A Theory of Catholic Education 9781474235716, 9781472581389

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For Bernie, my wonderful wife, thank you for everything.

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Acknowledgements The origin of this book lies in the work I completed as part of my doctoral studies at the Institute of Education, London. There are many people who have played an important role both in helping me to achieve my doctorate and then being able to write this book. There are two whom I need to single out in order to acknowledge my deep gratitude. The first is Professor Michael Hand, who was my sole supervisor throughout my six years of part-time doctoral studies. Michael was an outstanding supervisor who used his skills as a philosopher of education to challenge me and force me to think carefully and critically about my research. At numerous moments he pointed both my thesis and then this book in the right direction. In particular he should be credited with encouraging me to turn to the theologian Karl Rahner for inspiration. I am grateful for all his help and clear guidance. The second person I need to thank is my wife, Bernie. This book owes so much to her complete support, commitment and love. Bernie made it possible for me to carve out all the time that has been needed to both complete the research and prepare this text for publication. Without her by my side it would not have been possible to even embark on, let alone complete it. As in all things she has been by my side helping, encouraging and making it all possible. It is impossible to find the words to thank her enough for all her help and support throughout every stage of writing this book. It is dedicated to Bernie. There are numerous others who have played a significant role in helping me to come to grips with the theory of Catholic education. Some, like my parents Brendan and Eileen, have stood quietly in the background providing love and commitment. Others would include the students and colleagues I have worked with in different Catholic schools over many years. As well as working as a secondary school teacher in Catholic schools I am the product of a Catholic education both as a child and then later as an undergraduate at Heythrop College, London. I am hugely grateful for the education and schooling I received both as a pupil and as a student. However, in formulating the central argument in this book it has often been necessary to draw attention to the shortcomings and deficiencies within the theory of

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Catholic education as it currently stands. This has been done from the firm conviction that a successful way forward can be found towards constructing a more seaworthy and robust theory of Catholic education. I am very gratefully all those who have helped me develop and complete this book, including the practical help provided by Bloomsbury.

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Introduction

This book is about the construction of a theory of Catholic education that is both coherent and defendable. As such it addresses normative questions about the nature and purpose of Catholic education and schooling. It presents and defends an argument about how Catholic theology can be used to inform and guide the development of a robust theory of Catholic education. The starting point of this book is the claim that the theory of Catholic education and schooling as it currently stands is not sufficiently robust. It is argued that this is a serious situation because in the opening decades of the twenty-first century Catholic education faces many threats and concerns. The argument begins by mapping out the difficult situation that Catholic education currently finds itself in. There are a range of external threats, from a critique of faith schools to ongoing concerns about the way Catholic education diminishes autonomy and involves indoctrination, and some significant internal threats. It is these external and internal threats that form the broader context for this book. It will be explained that the force behind many of these threats stem form a number of serious deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education. These deficiencies need to be addressed and repaired in order for the theory of Catholic education to begin responding to or resolving the serious threats it currently faces. The argument in what follows is presented in two interconnected stages. The first stage focuses on establishing the cogency of the claim in the primary premise, about the flaws or deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education as it currently stands. This involves engaging in a critical analysis of the official Catholic Church teachings on Catholic education. These teachings are taken as providing authoritative guidance on what the nature and purpose of Catholic education ought to involve. The attention will be on the cogency of this guidance rather than on the way in which it has been applied in particular countries or regions of the world. The critical analysis of the official Church teaching on education reveals both a conceptual looseness around the meaning of Catholic education and an ambiguous relationship between theology

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and educational theory. There is a presumption that the theory of Catholic education is committed to a confessional approach, in which the nurturing of faith is the fundamental goal. These issues are reflected beyond official Church teachings on education in the writings of leading Catholic thinkers, most notably Newman and Maritain. Both of these thinkers have sought to clarify and defend Catholic education. Newman approached this from a more theological stance, while Maritain used the philosophical framework of NeoThomism to describe the key features of the theory of Catholic education. In differing ways both fall short of providing the theoretical underpinning that is needed to robustly defend Catholic education and schooling. The focus of the second stage of the argument involves moving on from this critical analysis by launching into the more positive task of theory construction. This will be done in the light of the deficiencies and concerns identified during the first stage. It is not a matter of constructing a theory of Catholic education from scratch. Instead this is to characterize theory construction in a way that would resonate with Neurath’s metaphor of a ship which is forced to make repairs while the vessel is on the open sea. In similar ways the theory of Catholic education is one that needs to be repaired and enhanced in continuity with existing theoretical constructions, rather than being completely rebuilt. Catholic education is an ongoing project or tradition that cannot be feasibly rebuilt afresh. The weaknesses and deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education as it currently stands are used to guide where it needs to be repaired or enhanced. Before launching into the first of these stages, attention needs to be given to both the context and some of the more obvious qualifications that underpin the argument and proposals presented in this book. To begin with this is a theoretical argument. This means it does not present empirical surveys, interviews with and observations of the various stake holders involved in Catholic education and schools. However, it ought to be recognized that it is firmly rooted in the experiences of an author who is a secondary school teacher committed to working in Catholic schools. It is this practical experience and insight that has motivated and driven the desire to move forward debates about the theory of Catholic education. The argument in this book is grounded in the firm conviction that the issues at stake need to be approached at the theoretical level rather than in the particularities of specific Catholic schools or practitioners. Instead of this the focus is on Catholic education in more general terms, primarily around the conceptual and theoretical issues at stake. However, the intention is to consider these theoretical issues in relation to their practical

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Introduction

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ramifications for the curriculum that ought to operate in Catholic schools. It should be recognized that the author’s practical experience will inevitably be reflected in the context of this work. More generally Catholic education and schooling in the twenty-first century is the primary context. Within this broad context, references will be made to Catholic education in the United Kingdom and to educational policy as it relates to England and Wales in particular. However, the implications for the theory of Catholic education in other regions of the world will quickly become apparent.

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Testing Times for Catholic Education

Introduction This chapter sets out why Catholic education stands in need of a robust theory of education. It challenges assumptions about the current healthy state of Catholic education in countries such as the United Kingdom. It will explain that Catholic education is facing a range of threats and tensions. These threats are both external, from those who challenge the legitimacy of all faith schools, and internal, from within Catholic theology and reflection. These threats and tensions converge on philosophical questions about the justification, aims and purpose of Catholic education and schooling. This chapter presents an argument that demonstrates that there is a contemporary need for a defensible and coherent theory of Catholic education that is robust enough to begin responding to both the internal and external threats currently facing Catholic education and schooling. This is crucial ground clearing for presenting the argument that will be developed in subsequent chapters. The disquieting claim that grounds this argument is that Catholic education lacks precisely what it most urgently needs – a robust theory of education.

The global reality of Catholic education It is important to begin with the fact that Catholic education is a global reality and enterprise. As Grace pointed out: The Catholic schooling system is probably the largest faith-based educational provision internationally, involving about 120,000 Catholic schools serving almost 50 million students in a wide range of socio-economic, political and cultural settings worldwide. (Grace, 2003, p. 151)

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For example, within the United Kingdom nearly 10 per cent of children are educated within Catholic schools. These schools are integrated in the state provision and provide a Catholic education that runs from the ‘cradle to the grave’. Catholic educational provision runs from preschool education through to the full range of secondary schools and post-sixteen Further Education colleges. It is an uncontroversial fact that the Catholic Church has been an important educational provider in many countries. It has been committed to education often prior to state involvement in the universal provision of education (Elias, 2002). In some countries the establishment of Catholic schools was seen as a more important priority for the life of the Catholic Church than the foundation and building of churches. One classic historical example of this was the declaration of the first synod of the province of Westminster diocese in 1850 that stated, We prefer the foundation of good schools to every other work (including the building of parish churches). (Quoted in Arthur, 1995, p. 15)

Establishing and maintaining this system of Catholic educational provision has involved a huge investment of human and financial resources on the part of the Catholic Church. In some countries such as France, state funding for Catholic schools covers only the costs of teachers’ wages. In the United Kingdom Catholic schools now receive almost all of their funding from central government, apart from any capital expenditure. Ninety per cent of this is covered by central government and the remaining part has to be made up from the Catholic community. Even this small percentage represents a sizable financial burden for this community. The partnership introduced in the Butler Education Act (1944) allowed the Catholic bishops to opt for ‘Voluntary Aided’ rather than simply ‘Voluntary Controlled’ schools. The bishops opted for the more expensive status because they wanted to maintain more direct responsibility for and control of Catholic schools throughout the United Kingdom. This practical commitment is an indicator that having Catholic schools has been, and continues to be, important to the ongoing life of the Catholic Church. In many countries, including the United Kingdom, the Catholic Church has been an important partner in facilitating and enabling universal state education to come into existence. It played an important role in educating and helping to assimilate poor immigrant Irish workers throughout the nineteenth century (Hornsby-Smith, 1978). There is here an ongoing commitment to Catholic education that is more than simply historical or the result of some practical need.

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The effectiveness of Catholic education It is important to recognize a large body of evidence that indicates that Catholic education is highly effective. Over 40 years ago in the United States, Greeley and Rossi (1966) first demonstrated positive connections between Catholic schooling and academic achievement. In subsequent decades sociologists and economists undertook further studies into Catholic schools in the United States and found positive results. As Arthur points out, they found three things: First, on average, Catholic schools were more educationally effective than public schools. Second, Catholic schools were especially beneficial to students from less advantaged backgrounds. Third, there were strong indications that higher levels of discipline and academic demands accounted in a large part for the success of these schools. (Arthur, 2005, p. 149)

Bryk and Lee (1993) published further research into the effectiveness of Catholic schools in the United States that pointed to what could be loosely called a ‘Catholic school effect’. They defended the thesis that pupils in Catholic schools do better because their schools are better. They were better in terms of teacher expectations, discipline and the emphasis on belonging to a community. Studies in other countries, ranging from New Zealand to the United Kingdom, have also indicated that Catholic schools are effective at improving pupil attainment. For example Morris, who has repeatedly analysed Catholic schools in England in terms of Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) inspection reports and public examination results has argued in support of a positive Catholic school effect on pupil progress and attainment. For example in his scrutiny of the achievements of pupils receiving ‘free school meals’ (an indicator of social deprivation) Morris maintained that The findings suggest that Catholic schools perform favourably on the national benchmarks favoured by the Government. They seem to be more effective than others having similar socio-economic pupil profiles and their academic productivity seems to become more evident the greater the level of deprivation. (Morris, 2005, p. 326)

In the United Kingdom Catholic schools regularly receive good or outstanding OFSTED inspection judgements and many of the top-performing state schools are Catholic ones (Morris, 2008). When this is coupled with the findings of school effectiveness research, the result reinforces the perception, at least among parents and the popular press, that Catholic schools are highly effective. Catholic

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schools are often heavily oversubscribed and many non-Catholic parents apply for their children to attend these schools. In response, the growing popularity of Catholic schools among parents during the 1980s and 1990s and the greater emphasis on parental choice led to an increased appreciation of Catholic schools from the UK government. The ‘New Labour’ government that came to power under Tony Blair in 1997 heralded a new highly positive situation for Catholic education in the United Kingdom. Not only did Prime Minister Blair give a personal endorsement to the quality of Catholic education by sending his own children to Catholic secondary schools, but his government’s policy also promoted faith schools. His Education Secretary (David Blunkett) repeatedly spoke of wanting to ‘bottle’ the special qualities that faith schools had. The White Paper Schools Achieving Success (2001) was a policy document that intended to go some way towards bottling or replicating it. The plan was to significantly increase the number of faith schools by moving beyond the three faiths already represented (Anglican, Jewish and Catholic). In widening the ‘faith school franchise’ the intention was to model the good practice found particularly in Catholic schools. At the start of the twenty-first century it was easy to pick up the impression that Catholic education was basking in a ‘golden age’, at least in the United Kingdom. Not only did it continue to exist as a global network but also in most countries it was judged to be highly effective in terms of improving student progress and achievement. Catholic schools are routinely oversubscribed and parents, including many non-Catholic ones, aspired to get their children into them. Moreover, governments, like the UK one, were seeking to emulate their good practice through increasing the number of faith schools.

The danger of first impressions A truism of human experience is that our first impressions will often be wrong or seriously misinformed. If there was a golden age for faith schools it was short lived. Even in the year that Schools Achieving Success (2001) was published the attitudes to faith schools began to change in a negative way. A catalogue of events happened throughout 2001 that profoundly altered perceptions of faith schools, even well-established and effective Catholic ones. As Judge observed: Occasionally, the often placid meanderings of educational policy collide with the tragic events in world history. (Judge, 2001, p. 472)

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A number of events coalesced – or collided – that brought to the fore the possible negative effects of all faith schools. First, the Ousley Report (2001) and the Cantle Report (2001) into the rioting and social unrest in northern cities in England during the summer of 2001 pointed to deep social divisions. This was reflected in the segregation and lack of cultural and racial intermixing in local schools. The Cantle Report called for schools to play a key part in overcoming ethnic and religious divisions in the local area. Second, there was sectarian violence in Northern Ireland directed at primary school children as they and their parents walked to school. For several weeks daily news reports repeatedly showed groups of ‘Protestants’ or ‘Loyalists’ throwing stones and hurling abuse at young children as they made their way to and from their Catholic primary school. The social division in this event was shown to be directly related to faith schools. A third event was the shocking terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. That such violence was connected with religious beliefs was hugely disconcerting and it demonstrated in a graphic way that religious faith might have some very sinister implications for society. Of course one of the reasons for wanting to ‘bottle’ the special qualities of faith schools was the assumption that religion was a positive or at least benign feature of human life. The events both within the United Kingdom and on a global scale were causing a fundamental reappraisal in the way religious belief is viewed and evaluated. Both in the popular press and within political discussion there was a renewed and more critical debate about what ought to be the place of religion and faith. This was the beginning of a renewed debate about faith schools that was at odds with the proposed expansion contained in government policy about education and schooling. There was, as Burntwood observed, a change in perspective: By the end of 2001, government ministers and their advisors were qualifying their support for faith schools with an insistence on admissions policies that encouraged pupil diversity. (Burntwood, 2002, p. 241)

In fact this call for changes in school admissions policies was a sign of shifting attitudes to all faith schools. Initially it was proposed that both new and existing faith schools in the United Kingdom were to be required to have a minimum quota of 25 per cent of pupils not from the sponsoring faith community. For Catholic schools this proposal was seen as potentially very threatening. Although it was permissible to have up to 10 per cent of pupils in a Catholic school that were not Catholics, even this percentage

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was regarded as far from ideal. Changing this from something permissible (depending on local circumstances) to making it mandatory, and increasing the percentage so significantly would have been to alter the terms and assumptions of the 1944 Butler Education Act. This act presumed that Voluntary Aided schools, like Catholic ones – were primarily for the members of the Catholic community. Naturally there was a huge outcry from faith schools and religious leaders, and after some lobbying the proposal to impose a minimum quota on existing faith schools was dropped. However, it has remained an element of education policy in the rules surrounding Free Schools. These are schools that can be set up free from Local Authority control and which can reflect the preferences of parents. In Free Schools the quota is currently set at 50 per cent. For advocates of Catholic schools the imposition of a minimum quota was taken as something which was both unfair and detrimental to their ethos. It brought to the foreground the issue of school admissions policies and cast the practice of Catholic schools in a negative light. This was coupled with a wider reform of school admissions policies that was taking place as part of the Blair government education policy. This reform prohibited the use of interviews as part of the admissions process. Many oversubscribed faith schools, in particular Catholic ones, used these interviews as a way of ensuring that places were offered to pupils and their parents who were committed Catholics. This new policy tacitly resulted in calling the admissions procedures of Catholic schools into question as covert and suspect practices. In the wake of changes to the government in the United Kingdom, education policy since 2001 has continued to reflect a more cautious approach to faith schools. An increasing number of Catholic schools have taken up the opportunity to become academies, rather than be under Local Authority auspices as Voluntary Aided schools. However, the policy of encouraging schools to become academies is wrapped up with reducing the importance of Local Education Authorities and funding issues rather than enhancing the provision of faith schools. A closer analysis of the situation in the opening decades of the twentyfirst century indicates that Catholic education is not actually basking in a golden age. In reality the situation is more complex in that any support for Catholic education and schooling has to be counter balanced by some significant issues and concerns that call into question its legitimacy. One helpful way of characterizing these concerns is to classify them into external and internal threats and issues. For not only has there been a reappraisal of

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the place of religion and faith as a good in human society, but there is also a range of concerns that Catholics themselves have been pondering about the nature and purpose of Catholic education. By spelling out these external and internal threats to Catholic education, it becomes easier to appreciate the full extent of the testing times that Catholic education is currently facing.

External threats currently facing Catholic education The range of external threats currently facing Catholic education can be plotted out into five sets of concerns and arguments. Each of these sets of external threats will now be considered and placed into the context of recent UK education policies, initiatives and debates.

1. Catholic education: A threat to social cohesion? Since the events of 2001 it has become increasingly common to hear the charge that all faith schools are a threat to present and future social cohesion. Within newspapers and pamphlets (such as the 2001 British Humanist Association critique of faith schools) the alleged threat to social cohesion has been repeatedly made. The key claim is that educating children by dividing them up into members of faith groups (or non-members) is to draw attention to social divisions and differences in society. There is a fear that expanding the number of faith schools is harmful to society because, it provokes the kinds of question raised by, for example, Parker-Jenkins: Moreover, will the development of faith-based schools lead to greater social disharmony, reinforce gender stereotyping and provide opportunity for the promotion of narrow religious doctrines? (Parker-Jenkins, 2005, p. 1)

The issue here pivots around the negative connotations in ‘dividing’ pupils along religious-cultural lines. The claim is that this is detrimental to having a harmonious society because it perpetuates and reinforces already existing divisions in society. Religious differences have often had the effect of polarizing opinions and communities. The fear is that if children from different religious and ethnic groups do not learn to mix with each other, they will miss out on important goods in life (like learning to tolerate and respect religious diversity) so there is a danger that any existing social divisions will simply be replicated (rather than eradicated) in future generations.

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It is important not to underestimate the force of claiming that all faith schools, even Catholic ones, threaten social cohesion. This is accurately spelt out by Halstead and McLaughlin in their observation that The charge of divisiveness is particularly damaging to faith schools because it alleges a tangible evil which effects society as a whole. (Halstead and McLaughlin, 2005, p. 61)

It amounts to a claim that faith schools are contrary to the common good of society. In terms of Catholic education this is a startling claim, one which is the complete opposite to what advocates of Catholic education maintain.

2. Catholic education should be recognized as a threat to the ideals of common schooling and comprehensive education Although closely connected with concerns about threatening social cohesion, this second threat operates at a more conceptual level. It amounts to a claim that Catholic education is inimical with or fundamentally at odds with the ideals of common schooling. The common school was a central theme throughout the writings of Dewey. It linked with his arguments about what it means to be an educated person and the way that education is linked with democracy. As Dewey explained: The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated . . . but there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of government: it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint and communicated experience. (Dewey, 1978, p. 93)

Education needs to take place in the common school – a school that is mixed in terms of gender and religio-ethnic composition. It ought to be the local neighbourhood school where all children, regardless of their class, race, gender, religion and wider culture could be educated together and in so doing, they would learn how to live together in a democracy when they become the future generation. The common school has further benefits, as Pring explains, More positively, the intermingling of those differences in the community of the school would be seen as an enrichment of those very differences. (Pring, 2008, p. 1)

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This is all part of what is often referred to as the ‘social function’ of schooling (Dewey, 1978). This function is about securing and guiding the development of the next generation of society. The common school expresses the need for providing a shared experience of community and culture, and this is part of good citizenship education. This has been helpfully expressed by Levinson who noted that common schools stand as Public symbols of our civic commitment to diversity, mutual respect, common humanity, social justice, equality and solidarity. (Levinson, 2002, p. 134)

In effect the common school symbolizes the common humanity (Halstead, 2008) and the equal rights that children should enjoy in their educational provision. When it comes to Catholic education, and all faith schools, the educational ideals behind common schools would appear to be challenged. Given that the primary focus of Catholic education is to serve the needs of the Catholic community, in effect this is to cut across the symbolic nature of common schools by educating a separate section of the community. Moreover Catholic schools can be shown to have a distorting effect on other schools in the area. As Allen and Vignoles report, [I]f 25 per cent of pupils attend a VA faith school in an area this is associated with a 20 percentage point increase in the proportion of pupils not at their nearest school. (Allen and Vignoles, 2009, p. 7)

It is worth noting Pring’s observation that, The arguments for the common school are based on a particular understanding of the aim of education, namely that education aims to create a more cohesive and enriching community, shaped by a common culture, from which all benefit, whatsoever the cultural background from which the learners come. (Pring, 2008, p. 17)

At stake here is the claim that having separate Catholic schools is incompatible with an educational theory that gives central place to the common school. Matters are made more complex when it is insisted that the only justifiable form of school in a liberal state is the common school and that this kind of school needs to be liberal. This casts doubt on whether a Catholic school can really be compatible with the ideals of the common school. This is a more subtle but significant external threat currently facing Catholic education. At a fundamental level it challenges the educational legitimacy of having this kind of schooling. If the ideal type of school is the common school then this means that Catholic ones fall short in some significant or essential way.

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3. Catholic schools: Evidence about their ineffectiveness The third threat is from those who would challenge and reject the claims that Catholic education is more effective than other similar types of education and schooling. The data, referred to above, supporting the positive appraisal of the effectiveness of Catholic schools especially in the United States has been seriously challenged. If the evidence about the relative effectiveness of urban Catholic schools is called into question then this is potentially threatening to one of the popular ways of justifying Catholic education. Both at the popular level and among educational researchers there has been an increased questioning of the alleged ‘Catholic school effect’. While it is true in the United Kingdom that Catholic schools tend to achieve good academic results, the question has been asked about what this really proves about Catholic schools. As Schagen and Schagen explain, The crucial question is whether these good results mean that faith schools are particularly effective, or whether they merely reflect a more select, privileged intake. (Schagen and Schagen, 2005, p. 202)

This is an area where there needs to be careful analysis of the available data from the records of pupil achievement in public examinations. The analysis by Schagen and Schagen (2002) revealed some interesting results. For example, there is a difference at General Certificate in Secondary Education (GCSE) age with pupils at Catholic schools achieving better results, but at other stages there are negative results compared with other schools. This led them to maintain that We must therefore say that overall, RC schools do not seem to perform better or worse than non-religious schools. (Schagen and Schagen, 2002, p. 210)

They concluded by suggesting a further hypothesis (p. 211) that would explain any positive ‘faith school effect’ which pointed to the importance of community identity and to the sense that parents have of working with their local faith school. The attitude of parents to the school and the shared values could be the determining factor. It is also worth noting that even advocates of a ‘Catholic school effect’ actually draw cautious conclusions and recognize the limitations of studies into Catholic school effectiveness (Arthur, 2005). Grace (2002) acknowledges that the research into Catholic schooling is remarkably underdeveloped. Allen and Vignoles (2009) have argued that initial studies into the effectiveness of Catholic schools were flawed. They point out that, However, early studies did not account for the selection bias that results from factors effecting the probability of attending a Catholic school (such as religious

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affiliation and income) also directly entering the education production function. (Allan and Vignoles, 2009, p. 5)

This is an area that stands in need of further empirical study. It is possible that further study and analysis will reveal that Catholic schools are not more effective than other types of schooling. At the very least, the question of whether Catholic education is more effective than other similar types of education has now become a disputed one.

4. The political challenges to Catholic schooling A fourth external threat comes from the political challenges to all faith-based involvement in state education. At a superficial level these concerns are often couched in terms of taxation policies (Judge, 2001) and raised in the old slogan about having to pay for ‘Rome on the rates’. The political challenge is brought into focus by the question Pring raises: Why should all taxpayers pay taxes to nurture such religious beliefs in young people? (Pring, 2006, p. 179)

It is important to recognize that the real issue here is a fundamental political question about what ought to be the relationship between the state and religion. Relationships between states and religion have often been fraught with difficulties. As Galston (2003) helpfully explains there are three main ways of depicting this relationship. The first would be theocracies where one religion is central to politics, and these can be contrasted with the second – civic republics – that have one preferred religion (and within that, one denomination) which is used to meet civic ends. The third way of depicting the relationship is that found within liberal constitutional democracies, where there is a plurality of religions and a separation between politics and religion. As Galston observes, Many different religions are allowed to operate more or less freely, state power and purpose enjoy substantial autonomy from any particular religion. (Galston, 2003, p. 412)

Obvious examples of liberal constitutional democracies would be the United States and France. In these countries there is a strict separation between the state and religion and this has a direct bearing on educational provision. In the United States, for example, there can be no direct state funding for faith schools. These schools must operate in the private sector. In other countries such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, where there has been some degree of partnership

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between the state and the Catholic Church in providing state education, there have been increasing calls to emulate the approach of the United States. One important reason for this is based on an argument for the state to be neutral on matters of religion. The state is agnostic about matters of God and religion. Citizens are free to make choices about whether or not to belong to a religion. It is in effect a private matter. This has an educational impact because the state is faced with two options. The first is to provide support for all religions to be involved in providing state education. The second is to refuse to support or to allow any religion to be involved in providing state education. Increasingly, given the wide range of different religions and subsets of denominations within them it has been argued that it would be almost impossible and financially difficult to go with the first option. In fairness then, the state ought to show its neutrality by refusing to support any faith schools. This can be used as an argument against allowing Catholic schooling to continue to be a provider to state education in countries like the United Kingdom. This political threat to Catholic education has a further caveat. This is because the issue of the relationship between the state and religion brings into focus tensions about parental rights. As Galston explains: Also characteristic of liberal constitutional democracies is a substantial though contested sphere of parental authority to make educational choices for one’s own children. (Galston, 2003, p. 412)

Traditionally it has been argued that parents have a right to bring up their children within their religion. This parental authority and right has been seriously challenged and called into question (Callan, 1985, 2000, 2002; Hand, 2009; and White, 1982, 1992, 2003). A denial of this right amounts to a further significant political threat to Catholic education.

5. The indoctrination/autonomy challenge The final set of external threats to Catholic education comes from a range of arguments developed by many liberal philosophers of education. These call into question the legitimacy of all faith schools because in important regards they clash with the aims and purposes of education. These arguments are not new and they pivot around the concepts of autonomy and indoctrination. In the writings of Wilson (1967), R. S. Peters (1970), White (1982) and Hirst (1974), major concerns were raised about the relationship between religious

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(Christian) education, indoctrination and the need to educate children to be autonomous. These ongoing concerns about faith-based education continue to be raised and given contemporary expression. When taken together these can be judged as more powerful arguments (Pring, 2006) against the concept and practice of having separate Catholic (faith) schools. This is because if these arguments hold up it means that Catholic schools are incompatible with the central aims of education. Among these liberal philosophers of education, ‘autonomy’ is regarded a central goal of education. In the 30 years since the appearance of Dearden’s paper, autonomy has been elevated by many to the status of the primary and coordinating aim of all educational endeavour. It has been the central theme of some of the most well-regarded works in philosophy of education in recent years (Callan, 1988, 1997; White, 1990; Levinson, 1999; Brighouse, 2002). It is included in the new statement of aims for the school curriculum in England and Wales, which requires schools to ‘develop pupils’ integrity and autonomy and help them to be responsible and caring citizens capable of contributing to the development of a just society’. (Hand, 2006, p. 535)

Personal autonomy requires that children and young adults learn how to question and challenge traditional sources of knowledge and authority. Adults who have successfully developed personal autonomy are able to use rational arguments and principles to weigh up choices and decisions, without being unduly influenced by external sources of authority or irrational considerations. Religious beliefs are often characterized as ‘non-rational’ or even as irrational. Moreover, autonomy is often associated with the concept of democracy because of its integral association with making choices. It can be argued that a fundamental part of being able to participate in a liberal democracy is being able to make autonomous choices, not least about who should govern. Autonomy hinges both on what is taught and how it is taught. Autonomy is typically associated with being able to lead a flourishing life. Some philosophers of education (Callan, 1997; White, 1990) argue that faith schools (including Catholic ones) with their heavy emphasis on faith development would find it difficult to promote personal autonomy. Part of being autonomous is having the capacity to critically evaluate one’s own beliefs and it is this which is difficult for faith schools to achieve. Moreover, closely coupled with the charge that Catholic education stifles or hinders personal autonomy

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is the equally threatening accusation that it cannot be a truly broad education. This is because, as Pring points out, The development of the mind and thinking through the nurturing of a particular ideological view of the world is seen as indoctrination. (Pring, 2006, p. 180)

To raise even the accusation of indoctrination is deeply damaging to Catholic education. In its ordinary usage this is normally taken to be a highly negative concept that involves closing the mind of the child. To be indoctrinated is normally taken to be the antithesis of being properly educated. Indoctrination involves acquiring beliefs in non-rational ways whereas education involves acquiring them through rational ways. If Catholic schools, as faith schools, involve indoctrination then this amounts to a major philosophical objection to their existence. In effect it is to deny that genuine education takes place in Catholic schools because their intention is to indoctrinate pupils. These philosophical objections to faith schooling have also been given some popular expression in recent years. An obvious example would be Dawkins, whose best selling work The God Delusion (2006), highlights the danger of labelling children as ‘Catholic’ or ‘Hindu’. A striking analogy is drawn with labelling children as a ‘Labour’ or ‘Conservative’ child. Such political labels for children would be considered highly odd and harmful. Children need to discover their own political perspectives and the same should go for their religious beliefs. Dawkins used the graphic language of child abuse to hammer home his concerns with faith schools. He maintains It’s time to question the abuse of childhood innocence with superstitious ideas of hellfire and damnation. Isn’t it weird the way we automatically label a tiny child with its parents’ religion? (Dawkins, 2006, p. 98)

Using less graphic language a similar argument has been developed about the rights of children not to receive a religious upbringing. This is a challenging line of argument that subverts the standard defence of faith schools that they should be allowed to exist in order to support the right of parents who want to bring up their children as religious. Marples (2005) has drawn attention to the distinctions between parental rights and the rights of children. A key consideration is the child’s right to an open future Those who would frustrate, either intentionally or unwittingly, a child’s capacity for independent thought, are denying the child a right to flourish. (Marples, 2005, p. 137)

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In effect, this is to argue that faith schools seriously damage the child’s rights not to be indoctrinated or to have their autonomy hindered. The rights of the child need to be set in balance with the desire and the purported rights of their parents. Up to this point the attention has been on the five principal sets of external threats and challenges facing Catholic education. Behind all these external threats lie a number of fundamental questions about the justification and purpose of Catholic education. The difficulty of responding to these threats and challenges is compounded by the fact that there are also a significant number of internal ones. Attention will now shift to outlining these and in the course of this discussion it will become evident that similar fundamental concerns about the aims of Catholic education are bubbling beneath the surface of these issues.

Internal threats currently facing Catholic education The range of internal threats currently facing Catholic education can be plotted out into three sets of concerns or issues. Each of these internal threats and tensions will now be considered and set against their wider context.

1. Tensions caused by changes in Catholic theology Although it is now over 50 years since the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), it is imperative to appreciate that it inaugurated major changes in theology and pastoral practice within the life of the Catholic Church. According to the theologian and eminent church historian Alberigo, Vatican II has rightly been described as the most important event in the history of the Roman Catholic Church since the Protestant Reformation. (Alberigo, 1987, p. vii)

This council’s legacy was not simply in the 16 principle documents that were promulgated but also in updating the self-understanding of the Catholic Church and how it wanted to relate to all human beings. Prior to Vatican II the stereotypical way of describing the Catholic Church was as an inward looking defensive community that emphasized papal authority and the external practice of the Catholic ritual and faith. After Vatican II standard theological discourse depicts a paradigm shift to an outward looking community that emphasized community and communion (Dulles, 1974; Kasper, 1989). The

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Church recognized that it had a global role to play in serving humanity and being a unifying presence in the world. This was summed up in the two central documents Lumen Gentium (1964) and Gaudium et Spes (1965). The latter has the full title of The Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World. This document explains that the Catholic Church seeks to be at one with the hopes and fears of all human beings and that it exists in order to serve humanity, in particular the poor and needy. In theological terms the Church is described as having made a ‘fundamental option for the poor’ through the events of Vatican II. This paradigm shift in ecclesiology and pastoral practice has brought with it many tensions and difficulties for the internal life of the Catholic Church, and these have a bearing on educational issues (McDonough, 2012). There are two facets to these tensions. First, at the general level there continue to be some Catholics who are unhappy with the changes inaugurated at Vatican II and they would want to educate young people to be aware of these problems. This is to bring to bear on Catholic education internal church politics between conservatives and liberals, and traditionalists and progressives. The second facet is the problem of implementing this paradigm shift into both general Catholic self-understanding and educational practice in Catholic schools. This is a complex activity because prior to Vatican II it was relatively easy to spell out what it meant to be Catholic. The emphasis was, as noted above, focused on the formal membership of the Church and participation in the external rites and rituals of the Catholic Church. Carefully following rules and the customs of Catholic devotion, and deferring to papal authority were defining characteristics of being a Catholic. After Vatican II, describing what being Catholic involves became more fluid. It was clearly not to be just identified with the external practice of Catholic ritual and culture. It came down to being a certain kind of person, with the emphasis on who you are rather than on what you are or do. A lived-out commitment to the poor and needy became a defining feature of being a Catholic. The effect of this would suggest that Catholic education is something more nebulous and perhaps much more akin to a kind of ‘character education’. All this means that Catholic education has to be understood in relation to the tensions and changes rooted in Vatican II. How this significant Church council has been received and implemented is a matter of ongoing debate and this has an effect on Catholic education. These shifts in theology and pastoral practices inaugurated at Vatican II were far from superficial theological minutia. There were many deeply practical

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implications that have had a lasting effect on Catholic education. Perhaps the most obvious illustration is provided by the changing role played in Catholic education by members of religious orders. In the decades immediately after Vatican II, large numbers of people who belonged to these religious orders left them to return to being lay members of the Church. In addition, the superiors of these religious orders drew inspiration from the proceedings of Vatican II to reappraise their order’s charism and to refocus their apostolic work. As a result of this reappraisal many religious orders ceased to be directly involved in Catholic education and in the running of Catholic schools. Teachers and principles who had been members of religious orders were replaced by lay Catholics. On the one hand this can be seen as embodying key elements of Vatican II about full lay participation in every aspect of the Church’s life. However, on the other hand it has triggered questions and ongoing concerns about Catholic identity. Some sociological researchers like O’Keefe have repeatedly drawn attention to this issue (1996, 1999; and Grace and O’Keefe, 2007) and it is a feature in both Arthur’s (1995) and Grace’s (2002) analysis. Put in basic terms, prior to Vatican II there was little need to question the Catholic identity of schools that were composed of teachers and principles who were nuns, brothers or priests. However, as the physical presence of religious orders in Catholic schools declined, this raises concerns about its effect on Catholic education. Behind this issue are more substantive questions about the relationship between theology and education, and about the ambiguity over the concept of Catholic education. In the decades after Vatican II, the issue of Catholic identity and the distinctive nature of Catholic schools has become a cause for concern for the Catholic faith community. Works by Arthur (1995), McLaughlin (1996, 1998), Groome (1998), Conroy (1999), Sullivan (2001), Grace (2002), Hayes and Gearon (2002), Miller (2007), McKinney (2011) and McDonough (2012) reflect this by attempting to articulate what are or should be the distinctive characteristics of Catholic education and schooling. This plethora of differing articulations reflects the fact that this is a contested issue. At the heart of this is an ambiguity in the meaning of Catholic education, in that it can be taken to refer the formation of someone as a Catholic and to a distinct theory or approach to education. These issues of distinctiveness and identity, both at the general theological level and within the applied theological context of Catholic education and schooling, amount to a major internal tension or threat that affects Catholic education.

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2. The problem of declining Catholic practice An analysis of social trends by sociologists like Hornsby-Smith (1978, 1999, 2009) has shown that increasingly Catholics in the United Kingdom are assimilating with and mirroring the wider social patterns of the rest of society. The practice of Catholics in a range of activities can be shown to be broadly similar to other members of society. Hence, just as church attendance has declined across the whole of society in the United Kingdom, the pattern has been a similar, although slower one, for Catholics. On issues such as cohabitation prior to marriage, there is little if any difference between the practice of members of the Catholic community and the practice of the rest of society. This is against the context of the majority of Catholics having attended Catholic schools either in Ireland or in the United Kingdom. This has fuelled a deep-seated concern that in some respects Catholic education and schooling appears to be failing to yield young people who want to practice their Catholic faith after they have left fulltime (Catholic) education. Whilst there are (to date) no longitudinal studies that track the correlation between attendance at Catholic schools and regular church attendance, there are some widely held perceptions about the declining levels of practise among younger Catholics. Taking the United Kingdom as an example, it is possible to cite the widespread existence of Catholic schools that serve the majority of the Catholic community, and yet regular church attendance has continued to decline over the past four decades. Moreover it appears to be that the greatest level of decline is among the younger age groups. There is here the basis for another significant internal threat to Catholic education. Catholic schools appear not to be able to yield young people who will practise their faith in adult life. There is an anomaly here. Attention has already been drawn to the positive data about the enhanced attainment and progress of pupils at Catholic schools. In terms of inspection reports and examination league tables Catholic schools can be judged to be effective (Morris, 2012). In addition research into pupil attitudes towards their Catholic schooling has been positive (e.g. Manghan, 2005). It could be reasonably argued that Catholic schools are popular with parents and pupils, and are successful in terms of supporting pupil progress. Yet they yield adults who are not much more likely to continue with Catholic practise than those who attended non-Catholic schools. There would appear to be a dissonance between Catholic practise and having had a Catholic education and schooling.

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3. Uncertainty about what is the purpose of Catholic education Given that Catholic education has not been good at producing young people who practise their faith, there has been some serious soul searching among Catholics about what is or should be the purpose of a Catholic education. One response has been to question the adequacy or quality of Catholic education. A prime example of this was Arthur’s often polemical text The Ebbing Tide: The Policies and Principles of Catholic Education (1995). This work opens with the observation that Many Catholics, both clerical and lay, are deeply concerned about the direction that Catholic schools have taken and have been increasingly asking for a redirection of educational effort from children to adults. In short, they believe that Catholic schools have lost their way and feel that whilst it may be too late to reform them it is not too late to disestablish them. (Arthur, 1995, p. 1)

The central argument in Arthur’s analysis is that there has been a shift in the approach of Catholic secondary education. It has moved from being concerned with the transmission of Catholic religious and liturgical culture, which he termed the holistic model, to a dualistic or pluralistic model. In this model the religious and secular elements of education are separated, and this results in making the school ethos something additional to the secular curriculum. Arthur finds the newer approach seriously wanting and suggests it is this that is causing the Catholic school to be ineffective. A second response has been to draw attention to the extremely difficult situation that Catholic education finds itself in because of explicit government policies to create a market place within educational provision. This is the argument developed by Grace in Catholic schools: Mission, Markets and Morality (2002). Grace seeks to draw attention to the tortuous situation that Catholic head teachers find themselves in because of the huge changes in government led educational policies over the past 20 years. There is quite literally a deep tension between the mission of Catholic schools and the educational market place that they have been forced to operate within. As Grace explains, If schools in a market economy in education must show good company results in academic success and growing social status, what becomes of the Catholic school principle of ‘preferential option for the poor’? (Grace, 2002, p. 181)

In order to survive there have had to be compromises and accommodations. Grace is maintaining that Catholic education has had to adapt to making academic achievement and league table position an ever increasing priority.

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Both Grace and Arthur draw attention to an uncertainty about what Catholic education is primarily intended to do. Ultimately the question is whether a Catholic education is about the formation of someone into the Catholic faith or about academic progress. Indeed, both draw attention to a contemporary lack of confidence about promoting the explicit faith mission of Catholic schools. There has been a reticence for either of these researchers to make explicit a link between Catholic education and the participation of young people in the practice of the Catholic faith. This reticence could be described as a crisis in confidence about what the primary goal of a Catholic education ought to be. This crisis in confidence about expressing the faith mission is a significant internal threat facing Catholic education. It brings into focus again questions about the relationship between theology and Catholic education.

The convergence of internal and external threats facing Catholic education Up to this point the attention has been on mapping out the range of internal and external threats that are currently facing Catholic education. This has been done in order to establish the case that these are indeed highly testing times for Catholic education. Catholic education is under attack. It faces a range of threats and tensions that converge around the very aims and purposes of Catholic education. Both in the internal and external threats identified, there are recurring issues about the fundamental reasons for having Catholic schools. Beneath each of the eight threats and issues mapped out are questions about the conceptions of Catholic education. The majority of the external criticisms of Catholic education pivot on assumptions about what the primary aim of Catholic education is taken to be about. Similarly the internal threats reflect theological tensions about the contemporary conception of what it means to be a Catholic in the post-Vatican II Church. This adds further complexity to what Catholic education means. The internal and external threats to Catholic education converge into philosophical considerations about the aims and nature of Catholic education. The key questions here are about the theory of Catholic education.

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Conclusion Catholic education is experiencing highly testing times and is under attack. This attack draws attention to a conceptual looseness and to theoretical weaknesses around the nature and purpose of Catholic education and schooling. What is needed is a robust the theory of Catholic education. The primary premise for the subsequent chapters is the disturbing claim that, despite years of practical experience in Catholic education and schooling, there is not a sufficiently robust theory of Catholic education. This is a contentious premise. It is one that must be argued for and firmly established. This disquieting claim is the context for this book as a whole and it will be used to guide and inform the construction of a robust theory of Catholic education. The focus of this chapter has been to demonstrate that this is undeniably a testing time for Catholic education. It faces serious internal and external challenges that converge to raise fundamental questions about the aims and nature of Catholic education. These are the issues that go to the heart of what a seaworthy theory of Catholic education would need to begin to respond to. It will be maintained that there is not at the present time a theory of Catholic education that is both defensible and coherent. Without this kind of robust theory it will not be possible to adequately respond to the external and internal threats that it currently faces. The focus in the next four chapters will be on presenting a critical analysis of existing attempts to describe the theory of Catholic education.

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Official Church Teachings and the Theory of Catholic Education

Introduction This chapter challenges the assumption that there is at the present time a robust theory of Catholic education. It will conduct a survey of official Catholic Church documents on education and schooling. These documents provide guidance, summing up the aims and rationale, for Catholic education in different countries and regions around the world. It will be argued that a critical analysis of the official Church teaching on Catholic education reveals a surprising lack of detail about what the theory of Catholic education involves. Although these teachings present many positive themes about education and schooling a closer analysis reveals a preference for vague slogans rather than a detailed description of this theory of education. This weakens the value of existing accounts of the theory of Catholic education and schooling. Given the testing times currently facing Catholic education the concerns within these documents amount to a serious situation.

