, along with former Reich Foreign Office personnel files held by the High Commission. It quickly became evident that many applicants had lied about their past relationship to National Socialism. The US High Commission believed that candidates had the DfAA at a great disadvantage because the Allies still held all official German records from before 1945. They did not return the personnel files from the old Foreign Office until March 1951 (a settlement on other diplomatic and military records only came in 1958). 37 After the West German government gained the right to select its own diplomatic personnel under the Small Revision of the Occupation Statute in March 1951, the US High Commission would continue to assist the Foreign Office with material from the Berlin Document Center when requested. But it "progressively reduced" its role in advising on personnel matters. US HICOG's Political Affairs Division later claimed that it had refrained from criticizing a number of ill-advised appointments made by the Auswartiges Amt and that the attacks of 1951-52 had confirmed the wisdom of disassociating itself from West German personnel selections. It also noted that a number of objectionable appointments to lead missions involved politicians, and the High Commission did not want to become involved in West German domestic politics. 38 With the exception of skeptics like Armand Berard and Charles Thayer, the Allied High Commission as a whole worried about the Foreign Office's personnel policy only at times when it became a public embarrassment for the Adenauer government. 39 In short, after the Small Revision of the Occupation Statute the Three Powers treated the diplomatic personnel of its West German ally like that of any other country. The Auswartiges Amt clearly recognized that it could now run

Personnel Policy, 1949-55

I 53

its own personnel policy without the High Commission's interference. Herbert Dittmann, who had succeeded Haas as head of Division I, told UA-47 on February 21, 1952, that "the foreign viewpoint no longer plays a great role today. In the beginning it was decisive. But today the viewpoint from abroad no longer plays a great role [Aber vom Ausland gesehen spielt es heute ... keine grojJe Rolle mehr]-perhaps with the exception of a few influential posts in America."40 The Bundestag also conducted an investigation into the DfAA's personnel in 1950. In July the Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution to set up a foreign service subcommittee, which had its first meeting on September 27. 41 It consisted of Gebhard Seelos (BP, chairman), Gunther Henle (CDU), Gerhard Ltitkens (SPD), Karl Georg Pfleiderer (FOP), and Carl von Campe (DP), all former diplomats themselves. Probably in order to defend itself against charges that it was too well-disposed to the new foreign service, the subcommittee also invited non-diplomats Ptinder (CDU), Max Wanner (SPD), Hans Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenberg (FOP), Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (DP), and Bernhard Reismann (Z) of the Foreign Affairs Committee to become regular members. 42 By its own definition, the subcommittee was not an investigative committee, like UA-47 a year later, but merely wanted to obtain an overall picture of the DfAA's personnel policy. 43 Nonetheless, it discussed in detail with representatives of Division I the cases of 100 of the 217 Higher Service officials employed as of October 1950. The subcommittee's report on October 26, 1950, endorsed the DfAA's insistence on "professional qualifications" but advised that the full Foreign Affairs Committee had to decide whether using 25 or 30 percent former Wilhelmstra/3e members in establishing the new foreign service was problematic. The subcommittee suggested that "a neutral section" of the Justice Ministry should be commissioned to examine materials from the Nuremberg trial against Weizsacker pertaining to individuals now employed in the DfAA. It also thought that something should be done to correct the imbalance between Protestants and Catholics. While 47 percent of the West German population was Catholic, they held only 137 posts of a total of 767 (18%) of all ranks. The subcommittee recommended preferential treatment for Catholic applicants with comparable credentials. 44 All told, the subcommittee believed that Division I had done a respectable job given the circumstances. Its own tough questioning of Haas and his coworkers about individual cases also demonstrated that, despite being comprised of so many former diplomats itself, it had conducted a wide-sweeping and critical investigation. 45 The failure of the full Foreign Affairs Committee

154 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE to follow up vigorously on the subcommittee's recommendations suggests that it too was pleased with Division I's cooperation and satisfied with its answers. The Foreign Affairs Committee's response to the subsequent accusations of one of its members, Reismann, that the DfAA was pursuing an "anti-Catholic" personnel policy demonstrates its goodwill toward Haas's work. Since the spring of 1950, Reismann, from the Catholic Center Party, had been critical of the small number of Catholics employed in the Working Groups. He also was the member of the subcommittee Auswiirtiger Dienst least satisfied with Division I's explanations about the career tracks and "persecuted status" of various Wilhelmstral3e veterans. 46 In January 1951, his article "The Foreign Service in Bonn-Closed Society" repeated his contentions about an antiCatholic policy and received great attention in Catholic political circles. 47 The full Foreign Affairs Committee, however, believed that the article was unfair and did not contain anything new of substance, despite Reismann's use of American sources from the Nuremberg trials. 48 On January 25, the committee issued a communique that dismissed his charges. 49 During the summer of 1951 the committee also agreed not to discuss "Inside Germany Informations, New York," a pamphlet distributed on a large scale to public figures in the Federal Republic that raised charges against a number of diplomats. Supposedly from New York, its imperfect English title and Frankfurt postmark strongly hinted at a German author. 50 It was one of several anonymous mailings that summer which attacked veteran diplomats. 51 By this time both Adenauer and the CDU/CSU had turned against Haas. Adenauer blamed Haas alone for the DfAA's "questionable" personnel policy, and already on May 5, 1950, the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation's steering committee not only noted this but added that "the leader of the Personnel Division should be staffed by a man of our trust. " 52 The wearisome process of selecting the first German mission chiefs for London, New York, and Paris had produced the first significant disagreements. On January 31, 1950, Haas complained to the US HICOG political liaison in Bonn that considerable competition existed among politicians vying for the New York, London, and Paris posts. For consul general in London, Haas favored Kurt Sieveking, head of the Hamburg State Chancellery and his colleague on the minister presidents' Organization Committee from the previous summer. However, Adenauer reserved for himself the final decisions and did not want to send any former diplomats to these cities. 53 Adenauer's choices did not meet Haas's expectations. The chancellor selected CDU politician Hans Schlange-Schoningen for the United States.

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.t,.uoh be1 -

DtNen>.l'IU, 91.r wollen JIU' U• S.Uel -

6. This illustration from a 1951 anonymous pamphlet clearly expresses fears about a "restoration" of WilhelmstraJ3e veterans in government and university circles after 1945. Depicted are (Karl) Walther Becker (Foreign Trade Division of the Economics Ministry), Gustav Sonnenhol (European Recovery Program Ministry), Hasso von Etzdorf (Auswartiges Amt), and Erich Kordt (University of Diisseldorf and a guest lecturer at the Federal Republic's school for diplomats in Speyer). The caption reads, "From Hitler to Adenauer: For clever diplomats, one thousand years are like one day of dress reform!", a play on both Hitler's plans for a "thousand-year Reich" and the military-style uniforms of the SS and SA. The sub-caption reads, "We remain-yours truly- the old ones, even under the new old one [Adenauer]/we only want the positions, without morals or inhibitions!" The pamphlet incorrectly identifies Becker as a member of the SS and SD (PA AA, NL Haas, vol. I).

I S6 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Schlange-Schoningen had come to prominence in 1931 as minister for Osthilfe [relief of agriculture in Eastern Germany] and minister without portfolio in Heinrich Briining's second cabinet, and then after the war as director of the Frankfurt Administration for Food, Agriculture, and Forests. The State Department pointed out that he had at least stayed well clear of the NSDAP at all times. However, it was sympathetic to Haas's judgment that, in its words, "overweening ambition may be [Schlange-Schoningen's] principal characteristic."54 Schlange-Schoningen created difficulties for Haas by presenting his own suggestions for his consulate staff. More importantly, and perhaps initially with Adenauer's blessing, he also was a steadfast proponent of opening the German consulate general in the US capital, Washington, DC. Since the first German missions were not supposed to play a role in diplomacy, both Haas and the Americans thought New York the appropriate choice, since it was the main commercial center. 55 Schlange-Schoningen's preferences became moot, however, after some of the American press seized upon critical comments he had made about the United States and "Amerikanismus" in the 1930s. 56 His luck changed for the better after Adenauer's failed efforts to name first Fritz Oellers, the head of the FOP in Schleswig-Holstein, and then Wilhelm Vocke, president of the directorate of the Bank deutscher Lander, as consul general in London. Schlange-Schoningen became the Federal Republic's first mission chief in the United Kingdom on June 16. 57 Adenauer chose Schlange-Schoningen based on domestic political considerations. A spoils system for diplomatic posts was something relatively new in the German context and thus suspect to many observers. As early as March 1950, the US High Commission reported that "several reliable sources," including Haas, Herwarth, and Carlo Schmid, thought that the chancellor was using consular appointments "either to find jobs for inconvenient members of his own party or to remove from the German political stage persons of other parties who might embarrass him." 58 Throughout the late 1940s SchlangeSchoningen had favored a nonpartisan economic and social policy, contrary to Adenauer's wishes. During coalition negotiations in 1949, he not only supported a "Grand Coalition" with the SPD but also had the audacity to run against Adenauer's favored candidate for Federal President, the FDP's Theodor Heuss. By sending Schlange-Schoningen to London, Adenauer rid himself of a potential rival. He would repeat this practice on several occasions, most notably in the cases of two other party colleagues, Friedrich Holzapfel and Leo Wohleb. Holzapfel, who had a sufficient following within the CDU to be considered a candidate for chancellor in 1949, went to Berne in 1952.

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Wohleb was a die-hard opponent of the creation of a "South-West State" that would subsume his native Baden irrevocably within a larger political unit. After a 1951 plebiscite decided in favor of the new Land Baden-Wiirttemberg, the Auswartiges Amt would watch with some irritation as Wohleb continued the struggle for Baden from his post in Lisbon in 1952-53. 59 As Amulf Baring has pointed out, Adenauer made political appointments not only to neutralize potential opponents but also to reward members of his coalition and friends from his own party. 60 His new selection for New York came from the ranks of the FDP. Heinz Krekeler, a chemist who had worked for I. G. Farben in the 1930s and 1940s, was a relative unknown serving in North Rhine-Westphalia's state parliament. His qualifications for the job included his never having been a NSDAP member, his prewar travels in England and the United States, and his good English. 61 His appointment came at the urging of his own party. Federal Justice Minister Thomas Dehler (FDP) informed Krekeler on March 14 that his name had been seriously considered for London at the cabinet meeting on the same day. 62 Both Vice-Chancellor Franz Blucher and Friedrich Middelhauve, leader of the powerful FDP organization in North Rhine-Westphalia, firmly supported his candidacy. On May 5, Adenauer made a trip to Diisseldorfto meet with Krekeler and posed the vital questions: "Can you speak English, and how do you stand with the Jews?" Krekeler could answer positively on both counts, since he claimed Jewish friends and had done little personally that might provoke New York's sizeable Jewish community. 63 Less than a week later Blankenhom informed Charles Thayer from the US High Commission that Krekeler was the official candidate for New York. 64 Through most of April, however, Haas had been championing Sieveking again, this time for New York. 65 Krekeler recalled that when Haas showed him the list of personnel envisioned for New York, Sieveking's name, although erased, was still clearly visible next to the designation "consul general." 66 It was no coincidence that Adenauer's distrust of Haas flared up again around this time. He even considered stationing Haas abroad. 67 After reading press reports about Sieveking's candidacy for New York, Adenauer protested sharply to Haas on May 3. 68 Shortly thereafter, matters cooled a bit. On May 15 the chancellor sat down with Haas, Melchers, and Blankenhom, and in the latter's words, "some substantial progress was made" on the question of upcoming consular appointments. In July, Adenauer also would ask Haas for his suggestions for staffing leading positions in the DfAA. 69 Nonetheless, Haas's relations with his boss had started out on the wrong foot.

158 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE Of the first three West German mission chiefs, the eventual consul general in Paris, Wilhelm Hausenstein, did not fit the patronage pattern described by Baring. After Heinrich von Brentano declined to give up his position as chair of the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation to go to France, the Catholic writer Maria Schltiter-Hermkes, one of Adenauer's neighbors in Rhondorf, recommended the writer and art historian Hausenstein as an expert on French culture. 70 Much to Adenauer's surprise, Hausenstein's nomination drew intense criticism from a number of quarters. The abstract artist Willi Baumeister wrote to Theodor Heuss that Hausenstein's dislike of modem art made him an inappropriate choice for Paris. More seriously, Adenauer's own party disapproved. On May 9 all except one member of the CDU/CSU's Bundestag steering committee voted against Hausenstein, and the committee immediately drew up a list of other candidates. Many of Hausenstein's future colleagues in the Foreign Office later expressed serious reservations about his political skills. Until his retirement in 1955 his critics included not only the diplomatic "insiders" Blankenhom and Haas but also his fellow outsider Walter Hallstein. 71 Haas was displeased with Adenauer's choices to lead the first consulates general, but he added to the tensions with the chancellor by championing a nonpartisan personnel policy. He wanted to consult as many different parties as possible, including the SPD, in order to limit criticism of the Foreign Office, and he even met twice with SPD Chairman Kurt Schumacher. 72 Sometime in early 1950 Haas suggested to Blankenhom that a special committee should be set up to screen candidates for the foreign service and to help prevent further attacks. The committee would consist of one member each from the CDU/ CSU, SPD, and FDP Bundestag delegations, an academic, an industrialist, a representative of German business interests, and a member of the German Federation of Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). 73 Blankenhom probably was sympathetic, as he had already discussed a similar idea with British occupation officials in August 1949.74 In the same spirit, Hallstein approached the CDU's Heinrich von Brentano in early 1951 about coordinating with the Bundestag. Brentano reported that both he and the SPD's Gerhard Llitkens were interested. 75 In 1952, after even greater controversy had erupted over personnel policy, Maltzan's report also suggested that parliamentary approval be secured in advance for all important future personnel decisions. 76 However, Adenauer understood personnel policy, in Udo Wengst's words, as a "Regierungsinstrument [instrument of rule]" and therefore as anything but nonpartisan, and he rejected these proposals. 77 In 1955 the Bundestag,

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against Adenauer's wishes, created an independent Personnel Screening Board with a veto right over all officers of the rank of colonel or above in the new Bundeswehr. 78 The subsequent creation of the armed forces proceeded calmly, which suggests that a similar screening board for the foreign service would have been wise. However, Haas's efforts also poisoned his relations with the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation. Its steering committee concluded on December 14, 1950, "that the best understanding and coordination reigns between Staatsrat Haas and delegate Li.itkens, while all CDU suggestions and proposals receive no consideration," and that it should voice its reservations about Haas's personnel policy. 79 In April 1951 CDU circles complained that the composition of the Higher Service had developed in such a way that "in practical terms, the CDU hardly has any possibilities to influence [it]." Upon examination, they had discovered that only 16 of 122 Higher Service members were CDU members. Many other diplomats, they believed, either belonged to the SPD or stood close to it. 80 The idea that Haas stood in league with the SPD is far-fetched. In fact, in January 1951, Li.itkens would blame Adenauer for not taking the opposition into account in establishing the foreign service, a charge that he would repeat in the Bundestag's budget deliberations later that year. 81 Instead, it appears that Haas resented the intrusion of partisan politics into his domain, in general, with fateful results for himself. In June 1951, when Heinrich von Brentano made suggestions for staffing approximately 30 new consulates, he complained to Adenauer that Haas had supposedly said it was "unheard of' for the leader of a parliamentary group to make personnel suggestions. 82 Haas also tried to prevent the appointment of Hans Mi.ihlenfeld, leader of the DP Bundestag delegation in Adenauer's coalition, to a post abroad (Mi.ihlenfeld became ambassador to the Netherlands in 1953, and most observers thought his performance confirmed Haas's reservations). 83 The decisive break came in July 1951, when Haas asked for a written order from Adenauer to appoint two CDU politicians to the foreign service. Blankenhom told him, "You will not receive a written order. You don't understand the Federal Chancellor's domestic political needs!" 84 On July 16 Adenauer wrote to Heinrich von Brentano that it was "rather certain" that Haas would be sent abroad soon. He hoped that Brentano would not mind waiting a few weeks before his complaints were dealt with. 85 On July 25, Blankenhom's deputy, Herbert Dittmann, replaced Haas as head of Division 1. 86 Adenauer later claimed that the Foreign Office had resisted many of his personnel suggestions. Although he would never have believed that Haas was capable of a "restoration," he claimed that one had taken place:

160 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE not a nationalist restoration, certainly, but a group of officials trying to get its own people back into government service.B7 Haas's reassignment to Turkey did not stop the complaints from the CDU/ CSU Bundestag delegation that the Foreign Office was ignoring its personnel suggestions.BB Besides Globke, another of Adenauer's key advisors in the early 1950s, Otto Lenz (state secretary in the Federal Chancellery 1951-53) harbored strong reservations about the ministry's personnel policy.B9 Lenz was particularly active in criticizing the Auswartiges Amt, so much that Globke told him that Hallstein and Blankenhorn frequently complained about his interference in foreign policy. 90 Lenz thought that blaming Haas alone for the "restoration" (to use Adenauer's term) was decidedly unfair. Instead, he pointed his finger at Blankenhom, who had not used his influence to prevent this trend. During 1952, accusations and counteraccusations on this issue flew within the Chancellery. 91 Starting in April 1951, Lenz demonstrated great interest in making Division I more accommodating to the CDU/CSU's political interests and made some inroads, most notably with Karl Wilde, who, not a career diplomat, came into the Foreign Office from the Transportation Ministry with Lenz's backing in mid-1951 and worked at the desk for the Higher Service in Division I led by Melehers. By the end of the year, he led the entire subdivision responsible for personnel. 92

The Frankfurter Rundschau and UA-47 Haas's successor, Herbert Dittmann, initially resisted his appointment to a job that he considered both difficult and thankless. 93 He brought two positive qualifications to the new position. Adenauer knew and trusted him as Blankenhorn's deputy, and he had past experience in the Foreign Office's Personnel Division. Unfortunately, Dittmann worked there while Joachim von Ribbentrop was foreign minister, and he had joined the NSDAP in 1937.94 Although Die Welt wrote that Dittmann 's appointment had brought a "refreshing wind" to the Foreign Office and had ended the "restoration," most observers feared that partisan interests, including Catholic groups (Dittmann was Catholic, as were Adenauer and Globke), would now dictate the ministry's personnel policy. 95 Haas spoke with Dittmann and expressed his wish that the previous guidelines for personnel policy be kept in place, including the emphasis on professional qualifications. But as Dittmann told UA-47, they had not discussed any specific details for judging a candidate's political suitability. Hallstein, however, had

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listed three requirements: no NSDAP members who had joined before 1933, no members of the allgemeine [general] SS, and no party activists. 96 Dittmann's appointment did not inspire Michael Heinze-Mansfeld's series criticizing the Foreign Office's personnel policy in the Frankfurter Rundschau, but Mansfeld's first article on September 1, 1951, did start off by dwelling on it. Mansfeld's articles engendered a tremendous public response for several reasons. They appeared in a national newspaper and attacked 21 leading diplomats. Mansfeld argued that they were unsuitable for the foreign service due to their past activities but nonetheless had managed to help each other into their current jobs. Using actual material from the Nuremberg ministries trial, he implicated Werner von Bargen and Werner von Grundherr in crimes against humanity. He cast considerable doubt on the resistance activities of the Kordt brothers, Hasso von Etzdorf, Albrecht von Kessel, and Gottfried von Nostitz and argued that they had coordinated their Nuremberg testimony in order to defend Weizsacker. Mansfeld pointed out that Dittmann was the first head of personnel of a federal ministry to be a former NSDAP member, recalled that Melchers had denied his own official knowledge of the Holocaust while testifying at Nuremberg, and even accused Haas of taking advice from former WilhelmstraBe personnel chief Hans Schroeder. He concluded his series by expressing doubts about whether so many diplomatic "experts" were necessary and stating that these developments, if allowed to continue, would raise grave doubts abroad about the domestic situation in Germany. 97 On March 17, 1952, Mansfeld and Helmut Hammerschmidt would dramatically reiterate these charges in a radio broadcast on the Bayerischer Rundfunk. 98 Mansfeld's accusations received considerable coverage in the West German and foreign media from September 1951 through the concluding Bundestag debate in October of the next year. 99 Among the political parties, only the rightwing DP attempted to defend the Auswartiges Amt. The other parties, from the KPD on the left to the FDP on the right, criticized the ministry (although the presence of many former diplomats within the FDP 's ranks made this a selfdefeating practice for that party). As Hallstein and Blankenhorn learned during a long, heated talk with Franz-Josef StrauB (CSU), distrust of the Foreign Office and of Blankenhorn's role in its personnel policy was widespread within the CDU/CSU. 100 Haas later blamed a circle of WilhelmstraBe veterans who had not been reemployed, including Eugen Budde and F. K. Siebold, as well as US Nuremberg prosecutor Robert Kempner, for helping Mansfeld. 101 In a press release dated September 7, 1951, the Foreign Office called Mansfeld's articles "irresponsible," because both the ministry and the Bundestag

162 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE had already examined the diplomats in question. The Frankfurter Rundschau refused to be intimidated, however, and threatened to sue unless the Auswartiges Amt produced firm evidence that its accusations were false. Hallstein quickly announced that the ministry would conduct its own investigation. 102 On September 26, 1951, Adenauer entrusted the former president of the Cologne Court of Appeals [Oberlandesgericht], Dr. Rudolf Schetter, with this task. Schetter had agreed with the judgment rendered against Weizsacker at Nuremberg, so observers believed that he would conduct a critical examination.103 For evidence he used selected documents from the Nuremberg trials, the existing literature on the Foreign Office's participation in the German resistance against Hitler, and the personnel files of the diplomats mentioned in the articles. 104 Unfortunately, most of the original personnel files had been destroyed in a bombing attack in November 1943. As a result, Schetter also relied heavily on testimony from the diplomats themselves. 105 Unsurprisingly given his sources, Schetter's report of November 24, 1951, fully exonerated the officials involved and also found the Foreign Office's overall personnel policy to be in order. 106 Before Schetter concluded his work, on October 24, 1951, the Bundestag adopted an SPD motion to create an investigative committee, UA-47. The accused diplomats initally welcomed it, because they believed that an investigation would lead to their exoneration. Uitkens may have raised these expectations by telling Haas that Adenauer was the target of the SPD's motion, not the diplomats. The chancellor had neglected his responsibilities toward the Foreign Ministry. 107 However, it was expected that the committee would adopt a very tough posture since none of its members had served on the Bundestag subcommittee for the foreign service from the previous fall, and almost all had suffered under National Socialism. 108 UA-47 had ample material at its disposal to make a judgment about the ministry's personnel policy, and not only testimony from Foreign Office officials. For example, the Foreign Office submitted brief biographical information on 231 Higher Service officials on November 23 and 29, 1951. This information did not cover the entire Higher Service (on October 1, 1951, there were 383 officials), but the entry for each official contained the results of a check of NSDAP records at the US-administered Berlin Document Center. In a number of cases, these records revealed unflattering discrepancies, with information provided by the diplomats themselves. 109 Haas testified that the number of Higher Service applicants who had lied about their ties to the NSDAP "is certainly shockingly large," and in many cases he and his coworkers had not had

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full knowledge about their activities during the Nazi era. Moreover, although he denied that a clique had formed in the Higher Service, severe problems did exist in the Elevated and Intermediate Services. The middle-service ranks in all government ministries from 1933--45 had been notorious for their high percentage of Nazi Party members and fellow travelers. A number of officials from these ranks, Haas noted, had been reemployed and had then played a decisive role in reappointing their former colleagues. Their influence had grown so large that Haas had reshuffled the entire staff at the desks responsible for selecting them. 110 UA-47's members became even more concerned with conditions in the Foreign Office after a February 1952 trial in Nuremberg against diplomat Franz Rademacher, from 1940 to 1943 head of the Jewish desk in the Abteilung Deutschland. In March the German court convicted Rademacher of fifteen hundred charges of aiding and abetting manslaughter [Beihilfe zum Totschlag], but while his lawyers were filing an appeal Rademacher jumped bail and fled to Syria. 111 Dittmann correctly feared that the trial would implicate a number of diplomats in the Final Solution, including himself, because they had co-signed documents. He sent another official, Ruprecht von Keller, to monitor the proceedings. However, when Dittmann did not clearly answer UA-47's questions about Keller's activities or his own knowledge of the documentation, he raised suspicions that Keller had been ordered to implore the prosecution to show restraint in its presentation of evidence. Dittmann denied this, as well as rumors that he had checked into the hospital in March simply to escape the fray. His behavior, in combination with the Rademacher trial itself, greatly disturbed the committee. 112 On March 20, 1952, committee chairman Max Becker (FDP) and members Erich Kohler (CDU) and Fritz Erler (SPD) held a press conference to report on UA-47's progress. Kohler stated that there were many indications that Division I's principle of using "experts" whenever necessary had been applied "exaggeratedly [iiberspannt] and too strongly." Mansfeld's charges about a renazification of the Elevated and Intermediate Services also appeared to have some validity. "It cannot be denied that in individual cases persons have been drawn upon who previously have had political functions in the NSDAP or in the NSDAP's Auslandsorganisation." In the committee's opinion, Kohler added, Haas's principles for personnel selection established in the winter of 1949-50 had "by no means always been taken into account to the desirable extent." 113 The personnel controversy directly affected the Foreign Office's work. In a lengthy memo on March 24, 1952, Wolfgang Freiherr von Welck of Division

164 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE I wrote that the attacks had shaken members at all levels of the Auswartiges Amt, who were increasingly upset that the normal disciplinary proceedings for civil servants had not been followed. Diplomats who testified felt as if they were on trial and stood accused from the start, with the normal burden of proof reversed. Moreover, UA-47 seemed to blur the division of powers between the branches of government by conducting hearings on ministerial personnel policy, a subject normally reserved for the executive branch. The Foreign Office's esprit de corps and daily work had suffered greatly. Since none of the officials under investigation could be transferred or promoted until UA-47 completed its work, numerous appointments both at home and abroad had been blocked over the past four months. Dittmann's hospitalization nearly halted Division I's work. Worst of all, the scandal had scared away younger people who until recently had been interested in joining the foreign service. 114 The US High Commission confirmed that the Foreign Office's work "has been greatly retarded." Most seriously affected was the establishment of new foreign missions, in part because it was necessary to appoint "people who cannot be attacked in the newspapers." 115 Adenauer described the situation bluntly at a press tea on July 11, 1952: "We can't work at all anymore. The people enjoy absolutely no respect anymore abroad [haben gar kein Ansehen mehr im Ausland]." 116 UA-47's final report of June 18, 1952, concluded that persons had been employed whose background might give rise to doubts at home and abroad about the strength of democracy in the Federal Republic. Haas, Melchers, Blankenhorn, Schwarz, and Dittmann were all guilty of well-intentioned wishful thinking and insufficient knowledge of the facts in assembling the Higher Service, while there was evidence of coordinated attempts by two other officials, since removed from Division I, to bring politically undesirable persons into the Elevated and Intermediate Services. However, the vast bulk of the report focused on the 21 diplomats named in Mansfeld's articles plus Curt Heinburg of the Personnel Division, and the findings were remarkably limited and restrained. UA-47 voted against the further employment in the Foreign Office of only four of the diplomats it examined: Werner von Bargen, Werner von Grundherr, Heinburg, and Dittmann. While the first three officials had been implicated in the Holocaust, UA-47 thought Dittmann unsuitable for the foreign service not because he had worked in Ribbentrop's personnel office (which merely made him inappropriate to work in Division I) but because he had perjured himself before the committee with his testimony about the Rademacher trial. Both Grundherr and Heinburg had already passed the normal retirement age of

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65 and agreed to leave the foreign service voluntarily before the Auswartiges Amt began disciplinary proceedings. However, UA-47 did not find the other two men, Bargen and Dittmann, unfit for service in other organs of the Federal government. They were merely unsuitable as "calling cards." In seven other cases, the committee recommended certain restrictions on their future work in the Foreign Office. It thought that Haas, Schwarz, and Melchers should no longer handle personnel affairs. Peter Pfeiffer (for one year), Hans Schwarzmann, Alois Tichy, and Heinz Triitzschler should not be stationed abroad; Triitzschler was also not to be promoted for the foreseeable future. In the remaining ten cases-Blankenhom, Etzdorf, Herwarth, Kurt von Kamphoevener, Keller, Albrecht von Kessel, Theo Kordt, Hans Ulrich von Marchtaler, Gottfried von Nostitz, and Susanne Simonis (in charge of Division I's desk for women in the Higher Service )-the committee raised no objections. Almost as an afterthought, UA-47 recommended several general measures, including the creation of another state secretary in the Foreign Ministry to deal with organizational matters and relations with parliament; the appointment of a new leader of the Personnel Division who had no ties to Ribbentrop's Foreign Office; and a report from the Foreign Office on the legal status of foreign services in other countries, including its position on the desirability of creating a foreign service law to regulate appointments. 117 The tremendous public outcry engendered by Mansfeld's articles stood totally out of proportion to UA-47's final recommendations, all of which could be-and were-ignored by the executive branch. Moreover, the committee failed to provide an overall analysis of the Auswartiges Amt's personnel policy, although its mandate by no means restricted it to the diplomats attacked in the press. 118 The report's mild findings led many observers to the conclusion that the controversy had been overblown and that in the future the Bundestag should be much more careful about intervening in the executive branch's personnel policy. 119 Although the October 22, 1952, Bundestag debate on UA-47's report was entertaining, it was notable for only two reasons. 12° First, it saw Adenauer's most intensive defense of his diplomats since Mansfeld's articles of the previous year. Second, Fritz Erler (SPD) said that the higher up the Foreign Office's Higher Service one went, the higher the percentage of former NSDAP members. Adenauer humorously dismissed this point with the comment that starting from the top down, neither the foreign minister (himself) nor the state secretary (Hallstein) had been in the party. Nonetheless, Erler had raised a valid point that UA-47's report had not addressed. The debate ended after the

166 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE Bundestag voted to refer the report to the Foreign Policy Committee. Blankenhorn, who Erler attacked as the man behind the Foreign Office's personnel decisions, believed the debate had been "exceedingly weak." He admitted that the foreign service needed to be reformed and expanded due to all of the new tasks, such as European integration, that it faced. However, the debate "presents a disquieting picture," he wrote, "that stands in no relation to the greatness of the [foreign policy] problem that the chancellor has solved in such a masterly way." 121 In March 1953, Hallstein announced that investigations by Federal Disciplinary Counsel [Bundesdisziplinaranwalt] Walter Franke-an SPD member of Jewish ancestry who had emigrated during the Third Reichhad indicated no need to institute formal disciplinary proceedings against any of the diplomats investigated by UA-47. 122 Why did UA-47's investigations in the end produce such limited results? Members of the committee tended to see the personnel issue from the perspective of the Foreign Office's overall problems. Committee member Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU) wrote that just evaluating the diplomats attacked in the press would miss the main point ofUA-47's work, which was evaluating how the ministry got into its present sorry state in the first place. 123 Brill agreed and expressed his wish for a foreign service law, which also would allow outsiders to come into the Foreign Office more easily. 124 Yet as noted earlier, legally the Adenauer government was not bound to follow any of the report's suggestions. More importantly, UA-47 did not want to dwell on controversies relating to the politics of the past. As Becker put it, "We are 1) not a court of appeal in denazification board matters; we are 2) no repeat of the Nuremberg Wilhelmstraf3e trial, we are furthermore also not a criminal court." 125 During the Bundestag debate he added, melodramatically, that UA-47's report could have been more detailed in many respects, but "for Germany's sake it is not." 126 This concern with appearances only is understandable when we consider it in the context of 1951-52, a time in which West German society considered success in foreign policy important and also wished to put denazification behind it once and for all. In addition, none of the political parties wished to alienate former Nazis willing to accommodate themselves with the new system, which is why they had prioritized creating laws to ensure the return of numerous "displaced" civil servants to federal service. 127 Adenauer commented during the debate on UA-47's report, "I think we should stop this Nazireich-business [Nazireicherei] (applause from the coalition parties). Because you can count on this: once we start with it, no one knows where it will stop (renewed applause from the coalition parties ... )." 128 A year later Brill, well

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aware of the Foreign Office's role during the Nazi years and outraged by the lack of consequences from the report, wrote that he would reply to Adenauer with Schiller's motto, "World History is the World Court!" 129 The one change that the investigation did produce had to do with the leader of Division I. During the spring of 1952, Adenauer and Hall stein searched for a replacement for Dittmann, in part due to pressure from the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation. Attempts to engage either Krekeler or Hermann Katzenberger (ambassador to Ireland, CDU) failed. 130 For his part, Krekeler refused to commit himself as long as he was not guaranteed direct access to the cabinet (which he thought necessary to perform the task successfully). He would not get the job, he also predicted, because his own FOP was opposed to his taking it. 131 As a temporary measure, WilhelmstraJ3e veteran Peter Pfeiffer, head of the attache training school in Speyer, replaced Dittmann in August 1952. 132 Pfeiffer's appointment came only a few weeks before the debate on UA-47's report and therefore invoked angry protest from all sides. Heinrich von Brentano, who had a high opinion of Pfeiffer, felt that the appointment should have waited until later and that Pfeiffer, through no fault of his own, had been needlessly exposed to further criticism. 133 Diplomat Alexander Drenker wrote that Pfeiffer's reassignment a year later came after he had attempted to cover up for a colleague who had a homosexual affair with an employee of a foreign mission in Bonn. 134 If that is true, it was only a pretext for Pfeiffer's removal, since he had not been chosen for the long term. His successor, Josef Lons, was an Adenauer confidant from the Cologne city administration, a member of the "Cologne clique." Lons had already served in Division I for a number of months as leader of the subdivision for organizational questions. Although veteran diplomats gave him credit for being a skillful administrator, they complained that Lons had little knowledge of the foreign service, not to mention foreign countries and languages. They joked that Lons could be posted abroad only where Cologne dialect [Ko/sch] was understood. However, he and his successor, Alexander Hopmann, provided Adenauer with a trustworthy CDU personnel chief until 1961. 135 The most controversial era of the Foreign Office's personnel policy had come to an end.

The Foreign Office's Personnel Policy, 1949-SS Several things stand out about the Foreign Office's personnel policy in the early 1950s. Based on current knowledge, the Auswiirtiges Amt did not

168 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE compare unfavorably with other central government ministries in the 1950s in terms of both former Nazis and those reinstated under the 1951 law governing "displaced officials" whose careers had been interrupted due to the war. However, the number of former Wilhelmstraf3e employees in leadership positions was extremely high, and many of these individuals had maintained at least formal ties with the NSDAP and its organizations. Moreover, there is evidence that Division I deviated from the minimum guidelines discussed by Hallstein and Dittmann in 1951 in terms of former SS members and party activists. In part this was due to the urgent and legitimate need for experienced personnel, but Wilhelm Haas himself admitted that personal familiarity played a great role in Division I's appointments. As he told UA-47, "We know our old colleagues." 136 The percentage of former Nazi Party members in the Auswartiges Amt's Higher Service through the mid-1950s does not seem unusual compared to other ministries. 137 As chart 3 indicates, the percentage soon stabilized in the mid-30th percentile, compared for example to 44.6 percent in the Interior Ministry's Higher Service in 1952. The percentage increased the higher one went up the hierarchical ladder in the central office, and 42 of the I 00 leading officials in the ministry between 1949 and 1955 had belonged to the party. Another seven had applied to the NSDAP but been rejected (see chart 4). This compares favorably to Udo Wengst's findings that 60 percent of all new division leaders appointed in the Federal Government between August 1950 and February 1953 belonged to the NSDAP. 138 However, on March 24, 1952, 65.3 percent (49 of 75) of personnel serving as desk officers and higher had been members, a higher percentage than in 1940 (59% ). 139 The concentration may reflect Haas's policy of keeping most former NSDAP members in the Bonn office during the early years so as not to create alarm abroad. 140 To its credit, throughout 1955 Division I attempted to employ individuals who had been persecuted by the NSDAP. Of the entire Higher Service, 17 percent (98 diplomats) qualified as Nazi persecutees as of October 1, 1952. Based on a cautious reading of the biographies in the appendix to this study, 22 of 100 leading officials through mid-1955 had experienced serious personal difficulties under National Socialism, including persecution for racial or political reasons, emigration, and arrest. 141 Two other leading officials, Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz and Gerhart Feine, had intervened directly to save Jews, while four others, Hasso von Etzdorf, Hans von Herwarth, Albrecht von Kessel, and Theo Kordt, were generally considered members of the diplomatic resistance.

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The Auswartiges Amt also did not compare unfavorably with the rest of the West German government in terms of "displaced officials." Approximately 430,000 German government officials had become unemployed due to Germany's capitulation, the loss of the eastern territories, and denazification. 142 A much smaller group of officials lost their jobs due to National Socialist persecution. On May 11, 1951, the Bundestag passed two laws-one for displaced persons covered by Article 131 GG and another for persecuted officials-which eventually would enable approximately 150,000 former officials to return to work or receive compensation for their previous service. 143 Former diplomats followed these legislative developments with great interest. During the spring of 1950, former diplomat and FDP Bundestag delegate Karl George Pfleiderer received pleas from a number of his ex-colleagues for a solution favorable to the old diplomatic corps. 144 The May 1951 laws required government ministries to devote around 20 percent of their personnel budget to reemploying former officials. These laws ensured great continuity in the central government's personnel. Along with other legislation covering civil servants, they helped win the officials' loyalty to the new state, something that often was lacking under the Weimar Republic. 145 On the other hand, officials who fell under the provisions of Article 131 GG were favored in practice over those who had been persecuted during the Third Reich, not least because the individual ministries themselves made the

CHART THREE- Percentage of Former NS OAP Members (Higher Service), 19 50-54 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Sources: Claus MUiler, Relaunching German Diplomacy, 280; Chart (May I, 1952), n.a., n.d., PA AA, B 2, vol. 32; Suddeutsche Zeitung, Sept. 21, 1954.

170 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE final decision on reinstituting victims of Nazism, whereas the" 131 ers" applied directly to a branch of the Finance Ministry to have their claims acknowledged. Moreover, because of indifference to or even rejection of the principle of favoring former officials with anti-Nazi records, many officials with tainted pasts came into federal service. The Bund der Verfolgten des Naziregimes [Union of Victims of the Nazi Regime, or BVN] asserted that this was so in some ministries because former members of the Nazi Party were in charge of restitution affairs. 146 In March 1952 the Auswartiges Amt actually had the second lowest percentage of 131 ers of all federal ministries, with 23 percent (or 214 of 929) 13 lers in all service grades; the percentage for the entire government was 25.2 percent (12,262 13 lers in 48,601 appropriated positions), with many offices having over 50 percent. By the start of 1953, the share of 131 ers in the Foreign Office had increased to 39.7 percent (361 of910), outstripping the overall rate for the government (28.3%, or 14,893 out of 52,620 positions). Nonetheless, other relatively large ministries had comparable percentages (e.g., the Interior Ministry with 42.3% or 182 of 430 appropriated positions), while many small offices had enormous concentrations, led by the Refugee Ministry with 74.6 percent (4 7 of 63). 147 These statistics are incomplete, since they only deal with the central office in Bonn, but once again the Foreign Office's personnel policy seems to fall into the average range for federal ministries. According to a survey conducted by the Interior Ministry in early 1952, the Foreign Ministry also had by far the largest number of officials who claimed persecuted status. 148 On the other hand, the Auswartiges Amt's emphasis on "professional standards" brought a very high proportion of WilhelmstraJ3e veterans into leading positions in federal service. For practical reasons, few government organs in West Germany started tabula rasa. 149 However, the Foreign Office went to an extreme. As chart 5 indicates, the overall percentage of former diplomats dropped steadily through late 1954, when it stood at approximately 28 percent. But 61.3 percent of officials serving as desk officials or higher in the central office on March 24, 1952, were former WilhelmstraJ3e members. 150 Of the 100 leading officials in the appendix to this study, 72 had worked previously in some capacity in the WilhelmstraJ3e, and 64 of these had been career diplomats. These percentages were much higher than in other government ministries. In August 1950, approximately 42.9 percent of division leaders in the entire government had served in a Reich ministry before 1945. By February 1953, this figure had climbed to 45.2 percent, still considerably lower than in the Auswartiges Amt. 151

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CHART FOUR- Biographical Information on 100 Leading Officials in the West German

Foreign Office, September 1949-June 1955 These data include all 100 individuals who served as subdivision or deputy division leader or higher in the central office (excluding Adenauer) or as head of a diplomatic mission abroad, as well as Foreign Office legal advisor Erich Kaufmann.

Confession

Education

Protestant: 68 Catholic: 29 None: 3

Some post-secondary: 98 Of these, doctorate: 79 (multiple doctorates counted once) Of these, Dr. jur.: 58

(Wilhelm Mackeben is listed as a Protestant; the date he changed his confession to Catholicism could not be determined.)

Pre-1945 Relationship with Auswiirtiges Amt Career diplomats (tenured civil servants): 63 Non-career diplomats with assignments: 9 No previous relationship: 28

Relationship with NSDAP Party member: 42 FM-SS, SA: 4 Known serious difficulties (arrested, emigrated, forced from career): 22

Sources: See Appendix.

The policy of excluding members of the general SS, NSDAP activists, and officials appointed by Ribbentrop was interpreted quite loosely by Division I. A short list of former SS members reemployed through 1955 includes Horst Bohling, Franz Krapf (attache 1938), Ernst Ostermann von Roth (attache 1934), Georg Graf zu Pappenheim (attache 1936), Friedrich Pfisterer (attache 1939), Ulrich von Rhamm, and Oswald Freiherr von Richthofen (attache 193 5). 152 Information from the Berlin Document Center screen conducted in 1951 revealed that three of the 100 leading diplomats-Karl Du Mont, Kurt von Kamphoevener, and Herbert Siegfried-had been patron members of the SS or ReiterSS.153 During the debate on UA-47 Adenauer claimed that no former members of the SD had been employed, but there were at least two cases. 154 Although a

172 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE

CHART FIVE- Percentage of Former NSDAP Members (Higher Service), 19 50-54 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0

----- Former AA

Sources: Claus Miiller, Relaunching German Diplomacy, 280; Chart (May I, 1952), n.a., n.d., PA AA, B 2, vol. 32; Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Sept. 21, 1954.

member of the diplomatic resistance, Hasso von Etzdorf had joined the SA in 1938, supposedly for protocol reasons while stationed in fascist Italy. 155 Still other returnees like Gunther Diehl (NSDAP 1938), a functionary of the NSDAP-Studentenbund [Student League] in the 1930s with a specialty in Belgian national minorities (i.e., Flemish nationalists); Gunther Erdmann (NSDAP 1933), who held a position with the Hitler Youth (Gefolgschaftsfahrer); Wilhelm von Grolman (NSDAP 1933, attache 1934), who led the Auslandsorganisation's group in Sweden; Leopold Krafft von Dellmensingen (SA 1933-35 and 1937--45, attache 1935, NSDAP 1940), who became an SA-Sturmfiihrer in 1942; Dietrich Freiherr von Mirbach (NSDAP 1933, attache 1935), who served as Steengracht von Moyland's personal assistant from 1943 to 1945; and HansFelix Rohrecke (NSDAP 1939), who worked in the Reich Chancellery from 1936 to 1939, brought considerable political baggage. 156 A related trend concerned the employment of a number of officials who had entered the WilhelmstraBe as attaches in the late 1930s. Starting in 1938, the year of Ribbentrop's appointment as foreign minister, their training became openly ideological and designed to produce a new type of National Socialist diplomatic corps. But even before then the number of attaches who belonged to the NSDAP, SS, and SA continued to increase steadily (in the 193 7 crew only one individual was not a member of any of these three organizations). 157

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Besides the aforementioned Krapf(attache 1938; NSDAP 1936, SS 1933-39, SS-Untersturmfahrer [Lieutenant] 1938) and Pfisterer (attache 1939; NSDAP, SS 1940, SA 1933), individuals reemployed through 1955 who had entered the Foreign Office as attaches between 1937 and 1939 included Karl Albers (1938; NSDAP 1933, SA 1933-34; worked in Ribbentrop's office 1943--45); Hilmar BaBler (1939; NSDAP 1936); Wolfgang Galinsky (1937; NSDAP 1939, SA 1933-37); Horst Groepper (1938; NSDAP 1933, SA 1933-35); Hans-Christian Halter (1938, NSDAP 1937, on Ribbentrop's personal staff 1938-39); Reinhard Henschel (1937; NSDAP 1937--44); Kurt Ludde-Neurath (1938; NSDAP 1937, SA 1933-39); Ivar Maenns (1937; NSDAP 1939, SA 1934-38); Gerhard Moltmann (1937; NSDAP 1939, SA 1933, SA-Sturmbannfiihrer 1942); and Herbert Muller (later Muller-Roschach, 1938; NSDAP 1933). Fritz Wussow (NSDAP 1934) was also admitted to training for the Higher Service in 1939, although he had worked in the Foreign Office on consular affairs since 1927. 158 Regular attache crews were suspended due to the start of the war, but another group of individuals reentered the Foreign Office in the early 1950s that had been employed in or transferred to the WilhelmstraJ3e between 1939 and 1945. Prominent among them were officials who worked on propaganda and cultural affairs, such as Gunther Diehl and Georg von Lillienfeld (NSDAP 1938, SA 1932-34). 159 Yet another case was Hans Schwarzmann (NSDAP 1933), who was married to Ribbentrop's cousin. He entered the ministry in December 1939 as a wissenschaftlicher Hiljsarbeiter (anon-tenured Higher Service position) and became a legation secretary (a tenured civil servant) in 1941. In both 1940--41 and 1944--45 he worked in Ribbentrop's office. 160 The most prominent official from the Ribbentrop era who returned to the new Foreign Office was Fritz von Twardowski, a career diplomat who entered the ministry as an attache in 1922. He served as head of the Cultural Division from 1939 to 1943. It is unlikely that his activities in this position were taken very seriously by his contemporaries after the war, despite the fact that Ribbentrop and other National Socialists saw cultural policy as an instrument of power politics (in his defense, Twardowski had registered objections to "cultural propaganda"). In any case, they did not prevent him from becoming deputy leader of the Evangelisches Hilfswerk from 1946 to 1950 or, briefly thereafter, provisional head of the Federal Press Office and speaker for Adenauer's government. In 1952 he was appointed ambassador to Mexico. 161 WilhelmstraJ3e veterans who returned in the early 1950s with links to National Socialist crimes-including Bargen, Brautigam, Grundherr, and Heinburghave been discussed previously in this study.