Official Catholic Church teachings on education and schooling The Roman Catholic Church has a hierarchical structure that enables it to function at a global level with a considerable degree of unity and uniformity. In particular it has a centralized structure that pivots around the office of the Papacy and the Roman Curia, who together play a leading role in safeguarding and making known what is referred to as the Magisterium (teachings of the Catholic Church). One of the key ways in which this structure operates is

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through issuing written guidance for the benefit of both the hierarchy and whole Church spread around the globe. Throughout the Church’s existence countless documents have been promulgated that cover many aspects of life and Catholic practice. Over the past century an increasing number of documents have been promulgated specifically about Catholic education and the Catholic school. Out of these documents the Pius XI papal encyclical Divini Illius Magistri (1929) and Vatican II’s Gravissimum Educationis (1965) stand out as authoritative statements. After Vatican II an ongoing commission was created, the Congregation for Catholic Education, which has produced a number of guidance documents that have developed themes that were not sufficiently dealt with in Gravissimum Educationis. All of these texts are taken as containing the official Church teachings on education and they provide guidance on both how to defend and deliver Catholic education and schooling. However, before beginning an analysis of this teaching and guidance it is important to recognize the long-standing involvement of the Catholic Church with education and schooling. Centuries before the advent of universal education and the state provision of schools, the Catholic Church was founding and maintaining places of education. These ranged from small schools, often for choristers, connected with monasteries and cathedrals to the universities of the late Middle Ages. Mostly this was an education for males and was closely connected with the schooling and preparation of ordinands for clerical life. There has been a long and largely positive relationship between the Catholic Church and the provision of education (Elias, 2002). In the wake of the Reformation this relationship became more complex in two key ways. First, the establishment of Catholic schools became one of the practical strategies that were used to counter the Protestant Reformation. Protestant denominations of Christianity spread rapidly into many western European countries and the Catholic Church sought various ways of responding to this new situation. In countries such as England and Scotland, Catholic schools were established as a means of protecting or inoculating the children of Catholic parents from the wider Protestant culture. In many Protestant countries Catholics experienced prejudice and discrimination and the provision of Catholic schools was one way of dealing with this (Conroy, 1999; Elias, 2002; Eliot, 2006). There had also been from the time of pope Pius IX (who died in 1878) condemnations that forbade Catholics from attending non-Catholic schools (and universities) and these condemnations had entered Canon Law. However, this injunction was rendered largely ineffective because the local bishop could grant approval for a Catholic to attend a non-Catholic school or university.

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During the eighteenth century the ‘new world’ of North America experienced huge influxes of immigration and there was a similar desire to ‘protect’ Catholic children from the Protestantism that was there. As Hunt explains in his summary of the history of Catholic education in North America, Consequently, Catholic elementary schools were established at great cost, usually under parish auspices, to protect the faith of the children of an immigrant, poor population. (Hunt, 2005, p. 163)

The same impulse to protect children’s Catholic identity and faith motivated the development of Catholic education in other countries, for example in Australia (Pascoe, 2007) and in Canada (McDonough, 2012). The second complexity was the emergence of an interrelationship between missionary activity and the provision of Catholic schools. Catholic Christians, like other denominations of Christianity, were highly active in missionary work during the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. This was of course linked with European colonialism, not least because missionaries were able to take advantage of the infrastructure and security provided by colonial powers. Missions were established in almost all African countries, the sub continent of India and in other less economically developed countries. Alongside the proclamation of the gospel message Catholic missionaries routinely established Catholic schools. In addition to religious instruction these schools also provided a general education. On the whole these schools were funded and staffed by members of religious orders who had come from European countries. It was quickly realized that providing schooling was an effective way of supporting the missionary activity. In many African countries the Catholic Church was a primary provider of education well into the twentieth century (for instance, see the example of Zambia as decribed by Carmody, 2007). As a result the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of Catholic schools throughout the world. Within Europe and the ‘new world’ this was in order to safeguard and protect Catholic children from the dominant protestant culture. In what were described as missionary territories, Catholic schools were established as part of the consolidation of the missionary activity. This expansion of Catholic education and schooling meant that being involved in education became a major component in the practical work of the Catholic Church. This has continued into the present day and globally the Catholic Church continues to be the largest provider of education and schooling (Grace and O’Keefe, 2007). The practical involvement and experience in education underpins and informs the official

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Church documents that have been issued over the past century. Alongside these documents there are many other statements about the Church’s involvement in education. These include papal bulls about the founding of a particular college or university, and also statements by individual bishops or groups of bishops about their plans for establishing schools or universities. These shorter, more local statements will not be considered as part of the following analysis of official Church teachings on education. Rather the focus will be on the more general centrally written statements about Catholic education and schooling. This is because these documents are taken as providing the guidance and teaching about what Catholic education involves and how it ought to be organized and delivered in local contexts.

The 1929 Papal encyclical Papal encyclicals are an important way in which the pope communicates definitive teachings. To date the only papal encyclical about Catholic education was issued by Pope Pius XI in 1929, and as such it stands out as an important statement of official Church teaching on Catholic education. This encyclical, known under its Latin name of Divini Illius Magistri is about the Christian education of young people. Prior to 1929 papal utterances about education were confined to the issuing of bulls or instructions about the founding of universities or places of learning, or occasional themes in sermons (Elias, 2002; Hunt, 2005). Like other encyclicals Pius XI’s educational one needs to be read against its historical context, in particular the impact of the Enlightenment on the systems of universal education that had spread across many countries. As Elias explained, State systems of education developed in Europe apart from the Catholic Church. Also, a philosophy of education emerged that was based on purely naturalistic principles, giving little or no room to a serious study of religion and morality. It was in this context that Pope Pius XI promulgated in 1929 the only major encyclical letter of the Church on education. (Elias, 2002, p. 196)

Given this context the encyclical sought to deal with two issues. The first is about the right of the Catholic Church to be involved in education and schooling. To do this Divini Illius Magistri employed a rights-based argument that utilized the scaffolding provided by Natural Law principles. It depicted three levels to sociopolitical relationships. At the primary level there are families, and these

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are the fundamental units of society. In the secondary supporting level there is the state. In essence the state existed to help families fulfil their telos, which is the generation of children and their formation within families. There is a third level that comes about when individuals join the Church. This is a supernatural order in which there is a superiority to the natural order afforded by the state. The encyclical maintains that while the family comes first it is dependant on the wider civil society if it is to achieve its purpose. One of the important roles of civil society is to support families in various ways, including educational provision and ensuring that the rights of families are met. The encyclical also maintains the prerogative of families to exercise their legal rights to bring up their children in their religion. The encyclical argues that as a consequence the Catholic Church has both a right and a responsibility (towards families) to be involved in education. The encyclical argues that the state must recognize the rights of the Church in this area and that it ought to be contributing financially to support Catholic schools. In the words of the encyclical: Consequently, education which is concerned with man as a whole, individually and socially, in the order of nature and in the order of grace, necessarily belongs to all these three societies in due proportion, corresponding according to the dispositions of Divine Providence, to the coordination of their respecting ends. (Divini Illius Magistri, 1929, paragraph 14)

The encyclical maintains that each of the three ‘societies’ had rights and responsibilities concerning the education of young people. Of primary importance was the inalienable rights of the family when it came to education, and in order to emphasize this the encyclical (in paragraph 37) approvingly refers to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1925 to uphold the rights of parents to send their children to a Catholic school against the insistence of the state of Oregon that they should not. In addition, the encyclical does recognize the rights of the state in providing a range of educational provisions and types of school. Within Catholic practice throughout the twentieth century the Natural Law political philosophy of Thomas Aquinas was regarded as authoritative. Given this it is hardly surprising that Divini Illius Magistri couches the discussion of Catholic education and parental rights in these terms. The second issue that the encyclical deals with are connected with the aims of education. Pius XI wanted to emphasize that education is about preparing for the afterlife and thus the fundamental aim of education was described as Preparing man for what he must be and for what he must do here below, in order to attain the sublime end for which he was created, it is clear that there can be

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The idea of education as a preparation for death is a thread that runs throughout the encyclical (Elias, 2002). This was presented in the typical categories of Catholic theology about the reality of original sin and its impact on human life. The encyclical maintains that Every method of education founded, wholly or in part, on the denial or forgetfulness of original sin and of grace, and relying on the sole powers of human nature, is unsound. (Divini Illius Magistri, 1929, paragraph 60)

In this it is raising objections to what Pius XI considered to be ‘enlightenment trends’ in education. These trends focus on fostering autonomy and individual self direction among pupils. In contrast to these the encyclical argues that human beings would without the assistance of divine grace always struggle to achieve anything like autonomy. This is because of the corrosive effects of original sin. Alongside these anthropological claims the encyclical also adopts a conservative stance to other educational ideas. According to the encyclical, a proper or complete education is one in which Christianity was central. It states that It is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organisation of the school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch be regulated by the Christian spirit, under the direction and material supervision of the Church: so that religion my be in very truth the foundation and crown of the youth’s entire training; and this is in every grade of schooling. (Divini Illius Magistri, 1929, paragraph 80)

This quote draws out the role of the Church in controlling the content and delivery of the curriculum. This is in order to ensure that education was fundamentally religious. The point of a Catholic education is to induct the pupil into the Catholic faith. Religion is to be the foundation at every grade of schooling. The encyclical explained that the outcome or product of Christian education is The supernatural man who thinks, judges and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with right reason illumed by the supernatural light of the example and teaching of Christ; in other words, to use the current term the true and finished man of character. (Divini Illius Magistri, 1929, paragraph 96)

Here the encyclical is clear about the centrality of faith formation in Catholic education. Producing Christlike adult members of the Church is the goal of this

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kind of education. The tenor of the encyclical is defensive. It wants to set out a vision of education that stands in contrast to the kinds of schooling that is on offer in non-Catholic schools. Pius XI’s encyclical reflects and reaffirms the role of Catholic schools in promoting Catholic identity and protecting young Catholics from the threats of secularism and protestant culture.

Critical discussion of Divini Illius Magistri An obvious observation about the Papal encyclical Divini Illius Magistri is that it takes an overtly conservative stance to the education and schooling of young people. In this the encyclical was a product of its time. The Catholic Church was for first half of the twentieth century threatened and dominated by the challenges of ‘modernism’ and as consequence papal documents were written in a defensive style. Defending the truth of the Catholic faith was an important priority and there was a suspicion of any ‘modern’ approaches. Given this it is hardly surprising that it expressed deep reservations about a range of issues, from nonreligious theories of moral education (paragraph 62) and sex education (paragraph 65) to the coeducation of male and female pupils (paragraph 68). Pupils could not, because of original sin, determine their own moral values particularly about sexual ethics. Morality had to be mediated through the magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church. Church teaching was there to guide and protect young people and the education and training received at school played a key role in communicating this to them. Beyond the observation that the encyclical is educationally conservative there are three fundamental concerns about what it teaches about the theory of Catholic education. The first of these concerns is to note the encyclical’s preoccupation with asserting the rights of the Church to be an educational provider. This is done through using the scaffolding of Natural Law arguments about the rights of parents to bring up their children within their own religion. Over 50 of the paragraphs in the encyclical (out of a total of 102) are concerned with the various rights and prerogatives of the Catholic Church, the state, and parents when it comes to education. What justifies the Church’s involvement in the education of the youth are juridical claims rather than theological arguments. What is emphasized are the political rights of parents to call upon the Church in educating their children, rather than any theological reasons for being involved in education.

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A second concern is connected with the theological anthropology that permeates through the encyclical. At one level it is a good feature in that it is drawing attention to the interconnection between educational theory and the goal of human life. However, the encyclical (as noted above) puts a heavy emphasis on original sin and the need to provide young people with thorough training and formation as they prepare for their death. In this version of theological anthropology there is little scope given to autonomy, religious freedom and the primacy of the individual’s conscience. The third concern is that where the curriculum is discussed in the encyclical it is in terms of the Church’s control over the content of what is taught. The Church wants to safeguard and protect children from errors. The right of the Church to do this is because she has the God-given authority to be like a mother who naturally wants to teach her children right from wrong. This could be criticized as being theologically impoverished account of the relationship between education and theology, in which the former is used to control the content of the latter. It was not until the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) that these concerns and official Church teaching on Catholic education were formally reconsidered. Much of the significance and evaluation of Vatican II’s education document involves reading it in the light of Pius XI’s encyclical.

The Second Vatican Council declaration Gravissimum Educationis Alongside encyclicals another source of highly authoritative Church teachings is found in documents promulgated in an ecumenical Church council. The most of recent of these was the Second Vatican Council. Towards the end of this council (December 1965) a document was issued on the extreme importance of education, it is referred to as Gravissimum Educationis. This document sought to reaffirm much of what Pius XI had stated in 1929, recasting the language and tone and expressing the Church’s ongoing commitment to Catholic education and schooling. Gravissimum Educationis begins by stating the universal right to education and moves onto the concept of ‘Christian Education’ before dealing with issues relating first to schools and then Higher Education and the sacred science (theology). Gravissimum Educationis opens with the insistence that To fulfil the mandate received from the divine founder of proclaiming the mystery of salvation to all men and of restoring all things in Christ, Holy

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mother the Church must be concerned with the whole of man’s life, even the secular part of it in so far as it has a bearing on his heavenly calling . . . Therefore she has a role in the progress and development of education. (Gravissimum Educationis, 1965, paragraph 1)

It is important to recognize that not all of the statements issued by Vatican II are at the same dogmatic level. Gravissimum Educationis is one of the three declarations that were issued at this council and as such these are lower ranking statements compared to the major dogmatic constitutions that were promulgated. As such it needs to be recognized as a positive statement of the Catholic Church’s stance to education, but certainly not as a fully developed account of the theory of Catholic education. Gravissimum Educationis refers to the inalienable right to an education that is in keeping with one’s ultimate goal. It asserts the right of the child to a moral and religious education, and this would include knowledge and love of God. The declaration maintains that, Christians because of their baptism have a right to a Christian education. (Gravissimum Educationis, 1965, paragraph 2)

This education is explicitly about faith formation and geared towards helping the person to become aware of the gift of faith and to be able to fully participate in liturgical worship. It involves developing into the kind of people and members of the Church who bring their faith to bear on the common good of society. Indeed the theme of serving the common good is a central feature of Gravissimum Educationis. Christian education is itself depicted as something which serves humanity because it bears fruit in the lives of those who are educated as Christians. They go on to serve the common good of humanity in virtue of the Christian education that they have received. Gravissimum Educationis argues that as a result of the way Catholic schools support the common good of society, there is an obligation on the part of the state to support them financially. As such parents must be able to enjoy true liberty in their choice of school, and [p]ublic powers because of distributive justice must make it financially possible for parents to freely choose a Catholic school for their children. (Gravissimum Educationis, 1965, paragraph 6)

Catholic education also serves by acting as a counterbalance to a state monopoly on educational provision.

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In the second half of Gravissimum Educationis attention shifts from the more general demands for Christian Education to the nature of Catholic schools. Catholic schools share, with all schools, the commitment to the human formation of young people (paragraph 8). The distinguishing feature of a Catholic school is to create for the school community a special atmosphere animated by the Gospel spirit of freedom . . . to help youth grow . . . and to let knowledge acquired be illuminated by faith. (Gravissimum Educationis, 1965, paragraph 8).

The declaration goes on to add that Catholic schools can and should be an aid to the mission of the Church. The practical goal of the Catholic school is to lead pupils from the current situation to promote the good of the earthly city and also prepare them for service in the spread of the Kingdom of God . . . to be the saving leaven in the human community. (Ibid.)

This positive statement shares with Divini Illius Magistri a similar stance on how a Christian education involves forming pupils into committed members of the Church. They are being formed into Christlike people who will make the world a better place and be able to spread the Christian message.

Critical discussion of Gravissimum Educationis There is much continuity but some significant differences between the theory of Catholic education presented in Gravissimum Educationis and Pius XI’s encyclical. For example, the encyclical is preoccupied with parent’s rights, and while this is present in Gravissimum Educationis it is complimented with an additional argument about the rights of the child, following baptism, to have a certain kind of education. The use of these kinds of rights-based arguments could confidently appeal for support from the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. Of course, any potential weaknesses in these arguments would stem from the inherent tensions in the declaration. However, there is the worry that Gravissimum Educationis is also too preoccupied with asserting the rights of the Catholic Church to be an educational provider. As a consequence attention is deflected away from describing what the distinctive elements of Catholic education actually involve. If the claims used to justify the Church’s involvement in education are ignored, it could be argued that there would be very little other content to be found in Gravissimum Educationis. This document

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contains little of substance concerning the aims, content and pedagogy of Catholic education. The style and tone of Gravissimum Educationis is more progressive, and it is free from the defensiveness of the encyclical. Any references to original sin have been gently jettisoned and there is no reaffirmation of its place in Catholic education. Moreover there is little emphasis on Catholic education being about preparing for death and the after life. A key goal for this education is serving the common good and helping pupils to be able to share the good news of the Gospel. However, on the more negative side the toning down of the teachings in Divini Illius Magistri again draws attention to the lack of content in Gravissimum Educationis. This concern is compounded by the style and genre of Gravissimum Educationis. It is written in open and optimistic terms, in which the emphasis is on the use of positive phrases and general statements. Of course this style could be criticized as one that opts slogans and imprecise statements in which it is hard to pin down the exact meanings. For example, it explains how a true education is one that aims at the formation of the person in pursuit of his ultimate end and of the good of societies (paragraph 1). In equally general terms, it asserts the right of children to a moral education together with a deeper knowledge and love of God (Ibid.) At another point it declares that the special kind of community in a Catholic school is one which helps the young to grow into the new creatures they were made through baptism (paragraph 8). These positive phrases are vague and it is difficult to work out what they actually mean for the content of curriculum in a Catholic school and how it would be taught. The closest Gravissimum Educationis comes to explaining the distinctive pedagogy of Catholic education is a brief comment about of the vocation of all those who assist parents in their duties of bringing up their children (paragraph 5). The declaration encourages lay people to be well prepared and qualified teachers who are able to bear witness to Christ, the unique teacher (paragraph 8). In the concluding paragraph teachers are exhorted to imbue their students with the spirit of Christ and to excel in pedagogy and the pursuit of knowledge to both advance the internal renewal of the Church and extend the influence of the Church in the modern world. The vagueness of these various phrases gives at best a suggestion about the kind of pedagogy being advocated for Catholic education and schooling. A central part of Gravissimum Educationis surrounds the discussion of Catholic schools. The treatment of Catholic schools in paragraph 8 is broadened out in the subsequent paragraph into a recognition that there are different kinds of Catholic schools. However, between these two paragraphs there is a notable

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tension. If paragraph 8 is taken in isolation it is possible to suggest, as Briel (2008) has done that there is a distinctly catechetical vision of what goes on in the Catholic school. According to Briel this vision of Catholic schooling can be summed up as involving first, catechetical instruction, and second, an education that nourishes life according to the spirit of Christ. Third, it is an education that aims at leading to intelligent and active participation in the liturgical mystery, and finally its goal is to be an education that gives motivation for apostolic activity. This overtly confessional account of Catholic schooling is immediately qualified by the treatment of the different kinds of Catholic schools in the next paragraph. This part of Gravissimum Educationis draws attention to the presence of nonCatholics who attend Catholic schools. For these pupils, who are described as ‘strangers to the gift of faith’, the Catholic school will care for their educational needs. Here there is no hint of the catechetical vision described previously. Moreover at this point Gravissimum Educationis calls for the development of different kinds of schools for those who are poor or in need. This general injunction, is aimed at all who are poor and needy rather for Catholics in this situation. Here the vision of Catholic education is more about serving the needy rather than on nurturing the faith of Catholic children. The tensions between these two paragraphs reflects the debates at Vatican II as this document was considered and edited by the council members. There had been eight draft versions of this document and, up until the sixth, it had the title The Catholic School. The change in title reflected a desire to formulate a more inclusive stance in order to avoid simply equating Christian education with attendance at a Catholic school. Of course the tension here reflects the ambiguity in the concept of Christian education. It is possible to distinguish between it as the formation of someone as a Christian and as a Christian approach to what education involves. Whilst the recognition of the ambiguity around this concept is to be welcomed, it is important to note that what is conspicuously absent from Gravissimum Educationis’ discussion of the Catholic school is a fuller consideration of the curriculum that ought be delivered there. A further concern with the declaration comes towards the end of the document (in paragraph numbers 10–12) when the attention shifts away from schooling and onto Catholic colleges and universities. These sections amount to an exhortation to raise the profile of theology within Higher Education, and especially in Catholic colleges. It is explained that promoting the study of theology in this way will have many outcomes, from fostering priestly and lay vocations to furthering research within theology itself. This will support ecumenism, dialogue and the development of doctrine. It would be possible to cite the influence of Newman’s

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arguments in this part of the statement. However, the concern is about the lack of relationship between these final sections of Gravissimum Educationis and the majority of the text that precedes it. The only link would be the way that graduates of Catholic colleges could serve the wider society and be encouraged to enter the teaching profession in order to work in Catholic schools. What is conspicuous by its absence is any attempt to relate the theology that ought to characterise Catholic colleges and universities, and the curriculum found within Catholic schools. Curriculum theorists and philosophers of education have frequently drawn attention to the long and complex interrelationship between universities and the school curriculum, but this is something that has been bypassed by both Gravissimum Educationis and Divini Illius Magistri. This omission is a further reminder that the Vatican II document is describing and asserting in positive but vague terms the Church’s stance towards schooling and education. It falls well short of attempting to be anything like a fully developed theory of Catholic education.

Post-Vatican II Church teaching on Catholic education Gravissimum Educationis is best regarded as a statement of basic positions (Carter, 1966). This reflects the decision made at Vatican II and noted in the opening section of the declaration to set up a post-conciliar commission to take further reflection on Catholic education and the distinctive features of Catholic schools. This commission was established, and is known as the Congregation for Catholic Education. Since the close of Vatican II it has issued a range of guidance documents as well shorter statements aimed at encouraging those who work in Catholic schools. Of these guidance documents two stand out. The first issued in 1977 was titled The Catholic School, and the second issued in 1988, had the title of The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School. These texts sought to take further and clarify the discussion of Catholic education found in Gravissimum Educations. The other statements issued by Congregation for Christian Education have tended to concentrate on issues of staffing and the distinctive role of the Catholic teacher. One document focused on the involvement of lay people in education (1982) and two others about the special the contribution that members of religious orders can make to the success of Catholic education (2002, 2007). The guidance documents and statements issued by the Congregation for Catholic Education provide a filter against which both Divini Illius Magistri

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and Gravissimum Educationis are now interpreted. In retrospect, Gravissimum Educationis now tends to be regarded as one of the weaker documents of Vatican II (Carter, 1966; Elias, 2002; Kelty, 1999; Ratzinger, 1966). The work of the postconcilliar commission picked up on themes only hinted at during formulation of Gravissimum Educationis at Vatican II. In particular the 1977 statement on The Catholic School and the 1988 document on The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School Are attempts to extend what was implied about education in the declaration and in Vatican II as a whole. Both the 1977 and 1988 documents could be described as rambling texts, with a tendency to employ vague phrases. Both tend to proliferate the number of aims and goals for Catholic education. The thematic style of these documents compound the vague phrases found in Gravissimum Educationis rather than clarifying and developing them. One of the more obvious illustrations of this surrounds the way that the Catholic school is described as a ‘synthesis of culture and faith and a synthesis of faith and life’. The text of The Catholic School (1977) maintains that the Catholic school undertakes this task in two ways: The first is reached by integrating all the different aspects of human knowledge through the subjects taught, in the light of the Gospel; the second is the growth of the virtues characteristic of the Christian. (The Catholic school, 1977, paragraph 37)

This is, as Sullivan (2001) observes, a dense and complex statement. It is just not clear what it really means to describe a Catholic school in these terms. Moreover, in practical terms how are the various subjects of the curriculum supposed to be read in the light of the Gospel – does mathematics or geography have any differences in the context of the gospel? Again to refer to Christ being the foundation of the whole educational enterprise (The Catholic School, 1977, paragraph 35) is to make a vague slogan-like claim. In what sense is Christ the foundation of education? When it comes to teaching languages, science, art and almost all of the curriculum, how should or could it relate to Christ in any meaningful way? Presumably ‘Christ’ is not the answer to every question raised by educators. Moreover, there is a possible tension between this part of the document and others which describe the autonomy of different subjects on the curriculum. Individual subjects must be taught according to their own particular methods. It would be wrong to consider (them) as mere adjuncts to faith or as a useful means of teaching apologetics. (The Catholic School, 1977, paragraph 39)

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This would point to a basic similarity between the way the subjects of the curriculum are studied in a Catholic school and in non-Catholic ones. Instead of clarifying the vagueness of Gravissimum Educationis the 1977 document on The Catholic School has added to it. Another example of this is the guidance document issued in 1988, in which the religious nature of all education is considered. When the Congregation for Catholic education issued the Religious Dimension of Education (1988) it sought to draw-out a positive relationships between the realms of education and religion. The document attempted to describe how this spanned from the climate or ethos of the school to all of the subjects that are taught. However, this document simply asserts the belief that there is a religious foundation to all education instead of presenting a worked out argument to justify or defend it. Here it is possible, like Biemer (1992) to identify an echo of the approach taken by Newman in his Idea of University (1996). Ultimately this document also compounds the vagueness detected in Gravissimum Educationis. However, one aspect of the 1988 document that is to be welcomed is the distinctions it draws between religious education or religious instruction and catechesis and how these relate to the Catholic school. The document explains that The aim of catechesis, or handing on the Gospel message, is maturity: spiritual, liturgical, sacramental and apostolic; this happens most especially in a local Church community. The aim of school however, is knowledge. (Religious instruction) tries to convey a sense of the nature of Christianity, and how Christians are trying to live their lives. (The Religious Dimension of Education, 1988, paragraph 69)

This is a potentially helpful way of distinguishing between the wider goals of the school and the specific focus of religious education in the curriculum in Catholic education. Yet there are two concerns with this. The first is a latent problem over the content of both catechesis and religious education. This is because the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992) is the source or content for both. In practice this might easily undermine the distinction between religious education and catechesis because both involve learning about the same content. The second concern is that this distinction implies that formal education is different to the catechetical education that pupils might receive outside of school. There is here an undeveloped argument that needs to be made explicit and properly defended. While formal education is different to the

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informal or broader education there would, if both are to count as ‘education’, be a considerable degree of overlap. What is not clear from the document is why catechesis would be inappropriate within formal education but not within informal settings. The document ignores this issue and simply asserts this distinction.

Evaluating official Church teaching on Catholic education Up to this point the focus has been on surveying and critically discussing the three main strands of official Church teaching on Catholic education. The attention now needs to shift from considering specific documents to evaluating them in more general terms. Perhaps the most obvious points to begin this is by noting the way this teaching frequently employs a blurred distinction between upbringing, education and formal schooling. One reason for is that it makes it easier to gloss between education and catechesis. This is something that permeates the two central documents, Vatican II’s declaration and Pius XI’s encyclical. Blurring the distinction between education and upbringing is a largely unproblematic stance. However attempts to conflate education and catechesis are far more controversial. In retrospect it is possible to recognize why those who promulgated Gravissimum Educationis, wanted to gloss between formal education and catechesis. It allowed them to affirm the parent’s central role in bringing up their children within their faith, or in other words, to give them a Christian education. This was a way to avoid simply equating a Christian education with attending a Catholic school. Gravissimum Educationis alludes to the possibility that any kind of schooling that gives due regard to moral and religious education could be a suitable site for helping parents in the task of educating their children to be Christians. There was no censure or criticism of parents who had no choice but to send their children to non-Catholic schools. More importantly, there would be no forced imposition of faith on those nonCatholic children who attended Catholic schools. In effect Vatican II opted to produce a pastorally aware document that deliberately sought to tone down Divini Illius Magistri. However, both the encyclical and Gravissimum Educationis share the same failure to focus on the kind of curriculum and pedagogy that ought to be characteristic of a Catholic school. In the post-conciliar period the guidance issued by the Congregation for Catholic Education has sought to provide further insights and reflections on what

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is distinctive about Catholic education and Catholic schooling. Unfortunately these texts have lacked precision. They are written in a style that drifts from reflections into ramblings and they have opted to employ indeterminate slogans. As a consequence they have not helped to crystallise sufficiently robustly the theory of Catholic education. Moreover, the other post-conciliar statements have tended to focus on the staffing of Catholic schools rather than on the content of the curriculum. In Chapter 1 attention has already been given to the large fall in members of religious orders who teach and run Catholic schools. This decline began before Vatican II but increased in the years immediately afterwards. It was noted that this has triggered off debates about the identity and distinctiveness of Catholic schools. In response the Congregation for Catholic Education has issued statements that have affirmed the witness of lay Catholics who work in schools (1982) and others have sought to affirm the special contribution that members of religious orders continue to make to Catholic education and the running of Catholic schools (1997; 2002; 2007). It is likely that this focus on staffing has deflected attention from more central questions about the curriculum in Catholic schools. Even in the post-conciliar Church teaching on Catholic education that there has been a tendency to settle for slogans like ‘Christ at the centre of education’ rather than to engage with the ambiguity in the concept of Christian education. Discussion and debate has remained at the level of slogans, or what McLaughlin (1996) refers to as ‘Catholic edu-babble’. These are phrases and slogans that give the impression of coherence but in reality stifle and hinder discussions about the distinctiveness of Catholic education and schooling. The problem of Catholic edu-babble permeates many attempts to explain the theory of Catholic education, and it will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5. One unifying feature of much of the official Church teaching is to refer to the repeated references to the way that Christian education serves the common good and the wider society. It is hardly contentious to observe that many of the alumni of Catholic schools serve the common good. Obviously, this claim raises empirical questions about whether Catholics schools are any more effective than other types of schooling at producing young people who serve the common good. However, this point like the repeated discussion of parental rights, has the potential to deflect attention away from the more fundamental questions about what ought to be the relationship between Catholic theology and educational theory. Unfortunately the ongoing concern with official Church teaching is that it is vague in terms of the aims and content of education.

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Conclusion Up to this juncture the focus of attention has been on analysing the official Church documents on education over the past century. It has been maintained that it is not possible to find neither a developed nor robust theory of Catholic education in these documents. The teachings contained in theses educational documents contain many positive statements but they are profoundly vague. This chapter has engaged in a review and analysis of official Church teaching on education, in particular Divini Illius Magistri, Gravissimum Educationis, and the post-conciliar documents issued by the Congregation for Catholic Education. It has challenged the assumption or expectation that within the official Church teachings on education there is a coherent and above all defensible theory of Catholic education.

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Newman and the Theory of Catholic Education

Introduction This chapter focuses on Newman’s positive contribution to the theory of Catholic education. Newman is one of the very few Catholic theologians who has attempted to consider education in detail. Although it ought to be acknowledged at the outset that Newman’s primary focus was on tertiary education, about the idea of a university, rather than the concepts of the Catholic education and schooling. It might well be that had Newman published on this he could have come up with alternative arguments and reflections. It will be maintained that Newman’s insights are relevant starting points for examining the theory of Catholic education and schooling. His influence on official Catholic Church teaching can be identified (Biemer, 1992). This is not least because he helps to draw attention to what ought to be the relationship between the arguments in support of liberal education and the theory of Catholic education. It will be explained that there is some ambiguity over how much Newman’s arguments for liberal education are actually grounded in more general theological arguments about the distinctive nature of Catholic education. In what follows it will be argued that Newman’s work is helpful in drawing attention to one of the central problems within the theory of Catholic education, namely what ought to be the relationship between educational theory and (Catholic) theology. John Henry Newman (1801–1890) was a leading figure in nineteenthcentury Britain. Historians have noted his ongoing significance and the stature that he came to enjoy over the last century (Cornwell, 2010; Ker, 2009). Newman played a key role in the Oxford Movement that brought much renewal to the life of the Church of England in the Victorian period. During

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his own lifetime he gained considerable notoriety, not least for converting from the Church of England in which he had been an ordained minister, to Roman Catholicism. He was subsequently ordained as a Catholic priest and towards the end of his life the Pope appointed him a Cardinal. In recent years Newman’s stature within the Catholic Church has received further prominence as he has progressed through the beatification process, and in 2010 he was declared ‘blessed John Newman’ by Pope Benedict XVI. Some of Newman’s theological texts such as the Apologia pro vita sua and An Essay on the Development of Doctrine have remained influential theological texts. Nestled within his theological and pastoral works are a collection of discourses devoted to education, published as the Idea of a University in 1852. This work has become a seminal text that has spawned discussions on the nature and purpose of higher education and its relationship with liberal education. His Idea of a University contains a set of nine discourses that were originally lectures delivered in Dublin as part of his involvement in establishing and promoting the first Catholic university in Ireland. Newman had been invited by the Irish bishops to be the rector of this university and he played a central role in setting it up. After relinquishing this role and returning from Ireland, Newman opened a school for Catholic boys in Birmingham and took an active role in running it. Newman is notable because his theoretical reflections on education can be juxtaposed with his practical experience and commitment to Catholic education. He declared that ‘Now from first to last, education, in this large sense of the word has been my line’ (Newman, 1956, p. 259). Moreover, as Cornwell explains: It had become clear to Newman, on his conversion, that his vocation would be the education of Catholics rather than the conversion of Anglicans. (Cornwell, 2010, p. 125)

Newman’s involvement and commitment to education are grounded in the importance he attached to the pastoral work he carried out as a priest, which was part-and-parcel of how he served others as a minister in the Church. In addition, the various educational projects in which Newman was involved provide an illustration of the kind of relationship that the Catholic Church typically had with education in the nineteenth century. For example, the Irish bishops wanted to respond to the opening of a number of Queen’s University colleges in Ireland, which were modelled along the secular lines of University College London. The Irish bishops wanted to provide an alternative to this as they considered this kind of university college to be a new threat to the

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education of Catholics living in Ireland. It was against this context that Newman was invited to be the first rector of a distinctly Catholic university. Similarly, Newman opened a school for Catholic boys in Birmingham in order to provide an alternative that Catholics could choose for their sons. In what follows, the central features of Newman’s educational ideas will be outlined before being subjected to a critical analysis. Before launching into this it is important to identify a couple of cautionary notes. Beyond the obvious historical difficulties (such as the rudimentary state of universal education, the effects of the Industrial Revolution and the elitist education found in Oxford and Cambridge universities), Newman’s treatment of education can be misunderstood. To be more precise, in advocating ‘liberal’ education Newman can be easily misunderstood. For him liberal education was about developing the capacity to think and it was closely connected with the traditional liberal arts of the medieval university. As part of this it was possible to study both mathematics and classics. A second cautionary note is the occasional nature of Newman’s work on education (Ker, 2011). Newman did not deliberately set out to elaborate a theory of education, if by that we mean a comprehensive statement of principles intended as a guide to educational practice. (Arthur and Nicholls, 2007, p. 60)

Given this, Newman should not be treated as if he provides a detailed theory of Catholic education. In what follows it will be necessary to begin by identifying the key themes in his argument before going on to piece together more generally where Newman stands vis-à-vis the theory of Catholic education. The primary source for this will be the discourses that constitute his Idea of a University. A more complete account would need to appeal to his other writings and his sermons but limitations of space preclude appealing to his other work. Following his conversion to Catholicism Newman’s attention shifted to the education and formation of Catholic ‘gentlemen’. He seized the opportunity to be practically involved with this goal in Ireland. Here the only universities were ones that Catholics were prohibited from attending either by Church teaching or by legal injunctions about Nonconformists attending Protestant universities. However, Newman is not advocating an account of education based on social justice that could be accessed by all members of the Catholic community. This brings into focus the shifts in educational focus since Newman’s time: Now education is treated as a matter of distributive justice . . . There have also been huge shifts in the nature of knowledge and its role in society . . . Now the

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In contrast, Newman is primarily concerned with university education for males alone, rather than with providing an account of Catholic education. These cautionary notes and shifting attitudes need to be kept in view in order to accurately evaluate Newman’s work on the theory of Catholic education.

What are the central features of education according to Newman? Newman weaves together a set of arguments that combine to demonstrate the special nature of a Catholic university and why this is superior to other institutions that claim to be universities. Newman presents these arguments as if they are deductions from the definition of liberal education. Newman opens his discourses on the Idea of a University (henceforth Idea) by stating his definition of what a university is fundamentally about: ‘It is a place of teaching and universal knowledge’ (1996, p. 3). Newman composed his Idea to help his original audience (in Dublin) understand what was different about a Catholic university. In these discourses Newman wanted to set out what was special about a Catholic university and to explain why young Irish men ought to attend this type of university rather than one of the other universities in Ireland. As Turner explained, Newman needed to demonstrate the necessity for and unique qualities of the new institution being founded. Second, as Newman’s task unfolded itself, he had to persuade his audience that their sons should receive not only an education in a Catholic university, but also a liberal rather than a professional education. (Turner, 1996. p. XIV)

Starting from this practical context Newman developed a set of arguments that began by noting the way in which a Catholic university would include the study of theology. However, Newman was at pains to emphasize that he was arguing for a university and not a seminary (Ker, 2011). The Catholic university in Dublin would be like other universities and it would include the study of theology as a legitimate part of universal knowledge. In the second, third and fourth of his discourses Newman constructed further arguments about the importance of theology within a university, and

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the ways in which theology plays a key role in ensuring that a liberal rather than a utilitarian education takes place. He launched his argument from an analysis of the concept of a university, declaring that, A university, I should lay down, by its very name professes to teach universal knowledge: theology is surely a branch of knowledge: how then is it possible for it to profess to teach all branches of knowledge, and yet to exclude from the subjects of its teaching one which, to say the least, is as important and as large as any of them.

He went on to add: As to the range of university teaching, certainly the very name of university is inconsistent with restrictions of every kind . . . a university should teach universal knowledge. (Newman, 1996, p. 24)

Newman maintains that a Catholic university alone is the only kind that can provide an authentic liberal education. In his opening discourses he maintains that in a Catholic university proper recognition is given to theology as a genuine branch of knowledge. Newman was critical of the Queen’s universities that had recently been opened in Ireland because these on principle did not teach theology. In contrast, the strength of the Catholic university is that it is able to take seriously open questions, about the existence of God and the possibility of divine revelation, that are part of theology. Newman argued that if God existed then this would have a number of implications for the education offered by the university. At a fundamental level, all knowledge would have its origin in the creative impulse of the one God. There would be a unity to all knowledge that could be traced back to a divine origin. More practically, theology would be a legitimate subject in the university because it involves both a higher knowledge (about God) and it involves the study of the fundamental truths of human existence. Also other subjects would need to understand themselves in relation to the totality of human knowledge. This would mean, for example, that science would not be exploring a neutral or impersonal universe, a brute fact, but rather creation – the work of the creator. Newman sought to defend the status of theology as both a genuine academic discipline and branch of knowledge. He argued that its exclusion from the curriculum of a university would reflect flawed logic because all knowledge forms a unity and as such theology ought to be part of it. Newman argued that given the definition of a university, it would follow that a university should

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in principle be committed to the teaching of every branch of knowledge. His deduction is elementary – theology is a branch of knowledge and thus it too ought to be part of what is offered in the curriculum at a university. An institution that prohibited and excluded any science (including the science of theology) on principle is, according to Newman, one that by definition could not be a true university. Moreover Newman maintained that in a Catholic university theology, along with all the other subjects, has a role to play in providing the necessary counterbalance to the competition that occurs between different academic disciplines. There is a tendency for some subjects to assert themselves over rival disciplines. Newman cited the example of economics. He argued that in the secular university economics is given a disproportionate importance in the curriculum and in the underlying rationale of the university. Newman maintained that the inclusion of all subjects (including theology) helped to safeguard against economics, or any other subject, becoming superior in the university curriculum. It is as if theology’s inclusion has a symbolic significance. The university teaches all branches of knowledge, including theology, and this is how a university is able to foster what Newman refers to as the ‘philosophical mind’. It is this philosophical mind that can recognize where one subject is overreaching its proper limits and unfairly seeking to dominate the curriculum. The inclusion of theology serves this important goal. Newman is not saying that theology is the highest discipline nor that it has the authority to oversee and correct any excesses in other disciplines within the university (Cornwell, 2010; Ker, 2011). This role he assigns to the philosophical mind trained by a liberal education. However, theology given its presence in the university plays a role in developing this philosophical mind. In the closing discourses of the Idea Newman considers theology and the Church’s presence in the Catholic university. In the last discourse he deals with the Duties of the Church towards knowledge, where he argues in favour of a special relationship between Church authorities and the university. The Church has oversight of the truths of theology and this gives it the right and responsibility to protect the revealed truth both inside and outside of the university. Newman explains that this does not mean that the Church would censure the content of subjects such as literature, but rather it would insist that theology should be studied alongside whatever is being studied. The Church would promote and guard knowledge and university education, and as such enjoy jurisdiction over the university. Ultimately there is no clash between religion and natural sciences, indeed these will be fostered and pursued in the

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Catholic university. This is because Newman is arguing for a university rather than a seminary. Equally the study of literature will be a feature of university learning, despite the realization that it is the product of a fallen human nature. The study of literature needs to be part of the liberal education delivered at a university in order to prepare the student for the world. However, it needs to be juxtaposed with Church teachings so that the student can learn to understand other subjects in a more balanced way. Throughout the Idea Newman argues in support of a liberal education, as opposed to one which is bound up with professional or vocational preparation. In the fifth discourse Newman explains that knowledge is its own end. At university students are free to pursue studies according to their individual preference not for any utility. Learning is to be done for its own intrinsic sake. Knowledge is capable of being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind that any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward. (Newman, 1996, p. 78)

It is a liberal education as opposed to a servile one that is on offer at university. In this Newman was making a stand against those who wanted to make ‘utility’ or usefulness the point of acquiring knowledge and education. Knowledge is its own reward. Liberal education, viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect as such, and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence. (Newman, 1996, p. 90)

To be educated is to be able to use your mind rather than having to passively absorb a mass of information. Newman stresses philosophy and sees it as the vehicle to achieving a cultivation of the intellect and this is a principle goal of liberal education. (Ker, 2008, p. 1)

According to Newman it is liberal or philosophical knowledge that is the goal or end of university education. The person educated at university gains a connected view or grasp of things, and this Newman calls philosophical knowledge or the enlargement of the mind (Newman, 1996). This could be summed up as the capacity to think. It is important to note that this argument for liberal education is not connected or supported through any theological argument. In Newman’s argument for liberal education there is no attempt to justify or ground it in theology.

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A further characteristic of Newman’s account of education is an emphasis on the intellectual rather than on the moral development of the student. He pointed out that, It is a real mistake to burden [liberal education] with virtue or religion as with the mechanical arts. Its direct business is not to steel the soul against temptation or to console it in affliction, any more than to set the loom in motion.

A few sentences later Newman goes on to state that Knowledge is one thing, and virtue is another. (Newman, 1996, p. 89)

Newman explains that a liberal education does not necessarily lead to virtue or to being a more ethical person. In the final set of discourses a significant distinction is drawn between what a student can gain from a university in terms of faith development. As a human institution the university can bring about the education of the gentleman but this is different to helping the individual overcome their fallen sinful nature as a human being. Newman maintains that persons of genuine ethical virtue can only come into being through faith formation as a Catholic Christian. At university the student receives the kind of liberal education that helps him to develop his natural human capacities (through becoming a gentleman). At a Catholic university the student has the advantage of being reminded through the presence of theology that Church teachings give numerous insights into the ultimate ends of human life.