174 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE The Foreign Office repeatedly proved astoundingly insensitive to public opinion at home and abroad in its appointments to important positions. For example, Peter Pfeiffer was to become West German observer at the United Nations in 1954 until international protests about appointing a former NSDAP member to this post forced the Foreign Office to withdraw his name. 162 Two years later Otto Brautigam left his post as head of Subdivision 35-Eastern Bloc, due to the publication of documents that implicated him in mass executions while working for Alfred Rosenberg's Ostministerium during the war. Interestingly, already in the fall of 1952 Division I foresaw that controversy could arise over Brautigam's appointment to this position but managed to convince Hallstein (and override Blankenhorn's concerns about attacks). Peter pfeiffer and his deputy Welck believed that sufficient material was available to successfully defend their colleague if necessary. The resulting affair finally was resolved in 1960, when Brautigam left the Foreign Ministry for good. 163 This lack of concern about the past activities and politics of former colleagues when making personnel decisions may have intensified after 1951 due to the end of US screening and Haas's dismissal. However, it was apparent right from the very start, as was a related tendency, the exclusion of ex-diplomats who were not thought to have acted in a "decent" way toward former colleagues (a mentality carried over from the immediate postwar years). Melchers's papers from his time in Division I included a list of 24 names with the heading "employment not possible." 164 These included Eugen Budde and F. K. Siebold, accused of aiding Michael Mansfeld. Budde also was chairman of the BVN, which was critical of the Foreign Office, although he also was suspected of misconduct in office in the late 1930s. 165 Former Intermediate Service member Fritz Kolbe was not on the list, but Melchers, the Kordt brothers and others raised doubts about his participation in the German resistance against Hitler and even thought that he had played a role in the 1945 suicide of the former German mission chief in Berne, Otto Kocher. This plus the fact that he had collaborated with a foreign intelligence service ended any chance he had of being employed, despite-or perhaps because of-the personal intervention of Allen Dulles of the CIA on his behalf. 166 More shocking, however, are some of the individuals that appear on a list of229 former diplomats who were considered suitable candidates. Their presence indicates that Melchers suffered either from wishful thinking or (willful?) ignorance. 167 One was Ernst Achenbach, who led the Political Division of the German Embassy in Paris during the war and helped to initiate the deportation of the French Jews. After the war he became a successful lawyer who spe-

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cialized in representing industrialists during denazification proceedings, and between 1951 and 1953 he organized a campaign for a general amnesty of war criminals. He also began a political career in the FDP in North Rhine-Westphalia and would enter the Bundestag in 1957 .168 Melchers correctly noted that Achenbach "probably had no interest" in working again as a diplomat. He also ruled out Otto von Erdmannsdorff, who had been acquitted at the Ministries Trial in Nuremberg. Melchers sensibly wrote "no, investigate" next to FritzGebhardt von Hahn, who had worked on Jewish policy in the Foreign Ministry between 1941 and 1943. Hahn found employment with other government ministries but in 1968 would be sentenced to eight years for participating in the murder of Greek and Bulgarian Jews. 169 Melchers noted "not acute" and "not presently" by the names of Ribbentrop's translator, Paul Otto Schmidt, and his deputy Karl von Loesch (SS 1940). 17° Franz von Sonnleithner had come into the Auswartiges Amt soon after Ribbentrop in 1938 and served as one of the foreign minister's liaisons to Hitler's headquarters. "Doesn't want to," wrote Melchers. 171 Still others included Otto Brautigam ("yes, later"), "Herbert Muller" (Muller-Roschach), Ulrich von Rhamm ("not presently"), Hans Schroeder, Gustav Sonnenhol ("not presently"), and Henning Thomsen ("yes"). The Foreign Office also drew personnel from other parts of the West German government. For example, after 1948 Maltzan had brought many officials known to him from Reich ministries or I. G. Farben into the Economic Ministry's Foreign Trade Division, including officials from the old WilhelmstraJ3e, who alone made up about a third of its personnel. Between 1951 and 1954 many officials from the Foreign Trade Division, including almost all of the former diplomats, came into the new Auswartiges Amt, and starting in 1953 Maltzan himself brought his most trusted coworkers with him into Division IV. Several subsequently reached prominent positions, including state secretaries Rolf Lahr and Albert Hilger van Scherpenberg and the ambassadors Helmut Allardt, Hans Kroll, Carl Hermann Mueller-Graaf, and Gunther Seeliger. 172 In some cases, highly compromised personnel came from other ministries. For example, in 1953 the Auswartiges Amt absorbed the Interior Ministry's Zentrale Rechtschutzstelle [Central Office for Legal Protection]. This office was supposed to represent the interests of German prisoners of war and war criminals in foreign custody, an area that the Foreign Ministry claimed fell under its auspices. In one of the most unsavory episodes in the new ministry's history, through the late 1960s the Zentrale Rechtschutzstelle informed hundreds of West Germans of standing warrants for their arrest in foreign countries, where they had been tried in absentia for their activities during World

176 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE War IL When these activities became public in 1968, that department's leading officials, Hans Gawlik (a former Nazi prosecutor in Breslau who defended members of the SS and SD at Nuremberg) and Karl Theodor Redenz (an SSOberschaifuhrer and member of the SD), claimed the notifications were part of their official responsibilities. The problem was that they regularly warned individuals who were serious war criminals, for example Klaus Barbie, the "Butcher of Lyon," against foreign travel. 173 As the cases of Gawlik and Redenz illustrate, many problematic appointments had no previous connection with the Auswartiges Amt. In late 1954 WilhelmstraBe veterans made up slightly more than 20 percent of the Higher Service, but the share of former NSDAP members stood at around 36 percent. 174 The restitution laws for former Reich civil servants led to the employment of outsiders with dubious pasts. The most notorious case involved Franz NuBlein, who served as government prosecutor in Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia and sanctioned numerous executions. In 1947 a Czechoslovak court sentenced him to 20 years in prison, and when he was released and repatriated to the Federal Republic he used several patrons and his status as a former civil servant to find work in the Foreign Ministry in 1955. 175 Even the new crews of attaches recruited by the Foreign Ministry were by no means clean politically. In a recent memoir Felix 0. Gaerte, who attended the Speyer school for diplomats in 1950, freely admitted that he applied to join the SS as a student in 193 7, achieved the rank of Waffen-SS Untersturmftihrer in 1944, and during the last months of the war worked in the Abwehr [German military intelligence], which by that point was being run by Heinrich Himmler's RHSA. 176 It seems clear that Division I's preeminent concern in the early 1950s was finding sufficient quantities of qualified personnel, and that the political screening of candidates took secondary priority. Several other aspects of the Foreign Office's personnel policy also displayed continuity with the past, although in this case they had little to do with National Socialism. In terms of confessional balance, the Foreign Office differed from the rest of the government, especially at the very highest level. Although Catholics made up 45 percent of the entire West German population in January 1950, they comprised only 25.8 percent of the government's Higher Service (257 officials) compared to 68.4 percent Protestants (682 officials) and 5.8 percent of other confessions (58 officials). 177 Thanks in large part to the Federal Chancellery's efforts to achieve confessional parity in the Higher Service, their total numbers were about equal in August 1950 and had slid only slightly in favor of the Protestants by February 1953. 178 In the Foreign Office,

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7. State Secretary Albert Hilger van Scherpenberg, right, congratulates senior doorman Ernst Mtihlenhaupt on his retirement in December 1959. Mtihlenhaupt began work as a doorman for the Foreign Office in Berlin in 1917. The occasion can be seen as evidence of the loyalty and solidarity that employees of the old Wilhelmstraf3e felt toward one another, even down to lower-ranking staff, which had implications for who was going to be reemployed in the 1950s (Marianne RohwedderFlink; copy in PAAA).

however, Protestants still dominated. In March 1952 one of Hans Globke's friends, Hans Kroll, even suggested using the controversy surrounding UA-47 to bring more "people of our worldview," including alumni of Catholic student fraternities, into the ministry. 179 Claus Miiller found that the higher up one went in terms of Higher Service rank, the closer the Auswartiges Amt came to denominational parity, but also that Protestants made up two-thirds of the entire Higher Service through 1952. 180 An analysis of the background of the 100 leading diplomats confirms Muller's findings: Protestants outnumbered Catholics by a ratio of more than two to one. Moreover, 58 had completed law degrees, another continuity with the pre-1945 Foreign Office. 181

178 ADENALI ER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Another characteristic of personnel policy throughout the entire West German government in the 1950s was the concerted attempt to limit the role of women in public service, in particular married women, whose place was supposed to be in the home. 182 In the Auswartiges Amt, women made up only a minuscule proportion of the Higher Service. On October 1, 1950, there were only 5 (3.65%), a year later 15 (3.92%), and on October 1, 1952, a grand total of 33 (5.73%). 183 The most prominent woman during these years was Wilhelmstral3e veteran Erica Pappritz, deputy leader of the Protocol Division (the only woman who appears on the list of 100 leading officials). In 1951 she had the honor of becoming the first female legation consular first class in German history and later achieved some notoriety for an etiquette book that became a best-seller. 184 Hanna Kiep, widow of a former Foreign Office official executed after July 20, 1944, served until 1968 as head of the Women's Desk in Washington, the only such desk at any of the West German missions. 185 Diplomats' wives played an important but underappreciated role in their husbands' work, including in handling social duties while stationed abroad. Protocol chief Herwarth did not hide the fact that his wife, Elisabeth, proved invaluable in helping him manage his workload in Bonn. 186 However, official federal policy strongly discouraged married women from continuing in government service. Moreover, in some countries, especially Muslim ones, other prejudices made it nearly impossible to post both sexes on an equal basis (the Foreign Office officially considered almost all such missions hardship posts). 187 This was not only the case in the Third World. In 1954 Texas state law forbade the former CDU Bundestag delegate Margarette Groewel from closing the lease for the new consulate building in Houston, and Heinz Krekeler had to sign for the unmarried woman. 188 Regardless of where they were stationed, women found they had limited opportunities in the foreign service during the 1950s.

The Quest for lnternal Consistency" in Personnel Policy 11

As soon as the urgent personnel needs of the early 1950s had been met, slowly but surely the Auswartiges Amt reestablished the old principle of "internal consistency" in the foreign service. This meant that it tried to provide for its personnel needs mainly from within its own ranks. The ministry extended civil servant status to many of the Higher Service employees brought in during the first part of the decade, 209 in all between 1952 and 1960. Most had to work in the Foreign Office for at least three years to qualify. The golden age of

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the outsider came to an end by mid-decade, at the latest, in part in reaction to what was seen as the inadequate performance of many of the first generation of mission chiefs (see the next chapter). 189 The foreign service's "special branches" contained the largest concentration of outsiders in the ministry during the 1950s. These branches, employed mainly at the West German missions, included the Economic Service, special attaches for culture, forestry, agriculture, and social affairs, and after 1955, military attaches. Economic and social attaches were first established by Haas during his tenure as head of Division I in an attempt to bring new blood into the ministry to handle specialized subjects. However, the ministry treated the special branches like foreign bodies. The outsiders there were expected to serve for only a few years before moving back into their normal professions. The largest and most important of the special branches was the Economic Service. Although it was led by career Higher Service officials, it consisted mainly of experienced businessmen from various branches of the economy. The Auswartiges Amt soon found to its distress not only that many attaches did not want to return to their old jobs but also that they were only prepared to work if offered the prospect of becoming tenured civil servants. Claus Muller described this conflict as the only major outsider problem of the postwar period, which, however, solved itself as time went on due to the peculiar nature of the economic attaches' work. Chambers of Commerce and similar bodies usually took care of direct trade promotion, but in the initially unsettled postwar conditions, the German missions had to bridge the gap. By the middle of the decade, however, West German industry had reestablished its ties abroad and the economic attaches could concentrate on analyzing general economic conditions in their host country. Since it was no longer necessary to have attaches with practical business experience, by the latter half of the 1950s economic outsiders normally came from the Economics or Finance Ministries, not private industry. The other special branches also received a cold reception. The cultural attaches, frequently artists, were criticized for being inexperienced in administering funds. Some diplomats thought the social attaches, who by 1959 reported on social and especially labor conditions in nine countries in Western Europe as well as the United States, Canada, and South Africa, were unnecessary. They called the job a "pension post" for the Federal League of German Unions, which did not even bother to staff it properly. By the end of the 1950s the only truly welcome outsiders were press attaches from the Federal Press and Information Office. More and more often, cultural and economic attaches

180 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE were career diplomats themselves, and the "special branches" lost importance as the overall number of outsiders in the Auswartiges Amt also decreased over the course of the decade. 190 As time went on, attaches represented an increasingly important personnel source. Initially, the Foreign Office experienced difficulty attracting young people. Low pay, especially compared to the private sector, presented one major obstacle in recruitment. 191 The prospects for promotion, at least for the first generation of attaches, were also unfavorable due to the consequences of the Second World War. Older diplomats returning to service were accommodated first. Moreover, outsiders often occupied very high positions at a young age. For both reasons, the age of Higher Service officials often bore no relation to their career grade, and normal promotion pathways remained distorted for some time. 192 The Foreign Office published guidelines in April 1950 that set high standards for Higher Service attaches. Candidates were required to be at least twenty-five years of age, to have completed their university studies, and to have a good knowledge of law, economics, and history. Moreover, they had to be proficient in English and French, with additional languages highly desirable.193 However, it proved difficult to find a suitable first group of attaches from among the many applications that the ministry received. Due in part to the disruption caused by the war, few possessed the necessary knowledge of foreign languages. Eventually, an initial group of seventeen candidates arrived at the new training school at Speyer in Rhineland-Palatinate, which the Allied High Commission supported financially. The first three crews in 1950 and 1951 were given six-month crash courses based mostly on theory. In 1952 the fourth crew became the first to take a normal eighteen-month course, which included an apprenticeship at a desk in the Auswartiges Amt. After the completion of the new Foreign Office building in 1955, training moved to Bonn. 194 West German attaches resembled German society somewhat more closely than their predecessors under the German Reich. Of the 608 attache candidates who entered training between 1950 and September 1969, 421 had a background in law. Only 63 came from the world of business and economics; 104 were linguists [Philologen], and the remaining 20 candidates had other types of training. 195 Most of the attaches continued to come from families of some economic standing, but no longer from predominantly aristocratic backgrounds. 196 These continuities with the pre-1945 Foreign Office are unsurprising. Legal studies remain desirable for any type of state service in Germany today, and there normally is a positive correlation between income level and education (including

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knowledge of foreign languages). The 46 women attaches and the 16 attaches whose fathers were laborers in the crews between 1950 and 1968 would not even have been in the candidate pool before 1945. 197 On the whole, however, these data reflect the fact that the Foreign Office remained an elite institution. The strategy of internal consistency would not prevent the Auswartiges Amt from making further controversial appointments over the next two decades. In a commentary broadcast by the Hessischer Rundfunk in August 1968, Ulrich Keitel reviewed a number of recent scandals concerning diplomats with dubious pasts and wondered, "How many targets does the Auswartiges Amt offer?" Not even the appointment of Social Democrat and anti-Nazi Willy Brandt as foreign minister in late 1966 seemed to have brought any real change in this regard.198 This problem would die out as the generation of civil servants still old enough to have held positions in the Third Reich started retiring in the 1960s and 1970s-only for controversy to be revived, ironically, with the "Obituary Affair" in 2003 as this generation itself died out. In light of these personnel issues, it is easy to forget that UA-47's recommendations began in consideration of the fact that State Secretary Walter Hallstein and his deputy Herbert Blankenhorn were totally overworked. The committee recommended appointing an additional state secretary in charge of overseeing personnel policy, coordinating work in the home office, and keeping the missions informed. 199 The Foreign Office's leadership structure also remained highly controversial in the early 1950s and forms the subject of the next chapter.

7

The Leadership Structure in the Auswfirtiges Amt,

1951-55

A POPULAR JOKE IN BONN in 1952 compared the Auswartiges Amt to a train, with Adenauer, Hallstein, and Blankenhom as the locomotive. "The locomotive is traveling at full-steam, but it suddenly turns out that the train's cars are standing still. About one division it's even said that it comprises the sleeping car" (a reference to Division IIl). 1 The joke highlighted the fact that decision making in the Foreign Office during the early 1950s was dominated by a small group of officials around Adenauer, often to the exclusion of major units of the ministry, including important diplomatic missions. During periods of particularly intense activity such as 1950-52 (dominated by the negotiations on the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community, and the General Treaty) and between mid-1954 and early 1955 (marked by the failure of the EDC and a new round ofnegotiations on rearmament and the Occupation Statute), complaints about this situation became acute. Yet these narrow leadership structures did not present a major obstacle for a foreign policy that led to West German sovereignty in 1955. If the leadership was restricted to a relatively small circle, the leaders themselves represented the ministry's greatest strength.

Adenauer, Hallstein, and Blankenhorn Central to the leadership question was Adenauer's own style. He depended on others both for information and as sounding boards for ideas and was skill-

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ful at creating consensus. However, he did not make decisions based on collegial consultations or display any sentimentality in personnel issues. 2 In many ways, Adenauer advocated secret diplomacy. As he told his cabinet on April 1, 1952, it was impossible to make foreign policy by appealing to the broad public.3 Unfortunately, he also tended to be secretive toward his own coalition and government. Wilhelm Grewe believed that Adenauer's penchant for "secret-mongering [Geheimniskriimerei]" created unnecessary tensions among coworkers. 4 He certainly did not appreciate public statements by ministers or bureaucrats that were uncoordinated with his foreign policy and did his best to suppress them. 5 Other important aspects of Adenauer's leadership style had already become clear during his years as lord mayor of Cologne (1917-33), including his attention to detail and use of personnel policy for political purposes. 6 As noted previously, Adenauer harbored suspicions about all Wilhelmstra!3e veterans. Blankenhorn wrote in his diary in late 1949: "The Chancellor's position on the Aus[wartiges] Amt: skepticism, mistrust, resentment based on previous bad experience."7 Herwarth speculated that Adenauer's negative experience involved Geheimrat Heinrich von Friedberg, head of the Foreign Office's Division for the Occupied Territories and the Saar (and Herwarth's first boss), who in the 1920s personally reprimanded Adenauer for his plan to detach the Rhineland from Prussia. According to Herwarth, "Adenauer left the meeting deeply outraged [tief gekriinkt]." 8 There may have been a more important reason, too. On several occasions near the end of his life Adenauer asserted that German civil servants and others in official positions had not done what they could have to resist National Socialism. When asked by a reporter in 1965 if he thought at the time that Hitler would remain in power for 12 years, he said that this had been impossible to predict back then. Adenauer: ... But I saw how little capable of resistance they were. Reporter [Friedrich L. Millier, Bild am Sonntag]: A sign, that the masses certainly were ready ... Adenauer: ... that the entire bureaucracy immediately gave in, when the Nazis exerted pressure. When they threatened with arrests, and so forth. If Hitler hadn't started a war with the entire world, he would have remained in power for a long time still. He had the police and army. 9

He told prominent CDU politicians assembled for his ninety-first birthday on January 5, 1967, that "if the German authorities had not failed to act [nicht

184 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE ... versagt hatten], National Socialism would never have come to power in Germany. That is for me a rock-solid conviction." 10 It is possible that Adenauer's caution also was shaped by the advice on the Wilhelmstra/3e that he solicited from two former diplomats who also happened to be his party colleagues, Gunther Henle and Clemens von Brentano. Both recommended employing outsiders whenever possible, in part to avoid attacks on the new ministry. Brentano, later the Federal Republic's first ambassador in Rome (1950-58), also warned that the old Auswartiges Amt, for better or worse, had never completely abandoned "Bismarckian" traditions. For example, it would have been only too willing to play the Soviets against the West one day and then the West against the Soviets the next. In 1949, however, this policy would lead to ruin and had to be avoided. In addition, it had assisted and supported Hitler's policies, and Brentano, who left the Foreign Office shortly after the death of Gustav Stresemann in 1929, thought the story about diplomats staying at their posts after 1933 "to prevent the worst" was largely an excuse. He added that the diplomats were no worse than other German elites and stressed that he blamed least the younger generation. 11 Adenauer's comments to the German press in Berlin on April 19, 1950, encapsulated his ambivalence about the career diplomats. He realized that only former Wilhelmstra/3e members could provide the expertise and routine required by a properly functioning foreign ministry but quickly added that he wanted the Foreign Office to have a "new face" and that experienced personnel should be employed only to the extent necessary. 12 Despite his reservations, Adenauer displayed a willingness to continue Foreign Office traditions. In July 1950 he declined a suggestion to create a Ministry for International Cooperation instead of an institution bearing the name Foreign Office. 13 Adenauer also lent credibility to the idea that the Auswartiges Amt had been a bastion of the anti-Nazi resistance. During his August 1951 vacation in Switzerland, he laid a wreath at Weizsacker's grave. 14 On July 20, 1954, the tenth anniversary of the failed assassination attempt against Hitler, he and other politicians commemorated the diplomatic resistance in a series of speeches held at the new Foreign Office building. Adenauer said that the Foreign Office's martyrs had "given their lives ... so that the unjustifiable condemnation [of the Foreign Office] at home and abroad might be reversed." He stressed Weizsacker's efforts to prevent war before the Munich Conference by admonishing the Western powers to take a firm stand against Hitler. 15 Pointing to the fact that the chancellor appointed career diplomats to replace the initial group of non-career mission chiefs in every case except one (Krekeler), Wil-

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helm Haas claimed that Adenauer's initial sharp distrust of the WilhelmstraBe veterans faded, partly due to Blankenhom's influence. 16 Nonetheless, relations between Adenauer and his veteran diplomats were frequently tense in the early 1950s, although it is important to note that his mistrust was not predicated solely on their backgrounds. Instead, personal ties played the decisive role. Blankenhom, Dittmann, and Herwarth were former WilhelmstraBe members who enjoyed Adenauer's confidence and served as close coworkers. The same can be said of Maltzan, who slowly worked his way into this circle starting in 1953. Adenauer's relationship with WilhelmstraBe veteran Hans Kroll during the latter's tenure as ambassador to the Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early 1960s is also well-known. The work of other diplomats, most notably Haas, would suffer because they did not enjoy Adenauer's support. This emphasis on close personal ties was nothing new. Ever since his days as lord mayor of Cologne, Adenauer's closest colleagues were intelligent and gifted officials who were totally dedicated to him and willing to subordinate their own initiatives and interests to his. 17 Hallstein and Blankenhom fit this image well. They had great responsibilities in the Foreign Office, because Adenauer had neither the time nor the inclination to run the ministry. In many respects, Hallstein was de facto foreign minister until Heinrich von Brentano took over from Adenauer in June 1955. More importantly, Blankenhom and Hallstein were part of Adenauer's intimate political team. Along with Lenz and Globke, they remained the chancellor's closest advisors for as long as they remained in Bonn. 18 Blankenhom suggested in October 1952 that Adenauer form a "working group" consisting of himself, Globke, Lenz, Hallstein, and Federal Press Chief Felix von Eckardt to coordinate all important political issues-and to prevent infighting within the Chancellery-in preparation for the upcoming elections to the Bundestag in 1953. Somewhat earlier, Adenauer and Hallstein had even considered letting Blankenhom leave the Foreign Office to concentrate on the elections. 19 During the 1953 campaign, Adenauer's special train was equipped with telegram and teletype intended for use by four men only: Globke, Lenz, Hallstein, and Blankenhom. 20 Until May 1955 both Hallstein and Blankenhom had offices not in part of the ministry but in the Chancellery in the Palais Schaumburg, in close proximity to Adenauer's chambers on the second floor. "When Hallstein wanted or was supposed to go to the chancellor, he had to climb the stairs," wrote Gunther Diehl, the Foreign Office's press chief from 1952 to 1956, while "Blankenhom only had to cross the floor, then he was with the old man." 21

186 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Hallstein and Blankenhorn complemented each other personally and professionally. Hallstein possessed great intelligence and an enormous work capacity. "Seldom in my life have I encountered a more tightly [strail] organized brain than that of Walter Hallstein," wrote Eckardt. "His spoken and written style is attractive [besteckend], his reasoning clear, if also frequently somewhat complicated."22 Rolf Lahr, one of the West German diplomats negotiating with the French on the Saar question, wrote to his mother from Paris in May 1954: "Hallstein said-pure Hallstein-'There are people who hold a certain degree of uncertainty for an advantage, and [there are] others who at the end of a conversation want to know what has been said. I belong to the latter.' Me too."23 Hallstein's colleagues in the Foreign Office considered him coldly intellectual, pedantic, neither courteous nor human enough, and overly theoretical. He had a way of unnerving officials, including participants at directors' meetings [Direktorenbesprechungen], when their ideas were not well thought out. Such situations were feared, Wilhelm Grewe recalled. On the other hand, this trait imposed a certain discipline and clarity on discussions, and Hallstein knew how to listen well and accept contrary arguments. 24 Adenauer himself sometimes had trouble with the state secretary, who had the habit of dwelling on topics that the chancellor did not want to discuss. Eckardt recalled that Adenauer also became nervous when this happened, since Hallstein's logic was normally airtight. He avenged himself by poking fun at Hallstein, who was no match for the chancellor in wit. Non-intimates often found this treatment shocking. 25 Although Hallstein was reserved and sober, he was by no means colorless. His close associates testified to his well-rounded intellect. He knew about and enjoyed literature, philosophy, and especially theater, which was his passion. Hallstein also had a decent sense of humor and could be quite charming in small circles. 26 It is safe to say, however, that most of his coworkers did not love Hallstein but instead respected him for his professional abilities. In comparison to the staid professor, Blankenhorn fit the picture of an elegant, eloquent diplomat who enjoyed life and had a great sense of humor. Rolf Pauls, personal assistant to Blankenhorn from 1949 to 1950 and then to Hallstein from 1952 to 1956, recalled that his first boss was the more relaxed of the two. Hallstein would leave a social event late at night with a huge bundle of documents under his arm and read them all before coming to work the next morning, not having slept much in between. In the same situation, Blankenhorn would scramble the next day in his office to see which business could be put off temporarily. Above all, Blankenhorn possessed great political sense

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8. Walter Hall stein, Konrad Adenauer, and Herbert Blankenhom in Paris on October 23, 1954, on the occasion of the signing of the treaty that would make the Federal Republic a NATO member (Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-27107-000 I).

and knew the West German political scene intimately. As Pauls put it, "he heard the grass growing." 27 Blankenhom had enjoyed a special relationship with Adenauer ever since joining him in 1948 as his personal assistant and secretary general of the CDU in the British zone. He was the key official for foreign affairs in the Chancellery in 1949-50. After Hall stein's arrival in mid-1950, Blankenhom correctly assumed that his personal relationship with the chancellor would ensure him continued influence, and he knew in any case that his status as a Wilhelmstraf3e veteran and a former Nazi Party member made him a poor choice to become state secretary for foreign affairs. If Blankenhom assumed that he would continue to be Adenauer's most important foreign policy advisor due to Hallstein's inexperience he would be mistaken, since Hallstein quickly proved his merits. As it turned out, the two got along well together. Blankenhom

188 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE recognized Hallstein's great intelligence, while Hallstein respected his deputy's special ties with the chancellor. 28 Hallstein made clear to the Foreign Office leadership in April 1951 that Blankenhorn was his deputy and needed to be kept fully informed of all significant developments. Important documents were to be sent to Hallstein with a copy for Blankenhom. Hallstein would decide himself which matters should be presented to Adenauer. 29 While he never regained the exclusive position he enjoyed in 1949-50, Blankenhorn remained one of Adenauer's most trusted advisors. Otto Lenz, who quarreled with him about developments in the Foreign Office, believed that Blankenhorn had fallen out of favor by early 1953. However, Adenauer's displeasure arose due to transient political difficulties and never became a permanent critique. 30 Blankenhorn's name continued to appear on Adenauer's visitor list with the same frequency as Hallstein's. 31 Adenauer practically pulled Blankenhorn out of his sickbed to have him co-chair the West German observer delegation at the January 1954 Berlin Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference, despite the fact that Wilhelm Grewe had been preparing to lead the delegation since late 1953. 32 A year later, when he finally decided to make Heinrich von Brentano foreign minister, the chancellor tried in vain to persuade Blankenhorn to become a second state secretary next to Hallstein. This did not prevent Adenauer in the late 1950s from flirting with bringing him back to Bonn as state secretary in the Foreign Office or for using him as a type of personal ambassador on several occasions. The first serious break between the two men occurred in the early 1960s, when Blankenhorn felt that Adenauer had reoriented his policy too strongly toward that of Charles de Gaulle to the neglect of West German-American relations. 33 Hallstein and Blankenhorn complemented one another not only personally but also politically. In Hans-Peter Schwarz's words, "Blankenhorn sees power blocs; Hallstein, institutions and paragraphs. Blankenhorn's disposition is undoubtedly much closer to Adenauer's." 34 Adenauer himself told Lenz that Blankenhorn possessed more political understanding than Hallstein. 35 Already by 1945, far earlier than many of his former diplomatic colleagues, Blankenhorn contemplated a Germany divided between the superpowers as a probable and-for the western parts-acceptable outcome for the foreseeable future, a position quite similar to Adenauer's. 36 Nonetheless, Hallstein's contribution was invaluable because, between 1950 and 1957, the Federal Republic found itself constantly involved in negotiations on the Occupation Statute, the European Defense Community (and later West German membership in NATO), and other European institu-

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tions such as the European Coal and Steel Community (1950-52) and the European Economic Community (1956-57). These treaties would determine West Germany's future for decades, and the Federal Republic did not negotiate from a position of strength vis-a-vis the Western Powers. As many German rights as possible had to be guaranteed through precise formulations. 37 In this area Hallstein was particularly skilled. He was also a firm believer in supranational European institutions, as was his fellow lawyer Carl Friedrich Op hills, who in 1952 became leader of the subdivision in Division II responsible for European integration. 38 Blankenhom counterbalanced Hallstein's tendency to conceive of foreign policy aims in terms of structures, whether institutional or treaty. For him, the key question remained whether plans responded to political realities. He brought an element of flexibility to the decision-making process within the Chancellery, especially regarding East-West relations. 39 Blankenhom's departure for the NATO mission in Paris in 1955 was soon followed by the start of negotiations on the European Economic Community as well as the proclamation of the "Hallstein Doctrine," by which the Federal Republic threatened to break diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic. At least one author has speculated that this tum toward more doctrinaire approaches in the Federal Republic's foreign policy might have been moderated ifBlankenhom had remained in Bonn. 40 In accordance with his personal leadership style, Adenauer relied heavily on both Hallstein and Blankenhom in implementing his foreign policy. All three engaged in shuttle diplomacy throughout the early 1950s, and it is remarkable how often they traveled during this period. From 1950 to 1954, Adenauer was on the road at home and abroad for a grand total of 451 days. 41 Much of this time he spent representing the Federal Republic at conferences as foreign minister. Hallstein's travels are more difficult to reconstruct, since he apparently did not keep a diary, but he frequently found himself abroad conducting negotiations. The most extreme example came during his first months of service, when he led the talks on the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. Despite having been appointed state secretary in the Chancellery in early August 1950, he spent, according to the West German delegation's calendar, an inordinate amount of time in Paris between late June 1950 and the end of March 1951, when the treaty text was finalized. 42 Adenauer frequently used Blankenhom as a type of special ambassador for important missions and put him to particularly good use in 1953 after the chancellor's anxiety peaked due to

190 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Joseph Stalin's death in March. Blankenhom traveled to Washington alone no fewer than four times during the year. 43 Similarly, Adenauer frequently entrusted important issues to groups attached to the Foreign Office but, at least initially, outside of its regular structure. The Secretariat for Schuman Plan Questions, for example, did not become part of Division II until 1952, while the German Delegation to the Interim Committee of the EDC was not integrated into Division II until 1954. Most significant was the Delegation for Changing the Occupation Statute through Contractual Relations, led by Wilhelm Grewe. Along with a small staff (comprised in part of his own law students from Freiburg) that came to be known as "Grewe's Kindergarten," he was responsible for preparing and leading negotiations with the Allied High Commission on the Occupation Statute from May 1951 to May 1952 that led to the General Treaty and its related agreements. 44 Grewe was joined in the evening by an Instruction Committee composed of Hallstein, Blankenhom, and between four and eight other officials to evaluate the exhausting negotiations. 45 He would assume this role again after the collapse of the EDC in August 1954 forced two new rounds of negotiations on the General Treaty. In two other important cases, Adenauer also entrusted men who were complete outsiders to the Foreign Ministry with negotiating responsibilities. Hermann Josef Abs led the German delegation at the 1952-53 London Debt Conference, and law professor Franz Bohm co-led the delegation for the Restitution Agreement with Israel during the same years. 46 One other issue is relevant to the position of Hallstein and Blankenhom in the Foreign Office. Both multilateral issues (including defense and European integration) and Occupation affairs were concentrated in Division II directly under Herbert Blankenhom. Haas's complaint that the division was a "ministry within a ministry" therefore retained some justification, even after many of its tasks arising from the first days of the Occupation Statute had been distributed to other divisions. This arrangement in part reflected Hallstein and Blankenhom's doubts about the ability of WilhelmstraBe veterans to conduct the new style of diplomacy. 47 More importantly, however, it further demonstrated that only men who enjoyed Adenauer's complete confidence were in charge of important policy issues.

The Leadership Structure in the Foreign Office Did the ministry's leadership structures need to be reinforced and widened? Were Blankenhom and Hallstein burdened with too many tasks? Many observ-

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ers in the early 1950s thought so, including West German diplomats. Wilhelm Haas told the Budget Subcommittee of the Bundestag Committee for the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs on January 26, 1951, that the DfAA was far more thinly staffed at the top than all other foreign ministries. For example, in Britain the Foreign Secretary had a 42-person-strong leadership group directly subordinate to him. "Our situation today is such that one state secretary and not even a minister is stationed above all the division leaders. I fear that the political effectiveness of the entire office is endangered if the top is kept too weak."48 For Maltzan, widening the leadership structure was the key to the entire reorganization of the Auswartiges Amt. His 1952 report noted that all divisions emphasized "that decisions are received [from the foreign minister and state secretary] only with great difficulty and considerable delay ... due to the great demands placed on them from other quarters. " 49 Blankenhom wrote in his diary in July 1952: [Maltzan believes the fact] that the state secretary simultaneously holds the functions of head of administration, advocate for foreign policy questions before parliamentary organs, representative for the chancellor at international conferences and finally main negotiation leader for European integration questions makes it impossible for the Auswartiges Amt to develop prosperously [ist far eine gedeihliche Entwicklung des Auswiirtigen Amtes unmoglich]. 50

The leadership question came up throughout the Bundestag's second reading of the Chancellery's budget for the 1950 Budget Year on May 31, 1951. Carl von Campe (DP), a former diplomat on the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, recommended creating an additional political deputy state secretary to lead Divisions II and III and take pressure off the leadership. It was impossible for Adenauer and Hallstein to handle all of their responsibilities alone. "You can't create an organization out of nothing," said Campe, "and at the same time participate in Schuman Plan negotiations, be in Strasbourg the next day for a meeting of the European Council and simultaneously be responsible for everything that happens here [in Bonn]." Neither the DP's plan for a deputy state secretary nor an initiative from the SPD to subordinate Division II directly to Hallstein found approval, but the Bundestag agreed with Campe's general diagnosis. Even the Budget Committee member who presented the report complained that the Foreign Office's request for the 1950 Budget Year arrived very late, and that trips abroad by Adenauer and Hallstein during the first months of 1951 had played a considerable role in the delay. 51

192 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE After the final parliamentary debate on the Foreign Office budget on October 16, 1951, future Federal Press Chief Felix von Eckardt wrote in the Weser-Kurier that complaints about Adenauer's unwillingness to delegate authority were fully justified. Important decisions within the ministry had been held up for months as a result. 52 The Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee agreed with the opinion of its chairman, Carlo Schmid, that the Foreign Office was improperly organized ifHallstein had to make such frequent trips abroad. 53 Late in 1951, after Lenz told him that the central office had left the missions in Paris and Brussels largely isolated and uninformed, Adenauer himself became concerned that the Foreign Office leadership had become overwhelmed with work. 54 There was some truth behind the perception that the Foreign Office's division leaders and, especially, the West German missions were not well integrated into Adenauer's foreign policy. Hallstein and the division leaders, including the head of Subdivision A of Division II (General Foreign Policy), Heinz Triitzschler von Falkenstein, assembled every morning Monday to Friday at 9:00 a.m. around a round table in the Palais Schaumburg for what were often lively directors meetings that were nicknamed the "morning prayer [Mm;genandacht]." Pauls, who regularly attended these meetings as Hallstein 's personal assistant from 1952 to 1956, recalled that legal advisor Erich Kaufmann was another frequent participant. 55 However, the division leaders' status in Adenauer's overall scheme of things is probably reflected best in Hans Globke's November 10, 1952, notice to Hallstein that he could not see fit to include the participants' cars on the list of vehicles that enjoyed free passage onto the Chancellery grounds. 56 The leadership in the home office remained in considerable flux in the early 1950s. Maltzan's 1952 report argued that the Foreign Office's work suffered because important positions had not yet been permanently occupied. Six Ministerialdirektor posts (the normal civil service rank for division leaders) existed in mid-1952, but only Blankenhom officially held this title as head of Division II. For a variety of reasons, the leaders of the five other divisions merely had been commissioned [beau.firagt] with their tasks. For example, the head of Division V, Hermann Mosler, was a law professor at the University of Frankfurt am Main. After starting work as head of the Legal Division on September 15, 1951, he remained tom between keeping his post in the Foreign Office and returning to his academic work. Academia finally won out, and Mosler returned to Frankfurt after August 31, 1953. 57 This scenario threatened to repeat itself with his successor, Grewe. After his

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duties concerning negotiations on revising the Occupation Statute ended in 1952, Hallstein desired to keep him in Bonn. Grewe took over from Mosler on a temporary basis on September 15, 1953, but even before he started, he complained that only participating in important political tasks would make staying in the Foreign Office more attractive than returning to his university post at Freiburg full-time. 58 A solution was found when Hans Berger from the Interior Ministry replaced him on May 1, 1954. Berger would lead the Legal Division until 1959. 59 Grewe, who remained a special advisor at Hallstein's insistence, began to flirt once again with the idea of returning to the Foreign Office late in 1954. 60 In June 1955, he became both a civil servant and Blankenhorn's successor as head of Division II, which finally allowed him to play a role in shaping important decisions. The career diplomat (Karl) Walther Becker oversaw the embryonic Foreign Trade Division (IV) from February 15, 1951, to January 1, 1953. 61 He was merely its deputy leader, and it was understood that Maltzan would replace him as soon as the rest of the Division's elements could be transferred from the Economics Ministry. Similarly, the Cultural Division had only a deputy leader until 1954, Rudolf Salat. For several decades Salat had worked in the Secretariat General of the Catholic organization Pax Romana in Switzerland. 62 In 1954, he became first consul at the West German Embassy to the Vatican. The Cultural Division did not receive many resources until around 1955, and it is also conceivable that institutional prejudice against Salat as an outsider worked against his permanent appointment. There was little sense in naming any of these individuals Ministerialdirektor. More interesting are the cases of the first two leaders of Division I, Haas and Dittmann, and the first leader of Division III, Theo Kordt. All were experienced career diplomats but were also merely commissioned. Haas quickly wore out his welcome with Adenauer due to his independent-minded personnel policy. However, Adenauer's mistrust was not at play in preventing Dittmann and Kordt from becoming Ministerialdirektoren. Dittmann had worked closely with Adenauer and enjoyed his confidence, and Kordt had even been mentioned in the press as a possible candidate for state secretary before Hallstein was appointed. Instead, the 1951-52 personnel controversy played an important role in their fates. Dittmann had barely succeeded Haas when the controversy broke out and forced his resignation. By September 1951, it appeared as if the Foreign Office had secured the other ministries' required approval for Kordt's appointment as leader of Division III. Then, however, UA47's investigations intervened, along with the committee's request to stop all

194 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE promotions or transfers of diplomats named in Mansfeld's articles until its hearings were over. In November 1952 Kordt asked Division I why he still had not been officially appointed. He wrote that he had "to see the reason in [the fact] that the Auswartiges Amt is ascribing significance to the reproaches of the journalist Heinze-Mansfeld, directed by Mr. Kempner ... , despite their groundlessness as proven in the Bundestag committee."63 In fact, the Foreign Office did not consider either Kordt or Dittmann undesirable. Hallstein even went to some length to defend Dittmann against attack from the SPD during the Bundestag's budget debate on June 24, 1953. 64 However, the ministry thought it safer to remove them from the political crossfire in Bonn. In 1953 Kordt became ambassador to Greece and Dittmann consul general in Hong Kong. 65 Kordt retired in 1958, but Dittmann would return to become permanent deputy to the state secretary in 1958-59. Besides Blankenhorn, few of the Foreign Office's division and deputy leaders had regular access to Adenauer. Adenauer's appointment calendar indicates that Dittmann played an outstanding role through 1951, especially when Blankenhorn was incapacitated due to illness or accident. Neither Triltzschler nor Ophills, the subdivision leaders in Division II, subsequently attained Dittmann's importance, although the latter appears frequently on Adenauer's calendar in 1954 whenever European matters were discussed. Of the Foreign Office's personnel chiefs, Wilhelm Haas spoke with Adenauer all of six times between December 1949 and June 1950; Dittmann saw him on March 4 and June 6, 1952; and Peter Pfeiffer four times between September 15, 1952, and September 2, 1953. After meeting with the chancellor three times in December 1953 alone, Josef Lons appeared on the calendar only seven additional times through June 1955. Theo Kordt apparently met with Adenauer for the first time on November 23, 1953, when he was already on his way to Greece as ambassador, and his deputy Hasso von Etzdorf remained totally shut out. Kordt's successor, Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick, met with Adenauer once in both July 1954 and June 1955. Mosler, who enjoyed good ties with Hallstein, appears periodically on the calendar from May 1952 to September 1953, while Berger appears in June 1954 and January and February 1955. Adenauer understood Grewe mainly as a negotiations leader in the early 1950s, and it was in the context of negotiations with the Allied High Commission that he became a frequent conversation partner (sometimes accompanied by Kaufmann) in late 1951 and early 1952. Grewe said that he briefed Adenauer every second day for a few hours during the high points of negotiations on the Contractual Agreements. 66 He also met with the chancellor repeatedly in January 1954

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due to the Berlin Conference and later the same year after the collapse of the European Defense Community. Salat appears very infrequently on the list. As could be expected, Herwarth met most frequently with the chancellor while accompanying prominent foreign visitors in his role as federal protocol chief, with Ernst-Gunther Mohr replacing him starting in April 1955.67 In 1952 Maltzan slowly entered the picture for the first time as a possible addition to the higher leadership. Adenauer still had doubts about him. Although Blankenhorn thought that Maltzan might be named ambassador to an important post, perhaps Washington, he considered it unlikely that Maltzan would be appointed leader of Division IV. 68 In June 1952 the Schuman Plan countries wanted to make Hallstein president of the European Court of Justice, and Maltzan came up as a possible successor as state secretary. The point became moot when Hallstein followed his initial inclination to remain at his post, but Adenauer was finally warming up to Maltzan. 69 By November 1953, Blankenhorn hoped that Maltzan had become acceptable as his deputy while he was away on another sick leave. "I hope very much that the state secretary and the chancellor accommodate this wish," Blankenhorn wrote in his diary, "because I fear that the state secretary will not be able to hold up on a purely physical level [with] the present excessive workload." 70 That month Maltzan indeed became one of Adenauer's regular conversation partners, and in December Hallstein named him Blankenhorn's deputy. 71 Adenauer himself had reason to complain about the Foreign Office's narrow leadership on Saturday, June 19, 1954, the day after Pierre Mendes-France became French minister president and foreign minister. All of the likely candidates to advise him on the implications of Mendes-France's rise to power were either out of town for the weekend (Hallstein, Maltzan, Grewe), sick (Blankenhorn), or otherwise indisposed (Theo Blank of the Dienststelle Blank), and the German mission in Paris had not reported either. Adenauer was supposed to speak the next day at a CDU event in Dlisseldorf, where he would demand the restoration of German sovereignty independent of ratification of the EDC Treaty but did not know what to say about this important development. "You must admit," he wrote Hallstein, "that this is an indefensible state of affairs that must not be repeated." 72 The central office's relations with the missions also remained problematic, in no small part because it distrusted the abilities of its ambassadors and consuls. Most of the initial appointees to posts in Western Europe and the Americas were either outsiders, selected primarily to placate foreign opinion, or political appointees from Adenauer's coalition government (occasionally

196 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE both). Despite the importance of their posts, the leaders of the diplomatic missions in London (Schlange-Schoningen), Paris (Hausenstein), and Washington (Krekeler) were considered by many observers to be among the most troubling. On September 5, 1950, Haas summed up his impression of the first three mission chiefs to Cal Ancrum of the US High Commission. The Organization Office had nominated all candidates to lead consular posts with the intention of changing their status to that of diplomatic representatives at the appropriate time. Hopefully this rather old first group (the average age was 62) would remain in good enough health to serve three or four years and then be replaced with a new generation. Although Haas did not know Krekeler well enough to be certain that he was qualified to represent the Federal Republic in Washington when the time came, he "had far exceeded every expectation originally had of him." Krekeler had managed to set up the New York Consulate General efficiently and to stay clear of any unpleasant publicity. The exact opposite applied to Schlange-Schoningen, Haas said, and the US High Commission could be glad that he had not been sent to the United States. "Haas felt that the trouble was that Schlange-Schoningen was too conscious of his own importance as a former Reich minister to buckle down and do the job that he had been sent out to perform," noted Ancrum. On the other hand, Hausenstein "had disappeared into the blue haze of Paris. Nothing was heard of him, but at least he was quiet." Hausenstein's staff was good, added Haas, and his office "had made reasonable progress." 73 Haas's categorization of the three men remained relatively accurate throughout their time of service. Krekeler excelled at his post; Hausenstein was very good for cultural relations but seemed ill-suited for serious diplomatic tasks; and Schlange-Schoningen often provided unpleasant surprises. The varying degrees of tact possessed by the three men manifested themselves from the start. Krekeler, fully sensitive to Allied restrictions on any overt diplomatic activity on his part, refused to comment to the American press about purely political questions. Hausenstein likewise stressed the nonpolitical nature of his mission, and the very reserved, at times frosty, stance taken by the French toward him and his staff during the first years in Paris ensured he had little opportunity to dabble in politics anyway. 74 On the other hand, SchlangeSchoningen held an exclusive interview with the Reuters press service on November 8, 1950, in which he urged that German representatives be included in Allied talks on German rearmament. Expressing German frustration regarding continued delays, he even asked, "Will it be the same as between 1933 and 1938?"75 Two days later, Adenauer sent a circular to the consulates general in

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London, New York, and Paris. Due to recent incidents [aus gegebenemAnlass] he requested that the missions make no statements on political questions for which the government had not issued guidelines unless the content had been cleared with Hallstein or Blankenhom. The Organization and Personnel Division was instructed to send the directive to all other missions that had recently opened as well. 76 Blankenhorn frequently complained that the representatives in London, Paris, and Washington possessed none of the qualities required to conduct successful diplomacy. On June 11, 1952, he wrote in his diary that SchlangeSchoningen made an "old, tired and exhausted [verbraucht] impression" during a visit to Bonn, noting that "a change in London seems urgently necessary to me." 77 Hausenstein, in Blankenhorn's opinion, "understands only very little about foreign policy matters." Adenauer complained to Hausenstein in person in July 1952 about too little contact with the French Foreign Ministry. 78 Blankenhorn possessed much goodwill for Krekeler but feared that he would never be able to overcome the stigma of being "a somewhat provincial type." "When you consider the problem of staffing our ambassadorial posts in Paris, London, and Washington," Blankenhorn wrote, time and again you become painfully aware of how few appropriate personalities the Federal Republic has available for such important tasks. The informed person [Kenner] knows the reason: During his final years in power, Hitler did not murder 4,000-5,000 of the most valuable Germans in vain. The worst shortcoming involved is that the people in London, Paris, and Washington as a rule lack the criterion for political questions. You could overlook everything else. 79

As early as February 1952 Adenauer and Lenz had discussed the question of who should be sent to these three cities when the Federal Republic received the right to open regular embassies there. 80 Krekeler quickly demonstrated that he did have useful abilities, especially through his success in helping to organize the German mission net in the United States. For a brief time in 1952 he was even a candidate to take over Division 1. 81 On the other hand, SchlangeSchoningen and, somewhat more unfairly, Hausenstein never overcame the stigma of limited usefulness. Blankenhorn also lacked faith in the leaders of the Federal Republic's other missions in Western Europe and the Americas. In February 1953, the Foreign Office held a conference of the Western European mission chiefs in Bonn along with Krekeler and the West German observer at the United Na-

198 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE tions, Hans Riesser. Blankenhom's impression was that "today the central office already has well-qualified officials [Krafte] at its disposal, while the missions are led by men who are too old and not forceful enough. One naturally cannot expect much from people like Schlange-Schoningen, Hausenstein, [Clemens von] Brentano in Rome, [and] Prince Adalbert of Bavaria [the ambassador to Spain]."82 Hans von Herwarth also considered several outsiders from the early 1950s "flops," including CDU politician Friedrich Holzapfel (Switzerland) and the FOP politicians Fritz Oellers (Brazil) and Hans Miihlenfeld (the Netherlands). 83 It was not only career diplomats who expressed such reservations. Rolf Lahr, a newcomer to the Foreign Office in 1953, had his own worries about outsiders like Hausenstein, Holzapfel, Miihlenfeld, Brentano, and three men unfamiliar to him, stationed in South America, who had accumulated "political merits [Verdienste]": Oellers, the SPD's Gustav Herbig (Uruguay), and presumably, the CDU's Hermann Terdenge (Argentina), although Terdenge had led the Foreign Office's Cultural Division in the early 1930s and was therefore (like Clemens von Brentano) not an outsider. "I understand of course that our Federal Chancellor wants to get rid of incompetent or uncomfortable 'political friends,"' Lahr wrote to his mother, "but our Foreign Minister should not unload them in the Auswartiges Amt." 84 Personnel chief Josef Lons, also an outsider, complained that the first generation of mission leaders may have broken the political ice in the countries in which they were stationed, but they were unfamiliar with the requirements of professional diplomacy and were frequently inactive in promoting West German interests. 85 While it may be true that in modem diplomacy mission chiefs have become mere recipients of orders without much of an independent role, the extent to which major West German missions were left out of the political loop in the early 1950s is somewhat startling nonetheless. 86 This trend was particularly notable in the case of the diplomatic missions in London, Paris, and Washington. At first, the Three Powers' desire to conduct political relations with the Federal Republic solely through the Allied High Commission limited their role. In May 1952, Der Tag, a CDU-affiliated paper, described the diplomatic mission in London as a "consulate at a lost post" because it had so little contact with the central office. 87 Schlange-Schoningen claimed that he had no idea how the journalist, who had taken a tour of the mission, had come to this conclusion. 88 However, the Foreign Office had reason to suspect that he himself had something to do with the article. Earlier that year he had requested that, in the future, Bonn should orient him on the political situation, inform him of

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its goals and intentions, and finally authorize him to take specific diplomatic actions that he felt the British government would allow. 89 Hallstein replied that the Occupation Statute still limited West German foreign policy. In the spring of 1952, negotiations with the Three Powers on the Occupation Statute had reached an advanced stage. This situation called for the continued strict routing of all political relations with the Powers through the High Commission only, even if the wishes of some parts of the foreign service for a greater role had to be ignored. Hallstein was certain, however, that the situation would soon improve for the missions in Washington, Paris, and London. 90 Indeed, the High Commissioners increasingly came to resemble normal national ambassadors after negotiations on the Occupation Statute concluded in 1952, even though the original General Treaty would not be ratified due to its link with the doomed European Defense Community. When Herbert Wehner (SPD) suggested using the High Commission to clarify certain questions about relations with the GDR and the inter-German border at a meeting of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee on June 6, 1953, Adenauer replied: "I believe you overestimate the present status of the High Commissioners in Germany. In the eyes of their superiors [Auftraggeber] the High Commissioners in Germany are nothing more than agents [Beauftragte] who have to communicate [to the Federal Republic] what has been decided [by their governments] in Washington, London, and Paris."91 His statement implied that West German-Allied relations had normalized in practice and that the diplomatic missions in the capitals of the Three Powers also had more latitude. Heinz Krekeler recalled that his mission in Washington did play a greater political role starting in 1953.92 Nonetheless, the missions in the capitals of the Three Powers continued to feel isolated whenever crucial issues arose. In the second half of 1954, the Auswartiges Arnt did a particularly poor job of keeping the Washington mission informed. For example, everything it knew about the August 1954 Brussels Conference (an unsuccessful last-minute attempt to save the European Defense Community) came from the US State Department or British and Dutch colleagues. "This is certainly very depressing," concluded Embassy Consular Georg Federer. "Above all it cripples our duties here, which of course among other things include political reporting." 93 On important issues that winter, such as the status of the Saar, the German position on NATO's proposed armaments pool, and Western discussions on preparing for talks with the Soviet Union, Krekeler and his colleagues once again heard more from the State Department and the Washington diplomatic corps than from Bonn. To drive

200 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE home the point that his mission was greatly disadvantaged in terms of information compared to other missions in Washington, Krekeler prepared a memo in January 1955 based on information that he had solicited from US, British, and French diplomats. In 1954, the State Department sent around 5,000 telegrams to the US Embassy in Rome and had received around 4,600 in return. The British Embassy in Washington in the same year had sent 4,500 telegrams on political and economic subjects and received 6,700 from London, while the French Embassy reported sending 8,000 and receiving 18,000 telegrams of all kinds (a roughly comparable total because the French counted pages instead of individual messages). In comparison, the German Diplomatic Mission had sent 794 telegrams and received exactly 826. 94 Krekeler complained yet again in the spring of 1955 about the meetings of the London Working Group to prepare for upcoming Four Power conferences in Geneva. Although West German officials had participated in some of the deliberations, the Washington mission heard about the results of the talks for the first time from the British Embassy on May 10. Ten days later, it received the official final report on the meetings from the State Department. The Auswartiges Amt also sent a report on May 18, but Krekeler complained that it contained only material that had appeared in the newspapers. Only with some difficulty did Krekeler manage to get a copy of the final report from Bonn at the end of May. 95 These communication problems had little to do with the central office's fear of provoking the Three Powers while the Occupation Statute was in effect, nor did they necessarily reflect a distrust of diplomatic outsiders running important missions. In December 1955, some seven months after the Federal Republic had become a sovereign state, Herwarth, the career diplomat who had replaced Schlange-Schoningen in London, gave Division III a memo listing no fewer than twelve important issues about which the London embassy had been poorly informed. These included various trips abroad by Adenauer and Foreign Office officials as well as general information about developments in NATO. 96 The most celebrated case of a "consulate at a lost post," since it led to press attacks against Hallstein, involved the Paris diplomatic mission during the months leading up to the French National Assembly's rejection of the European Defense Community Treaty on August 30, 1954. Wilhelm Hausenstein's coworkers in Paris reported accurately throughout the summer that the treaty stood almost no chance of ratification in the French parliament. Nevertheless, there was no change in the official policy of support for the EDC. Moreover, Hallstein and Ophiils remained supremely confident until the very end, and

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Adenauer seemed genuinely disappointed that it had failed. Early explanations for this reaction incorrectly argued that Adenauer had been misinformed or had only listened to selected information from his contacts with fellow Christian Democrats in the Mouvement des Republicains Populaires, a pro-EDC party, or his own party colleagues Heinrich von Brentano (CDU) and Franz-Josef StrauB (CSU), who visited Paris to make an appraisal. In fact, Adenauer and Hallstein were realistically pessimistic. They hoped that the massive pressure US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was applying to France might have a positive effect, but since March 1954 the Foreign Office also had considered how to break the link between the EDC Treaty and the General Treaty so that West Germany might attain sovereignty even if the EDC failed. Adenauer's own statements during the summer indicated that this was indeed his plan. His government nonetheless clung to the EDC until the bitter end and did not propose alternatives. As he told the Cabinet on June 15, 1954, if the EDC should fail, the impression must not arise that the Federal Republic was at fault or in any way an undependable partner. 97 However, the Foreign Office leadership apparently did little to inform either its own missions or the government coalition of its overall strategy and the rationale behind it. After the EDC failed, the impression arose, in the words of the FDP's Thomas Dehler, that Adenauer's leadership methods were insufficient and that Hallstein did not use the Foreign Office at all. The FDP's National Committee concluded that the foreign policy apparatus had failed in its job at a key moment and that the time had come to think about appointing a separate foreign minister. 98 The Suddeutsche Zeitung agreed that the problem was that the ministry lacked a head, although no one thought Adenauer would give up the minister's portfolio in the near future. Hallstein and Blankenhorn needed relief. It reported that due to the EDC, Hallstein had alienated himself from his colleagues in the Foreign Office and from the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee. Only Adenauer's support kept him at his post, since he had no political allies at the time. In the paper's opinion, it was no secret that the West German missions were poorly incorporated into policy making, and the Paris Diplomatic Mission had been treated particularly unfairly. 99 Hausenstein certainly believed so and wrote later ofHallstein's "primitive optimism" concerning the EDC. 100 Hallstein and Lons were not pleased with the fallout and blamed Foreign Office press chief Gunther Diehl, another EDC skeptic, for inspiring the negative coverage. 101 After the French National Assembly rejected the EDC Treaty, another intense round of negotiations between the Western Powers and the FRG began

202 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE to formulate a new General Treaty and to find a substitute for the EDC. Two months later in London, Adenauer scored a major success when the NATO Powers agreed to accept the Federal Republic directly into the alliance as a full member. However, the Foreign Office's leadership was now preoccupied with negotiations once again, and the old complaints arose about Adenauer neglecting relations with parliament and his own coalition. Minister without Portfolio Franz-Josef StrauB felt upset enough to write an especially blunt letter to the chancellor on October 8, 1954, which emphasized "we cannot rely on foreign policy to substitute for what has been neglected in domestic policy." 102 Adenauer did not appreciate StrauB's letter in the least. 103 However, it reflected the persistent misgivings within parliament and his own party about his dual role as chancellor and foreign minister. Were the Foreign Office's leadership structures truly too narrow? When it came to important matters, the answer is probably no. Adenauer, Hallstein, and Blankenhorn seem to have had sufficient information to make decisions on all major issues. Even though paperwork increased dramatically and led the divisions to complain that they did not have enough staff, it had not yet reached anywhere near the level of the late 1950s. The amount that filtered up to Hallstein and Blankenhorn was heavy, but for quite some time it was still manageable. In this sense it was a blessing in disguise that the West German mission net grew rather slowly. 104 Also significant was the fact that the important diplomatic activity involving the Western powers and NATO took place within a geographically compact area, making shuttle diplomacy quite possible. It was easy for high-ranking German diplomats to reach the conferences on European integration in Paris, for example, or the meetings of the European Council in Strasbourg, and through 1952 important talks took place a stone's throw away at the Allied High Commission's headquarters on the Petersberg above Bonn. All the major negotiations also were inter-ministerial in the truest sense of the word. For example, the Dienststelle Blank, under Theodor Blank (CDU), the nucleus of the future Defense Ministry, was in charge of negotiations on rearmament. Despite the Foreign Office's complaints about the role of other ministries in foreign policy, this division of labor helped to take pressure off the Foreign Office leadership at conferences. In addition, intense phases of negotiation were concentrated between 1950 and 1952 (Schuman Plan, EDC, General Treaty) and between late 1954 and early 1955 (NATO, new General Treaty). It was possible for a small leadership staff to get its work done during these phases "at a gallop," working 12, 14, and even 16 hours a day during intense stretches. 105

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Finally, there is also some negative evidence-none of the solutions proposed to help Hallstein and Blankenhorn through 1955 were actually implemented. On several occasions critics proposed creating an additional state secretary or even deputy state secretaries. 106 Blankenhorn himself had favored a second state secretary in October 1954, because he believed the ministry's workload had increased greatly just over the past few months. West Germany's impending membership in NATO would greatly increase its diplomatic weight and lead to even more work by making bilateral relations with other states more important. He wanted a second state secretary who would serve as the foreign minister's deputy and represent West Germany at the NATO Council and Western European Union. 107 Nonetheless, the "Hallstein solution" of only one state secretary prevailed for the rest of the decade. In 1958, the Bundestag Budget Committee vetoed Foreign Minister Brentano's proposal for two deputy state secretaries to help coordinate work with other government ministries. 108 To some extent tradition played a role in this development, since the classic German ministry had only one state secretary, but by 1960 tradition had to bend to the weight of circumstance as an ever-growing workload led to the appointment of a second state secretary, Karl Carstens. Maltzan's 1952 report had contained a number of other suggestions, including a new hierarchical level between the state secretary and the divisions, the "general secretary," with enough power to relieve both the minister and the state secretary of many of their administrative duties. The French employed such an official in their foreign ministry. 109 In May 1952 the idea of creating a general secretary was broached for the first time in a discussion between Adenauer and Blankenhorn. 110 The chancellor thought about commissioning Maltzan for a three-month period to oversee the expansion of the Foreign Ministry. If he did a good job, he could be appointed either the ministry's general secretary or ambassador at a major post. 111 In 1954, Blankenhorn again proposed the creation of a general secretary who would concentrate on improving coordination between the central office and the missions. 112 Nothing came of these ideas either, which strongly suggests that the Foreign Office leadership became preoccupied with organizational problems only when these became a target of public criticism. Maltzan's report also recommended giving the division leaders greater powers and creating ambassadors-at-large to oversee foreign missions. Once again, the former was not realized, but in 1955 Peter Pfeiffer became the Foreign Office's first inspector general for the missions. Maltzan also argued in his report that, like in other foreign ministries, West Germany should have a policy planning staff under the state secretary to

204 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE establish general guidelines for policy. Wilhelm Grewe seems to have been the most fervent advocate of a planning staff in the early 1950s. Grewe, who was thinking about returning to teach law after the Occupation Statute negotiations had concluded, wrote Hallstein in November 1952 that he had been disappointed with his recent experiences in Bonn. "That holds true in particular for the treatment of my note on the reunification question. I have the feeling that it was taken really only as a disturbance, insofar as it was read at all." Grewe was referring to a memo arguing that, in legal terms, joining the EDC was compatible with a "neutrality treaty" with the USSR. Due to the importance of reunification, the Federal Government had to make the attempt to create a special relationship with the "NATO-System" that would allow it the possibility to arrange relations with the Soviets on its own. His failed attempt to clarify the government's position, as Grewe put it, combined with his intimate knowledge of the General Treaty, moved him to publish the essay anonymously in modified form in the journal Auftenpolitik in December 1952. 113 Grewe wrote to Hallstein that I have the fear that this outcome [Ablauj] is symptomatic and will repeat itself. The enormous overload [of work] that the Chancellor and you are faced with and which I find, with all respect for your accomplishments, extraordinarily detrimental for the functioning of the Auswartiges Amt will lead again and again, I fear, to this: the fundamental problems of long-term planning, which you once in a conversation intended as a task for me, will come off badly. To this day I basically do not know what the Chancellor really thinks about the reunification question. 114

Shortly thereafter the Foreign Office sent Grewe to Washington to study the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. 115 Grewe had put his finger on one of the major problems of conducting policy with a small circle of confidants: namely, that there might not be sufficient time to do anything except move to the next task. Blankenhorn agreed that Adenauer had little sense for long-term planning. 116 However, a planning staff for the Auswartiges Amt would have to wait until 1963, although Blankenhorn, Grewe, and Wolfgang Freiherr von Welck were involved in getting the Federal Government to support the creation of a foreign policy think-tank, the Deutsche Gesellschaftfiir Auswiirtige Politik, in 1955. u7 It is questionable whether Adenauer's self-confident leadership style could have accommodated a planning staff in the first place.

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The foreign Minister Question Everyone agreed, however, that the Auswiirtiges Amt sooner or later would need an independent minister. In late 1950 the press had speculated about various candidates for the post in anticipation of the Small Revision of the Occupation Statute. 118 Adenauer himself apparently seriously considered appointing Hallstein, who had no political power base and therefore would be totally dependent. He was not even a member of a political party, which Adenauer felt had certain advantages for dealing with his coalition. 119 However, Blankenhom correctly predicted that Adenauer would keep the job himself, as he told the US High Commission on September 28, 1950. Heinrich von Brentano was too tied up leading the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation (and too independent), and there were no other suitable candidates. "Blankenhom said Hallstein was a good administrator, not tarred with [the] foreign service brush," the US report stated. "Asked whether he had sufficient force to stand up to the chancellor, Blankenhom replied, 'No, that's the trouble. "'12° By October rumors were rife in Bonn that Adenauer would become minister. 121 In the end, as Blankenhom told the press on October 21, "there is no doubt that Federal Chancellor Adenauer will be his own foreign minister. By the way, in the current situation this is only for the best [es ist nur gut so]," a reference to Adenauer's contacts and experience with the Allied High Commission. 122 However, months would pass before this decision became official. One major factor behind Adenauer's unwillingness to make an announcement sooner was coalition politics and especially the maneuvering of the CDU/ CSU's major coalition partner, the FDP. 123 Vice-Chancellor Franz Blucher and the head of the FDP's Bundestag delegation, Hans Wellhausen, wrote to Adenauer on November 17, 1950, with a catalogue of demands including the appointment of a foreign minister responsible to parliament and the accelerated creation of foreign missions. They also wanted a separate Foreign Trade Ministry created out of Blucher's Marshall Plan Ministry. Blucher was the FDP's leading candidate for both this post and that of foreign minister but could not make up his mind about which one he preferred. This was the first of many attempts by the FDP over the coming months to enhance Blucher's position in the cabinet vis-a-vis Adenauer. But Adenauer's own Bundestag delegation firmly opposed an FDP foreign minister. In fact, the delegation's leadership did not want any minister at all at first, probably for reasons similar to those given by its coalition partners in the DP-it was disappointed with the Small Revision, which had not returned full German sovereignty. 124 Faced with a divided coalition, Adenauer seems to have

206 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE avoided a decision until the last minute, by which time he had smoothed the way for his own candidacy. On March 12, 1951, the CDU/CSU Bundestag steering committee approved Adenauer's decision to make himself foreign minister. 125 The next day the cabinet also gave its approval. Adenauer told it that he must hold this portfolio, according to the protocol, "as long as the question of German equality [Gleichberechtigung] had not yet been decided," although the FOP members repeated their argument about the need for an independent minister. 126 Andre Fran9ois-Poncet wrote that although the German press was making a big deal out of Adenauer's decision, it came as no surprise. In reality, Adenauer had wanted the job himself from the outset and, after flirting briefly with appointing Hallstein, ended up keeping it. "The Chancellor's behavior cannot be explained solely by his taste for personal power, his suspicion of others or his propensity to do everything himself. It is consistent with tradition." An excellent student of German history, Fran9ois-Poncet remarked that the Reich's chancellors also had been foreign ministers, "and Mr. Adenauer would very much like to fit himself into their lineage." 127 Almost immediately, both political friends and foes began to complain that one man could not be chancellor and run the Foreign Office at the same time. Federal President Theodor Heuss (FDP), concerned with deflecting criticism from the government, wrote to Adenauer as early as March 15, 1951, to suggest that his party colleague Bliicher represent the Federal Republic at conferences outside of Germany. "The common identity of both the Chancellor and Foreign Minister at such encounters is of course not free of difficulties," wrote Heuss. 128 Adenauer sidestepped the issue with Heuss, but some of his closest coworkers and party colleagues were also interested in an independent minister. His own CDU/CSU did not think that the chancellor should be saddled with direct ministerial responsibilities. 129 On May 29, 1951, the new state secretary in the Chancellery, Otto Lenz, discussed the need for a foreign minister with Heinrich von Brentano and even asked whether Brentano would be interested in taking the job. Brentano, depressed about an unruly CDU/ CSU Bundestag delegation, declined and said that he would prefer to resign altogether. However, Lenz had helped put an idea into his head that he would pursue doggedly over the coming years. By the fall of 1951, the press had already begun to speculate about Brentano 's candidacy. 130 Adenauer himself realized that he could not remain both foreign minister and chancellor indefinitely since he was unable to devote sufficient attention to the ministry. 131 While in Paris in November 1951 Adenauer discussed with

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Blankenhom who should succeed him, with Brentano or a member of the FDP as possible candidates. 132 The German press reported on July 15, 1952, that Adenauer would appoint a new foreign minister soon after the Bundestag's third reading of the Treaties of Bonn and Paris. 133 Once again while in Paris, this time in May 1953, Adenauer surprised Blankenhom by saying quite forcefully that, despite all his second thoughts, he would not keep the foreign minister's portfolio past the fall elections. 134 By this time Brentano was actively campaigning behind the scenes for it with the strong support of the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation. Adenauer, for his part, favored banker Hermann Josef Abs, whom he had tried to make state secretary for foreign affairs in 1950. He found it useful that Abs was not closely affiliated with a political party. 135 Over the next two years Brentano became the clear favorite for the post, especially since the chancellor could not ignore the wishes of his own party. By mid1954 Adenauer had given up on Abs as well as other possibilities from the CDU such as Eugen Gerstenmaier, who had a following in the Auswartiges Amt among diplomats who had known him in the Third Reich and later in the Evangelisches Hilfswerk. 136 Nonetheless, Adenauer remained foreign minister until June 1955, because he wanted to oversee the realization of the treaty complex that would give the Federal Republic sovereignty and an active role in Western defense. Until the treaties were in effect, his doubts about the wisdom of surrendering the ministry to another politician always outweighed his belief that a separate foreign minister was necessary. As he wrote the FDP'sAugust-Martin Euleron July 16, 1951: It seems to me that giving up the foreign ministry at the present time is fully incompatible with the interests of the German people, the federal government, and the coalition. In the next 3--6 months, the question of establishing equal rights, a mutual-aid treaty [Beistandsvertrag, with the Western powers] and the German people's defense contribution has to be solved. To me it seems entirely impossible to entrust this task to a man who is unfamiliar with the previous course of negotiations. I also wish to point out that especially in foreign policy the personal relationship between the leading statesmen plays a very great role, and that the personal trust that I-as I would like to assume-enjoy with important foreign statesmen represents a great tangible factor in Germany's favor [einen grofien realen Faktor zu Gunsten Deutsch/ands darstellt]. 137

This logic did not fall on deaf ears within the coalition. By the end of 1951 even the Free Democrats, who had been most critical of the personal union of both

208 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE portfolios, agreed it would be a bad idea to replace Adenauer as foreign minister as long as negotiations on the General and EDC Treaties were ongoing. 138 The main problem for Brentano was that the process of achieving West German sovereignty and disarmament dragged on for years. Even after the CDU/CSU's tremendous success in the September 1953 Bundestag elections Adenauer refused to make him minister. His doubts about surrendering the portfolio to Brentano were strengthened by the opposition ofBlankenhom and Hallstein, their allies in the CDU/CSU, and even the US High Commissioner, James Conant, and the US European ambassador, David Bruce. Blankenhom told Adenauer with some vehemence that he was invaluable as foreign minister, given the unsettled business of the General Treaty and the EDC. 139 Adenauer argued to the press and to his own Bundestag delegation that he hoped to give up the foreign minister's portfolio soon, but only after the "most important things were cleared up." His personal ties with foreign statesmen were too important an advantage before West Germany was sovereign and rearmed. 140 In June 1954 Globke told the CDU's Heinrich Krone that Adenauer wanted to make Brentano minister that summer. Then the collapse of the EDC project in August opened up another long round of negotiations, which meant that Brentano would have to wait until after the talks on the Paris Treaties ended. 141 On May 2, 1955, three days before the treaties came into effect, Adenauer finally told the CDU Executive Committee he would ask Heuss to relieve him as foreign minister and appoint Brentano as soon as the Federal Republic had fulfilled its first functions at NATO and the Western European Union. He would do this not only because Brentano enjoyed his trust-a doubtful statement-but also "because I view this part of my work as closed-it is a period [Abschnitt]-and finished." Adenauer wanted to devote himself to the new armed forces and instituting social reforms. His memoirs mention that it was not an easy decision to give up the Foreign Office, but his many tasks as chancellor and CDU chairman made it necessary. As he wrote to Heuss on May 22, he had left many areas of the ministry totally to Hall stein, "and over the long run it is not good that the foreign minister concerns himself with these things only in the remotest way." 142 The ratification of the Paris Treaties in 195 5 marked the end of the Occupation Statute and the start of West German sovereignty. For contemporaries it also signaled a new phase in the Federal Republic's foreign policy. Blankenhom, Franz-Josef StrauB, and Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) agreed that "the German ship now is coming out of coastal waters onto the high seas" and that wide-sweeping organizational changes were needed in order to ensure better long-term planning and coordination of foreign and defense policy. 143 Plans for

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a small kitchen cabinet, for a federal defense council, and to make Kiesinger leader of the CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation did not materialize; Adenauer dealt them a serious blow by making their most ambitious proponent, StrauB, minister for atomic questions. 144 Nonetheless, Brentano's appointment was part of a larger "changing of the guard" within the Federal Republic's Foreign Office and Chancellery. 145 Hallstein would remain as state secretary, but in the spring Blankenhorn departed to become ambassador to NATO in Paris. Maltzan left for Paris as ambassador to France and Herwarth went to London. A close Adenauer coworker from the Chancellery, Press Chief Felix von Eckardt, became observer at the United Nations. Blankenhorn, Maltzan, and Herwarth were replaced in the home office respectively by Grewe, Albert Hilger van Scherpenberg, and Herwarth's "old friend" Ernst-Gunther Mohr, the career diplomat serving as West German ambassador to Venezuela. 146 Another veteran diplomat, Heinz Trtitzschler, became the Cultural Division's first formal leader. Finally, the Auswartiges Amt found an appropriate low-profile role for Peter Pfeiffer, taking advantage of his experience in the new post of inspector general for the German missions. Of the first three mission chiefs sent out in 1950, only Krekeler kept his job. Now the Foreign Office's doubts about the political abilities of two of the three outsiders became fully clear. Schlange-Schoningen and Hausenstein were not allowed the symbolic honor of presenting their credentials as full ambassadors in London and Paris. 147 One ofHerwarth's first acts as ambassador was to report that while UK-West German intergovernmental relations were good, the British public remained very suspicious of Germany. He recommended among other things a massive expansion of the embassy's press division, the creation of an information center, and in imitation of Krekeler, perhaps employing a public relations firm. 148 The farewell celebrations for Hausenstein in Paris indicated that, on the other hand, the French truly appreciated his work. Hausenstein's supporters in the Bundestag later had to intervene to secure him an adequate pension. Understandably, Hausenstein became bitter about this treatment. 149 Brentano's appointment was greeted with great unease by Hallstein and Blankenhorn. Not only had he been campaigning to become minister for some time, but he was associated with the critics of the ministry in the CDU/CSU. His relations with Blankenhorn often had been strained in the past, and Fran9ois-Poncet reported that his relations with Hallstein were by no means excellent either. 150 Heuss worried that Brentano and Hallstein would make a bad team due to oversensitivity. "They will largely agree in their political opinions [in ihrer politischen Sachauffassung]," he wrote Adenauer, "but to me it is

210 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE uncertain whether H[allstein], in spite of all of his loyalty as an official, will take directives from B[rentano]." 151 On June 2, 1954, Hallstein actually said he would quit if Brentano became foreign minister. For his part, Blankenhorn had no desire to complicate his relations with the new foreign minister by acting as Adenauer's watchdog. During the winter of 1954--55 Adenauer told Blankenhorn that he intended to appoint two state secretaries in the Foreign Office and wanted him to be one of them. However, Blankenhorn stood his ground. Citing his chronically poor health, he wrote Adenauer on March 2, 1955, to request reassignment to a less demanding post, for example the new NATO ambassadorship in Paris. Displeased, Adenauer tried his best to dissuade him and only slowly warmed to the idea of sending him abroad. He had to be talked out of the rather eccentric idea of putting the NATO embassy directly under the Chancellery. 152 During the spring of 1955 Adenauer experienced his own doubts about the pending change. He told Reuss on April 25 that Brentano was inexperienced and lacked resoluteness. 153 On May 17 press reports surfaced that the chancellor would remain foreign minister after all, prompting an alarmed Brentano to visit Adenauer at his vacation spot at the Biihlerhohe in Baden for a personal assurance to the contrary. 154 Then on May 23 Adenauer wrote Brentano to say that until further notice he wanted to "keep in his hands" policy concerning European integration, the United States, the Soviet Union, and all of the important international conferences yet to be held in 1955, arguing that he needed to be able to exploit his personal ties to John Foster Dulles whenever necessary. He did not want this arrangement to become apparent to the outside world, "except if there are especially urgent reasons," and wished to work in complete agreement with Brentano. In effect, however, Adenauer had reserved the right to continue to manage the most important aspects of West German foreign policy. As he made clear in a letter to Reuss, he would make full use of his constitutional power to determine the overall lines of policy. 155 Brentano became foreign minister on June 7. Little more than a week later, Adenauer issued him a severe reprimand for publicly suggesting in Washington that informal talks with the GDR on reunification were possible. The new foreign minister clearly placed more priority on German reunification than Adenauer did. Throughout the rest of the year a series of similar missives followed in order to ensure Brentano's absolute dependability. "Adenauer can and will not tolerate a politically independent foreign minister," wrote HansPeter Schwarz. "Not only the insiders and the well-informed journalists, but soon everyone else down to the political cartoonists as well, know that the chancellor continues to make foreign policy as his 'domaine reservee. "' 156

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Es blcibt alles heim.Alten f, W. Rdnlc.c (Nord_pttiS, 1955) 9. This 1955 political cartoon comments on Adenauer's unwillingness to delegate authority to his new foreign minister, Heinrich von Brentano. The title, "Es bleibt al/es beim A/ten," is a play on words that means either "It All Remains the Same" or "Everything Stays with the Old Man" (F. W. Reinke, Nordpress, reproduced in Walther Freisburger, Konrad, sprach die Frau Mama. Adenauer in der Karikatur. Oldenbourg: Stalling, 1955).

212 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Moreover, although Hallstein and Blankenhorn had moved out of their offices in the Chancellery, both maintained the right to speak with Adenauer directly without asking Brentano 's permission. In diplomat Alexander Drenker 's opinion, Brentano was never really minister as long as Hallstein remained in Bonn. 157 Adenauer retained all key areas of foreign policy in his hands until 1961, when his deteriorating political position forced him to appoint a new foreign minister, Gerhard Schroder (CDU). Long before 1955, observers in the Federal Republic and abroad had already begun to view West German foreign policy as Adenauer's personal domain. Due to his dual portfolios, he was able to travel abroad both as head of government on official visits and as the chief German negotiator at various diplomatic conferences. This double exposure meant that he was soon on intimate terms with the Western heads of state and foreign ministers. As an international symbol of the new Federal Republic he had no rivals, especially when one considers that Federal President Reuss made his first trip abroad only in 1956. Already in January 1952, Blankenhorn could report that Adenauer, based on his sparkling performance at the December 1951 European Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris, was "without a doubt the leading European statesman." 158 When pollsters asked the West German public in February 1953 which of a series of statements most applied to Adenauer, 55 percent of respondents chose one stating that he was a good negotiator and had restored Germany's reputation. It was the leading response. In January 1955, 70 percent picked this same statement. 159 What the German political scientist Karlheinz NiclauB called the "Personalifisierung" of foreign policy during the Adenauer era was well underway. 160 With Brentano's appointment, however, the Federal Republic's Auswartiges Amt, and indeed Adenauer's entire foreign policy, had left its heroic era with its "cavalry-like, often thoroughly breakneck tempo" and entered a calmer phase characterized by routine ministerial work. 161 The basic structure of the home office and the mission net stood completed, although in need of fine tuning. 162 Before he left office in November 1961, Brentano introduced a variety of changes. In the Groj3es Revirement of 1958 he dissolved Division II and III in favor of three geographic divisions, two for the Western world and one for the Communist Bloc. His original plan also called for two deputy state secretaries to help coordinate policy with other ministries. Since the Bundestag's Budget Committee was unwilling to allocate budget slots for these brand new positions, they were created as "Permanent Deputies to the State Secretary." Brentano's reorganization responded to the growing demands placed upon

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the ministry and also reflected his personal desire to place more emphasis on reunification and security issues. However, the accompanying personnel changes-some controversial since they involved WilhelmstraBe veterans like Herbert Dittmann and Werner von Bargen-indicated that Brentano was also attempting to set up shop as he liked after Hallstein's departure earlier in the year to Brussels as president of the European Community. 163 In 1960, the ministry created a second state secretary and, in 1963, Grewe's long-sought-after planning staff. The Auswartiges Amt has gone through various changes since then, particularly in terms of expanded leadership structures and coordination staffs for important policy areas. Striking, however, is the fact that the ministry today maintains the basic seven-division structure (including Protocol) established in 1949-50, joined by two new divisions that deal with European issues and "the United Nations and Global Questions." 164 By mid-1955 not only had the Foreign Office clearly left the reconstruction stage, but the first phase of Adenauer's foreign policy had also culminated in the twin successes of sovereignty and NATO membership. A variety of factors peculiar to the early 1950s, and especially the Occupation regime itself, had made it possible to conduct policy without fully using ministerial structures. The appointment of an official responsible for organizational and personnel questions above the division leaders might have helped the ministry cure its "childhood illnesses" more quickly. In retrospect, however, both the highly politicized nature of personnel policy and the lack of an experienced official who enjoyed Adenauer's trust spoke against such solutions. The one area in which serious criticism of the higher leadership seems justified was its inability or unwillingness to involve more of the division leaders and especially the foreign missions in the decision-making process. Whether this tight control was in fact politically necessary remains to be examined. The previous scholarship has argued that Adenauer and his diplomats were in frequent, if not constant, disagreement on policy issues and that such disagreements were the basis for Adenauer's distrust, which was returned by many of the diplomats themselves. Various authors have pointed to Adenauer's difficulties with Foreign Minister Brentano (1955-61) and other diplomats in the late 1950s, especially concerning Eastern policy and German reunification. 165 The next chapter traces the origins of these conflicts but also concludes, perhaps surprisingly, that during the early 1950s significant agreement existed within the Auswartiges Amt about the basic premises ofWestbindung.

The Career Diplomats and Adenauer's Foreign Policy

TH E I NFLU X OF VE TE RAN DI PLO MATS into leadership positions demonstrates that experienced officials desired to restart their careers after 1949 and were successful in doing so, but it says little about their intentions. More important is determining whether Wilhelmstral3e veterans had great sway within the new ministry, and whether they preferred a foreign policy based on their experiences from the pre-1945 era. Not surprisingly, the answer to the first question is no. Veterans were not in a position to exert significant influence within the Auswartiges Amt. However, the answer to the second is much more complex and perhaps unexpected. Adenauer's most thoughtful critics within the diplomatic corps shared his analysis of the strategic situation and even his overall goal of close cooperation with the West. However, they differed on tactics for waging the Cold War. The post-Stalin thaw in the Cold War in combination with the Federal Republic's imminent sovereignty and rearmament would lead to increasing dissatisfaction-and not only among Weimar veterans but also for newcomers like Wilhelm Grewe-with Adenauer's hard-line "policy of strength" vis-a-vis the USSR.

The Limited Ability of WilhelmstraBe Veterans to Assert Their Position Many career diplomats were unhappy in the early 1950s for reasons that had nothing to do with opposition to Adenauer's foreign policy. As demon-

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strated previously, both Wilhelm Haas and Gustav Strohm, among others, implied that the Weimar-era diplomatic corps was a positive model for the new Foreign Office. Moreover, both they and their former colleagues asserted that during that period the professional diplomats had conducted German foreign policy and that this policy was relatively successful. During the years 1949 to 1955, however, veteran diplomats were in a poor position to assert their leadership. Due to the ministry's late official foundation and the growing importance of new areas in foreign policy after 1945 (especially economic affairs), other ministries were able to claim leadership in certain areas of German foreign relations. The Foreign Office was never able to reestablish the predominant position among the ministries that it enjoyed before 1945. In addition, the ministry's personnel grew so fast in the early 1950s that it is doubtful whether the old hands could have shaped the Foreign Office's self-understanding and esprit de corps very substantially. Indeed, outside observers of the Auswartiges Amt thought that the old solidarity from the pre-1945 era had somehow been left behind, even if many of the veteran diplomats had not been.' Blankenhom noted that he did not recognize over 80 percent of the officials gathered at the Auswartiges Amt's first social evening in Bad Godesberg on February 11, 1953. 2 The early 1950s also were a golden age for outsiders in the West German foreign service, which the career diplomats did not always appreciate. Ulrich Sahm, in charge of the Schuman Plan Secretariat and a newcomer to diplomacy, recalled that in the early years the office's overworked leadership could do little to create a sense of camaraderie among the officials. This task was also complicated by the fact that the ministry's various divisions were scattered in so many different buildings. 3 Greater solidarity undoubtedly developed within the ministry as it came out of the reconstruction phase. Just as in the past, some elements of the diplomatic corps began to see themselves once again as an elite among the government bureaucrats. The ministry, as usual, also had to contend with the associated public perception that it was elitist as well. 4 However, the point is that the reconstruction phase in the early 1950s was a very poor time to mold the new ministry according to old forms. Some traditions from the pre-1945 period, such as the annual fox hunt for the foreign diplomatic corps organized by Herwarth, were revived successfully; others like the three-hour lunch died out entirely as the veteran diplomats retired. 5 Moreover, as more and more veterans left the diplomatic service, memories of the WilhelmstraBe faded and were replaced by a new and thoroughly democratic "'Bonn' or 'Federal Republic' institutional self-understanding."6

216 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Veteran diplomats were also displeased with their relationship with Adenauer. Samuel Wahrhaftig wrote that the West German diplomats were relieved when Brentano took office in June 1955 since they finally had a real minister to represent them. 7 This reaction may also have stemmed from the bad blood between Adenauer and the career diplomats due to the former's apparent reluctance to defend his ministry during the public controversy on the Foreign Office's personnel policy in 1951 and 1952. Adenauer intervened actively only during the Bundestag debate in October 1952. The career diplomats resented this strongly. 8 When, during a discussion on personnel and organizational questions on June 19, 1952, Hans Globke complained to Blankenhom about diplomats critical of Adenauer and his policies, Blankenhom defended his colleagues. He referred to persistent organizational problems that plagued the Foreign Office, the constant attacks from parliament and the public, and last but not least, Adenauer's strong mistrust of his own officials. Blankenhom wrote in his diary, "no wonder that inferiority complexes develop that are vented in negative comments [die sich in negativen .A."ujJerungen abregieren]. "9 There also were strong indications already by 1948 and 1949 that many WilhelmstraBe veterans desired a nonpartisan policy incorporating the political opposition, in this case the Social Democratic Party. Once again, they pointed to the Weimar experience as a model. 10 This was one reason for Adenauer's falling out with Haas in the summer of 1951. Blankenhom was interested in improved cooperation with the SPD as well. He displayed increasing frustration with the West German government's unwillingness to involve the SPD actively in its foreign policy in light of severe new challenges posed after 1953, when the European Defense Community appeared to be in grave difficulties and the Soviet Union seemed to be making gains in the East-West conflict. In February 1953, Blankenhom wrote that he personally thought the moment had come for a revision in domestic policy, including moving the scheduled fall national elections up to June and holding serious talks with the SPD on establishing a West German army. 11 More than two years later, he observed that Adenauer had no plans for winning the SPD's cooperation in connection with West German accession to NATO now that the EDC was no longer an option, a situation which he feared would have serious consequences for setting up the Federal Republic's armed forces. 12 There is considerable evidence to support the idea of a "quarantine policy" instituted against WilhelmstraBe veterans by Adenauer and Hallstein. 13 Hallstein admitted that he thought very little of the diplomats who had served during the Third Reich. 14 US High Commission officials reported in December

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1952 that Division III, the other "political division" in charge of coordinating the German foreign missions, felt neglected and underinformed compared to Division II, where all important policy questions were concentrated. 15 Perhaps it was no coincidence that Division Ill's leaders during this period-Theo Kordt and his deputy Hasso von Etzdorf until 1953, Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick thereafter-were WilhelmstraBe veterans. Wilhelm Grewe believed that there was something to the idea of a rivalry between Divisions II and III. Division III, which had a more tradition-bound spirit, felt that outsiders dominated Division II, whereas members of Division II sometimes got the impression that the veteran diplomats of Division III always thought they knew better. Grewe emphasized that tensions never reached the point of endangering collegial relations or affecting daily work. He added, however, that Hallstein purposely concentrated important affairs in Division II to keep them under close observation. For example, in the midst of a determined Communist Bloc campaign to upgrade the German Democratic Republic's relations with other states, Hall stein decided on April 3, 1954, to let Division II handle the question of "relations with the GDR" instead of Division III (normally entrusted with bilateral relations). 16 Moreover, Hallstein appointed Grewe to replace Blankenhom in 1955 to head Division II because he wanted another person he trusted in that post. 17 Fritz Caspari, who entered the foreign service in 1954, bluntly said that the WilhelmstraBe veterans from Division III frowned on the multilateral diplomacy conducted by Division II. They could and did continue to work in their traditional manner which emphasized bilateral relations and tried to reassert their old leading role in policy making. In his words, Division III was the "sleeping-car-division [Schlafwagenabteilung]" compared to the dynamic Division 11. 18 Sahm characterized the "old-school diplomats" in not dissimilar terms. 19 Two points should be noted here, however. First, complaints from coworkers or scholars that veteran diplomats did not meet the requirements of the "new school" might also be a backhanded way of saying that they disagreed with specific integration plans. There were legitimate reasons to harbor reservations about plans like the European Defense Community, which most Western military establishments thought unworkable, or European economic integration, which free traders like Ludwig Erhard thought would hamper West German economic growth. 20 With issues like European integration it is important to distinguish carefully between principled objections on the one hand and practical or situational objections on the other, a task that admittedly is not always easy.

218 ADENAUER'S FOREIGN OFFICE Second, many of the best examples of diplomats who seemed trapped in the past-and who were steadfastly opposed to Westbindung-involved men who had little influence in the new Auswartiges Amt. Many were not even reemployed there. Rudolf Nadolny, German ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1933 to 1934, continued to advocate a neutralized Germany throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. Along with former colleagues like Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz and Gaffron, Nadolny was quite active in promoting his agenda after 1950 in an organization called the "Society for German Reunification." 21 In 1953 Hallstein requested a study of prospects for West German Eastern policy from Richard Meyer von Achenbach, the former leader of the WilhelmstraBe's Eastern Division, who was residing in Sweden. Achenbach also recommended a policy that aimed at establishing a neutral Germany between East and West. 22 Still another former diplomat, Gustav Sonnenhol, made similar proposals while working for Deputy Chancellor Franz Blucher's European Recovery Program Ministry (Sonnenhol returned to the Foreign Office only in 1968). 23 An open exponent of a more independent policy between East and West within the Foreign Office itself in the early 1950s was Werner Otto von Hentig, an old Middle East expert from the WilhelmstraBe who served as the Federal Republic's ambassador to Indonesia from 1952 to 1954. In a series of articles on his experiences in the foreign service that appeared in the Franlfurter Hefte after his retirement in 1955, Hentig wrote that Third World countries were interested in cooperating with West Germany, which like them was presently in a dependent status vis-a-vis the Great Powers. His superiors in Bonn rejected his pleas to assert a German leadership position among these states in order to rebuild Germany's power position. 24 On a related note, the French High Commission reported in January 1952 that Nehru was pleased to have Ernst Wilhelm Meyer, who resigned while stationed in Washington in 193 7 in protest of Nazi policies and later sat in the Bundestag for the SPD, as ambassador to India. He supposedly sympathized with Nehru's neutrality policy and thought that the best way to avoid World War III was to build a "glacis" or shield of neutral states between East and West. 25 Finally, an indeterminate but probably significant number of diplomats, including Oscar Schlitter (embassy counselor in Madrid and London) and, after he retired in 1954 as the Federal Republic's observer at the United Nations, Hans Riesser, sympathized with or moved in circles close to the Free Democratic Party (FOP). 26 Despite belonging to Adenauer's coalition government in the period under consideration, the FOP advocated a much more nationalistic foreign policy and placed greater emphasis on the German question. Brauti-

The Career Diplomats and Adenauer's Foreign Policy 219 gam also belonged to this circle and in 1952 expressed the wish that an FDP foreign minister replace Adenauer. 27 Other diplomats, ranging from Hentig to the SPD member Gustav Herbig, West Germany's ambassador in Montevideo, approved ofWilhelmstraBe veteran and FDP parliamentarian Karl Georg Pfleiderer 's 1952 plan for a neutral, reunified Germany that would function as a bridge between East and West. 28 These elements did not influence the Auswartiges Amt's official policy line in any significant manner. This was due in part to an express quarantine on the part of the Foreign Office's leadership. For example, Hallstein suppressed circulation of Achenbach's memo, even though Brautigam apparently saw no harm in discussing it. 29 Nadolny, Prittwitz, and other older diplomats with similar views on East-West relations were not offered employment because of their advanced age (for diplomats at this time, the official retirement age was 65), but their desire for negotiations with the USSR almost certainly made it undesirable to reemploy them in light of the possible reaction of the Western Allies. The suppression of deviant thinking tells only part of the story, however. For example, Hentig seems to have been something of a black sheep who constantly quarreled with superiors in Bonn and tried to encourage Arab states to resist the 1952 Restitution Agreement with Israel. After he left the diplomatic service in 1954, he became an advisor to King Saud of Saudi Arabia. 30 The Foreign Office as a whole was probably glad when Riesser, considered a difficult character, retired in 1955. 31 As will be demonstrated, there is also considerable evidence that neutralist or bloc-free views were in the minority among Foreign Office personnel, including among former Wilhelmstrafie members in advanced positions. Even if they were loath to do so, Wilhelmstrafie veterans had to recognize that they would not enjoy their accustomed status and prestige in either the new Foreign Office or West German society, nor would their ministry do so within the overall context of West German foreign policy. Accordingly, the term "Koblenzerstrafie" (or later "Adenauer-Allee") never became the popular designation for the Federal Republic's Auswartiges Amt-it simply could not conjure up the same images that "Wilhelmstrafie" had before 1945.