Newman and the theory of Catholic education There are three main themes that emerge from the arguments and points made in his Idea that bring into focus Newman’s positive contribution to the theory of Catholic education. The first is about the inclusion of theology in the curriculum. Newman argued that theology ought to be included in the curriculum because it is a genuine branch of human knowledge. As such, its inclusion expresses that there are no sections of human knowledge that are excluded, in principle, from the curriculum. In this, Newman could be depicted as foreshadowing parts of Hirst’s arguments about the forms of knowledge (Hirst, 1965). For Hirst ‘religion’ (here treated as more or less equivalent to theology) was one of the eight forms of knowledge that inform and guide the curriculum. Hirst and Newman would agree that ‘religion’ could not legitimately be excluded from the curriculum. A further resonance between them would be Newman’s argument about the role of all branches of knowledge

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having a part to play in overcoming the danger of academic imperialism. This would parallel Hirst’s insistence that all eight of the forms of knowledge were needed and they were not in competition with each other. Newman’s argument about the need to include theology is grounded on the unity of all knowledge. Including theology allows Newman to develop a theological perspective on the curriculum. The various subjects of the curriculum through which the universe is studied and investigated enjoy a unity thanks to theology and can be traced back to a divine origin. The second theme in Newman’s Idea is the similarity between the Catholic university and other types of university. When Newman wrote about the university education whether Catholic or not He treated its ‘essence’. But he also wrote about particular universities. He wrote about the university he loved, Oxford, about the university he detested, London, and about the university he wanted to bring into being in Dublin. (Loughlin, 2009, p. 223)

To reiterate the point, Newman’s Idea is advocating a university education and not arguing in support of a seminary in which theology is the central subject. Like any proper university the goal of a Catholic university education is to gain a liberal education. This is different to professional training or acquiring knowledge for some utilitarian purpose. There is an intrinsic value to knowledge, and knowledge is its own reward, and this is exactly the same in Dublin as it is in Oxford. The enlargement of the mind is the defining characteristic of a genuine university. Newman argued that an educated person acquires understanding and the ability to think carefully. He explained that, In default of a recognised term I have called the perfection or virtue of the intellect by the name of philosophy, philosophical knowledge, enlargement of the mind, or illumination. (Newman, 1996, p. 114)

Newman did not argue for a distinctly Catholic variant of this kind of university education but rather insisted that any genuine university would be committed to this kind of liberal education. Like all universities the Catholic one that Newman wanted to establish in Dublin would be committed to the enlargement of the mind. The advantage of a Catholic university was that it included in principle all branches of knowledge (as epitomized through the presence of theology) and this meant it could ensure that economics, and utilitarianism more generally, would not be able to dominate the curriculum. This would help to safeguard a liberal education.

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The third theme in Newman’s Idea is the way that he down plays the religious and moral aspects of education. For Newman education involves fostering the dispositions noted above about the capacity to think, or what he described as enlargement of the mind. According to Newman this disposition was a defining characteristic of being a ‘gentleman’. One of the outcomes of a Catholic university would, like others, be the formation of ‘gentlemen’. Newman described being a ‘gentleman’ in very positive terms: It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life; these are the connatural qualities of a large knowledge; they are the objects of a university. (Newman, 1996, p. 89)

On first impression this would appear to be about character education. However, on closer inspection Newman is clear that it does not involve either moral or catechetical aspects. A university education does not involve the catechesis and formation of the student into a Catholic Christian or even into a ‘Christian gentleman’. Newman was emphatic about this, and in the preceding sentence to the above quote, he insisted that ‘liberal education makes not the Christian, not the Catholic, but the gentleman’ (Newman, 1996, p. 89). One does not become a Catholic through the formal education one receives while at university, and Newman was willing to concede that this would be the situation even within his Catholic university in Dublin. In this third theme, Newman brings into focus the vagueness in the concept of Christian education. His rejection of the catechetical interpretation of this concept is clear. Newman is concerned with the theory, or in his terms the ‘Idea’, of what education as a whole ought to involve. Newman does not even attempt to argue that it ought to involve catechesis and moral education. However, this observation should be partially qualified because Newman attached importance to the residential and pastoral aspects of a university education. Newman was committed to students living in the university and having a close relationship with their tutors. It was through this non-formal education that students might be able to gain both moral and catechetical formation. Rupert (1998) has drawn attention to the way Newman’s practical plans for the university in Dublin had as one of its initial projects the building of the university church. No doubt Newman assumed that the students would be attending it and perhaps gaining religious formation through it. This means that catechesis and moral formation would in this partial way be a part of the Catholic university that Newman proposed. However, it was certainly not in

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the formal education that took place there. In this Newman is characterizing a basic similarity between the good practice he was involved with as a Fellow at Oriel and in the Catholic university he planned for Dublin. Newman’s stance on how a liberal education does not make someone a Christian is suggestive of another way in which he foreshadowed arguments subsequently developed by Hirst, in that Hirst argued both that Christian education was a contradiction in terms (Hirst, 1992), and that there was a fundamental difference between the formation of someone as a Christian (catechesis) and a genuine education (Hirst, 1976).

A critical discussion of Newman and the theory of Catholic education The theory of Catholic education that emerges out of Newman’s discourses on the Idea has many positive features. However, these can often be obscured by the standard criticisms that are levelled against Newman’s broader account of university and liberal education. It should be noted that many of these criticisms although significant are not the primary focus for this book, and as such little sustained attention will be given to defending Newman against them. It will be argued that the most striking feature of Newman’s argument in support for liberal education is made without recourse to theological arguments. He merely argues in favour of including theology in the curriculum and does not support or underpin liberal education on theological grounds. Newman’s arguments do not provide a religious or theological justification for liberal education. A Catholic university, like any other, is a place where liberal education can be pursued. However, in this claim Newman has not explained how theology could underpin liberal education. Newman can be criticized for juxtaposing liberal education and a Catholic university without providing any kind of supporting argument about how the ‘Catholicity’ of a university would ground or justify the liberal education that ought to take place there. Newman does not specify why the education in a Catholic university would need to be a liberal one. It might well have been that the Irish bishops who invited him to run the Catholic university would have preferred a super-seminary (theology plus other subjects), however, this is not what Newman argued for (Cornwell, 2010; Ker, 2011; Rupert, 1988). Newman modelled his proposed Catholic university not on the seminary but on what he saw as the best aspects of non-Catholic universities (such as Oxford). Moreover in Newman’s argument for a liberal

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education it is the enlargement of the mind (the capacity to think) rather than any subject, theology included, that plays the key role. A liberal education does not prepare you for a specific profession but it does develop the disposition of enlargement of the mind. For Newman this disposition is the defining characteristic of the ‘gentleman’. A successful liberal education resulted in the formation of the ‘gentleman’ and this is different from the formation of someone as a Christian. This indicates a dissonance between a Catholic university, liberal education and the catechesis of someone as a Christian. According to Cornwell (2010) there is a striking paradox at play in Newman’s argument here given his audience, in particular the Irish bishops who wanted a Catholic university which was established on religion. He explains that Newman was proposing that, the Church as educator, and the university as educator, are two different entities; capable of collaboration, yet not one and the same thing. (Cornwell, 2010, p. 131)

A university will, according to Newman, be geared to a liberal education in which the enlargement of the mind is fostered, rather than the formation of the Christian. This brings into focus an ambiguity in Newman between the relationship between liberal education and theology. This stems from the way the arguments of the Idea lead to two separate sets of claims. Some of the discourses are aimed at justifying the inclusion of theology in the curriculum of the university, while others deal with the distinctive features of liberal education. If there is a tacit connection between these sets of claims, it is weakened by the quality of some of Newman’s arguments for the inclusion of theology in the university curriculum. Newman blends together a number of arguments about theology’s place in the university in order to make two points. The first is to insist on its legitimate place in the university curriculum and the second is to argue for the special role that theology plays within the curriculum. Newman argues that theology is an essential or defining feature of the concept of a ‘university’. Without it there is a distortion of what universal knowledge consists of. There can only be a unity and cohesion of knowledge if all branches of knowledge are present within the curriculum. Newman comes close to presenting these points as a syllogism, arguing from his definition that a university is a place where there is a universal teaching of knowledge. However, both the logical form and the soundness of the premise in this syllogism can be challenged. Newman takes it as a given that theology just is a branch of knowledge, yet this is an assumption. Given Newman’s experience of studying and teaching at Oxford where he had

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learnt and taught the discipline called divinity or theology, it is an assumption grounded on his faith. However, as Loughlin pointed out: Yet Newman does little to defend his claim that theology is knowledge. He thinks it is sufficient to note that unbelief rests upon a mere assumption, that philosophy has yet to show the unattainability of religious truth, and that the onus probandi lies with those who think otherwise. (Loughlin, 2009, p. 229)

Newman simply rejects, without refuting, the arguments of those who would deny the truth and knowledge status of theological discourse. At a general level he could be accused of merely asserting his assumptions that theology involves knowledge, and that the ‘knowledge’ in theology is basically the same as that found in other disciplines or branches of knowledge. The concern here is that Newman is using the concept of knowledge in an unrecognizable way, in that Newman appears to be inferring from the presence of the subject of theology that theology is a branch of universal knowledge. There is of course an academic discipline known as ‘theology’, however, this is not the same as establishing that this subject is a branch of universal knowledge. Moreover, it is as if Newman has failed to appreciate the controversial nature of many theological claims, not least the question of God’s existence. One way of defending Newman would be to interpret him as presenting a conditional argument in which the existence of God is taken as given. In making the argument for a Catholic university, Newman was of course speaking to a predominantly Catholic audience, and he was there at the behest of the Irish Catholic bishops. In this context issues of God’s existence would not have been seriously raised or questioned. This is to maintain that in effect Newman was setting out what the implications would be for a university if God’s existence was known. Newman, like his audience, simply accepted the existence of God. However, Newman could be criticized for glossing between the conditional premise of ‘if ’ God exists and the making of an assumption that God does exist. Indeed if God does exist a reasonable case can be made (as Newman did) to show that this would impact on the other disciplines of knowledge in the university. There is in theory a difference between the study of God’s creation and the study of a universe which is not the product of a creator God. Newman’s argument is weakened by the presence of his assumption about the existence of God. Of course if the opening premise is weak, this makes it harder to accept the deductions and conclusions in the rest of Newman’s argument in the Idea. One way in which Newman could attempt to support his opening premise would be to appeal to natural theology. Newman, like many other Catholic

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theologians in the nineteenth century, had much confidence in what natural theology could legitimately establish. During the First Vatican Council (1869– 1870) the dogmatic teaching in Dei Filius was promulgated and this document asserted the ability of natural theology to prove beliefs such as the existence of God. For Newman, as a Catholic speaking with other Catholics about his vision for the Catholic university, he may well have felt fully confident about natural theology allowing him to take his opening premise as being true and unproblematic. However there are a number of problems with appealing to natural theology in this way. At the obvious level it would appear that Newman is being over confident about what natural theology can legitimately establish. Among contemporary Catholic theologians the common interpretation of Dei Filius (1870) is that it asserted the possibility of being able to engage in natural theology rather than teaching that it can be used definitively to prove the existence of God. The success or otherwise of Newman’s account of Catholic education is connected with the question of whether or not natural theology is able to establish the existence of God. The upshot of this is that, despite the conviction of his faith and the possibility of appealing to natural theology, Newman has still employed a premise that is conditional on accepting the existence of God. As such it is a controversial premise. What is intriguing about Newman’s Idea is the way he avoids positing any relationship between his religious assumptions about God’s existence and what ought to be taught to students. He more or less adopts the liberal curriculum as it currently stands and makes no recourse to theology. He has not attempted to develop an argument about why Catholic Christians ought to follow this kind of curriculum. This is the major concern with Newman’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education. The problem is that it avoids exploring or understates the relationship between theology and educational theory. There is no real attempt to provide a theological explanation of why a Catholic university would be committed to providing a liberal education. Moreover, the arguments Newman employed to justify the inclusion of theology complicate the situation. They risk the danger of implying that the justification for Catholic education is dependent on assumptions about whether or not God exists. Ultimately Newman’s way of arguing ends up underemphasizing the relationship between theology and educational theory. When it comes to liberal education Newman has not sought to use theology to justify why it ought to be a defining characteristic of a Catholic university.

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Newman’s failure to underpin his educational argument on theology can be briefly illustrated by referring to one of the more general criticisms raised against him. This concerns his definition of universities as places where there is the teaching of universal knowledge. There is certainly no theological justification for this definition. In contrast to Newman there are alternate definitions that might be more open to theological justifications. For example, many have put the emphasis on universities as centres of research rather than as places of teaching, and others have drawn attention to them as places of dispute. For example, MacIntyre (1998; 2009) has frequently pointed out that universities are aptly characterized as places of learned disagreement. It is not just that Newman’s definition of the university is controversial, but more importantly he also fails to draw upon theology to support his argument.

Conclusion This chapter has considered Newman’s contributions to the theory of Catholic education. He is significant as one of the relatively few Catholic theologians who has given an extended consideration to issues of educational theory. In arguing for his idea of a Catholic university Newman brings into focus some distinctions that help to clarify the theory of Catholic education. Perhaps the most important of these concerns his stance on formal education and the formation of someone as a Christian. This distinction brings into focus the vagueness and ambiguity in the concept of Catholic education. This concept can be taken to mean either the education of someone as a Catholic Christian or the approach or theory that Catholics might take of education as a whole. Newman affirms that a liberal education does not make one a Christian, rather the most it will do is make someone a gentleman. In distinguishing between faith formation and education Newman brings into focus the question of what ought to be the relationship between faith formation and formal education. In presenting his arguments in support of a Catholic university Newman suggests that the concept of Catholic education can be coherently uncoupled from faith formation. In this, Newman was recognizing some of the limits of what could be achieved through formal education. Another positive feature of Newman’s argument was the role of what he referred to as ‘philosophy’ (or the enlargement of the mind) in being educated. He is emphatic that the overarching goal of a liberal education is to develop the capacity to think. In assessing the positive

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features of Newman’s account of education it is relatively easy to suggest a resonance between him and Hirst. In some notable respects Newman offers an embryonic version of the kinds of arguments Hirst subsequently developed in support of liberal education. Newman could be characterized as a precursor to Hirst. In this, Newman sought to make the case for liberal education. Of course these positive features of Newman’s account need to be counterbalanced with the weaknesses and issues raised about the coherence of his arguments. There are the specific questions about Newman’s assumptions about knowledge being a unified whole and the obvious platonic overtones which this brings (Dunne, 2006). Moreover, there are some seriously underdeveloped aspects to Newman’s argument. The most obvious of these surrounds the relationship between liberal education and theology. In this Newman draws attention to a more fundamental issue about what ought to be the relationship between theology and education within a robust theory of Catholic education. Now attention will shift to the philosopher Maritain who has taken reflection on the theory of education further than Newman was able to, not least because he was better at not understating the relationship between liberal education and theology.

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Maritain and the Theory of Catholic Education

Introduction This chapter will focus on the philosopher Jacques Maritain who, alongside Newman, is one of the relatively few Catholic theorists to have carried out an extended treatment of Catholic education. Whereas Newman is a theologian, Maritain is a philosopher and he sought to make a distinctly philosophical contribution to discussions about Catholic education. He drew heavily on the philosophical tradition rooted in Thomas Aquinas and along with others contributed to a revival of interest in this during the mid-years of the twentieth century that is often described as neo-Thomism. In a similar way to Newman, there are many positive features to the contributions that Maritain has made to the theory of Catholic education and some of these have percolated into the official Church teaching on Catholic education. In many respects Maritain can be judged as developing and enhancing Newman’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education. One of the differences between Maritain and Newman is the way he characterized the meaning of Christian education. Instead of taking it in the two typical senses, as either the formation of someone as a Christian or as a distinct theory of Christian education, he used it to refer to the kind of education that characterized a Christian college. Against the largely positive contribution that Maritain made, he will be criticized for failing to adequately develop his supporting arguments. It is this lack of detail that leads to the concern that like Newman, although to a lesser degree, there is a tendency to down play the relationship between theology and education. Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) was a French philosopher who spent much of his professional career as a philosopher lecturing in the United States. He published widely in general philosophical fields including epistemology,

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metaphysics and political philosophy. Maritain was one of the philosophers involved in formulating the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. In his early twenties he converted from Protestantism to Catholicism, mainly as a result of his introduction to the works of St Thomas Aquinas. For Maritain being a philosopher and a committed Catholic went together in a positive and constructive way. Nestled within his wide-ranging works are some smaller studies devoted to educational issues and it is these which will be the primary focus in what follows. The most important of these studies is Education at the Crossroads (1953), a work that was based on the Terry lectures that he delivered at Yale in 1943. This work was widely published in the United States where it has continued to be an influential text. Some such as Dearden (1982) have regarded it as the closest statement that there is of a distinctive theory of Catholic education and others have reiterated this observation (Carr et al., 1995). In addition to the 1953 study there is a collection of shorter essays by Maritain named The Education of Man (1962 – edited by D & I Gallagher). Compared to Maritain’s total body of work these specifically educational texts amount to a small selection of works and this provides a helpful reminder that he was not primarily a philosopher of education. Moreover, much of his discussion of the aims of education need to be interpreted against the broader themes in his other non-educational works. There is, as Gallagher (a leading commentator on Maritain) noted, the need for some caution in appraising his contribution to educational theory: Maritain’s educational work, unlike Dewey’s, are not usually considered to be among his major contributions to philosophy. He himself refers to these and other works as sketches in that they are simply outlines of large studies that he hoped to complete and in that they are intended as starting points for fellow-Thomists and collaborators to join in the same task. (Gallagher, quoted in Allard, 1982, p. vii)

The sketch-like quality of Maritain’s education contributions will inevitably be reflected in what follows and will be a principal part of the criticisms that are raised. Maritain would have been the first to recognize that he has not given a fully developed theory of Catholic education. Unlike Newman who has continued to exert an ongoing influence, the contemporary interest in Maritain has tended to wane particularly outside of North America. However, it is important to recall that he is a notable philosopher from the more recent past who led a revival in Christian humanism during the early twentieth century . . . Inspired by a vision of the common good and of a future Christian commonwealth derived from orthodox Catholic teachings, Maritain proposed traditional answers to modern problems. (Power, 1998, p. 1)

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Keeping this in mind attention will now turn to describing how Maritain understood the central features of education. Maritain, like Newman, offers a number of positive insights into the theory of Catholic education and his insights provide a useful starting point upon which to enhance and further this theory. In what follows the emphasis will be on both giving a positive exposition and a critical scrutiny.

What are the central features of education according to Maritain? Maritain is concerned with presenting arguments about what education, taken as a whole, ought to involve. He is interested in education in general rather than formally presenting the distinctive theory of Catholic education. Maritain’s educational arguments are underpinned by the premises and philosophical traditions of neo-Thomism. This means that if Maritain successfully describes what education in general ought to involve he has simultaneously described what the theory of Catholic education ought to involve. One way in which Maritain stands out is his distinctive use of the concept of Christian or Catholic education. Typically this concept is taken as referring either to the catechesis of someone as a Christian or as the theory of Christian education. For Maritain Christian education refers to the kind of education that takes place within a Christian school or college. Maritain’s two specifically educational works, Education at the Crossroads and The Education of Man, approach educational issues with the clarity that is often characteristic of good philosophy, in that Maritain begins by focusing on the aims or goal of education, and in this he recognizes the interrelationship between educational theory and anthropology. Here anthropology is being used in the philosophical sense, as a theoretical analysis, rather than in the empirical sense which typically characterizes anthropology in the social sciences. Maritain argues that anthropological questions about what it is to be ‘man’ are of primary importance in working out what education ought to involve. It is the anthropological questions about what a human being is that dictate what the goal and aims of education need to be. This interconnection between educational theory and anthropology continues to be something that contemporary philosophers of education draw attention to (e.g. White, 2003a). For Maritain, The chief task of education is to shape man, to guide the evolving dynamism through which man forms himself as a man. (Maritain, 1953, p. 1)

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In this statement he is alluding to the axiom of the Greek poet Pindar who declared that humans should become what they are. According to Maritain our contemporary understanding of what it is to be a human being, a person, is drawn from three distinct strands. The first of these is from ancient Greek philosophy, in particular the Aristotelian insistence that ‘man’ is a rational animal. The second is from the Jewish belief about humans being in a personal relationship with God and how humans need to respond to this by following the law of God. The third strand is from the Christian belief that humans are sinful creatures who have been called through grace to share in God’s divine life in an ongoing relationship based on love. Maritain uses this three-stranded account of what it is to be a human being as the starting point for his treatment of the aims of education. These strands help to bring into focus the theological premises within Maritain’s position. Reference has already been made to him as a neo-Thomist and the relevance of this need to be spelt out. It is not simply that Maritain was a contemporary exponent and advocate of Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy and theology, rather that Maritain’s neo-Thomism reflects his philosophical and theological assumptions and starting points. Maritain as a committed Catholic is a philosopher who engages in philosophy in a way that accepts and endorses his faith. The premises of theology, such as the necessary existence of God, are truths formally revealed by God and whilst they are open to critical scrutiny they are not for a Thomist like Maritain open questions. Strictly speaking, according to Maritain, the premises of philosophy are independent of God and religious belief. However, they can be legitimately approached and engaged with from within the stance of faith and Maritain does this by drawing upon Aquinas. Amongst neo-Thomists there is a tendency to refer to this as Christian philosophy, but Maritain is not comfortable with doing this. For Maritain the activity of philosophy is something that both the Christian and non-Christian can do. It follows that Maritain’s analysis of anthropology will also bring into focus his theological beliefs about the place of God in constituting the ultimate aim or fulfilment of human beings. For Maritain what it is to be a human being is something that has a profoundly religious dimension. Personhood is ultimately wrapped up in recognizing one’s relationship with God. It involves coming to recognize, understand and appreciate human beings as created in the image and likeness of God. As a consequence of the interconnection between anthropology and the aims of education, it would follow that for Maritain education ought to be characterized in a religious sense. Education, both informal and formal, would be directed towards this religious goal. Maritain sought to explain what this kind of anthropology would mean

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for a genuinely liberal education. In the opening chapters of Education at the Crossroads, Maritain seeks to tease out some of the distinctions between ‘man’, ‘human’, ‘person’, ‘individual’ and the development of ‘personality’. He works with the definition that Man is an animal endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal relationship with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God. (Maritain, 1943, p. 7)

This definition reflects his religiously grounded anthropology. From this initial step he goes on to describe the educational implications. In simple terms Maritain maintains that given the kind of ‘thing’ that human persons are, they require an education that will awaken their freedom at a number of different levels including what he took to be the fundamental level, the religious one. An account of liberal education ought to be inclusive of these different levels of freedom.

Maritain’s anthropology and corresponding account of education Maritain explains that there is a deep-seated bipolarity within human beings. Each human enjoys simultaneously having both individuality and personality. The physical individual aspect of the human is one pole and the spirit or soul is the other pole. Although Maritain’s blurring of the distinctions between ‘person’ and ‘personality’ sits uncomfortably with contemporary common usage, it does serve to emphasis that the spirit or soulful aspect of the human is bound up with being a person. There is something over and above mere individuality and this is where ‘person’ and ‘personality’ come into play. Maritain uses the terms ‘soul’, ‘person’, and ‘personality’ in order to express the animating principle within the physical individual. Maritain is at pains to distance himself from a crude Cartesian dualism. There is a unity in the human being between the individual physical matter and the person. To emphasize this unity Maritain often refers to the ‘human person’: When we say that a man is a person, we do not mean merely that he is an individual, in the sense that an atom, a blade of grass, a fly or an elephant is an individual. Man is an individual who holds himself in hand by his intelligence and his will; he exists not merely in a physical fashion. (Maritain, 1962, p. 162)

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Humans are individuals in ways that are different to other individual entities (such as flies) because they have the two key features of free will (the ability to choose) and intelligence. Maritain maintains that these features are interrelated, in that what one freely chooses to do would be connected with one’s intellect (in terms of what and how one knows and what one desires to know). According to Maritain these are spiritual capacities reflecting the reality of the soul. He contends that this avoids Descartes dualism because, in basic terms, the same thing is both an individual and a person. Maritain uses these anthropological themes to guide and inform his account of education. This covers the widest sense of education as a process of ‘upbringing’ as well as the more specific rational and cognitive development of the individual. The latter is something that mostly occurs in school or formal education and the former on the whole is achieved outside of formal education in the home, the Church and wider community. It follows that Maritain seeks to do two things. The first is to describe in more general terms a vision of education as upbringing which will be focused primarily on the development of the ‘person’ rather than the physical development of the individual. As Maritain puts it, A kind of animal training which deals with psychological habits, conditioned reflexes, sense memorisation etc., undoubtedly plays a part in education: it refers to material individuality, or to what is not specifically human in man. But education is not animal training. The education of man is a human awakening. (Maritain, 1953, p. 9)

This human awakening is something that needs to fostered and stimulated through formal education. Secondly, Maritain seeks to spell out the key characteristics of the kind of liberal education that ought to be part of general education at school, prior to the specialisation that would occur during Higher Education. In many respects Maritain is developing Newman’s arguments for liberal education. In contrast to Newman he is advocating a liberal education for all (rather than just for gentlemen) as part–and-parcel of secondary education. Maritain is advocating a liberal education for all secondary school pupils which would come prior to university. After gaining the ‘rudiments’ in primary school, young people would be presented with a broad common curriculum in what Maritain characterized as the ‘humanities’. For Maritain the humanities needed to be recast to include the whole curriculum (i.e. all science and arts subjects). Young people needed to be initiated into the full range of human knowledge (the humanities) and it was certainly not sufficient for them to be given an education

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in the liberal arts without any time being given to the physical sciences. Although Maritain recognized that a primary focus of formal education at school would inevitably be on intellectual and cognitive development, this was not the whole picture. Pupils also had to develop dispositions about the dignity of work, in particular manual labour and the satisfaction that comes from a job being done well. This would be a way of overcoming the distinctions and oppositions between a liberal and a vocational education. For Maritain the role of formal education was not for pupils to achieve mastery of particular subjects but rather for them to gain a general awakening through their exposure to the humanities. Young people could specialize their education at university or enter the world of work. In either context, learning or education would not stop with the end of compulsory schooling. Maritain maintained that given the interconnection between education and anthropology that being educated is a lifelong process of becoming fully human. For those who did opt to continue formal education at university there was the opportunity to specialize in particular disciplines.

Maritain’s insistence on education for freedom Maritain wanted to play on the various meanings of liberal education and in doing this he made freedom the central value and motif in the theory of education he advocates. He utilizes his anthropology, and the claims that underpinned his argument, to extend the meaning of liberal education. According to Maritain, The prime goal of education is the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom to be achieved by the individual person . . . [and he adds] this liberation comes through knowledge, wisdom, goodwill and love. (Maritain, 1943, p. 11)

This claim throws some light on Maritain’s complex account of freedom. It exists at different levels or degrees and has both metaphysical and political dimensions. Maritain uses a range of terms to discuss freedom including ‘freedom of independence’, ‘liberty of spontaneity’, ‘liberty of autonomy’, ‘terminal freedom’, ‘freedom of choice’, ‘free will’ and the ‘conquest of freedom’. Maritain presents a complex account of freedom in which there are four senses to the meaning of freedom and education for freedom. Freedom begins first at the physical level. For example, a stone could be described as being in ‘free fall’ and this would indicate that nothing is

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constraining its physical movement. At the second level vegetative life enjoys the freedom in the way it grows according to its nature. At a third level sensitive life can be described as having a freedom of spontaneity, for example, the bird sings or flies ‘freely’ and as such nothing is constraining it. Maritain explains that freedom can be enjoyed at an even higher fourth level when a human person uses his or her intelligence to make choices which are self-imposed in a way that the stone, plant or animal movement is not. It is not simply to be unconstrained in these senses but the result of autonomy where ends are self-imposed. It is the human person that can enjoy this autonomous freedom. This is because the human person has free will. Maritain also referred to this autonomous freedom as ‘freedom of independence’. Maritain argues for an account of freedom in which there is a spectrum, beginning with an initial freedom that the human person has in virtue of being a physical individual. At the other end of the spectrum is a terminal freedom in which the human person achieves an autonomous freedom. Movement or development along this spectrum occurs because the human person has intelligence (a mind) and is also endowed with free will. Maritain likened this movement to the conquest of the mountain climber who reaches the peak after much toil and endurance. Achieving autonomy is not an easy or guaranteed goal. It is free will and the intellect that acts as the motor that enables the human person to achieve this goal. Education has a central role in supporting the conquest of freedom and in helping the person to achieve autonomy. According to Maritain the development of the person or personality and the achievement of freedom of independence are integrally connected. He explained that ‘In each of us personality and freedom of independence increase together’ (Maritain, 1962, p. 165). Maritain argues for an interrelationship between being a person and achieving freedom of autonomy. There is no guarantee that a human person will become free in this more profound sense. Maritain declared that, Man is not born free, he becomes free by warring on himself and thanks to the many struggles he faces and by exercising his freedom, he wins his freedom. (Maritain, 1962, p. 168)

Formal education plays a pivotal role in fostering freedom generally and in particular in helping to achieve the autonomy that Maritain referred as the conquest of freedom. This could be described as a process of ‘becoming’ free or about beginning to achieve freedom. According to Maritain there are several directions in which it can lead, with the most important being the true conquest

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of freedom in which the human person achieves a liberation in which a complete (or in Maritain’s terms terminal) relationship with God is realized. It involves becoming holy in the way that is characteristic of saints or martyrs. According to Maritain education for liberty (liberal education) hinges on the role of formal education in developing the intellect in relation to free will. As children and young people are presented with knowledge and with truth, this informs and guides free will. Choices can be made in response to knowledge, truth and understanding. The student is introduced to truth in accumulated knowledge, understanding, and wider culture and this informs and guides their free will. According to Maritain: ‘The educational venture is a ceaseless appeal to intelligence and free will in the young person’ (Maritain, 1962, p. 61). Freedom and rationality are integrally connected in so far as the human person is capable of knowing and acting on her knowledge that she is free. The human infant is born as a tabular rasa and if he or she is to function and to begin to conquer freedom, it will be necessary to be initiated into the collective insights and knowledge accumulated by the wider society. Allard (1982) maintains that for Maritain ‘education’ and ‘freedom’ are two sides of the same coin. One of the contemporary resonances with Maritain’s account is his insistence that a liberal education is a lifelong process. Beyond formal education each of us is striving to achieve freedom throughout the whole of our lives. This is part of the reason why secondary education provides a broad and general ‘liberal’ education rather than promoting specialization. Higher Education is, in contrast to Newman, about specialization rather than fostering a liberal education for a select grouping in society. Another contemporary characteristic is the attention Maritain gives to education for active citizenship. Maritain is drawing out what sort of education the human person living in a free society is entitled to receive. It is one in which all citizens have a right to a liberal education and one which will involve the development of dispositions including love of justice and a sense of cooperation between people. These dispositions are part of what Maritain refers to as the democratic charter. At the heart of this charter is a commitment to equality and a respect for individual rights. Education needs to take place in a way that reflects and emulates this democratic charter, in particular educating students in such a way as to ensure the future survival of democracy. Part of the function of a school is to form citizens with critical minds who can participate in political life and contribute to the common good. Without this political freedom it would be extremely unlikely that the primary goal of education, the awakening of autonomy, could be achieved.

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Maritain’s practical proposals about the curriculum Although Maritain was primarily concerned with exploring the relationship between anthropology and education, he did give some attention to practical considerations about the curriculum. These practical proposals are distinct from his general assertion that all parts of the curriculum ought to be referred to as humanities. For Maritain this assertion was more of a slogan than a practical proposal for how to reclassify the subjects of the curriculum. In both Education at the Crossroads and in the Education of Man Maritain made a number of proposals about the secondary school curriculum. For seven years, from the age of 13, there were two phases to this curriculum. The first, from 13 to 15, were the years of the humanities. Pupils would learn what Maritain called the instruments of thought (grammar, logic and languages) and history, geography and zoology/ biology. Each year would have its own focus, starting with languages, followed by grammar and finally history and expression. The second phase, which he called the college years, ran from 16 to 19. The focus was on knowing about different branches of the humanities and general rational activity. There would be a year devoted to maths and poetry, another to natural science and fine arts, followed by a third year engaging in philosophy. The final year would focus on ethical and political philosophy. Maritain proposed a broad common curriculum that would be on offer to all pupils. Against this context it is interesting to note that for Maritain philosophy would be part-and-parcel of the common curriculum, however theology (and religious education) would be present as an optional course. In these practical proposals Maritain was, as Allard (1982) pointed out, recasting the traditional trivium and quadrivium of the medieval university and applying it to the contemporary secondary curriculum. The trivium were the subjects of grammar, logic and rhetoric, which were considered to the three ways into or foundation of learning. After completing the trivium students could progress onto the quodrivium. These were the four subjects of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. Taken together these were the seven subjects of the liberal arts and they were regarded as the essential preparation for the study of philosophy.

Maritain and Christian education It has already been noted that Maritain gives his own distinctive sense to the concept of Christian education. In that he uses to refer to the kind of education

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that would take place a Christian college or school. It is interesting to observe that Martian presents his explicit treatment of Christian education as if it were an addendum, coming at the end of both Education at the Crossroads and The Education of Man. Maritain maintains that the education that takes place in a Christian school or college is one that can combine both educational and catechetical elements. For example, he describes how Christian education does not only lay stress on the natural spirituality of which man is capable, . . . and if it is true to its highest aim, it turns man towards grace given spirituality, toward a participation in the freedom, wisdom and love of the saints. (Maritain, 1962, p. 131)

In this Maritain is not actually advocating a confessional account of education. In the Christian college the student is presented with the curriculum plus additional opportunities in which the student can nurture their faith. As part of this he recommends fostering liturgical knowledge and the liturgical life of Catholic students. Students can elect to take part in this during their school day. However, in terms of the rest of the curriculum the wider goals of education remain focused on awakening the person, rather than fostering his or her faith. When describing the curriculum in a Catholic school he avoids couching it in terms of confessional education by explaining that, Our watchword should be enlargement, Christian inspired enlargement, not narrowing, even Christian centred narrowing, of the humanities. (Maritain, 1962, p. 136)

The emphasis is on the way in which Christianity can positively inspire or influence the content of the curriculum rather than controlling it. As part of this Maritain advocates expanding the list of great books to include some of the works of St Augustine. More generally Christian ideas, from contemplation to the dignity of manual work, should be used to inform and enhance the curriculum. Here the emphasis is on fostering broadly Christian dispositions amongst students. This is very different from encouraging them to love the saints. Maritain specifically rejects references to Christian maths, rather he suggests that the Christian educator will strive to bring out additional elements of a subject that reflect a religious or theological dimension. The Christian educator will awake in the student something beyond mathematics, first, a sense of the proper place of these disciplines in universal knowledge and human thought; second, an unspoken intimation of the immortal value of truth,

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Although hard to pin down what he means by something ‘beyond mathematics’ it is to do with helping students improve their understanding of this subject in the greater scheme of things, rather than using it to foster faith or a love of God. This is about cognitive ability in say mathematics rather than faith formation. One of the distinctive features of the Christian school or college according to Maritain is over the optional status of religious education (or theology). For Maritain this subject was primarily about faith formation and catechesis. He proposed that it too ought to be on offer for students, however, it would not be a compulsory part of the curriculum. For Maritain it is imperative that this kind of course is only taken on grounds of free consent. Moreover, he hints that theology (and presumably religious education) might not be suitable for some people and courses in it should only be taken by pupils who have a natural inclination for it. What is intriguing about Maritain’s treatment of Christian education is that it would allow for the possibility of students who attended this kind of school or college to pursue their education without taking up any of the opportunities for religious education, bible study, or liturgical celebrations. In fairness to Maritain, he no doubt assumed that students who attended a Catholic school or college would want to take up these additional opportunities alongside their compulsory subjects. Having outlined Maritain’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education the attention now needs to shift away from positive exposition and onto critical discussion.

A critical discussion of Martian and the theory of Catholic education Although Maritain’s account of education has many positive features it also provokes a number of concerns. Before summarizing the positive features and critically discussing the theory of education that emerges from Maritain, some attention needs to be given to the sense in which it can be regarded as a contribution to the theory of Catholic education. Of course this might be regarded as a facile issue because Maritain was presenting his account of education as a neo-Thomist philosopher and as such he sought to integrate his Catholic faith into these philosophical works. Therefore the theory of education he formulates could be

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readily regarded as contributing to the theory of Catholic education. However, there is a genuine question that can be raised here. Maritain is concerned with presenting arguments about what education, taken as a whole, ought to involve. The titles of his texts about education indicate that he is interested in education in general rather than in presenting what the distinctive theory of Catholic education involves. Reference has already been made to both his uneasiness with the concept of Christian philosophy and to the distinctive way in which he uses the concept of Christian education. There is also the observation that his treatments of Christian education appear almost as postscripts within his two educational texts. One way of resolving any potential tension here would be to recall the ways in which Maritain’s argument are underpinned by the premises and philosophical traditions of neo-Thomism. This would make the theory of Catholic education synonymous with the ‘true’ account of education. Thus if Maritain has successfully described what education in general ought to involve he has simultaneously described what the theory of Catholic education ought to involve. Of course this means that if the scaffolding provided by neoThomism were to be taken away or undermined this would make the potential tension here more significant. It is worth noting an almost identical concern was raised about the underlying argument presented in Pius XI’s 1929 encyclical, considered previously in Chapter 2. An illustration of the tension at play here is revealed in his unquestioned acceptance of the way that anthropology is integrally bound up with religion. Maritain is not merely including a vague religious dimension to anthropology. This is because he accepts the Thomist insistence that the telos of human life is ultimately religious, in that it is about being in a positive relationship with God. This kind of theocentric anthropology is not self supporting and as such it highlights the degree to which Maritain’s theory of education is bound up with the success or otherwise of neo-Thomism. It should be evident from the general exposition of Maritain and education above that there are many positive characteristics. At a generic level it is free from the defensiveness that permeated Pius XI’s encyclical. It successfully avoids being drawn into trying to justify Catholic education in terms of parental rights. In large part this is because it presents in positive terms the theory of what education when taken as a whole ought to involve. This positive tone is built upon a coherent line of argument that recognises the interrelationship between philosophical anthropology and theories of education. By beginning with an account of what ‘man’ is in general terms, Maritain is able to present a plausible argument about the kind of education that ought to take place. Another positive characteristic of

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Maritain’s account is the way in which it is inclusive. Liberal education is depicted as something that all students are entitled to as part of their general secondary education. Not only does this inclusion stand in stark contrast to Newman, but it also allows for university education to be geared to specialization and research. This gives Maritain’s account a contemporary resonance, despite the fact that much of his educational arguments were formulated during the depths of the Second World War. One other positive feature is the way in which Maritain did not confine himself to a general discussion of education without regard to the practical implications for the curriculum. He even advocates the introduction of philosophy into the secondary school curriculum. These positive characteristics need, however, to be juxtaposed with possible concerns and criticisms that can be raised about the details of Martian on the theory of Catholic education. Although he recognized the sketch-like quality of his educational theorizing, this admission does not mitigate these criticisms and concerns. There is miss-match between his theory and his practical proposals. A few of the more obvious examples help to illustrate this. First, Maritain’s practical suggestions for the secondary school curriculum have little in the way of theoretical underpinning. This is not simply about Maritain’s slogan-like assertion that all subjects ought to categorized as humanities. Rather there is no supporting argument about his listing of subjects, nor about the reasons for studying them in any given year. While it might be possible to use this list of subjects to work out many of Maritain’s educational assumptions, there is no supporting argument to justify his description of the curriculum. Moreover, there is a suspicion that what has influenced Maritain’s description of the seven years of secondary education was the traditional trivium and quadrivium. There is at best a tacit argument that is merely being hinted at here. A second illustration of the dissonance between his theoretical arguments and practical proposals crops up in his treatment of moral education. Maritain draws attention to many dispositions that ought to be fostered among pupils, from the love of justice and a sense of cooperation between people to positive attitudes to manual labour and the satisfaction of doing a job well. Yet in Maritain’s practical proposals no attention is given to how these dispositions could be practically implemented in the curriculum. It would be expected, given Maritain’s theory, that moral education would play a prominent role in the curriculum he proposes. The specific proposals are not sufficiently tied to his theoretical account. The missmatch between his theory and practical proposals would support Maritain’s observation about the sketch-like quality of his educational reflection. It can be criticised for being an underdeveloped account. Moreover, it can also be argued

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that some parts of Maritain’s theoretical reflection are also underdeveloped. For example, while Maritain does offer a justification for why freedom ought to be the central educational value it could be criticized for being incomplete. It is as if Maritain has started well, but he has not taken the supporting arguments far enough. This is well reflected in his use of anthropology to guide and inform educational theory. While this is a plausible and fruitful approach it is weakened by his failure to justify his preferred anthropology. In addition there are some parts of Maritain’s practical proposals that do not have any obvious basis in his theoretical account of Catholic education. The most obvious example of this is his inclusion of philosophy within the common curriculum of secondary school pupils. Maritain does not offer any supporting reasons to explain or justify why philosophy ought to be introduced into the final years of secondary education. There is no explanation of why these pupils, as opposed to the younger ones ought to be exposed to philosophy. The failure to provide any theoretical justification helps to fuel the suspicion that his reasons for including it actually stem the way the trivium and quadrivium prepared students to engage in philosophy. It might well be that there are many sound reasons why philosophy ought to integrated into the curriculum of a Catholic school, however, Maritain has merely introduced it without any justification. Maritain, like Newman, draws a helpful distinction between the catechesis that occurs in the home and Church, and formal education that takes place in school. Moreover, his idiosyncratic use of the concept of Christian education introduces a further distinction into what it can be taken to be. For Maritain Christian education is about the educational provisional that is characteristic of a Catholic school or college. The curriculum in this kind of school would be non-confessional and it would be complimented by a range of additional, although optional, courses and activities. Maritain, along with Newman, can be cited as allowing for the possibility of couching the theory of Catholic education along non-confessional terms. However, where Maritain can be criticized in this is his failure to spell out the details of this. In particular, it is difficult to work out in practice how the curriculum in a Catholic school could be organised to allow pupils to pursue a range of optional courses in religion or theology and activities such as liturgies alongside their compulsory core curriculum. These are eminently practical questions and consideration that unfortunately Maritain does not address. Finally, there are a number of lesser theological anxieties that can be raised about Maritain’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education. On first impressions Maritain appears to be much better than Newman at not downplaying

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the relationship between theology and education. This would be because Maritain readily accepts the premises and assumption of neo-Thomism, which is an approach that emulates Aquinas’ integration of Aristotelian philosophy with theology. In this broad sense theology would be assumed or presupposed within Maritain’s treatment of education. However, there are some possible drawbacks with this approach. For instance, the broad approach of neo-Thomism has been subject to criticism and it is possible to identify in the developments of Vatican II a move away from it. Some, including Kelty (1999), Joseph (2001) and Elias (2002), have described a major decline since the 1960s in attempts to formulate the theory of Catholic education along Thomistic lines. Beyond this shift in theological attitudes towards neo-Thomism there is a question about how exactly theology guides and informs Maritain’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education. For example, Maritain does not explain how theology would support his conviction that freedom is the central priority in education. Although it might be possible to connect his insistence on education for freedom with the biblical teaching that the truth will set you free (John 8:32) this is not something that Maritain actually does. It might well be that the theological underpinning here is implicit rather than formally worked out. Given this it is possible to raise the suspicion that perhaps Maritain is simply adopting pre-existing ideas about liberal education without any theological justification. This would mean that Maritain could also be criticized for downplaying the relationship between education and theology.

Conclusion This chapter has considered Maritain’s contributions to the theory of Catholic education. He stands alongside Newman in being one of the relatively few Catholic theorists who has given an extended consideration to the theory of Catholic education. Maritain brings into focus some interesting and helpful distinctions about the theory of Catholic education, for example, the relationship between the theory of Catholic education and the kind of anthropology that Catholic theology could legitimately affirm. Moreover, Maritain extended the meaning of liberal education making it a feature of the kind of education that all students are entitled to. Maritain, like Newman, is suggestive of ways in which the theory of education can be coherently uncoupled from faith formation. In this both were recognizing some of the limits of what could be achieved through formal education. Of course these positive features of Maritain’s

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contribution to the theory of Catholic education need to be counterbalanced with the overarching concern that his supporting arguments are not sufficiently developed. Maritain shares with Newman, but to a lesser degree, the tendency to downplay the relationship between education and theology. Having considered both Newman and Maritain over the last two chapters it has become clearer that the existing contributions to the theory of Catholic education stand in need of further development. Attention now needs to move away from these existing contributions in order to consider how to go about improving and enhancing the theory of Catholic education. In many respects this will involve repairing and developing the central themes identified by both Maritain and Newman.