Tradition and German Foreign Policy Undeniably, there were many diplomats, both veterans and newcomers, both within the new Foreign Office and outside of it, who categorically

220 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE objected both to Westbindung and to Adenauer's conciliatory stance toward the Western powers. They placed national unity above other considerations. However, such WilhelmstraBe veterans in leading positions as Blankenhom, Maltzan, Etzdorf, Herwarth, and Albrecht von Kessel played important roles in establishing the Federal Republic's new foreign policy. By no means did Germany's foreign policy heritage stand in unequivocal contradiction to Konrad Adenauer's foreign policy. Scholars have emphasized that many career diplomats in the 1950s had reservations about Adenauer's policy of Western integration in which traditional ways of thinking played an important role. Depending on the author, this observation may be either a positive or a negative. Already in 1957 the American political scientist Samuel L. Wahrhaftig had mentioned that many West German diplomats thought the Weimar Period was the Golden Age of the professional diplomat, and that they admired the Rapallo Treaty (and in some cases even the Hitler-Stalin Pact) as a classic example of diplomacy. In raising these points, Wahrhaftig implied more critically that German career diplomats might be dissatisfied with the strict pro-Western orientation of Adenauer's foreign policy. 32 Three and a half decades later, Karl-Eckhard Hahn surveyed proposals made by Bonn diplomats (including former WilhelmstraBe members working in other government offices) on the German question between 1949 and 1959. They agreed that Westbindung was necessary, but contrary to Adenauer they wanted special provisions for security policy that would allow for reunification and thought that Germany's central position in Europe had to be taken into account and even exploited during the Cold War. For these diplomats, Westbindung was just one strategy among many, and Weimar and especially Gustav Stresemann 's policies were part of the "golden age" of diplomacy. The "Weimar tradition" played an important generational role, and "it was by no means only the old veterans [Altgedienten] who pressured the chancellor with their plans [die dem Kanzler mit ihren Planen zu Leibe rilckten]." Hahn's article appeared in a collection edited by "New Right" historians Rainer Zitelmann, Karl-Heinz WeiBmann, and Michael GroBheim tellingly titled Westbindung: Opportunities and Risks for Germany. 33 Others have asserted that many career diplomats were skeptical about European integration and indeed any type of non-bilateral relations. The political scientist Paul Noack wrote in 1977 about the tensions in the Foreign Office between the "Integrationisten [pro-European integration party]," consisting of Hallstein, Ophtils, Grewe, and their coworkers on the one hand, and Wilhelm-

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straBe veterans on the other. Noack believed that veteran diplomats supported European integration but saw it as only one diplomatic strategy among many. However, they were at a disadvantage both because their past careers in the Third Reich encouraged them to be cautious in expressing their views and because the "Integrationisten" held more influential positions. Blankenhom stood between the two groups. 34 As a corollary, the career diplomats could not be totally trusted with implementing the Federal Republic's "modem" and integrationist foreign policy. Some members of the Allied High Commission in the early 1950s also felt that the diplomatic corps contained many old-school nationalists (although they did not think that many diplomats harbored National Socialist sympathies). In January 1950 the US High Commission listed the "Foreign Office" as a possible focal point for German nationalism. It did not believe that diplomats like Hans von Herwarth, Vollrath von Maltzan, Albrecht von Kessel, and the members of the DBFF were "in any way nationalistic, let alone Nazi," but feared that they might become a magnet for younger Germans who did harbor dangerous views. 35 The personnel controversy of 1951-52 did not provoke deep concern in Allied circles, but temporarily High Commissioners Andre Frarn;ois-Poncet and (to a lesser extent) Ivone Kirkpatrick became worried that the ministry was becoming a nationalist stronghold. 36 Some mid-level members of the High Commission were far more critical. Charles Thayer wrote in his memoirs that the Cold War had unfortunately prevented the Adenauer government and the High Commission from waiting until a new generation of civil servants was available. He also recounted a conversation with a group of young attaches who were unable to say unequivocally that they would resign in the event the German government oriented its policies toward Moscow. Thayer left the reader with the impression that these fledgling diplomats, unlike their predecessors, had learned the value of democracy but also that under certain circumstances they would not equate national interests with a pro-Western orientation. 37 Repeatedly French Deputy High Commissioner Armand Berard reported that many conservative nationalists had reentered the diplomatic corps, and the terms he used to describe them are striking. In September 1950 he wrote that the groups helping to implement Adenauer's policy were the same that had been behind Germany's "redressement [recovery]" after World War I-conservative diplomats and soldiers. He saw Haas's dismissal the next summer as another sign that the Foreign Office was moving more and more in the direction of the ideas of the right-wing German National People's Party (DNVP) from the Weimar era. 38

222 AOENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Yet it is not at all clear that these personnel and intellectual continuities had a negative influence on West German foreign policy. As Peter Kriiger argued, there are striking parallels between some important aspects of the foreign policy of the Federal and the Weimar Republics through the Stresemann era-an emphasis on economic relations, the desire to enter international organizations and to conduct multilateral diplomacy, the willingness to enter binding arbitration, and finally, the attempt to pursue a policy of peaceful cooperation in Western Europe. Another parallel was the measured and patient style of Stresemann 's diplomacy, which departed significantly from the unpredictable and often bellicose Wilhelminian foreign policy. 39 A July 9, 1954, draft memo in the papers of Albert Hilger van Scherpenberg (deputy director of the Foreign Trade Division) titled "Foreign Policy and Trade Policy" drew links not only to Weimar but also the Kaiserreich in arguing for a complete break with the foreign economic policies of the Third Reich. It pointed out the impossibility of simultaneously conducting an economic policy based on state intervention and a liberal trade policy. Since the currency reform in 1948, the Federal Republic's economic policy "had consummated a decided turning away from all dirigiste economic tendencies," and by implication its trade policy needed to follow. However, work remained to restore a free market economy as it existed before 1914 or during the 1920s, in particular in the area of currency convertibility. Further progress toward this goal would help promote European integration over the long run as well as improve relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. In the future the Federal Republic could also best secure its political and economic interests in important geographic areas "through the classical means of granting credits and loans." One of the examples used was German investment policy in the Near East before 1914. 40 More importantly, "tradition" is not the same thing as "strategy," political, military, or otherwise. Patterns of thinking, cultural affinities, the social background of elites in policy-making positions, and forms of international political behavior may persist in a state's foreign policy over time and in this sense form traditions. On the other hand, "strategy," in the words of Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, "is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate."41 Tradition may inform strategy, and may at times help produce very poor strategy, but is only one component that goes into making it. However, students of post-1945 Germany have frequently equated tradition with strategy. In an influential 1970 essay the political scientist Waldemar Besson identified two "traditions" that have prevailed in German foreign policy

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since the foundation of the German Reich in 1871. 42 The first was the "Mitteleuropatradition [central European tradition]," the classic German foreign policy option associated with Bismarck and Stresemann. It assumed that the Reich's strategic role was as a bridge in the middle of Europe. For that reason, it was Germany's duty to avoid a firm orientation toward any of its neighbors. It was possible to do so in theory by emphasizing the balance of power and by acting on the assumption that Germany had no major territorial ambitions (revisionism against the Versailles Treaty notwithstanding). Wilhelmine policy, particularly during World War I, and most of Nazi foreign policy were deviations from the Mitteleuropatradition in that they used Germany's central European location as a base for an expansionist policy and rejected the idea that German ambitions were satiated. Westbindung, historically closely associated with Adenauer, represented a second and essentially new option that became powerfully influential in a remarkably short period of time. Every West German government subscribed to its basic premises. 43 In reality, these orientations were not ends in themselves but strategies employed to reach desired ends. Bismarck's dictum of "try to be one of three, as long as the world is governed by the unstable equilibrium of five great powers" is instructive. 44 For most of the nineteenth century permanent alliances were virtually unknown, and in this sense the Reich's avoidance of a firm orientation toward any of its neighbors was business as usual for a European Great Power. 45 The Weimar Republic's Auswartiges Amt preferred the "European Concert" to alliances in part for very practical reasons: it opposed all attempts to solidify the status quo of the Versailles Treaty by limiting German influence and the possibility of territorial revision, especially in Eastern Europe. 46 Adenauer's Westbindung arose in order to provide security in response to unprecedented conditions: the collapse of both Germany and Europe as important power centers, the serious Soviet threat, and an accommodating Western alliance led by the United States. Only after 1945 did Germany truly have a choice between East and West, and by then much of the rationale for the Mitteleuropatradition no longer existed. Moreover, not only nationalists in the Federal Republic but Taft Republicans in the United States, Gaullists in France, and members of both the Conservative and the Labour Parties in Britain, among others, found the post-1945 era's standing military alliances and international integration strange, even horrifying, innovations. Certain concepts from the past undoubtedly influenced the diplomats' thinking, whether they had served previously in the WilhelmstraBe or not, starting with the tradition of a united Germany. Diplomats associated with

224 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE the resistance believed that a strong Reich was essential to European stability and peace, especially against the Soviet threat. This is a constant theme in former ambassador to Rome Ulrich von Hassel 's thinking during the war until his death in the wake of the July 20, 1944, assassination attempt on Hitler, and it also informed the thinking of younger conservative diplomats like Etzdorf and Erich Kordt. Such ideas were obviously tactical and meant to appeal to the Western powers during wartime, but they also reflected a sincere inability to imagine a Europe in which the Reich did not play a leading role. 47 This combination of all-German nationalism and anti-communism persisted after the war. For example, in July 1949 French occupation officials described Maltzan as a convinced nationalist who does not seem to want to sacrifice any German interests, even to bring about change. However, he always expresses his nationalist sentiments moderately and intelligently. The idea of abandoning some German rights in the interests of European unity, for example, does not sink in with him [ne l'effleure meme pas]; on the contrary, he is persuaded that only the full restoration of Germany can be of use in a Western triumph. This triumph seems to be his current principal preoccupation. He condemns the tendencies of Nadolny, who could pretend to believe in a compromise with the USSR or a double game, or a new Rapallo. He concedes "it is too early for that. " 48

Generational factors were probably more decisive than socialization within the WilhelmstraBe in this context, however. Public opinion polls taken in the late 1970s indicated that Germans 65 and over (that is, born during or before World War I, as almost everyone in a leadership position in the West German Foreign Office in the 1950s was) described their views as more "national" and less "European" than their younger fellow citizens. They also had a much greater fear of communism. 49 Moreover, the oldest age group desired reunification more fervently than any other group. 50 The West German population as a whole believed reunification was the most pressing item on the Federal Republic's political agenda until well into the mid-1960s. 51 "For almost all influential politicians" in Western Germany from 1945 to 1949, wrote HansPeter Schwarz, "[the existence of] the Reich was still a matter of course, and the path to the Federal Republic seemed to justify itself only because it did not seem to block the way back."52 The diplomats placed strong emphasis on German unity, as did other elements of West German society.

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Related to this political nationalism was a sense of European cultural superiority. Since it was quite compatible with anti-communism, this sentiment had clear implications for the diplomats' orientation in the Cold War. For example, the Eastern expert Otto Brautigam wrote in a May 1953 memo that "the sharp dividing line between the European cultural world and Bolshevism must not become softened."53 According to his biographer, for Albrecht von Kessel "Russia ... is not Europe ... not Russia west of the Urals either."54 Sven Olaf Berggotz also has noted that West German diplomats stationed in the Middle East, like their colleagues from other Western states, tended to have a condescending and racist view of Arab society, a legacy from the late nineteenth century. Even for diplomats well disposed to the Arabs-for example Melchers, who served as ambassador to Iraq from 1953 to 1957-the superiority of European culture was a given, and the mass of the post-colonial Arab population was barely capable of managing its own affairs in a reasonable way. Only in the 1960s did this mentality change markedly as a new generation of officials came to the fore. 55 Moreover, the traditional diplomatic elite thought in power-political terms. As Etzdorfwrote, regaining Germany's position as a great power was the overriding goal of the Foreign Office after 1918. 56 Overall, most diplomats were not willing to renounce claims to full revision of the Versailles Treaty or to new national greatness. This held true even in the critical period 1938-39, when some diplomats around Weizsacker attempted to reduce the danger of war through conspiracy with other powers. 57 After 1945 veteran diplomats would want once again to help restore Germany to a prominent role in the international system. Adherence to the ideal of a united Germany, anti-communism, and the desire to renew Germany's role as a major power in international politics again would not go far alone in ensuring the diplomats' agreement with Adenauer's foreign policy. As noted in Chapter One, these factors also contributed to their support of Hitler's foreign policy. Brautigam wrote in his wartime diary on June 22, 1941, "outbreak of the war with the Soviet Union. Now it had finally arrived, the conflict with Bolshevism. It had to come if a final pacification and new ordering of Europe was supposed to be brought about." 58 Christian Gerlach has argued that many of the generals and officials active on the Eastern Front who were in the conservative opposition to Hitler shared his goal of checking Soviet power. One of their motivations to remove him, although not their sole one, was their belief that they could bring the war to a more successful conclusion for Germany than the Nazi leadership. The argument made

226 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE by Herwarth, Gustav Hilger, and others that "Russia can only be beat with Russians" (that is, Soviet citizens dissatisfied with Communist rule), while it undoubtedly would have led to far more humane policies toward the various ethnic groups under Nazi rule in Eastern Europe, needs to be understood in this context. 59 On the other hand, the experience of the Third Reich certainly increased their willingness to contemplate new options for German foreign policy. For example, the resistance against Hitler in the Foreign Office that first developed during the Munich Crisis showed amazing sensitivity to the disastrous strategic implications of National Socialist foreign policy (if not necessarily to the consequences of other aspects of Nazi policy). 60 In addition, younger members of the resistance, especially those associated with the Kreisau Circle, thought in national and European terms at the same time. For example, both Helmuth James Graf von Moltke and the diplomat Adam von Trott zu Solz, each a strong Anglophile, could imagine a type of European federation or commonwealth of nations without the nationalist rancor of past history. 61 It was by no means contradictory, therefore, when Erich Kordt wrote Haas on July 4, 1949, to propose another argument in favor of creating a German foreign ministry for Haas to use at the Wiesbaden Conference of Minister Presidents. Only foreign ministers could represent their nations at meetings of the European Council. "I would however find it dangerous," he wrote Haas, "were we to enter the European Council as a member possessing lesser rights. In the final analysis we don't have much more than the European ideal which we can offer our youth. Therefore we should take the pretext from the other side [that] we didn't have a foreign minister."62 Far more important than traditional concepts, however, was the totally new strategic situation after 1945, which produced strange bedfellows in West Germany by sheer force of logic. As Hans-Peter Schwarz pointed out, many West Germans who favored a neutral stance between the superpowers in the late 1940s in the interest of national unity were compelled after the winter of 1947-48 to advocate an alliance with the West. "However the Germans twisted and turned, they could not get around a clear option for one of the two blocs," he wrote, and for most the West was clearly preferable. 63 Hans von Herwarth wrote that the vast majority of the diplomatic corps thought Adenauer's pro-Western orientation was absolutely correct and rejected Schaukelpolitik, or vacillation between East and West. He thought that fear of Stalinism was important to keep in mind in understanding this. 64 Gustav Hilger wrote in 1953 that the possibilities open to Germany in the early 1920s had disappeared

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and that only two alternatives remained: alliance with the Western powers or with the Soviet Union. "But in the event of the latter, Western Germany, and probably the rest of Europe, would doubtless share the fate of the East European satellites."65 Already in 1946, the WilhelmstraBe veteran Georg Vogel (not reemployed in the Foreign Office until 1956 due to his work for ViceChancellor Franz Blucher's European Recovery Program Ministry) was very explicit on this same point in a memo on a German peace treaty he submitted to the Hes sen State Chancellery. 66 Albrecht von Kessel wrote to the head of the FDP's Bundestag delegation, Thomas Dehler, on June 18, 1954, that Germany was no longer a first- or even a second-rate power but merely a "borderland [Grenzmark]" between East and West. "But in all of history a borderland has never possessed the strength to exercise a mediating role [Funktion] and to be a bridge." West Germany would make the terrible mistake of"sitting between all stools" if it overestimated its own strength and tried to mediate alone between both camps in the Cold War. 67 Still others like Joachim Peckert, a newcomer to the Foreign Office's Eastern Division in January 1954, and WilhelmstraBe veteran Helmut Allardt agreed that the power-political situation after 1945 differed fundamentally from that of the Weimar era; in Peckert's words the Kaiserreich and Weimar models for Eastern policy no longer applied. 68 Most diplomats also agreed that Western fears of German intentions toward the USSR were highly exaggerated, although they always had to be taken into account. Herwarth mentioned that Allied diplomats feared a new "Rapallo," although they seemed unsure as to the exact provisions of the original 1922 treaty (diplomatic relations, agreement not to raise financial claims resulting from World War I, arrangements to promote trade). On at least one occasion, he tried to calm Allied colleagues by emphasizing the treaty's limited nature. 69 This seems disingenuous, given German-Soviet military cooperation in the 1920s, but it also illustrates that Herwarth thought Allied views greatly distorted. Kessel commented in 1954 about the strong mistrust and "almost pathological notions [geradezu krankhafte Vorstellungen ]" harbored in Paris and Washington even by politicians well-disposed to Germany about the Federal Republic's intentions toward the USSR. 70 Allardt even spoke of a "myth," reflecting Western fears, that had developed around Rapallo. In reality, the treaty had merely demonstrated that peaceful and profitable coexistence was possible between two states with greatly different ideologies and goals. 71 The diplomats' periodic counterproposals or objections were not so much against Westbindung itself, as Hahn implied, as against the Adenauer government's apparently inflexible "policy of strength." Their response to the famous

228 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE "Stalin Notes" of 1952, in which the Soviet dictator proposed a unified but neutral Gennany, made clear that the diplomats had no strategic alternative but desired a lessening of East-West tensions. Some, like Haas, thought that exploring the Soviet offer might have given the West new perspectives on Soviet intentions on the Gennan question or, at least, a tactical advantage. However, he admitted in the same breath that he recognized the strength of the arguments in favor of military integration into the West. 72 Allardt at first reacted more dramatically. He declined to become West Gennan ambassador to NATO when this new post was offered to him by Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick of Division I in the fall of 1953 because "the Federal Republic's early accession to NATO had in my opinion ruined all of the perhaps still-extant possibilities for reunification for the foreseeable future." The federal government had refused to consider negotiating with the USSR in 1951 and 1952, and now it was probably too late, Allardt felt. In any event, as he recounted in his memoirs, he refused to represent a policy before NATO that he felt was disastrous for Gennany. 73 However, only a few pages earlier in the same work Allardt wrote that the first Adenauer government's (1949-53) decision to prioritize becoming part of the West instead of reunification "certainly deserved all respect" in light of the great distrust West Gennany faced internationally and the unrest caused by Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. 74 In a later volume of his memoirs, Allardt even admitted that Westbindung and alliance with the United States had been irreplaceable and a blessing. Adenauer's purely declamatory reunification policy, based on the policy of strength, on the other hand, was naive and did not impress the USSR, especially given the Federal Republic's initial weakness. 75 Haas and Allardt realized that the post-1945 international and European situation differed fundamentally from the inter-war situation, and this consideration moderated their views. To sum up, the Gennan Reich, revisionism (or the idea that Gennany was a great power and should be treated as such), a sense of European cultural superiority, and anti-communism were identifiable traditions that influenced career diplomats. This intellectual baggage might accommodate a variety of political strategies, especially taken in context with experiences made under National Socialism and during the Second World War. There is no question, as Hallstein, Caspari, Sahm, and others testified, that many career diplomats seemed inflexible and trapped in the past. However, if strategy is a process, as Murray and Grimsley put it, and tradition only one factor that plays a role in it, then one might expect that others would draw conclusions that were far more compatible with Adenauer's foreign policy. This policy was very successful

The Career Diplomats and Adenauer's Foreign Policy 229 between 1949 and 1955, especially in terms of revising the occupation regime and making the Federal Republic an equal partner with Western countries. The CDU/CSU's electoral victories in 1953 and 1957 demonstrated the public support for Westbindung, and by 1959 even the SPD, which until then had prioritized German reunification, had dropped its objections. There is every reason to expect that these successes had a similar effect within the Foreign Office at least in neutralizing opposition. Perhaps most importantly, the changed strategic situation after 1945 made a policy of association with the West seem urgent, even for nationalist diplomats. The case of Albrecht von Kessel, who served as deputy mission chief in Paris ( 1950-51) and Washington ( 1953-58), nicely illustrates this phenomenon.

Albrecht von Kessel's Journey toward Westbindung Kessel joined the foreign service in 1927 and was a self-declared "moderate conservative" who had identified with the "progressive wing" of the veterans' organization Der Stahlhelm during the Weimar era. He rejected the more reactionary domestic policy of Alfred Hugenberg's DNVP. At the same time, however, Kessel thought that Stresemann 's foreign policy had reached an early dead end, and he supported Heinrich Briining's harder line against the Western powers as the appropriate way to overturn the Versailles Treaty. He later became a close colleague ofWeizsacker at Berne from 1935 to 1937, in Berlin as his personal secretary from 1938 to 1939, and finally at the Vatican Embassy from 1943 to 1945. 76 A member of the "circle of friends," he helped propagate Weizsacker's status as a resistance leader and even described him in 1949 as "the Christian Seneca of our epoch, who once again bore witness to the indestructible force of goodness." The quote came from an issue of the 77 Foreign Policy Letters (Auftenpolitische Briefe) which Kessel, a prolific diarist and memo writer, sent per subscription to friends between April 1948 and April 1950 to inform them on world events. 77 As an experienced diplomat, he was to oversee the proper functioning of the Paris and Washington missions after the war, a role that had great importance in the early 1950s since neither Wilhelm Hausenstein in Paris (1950-55) nor Heinz Krekeler in Washington (1950-58) were career diplomats. In addition, Kessel led the German Secretariat for the European Defense Community in Paris from 1951 to 1953, where he won praise from the chief West German negotiator and later defense minister Theodor Blank. 78 Blankenhorn also thought highly of Kessel's political sense and

230 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE wanted to appoint him, along with Wilhelm Grewe, to head either Division II or Division III of the Foreign Office in the mid-1955 reshuffling of the Foreign Office leadership. 79 For Kessel, the realization that a policy of strength was necessary came about slowly and only in response to the intensification of the Cold War. In a series of interviews held in late July and early August 1944 with a British member of the Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters in Rome, Kessel (then first secretary of the German Embassy in the Vatican) stated that he would rather see all of Germany occupied by the Soviets than divided between the victorious powers. Under the latter circumstances, it was possible that Germany would experience civil war or become a battleground in a future military struggle between the victors. 80 In February 1945, US diplomats reported that German diplomatic circles in Switzerland were so pessimistic and desperate that they were actually ready to accept the Sovietization of Germany for twenty to thirty years. One contact, speaking for other German diplomats who did not belong to the NSDAP, "believes that the spiritual and moral power of regeneration of the German people can overcome more easily a transient Sovietization than a splitting up of the Reich, and he is convinced that the people will endorse this development if the Russians in their policy show themselves wise and moderate."81 In 1947 Kessel believed that it was still possible to set up a unified, neutral Germany. In retrospect, he accused the Americans of not engaging in energetic and serious negotiations with the Soviets, as well as of not listening to Russian experts like Rudolf Nadolny. Kessel felt that they had missed a chance to "pacify" Central Europe and the world as well. 82 Between 1948 and 1950, he became worried about increasing Cold War tensions that he felt would lead to World War III. "And what are we poor 'West Germans' with our narrow piece of territory in all of this? ... A nothing!" Kessel wrote to his friend Ulrich Sahm on September 20, 1948. If the conflict waited for a year or a year and a half, they might even be tempted or forced to set up their own troops, which Kessel thought would be "the height of misfortune-rebus sic stantibus ."83 Some of Kessel's former colleagues thought along similar lines. On May 27, 1949, Gottfried von Nostitz forwarded a "very interesting" circular letter to Blankenhom from Georg Federer, who was then in the United States. 84 Federer believed that the time had come for German political leaders to make an appeal to the Four Powers to set up a neutral, united Germany before the decision to set up a western German state became irrevocable. He knew that a neutral Germany was impossible, but the proposal could possibly calm Cold

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232 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE War tensions and defuse the possibility of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. He also thought it would be foolish for the West Gennans to rush headlong into the anns of the Western Allies when they had nothing to gain by committing themselves quickly and might be able to reopen international discussions on Gennan unity. Almost a year later, on May 8, 1950, Fritz von Twardowski, still with the Evangelisches Hilfswerk in Hamburg, echoed similar sentiments to his fonner colleague turned FOP politician Karl Georg Pfleiderer. He thought that the Federal Republic certainly had nothing to gain by turning east and should fight communism wherever possible, but that it also would not profit from taking sides in the Cold War. Until West Gennany was fully sovereign in the field of foreign affairs, it should not make a military commitment to the Occupation Powers to join the West if requested, as was currently rumored. Such a commitment would merely complicate things for the Gennans in the Soviet Zone, and the Federal Republic would gain nothing in return. "How are we supposed to take part in the Cold War!" Twardowski asked. 85 The outbreak of the Korean War and Adenauer's offer to the Western Occupation powers to have the Federal Republic participate in Western defense provided the unwelcome answer to Twardowski's question. In a circular letter dated August 20, 1950, Kessel, now at the Gennan Diplomatic Mission in Paris, wrote that international nervousness about an imminent war was decreasing, but no one was willing to say that war would not break out next year or the year after. For the West, Korea was actually a blessing in disguise [ein Gluck im Ungluck]-a timely warning before general war broke out. Kessel thought the West should take bold steps, giving up Korea and Indochina in favor of a controlled Japanese reannament and a concentration of all available forces in Europe. He was still opposed to any fonn of Gennan reannament if the Western Allies did not provide a protective shield of at least twenty tank divisions behind which West Gennany might ann itself safely. 86 Kessel remained worried about the potential for a third world war through late 1950. 87 He did not think war would break out that year, because Soviet military preparations for an offense were still in their initial stages. This meant, however, that 1951 would bring the acute period of danger. He also thought that West Gennany had been too eager to reann and in the process had tried to overtake [iiberrunden] the British and French in tenns of importance, with negative results. The less noise the Gennans made about reannament, the more likely that the question would come up again later in a more reasonable manner. Kessel thought the upcoming Four Powers Conference in Paris was a

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useful "poker game" in order to win time. 88 He said as much in a letter to Hallstein on December 12, 1950. The conference also could be used to put the Soviets in an embarrassing position-for example, if the Western Powers pushed for approval of the Austrian Peace Treaty, which the Soviets seemed likely to reject-and open the eyes of those in France prone to flirt with Moscow. 89 In an undated, fragmentary memo from the second half of 1950, Kessel outlined his ideas for an alternative to containment involving a Western "political offensive" based around a new initiative on the German questions. 90 Within six months, total occupation forces in Germany could be limited to two or three Soviet divisions and one division each for the Western Occupation Powers, each bound to a specific geographic area. The Four Powers could then decide in what form and according to which timetable they could restore German unity. The West could make its proposal attractive by linking it to economic aid for Eastern Europe. If the Soviets rejected the offer, nothing was lost, and the Western Powers would have won in the propaganda war. By early 1951, however, Kessel had become more sober in his calculations on achieving German unity and reaching a settlement in the Cold War. His February 9, 1951, letter to an unnamed "friend" stated that the time for a plan for a unified, neutral Germany had passed, although it might come again. He did not think the Soviets were seriously interested in giving up their position in Central Europe, nor was the time right for ending the Cold War. 91 In all probability, Kessel was reacting to developments in the Korean War, which had become much more explosive since the intervention of the People's Republic of China in November 1950. Slowly, he seems to have reached the conclusion that the best way to serve the Federal Republic's interests was some form of Adenauer's policy of strength. The European Defense Community now caught Kessel's imagination as a vehicle for using a policy of strength that might eventually relieve Cold War tensions. A 1951 memo proposing a new plan for settling the Cold War and reuniting Germany makes this clear. This was part of an initiative by Kessel and Gebhardt von Walther (who entered the foreign service as an attache with Blankenhorn in 1929) to get Blankenhorn to use his influence to get the government to "activate" the German question. 92 Kessel wrote that the USSR would try to use the German question again and again to create divisions in the Western camp. "There is only one effective method against dictators: the offensive," Kessel wrote, and since a military offensive was out of the question, the West for its part "had to take up the German Question and forge it into a weapon against the Soviet Union." Kessel believed that only political dreamers or fellow

234 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE travelers could accept neutralization as the price for reunification, but the theory that Moscow would submit to negotiations only after the West was "strong" had obvious dangers, in particular in terms of awakening Soviet fears that the West someday could present it with an ultimatum. This could lead to a Soviet preventative war. On the other hand, there was every reason to believe that Moscow would view a serious Western offer to negotiate as a calming factor. For these reasons, the West German chancellor should go to the Western Allies, especially the Americans, with a plan for a constructive solution to the German question that consisted of the following elements: 1-Accelerated culmination of the Federal Republic's integration into the West; 2-Simultaneous preparation of all-German free elections under international control through secret negotiations with Moscow; 3-Immediately after elections, both the United States and the USSR would withdraw their troops from Germany with the exception of two regiments each (for example in Dresden and Magdeburg for the USSR, in Hannover and Kassel for the United States);

4--The EDC would take over protection of Germany, if necessary with German troops stationed in Western Germany only and limited in terms of both their numbers and weapons technology; 5-Finally, the United States would agree to reduce its divisions on EDC territory to a minimum (Kessel's memo expressly mentioned that the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, and Turkey did not belong to this area).

If the Soviets rejected this plan, the West could say that it honestly had tried to come to agreement with the USSR. It was possible, however, that they would agree, in which case the West would have the opportunity to conduct a political offensive on a grand scale. In any case, the effort would considerably reduce the chance of war. As he stressed in the February 1951 letter to his "friend," there was not much left to do besides trying to win time through conferences. 93 Kessel thought the EDC had advantages over all other plans for providing for German security. The EDC automatically precluded the possibility of a future Franco-German conflict and was the decisive step on the way to European unity. Moreover, it gave Europe the possibility of acting as a moderating factor in the Cold War-in early 1953 Kessel was concerned with the Eisenhow-

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er administration's "roll back" rhetoric-and also starting negotiations with Moscow. 94 Kessel thought direct West German entry into NATO dangerous. The USSR saw NATO as an instrument of US imperialism but realized it was currently too weak to do much harm. However, a large number of German divisions in NATO would change the Soviet attitude and perhaps increase the chances of preventative war. Alternatively, the EDC limited West Germany to 12 divisions, and it was difficult to change this provision. 95 The EDC also would improve the West's capacity to negotiate successfully with the USSR. When Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak asked Kessel on October 26, 1952, about the price the Federal Republic was willing to pay for reunification, Kessel answered that at present it could offer nothing except its own political and physical existence, which in all honesty nobody was willing to sacrifice. "The situation would change when Europe had forty divisions at its disposal. Then we could sit down with the Americans and think about the price we were able to offer to the Russians for a withdrawal." 96 Perhaps the most decisive point for Kessel was that it seemed unlikely Germany would be reunified if it were not done as part of a process of building a united Europe, since the French and British would object if they suspected a revival of German nationalism. A united Europe for Kessel also included all of the Soviet satellite states, which for him belonged to the Western cultural world and whose addition would allow Europe to play a mediating role between the USSR and the United States. "For only a Europe which includes Warsaw and Bucharest next to Paris and Berlin will be able to play the role of a 'Third Force' in the future," he wrote. 97 Europe as a "Third Force" between the superpowers was a constant theme in Kessel 's thinking and was related not only to his belief in the permanent value of European culture but also to his great reservations about the potential US role in Europe. Europe could not expect to live on American charity forever and therefore needed to unite, especially economically. 98 However, too large a US role in Europe held even greater dangers. I will gladly concede that we might be able to achieve quicker successes in the economic and power-political areas pursuing other paths, in that we became something like an American bridgehead in Europe. In that case we have to be clear about the fact that we would deliver a deathblow to Europe and thereby also to the hope to interpose this continent, with all of its historical and cultural traditions, as a "Third Force" between America and Russia in a better future. These are considerations that are independent of whether or not it comes to war. 99

236 ADENALI ER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE At the same time, the Stalin Notes of the previous year did not lessen Kessel's mistrust of Stalin's intentions. He thought they had been sent at a time when approaching the USSR would have been a "deadly risk" for the FRG and would have ruined its relations with the Western Powers. 100 Kessel remained unreconciled to West German membership in NATO almost until the demise of the EDC. In April 1954, based on suggestions from NATO circles, he wrote to Blankenhorn proposing that an alternative to the EDC incorporate as much of the military planning for the EDC as possible and drop all of the associated political plans. He foresaw a regional integration of military forces in West Germany and the Benelux States as well as in parts of Denmark and France (thus leaving the Danes and French with national armies as well). All members would have the right to participate in NATO's central command (SHAPE) and to send a representative to the NATO Standing Group in Washington. 101 Two months later Kessel, convinced the EDC would not materialize, believed the Western Allies should put their relations with West Germany on a new footing immediately by allowing it to set up an army. Moreover, this new arrangement should allow the Federal Republic to seriously explore the establishment of relations with the USSR as long as the Allies agreed. His letter to Thomas Dehler left unmentioned whether the West German divisions should be within NATO. 102 The intensification of the Cold War led to a transformation in Kessel 's thought in the late 1940s and early 1950s. He progressively abandoned his idea for an independent, united Germany positioned between the superpowers and, although he held very different premises than Adenauer, came to accept Western integration and even the European Defense Community. His case demonstrates that not all WilhelmstraBe veterans were rigidly bound to the past and that they could react to the changing strategic landscape. If Kessel is representative, Noack's findings must be modified: WilhelmstraBe veterans thought that integration plans, like all other plans, had to respond to political realities, but this does not permit the conclusion that they preferred other strategies over integration. Blankenhorn's plans in 1955 to name Kessel to lead either Divison II or III did not materialize. Kessel suspected that Adenauer himself vetoed the idea, presumably because the diplomat in early 1955 had once again been discussing plans with Blankenhorn and others for reviving the reunification question after the Federal Republic regained its sovereignty and joined NATO. But he also consoled himself with the fact that he probably would not be able to have much influence on the chancellor (or Hallstein) in his new position. 103 To

The Career Diplomats and Adenauer's Foreign Policy 237 Kessel, not only was Adenauer an egomaniac who did not tolerate different opinions, but he also remained hopelessly rigid in his policies on reunification and relations with the Soviet Bloc. 104 It was on this point, not on the strategy of Westbindung, that basic differences existed between Adenauer and many of his veteran diplomats.

The Desire for a More Active Cold War Policy By 1953 at the latest the Foreign Office's leadership seemed to have reached a consensus that a pro-Western policy of strength based on a military buildup was the proper security strategy for the Federal Republic. For example, the Foreign Office's Eastern experts, Brautigam and Hilger, demonstrated their support for the concept. Hilger expressed his approval of a policy of equalized strength between the two power blocs at a meeting of the CDU's Working Group for Foreign Policy and EDC Questions on January 20, 1954. Since Germany was too weak to attempt this itself, it needed Western support and an anchorage in the Western camp. When the Soviets no longer thought that time was working for them, "it would be possible to reach a fruitful development toward a settlement." He thought it important not to underestimate the USSR's strength, however. At the same meeting Brautigam emphasized that the Soviets feared the combination of US materiel and German troops. 105 Hilger's comments indicated an important difference between the policy of strength imagined by many career diplomats, including Kessel, and Adenauer's own conception. After the West had reached military parity or superiority vis-a-vis the USSR, they believed it would be possible to negotiate and reach a favorable settlement. Unlike Adenauer, they believed that the West needed to make its own initiative. Blankenhorn developed such thoughts quite clearly in his diary in October 1952. He did not think that a solution to the German reunification problem could be found in isolation from other international issues. Instead, he thought that the West could come to a negotiated, universal agreement with the USSR covering all problems. Blankenhorn did not foresee Western concessions in Central Europe, but thought they could be made in other areas, perhaps in the Middle East or East Asia. Reunification would therefore figure as part of a global settlement. 106 During the same month, Blankenhorn told the president of the Indian Chamber of Deputies, S. Radhakkrishnan, during the latter's visit to Germany that he agreed that the West should not use its growing strength to one day present Russia with an ultimatum. Instead, the

238 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE West's strength must lead to an effort to devise a plan for a worldwide easing of tensions and disarming of flashpoints [eine globale Bereinigung].1°7 By July 1953 he had drafted a plan to disengage the superpowers in Central Europe. 108 The Blankenhorn Plan is notable for two reasons. First, it won Walter Hallstein's full support, demonstrating the difficulty of talking about a "quarantine policy" in the Foreign Office. Second, it displayed similarities to elements contained in Kessel 's disengagement plans of 1950 and 1951, and it would not be surprising if Blankenhorn had conferred with Kessel beforehand. Blankenhorn started by stating that Germany's reunification goals were those expressed in the Bundestag resolution of June 10, 1953. 109 However, the EDC contained certain elements that could be the basis of a security system which should be offered to the Soviets. A Germany incorporated into the EDC would be permitted only a set number of divisions, and limits would be set on the types of German armament and German arms production capacity. Finally, Blankenhorn proposed a two-stage plan for restructuring the current security system in Germany. In phase one, US and British troops would withdraw behind the Rhine, leaving only EDC (including German) forces between the Rhine and the Elbe. Simultaneously, Soviet troops would withdraw behind the Oder-Neisse and agree to a UN-controlled demilitarization of the former East Germany, thus creating a neutral zone. In a second phase, US and British troops would withdraw to the "periphery" (i.e., to non-EDC European territory), while the territory between the Oder-Neisse and Germany's 1937 eastern frontier would expand the neutral zone under UN administration. When Blankenhorn and Hallstein presented the plan on July 8, Adenauer was impressed, except for the disengagement plan, which he considered premature. Blankenhorn had another motive for making his proposal, as became clear a few months later. He thought the Adenauer government was not doing enough to promote German unification. In January 1954, Blankenhorn met with Walther and Kessel (who had recently been reassigned to Washington) in Lucerne, Switzerland, where he presented ideas for the upcoming Berlin Conference. He felt that Adenauer's demand to the Western powers that they hold a Four Power conference on Germany had greatly helped Adenauer win reelection the previous September. Now it was important for the federal government to express a stronger desire for unification than it ever had before by addressing the Berlin Conference directly with a proposal, even if East German representatives were allowed an active role in the conference as a result. The federal government should make a sizable economic offer consisting of consumer goods in order to "buy the freedom [loskaufen]" of the GDR's population. Blanken-

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horn assumed that the USSR would reject these proposals, but it was important that the federal government defend itself against the growing sentiment in the West German population that it did not care honestly about reunification. 110 Despite participating in the preparatory discussions for the Berlin Conference that winter, the Adenauer government did not make an official proposal at the conference. Adenauer himself did not want to do anything that would undermine the Federal Republic's policy of isolating the GDR by giving the latter an opportunity to participate in the deliberations. 111 However, the West German observer delegation (headed by Grewe and Blankenhorn) was active behind the scenes in a manner that was certainly contrary to Adenauer's intentions. The delegation had discussed proposals for a European security system. Blankenhorn presented the plans to leading members of the British delegation but found little sympathy. 112 Blankenhorn would continue to make informal solicitations of this nature on other occasions. For example, at the Geneva Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference in October 1955, he told British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Sir lvone Kirkpatrick that, in order to break the deadlock at the conference, the West might offer German neutrality in return for unification. Moreover, the West had to determine what it proposed in case a united Germany decided to remain neutral. This led Kirkpatrick to remark that the West owed much to Adenauer and that it would have great difficulties once he was gone. 113 By the time Adenauer laid down the foreign minister's portfolio on June 7, 1955, West Germany was a NATO member and reunification seemed a distant prospect. Already by December 1954, Hilger realized that "we can no longer work with the fiction that German rearmament does not change the situation" and that a global solution to the Cold War based on disarmament was necessary to forward reunification. 114 On February 10, 195 5, Blankenhorn and a number of diplomats (Wilhelmstral3e veterans Brautigam, Kaufmann, and Franz Krapf, Blankenhorn's personal assistant) along with General Adolf Heusinger came to the conclusion that given the current Soviet stance there was no system that could provide true security for all involved European states that allowed for German reunification as well. 115 Proposing a demilitarized zone in Central Europe might, for example, be dangerous, because the Soviets could always demand, in return, recognition of all existing European boundaries and a non-aggression pact with the Communist states of Eastern Europe, which would be tantamount to giving up the territories east of the Oder-Neisse forever and recognizing the Soviet satellite system. Moreover, the Soviets' main goal was the removal of US troops from Europe, which would be fatal

240 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE for Western Europe's security. Blankenhorn, Adenauer, and Hallstein reached similar conclusions in a conversation on March 9. 116 Since the 1954 Geneva Conference, Soviet policy had been to maintain the status quo, so it was impossible to hold a successful Four Power conference on German unity. "Everything that we still thought offerable even last year has proven insufficient in light of the rapid development of the atom and hydrogen bomb. What does a neutralization or demilitarization of the Eastern Zone represent for Soviet Russia today? What does a further restriction of German troop strength and armament mean for her?" The only things that could be offered were out of the question: a US withdrawal from Europe (which military experts thought would make Europe indefensible) or an "Austrian solution" for Germany, which would probably be the first step toward US withdrawal. "That did not mean," Blankenhom wrote in his diary on February 10, that we should not put this question [a European security system that provided for reunification] to Soviet Russia again and again and through appropriate initiatives bring it to proclaim its true intentions; for only when it becomes clear from such negotiations that Soviet Russia is not prepared to give up the current status quo, but instead that its policy more probably aims at reaching to absorb further European territory from the basis of this status quo, only then will public opinion position itselffirmly behind a policy of European integration. Therefore we will develop security plans, coordinate [abstimmen] them with the Allies and propose them to the Russians-without illusions that anything concrete and peace-serving can come from them. 117

Throughout the 1950s, West German diplomats continued to make proposals for European security systems and German reunification. 118 All of these plans met with Adenauer's disapproval. Nonetheless, it is plausible that Blankenhorn's initiatives contributed to a change in his thinking starting around 1953 that made him more open to disengagement proposals as a way of advancing detente. For example, the Heusinger Plan of June 11, 1955, drafted by Heusinger, Blankenhorn, Erich Kaufmann, and Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick, called for a demilitarized zone in Central Europe bordered by additional zones on either side in which both NATO and the Soviet Bloc were to station equal forces, as well as making proposals for both worldwide and European disarmament. Adenauer gave it to Dulles on June 13 for use at the Geneva Conference; however, because it was considered too complicated and too unattractive for the USSR, it was never presented. Adenauer found the

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Heusinger Plan acceptable because its various zones did not correspond to national boundaries and therefore allowed for disengagement of armed forces but not for a neutral zone, which was anathema to him. 119 Moreover, the need for a global solution to the Cold War that incorporated Soviet security concerns, which had been argued by Blankenhorn since at least 1952 and Kessel since at least 1950, found increasing recognition in Adenauer's thinking after 1953, in particular in the idea of "controlled disarmament." 120 Once again it is difficult to make a direct linkage here, but it is probable that Adenauer came to these conclusions at least in part on the basis of consultations with Blankenhorn on the new, post-Stalin international situation. Even diplomats who in retrospect were some of Adenauer's worst critics had words of praise for him upon West Germany's attainment of sovereignty in 1955. Notes for a speech by Kessel given at a reception in honor of Heinz Krekeler's appointment as ambassador to the United States on May 6, 1955 (an appointment that coincided with the transformation of HI COM into Allied embassies in Bonn), contain a remarkable phrase: "The mutual bond between Germany and the Anglo-Saxon powers is achieved, that goal which Bismarck and Stresemann strived for in vain." 121 Any individual's understanding of tradition is liable to be subjective to some extent, but it is hard to believe Kessel would have mentioned Bismarck, Stresemann, and by implication Adenauer in the same breath had he not wanted to pay great homage to Westbindung's accomplishments. On the whole, then, tradition, to the extent that it motivated the West German diplomatic corps, dictated neither a bloc-free nor a pro-Western nor a proEastern orientation. In fact, the post-1945 world was brand new in the sense that the Soviet Union was now a superpower, the United States was acting as if it was one for the first time, and Germany was divided and weakened. The choice between East, West, or neutrality could not have presented itself before 1945. During the Cold War this meant aligning with the West for most, if not all, diplomats, who came to support the basic lines of Adenauer's policy until 1955, despite reservations about its modalities. Even if they were uneasy about the consequences of military alliance with the West (or, like Kessel, with the United States) for German unification, no other strategic orientation presented itself as a serious contender. In retrospect, more significant than disputes over Westbindung were disagreements that just started developing within the ministry after Stalin's death in March 1953 about the necessary limits of the Federal Republic's diplomatic activity. Ratification of the EDC and General Treaties earlier that year made

242 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE the FRG's acquisition of sovereignty seem imminent, but would it be able to conduct international relations like a "normal" state? In particular, could the FRG maintain relations with Communist states and, if so, at what level? 122 The career diplomats in the Foreign Office's Divisions III and IV advocated normalizing relations with Communist states as quickly as conditions allowed. The "pragmatists" in Division III (to use Wilhelm G. Grewe's term), mainly Eastern experts like Brautigam, foresaw opening missions in Eastern Europe quite early. 123 Looking forward to the time when the FRG would become sovereign, Brautigam wrote in a memo commissioned by Blankenhorn on May 9, 1953, that iffull relations with the USSR and other Communist states were impossible (due to either lingering Western fears or Communist insistence on recognition of the GDR), other possibilities existed to engage in a dialogue. Economic relations could be approached first, including the expansion of already existing bilateral trade treaties to include other Communist states as well. However, trade missions were necessary to put economic relations on an acceptable basis. West Germany was too weak a state to mediate by itself in the Cold War, and it desired close adherence to the West in any case, but opening a dialogue was necessary in order to further both detente and reunification. 124 Soon thereafter, the Foreign Trade Division submitted a proposal for the 1954-55 budget, arguing that it was necessary to secure funds for opening trade missions in Eastern European countries with which the FRG had an Allied Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA}-negotiated trade agreement (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria). These agreements dated from the period of military occupation. The new round of talks with the Poles and Czechs to renew the JEIA treaties (as well as upcoming trade talks with the Romanians) indicated that the low point in the FRG's relations with the satellite states had been passed. Moreover, the improvement in economic relations might be followed by a similar improvement in the political situation, which was another reason to open trade missions as soon as possible. 125 Although it is impossible to re-create the exact circumstances, the Foreign Office's leadership found these proposals premature, if not totally unacceptable. No budgetary plans were made for trade missions in Eastern Europe. Brautigam resubmitted his 1953 memo practically verbatim to his new boss, Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick, on May 3, 1954. 126 Both the Foreign Office's leadership and the pragmatists agreed that diplomatic and economic relations with the USSR were necessary after the treaties became active, due to the Soviet Union's status as one of the Four Powers responsible for matters concerning all of Germany, including reunification. However, the pragmatists were

The Career Diplomats and Adenauer's Foreign Policy 243 willing to accept increased GDR ties (short of fonnal diplomatic relations) with other states if this was the unavoidable price for broader relations with the Communist world. They thought it unrealistic to insist on strict isolation of the GDR. As could be expected, none of the Eastern experts were enthusiastic about the Hallstein Doctrine developed after Adenauer's September 1955 trip to Moscow (Weick was openly skeptical), nor did they think the West Gennan government would cling to it for almost twelve years (the FRG established diplomatic relations with Romania in 1967). 127 Here lay the roots of an important disagreement within the Foreign Office that would play an ever-increasing role after 1955. In September 1959, Albrecht von Kessel himself resigned to protest West Gennany's inflexible policy toward Eastern Europe based on the Hallstein Doctrine as well as the dominance of lawyers within the Foreign Office, whom he blamed for this rigidity. He became foreign policy correspondent for Die Welt, where he frequently wrote columns against the Alleinvertretungsanspruch [the FRG's claim to be sole representative of the Gennan nation]. It was therefore only fitting that the Brandt government, which would revise that policy after 1969 and nonnalize relations with the GDR, awarded him the Groj3es Verdienstkreuz mit Stern. 128 In 1958 he wrote "certainly one should not ascribe any dogmatic value to the treaties that today bind Gennany with the Western world. They are for me perhaps the only transient expression of a political attitude that must not be shaken by anything, namely, the close friendship with the United States, England, and France." 129 For the career diplomat Kessel, politics was the art of the possible and could not be defined by fonnulae.