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How to Go about Constructing a Robust Theory of Catholic Education

Introduction Throughout Chapters 2, 3 and 4 it has been argued that the theory of Catholic education and schooling as it currently stands is not sufficiently robust. The critical analysis of the official Church teaching drew attention to two key issues. One is a preference for couching treatment of Catholic education in terms of the right of the Church to be an educational provider. A second is a tendency to overuse theological slogans to describe Catholic education and schooling. Indeed, little attention has been given to the relationship between theology and education, nor about how this makes the curriculum in a Catholic school distinctive. Beyond the official Church teaching, the contributions made by Newman and Maritain were considered. Both share a similar tendency to downplay the relationship between theology and education. The thrust of the argument developed in the preceding chapters has been to cast light on a number of significant deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education. In a large part it is these deficiencies that underlie many of the external and internal threats considered in the first chapter. Thus a number of theoretical and conceptual issues have been identified. In particular these have been about the conceptual looseness and ambiguity around the meaning of Catholic education and recurring concerns over the relationship between theology and the theory of Catholic education. Having drawn attention to these concerns or deficiencies the argument now needs to move on to considering the ways in which this theory can be improved or repaired. This is to put the attention on constructing a theory of Catholic education that is robust, being both coherent and defendable. However, before this task can begin it is imperative to briefly consider the methodological

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question about how to go about constructing a robust theory of Catholic education. Thus the critical analysis of the opening chapters now needs to give way to a constructive one. The question of how to make this move will be the focus of this chapter. This will then provide the platform from which to start constructing in the subsequent chapters, a stronger and more defensible theory of Catholic education.

How to begin constructing a robust theory of Catholic education The challenge of how to begin constructing a robust theory of Catholic education raises some issues connected with methodology. Above, in the introduction, it was noted that the argument being developed in this book is a theoretical one that straddles both the theology and philosophy of Catholic education. This is to put the emphasis on reasoning and arguing, detecting fallacies, conceptual analysis and clear exposition. However, beyond this broadly stated methodology some attention needs to be given to what this means for the task of constructing a theory of Catholic education. An obvious starting point is to be attentive to what is involved with theory construction. There are of course a number of different ways in which theories can be developed or constructed, and obviously many of these are not unique to philosophy and theology. For instance philosophy, as illustrated by the likes of Plato or Hume or Davidson has been heavily involved in the task of constructing theories in a range of differing ways. At the more obvious level this would involve attending to careful and precise descriptions of the underlying arguments, ideas and concepts that operate within a given theory. This will often involve drawing out inconsistencies and limitations in a theory. Through this ground-clearing philosophy can also contribute to the generation of solutions to limitations and inconsistencies. Beyond this one of the notable ways in which philosophy is involved in constructing theories is in the search for a solid foundation upon which to build it. Philosophically that has been wrapped up in epistemological foundationalism. A classic stance among many philosophers has been to seek an Archimedean point or set of certain first principles that can act as the firm foundations upon which knowledge claims, beliefs and theories can be built. The obvious example of epistemological foundationalism is Descartes. Within a Cartesian paradigm the role of philosophy in the task of theory construction

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would be to strip things away in order to search for some certainty. After stripping the existing theory away to reveal a firm foundation, the task would then be to rebuild the theory upon this certainty. The role of philosophy is to clear the ground and establish the foundation point around which the building (theory) can be constructed. In contrast to this Cartesian approach there is an alternative way of characterizing how philosophy is involved in the construction of theories. This would be an anti-foundationalist paradigm. It would involve rejecting epistemological foundationalism in preference for a coherentist approach. Knowledge and belief claims do not have fixed foundations. The metaphor of solid foundations is replaced with a more organic one, where beliefs and knowledge claims are woven together in a web like way to form structure and coherence. If the web of knowledge and belief claims were untangled or disconnected from each other there would be nothing left and certainly not a solid foundation. To push the metaphor, the strength of the web comes from its internal structure and the coherence between each strand. In an anti-foundationalist paradigm the role of philosophy in theory construction is to build upon and enhance what already exists, in a way that recognizes the coherence and interrelationship in existing knowledge and belief claims. This simple description of the two dominant ways in which philosophy is involved in theory construction can be used to illustrate how the task of constructing a theory of Catholic education can be approached in two divergent ways. The first would reflect the Cartesian paradigm. This would involve stripping away existing curriculum theory in order to build a theory of Catholic education that was distinct from existing attempts to justify the institution of schooling, or compulsory education, or state maintained faith-based schools. The second approach, reflecting the anti-foundationalist paradigm, would involve working with what already exists in terms of educational theory. This would be to take as given a broadly subject-based curriculum and a system of compulsory state education organized via the institution of schooling. The priority would not be to go back to the drawing board in order to attempt to rebuild a theory Catholic education from scratch, but to hold in place much of the existing system in order to strengthen or repair any weaker strands in the web. This is to characterize the task of theory construction as an ongoing project or tradition that stands in need of repair rather than as something that requires reconstruction and rebuilding on some solid foundation. In the following chapters it is the second approach to constructing a theory of Catholic education that will be used to develop a more robust theory. There are two qualifications that need to be noted about this at outset. First, this is

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not to deny that it might well be possible to strip existing theory of Catholic education away to reveal some Archimedean point upon which to construct a more robust theory. Second, this decision does not involve taking a stance on epistemological foundationalism. Rather the intention behind this decision is grounded in the argument and analysis of the preceding chapters. The critical analysis has revealed concerns and deficiencies within the existing theory of Catholic education, however, it has not uncovered irretrievable flaws or profound incoherence. It is a theory that stands in need of repair rather than being one that needs a complete reconstruction. It is because of this that the metaphor of Neurath’s boat quickly comes to mind. Indeed this metaphor is suggestive of a methodological framework that can be employed in arguing for a more robust theory of Catholic education. Neurath’s metaphor uses the image of a ship that needs to be repaired whilst it is still at sea. The sailors cannot take the vessel into dry dock for repair but must make alterations and repairs while it is on the go. When Neurath originally used this metaphor it was in order to support his coherentist account of the philosophy of science. For Neurath the strength of this metaphor is that it draws out the ways in which our scientific knowledge claims are like a ship on the open seas. They are constrained by their context in the world in which they are made. These scientific knowledge claims operate in a kind of tradition in which there is a history and methodology within which they have been considered and grappled with. Just like a ship at sea we are not in a position to rebuild our scientific claims on empirical foundations that are infallible and pure, or in some sense ahistorical. As Neurath pointed out, There is no way to establish fully secured, neat protocol statements as starting points of the sciences. There is no tabula rasa. We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from its best components. Only metaphysics can disappear without a trace. (Neurath, 1932/1983, p. 92)

The ship has to remain structurally intact not least because it is being used to stay afloat on, but at the same time it needs to be repaired. These repairs can only take place while the ship is at sea. These repairs need to be done, as Quine (1960) explained, one plank at a time. This metaphor is intriguing because it is suggestive of the way in which even central planks could be replaced. In addition it is possible that eventually every plank in the vessel could be replaced. To push this metaphor in terms of theory construction, it hinges on the claim that when replacing problematic planks with better ones this must be done in a way that

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make sure that the planks fit. The repairs need guided by the larger framework within which the problematic plank is located. This implies that our norms are justified through appealing to the norms that are already there. As a result any replaced planks or sections of the ship have to fit in with the overall structure of the vessel. In proposing that Neurath’s ship is suggestive of methodological framework it is being claimed that this metaphor can be uncoupled from its original context within the philosophy of science. It is to take it as a kind of framework for how existing theories can be repaired and enhanced in terms that reflect their context or tradition. The task of developing a robust theory of Catholic education is not one that is being approached in a purely abstract way, but instead it is being approached from within the context of an existing tradition of Catholic education. The opening chapter drew attention to the historical reality of Catholic education and schooling. The theory of Catholic education is aptly characterized as a living tradition and ongoing project. Up to this point it has been argued that there are problems with the theory of Catholic education and these are indicative of the ways in which it needs to be repaired. These would be the planks in the ship or theory that need to be repaired. These repairs need to be made at the same time as keeping the overall theory of Catholic education structurally intact. This ship or theory is not one that can go into dry dock in order to be rebuilt, rather it has to be repaired while ensuring that it continues to be seaworthy. Using Neurath’s metaphor as a general methodological framework is not without precedent. Some philosophers outside of the philosophy of science have drawn on this metaphor and have couched it in terms of a Neurathian procedure (e.g. Hursthouse, 1995 and McDowell, 1995). The use of this Neurathian procedure in ethics is described by Harman (2003) as one of the three good trends in contemporary moral and political philosophy. An example of using Neurath as a methodological framework within the philosophy of education has been employed by Aspin and Chapman (2001). In their proposals about how to approach the concepts, values and theories connected with lifelong learning Neurath’s ship is used to provide the guidance. They describe how educational discourse about lifelong learning ought to be understood, like other cognitive activities, to be an interwoven web of different strands coming together in a coherent whole. Aspin and Chapman do more than simply cite Neurath’s metaphor as a helpful way of framing educational discourse about this topic. They explain how various criteria would need to be used in order to make the improvements to the discourse about lifelong

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learning. In practical terms their approach is illustrative of a procedure for subjecting theories, beliefs, policies and solutions to critical scrutiny. Their approach is suggestive of a method that could be utilized when engaging with educational theories and discourse. As they explain, Conceived of in this way educational discourse and policy analysis and construction is like any science – an unending quest to comprehend clearly the theories with which we are working, to compare them with the theoretical efforts and productions of others faced with similar problems, to subject them to positive criticism, to attempt to improve them and make them fit for their educational purpose. (Aspin and Chapman, 2001, p. 5)

Thus one plausible way of constructing a robust theory of Catholic education would be to emulate the use of Neurath’s ship as a general methodological framework. What this will involve can be sketched out in the following way. The critical analysis pursued in the preceding chapters draws attention to the principal weaknesses or concerns surrounding the theory of Catholic education as it currently stands. These weaknesses and concerns can be described as deficiencies that would need to be repaired in order to ensure that the theory of Catholic education is sufficiently robust. In terms of Neurath’s metaphor, these weaknesses could be viewed as the planks that need to be repaired or replaced in order to overcome the deficiencies. The challenge now is to begin the repair work to the theory of Catholic education. It is not possible to steer this vessel into a dry dock which means the repairs required to make it more robust need to be carried out while it is still at sea. In terms of method, a Neurathian procedure will be employed to frame or guide the development of a robust theory of Catholic education. The broader task of repairing this theory will, from a Neurathean perspective, inevitably involve holding in place much of the existing tradition or project of Catholic education. Therefore there will be no attempt to justify the institution of schooling, or compulsory education or the broadly subject-based curriculum. The Neurathian procedure will use the concerns and issues identified in the critical analysis of Chapters 1–4 as the starting points. These will be taken as indicators for where there are deficiencies in the existing theory of Catholic education and which planks need to be repaired or replaced. In terms of guiding this repair work attention needs to move onto specifying more accurately where these deficiencies lie. The critical analysis in earlier chapters brought into focus inconsistencies and weaknesses in the theory of Catholic education. The more detailed treatments of official Church teaching

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and the analysis of both Newman and Maritain drew attention to a number of similar weaknesses and concerns. In what follows it will be maintained that these deficiencies provide a helpful indicator for where repair work is needed. This is to recast these deficiencies as the planks that stand in need of repair work. This might involve either patching them up or overcoming the deficiencies by finding some way of replacing them.

Deficiency 1: The problem of Catholic edu-babble The first deficiency is simple but endemic. It is the presence and widespread use of Catholic edu-babble, the vague slogan-like descriptors that are used to describe and explain the theory of Catholic education. This deficiency was identified at the end of Chapter 2 and was part of the more general concern about official Church teaching on Catholic education. It was McLaughlin (1996) who first coined the phrase Catholic edu-babble and it refers to the profound lack of clarity in the phrases that are routinely used to describe and discuss Catholic education. As McLaughlin explained: There is a distinctive Catholic variant of edu-babble which is typically forged out of phrases drawn from the various educational documents of the Church. Often the documents are ‘mined’ for such phrases in a rather eclectic way . . . Like edu-babble in general, such phrases are primarily useful as spurs to a deeper discussion, not a substitute for it. (McLaughlin, 1996, p. 138)

Catholic edu-babble is a serious issue because it clouds the meaning of statements about Catholic education. It tends to appear as theologically loaded slogans and clichés that are used in the descriptions of the central features of Catholic education. Common examples of it would include statements such as ‘Christ is at the centre of education’, ‘Gospel values and the curriculum’, or Catholic education makes pupils ‘fully alive’ or ‘able to reach their full potential’. These are of course examples of slogans and platitudes. What amplifies their vagueness is the way in which these statements also convey expressions of piety and faith commitment. For example, to declare that ‘Christ is the foundation of education’ is to express the belief and faith stance that Christ is at the heart of every aspect of human existence. As with all slogans and clichés, both of the theological and non-theological variety, there might well be occasions when their use would be beneficial, such as within a school prospectus, in a brief mission statement or even within a sermon. However, when removed from this

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kind of general context there is a real concern surrounding their vagueness and abstraction. Moreover, Catholic edu-babble has had a stifling effect on the development of a robust theory of Catholic education (McLaughlin, 1996). In a large part this is because there is a tendency for instances of it not to be recognized as such but instead assumed to be clear and helpful summaries. However, these kinds of phrases and slogans need to be viewed as starting points for further reflection about the nature and purpose of Catholic education. Too often, unfortunately, they are treated as the end points or conclusions in discussions of Catholic education. In Chapter 2 it was noted that a dominant feature that ran through the official Church teaching on education was the repeated use of vague and theologically loaded slogans. In addition, there were instances of this nestled within both Newman’s and Maritain’s discussion of Catholic education. One way of drawing out the problems with Catholic edu-babble is through reconsidering a frequently quoted instance of it. This is found in the Church document on The Catholic School (1977) where the purpose of a Catholic school is explained in these terms: Its task is fundamentally a synthesis of culture and faith, and a synthesis of faith and life: the first is reached by integrating all the different aspects of human knowledge through the subjects taught, in the light of the Gospel; the second is the growth of the virtues characteristic of the Christian. (The Catholic School, 1977, p. 37)

This complex sentence contains several examples of Catholic edu-babble. The first two stem from the concept of ‘synthesis’, and a third from the phrase about integrating all knowledge in the ‘light of the Gospel’. These statements are both vague and abstract which makes it difficult to properly grasp what they actually mean (Sullivan, 2001). Although talk of ‘synthesising culture and faith’ might be meaningful, it is an indeterminate concept. Similarly to refer to ‘integrating all the different aspects of knowledge through the subjects taught in the light of the Gospel’ is an overly abstract claim. The problem with these clauses is that they are polythemic and there is a lack of clarity about what they could and what they should mean. The vagueness within these clauses is compounded when the sentence is taken as a whole. This provokes a genuine concern of ambiguity over the meaning of these complex and abstract sentences. For example, what in practical terms would it mean for the curriculum to ‘integrate all the different aspects of human knowledge in the light of the Gospel’?

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Similarly the statement about Catholic education ‘synthesising’ faith and culture needs to be unpacked and explained further. However, this is something which is not done in the rest of the document. In fact within its original context this statement is treated as a concluding or summary observation. It is as if these phrases have been successfully explained and no further clarification is required. Even within the original context the slogan about Catholic schools being a ‘synthesis of faith and culture’ is both vague and abstract, and when it is removed from this context this lack of clarity is further compounded. The presence of Catholic edu-babble amounts to a serious deficiency within the theory of Catholic education. A robust theory of Catholic education would need to overcome or repair this deficiency and ensure that it avoided both vagueness and ambiguity. As such there ought to be no place for Catholic edu-babble in accounts of the theory of Catholic education. This involves a commitment to avoiding the use of indeterminate slogans and clichés when describing and defending the theory of Catholic education. The widespread prevalence of Catholic edu-babble serves as a useful reminder that overcoming this deficiency is a challenging demand. It is a much tougher demand than it might appear, not least because of the widespread presence of such Catholic edu-babble. However, a robust theory of Catholic education is one that would be largely free from any instances of it. This is a central way of defending the clarity and meaningfulness of statements about Catholic education. Catholic edu-babble is a deficiency because it is imprecise and it is frequently substituted in place developed ideas and arguments. A robust theory of Catholic education is one that would avoid this kind of vagueness and ambiguity through being clearly spelt out and applied in practical terms to the curriculum.

Deficiency 2: Problems caused by the confessional or catechetical meaning of Catholic education It was noted in previous chapters that there are two dominant ways in which the phrase ‘Catholic education’ can be taken. The first, and perhaps more obvious sense, is to interpret it in terms of the education or formation of someone as a Catholic Christian. This kind of education is typically regarded as catechesis, which is the nurturing of faith and commitment to Catholicism. The alternative way of taking this phrase is to refer to a distinctly Catholic account or approach to what counts as education as a whole. It is important to note that this distinctly Catholic account of education is separate from catechesis and the

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nurturing of faith. This is to take ‘Catholic education’ as a way of referring to a theory of Catholic education which is distinct from catechesis. In the critical discussion of Maritain it was noted that he employed the concept of Catholic education in a third way when describing the distinctive characteristics of education within a Catholic school or college. Part-and-parcel of the critical analysis in the preceding chapters involved showing that there is ambiguity in the existing contributions to the theory of Catholic education. However, the dominant interpretation of Catholic education has been one of confessional education, the formation of Catholics. One of the problems caused by the ambiguity in the meaning of Catholic education is that it has often hindered attempts to take further the theory of Catholic education. It has been assumed that Catholic education is by definition an essentially catechetical endeavour. This assumption has often gone unchallenged. In most, although not all of the external and internal threats identified in Chapter 1 the ambiguity around the meaning of Catholic education has played a role. For example, the internal threats and concerns facing Catholic education are fuelled by the assumption that Catholic education is integrally connected with catechesis. Hence, part of Arthur’s critique in The Ebbing Tide (1995) is that there has been a failure to keep this catechetical (what he referred to as the holistic) characteristic central. Similarly Grace’s (2002) empirical work revealed how many Catholic schools in the United Kingdom are being deflected from their true (catechetical) mission because of the pressure of market forces being introduced by successive government initiatives. In addition the force of many of the external threats comes down to assumptions about the meaning of Catholic education. For example, the concerns about Catholic education hindering autonomy and being indoctrinatory pivot on an assumption that Catholic schools are by definition confessional, and thus involved in an illicit immoral process of nurturing pupils into the Catholic faith. The deficiency here stems from retaining the catechetical or confessional meaning of Catholic education. One obvious, although challenging, way of responding to this deficiency is to contest the assumption about Catholic education being a confessional activity. In term of Neurath’s metaphor, the confessional plank of this theory needs to be replaced by one that is nonconfessional. This way of repairing the theory of Catholic education would need to be carefully argued for in the light of the critical analysis presented in the first four chapters.

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It is important to remember that there is a difference between nurturing faith and other ways of teaching. The catechist, as opposed to the educator, works with a specific assumption about having a shared faith with the student (or catechumen). This difference is drawn out in a typical definition of catechesis: When believers, with fellow believers deepen their personal faith by their dialogue, activity and worship with fellow members of the Church. (Rummery, 1975, p. 172)

The catechist is seeking to foster and nurture a shared faith between herself and the person being catechized. Catechesis tends to give priority to the content of what is being taught, wanting to ensure that the catechumens are properly nurtured in the central tenets of the faith. While this does not preclude criticism and evaluation, the broad approach of catechesis can also be characterized as apologetics. This stance involves attempting to give a positive defence of the Catholic faith. The process of catechesis seeks to foster faith and transmit beliefs to those who are being catechized. It is at this point that the concerns raised by Hirst begin to have their force. Hirst maintains that there are a number of difficulties with both the concept of Christian education and the distinctions between education and catechesis. At the conceptual level he argued that Christian education is a contradiction in terms (1972). In this he is, like R. S. Peters, using the insights of conceptual analysis to clarify the meaning and more controversially the content of education. He argues that ‘education’ is a concept that does not need to be qualified in terms of supporting ideas or frameworks. This means that to refer to ‘Christian education’ is to introduce a redundant concept because adding ‘Christian’ to the concept of ‘education’ does not take it any further. When it comes to the distinctions between catechesis and education, Hirst (1981) argues that they reflect two differing concepts of education, one primitive and the other sophisticated. In primitive education the priority is the way in which the group or society seeks to pass onto the next generation its rituals, values and beliefs. Catechesis is like this because it is concerned with handing on the faith, beliefs, values and rituals in their entirety to the next generation of Catholics. In contrast the sophisticated concept of education involves a recognition that the beliefs being handed onto the next generation are not of the same status. Some are objectively true on rational grounds and education involves passing on beliefs and practices according to their objective status and with appropriate justification. The sophisticated concept of education is concerned

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with developing reason and learning how to distinguish between what is belief, conjecture and subjective preference. Hirst argues that catechesis and education have some significant differences: Education in this second sense therefore, just because it is bound by the limits of reason, stops short of seeking to determine the personal development of pupils in terms of belief, action, attitudes, etc., where reason itself stops. It does all it can in terms of reason to prepare for personal commitment and faith, but beyond that it cannot go. It is concerned with all that reason can provide for the rationally autonomous life, on controversial as much as on non-controversial issues. But the life of reason it seeks to develop, it cannot of itself seek to complement by developing the life of faith. (Hirst, 1981, p. 88)

Hirst argues that education and catechesis have distinct aims and any attempt to combine education with catechesis would be to engage in a self-defeating activity. However, these concerns and arguments raised by Hirst are not equally persuasive. The first, about Christian education being a contradiction in terms, can be more easily challenged in a large part because philosophers of education are less inclined to push conceptual analysis to the same kinds of extremes that Hirst and Peters want to. The meaning of education can be enhanced or framed through linking it with supporting concepts. Perhaps the most obvious example is the linking of education with ‘liberal’. The concept of ‘liberal’ brings important supporting ideas to the meaning of education and this is now a widely endorsed concept. Hirst can be challenged over his rejection of the coupling of ‘Christian’ and education as it too can be characterized as a guiding framework that brings supporting ideas to the meaning of education. The Theos report Doing God in Education (Cooling, 2010) can be cited as a positive example of how this can be done. The second argument which distinguishes between catechesis and education raises more challenging concerns which are far harder to overcome. Hirst couches his concerns over the distinction between education and catechesis at a conceptual level. However, the concern here is a more challenging moral objection to catechetical or confessional forms of education. Given that education is concerned with fostering reason it would be morally unacceptable to attempt to hand on controversial and unknowable/unjustifiable religious claims to pupils as if there were knowable and justifiable in the way many other kinds of truth claims are. In

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more recent years this moral challenge has been reaffirmed and developed by Hand (2003, 2004, 2012). The trouble with beliefs imparted in this way is that they come to be held independently of relevant evidence and argument, and are thus highly resistant to rational criticism and revision. This sort of teaching is rightly regarded as indoctrinatory, and indoctrination is rightly condemned because to damage someone’s capacity to criticise and to revise her beliefs is to do her a kind of harm. (Hand, 2012, p. 551)

A theory of Catholic education that advocates a confessional account of education is faced with this moral objection. Of course one way of avoiding this objection would be to recognize and affirm a clear distinction between catechesis and education, and similarly to distinguish between confessional and non-confessional theories of Catholic education. In order to construct a robust theory of Catholic education it is necessary to reject not just the inconsistent use of the concept of Christian education but more precisely the catechetical or confessional sense of Christian education. The latter cannot be properly defended and as such, persisting with it would undermine the attempts to formulate a robust theory of Catholic education. The second deficiency is the demand that Catholic education should not be characterized as catechesis or the formation of pupils to become Catholics. This is to reject the confessional meaning of Catholic education. In a robust theory of Catholic education the phrase ‘Catholic education’ needs to be taken as one which refers to what Catholic Christians consider education as a whole ought to involve. This is to challenge the widely held assumption that tends to equate Catholic education with catechesis and a confessional account of education. A robust theory of Catholic education can address this second deficiency by rejecting the confessional or catechetical meaning of Catholic education.

Deficiency 3: The relationship between theology and education Many of the threats, issues and concerns raised about the theory of Catholic education in preceding chapters have in common a more fundamental question about what the relationship between theology and the theory of Catholic education ought to be. The critical analysis of official Church teaching on education, and of Newman and Maritain, demonstrated that spelling out this

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relationship is difficult. It was noted in Chapter 2 that there was preoccupation in many of the Church documents on education to focus on the Church’s right and responsibility to assist parents in providing a religious upbringing for their children. As a result little real attention is given to the ways in which the Church’s theology informs and guides the theory of Catholic education. Instead of providing a detailed consideration of the way it guides the curriculum instances of Catholic edu-babble are frequently employed. There are, for example, statements about the way Gospel values guide the curriculum. However, pinning down the relationship between theology and Catholic education has been an elusive task. It was explained that in Newman’s work there is a tendency to understate the relationship between theology and the curriculum. In a large part this is because Newman argues in favour of liberal education without any recourse to theology. Although Maritain employs the categories of neo-Thomism there is, to a lesser degree, a similar tendency to downplay the relationship between theology and education. The analysis in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 indicates that there is a tendency to glide over this relationship and to fail to give it sufficient consideration. The deficiency here is about what the relationship between Catholic education and (Catholic) theology ought to be. It involves addressing the demand that theology should have a substantial rather than an underdeveloped or superficial relationship with the theory of Catholic education. One helpful way of clarifying what is at stake in this deficiency is to consider the taxonomy of the relationship between theology and education. There are three principle ways in which this relationship can be classified. The first is the rejection of any relationship between theology and educational theory. This is a position frequently associated with R. S. Peters and P. Hirst. One of Hirst’s notable contributions to this issue was his argument that Christian education is a contradiction in terms (1972). Although this claim was part of his rejection of confessional forms of education, it also reflects his denial of any positive relationship between education and theology. The second way to classify this relationship is through the blending of theological ideas with relevant parts of educational theory and the curriculum. This is well illustrated by Cooling (2010) in the Theos report Doing God in Education. There are points at which theology in general can be blended with educational theory and there are some subjects that might provide more opportunities than others for raising theological points. For example, it has been repeatedly argued by Smith (2000, 2001, 2007) that there are numerous ways in which the teaching of languages can be combined and enriched with theological ideas. Cooling (2010) illustrates how theological themes can be successfully added to various subjects and topics

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within the curriculum as it currently stands. This is a fundamental part of the way in which he demonstrated how to ‘do’ God or theology in education. As such it could be argued that theology does have some kind of relationship with education. However, there are a number of concerns with this approach, not least that it involves looking for opportunities to embellish various topics within the curriculum with theological motifs. In some subjects this kind of theological embellishment could be heavily applied, such as in the delivery of modern foreign languages, but in others such as mathematics it would be much thinner. For the latter it might come in more surreptitiously through the use of theological concepts in a tangential way to help illustrate mathematical principles. For example, the concept of ‘tithing’ could be the basis for examples to be used when teaching percentages or fractions. Above all, in this context theology is being added to the curriculum where the opportunity presents itself. There are two main concerns with this second way of classifying the relationship between theology and educational theory. The first is to do with the opportunism that is involved as theology is being added to current educational practice where the opportunity presents itself. Some of these opportunities would be extremely tenuous and might be regarded as attempts to ‘smuggle’ theological ideas into the curriculum. It is not just that this is a negative image but more importantly that it is a very hit-and-miss approach that rests on the teacher’s pedagogic skills of teasing out possible opportunities to add theology themes to her delivery of the curriculum. The second concern is a more general ambiguity over what the main intentions are for adding theological themes to educational theory in this way. It is not clear whether ‘theology’ is being promoted as one of a range of possible cross-curricular themes which could sit alongside others such as spirituality and environmental awareness. Alternatively, it could be wrapped up with a confessional approach to ‘Christian education’ in which subjects like modern foreign languages are couched in terms of their ability to foster certain theological beliefs and dispositions. Thus the intention would be to use the subjects in the school curriculum, wherever the opportunity arose, to nurture the Christian faith of pupils. This would of course be something that would be precluded as part of overcoming the second deficiency that was considered above. In contrast the third way of classifying the relationship between theology and education is a far more substantial one. This is to regard theology as providing a more complete or overarching framework that informs and guides educational theory and classroom practice as a whole. Here the focus is on using theology to provide a framework or set of interpretive

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guidelines for developing a theory of Catholic education, and this would involve the curriculum as a whole. The metaphor of ‘framework’ is, as Severn (2003) explains, a complex concept and it is used here to suggest that the relationship between education and theology can be couched in terms of a positive integration and combination. The theological concepts of ‘Christian’ and ‘Catholic’ have the potential to guide and inform educational practice in a more complete way, rather than as and when the opportunity arises. One way of doing this would be, as Hand (2012) has suggested, to consider the selection criteria for what counts as worthwhile activities. It is important to note that this third way of characterizing the relationship between theology and education does not need to be taken in confessional terms. This is because theology is not being used to nurture the faith of pupils, rather here it is being appealed to in order to provide the guidelines for the aims and the content of the curriculum as a whole. Traditionally, work in this area has focused on the place of religious education in the curriculum rather than on the more fundamental issue of how theology could inform or guide educational theory as a whole. The attention has been on the place of religion and religious education in the curriculum. It is interesting to note that Hirst is notable for defending religion on the curriculum despite his insistence that Christian education is a contradiction in terms. In the light of this discussion of the taxonomy of the relationship between theology and education the issues at stake in the third deficiency come more sharply into focus. Too often within the theory of Catholic education there has been a failure to realize the potential and place of theology in relation to educational theory. It is something that both Newman and Maritain downplayed in their treatments of the theory of Catholic education. In effect there has been a missed opportunity to utilise the insights of theology within educational theory. To clarify further, in curriculum planning theological ideas could be used to guide and inform the curriculum. This is distinct from the theology that crops up within religious education lessons that is formally taught to pupils. There is a parallel here with the way in which a teacher’s motivation could be rooted in a religious vocation but this is distinct from what this teacher would or should teach to pupils. To argue that theology is able to provide a framework for educational theory is to maintain that there is a substantial relationship between theology and education. The metaphor of framework draws out the useful distinction between what guides and informs the curriculum and what is actually taught to pupils.

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A robust theory of Catholic education would need to demonstrate that there is a substantial relationship between it and theology. This is to make explicit the way that theology has a relationship which encompasses the curriculum as a whole, rather than being consigned to just religious education or to other opportunities that crop-up in different subjects. A possible way of illustrating this is to compare it with characteristics of a seaside rock, in which the lettering in the rock candy runs throughout its entire length. The lettering in the rock is not pasted or stuck on in a superficial or opportunistic way. Hence, theology is being characterised as having a substantial relationship with educational theory: it is capable of permeating through providing a framework for it, rather than by being a separate or additional part of it. This approach involves a fuller relationship between education and theology. To overcome the third deficiency would be to commit a robust theory of Catholic education to a substantial or integral relationship between theology and education.

How to repair the central deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education In terms of Neurath’s metaphor, the three deficiencies identified indicate the planks that need to be repaired in order to ensure that the theory of Catholic education remains both seaworthy and better able to continue with its journey. In the light of these three central deficiencies, the way forward for developing the theory of Catholic education crystalizes into shape. These deficiencies can be used to mark out the planks in the theory that need to be repaired or replaced. What is needed is a theory of Catholic education that is non-confessional and which can be theologically justified. This is a demanding challenge because it involves developing an argument that uses Catholic theology to reject the legitimacy of a confessional account of Catholic education. The discussion throughout this chapter has made it clear that this is a central plank within the theory of Catholic education as it currently stands. In order to begin this repair work it is imperative to find a theological account that has a positive explanation of the relationship between human experience, philosophy and theology while at the same time being able to avoid making them synonymous with each other. It is here that the theology of Karl Rahner, a leading twentieth-century Catholic theologian, intuitively comes to mind. Rahner’s theology is marked out by a recognition of the interrelationship between theology and philosophy. This positive appraisal of philosophy is built

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around Rahner’s recognition of what is called the ‘anthropological turn’. Rahner builds his theology around ‘anthropology’ rather than jumping ahead to strictly theological concerns. There is a philosophical movement, which is independent from theological claims and beliefs, that is able to lead onto a theological movement. Within human experience the philosophical movement draws attention to the bigger picture or horizon against which human life is lived. It is through helping the individual to lift her head in order to notice the horizon that allows a movement from the philosophical to a theological movement. This way of depicting the interrelationship between philosophy and theology makes Rahner’s theology a potentially apt way of justifying a non-confessional account of Catholic education. This is because the theory of Catholic education could be set within the context of his philosophical movement. It would not be concerned with jumping ahead to nurture pupils in the Catholic faith but rather it would be committed to ensuring that pupils lift their heads in order to notice the wider horizon against which human life is lived. There is an intuition that Rahner would be able to provide the kind of theological justification that is needed. Over the next five chapters this intuition will be tested out. It is of course not being maintained that Rahner’s theology is the only way of providing a theological justification of a non-confessional account of Catholic education, but it will be argued that, because Rahner made the anthropological turn the defining theme in his theology, his theology can be used to provide the theological underpinning required in the construction of a robust theory of Catholic education.

Conclusion By way of summary it is helpful to explain how the three central deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education need to be repaired. In terms of the first deficiency, the way to overcome or repair it is to purge the theory of Catholic education from instances of Catholic edu-babble. This would of course involve avoiding the use of vague and theologically loaded slogans. More substantially it would also involve avoiding indeterminate and ambiguous statements to describe Catholic education. Too often phrases such as ‘Christ at the centre’ have been applied to the theory of Catholic education and to the curriculum in Catholic schools in the most general of senses. However, it is not that these slogans or polythemic phrases can never be employed but rather that they need to be capable of being explained or unpacked and in the light of this, applied

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to the curriculum. In this way they could serve as a genuine spur to promoting educational theory. In terms of the second deficiency, the way to repair it is to reject the confessional interpretation of Catholic education. This would be to replace the catechetical interpretation or assumption associated with the meaning of Catholic education. Instead Catholic education would be taken to refer to a theory of education taken as a whole, rather than being about the formation of pupils as Catholic Christians. This would be to agree with the likes of Hirst and Newman that education and catechesis are incompatible. Catholic education would need to be understood and described in non-confessional terms. Therefore, an indicator that the theory of Catholic education has overcome this second deficiency is if it can be framed, understood and justified in non-confessional terms. The third deficiency about the relationship between theology and education would be overcome through rejecting both the minimalism and opportunism of the typical approaches to framing this relationship. Instead the theory of Catholic education would be understood and described in terms of there being a substantive relationship between theology and education. What would add coherence or structural integrity to these repairs to the theory of Catholic education would be if the substantial relationship between theology and education could be used to justify the rejection of the confessional interpretation of Catholic education. The focus in the second half of this book is to move on from the critical analysis in order to launch into the more positive task of theory construction. This will involve testing out how far the theology of Karl Rahner can be taken to help construct a robust theory of Catholic education. This will depend on how well his theology is able to provide the theological justification for developing a non-confessional account of Catholic education. This constructive analysis will be extended over Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. In Chapter 6 the central themes and arguments in Rahner’s theology will be considered. From this context it will be proposed that Rahner has the potential to inspire the development of a non-confessional theory of Catholic education. Chapters 7 and 8 will identify how this argument can be made, and throughout it will be maintained that Rahner is able to inspire and support the development of a robust theory of Catholic education. This will be followed, in Chapter 9, with an analysis of what the practical implications would be for the curriculum. This will provide a way of demonstrating how a Rahnerian inspired theory of Catholic education can be purged of the deficiency of Catholic edu-babble. It will be in this chapter that many of the practical implications for the curriculum in a Catholic school

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will be proposed and argued for. Finally in Chapter 10, the focus will return to the deficiencies identified in this chapter and the various threats in the opening chapter. This will be done in order to assess the extent to which the theory of Catholic education being constructed here is able to overcome these three central deficiencies and many of these threats. Therefore the subsequent chapters will initiate an argument about how Rahner’s theology can inform and guide repairs to the theory of Catholic education.

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Using the Theology of Karl Rahner to Develop the Theory of Catholic Education

Introduction This chapter will be devoted to presenting an overview of Rahner’s theology. This is needed in order to support the argument that Rahner is able to inspire the development of a robust theory of Catholic education. Alongside this general exposition of Rahner a number of reservations and concerns will be considered. This is to draw attention to both the positive features and possible weaknesses that are typically associated with Rahnerian theology. In this chapter the focus will be on a general treatment of Rahner, and in Chapters 7 and 9 the attention will move onto explaining in detail the ways in which he is able to inspire and support the development of a robust theory of Catholic education that overcomes the central deficiencies. Here the attention will given to Rahner’s methodology and anthropology and how he drew attention to the presence and significance of mystery in human life. Throughout it will be maintained that Rahner’s theology provides a theological account that is able to offer a positive explanation of the relationship between human experience, philosophy and theology while at the same time successfully avoiding making them simply synonymous with each other.

Karl Rahner Karl Rahner is widely recognized as one of the most influential Catholic theologians of the twentieth century. He was born in Germany in 1904, and joined the Jesuit religious order and was eventually ordained a priest. He died in 1984, having spent most of his life working in various academic

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posts, lecturing and publishing widely in theology. Rahner is now typically regarded as a pastoral theologian, but his wide-ranging works engage with the central branches of theology, most notably Trinitarian theology, Christology and ecclesiology. His theology has a firm pastoral focus and it is rooted in the Ignatian spirituality of his religious order (Egan, 2005). Rahner was a leading figure in the proceedings of Vatican II, both as a theological expert and through the influence of his published works on the central documents formulated at the council. One of the main reasons why Rahner became so influential is because of the way he is able to combine traditional Catholic theology with many of the more modern ideas that stem from the enlightenment and Kant. He helped to lead the way in overcoming the polarized and defensive approach within the Catholic Church, known as the modernist crisis, that had dominated the first half of the twentieth century. Rahner was able to achieve this because he adopted and developed transcendental Thomism. This is a development within the traditional use of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas. Transcendental Thomism seeks to reconcile this tradition with Kantian epistemology (Sheehan, 2005). Before presenting an overview of Rahner’s theology it is important to recognize some of the more obvious limitations. The first is a general comment about Rahner being a prolific writer. His series of studies known as Theological Investigations runs into 23 volumes, and he published thousands of articles in an academic career spanning over 50 years. This makes any attempt at giving a brief synthesis or overview challenging. Second, summarizing Rahner’s work can be difficult because of inherent issues within his texts, and even leading Rahner commentators have noted that Rahner was not always a careful writer, and when focusing on one particular problem, he had the habit of presupposing conventional positions on other problems. This he could do even when he himself has elsewhere criticized these conventional accounts radically. (Endean, 2005, p. 286)

He could be described as an unsystematic systematic theologian (Kilby, 2007). Mindful of this difficulty, the following summary of Rahner’s theology will weave together a summary that draws on three of his central texts. These are his early philosophically based work Spirit in the World (originally published in 1939) and Hearers of the Word (originally published in 1941), and his more comprehensive theological summary Foundation of Christian Faith (1976). The former embody the seminal ideas that Rahner developed during his doctoral studies and while participating in seminars delivered by Heidegger. The latter

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reflects Rahner’s mature reflection that he wrote as a more systematic and introductory treatment of his work (Fischer, 2005).

Rahner’s methodology Rahner employed a distinctive theological method in which there were two interconnected movements, one philosophical and the other theological. His way of understanding the relationship between philosophy and theology stands in stark contrast to the typical approach that he was formed in as a seminarian preparing for ordination. Instead of treating philosophy as a preamble to theology, Rahner intends to demonstrate that philosophy can be both complementary to and integrated with theology. Kilby explains the paradoxical nature of Rahner’s integration of philosophy and theology in these terms: If the thing which philosophy is about is an inner moment of the thing which theology is about, then philosophy is an inner moment of theology. (Kilby, 2004, p. 73)

Rahner utilizes an approach to theology that is built upon a convergence between both the theological and the philosophical. He wants to treat philosophy and theology as a unity. The convergence is such that philosophy in its broadest senses could be the starting point for engaging in theology. This allows Rahner to develop the ways in which philosophy was able to lead towards theological responses and answers. Philosophy is capable of leading a person to the point where theology could be meaningfully engaged with or accessed coherently. This Rahner likened to a point of threshold, where philosophy could bring one to the threshold of theology. Moreover, given that theology and philosophy converge, Rahner was able to demonstrate how almost every aspect of traditional theology could be approached from an anthropological perspective. Be it Christology or ecclesiology theology did not have to begin with revelation but in anthropology and the willingness to engage in philosophical questioning. For Rahner this has important practical and pastoral possibilities. Not least because it provides a way of making the Christian faith accessible to those who live in a secular world and who have little if any grasp of theology or religion. Rahner is convinced that the majority of people within contemporary society are in this situation, and this makes the accessibility of the Christian faith a pressing issue. For Rahner this is not a matter of proclaiming the Christian message

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using contemporary language but rather about making accessible to all people the fundamental ideas upon which Christianity is built. It is this, rather than jumping ahead to theological beliefs about Christ, that is of primary importance. In this philosophy is able to play a central role. This is because the unity or convergence between philosophy and theology allows Rahner to present Christian faith in terms of a question and answer. Philosophy in its broadest sense focuses on the questions of human existence and it is theology that provides the responses and answers to the questions of human existence. It is in the asking of these philosophical questions that provides the starting point for theology. Philosophy engages with the presence of mystery in human life and raises questions about the possibility and presence of profound mysteries in human experience. This is what Rahner refers to as absolute mystery. According to Rahner it is philosophy that draws attention to this and it is theology that seeks to name and make sense of this experience of mystery in human existence. Theology names it as God. This is far more sophisticated than simply equating God with mystery because Rahner is insistent that God is not an object in the world, but rather that the presence of mystery points beyond – ultimately towards what theology names as God.

The anthropological turn Rahner’s theological method of convergence between philosophy and theology allows him to embrace the anthropological turn. Rahner repeatedly insists both that theology must begin with anthropology and that it must also must be understood as anthropology. For example, he declares: ‘Today dogmatic theology must be anthropology and such an anthropological turn is necessary and fruitful’ (Rahner, 1967, p. 43). This alignment between Catholic theology and anthropology is one of the overarching themes within the extensive writings of Karl Rahner. In arguing for an anthropological turn in theology Rahner is engaging with the critique of projectionists, most notably Feuerbach and Marx, who sought to eliminate theology and reference to God in human life. For the projectionists theology should be dismissed as at best the projection of human hopes and fears. They insist that theology ought to be characterized as the product of delusion or fantasy or of an opiate in which humanity merely indulged in a form of escapism. There is no God to be experienced or encountered. For the likes of Feuerbach and Marx theology is a mirror which merely reflected the longings, angst and

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alienation of human beings. The strength of this challenge was rooted in the anthropological turn brought about by Kantian epistemology. By embracing this anthropological turn, Rahner sought to subvert or undermine the projectionist challenge and the potential threat brought about by this kind of epistemology. If theology begins with anthropology and is, moreover understood as anthropology, then the force of the projectionist challenge dissipates. Rahner explains how one could begin with anthropology and this would inevitably lead into the experience of the infinite or mystery. It is this that leads to the possibility of experiencing God and the possibility of constructing a positive theology. Rahner embraces the anthropological turn and insists that because (dogmatic) theology is anthropology it can be liberated from the projectionist challenge. It is important to recognize that Rahner is not depicting this anthropology in abstract terms but in the basic human experiences of everyday life. It is in the experiences, knowledge claims and free will of the self-conscious human being that anthropology can be recast as theology. Rahner’s anthropological turn and his methodology of combining theology within philosophy allow him to focus on the fundamental characteristics that mark out human existence. He refers to these as existentials. These existentials permeate Rahner’s work and the four central ones will now be outlined.