Conclusion

I N AU GUST 1966, less than a year before he died, Konrad Adenauer told the Swiss historian and journalist Jean Rudolf von Salis that "they should eradicate all foreign offices root and branch!" When Salis replied that they were accused above all of formalism, or strict adherence to prescribed forms, Adenauer said, "This formalism goes deeper; the worst thing is that it suppresses the true meaning of foreign policy. One loses sight of the problems [Man sieht die Probleme nicht mehr . .. ]." 1 Four years earlier, foreign policy commentator Albrecht von Kessel had noted that Adenauer remained intensely distrustful of the Auswartiges Amt and its diplomats, even after he gave up the ministerial portfolio. However, Kessel did not find Walter Hallstein or Heinrich von Brentano adequate leaders either. "What the Office has lacked more than anything else was a chief who truly concerned himself with the house, that is, who held the civil service together, but also was its advocate [fiir sie eintrat]."2 Obviously, Adenauer's relationship with the Auswartiges Amt was no love affair. While foreign minister, he had neither the time nor the inclination to devote himself to the Foreign Office and its problems. He preferred instead to concentrate on high policy with the assistance of a small circle of trusted advisors. However, the Foreign Ministry's rapidly increasing competencies and workload required more supervision from the highest levels, and the diplomats felt this lack of attention acutely. They thought that the chancellor did not always understand the needs of professional diplomacy and complained, with justification, that he too often left them out of the loop. The Auswartiges Amt itself had only just emerged from the period of its "childhood illnesses" when

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Adenauer turned it over to Heinrich von Brentano in 1955. In the early 1950s, when Adenauer's immediate goals-sovereignty and equality in the Western Bloc-were limited and obvious, his leadership of the ministry did not present serious problems. Special conditions during the first half of the decade, such as the proximity of the Allied High Commission on the Peters berg, accommodated Adenauer's methods especially well. West Germany's foreign policies were indeed tremendously successful through 1955. The Federal Republic went from being a state living under an Occupation Statute and without the right to conduct an independent foreign policy to one that had regained its sovereignty (except in matters concerning German unification) and had become an ally and partner for other Western countries. As some observers noted, it already enjoyed considerable international status several years before it was sovereign. For example, on June 3, 1953, the Dutch paper Het Parool wrote the Federal Republic was becoming increasingly important in world politics, as evidenced by the fact that the Three Western Powers had agreed to keep the Adenauer government informed about discussions on Germany at the upcoming Bermuda Summit. West Germany was not yet sovereign but already was taking its place among the world powers, and its significance would only increase due to European unification and the growing insight in Bonn that foreign policy could not focus solely on German issues. 3 West German reactions to the lifting of the Occupation Statute underline, however, the feeling among many at the time that in important respects this type of sovereignty and partnership was no more normal than Adenauer's leadership of the Foreign Office. In his memoirs Adenauer called May 5, 1955, "one of the greatest days in German history." "Ten years after the collapse of National Socialism, the occupation period came to an end for the Federal Republic. We were a free and independent state. Sovereignty returned to us the most important right of any state, the freedom of decision. It gave us the right to decide over our internal and external affairs as we saw fit [nach eigenem Ermessen]." In a public declaration that day he added that "what had been unfolding for some time already on the basis of growing trust has now become a legal fact: we stand as free [people] among the free, bound to the former Occupation Powers in true partnership." Yet the moment was subdued because both the government and the opposition remembered that there were millions of Germans in the GDR who, as Adenauer's declaration put it, "were forced to live separated from us in bondage [Unfreiheit] and illegality." An FDP orator saw May 5 as only the start of a longer process toward German unity, while

246 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFF I CE Erich Ollenhauer of the SPD argued that one could speak of sovereignty only after reunification in freedom. He added that the Federal Republic's new obligations to NATO and remaining Three Power rights in Germany (for example, to intervene if domestic disorder threatened their troops stationed there) were also important limitations on political freedom of decision. Adenauer himself seemed to concede the very usefulness of sovereignty when he closed this section of his memoirs by stating that the Federal Republic was always willing to surrender it to further the process of European unity. 4 That these ambivalent attitudes remained throughout the entire Cold War is evidenced by the ongoing debates after 1990 about whether a now reunited Germany can pursue a "normal" foreign policy, whether this means pursuing national interests or breaking with past traditions. 5 For their part, the Occupation Powers realized that their control over foreign relations gave them a powerful card in dealing with the Federal Republic and had concerns about what would happen after they surrendered it. The Foreign Office's structure, largely finished by 1955, reflected not only Adenauer's but also Allied preferences for the Federal Republic's foreign policy: it focused heavily on Western Europe and the Western hemisphere, less so on Asia and Africa (as, for example, the French desired in 1949-51), and almost not at all on the Soviet Bloc. The Three Powers would represent the Federal Republic's interests around the world wherever the latter did not have diplomatic relations, even into the 1970s in the case of Communist states and organizations such as the United Nations, where a Communist veto of West German membership was likely. Allied support was also important for helping the Federal Republic reinforce its claim to be the sole representative of the German nation by isolating the GDR internationally, after 1955 specifically with the Hallstein Doctrine. 6 But in the end the Occupation Powers concluded that they needed to trust the Adenauer government to pursue reasonable policies. Reliance on formal controls would only prove self-defeating. West German elites wanted to acquire foreign policy rights, including the right to establish a foreign ministry, as quickly as possible. As early as 1948 it became clear that they would attempt to use German economic potential, for example, as a means of gaining concessions. Adenauer's own attempts to pursue foreign policy without a foreign office in 1949-50 represented this wish as well. However, he clearly realized that the Federal Republic had to exercise caution lest it alarm its neighbors. As Adenauer told the Bundestag's Committee for the Occupation Statute and Foreign Affairs on November 4, 1949, while discussing his plans for a foreign affairs apparatus, the two guide-

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lines for his foreign policy were not to raise prestige questions and that "Germany must not 'play the fat Willy' [den dicken Willy or Wilhelm ]"-in other words, it must not try to show off or play the boss. 7 In particular, the Adenauer government constantly had to take Allied fears into account when, starting mid-decade, it began to explore possibilities for normalizing relations with the Soviet Bloc. These apprehensions about collaboration between the FRG and USSR would resurface later, during Adenauer's trip to Moscow in September 1955, throughout the course of Willy Brandt's Neue Ostpolitik, and then again during German reunification in 1989-90. 8 This measured style in West German policy harked back to the mid- l 920s and, reinforced by the European project, NATO membership, and the recognized need to make restitution for Nazi crimes, would come to characterize it down to the present day. It was also clear that the majority of veteran diplomats supported these goals. In 1957 Hans von Herwarth referred to the diplomats who had resisted Nazism as role models for the new foreign service, which he also thought was truly democratic in its outlook [wirklich demokratisch fundiert ist] for the first time ever. In his opinion, this had to do with a major social transformation in the German nation that had occurred as a result of the "complete catastrophe," that is, the Second World War. The consequences of this war, which in contrast to the First World War completely extinguished Germany's sovereignty, swept over the Germans like a "revolution" and led them to throw off many "nationalistic fetters." Its impact on West Germany's foreign policy could be seen in the Basic Law, which subordinated domestic law to international law and allowed the Federal Republic to transfer sovereign powers to international and supranational organizations. It was also reflected in the policy of European integration championed by Adenauer, which Herwarth called one of the bases of both the Federal Republic's diplomacy and its diplomatic service. 9 There is much to criticize in Herwarth's account of why most diplomats stayed at their posts in 1933, which is clearly apologetic. Yet in other respects he accurately described the changed international and domestic environments that WilhelmstraBe veterans faced. Germany's defeat in 1945 discredited Nazism and its military and foreign policies. The occupation regime set important parameters for the development of a new democratic political system in Western Germany that German elites had to observe if they wanted to actively participate in it. With the Cold War, it also determined the general orientation for the future Federal Republic's foreign policy. Foreign policy successes reinforced Adenauer's position as a "strong chancellor" and played a role in securing the diplomats' acceptance of his government. Moreover, the dynamic

248 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE expansion of personnel in the early 1950s and the decision-making structures established within the ministry by Adenauer, Hallstein, and Blankenhorn limited the veterans' role. The veterans themselves recognized the need for a new start in Germany and by and large worked loyally within the Foreign Office. Officials in leadership positions in the central office such as Blankenhorn, Etzdorf, Herwarth, Kessel, Theodor Kordt, and Melchers had ties to the German resistance. Although their roles in it could be and often were exaggerated, they were hardly likely to support a return to dictatorship. The same could be said of those persecuted or arrested under Nazism such as Haas, Maltzan, Scherpenberg, and Weick. In addition, it is clear that the veterans recognized the changed strategic situation of the state they represented. They were able to put aside reservations about Adenauer's policy ofWestbindung because they could not deny the basic logic of that strategy in face of the Soviet threat. Moreover, two concepts developed by veterans were quite forward-looking. They argued that one day the West would have to come to an understanding with the USSR based on recognition of the latter's legitimate security interests. They also recognized that the strict diplomatic isolation of the GDR would quickly prove both untenable and, if the FRG wanted to normalize relations with Eastern Europe, very limiting. In these areas "tradition-bound" veteran diplomats anticipated both detente and Willy Brandt's new Eastern Policy. All these factors make talk of a "restoration" in the Auswartiges Amt seem exaggerated. Yet in one key respect it was well founded. The ministry saw itself as the institutional descendent of the Foreign Office established by Bismarck in 1870-71. This fact was reflected in its initial organization and personnel policy and also in its institutional memory, which drew a clear distinction between the core of professional diplomats and those brought into the ministry by the National Socialists between 1933 and 1945. As recently as 1979 the Foreign Office published a brochure stating that its diplomats had offered strong resistance to Nazism "without being able to prevent the worst," perpetuating the myth of the "two foreign offices" from the late 1940s. 10 Although it cannot be singled out for all of the missteps taken in its personnel policy, which was similar to that of other central government ministries in the 1950s in most respects, this mentality did lead to the return of a high percentage of veteran diplomats. In many cases officials who had been members of the SS or who had entered the Auswartiges Amt after 1938 returned despite the guidelines promulgated by Haas and Hallstein, and the ministry turned a blind eye to supposedly "decent" Wilhelmstal3e veter-

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ans like Werner von Bargen and Otto Brautigam and outsiders with good contacts, like Franz NiiJ3lein, who had played a role in Nazi crimes. Even granted the urgent need for personnel in the early 1950s, the damage such individuals would do to the ministry's reputation was not worth whatever experience they might have contributed. The objections temporarily raised to Brautigam's employment by Hallstein and Blankenhom also indicate that a different policy could have been possible, even if simply for public relations, if a more consistent motivation to confront the recent past had existed in the Federal Republic in the early 1950s. It did not. But here, too, there would be no simple return to position and social status for the WilhelmstraBe veterans. Defeat, death, and Allied occupation barred a return to office for prominent officials during the Third Reich, including the higher leadership around Ribbentrop and his ambassadors. Those who did reenter the foreign service faced competition from talented outsiders and also had to come to grips with the demands of multilateral diplomacy, including the totally unprecedented challenges of European integration. Even if the ministry limited access for outsiders after the mid- l 950s, the increasing need for specialists in economics and other technical fields challenged the standing of the traditional, generalist diplomat. In addition, by the early 1960s a number of trends had clearly lessened the entire profession's prestige. Conference diplomacy and modem communications greatly reduced the ambassador's role, as Adenauer's methods amply demonstrated. For talented young people considering the diplomatic service, German industry offered far higher salaries, and both there and in other government ministries in Bonn they could expect promotion and real responsibility far more quickly. In response, applications for the foreign service had fallen off greatly compared to the early 1950s, and a commentator in Die Welt wondered, "where are the golden times of diplomacy?" 11 Most importantly, the story of the "two foreign offices" had only limited resonance. If there had been doubts after the 1949 Nuremberg judgment against Weizsacker and his colleagues that the majority of the traditional diplomatic corps had loyally served the National Socialist state, these began to evaporate over the next two decades. In 1954 the American historian Paul Seabury concluded that "the Nazis transformed the German Foreign Office into a pliable instrument of their policies." 12 In 1956 in Germany, Leon Poliakov and Josef Wulf, the latter a Holocaust survivor, published a collection of documents whose first section detailed the Auswartiges Amt's role in the Third Reich's Jewish policies. The editors concluded that the ties between German diplomacy

250 ADENAUER' S FOREI GN OFFI CE and the "gas chambers of Auschwitz" were "surprisingly close." 13 The years 1960-61 saw not only the Eichmann trial in Israel, which threatened to cast a highly unfavorable light on the Foreign Office, but also the publication of Raul Hilberg's The Destruction of the European Jews, which effectively did. 14 In the mid-1960s prosecutors in the Federal Republic started no fewer than ten trials of former German diplomats for participating in mass murder, often following leads from materials used at the Nuremberg trials themselves. 15 Just after the legal authorities began winding down their investigations in the late 1970s, historians Christopher Browning and Hans-Jurgen Doscher published important works that detailed the Auswartiges Amt's relationship with Nazism and its racial policies. Even the GDR's Brown Books and other attacks against former Nazis found a receptive audience in the Federal Republic by the 1960s and were no longer dismissed simply as Communist propaganda. For example, Adenauer's confidant Hans Globke, who normally avoided the limelight, appeared on West German television in 1961 to answer charges raised in an East German TV film called Aktion J. 16 Norbert Frei has described West Germans who came of age in the 1960s as the "children of suppression [Kinder der Verdriingung]" who now favored a more critical discussion of the past than their elders, in no small part due to the evidence that had been amassing about the role of former Nazi elites in the Federal Republic. 17 The Auswartiges Amt was an instrument of the National Socialist state before 1945, and the small number of individuals honored as resisters does not change this fact. On the other hand, many WilhelmstraJ3e veterans proved capable of contributing to a new foreign policy and a new democratic state. As Adenauer told the press in March 1951, tradition and expertise were necessary, but so was a new start.

Appendix TheAuswartigesAmt, 1951-June 1955

Higher Leadership Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs: Konrad Adenauer (March 3, 1951-June 7, 1955); Heinrich von Brentano (June 7, 1955-November 11, 1961) State Secretary of the Foreign Office: Walter Hallstein (April 2, 1951-January 7, 1958) Deputy: Herbert Blankenhom (1951-55); Wilhelm Grewe (1955-58) Attached: Legal Advisor (1950-52 to the Chancellery, 1952-58 to the Foreign Office): Erich Kaufmann (1950-58) Negotiation Committee (later Delegation) for the Dissolution of the Occupation Statute: Grewe (1951-53) Press Officer: Gunther Diehl (1952-56) Foreign Service Inspector: Peter Pfeiffer (1955-60)

Divisions of the Central Office in Bonn Division I: Personnel and Administration Leader: Wilhelm Haas (March 15, 1951-July 25, 1951); Herbert Dittmann (July 25, 1951-August 11, 1952); Peter Pfeiffer (August 11, 1952-August 1953); Josef Lons (August 1953-1958) Deputy Leader: Werner Schwarz (1951); Lons (1953); Gerhard Stahlberg (1953-57) Subdivision A: Personnel. Leader: Karl Wilde (1951-52) 1952: Subdivision Personnel I. Leader: Wolfgang von Weick (1952-53), Subdivision Personnel II: Leader: Wilde 1953: Subdivision 10. Leader: Wilde (1953); Stahlberg (1953-57)

252 Appendix Attached: Speyer Training Center for Attaches (1953 integrated into Subdivision 10): Peter Pfeiffer (1950-52); Kurt-Fritz von Graevenitz (1952-55) Subdivision B: Organization (1952 Subdivision Organization and Administration; 1953 Subdivision 11 Administration). Leader: Schwarz (195152); Werner Junker (1952); Lons (1953); Felician Prill (1953-56) Attached: Ministerial Office Director (created 1953; 1954 integrated into Subdivision 11) Division II: Political Division Leader: Blankenhom (1951-55); Grewe (1955-58) Deputy Leader: Dittmann ( 1951 ); Heinz Triltzschler von Falkenstein (1951-55); Carl Friedrich Ophiils (second deputy, 1953-55) Subdivision A: Peace Settlement, Tasks Left Over from Liaison Office to AHC (created 1952; 1953 Subdivision 20 General Foreign Policy). Leader: Triltzschler (1952-55) Attached: Berlin Office oftheAA(1953-58) Central Legal Protection Office (1953-56) Subdivision B: Inter- and Supranational Organizations (created 1952; 1953 Subdivision 21 Inter- and Supranational Organizations). Leader: Ophiils (1952-55) Attached: Secretariat for the Schuman Plan (1950-52; thereafter 22 Conference Secretariat) German Delegation to the Interim Committee of the EDC (1952-54) Division III: Geographic Division Leader: Theodor Kordt (1951-53); Weick (1953-58) Deputy: Hasso von Etzdorf(l951-53); Gustav Strohm (1953-55) Subdivision 30 Political Relations with Other States (created 1953) Leader: Strohm (1953-55)

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Subdivision 35 Eastern Bloc and Eastern Bloc Affairs (created 1953) Leader: Otto Brautigam (1953-56) Attached: Advisor for Eastern Questions: Gustav Hilger (1953-56) Division IV: Foreign Trade Division (Under Construction 1951-53) Acting Leader: (Karl) Walther Becker (1951-53) Leader: Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan (1953-55); Albert Hilger van Scherpenberg (1955-58) Deputy: Scherpenberg (1953-55); Junker (1953-55) Directly Subordinate to Leader of Division IV: Delegate for Franco-German Relations ( 1955-57) Delegation (after 1955 Delegate) for Trade Agreement Negotiations

(1953-) Division V: Legal Division Leader: Hermann Mosler (1951-53); Grewe (1953-54); Hans Berger

(1954-59) Deputy: Gerrit von Haeften (1951-53); Friedrich Janz (1953-54); Wilhelm von Grolman (1954-59) Division VI: Cultural Division Leader: Vacant (1951-55); Triitzschler (1955-59) Deputy Leader: Rudolf Salat (1951-54); Karl Heinrich Frahne (1954-55) Protocol Leader: Hans Herwarth von Bittenfeld (1951-55); Ernst-Gunther Mohr

(1955-58) Deputy: Erica Pappritz (1951-58)

West German Political Missions in Foreign Countries, June 1950-June 1955 Botschaft = Embassy Diplomatische Vertretung = Diplomatic Mission Generalkonsulat = Consulate General Gesandtschaft = Mission

254 Appendix 195 0-19 51: The First Consulates General Belgium: Generalkonsulat Brussels (November 15, 1950); Anton Pfeiffer Canada: Generalkonsulat Ottawa (February 13, 1951); Werner Dankwort Denmark: Generalkonsulat Copenhagen (January 10, 1951); Wilhelm Noldeke France: Generalkonsulat Paris (July 7, 1950); Wilhelm Hausenstein Greece: Generalkonsulat Athens (December 7, 1950); Werner von Grundherr Italy: Generalkonsulat Rome (December 2, 1950); Clemens von Bretano Netherlands: Generalkonsulat Amsterdam (October 24, 1950); Karl Du Mont Sweden: Generalkonsulat Stockholm (March 5, 1951); Kurt Sieveking Turkey: Generalkonsulat Istanbul (October 24, 1950); Kurt von Kamphoevener United Kingdom: Generalkonsulat London (June 16, 1950); Hans SchlangeSchoningen United States: Generalkonsulat New York (June 28, 1950); Heinz Krekeler

1951 Argentina: Botschaft Buenos Aires (December 30, 1951 ); Hermann Terdenge Belgium: Botschaft Brussels (June 27, 1951); Anton Pfeiffer Brazil: Botschaft Rio de Janeiro (July 10, 1951 ); Fritz Oellers Canada: Botschaft Ottawa (November 8, 1951 ); Dankwort Chile: Botschaft Santiago (February 4, 1952); Carl von Campe Denmark: Botschaft Copenhagen (June 27, 1951); Noldeke; 1955 Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz France: Diplomatische Vertretung Paris (July 11, 1951; after May 26, 1955, Botschaft); Hausenstein; 1955 Maltzan Greece: BotschaftAthens (July 12,1951); Grundherr (to 1952); 1953 Kordt Italy: Botschaft Rome (June 1, 1951 ); Clemens von Brentano Luxembourg: Generalkonsulat Luxembourg City (April 13, 1951; after April 23, 1952 Gesandtschaft); Josef Jansen; 1955 Wilde Netherlands: Botschaft The Hague (June 28, 1951 ); Du Mont (to 1952); 1953 Hans Mtihlenfeld Norway: Gesandtschaft Oslo (August 11, 1951 ); Georg von Broich-Oppert South Africa: Generalkonsulat Pretoria (February 26, 1951; after January 22, 1952, Gesandtschaft; after April 15, 1954, Botschaft); Rudolf Holzhausen; 1954 Strohm Sweden: Gesandtschaft Stockholm (June 26, 1951 ); Sieveking; 1954 Herbert Siegfried

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Switzerland: Gesandtschaft Bern (May 6, 1952); Friedrich Holzapfel (preceded by Generalkonsulat Zurich, May 17, 1951, and Generalkonsulat Basel, June 7, 1951) United Kingdom: Diplomatische Vertretung London (June 20, 1951; after May 26, 1955, Botschaft); Schlange-Schoningen; 1955 Herwarth United States: Diplomatische Vertretung Washington (July 2, 1951; after May 6, 1955, Botschaft); Krekeler Uruguay: Gesandtschaft Montevideo (December 29, 1951); Gustav Herbig; 1955 Schwarz Yugoslavia: Politische Vertretung (Political Mission) Belgrade (July 13, 1951; after April 2, 1952, Botschaft); Robert Ulrich; 1953-55 Kroll

1952 Australia: Botschaft Canberra (July 9, 1952); Walther Hess Bolivia: Gesandtschaft La Paz (December 30, 1952; after July 13, 1954, Botschaft); Werner Gregor Costa Rica: Gesandtschaft San Jose (October 7, 1952)-see El Salvador Ecuador: Gesandtschaft Quito (July 4, 1952; after March 14, 1955, Botschaft); Joachim Kuhn Egypt (also Yemen): Botschaft Cairo (October 16, 1952); Gunther Pawelke; 1955 Becker El Salvador (also Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama): San Salvador (October 7, 1952; after December 23, 1954, Botschaft); Eugen Klee; 1955 Bernd Mumm von Schwarzenstein Iceland: Gesandtschaft Reykjavik (December 16, 1952); Kurt Oppler India: Botschaft New Delhi (April 22, 1952); Ernst Wilhelm Meyer Indonesia: Botschaft Djakarta (June 25, 1952); Werner Otto von Hentig; 1954 Helmut Allardt Iraq (also Jordan to 1955): Gesandtschaft Baghdad (September 19, 1953); Wilhelm Melchers Iran: Gesandtschaft Teheran (October 1, 1953; after June 20, 1955, Botschaft); Lutz Gielhammer Ireland: Gesandtschaft Dublin (July 26, 1951 ); Hermann Katzenberger Japan: Botschaft Tokyo (April 19, 1952); Heinrich Northe; 1955 Hans Kroll Mexico: Botschaft Mexico City (August 29, 1952); Fritz von Twardowski Pakistan: Botschaft Karachi (May 14, 1952); Wolfgang Jaenicke; 1954 Hans

256 Appendix Podeyn Paraguay: Gesandtschaft Asuncion (October 1, 1952; after March 17, 1954, Botschaft); Julius Borgs-Maciejewski Peru: Botschaft Lima (September 4, 1952); Wilhelm Mackeben Portugal: Gesandtschaft Lisbon (November 10, 1952); Leo Wohleb; 1955 Gebhard Seelos Spain: Botschaft Madrid (November 6, 1952); Adalbert Prinz von Bayem Syria: Gesandtschaft Damascus (October 14, 1952); Hansjoachim von der Esch Thailand: Gesandtschaft Bangkok (December 22, 1952); Gottfried Kaumann Turkey: Botschaft Ankara (June 21, 1952); Haas Venezuela: Gesandtschaft Caracas (April 28, 1952; after June 15, 1955, Botschaft): Mohr; 1955 Gerhart Weiz

1953 Austria: Wirtschaftsdelegation [Trade Delegation] of the Federal Republic in Vienna (November 21, 1953); Carl Hermann Mueller-Graaf Colombia: Gesandtschaft Bogota (January 13, 1953; after April 13, 1953, Botschaft); Karl Schwendemann Cuba: Gesandtschaft Havana (July 22, 1953; after July 17, 1954, Botschaft); Theodor Suss Dominican Republic: Gesandtschaft Ciudad Trujillo (September 11, 1953; after March 25, 1955, Botschaft); Gunther Reinhard Bock 1955 Finland: Handelsvertretung [Trade Mission] Helsinki (March 22, 1953); Reinhold-Friedrich Koenning Haiti: Gesandtschaft Port-au-Prince (September 23, 1953); 1955 Fritz Wussow Lebanon: Gesandtschaft Beirut (May 20, 1953); Herbert Nohring Liberia: Gesandtschaft Monrovia (July 23, 1953; after January 12, 1955, Botschaft); 1955 Hans-Felix Rohrecke Panama: Gesandtschaft Panama City (February 20, 1953}-see El Salvador Sri Lanka: Gesandtschaft Columbo (December 9, 1953); 1955 Georg Ahrens

1954 Afghanistan: Gesandtschaft, Kabul (December 22, 1954); Franz Quiring

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Ethiopia: Gesandtschaft Addis Ababa (January 14, 1954); Hans Bidder Holy See: Botschaft Vatican City (June 1, 1954); Jaenicke Nicaragua: Gesandtschaft Managua (October 13, 1954}-see El Salvador

1955 Burma: Botschaft Rangoon (February 11, 1955); - Jordan: Gesandtschaft Amman (March 1, 1955}-see Iraq

West German Missions at International Organizations Led by the Foreign Office Geneva: Permanent Delegation of the FRG at the Offices of the United Nations and at Other International Organizations (March 16, 1953); Gerhart Feine New York: Office of the Permanent Observer at the United Nations (October 2, 1952); Hans Riesser; 1955 Felix von Eckardt Paris: Permanent Mission of the FRG at NATO Headquarters (May 9, 1955); Blankenhorn Strasbourg: Permanent Mission of the FRG at the European Council (November 2, 1954); Karl Carstens

Short Biographies of the 100 West German Diplomats Listed Above These biographies are intended to provide brief information on the 100 leading officials in the Foreign Office between 1949 and 1955. These data include their life dates, confession, highest educational level, political affiliations (including membership in the NSDAP, SS, and SA), and main occupations before they entered the Federal Republic's Auswartiges Amt. Foreign ministers Konrad Adenauer and Heinrich von Brentano are not included. Several German technical terms used in the biographies refer to the retirement of tenured civil servants, including career diplomats. Ruhestand indicates permanent retirement. There were also two types of provisional or temporary retirement from active service: einstweiliger Ruhestand and Wartestand. The latter is used specifically for officials whose office has been abolished or reorganized, after which they must be either reassigned or

258 Appendix permanently released. These terms have been noted in the short biographies whenever they appeared in a diplomat's vitae. Dr. jur., Dr. med., Dr. oec, Dr. phi/., and Dr. rer. pol. are German designations for doctorates in law, medicine, economics, the humanities (and some social sciences), and political science, respectively. The more general designation for doctorates in academic disciplines, "Ph.D," has been given when only it appeared in the sources. 1. Ahrens, Georg (1890-1907). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1914, Foreign Office 1914-38. Wartestand 1938, then works in industry (AEG). Contract worker in Foreign Office Cultural Division 1939-45. Hesse state government 1946-49, then writer. 2. Allardt, Helmut (1907-87). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1936, Foreign Office 1936-45. NSDAP 1939. Internment in Turkey. Editor of Archiv der Gegenwart, then VfW, 1950-52 Federal Economics Ministry. 3. Adalbert, Prinz von Bayern (1886-1970). Catholic, Ph.D. Historian. Military in WWI and WWII. After 1945 president of the Bavarian Red Cross. 4. Becker, (Karl) Walther (1894-1973). Protestant, Dr. rer. pol. Military in WWI. Foreign Office 1921-37 as trade expert, then 1937-45 as tenured civil servant (Diplomatic-Consular Examination 1937). NSDAP 1935. Coffee import industry in Hamburg 1947-51. 5. Berger, Hans (1909-85). Catholic. Dr. jur. 1937-39 Gerichtsassessor (judge on probation) in Cologne. Works for Reichskommissar far die Preisbildung [Reich Commissioner for Price Setting] 1939-44. Resistance ties. After 1945 legal service in British zone; president of District Court in Diisseldorf 1949-53, Federal Justice Ministry 1953-54. 6. Bidder, Hans (1897-1963). Protestant, Ph.D. Diplomatic attache 1922, Foreign Office 1922-45. NSDAP 1941. Stays in China advising German companies 1945-50, returns to Germany 1951. 7. Blankenhorn, Herbert ( 1904-91 ). Protestant, university studies. Diplomatic attache 1929, Foreign Office 1929-45. NSDAP 1938. Resistance ties. Internment. Chancellery of British Zonal Advisory Council, CDU 1946-48. General secretary of CDU in the British Zone and personal assistant of the president of the Parliamentary Council (Adenauer) 1948-49. CDU. 8. Bock, Gunther (1899-1968). Catholic, Dr. phil. Diplomatic attache 1923, Foreign Office 1923-45. NSDAP 1937. Internment in Italy. In Germany 1946-48, returns to Italy 1948-49. After 1949 in Argentina; German-Argentine Chamber of Commerce 1950-52.

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9. Boltze, Erich (1891-1981). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Prussian legal service. Diplomatic attache 1920, Foreign Office 1920-45. NSDAP 1938. Returns to Germany from Japan 1948. Secretary general of Liquidation Committee ofIG Farben 1950-53. 10. Borgs-Maciejewski (before 1948 Maciejewski), Julius (1896-1984). Catholic, Dr. rer. pol. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1927, Foreign Office 1927-44, then einstweiliger Ruhestand 1944. NSDAP 1940. Works for CDU in Berlin 1945-49. CDU. 11. Brautigam, Otto ( 1895-1992). Catholic, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1920, Foreign Ministry 1920-41, 1945. In Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories 1941-44. NSDAP 1936-40. Internment. Writer, also advisor on "Eastern questions" for US offices in Munich 1946-53. 12. Brentano di Tremezzo, Clemens von (1886-1965). Catholic, university studies. Center Party before 1933. Bavarian Foreign Service 1912-19, then Foreign Office 1919-20, 1921-29. Einstweiliger Ruhestand 1929, Ruhestand 1937. Business, then head of Baden State Chancellery 1946-50. CDU. 13. Broich-Oppert, Georg von (1897-79). Protestant, university studies. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1924, Foreign Office 1924-35, then Wartestand, Ruhestand 1937 (political reasons). I. G. Farben 1939-45. After 1946 politician and civil servant in Berlin. CDU. 14. Campe, Carl von ( 1894-1977). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1920, Foreign Office 1920-41, then einstweiliger Ruhestand. Works in industry. NSDAP 1940. DP. After 1946 career politician, MdB 1949-52. 15. Carstens, Karl ( 19 I 4-92). Protestant, Dr. jur., professor. Military in WWII. Bremen legal service 1938-39. NSDAP 1940. Lawyer in Bremen 1945. Legal advisor of Bremen state government 1945-47, 1949-54. Legal studies at Yale University, 1948-49. Professor at University of Cologne 1950-54. CDU. 16. Dankwort, Werner (1895-1986). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1920, Foreign Office 1920-45. Returns to Germany from Sweden 1945, internment 1945-47. Deputy leader of West German mission to OEEC in Paris 1949. 17. Dittmann, Herbert (1904-65). Catholic, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1929, Foreign Office 1929-44. NSDAP 1937. Internment in Turkey, then Germany 1944-46. Judge in North Rhine-Westphalia 1946-49. 18. Du Mont (before 1945 Dumont), Karl (1884-1961). Protestant, Dr. jur.

260 Appendix Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1919, Foreign Office 1919-44, dismissed due to foreign wife. NSDAP application rejected 1941; FM-SS. After 1945 Otto Wolff Company in Berlin. 19. Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand (1904-73). Protestant, university studies. Works 1933-35 for Alfred Rosenberg's Aufienpolitisches Amt [Foreign Policy Office], 1935-38 for Hamburg-America Shipping Line (Hapag). Attached to Foreign Office in Denmark as shipping attache 1939-45. NSDAP 1932. In 1943 saves approx. 7,000 Danish Jews from deportation. Represents West German industry in Copenhagen 1946-50. 20. Eckardt, Felix von (1903-79). Protestant, Rea/gymnasium [college preparatory high school]. Journalist, attached to Foreign Office 1929-32. Works as screenplay writer for German film industry 1933-45. After 1945 journalist. CDU. 21. Esch, Hansjoachim von der (1899-1976). Protestant, Dipl.-Ing. [engineering degree]. Military in WWI and WWII. Represents German firm in Egypt, conducts archeological expeditions; author 1929-39. Engineer for Swedish firm in Hamburg 1945-47. In Sweden, writer 1947-51. 22. Etzdorf, Hasso von ( 1900-89). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1928, Foreign Office 1928-45. Member of DNVP, Free Corps, Stahlhelm [conservative veterans organization] in Weimar Republic; NSDAP 1933, SA 1938 (Obersturmbahnfahrer). "Diplomatic Resistance." DBFF 1947-50. 23. Feine, Gerhart (1894-1959). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1923, Foreign Office 1923-45. In 1944 helps save Hungarian Jews. After 1947 in Bremen justice system, president of State Justice Administration [Landesjustizverwaltung] 1949-52. 24. Frahne, Karl Heinrich (1903-59). Protestant, Dr. jur. Academics. 1931-37 Institute fur Auswartige Politik, Hamburg. Deutsches Institut fur AuBenpolitische Forschung, Berlin, 1937-39. Attached to Foreign Office as cultural attache 1939-44. NSDAP 1940. After 1945 writer and book author. 25. Gielhammer, Lutz (1898-1988). Catholic, Dr. jur. Military in WWII. Works in banking industry, including in Iran 1929-38; Orient Specialist [Orientreferent] for I. G. Farben, Berlin, 1938-44. NSDAP 1935. Federal Finance Ministry 1950-53. 26. Gregor, Werner (1896-1971 ). Protestant, Dr. rer. pol. Military in WWI and II. DDP/German State Party 1926-30. Diplomatic attache 1925, Foreign Office 1925-44. NSDAP 1936. Prisoner of war 1945-47. Representative of Chilean Sociedad General de Comercio SA 1949-52. SPD. 27. Grewe, Wilhelm (1911-2000). Protestant, Dr. jur., professor. Academics

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1933--45. NSDAP 1933--43 (expelled due to refusal to divorce wife, who was affected by Nuremburg Laws). Law professor in Gottingen 1945--47, in Freiburg 1947-51. 28. Grolman, Wilhelm von (1904-62). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1934, Foreign Office 1934--45. NSDAP 1933, head ofNSDAP Auslandsorganisation in Sweden 1935-37. Businessman in Aachen 1947-50. Federal Ministry of Justice 1950-53. 29. Grundherr zu Altenthann und Weiherhaus, Werner von (1888-1962). Protestant, Dr. phil. Diplomatic attache 1918, Foreign Office 1918--45. Implicated in anti-Jewish policies in Denmark. NSDAP application rejected 1940. Internment 1945--47. 30. Haas, Wilhelm (1896-1981). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1922, Foreign Office 1922-37, then Ruhestand (Jewish wife). I. G. Farben, Berlin, 1938. I. G. Farben representative in China 1938--45. Head of Chancellery of Bremen Senate 1947--49. 31. Haeften, Gerrit von (1899-1971 ). Protestant, university studies. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1928, Foreign Office 1928--45. NSDAP 1937. Returns to Germany from Switzerland 1947. Lawyer 1947--48. DBFF 1948--49. Legal Office [Rechtsamt] of United Economic Area 1949-50, later Federal Ministry of Justice. 32. Hallstein, Walter (1901-82). Protestant, Dr. jur., professor. Military in WWII. Law professor at University of Rostock 1930--41; then University of Frankfurt a.M. 1941. Prisoner of war. Again law professor, then Rektor [president] of University of Frankfurt 1946-50, guest professorship at Georgetown University 1948. President of German UNESCO committee. CDU. 33. Hausenstein, Wilhelm (1882-1957). Catholic, Ph.D. 1907-19 SPD. Art historian, author, and journalist. Prohibited from publishing books 1936, prohibited from journalism 1943 (Jewish wife). Co-founds the Suddeutsche Zeitung 1945, active as author and journalist. 34. Hentig, Werner Otto von (1886-1984). Protestant, Dr. jur et rer. pol. Military in WWII. Diplomatic attache 1911, Foreign Office 1911-26, 1928--45. Foreign Office representative to the Wehrmacht 1941--45 (through 1942 to 11th Army Headquarters-A OK JI). Resistance ties. Internment 194546. Foreign affairs expert [Referent] for Evangelische Kirche [Protestant Church] in Germany 1946--49. 35. Herbig, Gustav (1888-1965). Catholic, university studies, professor at business schools. Military in WWI (Austria-Hungary). High school and

262 Appendix university teacher, politician in Czechoslovakia, member of parliament 1935 for Sudeten German Social Democratic Party (DSAP). Applies to NDSAP 1939, rejected 1941 (Freemasonry). Loses university job 1942, sent to concentration camp 1944. Member of Czechoslovak parliament 1946. Flees Czechoslovakia to Western Germany 1948. SPD, 1949-51 MdB. 36. Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Hans (1904-99). Protestant, university studies. Military in WWII. Diplomatic attache 1927, Foreign Office 1927-39. Member of"Diplomatic Resistance." Bavarian State Chancellery 1945--49. 37. Hess, Walther (1900-1986). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1925, Foreign Office 1925-38, then Einstweiliger Ruhestand (Jewish wife). Businessman in Greece 1938--43, 1944--49. Attached to Foreign Office in Bulgaria, 1943--44. 38. Hilger, Gustav (1886-1965). Protestant, Dipl-Ing. [engineering degree]. Foreign Office 1923--45 (economics expert at Moscow Embassy 1923--41, in Foreign Minister's Office and special assignments for Ribbentrop's personal staff 1941--44). Internment. In US 1945--46, in Germany 1946--48, then in Washington, DC, as advisor for "Eastern Questions" to US State Department 1948-53. 39. Holzapfel, Friedrich (1900-1979). Protestant, Dr. rer. pol. DNVP before 193 3. Businessman. Arrested 193 7. Lord mayor of Herford 1945--46. CDU. Business chairman (Geschaftsfahrer) of CDU in British Zone 1946--49, then for CDU in the Federal Republic 1949-52. MdB 1949-52. 40. Holzhausen, Rudolf(l889-1963). Protestant, university studies. Military in WWI and IL Diplomatic attache 1919, Foreign Office 1919-34, then Einstweiliger Ruhestand ("racial grounds"). Ruhestand 193 7. Various activities 1935--45, including farming. Bavarian state government 1945--49. Leads Organization Staff for Creating Trade Missions Abroad, VfW 194950. 41. Jaenicke, Wolfgang ( 1881-1968). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military service in WWI. Communal politician. Governor of Breslau 1919-30. Governor of Potsdam 1930. Reich Commissar for execution of Peace Treaty in Posen and Silesia 1919-26. Special emissary of the Reich government to India and Burma 1928-29. DDP!Staatspartei, Reichstag delegate 1930-32. Suspended from political office 1933. Works for League of Nations in China as advisor to Jiang Jieshi 1933-36. Forced retirement 1936--45. Works for Bavarian government on refugee issues 1945-50. CSU. 42. Jansen, (Gerhard) Josef (1909---66). Catholic, Ph.D. Military in WWII. Businessman 1934--45, including 1939--42 as director of the Deutsche

Appendix

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Osram-Gesellschaft, Athens. Prisoner of war. Country executive [Landrat] of Kreis Zell/Mosel 1946--48, then of Kreis Mayen/Andernach am Rhein 1948-51. 43. Janz, Friedrich (1898-1964). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Foreign Office 1927-30, 1934--45. Diplomatic-Consular Exam 1937. NSDAP 1941. Baden Finance Ministry 1947-50, then administrator of Deutsche Bank assets in French zone of Baden. Head of Baden State Chancellery 1950-52. 44. Junker, Werner (1902-90). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1927, Foreign Office 1927--45 (office ofForeign Office Plenipotentiary for Southeastern Europe 1944--45). NSDAP 1935. Senate Chancellery, Hamburg, 1947-51. 45. Kamphoevener, Kurt von (1887-1983). Protestant, university studies. Military in WWI and WWII. SPD 1930. Diplomatic attache 1911, Foreign Office 1911--45. NSDAP 1940, FM-SS Reitersturm. After 1946 foreign language teacher, British Education Center, Hamburg. 46. Katzenberger, Hermann (1891-1958). Catholic, Dr. jur., Ph.D. Center Party before 1933. Heads Foreign Office Press Division 1928-32, attached to Press Division 1934-38. Ruhestand 1943. Head of press office in North Rhine-Westphalia 1947-50. Director of Bundesrat (upper house of parliament), Bonn, 1950-51. Co-founder of CDU. 47. Kaufmann, Erich (1880-1972). Protestant, Dr. jur., Ph.D., professor. Academics 1908-34. Legal advisor to Foreign Office 1927-33. Relieved of all positions 1934 (Jewish ancestry). Emigrates to Netherlands 1939. Law professor at University of Munich 1946-50. 48. Kaumann, Gottfried ( 1893-1954). Protestant, Dr. jur et oec. Military service in WWI. Director of Junkers Aviation Corporation 1922-31. Represents German civilian aviation abroad 1933--45. VfW 1947. Federal Economics Ministry 1949-52, leads office [Treuhandstelle] for Inter-Zonal Trade in Berlin. 49. Kessel, Albrecht von (1902-76). Protestant, university studies. Diplomatic attache 1927, Foreign Office 1927--45. NSDAP application rejected 1943. Member of "Diplomatic Resistance." Works for Evangelisches Hilfswerk 1945, then active as writer. 50. Klee, Eugen (1887-1956). Catholic, Dr. jur., Dr. phil. Diplomatic attache 1919, Foreign Office 1919--44. Einstweiliger Ruhestand 1944. Country executive [Landrat] of Kreis Alzey, Rhineland-Palatinate, 1947-52. 51. Koenning, Reinhold-Friedrich (1898-1956). Protestant, Ph.D. Reich Finance Ministry (Division of International Questions) 1929--45. NSDAP

264 Appendix 1933. Wtirttemberg-Baden Economics Ministry 1947. 52. Kordt, Theodor ( 1893-1962). Catholic, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1921, Foreign Office 1922-45. NSDAP 1939. Diplomatic Resistance. Returns from Switzerland to Germany 1946. Teaches international law at University of Bonn 1947-53. Observer for North Rhine-Westphalia at Parliamentary Council, Bonn, 1948-49. Head of international law desk of North RhineWestphalia's government 1948-50. 53. Krekeler, Heinz (1906-2003). Protestant, Ph.D. Chemist for Edeleanu GmbH in Berlin 1930-34. Chemist for I. G. Farben, Ludswigshafen-Oppau, 1934-45. FDP, 1947-50 member of parliament in North Rhine-Westphalia. 54. Kroll, Hans ( 1898-1967). Catholic, Dr. rer. pol. Diplomatic attache 1920, Foreign Office 1920-45. Returns from Spain to Germany 1946, internment. Foreign policy advisor for government of North Rhine-Westphalia 194748. Federal Economics Ministry 1950-53. CDU. 55. Kuhn, Joachim (1892-1978). Protestant, Dr. phil. Military in WWI. Foreign Office 1917-45. Internment 1945. State Chancellery ofNorth RhineWestphalia 1946-52. 56. Lons, Josef (1910-74). Catholic, Dr. jur. Works for Koiner Lebensversicherung AG 1937-45. Lawyer in Cologne, work for Cologne city government 1945-50. CDU. Secretary general of CDU in the British Zone, advisor to Adenauer 1946-48. Counselor [Beigeordneter] in Cologne city administration 1948-52. 57. Mackeben, Wilhelm ( 1892-1956). Protestant, later Catholic, university studies. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1919, Foreign Office 1919-45, diplomatic attache 1920 (works for Ambassador Ritter 1939-42). Einstweiliger Ruhestand 1942, after 1943 no assignment in Foreign Office, thereafter businessman. 58. Maltzan Freiherr zu Wartenberg und Penzlin, Vollrath von ( 1899-1967). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1925, Foreign Office 1925-38. Einstweiliger Ruhestand (Jewish mother) 1938. Attached to Foreign Office 1939-42 (incl. work for Ambassador Ritter). With I. G. Farben 1939, 1942-45. Hessen Ministry for Economics and Transport, then at US Zonal Council in Stuttgart 1946. Bizonal Administration for Economics, then Vtw 1946-49, thereafter Federal Economics Ministry. 59. Melchers, Wilhelm ( 1900-71 ). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1925, Foreign Office 1925-45. NSDAP 1939. Resistance ties. Evangelisches Hilfswerk 1946-48, works for Bremen senator for Harbors and Navigation (Hafen und Schiffahrt) 1948-49.