The supernatural existential Human beings through their mundane experiences of the world could in general be described as having a rudimentary experience of ‘the infinite’ (or mystery) and beyond that of God. This comes about because of the supernatural existential. According to Rahner this is a universal feature of human existence that despite its universality is something that ought to be understood as a God given gift. In many respects the supernatural existential is rooted in Rahner’s analysis of what must be presumed as true about being human if the Christian message is capable of being accepted or received. What kind of hearer does Christianity anticipate so that its real and ultimate message can even be heard? (Rahner, 1976, p. 24)

The human being, as a person, is the kind of entity that is capable of hearing and responding to the divine revelation contained in the Christian message. Rahner’s presentation of the supernatural existential needs to be understood in relation to the broader issues in the theology of grace. One of the major

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debates between Catholic and reformed theologians for the past three centuries has been around the theology of grace. In many respects grace expresses the fundamental way in which God is to be found or encountered within creation. It is also through God’s grace that human beings are able to come into a relationship with God. The theological debate around grace has pivoted on distinctions between natural and supernatural grace. It is traditionally argued that the ability to recognize God’s presence is a supernatural gift, given freely by God to some. Whereas some human beings have received this free gift, there are many others who appear to be deprived of it. Among both Catholic and reformed theology it has been typically accepted that God’s grace and salvation are intrinsically linked with Christianity and membership of the Church in particular. Both Catholic and reformed theology have tended to emphasize the experience of God and salvation in narrow and exclusive terms. In contrast to this Rahner’s supernatural existential allows him to insist that God is capable of being experienced by all human beings and while at the same time as being available to all it remains nevertheless a free gift from God. Without delving into the complexities of the theology of grace it is important to realize that the supernatural existential is in many respects a philosophical and theological precondition or working assumption within Rahner’s theological anthropology. Rahner maintains that, Really and radically every person must be understood as the event of a supernatural self-communication of God. (Rahner, 1976, p. 127)

As such this assumption grounds what Rahner wants to say about the other existentials. His theological anthropology presupposes that humans, taken as a whole, are the kinds of being that are capable of experiencing God (or God’s grace). God’s self-communication in grace cannot be differentiated from those basic structures of human transcendence. (Rahner, 1976, p. 128)

The supernatural existential provides the anthropological (and hence theological) underpinning for the other three existentials that characterize human existence.

The transcendental existential Human beings exist as physical entities in a world of space and time, and as self-conscious and rational beings they are capable of knowledge claims and

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are able to reflect on the most mundane of experiences. It is this ordinary and largely unproblematic fact of (philosophic) anthropology that Rahner takes as the starting point for his discussion of both the transcendental existential and for his explanation for the way in which theology is anthropology. Rahner focuses on experiential knowledge, or in other words our knowledge claims of the world around us. In experiencing or knowing objects such as trees or flowers there are two dimensions, the objects which are known and the one who has these knowledge experiences. This is to pick up the distinction between what is known and the one who knows. There is someone that is having the experience of perceiving, for example a tree or flower. The human being is able to ask questions about what is it that is known in this experience, about this or that particular tree, as well as about flowers or trees in general. Moreover, the individual can ask questions of him or herself in relation to the objects that are known. Human beings inevitably ask questions about their sensory experiences and about what it is that they know. This questioning begins at the most rudimentary level. Human beings are routinely involved in questioning and making sense of their various experiences. It is here that Rahner draws attention to the connection between this questioning and transcendence. Part of gaining knowledge of a given experience, about this or that tree or flower, involves questioning and making sense of it. This involves moving from partial to more complete knowledge and understanding or a movement from less to more. This Rahner considers to be a small moment of transcendence. It is the quality or state or exceeding or surpassing what was previously known and understood, and hence it is an instance of transcendence. There is also an element of the human being recognizing that they do exist at a self-conscious level. As such they are apart from or above the material world that they know through their sensory experiences. In the transcendental existential Rahner maintains that these small moments of transcendence saturate and characterize human existence. He maintains that these small but constant instances lead onto greater examples of transcendence in human existence. Human existence can be characterized as a continual process of transcendence. To be human is to be reaching out towards something higher or more infinite. Rahner presents a range of supporting observations and arguments about the presence of transcendence in human experience. These were originally developed in his early more philosophical work Spirit in the World (1995) and they can be briefly summarized in the following terms. Rahner’s initial strategy is to employ the concept of transcendence in its most general sense and to cite any kind of movement or progress from a lower level to a higher one as examples

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of it. Every day knowledge acquisition illustrates this. Any act of acquiring new knowledge, such finding out how many pears are on a pear tree would be an instance of transcendence. Rahner builds on these everyday examples and maintains that within them there are more significant instances of transcendence at play. For example, in any act of perception the human being is able to become self consciously aware of being someone who ‘perceives’. Moreover, this person is able to raise a range of questions, from what is being perceived and who is perceiving it and onto questions about this act of perception. In answering these questions a person is able to increase their knowledge and awareness. Built into these questions is a quest for transcendence, moving from a partial to more complete answers. Rahner also argued that human beings have the ability to question everything, from our sensory experiences to the meaning of our existence. A basic feature of being human is engaging with more complex questions, often connected with ultimate issues in life. According to Rahner these routinely come down to these questions: What is the meaning of life? Who am I? Who are we? Where did we come from? Where are we going? How should I live? What should our stance be towards our own mortality? Does God exist? (Rahner, 1976, pp. 18–26)

According to Rahner this ability to question everything is an indicator that we are constantly striving for even greater knowledge or insight, and this reflects our quest for transcendence. Rahner proposes that human life as a whole could be characterized as a question. Questions and question asking permeate the daily lives of human beings. Here Rahner can appeal to the way young children can question everything, often by continually asking ‘why’ questions. Such a chain of questions typically trails off into the open and even existential questions about what is or ought to be point of human life. This is suggestive of a natural connection between questioning and transcendence. For Rahner this is born out in the way that nearly all of our answers can themselves be called into question. Even our best answers from biology, chemistry and psychology about what is a human being can be challenged and called into question. It as if there is an ongoing search for ever more complete answers. It is at this point that Rahner draws out associations between transcendence and the infinite. One obvious association would be the infinite range of questions that can be asked about every facet of human existence. The less obvious sense is the way in which searching for answers involves progress and development in the quest for ever more complete answers. Implicit here is the idea of searching for the more

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complete or final answer. For Rahner this introduces ‘the infinite’ towards which human knowledge and questioning is trying to reach out to. To express this Rahner repeatedly referred to the Vorgriff auf esse. This quasi-technical phrase draws on ideas from both Heidegger and traditional Thomistic thinking. It is normally translated as the pre-apprehension of infinite reality. Rahner maintains that in our grasp or apprehension of every act of knowing or willing there is what could be described as a prior or co-awareness of infinity or mystery. When we are aware of a particular object we also have an awareness of the wider context or horizon that frames our awareness. Although we might be focused on one particular object, it always exists against a broader horizon. Often we will not notice the wider horizon, but it is always there. To explain this co-awareness Rahner employed a range of metaphors including ‘unthematic’, ‘preconceptual’, ‘unobjectified’, and ‘pre-reflective’. Although these are difficult to pin down they do help to convey possible connections between how our experience of the particular might be connected with the infinite (or absolute mystery). Humans are seldom directly aware of this coawareness that is at the basis of everyday knowing, questioning and willing, and in this sense it is like the horizon in that it is always there but it is often not noticed and appreciated. The vorgriff auf esse can be overlooked or ignored, but it is there for all people no matter what the situation of their lives. Some Rahnerian scholars have suggested alternative images to horizon (for instance, Kilby, 2007; O’Donovan, 1995) by likening the vorgriff auf esse to the water within which fish swim or the air that we breathe.

The existentials of freedom and history It is helpful to present the remaining two existentials together because in many respects they need to be understood in relation to each other. In these two existentials one of the primary tensions of human existence comes into focus. The historically bounded nature of human existence frequently comes into tension with the experience of freedom and free will. Our ability to exercise freedom is often limited or curbed by the historical contexts within which we exist. The existential of freedom and history are integrally connected with each other. According to Rahner both provide further insight into the transcendental existential that characterizes human existence. Rahner explains that, a human is not merely also a biological and social organism who exists in time with these characteristics. Rather he is subjectivity and his free personal self

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interpretation take place precisely in and through his being in the world, in time, and in history, or better, in and through world, time and history. (Rahner, 1976, p. 40)

Human beings have free will and they exist in a world of space and time and as such they exist in history. For Rahner human history can be readily interpreted as the unfolding free choices that human beings make. Transcendence is identifiable in the movement and development that history describes. Whether it is in terms of natural history (evolution), human history, or salvation history there is progress and development taking place. There is a movement towards a more complete understanding and this is a further indicator of the transcendence that characterizes human existence. In addition the events that are described in these various histories are able to stimulate questions about the meaning and purpose of life. Indeed the broad sweep of life originating from the simplest of amoeba to the evolution of self-conscious homo sapiens can stimulate questions about what this might signify. At the same time being attentive to history brings into focus the choices and decisions that free human beings have made. This has both a positive and negative dimension. On the positive side, history can be used to affirm both freewill and ways in which human beings can be held responsible for their actions. On the negative side, history draws attention to the way our ability to make free choices now is influenced or curbed by the kinds of choices others in the past have made. To express this aspect of the historical existential Rahner made use of the concept of ‘original sin’. It is original in the sense that it has always been a feature of human life that we are affected by the free choices of others, including those who have gone before us. It is a permanent feature of human life. This is a limitation on our exercise of freedom and it can frequently skew or misdirect our free choices. It is interesting to note the way Rahner has uncoupled the doctrine of original sin from its typical connections with the fall from grace of Adam and Eve. This is an illustration of how Rahner seeks to make traditional theological beliefs accessible to members of contemporary society without having to jump ahead into contentious theological debates. Original sin can be approached in the light of the existential of freedom and history without having to invoke the theology of the Fall and reference to biblical teachings about Adam and Eve. Rahner maintains that human freedom is never complete because we always have to act within the situation imposed by history. Both our own history and that of others curb and limit our freedom. As result of this we cannot know how free we really are and this is a challenging situation within which to exist. Moreover it also has a consequence of making it very difficult to adequately

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assess the moral quality of our actions. Rahner distinguishes between ‘categorical freedom’ and ‘transcendental freedom’. The former is basically our free will to choose or not to do particular actions in the mundane world of space and time. The latter is about the fundamental orientation of one’s life. To explain the interrelationship between both kinds of freedom Rahner used the metaphor of ‘shoot and root’. This draws attention to the way that our categorical freedom emerges or is rooted in the everyday acts of free will that characterize human existence. Over a whole lifetime of choices a human being could be described as having made a fundamental option. This will either be one of openness to infinity and mystery or one that rejects this. In many respects this would compliment Rahner’s description of the Vorgriff auf esse. This horizon is always present, although we often choose to ignore it. We can ignore or choose to engage with the open questions about how we ought to exercise our freedom as we live our lives.

The centrality of mystery Up to this point the focus has been on explaining the key features of Rahner’s theological anthropology. This has involved describing the various existentials that characterise human existence. Attention now needs to shift onto outlining how this theological anthropology coheres with the central motif in Rahner’s theology. In many respects Rahner’s systematic theology is organised around one relatively simple theme, that of mystery. According to Rahner the many mysteries of Catholic faith are facets of one underlying mystery: The mysteries of Christianity, in the plural, can be understood, as the concrete form of the one mystery once the presupposition is made that this holy mystery also exists, as the mystery in absolute proximity. (Rahner, 1969, p. 72)

Rahner is drawing attention to the centrality of mystery in human existence. Some commentators on Rahner have argued that every part of his theology is a variation of the theme that mystery points towards God (Kilby, 2004; O’Donnell, 1984; Sheehan, 2005). As a way of summing up Rahner’s theology as whole the various ways in which the centrality of mystery reappears will be briefly outlined. To begin with Rahner maintains that humans constantly come up against mystery because of the transcendental existential, whether this be in sensory

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experiences, knowledge claims, history or the experience of freedom. Human beings experience mystery and they grasp at it in order to make sense of it. According to Rahner, given the four existentials that characterize human existence, human beings are capable of living in such a way that they could notice the wider horizon of infinity or mystery against which they exist. It is through recognising and grasping at this horizon that the human being is able to begin to appreciate the significance of mystery in human existence. This grasping at mystery has the potential of leading to the experience God. This is not an automatic process and it is equally possible for an individual to fail to recognize the presence of mystery, let alone the possibility of experiencing or affirming the experience of God. Over life each human being is involved in making his or her fundamental option, and this is the basic orientation of the individual in terms of being open or closed to what philosophy would describe as absolute mystery and what theology goes on to name as God. Rahner blends the existentials into his presentation of the theology of God, Christ, salvation, ecclesiology and the other theological themes he engages with. It is Rahner’s ability to combine this philosophical anthropology with these parts of theology that reflect his creativity as a theologian. The experience of mystery and the attempts to grasp it are mediated through the everyday events of human history. We can look back at history and identify the ways humans have sought to respond to their ongoing experience of mysteries. This is reflected in both Rahner’s theology of religion and of his treatment of doctrine of the incarnation. All religions have a positive significance because they are genuine examples of human beings engaging with their experience of absolute mystery. The incarnation can similarly be interpreted against the human desires to engage with the absolute mystery that theology names as God. Rahner formulates a theology of the incarnation that appeals to the mystery expressed in the history contained in the Jewish scriptures and he even argues that in the process of evolution mystery and transcendence are in operation. Rahner presented the incarnation of Christ as the goal of the entire history of humanity (sociologically, religiously, and biologically). The progress, development and evolution within this human history is, according to Rahner, a reflection of the way human beings are striving to grasp at or reach out towards absolute mystery. Rahner’s Christology and Trinitarian theology are presented in terms of mystery. Christ is described as the presence of mystery in flesh and blood (the historical person of Jesus), while the Trinity is understood to be about the way God reveals his mysterious and saving presence to humanity. Behind these doctrines is a description of the nearness of God as absolute mystery. Obviously

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theological opinion might well be divided on how successful Rahner is in these specific parts of his theology, but this does not detract from fact that mystery is the central theme in his theology. As O’Donnell helpfully explains: His key insight is that man inevitably lives in the presence of Holy Mystery and that this mystery has drawn so near to us that He can be found in the depths of our own spirit and in the space and time of our human history. (O’Donnell, 1984, p. 318)

Rahner’s insistence is that human beings live in the context of mystery. It is this ubiquitous feature of human life that provides the context or framework for his treatment of the mysteries of the Christian faith. It is in relation to this point that Rahner presents the paradox of how a self-righteous person is capable of rejecting God and deluding themselves about how free their actions are. Equally the atheist might opt for atheism in the name of freedom and then go onto live a life in which their actions and way of life tacitly affirms God’s loving presence. This is the basis of Rahner’s argument for ‘anonymous Christians’. Rahner’s central theological claim that ultimately the mystery of faith is mystery itself is grounded in his analysis of the place of transcendence and mystery in human existence.

Challenges to Rahner The preceding exposition of Rahner’s theological anthropology has been presented in a positive way, however, some attention now needs to be given to a number of challenges to Rahner. It has been explained that Rahner was a creative theologian who wanted blend Catholic theology with insights from both Kant and Heidegger in a way that is rooted in Aquinas. This is an ambitious approach but it is also open to wide-ranging criticisms at general levels and he could of course be critiqued on many fronts, both philosophically and theologically. However, it is not primarily these broad criticisms of his theology and philosophy that will be the focus here. Instead the attention will be reserved to issues that stem naturally from the preceding exposition of Rahner’s theological anthropology. It will be explained that the main challenges relate to his tendency to use the concepts of mystery and transcendence in ways that are vague and not clearly thought out. If Rahner is to guide repairs to the theory of Catholic education it will be necessary to sharpen his conceptual tools and to develop some of his central arguments.

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Rahner’s description of the way transcendence and mystery saturate human existence is rooted in his willingness to take both these concepts in the broadest terms. Rahner is happy to stretch the meaning of ‘transcendence’ to include even the most mundane changes in knowledge or the results of the smallest instances of free will. However, this is arguably to employ an overly broad definition of transcendence. The problem with this is that this allows him to appeal to numerous small instances of transcendence permeating life. This raises the concern that transcendence is something that is largely of trivial concern. While acquiring a new instance of knowledge would result in some change and in that sense it is a development, it is questionable as to whether this amounts to ‘transcendence’ in any significant sense. For example, knowing that there are 67 pears on the tree rather than say 63 is hardly a significant instance of transcendence. His conceptual looseness over the meaning of transcendence makes it permissible for any instance of change or development to be regarded as an instance of transcendence. This is replicated in Rahner’s treatment of the significance of questioning in human existence. He moves quickly from the ubiquitous ways in which human beings raise questions about almost every part of human life to a more fundamental claim about the significance of question asking for human beings. While there is no denying that human life is saturated with questions, from very practical ones to others about the point of life. However, question asking might not be as important or significant as Rahner assumes. To begin with Rahner appears not to consider examples of questions which, when answered, do not increase our knowledge. Rahner appears to assume that there is a necessary connection between increasing knowledge and the asking of questions. More importantly Rahner puts much emphasis on the way mundane questions can, when pushed, trail off into a range of open issues. However, this general claim has to be set against the context of our existing knowledge across wide-ranging disciplines. For instance, the disciplines of biology, chemistry, psychology, sociology and history can provide us with comprehensive answers to numerous questions. Rahner would appear to be making too much too quickly about questions and the asking of questions in human existence. Many questions can be given a thorough response and explanation and as such the need to push onto open-ended issues and questions might not be compelling as Rahner maintains. Rahner could be challenged for moving too quickly from all questions to certain kinds of questions. There are of course a number of questions about human existence (such as who am I or how ought I live) that are open-ended. However, these are a smaller subset of questions, within the full gamut of questions that can be raised.

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Rahner’s willingness to use the concept of transcendence in a vague or general way does present a challenge. However, one way of responding to this is to qualify and develop Rahner’s use of this concept. In terms of question asking and transcendence it would be possible to propose that it is not that all questions matter, but rather that many questions, include some mundane ones, can be pushed onto raising further questions about the ultimate purpose of human existence. In Chapter 7 Rahner’s use of the concept of mystery is scrutinized and developed. Rahner’s tendency to use concepts without precision can be spotted in a number of other respects. For example, in his willingness to take the meaning of history in very broad terms. It includes the evolution of the human species, the events of world history and the history of religions. Part of the latter is accepting the narrative of Judaeo-Christianity as the history of salvation. It is also possible to raise some reservations over Rahner’s use of phrases such as ‘unthematic’ or ‘preconceptual’ awareness. The concern would be that these are potentially ambiguous concepts. Rahner used them in order to convey the ‘co-awareness’ of both an object that is being perceived and the wider context within which this perception occurs. This allowed him to employ the image of the horizon that is at the same time always there and yet often not acknowledged. In defence of Rahner it should be acknowledged that this is a complex idea for which there are not any tightly expressed concepts that he could utilize. Rahner’s loose expression is a successful way of him referring to a general or vague awareness of the bigger picture or broader conceptual scheme that frames our individual experiences. Another challenge is nestled within this is Rahner’s anthropological turn and methodology of combining philosophy and theology. He employed a number of concepts that he took to be interconnected, most notably transcendence, mystery, absolute mystery, holy mystery and finally God. There is here a looseness of language that has both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side it allows Rahner to use the experience of mystery and to affirm it through philosophy, as the very thing that theology names as God. Rahner is far from simply equating every instance of transcendence or mystery as really an experience of God. Instead these experiences can, when theology is brought into view, be used to point towards God. However, on the negative side the looseness of language can be used as a sign of a lack of precision. The distinctions between mystery and absolute or holy mystery are not fully developed or explained by Rahner. The imprecision is compounded by Rahner’s use of ‘holy’ because this could imply that he has built the

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experience of God into his definition of mystery. There is a challenge here that despite the positive aspects casts a shadow over the relevance of Rahner. This challenge will be picked up and addressed in the next chapter. It can be noted, in passing, that the motivation for Rahner’s preference for glossing and eliding concepts such as mystery and holy mystery was his stance as a pastoral theology. It is not simply that he was an unsystematic systematic theologian, rather he deliberately sought to couch his theology of mystery in general and positive terms. He was anxious to make the Christian message accessible to modern men and women. To do this he adopted an inclusive approach that is built upon his insistence that human beings are the kinds of entity that are capable of hearing and responding to God’s presence that the mystery in human existence points to.

Conclusion There is of course a final observation concerning Rahner, namely his notable lack of treatment of issues to do with education or schooling. Despite turning his hand to numerous issues within pastoral theology, there is little reference to Rahner dealing with educational issues. Where they do exist he is more concerned with applying wider themes to specific questions or issues, such as his brief notes on a ‘theology of children’. In this he does not deal with the education of children or even really engage with the wider theme of the upbringing of children. At other times when he writes about children he is discussing infant baptism. His real concerns here are the theological issues about the need for baptism and the wider theological debate about whether there is salvation outside the (Catholic) Church. While this lack of formal treatment of Catholic education within Rahner is noted it ought not to be regarded as a significant problem. What will be proposed is that Rahner’s theology has potential because of how it can be employed. The potential within Rahner has been noted by one of his leading commentators, Endean, who explained: The future of this theology probably lies with people other than theologians, at least in a narrow professional sense. Rahner has taught us how to take secularity seriously as a source for theology without compromising our commitment to Christian tradition. The future of his approach to theology will lie, I suspect, largely in the practical sphere, as people find Rahner a helpful resource for the theological interpretation of different life situations. (Endean, 2005, p. 293)

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The argument in the remainder of this book is built on the premise that Rahner’s theology is a highly helpful resource for the theory of Catholic education. Whilst it is a reasonable to note that he does not engage with education, subsequent chapters will go some way to rectify this situation. The premise being proposed here is that Rahner is be able to provide the kind of theological justification that is needed to repair and enhance the theory of Catholic education. In what follows this premise will be tested out. Of course it is not being maintained that Rahner’s theology is the only way of providing a theological justification of a non-confessional account of Catholic education. However, it will be maintained that, because Rahner made the anthropological turn the defining theme in his theology, he can be used to provide the theological underpinning in the construction of a robust theory of Catholic education.

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7

Mystery, Rahner and the Theory of Catholic Education

Introduction In Chapter 6 an overview of Rahner’s theology was presented. Particular consideration was given to his methodology, his theological anthropology and the way he drew attention to the presence and significance of mystery in human life. In this chapter the focus will shift onto explaining the ways in which Rahner is able to inspire the kinds of developments that are needed to repair and enhance the theory of Catholic education. This is to return to the overarching argument introduced in Chapter 5 that proposed that Rahner’s theology is able to inspire a way of engaging with the three central deficiencies that the theory of Catholic education faces. The first of these deficiencies is the use of Catholic edu-babble which employed vague slogans that fail to adequately underpin and describe the theory of Catholic education. The second deficiency is the difficulties that result from insisting that Catholic education by definition refers to or means a catechetical or confessional account of education. The third deficiency is about the underdeveloped relationship between theology and the theory of Catholic education. There is a superficial relationship and this needs to be replaced by a substantial one. This chapter will develop the argument that Rahner’s theology can inspire a way of overcoming these deficiencies. In fact it will be argued that Rahner is suggestive of a way of simultaneously overcoming the second and third deficiency through using a theological justification for a non-confessional theory of Catholic education. This argument will proceed by picking up on Rahner’s recognition that human existence, and therefore human knowledge, is bounded by mystery. At the heart of Rahner’s theology is an insistence about the significance of mystery in human life. It will be proposed that this theological insight can be used to

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inspire and stimulate a range of educational arguments. When developed with reference to Rahner’s method, these educational arguments are able to provide the justification for a non-confessional account of Catholic education. As part of this it will be maintained that the curriculum as a whole has a central role to play in bringing pupils to what Rahner described as the threshold of theology. It is the whole curriculum, rather than just religious education that has a role to play in ensuring that pupils recognize the mystery within human existence. However, before launching into this argument it is necessary to give some attention to the concept of mystery. The overview of Rahner’s theology in Chapter 6 drew attention to his insistence that mystery is a ubiquitous and fundamental part of life. This makes ‘mystery’ a very important concept and one that stands in need of further clarification. Moreover, Rahner used the concept of mystery in ways that differed to common usage, for example, he referred to both absolute and holy mystery. Given this, the priority for the first part of this chapter will be to clarify the meaning of mystery and to identify the various kinds of mysteries. In the light of this it will be proposed that in certain respects Rahner’s position would need to be qualified and developed. It is not mystery in some general sense that matters but rather certain kinds of mysteries – ones that expose the interrelationship between the workings of reason and mystery. This claim will be used as a key premise in arguing that the curriculum as a whole ought to draw attention to these kinds of mysteries. It is mysteries that have to do with the limits of reason that are capable of bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. This, it will be argued, is distinct from a confessional account of the curriculum.

What counts as mystery? The primary task at this juncture is to map out the main senses of ‘mystery’. This will involve identifying, naming and classifying this concept – in other words presenting the taxonomy of mystery. The generic meaning of mystery pivots primarily around referring to anything that is kept secret or remains unknown and unexplained. ‘Mystery’ functions as a way of referring to the state or quality of being obscure, and as such it is often regarded as synonymous with a secret, puzzle, enigma, riddle or conundrum. An important characteristic is the way that ‘mystery’ is connected with stimulating or arousing curiosity, interest and a sense of suspense because

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the facts of the matter are concealed. A mystery could be a person, situation or thing that presents qualities or features that arouse speculation or curiosity because it is obscure. In many situations or contexts the mystery arises from something being out of place, for example, a physical object that is out of place would trigger curiosity. The object itself is not a mystery, its nature and function is understood, but its presence in this situation is out of place. For instance, if human artefacts were discovered on an island that was thought to have been deserted or free from human habitation. It would present a challenge to what was previously accepted or known. In addition, mysteries can also appear in literary forms, such as in the genre of the murder-mystery in which the reader is challenged to piece together the evidence to work out who the perpetrator is. At the etymological level ‘mystery’ is rooted in the Greek word mysterion and it was linked with the verb myein which meant to shut or to close. This indicates the association between mystery and the keeping of secrets that are shut away or closed off from others. The word mysterion is frequently found in texts that refer to the practices of the mystery religions that emerged in antiquity. Within these mystery religions (such as the Eleusian or Orphic) the emphasis was upon the way devotees first needed to be initiated through various rites before they could learn the hidden truths of the religion. The connections between the contemporary usages of mystery and the earlier meaning of mysterion have continued to be influential through their presence in various New Testament documents and within Christian theology (as a way of referring to the unfolding plan of God).

Mystery and related concepts In order to further clarify the meaning of mystery it is helpful to outline some of the conceptual links between it and related concepts such as puzzles, conundrums, secrets and unanswered questions. For example, there is much overlap between a mystery and a puzzle in that both concepts are about something that is a confusion or problem. Both can be clarified or solved by reasoning and studying. Of course the concept of a puzzle has closer connections with reasoning and problem-solving in that to be puzzled is to be mentally confused or baffled and ‘puzzling out’ is synonymous with reasoning and working out the solution. The working assumption with any given puzzle is that there is a solution that can be figured out, if enough reasoning or studying is undertaken. Puzzles

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are taken as presenting a challenge about whether or not one has the cognitive ability to work it out. While it would be odd, but not logically impossible, to have an unsolvable puzzle. It would be more natural to speak of some mysteries as being unsolvable or very difficult to solve without knowing the underlying or hidden aspect. In this respect mysteries would have more affinity with the concept of conundrums. Unlike puzzles, conundrums are problems or dilemmas that are normally unsolvable. A situation might be described as a conundrum because the required solution is beyond comprehension. For example within economics trying to combine full employment with inflation has been described as a conundrum – there is a real problem but it is not possible to fathom out the solution in practice. A tacit feature of conundrums like this is that there is a logical impossibility or even contradiction at play. Often conundrums are associated with triviality or puns, yet when taken seriously they draw attention to the difficulty in trying to resolve these kinds of puzzles. Another characteristic of mystery is the connection it has with the concept of secrets. There is overlap between both concepts in that they often involve knowledge that is hidden from others. Moreover this might only become available after one has been initiated, for example, into a trade secret. In contrast secrets as opposed to mysteries are deliberate attempts to conceal knowledge and understanding. This sense of keeping a secret from others, often many others or the majority, is not normally a contemporary feature of mysteries. It was an aspect, as noted above, of mystery religions and within mystery plays. The latter involve performing plays in which the hidden plan of God is at work. Unless you are initiated in the belief system you would be unlikely to figure out the mystery being performed in the play. With secrets something is hidden or concealed normally with some purpose or intention. However, with a mystery this deliberate concealment is often missing. Yet working out a mystery will often be like working out a secret in that the challenge is to go beyond initial appearances and to delve deeper. In a similar way mysteries can be compared and contrasted with unanswered questions. Some questions are unanswered because they are about mysteries. An example would be the mysteries around how and why Stonehenge was constructed. However, the category of unanswered questions is wider than that of mysteries and many have no connection with mysteries. For example questions about how many grains of sand are there in the Sahara or how many fish are there in the North Sea are unanswered, and probably unanswerable, however, they are not mysteries. They are difficult to answer questions rather than being about something mysterious.

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A taxonomy of mystery Beyond this general discussion of the concept of mystery it is helpful to consider the main ways in which it can be classified. It will be explained that mysteries can be placed into three categories that are built around a basic distinction between solvable and unsolvable mysteries. The first category contains mysteries that are solvable in practice. The second would be mysteries that are solvable in principle but perhaps not in practice. The third category contains mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. In effect this is to describe a simple taxonomy of the concept of mystery. Each of these categories can be described in the following terms.

1. Mysteries that are solvable in practice While many, perhaps almost all, examples of mystery are solvable there is a difference between those that can be solved in practice compared with those that could only be resolved in principle. At the practical level developments in natural and social sciences have been able to solve numerous examples of mysteries. In ancient times many natural phenomena were shrouded in mystery, for example, it was common to attribute the cause of both thunder and lightening to the direct action of God. However, with advances in physics and geography these mysteries have been solved. The mystery has gone, although a sense of awe and wonder might remain. The enlightenment period stands out as a time when numerous mysteries were solved in practice. For example, there is now no mystery around the purpose of the human heart, the puzzle surrounding its function has been solved. The ability of both social and natural sciences to solve mysteries can fuel the assumption that all solvable mysteries are capable of being solved in practice. Of course this assumption would need to be qualified by recognizing that there are some limitations to what current practices in these sciences can establish. However, with enough refinement these practices will crack remaining mysteries. For example, in the past a number of police investigations became ‘cold cases’ in that they could not be resolved given the available evidence and the limits of forensic science. However, as forensic science has improved, not least because of discoveries about genetics and DNA, it has been possible to reopen cold cases and solve the crime. A few decades ago these cases were conundrums or mysteries that were not solvable and now in the light of the improvements in forensic science and

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crime scene investigation, the evidence can be reassessed and the mystery resolved. However, the assumption that all mysteries are solvable in practice, given enough time, is one that can be challenged.

2. Mysteries that are solvable in principle There are some mysteries which are not solvable in practice, such as various historical mysteries. Our practical ability to make sense of the actions and motives of people who lived in earlier generations might be severely limited and because of the passage of time these might be hidden from us. In practice these mysteries cannot be solved but they do remain solvable in principle. Using again the example of Stonehenge, although we cannot in practice resolve the mystery surrounding this monument we know how it could be solved in principle. Hence, if an archaeological site uncovered evidence such as a stone tablet describing the purpose of these monuments, then the mystery surrounding them would be resolved. If we discovered this crucial bit of information then the mystery would be uncovered. There is a sense in which many of these solvable in principle mysteries could be described as permanent. The underlying puzzle is not going to disappear and this is what helps to keep these kinds of mysteries so fascinating. However, strictly speaking these mysteries exert a curiosity because they appear to be solvable only in principle. There is the possibility that some mysteries, such as the original purpose of Stonehenge, will never be solved in practice.

3. Mysteries that are unsolvable in principle Some mysteries might be incredibly difficult to practically solve, such as the puzzle of trying to identify the Higgs-Boson particle. However, this practical difficulty is distinct from those kinds of mysteries which are in principle unsolvable. It should not be confused with the conceptual issues surrounding the meaning of an ‘unsolvable mystery’. In distinguishing this third category of mysteries the attention is on ones which are intrinsically unsolvable. As a matter of logic these kinds of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. At a conceptual level there is nothing incoherent in maintaining that a mystery could never be solved. There is not a necessary connection between mysteries and their solvability. As has been noted, it is usually assumed that all mysteries are capable of being resolved, at least in principle and if given enough time and resources. This makes unsolvable in principle mysteries an intriguing

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and challenging idea. However, working out what would count as examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle is a far more difficult task. In terms of the earlier discussion of the concept of mystery, they would need to be more like conundrums rather than challenging puzzles. With unsolvable in principle mysteries a logical claim is at stake. For example, in the mystery about whether there is an edge or end point to space there are some logical and conceptual issues about whether space is something that could have an end point and whether it is even coherent to speak about a point beyond the ‘edge of space’. The mystery here reflects logical issues thrown up in the very concept of space and as such it is impervious to any practical considerations about how to test it out in practice. The difficulty of finding examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle will be the focus in the next chapter. There a range of examples will be carefully examined. An advantage with the three categories within the taxonomy of mystery is that they are able to cover all instances of mystery. Mysteries are either solvable or unsolvable. While the distinctions between these categories are clearcut there might well be instances of mystery that are difficult to place in the correct category. For example it is possible that some mysteries appear to be unsolvable. It would be relatively easy to be confused about whether a given instance is solvable in principle alone (and it will never in practice be resolved) with a mystery that in principle can never be resolved. There is a sense in which both could be described as permanent mysteries. However, the more significant variety of permanent mysteries are the ones that are in principle unsolvable. If a mystery cannot be solved in principle it challenges more than our ability to comprehend and make sense of this particular instance of a mystery. It also indicates that there are boundaries to what can be known and reasoned about, that there are some things that are in principle unknowable and beyond our ability to reason or comprehend. Unsolvable mysteries raise concerns about the ability of reason to be able to make sense of all of our experiences.

Rahner and the taxonomy of mystery Having clarified the meaning of mystery and outlined the taxonomy for this concept, attention can now move onto a reappraisal of Rahner’s theology of mystery and how this could guide repairs to the theory of Catholic education. The discussion of the meaning of mystery can be used to demonstrate the ways in which Rahner’s theology could be highly relevant and useful for educational

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issues. It is being proposed that in the light of this discussion of mystery Rahner’s account would need to be qualified and developed in a number of respects. In a number of ways Rahner’s use of the concept of mystery is different to the way it is commonly used. There is also a looseness in Rahner’s use of this concept that would need to be altered and improved if he is going to be useful in repairing the deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education. Thus, there is a need to clarify the ways in which Rahner’s treatment of mystery would fit in with the preceding discussion of mystery. In addition to developing Rahner vis-à-vis the taxonomy of mystery, it will be maintained that this modification would strengthen his underlying argument. The key modification is to qualify Rahner’s position is terms not of mystery in general, but rather about presence and significance of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. The overview of Rahner’s theology in Chapter 6 drew attention to his willingness to move quickly from our ability to question the presence of transcendence in human life. In similar ways he maintains an interrelationship between our every day experience of mystery and what he refers to as absolute or holy mystery. He posits a connection between every instance of mystery and a wider awareness of unfathomable mystery. As part of this he operates with the assumption that any instance of a mystery is a potential trigger for raising questions about or pointing to the presence of absolute mystery. It was explained above that Rahner’s loose or inclusive way of arguing about mystery allows him to move from the general experience of questioning and mystery in life to the claim that this could lead to absolute mystery. Of course Rahner does allow for the possibility that someone might ignore the presence of mystery in life. Rahner’s usage of the concept of mystery is one that could be criticized for gliding between the different senses of mystery. It is this which is the basis of many of the challenges or reservations identified at the end of Chapter 6. Rahner opted to take the concept of mystery (and transcendence) in the broadest of senses without appreciating the primary distinction between solvable and unsolvable mysteries. Through referring to mysteries in general rather than specifying whether he meant solvable or unsolvable in principle ones, he rendered many of his arguments both unclear and unpersuasive. Too often Rahner argued loosely about the presence of mysteries without recognizing that many of these mysteries are solvable. As such there is no need to interpret them as triggering a chain of questions that lead to the possibility of absolute mystery. When confronted with a mystery the primary challenge would be to work out if it is solvable in practice or in principle or to consider if it is an instance of a mystery

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which is unsolvable in principle. Given this, it could be maintained that Rahner is correct to identify the way that mysteries trigger questions, however, these are much more likely to be about how to go about resolving them. Rahner’s lack of precision over the concept of mystery means that there is a tendency for him to move from every mystery and question to absolute mystery far too quickly. The concern here can be illustrated by referring to Rahner’s insistence of the presence of mystery in human existence. Rahner maintained that the ubiquity of mystery in human life should be taken in itself as something profoundly mysterious about human existence. However, the significance of this claim hinges on what kind of mystery it is. Rahner’s failure to distinguish between the kinds of mystery involved weakens the significance of the way in which mystery saturates human existence. There is a way of overcoming this concern by bringing the distinction between solvable and unsolvable in principle mysteries to bear on Rahner’s treatment of mystery. This is to develop and qualify Rahner’s usage of mystery. This is to propose that Rahner’s looser or more general treatment of mystery should be reinterpreted to be primarily about the kinds of mysteries which are unsolvable in principle. This means Rahner’s more general claim about mystery in human life ought to be qualified to be about the presence of unsolvable ones. Instead of calling attention to all mysteries, Rahner could be reinterpreted as pointing to the presence and significance of unsolvable mysteries in human existence. This would be to reject Rahner’s overly broad definitions of the concepts of mystery and transcendence. The implications of developing Rahner in this way, of going beyond his position, can be briefly described in the following terms. Rahner’s theology would be about calling attention to the presence and significance of certain kinds of mystery, in particular ones that are unsolvable in principle. These are significant because they present a challenge to the abilities of reason. A mystery that cannot be resolved would be one that is in some senses not capable of being comprehended. It can be known about and described but it cannot be resolved. When presented with a mystery that is unsolvable in principle there is no way of being able to puzzle it out or uncover the solution. The lack of solvability has nothing to do with practical considerations about how to verify it. It is in effect a limitation to what can be reasoned about. Being a mystery that is unsolvable in principle brings with it a number of logical implications. It is incapable of being resolved. One of the advantages of developing Rahner in this way is that it makes some of his arguments, even if loose or inclusive, more persuasive.

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Thus when presented with a mystery that is in principle unsolvable there are a range of potential questions that can be triggered. These would build on each other – in asking why is it that this mystery cannot be solved there would be secondary questions about what does this mean for our ability to reason. Moreover, it disturbs the relationship between mystery and reason. A mystery that is unsolvable in principle is one that cannot be fitted into what is already known and understood. It is an anomaly. This would mean that there are limits and boundaries to how far reason can take us in making sense of our experience. The presence of unsolvable mysteries is able to provoke challenges about the powers of reason and also introduce the possibility of there being some things that are permanently beyond human knowledge. This would serve to support Rahner’s position about the bounded nature of human knowledge. There are some things that we are aware of, that can be grasped at and yet are never capable of being fully grasped. These kinds of mystery fuel an awareness of something that is beyond what is (humanly) knowable. At the very least this could trigger questions about what this might mean. It could also bring into focus the way that some knowledge claims lead not to greater clarity or understanding but rather to what is incomprehensible. This is suggestive of there being between reason and certain kinds of mystery a corollary or natural relationship. Some knowledge claims, about certain kinds of mysteries, inevitably lead not to an increase in knowledge by to mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. In the light of this kind of qualification and development it can be argued that Rahner’s arguments become more persuasive. It is not mysteries in general that count but rather certain kinds of mystery. What matters is not the ubiquity of mystery in human experience but rather the possibility that some of these are unsolvable in principle. Although this is not an accurate reflection of Rahner’s position it is one that in the light of the analysis of ‘mystery’ considered above is a more coherent and defensible account. In what follows it will be explained that these modifications make Rahner’s theology a more fruitful resource for the educator.