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60. Meyer, Ernst Wilhelm (1892-1969). Protestant, Dr. jur., Dr. rer. pol., professor. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1921, Foreign Office 192137. Resigns in protest of Nazi policies while stationed in Washington, DC, 1937. University professor in United States, 1937-47. Political science professor at University of Frankfurt a.M. 1947. SPD. 61. Mohr, Ernst-Gunther (1904-91). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1929, Foreign Office 1929-45. NSDAP 1935. DBFF, 1947-50. 62. Mosler, Hermann (1912-2001). Catholic, Dr. jur., professor. Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Berlin, 1937-45. Lawyer in Bonn 1946-49. Law professor at University of Frankfurt a.M. 1949-54. 63. Mueller-Graaf, Carl Hermann (1903-63; before 1950 Carl Hermann Muller). Protestant, Dr. jur. Reich Economics Ministry 1931-40. Attached to Foreign Office 1940-42. With Reich Inspector General for Water and Energy 1942-45. NSDAP 1937. Writer 1945-49. VfW, then Federal Economics Ministry 1949-53. 64. Muhlenfeld, Hans (1901-69). Protestant, Dr. jur. Lawyer and businessman. Cofounder of DP. Member of Frankfurt Economics Council 1948-49. MdB 1949-53. 65. Mumm von Schwarzenstein, Bernd (1901-81). Protestant, Dr.jur. Military in WWII. Diplomatic attache 1928, Foreign Office 1928-39, then released. Five-year jail sentence for Wehrkraftversetzung [undermining military morale] 1944. Businessman 1946-52. 66. N ohring, Herbert ( 1900-1986). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1929, Foreign Office 1929-45. NSDAP 1934. Implicated in deportation of Jews from Salonika, Greece. Internment 1945-46. Language teacher 1946-47. Schleswig-Holstein state government 1947-49; Schleswig-Holstein plenipotentiary to Federal Government in Bonn 195052. FDP. 67. Noldeke, Wilhelm (1889-1971). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1918, Foreign Office 1918-45. Application to NSDAP rejected 1941. Hamburg legal system 1945-47. Central Justice Office [Zentral-Justizamt] for British Zone, Hamburg, 1947-50. 68. Northe, Heinrich (1908-85). Protestant, Dr. jur., Dr. med. Diplomatic attache 1933, Foreign Office 1933-45. NSDAP 1935. Medical school 194550; doctor in Freiburg and Bonn 1950-51. 69. Oellers, Fritz (1903-77). Catholic, Dr. jur. Military in WWII. After 1930 lawyer in Halle and Berlin. FDP. Delegate to Frankfurt Economics Counsel

266 Appendix 1948-49. MdB 1949-51. 70. Ophills, Carl Friedrich (1895-1970). Protestant, Dr. jur., professor. Justice service 1918-23. Attached to Foreign Office as a commissar for Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 1923-30 (at Anglo-German Tribunal in London 1925-30). Frankfurt a.M. Regional Court of Appeals [Landesgrichtshoj] 1931-45. NSDAP 1933. Rechtsamt [legal office] of United Economic Area 1948-49. Federal Ministry of Justice 1949-52. 71. Oppler, Kurt (1902-81). Catholic, Dr. jur. SPD 1926---33. Businessman 1921-27. Legal practice 1932-37. Prohibited from practicing law 1937. Emigration (political and "racial grounds") 1938-45, in Netherlands and after 1940 Belgium. Hessen Ministry of Justice 1946. Head of Personnel Office (Persona/amt), VfW 1947-49; thereafter head of VfW Abwichlungsstelle [liquidation office]. SPD. 72. Pappritz, Erica (1893-1972). Protestant, privately educated. Attached to Foreign Office 1919-45, after 1932 in Protocol. NSDAP 1940. Helps with protocol affairs for Bavarian State Chancellery and Federal Chancellery 1947, 1949. 73. Pawelke, Gunther (1900-1976). Catholic, Dr. jur. Military in WWI and II. Diplomatic attache 1927, Foreign Office 1927-42. In military hospital 1943. Farmer 1942-50. 74. pfeiffer, Anton (1888-1957). Catholic, Ph.D. Bavarian People's Party, general secretary 1918-33, member of Bavarian parliament 1928-33. In school service 1914-45. Arrested 1933. Head of Bavarian State Chancellery 1945-50, Bavarian Minister for Denazification 1946. Parliamentary Council, Bonn, 1948-49. CSU. 75. Pfeiffer, Peter ( 1895-1978). Catholic, university studies. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1925, Foreign Office 1925-45. NSDAP 1940. Internment 1945-46, then various jobs, including as a gardener's assistant [Gartenhelfer]. Head of DBFF 1949-50. 76. Podeyn, Hans (1894-1965). No confession, teachers' college. SPD before 1933. Member of Hamburg Burgerschaft [parliament] 1924-33. Hamburg school service 1914-33, dismissed 1933. Various occupations 1933-45. Landwirtschaftsamt [agricultural ministry] Hamburg 1945-46. Central Office for Food and Agriculture, British Zone, 1946---49; later Frankfurt Administration for Food, Agriculture, and Forests. Deputy leader of German mission to Economic Cooperation Administration, the representative to the Mutual Security Agency and to the Foreign Operations Administration in Washington, DC, 1949-54. SPD.

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77. Prill, Felician (1904-81). Catholic, Dr. jur. Military in WWII. Government service in Danzig 1929--40. In Finanzamt (tax office), Magdeburg, 194041. Prisoner of war. Head of Finanzamt, Magdeburg, 1946--48. Works in Frankfurt Financial Administration, later Federal Finance Ministry 194854. 78. Quiring, Franz (1892-1957). Protestant, Ph.D. Diplomatic attache 1920, in Foreign Office 1920--45. Implicated in deportation of Jews from France. NSDAP 1933. Editor of Kosmos Press Service, Baden-Baden, 1946--49. Head of Office for Occupation Costs (Besatzungskostenamt) in Rastatt 1950-53. Deputy leader of Federal Information Office for Trade (Bundesauskunftsstelle far Auj3enhandel) in Cologne 1953. 79. Riesser, Hans (1887-1969). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1919, Foreign Office 1919-34. Ruhestand ("racial grounds") 1934. Thereafter businessman in France and Switzerland. Works for German military intelligence 1939. Citizenship revoked 1941. Returns from Switzerland to Germany 1949. 80. Rohrecke, Hans-Felix (1888-1973). Protestant, Dr. jur. et rer. pol. Military in WWI. Foreign Office 1919-36, diplomatic attache 1920. Works in Reich Chancellery 1936-39. Works in Foreign Office 1939--44. Einstweiliger Ruhestand 1944, then works in armaments industry. Volkssturm I 945. NSDAP 1939. 81. Salat, Rudolf (1906-94). Catholic, university studies. Works in Switzerland for Pax Romana 1930-50. 82. Schlange-Schoningen, Hans (1886-1960). Protestant, university studies. Military in WWI. DNVP to 1928. Farmers and Country People's Party 1928-33. Member of Reichstag 1924-32, member of Prussian Parliament 1921-28. Minister without portfolio 1931-32, then minister for Osthilfe [Eastern Assistance for farmers] in Bruning cabinet. Manages estate 193 345. Resistance ties. Co-founder of CDU, member of British Zonal Council 1946--47. Heads Frankfurt Administration for Food, Agriculture, and Forests 1947--49. MdB 1949-50. 83. Scherpenberg, Albert Hilger van (1899-1969). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1925, Foreign Office 1925--44. Arrested (ties to Solf Circle) 1944. Bavarian Economics Ministry 1945--49. Works in VfW, later Federal Economics Ministry 1949-53. 84. Schwarz, Werner (1890-1971). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1922, Foreign Office 1922-37. Ruhestand (Jewish wife) 193 7. Berlin government 1946, then Food, Agriculture, and Forests

268 Appendix Administration of the American Zonal Council, Stuttgart. Personnel Office, VfW, 1949. 85. Schwendemann, Karl (1891-1974). Catholic, Dr. phil. Z 1930-33. Military in WWI. Attached to Foreign Office as press attache 1917-22. Diplomatic attache 1922, Foreign Office 1922--45, Einstweiliger Ruhestand 1945. Application to NSDAP rejected as former member of Center Party, "opportunist," 1941. Internment 1945--46. 86. Seelos, Gebhard (1901-84). Catholic, Dr. jur. Military in WWII. Diplomatic attache 1925, Foreign Office 1925--44, Ruhestand 1944. Application to NSDAP rejected 1935 (devout Catholic). Renewed application 1940, issued Party Number 7 906 304, but in 1942 once again denied membership for religious reasons. Resistance ties. Bavarian State Government 1945--49, Bavarian representative to US Zonal Council 1945--49, and (after 1947) Frankfurt Bizonal Executive Council. BP, 1949-51 MdB. Bavarian State Government 1951-53. 87. Siegfried, Herbert (1901-88). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1929, Foreign Office 1929--45. NSDAP 1937, FM-Reiter SS. Lawyer in Bielefeld 1947-51. 88. Sieveking, Kurt (1897-1986). Protestant, Dr. jur. Military in WWI. DVP before 1933. Attached to Foreign Office 1923-25. Works as lawyer in Hamburg 1925-35. Trustee and general representative ofBankhaus Brinckmann Wirtz & Co., 1935--45. Syndikus [legal advisor], later head of Hamburg Senate Chancellery 1945-51. CDU. 89. Stahlberg, Gerhard (1903-90). Protestant, Dr. jur. In Prussian legal service 1925-34. Diplomatic attache 1934, Foreign Office 1934--45 (in Legal Division 1936--45). Wilrttemberg-Hohenzollern Economics Ministry 1945-50. 90. Strohm, Gustav (1893-1957). Protestant, Ph.D. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1922, Foreign Office 1922--43. Ruhestand due to "defeatism" 1943. NSDAP 1938. DBFF 1946-50. SPD. 91. Suss, Theodor (1892-1961). No confession, Dr. jur., professor. Military in WWI. Law professor 1922--43, in United States 1926--28. Rektor [president] of University ofErlangen 1943--45. In Bavarian Ministry of Culture 1945. Professor at University of Cologne 1949-53. 92. Terdenge, Hermann (1892-1959). Catholic, Dr. oec. publ. Diplomatic attache 1926, Foreign Office 1926--37 (directs Cultural Division 1930-33). In private industry 193 7--46. Oberkreisdirektor [Chief County Executive], Warendorf, Westphalia, 1946-51. CDU. 93.Trutzschler von Falkenstein, Heinz (1902-71). Protestant, Ph.D. Diplo-

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matic attache 1934, Foreign Office 1934-45. Helps to write Foreign Office "White Books." NSDAP 1940. 94. Twardowski, Fritz von (1890-1970). Protestant, Dr. jur. et rer. pol. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1922, Foreign Office 1922--45 (head of Cultural Division 1939--43). NSDAP 1940. Deputy leader ofEvangelisches Hilfswerk 1946-50. Commissarial head of Federal Press Office 1950-51. 95. Ulrich, Robert (1888-1952). No confession, Dr.jur. Military in WWI. Diplomatic attache 1919, Foreign Office 1919-35. Dismissed due to "racial grounds." In United Kingdom 1936-50. Interned 1940. British "temporary civil servant" 1941--45. British citizen 1947--48. Author and translator, editor of Neue Auslese 1948. 96. Weiz, Gerhart (1906-83). Protestant, Dr. jur. Diplomatic attache 1935, Foreign Office 1935--45. NSDAP 1937. Teaches law at University of Bonn 1946--48. Counsel for the defense at Nuremberg Trials 1947--48. Works for Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, 1949. 97. Weick, Wolfgang Freiherr von (1901-73). Protestant, university studies. Diplomatic attache 1927, Foreign Office 1927--44. Arrested 1943, dismissed from Foreign Office 1944. NSDAP 1935. Evangelisches Hilfswerk 1946-50. 98. Wilde, Karl (1910-84). Catholic, Dr. jur. et rer. pol. Military in WWII. Reich Economics Ministry 1939--42. NSDAP 1936. Prisoner of war, released 1947. Frankfurt Administration for Transport 1947--49. Federal Transport Ministry 1949-51. CDU. 99. Wohleb, Leo (1888-1955). Catholic, university studies. Before 1945 in Baden school service. Member of Baden State Parliament 1931-33. Works in South Baden Ministry of Culture 1946. Baden Christian-Social People's Party (later CDU). State president of South Baden 1947-52. 100. Wussow, Fritz (1901-82). Protestant, university studies. Prussian state administration 1920-27. Consular official in Foreign Office 1927-38. Admitted to training for Higher Service 1939. Foreign Office 1939--45. NSDAP 1934. Interned 1945--47. Businessman in Hamburg 1948-51. Works in Federal Ministry for Expellees 1951-53. Sources: Claus Muller, Relaunching German Diplomacy; Auswartiges Amt, ed., Die Auswiirtige Politik; Biographisches Handbuch I-III; Biographies, Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung online edition (accessed January 28, 2012); Miinzinger-Archiv/Archiv der Inlernalionalen Biographie; Werner Habel, ed., Wer isl Wer? 1955 (Berlin: Arani, 1955); Habel, ed., Wer isl Wer?

270 Appendix 1962 vol. 1: Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and und Berlin (Berlin: Arani, 1962); Horst G. Kleinmann and Stephen S. Taylor, ed., Who's Who in Germany 1960 (New York: Intercontinental Book and Publishing Co., 1960); The Statesman's Yearbook (various editions); Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt; Doscher, Verschworene Gesellschafl; Haas, Beitrag; NARA, RG 59 and 466, various files; NARA, Berlin Document Center NSDAP Collections/Zentralkartei and Ortsgruppenpartei; PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 13; PAAA, B 2, vol. 32; Conze et al., Das Amt; Tobias C. Bringmann, Handbuch der Diplomatic, 1815-1963: Auswiirtige Missionschefa in Deutsch/and und deutsche Missionsschefa im Ausland von Metternich bis Adenauer (Mtinchen: Saur, 2001).The German Foreign Office also supplied information pertaining to specific individuals upon request.

Notes

Abbreviations Used in the Notes AAPBRD----Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and ACDP-Archiv fiir Christlich-Demokratische Politik ADAP-Akten zur Deutschen Auswiirtigen Politik AdDL-Archiv des Deutschen Liberalismus AzV-Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and BA Koblenz-Bundesarchiv, Koblenz BoyHStA -Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Biographisches Handbuch-Auswiirtiges Amt, ed., Biographisches Handbuch BNA-British National Archives/Public Record Office DBPO--Documents on British Policy Overseas FRUS---Foreign Relations of the United States lfZ~Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte MAE-Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres NARA-National Archives and Records Administration, College Park NL-Nachla/3 (personal papers)

PA AA-Politisches Archiv des Auswiirtigen Amts Parlamentsarchiv-Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestages PR-Der Parlamentarische Rat 1948-1949 RG-Record Group StBKAH-Stiftung-Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus

Introduction I. SeeAmulfBaring, Au/Jenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie. Banns Beitrag zur Europiiischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1969), 17, on the Museum Koenig. 2. Neue Zeitung, March 16, 1951; Frarn;ois-Poncet (Bonn) telegram 1717/20 to MAE (Paris), March 16, 1951, MAE, Serie Europe 1944--1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1949-1955, vol. 333, 23; Oskar Kossmann, Es begann in Polen: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten und Ostforschers (Lilneburg: Nordostdt. Kulturwerk, 1989), 259. 3. Hans-Jurgen Doscher, Verschworene Gesellschaft. Das Auswiirtige Amt zwischen Neubeginn und Kontinuitiit (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), reissued with a new introduction as Seilschaften. Die verdriingte Geschichte des Auswiirtigen Amts (Berlin: Propyliien, 2005). This book extends themes of Doscher's earlier work, Das Auswiirtige

272 Notes to Pages 5-9 Amt im Dritten Reich. Diplomatie im Schatten der "Endlosung" (Berlin: Siedler, 1987), which examined the connections between the diplomats and the Nazi system. 4. Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Mosche Zimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010). The present author contributed the sections on denazification and the restart of diplomats' careers after 1945. 5. See especially Johannes Hurter, "Das Auswiirtige Amt, die NS-Diktatur, und der Holocaust. Kritische Bermerkungen zu einem Kommissionsbericht," Vierteljahresheifie fiir Zeitgeschichte 59, no. 2 (April 2011 ): 167-192. 6. Hitlers Diploma/en in Bonn. Das Auswiirtige Amt und seine Vergangenheit, directed by Heinrich Billstein and Mathias Haejntes, WDR Television (premiered January 18, 2006). 7. Astrid Eckert, Kampf um die Akten: Die Westallierten und die Riickgabe van deutschem Archivgut nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Transatlantische Historische Studien 20 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004 ). 8. Hans von Herwarth to the author, June 7, 1993, in Bonn. 9. Theodor Eschenburg, "Die 'einsamen Entschlilsse' des Kanzlers und das Verfassungsrecht," March 25, 1954, enclosure to Der Siidwestspiegel, April 10, 1954. Another early statement is by A. J. Heidenheimer, "Der starke Regierungschef und das Parteiensystem: Der 'Kanzler-Effekt' in der Bundesrepublik," Politische Vierteljahresschrift 2 (1961): 393-425. 10. Karlheinz NiclauB, Kanzlerdemokratie. Bonner Regierungspraxis van Konrad Adenauer bis Helmut Kohl, 2nd ed. (Paderborn: Schoningh, 2004). 11. Entry on Herwarth in Biographisches Handbuch II, 291-292; Hans von Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin. Erlebte Zeitgeschichte 1931 bis 1945 (Frankfurt: Propyliien, 1982). 12. Hermann Lilbbe, "Der Nationalsozialismus im deutschen Nachkriegsbewusstsein," Historische Zeitschrift 236, no. 3 (1983): 579-599, quote 585. 13. Paul Frank, Entschliisselte Botschafl. Ein Diplomat macht Inventur (Stuttgart: DVA, 1981), 15. 14. Norbert Frei, "Das Problem der NS-Vergangenheit in der Ara Adenauer," in Bernd Weisbrod, ed., Rechtsradikalismus in der politischen Kultur der Nachkriegszeit. Die verzogerte Normalisierung in Niedersachsen. Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Niedersachsens nach 1945 (Hannover: Hahn, 1995), 19-31, here 26ff. In general, see also Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfiinge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit (Munich: Beck, 1996). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author. 15. For a concise statement of the problem and the older literature on it, see Leonidas E. Hill, "The WilhelmstraBe in the Nazi Era," Political Science Quarterly 82, no. 4 (Dec. 1967): 546-570, here 547-549. 16. Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim, "Introduction," in Craig and Loewenheim, eds., The Diplomats, 1939-1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3-8, here 5. 17. Ibid., 5-7; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice ofDiplomacy: its Evolution, Theory and Administration, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2011), 185-228. 18. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, expanded ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 93ff.; Harold Nicolson, The Evolution ofDiplomatic Method (New

Notes to Pages 9-10

273

York: Macmillan, 1954), 73-84. 19. Ulrich Sahm, "Diplomaten taugen nichts. "Aus dem Leben eines Staatsdieners (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1994), 354. 20. Amulf Baring and Hans-Peter Schwarz have depicted Adenauer's immediate policy-making environment without, however, going much beyond the Federal Chancellery. Baring, Au/Jenpolitik, esp. 1--47; Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aujstieg 1876-1952 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1986), 656-671. Other authors have analyzed this environment in the context of specific policy issues. See Gero von Gersdorff, Adenauers Au/Jenpolitik gegenilber den Siegermiichten 1954. Westdeutsche Bewaffnung und internationale Politik. Beitrage zur Militargeschichte 41 (Munich R. Oldenbourg, 1994), 55-62, 132-139, 207-210, 256-263, and 335-336; Sven Olaf Berggotz, Nahostpolitik in der ,.fra Adenauer. Moglichkeiten und Grenzen 1949-1963. Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 33 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1998), 83-113, 179-200; and Hanns Jurgen Kusters, Der Integrationsfriede. Viermiichte-Verhandlungen ilber die Friedensregelung mit Deutsch/and 1945-1900 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 461--481. 21. Representative of the former tendency are Doscher's Verschworene Gesellschafl and the memoir by the ministry's first head of personnel and administration, Wilhelm Haas, Beitrag zur Geschichte der Entstehung des Auswiirtigen Dienstes der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and (Bonn: Kollen, 1969); representative of the latter is Claus Muller, Relaunching German Diplomacy: The Auswiirtiges Amt in the 1950s. Bonner Beitrage zur Politikwissenschaft 7 (Munster: Lit, 1996). 22. Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Die Bundesregierung und die auswartigen Beziehungen," in Schwarz, ed., Handbuch der deutschen Au/Jenpolitik (Munich: Piper, 1975), 43-112, here 76. 23. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 5. See also Gottfried Niedhart, "Aul3enpolitik in der Ara Adenauer," in Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., Modernisierung im Wiederaujbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschafl der 50er Jahre, updated study ed. (Bonn: Dietz, 1998), 805-818, here 805; Lothar Kettenacker, Germany since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 61. 24. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe; Timothy Garten Ash, In Europe sName: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), 22-23; Helga Haftendom, Deutsche Au/Jenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschriinkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945-2000 (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001). 25. Frank Schumacher, "Yorn Besetzten zum Verbundeten: Deutsch-amerikanische Beziehungen 1949-1955," in Detlef Junker with the assistance of Philipp Gassert, Wilfried Mausbach and David B. Morris, eds., Die USA und Deutsch/and im Zeitalter des Ka/ten Krieges 1945-1990. Ein Handbuch., vol. 1 (Stuttgart: DVA, 2001), 150-159. 26. Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 173-196. 27. Quite possibly, this idea was first suggested by journalist Fritz Rene Allemann, Bonn ist nicht Weimar (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1956), esp. 411--440. For other examples concerning modem Germany, see Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik. Deutsch/and im Widerstreit der au/Jenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschafl 1945-1949, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980); Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 55ff.; and Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing

274 Notes to Pages 11-14 Germans, 1945-1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 28. See the literature review in Mary Fulbrook, "The Concept of Normalization and the GDR in Comparative Perspective," in Fulbrook, ed., Power and Society in the GDR 1961-1979: The 'Normalization of Rule'? (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 1-30, here 4-8. 29. On the "restoration" concept in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see A. Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 41--45, 110-111.

1-The Auswiirtiges Amt of the German Reich, 1871-1945 I. Biographisches Handbuch III, 671-673; Conze et al., Das Amt, 52-53, 538-539. 2. Hans E. Riesser, Haben die deutschen Diploma/en versagt? Eine Kritik an der Kritik van Bismarck bis heute (Bonn: Bouvier, 1959). 3. Sebastian Weitkamp, Braune Diploma/en: Horst Wagner und Eberhard van Thadden als Funktioniire der "Endlosung" (Bonn: Dietz, 2008), 462--463. See also Ernst von Weizsacker, Erinnerungen (Munich: Paul List, 1950). 4. Paul Seabury, "Ribbentrop and the German Foreign Office," Political Science Quarterly 66, no. 4 (Dec. 1951): 532-555, here 533. 5. Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law Number JO, vol. XII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951 ), 916. On the nonpartisan tradition, see Max Weber, Politik als Beruf(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1992 [1919]), 32-33. 6. See especially Klaus Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps 1871-1945. Badinger Forschungen zur Sozialgeschichte; Deutsche Fiihrungsschichten in der Neuzeit, vol. 16 (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1985). 7. Klaus-Jiirgen MUiler, "Nationalkonservative Eliten zwischen Kollaberation und Widerstand," in Jiirgen Schmadeke and Peter Steinbach, eds., Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschafl und der Widerstand gegen Hitler (Munich: Piper, 1985), 24--49, here 24-27; Ian Kershaw, The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 260ff. 8. On German attitudes toward Weimar, see Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). Steven Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), e.g., 235-236, explores the same trend among university professors. 9. Gerhard L. Weinberg, "The World through Hitler's Eyes," in Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 30--53, here 37-38; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische AujJenpolitik (Frankfurt a.M.: A. Metzner, 1968), 25; Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler: The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 25. l 0. See for example Ulrich Herbert, Best: Biographische Studien iiber Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunfl, 1903-1989 (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); Eric A. Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 2979; and journalist Gitta Sereny's fascinating portrait Albert Speer: His Struggle with Truth

Notes to Pages 14-17

27S

(New York: Knopf, 1995). 11. Stephan Malinowski, Vom Konig zum Fuhrer. Sozialer Niedergang und politische Radikalisierung im deutschen Adel zwischen Kaiserreich und NS-Staal (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003). 12. Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 4th ed. (London: Arnold, 2000), 212-213, summarizes the literature on elites in the Third Reich. 13. Karl-Giinther Sasse, "Die Griindung des Auswartigen Amts 1870/71," in Auswartiges Amt, ed., JOO Jahre Auswartiges Amt (Bonn, 1970), 9-22; Sasse, "Zur Geschichte des Auswartigen Amts," ibid., 23-33; Kurt DoB, "The History of the German Foreign Office," in Zara Steiner, ed., The Times Survey ofForeign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books, 1982), 225-235; Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Auflenpolitik, 20-21; Lamar Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Cecil, "Der diplomatische Dienst im kaiserlichen Deutschland," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 15-39; Hans Philippi, "Das deutsche diplomatische Korps, 1871-1914," ibid., 41-80; Paul Gorden Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), esp. 13-22 and 55--67; Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 18-34; Karl-Alexander Hampe, Das Auswiirtige Amt in der Ara Bismarck (Bonn: Bouvier, 1995); and Hampe, Das Auswiirtige Amt in Wilhelminischer Zeit (Miinster: Scriptorium, 2001 ). 14. Hampe, ha Bismarck, 67-70; and Hampe, Wilhelminischer Zeit, 40--42. 15. Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 39-57; Hampe, Wilhelminischer Zeit, 57, 100-109. 16. Kurt DoB, "Yorn Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik: Das deutsche diplomatische Korps in einer Epoche des Umbruchs," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 81-101, here 85. 17. Sasse, "Zur Geschichte des Auswartigen Amts," in Auswartiges Amt, ed., JOO Jahre Auswiirtiges Amt, 31; DoB, "Yorn Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 85-88; Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 320-328; and Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, 55--68. 18. On October 28, 1908, the Daily Telegraph published an interview with Wilhelm II in which he stated that he had refrained from a policy of humiliating Britain and that during the Boer War he had worked out a campaign plan for British forces. He also reaffirmed Germany's fleet-building policy. The interview caused outrage in Britain and led to calls for increased parliamentary control of foreign policy in Germany. Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 324-326; Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, 55-62. 19. Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats, quote 66. 20. Kurt DoB, Das deutsche Auswiirtige Amt im Ubergang vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik. Die Schiilersche Reform (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1977), 17-146; Robert Mark Spaulding, Osthandel and Ostpolitik: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer. Monographs in German History 1 (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997), 120. 21. Peter Grupp, Deutsche Auflenpolitik im Schatten van Versailles 1918-1920. Zur Politik des Auswiirtigen Amts vom Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs und der Novemberrevolution bis zum Inkrafttreten des Versailler Vertrages. Sammlung Schoningh zur Geschichte und Gegenwart (Paderbom: Schoningh, 1988), 11-25, quote from Walter Oehme (secretary of

276 Notes to Pages 17-19 the deputy state secretary in the Reich Chancellery 1918-19). 22. Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, "Aul3enpolitik und Reform des Auswartigen Dienstes. Rede vor der Verfassungsgebenden Deutschen National-Versammlung, Weimar, I 0. April 1919," in Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente und Gedanken um Versailles (Berlin: Verlag fur Kulturpolitik, 1925), 62-70, here 67; on anti-Republican sentiment in the Foreign Office, see the cabinet discussion on April I, 1919, in Akten der Reichskanzlei, Weimarer Republik. Das Kabinett Scheidemann, 13. Februar bis 20. Juni 1919, ed. Hagen Schulze (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1971), 127-128, and John L. Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister: Constantin Freiherr von Neurath (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 19. 23. Peter Kruger and Erich Hahn, "Der Loyalitatskonflikt des Staatssekretars Bernhard Wilhelm von Biilow im Frilhjahr 1933," in Vierteljahresheftefiir Zeitgeschichte 20, no. 4 (Oct. 1972): 376-410, here 377. 24. Leonidas E. Hill, Die Weizsacker Papiere 1900-1932 (Berlin: Propylaen, 1982), 363-364, on Weizsacker and other diplomats in Basel in early 1924. 25. Heineman, Hitler's Foreign Minister, 19-20, quote 20; Dol3, Das deutsche Auswartige Amt, 208-209. 26. Heineman, Hitler's Foreign Minister, I 9; Hill, Die Weizsacker Papiere 19001932, 41-45, 49-51, although it is difficult to accept Hill's description ofWeizsacker as a "republican by reason [Vernuftsrepublikaner]," 51, given the latter's antipathy toward parliamentary government. 27. Hill, Die Weizsacker Papiere 1900-1932, 364. 28. Cabinet meeting of April I, 1919, in Akten der Reichskanzlei, Weimarer Republik. Das Kabinett Scheidemann, 13. Februar bis 20. Juni 1919, 127-128; see also Hill, Die Weizsiicker Papiere 1900-1932, 363. 29. This is obvious from the entries in the Biographisches Handbuch I-III; see also Jane Kaplan, Government without Administration: State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), esp. 1-58. 30. Kruger and Hahn, "Loyalitatskonflikt," 404-405; Dol3, Das deutsche Auswiirtige Amt, 208-209; see also the testimony of Werner von Grundherr to UA-47, "Stenographisches Protokoll iiber die 23. Sitzung des 4 7. Ausschusses ... am 3. April 1952," April 3, 1952, Parlamentsarchiv. 31. Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 42-43. 32. Hans von Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 26; Herbert Blankenhorn, Verstandnis und Verstandigung. Blatter eines politischen Tagebuchs 1949-1979 (Frankfurt a.M.: Propylaen, 1980), 35-36; Wilhelm Haas, Lebenserinnerungen (Bremen: Privately printed, 1974), 73. Even Weizsacker grudgingly admitted that Stresemann was far better than the run of the mill Weimar foreign minister, although inexperienced and too trusting of foreign powers; Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 80. 33. Peter Kruger, "Struktur, Organisation und aul3enpolitische Wirkungsmoglichkeiten der leitenden Beamten des Auswartigen Dienstes 1921-1933," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 101-169, here 107-108. 34. Paul Seabury, The WilhelmstrajJe: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954), 9-10; Ludwig Zimmermann, Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der .A"ra der Weimarer Republik (Gottingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1958), 32-34. 35. Philippi, "Das deutsche diplomatische Korps," in Schwabe, ed., Das

Notes to Pages 19-20 277 diplomatische Korps, 55-56. 36. Peter Kruger, Die AujJenpolitik der Republik von Weimar (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985), 12. 37. Do/3, Das deutsche Auswiirtige Amt, 215-286; Do/3, "Vom Kaiserreich zum Weimarer Republik," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 92-99. 38. Seabury, Wilhelmstrasse, 16-21; Dof3, Das Deutsche Auswiirtige Amt, 290; Dof3, "Vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 97-98; Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 22-24. On the period from 1933 to 1938, see Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische AujJenpolitik, 25-27. 39. Do/3, "The History of the German Foreign Office," in Steiner, ed., The Times Survey, 242; Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 22-24. 40. Kruger, Au/Jenpolitik, 27-29; Kruger, "Zur Bedeutung des Auswartigen Amts filr die Aussenpolitik Stresemanns," in Wolfgang Michalka and Marshall M. Lee, eds., Gustav Stresemann (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1982), 400-415, here 402ff.; Kruger, "Struktur," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 101-169. 41. Der Bundesbeauftragte filr Wirtschaftlichkeit in der Verwaltung (signed Mayer), "Gutachten Uber die Organisation des Auswartigen Amtes," Nov. 1954, 139, here 3, copy in BA Koblenz, B136, 4689, 141.02/4 Auswartiges Amt 19.1.1952-7.7.1960; Kruger, "Struktur," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 161-162. 42. Kruger, "Struktur," 164-165; Kruger, "'Man !asst sein Land nicht im Stich, weil es eine schlechte Regierung hat': Die deutschen Diplomaten und die Eskalation der Gewalt," in Martin Broszat and Klaus Schwabe, eds., Die deutschen Eliten und der Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Beck'sche Reihe 401 (Munich: Beck, 1989), 180-225, here 205. 43. On the importance of Schliler's reforms, see Dof3, "Vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 98-99. 44. Kruger, Au/Jenpolitik, 28; Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 23. 45. Kruger, "Struktur," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 124ff., identifies 49 of 161 higher officials during the Weimar years as members of student fraternities. Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 78-85, estimates that during the period 18711914, 20-27 percent of leading diplomats were fraternity members. There seems to have been a correlation between high rank and corps membership; Kruger, "Struktur," 121-124, also mentioned that during Weimar a virtual "Juristenmonopol [monopoly of jurists]" among applicants remained firmly in place. 46. For 1871 to 1914, see Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 94-103, and for Weimar, see Kruger, "Struktur," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 119-121. Cecil ascribes the under-representation of Catholics and Jews to religious prejudice, but Kruger suggests that very few Catholics applied for the Foreign Service 1921-33 in part because of a "katholisches Bildungsdefizit [Catholic educational deficit," referring to university education]. Peter Grupp, "Juden, Antisemitismus and jtidische Fragen im Auswartigen Amt in der Zeit des Kaiserreichs und der Weimarer Republik: Eine erste Annaherung," Zeitschrifl far Geschichtswissenschafl 46, no. 3 (1998): 237-248, cautiously reviews the literature on this question. 47. On the Kaiserreich, see Cecil, "Der diplomatische Dienst," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 15-17, and Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 58-78; on Weimar, see Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 41-43. 48. Krliger, "Struktur," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, 116-117, 150-151; see also Ingmar Stitterlin, Die "Russisiche Abteilung" des Auswiirtgen Amtes

278 Notes to Pages 20-24 in der Weimarer Republik. Historische Studien 51 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994), 25-66, who concludes that among the Russian experts the nobility's dominance had clearly been broken. 49. Kruger, "Die deutschen Diplomaten in der Zeit zwischen den Weltkriegen," in Reiner Hudemann and Georges-Henri Soutou, eds., Eliten in Deutsch/and und Frankreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 281-291, here 288. 50. This and the following two paragraphs are based on Peter Kruger, "Zur europiiischen Dimensionen der AuBenpolitik Gustav Stresemanns," in Karl Heinrich Pohl, ed., Politiker und Burger. Gustav Stresemann und seine Zeit (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 2002), 194-228; Gottfried Niedhart, "AuBenminister Stresemann und die okonomische Variante deutscher Machtpolitik," ibid., 229-242; Jonathan Wright, Gustav Stresemann: Weimar's Greatest Statesman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Klaus Hildebrandt, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche AujJenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler (Stuttgart: DVA, 1995), esp. 600-607. Niedhart, Die AujJenpolitik der Weimarer Republik (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), provides an overview of Weimar foreign policy and its historiography. 51. Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals, vol. XII, 916-917. 52. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische AujJenpolitik, 28-33. On Neurath, see Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 18-67; on Billow, see Kruger and Hahn, "Loyalitiitskonflikt," 401-409. 53. Miiller, "Nationalkonservative Eliten," in Schmiideke and Steinbach, Der Widerstand, 26. 54. Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 84-102. 55. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische AujJenpolitik, is the classic work on this subject; see also Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 117-133. 56. On Hermann Goering's wire-tapping service, Zachary Shore, What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13. 57. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische AujJenpolitik, 182-183. 58. Rebecca Wellington, "Summary of interrogation of Friedrich Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron, Oct. 24, 1945, in his house in Tutzing," NARA, RG 59, M679. See also Hahn and Kruger, "Loyalitiitskonflikt," 401-404. 59. Herbert von Dirksen, Moscow, Tokyo, London: Twenty Years ofGerman Foreign Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952), 107. 60. Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 25-28, 66, 72. Theo Kordt used such arguments in a draft "Gutachten" for Gerhart Weiz's denazification, undated but from late summer 1948, PAAA, NL Theo Kordt, vol. 5. About the example set by Italian diplomats, see Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten... Die WilhelmstrajJe in Frieden und Krieg. Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindriicke 1928-1945 (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1950), 51-52. 61. Hans Kroll, Botschafter in Be/grad, Tokio und Moskau 1953-1962 (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967), 16-17; see also Kordula Kiihlem, Hans Kroll (18981967): Eine diplomatische Karriere im 20. Jahrhundert. Forschungen und Quellen zu Zeitgeschichte 53 (Diisseldorf: Droste, 2008), 62-63. 62. Werner von Bargen, "Lebenserinnerungen," PAAA, NL Werner von Bargen, 86ff. 63. Biographisches Handbuch I, 70-71. Bargen, "Lebenserinnerungen," 102, 109, asserts that he joined on the suggestion of superiors, including Billow, to keep real Nazis

Notes to Pages 24-2 6 279 out of the ministry, but the timing seems too early to be credible. 64. Cited in Rainer A. Blasius, "Vom Koniglich PreuBischen Leutnant zum Botschafter der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Blasius, ed., Hasso von Etzdorf: Ein deutscher Diplomat im 20. Jahrhundert (Zurich: Hausmesser Verlag, 1994), 7-54, here 14. 65. Most ofNeurath's Erla/3 is printed in Ulrich Sahm, Rudolf von Scheliha, 18971942. Ein deutscher Diplomat gegen Hitler (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1994), 44-45. 66. Jost Di.iffier, "Zurn 'decision-making process' in der deutschen AuBenpolitik 1933-1939," in Manfred Funke, ed., Hitler, Deutsch/and und die Miichte. Materialien zur Auj3enpolitik des Dritten Reiches. Bonner Schriften zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte 12 (Di.isseldorf: Droste, 1976), 186-204. 67. Marie-Luise Recker, Die Auj3enpolitik des Dritten Reiches. Enzyklopadie deutscher Geschichte 8 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 5--6; Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich. Translated by Anthony Fothergill (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), esp. 29ff; Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Auj3enpolitik, 613--6 I 4; Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 86-116; Marshall M. Lee and Wolfgang Michalka, German Foreign Policy, 1918-1933: Continuity or Break? (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), 146-148; Kri.iger and Hahn, "Loyalitatskonflikt," 390394. 68. Rainer F. Schmidt, Die Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches 1933-1939 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002), 62-64. 69. Hans Mommsen, "Der deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler und die Uberwindung der nationalstaatlichen Gliederung Europas," in Mommsen, Alternative zu Hitler. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Widerstandes (Munich: Beck, 2000), 266--283, here 267-268. 70. Bruning memo of Aug. 31, 1935, in Heinrich Bruning, Briefe und Gespriiche 1934-1945. Edited by Claire Nix with the assistance of Reginald Phelps and George Pettee (Stuttgart: DVA, 1974), 466-482, quote 480, emphasis in original. 71. Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War 11, 1937-1939 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 39-51. On Neurath specifically Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 159-170. 72. Kri.iger, "Man laBt sein Land nicht im Stich," in Broszat and Schwabe, eds., Die deutschen Eliten, 200-204. 73. Gregor Schollgen, A Conservative against Hitler: Ulrich von Hassel: Diplomat in Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, 1888-1944. Translated by Louise Willmot (New York: St. Martins, 1991); Gustav Sonnenhol's memo summarizing Hassel's appearance before the Volksgerichtshof on September 7, 1944, ADAP E VIII, 435-437, here 436. Many leading resistance members harbored deep suspicions about parliamentary democracy and, like the Nazis, saw a "conflict-free society" as a desirable goal. Hans Mommsen, "Gesellschaftsbild und Verfassungsplane des deutschen Widerstandes," in Mommsen, Alternative, 53-158. 74. Donald M. McKale, Curt Priifer: German Diplomat from the Kaiser to Hitler (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1987), 103. 75. Grupp, "Juden," 240-242. 76. Kri.iger and Hahn, "Loyalitatskonflikt," 386-390. 77. Christopher Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study ofReferat D Ill ofAbteilung Deutsch/and 1940-1943 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), 11-14, quote 13; see also Jacobsen, "Zur Rolle der Diplomatie," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, l 76ff.; Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 120ff; and McKale, Curt

280 Notes to Pages 26-29 Priifer, 103-109. On anti-Semitism in the conservative resistance, see Christoph Dipper, "Der Deutsche Widerstand und die Juden," in Geschichte und Gesellschafl 9 (1983): 349-380; Hans Mommsen, "Der Widerstand gegen Hitler und die nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung," in Mommsen, Alternative, 384--415. 78. The major exception to this position, dropped in 1938, was that all foreign Jewish property in Germany was exempt from Jewish legislation. Browning, Final Solution, 15-16. 79. Mommsen, "Der Widerstand gegen Hitler und die nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung," in Mommsen, Alternative, 392. 80. Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische AujJenpolitik, 465--467; Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 134-147. 81. Not including attaches and contract employees (together both groups consisted of around 50 persons in 1937), there were 431 Higher Service officials on April 1, 1933; on April 1, 1937, 421; on April 1, 1939, 491; on April 1, 1941, 568; and on April 1, 1943, 580. Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 69-70; Auswartiges Amt, ed., 40 Jahre AujJenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and. Eine Dokumentation (Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1989), 711; McKale, Curt Priifer, 134. 82. Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 69; McKale, Curt Priifer, 129-135, 220 note 4; Donald M. McKale, The Swastika outside Germany (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1977), 40--41, 63; Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 146-147. 83. Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 103-110, 114-118. 84. Bohle's March 1, 1937, memo to all German diplomatic and consular missions, inADAP C VI, part 1, 513-515. 85. McKale, The Swastika outside Germany, 108-118; Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 160, 169, mentions these facts without connecting them to the "mass flight" into the SS. 86. Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 143-147. 87. Walter J. Mueller, Lucille M. Petterson, and John A. Conway, "Personnel Policy and Politics in the Foreign Office under the Third Reich," enclosure one to HI COG (Frankfurt) report 672 to State Department, Aug. 31, 1951, NARA, RG 466, Records of the Executive Director/Security Segregated General Records, 1949-52, 361.2 General 1949-52. See also Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, 465--477. On party membership and promotion after 1938, see the testimony of Rupprecht von Keller, Oct. 2, 1951, Werner von Grundherr, Oct. 9, 1951, and Albrecht von Kessel, Oct. 23, 1951, to Schetter, PA AA, NL Haas, vol. 4, as well as Alois Tichy's testimony to Schetter of Oct. 5, 1951, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 1. 88. Walter Hess, Unterwegs mit DiplomatenpajJ (Munich: Olzog, 1984), 74. On Hess, see Biographisches Handbuch II, 294-295. 89. Browning, Final Solution, 184-185. 90. Cited in Sahm, Rudolf von Scheliha, 45. 91. Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 133-135. Nor was SS membership automatic as some diplomats claimed after the war; for example, Hans-Otto Meissner, In stiirmischer Zeit: Als Diplomat in London, Tokio, Moskau, Mailand (Esslingen: Bechtle Verlag, 1990), 23. 92. Theo Kordt, draft copy of"Eidesstattliche Erklarung" for the former diplomat Giinther Altenburg's denazification proceedings, June 20, 1949, PA AA, NL Theo Kordt, vol. 1; Kordt to Werner Fries, April 26, 1947, PAAA NL Theo Kordt, vol. 2; Ander Hencke to Theo Kordt, Oct. 27, 194 7, ibid.; Theo Kordt's "Eidesstattliche Erklarung" for Hencke,

Notes to Pages 29-32

281

Nov. 22, 1947, ibid.; Werner von Bargen, testimony to Schetter, Oct. 5, 1951, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 4; Bargen testimony to UA-4 7, "Stenographisches Protokoll iiber die 16. Sitzung des 47. Ausschusses, March 19, 1952, Parlamentsarchiv; L. Werz, "Stellungnahme zu dem Auszug aus 'Inside Germany Informations,"' PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 1. On Bruning, see Kruger and Hahn, "Loyalitatskonflikt," 408--409, and Bruning to Peter Pfeiffer, Jan. 29, 1947, in Bruning, Briefe, 455. 93. L. Werz, who was stationed in Barcelona in 1934, mentions this argument. "Stellungnahme zu dem Auszug aus 'Inside Germany Informations,"' PA AA, NL Haas, vol. 1. See also Etzdorf's reply to the Franlifurter Rundschau's series on the Foreign Office's personnel policy, Oct. 11, 1951, PA AA, NL Haas, vol. 4. 94. Kruger and Hahn, "Loyalitatskonflikt," 410. 95. Jacobsen, "Zur Rolle der Diplomatie im Dritten Reich," in Schwabe, ed., Das diplomatische Korps, I 79. 96. See esp. Doscher's conclusion, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 309-311. 97. Ibid., 170. See also the testimony by Herbert Dittmann to Schetter, Oct. 3, 1951, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 4. 98. Conze et al., Das Amt, 158-166. 99. Mueller, Petterson, and Conway, "Personnel Policy and Politics in the Foreign Office under the Third Reich." 100. Eugen Betz to Karl Albers, Oct. 14, 1949, I, with an attached questionnaire and answers prepared by Dienstmann and Rohde, BA Koblenz, NL 286 Pfleiderer, vol. 68. See also Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Auflenpolitik, 464--483. 101. Betz to Albers, Oct. 14, 1949, with an attached questionnaire, BA Koblenz, NL 286 Pfleiderer, vol. 68; Leonidas E. Hill, "Alternative Politik des Auswartigen Amtes bis zum 1. September 1939," in Schmadke and Steinbach, eds., Der Widerstand, 664-690, here 666; Heineman, Hitler's First Foreign Minister, 139; Haas, Lebenserinnerungen; Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin; Hess, Unterwegs, 74-76. On the NSDAP and civil servants in general, Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart: DVA, 1966). I 02. Andor Hencke, "Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Auswaertigen Amt und der NSDAP," Wiesbaden, Nov. 5, 1945, NARA, RG 59, M679. On the career diplomats' view of Steengracht, see also Harold C. Vedeler, "Summary Interrogation of Heinz Trutzschler von Falkenstein, Sept. 9, 10, 15, 1945 at Hesse-Lichtenau," ibid. I 03. Rebecca Wellington and Peter Hamden (State Department Special Interrogation Mission), "Summary of Interview of Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff at His Home in Lenzkirch, Switzerland, Nov. 7-8, 1945," ibid. On Dieckhoff and his brother-in-law, see Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop, new ed. (London: Abacus, 2003), 10, 22, 94, 105-106, 410,412. 104. A. W. Klieforth, "Summary of Interrogation of Karl Ritter, Oberursel, September 3, 1945," 3, marked "written from memory," NARA, RG 59, M679. 105. Donald M. McKale, ed., Rewriting History: The Original and Revised World War II Diaries of Curt Priifer, Nazi Diplomat. Translated by Judith M. Melton (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1988), 114-115. 106. Haas testimony to UA-47, "Stenographisches Protokoll iiber die 5. Sitzung des 47. Ausschusses," Jan. 18, 1952, Parlamentsarchiv. Haas left the ministry in 1937 and therefore based his testimony primarily on conversations with former colleagues. 107. Harold C. Vederler, "Interview of Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt, Oerursel (Military Intelligence Service Center), October 19, 22-26 1945," NARA, RG 59, M679. 108. See McKale, Rewriting History.