The educational implications of Rahner on mystery If Rahner’s theology is taken to be about calling attention to the significance of certain kinds of mysteries in human existence, it becomes possible to identify a number of issues that are particularly relevant to education and theories of education. It can be argued that Rahner is drawing attention to the kinds of

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mysteries that are ultimately connected with the interrelationship between the workings of reason and mystery. For the educator this is potentially significant because this is something that would impinge on the development of reason. Given the relationship between education, schooling, the curriculum and the development of reason anything which is relevant to our understanding of ‘reason’ ought to be considered as part of educational theory. Moreover, in terms of educational presuppositions a primary aim of education as a whole and of the curriculum in particular, is routinely taken to be the fostering of rational development. Through acquiring knowledge and being initiated into open discussions a pupil’s rational ability develops. Moreover, the curriculum as a whole is geared to fostering this rational development and equipping pupils with the ability to engage in rational discourse and to look for rational solutions and responses. These kinds of educational presuppositions would need to be reconsidered in the light of Rahner’s theology of mystery. His theological insistence about the significance of certain kinds of mystery draws attention to an aspect of the workings of reason that is typically overlooked in theories of education. Certain kinds of mystery indicate that there are limitations within the workings of reason. This is something that ought to be recognized and incorporated into rational development. For example, a rationally developed person would be one who knows and understands that there are limitations to how far reason can be pushed. They would have an understanding of why rational discourse will not always be sufficient. This would imply that a rationally developed person would be someone who knows, understands and appreciates the limitations of reason in the face of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. It follows that however much reason is developed or fostered by the educator there will be some unsolvable mysteries that cannot be rationally resolved. Given this it would mean that the educator would look to foster a sense of humility in pupils over how far reason can take us. To summarize more succinctly, recognizing a relationship between mysteries that are unsolvable in principle and the workings of reason would have a number of educational implications. This is because these kinds of mysteries draw attention to the way that reason at some points comes to an impasse. Rational discourse cannot comprehend or make sense of an unsolvable mystery and this, as noted above, means that there are limitations concerning what reason can help us to know about. This implication has a direct bearing on a range of educational assumptions. It would challenge the assumption that reason can help us to know (at least in principle) about everything, if we have enough time

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and resources. It also indicates that rational discourse is in a few crucial respects inevitably limited. In terms of the curriculum this would have a number of implications. To begin with, as pupils engage with the curriculum they will inevitably be brought into contact with a range of mysteries. Although most of these will be of the solvable variety, some at least will be ones that are unsolvable in principle. There is no prima facie reason for confining unsolvable in principle mysteries to specific subjects or parts of the curriculum. The whole curriculum would be involved. In practice, when a mystery presents itself in any given part of the curriculum the pupil would need to be able to place it in the correct category – as either solvable or as unsolvable. This would mean that in the course of learning about the subjects of the curriculum pupils would need to gain the ability to properly classify mysteries. In addition, the presence of unsolvable mysteries within the curriculum would present pupils with some challenges. There would of course be the challenge of being humble about our reasoning ability. In addition the presence of these kinds of mysteries trigger questions and pupils would face the challenge of working out how to respond to them. This challenging situation could be likened to the point of threshold that Rahner described in the convergence between philosophy and theology. This insight from Rahner’s theology could be employed to describe the curriculum, as a whole it has a role to play in bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. This is distinct from maintaining that the whole curriculum teaches theology or even theological ideas. The curriculum is geared to developing rational ability through the acquisition of various disciplines. However, in the course of this pupils would need to be challenged with the unsolvable in principle mysteries that are part-and-parcel of both the workings of reason and the various disciplines of the curriculum. Up to this point it has been proposed that Rahner’s theology of mystery, when suitably qualified, has a number of educational implications. In the light of this it will now be explained that how Rahner is able to inspire a way of repairing the central deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education. In particular it will be maintained that Rahner is suggestive of a theological justification for a non-confessional theory of Catholic education. The key steps in this argument will now be presented. The theory of Catholic education would, unlike many others, recognize the educational implications of unsolvable in principle mysteries for the development of reason. As part-and-parcel of engaging with the curriculum as a whole pupils would have their rational capacities developed through acquiring knowledge and

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being initiated into open discussion. This would also involve ensuring that pupils knew and understood about the presence of unsolvable in principle mysteries. They would need to be able to think through the ways in which such mysteries draw attention to some limitations within the workings of reason. There are instances when reason is unable to resolve a given mystery. This would trigger a number of questions about what this might mean. It would be in response to these questions, as well as the presence of unsolvable in principle mysteries, that pupils would be able to think through or engage with theological answers to them. Through the presence of these kinds of mysteries pupils would be brought to a point of threshold. This is different to the confessional account of Catholic education, where pupils are nurtured into adopting certain theological beliefs. Rather than being involved in a confessional activity Catholic education could, using Rahner, be described as a non-confessional activity of bringing pupils not to theological beliefs but rather to the threshold of theology. There is here a resonance with the way Rahner used his method of uniting philosophy and theology in order to demonstrate how the philosophical movement could bring one to the point at which theological responses become accessible or viable ones. So the whole curriculum, rather than through religious education, pastoral care or the liturgical life of the school, is the way in which pupils are brought to the point where one could begin to engage with theology and theological responses to the presence of mystery in human experience. What is significant about the curriculum is not that it somehow reflects God’s glory or how Christ is at the centre of it or that it reveals absolute mystery, but rather the way it has numerous relationships with unsolvable in principle mysteries. The implication of this is that the curriculum in a Catholic school ought to be geared to ensuring that pupils can recognize this kind of mystery and are able to think through what its significance and meaning for human life might be. This would mean that a Catholic education has the goal of bringing pupils to this point of threshold. What would be distinctive about Catholic education would be the way it challenges pupils not to simply ignore the presence of unsolved mystery, but to give the other options serious consideration. A Catholic education is one that would, through its commitment to rational development, be about bringing pupils to the point where theology can be approached not in terms of faith formation or as a characteristic of human experience but as a set of responses and answers to the presence of unsolvable mystery in human life. This is of course to utilize Rahner’s image of the threshold of theology as a way of describing the central goal of Catholic education. It is helpful to recall

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the positive connotations with this metaphor. Talk of a ‘threshold’ emphasizes being at the point of entry and this is distinct from having entered. Part of being at the threshold of something is being in a position or having the potential to move forward and so be able to engage with what is on the other side of the entry. Here ‘theology’ is being used to refer to the beliefs and faith stance that are characteristic of the Catholic Christian who actively participates in this faith tradition. To be at the threshold of theology is to have the potential to engage with these beliefs and this faith, and the way that it explains or makes sense of the presence of mystery within human experience. This means it would be the curriculum as a whole that would have a role to play in bringing pupils not to theology proper but to this point of threshold, the point where theology could be properly accessed and engaged with. This is distinct from faith formation and catechesis, and at the same time it would involve a commitment to rational development. Moreover, this would amount to an overt rejection of indoctrination. The priority is on rational development which includes making pupils aware of the presence and significance of certain kinds of mysteries. As such this way of understanding the theory of Catholic education is one that avoids the deficiency of the confessional account of Catholic education. Through the curriculum pupils will come to know and understand that when reason comes to an impasse then theological responses could become a viable way forward. At this point theology, revelation and the supernatural can be accessed and engaged with as a legitimate way of making sense of and explaining the presence of unsolvable mystery in human experience. The educator has a responsibility to ensure that pupils do not ignore or fail to recognize what might be important for their rational development. This means that if unsolved mysteries do raise issues that are important to the rational development of pupils, then there is here an argument for why pupils would need to engage in questions about the meaning and significance of the mysteries that they encounter in the curriculum. It is helpful to keep in mind a further educational aspect of the Rahner’s metaphor of coming to the threshold of theology. For it might well be that some, perhaps even many, pupils who experience this kind of Catholic education will choose not to enter beyond the threshold of theology in order to accept it. Moreover, it is also possible that there will be some (and conceivably many) pupils at a Catholic school who cross the threshold of theology and then go onto reject it. Being brought to the threshold of theology is distinct from going on to accepting theological answers. The curriculum at a Catholic school would have the crucial role of bringing pupils to this point of threshold. To ensure that

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pupils are in a position to accept, reject, or ignore theological answers to the presence of unsolvable in principle mysteries they need to be at the point where this is a viable choice. Crucially this is a state of affairs that can only come about if pupils have actually got to this point of threshold and do not simply ignore (through oversight or wilfully) the significance of unsolvable mystery vis-à-vis their rational ability.

Conclusion The final part of this chapter has explained how Rahner’s theology, if qualified and developed in terms of the distinction between solvable and unsolvable mysteries could inspire a theological justification for a non-confessional account of Catholic education. This would be the first step in engaging with the central deficiencies currently facing the theory of Catholic education. Having outlined this argument far more needs to be developed about this and the ways it helps to repair the other deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education. However, before being able to proceed with this there is a need to deal with a potential flaw in the analysis that has underpinned this chapter. This flaw concerns the failure to provide any detailed examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. Although the category of unsolvable in principle mysteries has been dealt with as a logical possibility little, if any, attention has been given to whether there are any candidates for this kind of mystery. Obviously, if some examples of unsolvable in principle mysteries can be identified then this will strengthen the preceding argument. However, if these examples are not forthcoming or do not stand up to scrutiny this will significantly undermine the argument. Dealing with this potential flaw will be the focus of the next chapter, where a number of possible examples will be considered in detail.

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8

Are There Any Mysteries That Are Unsolvable in Principle?

Introduction At the end of Chapter 7 a potential flaw with the strategy of using Rahner to repair the deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education was identified. The flaw is around the failure to provide any examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. There is little to be gained from reinterpreting Rahner, in terms of his theology calling attention to unsolvable mysteries, if in fact these kinds of mysteries do not exist. In this chapter attention will focus on the question of whether or not there are any examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. Although these kinds of mysteries have been dealt with at a conceptual level, as a possibility, little attention has been given to whether there are any instances of this kind of mystery. If a number of examples can be identified, this will strengthen the strategy of using Rahner to repair the deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education. Failure to provide some examples would of course weaken this strategy. Alongside providing some examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle this chapter will argue that these kinds of mysteries are important in a number of respects. This is because the examples to be considered will draw attention to the limitations and inherent tensions within the workings of reason. As such, despite being relatively rare, these kinds of mysteries have a wider significance and are far more than logical curiosities. The taxonomy of mystery considered in the last chapter rested on the primary distinction between solvable and unsolvable mysteries. The discussion of the concept of mystery illustrated that almost all examples of mysteries could be sorted as solvable, solvable in principle or solvable in theory. It was proposed that the taxonomy of mystery would also include the possibility of mysteries

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that were unsolvable in principle. It is an open question as to whether or not there are many examples of this kind of mystery. It will be maintained that the task of identifying examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle poses a number of challenging issues. In response to these challenges it will be argued that the antinomies of pure reason that Kant drew upon in the Critique of Pure Reason (2003) can be cited as examples of mysteries that can be accurately described as unsolvable in principle (henceforth referred to as unsolvable mysteries). The success of this argument will depend on being able to keep the focus on the antinomies rather than the wider philosophy of Kant. In what follows the antinomies will be considered in a way that is uncoupled from Kant’s more controversial argument for transcendental idealism. It will be explained that although all four are closely connected through having a similar structure, they draw attention to four fundamental but different respects in which reason inevitably results in mysteries that cannot be solved in principle. The antinomies, as Kant explained, demonstrate the ways in which reason results in internal conflicts and this has implications for our fundamental grasp of ‘reality’. It is important to note that it is not being proposed that the Kantian antinomies are the only examples of these kinds of mysteries. It might well be that some of the recurrent debates within philosophy, from the liar paradox to the problems of other minds, could potentially be considered as further examples. Indeed many philosophers have drawn attention to questions that cannot be answered in principle (for example, Hume, Wittgenstein and Davidson). However, unlike the antinomies, these philosophical questions, puzzles and conundrums do not raise the same kind of fundamental concerns about the workings of reason. It will be argued that the antinomies are apt examples of unsolvable mysteries because they stem from the inherent tendency within the workings of reason towards contradiction. In contrast some of the recurrent debates within philosophy present logical puzzles or conceptual conundrums that trigger off philosophical speculation. The Kantian antinomies will be focused on because they are among the most striking examples of mysteries that can be classified as unsolvable in principle. One further advantage with focusing on the antinomies is their educational implications. Educators are concerned with fostering reason among learners and the antinomies are integrally connected with the workings of reason. This means that the antinomies as examples of unsolvable mysteries raise issues that are potentially important for the educator. These educational issues will be picked up in the next chapter when the focus returns to Rahner and the theory

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of Catholic education. It is important to recognize that a delicate distinction is being drawn here. This is because the antinomies are being approached in a way that is uncoupled from transcendental idealism and yet at the same time there is a basic agreement with the Kantian tradition which affirms how they can be taken as examples of unsolvable in principle mysteries. This is to acknowledge the sense in which the argument developed below is bound up with the Kantian tradition.

What are the antinomies? An antinomy is a paradox that arises when a true statement leads to a contradiction. Typically antinomies are made up of two parts, a thesis and a corresponding antithesis. It is the clash between a law or principle and a claim that contradicts it. Although many philosophers have referred to them it is Kant who is most notable for drawing attention to the potential significance of four fundamental antinomies. Although the antinomies he utilized predated him they are often now simply called the Kantian antinomies. According to Kant an antinomy is defined as ‘a contradiction in the laws of pure reason’ (2003, p. A407/B434). The four antinomies that Kant discussed formed a central part of the section of the Critique of Pure Reason that dealt with the dialectic or logic of illusion. Kant drew attention to the way that these antinomies involve a conflict between two contradictory propositions. The Kantian antinomies can be summarized as: 1. The claim that the world has a definite beginning and end as opposed to the claim that the world is infinite. 2. The claim that all things are made up of simple, indestructible, indivisible parts as opposed to the claim that everything is composite and infinitely divisible. 3. The claim that we can act in accordance with our own free will as opposed to the claim that everything we do is determined by nature. 4. The claim that there are necessary causes as opposed to the claim that nothing is necessary and everything is contingent. The opposing propositions are the conclusions to a sound chain of reasoning and this means that a paradox results in which both conclusions in the antinomy (the thesis and the antithesis) are true and yet they cannot be true if the opposing proposition is true. It is here that the profound logical challenge in

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the antinomies comes into focus. It is this that can be used to argue that they ought to be classified as examples of mysteries which are unsolvable in principle (henceforth referred to simply as unsolvable mysteries). For Kant the antinomies drew attention to inherent problems within the workings of pure reason and he used the contradictions that surface from them to support his arguments in favour of transcendental idealism. This means that the antinomies play an important role in the wider Kantian project. In fact some Kantian scholars (e.g. O’Shea, 2012) have drawn attention to the way that it is the antinomies rather than David Hume that awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber, in that they provide the obvious presence of contradiction within reason itself and it was this that drove Kant to be the ‘destroyer of metaphysics’. The significance of the antinomies of pure reason is that they are a wake up call that necessitates an explanation about why reason leads to the contradictions in the antinomies. As O’Shea helpfully explains: This is one important way in which Kant conceives of his Critique to be an exercise in true self-knowledge centred on a reflective search for internal rational coherence. The Critique of pure reason is a trial in which reason must give an account of itself in light of its own demonstrable and inherent tendency to self destruct. (O’Shea, 2012, p. 50)

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant explains that there is a relationship between some profound logical puzzles and the workings of reason. If the antinomies are taken to be unsolvable mysteries, this would mean that they could also be used to demonstrate that there is a corollary between reason and certain kinds of mystery. This would give coherence to the claim that on some occasions reason leads not to greater clarity but to a mystery that is unsolvable. The antinomies are issues that predated Kant and they acted as a powerful trigger for his critique of pure reason. Kant considers the antinomies to be helpful ways of exposing the inherent tensions in the workings of reasoning and, just as they awoke him from his slumbers they could help to do the same for his readers. Kant commented [in his correspondence] on how the problems that arise in the antinomies would be a good way to present the difficult reasonings of his critique to a wider audience. (O’Shea, 2012, p. 50)

It is Kant’s use of the antinomies to critique pure reason that will be the focus below. They do indeed draw attention to tensions within reason, and to a significant correlation between mystery and reason.

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Before considering the specifics of the first antinomy it is helpful to draw attention to the broader context in which it and the other three were set within Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (2003). The antinomies appear within the extended second division, titled the Transcendental Dialectic, and are part of Kant’s attempt to recognize and expose what he considered to be illusions that pervade our fundamental knowledge claims. Kant maintains that we attempt to know things that can never be known and he explains this in terms of our ability to grasp at transcendental reality. It is something that we grasp at without ever achieving. This section of the Critique addresses our puzzling disposition to develop concepts around free will, God and the immortality of the soul. The antinomies are preceded by Kant’s treatment of ‘rational psychology’, known as the paralogisms, and are followed by ‘rational theology’, known as the ideal of pure reason. In all this Kant is critiquing the traditional branches of special metaphysics which dealt with the soul, the cosmos and God. The problems or pretensions of this metaphysics have their origin in the incoherence within the routine workings of pure reason. Although in what follows the antinomies will be treated individually, there is much similarity and overlap between the antinomies. This is not simply because they are presented in a similar style and are supported with the same kinds of arguments. It is also because they are facets of a general problem. The antinomies of pure reason stem from the way in which pure reason works. For Kant pure reason is the faculty of inferring and it is also the arbiter of empirical truth. By ‘inference’ what is meant is the logical deductions that are part-and-parcel of any syllogism. In the movement from the major premise and minor premise to the conclusion, inferences are made. This ability to make inferences plays a key role in what we make of the world which we experience. We constantly make judgements about the world around us and this involves using categories (like space and time) that enable us to order our sense experiences. In forming these judgements pure reason plays a pivotal role in making deductively valid inferences. These inferences are not sensory intuitions but rather the rules of understanding and the resulting judgements. Reason in formulating inferences is able to provide the logical connections between experiences and as such it is a key tool that allows us to be able to make sense of our experience. This is because the logical faculty of pure reason seeks to discover the logical entailments between our various judgements. According to Kant one of the fundamental ways in which reason works is by creating unity: If the understanding may be a faculty of unity of appearances by means of rules, then reason is the faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under

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principles. Thus it [reason] never applies directly to experience or any object but instead applies to the understanding, in order to give unity a priori through concepts of ‘the unity of reason’, and is of an altogether different kind than any unity that can be achieved by the understanding. This is the universal concept of the faculty of reason. (Kant, 2003, p. A302/B359)

Reason strives for a unity within our understanding and judgements, and triggers a series of inferences and deductions that seek to establish or conclude that there are ‘cosmological ideas’. This, according to Kant, could be summed up as reason’s quest to explain the cosmos as a whole.

The first antinomy The first antinomy contains two aspects, which is why some Kantian scholars (Guyer, 2010; Wood, 2005) describe it is a double antinomy about both ‘space’ and ‘time’. The thesis of this antinomy is that the world has a beginning in time and in space, and it is also enclosed in space. The antithesis of this is that the world has no beginning and no bounds in space but is infinite in regard to both time and space. This antinomy is not raising issues that can be resolved in empirical terms. However, both the thesis and antithesis are grounded in our everyday judgements of the world and both can appeal to a compelling chain of deductive reasoning. The controversy surrounds the way in which here pure reason results in contradiction. The thesis and antithesis involve two contradictory cosmological ideas. They cannot both be true and yet the chain of inferences indicates that both are true. Kant distinguished between conditioned and unconditioned experiences. The conditioned experiences of the spatio-temporal objects we experience depend on prior conditions. Both the thesis and the antithesis of the antinomy use reason to make inferences and deductions from our judgements of these conditioned experiences. Both the thesis and the antithesis involve making a reductio ad absurdum argument. Hence the thesis that the world began once upon a time and that it has spatial limits too can be subjected to a reductio by working with the assumption that the world had no beginning. This would mean that at any given point in time, such as the present moment, eternity has lapsed by and there has been an endless sequence of conditioned experiences. However, an endless prior sequence is impossible because these

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conditioned experiences would depend on there being an unconditioned experience, a starting point. As Kant explained: For if one assumes that the world has no beginning in time, then up to every given point in time an eternity has elapsed, and hence an infinite series of states of things in the world, each following another, has passed away. But now the infinity of a series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be completed through a successive synthesis. Therefore an infinitely elapsed world series is impossible, so a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence; which was the first point to be proved. (Kant, 2003, p. A482/B456)

This reductio is persuasive because it involves understanding ‘infinite’ to mean what one could never finish measuring. Given that the past is that which has already gone by and this means it has been completed, this situation can only be explained if there is starting point for time. In a similar way the antithesis of the first antinomy can also be shown to lead to absurdity. The antithesis states that the world has no beginning and no bounds in space, and it is infinite with regard to both space and time. If it were supposed that the world had a beginning point in time it would imply that before this there was no world and therefore a ‘time’ in which there was nothing. This leads to an absurd situation in which there is no world in which to measure or even to coherently refer to the passage of time. But more crucially nothing can happen in empty time – there could be no ‘before’ the beginning of the world. Kant explained it: For suppose that it has a beginning. Since the beginning is an existence preceded by time in which the thing is not, there must be a preceding time in which the world was not, ie an empty time. By now no arising of any sort of thing is possible in an empty time, because no part of such a time has, in itself, prior to any another part, any distinguishing condition of its existence (whether one assumes that it comes to be itself or through another cause). Thus many series of things may begin in the world, but the world itself cannot have any beginning, and so in past time it is infinite. (Kant, 2003, p. A428/B456)

Both the thesis and the antithesis are able to argue in favour of two diametrically opposed ideas – both that the world had a beginning point and that it is infinite and had no starting point in time. The force of this antinomy is reiterated in the double aspect it has in relation to the world’s extension in space. It can be deduced that there must be a final outer spatial boundary

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that encloses all matter within the cosmos. Again it can be inferred from the conditioned experience that if pushed back far enough there would need to be some unconditioned aspect of space. The first antinomy brings together two sets of claims that are both rationally defensible but which cannot both be true, in that the thesis and the antithesis are contradictory in relation to each other. The antinomy pulls in two directions and in terms of the thesis and the antithesis, there is no way of choosing which is the superior response. Both use deductive reasoning to come to mutually incompatible conclusions. Reason leads to two truths which contradict each other. There is something deeply puzzling about the way in which this contradiction is created by the legitimate workings of reason. Before moving on to consider the second antinomy, it is worth noting how the first antinomy has resurfaced within modern cosmology. Physicists, rather than philosophers, have been leading the way in trying to work out whether there is a beginning and/or an end point to the universe as a whole. The various theories, from the big-bang theory to the steady-state theory, have had to use deductive rather than inductive arguments. The question of the origin of the universe cannot be fully resolved by appealing to the big-bang theory or empirical evidence because the issue is ultimately a logical one. This is not because it is very difficult to collect evidence or because it is of a debatable quality. Indeed modern cosmologists are engaging with the issues raised in the first antinomy. The competing theories among contemporary cosmologists provide a useful reminder of Kant’s point about the way reason, when applied to the question of the origin of everything, pulls towards contradiction and to a profound lack of clarity. Some cosmologists (such as Hawking, 1988) have sought to avoid the force of this antinomy by being dismissive of talk about ‘before the big bang’. This is because it is maintained that space and time are integrally connected and both simultaneously came into existence with the big bang. This would mean that there is no time ‘before’ the big bang and this would make it a mistake to speak of a ‘before’ when there was no time in which this ‘before’ could be found. However, this kind of manoeuvre is problematic in that it reflects a failure to recognize the force of the antinomy. Cosmologists like Hawking in making this kind of judgement are going beyond what on empirical grounds they are able to justify. This is precisely an example of a cosmological idea – it is the outcome of a whole chain of inferences. Moreover, even after asserting the idea that there is no ‘before the big bang’ the tensions which led to the first antinomy remain. Reason still wants to strive for unity in our judgements about the

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states ‘before’ the advent of time. It remains coherent or meaningful, although deeply puzzling, to speak about the situation before the start of time. The quest about how to make sense of the cosmos as a whole remains, including what the situation was before space and time came into existence. In effect, modern cosmology provides a striking example of how the same issues within the first antinomy have resurfaced. Cosmology encourages us to treat the issues here as an empirical question, however, the first antinomy remains relevant. There is within the first antinomy a contradiction that has been caused by the legitimate workings of reason and this is a deeply puzzling situation. It is an apt example of an unsolvable mystery.

The second antinomy This is the second of what Kant called the mathematical antinomies and it draws attention to the fundamental qualities within the cosmos, whereas the first focused on issues related to the quantity of it. The thesis of the second antinomy is that every composite substance in the universe consists of simple parts and nothing exists anywhere except the simples or what is composed of the simples. The antithesis is that no composite thing in the world consists of simple parts and nowhere does there exist anything simple. In our judgements about the world there are inferences and deductions at work that result in two contradictory cosmological ideas. On one side these are about the way composite spatio-temporal bodies can be divided into smaller parts. The antinomy focuses on the way in which this principle of understanding the world can be taken in two conflicting directions. One way is to maintain that this ability to divide bodies into composite parts could continue ad infinitum – and so without end – and the second is to recognize that there are some simple parts of things that cannot be further divided. As with the first antinomy, although this might appear to be an empirical question, this antinomy is really about the principle of reasoning that are in operation when we make judgements about the quality of things. It is another example of a pseudo-empirical antinomy. It appears to be the kind of issue that could appeal to nuclear fusion and the practical success of splitting the ‘atom’ – or smallest unit. However, this kind of appeal does not diffuse the force of the antinomy. The assumption or principle remains intact even in the light nuclear fusion, because instead of focusing on atoms the attention shifts to the component parts of atomic structure. There is a logical question here about whether it is

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possible to keep on dividing things indefinitely and whether or not there come a point where no further division is possible. The thesis in this second antinomy argues that composite bodies as well as the cosmos as a whole cannot be divided into component parts indefinitely. Ultimately, here would be some elements that cannot be further divided and these would be the unconditioned building blocks. Kant again employs a reductio to support this argument which can be paraphrased in the following way. If it is supposed that composite bodies do not consist of simple parts we would find ourselves having to think away all composition. The result would be not just that there are no composite parts but also that there are no simple ones either, and this would presumably mean that there is nothing left. This would be an absurd situation. The point of this thesis is to argue that we cannot think away the assumption or principle that every composite substance consists of simple parts. Although we might not always be able (practically) to identify these components, it is taken as a known or given that essentially the cosmos is constructed from simple parts. The antithesis to this second antinomy takes up the opposing position that composite substances have no simple parts, for there are none. Part of our understanding of things such as space and the cosmos point away from there being any smallest indivisible parts. The reductio here would involve recognizing that if composite things did have simple parts then these would take up certain amounts of space. However, since (according to Kant) spaces are always made up of further spaces, any simple substances would be further examples of composite substances – and this is not simple. The assumption here is that because simple parts of things cannot be perceived in space then they cannot exist. Kant explains this in the following terms: The existence of the absolutely simple cannot be established by any experience or perception, either outer or inner and that the absolutely simple is therefore a mere idea, the objective reality of which can never be shown in any possible experience. (Kant, 2003, p. A437/B465)

When the antithesis maintains that there are ‘none’ in terms of simple parts, it would mean that we cannot be sure that there are any on the basis of experience. The ‘absolutely simple’ is an idea that has been constructed by reason and it is not something that can be experienced and therefore cannot be established or proved. Whether one is a rationalist like Descartes or an empiricist like Hume, the absolutely simple is not something that can be experienced.

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The second antinomy is another pairing of contradictory ideas that pull in opposing directions. Both the opposing ideas are cosmological and as such are the product of reason. However, despite this they lead to two different ways of characterizing the world or cosmos as a whole. The problem, as Wood helpfully explains, can be summed up in the following terms: Each pair of answers gives us two incompatible interpretations between which we apparently have to choose. And whichever way we respond to each of the cosmological questions, the answer we give seems unsatisfactory. (Wood, 2005, p. 90)

This second antinomy brings into focus what is in effect an impossible choice that has been brought about by the proper functioning of reasoning. As with the first antinomy, reason results not in clarity but rather in an unsolvable mystery.

The third antinomy Kant expressed the third antinomy in terms of a question about whether the causality producing any event in nature depends on a spontaneous cause beyond nature. This way of expressing it masks the way that this antinomy is actually about the ‘freedom verses determinism’ debate. Kant couched this antinomy in Aristotelian terms in order to demonstrate its relationship with first cause arguments. The third antinomy involves the claim that we can act in accordance with our own free will as opposed to the claim that everything we do is determined by nature. The thesis here maintains that there are spontaneous causes in nature and the antithesis is a denial of this – there is no freedom because everything in the world happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature. Kant accepted Hume’s critical treatment of causality and he maintained that causality was part-and-parcel of how reason operated. Hume had drawn attention to the way that we cannot experience ‘causation’ as such – what we see are a conjunction of experiences, with the movement of one billiard ball being followed by the next. In order to be able to make any judgements about our experience, reason would need to infer ‘causation’. This is a further example of a cosmological concept in that it is applied to the universe as a whole. Kant explains that it is an a priori principle of understanding in experience that there is causality in accordance with the laws of nature: Everything that happens presupposes a previous state, upon which it follows without exception according to a rule. (Kant, 2003, p. A444/B472)

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Cause is itself a happening in nature and every such happening has its cause in turn. There is a series of dependent events, and each is capable of providing the sufficient explanation of the subsequent event. What the third antinomy does is draw attention to the way in which this assumption of causality leads to two contradictory claims, one about determinism and causation and the other about free or spontaneous acts. This is a variant of the ‘free will verses determinism’ debate. The thesis here maintains that freedom is spontaneity and as such it presupposes the claim that free will involves accepting that there could be a series of states that could start themselves. This thesis assumes that there is a source of causality that comes through freedom. This means there are two sources of causality, one in accordance with the laws of nature and another from free will. This thesis is challenged through the claim that causation has a single source (either a prime mover or a causal chain that is infinite). However, if it were supposed that all causes were natural it would result in a situation in which there would be no room for free will or freedom to be the cause of an event. For Kant the difficulty with this is that it would be an incomplete picture of our situation. If there is to be free will then it must be possible for there to be some uncaused causes. This means causality cannot just be described in terms of each event being dependent on some prior state of affairs that stretches back in an infinite chain of causality. The antithesis in the third antinomy involves a denial of free will because the laws of nature govern everything. Spontaneous freedom would mean that causality operates in a capricious or sudden way and this would conflict with causal laws that are experienced in the laws of nature. If there were spontaneity and freedom from the laws of nature it would cause major problems, ultimately undermining the very laws of nature that reason has constructed to help us make sense of the world. The reductio that Kant employs in this antinomy could be pushed further in order to illustrate how freedom challenges regularity and laws. Freedom can be characterized as lawlessness or spontaneity and this would stand in contrast to the law-like situation that comes with patterns of regularity. There is a paradox here – to be able to make sense of our experiences, judgements have to be made about there being regularity in the laws of nature and yet if there was free will this would be undermined. The third antinomy raises an intriguing conundrum about being able to reconcile both lawfulness and lawlessness, as Palmer succinctly put it: ‘You cannot have regular laws if you allow exceptions all the time’ (1983, p. 83). Kant is well aware that the antithesis is highly problematic because it indicates the cost of allowing for freedom on the principles and workings of reason.

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Freedom or spontaneous causation and the denial of freedom are cosmological concepts and both have what Kant would describe as an illusory quality. This antinomy brings into focus a mystery that despite appearances cannot be resolved in principle. It is the result of two rationally justified cosmological ideas that on deductive grounds could both be true, and as a result they come into contradiction with each other.

The fourth antinomy This antinomy can be summed up as the claim that there are necessary causes as opposed to the claim that nothing is necessary and everything is contingent. The fourth Kantian antinomy pivots on the concept of a necessary being. Like the third one, it is couched in Aristotelian terms having a close connection with the argument for a prime mover. There is a degree of overlap or similarity between the third and fourth antinomy. Some Kantian commentators, such as Schopenhauer (1969), have even treated them as a single antinomy. The thesis maintains that to the world there belongs something that, either as a part of it or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary being. In contrast the antithesis maintains that there is no absolutely necessary being existing anywhere, either in the world or outside the world as its cause. This antinomy also has an affinity with the first antinomy in that both involve first causes. In the fourth antinomy the focus is on necessary first causes rather than on temporal first causes. The causal chain depends on a necessary first cause. The thesis in the fourth antinomy is that that there is a necessary being (which is either part of or the cause of the world) which could be established by arguing along the following lines. In our judgements about the world we posit numerous series of changes and each of these changes is a necessary consequence of some condition that preceded it. The necessity in the chain could be traced back to a beginning point that is unconditioned. This unconditioned point would be ‘necessarily’ unconditioned. If there was not something necessary we would struggle to adequately explain or make sense of any consequent changes that occurred. This necessary thing or ‘being’ would either need to be a part of the series of causes within the world or be the kind of thing that is capable of causing or bringing it about within the world of the senses. Every contingent event can be traced back along causal chains and this would lead to a first cause. This first cause would be different to all the subsequent contingent events in that it would need to be something that is necessary. In order to give a rational explanation of the causation that we

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experience there would need to be a necessary being. This being would be outside the world that we experience and as such would be beyond what we can have knowledge of. In contrast to this the antithesis of the fourth antinomy denies the thesis. There is no such thing as a necessary being, either inside or outside of the world. Just because each part of the series is necessarily dependent on some prior condition, this should not be confused with positing necessity to each part of the series. Each part within the whole is optional, and this contingency points away from there being a necessary being. Part of our basic judgements about the world is that there are causes and effects, and that the contingencies of life can be traced back along causal chains. This ability to make sense of the world that we experience (in terms of cause and effect) is responsible for the profound logical puzzle in this antinomy. The drive to give a rational explanation pushes the fourth antinomy in the same direction as Aristotle’s account of causation with its recognition of the importance of the final cause. The final cause is the key to providing the complete explanation. This antinomy brings into a focus a pair of claims that are the product of reason working correctly. Given this they can both be true and yet they cannot simultaneously be true. Attention to the causal chains within the temporal sequence is able to justify two mutually exclusive claims. On the one hand there is a necessary being and on the other there is no such thing as a necessary being. The formal contradiction here has resulted from sound reasoning and this would point to it being an example of an unsolvable mystery. Here, as with the other antinomies, Kant is drawing attention to the fundamental flaws with reason. There is a relationship with his critique of pure reason and his attack on traditional metaphysics. This is because it is the inherent drive towards contradictions within the right working of reason that has played a substantial part in creating the traditional problems of metaphysics. The contradiction with this antinomy has much affinity with the other three. All four Kantian antinomies are sets of contradictions that emerge from the principles or working assumptions of reason. Both individually and as a whole, these antinomies point to unsolvable mysteries.

Are the antinomies examples of unsolvable mysteries? Having reviewed each of the antinomies, attention now needs to shift to the claim that they ought to be classified as unsolvable mysteries. Up to this point it has been explained that each pairing involves contradictory claims. The

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antinomies both collectively and individually raise profound logical puzzles not least because each brings into focus formal contradictions. Each thesis and antithesis is a cosmological idea that can be properly inferred and constructed by reason and as such they could be regarded as true. However, they cannot be simultaneously held as true, and this amounts to a profound logical puzzle. Moreover, the antinomies are the inevitable outcomes of the way reason works and there is something deeply puzzling and challenging about the way in these four respects mystery rather than clarity is generated by the ordinary workings of reason. However, this is not quite the same as establishing that they should be taken as examples of unsolvable mysteries. Indeed, Kant is typically interpreted as having given a resolution to the antinomies and this would undermine the claim that they are ‘unsolvable in principle’. This is because Kant couched his positive arguments for transcendental idealism as a way of responding at least in part to the antinomies – and to his critique of pure reason. This challenge now needs to be considered in order to support the claim that the Kantian antinomies are examples of unsolvable mysteries. It can be argued that although Kant certainly responded to the challenges thrown-up by the antinomies, this is distinct from actually resolving them. It will be maintained that the challenges or illusions triggered by the antinomies remain whether or not Kant’s controversial epistemology is embraced. This will be taken as a tacit admission that the contradictions found within the antinomies are examples of unsolvable mysteries. It has already been noted that within the Critique the antinomies play a central role in Book II on the Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason, nestled between the Paralogisms and the Ideal. In dealing with the dialectic or illusion, Kant is explaining that these contradictions are unavoidable because they are rooted in the normal workings of reason. The contradictions within the antinomies are a result of sound chains of reasoning. In the processes of making judgements inferences are made, and what Kant’s careful criticism or analysis of reason demonstrates is that the antinomies are inevitable outcomes. In some crucial respects reason leads to these sets of contradictions. This throws up the dilemma of having to decide between the thesis and antithesis. The thesis in each of the antinomies represent the perspective of the speculative rationalist and have an obvious connection with the concerns of special metaphysics about the ideas of immortality, God and freedom. In contrast the antithesis defends what could be described as the principles of pure empiricism. As such each antithesis would point to a cosmos which is infinitely extensive in terms of space and time, and capable of being infinitely divisible, determined by prior

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causes and contingent. Such a cosmos would be endlessly open to exploration and investigation, and any conclusions reached could be further questioned and critiqued. What is distinctive about Kant’s position is his insistence that there is an illusion which permeates both of these fundamental stances. Both the rationalist and pure empiricist approaches have a tendency towards what Kant referred to as dogmatism, and this is rooted in striving for total or cosmological positions. The rationalists become dogmatic about the existence of freedom, the soul and God, and this is true of a scientific or naturalist approach which positively denies their existence. The pure empiricists similarly overstep the evidence to be dogmatic about the denial of the existence of freedom, the soul and God. There is a shared tendency from both perspectives to misunderstand the role and reach of theoretical reason. Kant described this in terms of the way that the thesis and antithesis of the antinomies generate ideas which are either too big or too small. Within the first three theses and the antithesis of the fourth antinomy there are ideas which are too small given our judgements or assumptions about the world we experience. They set a boundary or border beyond which we cannot go and this idea or claim is too small, because as Kant explained, By an unavoidable law of nature the question why will pursue you and require you . . . to go beyond this point. (Kant, 2003, p. A488/B516)

There is a quest for more complete answers and this is part-and-parcel of the quest for the unity of reason. It is this which drives forward questions such as what happened before the ‘big bang’. This boundary point is too small given the assumption or a priori principles of reasoning. In contrast the first three antitheses and the fourth thesis go in the opposite direction and generate ideas which are too big for the way we reason and understand our experiences. There is, in the light of Kant’s analysis, a relationship between the workings of pure reason and some profound contradictions. There is something profoundly puzzling about the way reason leads not to greater clarity but to mystery. According to Kant there is a hidden error at work in the antinomies and this comes down to a failure to distinguish between phenomena and the noumena. In making judgements the common sense workings of reason treats the objects of experience as things in themselves. This is to regard them as intelligible objects or noumena. For Kant this would mean that the experience of the object is both conditioned and unconditioned. However, Kant maintains that we cannot have access to things in this kind of way. He insists that all our experiences will be conditioned and it is not possible to have experience of things within themselves

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given our epistemic situation. Reason has a regulative function in helping us to order and makes sense of our experiences but it cannot be used in a constructive way to establish the content of those experiences. It is the failure to be attentive to this that ultimately results in the conflicting positions within the antinomies. Kant utilizes the distinction between appearances and things in themselves to provide a way of resolving the contradictions. Kant proposes that the antinomies involve a mistaken presupposition about treating the cosmos, as it exists in space and time, as a thing in itself. It is a mistake to treat the world or cosmos as a ‘thing in itself ’. It is only in the empirical regress of a series of appearances that the world is encountered and it is not experienced as an unconditioned whole. As Kant explained: Hence it (the cosmos) is always conditioned, then it is never wholly given and the world is thus not an unconditioned whole, and thus does not exist as a whole, either with infinite or with finite magnitude. (Kant, 2003, p. A504/B533)

According to Kant each pairing of thesis and antithesis in the antinomies considers the objects of experience to be things in themselves and to constitute grounds for maintaining a cosmological or totalizing idea. When it comes to the third and fourth antinomies the illusion is caused by a failure to recognize that causes could be a feature of things in themselves. When freedom is viewed in terms of appearances, internally or from the outside, then it will be shown to be incompatible with empirical findings. In the realm of appearances, causation points to determinism. In response Kant proposes the possibility that freedom might be a feature of a thing in itself. This would be a way of avoiding the conflict in the third antinomy. In a similar way it is possible to argue that the necessity of a necessary being could be a characteristic of a thing in itself. Kant is careful to avoid any kind of discussion about what this ‘thing in itself ’ would consist of. However, he is suggesting a possibility here while remaining agnostic about what the content of this noumena would be. It is in this respect that Kant declared that he was making room for faith by denying traditional metaphysics. Thus for Kant transcendental idealism provides a way of diffusing the inevitable contradictions that the antinomies drew attention to. It was in this respect that he used the antinomies to provide a partial support for transcendental idealism. Given this, some commentators (Guyer, 2010; KempSmith, 2003) have maintained a degree of circularity in Kant’s use of the antinomies in that he appears to have given special prominence to the first two antinomies because they presuppose or imply a support for transcendental

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idealism. Also Kant set his analysis of the antinomies within the long section of his Critique about dialectic or illusion. Referring to the illusions connected with pure reason, and as consequence the antinomies, helps to tacitly presuppose or support transcendental idealism. However, against this interpretation of Kant there are a number of arguments that would challenge the claim that even transcendental idealism actually resolves the mysteries in the antinomies. First, attention needs to be drawn to Kant’s use of illusion or dialectic. In common usage this phrase is suggestive of a sensory mistake, such as when presented with an optical illusion in which our mind is ‘tricked’ into making the wrong judgement. The force of Kant’s own argument in the Critique is that the ‘illusion’ is something inevitable or necessary. In the process of making judgements a number of inferences can be legitimately made. There is no trickery or mistake being made – the strength of Kant’s own analysis of the antinomies is to demonstrate that there is not any trickery or sensory mistake that results in these four sets of contradictions. If pure reason is working properly then it will inevitably end up with the cosmological ideas that come to a head in the antinomies. This means that some caution needs to be used in adopting Kant’s usage of ‘illusion’ and as a result the generally supportive relationship between the antinomies and transcendental idealism can be challenged. Second, to be more precise transcendental idealism does not actually resolve the antinomies. Rather it is an epistemological distinction that offers a way of handling these inevitable contradictions. Strictly speaking the distinction between phenomena and noumena provides a way of not having to deal with the contradictions in the antinomies. It is not that they are resolved but rather that they are placed in a context in which they cannot be talked about. Taking the example of the third antinomy, about freedom and determinism, transcendental idealism would characterize ‘freedom’ as a feature of a ‘thing in itself ’ and determinism would be a feature of things as they appear to be. Although we cannot know about things in themselves, this distinction means freedom and free will remain both meaningful and possible despite the determinism that is so readily a part of the realm of appearances. However, noumena are inaccessible to us and we cannot know about them, and as such we cannot meaningfully talk about them. For some Kantian commentators this is something positive, for example, Gardner approvingly states: Transcendental idealism translates the mysteriousness of human freedom into something at least negatively comprehensible, given our ignorance of its form. (Gardener, 1999, p. 264)

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It may be comprehensible but now ‘freedom’ is a feature of ‘things in themselves’. It can be posited, and referred to, however the contradiction in the antinomy has not actually been resolved. In effect the issue has been reclassified through transcendental idealism. Finally even if Kant’s transcendental idealism were to be endorsed, it could still be argued that it has not solved the mysteries in the antinomies. Indeed, it could be argued that employing the distinction between phenomena and noumena actually compounds the mystery in the antinomies. If either the thesis or the antithesis is bound up with things within themselves this would put them permanently beyond our reach. We could at best posit such things as freedom but we could not, given our epistemic situation, know this. A key part of the Kantian resolution of the antinomies is, through transcendental idealism, to recognize our inability ever to know about things in themselves. There is an important sense in which noumena could be classified as unsolvable mysteries because we could not, given our epistemic situation, ever be able to get to know things in themselves. Thus, even if Kant were offering a resolution to the antinomies there is a sense in which it would only increase the unsolvable mystery associated with the antinomies.

The wider significance of the antinomies Much of the preceding discussion of the antinomies rests on an assumption about the significance of the Kantian antinomies. If the antinomies are considered in their own terms, this assumption could be challenged and a question raised about their wider significance. Each pair of thesis and antithesis do of course draw attention to profound logical concerns and while they might raise intriguing issues it could be asked what more than this do they do? This comes down to whether or not these kinds of logical puzzles actually matter. One of the standard ways of undermining Kant’s position would be to trivialize the significance of the antinomies. Indeed, Hegel provides a classic example of this manoeuvre; he sought to dismiss them as either mere conundrums or as features of older philosophical perspectives, such as Aristotelian approaches. In this kind of Hegelian attack on the Kantian antinomies it is perhaps only the third one with its relevance to questions about human agency that would have any wider importance. It has already been pointed out that Kant wanted to curb the excesses of certain kinds of metaphysical speculation and, beyond questions of moral responsibility, some of the antinomies have not continued

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to be influential issues within philosophical debate. For example, questions about the simplicity or otherwise of the soul play at best a peripheral role in contemporary debates about personal identity. The concern is that although they serve as examples of unsolvable in principle mysteries, the antinomies are now chiefly only of historical interest. However, this concern is one that fails to appreciate the wider signifi cance of the antinomies. What Kant succeeded in doing in the Critique is to draw attention to the limits of reason. The inferences or a priori principles of understanding that function in our judgements are the ways in which we are able to make sense of the world. Without these principles there would be no regulation or ordering of experience. Kant maintains that it is this that provides the framework or context in which to engage in empirical investigations of the world. Reason regulates and plays an instrumental role in creating and projecting a unity between our various judgements about what we experience. More specifically it is this which is used to ground the scientific understanding and explanation of the world. Kant explains that it is the regulative function of reason that allows the elaboration and expansion of empirical knowledge through the construction of theories. He used the striking metaphor of reason being both the judge and jury when it came to our ability to make sense of the world and to engage in empirical investigation of it. The significance of the antinomies has to be appreciated against this context. They are a product of the proper functioning of reason and they occur precisely because reason drives towards a unity and makes use of cosmological ideas. Just as there would inevitably be a tension between one person acting as judge and jury, the same internal tension surfaces within the workings of reason. One of the central subtexts of the Critique is drawing attention to the way that reason necessarily leads to the kinds of tensions and incoherence contained in the antinomies. The antinomies emerge out of the normal workings of reason. Although Kant unhelpfully described this in terms of a dialectic or illusion, he has argued that these do not disappear in the way an optical illusion will once it has been recognized or identified. It is not just a matter of spotting the antinomies as puzzles and then learning to compensate or adjust for them. The ‘illusions’ will continue because of the way reason works. The illusions here do not come to an end and this results in an intriguing situation in that we can recognize them and yet despite this there is nothing that can be done to avoid them. Of course Kant wanted to use this challenge in order to encourage the adoption of transcendental idealism, however, the point for Kant is to ‘critique’ reason itself. In addition

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the antinomies are significant because they suggest that between the workings of reason and instances of unsolvable mysteries there is a corollary. This could be pushed further onto a claim about a fundamental relationship between the way reason works and mystery, in particular mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. When assessed carefully, or in Kant’s terms when the illusions are recognized, reason will be shown to lead inevitably to instances of mysteries that are unsolvable.

Concluding comments The focus in this chapter has been on presenting a case for treating the ‘antinomies of pure reason’ as examples of mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. This has involved focusing on the antinomies themselves, in a way that is largely uncoupled from Kant’s wider and more controversial argument for transcendental idealism. Each antinomy was considered in order to draw out the contradiction at play and to demonstrate that each is an apt example of an unsolvable mystery. In the final part of the chapter attention shifted to assessing why these kinds of mysteries matter and it was maintained that their significance lies in the fact that they highlight the corollary between the proper functioning of reason and unsolvable mysteries. The thrust of the argument has been on explaining that reason cannot resolve the antinomies. Although Kant elegantly drew attention to these concerns they are not necessarily tied to Kant nor to an acceptance of the more controversial aspects of his epistemology. There are two moves in the argument. The first is to explain the antinomies bring into focus profound logical problems that result from normal working of reason. The second is to briefly consider Kant’s suggested way of resolving the antinomies. It was argued that Kant did not actually resolve the antinomies through transcendental idealism. Thus it can be concluded that the mysteries in the antinomies remain unsolved and this can be taken as an indicator that they are unsolvable in principle. In the light of these two moves it can be maintained that the significance of the antinomies lies in drawing attention to the inherent tensions within the proper workings of reason. These issues will be picked up in the next chapter which returns to the task of using Rahner to repair the deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education.

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Introduction In the light of the analysis in Chapter 8 of examples of unsolvable mysteries, attention can now return to how Rahner’s theology can be used to repair the central deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education. The focus of the argument in Chapter 7 was on the ways in which Rahner’s theology of mystery and his theological method could be used to reframe the theory of Catholic education in non-confessional terms. The curriculum as a whole, given its commitment to fostering rational development, ought to be understood as bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. This is to address the second, and to a large extent the third, deficiencies that currently undermine the theory of Catholic education. In a large part this is because the justification for rejecting the catechetical meaning of Catholic education has been grounded on theological considerations. Drawing a distinction between catechesis and Catholic education has been a recurrent theme, identifiable in both Newman and Maritain. However, there has up to this point been no attempt to use theology to justify this distinction. Here the attention will move away from the broad strokes of this argument in order to explain how it can overcome the first deficiency, the stifling problem of Catholic edu-babble (McLaughlin, 1996). Thus this chapter will have a practical focus in order to demonstrate the implications for the curriculum in Catholic schools. It will be argued that the aim of bringing pupils to the threshold of theology, as the central goal of Catholic education, could not in any sense be regarded as an instance of Catholic edu-babble. It will be argued that there are three distinct but yet closely connected implications for the curriculum in a Catholic school that result from recognizing unsolvable mystery. The first is a recognition that there is a

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relationship between unsolvable mysteries and the curriculum as a whole. There are some obvious examples of topics and subjects that routinely deal with these kinds of mysteries. It will be proposed, however, that there is also at the more general level a relationship between the curriculum, the development of reason and these kinds of mysteries. The second practical implication arises from the first in that drawing these out will require using philosophical analysis and arguments. To ensure that this occurs and to avoid any practical concerns about teachers lacking the skills to be able to do this it will be proposed that philosophy lessons should be introduced into the curriculum of Catholic schools. This proposal will need to be carefully explained in order to distinguish it from the bewildering array of approaches typically used to promote the place of philosophy in the school curriculum. A third practical implication for the curriculum, closely connected with the first two, would be a reconfigured account of religious education. This would involve shifting away from the confessional account of religious education that has traditionally been advocated for it within Catholic schools. It will be proposed that both the aims and content of religious education would need to be reassessed if it is accepted that a primary goal of Catholic education is to draw attention to unsolvable mystery rather than to nurture commitment to the Catholic faith. These practical implications for the curriculum in a Catholic school now need to be considered. Before launching into this it is important to recall that this what is at stake is a normative argument about what the curriculum in a Catholic school ought to be like. It is acknowledged that it is possible that some schools, whether they are Catholic or not, might already be characterized as bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. The argument being made here is about what the curriculum in Catholic schools ought to be like if theology is being used in a substantive rather than a superficial way to guide the theory of education. If a central idea of Catholic theology, about the theology of mystery, is used to guide and inform the curriculum it would be necessary for it (in various different ways) to draw attention to unsolvable mystery.

Practical proposal 1 In the light of the arguments developed throughout Chapters 7 and 8, the case has been developed for recognizing the importance of certain kinds of mysteries in human existence. What is significant is not merely the presence of mystery but rather the way in which unsolvable mysteries, such as those

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instanced in the antinomies, have an integral relationship with reason. The right workings of reason, if pursued to its logical conclusions, will inevitably lead to unsolvable mystery. In a Catholic education a priority will be on ensuring that pupils are able to pursue reason to its logical conclusions and to be able to recognize unsolvable mystery. This is because these kinds of mysteries point to the place and significance of mystery in human existence. That there are some unsolvable in principle mysteries points to what could be described in Rahnerian terms as absolute mystery in human existence. It is the right workings of reason that can lead to or suggest the presence the absolute mystery that theology goes on to identify or name as God. Hence it is in recognizing the presence and significance of (certain types of) mystery that it is possible to be brought to the threshold of theology. The curriculum in a Catholic school is able to bring pupils to the threshold of theology precisely because it draws attention not merely to mysteries in general but to unsolvable ones in particular. A Catholic education is one that is guided and informed by the theology of mystery. It is built around the relationship between Catholic theology and mystery which is part-andparcel of the human condition. In a Catholic school it is the curriculum as a whole that brings one to the threshold of theology. Rather than just religious education it is every part of the curriculum that has a role to play in drawing attention to unsolvable mystery and in this way bringing into focus the significance of mystery in human experience. This is because through the curriculum reason and rationality is fostered. What is distinctive about the type of Catholic education and schooling being proposed is that it maintains that it is through reason itself and the development of rationality that one is brought to a point where theology could become accessible. It is through the curriculum that rational development and reasoning ability is promoted. In response to the presence of unsolvable in principle mysteries that crop up through the ordinary workings of reason theology is able to offer insight and answers. This can be likened to a point of threshold. It would be reached through learning how to recognize the presence and significance of unsolvable mystery throughout the curriculum. If this analysis, inspired by Rahner’s theology of mystery, is accepted an obvious practical implication for the curriculum would be to ensure that pupils recognize and understand the relationship between rationality and unsolvable mystery. There would be both specific and general dimensions to this. At the specific level it is possible to highlight a range of topics from some subjects in the curriculum through which the teacher could draw attention to

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the unsolvable mysteries that lie behind the Kantian antinomies. These would be the more obvious opportunities for pupils to engage with the unsolvable mysteries found in the antinomies. The example of the first antinomy (with its double character) about whether the universe has a beginning in space and time or whether it is infinite in relation to them, provides a useful illustration. Topics within the study of physics that deal with the origins of the universe would be suggestive of the issues that are connected with this antinomy. In addition the topic of cosmology would provide opportunities for the teacher to speculate with pupils about a range of metaphysical issues. These could include questions about the nature of reality beyond its physicality and about our ability to understand or explain why everything came to be. Moreover, within the topic of cosmology there would be natural opportunities to ask a range of questions about the origin of the universe, its first cause and whether its existence is necessary. These questions would bring into view differing issues from monism to creationism and this would also relate to other areas of the physics syllabus which evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various cosmological theories. In evaluating these strengths and weaknesses pupils would be engaging in a debate that has a strong resonance and connection with the first antinomy. It was noted in Chapter 8 that in more recent times scientists rather than philosophers have taken the lead in addressing the cosmological ideas at play in the first antinomy. Thus when learning about the topic of cosmology in physics lessons pupils would be coming across issues that have a relationship with the questions and issues surrounding the first antinomy, this would provide an obvious opportunity to raise the issues it triggers. Although this is distinct from physics teachers explicitly addressing the first antinomy within physics lessons, it does provide the opportunity for them to consider the metaphysical issues that lie behind it while teaching these topics. Another opportunity for the physics teacher to invite students to engage with questions that relate to the antinomies would be through the topics about space and time. For example, when a teacher is teaching about ‘time’ in physics lessons it would lead to opportunities to examine the competing claims of the thesis and antithesis in the first antinomy. In a similar way teaching about atomic qualities in science lessons would naturally prompt discussion about the kinds of metaphysical issues that lie behind the second antinomy. These topics are overtly suggestive of questions surrounding the ultimate material components of the universe to which there are a range of metaphysical responses, from hylomorphism to atomoism.

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Given the close relationship between modern cosmology and mathematics there would be some topics in the study of mathematics that are suggestive of the antinomies and which would enable the teacher to speculate about the metaphysical questions behind them. It is important to recognize that modern cosmology is heavily dependent on the mathematics that underlies quantum mechanics and much of the ‘new physics’. This would mean that within some maths lessons (some) pupils would come across the mathematical principles that are connected with the first antinomy. Both maths and physics lessons could be used to demonstrate the Kantian insight that our empirical theories fail to satisfy our quest for understanding. As pupils learn about rival theories in their science and maths lessons they are presented with another opportunity to consider issues connected with the antinomies. This is because when Kant employs the various reductio absurdum arguments in the antinomies he brings into focus the way that neither our conditioned or pure reason could escape the contradictions that reason inevitably leads to. In learning about these rival scientific theories the key point would not be that science provides evidence that supports either the thesis or antithesis of the antinomies but rather that there are metaphysical questions about the inability of our explanations to provide a complete understanding. Another example of a specific topic that could be used by the teacher to trigger questions about either the antinomies or the underlying metaphysical debate would be the mathematical concept of infinity. It is employed in both the thesis and antithesis of the first and fourth antinomies. In maths lessons pupils need to learn about infinity as part of basic arithmetic, in terms of the infinite possibility of addition or subtracting. In acquiring this understanding pupils would have an obvious opportunity to speculate about Aristotle’s distinction between potential and actual infinities. Part-and-parcel of mathematics is learning that actual infinity should not be mistaken for physically existing infinities. Through helping pupils to understand ‘infinity’ there would be a natural opportunities for pupils to engage with it. Some of the puzzles and conundrums of maths (and indeed science) depend on pupils having an understanding of infinity and as such these would provide natural entry points for pupils to discuss not only metaphysical questions in general but also the antinomies in particular. Outside of mathematics too the concept of infinity routinely crops up, for example, in history where certain themes or patterns continually reappear in a way that is suggestive of being perennial or endlessly recurring. This would again present an opportunity for pupils to discuss these types of questions.

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Another subject in which issues connected with the first antinomy might be expected to crop up would be within religious education. A typical topic in religious education are ‘creation stories’ which involves questions about cosmology and the way in which various creation myths seek to offer an explanation of the origin of the universe. Some creation myths posit a fixed starting point for the universe and employ versions of the cosmological argument for God’s existence. There is a clear resonance here with the issues lying behind both the first and fourth antinomies, thus making this topic an apt trigger for pupils to engage in debates about the cogency of cosmological arguments and about what constitutes a complete or final explanation. To summarize the argument so far, there are some obvious topics within the study of physics, maths and religious education which are suggestive of the unsolvable mysteries that lie behind the antinomies. When these topics are taught in a Catholic school the intention would be to use them as triggers for getting pupils to engage with the issues that the antinomies bring into focus. Moreover, the teacher would need to use the teaching of these topics as a stimulus for encouraging pupils to engage with the meaning and significance of unsolvable mysteries. It should be noted that the third and fourth antinomies, particularly the freedom verses determinism one, could be raised within other parts of the curriculum such as in history and human geography. It is not that historians deal in any formal sense with the Kantian antinomies but rather that there is an echo of these issues within some aspects of history. For example, in the study of history a typical topic would encompass issues such as historicity or the idea of progress in history. These trigger questions about whether or not there are structural causes within history or whether change and development in history is down to powerful individuals. These would be individuals who use their freedom and creativity but at the same time are nurtured by and to a large extent determined by their own historical context. In the process of making these kinds of judgements in history lessons there is a potential opportunity to encourage pupils to engage with metaphysical debates about spontaneity, freedom and determinism. In a Catholic school what is being proposed is that these more obvious topics would be presented to pupils as triggers for engaging with the presence of unsolvable mystery in human experience. In some lessons pupils would be taught about issues that are at least suggestive of the antinomies. In others opportunities would be acknowledged and used as apt occasions for drawing a pupil’s attention towards the presence of unsolvable mysteries. The curriculum

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in a Catholic school would take full advantage of any obvious connections with these kinds of mysteries. However, alongside these more obvious connections there is a looser or more general relationship between the curriculum as a whole and unsolvable mysteries. This is because of the role that the curriculum plays in fostering reason among pupils. Often this role is couched in terms of the way in which the curriculum has the central aim of training or developing pupils to become critical thinkers. There is a broad consensus that fostering reason as either a skill or a disposition is a central educational aim (see for instance Law, 2006; Siegel, 1988; White, 2012; Winstanly, 2008). It is in the role of the curriculum in the development of reason that the more general relationship with unsolvable mysteries can come into focus. This is because what the Kantian antinomies draw attention to are the inherent tendencies within the workings of reason toward self-destruction. Thus activities that seek to foster reason, which would include almost every part of the curriculum, would need to teach about the way in which reason will inevitably lead to the unsolvable mysteries (as instanced in the antinomies). This is a state of affairs that tends not to be readily recognized or even acknowledged in theories of education. One of the central arguments developed in the preceding chapter is about the broader significance that the unsolvable mysteries have for our understanding of ‘reason’. The antinomies are significant precisely because they draw attention to inherent self-destructive tendencies in the right functioning of reason. These contradictions stem from reason working as it should and this is part of the paradox that Kant’s Critique draws attention to. Given that there is a corollary between reason and unsolvable mystery this is something which would need to be acknowledged and appreciated. In the general process of educating pupils to be critical thinkers, or to reason well, the curriculum as a whole has a central role to play in fostering rationality. It follows from this general role that making pupils aware of the connections between unsolvable mystery and reason ought also to be part of the way that the curriculum fosters rationality. Ultimately what matters is not that aspects of the antinomies, an associated thesis here or a topic suggestive of an antithesis there, are explicitly present within specific topics of various subjects in the curriculum but rather the more profound relationship between mystery and reason. This is something that must permeate the curriculum as a whole. The unsolved mysteries at play in the antinomies result from the ordinary functions of reason and this would

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have implications for the educator’s attempts to foster the development of reason through the various subjects of the curriculum. Rather than just paying attention to the explicit instances of the antinomies within specific topics the educator would also need to be attentive to the more general relationship between unsolvable mystery and reason. It follows that if reason inevitably leads to the kinds of unsolvable mysteries reflected in the antinomies, it is this rather than specific topics that would be more important to the wider goal of fostering the development of reason. It is important to recall that Kant did not invent the antinomies but employed pre-existing ones to draw attention to the problems that are inevitable aspects of reason working properly. It is, as O’Shea observed, a wake up call to pure reason, demanding an explanation of the apparent internal contradictions in reason’s own house. (O’Shea, 2012, p. 50)

The antinomies stem from the right functioning of reasoning in the making of judgements, formulating and using inferences, developing cosmological ideas and searching for unity between these ideas and our judgements about what is experienced. In each subject of the curriculum various cosmological ideas are at play because they are built into the fabric of our judgements. More specifically there is a latent or implicit way in which the cosmological ideas that result in the antinomies are present throughout all the subjects of the curriculum. The first antinomy provides a helpful illustration of this because it brings into focus the cosmological ideas of space and time that are fundamental to how reality is understood. There is an almost intuitive recognition that space and time are instances of cosmological ideas that permeate most, if not all of our judgements. Of course Kant took both space and time to be categorical frameworks which we use to make sense of all of our experiences. The origin of these cosmological ideas are found in the judgements and inferences that we extrapolate from our experience of the world. As such they are continually cropping up (in a latent way) in almost every subject. They are in our judgements, and in the inferences that ground these, and as such they are repeated allusions to both the theses and the antitheses of the antinomies. Both the thesis and antithesis are grounded in our everyday judgements of the world and both can appeal to a compelling chain of deductive reasoning. For example the unsolvable mystery in the first antinomy is latently present in all judgements, and related inferences, that involve the categories of space and time. This means that it is part of almost every human experience and knowledge claim. As such it would be an implicit or foundational part of the knowledge claims that ground the various subjects in the curriculum.

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The curriculum in a Catholic school, in addition to using the obvious points of association with the antinomies, would also need to recognize the more general ones too. When delivering the curriculum one important aim would be to ensure that the relationship between it and the unsolvable mysteries as instanced in the antinomies is drawn out and made clear to pupils. In practical terms this would mean that in a Catholic school individual subject teachers would need to look for opportunities to make pupils aware of connections with unsolvable mysteries, in particular the antinomies. This would be an important part of ensuring that the curriculum did indeed serve the purpose of fostering reason among pupils. The first practical proposal is for the Catholic school the curriculum to recognize the specific opportunities that exist for making pupils aware of unsolvable mystery. Of course, the challenge of teaching about unsolvable mysteries vis-à-vis individual subjects is easier said than done. Although specific topics that are more readily suggestive of the antinomies are to be found, they would represent only a small slice of the curriculum and these would mostly be found in only a limited number of subjects. Moreover, while the case can be made for the general relationship between the whole curriculum, the development of reason and the antinomies it is another matter to specify what this would mean for the day-to-day practice within the different subjects of the curriculum. In order to overcome these challenges and practical concerns it is time to consider the second but closely connected practical proposal for the curriculum in a Catholic school. This is the proposal to introduce a new subject within the curriculum of a Catholic school.

Practical proposal 2 This is a practical proposal for the introduction of philosophy into the curriculum offered at Catholic schools. This would be a compulsory subject. In the terminology of the national curriculum it would be an additional ‘core’ subject, that would be taken by all pupils in both the primary and secondary phases of the school curriculum. The finer details of this second practical proposal now needs to be scrutinized, not least in order to distinguish it from the bewildering diversity of ways in which philosophy is already in the curriculum. In addition some indication will be given of the likely content of this course. As an academic discipline philosophy has a long established history that would, within a Western perspective, trace its origins back to the philosophers

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of Ancient Greece. Even within the modern university philosophy continues to be regarded as a high-status academic subject. Many of the advocates of philosophy in schools share the conviction that philosophy is an intrinsically valuable pursuit that is worth studying for its own sake. Philosophy is already present in the curriculum in a number of ways, from specific programmes (such as Philosophy for Children [P4C]) to formal qualifications in Advanced Level philosophy. Philosophy also figures prominently in other courses, such as in the epistemology that constitutes the Theory of Knowledge unit of work within the International Baccalaureate qualification or in the use of logic and reasoning skills that are a central part of the ‘Critical Thinking’ Advanced Subsidiary qualification. Moreover, philosophy is present within some of the subjects that typically make up the curriculum, for example, both history and English literature routinely employ philosophical ideas and themes. One obvious way in which philosophy is also present is through religious education. In addition to the philosophy of religion, religious education normally includes a range of ethical issues and often this philosophy is embedded within religious texts and beliefs. It is not uncommon for religious education to be renamed as philosophy and ethics in many English comprehensive schools. Despite being present in these ways, philosophy is not currently compulsory, other than through its presence within the religious education programme. Having briefly surveyed how philosophy is present in the curriculum attention will now be given to the characteristics of these differing approaches to philosophy. When it comes to philosophy in schools there is an obvious distinction surrounding age. Some philosophy in schools is overtly aimed at primary school pupils while other approaches are geared towards older secondary school students. The most obvious example of the latter would be where philosophy is being taught as a discrete academic subject, such as A-Level philosophy or within the International Baccalaureate. These qualifications are for older secondary school students, they allow students to progress onto higher education and also provide a specific progression route for those who want to take up philosophy at university. The proportion of pupils taking these qualifications is increasing but it remains a small one in terms of the total cohort of students. The primary goal of the AQA philosophy course is to introduce students into academic philosophy: At AS, the specification concentrates on a number of key philosophical themes, intended to provide students with a broad introduction to Philosophy. At A2, students will specialise further, selecting two themes to study in depth and focusing on philosophical problems through the study of a key text. (AQA Philosophy Specification, 2014, p. 2)

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Although narrower in scope the Theory of Knowledge unit for the International Baccalaureate is similarly aimed at introducing students to the central issues in epistemology: Theory of Knowledge is a course designed to encourage each student to reflect on the nature of knowledge by critically examining different ways of knowing (perception, emotion, language and reason) and different kinds of knowledge (scientific, artistic, mathematical and historical). (International Baccalaureate Organisation, 2012, p. 1)

Both the International Baccalaureate diploma and the AQA specification share a focus on broadly analytic philosophy which is presented to students as a way of engaging with an ancient and intrinsically worthwhile academic pursuit. When it comes to younger, primary aged pupils there are a number of broadly similar approaches to philosophy that are basically variants of the Philosophy for Children programme (henceforth P4C). For over 30 years the approach first developed by Lipman in the United States, P4C, has spread into a significant number of primary schools in the United Kingdom. Lipman (1977) has led the way in arguing that young children have a propensity for asking questions and he claims that, the child’s context is full of wonder because they are still acquiring frames of reference. (Lipman, 1977, p. 15)

He argues that children need to be exposed to philosophy in order to keep this sense of wonder alive. Lipman championed the cause for promoting philosophy amongst primary age pupils. In doing this he was challenging an assumption, rooted in Plato, that maintained that children lacked both the experience and cognitive capacities to be able to engage in the rigors of philosophical enquiry. Lipman successfully developed a way of teaching primary aged pupils philosophical ideas, through the use of a distinctive pedagogy based around classrooms as communities of enquiry. One of the important features of Lipman’s methodology is that it sought to use philosophy as a way of enabling primary-aged children to become both more thoughtful or reflective and also more considerate individuals. Building on the work of Lipman others such as the Society for Advancing Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education (SAPERE) have sought to help primary aged pupils to ‘think critically, caringly, creatively and collaboratively’ (SAPERE, 2012, p. 1). Through the community of inquiry children are guided in how to work together collaboratively. SAPERE is not the only organization that has focused

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on bringing philosophy to primary aged school children. The Philosophy Foundation (Worley, 2011) seeks to introduce these pupils to a wide range of philosophical problems through using simplified versions of the kinds of philosophical puzzles and conundrums that are found in typical undergraduate philosophy courses. What is distinctive about Worley’s approach is that the teacher has the task of being the in-class philosopher with the role of nurturing or guiding pupils in the process of ‘doing’ philosophy. Another influential idea within the various approaches to philosophy in schools relates to the purpose of studying philosophy. It is frequently argued that philosophy in schools is an effective way of developing critical thinking skills, for example, Winstanley maintains that, Philosophy is a powerful subject and that philosophizing, or philosophic enquiry, is the optimum pedagogy for fostering the essential skills and dispositions of critical thinking. (Winstanley, 2008, p. 85)

Through engaging with philosophical problems pupils will be challenged to develop their thinking skills, and the purpose of philosophy is to use it to develop these skills. Another variant of this approach is found in Siegel’s arguments about why epistemology, as an essential sub-discipline of philosophy, ought to be taught in schools. Siegel (2008) identifies various reasons for this, ranging from harnessing natural pupil interest in epistemology to a set of arguments about how philosophy develops rational development rather than simply ‘critical thinking’. Educating for critical thinking requires that students be educated not simply to be critical thinkers, but to understand and reflectively endorse that educational aim as well, on the basis of reasons that warrant its status as an educational ideal. (Siegel, 2008, p. 84)

The underlying point is that philosophy ought to be part of the school curriculum because it is a particularly fruitful way of developing certain kinds of skills and dispositions.

Philosophy in the curriculum of Catholic schools Philosophy lessons would provide a practical way of ensuring that all pupils learnt how to recognize and think through the implications of unsolvable mysteries. This is because these mysteries, as instanced in the antinomies,

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are examples of the logical conundrums that philosophers typically consider. Philosophers before and after Kant have sought to grapple with these kinds of logical quandaries. Indeed some philosophical training or experience of engaging in philosophy is normally a prerequisite of being able to grapple with these issues. For these practical reasons pupils would need to do some philosophy in order to ensure that they could recognize and begin to work out the possible significance of unsolvable mystery. As part of this it would be necessary for pupils to be taught by teachers who had received some kind of philosophical training and who were sufficiently skilled in ‘doing’ or delivering philosophy. It might well be that many subject teachers would lack the philosophical training and the curriculum time available, to be able to draw attention to the unsolvable mysteries as they cropped up within their own subject. A practical way of overcoming these difficulties is to have philosophy lessons delivered by philosophy specialists. This is because philosophy is a particularly apt subject for drawing attention to logical puzzles and different kinds of mysteries. Philosophy is able to clarify the salient issues in the puzzles and problems that crop up in our attempts to make sense of our experiences. It can do this by drawing attention to the unsolvable mysteries which are present in the rest of the curriculum, in both the obvious instances and in the more general ways. In addition philosophy lessons would aim to both foster reason and to help pupils to critique it. The special quality of philosophy in this respect is drawn out in Pring’s observation that, Philosophy begins when one is systematically puzzled about what is meant by what is said and written. (Pring, 2008b, p. 18)

In philosophy lessons pupils would be helped to recognize the interrelationship between reason and unsolvable mystery. Hence this subject would provide a practical way for ensuring that the curriculum in a Catholic school did draw sufficient attention to unsolvable mystery. The introduction of compulsory philosophy lessons is closely connected with what is distinctive about a theory of Catholic education that draws its inspiration from Rahner. In that it would help to ensure that pupils did recognize that mystery is part-and-parcel of the human condition. Being able to recognize and appreciate this aspect of the human condition can play a role in brining pupils to the threshold of theology. Given that a Catholic education is bound up with recognizing mystery it is essential that pupils do not ignore it and learn how to distinguish between different kinds of mysteries in human existence.

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The philosophy to be introduced into the Catholic school curriculum would be drawing on insights from Rahner. In that this philosophy would be broadly focused on the mysteries that are part-and-parcel of human existence. It would be philosophy that engages with the presence of mysteries in many different areas of human existence, both within specific disciplines and within the quandaries that reason and rationality lead to when pushed to their extremes. Within philosophy lessons pupils would be taught how to recognize the presence of profound mysteries or what Rahner referred to as absolute mysteries. In this way philosophy lessons in a Catholic school would play an important role in bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. This would be the starting point of being able to access a central idea of Catholic theology about the significance of mystery. It is here that the crucial characteristic of philosophy in the curriculum in a Catholic school comes into focus. In philosophy lessons pupils would learn that some mysteries are unsolvable in principle. These lessons would ensure that pupils appreciate and understand unsolvable mysteries and not simply learn how to recognize examples of them. There are some problems, such as the profound logical puzzles that Kant drew attention to in the antinomies, that are in principle unsolvable. This is to affirm a tradition in philosophical reflection that draws attention to our inability to resolve all problems, puzzles and mysteries. Kant was able to use the antinomies in order to demonstrate the inherent tensions within the way reason functions and that there are limits to what can be known. This emphasis on the limitations of our knowledge is echoed in Wittgenstein’s often repeated observation that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. There are some things which we cannot speak about and this limitation needs to be recognized and accepted. One of the roles of philosophy lessons would be to work out where these limitations lie. There is here an echo of Socrates’ observation that the only true wisdom or knowledge is about coming to know that you know nothing. It is being maintained that an important characteristic of philosophy lessons in Catholic schools would be to help pupils to be able to work out what is knowable and what is unknowable. The kind of philosophy that ought to be introduced into the curriculum of a Catholic school is one that engages pupils in the task of appreciating and understanding the significance of unsolvable mystery. By way of summary the principle aims of philosophy in Catholic schools can be listed as follows. First, these lessons would seek to engage pupils with the questions triggered by the presence of unsolvable mysteries in the rest of the curriculum. This is to pick up on and reinforce the teaching that pupils would

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have gained when learning about topics such as cosmology, atomic qualities or infinity. It was explained above that these topics are suggestive of and connected with some of the antinomies and as such they provide apt opportunities for teachers to draw attention to unsolvable mysteries. To ensure that sufficient attention is given to this, philosophy lessons would provide a suitable location to make sure that pupils did engage with the questions caused by these kinds of mysteries. Second, philosophy lessons would have the task of ensuring that pupils understand the interrelationship between reason and unsolvable mystery. Part-and-parcel of this would be encouraging pupils to engage with the questions and issues that lie behind Kant’s Critique of reason. There are limits surrounding what can be known and this is because of the inherent self-destructive tendencies within the workings of reason. The problems that crop up in the antinomies are ones which will remain unsolvable as a matter of principle. So these philosophy lessons would give, as Siegel (2008) recommended due regard to the teaching of epistemology as a distinct but fundamental sub-discipline. A third aim of philosophy lessons would be to ensure that pupils developed an appreciation or awareness of why the presence of unsolvable mysteries matter. In practice this would be a more reflective part of the subject. It would be about encouraging pupils to think through and reflect on the possible significance of unsolvable mysteries and to raise questions about what this might imply or suggest about human existence. Part of this would be about recognizing where the limits of philosophy lie and that other disciplines, such as theology, may well play a pivotal role in helping us to make sense of and respond to the presence of unsolvable mystery. In effect this is about fostering the disposition of humility when it comes to our knowledge claims. One practical consequence of introducing philosophy into Catholic schools would be to foster a sense of humility among pupils regarding the extent of what we can know and hope to know. Challenging pupils about the need for some humility vis-à-vis our knowledge claims would be a striking counterbalance to the way that some other parts of the curriculum emphasise the human ability to know and make sense of everything we experience. Within the curriculum there is, understandably, an emphasis on inducting pupils into what is known. Hence these philosophy lessons would draw attention to where our reason and knowledge will inevitably break down. This is to foster humility among pupils through helping them to recognize both what is not known and what is in principle unknowable. An important part of this would be introducing pupils to the salient aspects of Kant’s Critique, which would involve taking pupils through the limitations of both empiricism and rationalism. In effect philosophy in the Catholic school

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would be loosely built around the central themes in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 2003). This would be achieved through a problem-based approach in which discussion and reflection would figure prominently. For fairly obvious pedagogic reasons, it would not be a text that pupils read but its central themes would inform and guide the content of the philosophy lessons. This would be in order to equip pupils with a range of philosophical skills connected with logic and the construction and analysis of arguments. Kant drew attention to the importance of inferences in the exercise of reason and thinking. Philosophy in a Catholic school would involve making pupils aware of the kinds of inferences and cosmological ideas that are constructed in the lessons they experience on a day-to-day basis and the unsolvable mysteries they lead to. Alongside this content this kind of philosophy would have a number of practical goals. The first would be about learning how to work out what would count as an unsolvable mystery. This would involve being able to classify and analyse different kinds of mysteries. The second would be about providing pupils with some curriculum time to be able to step back from what is learnt in the rest of the curriculum. One way of promoting this would be to mirror some of the pedagogic practices employed by P4C, such as getting pupils to work away from their desks and to focus on careful dialogue within a community of enquiry. To reiterate, the heart of this second practical proposal is that a broadly Kantian understanding of philosophy ought to be introduced into the curriculum of Catholic schools. The lessons would be geared to helping pupils be attentive to unsolvable mysteries that are largely latently present within the rest of the curriculum. An intriguing feature of human existence is that there are some unsolvable mysteries. This can be used to trigger questions about what this means and what ought to be our response to the unknowable. The ability of philosophy to help in this regard is usefully drawn out by Pring’s observation that to teach young people to think philosophically is to nurture a sense of puzzlement, to encourage the search for clarification of meaning, to get them to realise the systematic nature of the confusion in the usage of key concepts, and to enable them to recognise the foundations of these misunderstandings in the traditional areas of philosophical enquiry. (Pring, 2008, p. 19)

These comments are a helpful indicator that philosophy is a highly apt subject for making pupils aware of not just puzzles but also of the profound unsolvable mysteries of human existence. The point of homing in on unsolvable mysteries is precisely because they can be overlooked or missed. There is of course an affinity between both Kant and Rahner over this concern. For Rahner it is couched in

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terms of the danger of not noticing the horizon or vorgriff auf esse. For Kant reason needs to be critiqued in order to be attentive to the self-destructive tendency within it. This is something which is often missed. Kant deliberately set his discussion of the antinomies within his broader discussion of the dialectic or illusion. Just as Rahner frequently noted, one often fails to notice the horizon that surrounds one, and the same is true of the unsolvable mysteries exemplified in the antinomies. Through the study of philosophy pupils would be taught how to identify different kinds of mysteries and be able to focus on unsolvable mysteries. In philosophy lessons pupils would be challenged to engage with the possible significance of these kinds of mysteries. As such the new subject of philosophy would play a practical role in ensuring that the Catholic school curriculum as a whole brings pupils to the threshold of theology.

Practical proposal 3 Up to this point the first two practical proposals for the curriculum in a Catholic school have been considered. Both are closely connected. It has been explained that the introduction of compulsory philosophy lessons is bound up with the difficulty of ensuring that pupils do recognize the presence of the unsolvable mysteries that are explicitly and implicitly present in the curriculum. This is where compulsory philosophy lessons would play a crucial role. These lessons would provide an ongoing way of ensuring that pupils learn to recognize the presence of unsolvable mysteries and question their significance. Attention now needs to shift onto a third practical implication for the curriculum in a Catholic school, namely a reappraisal of the nature and purpose of religious education. The practical implications for religious education are a consequence of both the move away from a confessional theory of Catholic education and the introduction of philosophy into the curriculum in a Catholic school. To begin with religious education, along with the whole curriculum, would need to be framed in non-confessional terms. This is because Rahner’s theology of mystery can be used to provide a theological justification for a non-confessional theory of Catholic education. In practical terms this would have implications for the content of religious education and for who ought to be allowed to teach this subject. It is helpful at this juncture to recall aspects of the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, in particular the analysis of the official Church teaching on education. It was pointed out that there is an evident tendency to give religious education a prominent place within the curriculum of a Catholic school. It

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is religious education, more than any other subject that supported parents in bringing up their children within the Catholic faith. The content of religious education is determined by the teachings within the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994) and those who teach it are expected to be living witnesses of the Catholic faith. Since the close of the Second Vatican Council (1965) the Congregation for Catholic Education has issued a number of documents that have considered staffing issue at Catholic schools. This has been to address the sharp decline in the numbers of religious orders who teach in Catholic schools generally and in particular who teach religious education (Grace, 2002). It has been typically assumed that religious education in Catholic schools is concerned with nurturing faith and thus that it ought to be taught by teachers who are practicing members of the Catholic Church. Against this context reframing religious education in Catholic schools in non-confessional terms would have far-reaching consequences. These can be described in both negative and positive terms. Obviously religious education would no longer be concerned with nurturing pupils in the Catholic faith. It would share, along with the rest of the curriculum, in the task of bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. This would involve some changes in determining the content of religious education. It would no longer need to deliver only the doctrines and rituals of the Catholic Church or the specific teachings of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994). Religious education in Catholic schools would be able to move away from an explicitly Catholic Christian focus to a broader account of religious education. This would involve the study of religion more generally, both in terms of world religions and an exploration of the significance of religion in human life. Similarly the question of who ought to teach religious education could shift away from ‘living witnesses’ and ‘practising Catholics’ onto teachers who were skilled at teaching this kind of religious education (i.e. able to make pupils aware of the connections between religion and unsolvable mysteries). In more positive terms religious education in Catholic schools would focus on the presence of mystery within both religions and human existence. Religions will be learnt about in terms of what they reveal about mystery and how humans have sought to respond to and make sense of it. This would be to develop a distinct approach to non-confessional religious education. Typically the latter is preoccupied with different religious doctrines and rituals. In a Catholic school it is mystery that would provide the lens through which religion and religious traditions are approached. Pupils could learn about and from the various ways in which religion engages with and strives to make sense of the mystery that permeates human existence.

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Reframing religious education in these non-confessional terms could appeal to a number of considerations that have been noted throughout the course of previous chapters. First, there are wider aspects of Rahner’s theology and methodology that are relevant here. Rahner gave a positive treatment of religion and world religions within his theological analysis. All religions are an expression of the various existentials of human existence and they reflect the ways in which humans have struggled to make sense of transcendence and mystery in life. A curriculum that is bringing pupils to the threshold of theology would want to make them aware of the ways in which various religions and the religious dimension of life are associated with mysteries. Also in terms of Rahner’s methodology and pastoral focus, the pupil at a Catholic school need to be brought to the threshold of theology rather than be nurtured in the Catholic faith. The latter would, in Rahnerian terms, involve jumping ahead to theology. Religious education, like the rest of the curriculum, would have the role of bringing pupils to the point where they are capable of accessing theology and the answers within it. This would be distinct from exclusively teaching the doctrines and rituals of the Catholic faith within religious education lessons. The move towards a non-confessional theory of Catholic education would call for a distinct approach to religious education. In making mystery the guiding principle to religious education Rahner’s theology of mystery, as well as his theology of world religions, would be a helpful resource. Second, there have been a number points at which attention has been given to a distinction between religious education and catechesis. For instance, in Chapter 2 it was noted that the document on the Religious Dimension of Education (1988) made a helpful distinction between the aims of catechesis and religious education. This was a way of distinguishing between the wider goal of religious upbringing and of the religious education that took place in the curriculum. Then in the discussion of Newman attention was given to his distinction between education and faith formation. He was adamant that an education at a Catholic university would make you a gentleman but not a Christian. For Newman any catechesis happened through informal parts of university education, such as in the residential experience and through participation in the services in the university church. This part of Newman’s analysis could be used to support the drawing of a distinction between religious education and catechesis. The latter is something that happens within informal educational settings. In contrast to this broader catechesis, religious education lessons could be described in non-confessional terms. A similar stance was identified in Chapter 4 while discussing Maritain. It was explained

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that Maritain took the concept of Catholic education idiosyncratically to refer to the additional activities that a Catholic school or college would provide to compliment the curriculum. Students would be offered a range of optional activities that included biblical studies, theology and liturgical celebrations. In terms of Maritain’s account, this non-confessional religious education could be distinguished from these optional and more confessional activities. In addition to reframing religious education in broadly non-confessional terms, the introduction of philosophy within the curriculum of the Catholic school would also have a number of practical implications. Both philosophy and religious education lessons would play complimentary roles in bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. There might be many instances where philosophy lessons would pick up the issues and mysteries dealt with in religious education. Similarly in religious education lessons students would be able to learn how religions give answers and responses that can make sense of unsolvable mysteries. In terms of the proportion of curriculum time given to both religious education and philosophy a case could be made for both to be given an equal weighting in order to reflect their complimentary relationship.

Conclusion This chapter has presented three practical strategies for ensuring that the curriculum in a Catholic school brings pupils to the threshold of theology. Although some indication has been given of the content of philosophy and the ways in which religious education would need to change there is of course a need for far more detail to be added to each of these strategies. This need will be addressed in a subsequent study. However, enough of the practical details have been provided to demonstrate that the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education can be given concrete expression. The implications for the curriculum have been identified and this serves to demonstrate that it is free from the deficiency of Catholic edu-babble. This chapter has argued that the theory of Catholic education that draws its inspiration from Rahner’s theology of mystery can be applied in practical terms to the curriculum. There has been no need to employ indeterminate slogans and the most significant curricular implications have been identified and spelt out. The practical strategies considered are built upon the theory of Catholic education that draws its inspiration from Rahner’s theology of mystery. The educator, given her aim of fostering reason would seek to educate pupils about

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the presence and significance of mystery across the curriculum. Through the curriculum as whole pupils would be brought to the threshold of theology, which is very different from having a confessional Catholic education. What this means in practical terms is that a pupil who attends a Catholic school would be challenged, through a curriculum that includes the study of philosophy, to recognize that the mystery in human existence might be theologically significant. This would be complimented through the study of non-confessional religious education in which pupils would be introduced to the ways in which the religious dimension of life expresses human attempts to grapple with the experience of mystery in life. This would have positive outcomes both in terms of bringing the pupil to the threshold of theology and, in a more general sense, in supporting his or her fundamental option.

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Introduction In this final chapter the attention needs to return to the Neurathian procedure adopted in Chapter 5. There it was proposed that Neurath’s metaphor of the ship was suggestive of a methodological framework that could guide the construction of a robust theory of Catholic education. This framework has informed and supported the argument developed throughout Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Principally this was achieved through identifying the three central deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education as it currently stands. These deficiencies brought into focus the planks within this theory that need to be either repaired or replaced. In terms of the Neurathian procedure, the deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education have to be repaired while keeping the project or tradition of Catholic education afloat and structurally intact. The arguments and analysis developed in the last three chapters have presented the way in which these repairs could, using the inspiration of Rahner, be made and justified without undermining the project of Catholic education. In this chapter the priority will be to evaluate and defend this way of repairing the three central deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education. This will be the focus in the first half of this chapter. It will be argued that this Rahnerian-inspired theory successfully repairs or replaces the deficient planks in it. In what follows large portions of the argument in this book as a whole will be reviewed. This will be continued in the second half of this chapter, when attention will return to the various external and internal threats identified in Chapter 1. It will be explained that many of these can be responded to. Finally it will be concluded by briefly identifying where further work or refinement of the theory of Catholic education is still needed.

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Repairing the deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education The three central deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education have crystallized throughout the critical analysis of the opening chapters. In the first chapter it was explained that a number of the external and internal threats were symptomatic of some common deficiencies. The analysis of official Church teaching on education and schooling in Chapter 2 brought into view a preference for justifying the Catholic Church’s right to be involved in education rather than exploring the relationship between theology and educational theory. There was a tendency to couch the aims and justification for Catholic education in vague slogans or indeterminate phrases, and through appeals to parental rights rather than developing sustained and theologically informed arguments. The first of these deficiencies was the problems caused by the prevalence of Catholic edu-babble, the second deficiency was the confessional interpretation of Catholic education and the third was the impoverished relationship between theology and education. The constructive analysis of Chapters 7, 8 and 9 has engaged with these deficiencies and repaired or replaced these planks within the theory of Catholic education. However, the quality of this repair work needs to be reviewed and evaluated, not least because these repairs have been made without the benefit of returning to dry-dock. In what follows the repairs made to each of the three deficiencies will be reviewed.

Repairs to deficiency one The first deficiency, the problem of Catholic edu-babble, was described as being endemic and as having a stifling effect on the development of a robust theory of Catholic education. The critical analysis of official Church teaching on education, as well as that of Newman and Maritain, drew attention to the prevalence of indeterminate, ambiguous and often theologically loaded slogans being used to describe and defend the theory of Catholic education and schooling. The way of overcoming this deficiency is to purge the theory of Catholic education of instances of Catholic edu-babble. In practice this involves unpacking any vague statements and using them as a spur or way of guiding a more detailed explanation of the theory of Catholic education. It also involves being able to specify their application in terms of curriculum aims and curriculum structure.