282 Notes to Pages 32-35 109. Holzhausen memo, "Die Organisation des Auswartigen Amts und seine Personalpolitik vom Kaiserreich bis zum Zusammenbruch des nationalsozialistischen Reiches," Feb. 7, 1949, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 1018. On Holzhausen, Biographisches Handbuch II, 366-367. 110. Michael Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 97-114, 126-138. 111. SD report of February 4, 1943, excerpted in Heinz Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich. Auswahl aus den geheimen Lagerberichten des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1939-1944 (Neuwied: H. Luchterhand, 1965), 345-348, here 346-347. 112. Auswartiges Amt, ed., 100 Jahre Auswartiges Amt, 45. 113. Hiirter, "DasAuswartigeAmt," 186. 114. See for example Mark Mazower, Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2008), e.g., 224. 115. Christoph M. Kimmich, German Foreign Policy 1918-1945: A Guide to Research and Research Materials, rev. ed. (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1991 ), 17. 116. Seabury, Wilhelmstraj3e, 111-112, 114; Browning, Final Solution, 87-90. 117. Seabury, Wilhelmstrafle, 122. 118. Ibid., 112-114, provided an excellent summary already in 1954. On the ministry's role in plundering art and archives, see Anja Reuss, "Die 'Beuteorganisation' des Auswartigen Amtes: Das Sonderkommando Kiinsberg und der Kulturgutraub in der Sowjetunion," Vierteljahreshefte far Zeitgeschichte 45, no. 4 (1997): 535-556. On the SD, Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 211-212, 292-293; Bloch, Ribbentrop, 348-349, 358359; Sebastian Weitkamp, "SS-Diplomaten. Die Polizei-Attaches und SD-Beauftragten an den deutschen Auslandsmissionen," in Christian A. Braun, Michael Mayer, and Sebastian Weitkamp, eds., Deformation der Gesellschaft? Neue Forschungen zum Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: WVB, 2008), 49-92. 119. This point is made strongly by Hiirter, "Das Auswartige Amt," 181-182. 120. Hans-Jiirgen Doscher, "Martin Luther-Aufstieg und Verfall eines Unterstaatsekretars," in Ronald Smelser, Enrico Syring, and Rainer Zittelmann, eds., Die Braune Elite II. 21 weitere biographische Skizzen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993 ), 179-192; Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 213-239; Weitkamp, Braune Diplomaten. 121. Michael Mayer, "Akteure, Verbrechen und Kontinuitaten. DasAuswartigeAmt im Dritten Reich-Eine Binnendifferenzierung," Vierteljahreshefte far Zeitgeschichte 59, no. 4 (Oct. 2011): 509-532. 122. Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 235. 123. Browning, Final Solution, 88-89, 101, 145-146; Doscher, Verschworene Gesellschaft, 268-274. 124. Biographisches Handbuch II, 124-125; on Grundherr and the Danish Jews, see Herbert, Best, 360-374; Browning, Final Solution, 158-161. 125. Conze et al., Das Amt, 180,453. 126. Biographisches Handbuch II, 235-237; Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 250252; Doscher, Verschworene Gesellschaft, 216-218. 127. Biographisches Handbuch III, 309-310; Weitkamp, Braune Diplomaten, 443444. 128. Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr., "Herbert Blankenhom in the Third Reich," Central

Notes to Pages 36-39

283

European History 42, no. 2 (2009): 253-278, here 267-268. 129. Conze et al., Das Amt, 15. 130. Browning, Final Solution, 72-76; Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 213-255, 262-305. 131. Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 252-255. 132. David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 101-115; Peter Longerich, "Davon haben wir nichts gewusst ! "Die Deutschen und die Judenverfolgung 1933-1945 (Munich: Siedler, 2006), 201 ff. 133. Bankier, The Germans, 115. 134. Quotes from ibid., 156; see also Longerich, "Davon haben wir nichts gewusst!," 326-328; Mayer, "Akteure," esp. 528. 135. On Weizsacker, Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 243-245; Bargen testimony to UA-47, March 19, 1952, in "Stenographisches Protokoll Uber die 16. Sitzung des 47. Ausschusses ... am 19. Marz 1952," Parlamentsarchiv. 136. Weitkamp, Braune Diplomaten, 442ff 137. Poncet (Bonn) to Schuman/Direction d'Europe, letter 1969/EU, Oct. 2, 1951, 8, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-SerieAllemagne 1949-1955, vol. 138, 1-8. 138. Sasse, "Zur Geschichte des Auswartigen Amts," in Auswartiges Amt, ed., 100 Jahre Auswiirtiges Amt, 45-46; "Diskussionen zur Geschichte des Widerstandes. Ein TagungsresUmee," in Schmadeke and Steinbach, Widerstand, 1119-1158, here 1129. 139. Even Wilhelm Melchers, who normally went to great lengths to paint the best possible picture of the Foreign Office, admitted this. See his testimony of Oct. 17, 1951, to Schetter, in PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 1. 140. Memo from Ulrich (Ref. 117), to Ref. 993, "Betr.: Dokumentation Uber Widerstand im frliherenAuswartigenAmt," April 14, 1961, with two enclosures, PAAA, B 12, vol. 1713. Those executed were Albrecht Graf von Bernstorff, Eduard Brlickelmeier, Herbert Gollnow, Hans-Bernd von Haeften, Ulrich von Hassel, Otto Kiep, Richard Kuenzer, Hans Litter, Herbert Mumm von Schwartzenstein, Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenberg, and Adam von Trott zu Solz. Of the eleven arrested employees, three would occupy significant positions in the Federal Republic's Foreign Office: Wolfgang Freiherr von Weick, Theodor Auer, and Hilger van Scherpenberg. 141. Betz to Albers, Oct. 14, 1949, with attached questionnaire, BA Koblenz, NL 286 Pfleiderer, vol. 68. Gustav Strohm, "Das Auswartige Amt der Weimarer Republik" (Dec. 1948-Jan. 1949), PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 37. 142. Norbert Frei and Peter Hayes, "The German Foreign Office and the Past," Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 39 (Fall 2011): 55-70, here 59. 143. On May 19, 1943, Hitler himself ordered that no one married to a foreigner could occupy an "influential post" in the NSDAP, the government, or the military. In a letter of November 25, 1944, Ribbentrop expressed his regret at having to dismiss Karl Dumont, later the Federal Republic's ambassador in the Netherlands, and thanked him for his services. PA AA, Pers. H. Akten Nr. 131 ~Dr. Karl Dumont, vol. I. 144. Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, 8-10. 145. "Stenographisches Protokoll Uber die 11. Sitzung des 47. Ausschusses," Feb. 22, 1952, Parlamentsarchiv. Melchers's Feb. 28, 1946, memo is reprinted in Haas, Beitrag, 388-408. On Melchers, Biographisches Handbuch III, 219-220. 146. Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg

284 Notes to Pages 39-42 Military Tribunals under Control Council Law Number 10, vol. XIII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1952), 391, 401--402. 147. Marion Thielenhaus, Zwischen Anpassung und Wiederstand. Deutsche Diplomaten 1938-1941. Die politischen Aktivitiiten der Beamtengruppe um Ernst Freiherr van Weizsiicker (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1984). Also critical are Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 188-190; Daniel Koerfer, "Ernst von Weizsacker im Dritten Reich. Ein deutscher Offizier und Diplomat zwischen Verstrickung und Selbsttauschung," in Uwe Backes, Eberhard Jesse, and Rainer Zitelmann, eds., Die Schatten der Vergangenheit. Impulse zur Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1992), 375--402; Rainer Blasius, Fiir GrofJdeutschland~gegen den grofJen Krieg. Staatssekretiir Ernst Freiherr van Weizsiicker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39 (Cologne: Bohlau, 1981), and Blasius, "Uber London den 'groBen Krieg' verhindern. Ernst von Weizsackers Aktivitaten im Sommer 1939," in Schmadeke and Steinbach, Widerstand, 691-711. Leonidas E. Hill takes a much more positive view. See for example his "Alternative Politik des Auswartigen Amtes bis zum 1. September 1939," in Schmadeke and Steinbach, Widerstand, 664-690. On the younger diplomats' view of Weizsacker, see Klemperer, German Resistance, 26-27. 148. Klemperer, German Resistance; Sahm, Rudolf van Sheliha; Lucas Delattre, A Spy at the Heart ofthe Third Reich: The Extraordinary Life ofFritz Kolbe, Americas Most Important Spy in World War II. Translated by George A. Holoch, Jr. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005); Conze et al., Das Amt, 248, 295-316; McKale, The Swastika outside Germany, 188-189; Auswartiges Amt, ed., Zurn Gedenken an Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz 1904-1973 (Berlin, 2004). 149. Rebecca Wellington and Peter Harnden (State Department Special Interrogation Mission), "Summary oflnterview of Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff at His Home in Lenzkirch, Switzerland, Nov. 7-8, 1945," NARA, RG 59, M679. 150. Sylvia Taschka, Diplomat ohne Eigenschaften? Die Karriere des Hans Heinrich Dieckhojf (1884-1952). Transatlantische Historische Studien, 25 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006), quote 262. 151. Kroll, Botschafter, 72-73. 152. Walter Zechlin to Fritz Eberhard, Jan. 12, 1949, BAKoblenz, B Z35, vol. 13, 3, 149.

2- The Foreign Affairs Question in Occupied Germany, 1945-49 I. "Control Council Proclamation No. 2: Certain Additional Requirements Imposed on Germany," September 20, 1945, in Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-1954 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 68-79. 2. DoB, "The German Foreign Office," in Steiner, ed., Times Survey, 248. 3. John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 129. 4. Excerpts of the Potsdam Conference's final report of August 2, 1945, in Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany, 40-50, here 44. 5. Dietrich Staritz, "Die SED, Stalin und der 'Aufbau des Sozialismus' in der DDR," Deutschland-Archiv 24, no. 7 (1991): 686-700; Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA:

Notes to Pages 42-4 5 285 Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995). 6. Heike Bungart, "A New Perspective on Franco-American Relations during the Occupation of Germany, I 945-1948: Behind-the-Scenes Diplomatic Bargaining and the Zonal Merger," Diplomatic History 18, no. 3 (Summer, 1994): 333-352, here 337; Gunther Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutsch/and 1945-1948. Alliierte Einheit-Deutsche Teilung? Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 37 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 83-92; Martina Kessel, Westeuropa und die deutsche Teilung: Englische undfranzosische Deutschlandpolitik auf den Auflenministerkonferenzen van 1945 bis 1947 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989), 298. 7. Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); John Farquharson, "The 'Essential Division': Britain and the Partition of Germany, 1945-9," German History 9 (Feb. 1991): 23-45; Elisabeth Kraus, Ministerienfar das ganze Deutsch/and? Der Alliierte Kontrolrat und die Frage gesamtdeutscher Zentralverwaltungen. Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 37 (Munich: Oldenbourg, I 990). 8. Deighton, Impossible Peace, 135-167. 9. On the economic situation in Germany through early 1947, see AzV II, 10-17, and Christoph KleBmann, Die doppelte Staatsgriindung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955. Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale ftir politische Bildung 186 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fiir Politische Bildung, 1986), 46-50, 99-110. I 0. Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat, 203-228; Kraus, Ministerien, 130-135, 226227, 232-233, 264. 11. J. M. Troutbeck (Foreign Office) to M. R. Wright (State Department), June 19, 1945, BNA, FO 371/46831. 12. There is voluminous material on the issue of German officials and state property abroad in BNA, FO 371/46830-46847, and MAE, Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1944-1949, vol. 4. See also the documentation in FRUS I 945 III, 1136-1142. 13. Donal 6 Drisceoil, "Neither Friend nor Foe? Irish Neutrality in the Second World War," Contemporary European History 15, no. 2 (2006): 245-253; Doscher, Verschworene Gesellschaft, 48-59; Robert Cole, Propaganda, Censorship, and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 68, 86. 14. Hackworth (legal advisor) memo to US Assistant Secretary of State Holmes, April 17, 1945, in FRUS 1945 III, 1138. 15. Ibid., 1142-1148. 16. British Embassy (Washington) Aide-Memoire No. 1848/_/45 to State Department, June 11, 1945, ibid., 1148-1149. 17. Joseph C. Grew (Acting Secretary of State) to Lord Halifax (British Ambassador, Washington), July 13, 1945, ibid., 1149-1151. 18. Clattenburg (SPD) memo to Lyon (CON), "Increasing demands upon the Department of State and the American Foreign Service for services in behalf of Germany and Germans," Sept. 18, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Records of the Special War Problems Division, Box 4: IOGA "General History." 19. On the inter-Allied discussions, see the French translation of memo by Donald R. Heath (Assistant Director of Political Division, Office of Political Affairs, OMGUS) to the Political Directorate, Aug. 29, 1945, with three attachments, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1944-1949, vol. 6, 39-50; and Allied Control Authority Political Directory Document DPOL/P (45) 17, Sept. 24, 1945, memorandum of

286 Notes to Pages 45-46 British Delegation, signed Steele, copy, with cover letter, ibid., 71-75. 20. Copy of DPOL/P (45) 32 (approved at the 16th meeting of the Political Directory on Dec. 13, 1945), "Fondation de Bureaux Interminaires pour Jes Affaires Allemandes dans Jes Nations Unies et Pays Neutres," with attachment, "Details concemant Jes Bureaux Interminaires proposes," with cover letter from Koeltz (Berlin) to Berthelot (Secretary of lnterministerial Committee for German and Austrian Affairs, MAE), Dec. 27, 1945, ibid., 93-98. 21. These developments were summarized in a note dated Feb. 22, 1946, from the Quai d'Orsay's Direction d'Europe, Sous-Direction d'Europe Centrale (initialed "BC") to Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, ibid., 137-139. See also MAE telegram to General Pierre Koenig (France's military commander in Germany), no number, Feb. 1, 1946, ibid., 108-109; and the Coordinating Committee's decision of Feb. 16, 1946, CORC/P(46)65, ibid., 163-64. 22. Berlin (Seydoux) telegram no. 178-179 to MAE, Feb. 19, 1947, ibid., 35; Berlin (Noiret) letter no. 3,715/Pol. to Commissar General for German and Austrian Affairs, MAE, Feb. 21, 1947, with one enclosure, ibid., 40-44. 23. Koenig (Berlin) letter 2777/POL. to Bidault, "a.ls. du Projet de creation des Offices Provisoires des Affaires Allemandes a l'etranger," June 28, 1946, ibid., 151-152. 24. FRUS 1945 III, 1151, note 46. 25. Berlin (J. A. Calhoun, US Political Advisor for Germany) report 10414 to Washington, July 7, 1947, with enclosure "Functional Program for German Foreign Affairs, July 1 to December 31, 1947," NARA, RG 59, 862.00/7-747. 26. The coordination office was to consist of four divisions (administrative, consular, legal, and a division for repatriation and German property abroad). AF our Power secretariat with a rotating presidency would head each division. It would also submit important problems to an inter-Allied surveillance committee that would, if necessary, refer them to the Political Directorate. Berlin (Noiret) letter no. 3,622/POL. to Commissar General for German and Austrian Affairs, with one enclosure, Jan. 20, 194 7, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1944-1949, vol. 72, 14-20. In February, the Control Council planned to send different letters to Sweden, Portugal, and Spain; former enemy states having signed a peace treaty (Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland); and various United Nations states. The French element achieved a success when the subcommittee agreed upon the exclusion of former German diplomats of an elevated rank. The list, subject to reservation, consisted of Friedrich Janz, Ernst Busch, and "Heinrich von Herworth" (Hans von Herwarth?), proposed by the United States; Konrad Roediger, Walter Schroder, Maximilian von Hagen, and Edward von Seltzam, proposed by the United Kingdom; and "Kaltzenberger" (Hermann Katzenberger?), Edgar Scharf, and Josephine Blesch, by the Soviet Union. The French Surete was to examine Roediger, Janz, and Busch. Berlin letter no. 3,715/Pol. (Noiret) to Commissar General for German and Austrian Affairs, Feb. 21, 1947, with one enclosure, ibid., 40-44. 27. "Projet de Note I' Autorite Alliee de Controle aux Gouvemements de Certaines Nations Unies," enclosure to Noiret (Berlin) to Commissar General for German and Austrian Affairs, Berlin letter no. 3,622/POL., Jan. 20, 1947, ibid., 19-20. 28. Note of Allied Secretariat CORC/P(46)384/l, Allied Control CommitteeCoordination Committee, "Offices Provisoires pour Jes Affaires Allemandes a l 'Etranger," June 2, 194 7, copy of French version in MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1944-1949, vol. 6, 179-181.

Notes to Pages 47-4 9 287 29. Saint-Hardouin (Berlin) to MAE telegram 500-501, June 7, 1947, ibid., 182. On the French position, see Kraus, Ministerien, 349. 30. A recent overview is Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007). On Germany specifically, see Charles S. Maier with the assistance of Gunther Bischof, ed., The Marshall Plan and Germany: West German Development within the Framework of the European Recovery Program (New York: St. Martin's, 1991). 31. Text of Adenauer's press conference in Bonn, Aug. 23, 1949, in Udo Wengst, ed., Auftakt zur ,.fra Adenauer. Koalitionsverhandlungen und Regierungsbildung 1949. Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945 3 (Dlisseldorf: Droste, 1985), 51-65, here 61-62. 32. In contrast, the USSR did not permit any foreign consulates in its zone, nor did it open any in the Western zones. OM GUS Office of Political Affairs, "Functional Program for German Foreign Affairs, July 1 to December 31, 1947," July 3, 1947, in University Publications of America, Inc., Confidential US State Department Central Files. Germany. Internal Affairs 1945-1949, Reel 5, frames 527-531. 33. Elmer Plischke with the assistance of H. J. Hille, History of the Allied High Commission for Germany. Its Establishment, Structure and Procedures ([Bonn?] Historical Division, Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, 1951 ), 67--68. In 1951, the CTB 's activities were completely transferred to West German authorities. 34. See the materials in NARA, RG 59, Records of the Special War Problems Division, Box 4, IOGA "History," as well as Walter J. Marx, "Consular Services for German Nationals," Department of State Bulletin 20, no. 514 (May 8, 1949): 575-578. 35. "Bericht des Landtagsabgeordneten Dr. Hoffmann tiber Beobachtungen auf seiner Italienfahrt vom 29.10 bis 12.11.49," Nov. 17, 1949, PA AA, B 11, vol. 346. The same file contains a number of requests dated 1949 and 1950 from Germans living in Italy for the Federal Republic to establish missions there. 36. "Protokoll tiber eine Sitzung des Verwaltungsrates des Deutschen Btiros fiir Friedensfragen am 29. September 1948 in Bonn, Gebaude des Parlamentarischen Rates," Oct. 2, 1948, 6, BAKoblenz, B Z35, vol. 17, vol. I, 33-38. 37. Memo from "Dr. R [Alfons M. Reuschenbach?] to Maltzan, Feb. 14, 1947, with three enclosures, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 1863. 38. Strassmann to the Bi-Partite Economic Control Group, D-0/2606 "Betr.: Errichtung von deutschen AuBenhandelsagenturen im Auslande," June 4, 194 7, ibid. 39. "Schnelldienst" der Informations- und Presseabteilung der VaW, June 2, 194 7, ibid. 40. Protocol of the 21st meeting of the American zone Landerrat on June 2 and 3, 1947, in AzV II, 467. 41. Udo Wengst, Staatsaujbau und Regierungspraxis 1948-1953. Zur Geschichte der Verfassungsorgane der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and. Beitrage zur Geschichte des Parliamentarismus und der politischen Parteien 74 (Dlisseldorf: Droste, 1984), 29-32; Rudolf Morsey, Die Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and. Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1969. Oldenbourg GrundriB der Geschichte. 2nd ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 12-13. 42. Klaus Schwabe, "German Foreign Policy Responses to the Marshall Plan," in Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan, 225-281, here 249-255. 43. See, for example, the April 1946 comments by Hamburg Lord Mayor Rudolf

288 Notes to Pages 49-50 Petersen in Jost Dilffler, Jalta, 4. Februar 1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Entstehung der bipolaren Welt. 20 Tage im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: DTV, 1998), 205. In general, see Hans-Jilrgen Schroder, "Wirtschaftliche Aspekte westdeutscher AuBenpolitik in der Adenauer-Ara," in Franz Knipping and Hans-Jilrgen Millier, eds., Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bundnismacht. Das Machtproblem in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and 1945-1960 (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1995), 121-138. 44. Schwabe, "German Foreign Policy Responses," in Maier, ed., The Marshall Plan, 249-250, quote 250; Werner Btihrer, Westdeutschland in der OEEC. Eingliederung, Krise, Bewahrung. Que lien und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 32 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), 46-51; Manfred Knapp, "Deutschlands Wiedereingliederung in die Weltwirtschaft. AuBenwirtschaftliche Vorentscheidungen in der Grtindingsphase der Bundesrepublik 1948/49," in Knipping and Millier, eds., Aus der Ohnmacht, 85-119, here 95-98. 45. Btihrer, "Erzwungene oder Freiwillige Liberalisierung? Die USA, die OEEC und die westdeutsche AuBenpolitik 1949-1959," in Ludolf Herbst, Werner Btihrer, and Hanno Sowade, eds., Vom Marshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and in die westliche Welt (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 139-162, here 148-150; Manfred Knapp, "Die Anfiinge westdeutscher AuBenwirtschafts- und AuBenpolitik im bizonalen Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiet," in Knapp, ed., Von der Bizonengrundung zur okonomisch-politischen Westintegration. Studien zum Verhaltnis zwischen Auj3enpolitik und Auj3enwirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Entstehungsphase der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and (1947-1952) (Frankfurt a.M.: Haag & Herchen, 1984), 13-94, here 53ff. 46. Hanns Lang (Stellv. Geschaftsfiihrer der AuBenhandelskontor GroB-Hessen G.m.b.H., Frankfurt a.M.) to the Verwaltungsrat der VfW, "AuBenhandelsvertretungen der Lander als Zwischenlosung," Jan. 20, 1947, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 1863; US Consulate Hamburg Report 514 to Washington, July 7, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/7-747, on Petersen's request that the Hamburg Senate empower some of its members to negotiate with Allied authorities on trade missions; Werner Veith (Heidelberg), to Maltzan (Minden), July 22, 1947, plus enclosure, BA Kob1enz, B 102, vol. 46, Heft 2/5; Maltzan to Veith, Aug. 11, 1947, ibid.; Veith to Maltzan, Aug. 28, 1947, ibid.; Veith to Maltzan, Sept. 17, 1947, ibid.; Maltzan to Veith (copy), Sept. 22, 1947, ibid.; Fritz Sanger (editor-in-chiefof Deutscher Presse-Dienst, Hamburg) to Maltzan (Frankfurt), July 13, 1948, ibid.; Maltzan to Sanger, July 30, 1948, ibid. 47. See Maltzan's correspondence in May and June 1948 with Freiherr Kurt von Lersner (Nieder-Erlenbach), who had proposed trade missions attached to Maltzan 's office in a letter to US ambassador Robert Murphy, BA Koblenz B 102, vol. 49, Heft 2/8. 48. "Communique issued at the Conclusion of Informal Talks on Germany among Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Benelux Countries, London, June 7, 1948," in US Department of State, ed., Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), 143-146. 49. "The London Documents: Directives regarding the Future Political Organization of Germany," July I, 1948, in Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany, 315-318, here 316317. 50. FRUS 1948 II, 385-392, esp. 390-391. For the minister presidents' reaction to the London Documents and the events leading to their counterproposal, see Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 39--48. 51. Knapp, "Die Anfiinge," in Knapp, ed., Von der Bizonengrundung, 56--63. 52. Werner Btihrer, "Auftakt in Paris. Der Marshallplan und die deutsche Rtickkehr

Notes to Pages 50-53

289

auf die internationale Btihne," Vierteljahreshefle for Zeitgeschichte 36, no. 3 (July 1988): 529-556, here 532ff. 53. Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 128ff., 170-171. 54. The weekly reports of the Washington delegation from the period before September 1949 are collected in BA Koblenz, B 214, vol. 96. On the later period, see for example the Dec. 9, 1949, letter from Bllicher to Adenauer, with an excerpt from the "Wochenbericht der ECA-Mission Washington, 2. Dezember 1949," on the discussion on German rearmament in the United States, BA Koblenz, NL 80, vol. 78, 34-37; and Blticher's Jan. 27, 1950, letter to Adenauer containing Fernschreiben 5216 from the OEEC Mission, Werner Dankwort (Paris) to Blticher on French official and public opinion on the future of the Saar mines, ibid., 66-68. 55. Quoted in Blihrer, Westdeutschland in der OEEC, 70. 56. On the DBFF, Manfred Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion und westdeutsche Realitiit. Von den Vorbereitungen for einen deutschen Friedensvertrag zur Griindung des Auswiirtigen Amts der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and 1946-1949/51 (Dlisseldorf: Droste, 1978), and Heribert Piontkowitz, Anfiinge westdeutscher Auflenpolitik 1946-1949. Das Deutsche Buro for Friedensfragen. Studien zur Zeitgeschichte 12 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1978). 57. Bremen contributed 4 percent of the budget and the three larger states each contributed 32 percent; Haas, Beitrag, 12. 58. On the DBFF's personnel policy, see Piontkowitz, Arifiinge, 57ff. On Strohm, see Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 38. 59. Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, l 74ff.; Piontkowitz, Arifiinge, 117-167 and 251, note 54a. 60. British Intelligence Office, Hamburg, memo, "Preparations for a 'Shadow' German Foreign Office," enclosure to letter POL/908/18/48 from the German Political Branch, Political Division, Control Council for Germany, British Element, Berlin, to the Foreign Office's German Political Department, July 28, 1948, BNA, FO 371/70692, Paper C 6281; minute by Rolleston, Aug. 4, 1948, ibid. 61. German Political Department, Foreign Office (London) letter C 6281/6281/18 to Political Division, Control Commission for Germany, British Element, Berlin, Aug. 11, 1948, ibid. 62. Kit Steele letter Pol. 1469/8/44 to P. E. Dean (German Political Department, Foreign Office), Aug. 30, 1948, BNA, FO 371/70692, Paper C 7263; Ivone Kirkpatrick letter C 7263/6281/18 to Steele, Sept. 21, 1948, ibid. 63. Peter Garran (Political Division, Control Commission for Germany, British Element, Berlin) to Kirkpatrick, Nov. 5, 1948, BNA, FO 371/70692, Paper C 9152. 64. Memo of conversation with Schuman and French delegation and Acheson, April 1, 1949,inFRUS 1949III, 158-160. 65. The text of the Occupation Statute is in Oppen, Documents on Germany, 375377. See also the OMGUS draft Occupation Statute, Oct. 12, 1948, in FRUS 1948 II, 608-613, here 610; and the note by the Secretariat of the Tripartite Committee on the Occupation Statute, Frankfurt, Oct. 25, 1948, ibid., 615-624, here 615. 66. "Classified List of International Agreements on Understandings in the Nature of Agreements Made on Behalf of Western Germany or of the Individual Western Zones," Appendix B to HICOM Political Affairs Committee document POL/P(50)50, "German Treaty Obligations," Sept. 29, 1950, 32, NARA, RG 43, Lot File M-88-Council of Foreign Ministers, Contractual Agreements, Box 142, IV-I Foreign Relations.

290 Notes to Pages 53-56 67. James Riddleberger (acting US political advisor for Germany/Berlin) telegram toAcheson,April 14, 1949, in FRUS 1949 III, 237-242, here 238; the German stenographic protocol of the meeting in PR IV, 112-139, here esp. 114-116; Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-1949, vol. 2 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), 1108; and Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1950), 430--431. 68. PR IV, 115. 69. BUhrer, "Auftakt in Paris," 545. 70. Jost DUffier, "Supranationalitlit und Machtpolitik im Denken deutscher politischer Eliten nach den beiden Weltkriege," in Gottfried Niedhart and Dieter Riesenberger, eds., Lernen aus dem Krieg? Deutsche Nachkriegszeiten 1918-1945 (Munich: Beck, 1992), 67-83, here 77-78. 71. Reiner Pommerin, "The United States and the Armament of the Federal Republic of Germany," in Pommerin, ed., The American impact on Postwar Germany (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 15-34, here 20-21. 72. On the Herrenchiemsee Constitutional Convention, which met August 10-23, 1948, see Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 53-59. 73. Protocol of the third meeting of the Verfassungskonvent, Aug. 14, 1948, BA Koblenz, B Z 12, vol. 31, Sitzungsprotokolle UnterausschuB III, Organisationsfragen 1.-6. Sitzung, 36-63. 74. "Bericht Uber den Verfassungskonvent auf Herrenchiemsee vom 10. bis 23. August 1948," in PR II, 585,587,606,615. 75. On its position on the Herrenchiemsee Conference, see Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 157-159, and KleBmann, Die doppelte Staatsgriindung, 196. 76. Plischke, History of the Allied High Commission, 14. 77. The original "theses" drafted by the Committee on the Occupation Statute on December 5 are in PR IV, 46--49, and the final version voted on by the Council's Main Committee on Dec. 10 is in ibid., 50-53. 78. Quoted in ibid., 53, note 2. 79. Report from Johannes Elmenau (Bavarian Plenipotentiary to the United Economic Area, Frankfurt) to Anton Pfeiffer (Bavarian State Chancellery, Munich), "Betr.: Personalbesetzung des Ministeriums bzw. Amtes fiir zwischenstaatliche Beziehungen," Aug. 11, 1949, BayHStA, NLA. Pfeiffer, vol. 241; Elmenau's report to the Bavarian State Chancellery, Aug. 19, 1949, ibid. 80. Extensive documentation on the Organization Staff is in PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 36. 81. Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 168-169. By the spring of 1948, Ulrich Doertenbach in consultation with the DBFF's Dirk Foster had written a memo on the missions question. Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 268, note 5, says that Doertenbach's memo is "unknown." However, Eberhard sent a copy ofa 17-page memo titled "Gedanken Uber die Einrichtung deutscher Vertretungen im Ausland" to PUnder, on May 20, 1948, BA Koblenz, B Z 13, vol. 314, Heft 2. Given its subject matter it is likely that it is Doertenbach's memo or a modified version thereof. 82. Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 173-178; "Bericht von der Abteilungsleiterbesprechung im Deutschen BUro fiir Friedensfragen am 18. August 1948," Aug. 19, 1948, 3, BA Koblenz, B Z35, vol. 7, 22-23. 83. Foster to Eberhard, "Plan fiir die Organisation der kUnftigen Behandlung

Notes to Pages 56-58

291

auswartiger Fragen," Nov. 25, 1948, IfZG, ED 134 NL Foster, vol. 6. Foster, "Plan fur die ktinftige Organisation der Behandlung auswartiger Angelegenheiten," Dec. 10, 1948, ibid. 84. "Die Regelung der auswartigen Angelegenheiten bei der kunftigen Bundesregierung," in Haas, Beitrag, 85-93. 85. "Bericht von der 16. Referentenbesprechung im Deutschen Buro fiir Friedensfragen am 10.6.49," June 10, 1949, 1, IfZG, ED 117 NL Eberhard, vol. 59. 86. See Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 173-196. 87. "Sitzung des Parteivorstandes am 21. und 22.1.1949," in Willy Albrecht, ed., Die SPD unter Kurt Schumacher und Erich Ollenhauer 1946 bis 1963. Sitzungsprotokolle der Spitzengremien. 2: 1948 bis 1950 (Bonn: Dietz, 2003), 68-76, here 74. Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 178-183, describes the internal discussion within the SPD during the first part of 1949. 88. "Yorn Parteivortand tibemommene Ergebnisse der Beratungen des AuBenpolitischen Ausschusses," attachment to "Stitzung des Parteivorstandes am 1. und 2. Juni 1949 in Hannover," in Albrecht, Die SPD, 184-237, here 195-197; Ltitkens to Haas, June 21, 1949, with enclosure, "Denkschrift des Parteivorstandes der SPD tiber Errichtung eines Amtes fiir Besatzungsfragen und zwischenstaatliche Beziehungen," plus attachment, no date, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 37. 89. On the dispute between the council and the minister presidents, see Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 81-88, andAzV V, 7-10, 36-37. 90. AzV V, 630-635, 638-641; Hermann Wandersleb, "Vorschlag fiir einen Geschaftsverteilungsplan der ktinftigen Bundeskanzlei," June 15, 1949, BA Koblenz, B Z12, vol. 92, vol. 1, 128-131; "Protokoll tiberdie 3. Sitzung des Organisations-AusschuBes am 18.6.1949 in Schlangenbad," ibid., 82-104, here 90ff. Wandersleb's revised proposal reflected the desire for a separate state secretariat; "Vorschlag fiir den Autbau der ktinftigen Bundeskanzlei. Zusammengestellt auf Grund der Aussprache in der Sitzung des OrganisationsausschuBes am 11. [sic-17] Juni," no date but marked "distributed," apparently at the June 23 meeting, BA Koblenz, B 212, vol. 93, vol. 2, 82-84. 91. AzV V, 642; Stenographic protocol of the Organization Committee's third meeting on June 18, BAKoblenz, B Zl2, vol. 92, vol. 1, 82-104, here 86. 92. Piontkowitz, Arifiinge, 191, 277 note 55; AzV V, 674-677. The full document, "Vorschlag fiir die Behandlung der auswlirtigenAngelegenheiten in der Bundesregierung," is printed in Haas, Beitrag, 94-98, where it is falsely attributed to the VfW and Ptinder's coworkers Carl Krautwig and Herbert Martini (see also ibid., 15). Not only does the document itself criticize the VfW's plans, but a copy in lfZG, ED 134 NL Foster, vol. 6, links it to a June 22 Frankfurt meeting between Haas, Etzdorf, Strohm, and Mohr. 93. Stenographic protocol of meetings 4-6 ofOrganisationsausschuB, June 23, 24, and 25, 1949, BA Koblenz, B Zl2, vol. 93, vol. 2, 85-270, here 267-270. 94. "Gegenvorschlage zu dem Organisationsplan fiir die Bundesbehorde fiir Auswartige Angelegenheiten von Botschaftsrat a.D. Clemens von Brentano," no date but presented June 30, BA Koblenz, B Zl2, vol. 94, vol. 3, 140-142; the text without the organization chart is in AzV V, 700-702. 95. Stenographic protocol of meetings 7-11 ofOrganisationsausschuB on June 30, July 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1949, BA Koblenz, B Z 12, vol. 91, 1-207, here 22-36. 96. On the Council's origins and initial sessions, see Wilfried Loth, Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europiiische Integration. Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe 1551 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 69-76.

292 Notes to Pages 58-61 97. AzV V, 838. See DBFF (signed Strohm) to Haas, July 18, 1949, PA AA, NL Haas, vol. 37. See also "Erich" [almost certainly Kordt] (Munich) to "Billy" Haas, July 4, 1949, ibid. 98. The Organization Committee's final formal deliberations on foreign affairs on July 11 are summarized in AzV V, 835-839. 99. The relevant section of the report is reprinted in Haas, Beitrag, 16-20, and the organization plan in ibid., 99-100. 100. Ernst-Gunther Mohr, "Aktenvermerk tiber eine Besprechung mit dem Generalsekretar der CDU, Herm Dr. Blankenhorn am 17.12.48 tiber die ktinftige Organisation der Behandlung der auswartigen Angelegenheiten," Dec. 21, 1948, IfZG, ED 134 NL Forster, vol. 6. 101. Der Prasident des Rechnungshofs im Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiet, Hamburg, "Grundsatzliches zum Aufbau der Bundesverwaltung," March 1, 1949, with five attachments, BA Koblenz, B Z 12, vol. 105. 102. Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 98-99; Der Prasident des Rechnungshofs im Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiet, Hamburg, "Vorschlage zur Gliederung der Bundesministerien," May 3, 1949, BA Koblenz, Z 12, vol. 105, copy in BA Koblenz, NL 18 Jakob Kaiser, vol. 452, 68-112, with Enclosure A, "Gliederungsplane fiir die einzelnen Ministerien." 103. Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 107. 104. The exact origins of the "foreign trade ministry" or "Ministry for Interstate Relations" idea remain unclear, as does Vollrath von Maltzan 's role in developing it. Ptinder first mentioned it outside of Frankfurt Administration circles in his letter to Adenauer, and all known plans date after this letter. Ptinder to Adenauer, June 3, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 5 Ptinder, vol. 717, 7-12. 105. Protocol of the Second and Third Meetings of the Organization Committee, June 17-18, 1948,AzVV, 627-629, 632. 106. Allgemeine Zeitung, June 21, 1949; Der Kurier, June 21, 1949; Frankfurter Rundschau, June 21, 1949; Neue Ruhr Zeitung, June 22, 1949; Rheinische Post, June 22, 1949; Siiddeutsche Zeitung, June 23, 1949. 107. Posadowsky (Frankfurt) to the DBFF, Report no. F.1204/49, "Betr.: AuBenpolitisches Amt," July 15, 1949, BA Koblenz, B 235, vol. 13, vol. 3, 27. Ptinder to Adenauer, July 26, 1949, with enclosure, memo by Schniewind, "Entwurf fiir den Organisationsplan eines Bundesministeriums fiir zwischenstaatliche Angelegenheiten," no date, BA Koblenz, NL 5 Ptinder, vol. 265, 48-52. 108. Ptinder to Adenauer, Aug. 24, 1949, with enclosure, memo on Ptinder's talk with Robertson and McCloy on Aug. 16, BAKoblenz, NL 5 Ptinder, vol. 265, 64-67. 109. Adenauer to Erhard, June 18, 1949, in Konrad Adenauer, Briefe 1949-1951. Edited by Hans Peter Mensing. Rhondorfer Ausgabe (Berlin: Siedler, 1985), 36; and Adenauer to Viktoria Steinbiss (CDU), July 18, 1949, ibid., 60. 110. See Willy Brandt's report (based on sources in the British military government) to the SPD National Committee, March 2, 1949, Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, Bonn, NL Schumacher, J 79 II (Wengst materials). 111. Brandt report to the SPD's National Committee, Aug. 23, 1949, ibid. 112. Rudolf Morsey, "Personal- und Beamtenpolitik im Ubergang von der Bizonen zur Bundesverwaltung (1947-1950)," in Morsey, ed., Verwaltungsgeschichte. Aufgaben, Zielsetzungen, Beispiele. Vortriige undDiskussionsbeitriige derverwaltungsgeschichtlichen Arbeitstagung 1976 der Hochschulefiir Verwaltungswissenschafien Speyer. Schriftenreihe

Notes to Pages 61-65

293

der Hochschule Speyer 66 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1977), 191-239, here 202-203, 206-207, 214-215; Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, 572-573, 619; Henning Kohler, Adenauer. Eine politische Biographie (Frankfurt a.M.: Propylaen, 1994), 456. 113. Posadowsky (Frankfurt) to DBFF, Report F1331/49 "Betr.: AuJ3enpolitische Betatigung Deutschlands," Aug. 4, 1949, 2, BA Koblenz, B Z35, vol. 13, vol. 3, 24. 114. Elmenau's report on the conversation between Adenauer and Ehard in Frankfurt a.M. on August 20, 1949, dated August 21, in Wengst, ed., Auflakt zur ,fra Adenauer, 30-31. Elmenau's reports of August 11, 1949, 2, to Anton Pfeiffer and of August 17, 1949, to the Bavarian State Chancellery concerning Ptinder are in BayHStA, NL A. Pfeiffer, vol. 241. 115. Rudolf Morsey, "Die Bildung der ersten Regierungskoalition 1949. Adenauers Entscheidungen von Frankfurt und Rhondorf am 20. und 21. August 1949," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 34 (1978): 3-14, here 3ff.; Morsey, "Konrad Adenauer und der Weg zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1946-1949," in Morsey, ed., Konrad Adenauer und die Grundung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and. Rhondorfer Gesprache 3 (Stuttgart: Belser, 1979), 9-39, here 36-37; Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, 624-626; and especially Kohler, Adenauer, 520-528. 116. Piontkowitz, Anfange, 193, 277-278, note 60. 117. Transcript of Adenauer's press conference in Bonn on August 23, 1949, in Wengst, ed., Auflakt zur ,fra Adenauer, 51--65, here 60. 118. Herbert Martini, "Stellungnahme zu den Empfehlungen des OrganisationsausschuJ3es der Ministerprasidenten tiber den Aufbau des Bundesamtes fiir Auswartige Angelegenheiten," Sept. 2, 1949; BA Koblenz, NL 5 Ptinder, vol. 265, 73-76; Ptinder to Adenauer, Sept. 5, 1949, ibid., 77-78; Ptinder to Adenauer, Sept. 6, 1949, with copies to CDU/CSU politicians Fritz Schaffer, Jakob Kaiser, Freidrich Holzapfel, Rudolf Vogel, and Helene Weber, ibid., 79-81. 119. The relevant passage is printed in Auswartiges Amt, ed., 40 Jahre AujJenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and. Eine Dokumentation (Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1989), 20. 120. Wengst, Staatsaujbau, 65--67; see also Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, 589-592. 121. Rolf Pauls to the author, May 7, 1993, in Bonn.