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Throughout the last three chapters a number of Rahner’s theological insights have been analysed, clarified and applied to the curriculum. This was done in order to minimize the risk of creating further instances of Catholic edu-babble. For example, Rahner’s theology draws attention to the significance and place of mystery in human existence. This theologically loaded claim was scrutinized through an analysis of the concept of mystery. This was done in order to go beyond Rahner’s willingness to affirm every example of a mystery as potentially theologically significant. A second instance was the claim that it is the curriculum as a whole that would bring pupils to the threshold of theology. The meaning of this claim was considered at a theoretical level in Chapters 7 and 8 and at the practical level in Chapter 9. This has helped to ensure that this claim cannot be regarded and dismissed as an ambiguous and vague slogan or one that is theologically loaded. There was a need to tighten up Rahner’s language and arguments because he is, as noted in Chapter 6, an unsystematic systematic theologian. The benefit of ironing out these issues with Rahner is that it has helped to avoid ambiguity and vagueness when using him to inspire the theory of Catholic education. In fact throughout Chapter 9 the focus was on explaining in concrete terms what it means for the curriculum to bring pupils to the threshold of theology. It was explained that it is through the presence of unsolvable mysteries in the curriculum that pupils could be brought to the threshold of theology. There would be some specific subjects and topics that the kinds of mysteries instanced in the antinomies would naturally crop up. There would also be a more general way in which every part of the curriculum would have a relationship with unsolvable mysteries. In Chapter 9 it was argued that in order to draw this out and to ensure pupils did not overlook or ignore such mysteries, a new subject ought to be introduced. This was a proposal to introduce philosophy into the curriculum. Again this proposal was not left at an indeterminate level, but rather the details about the aims and content were identified. The proposal to introduce philosophy into the curriculum as part-and-parcel of the theory of Catholic education had of course been made many decades before by Maritain. However he had failed, as it was noted in Chapter 4, to justify, other than in the most general ways, why it ought to be part of the curriculum for older students. In Chapter 9 there is a clear justification and explanation for why philosophy needs to be introduced for all pupils as part of their education at a Catholic school. This is because it would provide a practical way of ensuring that pupils do engage with the presence of mysteries which are unsolvable in principle. In effect this is an argument about why philosophy ought to be a

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compulsory part of the curriculum in Catholic schools. Moreover, it is a way of justifying the place of philosophy that is distinct from the typical ways that are used by advocates of philosophy in schools. Introducing philosophy also has a resonance with Newman’s arguments about philosophy playing a pivotal role in the enlargement of the mind. Throughout Chapter 9 the general claim that the curriculum could bring pupils to the threshold of theology was unpacked and given practical expression. Indeed the intention in this chapter was to demonstrate that the theory of Catholic education could be clarified and explained in practical ways without having to engage in Catholic edu-babble. This is something that the official Church teaching on education has repeatedly struggled to achieve. It is also something that Newman and Maritain found difficult. Given this, the theory of Catholic education developed here can be judged as having effectively avoided the deficiency of Catholic edu-babble.

Repairs to deficiency two It was proposed (in Chapter 5) that the way to repair the second deficiency was to reject the confessional account of Catholic education. This involved taking it to refer to a theory of education as a whole, rather than to be about the formation of pupils as Catholic Christians. To successfully repair the second deficiency it is necessary to be able to frame, understand and justify Catholic education in non-confessional terms. It was also proposed that it would add coherence and structural integrity if a substantial relationship between theology and education could be used to justify the rejection of the confessional interpretation of Catholic education. In many ways this is to combine the issues at stake in the second and third deficiencies. A substantial relationship between theology and education would be one that successfully rejects and avoids the minimalism or opportunism of the typical approaches to framing this relationship. Even a brief review of the analysis and argument developed in previous chapters will indicate that the second deficiency has been successfully repaired. The argument developed in Chapter 7 took its inspiration from Rahner’s theology of mystery, with its insistence that mystery permeates human existence. It was this theological insight, coupled with the anthropological turn, that made it possible to use Rahner in order to inspire the development of a nonconfessional theory of education. This theory of Catholic education recognizes

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the educational implications of the presence of unsolvable in principle mysteries for the development of reason. As part of rational development pupils would need to know about and appreciate the potential significance of unsolvable in principle mysteries. This is because some mysteries draw attention to limitations in the workings of reason. It is through the presence of these kinds of mysteries that pupils are brought to a point of threshold. A primary goal of Catholic education is to bring pupils to this point of threshold as part-and-parcel of rational development. There is within the curriculum what could be described as a philosophical movement that brings pupils not to theological beliefs but rather to theology’s threshold. Hence it is the whole curriculum that brings pupils to the point where they can begin to engage with or access theology and theological responses to the presence of mystery in human experience. What is significant about the curriculum in Catholic schools is how it challenges pupils in two ways. The first way is through ensuring that pupils do not simply ignore the presence of unsolvable in principle mysteries and the second is the challenge of giving serious consideration to the questions and issues that these mysteries raise. A Catholic education is one that would, through its commitment to rational development, be about bringing pupils to the point where theology can be approached and accessed not in terms of faith formation or as a characteristic of human experience, but as a set of responses and answers to the presence of unsolvable mystery in human life. This is a non-confessional way of depicting Catholic education. Perhaps more significantly it is one that seeks to emulate the theological arguments and methodology of Rahner. It is his theology of mystery that has provided the inspiration. Moreover, his theological method avoids the danger of making theology and philosophy simply synonymous. Rahner can be qualified and he can be interpreted as doing far more than naively asserting that every instance of mystery is somehow an experience of God. This is because Rahner does not turn philosophy into theology, not least because he embraced the anthropological turn. When applied to educational theory these theological insights are helpful in avoiding a number of dangers. The first is the temptation to treat all or most of the curriculum as an opportunity to engage in theology. The curriculum is not turned into theology or into opportunities for pupils to engage with theology or even theological mysteries. The second danger avoided is the temptation to attempt to make theology the most important part of the curriculum. It is the whole curriculum that would be involved in drawing attention to the presence and significance of certain kinds of mysteries. In a Catholic school pupils would be initiated into the curriculum as a totality in order to develop their rational

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ability. The curriculum would be approached in a way that resonates with Rahner’s philosophical movement. In the raising of questions, engaging with the transcendental existential, human beings live against a broader horizon of mystery. The curriculum would reflect the human ability to make sense of and gain a better grasp of the universe within which life is lived. Through the curriculum pupils would come to know and understand that when reason comes to an impasse, theological responses can become a viable way forward. At this point theology could be accessed and engaged with as a legitimate way of making sense of and explaining the presence of unsolvable mystery in human experience. It is important to recognize that the educator would have a responsibility to ensure that pupils do not ignore or fail to recognize what might be important for their rational development. This means that if unsolvable mysteries do raise issues that are important to the rational development of pupils, then there is here an argument for why pupils would need to engage in questions about the meaning and significance of the mysteries that they encounter in the curriculum. This means it would be the curriculum as a whole that would have a role to play in bringing pupils not to theology proper but to the point where theology could start to be properly accessed and engaged with. This is distinct from faith formation and catechesis, and at the same time it involves a commitment to rational development. The priority is rational development but this includes making pupils aware of the presence and significance of certain kinds of mysteries. As such this way of understanding the theory of Catholic education is one that successfully avoids the deficiency of the confessional account of Catholic education.

Repairs to deficiency three The third deficiency is about the impoverished relationship between theology and educational theory. The arguments developed throughout Chapters 7, 8 and 9 draw attention to how to establish and describe a substantial relationship between theology and the theory of Catholic education. It was explained that Rahner’s theological anthropology, theology of mystery, anthropological turn and theological method are being employed to guide and inform educational theory. It has been argued that Rahner inspires a theological justification for a non-confessional account of Catholic education. Rahner’s theological anthropology is grounded in the human experience of questioning and making

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sense of the world within which we exist. We live against a wider horizon, what Rahner described as the vorgriff auf esse, that we often fail to notice. This anthropology paves the way for arguing that in schools the curriculum has a role to play in ensuring that pupils do become aware of the wider horizon of human existence, in particular the puzzles of human existence and mysteries that are unsolvable in principle. It is this, rather than moving directly ahead to theological answers and responses, that would be the priority for education and schooling. To simply present the answers and responses of theology to pupils would be to go against both the anthropological turn and Rahner’s theological method. Pupils need to engage with the philosophical movement, as they are initiated into the curriculum, in order to be able to raise questions about the puzzles of human existence and the significance of unsolvable mysteries. In this way the curriculum would be helping pupils in terms of what Rahner described as the fundamental option. This is the basic orientation of a person’s life in terms of their openness (or not) to absolute mystery and God. Part of education and schooling would be to help pupils to become aware of the wider horizon of mystery in human existence rather than simply to leap ahead beyond the threshold and into theology. In this context any attempt to move directly into the answers of theology would have a stifling effect and could be regarded as indoctrination. Rahner points to the convergence between the philosophical and the theological movements. To merely present pupils with theological answers is to deprive them of the questioning and wider horizon of mystery that would make theology accessible and bring about genuine responses to the mysteries of life. Pupils have to come to the point of threshold first, before they are in a position to choose whether or not they want to enter. When viewed in these Rahnerian terms a confessional theory of Catholic education would bring with it a serious risk. This is the danger of ignoring or making superfluous the philosophical movement and illicitly rushing straight on to the answers of theology. Rahner’s theological anthropology could be used to reject a confessional account of Catholic education and schooling. Moreover, it could be used as a basis for arguing that Catholic education is incompatible with indoctrination. To jump ahead in order to grasp at or access the theological answers could not be justified on theological grounds. The argument developed in Chapters 6 and 7 has demonstrated some of the ways in which a Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education has successfully repaired both deficiencies two and three. The theory of Catholic education defended in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 is built around a substantive

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relationship between theology and education. As such it rejects both the minimalism and opportunism of the typical approaches to framing this relationship. This substantive relationship provides a theological justification for characterizing and understanding the theory of Catholic education in nonconfessional terms. Not only can the meaning of Catholic education be framed in non-confessional terms, the justifications for doing this are deeply theological. This was something that both Newman and Maritain failed to provide when they distinguished between catechesis and education. The ability to provide a theological justification for rejecting the confessional meaning of Catholic education is indicative of the state of the relationship between theology and education. The Rahner-inspired theory of Catholic education can be accurately understood and described as having a substantive relationship with theology. Up to this point it has been argued that a Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education is one that successfully avoids all three of the central deficiencies. It allows Catholic education to be understood in non-confessional terms and it does so on theological grounds. It is a theory of education that is informed and guided by a substantive relationship with theology. In addition it successfully avoids Catholic edu-babble and the stifling effects that stem from it. Moreover, the practical implications for the curriculum can be readily identified in terms of all subjects and religious education in particular. It also presents a theologically informed way of arguing for the introduction of philosophy into the curriculum. The result is that the project of Catholic education has been strengthened through being underpinned by a far more robust theory of education. There is a further way of illustrating the seaworthiness of the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education, and this is to use it to reconsider the external and internal threats that Catholic education currently faces. If the analysis and argument of this book are accepted, the theory of Catholic education will have been strengthened and it will have become more robust. In support of this it can be argued that a number of the threats identified in Chapter 1 could be reappraised and their challenge could be mitigated or diminished. In the next part of this final chapter attention will return to the various threats considered in the opening chapter.

A reappraisal of the external threats facing Catholic education This reappraisal of the various threats from Chapter 1 is not seeking to argue that all these challenges evaporate or lose their force in the light of the

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repaired theory of Catholic education. Many of these threats remain, however, a number of them can be successfully rebuffed and others can be considered as less threatening in the light of the repairs. Attention will begin with the five external threats. The first and second of these threats shared a broadly similar concern. One was the charge that Catholic education was a practical threat to social cohesion and the other was a more conceptual concern that it was an affront to the ideals of common schooling. Neither of these concerns have figured as part of the repair work, not least because the theory of Catholic education offers a justification for educating pupils along religious or theological grounds. Moreover, as a matter of contingent fact it would be expected that more Catholics would choose a Catholic school for their children and as such the concerns of social division would be perpetuated. However, some of the force of the first two external threats could be partially softened by working through the implications of it being a non-confessional theory of education. Catholic education would not have the aim of fostering the Catholic faith and along with it Catholic identity. It is a theory of education that is committed to fostering rational development and through this bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. This is a theory of education that can be offered to all pupils, regardless of whether they have been baptised as infants or not. As non-confessional, the repaired theory of Catholic education would not be about forming pupils in the Catholic faith. It is a theory of education and an account of schooling that is making a claim about how education as a whole (for all children) ought to be organized. This might be taken as weakening the concerns raised about the way in which Catholic schools threaten present and future social cohesion. Similarly, it could be argued that the repaired theory of Catholic education would be better at cohering with the ideals of common schooling and comprehensive education. This theory maintains that all pupils ought to be brought to the threshold of theology because this is part-and-parcel of rational development. All pupils, and not just Catholic ones, stand at risk of failing to notice what Rahner described as the vorgriff auf esse. The repaired theory of Catholic education would be offered to all pupils in a way that is reflective of the ideals of comprehensive schooling. For example, there is in other theories of education a failure to foster a sense of humility among pupils in terms of what is knowable. It can be reasonably argued that fostering this disposition is something that is beneficial to all pupils. A further example of the comprehensive ideal at work in this theory of Catholic education is the argument for introducing philosophy as a compulsory part of the curriculum. All pupils across all phases of schooling would need to have philosophy lessons. Other arguments for

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introducing philosophy into the curriculum have appealed to its usefulness in terms of study skills and critical thinking. There has also been a tendency to regard philosophy as a high status subject that is particularly apt for more-able pupils and for older students (White, 2012). In contrast the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education advocates the introduction of philosophy in a way that embodies the comprehensive ideal. These examples help to challenge the claim that Catholic education is inimical with or fundamentally at odds with the ideals of common schooling. It can be argued that this theory of Catholic education embodies key elements of the vision of the common school in that it can be offered to all pupils in nonconfessional terms. This is to reappraise the primary goal of Catholic education. It is not about serving the needs of the Catholic community but rather it is a theory and vision of education that is committed to rational development and bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. The theory of Catholic education, when understood in these terms, is able to function as a vehicle for the ideals of the common school. Thus even if the ideal type of school is the common school, it could be argued that the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education is compatible with this. However, this would involve using this theory to underpin all educational provision. While this is possible, it is more likely that only Catholic schools would embrace it. In this situation nothing has been done to alleviate the worry that faith schools divide and ghettoise communities. When it comes to the third external threat, relating to concerns over the evidence about the effectiveness of Catholic education, there is little, if anything, that the repaired theory of Catholic education can do to mitigate these concerns. In many respects they are entirely empirical and relate to the alleged ‘Catholic school effect’. As such this threat could be regarded as unaffected by any repairs to the theory of Catholic education and schooling. However, in terms of responding to the fourth external threat, the political challenges, the repaired theory of Catholic education can be judged as being more successful. The concern about ‘paying for Rome on the rates’ is one that begins to dissipate once it is grasped that Catholic education can be characterized as non-confessional. Thus the concern noted by Pring (2006) about all tax payers having to pay to nurture religious beliefs would become redundant. If Catholic schools are not about forming pupils into Catholics but rather about offering a non-confessional theory of education then they can more legitimately be funded through general taxation. Beyond worries over taxation there was a more fundamental concern about the way that the partnership between the Catholic Church and state funding of Catholic schools violated the requirements of state neutrality in matters of religion. It was

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noted in Chapter 1 that it could be argued that in the cause of fairness the state ought to show its neutrality by refusing to support any faith schools, including Catholic ones. This of course could be used as an argument against allowing Catholic schools to continue to be providers of state education in countries like the United Kingdom. However, if Catholic education is non-confessional, because it is not geared to the nurturing of faith but to bringing pupils to the threshold of theology, then this would be far more in accord with state neutrality. If Catholic schools implemented the curriculum described in Chapter 9 they would be providing the kind of education that is not incompatible with state neutrality. As such the state would be able to fund Catholic education without serious concern that it is going against the principles of a liberal democracy. It would be this rather than appeals to historical conventions or parental rights that would be able to justify the continued public funding of Catholic education and schooling. The final external threat, the indoctrination and autonomy challenge, raises serious question marks over the compatibility between Catholic education and the central aims of education. This philosophical threat raises a powerful objection to the moral legitimacy of Catholic education and schooling. This is because personal autonomy requires that children and young adults learn how to question and challenge traditional sources of knowledge and authority. Autonomy, as the gateway to a flourishing life, hinges both on what is taught and how it is taught. Many philosophers argue that Catholic education does not promote autonomy and that it has a tendency to seek to indoctrinate pupils. To be indoctrinated is normally taken to be the antithesis of being properly educated. Indoctrination involves acquiring beliefs in non-rational ways, whereas education involves acquiring them through rational ways. If Catholic schools, as faith schools, involve indoctrination then this amounts to a major philosophical objection to their existence. However, when these objections are reconsidered in the light of the repairs made to the theory of Catholic education, much of their force begins to evaporate. In a number of key respects the concerns over both hindering autonomy and indoctrination can be successfully rebuffed. To begin with the theological framework that underpins the repaired theory of Catholic education explicitly prohibits indoctrination. It has been explained that pupils are to be brought to the point of threshold, where theological answers and insights can be meaningfully accessed or grasped at. This is distinct from entering into theology and jumping ahead to present pupils with the prescribed answers of theology. Pupils have to learn how to recognise the wider horizon of mystery against which they exist. The goal of a

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Catholic education would be for pupils to be able to identify this and begin to engage with the kinds of questions that can lead to the threshold of theology. To seek to indoctrinate pupils would be to sabotage the convergence between the philosophical and theological movements that Rahner described and built into his method of theology. On these theological grounds indoctrination would be antithetical to Catholic education and schooling. Moreover in the kind of curriculum described in Chapter 9 there would be no opportunities for indoctrination to take place within a Catholic school. The presence of both nonconfessional religious education and compulsory philosophy lessons would be a practical expression of the way in which this Catholic education is committed to the kind of genuine education that is incompatible with indoctrination. If Catholic education is incompatible with indoctrination then the associated accusation that it is morally questionable also dissipates. It is important to emphasize that the theory of Catholic education would be committed to promoting the autonomy that philosophers of education typically advocate. This is because the primary goal of Catholic education would be achieved through fostering rational development. Pupils would have to learn about both the importance of reason and the limits of reason. Within this theory of Catholic education there is a commitment to rational development which would enable pupils to be able to use rational arguments and principles to weigh up choices and decisions, without being unduly influenced by external sources of authority or irrational considerations. In practice this is to foster personal autonomy. Thus the autonomy and indoctrination threat can be rejected as both non-applicable and irrelevant. Up to this point the five external threats to Catholic education and schooling have been reconsidered. It has been explained that the first three threats would remain, although two of these could be regarded as partially softened. However, when it comes to the fourth and fifth internal threat the repaired theory of Catholic education can be judged as successfully overcoming or dismissing them. Attention now needs to move onto the internal threats to Catholic education.

Reappraising the internal threats The analysis in Chapter 1 also identified three internal concerns and issues that were potentially threatening to Catholic education. Unlike the external threats, these three internal ones are more nebulous and reflect debates amongst

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Catholics about what the purpose and goals of Catholic education are and ought to be. Here it will be argued that the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education offers a way forward rather than formally resolving or eradicating these internal threats. This can be illustrated in terms of the first of these, the tensions caused by changes in the theology brought about by the Second Vatican Council. These tensions reflect the paradigm shift in ecclesiology that occurred in the events of Vatican II. The tensions here are an inevitable consequence of this change of paradigm. The first internal threat raises issues that go far beyond debates within Church politics between liberal and conservative approaches to pre-Vatican II and post-Vatican II theology. This is because this threat raises complex issues about Catholic identity and the ways in which a Catholic education might support and guide the development of this among pupils. As Chapter 1 explained, in the decades after Vatican II the issue of Catholic identity and the distinctive nature of Catholic schools became a cause for concern for the Catholic faith community. Works by Arthur (1995), McLaughlin (1996), Groome (1998), Conroy (1999), Sullivan (2001), Grace (2002), Hayes and Gearon (2002), Miller (2007), McKinney (2011) and McDonough (2012) among others, draw attention to concerns over what are or should be the distinctive characteristics of Catholic education and schooling. Many of these works point to the tangible signs of change and one of the most obvious was the marked decline in members of religious orders staffing and running Catholic schools. The first internal threat reflects the debate since Vatican II over what the distinctive characteristics of Catholic education and schooling ought to be. In terms of responding to this debate a Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education is able to offer a theory which fully embraces the paradigm shift inaugurated by Vatican II. To begin with, this book develops and defends a theory of Catholic education that has a substantive relationship with theology, and this would include the theology that underpinned Vatican II. As such it is potentially better placed to be aware of and in tune with developments and paradigm shifts in theology. Theology is being used to inform and guide educational theory and if there are significant theological developments, these could be incorporated into the way in which it guides and informs this theory. The theory of Catholic education can be positively framed in the terms of the paradigm shift in theology inaugurated at Vatican II. The argument developed from Chapters 5–9 provides an example of this. The preoccupation with external practice that gave way to a more fluid account of what it means to belong to the Church is present in the Rahnerianinspired theory of Catholic education. This is because a Catholic education is

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about bringing young people to the point of threshold rather than nurturing them into the Catholic faith and in this way fostering their Catholic identity. It is also a theory of education that is potentially open to all rather than being primarily aimed at just those who belong to the Catholic Church, or to the children of parents who belong to the Church. One of the advantages of drawing inspiration from Rahner is that he was one of the leading theological experts at Vatican II and his theology helped to bring about the changes that were ushered in at this council. Using him as a resource to develop the theory of Catholic education results in a theory that embraces and embodies the profound changes in theology and pastoral practice within the life of the Catholic Church. In practical terms the theory of Catholic education developed here moves the debate in the first internal threat onto a new footing, one that focuses on the curriculum of a Catholic school. In Chapter 9 the distinctive curriculum of a Catholic school was described. This stands in contrast with many of the commentators on Catholic education who have been preoccupied with the issue of staffing or the institutional identity of Catholic schools. Given the marked decline in members of religious orders involved in Catholic education, much attention has been given to how to ensure teachers have sufficient ‘spiritual (or Catholic) capital’ to be able to perform their role effectively (Grace, 2002). To focus instead on the curriculum is a way of moving the issue of distinctiveness of Catholic education forward. In terms of concerns about staffing Catholic schools, the repaired theory of Catholic education is suggestive of a different approach. There is no a priori reason why teachers at a Catholic school would need to be committed members of the Catholic Church. Instead this theory would demand that all teachers at a Catholic school should be able to play a proper part in bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. It would be the ability to deliver this kind of Catholic curriculum that would make Catholic schools distinctive. In Chapter 9 it was explained that this could even relate to teachers of religious education. Of course as a matter of contingent fact it might be that the vast majority of teachers in a Catholic school would be Catholic, but there would be no formal requirement for this to be the case. It can be maintained that the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education is able to take seriously the first internal threat and to provide a way forward in clarifying the distinctiveness of Catholic education. In terms of the second internal threat, about concerns over declining Catholic practice, the theory of Catholic education developed in preceding chapters would offer a number of insights. At the obvious level this theory does not even begin to suggest that it is able to eradicate this internal threat. Fundamentally

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this is because it is a non-confessional theory of Catholic education and as such it does not even attempt to nurture the faith and religious practice of pupils. Behind the second internal threat is the assumption that Catholic education is integrally bound up with promoting Catholic practice among pupils. This assumption involves taking the meaning of the phrase ‘Catholic education’ in catechetical terms. It has been explained that the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education would reject the assumption that underpins the second internal threat. Moreover, it would argue that it involves a misunderstanding about what the goal of Catholic education ought to be. The primary aim of a Catholic education is to bring pupils to the threshold of theology rather than to nurture faith and to foster Catholic practice. It was explained in Chapters 7 and 9 that as pupils engaged with the curriculum as a whole they would be brought to a point of threshold. At the same time this might lead to some, and in theory many, who choose not to cross over this threshold. In addition, others might cross the threshold in order to access or engage with theology and then subsequently go on to reject or dismiss it. As such it would not be a failure or a problem for this repaired theory of Catholic education if pupils went on to reject Catholic faith and practice. A primary goal of education is to bring pupils to the threshold of theology and to ensure that they are capable of accessing it. Thus, a successful outcome for an effective Catholic education might be that pupils, having reached the threshold, make a choice not to cross it or not to access the insights and answers of theology. In effect the second internal threat is not actually being resolved but rather rejected. To use the imagery of the Neurathian procedure, in replacing the confessional plank with a non-confessional one, the theory of Catholic education becomes uncoupled from questions and concerns about Catholic practice. Any questions about the relationship between Catholic practice and Catholic education can be side stepped or simply rejected as irrelevant. In the second half of this book it has been argued that Rahner’s theology provides the theological justification for this. It has also been explained that characterizing Catholic education in non-confessional terms can appeal to Newman and Maritain, as well as to certain parts of the official Church teaching on Catholic education. The third internal threat is about the uncertainty over the purpose of Catholic education. This concern draws attention to the anxiety over what is or ought to be the purpose of a Catholic education. The theory of Catholic education developed in this book is able to address this concern through making a theologically grounded argument that clarifies the purpose of Catholic education in non-confessional terms. It has been explained that the primary purpose of

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Catholic education is to bring pupils to the threshold of theology. In Chapter 9 the practical implications for the curriculum in Catholic schools are identified and clarified. Although this removes the uncertainty over the purpose it is much harder to eradicate the anxiety that is associated with pinning down what the ‘Catholicity’ of the theory of Catholic education involves. However, the anxiety can be alleviated by bringing into sharper focus the ways in which the Rahnerianinspired theory of Catholic education can be considered as a distinctively Catholic one. It is of course important to recall the differing senses in which ‘Catholic education’ can be taken. Both in Chapter 2 and in the discussion of deficiency two in Chapter 5 it was explained that this phrase can be taken in a number of different ways. A typical way of interpreting it is to take it as referring to the formation of someone into the Catholic faith or as catechesis. A second way is to take it as referring to a Catholic account of what education, taken as a whole, ought to involve. To repair the theory of Catholic education it has been argued that the first way of interpreting Catholic education needs to be rejected in favour of the second. Given this the Catholicity of the theory of education developed in the second half of this book does not depend on the extent to which it yields pupils who practise their Catholic faith into adult life. Instead it is Catholic in the sense that its aims are derived from theological reflection on the human situation. It has been explained, through appealing to Rahner, that Catholics recognize the significance of mystery in human life. Mystery is partand-parcel of the human condition. It is possible, as Rahner describes, to treat the everyday encounter with mystery as the starting points for both philosophy and theology. This is suggestive of how affirming the presence of mystery could lead pupils onto the threshold of theology. Obviously Catholic belief and theology does not have the monopoly on mystery in human existence. Affirming the presence of mystery in human life is not something that is uniquely Christian, or indeed religious in the broadest senses. Moreover the analysis of the antinomies in Chapter 8 makes it clear that affirming the presence of mystery in human existence is something that is deeply Kantian. Nevertheless, the presence and significance of mystery in human existence is a particularly salient feature of the Catholic tradition. When this insight is brought to bear on educational theory it results in one that will explicitly seek to make pupils aware of the presence and possible significance of mystery in human existence. This theory of Catholic education is one that stands in contrast to other theories of education precisely because it does recognize the mysterious aspect of the human condition. It is this that makes the theory of Catholic education distinctive. Affirming the presence of mystery in human

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existence is a central and authentic dimension of Catholic theology and belief. The theory of education developed above has described what the implications of affirming the presence of mystery inhuman life would be for the curriculum in a Catholic school. One of the benefits of this is the way in which it allows for a re-evaluation of those such as Arthur (1995) and Grace (2002) who are deeply concerned about the perilous state of Catholic education in countries such as the United Kingdom. For Arthur the tide is turning in the way that Catholic secondary education has moved away from transmitting Catholic religious and liturgical culture. Arthur pointed to a tension between the secular curriculum and the more holistic aims of Catholic education. The repaired theory of Catholic education offers a clear response to this kind of anxiety and concern. To begin with there would be no play-off between the secular curriculum and the wider aims of Catholic education. The curriculum as a whole has the role of bringing pupils to the threshold of theology rather than seeking to transmit Catholic religious and liturgical culture. Catholic schools are not about nurturing faith nor a Catholic identity. Rather through the distinctive curriculum that is underpinned by the repaired theory of Catholic education pupils are challenged to engage with the horizon of mystery. In broadly similar terms the concerns that Grace raised about the tortuous situation that Catholic head teachers find themselves in can also be given a clear response. The challenge for Catholic head teachers would be to implement the kind of curriculum described in Chapter 9. It would be a curriculum that prioritizes rational development and as such it reflects the typical academic curriculum. It is through the curriculum as a whole that pupils are brought to the threshold of theology and it is this which is the primary goal of Catholic education. There is here little real tension between the demands of a high-quality academic curriculum and the wider goal of Catholic education. This makes the concerns about compromises and accommodations less significant. Up to this point the three internal threats to Catholic education and schooling have been reconsidered. It has been explained that the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education is able to respond well to the first threat, about the shifts in theology and to the third one, about the anxiety over the purpose of Catholic education. In terms of addressing the second threat, about the decline in Catholic practice, it is able to offer a way forward despite not being able to resolve it. Thus the repaired theory of Catholic education is one that is robust enough to overcome or reframe many of the internal threats that were identified in Chapter 1.

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The future direction of the theory of Catholic education Thus it can be argued that in the Rahnerian-inspired theory of Catholic education the central deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education can be successfully repaired. To make these repairs theology has provided the inspiration and underpinning. Although attention has been given to the practical implications, in particular the curriculum in Catholic schools, there are inevitably some limitations and issues that would need to be picked up in subsequent studies. Before moving to the conclusion a number of these limitations and issues will now be briefly identified. The first of these concerns involves the need to take further the practical implications for the curriculum of Catholic schools. The practical issues dealt with in Chapter 9 were described in sufficient detail to illustrate how the theory of Catholic education could be purged of the Catholic edu-babble that so often stifles it. However, beyond this there is a need to take further the practical implications for the curriculum in a Catholic school. For instance, having identified the specific subjects in which the Kantian antinomies naturally crop up, there are practical pedagogical questions about how to teach this to pupils of different ages and abilities. Similarly the aims and rationale for the new subject of philosophy would need to be complemented with further detailed planning for the introduction of this subject. Introducing a new subject into the curriculum across all phases of schooling would require plenty of further more detailed practical planning. This would also be true of the developments needed for religious education. Much of the current programme of study would need to be replaced by new schemes of work that would focus on the way in which religions engage with the presence of mystery in life. Alongside the schemes of work for philosophy and religious education the supporting teaching and learning resources would need to be developed. Creating all of this would be both a time consuming and highly challenging task. Although this is not by any means a decisive limitation it is an important practical consideration. These practical issues would need to be addressed in subsequent studies. Beyond these and other practical considerations such as how in practice to foster the disposition of humility, there are some more general concerns about the other deficiencies within the theory of Catholic education. Up to this point the focus has been on the three central deficiencies that are most in need of repair, however, there are others which although not central

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remain problematic. These other deficiencies have fallen outside the scope of this book but in terms of further strengthening the theory of Catholic education they would need to be considered. An example of one of these other deficiencies is the preoccupation with parental rights that has deflected attention away from the curriculum and pedagogy that ought to be distinctive of a Catholic education. There is a need for further subsequent work that redirects attention away from parental rights and on to how theology could be used to guide and inform the pedagogy as well as the curriculum in Catholic schools. The metaphor of Neurath’s ship is a helpful reminder that the task of constructing a robust theory of Catholic education is an ongoing process. Repairing the central deficiencies has cleared the decks ready to work out where other repairs need to be made. Identifying and repairing other deficiencies would need to be addressed in subsequent studies on the theory of Catholic education. A third issue and possible limitation concerns the focus on Rahner. While he is a leading Catholic theologian, he is by no means the only one. Having demonstrated how Rahner could be brought into relationship with educational theory, there is scope for considering other theologians alongside him. Involving other theologians could potentially stimulate further repairs and improvements in the theory of Catholic education. Subsequent studies could usefully explore other eminent twentieth century theological voices, from Schillebeeckx to Ratzinger (Benedict XVI), which could be used to guide and inform the theory of Catholic education.

Concluding comments This chapter has argued that the deficiencies identified in Chapter 5 have been successfully repaired. The quality of these repairs is such that the deficiencies have been overcome and the result is a far more seaworthy or robust theory of Catholic education. Moreover the second half of this chapter has argued that a further indicator of its robustness comes from the way in which it is able to address and overcome a number of the internal and external threats currently facing Catholic education. The result is that the theory of Catholic education can be presented in more coherent and defendable terms. The attention has been on working out how far the use of the theology of Karl Rahner can be taken in guiding the construction of a robust theory of Catholic education. It has been

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argued that his theology provides the inspiration for a theological justification for developing a non-confessional account of Catholic education. The resulting theory of Catholic education is robust enough to both overcome the central deficiencies and respond to many of the external and internal threats which it currently faces.

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Conclusion

By way of conclusion attention will briefly return to providing an overview and summary of the argument of this book as a whole. This will be to draw attention to the interconnected stages in the preceding chapters. The focus has been on constructing a robust theory of Catholic education. It has been explained that this involves repairing three central deficiencies within this theory as it currently stands. These repairs have been guided and informed through bringing theology to bear on educational theory. The steps in the argument of this book have come in two stages. The first is a critical analysis of the theory of Catholic education. In the second stage the focus moved on to a constructive analysis that sought to demonstrate how the deficiencies could be successfully repaired. Beyond this twofold movement in the argument it is important to recognize the interconnections between each of the chapters, not least because this underpins and strengthens its cogency. The opening chapter set the context by focusing on a range of external and internal threats that currently face Catholic education. In doing this it challenges the assumption about the current seaworthiness of the theory of catholic education. The external threats range from concerns about the effectiveness of Catholic schools to ones about indoctrination and the way they inhibit autonomy. A number of internal threats were also presented, in particular concerns over the significant theological changes introduced at Vatican II and reservations over how Catholic schools foster Catholic identity. It was argued that these various threats converged over questions about the aims and purposes of Catholic education. Against this context the next three chapters maintained that the theory of Catholic education as it currently stands has some significant deficiencies. In Chapter 2 an analysis of the official Church teaching on Catholic education reveals the tendency to couch descriptions of the theory of Catholic education in indeterminate and often ambiguous terms. This chapter

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engaged in a review and analysis of official Church teaching on education, in particular Divini Illius Magistri, Gravissimum Educationis and the postconciliar documents issued by the Congregation for Catholic Education. This critical analysis cast light on the inability of official Church teachings to present a theologically informed and detailed defense of the theory of Catholic education. In Chapter 3 attention moved to Newman’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education. It was argued that Newman’s Idea of a University brings into focus the ambiguity in the concept of Christian education. Although Newman rejected the catechetical interpretation, because a university made you a gentleman and not a Christian, he failed to explore the relationship between theology and educational theory. He made no real attempt to justify a liberal education on theological grounds and given this it is possible to characterize Newman as foreshadowing some of Hirst’s arguments. Following this critical discussion of Newman, Chapter 4 considered Maritain’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education. He brought into focus the relationship between the theory of Catholic education and the kind of anthropology that Catholic theology could legitimately affirm. Maritain also extended the meaning of liberal education making it a feature of the kind of education that all students are entitled to. Like Newman, Maritain is suggestive of ways in which the theory of Catholic education can be coherently uncoupled from catechesis. In this both were recognizing some of the limits of what could be achieved through formal education. It was argued that Maritain’s contribution to the theory of Catholic education is not sufficiently developed and this raises the concern that he, like Newman, downplayed the relationship between theology and education. Maritain failed to provide a theological justification for the kind of liberal education that all students are entitled to receive. The critical analysis pursued throughout Chapters 2, 3 and 4 brought into focus concerns over the coherence and robustness of the theory of Catholic education. In Chapter 5 the argument moved on to considering ways in which this theory could be improved or repaired. This introduced methodological questions about how to go about constructing this kind of theory. It was explained that Neurath’s metaphor of the ship that needed to be repaired while still at sea is suggestive of a methodological framework. This general methodology reflects well the critical analysis of the opening chapters, in that it is not that the theory of Catholic education needs to be completely rebuilt. Rather there are some serious problems that need to be repaired. Catholic

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education is aptly characterized as an ongoing project or tradition and thus like a ship at sea it is not a question of returning to dry dock for a complete rebuild but instead it involves repairing the ship while it is on open waters. In Chapter 5 three central planks or deficiencies that need to be repaired were identified. In order to begin repairing them it was proposed that it is imperative to find a theological account that gives a positive explanation of the relationship between human experience, philosophy and theology while at the same time avoiding making them synonymous with each other. At this point the theology of Karl Rahner, a leading twentieth-century Catholic theologian, intuitively came to mind. Chapter 6 took up this intuition and presented an overview of Rahner’s theology of mystery. Particular attention was paid to the way in which he embraced the anthropological turn within theology. Rahner builds his theology around ‘anthropology’ rather than jumping ahead to strictly theological concerns. He points to a philosophical movement which is independent from theological claims and beliefs, that is able to lead onto a theological movement. Within human experience the philosophical movement draws attention to the bigger picture or horizon against which human life is lived. This is the horizon of mystery, the vorgriff auf esse. Chapter 7 launched into an analysis of the concept of mystery in order to bring it to bear on Rahner’s theology. It was explained that his looser argument needed to be qualified in terms of drawing attention not to all mysteries but to those of a certain kind. It was argued that this way of developing Rahner’s ideas allowed his theology of mystery to provide the theological inspiration for repairing the three deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education. It was explained that he could inspire a theological justification of a non-confessional account of Catholic education. This could be couched in ways that were free from the vagueness of Catholic edu-babble and could be given practical expression in the curriculum of Catholic schools. Before going on to identify how the Rahner inspired theory of Catholic education could be given practical expression Chapter 8 needed to consider the possibility of mysteries that were unsolvable in principle. This chapter took the Kantian antinomies as some of the clearest examples of these kinds of mysteries. It was explained that the antinomies brought into focus profound logical problems that resulted from the normal workings of reason. It was argued that Kant did not actually resolve the antinomies through transcendental idealism. Thus the mysteries in the antinomies remain unsolved and this can be taken as an indicator that they are unsolvable in principle. In providing a number of

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examples of these kind of mysteries the strategy of using Rahner to repair the deficiencies in the theory of Catholic education was strengthened. In Chapter 9 the focus shifted to the more practical issues connected with using Rahner to inform and guide the repairs to the theory of Catholic education. It was argued that there are three distinct yet closely connected implications for the curriculum in a Catholic school. The first is a recognition that there is a relationship between unsolvable mysteries and the curriculum as a whole. The second practical implication is the need to introduce philosophy into the curriculum. Philosophy is a particularly apt way of ensuring that pupils do engage with unsolvable mystery. In addition many teachers might lack the expertise and curriculum time to be able to make connections between what they teach and unsolvable mystery and the significance of this. As such introducing philosophy would overcome this problem. The third practical implication for the curriculum, closely connected with the first two, is a reconfigured account of religious education in Catholic schools. It would need to focus on the relationships between mystery and religion. As such it would be distinct from typical non-confessional approaches to religious education as well as from the doctrinal approaches currently being employed in Catholic schools. Chapter 9 argued that it is the whole of the curriculum that would be involved in bringing pupils to the threshold of theology. In Chapter 10 attention returned to the three central deficiencies facing Catholic education. The constructive analysis of Chapters 7, 8 and 9 was reviewed in order to demonstrate that the repairs can be successfully made and the theory of Catholic education can be judged as robust. In order to illustrate this, the second half of Chapter 10 returned to the various internal and external threats identified in Chapter 1. It was argued that the Rahnerianinspired theory of Catholic education is able to respond to and overcome a number of these threats. In particular the indoctrination and autonomy challenge can be dismissed and the internal debates about the purpose of a Catholic education can be clarified. Ultimately the argument developed throughout these chapters has challenged the assumption that Catholic education ought to be characterized in confessional terms. It has done this on theological grounds. Bringing theology to bear on educational theory produces some surprising fruits. One of these is a theological insistence that indoctrination is incompatible with the theory of Catholic education. Another is the stimulation of the development of a distinctive Catholic curriculum. It is this that would help to mark out Catholic schooling from the other kinds available for parents to choose from. A third

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surprising fruit is the need for educators to foster the disposition of humility in terms of what we know and what we can hope to know. This kind of humility is something that other theories of education tend to neglect or simply dismiss. The theory of Catholic education, when successfully repaired, is one that takes seriously the need to engage pupils with the significance of mystery in human existence and to help them foster the disposition of humility regarding what is known and knowable. Given that the theory of Catholic education is nonconfessional it is one that is open to all. In drawing attention to the place of mystery in human existence it offers a unique and much-needed theory of education.

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Index admission policies 9–10 aims of Catholic education 19, 23–4, 25, 29–31, 37, 43, 186, 191–2 Alberigo, G. 19 Allen, R. & Vignoles, A. 13, 14 antinomies of pure reason 134–53 Arthur, J. 7, 21, 23, 193 Aspin D. and Chapman J. 83–4 autonomy 1, 16–19, 67–9, 88, 187–8, 200

Halstead, M. 12 Hand, M. 17, 91, 94 Hirst, P. 16, 55, 60, 89–90, 92, 94 Hornsby-Smith, M. 22 humility 127, 169, 185, 194, 201

Burntwood, N. 9 Butler, R. 6, 10

Kant, I. 100, 134, 135–53, 158, 199 Ker, I. 47 Kilby, K. 100

catechesis 41–2, 54–5, 56, 71, 75, 87–91, 97, 155, 173, 180–2, 183, 191 Catholic edu-babble 43, 85–7, 96, 155, 174, 179–80 Catholic identity 14, 20, 21, 29, 185 The Catholic School 39, 40, 41, 86–7 common good 12, 35, 43, 69 common schooling 12–14, 186–7 confessional education 2, 38, 71, 115, 118, 180–2, 183, 191 Cooling, T. 90, 92 Cornwell, J. 46 cosmology 140–1 Dawkins, R. 18 Dei Filius 58 Dewey, J. 12, 13, 62 Divini Illius Magistri 28, 30–4, 39, 42, 44, 73 effectiveness of Catholic schools 7– 9, 13, 14–15, 186–7, 193–4 Elias, J. 6 Endean, P. 101 Gallagher, D. 62 Galston, W. 15, 16 Grace, G. 5, 6, 14, 15, 21, 23, 30, 88, 193 Gravisimum educationis 28, 34–9, 42, 44

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indoctrination 16–18, 183, 187–8 Judge, H. 8

Levinson, M. 13 McIntyre, A. 59 McLaughlin, T. 12, 43, 85, 87 Maritain, J. 1, 2, 61–78, 179, 184 methodology 80–2, 84 Morris, A. 7 mystery (meaning of) 118–20 mystery (types of) 121–3 Neurath, O. 2, 82–4 Newman, J. 1, 2, 45–60, 66, 92, 173, 180, 184 O’Shea, J. 136, 162 parental rights 16, 18, 31, 33, 36, 73, 195 Parker-Jenkins, M. 12 philosophy in schools 164–6 Pring, R. 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 167, 171, 186 Rahner, K. 95, 96, 99–120 The religious dimension of education 21, 39, 40, 43, 173 Religious Education 171–4 religious orders 21, 39, 189, 190

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216 Schagen & Schagen, 14 Schools achieving success (2001) 8 Seigal, H. 166, 168 social cohesion 11–12, 185 Sullivan, J. 40, 86 supernatural existential 103–4

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Index theology and education 80, 178, 182–4, 198 transcendental exitstential 104–7 Turner, F. 48 Vatican II 19–21, 28, 189–90 Vorgriff auf esse 107, 171, 183, 186, 199

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