3-The Return of the German Diplomats I. Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 354-355. 2. Biographisches Handbuch II, 391-392; Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin; Conze et al., Das Amt, 364. On Herwarth's role in the resistance, see Conze et al., Das Amt, 133ff., 166ff; Klemperer, German Resistance, 101-105, 129-130. On Kostring and Herwarth, see Christopher Simpson, Blowback: Americas Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), 17-25. Herwarth acknowledged that Pannwitz's troops were brutal. Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 338. 3. Joachim Hoffmann, Die Geschichte der Wlassow-Armee. 2nd ed. Einzelschriften zur militarischen Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 27 (Freiburg: Rombach, 1986), 381-382. 4. Simpson, Blowback, 86-87, 308-309, note 12; Conze et al., Das Amt, 364-365;

294 Notes to Pages 66-7 l Herwarth, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, 352-355. 5. Simpson, Blowback, 308-309, note 12. 6. Clemens Vollnhals, ed., Entnazifizierung. Politische Siiuberungen und Rehabilitierung in den vier Besatzungszonen I 945-1949 (Munich: DTV, 1991 ); KlausDietmar Hencke, "Die Trennung vom Nationalsozialismus. Selbstzerstorung, politische Siiuberung, 'Entnazifizierung,' Strafverfolgung," in Klaus-Dietmar Hencke and Hans Woller, eds., Politische Siiuberung in Europa. Die Abrechnung mit Faschismus und Kollaberation nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: DTV, 1991), 21-83; Helga A. Welsh, "'Antifaschistisch-demokratische Umwiilzung' und politische Sauberungen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands," in ibid., 84-107; figure from Christa Schick, "Die Internierungslager," in Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller, eds., Von Stalingrad zur Wiihrungsreform. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutsch/and. Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 26 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 301-327. 7. Allied Control Council Directive 24, "Removal from Office and from Positions of Responsibility of Nazis and Persons Hostile to Allied Purposes," Jan. 12, 1946. 8. Enrico Syring, "Walther Hewel-Ribbentrop's Mann beim 'Fiihrer,"' in Smelser et al., eds., Braune Elite II, 150-165. On Killinger and Jagow, Biographisches Handbuch II, 414-415, 532. 9. The Office of the US Political Advisor for Germany believed the Soviet Union held 128 former employees of the Auswiirtiges Amt as of December 3, 1947. Chase (Office of the US Political Advisor for Germany, Berlin) to the State Department's Division for Central European Affairs, Dec. 3, 1947, Dispatch 11405, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/12347. In August 1955 the West German government knew the whereabouts of 42 of these diplomats and estimated that 46 more could still be alive. Hergt (Ref. 204) memo, "Deutsche Gefangene in sowjetischem Gewahrsam," Aug. 12, 1955, plus six enclosures, including "Anlage 2. Aufzeichnung Betr.: Ehemalige Angehorige des Auswiirtigen Dienstes, die noch in der Sowjetunion zuriickgehalten werden," BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhorn, vol. 51, 94-126. 10. Conze et al., Das Amt, 375-401. 11. Ibid., 341-342. 12. On denazification in general, see Cornelia Rauh-Kiihne, "Die Entnazifizierung und die deutsche Gesellschaft," Archiv fiir Sozialgeschichte 35 (1995): 35-70, and Perry Biddescome, The Denazification of Germany: A History, 1945-1950 (Stroud: Tempus, 2007). On the denazification of German diplomats, see Conze et al., Das Amt, 342-352. 13. Allied Control Council Directive No. 38, "The Arrest and Punishment of War Criminals, Nazis and Militarists, and the Internment, Control and Surveillance of Potentially Dangerous Germans," Oct. 12, 1946. 14. Lutz Niethammer, "Zurn Wandel der Kontinuitatsdiskussion," in LudolfHerbst, ed., Westdeutschland 1945-1955. Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), 65-83, here 78. 15. Allied Control Council Directive No. 38. 16. Justus Fiirstenau, Entnazifizierung: Ein Kapitel deutscher Nachkriegspolitik. Politica 40 (Neuwied: H. Luchterhand, 1969), 227. 17. Conze et al., Das Amt, 342-353. 18. Ibid., 345-347, quote 346; Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 193-194. 19. Herbert Blankenhorn, "Fragebogen," May 6, 1946, Staatsarchiv Hamburg,

Notes to Pages 71-73

295

Bestand 221-11, Misc 5154; Winkelmann, Spec-Dept. III im Kriminalamt, Hamburg 13, "Interrogation Report," Aug. 22, 1946, ibid.; Maulucci, "Herbert Blankenhom in the Third Reich"; Birgit Ramscheid, Herbert Blankenhorn (1904-1991). Adenauers auj3enpolitischer Berater. Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 49 (Diisseldorf: Droste, 2006), 1-94. 20. British Liaison Staff of Zonal Advisory Commission, Special Branch, "Fragebogen/ Action Sheet," Jan. 8, 1947, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Bestand 221-11, Misc 5154. 21. Wolfgang Kriiger, Entnazifiziert! Zur Praxis der politischen Siiuberung in Nordrhein-Wesifalen (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1982), 85; Joachim Lilla, "Adolf Steengracht von Moy land (1902-1969). Letzter Staatssekretar des Auswartigen Amtes im 'Dritten Reich,"' Shoah.de. Zukunft braucht Erinnerung, http://zukunft-braucht-erinnerung.de/ drittes-reich/biografien/520-adolf-steengracht-von-moyland-1902-1969 .html#_ftnrefl 10, accessed Nov. I, 2010. 22. Such cases included Wilhelm von Schoen (the former German ambassador to Chile) in the American zone and Hans Kroll in the UK zone; Conze et al., Das Amt, 349-350. 23. See the text of the discussion following RudolfMorsey's paper "Personal- und Beamtenpolitik" in Morsey, ed., Verwaltungsgeschichte, 239-243, here 243. 24. For example, Maltzan was a target for appeals for assistance. Erica Pappritz to Maltzan, Sept. 19. 1946, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 45; Maltzan to Pappritz, Oct. 14, 1946, with enclosure, ibid.; F. Janz (Frei burg) to Maltzan, Jan. 8, 1946, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 44, Heft 1; and the 1949 correspondence between Maltzan (Frankfurt) and Bargen (Stade), BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 53, Heft 1. 25. Conze et al., Das Amt, 346, 361. 26. Earl F. Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1975), 314-315. 27. See the memo by William S. Espy, Political Division, Ministerial Collecting Center, Sept. 19, 1945, with the attached chart and reports, copies in BA Koblenz, NL 263 Rheindorf, vol. 416. On Triitzschler, see Conze et al., Das Amt, 486. 28. Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 303-305. 29. Conze et al., Das Amt, 363-374. 30. Paper C 4724, "A First List of Diplomatic Personalities," July 25, 1945, BNA, FO 371/46909. 31. Harold C. Vedder (US Political Advisor for Germany's Office, Wiesbaden) to James W. Riddleberger (head of the Division of Central European Affairs, State Department), Oct. 31, 1945, with attachments "List of Officers of the German Foreign Office Who Are First-Class considering Their Character, Knowledge, Experience and Political Attitude," and "List of Officers of the German Foreign Office Who Are Important because of Their Character, Knowledge and Political Attitude," NARA, RG 59, 862.021/10-3145. 32. "Personal des Auswartigen Amtes nach dem Stand von Ende Marz 1945," April 1945, NARA, RG 226, OSS Field Station Files, E.190C, Box 07, Dulles Files-George Wood Case. 33. Conze et al., Das Amt, 361; Georg Schroth, "Beziehungsgeflechte ehemaliger Hoherer Beamten des Auswartigen Amtes nach 1945. Der sogenannte 'Freundeskreis' und die Wiedererrichtung des Auswartigen Amtes in der Bundesrepublik," MA thesis, Humbolt-Universitat Berlin, 2004; PAAA, Bestand Freundeskreis.

296

Notes to Pages 73-77

34. Vollnhals, Entnazifizierung, 7-o4; Hencke and Woller, Politische Sauberung, 32-06. 35. Vollnhals, Entnazifizierung, 58-o2. 36. Furstenau, Entnazifizierung, 235. 37. Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 35. 38. Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik, 264-265. 39. Merritt and Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, 63, note 20. On Neurath, Norman J. W. Goda, Tales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 92-133. 40. Quotes from Maulucci, "Herbert Blankenhorn in the Third Reich," 260, 262. 41. Conze et al., Das Amt, 342-353. 42. Ibid., 350; Kroll, Botschafter, 171-172. 43. Conze et al., Das Amt, 351-352. 44. Susanna Schrafstetter, "A Nazi Diplomat Turned Apologist for Apartheid: Gustav Sonnenhol, Vergangenheitsbewaltigung and West German Foreign Policy toward South Africa," German History 28, no. I (March 2010): 44-o6, here 45--49; Hauptstaatsarchiv Duesseldorf, NW 1092, Berufsgruppe 42, Nr. 60, Entnazifizierungsakte Dr. Sonnenhol, containing sworn declarations by Werner Otto von Hentig (Sept. 13, 1946) and Peter Pfeiffer (March 9, 1947). 45. Weick memo, "Betr.: Bezeichung der politischen Belastung oder Entlastung," April 2, 1953, PAAA, B 100, Bd. 92. 46. Herbert, Best, 435--436; Herbert, "Ruckkehr in die 'Burgerlichkeit'? NS-Eliten in der Bundesrepublik," in Bernd Weisbrod, ed., Rechtsradikalismus in der politischen Kultur der Nachkriegszeit. Die verzogerte Normalisierung in Niedersachsen (Hannover: Hahn, 1995), 157-174, here 161-162; Rauh-Kuhne, "Die Entnazifizierung," 64-70. 47. Conze et al., Das Amt, 354ff. On the flight of diplomats associated with the Foreign Office's "Jewish policies," Gerald Steinacher, Nazis on the Run: How Hitler's Henchmen Fled Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201 I), 254-255. 48. Herbert, "Ruckkehr in die Burgerlichkeit?," in Weisbrod, ed., Rechtsradikalismus, 69-73. 49. Ernst Klee, Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was var und nach 1945 (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 2003), 61-62. 50. Ibid, 304; Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 175-182. 51. Weitkamp, Braune Diplomaten, 401--432; press clippings in BA Koblenz, NL 263 Rheindorf, vol. 414. 52. Klee, Das Personenlexikon, 477. 53. They were Gebhard Seelos (BP; 1955 ambassador to Portugal), Gunther Henle (CDU), Carl von Campe (DP; 1952 ambassador to Chile), future chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU), Karl Georg Pfleiderer (DP; 1955 ambassador to Yugoslavia), and Gerhard Lutkens (SPD). 54. Haas, Lebenserinnerungen; Biographisches Handbuch II, 150-151. 55. Haas, Beitrag, 14. 56. Biographisches Handbuch I, 437--438. 57. Biographisches Handbuch II, 173-175; Bernhard Loffler, Soziale Martkwirtschaft und administrative Praxis: Das Bundeswirtschaftsministerium unter Ludwig Erhard. VSWG-Beihefte 162 (Wiesbaden, 2002), 168-169.

Notes to Pages 78-80

297

58. Cited in US Consulate General, Bremen (Maurice W. Altaffer), dispatch 950 to State Department, Nov. 5, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/11-547. 59. Bremen (Altaffer) dispatch 948 to State Department, Nov. 5, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/11-547. 60. On the DBFF's personnel policy, see Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 57ff. 61. "Personal des Deutschen Biiros flir Friedensfragen (Stand am 16. 12. 1949)," IfZG, ED 117 NL Eberhard, vol. 59. 62. Grewe interview with the author, June 17, 1993, Konigswinter. On Kaufmann, a law professor of Jewish ancestry who had advised the Foreign Office during the Weimar Republic and who was forced to flee to Holland in 1939, see Frank Degenhardt, Zwischen Machtstaat und Volkerbund: Erich Kaufmann (1880-1972). Studien zur Geschichte des Volkerrechts 16 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008); Ludwig Biewer, "Erich KaufmannJurist aus Pommern im Dienste von Demokratie und Menschenrechten," Baltische Studien 75 (1989): 115-124; and Biewer, "Erich Kaufmann, der erste Volkerrechtsberater des Auswartigen Amts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Auswiirtiger Dienst. Vierteljahresschrift der Vereinigung Deutscher Auslandsbeamten (1992): 6-10. On Grewe, see Wilhelm Grewe, Ruckblenden 19 76-1951. Aufteichnungen eines A ugenzeugen deutscher Auflenpolitik van Adenauer bis Schmidt (Frankfurt a.M.: Propylaen, 1979). On Schmoller, see Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche lllusion, 154; Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 147ff., 172; and Grewe, Ruckblenden, 130-131. 63. Bremen (Altaffer) dispatch 948 to State Department, Nov. 5, 1947, NARA, RG 59, 862.00/11-547. 64. Oskar Kossmann, an academic who joined the DBFF on August 1, 1948, as an expert on Eastern Europe, claimed that it soon became clear to him that the Peace Office was a nascent foreign office. Kossmann, Es Begann in Polen, 232-233. 65. "Liste I: Anschriften in Deutschland," March 1950, PAAA, R 143450 (Bestand Freundeskreis). Interestingly, fourteen diplomats lived in the German Democratic Republic, although no one on the list still resided in East Berlin. 66. See, for example, S. Jonathan Wiesen, West German industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Jay Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955, Studies in War, Society, and the Military (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); Patrick Wagner, Hitlers Kriminalisten. Die deutsche Kriminalpolizei und der Nationalsozialismus zwischen 1920 und 1960 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), 152185; and Alaric Searle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959 (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003). 67. This is a recurrent theme in the Special Interrogation Mission's records, NARA, RG 59, M679. 68. Harold C. Vederler, Interview of Paul Otto Gustav Schmidt, Oerursel (Military Intellegence Service Center), Oct. 19, 22-26, 1945, ibid. 69. On Gaus, see Conze et al., Das Amt, 385-86; Gerhard Stuby, Vom 'Kronjuristen' zum 'Kronzeugen. ' Friedrich Wilhelm Gaus: Ein Leben im Auswiirtigen Amt der Wilhelmstrafle (Hamburg: VSA, 2008). Copy ofGaus's statement in PAAA, NL Nostitz, vol. 3; see also Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 306. On Kempner, see his autobiography, Ankliiger einer Epoche. Lebenserinnerungen. in Zusammenarbeit mit Jorg Friedrich (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1983). Two weeks earlier Kempner told Gaus that he would be turned over to the Soviets if he did not make a full written confession. Excerpts from

298 Notes to Pages 80-83 Gaus 's testimony to US prosecution lawyers Kempner and Peter Beauvais, March 6, 194 7, PA AA, NL Nostitz, vol. 3. Interestingly, this transcript is not included with the rest of the transcripts of Gaus's talks with US officials at Nuremberg from 1946 and 1947. See National Archives Microfilm Publications, Microfilm Publication M I 019, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Interrogations, 1946-1949, reel 20, 321-482. 70. Ulrich Dortenbach to Maltzan, April 17, 1947, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 43, Heft 1. 71. Nostitz letter to the editor of the Neue Zeitung, April 22, 1947, PA AA, NL Nostitz, vol. 3. 72. See "Die Deutsche Diplomatie von gestern," Tages-Anzeiger (Regensburg), Nov. 18/19, 1949, signed "Dr. R." (the text of the article in PA AA, NL Haas, vol. 37, attributes authorship to Werner von Grundherr, Hermann Mosler, and Allzen[?]), and Werner Otto von Hentig's letter in Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), No. 103, May 4, 1947. Twenty years later, Hentig had changed his mind considerably and blamed the ministry's leadership in the mid-1930s for not taking a more decisive stance against encroachments. Hentig essay, "Der Beamte des Auswartigen Amtes und die Nationalsozialistische Partei," written around Easter 1966, ItZG, ED 113 NL Hentig, vol. 1, 155-158. 73. Conze et al., Das Amt, 346-347, 401-403. On Melchers's efforts to save Jews and the complexities of his case, see Browning, "The German Foreign Office Revisited," Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 39 (Fall 2011): 71-79, here 77-78. 74. Melchers to Theo Kordt, April 13, 1947, PAAA, NL Theo Kordt, vol. 3. Kordt fully agreed; Kordt to Melchers, May 12, 194 7, ibid. 75. Copy ofMelchers's (Bremen) letter to Gaus, May 27, 1947, ibid. 76. Maltzan to Melchers (copy), June 23, 1947, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 44, Heft 2, 3; Theo Kordt to Melchers, June 21, 1947, PAAA, NL Theo Kordt, vol. 3. 77. Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals XII, 1186-1188. 78. Melchers, "Das Widerspiel der Krafte im Auswartigen Amt wahrend des Krieges," Oct. 17, 1948, BA Koblenz, B Z35, vol. 11, 1, 4 7-54. 79. Auswartiges Amt, JOO Jahre Auswartiges Amt, 44; Weitkamp, Braune Diplomaten, 462-463. 80. Doscher, Das Auswartige Amt, 213-255, 262-305. 81. On the sentences handed out to diplomats, see Conze et al., Das Amt, 388-401. 82. Kempner helped Michael Heinze-Mansfeld, whose article series in the Frankfurter Rundschau of September 1--6, 1951, sparked the Bundestag's investigation of the Foreign Office's personnel policy. Mansfeld's testimony to Schetter, Oct. 25, 1951, reprinted in Haas, Beitrag, 222-225, here 223. 83. Conze et al., Das Amt, 401-435. 84. Blasius, Fiir Deutsch/and, 141-157; Hill, "Alternative Politik," in Schmadke and Steinbach, eds., Der Widerstand, 680--682. 85. Peter Hoffmann, The History ofthe German Resistance 1933-1945. 3rd English ed. Translated by Richard Barry (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 107-108; Klemperer, German Resistance, 28; Blasius, Has so von Etzdorf, 20-29. See also the memo by Kordt and Etzdorf from Oct. 1939, "Das drohende Unheil," ibid., 138-148. 86. Hoffmann, History of the German Resistance, 101-105, 118-119, 133-134, 157-158. 87. Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik, 175-180, I 97-201. 88. Hill, "Alternative Politik," in Schmadke and Steinbach, Der Widerstand, 675.

Notes to Pages 83-86

299

89. "Ein Nazidiplomat entwirft die deutsche Verfassung," Aujbau/Reconstruction 14, no. 36, Sept. 3, 1948. Compare Klemperer, German Resistance, 156-157, 166. 90. Theo Kordt (Bonn) to Robert Ulrich (Belgrade), Nov. 16, 1951, ItZG, ED 157 NL Erich and Theodor Kordt, vol. 15. 91. Kurt Wessel, "Restauration?," Stuttgarter Zeitung, May 3, 1949. 92. "Vemehmungsprotokolle" of Schetter's interrogation of Kessel, Oct. 23, 1951, and Nostitz, Oct. 17, 1951, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 4. For the "BlackReichswehr" metaphor, see Joachim Joesten, "The New WilhelmstraBe: West Germany's Foreign Office, 19491952," New Germany Reports 18 (May 1952), 3ff. 93. Conze et al., Das Amt, 362. 94. Neues Deutsch/and, June 24, 1947. 95. Vogel, "Auszugsweise Abschrift aus Aktenvermerk vom 7. November 1947," Nov. 7, 1947, ItZG, ED 117, vol. 59. 96. Pravda, April 1, 1948 (translation ibid.). 97. "Diplomaten ohne Legitimation," lead article in Der Morgen (Berlin), Aug. 11, 1948. On the DBFF's reaction, Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, 175. 98. Manfred Kittel, Die Legende van der "Zweiten Schuld": Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in der ,4.°ra Adenauer (Berlin: Ullstein, 1993), 138; Ministerium fiir Auswartige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Von Ribbentrop zu Adenauer. Eine Dokumentation ilber das Bonner Auswartige Amt (Erfurt: Druckerei Fortschritt, 1961). WilhelmstraBe veterans would also feature centrally in several "brown books" about former Nazis in the FRG, which the GDR would publish during the 1960s. 99. Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, esp. 164 note 164, and 174. 100. Doc. 1469/15a/48, "Extract from Telegram No. l YB 26600. Dated 23rd Sept. 48. CDU Foreign Affairs Committee," BNA, FO 1049/1576. 101. Blankenhom to Holzapfel, Jan. 26, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 278 Holzapfel, vol. 242. 102. Protocol of the meeting in Herford on setting up a CDU foreign policy committee, Jan. 13, 1947, no author, Jan. 15, 1947, ibid.; "Niederschrift Uber die Sitzung des AuBenpolitischen Ausschusses vom 15. Mai in Herford," May 15, 1947, ibid.; Werkmeister to Holzapfel, June 19, 1947, ibid.; Karl-Friedrich von Hahn to Holzapfel, Feb. 11, 1948, with list of British zone Higher Service diplomats (not in file), ibid.; Hahn to Holzapfel, Dec. 28, 1948, on criteria for selection, BA Koblenz, NL 278 Holzapfel, vol. 243; Hahn to Holzapfel, Dec. 30, 1948, on criteria for selection, with enclosure, article in Neue Zilricher Zeitung by "E.S. DUsseldorf," titled "Errichtung deutscher Handelsvertretungen im Ausland?'' Dec. 24, 1948, ibid.; Hahn to Holzapfel, June 2, 1949, with enclosure, list of 67 "especially valuable" diplomats with their addresses, ibid. 103. Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, 32. 104. Lewis J. Edinger, Kurt Schumacher: A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 85ff., 244-251; Jeffrey Herf, "Multiple Restorations: German Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism, 1945-1946," Central European History 26, no. 1 (1993): 21-56, here 30-31. 105. Cited in Piontkowitz, Anfange, 18. 106. Memo by Karl Mommer (DBFF), "Unterhaltungen mit Erwin Schoettle, Dr. Schumacher, Staatsrat Schmid, Uber die Zukunft des Friedensbiiros in Esslingen, am 19. Januar 1948," Jan. 20, 1948, ItZG, ED 117 NL Eberhard, vol. 59; Piontkowitz,

300 Notes to Pages 86-89 Anfiinge, 108-109. 107. On Adenauer's reaction to the SPD's claims, see Herf, "Multiple Restorations," 45-46. 108. Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, 152-164, and Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 109-114. 109. Piontkowitz, Arifiinge, 178-187. 110. Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, 186. 111. Neuer Vorwiirts, Dec. 25, 1948. 112. Gerhard Llitkens, "Die Bourbonen von Frankfurt," SPD-Pressedienst, Feb. 25, 1949. 113. The charges were repeated by the Miinchner Abendzeitung, "Skandal in Frankfurt-Hitlerfreunde im kommenden Ministerium des Auswartigen," March 1, 1949, and Peter Maslowski, "Ribbentrop redivivus," Neue Presse, March 3, 1949. The Abendzeitung on March 7 also ran a defense of Eisenlohr, "Die Debatte um das klinftige 'Auswartiges Amt.' Der Fall Eisenlohr." Eisenlohr defended himself in a Frankfurt press conference on March 11; the four-page transcript is in BA Koblenz, B Z 35, vol. 13, vol. 3, 129-132. See also Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, 185-186. 114. Eberhard to Hermann Brill, March 1, 1949, with enclosure, IfZG, ED 117 NL Eberhard, vol. 116, IX, 1, Foster to Konrad Rodiger, March 8, 1949, IfZG, ED 134 NL Foster, vol. 6. See also Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 185. 115. Ibid., 186. 116. Besides the articles mentioned in note 113, see "Hitlerdiplomaten in der Offensive," Aujbau/Reconstruction (New York), March 18, 1949; Robert de Saint Jean, "Une 'Wilhelmstrasse' secrete elabore deja une politique etrangere allemande," Carrefour, March 30, 1949; Piontkowitz, Anfiinge, 187. 117. Transcript of the plenary debate on March 24 and 25, 1949, in BA Koblenz, B 3, vol. 63, vol. 3, 297-319. 118. Copy, dated April 1949, in IfZG, ED 117 NL Eberhard, vol. 103. 119. "Die sozialdemokratischen Angehorigen des Deutschen Bliros ftir Friedensfragen" (Hartmann, Harkort, Strohm, Pusch, Partsch, and Hillebrand) to the SPD's Executive Committee, Hannover, April 26, 1949, IfZG, ED 117 NL Eberhard, vol. 59. 120. Eisenlohr to Plinder, May 17, 1949, with enclosure, Werner Otto von Hentig to Eisenlohr, May 14, 1949, BAKoblenz, NL 5 Plinder, vol. 254,18-20; RudolfHolzhausen memo on his talks with Llitkens on May 13, 1949, in Frankfurt, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 36. 121. Strohm, "Das Auswartige Amt der Weimarer Republik," PA AA, NL Haas, vol. 37, along with cover letter from Strohm (DBFF) to "Billy" Haas (Bremen), Jan. 7, 1949; Neuer Vorwiirts, Dec. 25, 1948. 122. Hajo Holbom, "Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Weimar Republic," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994 [1953]), 123-171, concluded that this was true during the politically unstable conditions of the early Weimar period. 123. See for example Herwarth to Mohr, April 7, 1949, BA Koblenz, B Z35, vol. 11, vol. 1. 124. Strohm to Posadowsky, April 20, 1949, ibid. Doscher, Das Auswiirtige Amt, 38-50, has commented on Strohm's apologetic intentions. 125. Haas, Beitrag, 27-28.

Notes to Pages 89-90

301

126. Hans von Herwarth, "Der deutsche Diplomat: Ausbildung und Rolle in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart," in Karl Braunias and Gerhard Stourzh, eds., Diplomatie unserer Zeit. Beitrage aus dem Internationalen Diplomaten-Seminar KlejJheim (Graz: Styria, 1959), 227-246, here 240-241. 127. See for example the summary of the public discussion in the DPA's DiplomatenDienst 24 (July 26, 1949), copy in PAAA, NL Etzdorf, vol. 211-1. 128. Editorial, "Wir verlassen die Quarantane," Franlifurter Neue Presse, Aug. 9, 1949. 129. See Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, Office of Political Affairs, Internal Political and Governmental Division, "Daily Political Report No. 3, 26 September 1949 ," NARA, RG 84, US High Commissioner for Germany, General Records, 1949-52, 350-Political Affairs, General, 1949-52, Daily Political Report, summarizing arguments of the Mainz Allgemeine Zeitung. 130. Copies of the plan, "Organisationsplan fiir das deutsche provisorische Auswartiges Amt," 2, with cover letter, "Vorschlag fiir die Errichtung eines provisorischen Auswartigen Amtes zur Einleitung der Auswartigen Beziehungen Deutschlands," in PA AA, NL Haas, vol. 36, and, along with the list of personnel, in BayHStA Mtinchen, NL Anton Pfeiffer, vol. 262. 131. Gilnter Wollenstein, "Rudolf Nadolny-AuBenminister ohne Verwendung," Vierteljahresheftefar Zeitgeschichte 28, no. I (Jan. 1980): 47-96, here 73-74. 132. Holzhausen (Berlin) memo, Jan. 28, 1947, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 36. There is evidence of one meeting between US officials and Nadolny and Dumont on Jan. 16. Holzhausen (Berlin) memo, Jan. 24, 1947, PAAA, NL Haas, vol. 36. 133. Wollenstein, "Rudolf Nadolny," 66-93. 134. Eugen Budde, Gibt es noch eine deutsche Au/Jenpolitik? Betrachtungen zur Politik und Diplomatie eines geschlagenen Staates (Stuttgart: Mittelbach, 1947), 11-13, 34-35,65-68,82-83. 135. Budde to Maltzan, Nov. 27, 1948, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 1863; Budde to Pilnder, Dec. 4, 1948, with enclosures, "Vorschlage fiir die Wiedererrichtung wirtschaftlicher konsularischer Vertretungen im Ausland," Dec. 4, 1948, and Budde's article "Deutsche Konsuln im Ausland," BA Koblenz, B Zl3, vol. 313. The article appeared in the Badische Neuste Nachrichten on Jan. 14, 1949. See also Fries to Budde, Nov. 30, 1948, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol. 1863. For the background on Budde's initiative, see Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion, 179ff. 136. Pilnder to Budde, June 28, 1949, with enclosure from Budde to Pilnder, "Betr.: Konsularische AuBenwirtschaftsvertretungen und Konsulargesetz," June 27, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 278 Holzapfel, vol. 243. 137. Budde to Holzapfel, May 20, 1949, with enclosure on the new federal government's foreign policy tasks, ibid.; note by Holzapfel, June 10, 1949, on his phone conversation with Blankenhorn of the same day, ibid.; Blankenhorn to Holzapfel, June 21, 1949, ibid. 138. See the report by Andre Duchamps (French Consul, Frankfurt a.M.) to SaintHardouin (Baden-Baden), letter no. 49/II, Feb. 26, 1949, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1944-1949, vol. 6, 220-221. 139. Maltzan to former diplomat J. L. Schlemann, Dec. 29, 1948, BA Koblenz, B 102, vol.48, Heft 2; Fritz Sanger to Maltzan, July 13, 1948, ibid.; Maltzan to Sanger, July 30, 1948, ibid. See also former ambassador in Washington and CSU-politician

302 Notes to Pages 91-94 Wilhelm von Prittwitz und Gaffron to Holzapfel, July 30, 1947, BA Koblenz, NL 278 Holzapfel, vol. 242. 140. Etzdorfto Nostitz, May 17, 1949, I, PAAA, NL Nostitz, vol. 6. 141. "Bericht von der 33. Abteilungsleiter-Besprechung im Deutschen Buro ftir Friedensfragen am 27. Mai 1949," May 27, 1949, 2, IfZG, ED 117 NL Eberhard, vol. 59. 142. The plan, "Deutsches Forschungsinstitut ftir Internationale Fragen" (authored by Hasso von Etzdorf), is appendix C to Anton Pfeiffer's Oct. 8, 1949, memo, reprinted in Haas, Beitrag, 116-117. See also Etzdorf's letter to Nostitz, May 17, 1949, I, PA AA, NL Nostitz, vol. 6. 143. Herwarth, Von Adenauer zu Brandt. Erinnerungen (Berlin: Propylaen, 1990), 75-76. 144. Blankenhorn diary entry, Sept. 13, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhorn, vol. 1a, 156. 145. Blankenhorn diary entry, Sept. 17, 1949, ibid., 161. 146. Auswiirtiges Amt, ed., 40 Jahre AujJenpolitik, 20.

4- Foreign Policy without a Foreign Office, 1949-51 I. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann 1952-1967 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1991 ), 245-246. 2. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, 6. Thomas A. Schwartz, Americas Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 299, 391 (note 6), coined "dual containment" of West Germany in order to emphasize the interrelatedness of both halves of the equation. 3. State Department (Acheson) to London (Douglas), tel. TOSIG 33, July 10, 1950, NARA, RG 59, 396.1-ISG/7-l 050. 4. These positions are summarized in the State Department's Office of German and Austrian Affairs, Sept. 14, 1949, memo to Dean Acheson, paper no. 3, NARA, RO 59, 740.00119 Control (Germany), 9-1449. 5. State Department (Acheson) to London (Ambassador Douglas, Chair of US Delegation to International Study Group on Occupation Statute), tel. TOSIG 37, July 14, 1950, NARA, RG 59, 396.l-ISG/7-1450. 6. See, for example, the memo from the State Department's Bureau of German Affairs, Feb. 11, 1950, in FRUS 1950 IV, 597-602. 7. Holmes (London) telegram to Acheson, Sept. 1, 1949, in FRUS 1949 III, 269-271. The final list of organizations included the OEEC, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization (immediately) and the Council of Europe and GATT (association "after due consideration"). Considered inappropriate for the immediate future were NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Association, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Western European Union. Totally inappropriate due to Soviet Bloc presence were the UN, the International Postal Union, the International Telecommunications Union, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, UNESCO, and the World Meteorological Association. Holmes to Acheson, tel. 3650 with handwritten additions, NARA, RG 59, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/9-1149; and Holmes to Acheson, tel. 3678, Sept. 13, 1949, ibid./9-1349.

Notes to Pages 94-96

303

8. Acheson telegram to McCloy (Frankfurt), Sept. 9, 1949, in FRUS 1949 III, 271-272. 9. McCloy (Bonn) telegram to Acheson, Sept. 13, 1949, ibid., 272-275. 10. Blankenhom diary, entry of Sept. 9. 1949, BA Koblenz, NL Blankenhom 351, vol. la, 148. 11. Blankenhom diary, entries of Sept. 16, 17 and 20, 1949, ibid., 159-161, 165. 12. Blankenhom diary entry, Sept. 24, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL Blankenhom 351, vol. 1b, 1; Anton Pfeiffer's memo, "AuBenpolitische Aufgaben und Moglichkeiten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Haas, Beitrag, 101-110. 13. Blankenhom, Verstiindnis, 66. 14. Blankenhom diary entry, Oct. 10, 1949, BAKoblenz, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. lb, 29-31. On Abs, see Lothar Gall, Der Bankier Hermann Josef Abs. Eine Biographie (Munich: Beck, 2004). 15. Blankenhom diary entry, Oct. 22, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. lb, 52-53; Armand Berard, Un ambassadeur se souvient. Tome 2: Washington et Bonn 1945-1955 (Paris: Pion, 1978), 235; Franc;ois-Poncet (Bonn) tel. 396-399 to MAE, Oct. 23, 1949, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1949-1955, vol. 304, 1-2; US HICOG Frankfurt airgram A-585 to Secretary of State, "Daily Political Report" no. 23, Oct. 25, 1949, NARA, RG 84, Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn-General Records 1949-52, 350---Political Affairs, General, 1949-52, Daily Political Report. 16. Translation of"French Memorandum Presented at Meeting of Political Advisors Oct. 26," BNA, FO 371, 76788, Paper C 8498; C. E. Steele (Political Advisor, British High Commission) to P. E. Dean (Department of German Affairs, Foreign Office), Oct. 31, 1949, ibid.; Riddleberger to McCloy, Oct. 26, 1949, NARA, RG 466, McCloy Papers, Classified General Records 1949-52, D (49) 317. 17. AAPBRD 1949-50, 6-7. Blankenhom replied to Berard by referring to Adenauer's previous stance and the creation of a Liaison Office in the Chancellery. Berard's tel. 468-470 to "President de la Republique, President du Conseil, M. Parodi, M. Clappier, M. de Bourbon-Busset," Nov. 1, 1949, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, SousSerie Allemagne 1949-1955, vol. 332, 85-86. 18. Bernard Gufler (Frankfurt) to Perry Laukhuff (State Department), Dec. 20, 1949, NARA, RG 59, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/12-2049. 19. Wolfgang Holscher, ed., Der Auswiirtige Ausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages: Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1953. Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der Politischen Parteien. Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945 13 (Diisseldorf: Droste, 1998): I, 13-20, quote 18. 20. Deutsche Presse-Agenturreport, Nov.7.1949, excerpts in PAAA, B 110, vol. 4. 21. The committee discussed inviting Adenauer to address it at each of its first two meetings on Oct. 14 and 26. Auswiirtiger Ausschu/3 1949-19531, 3-13, here 4, 12-13. 22. Ibid., 18-19; Die Welt, Nov. 5, 1949; Essener Tageblatt, Nov. 5, 1949; WestdeutscheAllgemeine, Nov. 7, 1949. See also Globke's Nov. 9, 1949, memo to Dittmann, BA Koblenz, B 136, vol. 1847, 141.02 Auswartiges Amt vol. 3, 6. Verschiedenes, 202, which stated that Division III of the Chancellery was already considered an independent office [selbststiindige Einrichtung] for administrative purposes. 23. Berard (Bonn) tel. 532/533, Nov. 8, 1949, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1949-1955, vol. 332, 92; Rheinecho, Nov. 9, 1949; Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaflszeitung, Nov. 5, 1949; Der Spiegel, Nov. 10, 1949.

304 Notes to Pages 96-99 24. Die Neue Zeitung, Nov. 7, 1949; Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 7, 1949; Bonner Rundschau, Nov.7.1949; Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 9, 1949; Blankenhom diary entry, Nov. 9. 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. lb, 121122; Blankenhom diary entry, Nov. 12, 1949, ibid., 164. 25. Globke memo to Blankenhom (initialed Nov. 11) and Dittmann (initialed Nov. 10), Nov. 7, 1949, BA Koblenz, B 136, vol. 1847, 141.02 Auswiirtiges Amt vol. 3, 6. Verschiedenes, 201, with alternate budget plans to bring the necessary foreign affairs officials into the Chancellery. 26. Steele to Dean, Oct. 31, 1949 BNA, FO 371/76788, Paper C 8498. 27. Karl-Heinz Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbundeter. Sicherheit, Kontrolle, Souveriinitiit. Studien zur Sozialwissenschaft 95 (Op laden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991 ), 44-52. 28. Acheson (Paris) telegram to Truman and Acting Secretary of State Webb, Nov. 11, 1949, in FRUS 1949 III, 305-306; Acheson telegram to Webb, forwarding "Conclusions of the Tripartite Meeting Held in Paris on November 9 and 10. Directive to the High Commissioners," ibid., 306-308. 29. Meeting of Adenauer and the Allied High Commissioners on Nov. 15, 1949, AAPBRD: Adenauer und die Hohen Kommissare 1949-51, 9-11. 30. Draft text of protocol in FRUS 1949 III, 343-348. 31. AAPBRD 1949-50, 432-437. 32. HICOM Council (signed Robertson) letter AGSEC (50)138 to Adenauer, Jan. 28, 1950, copy in NARA, RG 466, McCloy Papers, Classified General Records 1949-52, D(50)1251d. 33. A copy of the invitation's text is in US HICOG Frankfurt (Riddleberger) tel. 2220 to Secretary of State, Sept. 10, 1949, NARA, RG 59, 740.00119 Control (Germany)/9-1049. HICOM Press Release No. 39, Dec. 15, 1949, copy in NARA, RG 466, McCloy Papers, Classified General Records 1949-52, D(49)455, listed eleven foreign diplomatic missions accredited to the High Commission: Canada, Luxembourg, India, Greece, South Africa, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain. 34. Blankenhom diary entry, April 3, 1950, BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. 3, 128; Blankenhom diary entries for April 5-6, 1950, ibid., 143; Blankenhom memo to Adenauer describing Rizzo's talks with Adenauer on April 6, April 6, 1950, ibid., 150-151; Blankenhom diary entry, May 19, 1950, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. 4, 15; Blankenhom diary entry, Aug. 24, 1950, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. 5, 103. 35. See US HICOG Bonn tel. 25 to US HICOG Frankfurt, Oct. 21, 1950, on the HICOM council meeting from the previous day, NARA, RG 466, McCloy Papers, Classified General Records 1949-52, D( 49)289b. 36. MAE, Sous-Direction d'Europe Centrale (signature illegible) tel. 767-771 to Bonn (copies to London and Washington), Nov. 28, 1949, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-SerieAllemagne 1949-1955, vol. 135, 38-39. 37. MAE tel. 7039 to Washington, copies to London and Madrid, Sept. 11, 1949, ibid., 29, asking French diplomatic representatives in those cities to study the question; Bonnet (Washington) tel. 4310 to MAE, Dec. 8, 1949, ibid., 43; Massigli (London) tel. 3461-3463 to MAE, Dec. 20, 1949, ibid., 62-63. 38. Haussaire (Bonn) tel. 954 to MAE, Dec. 12, 1949, ibid., 45-48; Political Affairs Committee, Allied High Commission, paper POL/P( 49)26, "Recommendations of

Notes to Pages 99-100

305

the Working Party on Foreign Missions Regarding German Consular and Commercial Represenation," Dec. 13, 1949, BNA, FO 1049/1797, 397/75A/49. 39. US HICOG Frankfurt (Gufler) dispatch 130 to Washington, Jan. 27, 1950, with four enclosures, ibid. A copy of the official HICOM report with cover letter AGSEC (50) 223 from HI COM secretary general J.E. Slater to Blankenhom, Feb. 8, 1950, is in PAAA, B 10, vol. 157, 38-42. See also Slater's memo to Hays, "Subject: German Consular and Commercial Representation Abroad," Jan. 25, 1950, NARA, RG 466, McCloy Papers, Classified General Records 1949-52, D (50)178a. West German records of the meeting are inAAPBRD 1949-50, 72-75, andPAAA, B 110, vols. 15 and 17. 40. Adenauer to HICOM acting chair McCloy, May 12, 1950, AAPBRD 1949-50, 150-151. 41. Franc;ois-Poncet (Bonn) tel. 2482-2488 to MAE, May 26, 1950, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-SerieAllemagne 1949-1955, vol. 135, 206-207. 42. MAE, Sous-Direction d'Europe Centrale, tel. 1491 to French HICOG Bonn, May 30, 1950, ibid., 211-212. 43. Franc;ois-Poncet (Bonn) tel. 2555/57 to MAE, June 1, 1950, ibid. 213-214. On the June 2 deliberations of the Political Affairs Committee, Berard (Bonn) tel. 2605 to MAE, June 3, 1950, ibid., 219. See also US ambassador in Paris David Bruce tel. 2712 to State Department, June 6, 1950, RG 466, Records of the Executive Director, SecuritySegregated General Records, 1949-52, 301-Diplomatic and Consular Relations, Germany 1949-52; HICOM Council (signed Frarn;:ois-Poncet) letter AGSEC(50)1189 to Adenauer, June 6, 1950, PAAA, B 10, vol. 157, 74. 44. Adenauer to HICOM (Franc;ois-Poncet), Sept. 14, 1950, ibid., 147; Allied Secretariat General (Handley-Derry) letter AGSEC(50)2260 to Adenauer, Oct. 12, 1950, ibid., 184. 45. Identical letters for each country from Adenauer to HI COM (Kirkpatrick), Jan. 18, 1951, PAAA, B 10, vol. 158, 3-6. 46. McC!oy (Bonn) tel. 509 to State Department, Feb. 3, 1951, RG 466, Records of the Executive Director, Security-Segregated General Records, 1949-52, 30 I-Diplomatic and Consular Relations, Germany; Franc;ois-Poncet (Bonn) tel. 1850/1852 to MAE, March 22, 1951, MAE, Serie Europe 1944-1960, Sous-Serie Allemagne 1949-1955, vol. 137, 101-102; Bonnet (Washington) tel. 1923/27, to MAE, March 6, 1951, ibid.; Acheson (State Department) tel. 92 to US HICOG Bonn, March 23, 1953, RG 466, Records of the Executive Director, Security-Segregated General Records, 1949-52, 301-Diplomatic and Consular Relations, Germany 1949-52; McC!oy (Bonn) tel. 765 to State Department, April 23, 1951, ibid. 47. Acheson (State Department) tel. 100 to US HICOG Bonn, April 6, 1950, RG 466, Records of the Executive Director, Security-Segregated General Records, 194952, 301-Diplomatic and Consular Relations, France 1949-1952; Dittmann memo to Blankenhom, April 2, 1951, PA AA, B 10, vol. 162, 82; Dittmann memo to Blankenhom, May 18, 1951, PAAA, B 10, vol. 158, 48. 48. HICOM Secretariat General (Handley-Derry) letter AGSEC(51) 592 POL to Blankenhom, April 4, 1951, PAAA, B 10, vol. 158, 34; HI COM Secretariat General (G. P. Glain) letter AGSEC(51) 1032 to Blankenhom, June 19, 1951, ibid., 59; AuswiirtigesAmt, ed., 40 Jahre AujJenpolitik, 748-749. 49. See his comments at the meeting of US ambassadors in Rome March 22-24, 1950, FRUS 1950 III, 795-819, here 813-819.

306 Notes to Pages 101-3 50. Schwarz,Die,.fraAdenauer. GrunderjahrederRepublik, 1949-1957. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2 (Stuttgart: DVA, 198 I), 55-57. Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenuaer, the CDUICSU, and the West, 1949-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), discusses the nuances in Adenauer's view of the West. 51. See Werner Weidenfeld, "Konrad Adenauer und die EVG. Eine Studie zum subjektiven Faktor in der Politik," in Hans-Erich Volkmann and Walter Schwengler, eds., Die Europiiische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Stand und Probleme der Forschung (Boppard: Boldt, 1985), 255-270, here 261-262. 52. Josef Foschepoth, ed., Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage. Sammlung Vandenhoeck (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988); Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Adenauer's Ostpolitik," in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979. Westview Special Studies in West European Politics and Society (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 127-144. 53. William I. Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-54 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 117-122. 54. Ludolf Herbst, Option for den Westen. Vom Marshallplan bis zum deutschfranzosischen Vertrag. Deutsche Geschichte der neuesten Zeit vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: DTV, 1989), 11-34. 55. Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbundete, 54--56. 56. Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aujstieg, 776ff On Adenauer's difficult foreign policy situation in early 1950, see ibid., 690-795; Kohler, Adenauer, 583ff.; Herbst, Option, 1134; and Schwartz, Americas Germany, 84--95. 57. Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, Feb. 22, 1950 (which mentions an even earlier use of the term in a West German paper); report of the Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, "Der deutsche auswartige Dienst. Auslandspressestimmen," May 5, 1950, PAAA, B 110, vol. 4, on a story in the Swiss paper TAT from May 4. 58. Adenauer to British journalist John H. Freeman (Times correspondent in Bonn 1949-54), April 27, 1950, in Adenauer, Briefe 1949-1951, 198-199; see also Adenauer, Erinnerungen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart, 1965), 312. 59. Adenauer to the chairman of the Dutch Catholic People's Party and editor-inchief of De Volkskrant, Carl Romme, May 25, 1950, in Adenauer, Briefe 1949-1951, 219; President of the Belgian Chamber of Deputies Frans van Cauwelaert to Adenauer, July 22, 1950, in response to Adenauer's May 23 letter, PAAA, B 10, vol. 157, 98-99. 60. On Boker see the Munzinger-Archiv 18/78-P-13082 (May 6, 1978); Boker to the author, June 24, 1993, in Munich. Boker made a farewell visit to Blankenhom in Bonn on Nov. 8; Blankenhorn diary entry, Nov. 8, 1949, BAKoblenz, NLB!ankenhorn 351, vol. lb, 111. Baker's final report, "Die Politik der Vereinigten Staaten gegentiber Deutschland," Feb. 2, 1950, with cover letter of Feb. 4, is in BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhorn, vol. 3, 68-76. He also made periodic reports before returning; Blankenhorn diary entry, Jan. I, 1950, ibid., 4--5. 61. Kessel's July 31, 1950, report on his visit to the Vatican from July 27-31 in PA AA, B 110, vol. 149. 62. Extensive documentation on Spiecker's trip is in PAAA, B 11, vol. 1184. 63. Wolfgang Stump, "Konrad Adenauer: Reden und Interviews 1945-1953. Zugleich ein Beitrag zu seinem politischen ltinerar," in RudolfMorsey and Konrad Rep gen, Adenauer-Studien III. Untersuchungen und Dokumente zur Ostpolitik und Biographie.

Notes to Pages 103-5

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Veri:iffentlichungen der Kommission fur Zeitgeschichte. Reihe B: Forschungen 15 (Mainz: Matthias-Griinewald-Verlag, 1974), 243-268, here esp. 250-268. 64. David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 54-56. 65. Steering committee meeting of Dec. 7, in Die CDUICSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag: Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1953. Edited by Helga Heidemeyer. Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Vierte Reihe: Deutschland seit 1945 11. Vol. 1/1 and II (Dilsseldorf: Droste, 1998), 121-123, here 122; Steering committee meeting of Dec. 14, ibid., 135-136; CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation meeting of Dec. 8, ibid., 123-131. The faction had complained already on Nov. 10 about not being informed of his interview with the Baltimore Sun; see ibid., 60---61. 66. Raymond Poidevin, Robert Schuman: Homme d'Etat 1886-1963 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1986), 2 l 9ff. 67. Douglas (London) to Acheson (Washington), July 13, 1950, FRUS 1950 IV, 749-751; McCloy (Frankfurt) to Washington, July 15, 1950, ibid., 754-757. 68. CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation's Steering committee meeting on Oct. 18, in CDUICSU-Fraktion 1949-1953, 34-35; CDU/CSU Bundestag delegation meeting on Oct. 19, 1949, ibid., 35-37. 69. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages. Stenographische Berichte, 1. Wahlperiode, Nov. 15, 1949, 397-448; "Summary Report of the Seventeenth Plenary Meeting of the Bundestag on Tuesday, 15 November 1949," Nov. 15, 1949, NARA, RG 466, Records of the Executive Director, Security-Segregated General Records, 1949-52, 362. 70. Blankenhom diary entry, Nov. 23, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. 2, 113-114. 71. Blankenhom diary entry on his meeting with Dayton and Pabsch (UK HICOG), Nov. 25, 1949, ibid., 132; Blankenhom diary entry on his talks with Adenauer and Berard, Nov. 26, 1949, ibid., 178; meeting of the FDP's Executive Committee on Nov. 18-19 1949, in Udo Wengst, ed., FDP-Bundesvorstand. Die Libera/en unter dem Vorsitz van Theodor Heuss und Franz Blucher. Sitzungsprotokolle 1949-1954. Erster Halbband 1.-26. Sitzung 1949-1952. Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Vierte Reihe-Deutschland seit 1945 7/1 (Dilsseldorf: Droste, 1990), 70; Blankenhom diary entry, Nov. 23, 1949, BA Koblenz, NL 351 Blankenhom, vol. 2, 113-114. 72. Auswiirtiger Ausschu/3 1949-1953 I, 32-37; the original protocol with attachments, including a copy of Schmid's Jan. 28, 1950, letter to Adenauer, is in Parlamentsarchiv, AusschuB fur